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Abstract
There is a growing view in the historiography of Australia s war in Vietnam that 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF) succeeded in defeating the Communist insurgency within Phuoc Tuy, the province in which the Task Force was based, by time it withdrew from Vietnam at the end of 1971. This belief comes against a backdrop of a historiography of pacification that is dominated by works looking to win doctrinal battles within the US military. By examining the conduct of pacification in Phuoc Tuy between 1966 and 1972, this thesis challenges both these perspectives. A detailed case study of a single province puts both the operations of 1ATF in a wider context, and allows pacification to be examined on its own terms rather than through the prism of contemporary counterinsurgency. By focusing on a single province, this thesis is also able to examine the political, economic and military aspects of pacification and how they influenced one another, rather than focusing on a single program or aspect. By taking this view, this thesis is able to examine how successful pacification was in Phuoc Tuy. Despite a flawed conception and frequent mismanagement, pacification did begin to change Phuoc Tuy s political and economic structure and succeeded in eroding the power of the Communist insurgency. Yet ultimately pacification could not overcome the weaknesses inherent in the South Vietnamese government. Equally while 1ATF achieved some success in operations in Phuoc Tuy, it did not have the ability to solve the political problems underpinning the insurgency. Although it was weakened, the Communist insurgency survived. Pacification did not succeed in Phuoc Tuy.