Abstract
This thesis aims to examine the decision-making process of China's maritime security policy. In particular, it addresses the question of what factors have led to the inconsistent nature of China's maritime security policy, a phenomenon as yet little examined. In contrast to existing studies regarding China's maritime power which have implied that there is a clear driver dominating China's maritime security policy, this thesis highlights inter-agency competition in the policy process. It argues that due to the fragmentation of its decision-making authority, China does not have a clear driving force dominating the making of its maritime security policy. Instead, its policy is influenced and shaped by various loosely coordinated actors in the policy process and is a product of extensive bureaucratic bargaining. Consequently, even though Beijing has an overarching policy guideline to build the country into a maritime power (haiyang qiangguo), relevant decisions on specific maritime security issues are made disjointedly and slowly, which contributes to the inconsistent nature of its maritime security policy.
The theoretical foundation of this thesis is the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) model which is one of the most important analytical frameworks for the study of Chinese politics and decision-making process. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: Beijing's policy on the East China Sea dispute, its policy on the South China Sea dispute, the Chinese aircraft carrier program and China's counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. They help explain the roles played by policy actors in the decision-making process of China's maritime security policy when the country confronts various security challenges.
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis to explain the inconsistent nature of China's maritime security policy and, on a broader level, offers new thoughts for the future study in relation to China's foreign and security policy. In addition, it extends the FA framework by dividing policy actors into two groups, primary and marginal, according to the weight of their influences on policy outcomes.