Churchill and the Phoney War: A Study in Folly and Frustration

Abstract

The Phoney War is a comparatively neglected period in studies of Churchill and war. Yet, this was a time of an extraordinary transformation in Churchill’s fortunes: he returned from almost a decade in the political wilderness to take an active role in the strategic direction of the war and he then went on to become Prime Minister.

This study reassesses the nature and significance of Churchill’s contribution to Britain’s war effort during the Phoney War. The issues and events considered are those Churchill believed important and upon which he spent much time and energy but, nevertheless, they are matters that have been inadequately explored, are misunderstood, or remain controversial in the scholarship. There is little here of the public Churchill of the evocative speeches and ‘bull dog’ persona. This is a study of the Churchill the public did not see, the man of the Admiralty war rooms and of staff meetings, of the War Cabinet and its committees, all places in which he developed his priorities for victory.

This thesis is in two parts. The first deals with Churchill as First Lord and focuses on his supervision of the anti-U-boat war; his attempts to develop a naval offensive and his view of appropriate naval strategy; and his contribution to the building of the navy he considered necessary to fight his war. The second part addresses Churchill and the wider war; his attempt to animate Britain’s war effort with the government; his pursuit of a more aggressive prosecution of the war; and his contribution to the disastrous Norwegian Campaign of April/May, 1940.

The principal conclusion of this thesis is that, for Churchill, the Phoney War was a period of folly and frustration, a time during which he failed in many areas to show himself either a warrior of superior qualities or a potential war leader. His folly was to be found in flawed assumptions, excessive self-confidence, dubious strategy and a penchant for risk; his frustration was driven by the strictures of government, the limitations of the Allied military position and the unique circumstances of the times, but it was also very much a product of his own faults and short-comings.