Abstract
The liberalisation of domestic telecommunication (telecom) markets has become a
worldwide trend. As a result, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
evolving from deliberations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has been
heralded as the mechanism with which to effect telecom liberalisation domestically. For
countries in Africa, the GATS instruments have been translated as a means to establish
the principles required for an effective telecom industry supported by key institutions in
policy, regulation and implementation. However, the analysis of relevant literature on
telecom in Africa has tended to focus on technological developments based on current
observable outcomes. This methodology is inadequate because it fails to account for the
context-specific nature of the policy arena and framework shaping telecom outcomes.
I argue that we must consider telecom outcomes by understanding the nature of political
institutions domestically and their interaction with the international arena. To explicate
this intersection of ideas, I draw on two seemingly independent theories, Neopatrimonialism
and New Institutional Economics (NIE) with reference to the works of
van de Walle (2001) and North (1990) respectively, to shed light on the nature of the
Kenyan political context and the value of the GATS as an instrument that facilitates
credibility and reduces opportunistic ex-post behaviour. It is contended in this study, that
for the Kenyan Government, the value of the GATS accession lies in the legitimising role
that it facilitates in accessing funds from the international community. This study thus
highlights the inevitable tension that arises when domestic policy-reform goals are
juxtaposed with international trade obligations undertaken through treaty accession and
informed by a liberalisation agenda.
A qualitative approach was used to collect the data and involved interviews and
documentary analysis. The findings suggest that Kenya is partially in compliance with its
GATS telecom commitments. However, this partial reform results from patrimonial
tendencies in Kenya and is exacerbated by the need to attract hard currency through aid
packages that dictate the nature of the policy process and the relationship between Kenya
and the international community.
In conclusion, even with policy reforms, state agents always find ways to maintain or
create clientelist practises. Unless such reform is accompanied by political changes that
provide checks and balances on institutions and state agents, reform policies on their own
will not create an effective telecom sector. To truly evaluate telecom reform therefore, we
must appreciate the context-specific nature of policy making.