The Commander’s Eyes and Ears: Australian Army Combat Intelligence in the Cold War (1945-75)

Abstract

Between 1945 and 1975, the Australian Army was committed to various operations ranging from supporting war crimes trials, occupation duties in Japan, and WWI-like warfare in Korea to counterinsurgency deployments in Malaya, Borneo, and South Vietnam. While official historians, respected academics, and popular authors cover these operations well, the role of the army’s combat intelligence during this period has been seriously neglected. Consequently, the paucity of serious research on the army’s intelligence during the Cold War means that numerous gaps remain in our understanding of how it operated and supported force commanders on operations. This thesis corrects this deficiency by defining and evaluating the Australian Army’s combat intelligence contribution during the Cold War in the 1945-75 period. Using official archival records and new individual evidence from veterans, much of which had not been publicly available before, and some that were not accessible by the official historians, it explores the organisation, administration, training, doctrine, and effectiveness of army combat intelligence operations. It also examines their ability to adapt to the changes in warfare and technology after the Second World War. Several myths, criticisms, and misremembered ‘facts’ that have grown around the Australian Army’s intelligence operations in the post-war period are explored, and the record corrected regarding several inaccuracies in our official history. While small compared to the US or the British Army’s contribution of battlefield intelligence resources during the Cold War, the Australian Army’s support was both meaningful and significant. It was meaningful because it helped establish the post-war Australian Intelligence Corps' professional foundation and was significant as it provided essential support to Australian and allied commanders on operations in Japan, Korea, Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam.