Sussing out the vibe: Federal property acquisition and the search for a principled approach to the scope of the ‘just terms’ proviso in s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution

Abstract

In relation to the case law dealing with the scope of s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution (‘the Proviso’) it has been suggested that no coherent line of principle emerges, that one meets undisclosed processes of reasoning and that, as a consequence, the Proviso’s operation is unpredictable. This dissertation gives an account and critique of the increasing incoherence of s 51(xxxi) jurisprudence and the High Court’s failure to articulate the constitutional values the Proviso serves to protect. A comprehensive account is given of the Proviso’s inherent interpretive challenges and the various approaches the High Court has adopted to tackle them. The thesis considers in detail the Proviso’s complex interrelationships with other constitutional powers and limitations. It is argued that understanding these interrelationships is a necessary pre-requisite to understanding the problems the Proviso throws up and the formulation of possible solutions. In this context, it considers whether the Proviso’s protective scope can be coherently described as a function of whether or not a given acquisition operates arbitrarily or breaches various tenets of the rule of law. Are decisions dealing with the Proviso’s scope explicable on the basis that the Proviso operates to proscribe legislation which offends such principles as non-retrospectivity, generality and the separation of powers - at least in the property domain? Four cases dealing with the application of the Proviso to what might be called ‘retrospective interests,’ that is, interests arising by way of the retrospective operation of judicial decisions are analysed in detail. It is argued that by excising these types of cases from the mainstream of s 51(xxxi) jurisprudence an opportunity to clarify other areas of doctrine and reconcile other decisions opens up. Finally, various accounts of the Proviso’s purpose or function are evaluated. The thesis concludes that, while various rule of law principles provide a useful guide to understanding the High Court’s decisions in many instances, there exist a number of hard limits on reconciling existing case law and that it is easy to overstate the degree of coherence to be found within it.