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Abstract
In the historiography of the Gallipoli Campaign, the August Offensive the largest
and last major effort to break the deadlock and defeat the Ottoman Empire at Gallipoli
is invariably portrayed as a near miss , or near success . Victory was assured, the
story goes, if only the Allies had pushed a little harder, or had been the recipients of
some simple good luck. This view of history is problematic. Apart from glossing over
the fact that the August Offensive was an utter failure, it has prevented, largely
through the enduring strength of the Anzac myth, an objective analysis of the
offensive. This thesis aims to address this historical imbalance by re-examining the
operational capabilities of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), and indeed,
the true potential for success in a prolonged offensive operation at Gallipoli in 1915.
In this sense, the August Offensive must be viewed within the wider context
of Allied operations during the First World War. Despite its differences in location,
scale, and enemy, the war fought at Gallipoli was very similar to that fought on the
Western Front. In 1915, both the MEF at Gallipoli and the British Expeditionary
Force on the Western Front were trying to adapt to a new form of warfare one
where static defence had replaced the manoeuvre and offensive warfare that formed
pre-war British doctrine. The August Offensive, like the battles at Neuve Chapelle
and Loos, was another example of this adjustment. All three aimed for too much, and
all three failed. By focusing on the operational level of war, and examining aspects
such as planning, command, mobility, fire-support, inter-service co-operation, and
logistics, this thesis contends that the August Offensive was not a near success , or,
indeed, even a viable operation. It never approached success, nor could it.