Fallibilism and scepticism

Abstract

When I say that my belief that p is fallible or fallibly justified, do I mean to say only that my belief or my justification is uncertain, or do I mean to say more than this? This question is useful for navigating the literature on fallibilism in contemporary epistemology. Most epistemologists agree that certainty is a rare commodity, and that we are error-prone in some sense. They also agree that neither of these things is incompatible with knowledge. But there exists no consensus amongst epistemologists regarding what we mean, or ought to mean, when we describe ourselves as fallible. This dissertation considers some of the myriad things that are, or may be, at stake here. I begin by defending an uncertainty account of fallibility. I then propose an answer to the question: is fallible knowledge possible? This question invites us to consider the reasons for thinking that the concept of knowledge is incompatible with fallibility. For example, what link is there (if any) between the motivations for infallibilism and internalism? How we answer these questions, I contend, depends upon our attitude towards epistemic circularity. I will argue, in effect, that there is no middle path between the traditional Scylla of dogmatism and Charybdis of scepticism. My argument for this is ultimately based on the intuitive incompatibility of knowledge and epistemic circularity. I formulate and defend this argument. Along the way I also weigh the merits of other arguments against different types of fallibilism.