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SOCIAL POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY CONFERENCE, SYDNEY, 21-23 JULY 1999

VOLUME 1

edited by Sheila Shaver and Peter Saunders

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Foreword

In 1999, the Social Policy Research Centre once again hosted the National Social Policy Conference, the sixth time it has done so. The Centre's charter identifies one of its main functions as being the organisation of seminars and conferences on social policy issues. Over the years, the social policy conference has come to have a special place in the SPRC work program. It has also become a regular national forum for people from academia, government and social policy agencies to exchange ideas about research on the issues facing the nation and its policy makers. Its interdisciplinary character and broad range of subject matter have, we believe, encouraged informed critical dialogue about the strengths, weaknesses and directions of Australian social policy.

At the century's end, Australians face a global environment fraught with uncertainty. Changes in taxation, employment, the financial relationships between the Commonwealth and the States and welfare reform are on the domestic agenda. The conference theme, *Social Policy for the 21st Century: Justice and Responsibility*, invites reflection on the policies, the means to fund them, and the kinds of delivery mechanisms that will most effectively contribute to the well-being of all Australians in the next century.

The Keynote and Plenary addresses evaluate the state and direction of social policy developments on the eve of a new century. Jill Roe brought an historian's eye to past and present developments, in order to assess the prospects for the future trends and priorities. Peter Townsend took up the theme of social exclusion and social polarisation, putting these in the context of national and international policy developments. Anne Marie Guillemard, the Centre's 1999 Visiting Fellow, looked at changes in work in later life, and the challenges these pose for employment and employers.

The papers in this and its accompanying volume take up these themes. This volume includes the Keynote Address and the first Plenary Paper as well as fifteen papers selected from the large number given at the conference. Together, the two volumes provide a balance between analytical, theoretical and practical approaches to social policy which will stimulate interest in a variety of areas.

Peter Saunders
Director

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Social Policy and the End of the Cold War: Where Do We Stand?

Jill Roe[1]
Division of Humanities
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1 Introduction

It is a great and unexpected honour to be addressing you today. Still, it makes sense to have an historian at this moment; and at a time when some sectors of Australian society seem to be in denial about the value of historical knowledge, it is heartening that the social policy world still thinks history matters - even if, as I shall later suggest, it could do better in some respects. To me, and I imagine to many of you, the sense that history matters represents the best possible premise for the conference theme, 'Social Policy for the 21st Century', with its timely stress on the historic values of 'justice and responsibility'. If there are doubters, and there probably are, I hope to convince you that history offers a more realistic purchase on where we stand than the simplicities of the calendar and its swag of fortuitously associated events. This address looks ahead by reaching back, mostly to the 1970s, though occasionally as far as the 1890s. Its starting point is the end of the Cold War, rather than 'the cusp of the millennium' or some such.

Not that I mean to be a kill-joy about the big events coming up: the third millennium (whenever it actually begins), the Y2000 Olympics and the centenary of Federation in 2001. Despite media overload, and gross opportunism in many quarters, not to mention the state of Sydney right now, many Australians are looking forward to these events, and my working assumptions are the opposite of negative. Focal events, and the views of visitors, have often produced fresh

1 Addresses like this are seldom prepared unaided, and I wish to acknowledge a small (very small!) allocation from my Department at Macquarie University, the occasional research assistance of Robyn Arrowsmith and Lynn Milne, and the advice of several esteemed colleagues who may or may not be mentioned hereafter but whose insights and encouragement are appreciated all the same. In these days of reflexive scholarship, it seems important to mention how I and my colleagues have looked for press reports of the fall of the Berlin Wall, for Australia reviews and listings of the work of Richard Titmuss, and for dates for foundational figures in the field such as T. H. Kewley (1911-1989) and the legendary Katherine Ogilvie (1902-1983), both of whom died in the 1980s, as did Aboriginal activist Pearl Gibbs (1901-1983). I am delighted to add that Ronald Mendelsohn is here today. There is a Sydney slant to what follows, though I do not apologise for that. It is just a start; and part of my message is that we be clear about such things.

understandings - as when, a century ago, phrases such as 'State experiments' and 'social laboratory' entered our vocabulary - and with luck, these coming events will be a help again, even, and perhaps especially, for Aboriginal Australia. In what follows, hope is almost as important as history.

The question is: where *do* we stand now, in 1999? First, I will seek to establish a viable historical perspective on contemporary events. Second, assuming that a certain amount of self-examination never goes astray, I will take a more extended look at what has been happening to social policy and history as related fields, since the 1970s especially, and this will be both personal and professional. Third, at a time when politically inspired social policy prescriptions seem to be popping up everywhere, I mean to take critical note of some of the options currently on offer, including Aboriginal Australians' demand for an end to 'welfarism'. Overall, I propose that, although wrong lessons have been learned from contemporary history, and it often seems that Australian history is just too hard, too layered, and above all too recent, to serve as a corrective, if you take the longer view, I think you will find that the ground on which we stand is firmer than it seems. Moreover, if the Australian approach to justice and responsibility can be made to prevail, the costs of change need not be left to lie where they fall, as has happened of late. About one million Australians voted for Pauline Hanson's One Nation party last election, and even if most were in Queensland, that is a worrying thought (Jupp, 1998; Goot, 1998).

2 1989 and Thereabouts

The Cold War ended in 1989. The end of the Cold War has been the most hopeful moment in modern history. Who can forget the euphoria as East Germans started streaming over and around the Wall on the night of 10 November 1989. Suddenly, that deadly concrete and barbed wire structure dating from 1961 divided the great city no more. Next day's headline in the far-off *Sydney Morning Herald* read simply: 'FREEDOM. The Wall Crumbles'.

Another *Herald* headline that day read 'The World Jumps Off Its Axis'. It was too soon to say more. 1989 was the year of ever-intensifying wonder, beginning when the free trade union movement Solidarity was restored to legality in Poland. Soon after, Hungary opened its border with Austria, and later to West Germany. The year closed with the execution of the Ceausescus in Rumania, and the demise of two other tyrants, Pinochet in Chile and Noriega in Panama. By year's end it was clear that (to quote another *Herald* headline, 4 December 1989), 'The Cold War is Over'. Within months, free elections would be held in all the old Warsaw Pact countries and Germany unified. The collapse of the Soviet Union came soon after.

On that same day when the fall of the Berlin Wall was headlined FREEDOM, there were articles in the *Herald* on Gorbachev the unwitting liberator, and more ominously, on chaos in the eastern bloc and the prospect of a fourth Reich. But the sub-editors became increasingly sure of the direction of things. And whether or not the world had 'jumped off its axis' - and in a sense it did - the fact remains that 1989 saw the communist world give way to the capitalist.

The year 1989 was historic in another respect. On 14 July 1989, the world celebrated the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution. It was in Paris in July 1989 that Gorbachev spoke of 'a common European home', and of that great reference point, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It was to the ideals of the French Revolution that Eastern European dissidents had turned again and again. And Chinese students had sung the Marseillaise in Tianenmen Square only weeks before. Most importantly, whereas a century earlier, at the centenary of the French Revolution in 1889, there had been hopes and fears of another, in 1989, there really was one.

Not everyone was impressed by recollection of the first modern revolution. Lavish celebrations in Paris to mark the fall of the Bastille on 14 July, 1789 were reported that day as 'Birthday of the Bastille sends Paris crackers' on p.17 of the *Sydney Morning Herald* ; and a rather grudging editorial was headed 'The French and their Revolution'. As if it were not ours, or the world's too. Shaped by revisionist historiography and Thatcherite in tone, the editorial referred to the Chinese students as offering a 'curious spectacle' and left mention of the Revolution's symbolic importance to the last paragraph.

No doubt the French Bicentenary was overshadowed. And of course, and for as long as I can recall, the role of ideas in the French Revolution has been downgraded by historians, even more so these days. The prevailing interpretation is that the Revolution was a tragedy for France, due to extremism and the backlash (Doyle, 1989). Nonetheless, it is also true that the rush to economic rationalism in the 1980s placed more inclusive values at a discount; and, in passing, it is interesting the tone was in marked contrast to reportage a decade or so earlier of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution. 'Happy Birthday America' said the *Sun-Herald* , 4 July 1976. Reporting centre page, journalist Don Roseborough summed things up: '[i]t's all happening here in America today'.

I will return to American perspectives. The point here - I hope I have not laboured too long over it - is that 1989 marked the end of an era. In *The Age of Extremes* (1994) the distinguished British historian Eric Hobsbawm writes of 'the Short Twentieth Century' (1914-1991). In this scenario, the short 20th century begins with the First World War and ends with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Hobsbawm, 1994: 5). This seems like a viable historical perspective to me. And if not exactly reassuring in social policy terms, it is at least a

clarification of where we stand. With the end of the 20th has gone, on the one hand, the fear of social revolution in advanced capitalist societies which underwrote so much of the history of social policy. A century ago, it was said 'We are all socialists now'. Today we are all capitalists. Mostly. Well may we wonder what will come next, if hard-won protective arrangements are dismantled: indifference perhaps, as in the US, where downward social mobility is a serious issue and it is assumed the losers will manage, somehow - or, as I once heard a girl hiss at a protestor in Cambridge, MA, 'get another job' (Newman: 1994). On the other hand, the time-bound and unbalanced approach of Soviet-style socialism made it ambivalent about social protection too. That world system did not contribute much to social policy repertoires at its core, and it meant uncertain or too easily discredited allies elsewhere. Not that this was the whole story by any means. The communists were great shop stewards in Australia; and unity is strength. But looking ahead, a balance is not so hard to strike. At a time of capitalist insurgency, and its accompanying ideology of globalism, it is surely better that a range of alternative understandings are again respectable, citizenship and community for example, and that human agency is once more acknowledged (Saul, 1995).

The marketeers have been having a field day. But we should take heart from the fact that 1989 has restored to prominence more inclusive values. The cracks are already showing, and second thoughts are increasingly expressed (recently by the Deputy-Governor of the Commonwealth Bank, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 July 1999). Geoffrey Blainey wonders aloud if socialism will not be popular again in about 15 years time. My suggestion is less dramatic, but I would think more weighty, namely, that 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' has passed into the parlance of modernity, and in that guise is now well-nigh indestructible. The emphasis may have fallen differently from time to time - thus Liberty is to the fore today, whereas Equality was the leading preoccupation 50 years ago - and some elements seem more vulnerable than others, most notably Fraternity, which has a particular resonance and importance in this country - yet the script itself survives. What is more, it is integral to modern concepts of well-being. To leap ahead for a moment, to the various social policy prescriptions and futures in circulation, it seems that in mature capitalist societies striking the right balance between 'freedom to' and 'freedom from' is where it is all at now (Hattersley, 1998).

Touching base briefly, it is harder to maintain the optimism. In Australia, an update on Fraternity is especially needed. Words like 'mateship' and a 'fair go' once served, but no longer it seems, or not very well. In truth, mateship has been on the down since the 1950s, when Manning Clark described it as 'small beer' (Clark, 1956), with numerous critiques since, including some vigorous feminist critiques (for example, Pringle and Watson, 1990). A 'fair go' has lasted rather better (Mendelsohn, 1982; Horne, 1998). However, a *Report on Fairness* compiled by the International Institute for Research on Competitiveness at Curtin

University, WA, is said to have found that the classic Australian approach of 'a fair go' has 'all but gone', and is being replaced by 'an unhealthy suspicion of others' seen to be doing better than one's self. According to the report (Matt Price, *Australian*, 15 February 1999), there is a common mistrust of outsiders, and widespread resentment of disadvantaged groups such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Australians, it seems, have a problem with 'otherness'. In economic terms, this is probably inevitable, given that enterprise bargaining has so speedily replaced long-established habits of centralised wage fixation and regulation, and competition is king, even in educational institutions (and I suspect charitable organisations too). In strictly social policy terms, what the findings suggest is that the 19th century distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor has been revived in this country, as elsewhere; and that the ancient principle of 'less eligibility' enshrined in the British New Poor Law (1834) - that is, the poor should always be worse off than the lowest paid independent labourer otherwise work incentives will be undermined - has been given a great new lease of life.

3 The 1970s and Before

I am not sure how much credence should be placed on this report, but it is a straw in the wind. And it is not what was supposed to happen. Although we knew our social policy theory and the three - or was it four? - models of social policy - can I recall them? - residual, handmaiden, institutional - 20 years ago, scarcely anyone imagined that the idea of social policy as a strengthener of market rewards, i.e. the 'handmaiden' model, would take hold in late 20th century Australia, or even that policy would go in that direction. As recently as the late 1970s, when affluence seemed less assured, the main issue was still seen as redistributive. What was embarrassing was that the Australian approach was not sufficiently so, and it looked suspiciously like a residual operation.

In 1976 there appeared a chunky red and white covered book of readings and commentary entitled *Social Policy in Australia* (Roe, 1976). It was a novice and in some respects perhaps dull offering; but it did surprisingly well. Not in all quarters, however. Left reviewers were especially unimpressed. The title was pretentious. The readings were scarcely worth exhuming. The editor suffered from historical amnesia. This was mortifying, and in part true - I did not know much labour history then - but in retrospect, the more telling criticism came from another quarter. Colin Bell, an English sociologist working at this University at the time, wondered why the editor had so little to say on what was distinctive about Australian social policy (Bell, 1976). The short answer is, I had not given it a thought.

Some subsequent writings have attempted to meet Bell's point, as in my last offering to this conference, 'Social policy and the cultural cringe' (Roe, 1993), and more recently on 'The Australian way' (Roe, 1998).[2]

Others have been hard at work on the issue; and broadly speaking, I think one of the great achievements of social policy analysts in the 1990s has been to work out what is and what is not distinctive about 'the Australian way'. Just to mention a couple of indicators, under Peter Saunders (1998) and Sheila Shaver (O'Connor, Orloff and Shaver, 1999) the Social Policy Research Centre has vigorously pursued comparative international contexts on key issues such as income distribution and gender outcomes; and I have just mentioned *Contesting the Australian Way*. One contributor to that collection brings both national and international perspectives to bear by asking 'Is Australia particularly unequal?' Answer: no, not in 1993 anyway, when Australia ranked among the most equal of the 25 richest countries in the world. And lo! Australia does have 'a distinctive poverty regime' after all (Whiteford, 1998). Meanwhile, in an excellent account a few years back of its refurbishment during the Labor years, political scientist Frank Castles has, happily I think, eaten his fierce words about the outdated character of 'the worker's welfare state' in Australia (Castles, 1994). It should have been the male working class welfare state too, he adds.

It is a relief to find *Social Policy in Australia* (Roe, 1976) has a substantial index entry for 'women'. As you would expect in social policy works, but is still not standard in general histories, there are entries for 'wives' and 'widows' as well. It seems I still had my feet on the ground there - in general we objected to separate women entries in those days, unless there was one for men too. However, there is no reading on women and social policy inside. Maybe we were not thinking hard enough about that either. But we were trying; and the women's movement did not come from nowhere. A prior attempt to chart need had been made for example by the New South Wales Council of Social Service with the Aitken-Swan study of widows (Brennan, 1960). And through the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), the newly founded Women's Electoral Lobby made a 'client' submission to the Henderson Poverty Inquiry (I seem to recall I was an editor), but a traditional 'give us a bit more' approach prevailed. Basically, 1976 was too soon to know much. With the four classic works on Australian women's history appearing in 1975, the ground work with regard to sources for women's past experience had only just begun (*Australian Historical Studies*, 1996; Daniels et al., 1977). Soon there would be a whole book on the subject (Baldock and Cass, 1983), and there has even been a successor volume (Edwards and Magarey, 1995).

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2 This is not a commercial for the recently published collection in which it appears, *Contesting the Australian Way* (Smyth and Cass, 1998), though I may as well mention it, as it is miracle to get anything published these days.

Recent research suggests that Australian social policy is now more nearly 'gender blind' (Shaver, 1993). But we can probably agree with Marilyn Lake too, that there are too many weary women out there and that women need to re-invent the welfare state (Lake,1999). Maybe they are, through volunteering, but history shows they have been doing that for a century or so. The great contribution of Australian women and some men during wars for example is increasingly appreciated (Oppenheimer, 1998, 1999). It is rather bad form to laugh at sock knitters these days. Not only have most of us forgotten how to knit, but during World War I the army sock allocation was three pairs. And I cannot feel so sanguine about what is happening to women at the margins. The apparently worsening situation of young Aboriginal women is most perturbing (Daly and Smith, 1998).

I now understand why writers often say they cannot bear to read their early work. Apart from anything else, it reminds you how old you are. Pressing on, there are some 17 index entries to Aborigines in *Social Policy in Australia* (Roe, 1976) and the Commonwealth gets a guernsey for non-discriminatory benefits in the 1940s. That seemed quite good to me at the time. It does not now. (I did not know who got the money then, or much about Queensland.) And again, there is no specific reading inside. At least there is a capital A for Aborigines (a comparatively new thing then); and not much research had been done there either. As Peter Cochrane has recently explained in an important article in *Eureka Street* (October 1998), the problem was that Aboriginality was still something anthropologists did, not historians or social policy analysts (with some notable exceptions, such as C.D. Rowley and Lorna Lippmann); and the great surge in acknowledged Aboriginality and Aboriginal Australian history which we now take for granted (if variously interpret) was just beginning. The realisation of Aboriginal difference has come slowly and painfully. The turning point was Henry Reynolds' *The Other Side of the Frontier* (1981).

I hope there will be another soon. The great truth that some 19th century Australian historians were realising in the 1980s, Beverley Kingston for one (1988), that in Australia, Aboriginal people became 'the poorest of the poor' and subject to rigours remarkably like those of the British New Poor Law (1834), has never really been developed. By now, I fear, the worlds of social policy and Aboriginality are further apart than ever; and to leap ahead again, speaking as both an historian and a citizen - I agree with Reynolds here, that they can hardly be divided (1999: 244) - I believe it would be appropriate if Aboriginal leaders clarified what they mean when they call for an end to 'welfarism' (e.g. Noel Pearson, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 May 1999; Alan Duff, the Margaret Throsby Show, ABC Radio, May 1999). Presumably it does not mean that Aboriginal Australians should cease to be entitled to the same benefits as other Australians, such as old age and sickness benefits. It was right in 1976 to note the importance of non-discriminatory benefits from the 1940s (even if it did not really happen until later), and fundamentally it still is.

As for immigration, good heavens, only nine entries! In a work subtitled 'Some Perspectives 1901-1975' this seems limited to say the least, though the actual references look reasonable still, and the integration policy is questioned. It seems the editor had more to say about the decline of the White Australia Policy than the strains of ethnicity, another consuming concern for later workers in the field. Here the ground has shifted more than once in 20 years, and the immigration debate continues. By now, however, some historians are wondering why the multicultural character of 19th century Australia has not been acknowledged; and graduate students are hard at work on the sources. In retrospect, more not less should have been said about the end of the White Australia Policy. As Donald Horne has often remarked, and research is beginning to consider, the ending of the White Australia Policy is one of the most significant achievements of the Australian people.

At this point I hasten to say *Social Policy in Australia* has long been out of print and so far as I know there are no plans to reissue it. This is not some kind of commercial. The relevant question is: what were people like me really thinking about 20 years ago, when social policy was a new, and to some, unwelcome phrase? If not centrally about race, or ethnicity, or (to be honest) even gender, what? Well, the answer is not hard to find, and you can reach it by elimination anyway. 'The approach adopted throughout', it is written, '[is] that large events (or people for that matter) do affect social policy-making, but most significantly in their differing impact over social classes, and that in reality social policy is the expression of adjustments between classes' (Roe, 1976: 316). That phrase 'or people for that matter' seems a bit cavalier now, does it not? That great sixties mantra 'people matter' was still a collectivist idea, and events had not yet brought an understanding of the inner dynamics of cultural history, which at its best now serves to illuminate whole new areas of individual agency. Anyway, the text goes on to say that, despite difficulties in grasping class differentials in a modern affluent society like Australia, 'class relations have been the essence of social policy'. So that is it: social class was the thing.

Timing always matters. Two aspects have a bearing. First, the text was actually written in 1974. I am surprised to read that the Henderson Poverty Commission's findings had not yet appeared. Second, it was written on leave in London. That is not especially significant in itself, except perhaps in that it was not Australia, where Labor was at last in government, if not power. More significant, and with a bearing on Bell's (1976) insightful comment on the final product, is that back home I had been teaching modern British history; my head was full of the 'welfare state' debate there and in Australia (and the Australian literature was still manageable); and my hero was Richard Morris Titmuss, founder and doyen of postwar social administration analysis in the UK, a man whose lustre is not much dimmed for me by the recent innovative double memoir of him and his wife Kay by their only, and possibly somewhat undutiful daughter, Anne Oakley (1997). Titmuss died in 1973 and his last book, lectures entitled *Social Policy. An*

Introduction , was published posthumously, in 1974. There was I, a Level B lecturer with my swag of Australian materials on one the hand and the slim blue volume *Social Policy* on the other. I even dared to criticise the great man: 'When we study welfare systems', he wrote, 'we see they reflect the dominant cultural and political characteristics of their societies' (1974: 22). What about economic characteristics, quoth she. After all, it was Titmuss who insisted that we should try to see things whole.

Memory, as younger historians are forever reminding us, is a tricky source. In any event, in 1974 it seemed obvious that essays such as 'The social division of welfare' had the potential to cast a flood of light on class in Australia (Titmuss, 1958). As well, although Titmuss had worked as an actuary and his strongest insights were generally grounded in the sums, he brought exciting new histories to bear, such as the relationship between war and welfare. That has mattered a lot in this country, for women as well as for men, and not just during World War I, as later studies have clarified, e.g. of 'the Repat' and war widows (Roe, 1987; Garton, 1997; Damousi, 1999). Another significant essay, as I recall, pertained to the Pill. Less assimilable, but still a great challenge , was *The Gift Relationship* (1970), Titmuss's last major work. A comparative study of blood donating systems in the UK and the US, *The Gift Relationship* may have evinced something of the old British Left's anti-Americanism, but it also restored altruism to the agenda. (I see*The Gift Relationship* has recently been reissued in the UK, its importance underlined in the age of AIDS.) Above all, Titmuss's moral stance seemed so impressive. Almost from the beginning - though not quite, as a liberal eugenic strand has been identified there (Oakley, 1991)- certainly from the 1940s and *Issues Of Social Policy* (Titmuss, 1950), he insisted on the functional superiority of universal and inclusive social policy provision over selectivist approaches. And, for some, maybe many - Bettina Cass tells me for her - it was all summed up in that wonderful Postscript to *Social Policy* (Titmuss, 1974) where he wrote about his experiences as a cancer patient in Westminster hospital. It concludes with his observation about the only discernible variable between his radium treatment and that of a young West Indian fellow sufferer. 'Sometimes he went into the Radium Room first; sometimes I did. What determined waiting was quite simply the vagaries of London traffic - not race, religion, colour or class' (Titmuss, 1974: 151). It seemed strange that Titmuss was so little known in Australia.

Or was he? A quick survey suggests that only the few paid much attention during his life time. But the few were significant, especially Sir Keith Hancock, probably Australia's greatest historian to date and as general editor of the History of World War II UK Civil Series, a major influence on Titmuss (Davison, Hirst and Macintyre, 1998; Gowing, 1975). It was Hancock who drew the young John Lawrence's attention to Titmuss's ideas, and Titmuss was an examiner of Lawrence's PhD thesis, from which emerged what is still the only history of social work in Australia (Lawrence,1965). Here is one of those links in which the

historian delights. Another would be through Kathleen Woodroofe, the first woman associate professor in history at this University, who also wrote the first history of the social work profession, *From Charity to Social Work in England and the United States* (1962). Too much cannot be made of personal links, however. Mostly the Cold War was too cold; and Catholic social teaching was probably more influential in the heyday of the DLP, which finally died the death in 1974 (hands up those who know who Santamaria was).

From a look in the most likely places - journals, reviews, etc. - it seems the Australian impact came later, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus a reviewer of *Retreat from the Welfare State* (Graycar,1983) in the *Australian Journal of Social Issues,* Christine Hallett (1984: 72), noted that 'the influence of Titmuss upon the book is profound'; and I doubt if there is a serious contributor in similar journals in the 1980s who did not draw in some way on his work. By then, unfortunately, the big men were about to move in, to, among other things, recast Australian history in a suitably economic rationalist format, most notably Paul Kelly's *The End of Certainty* (1992), with its rigid notion of an 'Australian settlement'.

Our little survey also casts light on the particular impact of Titmuss in Australia. In the first review located of *Essays on 'the Welfare State'* (1958), in *Public Administration* in1959, Mary McLelland was cool-ish in tone, conveying maybe that the essays on the National Health Service were the best. In the long run that may well be proven right. But what people seem to have been most impressed by - are still impressed by - is Titmuss's understanding of the dynamics of inequality. The item most often referred to is that essay I mentioned earlier, 'The social division of welfare'. (And, in passing, it is interesting to discover, the book it appeared in, *Essays on the 'Welfare State'*, plus the lectures on *Social Policy*, seem to be the ones most frequently on university reading lists of the time.) And if you think about it, that's not surprising. 'The social division of welfare' largely explained the persistence of poverty in the 'welfare state' era. And it spoke directly to the 'Australian Dream'.

The 'Australian Dream' is so out of fashion by now there is not even an entry in that excellent work of reference, the *Oxford Companion to Australian History* (1998). The last time anyone dared to use the phrase was 1968, when Ian Turner collected up visions and dreams of Australia's future, from the 18th to the mid-20th century (*The Australian Dream*, Turner, 1968). It is not the same thing as the Australian Legend, by the way. By the 1890s, the Dream had come to refer to a new and fairer society, a hope which found expression in both literature and legislation, not least social policy literature and legislation. Not as much was achieved in social policy as the boosters say; but the foundations were laid in accordance with the most advanced prescriptions of the day, and what is now seen as a distinctive and quite effective poverty regime dates from that time (Roe, 1976; Whiteford, 1998).

In retrospect, it is obvious that in some respects the national experience was not really aligned with the Titmuss paradigm, the vulnerability of which is now all too plain, in the UK as well as here (Deacon:1993). In Australia, the approach has always been highly selective, with significant work-related content, whereas the Titmuss approach was all universalism and the State (Kewley, 1965, 1980; Castles, 1994). Things did veer in that direction during the Whitlam years, as with Medibank, the national superannuation inquiry and free tertiary education. But it mostly did not last. We still have Medicare, I think.

What also seems clear in retrospect is that 'the golden age' ended in 1974 (Macintyre, 1999). A new chapter in Australian social policy history was beginning. Nonetheless, the likelihood is that future historians of social policy in Australia will see the last 20 years as much in terms of continuity as of change. Maybe reading Titmuss helped people keep a straight course during the eighties, dubbed by Macintyre 'the gilded years of excess'. By now, then, we stand at the beginning of a second century of social policy and social practice with an inheritance to defend and extend.

A caveat or two must be entered. A 1998 survey of social work as a subject in Australia suggests that it is on the verge of a research culture (Rosenman, O'Connor and Healy, 1998). If so, let us hope it includes some more history. It is a lamentable fact that, a generation on, we do not have a successor volume to Lawrence's pioneering history of social work in Australia (1965). Leading figures in university Social Work departments set the scene for the 1960s rediscovery of poverty. Later, here at least, they were important in establishing research institutes. The Social Policy Research Centre was established in 1978 (O'Farrell, 1999: 74). By now, I would suppose, these departments constitute not just a vital training ground but a core constitutency for the still emerging field of social policy. That is to say, institutions matter as well as ideas and individuals; and no satisfying answer to where we stand is possible without some sense of that history too. Another way of putting it would be that for good and useful history, you need long runs of sources, not just bits and pieces.

I mention this at a time of close, and rewarding, scrutiny of diverse intellectual traditions in the humanities and the social sciences in this country (Maddox, 1998), also because tradition is, or can be, in itself a source of strength. By way of illustration, a closer look than is feasible here would surely show a significant American influence on social policy and social work education in Australia since the 1960s. If you look through the staff lists of those same Sydney departments back to 1961, there are usually one or two, usually women, with American qualifications, often obtained from Chicago. (The impression would probably be even stronger if one surveyed economics departments too, but that task lies ahead.) I like especially the story of Norma Parker, a West Australian by origin and founding figure of social work in this University, meeting up with Kate Ogilvie on the boat coming back from the US in the early 1930s. Parker had just

gained her professional qualification from the Catholic University, Washington, and was on her way back to set up the first almoners' department at St Vincent's Hospital, Darlinghurst. Kate Ogilvie had been on a trip to study hospital administration funded by the Rachel Forster Hospital, in Surry Hills (Roe, 1998: 144). Both appear on the Sydney University staff list in 1961, as does R.J. Lawrence. Likewise, the changing nomenclature of that Department since then may be followed in the University's official history (Connell et al., 1995: 229-34). But what does that mean? Was there a Cold War problem in Sydney, as in Melbourne? Who knows? By now, it is called the Department of Social Work, Social Policy and Sociology. Of course, the social sciences are mostly very young in this country, reaching back not much further that the 1950s; and it maybe too soon to tell tales. But the Sydney Department will soon be 60, and its widening span seems to capture something of more general significance. May I be so bold as to suggest it could usefully mark survival to the millennium by commissioning a history of itself.

Another and very different caveat is necessary. The first of these social policy conferences - an institution which is itself a mark of field maturation - was held in Canberra in May 1982. From the account in the *Australian Journal of Social Issues,* by none other than Sheila Shaver (1982), it does not sound as if it was terribly stimulating. 'As the showcase for a new discipline', she reported, 'the conference displayed a largely obsolete line of goods'. There was nothing much on the 1970s, and the boundaries had been drawn too tight. There were few economists and fewer historians in evidence. What struck me most, however, was that there was no paper on race or ethnicity. If this year's program is any guide - and I hope it is not - things do not seem to have changed much.

This section has been intended as a small contribution to the search for a national perspective on social policy since the 1970s and is rounded off with a suggestion as to how the period might be approached. In a policy sense, much larger contributions have already been made. Last year saw the publication of *Australian Poverty. Then and Now*, described by editors Fincher and Nieuwenhuysen (1998) as an 'informal tribute' to Ronald Henderson, who is in turn described as 'a latter day Australian William Beveridge', and whose landmark *Report* in 1975 is seen as 'the single most important contribution to the applied social sciences since 1945' (Fincher and Nieuwenhuysen, 1998: 2). This year (1999) has brought us 'Newtown' revisited, or to give the full title, *Social Change, Suburban Lives. An Australian Newtown 1960s to 1990s*, by Lois Bryson (one of two original researchers of the industrial suburb somewhere near Dandenong) and Ian Winter. In both cases, the longer view is quite sombre, highlighting 'the new geography of poverty' and the retreat from the welfare state. The essays suggest that impoverishment - or is it downward social mobility? - has increased since Henderson; and Newtown is a lesser place, due to factory closures. As well, in Newtown revisited there is a critical rethink of

approaches, and fascinatingly, a return to Titmuss and 'the social division of welfare'.

4 The New Prescriptions

Little enough time remains to address the new prescriptions. On reflection, I wonder if it matters. Respectful attention is paid to British talk of a 'third way' (Giddens, 1998); but how significant is it even there? (Lukes, 1998; Hattersley, 1998). Likewise Lindsay Tanner's *Open Australia* (1998), which is probably the representative Australian contribution, is all very well, but its perspectives do not extend back further than the supposedly alienating 1960s and it seems a bit alarmist. In real terms, the big question is how much people are prepared to pay for social protection and the luxury of belonging. If that sounds cynical, think what it would cost really to address the needs of Aboriginal Australia by way of regional development funds. Bear in mind also that the new prescriptions are not all that new in Australian terms. As a nation-building settler society, Australia has always had to make its own way, and it has a strong democratic tradition. Probably what we have already will have to do; and, I have been saying, that is no bad thing, so long as we understand it and what we are doing with it.

Throughout this address are woven thoughts and observations as to social policy and Aboriginality. Here history is not enough, at least not the history we have so far. Still to come is an understanding of how what has happened is part of the history of social policy in Australia, and a better documentation of what 'complicit' really means. For instance, it may be argued that 'the stolen generation' were victims of an already out-dated charitable/social policy of 'child saving' dating back to the 19th century; and far from people not being told, some evidence suggests that people knew quite well what was going on, or could have. In some places the raids were reported in the press; and there were always opponents. A closer look at other contexts, for example the early 20th century, might further illuminate how outdated and/or inappropriate social policies have affected the fate of Aboriginal Australians more generally (Parry, 1997). If the noble goal of reconciliation is to be achieved, there will have to be a lot more care and lot less anachronism all round.

Likewise, as remarked earlier, there is a need for clarification on what exactly is meant by 'an end to welfarism' (Henderson, 1999). Such calls are not new to history; and in Australia the preference for real jobs is longstanding (Macintyre, 1985). The present danger as I see it is that a crucial issue may be taken over by the New Right anti-welfare lobby, to the general detriment. I would like to think a real and constructive debate can be had. The appalling reality is well known. Long-run trends are unclear but in some parts the situation may be worsening; and genuine understanding is still far off (Altman and Hunter, 1998). To repeat, presumably it is not intended that hard-won welfare rights available to all

Australian citizens should be denied to Aboriginal people, whose circumstances are after all diverse (Chesterman and Galligan, 1999; Mulgan, 1998).

Once more, a better sense of history could help. As I read it, there have been significant innovations, as in the Australian and Torres Strait Islander Commission's Commonwealth Employment Development Projects, where the monetary equivalent of benefits is pooled, and locally administered (Altman, 1997). That sounds like a good start on chronic unemployment, and the problem of the wonderfully named 'sit down money'. But it is a delicate balancing act; and another look at the history of regional assistance plans, most recently the ill-fated Australian Assistance Plan of the 1970s, would surely be timely.

It is noticeable that Aboriginal women are only indirectly referred to in the literature, if at all. Meanwhile, the most recent *Census* data indicate a disproportionate and rising rate of sole parenting by Aboriginal women, particularly young women (Daly and Smith, 1998), and it is reported that one in four of all women in full-time custody in NSW jails is Aboriginal (*Sydney Morning Herald*, editorial, 19 July 1999). The women of the West such as Bessie Rischbieth and Mary Bennett who campaigned on behalf of Aboriginal women in the 1930s would be horrified by these statistics, as we should be. Here I wonder out loud if Aboriginal spokeswomen have not given up on feminism too soon. In any event, from a national social policy point of view, the case for better targetting seems unanswerable. Amartya Sen and others have shown that women's rights and well-being are one of the most important variables in the advancement of Third and Fourth World peoples.

Justice and responsibility are big ideas. As we approach the 21st century, we have a chance, due to greater cultural flexibility post-Cold War and what may now be described as a sound social policy inheritance to make something of them. But, paradoxical as it may seem, a good deal of the future is still locked up in the past; and it is appropriate to conclude by reflecting a little more deeply on the uses of history. As Keynes once remarked about business men who dismised economics, it is not that they do not use it, it is just that what they do use is so out of date. Policy makers should try to avoid such castigation. As a start, general history could be returned to the professional syllabi.

A correct appreciation of long-run perspectives matters. It is impossible to know where you stand without understanding how you got to be there. I have suggested that while Liberty and Equality get all of the attention, in Australia, and whatever way you look at it, it is Fraternity that is in most trouble. That is because it has been a core value here, unlike most places. It badly needs refurbishment, and serious attempts are being made, as with renewed emphases on citizenship and community and the truly civil society, also, in more light-hearted but still hopeful vein Donald Horne's *The Avenue of the Fair Go* (1998). But somehow what is on offer so far does not seem to quite fit the bill - is it spiritually? I have also tried to

do my bit today to underline the value of short-term perspectives. As I often say to my students in Australian women's history at Macquarie, I just do not want you to be as ignorant as I was when I began.

That great Aboriginal Australian Margaret Tucker (1904-1997) entitled her autobiography *If Everyone Cared* (1977). Unfortunately, caring is a word from which too much of its real meaning and value has been drained. But if it was good enough for Margaret Tucker, it is good enough for you and me. To come down a tone or two, I hope I have convinced you all that history is a help. At the very least, I hope there will not be any more cheap and outdated solutions; and that the politics of resentment can be met by a recasting of 'less eligibility' for the benefit of all, and that includes regional Australia.

Thank you.

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Work or Retirement at Career's End? A New Challenge for Company Strategies and Public Policies in Ageing Societies

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1 At Career's End

In the last 20 years, the allocation of work and leisure over the life course has undergone major changes. For one thing, young people are entering the labour market at a later age, given longer schooling and the difficulty of finding work. They experience an increasingly long, uncertain period of joblessness before finding stable employment. In France for example, the average age of entry in the labour market has increased by three years over the last quarter century. The proportion of young people less than 25 years old in the labour force decreased by half between 1968 and 1995, and it is now under 10 per cent (*Économie et Statistique,* 1996). This decrease cannot, in the main, be set down to population trends; it mainly has to do with the reduced labour force participation rate of young people, in France but also in many other European countries. For another thing, labour force participation after the age of 55 has fallen considerably on both shores of the Atlantic. Only Sweden and Japan have withstood this widespread trend. Detailed comparative international data about economic activity after 55 will be given in the following section.

The working life is thus becoming shorter at both ends. It now mainly involves middle-aged groups. In turn, new arrangements have been made in welfare systems so as to cover the new status both of young people entering the labour market and of ageing wage earners who have left the job market early.

In brief, we have, over the last 20 years, witnessed a revolution in the way the phases of education, work and retirement spread out over the life course. A recent OECD study (1998) has documented these major changes in nearly all member-states.[1] According to it, the average number of retirement years - the time spent

1 The OECD calculated the average number of years by using data from 15 countries: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the UK and USA.

outside the labour market - increased rapidly from 1960 to 1995: men have gained more than 11 years. Meanwhile, the average number of years spent working decreased considerably: by seven years. And in relation to 1960, young people are entering the labour market five years later, for the reasons already pointed out.

The same study (OECD, 1998: 120) has emphasised how much time has been pared off the number of years in employment between 1960 and 1995. In 1960, the typical man in an OECD member-state devoted 50 of his 68 years of life to work. Most of the 18 others were spent at school, and a few in retirement. In 1995, a typical man lived till 76 but devoted only half his life - 38 years - to work. The other years were spent in education, unemployment and, above all, retirement. If this trend continues, men will, by about 2020, spend much more time out of, than in, employment.

This impressive trend toward a shorter work life causes concern given the quite foreseeable ageing of the population in the early part of the third millennium. It jeopardises the financial equilibrium of old-age funds everywhere. The ratio of active persons to the inactive ageing is ebbing fast because of the swelling wave of early exit from the labour force and because of demographic ageing, as baby boomers grow older while generations with fewer members will be reaching the age to start working and pay into old-age funds. The OECD (1998: 122) states that: 'Demography poses an inescapable fiscal challenge in the period 2010 – 2030'. Nowadays, approximately three employees support each person over 65; but after 2010, this average will drop to two. This study draws the conclusion that 'any successful strategy to the ageing challenge will have to result in people working longer in life although other changes will also likely be needed' (OECD, 1998: 124). This trend toward a shorter work life also raises quite relevant questions about what kind of labour force will, in a foreseeable future, sustain national economies. The ageing of the population will, inevitably, lead to an ageing of the labour force itself as the latter is increasingly made up of wage earners between 40 and 55 years old and as the number of young people entering the labour market tapers off. In many firms, wage earners over 45 are already encountering difficulties: they are deemed too old for promotions or retraining (Aventur, 1994; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1997). Besides, early exit seems, for many ageing wage earners, the only possibility, even more so as many countries seem to think that replacing them with jobless youth can solve (un)employment problems. In the future, the question will be whether Europe can manage with such a small work force. Will firms choose to adapt the organisation of production to an older labour force, to whom they will continue giving work? Or will they recruit immigrants or even delocalise operations?

We must state forcefully that the ageing of our societies is not a catastrophe, and should not be viewed fatalistically. Let us not forget that a longer life span and

lessened morbidity are, above all, evidence of social progress. There is no reason they should be catastrophic if we anticipate the consequences by reinforcing social cohesion, solidarity and equity among generations. Meeting the challenge of demographic ageing means that we must now manage an ageing labour force. This will be the major issue for the coming decades. To cope with it, we must reverse the deep trends, now under way everywhere, toward shortening the work life. This can be done only by developing effective public policies for jobs and welfare so as to maintain older wage earners' 'employability' and by stimulating firms to adjust their personnel policies accordingly. The way is hard and long, but it is one of the major challenges facing developed societies as they enter the third millennium.

Herein, I want to argue for analysing the situation by taking into account changes in how time and ages in the life course are managed. Debates about demographic ageing have, till the present, overfocused on its eventual implications for old-age pensions. This focus is much too narrow to help identify the means of action for coping with these issues. In the next part of this paper, I shall examine the changes that, at the international level, have marked the end of the work life during the past 20 years and their harmful consequences. Significant among these changes is early exit, i.e., the ever younger transition toward economic inactivity. The following part will shift the focus onto the public policies implemented in several countries since 1990 in a rather unsuccessful effort to reduce the early exit trend. On the basis of my comparative international research, the fourth part will inquire into the reasons why public policies have had a hard time regulating firms but why certain countries (such as Japan and Sweden) have better withstood the early exit trend. In conclusion, lessons will be drawn about how to socially manage the life course so as to meet the challenges of an ageing labour force and an ageing population.

2 Ever Earlier Exit from the Labour Market

The Drop in Labour Force Participation Rate After the Age of 55

Labour force participation after the age of 55 has decreased substantially in both Europe and North America. Only Sweden and Japan have resisted this widespread trend. International data on variations in the economic activity rates of the 55-64 age group from 1971 to 1997 clearly depict this trend (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Proportionally fewer people are working after 55 - less than the majority in this age group of certain countries. In France and the Netherlands, the labour force participation rate of this age group has fallen below 40 per cent, less than half the1971 percentage. But in Germany and Spain too, the percentage of 55-64 year-old men now working is less than 50 per cent. Belgium and Finland (two countries not in Table 1) belong to the group of countries where economic inactivity after 55

Table 1: Employment Activity Rates for Men 55-64 Years Old in 12 Countries: 1971-1997[a]

Country	1971	1975	1980	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	1995	1996	1997	% Variation
United States	77.3	71.4	68.8	64.4	64.5	64.3	63.9	63.1	63.6	64.7	65.5	-15.3
France	73.0	67.1	65.3	46.7	43.9	43.3	42.0	40.3	38.7	38.6	38.4	-47.4
Germany[b]	77.1	66.7	64.1	53.6	54.1	51.7	49.9	48.0	48.0	48.0	47.3	-38.7
Netherlands	79.3	69.9	61.0	44.2	44.7	44.2	41.8	40.5	41.0	40.7	43.0	-45.8
Sweden	82.8	80.7	77.5	73.2	73.4	73.9	73.7	65.9	64.4	66.0	64.7	-22.0
United Kingdom	82.9	82.0	73.9	59.4	58.1	61.6	61.5	55.9	56.0	57.0	58.6	-29.3
Ireland	82.4	76.1	72.2	64.7	62.7	59.9	60.2	59.1	59.1	58.7	57.8	-30.0
Portugal	82.1	77.1	74.8	64.9	62.1	63.9	66.5	59.9	59.1	58.5	58.2	-29.1
Spain	82.7	76.7	71.5	59.1	57.0	56.7	56.2	51.6	48.0	49.9	50.5	-39.0
Canada	78.8	76.3	72.7	64.3	61.9	61.9	57.3	55.0	54.0	54.7	56.1	-29.0
Japan	85.3	83.2	82.2	78.9	78.2	79.2	82.0	82.1	80.8	80.6	80.9	-5.16
Australia	-	-	-	56.0	56.3	58.9	54.5	50.7	55.3	54.4	54.3	

Notes: a) Cross-sectional data are hard to interpret for women. They generally suggest stable or slightly rising rates throughout the period. But this global result covers two contradictory trends that have affected women: the trend of women massively entering the labour market, which started at different dates depending on the country; and the early exit trend. When cohort analyses could be made, they were able to disentangle these trends. They proved that women, like men, have had to retire early even though this trend has been hidden by their massive entry in the labour market.

b) Reunified Germany as of 1991.

Source: OECD data plus our own calculations.

has been imposed on a wide scale. The drop in labour force participation rates after this age has marked the past 15 years; Furthermore, this trend seems irreversible even though several governments (in the United States, Germany, France Italy, Spain, etc.) have passed various reforms delaying the retirement age or requiring longer periods of contributions to old-age funds in an effort to reverse the early exit trend and prolong working life.

In France, a minority of wage earners (38 per cent of men and 29 per cent of women) in the private sector work up until they take retirement. Many go on unemployment or 'preretirement' between their 50th birthday and actual

Figure 1: Employment Activity Rates of Men 55-64 Years Old: 1971-1997



Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics.

retirement. They contrast with civil servants, most of whom (72 per cent) still have jobs when they retire. France definitely stands out near the top of the list of countries that have overused schemes for compensating wage earners who leave the labour market early. Incentives for such schemes have been publicly funded. From 1977 to 1990, a consensus reigned among all parties - the State, employers and labour unions - about this. For differing reasons, all these parties agreed that joblessness and the economic recession should be solved by compensating older wage earners who gave up their jobs. This 'French style age-management' (Marchand and Salzberg, 1996) consists in pushing the young and old out of the labour market and protecting the jobs of the middle-aged.

A New Risk at the End of the Working Life

Rising joblessness after the age of 50, as well as the reluctance of firms to promote or retrain wage earners over 40, is evidence that the sizeable drop in the economic activity rate after 55 has swollen the ranks of 'semi-old' wage earners 'on the way out' in the next younger age group: 45-55 year-olds are experiencing age discrimination in the job market and at the workplace. A new age group is now at risk. The joblessness, precariousness and uncertainty that used to characterise young people is now an experience for wage earners at the other end of the work life.

A Series of Harmful Consequences

The widespread overuse of early exit has had a serious impact, in particular on ageing wage earners' 'employability'.

• Age Stereotypes Reinforced

Large scale recourse to preretirement schemes and other forms of early exit has thoroughly changed expectations and anticipations. Companies now have the habit of treating employees over 55 as redundant and unemployable. Hence, the latter must be pushed aside, regardless of the firm's managerial rationality. For their part, wage earners think that 55 is now the normal age for definitive withdrawal, and they make their plans in consequence thereof. In a big French automobile firm where, for 15 years, masses of employees at 55 have been pushed into preretirement via the National Employment Fund (Fonds National de l'Emploi), a worker declared: 'Retirement at 55 is the law'.

By emptying offices and workshops of those over 55, this massive early exit trend has reinforced age stereotypes. Top management, foremen and supervisors, as well as persons working on the line, will soon share the opinion that older workers: are unemployable and inefficient; lack motivation; are unable to adapt to change; and cannot be retrained. What may have been true for a generation, with a low level of initial education, is becoming a label superglued onto a whole age group, which is being declared too old to work and has lost all value in the labour market.

• The Ricochet Onto Younger Age Groups

This lack of consideration for wage earners over 55 has ricocheted onto younger age groups. Since those over 55 are thought to be too old to keep in the labour market, those a little younger are now 'nearly old'; they are on the way out and have no future. They are experiencing age discrimination in the workplace. The rapidly increasing unemployment rate among those over 55 is evidence of a lack of esteem. Whereas the unemployment rate decreased for all age groups in France, in 1998 for example, it continued rising by nearly four per cent for persons over 50. Furthermore, this is a matter of long-term joblessness, since the loss of a job at this age is often definitive: there is no hope of finding work again. Quite clearly, persons over 50 are excessively vulnerable to unemployment. In 1992, one out of three dismissals for redundancy in France involved wage earners over 50.

Persons in their 40s are also experiencing career problems at the accelerated end of the work life. Firms increasingly see them as a group with no future. Some companies are reluctant to train them, because the return on investment seems too

limited. They also hesitate about promoting such persons, since the latter are already on the way out. And of course, there is no question of recruiting from this age group since the threshold for recruitment has been set well before 40. As of 40, certain positions have no career prospects, and the concerned have, as a consequence, lost all motivation. As of 45, wage earners may be described as 'already waiting for retirement'. But might this behavior not result from the lack of career prospects? This age group has become a 'risk group' that suffers from discrimination, a group pushed out onto the fringes in the company. Realising how vulnerable they now are, they often react by becoming oversensitive and withdrawn, by refusing to accept new assignments or occupational mobility lest they be placed in a precarious situation in the labour market.

- **An Easy Solution for Firms**

Using early exit has been an easy solution for firms. They now use age as a natural criterion for managing personnel and systematically make older employees and young people bear the brunt of a smaller job pool. Such seemingly painless measures keep the social peace; and these very characteristics have both blinded employers to the fact that their personnel is inevitably growing older and kept them from preparing to cope with the situation they will soon have to face. For the representative sample of French companies in our survey conducted for the Ministry of Labour in 1992 (Guillemard, 1994), keeping ageing employees in the labour force was not a major concern. Full or gradual early exit was their favorite means for coping with an ageing work force. Comparisons show that British employers were more open than French ones toward retraining or recruiting ageing employees or even keeping the latter in their jobs after retirement (Guillemard and Walker, 1996). This difference in attitudes may be mainly due to the easy solution provided by publicly funded early exit schemes in France, which have no equivalent on the other side of the Channel. Owing to these public programs, French employers now reason mainly in terms of age discrimination - of pushing older employees out.

- **Ineffective Age-related Measures**

Everywhere in Europe, early exit schemes have had disappointing effects on unemployment. They have, at times, disguised joblessness but at an exorbitant price. As a means of opening jobs to younger people by laying off their elders, these measures certainly have not been very efficient. Why has this myth of jobless youth being helped by the early exit of the ageing persisted, even though assessments of such job measures in Europe have constantly proven it to be false?

Esping-Andersen, in a recent study (April 1999), convincingly proves how inadequate the early exit schemes adopted in various countries have been in

settling problems related to unemployment in general and to the unemployment of youth in particular. In the countries in this study, the total number of people leaving unemployment rolls as well as the number of those in the younger age groups entering from unemployment rolls are negatively correlated with older wage earners' early exit rate. Instead of limiting joblessness, early exit tends to worsen the problem. According to these data, each 10 per cent of 55-64 year old men who have left the labour force on preretirement corresponds to two to three per cent less in the total *number* of persons leaving unemployment rolls and to four to six per cent less in the number of young people who do so. Early exit thus seems more like a means whereby firms can get rid of wage earners they no longer want than like a measure for coping with unemployment and creating job opportunities.

- **For Firms: Loss and Disorder**

Early exit schemes have entailed a loss for companies and also caused disorder in them. There has been a loss of experience and know-how as ageing employees have left, and, also, a negative impact on the personnel's age-pyramid. The latter looks like a rectangle, given both early exits and the limited recruitment of young people. As a consequence, the work force is made up of the middle-aged to whom it is ever harder to offer career incentives. The prospects for advancement are limited for everyone, including young recruits. This lack of reliability and visibility in career prospects offered to various age groups may entail major costs for firms and impair their ability to motivate personnel.

3 Unsuccessful Public Policies in Europe Since 1990: Limiting Early Exit

Everywhere in Europe, the expansion of early exit with its harmful consequences has caused public authorities to react, usually by combining measures of three sorts: reforming old-age funds and raising the retirement age; replacing early retirement with part-time retirement schemes; and implementing active job policies for keeping older workers in employment. I shall now use studies made for the European Commission in 1998 to illustrate this policy trend. The greatest efforts in recent years to reduce the extent of early exit and keep people in the labour force longer have been made in those countries with high economic inactivity rates among men in their late 50s and early 60s. Such policies aim, independently of the effect on early exit itself, at containing the costs of welfare systems.

Increasing the Retirement Age

Germany will be gradually, between 2001 and 2012, increasing the retirement age to 65 for both men and women, even for those men who have paid into the Old-

Age Fund for 35 years or more and who may retire once they reach 63 - as of 2002, they will see their pensions reduced by 18 per cent if they take retirement at this age. The retirement age has also been raised for the jobless who may draw a full pension at 60 if they have received unemployment benefits for at least 52 weeks. Although they will be allowed to retire up to three years earlier, their pensions will, in this case, be reduced by 3.6 per cent for each year taken.

In France, although the retirement age has not increased since it was set at 60 in 1982, the requisite period of contributions for a full pension has climbed six months a year since 1994: from 37½ to 40 years. This was coupled with changing the formula for calculating pensions. Average wages during the last 10 years of the career now serve as the base, instead of average wages during the best 25 years: one year will be added on for each calendar year up till 2008.

Italy may have the pension system in Europe that tends most toward early retirement. Workers there may retire after working 35 years once they have reached 52 or else, irrespective of age, if they have accumulated 36 years of contributions to the Old-Age Fund. For civil servants, the requirements are less stringent. Although the new system being phased in since the 1995 reform will allow both men and women to retire at any time between 57 and 65, their pensions will be based more on the contributions they have paid into the Old-Age Fund than on previous wages. The transition period is, however, very long, running up to 2030. In late 1997, the government and unions agreed to shorten the transition period slightly and on a faster harmonisation of regulations in line with the recommendations of the Onorfri Report.

In Spain, the February 1995 Toledo Pact intended to improve the pension system's financial viability by increasing the retirement age. It recommended penalising early retirement and providing incentives to ageing wage earners who continue working by reducing their Social Security contributions. In July 1997, legislation was passed to rationalise the welfare system and implement many of the Pact's recommendations. It remains to be seen how effective this will be. According to a survey carried out in 1995, a large majority of Spaniards opposed raising the retirement age but favoured more flexible arrangements for combining part-time retirement with part-time employment.

In Belgium, the retirement age for women will gradually (till 2009) increase from 60 to 65, in line with men's. Moreover, the number of years of contributions to the Old-Age Fund required for a pension is gradually, from 1997 till 2005, rising from 20 to 35. In addition, Social Security taxes withheld on early retirement benefits have risen from 4.5 to 6.5 per cent.

In Finland, in 1990, the Pension Committee set the objective of raising the official retirement age from 65 to 68 by 2020. In 1994, several amendments were

introduced to deter early retirement: increasing pensions for whoever continues working after 60; raising the age for qualifying for early retirement from 55 to 58; reducing the age for qualifying for part-time retirement from 60 to 58; and increasing the official retirement age for public sector employees from 63 to 65.

In Austria, the actual retirement age lies well below the official age (60 for women and 65 for men). Since 1996, several cost containment measures have been introduced. In particular, the required period of contributions to the Old-Age Fund has risen from 35 to 37½ years, a measure more likely to affect women than men; and for persons retiring because they are unemployed, it has risen from 15 to 20 years. Furthermore, the formula for calculating benefits was modified so as to deter early retirement. Specifically, the percentage applied to the first 30 years of wages was slightly reduced, and the one applied to the next 15 years increased; all this trims the pensions of those who retire before having worked 45 years.

In the Netherlands, where the actual age at which people retire is one of the lowest in Europe, policy reforms have focused more on combating age discrimination in the labour market.

From Early to Part-time Retirement

A second set of policy measures has aimed at reducing the flow of older workers out of the labour market by both limiting the number who qualify for early retirement and providing incentives for those nearing the early retirement age to continue working. In a context of high unemployment, the latter sort of arrangement may be a compromise between fighting against joblessness and keeping older workers in the labour force. For many companies, this compromise has entailed the obligation to hire young people.

In Belgium, flexible retirement between 60 and 65 has been possible for all male employees since 1990, and will be open to women once their retirement age has risen to 65. Pension benefits vary depending on the person's employment record. Since 1985, employees at least 50 years old may opt for part-time work for up to three years till the age of 60, when they may retire. However, very few have taken advantage of this option: one per cent. In addition, companies are required to hire new employees to replace those opting for part-time work. A 1993 measure allows people to continue working part time once they reach 55; beneficiaries receive allowances on top of their wages from the Unemployment Fund and from employers. These measures have had no perceptible effect on the number of older workers staying in employment. By September 1997, only a few hundred people had opted for part-time early retirement.

Austria, too, has tightened eligibility requirements for early retirement, and encouraged gradual retirement since 1993, through a part-time early retirement

scheme whereby women between 55 and 60 or men between 60 and 65 may either reduce the hours spent working by 50 per cent but receive 70 per cent of a full pension or else reduce the hours by 70 per cent and receive 50 per cent of a full pension. Although this option seems financially attractive, no one has taken advantage of it, partly because the eligible also qualify for full early retirement or for a full rather than partial pension.

In Finland, part-time retirement schemes were introduced in the late 1980s with the intention of smoothing the transition toward retirement and reducing the number of persons going on early retirement. According to recent studies, however, such schemes are an alternative more to full-time work than to full-time retirement: they have trimmed the number of full-time workers instead of pensioners. Subsequently, two other measures, Part-Time Work Supplementary Benefits and Job Rotation Compensation, were introduced to reduce work hours. Both programs are open to those who have worked full time for the same employer for at least a year under condition that the employer hire jobless persons. To date, these programs seem to have had little effect.

In Germany, besides tightened eligibility requirements for early retirement, a part-time retirement scheme was introduced in 1996 for a limited five-year period, enabling those over 55 to work part time, the reduction in their income being compensated by the Unemployment Insurance Fund (30 per cent for a 50 per cent reduction in the time spent working). As elsewhere, employers are required to take on either people unemployed or trainees to fill the part-time jobs thus opened up. So far, however, such jobs have been few in number.

Denmark introduced the Early Part-Time Retirement Pay scheme in January 1995, with the same conditions applying as for full early retirement and open to people in the same age group, 60-67. By September 1996, just under 900 people had opted for this scheme.

In Italy, employees eligible for a seniority pension may, since October 1996, work part time, thus opening up a job for someone younger. This option has been little used, however.

In Spain, the Toledo Pact refers to introducing measures to facilitate flexible retirement, but no action has been taken so far.

During the 1990s, France probably developed part-time retirement more than any other EU country. The aim was to reduce the extent and costs of early retirement, and to keep older workers in employment. Incentives to employers for keeping on older workers date back to 1985, when employees over 55 were permitted to work part time while receiving an allowance amounting to 20-30 per cent of lost wages from the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Employers were required to take on new

workers for the jobs thus opened. This scheme was amended in 1992 so that employers could buy their way out of the obligation to hire new workers. The aim was to help firms get rid of redundant wage earners. At the same time, the obligation to make hirings in priority groups (such as young people under 26 with a low level of education, the disabled, jobless persons over 50, or the long-term unemployed) was loosened. In 1994, the scheme was further relaxed under the Five-Year Employment Act:the reduction in annual workhours could vary between 20 per cent and 80 per cent of the previous year's total as long as it averaged 50 per cent over the whole part-time retirement period. In 1995, the number opting for part-time retirement increased by 20 per cent. For the first time, more people were taking part-time rather than early retirement.

In 1994, the Netherlands abolished the measure that allowed firms to dismiss older workers first in case of redundancy. Other measures restricted access to the three pathways leading toward early exit through: disability insurance, for a long time the major pathway; the Unemployment Fund; and the Voluntary Pre-Retirement (VUT) scheme. A collective agreement between firms and unions opened the last pathway. Unlike the other pathways, it was financed mostly by employers. The pathway through the Disability Fund has been restricted considerably in recent years; those claiming benefits now have to pass more stringent medical examinations for assessing their ability to work. Meanwhile, a larger share of the costs of benefits has been shifted onto employers, whose contribution rates vary depending, in part, on the number of claimants in their firms.

In the United Kingdom too, eligibility requirements for disability benefits have been tightened. There too, Disability Insurance used to provide a pathway for leaving the labour force early.

In Sweden, as in the UK, early exit amounted to less of a trend than in other EU countries. Nowadays, receiving early retirement benefits depends on proving one's inability to work. In 1994, the minimum age for eligibility for part-time retirement rose from 60 to 61; the calculation of benefits is now based on 65 per cent of previous wages instead of 55 per cent; and work hours can be reduced by 25 per cent at most. Owing to these modifications, the number of people opting for part-time retirement has fallen off significantly.

Keeping Older Workers in Employment

The third aspect of old-age policies has been to provide incentives to employers so that they keep on older wage earners. Increasing the official retirement age will be likely to miss this goal if it is not combined with measures for protecting ageing workers. No significant policy changes have occurred over the last few years.

Furthermore, attempts to persuade employers to keep older wage earners in the work force have not met with much success.

Long-term unemployment has risen significantly for older workers since unification in Germany. Unlike in other countries, it is now higher for older wage earners than for youth. Under German job protection legislation, older workers are treated as a priority group to keep in employment. The most important measure of this sort provides age-dependent wage subsidies to the firms that open at least two part-time jobs for persons 50 years old or older who have been unemployed for at least 18 months. This has apparently not increased the number of older workers in employment, but it is hard to imagine what would have happened had this measure not been adopted. But such targeting, though hard to avoid, may, unfortunately, reinforce prejudices against the targeted group by giving the impression that its members are inferior or less efficient.

In France, active policies in favor of older workers were introduced in the late 1980s under a program for combating long-term unemployment. As in Germany, these measures aimed at providing incentives - wage subsides and exemptions from Social Security contributions - to employers who hire jobless persons over 50. In 1995, they were replaced by a new, though similar, program (*Contrat Initiative Emploi*) that has mainly targeted wage-earners under 45. Other measures have also been adopted, such as the one requiring employers to pay more into Social Security whenever they dismiss anyone over 50. More importantly, another measure, implemented in 1994, encourages firms to continue training older workers to acquire and improve skills and qualifications. Another measure for increasing flexibility allows workers to accumulate entitlement to paid leave; this gives the employer more room for managing leaves of absence for older workers nearing retirement. So far, as in Germany, these various measures have not proven very effective in keeping older workers in employment.

Finland seems to have more commitment than most other EU members to an integrated program for protecting wage-earners over 45. Since 1990, the following measures have been passed.

- The Finnish Institute of Occupational Health has developed the FinnAge Program to promote the health, employability and well-being of wage earners over 45. This program involves research, training, counselling and other activities inside firms.

- Under the Small Workplace Program, the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health encourages small firms to adopt practices for the welfare of their employees.

- The Employability for Tomorrow Program, implemented by the Federation of Employment Pensions Institute, aims at fostering education and circulating information so as to improve older workers's employability.

Launched by the government in early 1997 for a five-year period, the National Older Workers Program seeks to create job opportunities for ageing employees by making necessary changes in legislation, helping olders workers improve their skills, and providing information, training and research.

Unstable, Incoherent Public Policies

Around 1990, most European countries decided to try to reverse the long-term early exit trend. This change in public policy harbours many an ambiguity and contradiction. True, the new measures signal a determination to put an end to the golden age of early exit and to gradually shut down existing schemes in order to balance the books of old-age funds by prolonging the work life as need be. But meanwhile, most countries have not adopted coherent, comprehensive programs against age discrimination in employment. Only a few countries have launched programs with stiffer requirements for the ongoing training of wage earners during the second part of their careers. At present, given the fast pace of technological innovation, measures of this sort cannot be avoided if the aim is to maintain wage earners' skills and their ability to adapt.

Whenever the priority has been placed on defending jobs and fighting against unemployment, governments nearly everywhere in Europe have not resisted the tempting traditional solution of restricting the employment of older wage earners. In France, the new scheme created to trade preretirements for hirings illustrates this quite well. Even as public authorities have been trying to slow down the early exit trend, they have been encouraging firms and unions to reach an agreement about using the Unemployment Fund for a new preretirement scheme (Allocation de Remplacement pour l'Embauche), which has been renewed twice since 1995 (in 1996 and 1998) and is still in effect. It enables employers to let wage-earners go at the age of 57½ if they have contributed for 40 years to the Old-Age Fund in exchange for an equivalent number of hirings. Beneficiaries draw allocations from the Unemployment Fund (specifically, the Fonds Paritaire d'Intervention en Faveur de l'Emploi).

The French state is, as an employer, not behind other employers and the labour unions in advocating preretirement. As an employer, it acts in contradiction to the principles it lays down as a regulator. At the very time that public authorities are trying to fight against age discrimination and restrict preretirement schemes by private employers, they have left themselves wide latitude in providing compensation for early exit in big state-owned firms. The Paris Transit Authority

(RATP), the gas and electric utilities (ÉdF-GdF), the railroad (SNCF), France Télécom, and the Post Office all negotiated, during 1996, preretirement or early retirement schemes in exchange for a certain proportion of hirings. At ÉdF-GdF and the SNCF, employees as of the age of 53 may take advantage of the new arrangements. This is a far cry from any effort to limit early exit.

Given the continually decreasing economic activity rates of persons over 55 in most European countries (as pointed out earlier), and, too, the erosion of this rate for the 50-55 age-group, we see how little an impact the new orientations in public policy have had. Owing to their incoherence or even contradictions, they have not been able to lastingly counter the rising economic inactivity that characterises people late in their work lives.

4 The Rationales of Firms and Public Authorities: Difficulty Regulating the End of Careers

In Europe, public debate about the end of the work life seems in a double bind. When the priority is jobs, older wage earners are told to make room for youth; but when retirement problems are debated, they are summoned to keep on working. There is no coherent public policy for the second part of the work life.

The European Case

The studies we have conducted among firms in Europe show that employers are little aware of the need to manage the ageing of their work forces. In general, firms have tended to react to age questions instead of anticipating them. As a consequence, while public authorities have funded early exit schemes, firms have widely preferred externalising the problem of ageing employees. French companies, for example, have been much more reluctant than British ones to keep ageing workers in employment. Even given the prospects of a labour shortage, French employers very seldom take into consideration solutions for extending the period of activity of ageing employees, along with a reorganisation of work and internal reclassifications. For them, early exit still heads the list of measures to choose despite the prospects of an ageing work force and a tighter labour market (Guillemard and Walker, 1996).

In France, gradual preretirement schemes have been successful thanks to the Ministry of Labour, which has resolutely adopted a tit-for-tat strategy by approving full preretirement schemes only if firms adopt gradual preretirement arrangements for their personnel. However, fewer firms in France than elsewhere in Europe have taken measures in favour of ageing wage earners, as the research program conducted by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and

Working Conditions (1997) has clearly shown. This study was intended to detect 'good practices' for managing an ageing work force. Firms in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands had, more often than their French counterparts, adopted programs targeting wage earners over 40.

The comparative analysis of how firms and public authorities in Europe have interacted so as to manage the end of careers reveals strong contradictions between conflicting rationales. Companies usually handle age questions for reasons related to their broader objectives. As our survey shows, they have their own - mainly economic or organisational - reasons. Company rationales for using France's part-time retirement arrangements are of three sorts: the emphasis put on increases in productivity and flexibility in jobs; the accent placed on making cuts in both the work force and pay roll; and the priority assigned to managing skills and organisational flexibility.

The diversity of situations in the world of production, in companies which can be analysed as constituting differentiated 'social worlds', as the symbolic interactionists phrased it (Strauss, 1994), calls for a wide range of flexible, adaptable public measures. Instead, schemes have proliferated that, subject to complex regulations, are administered by a diversity of actors, ranging from public authorities to manufacturers' associations and labour unions. Besides, there is seldom any means of regulation that crosses the lines between welfare programs and job policies, for example, or that allows for negotiations that could broaden the field of compromise and decompartmentalise public programs.

Japan : A Coherent Policy for Efficiently Managing the End of Careers

Japanese public policy with regard to the end of careers has been remarkably constant in its support for employing ageing employees. This support has involved a range of converging means: the '*teinen* age' (as well as public authorities's constant efforts to make firms decide to raise it from 55 to 60 and more recently from 60 to 65) and an active employment policy.

First of all, the *teinen* age: lifetime employment comes to an end at this age limit. Thereafter, the wage earner must renegotiate his employment contract and his position (for instance, 'mentoring'). At Toyota for instance, wage earners reaching this age are often sent to work in a different position in a subsidiary or with a subcontractor. Although each firm sets its *teinen* age, public authorities provide financial incentives and have continually, since the 1970s, recommended firms to raise this age limit. Quotas were set in 1977 in order to make firms keep wage earners 55 years old or older as at least six per cent of their work force. Likewise, the Unemployment Fund was, in 1974, changed into Employment Insurance with an active employment policy (for favouring jobs, preventing joblessness and

raising the *teinen* age). A 1986 law for stabilising older wage earners in employment set a *teinen* age of 60 as objective. Ten years later, nearly all big companies have set this age at 60 or more. This policy has gone so far as to focus on the 60-64 age group: companies are encouraged to keep wage earners working till 65. This policy purposes to deal with the insolvency of pension funds and to prepare companies for a labour shortage, as smaller cohorts of young people enter the labour market in the third millennium.

Secondly, the active employment policy: part of this policy is the amendment to the 1994 Employment Insurance Act, which went into effect the following year. Its aim was to make up for the wages that 60-64 year-olds might lose when renegotiating their employment contracts upon reaching the *teinen* age. Individual aid is provided depending on the amount of lost wages. In October 1996, eight per cent of 60-64 year-olds working full time were receiving this aid. This quite clear public subsidy for employing ageing wage earners is financed through the Employment Insurance - what a contrast with French public policy, which has subsidised early exit!

The Japanese Ministry of Labour has a coherent set of incentives for firms that keep ageing employees in the work force. This policy has three pillars:

- provide various subsidies for retraining older wage earners and adapt working conditions to them;
- favour the hiring of ageing wage earners, in particular by reinforcing public placement services; and
- reinforce the opportunities for working after retirement through counselling and placement service associations for senior citizens (e.g., the well-known Silver Human Resource Centres).

This deliberate public policy has been drawn up in the Ministry of Labour's Employment Council. Bringing together the representatives of employers, labour unions and public authorities, this council has to work out a consensus on public policy guidelines. The apparent lesson to be learned from the Japanese case is that an intentional, coherent public policy is essential for orienting the behaviours of firms with regard to the management of an ageing work force.

Given the Asian recession, will Japan maintain the course of action it has set? There is no doubt that the size of the internal labour market in a context of strong economic growth was a factor pushing firms to follow public authorities' recommendations. But we can imagine that the Ministry of Labour will be capable of coming up with a new set of coherent means as part of a policy that will be just as intentional but adapted to the swing in the business cycle, a policy that will

continue helping older wage-earners remain employed, either in their former or in new jobs.

5 Conclusion

For most countries (except Japan and, to a lesser extent, Sweden), the elimination of ageing workers from the labour market is still a prevalent practice; and public policies have not affected company behaviours. Firms push wage earners over 40 onto the sidelines before pushing them all the way out after 50. These practices cannot meet tomorrow's challenge for two reasons. First of all, they cannot cope with the ageing labour force, a process already under way; nor with the slower growth in the labour force or even the predictable labour shortage as of 2006-2010, depending on the country. Secondly, they reinforce a rigid threefold organisation of ages in the life course. The ages for education and especially the time after work are becoming longer, whereas the age of work is shrinking. As we know, this threefold life course model, which is closely linked to the rise of industrial society and its time distribution, is breaking up into a slacker, flexible model (Guillemard, 1993).

The wage-earning relationship is less stable and less durable. New forms of employment are emerging. The concept of a lifetime job or even of a career is vanishing. Instead of successive ages of education, work, and non-work, we have overlapping periods of work, education and non-work that are dispersed over the whole life course.

Furthermore, occupational and life trajectories are diversifying. The organisation of the life course is becoming less rigid and, also less standardised. Strict chronological bounds no longer mark the ages of life. This new flexibility causes the individual's life course to be more diverse and more chaotic and unforeseeable. New social risks have thus arisen. Evidence of this is the delayed, unpredictable moment when young people enter the labour market, or the new risks cropping up at the end of the work life. Built up around the organisation of the life course in three ages, the welfare system is not capable of covering these new risks with their often serious effects. We observe a widening gap between rigid welfare arrangements and the new needs arising out of a more flexible organisation of the life course: the need for protection against the rapid obsolescence of know-how and skills, the need to change occupations several times, and the need to spread periods of 'inactivity' over the life course.

The contract between generations, which used to underlie retirement systems, must be reformulated. The accumulation of non-work oriented inactivity during the third age of life is no longer in phase with the emerging life-course model. The distribution of remunerated periods of economic activity and inactivity over the

whole life course should be renegotiated for all generations. A revitalised solidarity between ages and generations could come out of this. The flexible life course model that is emerging calls for us to rethink the ways of linking the time spent working and the welfare safety net (which provides pay for periods of non-work) so as to cover these new risks, notably at the end of the work life.

Research findings suggest different courses of action. The reform of retirement systems cannot be undertaken without taking into consideration changes in work itself, in employment and in the life course. Proposals for delaying the retirement age, by simply increasing the number of years of contributions to old-age funds required for a full pension, hardly seem capable of having the desired effect of making people work longer. On the contrary, they may worsen the end-of-career risk and increase the financial burden on ageing wage earners, whose situation would be even more precarious as retirement becomes an ever more distant prospect and as pensions dwindle.

To make the work life longer calls not for a retirement policy but for an active jobs policy. The eligibility requirements for receiving an old-age pension have, nowadays, very little impact on how older wage earners are leaving the labour market. Let us emphasise one fact: in Europe, more than half the people now going on retirement have already lost their jobs.

Working out a new contract between generations entails rethinking how remunerated periods of economic inactivity and work can be spread out more harmoniously over the life course. How unfortunate that negotiations about reducing the work week in France have been cut off from talks about the length of the work life, a topic seen only in terms of reforming retirement - as if the organisation of the life course in three ages still held. These interlinked elements should be placed at the centre of a renegotiated intergenerational contract. Only this negotiation could make all parties winners. Pensions might be paid out later but at a time chosen by the beneficiary; and the time spent working would be better spread over the life course, thanks to more possibilities for taking a sabbatical or parental leave and more flexible welfare arrangements (such as the *droits de tirage sociaux*) or 'flexible welfare provisions' for every age. Supiot (1999) has recently discussed this at the European level. Firms could benefit from this new contract, by gaining a more flexible and motivated work force, and wage earners, by gaining protection against new risks. Public authorities would be able to move welfare systems and, especially old-age funds out of the red. It is urgent to implement an effective public policy for the second part of the work life. We have seen how important this has been in Japan.

Renegotiating the distribution of periods of work and non-work over the life course is a crucial question for our societies' futures. Will public policy reforms suffice to meet the challenge of the ageing of the population with its impact on jobs

and social transfers? Will it do this so as to reinforce social cohesion and intergenerational solidarity? For lack of such an overall negotiation, our societies will split up into rival generations; and 'age warfare' will break out over a dwindling and poorly distributed supply of welfare benefits and jobs.

Translated from French by Noal Mellott (CNRS, Paris, France)

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Globalisation and the Politics of Community

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> Perhaps, however, the greatest challenge to these ideals of public provision lies outside the domain of the state - that is, in rebuilding the foundations of mutual trust, recognition and support across the work of the non-state public sector; and in re-establishing the feeling of community and place that offers, at least in part, an answer to the threat of insecurity. (Mark Latham, 1998: xxxi)

> Traditional state-centred welfare has failed to prevent social problems and has perpetuated dependency rather than re-engagement with work and the community. This does not mean winding back government assistance for those in need or for those who support them. Every day, organisations such as the Salvation Army and the Society of St Vincent de Paul address the very personal impact of social problems in ways that governments simply cannot. (Prime Minister John Howard, *SMH,* 29/1/99)

> In an era of dramatic change and profound insecurity, a new role for government is required. Sustaining the bonds of community and relationships has not been a major focus of government in Western societies. The new society that is evolving demands a different role for government, one which includes strengthening community and social relationships in the face of endless encroachment by markets and technology. (Lindsay Tanner, 1999: 57-8)

1 Introduction

A wide spectrum of political opinion is becoming concerned about 'the loss of community', as suicide, family breakdown, drug dependency and crime rates rise. The language of community - 'trust', 'mutuality', 'connectedness', 'reciprocity' - is finding its way into the rhetoric of politicians of very different political

persuasions. All seem to agree, at least upon the need to address the issue of societal breakdown, even if there is some disagreement concerning the proper role of the state in the process of its reintegration. There is also considerable agreement as to the need for a new social consensus that bridges the old social divides of left and right, labour and capital, and which harnesses something in the middle called 'the community'.

It is not surprising to find conservative politicians talking about harnessing community in times of fiscal restraint. Community, in the language of conservative politicians translates as 'not government'. It has the ring of popular democracy about it when used interchangeably in political contexts with 'the people'. It then becomes an excellent site to shift responsibility for social problems away from government. But why are social reformers, leftist politicians and policy activists using the same language?

Eva Cox (1995: 17) for example, a policy activist more inclined to support political agendas to the left of the political spectrum, writes that a 'truly civil society' would be one in which we gave more priority to 'social capital', that is, to facilitating the development of social networks and norms of reciprocity that facilitate cooperation and cultivate trust.

For Cox, social capital is the 'glue' of the social fabric, an outcome of cooperative, civic endeavours. Drawing on Putnam's (1993) study of civic life in Italy, she uses the notion of social capital as if it were a quantifiable collective resource and the pre-requisite for a healthy, invigorated economy. The economic rationalist argument which prioritises economic imperatives over social objectives is thereby deftly turned on its head: '... cooperation pays off socially, bureaucratically and economically ... If we trust others as we trust ourselves, prosperity and economic growth follow (Cox, 1995: 18).

We should note here that there are important differences in the way in which the language of social capital is being deployed by policy activists such as Eva Cox and more socially conservative politicians such as Mark Latham (1998), an ALP politician who advocates a new direction for the Australian Labor Party (ALP) along the lines of Tony Blair's British version of 'the third way'. Cox sees a much more active role for the state in promoting social capital than Latham. She envisages a 'productive interplay' between the 'state' and the 'community', with the development of trust depending upon the state providing a political framework to modify the inequalities built into the market system (Cox, 1995: 46).

Cox is concerned therefore, to *qualify* the notion of social capital. It seems then, that there is more than one *type* of social glue and that the glue of social capital is not sufficient to promote a just society on its own. For Cox, social capital needs

to be actively *shaped* by political and social institutions put in place by a state committed to the principles of social justice. She is more aware than Latham of the darker side of the bonds of community, the oppressive nature of close-knit communities and the exploitation and subordination of women within communal forms of organisation. The state is needed to provide a broader political framework, in which principles of social justice and equality can be articulated and institutionalised, and citizens actively empowered through publicly funded services.

Latham, like many conservative politicians adopting the current language of community, locates the mechanisms for generating social capital squarely within the 'non-state public sector', which he envisages as something quite distinct from the state. He advocates greater social justice by way of further devolution of responsibility for welfare onto this sector, to those 'self-governing communities of interest' which he believes will promote horizontal, and therefore more equal forms of societal integration simply because they are 'non-state' and thereby 'self-governing' (Latham, 1998: xxxii).

Institutions of the state by contrast, are seen by Latham (1998: 198) to be inherently more coercive than non-state organisations, promoting vertical webs of social relations within which welfare recipients are inevitably 'passive'. This view of 'the state' and 'the community' resonates with Prime Minister John Howards's claim in the opening quotation that only the independent, non-state organisations, like St Vincent de Paul and the Salvation Army can give people the personal service required - 'governments simply cannot'.

The fact that the social capital genre has taken off to such extraordinary lengths in the language of policy activists and in organisations concerned with social policy issues, reflects the urgent need for *a strategy* to re-inject 'the social' back into public policy - post economic rationalism. The priority of public policy, no matter which political party is in power, is to make the economy more efficient, productive and competitive in the global economic arena. This is the logic which has also been shaping social policy agendas. If politics can no longer provide moral leadership and a vision of the just society, then perhaps the only answer is to be found outside of politics - in the community itself.

In this paper I want to argue that even though I have great sympathy for policy positions which emphasise the need for well-functioning families and communities, I think it wise to consider the dangers of relying on a language that is so broad that it can be used just as easily by the left and the right. The social capital genre cannot take us outside the economic rationalist paradigm on its own, whether higher levels of government intervention are advocated or not. It does not provide us with a new social consensus but attempts to stretch the old, to accommodate the new economic conditions of globalisation.

The basis of the old social consensus is a social paradigm that Barry Hindess (1998) argues is shared by social democrats and liberal economists. Both these political positions understand society as divided up into the separate but interdependent spheres of 'economy', 'society' and 'state', with both sharing the view that properly managed, the economy can be expected to provide the resources for society. Their main point of difference is the extent of state involvement in providing the best conditions for economic growth, with liberal economists believing that the free market offers the best conditions for a prosperous economy.

According to Hindess (1998: 219), this model provided the foundation for the old social consensus between social democrats and neo-liberals around the Keynesian promise of state-controlled, macro-economic management. Conservatives and socialists held the same view that the economy *could* be managed for the best possible economic outcomes, as measured by economic growth, if all pulled together on the right levers at the right time. This meant that whatever was needed to secure the conditions for the economy to grow *became* the main role for government. In Hindess' view, economic rationalism is simply the *response* by the government trying to do this under the very different conditions of globalisation.

What I want to demonstrate in this paper is that the current proliferation of the social capital genre is a central part of this response and that as long as the rhetoric stays within the dominant paradigm suggested by Hindess, no social consensus can emerge which is truly committed to re-making a more inclusive community according to principles of social justice. This is because the old social consensus has reached its limits, with the normative framework that held it together being undermined by the same economic conditions that national governments are continuing to promote.

2 The Social Glue of the Old Social Consensus

The old social consensus, which united the social democrats and liberal economists, was itself stretched over a normative framework which had its roots in the 'historic compromise' between labour and capital in the earlier part of the twentieth century. The normative framework institutionalised by this pact was based upon three factors:

- A value system that was *shared* by the majority of white anglo-Australians. The normative ideal, set at the historic Harvester judgement of 1907, was that of the nuclear family, with the male head of the household as a full-time working breadwinner supporting his wife and children. Minimum wages were legally formalised on the basis of this norm. As economic

conditions changed over the course of the century, social policy measures were enacted to support the family as the basic social unit (Shaver, 1989).

- The promise of full employment, at least for all adult males, to be ensured through the government's management of economic development and growth.

- The expansion of the welfare state, to ensure certain health and education standards became available to all and to provide a social security safety-net for those falling outside the formalised worker/employer agreements.

This was a consensus made possible then, by a shared value system, institutionalised within a legal framework and supported by the welfare state. It was legitimated by the idea of social citizenship, that is, the right for *all* citizens to enjoy a modicum of economic welfare and security to the standards prevailing in society. Re-reading T.H. Marshall's classic analysis of the evolution of social rights reminds us that the social rights won during the twentieth century were not just bestowed by a benevolent state. They had to be fought for in the political sphere through the *collective* bargaining ability of the organised labour movement. These struggles were themselves community building, as was the fact that the rights were claimed as universal entitlements, to be enjoyed by all citizens (Marshall, 1963: 122).

What was the nature of the 'social glue' which this consensus generated over the course of the century? According to Marshall, this glue was of a different *type* to the glue of the older communal ties of pre-industrialisation, prior to the establishment of nation-states. The glue of social citizenship was based upon the feeling of loyalty, 'to a civilisation which is a common possession ... a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law' (Marshall, 1963: 96).

The nature of the glue of social citizenship which held the old social consensus together was derived from a shared orientation towards the universal. This is the orientation required to make the public sphere available for substantive claims to be debated according to principles of inclusiveness and social justice. Groups can challenge public policy on the basis of their exclusion and in the name of a more just society. The collective struggles mobilised in the name of these universalist principles generate a social glue which is *strengthened* the more inclusive the struggles become, although because it is tied to citizenship, it has an external limit. It remains dependent upon the sovereignty of the nation-state and the exclusion of those who are not citizens.

The language of social rights is quite distinct from the language of social capital. The glue of social capital is derived from social networks and civil associations

which have been formed to further the *particular* interests of members of a particular group. The contemporary usage of the term has its origins in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who used the term in the 1970s to describe the resources *individuals* could obtain from their particular social connections. It was a useful way for considering how some people gained privileged access to powerful positions because of their particularistic, social connections (Portes and Landolt, 1996). In Robert Putnam's (1993) influential empirical study of civic life in Northern Italy, however, the notion of social capital is transformed into a resource possessed by groups. But rather than seeing social capital as a resource which favours the interests of particular groups of individuals, Putnam makes the stronger claim that it is a resource of benefit to the society as a whole.

Those who follow Putnam and argue that social capital is good for society as a whole, claim that this is because of the social mechanisms which are an inherent part of group processes *per se*. It is not the purpose of the group that is translated into the common good, but the *activity* of the members of the group as they go about their cooperative endeavours. Working cooperatively develops social relations that are based on 'trust', that are 'horizontally integrated' rather than 'vertically integrated'. Social relations forged through voluntary participation in associations and groups are therefore regarded by advocates of social capital as more egalitarian than social relations forged through the market and the state. These are portrayed as *essentially* 'vertical', coercing people to act rather than enhancing their potential for cooperative effort.

For Putnam then, participation is itself the glue of the social fabric. There is no need to debate the ideals or objectives of the group according to principles of inclusiveness or social justice, because the common good is already conceived in terms of the 'stocks of social capital' that are built up as a result of this participation. The more we have, the more our economy will prosper and all will be better off. Once again the economic rationalist argument prevails. What is good for economic growth and prosperity is good for society as a whole.

Putnam's assumption here however, is that when people participate they will do so cooperatively, *for* the common good, or the good of society as a whole. But people join groups most often to promote their own interests, with the group functioning very powerfully in the market, or in the various levels of politics, to promote the interests of a particular group. Social capital is neither inherently 'good' or 'bad' for society as a whole. This needs to be determined through an analysis of the values and objectives of the group, judged according to universalistic principles of inclusiveness and social justice.

The language of social capital and social rights need not be oppositional. They work best when used together, when local action is inspired by leadership linking the action to principles which can be debated in the public sphere. For example,

the Green Bans of the trade union movement challenged the right of developers *in general* to have unrestricted access to the environment purely for economic gain (Thorpe, 1985).

The social glue proposed for the new social consensus, however, is not to be forged through collective struggles nor through a commitment to principles of social justice. Economic growth continues to be promoted as the main objective of government, with the particularistic language of social capital, in combination with the new, individualistic discourse of 'mutual obligation', being called upon to compensate for the glue of the old social consensus, as this becomes unstuck under the new economic conditions.

How has this transition come about?

3 Stretching 'The Old' Consensus: From Social Justice to Social Capital

Groups which did not fit the normative basis of the old social consensus were able to make claims on the state on the basis of their systematic disadvantage. This was made possible by the language of social justice being used in conjunction with the transformations in the language of citizenship that began to occur from the 1960s. During this time, citizenship discourses began to shift away from Marshall's more 'passive' view of the citizen as bearer of rights, to accommodate the more active agenda of 'empowerment' of the new left and the new social movements. Within these emerging citizenship discourses, citizens were no longer to be regarded as passive bearers of rights but as active participants in the institutional decision - making processes which shaped their lives (Kymlicka and Norman, 1995).

Citizens were to be empowered through increasing their opportunity to participate in public decision-making and through enhancing their opportunity for self-help through community development and education. These new active meanings of citizenship legitimated new claims on the state, on the basis that everyone had the right to participate in society as full and equal members of that society.

The groups who were systematically disadvantaged by the old consensus largely compromised all those groups who did not match up to the normative benchmark, the fully employed, white, able-bodied, anglo, male worker who was the real participant in the formal agreement between labour and capital. The legitimation for their claims on the state was found in the particularistic attributes of group members, more specifically in terms of what they lacked in comparison to this benchmark. These groups then became distinguished as particularistic

'communities', with their differences defined negatively, as obstacles that had to be overcome through government funded programs (Everingham, 1998).

These participation strategies, legitimated by the new active meanings infused into the language of citizenship, opened the door to three decades of community activism which has re-shaped 'community' as a political terrain. The new active language proved useful to groups marginalised by the consensus, but only in terms of providing them with services to 'catch up' to the normative benchmark. The benchmark itself could not be challenged through this strategy.

Women's services in particular relied upon this language of active citizenship, with it's universalistic orientation, to legitimate their claims. For example, Wendy Weeks' (1994) survey of community-based centres operating for women noted the emphasis these organisations placed on women's rights and their commitment to women's active participation. The goals of most of these services included statements like the following:

> To provide an informal, friendly space to meet, share experiences, develop skills, offer mutual support, and where women's issues can be raised, shared and acted upon. (Weeks, 1994: 75)

We can look at this language now and see how the primary objective of these organisations was, in fact, to build the social capital of disadvantaged groups and enhance their capacity to be 'active'. But these programs were not fought for in the name of 'social capital' during this era. Rather, the more universalistic language of 'rights' was used, in combination with the language of community - with social networks and mutuality being stressed as part of a broader *political* agenda of empowerment for members of that particular community.

Paradoxically, critics of these programs now support the arguments for enhancing social capital while criticising the 'overloading the state' by the more universalistic rights claims. It is the rights claims that are now being seen as creating a problem of credibility for the welfare state, rather than the necessity to enhance the social capital of groups of people marginalised by the terms of the consensus.

It is this paradox which highlights the limits of the old social consensus that has operated during the twentieth century. The new economic conditions are creating more and more disadvantaged and dysfunctional communities, yet the more they claim compensation or special assistance for their systematic disadvantage, the less universalistic the welfare system becomes and the less citizens experience themselves as united around a core of common entitlements - and the more governments can justify their challenge to the welfare state.

Mark Latham (1998: 193) has explained the loss of credibility of the welfare state in just these terms - the phenomenon of 'downward envy' amongst mainstream Australians which, he argues, has been provoked by the claims of special interest groups organised around particularistic 'segment-of-life-characteristics'. He is surely right when he argues that the way out is to re-think the welfare system around universal entitlements organised around core areas of human need (Latham, 1998: 172). But how does he propose to ensure the inclusion of the increasing number of people marginalised from the broader social consensus, groups who have been included in the past through their particularistic claims on the state?

The answer across the political spectrum here is the same. What is being advocated is not a new consensus within a new, more inclusive economic paradigm, but a further exercise in stretching the old consensus in new ways. These new ways include greater devolution of government responsibility of welfare to 'the community' to promote social capital, within a new model of citizenship that puts the onus on *individuals* to accept greater responsibility for integrating themselves back into society. It is this language of 'mutual obligation' which is combining with the language of social capital, not the language of social justice, although remnants of this language can still be found in the 'social capability' paradigm being espoused by ALP politicians.

4 A New Social Consensus or Stretching the Old?

The shared language of community has forged a rhetorical bridge across the spectrum of political opinion, while keeping the material basis of the old social consensus intact. Any new consensus is still to be organised around the fully employed, productive worker, but under the new consensus the social institutions which held the normative framework in place are to be dismantled under the guise of 'micro-economic reform', or privatised, that is run by 'the community'. New institutions legitimated by the language of social justice are not being advocated to fill this void - rather communities are expected to fill this void themselves, through the generation of social capital.

The common thread bridging these old divides of left and right, labour and capital can be found in the shift in emphasis in citizenship discourses, from 'rights' to 'obligations'. A sample:

> Where some would scrap work for the dole, I remain passionately committed to extending the principle of asking people to give back something to the community in return for assistance in times of need. (Prime Minister John Howard, *SMH,* 29/1/99)

Mark Latham advocating a similar consensual path for the ALP as taken by Tony Blair's 'third way' in Britain:

> The guiding principle of the new radical centre is to hold the cohesiveness and fairness of society together through new expressions of personal and collective responsibility ... It rejects the core features of the ideologies of both the old Left and the New Right - that is, the notion of the nanny state, within which government is responsible for the provision of welfare without the reciprocation of personal responsibility. (Latham, 1998: xxxi)

Lindsay Tanner regarded as a left-leaning ALP politician:

> Society has an obligation to ensure that all its members are able to belong, in the fullest sense of the word. This means more than basic material needs, but does not extend as far as the capacity to fulfil all individual potential, however exotic. This capacity to participate entails a mutual obligation to contribute to the community in some way. (Tanner, 1999: 53)

There are obviously many issues which continue to divide these representatives of the political spectrum, particularly with regard to the proper role of the state and the obligation that the state has in return to the individual. However, the emphasis placed on re-integrating those suffering the consequences of the new economic conditions most severely, through an emphasis on increasing *their* personal obligation and individual responsibility to the community, unites them more significantly than the issues which divide them.

What is the social glue being proposed here? According to Lawrence Mead (1986), whose work on citizenship is influencing this shift, the glue of 'mutual obligation' is to be found in the individual *guilt* that those unable to work or function effectively under the new economic conditions should be made to feel because they are not matching up to the normative standards:

> Far from blaming people if they deviate, government must persuade them to *blame themselves*. This sense of responsibility, though it is individual, is not something that individuals can produce alone. It rests ultimately on public norms and enforcement that are collective in character. (Mead, 1986: 10)

There is no recourse to the language of social justice here, although both ALP politicians want to retain some notion of social justice and a claim to the social

democratic project. They do this by drawing on the 'social capability' paradigm, as espoused by Amartya Sen (1992). Social justice within this model, is to come by way of ensuring the fairer distribution of the resources necessary for individuals to participate in society under the new economic conditions. Improving educational access and standards and an emphasis on cognitive skills development feature in Latham's proposals (1998: xxxviii), while Tanner takes a broader view, recognising, at least, the necessity to cultivate those skills of sociability and communicative competence that are fundamental to any healthy community yet which are not reducible to quantitative measures, nor enhanced through market forces (1999: 56).

However, without the social institutions which underpinned the language of social justice under the old consensus, this language of social justice must also lapse into a language that places the onus on individuals and their families to match up to the new standards. The language of social justice will come to mean in practice that the increasing numbers of people systematically marginalised from the benefits of the new economic conditions, will have to accept greater responsibility for their own social re-integration by adapting to the economic conditions which are marginalising them. They will have to undertake to learn the new skills demanded by the new industries and become more 'flexible' with regard to where they live and when they can work. They will have to accept any available work, no matter whether the pay is sufficient for them to support themselves and their families - and they are to be made to feel guilty if they do not.

These methods of re-integration, which demand greater mobility and temporal flexibility from families and an acceptance of greater levels of economic inequality, are directly at odds with the espoused need for greater 'connectedness', 'mutuality' and 'interdependence' used in the rhetoric of the social capital genre. They expose the limits of the old social consensus, which must now confront the irresolvable contradiction that its normative centre is being undermined by the very processes of economic growth that the consensus seeks to maintain.

Few politicians would admit openly to the desirability of going back to the family of the 1950s, which provided the shared normative basis of the old social consensus. Yet this would seem necessary if communities were to take on more responsibility for caring for others, without more public forms of assistance becoming available. The alternative of course, is 'the community', hence the rhetoric of 'harnessing community', primarily through the strategy of devolution.

5 The Devolution Argument

The primary strategy proposed to develop social capital and re-make our communities is through the devolution of responsibility for welfare from government to 'the community'. It is a strategy largely justified using the language of the social democratic movements of the 1960s, without any apparent recognition of this historical precedent, nor any accompanying analysis of the nature of the real existing communities that are now positioned to take up this responsibility.

Mark Latham (1998: 298) for example, argues that devolving structures of governance to 'self-governing organisations' will result in a 'smaller and more transparent scale of governance', while at the same time re-generating those much needed relations of mutual reciprocity - 'people need to interact on an organisational scale within which they can constantly assess the behaviour of others and find reasons for the creation of trust'. Further devolution, he claims, will in itself 'expose people to the logic of mutuality' putting people 'in a position to build the habits of reciprocated trust' (Latham, 1998: 295).

But what of the real existing organisations of the third sector, those 'non-state organisations' that are already positioned 'out there', ready to take over responsibility for welfare if and when it is to be further devolved? These are not *necessarily* vertically integrated, more personal and less bureaucratic than organisations more heavily supported by agencies of the state, even after three decades of devolution strategies. In fact, according to Wendy Earles (1997), the result of these decades of devolution, which have peaked in the current environment of the contract state, is more centralised and bureaucratic non-government organisations.

The problem is, that after an era of economic rationalism and the imposition of a corporatist management style onto these organisations, this terrain of community has itself become subject to the same logic of productivity and efficiency that organises the market. The political terrain of community has become a corporatised community, taking on the shape of market organisations.

Moreover, community organisations are able to play less of a *critical* role in the public arena, their advocacy being channelled through peak organisations whose primary role is to argue for more funding in the current climate of fiscal restraint. Community organisations once did have the potential to provide a critical voice. Agency workers employed in community-based organisations were able to identify new issues of concern and monitor the government's performance, making the government account for their performance in terms of their own social justice rhetoric. But this critical potential has now been severely curtailed. The strategic manoeuvres set in train by the new managerialism to ensure greater

accountability from this sector has turned the monitoring role of community-based organisations on its head. The government is now better positioned to monitor their performance than community organisations are able to monitor the government's performance. Moreover, the measures of success of this performance are set by the terms of the government's economic reform agenda (Everingham, 1998).

But an even greater problem is that devolution is being advocated at a time of great social fragmentation and increasing economic inequality. The social division between the have and have nots is increasing, categories of the socially wayward and abject are increasing, and the social welfare system, after years of devolution and corporatisation, is targeted at narrower and narrower categories of need. According to critics of further devolution like Rob Flynn (1997), more devolution will further *undermine* the universalist approach of the welfare state, which has been organised around the notion of universal social rights since Marshall's classic formulation of citizenship, aggravating the problem of social fragmentation.

Flynn articulates particularly well the crucial issue to be dealt with by proponents of devolution. What is going to give citizens *in general* a sense of their *common* concerns as citizens, that will bridge the factions and cut across sectional interests?

6 A Critical Community Project

A more inclusive social consensus requires a more inclusive normative foundation. The normative benchmark of the nuclear family, organised around the separation of the public and private spheres of life and the distinction between paid and unpaid work, is proving more and more problematic under the new economic conditions. It requires ever increasing particularistic demands to be made on the welfare system in the attempt to be inclusive - ever tighter targeting, ever increasing categories of dysfunction and disadvantage, ever more 'early intervention' strategies. Yet if funds are to be made available to meet these demands, then governments must continue to do whatever is necessary to ensure on-going economic expansion. This is not the way to step outside the economic rationalist paradigm, nor the way to promote well functioning families and communities.

The alternative is to recognise the limitations of this paradigm and consider options for a new normative foundation. John Raulston Saul (1997: 156) has already drawn attention to the inappropriateness of the model of economic growth by which we are all being judged today, whether we work in the market place, the public sector or the community. He argues that the measures of success which underpin this model were formulated in the industrial era and are now outdated. They do not work for the societies of today because they exclude all the investment

we need to make to ensure the health and prosperity of our communities, including investment in training and in the care of citizens.

Recognising the limitations of this paradigm will help us imagine what it might take to build a more inclusive community in a rapidly changing society. My imagining of this community includes all those social activities which are of interest to society and which contribute towards its reproduction - from the rearing of children and the caring for others to the planting of trees and business innovations.

Implementing these imaginings will involve the state, as the democratic tool of the community, in a fundamental way. It will also involve re-conceptualising the welfare system along universalistic lines, which might unite citizens once again around a core of common entitlements. But we will also need to consider how we might wind down the scale of the operation to a manageable and sustainable size. We might then learn to appreciate the benefits of living in a community driven less by our need to consume more, and more by our visions of the just society.

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Justice, Responsibility and Citizenship in the Restructuring of Housing Provision in Britain

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1 Introduction

Housing has featured prominently in welfare state restructuring in Britain since 1979 and continues to do so after the 1997 change of Government. Debate continues about whether re-organisation of the public, private and voluntary sectors represents a retrenchment of the welfare state or its restructuring. This paper uses the lens of citizenship theory to examine the changes in policy that have moved Britain towards a more Australian home ownership model, with a new stronger role for the voluntary sector. Competing conceptions of citizenship are reflected in the contests over the nature of the responsibilities of citizens and state. The main contests have been between neo-liberalism which stresses individual autonomy and minimal state involvement and alternative versions of citizenship stressing social rights.

2 Housing and Welfare, 1979-1999

The context for this paper is provided by the rapid transformation in housing policy from mass public rental programs to the promotion of owner occupation. Housing policy in Britain was defined with reference to the public sector for most of the 20th century and particularly in the early postwar period when council housing was seen as one of a series of social rights intended to secure reconstruction and social justice by reducing inequality. In a process resembling Australia's, the emphasis switched to private provision after 1954 (Greig, 1995), and accelerated after 1979. The developments in housing policy which have produced a 'property-owning democracy' supplemented by a quasi-market of social rented housing can be seen as representing a shift from the redistributive welfare state of the postwar period to a new form of regulatory state in which insertion of the word 'welfare' before 'state' is contested.

The transformation in housing tenure after 1979 is the most obvious manifestation of restructuring, as Table 1 shows. Prime Minister Thatcher might have had Australia in mind when she sought to achieve a nation of home owners for whom subsidies through the tax system were a valuable investment while subsidies for public renting were a route to dependency (Forrest and Murie, 1988). In 1981, local authorities, new town development corporations and other public landlords owned just over 30 per cent of the housing stock, housing associations owned around two per cent, private renting constituted 11 per cent and owner occupation stood at 56 per cent (it was 42 per cent in 1960). By 1996, owner occupation had reached 67 per cent, partly due to the Right to Buy (introduced in 1980 with discounts based on length of tenancy) and partly to new building. Public renting had declined to below 20 per cent. Housing associations, with around five per cent of the housing stock, have a more important role than their scale suggests, seen as the key actors in a quasi-market after 1987 (Bramley, 1993).

Table 1:Dwellings by Tenure, United Kingdom (percentages)

Tenure	1981	1986	1991	1996
owner occupiers	56.4	61.5	65.9	67.0
privately rented	11.0	9.9	9.5	9.7
housing association	2.2	2.5	3.1	4.5
public authority	30.4	26.1	21.4	18.8
no. = (000s)	21 586	22 598	23 671	24 568

Source: Wilcox, 1998

The comparison with Australia is striking, see Table 2, in that the level of owner occupation in 1996 is virtually identical but in the Australian case the growth has been different, having reached 69.9 per cent in 1961 (Greig, 1995: 97). It has declined slightly in recent years (Badcock, in print). However, there are striking differences in the tenure breakdown in the rental sector, with Australian rental housing dominated by the private sector. The nature and significance of these differences and similarities for justice and responsibility are considered after a fuller account of the restructuring in Britain and the nature of citizenship debates.

In summary, the role of the state changed in Britain in the 1980s: from provider of housing to 'enabler' of housing provision by others (Goodlad, 1993); from support for direct 'bricks and mortar' subsidy to reliance on means-tested rent allowances (Housing Benefit); from a reliance on public spending to reliance on public-private finance partnerships for 'social' housing programs; and from traditional bureaucratic public management to the use of market mechanisms within the public and voluntary sectors.

Table 2: Dwellings by Tenure, Australia (percentages)

Tenure	1981	1986	1991	1996
owner/purchaser	70.1	69.1	67.3	67.8
rented: government	5.1	5.4	5.7	5.2
rented: private and other	20.6	20.3	20.9	22.3
rent free and unspecified	4.2	5.2	6.1	4.7
n = n.s.				

Source: Badcock, in print

Controls on capital spending prevented local authorities from pursuing their traditional landlord role. In addition, central subsidies to local authorities' housing revenue accounts were phased out, rent levels were forced up and housing revenue accounts were isolated from other local government accounts but required to subsidise the personal allowances - Housing Benefit - paid to a growing proportion of public tenants as the sector became increasingly residualised (Malpass, 1990).

The Right to Buy remains the symbol of the retrenchment of the state. But owner occupation grew also as a consequence of the hidden subsidies provided through the tax system: no taxation on imputed rent; exemption from capital gains tax; and tax relief on mortgage payments. But these measures did not succeed in moving all public sector tenants into owner occupation. As the social rented sector became the haven of the poorest, the neo-liberal dream of a 'property-owning democracy' for all was modified by the politics of housing in Britain which required an acceptance of a continuing role for the state.

The general election of 1987 marks the transition from a primary concern with privatisation to marketisation of what remained of state provision. This was done through out-sourcing housing management and through transfers of public housing into the housing association sector. Housing associations (along with other non-profit landlords) were seen as an alternative that offered choice for tenants and a reduction in the scale of state involvement (Bramley, 1993). By 1996/97, 54 local authorities had ended their landlord role. Public tenants' support for alternative landlords had to be won, the need for investment providing the main incentive to consider alternative landlords.

Housing's share of total public spending was reduced and some substitution was achieved in private funding of part of the development costs of housing associations. This also had implications for rent levels, feeding a debate about what is 'affordable' housing (Wilcox, 1998). The emphasis in social housing provision fell more explicitly on the poorest and on clients of 'community care',

yet those least well housed - homeless people - saw a reduction in their rights to accommodation. This was opposed strongly throughout Britain but resisted successfully in the short term only in Scotland (Goodlad, 1999).

The fiercest resistance - much of it unsuccessful - to housing policy change has occurred over reductions in eligibility for Housing Benefit, cuts in council house building programs, rising rents, proposed transfers of public housing to alternative landlords and reductions in the rights of homeless people. Most of these changes were resisted by local authorities, tenants and others as they defended their conception of justice and the responsibility of the state. We now turn to consider these competing visions of social justice in greater detail.

3 Conceptions of Citizenship

Conceptions of citizenship can be seen as differing on two dimensions. First, the *nature* of citizens' rights and obligations varies, with the distinction between social and other (civil and political) rights having great contemporary significance. Secondly, the relationship between individual and community (or state) is conceived differently by the three classic theories: liberal, communitarian and republican. This section outlines contemporary citizenship theories and debates and considers how strands of citizenship theory have been interwoven in housing policy developments and outcomes.

The Contest Over Social Rights

A typology of rights, distinguishing civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1950), has dominated debates about the restructuring of the welfare state. Civil and political rights are rights against the state whereas social rights are claims for benefits guaranteed by the state.

The 'dominant postwar paradigm' of social rights (Roche, 1992) saw the creation of the welfare state as the mechanism for limiting the negative impact of 'class differences on individual life chances' (Turner, 1993: 6). The social rights to minimum standards and services in income, employment, health, housing and education which characterised the creation of the welfare state are seen as the end of an evolutionary process, starting with the establishment of civil and political liberties in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is these social rights and the associated 'powers of taxation and capacity to provide benefits without charge' (Rose, 1993: 224) that have been contested.

These benefits were withdrawn in the 1980s as the welfare state was restructured in the neo-liberal name of individual citizens' freedom to pursue their own welfare. Social rights are seen as redundant because welfare and social justice can

be secured simultaneously and more efficiently by individuals exercising autonomy - responsibility - in the market. Bureaucrats and professionals are part of the problem, the former because they build empires rather than provide services and the latter because they are arrogant and self-interested. It is necessary to use the market to secure choice and access to the services people consider they require. Access to what remains of public services is to be secured through a combination of methods including vouchers and consumer choice from a range of service providers in a mixed economy. Consumers need to know what they are entitled to receive and how to complain and secure redress if the service does not come up to standard. Most elements of this model were present in British housing policy in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Neo-liberals are assisted by some republican theorists who argue that social rights are not fundamental to citizenship: 'These (social rights) are rights that aim to secure the conditions for access to citizenship, but they are not rights by which citizenship can allow itself to be defined' (van Gunsteren, 1998: 107). In contrast, others argue that people can be full participants in society only if their basic needs are met. Feminists in particular have 'grave doubts about the New Right rhetoric of economic self-sufficiency ... many feminists share the Left's view that rights to participate must, in a sense, precede responsibilities. Indeed feminists want to expand the list of social rights ...' (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 358).

Defenders and critics of the concept of social rights have agreed on one thing: the lack of space in the postwar welfare paradigm for political participation. In its absence, forms of professional and bureaucratic power prevail and social rights are 'avoided or infringed' (Roche, 1992: 35) as can be seen in the treatment of ethnic minority groups in the public rented housing system (Henderson and Karn, 1987), for example. The Left's response to the New Right attack on social rights has often been to decentralise and democratise the welfare state. It is not always clear, however, whether participation is seen as changing the way social rights - or services - are delivered or is seen as increasing the range of substantive material entitlements of social citizenship. However, the notion of participation has taken forms that liberal-consumerist theorists favour: here the Right and Left can come together in a critique of the insensitive and unpopular state. But they cannot reach agreement about whether social rights can be dissolved into the market in a way that secures welfare and social justice.

States, Citizens and Communities

Cuts in the social rights of citizenship have placed more responsibility on citizens and less on the state. But the nature of the contests are illuminated by broadening the debate from a typology of rights to include consideration of the three classic

theories of the relationship between citizen and state: liberalism, civic republicanism and communitarianism.

Liberals see citizens as calculating holders of preferences and rights within the limits of their respect for others' rights. 'Citizenship and other political institutions are means that are accepted only conditionally - that is as long as they, in the individual's calculations, foster the maximisation of private benefit' (van Gunsteren, 1998: 17). This view, which resonates with public choice theory, tended to dominate political discourse in the 1980s and 1990s in Britain, the USA, Australia and elsewhere. In contemporary form it stressed the need for autonomy for individuals to create their own welfare through the market and for citizens to have rights that protected them against a profligate and oppressive state. It therefore intersects with the notion of reducing social rights and with the introduction of consumerist rights for citizen-consumers of public services.

Consumerism has been influential in suggesting how public services can be delivered more sensitively. The critique of consumerism, however, (Clarke and Newman, 1997 for example) stresses the interdependence of managerial and political processes. The focus on individual consumers neglects the multiplicity of stakeholders (or communities) such as potential users, funders, taxpayers, regulators and future users whose interests should be represented. The focus on service *delivery* neglects the issue of decision making about *what* should be provided. Consumerism in public services offers a much narrower conception of the role of citizens in a liberal democracy than social democratic concepts of citizenship which offer the opportunity to deal with the tensions between service users and other stakeholders.

Social democrats have had difficulty in articulating a clear alternative to neo-liberalism's attack on social rights which could not be defended easily with reference to the post-war paradigm. In the search for a 'third way' (Gidddens, 1998), elements of communitarian theory have been applied to housing, most importantly in the emphasis on housing associations. Debates on other housing issues, including neighbour disputes, have had communitarian undertones and some communitarian thinkers have been particularly influential on British politicians, including Labour Prime Minister Blair. Communitarianism emphasises that 'Individuals are formed by the community ... Deviation from the (community's) code is regarded as corruption and must be resisted' (van Gunsteren, 1998: 19). Failure to live up to the responsibilities of membership of such groups is 'met with disapproval rather than legal punishment.' (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 363). Contemporary communitarian theory has emphasised that voluntary organisations, such as housing associations, provide the forum within which citizens learn the virtues of civility and self-restraint necessary for

modern life. Communitarians such as Etzioni (1995) wish to reduce or eliminate the role of the state in favour of family and 'community'.

Theorists - and policy makers - claim that there are two related difficulties with communitarianism, concerned with first the relationship between civil associations and wider society and secondly with the relationships within associations. First 'civil society, left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power can challenge' (Walzer, 1992: 104). This need present no dilemma for social democrats, who can strengthen the state in response, but a neo-liberal government is also called on to play a mediating role between needy citizen and association. In Britain's case this is achieved through state regulators, such as the Housing Corporation and Scottish Homes, who also supervise the use of public money granted to housing associations.

Second, associations of civil society can impose unacceptable limits to individual freedom. That this fear is generally not well founded, at least from evidence about the experience of Scottish housing associations (Mullen et al., 1997), does not prevent a dilemma arising for a neo-liberal government at odds with itself in simultaneously wanting to protect individuals while reducing the scale of state involvement. The role of the state is shown in the case of British housing associations in the work of ombudsmen, for example, and in the development of a set of rights to protect individual consumers.

Some social democrats have sought to find a response to neo-liberalism and communitarianism in republican theories that recognise the tension between different conceptions of justice, resolved in favour of citizens exercising their civic duty, whatever the republic determines it to be. 'They place a single community, the public community, at the centre of political life' (van Gunsteren, 1998: 21). This approach values political participation for its own sake and remains optimistic about the 'civilising' effect of such participation. The republic is seen as mediating between communities of place and interest, allowing space for the development and existence of communities while tempering their worst excesses: 'A core task of the republic is the organization of plurality, not only of individuals but also of communities...' (van Gunsteren, 1998: 24). A key issue is how far 'the republic' is synonymous with 'the state' or, in other words, how the state is to mediate the competing communities while retaining democratic legitimacy. In housing policy, citizen participation has been the main means to achieve plurality. The developmental, republican conception of participation has been in tension with neo-liberal efforts to protect the consumer of state-funded services from oppression and with strong social rights versions of republicanism and communitarianism that see participation as serving instrumental ends such as better housing. The interest in participation cannot be understood if it is seen only as a manifestation of political rights being asserted over civil or social rights.

Citizen participation has provided a space in which citizenship theories and citizenship rights have been interwoven to achieve particular outcomes.

4 Housing Policy in Britain and Australia

The conceptual framework discussed above was developed to illuminate housing change in Britain. The question arises as to whether it might have some relevance to the situation in Australia. The differences between the two countries raise the question of whether different conceptions of justice, responsibility and citizenship have been applied. Does the restructuring of the last 20 years represent a convergence between Britain and Australia in the degree to which neo-liberal views of citizenship have been applied to housing?

This question cannot be answered with a simple yes, without ignoring the possibility that social rights should not be equated with public housing alone. In addition, there is a need to consider the wider context of the labour market, income inequality and social security as well as the variety of forms of housing intervention open to the state. Measuring the impact of social security and insurance systems and the financial benefits that flow from owner occupation in older age is notoriously difficult (Whiteford, 1998) suggesting that much more research is needed to enable comparisons to be made about the impact of different welfare regimes and tenure patterns.

A good deal of attention has been devoted to considering whether a home ownership/welfare trade off was brought about in Australia by the increased tax resistance of those engaged in the process of house purchase. Castles (1998) in particular seeks to test Kemeny's (1981) hypothesis of an inverse relationship between owner occupation and welfare expenditure, using evidence from a number of 'New World' and European countries. There is evidence that 'widespread home ownership in the countries of the New World does make a substantial difference to the social protection of the aged' (Castles, 1998: 16). In Australia's case, the imputed benefits are said to represent 27.6 per cent of cash disposable income across all quintiles in old age and 46.4 per cent of the income of the poorest quintile. Castles suggests that Kemeny's assumption about the direction of the causal link - from high mortgage payments to resistance to the tax 'burden' of a Scandinavian welfare state - may be wrong. Instead, a weak welfare state may provide an incentive to home ownership and a high tax welfare state may make saving for owner occupation difficult. However, this seems to substitute one simplistic hypothesis for another. Greig (1995) suggests a much more complex set of explanations for the rapid postwar growth of Australian owner occupation, including finding space for human agency. Castles' other conclusion that more research is needed to understand the 'diverse linkages'

(1998: 18) between old age and shelter - or welfare and housing policy more generally - seems more appropriate. In addition, it needs to be recognised that the benefits of owner occupation do not apply to renters in the lower income quintiles nor to those in younger age groups who may have difficulties in securing and sustaining owner occupation.

Tenure has been used in national and in comparative research to try to 'prove' the superiority of different housing 'systems' and tenures. Yet this is an approach that can fail to consider the varied nature of the rights and responsibilities of citizens and state implicit in 'home ownership', 'public renting' or other tenure forms. The debate has obscured the meaning of social rights. There are a variety of ways that claims may be made on the state in relation to housing apart from public housing for rent. A complex pattern of social rights may apply in both countries, in which public provision of housing in Britain may obscure other claims on the state.

In Britain, although there have been periods of obsession with promoting one tenure, for example in the 1980s and after the two world wars, these have been interspersed with periods of more comprehensive policy in which a variety of instruments have been used to influence access, affordability and quality. In many ways these are more comprehensive and generous than in Australia, despite the reductions in budgets and rights of recent years. There remains a significant policy framework intended to protect vulnerable owners and renters in all tenures and the potential variety and efficacy of policy instruments continues to inspire debate. Measures include repair and improvement grants, home improvement agencies, state assistance for mortgage interest payments for the unemployed and, most significantly, the continued existence of a social rented sector. Similarly, in Australia the power of the state has been used to promote housing outcomes other than public renting such as through the tax system and in a strong role as developer of housing for owner occupation. In Australia, a debate about the vulnerability of owner occupation is detectable (for example, Winter and Stone, 1998; Badcock, in print). But is the debate more muted in the absence of a history of policies - and politics - intended to sustain the most vulnerable in the private sector?

More generally, in the politics of housing in Britain, tenants' associations and housing associations have been joined by voluntary organisations representing people with particular housing needs in a claim for *substantive* citizenship rights. These 'new forms of social, cultural and political movements' (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 9) stress the distinction between *formal* and *substantive* citizenship and the need to recognise *de facto* denial of full citizenship status through institutional and legal discrimination. Does the politics of housing in Britain mean that the nature of the state's role is contested on ground that is

largely unclaimed for Australian housing policy debates because of the weak and diverse nature of the public and community housing sector?

Since the election of the Blair Government, the demise of neo-liberalism means that housing policy debate is largely amongst those who are united in recognising a role for the state but defend the concept of social rights in different ways. Some - 'Old Labour' - see state provision as the key route to welfare and justice. Others - 'New Labour' - are agnostic about who provides services. Their vision is less clearly articulated but is apparent in new debates about housing policy, for example, in the use of terms like 'community ownership' to present a positive image of non-profit rental housing that is neither state nor market.

5 Conclusions

In recent debates about justice and welfare, contests about social rights have obscured tensions arising from neo-liberalism and competing (republican and communitarian) conceptions of social rights. Neo-liberalism has emphasised the freedom - sometimes the responsibility - of the individual to pursue her own welfare. Other theories have stressed the responsibility of community and state to provide a framework of support and rights for all, to prevent social exclusion and ensure social justice.

The alternative conceptions and dimensions of citizenship are relevant to our concern with housing policy in Britain and Australia. Social housing and owner occupied housing have been at the centre of debates about the appropriate balance between the rights and obligations of state, community and individual, about service users and other communities of interest and about the distribution of the resources that flow from citizens' rights. This paper has argued that the meaning of tenure is contingent on particular localities, histories, geographies, politics and nation states - including the deployment of state resources in support of a variety of forms of 'private' housing as well as 'public' housing. This makes comparisons between countries hard to carry out and suggests that simplistic accounts of housing 'systems' based on tenure split are potentially misleading. A fuller comparison of Britain and Australia would answer questions such as : what variety of social rights are associated with different tenures in Britain and Australia and are there differences in the conceptions of justice, responsibility and citizenship in the two countries in relation to housing? However, the lens of citizenship theory allows us to see that for both countries there are many more than two ways from which to choose in forging a new prescription for justice and in establishing the responsibility of state, community and citizen in housing policy.

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Ageing at the Margins? Self-reliance and Rural Restructuring as Agendas for Aged Care

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1 Setting the Scene ...

While Australia still likes to portray itself as a 'young society', by 'conventional demographic standards this has not been the case for some time' (Borowski, Encel and Ozanne, 1997: 1). At the end of this century some 12 per cent of our population are now over the age of 65 years (Borowski and Hugo, 1997: 23) with Australia joining many other developed countries in becoming a 'Third Age' society (1997: 23). While the majority of our elderly population is not in the 'old-old' category, we are growing at a faster rate than Europe; there the ageing of farm populations is also causing concern. In addition, the need to attract younger people back to farming is a vital challenge to those previously communist states where collectivisation has ceased (Majerova, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).

The academic literature on policy development in a society which is ageing is wide ranging. It is not the purpose of this paper to review this literature (see Lawrence and Stehlik, 1996; Stehlik and Lawrence, 1996; and Stehlik, 1999), much of which can be dated back to Anna Howe's ground breaking collection *Towards an Older Australia* (1981). Rather, the purpose here is to focus on the dilemma that has emerged in the 1990s to develop universalist policies to 'manage' the ageing of Australian society. This dilemma, underpinned by a neo-liberalist policy framework and a discourse of self-reliance, is seeing a growing divide between those who develop these policies and those who experience them. In particular, we focus on results from several years research in a variety of communities in regional Australia to suggest that such a divide can be clearly seen in experiences of those elderly Australians who live outside of metropolitan or regional city settings.

Our paper therefore focuses on the policy assumptions and discourses which underpin the governing of the rural aged - specifically the presently dominant discourse of 'self-reliance'. In doing this it draws upon the now well-established Foucauldian-inspired body of literature on governmentality which is concerned

largely with the ways in which authorities attempt to align calculations at one place with action at another. We argue that policy influences are wider than just the traditional forms of health or social security: they are to be found in Regional Development and Transport policies; Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries policies; and in State Departments of Primary Industries. We consider here the experiences of those who are ageing 'on the land' - both the current cohort of elderly farmers and graziers (male and female) and the next cohort, the so-called 'baby boomers' (see Bulis and Stehlik, 1996).

2 Growing Old in Rural Australia

Internationally, the ageing of the world's population is being recognised as 1999 is the United Nations International Year of Older Persons. This is a timely celebration as it is now a century since the Convention of 1897/98 undertook to place responsibility for aged care with the Australian Federal Government (Kewley, 1980). In that time, aged care policies in Australia - whether for pensions, health care or, more recently, nursing home care - have become increasingly politicised and highly contested (Encel, 1997).

In 1981, Ken Dempsey wrote of the lack of interest in elderly people living in rural Australia. Over 20 years later, such a statement could still be made. Beer, Bolam and Maude (1994) identify an 'invisibility' of those Australians not in the capital cities which is 'evident in all aspects of social and economic life ... including the literature on economic activity, housing provision, population change, infrastructure provision, services and retailing activities' (Beer, Bolam and Maude, 1994: 7).

Developing an understanding of the spatiality of ageing is crucial in beginning to challenge the all too prevalent Australian image of an elderly person as one living in a retirement setting in a coastal resort city; or the other, of elderly couples living in their much-loved suburban (metropolitan) home. The latter image has recently been reinforced as a result of the media coverage of the nursing home debate. However, there are other (more challenging) images which have emerged from recent non-metropolitan research (see Chenoweth and Stehlik, 1999; Stehlik, Gray and Lawrence, 1999). For example, widows living alone and still managing large grazing properties; single (never married) elderly men renting accommodation from local Shires in return for doing 'odd-jobs'; volunteers in small rural centres as elderly as the 'clients' they serve; single frail women living alone in regional centres (see Bulis and Stehlik, 1996); and 'baby boomers' managing a farm without a succession plan (Stehlik, Gray and Lawrence, 1999). The obvious point needs to be made that as those people who live in these rural and remote settings experience their environment differently, therefore their ageing is also likely to be experienced differently.

The aged care debate in the next decade will focus on the reduction of available government revenues for an increasing population demand (Kendig and McCallum, 1990). Some commentators are predicting that, as occurred in France and Germany, this debate about lack of resources could lead to civil disturbances (Walker, 1996). Concomitantly, aged care policies have placed greater emphasis in the two decades on 'family' or 'community' care (see Kendig and McCallum, 1990), moving to a model of (residual) self-reliance and private for profit services, and away from a federally funded 'universal' care model. As a result this puts additional strain on those elderly Australians who continue to live beyond the eastern seaboard in sparsely populated and poorly-serviced areas (Stehlik and Lawrence, 1996). There is pressure placed on them to 'adjust' to market 'realities', leave such environments and move to the metropolitan centres - yet such a decision can be life threatening to individuals leaving them feeling abandoned and alienated.

3 Neo-liberalism, Self-reliance and Rural Restructuring

Since the early 1980s, rural Australia has undergone an unprecedented period of economic and social restructuring. While agriculture was long considered as providing the basis of stable rural development, policies based on 'economic rationalism' or 'neo-liberalism' (see Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 1993) have progressively challenged this belief with 'adjustment' and 'self-reliance' now seen as priorities for 'sustaining' rural Australia (see, for example, Department of Primary Industries and Energy, 1998). A number of government-sponsored initiatives, such as the National Landcare Program, Property Management Planning, the FarmBis program, and the Rural Strategic Planning Initiative all endorse 'self-reliance' as a desirable and necessary goal - these policies, developed within the 'agricultural' frame of reference, impact on ageing rural Australians. 'Self-reliance' has arguably become the key policy objective for rural/regional Australia with more sustainable, competitive and resilient rural industries and communities (Sharp, 1996) seen as the likely outcome.

From a sociological perspective, self-reliance might be seen as a convenient ideological tool which legitimates the continued withdrawal of financial support and services in rural Australia (see Stehlik and Lawrence, 1996; Higgins, 1999). However, if this were the case a much more *laissez-faire* approach by state agencies might be expected. This does not appear to be entirely borne out in practice (Lockie, 1999). The shift away from subsidisation and tariff support as the basis for regional development is not entirely leaving rural industries and communities open to the vagaries of market forces. Governments are, in fact, taking a different and apparently more 'bottom-up' approach to rural policy, in which community members are 'empowered' to develop plans of action (see Martin, 1997; Herbert-Cheshire, 1998). However, such 'community development

policies' are predicated on some powerful assumptions, including that a sense of 'community' exists naturally in rural regions, individuals should have the necessary resources to build community, and that such resources are essentially economic ones. For many frail, elderly rural citizens, they have little or no resources to call on, and their (often) volunteer activity is not valued or recognised by market-based neo-liberal discourses. Equally, older farmers who have experienced low commodity prices and drought are likely to have few resources.

The political significance of self-reliance as seemingly 'empowering' for individuals and communities can be questioned by examining neo-liberalism as a rationality of government. In Australia this approach has been applied to such diverse policy issues as unemployment (Dean, 1998), education (Meredyth, 1998), Aboriginal affairs (O'Malley, 1996) agriculture (Martin, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Higgins, Lockie and Lawrence, 1999; Lockie, 1999) and rural development (Herbert-Cheshire, 1998) and now, in this paper, on ageing. According to Miller and Rose (1990), Rose and Miller (1992) and Rose (1993), neo-liberal or 'advanced liberal' rationalities of government reactivate the liberal suspicion of governing by criticising the 'inefficiencies' and dangers of government involvement in social and economic life. 'Advanced liberal' government asks 'whether it is possible to govern without governing society, that is to say, to govern through the regulated and accountable choices of autonomous agents' (Rose, 1993: 298). Thus, instead of citizenship being constituted in terms of social obligations - as with welfare state programs - it becomes individualised, based on the exercise of 'personal choice' over a range of 'lifestyle' or consumption options (see Miller and Rose, 1990). Herein lies a contradiction. Rose (1996) notes that while 'community' appears to be displacing 'society' as the legitimate object and terrain of governance, individuals are expected increasingly to take responsibility and show themselves to be capable of taking 'rational' choices based on a moral code of individual advancement and community obligation. This means that communities, like individuals, are constructed discursively as sites of enterprise (see Burchell, 1996) in which individual capacities can be more 'naturally' cultivated beyond the 'artificial' constraints of 'society'. In this reading of neo-liberal governance one's life effectively becomes constituted as a business, based on personal, calculative, capacities, and a commitment to (economic) 'community' values. It is this 'business' approach to ageing that we are challenging here.

4 Impacts of Restructuring on 'Community'

'Advanced liberal' forms of government are particularly effective in programming entrepreneurial skills into individuals due to their 'capacity to create operable forms for exercising perpetual scrutiny over the authority of authority' (Rose, 1993: 295). The critique of the welfare state from both Right and Left has led to a

questioning of the expert knowledges which were seen to create both 'passive' forms of citizenship (see Dean, 1998) and 'dependency' (see Fraser and Gordon, 1994). The authority of experts are now to be penetrated through a range of techniques - for instance, audit, accountancy and financial management - which exercise scrutiny over the conduct of authority (Rose, 1993: 295) and encourage more 'active' and 'incentivated' conduct. Individuals must now take into account these economic disciplines in order for 'truthful' outcomes to be produced. Being 'entrepreneurial' therefore requires guidance in adopting a calculative and prudent approach to one's life. Much of the policy development in this area has focused on the establishment of such 'experts'. For example, as a result of the combined impact of the drought and falling commodity prices, rural Queenslanders were, many for the first time, exposed to farm financial counsellors, drought relief workers and suicide prevention workers. Equally, those who do not make the 'appropriate' choices are seen to lack the necessary life management skills and are therefore thought to require 'training' or 'counselling'. Thus the need for even more 'experts', including a burgeoning group of 'community developers'.

A diversity of strategies is employed by authorities to shape individual conduct. These techniques do not involve a direct imposition of force, but rather act on the calculations of agents rendering their practices 'knowable' in technical terms, and therefore amenable to management by expertise (Miller and Rose, 1990; Murdoch and Ward, 1997). Once different actors see their values, practices, and goals as intrinsically linked to one another a network is formed in which calculations at one place can be aligned with action at another: this is termed 'action at a distance' (Miller and Rose, 1990: 9-10).

Conceptualised as part of an advanced liberal rationality of government, 'self-reliance' is neither something that exists 'naturally' in rural/regional areas, to be 'harnessed' by community developers or state agencies, nor is it a necessary outcome of globalisation. Rather, its emergence and governance is politically contingent, involving particular claims to 'truthful' economic knowledge. Thus, while the language of 'self-reliance' and particularly 'being one's own boss' has long been a part of farming ideology and agrarian fundamentalism in Australia (see Aitkin, 1988; Gray, 1991; Kidman, 1991), state agencies have attempted increasingly to draw upon and reconstitute these ideas according to productivist state objectives. This means that while previously identified as part of farming as a 'way of life', 'self-reliance', since the early 1990s, has increasingly been rendered 'knowable' in economic terms through notions of entrepreneurialism, economic efficiency and business management (Higgins, 1998). It is important to note that such knowledges are neither value-neutral nor coherent but promote contractual individualism and economic restructuring as the 'truthful' standards by which all behaviour should be assessed (Muetzelfeldt, 1992). What policy makers should be asking themselves, is where do 'baby boomers' envisage their ageing future in these communities? How much of what is happening now to aged

Australians is affecting decision making about the future for the next generation who live in these communities?

5 Policy Responses

Economic knowledges have therefore been deemed to have the most authority to speak about, define and problematise 'self-reliance'. The calculations of economists, formulated in urban areas, have sought to constitute 'the rural' as an 'economic' problem that can be effectively managed only through the adoption of particular financial and life-management skills. In relation to the farming sector, for example, it is believed that formal education and training in business skills result in improved profitability and sustainability as well as better off-farm opportunities for non-viable farmers (Department of Primary Industries and Energy, 1998; see also Kilpatrick, 1996). Indeed, much emphasis is being placed on the need for education as a strategy for sustainability. Thus, those farmers who have no access to education, or who are older, are 'left behind'. Such assumptions devalue the goals and knowledges of rural residents in favour of standardised urban-based responses.

Those farmers who resist the construction of their practices purely in economic terms are increasingly deemed as 'unviable' in the long term and encouraged to leave the sector through 'welfare' incentives such as a $45 000 re-establishment grant. However, primary producers tend to have a cultural attachment to farming as a 'way of life' which sees many of them reject this 'market logic' and attempt to remain on their land at all costs (see Gow and Stayner, 1994; Gray, 1996). From the perspective of policy-makers, those whose problems are deemed as unable to be met through narrow 'economic' criteria are constructed as 'at risk' groups (O'Malley, 1992) who require more overt 'incentives' to conform. This clearly has implications for those rural residents who, due to isolation from 'centres of calculation' and a more narrow range of service provision, do not have the resources to adopt a more personal and active approach to self-management.

This recalls previous state responses. To digress for a moment, one of the most enduring aspects of our current welfare system, and a legacy of the historical past, which dates back to the British Poor Laws of the early 17th century, is the idea of the 'undeserving' and the 'deserving' poor. The 'undeserving' in this sense were those people perceived as being quite able-bodied, who could do something about their lot, and those who were impotent and often, disabled in some way and therefore more 'deserving' of charity. In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the poor were 'badged' that is, marked out as different from others. While this fell into disuse, mainly because of inherent enforcement difficulties, it of course has turned up again later in our human history. The concept of 'charity' and the impact of that on the individual is profound for many people. Our recent drought

research (see Stehlik, Gray and Lawrence, 1999) found that some older rural Australians will do anything not to have to accept what they perceive as 'charity'. As older citizens who perhaps have memories of the Depression and the way in which 'the dole' was distributed, they reject the stigma. There is also a tendency to equate 'charity' with the stresses of urban living: crime, poverty and homelessness. However, the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' has emerged again at the end of this century as the discourse of self-reliance reconstitutes individuals as potential successes (responsible individuals) and potential failures (irresponsible individuals). It also identifies communities in a similar way (see Herbert-Cheshire, 1999).

6 Governance and Ageing

State agencies are therefore attempting to equip individuals with the knowledges and capacities to evaluate their conduct in more marketised and economically 'rational' ways. Those who are unable to become more 'prudential' are diverted to welfare services which, it is assumed, will not only be willingly used, but also be easily accessed. However, the increased expectation that 'the community' will provide support services, in an environment of continued loss of services and social capital, make this claim somewhat dubious. Thus, we would argue, a bifurcation appears to be emerging between those who are deemed to have the capacities to make 'rational' and 'responsible' choices - through business disciplines and economic capital ('self-reliant' individuals) - and those 'targeted populations' (Dean, 1997) whose 'normalisation' requires governance through 'welfare', 'community' and 'charity'. It is our contention that the aged in rural Australia fit into the latter category, and that this results in forms of marginalisation not experienced in urban locations.

The proportion of older Australians in such regional/rural centres is higher than in the urban/metropolises (Battersby, 1994). From the little research which has been done, it is clear that, compared with their city counterparts, many older Australians who live in regional/rural areas face considerable, and in some cases, extreme disadvantage (Dempsey, 1991). The crisis being faced in regional and rural Australia is the combination of a number of recent phenomena, including: globalisation; market differentiation; climatic changes; environmental and population changes. As a result, the social and economic infrastructure of regional Australia is under severe strain. Recent responses from regional communities highlight the way in which this crisis is being experienced by diverse groups within regional Australia. For example, while some communities - such as those involved in mining - are experiencing fast demographic and economic growth, others, particularly in the agricultural sector, are experiencing decline. One commonality of many such communities is their continued isolation from the 'wealth' of urban centres and in particular, their sense of deprivation.

Government through community can be observed in powerful ways outside of metropolitan centres. A discourse of self-help and self-reliance is alive and well in rural Australia where it builds on deep-seated views of individualism, 'giving it a go', 'battlers', and a pioneering ethos (Kapferer, 1990). It is spatially exposed by its focus on 'leaving it with the community' to respond with 'expert' assistance. In metropolitan centres, self-reliance seems to be mediated through existing human services and responses to 'community' which are more space sensitive. The community responsibility ethos is much stronger within rural Australia, and the discourse of self-help uses this as a lever to govern through community. The burgeoning growth of 'evangelical' self-help 'gurus' crossing the country to offer declining communities advice on 'how to do it better with less' is evidence of this. Such gurus avoid cities. They are not welcome there.

7 Conclusion

The current parameters of any responses to the rural crisis have been framed in economic terms. Although much Federal and State Government support has been targeted to rural communities, there has been little or no collaboration between government agencies and little if any, long-term strategic planning. The concept of 'crisis' appears to highlight a short-term problem. Such responses fail to take into account the social and human dimensions of the crisis. They also tend to frame any responses within deficit models - community as pathology - rather than community as positive knowledge generator and developer. We are suggesting that long term strategies, social as well as economic, need to be developed now to ensure that Australia continues to have regional and rural communities in the 21st century.

While there is little doubt that funding cutbacks and withdrawal of services are continuing to occur, state agencies are using more indirect and subtle ways of regulating the actions of individuals and communities. Thus, rather than a demise in state regulation, or an 'empowerment' of communities, we appear to be seeing the emergence of 'neo-liberal' forms of governance which attempt to enhance the self-regulatory capacities of individuals so that they evaluate and govern their conduct in an increasingly marketised, 'rational' and economically efficient manner. Those individuals and communities who do not adopt a more 'active' entrepreneurial approach to their self-management are deemed as being 'at risk' and are either counselled to seriously re-assess their future or constituted as non-responsible welfare-dependents.

It is apparent that while universalistic policy formulas inform the making of not only aged care programs, but also those that apply more broadly to ageing rural Australians, the variable of space for those people experiencing such policies will continue to go unacknowledged resulting in their further marginalisation. We

presently appear to be moving into a period of policy making which is searching for alternatives to a traditional neo-liberal framework. It is imperative that policy makers and politicians recognise the impact the past decade of change has had on 'the bush'. Living in, and ageing on, the margins of Australian society means that any impacts of a reversal of marketisation will take longer to reach those people. We encourage an approach that takes account of the knowledges and experiences of elderly rural Australians and develops policies which support and assist, not further marginalise, them.

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Support For the Homeless in Australia

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1 Introduction

The authors (hereafter referred to as the National Evaluation Team) were recently involved in a national evaluation of a jointly funded Commonwealth and State/Territory program which aims to provide support for the homeless or those at imminent risk of becoming homeless (National Evaluation of the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP III), 1999). Under the most recent phase of this program, a National Data Collection (NDC) and National Research Program were established. The NDC was developed to assist in the enumeration of the homeless in Australia. It comprises an annual census of organisations providing support to the homeless or those at imminent risk of homelessness as funded under SAAP, as well as snapshot data on unmet demand and casual clients of SAAP services.

The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) were contracted to collect and manage this data and commenced doing so in 1995-1996. Whilst the most recent collection made available applies to 1997-1998, the analysis presented here refers to the 1996-1997 data. Since the inception of the NDC, a number of criticisms have been made regarding the validity and reliability of the information collected. Some of these criticisms have substance. However, the National Evaluation Team agreed that there has been an increase in the quality of these data over time. The service provider dataset houses comprehensive information on certain aspects of support provided to the homeless, and of some of the impacts of that support upon the lives of 'clients'. It does not, however, provide comprehensive data on the homeless in Australia. Under the National Research

Program of SAAP more work is currently being undertaken on the derivation of a reliable estimate of unmet demand for support in times of housing crisis.

It is a sad indictment of modern life that we have to describe the homeless as a specific sub-group of the population. The reality is that there is a need to more fully understand the nature of homelessness in Australia, in order that effective responses can be made to the factors pushing people into and maintaining housing crisis. Within this context, SAAP can lay claim to being 'a world class innovative program for homeless people' (Council to Homeless Persons, 1998: 1). The Program is nationally coordinated and the data collected in such a way that is not emulated in other nations, as evidenced by an international literature review as undertaken as part of the National Evaluation. The Program attempts to pool Commonwealth and State/Territory resources to address homelessness. A further strength of SAAP is the evolving National Research Program which aims to assist the sector in further understanding many aspects of SAAP's implementation and to aid in ongoing development of the Program.

What is Homelessness?

Attempts to provide a universal definition of the condition of homelessness have resulted in characterising homelessness as a manifestation of a multitude of conditions which may be an outcome of a variety of events (Avramov, 1995). Yet definitions are important because they alert us to how things are perceived in particular instances and to how those perceptions change over time. Late in the English feudal period frequent reference was made to the itinerant poor who were, at that time, all but indistinguishable from the poor at large (Hopper, 1997). Later, vast tomes were assembled regarding the history of the vagrant. A number of themes are apparent in literature concerning vagrancy, the legacy of the depression in Australia during the early 1900s, the post-World War II period of relative prosperity and the emergence of a 'new' group of homeless persons.

Numerous definitions of homelessness exist, and these vary according to the context within which they are used. Homelessness is a culturally defined concept and gains meaning from how people live in a given society (HORSCCA or Morris Report, 1994:23). Definitions range from the simplest common sense and literal understanding, to the most abstract. The exact meaning of the words 'home' and 'permanent' is not clear. Detailed definitions are often specified in various government policies and acts of legislation. Irrespective of their complexity and diversity, most definitions encompass insights into sub-standard living conditions (e.g. sleeping rough and overcrowding) and determinants of these (e.g. human-made disasters, natural disasters and the individual's choice not to live in permanent accommodation) (Avramov, 1995).

Neil and Fopp (1992: 3) suggest there are two important issues to be considered in defining homelessness: the notion of home, and the value of objective or subjective criteria in providing a more appropriate definition. The concept of 'home' is an important component in many definitions of homelessness. Emphasis is being given in such definitions to the importance of personal attachment to a dwelling - the lack of a 'home' in comparison with the absence of a 'house'. Neil and Fopp (1992: 4-5) have identified a number of attributes of home. These are security of tenure, security for each member of the household against internal and external threats, decent standards, affordability, social relations, control and autonomy, identity, accessibility, compatibility and appropriateness.

Defining Homelessness in Australia

A number of definitions of homelessness are used in Australia in different contexts. The definition under the *Supported Accommodation Assistance Act 1994* is as follows:

4 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a person is homeless if, and only if, he or she has inadequate access to safe and secure housing.

(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person is taken to have inadequate access to safe and secure housing if the only housing to which the person has access:
- (a) damages, or is likely to damage, the person's health; or
- (b) threatens the person's safety; or
- (c) marginalises the person through failing to provide access to:
  - (i) adequate personal amenities; or
  - (ii) the economic and social supports that a home normally affords; or
- (d) places the person in circumstances which threaten or adversely affect the adequacy, safety, security and affordability of that housing.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a person is taken to have inadequate access to safe and secure housing if:
- (a) the person is living in accommodation provided under SAAP; and
- (b) the assessment of the person's eligibility for that accommodation was based on the application of subsection (1) or (2) (ignoring the effect of this subsection).

Generality of subsection (1)

Subsections (2) and (3) do not limit the generality of subsection (1)

The Council to Homeless Persons (1998), one of Australia's peak bodies in relation to homelessness, defines a homeless person as someone who:

> is without a conventional home and lacks the economic and social supports that a home normally affords. She/he is often cut off from the support of relatives and friends, she/he has few independent resources and often has no immediate means and, in some cases, little prospect of self-support. (Council to Homeless Persons, 1998: 1)

Neil and Fopp incorporated the attributes of home, defining homelessness as:

> that state in which people have no access to safe and secure shelter of a standard that does not damage their health, threaten their personal safety, or further marginalises them through failing to provide either cooking facilities, or facilities that permit adequate personal hygiene. (Neil and Fopp, 1992: 8)

The temporal dimensions of homelessness have also been discussed (Chamberlain and MacKenzie, 1998; Neil and Fopp, 1992). Homelessness is not a state in which all people permanently remain. Some will be homeless for only a short period; some will be episodically homeless; and others will be homeless for long periods.

Some definitions are age specific, as is demonstrated in definitions of homeless youth and children. The Burdekin Report (HREOC, 1989) describes homelessness as follows:

> 'Homelessness' describes a lifestyle which includes insecurity and transiency of shelter. It is not confined to a total lack of shelter. For many children and young people it signifies a state of detachment from family and vulnerability to dangers, including exploitation and abuse broadly defined, from which the family normally protects a child. However, the Inquiry also found that there is a growing number of children who are 'homeless' because the whole family cannot obtain adequate shelter. (HREOC, 1989: 7)

Chamberlain and MacKenzie (1992) dealt with the issue of varying levels of homelessness by introducing the concept of a 'continuum' of homelessness. It is argued that such a conceptual framework allows estimates to be made of different sub-groups of the homeless population and those at risk of becoming homeless. Chamberlain and MacKenzie (1998) extended this model for youth homelessness

and specified that there were three categories of homeless persons - the primary homeless (includes people without conventional accommodation), the secondary homeless (includes those living in temporary accommodation) and the tertiary homeless (includes those living in boarding houses in the medium to long term and those who are considered to be in marginal accommodation).

Who Are the Homeless?

The homeless are not a homogenous group. They have different problems and needs before and during the transition to homelessness. The backgrounds of the homeless are varied. They may have a multiplicity of disabilities, constraints or needs that are translated into a lifestyle characterised by what has become known as housing crisis. They therefore have different capacities and needs in responding to this crisis situation.

Homeless people can be differentiated between using socio-demographic characteristics, by a measure of the complexity of their problems, and by the type of public assistance and care they receive (Avramov, 1998: 33). Research in Europe reveals that services for homeless persons perpetuate social stratification by selecting 'easier clients' for support, and that service standardisation can lead to the exclusion of individuals who do not 'easily fit the system' and whose needs are difficult to meet (Avramov, 1998: 34).

Service provider data and research targeted at specific sub-groups of the homeless are the main sources of information regarding gender, age and socio-economic characteristics of the homeless. But these data paint only part of the picture. Homeless persons who remain outside the institutional framework of emergency and transitional services are currently beyond statistics. It is only possible to estimate the extent to which these people whose needs are not currently being met comprise a proportion of the homeless.

Routes into Homelessness

The determinants of homelessness have been reviewed in a number of ways.

- Burke (1994:10) has identified a number of direct and indirect factors affecting homelessness: poverty, health, housing, social dislocation and domestic violence, and social values. People may be homeless because of a lack of affordable housing, because their incomes are too low to pay for basic living expenses, and because of a lack of services to help them overcome personal challenges. These are the systemic or underlying factors which cause homelessness and make it more likely that problems - such as mental illness, physical illness, domestic violence, or substance abuse - will

result in homelessness for an individual or a family. The causal factors of homelessness tend not to operate in isolation; rather they 'reinforce and complement each other' (Burke, 1994: 11).

- Avramov (1998) discusses homelessness and housing exclusion in the context of background factors which operate as an 'opportunity', either enhancing or abasing mechanisms determining access by the underprivileged to housing. Background factors include the demographic structure of the population, population trends, the volume and features of housing stock, and the magnitude of poverty in the population as a whole. These background factors operate through proximate factors of housing exclusion: low levels of household income, limited access to affordable housing and the inferior quality of low-cost housing (Avramov, 1998: 12). Housing exclusion, and homelessness at its extreme manifestation, is induced by the relationships between background and proximate factors.

Fopp (1995) highlights an important issue in understanding homelessness: that of the confusion in discussing the causes and consequences of homelessness. In a summary of discussions of the causes of homelessness, Fopp (1995: 15) contends we should:

- not presume that personal characteristics are deficiencies;
- not presume that personal characteristics are causes;
- not use anecdotal evidence to draw policy and causal conclusions;
- not presume that the direction of causation is necessarily as it appears;
- not confuse symptoms and causes; and
- not use the so-called multiplicity of characteristics to avoid or camouflage the most important cause of homelessness which is related to income.

This work suggests that there is a hierarchy of problems which the homeless experience.

2 Australian Homelessness in an International Context

Throughout the world the homeless appear to be characterised by a number of similar factors: lack of access to appropriate and affordable housing, poverty or low-income, low levels of education and literacy, tenuous attachment to the paid labour force, poor health, family breakdown and a lack of adequate support networks in times of crisis. The extent to which particular groups of people are

found within the homeless population, however, varies between countries in relation to differences in political, economic and social contexts and, in particular, to differences in the way in which the homeless are counted.

Recent figures indicate that 75 per cent of the homeless in the United States are single persons unaccompanied by children, and within the European Union this category accounts for between 60 and 70 per cent of the homeless. However, in the United Kingdom just over 50 per cent of homeless people have children; this figure does not include people assessed to be homeless through their own fault, or single homeless people unable to afford a dwelling and resorting to alternative accommodation (Avramov, 1995: 69). In the United Kingdom, 75 per cent of the homeless (as counted) are aged 35 years or under. In Europe, there is growing concern with the high proportion of the homeless that are young people, but no reliable data are available which adequately describe the extent to which this is the case. The extent of homelessness also varies throughout the European Union. Further, in the United States, war veterans comprise a significant proportion of homeless males, with 40 per cent having served (including active and non-active service) in the Armed Forces compared with 34 per cent of the adult male population.

Who is Homeless in Australia?

As previously indicated, accurate measurement of the number of homeless people at any one point in time is fraught with difficulties. Chamberlain and MacKenzie (1998) detail a variety of aspects of homelessness that can be measured. Their work highlights the temporal nature of homelessness, as well as the different degrees of homelessness, ranging from primary homelessness, to urban campers, to tertiary homelessness (the boarding house population), and the 'marginally housed'.

As stated earlier, enumerating the extent of homelessness in Australia is compounded by a lack of reliable and comprehensive data. While the NDC provides information regarding clients of SAAP services and the extent to which requests for assistance have been met, it does not provide information regarding the total number of people who are homeless or at imminent risk of becoming homeless and who do not access SAAP services.

In 1998 Chamberlain and MacKenzie proposed a set of estimations which they believed could be used to more accurately understand the full extent of youth homelessness in 1991 and 1994. Such estimates importantly relied upon data additional to SAAP data, for example, a national census of homeless school students. Such broader 'population' data is also required in order to be able to develop a reasonably accurate estimation of the homeless population overall.

Estimates of the extent of the homeless population in Australia are proposed in the following section, but these are tentative at best. It is important to develop a more reliable estimate of the extent of homelessness in Australia in order to better inform governments and Australian society of the extent of homelessness in Australia, and to better target service provision under SAAP.

3 SAAP: The Australian Program for Homelessness

Until 1985, SAAP policy and program reforms to homelessness in Australia were diffuse, and the States/Territories operated a range of independent programs. Since 1985, under bilateral agreements, the Commonwealth Government and the State/Territory Governments have jointly funded SAAP to provide a nationally co-ordinated policy approach to address the social phenomenon of homelessness, and to provide support and services to homeless people.

SAAP has evolved through three phases, with each phase involving an evaluation to assess progress made and to inform the development of the next phase of the Program. The current agreement covers the period 1994 to 1999.

The *Supported Accommodation Assistance Program Act 1994* had as it aim (Section 5(I)):

> To provide transitional supported accommodation and related support services, in order to help people who are homeless to achieve the maximum possible degree of self-reliance and independence.

According to the 1996-1997 service provider data housed in SAAP's NDC, as at June 1997 there were 1183 SAAP agencies operating in Australia (AIHW, 1997: 13). These are separated into eight categories according to their service delivery model (as defined in the NDC), with accommodation agencies comprising about three-quarters of all agencies:

- medium- to long-term accommodation (474 agencies);
- crisis or short-term accommodation (408 agencies);
- multiple service delivery model (144 agencies);
- 'other' (50 agencies)[1];

1 The definition provided by the AIHW for this category of service is those agencies that provide support using a service delivery model not covered in the other service categories (AIHW, 1997: 151).

- outreach support (39 agencies);
- day support (28 agencies);
- agency support (20 agencies); and
- telephone information and referral (19 agencies).

State/Territory variations were apparent in the extent of service types provided.[2] It is not clear to what extent such variations were due to differences in the nature of support provided by agencies. Inconsistencies between States/Territories in the application of definitions of service delivery models were brought to the attention of the National Evaluation Team.

There are differences in the nature of SAAP services provided in urban and rural/remote Australia. Once again, the extent to which this is a result of different service classification systems is unclear. For example, in remote areas and large rural centres crisis/short-term accommodation service delivery dominated, whereas in capital cities and other metropolitan areas medium- to long-term accommodation service delivery dominated. In 'other' rural centres, medium- to long-term accommodation agencies were more prevalent than elsewhere (AIHW, 1997).

In 1996-1997, SAAP funding to service types totalled $200.54 million, with crisis short-term accommodation receiving the bulk of the funding (around $91 million), followed by medium/long-term accommodation ($57 million), multiple services ($33 million), other ($7 million), outreach support and day support ($4 million each), telephone information/referral ($3 million), and agency support ($1 million). Agency support services received the lowest level of funding at $68 198 per agency. Outreach support received on average $108 770 per agency, multiple services received $226 365, and crisis/short-term accommodation received $224 050 (AIHW, 1997: 21).

SAAP Clients: A Summary Profile

The NDC provides only an 'estimation' of the number of clients serviced by SAAP agencies across a 12-month period. However, the nature of support provided to those clients can be summarised along with details of the types of agencies providing that support. Information has also been collected regarding the level of unmet demand - either for people whose needs cannot be met by the first point of contact with the SAAP service system, but who can be responded to by another SAAP service, or for people whose needs cannot be met at all by a SAAP

2 Further details of these variations can be found by referring to the *SAAP NDCA Administrative Data Collection* in SAAP NDCA *Annual Report Australia* 1996–1997.

agency.[3] The number of children who accompany SAAP clients is also recorded, although criticisms have been made that the current system of data collection does not accurately enumerate the number of children coming into contact with SAAP agencies. These three figures together are used to provide *an indication* of the number of people who were homeless in Australia during 1996-1997.

Number of Clients

According to the SAAP NDC report for 1996-1997, the number of clients supported by SAAP agencies was estimated at 100 928 persons. This figures comprises 64 291 clients who had valid identification codes under the NDC system. The remaining 36 637 clients is an estimation of the number of homeless people, using information provided by those SAAP agencies that could not assign a valid identification code[4] to a client through the NDC system. Further, the NDCA estimates that 105 898 persons' needs were not able to be met by a SAAP agency, suggesting that the incidence of unmet demand among the homeless who had tried to enter the SAAP system was in excess of 50 per cent.

Additionally, a high number of children present to SAAP agencies. A total of 60 572 children were recorded as being supported by SAAP agencies during 1996-1997 (this estimate may be over-enumerated due to children receiving assistance in multiple support periods). For children recorded, almost half (48 per cent) were aged 0-4 years, 41 per cent were aged 5-12 years, eight per cent were aged 13-15 years, and the remainder being 16-17 years (AIHW, 1997: 39). More than three-quarters of clients (78 per cent) did not have accompanying children when accessing support or receiving accommodation, with the Australian Capital Territory having the highest proportion of support periods (85 per cent) for clients having no accompanying children (AIHW, 1997: 29).

According to the NDC the number of homeless people in Australia who had attempted to enter the SAAP system was 267 398, representing 1.4 per cent of the Australian population (including newly arrived immigrants who are not yet

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3 The unmet demand data housed in the NDC needs to be used with some caution. It should not be taken as representing an accurate indication of the extent of homelessness in Australia. It specifically measures the extent to which requests for support from SAAP services have not been met. These data do not count persons who do not approach SAAP services for support but who are homeless. Criticisms have also been made of the NDC's unmet data on the basis that it may include multiple requests for support (which remain unmet) from one individual. This could inflate estimates of unmet demand.

4 In order to assist in longitudinal analysis of SAAP clients, a unique and confidential ID code is assigned to service users who agree to have their personal details recorded in some depth.

Australian citizens). One interpretation would be that 51 per cent of people seeking support or supported accommodation from SAAP agencies were turned away. A number of criticisms have been made of the unmet demand collection and it is against that background that these figures are proposed as an estimation with a reasonable standard error.

Age, Gender, Ethnicity

Of the clients supported by SAAP agencies in 1996-1997, 52 per cent were males. 'Clients aged 15-19 years (inclusive) were the single largest age grouping, accounting for 22 per cent of all clients. Those aged 20-24 years also constituted a substantial 16 per cent of the total and 14 per cent of clients were aged 45 years and over' (AIHW, 1997: 25).

Female SAAP clients characteristically were younger than male clients.

There were differences across the States/Territories in the target groups of SAAP services. Single males were the largest primary target group for SAAP support in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory. Young people comprised the largest single group primarily targeted by SAAP services in Victoria and Tasmania. In Western Australia, women escaping domestic violence were the dominant target group. In the Australian Capital Territory, SAAP services generally supported 'cross–target' groups, that is, more than one primary target group.

With respect to support periods by client group (AIHW, 1997: 38):

- Tasmanian SAAP services provided the highest proportion of support to young people, 31 per cent of support periods (22 per cent Australia as a whole);
- New South Wales SAAP services provided the highest proportion of support to single males, 37 per cent of support periods (25 per cent Australia);
- Tasmanian SAAP services provided the highest proportion of support to single women, eight per cent of support periods (two per cent Australia);
- South Australian SAAP services provided the highest proportion of support to families, 11 per cent of support periods (five per cent Australia);
- Western Australian SAAP services recorded the highest proportion of support to women escaping domestic violence, 37 per cent of support periods (21 per cent Australia); and

- SAAP services in the Australian Capital Territory provided the highest proportion of support to clients in the cross-target category, 41 per cent of support periods (26 per cent Australia).

In 1996-1997, indigenous Australians comprised 12.4 per cent of SAAP clients, with twice as many females as males seeking support. The proportion of clients from non-English-speaking backgrounds was lower at 9.2 per cent, with the proportion of females seeking support (10.4 per cent of all female SAAP clients seeking support) being somewhat higher than males (8.2 per cent of all male SAAP clients seeking support) (AIHW, 1997: 29).

Employment Status

Not surprisingly, in only six per cent of cases were clients employed (either on a full-time or part-time basis) prior to receiving support. A further three per cent were employed on a casual basis. Thirty-eight per cent were unemployed and 53 per cent were not in the labour force. For the majority (82.8 per cent) the primary income source before support therefore was government payments, while 11 per cent had no source of income (AIHW, 1997: 43). Primary income source for users of SAAP services did not change following the majority of support periods (83 per cent) (AIHW, 1997: 85).

Housing Status

The housing status, by support period of clients, prior to seeking support showed that:

- one-third of all clients lived in private rental dwellings (29 per cent males, 40 per cent females);

- around one-fifth (19 per cent) lived in a caravan, tent, park, street or squat (29 per cent males, five per cent females);

- one-fifth lived in SAAP/CAP-funded accommodation - 13 per cent in crisis/short-term (13.1 per cent males, 13.5 per cent females), two per cent in medium-long-term (two per cent for both males and females), and five per cent in other accommodation (seven per cent males and three per cent females);

- eleven per cent lived in other non-SAAP accommodation (nine per cent males, 14 per cent females);

- eight per cent lived in public housing (four per cent males, 12 per cent females);
- four per cent lived in institutions (six per cent males, two per cent females); and
- three per cent were owner/occupiers (one per cent males, six per cent females) (AIHW, 1997: 45).

Main Reason for Seeking Support

The main reasons for clients seeking support across support periods were:

- domestic violence (22 per cent);
- relationship and family breakdown (14 per cent);
- financial difficulty (13 per cent);
- eviction and 'other' reasons (six per cent each);
- substance abuse, long-term homelessness, itinerancy (five per cent each);
- time out from family situation, interpersonal conflicts, physical/emotional abuse, arrival from interstate (four per cent each);
- at imminent risk but not homeless (three per cent);
- emergency accommodation ended, recently left an institution, psychiatric illness (two per cent each); and
- sexual abuse (one per cent) (AIHW, 1997: 42).

The main reasons for clients seeking assistance differed across target groups.

- The reasons most frequently cited by young people were family/relationship breakdown, 'other', long-term homelessness, time out from a family situation, and interpersonal conflicts.
- Not surprisingly, for women escaping domestic violence the main reasons for seeking support were domestic violence, physical/emotional/sexual abuse, and relationship or family breakdown.
- For families financial difficulty ranked highly, as did domestic violence, relationship or family breakdown and eviction.

- For single males financial difficulty was the most frequent reason given, whereas for single females it was domestic violence.

Reasons for seeking support varied according to race and ethnicity. One in three clients who were either indigenous Australians or from a non-English-speaking background were likely to be escaping from domestic violence. This compares with 16 per cent for other clients.

In half of the cases of support (49 per cent), the main source of referral was self, family and/or friends. Other significant sources of referral were other SAAP agencies (10 per cent) and telephone/crisis referral agencies (eight per cent) (AIHW, 1997: 41).

Period Homeless before Entering SAAP

One in three persons seeking support from SAAP agencies had been homeless for two weeks or less (AIHW, 1997: 43). Clients at imminent risk of homelessness contributed 25 per cent of the total. Notably, 15 per cent of support periods were provided for persons who had been homeless for at least one year. Those who had been homeless for two years or more tended to be older (45 years and over). However, people aged between 15 to 19 years were proportionally most likely to have been homeless for between one and two years (seven per cent). As data regarding length of homelessness upon accessing a SAAP service were missing for over one-half of all support periods, the NDCA caution against extrapolating to the broader population on the basis of such indications.

Duration of Support

Nationally, the duration of support provided in 1996-1997 was short, with over two-thirds support continuing for a period of two weeks or less. Support lasting less than one day was provided in 18 per cent of cases, and 32 per cent of support periods lasted one to three days. Support lasting between four and 13 weeks was provided in 15 per cent of cases, with nine per cent of support periods being in excess of 13 weeks.

There were considerable variations across the States/Territories in this pattern of duration of support. Very short periods of support were more common in New South Wales (62 per cent receiving support for three days or less). This was not so in Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory where the proportion of support provided for three days or less was 34 per cent, 36 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. Support was provided for more than 13 weeks in Victoria in 18 per cent of cases, compared with five per cent in New South Wales and six per cent in the Northern Territory.

Agencies targeting families, youth and single women were proportionately more likely to provide support for long periods. However, very short periods of support were relatively common at agencies targeting a variety of groups, at agencies targeting women escaping domestic violence, and at youth agencies.

Overall, more males than females received support for short periods of time, with 53 per cent of male clients receiving support lasting three days or less, compared with 35 per cent of female clients. People aged 15 to 19 years and those aged less than 15 years had the highest proportion of support periods longer than four weeks (approximately 35 per cent).

Support for indigenous Australians was short term, with 54 per cent being assisted under the Program for less than three days.

Case Management/Support Plans

SAAP agencies in all States/Territories offered support plans to their clients, with the Australian Capital Territory having the highest proportion of clients on such plans at 66 per cent of support periods (in comparison with 49 per cent for Australia). The Northern Territory had the lowest proportion of clients with case support plans, at 29 per cent of support periods, with 48 per cent of agencies indicating that such plans were not appropriate (AIHW, 1997: 68).

Nationally, clients receiving support in medium/long-term accommodation had the highest proportion of support plans at 53 per cent, followed by outreach support at 50 per cent, and crisis/short-term accommodation at 49 per cent. Support plans were more commonly developed within services targeting families (59 per cent support periods), single females (56 per cent) and young people (55 per cent). They were more frequently deemed inappropriate by those SAAP agencies targeting single males (34 per cent) and women escaping domestic violence (33 per cent) (AIHW, 1997: 69).

Clients with High Needs

Information from SAAP-funded research into appropriate responses for homeless people with 'high needs' (unpublished report, 1998) estimated that 18 per cent of all SAAP clients were in this category.

4 Pathways to Support

The NDC provides information which can be summarised to assist Program administrators and support workers to better understand the context within which

individuals have accessed and experienced support provided by SAAP services. The summary of NDC data can be used to present a series of snapshots of client circumstances at different stages of access to SAAP support. Among other data it houses information on the:

- proportion of support provided by agencies targeting different client groups;
- housing, income and employment status of clients prior to support;
- location of clients prior to support;
- source of clients' referral to a SAAP agency;
- type of service provided by the SAAP agency contacted;
- primary and secondary reason for seeking assistance;
- length of support provided;
- type of support provided; and
- housing, income and employment status of people following support

Figures 1 to 5 summarise this data using a 'pathways' analysis (with the exclusion of housing, income and employment status of clients prior to support) across the five target groups (youth, single males, single females, families and women escaping domestic violence). Given the potential heterogeneity of the persons supported by cross–target or generalist services they were omitted from this descriptive analysis.[5] Information on housing, income and employment status of individuals prior to accessing a SAAP service is not broken down by agency target group in the 1996-1997 NDCA Annual Report (AIHW, 1997) for Australia. The specification of 'pathways' through the SAAP system assists in providing an overview of the similarities in and differences between the situations and experiences of different types of homeless people.[6] They are presented sequentially according to the proportion of total support periods provided across Australia to each target group.

Single Males (24.8 per cent of support periods nationally)

Single males were primarily residents in capital cities or other metropolitan areas prior to contacting a SAAP agency (68 per cent) (see Figure 1). Like all target

5 The cross-target/multiple/general group of clients accounted for 26.1 per cent of support periods during 1996-1997 (AIHW, 1997).

6 It is not being proposed that all people included under each target group category had the same experiences of SAAP agency support. The authors advocate further research which develops a clearer understanding of the extent to which there are groups of people with quite different needs for and experiences of support within each of the broad target groups.

Figure 1: Pathways to Homelessness for Single Males



groups, they most frequently came independently to a SAAP service or were referred by family and friends.

Two-thirds of this client group were looking for accommodation. One-third contacted a crisis or short-term accommodation agency and one-third contacted an agency which provided medium-term accommodation. They were most frequently experiencing either financial difficulties, substance abuse problems or relationship and/or family breakdown.

Similarly, they often stayed with a SAAP agency for no more than three days. During that time the assistance sought most frequently was crisis accommodation, followed by laundry and shower facilities and meals. Other assistance sought was the provision of information, retrieval/storage and removal of personal belongings and the provision of recreation. This assistance is indicative of the type of service delivery which has been provided for single males in the past.

Following this support, four out of ten males accessed accommodation in the private rental market, a substantially lower proportion than that for other target groups. One-quarter were housed in 'other' non-independent accommodation. This includes SAAP–funded accommodation at hostels, motels and community placements, as well as living in a car or park or in some form of institutional setting. There was no change in the source of their income, and nine out of ten males who were unemployed prior to contacting SAAP remained unemployed following support.

Young People (21.5 per cent of support periods)

The location of young people prior to contacting a SAAP agency was similar to that for single males, that is, predominantly in urban areas (see Figure 2). Apart from self-referral or referral by family or friends to a SAAP agency, they were referred to the agency which provided them with support by another SAAP agency, or by a community services department.

One-half of clients of youth agencies sought support from an agency which provided medium- to long-term accommodation, while one-quarter sought assistance at a crisis or short-term facility.

One-third sought support because of a relationship or family breakdown. One out of ten reported long-term homelessness.

The length of support provided to young people was more evenly distributed across time than was the case with other target groups. One-fifth of youth received support from a SAAP agency for less than one day, between one and

Figure 2: Pathways to Homelessness for Young People



three days, between one and three weeks, and between one and three months. They were also proportionately more likely than most other groups to be seeking long-term support. In addition to the provision of SAAP or crisis accommodation, young people were most frequently provided with information, assistance with transportation and the provision of recreational opportunities, assistance with enhancing their living skills and personal development, advocacy support and financial assistance. Related to their reasons for accessing a SAAP agency was the provision of family and relationship counselling and support to young people.

Following support, youth were less likely than other target groups to enter public housing. Two-fifths of young people entered the private rental market and one-quarter accessed 'other' independent housing. Most frequently there was no change in source of income, but of particular note is the high proportion with no income before or after support. As with all SAAP clients who were unemployed prior to contacting an agency, the majority was unemployed at the conclusion of support.

Women Escaping Domestic Violence (20.7 per cent of support periods)

While the majority of women escaping domestic violence were resident in a capital city prior to support, in comparison with other target groups they were most likely to come from rural and remote areas (see Figure 3). They were also the most likely target group to have accessed SAAP support as a result of contacting a telephone or crisis referral agency. Given the emphasis placed on resourcing such services under the National Domestic Violence Strategy, this pattern of access to SAAP services is not surprising.

Reflecting the nature of this target group's reasons for requiring support under SAAP, the majority of women contacted an agency which provided crisis or short-term accommodation. In fact 90 per cent of women in this target group had their needs met by a SAAP agency which provided accommodation. Stating the obvious, the majority of these women sought assistance because of domestic violence, relationship and family breakdown and abuse of some form.

One-third of women escaping domestic violence were supported for between one and three days by SAAP, while one-fifth received support for less than one day. A further one-fifth were supported for between one and three weeks. Apart from the provision of crisis or short-term accommodation, this target group were provided with information services, laundry/shower facilities and meals, transport and, importantly, domestic violence counselling.

Figure 3: Pathways to Homelessness for Women Escaping Domestic Violence



Following support, women escaping domestic violence had the highest rate of access to owner-occupied housing and to public housing. A reasonable proportion remained in SAAP crisis or short-term accommodation. There was primarily no change in their income. Neither had these women secured employment.

Families (4.9 per cent of support periods)

Families were primarily resident in urban areas prior to seeking support (see Figure 4). They were referred to SAAP agencies either by family or friends, or found out about such support by themselves.

As was the case with women escaping domestic violence, their need was primarily for accommodation. Notably, at least one-half of families were provided with medium- to long-term accommodation. Most frequently they cited 'other' reasons for contacting a SAAP agency, followed by financial difficulty, relationship and family breakdown and (interestingly) domestic violence.

They were supported for long periods of time - 27 per cent for up to three months, 21 per cent for up to four months, three per cent for 12 months or more. The main form of support provided to these families was housing and information.

After support, one-half of the families accessed private rental accommodation and one-quarter entered public housing. Once again, there was no significant change either in income source or likelihood of moving into paid employment.

Single Women (2 per cent of support periods)

Single women who received support came overwhelmingly from capital cities (69 per cent) (see Figure 5). Two-fifths came independently to the SAAP agency, or were referred by family and friends. In one-tenth of support periods, a telephone or crisis referral agency suggested that these women contact a SAAP agency for assistance.

Around two-thirds of single women assisted by a SAAP service were provided with medium- to long-term accommodation, while a further one-quarter contacted a crisis or short-term accommodation agency. Assistance was sought because they were either escaping domestic violence or for some 'other' reason. Importantly, eight per cent sought assistance because they were classified as being among the long-term homeless.

The agencies generally provided support for comparatively longer periods of time. Apart from the provision of accommodation, information was provided and

Figure 4: Pathways t Homelessness for Families



Figure 5: Pathways to Homelessness for Single Women



in one-half of support periods meals, laundry and shower facilities and transport services were also offered. Single women also received various counselling services, advocacy and liaison support.

Following support, single women most frequently entered private rental accommodation and public housing. This group did not experience any change in income source and over three-quarters remained unemployed.

In Summary

The authors consider these 'pathways' to be instructive as they provide useful profiles of significant client groups and data on the extent to which SAAP services are encouraging a return to family and independent living. With the exception of women escaping domestic violence, SAAP clients are predominantly from urban areas. They are characteristically referred to SAAP agencies either by family or friends, or take the initiative to approach agencies themselves. Clients typically want housing. Women escaping domestic violence seek crisis or short-term accommodation, while other groups more typically seek medium- to long-term housing. The length of support is a reflection of housing needs, with domestic violence clients tending to require accommodation for a shorter period.

On leaving SAAP accommodation the tendency is for all groups to move into the private rental market. However, this is least likely for women escaping domestic violence. This group tend to move into public housing (although in small numbers) and owner-occupied housing upon exiting SAAP services more commonly than do other client groups. Families and single women are the only other groups likely to move into public housing in significant numbers (around 20 per cent). Typically on leaving SAAP accommodation there is no change in income and no entry or return to the paid work force. Upwards of 80 per cent remain unemployed. The implication of this for SAAP objectives is instructive.

5 Conclusion

The 'pathways' data presented here generally reinforce the views revealed by many key stakeholders in SAAP service provision during the evaluation process - different categories of homeless persons are provided with different forms of support under the Program in response to different needs. There are policy implications which flow from this heterogeneity of client base. Primarily there is clearly a need for SAAP to continue to develop the extent to which services can be provided in a flexible manner - that is, in a way which can meet the varying needs of the homeless.

However, the capacity for SAAP service providers to effectively resolve housing crisis in the long-term is limited. Fopp's (1995) synthesis of the causes and consequences of homelessness emphasises the importance of a stable and reasonable level of income in increasing the capacity of the disadvantaged to maintain stable and appropriate accommodation. During 1996-1997 service providers were generally able to do very little to affect the income of their clients, although good practice examples of co-location of work co-operatives with support services, and the piloting of *foyers*[7] do exist within Australia. The major strength of such initiatives was that they facilitated access of homeless persons and 'at-risk' groups to a range of support services, for example, to accommodation, support, paid work and on-the-job training. That said, across Australia service providers were limited in the extent to which they could bring about lasting changes in the health status and level of education of clients. Yet the performance indicators which to date have been used to measure the 'success' of SAAP have been: a change in type of housing following service provision; a change in source of income; and a change in labour force status.[8]

The extent to which structural issues affect the capacity of service providers to change homeless persons' lives by developing attachment to affordable and appropriate housing can not be understated. Government policies which effectively provide expanded opportunities for employment and which increase the capacity of the socially and economically marginalised to take advantage of such opportunities need to be prioritised. Further, the development of an adequate array of 'exit' points (that is, housing) from crisis and medium- to long-term accommodation on the basis of an increased understanding of demand and supply amongst the disadvantaged, is required.

There are clearly issues of data validity and reliability within the NDC (National Evaluation of SAAP III, 1999). Nevertheless, this collection of data is an extremely useful source of information which can assist in more effectively responding to the needs of the homeless and those at risk of becoming homeless. Detailed analysis of these data can provide an understanding of the needs of different SAAP clients, where they come from and where they go to following government-funded support. A rigorous analytical method would respond to specific issues of data reliability.

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7 A discussion of the *foyer* concept can be found at the University of York website, <http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/chap/foyersum.htm>.

8 It should be noted that work is currently being undertaken within the SAAP National Research Program to develop a more appropriate set of indicators at both the macro and the micro level of program implementation.

Within that context, insight into which categories of people find it proportionately more difficult to access non-SAAP-funded housing following support could be provided. Further 'pathway' analyses could be conducted to identify within target group variation as well as between group variation in terms of the needs of clients and the impact of support. For example, a comparison of the pathways of high needs single males through SAAP support with the pathways of single males with a lower level of need would be useful. The extent to which there are differences between the needs and experiences of women escaping domestic violence who come from rural as opposed to urban areas could also be detailed.

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Never too Early: Prevention of Crime, Substance Abuse and Associated Social Problems through Early Intervention Strategies

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1 Introduction

This paper is based on the product of a sixteen week research consultancy. In that time the research team reconceptualised the field of developmental crime prevention, carried out a selected review of the international literature on human development and early intervention, carried out an audit and analysis of 'early intervention' services and programs in Australia, and formulated a policy framework for planning developmental prevention initiatives. The research and prevention strategies focus on crime but, given the nature of the developmental perspective, intervention strategies could equally be applied to prevention of substance abuse and other social problems.

2 The Need for a Developmental Approach to Crime Prevention

Criminal and antisocial behaviour in Australia brings responses ranging from the 'get tough in the cops, courts and corrections' arena to approaches which blame cultural and social change such as rising rates of female employment and divorce, as argued by Sullivan (1997) of the Centre for Independent Studies in her recent analysis of Australian crime rates. Apart from the simplistic nature of this approach, relying as it does for its plausibility on co-occurring social trends

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1 This paper is a distillation from *Pathways to Prevention: Developmental and Early Intervention Approaches to Crime in Australia,* a report for the National Campaign Against Violence and Crime and The National Anti-Crime Strategy. The interdisciplinary research team responsible for the report includes Dr Judy Cashmore, Emeritus Professor Jacqueline Goodnow, Professor Alan Hayes, Associate Professor Jeanette Lawrence, Professor Ross Homel (Team Convener), Professor Ian O'Connor, Emeritus Professor Tony Vinson, Professor Jackob Najman, Professor John Western, Ms Linda Gilmore (Developmental Literature), and Dr Marie Leech (Audit of Services).

that may or may not influence each other; and the fact that questions are increasingly being raised about the effectiveness of incarceration as a response to crime and antisocial behaviour, these approaches are exclusionary, presupposing a core of 'decent people' that is distinct from a 'criminal element' that must be contained if it cannot be excluded.

In opposition to these positions, early interventionists take the view that the roots of criminal offending are complex and cumulative, and that they are embedded in social as well as personal histories. To uncover significant risk factors that are the facilitating conditions for entry into a criminal career requires a life-course perspective that views each potential young offender as someone who is developing over the life course and in specific social settings. An Early Intervention perspective is not a 'bleeding heart' justification for the abdication of personal responsibility for harmful actions, but it does call for a realistic analysis of any individual's life in its place and time. Only within such a perspective can interventions be directed both to the problems in the person and to the features of that person's social circumstances that encourage crime.

The developmental perspective is inclusive, embedding potential young offenders in their families, and embedding the families in the wider society.

3 Why Early Intervention? Are There Solid Grounds for Such an Approach?

Justifications for this approach come in a number of shapes and forms:

The Significance of Early Experience

Does early experience really make a difference to the later occurrence of delinquency or crime? A resounding 'yes' is the reply from commentators such as Farrington (1986), Loeber (1991) and Guerra (1997) who, respectively, discuss the 'stepping stones', the 'developmental pathways', and the 'precursors' to juvenile delinquency and adult crime. A recent report from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (Weatherburn and Lind, 1997) supports the need for policies that address child abuse and neglect as a key element of crime prevention, indicating, for example, that poverty, single parent families, and crowded dwellings - taken together - account for 56 per cent of the variance in juvenile crime.

The conclusion reached by Weatherburn and Lind, a conclusion supported by other studies, leaves little doubt about the significance of early experience:

> Early intervention programs designed to reduce the risk of child neglect, have an important role to play in long-term crime prevention. (Weatherburn and Lind, 1997: viii)

Evidence of Effectiveness of Early Intervention Programs

In an ideal world, we would be able to add to the above that, for example, when we intervene and lower the incidence of child abuse and neglect, we lower the level of participation in crime. In time, we should be able to add that evidence. In the meantime, we need to turn to programs where early intervention of another kind has occurred and the results have been evaluated. Most of these early interventions were begun with the intention of improving the school performance of children from disadvantaged areas. As long-term effects were measured, however, it became clear that changes were occurring not only in school performance and attitude toward school. Changes were also occurring in a variety of 'social' behaviours (Zigler, Taussig and Black, 1992).

I note a summary comment from someone who is not himself a 'developmentalist'. The comment comes from Sherman (1997) in the course of reporting the results of a survey for the US Congress by the National Institute for Justice: a survey dedicated to determining 'what works, what doesn't, and what's promising' in crime prevention:

> Family risk factors have a major effect on crime. Family based prevention can directly address those risk factors, with substantial success. The more risk factors they address, perhaps, the better. The earlier they start in life, it seems, the better. Programs for infants and young children may be most cost-effective in the long run, even if they are expensive in the short run. Combining home visiting with preschool education reduces crime committed by children when they grow up...
>
> Most of these conclusions have been independently reached by diverse scholars from diverse disciplines (Yoshikawa, 1994; Tremblay & Craig, 1995; Hawkins, Arthur & Catalano, 1995; Crowell and Burgess, 1996; Kumpfer, Molgaard and Spoth, 1996; Wasserman and Miller, forthcoming). Given the normal disagreements among social scientists, the level of consensus about these conclusions is striking. (Sherman, 1997:1)

Evidence of Cost Effectiveness

Worth noting at this point is that analyses of relative cost-effectiveness are rare. They seem, however, to be increasingly recognised as needed, and to be advocated as a step to consider not only in the post-action stage of evaluation but also in the first stages of planning (see Greenwood et al., 1996).

The relevant information here comes from a report for the Rand Corporation (Greenwood et al., 1996). It is specifically concerned with costs in relation to the percentage of reduction in crime. The selected programs for the study covered: home visits and day care; parent training; delinquent supervision (programs targeting those who have committed a first offence); graduation incentives (cash and other incentives to finish school); and application of California's 'three strikes' law (incarceration after three violent or serious offences). In the analysis, parenting programs and graduation incentives emerge as clear winners. California's

> three-strikes law is estimated at achieving a 21 per cent reduction in crime (crimes that cannot occur while people are in gaol) at a cost of (US)$5.5 billion a year. For less than an additional billion dollars, graduation incentives and parent training could roughly double that crime reduction, if they are as effective as our analysis suggests. (Greenwood et al., 1996: 5)

A broader set of measures is used by Weikart and his colleagues for evaluation of the Perry Pre-school Project. In addition to the money saved by people being out of prison, they take into account the positive benefits to society in terms of people acquiring a job and paying taxes, becoming married, and taking out bank loans (children who went through the Perry Preschool Project were significantly more likely to take these positive steps as well as to not commit crime). On these estimates, the Perry Preschool Project emerged as returning to US society a very high financial return for each dollar spent on the program, $7 for every $1 spent on the program (Schweinhart, Barnes and Weikart, 1993).

4 A Basis in Empirical Studies

The studies are of two kinds: longitudinal studies and intervention studies.

In longitudinal studies, the same individuals are tracked over parts of the life course. The data gathered can then be analysed to ask which conditions at earlier points in life are related to what happens at later times. Some of these analyses stop at the point of asking which conditions are correlated with later events and which are not. The more useful analyses are those that *use the correlations to construct pathways of various kinds.* Longitudinal studies dominate the

literature to date, with many oriented towards identifying the factors in early childhood that lead to disadvantage in later life. Several influential longitudinal studies are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Examples of Longitudinal Studies

Study	Target of prediction	Sample	Age at commencement
Bloomington Longitudinal Study (Bates, et al., 1991)	Behaviour problems and social adjustment	168	6 mths
Concordia Longitudinal High Risk Project (Serbin, et al., 1991)	Psychosocial problems	2891	7, 10 and 13 yrs
Dunedin Multidisciplinary Study (Moffitt, 1990)	Health, development and behaviour	1037	infancy
Newcastle Thousand Family Study (Kolvin et al., 1988)	Health and Development		infancy
Kauai Study (Werner and Smith, 1992)	Development	698	infancy
Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development (Farrington, 1995)	Criminal behaviour	411	8 yrs
Mater Study (Najman, 1997)			infancy

These studies have been the major sources for the identification of risk and protective factors for later delinquent or criminal activities.

Intervention studies involve the taking of some specific steps to alter what happens either in the short term (e.g., six months after intervention) or in the long term. A summary of major intervention studies is provided in Table 2.

Intervention studies provide the means for determining whether changing the conditions associated with risk factors pointed to by longitudinal studies makes a difference and for determining how much of a difference one change makes in comparison with others. They also provide the means for checking hypotheses about prior events: hypotheses formed on the basis of longitudinal studies. Ideally, the two kinds of studies (longitudinal and intervention) are integrated with one another but traditionally this has seldom been the case.

Most of the intervention programs specifically concerned with delinquency or crime are relatively new, so that outcomes over a long time period are not yet known. One way around this problem is to combine long-term tracking with shorter term segments. To take one example, we know from longitudinal studies that persistent aggressive behaviour at ages three to four is correlated with

Table 2: Summary of Major Prevention Programs

Program	Level[a]	Focus outcome	Dev. phase	Participants	C[b]	R[c]	Duration	Content	Outcomes
Elmira Prenatal/ Early Infancy Project (Olds, 1988)	T	Develop-mental problems	Prenatal/ infancy	400 first-time young, single and/or low SES mothers	yes	yes	2yrs	Family support	Improved pregnancy outcomes, better parenting skills. At age 4: higher maternal employment, fewer subsequent pregnancies, more widely spaced pregnancies, more mothers returned to education, less abuse/neglect.
Syracuse Family Development Research Program (Lally, Magione and Honig, 1988)	T	Cognitive	Prenatal/ infancy	108 low-income families	yes	no	5yrs	Family support Early education	Initial cognitive gains not maintained. 10 year follow-up (children aged 13-16): lower delinquency, better school attendance and performance for girls.
Yale Child Welfare Research Project (Provence and Naylor, 1983)	T	Family stress and coping	Prenatal/ infancy	18 children in high risk environment	yes	no	3yrs	Family support Early education	At age 12: mothers more self-sufficient, better educated, fewer children. Children higher school attendance, fewer special services (boys), less aggression/antisocial behaviour, no effects on IQ maintained.
Houston Parent-Child Development Program (Johnson, 1988)	T	School performance and behaviour problems	Early childhood (ages 1-3)	1 y.o. low income Mexican-American 8 cohorts (x 100)	yes	yes	2yrs	Family support Parent training Early education	Following program: mothers more positive interactions, more stimulating home environment; children small increase in intellectual ability. Follow-ups when children aged 4-7 years and 8-11 years: controls had more behaviour problems, were less emotionally sensitive/considerate, required more special services. Program families higher SES and higher aspirations for children's education/career.

Table 2: Summary of Major Prevention Programs (cont.)

Program	Level[a]	Focus outcome	Dev. phase	Participants	C[b]	R[c]	Duration	Content	Outcomes
Perry Preschool Program (Weikart and Schweinhart, 1992)	T	Cognitive	Preschool	58 disadvantaged 3-4 year olds	yes	yes	1-2yrs	Family support (teacher visits) Early education	Intellectual gains not maintained, but higher school achievement, higher rates of literacy and employment, less offending (especially fewer arrests) and antisocial behaviour, less welfare dependency (follow-up to age 27).
Oregon Social Learning Centre (Bank, Patterson and Reid, 1987)	T	Antisocial behaviour	Early childhood & primary years	Various ages to preadolescence	yes	yes	17-19 sessions	Parent training	Short-term programs were ineffective. At one year follow-up: child behaviours and parental child-rearing methods improved.
Montreal Prevention Project (Tremblay, et al., 1995)	I	Antisocial behaviour	Early primary	250 disruptive boys aged 7-9 yrs	yes	yes	2yrs	Parent training Child training	At age 12: lower delinquency, less antisocial behaviour, higher school achievement.
Seattle Social Development Project (Hawkins, et al., 1992)	U	Antisocial behaviour	Early primary	500 Grade 1 children	yes	yes	2yrs	Parent training Child training Teacher training	After program, teachers rated intervention group as less aggressive. 5th grade: experimental group less delinquent behaviour, better family communication and parent management, higher attachment to school.
School Bullying Program – Norway (Olweus, 1991)	U	School bullying	Primary	All children in grades 1-9 (age 8-16), all schools	no	no	2yrs	Child training Parent info School mgmt	2 year follow-up: bullying reduced 50%, antisocial behaviour reduced, lower rates of offending (theft, vandalism, truancy), more positive attitudes towards school and school work.

Note: a) T = Targeted: participants were chosen on the basis of membership of a group judged to be at increased risk. I = Indicated: participants were selected because they displayed behaviours that were precursors to aggressive/offending outcomes. U = Universal: program offered to general population or group.

b) C = Control group included in program design.

c) R = Randomised design: at recruitment families were randomly allocated to treatment and non-treatment groups. Because the two groups were assumed to be equivalent initially, later differences between the groups could be attributed to program effects.

aggressive behaviours at later ages, and that this later behaviour is correlated with delinquency at still later ages. Aggressive behaviours at ages three to four, for example, are correlated with aggressive behaviours at age seven (Achenbach, Phares and Howell, 1994), and children who display aggressive behaviours at age seven are more likely at age 14 to report having carried illegal weapons or to have been involved in criminal behaviour (results from a Canadian study by Rubin, et al., 1995). When funding for intervention studies is short term, we can then take several short-term chunks of a life course to check on whether the progressions and connections indicated by long-term longitudinal studies can be used to design and evaluate briefer intervention studies.

At this point then we have a series of grounds for advocating a developmental/early intervention approach.

- Evidence of the significance of early experience.
- Evidence of effectiveness of the approach in terms of changes in behaviour.
- Evidence of cost effectiveness.
- A basis in empirical studies.

4 What are the Essential Ingredients of the Early Intervention/Prevention Perspective?

Developmental prevention, in Farrington's (1996:18) definition, 'refers to interventions designed to inhibit the development of criminal potential in individuals'. Tremblay and Craig (1995) expand on that definition:

> Developmental prevention refers to interventions aiming to reduce risk factors and increase protective factors that are hypothesised to have a significant effect on an individual's adjustment at later points of ... development. (Tremblay and Craig, 1995: 156-7)

These definitions are starting points for understanding early intervention approaches. The following adds some flesh to the definitional bones.

A first essential ingredient of the approach is to identify those risk and protective factors that are hypothesised to have significant effects. Evidence for the compilation of risk and protective factors comes from longitudinal studies, several of which are listed in Table 1. The nature of risk factors suggested by longitudinal studies include genetic and biological characteristics of the child, family characteristics, school factors, stressful life events and community or

cultural factors. Table 3 summarises the factors that have been linked to negative outcomes.

The Nature of Protective Factors

Despite the suggestion that prediction of maladaptive behaviour is enhanced when protective factors are considered in addition to risk factors (O'Donnell, Hawkins & Abbott, 1995), few studies have been concerned with identifying the protective factors that act to inhibit criminal potential.

The significance of protective factors, however, is underlined by the fact that predictions from risk factors are statements of probability. Although, factors such as early troublesome behaviour are highly predictive of later offending, more than 50 per cent of at-risk individuals may not progress to such outcomes (Loeber & Dishion, 1983). It is especially important then to identify protective factors and mechanisms that are likely to inhibit the development of antisocial behaviour and divert children to the pathways that lead towards positive outcomes.

A wide range of protective factors has been proposed on the basis of longitudinal studies (see especially O'Donnell, Hawkins and Abbott, 1995; Werner, 1993; Losel and Bliesener, 1994). These have been brought together in Table 4.

Having established the existence and significance of risk and protective factors, early interventionists point to a second ingredient of the approach, the ways events unfold over the life course.

Early Interventionists do not see life as marked by one steady march toward adulthood that is set early in life, or one steady line of change, either for better or for worse. Instead, what occurs is a series of phases, a series of points of change, a series of transitions. In the course of becoming an adult, for example, an individual moves from home to school, from primary to secondary school, from school to seeking entry into the paid work force, acquiring a driver's license, being legally able to buy alcohol, possibly leaving home. Each life phase is seen as bounded by transition with each of these transitions having in common the fact that they always present new developmental tasks. However, transitions differ in many respects.

- Some transitions are a matter of choice, others are not.
- Some transitions we make solo, others we make in the company of others.
- Some transitions open up options, others reduce them.
- Some transitions we manage well, others we fumble.

It is their differences that open the way for considering assistance or intervention. These phases and transition points are where intervention can

Table 3: Risk factors associated with antisocial and criminal behaviour

Child risk factors	
prematurity impulsivity	poor problem solving
low birth weight	beliefs about aggression
disability	attributions
prenatal brain damage	poor social skills
birth injury	low self-esteem
low intelligence	lack of empathy
difficult temperament	alienation
chronic illness	hyperactivity/disruptive behaviour
insecure attachment	
Family risk factors	
Parental characteristics	
teenage mothers	substance abuse
single parents	criminality
psychiatric disorder especially depression	antisocial models
Family environment	
conflict and disharmony	large family size
marital discord	father absence
disorganised	long-term parental employment
negative interactions/social isolation	
Parenting style	
poor supervision and monitoring of child	neglect
discipline style (harsh or inconsistent)	low involvement in child's activities
rejection of child	lack of warmth and affection
abuse	
Risk factors in the school context	
school failure	peer rejection
normative beliefs about aggression	poor attachment to school
deviant peer group	inadequate behaviour management
bullying	
Stressful life events and transitions	
divorce and family break-up	war or natural disasters
death of family member	
Community and cultural factors	
socioeconomic disadvantage	urban area
population density and housing conditions	neighbourhood violence and crime
cultural norms re violence as acceptable response to frustration	
media portrayal of violence	social or cultural discrimination
lack of support services	

Table 4: Protective Factors Associated with Antisocial and Criminal Behaviour

Child factors	
Social competence, school achievement, social skills, easy temperament, above-average intelligence, internal locus of control, attachment to family, moral beliefs, empathy, values, problem solving, self-related cognitions, optimism, good coping style	
Family factors	
supportive caring parents	more than two years between siblings
family harmony	responsibility for chores or required helpfulness
supportive relationship with other adult	secure and stable family
small family size	strong family norms and morality
School factors	
positive school climate	responsibility and required helpfulness
prosocial peer group	sense of belonging/bonding
opportunities for some success at school and recognitionof achievement	
school norms re violence	
Life events	
meeting significant person	moving to new area
opportunities at critical turning points or major life transitions	
Community and cultural factors	
access to support services	participation in church or other community group
community networking	community/cultural norms against violence
attachment to the community	a strong cultural identify and ethnic pride

occur most effectively. At each of these transition points, there is the possibility of more than one outcome. For some children, the transition from home to school is unproblematic, especially if they have had the advantage of a happy preschool experience. Again, some people negotiate the transition from school to the paid work force with a minimum of effort, while others never make the transition.

Essentially, developmental approaches are characterised by a pervasive emphasis on *pathways* and on aspects of time and timing. Pathways are understood not just as unique individual biographies, but as roads through life - from conception to death - that fork out in different directions at the kinds of crucial transition points that mark new experiences and relationships.

Though it is possible to intervene at any transition point, there are good reasons for intervening early in life. Families with babies and preschoolers that are at risk of poverty, relationship breakdown, and abusive or inept parenting styles are more likely to produce teenagers at risk of criminality and substance abuse. Once it is accepted that some configurations of risk at an early age have multiple consequences later in life, it follows that successful intervention at an early age is a cost effective preventive strategy. In addition, it is likely to be strategically effective to attempt to divert people from harmful pathways before maladaptive patterns of behaviour are well entrenched. Protective and anticipatory action is more powerful and less painful than clinical or punitive interventions after a history of offending.

A third ingredient of the approach involves the significance of *social context,* an aspect of early intervention approaches that is often not well understood. Definitions that emphasise for example 'criminal potential in individuals' (Farrington, 1996: 18) may seem to leave no room for the social context. In fact, social contexts are always regarded as significant.

It is not only that social contexts make a difference to the skills, strategies, or identities that individuals develop. They also make a difference to the support that is available when transitions are made. For example, transitions are made more easily when there are personal social supports, such as a network of friends, and when there are social structures to provide information. In an ideal world, the support available from 'developmentally friendly' services and structures would be able to compensate for what may be lacking within individual families or their immediate social networks. In effect, within developmental perspectives, neither the problems nor the solutions are seen as belonging solely to an individual.

These three ingredients then of the early intervention approach - identification of risk and protective factors, the importance of transitions and pathways; and the relevance of social context – form the core of the early intervention perspective.

5 Early Intervention/Developmental Perspectives: The Australian Context

The following set of conclusions from the international literature formed the framework for an audit and appraisal of services/programs in Australia, and assisted in the development of recommendations for a policy framework for this approach.

- In terms of age, it is never too early to intervene, and never too late. The key question is whether the point of intervention in the developmental pathway can be shown to result in positive change.

- Generic interventions that target a range of risk and protective factors are best directed at very young children, while those with a more specific focus are more appropriate at later transition points.

- 'Hit and run' interventions should be avoided. The most effective programs are sustained over time, and may include 'booster shots' some time later.

- There are many risk and protective factors, none of which individually accounts for a large percentage of the variance of offending behaviour.

- Risk factors have a cumulative effect, hence the total number of risk factors present in the life of an individual or a community is vital.

- Some risk factors have more impact than others in terms of the development of a propensity to be involved in crime and other problems. However, with the exception of the experience of child abuse and neglect, the empirical evidence on the weights that should be assigned to different factors is ambiguous.

- Risk and protective factors operate at several levels (child, family, school, local community, and broader society) and vary with transition points and stressful life events.

- Well-designed interventions based on the best scientific knowledge available all achieve at least a half-standard deviation improvement in outcomes. It is difficult therefore to specify which kinds of interventions are 'best'. What interventions are 'best' will depend on a range of local contextual factors.

- Programs that are most effective are those that have a large 'uptake' by the target population and influence a number of risk and protective factors at different levels in that population (e.g., child, family and preschool).

In summary, effective early intervention strategies must aim to:

- reduce risk factors;

- strengthen protective factors;

- target different developmental phases or transition points (for example, ante-natal, post-natal/infancy, early childhood, transition to school); and

- target different settings or contexts (family, school, community, peer group).

Many approaches and programs are likely to have preventive effects. These include:

- Prenatal and Infant Development
- Parenting Education
- Preschool Education
- Child Care
- Early Intervention for children with Learning/Development Disorders
- Support for Disadvantaged Parents
- Family Literacy
- Family Support
- Preventing Disruptive Behaviour and Bullying
- Support for Children of Offenders
- School Support Programs
- Community Involvement.

The Potential 'Early Intervention' Field in Australia

Table 5 presents a set of selected programs to illustrate the potential early intervention field in Australia.

Findings of the fieldwork presented a complex picture of this field. It is rare indeed to find any reference to crime prevention in the goals, aims and objectives of services for families and children; and consequently conscious strategies of crime prevention are absent. However, it is clear from the scientific literature that many programs and services may in fact be having a profound impact on the incidence of social problems such as juvenile crime and substance abuse, even though that is not their stated intention.

Two striking characteristics of the potential early intervention field are *diversity* and *fragmentation.* In terms of *diversity,* some 6100 child care centres operate in Australia; over 5 500 preschools including mobile services cater for an unknown number of children. No records exist to indicate which centres operate special programs - the fieldwork illustrated that it was possible to stumble on such programs as The Anti-Bias Approach in Early Childhood purely by chance. A wide variety (and unknown number) of parenting programs, home visiting programs and family support programs exist. Over and above the generalist child care and parenting/support services is a layer of specialist services, also indicated as having a role in crime prevention. These specialist programs include:

- services for families with children with disabilities;
- services and programs for Aboriginal families and children;
- services for families and children of non-English speaking background;
- support services for children of prisoners;

Table 5: Examples of Programs and Services in Australia

A Special Needs

Programs for Aborigines/Torres Strait Islanders

- Aboriginal Early Childhood Services Support Unit (AECSSU)
- Adolescent Parents
- Aboriginal and Islander Childcare Agencies (AICCAs)
- Casino Aboriginal Intensive Family Based Services
- Cross-Cultural Induction Program for Teachers
- Murawina Aboriginal Long Daycare
- Remote Areas Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander Child Care (RAATSIC)
- Aboriginal Support Network
- Early Childhood: An Intervention Program
- Program Support Network
- Aboriginal Studies Curriculum
- Staying Healthy Curriculum
- Adopt-a-Cop

In Development Stage:

Western Australia:

- Early Intervention Program for Aboriginal Families
  Aboriginal Parenting Materials

South Australia:

- Parent Easy Guides for Aboriginal People

Queensland:

- Education Program for Aboriginal Parents/Carers

Programs for People of Non-English-speaking Backgrounds:

- Ethnic Child Care, Family and Community Services Co-operative Ltd.
- Casual Ethnic Workers Pool
- The Anti-Bias Approach in Early Childhood
- Amigos Pre-School and Child Care Centre
- Vattana Neighbourhood Childcare Centre
- Styles Street Children's Community Long Day Care Centre
- Supplementary Services Program

Programs for Children/Families of Offenders:

- Children of Prisoners Support Group Co-op Ltd (COPSG)
- O.A.R.S (Offenders Aid and Rehabiliation Services) of S.A. Inc.
- Outcare Inc.W.A
- CRC Justice Support Incorporated NSW
- VACRO Vic

Programs for Children with Disabilities:

- Special Needs Subsidy Scheme
- The Early Intervention Co-ordination Project

(cont.)

Table 5: Examples of Programs and Services in Australia (cont.)

B Children and Family Services

Pre-School Enrichment/Literacy/Family Learning Programs:
- Home Instruction Program for Preschool Youngsters (HIPPY)
- Early Intervention for Children at Risk of Conduct Disorder
- Parents as Teachers
- Fun Family Reading Program
- Parents and Children Learning Together

School-based/School Age Behavioural Programs
- Child Protection Education
- A Fair Go For All
- M.E.W.S. (Marist Educational Welfare Services)
- Creative Times
- A Partnership for Encouraging Effective Learning (APEEL)
- The P.E.A.C.E Pack
- Future Parents Program

Counselling (Family):
- Families First Victoria
- Centacare Early Intervention Program
- Burnside

Development of Family/Household Skills:
- Parenting SA
- Triple P (Positive Parenting Program)
- Home-Start Australia
- Holdsworth Family Support Services
- Early Childhood Health Services
- Perth Positive Parenting Program Demonstration Program

Community/Community Centre-based:
- Good Beginnings
- TUFF (Together for Under Fives and Families)
- Connect Redfern
- The InterAgency Schools as Community Centres Pilot Project
- Curran Interagency Schools as Community Centres Pilot Project

- anti-violence and support services and strategies for the gay and lesbian community; and
- services with child protection components.

Diversity within this field extends to the level of individual categories. For example, within the 'home-visiting' category, programs such as Home-Start and Good Beginnings differ considerably in character, while family support services evolve to suit the needs of local neighbourhoods.

In terms of *fragmentation*, structural features appeared to be significant. Due to historical factors impinging on lines of development, differing administrative and funding bodies, varying degrees of involvement of three levels of government (Commonwealth, State/Territory and Local), different philosophical and theoretical underpinnings, and lack of national and/or State databases regarding services, the early intervention field displays considerable fragmentation. A by-product of this fragmentation is a lack of cross-fertilisation across the field. This immediately suggests a recommendation that transcends the analysis of any specific program: *set up seminars or other means of communication in local areas so that intervention workers have an opportunity to glimpse the big picture.* This should lead to greater coordination of service delivery at the local level, and hence a more effective targeting of multiple risk factors - one of the key concepts emerging from the developmental literature.

Results of Audit of Australian Programs/Services

Findings from the audit and from discussions with service providers clustered around two general areas: Australia's special population mix, and issues relating to implementation of programs/services in Australia.

There was strong support in the *Aboriginal community* for:

- Aboriginal control and administration of services;
- detailed consultation with Aboriginal communities on issues relating to family and children's services;
- facilitating access to education;
- Aboriginal workers for Aboriginal clients;
- the introduction of innovative practices in mainstream services in order to increase provision; and
- the view that the stolen generation had had wide-ranging impacts on family life and on behaviour due to the loss of culturally appropriate parenting skills.

People from some non-English-speaking backgrounds (NESB) emphasised the need to recognise that, within sub-groups, there is also, as in the Aboriginal community, a lack of homogeneity, resulting in different needs within the community. The emphasis of NESB providers consulted was thus on building bridges of understanding, access and acceptance.

The following issues relating to implementation of programs/services in Australia were identified.

- The emergence of partnerships was noted, a move recommended by early interventionists as a way of addressing multiple risk and protective factors.

- The pivotal role of child care centres/preschools in family life was noted and the potential for expansion of this role into community/family centres was explored.

- The 'missing parent' (due to parents being in the work force) was raised as a potential barrier to participation in programs.

- A high proportion of what could be judged to be the most innovative programs are pilots and therefore have no guarantee of continuing beyond the pilot stage.

- Lack of reliable ongoing funding was a constant source of concern.

- Service providers emphasised the importance of government social security policies and adequate payments which reflect a real concern for families as a context within which programs operate: 'What is the use of nutrition programs if people do not have enough money for food?' was a typical comment. The 'context' for provision was emphasised as crucial to the success of programs.

- A striking characteristic of recent initiatives in the area of provision was the incorporation of strong evaluation components.

- Service providers expressed concern about the impact of wider inter-related policies on child development, for example: cuts to child care forcing changes in patterns of care for children; and school education policies which permitted high numbers of school expulsions.

- The issue of *access* emerged as another key problem. For example, most of those who attend parenting programs, both in Australia and Britain (Bright, 1997), are white middle class, indicating a need to establish what would be the best model for those parents who need such programs most. Again, in terms of access, a similar pattern emerges with respect to disadvantaged families and preschool education. One survey in Britain found that more than 50 per cent of the most disadvantaged children had received no preschool education compared with 10 per cent of the most advantaged group. It would also appear that those who are most disadvantaged do not necessarily attend the type of facility which would be of most benefit to them.

Service providers were asked to indicate specific gaps in provision, which they indicated as follows:

- services for mothers on methadone;
- research into the impact on siblings of family focus on a child with disabilities or behavioural problems;
- research into the impact of a variety of patterns of child care on young children;
- specific services for women with post-natal depression; and
- programs and services for gay and lesbian young people.

Appraisal of Programs From a Developmental Prevention Perspective

An analysis of programs/services in relation to risk factors manifested at the levels of children, families and schools revealed a number of emphases and omissions. Among the child risk factors, low self-esteem and disability received considerable attention. At the level of the family, poor supervision and monitoring of children was easily the factor to receive most attention. Also prominent among the aims of the different programs were risk factors associated with social isolation, conflict and disharmony, and disorganised families. Within the school context, the focus was clearly upon facilitating school attachment and preventing school failure.

It could be argued that the absence of services targeting key risk factors, given their importance as predictors of criminal and delinquent behaviour, is a reason for extending the range of early intervention services in Australia so that some of these risk factors are encompassed. That line of thinking would lead to considering programs focused on:

- perinatal risk factors;
- the crime-related consequences of the parental characteristics listed as risk factors in Table 2 - that is, teenage mothers, single parents, depression, substance abuse, criminality, antisocial models; and
- the problems associated with the transition from primary to secondary education. These should include reinforcing or 'booster' interventions, given the multiplicity and diversity of challenges during the transition in question.

6 Conclusion

In broad terms, this research project addresses a vacuum in the provision of services and in the practice of crime prevention in Australia. At the same time,

the project contributes at a theoretical level by exploring in depth the concepts of 'developmental prevention' and 'early intervention', with particular attention to what recent research can tell us about the nature and causes of crime and its prevention. A final feature of the project that warrants emphasis is the way in which our understanding of the implications of the developmental perspective has expanded our understanding of risk and protection and the multi-faceted nature of early intervention.

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