Enduring Elements of Strategy for Irregular Warfare

Abstract

This work develops an improved understanding of irregular warfare by identifying its enduring elements of strategy. This has been done through an approach that combines hermeneutics and scientific empiricism. Selected examples and theories of â conventionalâ warfare have been examined through historical analysis and have been used to propose a common list of inputs to warfare. This framework of the inputs to warfare has been compared to selected examples of irregular warfare and it has been found that the framework explains the contributing factors for irregular warfare albeit with varying emphasis on the importance of particular inputs. The framework was then used to interpret selected theories of irregular warfare that have been developed in modern times since Callwell published his book Small Wars. The outstanding contribution of these theorists has been to emphasise the importance of gaining the population support in contesting irregular warfare. The framework of the inputs to warfare has then been used to gain a better understanding of irregular warfare and, from that understanding, to identify the elements of strategy for irregular warfare which have been consistently observed in the examples chosen previously. The framework of the inputs to warfare that was proposed was categorised as follows: 1. Military forces. 2. Non-Military Capability 3. Military Leadership 4. Political Leadership 5. Military Theory 6. â Unforeseenâ Events This framework was chosen to allow the closer examination of separate aspects of the conduct of warfare, in particular irregular warfare. The use of this framework allowed the identification of the following enduring elements of strategy for irregular warfare: 1. The details of each insurgency, for both sides, depend on the specific situation at the time. 2. Political, social and economic considerations are paramount. 3. Population support is vital. 4. Limited role for the military. 5. Adaptation is important. By understanding the enduring nature of the elements of strategy competing organisations in an irregular warfare campaign will be better placed to apply military force to the situation at hand. This will improve (but not guarantee) the chance of success in conducting irregular warfare.