Abstract
One of the most remarked on, and perplexing, aspects of beliefs is their resistance to change as
discussed by researchers such as Frijda, Mesquita, Manstead and Bern, amongst others. This is
especially the case for false beliefs. The thesis examines the many influences on belief formation
in general, but with a special interest in false beliefs. While the basic definition of belief used is
partly derived from philosophical literature, including Clifford, Russell, Goldman, Garfield, and
Morton, it is shaped by an interdisciplinary approach to understanding belief formation and
resistance to change, predominantly involving cognitive psychology, neuroscience and social
psychology. An extensive review of literature on heuristics and biases-particularly the work of
Tversky and Kahneman, and Gilovich and Griffin- reveals effects on perceptions that affect
beliefs, and leads to a similar review of the interactions of emotions and feelings with beliefs. The
'feelings-as-evidence' hypothesis proposed by Clore and Gasper emerges as having significant
explanatory power with respect to feelings contributing to establishing and maintaining beliefs.
To further understand possible mechanisms at play, Antonio Damasio's definitions of emotion
and feeling, and his somatic marker hypothesis, are proffered as a solid foundation for examining
how emotion and feelings interact with the numerous influences on beliefs and how they
contribute to feelings being such a dominant source of 'evidence' used by people in a lay
context to establish that, for them, a belief is true. On the basis of this foundation and literature
on levels of consciousness (e.g. Damasio, 201 0; Gallagher, 2000; Northoff et al., 2006;
Panksepp, 2005, 2012; Panksepp and Northoff, 2009), the thesis develops the proposal that
emotions and feelings act through a lens of self-enhancement and self-protection processes to
support beliefs that protect a person's neural construct of their 'self' with feelings being the key
perceptual indicator of whether a belief serves the self-construct or not. If a belief, whether true
or false, is experienced as serving the interests of the 'self', then it is likely to be highly resistant
to change.