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Abstract
Flying Squadrons are the very substance of an air force. By its nature, the air service is a highly technical one requiring both complex machinery and sound human judgement to function at its peak. The smallest independent unit of an air force is the squadron. Squadrons have a discrete status which makes them ideal candidates for in-depth study. This thesis examines the impact of technology and command on a single squadron's operations because technology and command have been and will remain pivotal in determining the success or failure of the air service. Although the Australian No 1 Squadron has existed almost continually from 1916 to the present, this thesis only examines a specific period of its life. The period 1916-1958 was chosen since the squadron formed as an independent Australian Flying Corps unit in January 1916, served in both World Wars and the Malayan Emergency, returning to Australia to resume domestic operations and training in 1958. Of significance to the work, during the specified period, the Squadron was controlled by both the Army and Air Force, by both the British and Australian Governments, had successes and failures and was an operational and a training unit. The Squadron has thus mirrored the growth and changes experienced by the developing Air Force as a whole. The main purpose of examining such a squadron is that it provides an insight into the development and thinking of the RAAF and highlights pitfalls evidenced in technological and command problems which still plague military staff today. In examining the operations and operational effectiveness of No 1 Squadron, three determinants have been specifically examined: technology, that is the aircraft flown, the commanding officer's personality and his methods and the organisational structure under which the Unit operated. Naturally, all three matured as doctrine, knowledge and experience also matured. The Thesis concludes that when the Squadron is winning, it is generally technology that creates the relative advantage and when loosing, strong leadership in the form of command must come to the fore. The results obtained support the thesis in keeping with contemporary RAAF doctrine, that technology and command strongly impact squadron operations and hence, operational effectiveness.