

Time and transcendence: The corporeal conditions of time and social synchronisation

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
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TIME AND TRANSCENDENCE

The corporeal conditions of time and social synchronisation



Will Johncock

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Will Johncock

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy



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Introduction

Body *and* Time (Space *and* Time)

Time is everywhere, yet it eludes us. It is so deeply implicated in our existences that it is almost invisible.

— Barbara Adam, *Time and Social Theory* (1990:9)

Why shouldn't I kill time? Time will eventually kill me.

— Michael Flaherty, *The Textures of Time* (2011:134)

Objectivity, space and transcendence

Humans are bodied. Bodies change. Is such bodily change an unavoidable ramification, and corporeal representation, of the relentless power of time? If we believe that no human can escape time, and that time marks our inevitable/eventual transition to death, does this reflect that time is a pre-existing, objective mechanism into which humans are born, simply to live for a finite period under its jurisdiction? This sense of time emerges in writing this thesis. One is allocated a period to complete such an undertaking, engendering the impression of a race against an opponent. This speaks to our concern that time is “against us,” restricting our everyday endeavours, from career development to family commitments to catching the bus. Time looms large, yet there is rarely enough of it.

Functional social systems are seemingly conditioned by something objectively regular about time, which is utilised in order to arrange and synchronise subjects and practices into dependable schedules. Once there is agreement about the representation of time on clocks and calendars, time's presumed objectivity and regularity will dictate consensus as to when any subsequent time will arrive (even if there is disagreement concerning which clocks – and indeed which calendars – represent time “exactly”). That is, if a social system has agreed upon a particular representation of time which uses seconds, minutes and hours, subjects using

synchronised clocks within this system will agree about when it is 9:00 in the morning, and also about when 9:01 in the morning has subsequently arrived. Within any representational system, this regularity with which subsequent times occur seems to suggest something singular about time that is outside human interference. Time itself is presumed to sit behind the clocked and calendared representations it conditions, its inaccessibility to any human marking its objectivity for humans collectively.

There are no representations of time more ubiquitous than international time zones, which function as measures of a singular, globally objective time-source to which the world collectively abides. This ensures global, human synchronisation, whereby as social time theorist Barbara Adam observes, “our social action can be internationally coordinated through a standardised network of time that spans the globe” (1995:21). Because of this global standardisation, “one hour of clock time is one hour wherever we are” (24). To reiterate, one hour of clock time is considered to have global consistency because of the assumption of an underlying, singular, objective temporality which conditions its representation(s).

These opening observations have introduced the first of three concepts which will feature prominently in our considerations; *objectivity*. We will soon address two other key concepts; *space*, and *transcendence*. Let us now though define the first. The term “objective” will be employed in this thesis to describe what *inescapably applies to all, incorporating, but never trumped by, what is individual or particular*. Analogically, this is a common interpretation of law, which is arguably objective if it applies to entire populations by regulating and integrating all individual behaviour. The everyday assumption of time’s objectivity assumes that differing individual impressions of time are simply warped, subjective, contingent experiences of a singular, objective phenomenon, whose source or origin permanently pre-exists individual and social idiosyncrasies.

This thesis will interrogate this assumption that the source of time is objectively separate and pre-exists spatialities such as embodied humans who are simply born into a time in which they live for a duration/period. If you believe you are beyond the pervasive influence of this sense of time’s inescapable objectivity, consider the following, typical morning scenario. Your alarm sounds at 7 o’clock, reminding you that your attendance is required at a meeting at 9 o’clock. However, you are still tired. Do you:

- (i) control time's rhythm to slow it down, allowing you to continue sleeping without being late?
- (ii) suppose that time's rhythm is random, whereby even if you rise for, prepare for, and travel to, work, as per any other day, time might unexpectedly advance, rendering you late anyway?
- (iii) presume that time's rhythm is consistent and persistent, whereby if you sleep longer than normal, the agreed upon social representation of this time will ensure that you will be late?

The third outcome seems most plausible. If everyone could control time individually, as per the first outcome, there would be little of the social synchronisation which does occur. Equally, in terms of the second outcome, if the rhythm of time was random, then societies would not have the temporal reliability required to function. Conversely, an assumption of time's consistency, beyond individual control or interference, seemingly acknowledges an external, objective source. This seems to be the time of which human, social representations take advantage in order to regulate and synchronise activities. Or in other words, the natural phenomenon, time, is separate from the social construction and representation of it.

However, whereas the first and third options offer absolute positions (either time controls us, or, we control time), the second option is more ambiguous. Whilst we might not agree with its extreme demand that the rhythm of time is "random," we could instead ask; what of the notion that the rhythm of time often *seems* variable? A tedious day doing unenjoyable work can seem to pass slowly, whereas an evening with friends appears to pass more quickly. Are these merely individualistic, idiosyncratic, *misrepresentations* of time (the aforementioned "warped, contingent" experiences)? Or do they indicate that time is not as objectively distinct from "human interference" as initially supposed?

This is one of many curiosities which contribute to my suspicion that time's source does not simply externally pre-exist a human realm of social arrangements and physical processes. If the source of time does not transcend the physical, human realm however, then where is it? As the introductory citation from Barbara Adam observes, time is often characterised in terms of invisibility. Space is visibly identifiable, as the substance of the universe. Conversely, time is everywhere but nowhere. This prompts the related query that if time is ethereal and transcendent,

how does it function in a tangible, spatial realm? How could something supposedly not spatial affect something that is spatial?

This recurring discussion of *space* and *transcendence* demands their definitions, complementing that earlier provided for *objectivity*. “Space” will refer to *worldly physicality/tangibility/substantiality/sensibility*. To introductorily frame an understanding of what such “worldly space” will imply in this thesis, let us briefly compare this definition to the conception of space provided by eighteenth century philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804). For Kant, space is primarily a transcendent, cognitive frame which arranges and systematises representations of objects imported by the sensory apparatus. Rather than extensively engaging Kant’s thesis of pure reason, I simply raise his conception of space in order to better situate that of this impending inquiry. For Kant, before worldly experience, space is already *a priori* intuition of the mind, anterior to, and transcendent from, spatial objects which are indebted to it for their manifestation. “Objects must conform to our cognition,” explains Kant, we have “an *a priori* cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us” (1999[1781]:110). Conversely, our inquiries will not begin from a separate, organising, transcendent structure for space.

This marks an opportune point at which to clarify that the term “transcendent” in this thesis will refer to *exteriority, as something hierarchised over or outside something else*. In this regard *The Collins Dictionary* defines “transcend” as what is “above or beyond,” “exceeding or surpassing” (1982:1256).¹ Interestingly for our spatial, and thus *material*, concerns, the dictionary concludes this definition of “transcendent” by describing that which is “free from the limitations inherent in *matter*” (1256; my emphasis). I intend to guide us on an exploration of the assumption that the source of time transcends what is spatial/material.

Even if, at this introductory stage, the time-space relation is unclear, let us acknowledge that humans comprehend corporeal/spatial transition in terms of time. What will emerge in this thesis is an interrogation of what conditions the possibility of time as transition and change. Is the changing body simply an exemplar of time, the source of which is external to the body? In short, our focus will be upon what conditions the conditions of time.

¹ In the aforementioned Kantian terms, transcendence marks what is beyond or before worldly experience, as per the *a priori* structures of reason posited in *Critique of Pure Reason* (1999[1781]).

Time limit(s)

In comprehending this ontological morphogenesis of time, what emerges is a series of breaks, of endings and beginnings. These endings and beginnings limit time. Considerations of the limits of time prompt queries into whether there are separate “parts” of time, correlative to the apparent separation of space into distinct bodies. For example, are there separate instants of time – t_d t_e t_f – which line up like human bodies in a queue? If times are indeed separate, how do they flow in the orderly fashion that many physicists refer to as a linear continuum of instants?² Perhaps such instants are not completely separate, whereby the temporal flow of the three aforementioned instants should actually be described as $t_{...d+e}$ t_{d+e+f} $t_{e+f+...}$? If this is so, there will be ramifications for the human body, and for the social body. If states of time are co-implicated, then distinguishing the “before body” from the “after body” becomes less straightforward. At what point, at what limit, is a human body or social body distinguishable from its previous or subsequent incarnations?

What is introduced here is the notion that time is the limiting condition of phenomena *and* of itself. In this regard, Ovid’s renowned characterisation of the “great devourer Time” (2003[8 A.C.E.]:126) must be appreciated in cannibalistic terms. Time, in regulating spatial, worldly disappearance/appearance, seemingly disappears/appears itself, as a perpetually fleeting, intangible transformer of tangible matter. A time whose source is outside the physical realm is only witnessed via tangible/physical change, just as the wind is only visible via changes such as the rustling of leaves. This characterises time as stealthy, the aforementioned everywhere and yet nowhere, whereas space appears to be physically accountable. My curiosity as to how something supposedly ethereal could participate in something tangible informs the key question of this thesis. In exploring whether time is actually spatial (physical/tangible/substantial/sensible), the question at stake will be *whether the human body, which is spatial, is not merely an exemplar of time, but is something through which time is produced.*

Why have time *and* space been conceptually polarised from each other at a constitutive, ontological level? Furthermore, how is it that despite this conceptual polarisation, there is the presumption of a cohesive interplay between the two, which produces the transitional/changing

² In *A World of Chance* (1936), philosopher Edward Spaulding notes that “time, as ‘conceived of’ by Classical Mechanics (Newton) is an unlimited linear continuum of instants” (150).

spatial realm? This is illustrated in practices defined as body modifying, where skin and flesh, as with the visibly rustling leaves of time's aforementioned gust, embody corporeality and temporality. During the first three chapters of this project, we will regularly explore the participatory potential that body modification processes present in corporeal-temporal production. The presumption that time is an impartial, ethereal frame of reference, which contextualises from without the spatial processes of physical reality (such as the body-as-space), will duly be questioned.

The social, corporeal sites of interrogation

In considering whether time is produced through spatialities such as the human body (which would acknowledge time's spatial ontology and conditions), two sites of interrogation assume special relevance:

- i) Human corporeality, via which each human experiences:
 - a. space, as one's embodied/spatial aspect of a spatial realm, and;
 - b. time, via bodily transition.
- ii) The social, the arena of human, corporeal, spatial-temporal production.

These sites, which regurgitate the division between time *and* space in the form of context *and* matter, culture *and* nature, can be interrogated through the manner that their relations produce socialised, temporalised corporealities. Body modification practices, including tattooing, dieting, body piercing, tanning and plastic surgery, seemingly produce “before bodies” and “after bodies.” Such practices, emerging from social contexts, contribute to the production of changing bodies-as-spaces. In remembering the aforementioned *limit*, it can be argued that such social contexts only manifest due to the norms, meanings and interactions which mark the end of one social eruption, and the beginning of another. Yet there is an implication between social contexts that also confounds any simple sense of separateness.

Consequently, it must be asked whether a socially contextualised human body, consistently identifiable despite the apparent limits which distinguish particular social contexts/bodies, is bound up in the co-implicated production between social bodies. When

considering such production, the distinction of individual bodies from social bodies, and of individual time from social time, blurs. Furthermore, if the human body is interpreted as being a natural phenomenon, and yet also as being implicated in social-cultural production, what becomes questionable is the distinction between natural time and social time. This complicated tension between the individual, the social, and the temporality/continuity of each, will have ramifications for the notion that the source of time simply pre-exists each and every body-as-space that is “born into time.”

Where we are heading

These interrogations of the time|space polarisation will serve the fundamental question of this thesis, which asks whether the human body-as-space is not merely an exemplar of time, but is implicated in the production of time. The conditions of time will duly be examined, as will their supposed separation from the conditions of space. This project is thus distinguishable from philosophies in which space is polarised from time. Furthermore, the originality of such an argument for the social sciences is characterised by its differentiation from accounts exclusively concerned with the organisation, or experience, of time. As we will see, in such cases social scientists might assume a pre-existing source of time, anterior to the social management or subjective experience of it.

I am not contesting the pragmatic worth of such inquiries. The conventional understanding is that time is not really the form in which it is constructed by humans, but rather is a worldly phenomenon which humans simply represent, measure and spatially manage. Socially constructed time, and indeed the human construction of any worldly phenomenon, is presumed to be contingently, humanly, socially variable, rather than the inherent phenomenon itself. However, by exploring in this thesis whether what is inherent about time *is* that it is produced through spatialities including humans, and by also noting that humans are social, what emerges as requiring interrogation is the supposed exclusion of the social construction of time from the phenomenon of time itself. If it is possible that time really is, inherently, a human phenomenon (because it is a spatial phenomenon), it will have to be considered whether the frame of social constructionism can be kept intact. I am therefore positioning the following

argument as a socially scientific exploration into the *ontology of time*.³ This differentiation will be explained during the first two chapters, in which its developing argument will be compared to those of renowned “social time” theorists.

Attending to this issue flags an opportunity to briefly discuss the methodology of such research. Part I of this thesis can be considered sociologically structuralist, particularly given its primary engagement with the sociology of Émile Durkheim. This informs an exploration into the relations of subjectivity to objectivity, of the individual to the social, and of the ramifications for social time and synchronisation. Here we will also consider points of divergence, addressing why certain, prominent, contemporary social theorists of time are either not the focus, or are those against whom the argument of this thesis will be contrasted.

As we progress into Part II and beyond, this problematisation of the subject|object distinction will demand a post-structuralist, and then a phenomenological, method of inquiry. It will be necessary to distinguish why the interrogation of the structuralist method offered by someone like Jacques Derrida is more relevant than other, seemingly similar, thinkers. Indeed, as we enter the phenomenological phase of this project, the importance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work in comparison to some historically significant, phenomenological informants will equally be clarified. Merleau-Ponty’s attention to what is phenomenologically primordial in terms of subjectivity, objectivity and time also characterises the method via which Henri Bergson’s assertion that the conditions of space and time are incompatible will be approached in Part III.

Whether or not what this is articulating could strictly be considered a methodology is admissible only if it is acknowledged that structuralist sociology, post-structuralism and phenomenology *are* methodologies, rather than simply disciplines in which texts are published. In engaging each, a methodology will emerge as a sociologically (post-)structuralist, phenomenological interrogation of subjectivity, sociality, corporeality and temporality. As will become evident, these structuralist and phenomenological methodologies demand that the notion of a starting or originary “point,” which can be outlined now prior to undertaking it, is problematic.

Instead, the methodology (re-)emerges with/as the unfolding argument, marking one of the virtues of maintaining a primary engagement with a different thinker at each stage of this thesis. Contrarily, a separate, anticipatory and retrospective description of what methodologically

³ This project is therefore relevant to sociology, philosophy, and the philosophy of social science.

will occur, or has occurred, as though frozen in time, would contradict the impending considerations of how time manifests structurally and phenomenologically. Nevertheless, I understand the reassurance that a map of an impending argument can provide to a reader, and as such, I can outline its three parts:

Part I: From the “what” to the “who” of time (Chapters 1 & 2) – Explores the source of the temporality of objective social rhythms (objectivity being crucial for social function and synchronisation). The relation between human subjects, and these collective social temporalities, is examined extensively through the context of body modification practices, questioning whether what is collectively social pre-exists individual subjects.

Part II: From the “who” to the “how” of time (Chapters 3 & 4) – A post-structural, and phenomenological, interrogation of the timing of subjectivity as developed in *Part I*, exploring whether sociality comprises the structural production of anything, including all spatialities, not simply embodied humans.

Part III: The monism of time (Chapter 5) – In considering whether the incarnation of spatial subjectivity is a collective, social, structural ontology, the potentially monist character of space, and time, is compared to the supposition that the conditions of time and space are polarised.

Our opening discussion concerned the relation of bodily/corporeal/spatial change to time. Interrogating the time|space polarisation considers whether when one talks of what is corporeal/spatial, time/temporality is necessarily being discussed. This project, in asking whether the human body produces time, anticipates a shift in the emphasis of questions concerning time, from those which ponder the “what” of time, to considerations of time’s “who” and “how.” Such a development will require a transition from the assumption of a transcendent and ethereal conditioner of social time agreement (synchronisation), to an appreciation of a production which is spatially immanent. I duly now ask; in this realm, in which embodied humans are immanent, to what or to whom do we attribute time’s production?

I

From the “what” to the “who” of time

1.

Objective Time

Transcending the human subject?

We accept clock time, even though such time is a social construct. As an objective fact of daily life it provides a commonly held standard, outside of any one person's influence, to which we turn again and again to organise our lives.

— David Harvey, *Between Space and Time* (1990:418)

All things arranged temporally are taken from social life.

— Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1995[1912]:10)

The “objectivity” objective

The central question under consideration, which asks whether the human body is something through which time is produced, rather than merely something which exemplifies time, will explore the conceptual polarisation of the spatial/physical/tangible/sensible realm from the supposed intangibility of time. Rudimentarily, an embodied experience *with* time can be acknowledged in corporeal/spatial transition. The inescapability of this experience with time is an *objective* reality for all humans. The notion of time's objective qualities must be addressed. Time's objectivity seems to condition the social function which occurs via collective synchronisation. Our introductory definition of “objective” applies here, as something which inescapably applies to all. It is in this context that we will explore whether an objective source of temporality, outside the interference of any individual, conditions social synchronisation. This everyday assumption informs the citation from David Harvey which opens this chapter, whereby time's apparent regularity becomes a social utility, represented by clocks and calendars upon

which the social agrees, and to which the social abides. Social theorist David Gross describes this social agreement as requiring “a particular temporality to be widely accepted and internalised by a population at large” (1985:54). As already considered however, does this mean that the source of what is objective about time pre-exists, and duly conditions, the social arrangements of the human, physical realm from without?

The contentious nature of separating the source of objective time from human subjects will emerge in chapters one and two, as we work through sociological and philosophical accounts which demarcate time’s source from corporeal, spatial being. The notion of time’s anterior objectivity will come under particular scrutiny when engaging the physics of Isaac Newton, in which objective time transcends the spatial realm. Whilst this divorces the source of time from humans, Newton’s conception can explain social synchronisation if humans abide by the same representation of a time-source which conditions such representations objectively and uniformly precisely because it is separate from human interference.

This supposition that the source of objective time transcends, and is simply used by, the human, social realm will be interrogated via sociologist Émile Durkheim’s thesis of collective rhythms. In exploring whether humans are implicated in such a source, care will be exercised not to reduce individual timing to the idiosyncratic desires of each subject, which would contradict the objectivity that seemingly explains social function and synchronisation. Firstly then, let us clarify social science’s typical conception of the relation between society and time.

The role of social time

The sociology of Georg Simmel (1858 – 1918) is relevant to this introductory discussion, due to Simmel’s interest in the impact on the subject of the de-personifying structures via which city societies synchronise. In *The Metropolis and Modern Life* (1997[1903]), Simmel explores whether the individual can “preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces” (174-175). One such social force is the common, imposed time by which everyone abides in order to socially function. Life within this new, thriving metropolitan environment demands considerable coordination, given the central role of the metropolis as the “seat of the money economy” (176). The city can only manage this

responsibility by arranging its subjects objectively. This objectivity reflects the quantifying character of money, reducing all “individuality to the question: How much?” (176).

The social relationships and business affairs of the metropolis are complex, direct bartering and domestic production having been replaced with the anonymity of an intricate, market-based system. Metropolitan life duly integrates all activities into a reliable and impersonal time schedule to which everyone conforms. Simmel here employs the common interpretation of time as an objective mechanism from which the idiosyncrasies of individuals are excluded, observing “a firmly fixed framework of time which transcends all subjective elements” (1971[1903]:328). Subjects adhere to such objectivity in order that the particularities of their lives cohere with the social collective. This maintains social function, for “without the strictest punctuality in promises and services the whole structure would break down” (1997:177).

The French sociologist, Henri Lefebvre, later criticises this abstracting effect of centralised, modern time. With the advent of modernity, Lefebvre believes “time has vanished from social space” (1999[1974]:95). Lefebvre attributes the disappearance of time to its clocked representation, whereby time is “recorded solely on measuring-instruments, on clocks, that are isolated and functionally specialised” (95). This reading of time’s abstraction resonates with my curiosity regarding the conceptual distinction of intangible time from tangible space. Time’s supposed ethereality conditions its disappearance, where if time is not represented, it seems “no longer visible to us” (95).

Lefebvre echoes Simmel’s time-commercial equation in describing modernity’s expulsion of time from a socially *spatial* realm (“space is social morphology...[of the]...living organism” (94)), to a socially *financial* arena. By identifying capitalism’s absorption of what is socially spatial (95), time is disassociated from embodied human processes, instead becoming an abstract financial object. Commercial time is bought and sold just like any “thing,” whereby if time is money, “it disappears after the fashion of an object” (96).

Such accounts inform certain characteristics of the enquiries into time by the social sciences, in which the focus is the management, or the experience, of time. In this guise, an already existing source of time is presumed, a natural, worldly phenomenon anterior to the social abstraction/organisation,¹ or the subject’s experience, of it. By interrogating this supposed

¹ For one such sociologically influential example, see Eviatar Zerubavel’s *The Seven Day Circle: The History and Meaning of the Week* (1989).

separation, which also exemplifies the supposition of a conceptual division between nature and culture, I am conversely concerned with the ontology of time's source and production. Barbara Adam is aware of such a distinction, stating in *Time and Social Theory* (1990):

To study the experience of duration, the estimation of an interval, people's orientation within horizons, or the timing, sequencing, and coordinating of behaviour, is to *define time* as duration, interval, passage, horizon, sequencing, and timing...time does not "emerge" from these studies, but is pre-defined in the very aspects that are being studied (94).

Adam's demand is that the social sciences should acknowledge that humans do not merely experience time, but are also involved in the production of time. Nevertheless, what is at stake in Adam's argument, and that of my inquiries, diverges in terms of conceptions of "production." Adam attributes human time-reckoning capacities as "members of Western industrial societies" to where "*we create time* as a resource, as a tool, and as an abstract exchange value" (161). Adam's notion of "production" is therefore characterised by utilisation. If we create time as a "resource" or a "tool," time manifests as a socially meaningful or manipulable abstraction of an otherwise worldly, natural phenomenon, thus reinvoking the assumption of a culture|nature division. Conversely, in this thesis we will not simply consider time as it is socially practiced, the "what" of its incarnation, but rather will interrogate the "how" of time. How does time incarnate?

The strength of Adam's sociology is its critical analysis of social time's apparent givenness, exemplified in the hope that "time will lose some of its taken-for-granted status in social theory" (68). I unconditionally endorse this desire. Adam's commentary illuminates every aspect of social life, providing a comprehensive default reference for any researcher of social time. In *Timewatch* (1995), Adam states that human social behaviour does not simply arrange time, but in some way constitutes time. One such observation notes that "human social life...constitutes time, entails time and is enacted in time: it creates a new past and a new future" (39). However, whilst Adam's inquiry is focused on critiquing what sociology has taken for granted, it is not extended to developing a socio-onto-logical model of time's source/production. This is not a criticism, but instead an indication of how Adam's concerns are distinguishable from that of this thesis. I intend to explore *and* construct this model of time's source.

This point also distinguishes the direction of my research from the slightly more contemporary accounts of time provided in the renowned social science of Michael Flaherty. Flaherty generally explores the subject's *experience* of time. This is declared in *A Watched Pot: How We Experience Time* (1999) as a response to the "tendency for sociological students of temporality to gloss over the basic fact that what feels like minutes for one person may feel like hours for another" (5). By interviewing subjects in different social arenas, what emerges is that the experience of time is not universally identical. Consequently, "in particular circumstances, it *feels like* much less time has elapsed than has actually been measured by the clock or calendar" (104; my emphasis).

Analyses such as Flaherty's presume the existence of an anterior, objective time-source which grounds the differing experiences/impressions of it. Conversely, in asking in this thesis whether time is produced through spatialities such as the human-as-body, we will be interrogating the conception of a pre-existing source of time which conditions contingent, separate experiences of it. Philosopher Gail Weiss expresses similar reservations about subscribing to a model which conceptually separates the source of time from human experiences of that time. As Weiss emphasises, "surely it is overly simplistic to say that time, as measured by calendars, watches, sundials, and the movement of planets and stars, is "out there" while our temporal experience is within us" (1999:112). Terminology such as "feels like" and "seems" is peppered throughout Flaherty's work, as sensations separate from the actual duration that is measured by clocks and calendars (Flaherty 1999:29, 34, 37, 59, 64, 94, 104). As with my commentary on Adam, this is not a criticism of Flaherty's sociology. Rather, this flags the differentiation of Flaherty's research intentions. We will later return to the social intersection of time-experience and subjectivity in Flaherty's work. Indeed, in exploring whether what is inherent about time is that it is produced through spatialities such as humans, who are social beings, the notion that the time humans experience *is* a social construction should not be excluded. What will require scrutiny though is the interpretation that any human, social construction (which as a human construction is a spatial construction), is *separate from* the actual, worldly phenomenon.

Such differing research intentions are eloquently described by Austrian social scientist, Alfred Schütz, whose phenomenological focus asks; "is social science concerned with the *very being* of man or only with his different modes of social behaviour?" (1967[1932]:3; my

emphasis). My focus is on that “very being.” The different modes of social behaviour are not necessarily opposed to such an inquiry however. Indeed, I believe such modes can leverage insights into the “very being” of Being. In considering the focus in this thesis on the participatory role of the human body-as-space in the being of Being, body modification practices will initially provide one such insight. An inquiry such as this, which is interrogating the characterisation of time’s source as spatially transcendent, is exploring how trans-historical texts speak to, and through, each other. In this regard, body modification is one such potentially immanent text. We will now familiarise ourselves with this context.

What is body modification?

Body modification practices are typically categorised as ways in which an individual plays an agentive role in the changes to their corporeality. Sociologist Mike Featherstone succinctly defines what could be included under the conceptual umbrella of body modification as “practices which include piercing, tattooing, branding, cutting, binding and inserting implants to alter the appearance and form of the body” as well as “bodybuilding, anorexia and fasting” (2000:1). Bodies are assumed to change “naturally” when something like the gradual wrinkling of the skin is perceived to represent the prolonged, inevitable temporality of ageing. There is a different appreciation of the change from pre-tattooed to tattooed skin however, where the limit(s) of corporeal time become dramatically, suddenly conspicuous.

The voluntary modification of the body is not a new phenomenon, nor is it the exclusive domain of any particular class, race or other demographic. The anthropological research of Gloria Brame, William Brame and Jon Jacobs notes in this regard that “historically, travellers’ tales and the works of anthropologists have shown that body modification is virtually universal” (1993:298). Whilst it is not in the scope of this chapter to provide an historical account of body modification practices, it is worth observing the varying appreciations of body modifications that permeate different cultures, times and societies. Tattooing, one of the most ancient and widely undertaken forms of body modification, provides such an illustration.² Archaeological findings indicate that tattooing was commonly practiced during the Stone Age. Sociologists Clinton

² Countless researchers identify tattooing, and body piercing, as the oldest recorded forms of body modification, one example being Bonnie Graves in *Tattooing and Body Piercing: Perspectives on Physical Health* (2000).

Sanders and Angus Vail note that “carved figures from European sites dated 6,000 years B.C., and Egyptian figurines created some 2,000 years later, show facial and body markings thought to represent tattoos” (2008:9).

Tattooing in ancient Egypt is believed to have been restricted to women, particularly dancers and priestesses.³ Conversely, there is evidence in other cultures of tattooing being used to indelibly mark, identify and marginalise social deviants. In sixth-century Japan for example, criminals and social outcasts were tattooed on the face or arms as a form of public identification and punishment (Richie and Buruma 1980:12-13). This contrasts with the high status attributed to the moko tattoos on the lip and chin areas of Maori women, and to the extensive geometric facial and body tattoos of Maori men. These designs are so indicative of the individual’s social role, that “following contact with Europeans, they [the tattoos] were often used by members of the nobility as signatures on legal documents” (Sanders & Vail 2008:10).

Body modification practices thus take on different characters depending on the context/culture in which they are undertaken. In a current, Western regard, forms of body modification that are more socially accepted typically include processes correlating beauty with youth. Gloria Brame duly observes that “Euro-American culture has esteemed modifications that reverse or stall the effects of aging” (1993:301). Here we see how cosmetic surgeries which remove wrinkles become normative and acceptable. Featherstone insightfully articulates this correlation in terms of a connection between consumer culture and cosmetic surgeries. By purchasing what one anticipates will be a better body image, one perceives themselves as “freed from the visible signs of ageing and culturally inappropriate blemishes” (2010:205). Sociologist Victoria Pitts-Taylor’s⁴ *In The Flesh* (2003), a text to which we will again refer, further illuminates this discussion concerning the cultural conventions of body norms in noting that such surgeries are “not only acceptable, but almost expected of people of a certain gender and class status” (2003:35). Consequently, when Featherstone astutely observes that some cosmetic surgery is undertaken with the purpose of creating an aesthetic which is actually *not* normal, but rather mimics that of stars and celebrities (2010:204), it is still apparent that such aesthetics are culturally and normatively driven for certain demographics.

³ An account of this regulation is found in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt: P-Z, volume 3* (2001).

⁴ “Victoria Pitts” at the time of publication.

Certain modifications though, such as scarification and branding, are commonly criticised. Scarification involves professionally applied knife cuts to produce scarring, whereas branding burns patterns into the skin. These practices are often seen as self-mutilating rather than self-beautifying, to the extent of being, as Pitts-Taylor's research reveals, "linked to anorexia, bulimia, and what has been called 'delicate self-harm syndrome'" (2003:25). Both are often aligned with body piercing and tattooing,⁵ as affronts to the aforementioned, contemporary, Western beauty norms. Pitts-Taylor agrees, declaring that, "piercing, branding, scarification, heavy tattooing, and the like challenge conventional beauty ideals, often resulting in shocked condemnation" (15).

A different appreciation of scarification pervades certain African contexts however, where it has been traditionally, symbolically employed. Women of the Sudanese Nuba tribe receive cuts that mark their physiological maturation, in that, as anthropologist Robert Brain notes, cuts are made at puberty, at the onset of menstruation, and after the woman's first child (1979:70-73). Once scarification has commenced, one's membership to a particular tribe is symbolised, as is their passage into adulthood. One must be cut to belong. This contrasts with the institutionalised critiques of the same practice in a contemporary, Western context, which portray the body modifier as socially distanced. Sanders and Vail's research notes this typical characterisation of scarification in North America, the media positioning the practice as "a body alteration eminently suited for symbolising disaffection from mainstream values" (2008:8).

Such sociological fluidity between individual practice and social appreciation illustrates that the body is not something which identically transcends even relatively modern eras, but manifests temporally/contextually. This plasticity of corporeal composition problematises the notion of an inherent "corporeal truth," positing the idealised body in mythological terms, as an unrealisable model against which subsequent earthly variations are compared. *The Collins Dictionary* defines myth as "a story about superhuman beings of an earlier age, usually of how *natural phenomena*, social customs, etc., *came into existence*" (1982:751; my emphasis). The body is a particular aspect of these natural phenomena, a specific part of the spatial realm, which in "coming into existence" is interpreted as arriving *subsequently* in an already existing time. This is the accepted frame of reference we will be interrogating, which supposes that the source

⁵ For a recent example, see pages 68-70 of *An Introduction to New Media and Cybercultures* (2010), in which cultural studies researcher Pramod Nayar categorises all such practices as "procedures of aestheticisation."

of time pre-exists, and is separate from, spatial things. Mythological and theological suppositions concerning time and change inform this conceptual polarisation and thus require discussion.

Mythology, theology, time and change

A concern regarding the change exhibited by the spatial universe can be identified in the earliest recorded fragments of Western thought. Ancient Greek philosophers wonder how a thing can remain the “same thing” whilst becoming different.⁶ According to the British philosopher Bertrand Russell, such curiosity is not simply an inquiry into the nature of change, but rather reflects the human desire for stability. Russell notes that “the search for something permanent is one of the deepest of the instincts leading to philosophy” (1961:63). Bruno Latour, the French anthropologist, similarly recognises stability’s prioritisation. In *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993), Latour proffers stability as one of two variables which connect Nature and Society. In this sense, the more stable something is, the more identifiable it is to an inquirer.

What is interesting about these observations is that, in identifying change, the human is understood to be searching for something which transcends, and inherently conditions, such change. This theme will resurface throughout this chapter, as we observe social conceptions of the human body, and the consequent reactions to practices which modify it. Here the body is posited as the ground upon which corporeal time emerges, via modifications as markers of change. As we will see, these markers are often criticised for being distanced from the supposed, inherent truth of the body, defined against, as Pitts-Taylor states, “implicit assumptions about the body as naturally pristine and unmarked” (2003:75).

Time is intrinsic to ancient Greek conceptions of change, which therefore provide a relevant conceptual frame for this current stage of discussion. Philip Turetzky’s philosophy observes that “even the most sophisticated of Greek thinkers always treated problems about time as subsidiary aspects of problems about change” (1998:5). Such an appreciation of time operates in the myth of Kronos, the Titan God of Time and the Ages, described in mid-sixth century B.C.E. by mythographers Hesiod and Pherecydes. The etymological association of “Kronos” with “chronology” becomes apparent in Hesiod’s *Theogony* (2006[circa 700 B.C.E.]). *Theogony*

⁶ In Richard Geldard’s *Remembering Heraclitus* (2000), the relation of change to identity emerges via philosopher Heraclitus’ question as to whether one is able to step into the “same river” twice, given its perpetual change.

tells of the great Ouranos (the sky), who forces his wife Gaia (the earth) into copulative submission, laying “outstretched on Gaia in his longing to make love” (28). One of their sons, Kronos, reacts against his oppressive father by castrating him, hacking “his father’s genitalia off” (28). Kronos’s act separates sky/father from earth/mother⁷ with a gap in which the remaining children gather, rescuing them *just in time*.

Hesiod therefore portrays Kronos, time, as that which forges the gap in an otherwise all-encompassing divinity, facilitating transitional human life and experience. The violent act is productive, illustrating the ancient Greek characterisation of time as a generative force of change. Kronos, that ancient exemplar of time, is not a neutrality that merely frames or measures change. Rather, Kronos, time, is the protagonist who initiates the before and the after.

Unlimited source of limits

Earlier we observed how the before and after that body modification practices produce for human corporeality are often characterised as a *violent* production. We are thus now acquainted with two characterisations of change as violence: (i) body modifications, which violently, “permanently” re-produce corporeality, and; (ii) time, that violent protagonist of the before and the after. For ancient Greek mythology, such temporality is evidently a theological matter.⁸ The first recorded construction of time in a form other than myth is identified in a fragment attributed to the pre-Socratic philosopher, Anaximander of Miletus (610 B.C.E – 546 B.C.E). Anaximander posits the source of all things in the world as “some other *apeiron* nature, from which come into being all the heavens and the worlds in them” (1983[circa 550 B.C.E.]:118). This *apeiron* nature is an unlimited, unchanging source of all worldly, changing things, which in coming to be, and then being destroyed, illustrate their limited nature.

Just as in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, where Kronos, as time, separates the human world from the divine realm via a “just” action, similarly it appears for Anaximander that time functions as

⁷ In a similar manner to Greek mythology, ancient Greek philosophy often evokes the divide or gap between the human world and the divine realm with the imagery of earth and sky. Socrates, for example, is portrayed in Plato’s *Apology* as denying that his interrogative method doubts the validity of the heavens, by condemning the “ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds” (Plato 2002[circa 360 B.C.E.]:10).

⁸ In *Wisdom’s Odyssey: From Philosophy to Transcendental Sophistry* (1997), philosopher Peter Redpath describes the development from Greek mythology to Greek philosophy as a “break from the traditional Greek theological method of learning” (7).

justice. This just “assessment of Time” (118) is attributable to the ancient Greek characterisation of time, in which the authority of an unchanging, anterior, divine realm is distinct from the perishable realm of changing things. Time is the just constraint which prevents physical things from being unlimited. The human body is one such physicality, exemplifying time’s limiting function. The source of “just time” is thus separate from the physical realm. This interpretation is what will be interrogated in this thesis. In asking whether the body is involved in producing, rather than simply exemplifying, time, it will be asked whether something like the modified body, a body-as-space, not only represents antecedence and subsequence, time’s limits, but also produces time-limits.

Given the conceptual distinction of changing, spatial realm from unchanging, divine realm, could this also mean that the social opposition toward certain body modification practices is somewhat informed by the perception that they *permanently* mark the body? That is, does the supposed permanence of certain body modifications encroach into the unchanging jurisdiction that God should monopolise? Judaism and Catholicism forbid tattooing, traced to a verse from Leviticus, which states that “you shall not make any cuttings in your flesh...or tattoo any marks upon you: I am the LORD” (Leviticus 19:28). The notion of corporeal permanence is debatable, an issue that will be later explored. Indeed, body modification practices are relevant to discourses concerning mutability *and* permanence, whereby the potential co-existence of flux and fix, or change and permanence, will be apparent in our inquiries.

Nevertheless, the key issue here is not simply God’s divine immutability, but the way that such an unchanging source of change must be exteriorised from the spatial/physical world. This positions the source of time outside the realm of bodies. Or in the vernacular of our interrogation, such time is exemplified by, but not produced by, bodies-as-spaces. The pathologisation of certain body modifications, which features the “idealisation of the natural body in self-mutilation discourse” (Pitts-Taylor 2003:33), presents a correlation between the supposition of an unchanging divine nature, and the pre-modified, natural human body. With the introduction of body modification practices, human corporeality morphs into an “improper” version of its true or natural incarnation. In this sense, fashion theorist Karmen MacKendrick compares the modified body to “the unnatural adaptability of a canvas” (1998:10). According to such logic, the divinely created, pre-modified body provides an anteriority against which all *subsequent* violations of it in the transient realm are assessed.

The unchanging-realm|changing-realm binary is consistent with theories which posit that the chronometry of human life, and the biological temporality of physiological processes, are conditioned by a time whose source is external to the spatial/physical world. This conceptual polarisation is the focus of our inquiries, given that contrarily, in terms of the key question being explored, the body can only be something through which time is produced if the source of time is immanent in the transient, physical realm. As we will now examine though, conceptions in which the source of time is outside the physical realm are able to characterise such time as objective. Time's objectivity is important, due to it seemingly conditioning a common temporality from which social function, via social synchronisation, ensues.

Uniform and objective time

A foundational theory which exteriorises the source of time from the spatial realm is provided by the Italian physicist, Galileo Galilei (1564 – 1642). Galileo represents time geometrically according to the regularity of the displacements of distance (space) of bodies in motion. When measuring a particle with uniform motion, it is stated that “the distances traversed by the moving particle during any equal intervals of time, are themselves equal” (Galileo 1914[1632]:154). Time, in being represented geometrically, is defined by its uniform regularity, distinguishable from actual motion. This exteriority from the interference of a changing, sensible (human) realm characterises time as an objectively independent variable in the measure of motion.

The influential English mathematician, Isaac Barrow (1630 – 1677), also attributes the uniformity of time to the exteriority of its source from the spatial realm. Barrow explores whether time existed before the creation of the world, ascertaining that “before the world and together with the world, time was, and is, since before the world arose, certain beings were able continually to remain in existence” (Barrow 2009[1683]:160). The exemplar of these “beings” that remained in existence is God. That something such as time could exist beyond the created world means for Barrow that “time does not denote an actual existence, but simply a capacity or possibility of permanent existence” (160). Accordingly, Barrow argues that time is not bound to

worldly motion,⁹ but is instead an external, objective, pre-condition of the physical/spatial created world.

Time, if independent from worldly interference, does not require worldly change or motion for it to exist. However, humans describe time in terms of the measurement of such change/motion (for a primary example of this, think of planetary movements). Accordingly, Barrow claims that “if all things had remained unmoved, in no way would we be able to distinguish *how much* time had flowed past” (160; my emphasis). The importance of the “how much” of time is an insight into the way in which the concept of time manifests via the comparison of measurable quantities. Or in Barrow’s words, time emerges as “the application of measures; thus time is in itself a quantity” (160). The comparability of time measurements invests time with an objective quality, with this objectivity requiring time to be distinct from the particular changes/motions themselves. The changes do not cause time; time would exist regardless. Nevertheless, spatial changes and motions can distinguish what would otherwise seem to be time’s indistinguishability. Significantly for our inquiry, Barrow’s objective time thus removes any capacity for the source of time from what is corporeal/spatial, defining the physical, bodied realm only as that which exemplifies time’s apparently transcendent source.

Given that time is conceived by Barrow as flowing *evenly* outside worldly interference (otherwise time(s) would not be comparable), not just any motion can distinguish time. Rather, the measurement of time requires *uniform* motion, which “proceeds always in an even tenor” (160). Barrow recognises the reliability of the celestial motions as facilitating the measuring of hours, days, weeks, months and years.¹⁰ In continuing the characterisation of time as an homogenous magnitude of geometric measurability, “all of whose parts correspond to the respective parts of an equable motion” (160), time is represented in a straight line.

The ramification of linear, unidirectional, forward-moving objective time, whose source transcends the bodily/spatial realm, is that the pre-modified body is permanently installed in a separate, previous past, at a point to which the body can never return. Under this conception, modifications such as scarification and tattoos are irreversible, or as sociologist Margo DeMello observes, are “permanent and alter the body forever” (2007:xvii). This evokes my earlier

⁹ Given that time precedes a world created *in time*, Barrow saw time, as philosophers Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs note, as the precondition of physical existence and motion (1997:26).

¹⁰ Barrow clarifies that the “celestial bodies are not the first and original measures of Time” (37), but rather are those motions upon which our senses and experiments rely for regularity.

interpretation that such practices could be perceived to muddle with the permanent|transient distinction that is classically installed between God and humans.

The source of uniform, linear time that is a capacity of God, functioning before His creation of the world, or what philosopher Edwin Burtt describes as “before the creation of things in motion” (1954:160), does not therefore exist *in* the spatial/physical realm. Instead, as Barrow asserts, time transcendentally conditions the potential existence of spatial/physical motions/changes. This representation of ethereal time, in comparison to its substantially characterised counterpart, space, is the assumption being investigated.

Consequently, we are reviewing a series of thinkers who account for time’s objectivity by positing its source outside the changes of a spatial/physical realm. The objectivity of time is important for a sociological exploration into time, given the apparent role of objective conditions in social function. Without objective synchronisation, social arrangements would be in disarray. However, a model in which time’s source transcends spatiality/physicality has considerable ramifications for a thesis interrogating the possible time-productive capacity of the human body.

In working through this dilemma, let us consider a variation of Barrow’s model developed by one of his students, physicist Isaac Newton (1643 – 1727). Newton adopts the objective element of Barrow’s characterisation of time whilst adapting its theological component. To do this, Newton declares that “no being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere...and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist” (Newton et. al. 1978:136). The point is not that God is *in* space *somewhere*, but rather that space ontologically emanates from God, whose omnipresent, necessary existence/Being means He is *of all space, everywhere*. This explains the causation which determines “that space is an emanative effect arising from the first existence of being, because when any being is postulated, space is postulated” (136).

The most interesting aspect for our current discussion is that time emerges according to the same logic, as an indication and a consequence of God’s necessary existence. Anything which exists must exist at some time, in the same manner that we have just seen that anything must exist spatially. The necessity of God’s existence is crucial, whereby as Newton states in *The Principia: The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1952[1673]), because “the Supreme God exists necessarily...he exists always and everywhere” (505). It is not that time is

“created” by God, but rather that time necessarily arises from His always existing all-the-time, an eternal existence which is the ontology of time.

Whilst theological bases of ontological production will soon be traded for human ones, at this point we are recognising why time and space have been characterised in terms of separate conditions. In Barrow and Newton we have covered foundational theories of uniform, objective time. From a sociological perspective, objective time is fascinating. If there was not the kind of detached, uniform temporality that Barrow and Newton posit, could there be social function and synchronisation? As the exercise employed in the introduction illustrated, the notion of a time outside our control or interference is the one to which humans conform in an everyday sense. The question is, thus, whether social frames only function because of an adherence to the regularity of an anterior, exterior, universally objective time-source.

With Newton we see a re-conceptualisation of *causality*, an issue that will feature throughout the coming chapters. In considering the emanation of time for Newton, God’s existence operates causally with, but not prior to, time’s existence. It is not that God *wills* time to become, which would insert a before, and an after, of time. There is not a point when there was time, and when there was not. Given that time emanates from God’s existence, it always already was/is. The importance of this for our current considerations is that because God creates, rather than causes, the natural realm of humans, that domain which could only, according to Newton, “proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being” (501), it so follows that time must precede the spatial/physical world and its embodied beings. This could be an insight into why detached conceptions of time and space seem so logical. Whilst Space emanates in the same manner as Time, it is the creation of the specific, worldly, spatial realm from this Space which arrives after such emanations. Does this mean therefore that if worldly, created bodies-as-spaces are preceded by the emanation of Time, and Time frames spatial motion by flowing evenly and uniformly, that all such bodies will manifest similarly?

Uniform bodies

In separating the source of time from worldly spatiality/sensibility, Newton’s model actually distinguishes two different times. There is true, absolute time, that “flows equably without relation to anything external,” which is distinct from relative, merely apparent time, as perceived

via sensible motion (1952:77). Despite physicist Albert Einstein's theory of relativity¹¹ problematising the aspects of Newton's model which rely upon absolute motion, Newtonian time is still relevant for our inquiry. This is because it presents an idea that humans seemingly take for granted; a singular time-source outside the interference and influence of any human or other worldly spatial/physical thing, to which all humans can objectively regulate and synchronise their lives. This is the assumption being interrogated in this thesis, that the origin or source of time permanently pre-exists spatial things, such as embodied humans, which are simply born into a time in which they live for a duration/period.

The ramification of Newtonian time for the body is the assumption that a corporeality which changes according to a "constant and uniform" (376) temporality will age consistently. Sociologist Wilbert Moore evokes this assumption in stating that "age, being basically a function of time, should move at a steady rate" (1963:60). Empirical support for this claim is found in the research of anatomist Harold Brody, which reports that neurological studies on brain degradation illustrate that "brain weight decreases continuously at a uniform rate, the maximum decrease between 25 and 96 years being about 11% of the mean weight of a series of 2080 brains" (1955:512). Such medical studies form part of greater social discourses which assume that the normal body ages, or changes, consistently over time.¹² Even abnormal bodies, such as those afflicted by the rare genetic condition "progeria"¹³ (in which the physicality of "old-age" manifests at an early age), are seen to change at a constant, albeit comparatively accelerated, rate (Brown 1992:1222S). What is therefore being illustrated is that the body's consistent ageing, in normal and extreme forms, is presumed to obey the unstoppable force of constant, uniform time.

Given that uniform time is associated with the regularity of celestial movements, a conceptual association emerges between the spatial movements/transitions of these planetary bodies, and those of the human body/corporeality. Or as Weiss again accurately notes, given that the temporality of clocks and calendars is based on spatial (corporeal) movement of the earth around the sun, there seems to be an aspect of clock time which is "not merely an external, analytical device that helps us negotiate our everyday affairs, but is based on corporeal movement, movement that is inscribed in our own bodies" (1999:112). One way in which this

¹¹ See Einstein's *Relativity: The Special and the General Theory* (2006[1920]).

¹² In *The Human Body* (2008), Scottish anatomist and anthropologist Arthur Keith attributes this phenomenon to the consistent ageing of the *overall* body, where "the collective changes in the body occur so uniformly" (132).

¹³ The condition is so rare that Professor Ted Brown from the New York State Institute for Basic Research reports that progeria has "a reported birth incidence of about one in eight million" (1992:1222S).

inscription manifests is seemingly that the apparent uniformity of planetary rhythms is correlated to the human body, whereby all such bodies are presumed to transition over time at a constant rate. As a consequence, the body modifier, in conflicting with the uniform temporality that supposedly emanates from a divine realm and conducts all such bodies, is acting in sin. This was seen earlier in the anti-tattooing sentiments displayed in Leviticus, in which the Lord forbids the marking of the body. A similar valuation of the body features in the New Testament's *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, which asks; "do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God?...Therefore honour God with your body" (1 Corinthians 6:19-20). What is observed here is a connection between theistic conceptions of the body, and social discourses that criticise certain body modification practices. Both define voluntary intrusions upon human corporality in terms of destructive moralities.

Calls for the abolition of "non-therapeutic" body modifications similarly posit an inherent corporeal morality, often, as we have covered, equating body modification with self-mutilation. Such an ethical frame is found in Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* (1996[1797]). Here Kant calls for wider recognition of the moral obligation of individual self-preservation, whereby the "duty of a human being to himself as an animal being is *to preserve himself* in his animal nature" (176). This "duty to the self" is said by Kant to be violated in acts of self-harm, which "maim oneself" (176, 177). Given the presumption that one's body is a divine creation, these violations are not simply attacks upon oneself, but are a "violation of duty to God" (177). Discourses which portray body modification practices as self-mutilating conjure the moral frame which equates corporeality with divine creation. This characterises any intrusion upon corporeality as dangerously anti-theistic (one should not "play God"), and as that which diminishes the capabilities of any such corporeality. Dr. Thomas Schramme illustrates this latter, medical opinion when he notes that "self-mutilation involves an impairment of bodily functional abilities" (2008:13).

In terms of Newton's theological conception of time, tampering with the body displays the relative nature of mutable materiality, external to real, objective time. Empirical measures of mutable, relative time approximate the objective succession of things as they occur according to real, absolute time, whereby "all things are placed in time as to order of succession" (Newton 1952:79). This absolute, continuous time objectively conditions the spatial/physical world, sequentially ordering and permanently positioning the pre-modified body in place before its

modified counterpart. Objective time in this conception remains as the external limit of all spatial change-as-succession, including that of human bodies.

The intention at this point is to have examined the notion of objective, uniform time. Such an undertaking:

- (i) illustrates the development/institutionalisation of the belief which positions the source/production of time outside the spatial, physical, human realm, and;
- (ii) suggests that social, temporal agreement (social synchronisation) and social function is conditioned by the regularity of this anterior, exterior time-source, which the social utilises from without, and to which socialised, embodied humans adhere.

The ramification for our exploration into the potentially time-productive quality of the human body is that currently, contrarily, the body-as-space merely exemplifies time's transcendent, objective source. We do not want to deny that time is objective, given the apparent role of objectivity in structuring and conditioning social synchronisation and function. However, can time's objectivity be incorporated into a conception which does not detach time's source from worldly humans?

Objective time, self-mutilation and suicide

An investigation into such a possibility can be assisted via a focus on the temporality which regulates the social function of such worldly humans. In this regard, we will be guided by the structuralism of French sociologist, Émile Durkheim (1858 – 1917). One era of Durkheim's structuralist approach examines European suicide rates in the late nineteenth century. The sociological relevance of this is that it does not merely seek to uncover the individual motives for suicide, but rather considers how a society produces *regular* suicide rates. What will be of particular interest is whether such suicide rates, with their reliably predictable rhythms, are exemplary of Newton's "uniformity of things" that is conditioned by an exteriorised, objective time-source.

Whilst I believe there are embedded time structures/rhythms within Durkheim's sociology, this is not the entire extent to which his analysis of suicide is relevant. In revisiting

Kantian ethics, the self-mutilation that normative, contemporary Western discourses equate with body modification practices is evoked by Kant as “partial suicide.” According to Kant’s duty of self-preservation, “killing oneself is a crime (murder)” (Kant 1996:176). Suicide represents a moral indiscretion not only against oneself, but against others by “debasing humanity” (177). It is even, as just covered, an indiscretion against God. Self-maiming/self-harming is similarly a moral breach. Most interestingly for our impending examination of suicide is the way Kant characterises forms of self-harm as “ways of partially murdering oneself” (177). That is, self-harm and suicide are part of the same process, deserving equal moral condemnation.

The Kantian argument which associates self-mutilation and suicide is interpreted slightly differently by psychiatrist Dr. Karl Menninger, who writes that “local self-destruction is a form of partial suicide to avert total suicide” (1938:271). Whilst this avoids describing self-harm and suicide in terms of the same process as Kant does, this typical psychiatric interpretation still evokes the Kantian phrase “partial suicide” in connecting self-harm to suicide. This is interesting because body modification practices, as we have seen, are also commonly identified as self-harming, and as a manifestation of self-destructive impulses.¹⁴ The correlation of self-mutilation with body modification is contentious. Nevertheless, this conceptual association of self-mutilation, body modification and suicide provides an emphatic sociological connection.

This connection is not the primary motivation for engaging Durkheim’s investigation into suicide rates however. As indicated, it is the ramifications for time of his sociological analysis that are of current interest. Time’s objectivity is seemingly necessary in order to account for the rhythms of social synchronisation and function. We first considered objective, social time via Simmel’s metropolis. Since that discussion, the source of objective time has been characterised as external to the spatial/physical world, defining the human body as an exemplification, but never as a producer, of such time. Time is objective because its source is beyond the subjective idiosyncrasies of any individual. However, what if the human, a subjectivity, could be implicated in the production of objective rhythms? Could this have constructive results in acknowledging a potentially more intimate relationship between human subjects and the source of objective time? It is with the assistance of Émile Durkheim that this will be explored.

¹⁴ See texts such as: Lynne Carroll & Roxanne Anderson’s *Body Piercing, Tattooing, Self-Esteem, and Body Investment in Adolescent Girls* (2002); Sheila Jeffreys’ *Body Art and Social Status: Cutting, Tattooing and Piercing from a Feminist Perspective* (2000), and; Andres Martin’s *On Teenagers and Tattoos* (1997).

The Objectivity of Social Facts

In 1886, Durkheim's close friend from the École Normale, Victor Hommay, committed suicide. Durkheim's obituary read as a blueprint for his later account *On Suicide* (2006[1897]), in that the socially isolated Hommay was described as separated from the "cohesive and animated society" of the École (R. Buss in Durkheim 2006:viii). This theme of social cohesion, and the *mysteriously simultaneous alienation and connection* between the individual and society, materialises in Durkheim's intrigue concerning how each social period produces a uniform, or regular, suicide rate. This focus on the social rhythm of such behaviour contradicted the typical assumption that suicide was simply individually authored. Sociologist Jack Douglas agrees, noting the differentiation of Durkheim's research in that "the common sense view of suicide was that it was an intensely individual act" (1967:16).

Just as suicide is often defined in terms of individualism, similarly a discourse of autonomous causation pervades body modification practices. As DeMello notes, the usual interpretation is that "individuals choose to take their own bodies into their own hands, and modify themselves via piercing, tattooing, surgical and pseudo-surgical practices" (2007:32). The notion of the "body project"¹⁵ for the body modifier is paramount, whereby particularly with tattooing and piercing, Pitts-Taylor's research reveals a perceived "self-control over one's body through self-inscription" (2003:10). This is further evidenced at the central hub of the body modification community, the website *Body Modification Ezine (BME)*, where Pitts-Taylor recognises "the highly individualistic discourse of *BME*" (169). The interpretation of suicide as a sovereign process (death by *one's own hand*), against which Durkheim will argue, is here replicated in discourses of autonomy associated with body modification practices.

As indicated, causality informs our focus on time. The transition from pre-modified body to modified body not only demands an acknowledgement of before and after, but also asks what brought the after from the before (to adopt a linear, unidirectional, forward-moving temporality). Was it a sovereign, individual agent, as body modifiers typically suppose? This is something we will further explore soon. In considering the causation involved in suicide however, Durkheim adopts a scientific approach. By interrogating the concept of an isolated individual subject, he

¹⁵ The term "body project" is often attributed to sociologist Chris Shilling's *The Body and Social Theory* (1993), something Pitts-Taylor brings to our attention in *The Legal, Medical and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation and Transgression* (2009:159).

instead discovers the statistical regularity of suicide rates, suggesting a shared phenomenon. This is important, because, as he expresses, “a scientific investigation can thus be achieved only if it deals with comparable facts” (1952[1897]:xxxix). Here the individual is only relevant as a particular aspect of a comparable, greater whole, reflecting Durkheim’s interest in the broader, social production of the subject/self.

In considering such production, Durkheim believes subjects are always informed by a past that is alive in the present. One learns to become social, and such education is unavoidable. Rather than education only being the deliberate, intended acquisition of skills, one is inescapably constituted by experience, whereby “education is, precisely, the socialisation of the human being...the historical fashion in which the social being is constituted” (Durkheim 1938[1895]:6). It is here, in *The Rules of Sociological Method*, that Durkheim identifies categories of social phenomena and roles which manifest via individuals as “ways of acting, thinking and feeling that present the noteworthy property of existing outside the individual consciousness” (2). This forms the basis of an analysis focused upon social, rather than simply individual, behavioural causation.

The historical character of these “coercive” forces blurs the present and the past. Causation extends beyond the present self *and* beyond the present social, in that “the present events of social life would originate not in the present state of society but in prior events, from historical precedents; and sociological explanations would consist exclusively in connecting the present with the past” (117). This effect of a past informing a future present is not deterministic however.¹⁶ Given the particularities and differences of individuals in social arenas, Durkheim contends that “it is impossible to conceive how the stage which a civilization has reached at a given moment could be the *determining* cause of the subsequent stage” (117; my emphasis).

Instead, Durkheim is acknowledging an *objective coercion* of any social arena, from which all behaviours, normative or non-normative, legal or criminal, manifest. Durkheimian commentator Steven Taylor observes in this regard that “unlike most theorists who see deviance as caused by ‘alien’ traits in societies or individuals, Durkheim sees both deviant and normal behaviour arising from the same sources” (1988:52). This contradicts interpretations of non-normative body modification practices as representing breaks from society, and as “being

¹⁶ This speaks to why Durkheim is relevant to this thesis. In exploring Durkheim’s text, which is seemingly past temporally/historically, the question of the timing of a text is opened. We see that something like Durkheim’s *On Suicide* is alive, productive beyond the time frame in which it was published (evoking the way behavioural patterns permeate beyond their past or present incarnation).

‘deviant’ in that deviance is defined as that which is the focus of social reaction” (Sanders & Vail 2008:viii). Such an interpretation would be problematic according to Durkheim, given that according to the objectivity of the social forces that he identifies, it would have to be argued that the motivation to modify the body in a non-normative way manifests from the same source that engenders normative body practices. Non-normativity is irreducibly entangled with normativity, whereby the body modifier who creates a non-normative corporeality is equally bound up in the production of normative body frames. Durkheim’s insight is that society is an organism, whose rhythm objectively organises all citizens in a regular fashion. This means that aspects such as crime, suicide and body modification practices are living, productive, individual manifestations of a collective field from which nothing is excluded.

Whilst we are yet to explore the ramifications for time of this sociology, it should be remembered that an *objective* time seemingly conditions social function and synchronisation. If the human body is to be involved in such time-production, as per the central question being considered in this thesis, then the source of objective time will need to be immanent within the realm of social, human subjects, rather than that which governs transcendentally. This inquiry can be framed by first asking whether the objective source which underpins such social rhythms is immanent to, or transcends, human life.

The before and after of continuous time

By positing a social past that is alive in the social present, Durkheim is identifying social continuity. Additionally, Durkheim recognises a regular rhythm to such continuity (indeed, this is his fascination with suicide). In exploring this social continuity, we will be asking whether the objective, rhythmic coercion of human subjects is conditioned by a source whose objective temporality does not require an externality from the spatial, social realm of embodied humans. To consider the continuity of the temporality of social rhythm, what is meant by “continuous time” must first be clarified.

Here we will return to ancient Greek conceptions of time. Much of the work of the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384 B.C.E – 322 B.C.E.), reflects the Presocratic view that time and movement are perpetually connected and correspond with each other (2007[circa 350 B.C.E.]:80-83). This Platonic theory states that time is numbered in accordance with the circular

motion of the sphere, found in celestial bodies. These circular motions facilitate a numerical appreciation/representation of time, whereby “the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the years, have created number, and have given us a conception of time” (Plato 2008[circa 360 B.C.E.]:35).

In terms of this numbering of time, Aristotle argues that time corresponds to, but is not identical with, motion or movement. Motion is bound to the thing which is moving, a particular part of Being, whereas time is always everywhere. Time and motion cannot entirely coincide because “the change or movement of each thing is only in the thing which changes...but time is present equally everywhere and with all things” (2007:80). In identifying time as not being identical with movement, but yet also as not being independent from movement, Aristotle argues that “time is number of movement in respect of the before and after” (83). These before-and-afters of a thing are magnitudinal, given that movement is only identifiable via change-as-magnitude. It so follows that “because time and movement always correspond with each other” (81), if before and after in movement are only identifiable as magnitudinal/spatial change, then time is also only identifiable magnitudinally/spatially.

The spatial motion of the spatial world is therefore exemplary of an external time-source to which it corresponds. This correspondence comes from the uniform numbering of the before and afters of spatial motions, but such uniformity is not a constitutive, spatial part of the motions. Time’s uniformity is attributable to its objective separation from the spatial realm. Such time, only recognisable via the distinction between before and after, restricts corporeality to pre-change and post-change states that exemplify, but do not participate in, a temporality which governs from without. The modified body of Aristotelian-type continuity has its transition imposed transcendentally. It is important to recognise the socially ingrained nature of such before-after relations when conceiving of time. As David Gross’ social theory observes, this impression is instilled as time’s inherent character, whereby “the earliest forms of dating were based on the marking of a ‘before’ and ‘after’ with regard to memorable local occurrences such as wars, or certain natural phenomena such as floods or eclipses” (1985:57).

Aristotelian time, the uniform numbering of before-and-afters, is counted, meaning that “time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration” (Aristotle 2007:81). This raises the question; who/what does the counting? Aristotle posits the “soul” as that which qualifies the before-and-after of change as countable. Asking whether time would

exist without a soul to count its progression is granted by Aristotle to be a fair question, “for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted” (88). This is not to suggest that time is the production of a subjective, *human* soul. What Aristotle is instead positing is the existence of something that can invest the before and the after of change in the spatial realm with the quality of being countable. In order to count objectively, this something which counts, this soul, must be separate from such spatial change. The source of Aristotelian, objective, uniform time thus operates externally to the human, spatial realm, as it does for Barrow and Newton. It will soon be seen though that the importance of Aristotelian time is not in its provision of another model of a transcendent time-source, but rather in terms of its conception of time’s continuity.

We can note a difference developing here between a sociologically structuralist conception of uniformity, and that offered in Aristotelian philosophy. The objective continuity of social forces for Durkheim produces a regular rate of suicides via a uniform, immanent rhythm from which nothing is excluded. This does not count/quantify such uniformity from afar in the manner of the Aristotelian soul that objectively oversees before and after.¹⁷ Aristotle detaches the source of objective rhythms from humans. This reflects the everyday assumption that time rolls on continuously, outside the influence of any human or worldly thing. Time’s continuous regularity is here something which the social utilises for function and synchronisation, positing time as permanently pre-existing, uniform and continuous. Under such a model, the transitions of the human body merely exemplify the omnipresent power of a transcendent time-source.

This is the point from which my interest in Durkheim manifests. We will engage Durkheim’s sociology to explore whether collective, uniform, human rhythms merely abide by the continuous, inescapable force of a transcendently objective source. Contrary to this, I am interested in whether the uniformity of human rhythms produces a worldly, immanent source of objective rhythm. If objective time is what conditions the rhythms of social synchronisation, then implicating the human subject in the source of objective, social rhythms would be a potential step toward characterising the human body as implicated in the production of time.

¹⁷ The distinction of an “inner” soul from the “outer” temporality of an external, physical world means that Aristotelian time is actually somewhat divided. The time of motion, when a thing moves between positions, is detached from the time of the objective mind/soul which registers this before-after experience. See pages 22-29, Book IV of Aristotle’s *Physics* (2007[circa 350 B.C.E.]).

It is in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* that Durkheim refers briefly to time. Durkheim attributes all worldly things to a set of categories, a legacy of Aristotelian philosophy.¹⁸ These are “the categories of understanding: notions of time, space, number, cause, substance, personality” (1995[1912]:8). Durkheim observes that the objective world cannot be experienced outside these categories, since “we cannot think of objects that are not in time or space, that cannot be counted, and so forth” (9). One of these categories, time, cannot be conceived of except in periods, whereby trying to comprehend “a time that was not a succession of years, months, weeks, days and hours...would be nearly impossible” (9). These conventional time periods are socially derived, meaning “what the category of time expresses is the time common to the group, a social time” (1915[1912]:11). The category of time, an objective reality, is produced by collective human practices, and “corresponds to the periodical recurrence of rites, festivals, and public ceremonies at regular intervals...taken from social life” (9). Time duly emerges, and is maintained by, the regular, rhythmic re-production of social periods, in that they “express the rhythm of collective activity while ensuring that regularity” (1995:10).

The category of time, which becomes or manifests via the objective reality of a collectivity, is a social phenomenon according to this reading. Typically, the interpretation would be that such time periods are simply human concepts, and are social constructions or representations of the separate, actual, worldly phenomenon of time. However:

- (i) by exploring in this thesis whether what is inherent about time is that it is produced via spatialities such as humans, and;
- (ii) taking into account that humans are social, means that;
- (iii) if indeed our exploration determines that time is produced through embodied humans, then the social construction of time will need to be accommodated in, rather than separated from, what is inherent about time.

Durkheim refers to the same time periods (minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, years etc.) as Newton and Aristotle. For the latter pair however, such rhythms illustrate how objective time is *represented* and *utilised* by the spatial, social realm of humans, a realm from which objective

¹⁸ The Aristotelian Categories place every object of human (subject) apprehension into one of ten categories: substance; quantity; quality; relation; place; time; position; state; action; affection. Neoplatonist philosopher, Porphyry, collates these thoughts in Aristotle’s *The Organon* (2010[circa 50 B.C.E]).

time is separate. Durkheim's interest in the *production* of objective rhythms by the human, social realm indicates that his sociology could conversely help us develop an inquiry into whether the human is involved in the production of such time. In exploring this possibility, recognising that socially derived time periods such as minutes, hours, weeks, months etc. are time limits, means that the question of Aristotelian limits/intervals of continuous time (re-)emerge(s).

The limits of continuous time

Changes that are numbered and counted in the Aristotelian before-after interval operate as a succession, whereby “just as motion is a perpetual succession, so also is time” (Aristotle 2007:81). In numbering this succession, what are countable are instants or “nows.” Each now comprises a before and an after, although as Aristotle states in *Physics*, time is not a series of nows placed alongside one another (79). Time-as-present-now is the boundary/limit of the past-now and the future-now. However, a past-now, in allowing the subsequent now to be present, does not cease to be present itself, but instead somehow participates in the “subsequent” now. Here is the paradox of any state of continuous temporality. Indeed, this question of when any point in time begins or ends will reappear throughout this thesis. Each now remains the same, as the identifiable condition of the before and after in change, and yet becomes different insofar as it is in succession. Or in Aristotle's words, the “‘now’ in one sense is the same, in another it is not the same” (81). Aristotle employs an analogy with something being carried in order to illustrate that whilst being carried it remains the same thing, but yet being carried differentiates it, in that “since the body carried is moving, it is always different” (82).¹⁹ Likewise, the now is carried by the continuity of time.

Aristotle's characterisation of continuous, morphing time evokes Durkheim's conception of social time. A social period for Durkheim does not entirely replace its preceding period, neatly lined up side by side. Equally, we have just seen Aristotle argue against the notion that moments in time could be placed alongside each other. Indeed, it is the way that time(s) for both Aristotle and Durkheim bleed into other time(s) that invests temporality with continuity in the theory of each. The development of a new social period for Durkheim is not simply distinct from

¹⁹ This is consistent with our earlier observation that body modification practices exemplify the body's concurrent mutability and permanence.

preceding periods, given that “all societies are born of other societies without a break in continuity” (Durkheim 1938:105). Whilst this negates the possibility of a complete “break” in time, change remains integral to its continuity. The re-positioning of individual subjects objectively produces a new social, whose collective practices link the current social period to the one from which it has developed.

What are the ramifications for the human body of Aristotelian and Durkheimian conceptions of continuity? Both conceive of change as a concurrent sameness and difference. According to such a reading, the corporeal changes that body modification practices engender do not represent the earlier raised “neat distinction” between pre-modified and modified versions of the body. Rather, the body perpetually manifests as the aforementioned, simultaneous sameness and difference. Such (modified) bodies thus divide and join as the productive limit(s) of continuous time, rather than merely exemplify its breaks. Body modification practices, in bringing about corporeal change, can duly be re-classified as limiting processes. That is, the body functions as a spatial, temporal limit.

Similarly, the limiting function of the Aristotelian “now” concurrently joins and divides time. Time “is both made continuous by the ‘now’ and divided at it” (Aristotle 2007:82). However, whilst my interest is to explore whether what is spatial and transitioning, the body-as-limit, produces time, conversely for Aristotle the similarly functioning now-as-limit is not a rhythm in transition, as time, but rather is transcendently counted *by* objective time. As he states, the now “is simply the number of continuous movement, *not any particular kind of it*” (88; my emphasis). Contrarily, if it is determined in this thesis that the body-as-space, or according to our current vernacular, the body-as-limit, *is* something through which time is produced, then the source of time’s continuity *will* need to be attributable to its limits, such as bodies-as-limits as particular forms of time. A tension is duly starting to emerge between particular conditions and general conditions, or between subjective rhythms and objective rhythm. Here sociological conceptions of the relation between subjective behaviours and social behaviour can further assist.

Objective rhythm and subjective behaviours

Exploring the human involvement in the production of uniform, continuous, objective rhythms will take us in a different direction from Newtonian and Aristotelian accounts which situate the

source of such objectivity/uniformity/continuity outside the worldly, human realm. The Aristotelian “nows” bleed into each other under the gaze of a transcendent soul. Conversely, we are about to consider the human subject’s role in the blurring of Durkheimian “social-nows.” The subject-as-now is implicated in the production of each social-now, but only due to the continuity that their incarnation provides as a behavioural blend of informed-social-was, present-social-is, and anticipatory-social-will-be.

These behaviours are produced by a network of coercing relations which affect individuals in ways of which they will often be unaware. Even if an individual’s acts appear to express personal motives and desires, by conforming, as Durkheim states, to “my own sentiments and I feel their reality subjectively” (1938:1), such reality is still objective; it “does not cease to be objective” (1). Durkheim’s use of the term “objective” can be linked to his conception of “social facts.” Social facts are introduced here in *The Rules of Sociological Method* as objectively²⁰ collective, coercive entities, differentiated from the individuality of subjective consciousness. Durkheim is emphatic about this distinction, whereby “social phenomena, measurable forces or ‘facts’ – objective, resistant, and persistent” (xiii), are distinguishable from the will of the individual (xiii).

Importantly, a “social fact” is not simply the sum of individual manifestations. The way I understand this is that society is not reducible to individuals. If the social fact, which is a single collective, was the average of the aggregate of its individual manifestations, this would imply a divisible entity, and would not constitute a collective phenomenon.²¹ This would give the individual an autonomy not present in Durkheim’s sociology, and duly contradict the objective, collective, social structures that he observes. Correlatively, this would be tantamount to Aristotle investing each “now” with an autonomy distinct from the continuity of time. Durkheim, employing an analogy of chemical and biological compounds, notes that “life could not be separated into discrete parts; it is a unit, and consequently its substratum can be only the living substance in its totality and not the element parts of which it is composed” (xlvi). This logic of collective composition is then applied to sociology. Social phenomena are different from each

²⁰ References to the objectivity of social facts are numerous, editor George Catlin noting Durkheim’s “stress upon the objectivity to the individual of social phenomena” (xxviii).

²¹ Durkheim’s interpretation of the relation of subjective behaviour to collective behaviour can be distinguished from that of German sociologist Max Weber. Weber characterises the subjective meaning of action as an “average of, or approximation to...sociological mass phenomena” (1997[1922]:96).

individual consciousness, meaning that social “facts reside exclusively in the very society itself which produces them, and not in its parts, i.e., its members” (xlvi). The social has a life of its own, outside its individual constituents. There are concerns I have with this conceptual exteriority in terms of the consistency of Durkheim’s argument, and these will soon be unpacked.

In tracing individual thoughts and actions to objective, collective, social forces, Durkheim questions whether suicide is an autonomous, self-motivated act. By analysing the statistical distribution of suicide rates, uniform patterns illuminate the social forces that determine such consistency, where the “regularity of statistical data...implies the existence of collective tendencies exterior to the individual” (Durkheim 1952:283). These collective tendencies are considered to be responsible for social trends, motivating the query of how “a supposedly stable society always has the same number of disunited families, of economic catastrophes, etc?” (270). In essence, Durkheim asks not just what mysteriously causes humans to suicide, or what causes the uniformity and regularity of suicide rates, but instead, what coerces humans to do anything! That is, what keeps the rhythms of social practice/behaviour regulated in such a continuously uniform fashion? According to Newton and Aristotle, for a rhythm to be uniform and objective, its source must transcend the worldly, human realm. Conversely, and interestingly for the development of this chapter, Durkheim postulates that the source of an objective rhythm can be immanent within the human realm.

However, Durkheim, as noted, also consistently characterises the objectivity of social forces as *exterior* to each individual human. We have seen that in *The Rules of Sociological Method* Durkheim introduces social facts as being “noteworthy” because they are ways of acting, thinking and feeling that exist *outside* the individual consciousness (1938:2). This externality underpins their coercive power, “independent of individual will” (2). Durkheim’s motivation here is to define social facts, and collective consciousness, as “different in nature” (xlix) to individual consciousness. This conditions his claim that individual behaviours are not reducible to autonomous subjectivities. The objectivity of the social sciences for Durkheim manifests via the externality of social forces from individual subjects, mirroring the objectivity of the “natural sciences” that is attributed to the separation of an object-thing from any subject-consciousness. Durkheim duly states that just as “idealists separate the psychological from the biological realm, so we separate the psychological from the social” (xxxix).

Consequently, the social fact is interpreted as if it is an objective thing. The method of the social scientist is “objective. It is dominated entirely by the idea that social facts are things and must be treated as such” (143). It is not that social facts are material things for Durkheim. Nevertheless, the relation between the subject and the social-fact-as-thing should be treated the same as that between the subject and the material-thing in the physical sciences. Social facts are, in Durkheim’s terms, “things by the same right as material things” (xlii). The objectivity of a “thing,” beyond subjective idiosyncrasy, assures its regularity beyond subjective desires, whereby “the most important characteristic of a ‘thing’ is the impossibility of its modification by a simple effort of the will” (28). Durkheim is affirming that social, objective production cannot be trumped by contingent, individual desire.

If the objectivity of social rhythms is attributable to the continuity of social facts, and Durkheim is excluding individual humans from their constitution, then this seemingly contradicts any intention to implicate humans in the production of objective rhythms. Such rhythmic implication is of course required in order to inform the development of the central inquiry of this thesis, namely that humans are involved in the production of objective time (an involvement that is bodily/corporeally based). The supposed exteriority of objective social facts from each individual therefore requires attention.

One interrogation of the externality by which Durkheim characterises social phenomena/facts emerges in the observation that whilst the social fact is exterior to the individual, it is fabricated by a social collective, of which each individual is a constituent. Could this be read in a manner in which each individual is in fact, *in the fact*? Regarding social facts, Durkheim does explicitly state that “we have collaborated in their genesis” (xlv). Whilst in terms of their (re-)production, “each one of us participates in them only as an infinitesimal unit” (xlv), social facts still reflect the diversity of individualities. There is no coercion of individuals without individual influence. Of this, Durkheim is adamant; “there is no conformity to social convention that does not comprise an entire range of individual shades” (lvii). This emphasises my earlier point, that social forces are coercive, but not entirely deterministic, constraints.

In the preface to the second edition of *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim indeed critiques readings of the first edition which characterise social facts as deterministic. Responding to claims that his school of thought was only “explaining social phenomena by constraint” (liii), Durkheim’s refutation is clear; “this was far from our intention” (liii). By again

referring to the physical sciences, Durkheim notes of natural causality that “every physical milieu exercises constraint on the beings which are subject to its action” (lv). However, there is a difference between the “modes of coercion” (lv) that occur in the social milieu, and those of the physical milieu. In physical causation, “the pressure exerted by one or several bodies on other bodies” (lv) manifests with pre-determined effects. This should not be confused with social causation. Social facts are malleable, being shaped by whichever institutionalised forces are contextually/currently prevalent, whereby “the peculiar characteristic of social constraint is that it is due, not to the rigidity of certain molecular arrangements, but to the prestige with which certain representations are invested” (lv). The collectivity of the social-fact-as-thing manifests uniquely, informed, but not determined, by its cause. For there to be a social fact, a collaboration occurs in which “several individuals must have contributed their action; and in this joint activity is the origin of a new fact” (xlv). Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that this is an *external* manifestation for Durkheim, in that this “joint activity takes place outside each one of us” (lvi).

We are thus at a tense point in exploring the involvement of the human subject in objective rhythms. The individual is being conceptually positioned outside social objectivity, however this limit between the individual and the social, the subjective and the objective, is blurry. I intend for us to interrogate this limit in two ways in the next chapter. Firstly, we will ask whether Durkheim’s insistence that the social fact is exterior to the individual is conditioned by the assumption of the *prior existence* of what is objectively social. Do social structures pre-exist the individuals they coercively produce? Consistent with our focus on time, such unidirectional, forward-moving causality will be examined.

Secondly, individuals are recognised by Durkheim as being co-constitutive of social phenomena. Yet the notion that social facts are “outside” each individual consciousness conversely, and contradictorily, demarcates individuals. Indeed, such division seemingly conflicts with the inescapably socialised subjectivities which manifest via Durkheim’s structuralism. In response, we will investigate whether the individual-social relation is as constitutively separate as this model demands, by considering the role of consciousness. We have moved beyond the conception of sovereign, self-productive subjectivity. However, in doing so, is there the danger of overcorrecting, and suffocating the subject with objective, structural production? If the role of the embodied individual in the production of objective rhythms is to be acknowledged, this overcorrection must be addressed.

From objectivity to subjectivity

In discussing overcorrection, I am not suggesting that objective coercion necessarily does suffocate subjective dynamism. Consider, for example, the argument that if one's actions are produced by social forces, then this absolves them of individual responsibility for such actions. It is with this type of claim that I disagree, emphasising Durkheim's reasoning that morality is found in an objective collective. This evokes the Kantian impression of morality explored earlier. There we saw that self-harm and suicide are forbidden in terms of the duty of self-preservation that one has in upholding the morality of humanity overall. Similarly, Durkheim distinguishes his conception of collective morality from relatively lax, individual, moral manifestations. As he states, a morality that is "only guaranteed by the uncertain feelings of the average"²² conscience, would be extremely unprotected" (1952:282). If morality is a system of collective states that "springs from society" (283), then each subject, as a socially constitutive being, is invested with moral responsibility for their actions, rather than absolved of it. Such reasoning argues that even if one is produced by what is seemingly external to them, their subjectivity is not negated, but rather is *guided* by social structure(s).

This has been demonstrated in the example of body modifiers. In experiencing a body project subjectively, what is often portrayed is autonomous bodily production and authorship. However, as argued via Durkheim's sociology, the regularity of suicide rates contradicts characterisations of autonomy in terms of any behaviour. Nevertheless, the subject is not removed entirely from a role in their own production. Rather, in considering what brings about something, whether it is a body modification, or a suicide, "according to Durkheim individual motives are pretexts or opportunities, but not causes" (Halbwachs 1978[1930]:33).²³ Such a conclusion, when extended to all behaviours of all humans, is an insight into the co-implication of subjective and social rhythms. Individual behaviours have an objective character because of their socially constitutive capacity, even if experienced subjectively.

²² "Average" in this usage appears to be synonymic with "typical." This does not contradict the earlier argument *against* conceiving of the social fact as the average of a social aggregate, provided that the "typical" phenomenon is characterised in socially plastic and porous terms, distinguished from the rigidity of an average which *divides* a social phenomenon, and therefore gives each average component a certain autonomy.

²³ This citation is taken from Durkheim's peer, Maurice Halbwachs, whose sociology will be engaged in the next chapter.

The position in which we find ourselves therefore is attempting to reconcile objectivity (which seems to be responsible for social synchronisation and function) with subjectivity. In retrieving objective rhythms from worldly, transcendent exteriority, the source of objective rhythms in the human, social realm has been acknowledged. However, Durkheim's conception of social facts, as the objective, rhythmic production of subjectivity, is of a phenomenon that whilst being immanent to this social realm, is still exterior to every individual human. Such "exteriority" must be addressed in order to implicate the individual in the production of objective rhythms, rather than merely present the individual as exemplifying an objective source. This is necessary if ultimately, this thesis is to implicate the human in the production of one particular objective rhythm, time, and to characterise this productive role as bodily/corporeally constituted. The central question here, which is exploring whether the body-as-space produces time, will thus interrogate the objectivity of Durkheimian sociology. Is the source of such objectivity outside each human subject? We will determine this by exploring subjective time.

2.

Subjective Time

Transcending the physical realm?

Time – our youth – it never really goes, does it? It is all held in our minds.

— Helen Hooven Santmyer, *She Said What?* (Cannon 1995:130)

Existing time(s)

In exploring whether the human body produces, rather than merely exemplifies, time, what is under consideration is the human role in time's source. The typical assumption is that the source of time is objectively outside any human's influence. Such time pre-exists representations of it on clocks and calendars, which utilise time's objective rhythm in order to facilitate social synchronisation and function. Whilst a bodied/spatial constitution for time has not yet been acknowledged, nor even an implication of humans in the production of objective time, the previous chapter has illustrated how the source of the objective rhythms of subjectivity is immanent to the human, social realm. This source, however, is supposedly exterior from each human subject. The challenge in this chapter will be to interrogate such supposed exteriorisation. Potential issues we have identified as requiring attention are:

- (i) the unidirectional, forward-moving linearity of time, in which social structures are permanently anterior to the subjects they subsequently, coercively produce, and;
- (ii) the separation of every individual consciousness *outside* the collective consciousness of social facts.

In considering the relationship between these notions of pre-existence, the human subject, and time, Christian ideology provides an interesting frame for this discussion to commence, given its Newtonian-like, linear time narrative separating God, the creator (anterior), from the created (posterior) world. This separation is important for Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) when he meditates upon the nature of time in *Confessions* (1961[circa 400]). Time attracts his philosophical interest following the death of a friend. Augustine attributes his grief to the direction of the human soul towards an external, spatial world of transitory elements. Every human “is tethered by the love of things that cannot last and then is agonised to lose them” (77). What rescues Augustine from this grief is the passage of time, with the possibility of new experiences. This is because “time never stands still...It came and went, day after day, and as it passed it filled me with fresh hope and new thoughts to remember” (78-79).

Augustine cautions however that by bringing new possibilities and new attachments, time also brings vulnerability. In consoling with one movement, only to upset with another, the passing of time fragments the self, whereby the human is “torn to pieces” (2002[circa 400]:52). Augustine is expressing what we identified in the last chapter; time’s limiting function. Time-as-limit prevents any thing from remaining identical. The human body is one such thing. However, my curiosity in this thesis concerns whether the body also produces this limit. Augustine, contrarily, in seeking an existence protected from the vulnerabilities of a time-based realm, turns to God, “for he alone loses none dear to him to whom all are dear in Him who cannot be lost” (54). Things in the spatial/sensible universe are transient, “by passing away and succeeding” (55), in contrast to the realm of its Creator which “abides and continues forever” (56).

Confirming God’s existence outside the transience of the spatial/sensible realm does not solve the question for Augustine of what time is. He asks in bewilderment, “what, then, is time?...if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled” (1961:264). Augustine observes that time is only conceivable as past, present, and future. Whilst the past no longer is, and the future is yet to occur, we still speak of a “long time” and a “short time” “only when we mean the past or the future” (264). These are periods of extension, even though each does not seemingly presently exist for Augustine, because one period has passed, and the other has yet to arrive. Given our engagement with Durkheim’s argument that the past is alive in the present, this issue of the “non-existence” of time periods requires clarification.

In contrast to the supposed non-existence of past-duration and future-duration, the present-instant has no duration according to Augustine. Time, “when it is present has no duration,” for if the present was more than an unextended instant it would no longer simply be present, but rather “could be divided into past and future” (266). Such duration would mark its passing into the non-existence of what will be, or what has been. This passing of the present is crucial, for if it did not extend or pass, it would be eternal, not temporal. As Augustine states; “in eternity nothing moves into the past: all is present. Time, on the other hand, is never all present at once” (261-262). If only something in existence can be of extension, whereby “something must exist to be capable of being long” (266), what does this mean for the past and the future? This extension cannot be of the past, because the past no longer exists. Nor can it be of the future, because the future is yet to exist. Considering that this extension cannot be of the present either (because the present is unextended), must it be concluded that time does not really exist?

The present is real

To avoid such scepticism concerning time, Augustine considers whether past and future do exist, but are hidden. That is, does time “emerge from some secret refuge when it passes from the future to the present, and goes back into hiding when it moves from the present to the past” (267). This “existence” of the past and the future, and of time/temporality in general, therefore seems hidden by, and conditional upon, the present.

Here we are reminded of the conceptual polarisation of substantial space from insubstantial time that is under interrogation in this thesis. This conceptualisation presumes, as philosopher Elizabeth Grosz observes, that “time is more intangible than any other ‘thing’” (1999:1). Spatial things in the physical world are characterised as tangibly real and accountable. Conversely, time is mysterious and invisible. It lurks as “a silent accompaniment, a shadowy implication” (1). Such a portrayal is consistent with Durkheim’s description of the “mysterious” uniformity of social rhythm. Even our sociological muse is susceptible to being suspicious of time. Despite this characterisation of time as hidden and ethereal, we will remain interested in Augustine’s curiosity about time. This is due to his focus on the subjective involvement in time. Such focus is important, in that we are currently grappling with the human subject’s productive role in the temporality of objective rhythms.

In order to explore time's potentially hidden existence, Augustine discusses one's awareness of time. This awareness includes measuring and comparing extensions/periods of time. Such extension, time, can only be measured in the present, "while it is passing, for no one can measure it either when it is past and no longer exists, or when it is future and does not yet exist" (1961:266). Because the present is always transitioning to non-existence, Augustine believes that time only exists, and can only be measured, as a passing existent-present (266, 269). The duration-less present is the measure *and* possibility of time, incorporating a hidden past and future. As a result, there is a manner in which past and future exist, but only as conditional upon the present.

How similar is this conception of a hidden past and future to the temporality of social rhythms in Durkheim's sociology? For Durkheim, individual behaviours are not merely a present phenomenon. Rather, they reflect how the present period has been informed by preceding periods, evidencing "in the past the germs of new life which it contained" (1952:359). The past lurks in the present as a trace,¹ just as for Augustine the past exists by lingering in the present-as-passing. The trace in this regard delivers time's continuity, meaning the present social period gives an insight into a future social structure. What is continuous can therefore be characterised as contagious, if we identify the trace of the future as a germ hidden in the past and/or present. Or as Durkheim demands; "the future would be impossible if its *germs* were not contained in the present" (332; my emphasis). Just as for Augustine the future exists only as an anticipation of its manifestation as a present-that-will-be, similarly for Durkheim the future is only possible because its subsequent potential already lurks in present uniformity.

The first of our inquiries into Durkheimian objectivity intends to interrogate this assumption that time is exclusively a forward-moving, linearity of pasts which necessarily, and only ever, precede future presents, and the consequent supposition that the objectivity of social structures is attributable to the permanent *pre-existence* of such structures from the individuals that are *subsequently* produced under their structural influence/force. If time's objectivity conditions social function and synchronisation, then contrarily implicating the human in the production of such objectivity will inform our central exploration into the possibility that time has a bodied/spatial constitution.

¹ In chapter three we will further engage the temporality of the "trace," via French post-structuralist Jacques Derrida.

Presenting: the past

In attending to the correlation between social production and the direction of time, the insights of American philosopher and sociologist George Mead (1863 – 1931) will assist via his focus on the present as the locus of reality. In *The Philosophy of the Present* (2002[1932]), Mead acknowledges, similarly to Augustine, the assumption that past and future are what has been, or are what is yet to be. As Mead states; “the present implies a past and a future, and to these both we deny existence” (35). In a further consistency with Augustine, Mead interrogates this presumption. Crucially for Mead, such an inquiry should not be concerned with the past when it was previously present, whereby “we orient ourselves not with reference to the past which was a present” (46). This is because when that past was present it did not have the status of being past.

Conversely, Mead is interested in the relation of the past to the present. On the one hand, Mead describes this relation as irrevocable. This evokes the exclusively forward-moving time linearity of Durkheimian sociology, where the past conditions the possibility of the present reality, “expressed in irrevocability” (36). Indeed, this “character of irrevocability is never lost” (37), with the past of a new present always conditioning the emergence of that present. This is the everyday assumption that time only moves forward from pasts which necessarily precede the present. Mead defines this irrevocability as the “the necessity with which what has just happened conditioning what is emerging in the future” (47). Congruently, Durkheim describes such progression as the way past social incarnations inform subsequent, present socials, where “our social institutions were bequeathed to us by former generations” (1938:xliv). For Mead, this is structurally inescapable, signifying the “necessary relation of the past and the present” (2002:43).

On the other hand though, Mead describes the past as both “irrevocable *and* revocable” (36; my emphasis). The revocability of the past is attributable to the novelty of a new present, the emergence of which is akin to the coerced, but not completely determined, production of the individual by historical social forces that we have recognised via Durkheim’s sociology. Because the emergent present does not identically repeat a conditioning past, but rather is a novel/new perpetuation, the constitutive conditions of that present, the past, must also be (re-)constituted and (re-)manifest concurrently with the present. This is due to the past-present relation being a new development which the past alone could not constitute, and thus in which the past becomes something different. This novel/new relation with the present, in which the past constitutively

participates, means that the present “marks out and in a sense selects what has made its peculiarity possible” (52). The conditions of the present, its past, are constitutionally altered in terms of this present, whereby concerning the past, it is the “‘what it was’ that changes” (37). The world that was is reconstructed in terms of the world that is/emerges.

This argument will soon inform our considerations of the connection between the subjective individual and the objective social in Durkheim’s sociological analysis of suicide. Mead inadvertently directly contributes to this theme by describing the past-present relation in terms of suicide, stating that “if of two thousand individuals under disintegrating social conditions one commits suicide...his committing of suicide is an expression of the past” (48). What we are identifying however is more than a mere expression of the past in the present. Instead, the past conditions a present whose emergent novelty/particularity (re-)produces, rather than simply follows on from, this conditioning past:

The past is there conditioning the present and its passage into the future, but in the organisation of tendencies embodied in one individual there may be an emergent which gives to these tendencies a structure which only belongs to the situation of that individual. The tendencies coming from past passage, and from the conditioning that is inherent in passage, become different influences when they have taken on this organised structure of tendencies (48).

In relation to Durkheimian sociology, three ramifications arise from Mead’s commentary above. Firstly, any individual behaviour, such as suicide, can be interpreted as an “organised structure of tendencies” which, when emerging in the present, (re-)incarnates the past tendencies in a new, co-implicated with/as the present, manner. This changes what the past was.

Secondly, each suicide participates in the production of a social rate/rhythm of suicide as a continuation, but not an identical replication, of a preceding uniform rate/rhythm. Indeed, the uniformity of the past suicide rate/rhythm only manifests in the present, whereby the “what it was” of the past becomes not simply that which *has* conditioned the present suicide rate/rhythm, but also that which *will have* been conditioned by the present suicide rate/rhythm. Or in Mead’s terms concerning time, in relation to the past the present represents “the future [that] is continually qualifying the past in the present” (Mead 2002:65).

Thirdly, I want to argue that this means that the present individual participates in the production of the social at the same time as they are produced by the social. This concurrent manifestation of cause and/as effect is explained by the distinguishability of an effect of past social forces (a suicide), which simultaneously emerges as a cause in maintaining the uniformity of social rates/rhythms of suicide. The co-production of social and subject means that the social-as-past-conditioner-of-the-present does not simply pre-exist the individual-as-present-expression. This assumption is an issue that has emerged in Durkheim's sociology. Instead, what occurs is that the present-individual-expression (re-)produces the social-as-past-conditioner-of-the-present, affirming Mead's notion of a past becoming what it was in the present.

These insights provide a basis upon which to critique Durkheim's notion that social facts are objective because they pre-exist the subjects which they coercively produce, and that, as Durkheim states, "their existence prior to his own implies their existence outside of himself" (1938:2). Durkheim's sociology fixes the past permanently in place. Past social structures are productive of present individuals, but are not produced by present individuals, who "took no part in their formation" (xlv). Conversely, Mead's conception of time supports my claim that what is actually occurring in Durkheim's sociological model is not only a past traceable in the present, but also a present participating in producing that past. The present incarnation of each individual is implicated in the production of the objective social forces/facts from which the individual has been produced. That is, the subject participates in the production of socially objective rhythms.

Let us recall from chapter one the pre-modified-body/modified-body distinction which underpins body modification temporality. The pre-modified body does not exist without the incarnation of the modified body. A past for corporeality is conditioned by the emergence of a distinguishably different, yet consistently/continuously identifiable, present corporeality. Durkheim unintentionally posits a similar role for the present in arguing that "the function of social phenomena must be measured" (119). That is, the continuously uniform, but not identical, relation of current suicide rates to those of a preceding period produces the simultaneous realities of conditioning-and-conditioned past-and-present societies. The distinction between a pre-modified body and a modified body is as necessary for corporeal time as is this distinction for social time. The measurable rhythms/rates of social phenomena such as suicides, which join and distinguish social periods, emphasise the role of the present in the continuity of time.

Following this line of argument, I anticipate the criticism that it is simply our impression of the past that has changed, whilst the “past in-itself” remains fixed. This, however, is the kind of reading that an engagement with Mead can problematise. A past “in-itself” is not a “past,” nor a separate state of time/temporality. Rather, it is only via its relation to the present that the past, as time/temporality, becomes. The emergence of the present from the past produces the past as that which is past to, and will have participated in producing, this particular present. We must be clear here. What is being contested is the presumption that the source and the origin of a state of time such as the past are permanently unalterable. If Durkheim’s social facts are objective, it is not because they transcendentally pre-exist the present in which the individual manifests. This malleability of the past is, as Mead notes, a perpetual process:

...we are not contemplating an ultimate unchangeable past that may be spread behind us in its entirety subject to no further change. Our reconstructions of the past...never contemplate the finality of their findings. They are always subject to conceivable reformulations (2002:57).

The typical interpretation of an inaccessible, merely historically observable, past is duly reconceived. Via the social phenomenology of Schütz, and echoing Durkheim, social science declares that “with respect to the social world of *predecessors*, or *history*, I can only be an observer and not an actor” (1967:143). This is inconsistent with the insight currently developed in this chapter of the co-constitutive interplay between present and past social actors who participate in the production of social forces/facts/rhythms. Schütz actually goes beyond Durkheim’s position in demanding that “the world of predecessors is by definition over and done with” (208), and that “it has no open horizon toward the future” (208). My concern with this claim is that even without adventurously arguing that the past is (re-)produced in the present as I have just done, a rudimentary evaluation of social production should at least recognise the openness (or an “open horizon”) between a past and the present-as-future that it informs. Whilst Schütz observes “relations between predecessors” (208), what is lacking is an acknowledgement of time’s intergenerational, productive relations. Schütz instead describes preceding relations as “already past and hence fixed in themselves” (208). Conversely, as has been argued via Mead,

there is no past in-itself. Rather, the past only manifests in co-constitutive relation to/with a present to which it is past.

By describing the co-constitution of human subject and objective, social rhythms as a past-present co-production, there is a suggestion that the objective rhythm in which the human is implicated could be time. According to the argument just developed, the “present,” whether as a social system, human body, or other temporal manifestation, produces the past from which it has been conditioned. The emergence of the present from the past produces both concurrently, because the past becomes the past which will have produced this particular present. Is this process time? Past, present and future might be human, social concepts, however this structural emergence conditions the becoming by which time is characterised. The answer as to whether this is time will unfold as we further explore structural/relational emergence. What we can already take from our engagement with Mead however, is that if any time state, such as the past, has an origin that is perpetually reproduced, this problematises the assumption that the source of time is simply an origin that is eternally fixed in the past, away from which new presents are increasingly distanced. This insight can only inform our exploration into whether human bodies, which are seemingly simply present, are implicated in the production of time. Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, if during our inquiry it emerges that time is produced through spatialities such as humans, then considering that humans are social beings, the notion that time is a social construction will need to be accommodated. Rather than positioning a social construction as a contingent representation of a separate, actual, inherently worldly phenomenon (time), the social construction of time will instead have to be identified as implicated in the phenomenon of time itself, if indeed humans are productive constituents of it.

This prompts the basic question of what constructs the social. What is sociality? Mead’s response to this question exhibits an important consistency with our current considerations of the simultaneous multiplicity of states of time. In this regard, emergent phenomena are concurrently in both the new (present) and the old (past) systems. This systemic plurality defines, for Mead, socialisation. Sociality manifests because “in the passage from the past into the future the present object is both the old and the new” (76-77). The novelty of the present emergence, co-constitutive of/as the conditioning past, is a pluralising, socialising, temporalising phenomenon. Sociality emerges via systemically-plural constituents, whereby as Mead suggests “the social character of the universe we find in the situation in which the novel event is in both the old order

and the new which its advent heralds” (49). Such plurality will inform an understanding of the “mysterious” connection between the subject and the temporality of objective, social rhythms.

Causation: suicide and body modification

The individual’s/subject’s involvement in the uniformity of socially objective rhythms is the “mystery” to which Durkheim refers. Durkheim’s sociology asks how an individual can inform or infect how another individual from a different time relates to suicidal acts and rates, as “today’s population has not learned from yesterday’s the size of the contribution it must make to suicide” (1952:273). Nevertheless, individuals perpetuate this contribution (273). This argument redefines assumptions concerning suicidal causality. The coercion of individuals to kill themselves represents a condensation of the personal and the impersonal, contradicting closed equations restricting suicidal motivation to sovereign, individual misfortune/sadness. Rather, the regularity of suicide is already attributable to collective uniformity. Agency thus manifests as a social blur, rather than as an individual demarcation.

This decentralised interpretation of agency differs from the liberal, political, philosophical conception, whose concern is with government intervention into a society.² Liberalist thought often focuses upon freedom of choice, concerned with, as political philosopher Jean Hampton observes, “the danger to liberty coming from the power of the state” (1994:188). This configuration of a pre-existing, sovereign imposition on the individual is what my reading of Durkheim’s sociology contests. Social forces, I argue, concurrently *organise, and are organised by*, the socialisation of subjects. This perpetually interactive genesis is described by sociologist Vicki Kirby as a process wherein “society is organised in terms of ‘discursive practices’” (2006:40). Discourse incorporates all interaction and behaviour, one’s entire body caught up in such power relations. Again, this should not be confused with the liberal political tradition which separates body from agent, Grosz observing that in this regard “the body is seen as a possession of the subject, who is thereby dissociated from carnality and makes decisions and choices about how to dispose of the body and its powers” (1994:8). The issue of the body’s productive involvement in the power dynamics by which the social is arranged will become more

² For a recent study into the role of government for contemporary, liberal political thought, see Larry May and Jeff Brown’s *Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (2009).

prominent as we progress into later chapters. This will directly speak to our central interrogation of whether corporeality is constitutively implicated in, rather than merely exemplifies, time.

Exhibiting more in common with liberal notions of the body and power, body modification practitioners generally define their practices in terms of a control *over* corporeality, and often also as a defiance of, or a detachment from, social power and regulations. This is consistent with the impression of autonomous suicidal causality against which Durkheim is arguing. Here the self-curating thematic of body modification discourses characterises the body as a personal self-projection, presuming, as Pitts-Taylor observes, that “such practices exteriorise an ‘inward depth’” (2003:31). Similarly, Mike Featherstone notes the common motivation of such practices as “taking control over one’s body, of making a gesture against the body natural” (2000:2). This sense of corporeal control permeates the body modification community, reflected its manifesto found at the aforementioned *Body Modification Ezine (BME)*. BME’s founder, Shannon Larratt, duly states that “a person has ownership of their own body, and we don’t have the right to try to take away that sovereignty” (2004).

Non-normative practices such as self-cutting are accordingly perceived as seizing control of the body, where “if you’re the one doing it, or having it done to you, it is your decision, the same goes for scarification, tattoos or body piercings” (2004). The message of control is all-pervasive within commentaries concerning non-normative body modifications, assuming individualistic self-creation in defiance of norms. Society is kept at a distance, with some women, for example, describing genital piercing as a way to rebel against male dominance and to “reclaim” power over their own bodies (Pitts-Taylor 2003:3). This asserts a self-constructive reclamation of the body from both a patriarchal, social framework and a deterministic biology. Such individualised body “recovery” envisages a demarcation from the social, polarising the individual and the social combatively. As Gans observes, what is presumed here is that body modifiers are able to “designate their bodies as loci of resistance” (2000:165). Conversely, our investigations in these two chapters have not characterised such resistance as originating outside or against the social, but rather as expressing the social’s collective, objective, yet differentiated forms of coercion. This is the importance of Durkheim’s argument; that the source of such objective rhythms emerge immanently from/as the human, social realm.

Subjects and bodies are never outside power, nor are they simply produced by *pre-existing* social structures. Rather, body modification practices manifest as embodied insights into

the myriad social forces from which one is genealogically produced, and which one participates in producing. Social facts produce individuals as objects who concurrently produce such objective facticity. This is a process, as philosopher Francois Ewald observes, in which the “group finds itself objectivised in the form of the individual” (1992:171). The implications for the temporality of social causation are considerable. Let us first consider the causation of a straightforward temporality:

Socially determinate temporality

A society produces subjects. Unidirectional, forward-moving and linear, the cause (before) is the collective pressure of established social protocols. The effect (after) is the production of subjects as the social dictates.

Subjectively determinate temporality

A subject produces itself. Mimicking aspects of the liberal political position, the cause (before) is the motivation of the agentive individual. The effect (after) is self-creation/self-realisation.

Durkheim’s sociology challenges the notion of subjectively determinate causality/temporality. Our consequent interrogation of the socially determinate, unidirectional causality of Durkheim’s sociology contests the notion of *pre-existing* social structures that are *separate* from the subject. This perspective problematises the features common to social determinism *and* subjective determinism. Both these frames posit an anterior cause and a posterior effect. Conversely, when the incarnation of the subject is implicitly involved in the production of objectively subject-shaping social structures, cause and effect manifest concurrently. The distinguishability of an effect (a suicide) only manifests via its simultaneous emergence as a cause which participates in the uniform, social rate of suicide. The continuity *and* uniformity of social rhythm emerge concurrently via/as an objective temporality in which the social *and* the subject are co-immanent constituents. Furthermore, by adopting Mead’s characterisation of time’s manifestation as past-present co-constitution, the time-productive characteristics of objective, sociological rhythms can be considered. The emergence of the “present,” whether as a social system, subject, or otherwise, produces, and is produced by, concurrent pasts and futures. The concepts of “past,” “present”

and “future” could be described as human contingencies. Nevertheless, they potentially describe what their relations incarnate; time.

Social and subjective determinism both separate the social structure and the individual. Durkheim emphasises this by exteriorising individual consciousness from the collaborative character of social structure, something we will soon address. Such a distinction demands the interactivity of two *different* components, whereby in terms of time, the limit between “before” and “after” is eternally permanent. Alternatively, in the developing argument of this chapter, the co-production of social and subject both manifests *and* blurs such time limits. The body modifier is not simply an individual whose motivation to tattoo their face or undertake plastic surgery is reactionary to pre-existing social forces and norms. We are not encountering an oppressive social production of the subject, nor a defiantly demarcated self-production. Rather, the body modifier’s subjectivity is perpetually bound up with a broader objectivity, whereby one does not precede the other.

This is a significant ramification for the temporality of Durkheim’s social facts; the simultaneous incarnation of subject and object. Understanding how objective rhythms manifest with/as human subjects is the first stage of our exploration. This insight will now need to be developed to consider whether humans are implicated in producing the objective rhythm which seemingly conditions social synchronisation and function; time. In terms of the primary question of this thesis, this would not necessarily signify that the human role in producing time is corporeally/bodily based. Nevertheless, it would progress the argument in such a direction, by recognising time-production in the human realm, and attributing such capacity to humans (who of course, are bodied).

The enabled subject

Individuals are social constituents, producing, rather than merely following, past social incarnations. Recognising this facilitates an engagement with the accusation from British sociologist, Anthony Giddens, that Durkheimian sociology installs a constrained individual who is devoid of agency. In *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (1984), Giddens demands that structural sociologies suffocate subjects by imposing “circumstances, of which agents are ignorant and which effectively ‘act’ on them, independent of

whatever the agents may believe they are up to” (xix). Giddens sees Durkheim’s sociological exploration into suicide as a prime example. Conversely, Giddens does not want to discount the role of the individual, in that “there are some acts which cannot occur unless the agent intends them. Suicide is a case in point. Durkheim’s conceptual efforts to the contrary” (8).

This chapter’s current inquiry into Durkheimian sociology conceives of a social-subject co-constitution, in which each individual subject is conditioned by, *and conditions*, social forces. The issue for Giddens though seems to be Durkheim’s use of the terms “exteriority” and “externality” to describe the subject’s relation to social forces. This is exemplified in Giddens’ critique that “structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is more ‘internal’ than exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense” (25). However, I believe Durkheim uses these loaded terms to emphasise that behaviours, such as suicide, are not exclusively motivated by individual, subjective, agentive causation. Given my reading of individual-social co-constitution in Durkheim’s sociology, I therefore argue that Durkheimian social structure manifests not as pure constraint as Giddens supposes, but rather as an expression of a conditioning/conditioned individual. In this regard Giddens and I therefore actually agree that “structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling” (25). Giddens’ reading and mine differ though on the nature of the constraint and exteriority in Durkheimian sociology. As noted in the last chapter, Durkheim directly refuted these kinds of accusations that his sociology overly constrained the individual.

Justification for how I am interpreting Durkheim can be attributed to the conception of time developed with Mead’s considerable assistance, in which the past is not permanently finalised. Conversely, Giddens’ interpretation relies upon the unidirectional, forward-moving, linear conception of time which underpins Durkheim’s fraught basis for objectivity. Giddens identifies that social structures exist before and after the life of an individual in Durkheim’s sociology, whereby “the *longue durée* of institutions both pre-exists and outlasts the lives of individuals” (170). This is the basis upon which Giddens argues that Durkheimian structural properties are outside and “certainly exterior to the activities of the ‘individual’” (170). However, to argue this, Giddens must assume a past institutional structure that is separate from the present. This is an interpretation that has thus far been reconfigured in this chapter. The past is not objectively exterior to the present. Rather, the past emerges with/as a co-constitutive present. Whether Durkheim, and Giddens, realise it or not, this implies that the present individual

is not simply conditioned by a social past, but rather the social past is also conditioned by the present individual. Or in Mead's terms, the present individual *calls* the social past which will mark the individual's "peculiarity." It is this present, individual peculiarity which characterises the subject-enabling aspect of social forces. This is evoked by Durkheim as the aforementioned "individual shades" described as being involved in the "genesis" of the social fact. There is not a pre-existing social structure that determines individuals. Rather, the social coerces, and is coerced by, individual constituents. This coercion is objective, meaning, as we have explored, that all manifestations, non-normative *and* normative, are socially constitutive.

Recalling our introductory definitions, "objective" refers to what inescapably applies to all individuals/particularities/subjectivities. This is what I identify as most *enabling* about the objectivity of social forces (which Durkheim confusingly characterises as "exterior" to the subject). The subject is enabled by such structural properties in that objectivity conditions the social synchronisation upon which the arrangements and practices of individuals rely, and duly (re-)produces. Contrary to Giddens, it is not purely a "constraint [that] stems from the 'objective' existence of structural properties that the individual agent is unable to change" (176). Indeed, the notion of "unable to change" confirms Giddens' reading of a unidirectionally linear cause-effect chain, between a pre-existing social and the subsequent "will" of an individual. Conversely, in this chapter socially determined, and subjectively determined, causalities have been problematised, instead positing a concurrent, co-constitutive production of the subject and/as the social. It is not that the subject wills change to an already existing social. The subject instead is always already inescapably participating in/as social (re-)construction. The enabled, socially structured subject will re-emerge via the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu in the next chapter.

This chapter has correlated individual-social co-constitution with the *immanent* co-constitution of past, present and future. Conversely, the early theory of influential sociologist Barbara Adam characterises these time relations in *transcendent* terms. This sits awkwardly with any possible contestation to the characterisation of time's source as transcendent. In *Time and Social Theory*, whose thematic divergence from the ambitions of my considerations were discussed in the previous chapter, Adam supposes that "human time is characterised by *transcendence*...All human action, for example, is embedded in a continuity of past, present, and future" (1990:127; my emphasis). Adam's interpretation is that once one's subjectivity extends beyond an immediate present, this constitutes "transcendence." Indeed, Adam involves Austrian

sociologist, Helga Nowotny, in supporting the claim that no human societies “lack the ability to transcend the immediate present” (Nowotny 1975:328). This kind of here|there, now|then opposition is something that the engagement with Durkheim and Augustine in this chapter has contested. This argument will intensify in chapter four, when the possibility that every moment of time *is* every other moment of time will be considered.

Whilst Adam’s later text, *Timewatch* (1995), acknowledges that we can “reinterpret, represent, restructure and modify the past” (38), her characterisation of this as the human capacity to “transcend” the present differentiates her concerns from mine. Adam astutely addresses the ramifications for subjectivity which come from presuming that the past and the present are absolutely distinct, in that this “inhibits an understanding of selves and societies *being* their pasts and futures, of mutual implication, of coevalness, of unity and relatedness with difference” (169). Nevertheless, we are being careful not to overcorrect the assumption that time’s source transcendently divides human, social phenomena, by instead adhering to the inverse, but equally extreme assumption which postulates a human transcendence over time. Conversely, Adam’s terminology, in describing how humans transcend time(s), sometimes does rely upon such an overcorrection. I endorse Adam’s protestation against “the tradition of understanding the ‘then and there’ as other to the ‘here and now’” (169). However, by describing this as a present which is “transcended,” such a conceptual division appears to simply be (re-)installed, or (re-)positioned, rather than interrogated. Mead is occasionally also inconsistent in this regard, describing a temporalising process “which transcends the present” (2002:54). This is not necessarily a criticism of Adam or Mead, but a reminder of the specific focus of the exploration through which I am leading us in contesting the time-as-transcendence characterisation. In fact, we will consider in chapter five whether such conceptual division can actually be incorporated into, rather than excluded from, our inquiry.

I have not correlated Mead’s conception with transcendence in any case. Mead has facilitated the insight that an individual belonging to more than one system (present-as-past-expression and past-as-present-production) does not transcend one system to be in the other simultaneously. Rather, one is only in a system because of their relational particularity to/in/as the other system. This (re-)produces both systems, present, past, immanently, concurrently and co-constitutively. In fact, the individual must be “contemporaneously in different systems to be what it is in either” (Mead 2002:86). This “socialisation,” blurring apparently finite subjective

boundaries and problematising the notion of an eternally permanent finality of a subject's past, is conditional upon the present for its emergence. The past-present relativity that is "presented" is crucial, whereby as an expression of the past "in the present" an individual's "location in one system places it in the others as well" (86). Mead duly affirms the present-centric rhythm identifiable in Augustinian time. For Augustine, it is in the present that time upsurges, something Mead characterises as sociality; "the sociality of the present" (86).

Our engagement with Augustinian philosophy has been incorporated to consider the role of the subject in the production of objective rhythms, and ultimately, hopefully, also in the production of objective time. This inquiry has characterised the concurrent co-constitution of the subject and the social as engendering the objective rhythm(s) of the social, a shifting-but-continuous uniformity. The subject's involvement in the temporality of objective rhythms is defined by their role in the constitution of a present from which past and future co-manifest. As noted, correlatively, Augustine considers the past and the future to be hidden in the present. We will now explore the human subject's position at the heart of the temporality of this objective rhythm. Somewhat worryingly though for our key enquiry into whether time-production can be attributed to the human body, Augustine, like a police officer attending a metaphysical crime scene, is about to ask us to step away from "the body."

Consciousness of, and as, time

In determining how the past and the future are dependent upon the present, Augustine turns to the human mind. When considering what is past, Augustine notes that his "own childhood, which no longer exists, is in past time, which also no longer exists. But when I *remember*...it is in the present that I picture it" (1961:267; my emphasis). By engaging Mead we have challenged the supposed non-existence of the past, whereby there is never a past in-itself, but always a relationally produced "present-past." Interestingly for Augustine in this regard, whilst the past has passed, it remains able to be experienced via memory. The past thus has a conditional existence, as traces of experiences which "left an impression on our minds, by means of our sense-perception" (267). In remembering them, these pasts become present, even if the period which left the impressions has apparently passed.

Likewise, in considering the foreseeing of what is yet to occur, “it is only possible to see something which exists” (268). This means that it is not that one predicts something which is yet to come into being, but rather that what is anticipated is already in the process of being, whereby “whatever exists is not future but present” (268). Thought anticipates a future that is traceable in present indications. Emphasising this mental constitution of the flow of time, Augustine clarifies that “the present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation” (269). Furthermore, the mind is also attributed with responsibility for how the future or past can be diminished or increased when they do not exist in themselves (thus cohering with Mead’s refutation of a past in-itself). Augustine’s assertion is that “it can only be that the mind, which regulates this process” (277). Humans experience a spatial/sensible universe by expecting, perceiving and remembering entities/events. If all such spatial changes ceased however, time would not, because “the movement of a body is not the same as the means by which we measure the duration of its movement” (273). The means to which Augustine here refers is time, the experiential capacity with which subjects measure spatial change via an extension of the mind (274).

Given the spatial/sensible focus of our inquiries into the potentially time-productive human body, Augustine’s restriction of time-experience to a mind-based realm divorced from spatiality/sensibility could seem alarmingly prohibitive. However, this mental-centrism does not necessarily contradict such efforts if Augustinian time can speak to our concern about the subjective involvement in, and production of, objective rhythms. Recognising the subjective element is important in order to avoid exteriorising the source of objectivity from human subjects. If one such rhythm, time, can only be characterised as objective because its source transcends human interference, then whilst this can explain social synchronisation (via universal adherence to a pre-existing, absolute, temporality), the ramification will be that humans merely exemplify time, rather than are entities through which time is produced. Contrary to this, Augustine demands that humans are somehow implicated in time’s experiential manifestations. Thus, despite Augustine’s exclusion of spatiality/corporeality, his model is still greatly relevant to our inquiry, as will become apparent by re-constructing our comprehension of “subjectivity.”

At this point, it is justified to ask how Augustine’s prioritisation of subjective, mental processes can be accommodated within the sociologically structuralist argument developed earlier, in which individual minds are not prioritised or defined as demarcated, causal nodes

representing exclusively subjective modes of production. In response, we can discuss the notion of origination. For Durkheim, social currents manifest in/as the collective, and do not “originate in any one of the particular individual consciousness” (1938:4). However, even if the subject is not an autonomous instigator of their behaviours, such behaviours collectively produce social rhythms. The society is dependent upon the subject’s productive role. Given this lack of individual pre-enactment, the socially situated subject only becomes/behaves that subject in the present, along with the social. Durkheim correlates such social rhythms with consciousness, as a “*state of mind* transmitted to...[a] number of persons [who] make the *state of mind* become an act” (1952:273; my emphases). This prompts us to recall the second point to be addressed in this chapter; Durkheim’s claim that the rhythm of social facts is objective because the collective consciousness is *outside* individual consciousness.

Durkheim characterises consciousness as manifesting socially “beyond” the minds of individuals. This collaborative, collective consciousness produces social facts, which are objectively responsible for the uniform continuity of social rhythms, outside each individual. Indeed, a new social emerges when “the consciousness of individuals, instead of remaining isolated, becomes grouped” (275). Whilst Durkheim would therefore disagree with Augustine if Augustine asserted a separate, atomic, subjective conception of time by the mind, he would be more receptive if such subjectivity/mentality was portrayed collectively. It seems contradictory to equate what is subjective with what is collective. However, this captures the messiness of Durkheim’s model, of an external force that can only exist within the internal expression-of-the-collective that is the individual.³ Whilst the behaviours which produce the uniformity of social rhythms are not individually isolated, they do manifest individually. Sociologist Nick Crossley recognises that the conception of externality upon which this relies is not one of straightforward internal|external opposition, explaining that “even if social structures are ‘external’ to individuals in the specific manner outlined by Durkheim, we should recognise, as indeed Durkheim did, that they never exist anywhere but within matrices of concrete human action and interaction” (2001:321). This recognition of phenomena that are concurrently individual *and* collective illustrates the power of sociology for Durkheim, who cites sociologist Gabriel Tarde in proclaiming that “in sociology we have through a rare privilege, knowledge both of that element

³ The notion that in a One|Other relation neither pre-exists the other, whereby each is instead a productive force *within* the other *as* the other, will re-emerge throughout the remaining chapters.

which is our individual consciousness, and of the compound of consciousness in individuals” (Tarde in Durkheim 1952:275).

Concerning the temporality of body modification, this impression of subjectivity informs the insight that the decision to body modify does not precede social influence, nor does social influence precede individual decisions. Rather, there is a simultaneous co-production of society and individual, where subjective, individual decisions are implicated in/as social forces. These social forces are concurrently “outside” the individual, as objective impressions upon all in society, and “inside” the individual, via the incarnation of particular, objective expressions. The subject is outside its individual self by being inside its collective self, as a constitutive social element which is always already producing its individual self. Consequently, the already problematic manifesto of the body modification community, which instils notions of a socially-demarcated control over corporeality, becomes even more fragile. Given the argument developed in this chapter of the co-constitution of subject and society, one cannot argue that body modification practices are merely a *reaction* in defiance of social norms, from outside such norms. In acknowledging the co-constitution of subjectivity and objectivity, of the individual and the social, there are no anterior and posterior positions in the temporality of cause-and-effect. Whether it is suicide, tattooing or any recognisable act or thought, neither society, nor the subject, pre-dates, or arrives after, the other.

The body modifier, as an incarnation of social forces by which they are impelled to undertake modifying practices, does not have their own subjectivity negated by such objectivity. If subjectivity was absent, there would not be *uniformity* to social rhythm/temporality. Rather, there would be a straightforward *replication* of one social period in the next, producing identically moulded “subjects.” Social temporality would instead be replaced by something resembling the way the eternal, divine realm is depicted. Regardless of the objective coercion of behaviour, the subjectivity of individuals is identifiable in the rhythms of social collectives. Consequently, equations of subjectivity with sovereignty/autonomy, and a correlative break in the rhythm/continuity of time, are refuted.

Augustine affords humans a central, mentally and subjectively experiential role in time’s emergence. This could be significant for our exploration into whether the source of time is produced through, instead of transcends, humans. However, does the subjective character of Augustinian time-consciousness contradict the social synchronisation that the objectivity of

something like Newtonian time can explain? If time-consciousness is exclusively a subjective mechanism or experience, where is the common or objective quality of time by which subjects co-synchronise? What indeed would 9 o'clock represent without a common, objective time for everyone in a social frame?

Collective memory

In order to address this issue, an acceptance of subjective time needs to be conditional upon the porosity of its mental constitution. As observed, Durkheim characterises consciousness as collaborative, decentralising the individual consciousness when describing the rhythmic uniformity of behavioural patterns as “social things, products of collective thought” (1995:9). The social production of, and adherence to, such rhythms, means that consciousness of time is also an “impersonal framework that contains not only our individual existence but also that of humanity” (10). Such objective, collective consciousness manifests uniformly, coercing the knowledge and production of social time for *and* by all subjects, because it is “conceived objectively by all men⁴ of the same civilisation” (10). Note the double meaning of the word “conceive” here, suggesting both: (i) a comprehension of something, and; (ii) a participation in the creation of something (in this case, collective time). Attending to the timing of this collective creation reveals an important consistency regarding the subjective aspect of time for Durkheim and Augustine.

Part of Augustine's confusion regarding time was how God, outside the spatial/sensible universe of temporal things, could create a temporal world. This evokes my suspicion about the polarisation of space from time. Durkheim echoes Augustine's concern with a concluding remark in *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, observing that “a God relegated by his majesty outside of the universe and everything temporal, cannot serve as a goal for our temporal activity, which is thus left without an *objective*” (1952:343; my emphasis). For Durkheim, remember, the objectivity of social rhythm is not conditioned by a divine, transcendent source, but emerges from the social processes themselves. Our consequent engagement with Durkheimian sociology argues that the subject is a constituent of such objectivity, seemingly exceeding their apparent

⁴ Gender-specific terms, when employed by a theorist in a general statement, should be replaced by the reader with gender-neutral terms, reflecting the objectivity of social forces to all humans.

borders without ever being entirely outside them. The subject does not cause the objective temporality of social rhythms by willing their own behaviours. Instead, as has been argued in this chapter, they concurrently inherit them from, and contribute them to, social structure.

This point facilitates a noteworthy return to Augustine's conception of time, whose subjective, mental construction can now also be interpreted as not dominated by one's will. For Augustine, the created being does not precede time, but only comes about *with time* in the same creative act *as time*.⁵ This recalls our earlier appraisal of the modified body, which only manifests when the pre-modified body also does, conditioning corporeal temporality. Rather than presenting a human subject at the mercy of time from without, or a subject that wills or interprets time indiscriminately, the subjective nature of time for Augustine reflects the inescapably *collective* temporality of human subjects. If humans were not temporal, they would be eternal, and no longer human. Augustine thus appeals to humans "to feel" the periods of time (1961:265). The subject does not decide to control time, but rather cannot avoid experientially manifesting time's passing through a collective mentality. We are about to see how this collective sense of consciousness correlates with my interpretation of Durkheim's sociology, in which the subject does not individually originate the regular temporality of social rhythms, but nevertheless social temporality is incarnated through them.

In terms of the mental aspect of time/temporality, a straightforward past would suggest that memory is history is time. However, Augustine's and Durkheim's conceptions of collective consciousness illustrate that one's memory is not a mere "storehouse" of past, historical experiences. Rather, memory extends beyond a subject, who acquires and produces memories through present experience. Augustine acknowledges the social fabric of time-consciousness in doubting his ability to "think of them [memories] at all, if some other person had not brought them to the fore" (218). Rather than the subject being preceded by the time of which they will be conscious, or indeed of the subject preceding the time of which they will be conscious, here subjectivity inescapably manifests with time-consciousness, intersubjectively, socially dispersed. This is the becoming of the subject, where memory, in collectively bringing forth that of which one is not always aware, manifests as the process "where I meet myself" (215). This evokes

⁵ Philosopher Milič Čapek notes an ideological confrontation between Augustine's conception of a human participation in time, and Barrow's earlier observed absolute time; "Augustine's conception that the world was not made *in* time, but *with* time, was later criticised by Isaac Barrow who held it to be incompatible with the doctrine of absolute time" (1976:xxxi).

Mead's co-constitutive past-present relation, in that the subject who remembers the past only manifests in the present concurrently with the past which also manifests. Mead characterises the mind in equally broad, collective terms, stating that "the field of mind is the larger environment which the activity of the organism calls" (2002:54). This primacy of the organism for Mead means that his conception of blurred subjectivity will become increasingly relevant to the spatial/corporeal focus of our inquiry as it develops. For now however, if we are to benefit from engaging a model of subjective time, such a socially unrestricted conception of subjectivity will be necessary in order to explain the common/objective time-consciousness which conditions social synchronisation.

The socially dispersed character of collective consciousness brings our attention to the second aspect by which Durkheim defines the objectivity of social facts that we have flagged for interrogation; the supposed exteriority of individual consciousness from the collective consciousness. My reading of Durkheim recognises individuals who are implicated in the production of the collective force from which they are constituted. It is difficult to describe this as a relation of *exteriority* between the social-self and the individual-self, particularly when our engagement with Meadian time has illustrated that every state is concurrently constitutive of the other. There is not an institutionalised, social, collective consciousness which is fixed, pre-dates and produces individual consciousnesses. Instead, recognising the simultaneous production of the subject and the social, a co-constitutive, perpetual process, coheres with Augustine's conception of consciousness where one meets oneself in/as the social/collective. Durkheim's insistence that the individual-social relation is one of objective separation does not reflect the co-constitutive porosity which characterises the individual-social relation. Nor is it consistent with the rest of his sociology, which argues against the demarcation of the individual from the social. Consciousness is objective because it is a collective fact in which every individual always already participates. In terms of what is collective, objectivity is defined by the implication of all individuals, rather than its separation from each individual.

This recognition of memory's porosity is congruent with the work of one of Durkheim's peers, the French sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs (1877 – 1945). In *On Collective Memory* (1992[1941]), Halbwachs' argument is that "collective memory is not a division, or a given, but rather a socially constructed notion" (22). Individuals acquire *and* produce their memories socially, for "it is in society that one can recall, recognise, enact and localise their memories"

(38). Memories reflect our relations with others, just as Augustine argues that memories would not even manifest were it not for other people bringing them “to the fore.” In belonging to such memorial contexts, Halbwachs notes that “when I remember, it is others who spur me on, their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies on theirs” (38). Recollective processes are attributable to one’s presence in a social frame. Indeed, it now becomes apparent; to *recollect* is a *collective* operation. The observation from Santmyer which opened this chapter, namely that the time of one’s youth is *held* in the mind, must duly be defined as a socially implicated *possession*.

Memory that is not restricted to a specific mind still involves the productive role of the individual. Just as up to this point in this thesis it has been argued that objective consciousness is not exterior to the human, equally a social dispersed memory should not be characterised as something the human accesses from without. David Gross astutely observes the temptation to characterise social memory as an external apparatus monopolised by state/institutional control. Because of its extensive inventories of data and “enormous storage capacity (files, census information, police records, computer banks, and the like), the state is becoming *the* official source of memory for society” (1985:74). Whilst these are aspects of socially/collectively constructed memories/consciousness, such a production is not separate from its present, past, and future subjective, human constituents.

In terms of our exploration into whether the individual is implicated in time’s production, another way to describe such collectively constructed consciousness is that the subject (re-)produces the social which (re-)produces the subject’s memories. Memory-as-past is thus never fixed, as has been observed via Mead, but instead is a collective (re-)production. This (re-)emergence of collective states, in the form of states of temporality, is reflected in Halbwachs’ identification that “collective historical memory has both cumulative and presentist aspects,” showing “partial continuity as well as new readings of the past in terms of the present” (1992:26). Collective memory embodies social structures which have produced, and been produced by, individuals, representing not what is distantly past, but rather what is durably and presently socially contextualised/materialised. This is a process which the subject perpetually inhabits, whereby something like a suicide participates in/as the memory of a social body, via its contribution to the overall, uniform, rhythm of suicide rates. The social body *remembers itself* in a blurred movement from the specificity of the individual to the collectivity of the social, incarnating individuals who incarnate its, and their, rhythmic production. This continuous

uniformity “reminds” subjects in subsequent social periods how and when to take their own lives. The Durkheimian “mystery” of social uniformity is duly articulated. Given this role of each subject as a continually socially memorial constituent, the interpretation of suicide (or of death generally) as marking the finality of one’s social participation, is debatable.

This subject and social co-constitution will be explored in the following chapters with an emphasis on the role of the human body/corporeality. For now however, we will address the implications of this conception of memory by again distinguishing the focus of this chapter from the kind of social science exemplified by Michael Flaherty. In one sense, Flaherty encouragingly recognises the self as a social construction; “inasmuch as the self is a thoroughly social entity” (2011:132). However, Flaherty also relies upon a restricted, interiorised characterisation of time-experience as the mind’s “internal environment (i.e., self-consciousness, cognition)” (1999:141), which interprets “information from its external environment (i.e., one’s situation or circumstances)” (141). Flaherty’s argument is therefore conditioned by the juxtaposition of the mind’s internality from a social, situational realm. This marks the mind as a container/storehouse for memories, whereby in cases of “temporal compression” (Flaherty’s term for experiences in which there is “less” conscious experience in a “standard” period of time than is typical (105)), there can be a “loss of memory over time” (110).

In contradiction to the conception of memory currently developed in this chapter, where states of memory are reconstituted along with states of time and social states, Flaherty’s focus on the experience of what can only be an already existing time-source, to be remembered or lost, quantifies memory. This invokes the conception of a storehouse of memory that Durkheim and Augustine have avoided. Furthermore, the notion of a “loss of memory over time” demands that the past is separated from a present in which the past, as an objectively fixed fact, is either retained or involuntarily relinquished. This contradicts our Meadian inspired reading of the past as implicated in, and reproduced by/with, the present to which it is in relation. Given that Flaherty does not recognise a socially unrestricted, collective consciousness, he is forced to characterise synchronisation, the objectivity of time which conditions social function, as something external to the subjectivity of individual consciousness. As he states, “synchronicity is not quite a facet of consciousness” (35). For Flaherty, time is quantifiably objective because its source is outside each subject, a pre-existing utility that can be used for synchronisation. This is the kind of conception currently being interrogated in this chapter. By recognising mind,

memory and consciousness as blurred social phenomena, social time agreement can be characterised as consciousness. This sense of synchronisation will be explored at length in chapter four.

Eviatar Zerubavel's sociological conception of collective memory is seemingly more consistent with this characterisation. Zerubavel's *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (2003) evidences this, exploring how "a *sociomental* topography of the past helps highlight this pronouncedly social dimension of human memory, by revealing how entire communities, and not just individuals, remember the past" (2). In acknowledging that we remember not just as individuals, but also as communities, Zerubavel mimics Halbwachs' description of the social constitution of individual memory. Social practices and institutions participate in/as our memories, because "the social environment affects not only what we remember but also *when* we come to remember it" (4). After articulating social memory in a manner consistent with Durkheim's demand that social forces are not the sum of individual components, in that "collective memory is more than just an aggregate of individuals' personal memories" (28), we then arrive at the originality of Zerubavel's work. However, as with the social science of Flaherty, it is here that an awkward tension manifests.

Congruent with the argument developed in this chapter with Mead, Zerubavel acknowledges that the past and the present are not absolutely distinct; "the past and the present are not entirely separate entities" (37). Zerubavel attributes this to the present amassing what has preceded, whereby "the present is largely a *cumulative*, multilayered collage of past residues" (37). However, Zerubavel characterises such past-present co-implication/continuation as an illusory mental technique which combines what we actually, really believe are distinct and separate points in time. This claim is difficult to reconcile with his previous reading of a past that is not separate from the present, instead now stating that "continuous identities are products of the *mental* integration of otherwise disconnected points in time into a seemingly single historical whole" (40).

The reason for engaging Flaherty, and now Zerubavel, is to differentiate what is at stake in our inquiries in this thesis from currently pervasive accounts of time in the social sciences. Zerubavel's argument that the mind arranges "time points," assumes that time's source is anterior to a consciousness which subsequently organises representations of it for socially pragmatic purposes. This is consistent with the typical assumption that real time is not the social

construction that humans use, but rather is a worldly phenomenon anterior to the human representation, measurement, management and utilisation of it. Here the individual employs techniques to fuse time according to Zerubavel, via “mental editing to produce an illusory *quasi-contiguity* that can help offset the actual temporal gaps between noncontiguous points in history” (40). It is not that Zerubavel is arguing that time is literally constituted by distinct points, but rather explaining how we divide or “cut up” (85) a time which precedes such mental efforts. Conversely, I am interested in exploring an ontology in which time is not a pre-existing transcendent source which is *then* experienced by a human. This will instead bring a focus on the potentially concurrent emergence of time and/as the human. As noted, if in this inquiry it emerges that time is produced or constructed through spatialities such as embodied humans, then given that humans are social, it will also not be possible to exclude social constructions of time from the phenomenon of time itself.

This chapter has acknowledged the co-constitution of pasts, presents and futures, a relational production in which there are no experiences of time “in-itself” because there can never be a time “in-itself.” Contrarily, Zerubavel is positing the experience of time as just that...a mental division and fusion of in-themself “disconnected points in time.” The conception of mental phenomena that has been engendered in this chapter is of an objective blur, in which the subjective consciousness and the social consciousness emerge *with* time, as concurrent, systemic pluralities. Such an interpretation differs from Zerubavel’s mind-time relation, in which time precedes a mind which abstracts and separates time, whereby “cutting up the past into supposedly discrete ‘periods’ is basically a mental act” (96). Even if Zerubavel astutely acknowledges that time is not actually constituted by divided periods, the source or origin of time here is still installed as preceding our mental management of it. This is not a criticism of Zerubavel, but instead indicates the divergence of our foci. Zerubavel’s and Flaherty’s sociologies are focused on the human experience/representation/knowledge of a time with a pre-existing, anterior source or origin. Conversely, in this thesis we are concerned with the human involvement in time’s ontology and production.

A typical characterisation of memory conceives of a subject who brings an objective, permanently fixed past into the present. This is a time that is measured and quantified into minutes, hours, days and years on a linear, forward-moving path of distinct, separate instants. Chronological time here lines up a past which precedes a present which precedes a future. A

social conception of memory goes beyond this straightforward time path, given that what is past does not exist without the productive capacity of the present subject/social co-constitution. From this emerges the subject(s), the social(s), and the memories, concurrently, producing an objective memory as it is recalled.⁶ As Durkheim and Augustine state, there is not a storehouse of objective facts waiting to be called upon by a subject. Rather, without the social interaction that anticipates a past that has yet to be, there could be no memory.

Resembling the earlier discussion which problematised the discernible point where individual agency ends, and a social source of behavioural acquisition begins, it is this theory of time which we have also seen Halbwachs engage in positing collective memory. The development of an argument that situates the individual's consciousness/subjectivity in/as the temporality of an objective, collective rhythm is invaluable to our inquiries, given the ultimate ambition to explore the potential implication of humans in the source of objective time. The collective constitution maintains time's objectivity, which is important given the role of an objective temporality in social function and synchronisation. However, we will now see that time's "objectivity" is a characterisation that Augustine cannot accommodate in his framework.

Time and self-destruction

The Augustinian subject is one phase of collective, human temporality. As the protagonist that experiences life, the subject-as-temporal-being is a present that passes, to be inevitably and perpetually destructed and made non-existent. However, as a conscious narrator of experience, the subject accounts for past, present and future in a God-like unified self-presence which offers an image of eternity. One "looks forward, not to what lies ahead of me in this life and will surely pass away, but to my eternal goal" (Augustine 1961:278). Only an existence concerned with eternity will avoid the self-destruction toward which temporal life tends.

This impression of time's self-destructive nature evokes Kant's condemnation of body-tampering processes. We have of course seen this self-harming characterisation also being attributed to body modification practices. Self-destruction is not only implied in Augustine's

⁶ The dynamic nature of memory is apparent during eyewitness accounts of crimes. Research undertaken by psychologists David Hall, Elizabeth Loftus and James Tausignant indicates that memory changes, beginning when "original memory for an event is reactivated and new information is added by postevent experience" (1984:134). Memory is not an isolated event, but rather "a series of events" (124).

theory of subjective time, it resounds as its mantra. For Augustine, the individual manifests time's passage *subjectively*, and it is the violence of being-temporal which will destroy them. Likewise, we have seen that when body modification practices are characterised in subjectively centric, normatively-violent terms, "analysts...will see this as indicating a tendency toward self-destructive behaviour" (Sanders & Vail 2008:39).

Could it be then that body modification practices, in conjuring imagery which demands an acknowledgement of a changing corporeality, are often vilified because they remind us of our own apparently fleshy mortality and finite temporality? Is there a connection between destructive impressions of subjective time, and similarly auto-violent characterisations of subjectively motivated body modification practices? Augustine equates temporality with mortality after all, and with mortality being repositioned in an increasingly secularised Western culture⁷ (what sociologist Steve Bruce describes as the "secularisation paradigm" (2002:1-44)), one would not expect the marginalisation of certain body modification practices to soften in the foreseeable future.

In offering a mind-based characterisation of time's self-destructive capacities, one that is separated from the realm of flesh and substance, Augustine abides by the time|space polarisation that we are in fact interrogating. Indeed, Augustine describes the temporality of memory, perception and expectation as processes upon which the reality of a separate, spatial/sensible realm depends. It is not that the entirety of reality is housed in the mind. Rather, time becomes a productive mental impression, something that remains "after *the thing itself* has ceased to be" (Augustine 1961:276; my emphasis). The phenomenal, spatial "thing itself," and the time-productive mind, are thus separate. Just as Newtonian and Aristotelian models for objective time position its source outside spatiality/sensibility, equally in Augustine's subjective model, time and spatiality/sensibility are divided.

Furthermore, despite Augustine's recognition of the social constitution of mind-as-time, he disagrees that time is objective. Whilst Durkheim identifies "social consciousness" as productive of objective rhythm, Augustine declares that "I must not allow my mind to insist that time is something objective" (276). It is only via the reading through which I have led us of Augustinian time that the temporality of an objective rhythm emerges which implicates both

⁷ In *Alternative Religions: A Sociological Introduction* (2003), sociologist Stephen Hunt examines how Western religions will manage a "Western culture [that] is undoubtedly increasingly secular" (211).

subjective and objective aspects. By incorporating Durkheimian sociology, we have observed that the source of objective rhythm does not transcend the realm of humans. Rather, its upsurge is attributable to the social constitution of individual consciousness. In terms of the central focus of this chapter, and this thesis, this has been a worthwhile exercise. However, if the subject's constitutive role in such objective rhythms is to be acknowledged as a production of the objective rhythm that is time, and this is to be attributed to the body, the polarisation of ethereal time from tangible space must be further interrogated.

In reconceptualising mind and memory, Augustine has assisted us in recognising a collectively characterised subjectivity, albeit one grounded in an intangible consciousness. Despite this restriction, we are not yet finished with his philosophy. Augustine's interest in the role of consciousness in time is seemingly what attracts him to the analogy of the spoken word for the ancient Greek philosopher, Plotinus (205 – 270). The spoken word could be an interesting direction for this thesis to take. Speech consolidates the subjectivity of a speaker and the objectivity of collectively agreed upon rules. More importantly however, the audible substantiality/spatiality of speech takes us beyond notions of pure intangibility. This is important if we are to break down the supposed polarisation of ethereally-time|substantial-space, and in turn recognise the human body-as-space as immanent in time's production.

Spoken, social time

In Plotinus' *The Enneads* (1994[circa 250]), the sound of speech is described as a sensibility that incorporates both an impact of air made by the breath, and a counter-action as the experience of what is spoken. This defines "speech as action upon a substrate [air] and experience within that substrate" (6.1.5). The significance/meaning that the sound possesses is essential, for its "nature is that it be significant, as noun and verb are significant" (6.1.5). Such significance of the sound will differ according to each listener, which illustrates for Plotinus the varied unification by which Soul also operates. Soul, as a universal aspect of God's created world, manifests in varying degrees in individuals depending on their commitment to such a notion. Similarly, the sound of a spoken word is accessible beyond each individual, however it will only take on significance/meaning to some of them, whereas for other individuals it will be experienced more as an "impact" of air. As philosopher Genevieve Lloyd summarises, the spoken word, just like

the Soul, is “entire at every point in the appropriate space, every listener catching the whole” (1999:52). However, this “whole” is experienced differently by each person.

Plotinus is positing *one self-identical presence* in the case of both speech and Soul. Such presence is then *subsequently* interpreted differently by individuals, whereby what is present about speech and Soul precedes the particular manifestations that depart from it. Plotinus duly describes the awareness of a mind/consciousness that turns back to contemplate the presence from which its individual significance has come. The speaker, as that “thing of beginnings in time” (1994:4.4.14), represents a “newcomer” which winds itself around its awareness of the One “that each of us was at first” (4.4.14).

The reason for raising this point is that it indicates Augustine’s apparent intrigue concerning how significance for the spoken word emerges via an intimate connection between time, consciousness and sociality. Speech concurrently binds the individual to a universal presence, and yet also distinguishes each individual as a particular expression of it. Accordingly, in *Confessions* Augustine attributes his social maturation to speech acquisition, when he “ceased to be a baby unable to talk, and was now a boy with the power of speech” (1961:29). Such development is more spontaneous than formally learned, as “it was not my elders who showed me the words by some set system of instruction” (29). Neither was this an autonomous development, for speech taps into a “universal language, consisting of expressions of the face and eyes, gestures and tones of voice” (29). One is instead educated via general socialisation, whereby primary instruction can be no measure of general education (29). This resembles Durkheim’s reference to the unwitting socialisation of young subjects. Such an inescapable process describes the coercion “to which the child is subjected,” by way of “the pressure of the social milieu which tends to fashion him in its own image” (Durkheim 1938:6). Congruent with Augustinian speech development, this subject-incarnating, social instruction of Durkheimian “education” often has no official or sole teacher.

It must be remembered that for Durkheim this socialising process is one of constraint. The normalising effects of such frames will restrict what can and cannot be said. Consequently, as the young subject enters a social arena, their speech will reflect “if this manner of speech is permitted” (Durkheim 1952:288). Similarly, Augustine is aware that whilst he is able to express himself through speech, this is only according to social protocols. The seemingly individual act of speech actually takes him deeper into the social realm, rather than marking him off from it,

inspiring Augustine's description of speech as a dramatic "further step into the stormy life of human society" (1961:29).

An individual's capacity to socially synchronise must also manifest via such primary instruction. We can return to Flaherty here, whose research coheres with the development of this chapter in noting that the individual is "entangled in a web of habits, schedules, calendars, seasons, and other socially defined regularities" (1999:102). Synchronicity conditions these regularities, and emerges as a nearly "unconscious aspect of temporal experience" (99). Or in Flaherty's terms, the synchronicity of these regularities forms a set of "background expectancies that make for orderly interaction" (99). Just as with Durkheim and Augustine, Flaherty identifies the socialisation of the subject as a primary experience. The individual develops by adapting, and being adapted to, synchronous social rhythms, whereby synchronicity is a skill "acquired in the course of primary socialisation. Gradually, one learns not to cut encounters off too quickly or drag them out beyond their proper length" (99). The aforementioned dramatic passage into the stormy social realm demands the subject's time-coherence, and time-agreement, with others.

In considering this "dramatic" character of sociality, Augustine's claim that speech comprises not only the spoken word, but also facial expressions and gestures, re-emerges. Evoking German philosopher Martin Heidegger's understanding of embodied speech, where the hand has the body and speech has the entire man (1992[1982]:119), considerations such as ours concerning whether the body is implicated in producing socially objective rhythms can be developed by: (i) interpreting the body as speech, and; (ii) exploring the socially constitutive capacity of speech. As noted, speech integrates the subjectivity of a speaker and an objective structure of speaking. Acknowledging a corporeal constitution to the subjective role in objective rhythms could assist in attributing this role to the body-as-space, informing our central inquiry.

In this regard, Czech philosopher Anna Hogenová observes speech as "a corporeal process towards the world...speech pertains to the body, the body pertains to speech" (2005). This reading allows us to interpret anything bodied, including body modification practices, as speech, as if one had uttered words.⁸ Remembering Durkheim's point that speech is constrained by social protocols, body modification practices, no matter how seemingly non-normative, do

⁸ Body modification is often "deciphered" in terms of what such marks "say" about their bearer. As Sarah Sawyer advises in *Body Piercing and Tattooing: The Hidden Dangers of Body Art* (2007), "consider the social implications of your body modifications before you obtain them. What does your tattoo say about you?" (62). As we will explore in the next chapter however, the body-as-speech does not represent a division between intention and meaning.

not break from the social. By piercing one's lip, tattooing one's cheek, or branding one's entire body, the subject is speaking-moving deeper into the ferocity of social life, rather than distancing themselves from it. This can be acknowledged as the fleshy speech of the body.⁹

Whilst the normativity of such practices will determine the nature of such speech, it will not affect the sheer fact of their spoken quality. Accordingly, by adopting the speech-social co-relation of Durkheimian sociology or Augustinian philosophy, body modification processes, as speech, present as socially productive. This coheres with typical impressions of body modification practices in tribal settings, in which group members, by being tattooed or pierced, "differentiate themselves from animals and human beings who do not belong to their tribe," which "signals social connections" (Sanders & Vail 2008:4). Whether the same practices are normalised in a Western society is not what is being debated. What is not at issue here is acceptance, but rather, acknowledgement. By being body modified, one acknowledges and is acknowledged. This acknowledgement is speech, and speech, as conceived by Durkheim and Augustine, constitutes socialisation. As a result, I agree with the claim made by Victoria Pitts-Taylor, that such an interpretation serves to "emphasise body modification's status and appeal as a politicised 'speech act'" (2003:95-96).

Mead has inspired this chapter's interrogation of Durkheimian sociology, in which present individuals have been recognised as having a productive role in the continuous temporality of objective, social rhythms. By now implicating speech in social production, it follows that in identifying corporeal speaking capacities, body modification practices emerge as productive participants of/in objective rhythms. Speech, whether as spoken words, hand gestures, or body modifications, *tangibly* produces the temporality of objective, social rhythms. This is because, as our engagement with Mead illustrated, the present (of speech in this case) is a systemic expression implicated in the incarnation of other systemic, time states. Or in more straightforward terms, present speech (re-)produces, and is concurrently (re-)produced by, past and future speech.

However, whilst Augustine recognises speech as tangible/substantial, he believes that its temporality only manifests as a mental intangibility. Syllables in spoken words are short or long, comprising parts of words and sentences. The sound of one syllable does not begin until another

⁹ Body language commentators often portray the body in this manner. See, for example, Shannon Saylor's *What Your Body Says* (2010).

has finished, whereby in hearing a long syllable followed by a shorter syllable, one cannot “measure the long one while it is still present, because I cannot measure it until it is completed, and once it is completed it is no longer there to be measured” (1961:276). Only once syllables pass can their now past durations be compared, leading Augustine to argue that time-as-sound is not a tangible/substantial presence. Rather, he defers to the memorial impression that the sound makes on the mind, in that during speech-as-sound “I must be measuring something which remains fixed in my memory” (276).

Augustinian spoken time is therefore intangibly subjective. Nevertheless, examining our consciousness means for Augustine that rather than conceptually positioning time as an external governor of changes occurring in a distant physical domain, the human is immanent in the structure of time. This contests the passivity of the Aristotelian human who, as Genevieve Lloyd notes, witnesses “time’s bewildering passage, out of a nonexistent future through an extensionless present into an equally nonexistent past” (1999:56). Conditionally consistent with Augustine’s thesis is Durkheim’s conception of social forces, and Halbwachs’ appreciation of social consciousness. Both of these models, as with consciousness for Augustine, argue against a positivist conception that the source of the timing of objective rhythms transcends worldly human subjects (with Durkheim and Halbwachs having characterised their ontologies of subjectivity in particularly collective, social terms). This has brought us to our most recent insight, that speech integrates subjective speakers and an objective structure in producing objective social rhythms.

The source of objective rhythm does not transcend humans

I emphasise that Durkheim’s theory is only conditionally consistent with Augustine’s, given that the theologian turns away from the physical/material/spatial world in order to adopt a life of “inner conscious” contemplation. Augustine’s focus is upon the only time frame deemed to be worthy of human attention; eternity. A relation to God’s eternity becomes apparent by acknowledging one’s physical/material/spatial transience, engendering Augustine’s recognition that “you, my Father, are eternal. But I am divided between time gone by and time to come” (1961:279). Contrarily, Durkheim’s sociology does not overtly subordinate the physical/material/spatial world. Rather, it simply neglects it. As observed, Durkheim installs a

mind|matter division by asserting that social facts, products/producers of collective consciousness, are “not material things,” but simply things by the same right. Besides this claim, materiality is not a prominent concern in Durkheim’s argument. Whilst Augustine’s mind-centric, subjective model for time necessarily excludes objectivity *and* spatiality, Durkheim is concerned with identifying an objective rhythm for the temporality of human, subjective consciousness, which “could not be reanimated if living centres of consciousness did not exist to receive its influence” (1952:278). Indeed, rather than dividing cognition/consciousness from what is spatial as Augustine does, Durkheim simply wants to avoid restricting subjectivity to the exclusively interiorised cognition/consciousness of demarcated, sovereign individuals.

We have interrogated the externality by which Durkheim defines the relation of the individual consciousness to the social fact. This has instead characterised individual humans as concurrent productions *and* producers of the temporality of objective, social rhythms. When a suicide manifests in the present, just as when a body modifier is tattooed, the act is typically defined by an individual’s internal/interiorised motivation. This is contradicted with Durkheim’s assertion that in individual behaviour what is actually witnessed is the evocation of a prior social collective, the incarnation of a social memory as “the product of previous social activity” (Durkheim 1938:113). In extending this ramification of Durkheim’s sociology, this chapter has argued that any present manifestation concurrently produces/distinguishes the past in terms of its now evident uniform continuity. The past becomes with the present. Past, present and future are human concepts. Nevertheless, they describe the incarnation of time as its necessarily transitory presenting. This present, we have seen, is the subject-social co-constitution. However, as stated, the present could be anything. What is recorded in the present is not simply the number of suicides, for example, in a society, but rather a collective temporality/rhythm. It must be said then that such measurements are *not only quantifying, but also chronologising*. Future suicides, and their correlative social forces, similarly infect, and are infected by, or produce, and are produced with, the present. The current social frame, in being the productive link in the continuous temporality of uniform, social rhythms, will anticipate the future suicide rate in the same way that it (re-)produces the prior rate.

Suicide (as posited by Durkheim), or body modification practices (as posited by myself), are collective expressions of, and participating producers in, objective, social rhythms. Neither behaviour is simply exemplary of individual causation. Rather, each is the collective

speech/expression of a society (re-)producing. This is an objectivity in which the individual is perpetually, constitutively implicated. Such an insight has facilitated the implication of humans in the source of objective rhythms, contrary to Barrow's, Newton's and Aristotle's models in which the source of such objectivity transcends the human realm. This is an important development if humans are to be identified as involved in the production of the objective rhythm that is time.

This chapter has explored this role of the human subject whilst being aware not to restrict time to a demarcated, interiorised, mental experience or operation. Whilst Augustine's socially limitless conception of subjectivity coheres with this, the concern has been raised that for Augustine, the source of time transcends human corporeality and the entire spatial/physical/material realm. This seemingly contradicts our inquiry into whether a human production of time is attributable to the body-as-space. Nevertheless, Saint Augustine's appreciation of time has contributed significantly. Indeed, in acknowledging Augustine's relevance to any inquiry into time, Barbara Adam's earlier discussed research, the extent of which is seemingly unrivalled in the social sciences, notes that whilst "not every treatise of time refers to Heraclitus, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger, Schütz, or Whitehead, I have not come across a single study that does not mention St. Augustine's *Confessions*" (1990:33). Augustine's conception of a socially organised consciousness has, furthermore, assisted in problematising Durkheim's belief that the social fact, responsible for the uniformity and temporality of social rhythms, is objective because it is external to the individual consciousness. It has instead been argued that there is not a pre-existing, fixed, collective consciousness which produces individual consciousnesses. Rather, the concurrent, co-constitutive production of the subject and the social has been recognised, demanding that consciousness is objective because it is a collective in which all individuals are implicated, and not due to its supposed separation from individuals.

Despite these efforts in accommodating objectivity *and* subjectivity within the same model, the ontological division between time and space remains intact. Humans have been implicated in the source of the temporality of objective rhythms. We now need to explore how this is an involvement in the source of time, and in terms of the core question of this thesis, whether this involvement is attributable to the body-as-space. As noted, Durkheim does not negate the role of spatiality in the temporality of socially uniform rhythms (suicide is, after all,

an embodied phenomenon). Indeed, at one point he explicitly refers to the way individual manifestations of collective conditions “depend to a large extent, on the *organopsychological* constitution of the individual” (1938:8; my emphasis). Such organic dependence is discussed in Chris Shilling’s examination of Durkheim’s last major study, in which Durkheim explores totemism in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Shilling astutely argues that the individual body, rather than being ignored from such inquiries, is instead “inescapably anchored in the natural world as a critical medium through which the symbolic order of society, or the social body, is constructed” (2005:213). Furthermore, consistent with Shilling’s observation is Durkheim’s own, albeit somewhat isolated claim in his essay *Individual and Collective Representations* (1974[1898]), that there is no need to separate an ideal milieu from the body (28).¹⁰ This would seem to suggest that Durkheim’s sociology has the potential to avoid the ramifications concerning space found in Augustinian philosophy. However, time remains, in Durkheim’s terms, “an abstract framework,” and there is no thorough acknowledgement of a synonymy between corporeality and temporality in his sociology.¹¹

We are still presented with the conception that Being manifests in terms of time *and* space, of the ethereally temporal *and* the tangibly spatial, of an entanglement between two realms. Importantly though, we can now understand what conditions the temporality of objective rhythms as something other than a worldly transcendent, permanently fixed, anterior source. Our efforts are thus not blinded by the *what* of time (whereby time would be an inalterable object, detached from a perceiving subject), but are instead exploring the potential *who* of time (whereby the subject would be involved in/as time-as-object). In this regard we need to more directly explore how the now identified subject-social co-constitutive processes, which produce objective rhythms, participate in the source of the objective rhythm with which we are primarily concerned; time.

¹⁰ See Nick Crossley’s ‘Sociology and the Body’ discussion in *The Sage Handbook of Sociology* (2005) concerning how this informs the understanding that Durkheim’s sociology is not reducible to a mind/body dualism.

¹¹ English sociologist Howard Newby actually characterises sociology as a discipline that is intentionally detached from corporeal/biological concerns; “The very *raison d’être* of sociology has rested upon identifying and demarcating a disciplinary paradigm quite distinct from, and irreducible to, the natural and the biological” (1991:7)

II

From the “who” to the “how” of time

3.

Bodies Which Time

Incarnation as temporalisation

Human beings make meaningful the world which makes them.

— Pierre Bourdieu & Loïc Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (1992:7)

Social time and natural time

The preceding chapters have acknowledged a subjective role in the temporality of objective rhythms. Objectivity is important. Without an objectively common temporality, societies could not function. The source of such objectivity has historically been attributed to its separation from the interference of any human. This characterises social frames as utilising a pre-existing, externally objective source, in order to maintain social synchronisation. In conversely during the last chapter implicating the human subject in the production of objective rhythm(s), care has been exercised not to posit a demarcated subjective role or experience. Otherwise, the shared coherence of social synchronisation would not occur. The subject's involvement has instead been defined as socially dispersed, concurrently producing, and produced by, the objectivity of subject-social rhythms. This does not yet implicate the human in the source of the rhythm that is time however, whereby the constitution of time is still conceptually separated from space.

Let us return to Durkheim briefly in order to explore this issue of time's constitution from a new angle. It has been comprehended that the uniformity of social facts *presents* structural subjectivities that are implicated in the temporality of social rhythms. Lefebvre would probably be amenable to this account. We have seen his dismay at the manner with which modernity has divorced time from the living, human organism, by hiding time in the abstract realm of clock

measurement. This defines time simply as a resource to be socially consumed, deployed and discarded (Lefebvre 1999:95-96). What is implicit in Lefebvre's account is the commonly held conceptual distinction between worldly, natural time, and human, social time. He describes his research in those very terms, as "the study of *natural rhythms*, and of the modification of those rhythms and their inscription in space by means of *human actions*" (117; my emphases).

I reintroduce Lefebvre here to consider whether this same division is what lurks in the irreconcilability of time and space(-as-body). Sociologies such as Durkheim's generally distinguish the human, social realm from natural materiality. Social time is, for sociologists, typically the time of humans, distanced from that of the natural/physical realm (despite humans being embodied/physical). In terms of the current position of this inquiry then, sociology is simultaneously the shoulders upon which we stand (by unrestricting human subjectivity), and the Achilles heel by which we fall (by excluding spatiality/physicality). If something spatial/physical/natural like the human body is to be acknowledged as a source of time, this social-time|natural-time dichotomy must be interrogated. Of course if during our exploration it emerges that time is produced or constructed through humans, then given the sociality of humans, the ramification will be that the typical conception of the social construction of time as a separate representation of the actual, worldly phenomenon of time will have to be reconsidered.

Social theorist John Urry confirms these suspicions of sociological inquiries into time when he states that "most social scientific accounts have presumed that time is in some sense social, and hence separate from, and opposed to, the time of nature" (2000:417). A definitive example of this distinction is found in the sociological collaboration of Pitrim Sorokin and Robert Merton, *Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis* (1937). Here the time found in human societies is distinguished from the unerring cycles of seasonal, natural time. Natural time is duly described as "uniform, homogenous; it is purely quantitative, shorn of qualitative variations" (621).

Sorokin and Merton's conception of uniform, natural time is somewhat different then from the characterisations we have covered in which the source of uniform time is worldly transcendent. For Barrow, Newton and Aristotle, time's objectivity and uniformity is attributable to its source being outside the interference of the spatial/natural realm of humans. As a result, "natural time," worldly time, is for Newton "relative, merely apparent time, as perceived via sensible motion" (1952:77). Conversely, for Sorokin and Merton, it is worldly, natural time that

is uniform and unerring. Despite this considerable difference, both these models nevertheless demand that the source of objective time transcends human influence. Indeed, for Sorokin and Merton, one's only experience with objective time is via the clocked representation of it that Lefebvre laments. The clock is simply a representation of a natural, objective, regular time-source that is separate from humans.

Such is the pervasiveness of the clock in modern, human societies that it takes on the character of time itself. This is why historians such as Lewis Mumford believe that "the clock, not the steam-engine, is the key-machine of the modern industrial age...even today no other machine is so ubiquitous" (1934:14). In exploring the conceptual polarisation of social time from natural time, we will soon question whether the clock, as a human invention, merely measures real, objective time externally. The clock after all was invented, as feminist scholar Ivana Milojević notes, "to respond to the needs and desires of a particular society/culture/civilisation/gender" (2008:333). It is seemingly only what is common about social time which regulates how two or more people, who have arranged to meet at 9 o'clock in the morning, will agree on when that occurs (even if sometimes only approximately). However, do social time's various incarnations differentiate it from a singular, natural, objective time?

Multiplicitous social time

The industrialisation of time is integral to these kinds of discourses concerning social time. Capitalist, industrialist, colonialist social structures are characterised as standardising, dividing and allocating time in order to maximise the efficiency of a cohesive workforce. As British author, Jay Griffiths, observes, "hegemonic time is Western, Christian, linear, abstract, clock dominated, work oriented, coercive, capitalist, masculine and anti-natural" (2002:14). The hallmark of industrial time is its partitioning into uniform slices. This serves two purposes.

Firstly, punctuality, which is instilled as an ethically virtuous quality,¹ becomes easier to enforce when time is divided into collectively agreed upon units. Synchronisation is essential to a functioning workforce, with punctuality distinguishing the productive worker from the

¹ In *On Time, Punctuality, and Discipline in Early Modern Calvinism* (2009), historians Max Engammare and Karin Maag explore how sixteenth-century Protestant reformers in Geneva, London and France installed a moral code which prioritises "punctuality." Also relevant is *Discipline and Punish* (1977[1975]) by French philosopher Michel Foucault, which observes the eighteenth-century regulation of the individual and social body via "a whole micro-penalty of time" (178) for misdemeanours such as tardiness.

latecomer. This marginalises the latter, according to psychologist Robert Levine, as “a social inferior and moral incompetent” (1997:69). Barbara Adam is one of many social theorists who explore the instilment of this time-diligence in each subject’s earliest social interactions, being “learnt during early childhood and bedded down over the many years of schooling” (1995:59).

Secondly, labour time, as a quantifiable component of production, can be used in commercial exchange. This is attributable to its standardisation, whereby as Adam again observes, “the calculation of ‘man-hours’...like the clock time units on which it is based, is an invariable, standardised measure that can be applied universally” (Adam 1990:112). Interestingly, the capitalist standardisation of time which regulates the working, social body, parallels the normalising forces already explored which coercively shape the human body. Standard time orders the social body, providing greater control with more reliable outcomes. The social regulation of the human body that we have explored evokes this model, whereby the non-standard modified body often presents as unruly and uncontrollable, challenging the corporeal schema that capitalism imposes, and upon which it relies. This point is articulated well by the body theory of Margrit Shildrick, who notes that “in modernist terms, the model of a ‘normal’ body implies one in which everything is predictable, well-ordered and functional within a narrow set of parameters that reflect only the bodily capacities of the majority” (2008:32-33).

Discussing industrialised time gives an insight into how time becomes a resource, as a transferable commodity that can be saved and purchased. A rudimentary conclusion to draw from this is that time duly becomes abstracted as a commercial, ideal concept, contributing to the ethereal-time|substantial-space polarisation we are interrogating. Of more immediate relevance though is how this characterisation speaks to our current consideration of the supposed multitude of standardised, socialised times that sociologists such as Sorokin and Merton distinguish from the singular, objective uniformity of natural time. In asking whether social time can be described in the same objective regard, Sorokin and Merton observe that the typical understanding is that it cannot (1937:621). This influential sociological investigation into time informs the aforementioned position of the social sciences, defining a “system of time which varies with the social structure” (621), in contradistinction to the invariant, objectively constant time of nature.

Natural time duly presents as a blank, unified, homogenous slate against which the complexities of different social time(s) are compared. The unerring regularity of natural time is then *used* socially, conceptually underpinning the characterisations of time as a resource that we

have seen Lefebvre present. Sorokin and Merton agree, for “where natural phenomena are used to fix the limits of time periods, the choice of them is dependent upon the interest and utility which they have for the group” (621). The social times of differing cultures/groups are seen to manifest as subsequent representations and adaptations of a naturally regular time, mimicking how culturally/socially informed modified bodies are interpreted as altering an anterior, natural, regular corporeality. The result is that socially constructed or informed bodies can only emerge as particular, subsequent versions of what the body really was/is. Likewise, social times are understood to arrive after natural time’s singular, anterior, primordial objectivity. Barbara Adam’s research into the construction of conceptual distinctions between social time and natural time indeed observes that typically “social time seems defined against ‘an other’ which appears to be a convenient backcloth” (1990:150). This distinction divides social time(s) from the natural cycles on which they are based, such as night and day, birth and death, and harvesting seasons.

This frame means that social time seemingly accommodates natural rhythms and temporality. However, the particular, idiosyncratic, social adaptations diverge from what is really or naturally time. Considering such supposed divergence, often this social-natural relation seems remarkably intimate. For example, when observing the African *Nuer* tribe, British sociologist and anthropologist, Edward Evans-Pritchard, documents the dependence of their social temporality on the natural cycles of the “cattle clock” and other seasonally based activities. The argument is that in such an environment, social activity *is* time, Alfred Gell noting here that “time is concrete, immanent and process-linked, rather than being abstract, homogenous and transcendent” (1992:17). Contrary to Lefebvre’s interpretation of an abstraction of time from social practice, Evans-Pritchard believes that Nuer time never becomes a commodified resource. Language apparently illustrates this, for the “Nuer have no expression equivalent to ‘time’ in our language,” preventing the quantification of time as something “which passes, can be wasted, can be saved” (Evans-Pritchard 1940:103). Instead, points of/in time emerge with seasonal action, in that “points of reference are the activities themselves” (103). These points of time are “not controlled by an abstract system” (103), but come from social activity, which shares an equally intimate relationship with ecological cycles. Given this correlation between social activity and temporality, Evans-Pritchard concludes that during periods devoid of significant social activity, the Nuer do not refer to time at all.

However, is this actually the case? Evans-Pritchard notes the Nuer's lack of a "word for time." As seen via our engagement with Plotinus in chapter one though, something like the human body always speaks, and such speech is always socially constitutive. Thus, whenever there are bodies, there are never periods devoid of social activity. If social activity and temporality are effectively synonymous for Evans-Pritchard (and indeed, for how in the last chapter I have applied Mead to Durkheim's sociology), then the spoken word of corporeal activity perpetually "speaks" time. Whenever there are Nuer people, their embodiment will be their reference to, their word for, time. In problematising Evans-Pritchard's conclusion concerning the Nuer's supposed lack of temporality themed language, I am simply following his lead in defining social activity as temporality, and recognising the role of the body in social activity.

By exploring in this thesis whether the human body is implicated in the production of time, the source of time will need to emerge immanently from within the human, social, spatial/physical/material world. Contrarily, whilst Evans-Pritchard does not hypothesise a worldly transcendent source of time which humans simply measure/represent/commodify, the time he posits still relies upon "the significance which natural changes have for human activities" (104). In this regard, his argument coheres with, rather than interrogates, discourses which separate human, social time from natural, material time, by presenting a *unification* of human, social structure *and* environmental conditions. Evans-Pritchard differentiates, then synthesises, natural time *and* Nuer social time, reflecting the Nuer's "relations to environment, which we call oecological time, and their relations to one another in the social structure, which we call structural time" (94). In this conception, natural time is anterior, it exists first, before it is restructured via social activity.

Furthermore, Evans-Pritchard's argument concerning the lack of time vernacular/words in the Nuer language assumes Western clocked and calendared time notions as the default for time itself. Note his astonishment that the Nuer "do not use the names of the months to indicate the time of an event" (100). Nuer time, for Evans-Pritchard, a primal unification of oecological cycles and structural relations, can only make sense against the Western clock and calendar. Whilst the structural character of time will emerge prominently in this chapter, the way Evans-Pritchard separates human, social, structural time from natural, spatial, ecological time means his interpretation exemplifies the kind of argument this thesis is interrogating.

We are developing the understanding that this social-time|natural-time polarisation is instilled via characterisations of the diversity of social time, in contradistinction to its supposedly unified, natural counterpart. The week, for example, varies in length for different societies. Historians Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield observe that this arose from societies needing “a time unit smaller than a month but longer than a day” (1990:43). The ancient Colombians had a three-day week, the ancient Greeks ten-day weeks, whereas the contemporary, Western, seven-day week is a Babylonian legacy that influenced the Jewish calendar, whose week consisted of six days plus the Sabbath.² The French decimalised the Judeo-Christian seven-day week in 1799. However, as historian Gerold Whitrow observes, “their ten-day week was soon scrapped by Napoleon” (1989:120). More recently, the Soviet Union fluctuated between five day and six day weeks.³

Are these kinds of social time’s variations merely different representations of a universally objective time, whose source is external to humans? This Newtonian-like model seemingly explains that subjects in a particular society synchronise by using the same representation of time, whose objectively, externally regular, source, dictates agreement about when a certain “o’clock” arrives. This interpretation means that geographically dispersed social contexts, as time zones, simply divide and represent an already existing, global time. As explored, this is the assumption of certain social science accounts of time, where the source of time is an objective phenomenon that transcends human experience. No individual can interfere with time’s regularity, whereby such time is a resource that can be used objectively for all. This of course contradicts the exploration of this thesis into the potential human involvement in the production of time.

The social-time|natural-time polarisation, which installs a natural time that is objectively singular, differs from Newtonian and Aristotelian models in which the source of time is objective because it is *outside* the natural realm. Nevertheless, as we have now seen, such socially scientific conceptions cohere with Newton and Aristotle in exteriorising the source of objective time from humans. The social sciences often presume that natural time constantly conditions the various social times, with a uniformity that becomes visible via measurement on clocks and

² In *The Mathematics of the Calendar* (2007), historian Marc Cohn explores many such historical influences into the Western, seven-day week.

³ For a comprehensive analysis of Soviet-era temporality, including a focus on “working hours” (1983:138-140), see Soviet scholar Basile Kerblay’s *Modern Soviet Society*.

calendars. Adam describes this tendency where social time is characterised as responsible for the “structuring of ‘undifferentiated change’ into episodes,” establishing “natural time as very different from its social science conceptualisation” (1990:150-151). Durkheim’s sociology takes this natural|social distinction further by arguing that time can only be a social phenomenon, meaning *human* social time. In chapter one we saw that according to Durkheim, only humans regulate their lives by socially derived periods. This interpretation permeates the Introduction of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, in which Durkheim declares that “the category of time expresses a time common to the group, a social time, so to speak. This category itself is a true social institution. It is peculiar to man; animals have no representation of this kind” (1915:10). In demarcating social time from non-human nature, Durkheim presupposes the human-social|natural division upon which social science conceptions of time often rely. This division also lurks in Durkheim’s earlier discussed argument that social-facts-as-things differ from material-things, because they are different *types* of things (1938:xlili).

Given that we are exploring whether the body, the naturality/spatiality/materiality of the socialised human, is involved in the production of time, socially scientific conceptions which polarise natural from social seem reductive. In chapters one and two it has been asserted that the human constitutes, and is constituted by, the temporality of social rhythms. If the intention of this thesis is to argue that this constitution is attributable to the body-as-space(-as-nature), then the social|natural dichotomy will need to be dismantled. Unpacking this conceptual dichotomisation of social from natural will contribute to our exploration into the implication of the human body-as-space with not just objective, social rhythms, but also with objective time. Indeed, if the human is social, and the human emerges as implicated in the production or construction of objective time, then the social construction of time will be inherent to, and implicated in, objective time, rather than a separate, contingent, representation of it.

An institutionalised division

Sociologies often restrict non-human animals to a non-social, natural rhythm. This, according to historian Daniel Boorstin, represents the supposition of humanity’s time-centric escape from nature, where only by marking off months, weeks, and years, days and hours, minutes and seconds, would mankind be liberated from the cyclical monotony of nature” (1985:1).

Assumptions about the repetitive cycles of nature, which underpin its conceptual separation from its social counterpart, will now be explored.

We have considered nature's supposed invariance via an unchanging corporeality existing prior to the introduction of socially informed, body modification practices. An "unerring nature" was also encountered in the absolute uniformity of celestial bodies. This supposes that natural rhythms always have been, and always will be, whereby as Adam notes, "the laws of nature are considered to be true in an absolute and timeless way" (1990:151).

The characterisation of nature as "timeless" does not contradict there being natural time. Rather, it provides an insight into why natural time can tend to be interpreted in terms of unerring, absolute change. Recall the ageing body from earlier chapters. In contradistinction to the modified body, which is presumed to be produced by individual agency, the ageing body seems to occur beyond a subject's control. That body modification practices are typically correlated with a subjective mind is consistent with the understanding that the human, social world is organised around values and goals, whereas the natural world is simply determined by inescapably unerring processes.⁴ The social scientist is duly presumed to be involved in a subject-subject relation with their field, whereas the natural scientist is bound to a subject-object relation, uncovering objective, timeless truths. Nature does not think, but instead simply changes and temporalises via an obedience to omnipresent laws, a process in which the substantial/spatial/physical fleshed/bodied human is trapped. This is the frame which our central question is interrogating. Can an argument emerge where the spatial/natural human body is not simply at the mercy of a time-mechanism which it exemplifies, but rather is implicated in producing such a mechanism?

Whether through the human-centrism/anthropocentrism of Durkheimian sociology, or by way of the ecological time of Evans-Pritchard, social science commonly associates social time with human contingencies, juxtaposed against the absolute regularity of natural time. Barbara Adam attributes the institutionalisation of this social|natural division to classical philosophical influence, whereby "all theorists concerned with time make distinctions and these can be located in the writings of classical philosophers" (1990:19). The classical philosophical division to which Adam is referring is found in the second volume of René Descartes' (1596 – 1650)

⁴ For an account of the differences between the research methodologies of the social sciences and the natural sciences, see sociologist Anthony Giddens' *New Rules of Sociological Method* (1976:153-154).

Meditations (1968b[1641])).⁵ In this and other texts, “Cartesian” philosophy holds that minds and bodies are different substances.⁶ This conceptual separation of mind from body is particularly relevant given our preceding interrogation of the characterisation of the body modifier as a cognitive/rational agent who possesses power *over* their corporeality.

In an era associated with the Enlightenment’s prioritisation of such rational processes, Descartes doubts his existence when considering how he “knows” that perceived things exist, including his own physicality. Such perceptions are potentially just dream-like illusions. Ironically, it is through this doubt that Descartes finds certainty of self-existence, for “to doubt” is “to think,” and “to think” is to be a self-aware creature (*cogito, ergo sum*). Stephen Hetherington notes that as a result, Descartes is “unable to doubt his own existence, even while accepting that he can doubt...such beliefs as those about his body – including his having one” (2003:8). However, that his now definite mind possesses a “clear and distinct” conception of his body convinces Descartes that if another aspect of the world besides one’s mind exists, it could only be in a corporeal or extended form, with which he, as a thinking creature, causally interacts. Descartes concludes that if a body exists, “the only alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me” (Descartes in Cooney 2000:20).

As we will see, the mind|body dichotomy which emerges from Cartesian philosophy is interpreted as contributing to the production of many dualisms, such as nature|culture and female|male. The specific importance for our question in this thesis however is whether Cartesianism is equally as pervasive in the time|space divide. If it is to be determined that the human body-as-space is implicated in the production of time, rather than merely exemplifies time’s passage from without, time and space cannot be as ontologically separate as Cartesian type binaries assume.

Structures of meaning

The Cartesian distinction of body-as-extension from mind-as-not-extension, and any residual dualisms, seemingly informs the time|space polarisation currently being interrogated. It is via an

⁵ Adam explains; “the philosophical approach is dominated by Cartesian dualism which separates not just mind from body, but...subject from object, the individual from the collective, and traditional from modern conceptualisations and structures of time” (1990:152).

⁶ Descartes distinguished between the *res cogitans* (a soul or mind which thinks) and the *res extensa* (material matter of the body) (Descartes 1968a[1637]).

engagement with structuralist ideology that I anticipate that the dualist oppositions of body-as-space from both time-as-not-space and mind-as-not-space can be challenged. Structuralism, in asking how anything manifests, identifies frames which fundamentally account for human behaviour, beyond individual minds. As structuralist scholar Richard de George explains, this acknowledges what “accounts for human actions at a more basic and profound level than do *individual, conscious* decisions” (1972:xii; my emphasis). The congruence with the development of our inquiry concerning socially produced subjectivity is noteworthy.

Indeed, as raised via Giddens’ analysis of Durkheimian sociology, we have already encountered a form of structuralism in Durkheim’s social facts. Sociologist Roy Boyne agrees, describing Durkheim’s focus on an individual’s social constitution as laying “down one of the key features of structuralism” (2000:163). Durkheim takes subjectivity beyond its demarcated, individual limits, and into the social, structural substratum. However, it is via a structuralist methodology which informs Durkheim’s version that we will investigate the supposed polarisations of mind from body, and of time from space.

A foundational form of what was to become structuralism is found in the semiological theory of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Presented as a science of linguistic signs,⁷ de George observes that “a key to the techniques of structuralism is found in linguistics” (1972:xviii). Saussure’s semiology distinguishes between a linguistic system and its spoken manifestations by comparing *langue* (language as what people have in common) to *parole* (the speech of each particular person). In identifying an impersonal system of grammatical patterns and syntactical rules that exist in language (*langue*), it will then be possible to distinguish “what is social from what is individual, and what is essential from what is ancillary or accidental” (Saussure 1966:14). By determining what is essential (social) within a system, the way in which common meaning/understanding is produced will be identifiable.

To explain this production, Saussure defines language as a *system of signs*, each sign consisting of two components. One component, the *signifier*, is the tool (such as a word) that represents a thing. The other component, the *signified*, refers to the related mental concept. Together, these components *contingently* comprise a sign. This composition is interpreted as contingent because any number of signifiers/words could seemingly have been associated with

⁷ Saussure’s semiological theory was delivered in a “General Linguistics” lecture series between 1907 and 1911 at the University of Geneva. Students organised and published this material after Saussure’s death as *Course in General Linguistics* (1966[1916]).

any conceptual thing. Saussure emphasises that the “bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary,” in the sense that “the signifier has no natural connection with the signified” (1972:73). That nothing about the construction of a sign is self-evident demands that its meaning and signification is only found by comparison with other signs within an entire language system. Meaning does not eventuate from a necessary correspondence between signifier and signified, or between sign and the world, but is instead a relational and differential mechanism between signs.

This arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified is re-interpreted however by the French linguist Émile Benveniste. Saussure argues that the contingency of the signifier-signified relation is exemplified in translation, for what is signified (the mental concept) by a sound signifier in one language “could be represented equally by any other sound sequence, which is proved by differences among languages” (1966:68). If one considers the conception “ox,” the sound signifier o-k-s in English functions similarly to b-ö-f in French (for the word “bœuf”). Two different signifiers refer to the same conceptual/signified “thing.” What this indicates for Benveniste though is that if many signifiers co-exist with the same signified, then the signified has an irreducible, pre-existing quality which each language expresses in its own way. This has ramifications for the timing of the arbitrariness in Saussure’s system of signs

Saussure’s “mistake” is seemingly attributable to his presumption that *access* to the substance of reality, the concreteness of things, is provided through signs which are outside such substantiality/sensibility/reality. Given our interrogation of the externalisation of time’s source from the substantial/sensible body, it is no surprise that I am attending to this kind of issue. Whilst Saussure’s semiology assumes that a world exists prior to language, he holds that it did not exist meaningfully. Before the differentiation/signification that language provides, the world is one anonymous plenitude, in that “nothing is distinct before the appearance of language” (112). For Saussure then, meaning comes from without to the spatial realm via language signs.

When referring to the signified half of the sign, Saussure appears to have been concerned with what the signified says about the “real thing” in the world. This manifests in the evidently “unnecessary and unmotivated character of the bond which united the sign to the thing signified” (Benveniste 1971[1966]:47). Here is the real arbitrariness within Saussure’s semiology. That the thing emerges only through the self-referentiality of the system indicates that what Saussure instead intended to argue is that the relationship between the sign and reality, between the sign and the “real world” thing that is signified, is what is arbitrary. Or in Benveniste’s terms, “what

is arbitrary is that one certain sign and no other is applied to a certain element of reality, and not to any other” (46). Conversely, there is nothing arbitrary about the signifier-signified relationship, which produces consubstantial components of signs/things that emerge systemically/differentially.

This differential production is why structuralism is relevant to our current concern with dismantling supposed separations such as body-as-space from time-as-not-space. Structuralism’s “differential process” produces meaning via how a particular sign relates to, and differs from, other signs in a system of signs. In terms of language, to understand the word “mother,” it is therefore necessary to understand “father,” “daughter” and other words. A common set of relational conventions govern meaning, something structuralist commentator David Howarth describes as “a shared set of norms and rules that human beings learn and internalise” (2000:10). Just as meaning is produced differentially within a language structure, shared conventions similarly underpin other social structures. The “normal body” for instance is produced in relation to other bodies and “not-bodies.” Corporeally constructive practices like body modification are thus also only read within a relational system. In this regard, cultural anthropologist Eric Gans notes that one can recognise the “semiotic character of their inscriptions...whereby the pierced or tattooed body exhibits the arbitrary meaningfulness of the inscribed sign” (2000:159).

By revisiting the Nuer we can see how their time is constructed structurally. Nuer time refers to social activity, although as has been argued, there are never periods which are without activity and devoid of reference to time. Any such activity is associated with the ecological change that is limited by an annual cycle, and “therefore cannot be used to differentiate longer periods than seasons” (Evans-Pritchard 1940:94). Seasonal time periods are differentiated within a cyclical structure. These periods are derived from social activities associated with distinguishable climatic changes, such as the “movement from villages to camps, which is the Nuer’s response to the climatic dichotomy of rains and drought” (95). Consequently, time means something different depending upon the associated activities, reflecting a relationally structured, socialised temporality. The routine tasks of the dry season differ from the varied activity of the rainy season, “when there are frequent feasts, dances, and ceremonies” (103). Consistent with our Durkheimian explorations, the socially structured character of time emerges, whereby without consensus, time concepts would not exist. Evans-Pritchard agrees, stating that “all time is structural, since it is a conceptualisation of collateral, co-ordinated, or co-operative activities:

the movements of a group” (104). Nuer time is structurally arranged around an “age-set system.”⁸ Age-sets describe not how long ago an event occurred linearly, but rather its concurrent, multidirectional relations to other sets of times/events. Events are thus structurally separated by the “relation between groups of persons” (105).

Structural time cannot be discussed without also referring to Durkheim. As he states in *Elementary Forms*, “we can conceive of time only if we differentiate between moments” (1995:9). A particular time has no meaning in-itself. Just as in the previous chapter it was argued that there is no past “in-itself,” equally for Durkheim times manifest differentially from other times. In the preceding chapters the co-production of time-states has been acknowledged, whereby none is autonomously produced. As has been identified, Durkheim does not address the spatial/bodied role in social, structural production. Nevertheless, space, like time, is a structural phenomenon for Durkheim. Particular spaces arise via differentiation from the rest of space(s), arranging/emerging “differently: to place some on the right, others on the left, these above, those below...just as, to arrange states of consciousness temporally, it must be possible to locate them at definite dates” (10). Space would not manifest, and neither would time, if they were “not divided and differentiated” (10).

In considering that all production is relational, we can revisit the prohibition of tattooing by certain religions. Structuralist logic suggests that such proscription is not an insight into the inherently evil character of body marking, but instead simply represents what is meaningful for one religion in comparison to another. Dermatological scholar Noah Scheinfeld concurs, interpreting the biblical citation from Leviticus upon which Christianity and Judaism have equated bodily marking with sin, as an opposition that is actually designed to distinguish these religions from others. This links their prohibition of tattoos “to the use of tattoos by religions that the Jews opposed, for example, the cult of Baal, the Egyptian pantheon, and religions that the Christians opposed, for example, the cult of Isis” (2007:363).

Structuralism duly complements and develops the contestation in this thesis to the body modification community’s already problematic characterisation of non-normative practices as a defiantly individual control of self/identity. A structuralist appraisal would be that whilst body projects appear to be self-productions, they actually only manifest within the organisation of a social system. This resembles what anthropologists observe in many tribal cultures, where

⁸ For a comprehensive account of “age-sets,” refer to Chapter VI of Evan-Pritchard’s *The Nuer* (1940).

tattooing speaks of collective, rather than simply of personal, expression. Alfred Gell notes that “in traditional Polynesian settings the tattoo was significant not so much as a thing in itself, than as the relative social standing it declared” (1993:305-306). Correlatively, something like a piercing is linked to other piercings, and non-piercings, and meaningfully constructed accordingly. Gans observes in this sense that in being pierced, individuals are “nodes whose privilege is organisational rather than hierarchical,” whereby “the pierced body as a whole holds no particular interest in itself, it is merely a hub from which to radiate signification” (2000:159). The metal spike through one’s lip, or the ear stud of another, are “signs of modification” which manifest in terms of how their differences relate.

We have thus reviewed the ramifications of structuralist logic, in which subjectivity/identity is not attributable to an inherently individual quality that something possesses, but rather manifests via its relation/differentiation to other things/subjectivities/identities/qualities. According to such a mechanism, time, and space, are each differentially produced. Despite this, the frame which polarises time from space is intact. Dismantling this polarisation is essential in addressing whether something spatial like the body is immanent to time’s production.

But are we overlooking something that is relatively obvious here? According to structuralism, time, space, and indeed everything, is produced structurally, that is, differentially. Consequently, perhaps the way to interrogate the supposed ontological division between time-as-not-space and body-as-space is to explore what is being identified as the common element in the production of each; difference.

Difference

Durkheim’s structuralism enquires into the differential production of time and space, asking “what is the origin of that differentiation?” (1995:9). In considering such “origins” in terms of the conceptual separation of time-as-not-space from body-as-space, we will benefit from engaging the post-structuralism of Jacques Derrida (1930 – 2004). Derrida’s theory of “grammatology” in *Of Grammatology* (1976[1967]) builds on Saussurean, structuralist insights. In discussing structuralism, Derrida introduces *différance*, which he carefully explains to the reader in *Margins of Philosophy* (1982[1972]) is “neither a word nor a concept” (7). Rather,

différance is the production and meaning of anything via “a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation – concepts that...could be inscribed in this chain as *temporalisation*” (8). We are about to explore how *différance* temporalises. Firstly though, the considerable potential that this characterisation of production-as-temporalisation has for our work in this chapter should be noted. We have already encountered the portrayal of time as production in Greek mythology, however in that case time was a worldly-transcendent, divine source. Derrida’s interpretation requires examination.

The post-structuralist character of *différance* is its temporalising function, deconstructing the rigidity of structuralist frames by illustrating the perpetual slippage of meaning and identity.⁹ It is not only that meaning is possible relationally, as per structuralism. Rather, what must also be recognised is that if meaning is produced through relations alone, then it never emerges permanently, fully and finally. Meaning will always slide around such relations, perpetually deferring to other points in the structure in order for any point to become what it is. We are reminded here of Saussure’s conception of language as a differential system without positive terms. “Positivity” is not a reference to ethical notions of “good” or “bad.” Instead, if a system is devoid of positivity, the signs within it cannot fix or capture meaning or identity as they are only definable or identifiable via other signs to which they perpetually refer, and from which they perpetually differ. The becoming of meaning and identity according to *différance* is therefore always a becoming, always a temporalisation. Philosopher Joanna Hodge evokes this fluid function, characterising *différance* in terms of “relation and modality” rather than “deployments of quantity and quality” (2007:69).

In spelling *différance* with an *a* replacing the *e*, Derrida opens *différance* to a condensation of meanings, going beyond that of “the word difference (with an *e*)” which can “never refer to differer as temporalisation” (8). This collusion between *différance*-as-temporal-difference and *différence*-as-spatial-difference is one of secrecy given the identical sound of each in French. Derrida describes *différance* in exactly these terms in *Speech and Phenomena* (1973[1967]), noting that “the silent writing” of *différance* designates “differing *both* as spacing/temporalising and as the movement that structures every dissociation” (41-42). This

⁹ Deconstruction extends what is fundamental about an argument, reaching what it purports to be the actual conclusion, concurrently claiming to undermine the original conclusion. In this regard, differentiating structuralism from post-structuralism becomes difficult, whereby for Derrida, “to deconstruct is also a structuralist gesture or in any case a gesture that assumes a certain need for the structuralist problematic. But it is also an anti-structuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity” (1985:2).

“silent,” invisible relationship problematises the separation of elements in binary oppositions, such as between spatiality and temporality, that typically underpins structuralist meaning. In terms of its silent operation, if *différance* does not manifest exclusively in spoken form or written form, but rather is the condition of the meaning or identity that is produced in a structure of speech or a structure of writing, then it must be said that *différance* “belongs neither to the voice nor to writing...and is located, as the strange space between speech and writing” (1982:5).¹⁰

Derrida’s characterisation of *différance*, temporalisation, as “silence,” reiterates the ethereal, hidden, mysterious (Durkheim) conception of time that we are interrogating. The temporality of *différance* is described as a secretive, invisible function, whereby as reiterated in *Margins of Philosophy* “the *a* of *différance* is not heard; it remains silent, secret and discreet as a tomb” (1982:4). As addressed, such characterisations of temporality participate in the dichotomous separation of tangible, accountable space, from lurking, abstract time. Derrida notes that the *a* of *différance*, its silent, temporalising quality, cannot be exposed, for “one can expose only that which at a certain moment can become *present*, manifest, that which can be shown” (5). Time, *différance*, in manifesting things silently by perpetually distinguishing or differentiating those things, never fully and finally presents/emerges. Derrida duly confirms that “if *différance* ~~is~~ (and I also cross out the ‘~~is~~’) what makes possible the presentation of the being-present, it is never presented as such” (6).

We are interrogating the polarisation of time from space in order to consider whether it is possible that a spatiality such as the body is time-productive. Given this intention, it could be asked why then are we exploring a post-structuralism (or in Derrida’s case, a post-structuralism which is ~~not~~ a post-structuralism), which according to these discussions does not seem to problematise the characterisation of time as ethereal/non-substantial/non-spatial? If time-as-*différance* is silent and invisible, does this not oppose it from the visible, substantial body-as-space? That is, in terms of their seemingly incompatible constitutions, does this not simply reinstall the time|space opposition? In order for this not to be the case, the productive, temporalising deferral of post-structuralism will have to illustrate that such binary components are co-constitutional, rather than purely oppositional. We will begin exploring this by discussing the role of hierarchisations in post-structuralist “oppositions.”

¹⁰ Derrida’s concern with blurring the speech|writing dichotomy will soon become a prominent issue in this chapter.

Hierarchisations

If the differential construction of every thing is an endless deferral, how do words within a linguistic system, gender in a sexed system,¹¹ or body modifications in a corporeal structure, manifest at all? How does any thing ever become that thing, without having always already slipped (deferred) relationally away into being “not this thing”? In terms of language, Derrida’s answer is that there are hierarchised binaries, economies of valuation, woven through the structure to “fix” meanings. These oppositions consist of a privileged, “inside” term, and an excluded, “outside” term.”¹² The privilege granted to the “essential” term within the binary composition of any sign/binary fixes the system in place and gives “meaning” to what would otherwise be ambiguous, given that it refers to nothing which exists prior to the system. The sign normalises what is seemingly essential to it and displaces what is not, installing a presence as the sign’s or thing’s essential quality “to be put in the place of the thing itself, *the present thing*, ‘thing’ here standing for meaning or referent” (1982:9).

Derrida questions this dominating role afforded to presence, arguing that meaning is instead unstable. That the signified concept is never present in-itself, but rather relationally relies upon its “absent” counterpart(s), means that it is not only what overtly emerges/presents which produces signification/meaning. Instead, the apparent “absence” to any thing also participates in/as “presenting” that thing. In this light, the earlier discussed prioritisation of social time over natural and biological time, or vice-versa, seems fragile, as do models which, as Barbara Adam notes, position “modern over traditional time, and commodity over event-based time” (1990:153). Time cannot be reduced to an either/or proposition, given that it is time-as-*différance* which presents/temporalises every thing. Crucially, this is a co-constitutive manifestation of what is present with/as what is absent.

This contestation of the hierarchisation of presence over absence allows us to revisit Augustine’s time model. Time for Augustine is present-centric. The present is everything, whereby past and future do not exist without emerging through a present-as-passing. Here we can observe a fundamental conflict between the conceptions of time proposed by Derrida and

¹¹ The gendered subject that does not exist prior to a series of references, nor at any particular point of reference, is therefore a construction of signification that, in gender theorist Judith Butler’s words, “not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process” (1993:10).

¹² During “Linguistics and Grammatology” in *Of Grammatology*, Derrida identifies writing|speech as a fundamental form of the interiorisation|marginalisation opposition.

Augustine. For Derrida, the present is never in-itself, but rather is only present because what is (seemingly) absent is bound up in the “presenting” of presence. It is not that what is (seemingly) not present (the past or the future) is ever non-existent for Derrida (which is something Augustine contrarily does demand). Rather, what is absent is always, according to Derrida, an active “presenting.” Conversely for Augustine, whilst past and future cannot exist without a present with which they are co-implicated as duration, there is also a duration-less present existing independently from the absence of past or future (which conflicts with Derridean *différance*). Time, for Augustine, “when it is present has no duration” (1961:266). This aspect of Augustine’s argument informs the assumed hierarchisation of presence over absence with which Derrida’s deconstruction is concerned. We have engaged another conception of time’s present-centrism via Mead. However, Mead’s demand that there is no time “in-itself” exemplifies an important consistency with the temporality of Derridean deconstruction that Augustine’s conception lacks.

Derrida’s deconstruction is not simply reversing the binary and prioritising absence over presence, but rather is calling into question this hierarchical opposition of supposedly independent states. It is not that the present becomes hidden, but “rather that *différance* maintains our relationship with that which...exceeds the alternative of presence and absence” (Derrida 1982:20). Because meaning is produced by a field or structure of difference, it is always concurrently present and/as absent. We are engaging Derridean post-structuralism for a specific reason. If the absence|presence binary which informs the conceptual separation of intangible-time from tangible-space can be problematised, this will assist the development of our inquiry into whether something spatial, like the human body, is not absent from the production of time, but is co-constitutively involved with/as time. Doreen Massey observes, Derridean-like, that with any such dichotomy what emerges is “a presence and an absence; a dualism which takes the classic form of A|not-A” (1994:255). If “A” is prioritised, then the other term, “not-A,” takes on a character of relative lack. As will be seen, Massey is one of a number of commentators who believe time is conceptually hierarchised over space, in that it is “time which is conceived of as in the position of ‘A’, and space which is ‘not-A’” (256). If the body-as-space is to be acknowledged as time-productive, a post-structural engagement will need to attend to the conception of space as the supposed “not-A” of time-as-A.

Time > Space, Male > Female

Massey argues that time is hierarchised in the time|space dualism. This is due to the productivity by which time is characterised, “as change, movement, history, dynamism; while space, rather lamely by comparison, is simply the absence of these things” (256-257).¹³ Such a frame subordinates space by attributing time with a potential that spatiality lacks as a mere passive container in which (other) things happen. Correlatively, in chapter one we explored theological conceptions of the sensible universe’s becoming, in which time is ontologically anterior to worldly space(s). Time emanates omnipresently from God’s always-already Being, whereas worldly-space is created subsequently from general Space which has already emanated. Here, time is interiorised as Being’s default, something Belgian philosopher, Luce Irigaray, describes as philosophy’s confirmation of “the genealogy of the task of the gods or God. Time becomes the *interiority* of the subject itself, and space, its *exteriority*” (1993[1984]:7). If this is the case, then just as Derrida notes that within any binary, the hierarchised term will marginalise the exteriorised pairing, so in the time|space dualism, time, in being hierarchised, is interiorised.

In observing the sociological implications of such a dualism, when discussing time one speaks of *histories*, not *herstories*. Is this an insight into the exteriorisation of women from time, and the political equation of females with what is spatial? *Everything You Know About English Is Wrong* (2008) by Bill Brohaugh etymologically illuminates this discussion. In Latin, *historia* unprovocatively translated to “narrative, recounting, or something learnt by inquiring” (7). However, *historia* was derived from the Greek *histor*, meaning “knowledge, learning...wise man” (7). It was the wise *man*, not woman, who told *history*. Such a frame aligns the productive potential of time with social, male achievements defined by history, culture, education, progress, civilisation, politics and reason. Conversely, the other poles of these concepts are spatial, marginalised as the supposed stasis of what is cyclical, bodily, maternal and reproductive. Massey would agree here, given her acknowledgement that “space and the feminine are frequently defined in terms of dichotomies in which each of them is most commonly defined as not-A” (1994:257). Similarly for Irigaray, “the feminine is experienced as space...while the

¹³ Mimicking Derrida’s care to avoid merely inverting the current dualism, Massey does not believe that space should be hierarchised over time by upgrading “the status of space within the terms of the old dualism, but that what must be overcome is the very formulation of space|time in terms of this kind of dichotomy” (260).

masculine is experienced as time” (1993:7). What prove to be the political hierarchies of time|space and male|female therefore manifest concurrently.

This post-structural examination of the time|space divide is being undertaken in order to ask whether the body-as-space is not polarised from time’s production. As a result, an interpretation that what is correlated with space (arguably the female in this case) is time’s exterior, must be investigated. Furthermore, the argument “time is a man, space is a woman” (Blake in Forman & Sowton 1989:4), potentially contradicts our engagement with Durkheim which identifies a concurrent production of the subject with/as the social that attributes *every subject* with an inescapably productive involvement in the temporality of social rhythm(s). Consequently, characterisations which exclude female subjects from time and certain social processes, due to their purportedly contrary correlation with what is spatially static and ineffectual, require attention.

Females and time; marginalisation/exclusion?

Females are supposedly polarised from the productive achievements of time-as-culture when discourse and politics confines them to correlations with physiological processes. Social theorist David Harvey refers to this as “the gendering of ‘Father Time’” (1990:420), where if temporality and femininity are mentioned together, it is only in terms of nature’s cycles. The menstrual cycle exemplifies this, equating females with space (body) and positing time as a transcendent, oppressive organiser of female, corporeal processes. This is conceptually juxtaposed from the linearly progressive temporality of what is male, represented by the calendar. Feminist researchers Freida Forman and Caoran Sowton observe this in “the dominant myths of western civilisation [which] are those of man marching through time on a mythic journey in search of self, while woman remains outside historical time” (1989:x). Patriarchal history excludes women from decision making processes in human development, and from “the world of male-defined time, and as such [they] are never at home there” (Forman 1985:27). As will soon be addressed, however, the possibility of such exclusion, and its purportedly alternative subjective experience, is contentious.

Despite this, it is argued that feminism's first wave fought for the inclusion of women into these already existing institutions,¹⁴ focusing on temporally unidirectionally linear narratives of progress and equality. The agenda demanded equal rights with men, or as Toril Moi describes it, women's "right to a place in linear time" (1986:187). Given that social, political and historical developments were measured against the limitations of nature, a nature with which the ahistorical female-as-reproducer was conceptually aligned, this inclusion remained conditional.

Consequently, rather than attempting to function within a temporality which had excluded women, the second wave of feminism shifted focus. According to certain commentators, including Sandra Ponzanese, this demanded "women's right to remain outside the linear time of history and politics" (2004:76). It is from this impetus that "women's time," a term coined by philosopher Julia Kristeva, emerges. This term is not suggesting that one universal, natural rhythm applies to all women. Instead, it argues that women are uniquely, almost suffocatingly, implicated in the production of modern, *social/cultural* rhythms, given the multiple roles that first-wave feminism granted them. This productive entrapment in social temporality is reflected in the numerous demands of home and work, whereby it is women who are, as feminist theorist Rita Felski describes it, "juggling child care, frantic about their lack of time" (2000:20).

Social time's aforementioned multiplicity re-emerges. Not all times are sociologically equal, in that some times are "privileged and deemed more important than others" (Adam 1995:94). Time is purchased, distributed and sold by an industrial, patriarchal frame of reference whose inside-male|outside-female dichotomy means, as Forman notes, that "time is not freedom for women" (1985:27). Rather, female time is marginalised in comparison to male time, with something like "housework/domestic-labour" manifesting as a diffuse role in which the female is on call *at any time*. This issue, which has been much discussed by feminists and social scientists,¹⁵ associates domestic duty with the free time of females. In terms of paid work, female subservience to male time is similarly exemplified. Women generally earn less than men, even for the same labour, estimates claiming that women's employment earns them 60-77% of the

¹⁴ See Milojević's *Timing feminism, feminising time* (2008) for a summary of first wave feminist methodology.

¹⁵ For one such exploration discussing women and housework, see sociologist Claudia Geist's *Housework Time and Division of Labor* (2003).

male wage.¹⁶ This marginalisation means that “in a world where time is money, and where money can mean time, women have little of either” (28). Perhaps here it is appropriate to recall that in the first chapter it was observed how ancient Greek mythology personifies time as Cronus, *son* of mother earth and father heaven. This arguably attributes time with an inherently masculine identity from its initial, human conceptions.

The reason for exploring the conceptual alignment of the male with time is that in considering the correlatively marginalised female’s “spatial” characterisation, a sociological insight emerges regarding the supposed polarisation of time from space. I am not concerned with emancipating females from a spatial characterisation. In considering whether the human body-as-space is implicated in the production of time, I do not want to exclude *any* human from what is spatial. Our brief engagement with feminist discourse has observed the presumed exclusion of the female from productive time due to their supposed, conceptual correlation with space. This informs the time|space division that we are interrogating, whereby if I have any emancipative intention, it is concerned with resurrecting space from this purported exteriority from time.

Time as possibility, space as closure

Structuralism tends to fix static-space in opposition to dynamic-time. Argentine political theorist Ernesto Laclau endorses the structuralist conception that “temporality must be conceived as the exact opposite of space” (1990:41). The supposedly static, positive nature of space is fixed in place by the structural presence of spaces.¹⁷ Laclau duly describes “spatiality” as “coexistence within a structure that establishes the positive nature of all its terms” (69). In contrast to this spatially closed and stationary system, time for Laclau “takes the form of a dynamic which disrupts the predefined terms of any system” (Massey 1992:68). Laclau demands that dislocation and temporality are synonymous, indeed “dislocation is the very form of temporality” (1990:41, 42). Correlating temporality with dislocation is of course consistent with the temporalising characterised by Derridean *différance*.

¹⁶ For example: (i) Freida Forman’s *Reflections on Feminising Time* (1985) claims that women earn 60% of what men earn for the same work; (ii) The Associated Press reports in *Women still earn less than men* (2010) that women with children earn a third less than men: (<http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/women-still-earn-less-than-men-study-20100308-psn3.html>); (iii) The Institute for Women’s Policy Research states in *The Gender Wage Gap for 2009* (2010) that women earn 77.1% of what men earn, meaning the wage gap between genders is 22.9 percent: (www.iwpr.org/pdf/C350.pdf).

¹⁷ This correlates with Derrida’s interpretation of structuralism as internally rigid.

This depiction of space informs an understanding of its conceptual equation with what is female and feminine. Feminist discourses recognise the association of what is male with rational, cultural achievements via a linear, forward-moving development intertwined with/as time, whereas what is female is conceived of as statically stuck within a natural, repetitive cycle. Or in Massey's terms, "the spatial, because it lacks dislocation, is devoid of the possibility of politics" (1992:68). Discursive dichotomies emerge which group socially productive terms such as male-mind-reason-culture in contrast to female-body-intuition-nature.¹⁸ A woman-as-spatiality system remains a reproductive container for something more dynamic. This resonates with Irigaray's suggestion that "the maternal-feminine serves as an *envelope*, a *container*, the starting point from which man limits his things" (1993:10). Space is closed and cannot (re-)produce time, whereas time, which is dynamic, can (re-)produce space. The ramification for our concerns would be that the body-as-space merely exemplifies, but is never involved in producing, time.

The time of space and the time of time are two distinct times for Laclau. The time of a closed system is one of spatial change without progressive dislocation. The female is often represented as such, with a rigid reproductive rhythm imposed that is consistent with how Laclau describes spatial time as "a purely cyclical succession...a reduction of time to space" (1990:42). The unfolding of the seasons could also be included here, whereby "any repetition that is governed by a structural law of succession, is space" (41). Interestingly, this acknowledges spatial-temporal processes. Whilst not being "real historical time," these processes still produce spatial becoming. Laclau's response is that temporal processes will inevitably occur in the physical/spatial realm. Temporality is intrinsic to the prospect of anything, whereby as we have just seen for Laclau, dislocation *is* possibility" (41, 42). This recalls the notion from earlier chapters that body modification practices, ageing, or any bodily change condition bodily production by dislocating/temporalising bodies into pre- and post- versions. The static body (space) means nothing in-itself, but a body (space) dislocated (differentiated) from itself does. Laclau is arguing that space cannot perform this self-distinguishing/temporalising process, and that its possibility is enacted by time which is separate from space.

Laclau would thus agree that body modification practices temporalise the body-as-space, however he would argue that such time-production is never brought about *by* the body-as-space.

¹⁸ Feminist researchers Linda Brodkey and Michelle Fine claim that science affords a few privileged white males the belief that they alone legislate reality. Accordingly, "these men reside in a world in which 'mind over matter' means that what counts is what each individual man can know, understand, and represent as empirical" (1992:80).

Conversely, we are exploring whether the body-as-space does have this temporalising capacity. If this can be realised, then even if feminist theories argue that patriarchal frames separate what is male-mental-time-cultural from what is female-corporeal-spatial-natural, a primary role in, rather than an exclusion from, time, will be inescapable for males *and* females, given the embodied/spatial constitution of both.

If this thesis is to develop the argument that all bodies-as-space(s) are productive of time, then females-as-bodies (and indeed males-as-bodies) will constitute a more primordial ontology than any patriarchal arrangement of such time from which women are seemingly marginalised. In preceding chapters we began this task by considering the inescapably productive role of the human subject in the temporality of the objective, social rhythms from which the subject is produced. This chapter is now endeavouring to characterise this as productive of time itself, and then to substantialise/spatialise this production by attributing it to the body-as-space. Reductively for Laclau however, space only manifests as closure, in contradistinction to what is social:

Any social level – if we can speak of levels to refer to something that is essentially non-spatial – can be the location of mythical re-articulations...Society, then, is ultimately unrepresentable: any representation – and thus any space – is an attempt to constitute society, not to state what it is. But the antagonistic moment of collision between the various representations cannot be reduced to space, and is itself unrepresentable. It is therefore mere event, mere temporality (1990:82).

I am not contesting this claim that society is temporality. Indeed, this is congruent with our engagement with Durkheimian sociology. What I am challenging is the belief that the social is not also, at the same time, spatial. Laclau's anti-spatial-social demands that if anything, female or otherwise, is characterised spatially, then they are excluded from socially productive/progressive processes. Such exclusionary discourse is inconsistent with the sociologically developed aspect of this thesis, which argues against the possibility of a politics of social exteriority. As observed, no subject can avoid being socially productive/constitutive.

Laclau has demanded that spatiality implies coexistence with a structure, establishing a rigid, positive fixity. Time, in contrast, is a dynamic production, always dislocating in the

process of becoming. Time thus subordinates space, given that space becomes a thing which time manipulates/makes-possible. I like Massey's summation of this interpretation, whereby "it is time, and the characteristics associated with time, which are the primary constituents of both space and time; time is the nodal point, the privileged signifier" (1994:257).

However, it should not be forgotten that Derridean post-structuralism illustrates that a thing's privilege only manifests relationally with its correlative other in a structural dualism. Each depends on the other for its own production, marking the perpetually unstable participation of both in the production of the other, constituting, and constituted by, the other. The notion of a neat division in a dichotomous pairing, such as between time and space, is therefore problematic. This facilitates an interrogation of any rigid structuralist reading of the time|space dichotomy, such as Laclau's. Whilst for Derrida *différance* is a temporalising, such time and timing cannot be a productive force at the expense of passive space. Rather, time ~~is~~ only because space ~~is~~, whereby each relationally, differentially constitutes the production of the other, as the other. Armed with such logic, we will soon critique all such readings which demarcate the spatial human body from time's dynamic production.

Social-corporeal junctions

The characterisation of space/corporeality as passive, and as something which does not participate in social production, seemingly contradicts the notion that the focus of the social sciences is embodied, fleshed humans. As sociologist Peter Freund notes, "psychology and anthropology, as well as sociology, in particular, have a curiously 'disembodied' view of human beings" (1988:839). In attempting to avoid biologically essentialist accounts which define race or gender as ultimate determinants of human behaviour,¹⁹ the social sciences, as we have seen, often perhaps inadvertently rely upon the mind|body dualism that they confront.

Conditioned by assumptions that culture and nature are divided phenomena, the relationship between what is social and what is corporeal/spatial is typically analysed as a one-directional social production of the human body. This is not an entirely worthless exercise. The physiological changes of bodies via their interaction with social structures are fascinating.

¹⁹ For one such contestation of biological essentialism, see *Challenging Racism and Sexism: Alternatives to Genetic Explanations* (1994), in which psychologist Ethel Tobach and biologist Betty Rosoff challenge the belief that intelligence or aggression are genetically determined by race or gender.

Medical journals have identified for decades that modern humans are generally taller than their predecessors. Lawrence Galton's *Are We Growing Into Giants* (1959), observes that "people have been getting taller at a rate of about one centimetre – about two-fifths of an inch – every decade" (1959:115). This is linked to an increasingly faster physiological development, evidenced in the average age of the commencement of menstruation dropping from sixteen to thirteen in the last one hundred years (McElroy & Townsend 2008:223). Different nutritional and sanitation standards are among the stimuli for these changes, illustrating a social influence in the re-production of human biomechanics and physiologies. Such physiological malleability in general is not remarkable when considering how body rhythms respond to a broader, natural environment. This organic synchronicity of rhythms is reflected, as Adam notes, in how "our activities and our sleep are linked to the light and darkness cycle of the earth" (1990:74).

In preceding chapters, Mead's present-producing-past, no-time-in-itself, ontology of temporality has informed our acknowledgement of the implication of individual rhythms in/as social rhythms. What we are considering now though is how social structures relate to the actual matter/space/physicality of bodies, with a view to attributing the individual-social co-constitutive rhythm to the body-as-space. In considering how work, for example, shapes muscular development and physiological arousal or stress, it becomes apparent that changing patterns of production are intimately related to corporeal constitution. This issue is famously explored in *Capital* (1992[1867]) by the German philosopher and economist, Karl Marx. Marx argues that capitalist, industrial mechanisms shape the physiological rhythms of the human body, exhausting the nervous system and restricting which muscles develop due to the limited range of operation required by factory machinery. The German philosopher and social scientist, Friedrich Engels, similarly argues in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1987[1845]) that work deforms human bodies, particularly those of children and women, by imposing tasks such as carrying coal. The result of "such over-exertion is the diversion of vitality to the one sided development of the muscles...while the rest of the body suffers and is atrophied" (282-283).

We must go beyond simply identifying how societies produce or shape the body however. Or as Nick Crossley observes, there can be more to sociological inquiry than the presumption that "because society affects the body it is somehow not 'of' the body; that it is

disembodied” (2006:4).²⁰ The previous chapter acknowledged a human involvement in social production that is conditioned by their inescapable implication in the temporality of objective, social rhythms. In order to explore our central question of whether the body-as-space does not merely exemplify time, but is instead time’s source, this productive, rhythmic participation of the human will need to be acknowledged as time, and attributed to the body-as-space.

The agentic, productive capacity of the body-as-space, if identifiable, will concurrently dismantle the mind|body binary, given that typically, agency is exclusively equated with mind-based cognition. The relevance of this for our interrogation of the time|space divide is that the mind is presumed to be the intangible component in the mind|body dichotomy, just as time is interpreted to be in relation to space. The body, like space, is conversely the substantial/tangible components. If agency can be conceived as corporeal however, whereby the body-as-space is characterised as agentively productive rather than passively produced, what is spatial will not be restricted to the closed terms of structuralisms such as Laclau’s. It is therefore necessary that the subject’s productive implication in social structure, an argument already constructed in preceding chapters, is recognised as corporeally/spatially constituted. We will benefit in such an inquiry by engaging the sociology of the French post-structuralist, Pierre Bourdieu (1930 – 2002).

Agentive corporeality

In seeking to acknowledge the buried structures of the social world and the “‘mechanisms’ which ensure their reproduction or transformation” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:7), Bourdieu intends to render ambiguous the opposition between objective structure and subjective agency, or society and the individual. For Bourdieu and Wacquant, structuralist objectivism interprets the social environment of established structures and institutions, such as education and the opposition male|female (134), as deterministically producing the embodied individual. This presents the world as a spectacle, “offered to an observer who takes a ‘point of view’ on the action” (Bourdieu 1990[1980]:52). Characterising the subject as a passive observer does not reflect,

²⁰ The exclusion of the body from the history of sociological inquiry is an issue that was comprehensively discussed by sociologists in the 1990s. Crossley makes a similar demand to his point above in *Merleau-Ponty, the Elusive Body and Carnal Sociology* (1995), where he states that “the body eludes sociology every time it is dissociated from and juxtaposed to the social” (44). For two defining examples of this kind of discussion, refer to Chris Shilling’s chapter ‘The Body in Sociology’, in *The Body and Social Theory* (1993), and Brian Turner’s chapter ‘Recent developments in the theory of the body’, in *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory* (1991).

however, their constructive role in social structure, and would duly interpret the body-as-space as merely a submissive exemplification of objectively structured rhythms.

In contesting this interpretation, Bourdieu is not instead prioritising subjectivity however. Such inversion would simply reinforce the agency|structure binary, whereby a “fall into subjectivism is incapable of giving an account of the necessity of the social world” (52). This echoes Derrida’s concern to avoid pointlessly inverting the presence|absence binary. Furthermore, in being careful not to hierarchise “individual agency,” Bourdieu’s intention resonates with our interrogation of the perception that body modification practices represent an individual agent defying social power structures. Contrary to this, Bourdieu is interested in tracing objective social structures within subjective actions, and vice-versa, reflecting the call of Derridean *différance* to acknowledge the co-dependence of the present and that which seems to be absent and invisible.

Whilst attending to what is objective about social structure we should not forget why objectivity is important. In recognising the human involvement in/as the temporality of objective, social rhythms, we have avoided reducing this involvement to a sovereign, subjective operation, given the problems this would raise for the *shared* coherence of social time. A purely subjective time could seemingly manifest many disconnected rhythms, whereas a common, socially objective time conditions and synchronises social function. Consequently, the subjective involvement has instead been acknowledged as concurrently producing, and being produced by, socially objective rhythms.

In exploring this kind of socially and objectively dispersed subjectivity, Bourdieu argues that one’s position within a social structure is reflected by their *bodily* practice (1990:9, 10, 57-58, 66-79). The body is a site of interaction between an individual’s practices and social structures. What consequently emerges as the body is described by Bourdieu as *habitus*, a set of structured/structuring practices, manifesting as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices” (53). These durable, transposable dispositions are all ways of physically being, such as moving, gesturing, talking, and even, it must be said, being body modified. Such dispositions manifest within each individual as symbolic templates for behaviour. Hence Bourdieu’s characterisation of *habitus* as that which generates, conditions and organises bodily practice(s).

These symbolic templates frame one's belonging to a class of individuals who occupy similar social positions and share the same *habitus*. Accordingly, Bourdieu describes *fields*, which perpetuate a particular population's bodily practices. Given that one already belongs to a field in order to acquire its practices, this acquisition takes on an objective, natural impression. This is reminiscent, as seen in chapter one, of the hyper-normalisation of certain beautification, body modification processes for those of a certain social class. In being the "product of a particular class of objective regularities, the *habitus* generates all the 'reasonable,' 'common-sense,' behaviours...possible within the limits of these regularities" (55). The ensuing regularity of *habitus* means individual behaviours embody the field from which they have been produced.

What is most relevant for the current stage of our inquiry in this chapter is this recognition of an individual-social, co-constitutive production, and attributing it to the body-as-space. When tracing an individual's trajectory within the objectivity of a field, Bourdieu focuses on *capital*. Capital arises in various economic and cultural forms that, as sociologist Craig Calhoun observes, "structure the organisation of fields" (2002:264). The relative forms, and total amount, of capital an agent embodies facilitates their pursuit of position and social power. This represents the organised struggles of social and political life, endowing each individual with agency in terms of the structures in which they are rooted (Bourdieu 1989:20-21). As noted, Bourdieu characterises this organised struggle as produced by durable, transposable, physical dispositions. Consequently, capital for Bourdieu enables, and is enabled by, embodied social behaviour, contrary to Marx's reading of capital processes as purely economically and industrially driven impositions upon the progressively deformed human corporeality.

My interpretation of such enablement and agency is not that one *has* capital, and then decides how to use it. Rather, one *is* fleshed-capital, based on embodied social relations. These relations produce, and rely upon, agential bodies, as a perpetual arrangement of the social body by a socially arranged human body. Dispositions, ways of being bodily positioned in a social field, become the generative basis of structures that are *structuring*, in guiding practices, and are concurrently *structured*, in that the acquisition of the power to affect objective behavioural practice is bound up in the acquisition of the objective behavioural practices themselves. In considering body modification as an example of such dialectical, embodied practice, one must endorse the appraisal that sociologist Christian Klesse contributes, stating that the act of getting tattooed or pierced has the effect of reflecting *and* creating collectivity (1999:22). Body

modifications, constitutive of, and constituted by, *habitus*, are signified/produced in terms of their relational position within social contexts which they/*habitus* produce. This *near*-circularity to such structural production ensures a perpetual potential for plasticity, whereby as commentator Cheleen Mahar notes, “because of its mode of development, *habitus* is never ‘fixed’” (1990:11). Modified bodies modify the modifying, structuring, social bodies by which they are modified. We are duly moving past the depiction explored earlier in this chapter of the body-as-space as the passive component to its dichotomous, dynamic counterpart, time.

The always already body

By applying Mead’s ontology of time in which there is no-time-in-itself, human subjects have been productively implicated in the temporality of objective, social rhythms. Bourdieu now provides an insight into the bodily constitution of this rhythmic co-implication between subjects and social structures. *Habitus* illustrates how the social body produces an individual body that was already involved in the production of the social body. There is not a point of time in-itself when a social body *pre-existed* an individual body, or vice-versa. Rather, each is constituted by the other, whereby the direction of the temporality of social-individual causation is not as straight-forward as it seems. Indeed, Bourdieu and Wacquant describe each individual’s trajectory as “where the past, the present, and the future...interpenetrate one another” (1992:22). This is consistent with my interrogation of Durkheim’s sociology, which argues against the supposition of exclusively forward-moving, time-linear, cause-effect chains dictating the social-individual relation.

The importance of Bourdieu’s conception for the development of this chapter is Bourdieu’s corporeal/spatial focus. Gail Weiss also observes this primary co-implication of social structure and natural physicality, stating that “for Bourdieu the body is first and foremost the site where the natural and the social are inextricably intertwined in an ongoing process whereby the natural is socialised and the social is naturalised” (2008:234). Social structures *are bodied*. Marx and Engel’s focus on capitalist, structural *interference* into human physiological development can thus be re-read, whereby it would now have to be remarked that physiological modification, a practice-based development, dialectically participates in a physiologically structured society. Nature-as-body and culture-as-social coincide, whereby bodies are not simply

at the mercy of a shifting social structure, but are the concurrent incarnators and incarnations of a shifting social corporeality. Bourdieu and Wacquant's declaration which opened this chapter, namely concerning the co-constitution by which humans produce the world which produces them (1992:7), can now be understood as a bodily co-constitution.

There are considerable similarities between this conception, and the theory of structuration from Anthony Giddens that we have already encountered. In *The Constitution of Society*, Giddens acknowledges the role that individual practices play in constructing social behaviours, which are "'carried' in reproduced practices embedded in time and space" (1984:170). This structural process affords the individual a certain productive agency. Each individual action reproduces the day-to-day enactment of social life (26), and yet restricts the range of activities that can be reproduced. Thus, structure is "always both enabling and constraining" (169), congruent with the relation that Bourdieu describes between the subjective individual and the objective social. Indeed, Giddens declares his intent in terminology which is evocative of Bourdieu's, stating that "in formulating structuration theory I wish to escape from the dualism associated with objectivism and subjectivism" (xxvii).

Given this similarity, why then in this thesis have we engaged Bourdieu at length, and not Giddens? The answer to this query concerns the primacy of the body for Bourdieu. Whilst Giddens recognises the "positioning of the body" (xiv) as an important "medium" for the reproduction of social structures, he is reluctant to attribute agency to the organic matter/substance of the body. Expressing confusion concerning where agency is in relation to the flesh of bodies, he notes that "the self is obviously not just an extension of the physical characteristics of the organism that is its 'carrier'" (36). Giddens' confusion is commendable, for it acknowledges that if the self is not "carried" by one's physicality, then corporeality is perhaps not merely a Cartesian extension of an insubstantial self, but somehow constitutes selfhood.

Unfortunately, Giddens avoids this debate by instead only addressing how social systems "mediate the physical and sensory properties of the human body" (36). This neglects that such mediation could be entirely fleshy, and implies that bodies, in their enablement and constraint, simply exemplify the mental milieu of social production. Action is defined as "a flow, in which the reflexive monitoring which the individual maintains is fundamental to the *control of the body* that actors ordinarily sustain" (9; my emphasis). The agency of individuals/actors, which is also (re-)productive of socially structured behaviours, is here depicted as what *controls* and produces

their associated bodies. The body manifests as the tool of an agent, whose enabled and structured constitution witnesses a “transformation of the body into an instrument of acting-in-the-world” (53). Such corporeal instrumentation does not cohere with the primacy of Bourdieu’s agentic, productive body-as-*habitus*. Giddens in fact defines the body as possessed by an agent, “which is understood as a ‘body’ by its owner only in the contextualities of action” (66). Conversely, our inquiry has problematised the belief that the agent-body relation should be defined purely in terms of a hierarchical ownership.

Habitus is therefore not an apparatus that simply restricts an individual’s embodied, dispositional constitution from an objective without. Rather, as the individual’s immanent enablement of a socially structured body, it is “the internalisation of externality” which “enables the external forces to exert themselves, but in accordance with the specific logic of the organisms in which they are incorporated” (Bourdieu 1990:55). The historically objective internalisation of structurally induced practice does not restrict behaviour and disposition to the desires of an individual mind/consciousness. Nor does it curtail individual agency by instead offering only a social source of individual behaviour and practice. Instead, by *enacting* what is individually bodied *and* what is socially bodied, *habitus* spatially blurs agency as an “enacted belief” (68). Agency is redefined from Cartesian rationality and wilful cognition, to objectively, practically, primarily, *bodily being in the world*. This primacy-in-practice means that what is learned by the body “is not something that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is” (73). The objectivity of the individual’s corporeal involvement is crucial, and can be attributed to the inescapability of such involvement. Such objectively inescapable participation avoids reducing the subject’s involvement to a sovereign, separate, individual process, as was also avoided when considering the role of the Augustinian subject in time.

The individual, the body-as-space, conforms to the objectivity of a field, however not as a mere replication of its ritual activities/behaviours/dispositions. If this were the case, the body would simply repeat/exemplify imposed social and temporal structures. Instead, the body-as-space constitutes ritual activity, as an immanent articulation of the world that also articulates the world. This contests the notion that flesh is divided from its social environment. Such recognition of the ontological productivity of the body is consistent with this thesis, problematising what Vicki Kirby describes as the “somatophobia of Western metaphysics that renders matter immaterial” (1997:54-55). The frame that defines space as closure, in

contradistinction to time as potentiality, is reconfigured by this appreciation of the productive body-as-space. Our work in this chapter, in exploring whether the body produces a spatially immanent source of time, rather than merely exemplifies a spatially transcendent time-source, can potentially build on this recognition of the body-as-space as the producer of the temporality of social structure and/as rhythms.

The dislocated body: the corporeal memory/trace

Not only is one located within *habitus*, but one *is habitus*, a present embodiment that is also a social history and a future. The body constitutes this time structure by manifesting trans-temporally and even omni-temporally, consistent with Mead's insight that rather than there ever being a time-in-itself, presents, pasts and futures instead perpetually co-emerge. The body can never be a mere reiteration or copy of what has preceded it, given that the past body (be it a human body or a social body) only emerges with, rather than anterior to, the present. At least this is how I read Bourdieu's eloquent description of the body as "the presence of the past in this kind of false anticipation of the future" (Bourdieu 1990:62). "False" is a curious way to describe this transition, but seemingly refers to how whatever will exist is not simply something permanently fixed in a preceding present, able to be entirely anticipated from an objectively separate state of time. Rather, as we have seen, what will exist only manifests with, in and as the present, a process from which time manifests. Or in Derrida's terms already covered, the body brings forth a signification that is not simply *in time*, but rather which *is time*. *Habitus*, like a cognitive memory trace, ensures the presence of, and indeed the production of, past experiences. Concurrently ~~present~~-located as an individual body, and yet ~~absent~~-dislocated as an objective, co-constitutive, collective site, *habitus* functions as a perpetually plastic, embodied social *trace*.

The understanding of *habitus* as a dynamic, social construction, a corporeal, memorial production, between the individual body and the objective, social body, captures Halbwachs' conception of memory as a social construction (1992:46-51, 124, 173, 182, 187). Individuals, and their memories, participate in, and rely upon, collective social environments in order to emerge as individual memory incarnations.²¹ If the individual body is productively implicated in

²¹ Equally we have seen that modified bodies are only produced socially-relationally, manifesting as the traces of a system that is devoid of autonomous, positive signs.

the structures from which it emerges, then just as mind and memory are blurred across the social milieu for Halbwachs, so corporeality must likewise be dispersed for our inquiry. Collective memory frameworks are indivisible, for describing them as the sum of individual memories would attribute each memory (and in terms of the embodied memory of *habitus*, each body), with a contradictory autonomy/positivity. Just like the mind, the body is not bound “inside” any separate, demarcated entity, but is socially threaded through a larger fabric. This conception of the body will be the focus of chapter four, when we will ask what, and where, is corporeality.

As addressed in chapter two, memory produces instead of merely accesses, whereby Halbwachs argues that a society’s collective memory is a *reconstruction* of the past in light of the present (46-51). The equally dynamic *habitus*-as-embodied-memory exhibits alterability with each iteration, each individual incarnation, of body-as-practice. The embodied identity of the individual-social co-constitution (re-)emerges through its continually shifting relation. Derrida describes such perpetual self-incarnation in the sense that “the relation to self can only be *différance*, that is to say alterity, or trace” (1991:261). *Habitus*-as-embodied-trace is not a precise replica of its past, but is instead an already ongoing (re-)definition of itself and of its past. By engaging Mead it has been argued that this emergent trace, which is a present incarnation, (re-)produces the relational past in a movement which characterises time, given that a permanently fixed past in-itself is not time/temporality. In terms of *habitus* then, the shifting, collective structure which the body produces, and by which it is produced, is time. Difference, corporeal/spatial difference, manifests as time. *Habitus* is *différance*, that temporalisation which Derrida describes as a “constitution of the present...which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporisation” (1982:13). The temporality of the present and the spatiality of the present coincide as the never fully and finally self-coincidental (and thus always temporal) body (space).

Given such structural plasticity, the socially constituted/constitutive body is never fully, finally or permanently signified, contesting the foundation of Laclau’s non-spatial-social. Laclau’s objection to the correlation of sociality and spatiality relies upon the assumption that what is spatial is rigid and passive. This contributes to discourses which argue that something like the body-as-space merely exemplifies time’s production. Conversely, the corporeal-social structure just explored here illustrates the dynamic qualities of what is spatial, whereby we see how the spatial temporalises.

Habitus is this structure, produced by all bodily practices (including those which are categorised as “body modifying”), and developing plastic, yet durable, forms by which it (the structure of practice), and they (the structured practices), continue. Sociologists Gloria Brame and William Brame accordingly refer to something like tattooing as a plastic yet extended relationship, in the way that it develops over time and “creates within a group a sense of continuity” (1993:331). That *habitus* produces new forms of all practices indicates the plasticity of what is considered to be a “body modification practice.” We will address this issue soon by interrogating the exclusive categorisation of “body modification practices.” For now however, it must be recognised that *habitus*, as a structuring structure of bodily practices, incorporates the modified body which acts as a symbolic, differentiating template for future-and-past productions of *habitus* and/as the body. If time is difference, the temporalising of *différance*, then this relational production between the embodied individual and/as the social body means that time does not come to the body from without. Rather, the body always was, and already is, the society, and the temporality, from which it is (re-)produced.

This is an appropriate point at which to review. In preceding chapters, the inescapable implication of every subject in co-constitutively producing objective, social rhythms has been acknowledged. Following this, our concerns have been:

- (i) to characterise this co-constitutive production as also producing the objective rhythm that is time, and;
- (ii) to attribute the subject’s productive involvement to the body-as-space.

Différance now addresses the first point, as an insight into how the co-constitution of subjects, with/as the social, is time. According to *différance*, all subjectivities are co-constitutive. If sociality is fundamentally conditioned by intersubjectivity, then *différance*, as the condition and the rhythm of structurally produced (inter-)subjectivities, is the primordial social ontology. Given the primordial nature of this ontologically productive rhythm, whereby nothing precedes the differential ontology/production of *différance*, not even *différance* can pre-exist the subjectivities which emerge/present via it. *Différance* is not the eternally fixed ground of subject production, but rather the ontological possibility which perpetually (re-)emerges/(re-)presents

with/as co-constitutive subjectivities. Subjects thus (re-)condition that which conditions primordial sociality/intersubjectivity; *différance*.

If, as we have covered, *différance* is time, then what (re-)conditions *différance* – the co-constitution of subjects as primordial sociality – is also time. Crucially, *différance*'s rhythm of temporalising/time-production is objective, given that, adhering to our introductory definition of “objectivity,” no subjectivity pre-exists the relational/differential ontology of *différance* which applies to all subjectivities inescapably, incorporating, but never trumped by, any individuality/particularity/subjectivity. *Différance* constitutes time, its rhythm is objective, whereby what therefore manifests is objective time.

In terms of how we have attended to the second point or aspiration concerning the attribution of the subject's productive involvement in time to the body-as-space, let us recall that *différance* is temporalisation, whereby time is not a productive force at the expense of passive space. Rather, time *is* only because space *is*. According to the deconstruction of any hierarchical binary components, rather than simply being separate and opposed, time and space participate in the production of each other, as the other. In *habitus* we have seen time and space emerging in this intimate fashion. The co-constitution of subjects, with/as the social, is bodily/spatially constituted. All bodies-as-spaces-as-subjectivities are objectively co-constitutive with/as the primordially structuring and structured social. This production is objectively temporalising, given that no spatiality, nor indeed the social structure of space, pre-exists the other's incarnation. Space becomes, or *is*, only because, and as, time becomes, or *is*.

Such a discussion has considerable ramifications for our interrogation of the conception that time is a worldly phenomenon which human subjects simply represent via contingent social constructions. This conception separates the social construction of time from the phenomenon that it is supposedly simply representing; time itself. Via the application of *différance* in this chapter though, if time is a primordially intersubjective ontology, produced or constructed through socially structured spatialities/subjectivities including humans, then time actually is nothing but a social construction. Crucially, this social construction of time is not separate from the actual phenomenon of time, but rather, time's co-constitutive conditions mean that it is inherently a social phenomenon. This social nature of time will be elaborated much more extensively in the following chapter.

By implicating the organic, human body-as-space in the temporality of social production, we avoid the restriction seen in the body modification community's depictions of a separate, cognitive control over one's corporeality. That is, such depictions cannot avoid conceptually separating what is natural-spatial-passive from the dynamism of mind and time. If we think here of the body as natural, and of what is social as cultural, by implicating the two realms into the one mechanism I am not proposing that I am the first to complicate the nature|culture division. Rather, what is relatively novel is my curiosity concerning if an interrogation of this division can be an insight into whether time's source is spatially immanent. In chapters one and two the argument was developed that the human subject is inescapably, productively implicated in the temporality of objective, social rhythms. This chapter, in more directly addressing our question of whether the body-as-space produces time, has attributed the implication of the subject in objective, social temporality to the subject's bodily (spatial) practice.

However, given that the subject cannot avoid productively participating in such rhythms, why should the subject-as-space have to *do* anything, as in undertake "practice," in order to temporalise? Such an assumption could actually reinforce the notion that time is inherently dynamic, no matter what it does, whereas space is a rigid, atemporal presence before becoming temporalising via bodily practice. If this thesis is going to characterise what is spatial as inherently time-productive, simply being spatial should suffice. Consequently, we are going to explore whether the current link between time as perpetual-difference/*différance*/*habitus*, and being bodied, can be conceived of more fundamentally. With Derrida's assistance, we will consider whether simply being bodied, simply being spatial, regardless of bodily practice, is inescapably temporalising/time-productive.

Another application of Derridean post-structuralism will also emerge from this exploration, which will question the exclusive categorisation of certain practices as "body modifying." Consistent with our ongoing thesis that neither the individual body nor the social body pre-exist the other, this will interrogate the notion that a body exists before any other, and indeed, before body modification practices. If the aforementioned argument that space must *do* or *practice* in order to temporalise is to be contested, what must be addressed is whether, ontologically (but not necessarily chronologically) anterior to *doing/practicing*, the body-as-space is unavoidably, already, modifying and temporalising/time-productive.

The body, speech and writing

The aspect of Derridean post-structuralism that is most relevant here calls for an end to the “book” and the beginning of “writing.” The book for Derrida is *logocentrism*, or more specifically, as Derridean scholar Niall Lucy clarifies, the belief that “before everything else (history, knowledge, consciousness, etc.)...there is presence...the Logos” (2004:71). This assumption of an untouchably anterior origin of truth/meaning has significant ramifications for corporeal temporality. A logocentric presence for the body underpins the aforementioned self-mutilation argument, which presumes the skin to be a naturally passive and unmarked surface that precedes the cultural inscription of body modification practices. Such inscription, as we have seen, is criticised by medical practitioners, but endorsed by body modifiers, on the grounds that cultural practices re-invent the body-as-space beyond its absolutely biological, natural state. Derrida queries this kind of frame, which supposes that culture distorts and mediates what is natural and anterior, when interrogating spoken|written dichotomies in *Of Grammatology*.

Phonocentrism purports that what is essential or natural in signification is that which is spoken. This presumes the absolute proximity of the voice to what is signified, excluding the written signifier as supplementary to speech. In this regard, Derrida observes the belief that “the order of *natural and universal* signification is produced as spoken language” (1976:11). Conversely, writing, the written signifier, is purported to simply mediate, or deviate from, the spoken signifier. Phonocentrism’s debasement of writing as a signifier of a signifier is not a recent development. Rather, since Aristotle’s classification of the written word as a symbol of the more innate spoken word, it has been, according to Derrida, Western metaphysics’ archetypal “mediation of mediation and a fall into the exteriority of meaning” (13). This provides a foundation for French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1712 – 1778) denigration of writing, stating that “languages are made to be spoken, writing serves only as a supplement to speech” (Rousseau in Derrida 1976:144). Rousseau supposes, and explores, a human transition from a natural (spoken), to a political (written), state, producing a “social contract” (1909[1755]) which idealises a pre-modern version of society. It is from this work that the French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908 – 2009), draws, declaring that “Rousseau poses the central problem of anthropology, viz. the passage from an unbridled nature to an ordered society” (1992[1955]:229).

Derrida believes that this frame which hierarchises speech as immediate, and marginalises writing as mediated, distanced and corrupted, is evident in the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss,²² stating that “Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism is a *phonologism*...the exclusion or abasement of writing” (1976:102). We should be concerned by phonocentrism’s exclusion and denaturalisation of writing. Phonocentrism imposes a unidirectional, linear chain from speech, to after speech, whereby “linearism is undoubtedly inseparable from phonologism” (76). Along such lines, body modification practices which *re-write* the body are characterised as de-natural(ising). In a practice like body piercing, the materials (jewellery) and the processes (piercing techniques), represent synthetic intrusions into the body, distancing it from its “natural state.” This body-as-space cannot be implicated in the production of itself, nor in the temporality of social structures. Rather, the exclusively forward-moving, linear production of the passive body-as-space is transcendently, “de-naturally” imposed. The argument produced thus far in this thesis goes beyond this interpretation of spatial passivity. The coming sections will develop this point in order to consider whether body modification is the fundamental condition or state of being of space.

Lévi-Strauss believes that he observes this progression from nature to culture that Western society supposedly enforces upon humans. During a series of encounters with the *Nambikwara* tribe from Brazil, he notes that as an outsider he is not permitted to know their names, whereby around him the tribe members “are not allowed...to use *proper names*” (Derrida 1976:110). By encouraging the children to fight amongst themselves, and then to reveal the names of their combatants to him as revenge, Lévi-Strauss learns the names of the entire community (1992:111). For Lévi-Strauss, this gives an insight into the vulnerability of the primitive Nambikwara to infiltration from Western civilisation. The disclosure of proper names represents not just the breaking of tribal law, but a moment where the anthropologist confesses to “violating a virginal space” (Derrida 1976:113).

For Derrida however, this reflects an ethnocentric tradition, where the confession legitimates a Western insight into what is non-Western, by journalising and calculating the relation between culture (Western, civilised society) and nature (Other, primitive society). The Nambikwara, as the Other, are depicted as exemplifying natural, original innocence, the “index to a hidden good Nature” (115). This us-and-them model then indicates to what extent humanity

²² For one example, see Lévi-Strauss’ *The Raw and the Cooked: Mythologiques* (Vol. 1) (1983[1964]).

has fallen since its original (primitive) state, providing an insight into the “degradation of our society and our culture” (115). Rousseau’s “natural” to “political” transition is evoked here.

In furthering his argument about the violation of a pre-culturalised utopia by Western civilisation, Lévi-Strauss recounts the “writing lesson.” In this he distributes writing materials such as pencils and paper to these purely “oral people” to observe what they will do with them, for “that the Nambikwara could not write goes without saying” (Lévi-Strauss 1992:288). With these new implements the tribespeople “scribble,” which, given Lévi-Strauss’ assumption of a “people without writing,” are perceived to be acts of pure imitation (288). The only member of the tribe seen to comprehend the purpose of writing, “to have understood what writing was for” (288), is the chief. He not only scribbles lines along with the other tribespeople, imitating the anthropologist, but also understands that these scribbles are meant to possess meaning, even if he does not understand what that meaning is.

The imitation by which Lévi-Strauss characterises the chief’s writing practice bears an inverted resemblance to accusations of cultural mimicry in the body modification community. This is evident in the perceived appropriation of Eastern imagery by Western body modifiers, having their bodies written with tattooed symbols that they do not entirely understand.²³ Just as Lévi-Strauss’ chief apparently participates in a writing practice grounded in imitation, rather than comprehension of the written symbols, the Western body modifier is interpreted as similarly intending to harness the symbolic effect/power of Eastern symbols, whilst only rudimentarily knowing their signification.

In noting this effect that writing produces, it is during a subsequent exchange of gifts between the Nambikwara and another tribe that the chief introduces a new stage in the procedure, by taking out a writing pad and “reading” the distribution of gifts from a list. For Lévi-Strauss, this is an exhibition by the chief that “he had allied himself with the white man, and that he could now share in his secrets” (289). The chief, Derrida notes, has understood writing’s “role as sign, and the social superiority that it confers” (1976:125). Similarly, the Western body modifier identifies the Eastern tattoo as a sign with different powers from those of their own culture. Tattooing’s increasing popularity in Western culture gives it “fashion” status,

²³ In *The Cultural Geography Reader* (2008), anthropologist Peter Jackson asks whether “the appropriation of all things Eastern has gone too far?” (420). Also relevant to this discussion is Margo DeMello’s *Bodies of Inscription: A Cultural History of the Modern Tattoo Community* (2000:71-77), which considers the Western appropriation of Japanese tattooing aesthetics.

whereby a “return” to Eastern forms could be perceived to convey a more genuine connection with one’s body art, and with the art of tattooing itself, beyond Western fad. Thus, an alignment with the bodily writing of Eastern tattooing functions as a status/power symbol.

That the pre-literate tribal elder grasps that writing is a tool of power troubles Lévi-Strauss, for “the anthropologist understands what he has taught” (Derrida 1976:122). In teaching the Nambikwara to write, Lévi-Strauss believes he has corrupted the innocence of this primitive, natural state. This assumption of a pure, pre-written nature again resembles the conceptual installation of a pristine, unmarked, natural body which precedes the violent intrusion of body modifying, writing practices. As we will see, I do not disagree with Lévi-Strauss that there is an essential connection between writing and violence. This is also Derrida’s position, stating that Lévi-Strauss is not to be challenged when he relates writing to the exercise of violence (106). What we can suspect though is that this violence occurs at a more intrinsic level than is supposed by phonocentrism.

We are exploring this as part of our current consideration concerning whether simply being bodied, simply being spatial, produces the rhythms of objective, social temporality more fundamentally than the notion of a bodily practice normally confers. In having to *do* bodily practice (contrary to simply *being* bodied), there is the implicit assumption of a separate, in-itself stage prior to such practice. Earlier chapters have already challenged the belief for example that a pre-modified body exists in-itself, prior to the emergence of its “violently” modified counterpart. This coheres with Mead’s conception of time, in which there is no pre-existing past-in-itself. Rather, the past perpetually, relationally emerges with/as the present. Equally, each body is produced structurally, whereby no body pre-exists such relational production. Could a similar logic mean that a pre-violent state never existed in the Nambikwara? In considering this, our conception of violence will shift, from its typical characterisation of negation and destruction, to that of possibility and production.

Bodily writing as originary violence

In Saussure’s semiology, which informs Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology, a proper name only manifests via its differential relation to other proper names. No name is “proper” in-itself, just as it has been argued that no body modification has meaning positively, but rather only

manifests differentially and systemically. Similarly for Derrida, the proper name is only possible through its “classification and therefore within a system of differences, within a writing retaining the traces of difference” (1976:109). This is what he refers to as the death of the proper name, whereby “the expression ‘proper name’ is improper” (111). It is by applying such logic that we are about to see that violence does not arrive from without to the Nambikwara when Lévi-Strauss enables the disclosure of proper names. Rather, there is an *originary violence already operating as the differentiability* by which the tribe members are distinguished by names. This is the “violence of the arche-writing, the violence of difference, of classification” (110).

Derrida identifies an essential relation between writing and violence, even in the Nambikwara’s supposedly pre-literate culture. This is the archetypal writing, where writing is violence because, and this is very important, *violence is difference*. Violence is the differentiability that conditions the distinguishability of anything. This originary violence that is more fundamental than the seemingly violent intrusion of the anthropologist is similarly traced in the prohibition of the disclosure of these proper names. For Derrida, such prohibition shows how law is a violent institution born from this arche-violence that “institutes the moral” (112). Law *differentiates* between “lawful” and “unlawful” after all. Lévi-Strauss inadvertently exposes what is inherently violent about “law,” rather than committing a straight-forward offence against it. The real violence in Nambikwara society is an originary network of relational differences which characterises “writing” in its most primordial mode. Rather than *subsequently* violating a prior integrity, originary violence operates differentially as *Being’s* production, realising/distinguishing all possibilities/incarnations.

Hence, in terms of body modification, even before such practices “violently” occur to corporeality, the body expresses violence as the condition of differentiation from other bodies and things. This insight has significant ramifications for our current inquiry into whether the body-as-space temporalises simply by being bodied/spatial. With Bourdieu’s assistance this chapter has acknowledged the body-as-space as productive of the temporality of social, structural rhythms, based upon an individual-social co-constitution that is conditioned by bodily (spatial) practice. I am now extending this argument by exploring a primordially productive capacity for the body-as-space that is simply attributable to it being (spatial). What is becoming apparent from this engagement with “Derridean writing” is that the body is inescapably, violently

productive, and this is attributable to the differentiation/*différance*, as space, that the body manifests, conditions and represents.

The entire body is therefore written, even considering the prohibition of certain practices and their verifiable traces. The typical tattoo shop manifesto of “no minors and no facial tattoos” (DeMello 2000:20) does not prevent the writing of the under-age body, or of the face. If tattooed bodies manifest in terms of how they relate to, and differ from, other tattooed and non-tattooed bodies, accordingly there is a bodily writing-violence occurring before tattooing arrives like an anthropologist on a supposedly unmarked scene. This violence, the originary differentiation of bodies, produces bodies via their structural, relational co-constitution. The non-tattooed body is already, and always, tattooed by its implicated relation to a corporeality which conditions the possibility of tattooed bodies, non-tattooed bodies and bodies generally.

Earlier, the implications of structuralist conceptions of how corporeal meaning only emerges relationally challenged the belief that body modification practices demarcate a subject’s control of self-production. Now it can be observed that the originary differentiation of bodies means that the embodied individual is actually, ironically unable to avoid a productive participation in their own modification. However, this occurs at an uncontrollable, incarnated level, simply on the basis of being bodied/spatial. The body-as-space always was, and always is, writing, via its differentiation from other bodies-as-spaces, and indeed, from any spatiality.

The interpretation that corporeality is inscribed only when certain, officially recognised modification practices write it in a hyper-visible manner, now seems reductive. One’s first tattoo does not mark the beginning of self-writing, but rather is another form of writing which the body-as-space already conditions and undertakes. Just as the Nambikwara are not introduced to writing by an anthropologist, but in their differentiation via naming and laws already undertake writing, neither is the body introduced to writing by an *exclusive* set of practices. Wherever worldly difference manifests, there is writing. Writing is not the disruption of an originary present, but rather what is originary and always present is writing in general, which is not, as Vicki Kirby observes, “a loss of the origin that textuality replaces, but an original (worldly) writing through whose radical interiority the referent *presents* itself” (2011:46). There is, always was, and will already be in place/being-displaced, an originary ever-writing. Writing is Nature, whereby everything that Lévi-Strauss situates outside Nambikwara life is instead operating differentially within/as it.

It is not that Lévi-Strauss is blind to obvious forms of the records that the Nambikwara keep, noting his astonishment “that the societies we call primitive often have a staggering capacity for remembering...reciting straight off family trees involving dozens of generations” (Lévi-Strauss in Derrida 1976:124-125). Rather, what escapes him is that these networks of relations and differences, which signify genealogies and social structures, characterise “writing” in its primordially. Consequently, Derrida demands that the “writing lesson” is not a passage from speech to writing with the “introduction of writing tools,” but rather a movement from one form of writing to another, which “operates within writing in general” (125).

The ramifications for the time-productive body-as-space are evident. Bourdieu’s structuring-structured corporeality has attributed the role of the human subject in the temporality of objective, social rhythms (as was developed in chapters one and two), to the human’s spatiality. However, Bourdieu presents a practice based mechanism. The body, space, only becomes productive via the transposable dispositions by which it manifests, such as ways of moving, gesturing and talking. Our engagement with Derridean violence has instead characterised all relational differentiation (originary writing) as production/temporalisation. This acknowledges bodies-as-space(s) as primordially, inescapably productive/temporalising. Space produces and temporalises just by being bodies and things. Rather than requiring Bourdieu’s ways of bodily being, this focuses on the simple state of *being* bodied/spatial.

If nothing escapes writing-as-differentiation, as the originary, natural condition of being, then the notion of a linguistic sign that is exterior to, and chronologically before, writing, “falls into decay” (14). Derrida’s aforementioned “end of the book” is the end of a logocentrism governing signification from outside, and challenges the presumption of a pre-existing sign presiding over the inscription that its signifier(s) perform(s). This is the “beginning of writing,” beyond an exclusively categorised set of empirical, mediated marks, to instead recognising what originarily conditions the possibility to write in any empirical form. If language and the sign do not precede writing, then speech, graphic script, and the body are all differentiating forms or “species of writing” (8). The body-as-writer is something with which Derrida would agree, given his demand that “the most elementary processes within the living cell” are also “a writing” (9).

Characterising the body-as-writer coheres with Kirby’s appreciation of Nature-as-writer. For Kirby, the textual processes of matter manifest as “an inseparability between representation and substance that rewrites causality” (1997: 61). The temporality of the writing and the written

explodes concurrently, rather than representation (writing) following substance (body). Kirby duly characterises the body as “a shifting scene of inscription that both writes and is written” (61), which is congruent with this chapter’s developing acknowledgement of the simultaneously modified/modifying body.

That body modification practices are typically comprehended as a reworked “authorship” of a subject’s body is consistent with the impression that “writing” is an author’s *re*-presentation of reality. Now, however, we have corporeal writing. Body modifications exhibit the always writing of/as the body-as-space, rather than *introducing* writing to space. Consequently, just as Derrida’s writing-as-differentiality spelled death for the proper name, similarly for body modifications, this incarnated, originary violence-as-writing seemingly contradicts the idea that “body modification” is restricted to a distinct, proper category of practice(s). This point speaks to our earlier considerations of whether the body is something which structures, modifies, produces and temporalises just by being, rather than having to do or undertake specified practices.

In considering the tension between normative and non-normative forms of body modification practice, what is now evident is that concurrently structured and structuring bodies-as-spaces write the norms by which they are written. Moreover, if the originary, natural and entirely normative capacity of corporeality is that it writes/temporalises/modifies, then this not only blurs the nature|culture divide, but also characterises the exclusive categorisation of certain body writing practices as redundantly restrictive. This is because the primordial modifier, temporaliser and producer is simply the subject-as-body-as-space.

Being bodied writes/produces one’s body, other bodies, and the structures that write/produce bodies. Being bodied is writing. Such writing conditions every manifestation-via-originary-difference, as the *deferral* or *detour* from one thing to another by which the distinguishability/*différance* of any thing structurally manifests. Writing is therefore congruent with what has been described in this thesis as time. Time, as difference, is the primordial, perpetual violence of spatial incarnation. The body-as-space is one such primordial incarnation, writing/being-written as it erases/is-erased, just as for Derrida the proper name classifies/is-classified in order to obliterate/be-obliterated. Without such self-dislocation, the body, space, would be perpetually self-coincidental, and thus never temporal. The distinguishability of something like the body-as-space is space differentiated from space, space producing space, space temporalising. This argument directly addresses our central question concerning whether

the body-as-space produces time. If, as per *différance*, time is originary differentiation, then the time-productive capacity of subjects as bodies-as-spaces is exemplified in their ontologically generative role as writer-modifier-differentiator-temporaliser.

This conception of the subject *as* time, rather than just as something which *experiences* time, flags another important distinction from the social science of Michael Flaherty. Flaherty is concerned with one's agential involvement in time experience. He constructs his argument by citing Clinton Sanders' contestation of the presumption that body modifications are "'caused' by psychiatric or interpersonal problems of maladjustment" (Flaherty 2011:8). As Flaherty notes, Sanders instead argues that rather than exhibiting a pathology, a practice like tattooing represents agential self-decoration, or "customisation of the body" through "the exercise of choice" (Sanders & Vail 2008:37). Flaherty applies this logic to the subjective management of time, asking; "are there analogous efforts to customise temporal experience?" (2011:8).

I have of course argued against the characterisation of body modification as exclusively exercised by individual/subjective choice and self-construction. This does not negate individual agency, but rather recognises its objective, socially blurred constitution. Flaherty will agree here, demanding that "scholars who reject agency view it as a conceptual stalking horse for self-determination. They misinterpret the conceptualisation of agency as absolute freedom from any and all social forces" (38). No such misinterpretation has been made in our inquiry here, so on this point Flaherty's argument coheres with that of this chapter.

Where Flaherty's research interests diverge from mine is identifiable in terms of discussions concerning agency and time. The argument developed in this chapter demands that the time-agential capacity of the individual is simply attributable to their being. Agency and embodiment are synonymous, where the *matter* of agency concerns its time-productive *materiality*. Time becomes with/as each embodied-as-space agent. Conversely, Flaherty's interest in time-agency explores the way a subject slows down or speeds up time. As he states; "when time is passing too slowly, we speed it up; and (less frequently) when time is passing too quickly, we slow it down...Agency is in evidence" (34). This discussion is about efforts to control the experience of time, in that "we commonly seek to exercise some control over how time feels" (15). My concern with such a reading however, is that it installs the source and the origin of time as permanently pre-existing our experience of it. This is clearly evident in Flaherty's correlation of "time-agency" with a "control" over timing. Time here can only be a

natural, “dictating” phenomenon, which individuals can then try to subsequently manipulate. Or in Flaherty’s terms, we “employ agentic practices in an effort to exert some control” (82). Such attempted exertion of control must install a combative relationship between the human subject and time. Indeed Flaherty uses this exact vernacular, in describing how “human beings wield the weapons of creativity against the forces of time” (23).

This is the kind of conception that we are interrogating in this thesis, by recognising time’s source as immanent to being bodied, rather than as a transcendent force to be overcome, avoided or managed subserviently. In such a guise, social science seeks the human subject’s possible emancipation from aspects of time’s apparent omnipotence. As we have seen however, and will now extend upon, a human emancipation from time is contradicted by the primary manner in which simply being bodied means that one temporalises, modifies and produces.

The futility of emancipatory intentions

That space produces/modifies/temporalises space means that the somewhat redundant character of body modification as an exclusive “category of practice” is not being claimed because a meal eaten, a step taken, a blink or a breath modifies the body to some degree. It is not that the demarcated classification of practices such as tattooing or piercing as “body modifying” is negligent of other less dramatic, but nevertheless body-altering, processes. Rather, what I am positing is that the inescapability of embodiment makes one a body modifier by sheer incarnation. Bodies cannot help but modify, cannot help but write, cannot help but temporalise. We are, therefore, acknowledging what conditions corporeal difference, rather than attending to the contingent, political stakes associated with particular forms of corporeal difference(s).

Consequently, the legitimisation of marginalised practices is not my concern in this current discussion. Indeed, it is possible that calls of this kind from the body modification community contribute to the marginalisation of such practices, rather than engender their emancipative progression into normativity. Such a claim is consistent with Michel Foucault’s suspicions of the effectiveness of the Gay and Lesbian liberation movement.²⁴ Foucault doubts that such efforts emancipate non-normative sexualities from an oppressive heterosexual frame,

²⁴ In *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (2000), Foucauldian commentators James Miller and Jim Miller describe an encounter where Foucault is thanked for making gay liberation possible. Foucault is recorded as politely refusing the compliment, replying that “really my work has had nothing to do with gay liberation” (254).

instead contributing to the discursive construction of instilled sexual frames which marginalise homosexuality.²⁵ Queer theorist Annamarie Jagose agrees with this reading that “Foucault questions the liberationist confidence that to voice denied and silenced lesbian and gay identities and sexualities is to defy power, and hence induce a transformative effect” (1996:81).

Such an argument relies upon Foucault’s model of decentralised power in which every subject perpetually participates. This conceives of power not as “a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state,” but rather as “a system whose effects...pervade the entire social body” (1978:92). One cannot escape or defy power. Every individual is duly invested with an unavoidable capacity to (re-)produce power. The body politic is the individual, in that “one is always ‘inside’ power, there is no ‘escaping’ it, there is no absolute outside” (95). The temporality of Foucauldian power is thus similar to Bourdieu’s *habitus*. Rather than a unidirectional, forward-moving, linear passage from cause to effect that imposes socially structured power onto subjects from without, every subject is already bound up in power’s production as its concurrent cause-effect. As a consequence, attempts at sexual liberation are never detached from the production of institutionalised sexual power. Indeed, throughout our preceding chapters, it has been by employing an impression of subjectivity consistent with this Foucauldian model that contestations have been made to characterisations of body modification as a demarcated self-production in defiance of, or liberating oneself from, social power. In opening a discussion between Foucault’s concept of power, and discourses concerning cosmetic surgery, Victoria Pitts-Taylor accordingly contests the argument that body image pressures which compel one to undertake such surgery represent the internalisation of externalised social forces from without. Rather, an “architecture of the self” is always constructing and being constructed, and is implicated in the production of such forces, whereby neither surgeries nor subjectivity are “free of power – part of a ‘true’ self – nor only an expression of power working against a ‘true’ self” (2009:162).

Rather than attempting to liberate certain body modification practices from the realms of marginalisation/non-normativity/denaturalisation, what is more congruent with our developing insights is the exploration of a potential liberation from categorical restrictions in which only certain practices are identified as “body modifying.” Foucault echoes such a call in relation to

²⁵ See Foucault’s *The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom* (1994:281-301). Also relevant is ‘The Deployment of Sexuality’ in Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality Volume One* (1978[1976]).

sexuality, stating that “it is not enough to liberate sexuality; we also have to liberate ourselves...from the very notion of sexuality” (1988:31). What is at stake in the inquiry of this thesis, and in Foucault’s work, is something more foundational than the contingencies of particular body modification practices or sexualities.

The originality of this argument is illustrated by distinguishing it from that contributed by established body modification commentary. In this regard, the influential work of Nikki Sullivan is something with which I have recently become acquainted. Sullivan challenges the interpretation that modification practices bring “to the surface” an individual’s pre-established, inner truth. Consistent with my inquiry, Sullivan is thus interested in problematising the discourses of self-authorship that are typically associated with body modification. As Sullivan states in *Illustrative Bodies: Subjectivities, Sociality, Skin Art* (1995), the inscription of body modification becomes the codification of social excitations rather than the intentionality of a purely self-imposed process (1995:146). Sullivan’s focus is on what body modifications *do*, rather than what they *mean*,²⁶ demanding that there is no demarcated subject represented in body modification. Rather, the subject/body only emerges via its social relation with other subjects/bodies. This perpetual, fleshed encounter determines that “both self and the other are continuously (re)constituted, are (re)read and (re)written, mark and are marked” (2001:35).

Our engagement with Derridean writing-violence has acknowledged an originary differentiating process that conditions the possibility of distinguishable bodies. Taking a different approach, in *Tattooed Bodies: Subjectivity, Textuality, Ethics, and Pleasure* (2001), Sullivan utilises the work on alterity by French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906 – 1995). Much has been written on the relations and tensions between Derridean and Levinasian notions of difference, alterity and trace,²⁷ and my intention is not to contribute to this discussion. Rather, I am interested in how Sullivan’s application of Levinasian alterity to an interrogation of body modification practices represents a different set of concerns from an engagement with Derridean violence, and why these differences are important in terms of this chapter and this thesis.

In considering subjectivity, Sullivan engages Levinas’ notion of alterity as conditioning the possibility for both the “I” and the “Other” to exist. The I is to some extent separate from the

²⁶ A recent example is provided by Sullivan’s *The Somatechnics of Bodily Inscription: Tattooing* (2009).

²⁷ *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas* (1999) by philosopher Simon Critchley attempts to assimilate Derrida’s originary difference with Levinas’ ethical metaphysics. This inspires counter arguments, such as philosopher Martin Hägglund’s *The Necessity of Discrimination: Disjoining Derrida and Levinas* (2004), which demands that such assimilation incompatibly reduces deconstruction to a series of non-violent relations.

Other, but is not autonomous, in that its separateness is only possible because the Other exists from which the I is differentiated, whereby “I am, despite this dependence, or thanks to it, free” (Levinas 1969[1961]:37). Subjects only manifest via these structural conditions, through their alterity from that which they are not (but in which they are constitutively “involved”) (35-40). To be “I,” therefore, does not mean to remain the same self, with or without the Other. Instead, for Levinas, the I is perpetually recovered and produced by “all that happens to it” through this “primordial work” of alterity (36).

In serving a similar intention to my engagement of Derridean originary violence as that which differentially conditions all possible identities (and their perpetual slippages), Sullivan employs a characterisation of the primordially of Levinas’ alterity as “a structural possibility that precedes and makes possible” (Sullivan 2004).²⁸ I am cautious about subscribing to this interpretation however that alterity “precedes” possibility, given that this positions alterity as a pre-existing ontological mould from which possible space/matter/subjectivity emerges. Indeed, Sullivan describes alterity in this discussion as “not situated in time and space” (Sullivan 2004). Instead, as with Derridean violence, I argue that alterity perpetually (re-)emerges with/as space/matter/subjectivity-as-possibility, *as* its temporality. Levinas’ characterisation of alterity is consistent with this if we observe that alterity is only possible if, and as, a subject is structurally, differentially manifested with its Other. Levinas states in this regard that “alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is other” (Levinas 1969:36). Despite this conflict between Sullivan’s reading and mine, in contesting the presumption that body modifications represent one’s internal, sovereign meaning, Sullivan insightfully argues that the subject does not exist prior to a relational production with the Other, in that “the self exists through and for the Other; the self/psyche is engendered – or inspired, as Levinas puts it – in and through alterity” (2001:103). As with Derridean violence, the One/Other co-production is a relational, structural porosity without permanently fixing pre-existing, positive identities.

Concerning the earlier observed accusation that Western tattooing appropriates Eastern imagery in order to harness the symbolic power of the Other culture, what Levinasian alterity *and* Derridean violence clarify is that West and East do not exist in isolation from, or prior to, each other. Rather, West and East emerge concurrently and structurally, the same applying for the civilised and primitive cultures of Lévi-Strauss’ anthropology. What seems to be a

²⁸ See also Sullivan’s *Being Exposed – The Poetics of Sex and Other Matters of Tact* (2004).

straightforward adoption of Eastern imagery, we can reconceive as the structural trace of the East that is already operating in the (originary) possibility of Western aesthetics. Subject (West) and Other (East) co-manifest, whereby the trace of the Other is co-constitutive of the subject.

Similarly, the trace conditions the (co-)production of bodies, or in Levinas' terms, as "having-the-other-in-one's-skin" (1998[1978]:114-115). The subject never comes to the Other pre-defined, but is perpetually, corporeally produced by a ~~beyond~~ which it equally constitutes. Margit Shildrick informs this discussion by noting that once the skin surface of bodies is understood not simply as a "protective envelope" that defines one's limit, but also as an "organ of interchange" (2001:71), then what is Other is always implicit in the subject. Or in Shildrick's terms, other bodies are "always there, 'like my skin'" (71). In relinquishing the notion of the exclusively separate subject and Other, we move beyond the notion of a bounded body, to instead recognise an ontology which, for Shildrick, "open[s] up the possibility of reconfiguring relational economies that privilege neither the one nor the two" (71). For the modified body then, meaning becomes a tenuously blurred, rather than a reliably self-expressive, exercise. This acknowledgement is a strength of Sullivan's work, who concludes in terms of Levinasian alterity that "not only is the distinction between self and other undermined by Levinas, but the question of what the tattooed body of the other means, or whom the tattooed wo/man is, is rendered redundant" (2001:111). Signification for body modification is a co-implicated, slippery, corporeal production beyond sovereign intention or control. Sullivan's application of a Levinasian model of subjectivity to the ~~meaning~~ for body modifications is insightful.

However, just as Sullivan places the structural frame of alterity outside the subjectivities and bodies which co-manifest via its ontological precedence, we will now see that similarly, the meaning/identity of the category of body modification remains problematically anterior and in-itself in Sullivan's appraisal. This is an awkward supposition that we must address, considering that the notion of an in-itself, pre-existing meaning/identity for all such subjectivities and bodies (which manifest via the ontology of alterity) has been described as redundant.

The redundancy of body modification?

By restricting the ramifications of Levinasian alterity to the notion that meaning is redundant for individual modified bodies, Sullivan's argument stops at the point where our current inquiry

overflows into the *categorisation* of body modification practices. Individual modified bodies do not arrive from without after all, whereby the redundancy of the notion of in-itself meaning/identity for such bodies is, I argue, bound up with the equally redundant notion that any practice is essentially, in-itself, body-modifying. Each practice should not be granted, via omission from such focus, an “essentially modifying” status. Instead, practices can only be acknowledged as modifying due to the originary corporeality/spatiality/temporality which conditions the possible differentiation of bodies-as-space. To discuss body modification practice is to be concerned with a differentiating, temporalising process which bodies already are, and condition. Sullivan, quite rightly, notes that originary alterity challenges the “assumption that meaning/identity is reducible to an essence present in the textual body of the other” (2001:111). However, I extend such a thesis by arguing that without characterising each body modification practice in equally redundant terms, the pre-existence of such modifying practices to modified bodies is assumed.

This argument concerning Sullivan is similar to how Bourdieu was earlier engaged. For Bourdieu, transposable dispositions, ways of bodily being in the world such as moving, gesturing and talking, constitute the corporeal/spatial production of spatial-social structures which concurrently produce corporeality. Subject-corporeality is not a demarcated, individual phenomenon, but manifests relationally within fields of behavioural bodily being. However, this chapter has argued that what primarily conditions these *ways* of bodily being in the world is an ontological mechanism in which simply *being* bodied differentiates/produces/temporalises space(s) from/as space(s). Sullivan is consistent with Bourdieu in arguing against there being defiantly subjective self-production. Body modifications mean nothing in-themselves, only manifesting in relation to other bodies/modifications. As this chapter has done with Bourdieu though, I develop this point further by recognising the body-as-space as the primordial temporaliser-producer-modifier, which conditions Sullivan’s ways of body modifying, just as it conditions Bourdieu’s ways of bodily being.

This difference is subtle, but crucial, if something like tattooing is to be comprehended as just another form of time’s writing. If no bodies pre-exist alterity’s relational conditions, whereby tattooed bodies only manifest with/as other bodies and entities, then the implicated producer, tattooing-as-writing, tattooing-as-time, must manifest concurrently with such bodies. Alterity relationally conditions the incarnation of entities, subjectivities and bodies. Because

alterity's conditions are *relational*, such conditions can only be incarnated by relationalities, that is, by entities, subjectivities and bodies. There is not a *pre-existing act* which humans undertake or employ that was permanently defined in a distant, inalterable past as "body modifying." Rather, just as we have considered how the past becomes the past that it is, in and with the present, something like tattooing only becomes a body modifying practice during a spatial encounter when tattooed bodies, as time, manifest. Bodies, space(s), produce tattooing, *as* tattooing produces bodies/spaces. The association of tattooing with practices like piercing, or scarification, under the umbrella of "body modification," neglects that the originary alterity/violence of bodies-as-space(s) conditions the presence, possibility and becoming of each practice. Tattooing cannot be permanently categorised as body modifying, in exclusion from other practices, because it has not even become body modifying until originary, modifying bodies differentially co-condition the possibility of tattooed and "non"-tattooed bodies.

To clarify, I am arguing that body modification, as a category (or indeed, "body") of practices, is redundant, according to the same logic that Sullivan employs for the modified body. For Sullivan, one's body modifications have no inherent meaning, but are only relationally produced, transferring the focus from what the modified body "*means* to what the process of marking and being marked *does*" (2001:113). Similarly, I argue that body modification practices mean nothing in-themselves, but rather only become body modifying via an originary corporeal/spatial alterity which conditions the possible differentiation of bodies. Each practice only becomes "body modifying" via the embodied, structural encounter which simultaneously produces subjects as body modifiers and/as modified bodies. The argument conceived in this chapter is that such structural production is time, duly developing an argument that the body-as-space produces time, rather than is temporalised by an external time-source.

This marks the significance of taking the argument of redundancy into the category of body modification. The spatial production/temporalisation of space cannot be via a categorical source of practice that is outside, and prior to, subjects-as-bodies-as-space(s). Indeed, this conflicts with Sullivan's point that the identity of anything cannot pre-exist relational production. If time is constituted differentially/corporeally/spatially, then practices producing corporeality-as-time must emerge relationally with/as corporealities/spatialities. This problematises the assumption of a storehouse of practices whose identity/meaning is permanently and categorically

fixed by an origin that remains in an inalterable past, and can be called upon to temporalise the body. The primordial “time-practice” is always, already, simply being bodied-as-space-as-time.

Derrida or Levinas?

The primary role of Derridean violence in the argument of this chapter, and of Levinasian alterity in Sullivan’s work, illustrates another key difference between Sullivan’s focus and mine. Both Derridean violence and Levinasian alterity contest notions of demarcated, exclusively individual, subjectivity. They do this by arguing that anything which *is*, constitutes a ~~beyond~~ by which it is constituted. However, in terms of the specific context in question, body modification practices, the efficacy of Derridean violence emerges. Derrida’s re-writing of violence beyond the reductive dichotomies of “good” and “bad,” “before” and “after,” or “natural” and “cultural,” acknowledges violence as originary and natural. As a result, I believe the most effective way to challenge instilled discourses which, as observed, condemn non-normative body modifications because of their “corporeal violence,” is via Derrida’s reconfiguration of “violence.” Furthermore, this avoids futile attempts to rescue particular body modification practices from their non-normatively “violent” characterisations, by instead focusing upon the primordial and productive conditions of all violence. This is the strength of the Derridean argument in addressing body modification practices. Derrida embraces “violence” by re-writing it,²⁹ whereby what is violent is not characterised as disrupting a pre-existing incarnation, but rather is that which *is* incarnation.

Contrarily, Sullivan’s deployment of Levinasian alterity does not deconstruct “violence,” but instead strangely divorces violence from alterity. Sullivan denounces violence, characterising it as a subject’s domination of the Other that denies any becoming/alterity with the Other. In distinguishing violence from alterity, Sullivan claims that “such a *disavowel of alterity* results in an hegemony of the Same that *is tantamount to an act of violence*, to a single blow in and through which “I” become master” (2001:139; my emphasis). Sullivan’s interpretation that Levinasian alterity is inconsistent with violence again emerges with the claim that “textual violence does not consist of marking and being marked, but rather is the result of disavowing

²⁹ Here I am reminded of early 1990’s “Riot Grrl” punk artists such as Kathleen Hanna of Bikini Kill, who would attempt to re-write/re-produce the term “slut” by scrawling it across their torsos during performances. See filmmaker Kerri Koch’s *Don’t Need You: The Herstory of Riot GRRRL* (2005).

such a process...Or as Levinas might put it, Western ontology...is a systematic form of violence that reduces the Other to the Same” (134).

Conversely, I interpret alterity as being more congruent with violence. This is consistent with Joanna Hodge’s acknowledgement of the symmetry between the originary differentiation of *différance*, and that of alterity (2007:141). Hodge here directs us to Derrida’s own claim in *Specters of Marx* (1994[1993]) of “no *différance* without alterity” (31). Derridean, originary violence demands that “textual violence” does indeed consist of the relational marking and production of bodies-as-space, by bodies-as-space, contrary to Sullivan’s critique above. This violence-as-time is an originary production that never “disavows alterity,” nor “reduces to Same,” as Sullivan further claims, but rather conditions alterity’s incarnating/worlding of world. Violence incarnates via differentiation, whereby bodies do not pre-exist their relation with other bodies because they are always, already manifesting through and as this relation. That Sullivan describes this process as one of alterity, but not of violence, handicaps an argument seeking to problematise discourses which portray certain body modifications as essentially, violently denaturalising. Such an argument is clearly augmented by Derrida’s reconfiguration of that key term; *violence*. Sullivan’s reading of Levinasian alterity suits general contestations about notions of pre-formed identities and subjects. However, the particularities of the body modification argument are enabled by Derrida’s attention to the primordially of violence, distancing Levinasian alterity from one of body modification’s key inquiries.

Where does this leave the body?

Modified bodies cannot be opposed to apparently non-modified bodies, for there is no point when the body-as-space is not modifying/being-modified. The inscribed body, a cultural artefact, is replaced by the naturally inscribing, temporalising body-as-space, whereby *writing/bodying* is the originary condition of *being-written/being-bodied*. The inescapable nature of this Nature is that each subject is perpetually bound to be *modifying the modifier*, the modifier being space which temporalises. The importance of distinguishing Sullivan’s position from what is at stake in terms of this thesis is this ramification for the source of time. The originary modification/differentiation/temporalisation is simply being embodied/spatial. This redefines

modification from a practice that bodies undergo in time, to a temporalising that bodies-as-space cannot avoid being. Consequently, “body” and “space” are both nouns *and* verbs.

Our engagement with Durkheimian sociology in preceding chapters acknowledged the implication of every human subject in producing the temporality of the objectively structured, social rhythms by which subjects are co-constituted. The current chapter, in opening a discussion with Bourdieu’s sociology, has developed this argument by attributing such human-social co-constitution to the body-as-space. Furthermore, Derridean *différance* has provided the insight that this primordially productive rhythm, of structurally produced subjectivities, is time. Such time is an *objective* rhythm, given that no subjectivity pre-exists, trumps, nor is excluded from this relational/differential temporalisation/production. Structurally temporalising is the objective reality/incarnation of all subjectivities.

As crucial as this development has been in exploring whether the body-as-space produces time, I anticipate the criticism that what has also emerged is a dislocated character for the body. That is, by acknowledging the human body as a spatial source of temporality, a perpetually worlding, temporalising, ontologising production whose bodily limits are blurred with those of co-constitutive spaces/bodies, it is difficult to say exactly where corporeality is. In conceiving of the body in all-encompassing terms, it could now appear to be everywhere and yet nowhere. By characterising the body-as-space-as-time, I do not want the reader to fear we have lost the body-as-space, due to the slipperiness of its relational, differential, structurally temporalising quality.

It must therefore be addressed whether, in focusing upon the tangible/substantial/physical character of time-as-body-as-space, the body has become, ironically, abstracted. In recognising the body-as-time, has the body taken on those ethereal, transcendent properties with which time has classically been aligned, and that are being contested in this thesis? If a contrary response is to be made to this, the body’s presence, its reality, must be affirmed. If our sociology is now a corporeology, if it recognises the body-as-space-as-time, some foundational inquiries must be explored. What is the body? *Where* is it? *When* is it?

4.

Social Time

The body always already knows the time

There is no problem of the *alter ego* because it is not *I* who sees, not *he* who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, being an individual, of being also a dimension and a universal.

— Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968[1964]:142)

Time as it stands won't be held in our hands, or living inside of our skin.

— Noel Gallagher, *Hey Now* (1995)

Ethereal corporeal shift(s)

Suggesting that the embodied human is implicated in time's production seems counter-intuitive. The everyday assumption that the source of time is "outside us" is seemingly exemplified in the above lyric from Noel Gallagher, songwriter in English group, *Oasis*. Conversely, the preceding chapters have developed an argument positing that corporeality always already constitutes a differentiating, temporalising production which disperses the body beyond its apparent borders. This perpetual differentiation concurrently implicates-and-separates everything, in order to incarnate any thing. Consequently, perhaps Gallagher's lyric, in noting that time is not "*inside* our skin," can actually be read as an acknowledgement that the "inside-is-outside-is-inside-is..." intersubjectivity, which engenders time, problematises bodily limits. The relation between the body's limit, and time, will be a prominent theme in this chapter.

Closing the body's limit potentially contradicts our inquiry, which in exploring whether the human body-as-space produces time, rather than simply exemplifies time's transcendent source, is interrogating the time|space polarisation. Closing time off from space characterises time's source as ethereal and hidden, outside the tangible substantiality of humans. By acknowledging the inescapable involvement of human subjects in the production of time however, and attributing this to corporeality/spatiality, our central question of whether the body-as-space produces time seems to have been addressed.

However, this development has potentially come at a price. Exploring how any thing (such as the body-as-space) relationally produces every other thing has helped reconceive of the conceptual opposition of passive space from dynamic time. This has contributed to the counter-characterisation of the body-as-space as constitutively productive of, rather than passively produced by, time. Nevertheless, I anticipate the criticism that the body could now be described as dislocated and abstracted. In recognising the body as an agentive constituent of its omnipresent ~~beyond~~, has the body taken on those ethereal, abstract, transcendent properties by which time has typically been juxtaposed from tangible space, and against which this thesis is arguing? What must be clarified, in maintaining the spatial/tangible/substantial constitution of time-as-body-as-space, is *where* the time-productive body is. Indeed, if the argument is that space is time, the body's *where* should also be its *when*.

The issue of *when* the body *is* emerged during the post-structural explorations of the last chapter, in which it was argued that any thing, such as the body, does not pre-exist a relational production with other bodies/things. Nothing comes to an Other pre-defined, but rather every thing is perpetually, relationally produced by Other(s) which it equally constitutes. This differentiating temporalisation, which things such as bodies always already condition, and by which they are always already conditioned, has ramifications for our current question of where the time-productive body is. If the body is perpetually dislocated, simultaneously here-*and*-there, how can the body ever be objectively present somewhere, when it always already constitutes the time-productive, primordial slippage of becoming-present?

The argument developed in the previous chapter acknowledges a body-as-space which, just by being, is perpetually implicated in the production and modification of space(s) ~~beyond~~ its apparent corporeal limits. This marks the point at which overt references to body modification, a domain which has served us well in exploring the time of individual and social bodies, will be

superseded. More than being concerned with a body which *is modified*, we are now grappling with an ontologising body *which modifies* simply by being. Our focus has shifted to a body whose modification and temporalisation is its inescapably *objective* ontology. The importance of objectivity has been noted in preceding chapters, given that an objectively common time conditions social function. Without time agreement between subjects, social arrangements would not eventuate.

We have observed how time's objectivity has typically been attributed to a source that is separate from human interference. This demands that representations of time on clocks and calendars utilise time's external, objective regularity in order to facilitate social synchronisation. Here objective time is something humans represent from without, time's regularity and reliability for every human depending on its exteriority from the interference of any human. This regards the objectivity of Being as a separation of knower/observer from what can be known/observed. The preceding chapters of this thesis have begun developing a contestation to this polarising model, instead identifying the source of time as objectively immanent to the human realm. The human does not observe a separate, transcendent time-source. Rather, humans collectively (co-constitutively), inescapably (objectively) produce time. Such production is objective, considering our introductory definition of objectivity as what applies to all inescapably. An inescapably immanent, rather than an inescapably transcendent, ontological source has been acknowledged, in which no subjectivity pre-exists the objectivity of relational temporalising/becoming. This production, for the human, has been attributed to the body-as-space. In clarifying during this chapter how we *know* where this body-as-space is, in order to maintain its time-productive capacity whilst addressing concerns about its potential shift into the abstract realms of transcendence, we will simultaneously be exploring the nature of knowledge.

This argument will be put into practice by also asking how one knows when it is 9 o'clock. There will be the temptation to resort to the everyday assumption that in the same social setting my 9 o'clock coheres with your 9 o'clock because we agree upon a social construction or representation of objective time, and that the externality of the source of such objective temporality maintains its regularity and commonality for all. That is, we know the same socially constructed representation of a time-source which is separate from us both. However, in considering that this thesis has developed an argument in which the human is involved in the production of objective rhythms and time, we must be cautious about subscribing to the

interpretation in which the social construction of time is contingent and separated from what is inherent and real about time. As articulated in the previous chapter, if the ontology of time is its *intersubjective*, and thus social, conditioning, then there is actually something inherently social about time's construction or production. This issue will soon be addressed, where in asking how we know when it is a time such as 9 o'clock, whilst being aware of our productive implication in the source of time generally, we will concurrently be considering how we know ourselves.

The issue of knowledge arose during the previous chapter, in which we discussed one of the most influential interrogations of self-knowledge/certainty. In doubting his existence, Descartes emerges as a knowing being. Descartes' doubt is more an epistemological, than a sceptical, endeavour. Nevertheless, his interrogation of perception has a sceptical element. As we have seen, Descartes claims that one can never be certain of perceptions because of the potential that they deceive us as dreams do.

The French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961), conversely notes that such scepticism uses a secondary perception (the dream) to question the primary, direct, experiential perceptions of already being in a world about which can be dreamed. Dreams come from already worldly experiences, meaning Descartes' "argument postulates the world in general, the true in itself...secretly invoked in order to disqualify our perceptions" (Merleau-Ponty 1968[1964]:5). Furthermore, I interpret the timing of Descartes' doubt not as a linear, unidirectional, forward-moving progression from: (i) Descartes doubting, to *then*; (ii) self-certainty as a thinking being emerging (and with it, a world). Rather, doubt, subjectivity and the world manifest concurrently. There is never not a world. This supports Merleau-Ponty's point. Dreams rely upon a world to be doubted, whereby Descartes invokes the world that he doubts when he doubts it.

Merleau-Ponty does not doubt the world's existence, instead exploring "what it is for it to exist" (96). In considering the human's "direct and primitive contact with the world" (1962[1945]:vii), Merleau-Ponty focuses on perception. Here is where we will most benefit from engaging Merleau-Ponty. Sceptical arguments pre-suppose a thing *in itself*, oppositionally *outside* the human. Merleau-Ponty, though, interrogates the presumption of a thing *in-itself*. This presents a congruence with our interrogation in this thesis of the conception of an *in-itself* time-source from which humans are separate, and about which they can only know via representation.

The notion of the “in-itself” is interrogated by Merleau-Ponty in exploring the singularity of perceptual relations between observer and observed. Perceptual relations are conditioned by the embodied spatial positioning between an observer/perceiver and an object being observed/perceived. Merleau-Ponty duly describes how a “table before me sustains a singular relation with my eyes and my body” (1968:7). Singularity means that there are not two tables to experience, one in the observer’s mind and one separately in the world, but a single table occurring as a worldly perceptive act. We will explore this notion of singularity throughout this chapter, but as will be seen, singularity is essentially referring to what is common between observer/perceiver and observed/perceived, that being their spatial constitutions. The important point for us at the moment however is that because bodily movement, or physical positioning, alters the perspective of this singular perception, there is always a corporeal component (8) to experience. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of perception concerns not simply ocular vision, but rather, worldly, bodily relations. Elizabeth Grosz succinctly notes that one’s “body for Merleau-Ponty is the very condition of our access to and conception of space” (1994:91), whereby the body defines, and is defined by, its relation to worldly things.

This is consistent with our introductory definition of the body as the spatiality by which humans experience the spatial realm. In the previous chapter we explored how being inescapably, corporeally spatial means that every human cannot avoid relationally, differentially temporalising/time-producing. As noted however, this potentially correlates the body-as-space with those ethereal, abstract qualities by which time is typically characterised, as something always-becoming-but-never-is, in contradistinction to the substantial reality of space. It is in attempting to objectively situate the time-productive body, by addressing anticipated concerns that the body is now an abstract, relativist transcendence, that the current stage of this thesis can be informed by Merleau-Ponty’s aforementioned acknowledgement of the *singularity* of what is inescapably corporeal.

This issue of singularity will be important given that our current conception is of a time-productive body which constitutes, and is constituted by, that which seems to be ~~beyond~~ its apparent borders. For example, it is not that a body is permanently fixed at a spatial “there” in an inalterable past, *before* moving to a subsequent, separate, spatial “here” in the present. Rather, if there is a co-constitutive ontology of spaces-as-times then in substantialising the temporalising body-as-space, this time-productive dimension should avoid being a movement or

communication model which abstracts and displaces the spatially there *to* a spatially here. The body's "spatially here" should instead concurrently be objectively, identifiably, "spatially there." Again, objectivity is crucial, given the supposition that an objective coherence between subjective times conditions the synchronisation of social time. If it is being argued that each subject-as-body-as-space temporalises, then in terms of objective time this chapter must argue that bodies-as-spaces cohere with other bodies-as-spaces, and be able to articulate how.

The significance of Merleau-Ponty to this corporeally-centric argument can be articulated by distinguishing his bodily focus from the ontological models offered by two phenomenological giants, Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938), and Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976). Unpacking this distinction will be consistent with our previous exercise of addressing why a Derridean, instead of a Levinasian, ontology of relationality had been primarily engaged. In terms of Derrida, it is worth noting that it could seem potentially treacherous to follow the deconstructive argument we have just explored, with what will now be a phenomenological discussion. Derrida was generally critical of phenomenology, exemplified in *Speech and Phenomena* in which he argues that phenomenology can only ever *present* a logocentric metaphysics.¹ As seen in the previous chapter, Derrida believes that such a metaphysics installs the present in a manner which excludes what is seemingly absent. Or as philosopher Jack Reynolds describes, "for Derrida, metaphysics privileges presence, or that which *is*" (2004:56). Whilst exploring in this chapter whether Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology can illustrate that the body temporalises without becoming abstracted or dislocated, we will also need to respond to this claim from Derrida, in order to avoid characterising the body as statically, transcendentally present.

Phenomenological bodies

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology continues a line of inquiry heavily informed by Edmund Husserl. Husserl posits that the existence of the world is generally taken for granted, whereby such a belief is held indifferently. This "natural attitude," indifference about belief, cannot suffice, Husserl consequently demanding a phenomenological reduction (*epoché*) in which judgements about the existence of the external world are suspended until an interrogation of one's consciousness justifies such belief. As Husserl states in *Ideas I* (1983[1913]):

¹ See, in particular, chapter 5 "Signs and the Blink of an Eye."

We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the natural attitude; we parenthesise everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being: thus the whole natural world...I am not negating this 'world' as though I were a solipsist; I am not doubting its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am exercising the 'phenomenological' ἐποχή which also completely shuts me off from any judgement about spatiotemporal factual being (61).

The phenomenological reduction does not negate consciousness of the world. The world is still actual, "it is still there, like the parenthesised in the parentheses" (59). However, it does require that we bracket, or do not action, our judgement concerning the world's actuality.² In Husserl's terms, this means parenthesising (suspending) such judgement, we "put it out of action, we 'exclude' it, we 'parenthesise it'" (59). By suspending judgement, all that remains in an individual's consciousness is the world's givenness, its sheer experiential facticity. Consciousness of such worldly phenomena is therefore absolutely primordial, as "the infinite world of absolute mental processes – the fundamental *field of phenomenology*" (114). The apparent transcendence of this absolute consciousness seems potentially inconsistent with the argument developed in our previous chapter. Nevertheless, we will continue with Husserl in contextualising Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.

Whilst Merleau-Ponty is indebted to Husserl's project, his own inquiry in *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962[1945]) demands the impossibility of such a reduction. Merleau-Ponty's claim of impossibility is the first condition which will problematise the Derridean interpretation that phenomenology installs a pure, hierarchical, present. As we have noted, according to Merleau-Ponty our worldly existence is "primordial" (primitive) and "direct." The phenomenological reduction simply makes us aware of this:

...it is because we are through and through compounded of relationships with the world that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend the resultant activity...to put it 'out of play'...break with our familiar acceptance of it (1962:xiv-xv).

² This manoeuvre is also applied by Husserl to aspects of Being such as God, eidetic memory and formal logic.

Whilst we might become aware of our directly experiential worldly relations, we can never entirely break such relations in order to reflect upon experiential being from without. The experiential conditions of being-in-the-world (*être au monde*) prevent the complete reduction of experiential phenomena. Any reflection upon experience is conditioned by experientially being-in-the-world. The reflective moment is already a being-in-the-world moment, meaning for Merleau-Ponty that “radical reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life” (xvi). This description of life as “unreflective” is not as straightforward as it seems, and will be further addressed in this chapter. Nevertheless, what we can take from this passage now is that for Merleau-Ponty, one cannot parenthesise being-in-the-world, nor put it out of play by remaining transcendentally present to self without worldly experience. The reduction is a mode of being-in-the-world, and irreducible. This prevents the phenomenological reduction from completeness:

The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction...If we were absolute mind, the reduction would present no problem. But since, on the contrary, we are in the world, since indeed our reflections are carried out in the temporal flux onto which we are trying to seize...there is no thought which embraces all our thought (xv).

This catch, of *being in the world* to which the phenomenological reduction directs its attention *whilst being in that world*, means that the immediacy of experience, the “things themselves,” are never merely reducible to something to which one can reflectively return. Every subject is always implicated in the world which constitutes their consciousness, whereby there is never a world to be reflected upon that is immediate in-itself outside the subject, nor is the subject ever immediate in-itself outside the world. This distinguishes the focus on the primordially of worldly experience which is found in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, from that of Husserl’s phenomenology, whereby as Jack Reynolds explains, “despite the nostalgic yearning that Merleau-Ponty occasionally seems to have for a primordial union with the world, he makes it clear that one never returns to immediate experience” (2004:22). This is one condition by which Derrida’s critique that phenomenology is a return to a transcendent, pure present can be

problematised. Reynolds will be reinvented to this discussion at various points, given his inquiries into this very matter.³

Despite this contestation, Merleau-Ponty does not entirely refute the phenomenological reduction. Rather, and more interestingly for our work in this chapter, he challenges Husserl's characterisation of it as *transcendental* consciousness. Merleau-Ponty is instead intrigued by the way the reduction makes "unreflective" primordial being-in-the-world apparent. The reflection which conditions the phenomenological reduction:

...does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis...it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world, and thus brings them to our notice; it, alone, is consciousness of the world (1962:xv).

Without the reflection of the reduction, Merleau-Ponty believes our phenomenological being-in-the-world would go unrecognised. Husserl agrees, stating that if "the phenomenological attitude had not been recognised...the phenomenological world had to remain unknown" (1983:66). However, something requires attention. Here, recognition of being-in-the-world is consciousness of being-in-the-world. When Merleau-Ponty argues that consciousness is not a transcendent "withdrawal" toward absolute consciousness, "consciousness of the world" is instead a worldly *immanent*, directly perceptual, always already occurring experience. Yet in this early era of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology we have just encountered the description of being-in-the-world as our "*unreflective life*" (xvi). This notion of "un," of something in the world being otherwise than of worldly reflection, seems to contradict the characterisation of consciousness in worldly immanent terms. Contrarily, the perpetual, perceptual, inescapable mode of being-in-the-world that Merleau-Ponty posits should constitute self-reflection by always being that mode, rather than being *unreflective*. Merleau-Pontian being-in-the-world is, as noted, bodily. Consequently, his description of such a mode as *unreflective* could undermine the argument that the body is productive/agentive, if what is bodily/perceptually *unreflective* connotes passive *unthinking*.

Congruent with our interrogation of conceptions of transcendence of the spatial realm, Merleau-Ponty problematises Husserlian transcendental idealism, describing being-in-the-world

³ See Reynolds' chapter 'The Later Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and the Metaphysics of Presence,' in *Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity* (2004).

as an immanently relational consciousness, “a dimension in relation to which I am constantly situating myself” (1962:xiv). Ego and consciousness avoid ideal transcendence, in that “the true Cogito...does away with any kind of idealism in revealing me as ‘being-in-the-world’” (xiv). Whilst a problematisation of transcendence assists the argument from our previous chapter, a focus on the body should not associate it with passively *unthinking* qualities, opposing it from idealism/reflection, and potentially re-installing the passive-body|thinking-mind dualism. Being’s “unreflective” mode will soon therefore require clarification, via an engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenology, when we will also address the refutation of being-in-the-world’s “idealist” character.

Merleau-Ponty’s worldly act of perception manifests as a concurrent co-constitution of subject and object-world, the perceiver and the perceived table. This perceptual phenomenon not only occurs during the phenomenological reduction, but conditions it. If the phenomenological reduction is directed toward a world “in its givenness,” then being-in-the-world is the primordial phenomenological reduction, in that via its direct experientiality we already only have a relation to a world “in its givenness.” Judgements/reflections about the world supposedly outside that givenness, which Husserl wanted to bracket in order to avoid the ‘natural attitude,’ are actually simply modes of always already being-in-the-world in its givenness. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does not rely on Husserl’s transcendental/absolute idealist/mental processes in order to characterise worldly experience. Rather, the perceptual body is the focus, making explicit why this chapter and this thesis, concerned with the body’s relation to time, is engaging Merleau-Pontian, rather than Husserlian, understandings of subjectivity.

The body sits tenuously in Husserlian phenomenology. In Husserl’s *Ideas II* (1990[1952]), the translator’s introduction notes that Merleau-Ponty describes reading this text as an almost voluptuous experience (xvi). Despite this, *Ideas II* evidences the divergence of Husserl’s conception of the body from that of Merleau-Ponty. For Husserl, perceptual acts are bodily acts.⁴ This does not automatically acknowledge the perceiving subject as bodied though. Instead, the body only manifests reflexively, by one organ perceiving another:

⁴ In *Cartesian Meditations* (1999[1931]), Husserl describes the perceiving body as “the only Object ‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately...Touching kinesthetically, I perceive ‘with’ my hands; seeing kinesthetically, I perceive also ‘with’ my eyes” (97).

...perceptually active, I experience all of Nature, including my own animate organism, which in the process is reflexively related to itself...I 'can' perceive one hand 'by means of' the other – a procedure in which the functioning organ must become an Object and the Object a functioning organ (97).

This intentional bodily reflexivity, by which the body becomes, is conditioned by the double apprehension of touch. Husserl's interpretation is that whilst one cannot see oneself seeing (155-156), nor can one hear oneself hearing (given that "the sensed tone is not localised in the ear" (156)), in touching one *can* feel oneself feeling.⁵ The object being felt is felt by the perceiving subject, as is the tactile sensation in their feeling hand, a "double apprehension: the same touch-sensation is apprehended as a feature of the 'external' Object and is apprehended as a sensation of the Body as Object" (155). The body only becomes the body of a governing subject by incorporating these tactile sensations, whereby "the Body as such can be constituted originally only in tactuality...localised with the sensations of touch" (158). The ramification for subjectivity is that the body is not coincidental with the subject who experiences such sensations. This contradicts how we conceived of subjectivity in the previous chapter, in which subjectivity-*is-body/corporeality*. Instead, for Husserl, the body manifests as a possessed "field of localised," tactile sensations, an intermediary between the Ego/subject and the material realm from which sensations are incorporated. Or in Husserlian terms, the subject is "a counter-member of material nature...an Ego to which a Body belongs as a field of localisation of its sensations" (159). The body is between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, something *attached to* the subject, occupying the external realm in a way the subject does not. This can only be as "a thing 'inserted' between the rest of the material world and the 'subjective sphere'" (169).

Given the timing of any "insertion," this means that subjectivity/consciousness/ego exists prior to the spatial/material body. In demanding that the body manifests via the double sensation of touching/feeling and touched/felt, Husserl supposes the existence of a "Transcendental Ego" to which such sensations belong. This self-consciousness is ontologically anterior to the body and bodily experience, stating in *Cartesian Meditations* that "the being of the pure ego and his *cogitationes*, as a being that is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being of the world" (1999:21). The Transcendental Ego precedes the entire natural realm in fact, whereby "natural

⁵ We will soon see Merleau-Ponty employ the same touching-touched hand(s) example.

being is a realm whose existential status is secondary; it continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being” (21). The Ego’s worldly-transcendence is also evoked throughout *Ideas I*, such as when Husserl states that “after our phenomenological exclusion of the world and of the empirical subjectivity included in it...there is presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency” (1983:133). Indeed, chapter one of Section Two in *Ideas II* extensively (1990:103-119) characterises the Ego as that which conditions the possibility of the subsequent corporeal subjectivity that emerges from the double-apprehending touch. The essence of the pure Ego, Husserl states, “includes the possibility of an originary self-grasp, a ‘self-perception’” (107).

The development of Husserlian phenomenology makes distinct the transcendence of conscious experience, from the realm of external objects, presenting the body as an awkward, dichotomous insertion. Despite this, Husserl does not characterise his phenomenology in Cartesian dualist terms.⁶ Indeed, given the involvement of the Husserlian body in worlding experiences, his phenomenology could be accommodated in our inquiries if the body is read *as* conscious experience. Nevertheless, the corporeally-specific progression of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, to a point which is not restricted by a subject|object opposition, speaks more relevantly to the particular scope of my focus. This is despite Merleau-Ponty’s concession in *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968[1964]) that his earlier text, *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962[1945]), begins with a consciousness that is separate from the objects with which it is intertwined. As he states; “the problems posed in *Phenomenology of Perception*...start there from the ‘consciousness’ – ‘object’ distinction” (200). In the next chapter we will see how such distance is actually an immanent condition of perception. For now though, the Merleau-Ponty with whom we engage most substantially is that of *The Visible and the Invisible* era, in which the subject|object dichotomy becomes less straightforward. This is where Merleau-Ponty exhibits

⁶ Whilst Husserl admires Descartes’ interrogation of the certainty of physical externality, describing him in *Cartesian Meditations* as “France’s greatest thinker” (1999:1), he considers mind-body dualism to be a pseudo-problem. This, in Husserl’s opinion, is because Descartes does not take the issue of doubt far enough, stating that “in these matters Descartes was deficient...He stands before the greatest of all discoveries – in a sense he has already made it – yet fails to see its true significance, that of transcendental subjectivity” (1964[1929]:9).

Descartes takes the thinking subject as the ground of certainty of existence. However, Husserl argues that the thinking subject itself needs grounding, in terms of something about which could be thought. This “something” is consciousness of *phenomena-as-things* (experience as things themselves), rather than Cartesian consciousness of an *idea-of-a-thing* (representation of a thing). Consistent with the Husserlian notion of “intentionality,” in which a belief must be a belief about “something,” Husserl criticises Descartes in stating that “the expression *ego cogito* must be expanded by one term. Every *cogito* contains a meaning, its *cogitatum*...Consciousness is always consciousness of something” (12-14). In a similar way we have seen Merleau-Ponty critique Descartes’ conception of the dream in noting that there must already be a world about which can be dreamt.

consistency, albeit conditional, with the phenomenology of another of his predecessors, Martin Heidegger.

Heidegger's seminal text, *Being and Time* (1962[1927]), focuses on *Dasein*, a study of the relation between general Being, and particular beings, which "in its very Being, has this Being as an issue" (68). References to the body within *Being and Time* are scarce. Heidegger indeed declares in terms of the directionality of the body, that "Dasein's spatialisation in its 'bodily nature' is marked out in accordance with these directions (this 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, *though we shall not treat it here*)" (143; my emphasis). French existentialist, Jean-Paul Sartre, famously attacks this aspect of Heidegger's work, claiming that "Heidegger does not make the slightest allusion to it [the body] in his existential analytic" (2003[1943]:405).

This criticism is later acknowledged by Heidegger in the *Zollikon Seminars* (2001). During these seminars, delivered between 1959 and 1969, Sartre's critique of why Heidegger "only wrote six lines on the body in the whole of *Being and Time*" (2001:231) is raised. Heidegger responds that "whilst being unable to say anything more [about the body] at the time" (231), due to the difficulty of conceptualising the body, *Being and Time* assumes that humans could not participate in the "world-openness" of *Dasein* if they were not constituted by "bodily nature" (231). The being-in-the-world⁷ (*In-der-Welt-sein*) that *Dasein* explores, is, Heidegger demands, "always already fundamentally consisted of a receptive/perceptive relatedness to something which addresses us from out of the openness of our world, from out of that openness as which we exist" (232). Heidegger further describes the openness of any such human body as not limited by corporeal limits, in that "one must not confuse our existentiell bodily being with the corporeality of an inanimate, merely present-at-hand object" (232-233). Rather, the lived-body (*Leib*) stretches beyond apparent, corporeal boundaries. In accusing Sartre of being blinded by a Galilean conception of the corporeal object (*Körper*) that is restricted by spatial boundaries to being in one place at one time, Heidegger instead notes that whilst "the corporeal thing stops with the skin," one "cannot determine the phenomenon of the body in relation to its corporeality" (86). There are interesting congruencies and tensions between this argument, and that of Merleau-Ponty,⁸ which will be addressed in the aspects of this chapter dealing with bodily limits.

⁷ Heidegger's phrase chronologically precedes Merleau-Ponty's utilisation of the french version.

⁸ Curiously, Heidegger makes no reference to Merleau-Ponty during this seminar series.

Nevertheless, the primacy of bodily subjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology best informs our exploration into the spatial/material conditions of time. Bodily subjectivity/agency emerged in the preceding chapter, and is especially relevant to an exploration into the time-productive body-as-space, interrogating restrictive conceptions of the body as a passive, spatial object shaped by the dynamism of time. A problematisation of subject|object binaries is exemplified in Merleau-Ponty's application of Husserl's "touching/touched" body. In touching one's other hand, Merleau-Ponty notes in *The Visible and the Invisible* that a subject concurrently *touches* and *is touched*, "through this crisscrossing within [the hand(s)] of the touching and the tangible" (1968:133). On the basis that during perception the subject never transcends, nor is removed from, their body, that "object which does not leave me" (1962:103), characterisations of a separate, passive, corporeal object are contested. Crucially, when Merleau-Ponty questions whether his body is an object "he means 'object' both in the sense of 'intentional object' and 'physical object'" (Priest 1998:58-59), indicating the duplicity⁹ between the intentional perceiver and/as the physically perceived thing.

The "crisscrossing" of which Merleau-Ponty speaks refers to the hand incorporating itself into the world that it touches, whereby "movements incorporate themselves into the world they interrogate" (1968:133). The subject is part of the world that it touches *as* the touched world is part of the subject. What occurs is an always internal contact with the world, re-conceiving inside-body and outside-world borders. Given that worldly perception not only conditions the hand-as-body touching the other hand-as-body experience, but also conditions the relation between oneself-as-body and other worldly bodies/things, the body experiences itself, and other bodies/things, from inside itself and/as the world. Subjective experience is *chiasmatic*, a perceptual coherence between body and/as other/thing, "between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching," constituting an "overlapping or encroachment," whereby "things pass into us as well as we into the things" (123). Merleau-Ponty blurs the fabric which constitutes the individual-as-subject and the world-as-object. The subject's body experiences things in the same phenomenon in which such things experience the subject's body, because both are produced in/as the same worldly perceptive act.

⁹ "Duplicity" can refer to a thing's twofold state *and* to a deceit in speech or conduct which creates confusion. The *perceived* body's duplicitous character emerges in its simultaneous incarnation as Being's Plotinus-like, spoken *perceiver*. The body is ambiguously both perceiving and perceived.

The ramification is that there is not a purely separate subject that perceives (touches) pre-formed, separate objects, but rather such subjects, objects and the perceptive “touch is formed in the midst of the world and in the things” (134). Things become the things they are via worldly perception, and perception becomes concurrently via the duplicity of perceiver/perceived relations. These specific perspectives of perceptual relations re-produce things and/as the world, rather than discovering them pre-fabricated. The phenomenological reduction is thus not the judgement, nor the perception, of things in-themselves from a transcendent present. Instead, it is the always already being-in-the-world condition of things in their givenness. The givenness of things is the always open possibility of their co-constitutive ontologies. Another response therefore emerges to Derrida’s critique that phenomenology installs and hierarchises a logocentric, metaphysical present seeking a return to the origins of experience. As Reynolds notes, “what Merleau-Ponty seeks is not merely to return to the phenomenon, but to return to the phenomenon in a way open to that which makes the phenomenon itself possible and...that allows phenomenality to be possible at all” (2004:81). Perception does not provide the embodied subject with possible access, or a return, to a pre-existing world. Instead, embodied perception is an incarnating process which only occurs because it is of the world, whereby “he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he *is of it*” (1968:134-135). In terms of time, this reconfigures assumptions of a pre-existing entity perceived *after* by a transcendentally present perceiver. Rather, perceiver and perceived manifest co-constitutively and concurrently. To see is to be a body that is seen. In touching, in perceiving, the human body is among incarnate things, where among does not simply mean intermingling with, side by side, like marbles jostling for position in a cup, but instead as implicated in the constitution of such things.

This is a point with which the phenomenology of Heidegger’s later era is consistent. Heidegger explicitly states, concerning a less restricted understanding of bodily limits, what was implicitly presumed in *Being and Time*, whereby “when pointing with my finger toward the crossbar of the window over there, I [as body] do not end at my fingertips. Where then is the limit of the body? ‘Each body is my body.’ As such, the proposition [bodily limit] is nonsensical” (2001:86). This evokes Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of a singular flesh from which a perceiver and the perceived world manifest co-constitutively. Or as Merleau-Ponty’s eloquent terminology describes, “the visible can thus fill me only because I who see it do not see it from the depths of nothingness, but from the midst of itself” (1968:113). The indiscernible direction of

this body-world, carnal perception implicates the seer in what it sees, and vice-versa. The “seer and the visible reciprocate one another” (139). In considering the singular, monistic tendencies being suggested, we will soon address the *self*-reciprocating character of perception. If indeed, we are not already.

The production of Being as space/matter is the production of time

In considering this apparent reciprocity of seer and seen, philosopher Dorothea Olkowski asks an important question regarding the simultaneity of such a phenomenon. This concerns what is implied in both the act of seeing, and in the recognition of being seen, and queries whether a subject can perceive the world *and* apprehend a perception of themselves *simultaneously*? (2010:532). Olkowski notes that it could be presumed that only one of these actions is possible at any one time. For if to perceive is to consciously “look at or to see something in a deliberate manner...and if to apprehend the look is to be looked at and to become conscious of being looked at” (532), then there seems to be a temporal delay, rather than a simultaneity, between such states. The coming discussion concerning the ambiguity of bodily being will be relevant to this question.

The body, constituted by worldly substance/spatiality/materiality, chiasmatically perceives itself (from) within this worldly substance/spatiality/materiality, and yet concurrently distinguishes itself from such worldly substance/spatiality/materiality as a particular production of it. That is, the body reveals Being’s *ambiguity*, at once constituting both the subjectivity of self-as-space and the objectivity of world-as-space. Merleau-Ponty describes this ambiguously subjective *and* objective constitution as the *flesh of the world*, something discussed in Gail Weiss’ chapter ‘Ambiguity’ in *Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts* (2009). Weiss explains that for Merleau-Ponty the body is at once particular *and* general, local *and* global, or “subjective and at the same time, pervaded by what Merleau-Ponty calls an ‘atmosphere of generality’ that connects one to all other bodies, human and non-human” (Weiss 2009:134). This notion of “generality” is also raised in a previous argument from Weiss concerning the constitution of such worldly flesh. Weiss’ chapter ‘Urban flesh,’ in *Feminist Interpretations of Merleau-Ponty* (2006), engages the explanation from Merleau-Ponty in *The Visible and the Invisible* that the

flesh of the world, rather than being a specific substance or matter, is the primordial “element” which “stylises” all aspects of/as Being. For Merleau-Ponty:

The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we should need the old term ‘element’...in the sense of a *general thing*... a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of Being. The flesh is in this sense an ‘element’ of Being...the inauguration of the *where* and the *when* (139-140).

Such fragments of Being constitute, and are constituted by, what is general about Being. In considering the fleshed co-constitution between the fragmented particularity of subjectivity, and the generality of objectivity, Weiss recognises Being’s perpetual “stylising” (Merleau-Ponty’s “style of being”) as an “ongoing process of differentiation that cannot be reduced to sameness” (Weiss 2006:148). This description of stylising *flesh* as “differentiated” incarnation evokes the way in which Being’s all-encompassing spatiality/materiality has been characterised in this chapter in terms of “distinguishability.” As we see in Merleau-Ponty’s passage above, it is this stylisation/differentiation/distinguishability which is the “inauguration of Being’s *where* and the *when*,” consistent with the developing argument in this chapter that distinguishability conditions (inaugurates) there being Being. Here an insight is provided into just how *all-encompassing* the ontologising (inaugurating) “space” discussed in this chapter actually is. Such “space” is not simply a particular substance/material. This reflects Merleau-Ponty’s demand that worldly flesh cannot be designated simply as a specific form of matter, mind or substance. Rather, what is fleshy or spatial about the world is at once the general condition and possibility of anything. Weiss is no less attentive to these ambiguous conditions via which *flesh* manifests and is manifested, in that it constitutes both particular substances, matters and thoughts, and also that which “unifies, weaving together disparate gestures, bodies, movements, and situations into a dynamic fabric (148). The ambiguity of worldly flesh is its inaugurating condition.

Given that our intention in this chapter is to determine whether the body-as-space can be acknowledged as time-productive without being abstracted, such ambiguity could appear to inhibit such inquiries. However, recall that phenomenological ambiguity is, for Merleau-Ponty, conditioned by the *singularity* of experience. Such singularity potentially facilitates recognition

of how the body temporalises without perpetually displacing/slipping from here *to* there *to* here ad infinitum. This anticipates the critique raised in the previous chapter, that a body whose temporalising capacity is relationally, unrestrictedly constituted beyond its apparent subjective boundaries is ethereally abstracted. Conversely, we want to maintain that the time-productive body-as-space is *objectively* substantial, in order to maintain consistency with the supposition that it is something objective about time which conditions the temporality of social function/synchronisation.¹⁰ In previous chapters, an argument has been developed countering the notion that time is objective because its source transcends the realm of human subjects, whilst also contesting the contrary reduction that time is a demarcated, subjective mechanism. There must be something objective about time in order to condition the common apprehension by which social synchronisation occurs.

My interest in Being's self-distinguishable corporeal/spatial/material ambiguity concerns how it informs the question of time. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's summation that "the ambiguity of being-in-the-world is translated by that of the body, and this understood through that of time" (1962:98). As we will see, the *ambiguity* of bodily being can be understood in terms of time if we interpret the concurrent reciprocation of corporeal seer and seen as the upsurge of time. What this will consider is how the body-world-incarnate produces time. This targets what is at stake in this thesis; the body producing, rather than simply exemplifying, time. We will now explore this Being-mechanism in which, via phenomenological perception, *time manifests via the distinction of the body from, and as, the entirety of Being.*

Perception is a fabric of co-implicated distinctions, evoking the co-constitutive intersubjectivity of *différance*. As discussed, the distinction of the body-as-space from a spatial world is produced by, rather than *overcome* by, perception. Perception is not one body accessing a separate thing. Rather, perception co-constitutes what is common to both body and/as world. Instead of a look *by* a body *at* a separate world, body and world manifest with, as and through each other, via Being's look which manifests *as* things like the human body-as-space. The look, perception, is therefore spatial. As an entity like the body-as-space, perception distinguishes worldly spatiality from itself. Indeed, it distinguishes Being from Being, a concurrent separation-and-implication, which thus does not impose "distance from," but rather, by visibilising

¹⁰ This focus on the substantial body is not negating the abstract body however, consistent with Derrida's concern to avoid simply inverting already imposed binaries. Rather, the subjectivity/identity/meaning of any substantiality is a relationally (co-)immanent, rather than oppositionally transcendent, production.

corporeal thing from/as everything, is “constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity” (1968:135). Given this corporeal ambiguity, the body, which is constituted by worldly substance, chiasmatically perceives itself (from) within this worldly, spatial substance, and yet concurrently distinguishes itself from such worldly, fleshy spatiality/substance, as a particular production of it.

Being, as worldly space/matter, in distinguishing itself via spatial/material forms of itself, becomes. Spatialities/materialities, such as humans, condition there being Being. Consequently, every spatiality/materiality conditions the entirety of Being. Here Being is synonymous with spatiality/materiality, and the key term is “entirety” (which I will employ frequently from this point to refer to that from which nothing is exterior). The reason this co-constitutive perception conditions Being’s *entire* emergence is that without this perceptual self-distinguishability of Being from Being, in the form of spatialities/materialities such as embodied humans, Being would not *become* by emerging from itself as the self it always already was. Being-as-self becomes what it “always already was” given that its upsurge comes from nothing but itself. This “always already was” does not identically replicate a past version of itself however, given that as we have seen, the past is always being (re-)produced.

This is crucial to comprehending how the body produces time. If spatial incarnation in forms such as bodies is Being’s *becoming*, then this ontological production of spatial/material self-distinguishability conditions Being’s time. Time’s source or origin does not precede the incarnation of any spatiality such as humans. Rather, the incarnation of Being, in spatial/material forms of itself, always already produces its time. The incarnation of any spatiality/materiality, such as human flesh/flesh-of-the-world, duly temporalises and worlds the world of which it is co-constitutive. In terms of our current discussion in this thesis, this ambiguity of particular flesh and the flesh of the world seems to be one response to Olkowski’s insightful query concerning the simultaneous temporality of corporeal seer and seen. If time’s source externally preceded the incarnation of spatial subjects, such subjects would be bound to an exclusively forward-moving temporality, at any particular point of which it might only be possible to either consciously perceive, or be conscious of being perceived. However, when the source of time is the world’s self-divergent, self-productive, self-perception in the form of spatial subjects, seeing and being seen occur simultaneously and co-constitutively. The world is incarnated by perceiving itself through worldly perceiving spatialities.

Time *becomes* as this productive eruption of spatialities/materialities like embodied humans. If each spatial subject, such as each human, incarnates the *entirety* of Being as the source of time, this is not arguing that if any particular human subject did not exist (if you were not alive for example), then neither Being nor time would have manifested. Rather, given that worldly spatiality, as Being, is a common spatiality in which all spaces perpetually co-constitute, and because *there is* worldly space (that is, because Being exists), there is never a point at which time was introduced to a static presence. Time's incarnation is not the disruption of Being's atemporal *prior* presence. Instead, what I am demanding is that wherever there is Being, wherever there is any *thing*, there is time. Being's wherever is its whenever. In terms of humans-as-things, time manifests not as a passage acknowledged by an onlooking subject. Rather, time, as embodied subjectivities, is something Merleau-Ponty acknowledges as early as *Phenomenology of Perception* as "nothing but a general flight out of Itself" (1962:487). The corporeal human is Being-as-time, a spatial subjectivity that in conditioning Being as worldly spatiality, constitutes the plenitude of Being.

The ramification is that every subject, human or "otherwise," is inescapably, but not submissively, temporal and temporalising, by perpetually distinguishing what would otherwise be the atemporal realm of an "unbroken chain of the fields of presence" (491). This coheres with the argument developed in chapters one and two, which illustrated the unavoidable participation of human subjects in the temporality of objective rhythms, with chapter three then attributing this participation to spatiality/corporeality and characterising it as time's source. Speaking to the earlier caution against interpreting time's emergence as the disruption of a prior plenitude, Merleau-Ponty's use of the term "unbroken" should not be read as an anterior plenitude that is dismantled by time as a *subsequent* event. Rather, time is the distinguishing break which was always already occurring in order for there to be Being and/as time. The temporal "break" cannot disrupt a prior plenitude, given that without the break, without time, there is no plenitude, there is no Being.

Discussing the subject's inescapable temporality highlights a key difference between the portrayals of objective time from Newton and Merleau-Ponty. Articulating this difference will further align Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology with the developments of this chapter, characterising the human body as a producer, rather than a mere exemplifier, of time. Newtonian time's universal objectivity, which seemingly can account for social synchronisation (if all

subjects adhere to the same representation of an objectively inaccessible, universal time-source), characterises the human as inescapably temporal because of their physical/spatial/material transience and inevitable demise. The source of such universal, objective time is outside the influence or interference of any worldly physicality/spatiality/materiality. Consequently, it is perceived that human societies, situated in this realm, utilise this objective, external source in order to synchronise their individuals. The omnipresence of universal time's regularity is inescapable, dramatically evidenced in the human passage to death. Such time, whose source is outside the physical realm, is only witnessed via physical, substantial change, evidenced in the ageing and death of fleshy corporeality, just as the wind is only visible via material changes like the rustling of leaves.

Conversely for our phenomenological inquiry, human subjects are not inescapably temporal due to a finitude that is imposed by a relentless, external time-source. Rather than defining time as a destruction enforced from without, time is immanent and productive. The individual is inherently temporal because they are temporalising, whereby from their corporeal/spatial/material perceptual incarnation, time and/as Being manifest(s). Considering that in this chapter we aspire to maintain the spatial/tangible constitution of time-as-body-as-space by determining *where* the time-productive body is, this conception of the individual's broader constitution will soon expand into an exploration of the potential that the body is perpetually immanent in/at any space. This will address the anticipated concern from the last chapter; that the body's temporalising capacities abstract it as an ethereal transcendence, the characteristics with which time is typically, restrictively associated, and against which this thesis is arguing.

Attributing the individual with time's production again raises the issue which emerged from Augustine's model of subjective time in chapter two however. If each individual, each spatial/material subject, upsurges as the source or the origin of time, does this conception lack the shared conditions and knowledge of an objectively common time which underpins social synchronisation?

The production of time is knowledge of time

A response to such interrogations must comprehend the involvement of the subject in/as time as an inescapable dimension of subjectivity (as per Merleau-Ponty's terminology in the citation

which opens this chapter), rather than a subject's toolbox style capability. Congruent with Augustinian subjective time-consciousness, it is not that the subject-as-flesh *wills* time. If this was the case, subjects could pre-exist the time they willingly source. Rather, time manifests because/as spatial subjects manifest. Spatialities/materialities/corporealities incarnate Being and time. We have seen that this is Being perpetually perceiving itself through itself. The argument this chapter will now develop is that this self-incarnation constitutes Being's self-consciousness/self-knowledge.

Each spatial subject is distinguished from, and as, the entirety of Being-as-space, which is always already, and is only ever, constituted of/by itself. Consequently, each spatial subject, each present upsurge as worldly space, is "*aware of itself*, for the explosion or dehiscence of the present...is the archetype of the relationship of self to self, and it traces out an interiority" (1962:495; my emphasis). That Being's incarnation is perpetually *self*-perceptual means that this self-incarnation concurrently constitutes Being's *self*-consciousness/*self*-knowledge. Furthermore, even though this self-relation is always one of divergence, it evokes Derrida's *différance* without dislocating beyond the interiority of the emergent self or "here." This divergent self-consciousness marks another way in which the phenomenological model offered by Merleau-Ponty is not restricted by a transcendental, pure presence. The kind of logocentric metaphysics of which we have seen Derrida critique phenomenologies generally is therefore avoided. Such self-alterity prevents a static, present self-coincidence.

We have discussed how this self-incarnation of Being via spatial subjects produces time. That Being's self-incarnation is Being's self-consciousness/self-knowledge means that each Being-incarnating subject is never outside time-consciousness/time-knowledge. Embodied human subjects, body-subjects, and other spatialities/materialities *are* consciousness, manifesting perceptually with/as the flesh of the world of which they cannot avoid being conscious. That flesh (Being) is aware and conscious of itself indicates that just as in Augustine's, Durkheim's and Halbwachs' models of consciousness, consciousness for Merleau-Ponty is not a brain-demarcated cognition. Merleau-Ponty presents a corporeal consciousness that overlaps with(in) itself as worldly perception. This clarifies his characterisation of being-in-the-world as "unreflective" with which we were earlier concerned. Being-in-the-world's perceptive ontology is not unreflective in opposition to ration/cognition/consciousness. Instead, Merleau-Ponty employs "unreflective" to distinguish being-in-the-world's self-incarnating-thought (where

thought *is* worldly incarnation), from conceptions of a reflection which is restricted to a subject's thoughts of a separate, already incarnated world. Perception *is* ration/cognition/consciousness, as "one must see or feel in some way in order to think...every thought known to us occurs to a flesh" (1968:146). In terms of this correlation between one's spatial incarnation and their conscious experience, Olkowski observes the exemplification of what she describes as a consistent thread in Merleau-Ponty's work concerning the "continuity between interiority and exteriority" (1999:5). If fleshy, spatial incarnation *is* consciousness, then Merleau-Ponty is not restricted by "nature|consciousness (or body and mind) dichotomies" (5). Rather, Olkowski's point is that an organism constitutionally unifies what are otherwise perceived to be the separate realms of quantity or matter, order or life, and signification or mind (5). Consciousness feels because substance thinks.

Such an all-encompassing model thus substantialises/materialises the social, collective consciousnesses posited by Halbwachs and Saint Augustine. With this substantialisation/materialisation, Merleau-Ponty's importance in integrating the material body into sociological analysis becomes more apparent. Nick Crossley, who has published extensively on Merleau-Ponty, shares this opinion, whereby in discussing a carnal sociology, Crossley states that Merleau-Ponty allows us to "understand that human agents-subjects are bodies, and that bodies are sensible-sentient, communicative, practical and intelligent" (1995:60). As we have just explored, it appears that bodies-as-subjects are sentient of time because they are sensible *as* time.

Time is body is perception is spatial, manifesting as the particularity of things such as bodies which are distinguished from a flesh which they constitute, and by which they are constituted. Merleau-Ponty's aforementioned singularity is the self-consciousness-as-self-perception of flesh. The self-awareness of the flesh of the world temporalises, whereby subject-flesh, in perceiving Being-flesh also co-constitutes Being-flesh, and distinguishes self-from-self as time's upsurge. This is time, in that "time must *constitute itself* – be always seen from the point of view of someone who *is* of *it*" (1968:184). Indeed, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, "consciousness" has no meaning independent of this ontological self-relation that is "always affected by itself or given to itself" (1962:495-496).

The reciprocity of seer and seen emerges from worldly self, as itself. The human body distinguishes Being-as-flesh gazing upon itself from within itself, folding over inside itself via the perceptive, distinguishing, incarnating present. A significant ramification duly emerges for

this chapter's interrogation of whether the body-as-space, in temporalising, becomes an abstract ethereality, taking on the qualities with which time is typically associated in contradistinction to the substantiality of space. Contrary to this characterisation, the singular, spatial immanence of Merleau-Ponty's worldly flesh demands that the body does not temporalise via a *displacement* from here *to* there *to* here *ad infinitum*. This was the anticipated critique, that the body's blurred time-productivity renders it a relational abstraction. Now we comprehend the body, whose incarnation constitutes the entirety of Being, as always already present or here. The corporeal ambiguity by which the body presents however, as particular-subject flesh *and* entire-Being-flesh, is a mechanism in which Being only perceives itself by diverging through itself. This self that Being perceives is the self it always already was, given that it only emerges from itself in distinguishable forms such as the human body, without which, Being and/as time would not present/manifest. This presence is not a transcendent, metaphysical present that attempts to *return* to originary experience or to an originary self (which as we will further address soon is Derrida's primary concern with phenomenology). Rather, it is the perpetual production of originary experience, the perpetual production of the self as body-subject. The body concurrently fabricates seer and seen, toucher and touched, within what Merleau-Ponty describes evocatively as this "fabric of experience, this flesh of time" (1968:111). This is why the subject does not observe a transcendent time-source. Rather, the subject-as-body "creates time instead of submitting to it" (1962:279). This statement resonates with our central focus in this thesis, recognising body-flesh as something through which time is produced, rather than merely a subservient exemplification of time.

The importance of recognising that the world only manifests via this temporalisation, where Being-flesh perceives/distinguishes/manifests particular-flesh from/as entire-Being-flesh, cannot be overstated. Merleau-Ponty's position is that "the world, which is the nucleus of time, subsists only by virtue of that unique action which both separates and brings together the actually presented and the present...everything is 'temporalised'" (1962:387). The presented subject is not something which simply experiences time's force, but rather is/presents the worlding upsurge of time and/as world. The corporeal "I" of subjectivity is at once an exemplar, and a producer, of time and/as self and/as world, that unique action in Merleau-Ponty's terms between the presented and the present. The consequent "corporeal ambiguity" upon which Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology relies, about whose potentially abstract character concerns were raised, can now

be celebrated as a perpetual immanence in which the subject-as-body is always objectively present. As we have addressed, and will become further apparent, self-knowledge/certainty is not inhibited or jeopardised by the ambiguity of corporeality. Rather, this unrestricted subjectivity is consistent with the collective human subjectivities explored in Durkheimian sociology and Augustinian theology, in which, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, I "know myself only in my inherence in time and in the world, that is, I know myself only in ambiguity" (402).

This discussion concerning ambiguity and knowledge is implicit in what we have already developed. It has been argued that every spatiality/materiality, such as every human, conditions there being Being, and therefore condition the entirety of Being. As this concurrent co-production of subject and/as Being produces Being's time, every spatial/material subject conditions the entirety of time. That is, every spatial/material subject conditions there being time in general. The corporeal/spatial/material ambiguity between particular spatial subject and entire spatial Being/world does not jeopardise the subject's knowledge of self, nor of time. As Reynolds states, for Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity "is not envisaged to be a shortcoming, or a fall from some better, aggrandised state" (2004:59). Indeed, how could ambiguity represent anything like a "lack," considering that as we have seen, the body-subject is "always typified by ambiguity" (58). That subjectivity here is conditioned by the *divergent* ambiguity of self-world co-constitution contradicts Derrida's claim that a metaphysically hierarchised, logocentric, binary present underpins all phenomenology. This is also Reynolds' position, whereby if subjectivity is predicated on "a difference that is not a dualism...Merleau-Ponty does not appear to conform to the standard deconstructive definition of the metaphysics of presence" (58).

Rather, by conditioning the entirety of time, or time in general, each ambiguously embodied subject, *as* time, is always conscious of time. That this self-consciousness of the entirety of Being, which manifests via/as the perceiving subject, produces time, means that the subject is never outside the source of time, and thus could never be unaware of (the) time. Each subject-as-flesh is not only an individual time incarnation, but rather conditions the production of Being's temporality. As earlier observed, the subject is inescapably time-productive due to their incarnation, distinguishing what would otherwise be, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, an "atemporal realm." In temporalising, in worlding a world, subjective time and the objectivity of time in general emerge simultaneously, where each subjective, corporeal production as time conditions

the objective becoming of Being's temporality. This is attributable to their co-constitutive differentiation (evoking *différance*), a concurrent sameness-and-difference, from/as each other.

Each individual upsurge of time is therefore never demarcated from, or out of sync with, any other upsurge, given that each manifests as the concurrent ambiguity of particular-subject-flesh and entire-Being-flesh. This ambiguity demands that each upsurge of time constitutes the entirety of time, due to the incarnation of subject-flesh conditioning the incarnation of entire Being-flesh. Despite there being perhaps infinite upsurges of time, each manifests a time that is already conscious of, and implicated in, the entirety of time generally, and therefore, the time of other upsurges. This is the inescapability for *all* body-subjects of a self-synchronous flesh, incorporating/incarnating, and incorporated-by/incarnated-by, subject-upsurges who arrive at the 9 o'clock meeting at 9 o'clock, and those who do not arrive and whose synchronicity is seemingly abnormal. Durkheim's conception of the social is evoked here, in which normative *and* non-normative manifestations emerge from the same objective source, something we have further interrogated to acknowledge the reciprocal (re-)production of such objectivity by all normative and non-normative manifestations. The 9 o'clock meeting emerges with objective synchronicity, even if the incarnation of each subject manifests time subjectively. Again, this is due to the ambiguity of the time-upsurging subject-flesh, which is at once both distinguished from, and dispersed as, the entirety of Being-flesh-time.

This argument requires clarification, given that it relies upon a radical reconceptualisation of the notion of social synchronisation. Typically, social synchronisation describes subjects meeting at the same clocked or calendared representation of a permanently pre-existing time-source, the objectivity of which for all such subjects, outside the interference of any subject, can be *used* for the synchronisation of all subjects. In this regard, the subjects who will synchronise are also presumed to pre-exist the moment at which they will synchronise. That is, all such subjects exist of their own accord, then they come together at the synchronising moment.

The argument developed in this chapter however, instead characterises synchronisation as the simultaneous, objective co-incarnation of spatial subjects. Such subjects are inescapably synchronous because they emerge with, and as, each other intersubjectively, and therefore socially, *as* time. Such subjects cannot pre-exist the moment of synchronisation, given that they only become these subjects that they are, synchronously and intersubjectively with other subjects. This addresses how spatial subjects, who do not "arrive" at the 9 o'clock meeting "on

time” and are thus seemingly not synchronising with other subjects, *do* actually synchronise. Space, in the form of subjects, is not a phenomenon of *here* in opposition to *there*. Spatial subjects, if here at the meeting at 9 o’clock, are not precluded from also simultaneously being elsewhere which is seemingly not at the meeting at 9 o’clock. This is because the spatiality of any subject simultaneously conditions, or is present in, and is conditioned by, or is presented by, all other spatialities, including those seemingly not here and/or there. If, as argued in chapter three, this coherence occurs relationally/co-constitutively between *all* bodies/spatialities, synchronised subjects-as-bodies must incorporate and be synchronised with those which seem to be non-synchronised. It has been argued in this chapter that this synchronous co-conditioning of worldly, spatial incarnation is time. This challenges the conception that time is a source with a separate, permanently pre-existing, fixed origin, the social construction or representation of which is simply *used* by subjects to synchronise.

It is conventionally presumed that such social constructions or representations of time are not time itself. A social constructionist interpretation will be that the human construction or representation of such a worldly phenomenon is contingently, socially variable and constitutively separate from what is inherent to the phenomenon being represented. However, in considering the current argument that what is inherent about time is that it is produced through spatialities such as humans, and that such spatialities are intersubjectively, socially, conditioned, constructed and produced, the notion of social constructionism seems to remain intact within, rather than is excluded from, the actual, worldly phenomenon of time. Such worldly time is spatially intersubjective, and is therefore a social construction or production, in which case the social construction is not separate from the actual, worldly phenomenon. Subjects do not synchronise via social constructions or representations of a distantly anterior, separate, worldly source. Instead, the subject is time, manifesting as Being’s self-synchronous, self-social construction/production. Here the social construction of time can still be considered a representation of time, as long as such representation is of Being, by Being. Consequently, this self-representation is concurrently a self-production, dissolving representation and production into the one, simultaneous, worlding phenomenon.

Given this conception of unrestricted subjectivity and consciousness, we can now return to one of Giddens’ central criticisms of Durkheimian sociology in particular, and structuralisms in general. We have seen Giddens argue that because the individual is often unaware of their

structural production, structuralist sociologies overly constrain the individual. Indeed, Durkheim emphasises this characteristic of social facts, whereby not only is one not always aware of the objective manner with which their consciousness is coerced, but also awareness of other consciousnesses escapes us (1938:xliv). Durkheim's structuralist claim must now be re-read however via the conception of phenomenological subjectivity and consciousness, in which each subject, as an upsurge conditioning the entirety of Being/time (and thus all other upsurges), is always already aware/co-conscious of all other upsurges. Equally, Giddens' criticism that according to structuralism an individual is unaware of their production is rendered moot by this re-conception of structuralism's assumption of the subject's supposed lack of awareness concerning their objective production.

Considering the phenomenological drive of this chapter, it would be disingenuous to ignore its differences from the social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz, who we engaged in earlier chapters. Rather than describing consciousness as an immanent intersubjectivity as has just been developed here, Schütz posits a "unique stream of consciousness of each individual" that is "essentially inaccessible to every other individual" (1967:99). Schütz's phenomenological consciousness is seemingly considerably informed by Husserl's notion of intentionality (in which a belief must be about, or directed to, "something"). The intersubjectivity of intentionality is a transcendent relation. Intentional experiences are of "externalities" to one's consciousness, "directed to something transcendent" such as "all acts directed to...intentional mental processes belonging to other Egos with other streams of mental processes, and likewise all acts directed toward physical things" (Husserl 1983:79). Schütz's reading of intersubjectivity (and indeed Husserl's) contrasts with the immanence by which intersubjectivity has been characterised in our last two chapters, where the co-constitution of embodied subjectivities, and consequent consciousness of bodies-as-space(s), ensures a consciousness of the time of others. Contrarily, other consciousnesses, and any body (even one's own), are transcendent phenomena for Schütz, in that "not only are intentional acts directed upon another person's stream of consciousness transcendent, but my experiences of another person's body, or of my own body...fall into the same class" (1967:100).

It is in terms of appreciations of perception that Schütz's model of intersubjectivity diverges from that which our central inquiry has developed. Schütz, as with Husserl, postulates

external conditions when discussing intersubjective perception. Indeed, Schütz takes a citation from Husserl's *Logical Investigations: Volume 2* (2001[1929]) to exemplify this:

The listener notices that the speaker is expressing certain subjective experiences of his and in that sense may be said to notice *them*; but he himself does not live through these experiences – his perception is “external” rather than “internal” (Husserl in Schütz 1967:100).

Conversely, I read the flesh of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in such a way that perception is a perpetually immanent, ontologising/worlding mechanism. Perceptions are not of distantly external other bodies and consciousnesses, that Schütz believes one only “notices” as “merely images” which are “inadequate since they are spatial” (1967:102). Rather, perception manifests via/as each spatial incarnation, by which Being becomes self-conscious. There can be no simple externality, nor abstraction, where consciousness and the body are concerned.

The body-as-space, as the condition of time, is simultaneously: (i) a subjective, particular time, and; (ii) the possibility of time's Being/objectivity. As we have explored, this problematises the assumption that it is only by clocks and calendars that synchronisation is conditioned. When time is only understood as divisions along a linear path, as separate minutes, hours, days and years, each subject only synchronises with another subject if both know the same representation of a time from whose source they are separated (guaranteeing its objectivity for both). Conversely, when each temporalisation constitutes the entirety of time, or time in general, every temporalising subject, every distinguishability of Being upsurging as itself as time, is never out of sync with any other subject's time. This is because every subject co-conditions entire-time and/as Being by distinguishing Being-as-time(s) from itself.

“Divisibility” and “distinguishability” duly contrast in my application. The incarnation of the subject as the upsurge of time does not *divide* Being's particularity from Being's entirety, but rather *distinguishes* Being as Being. We will explore in chapter five whether this opposes distinguishability from divisibility, which could contradict the post-structuralist conception that everything is co-constituted. In terms of the current stage of this chapter though, the term “distinguishability” better evokes the self-implication of time's upsurge. As has been acknowledged, time is the distinguishability of flesh from/as flesh, never exceeding its touching-

touched self-relation. Consequently, a flesh of the world that is conditioned by/as self-perception from inside itself cannot avoid producing objectively common time, from which individual time(s) become distinguishable.

This is the aforementioned temporalising process, characterised as a concurrent sameness-and-difference. Every time-incarnating subject-flesh is at once both the exemplar, and the producer, of the entirety of Being; the flesh of the world. Such a shared phenomenon is therefore objective, in that every subject, every body, will be conscious, as the conditioner of Being-as-flesh-as-time, of the same entirety of time. I thus counter Schütz's claim that consciousness of another's "whole stream of lived experience is *not* open to me" and that "I can catch sight of only disconnected segments of it" (106). There are no disconnected, divided, closed segments, given that each particular time-upsurge, each corporeal-subjectivity, is co-conditioned by all other time-upsurges/corporeal-subjectivities.

Schütz justifies his interpretation of intersubjectivity on the grounds of ontological separation, in that "if I could be aware of your whole experience, you and I would be the same person" (106). Such a conception relies upon overcoming oppositions of inside|outside, perceiver|perceived and Ego/consciousness|body/physicality. Schütz exemplifies this in stating that when "observing him, his body is still a field of expression for his *inner* life" (173; my emphasis), presupposing "the existence of the other Ego animating the body" (21). This separation of inside-consciousness from outside-body is further installed in noting that the consequent physical changes represent "indications of the other person's *inner* life" (22; my emphasis). In conversely blurring the boundaries of consciousness, subjectivity and the body-as-space, I do not needlessly complicate matters by installing combative, temporal disconnections, consciousness|body divisions nor here|there perceptual distances.

This consciousness of/as time's entirety will necessarily include an awareness of all its constitutive, particular times. Each time, as we have explored, is never demarcated nor divided from the rest of time. Indeed, how could it be? Rather, just as the subject-upsurge is a flesh of the world expression whose ambiguity as particular-subject-flesh *and* entire-Being-flesh constitutes both self and/as Being, likewise the expression of a time, such as 9 o'clock tomorrow morning, constitutes both that time and/as the entirety of time in general. This socio-phenomeno-logical argument is concerned with time's ontology, reminding us that we are undertaking a different endeavour from typical social theories of time discussed in earlier chapters. What is at stake in

the work of social theorists such as Flaherty, Adam and Zerubavel is the management and experience of a separate, fixed, permanently pre-existing time-source.¹¹

What must be asked now though, given the self-self temporalising relation developed in this chapter, is whether “objective” best describes the common time via which social synchronisation occurs. In acknowledging that the source of time does not transcend humans, but rather that each material/spatial/embodied subject is/constitutes time’s production, this thesis has carefully avoided reducing time to an exclusively subjective production or experience. This is to maintain the objectivity for time that is necessary to condition the synchronisation upon which societies function. However, if each spatial subject, as time, is already the entirety of time, does this *monistic* spatial subjectivity suggest that time is actually a singular, *subjective* operation?

Subjective, monistic, social time

This emergence of a monistic singularity for time’s source has considerable ramifications for the assumption that the shared constitution of social time is attributable to time’s *objectivity*. In anticipating criticisms that the body’s time-productive relationality dislocates it to the abstract, ethereal realms of transcendence, we have clarified where the body-as-space is. The body is perpetually *here* or present. In considering now whether “objective” describes the common time which conditions social function, what is apparent is that time’s self-self temporalisation seems to have a subjective character. It is counter-intuitive to think of subjectivity in such broad terms. Nevertheless, an entirety of time that is concurrently constituted by, and constitutes, every moment of time, presents as such.

Time’s objectivity appears to underpin social systems. Newtonian, objective time, a uniform, exterior source which we collectively represent and to which we all abide, can seemingly explain social synchronisation. However, a model of subjective time like Augustine’s appeals to our daily experience with time, by centralising humans in, rather than marginalising humans from, time’s passage. Whilst time is an exclusively mental operation for Augustine, this consciousness is not demarcated within individuals. It is by engaging Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that a spatial/material appreciation of such collective consciousness as fleshed

¹¹ Flaherty describes social science in these very terms; “In contrast to the phenomenological exploration of subjectivity, sociologists emphasise the social organisation of temporality as manifested in clocks, calendars, schedules, seasons and other culturally defined periodicities” (1999:10).

self-perception has been developed. Time, manifesting as flesh perceiving flesh, as self perceiving self in the broadest sense of Being, is characterised as a subjective mechanism. Given that this perceptually manifests via the relation of the body to/as a co-constitutive world, bodies present as ontologising subjectivities. This is the importance of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology for our considerations. It spatialises what Augustine's correlatively blurred conception of subjectivity presented as a mind based ethereality, and what Durkheim's conception of the socially constituted subject neglected to explicitly address in terms of the physicality of humans.

We have thus arrived at the subjectivity of a monism, in which the regularity of the time of the social emerges due to the cohesion of the subject-as-flesh-as-time with itself. This encourages a re-reading of Merleau-Ponty's citation which introduced this chapter. Rather than describing, as Merleau-Ponty does, an "*anonymous* visibility" (1968:142; my emphasis) which inhabits subject and/as social, what instead manifests are perpetually self-familiar/self-conscious subjectivities. It is not that social relations abide by a time-source that is imposed upon the subject transcendently (and therefore objectively for all). Rather, the time of the social emerges with/as the incarnation of the subject, co-constitutive as it is with all other times-as-subjects. Social synchronisation occurs not simply because subjects know an abstract, clocked representation of an external time-source. Rather, subjects within a social context synchronise because each already is the time of the social, each already is the time of other subjects, each already is the entirety of time in general.

This evokes our commentary from chapter two, concerning how, for Durkheim, social time is "conceived objectively by all men of the same civilisation" (1995:10). To conceive is to know *and* to originate, conjuring "conceive's" double meaning of comprehension and of creation. Now however, we can characterise this collective conception, a self-consciousness/self-knowledge, as subjective. The subject, an upsurge of time, always already constitutes the entirety of time, by conditioning time in general. This is a perceptive production, distinguishing subject-as-flesh from/as entire-Being-as-flesh. Being manifests via this monistic distinguishability of self from self, in the form of embodied subjects. Given that subjects are bodied, and that perception incarnates as the body-world co-constitution, it follows that one's body is always already constitutive of the entirety of Being. We can thus now more explicitly attend to the aforementioned discussion concerning bodily limits.

Bodily limits and limitless bodies

This extension of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology addresses the anticipated concern from the preceding chapter. In acknowledging that the body-as-space is always already the entirety of time, or the general condition of time, it is not that the body's relational/structural temporalisation/time-production perpetually dislocates it from here *to* there as an abstract ethereality. That is a typical characterisation of time, in contradistinction to the substantiality of space. By instead recognising that the source of time is spatially immanent, the body-as-space is not relationally lost as a transcendent no thing, but rather is always already an omnipresent every thing. This omnipresence is not due to a perpetually productive deferral *away* from itself *to* every other thing, but rather is attributable to the body always already referring to other worldly incarnations which it co-conditions. This is a temporalising reference from self to self. The body is always already objectively present, not because it is perpetually, spatially self-coincident, but because it is the perpetually immanent condition of space generally. This immanent objectivity characterises the body as the self-awareness/self-consciousness of Being's monistic subjectivity.

A monistic, corporeal subjectivity means that perception implicates the body in/as all worldly bodies, human or "otherwise." The perception of "the body of others and their expressions is as primary as the perception of one's own body and its expressions" (Schilder 1950:218). This continual transition involving oneself and/as others-as-bodies takes Merleau-Ponty's conception of *flesh* to an inevitable point of interrogation; the limitless body. The limitless body is considered by Austrian psychoanalyst Paul Schilder (1886 – 1940), who poses, "the question of what is our own body and what is the body of others" (235). Consistent with the conclusion in chapter three that bodies cannot avoid modifying "other" bodies relationally/co-constitutively, Schilder's argument also destabilises human bodily borders by arguing that bodies perpetually modify/constitute, and are modified/constituted by, "other bodies," simply by their being (218). Such a process can now be attributed to the perceptually self-incarnating, globally subjective, flesh, given its constitution by, and constitution of, all "other bodies."

There is no simple "outside" the body in this understanding. This is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's claim that Being is experienced not from the "depths of nothingness," but from the "midst of itself." Gail Weiss brings our attention to just how close the positions of Merleau-Ponty and Schilder are here, noting that "'experience,' as far as Schilder (and Merleau-Ponty) are

concerned, already implies an intimate exchange between body and world that results in a lack of boundaries between the two” (1999:15). A coherence therefore emerges with our contestation in earlier chapters of the notion that body modification practices represent an invasion of the body. Conversely, the all-encompassing composition of the phenomenological body already immanently practices as all bodies. Body modification practices cannot be illustrative of a corporeal control *against*, or that invades, bodies, because corporeal/fleshed modification is already an embodied, incarnating expression *as* itself-as-bodies.

The body’s receptivity with/as a world of which it is means that there is nothing which cannot be, or is not already, implicated. Like an amorphous blob, the body, in Schilder’s terms, “incorporates objects or spreads itself into space” (1950:213). Instead of the term “incorporated” I prefer to use “implicated” in order to avoid, if possible, the sense of a before and after the union of separate objects. Nevertheless, Schilder’s point is clear, in that the body of the subject, and the subject’s conception or image of the body, is not limited to its presumed corporeal boundaries, but includes things like “a stick, a hat, any kind of clothes” (213). For body modifiers, this means that the “synthetic” materials involved in/with the body, such as glass jewellery, silicon implants or tattoo ink present as necessarily bodied and natural, rather than as non-organic intrusions. This breaks down the limit of the body, whereby whatever emanates from one’s body will retain, sustain and be the body also. This is not to say that “limitlessness” cannot accommodate the “limits” by which bodies and things distinguishably manifest. Limits are not entirely negated. Rather, what is being acknowledged is the perpetual immanence/porosity of any limit to any other limit, and therefore, the limitless reality of real limits.

Heidegger’s *Zollikon* era conceives of “the body” similarly. In questioning the supposed boundaries of the body, Heidegger states that “the difference between the limits of the corporeal thing and the body consists in the fact that the *bodily limit* is extended beyond the *corporeal limit*” (2001:86). Heidegger’s terminology requires caution however when comparing his interrogation of bodily boundaries to the sense in this chapter of limitless flesh. Heidegger differentiates body from corporeality. This earlier serves a purpose in *Being and Time*; the distinction between ontological Being (in this case, “body”) and ontic beings (“corporealities”). In one regard, Heidegger evokes the argument of a limitless body-flesh, a body-as-space which perpetually conditions, and is conditioned by, other shifting bodies-as-space(s). He states; “the limit of bodying forth...is the horizon of being within which I sojourn...Therefore, the limit of

my bodying forth changes constantly” (2001:87). Body here is Being’s ontological process(es). Conversely though, Heideggerian corporeality is ontic and fixed, in that “the limit of the corporal thing usually does not change” (87).

Heidegger’s terminology here should not be conflated with my reading of Merleau-Pontian flesh. I do not separate body and corporeality. The Heideggerian distinction of Being and beings, I instead express as the co-constitution of body/corporeality/Being and bodies/corporealities/beings. Body-and/as-corporeality is universal, ontological Being-flesh, emerging concurrently with/as ontic bodies/corporealities. Given the distinction Heidegger installs between body and corporeality, his criticism of Sartre’s explicit acknowledgement of “the body” seems contradictory. In differentiating between a corporeal object and the “bodying forth” of body, Heidegger is no more, nor less, blinded by the Galilean concept of the corporeal object than is Sartre. Rather, such terms simply describe the body as an ontological phenomenon *and* as an ontic manifestation in the argument of each.

In continuing this theme of the caution required when engaging seemingly congruent theories, I will also attend to Schilder’s claim that “the voice, the breath, the odour, faeces, menstrual blood, urine, semen, are still parts of the body-image even when they are separated in space from the body” (1950:213). Reading Schilder through this chapter’s phenomenological conception means that no thing is straightforwardly “separated in space” from any other thing. Rather, things manifest co-constitutively as the self-incarnating perception of Being’s internal differentiation. In this fashion, general “space” is no less “bodied” than any of its more identifiable spatial things/bodies. Space participates in/as spatial things, rather than is simply the general conduit in which things are spaced/separated. Merleau-Ponty captures this spatial co-implication when considering the perception of a pool bottom, which is not something one sees *despite* the spatial “interferences” of water and reflections. Rather, it is visible because of, and as, such worldly spatial “interferences”:

When through the water’s thickness I see the tiling at the bottom of the pool, I do not see it *despite* the water and the reflections there; I see it through them and because of them. If there were no distortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it were without this flesh that I saw the geometry of the tiles then I would cease to see it *as* it is and where it is (1964b[1964]:182).

I am therefore arguing that the term “separated” which Schilder employs should be replaced with “distinguished.” This returns us to the tension between distinguishability and divisibility, which will be comprehensively addressed in the final chapter. The notion that spatial things are distinguished, rather than separated/divided, is consistent with my argument that perception, in marking flesh from flesh, incarnates particular things which are concurrently, productively implicated in/as everything. Conversely, the detachment which is associated with “separation” potentially confuses what is at stake in spatial relations.

In addressing the interpretation that bodies incorporate “separate” things, we revisit the argument that has been developed in this chapter. The body-as-space and other things-as-spaces are always already co-constitutive, a perpetual, perceptual incarnation from which Being and/as time manifests. The phrase “always already” has featured prominently in this chapter. This is because when applied to how I conceive of corporeality, it evokes the perpetually productive presence of the body. This perpetual presence is attributable to the notion that for there to be a world, there must be distinguishable, perceivable things of it such as the body. The body is, in Schilder’s terms, a “*part of the world*” (1950:280; my emphasis). However, it must also be said that the body always already *is* the world, whereby objects are not merely incorporated in a linear, unidirectional, forward-moving temporality of what the body was “before” or “after” such composition. Rather, such incorporations represent trans-temporal manifestations of the entirety of Being which was always already constituted by/as the body.

That the body and the world are co-constitutive means that bodily limits are never breached by a separate “outside.” Rather than demarcating one body from another, or one body from any “thing,” what is instead required is a re-conceptualisation of the limit. Recalling chapter one, the medical discourses that accuse non-normative body modification practices of denaturalising the human, contradict modern medicine’s incorporation of supposedly artificial materials via transplants and prosthetics into a patient’s corporeality. Here, as Pitts-Taylor notes, the human body “absorbs synthetic and organic materials, and is reshaped by lasers, plastics, and sutures,” like a cyborg (2003:30). Cyborg theory describes such bodies as *hybrid* entities.¹² A neither wholly organic nor synthetic creature is postulated, sociologist Stacy Gillis noting “a mixture of biology and technology that challenges accepted identities” (2004:97). Such a

¹² Feminist Donna Haraway famously offers the cyborgian organic-machinic amalgam as a political strategy against patriarchal, theological essentialism, describing humans as “hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs” (1985:67).

creation supposedly disrupts the dualism that opposes the natural-human from what is artificially-non-human. A challenge to the limit is presumed to occur via this synthesis.

However, the opposition, and subsequent unification, of human flesh and non-human matter that the cyborg requires, conflicts with this chapter's argument regarding a self-constitutive, monistic corporeality, in which the notion that anything is outside what is natural (such as what is cultural or synthetic) is rendered obsolete. Cyborg theory, rather than problematising the nature|culture limit, actually enforces it by conceptually separating, and then synthesising, natural givenness on one side and social/cultural productions on the other. Conversely, what we can take from our engagement with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological body is that the natural and the social/cultural are not poles to be unified, but are always already co-immanent constituents.

This conceptualisation reconfigures an influential claim from Barbara Adam. Whilst I agree with Adam's observation that "for phenomenologists, time is social time because it can be constituted intersubjectively," I contest her accusation that in phenomenological conceptions "only humans, however, are accorded the status of 'subject'" (Adam 1990:42). My argument, which concerns the phenomenological intersubjectivity of the human-as-space with/as other spatialities, does not restrict subjectivity to the human. The human body-as-space is just one expression of a monistic, unrestricted, temporalising subjectivity, which conditions, and is conditioned by, all spatial, temporalising subjectivities/incarnations. Whilst I agree with Adam that social scientists have commonly refused to see "dead things" as social" (156-157), my characterisation of the inescapably intersubjective, temporalising character of all spatialities, reconceives of those things which are typically interpreted as inanimate and dead, to instead being lively social participants.

Given the importance of this point in understanding the jurisdiction of the social sciences, we will now explicitly clarify the limitless socialisation that the phenomenological, temporalising body conditions, and by which it is conditioned. The concept of a limitlessly social mechanism, from which nothing is excluded, is consistent with the earlier accommodation, rather than exclusion, of notions of social constructionism. Exploring this limitless social frame will return us to Mead's philosophy. This is a move which Adam would actually endorse, given that unlike the social phenomenologists with exclusively human concerns, she notes that "for Mead, sociality must not be understood in purely human, cultural terms, but rather as a quality that

permeates all living existence” (1995:80). We are about to consider the sociality of the body, and how this relates to its temporalising nature.

Limitless socialisation

Engaging the relations to which Mead attends concerning subjectivity, physiology, the physical environment, and the social will assist in articulating a conception of the limitless social constitution of the monistically spatial body. In *The Philosophy of the Present*, Mead discusses the relation of an animal to its environment. When selecting food, an animal relies on its nervous system, which: (i) via cognitive processes enables appropriate selection of food, and; (ii) brings itself physiologically into contact with food-as-object (2002:93). The animal is conscious of this experience between the food and the animal’s sensory apparatus. Such an experiential loop indeed participates in the selection of food, with the animal responding “to the influence or effect the outer world has upon it” (94). Conscious and cognitive living processes thus manifest in relation to physicalities such as food. However, whilst the response of the animal organism to the food is found “within the organism,” this is only “a part of a whole process of eating” (94). I ask the reader at this point not to be distracted by Mead’s vernacular of “within” and “outer,” as these terms are seemingly only deployed initially to capture the typical distinction of inside-animal|outside-environment.

Indeed, Mead demands that when considering a behaviour like eating, to define consciousness as an internal reaction of the organism to an external food-object is to abstract the organism from its setting. This is symptomatic of everyday assumptions about the limitations of consciousness, and “our tendency to cut off life and consciousness at the boundaries of the organism” (94). Instead, given the way that objects, such as food, become constituents of the consciousness of the animal (a consciousness which concurrently participates in (re-)constituting a changing spatial/physical environment), the animal should be acknowledged as “a part of the world of objects about him” (93). There is a congruence between Mead’s conception of blurred, embodied subjectivity, and the unrestricted body as posited by Heidegger. Heidegger describes “the here” of the organism not in terms of a demarcated “position in space” (1962:420), but rather as “the leeway of the range of the equipmental whole” (420). What is important for our

concerns is the recognition of an organism which is not a demarcated here, separate from a demarcated there.

This evokes the conception developed in this chapter of the monistic, concurrent manifestation of spatial incarnations. Equally for Mead, the organism-and-environment co-emergence is one of simultaneity and singularity, constituting “both the difference which arises in the environment because of its relation to the organism in its organic process of adjustment, and also the difference in the organism because of the change which has taken place in the environment” (2002:37-38). Rather than interpreting these differences as those of divisibly separate entities, they are being read as the self-distinguishability of a singular ontology from which entities concurrently and co-constitutively manifest. This seems largely consistent with what Merleau-Ponty has characterised as perception.

In terms of such self-distinguishability, Mead similarly describes these worldly changes of the “physical environment,” the animal organism’s emergence, as part of an “ongoing living process that tends to maintain *itself*” (37; my emphasis). Consciousness for Mead cannot be restricted to the interiority of particular organisms. Rather, consciousness manifests as and with contemporaneous organisms...a blurred organic *plurality*. Likewise in this chapter it has been argued that each embodied consciousness, as a monistically limitless upsurge of time, is conscious of the time(s) of all other upsurges. Time’s objectivity duly manifests. Now, though, such an argument is infused with this new, “pluralistic” terminology. Which prompts the question; can a plurality be monistic? Or in other words, is “monistic plurality” not an oxymoronic phrase?

Being’s plurality is Mead’s acknowledgement of two things. Firstly, the animal is a particular physical/corporeal incarnation. Concurrently however, via its co-constitution with the physical environment in general, it is also blurred across many physical/corporeal boundaries. Or in Mead’s terms, as it seeks its prey it is “at once a part of the system of distribution of energies which makes his locomotion possible,” that being a particular animal, and also “a part of the jungle system which is a part of the life system on the surface of the inanimate globe” (75). I would contest the characterisation that the globe is “inanimate,” as some kind of passive, mute platform for expression. More consistent with the argument in this chapter is a description of the globe as a particular incarnation that is co-constitutive with/as all other incarnations. Mead’s

conception is nevertheless noteworthy. Heidegger later observes the entity-environment relation similarly:

...inasmuch as any entity within-the-world is likewise in space, its spatiality will have an ontological connection with the world...the ‘aroundness’ of the environment, the specific spatiality of entities encountered in the environment, is founded upon the worldhood of the world (1962:134-135).

Implicit within Heidegger’s point is that spatial entities are not ontically detached. Rather, such entities are worldly constituents, specific spatialities “connected” to a worlding ontology, a “worldhood” which manifests as the common constitution of Being/world. Accordingly it must be said that the animal *is* the food...a pluralistic monism. There is not a separate organism which encounters docile objects, but rather a “whole” co-implication, in Mead’s description, of “the organism and its surroundings” (2002:88). Mead’s terminology again here slightly strays from my reading of his argument, so I will tweak it to state; “the organism and/as its surroundings.”

We are exploring Mead in order to acknowledge how the body, an organism-environment co-constitution, is a socialising and temporalising mechanism from which nothing is excluded. The aspect of sociality is Mead’s greatest relevance to the current stage of this thesis. Let us revisit what we have developed, in order to clarify what is meant by “social,” and to observe the two structural ways in which Mead’s “systemic plurality” socialises and temporalises:

1) Our engagement with Durkheim’s sociology, via Mead, illustrated that a plurality of systemic presence – the concurrent presence of a thing in two or more systems – changes the “earlier” systemic incarnation of a thing, or in Mead’s terms, “its presence in a later system changes its character in the earlier system” (92). We have seen how this occurs. The emergence of the new system from the old produces the old system simultaneously, given that the old becomes the past which *will have* produced this particular present. This reconceives of the assumption that the source of time is simply an origin that is eternally fixed in the past, away from which new presents are increasingly distanced. Instead, any state of time has a perpetually reproduced origin. Old/earlier and new/later are not merely in a chronologically linear, unidirectionally successive, relation, but emerge co-constitutively and simultaneously.

Mead's insight is that this co-emergence is sociality. That which emerges, upsurges in both past and present social structures concurrently; "the emergent lies in both, and is what it is because it carries the characters of both at once" (98). Systemic plurality is sociality, where "sociality is the capacity of being several things at once" (75). In the previous chapter I argued that this concurrent co-emergence of systemic pluralities is time. Evoking *différance*, what becomes apparent therefore is that time is this co-constitutive sociality, a systemic intersubjectivity. It is *in* and *as* the advent of the present that the past emerges, this "past that our present calls for," manifesting as the past that it is because in terms of the present, it "fits that situation" (74). What has been, actualises in the present, an intersubjective plurality where "the social nature of the present arises out of its emergence" (73).

I would like to propose now that time is this sociality. As earlier addressed, Adam rightly notes that for phenomenological inquiry, social time is usually the time of intersubjectivity. What I argue however, is that such subject(s) are not exclusively human. The phenomeno-socio-logical development of this chapter, in which time monistically manifests via the intersubjective co-constitution of the human-as-space with/as other spatialities, does not restrict subjectivity to humans. Rather, every socially plural spatiality is a subjectivity which conditions time. *Time, is the subject*. The intersubjectivity of time, its sociality, manifests via the co-constitution of present system with/as past system *and* via the co-constitution of spatialities/materialities/corporealities/incarnations-as-times. Such systemic plurality marks time as the emergent, social intersubjectivity. Social constructionism here is reconceptualised, from its typical definition as the contingent, human representation of something separately, inherently of the world, to where worldly time is inherently socially constructed. Time is a monistically self-social construction, concurrently represented *and* produced via spatial forms of itself.

2) The simultaneous/instantaneous plurality of Mead's sociality-temporality also coheres with our characterisation in chapter three of intersubjective, post-structural time-production/temporalisation. With Derrida's assistance it was conceived that the body-as-space only manifests relationally with other bodies and things. Mead echoes this claim in stating that the embodied animal only manifests because of its environmental relations, "for selves exist only in relation to other selves, as the organism as a physical object exists only in its relation to other physical objects" (185). For the argument of this thesis, this co-conditioning production means

the body is constituted in, and constituted by, that which is seemingly situated beyond its corporeal boundaries. Equally for Mead, the constant plurality of an organism “expresses the determination of the nature of an object by the natures of other objects” (98).

This chapter has extended this argument in anticipating the criticism that the temporalising body becomes an abstract, relational ethereality, by articulating how every temporal-corporeal upsurge constitutes the presence of/as all other upsurges, and/as the entirety of “presence.” Interestingly, just as I demand that consequently, each body-as-space, as a particular upsurge of time, concurrently constitutes the entirety of time, Mead similarly acknowledges that each organism “in living its own life lives the life of the whole” (103).

Of most current importance from this for our work in this chapter is the paradoxical coherence these points present between monism (which connotes a singularity) and sociality (which connotes a plurality). How can the *singularity* of something that is supposedly monistic have the *plurality* that is required for sociality? The way in which Mead’s conception of sociality as systemic plurality has been applied in the argument of our preceding chapters becomes crucial in this regard:

- i. Sociality, the social, is what is systemically plural.
- ii. Space is this systemic plurality, concurrently both a particular system/spatiality and the entire system of spatiality.
- iii. The self-self monistic relation of these concurrently co-constitutive, spatial pluralisations – what Mead describes as sociality – is time.
- iv. This is how monistic time is social. Space-as-time, Being, only becomes via its self-distinguishability as social/plural, co-constitutive intersubjectivities.

The body-as-space temporalises and socialises via its inescapably intersubjective co-constitution. In monistically “living the life of the whole” as Mead has just described, and congruent with our reading of Merleau-Pontian flesh, such corporeal/spatial intersubjectivity can now, ironically, be defined simply as a human phenomenon. This, however, is only because human corporeality is understood to be an unrestricted intersubjectivity. Vicki Kirby’s theory of “originary humanicity” (Kirby 2011) captures this limitless humanness, which also informs our

aforementioned acknowledgement of the limits in limitlessness. The human is at once entire-Being-as-human *and* a particular-human, an anthropomorphic, ontological limitlessness that manifests in localised, human limits/distinguishabilities. For Kirby, the human is concurrently a globally-singular *and* a localised-particular plurality, where “to allow anthropomorphism its non-local ubiquity is not to refuse its specificity, but rather to acknowledge that anthropomorphism’s infinite differentiations/specificities are expressions of one phenomenon” (20-21).

Acknowledging the “social” pluralism of all space(s)/material(s) complements this chapter’s attribution of an inescapable involvement in the production of time to *all* spatial incarnations. Restricting intersubjectivity to a separate human species is also challenged by Mead, who argues that “emergence,” socialisation via pluralisation, “belongs not only to...human social organisms, but is found also in a nature which science and philosophy have separated from human nature” (2002:46). The basis of this is Mead’s point, which we engaged earlier, that physical/spatial change produces a different world/universe. The physiology of the organism is different, as is the co-implicated environmental structure. Both emerge concurrently as the systemic plurality of organism and/as thing. This is intersubjective socialisation, consistent with the post-structuralist conception in chapter three of temporalisation/time-production. The social emergence of embodied organism and/as “physical things other than the body” (136), incarnates both contemporaneously. Spatialities co-condition and co-constitute, whereby there can be “no priority of reality ascribed to the [human] bodily organism” (136).

Consequently, the human utilisation/implementation of supposedly inanimate physical/spatial objects such as tools instead emerges as a pluralistic (socialistic) emergence of humans *with* such objects. Mead’s conception of an unrestricted social realm duly contradicts accounts of a human>object hierarchy as advanced by the likes of psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. For Freud, the socialisation and civilisation of humans equates to the achievements which distinguish and protect them from the rest of nature. What is social or cultural for Freud are “activities and resources which are useful to men for making the earth serviceable to them, for protecting them against the violence of the forces of nature” (Freud 1989[1930]:42). Freud posits that “the first acts of civilisation were the use of tools” (42), hierarchising humans over other animals and inanimate objects. This marks the evolution of humans beyond a supposedly unsocial (natural), prior status, in which humans “first appeared as a feeble animal organism” (44). Conversely, Mead sees no such hierarchy, instead acknowledging an unrestricted social

emergence that constitutes, and is constituted by, all physicality. This systemically plural, all-encompassing co-social-constitution means that “the bodily selves of members of the social group are as clearly implemental as the implements are social. Social beings are things as definitely as physical things are social” (2002:177).¹³

This is a point with which my interpretation of *The Visible and the Invisible* era of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology coheres. Perception is not something which when implemented, provides the embodied subject with access to a pre-existing world of things. Instead, perception is an incarnating, social process which is of the world, and is that by which the subject becomes with/as the object/thing-world. Mead emphatically echoes this all-encompassing perceptuality; “physical things are perceptual things” (178). I have argued that the body, and other spatialities, manifest concurrently as the self-distinguishing perception of Being. Mead can be read similarly. The embodied organism and its surrounding physicalities (such as food) emerge together via/as their contact/sensory relation. What this chapter’s developing argument offers Mead however, is a more nuanced interpretation of his notion of “contact/sensory.” Contact is not simply the coming together of tactile things to be sensed, but rather the immanent, perceptual upsurge of Being becoming Being, world becoming world, as bodies, rocks, plastics and any thing. This chiasmatic contact, the self-perception of monistic Being, conditioned/constituted by pluralistic incarnations, is socialisation. The explicit acknowledgement of this limitless socialisation is the importance of Mead’s work to this chapter, remembering that it is not that “limitlessness” cannot accommodate the “limits” by which bodies and things distinguishably manifest. Rather, the limit, as the distinguishability of Being’s immanent porosity, as Being’s incarnation/ontology, marks the limitless reality of limits.

With Merleau-Ponty’s assistance, such limitless self-perception has been characterised in this chapter as awareness and self-consciousness. If all spatial subjectivities, such as embodied humans, condition there being time, and condition there being Being, by distinguishing/diverging

¹³ Bruno Latour, whom we encountered earlier, posits a hybrid, social ensemble of human *and* nonhuman components, a network of (re-)distributed agency comprising a “new assembly” (1993:145). Whilst Latour accommodates “nonhumans” within this social fabric, where “the human is not a constitutional pole to be opposed to that of the nonhuman” (137), the division noted in cyborg theory is also apparent. This is exemplified in Latour’s criticisms of the dangers that deconstruction and sociobiology pose in their affirmation of “what has not been built at all by any human hand” (2003:41). Vicki Kirby actually describes Latour’s “hybridity as a composite of *both* ‘human’ *and* ‘nonhuman’” (2011:85-86), and critiques the implicit human>Nature hierarchy of its assemblage (79-88). In conversely positing that Nature writes, questioning why “does Nature require a human scribe to represent itself?” (86), Kirby evokes Mead’s non-hierarchical social to a greater extent than Latour.

Being from itself, as itself, then this explains how every subject is aware of the time of “others,” as well as explaining the objectivity of social synchronisation. As defined, synchronisation refers to the perpetually co-constitutive becoming of inescapably synchronous subjects; Being’s self-socialisation. Because no subject pre-exists such intersubjective origins, synchronisation is not attributable to a prior arrangement between already impregnably established subjectivities, finalised in the past in-itself. Rather, synchronicity in this thesis refers to the intersubjective simultaneity via which subjects become the subjects they are. Subjects are aware of each other because they become with/as each other. Mead’s example of an organism and its environment also recognises this self-perceptual self-awareness. These co-constitutive, co-distinguishable, intersubjective conditions of subjectivity mean that “out of this process thought arises, i.e., conversation with one’s self...the self does not project itself into the other. The others and the self arise in the social act together” (178).

This is consistent with the timing which conditions our acknowledgement that there is not a pre-existing perceived that is “seen” *after* by a perceiver. Rather, perceiver and perceived manifest perspectively, co-immanently and concurrently. To see is to be a body that is seen. Equally for Mead, it must be that the organism and its food manifest concurrently and socially. It is because of this congruence that I am uncomfortable with Mead’s claim that “in the process of communication the individual is an other *before* he is a self. It is in addressing himself in the role of an other that his self arises in experience” (177; my emphasis). There is no straightforward “before” version of subjectivity, and indeed this claim contradicts Mead’s general thesis. Mead’s description of a “communication” seems to be the problem here. I earlier noted that the time-productive dimension of the body-as-space should not be restricted to a communication model which displaces and abstracts the body *away* from a spatial here *to* a spatial there. The body is instead always already spatially (every-)here. The social mechanism of intersubjectivity in which objects and organisms are co-conditioned, because objects *are* organisms and vice-versa, is an ontology in which subject and other do not arise in a linear, unidirectional, before-after chain. Rather, as Mead more consistently states, “we become physical things no sooner than do the objects that surround us” (148). The human body-as-space, a socialising, temporalising, monistically plural, spatiality/materiality, emerges with, and as, all other spatialities/materialities. This fleshed cacophony *is the social, it is time*.

The where of the body

The body, like the bottom of the pool, is a thing *in* the world. What has also been acknowledged in this chapter however is that such things are also *of/as* the world. This is because their incarnation is attributable to the perception by which Being is distinguished from itself as things *of/as* itself. Time is this chiasmatic self-distinguishability, whereby without it, Being would not be. Perception must be comprehended as a Being-immanent incarnation, the temporalising by which Being becomes.

Exploring this has addressed the anticipated concern from the previous chapter that a post-structuralist corporeality which becomes temporalising is displaced and abstracted from here *to* there. This characterisation of abstract, ethereal time is typically positioned in contradistinction to the substantiality of space, and marks a key inquiry that this thesis, in exploring the time-productive capacities of body-as-space, is interrogating. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has facilitated the development of an argument in which the body, whose incarnation constitutes the concurrent incarnation of the entirety of Being/beings, is always already perpetually present, is always already *here*. This has allowed us to maintain the spatial/tangible constitution of time-as-body-as-space, and to acknowledge the objective *where* of the time-productive body. Each where is also a singular everywhere, given that the body is at once both a particular thing, a specific where, and yet its incarnation, implicated in the concurrent production of Being's entirety, constitutes every thing, every where.

The bottom of "Merleau-Ponty's pool" manifests similarly, concurrently both a specific particularity of the world, distinguishing world from world, and yet simultaneously a constituent of general worldly flesh. This co-constitution is evident when Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that "if there were no distortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it were without this flesh," then the bottom of the pool would not be "as it is and *where it is*." That the bottom of the pool is never without, nor not of, the flesh of the world, means that not only is the bottom of the pool constituted by worldly spatiality, but also that the bottom of the pool simultaneously constitutes worldly spatiality. Consequently, it is because of the bottom of the pool that these particular distortions and ripples of sunlight emerge. Likewise, the co-constitutive distinction of the human body from/as the pool, and of the pool from/as the human body, produces both simultaneously. The human body and the pool emerge as particular/local things, each is a "where" according to the

specificity of their perspectival, perceptual relation, as well as concurrently being productive presences in all wheres. There is nothing transcendent, ethereal or abstract about this for the body; its immanence is objectively ever-present and inescapable.

The perpetual presence of the body-as-space duly addresses this chapter's introductory stipulation, that in correlating spatiality with temporality, the body's *where* should also be its *when*. Each body, each spatiality, in constituting the entirety of Being, does so by temporalising. It follows that each entire-Being-constituting-body/space, as the upsurge of time, correlatively constitutes the entirety of time. The when of each spatial/material subject is every when, given that without such corporeal, perceptual upsurge, there would be no Being and no time. The self-self relation of this monistic subjectivity means that no upsurge of time is ever out of sync with any other upsurge. Every human always knows (the) time because they are (the) time. Indeed, each space-as-when participates in/as all spaces-as-whens. Consequently, to reiterate an earlier conclusion, social synchronisation refers not simply to human subjects who know when it is 9 o'clock tomorrow morning because of a common familiarity with the representation of a time whose source or origin is objectively, inaccessibly, external, distantly anterior and fixed. Rather, synchronisation refers to how each subject is already the time of other subjects, as the materially/spatially primordial condition(s) of time. As noted, this focus upon time's ontology distinguishes my research interests from social science theories of time in which, instead, the management and experience of an anterior, already existing time-source is explored.

The refutation of any transcendent dislocation and consequent abstraction of the time-productive body brings the argument of this thesis to a crucial stage. In the previous chapter, structural, differential co-constitution was acknowledged as the way the body-as-space produces time. We have developed this conception by appreciating the perpetually present and immanent, rather than abstract and transcendent, character of the differentially co-constituted body. Such differentiation/co-constitution engenders time, however in an always self-located, rather than a dislocated, manner. As discussed in my critique of Schilder's terminology, I describe the body-as-space as *distinguishable from/as*, rather than as *separated from*, other spatialities. The immanent conditions of distinguishability, rather than the transcendent oppositions of divisibility, demand that the temporalising body-as-space is never transcended, nor transcends. This is important for an argument that the body-as-space is time-productive, given that it

substantialises the source of time, which as seen, is typically contrarily defined in ethereal, abstract, transcendent terms.

However, in demanding that a conception of space is inherently a conception of time, and attributing this to an all-encompassing, all-conditioning, monistically spatial constitution, an ontology has emerged which is immanently distinguishable *rather than* transcendentally divisible. Whilst this argument has been crucial in conceiving of time as produced through the body-as-space, it appears that in separating distinguishability from divisibility, a mutually exclusive polarisation has been installed which is not unlike that of time|space. We are therefore potentially still dealing with the kind of polarisation that this thesis is interrogating. This socio-phenomenology of time has recognised that body modification is not something embodied subjects simply undergo in/during time, but rather is something in which they are always already involved, and condition, as time. Time has duly been characterised as the spatial subject which socialises with itself, as itself, a sociality *from which nothing can be excluded*. Given the all-encompassing nature of such a body-as-space, every space, including “divided space,” and not just “distinguishable space,” must be accommodated. At present however, this argument seemingly accommodates immanently distinguishable/co-implicated space(s), but not transcendentally divided/juxtaposed space(s). In order to attend to this matter, it is by having conceived of such spatial-temporal immanence that an engagement with a giant of space|time juxtaposition is imminent.

III

The monism of time

5.

Distinguished Time(s)

The coincidental nature of any time

Time and space are fragments of the infinite for the use of finite creatures.

— Henri Frederic Amiel, *Amiel's Journal* (2005[1882]:80)

Social utility of separated space(s)

The incarnation of spatialities such as the human body is time's ontology, through which Being emerges from itself, as the self it always already was. This changes our interpretation of body modification, from something which a subject's body undergoes under the auspices of time, to what the perpetually dispersed/dispersing subject-as-body objectively conditions as time. Durkheim's sociology first accompanied our recognition of the implication of subjects in the objective, rhythmic production of subjectivity. Derridean post-structuralism facilitated a consequent argument that this co-constitution of subjectivities can be bodily conditioned, and that it is time's source. The subsequent engagement with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has characterised this body-as-time as a monistically spatial/material subjectivity. We have avoided describing the difference(s) which characterise(s) the body-as-time's upsurge as a *divisibility* of space into space(s), or of time into time(s). Indeed, it was assumed that the monistic "always already" of Being would be contradicted if Being became something from which its previous incarnation was divided/separated. Such incarnation has instead been defined as a self-implicated upsurge, whereby time-as-difference manifests as the *distinguishability* of co-constitutive space(s) *from/as* space(s). Given these *co-constitutive* conditions, for the sake of clarity the distinguishable emergence of space(s) *from/as* space(s) will often be described in this chapter as an ontology of *co-distinguishability*.

The divisibility|distinguishability distinction raises a potential contradiction however. Space-as-time's ontology of co-distinguishability is *all-encompassing*, conditioning there being Being by distinguishing itself from itself. How then is it appropriate to characterise something *monistic* in terms of co-distinguishability *and not* divisibility? By separating two "processes," is the kind of polarisation not installed which we are interrogating? We do not want to address the time|space polarisation by simply assuming another polarisation between distinguishability and divisibility. Let me here flag that the word "simply" will often accompany the word "rather" in this chapter. For example, in arguing that the ontology of time is not *simply* "distinguishable" but *rather* is also "divisible," we will attempt to avoid excluding the "divisible" characterisation from the "distinguishable" characterisation. *Rather* will reference more than *simply* this *or* that, by attempting to incorporate "divisibility" within, and indeed as, "distinguishability."

The sociology of space-as-time developed in this thesis recognises time as the subject (instead of time just being that in which subjects exist). This all-encompassing spatial constitution/constitutor, from which nothing is excluded, will have to demand that all space(s), including divided space(s), are immanent/accommodated. The ramification for the kind of interpretation found in the citation from Henri Amiel which opened this chapter is a space and time which is at once immanently infinite *and* transcendently finite. This question of transcendence in/as immanence, and how the "transcendental field becomes a plane of genuine immanence" (2001[1995]:27-28), has been broached by Gilles Deleuze in *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*. However, the stakes in this work potentially diverge from those in mine when Deleuze observes "a big difference between the virtuals that define the immanence of the transcendental field and the possible forms that actualise and transform them into something transcendent" (32). It is this "big difference between" actualised, transcendent space(s), and an immanent field of co-permeation, that in this chapter we will attempt to reduce to a singular phenomenon. In order to accommodate spatial divisibility in a conception of monistic, spatial co-distinguishability, the transcendence of "something transcendent" must also be immanent.

There is no more rigorous manner in which to attempt this than by reading the argument of space-as-time through one of the most prominent critiques of "spatial time," offered by French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859 – 1941). It would indeed be remiss to posit that time is *entirely* spatial without engaging Bergson, whereby what will specifically be interrogated is Bergson's demand that there are aspects of time which are separate from space. This will be explored via

the common ontologies of distinguishability which characterise both his conception of time, and the conception of time developed in our preceding chapter. An interesting tension will develop. Surely, if Bergson argues that there are *non-spatial* aspects of time, then his argument should be incompatible with that of this thesis?

Whilst Bergsonian scholars examine every shift that Bergson's conception of time takes, we will be specifically interested in the facet of his philosophy which manifests as perhaps *the* exemplar of the supposition that the sources of time and space are ontologically polarised. Bergson's argument will initially be explored via two texts in which it is discussed in greatest detail; *Time and Free Will* (1960[1889]), and *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics* (2007[1934]). Given that these publications span a period of over forty years, we will not be restricting our discussion of Bergson's position.

In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson argues that humans conceive of experience spatially. The reason "we usually think in terms of space" (1960:ix) is identifiable in language. Human language descriptions impose the differentiating logic which seemingly reflects how things are distinct/divided in the material/spatial realm. For example, a rock is described as being in a different space from the dirt on which it might sit. This tendency however can also conceptually divide otherwise "non-spatial" things, such as conscious states, installing "the same discontinuity as between material objects" (ix). Bergson later extends this point, changing his vernacular from the "imposition" of spatially conceptual language, to its "utilisation," which suits "the requirements of social life" (128). Employing spatial representations facilitates social discourse, given the common, widespread assumption of ontological division between spatial things. Bergson reiterates this in *The Creative Mind*, exclaiming "how much simpler" it is to use the spatial notions "stored up in language!" (2007:24). Implementing spatial conceptions is socially pragmatic, whereby what "is spatial by nature has a social utility" (16).

In the previous chapter it has been ascertained that the social construction or conception of something (such as time) is not a separate representation of the actual worldly phenomenon. Rather, time manifests as Being's self-social self-construction. The social construction of time is Being's incarnation-and-representation of itself, by itself. Bergson's observation that "spatial language" is a "utility" that humans employ to mimic the supposed separation of material entities, demarcating the social/cultural concept from the inherently worldly phenomenon, thus presents a potential inconsistency with the monistic spatial-social conceived of in chapter four.

Here it has been socio-phenomeno-logically argued that all spatialities are primordially social, problematising the boundaries of inside|outside and subject|social. We will attend to this issue later. For now though let us note that Bergson is not necessarily installing these divisions, but querying the everyday, pragmatic practice of positioning social existence *outside* individual interiority, whereby as described in *Time and Free Will*, “our outer...social life is more practically important to us than our inner and individual existence” (1960:130). Interrogating this assumption motivates Bergson’s inquiry into why spatially discontinuous conceptions are instinctively applied to all aspects of human experience.

Indeed, a concern with how *all* phenomena are “misconceived of” as spatially/extensively divided/discontinuous is a consistent theme for Bergson. In *The Creative Mind*, Bergson demands that philosophy historically “misinterprets” time as only an extensive magnitude, whereby “when we evoke time, it is space which answers our call” (2007:4). The relation of extensive magnitudes to intensive states is central to Bergson’s distinction of space from time, and thus requires our attention.

Intensive states are not juxtaposed

Time and Free Will defines extensive magnitudes as measurable and comparable, whereas intensive magnitudes are not (1960:3). Space is extensive because it is divisible into distinct units (1). Collections of units, spaces, are also distinct from other collections/spaces, and so can be measured and compared as greater than, less than, or equal to each other. Conversely, intensive states, “inner” magnitudes such as “joy or sorrow” (7), are not comprised of comparable, measurable, separate units. Whilst a stronger or weaker intensive state/sensation will seem analogous to the magnitude of space/extensity, there are not distinct, quantifiable units of something like happiness by which to measure it. Bergson is clear; it is a “contradiction to speak of an inextensive quantity” (3).

Instead, conscious/intensive states of differing intensities manifest via their co-permeation. Joy, for example, (re-)produces the kind/quality of other conscious/intensive states, marking “qualitative alterations in the whole of our psychic states” (10). Such co-implication means the distinction between intensive states is indiscernible. The phenomena of consciousness cannot be treated “as things which are set side by side” (8-9). Intensity is misrepresented when

such co-implicated, qualitatively different, conscious states are divided into sections of the supposedly same phenomenon which only differ quantitatively/extensively. In setting up “points of division in the interval which separates two successive forms of joy” (11), a change in the magnitude of the same intensive state is assumed, a quantitative alteration “of one and the same feeling” (11). However, this transition is actually between different kinds/qualities of intensities, and not a quantifiably comparable, extensive/spatial change.

Bergson illustrates that the intensive states which accompany increased bodily/muscular effort seem to differ by magnitude/degree of sensation, when considering how a fist clenched with gradually more force gives “the impression of a sensation of effort entirely localised in your hand and running up a scale of magnitudes” (24). Research into paralysis though argues against the localisation of transitioning muscular pain (21-22). Bergson brings this to our attention in arguing that such changes are in the kind/quality, rather than in the magnitude/quantity, of consciousness of experience as the body is differently affected. The sensation, “at first localised there has affected your arm and ascended to the shoulder” (25). By localising the pain “in terms of space” (26), an increase in effort is incorrectly correlated to an increase in intensive sensation, to be compared alongside preceding and succeeding sensations. However, there are not standard, comparable, juxtaposed units of pain. Nor is there of the consciousness of heat. Consequently, in approaching a source of heat, it is not that the intensity of the sensation increases. Rather, “a more intense heat is really another *kind* of heat” (47; my emphasis), as one’s consciousness of bodily sensations changes quality.

It is worth pausing here to observe that Bergson’s conception of co-permeating intensive/conscious states, which share a qualitatively transitional relation, evokes the characterisation of time developed in our last chapter. We have explored how time states co-distinguishably emerge from/as other time states, whereby temporal transition manifests via this perpetual co-(re-)production. Let this correlation between Bergson’s argument and that of this thesis be the first point to emerge from this chapter’s undertaking:

Bergson’s argument

Intensive states are co-distinguishable/co-permeating/co-constitutive states.

Thesis argument

Time states are co-distinguishable/co-permeating/co-constitutive states.

This flags an important point concerning the vernacular of this chapter. “Co-distinguishable,” “co-permeation” and “co-constitutive” are synonyms. Some, or all, of these terms will be employed together depending upon the particular terminology of the relevant discussion at the time. Whenever one is mentioned however, all are implied.

The characterisation presented in this thesis of this co-permeation of states is of course of a spatial phenomenon, in which spatial multiplicities/states distinguishably emerge co-constitutively. Remember, in arguing that space-as-time is *monistically all-encompassing*, because it conditions Being by distinguishing itself from itself, *all* space(s) need to be accommodated. Consequently, we will now clarify Bergson’s position on what is spatial/extensive.

Counting space(s)

Complementing his intensive|extensive and consciousness|material oppositions, in *Time and Free Will* Bergson recognises “two kinds of multiplicity...one qualitative and the other quantitative” (1960:121).¹ Considering that it is our ambition in this chapter to accommodate within spatial distinguishability the seemingly polarised spatial divisibility, it is interesting that Bergson also states that “the verb ‘to distinguish’ has two meanings, the one qualitative, the other quantitative” (75-76).²

Bergson explains a quantitative multiplicity with reference to counting. Every number is an individual unit, and yet also a “collection of units” (75). There must be the assumption of something homogeneous about each collected, individual unit in order that they can be counted, or quantified, together. Nevertheless, the units must be distinct, “otherwise they would merge into a single unit” (77). Bergson illustrates his point by discussing the counting of sheep. Each sheep is unique, spatially distinct in a paddock, yet in counting them we “neglect their individual differences” in order to “take into account only what they have in common” (76).

What countable units have most in common for Bergson is simultaneous presence, which counting requires for number/magnitude to accumulate/increase. The simultaneity of units means that each will “remain...to be added to the others” (79). Given that these homogeneities must be

¹ It is this conception of multiplicity to which Deleuze is drawn, portraying it in *Bergsonism* (1988[1966]) as the legacy of Bergson’s philosophy.

² Bergson reiterates this point later concerning the “two possible senses of the word ‘distinguish’” (121).

distinct, each is set “alongside each of the new units” (77). Such juxtaposition is for Bergson a spatial phenomenon. Complementing our earlier discussion concerning the synonymic quality of co-distinguishable/co-constitution/co-permeation, here it should be noted that in the contrary regard, the terms “juxtaposed,” “divided,” “separated” and “mutually excluded” will all imply each other when any are mentioned during this chapter.

Such spatial juxtaposition is how the rings of a bell are counted according to Bergson. Each sensation is arranged spatially, negating the qualitative differences. The mind puts the rings/sounds “within some homogeneous medium in which the sounds, stripped of their qualities...leave traces of their presence which are absolutely alike” (87). The “homogenous medium” is simultaneous space, where what remains are not the sounds/presents, but the spatial interval(s) that juxtapose/divide/separate such homogenous simultaneities. Given their homogeneity, simultaneous spaces are juxtaposed/divided by intervals to prevent their blurring together unquantifiably. Bergson’s simultaneous, countable, extensive states must be discontinuous, occupying “separate positions in space” (89). It was earlier observed that conversely for Bergson, intensive states co-permeate. We briefly acknowledged that this evoked the conception of states of time in this thesis. Apparently, that was no mere passing evocation.

Duration and co-permeation

According to Bergson, the human error concerning real time (duration/*durée*) occurs when homogenous representations of comparable/countable/measurable points are deemed to be time’s *only* constitution. Think here of a clock or a calendar. By counting successive moments of duration, time seems to be only “a measurable magnitude, just like space” (104). In *The Creative Mind*, Bergson attributes this to our intellectual desire to know locations, where “fixity is what our intelligence seeks” (2007:5). We can recall here Bertrand Russell’s observation from chapter one concerning the human desire for permanence. In counting the spatial traces of fixed points, “all the intelligence retains is a series of positions: first one point reached, then another” (5). The homogenisation of discontinuous points facilitates their quantification. That is, we count, divide and calculate time. Such a quantifiable multiplicity of discontinuities is of course Bergson’s conception of space/extension presented in *Time and Free Will*. Time, understood only as an extensive “medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space” (1960:91).

We have seen that contrarily for Bergson there is no separation between intensive states. As will now become apparent, time can actually be understood as this *kind* of qualitatively relational, co-permeating phenomenon for Bergson.

Bergson differentiates time-as-duration/*durée* from time's spatial representation via three images in *The Creative Mind*. My favourite is that of an infinitely small piece of elastic, which when stretched progressively becomes a longer line. This evokes time-as-duration for Bergson if we focus on the action of stretching instead of on the resultant line (2007:138). When the resultant line is reflected upon as time's only constitution, our impression of time is of something strangely, spatially static, that the intellect subsequently divides into similar, simultaneous, discontinuous points that are "homogenous to and superposable on one another" (137). Bergson's opposition to such simultaneous superposability is that no two moments of time-as-duration are identical. As with our re-conception of the past in this thesis, from something which simply precedes the present, to something co-productive with/as the present, for Bergson every moment is (re-)constituted by the novel relation between preceding moments and the new present (137). This perpetual co-constitution, where duration is always "the state of completing itself" (138), means that durational states have no easily discernible, or discontinuous, beginning or end. Time-as-duration states are thus in contradistinction to spatial states because "duration excludes all idea of juxtaposition, reciprocal exteriority and extension" (138).

Bergson's willingness to exclude ontological divisibility from time-as-duration indicates the restriction he installs at the very point where our work in this chapter, which will explore whether it is possible to accommodate divided spaces with/in monistically co-distinguishable space(s)-as-time(s), commences. We should note here that for Bergson, the social, spatial construction of time is seemingly separate from the worldly, inherent phenomenon it represents. Conversely, the argument developed in this thesis has been that a monistically social, spatial construction is the inherent condition of there being worldly inherent phenomena, or of there being Being. Nevertheless, as part of this undertaking we will later ask whether Bergson inadvertently relies upon such a conception of monistic space to secure his argument.

When reflected upon, time for Bergson is represented extensively/spatially as a series of divided/discontinuous points. However, any representation such as this is an imperfect, partial version "taken from a certain point of view" (135). This is the basis upon which Bergson criticises Kant's refutation of the possibility of absolute knowledge. In *Critique of Pure Reason*,

Kant argues that the world can be known as it appears (is represented), but not absolutely. This, for Bergson, illustrates the aforementioned socially normative, pragmatic, conceptually spatial tendencies which ensure social function/survival, whereby as stated in *The Creative Mind*, “spatiality, and...sociability, are...the real causes of the relativity of our knowledge” (2007:16). Contrary to such representational reflection, which divides time spatially, Bergson describes the indivisibility of time-as-duration, “as something lived” (138-139). We can explain the “lived” aspect by attending to the relation of duration to “intuition.”

Bergson presents intuition as both synonymous with duration *and* as a method for accessing duration. When synonymous with duration, intuition simply lives/experiences the flow of co-permeating, durational states. As a method however, intuition opens beyond this experiential state, toward what Deleuze describes in *Bergsonism* as “the conditions of experience” (1988:27). More specifically, this is not a general consideration of the Kantian conditions of *all* possible experience, but rather is concerned with the particular, lived conditions of what is specifically human experience. In *Matter and Memory* (2004[1908]), Bergson duly describes intuition as seeking “experience at its source...where...it becomes properly *human* experience” (240-241).

Here intuition considers the heterogeneous relations of co-permeating, qualitatively relational, states. This, we should recall, is also Bergson’s characterisation of states of time-as-duration. Bergson consequently notes in *The Creative Mind* that “to think intuitively is to think in duration” (2007:22). *Time and Free Will* makes the complementary assertion that intuitive thinking/consciousness is conditioned by the co-permeation of states of duration, as “the succession of our conscious states...refrains from separating its present state from its former states” (1960:100). Given this durational co-permeation/co-constitution, intuition is not restricted by spatial separations of here|there, subject|object, or truth|representation. This means that as a durational method, intuition demands that “questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than of space” (2004:77). We must therefore presume that for Bergson, intuitively lived, real time does not separate the object represented (anterior) from the subject who “arrives” to represent it (posterior).³

Deleuze’s *Bergsonism* articulates that by considering how states transition qualitatively, “intuition has become method” (1988:32). Intuition-as-method is not simply duration.

³ See also where *The Creative Mind* describes a subject’s interiority to an object (2007:135).

Nevertheless, intuition-as-method is conditioned by the conditions of duration, opening awareness or consciousness to duration's perpetual (re-)production of qualitatively transitional, differences in kind (rather than merely in degree/quantity). Indeed, if intuition did not coincide with this durational process, it "would not be capable of...the determination of...genuine differences in kind" (33). The result is that states of time are appreciated as not simply representations of quantitatively different, spatial degrees, but also as qualitatively different, co-permeations. Bergson explains that with the method of intuition, time is perceived as "durations, all very different from one another" (2007:156). We can therefore conclude that in Bergson's estimation, one's experience of time is comprised by the everyday social requirements of spatial, measurable, quantifiable discontinuities, *as well as* by lived, durational, continuous, qualitative co-permeation/co-constitution. According to Bergson then, contrary to what has been developed in our previous chapter, "social time" and "really lived time" are separate phenomena. Social time is a spatially pragmatic function, in contradistinction to the intuitive experientiality of durational time.

Nevertheless, Bergson's conception of lived time as qualitatively co-permeating/co-conditioning states coheres with how time has been defined in this thesis (provided that we ignore for the moment the correlation of time with space that has been developed in the previous two chapters). Bergsonian time-as-duration is a phenomenon of co-permeating/co-constitutive upsurges which emerge distinguishably from/as each other. This develops our first flagged point into a second noteworthy observation:

Bergson's argument

Time states co-permeate/co-constitute/co-distinguish.

Thesis argument

Time states co-permeate/co-constitute/co-distinguish.

Surprisingly then, whilst Bergson's argument that there are *non-spatial* aspects to time should seemingly be the antithesis of an argument that time is entirely spatial/bodied, there are emphatic similarities between his conception of time's ontology and that of this thesis. Time states, defined in chapter four as emerging "co-distinguishably/co-constitutively," have the same character as how time-as-duration manifests in Bergson's argument.

In addressing intuition, we have just seen Bergson describe the intensive, co-permeating/co-constitutive states of time-as-duration as *successive*. Bergson repeats that “states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one another” (1960:98). This raises an interesting point; how can states which are perpetually involved in/as each other be successive? Do we not describe succession as when a state replaces, rather than simultaneously co-exists or co-permeates with, preceding states? If time-states co-permeate (co-exist) *and also* succeed (replace) each other, could there be a concurrent simultaneity *and* succession in the time-states of Bergson’s argument? Why would this even matter? Well, as we will now reiterate, this is how we have characterised spatial time(s).

Simultaneity and succession

Rather than past and present simply succeeding one after the other, duration for Bergson “forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole” (1960:100).⁴ This correlates with the succession already noted of the perpetual (re-)emergence of past(s) and/as present(s) and/as future(s). The continuity of this succession is in contradistinction to the discontinuity of space(s) for Bergson, given that, as stated in *The Creative Mind*, consciousness of/as time-as-duration “grasps a succession which is not juxtaposition,” but shifts from within as “the uninterrupted prolongation of the past into a present which is already blending into the future” (2007:20). Contrarily, Bergson demands in *Time and Free Will* that where “we should find only space” there is “nothing but simultaneities” (1960:116). Spatial simultaneities are juxtaposed, “set out in line” (102, 115, 226), without “duration nor even succession” (120).

Interestingly, the spatial “representation” of time that Bergson criticises for being interpreted as time’s *only* constitution requires an external, perceiving subject. An external observer can simultaneously account for every moment and the intervals which separate them, for “to perceive a line as a line, it is necessary to take up a position outside it” (103). Conversely, Bergson concedes no externality between the subject and time-as-duration. This seems worth mentioning considering it is reminiscent of our interrogation of a supposedly transcendent source of time that a passive subject merely observes.

⁴ Bergson repeats this later in *Time and Free Will*, describing the “melting into one another” of time states, “forming an organic whole” (1960:128).

Succession for Bergson, however, *cannot* incorporate simultaneity, given that the heterogeneous relation of time-as-duration's co-permeating states demands that "not one of its parts is still there when another part comes along" (2007:2). This is crucial. All parts, because of their co-constitutive affinity, are perpetually (re-)emerging in qualitatively different states, as "mental syntheses, and not objects" (1960:120). Because duration is never not in such qualitative re-production, it "eludes mathematical treatment" (2007:2). Such mathematical treatment, and the intellectual reflection of science, conversely, freezes what has already occurred into symbolic, static, objectively simultaneous representations which are comparable and combinable. These homogenous representations also anticipate how time *will* manifest, meaning that "the occurrence of the thing or the event can only come after them" (11). This characterises why spatial, intellectual, scientific representation separates past from present from future according to Bergson. It can be recalled that for Bergson, in order for homogeneous, simultaneous entities to avoid dissolving into each other indistinguishably, they must be mutually excluded via spatial intervals. This mutual exclusion, where for one space another "space has preserved no trace of it" (1960:105), differentiates the simultaneity of separated/divided/juxtaposed space(s) from the co-permeation via which states of time-as-duration perpetually succeed.

Having explored this first phase of Bergson's argument, we should remind ourselves that according to our earlier discussions, space(s) emerged as simultaneously co-productive, *and* successively co-preserving, phenomena. The co-implication of space(s) produces time(s) via the upsurge/transition of space(s)-as-time(s) into qualitatively different states/spaces. Because this is the perpetual becoming of simultaneously co-constitutive, distinguishable spaces-as-times, succession is inescapable. Space, conditioned by its distinguishability from/as self, perpetually succeeds itself as the self it always already was. Space-as-self succeeds itself as what it "always already was" given that its upsurge comes from nothing but itself. This ontologically productive upsurge is nevertheless a novel/new succession due to the logic we have already engaged in Mead's conception of time, where the present (re-)produces its conditioning past. The present and/as past are therefore perpetually originary in their succession of/as each other. Bergson cannot accommodate succession in simultaneity, however this thesis as developed in the last two chapters can.

Social synchronisation has been reconceptualised in the previous chapter as this perpetually co-productive, simultaneous incarnation, where no space-as-time is out of sync with

any other space-as-time because all spatial subjects simultaneously, intersubjectively/socially emerge with, and as, each other *as* time. We see that Bergson also correlates space with simultaneity. However, Bergsonian simultaneous space/extensity apparently lacks the co-constitutive, co-permeating attributes that we have explored. Indeed, the primary development of our preceding chapters – which has argued that the co-constituted/co-constitutive body-as-space produces, rather than merely exemplifies, time – is inconsistent with Bergson’s conceptions of the body and space. *Time and Free Will* declares that time is misconceived when it is represented as moments “external to one another, like bodies in space” (1960:107). We will soon see Bergson’s conception of bodies take on increasingly complex and different characteristics, as junctions of perception and memory. Nevertheless, the dispersed sense of the body as the entirety of space that has been developed in this thesis means that in opening our discussion to Bergson, at this point we have been primarily concerned with his conception of space, rather than of how bodies experience space. We thus arrive at the following comparative conclusion to be flagged concerning space:

Bergson’s argument

Spatial states are divided/juxtaposed/mutually-excluded simultaneously.

Thesis argument

Spatial states co-distinguish/co-permeate/co-constitute simultaneously.

It was first suggested in this chapter that Bergson’s understanding of time is surely incompatible with the reading of time presented in this thesis. After inspecting Bergsonian time more closely though, a symmetry became apparent in terms of the constitution of time-as-duration as heterogeneous, co-permeating states. Nevertheless, Bergson polarises divided/juxtaposed spatial states from co-permeating/co-constituting time states. We should not be alarmed by this, for it defines our ambition in this chapter clearly. If, as it was argued in the last chapter, spatial co-distinguishability *monistically* conditions the entirety of time, or time in general, then *all* spatial states must be accommodated. As the above conclusion illustrates, Bergson’s *simultaneously* divided/juxtaposed spaces are not accommodated in a conception of monistic space-as-time. Bergson’s conception of *simultaneous states* differs from that of this thesis:

Bergson's argument

Simultaneous states are divided/juxtaposed/mutually-exclusive, static and quantifiable with each other.

Thesis argument

Simultaneous states are co-distinguishable/co-permeating/co-constitutive, dynamic, and qualitatively (re-)produce each other.

Consequently, we will temporarily set aside discussions about space, to focus in the next few sections on the role of *simultaneity*. In previous chapters it has been argued that states of time such as past and present manifest co-constitutively and simultaneously. Let us see, if in attending to what is common between the simultaneous past and present in this argument, a commonality can emerge with the simultaneity of divided/juxtaposed states in Bergson's argument.

Are *all* simultaneous states ontologically productive?

Bergson's later conception of time in *Matter and Memory* concerns time's relation to memory, a realm we have already encountered via Augustine. Bergson differentiates three processes; pure memory, memory image and perception. Perception, we are informed, is not simply an instantaneous, present representation of an object. Rather, perception is "impregnated with memory-images" (2004:170). Memory images come from what is described as "pure memory," and importantly for the current stage of our inquiry, it is the relation between perception and pure memory which indicates how present and past relate.

For Bergson, when remembering, we "detach" ourselves from the present in order to re-experience first the past generally, and then specific regions of the past. Bergson likens this to the "focusing of a camera" (171). The more that memory comes into view, "its outlines become more distinct" (171). Importantly, whilst this process "tends to imitate perception" (171), memory is not a weakened perception, or "an assembly of nascent sensations" (179). This is the interpretative error that Bergson attributes to "associationism." In separating memory/past from perception/present, associationism substitutes for the heterogeneous flow of time-as-duration a "discontinuous multiplicity of elements, inert and juxtaposed" (171). Conversely for Bergson,

whilst memory and perception are radically different processes, they are *not* polarised. Indeed, memory-images participate in perception, as the “dim nucleus” of vision (172).

The key point here is Bergson’s demand that interpreting memory as weakened perception commits the same error as spatialising intensive/conscious/durational states. This defines past (pure memory) and present (sensation/perception) as homogenous states, different only by degree or “magnitude” (173). We have seen that conversely, states of time-as-duration differ qualitatively, and it is this character that Bergson attributes to the relation of past/memory to present/perception. The qualitatively relational, co-permeating states of time-as-duration mean that the conscious state which “I call ‘my present’ has one foot in my past and another in my future” (177). This is significant in terms of our current exploration of the present-past relation.

Bergson is asking us to understand that the constitutions of past/memory and present/perception are *qualitatively* different instead of quantitatively separate. Because one perceives and is embodied in the present, the present comprises sensation and movement. This is the “materiality of our life” (177), defining the present as essentially “sensori-motor” (177). Consistent with Bergson’s conception of mutually exclusive space(s), the materiality of the present is Euclidean, in that two things cannot occupy the same space simultaneously. Or in Bergsonian terms, “sensations and movements occupy space, and there cannot be in the same place several things at the same time” (178-179). The juxtaposed materiality of present states of perception differs qualitatively/constitutively from the co-permeating immateriality of states of duration and memory. The present is “sensation, extended,” whereas “pure memory, being inextensive and powerless, does not in any degree share the nature of sensation” (180).

We should pause here because something curious has emerged. Bergson defines the present as juxtaposed/divided states of space/extension/perception. Present states are radically, qualitatively different from the co-permeating/co-distinguishable, unextended states of the past/memory. That seems straightforward. What however does not sit easily with this comprehensible binary is that duration, time, is produced by co-permeating/co-distinguishable time states. That is, there is a co-permeation/co-distinguishability/co-constitution of presents (divided/juxtaposed spatial states) and pasts (co-permeating/co-distinguishable not-spatial states), in which one has, in Bergson’s words that we have just encountered, “one foot in each.” Does this mean that even though the extended/spatial present/perception and the unextended past/memory are radically different, that they are somehow *simultaneously* co-constitutive/co-

permeating/co-distinguishable, and thus share a common ontology? Indeed, how does something tangible (sensory present), co-constitute something intangible (memorial past)?

To explore this, we will first observe that for Bergson, present perception articulates the past-as-memory. *Matter and Memory* discusses this via the illustration of an inverted cone. The base of the cone, which “remains motionless” (196), represents the “pure memory” of the past. Underneath this is the point of the cone, as the consciousness of present action. Bergson argues that the perceptual present appeals to memory in a manner which participates in what the present perceives. A relevant memory will “descend from the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where *action* is taking place” (197). Memory emerges as a utility of the perceptual present, noting the “utilitarian origin of our perception” (206).

Because the present calls to the past, and not the other way around, Bergson calls the present the “actually lived,” or the “active” consciousness (181). Conversely, the past-as-pure-memory is defined by its “latency” and “radical powerlessness” (181). Bergson indeed describes the memorial past as “detached from life” (179). This is an intriguing development, as the notion of a powerless, lifeless detachment for any aspect of time seemingly contradicts Bergson’s earlier point that the perceptual present and the memorial past are *not* separated. Nevertheless, we will not argue with Bergson here, but instead follow his lead in assuming that memorially past states are somewhat “detached” from the present. According to Bergson’s own logic that we have encountered, if states are detached, then they are divided, juxtaposed or mutually excluded from one another, and they occur simultaneously. This is Bergson’s description of the spatialisation of states of time (and of course his description for anything spatial). What we will now need to consider therefore is whether this “detached powerlessness” of the past differentiates Bergson’s take on the simultaneity of the past-present relation from how in this thesis simultaneous pasts and presents have been discussed:

Bergson’s argument

Simultaneous past and present are divided/“detached.” Only the present is ontologically productive.

Thesis argument

Simultaneous past and present are co-distinguishable/co-permeating. Both past and/as present are ontologically productive.

Bergson's notion that if states are simultaneous then they must be divided/"detached" is not necessarily an issue. Indeed, simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states are what we are ultimately endeavouring to accommodate into a monistic ontology of simultaneously co-constitutive/co-distinguishable states. What is an issue however is that if *all* time-states are singularly/monistically ontologically productive as this chapter is considering, then the divided/"detached" past cannot be any less ontologically productive than the present, something Bergson seemingly posits in describing the past as latent/powerless. Given the singularity by which Merleau-Ponty characterises time, reincorporating his phenomenology into our considerations could now assist here.

The present is ontologically productive. Is the past ontologically productive?

Merleau-Ponty discusses Bergson's conception of the present-past relation by exploring analogous questions concerning language. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty argues against the interpretation that a speaker requires a separate representation of a word before being able to say it. The thought of the word "in the speaking subject, is not a representation" (1962:209). Instead, the thought of the word *is* the speaker's speaking the word, "his speech is his thought" (209). This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty's experiential, phenomenological consciousness, something already engaged during the previous chapter in arguing how spatial incarnations (flesh) are conscious of (the) time. There it was observed that a subject's knowledge of time is not simply consciousness of, or familiarity with, a pre-defined representation, but is attributable to every subject's self-consciousness existing *as* time.

In articulating how consciousness is directly existential/experiential, and not simply indirectly representational, Merleau-Ponty contests the Bergsonian argument in which the conscious present draws upon a radically distant, latent, pure memory. Again this coheres with our discussion in the previous chapter, in which it was noted that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology does not hierarchise a transcendental present which can return to a fixed origin. Jack Reynolds, whose insights accompanied those discussions, agrees, stating that "Merleau-Ponty does not appear to convey any sort of hierarchy that privileges presence and purity" (2004:57). Merleau-Ponty states that there is not a memorial storehouse in which consciousness delves to find a relevant word and "retain some 'pure recollection' of the word, some faded

perception” (1962:209). His criticism here that Bergson defines memory as “faded perception” is not as straightforward as it seems though. This, after all, is the very interpretation against which Bergson argues. We have seen that for Bergson, what manifests when perception “calls” memory differs radically from what memory was, rather than becoming a stronger (or less “faded”) version of the same phenomenon. Nevertheless, let us consider how Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation informs what seem to be valid concerns about Bergson’s supposed separation of the perceptual present from lifeless, powerless pasts-as-memories.

The past-present division of what Merleau-Ponty describes as “Bergsonian dualism” (209) is interrogated by arguing that recollection is more originary than a purported search of far flung, powerless memories-as-pasts, providing them with greater definition. Merleau-Ponty insists that “to remember is not to bring into the focus of consciousness a self-subsistent picture of the past” (26). This contestation of a “self-subsistent past” is consistent with how we have problematised the notion of a past in-itself. For Merleau-Ponty, perception manifests through a past horizon which is always constituted with/as the present (26). Whilst we have seen Bergson argue that the perceptual present summons from pure memory what is of “utilitarian interest,” for Merleau-Ponty, one’s entire past is always already implicated in/as perception, as a “synthesis of apprehension [which] links me to my *whole* past” (486).⁵ Merleau-Ponty’s point here is consistent with the argument we have developed that all time-states are co-productive.

Phenomenology of Perception interrogates Bergson’s point that memory-images are retrieved by the present to serve a particular sensory-motor utility/interest. The ramification of this retrieval process with which Merleau-Ponty is uncomfortable is that the present is only an impetus for these memories to be “relived.” The memorial origin remains transcendently past as pure memory. Consequently, the present which “brings past experience into play can restore only extrinsic connections...because the original experience involved no others” (17).

Merleau-Ponty’s argument that the past-present relation for Bergson is one of mutual exteriority is most overt in *The Incarnate Subject* (2001[1968]). Merleau-Ponty observes that Bergson installs two distinct realms, one perceptive, the other memorial, which must then speak to each other. It is via the body that this “junction” manifests (91). Remember, the body for Merleau-Ponty is not something which simply perceives. Instead, using our vernacular of chapters three and four, the body-as-space conditions, and is conditioned by, Being’s self-

⁵ See also where Merleau-Ponty states that past time is *wholly* grasped in the present (80).

perceiving, self-constituting upsurge. Merleau-Ponty is adamant that conversely “for Bergson, perception is not constituting” (89). Rather than the body-as-space’s upsurge conditioning Being’s self-consciousness of/as every where and/as every time, the Bergsonian body is divided between being a sensori-motor perceptual presence *or* an image in pure memory. That is, “sometimes the body is the locus of passage...in the physical world; sometimes it is only a representation, homogeneous with images from memory” (91). Whilst Bergson argues that in lived experience these realms are inseparable, Merleau-Ponty is not convinced; “Bergson fails to establish the articulation between the two levels: pure percept and pure recollection” (91).

Two claims emerge then from our discussion with Bergson, and now from Merleau-Ponty’s reading, which will require consideration if all simultaneous states are to be recognised as monistically/singularly ontologically productive, including those which are divided/juxtaposed:

- (i) Despite describing states of time-as-duration as co-permeating, is the relation between past and present for Bergson actually only one of division/juxtaposition?
- (ii) Are such divided/juxtaposed pasts *not* ontologically productive?

In characterising the body as time’s condition, we have recognised the body’s perpetual awareness/consciousness of the entirety of time, or time in general, given its co-constitution with all other time-upsurging bodies/spaces. If, for Bergson, the body’s sensori-motor perceptuality is separate as the present, then aspects of time-consciousness elude it. Merleau-Ponty concurs that when Bergson discusses “the body, he will leave consciousness of time out of his consideration” (96). Indeed, in *Matter and Memory* Bergson describes the perceptually present body as utilising memories imaged from the past, without being implicated in that realm, whereby “pure memory...interests no part of my body” (2004:179). Merleau-Ponty condemns this separation of memorial past from bodily/materially present as lacking the passage required for time. Such a body can only be, as stated in *The Incarnate Subject*, “a means of actualising the past,” and restricts “the body as a present existent rather than a temporal reality” (2001:96).

The body-as-space as conceived in our last chapter, whose incarnation distinguishes Being from/as itself, conditioning Being’s consciousness of/as itself, is always already conscious of all bodies-as-times. Whilst Merleau-Ponty does not make this explicit claim, he does

characterise the divergence of the flesh of the world from itself as constituting consciousness of/as flesh in general. Fleishy existence is fleshy consciousness, where such “existence...always implies conscious apprehension” (104). Conversely, Bergson, according to Merleau-Ponty, installs a subsequent “call” from substantial present, to ideal past, where the consequent memory image that relays between the two develops time-consciousness. This is not the primordial consciousness of Merleau-Ponty’s corporeality-as-flesh, nor of my conception of the all-proliferating, all-writing, all-ontologising body-as-space. Merleau-Ponty duly suggests to Bergson that “instead of *placing* in the world *seeds* of consciousness and instead of *leaving* in consciousness *traces* of materiality, he should have grasped consciousness as history and proliferation” (106).

There is symmetry between this interrogation of Bergson by Merleau-Ponty, and my argument in chapter three that the structuring-structured, constitutive-constituted co-production between subject and/as social of Bourdieu’s sociology does not attribute the subject’s productive involvement to the fundamental *matter* of their existence. Bourdieu requires the subject to undertake “ways of being,” to action/do something, in order to structure, and be structured, socially. Contrarily, and more fundamentally, I have characterised the spatial-subject’s constitutive participation or involvement simply by their existence/being/incarnation in what is inescapably, monistically, spatially social. This engagement of Bourdieu deploys a similar logic to that which underpins Merleau-Ponty’s accusation that simply being/existing is not a condition of knowledge for Bergson. For Merleau-Ponty, as early as *Phenomenology of Perception*, existence is primordially knowledge of/as Being, requiring no search for consciousness with “my body, nor with time, nor with the world, as I experience them in antipredicative knowledge, in the inner communion that I have with them” (1962:82). Merleau-Ponty demands that Bergson conversely postulates an intellectual knowledge, in which there is spatial division/juxtaposition – a gap, a break, a loss – to be overcome. As with the interpretation (which has been reconceived in this thesis) of social constructionism as the representation of a separate, worldly phenomenon, such intellectual knowledge requires one to “find a passage between a being who knows nothing and a knowledge cut off from this being” (2001:110). Our conception of the primordial consciousness and knowledge that something spatial like the body has of/as time, a monistic social production/construction/ontology, appears to conflict with the challenge that Bergson’s material/spatial/perceptual present faces in terms of time-consciousness/time-knowledge.

This engagement with Merleau-Ponty presents the argument that for Bergson, past and present states can only ever be divided/juxtaposed/mutually-excluded simultaneously. We have run with this interpretation, given that we are exploring the ontologically productive potential of divided/juxtaposed states. Divided/juxtaposed states need to be ontologically productive if it is possible to recognise an all-encompassing, monistic/singular ontology. However, Merleau-Ponty's reading of Bergson affirms the conceptualisation that if states are divided/juxtaposed, then one such state (in this case, the past), is closed off from ontologically productive participation. Instead of progressing the argument of this chapter, this reiterates that ontological division/juxtaposition/mutual-exclusion is not yet monistically/singularly accommodated with ontological co-distinguishability/co-constitution/co-permeation. Bergson's argument, and that of this thesis as it concluded in chapter four, maintains the same restriction:

Bergson's argument and Thesis argument

Simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states are not all ontologically productive.

Simultaneously co-permeating/co-constitutive states are all ontologically productive.

Some manoeuvring is required to recognise how simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states are ontologically productive. In this regard, we should note the heuristic nature of our interest in Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Bergsonian philosophy. The dialogue we are framing between Merleau-Ponty and Bergson is not to take either "side." Rather, we are opening this discussion in order to explore whether simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states are ontologically productive, and not simply dead/lifeless. Reconsidering the division/juxtaposition between perceptual present and memorial past that Merleau-Ponty has just interpreted in Bergson is accordingly appropriate, given that Bergson has a very different interpretation of how his work describes the relation between these time-states.

Bergsonian present-centrism reconsidered

Our previous section has considered how, according to Merleau-Ponty, the Bergsonian past and present are divided/juxtaposed simultaneously, excluding some states (pasts) from ontological productivity. The supposedly *monistic/all-encompassing* self-ontologisation that has been

described in chapter four as simultaneously (co-)incarnating states is thus still problematically unable to include certain simultaneous states – those being, divided/juxtaposed states. In this section we will approach this issue from another angle, by interrogating the reading that Bergsonian perceptual presents and memorial pasts are divided/juxtaposed.

It is Bergson's actualisation of the past *in the present* which, as we have seen, bothers Merleau-Ponty. Bergson, according to Merleau-Ponty, characterises the past-as-memory as separate/detached/static traces from which the active present draws, producing "time out of a preserved present, evolution out of what is evolved" (Merleau-Ponty 1962:482). Rather than an all-powerful, dynamic present retrieving a powerless, passive, past trace, Merleau-Ponty's converse interpretation is of an always originary trace, articulated in the "Temporality" chapter of *Phenomenology of Perception*. The trace for Merleau-Ponty is not simply a reference to a fixed, purely memorial, past, from the viewpoint of the present, but rather is a sense or significance of the past that is always rearticulating (480).

Merleau-Ponty asks us to consider a carving in a wooden table (479-480). Recognition of the carving is only possible because one has a past sense of carving and tables. The past participates in conditioning present perception. However, the past is not something latently fixed in the reservoir that is Bergson's "pure memory." Instead, the perpetually originary nature of the past-as-"trace" is conditioned by the unreflective mode of experiential being. The trace is always becoming something different by the way it is presently lived. We encountered this in chapter four, where by always perceptually being-in-the-world, experiential phenomena can never be completely "reduced" via reflection. Any reflective moment is conditioned by/as our "unreflective" being-in-the-world. We cannot parenthesise being-in-the-world, or put it out of play completely, in order to reflect upon it. Or simply, the present from which one can never be extricated is always already co-constitutive with/as an emergent reflection/past.

We have addressed concerns that any state could be *unreflective*, consistent with the argument that simply by being, one manifests *as* consciousness. Despite the potential confusion caused by Merleau-Ponty's use of the term "unreflective," his application of it is clear. If reflection does not reduce Being to a series of knowable, in-themselves moments, but rather participates in, and constitutes, that upon which is being reflected, then there is not a pre-existing past which has previously been present, to be recalled in its eternal, identical fixity. The reflective moment co-constitutes new, originary pasts, a primordial, phenomenological reduction

which “constitutes for it [reflection] a kind of original past, a past which has never been present” (282). As seen via our engagement with Mead, this is the past which has “never been present” because it only becomes the past that it is with and as this present(ing). The lived, “unreflective” present is not simply the condition for the originary past, as Merleau-Ponty accuses of Bergson’s philosophy. Rather, the originary past, a trace/sense of the past-as-present, is always becoming different via/as the present perception with which it is co-distinguished.

By considering the ontological productivity of the past/trace, our conception of primitiveness shifts. Typically, the primitive is comprehended as a present which eternally pre-existed. However, the originary past’s perpetually (re-)productive relation with/as the present means that what is primitive is the past that has never actually been present. The past is never simply something that was simply, previously, present in-itself, but is instead always co-constituted with/as the present. This is the primacy/primitiveness of the subject’s “un”reflective gesture with/as the world.⁶ Merleau-Ponty illustrates how rather than what is occurring being a uni-directional present-to-past conditioning, this primacy/primitivity co-conditions the present-as-sense-perception, by constituting “my sensory fields which are my primitive alliance with the world” (493). No time state, neither present nor past, is fabricated by others from without; “no one of time’s dimensions can be deduced from the rest” (492). This is the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s contestation of the hierarchy of present over past that he interprets in Bergson’s theory.

In this thesis we have conceived of time as an ontology of perpetually simultaneous present/here states. Time is produced through the body-as-space via the body’s co-constitutive distinguishability from/as all other space(s), a particular where-as-when that concurrently conditions/is-present-in, and is-conditioned-by/is-presented-by every where-as-when. This raises the question of whether Merleau-Ponty would also have issues with the present-centrism of the argument that has been developed in the previous chapters here. That however seems unlikely, given that Merleau-Ponty’s opposition to the present-centrism he reads in Bergson’s argument is due to its supposed subordination of a latent, dead past. This lifeless past is not found in the argument developed here, in which all time states are co-constitutive with/as each other.

Furthermore, in *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty actually describes time in similar “self-present” terms to that of my argument. Time is characterised as monistic self-

⁶ Here I am reminded of French philosopher Gaston Bachelard’s description of a “primitiveness which belongs to all” (1994[1958]:4), provided that “belong” does not simply define “primitive” as a character trait that one possesses, but indicates a *participation* in which one is perpetually, originarily implicated.

presence, where “by communicating with the world we communicate beyond all doubt with ourselves. We hold time in its entirety, and we are present to ourselves because we are present to the world” (493). Present-time-dependence can thus be incorporated into Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology if time is described as *self*-dependent and *self*-divergent. The sociological punch line offered by our inquiries, as observed in chapter four, is that if this self-distinguishable *pluralisation* is time, then time is the social subject. Social time is thus not simply a contingent construction or representation by human subjects of a separate worldly phenomenon of time. Rather, the incarnation of spatial subjects, as a monistically social frame not restricted to humans, is the condition of time in general.

In this chapter the ambition is to accommodate ontologically productive, simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states into an ontology of monistic productivity. As a result, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of any characterisation of time in which there are powerless states (the past) that are only produced by other states (the present) must be endorsed. However, as queried at the end of the last section, does this characterisation really reflect Bergson’s conception of time, given the qualitatively transitional, co-permeating time states for which Bergson argues?

The present-centrism that Merleau-Ponty believes underpins Bergsonian philosophy informs his criticism that Bergson’s past-as-pure-memory is a weak degree of the perceived present. We have seen though that Bergson contests this interpretation in *Matter and Memory* of “the difference between actual sensations and pure memory as a mere difference in degree, and not in kind” (2004:179). Leonard Lawlor accordingly argues that the position for which Merleau-Ponty criticises Bergson is not found in *Matter and Memory*. As a result, an unlikely alliance is supposed between Merleau-Ponty’s and Bergson’s conceptions of the past-present relation. Lawlor states; “if Merleau-Ponty rejects the conception that he incorrectly attributes to Bergson, then he actually supports Bergson’s position” (2003:90).

This argument is articulated more thoroughly by Deleuze. For Merleau-Ponty, memorial past and perceptual present *co-constitute simultaneously*. As will be seen however, this is also how Deleuze interprets the Bergsonian past-present relation, contrary to Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Bergson. Deleuze will assist us intermittently from this point in this chapter. Just as it would have been remiss to explore whether time is spatial in this project without engaging Bergson, similarly it must be observed that Deleuze commands a certain ubiquity in contemporary Bergsonian scholarship. In considering any possible incompatibility between the

readings by Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, we should also remember our earlier point concerning the heuristic nature of our Bergsonian exploration. That is, the discussion opened between Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, in which Deleuze is now being included, is interested in serving the potential identification of ontologically productive, simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states.

In exploring the Bergsonian past-present relation, the duality of the memory-image attracts primary attention. This is due to how Bergson describes it in *Matter and Memory* as simultaneously partaking of both the pure memory, “which it begins to materialise” (2004:170), and of perception, “in which it tends to embody itself” (170). Perception is duly conceived as “impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it” (170). Deleuze, in *Cinema 2: The Time Image* (1989[1985]), interprets this commonality between perception and memory as the co-implication, *not* the opposition, of present and past states. Whilst it is necessary for the present to pass (or to become past) for another present to arrive, Deleuze believes Bergson illustrates that it is also “necessary for it to pass *at the same time* that it is present” (79; my emphasis). The perceptual-memorial memory-image must, in Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, be “still present and already past, at once and at the same time” (79). Deleuze is arguing that this *simultaneous* coexistence conditions time, similar to the argument of this thesis in which time states are simultaneously co-constitutive. If the past did not exist *with* the present, the present would not also qualitatively transition and time would not be.

Such co-constitution means that the past/memory does not re-emerge as the present/perception it once was, a subordinated, fixed, distant past that is simply (re-)called. Rather, the past participates, in Deleuze’s terms, in “a different present from the one that they have been” (79). Neither present nor past is hierarchised, meaning we must be careful with commentaries such as that provided by Lawlor. Lawlor recognises the co-permeating states that are also a feature of Merleau-Ponty’s argument (Lawlor 2003:90). Curiously though, Lawlor’s terminology could be seen to compromise the primitive complicity of the present with/as the originary past, in suggesting that “instead it seems that the present itself is *dependent* on a past, on the ‘original or originary past’” (90; my emphasis). A more nuanced way to describe this might be, following Merleau-Ponty, that neither time state is solely “dependent” upon any other, given that all are always qualitatively transitioning with/as each other.

Nevertheless, both Deleuze’s argument and Lawlor’s argument reconfigure Merleau-Ponty’s reading that Bergson hierarchises present time states. Eternally fixed presents as

untouchable, productive sources, would prevent the “radically novel/new” emerging. As Deleuze explains in *Bergsonism*, such novel/new emergence is a feature of Bergsonian time, contradicting the notion of a “real that is ready-made, preformed, pre-existent to itself” (Deleuze 1988:98). For Bergson, time states are perpetually, qualitatively novel/new. The co-permeating, heterogeneous relation between time(s)-as-duration(s) for Bergson marks their (re-)production, as different kinds of pasts and presents, beyond replication of, in Deleuze’s terms, “sterile doubles” (98). Lawlor’s concern, and indeed Merleau-Ponty’s, is that if a past is uni-directionally produced by the present, the past “is derivative from that present and is not itself original, is not itself a sort of ‘origin’” (Lawlor 2003:91). Ironically however, the monistic self-self character of time’s ontology which we have explored is somewhat uni-directional, in that the body-as-space-as-time upsurges *from* itself *toward* itself. Typically, uni-directional refers to one exclusive direction at any one time. Here though, this self-self uni-directionality encompasses all directions simultaneously, as the possibility and condition of directionality, as time.

In the previous section, Merleau-Ponty’s reading that the Bergsonian past and present are separated/divided/juxtaposed, and that the past is ontologically powerless, reinforced, rather than problematised, the argument that not all simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states are ontologically productive. In this section we tried a different approach, by considering Merleau-Ponty’s contrary conception of co-constitutive/co-permeating time states, and observing that this is actually how Deleuze also interprets the Bergsonian past-present relation. That is, this section has considered whether what Merleau-Ponty interpreted in Bergson’s conception as simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states, instead manifest as simultaneously *co-constitutive/co-distinguishable/co-permeating* states. This coheres with the characterisation of co-distinguishable/co-constitutive/co-permeating time states. As a result however, we now see that such coherence brings us no closer to this chapter’s ambition of identifying ontologically productive, simultaneously *divided/juxtaposed states*, and accommodating them within a monistic ontology of co-constitution/co-distinguishability/co-permeation.

Interestingly, this kind of ontological co-constitution is defined by Bergson as a “partial coincidence.” This is significant in two regards. Firstly, “coincidental” states are typically conceived as those which *concurrently* share certain ontological conditions. For two or more things to coincide, even “partially,” something common must concurrently constitute those things. The synonymy of “concurrent” with “simultaneous” suggests a consistency between

Bergson's conception of co-constitution (*concurrently* partially coincident states), and the conception of co-constitution developed in this thesis (*simultaneously* co-incarnating states).

Secondly, Bergson describes such concurrent/simultaneous co-constitution as "partial." In an everyday regard, partiality refers to what is not entire, or is somehow incomplete. Does this therefore mean that the incomplete/partial coincidence of concurrently/simultaneously co-constitutive states is conditioned by "something" which prevents their otherwise entire/complete coincidence with each other? We will consider if the "something" which prevents such co-constitution/coincidence from being anything more than partial is the discontinuity/juxtaposition of states. Or in other words, we will be interested in whether ontological "partiality" informs our exploration into whether a supposedly simultaneously discontinuous/divided/juxtaposed state, such as the past, can be ontologically productive rather than powerless/lifeless.

Simultaneous states are ontologically productive

In considering the relation of Bergson's conception of partially coincident states to our inquiry's Merleau-Pontian inspired conception of simultaneously co-constitutive states, let us first attend to Merleau-Ponty's description of such partiality as the *impossibility* of past-present complete coincidence. In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty defines a coincidence that is partial as "a coincidence always past or always future" (1968:122). This is the co-constitution of visibility (the present) and invisibility (the past and future), in which the past (re-)emerges in a new/future form, simultaneously with/as the equally novel present. That the past is not simply presented again as the present it once was, is why Merleau-Ponty describes the past as "impossible," evoking the "past that was never present." The past is impossible because it is always instead becoming a *co-constituted past-and/as-present*.

This original past is concurrently also an original future given that the novelty of this production of the "past" manifests as the "past" and/as the "future" of the co-constitutive present. To be consistent, these time states are better described as the *past-and/as-present*, and as the *future-and/as-present*, or in Merleau-Ponty's terms, where the present is an "experience that remembers an impossible past, anticipates an impossible future" (123). We have considered how the co-distinguishability/co-constitution of these states conditions time and/as Being, whereby in (re-)productively emerging from nothing but itself, Being originarily/novelty emerges from itself

as the self it *always already was*. This can now be described as “always already *impossibly* was,” in keeping with the current theme, where one’s inescapable being-present-in-the-world means any recourse to the “was” of Being is always already co-constituted with the experiential present. Merleau-Ponty describes this impossible upsurge “that emerges from Being” as “‘is of it’ but is not it” (123). Whilst I comprehend Merleau-Ponty’s intention to distinguish “it” from “not it” in acknowledging the perpetual plasticity of what “it” was, and believe this is in concert with my inquiries, such terminology betrays the monistic sense of the body-as-space-as-time that has been engendered in this thesis, and indeed that Merleau-Ponty generally associates with the flesh of the world.

Here Merleau-Ponty is managing the same, seemingly irreconcilable, distanced positions with which we are grappling; divisibility and distinguishability, or transcendence and immanence. His attempted co-accommodation of these concepts describes a monistic subjectivity in which “it is only by remaining at a distance that it remains itself” (123). This “distance” will be crucial to relating Bergsonian *partial* coincidence to Merleau-Pontian simultaneity, and in turn to the possibility of accommodating ontological divisibility with ontological co-distinguishability.

There is distance in coincidence for Merleau-Ponty. However, this distance is an immanence, as Being is *relieved* from itself via forms of itself, “a relief which remains distinct” (123). This is a strange form of distance, maintaining an internal self-presence whilst relieving Being-as-self from what would otherwise be a static, metaphysically transcendent, presence. This self-divergent presence is attributable to impossibly present pasts, which in presenting are never (simply) present to be recalled as they were. This self-relation marks the implicated simultaneity of past and/as present, where as Merleau-Ponty eloquently states (and in spatial/material terms no less), “the weight of the natural world is already a weight of the past” (123). Moreover, the weight of the present is already a weight of all other time(s). If, as I have argued, every space/material, such as the embodied human, is involved in the production of time, then each is already a weight of all other spaces/materials. This simultaneity of spaces-as-times has been recognised as that which conditions social synchronisation. If every spatial incarnation constitutes, and is constituted by, all other spaces-as-times, there is never a worldly time from which spatial/perceptual subjects are out of sync. Or in Merleau-Ponty’s terms; “the world and I

are within one another, and there is no anteriority of the *percipere* to the *percepi*, there is simultaneity” (123).

Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of simultaneity coheres with the conception developed in this thesis of co-distinguishable/co-constitutive/co-permeating time states. In particular, the previous chapter argued that the distinguishability of spaces-as-times in/as each other opens each spatial subject unto itself, concurrently (re-)producing its impossibly pre-existing self-as-time(s). This, remember, is the sociological ramification; time is the subject who plurally/socially emerges with/as other times-as-subjects. This (re-)production marks the perpetual originality of subjectivity-as-past, and thus the impossibility of reliving a previously present subjectivity identically as it was. Merleau-Ponty describes such productive self-divergence as “an openness upon...the past[s]” which consequently “enter[s] into their definition” (124). In being recollected, the past “as it was” is “inexplicably altered” (124), perpetually (re-)emerging as a simultaneously co-constituted past-and/as-present, characterising the impossibility of a past that is simply as it was when it was previously present.

Directly concerning our intention in this chapter, we will now consider whether simultaneously co-constitutive states can be ontologically productive if what Bergson describes as “partial coincidence” also posits their simultaneously discontinuous/divided relation. For Bergson, the past manifests as something with which the perceptual present “partially coincides” (Bergson 2004:292, 297-298). Coincidence is “partial,” where as we have seen, the Bergsonian perceptual present is not identical with the past that it will become in relation with new presents. Indeed, there is a prominent aspect to Bergson’s argument which characterises each perceptual present as only manifesting the utilitarian aspects of past presents (206). Or as Bergson states concerning the action required in the present, what is incorporated from past/previous presents is “only that which can fit into the sensori-motor state...from the point of view of the action to be accomplished” (220). As with the perpetual, “inexplicable alteration” of past-and/as-present that we have just encountered via Merleau-Ponty, in this regard Bergson defines the partial coincidence of the present with the past as the creation of “something new every moment” (297).

Merleau-Ponty however demands in *The Visible and the Invisible* that Bergson’s conception cannot recognise such originary, ontological productivity. This is due to Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation that Bergsonian partial coincidence attempts to “return to the immediate data” (Merleau-Ponty 1968:124). Merleau-Ponty’s justification of this point is not expansive, so

let us try to unpack this claim for ourselves. If we recall Bergson's conception of intuition, there we saw that as a method, intuition opens awareness to how states of time are not simply representations of quantitatively different, spatial degrees, but are also qualitatively different, co-permeating states. This co-permeation of "partially coincident" pasts and presents is where, for Bergson, the present, as "concrete extended recovers its natural continuity and indivisibility" (Bergson 2004:293). Partial coincidence thus describes what would otherwise be the discontinuous, perceptual, spatial, socially pragmatic present rediscovering its co-permeating, indivisible, durational/memorial conditions. This seems to be a *return* to primordial conditions, where in Bergson's terms, the perceptual present and the memorial past are "grafted upon the other" (297). Indeed, Bergson describes partial coincidence as the radical form via which, concerning matter and memory, or perceptual present and memorial past, "union becomes possible" (297).

A contestation by Merleau-Ponty to such partial unity of past-present coincidence would be consistent with his more general critique of "intuitionist philosophies" which posit, or anticipate, a return to the natural/inherent immediacy of worldly givenness. We have already encountered this via his engagement with Husserl, in which we benefited from Merleau-Ponty's argument that being-in-the-world is perpetually, constitutively implicated in that upon which is being reflected. For Merleau-Ponty, and for this thesis, the perceptual present is co-constituted with/as memorial past. However, the simultaneity of past and/as present that we have comprehended does not, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, suggest their "fusion or coincidence" (1968:123, 124, 127, 128, 191). Bergson conceives of the relation between the perceptual present and memorial past as where the perceptual present partially coincides with, unifies with, or recovers its own "indivisible continuity." This characterises partiality as a distance/dehiscence that, according to Merleau-Ponty, can only be a "bad or abortive truth" to be overcome (125). In other words, for Bergson, the present, via intuition, approaches a complete union, rediscovery or recovery with the past, without ever totally/entirely coinciding.

Conversely, in chapter four we considered how Being's dehiscence/divergence/distinguishability from itself, as itself, actually conditions its *entire*/general emergence, knowledge, consciousness and/as time(s). Such phenomena are conditioned by the ambiguity of spatial subjects-objects. Commentator Derek Taylor defines this well in terms of consciousness, whereby "ambiguity is not accidental to thought but rather is

constitutive of it” (1992:149). Every time upsurge, every state of time, in conditioning time, constitutes the entirety of time. Or in other words, the divergence of every particular time constitutes time generally. Merleau-Ponty also celebrates the simultaneous, divergent self-self relation of fleshy “dehiscence” (1968:117, 118, 123, 128, 145, 146, 153) as conditioning self, consciousness and knowledge. What Bergson characterises as “only/badly/abortively” partial, is instead described by Merleau-Ponty as a “good error” (125), not preventing an entire coincidence with Being which a subsequent “union” partially addresses, but perpetually “opening” the entirety of Being. In supposing that Bergson negatively characterises partiality as incompleteness, Merleau-Ponty argues that this neglects how “every being presents itself at a distance, which does not prevent us from knowing it” but is “on the contrary the guarantee for knowing it” (127). Consistent with our inquiry in chapter four, knowledge here is the opening of Being. Being distinguishes itself from itself as concurrently co-conditioning subjects/knowers and objects/knowns, rather than knowledge simply being the possible union/coincidence of the present subject’s representation of a pre-existing, fixed object in-itself.

Merleau-Ponty is arguing that when Bergson uses the term “partial” he refers to something pre-existing, hidden, inaccessibly in-itself. What “Bergson lacks” here according to Merleau-Ponty, is to recognise “the identity of the retiring into oneself with the leaving of oneself, of the lived through with the distance” (124). Partial coincidence is not something which prevents the present’s complete coincidence with an aspect of the past and memory by imposing a distance-as-void. Rather, this distance, this partiality, conditions the complete possibility of present, past and memory, via/as the simultaneous co-distinguishability of self from/as self by which Being’s emergence has been characterised. Merleau-Ponty duly advises Bergson that partial coincidence is “a Self-presence that is not an *absence from oneself*” but instead is “a contact with Self *through* the divergence (*écart*) with regard to Self” (192).

This ontological productivity of partial-coincidence/simultaneity is what Bergson neglects according to Merleau-Ponty, evidenced in considering language and forgetting. We will first briefly discuss language. We have seen Bergson describe language as an intellectual (mis-)representation of a consequently inaccessible real, evocative of the polarising frame we have interrogated which posits that social construction is the representation of something separately, inherently worldly. Acknowledging a productively singular ontology already seems difficult in Bergson’s argument. Language for Bergson (particularly scientific and philosophical discourse)

spatialises, fixes, homogenises and separates from intuitional processes that which consciousness otherwise experiences directly. Merleau-Ponty accordingly describes in *The Visible and the Invisible* that for Bergson “the philosopher speaks, but this is a weakness...he should keep silent, coincide in silence, and rejoin in Being a philosophy that is there ready-made” (125).

Whilst Bergson characterises language as an intellectual break with the flow of consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty language describes the chiasmic/simultaneous way in which Being becomes, self-consciously. Language incarnates as Being’s distinguishability, whereby in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the “dehiscence of speaking” (118) is what “opens it [Being] to itself” (117).⁷ Semantic philosophies such as Bergson’s reductively “close up language as if it spoke only of itself” (126). Contrarily, in this chapter, the chiasm via which language manifests, simultaneously emerging as the perceptual real and the ideal representation, has been characterised as the divergences of/as life/Being. Whilst I therefore agree with Merleau-Ponty’s criticism against conceiving of language as only speaking of itself as an exclusively human linguistics, I actually argue that this means language *does* only speak of itself. Language is Being itself and Being’s life, or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “language is a life, is our life and the life of the things” (125). All spatial incarnations/things via which Being emerges from itself, as itself, are the language of Being. Being duly speaks only (of) itself. This monistic, self-self upsurge is how I describe time. Language is time is Being’s self-communication/self-consciousness, where if language for Bergson makes things spatial and social, I could not agree more, given that I have conceived of time as the spatial, social subject at stake in the sociological dimension of this thesis. Unlike Bergson though, this has not excluded the language-social-spatial correlation from ontologically productive processes. The social construction of Being is not its contingent misrepresentation by separate human subjects, but rather is the way in which Being immanently, intersubjectively/socially becomes itself via itself as spatial subjects.

Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation of language as Being-incarnation, rather than as representational break, informs his critique of Bergson’s characterisation of forgetting as an “occultation” (Merleau-Ponty 1968:194). This refers to Bergson’s conception of anything apart from the conscious present as lifeless, “latent and unconscious” (Bergson 2004:181). If during the passage through the present, “a segment of the past would fall into oblivion” (Merleau-Ponty

⁷ We have already encountered such conceptions of language via Derrida, and Kirby, defining language not just as something used to describe Being, but also as the manifestation(s) of Being.

1968:194), as Merleau-Ponty identifies in the past-present relation posited by Bergson in *Matter and Memory* (Bergson 2004:224, 319-320), then aspects of the past would be lost. Conversely, Merleau-Ponty's point is that forgetting is not an inability to access (remember) a purely past present. This is because such a permanently fixed, in-itself past does not manifest. Rather, the past present that is "forgotten" is actually the impossible past, the past that was never simply present because it is always becoming a co-constituted present-and/as-past. This past does not latently remain to be remembered, given that "forgetting" the pure past (a past which never manifests anyway) actually opens up the past to (re-)articulation with/as the present. This is a somewhat Bergsonian point, in that for the past to (re-)emerge in the present with which it is co-implicated, it must be different in kind to what it was. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty criticises Bergson's understanding of the past as preserved "pure memory," stating in *The Visible and the Invisible* that "if the pure memory is the former present preserved...it becomes impossible to see how it could open to me the dimension of the past" (1968:122).

Partial coincidence, the opening between present and/as past, simultaneously conditions both. However, Merleau-Ponty argues that Bergson misses his own point. For Merleau-Ponty, partiality, forgetting, is the originary condition of past, present, and ironically, memory. Forgetting and/as partiality thus correlates with our characterisation in chapter four of time as self-distinguishability. Where Being relaxes-and-contracts, forgets-and-remembers or perceives-and-is-perceived-by itself, within/as itself, incarnation manifests. The forgetting that conditions self-remembering/self-distinguishability is mimicked by Merleau-Ponty's correlative argument that imperception is inherent to perception (247). Equally, this recognises the invisible constitution of vision, as the impossible past that constitutes the present, or the constitutive "unconscious of consciousness" (255). Being-consciousness, as space-as-time, perpetually finds itself by forgetting itself.

It is according to such logic that Jack Reynolds argues for the similarity between Derrida's deconstruction and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.⁸ Reynolds reminds us of the general scarcity of commentary on Merleau-Ponty by Derrida (Reynolds 2004:61). However, Derrida's only sustained dialogue with Merleau-Ponty, in *Memoirs of the Blind* (1993[1990]), is

⁸ As Reynolds acknowledges, this congruence between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty is also discussed in Robert Vallier's essay, *Blindness and Invisibility: The Ruins of Self-Portraiture (Derrida's Re-reading of Merleau-Ponty)* (1997).

“predominantly flattering” (Reynolds 2004:61). Merleau-Ponty’s argument concerning the imperceptive constitution of perception, or the invisibility that is inherent to visibility, is here evoked by Derrida when he states that “invisibility would still inhabit the visible...the visible as such would be invisible, not as visibility, the phenomenality or essence of the visible, but *as* the singular body of the visible itself” (Derrida 1993:51). Invisibility is not the impotence of visibility for Derrida, nor for Merleau-Ponty. Rather, invisibility is the condition of visibility (and vice-versa). Given this intersection between Derrida and Merleau-Ponty, Reynolds’ conclusion regarding the correlations between their work must be endorsed, where “notwithstanding Derrida’s repeated efforts to distance himself from this tradition, there are some important ways in which his thought is...not entirely unlike the later writings of Merleau-Ponty” (2004:82).

We have stumbled upon something significant in all this; apparent polar opposites (forgetting|remembering, past|present, and unconsciousness|consciousness) are co-constitutive. This evokes our current intention to accommodate spatially *divided/juxtaposed* simultaneities with the seemingly polarised, spatially *co-distinguishable/co-permeating/co-constitutive* simultaneities. Our interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s reading, contrary to Bergson’s position concerning his own work, is that partial states are simultaneously co-constitutive states, where simultaneity does not simply indicate states that are polarised from temporalisation and/as ontological production.⁹ Partiality is not restricted to a nearly attained complete coincidence. Nor is simultaneity restricted to the partiality/incompletion of complete coincidence. Rather, partiality-as-simultaneity is the condition of complete incarnation. This reading thus presents the following correlation:

Bergson’s argument

All simultaneous states are ontologically productive.

Thesis argument

All simultaneous states are ontologically productive.

⁹ It was argued in chapter four that every co-constitutive incarnation is the perpetual origin of time. In *Cinema 2: The Time Image* Deleuze reconceives the interpretation that any realm for Bergson is an exclusive time-origin, by considering an image found in two mirrors facing each other. One mirror represents the virtual-past, the other, the actual-present. The virtual-past is an origin. However, the actualisation in the mirror image is concurrently also a (re-)virtual (re-)origin (1989:68). Merleau-Ponty uses the example of two mirrors (1968:139) as well in order to articulate the concurrent incarnation of the origin of the past and/as present.

Our engagement with partial coincidence illustrates that simultaneous states are all ontologically productive. However, this is because such simultaneous states are primordially *co-constitutive/co-distinguishable*, whereby again we find ourselves in the position at which we finished in chapter four. Our conclusion from this section, as with our conclusions from previous sections, does not yet address this chapter's intention of identifying ontologically productive, simultaneously *divided/juxtaposed* states. These are the states we are attempting to include in an ontology of simultaneously co-constitutive/co-distinguishable states, in order to justify a singular/monistic ontology.

Nonetheless, in this section we have addressed the issue that was earlier flagged concerning whether there is a commonality between Bergson's simultaneous states, and the simultaneous states as characterised by this thesis. All simultaneous states are ontologically productive (however, again this seems to be because of their co-constitutive/co-distinguishable, and not divided/juxtaposed, conditions). Let us now return therefore to our primary focus in this project, and consider whether the simultaneous states now identifiable in Bergsonian theory as ontologically productive, are spatial. Perhaps this focus on spatiality will illustrate how such states can be divided/juxtaposed. This, after all, is Bergson's classic definition of simultaneous states; spatial and divided/juxtaposed. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty demands as early as *Phenomenology of Perception* that it is "neither necessary nor sufficient to condemn the spatialisation of time as does Bergson" (1962:482). We will begin with this claim.

Divided/juxtaposed spaces are co-constitutive/co-distinguishable spaces

Merleau-Ponty's accusation that Bergson condemns the spatialisation of time must be prefaced with a certain condition. We have seen that for Bergson, the lived experience of time is constituted by: (i) spatial, measurable, quantifiable discontinuities, the necessities of social pragmatics, *and*; (ii) durational, continuous, qualitatively co-permeable, intensive states. Consequently, we are dealing with a more nuanced argument than a straightforward condemnation of time's spatialisation. Instead, Bergson's condemnation is directed towards the assumption that the spatialisation of time accounts for *all* that time is. Bergson's position is that time is also primarily/primordially *non-spatially* constituted, via co-permeable/co-constitutive states of time-as-duration.

However, it is of course the somewhat different argument developed in our preceding chapters that time is *entirely* primarily/primordially spatial. Here we can defer to Merleau-Ponty, who argues that such a spatial conception of time is not a problem if our primordially spatial, being-in-the-world is acknowledged. This means that any “time is exclusive of space only if we consider space as objectified in advance, and ignore that primordial spatiality...which is the abstract form of our presence in the world” (482). Again I will nuance Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, on this occasion addressing the “abstract form” of primordial spatiality he describes. Our considerations in this thesis have interrogated conceptions which polarise space, as real and tangible, from time as abstract and ethereal. Time-upsurges have duly been conceived as tangible/substantial/spatial, concurrently conditioning, and conditioned by, the real. In keeping with the theme of co-accommodating polarised conceptions though, I am not suggesting that we exclude what is characterised as “abstract” from what is “real.” This argument benefits from the earlier discussion attending to how unconsciousness is implicit in consciousness, or how forgetting constitutes memory.¹⁰ Consequently, we can agree with Merleau-Ponty if the abstraction that he describes as forming our presence in the world is comprehended as what opens us to/as the world. Abstraction here is the opening of/as the real. However, instead of describing a “presence *in* the world” as Merleau-Ponty does, it seems more consistent with the argument of our preceding chapters, and also with his phenomenology, to describe a presence *as* the world.

Returning to our main focus in this section, the stigmatisation of any assumption concerning the spatial constitution of time is not a sufficient basis, according to Merleau-Ponty, to provide an “authentic intuition of time” (482). This, we are told, “is what happened to Bergson” (482). Where Merleau-Ponty and Bergson therefore differ, reflecting the point of divergence between Bergson’s argument and that of the central exploration in this chapter, is in terms of conceptions of space. If space-as-time is monistic as our fourth chapter claimed, how can it not accommodate all form(s) of space(s)? Seemingly, our conception of space as co-constitutive states/incarnations, where each simultaneously emerges *distinguishably* from/as each other, is fundamentally different from Bergson’s argument that space(s) are simultaneously *divided/juxtaposed/mutually-excluded* things. Nevertheless, it is in the correlation just developed between Bergson’s conception of partial coincidence, and this chapter’s conception of

¹⁰ Indeed it is also inspired by Derrida’s earlier addressed reluctance to simply invert the presence|absence binary.

simultaneity, where all simultaneous states are ontologically productive in both conceptions, that Bergson's simultaneously divided space(s) will be potentially accommodated within an ontology of simultaneously co-distinguishable space(s).

Bergson demands in *Matter and Memory* that "each unique moment of the past survives" (2004:179). What does this mean, that the "past survives?" Rudimentarily, this is something with which our considerations would agree. If space-as-time is always already co-constitutive of all other space(s)-as-time(s), then every time is always, in some way, "existing/surviving." But why is it important to Bergson that the past survives? In answering this, we are about to consider Bergson's contestation of the interpretation that pasts, of which we are not conscious, do not exist. If perception-as-presence calls upon the past-as-memory, all pasts/memories must exist to be called, even when not seemingly participating in present consciousness.

Bergson notes that if something spatial is not immediately perceived, outside our field of vision, it is still assumed to exist. This is consistent with his conception of spatial simultaneity, in which spatial things are simultaneously dispersed in "space, thus appearing to preserve indefinitely the *things* which are there juxtaposed" (184). With unperceived ideal states however, this existence is not always granted. Past states are assumed to have once existed before the passing of time, whereby "time in its advance devours the *states* which succeed each other within it" (184). Bergson asks why the existence of an unperceived spatial state is considered to be real, whereas that of an unperceived ideal state is posited as obscure.¹¹ He duly demands, in acknowledging the involvement of ideal/memorial states in perceptual/present states, that "the adherence of this memory to our present condition is exactly comparable to the adherence of unperceived objects to those objects which we perceive" (187).

Having refuted the difference between the existential state of spatial *and* ideal objects which are not immediately perceived, Bergson then, strangely, re-installs a difference. He does this by asserting that ideal objects which are not being perceived are always lived, something which cannot be said of spatial objects outside our perceptual field. The co-permeation of conscious states means that "our previous psychical life exists for us *even more than the external world*, of which we never perceive more than a very small part" (2004:188; my emphasis). Given that in chapter four I have argued that every spatial incarnation is co-constitutively distinguished

¹¹ In *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, Deleuze reiterates Bergson's demand that recollections and times of which we are not presently aware still exist, like "the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space" (1989:80).

from/as *all* others, the suggestion of only perceiving a small, discontinuous part of “extensive spatiality” seems to simply confirm that Bergson has a different conception of space.

Infinite unperceived links are supposed by Bergson between perceived materiality and other material objects not being perceived, since all “obey necessary laws” (190). Unperceived materiality is linked to perceived materiality as that which “hides behind it infinitely more than it allows to be seen” (190). Bergson thus attributes to space the shadowy, hidden existence that in our earlier chapters we have encountered as being associated with time. Contrarily, Bergson affords no hiding to the intensive states comprising time-as-consciousness. Given that conscious states are not juxtaposed like extensive, spatial states, there is a co-permeation in which “our past psychical life conditions our present state” (191). Consistent with Augustine and Durkheim, memories are not stored somewhere. As Bergson asks concerning the past; “if it is retained, where is it?” (191). A question asking *where* the past or memory is relies on “images drawn from space” (191). Conscious states co-permeate, challenging assumptions of finite, spatial locations.

Bergson’s claim that each moment of the past survives can provide an insight concerning the accommodation of simultaneously divided space(s) with an ontology of simultaneously co-distinguishable space(s) if we now trace his preceding argument more carefully. Bergson’s first move correlates the existence of “not presently perceived” spatial/extensive/material objects/states with “not presently perceived” time/intensive/ideal objects/states. This is unusual, given the manner in which Bergson usually demands mutually exclusive properties between time and space. Nevertheless, such material/spatial states not being directly perceived presently exist, and there is no reason, Bergson tells us, why comparable ideal/time states, such as the past, should not also presently exist. Or in other words to make this as clear as possible, Bergson moves from the supposition concerning the simultaneous co-existence of space(s), in order to justify an argument positing the simultaneous co-existence of time(s)-as-duration(s).

It is from this point that Bergson’s conception of space *should* open to the co-constitutive space(s) for which have been argued in this chapter, via this justification of why past and present co-exist; the co-permeation of time/intensive states. Bergson demands that all time(s) exist given their heterogeneous relation(s) in which each becomes qualitatively different by surviving/existing in/as other times. This pivotal point complements the claims just raised, in that by moving from an argument concerning the co-existence of space(s) in order to explain the co-existence of time(s), and then justifying the co-existence of such time(s) by their co-constitutive

implication in/as each other, it must follow that such correlatively co-existing space(s) adhere to the same logic as such time(s).

However, as seen, Bergson argues that the time-states/intensive-states of our previous (not present) psychical life exist “more” than the space-states/extensive-states that are not currently perceived (not present). Bergson’s argument trips over itself here. Bergson cannot firstly rely upon an assumption concerning the co-existence of spatial states in order to explain the co-existence of time states, and then when returning to the spatial realm, strip spatial states of the co-constitution/co-permeation which their simultaneously co-existing logic has just afforded to time states. Either times are never co-distinguishable/co-constitutive/co-permeating, or, spaces, which are seemingly *only* divided, discontinuous and juxtaposed, must *also* be characterised as co-distinguishable/co-constitutive/co-permeating. Given that Bergson and I *do* recognise time as co-distinguishable/co-constitutive/co-permeating, space must also have these characteristics. This re-reading of Bergsonian space(s) describes not simply a quantitative multiplicity, which is its/their hallmark. Now we can also conceive of such space(s) as qualitatively transitional, perpetually co-constitutive/co-permeating/co-distinguishable, states.

This is in fact indicated in *Time and Free Will*, where Bergson surprisingly concedes that a quantitative multiplicity is qualitatively conditioned. What is spatial and quantitative cannot be ascertained “without considering at the same time a qualitative multiplicity” (1960:122-123). The argument is that by quantifying/counting objects, which are assumed to be discontinuous, juxtaposed and independent of their being quantified, there are actually also qualitatively different relations which manifest between such objects. The process of quantification becomes a constitutive aspect of the things being quantified, and therefore also of the quantified/unified whole/entirety. As Bergson states, quantifying them “alters the nature, the appearance and, as it were, the rhythm of the whole” (123). The point, although Bergson does not employ these words, is that the quantified/component multiplicities, and the unified quantity, are qualitatively different from their pre-unified incarnation as simultaneous, quantifiable multiplicities. A few pages later, Bergson insists that the spatially discontinuous representation of homogenous time, that “numerical multiplicity” of “well-defined states” (128), is actually constituted by the conditions “below” it, “a qualitative multiplicity” whose “heterogeneous moments permeate one another” (128). It was upon encountering these passages that I sensed an invitation to interrogate Bergson’s supposed exclusion of heterogeneous time-as-duration from homogenous space.

The simplicity of this reading of Bergson avoids counter-intuitive exclusions. How could the quantification of space(s) not produce a qualitatively different relation between such space(s), in which each is simultaneously, separately identifiable from the other(s), and yet also constitutively implicated in/as the other(s)? How could this not produce quantified-pasts and being-quantified-presents which co-transition into different pasts-as-presents? This indeed is consistent with Bergson's own conception of qualitatively transitional time-states. The qualitatively quantitative character of Bergson's ontology coheres with the co-constitutive space(s)-as-time(s) that have been identified in this thesis. What is qualitatively relational, and co-constitutive/co-distinguishable, conditions what *seems* to be *only* quantitative and juxtaposed/divided. Bergson would apparently agree, given his exclamation that "it is through the quality of quantity that we form the idea of quantity without quality" (123).

In review, this chapter began by observing that if, for Bergson, there are non-spatial aspects to time, then his conception of time must be incompatible with that developed in this thesis that time is entirely spatial. However, further exploration revealed that Bergson's conception of time, and the conception asserted in this thesis, were remarkably similar, both positing co-constitutive, co-distinguishably emerging, states:

Bergson's argument

Time states co-permeate/co-constitute/co-distinguish.

Thesis argument

Time states co-permeate/co-constitute/co-distinguish.

It was duly concluded that it must be in terms of space that such conceptions diverged:

Bergson's argument

Spatial states are divided/juxtaposed/mutually-excluded simultaneously.

Thesis argument

Spatial states co-distinguish/co-permeate/co-constitute simultaneously.

This discrepancy did not alarm us, for it defined our intention in this chapter clearly. If, as it was argued in chapter four, space *singularly/monistically* conditions the entirety of time (or time in

general), as an *all-encompassing* ontology, then *all* spatial states must be accommodated. As the above conclusion illustrated during our exploration in this chapter, simultaneously divided/juxtaposed spaces as presented in Bergson's conception were not accommodated within a conception of simultaneously co-permeating/co-constitutive monistic space(s). These forms of simultaneous states thus remained conceptually opposed and estranged. The issue of simultaneity became our consequent focus.

These consequent interrogations however were unable to accommodate simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states with an ontology of monistic, simultaneous, co-constitutive/co-distinguishable states. This was because states, if simultaneously divided/juxtaposed, seemed not to *all* be ontologically productive, therefore contradicting the *all-encompassing*, singular/monistic (re-)production acknowledged in our fourth chapter. Instead of developing this argument, both Bergson's argument, and that of this thesis, exemplified the same restriction:

Bergson's argument and Thesis argument

Simultaneously divided/juxtaposed states are not all ontologically productive.

Simultaneously co-permeating/co-constitutive states are all ontologically productive.

It has been in the section immediately preceding this current section, which was concerned with the correlation between Bergsonian partial coincidence and our conception of simultaneity, that it has been possible to recognise that for Bergson's argument, and for the argument of this thesis, *all* simultaneous states are ontologically productive. Simultaneity is not the partiality/incompletion of complete coincidence, but the condition of complete incarnation:

Bergson's argument

All simultaneous states are ontologically productive.

Thesis argument

All simultaneous states are ontologically productive.

What has been developed in this current section is the understanding that such ontologically productive, simultaneous states are both spatially divided/juxtaposed/quantifiable *and* spatially co-distinguishable/co-constitutive/co-qualitatively-transitional. This seemingly addresses our

chapter's inquiry into how a monistically ontologising space-as-time accommodates *all* spaces, necessarily justifying its "monistic" character.

This section has been the culmination of an argument which rather than being characterised as a corrective intervention concerning what is purportedly lacking in Bergsonian theory, is better described as a recognition of what is already implicit within Bergsonian theory. Bergson would probably be reluctant to agree with the kind of conclusion that this chapter attributes to his argument, yet it is a conclusion that has been developed via the very terms of his arguments spanning many texts. Given the significant ramifications of this conclusion, rather than close via this engagement with the aforementioned concessions from Bergson, we should reinvoke Deleuze to a final discussion. What we are anticipating, building on the insights that have just been developed, is an articulation of how partially-coincident (simultaneous) divided/juxtaposed states are productively implicated in the self-production of monistic co-distinguishability/co-constitution.

Monism (co-distinguishability/co-constitution) is dualism (division/juxtaposition)

In closing, and thus concurrently (re-)opening/(re-)originating this exploration into the monistic body-as-space-as-time, two aspects of Bergsonian philosophy should be appreciated.

1. Deleuze's insight in *Bergsonism* is that there are necessary differences "between perception and recollection, matter and memory, present and past" (1988:73). However, in recalling Bergson's cone, in which past and present co-exist, we should not discount the concurrent co-implication of these seemingly only polarised pairings. Deleuze, quite contextually for our current discussion, believes that Bergson's philosophy exhibits monist, *as well as* dualist, tendencies (73).¹² There are the dualisms of "pure present and pure past, pure perception and pure recollection" (74). However, present/perception also co-constitutes past/recollection, where "the present is only the most contracted level of the past" (74). Deleuze's point is important for this phase of our inquiry. This is because a monistic ontology, according to the logic we are exploring, cannot exclude dualist division/exclusion.

¹² Deleuze not only states that "the Bergsonian method has shown two main aspects, the one dualist, the other monist" (1988:73), but also that "starting from monism, we are able to rediscover dualism and account for it" (94).

The introduction by Deleuze of the term “contracted” to describe the past-present relation requires attention, as it provides an insight into the monistic co-constitution of divisible pasts and presents with co-distinguishable pasts and presents. The inverted base of the Bergsonian cone represents the dispersed past-as-memory. As the cone *contracts*, it reaches its point. This point is the perceptual present, which as seen in *Matter and Memory*, is constituted by relevant past states, “an incalculable multitude of remembered elements” (2004:194). It is this present-as-past-contraction which indicates a monism for Deleuze, where past and present only differ according to their relational contraction or relaxation. Or in Deleuze’s terms, they “have only differences of expansion and contraction” marking “an ontological unity” (1988:74).

If past and present differ only in terms of expansion and contraction, then their common ontological constitution means they must differ qualitatively/heterogeneously to avoid blurring into each other indistinguishably. That they are distinguishable is perhaps what indicates for Deleuze, echoing Bergson, how “quality emerges from this, quality that is nothing other than contracted quantity” (74). This is the monism that has been characterised in chapter four as space-as-time, in which spaces/states materially emerge simultaneously and distinguishably from/as each other. Crucially though, it is being argued, and will now be further articulated, that this does not exclude a state such as the past that is divided/juxtaposed/discontinuous/separated from the present. This divided past is the impossible past, which never emerges as it was when “present,” but only perpetually (re-)becomes a past-and/as-present.

Dualist division/juxtaposition is accommodated with monist co-distinguishability/co-constitution via this impossibility of the dualist/divided past, the impossible past which was never present. The impossible past will always be divided/juxtaposed/discontinuous/separated from its dualist pure present, because it never was, and never will be, simply a past/previous present. The impossible past does *become* present, it does become a present, however only by (re-)manifesting with/as a present that it co-conditions; the monistic past-as-present. The impossibility of the past that is divided *from* the present thus opens, and is accommodated with, the monistic ontology of past *from/as* present co-distinguishability.

Indeed, to be consistent with our Derridean engagement concerning originary all-co-constitution, we should describe this as the ~~impossibility~~ of ontological divisibility. Impossibility primordially co-conditions possibility, neither preceding the other. With a similar logic, Merleau-Ponty has alerted us to forgetting being the immanent origination of memory. It is the concurrent

divisibility/impossibility and co-distinguishability/commonality of Being which, in Deleuze's terms, "allows us to go beyond the duality of homogenous quantity and heterogeneous quality, and to pass from one to the other in a continuous movement" (74).

The perceptual/mattered present and the memorial/durational past are monistically constituted, for what is extended if not that which is contracted, and vice-versa? This is why Deleuze concludes that "there is always extensity in our duration, and always duration in matter" (87). It seems preferable to say duration *is* matter, and vice-versa, rather than follow Deleuze's Bergsonian terminology of extensity "in" duration. We have seen Merleau-Ponty criticise this as planting the "seeds" of one realm in the other, separating the constituents of what should always already be an ontological unity. In considering this however, it becomes apparent that Deleuze can also be excused here, for his description conjures the way in which monist space accommodates distance/transcendence in/as immanence. Perhaps this is the covert intention of Deleuze's "in," which is always already also "is"?

Deleuze indeed argues against conceiving of a mixture of duration and matter as though we "begin with a composite...the space-time mixture" (95). This coheres with our understanding of the upsurge of time, as the co-constitutive self-incarnation of space(s). Space and/as time are *always already* co-constitutive, rather than *becoming* composed. This is crucial to one of the central arguments developed in this thesis; that any spatial incarnation, in distinguishing Being from itself, conditions time and thus is the perpetual origin of time. Conversely, a subsequent mixture of duration and materiality would not capture the originary manner in which time is mattered/spatial.

2. In terms of such spatiality, we are aware that the term "space" in the argument of this thesis refers to all substance/matter/physicality/extension. This is not the case for Deleuze's reading of Bergson. For Deleuze, *matter* is substance/physicality/extension and is durational. Conversely, Deleuzian *space* represents time-as-duration's ultimate, static expansion, as duration's duration-less externality of juxtaposed states (1988:87). This is the classic polarisation of time-past-duration from space-present. Now, though, we can monistically/immanently accommodate such transcendent relations by inverting the logic concerning the impossible past.

Deleuze's duration-less present, space, is polarised/divided/juxtaposed/separated from past-time-as-pure-memory. This space, which I will call the *impossible present*, is a present that

will never be past. This is the same logic of the *impossible past*, a past that was never present, inverted. Just as it has been seen that the impossible past is the past that is never simply re-lived as it was when previously present (because the past is always becoming a co-constituted past-and/as-present), equally I argue that the impossible present is where the present is never simply as it will be when it is past, given that the present only becomes present via a perpetual (re-)co-constitution with past-as-duration, as a mattered present-and/as-past. Deleuze helps here by noting that “matter is never expanded enough...to stop having this minimum of contraction...through which it is a part of duration” (88).

Consequently, the impossible present-space (extension), dualistically divided from past-time-as-pure-memory (duration), only becomes present by opening (and therefore by being constitutively implicated in), the monistically co-distinguishable past-time-as-duration. Deleuze would again have to agree, given his summation that “duration is never contracted enough to be independent of the internal matter where it operates, and of the extension that it comes to contract” (88). Space-as-time is omnipresent and omni-self-divergent, as the possibility/opening of, and the real form(s) of, matter-as-duration, a substantial/tangible/physical self-divergence that our previous work, in chapter four particularly, has characterised as space’s plurally/socially dispersed subjectivity. Bergson’s cone illustrates such omnipresence. The conical tip is the perceptual, spatial, extended present, as the most contracted point of duration-as-past(s), but also represents a perpetual implication in/as what is least contracted and dispersed durationally/memorially.

Characterising Bergsonian ontology in monistic terms raises a potential concern though. Does such monistic space-as-duration, distinguishably materialising as contracted/relaxed states of the *same* mattered phenomenon, contradict Bergson’s demand that duration is constituted by qualitative differences in kind, and not just quantitative differences in degree between states of the same constitution? The answer is no, for two reasons.

Firstly, as just explored, matter is never expanded or relaxed enough to avoid its perpetual constituent, duration. Only the *impossible-present-space* could be duration-less, and would be comprised by what Deleuze describes as indefinite “differences in degree” (92-93). However, this Deleuzian space is actually what always opens (as) the material/mattered present, rather than something which ever manifests autonomously. What Deleuze calls matter, which is

what I have called space, cannot avoid co-constitution with/as time-as-duration. This is consistent with the argument that space is inescapably time-productive. The body-as-space, by sheer incarnation, cannot avoid being implicated in/as time's source.

Secondly, if past and present only differ via expansion and contraction, then their common ontological constitution means they must differ qualitatively/heterogeneously to avoid homogeneously blurring into each other indistinguishably. That past and present do manifest distinguishably indicates their qualitatively different, or heterogeneous, relation, consistent with Bergson's conception of time-as-duration, which "includes all the qualitative differences, to the point where it is defined as alteration in relation to itself" (92). Given this perpetual co-permeation/co-constitution of states, the difference between states is a self-difference-in-kind, "in itself and for itself" (93).

By characterising the production of time in chapter four as the incarnation of co-constitutive, simultaneously co-manifesting, space(s), time emerged as co-constitutive/co-distinguishable states, *rather than* as mutually excluded, divided/juxtaposed states. In separating simultaneously co-constitutive/co-distinguishable spaces from simultaneously divided/juxtaposed spaces, spaces emerged which were not accommodated within supposedly monistic space. This outcome seemed no less reductive than the time|space polarisation under interrogation. In recognising that time is the spatial, social subject, which conditions subjectivity in general, its omnipresence as spatial incarnation(s) demanded an ontology that excluded no space(s). By accommodating the simultaneity of particular, divided spaces with a conception of time as simultaneous, spatial co-distinguishabilities, something like the human body-as-space manifests at once as particularly ontic and generally ontological, as concurrently a thing and thinging, and as always already (re-)productively participating in/as monistically singular time.

Conclusion

Body *is* Time (Space *is* Time)

Despite the diversity of its parts...the body is capable of gathering itself into a gesture...which transcends spatial and temporal distances to bring the gestures of all painters together in one single effort...in a single cumulative history – a single act.

— Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs* (1964a[1960]:68-69)

Single, social time

There could not be a more poetic passage to frame our concluding thoughts than the one above. Nevertheless, given the way in which the argument of this thesis has accommodated simultaneously divided/juxtaposed spatialities within a singular ontology of simultaneously co-constitutive/co-distinguishable spatialities, there are terms within this passage to which we can attend more monistically than even Merleau-Ponty has done. Let us break it down, piece by co-implicated piece.

Beginning at its end (a practice which bears a symmetry with one of our developing inquiries, that of a perpetually originary past), we find affirmation of monistic space-as-time, the climactic argument of the last chapter. The “single cumulative history – a single act” (1964a[1960]:69), that Merleau-Ponty proffers seemingly straightforwardly evokes the singularity of every moment in time and/as history that we have witnessed in the preceding chapters. Just as it has been argued that every spatial incarnation conditions the emergence of, and duly constitutes, the entirety of time, or time in general, so we can interpret here in Merleau-Ponty that history/time is always already singular. The pluralistic singularity of time is, as we have discussed, attributable to the co-constitution of its spatially incarnated constituents. The spatial, human body, something through which time is produced, simultaneously emerges distinguishably with/as all other spatial incarnations. This perpetual relation of the body with its

multiplicitous self occurs because of such distinguishable self-divergence. When Merleau-Ponty describes this as occurring “despite the diversity of its parts” (68), I consequently prefer to replace the term “despite,” with the phrase “because of.” Indeed, this seems more consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s own claim in *The Visible and the Invisible*, in which one sees the bottom of the pool (a “divergent part” of the flesh of the world), not *despite* the water, shadows and shimmering light, but *because of* such fleshy, constitutive participations.

This is an indication of the multiplicitous ways in which Being, as space, as the body, manifests as simultaneously pluralistic *and* monistic. Consequently we see in the above citation from Merleau-Ponty that the “body is capable of gathering itself into a gesture” (68). What an interesting way this is of describing the body, conjuring the image of a corporeal conductor of its own dispersed harmonies. A similarly evocative commentary on this theme is found in the Bergsonian/Deleuzian terms of contraction and relaxation recently encountered. We can now say that the body, as Being, in singularly “gathering” itself, is *contracting* itself as an upsurge to/as the perceptual present, from which it will concurrently *relax* into/as other distinguishable forms of itself. That the body is “capable of gathering” itself into such a gesture wonderfully evokes the dispersed sense of the body as both a specific, and a general, phenomenology. It is not that the body, as Being, is simply *here* as opposed to *there*. Being is also perpetually (re-)configuring itself, a monistic corporeality which simultaneously ~~finds~~ itself as a particular, present body, and ~~forgets~~ itself as the impossible past of a body which was never present (given that the past is always already in past-as-present (re-)production). How suitably this re-invites a discussion with Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the way in which forgetting opens memory, consistent with our accommodation of transcendence with immanence, or of divisibility with distinguishability. The body is at once an individual gesture *and* that which, in distinguishing Being from itself, conditions gesturing in general. In this regard, it is not simply that the body is “capable” (as Merleau-Ponty describes) of gathering itself into specific ontic gestures such as the body. Rather, this gesturing, this self-incarnation, is *inescapable*.

The notion of the “gesture” coheres with what we have covered in this thesis if the gesture is characterised in broader terms than simply as an invitation to an “other” to participate in not yet existing intersubjective relations. Rather, gesturing is what always already conditions the possibility of intersubjectivity. I am here referring to the inescapability of the embodied human’s participatory involvement in the production of time. Our (re-)reading of Bourdieu in

chapter three has argued that rather than subjects having to *do something* (Bourdieu's "ways/practices of bodily being") in order to concurrently structure and be structured, as the process via which subject and/as social manifest simultaneously, the structuring/structured gesture manifests simply *by being*. Or more specifically, by being bodied. Just by being, one does not merely gesture to an "other" via already recognised forms of social interaction, but instead one also manifests as the self-gesture of Being, of the flesh of the world perceiving itself through itself in forms of/as itself. There is no reason why this self-gesture is not a social act, or a social phenomenon, provided we conceive of the social as limitlessly pluralistic *and* monistic, as was done with Mead's assistance in chapter four. Consequently, Merleau-Ponty is astute in describing the gesture as a "single act." By describing an all-encompassing conception of the social, from which nothing is excluded, every co-constitutive space-as-time, in conditioning Being's upsurge, is a gesture towards/as itself. The socio-phenomeno-logy of this thesis is not bound by the typical conception restricting the social construction of time to the representation of a separate, worldly phenomenon. Rather, time emerges as inherently socially constructed, given that the condition, the time and the becoming of Being is its intersubjective, co-constitutive, social production via spatial subjectivities of/as itself. Time is the social subject, whose incarnation constitutes, and is constituted by, that which is monistically social. Each such incarnation-as-gesture is always already occurring as Being's perpetually (re-)occurring condition, and thus, origin.

In the first three chapters it was by sociologically engaging body modification practices that we moved from a conception of bodies as separate, individual entities, to a singularly unrestricted conception of the body. In this conclusive chapter's opening citation with which we are still working, Merleau-Ponty notes that such singularity brings the "gestures of all painters together" (69). I will now employ a literal reading of this statement to embellish upon what we have argued concerning body modification, by characterising body modifiers as such painters. Body modification, as we have seen, is typically viewed as a practice which creates something on what was previously a blank, passive canvas. The gesture of the body modifier is comprehended as retaliatory, *against* a pre-existing society which has imposed regulatory norms, and *against* a pre-existing biology whose deterministic processes are beyond the control of the associated cognitive agent. Since undertaking the aforementioned sociological exploration we have reconceived of body modification. Body modification is now comprehended not simply as

something which the painter simply *undertakes* or does *to* their body canvas, but rather as something which the painter *as* body *is*. Given the co-implication of subject and/as social, which became evident during our engagements with Durkheim's sociology, Mead's monistic sociality and with Bourdieu's structurally embodied *habitus*, the notion of social norms or human biologies whose origins permanently pre-exist subjects has been interrogated. Rather, what is social, what is normative and what is biological manifest with/as all co-constitutive bodies, whether seemingly animate or otherwise. This is consistent with the accommodation of social constructionism within and as worldly ontology, instead of just being a contingent, human representation of the world. The canvas is therefore as socially productive/participatory as the painter, the canvas *is* the painter, whereby Merleau-Ponty insightfully posits that the gestures of all painters are "together." This is not simply to reduce them to *only* one and the same painter, or as separately pre-existing painters which subsequently combine forces. Instead, what this recognises is that each is concurrently distinguishable as a particular gesture-painter *and* as the condition of gesturing/painting.

The remaining unattended aspect of Merleau-Ponty's opening citation relies upon terminology which can be nuanced to better reflect what is at stake not only in this thesis through which we have worked, but arguably also in his. The incarnation of the body-as-space, as our preceding chapters have conceived of it, is the gesture of/as Being that conditions space and/as time. Merleau-Ponty describes such a gesture as that "which transcends spatial and temporal distances" (69). By the end of our fourth chapter, such a claim would have resonated strongly. The perpetual here-ness of the body, its omnipresent, co-constitutive, simultaneous emergence with/as all other spaces, which constitutes time, seemingly refuted the notion of spatial or temporal *distance*. These self-perceptual, perpetually immanent relations of time and/as body-as-space indeed apparently transcended, avoided or negated any problematic suppositions of separation, opposition and distance.

However, considering Bergsonian spatial divisibility caused us to rethink transcendence. If the body-as-space-as-time is monistic, there should be no form of space that is excluded. Consequently, it can now be said that the body-as-space-as-time does not simply *transcend* temporal and spatial distance. Instead, exploring how such transcendence is inherent to immanence has facilitated the accommodation of the spatial and temporal distance/division/juxtaposition which had been excluded in chapter four, within a conception of

spatial co-distinguishability/co-constitution/co-permeation in chapter five. If, as Merleau-Ponty has stated, the body-as-gesture is a singular act, something with which I could not agree more, then such bodily singularity must be able to incorporate all kinds of bodies-as-gestures-as-space(s). Moreover, if, as has been argued, space *is* time, then it must also be able to accommodate all kinds of time(s).

In the Introduction it was stated that the central question of this exploration will ask *whether the human body is not merely an exemplar of time, but is implicated in the production of time*. An argument has consequently been developed which addresses the immanently time-productive character of the body-as-space-as-time. Importantly, in characterising the body as concurrently particular *and* general, the body's dispersed time-productive capacity has not ignored that the body is always a "local" *exemplar* of time as well. Denying that the time-productive body concurrently exemplifies time would contradict daily experience.

It was also declared in the Introduction that what is at stake concerns why time *and* space have been conceptually polarised at a constitutive, ontological level. This conceptual polarisation has been unpacked via an *interrogation of the assumption that the source of time transcends what is physical/spatial*. What has been developed is an understanding of space-as-time as monistic. Such a conception of monistic space has required the accommodation of all such space(s), whether they are divisible from each other, or are co-distinguishable as each other. All that remains, the phenomenological world in its monistic givenness, is the singular, all-encompassing body-as-space, as the always, already source of time.

Such originary, bodily implication in/as time distinguishes this thesis from philosophical accounts in which space is polarised from time. Furthermore, exploring the consequent co-constitution between the individual body and/as the social body has problematised sociological assumptions that time simply pre-exists the social arrangement, management and representation of it. Accounts in the social sciences of the organisation and experience of a pre-existing, separate time-source are thus differentiated from the examination in this thesis of the ontology of time, which has been a sociological undertaking because time is the social subject under investigation. In accommodating social construction as the immanent condition, rather than the separate representation, of worldly Being, the underlying ramification is that everything is social and thus open to sociological inquiry.

In mapping how we have explored the subjectivity of time, it should be recalled that this undertaking began by considering the role of objective time in social synchronisation and function. By retrieving the source of objectivity from worldly transcendent exteriority, objective rhythms were identified as being produced immanently within the collective, social realm of humans. A further engagement with Durkheim illustrated an individual-social relation in which the individual concurrently constitutes, and is constituted by, objective social structure(s). Whilst this accommodated objectivity and subjectivity in the same model, the division between time and space nevertheless remained intact. Identifying how human subjects are productively implicated in the temporality of objective rhythms is one thing. This does not, however, automatically attribute such involvement to their embodiment/being-spatial.

Much care was exercised at this point not to reduce the human involvement in the temporality of objective, social rhythms to a demarcated, subjective operation. Without a common temporality, societies could not function, and the shared agreement, coherence and synchronisation which conditions social time would not occur. The subjective involvement in time has instead used the insight of individual-social co-constitution to characterise subjectivity as socially engendered, concurrently producing, and produced by, “other” subjectivities. With Derrida’s post-structural assistance, this originary/primordial ontology of co-constitutive subjectivities has been attributed to any spatiality, such as the body-as-space. Just by being bodied, one conditions the production of other bodies, a differentiating process which manifests as time. The inescapable reality of this time-productive ontology marks its objectivity for all subjectivities.

By acknowledging the human body as a spatiality in which the source of time is immanent, perpetually involved in a worlding, ontological production which (re-)conceives of bodily limits, the criticism was consequently anticipated that it is difficult to say where corporeality is. This presented a contradiction. Having characterised the body in such all-encompassing temporalising/socialising terms, the body appeared to be everywhere and yet nowhere. In developing an argument of the body-as-space-as-time, the body became, ironically, abstracted, taking on the ethereal, transcendent properties with which time has classically been aligned *in contradistinction* to what is spatial/tangible/substantial.

In order to address the concern that a post-structuralist, temporalising body is displaced from here to there to here *ad infinitum*, an engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology

facilitated the development of an argument in which the body, whose incarnation constitutes the concurrent incarnation of the entirety or generality of Being/beings, is always already perpetually present/here. The body-as-space is at once a particular thing, a specific where-as-when, and yet its incarnation, in simultaneously conditioning, and being conditioned by, all other space(s), is implicated in/as every thing, as every where-as-when. It is because this self-self relation manifests as an always immanent, worldly subjective, monistic mechanism, that no upsurge of time is ever out of sync with any other upsurge. Every body-as-space-as-when participates in/as all bodies-as-spaces-as-whens, which is how subjects know what the time is, how subjects cohere with the time of other subjects, and how social synchronisation occurs.

Working with Mead's conception of the social, it must be remembered that we have reconceptualised social synchronisation. Typically, social synchronisation is defined as subjects simultaneously meeting at the same clocked and calendared representation of a permanently pre-existing, distantly separate, time-source. The presumed external objectivity of this time-source seems utilisable for synchronisation by two or more already existing subjects, who can arrange to socially coincide via their shared knowledge of the same representation of time. In this thesis however, synchronisation is conceived of as the simultaneous, objective co-production of spatial-subjects-as-times, who are inescapably synchronous because they socially emerge with, and as, each other *as* time. Such subjects cannot pre-exist their synchronous ontologies, given that every subjectivity only emerges synchronously and intersubjectively with other subjects. As we have seen, this is Being's self-social construction/production, whereby the social construction/representation of time manifests via/as itself as spatial, social subjects.

Characterising space-as-time as a monistic, all-encompassing constitution demanded an ontology of immanent distinguishability *rather than* transcendent divisibility. Indeed, these co-constitutive conditions characterised space-as-time. Separating distinguishability from divisibility however installed the kind of mutually exclusive polarisation, reminiscent of that between time|space, that was being interrogated. Given the now apparent all-encompassing nature of the body-as-space, every space, including "divisible space(s)," needed to be accommodated, and has been during our inquiries in chapter five.

One particular ramification of this speaks to my claim in chapter two that the measurement of rates of social phenomena such as suicide(s) or body modification practice(s) are "not quantifying, but chronologising," given their constitutive role in (re-)producing

objective rhythms. This was an important observation at that stage. What must now be said though, given the way in which the supposed distinction between quantifiable space and qualitative time has been re-conceptualised, is that social rates of anything are concurrently quantifying *and* chronologising. By accommodating the simultaneity of divided space(s) with a conception of time as simultaneously co-distinguishable spatialities, something like the human body-as-space (re-)emerges as a particular thing that is also always already becoming/conditioning every thing. Consequently, in response to the opening query which asked whether *bodily change is an unavoidable ramification, and corporeal representation, of the relentless power of time*, we must answer that yes, time is relentless, and that this is because the body perpetually (re-)emerges as a particular thing and/as the condition of every thing. Bodily change is the character of being bodied, because being bodied is the perpetual, social condition, and the origin, of time.

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