China’s South China Sea Policy after 2007

Abstract

China’s approach towards territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) has, since 2007, become increasingly assertive. Beijing has used a variety of foreign policy instruments, namely diplomatic, administrative, economic, and military tools, to enforce its sovereignty claim and actual control over the SCS at the expense of other stakeholders. Nevertheless, Beijing in this period used a ‘salami slicing’ strategy, gradually gaining control of the region instead of launching armed attacks to gain its objectives as it did twice in 1974 and 1988. This thesis attempts to answer the research question: “Why has China’s policy towards the territorial disputes in the SCS in the period after 2007 been assertive?” The central argument of this research is that the evolution of domestic and international factors in recent years has led to China’s SCS policy becoming relatively assertive. Variables favouring an escalatory approach include: the increasing symbolic and material values of the SCS in China, Beijing’s newly acquired capabilities to enforce its claim and control in the SCS, and China’s low power concentration concerning the management of the SCS. On the other hand, determinants leading to Beijing’s cooperative approach include: China’s need of regional peace and stability for its uttermost goal of development, the existence of regional and international political and legal regimes, the complex engagement of Southeast Asian claimants, and the involvement of the US as a balancer. There is no obvious evidence shown in this thesis to determine whether internal or external elements play the most decisive role in the making of China’s SCS policy. However, Beijing’s assertive approach could be seen as a negotiated outcome of the interaction between such elements. The international community, including Southeast Asian states and the US, must continue a fine balance between providing incentives for China to enjoy its course of peaceful development and, at the same time, ensuring that China does not have any window of opportunity to undertake any aggressive move in the SCS.