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Abstract
The problem of intentionality is the problem of how some entities can be ‘about’ something. That is, sentences, thoughts, or symbols, among other things, display intentionality in that they are about something else; they are said to be a representation of something. This problem is usually framed in terms of the notion of meaning or content. What is the status of the meaning of a sentence over and above its formal and syntactic aspects? Within a scientific framework, what makes it the case that the word ‘teaspoon’ or the sentence ‘There is a flower in my coffee mug’ mean what they do? Is the meaning of an uttered word only dependent upon mind-internal properties? Or must we make use of mind-external factors such as the context of the utterance or the speaker’s social history in order to determine the meaning of an uttered word? Those who argue that the scientifically relevant (and tractable) properties that are involved in semantics are overwhelmingly, though not entirely, within the mind are referred to as Chomskyan internalists. On the other hand, externalists argue that there is something more to semantics than merely mind-internal events and their happenstance connection to the world: externalists insist that the meanings of our words (or sentences, or the contents of our thoughts, etc.) depend on some deep metaphysical (perhaps causal) connection between the mind and other worldly objects that are independent of the mind. Moreover, externalists insist that the truth or falsity of the meanings of our words must be an integral and explanatory part of a theory of semantics. In what follows I will examine the heated debate between externalists and Chomskyan internalists in regard to the correct way to construct a scientific theory of language, with particular emphasis on a scientific theory of semantics.