

Victoria per mentum : psychological operations conducted by the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy Province South Vietnam 1965-1971

Author:

De Heer, Derrill

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**VICTORIA PER MENTUM: PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY
IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE SOUTH VIETNAM 1965 – 1971**

VOLUME 1

DERRILL DE HEER

BA Admin, BA Adult Ed, Dip Teach.

MASTER OF ARTS (RESEARCH) HISTORY

**THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY
Northcott Drive Canberra ACT 2600**

2009

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
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CONTENTS

VICTORIA PER MENTUM: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE SOUTH VIETNAM 1965 – 1971.....	1
ORIGINALITY STATEMENT	2
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT.....	3
AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT	4
CONTENTS.....	10
TABLE OF PHOTOGRAPHS.....	14
TABLE OF PHOTOGRAPHS.....	14
TABLE OF FIGURES	17
TABLE OF MAPS	19
ABBREVIATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS	20
<i>Definitions.</i>	20
<i>Abbreviations and Acronyms</i>	21
<i>Military Terminology</i>	27
<i>American Staff Position Designators</i>	27
<i>American Joint Staff Headquarters</i>	27
INTRODUCTION.....	28
<i>Methodology</i>	33
<i>Thesis Outline</i>	34
CHAPTER 1	35
BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO AUSTRALIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM	35
<i>Australian Involvement in Vietnam - Australian Advisors – 1962</i>	42
<i>Australia's Increased Force 1965</i>	43
<i>Historical Background</i>	45
<i>Early Psychological Operations</i>	46
<i>Further Allied Build -up</i>	47
<i>Early Australians Army Experience in Psychological Warfare</i>	52
<i>Topography of Phuoc Tuy Province</i>	56
<i>Old Base Areas</i>	60
<i>Phuoc Tuy Province Prior to Australians Entering it</i>	62

<i>Psychological Operations Terminology</i>	<i>64</i>
CHAPTER 2	67
AUSTRALIAN ENTRY INTO PHUOC TUY PROVINCE AND THE EARLY USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	67
<i>Move to Phuoc Tuy Province.....</i>	<i>67</i>
<i>Initial Australian Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.....</i>	<i>68</i>
<i>Early Psychological Operations in Support of Offensive Operations</i>	<i>73</i>
<i>Australian Designed and American Produced Leaflets for use by 1 ATF</i>	<i>75</i>
<i>Special Uses of Leaflets: Some Examples.....</i>	<i>84</i>
<i>Use of Psychological Operations Teams in Cordon and Searches of Villages.....</i>	<i>86</i>
<i>Early Australian Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Connection.....</i>	<i>92</i>
<i>Effects of War Divisiveness on Australian Soldiers in Vietnam</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>Expansion of Australian Psychological Operations</i>	<i>104</i>
CHAPTER 3	112
SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS WITH WHICH THE AUSTRALIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAM WORKED	112
<i>South Vietnam Provincial Territorial Security Forces.....</i>	<i>112</i>
<i>Summary of Vietnamese Military and Paramilitary Forces within Phuoc Tuy Province.....</i>	<i>114</i>
<i>Regional Force Soldiers</i>	<i>117</i>
<i>National Police.....</i>	<i>119</i>
<i>National Police Field Force</i>	<i>119</i>
<i>Popular Force Soldiers.....</i>	<i>120</i>
<i>Political Warfare (Polwar) Activities During the Vietnam Conflict.....</i>	<i>120</i>
<i>Armed Propaganda Teams</i>	<i>124</i>
<i>Revolutionary Development Cadre.....</i>	<i>125</i>
<i>People's Self Defence Force.....</i>	<i>128</i>
<i>Province Reconnaissance Unit.....</i>	<i>129</i>
<i>The Unseen Enemy – Viet Cong Infrastructure</i>	<i>130</i>
<i>Situation of VCI in Phuoc Tuy Province 1970.....</i>	<i>131</i>
<i>Communist Political Training</i>	<i>137</i>
<i>Opportunities Lost</i>	<i>137</i>
<i>Viet Cong Ba Long Province (also known as Phuoc Tuy).....</i>	<i>139</i>
ENEMY POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE OPPOSING 1 AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE, PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM	143
CHAPTER 4	145

FORMATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNIT, TRAINING, PROGRAMMES AND ASSOCIATED AGENCIES	145
<i>Chieu Hoi Programme</i>	149
<i>Chieu Hoi numbers for Phuoc Tuy Province and the surrounding provinces</i>	155
<i>Training of the Psychological Operations Unit</i>	155
<i>Types of Support Offered to Task Force Units</i>	156
<i>Equipment</i>	157
<i>Commencement of the Australian Psychological Operations Unit</i>	161
<i>Use of Superstitions in Broadcasts</i>	168
<i>Vietnamese Government Organisations and Agencies</i>	176
<i>United States Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Advisory Team 89</i>	179
CHAPTER 5	182
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.....	182
<i>The Enemy</i>	182
<i>A Case Study of the Use of Broadcasts in Battle Situations</i>	184
<i>The Cambodian Operation from a Psyops Perspective</i>	192
<i>Ground Team Field Operations</i>	195
<i>Military Operations Conducted by Psyops Unit</i>	199
<i>Night Propaganda Missions</i>	199
<i>Case Studies Using Broadcasts in the Field During Normal Military Operations</i>	200
<i>Ground Missions in Support of Civic Action</i>	202
<i>Case Study 8 RAR unauthorised Killings</i>	210
<i>Australian Nine Rules Issued To All Officers And Soldiers</i>	211
<i>Suggested Numerical Value of the Enemy Captured or Returned Under the South Vietnamese Government Chieu Hoi Amnesty Programme</i>	214
CHAPTER 6	216
LEAFLET PROPAGANDA	216
<i>The Preparation and Use of Leaflets for Psychological Operations in Vietnam</i>	216
<i>Propaganda Theory</i>	216
<i>Matters of Leaflet Dissemination</i>	220
<i>Airborne Dissemination of Leaflets: Benefits and Problems</i>	220
<i>Air Dropping of Leaflets</i>	238
<i>Evaluation of Leaflet Operations</i>	245

<i>Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Leaflets</i>	245
CHAPTER 7	251
CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE	251
CONCLUSION.....	251
<i>The Question of Effect and Overall Assessment of Psychological Operations</i>	251
<i>Cultural geography</i>	253
<i>Use of Psyops when entering a new area and relocation of people</i>	254
<i>Psychological Operations need to be a part of any deployed force</i>	256
<i>HQ Staff – skill sets, experience, time extended for key personnel attached to HQ and other units</i>	257
<i>Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam</i>	257
<i>HQ 1 ATF</i>	258
<i>1 Psychological Operations Unit</i>	259
<i>Leaflet development / approval process</i>	261
<i>Concluding Remarks</i>	263
<i>Situation After Australian Troops had Withdrawn</i>	264
<i>Disbandment of 1 Psychological Operations Unit</i>	264
BIBLIOGRAPHY	266
<i>Monographs</i>	266
<i>Official Histories</i>	269
<i>Unit Histories</i>	270
<i>Published Australian Government Records</i>	272
<i>Department of Defence Records</i>	272
<i>Australian War Memorial</i>	273
<i>Derrill de Heer Special Collection. Temporarily located in the Special Collection at Australian</i> <i>Defence Force Academy Library, The University of New South Wales, Canberra.</i>	274
<i>US Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC. USA</i>	276
<i>The Marquat Library, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare College, Special</i> <i>Operations Command. Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA.</i>	277
<i>National Archives & Records Administration (NARA) College Park, Maryland. USA</i>	277
<i>Newspapers</i>	277
<i>Magazines and Journals</i>	277
<i>Communist Vietnamese Sources</i>	278
<i>Interviews</i>	278

Table of Photographs

<i>Photograph 1 : Winning Hearts and Minds Pennant.....</i>	<i>69</i>
<i>Photograph 2 : Brigadier Jackson Commander 1 Australian Task Force based at Nui Dat, South Vietnam presents a 'Winning Hearts and Minds' (WHAM) pennant to Captain Brian Stapleton, 1 Field Squadron Workshop in November 1966.</i>	<i>70</i>
<i>Photograph 3 : Route QL 2 running north through Phuoc Tuy province. The area shown is Binh Ba rubber plantation looking north. The road has been cleared back for 100 to 200 metres as the means of deterring attacks from enemy forces.</i>	<i>82</i>
<i>Photograph 4 : An early aerial photograph of the new village Suoi Nghe at the time of development by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit This is the aerial view of the newly constructed relocation village of Suoi Nghe just north of the Australian base at Nui Dat just before occupation by the illegal villagers transferred from 'Slope 30'. The frames were constructed in the port city of Vung Tau to the south and transported to this site. Apart from the improved housing, the villagers were balloted plots of land on which to grow food. The Australian government funded this project.</i>	<i>83</i>
<i>Photograph 5 : Australian soldier Corporal Arthur (Tiger) Feltham with man-packed broadcast equipment and power supply adapted from AN/PRC 25 set radio batteries accompanied by ARVN Interpreter Staff Sergeant Trinh, the Unit Vietnamese interpreter, photographed while broadcasting messages to villagers....</i>	<i>87</i>
<i>Photograph 6 : Australian soldiers move into a village during a 'Cordon and Search' operation.</i>	<i>88</i>
<i>Photograph 7 : Villagers waiting to be processed at a cordon and search.</i>	<i>89</i>
<i>Photograph 8 : Cultural Drama Team entertaining the villagers in the assembly area during a Cordon and Search. They are standing on the back of an Australian Mark 3 vehicle.</i>	<i>90</i>
<i>Photograph 9 : Medical staff from the village of Duc Thanh in front of village dispensary built by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit</i>	<i>91</i>
<i>Photograph 10 : United States 1 ¼ ton Psychological Operations Vehicle that contained extensive equipment for psychological operations work.</i>	<i>98</i>
<i>Photograph 11 : Captain A. Bruzga Staff Officer Grade 3 (Psychological Operations) in Nui Dat c. 1969..</i>	<i>106</i>
<i>Photograph 12 : Capt Algis Bruzga with ARVN Vietnamese interpreter near Nui Dat on 19 April 1969 preparing a tape recorded message to be broadcast from a helicopter to the Viet Cong in the region informing them they can obtain meals and medical attention if they surrender under the South</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>Photograph 13 : The writer shown second from right in back row was the Psyops Ground Team Leader with members of the RDC Team at Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy province South Vietnam during 'Face-to-face' POLWAR operations. c. July 1970. Note the 'black pyjamas' uniform worn by the RDC to look similar to the working attire worn by the villagers. No visible weapons were carried in the village during face-to-face operations in secure areas.</i>	<i>126</i>

<i>Photograph 14 : Lieutenant Colonel Tu – Phuoc Tuy Province Chief presenting weapons reward money to two Viet Cong ralliers. Sergeant Russ Tetlow Australian Psyops looking on in background. Lt Col Tu with other top provincial officials were removed from office during the Easter Offensive 1972.....</i>	<i>151</i>
<i>Photograph 15 : Fairchild two engine C 123K Provider aircraft operated by the 315 Tactical Aircraft Wing at Tan Son Nhut Air Base flown in Vietnam circa 1970. This aircraft was used at higher altitude by US Psyops personnel to drop leaflets along the Cambodian and Laotian border.</i>	<i>155</i>
<i>Photograph 16 : Private Wladyslaw (Wally) Koscielecki adjusting a loudspeaker mounted on top of a Land Rover at Hoi My South Vietnam. Note the platform under the speakers. This was used to stand a 16 mm film projector on to show films in villages.</i>	<i>158</i>
<i>Photograph 17: Australian AATTV soldier Warrant Officer Sam Booth – Australian advisor at the Phuoc Tuy Chieu Hoi Centre talking to Vo Thi Que who had escaped from the Viet Cong after two years. February 1971.....</i>	<i>160</i>
<i>Photograph 18 : Tent accommodation 1 Psychological Operations Unit – Nui Dat April 1970. Laundry and Ablution block is on the right hand side of the photograph. Accommodation was located among rubber and banana trees.....</i>	<i>161</i>
<i>Photograph 19 : 1 Australian Psychological Operations Unit Headquarters building with locally designed and produced unit sign on the road leading to the unit. Circa 1971. Motto – Victoria per Mentem or Victory through the Mind. The motto was introduced by Captain Peter Hudson.</i>	<i>164</i>
<i>Photograph 20 : United States Helicopter showing the 1,000 watt speakers mounted ready for operations</i>	<i>165</i>
<i>Photograph 21 : Photograph showing a commercial model Kudelski five inch reel-to-reel tape recorder broadcasting from inside a 161 Reconnaissance Flight Pilatus Porter aircraft in Phuoc Tuy province.....</i>	<i>167</i>
<i>Photograph 22 : In the photograph is Sergeant Wayne Stone with Staff Sergeant Ruong and a North Vietnamese returnee. This photograph was taken at the Ministry of Information Chieu Hoi Centre located east of the province capital Baria in Phuoc Tuy.. The returnee was killed by a mine some time later while assisting Australian forces.</i>	<i>176</i>
<i>Photograph 23 : Example of Cultural Drama Team performing on the back of a truck. Sound system provided by Psychological Operations Ground team.</i>	<i>197</i>
<i>Photograph 24 : Villagers at Psyops Night Propaganda (NiProp). Their faces show the interest in the simple plot of an American Western movie. c. 1971.....</i>	<i>200</i>
<i>Photograph 25 : Psyops Team preparing for water operations on a South Vietnamese Riverine patrol boat. Australian Psyop soldier believed to be Pte Graham Stone and ARVN Sergeant Trinh.</i>	<i>202</i>
<i>Photograph 26 : Dead Viet Cong soldiers near the entrance of the destroyed village of Thua Tich.....</i>	<i>205</i>
<i>Photograph 27 : The look of horror on the children’s faces from the village of Xuyen Moc indicates the shock of witnessing the bodies being dragged behind an Australian APC.</i>	<i>206</i>
<i>Photograph 28 : Viet Cong bodies placed in Xuyen Moc village centre for identification.....</i>	<i>208</i>

<i>Photograph 29 : Ex Viet Cong from Xuyen Moc guerrilla unit now employed as a Bushman Scout by Australian forces indicating VC markers on the ground, while protection party observes.....</i>	<i>213</i>
<i>Photograph 30 : Captain Meredith reading out captured document on the effectiveness of the Australian and other allied forces psychological warfare against them.</i>	<i>223</i>
<i>Photograph 31 : Iroquois Helicopter (UH-1H)</i>	<i>239</i>
<i>Photograph 32 : United States Air Force O2A Push /Pull Cessna ‘Skymaster’ aircraft. The O2B model is the same aircraft but without the forward air controller rocket pods under the wing. On the left-hand side behind the pilot built into the fuselage was an external speaker for broadcasting.</i>	<i>240</i>
<i>Photograph 33 : Pilatus Porter aircraft with underneath hatch open. This is where the broadcast speakers protruded from the aircraft.</i>	<i>240</i>
<i>Photograph 34 : Psyops operator Tony Schick and colleague about to dispatch leaflets out of an Australian RAAF helicopter using a chute to aid dispersal.....</i>	<i>241</i>
<i>Photograph 35 : Leaflet mixture including ‘safe conduct passes’ falling from the helicopter dispatch chute. The chute was provided by US forces</i>	<i>242</i>
<i>Photograph 36 : Leaflets falling away from the helicopter. Note the start of the distribution pattern.</i>	<i>242</i>

Table of Figures

<i>Figure 1 : US produced Australian designed Psyops leaflet number 246-273</i>	<i>76</i>
<i>Figure 2 : US produced Australian designed Psyops leaflet 246-352</i>	<i>77</i>
<i>Figure 3 : US produced, Australian designed, Psyops leaflet 246-11-67</i>	<i>78</i>
<i>Figure 4 : US produced Australian designed Psyops leaflet 246-21-67</i>	<i>79</i>
<i>Figure 5 : National Catalogue of Psychological Operations Materials centrally produced by 4th Psychological Operations Group under JUSPAO directions.</i>	<i>94</i>
<i>Figure 6 : The front and back of US produced Psyops Leaflet – ‘Safe Conduct Pass’ front containing the flags of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. Note how the back of the pass is signed by the President of South Vietnam – Nguyen Van Thieu who was President from 1967 until 1975.</i>	<i>95</i>
<i>Figure 7 : Australian produced ‘Punch a Postie’ Leaflet.</i>	<i>103</i>
<i>Figure 8 : Geoff ‘Jeff’ Hook Cartoon – ‘Punch a Postie’ 22 November 1968.....</i>	<i>104</i>
<i>Figure 9: South Vietnamese Provincial Territorial Security Organisation - Sub-Sector to Village.</i>	<i>115</i>
<i>Figure 10: South Vietnamese Village Organisation.....</i>	<i>118</i>
<i>Figure 11: Political Warfare Book ‘Handbook for Advisors’</i>	<i>122</i>
<i>Figure 12: Viet Cong Ba Long Province Organisation</i>	<i>141</i>
<i>Figure 13: Viet Cong Propaganda & Indoctrination Section.....</i>	<i>142</i>
<i>Figure 14 : National Liberation Forces opposing 1 ATF</i>	<i>143</i>
<i>Figure 15: Chieu Hoi statistics from January 1965 to 30 May 1971.....</i>	<i>155</i>
<i>Figure 16: Organisational Structure of 1 Psychological Operations Unit.....</i>	<i>154</i>
<i>Figure 17: Cordon and Search message.</i>	<i>173</i>
<i>Figure 18 : Surrender Appeal message.....</i>	<i>174</i>
<i>Figure 19: United States Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, Team 89, Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam</i>	<i>181</i>
<i>Figure 20: Organisational Structure of the enemy in Chau Duc District. The VCI are communist party members.</i>	<i>189</i>
<i>Figure 21 : The first ATF Leaflet ATF-007-70 giving the initial results of the Cambodian Campaign.....</i>	<i>194</i>
<i>Figure 22: Australian Prisoner of War Instruction Card</i>	<i>209</i>
<i>Figure 23: Nine Rules issued to every soldier in South Vietnam.</i>	<i>212</i>
<i>Figure 24: Suggested Numerical Value of killed or captured enemy.....</i>	<i>214</i>
<i>Figure 25 : Australian Leaflet ATF-002-70.....</i>	<i>229</i>
<i>Figure 26 : Chieu Hoi Leaflet ATF-003-70</i>	<i>231</i>
<i>Figure 27 : Australian Leaflet ATF-004-70.....</i>	<i>232</i>
<i>Figure 28 : Australian Leaflet ATF-006-70.....</i>	<i>234</i>
<i>Figure 29 : Australian Leaflet ATF-013-70.....</i>	<i>238</i>

Figure 30: Viet Cong Leaflet aimed at US and Australian Servicemen.....246
Figure 31: Viet Cong Leaflet aimed at US and Australian Servicemen.....247
Figure 32: Sample of Viet Cong jungle junk mail ‘Aussie Go Home’.....247

Table of Maps

<i>Map 1: Map showing the Provinces and Military Regions (Corps Tactical Zones) in South Vietnam indicating the location of Phuoc Tuy Province on the east coast where the Australian Task Force mainly operated.....</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>Map 2: Map of South Vietnam showing War Zones C and D, the Iron Triangle</i>	<i>44</i>
<i>Map 3 : Phuoc Tuy Province showing the location of 1st Australian Task Force</i>	<i>45</i>
<i>Map 4 : Changing Viet Minh boundaries within Phuoc Tuy province post 1945 and prior to 1965.</i>	<i>60</i>
<i>Map 5 : Map of Phuoc Tuy in May 1966 showing the South Vietnamese Government controlled areas.</i>	<i>68</i>
<i>Map 6: Road Map of 1st Australian Task Force in Nui Dat.</i>	<i>162</i>
<i>Map 7 : Map of leaflet drop area – Nui Thi Vai Mountain, Phuoc Tuy province South Vietnam.....</i>	<i>222</i>
<i>Map 8. : Map of Long Hai leaflet drop area – Phuoc Tuy province South Vietnam.....</i>	<i>224</i>

Abbreviations, Definitions and Acronyms

Definitions.

- Civic Action** The participation by an agency, organisation, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels , but for which the sponsor does not have primary government responsibilities. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population (FM 31- 23, Stability Operations – US Army Doctrine)
- Civil Affairs** Questions relating to relations in wartime between the commander of an armed force and the civilian populations and governments in areas where the force is employed, and which are settled on the basis of mutual agreement, official or otherwise. Civil affairs include those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and people in a friendly country or area. (FM 31- 23, Stability Operations – US Army Doctrine)
- Consolidation** psychological operations
A psychological operation conducted toward populations in friendly areas of operations or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating operations and maximum cooperation among the civil population. (FM 31- 23, Stability Operations – US Army Doctrine)
- Insurgency** A condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organisation revolution and is not recognised as belligerency. (FM 31- 23, Stability Operations – US Army Doctrine)
- Intelligence** The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, interrogation, and interpreting of all available information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies and operations. (FM 31- 23, Stability Operations – US Army Doctrine)
- Viet Cong Infrastructure** The political and administrative organisation through which the Vietnamese Communists (VC) control or seek control over the people of South Vietnam. It embodies the Communist (People’s Revolutionary) Party control structure, and the leadership and administration of parallel front organisations extending from the national through the hamlet level. The

VCi does not include the rank and file of National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN nor the military arm of the VC; the VC main, locals and irregular force. (FM 31- 23, Stability Operations – US Army Doctrine)

- Psyop** Those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in any group the emotions, attitudes, or behaviour to support the achievement of national objectives. These operations also include psychological warfare (PSYWAR). (HQ MACV Directive 10-1 Organisation and Functions – Psychological Operations. Dated 21 October 1970 (MACJ3)
- Psywar** The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. (HQ MACV Directive 10-1 Organisation and Functions – Psychological Operations. Dated 21 October 1970 (MACJ3)
- Propaganda** Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives; communications designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specific group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (HQ MACV Directive 10-1 Organisation and Functions – Psychological Operations. Dated 21 October 1970 (MACJ3)
- Political Warfare (POLWAR)** The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) POLWAR consolidates functions in the field of motivation, propaganda, security and welfare. It includes political education and indoctrination, troop information and education, PSYWAR, military civic action and civil affairs, counterintelligence, dependent welfare (including education and medical care), military sports, and schools to train selected personnel in all these functions. The objectives of the RVNAF POLWAR concept are to:
- a. Establish and maintain a high degree of loyalty, discipline, and morale within the RVNAF.
 - b. Gain the support of the civilian populace by improving the civilian-military relationship.
 - c. Combat the Viet Cong / North Vietnamese Army (VC / NVA) through effective PSYWAR

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A

AATTV Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam

AFV	Australian Force, Vietnam
Agent Orange	Defoliant/herbicide containing 2,4,T Dioxin
AHQ	Army Headquarters, Canberra Australia
AIK	Aid in Kind (US money supplied by the US government)
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand and the United States (Pact/Treaty)
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier, usually a version of M-113
APP	Accelerated Pacification Program
APT	Armed Propaganda Team
ARVN	Army of Republic of Vietnam

B

Bn	Battalion
BRIAM	British Advisory Mission to Vietnam
Bullshit Bombers	Larger US aircraft dropping high volumes of psychological propaganda leaflets
Bushman Scout	Ex – Viet Cong working for Australians usually as a scout. Same as US Kit Carson Scouts

C

Cadre	Communist call people ‘cadre’ to anyone in a leadership roll
Cav	Cavalry
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CO	Commanding Officer
COMAFV	Commander Australian Force Vietnam
COMUSMACV	Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support – later changed to Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
COSVN	Central Office for South Vietnam (Communists)
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone

D

DentCap	Dental Civil Action project.
DIOCC	District Intelligence Office Coordinating Centre
DMZ	Demilitarization Zone
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Communist North)
Duster	an M42, an old M24 tank chassis with two 40mm Anti-Aircraft Bofor guns in an open turret

E

EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
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F

FAC	Forward Air Controller, usually flying around in an O-1 Birdog, O2A if US origin. Porter aircraft if Australian
FF	Field Force
FFV	Field Force Vietnam
FSB	Fire Support Base, Firebase or forward operating base away from Nui Dat. Usually with a battery of artillery guns (6 x 105mm Howitzers) with a perimeter around them
Funny Money	Military Payment Certificates (MPC), scrip issued in lieu of US dollars and used on FWMAF bases.

G

Gunship	Usually a UH1H Huey, later a UH1G Huey Cobra
GVN	Government of South Vietnam

H

HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
Hawkflight	An Australian Ready- Reaction Force airlifted into an area by helicopter.
Hoi Chanh	an enemy soldier who took advantage of the Chieu Hoi amnesty program. (Open Arms). Program operated by the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi.
HQ	Headquarters

I

ICAP	Integrated Civil Action Project
ID	Identity (Card)
I FFV	US 1st Field Force Command Vietnam
II FFV	US 2 nd Field Force Command Vietnam
Indochinese Communist Party	Reappeared in 1951 as the Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam Vietnamese Workers' Party

J

JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS	Joint General Staff
JUSPAO	Joint United States Public Affairs Office

K

KIA	Killed in Action
Kit Carson Scout	North Vietnamese Regulars or Viet Cong who returned under then Chieu Hoi amnesty program and acted as scouts for US troops. Australian equivalent were called Bushman Scouts.

L

Lien Viet	Creation of a new ‘popular national front’ by the communists (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam), known as Lien Viet, whose announced objective was to achieve ‘independence and democracy’.
Litterbug	Radio call sign for psychological operators (dropping leaflets)
LZ	Landing Zone (note that some were Fire Support Bases and had names)

M

M-113	Armoured Personnel Carrier
M-16A1	M16 Automatic rifle firing 5.56mm projectile
M-18A1	Claymore antipersonnel weapon, threw out steel balls, lethal to 50 meters.
M-26A1	Fragmentation hand grenade (offensive)
M-42	Duster (twin 40mm Bofors antiaircraft cannon on M-42 chassis)
M-60	7.62mm machine gun of the infantry; belt fed, air-cooled; 600 rounds per minute
MAAG	Military Assistance Group Vietnam
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MDSZ	Mind Dam Secret Zone – Long Hai Mountains – name given by Viet Cong. Named after two Viet Minh officials – Minh and Dam
MAT	Mobile Advisory Team (US)
MATT	Mobile Advisory Training Team (Australian)
MEDCAP	Medical Civil Action Program - FWMAF Medics treated Vietnamese villagers
MILO	Military Intelligence Liaison Officer
Montagnard	French Lit. "Mountaineer" Originally from Polynesia, they were the original inhabitants of the coastal region of Vietnam
MPC	Military Payment Certificates, scrip issued in lieu of dollars
MR	Military Region – South Vietnam divided into 4 Military Zones

N

NDP	Night Defensive Position (mini Fire Support Base)
NFLSVA	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (communists)
NiProp	Night Propaganda
NLF	National Liberation Front
NP	National Police
NPFF	National Police Field Force
NVA	North Vietnamese Army

O

OIC	Officer in Charge
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Ops	Operations
ORBAT	Order of Battle

P

PAVN	People's Army of [North] Vietnam (Communists)
PF	Popular Force
Phoenix	CIA program operated by CORDS designed to neutralise the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)
Phuong Hoang	Vietnamese equivalent of Phoenix
Piaster	Vietnamese Money (in 1968 100 piaster was equal to 1 US Dollar, 1970 – 118 to \$1, 1971 – 418 to \$1))
PIC	Province Interrogation Centre
PIOCC	Province Intelligence Office Coordinating Centre
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAF	People's Liberation Armed Forces
POW	Prisoner of War
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PRU	Province Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Province Senior Advisor
PSB	Police Special Branch
PSDF	People's Self Defence Force
Psyops	Psychological Operations
Psywar	Psychological Warfare

Q

Quick Reaction Force	Helicopter-borne infantry with gunship is able to react to enemy attacks. Australian Defence and Employment Platoon was the Task Force Ready Reaction platoon - referred to as ' <i>Hawk flight</i> '.
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R

RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment
RD	Revolutionary Development
RDC	Revolutionary Development Cadre
RF	Regional Forces
Roman Plow	A Caterpillar D7E bulldozer used for defoliation missions
RPG2	Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher, Soviet made (B40)
RPG7	Later model Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher, Soviet made (B41)
RSSZ	Rung Sat Secret Zone – Name given to the area of mangroves North West of Vung Tau and along the Saigon River encompassing Long Son Island by the Viet Cong
RVN	Republic of South Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of South Vietnam Armed Forces

S

Sappers	NVA/VC whose job it was to blow things up; also an engineer
Search and Avoid	US reference to typical ARVN mission
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SSZ	Special Strike Zone

T

TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TF	Task Force
TOC	Tactical Operations Centre: normally a bunker where the operations centre is located.

U

USAF	United States Air Force
USIA	United States Information Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIS	United States Information Service
USMACV	United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USARV	United States Army Vietnam
USIS	United States Information Service, formerly USIA

V

VC	Viet Cong
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure
Viet Minh	League for Vietnamese Independence (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi – known as the Viet Minh)
Viet Cong	is a contraction of the phrase ‘Viet Nam Cong-San’ which means simply, ‘Vietnamese Communists’.
VIOCC	Village Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centre
VIP	Voluntary Informant Program
VIS	Village Information Service

W

Whispering Death	Viet Cong name for a B-52 air strike. They couldn't hear or see them
WIA	Wounded In Action

Z

Zulu Time	Greenwich Mean Time (now UTC)
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Military Terminology

Bombardier	Military rank in Artillery equivalent to Corporal
Brig	Brigadier
Capt	Captain
Cpl	Corporal
GSO 1	General Staff Officer Grade 1 has the rank of Lieutenant Colonel
GSO 2	General Staff Officer Grade 2 has the rank of Major
GSO 3	General Staff Officer Grade 3 has the rank of Captain or Lieutenant (in some cases a Warrant Officer may fill this position)
LCpl	Military rank of Lance Corporal
Lt	Lieutenant
Lt Col	Lieutenant Colonel
Maj	Major
Pte	Private
Sapper	Private
Sortie	A flight or mission in an aircraft
Sgt	Sergeant
SSgt	Staff Sergeant
Trooper	Private
WO	Warrant Officer (has two levels Class I and Class 2)

American Staff Position Designators

G1	Personnel and Administration (US)
G2	Intelligence (US)
G3	Operations (US)
G4	Logistics (US)
G5	Plans (US)

American Joint Staff Headquarters

J1	Personnel and Logistics on a Joint Headquarters (US)
J2	Intelligence on a Joint Headquarters (US)
J3	Operations on a Joint Headquarters (US)
J4	Logistics on a Joint Headquarters (US)
J5	Plans on a Joint Headquarters (US)
J6	Communications-electronics on a Joint Headquarters (US)

INTRODUCTION

This thesis '*Victoria per mentum: Psychological Operations Conducted by the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy Province South Vietnam 1965 – 1971*', describes, examines and attempts to evaluate the conduct of psychological warfare undertaken by the Australian Army in South Vietnam. In tracing the development of the Australian Army's psychological operations capacity in Bien Hoa and Phuoc Tuy provinces, the interrelations of Australian, American and South Vietnamese psychological operations will be described, the value of psychological operations as part of the overall plan, in particular the 'pacification' plan, will be emphasized and finally, an evaluation of those operations to measure the success or failure of those operations undertaken. Psychological operations are those planned psychological activities undertaken in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidation psychological operations and battlefield psychological activities.¹

Psychological operations are not a new concept in armed conflict. Their application goes back to the dawn of recorded history. The first known writing on the subject originated in the 5th Century BC, when Sun Tzu, a Chinese military strategist, stressed the value of destroying the enemy's will to fight through surprise, noise, rumours of treason in high places and assassinations. It is probably true to say that psychological operations have been a feature of all major campaigns, certainly in more recent times, and extensive programmes were developed during both world wars, Korea, the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation. General Sir Walter Walker in his report on the Borneo Operations said 'I arrived in Borneo with five principles of counterinsurgency warfare. After one month I added a sixth principle, winning hearts and minds of people, especially indigenous people. This was absolutely vital to the success operations, because by winning over the people to

¹ Definition in Australian Defence Force Publication, Operations Series ADFP 25 *Psychological Operations*. 1995, p. xvi.

your side, you can succeed in isolating your enemy from supplies, shelter and intelligence.

2

In a 1967 Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) publication *Psyops in Vietnam* they stated:

“There are three ways to get people to do things: by force, by persuasion, and by a combination of force and persuasion.

Psychological operations in a combat zone make use of a combination of force and persuasion. Psychological operations alone have produced few victories, but playing on the emotions generated by the stress of war, by heightening fears and dissatisfactions they can and have sparked a man or a unit into taking a desired action: to desert, surrender, mutiny, defect; to adopt passive resistance.

They also can impair the judgement of decision makers.

*Measuring the effectiveness of psychological operations in the Vietnam War was an inexact science. Several yardsticks, nevertheless, are available to the Republic of Vietnam, the United States and Free World Forces opposing Viet Cong guerrillas and their North Vietnamese supporters.*³

In South Vietnam, psychological operations were pushed to higher and higher levels. To be successful, the minds of the opposition must be won and their will to fight be destroyed; it is not sufficient to merely defeat them in battle. An examination is undertaken of the accelerated use of propaganda during the war and the reasons for the Australian Army forming their own psychological operations unit. It is less concerned with large unit military operations, Australian politics at the time of the conflict and United States military forces, except where they directly impact on the conduct or support of Australian psychological operations. The thesis is not an official history of Australian psychological

² Australian War Memorial Series 102 [59]. A Review of Australian Army Experiences in Vietnam. An unpublished book resulting from the CGS Exercise 1971. p 7-1 para 703

³ Psyops in Vietnam: Indications of Effectiveness. Planning Office, JUSPAO, Saigon. May 1967. p v.

operations as official histories can be defined as those authorised by an institution, group or person and where the same agent agrees to financially support the project. Official histories have full access to the official archival records where as I did not. Due to restricted access to some official sources such as intelligence files this thesis focuses on other primary and secondary sources.

Research was nevertheless hindered by incorporation of some of the unit's records with those of 1 Australian Task Force headquarters: after the return of the unit from South Vietnam in November 1971 the psychological operations unit equipment and records were handed to the Army Intelligence Centre then based at Woodside, South Australia. A number of records including all the voice broadcast tapes were destroyed prior to the Army Intelligence Centre moving from South Australia to Canungra in Queensland. Records, such as war diaries, that should have been completed as part of the information collection plan process in Vietnam ceased to be maintained by the second Officer Commanding of the unit Captain A White after only four months of the unit's operation, rendering them vague and useless to a researcher. No reason could be found why this happened. Capt White was approached but did not respond to telephone messages or correspondence. However, an adequate investigation of psychological warfare was possible from the files of 1 Australian Task Force and other unit files. Overall the files from the 1st Psychological Operations Unit do exist but appear to be incomplete. Files relating to propaganda leaflets are more comprehensive, but towards the end of the unit's service in Vietnam they were not properly maintained.

It is important to present a history of how and why the Australian Army conducted psychological operations in Vietnam while those with memory are still alive, especially when a number of official records are still classified as restricted or are not yet examined for public access. The thesis is shaped from the archives held by the Australian War Memorial (AWM), supplemented by research carried out at the National Archives and Research Administration in America (NARA, Washington D.C.) and at the archives held at the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USA. The Department of

Defence Intelligence Training Centre based at Canungra, Queensland granted me access to their archival files at the Intelligence Corps Museum. In addition, I hold a number of pertinent primary records from that period as I served in South Vietnam as an original member of the unit. As nothing has been previously written about the conduct of Australian psychological operations in Vietnam, this is an original undertaking.

Some areas of the thesis present minor aspects of psychological operations in order to piece together previously unacknowledged disparate events, for example the need to understand the formal and informal military and civilian structures of the South Vietnamese government. In writing this thesis it was found that there are truths to be uncovered, important lessons to be learned and sacrifices to be remembered. It is hoped that by focusing on Australian involvement in psychological operations in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1971 light will be shone on the work of individuals that undertook this work and of the unit's work and on those who served in it.

A critical analysis of past Australian psychological warfare doctrine and its implementation cannot be precise. The results of Psychological operations are not yet fundamentally quantifiable, although conclusions can be drawn from the operations that were conducted. Psychological operations suffer less from imprecision and lack of measurement than from a basic lack of definition, understanding, acceptance and completion. As a result, its very position within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) during and immediately after the Vietnam conflict was unsure, and consequently, the organisational influence and role of psychological operations has never received its proper due. Most histories concentrate on the command, control and staffing structure and the operations carried out by the combat units in a war of attrition. Small units are not seen as appealing enough to write about. The majority of the histories of the Vietnam conflict, and other unit histories of prior wars, are written by ex-members of these units, or other interested parties. The importance of writing about psychological warfare is the examination of operations to find the lessons to be learnt. Those things done well and those not done as well. These lessons are important for any unit conducting psychological operations in the future.

The original aim of the thesis was to focus specifically on the establishment of 1 Australian Psychological Operations Unit (1 APOU) and the operations that were undertaken by the unit from April 1970 until November 1971. Initially it was believed they were the only Australian unit involved in the conduct of psychological warfare. Researching the archives revealed that individuals and small groups were involved in these tasks from 1965 up until the formation of the 1 APOU in April 1970. In the early days, psychological operations were conducted on an ad-hoc basis until a formal position was established for a permanent staff officer on the task force headquarters. It was during this time that the United States Army and Air Force in Vietnam supported the Australians through the design, printing, delivery and supply of US leaflets, pamphlets and posters, and in the production of standard broadcast voice and returnee (Hoi Chanh) appeal tapes. This support continued after the unit was formed. The Australian leaflet operations followed the US style of leaflet design with the inclusion of Australian content and style.

A mistake found in the published official history of the Vietnam conflict and subsequently repeated in many other publications, provided another inspiration for this study. It was mistakenly claimed that 1 APOU was a unit in Vietnam under the command of 1 Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG) located in Vung Tau.⁴ In reality the unit was established as a Divisional Unit and attached to 1 Australian Task Force located at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province. When the Australian War Memorial was questioned about the accuracy of the facts, they were able to quote a letter by the Department of Defence (A426/1.109) dated 15 October 1979 – *Allotment of Units for Special Duty – Army Units in Vietnam (Southern Zone) from 31 July 1962 to 1 July 1973*. This letter was distributed after the end of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam conflict. One of the results of the corrections made by this thesis to the official record is that members and their dependants who may wish to

⁴ Ian McNeil & Ashley Ekins. *On The Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967 – June 1968*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003, Appendix B, p461.

claim benefits relating to their war experience from the Department of Veterans Affairs can be identified with a correct unit and based in Nui Dat at a correct time and place.⁵

History is subject to flaws and biases, and can never be captured and presented in its entirety and in this endeavour there are still many truths to be uncovered, and many lessons to be learnt. This thesis is an attempt to bring to light a number of events to inform the reader of the history of these little known and largely unexplained Australian psychological operations activities in South Vietnam.

Methodology

The Australian Army pamphlet *The Division in Battle*, Pamphlet 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, 1965 was one of a series of eleven pamphlets that contained the Army doctrine that was to provide the basis for training and study for the Australian Army. The doctrine was based on known principles of war, operational experience, exercises, and experience of other armies and studies of divisional organisation in tactical settings in the tropics. While this pamphlet was the doctrine during the conflict in Vietnam it appears that very little notice was taken of it during the conflict.

Firstly, an examination is undertaken of the circumstances leading up to the formation of the 1 Australian Psychological Operations Unit on the 14 April 1970 and the types of operations conducted. The context, which is, the forces, people and culture, types of operations, and policies and procedures that operated at the time is identified. These external influences had to be clearly understood so the unit could appreciate Vietnamese society and history, thus allowing the unit to engage with the Vietnamese people with some cultural and historical awareness.

⁵ After corresponding with the Department of Defence I was informed that as the conflict ended many years ago, they did not intend to change the information.

I have referenced a number of quotations taken from the Australian Military Forces 'Pocketbook South Vietnam'.⁶ This is deliberate. This information was the only source of official information the original psychological unit members received about the people of Vietnam, their religions, culture, the enemy and reasons for the war. On this single source the initial work of the psychological operations unit was based; it cannot be discounted as of no consequence.

Thesis Outline

The early chapters provide context by examining how the Australian troops were deployed to South Vietnam and how psychological operations were conducted by the Americans in support of the Australian operations. There is a detailed description of how the psychological operations unit was formed, staffed and trained by the Americans prior to conducting their own operations in Phuoc Tuy province in South Vietnam. There is also a description of the Vietnamese civil structures and military organisations the Australian soldiers needed to understand so they could be effective in conducting propaganda throughout the villages in the province. The final chapters describe a number of Australian operations as case studies, and also enemy propaganda directed against the Australians and evaluates how effective these operations were. Finally the thesis concludes with a general evaluation of how effective those psychological operations were and identifies the key lessons learnt.

⁶ Australian Army. *Pocketbook: South Vietnam*. Department of Defence, Canberra. 1967

CHAPTER 1

Brief background of the political history and events leading up to Australia's involvement in South Vietnam

The laws of war – this is a problem that anyone directing a war must study and solve.

The laws of revolutionary war – this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary war must study and solve.

The laws of China's revolutionary war – this is a problem that anyone directing a revolutionary in China must study and solve.

*Mao Tse-Tung,
Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (December 1936)*

This thesis covers psychological warfare activities undertaken by the Australian forces and excludes psychological operations undertaken by the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) and of those personnel who served with the United States Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Advisory Teams. The Vietnamese communist party came to power and subverted all other nationalist organisations in the north of Vietnam and infiltrated trained cadre to the south. They subverted and destroyed the Confucian village way of life in order to be able to rebuild society in their own communist ideals. The insurgent whole may be broken down into four principle parts. One of these is the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN) and for ease of reference throughout the thesis the use of the term National Liberation Front (NLF) or the term Viet Cong (VC) will be used to refer to those forces that were recruited and served as the communists in South Vietnam. There has been much discussion about whether it was formed as a spontaneous expression of opposition to the Diem Catholic regime or was it conceived by the Hanoi government. Whatever its origin, the NLF was controlled and directed by Hanoi.⁷ A second insurgent organisation is

⁷ Frederick P. Munson, Jack E. Brent, Albert H. Hessler et al, *Intercultural Communications Guide for the Republic of Vietnam (U)*. The American University, Washington, D.C. September 1967. p. 24.

the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This was the tool with which Hanoi controlled the NLF and the Liberation Army.⁸ The third insurgent organisation was the Liberation Army, made up of full military (or Main Force) units and paramilitary units which are composed of regional and local guerrillas.⁹ The fourth insurgent military organisation operating in South Vietnam was the North Vietnamese Army (People's Army of Vietnam or PAVN). These were regular units and were infiltrated to South Vietnam to fight with the VC for the reunification of the divided country.¹⁰ The soldiers were highly motivated and well trained successors to the Viet Minh units that fought the French Expeditionary Forces, and who could be trusted to carry out both guerrilla and conventional operations. They were also used to train units of the Liberation Army.

⁸ Ibid., *Intercultural Communications Guide for the Republic of Vietnam (U)*. p. 25.

⁹ Ibid., *Intercultural Communications Guide for the Republic of Vietnam (U)*. p. 25.

¹⁰ Ibid., *Intercultural Communications Guide for the Republic of Vietnam (U)*. pp. 25-26.



Map 1: Map showing the Provinces and Military Regions (Corps Tactical Zones) in South Vietnam indicating the location of Phuoc Tuy Province on the east coast where the Australian Task Force mainly operated.

This thesis takes as its starting point the outcome of the Geneva Conference held in 1954 to settle the French anti-colonial war in Indochina. The Geneva Accords settled the war by dividing Vietnam into two regions, the north half under the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh and the southern half briefly under Bao Dai who had become leader of the independent state of Vietnam on 8 March 1949, then from July 1954 Ngo Dinh Diem who was to remain President until 1956 when a referendum would be held to determine Vietnamese opinion on reunifying the two Vietnams.

... Diem changed the constitution of the State of Vietnam to consolidate his own power. In a blatantly rigged referendum in October 1955, he forced the removal of Bai Dao and established the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), with himself as President. For the next twenty years, the RVN would become generally known as 'South Vietnam' while the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) would be called 'North Vietnam. ...the divisions between the two regimes owed far more to ideology than to regional loyalties.¹¹

The Americans under their chief negotiator, John Foster Dulles, refused to sign the accords in the belief that the outcome would favour the communist Viet Minh forces. The Americans established the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in the hope of containing the spread of communism and that treaty was endorsed by France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Pakistan on 8 September 1954.

Ngo Dinh Diem became the President of South Vietnam on 26 October 1955 and SEATO forces rallied behind him. He was successful in suppressing the armed sects,¹² but looked for further support to continue the fight against what became known as the Viet Cong. These sects controlled large and strategically important areas of Southern Vietnam with their own private armies. These sects were Binh Xuyen, a Mafia-like organisation which ran much of the gambling and vice in Saigon and to which Bao Dao had granted control of

¹¹ P. Edwards with G. Pemberton, *Crises and Commitments: The Policy and Diplomacy of Australian Involvement in South East Asian Conflicts 1948-1965*, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1992. p. 192

¹² P. Edwards with G. Pemberton, *idid.*, p. 192

the Saigon Police. In 1955 and 1956 Diem also moved against two major sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, and various other warlord led factions, achieving victories.¹³ Diem called on Roderick Parkes the British Ambassador in Saigon on 19 February 1960 for information about Britain's counter insurgency in Malaya.¹⁴

British diplomats in both Malaya and Vietnam as well as in the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) increasingly believed that the British and Malays had to play a more active role in South Vietnam. The British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to Vietnam was established in September 1961. Britain's Macmillan government believed that there were two advantages in sending this mission. Firstly because Britain had experience in defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s and secondly because the British wanted to demonstrate, particularly to the Americans, that they were willing to share the burden of the Cold War struggle in Asia, and that it had a useful contribution to make.

The British believed that the Americans had trained the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) for a conventional Korean type conflict that was inappropriate and that the Americans seemed to lack the necessary experience to conduct a counter insurgency war along the lines that the British had used to fight guerrillas in Malaya.¹⁵ Early in April 1960, Admiral Gerald Gladstone, the British Commander-in-Chief Far Eastern Station, paid a brief visit to Saigon. He met Diem and impressed upon him the necessity to create a single intelligence agency in South Vietnam as the means for defending the villages and to pursue a 'clear and hold' strategy. The ARVN should establish absolute control in selected areas and remain there for twelve to eighteen months to re-establish lost confidence in the Diem government. Diem seemed to be aware of the shortcomings inherent in the attempt to apply

¹³ P. Edwards with G. Pemberton, *ibid.*, p. 192

¹⁴ P. Edwards with G. Pemberton, *ibid.*, p. 250

¹⁵ Peter, Busch, 'Supporting the War: Britain's Decision to send the Thompson Mission to Vietnam, 1960-61.' in *Cold War History*. vol 2, no 1. October 2001 pp 69-94 at p 71. Retrieved 3 July 2007 from <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634851>

Malayan methods in the RVN.¹⁶ He raised most of the points that would later be listed as the reason for failure of the strategic hamlet programme in Malaya, while demonstrating that the situation in Vietnam was quite different from Malaya.

Robert Thompson who was the permanent Secretary of Defence in Malaya, visited Vietnam for a second time accompanied by C.C. Too, Head of the Malayan Psychological Warfare Section, and Inche Salleh bin Ismail, the Malayan Deputy Commissioner of Police and Chief Police Officer in Perak. They toured Vietnam and reported to Diem in April 1960 suggesting that South Vietnam should organise its counter insurgency on the lines used in Malaya such as appointing an Emergency Operations Council and an Executive Committee as well as establishing one single intelligence agency. They also recommended the improvement of communication systems in general and wireless cover in particular and to pay more attention to psychological warfare.¹⁷ Diem showed interest in this British advice and on learning that Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner to Malaya from 1952 to 1954, was visiting Malaya in October 1960 he requested that Templer visit Vietnam. Templer was reluctant to do so, but he was persuaded to by Frederick Hoyer-Millar, permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office. Like Thompson, Templer urged Diem to take lessons from the Malayan Emergency and he stressed the importance of establishing a reliable intelligence network, a good communication system, and to appoint a combined civil, military and police intelligence committee at each administrative level throughout the country.¹⁸ The Americans thought little of the British suggestions and the recommendations were opposed specifically by General Williams, head of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Vietnam in March 1961.¹⁹

The US blocked the British suggestions particularly that of merging the intelligence agencies into one central body. The Australians were later to find some difficulty in working with the large numbers of South Vietnamese agencies that operated independently

¹⁶Busch, *ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁷Busch, *ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

¹⁸Busch, *ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

¹⁹Busch, *ibid.*, p. 79.

from each other and often in competition against one another. The adoption of the British suggestion would also have been of some advantage to the Australian's because they were familiar with the British techniques that had been used in fighting under British direction in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency and later in Borneo during the Indonesian Confrontation. Some of the senior personnel that were to fight in Phuoc Tuy province were knowledgeable in British techniques and would possibly have had greater success using these techniques than having to work with the less inefficient South Vietnamese/American counter insurgency techniques.

The US government had been involved during the French occupation in Vietnam by supporting the French with more than eighty percent of the material used by them. The French began to wind down their operation and the Americans now became more closely involved in defending the state of South Vietnam from attacks supported by North Vietnam through the establishment of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) under the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN), generally referred to as Viet Cong. These local forces were mobilised to defend themselves against attacks from the South Vietnam government forces in what rapidly became a civil war. The Viet Cong were dedicated to reuniting South Vietnam with North Vietnam. Eisenhower deployed US advisors to SVN in 1956. By 1960 they warned President Kennedy that American involvement could mire America in a bloody, protracted war. Despite these warnings, the president increased financial and military assistance to the Diem government. By the end of 1962, more than 15,000 American advisors were in South Vietnam, and US spending there had passed the US\$2 billion mark. The hope of achieving a quick victory was not encouraging.²⁰

Diem seemed more interested in establishing an autocratic regime than he did in promoting democracy. He consolidated power among his family members and refused to share power with local leaders. As a leading member of the Vietnamese Catholic minority, Diem

²⁰ Busch, *ibid.*, p. 81.

oppressed the Buddhists who made up the overwhelming majority of South Vietnam's population. Kennedy threatened Diem with loss of American aid if he did not institute democratic reforms. Diem ignored these warnings and support for the communists grew. As 1963 progressed, Kennedy considered his options: he could commit further by sending American combat troops or he could withdraw and let the communists claim victory. Kennedy found neither solution palatable. Then another option developed; some of Diem's generals began to plot a coup against their leader. Kennedy had promised to help developing nations help themselves and he gave his approval for the coup. On 2 November 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem died at the hands of his generals.²¹ In South Vietnam, citizens responded positively to the coup. With Diem out of the way, hopes rose that South Vietnam could stave off the communists. Less than two weeks after Diem's death, Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon Baines Johnson became President of the United States of America.

In 1963 President Johnson decided to intensify the fight against the communist forces and the North Vietnamese government and he adopted the policy of what he labelled as the 'more flags' programmes, that is having the US encourage more Western allied countries to join with the US in conducting military operations against the communist forces. Against a complicated set of international circumstances already demanding Australian troop involvement in the South Pacific region, the Menzies government agreed to commit troops to aid the Americans in South Vietnam.

Australian Involvement in Vietnam - Australian Advisors – 1962

The first move by the Menzies and the Liberal Coalition government to engage in military action in South Vietnam was its decision on 24 May 1962 to send thirty 'military advisors' to Vietnam as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV). Colonel Francis

²¹ Jacobs, Seth, *Cold WarMandarin : Ngo Dinh Diem and the origins of America's war in Vietnam, 1950-1963*. Lanham, Md. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. pp. 179-180.

(Ted) Philip Serong on his way back to Australia from Burma in April 1962 travelled via Vietnam as part of his debriefing-cum-information-gathering tour through the South-East Asia region. He had already written to Lieutenant General Reginald Pollard, Chief of the General Staff in February 1962 suggesting that Australia should offer a small group of ten to fifteen officers, whom he could lead to work with the United States advisors in the training of the South Vietnamese Army.²² The Menzies-led government later sought advice from the Department of Defence on how to aid the Saigon government in its anti-insurgent campaign. The Chief of the General Staff already had a solution; the one proposed by Serong.

When the decision was made to send the advisory team, the group was known as the Australian Army Component, Vietnam. In July 1962 the government changed the group's name to Australian Army Training Team Vietnam.²³ The first contingent of Australian advisors arrived in Vietnam at Tan Son Nhut Airport, Saigon on 3rd August 1962.²⁴

Australia's Increased Force 1965


On 29 April 1965 the Australian Government announced an increase in its deployment to South Vietnam with an infantry battalion-sized group of soldiers from 1 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR). This group was to be supported by a troop of armoured personnel carriers, a battery of Australian artillery, together with a battery from the New Zealand Army and a logistic support group. This battalion group was attached to an American Brigade (173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)) and worked alongside them in the Saigon, Bien Hoa, and War Zone C and D areas. Major J. S. Rowe an Australian intelligence corps officer was attached to the Headquarters of 173 Airborne Brigade and

²² B. Davies, & G. McKay, *The Men Who Persevered*. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, Australia, 2005, p

²³ A. Blair, *The Life of an Australian Counter-Insurgency Expert: Ted Serong*. Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2002, p 76.

²⁴ I. McNeil, *The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam 1962-1972*. Australian War Memorial Canberra., 1984, p. 15

coordinated the psychological operations for the Australian 1 RAR Group. Operations conducted by 1 RAR from September onwards can be grouped into three categories: operations against the heartland; operations against War Zone D; and special operations.²⁵




Map 2: Map of South Vietnam showing War Zones C and D, the Iron Triangle

On the 8 March 1966 the government approved the expansion of this deployment to a brigade sized task force of two battalions with additional support troops. This Task Force called 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) moved from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Tuy Province and was based in an area known as Nui Dat. Phuoc Tuy was located within III Corps Tactical Zone known to the South Vietnamese as Military Region 3. The Task Force came under command of the United States Commander of HQ II Field Force Command Vietnam (II

²⁵ I. McNeil, *To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1993, p. 123.

FFV) for military matters. Phuoc Tuy province was chosen after consultation between the Americans and Australian headquarters located in Saigon because it was close to the supply port at Vung Tau, located about thirty eight kilometres to the south and which could provide a quick escape route by Australians should a withdrawal be necessary. This was the Australians' primary area of operations, but they operated outside the province from time to time.



Map 3 : Phuoc Tuy Province showing the location of 1st Australian Task Force

Historical Background

Psychological operations are not a new concept in warfare. Sun Tsu, a Chinese military strategist, stressed the value of destroying the enemy's will to fight through surprise, noise,

rumours of treason in high places and assassination. Psychological operations have been a feature of all major campaigns, certainly in more recently times, and extensive programmes were developed during both World Wars and in Korea. General Sir Walter Walker in his report on the Borneo operations said 'I arrived in Borneo with five principles of counter insurgency warfare. After one month I added a sixth principle, winning the hearts and minds of the people, especially the indigenous people. This was absolutely vital to the success of the operations, because by winning the people to your side, you can succeed in isolating your enemy from supplies, shelter and intelligence.' To be successful, the minds of the opposition must be won; it is not sufficient merely to defeat them in battle.

Prior to Vietnam the only Australian psychological operations capability was developed in the Second World War for use in the Pacific Islands, but those capability lapsed during the post war periods. The need for national policies on psychological warfare, developed between Department of External Affairs now the Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Defence, and applied as necessary by any or all of the fighting services, has been amply demonstrated by the British experience in Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Malaya and Borneo, and more recently in Anguilla. Their experience, which Australia does not appeared to have profited by, clearly shows the need for a psychological operations capability.²⁶

Early Psychological Operations

From 1965 to April 1970, a select number of Australian Army officers and soldiers were employed initially in an ad-hoc manner to conduct or coordinate psychological operations in the Australian tactical area of responsibility. In 1965, 1 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment Group was serving with the United States 173rd Airborne Brigade in Bien Hoa province and psychological warfare operations were jointly planned by the American and Australian forces but these operations were carried out exclusively by the American servicemen. When the Australians increased their forces in 1966 and the Task Force was

²⁶ Australian War Memorial Series 102 [59]. op. cit., p 7-1 para 703 and 704

relocated to Phuoc Tuy province, psychological warfare continued to be planned and conducted on this ad-hoc basis. From 1968 to March 1970, the formal establishment of 1 Australian Task Force was increased to include a staff officer who was responsible for psychological operations. During this time, Australian forces continued to rely on and use the United States Army psychological warfare assets. On occasions, the Australian staff officers designed leaflets and voice tapes that were produced by the Americans and attached Vietnamese Army interpreters in support of Australian operations in Phuoc Tuy province. 1 Psychological Operations Unit was formed on 14 April 1970 from officers and soldiers serving in other Task Force units based at Nui Dat, South Vietnam.

Further Allied Build -up

In 1966 the Americans made heavy investments in building up the infrastructure of South Vietnam through political, social, and economic development. The earlier rural development and nation building projects, that is rural reconstruction, had failed primarily due to the lack of coordination and cooperation between the various American civilian agencies, such as the United States Mission and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and the government bureaucracy of the South Vietnamese government.

On 17 October 1967 a decision was made by the Australian government to raise the Australian Task Force to a three battalion task force with further supporting troops and tanks. This expansion was completed in 1968.²⁷ During the period 1966 to 1972 the United States Army supplied the Australians with the support services to sustain their operations in the field. These included heavy artillery to allow the Australians to operate and dominate areas beyond the range of the Australian 105 mm guns. American helicopters were provided to augment the Royal Australian Air Force's helicopter fleet that allowed a greater capability and flexibility to the Australian force in mobility and control of

²⁷ Ian McNeill & Ashley Ekins, *On The Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967 – June 1968*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003, pp. 245-250.

the province. Until 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit arrived in Vietnam in June 1967, US forces attached a civil affairs detachment to the task force that included a small number of psychological warfare operatives.²⁸

Throughout 1967 and 1968, 1 ATF psychological operations activity within Phuoc Tuy province was at a relatively low level when compared with that of the United States forces operating elsewhere in the country.²⁹

During 1968 the United States Vietnam policy changed from General Westmorland's 'War of Attrition' to General Creighton Abrams' 'One War Strategy'. Pacification, now called 'nation building', became an equal partner to conventional 'Big Unit' operations in a more synchronised and comprehensive effort. The strategy was to energise the South Vietnamese Pacification programme with the aim of building allegiance to the Government of South Vietnam by offering security to the population and to identify and defeat the Viet Cong infrastructure. In the period November 1968 to January 1969 the Accelerated Pacification Programme was carried out by the Americans and other Free World Military Assistance Forces which included Australia as part of the overall Allied force.³⁰

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) later changed to Civil Operations and Rural Development Support was controlled by William Colby of the Central Intelligence Agency and he developed a comprehensive plan for extending security to one thousand additional hamlets while simultaneously attacking the Viet Cong's political/military infrastructure. Colby had been the CIA Station Chief in Saigon from 1959 to 1962 and headed the agency's Far East division from 1962 to 1967 and from 1968 to 1971 he directed the United States Phoenix programme. The South Vietnamese version of this programme was called the Phuong Hoang programme. The Phoenix Programme was part of the Accelerated Pacification Programme (APP) and Phoenix was designed to

²⁸ McNeill & Ekins. 2003 pp. 189-190.

²⁹ Australian War Memorial Series 102 [59]. Op. cit., P 7-2 para 706

³⁰ William Egan Colby, *Lost Victor*, Contemporary Books Inc, Chicago, Illinois, 1989. p. 254.

neutralise the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The people attacked were those connected to the communist alternative government in civil or military administration of any North Vietnamese or Viet Cong units or those involved in tax collecting or who were political officers, recruiters and such like. Initially quotas of up to 1,800 VCI were to be eliminated or neutralised per month. The programme was an intelligence gathering exercise that produced enough evidence to arrest a suspect and bring them before a civil court for trial and sentencing. Colby felt that the programme was superior to the use of military force which he believed was too blunt an instrument and alienated many Vietnamese. Estimates of the number killed under Phoenix range as high as 60,000 people although Colby put the figure at 20,587. Phoenix has been defended on relativist grounds – the Viet Cong assassinated nearly 40,000 of their enemies, mostly government officials in the period 1957 to 1972. None of these arguments could prevent the programme from becoming a focal point of the burgeoning worldwide anti-war movement. Although Colby maintained that the deaths characteristically arose in combat and not as a result of cold-blooded murder, critics of Phoenix labelled it as an assassination programme and a crime against humanity.³¹ In August 1970 Phoenix Project became the Pentagon's number one psychological operation priority.³²

Concurrently, other South Vietnamese programmes conducted psychological operations to persuade the enemy to defect, that is return to the government under the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme which was a Viet Cong 'Open Arms' amnesty returnee programme that gave rewards and attempted to convince the people to support the Government of South Vietnam.

The Australians did not include a psychological operations unit in the Australian Task Force as none existed in the Australian Order of Battle at that time. Psychological operations in the form of voice air and ground broadcasts, plus air and ground leaflet

³¹ Colby, 1989, *ibid*, p. 331.

³² <http://www.rottent.com/library/bio/usa/william-colby/> p. 1 Retrieved 7 October 2005.

missions were supplied on an as-required basis through planning and tasking requests that were sent to the next higher headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) (US).

In the early part of 1969, an increase in psychological operations activity became necessary to support the involvement of 1 ATF in the American sponsored South Vietnamese Pacification and Development Campaign. This support was in the form of two United States ground teams, which were equipped for loud speaker, film and slide propaganda. Leaflet drops and airborne voice broadcasts were ordered and carried out by the United States Air Force assets.³³

United States military psychological warfare operators from 246 Psychological Operations Company (246 POC) and later from 6 Psychological Operations Battalion (6 POB) detached two small mobile teams, HB Loudspeaker and HE Audio Visual Teams,³⁴ to the Australian Task Force to provide a number of services in support for military operations and civil action projects. These included airborne voice missions, airborne leaflet dropping missions as well as ground broadcasts in support of operations including cordon and search. These American experts also assisted United States, Vietnamese and Australian Civil Action programmes and projects. Controlling the movement of Vietnamese civilians during the conduct of military operations close to the border of proclaimed 'non civilian access' areas and villages became an important issue for Australian commanders. The local villagers were warned in numerous loud speaker broadcasts about not entering designated 'non civilian access' areas as they could be accidentally killed. The restricted areas were designed to allow the civil populace to enter during the hours of daylight and were designated and promulgated by the Province Chief. Areas outside these were jungle areas

³³ Australian War Memorial Series 102 [59]. Op.cit., P 7-2

³⁴ United States Army Field Manual FM 33-5. Psychological Operations – Techniques and Procedures, January 1974. The United States military had a system of identifiers that demonstrated the cellular concept of their force structure. Cellular teams can be added or deleted without radically altering the overall organisation of the unit. Three elements are required to structure a force. They are the structure of the force, that is - command and control, supply and maintenance teams and operational teams. For example a United States Psyops HB team is a self contained field based loudspeaker team that supports troops in the field by broadcasting appeals to the enemy. A HE psyops team is a self contained audio visual field team.

and were aggressively patrolled by Australian and South Vietnamese forces. The Australians had two objectives. The first was to try and separate the Viet Cong from their source of recruitment, taxation and food re-supply in the villages. The second was to ensure that there was a buffer zone around these civilian access areas where the Australian forces would expect no innocent civilians to be, and therefore became 'free fire zones' to military forces. Such areas were aggressively patrolled and shelled. On at least one occasion these warnings were not heeded and a civilian walking in a well publicised non-civilian access area carrying a garden hoe over his shoulder was shot and killed because he was in a no-go zone (proclaimed non-civilian access area) and his hoe was mistaken for a rocket propelled grenade (RPG). Generally Australian combat soldiers operated in the jungle regions of Vietnam outside the designated normal 'civilian access' areas with the intention of locating and fighting with the Viet Cong. On a number of occasions, the Australian forces were involved in cordon and search operations or when the South Vietnamese forces needed assistance, such as during the Viet Cong Tet offensive of 1968, the Australians entered the provincial capital of Baria to assist in expelling the entrenched Viet Cong. Other operations involving Australian soldiers related to Civil Affairs operations such as medical and dental treatment, engineer construction projects and agricultural and infrastructure support. These operations were similar to operations carried out in Malaya under the British banner 'Aid to the Civil Power'. Broadcasts were conducted by the Australians to supplement and support the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information, Village Information Service (VIS) teams when it was beyond their capability. The showing of films in schools was another task conducted by the psychological field teams. The general theme of the films was health. The films in the form of cartoons used Vietnamese characters and dialogue and were produced by Walt Disney Corporation. Australian Commanders at most operational levels became more aware of the importance of the use of psychological operations to communicate with the local Vietnamese and to influence them to support the South Vietnamese Government.

Early Australians Army Experience in Psychological Warfare

Australian soldiers who had served in Korea had some experience of psychological warfare as conducted by the United States military as part of the United Nations forces. The US Army Far East Command's small Special Projects Branch of the Headquarters G-2 (Intelligence) Division began radio broadcasts and leaflet drops over the Republic of South Korea immediately after North Korea's invasion across the 38th Parallel in June 1950. Later during the fall of that year, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived in South Korea. This unit served as the 8th Army's tactical psychological warfare unit to the end of the war in 1952. The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company used both vehicle and aircraft-mounted loudspeakers to broadcast its messages. However, leaflet drops remained the favoured medium used by the US Army to influence the enemy and the themes used in them were along the lines of the 'Happy POW' 'Good soldier-bad leaders,' 'surrender and you will be well treated,' 'we can crush you,' and nostalgia for home, family and women.³⁵

The Menzies government increased the size of the Australian military force in Vietnam from one to two battalions. Menzies retired on 26 January 1966 and Harold Holt took over. The Australian military group was reconstituted as a task force group on 8 March 1966, but there was no suggestion of attaching a psychological operations unit to it. When operating with the Americans, the battalion had access to the United States psychological warfare experts who conducted broadcasts from voice aircraft and dropped propaganda leaflets over areas where the Viet Cong was believed to be operating. When the Australian Task Force was redeployed from Bien Hoa area to Phuoc Tuy province during April to June 1966,³⁶ the intelligence staff officers on the headquarters continued to call on American forces to provide tactical and civil psychological operations.

Phuoc Tuy province had long been a centre of strong anti-government feeling from the times of French colonialism and contemporary reports predicted that it would probably

³⁵ <http://www.psywarrior.com/KoreaPSYOPHist.html>. Retrieved November 2005.

³⁶ Frank Frost, *Australia's War in Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney, 1987, p. 78.

remain so regardless of the complexion of the government in Saigon. The province supported the Viet Minh and had remained united against the French colonial power between 1945 and 1954. Since then, the changing governments in Saigon, especially that of Ngo Dinh Diem, did little to assist the province population. An intelligence report prepared by the Americans and published in 1970 explains the basis for the anti-French mood of the South Vietnamese.

This distrust of the French and the Saigon administration was accounted for by the population consisting almost entirely of rice growing peasants who resented the affluence enjoyed by the Saigon upper class who were seen motoring through their province to Cap Saint Jacques (Vung Tau) in their imported cars every weekend. The intelligence report said that until a Vietnamese middle class emerged within the province, the existing distrust would probably continue and that while such feelings exist, the communists had a fertile breeding ground in which to sow their ideology.³⁷

This is the province that the Australians would operate in for the next five and a half years.

The Australian Defence Force currently divides psychological operations into four categories which are strategic, operational, tactical and consolidation.³⁸

Strategic psychological operations are directed at the total population, both military and civilian, in the area of operations under enemy, neutral and friendly control.³⁹ In Vietnam the strategic level was controlled by the United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in Saigon. Australia, New Zealand and Thailand, and to a degree the Philippines, placed their troops under General Westmorland's operational command and

³⁷ Untitled Intelligence document in writer's possession. Believed to be written in 1970 and published later as a Confidential Training Information Bulletin. Came into the writer's possession when he served as Intelligence Sergeant in 4 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion in Vietnam 1971. Copy lodged in the de Heer Special Collection UNSW Library at ADFA.

³⁸ Australian Defence Force Publication: *Operational Series ADFP 25 Psychological Operations* Canberra. 1995.

³⁹ Australian Army. *Division in Battle: Pamphlet 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare*. 1965, p 59.

that of his subordinate American tactical commanders. These arrangements were heavily qualified by the limits imposed by the Allied governments on the use of their troops in this type of warfare. Each country kept close watch over its contingent and negotiated with MACV the exact extent of the participation by its forces in combat. The political effects of heavy casualties in South Vietnam were a big concern to the Australian government. It was reluctant to have its soldiers engaged in risky offensive operations and insisted they be kept out of internationally sensitive areas such as the Vietnam – Cambodian border region. Lieutenant General John Wilton, Chief of the General Staff, held lengthy negotiations with Westmorland early in 1966 and agreement was reached for the Australians and New Zealanders to operate in their own area in Phuoc Tuy province.⁴⁰ MACV claimed that this was an area that large enemy main – force units rarely entered and that the Australians could be engaged in protecting the important highway passing through the province and holding down the local VC guerrilla forces.⁴¹ These comments fail to reveal the increased enemy activity in the province up until December 1965. (See the section on *Phuoc Tuy Province Prior to Australians Entering It* later in this chapter.)

Tactical psychological operations are directed solely at the enemy armed forces or civilians located in the fighting zone or in the area of projected tactical operations.⁴² These were the planned activities to support the conflict as decided upon by the superior headquarters. The 1st Australian Task Force reported to HQ II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFV).⁴³ Operational psychological warfare was carried out by in-country psychological warfare operators and it was designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians in areas where operations are planned or conducted. Objectives were developed by operational level commanders and were designed to conform to the strategic directions related to the conduct of the war. Psychological operations at the operational level were aimed to lower enemy morale and in the conduct of operations within a theatre of operations. Tactical

⁴⁰ Graham A. Cosmas. *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation 1962 -1967*, US Printing Service, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 344. I. McNeil, *To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1993, pp. 194-201.

⁴¹ Cosmas, 2006, *ibid.* pp. 344 - 345.

⁴² Australian Army. *Division in Battle: Pamphlet 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare*. 1965, p 60.

⁴³ McNeill, 1993, *op.cit.*, p. 196.

psychological operations were actions that brought psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians in support of the tactical military ground, air and sea operations. Examples of these were operations, such as cordon and searches of villages and hamlets, airborne and land based leaflet distribution and airborne and land based loudspeaker broadcasts. These measures were designed as the means for demoralising the enemy combat forces and also to persuade the enemy to switch support from the communist side to the government in Saigon.

Consolidation psychological operations were directed directly entirely against the civil population in both forward and rear areas, with the purpose of supporting military operations by influencing and gaining the cooperation of civilians in the rear of, or adjacent to the fighting zone.⁴⁴ Psyops carried out in counter insurgency operations will inevitably touch upon political questions. Consequently all psyops must be in complete conformity with government policy; no promises, threats, or statements can be made which diverge to the smallest degree from the laid down political directives.⁴⁵

The most precious propaganda asset of the established government is its credit in the eyes of the people. That credit can only be preserved by strict adherence to the truth. This is a practical consideration, not merely a moral one. Distortion of the truth for a short term advantage will, if the truth becomes known, undo the good work of the whole programme as the simplest peasant will draw the conclusion that the government lacks the confidence in its cause and so the long term results will be disastrous. ... An understatement is better than an overstatement.⁴⁶

Many of these were nation building operations to support pacification objectives as espoused by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) located at the MACV Headquarters.⁴⁷ In Vietnam these operations were used in support of the military civil action projects and contributed to the economic and social development of the civilians' lives such as advertising the availability of free medical and dental treatment and integrated civil action projects including the building of schools, roads and water reticulation systems

⁴⁴ Australian Army. *ibid*, p 60.

⁴⁵ Australian Army. *Division in Battle: Pamphlet 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare*. 1965, p 61.

⁴⁶ Australian Army. *Ibid*, p 59.

⁴⁷ Ian McNeil & Ashley Ekins, 2003. *op.cit*, p. 17.

for the villagers. The teams were also used to support the Vietnamese Information Service in making broadcasts to the civil population concerning conduct of the curfews imposed by the Province Chief with support from Australian forces and Vietnamese officials in the province. The night time curfew was from 7.00 pm to 6.00 am the next day. The civil populace was banned from entering most of the rural areas outside the villages in the province during the night while other areas were closed to them at all times. If they entered these areas they ran the risk of being killed by Australian and South Vietnamese forces. The non-civilian access areas were designated military as free fire zones (FFZ), that is, anyone in these areas was to be considered Viet Cong or as Viet Cong sympathisers or their suppliers. Other messages were broadcast relating to safety and security that affected the local populace. These included broadcasts warning about the danger of mines, raising awareness of military vehicle traffic and maintaining purity of river water for drinking. When the Australian task force assumed tactical responsibility for specified areas in Phuoc Tuy province in June 1966, it was realised that there was a need to have specialists to undertake operational psychological work associated with combat operations and to work in the areas of civil affairs and military civic action. It can be said that much of the work undertaken by 1 Psychological Operations Unit could be described in part as political warfare in that it was conducted with the aim of shifting the villagers' support from the Viet Cong to the government in Saigon.

Topography of Phuoc Tuy Province

Phuoc Tuy province is one of eleven provinces comprising III Corps Tactical Zone. Phuoc Tuy province is located forty kilometres by air and 110 kilometres by road southeast of the city of Saigon. Binh Tuy, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa and Gia Dinh provinces border the province to the north east, north and west (see maps on p. 37, p 44 and p.45).⁴⁸ An area

⁴⁸ National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA) - RG 472. Records of the United States Forces in South East Asia. Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Office of Civil Operations for Rural Development Support. Records and Analysis Directorate, Analysis Division. *Province Profiles with Vu-graphs, 1972*. Report prepared by CORDS for the US Ambassador in November 1972.

called the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), contained extensive mangrove swamps extend into the south western portion of the province with the South China Sea laying along its southern border. The island of Long Son is located in the Rung Sat. The main highway from Saigon through the province to the main sea port of Vung Tau is highway QL-15. The secondary main road, QL 2 (referred to as Route 2 by Australian forces), ran north from the province capital into Long Khanh province to the province capital Xuan Loc. In 1966, the population of the province was approximately 100,000 and they resided mainly in the fertile area between the Nui Dinh and Long Hai mountains.⁴⁹ These two mountain ranges together with the Nui Thi Vai Mountains and those located at the tip of the Vung Tau peninsula (Cap St Jacques) form the most dominant geological aspects of the (Phuoc Tuy/Vung Tau) province. The province was divided into five districts, Long Le where the province capital Baria is located, Duc Thanh, Long Dien, Dat Do and Xuyen Moc. The province average length is approximately fifty kilometres and its average depth is approximately forty kilometres, with a total land area of some 1958 square kilometres.⁵⁰ Almost the entire population is made up of Vietnamese with a small percentage of Chinese shop owners and businessmen in the towns of Baria, Long Dien, Dat Do and the city of Vung Tau. Phuoc Tuy contained a native (Montagnard) population of approximately 2,500 people and they were located mainly in the northern district of Duc Thanh. The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) called these mountains the Minh Dam Secret Zone and they are located south-southeast of the province capital Baria.⁵¹ The major river systems are the Song Rai in the East and the Suoi Gui Hop in the west.

The beaches of Cap St Jacques and Long Hai village area in the province had become the French recreational area in the south until 1941 when the Japanese entered Vietnam at Vung Tau and the coastal village of Phuoc Hai. The Vichy French government allowed Japanese forces to occupy all of French Indochina and in 1945 French forces rebelled against the Japanese leading to all the French officials being displaced. When the Japanese

⁴⁹NARA, *ibid*, n.p.

⁵⁰ Australian Army Journal, Volume V, Number 1. *The 'Red Rats' and Phuoc Tuy. Department of Defence. p. 135.*

⁵¹NARA, *ibid*, n.p.

occupation ended, the defenders, led by a local hero Minh and his deputy Dam,⁵² (committed nationalists with the Viet Minh) occupied former Japanese strongholds in the Long Hai hills. Armed with the discarded Japanese weapons and inspired by the desire for independence, the dissidents prepared to fight the returning French forces.⁵³ Following the withdrawal of the Japanese, Phuoc Tuy was occupied by the Indian military forces of the British Army whose garrisons were tasked with maintaining the status quo while reoccupation by the French was organised. The Vietnamese Nationalists reacted strongly to this new foreign presence and started fighting them from bases in the Long Hai Mountains (the NLF later named it the Minh Dam Secret Zone after two Viet Minh heroes Minh and Dam who had been killed earlier). By 1947, the French had re-established their governmental and military presence in Phuoc Tuy province. Shortly after this, hostilities broke out between the French and the nationalist Viet Minh in the north and the nationalists renewed their attacks on the French in Phuoc Tuy province. The Viet Minh received a great deal of popular support and were soon in control of most of the villages east of Long Dien.⁵⁴ The French, unprepared for a guerrilla war, were soon reduced to building defensible forts in the major villages of Dat Do, Long Dien and the coastal village of Phuoc Hai. Before long only large heavily armed groups of French forces could move successfully east of Long Dien. The French left Phuoc Tuy province almost immediately after the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954 and during the one hundred day truce that followed the signing, many northerners mainly Catholics came to settle in the districts of Duc Thanh in the north of the province and Dat Do district which is east of the provincial capital Baria. The state of North Vietnam was established at this time with expectation that the northern half of the country would be rejoined to the South in due course. The population of the Catholics that settled in Binh Gia village in Duc Thanh District numbered 8,000.⁵⁵ The South Vietnamese Army assumed control of the old French garrisons and peace came to the province and lasted until 1958. In that year the suspension of National elections brought the underground political elements back to the surface and these

⁵² McNeill, 1993, op. cit, p. 213

⁵³ McNeill, 1993. loc. cit.

⁵⁴ Frost, op.cit. p.35.

⁵⁵ McNeill, 1993. op.cit, p.215

reappeared under the name National Liberation Front (communists), or Viet Cong. Viet Cong, a contraction of *Cong San Viet Nam* (Vietnamese communists) was the term applied by President Diem to the South Vietnamese protesting at his government. Intended initially as a pejorative, it cast all dissidents in the same mould and deliberately ignoring the fact that opposition to Diem's rule was not just restricted to one political party the National Liberation Front which was controlled by the *Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam* – The Vietnam Workers Party, or communist party, based in Hanoi.⁵⁶ With widespread popular support and abundant aid from the north, the NLF preformed well and by 1963 most of Phuoc Tuy province was in control of the communist units. The Long Hai Mountains again became the stronghold for the Viet Cong units and remained that way with only minor incursions until after the withdrawal of the Americans and Australians in 1973.⁵⁷ The Long Hai Mountains and the May Tau Mountains in the north-east of the province were the two main base areas for the communist local forces and the NVA. These two areas would become the most difficult for the Australians and other forces to penetrate and control.

The economy of the province is based upon agricultural production and related agricultural related industries. Major cultivated crops included rice, rubber, peanuts and corn. Minor crops were manioc, sweet potatoes, fruits such as bananas and pineapples, pepper, sugarcane, vegetables and coffee. Rubber plantations were scattered throughout the central and northern areas of the province, three largest being the French owned Gallia plantation at Binh Ba, the Courtenay plantation with its headquarters at Cam My in Long Khanh province, and the Vietnamese owned plantation around Nui Dat within which the Australian Task Force was based. Neither the Nui Dat plantation nor other plantations which were located in Viet Cong controlled areas of the province were being worked by rubber tappers, and subsequent loss of income to owners was reimbursed by war claims payments.⁵⁸


⁵⁶ McNeill, 1993. op.cit., p. 494, endnote 8.

⁵⁷ NARA, *Province Profile*, op.cit., n.p..

⁵⁸ Australian Army Journal, Volume V, Number 1. *The 'Red Rats' and Phuoc Tuy. Department of Defence. P. 138.*

Old Base Areas

In the early days of the conflict the Viet Minh named a large part of Bien Hoa and Phuoc Tuy 'War Zone D'. The area took in the western and southern part of Phuoc Tuy province. This had no relationship to the United States defined area of the 1965-67 War Zone D.



Map 4 : Changing Viet Minh boundaries within Phuoc Tuy province post 1945 and prior to 1965.⁵⁹

In this zone the Viet Cong built a number of base areas or “Secret Zones” into which the French forces rarely ventured unless escorted by a large mobile force. The two most important areas were the Hat Dich in the northwest of the province and the Minh Dam in the south. The Viet Minh had built many camps above and below ground in this area, and had militarily and politically secured nearby hamlets and villages to ensure the provision of food from their agricultural resources. In this period the Hat Dich extended from Route

⁵⁹ Untitled Intelligence document in writer's possession. [Believed to be written in 1970 and published later as a Confidential Training Information Bulletin. Came into the writers possession when he served as Intelligence Sergeant in 4 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion in Vietnam 1971. Copy lodged in the de Heer Special Collection UNSW Library at ADFA.

QL15 in the west to Route 2 in the east and from Nui Dinh – Nui Thi Vai Mountains in the south to the province border in the north. From 1966 to 1970 the Australian military attempted to reclaim and pacify the area by destroying base camps and by clearing as much of the jungle as possible to destroy the communist communication tracks and trails. This jungle clearance was carried out by Australian engineers using large bulldozers called ‘Roman Ploughs’ and by the US spraying of defoliants in some areas.⁶⁰ Agent Orange is the best known of the chemical contained as an agent in the defoliation programme to destroy jungle cover, hidden crops and other vegetation during the war. Herbicides were authorised for use in Vietnam by the Americans in 1961 to improve waterway visibility and clear military base camp perimeters. Between 1962 and 1964 the US military experimented with Agent Green, Agent Pink and Agent Purple. In 1965, Agent Orange and Agent White replaced the previous agents and the Americans began to use herbicides in larger amounts as the war escalated. Agent Blue the only agent not derived from phenoxyacetic acid was used in all phases of the war. All these herbicides were named after the colour-coded bands around the 55 US gallon (Australian 44 gallon) drums which contained them.⁶¹ Volume 2 Appendix 1 indicates the type and amount of defoliants dropped over Vietnam. When some seasons were dryer, the peasant farmer declared that their lack of production was due to the Americans spraying Agent Orange. These complaints by the peasantry were capitalised on by the Viet Cong and they produced propaganda aimed at discrediting the ‘American imperialists’. These complaints had to be dealt with by the Australians intelligence, civil affairs and psychological operations ground team commanders. No direction or policy was given to psyops personnel as to what they may say other than that it was a drought year.

The defoliation programme ran from January 1961 to February 1971. Exposure to these chemicals was as constant a fear factor as it exposed their base areas as was being exposed

⁶⁰ Frost, op.cit, p. 83

⁶¹ Clark Smith & Don Watkins. *The Map Book: A Self Guide to Herbicide exposure*, 1981, From the White Water Archives, Agent Orange Vietnam Veterans Advisory Committee, Berkley California, USA.

to direct or harassment and interdiction artillery.⁶² This jungle clearing or 'land clearing' as it was called by defoliation and land clearing by bulldozers called Roman Ploughs, rendered the Hat Dich untenable for large Viet Cong Main Force (MF) units to hide and operate in, but the Viet Cong still operated in smaller groups, sub-units or in village guerrilla units in these areas. The Minh Dam Secret Zone once included the greater part of Long Dien, Dat Do and the area to the south enclosed by Route 44. By the middle of 1970, the Australians were further able to reduce the zone to the southern portion of the Long Hai hills. These hills were honeycombed with caves and caverns many of which had subterranean water supplies and had been occupied by Viet Minh when fighting the French and by the Communist Cadre and Viet Cong forces when fighting western forces after the French departure. The hill complex has been shelled, rocketed, bombed and assaulted by South Vietnamese, American and Australian forces on numerous occasions, but it always remained a sanctuary for Viet Cong District forces, cadre and guerrilla units. The Long Hai Viet Cong defences that were maintained continually remained a veritable death trap for the unwary and unskilled opposing soldiers who ventured there.⁶³

Phuoc Tuy Province Prior to Australians Entering it.

Viet Cong Forces in the South were gradually implementing the 1963 Ninth Plenum directives of the Lao Dong's First Central Committee to intensify their military effort to bloody the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam so as to erode the principal pillar of the unstable government and to roll back pacification.⁶⁴ The Party Secretary, General Troung Chinh, criticised those '*who do not yet believe in the correctness of this political programme and in the policy of peaceful reunification of the country*'.

⁶² Smith & Watkins, *ibid*, n.p.

⁶³ Untitled Intelligence document, *op. cit*, n.p.

⁶⁴ Cosmas, *op.cit*. pp. 193-194.

The typical tactics the Viet Cong employed were to besiege a strategic hamlet or government outpost, then ambush the relieving unit, usually with a superior force fighting from carefully prepared positions. Another less frequent tactic was to use larger forces, that is battalion or above in strength, to seize a village or district town and then stand their ground for one or two days against attacking ARVN or Regional Force elements. These actions cost the government heavily in troop numbers. Government casualties rose from an average of 1900 per month at the beginning of 1964 to 3000 at the end of the year. The Viet Cong also suffered heavy casualties, but the overall loss ratio shifted steadily against the Saigon forces.⁶⁵

In December 1965, in and around the resettled northerners' Catholic village of Binh Gia in the north of Phuoc Tuy province (the Viet Cong called the area Hop Tac), two Main Force Communist Regiments entered the village and set up defensive positions in an attempt to hold and control the village. These main force troops had recently acquired heavier weapons and had replaced their old French, Japanese and captured American weapons with newer copies of the excellent Soviet automatic assault rifle, the AK-47. These newer weapons fired the same 7.62mm cartridge. They were also abundantly equipped with mortars, anti-tank rocket launches and recoilless rifles. With the introduction of these Communist-bloc weapons, the Viet Cong standardised their infantry armaments and increased their firepower.⁶⁶ These troops remained to fight the government troops who came to retake the village. In a series of battles between 28 December 1965 and 3 January 1966 the Viet Cong destroyed a battalion of South Vietnamese marines and another of Rangers, killed almost two hundred government troops and five US advisors, captured more than three hundred individual and crew-served weapons, and shot down two helicopters. III Corps mounted a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in response, but failed to engage the withdrawing communist forces. Many of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam senior officers believe that this action presaged a Viet Cong advance

⁶⁵ Cosmas, loc.cit. p.194.

⁶⁶ Cosmas, 2006, loc.cit, p.193.

from guerrilla warfare to large scale operations.⁶⁷ This is an example of the operations in the period before the Australians moved into the province.

Psychological Operations Terminology

To understand psychological operations the terms used need to be clarified. The terms ‘psychological operations’ and ‘psychological warfare’ are often used interchangeably to identify an activity or function as old as human conflict or intercultural group relations. Both terms, however, are known to be of relatively recent origin. Psychological warfare was first used in 1920 and psychological operations in 1945.

The British military analyst and historian, J. F. C. Fuller, is believed to have been the one who coined the term ‘psychological warfare,’ when in 1920, in a scholarly analysis of lessons learned during World War I, especially as these related to the employment of such new weapons as armour, he allowed his mind to wander imaginatively about the character of the future battlefield. In his treatise on tanks he prophesied that traditional means of warfare, as then known and understood, might in time be replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not used or battlefields sought. ... but [rather] ... the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.⁶⁸ Fuller's employment of the term is believed to have been the earliest recorded use of the phrase and there is thought to be no direct connection between his use and the widespread adoption of it by Americans on the eve of World War II. The British did not adopt the term to describe what both they and the Americans hesitated to describe as propaganda operations. Instead of employing the term ‘PsyWar’, the British adopted the term ‘political warfare’ to describe those activities that Americans came to identify in time as psychological warfare or Psywar. Since World War II the British have

⁶⁷ Cosmas, 2006, loc.cit, p.194.

⁶⁸ J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918* London: Murray, 1920, p. 320.

followed American practice and now use the term 'PSYWAR' to describe the activities they previously identified as political warfare. The earliest recorded use of the term 'psychological warfare' in an American publication occurred in January 1940 when an article entitled 'Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It' appeared in a popular American journal.⁶⁹

The earliest recorded use of the term 'psychological operations' occurred early in 1945 when Captain (later Real Admiral) Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy, employed the term in an operation plan designed to hasten the surrender of Japan. Without any description or explanation, the term was used in the context 'All psychological operations will be coordinated both as to times and trends in order to avoid reduction of effectiveness of this main operation'.⁷⁰ The next use of the term occurred in 1951 when the Truman Administration renamed an interagency strategy committee giving it the title Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. Neither in 1945 nor in 1951 did the use of the term 'psychological operations' create so much as a ripple of interest. Although the Department of the Army made the change in 1951, it was not until the 1960s that psychological operations came to supplant psychological warfare as the all-inclusive term in common use. Any explanation of this development must take into account the fact that Americans have become increasingly concerned about the continued use of a term that includes the word 'warfare' to describe an activity that was directed at friends and neutrals as much or more than to hostile or potentially hostile people. In the late 1960s, with the widespread use of psychological operations in Indochina, emphasis was placed upon the need to integrate PSYOPS with other training and operations and upon the reinforcement which other missions could lend to psychological operations. The psychological objective of military assistance and civic action, for example, were more fully stressed in these operations.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Anon., Psychological Warfare and How To Wage It, *Current History and Forum*, LI January 1940, pp. 52-53.

⁷⁰ Ellis M. Zacharias, Capt. USN., *Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer*, New York, G. P. Putnam's & Sons, 1946, p. 345.

⁷¹ This Essay was originally published in *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Volume One, US Department of the Army, April 1976.

Psychological operations and psychological warfare are now part of what is referred to as Information Operations (IO).

CHAPTER 2

Australian Entry into Phuoc Tuy Province and the Early Use of Psychological Operations

We cannot win in the short run if we do not understand his method. We cannot win in the long run if we do not understand the world in which he fights. Behind him lie many years of success. We must know why.


*Roger Hilsman
Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs*

*The King's Law Bows to Village Custom
(Phep Vua thua le lang)*

Ancient Vietnamese Proverb

Move to Phuoc Tuy Province

The Australian military entered Phuoc Tuy province in 1966 and established a base at Nui Dat (Vietnamese topographical name meaning small hill) north of the province capital Baria and directly north of the pro-communist village of Hoa Long. From 1966 through 1971, the Australian Task Force was involved in all aspects of counter revolutionary and unconventional warfare while operating against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army main force units, district and local guerrilla units and the Viet Cong Infrastructure. With the growth in strength, and the increased training and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force forces, Australian forces were used as a barrier for keeping the enemy Main Force units away from the populated areas of the villages and towns. When the Australians entered the province, it could have been described as being under complete communist control. The only area that was then under the control of the Saigon government was the narrow strip of territory linking the coastal city of Vung Tau in the south, north along Route 15 to Baria as shown in the map below.



Map 5 : Map of Phuoc Tuy in May 1966 showing the South Vietnamese Government controlled areas.⁷²

Initial Australian Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

The first Australian officer to be responsible for conducting combined psychological operations and civil affairs in the Australian base at Nui Dat was Major John Donohoe, an intelligence corps officer who arrived at the headquarters of 1 Australian Task Force on 14 May 1966 and was appointed as the task force civil affairs and psychological operations officer. Donohoe took over from Captain Bob Rooney (Intelligence Corps) who commanded a group of former Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) soldiers who had been conducting one-off civil action projects in parts of South Vietnam.⁷³

⁷² Untitled Intelligence document, n.p.

⁷³ Ian McNeill. *The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam 1962-1972*, Australian War Memorial Canberra, Australia, 1984, pp. 232-233.

Donohoe reported that he had to 'beg and borrow' a total of six soldiers from various ATF units.⁷⁴ This figure varied from time to time and it was not until June 1967 that personnel were unofficially posted to an established civil affairs detachment and psychological operations section of 1 ATF. The second in command of the Australian Task Force civil action team was US Army Captain, Dick Church, from Augusta, USA. The team was a combined Australian-American one headed by Major Donohoe who believed that in order to gain the respect and confidence of the local people it was necessary for him to demonstrate that the Army was able to conduct both civil affairs work as well as engage in military operations. To the local people, most soldiers dressed in jungle greens and driving Land Rovers were considered as military personnel and therefore some other means had to be found to identify Donohoe's group as civil affairs operatives. To help the local people identify the civil affairs soldiers, he had a pennant designed to be flown from Land Rovers engaged in civil affairs work. The colours were the same as on the South Vietnamese National Flag with the top half red and the bottom half yellow with the letters WHAM (acronym for Winning Hearts and Minds) printed in the middle. It was also identification to the Australian soldiers that the vehicle and its occupants were engaged in civil affairs programmes.



Photograph 1 : Winning Hearts and Minds Pennant.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey: *The Australian Army and the Vietnam War: The Role and Impact of Civil Affairs*. The Chief of Army's Military History Conference 2002. p. 230.

⁷⁵ Australian War Memorial, Photographic reference REL/02091, Vehicle Pennant 'WHAM' (Winning Hearts and Minds). Retrieved March 2006.

Several pennants were made by a local Vietnamese woman whose husband had been killed by the Viet Cong. Within a month, Donohoe noted that 'each time the vehicle drove through the five separate villages in Phuoc Tuy province, the average stops initiated by the villagers was in the vicinity of eight.'⁷⁶ The villagers sought increasing aid from the Australian civil affairs section that extended it beyond its capacity. Australian army units were asked to assume certain areas of responsibility in civil aid and many soldiers devoted their one rest day to help the villagers by working on civic action projects. To maintain this support and to encourage the soldiers in the work, each participating unit was presented with a larger version of the pennant by the Australian Task Force Commander. These activities were designed to help and assist the people of the province as well as project a positive image of the Australian forces. This over time may translate to the villagers a positive image of their own government as all projects were completed in the name of the South Vietnamese government.



Photograph 2 : Brigadier Jackson Commander 1 Australian Task Force based at Nui Dat, South Vietnam presents a 'Winning Hearts and Minds' (WHAM) pennant to Captain Brian Stapleton, 1 Field Squadron Workshop in November 1966.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ AWM, Photographic reference REL/02091, loc. cit, Retrieved March 2006.

⁷⁷ Australian War Memorial web site www.awm.gov.au Photographic reference P014.033. Retrieved February 2006.

The pennant was used on Australian vehicles for over three months before enemy action against the Australians dictated its removal. Viet Cong snipers fired on the WHAM vehicles on four separate occasions, but no one was injured in these attacks. There was an attempt to destroy one of the vehicles by using a remote control detonated mine, but this failed through a malfunction.⁷⁸ On another occasion, a twelve year old boy handed a live hand grenade to Donohoe's Corporal interpreter and told him that he had been instructed to throw it into the vehicle with the red and yellow flag. The final action, that resulted in the Australian Task Force Commander ordering the removal of the pennants, was an ambush in the middle of Hoa Long village where an enemy group of five men used machine guns and rifles to attack a unit vehicle. The major and two others escaped by hiding in a ditch next to the road and this gave them cover from the small arms fire although Major Donohoe was wounded slightly. Some time later a prisoner and a returnee stated that the Viet Cong made a concentrated effort to 'remove' the vehicle with the little red and yellow flag.⁷⁹ This was a typical example of the VC attempts to disrupt activities that might persuade the villagers to support the South Vietnamese government or their allies in the Free World Military Assistance Forces. Part of the VC's attack on the unit was to place a price on the heads of the Australians in the unit. The sum of 20,000 piaster (about A\$200) for the death of a Corporal, 50,000 piaster (about A\$500) for Major Donohoe⁸⁰. These represented large amounts of money in Vietnamese society. Psychological operators, intelligence and Special Forces personnel such as Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) personnel were placed number one for assassination by the Viet Cong forces. Douglas Pike wrote in a JUSPA publication 'The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror' in February 1970:

Specifically there are fifteen types of South Vietnamese and FWMAF forces who come within the scope of the assassination programme. This 'Fifteen Categories' list has been frequently found among captured documents; the language varies slightly, but the following is a typical example:

⁷⁸ Australian War Memorial. AWM, Photographic reference REL/02091, loc. cit., Retrieved February 2006

⁷⁹ Australian War Memorial. *ibid.*

⁸⁰ Australian War Memorial. *ibid.*

- ‘1. Enemy personnel in fields of espionage, police, public security, special forces psywar, including covert organisations.
2. Members of reactionary political parties ...’⁸¹

The VC considered that the civil affairs and psyops activities were having some success and could have had a positive effect on the local villagers and may have led to the local inhabitants changing their allegiance from the communists to the South Vietnamese government.

An example of this concern can be found in captured documents that were sent to the Combined Document Exploitation Centre (CDEC). The translation carried out on the 11 April 1967 from documents captured on the 26 March 1967 stated in summary:

... (From a directive dated 30 December 1966) Plans for countering US/RVN Pacification Plan ... This is a most vicious plot of the US/RVN and is to be implemented in 1967. This plan is also aimed at setting up a security belt around Saigon to protect their military installations. To defeat this plot, the various units and organisations must implement the following tasks.

Conduct intensive propaganda activities to get the people to struggle against the US/RVN, and not to abide by any law or regulation prescribed by them.

Village guerrilla units, district units and concentrated units must formulate plans to keep track of pacification teams (which include psyops and civil affairs) (writers emphasis) and to eliminate them.

Tyrant spies must also be cut down.

Armed political struggles must be fomented to support the people of Strategic Hamlet ... which are to be pacified.

Do not take chances with the US/RVN. Careful plans are to be made. Rash actions are to be avoided. ...⁸²

Another typical communist report was found in captured documents on 26 February 1967 and translated on 2 March 1967 by CDEC stated:

⁸¹ Australian War Memorial Series 347, [198]. Douglas Pike, *The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror*, JUSPAO Saigon, February 1970. Pp29-30.

⁸² Captured Document (CDEC) Cong Truong 5 in Baria 27 April 1967, CDEC Log No. 05-1129-67, Item Number F034601071944 Record 433725. From the Vietnam Center and Archive Collection, Texas Tech University, USA. Downloaded 21 Feb 2009.

(Report prepared by political staff of the South Vietnam Liberation Army) ...on activities of Allied espionage and psywar agents. These agents were members of CIA, CIO, FBI, DIA, IV3, CARE etc ... and of RVN Central Intelligence Office, General Security Department, Military Intelligence Agents etc ... In addition to the RVN political parties, there were French, UK, Japanese, Korean and West German espionage networks.

(The document went on to reveal VC losses caused by the above agents. The document further stated the effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme)

...630 VC Cadre deserted with 311 weapons to allied units in 1965. In particular, 12 cadre members, among 620 men, reported with 18 weapons to Allied troops after killing 11 cadre.⁸³

Early Psychological Operations in Support of Offensive Operations

An early example of the use of psychological operations in support of Australian military operations can be seen in Operation 'Holsworthy' which was conducted in Phuoc Tuy province from 5 - 18 August 1966. The Australian units involved were 5 Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), 1 Armoured Personnel Squadron (1 Armd Sqn) (less one troop), a troop of engineers from the Field Squadron and 2 rifle companies of 6 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR). Attached were one light helicopter in direct support from 161 Reconnaissance Flight (161 Recce Flight) and one Iroquois helicopter from 9 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force (9 Sqn RAAF). The task was to conduct a cordon and search of the village of Binh Ba. Binh Ba was a three hamlet village covering an area of approximately one square kilometre. The perimeter of the village covered over six kilometres and its population at this time was approximately 2,300.⁸⁴ The subsequent intelligence summary issued by 1 Australian Task Force on the 12 August 1966 stated that 163 VC suspects were arrested. The results of the interrogations were that seventeen VC village guerrillas were discovered and handed over to the National Police for a more detailed interrogation. Ten of the captured, including eight deserters from the South Vietnamese Army who had worked actively for the Viet Cong, were taken to the Provincial

⁸³ Captured Document (CDEC) Report by Political Staff LA, HQ. 26 February 1966, CDEC Log No. 05-1511-67, From the Vietnam Center and Archive Collection, Texas Tech University, USA. Downloaded 5 Feb 2009. As can be seen by the reference to agencies and countries, the truth in propaganda does not have to be told. The main issue was FWMAF actions were hurting the VC and they planned to take action against them.

⁸⁴ McNeill, 1993, op.cit. p. 448.

Headquarters for further interrogation. Sixty-five were deemed to be Viet Cong sympathisers (VCS) who had collected food and money for them. A further twenty nine persons had been conscripted by the VC and these plus one other were deemed to be Hoi Chanh's' (returnees) under the National Chieu Hoi amnesty programme and they were evacuated to the province Chieu Hoi centre for indoctrination and rehabilitation. The remaining forty people were released back to their village as innocent civilians.⁸⁵ During this cordon and search the US psyops team had instigated safety and direction broadcasts from the air to inform the villagers to stay in their homes until further notification. The psyops ground team then instructed the villagers in what they were required to do. The psyops team moved throughout the village and continued to broadcast until all the villagers moved to the village centre where they were processed. Australian soldiers with Vietnamese assistance conducted searches of the village looking for VC hides and places where they may hide weapons and supplies.

Ever since the arrival of the Australians in the province on 5 June 1966, the Task Force had expanded considerable effort in the pacification of the village of Hoa Long by supporting the operations of the District Chief in providing armour, artillery and infantry support to the Regional Force and Popular Force units stationed in the village with a view to enhancing the security of the village, and by conducting civic action programmes in the village. Villagers from Long Phuoc were resettled in Hoa Long and Long Dien. The population of Hoa Long was recorded by a census in September 1966 as being 3756 people. Long Phuoc was used by the Viet Cong as a base area and safe haven and was extensively fortified and tunnelled. Some 1460 people were relocated to Hoa Long, which itself was also Viet Cong dominated.⁸⁶ The village of Long Phuoc was raised to the ground.

On the 30 October 1966 the Task Force cordoned Hoa Long village with two battalions (5 RAR and 6 RAR), 3 SAS Squadron, and 1st APC Squadron, and provided civil affairs and

⁸⁵ Headquarters 1 Australian Task Force Intelligence Summary dated 12/08/66.

⁸⁶ Captain Ian Hutchison, Australian Army Journal, Volume V, Number 1. *The 'Red Rats' and Phuoc Tuy. Department of Defence. p. 149.*

psychological operations support. This support was provided for both the civilians evacuated to the Province Interrogation Centre at Baria and to those civilians permitted to remain in Hoa Long. Every effort was made to display to the civilians that the action taken was for their own benefit. This action included medical treatment, dental treatment, provision of Vietnamese entertainment type movies and music, assistance in feeding arrangements, distribution of psychological leaflets, and the use of psychological operations audio broadcasts, aircraft and vehicles. Phuoc Tuy sector forces comprising an ARVN infantry battalion and other Vietnamese forces conducted a search of all dwellings in the village and arranged for the evacuation of selected villagers to the Province Interrogation Centre at Baria. It was assessed that this operation severely disrupted the Viet Cong infrastructure, but did not eliminate, despite the interrogation of 630 detainees which resulted in thirty eight Viet Cong, forty one Viet Cong suspects and eighteen draft dodgers being apprehended.⁸⁷

Australian Designed and American Produced Leaflets for use by 1 ATF

The following provides a brief account of how leaflets, pamphlets and posters were prepared by the Americans attached by 1 ATF for use by the Australians, before the Australians commenced printing their own. The leaflet shown below was designed specifically for use in persuading the enemy to surrender and receive prompt medical treatment and then be reintegrated into the South Vietnamese community.

⁸⁷ Australian Army Journal, Volume V, Number 1. *OP. CIT.*, pp. 150-151..




Figure 1 : US produced Australian designed Psyops leaflet number 246-273 ⁸⁸

The American 246 Psychological Operations Company (246 POC) printed 10,000 copies of this Australian designed leaflet for distribution by aerial dropping and distribution by hand among the villagers of Phuoc Tuy province. The leaflet depicted crossed Australian and South Vietnamese flags on one side and a picture of a wounded Viet Cong on the other. The text beneath the wounded guerrilla reads:

This is a picture of Pham Van Hung, a member of the Viet Cong 860th Battalion. He was captured in combat north of Ba Ria in Phuoc Tuy Province during the last week of May 1966. During the fighting, Hung was wounded in the thigh, but thanks to the excellent medical care he has received he is recovering nicely at the Australian field hospital. He has not been mistreated as Viet Cong propaganda would have you believe. The Australian forces are here to help destroy the Communists, but, at the same time, to help the Vietnamese people.

The illustration below shows a copy of a leaflet that was produced by the Americans to mark the arrival of the Australians in Phuoc Tuy province.

⁸⁸ Leaflet 246-273 is a 5 x 8 inch leaflet, which is black and white. The leaflet was retrieved 31 August 2005 from the Web Site www.psywarrior.com and from the PSYOPS LINKS page access the Australian Psyops in Vietnam pages. The compiler, SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret) has given permission to the writer to download these images and information from this WWW internet web site



Figure 2 : US produced Australian designed Psyops leaflet 246-352⁸⁹

The 246 POC printed 50,000 copies of this leaflet for distribution by aircraft and hand. The crossed flags were shown on one side and the message on the reverse side said:

We are members of the Australian Task Force. Our unit is operating with Vietnamese and other units to destroy the Viet Cong and their bases. While most of our units are busy defeating the Viet Cong, others are working on projects to help you.⁹⁰

The illustration on the leaflet shows an Australian soldier, wearing American styled version of an Australian army jungle hat making friends with Vietnamese village children and saying:

We come as friends. We are part of the Allied forces in Vietnam helping you achieve the inevitable victory over Communist aggression in your country. We want you to be able to lead a life of happiness free from the Viet Cong forever. Help us by providing any information about the Viet Cong.

A propaganda pamphlet is demonstrated in the following US-designed leaflet illustration. It shows Australian soldiers giving rice captured from local VC forces to Vietnamese

⁸⁹ Leaflet 246-352 is a 5 x 8 inch leaflet, which is black and white. The leaflet was retrieved 31 August 2005 from the Web Site www.psywarrior.com and from the PSYOPS LINKS page accesses the Australian Psyops in Vietnam pages.

⁹⁰ Leaflet 246-352 is a 5 x 8 inch leaflet, in black and white. The leaflet is held in the collection of SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Retired) and reproduced with his kind permission. See www.psywarrior.com.au. The leaflet was retrieved 31 August 2005

villagers. The Australian propaganda strategy was to demonstrate that the defeat of the VC could be to the advantage of the local villagers who would no longer have to support VC with rice and other village resources. The photographic image demonstrates to the villagers that the Australians had established their military force in the province, that they had interdicted the VC's supply line and the villagers benefited by receiving as a gift the rice seized by the Australians. The implication was that these villagers were the people from whom the VC troops seized the rice in the first place. More importantly, the leaflet emphasised the role of the Saigon government and reminded the villagers of their obligation to support that government as the means for enjoying a better life. It is believed the Australians prepared the message in consultation with the Americans and the 246 POC printed 50,000 copies of this leaflet.



Figure 3 : US produced, Australian designed, Psyops leaflet 246-11-67⁹¹

A translation of the leaflet follows:

Your friends the Australian soldiers have taken the rice that the Viet Cong forcefully took from you and are now returning it to the rightful owners. By supporting and

⁹¹ Leaflet 246-11-67 is a 5 x 8 inch leaflet, which is black and white. The leaflet is held in the collection of SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Retired) and reproduced with his kind permission. See www.psywarrior.com.au. The leaflet was retrieved 31 August 2005

helping the Australian soldiers you are helping your Government of Vietnam defeat the common enemy and bringing a better life to you and your loved ones.

It is not known who wrote the words for the leaflet, but it can be presumed to be an intelligence officer at the task force headquarters. Another more gruesome leaflet was produced by the Americans in large numbers (50,000 copies) warning VC soldiers of the death and destruction awaiting them from the Saigon government and Australian bombing and firepower. It shows an allied air strike with a dead Viet Cong in the foreground.



Figure 4 : US produced Australian designed Psyops leaflet 246-21-67⁹²

The translation of the message on the back of the leaflet reads as follows:

Attention Viet Cong Soldiers.

Attention Viet Cong Soldiers. You have witnessed just a small part of the death and destruction that await you soon. The mighty air power of the Government of Vietnam and Australian forces will destroy you and all you represent. Your only hope for survival is to rally to the Government of Vietnam at once. There can be no doubt in your mind as to the desolation that our air strikes bring, and they will continue with greater force each time until you are completely destroyed. You can save your life and the life of your comrades. Rally at once to the Government of Vietnam.

⁹² Leaflet 246-21-67 is a 5 x 8 inch leaflet in black and white. The leaflet is held in the collection of SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Retired) and reproduced with his kind permission. See www.psywarrior.com.au. The leaflet was retrieved on 31 August 2005

Another leaflet (Number 246-96-67) for which no electronic image was available has a long message on both sides addressed to the people of Hoa Long. Hoa Long was located close to the Australian Task Force and throughout the conflict maintained a strong communist support base. The 246 POC prepared 25,000 of the leaflets for distribution by aircraft and hand. The text on the back tells the people of the friendship of the Australians and how the village will prosper with their aid.

Before the Australians arrived in your village, the Viet Cong frightened you with stories telling how they would harm you and your family. In the months the Australians have been here you have seen that these stories were lies. Many of you have received rice and medical aid from the Australians and you have seen the projects they have begun to help your village. The schools your children attend have been repaired, a new market place is being built and your children have received school supplies from the Government. Many other projects are planned to help you further in the future. This should prove to you that your Government, aided by the Australians is making life better for you.

Leaflet 246-128-67 was a text leaflet entitled 'Movement' (no image available). The 246 POC printed 25,000 copies for distribution by aircraft and hand to the local citizens. The message was the same on both sides and tells the people not to fear the Australians and for them to report any complaint of damaged property so that they can be compensated.

You have nothing to fear from your friends who are the Government and Australian troops. The soldiers are here to help you get rid of the Viet Cong. We ask for your help and support. You should report any complaint of damaged property to your village officials. We sincerely apologize for this inconvenience. Soon the Viet Cong will be completely defeated and life will be much better for all of us.⁹³


A number of leaflets were dated 1968, but were actually printed in 1967 before the changeover to the 6 POB. The 246 POC printed the leaflets at the request of the 1st Australian Task Force, for example 25,000 copies of the leaflet 246-83-68 were printed for dissemination in the 1 ATF TAOR by aircraft and hand. The subject of the leaflet is resettlement to a safe area. The dissemination of the leaflet was to coincide with an

⁹³ Leaflet 246-128-67 is a 4 x 5 inch leaflet in black and white. The leaflet is held in the collection of SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Retired) and reproduced with his kind permission. See www.psywarrior.com.au. The leaflet was retrieved on 31 August 2005

operation to relocate villagers living in the areas known as Slope 30 and Hat Dich (see Map 3). The Viet Cong used the area of Xa Bang in the north of the province (known to them as Slope 30) for the bulk procurement of supplies coming in from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia and were carried by elements of Rear Services Group 4 (RSG 4). Additional supplies were obtained from the local populace and the area was also a key logistic centre for the network of walking tracks radiating from Slope 30 to 5 VC Division units and other Viet Cong provincial force bases. The presence of civilians in this area hindered the use of Australian artillery to support units in ‘hot’⁹⁴ contact with the Viet Cong when operating in this area. Such people were deemed to be living outside designated safe areas known as ‘civilian access areas’. The Australian Task Force conducted ‘Operation Ainslie’ from 31 August to 21 September 1967 in the northern area of the province. It was a combination of road route clearing, resettlement and ‘search and destroy’ operations. The people who were deemed to be ‘illegal residents’ in the area were to be relocated to this new area of the village of Binh Ba where houses were to be built by the Australians in a new hamlet known as Suoi Nghe. Highway QL 2 ran from the south to the north through Phuoc Tuy from the Province capital Baria in the south to Xuan Loc in Long Khanh province to the north. It was cleared for a distance of about 200 meters either side of the road from the Duc Thanh military headquarters and was intended to link up with 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment (US) (11 ACR) at the province border near the village of Cam My.⁹⁵ The extensive road side clearance was undertaken as the means for preventing surprise attacks on Australian vehicles and followed the pattern used during the Malayan Emergency. During this clearing of the sides of the road, a number of local houses and crops were destroyed as well as a number of extensive Viet Cong bunkers and trench systems in and around the vicinity of the road.

⁹⁴ ‘hot’ means an active shooting action.

⁹⁵ Ian McNeil, & Ashley Ekins, 2003, op.cit, p. 439.



Photograph 3 : Route QL 2 running north through Phuoc Tuy province. The area shown is Binh Ba rubber plantation looking north. The road has been cleared back for 100 to 200 metres as the means of deterring attacks from enemy forces.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Photograph supplied by Mr Graham Stone. Stone served as the unit photographer in 1 Psychological Operations Unit in 1970-71. c1971.

Suoi Nghe was a new hamlet built by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit (1 ACAU). This was not popular with the local populace.



Photograph 4 : An early aerial photograph of the new village Suoi Nghe at the time of development by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit⁹⁷ This is the aerial view of the newly constructed relocation village of Suoi Nghe just north of the Australian base at Nui Dat just before occupation by the illegal villagers transferred from 'Slope 30'. The frames were constructed in the port city of Vung Tau to the south and transported to this site. Apart from the improved housing, the villagers were balloted plots of land on which to grow food. The Australian government funded this project.

Many articles have been written about this resettled village. From a psychological operations point of view, it was a cultural and political failure. In February 1971, Lieutenant Colonel K Outridge wrote his end-of-posting report in which he observed that while there were numerous examples of successful civil action projects, there were also failures with consequent lessons to be learnt.⁹⁸ One of those failures he concluded was Suoi Nghe. Vietnamese have a strong connection to the land not unlike that of the Australian Aborigines. They live, work and are buried near their land and they greatly resent being forced to move away and to live in a western style urban setting. This mistake

⁹⁷ Australian War Memorial. AWM web site www.awm.gov.au photographic reference number P02060.016. Retrieved on 10 March 2006.

⁹⁸ Dennis & Grey, op.cit, 2002, p. 236.

was mainly due to the failure of staff officers at 1 ATF and other units to understand and connect with the essential elements of Asian culture. Another option was to distribute these 'illegal residents' to other villages, but this was opposed because they were associated with the Viet Cong. Grouping them in one new hamlet allowed the Vietnamese government officials to keep them under surveillance. 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit provided a great amount of assistance to this village. Later it was estimated that over 1,200 people were living at Suoi Nghe and the Vietnamese 626 Regional Force Company built a military post next to the village to protect it and deter the Viet Cong from having any contact with the occupants. Later this Regional Force unit had Australian advisors from AATTV attached to it.

Special Uses of Leaflets: Some Examples

At the request of 1 Australian Task Force the 246 POC printed 50,000 copies of leaflet 246-84-68 printed on 7 September 1967 for dissemination by aircraft and hand to warn the villagers living on hill known as Slope 30 of the curfew in the local jungles. It warned them that anyone found in the jungle after curfew would be considered to belong to the Viet Cong. An extension to Operation Ainslie (31 August to 21 September 1967) was ordered after the receipt of additional intelligence indicating that the enemy units 1 and 2 Battalion of 274 North Vietnamese Army Regiment would attempt to cross Route QL 2 from west to east. The Australian 2 and 7 RAR battalions were moved into blocking positions.⁹⁹

The results of the operation against the NVA units were that eighteen Viet Cong were killed in action, fourteen were wounded or escaped, and three were captured and handed to the South Vietnamese forces to be treated as prisoners of war. A number of weapons, some ammunition, supplies and equipment was captured and destroyed. There were 109 bunkers, 5 huts and 100 meters of trenches destroyed and a total of 130 persons embracing 34 families were re-housed in the village of Binh Ba, specifically in the hamlet of Suoi Nghe.

⁹⁹ McNeil & Ekins, 2003, op.cit, p. 439

Another 10,000 leaflets were printed by the 246 POC at the request of 1 Australian Task Force was leaflet 246-122-68 printed 22 September 67 for dissemination by hand that informed the Vietnamese that the Australians were patrolling in the area and that they were not to run away or hide when they saw Australian troops otherwise they would be considered Viet Cong and either shot at or made prisoner.

Leaflet 246-333-68 was printed on 9 November 1967 for the Australian Task Force. 100,000 of the leaflets were printed with the theme of 'Rally.' The leaflet depicts a photograph of a Viet Cong Guerilla on the front and text on the back:

Viet Cong Soldier

How long will this war last? President Ho says you must be prepared to fight another ten years. How old will you be in ten years? Can you face another ten years of bombing and shelling? Ten years in the jungles, ten years of hunger and disease, ten years without your family. Will your family remember you in ten years? They will not want an old sick man back. They want you now. Why not rally to the good life? We will help you to see your family again. They are waiting for you to come home. Don't wait any longer. Rally today.

Leaflet 246-353-68 was printed on 15 November 1967. 100,000 of the leaflets were printed with the theme of 'Rice Denial' for the Australian Task Force. Again, knowledge gained from the Malayan Emergency was used in trying to deny the Viet Cong access to local people who were supplying them with aid. The leaflet depicts a drawing of armed Viet Cong demanding rice from Vietnamese farmers on the front. The back is all text:

People of Phuoc Tuy

Soon it will be time to harvest the rice. The Viet Cong hiding in the jungle are hungry and need your rice. If you sell them rice they will stay in Phuoc Tuy and cause trouble. If you refuse to sell them rice they will leave Phuoc Tuy. Do not sell your rice to the terrorists but only to the government. Report any Viet Cong or agents who try to buy your rice. Let us drive the Viet Cong terrorists out of Phuoc Tuy.

Attached as Appendix 2 to Volume 2 is a list of known leaflets produced by the Americans and used by the Australians prior to the Psychological Operations Unit being formed in April 1970.¹⁰⁰

Use of Psychological Operations Teams in Cordon and Searches of Villages

When an operation to conduct a cordon and search of a village or hamlet was implemented, a psychological ground team accompanied the troops as they surrounded the village usually during the early hours of the morning. At first light or as the inhabitants started to stir, ground team operators broadcast instructions to the inhabitants to remain in their homes until instructed to do otherwise. On occasions, the Australian psyops teams and or Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) personnel accompanied by security teams, moved throughout the village informing the inhabitants when to move to the designated assembly area. While the inhabitants remained in their homes, a combined Australian–Vietnamese force that included National Police, Regional Force soldiers and military intelligence specialists entered the village. The force established reception and processing areas in the market place, school or a large cleared area. Australian forces, intelligence personnel and civil affairs workers such as medical and dental teams, established a centre on site to carry out their respective duties. A combined National Police/Australian Army intelligence/South Vietnamese Intelligence group established a holding area surrounded by concertina barbed wire and pickets in which villagers were gathered so that their documents could be checked. They were then released to other holding areas according to whether they had correct documents or were to be further detained because their names appeared on wanted lists. Other people identified as illegal residents, army deserters, criminals, suspected Viet Cong Suppliers (VCS), Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) personnel or Viet

¹⁰⁰ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 304. The quantities used cannot be determined from the file. It is presumed that each leaflet would be ordered in 50,000 to 100,000 lots.

Cong (VC) soldiers found in the village were apprehended and placed in a compound to be interrogated by National Police or by Vietnamese and Australian intelligence officials.¹⁰¹



Photograph 5 : Australian soldier Corporal Arthur (Tiger) Feltham with man-packed broadcast equipment and power supply adapted from AN/PRC 25 set radio batteries accompanied by ARVN Interpreter Staff Sergeant Trinh, the Unit Vietnamese interpreter, photographed while broadcasting messages to villagers.

The oldest male, or if no male was available in the family then the oldest woman, was to remain in the home with the family book. This book listed all the members of the household and was used as the basis for recording the names of the family members and authorising the purchase of restricted types of foodstuffs. These people would remain in the house during the search so they could answer questions of the searching parties and to ensure no damage to their property occurred and no items of their property were stolen.

¹⁰¹ Cordon and Search information is based on the procedures laid down in Army training and on the recollections of the writer in consultation with former members of the Psyops unit.



Photograph 6 : Australian soldiers move into a village during a 'Cordon and Search' operation.¹⁰²

While the villages were in the assembly area after being screened by the appropriate officials, the Australian psyops team would set up broadcast equipment to provide them with entertainment by a Vietnamese Cultural Drama team. Officials would inform them of events to be held in their area in the near future. Emphasis was placed on informing the villagers about where the 'non-civilian access areas' were located and they were warned that they may be killed accidentally if they entered these areas.

¹⁰² National Archives of Australia Series A1200 Photograph L64193 recorded by Australian News and Information Bureau. Retrieved April 2006.



Photograph 7 : Villagers waiting to be processed at a cordon and search.

Villagers were able to seek medical and dental treatment free of charge from either Australian medical staff attached to the Civil Affairs unit or from the infantry battalion conducting the cordon and search according to where the cordon was taking place.



Photograph 8 : Cultural Drama Team entertaining the villagers in the assembly area during a Cordon and Search. They are standing on the back of an Australian Mark 3 vehicle.

Some searches were conducted in villages that operated their own village first aid dispensaries or a small local hospital/medical centre. Trained staff from these local medical centres assisted in the provision of services during the cordon and searches or in any other follow-up matters that may have been required after the troops left the village.



Photograph 9 : Medical staff from the village of Duc Thanh in front of village dispensary built by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit¹⁰³

Children were sometimes given small items, such as notebooks for use at school, pens, rulers and bags. Soap was a popular gift and Americans sometimes supplied cakes of soap containing a series of Chieu Hoi amnesty slogans that were revealed as each level of soap was washed away. It was disappointing to see these products were not used by the recipients but were sold by the families at road-side stalls in spite of them being emblazoned with Chieu Hoi, health or government slogans. Sometimes the Australians distributed rice to village inhabitants that had been captured by the Australians from Viet Cong caches that had originally been taken from those villages or purchased with funds taken as 'VC taxation' from them.

¹⁰³ Photograph supplied by Mr Graham Stone the unit photographer in SVN in 1970-71. This photograph later appeared on an Australian poster promoting health services in the province.

Early Australian Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Connection

1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit (1 ACAU) was formed in Australia in April 1967 and arrived in Vietnam on the 10 June 1967. Those soldiers who had worked with Donohoe as previously mentioned, were either absorbed into 1 ACAU or were retained as a small section of personnel at the Task Force headquarters to continue to work in a small psychological operations group. Major Donohoe who was known around the Nui Dat area as the 'Man from WHAM' returned to Australia in July 1967. Initially the Australian Civil Affairs unit was complemented by the United States 14 AA Platoon of 2 Civil Affairs Company¹⁰⁴ which had been conducting civil affairs with Major Donohoe at the Task Force up until that time.¹⁰⁵ 2 Civil Affairs Company supported units in III Corps. 8 AA Platoon was a platoon of 2 Civil Affairs Company and was attached to the 196 Light Infantry Brigade. Similar to US Special Forces A and C teams the Psyops HA and HE teams was used instead of any numerical identification in Civil Affairs companies at that time.¹⁰⁶

The American civil affairs company remained as an attachment to the Australian forces until November 1967¹⁰⁷ when the Australian unit took over full control of civic action within the task force tactical area of responsibility within Phuoc Tuy province. While records show the American 14th AA Platoon from the US 2nd Civil Affairs Company was attached to the Australians, the first commanding officer of 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit, Lieutenant Colonel John McDonagh, said that the two units worked independently.¹⁰⁸ American trained psychological warfare operators were also working with or attached to

¹⁰⁴ The US Forces used two alphabetical letters to identify types of organisations. AA indicates a command headquarter (at any level) was included in the organisation of the platoon. AB would indicate a Battalion Headquarters used to support a field army or a civil affairs command in a communications zone. AC would indicate a group headquarters designed to provide psychological operations support to a theatre army. The list goes on. US Field Manual 3.24

¹⁰⁵ Dennis & Grey, op.cit, 2002, p. 231.

¹⁰⁶ Information supplied by Herb Friedman in an email dated 5 October 2007.

¹⁰⁷ Information supplied by Mr. Barry Smith (Lt Retired) historian of 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit Association in October 2005.

¹⁰⁸ Dennis & Grey, op.cit, 2002, p. 231. footnote 7.

the American Civil Affairs Company and they provided initial expertise on psychological warfare to the Australian Task Force staff officers. The American psychological warfare operators continued to assist the Australians from June to November 1967 when both teams were redeployed by II Field Force Vietnam to another area. These operators provided voice tapes and leaflets that invited the Viet Cong to return under an 'Open Arms' amnesty programme, which was called the Chieu Hoi programme. The United States forces CORDS Advisory Team 89 was based in the province capital, Baria, and worked directly with South Vietnamese forces and government civil administrative officials throughout the province. The Americans held considerable power and instructed or advised the Province Chief on matters both military and civil. The Australian task force planned and conducted its own tactical and operational psychological warfare, but it sent reports to the Americans for them to use in coordinating the Australian's civil psychological operations with their own civil action and propaganda conducted through local VIS operatives.¹⁰⁹

From July 1967 to March 1968 Australian intelligence staff officers on the task force headquarters continued to call on the Americans to support the Australians in psychological operations and to employ the American psychological warfare products that included voice tapes and propaganda leaflets. They were able to order such products through the US National Catalogue of Psychological Materials.

¹⁰⁹ Information supplied by Mr. Barry Smith (Lt Retired) historian of 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit Association in October 2005.




Figure 5 : National Catalogue of Psychological Operations Materials centrally produced by 4th Psychological Operations Group under JUSPAO directions.¹¹⁰

In March 1968 the Australian command created the new position of General Staff Officer Grade 3 Psychological Operations (GSO 3 Psyops). Captain Colin Swain was posted from 3 RAR and was the first officer to be officially appointed to this position. He was assisted by two soldiers with no training in psychological operations and one Vietnamese interpreter attached from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). This group developed the capacity to print their own leaflets in small quantities, but unfortunately no samples of any of the leaflets they produced can be located in the 1 ATF files. The Australians also ordered leaflets from the American's 6 Psychological Operation Battalion selected from their National Psyops Catalogue. One of the more important leaflets to be dropped by the Australians was the National 'Safe Conduct Pass'. If a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldier produced this or any other leaflet, they would be warmly welcomed by the South Vietnamese forces and FWMAF. The VC and NVA generally received the same treatment.

¹¹⁰ Australian War Memorial Series 304 [126] National Catalogue of Psyops Materials – Joint US Public Affairs Office – Field Development Division

If they were a senior officer or they were deemed to be valuable in providing intelligence or other important information, then they were transferred to a special centre near Saigon.¹¹¹



Figure 6 : The front and back of US produced Psyops Leaflet – ‘Safe Conduct Pass’ front containing the flags of the Free World Military Assistance Forces. Note how the back of the pass is signed by the President of South Vietnam – Nguyen Van Thieu who was President from 1967 until 1975.¹¹²

Another important role for psyops was to broadcast warnings to the Vietnamese civilian population concerning operations being conducted against the Viet Cong in their area. This included details of curfews that were imposed in all villages between 7.00 pm to 6.00 am during which villagers were prohibited from moving outside their village boundaries. The

¹¹¹ Telephone interview with Swain on 5 September 2005 by writer.

¹¹² Copy of front of ‘Safe Conduct Pass’ Leaflet from the American National Psychological Leaflets Catalogue and of one held in the author’s collection.

curfew was enforced in the hamlets and villages by the National Police (NP), Regional Force (RF), Popular Force (PF) and People Self Defence Force (PSDF) personnel. After curfew any villager found outside the village boundary faced the risk of being shot or wounded by ambushing forces from the South Vietnamese or Australian military forces.¹¹³

Swain's psyops team also conducted field psychological operations. These related to several tasks including the support of Australian units when they were conducting cordon and searches of villages, handing out leaflets and posters on matters of safety, controlling civilian access to areas where the Australians were conducting operations and airborne dropping of leaflets and voice missions directed towards the Viet Cong main force or village guerrilla forces. These operations will be explained in greater detail in later chapters. One notable incident that occurred during Swain's time was in the planning of a Task Force operation to conduct a military operation against the Viet Cong. In planning for one of these military operations against the Viet Cong, the GSO 2 Operations co-ordinated the planning for the operation deployment and the services required. One important act was to distribute leaflets and make broadcasts to warn the Vietnamese civilians to keep clear of the military operation then about to commence in their area so that they did not stray into the line of fire. The broadcast also informed the Viet Cong in the area that they were surrounded and that they should surrender under the National Chieu Hoi Open Arms amnesty plan. The Chieu Hoi amnesty programme was instituted in April 1963 when President Diem announced an amnesty for those members of the Viet Cong who rallied to the side of the government. This programme was initially well received, and more than 7,500 VC accepted the opportunity to return in the first 4 months, that is, from 1 May to 31 August 1963.¹¹⁴ The unstable political conditions in the last half of the year, along with communist military successes, caused the number of ralliers to drop sharply. In the last four months of 1963 only 1,400 VC returned. In 1964 fewer than 5,500 returned.

¹¹³ 1 Australian Task Force Standing Operating Procedures. Copy lodged in the de Heer Special Collection UNSW Library at ADFA.

¹¹⁴ Australian War Memorial, Personal Papers Major Twigg-Patterson 3DRL / 7520. *US Army Special Warfare School – Psyops Manual. Number 521. National Reconciliation in South Vietnam*, February 1969. pp. 1–3.

After confirming the US aircraft availability, the GSO 2 Operations confirmed that the operation would proceed and Captain Swain travelled to Vung Tau to carry out other psyops work. While he was away, the commencement of the operation was delayed by one day. However, the aerial broadcast was not rescheduled and this resulted in the aircraft flying over the operation area the day before the operation commenced broadcasting a warning to the Viet Cong that they should remain in their position and surrender to the Australian forces. The Viet Cong were thus given one day's warning to make good their escape. There appears to be no evidence that the VC did use this additional time to evade contact or capture. As the number of ralliers varied quite considerably after each offensive action carried out by the Australians it cannot be ascertained that the operation resulted in more or less ralliers returning. An internal investigation was undertaken and Captain Swain was blamed for the aircraft tasking mistake, but the fault was with the General Staff Officer Grade 2 Operations (GSO 2 (Ops)).¹¹⁵ The unfortunate Swain was posted to 1 Australian Reinforcement Unit and was replaced on 23 July 1968 by Captain Michael Nelson¹¹⁶ who served in the position from 24 July 1968 to 18 March 1969.

Another soldier who was attached to the ad-hoc psyops section at the task force headquarters was Corporal (later Sergeant) Malcolm Pool.¹¹⁷ He arrived on 7 January 1969 where he worked full-time on psychological warfare with Nelson and remained in the position with Captain Bruzga and for a further short period when the position was upgraded to that of a Major, principally because of 1 ATF's increased effort as the emphasis on pacification gained in magnitude.¹¹⁸ Major Cross was appointed to the position in October 1969. Bruzga duties were in all aspects of psychological operations. He was involved with leaflet dropping, voice airborne broadcasts and worked extensively with the attached US HE Team 7 audio visual team in visiting schools throughout the province. Each United States Psyops team was operationally self-sufficient with field teams consisting of two or

¹¹⁵ Telephone interview with Swain on 6 September 2005.

¹¹⁶ Telephone interview with Nelson on 6 September 2005.

¹¹⁷ Telephone interview with Pool on 5 February 2006

¹¹⁸ Australian War Memorial Series 102 [59]. Op.cit., P 7-2

three people equipped with vehicles that allowed them to carry all the broadcast equipment, tapes and leaflets. This thoroughness reflected the extensive experience, planning and fit-outs with which US psychological operations supported their units.



Photograph 10 : United States 1 ¼ ton Psychological Operations Vehicle that contained extensive equipment for psychological operations work.

Pool was also involved in providing support to Medical Civil Action Projects (MedCaps) and cordon and searches of villages. MedCaps were conducted by Australian medical and dental personnel when they visited villages during daylight hours. While the doctor and dentist were conducting clinics, they were supported by an Australian pharmacist, usually a sergeant or staff sergeant who dispensed the medicine the doctor or dentist prescribed. The attendee's names would be checked against the village blacklist (suspected VCI, VC suppliers or VC family members) by an intelligence unit soldier and they would indicate on their treatment card with a special mark that the treating medical personnel became aware of their status. It was necessary to prevent the VC from acquiring medicine through the MedCap system. Therefore, if the person seeking treatment described symptoms that were not supported by the doctor's examination, then a particular mark was made on the patient's card and the dispensing pharmacist gave the patient placebo medicine. This

pharmacist usually had some Vietnamese language training and was able to instruct the patient in how to take the medicine that had been prescribed. Sergeant Pool returned home to Australia for a year and was posted back to Vietnam on 6 January 1971 where he worked again with the newly formed 1 Psychological Operations Unit. He spent a further nine months in his second tour in Vietnam conducting psychological operations. Pool became the longest serving person in the Australian Task Force to be involved with psychological warfare in Vietnam. Attached as Appendix 2 to Volume 2 is a list of the known leaflets produced by the Americans and used by the Australians prior to 1 APOU being formed in April 1970.

The arrival of the US troops and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) together with the establishment of a relative stable government in Saigon plus the failure of the VC to win the promised quick victory led to the number of ralliers again increasing. In 1965, 11,000 VC rallied in all of South Vietnam and in 1966 the number rose to more than 20,000. The first three months of 1967 showed a large increase, with 11,700 ralliers as of 31 March 1967.¹¹⁹ The government conducted extensive information campaigns to attract returnees. Leaflets, radio broadcasts, loudspeaker announcements, cultural drama teams shows, and folk singers visiting villages were a few of the means used to spread the Chieu Hoi amnesty messages as well as promoting the successes of the Saigon government.

During the truce of the 1967 lunar New Year, celebrated as Tet, the government enlarged the campaign to reach the guerrillas at a time when they were considered most receptive to these appeals. Many VC returned to their homes during the holiday period and South Vietnamese government propaganda teams visited the house of each suspected VC before the holiday to leave an envelope containing a New Year greeting, a safe conduct pass, and instructions on how to defect, including a map showing the route to the nearest reception centre. Before the holiday, the government information media had stressed the fact that the VC was losing the war and the VC soldiers would be in danger of being killed if they

¹¹⁹ Twigg-Patterson, op.cit, p. 1–3.

remained in the communist ranks.¹²⁰ Emotional appeals for the VC to remain home after the holiday ended had some effect. The programme was successful as shown by the large numbers of returnees in February and March 1967. A similar, but smaller project in 1966 had the same result.¹²¹ Although VC propaganda at the time invited the Hoi Chanh to return to the VC, barely a few of them chose to do so.

Effects of War Divisiveness on Australian Soldiers in Vietnam

The Vietnam War was the most divisive war undertaken in Australia's history. The Australian Labor Party was opposed to the conflict as strongly as the Menzies Liberal Party-led government was firmly in support of it. Opposition to the war has been documented in various sources particularly by the Moratorium movement and university student groups.¹²² Australian domestic criticism of the war and the policies of the Australian Liberal Party-led government took various forms, some of which impacted directly on soldiers in Nui Dat. The introduction by the Menzies government of conscription (introduced prior to the government's commitment to Vietnam) as a means of ensuring the recruitment of sufficient troops to maintain the expanding size of the Army was particularly opposed by the more militant groups of trade unions such as the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF), the Seamen's Union of Australia (SUA) and the Deckhands and Firemen's Association. In July 1966 these unions opposed the sailing of the vessel *MV Boonaroo* to Vietnam with a cargo of stores for the Nui Dat Base. By mutual agreement between the war's opponents and the government, the *Boonaroo's* sailing was labelled as a 'peace ship' and it successfully transported its cargo to Vietnam. Less tolerance was shown to the sailing of the *Jeparit* which had been chartered to carry supplies to Vietnam on a continuing basis. In December 1966 the *Jeparit* was loaded with 40mm Bofor guns and the Seamen's Union protested resulting in the weapons being removed before the ship sailed on

¹²⁰ Twigg-Patterson, *ibid.*

¹²¹ Twigg-Patterson. *ibid.*

¹²² John Murphy, *Harvest of Fear, A History of Australia's Vietnam War*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1993, Chapters 11 – 13.

3 December 1966. The maritime unions condemned the use of the *Jeparit* in the war and in November 1969 waterside workers refused to unload it when it returned from Vietnam against the wishes of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF).¹²³

Soldiers serving in Vietnam expected that they would be supported at home by the people of Australia, but when 1 RAR returned home from its first tour in Vietnam and paraded through the streets of Sydney, it attracted a protest from anti-war protesters. One woman covered in red paint grappled with the commanding officer at the head of the march resulting in him being smeared with red paint.¹²⁴ Although this act was seen as an independent action by the woman and criticized by the media and others, it demonstrated some depth of opposition to the war. Australian soldiers serving in Vietnam also found themselves under attack from Australians at home, especially from the trade unions and university students. Trade union opposition to Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War did not emerge fully until 1965. Yet a significant part of trade union opposition to the Vietnam War was derived from a tradition of involvement in anti-war campaigns and other non-industrial issues. This marked the start of an anti-union feeling within the defence forces, particularly by the army. The reaction by the Department of Defence to the abuse of soldiers in the street was to order soldiers not to proceed on leave in uniform. Many soldiers believed that they had become the focus of the anti-war movement and particularly from those opposing the National Service call up. The government department responsible for conscription was the Department of Labour and National Service. The military members bore the brunt of the abuse when travelling in the community and said that the war opponents should direct their anger at the government and not at the person in uniform. In response to the unionist actions, the government threatened to man vessels with Navy crews and on 1 March 1967, the ship *MV Boonaroo* was commissioned as a Royal Australian Navy ship. Also in March 1967, the Seamen's Union refused to crew the

¹²³ Murphy, *ibid*, p.230.

¹²⁴ John Rowe. *Vietnam: The Australian Experience*. Time-Life Books (Australia) Pty Ltd, North Sydney, 1987, p. 53. John Rowe served in Vietnam as an intelligence officer.

Jeparit resulting in the owners allowing it to be crewed by naval ratings. These political and openly publicised civil acts of disobedience reflected the growing opposition to the war not only in Australia but also in the United States of America, Britain and Canada. This would have given comfort to the communist forces in Vietnam by demonstrating that the western governments did not have the full support of their people in this war.

The response of the ordinary soldiers serving in Vietnam to the dissent in Australia has rarely been reported and the following account describes some of the expression of resentment by soldiers towards the anti-war movement in Australia. There is no record of opposition to the war among Australian soldiers based in Nui Dat but some indication of the soldiers' opposition to the anti-war activists can be perceived in the actions of the GSO 3 Psychological Operations who produced a leaflet, printed in November 1968 that condemned the Postal Workers Union in Australia. (See Figure 7 below) The printing of this leaflet was in response to the gathering anti-war mood in Australia demonstrated by actions of women who formed the Save Our Sons movement (SOS Movement). The SOS Movement was started in May 1965 to oppose conscription for overseas service and more specifically the use of conscripts as part of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam conflict. SOS was supported by university students who sponsored draft resisters as well as some trade unions. One of the more notable draft resisters was John Zarb, a young postal worker who was sentenced to two years jail in 1968 for refusing to obey a call up notice. His jailing created a great deal of support, especially from his own union, the Amalgamated Postal Workers Union (APWU). During 1968, the APWU decided not to load or process the mail moving from Australia to Vietnam. The action of the APWU served as the proverbial last straw for the soldiers in Nui Dat and Captain Nelson ¹²⁵ decided to diffuse the anger among some soldiers by designing a leaflet labelled 'Punch a Postie on RTA' (Return to Australia). The production of that leaflet was approved by Captain John Bullen,¹²⁶ Officer Commanding the Topographical Survey Unit which printed the leaflet.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Telephone interview with Nelson on 6 September 2005.

¹²⁶ Telephone interview with Bullen on 4 September 2005.

However, the union in Australia became aware of the leaflet and complained to the Liberal-led government. Sir Phillip Lynch MP, the Minister for the Army at the time, requested an investigation by the Army. Colonel Donald Dunstan, Deputy Commander of 1 ATF, conducted an investigation and Captains Bullen and Nelson were questioned. The explanation was forwarded to the Minister, but it does not seem to have had any detrimental effect on the officers, as Captain Bullen was promoted to the rank of Major a few weeks after the incident.



Figure 7 : Australian produced 'Punch a Postie' Leaflet.¹²⁸

Geoff Hook, a well known Australian cartoonist who published his cartoons under the name 'Jeff', took up the theme of the soldiers as illustrated in the following cartoon in one of the National newspapers in Australia.

¹²⁷ In my telephone interview with Nelson and Bullen, the writer was told that Nelson designed and produced the leaflet, but Bullen was the person who approved the leaflet. In the book *Vietnam The Australian War* by Paul Ham on p. 520 Ham attributes the printing to Bullen. Bullen told the writer in 2005 that 1 Topographical Survey Unit was unable to print the leaflet as they only had screen printing presses in the unit and they were unable to print leaflets. Nelson had printed the leaflets in the back of the attached US psyops truck.

¹²⁸ Leaflet held in the writer's collection of Propaganda Leaflets. PMG is the abbreviation for Postmaster General's Department.



Figure 8 : Geoff 'Jeff' Hook Cartoon – 'Punch a Postie' 22 November 1968

There were no reports of soldiers assaulting any postal workers when they returned to Australia. There were other campaigns such as 'Wallop a Wharfie' after the dockworkers stopped loading the *HMAS Jeparit* with supplies. The soldiers were not so much concerned at the hold up of military supplies as they were about the delay it caused to the arrival of their beer supplies. The waterside workers refused to load the vessel and the army responded by doing the work themselves.¹²⁹ The use of these comic leaflets could be described as internal psyops leaflets and their production was used to raise troop morale. This use of leaflets to raise morale was not foreseen in the doctrine on psychological operations. It would appear that the postal and waterside workers of Australia had a more significant negative impact of the soldiers' morale than the enemy.

Expansion of Australian Psychological Operations

Captain Algimantas Bruzga was posted into Nelson's position in April 1969. His previous posting had been as second in command of B Company, 9 Battalion The Royal Australian

¹²⁹ Interview with Mr Bruzga in 2005.


Regiment.¹³⁰ On 15 October 1969 a formal organisational structure for the conduct of psychological operations was proposed by Bruzga to the Commander of the Australian Task Force, Brigadier S.P. Weir. Although Bruzga had no training as a psychologist or any experience in psychological warfare, he had been working in the field for a number of months and prepared a submission to establish what he termed an Australian Psychological Operations Unit.¹³¹ Captain Bruzga wrote that ‘over the previous three years several bids had been made for manpower to raise a Psychological Operations Unit, but in the past these proposals were deferred and for some considerable time Psyops had been conducted in 1 ATF with an ad hoc staff.’¹³² Captain Bruzga wrote that existing arrangements did not allow him to make a significant improvement in the conduct and scope of psychological operations. He had reported that he had been preoccupied with his work as a duty officer in the task force command post. Captain Bruzga had gained experience in conducting numerous psychological operations in the field and one of his techniques used on a number of operations, involved the preparation of taped messages which were broadcast from a helicopter over the jungle in which Viet Cong soldiers might be located. The broadcasts informed the soldiers that they could obtain meals and medical attention if they surrendered or returned to the government under the ‘Open Arms’ amnesty programme.¹³³ Articles appeared in Australian newspapers reporting Bruzga’s operations as ‘Meals on Wheels’. On one occasion when the Australian and South Vietnamese forces were fighting inside the large village of Dat Do east of Baria against the entrenched Viet Cong, Captain Bruzga flew low over the village numerous times broadcasting from a helicopter urging the enemy to surrender to the combined forces and join the Chieu Hoi programme. This was using standard commercial tapes produced by the Americans.

¹³⁰ Although Swain, Nelson and Bruzga filled the position of GSO 3 (Psyops), they said that while they nominally worked in the propaganda area, they actually spent much of their time performing shifts as Duty Officers in the Task Force command post

¹³¹ Bruzga to Weir, dated October 1969, AWM Series 98 File R310/3/138 Part 2, Psychological Operations – Psyops Unit. p. 1.

¹³² Bruzga to Weir, loc.cit.

¹³³ Press clipping from an unknown Newcastle newspaper c. 1969



Photograph 11 : Captain A. Bruzga Staff Officer Grade 3 (Psychological Operations) in Nui Dat c. 1969.

Brigadier Weir wrote to the Australian Force headquarters in Saigon on 31 October 1969 supporting the establishment of a psychological operations unit. The establishment was not too dissimilar to the establishment proposed in the Division In Battle, Pamphlet No. 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, Section 20.¹³⁴ Weir's proposal to HQ AFV was different to Bruzga's original proposal, but there were many similarities. He wrote that there was an 'urgent need to form the unit as the US forces were withdrawing their support and psychological operations was seen as essential to any force'. He requested that, pending

¹³⁴ Australian Army. Op. cit, p 71..

the formalisation of a change to the establishment, immediate steps be taken to augment the psychological operations personnel, meaning that the arrangements with the US forces be formalised and that an Australian psychological operations unit be established at Nui Dat.

135

One of the main reasons for the Australians establishing their own psychological operations capability was that the Australian ad-hoc arrangement with the Americans was unsatisfactory and with the likely departure of some of the US units, the Australians would be obliged to conduct their own psychological operations. The likely withdrawal of the US units was connected to changed political events in America at this time. Richard Nixon had been elected President in November 1968 and although he began to disengage US forces from South Vietnam by mid 1969 that operation was conducted very slowly. Peace talks had commenced in Paris and there was at this time some optimism that they could be concluded reasonably quickly. The Australian headquarters in Saigon was aware that de-escalation of US military operations was under way. As the US withdrawal was underway, the US MACV administrators may have suggested to the Australians that the Americans were withdrawing their own psyops personnel from the Australian area of responsibility and the Australians should conduct their own propaganda efforts.

Brigadier Weir made recommendations to the headquarters in Saigon that the formation of a psychological operations unit in Vietnam should not be considered in isolation, but rather as part of a greater use by the Australian Army of psychological operations in warfare. He said that the Army had not used psychological operations in the recent past but his submission, based upon his experience in Vietnam, led him to believe there was now a pressing need to establish a formal unit to conduct such operations. The Australian Army was not unaware of the use of Psychological Warfare as the Australian Division in Battle Pamphlet Number 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare (1965) stated that 'psywar played a vital role in counter insurgency'. The pamphlet also included a lengthy discussion of how

¹³⁵ Weir to HQ AFV Saigon 31 October 1969, Australian War Memorial Series 98 file R310/2/138 Part 2, letter 1 ATF R310/1/74 dated 31 October 1969 Psychological Operations Unit.

psychological warfare should be conducted and described the organisation of the Divisional Psychological Operations Unit. It appears that Weir was unaware that the Australian Army had conducted psychological warfare during World War II, a war in which he served as a young officer. Propaganda had been distributed through the Far East Liaison Office (FELO) throughout the South West Pacific after Singapore was retaken towards the end of World War II. Over six hundred people had worked in FELO throughout Australia and the South West Pacific regions. Psychological operations had also been conducted during the ten years of the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1958 and the British dropped 150,000,000 leaflets with appeals on them to induce the Malayan Communist Party members to surrender.¹³⁶ Most leaflets were dropped from Auster aircraft from the 656th Light Aircraft Squadron of the British Army Air Corps.

Brigadier Weir not only supported the concept of a psychological operations unit for the task force but also recommended that the Australian Military Forces (AMF) should consider it as a normal part of the Australian Army Order of Battle. He further stated that the permanent attachment of United States Psyops HB¹³⁷ loudspeaker team and HE¹³⁸ audio visual team had made a significant impact on the pacification programmes being conducted in Phuoc Tuy Province. A US HB Light Mobile Loudspeaker team had the capability to plan and conduct live or taped loudspeaker broadcasts and respond to targets with a psychological operation as the opportunity targets arose. Loudspeaker teams were employed in offensive situations by broadcasting before or following an attack to lower the enemy's morale and lessen his will to resist. They were employed in defensive situations, in relatively stable situations and were used as the means to encourage defection, desertion, and malingering among enemy soldiers. During pacification or consolidation operations, these psyops teams made broadcasts to keep local villagers informed about current

¹³⁶ Neil C. Smith, *Mostly Unsung: Australian and the Commonwealth in the Malay Emergency 1948-1960*, Melbourne, 1989, p. 16.

¹³⁷ HB team is a field based light mobile loudspeaker team and a HE team is an audio visual field team.

¹³⁸ No accurate date can be located as to when the US psyops teams arrived to support 1 ATF.

situations, announce proclamations, instructions, and news.¹³⁹ The increased availability of aircraft to conduct voice announcements and for dropping leaflets also had a significant impact on the tactical situation by increasing the numbers of Hoi Chanh (the Vietnamese term for ‘ralliers’), the term applied to the enemy who surrendered. These ralliers provided valuable intelligence upon which further combat and psychological operations could be planned. Captain Bruzga claimed in his submission to Weir that during his time conducting psychological warfare, he had realised the potential of psychological operations and saw it as a means for meeting the tactical and pacification goals as prescribed by US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in the two pronged attack on the enemy. This represented a new doctrine adopted by the US General Abrams USCOMMACV when he had taken over command from General Westmorland in July 1968. Abrams new approach saw military operations being conducted simultaneously with pacification operations and psyops being employed in both types of operations.

¹³⁹ Australian War Memorial, Personal Papers Major Twigg-Patterson 3DRL / 7520. *US Army Special Warfare School – Psyops Manuals. Number 460A. Loudspeaker Operations* dated September 1968. p. 1.



Photograph 12 : Capt Algis Bruzga with ARVN Vietnamese interpreter near Nui Dat on 19 April 1969 preparing a tape recorded message to be broadcast from a helicopter to the Viet Cong in the region informing them they can obtain meals and medical attention if they surrender under the South Vietnamese government 'Open Arms' programme.¹⁴⁰

One document which supported the conduct of psychological warfare was prepared by another Australian officer, Major Michael Dixon Currie, who had been posted to the US CORDS Advisory Team 89 as Province Senior Advisor, Psychological Operations in the provincial capital of Baria. Major Currie's position gave him considerable authority in psyops since he served under the direction of the US Military Province Senior Advisor.

¹⁴⁰ Australian War Memorial. AWM web site www.awm.gov.au Photographic Reference Number M/69/0237/VN retrieved October 2005.

The Advisory Team 89 psyops was responsible for visits by Vietnamese Cultural Drama teams to villages, the oversight of operations of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's), the conduct of province amnesty campaigns (Chieu Hoi Centre) sponsored by the Vietnamese Ministry of Information, planning psyops support where necessary for Regional and Popular Forces military operations and providing support for the People's Self Defence Forces. US Advisory Team 89 was also responsible for supporting the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) teams, supporting Village Information Services through Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and conducting the Phuong Hoang (Vietnamese equivalent of the US Phoenix programme) operations within the province on how and where to conduct these psychological operations. Currie wrote to the Deputy Commander of 1 ATF to praise the work of Bruzga in the following terms:

Much of the success of the Vietnamese Provincial Chieu Hoi programme in causing large numbers of the enemy to rally to the cause of the GVN can be attributed to the personal use by Capt Bruzga of voice aircraft orbiting at low altitude for long periods of time over enemy controlled territory.

By his courage and example Captain Bruzga has encouraged Vietnamese officers and officials to develop Psychological Operations in Phuoc Tuy Province to the point that these operations have become an effective weapon against the enemy by demoralising his troops and increasing the number of enemy defectors to a level to be of major concern to the enemy¹⁴¹.

Bruzga was one of thirteen Australians to be awarded the Vietnamese Psychological Warfare Medal and surprisingly was noteworthy for being the only recipient to have actually worked operationally in the Psyops field. His initiative, with Weir's support, was to lead to the creation of 1 Australian Psychological Operations Unit which is discussed in the Chapter 4.

¹⁴¹ Currie to Weir, 17 October 1969. Australian War Memorial Series 98 file R310/2/138 Part 2

CHAPTER 3

South Vietnamese Government Organisations With Which The Australian Psychological Operations Team Worked

*Knowing the other and knowing oneself,
In one hundred battles no danger,
Not knowing the other and knowing oneself,
One victory for one loss,
Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself,
In every battle certain defeat.*

*Sun Tzu, 500 B.C.
From Chapter 3, Strategy of Attack.¹⁴²*

The psychological operations ground team members were compelled to understand the administrative structures and systems of the South Vietnamese government at the provincial, district and village level. The complexity of the provincial military and civil administration relating to village and hamlet governance, with which the unit operated, took some time for the field psychological operators in the unit to be accustomed to.

South Vietnam Provincial Territorial Security Forces

Comprehending the military, paramilitary, and civilian governmental structures in Phuoc Tuy province was complicated by the use of different terminology by the Americans, the Australians and the Vietnamese. The Americans used the terms Province and District to describe the areas that made up a province. The Vietnamese used other terms at their Sector Headquarters to describe the provincial level of their military and civilian government and used Sub-sector for District level organisations. At both village and hamlet level was a mixture of military and civilian officials. The Australian commander

¹⁴² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: Book and Card Deck*. Trans, The Demma Translation Group, Shambhala Publications Inc, Massachusetts, 2003.

would converse with the Village Chief on civic matters and the Deputy for Security on operational military matters. Sometimes both leaders had to be involved when participating in Medical Civil Action Projects (MedCaps) or face-to-face political warfare operations under the Chieu Hoi and Phoenix (Phung Hoa) programs in a village or hamlet. The village National Police would also have to be directly informed, as representing a third element of government, because there seemed no coordination between the three groups. When the Australian Civil Affairs unit conducted Integrated Civil Action Projects (ICaps), MedCaps and Dental Civil Action Projects (DentCaps) in the villages or hamlets, it required coordination between the two separate arms, that is the military and civilian parts of the village council. When the Australian civil action teams came to a village and remained overnight within the village, they also brought with them a platoon of Australian soldiers for protection. These protection teams were supplied from Australian infantry battalions, artillery or engineer units within the task force. There was a need for protection in many villages of the province because there was no area within a village that could provide safe accommodation as well as security for the soldiers during and after their conduct of civil action projects.

Summary of Vietnamese Military and Paramilitary Forces within Phuoc Tuy Province¹⁴³

Regional Force Companies (RF)	These forces provided the Province and District Chiefs with territorial forces to conduct offensive operations within the province against the Viet Cong in areas in and around villages. Provided security for Pacification projects. The RF companies were the ready reaction force to counter Viet Cong attacks against villages and government installations within the province
Popular Force Platoons (PF)	Popular Force units were stationed in villages and provided military security close to the village or hamlet, or inside the village. They also protected village or hamlet offices. Selected infrastructure targets were protected. Bridges over rivers and creeks and checkpoints into and out of the villages were protected.
People's Self Defence Force (PSDF)	Voluntary force maintained some limited security within a village or hamlet and defended the citizens against small enemy attacks.
Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC)	Paramilitary organisation grouped in thirty person teams that lived with the people in villages. They helped the village organise their own self defence, assisted in building houses for the villages, oversaw Village Self Development (VSD) projects, collected intelligence and conducted psychological operations against the VC.
Armed Propaganda Teams (APTs)	APTs were ex Viet Cong who had previously rallied and were attached to the provincial headquarters. They were trained to operate in safe areas to visit and try to persuade families of the Viet Cong to return to the South Vietnamese government side under the National Chieu Hoi amnesty program
National Police (NP)	The National Police wore white uniforms and operated as other police forces. They investigated and prosecuted criminals, investigated road accidents and fatalities, collected intelligence on crime and information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Arrested and prosecuted VCI members.
National Police Field Force (NPFF)	NPFF were trained police and operated and fulfilled the police mission in contested and insecure areas. These forces were designed to operate with military forces in population control operations and against the VCI.
Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU)	These forces were controlled by the Province Chief and operated in overt and covert actions against the VCI. They collected intelligence against the VCI

¹⁴³ This table was prepared by the writer from his experience and from data held since the conflict.




Figure 9: South Vietnamese Provincial Territorial Security Organisation - Sub-Sector to Village.

Also located in Phuoc Tuy province were two South Vietnamese military training establishments. They were located to the north of the village of Van Kiep which was east of the provincial capital, Baria. One was known as the Regional Forces National Training Centre (VKNTC) and the other was known as the Phuoc Tuy Popular Force Training Centre (PTPFTC). The Popular Force training centre was one of three located in Military Region Three (III Corps). The other two centres were located in Tay Ninh province near the Cambodian border and Binh Duong province which bordered on Saigon. The South Vietnamese Junior Ranks National Academy, the National Military Police School, the National Signal School and an annex of the Language School were all located at Vung Tau south of the province.¹⁴⁴ Most of the Regional and Popular Force soldiers had been recruited from within the province, and saw their primary mission as defending their home and families. The Psyops ground teams supported the Australian Civil Affairs unit when they were building houses for the Vietnamese soldiers and their families. The Australian ground teams often showed films for the entertainment of those workers. This was part of the Polwar Directorate actions to promote the Saigon government image and policies that were expected to increase the loyalty of its citizens and morale of the soldiers.

No permanent regular units of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) were located in the province. The Australian Task Force acted as the front line combat military force from its arrival in 1966 and took the fight to the enemy main force units located in the jungle areas. At times American units shared adjoining areas of operations (AOs) in the province when these forces were conducting combined operations against the enemy. The fight by the Saigon government against the enemy was conducted in the province by a collection of security bodies bearing various names. The province had a number of Regional Force companies, Popular Force platoons and village Peoples Self Defence Force soldiers and support staff. The Regional Force and Popular Force were military organisations assigned

¹⁴⁴ Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS), *Regional Force/Popular Force Advisors Handbook 1971*, [Military Assistance Command Vietnam Saigon], pp. 60-61. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

to the sector (province) and, sub-sector commanders (district), and collectively throughout the country. These forces constituted more than half the manpower in the South Vietnamese armed forces.¹⁴⁵

Regional Force Soldiers

The Regional Force Companies were located in the province and district regions and were expected to maintain the national pacification effort by conducting territorial security operations against enemy guerrilla units. At times these units may have had to support Popular Force units by providing a ready reaction force (RRF) if the Popular Force was attacked by superior enemy forces. In Phuoc Tuy province, four of these RF Companies were grouped together to form a Regional Force Battalion. The diagram below illustrates the relationship between the Village Military/Civilian structures and the Village Administration. The Psychological ground team leaders conferred regularly with the Village Chief, Deputy Village Chief for Administration and the Deputy Village Chief for Security in each village. Another important organisation within the village was the National Police. Regular contact with them helped build up trust between the Australian military forces and the police.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ MACCORDS, *RF/PF Handbook*, Chapter 1

¹⁴⁶ MACCORDS *ibid.*




Figure 10: South Vietnamese Village Organisation

National Police

The National Police were often referred to by Vietnamese people and FWMAF forces as 'White Mice' because of their white uniforms. National Police at all levels within the province passed valuable intelligence to the Province Police Headquarters, CORDS Team 89 and Australian Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILO), but particularly in relation to those villagers on village 'black lists'.¹⁴⁷ A 'black list' contained details of known Viet Cong Suppliers (VCS), Viet Cong Infrastructure personnel (VCI) and of families that had sons, daughters or other relatives in the Viet Cong. In South Vietnamese society it was not an offence to supply family members with food and clothing, but it was an offence to supply additional items of assistance to the Viet Cong. Although the Police kept files on these people, they often confessed to not having enough specific data on these known suspects to arrest them and place them before the courts. The National Police had to be careful that reports from people alleging that their neighbours gave assistance to the Viet Cong were substantial and were not used to settle feuds between neighbours. False reporting did occur and was often traced back to family feuds, commercial rivalry or the hope of being paid the reward money offered by the government. Before any action was taken against a citizen there generally had to be at least three independent reports on the person's activities.¹⁴⁸

National Police Field Force

The armed wing of the National Police was the National Police Field Force (NPFF). The NPFF were trained police and they operated and fulfilled the police mission in Viet Cong-contested and insecure areas. These forces were designed to operate with military forces in

¹⁴⁷ Australian War Memorial. AWM Series 304 [173]– *Black List Long Huong hamlet*. There were lists for all villages within the province. This is just one example.

¹⁴⁸ MACCORDS, *RF/PF Handbook*, pp. 31-33.

population control operations and in operations against the underground Viet Cong Infrastructure located in villages. They assisted military forces when conducting cordon and searches of villages and hamlets, supporting major road block operations and by conducting identity checks where there were large numbers of the local population. The Australian Psyops unit and the Australian Task Force called on the National Police and the National Police Force Field Force for assistance when conducting cordon and searches.¹⁴⁹

Popular Force Soldiers

The Popular Force Platoons were assigned as village or hamlet security forces and were designed to provide the populace with twenty-four hour security against the local Viet Cong guerrilla elements. The Popular Force Platoon consisted of thirty-two or thirty-five soldiers. The PF soldiers were also trained to participate actively in revolutionary (rural) development (Pacification roles) as a part of their normal security role. They did this by providing security while they worked and were supposed to assist by providing labour and technical assistance to local projects. As these platoons only had the capacity to protect specified structures, they were generally unable to prevent the Viet Cong from entering a village at night to collect supplies, proselytise, collect taxes, or hold peoples' (communist) courts against captured village people who were suspected of helping the government.¹⁵⁰

Political Warfare (Polwar) Activities During the Vietnam Conflict

As part of unconventional warfare, relations between the civil and military communities became far more complex when fighting broke out between the Saigon government and the Viet Cong. In the Vietnamese military establishment, the value of political warfare

¹⁴⁹ When Australian forces conducted cordon and searches in villages, coordination between the province officials and the Task Force about the tasks to be undertaken were agreed upon. Examples of the Vietnamese organisation involved will be found in the operational documents.

¹⁵⁰ MACCORDS, *RF/PF Handbook*, Chapter 1

including its concept, organisation and techniques was constantly debated between the military and political forces. Political warfare during this conflict could be seen as a government organisational attempt to solve deep-rooted, non-combat military problems. It was seen by the Americans to have been introduced by the communists to the Republic of Vietnam in 1960. The American concept of this evolutionary process is demonstrated in the following diagram that also demonstrates how the Vietnamese adapted it to their armed struggle.

These problems were centred on questions of allegiance, loyalty, and civil-military relations. Other problems included the traditional problems of corruption, despotism, nepotism, mutiny, desertion, motivation, and soldier / dependent social welfare needs. The basic concept of Polwar came from the Russian Political Commissar system.¹⁵¹ The development of political warfare is described in the diagram below.

The Saigon government was led to establish its own Polwar Department to counter the communists' efforts which it titled the psychological warfare Department of Political Warfare. The Republic of Vietnam National Armed Forces as well as the Regional and Popular Forces were specifically engaged in the conduct of Polwar against the communists.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Political Warfare Book, *Handbook for Advisors*, issued by MACV, p. 2. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

¹⁵² MACCORDS, *RF/PF Handbook*, Chapter 8.




Figure 11: Political Warfare Book '*Handbook for Advisors*'¹⁵³

The Psychological Warfare Department of Polwar engaged in activities that contributed to the accomplishment of the South Vietnamese government missions. The first target was directed towards the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and included programs directed towards Regional and Popular Forces. These programmes were aimed at increasing loyalty towards the Saigon government and increasing the morale of these forces. Secondary target audiences were the civilian populace and the Viet Cong. Their primary objective was to develop thematic approaches, plans and doctrine for National Psyops and Civic Action

¹⁵³ *Handbook for Advisors*, Op.cit. p. 3.

Programs (CAP). Polwar was designed to supervise the implementation of these programmes and to provide media support for the accomplishment of developed programs.¹⁵⁴ Members of this division were to focus on the enemy about whom they were to collect, evaluate and disseminate information of the communist policies and plans. Polwar personnel were responsible for interrogating key VC and NVA prisoners of war and for analysing the enemy propaganda. From such information they were to implement plans for undermining the enemy's morale, sow dissention among their ranks, attempt to separate the VC from the South Vietnamese people and cause the VC to lose faith in their communist leadership. The Intelligence division also developed programs aimed at reducing support to the enemy by the civilian populace in enemy controlled areas. The Polwar printing capability per month was substantial. They had the capability to produce nationally 30 million leaflets, 800,000 posters and 600,000 booklets and pamphlets. Additionally they could produce 600,000 newspapers called *Tien Tuyen* for distribution to the South Vietnamese armed forces as well as one hundred thousand miscellaneous documents.

The Polwar Department produced radio programs, motion pictures and television programs. The Cultural Office used artists and writers in assisting to raise the morale of the RVNAF and the civil populace by sponsoring contests for the best poems, songs, musical arrangements, short stories and skits that would undermine the efforts of the communists. The Polwar Battalion Cultural Platoons conducted activities to bolster the morale of the people and the military. The American Political Warfare Advisory Division worked with the Republic of Vietnam National Armed Forces (RVNAF) General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) in the areas of propaganda, troop indoctrination, and social welfare, as well as discharging a variety of staff responsibilities for American psychological warfare and civic action.¹⁵⁵ The Australian Psyops ground teams occasionally operated with Polwar platoons when they were conducting joint face-to-face operations against the Vietnamese families who had relatives in the Viet Cong.

¹⁵⁴ *Handbook for Advisors*. Op.cit. p. 19

¹⁵⁵ Cosmas, 2006, op.cit, p. 288

Armed Propaganda Teams

Another paramilitary group that the Australian psyops ground teams occasionally worked with were the South Vietnamese Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) established to conduct political warfare against the Viet Cong. They had a depth of experience with the way the Viet Cong operated and they had an intimate knowledge of the principles upon which the Viet Cong based their propaganda techniques and conducted their military tactics. Australian psychological warfare operators concluded that South Vietnamese government officials and the senior military commanders within the province did not know how to effectively use these propaganda teams because they were suspicious of APTs having had previous affiliations with the VC. The APTs worked for the South Vietnamese government military and civilian officials and would have only come into contact with Australians who operated in the villages of the province. This group would have been AATTV military training team advisors, intelligence, civil affairs and psyops personnel. The Americans responded more positively by publishing through CORDS a small handbook called 'APT Handbook' (1970) for distribution throughout their military and civilian advisors and to other Free World Military Assistance Forces working as advisors. The aim was to educate the advisors to better understand the role of armed propaganda teams. The Armed Propaganda Teams were first formed on 1 October 1964 by the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi as the means for expanding the programme. Each Polwar company possessed an authorised strength of seventy-four men.¹⁵⁶

It was the outstanding achievements of these two initial APT companies that led to the formation of twenty-five additional APT companies in 1965 and 1966. The Armed Propaganda Teams were increased to forty-five companies in 1967, sixty-five companies in 1968, seventy-five companies in 1969, and ninety companies in 1970. By 1970 over 6,500 former Viet Cong soldiers were actively operating against their former comrades. These

¹⁵⁶ Military Assistance Command Vietnam Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development, *APT Handbook*, published by Publications Branch, MSD / CORDS 1970, p. 1. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

returnees provided valuable insights to the operating capabilities of the Viet Cong and helped to identify the families of the VC guerrillas. It was believed that the more important role for these propagandists was for them to operate in the regions in which they had previously fought. The propaganda team members were exempted from call-up in the South Vietnamese Army and were not to be assigned to direct combat duties. They were armed only for self defence during operations undertaken in insecure areas.

Revolutionary Development Cadre

Another group of Vietnamese to be engaged on the psychological operations-style of warfare was the Revolutionary Development Cadre. The tasks of these teams were to identify and neutralise the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the village, and to organise and encourage the people to participate actively in the People's Self Defence Force (PSDF). They were to assist the local officials to organise elections, maintain democratic institutions and bring government services to the people and to initiate and assist in carrying out Self-Help and Village Self Development (VSD) projects that were funded from Saigon. The responsibility for funding and management of the Revolutionary Development Cadre was placed under command of MACV/CORDS on 1 July 1969. The RDC were trained at the National Training Centre at Vung Tau ¹⁵⁷ and assigned to the rural areas where they formed the nucleus of the over-all pacification effort. The concept of RD teams was copied from the Viet Cong 'Action Militia'. There was a similar system for Montagnard personnel and it was called 'Son Thon'.

¹⁵⁷ Ngo Quang Troung, *Territorial Forces*, Indochina Monographs, U.S. Army Centre of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1983, p. 61. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.



Photograph 13 : The writer shown second from right in back row was the Psyops Ground Team Leader with members of the RDC Team at Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy province South Vietnam during 'Face-to-face' POLWAR operations. c. July 1970. Note the 'black pyjamas' uniform worn by the RDC to look similar to the working attire worn by the villagers. No visible weapons were carried in the village during face-to-face operations in secure areas.

In South Vietnam there were 1,555 Revolutionary Development Cadre groups. The American Province Senior Advisor appointed the group's Cadre Advisor to oversee their operations in the province. The South Vietnamese Minister for Rural Development was designated as the Government of Vietnam Revolutionary Development Cadre Project Manager.¹⁵⁸ RD Cadres were organised along paramilitary lines. Initially they were teams of fifty-nine (men and women) in each group, but this was later reduced to thirty-person groups. An RD Cadre member was neither a soldier nor a government official because the Vietnamese peasants saw both groups as hostile. In theory they were trained political organisers who worked among the common people to win their support for a cause through

¹⁵⁸ Project Agreement, US Department of State, Agency for International Development (AID), The Government of United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam draft agreement dated 26 January 1970. Article held by the writer from the time of the Vietnam conflict. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library

their deeds as well as their words. They were selected because they were highly motivated, politically sophisticated and of exemplary character. Each member was trained to relate his cause to the needs and aspirations of the humblest farmer or fisherman. However, the VC viewed these cadre members as well trained South Vietnamese government black pyjama combatants¹⁵⁹ and observed that they had a significantly greater rapport with the villagers than other government civilian or military administrators. They were a direct threat to the VC's influence in villages and hamlets. Their main objective was to organise the population to take care of their own defence against the VC and to raise the standard of living with some assistance from the government through self help and village self-development-funded projects. In 1969 when the teams were re-organised into thirty-person teams they were allocated to more than 1,400 villages in VC contested areas. In 1970 they were given additional tasks in an accelerated pacification plan. In 1971, the teams were further reduced in size to ten-person teams. Each group had a leader assisted by a liaison cadre who acted as an intelligence and medical cadre. Each team had two operational cells each with a cell leader and three cell members. The team members were multi-skilled and occupied positions as school teachers, information cadres, and land-use surveyors for the Land Reform programme. They worked as intelligence cadres in the Phuong Hoang Program, medical cadres in support of village public health and technical cadres in support of public works projects.

These Revolutionary Development Cadre groups were assigned to villages and provided the essential support to the village self-development programs. They generated enthusiasm among the village population and provided the organisational and technical expertise needed to keep the development projects moving despite obstacles and frustrations.¹⁶⁰ The Australian psyops field teams were impressed by these RD teams as they appeared to be the only group that villagers readily accepted, trusted and worked with. In 1970 a number of

¹⁵⁹ Ngo Quang Truong, op.cit, p. 65.

¹⁶⁰ Project Agreement, US Department of State, Agency for International Development (AID), *RDC Input to Revision to the Vietnamese Village Handbook-1971*. Article held by the writer from the time of the Vietnam conflict. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library

these RD cadre team members became interested in politics and through their work in the villages created an electoral base of support from the villagers and from other teams. Increasingly they took over positions in village, district and province government positions, while others were elected to political office in Saigon. It appeared that the South Vietnam Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem (1967-1975) became concerned about these cadre officials because of their popular support in many provinces. This impact led to the withdrawal of funds by the Americans for their work that led finally to the dissolution of the RDC.

The Americans consolidated the US Aid programs and this led to the abolition of the activities of the Revolutionary Development Cadre at the end of 1970. In 1971 all the RD cadre groups were disbanded and absorbed into the individual ministries to serve as civil servants, each according to their trained speciality.¹⁶¹ The RDC was an effective weapon against the influence of the Viet Cong mainly because they lived amongst the people and worked and advised them on a day to day basis.

People's Self Defence Force

The People's Self Defence Force (PSDF) was formally instituted by the General Mobilisation Law of June 1968 in the wake of the communist Tet offensive against South Vietnam's cities. The law required that every able bodied citizen should be mobilised to protect themselves, their family and their community. It was made mandatory for all male citizens aged 16 to 17 and 39 to 50 to participate in the PSDF program with the exception of those who had volunteered to serve in the military and those in the draft range of 18 to 38 years. In addition, elders over 50 years of age, disabled veterans, women and teenagers under 16 were also encouraged to join the PSDF on a voluntary basis in a supporting role. The aim of the PSDF was to organise, train and arm them to such an extent that they would be able to maintain security within their hamlets or city blocks and defend themselves

¹⁶¹ Ngo Quang Truong, op.cit, p. 66.

against small unit attacks.¹⁶² By 1972 the PSDF had over one million combat members, with about half of them armed with individual weapons, and most trained for combat. The PSDF support component was even larger with 2.5 million members. There are different assessments of their effectiveness, but it would seem that 500,000 South Vietnamese citizens choose to defend their homes rather than assist the communists to fight against the Saigon government. The Viet Cong saw the peasantry of the South to be the people that they needed to win over or control so they could displace the South Vietnamese government. The Viet Cong actively sought to neutralise the PSDF. The PSDF were equipped with older style weapons mainly of WW II vintage such as Thomson sub-machine guns and Garand rifles for which limited amounts of ammunition were supplied. These were heavy and cumbersome weapons for the small-framed, mostly elderly, Vietnamese peasants to handle. Most of the PSDF soldiers were in the older-age category and as they worked during the day at farming, commerce or fishing, they were often asleep at their posts at night. The VC targeted these groups by attacking them or urging them, as they said, 'to refuse to serve as soldiers for the Thieu/Ky clique then directing the Saigon government and the US imperialists'. In one incident the VC kidnapped the complete PSDF unit on Long Son Island located in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The PSDF members came back to the village a few days later minus their weapons. Two of the PSDF joined with the VC. This PSDF force had no contact with the VC again and it was assumed that they turned their loyalties to support the VC and their military activities. Curiously the commander of this group was never stood down or replaced and the implications that he had changed loyalty to support the VC never questioned.

Province Reconnaissance Unit

The Province Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) operated under the control of the Province Chief. The PRU conducted special operations to collect and exploit intelligence against the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The PRU supported and participated in operations against the VCI by

¹⁶² Ngo Quang Truong, *ibid*, pp. 66–72.

other forces. The PRU worked with and cooperated with the Australian intelligence unit when they conducted 'Acorn' intelligence operations. They assisted the Australians by assisting in the snatching of VC suspects from villages. This is discussed later in this chapter.

The Unseen Enemy – Viet Cong Infrastructure

The Communist forces against whom the Australians and Americans were fighting in South Vietnam were made up of military fighting members, that is, trained guerrilla fighters plus a large group of ordinary workers who supported the fighting forces in a myriad of ways, but especially in collecting food and resources and in mobilising support from the villagers and town people. The following description discusses how the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) members functioned and how they conducted their campaigns against the Americans and Australians. The Australian Psychological Operations ground team members initially knew nothing of Viet Cong Infrastructure or how the VC infrastructure functioned. No intelligence briefings were given to the operational ground teams and no documents were supplied that described this underground organisation. Over time the field teams slowly gathered details about their opponents from US District Advisors, Vietnamese government officials at the district and village level and through Vietnamese Policemen. The VCI was the communist shadow government in South Vietnam which fought to have the South re-unified with North Vietnam. It was the underground alternate government to the legitimate South Vietnamese Government. The SVN government was not legitimate in some people's eyes. The VCI body consisted of three main components consisting of military, party control structure and communist front organisations. It was controlled ultimately by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in the name of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). The PRP was the southern branch of North Vietnam's Communist Lao Dong (Workers) Party in Hanoi and although COSVN exercised defacto control, the PRP which

was represented at each echelon through the organisation, exercised control through the agency of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN).¹⁶³

This infrastructure existed at all levels throughout the country, but it was those members at the hamlet, village, district and province level who constituted the major challenge to the South Vietnamese Government's Pacification Scheme. These VC infrastructure workers were important in providing support such as food, recruits, intelligence, refuge, money and guides to Viet Cong Units. These communist workers were continually striving to bolster and expand their infrastructure at the lower levels and make the most of every opportunity to establish new cells and re-establish those that had been eliminated by the government and other security forces through military operations, such as the Phuong Hoang, Phoenix and other overt and covert offensive operations. The first mission was to provide an administration and government structure prepared to assume control of the country when the Saigon government was defeated. These members were to gain the support of the people while at the same time eroding the Government of South Vietnam's administration and authority from within. This meant at times the kidnapping or assassination of government officials, such as teachers and Village Chiefs.¹⁶⁴

Situation of VCI in Phuoc Tuy Province 1970

The Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure was the political and administrative organisation through which the communists sought control over the people of the Republic of Vietnam. The organisation embodied the communist party control structure and the leadership and administration of front organisations from the national through to the hamlet level. Without an understanding of 'wars of National Liberation' it is difficult for 'western' non-communists to obtain without acquiring a sound knowledge of communist political

¹⁶³ Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

¹⁶⁴ Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

doctrine.¹⁶⁵ Communist control of the population on its own is not sufficient to gain victory because the infrastructure is not capable of acting alone to counter government operations against it.¹⁶⁶ It is the military units which give it 'muscle', but these military units themselves are dependent on the infrastructure for their existence. VCI members were considered to be civil offenders against the laws of the Republic of Vietnam. They were either members or probationary members of the communist party and they attempted to perform the ideological functions of government by primarily levying taxes and recruiting manpower into their illegal organisations.¹⁶⁷ The VCI operated against political targets and performed executions and political coercion by means of extortion, kidnapping and other illegal means. They were difficult to find because they were well trained and often protected by their family connections. Some of these connections may have actively worked for the South Vietnamese government. The only way to operate against them was by collecting high value intelligence enabling them to be seized in their homes and prosecuted before a court and having them jailed. In a systematic elimination of opposition, they concentrated on province, district, village and hamlet chiefs, schoolteachers, and petty officials, that is, those people who represented the government in the eyes of the people.¹⁶⁸

In spite of efforts made by the South Vietnamese Government and Free World Military Assistance Forces to eliminate and neutralise them, the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) still flourished in most areas of South Vietnam. In 1969 well over half of the food used to feed the NLF and North Vietnamese Army main force in South Vietnam was provided through the infrastructure. In Phuoc Tuy Province, the VCI were well entrenched. The South Vietnamese Government officials showed apathy and lethargy in countering its expansion or in destroying its structure. Nor did the Australian Task Force and Provincial US CORDS Team 89 advisors make any real progress in encouraging aggressive participation

¹⁶⁵ Jack L'Epagniol, *Not by Arms Alone*, in *Army Journal*, no 266, July 1971, p.17.

¹⁶⁶ L'Epagniol, *ibid*, p. 20.

¹⁶⁷ Mark Bailey, *Aspects of the Australian Army Intelligence System During Confrontation and Vietnam*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No 32, Canberra, April 1994, p. 27.

¹⁶⁸ McNeill, 1984, *op.cit*, p. 376.

by the Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centres (PIOCC and DIOCC) of the Saigon government in elimination of the VC infrastructure. These South Vietnamese centres should have planned elimination operations against the VCI based on intelligence gathered from all available agencies. Although these Vietnamese centres often amassed the required information to make arrests and bring them before civilian tribunals to obtain convictions, the intelligence analysis side of these centres kept the information to themselves and the Vietnamese officials responsible to conduct these operations rarely requested the information. Australian intelligence operatives did collect information from the Province and District Intelligence Operations and Coordinating Centres through their own Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILO) and Australian District Counter Intelligence (CI) operatives. The Australians obtained additional information from prisoners of war, Hoi Chanhs, captured documents and other Free World intelligence agencies. The Detachment of 1 Divisional Intelligence unit introduced 'Acorn' operations into South Vietnam. These operations were different from the Phoenix/Phuong Hoang operations carried out by the Americans and South Vietnamese forces. The Officer Commanding the detachment of 1 Divisional Intelligence Unit in 1968, Captain Jack L'Epagniol, had experience in Acorn operations in Malaya while serving with the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade located at Terendak base in Malacca. He said that at least thirty Acorn operations were conducted during his tour, that is, one every two weeks. These operations took at least six weeks to prepare and involved an aerial reconnaissance by the group commanders a day or two prior to the operation being conducted. The helicopter would make a single pass over the targeted area with individuals lying on the floor looking down to identify their 'snatch and grab' group-targeted-houses and to survey and confirm the routes in and out of the village. Previously the houses had been photographed and detailed maps drawn of the plan of the village showing the routes to be taken on entering and leaving the village. At any one time there were several operations in various stages of development and these involved long hours of preparation, planning and discussion. In developing greater effectiveness of these operations the unit's counter intelligence corporals wore sergeant's rank brassards when outside the Nui Dat base to gain greater cooperation with the South Vietnamese and American forces. Intelligence Corps

members arriving in Vietnam as replacements for returning soldiers were inadequately trained for these Acorn operations. A training course was designed and a training programme for all members of the unit was instituted for two to three nights a week for several weeks to bring the unit members up to an acceptable standard to conduct these missions.¹⁶⁹

There seems to be some confusion whether Acorn operations ceased for a period of time in 1969. As these records are not available to researchers, the mystery remains. In 1970 Warrant Officer Class 2, Ron (Bob) Whalan, wrote that the Australian Divisional Intelligence Unit in cooperation with Vietnamese National Police Force recommenced 'Acorn' intelligence operations after a suspension of about one year. The reason for suspension is not clear and the associated files are not available. However ex-members of the Australian intelligence detachment have speculated that the Task Force Commander at that time had little belief in these types of operations and the Commander's emphasis was on intelligence information directed towards the destruction and capture of the communist main and local force military units. Through careful assessment of the collected intelligence, through planning and proper pin-point targeting of the suspects, the unit recommenced these operations. The term 'Acorn' is an acronym used to identify intelligence personnel when using radio communications. The Australian Acorn intelligence operations against the VCI were organised locally by 1 ATF and were not part of the Republic of Vietnam Phuong Hoang anti-infrastructure or the US Phoenix operations.¹⁷⁰

The Australians rehearsed five Acorn operations numbering from 12 to 17 commencing on 25 September 1968. An American advisor with the province CORDS Advisory Team 89 prepared a report on number 17 of the Australian Acorn operations because he was critical of the lack of action by the GVN in this regard. Operation number 17 was a selective

¹⁶⁹ Writer's communication with Jack L'Epagniol, *Acorn Operations*, Received Email 28 June 2007 from jack156@bigpond.com, copy in de Heer collection.

¹⁷⁰ Bailey, op.cit, p. 27,

pickup operation that detained twenty six known VCI or active supporters in forty minutes using a total of forty four personnel and a protection party provided by APCs and infantry. One important aspect of the system was the importance of only seizing from their homes people who were known to be VCI through thorough identification and evaluation, including a minimum of three solid and independent reports. This identification process was an established practice to prevent the loss of credibility that could have occurred in the villages if an innocent party had been seized. These operations had parallels with Commonwealth operations in Borneo and Malaya.¹⁷¹

Warrant Officer Ron Whalan from the Counter Intelligence Section of the Detachment of 1 Division Intelligence Unit noted in a memo to the Officer Commanding the unit that previous 'Acorn' operations had ceased on 22 September 1969. The unit's Counter Intelligence Section recommended that Acorn operations recommence on 17 September 1970. In the seventy days from 17 September to 27 November 1970 a total of eighty Viet Cong (VC) or Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) or Viet Cong Suppliers (VCS) personnel were taken into custody by the unit.¹⁷² They were assisted by the attached South Vietnamese Armys detachment of 10 Military Intelligence Detachment and elements of the Province Reconnaissance Unit working together with South Vietnamese National Police. These arrests resulted in forty-one VC infrastructure or suppliers being picked up and they were committed to prison after being convicted by a civilian court. Seven were released as innocent civilians or because of lack of evidence and thirty-two persons were held in custody. Of these it was anticipated that at least twenty-five would later receive prison sentences as they had confessed under interrogation to Viet Cong activities. Whalan's memo further went on to say that these guilty confessions were gained at their initial interrogations. Furthermore, while seven of them had not confessed, these seven had been

¹⁷¹ Bailey, *ibid*, pp. 28-29.

¹⁷² National Archives and Records Agency. RG 472, Records of United States in South East Asia, United States Military Assistance Command (MACV) Advisory Team 89 (Phuoc Tuy Province) General Records 1603-3A Phuoc Hoang 1970. *Report of Acorn Operations* by WO Whalan, Counter Intelligence Section Detachment 1 Div Intelligence Unit; 9 Dec 1970

identified by three captured prisoners of war. These prisoners were captured at a secret bunker on 23 November 1970 or had been named by other Viet Cong members arrested later and identified as active supporters or as suppliers to the Viet Cong in the village of Dat Do District. Whalan stated that as this was the first Acorn operation in a year, he requested that further operations be undertaken as the Counter Intelligence section had identified a further forty-two infrastructure or supply operatives and immediate action should be taken against them.¹⁷³ Failure of the Intelligence unit to provide operational information to the Psyops personnel at the Task Force Headquarters meant that no planned publicity of the arrests and subsequent convictions could be made involving the destruction of the VCI within the province. This positive publicity, in conjunction with support from Sector Headquarters, CORDS District Senior Advisor Psyops (DSA Psyops) and the Vietnamese Information Service could have produced publicity for distribution around the province to further enhance the image of the South Vietnamese Government. It is possible that a flow-on effect under the Chieu Hoi amnesty program or through other VCI captives could have created a greater influx of information about other Viet Cong operatives to the National Police and other intelligence-gathering organisations. At this time, public exposure of any VCI member had to have been personally approved by the Province Chief or his agent designated for such approvals. It should be noted that Lieutenant Colonel Tu and other senior officers were removed from office during the Easter Offensive in 1972 and some of those officers were brought before the courts for corruption. This approval procedure was intended to avoid disruption of any ongoing investigations by premature exposure of a person. It would preclude revealing sensitive intelligence sources and avoid loss of psyop credibility resulting from inaccuracy. Subsequent exposures that may have included additional information not formerly approved regarding an individual VCI, was also subject to this approval requirement.¹⁷⁴ It was an advantage to the Psyops personnel to

¹⁷³ National Archives and Records Agency. RG 472, Records of United States in South East Asia, United States Military Assistance Command (MACV) Advisory Team 89 (Phuoc Tuy Province) General Records 1603-3A Phuoc Hoang 1970. *Report of Acorn Operations* by WO Whalan, Counter Intelligence Section Detachment 1 Div Intelligence Unit; 9 Dec 1970

¹⁷⁴ Psyop Support of GVN Phuoc Hoang Program, *JUSPAO Psyop Policy Supplement No 1 to Policy Guidance No 106*. 22 April 1971. Copy in the de Heer Collection temporarily located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library, The University of New South Wales.

work with these authorities and to publicise only those convictions that would not have jeopardised other ongoing operations. The Acorn operations were very effective according to an enemy document captured in an ambush in June 1969. The Detachment of 1 Divisional Intelligence Detachment ceased Acorn operations in late 1970 when they were subsumed under the South Vietnamese Phuong Hoang program.¹⁷⁵

Communist Political Training

VC and NVA political training was similar in every communist military unit in Vietnam. It was described in US literature circulated within 1 ATF as the essential element that kept their forces together. All political indoctrination was controlled and directed by the Ministry of Defence, People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong Propaganda, Training and Indoctrination Section. Political Training at company level was detailed and explicit. At regimental level, the units' instruction allowed considerable room for interpretation due to variances in the size, mission, and personnel of subordinate units. Students accepted for political training appeared to come from the working class.¹⁷⁶ The areas of emphasis in the course of instruction for political training were divided into five general categories; the revolutionary situation in the RVN, the international situation, anti-Americanism, civilian proselytising, and popular support.¹⁷⁷

Opportunities Lost

It became evident to the Australian commanders and to CORDS Advisory Team 89 that some South Vietnamese Provincial authorities were counting the VCI eliminated by

¹⁷⁵ Bailey, op.cit, p. 29.

¹⁷⁶ *The NVA and VC Training System from the United States Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam Study (ST 70-06)* dated 10 December 1970. Reprinted in Australian Army Training Information Letter No 4/71 dated April 1971, p. 12. Copy of Handbook in the de Heer Collection temporarily located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library, The University of New South Wales.

¹⁷⁷ Training Information Letter 4/71, ibid.

Australian Task Force units in their combat operations in the jungle rather than seizing and prosecuting the VCI in the villages. Acorn operations conducted by the Detachment of 1 Divisional Intelligence Unit had to be carried out in cooperation with South Vietnamese agencies as a result of acting on specific intelligence captured from documents, prisoners of war, Hoi Chanh, illegal residents and informants. The results can only be described as very successful when compared with the lesser numbers of killed, captured and surrendered achieved by military operations over the same period. A weakness of the Acorn operations was the lack of follow up by other Australian and Vietnamese agencies. Intelligence units are by their very nature secretive and they are reluctant to share information with other units. An opportunity to publicise the results of these combined operations could have created a positive image for the South Vietnamese government, especially as the province was then deemed as 'pacified' or, in other words, under government control. The Australian Psychological Operations Unit and Province government agencies such as Revolutionary Development Cadre and Vietnamese Information Service could have conducted better positive propaganda campaigns throughout the province to publicise the success and the convictions produced by these types of operations. This indicates another failure by senior officers to understand and act on positive information that would have enhanced the South Vietnamese government's image. In addition to the publicity of these Acorn operations, a psychological operations campaign could have been instigated and an appeal could have been made to the population to 'dob in a suspect' with rewards offered for reliable information which would have resulted in the identification of other VCI leaders and may have led to many other arrests and subsequent convictions. The neutralisation of the VCI would have produced immediate tangible results in the Viet Cong because deliveries of food and medical supplies would have been reduced and money and taxes would not have been collected and the recruitment of new members/soldiers would also have been reduced. The failure to act in a positive manner is an indictment on the Australian and South Vietnamese military and intelligence commanders. By this time, Australians at the Task Force level had been assisting in the Vietnam conflict for five years and the opportunity was lost to test new ideas in this insurgent operation that could have been of use in future conflicts.

Viet Cong Ba Long Province (also known as Phuoc Tuy)

The Viet Cong Infrastructure in Phuoc Tuy Province was controlled and directed by the Viet Cong Ba Long Province Party Committee which was located somewhere in the jungle border area of north east Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh province. The most likely area was the May Tao Mountains or the mountain area further east in Bin Tuy province. The Australian Divisional Intelligence Unit assessed the VCI strength as being 290 people of whom at least two-thirds were members of the communist Lao Dong (Workers) Party while more than half could be classified as infrastructure personnel. It is worth noting that two of these Viet Cong groups were engaged in Propaganda, Indoctrination and Training. These groups distributed information about their policies through publications and conducted civilian schools and operated cultural improvement programs in areas where they had control. The group also formed clubs, showed movies, and sponsored live entertainment for the villages during which they emphasised, according to American interpretation, the 'righteousness of the Front and the wickedness of the GVN puppets'.¹⁷⁸ This section's activities, especially regarding schools and entertainment, were viewed as a normal part of the community services usually provided by a civil government. This section was known to increase its propaganda activities and promote aggressive themes before any major VC offensive. At the District level the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section Chief led an organisation similar to that described in the diagram below. The Section Chief was responsible for disseminating news and propaganda, entertainment, and education. There was a renewed emphasis placed on these functions after the 1968 General Offensive. At the province level, the Section was responsible for providing training courses for province, district and village cadres, for publishing leaflets and posters, and distributing books and magazines.¹⁷⁹ The People's Liberation Committee (PLC) was intended to serve as

¹⁷⁸ Military Assistance Command Vietnam, *The Viet Cong Infrastructure: Modus Operandi of Selected Political Cadres (u)*, [MACV, Saigon]. December 1968. Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

¹⁷⁹ Extract from *The Viet Cong Infrastructure: A Background paper*, June 1970. [United States Mission in Vietnam, Saigon.] Copy of Handbook in de Heer collection located at Australian Defence Force Academy Special Collections Library.

transitory organ of control and to be more sophisticated than the mass organisations under the National Liberation Front. Their intention was not only to influence people but also to perform civil administrative functions as would a legitimate government. The PLC was interposed in the chain of command between the various echelon Party Committees and their subordinate functional elements. Directives from the VC Liberation Committee emanated from COSVN and were passed down the echelons through Party channels. Liberation Committee representatives were chosen first at hamlet level and the structure was expanded to operate at regional level. The Party carefully selected such officers and allowed only suitable people to run for office. The appearance of Liberation Committees was the final stage of the VCI takeover, but it is not the critical one as far as indicating VC control. The critical point was the establishment of the Party Executive Committee (PEC) at Village level. When these were formed, the VCI organisation itself was complete. Below is an outline of the enemy political and military structure opposing the 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy province. The structure of Ba Long province is shown below. There is a distinct line between the Party, the Military and the Front Organisations. Those position marked in pink indicate the members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure and are communist party members. Ba Long Province was subordinate to 5 Viet Cong Division (5 VC Div). The communists had divided South Vietnam into their own strategic areas. The area of Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy and part of Long Khanh province was known to them as Military Region 7 (MR 7).




Figure 12: Viet Cong Ba Long Province Organisation




Figure 13: Viet Cong Propaganda & Indoctrination Section

Enemy Political and Military Structure Opposing 1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam




Figure 14 : National Liberation Forces opposing 1 ATF¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Compiled from: M. Anderson, M. Arnsten, and H. Averch, *Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964-1966*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1967, pp 7, 25; Frank Frost, *Australia's War In Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987, pp. 43-52; Adrian. Clunies-Ross, Major (ed), *The Grey Eight in Vietnam*, 8th Battalion, Brisbane, 1971, pp. 122-8.

These organisations and structures described above had to be carefully studied by the psychological operations unit as its teams conducted their political and psychological warfare against the enemy. Many in the unit did not understand that political warfare was quite different to anything they were ever trained as a soldier to do in Australia prior to arriving in Vietnam.

Examples of the Viet Cong's ruthlessness in controlling the peasantry of the country can be seen by them conducting (generally by night) show trials against those they believed supported the government. After a VC people's court was conducted, it was not uncommon for villagers to be made to watch the execution (assassination) of the person. The Viet Cong under the guise of a legitimate court proceeding conducted these show trials, but in reality it was a tactic of terror designed to keep the people frightened and compliant. See Volume 2 Appendix 9 for an example of a documented case of a Viet Cong Peoples Court proceedings in the village of Binh Ba against Nguyen Van Kien.

CHAPTER 4

Formation of Psychological Operations Unit, Training, Programmes and Associated Agencies

*The psychological operations programme is the least understood, the most
difficult to explain, and surely the hardest to measure of any of our efforts in
Vietnam.*

Report on the War in Vietnam.

*The military is based on guile,
Acts due to advantage,
Transforms by dividing and joining.*

Sun Tzu, 500 B.C.

From Chapter 7 The Army Contending.¹⁸¹

The Australian task force was under the operational command of the United States II Field Force Command Vietnam. As the Australian Task Force's superior headquarters, HQ II FFV provided 1 ATF with all psychological operations policy guidance and directives from Third Region Advisory Command (TRAC). While this suited the conduct of military operations, it became a problem in the conduct of psychological operations, in support of Pacification/Development operations, by the need to obtain prior concurrence of the province senior advisor who was an American. In his role as the province single manager for Free World Forces he could exercise the power of veto to 1 ATF proposals if he so desired.¹⁸² The policy guidelines and directives were produced by the US Psyops staff (G5)¹⁸³ at HQ II FFV. 6 Psychological Operations Battalion (US) was located at Bien Hoa and provided support in the form of leaflet and poster printing beyond the capability of the Australians. Under the Vietnamese government, Phuoc Tuy province was a provincial sector of III Military Region and was also referred to as III Corps or Military Region 3. Within III Military Region's

¹⁸¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: Book and Card Deck*, Trans. The Demma Translation Group, Shambhala Publications Inc, Massachusetts, 2003

¹⁸² Australian War Memorial Series 102 [59]. Op.cit., p 7-3

¹⁸³ G5 refers to the staff position within the headquarters. Psychological warfare was the responsibility of this staff officer.

Vietnamese the chain of command the Phuoc Tuy Sector was under command of 18 ARVN Division which was located in Long Khanh province to the north of Phuoc Tuy.

United States Air Force (USAF) elements located at Bien Hoa airbase provided specialist voice aircraft such as the Cessna 01 'Birdog' and Cessna 02B 'Skymaster' push-pull light planes that were specially modified for psyops work being fitted with loudspeakers for broadcast and Earlyword¹⁸⁴ capability-missions. During 1970 and 1971 the Australian Army 161 (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight supplied a Pilatus Porter aircraft to which airborne broadcast equipment was fitted. Leaflets could also be dropped from this aircraft at the same time as the voice tape was played.

Colonel Alan Stretton, Chief of Staff, HQ Australian Force Vietnam, recommended to the Commander, Major General R.A. Hay, on the 14 November 1969 that in light of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, their Audio Visual Field Teams would not be available to support the Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province. Stretton remarked that the Americans were not obliged to provide this support under current working arrangements between the two countries. Stretton said that the loudspeaker teams were of particular help when conducting village cordon and searches and other tactical operations, as well as in support of civil action projects, especially in schools as well as in tasks conducted by the South Vietnamese government officials and Vietnamese military units¹⁸⁵.

The provision of a broadcasting facility had been discussed three years earlier in a letter sent to HQ AFV on 10 September 1966 with the title 'Lessons Learnt' which contained the following comments:

Psywar aircraft have proved invaluable, particularly in cordon and search operations. Villagers have obeyed instructions given from the aircraft and later confirmed that it was because of the loudspeaker in the aircraft that they knew what they were supposed to do.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Earlyword is explained in a later Chapter.

¹⁸⁵ Bruzga to Weir, October 1969, AWM Series 98 file R310/3/138 Part 2

¹⁸⁶ Australian War Memorial File R810/1/9 *Training – Military. General 1 ATF Lessons Learnt*. Letter dated 10 September 1966 from 1 ATF to HQ AFV.

Psywar aircraft were used in other cordon and search operations as well. In Operation Camden 16 to 18 January and 31 January to 2 February 1967 aircraft were used to support the cordon and search of parts of the village of Hoa Long. Aircraft were also used to support Operation Beaumaris 13 to 14 February 1967. Intelligence staff reported in a letter to the Task Force that the use of the aircraft had been effective. Psyops aircraft were mentioned positively in another letter of 14 July 1967 by Task Force intelligence staff.¹⁸⁷

General Hay in Saigon forwarded the Task Force submission to Army Headquarters in Canberra on 15 December 1969 recommending that a psychological operations unit be raised for service in Vietnam. He suggested that the proposed platoon should be capable of gathering psychological intelligence and information, that it should also conduct research and analysis and develop propaganda as well as performing the normally accepted tasks of a psychological operations platoon. The platoon should employ indigenous specialists who could assist in preparing indigenous propaganda and training of special socio-ethnic groups as the means for exploiting the Vietnamese language, customs and traditions in order to persuade the people of Phuoc Tuy to support the South Vietnamese government.¹⁸⁸ Army Headquarters in Canberra which usually seen to work at glacial speed approved Hay's request in February 1970. General Hay telephoned Brigadier Weir on 13 February 1970 to announce Canberra's approval for the establishment of a psychological operations unit.¹⁸⁹

The staff officers at the task force headquarters met to decide on what units in Nui Dat were to supply officers and soldiers to initially staff the psyops unit. On 14 February 1970, Major Frank Cross the newly appointed General Staff Officer Grade 2 Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (GSO 2 (CA/Psyops)) signed an instruction to plan for the formation of the unit. Another planning meeting took place at the task force headquarters on the 19 February 1970 with staff from Saigon in attendance¹⁹⁰ and this resulted in the formal establishment of the task force's Psychological Operations

¹⁸⁷ McNeil & Ekins, op.cit, 2003, p. 427.

¹⁸⁸ Weir to Army HQ Canberra, 5 December 1969, AWM Series 98, file R310/2/138 Part 2.

¹⁸⁹ Hay to Weir 14 February 1970 AWM Series 98 R310/2/138 Part 2

¹⁹⁰ Cross for Commander, AWM Series 98 - 1 ATF file R310/2/138 Part 2 14 February 1970.

Unit.¹⁹¹ The unit was to be a smaller establishment from that originally proposed. All establishment positions were to be filled by Australian officers and men drawn from units within the task force at Nui Dat. Some positions required specific skills; for example the soldiers operating the printing machines had to have had previous experience as printers and the leader of the field teams needed to have previous experience in South East Asia and knowledge and exposure to Asian cultures.

Headquarters 1 ATF issued a raising instruction for 1st Australian Psychological Operations Unit on 18 April 1970.¹⁹² This was in reference to HQ AFV Raising and Reorganisation Instruction 13/70. The unit establishment number was 11/57/1 (TW). The unit had an authorised strength of three officers and nineteen other ranks, making a total of twenty two all ranks in the unit. The military Electronic Data Processing (EDP) reporting number was 96199. Approval was also given to employ five indigenous interpreters and one indigenous artist, although this position of artist was never filled. Records indicate that all personnel were posted into the unit on the 14 April 1970; however a couple of soldiers posted to the Task Force Headquarters prior to the formation of the unit worked with Cross to assist in psyops after Bruzga's return to Australia. Private Dave Everitt (21 November 1969 to 13 April 1970) and Sergeant Russell Tetlow (15 January to 13 April 1970) worked with Cross conducting psychological operations and in the setting up of the psychological operations unit. They were then posted to the unit. The Psychological Operations Unit was classified as a Divisional unit placed under command of 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF) but allotted to 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit (1 ACAU) for local administration and discipline beyond the capacity of the Officer Commanding 1 Psychological Operations Unit.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Australian War Memorial. AWM Series 98 file R310/2/138 Part 2 (letter 1 ATF R310/1/74 dated 28 February 1970. *1 ATF GS Instruction 8/70 – Raising of 1 ATF Psychological Operations Platoon*

¹⁹² See p.100 for diagram showing the establishment of 1 Psychological Operations Unit.

¹⁹³ Ashley Ekins, *On the Offensive*, AWM, Canberra, 2003, pp. 459-461 incorrectly shows the superior headquarters as 1 ALSG. This mistake can be traced to the department of Defence letter - Allotment of Units for Special Duty dated 15 October 1979, A426/1.109 and letter Involvement of Army Units in Vietnam (Southern Zone) from 31 July 1962 to 1 July 1973.

As the unit establishment provided no support services such as cooks, hygienists and other necessary staff for an independent unit, the 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit was made responsible for catering, issue of clothing and equipment and specified military discipline matters. Under the Australian Defence Act, powers of punishment were allocated to different ranks and as the 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel that person had all the powers needed to discipline any of the personnel in the psychological operations unit. In addition, as the psychological operations unit had no catering staff on the unit's establishment, the attachment to the Civil Affairs unit allowed the unit to be victualled properly. The equipment table was given as Tropical Warfare Equipment Table (TWET) 2057 but at the time of raising the unit, the equipment required for operating had not been agreed upon. The unit was allocated a number of long wheel-base Land Rovers to be supplied from other units serving within the task force. The psyops unit vehicles tactical identification sign was to be the number 81 white in colour on a black background. Later in 1970 Vietnamese Army interpreters and Bushman Scouts (explained in greater detail later in this thesis) were attached to the unit. Australian Army bureaucracy can often be very slow in matters of administration, but the speed with which the unit was raised from its initial conception in October 1969 until its commencement in April 1970 suggests that its establishment was welcomed in senior army circles and was possibly driven by the awareness of the quickening US military withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Chieu Hoi Programme

In order to break the integrity of the insurgents and separate the hard core communists from the misguided, an objective approach was taken. The main thrusts of the work undertaken by the psyops unit were programmes under the policy direction of the US MACV and the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information. As the Australians were one of the combat armies that made up the Free World Military Assistance Forces in South Vietnam the psyops unit was required to participate with the aim of demoralising the enemy forces under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme. The Chieu Hoi programme was an amnesty programme conducted by the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi. It was an 'Open Arms' amnesty programme and not, as

some commentators have described it, a surrender programme. An amnesty programme can be described as an offer of political pardon to insurgents to encourage defections from the enemy camp to the government. The advantages of the programme were that it induced insurgent members to rally (defect) to the South Vietnamese government and begin contributing to the South Vietnamese government's cause. The benefits of having Viet Cong soldiers return to the South Vietnamese government side was that it could provide accurate intelligence about the Viet Cong as well as reducing their strength. The benefits to the rallier was retraining and skilling in some trades, money for themselves, families and rewards for weapons, money and goods to build a home and reaffirmation of their South Vietnamese citizenship. Further, it would be seen to weaken the insurgent cause while strengthening the government cause. It would cause dissent and distrust within insurgent ranks and would be directed at citizens who may have recently become involved in the insurgency.¹⁹⁴ The 'Dai Doan Ket' or National Reconciliation programme was an extension of the Chieu Hoi programme and was aimed at the middle and upper ranks of the communist leadership. The South Vietnamese government would, after these soldiers attended re-education training at a Chieu Hoi centre, be given the opportunity to use their skills and gain employment commensurate with their talents and experience in South Vietnamese government departments.¹⁹⁵ There were some suggestions that some Viet Cong soldiers were deliberately sent to return under the 'Open Arms' programme, so they could become agents and obtain information that would be of importance to the VC.

When the South Vietnamese government offered amnesty, it recognised that any organised systemic violence had some political objectives and gave it the status of insurgency as opposed to criminal violence. Since an insurgency threatened the government of the day as a political entity, the government's recognition of an insurgent movement may have placed its own public image at a psychological disadvantage. The amnesty programme was not intended to punish the guerrillas at a time when the government's preference was to punish in order to set an example to others who may have considered joining the insurgency. The government's policy decision of leniency

¹⁹⁴ Twigg-Patterson, AWM file 3DRL/7520, loc. cit.

¹⁹⁵ Twigg-Patterson, *ibid.*

towards its citizens did not necessarily imply that it extended tolerance towards the insurgents. An offer of amnesty did not imply that the insurgency was out of control, although the offer usually indicated that the government was unable to quell the insurgency. This was the case in Vietnam and the amnesty functioned as an initial inducement. The government's aim was to re-establish any returnee back into the South Vietnamese society as an accepted and productive citizen. The Chieu Hoi amnesty tactic reintegrated insurgents by segregating recently returned guerrillas from those suspected or proven hard core elements of the opposing side. It provided resettlement opportunities, paid family allowances, and relocated the person if required. Vocational training, if necessary and rewards were provided for information according to the official scale of rewards. It also provided a retraining cycle to indoctrinate returnees against submitting to insurgent ambitions. Most importantly it tried to ensure that all government promises were kept.¹⁹⁶



Photograph 14 : Lieutenant Colonel Tu – Phuoc Tuy Province Chief presenting weapons reward money to two Viet Cong ralliers. Sergeant Russ Tetlow Australian Psyops looking on in background. Lt Col Tu with other top provincial officials was removed from office during the Easter Offensive 1972.

¹⁹⁶ Twigg-Patterson, *ibid.*

When the government initiated its amnesty programme, it created a special agency to develop policies for its administration. In Vietnam, the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi was the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme. Policy and administrative guidance for it was derived from the successful amnesty programmes in the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion and in the communist insurgency in Malaya.¹⁹⁷

Psyop exploitation of any amnesty programme began when the programme was first established and continued for the duration of confrontation with the insurgents. Insurgents were made aware of the programme and how they needed to take advantage of it. Any appeal was to be tailored to local needs and these varied widely in each area of the country. The programme in Vietnam was designed as a national programme and its primary theme of re-education was conducted at a secure centre within the province. The programme was to support amnesty to voluntary defectors, rewards for weapons either handed in or information about caches in the jungle and rehabilitation. The political and military gains was to be stressed over the insurgent movement as well as the correction of social problems, whether real or perceived, after which the person would be returned to their family and friends. Relief from hardships and danger caused by poor VC leadership, favouritism, and other divisive themes were emphasised during the programme. The exploitation of returnees to make leaflet or voice broadcast that appealed to former comrades and emphasised the government's promises of good treatment were the goal of the programme.

The Ministry of Information recognised that many of the ralliers were likely to have families to whom they had obligations. The GVN provided benefits to families until the returnee could provide for them himself. Some of the benefits available to the returnees were two sets of clothing valued at 1500 piaster,¹⁹⁸ 1200 piaster for repatriation, fifty piaster for food for wives and older children each per day, twenty-five piaster for younger children, and 150 piaster a month for each member of the family while staying at the Chieu Hoi centre. Families who decided to settle in a Chieu Hoi hamlet were

¹⁹⁷Twigg-Patterson, *ibid*.

¹⁹⁸ In 1970 there were 118 piaster to the Australian dollar. In 1971 the exchange rate was 480 piaster to the Australian dollar.

given materials and 12,000 piaster to build a house. This was supplemented with a supply of rice for six months. In addition to these benefits they were given an allowance of eighty piaster per day for working with the Government of South Vietnam or its Allies. Some were eligible to be given 1000 piaster for a house or a previously built government home. A furniture allowance of 2000 piaster was also given. This information was printed on leaflets air dropped to the Viet Cong from targeted Australian operations. Australian leaflets showing the rewards offered such as ATF-063-70 and ATF-086-71 are examples of the leaflets dropped.¹⁹⁹

In addition to the personal benefits there were rewards for the return of weapons. If the returnee was able to lead the South Vietnamese government or other FWMAF troops to weapon caches, they would be paid for those additional weapons and ammunition that were recovered. The following is an example of the values in piasters of the weapon rewards.

Pistols (all types)	1,200\$
Rifles (SKS, AK47, M16 etc)	3,000\$
Machine gun light	10,000\$
Machine gun heavy 7.62 .30 cal	17,500\$
60mm mortar barrel	20,000\$
81-82mm Mortar barrel	24,000\$
81-82mm Mortar (complete)	60,000\$
Anti-tank mine (each)	4,000\$
Individual mine (each)	500\$
Claymore mine or equivalent (each)	1,500\$

Note: the \$ symbol is used as the symbol for piaster.²⁰⁰

Large billboards displaying the reward payment system were placed in villages around the province.

¹⁹⁹ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 304 [294], [310], [371], [388] and [432 Part 1]. Examples of the leaflets are available to be viewed on the Australian War Memorial web site under the unit titled 1 Psychological Operations Unit, Vietnam Conflict. Leaflet numbers ATF-063-70 and ATF-086-71 are examples of the reward system

²⁰⁰ Australian War Memorial. AWM Series 304 [306], [384] and [432 Part 1].

The South Vietnamese Chieu Hoi programme was an example of an effective, well conceived amnesty programme supported by psychological and political warfare teams throughout the country with a high return in cost effectiveness.²⁰¹ Americans believed that the cost to facilitate and rehabilitate the returnees was US\$350 per person. The number of returnees throughout South Vietnam from 1963 to 1972 is shown in the table below:

Official Numbers of Chieu Hoi Ralliers 1963 - 1972 ²⁰²

Year	Weapons Brought In	Numbers Rallied	Cumulative Total
1963	276	11248	11248
1964	358	5417	16665
1965	1222	11124	27789
1966	1516	20242	48031
1967	1536	27178	75209
1968	2196	18171	93380
1969	3091	47023	140403
1970	1942	32661	173064
1971	462 (up to June 5)	20357	193421
1972	Unknown	8000 (estimate)	201421
Totals	12,599		201,421

Note: In addition to these official statistics, many South Vietnamese serving in the National Liberation Front returned to their villages without going through the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme.

The Chieu Hoi returnee figures for Phuoc Tuy province and the provinces surrounding Phuoc Tuy from January 1965 to 30 May 1971 are displayed in the following table. The reason for displaying these figures of the provinces surrounding Phuoc Tuy is that a battle may have occurred in one province and the opportunity to escape the communists and return to the South Vietnamese government could have occurred in another.

²⁰¹ Twigg-Patterson, loc.cit, p. 2.

²⁰² Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Chieu Hoi, *The Policy of Greater Unity of the People: Results of Chieu Hoi Activities*. Saigon, 1971, p. 13.

Chieu Hoi numbers for Phuoc Tuy Province and the surrounding provinces.

Province	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Up to 30 May 1971	Total
Phuoc Tuy	77	278	317	45	121	196	28	1062
Bien Hoa	196	221	396	159	392	376	77	1817
Long Khanh	46	81	84	49	145	201	36	642
Binh Tuy	289	220	199	45	111	227	26	1117
Vung Tau	28	153	327	196	122	56	3	885
Total	636	953	1323	494	891	1056	170	5523

Figure 15: Chieu Hoi statistics from January 1965 to 30 May 1971.²⁰³

These detailed figures above are not complete as they end at 30 May 1971. There appears to be no other figures that show a province-by-province breakdown from 1 June 1971 to the negotiated peace agreement in 1973. The figures show a marked decrease of returnees in 1968. The reason for this could be that many Viet Cong soldiers and their infrastructure personnel were killed during the Tet offensive of 1968. Another contributing factor was that the communists withdrew to their sanctuaries in the mountains or dense jungle areas to retrain, rearm and continue recruitment to their cause. Although there were other battles during the year, the intensity of these were of less passion and the opportunity for people to escape to return under the Chieu Hoi 'Open Arms' amnesty scheme was diminished. Although not shown on the table above there was a marked increase in returnees in the north western province of Tay Ninh which borders Cambodia, in 1970, due to the incursion by the ARVN and US forces into the communist sanctuaries. The difference in numbers were 1968, 293 returnees, 1969, 632 returnees and 1970, 1220 returnees. This increase appears to be as a direct result of the incursion into Cambodia.

²⁰³ Australian War Memorial. AWM Series 98 file R569/1/185 Chieu Hoi Returnee Figures.

1 Psychological Operations Unit - Establishment

Reference: Establishment II/57/1 (TW) notified in Army Routine Orders 30 April 1970 (I)




Figure 16: Organisational Structure of 1 Psychological Operations Unit

Training of the Psychological Operations Unit

Captain Frank Meredith, the first Officer Commanding the new unit, had attended the United States 6 Psychological Operations Battalion (6 POB) at Bien Hoa for training and some officers had been attached to US field teams to observe their operations in the field. The Product Development and Production Team had a short attachment to the Americans in Bien Hoa and gained some experience working with the US printing staff. Field operational staff attended a basic, theoretical, programmed training course designed by the American staff at Bien Hoa. The writer accompanied an airborne leaflet drop operation from a Fairchild C 123 Provider transport aircraft that flew along the Vietnamese side of the Laotian border and dropped over two million leaflets out the rear door from about 8,000 feet. The same type of aircraft (aircraft was not painted, but silver in colour) were also used to spray Agent Orange and other chemicals throughout the country.



Photograph 15 : Fairchild two engine C 123K Provider aircraft operated by the 315 Tactical Aircraft Wing at Tan Son Nhut Air Base flown in Vietnam circa 1970. This aircraft was used at higher altitude by US Psyops personnel to drop leaflets along the Cambodian and Laotian border.

After returning to the Nui Dat base from this basic training at Bien Hoa, the operational soldiers were divided into two teams and placed with US HB Team 2 outside broadcast and

the US HE Team 7 film projection team that operated with the Australian Task Force in order to receive practical field training within Phuoc Tuy province. Lieutenant Andrus was the US officer in overall charge of the American HB and HE teams. It appeared to the Australians that the US training was of little value. The Americans appeared interested only in attending Civil Affairs medical assistance programmes and showing films in Vietnamese Schools. This reduced their chance of exposure to hostile enemy. The US servicemen were about to return to their homes in the United States. The 1 APOU Ground and Air Teams were trained in the use of American equipment they would use, but the training was very basic and no practical tactical training for the teams was undertaken in the field.

Types of Support Offered to Task Force Units

The role of the psychological unit was to conduct psychological operations against the enemy in support of Australian infantry battalions, Special Air Service patrols and armoured elements. This involved airborne broadcasts and distributing specially printed leaflets to have the enemy respond to the Australian forces requirements. The unit was to conduct psychological operations, in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces and Provincial agencies, when they conducted military operations involving the civil population. Civil Affairs programmes were also to be supported on an 'as required' basis. The Australian unit provided support for special operations such as cordon and search of villages, amnesty (Chieu Hoi) programme, Phoenix/Phuong Hoang operations by the South Vietnamese forces, other political warfare face-to-face operations (Polwar), and Vietnamese government social programmes such as promotion of the 'Land for the Tiller' programme and to support refugees being relocated into the province. The command, operational control and tasking of the psychological operations platoon was conducted through the headquarters of 1st Australian Task Force. In the early months of the unit operations, staff direction and coordination was exercised initially by Major Frank Cross

the General Staff Officer Grade 2 Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs.²⁰⁴ Attached as Appendix 3 to Volume 2 is a list of the personnel who served with or were associated with the conduct of Australian Psychological Operations. On the list are the names of two soldiers who were posted to the unit but whose names do not appear on the official nominal roll which was produced some time after the conflict had ended.

Equipment

Psychological operations had not been conducted by the Australian military system since World War II and new equipment had to be provided for the unit. The unit was provided with Land Rover vehicles fitted for radios for use in showing films and carrying out other field activities in the province. The field teams operated as independent groups travelling around the province and not in convoy as most other units were required to do.

The psyops unit vehicles were to be supplied from other units within the task force and instead of surrendering their better vehicles to this new psychological operations unit, the units handed over their most battered and least roadworthy vehicles which had been worn out through carrying heavy ammunition and equipment at fire support bases. As the Psyops unit had to carry out the majority of its duties in villages throughout the province, it was important to use the cleanest and most mechanically reliable vehicles in order to give the best impression to the Vietnamese people. Reliable vehicles were needed so there would be a reduced chance of the vehicle becoming stranded in a potentially hostile place due to mechanical breakdown. If this had occurred it would necessitate a diversion of Task force effort away from combat operations. Brigadier Weir directed units within the task force to hand over their best vehicles otherwise he would confiscate the vehicles used personally by the commanders of the units. The psyops unit thereby commenced operations with clean and mechanically sound vehicles.

²⁰⁴ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 98 File Number R310/2/138 Part 2 - *HQ 1 ATF GS Instruction 8/70 Raising of 1 ATF Psychological Operations Platoon* dated 28 February 1970.

All the vehicles were $\frac{3}{4}$ ton long wheelbase Land Rovers fitted with radio and a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trailer.²⁰⁵ The trailer was to carry generators, sleeping equipment, rations and additional water. Each vehicle was modified to accommodate speakers on top of the vehicle. Below the speakers was a platform for mounting a 16mm projector for showing films to outdoor venues in villages or military posts. The vehicles were fitted with radios (AN/GRC 125) and loudspeaker broadcast equipment. Portable tape recorders could be connected to the loudspeaker and radio. The unit was now ready to carry out its allotted roles and tasks.



Photograph 16 : Private Wladyslaw (Wally) Koscielecki adjusting a loudspeaker mounted on top of a Land Rover at Hoi My South Vietnam. Note the platform under the speakers. This was used to stand a 16 mm film projector on to show films in villages²⁰⁶.

²⁰⁵ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 98 file R310/2/138 Part 2.

²⁰⁶ Australian War Memorial, AWM web site www.awm.gov.au photographic reference JON/70/0387/VN Retrieved July 2005.

Prior to 1966 the Viet Cong controlled most areas in Phuoc Tuy province. Over the period 1966 to 1969 the area was vigorously fought over by the Australians and South Vietnamese forces in a number of large and small-scale battles which altered the status of the province from Viet Cong controlled to Viet Cong contested and finally, to government control. From late 1969 to 1970 there was a greater emphasis placed on 'Pacification' or 'nation building' and the Australian forces continued to maintain the security of the province. The South Vietnamese territorial regional and popular forces (RF and PF) supported by the People's Self Defence Force (PSDF) and other paramilitary forces such as the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) assumed the tasks of population control, pacification and security of the villages and hamlets throughout the province. Involved in the pacification civil aid projects was the 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit whose tasks included construction, maintenance and improvement of roads and bridges; construction and improvement of schools, aid posts, markets and other related tasks and medical and dental aid visits throughout the province. Their funding came from the Australian Department of External Affairs and was administered through the Australian Embassy and Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam in Saigon. The Pacification phase was followed by the announcement of the US and Australian withdrawal. As peace talks began in Paris in May 1968 Pacification gave way to a new phase called 'Vietnamisation'.²⁰⁷ Vietnamisation was the American plan announced by President Nixon on 8 June 1969 that phased out US forces and turned war responsibilities over to the South Vietnamese. The hope was that South Vietnam could successfully oppose the North Vietnamese without US support. Vietnamisation was in response to the declining support for the war among US decision makers and the American public.²⁰⁸ This resulted in the additional training of the South Vietnamese forces and for them to assume more of the fighting against Viet Cong forces. Although at this time peace was expected soon, that outcome was to be delayed. At the same time as the Task Force was operating throughout the province, members of the Australian Army Training Team (AATTV) replaced some of the US personnel serving as

²⁰⁷ McNeil, & Ekins, op.cit, Glossary p. 483.

²⁰⁸ Marc Leepson. (ed). *Webster's New World Dictionary of the Vietnam War*, MacMillan Reference USA, 1996, p. 427.

District Senior Advisors (DSA's) and in other positions within the United States CORDS Advisory Team 89. Some of these Australians served in positions that required them to wear civilian attire, such as in the positions involved in the 'Open Arms' returnee amnesty programme that was concerned with the re-education of returning Viet Cong. Warrant Officer Sam Booth (AATTV) (see Photograph below) was an advisor to the Phuoc Tuy Chieu Hoi Centre.



Photograph 17: Australian AATTV soldier Warrant Officer Sam Booth – Australian advisor at the Phuoc Tuy Chieu Hoi Centre talking to Vo Thi Que who had escaped from the Viet Cong after two years. February 1971.²⁰⁹


Other work for these Australians was with the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information programme, civic action teams and Phuong Hoang (Phoenix) programmes. The military training effort with the South Vietnamese territorial forces, following the withdrawal of the US Military Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT), was entrusted entirely to the Australian AATTV Mobile Advisory Training Teams (MATT).²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Australian War Memorial, AWM Photographic reference PJE/71/0077/VN Retrieved February 2007.


²¹⁰ McNeill, 1984, op.cit, p. 92.

Commencement of the Australian Psychological Operations Unit

1 Australian Psychological Operations Unit was formed on 14 April 1970 and one week later on the 24 April was able to despatch its first leaflet. The production and distribution of leaflets will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters. Field operations commenced on 19 April with two ground teams undertaking field orientation trips with the attached American HB 2 Light Loudspeaker Broadcast Team and HE 7 Audio Visual Ground Teams. This seemed quite extraordinary as the Australian soldiers had not only to build their living accommodation consisting of tents, floors, protective blast walls, paths and ablutions, but had to set up and prepare all the equipment in the Headquarter building. The teams designed their own standard operating procedures as well as the fitting out of their vehicles. Members of the unit travelled to Bien Hoa to pick up photographic and printing machines and install them at the unit. This equipment was on loan to the Australians until they were able to procure and install their own. The building of the accommodation, ablution and washing facilities were largely overseen by an experienced second South Vietnam tour soldier, Corporal Jack Lawson, who came to the psyops unit from 17 Construction Squadron.



Photograph 18 : Tent accommodation 1 Psychological Operations Unit – Nui Dat April 1970. Laundry and Ablution block is on the right hand side of the photograph. Accommodation was located among rubber and banana trees



Map 6: Road Map of 1st Australian Task Force in Nui Dat.²¹¹

Training under the American Psychological field teams attached to the Australian task force was considered to be unsatisfactory because the Americans were judged to be inadequate in instruction or sharing of information. Radio call signs were allocated to the operation teams which was preceded by the codeword 'Litterbug'. That word was a US radio identifier term used when talking about or requesting psychological operations support over the radio network. The US teams confined their training of Australians to escorting the ground teams on visits to schools to show films about health and safety and cartoons that were specially produced by Walt Disney Corporation with Vietnamese language and using Asian images. The Australian ground teams accompanied the Americans on night operations in support of 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit which conducted medical civil aid projects in the province villages and hamlets. The Americans showed propaganda and general interest films to the waiting Vietnamese without explanation to the audience why they were shown. Nor did the Americans train or assist the Australian ground teams in the basic psyops techniques. At this time, the Australian Psyop teams were unaware of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and the role that system should have played in the selection of the films to be shown in different villages.²¹² The HES system was programme instituted by MACCORDS Reports and Analysis Directorate that province and district senior advisors had to assess each village and hamlets under their area of operations. These questionnaires covered all administrative activities that the village was administering, that is civil and military activities.²¹³ Racial differences were also prominent in the American teams that reflected tensions between the whites, blacks (now referred to as Afro-Americans) and Hispanics. It appeared to the writer that some African-Americans were responding to the 'black power' movement back in US cities. The US soldiers often said that they were "ninety days short", meaning that they had less than ninety days left of their tour of duty in South Vietnam with the implication that they were unwilling to undertake field operations that might be dangerous to their personal safety.

²¹²Military Assistance Command Vietnam. *Hamlet Evaluation System Handbook June 1969. and Revised HES Handbook – Question Set and Glossary January 1971.* Produced by Headquarters Military Assistance Command, CORDS, Reports and Analysis Directorate. Lodged in Special Collection, Australian Defence Force Academy Library. Private papers Mr Derrill de Heer.

²¹³ Ibid.




Photograph 19 : 1 Australian Psychological Operations Unit Headquarters building with locally designed and produced unit sign on the road leading to the unit. Circa 1971. Motto – Victoria per Mentem or Victory through the Mind. The motto was introduced by Captain Peter Hudson.

The two ground teams and the air team participated during the first month of operations in the dropping of leaflets and making voice broadcasts from helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. The aim was to train all the soldiers from the air and ground teams in both the ground and air activities. This would provide trained replacements when soldiers were absent on Rest and Convalescence (R&C) at the beach centre at Vung Tau or away for Rest and Recreation (R&R) leave overseas. This training provided the flexibility during operations when soldiers were absent or about to end their tour of duty and return to Australia. Replacement of unit members was made on their day of departure, that is, when one soldier arrived in Tan Son Nhut airport near Saigon to replace a soldier in country. The soldier they were replacing would leave Vietnam on the same aircraft that the replacement arrived on. No time was permitted for any handover, as this would have inflated the military's total authorised figures of the numbers of soldiers serving in Vietnam. Greater

efficiency and less time would have been needed for replacements to be effective in the field if a handover had been allowed to take place for selected specialist individuals. They could have accompanied ‘in country’ serving specialist soldiers on specific training and in-country familiarisation operations in this their new area of operations. After all, no new operational team members or intelligence staff had been trained in Australia for psychological operations.

The training was conducted over real targets and quickly changed to normal operations. All members of the teams flew in US helicopters over suspected enemy base areas or areas the enemy had occupied and made broadcasts from external speakers located on the left hand side of the aircraft.



Photograph 20 : United States Helicopter showing the 1,000 watt speakers mounted ready for operations

The unit evaluation of these helicopter voice missions revealed that the noise from the helicopter rotor wash, particularly when the aircraft banked in a turn, drowned out the

message being broadcast. It was also felt that the angle of the speakers did not allow the message to be directed downwards towards the target and its effect lessened. The use of standard flying patterns over the target area could not be undertaken because of configuration of the speakers. Some broadcast patterns allowed the aircraft to fly in circular patterns along the planned track for the mission. Another reason for rejecting the rotary wing aircraft in broadcasting operations was that the Viet Cong perceived helicopters more as aerial gun ships or troop carriers than as conveyors of peaceful voice messages for their benefit. Reception of the broadcast message was affected by the height of the aircraft's flight. If it flew too high, the message could not be heard and if the aircraft was too low the output became highly distorted from the helicopter background noise. A few months before the psyops unit was raised, the Australian Army's took delivery of the fixed wing Pilatus Porters and were now in service with 161 (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight (161 Recce Flt). Bids had to be lodged for the use of these Porter aircraft for voice missions and for limited leaflet drops through the Task Force Command Post Air Cell. There was high demand for the Porter aircraft from other units within the Task Force and the Air Team realised that it was essential for the psyops unit to plan many operational missions in advance and for 'quick reaction' broadcasts to seek priority use of the aircraft if voice broadcasts were to be undertaken in operational support of the Chieu Hoi program. Other high users of the aircraft were specialised electronic warfare (EW) operators from 547 Signal Unit who used the aircraft fitted with EW direction finding equipment to triangulate and locate Viet Cong radio broadcasting from fixed bases or when transmitting while their units were on the move. Airborne EW was found to be very accurate, especially when used in conjunction with other static ground tracking teams. A sortie pro-forma was designed and used by the headquarters for planning and statistical purposes. Copies were forwarded to MACV for the same purpose. A Leaflet Drop/Voice Mission Clearance Safety form had to be obtained from the Task Force Air Cell when leaflet dropping or voice broadcasts were being conducted. Notification of these airborne missions was conveyed to other units in the field and approval was obtained prior to entering those units tactical area of responsibility. The aircraft pilot required clearances from other Australian units that might be required to fire artillery into the same area over which the flight was being

undertaken or where the aircraft had to traverse through. Information contained on the form was transmitted to artillery units and air force flight control centres as a warning that an Australian aircraft was in or transiting the area. Should an artillery fire missions be called or an attack aircraft enter the area of operations, the Australian aircraft broadcasting would be warned to leave the area so the aircraft would not be accidentally brought down.



Photograph 21 : Photograph showing a commercial model Kudelski five inch reel-to-reel tape recorder broadcasting from inside a 161 Reconnaissance Flight Pilatus Porter aircraft in Phuoc Tuy province. c. 1971.²¹⁴

Voice airborne missions were carried out during the day and night. During the early phases of military operations conducted during 1970, the operational teams preferred planned night operations. There was a belief held by unit members that the local VC guerrilla units would be on the move during the evening rather than being located in base camps. Evening

²¹⁴ Photograph supplied by an ex-member of the psyops unit Mr Tony Schick - December 2005. At times cassette tape recorders were used instead of Reel to Reel recorders.

broadcasts were expected to be more effective because the guerrilla leaders could not readily prevent their troops hearing the message. However, it had been discovered from an interrogation of a returnee under the 'Open Arms' amnesty program that when a voice aircraft had flown over a base camp bunker system during the day or night, the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army Political Officer or other unit leaders would order the soldiers into the bunkers so that the broadcast message would be muffled or not heard. This was the first time it was established that the Viet Cong had instigated any direct countermeasures to the Australian propaganda broadcasts. Other returnees said that they had heard messages, but they were unable to decipher them from the background helicopter noise, or that the aircraft had been too far away. The targets for the pre-planned voice missions were selected by the psyops staff officer (GSO 2 Psyops) in conjunction with the operational staff officers (GSO 2 Operations) at the task force headquarters or by the command group of the unit. This command group at the Psyops unit consisted of the Officer Commanding, Operations Officer and the Intelligence Sergeant. The broadcast areas would be selected by considering where known or suspected enemy base camps or bunker systems were located based on previous intelligence reports or estimations. Other areas targeted were areas where recent combat actions with Australian forces or where it was thought that the enemy might be moving at night, such as routes towards villages. Continuous delivery of aerial propaganda broadcast was made over the province until November 1971. The number of broadcasts varied each week depending on the availability of aircraft, time taken to reconfigure the aircraft after use by others and other pre-planned operations such as the aircraft use as a forward air controller. Generally the selection of tapes was decided by the command group at the psyops unit. On some occasions the tapes were selected by the staff officer at the headquarters.

Use of Superstitions in Broadcasts

The use of superstitions in psychological operations has a long tradition and it was not surprising to find it being used in South Vietnam. The superstition most favoured by

Australians related to the Vietnamese belief that if a villager died violently or outside the village his soul would wander without resting. The heightened manner in which this was used will be discussed below. The American psychological operations were aware of the cultural sensitivity in using this superstition and warned the Australians that it should never be made in close proximity to villages of where South Vietnamese troops were operating. MACV Information Sheet 7 explains information about a number of different Vietnamese Spirits and is attached at Appendix 4 to Volume 2 of the thesis. Many Vietnamese village people hold firm beliefs about the reality of the after-life of their family and friends.²¹⁵ It was important for the Ground Team members to understand these so they did not offend any Vietnamese person when operating in and around villages. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) had advised the Task Force Headquarters through normal distribution of policies that reference to spirits of people existing in an after-life in psychological operations was to be approved by higher levels in Saigon. The Australian task force headquarters failed to provide a copy of this policy to the unit. Unit staff was aware of the use of superstitions from their brief training at 6 Psychological Operations Battalion, but were unaware of the necessity to seek approval before using such techniques. JUSPAO Policy number 36 – The Use of Superstitions in Psychological Operations in Vietnam is attached as Volume 2 Appendix 5. One particular taped message produced by the Americans for general use was the message that was referred to as ‘Wandering Souls’.²¹⁶ It was discovered later that there were a number of versions of this theme of Wandering Souls made by US forces throughout South Vietnam. The version used by the Australians was a taped message about twenty to thirty seconds in length and contained a spiritual theme divided into two parts. The first part of the message could be described as electronic music with a voice in an echo chamber in Vietnamese saying ‘they were wounded and they did not know where they were, they were dying’. In the second part of the taped message the music changed to a slightly weirder and psychedelic style of ghostly music making the voice changes to sound like a spirit voice. The voice declared that ‘I am

²¹⁵ The writer observed the preponderance of family shrines among villagers as a reminder of dead family members stretching back several generations.

²¹⁶ A version of Wandering Souls can be listened to on the world wide web (WWW) at the following address. www.psywarrior.com/wanderingsoul.html

dead and my soul (spirit) is wandering'. This demonstrated how the victim was no longer in the region of the village and his 'spirit' would be condemned to wander forever. In the unit, there was a belief that this particular tape would be better played at night because its psychological power will be enhanced in the quieter and cooler atmosphere of night. The effectiveness of these broadcasts was believed to be heightened during night flights when the aircraft would fly close to stalling speed at about one thousand feet above ground level with aircraft navigation lights switched off. At this altitude, the engine of the turbo propeller driven Porter aircraft was so quiet that it could not be heard from the ground.

Just after the arrival of the Porter aircraft in Vietnam, one aircraft was shot down by enemy fire using a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun during daylight hours just north of the Nui Dat base and both pilots were killed.²¹⁷ While it was felt that flying at night would lessen the chances of being shot down, most missions continued to be flown during daylight and on a few occasions, the VC did fire on the aircraft, especially over the Long Hai Mountains. One particular incident occurred in August 1971, when Private Paul Bishop was on board the aircraft. The aircraft was fired upon during the morning flight and the aircraft was required to return to fly over the same area in the afternoon, but the Viet Cong took no further offensive action. Because the aircraft was not particularly fast, it was an easy target for ground fire, particularly heavy machine gun fire.

The psychological effect of these taped messages even had an impact on some Australian pilots and the psyops observers flying with them. One pilot said the broadcasts gave him the 'creeps' and he often found fault with the aircraft after close inspection that prevented him from flying the assignment. On one occasion the psychological operations staff tricked the pilot by informing him that the 'spooky' tape was not being used. After discovering the deceit the pilot abused them on his return to Nui Dat.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Peter Nolan, *Possums and Bird Dogs: Australian Army Aviation's 161 Reconnaissance Flight in South Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2006, pp. 156-157.

²¹⁸ Base on the authors experience in Vietnam during 1970. Others who flew voice missions in Vietnam make similar claims.

After the Australian Army purchased its own voice equipment the use, quality and range of the broadcasts increased. The Australian sound equipment power output was eighteen hundred watt as compared to the one thousand watt US speakers. The speakers were mounted through the floor of the aircraft and as they were pointed directly towards the ground, they were more effective than the angled speakers mounted on helicopters and the loud rotor blade noise.

The 161 Recce Flt aircraft fitters manufactured a complete broadcast and leaflet dropping module for the Porter aircraft. A selector box allowed the operator, seated in the rear cabin, to select tape, microphone, or rebroadcast of radio messages through the loudspeaker system.²¹⁹ Combat soldiers on the ground were patrolling and ambushing by day and night and did not know when and where psyops broadcast missions were to be flown although clearance had been obtained through their battalion/squadron headquarters. The unit's superior operational headquarters were always informed that voice and leaflet missions were being flown. Patrols sometimes reported voices that appeared to be coming towards them and this created much anxiety as the soldiers at times believed that they were about to be attacked. On one occasion a small five-man Special Air Service patrol on an intelligence-gathering mission operating in the northeast of the province near the May Tao Mountains (a known VC stronghold) heard these voices one night. As they could not identify what direction the voice was approaching from, they hurriedly packed up and left their concealed lying-up-position because they thought the Viet Cong had located them. They hastily fled to a new position. It is not something the SAS troopers liked to undertake especially at night and outside the range of friendly supporting artillery. This information had been collected in late 1970 after the psyops unit approached a number of patrols from different units to obtain feedback on the clarity of the broadcasts.²²⁰ As the soldiers interviewed were not linguists they were unable to confirm that the words were being heard clearly on the ground. They were able to distinguish between the loudness of the voice

²¹⁹ Nolan, op.cit, pp. 163-164.

²²⁰ Author interviewed SAS Patrol Commanders in July and September 1970 on SAS hill to gain information on the clarity of the broadcasts. The unit Intelligence sergeant interviewed patrols from other units.

between day and night time. Many of the nights were quite still and the words filtered through the jungle and some thought they were about to come under attack from the enemy. They were able to confirm that they were unable to hear the aircraft from the ground at night.

Most voice missions were designed to play either standard tapes or specifically designed and targeted messages. The Australian Psyops were able to order a number of these standard tapes from the Americans that included messages of general surrender appeals and other standard tapes directed towards the civil population. These were designed and produced by the American Psychological Operations organisations located in Long Binh and Bien Hoa. The messages consisted of several generalised appeals to the enemy to surrender. The messages recorded lasted no more than twenty to thirty seconds. They were to be played on reel-to-reel tape recorders so that the same message could be repeated many times over and would last for about sixty minutes in all. These general messages could be played at any time including by the ground team during their field operations. The Australian operational teams in Nui Dat produced, with the aid of the unit interpreters, a number of messages that could be played by the ground teams when operating in the field. Scripts were written by the psyops teams to cover particular themes such as cordon and search, surrender appeals, rally instructions, Chieu Hoi instructions, civilian warnings, population control, post air strike appeals and so on. They were used by the ground team as a standard operating guide and were carried by the Team Leaders. They were part of each operational team field kit and gave the team the flexibility to respond to a number of situations that might be encountered in the field. See below for a sample of the messages:

THEME : Cordon and Search.

Attention Compatriots !! The ARVN and Allied Forces are sealing off the area to search for the VC. The operation²²¹ is aimed at bringing you security and a happy life. We are sorry to inconvenience you while operating but we ask for your assistance. Remain in your homes until you receive further instructions, do not attempt to leave the area. Inform the local authorities of any information you have concerning VC activities in the area. (1)

ĐỀ TÀI : Bao vây và lục soát.

Đồng bào chú ý !! Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đang mở một cuộc bao vây lục soát Việt Cộng. Cuộc hành quân nhằm đem lại an ninh và đời sống yên vui cho đồng bào. Chúng tôi rất tiếc đã làm thiệt hại đồng bào trong khi hành quân nhưng chúng tôi đã hỏi sự giúp đỡ của đồng bào. Hãy ở nhà đến lúc đồng bào nhận thấy một chỉ thị mới, đồng bào chớ mắc mưu mà rời vùng này. Thông báo cho giới thẩm quyền địa phương biết bất cứ mọi thông báo nào mà đồng bào thấy nằm trong hoạt động của Việt Cộng tại vùng. (1)

Figure 17: Cordon and Search message. ²²¹

²²¹ Sample Broadcast Messages for Ground Teams. A set of sample messages (incomplete) are attached as Appendix 8 to this thesis. Copies lodged in Special Collection, Australian Defence Force Academy Library. Private papers Mr Derrill de Heer. Taken from an incomplete collection of messages prepared by the Psychological Operations Team at Nui Dat South Vietnam. Probably based on data obtained from US forces.

THEME : Surrender Appeal - NVA

Attention NVA Soldiers - Attention NVA Soldiers -
Once again you have suffered heavy losses by ARVN and Allied Forces - there is no escape left for you. The men who fight for freedom and the National Just Cause do not wish you to die a needless death. Do not die here and become just another body left on the battlefield by your leaders. Lay your weapons down and allow yourself to be captured - do not sacrifice yourself needlessly. Surrender to the GVN and you will be well treated. You will receive immediate medical attention if you have been wounded.
(5)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Các bạn cán binh Bắc Việt chú ý !! Các bạn cán binh Bắc Việt chú ý !! Một lần nữa các bạn chịu một thiệt hại nặng nề do Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh gây ra. Không một ai trong các bạn có thể trốn thoát. Những người chiến đấu cho tự do và Chính Nghĩa Quốc Gia không muốn cho bạn chết một cách oan uổng. Đừng chết như vậy và các bạn chỉ còn một cái xác bị các cấp chỉ huy của bạn bỏ rơi trên chiến trường. Hãy vứt bỏ vũ khí và tự nạp mình. Đừng hy sinh một cách oan uổng. Hãy đầu hàng Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và các bạn sẽ được cứu xử nồng hậu. Nếu các bạn bị thương các bạn sẽ nhận ngay sự săn sóc thuốc men.
(5)

Figure 18 : Surrender Appeal message²²²

The psychological operations unit produced other tapes that recorded messages by willing and literate Vietnamese who had returned under the Open Arms returnee Chieu Hoi programme. These tapes were classified as 'Quick Reaction' tapes. They were produced in a period between a few hours to a couple of days by the person who had returned and were

²²² de Heer. *ibid.*

designed to be played over the area where the Hoi Chanh's ²²³unit was believed to be located or in the area through which the unit had been travelling. There was an expectation that other members of the returnee's unit would recognise the voice of their colleague and this would induce them to surrender. Or at least it might plant a seed in their mind about surrendering. Thus these 'Quick Reaction' tapes might tend to demoralise others in the VC unit. Such tapes had to be prepared quickly before the Viet Cong unit moved away to another base camp or unknown area. These tapes were produced by the Intelligence Sergeant or ground team leaders with the assistance of the attached South Vietnamese Army interpreters. Two such interpreters, Staff Sergeant Rount and Staff Sergeant Chin, were particularly skilled at this type of exploitation. The production of these quick reaction tapes was a two stage process; the first stage was to conduct a detailed interview with the returnee at the Chieu Hoi Centre. A detailed Psychological Questionnaire consisting of 128 questions would be the basis for the conduct of the interview. These interviews were different to interrogations that might be carried out by army intelligence interrogators. They were carried out in a quiet informal manner. After the interview was evaluated, a decision would be taken to try and gain the ralliers acceptance to have them write a letter to members of their former unit. The letter would be made into a leaflet for delivery by air. In addition, they could produce a taped message from the returnee to be broadcast. An example of the psychological operations questionnaire is attached as Appendix 6 to Volume 2. The questions concentrated on their daily routine, morale of the unit, what political training was given, whether they had been exposed to ground or air broadcasts and if they had seen or read any leaflets.²²⁴

²²³ The term Hoi Chanh means 'returnee'.

²²⁴ It has since been established that all the tapes produced in Vietnam by the returning Hoi Chanh's were returned to Australia and handed to the Army Intelligence Centre at Woodside, South Australia in November/December 1971. It is believed that unfortunately the tapes were destroyed when there were rumours in the Military that the newly elected Labor Party intended to launch an investigation into interrogations conducted during the Vietnam conflict. This information was provided to the writer by former members of the Australian Army Intelligence Corps who wish to remain anonymous.



Photograph 22 : In the photograph is Sergeant Wayne Stone with Staff Sergeant Ruong and a North Vietnamese returnee. This photograph was taken at the Ministry of Information Chieu Hoi Centre located east of the province capital Baria in Phuoc Tuy..²²⁵ The returnee was killed by a mine some time later while assisting Australian forces.

Vietnamese Government Organisations and Agencies

For teams to operate in the province, it was essential to understand how the military and civil administration of the province operated. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of these organisations that the ground teams cooperated and worked closely with. When the Australian psychological operations unit was established it was not given information about these South Vietnamese governmental agencies. Little was known about how they operated, their source of funding or how the field psychological operators on the ground were to interact with them. Initially the ground teams were at a distinct disadvantage because they were more likely to become involved with these civilian administrators in their work than with the South Vietnamese military units. The limited training given by the

²²⁵ Photograph from the collection of Mr A. Schick who served in the psychological operations unit. Photograph c. 1971

Americans did not mention how psychological operations could assist in military-based civic action. Also no Australian unit or agency provided the 1 APOU with information on such matters as the secret underground organisations that operated in the villages, known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), or about the provincial government bodies. The unit was doubly disadvantaged in being barred from receiving the very useful and detailed information from the Divisional Intelligence Unit of the Australian Task Force. It can only be presumed that the Divisional Intelligence Unit was only prepared to provide information to the Task Force Headquarters and major units. It may also have been because of their lack of training and understanding of the role of psychological operations and as psyops had not previously appeared on the Australian Army ORBAT failed to appreciate that successful psychological operations relies heavily on current and detailed intelligence. The failure of the Task Force Headquarters staff officers and intelligence staff officers to make a military appreciation of where and how the psyops unit would operate represented a serious failure of military command. This failure became evident in the early stages of ground team operations. The Intelligence unit was seemingly unaware that the majority of the work for the psychological operators would be undertaken in the populated areas of the province controlled by Vietnamese government and Territorial military forces. To overcome this distinct disadvantage in conducting its work, the psyops ground teams had to collect and assimilate much of the information from sources outside the Australian military. This information was collected through CORDS Team 89, National Police, Regional Force and Popular Force units, Revolutionary Development Cadre and United States and Australian Mobile Advisory Teams. A secondary task of field psychological operators was to collect intelligence. The Divisional Intelligence Unit gave no briefings on what to look for, how to report any information received and how the two units could work cooperatively together without interfering in each other's activities. The Task Force Australian intelligence unit also had Military Intelligence Liaison Officers (MILO) visiting and collecting information from some of the same sources as the psyops teams in the field. It can be said that the psyops teams spent more time in the field than many of the MILO operators. Being involved in the 'hearts and minds' campaigns with the civil populace different intelligence information became available to the psyops field teams. This

information was passed on to the American District Senior Advisors (DSA), Australian province MATT Team leaders attached to RF units and to the province Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent based in Baria.

The major problem faced by the unit when working in the province was to understand the operation of the numerous United States and South Vietnamese military, paramilitary and civilian organisations that they would encounter. Soldiers from the psyops unit conducted their own research about the local and military structures based on their knowledge of the makeup and organisational structure of the Australian forces within the Australian Task Force and they deduced that the structure of the South Vietnamese military forces would be similar. Added to this difficulty was the lack of information about how the South Vietnamese civil society operated, that is, what was the village social strata, how was it managed and how should the Australian psyops soldiers interact with social structures at all levels. What were the social and cultural protocols that could be expected to operate throughout the provincial villages? What authority did the Australian team leaders or soldiers have to interact with, or to command Vietnamese civilians or South Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces? The psychological operations unit saw its role as assisting, but not dominating. The older Australian soldiers looked back to their experiences of soldiering in Malaya, when Australians were required to support the civil population. And even then it was only when the civil situation was outside the resources of the local civil command. Malaya was classified as a police action with military support, but the situation in Vietnam was an undeclared insurgent 'hot' war. This interaction became even more problematic during 1971. In some instances young National Servicemen who had limited military and civilian work or life experiences, were required on occasions to command ground teams in the conduct of detailed sociological data collection throughout the province. The intention was for the psychological operations unit to produce a detailed published 'area study' of all the villages and hamlets in Phuoc Tuy province in 1971. This seems remarkable as the Australians arrived in the province in 1966, but it was not until 1970/71 that 1 ATF began to identify the need to carry out this survey. Army doctrine for psychological operations in Counter Revolutionary Warfare

Pam 11, (CRW) published in 1965 said that psyops was 'vital' to a CRW campaign. However, the young soldiers were able to conduct the operation with the skilful guidance of Major David Twigg-Patterson from 1 ATF and the Officer Commanding 1 Psychological Operations Unit Captain Peter Hudson. This Province Survey updated and expanded the original village reports carried out in 1970. There still remained the problem that young soldiers lacked the formal skills and background to conduct psychological operations work. The unit was fortunate in 1971 during this process to be directed by the Task Force staff officer, Major Twigg-Patterson. Although he has been described by a number of people as a difficult person, he was the sole Australian Officer to have received a comprehensive civil affairs and psychological operations training at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg and at other US establishments in the United States. After finishing his courses, he remained at the US school as an instructor for a few months. This was more for Australian military administrative and financial reasons, than for operational factors because his wife had accompanied him to the United States and his posting had to be extended from the time of the completion of the courses until twelve months had expired. By then he had served for one year at the American Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations School. Through this training he was able to command any civil action team or a psychological operations unit. Other unit officers had attended a ten-day Civil Affairs/Psychological Operators course at the Army Intelligence Centre at Woodside, South Australia.

United States Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Advisory Team 89

The first interaction of the psyops field teams with organisations outside the Australian forces was with the United States advisory team in the province known as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). A Lieutenant Colonel or a civilian equivalent commanded this team and he served as the province senior military and civilian advisor (PSA) to the South Vietnamese Phuoc Tuy Province Chief. Other US advisory officers with the rank of Major or Captain and soldiers who were part of that team

reported to him through the District Senior Advisors. This US advisory team amounted to ninety military and civilian advisors located throughout the province. These US advisors had considerable authority in that they supported and advised the provincial military and civil administration in their duties. Although the Vietnamese Provincial Chief was in command of the province, the US CORDS Senior advisor held the final say over the Province Chief by ordering the withholding of US support and aid. A number of Australians worked with CORDS throughout the country, and they were generally attached from the Australian Army Training Team or from Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam. Occasionally they were attached from 1 Australian Task Force. A number of the Australians filled the position of the Psychological Warfare Advisor within CORDS Advisory Team 89. Australians Major Dai Thomas, Major M. Currie, Major M. Farmer, Major Yeomans Smith, and Captain C. Hunter all served as Province Senior Advisors (Psychological Advisor) within CORDS. Warrant Officer Class 2 Sam Booth of the Australian Army Training Team was attached to the Chieu Hoi Centre as an advisor working with his South Vietnamese counterpart. These Australians reported through the US reporting system to the US CORDS Advisory Team 89, with copies of their reports sent to the Australian Headquarters in Saigon.




Figure 19: United States Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, Team 89, Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam ²²⁶

²²⁶ McNeil & Ekins, op. cit. p. 44

CHAPTER 5

Psychological Operations

The roof cannot be stable unless the house's pillars are strong. The national Government cannot be stable unless the village governments are strong

Old Vietnamese saying.

The Enemy

Throughout the period of deployment of 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy province, one of the most formidable forces with which the task force had to contend was D445 VC Local Force Battalion, a sub-unit of Ba Long Province. D445 was not a main force battalion but it repeatedly exhibited characteristics which caused it to be ranked at least equal in capability to the main force units. Other units operating in or near Ba Long Province, were units such as the battalions of 33 NVA Regiment, 274 Regiment, 275 Regiment, 74 NVA Rocket Regiment and D2 Battalion of SR 4. Indeed, D445 in early 1971 was assessed as clearly superior to the battalions of 274 Regiment, which suffered from morale problems. The enemy made full use of propaganda as they fought a more comprehensive political campaign. They used propaganda in the villages, fear by executing government officials or persons who were seen to be cooperating with the South Vietnamese government or other FWMAF units or personnel.

An Example of Information Obtained from a Returnee

The Detachment of 1 Divisional Intelligence Unit (Det 1 Div Int Unit) carried out on behalf of all the Australian forces in Phuoc Tuy province the first response detailed interrogation of detainees, whether they were captured enemy fighters, returnees, illegal residents or

innocent civilians caught in 'non-civilian' access areas. Brief summaries of these interrogations were published in intelligence summaries (Intsum) which were issued daily. General information on these detainees appeared in the body of the Intsum or at times detailed reporting of the information obtained was attached as an appendix. The person was then handed to the South Vietnamese forces at the province headquarters. An example of the information obtained is as follows.

A Hoi Chanh returnee, Nguyen Van Nhuong aka (also known as) Nguyen Van Loc originally came from the coastal village of Phuoc Hai in Phuoc Tuy province and joined the Viet Cong in 1960 and was admitted to the party on 29 July 1969. He became a company commander in the Viet Cong Local Force D 445 Battalion which operated in and around Phuoc Tuy province. He rallied under the 'Open Arms' programme on 29 July 1969 and the reason for rallying was he said was due to increased allied military pressure (presumably from FWMAF in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy province) in their operational area and he became convinced that the Viet Cong would not win the war. This returnee was debriefed by US forces and a report forwarded to all the units in the VC's area of operation. He had also been recently reprimanded by the Battalion Commander but the arrest of his girlfriend by the GVN was the final factor leading to his return. He supplied his interrogators with information about the communist Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN) Directive number Eighty Four regarding the upcoming nature and objectives of the 1969 Fall (Autumn) Campaign. The Tet campaigns on 1968 and 1969 were military failures, although much political ground was won. Directive Eighty Four called for Viet Cong Party and Operational units to switch from emphasis on military objectives to conduct a new major political campaign designed to gain popular support for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). He stated that there would be no 'general offensive' or large scale attacks by VC military forces. The campaign would be in two phases with the first phase beginning in August 1969 and ending in the first week in September. During the first phase, emphasis would be placed upon capturing specifically targeted hamlets and villages for a few hours for sufficient time to enable the political elements to propagandize the people. The primary theme of the political effort would focus on publicising the VC message about the forthcoming pullout of US troops, and the dire consequences to befall

*those who fail to take advantage of what may well be the final opportunity to join in support of the VC cause.*²²⁷

The COSVN Directive emphasized that the US was facing failure in South Vietnam and it was for this reason that they were withdrawing their troops. The first phase would be the withdrawal of twenty-five thousand troops. Nhuong went on to say that the US was trying to maintain its strength in Vietnam as long as possible, and those troops being withdrawn were primarily wounded and disabled soldiers. He also stated that the US in the near future intended to withdraw a further 50,000 to 100,000 troops. They were told at the conference that the success in the political struggle would ensure that the Americans remove all of their troops from South Vietnam.²²⁸ D 445 Battalion was given the responsibility for supporting the political elements in the hamlets and villages in Phuoc Tuy province from Dat Do to Phuoc Hai along route QL 44, Dat Do to Long Tan along QL 52 and from Cong Dau to Long Dien along QL 23.

Not only was valuable intelligence given by this returnee, but with the information collected and with the ralliers consent he was able to be exploited by the Americans who supported the Australians at this time with the production of leaflets and voice tapes. For a ranking enemy officer to rally indicates that the Viet Cong were able to be demoralised by constant harassment by the FWMAF ground and air operations and by constant follow up by bombarding them with propaganda voice and leaflet messages.

A Case Study of the Use of Broadcasts in Battle Situations

The following account provides an example of the circumstances of the use of ground and aerial broadcasts directed against the Chau Duc Guerrilla Unit in a battle situation near the village of Hoa Long. These events of 11-12 August 1970 were triggered by information

²²⁷ Australian War Memorial AWM Series 98 [115], [D/1/11A], Phuoc Tuy Ralliers and Agents

²²⁸ AWM *ibid.*

provided by an Australian counter-intelligence soldier²²⁹ who was stationed in the village of Hoa Long by the Australian Divisional Intelligence Unit. He liaised with the Commanding Officer and Operations Officer of the 8 RAR each afternoon at Nui Dat. He reported that a group of VC soldiers were expected to enter the village that night to collect food and other supplies. It had become a practice of 8 RAR sub-units to set ambushes close to the village with the intent of interdicting these incursions. By aggressive patrolling and ambushing, the battalion was trying to deny the enemy the opportunities to enter the village for re-supply and recruiting purposes. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Keith O'Neill, was familiar with the communist fighters' need to obtain food, money and intelligence from local villages from his experience in fighting against the Malayan Communist Party members during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s. The incursion of the VC soldiers into Hoa Long was expected, since captured documents from the unit, plus information received from Hoi Chanh, reinforced by information provided by agents to the Divisional Intelligence detachment Counter Intelligence operative, Corporal Ron Partis, indicated the unit was running low on food and medicines.²³⁰

A platoon of C Company 8 RAR under command of Sergeant Chad Sherrin ambushed close to the south-western side of the village and detected a party of between fifty and sixty people entering the village.²³¹ Sherrin did not engage them because the range was too great and because of the darkness of the night so he relocated his group closer to the area that the VC entered the village. At about 3.30 am the VC party emerged from the village using the same exit as they had entered. Sherrin's party engaged the group and called in artillery support from Nui Dat in the form of flares to illuminate the battlefield.²³² At approximately 4.00 am the Psyops Team Leader Team A²³³ Sergeant Derrill de Heer was woken by Major

²²⁹ Telephone interview October 2005 with Mr Ron Partis an ex-member of the Detachment of 1 Div Int Unit in South Vietnam.

²³⁰ Telephone interview de Heer/Partis of 26 June 2007

²³¹ Robert A. Hall, *Combat Battalion: The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2000, pp 69 and 145

²³² A. Clunies-Ross, (ed). *The Grey Eight in Vietnam: The History of Eight Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment November 1969 – November 1970*, A fuller description of this action by 8 RAR is on p. 103, and pp 109-117.

²³³ The writer was the team leader of Team A in the incident.

Cross the GSO 2 (Psyops / CA) from 1 ATF and told to collect his team and be prepared to travel by night to the battlefield area to support the operation by providing ground broadcasts directed at the Viet Cong urging them to surrender. The team was assembled and expected to be escorted to an area by an armoured group for protection as each psyop team was unable to provide their own protection. No support arrived, so the team drove their single unescorted Land Rover towards the ambush area without lights. Australian centurion tanks had been placed in various blocking positions in case the VC moved in their direction. The psyops team encountered one of these tanks on the road to the northwest of the village. Because there were other armoured units (APCs) in the area, road travel clearance was obtained by radio from the Task Force headquarters before the psyops vehicle moved towards the ambush position. Still without any supporting troops (Team A radio call sign Litterbug 11) the psyops team stopped on the main bypass road (Route QL 2) west of the village of Hoa Long not far from the Australian ambush position and by using the vehicle-mounted speakers, the team broadcast surrender appeals to the guerrillas. They were instructed to hide their weapons, wait to first light and come forward and surrender under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme under which they would be treated well.

The team leader (de Heer) believed that additional messages would be more effective if made by aerial broadcast and requested Nui Dat to provide a US Psyops aircraft based at Bien Hoa to be made available at daylight to broadcast messages by using the 'Earlyword' broadcasting technique. The 'Earlyword' system allowed a person standing on the ground with a radio to transmit their spoken message through the aircraft radio system to external broadcast speakers directed downwards towards the target area. At the same time the message could be recorded on a reel-to-reel tape recorder in the aircraft and stored so that when the radio broadcast finished the aircraft operator could play the message from the

recorder through the broadcast speakers towards the targeted area.²³⁴ This allowed the message to be broadcast over a much wider area.

The ground team did not have portable broadcast equipment with them and no protection party was available to escort and protect them if they had ventured into the battlefield. An aircraft could fly independently further away from the killing zone of the ambush repeating over and over the same message. An American Air Force Cessna O2-B 'Skymaster' Psyops aircraft appeared before dawn and the psyops commander requested the aircraft to fly so the message transmitted by Earlyword would be broadcast over an area further south and west of the village. It was further requested that the aircraft then fly to the west and northwest of the village closer to the Nui Dinh Mountains where the VC troops were known to have base or transit camps. Previous intelligence had indicated that they used this area when travelling back to their other base areas at Slope 30, Hat Dich or Xa Bang in the Duc Thanh district to the north. The aircraft was asked to use a different taped message over this area incorporating the standard surrender appeal. After these arrangements were confirmed, the team took fingerprints and photographs of some of the nineteen dead VC soldiers for identification purposes. The Hoa Long National Police detachment and Regional Force soldiers conducted searches within the village and detained six people as prisoners of war. After interrogation, three of these were reclassified as Hoi Chanh under the Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme. In addition, one other guerrilla surrendered to the Hoa Long Police as a Chieu Hoi. Over the following weeks, psyops Team A visited a number of surrounding hamlets and villages to obtain identification of the dead soldiers. Several village officials were able to identify some of the dead and some other villagers were able to supply information about the identity of others. It was estimated that this Australian ambush against the Viet Cong Chau Duc unit reduced its size by fifty percent. Other factors relating to guerrilla fighters who were not backed by a large supply line, took their toll such as sickness, poor food, lack of medical supplies and being constantly on the move

²³⁴ Earlyword is a Codeword of US Origin, named after a communications relay station in orbit as explained in a US locally produced manual in South Vietnam called *Field Team Handbook* designed for newly assigned psyops personnel to Vietnam that may be assigned to a Field Team during their tour

from the harassment of the Australians forces who were constantly on patrol. The only avenue open to the VC soldiers was to surrender under the Chieu Hoi programme offered by the South Vietnamese government and supported by the Australians. This came to look increasingly attractive to many of these guerrilla fighters. It is not known how many Chau Duc members returned under the amnesty programme over the next couple of months as some would have returned to the government in Duc Thanh or Long Le district. Some may have travelled north and returned in Long Khanh province. What we do know from those returning was they were hungry and tired or moving from one camp to another after contacts with the Australians. The organisational structure of Chau Duc is shown below.




Figure 20: Organisational Structure of the enemy in Chau Duc District. The VCI are communist party members.

Australians forces maintained patrols and ambushes against the remaining soldiers of the Chau Duc unit. They were severely restricted in approaching the villages that normally sustained them with supplies and therefore they were constantly on the move from their base camps in the Duc Thanh district. This reduced their operational capacity to fight the Australians or to attack South Vietnamese government organisations or units. They were also suffering from the lack of re-supply by D2 of SR 4 from the Cambodian border due to the earlier successful March to June 1970 cross-border incursion against the North Vietnamese bases by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam supported by United States forces.²³⁵

Over the next few weeks, several members of the enemy Chau Duc guerrilla unit returned under the Chieu Hoi scheme to the South Vietnamese government. This was the first occasion that a combat unit had received active support of the Australian psyops unit during a combat action. Psyops until then had only been involved in cordon and searches operations of villages, Polwar activities and civic action projects. Having shown its effectiveness on the battlefield, Team A was then deployed to the jungle in different areas north-west of Nui Dat with a detachment of armoured personnel carriers and supporting infantry to broadcast further surrender appeals. However, the commander of the APC Troop would not allow the team to broadcast such appeals on the grounds that the enemy would not approach the territory in which he intended to ambush if the broadcasts were made. This troop commander was unaware of the intentions of the Task Force commander's instruction about the real reason for the deployment, which was to demoralise the enemy after the loss of a substantial portion of the unit. This demonstrates how untrained combat forces and their commanders were unaware how to use or deploy combat psyops field teams. As demonstrated by the above case, the enemy could be persuaded not only to abandon engagement in a fire fight but also to surrender without firing a shot. The 8 RAR patrols intensified in the Chau Duc area of operations and over the next couple of months more than half of the remaining Chau Duc guerrilla unit was eliminated. The 1 Psychological Operations Unit prepared Hoi Chanh messages in both tape recordings and in leaflet form using

²³⁵ John M. Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War*, University Press of Kansas, 2005, Chapter 3.

information from the returning Chau Duc VC soldiers to be distributed over the same area. This attracted more defections over time from among the VC soldiers. Although this operation of winning returnees was conducted by Australians, many of the returning VC soldiers handed themselves in to National Police or to Regional Force soldiers in the villages in Phuoc Tuy province. Others travelled north and surrendered in Long Khanh province. A number of the returning VC who were interviewed at the Provincial Chieu Hoi Centre said they had been told by their Political Officers that Australians were cannibals and that if they didn't eat them, they would take them by helicopter and drop them into the South China Sea. It should be recognised that success in psychological operations can only be achieved if the ground war is proceeding well and the local inhabitants are seen as supporting the government against the enemy.

A Small Example of Broadcasting and Partygoers

1 Australian Reinforcement Unit (1 ARU) held a pool of soldiers, newly arrived in theatre, ready to reinforce other 1 ATF units requiring replacements for those soldiers lost through death, injury or through returning to Australia at the end of their tour. There was a tradition of having soldiers who had just arrived in country to place their name on a list if they wished to attend some local activities. The list was placed near the Other Ranks 'boozer' (soldiers' wet canteen) in full view of other soldiers. These activities were called the 'Hoa Long Dance' or the 'Dat Do Dogs' after two of the local villages. These entertainments did not exist, but it provided amusement for the old hands to see newly arrived soldiers get dressed up in their good polyester uniforms and wait for a truck at the soldiers club. The truck would not arrive and the new soldiers would be stranded. Most saw the joke and played along with it. However, this particular night a vehicle arrived and took them to the front gate of the task force where the Military Police informed them they could not leave the area as the road was mined and they were to return to their unit. The Military Police on this occasion were in on the joke. Some soldiers came back to the 1 ARU soldier's canteen, but others, still believing that the dance was to be held, decided to walk unarmed to the village of Hoa Long about one to two kilometres south of Nui Dat. The route took them through dangerous territory. Their departure was noticed by the perimeter guards and to avert a potential disaster, the Psyops unit was contacted for assistance. The psyops team initially conducted broadcasts from the task force perimeter but were concerned that

these broadcasts might not reach the soldiers if they had travelled beyond 800 to 1000 meters range of the broadcast. This range was the limit of broadcasts in the still cool air of night time. The psyops personnel then requested an Earlyword mission to fly over the area to broadcast to the soldiers to tell them to stop where they were and hide until morning. As well as possible enemy patrols there were a number of Australian ambushes in the area and the Hoa Long village had regional force soldiers guarding the village placing them in danger of being shot if they tried to enter the village. The psyops ground vehicle continued to broadcast from the 1 ARU perimeter and other locations within the task force perimeter. The 1 ARU soldiers hid in some bamboo and at first light the next morning the psyops operators flew over the area again broadcasting to them. They were found and returned to their unit not aware that they were within 200 to 300 metres of an Australian ambush position. They were lucky to survive the long standing joke about the 'Hoa Long Dance' and if these airborne and land-based broadcast elements had not been available there might have been a tragedy. This proves that if ground troops have lost their communication ability then clear instructions can be broadcast to them via psyops broadcast aircraft. This technique combined with ground broadcasts from a psyop vehicle from the 1 ATF perimeter appears certain to have saved a number of Australians that Saturday night in about July or August 1970. This use of psyops assets was something not envisaged when DIB Pam 11, CRW was written.

While this incident had its amusing and serious sides, it demonstrates the effectiveness of ground and airborne broadcasts. They can also be used to coordinate the search for lost personnel or help elements on the ground rejoin separated friendly elements. Additional applications such as base alert announcements, support for civil action projects, traffic control, intelligence collection and airborne recording of signals received, provided a useful capability to the Task Force.

The Cambodian Operation from a Psyops Perspective

In March 1970, the US MACV decided to attack the Ho Chi Minh trail in the southern part of Cambodia in order to stop military supplies entering South Vietnam down the Ho

Chi Minh trail from the north or through the Sihanouk trail in the south. The US thinking was that if the COSVN forces were denied supplies from the north via the trail or from the Sihanouk trail in the south then their activities would decline. An intense US bombing campaign was launched in that part of Cambodia and South Vietnamese forces, together with US forces, launched a limited incursion into Cambodia.²³⁶ The effect of this operation in Phuoc Tuy province was expected to be a reduction in supplies available to the local guerrilla forces and COSVN issued directives to local fighters in South Vietnam's Military Region 3 and 4 that they would have to source their own local supplies for the time-being. This was going to make an impact more severely in the communist area known as Military Region 7, and especially the areas of Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces as they were on the coast of South Vietnam and much further away from the Vietnamese Cambodian border.²³⁷ As major supplies were lost and replacements were seen to be a long way off, their position became worse. General Abrams believe that by destroying these border sanctuaries, the operations bought time for the FWMAF to increase pacification tasks and allow some US withdrawals from the war zone.²³⁸

As the Cambodian campaign progressed and news of the successful results was released through MACV headquarters in Saigon, the South Vietnamese government wanted this news to be conveyed to the people of South Vietnam. The Province Chief and the US CORDS Advisor did this through the Vietnamese Information Service. The Australians conducted a leaflet and voice broadcast campaign to inform the local Viet Cong of the success of the operation, and the losses incurred by the units located over the border in Cambodia. This was designed to further demoralise Viet Cong fighters. Standard mass-produced tapes about the Cambodian campaign were supplied by the American 6 POB to the Australian unit and a number of missions were flown over the province, particularly in areas where bunker systems were known to exist or over known or suspected VC strongholds such as the Long Hai, Nui Dinh, Nui Thi Vai and the May Tao mountain complexes.

²³⁶ Shaw, *ibid*, Chapter 2.

²³⁷ Shaw, *ibid*, Chapter 9.

²³⁸ Shaw, *ibid*, p. 153.




Figure 21 : The first ATF Leaflet ATF-007-70 giving the initial results of the Cambodian Campaign.²³⁹

To further publicise the South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia, the Australian psyops unit produced the following leaflet (Leaflet ATF-007-70) and dropped 100,000 copies of the leaflet over the province. The leaflet provided the following information:

News report for Communist soldiers. ARVN operations in Cambodia.

1. For years your supplies have come from bases in Cambodia.
2. In response to a call for help from the Cambodian Government the GVN ordered ARVN to go to Cambodia and destroy communist headquarters, base areas and caches.
3. These are the results of the Cambodian Operation by the ARVN and allies from 1 May to 13 May:
 - 5,500 Communist soldiers killed.
 - 9,076 different weapons captured.
 - 1,859 tons of rice captured.
 - 163 trucks captured.
 - Large quantities of ammunition, medical supplies and other essential military equipment have been captured.
4. President Thieu said on 12 May that the GVN forces will remain in Cambodia so long as the communist aggressors maintain bases and military forces there.

This means that now:

²³⁹ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 304 [250] and [322].

1. You have lost your sanctuaries in Cambodia. This is a very serious defeat for the VC/NVA forces.
2. You have lost large quantities of weapons, ammunition, medicines and rice.
3. Your hardships will become even greater now.
4. The GVN has proved to the whole world that it is too powerful for the communist aggressors. Sooner or later you will fall victim of the mighty ARVN and be buried in the jungles or in the hills away from your loved ones. Think about this! What will happen to you now?

This leaflet was followed up with another (ATF-008-70) providing an update on the number killed, weapons captured and the number of vehicles destroyed. MACV issued reports on the Cambodian incursion to all units under its command. The General Staff Officer Grade 2, Major Cross 1 ATF, consulted with the Officer Commanding the psyops unit and extracted such information from the MACV reports to be shown on the leaflets. At the same time as the psyops unit was printing leaflets the US was also printing similar leaflets for distribution throughout the country. In retrospect it may be argued that more propaganda could have been produced by the unit about the success of the Cambodian campaign. The Vietnamese and the US forces ability to slow the supply of men, arms, medicines and food to the communist forces could have made through more broadcasts as a measure for emphasising the vulnerability of their supply line and that the only thing for them to do was to return under the amnesty programme before it was too late to do so.

Ground Team Field Operations

In the early days the Australian psyops ground teams divided the tasks to be carried out in the province between the two ground teams. The secondary mission of these teams was to interview village officials and collect extensive sociological data about the village. In 1971 under Major Twigg-Patterson's direction, Captain Hudson sent teams to update and collect additional information and data from the village civil and military administrators, National Police and Revolutionary Development Cadre. The information already held on each village and hamlet was reviewed and comprehensively updated. It was obtained by ground team operations and involved a team operating in a village for up to five days. Comprehensive lists of questions were prepared for each visit to a village. From these reports a detailed demographic, sociological intelligence report on Phuoc Tuy province was produced. This information was used in planning


future operations in the village and elsewhere and the unit produced this information in book-form for distribution to each Australian unit and to the headquarters.²⁴⁰ In the early stages of the unit's formation and because of the lack of direction given to the Australian teams, the team leaders liaised with the US District Senior Advisors to see how they could work together so that the different Australian, South Vietnamese military and Vietnamese civilian teams would not be duplicating each other's work. The weekly timetable provided for an Australian team to work during daylight hours throughout a district accompanied by Revolutionary Development Cadre teams, Armed Propaganda Teams, and Vietnamese Information Service workers. The focus of these teams was concentrated on visiting families that had members or relatives in the communist forces. These families would be identified by the District or Village National Police and their names appeared on a 'black list'. The RDC also kept a 'black list' on villagers. The list would also include known and suspected suppliers to the Viet Cong who provided food, taxation and intelligence. The teams would emphasise to these families what benefits would be available if their relative returned to the government under programmes that would assist them with food and housing, retraining in selected skills and the provision of funding for a period of time, usually six months. The Australian teams reported that it was particularly satisfying when working with the Armed Propaganda Teams because they had extensive knowledge about how the communists indoctrinated their followers that ensured them their continuing support in the war.

The Psychological Operations Unit worked at times with the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) by supporting them in their activities. In the hope of increasing morale the Australians informed the population about new government policies and the programmes that were available to the people. Television was available in South Vietnam in limited areas and it was used by the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) as a means for providing entertainment, news and propaganda. The VIS personnel had commercial radios attached to speakers, which they used to broadcast programs and messages to the local people in static locations such as market places, from village offices and village squares. If a village was considered to be secure, a television set was

²⁴⁰ Unpublished Report: *Phuoc Tuy Province Survey*. Produced by 1 Psychological Operations Unit, Nui Dat South Vietnam. c.1971.

set up near the village market, village office or school on a stand about ten to fifteen feet above ground, powered by a small portable generator because most villages were without electric power. Thirty minutes after the night-time government television broadcasts ceased the internal village curfew would come into force. The major problem with the VIS television broadcast was with the equipment. Many of the television sets broke down. There were no adequate replacement or maintenance systems for the television sets. Over time the coverage was severely diminished. Failure to have a satisfactory repair or replacement TV and radio system in place diminished the effectiveness of getting government messages to the people.

On some occasions the Australians supported Vietnamese Cultural Drama Teams who sang, danced, and performed in comedy and drama acts on temporary stages, sometimes on the back of vehicles parked in the village. Some skits were designed to convey very subtle propaganda messages to the audience to demonstrate the virtues of the Saigon government and the drama teams were very popular with the villagers.



Photograph 23 : Example of Cultural Drama Team performing on the back of a truck. Sound system provided by Psychological Operations Ground team.²⁴¹

The Psyops team also arranged other forms of entertainment when Australian medical civil action programmes were being conducted in the village. The 16 mm films were

²⁴¹ Photograph supplied by unknown ex-member of 1 Psychological Operations Unit

obtained from the Americans in Saigon or Long Binh and depending on the classification of the village under the Hamlet Evaluation System, the types of films shown ranged from light propaganda to heavy propaganda intermixed with other entertaining films. One popular locally produced film was named 'Exodus' which portrayed the exodus of the Catholics and government officials from North Vietnam to the South during 1954. Some United States documentaries were shown, but were not without their cultural problems such as films about the successful US moon landings. Although the commentary was in Vietnamese, it was felt that the subject matter was too difficult for local peasants who would have had difficulty reconciling such dramatic events with their humble lives as peasants. A secondary aim of showing pictures was to distract the people from watching the medical teams treating the villagers. The last aim was to provide the village with pure entertainment using films that were in English, but with plots that could be easily followed. An example of this occurred during August until October 1970 when the unit showed a series of American 'Cowboy and Indian' films that was noticed to have an effect on the local children who were seen the following day placing feathers in their hair and playing the part of Indians. Taking on this distant unknown culture gave relief and some pleasant distraction to the children in the villages. In another village called Binh Gia, the Roman Catholic priest who led these Catholics out of North Vietnam ²⁴²and settled the eight thousand refugees in a village in Duc Thanh district requested 1 APOU to show any religious movies that the unit was able to borrow. The only picture that the unit could obtain was the movie 'The Robe' which was the story of Jesus. The dialogue was in English but one of the younger priests narrated the picture to those watching in Vietnamese. It was shown every night for five nights so each hamlet could view it. It was the priests' way of consolidating faith in their religion and visually displaying it to their congregation. Most of the medical assistance programmes were conducted in village schools or market places. Medical dispensaries were built progressively around the province and greater privacy was able to be given to the doctors when treating patients. Although ignored initially, the Hamlet Evaluation System was used to select the movies according to the classification of the village or hamlet based on criteria used in the assessment of village security. If security was fully established and the village had effective local government, the village was classified as an A or B Hamlet. If the Government of South

²⁴² Ian, McNeil, 1993, p. 215.

Vietnam had military and administrative control, but the Viet Cong could harass citizens outside of hamlet, it was classified as a C Hamlet. If the hamlet itself was insecure and the Viet Cong political cadres were active, but the Government of South Vietnam has some presence, then it was classified as a D or E Hamlet. If the hamlet was under Viet Cong control it was classified as a V Hamlet.


Military Operations Conducted by Psyops Unit

The psyops ground teams sometimes set up checkpoints leading to a village in the hours before the night time curfew began. These checkpoints were far enough out of the village so that at a particular time any person who was still returning from the fields or foraging in the forest would not have time to return to the village or hamlet before the curfew hour. This checking of the identity papers of each person moving towards the village was not without some danger. Sometimes when the team wanted to search a cart being pulled by a water buffalo, the animal would become nervous or bolt in response to the raised voices and sounds. Even when the cart was stopped at a distance and the search teams approached from the rear of the cart, some problems still occurred. On at least one occasion a team believed that the buffalo was deliberately spooked by the owner to jump about and bolt towards the village as a means of avoiding a search. When searches appeared to be deliberately obstructed by the villagers, the Australian ground team would drive to the nearest Vietnamese military post and camp there overnight. In the morning they would recommence their searches hoping to search and catch those villagers who may be smuggling food to the VC in the field. Australians preferred to stay in district compounds with the American and sub-sector soldiers or if the team was too far away from a compound it would stay with an Australian AATTV Mobile Advisory Training Team (MATT) located with the Vietnamese Regional Forces or in a National Police compound.

Night Propaganda Missions

Psyops personnel working with villagers conducted night propaganda missions or NiProp as they became known. The aim was to stay in villages and provide them with

movie entertainment without the conduct of propaganda programmes. The programme was undertaken to encourage the villagers to see the Australians as providers of entertainment and this policy was reinforced by the Australians showing that they trusted the villagers sufficiently enough to sleep in their village.



Photograph 24 : Villagers at Psyops Night Propaganda (NiProp). Their faces show the interest in the simple plot of an American Western movie. c. 1971.

Case Studies Using Broadcasts in the Field During Normal Military Operations

Sometimes when conducting psyops in conjunction with US forces misunderstandings of a military culture nature occurred. An incident arose when an Australian field team accompanied 302 Regional Force Company and a section of United States forces driving 'Duster',²⁴³ armoured vehicles in the conduct of an operation at the seaward end of the Long Hai mountains in October 1970. The Australians spent several days with the Vietnamese soldiers conducting propaganda broadcasts towards the mountains where the Viet Cong were located. The intention was to broadcast messages that were believed to be effective in demoralising them. These broadcasts were followed up with additional broadcasts announcing the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme and the benefits of the

²⁴³ A 'Duster' is a US armoured tank chassis with twin 40mm Bofors guns mounted on it.

programme. Each evening when the broadcasts were to be made, the US soldiers insisted on firing the bofor guns on the tank indiscriminately up and down the mountain at no particular target. The US soldiers ignored the fact that their military role was to use their heavy guns against the Viet Cong should they initiate an attack against the South Vietnamese defensive position. The US soldiers were told to stop by the Psyops team and the Vietnamese Company Commander, 1st Lieutenant Vu Binh Chinh, but each night they continued to fire numerous shells into the hills. The US actions directly contested the plans of the Australian psyops team to influence and win converts from the Viet Cong forces entrenched in the mountains. There was no incentive for them to surrender when being fired upon by the US guns. In spite of this, broadcasts were undertaken for four to five hours per night for a period of seven days. It is not known whether these broadcasts resulted in an increase in returnees as this operation was conducted in the Vietnamese area of operations and it is not known if any results were forwarded to 1 ATF.

In July/August 1970 the two ground teams requested the Officer Commanding, Captain Tony White, for permission to conduct water operations from boats in the mangrove swamps (Rung Sat Secret Zone) and river to the south of the province but permission was not granted. In a report written in December 1970 White now believed that operations should be undertaken in the Rung Sat Secret Zone. In 1971, Captain Hudson allowed a field psyops team to conduct broadcasts from Vietnamese Navy boats patrolling the waterways of the Rung Sat Secret Zone. No information is available on the number of hours broadcast, location and themes of the messages.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Information supplied by the author and by Mr Graham Stone. Mr Stone appears in the photograph below.



Photograph 25 : Psyops Team preparing for water operations on a South Vietnamese Riverine patrol boat. Australian Psyop soldier believed to be Pte Graham Stone and ARVN interpreter Sergeant Trinh.

Ground Missions in Support of Civic Action

Psyops supported the pacification programmes conducted by 1 Civil Affairs Unit such as the building of schools, bridges or roads. The Psyops Unit supplied broadcast equipment when official openings were being conducted by local officials who made speeches when new schools, roads or market places were completed. Leaflets and posters were produced for display on village notice boards. When roads were upgraded, the psyops teams would broadcast the message around the province. When Route QL 2 running north through the province was improved and extended, the psyops teams carried out publicity campaigns to impress civilian leaders in the whole region. One

example of this occurred when both psyops field teams transported village officials and notables from the Phuoc Hai village and from the Catholic village of Phuoc Tinh on the coast by helicopter to the village of Suoi Nghe. The helicopter flew over the populated parts of the province to show them the improvement in the roads, landing in the village of Suoi Nghe, which the Australians had built as a resettlement village (discussed in a previous Chapter). At the village they were given a tour of the pig breeding project, the growing of ‘miracle’ rice and pepper, the sorghum project and the distilling of this product into wine. Miracle rice code name IR8 was a genetic rice that was developed that not only could it be grown at many latitudes but at almost any time of the year. In the Philippines average yields prior to the introduction of miracle rice was 1 ton per hectare, IR8 yielded an average of 9.4 tons.²⁴⁵ It was the start of the ‘Green Revolution’ in rice farming. They were also shown the extensive maize (corn) growing project and commercial charcoal producing pit in the village. The village officials from each village spoke to their visitors from other villages about the commercial opportunities that could occur, such as selling their dried fish at centres in the province, as a result of the greatly improved roads built by the Australians. The officials were bussed back to their villages to gain direct experience of the improvement made to the roads.²⁴⁶

Losing the Hearts and Minds

Much of the psychological operations work was conducted in support of military operations by broadcasting to Vietnamese villages about curfews, civilian access areas and instructing the villagers when Australians conducted cordon and searches. These searches by the Australians with their Vietnamese counterparts were conducted to identify Viet Cong local guerrillas, Viet Cong suppliers and members of the Viet Cong alternative government infrastructure that may have been hiding in the village. Other psychological operations were conducted to support Vietnamese forces or the activities of other government organisations also aimed at winning the population’s support for the government through kindness. Examples of these were the support given to medical and dental services, entertainment with films, rebuilding of schools or improving the primitive road structures. But sometimes this winning of support was undone such as by

²⁴⁵ <http://www.atimes.com> downloaded January 2008.

²⁴⁶ The writer was responsible for arranging this tour of the village leaders. The funds for entertaining these officials was provided by the Province CIA officer through Aid-In-Kind (AIK) funds

the incident described above when US forces used their heavy weapons to blast at the mountain when the Australian psyops team was broadcasting to the entrenched Viet Cong as the means for persuading them to surrender or return under the South Vietnamese governments Chieu Hoi scheme.

Another incident which countered much of the good work of psychological operations was conducted by the thoughtless actions of Australian soldiers. The incident happened at the end of May 1969 when soldiers were ordered to transport the bodies of Viet Cong soldiers killed in a fire fight with Australians from the destroyed village of Thua Tich to the district headquarters of Xuyen Moc. 1 ATF SOPs stated that enemy bodies were to be buried at the scene of a contact unless specifically asked by the Province or District Chiefs to transfer the bodies elsewhere. This was an undesirable action to implement and was made far worse in its execution. It did far more harm to the plans for winning villagers support than could be imagined at the time. The event followed an ambush on the night of 29/30 May 1969 when soldiers under the command of Captain Arrowsmith killed a number of Viet Cong near the gates of the destroyed village of Thua Tich. This Australian incident had the potential to cause immense propaganda damage if the Viet Cong had chosen to exploit it as being a war crime, or if the National Liberation Front had publicised it to the international press. Several hundred metres south along Route QL328 was another ambush position that was occupied by members of the Defence and Employment Platoon (D & E Platoon) Headquarters 1 Australian Task Force. At about 2030 hours on the night of the 29 May, the D & E Platoon reported to the cavalry troop that about fifty Viet Cong were observed moving north along the track. The Cavalry troop initiated the ambush and about 15 VC were killed, although only eleven bodies were recovered the following morning because the enemy carried the other bodies away. In addition it was believed that blood trails indicated that another 5 Viet Cong were wounded in action and escaped or were taken away by the surviving Viet Cong soldiers.



Photograph 26 : Dead Viet Cong soldiers near the entrance of the destroyed village of Thua Tich²⁴⁷

As the bodies were being buried near the ambush site, a request was received by the Task Force Headquarters from the Village Chief of Xuyen Moc for the bodies to be returned to the village. This message would have been received via the Vietnamese/CORDS military radio system. The General Staff Officer Grade 2 Operations at 1 ATF approved the return of the bodies, which was contrary to their own Standard Operating Procedures. Arrowsmith was informed and decided that only those bodies that had not been badly damaged by the action would be suitable for return. Four bodies were carried on the top of the Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and the unit proceeded towards the village. On the way, the APCs were ambushed by the same Viet Cong group which resulted in five more Viet Cong being killed. In both actions, Australian forces incurred no casualties. A further incident occurred when the carriers were nearing the village when a number of people who appeared to the Australians to be attempting to hide were sighted and the carriers fired warning shots above their heads. They were innocent villagers from Xuyen Moc who were collecting grass for their water

²⁴⁷ Australian War Memorial. AWM photographic reference BEL/69/0378/VN *Ambush at Thua Tich*. Retrieved July 2004.

buffaloes. None were hurt in the incident. They had been working in an approved civilian access area and the mistake was most probably due to the Australian soldiers becoming nervous as a result of the two fire fights in the previous twelve hours. However, it appears that the bodies that were being carried on the carriers fell off at some stage and were dragged behind the vehicles into the village square of Xuyen Moc so that by the time the bodies arrived in the village, they were badly damaged. The scene is illustrated in the accompanying photographs. Villagers and their children who saw the disintegrated bodies of these men, whom they might have recognised as relatives or friends, would have been seriously shocked. The crowd viewing the bodies seem to be moved by the horror of the action of the Australians more than by curiosity about the identity of the bodies.



Photograph 27 : The look of horror on the children's faces from the village of Xuyen Moc indicates the shock of witnessing the bodies being dragged behind an Australian APC.²⁴⁸

An investigation was launched following the reporting of this incident but the officer was exonerated. However, it seems difficult to believe that the Australian soldiers in the vehicles were unaware that the bodies being dragged along behind their vehicles. It seems improbable that the soldiers did not look behind as they moved along as this

²⁴⁸ Australian War Memorial. AWM Photographic reference BEL/69/0376/VN *Children observing bodies being dragged behind Australian APCs in Xuyen Moc*. Retrieved May 2005.

would have been an operational requirement. It was fortunate that a photojournalist Mr Dennis Gibbons was present after the ambush and remained with the group throughout this incident. The photographer did take photographs of the bodies being dragged behind the APCs. This attracted much anger from the Commander of Australian Forces in Vietnam (COMAFV). Their main concern was that the photographs would get into the public domain in Australia. It is believed that HQ AFV destroyed the offending photographs and implemented a policy to vet all future public relation photographs for 'political acceptability' before they left Vietnam. The newly arrived Officer Commanding 3 Cavalry Squadron, Major Ron Rooks, had only been in Vietnam twenty-one days when this incident occurred. He issued orders that in future no bodies would be carried on APCs without his personal authority and all enemy bodies would be buried at the site of contact and not returned. Convention I, Article 27 of the Geneva Convention states that the 'Burial of the dead must be carried out individually if possible and must be preceded by a careful examination in order to confirm death and establish identity. The burials should be honourable and if, possible, according to the rites of the religion to which the deceased belonged'.²⁴⁹ Not only was this ignored, but the bodies were placed on display in the village of Xuyen Moc. Accepting the account as presented in the investigation it does not reduce the impact of the political and psychological damage that could have been gained and exploited by the communists. The communists were masters at political warfare and could have claimed that a massacre had occurred and that the people dragged behind the vehicles were in fact innocent civilians. Once a claim that an atrocity has been made it is difficult to gain the advantage when you are placed on the defensive. The Xuyen Moc village provided many recruits to the local guerrilla unit and to D445 battalion and many of its citizens would have known the identity of the victims. Much of the good work performed by civil affairs and psychological operations in the Xuyen Moc village and surrounding area would have been undone by this incident. The actions were contrary to the Law of Armed Conflict and would have alienated the villagers and children from the pacification work of the Australians and South Vietnamese government.

²⁴⁹ Australian War Memorial AWM Series 98 File R670/1/10 *Prisoners of War – General – Burial of VC and NVA Dead*. Letter by Major General A.L. MacDonald Adjutant General to Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam dated 1 August 1969.



Photograph 28 : Viet Cong bodies placed in Xuyen Moc village centre for identification.²⁵⁰

More of the story became public after the conflict when in 1976 a former soldier Mr (ex Sapper) K. Enright who had been at the action in Vietnam contacted a radio station in Darwin to tell them of the story about the ambush. Radio station 2UE in Sydney was contacted about the event and the journalist, Mr Greg Granger recorded an interview with Enright leading to Defence Headquarters in Canberra conducting an investigation through the HQ in 7 Military District in Darwin by Major Pound. Major Pound's investigation in 1976 was both superficial and flawed and seems to have been a cover-up of the facts. Enright claimed that the dragging of the bodies was deliberate and that he and others were told that the Village Chief of Xuyen Moc had requested that the bodies be dragged to the village over some distance. He had become seriously disturbed through thinking about this incident over some years. The investigation undertaken by the Defence Department was of poor quality. A formal 'Terms of Reference' had not been issued and most of the file consisted of notes and statements written in pencil.²⁵¹ But it could be noted that this was after the war ended, so this particular part of the story, useful as it is, could not have had an impact on the conduct of Australian psychological operations during the war.

²⁵⁰ Australian War Memorial, AWM Photographic reference BEL/69/0377/VN *Bodies of VC at Xuyen Moc*. Retrieved October 2006.

²⁵¹ Department of Defence Army file A138-3-5 classified Confidential – *Atrocity Allegation – South Vietnam – 3 Cavalry Regiment*. File held at Army History Unit, Campbell Park, Canberra.

Every soldier who went to Vietnam was issued with a card called ‘Australian Nine Rules’. The front of the card stated ‘The Communists will use any weapon to discredit the Government and countries, like ours, in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Don’t let your behaviour be a propaganda weapon which helps in any way to destroy Vietnam.’ Point number 2 on the card states inter alia ‘Try to understand the people, their way of life; customs and law.’ The failure of officers and soldiers involved in these types of incidents means that they forgot their training in Australia, or simply ignored their training on the history, customs, and laws of Vietnam that was prescribed in a book given to all officers and soldiers called *Vietnam Pocketbook*. This is particularly relevant in regards to spirits and to a person meeting their death in a violent manner. In addition to the nine-rule card, a Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam General Staff Instruction Number 26 was issued to all officers and soldiers in Vietnam.

AUSTRALIAN FORCE VIETNAM
P.W. INSTRUCTION CARD

As member of the Australian Army in Vietnam you are to comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949 to which your country adheres.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES YOU CAN AND ARE TO:

- a. DISARM YOUR PRISONER
- b. IMMEDIATELY SEARCH HIM THOROUGHLY
- c. REQUIRE HIM TO BE SILENT
- d. SEGREGATE HIM FROM OTHER PRISONERS
- e. GUARD HIM CAREFULLY
- f. TAKE HIM TO THE PLACE DESIGNATED BY YOUR COMMANDER

YOU CANNOT AND MUST NOT

- a. MISTREAT YOUR PRISONER
- b. HUMILIATE OR DEGRADE HIM
- c. TAKE ANY OF HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS WHICH DO NOT HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VALUE
- d. REFUSE HIM MEDICAL TREATMENT IF REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE

REMEMBER ALWAYS TO TREAT YOUR PRISONER IN A HUMANE MANNER, APPLY THE FOLLOWING RULES IN DEALING WITH CAPTIVES

- a. HANDLE HIM FIRMLY, PROPERLY AND HUMANELY
- b. TAKE HIM QUICKLY TO A SECURE AREA
- c. MISTREATMENT OF ANY CAPTIVE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE. EVERY SOLDIER IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY IN HIS HANDS
- d. TREAT THE SICK OR WOUNDED CAPTIVE AS BEST YOU CAN
- e. ALL PERSONS IN YOUR HANDS WHETHER CIVILIAN OR BATTLE CAPTIVES MUST BE PROTECTED AGAINST VIOLENCE, INSULTS, CURIOSITY, AND REPRISALS OF ANY KIND

HQ AFV GS INSTRUCTION No 26²⁵²

Figure 22: Australian Prisoner of War Instruction Card

²⁵² Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam General Staff Instruction Number 26. One of these cards was issued to every officer and soldier who went to Vietnam

Although the card was in reference to prisoners of war the preamble states 'As a member of the Australian Army in Vietnam you are to comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949 to which your country adheres'. There was a requirement for all military members to comply with all other conventions of the Geneva Convention. Captain Thomas Arrowsmith was decorated for his bravery with a Mention in Despatches (MID) for this and another previous action in rescuing a Special Air Service patrol. At the End of Conflict awards for the Vietnam conflict, Arrowsmith's MID award for bravery was upgraded to a Medal for Gallantry.

Case Study 8 RAR unauthorised Killings.

In his book *Combat Battalion* Dr Robert Hall ²⁵³ describes of two incidents involving an infantry platoon commanded by Second Lieutenant Jucha. After two successful ambushes of the Viet Cong some prisoners were captured and after the action was over the prisoners were shot and killed again contrary to the principles laid down in the Geneva Convention. There is no indication that Jucha gave any orders to kill the prisoners and it appears that one or more of the soldiers killed the prisoners of their own volition. Quite a number of the soldiers in the platoon felt angry with the enemy because of the loss of some of their mates often subject to land mines, and sought revenge. Hall wrote that 'revenge for the loss of mates was a powerful inducement to the callous disregard of moral behaviour'.²⁵⁴ In October 2007 the author spoke to Dr Hall and he advised that he was informed during his interviews with Jucha the enemy soldiers were shot in the process of being captured and it is somewhat unclear whether they could have been captured or not. Therefore the killings were in the course of the action. It could be described as an instinctive action by the soldier or soldiers involved. However the author interviewed ex-members of 8 RAR on 8 August 2006 in Canberra and was told by the person who carried out the shootings that they were shot some time after the action had been completed. There is a difference in the two versions and whatever is the truth will remain vague and a mystery. These events contain shades of

²⁵³ Dr Hall was an infantry officer in 8 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment and served in Vietnam during the time of this incident. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales.

²⁵⁴ Robert A. Hall, *Combat Eight: The Eight Battalion in Vietnam*, Allen & Unwin, North Sydney. 2000. p. 202

the US Army My Lai (Song My 4) killings, although the enemy were soldiers and not civilians. The book describes one incident when after the shooting the soldier dragged the body up to the commander of the platoon and deposited the body at his feet, 'like a dog dropping a bone in front of his master'.²⁵⁵ Jucha was a young National Service Officer of about 23 years of age and this was about the same age or slightly younger than the people he was commanding. It would appear that Jucha took no action against the soldier or soldiers who carried out what may have been unauthorised killings. The Geneva Convention, Convention III Article 13, states that prisoners of war must be humanely treated at all times emphasising that any unlawful act that causes death if prisoners is a grave breach of the Geneva Convention. It further states in Protocol I Article 37 Section 1 that it is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders who is 'hors de combat'.²⁵⁶

Australian Nine Rules Issued To All Officers And Soldiers

NINE RULES

**FOR AUSTRALIAN ARMY
FORCES IN VIETNAM**

We as a military force and as individuals are in this country to help the Vietnamese Government and People to win their long and courageous fight against the Communists. The product of victory is a democratic State with stable government and contented people. The Communists will use any weapon to discredit the Government and countries, like ours, in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Don't let your behaviour be a propaganda weapon which helps in any way to destroy Vietnam. Here are nine simple rules for conduct whilst in Vietnam.

**DISTRIBUTION – 1 to each member of the
Australian Army Forces VIETNAM**

²⁵⁵ Hall, op. cit.

²⁵⁶ Meaning "out of combat – disabled"

- NINE RULES**
1. Remember we are here only to help; we make no demands and seek no special treatment.
 2. Try to understand the people, their way of life; customs and law.
 3. Learn the simple greetings of the Vietnamese language and use them frequently
 4. Treat friendly people, particularly women with respect and courtesy.
 5. Don't attract attention by rude behaviour and larrikinism.
 6. Avoid separating us from the Vietnamese by a display of great wealth and privilege.
 7. Make friends among the soldiers and people of Vietnam.
 8. Remember decency and honesty are the sign of a man and a soldier; bad manners are the sign of a fool.
 9. Above all remember you are an Australian, by your actions our country is judged. Set an example of sincerity and fair play in all your dealings with Vietnamese and with other people who are assisting them.

Figure 23: Nine Rules issued to every soldier in South Vietnam.

Again, if this information had been exploited by the enemy, there would have been serious accusations levelled against the Australian soldiers in the province. If the information had leaked into the public domain, or through the Viet Cong proselytising of the villagers, then greater animosity would have occurred against the Australians.

There is another reason why apprehension of prisoners is better than killing them is that intelligence personnel can gain valuable information from prisoners even if it is as basic as unit identification, base area location, mission, future intentions, morale, and modus operandi. Enemy soldiers were to be classified as prisoners of war or reclassified as Hoi Chanh (returnee) under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme. As a Hoi Chanh, they could have been retrained and rehabilitated as a useful member of South Vietnamese society. Under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme, returnees were interviewed by psychological operations personnel and if they were willing and were literate they made taped messages about how they were treated in order to encourage others to return to the South Vietnamese government. Sometimes they wrote messages to their comrades back in the jungle, referred to as 'jungle mail' by the Americans, which would be printed on

one side of a leaflet a photograph of the returnee in a pleasant place or circumstance on the reverse. Often, the returnee assisted the Australian troops by pointing out the location of their base camps, the tracks they used or their entry points into villages. On other rarer occasions they were recruited to work for the Australians and were allocated to combat or psychological operations units. Australian infantry battalions had one bushman scout per platoon plus an additional one or two at company headquarters allocated and used them to identify signs in the field showing where mines were likely to be located. Sometimes the Australians would employ bushman scouts in their operations against the VC to advise the Australians in how to conduct operations against their former VC units. These people were known by the Australians as 'Bushman Scouts'. The Americans had earlier instituted the same system, but called them 'Kit Carson Scouts'.



Photograph 29 : Ex Viet Cong from Xuyen Moc guerrilla unit now employed as a Bushman Scout by Australian forces indicating VC markers on the ground, while protection party observes.²⁵⁷

Headquarters 1 ATF wrote to Headquarters AFV on 14 July 1967 and stated that ralliers under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme are a main source of intelligence and added to

²⁵⁷ Australian War Memorial, AWM photographic reference BLA/70/0741/VN. Bushman Scout. Retrieved September 2006.

the intelligence collection plan.²⁵⁸ The letter particularly mentions cordon and searches from Operation Camden conducted between 16-18 January 1967 and 31 January and 2 February 1967 and a further cordon and search of the village of An Nhut on the 13–14 February 1967. The letter emphasised how a live VC was more valuable than a dead one in that their knowledge and cooperation was able to be exploited by the Australians against the enemy. The following table gives an example of how this value could be calculated.

Suggested Numerical Value of the Enemy Captured or Returned Under the South Vietnamese Government Chieu Hoi Amnesty Programme.²⁵⁹

Criteria	Value
Enemy - Killed in Action	0
Enemy Captured – Prisoner of War	1
Enemy Captured – classified as Returnee Chieu Hoi	1
Enemy Captured – classified as Illegal Resident	1
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Illiterate – No exploitation	1
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – No exploitation	1
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – returns weapon	1.5
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – Leads to weapons cache	2
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – Weapon – provides intelligence	2.5
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – Weapon – provides Intelligence – exploited for leaflet	3
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – provides intelligence – Exploited for leaflet and voice tape	3.5
Hoi Chanh Returnee – Literate – provides intelligence – exploited for leaflet and voice tape – works for Australians as a Bushman Scout	5

Figure 24: Suggested Numerical Value of killed or captured enemy

²⁵⁸ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 98, file R810/1/9 – *Training General – 1 ATF Lessons Learnt*.

²⁵⁹ This table was prepared by the writer on an imputed scale of the various advantages that an enemy prisoner might be able to provide to the Australian forces.

Combat soldiers are drilled in taking the battle to the enemy. It could be argued that additional training needs to be extensively evaluated so that soldiers know and understand the value of intelligence and how some captured or returning prisoners provide valuable information and how they can be exploited if there is an extensive amnesty programme in place. Enemy killed in action could be identified within any held enemy order of battle lists thus producing some intelligence value. They may also be carrying documents that have more intelligence value than say, an illiterate Hoi Chanh who is not exploited, but according to the table above has a value of 1. The greatest value in any enemy prisoner is that they can be interrogated or interviewed according to their classification and useful information can be teased from them. Intelligence and psychological operations personnel cannot gain any such rewards from a dead enemy soldier.

CHAPTER 6

Leaflet Propaganda

There are but two powers in this world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.

Napoleon Bonaparte

The tongue has no bones; it can be twisted in any direction.

Vietnamese proverb

The Preparation and Use of Leaflets for Psychological Operations in Vietnam

It has been estimated that the United States and its allies dropped over fifty billion leaflets on Vietnam. The preparation, design and implementation of this huge operation was the responsibility of the United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).²⁶⁰ The psychological operations unit of the 1 Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy province formed part of this large endeavour and this chapter will discuss that part of the programme. This chapter will explain the major processes of leafleting operations and the problems encountered in delivering the leaflets into the hands of the target audience. An evaluation of how Australian leaflet development, production and missions were carried out is included.

Propaganda Theory

The variety of propaganda leaflets and posters produced during the Vietnam conflict was aimed at various target audiences. The propaganda was directed towards the enemy in

²⁶⁰ Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: The US Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam*, Westview Press, Colorado, USA, 1981. p. 3.

the field or towards refugees or for the promotion of the South Vietnamese Government programmes.

The tenor of a propaganda message had to be compatible with the susceptibility of the target audience. Audience susceptibility should determine the line of any intended persuasion that may be employed. 4th Psyops Group Propaganda Guidelines Number 3 provided detailed information and guidance about using a systematic approach for propaganda development. Each objective of the propaganda development was to be planned through to completion and to include the development of theme-possibilities for the accomplishment of each. It should be noted that the communist forces dominated the people of South Vietnam by force and coercion and would not have had the same concerns about audience susceptibility.²⁶¹

Like any society the Vietnamese population was divided into groups, that is social, religious, political and sporting. Some groups were sympathetic and others apathetic towards the group that they are associated with. Within those groups their attitudes varied from the very enthusiastic to little or no enthusiasm. If, for example, the target audience (population) was generally apathetic toward both the government of South Vietnam and the Viet Cong, the ultimate psychological objective was to develop hatred of the Viet Cong. Propaganda appeals at the outset resorted to name-calling, or referring to Viet Cong atrocities or other major incidents, but there was concern not to exaggerate because the audience might label it as blatant propaganda and the specific audience ignore it. The manner in which to approach this scenario was to establish objectives in the form of progressive attitudinal changes, culminating in establishment of hatred of the Viet Cong.

The manner in which this was to be approached was to phase-in intermediate objectives by arousing suspicion of the communists (1st objective), develop disgust (2nd objective), develop marginal hatred (3rd objective), and ultimately develop hatred (final objective). For each objective, theme-possibilities were developed. After planning each objective

²⁶¹ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 304 [133] 4th Psyops Group Propaganda Guidelines: Number 3, *A Systematic Process for Propaganda Development*, 15 July 1968.

outlined above, there was a need to check thoroughly against other propaganda efforts directed towards the same target audience to ensure no contradictions occurred.²⁶²

An example of developing messages which could arouse suspicion of the Viet Cong were messages that conveyed Viet Cong disregard for the old Confucian ways and values, that is by the killing or extracting by force compliance with the communist views by the village notables. An audience is most susceptible to lines of persuasion based upon its strong inner beliefs, since promise of material benefit is not a line of persuasion to which a target audience is always susceptible.²⁶³ Given that most Vietnamese had family members in the VC and that the VC advocated a strong nationalist policy that was dear to the hearts of most Vietnamese it may have been a forlorn hope to persuade any but the most committed anti-communist to hate the VC.

D Company 6 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment and supporting artillery, armour and helicopters severely disrupted an enemy regiment at the battle of Long Tan in August 1966 just prior to them be able to manoeuvre into a position to attack the newly formed Australian Task Force base. This was unbelievable to other enemy units. The enemy propaganda produced by the Viet Cong after the battle stated that they wiped out the Australian Task Force, which was untrue. But then truth is not the final consideration in determining message credibility; rather it is whether the propaganda can be reasonably believed.²⁶⁴

The message was to be easily understood and be written in simple language of the people and not the formal language of the educated class. It was to be remembered that in Vietnam during this time the target reader was often semi-literate. The message was made easier if the language was simple, concrete, familiar and the use of words and terms common to the area. The use of familiar images was another means of getting a message through to those who were illiterate. Throughout Vietnam the Vietnamese language differed depending on the locality. The language in North Vietnam has many variations from the South. Initially Australian trained linguists were trained in the North Vietnamese dialect. This oversight was not discovered until a couple of years after

²⁶² 4th Psyops Group, *ibid.* p. 6.

²⁶³ 4th Psyops Group, *ibid.* p. 7.

²⁶⁴ 4th Psyops Group, *ibid.* p. 9.

Vietnamese language training at Point Cook in Victoria was introduced. The psychological operations unit did not take into account any of these significant linguistic issues when preparing leaflets or voice tapes. Later in this chapter there is an explanation of why in some cases the language used by the psychological operations unit was thought to be too formal.

For a psychological product to be effective the message has to have the following characteristics. It should have credibility and this is mainly achieved by giving the message the semblance of objectivity, seeming to be fair minded and objective. The easiest way of assuring credibility is to deal only with the truth. The message was not to be one which contained obvious lies or incredible truths. For example, it was possible for a single section or platoon of government soldiers to inflict a decisive defeat against an enemy which outnumbered them twenty to one, but that does not mean the story formed a credible basis for a propaganda message directed toward the enemy. Analysis of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers' reports suggested that they were well aware of exaggerated reports concerning losses and it appeared that they were somewhat sceptical of all GVN and United States war statistics. This had a flow on effect to the other Free World Military Assistance Forces, of which Australian forces were one. In spite of this the Australian psychological operations unit, as previously mentioned, was directed to publicise the large numbers of enemy killed in the Cambodian incursion in early 1970. In one of the leaflets the Australians put the enemy losses in Cambodia at 7519 killed in action.²⁶⁵ Publicising the success in Cambodia was an essential use of propaganda, but the high figures of those killed would seem easily deniable by the political officers in the NLF. The final figure of the enemy killed was over 11,000. Generally for every person killed there are at least three wounded. This incursion would have conservatively eliminated or disabled over 40,000 of the enemy.

Known as metadiscourse, an effective psychological product employs repetition of its main theme. The message states the same message in several different ways and repeats what was stated before. It represents good slogans, which are among the most valuable verbal messages in the psychological arsenal. Any message was to be consistent.

²⁶⁵ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 304 [251], [323] *Leaflet ATF-008-70 Cambodian Campaign*.

Nothing destroyed consistency more than an appeal that was refuted by the next days or the previous days message.²⁶⁶

Matters of Leaflet Dissemination

All Australian leaflets were dropped from helicopters or from small fixed wing aircraft flying at low altitudes. The Australians were unaware at this time that formulas were available from US sources discussing how the dropping of leaflets was affected by the weather conditions. In addition, unusual conditions or terrain could have an effect upon any leaflet drop. Two examples will be explained later in this chapter. In these cases, it would appear that no matter how good the planning the outcome was unpredictable and unexpected.

If the falling rate of the leaflet is known and the wind speed and direction is known, the distance the leaflet travels before reaching the ground can be calculated. For example, if a leaflet is dropped from 5,000 feet and falls at such a slow rate that it takes one hour to strike the ground, in a 10 knot wind, the leaflet would travel in the direction of the wind for 10 nautical miles. If the wind was blowing twice as fast, the leaflet would travel twice as far. In the case of leaflet operations the leaflet falling rate is conditioned by its size, shape and weight.²⁶⁷

Airborne Dissemination of Leaflets: Benefits and Problems

He who stumbles twice over the same stone deserves to break his neck.

Spanish Proverb

²⁶⁶ This summary of the requirements of the Outline of Leaflets was taken from the following documents: 'How to Write Propaganda Leaflets', JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 5, 10 November 1965. 'Propaganda Evaluation Worksheet,' parts 2, 3, and 5 (4th Psyops Group Experimental Form 1) 'Lessons Learned from Evaluation of Allied PSYOP Media in Vietnam.' 'Supplement 1 to JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 42', 12 April 1968. These documents were viewed by the author at the Archives at Fort Bragg in July 2005.

²⁶⁷ *The Science of Leaflet Dissemination (Simplified)*, HQ 7th Psychological Operations Group, pp. 2-3.

The majority of airborne leaflet drops were successful and they landed within the target area, however some leaflet drops failed. The first known error was a leaflet drop in a cleared area known as the 'Firestone Trails' between the Nui Thi Vai and the Nui Dinh mountains about ten kilometres to the south west of Nui Dat. It was a transit area that the Viet Cong used to infiltrate villages on the road to Saigon. The aircraft made one low run between the towering mountains on each side. In all fifty thousand leaflets were despatched. Two hundred thousand of these leaflets were produced and dropped over four separate areas within the province containing a message directed at the major Viet Cong units operating in the province. The aircraft was flown by a new RAAF pilot in Vietnam undertaking 'in country' training and familiarisation in the province. After the dropping of the leaflets in the targeted area, the aircraft continued to fly for the next hour to familiarise the pilot with the western area of the province. On the return approach to Nui Dat helicopter pad, called Kangaroo Pad, the aircraft encountered many leaflets falling to the ground. After reporting this to the Task Force Command Post operations centre, the aircraft was ordered back into the air to conduct an aerial survey of where the leaflets fell. The red line on the map below indicates where the leaflets were dropped. The blue area indicates where the leaflets landed. They were dropped early in the morning, before any noticeable wind was determined. However, it appears that a light wind picked up the leaflets and blew them up the side of the Nui Dinh mountain to the top of the mountain, where a different westerly wind at that height blew the leaflets in an easterly direction and deposited them over working paddy fields, parts of the pro-communist village of Hoa Long, Nui Dat base and into the north-western part of the provincial capital Baria. This phenomenon could not have been predicted without scientific knowledge about the meteorological effect of wind in and around mountainous areas. If a heavier weighted paper had been used then the problem would not have occurred. This particular leaflet was leaflet ATF-010-70 produced in early June 1970 that showed a photograph of a dead body to be one of the fifteen bodies found on the battlefield during the month of May 1970.

dead on the battlefield unburied. The photograph below shows the Officer commanding the Psychological Operations Unit, Captain Frank Meredith, reading out the captured document to some members of the unit.




Photograph 30 : Captain Meredith reading out captured document on the effectiveness of the Australian and other allied forces psychological warfare against them. ²⁶⁸

The VC itself responded to this sensitive matter of disposal of the dead as raised by the Australian leaflets. The enemy's headquarters, Military Region 7, issued an order that bodies were to be recovered from the battlefield at all costs and given a proper burial.

There were other leaflet dissemination failures. Fifty thousand leaflets were to be dropped over the Long Hai Mountains which was a heavily fortified area occupied by the Viet Cong. On occasions aircraft were fired upon when flying over these mountains. On this mission the helicopter flew at a higher than normal altitude and this plus a light offshore wind carried all the leaflets out to sea. It was established later that had the leaflet been printed on heavier grade paper, the leaflets would have dropped at a faster rate and could have landed on the planned target area.²⁶⁹ The red line on the map indicates the flight path of the helicopter. The blue area indicates where the majority of the leaflets landed out to sea.

²⁶⁸ Australian War Memorial, AWM web site www.awm.gov.au Photographic reference number FAI/70/0388/VN. Retrieved September 2005.

²⁶⁹ Anecdotal evidence given to the writer during interviews with former members of 1 Psychological Operations Unit.



Map 8. : Map of Long Hai leaflet drop area – Phuoc Tuy province South Vietnam.

The leaflet dropped in this sortie was ATF-039-70 and carried a message urging the VC to surrender with a map on the reverse side showing a point to surrender at Long Hai village.




Figure 5: Reverse side of the leaflet showing the way to Long Hai village to Chieu Hoi.

Production and Dissemination

Although the Free World Military Assistance Forces in Vietnam had access to American produced leaflets through their National Leaflets Catalogue, the Australians used them until 1970 when the 1st Australian Psychological Operations Unit was formed. But the Australians still relied on US-produced leaflets, especially for the supply of ‘Safe Conduct Passes’ and posters. Leaflets were produced by the four American Psychological Operation Battalions in Vietnam and offshore in Guam by 7th Psychological Operations Group. They provided catalogues of all the leaflets they produced.

During the time the Australians were in Vietnam, they were able to order Americans leaflets and posters for use in psychological warfare and civil action projects. Corporal Ian Botham (ex 8 Battalion The Royal Australian Regiment (8 RAR) – a National Serviceman) who was the unit’s first printer worked particularly hard and the early

success of the unit's printing capability can be attributed to his prior civilian work experience and knowledge and his quiet and unassuming professionalism. Prior to the formation of the unit a number of printing and field operators were selected and sent to 6 POB at Long Binh to attend a one week US in-country psychological operators training course.

Initially the planning process developed for the production of leaflets was developed in consultation with the operational and support staff of the unit. The first Officer Commanding, Captain Frank Meredith, provided firm leadership in melding the various sections together. After a theme was decided, a printing job sheet was prepared and the unit's Operations Officer and Intelligence Sergeant would meet with the ARVN Vietnamese interpreters, the photographic and printing staff to decide on the target audience, the wording, the illustrations and method of dissemination. After the wording or theme of the leaflet was agreed upon, the interpreters translated the message into Vietnamese. Typesetting was done on an AM 'Varityper' model 660F,²⁷⁰ (a Multilanguage system) typewriter setting system. This was composed of a standard typewriter format unit, but instead of lettered keys, a font crescent was activated to print each key stroke onto an adhesive backed paper tape. The system was not dissimilar to the IBM golf ball typewriter method. The big advantage over typewriters was that the font could be changed at any time and the language changed as well. To overcome the problem of lack of Vietnamese language skills by Australian-trained soldier typesetters, the standard QWERTY operation keyboard was re-configured with Vietnamese letters and symbols, so that a draft could be prepared. Corrections were marked on the draft, and then a corrected copy prepared. This system was designed by the printing staff and assisted by the ARVN interpreters during the design and production of the first few leaflets. American print support at Long Binh was still in place and available at this early stage of the Australian production.

The next phase of production was the pre-press and paste up stage. This was the process of collating all the hard copy into some sort of pre-planned layout which was given to the GSO 2 (Psyops/CA) at the Task Force Headquarters or the Officer Commanding the

²⁷⁰ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 103 file R333/1/25, *Headquarters, 1st Australian Task Force. Establishments and Strengths – Returns – Manning HQ 1 ATF Psy Ops Pl [Psychological Operations Platoon]*, Folio 5, 7 March 1970.

unit, in this early stage of the print process and the finishing process, so that all interested personnel agreed to what was required. Although the GSO2 could not read the Vietnamese language the contents were assessed on layout, drawing, photographs and the attached English translation.

All photographs and printing were produced as half tones through the use of a suspended bench top camera with four lights to illuminate the area to be photographed. It was capable of turning a conventional continuous tone black and white photograph into a copy but rendered as graduated tone value dots on white ground, or in trade terms, a half tone. This allowed the photograph to be combined with the typewritten copy as an illustration to the text. The print production unit could produce from 60,000 up to 250,000 leaflets and delivered finished copies to the Nui Dat airstrip²⁷¹ within six to ten hours of the job being commenced. That was the target production-time decided on and was clearly recalled by those who worked in the unit.²⁷²

The printing units were AM Corporation Multilith Offset 1250 LW A4 machines which were the workhorse of the small offset trade businesses around the world of that time. The AM brand was chosen because of the need for United States support in the initial stages for the supply of consumable products. The more important reason was that AM Corporation had a Service Maintenance Facility in Saigon so that the agents in Saigon could be transported to Nui Dat and returned to Saigon the next day and down times was kept to a minimum. The Base Printing Units in Australia used the same machines so any replacement staff posted to the unit was familiar with the equipment. A copy of the leaflets produced by the 1st Australian Psychological Operations Unit are attached as Volume 2 to this thesis marked Appendix 7

The preparation and distribution of leaflets by the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy province represented an important element of the Army's psychological operations. It has been mentioned that the Americans dropped over fifty billion leaflets in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos over the period 1966 to early 1970. In the period 1965 to April 1970 the Australian forces would have ordered and had disseminated about six million

²⁷¹ Named Luscombe Field after the first pilot killed in the Korean war.

²⁷² Interviews with Stone, Chin Quan, Botham, Burke, Hoogkamer and Everitt with the author.

US produced leaflets. These totals were included in the US overall figures. The Australian 1st Psychological Operations Unit produced between seven and eight million leaflets in the twenty months of operation from 14 April 1970 to 25 November 1971. This amount is a best estimate because the printing work sheet records in the later part of 1971 are incomplete, missing or not recorded. To these leaflets produced and dropped by the Australian unit can be added a further two to three million American produced leaflets dropped, including about two million 'safe conduct passes'. The Australian effort amounted to about 0.02 percent of the total leaflets dropped in Vietnam. As a number of the records concerning the Australian leaflet operations prior to April 1970 lack detail, the above figures are an approximate. The leaflets produced by the Australians can be grouped into a number of categories. Of the one hundred and eighteen posters or leaflets produced 25 were classified as leaflets that were aimed at demoralising the enemy. There were fifty-eight leaflets designed to emphasize the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, of which 24 were 'quick reaction' leaflets that depicted NVA or VC Hoi Chanh (returnees) on them. These leaflets displayed a happy photograph of the person on one side of the leaflet with a personal hand written signed letter to members of his unit on the other side. Seventeen leaflets and posters were classified as safety messages and were designed to support civic action programs coordinated by the 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit and for distribution throughout the population by Vietnamese Information Service personnel. Three leaflets or posters supported South Vietnamese government Rural Development programs. Only five leaflets were produced by the unit to counter propaganda to Viet Cong propaganda messages which were aimed at Australian forces.

Summary of Propaganda Development

As psychological operators, the Australian were dealing with target audiences whose living conditions, attitudes, frames of reference and value orientations were very different from those to which Australians experienced even though many Australian soldiers had been exposed to similar Asian conditions while serving in Malaya or Borneo. Ground Team operators had to communicate with audiences within a warlike environment while at the same time military command required communication with the Vietnamese be undertaken within a formal system. To attempt to analyse and at the same time communicate with a Vietnamese audience in terms familiar to a Westerner

was a mistake often made by the operators. In retrospect, the two major critical factors that handicapped the psychological operations unit were the lack of Australian/Vietnamese linguists and the lack of formal training in psychological operations, political warfare and the understanding of Vietnamese history and culture. There were significant barriers to the unit's success although it is difficult to see how these could have been corrected in that war-time situation.

Australian Leaflet Production

Although there has been some discussion of leaflets in previous chapters of the thesis the following examples provide a brief account of the leaflets prepared for or used by the Australians after they commenced their own production. The leaflets were designed for specific purposes such as persuading the VC soldiers to surrender and be reintegrated back into the South Vietnamese community.




Figure 25 : Australian Leaflet ATF-002-70

This leaflet informs the reader about the main benefits of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms – amnesty) program if they gave themselves up and returned to the government of South Vietnam. It was emphasised that the returnee would suffer no retribution or punishment. Rewards for weapons handed in and other benefits for the family were promised. This theme was repeated many times in slightly different formats in the units leaflets.²⁷³ Messages and themes were repeated over and over again. This allowed the propaganda message to be reinforced at every opportunity. The leaflet explains:

Front of Leaflet

Rights of a Hoi Chanh

Back of Leaflet

- 1. You will be rewarded for weapons that you bring in.*
- 2. You will have full citizenship.*
- 3. You will be re-united with your family.*
- 4. You and your family will be protected.*
- 5. You will be assisted with finance.*

Leaflet ATF-003-70 gives additional information on the Chieu Hoi program. The ground teams gave out both leaflets ATF-002-70 and ATF-003-70 to Vietnamese government officials in the province concerned with the Chieu Hoi program so that they could approach families on the village ‘black list’, that is families with known members in the Viet Cong forces, to give them concrete information about the program should their relatives visit or if they were able to get messages to them. Leaflet ATF-003 carried the following message:

²⁷³ The lack of understanding of the enemy composition in the early stages of the formation of the unit and being denied full intelligence information was a problem in the early development stages of the development of propaganda. By 1970 many members of the VC Local Force units were NVA.



Figure 26 : Chieu Hoi Leaflet ATF-003-70

Front

Rally Instructions

1. Hide your weapons and go to the GVN or Allied Forces. Raise your hands and shout 'Chieu Hoi'.
2. After hiding your weapons, stay with a friend in this area. Ask him to contact the GVN or Allied Forces and let them know you want to Chieu Hoi.

Back of Leaflet

3. Go to DUC THANH District or Xa Bang early in the morning. When aircraft flies overhead, wave this leaflet or any other leaflet to attract his attention. The aircraft will help you rally safely. Many of your comrades have done this and they are now safe and well.

NOTICE: IF YOU FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL BE SAFE

Psyops leaflet ATF-004-70 was an idea copied from the Americans that showed a series of graves from the last five months with a number of known Viet Cong killed in the province shown on the headstone. There were three headstones bearing the future months and the questions asked, 'Will you be next'? The aim of this leaflet was to

demoralise the VC fighter and suggests that he would have lived longer if he had joined the South Vietnamese government side.




Figure 27 : Australian Leaflet ATF-004-70

Front of Leaflet

Who will be next! Soldiers of the VC and NVA! Why do you continue this senseless struggle? Already this year many of your comrades have been killed in Phuoc Tuy Province. Will you be next!

Rear of Leaflet

Will you be next! Months - Jan (113), Feb (105), Mar (51), Apr (87), May (88), Jun (?), Jul (?), Aug (?).

Leaflet ATF-004 was updated to show the latest number of VC deaths in the new production of Leaflets ATF-017 and ATF-032.

As explained in a previous chapter, it was the psychological operator's task with the assistance of information from interrogations by the intelligence agencies to obtain information about likely returnees who were literate enough to be exploited by the unit. In addition to any operational intelligence obtained by the Divisional Intelligence Unit or through other Vietnamese intelligence agencies, the Psyops unit intelligence Sergeant or ground team leaders with the aid of ARVN interpreters interviewed the Hoi Chanh to

ascertain if they would be prepared to participate in the making of a voice tape and write a short letter to their unit or to other members in their previous unit. Some letters were of a general nature, and some identified others in their previous units that had indicated they might, if the opportunity arose, to Chieu Hoi. This was carried out as quickly as possible after the person returned, but no force or intimidation was applied if they declined to participate. In the writer's experience very few declined. Many returnees stated that they returned because they were homesick, hungry, and sick and were tired of moving from one camp to another with the Australians hounding them. Some returned disillusioned because they thought the VC were losing the war. A number of the younger returnees who returned under the Chieu Hoi scheme were those who had previously been forcefully taken from their home or school and pressed into service with the VC. They had been subjected to intense communist propaganda by VC Political Officers when located in base areas and camps.

In the early period of the unit's existence, an opportunity arose to exploit two returnees. One was a woman, Tran Thi Sin who rallied on the day the unit was formed (14 April 70) and was exploited in a tape message as well as in a letter to her unit on 18 May 70. The delay in her exploitation was due to the South Vietnamese government ruling that a person can be available for interrogation/interview for three days after they returned. After that time had expired, the returnee had to be transported to the province Chieu Hoi Centre which was located east of Baria near the South Vietnamese Van Kiep military training camp. Extensions of time could be applied for up to one week. There were opportunities to visit and converse with returnees, but in this instance it was delayed until she was about to leave the centre. Another Hoi Chanh, Dao Van Dol, returned under the Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme on 18 May 1970 and after interrogation by intelligence personnel, was identified as someone who could be exploited. Dol made voice tapes and he wrote a letter back to his unit which was produced as the leaflet shown below:




Figure 28 : Australian Leaflet ATF-006-70

Dao Van Dol's letter

A letter to D445 Battalion I am Dao-Van-Dol, a soldier of B3, C4, and D445 Bn. Before I joined the VC, the communists were saying that joining the VC is to help liberate the country and bring peace and happiness to the people. Now after 6 years with the VC, I have realised that their facts are completely contrary. All I see is houses, bridges and roads being destroyed, innocent people being killed. Wherever the VC go and spread hatred. The above mentioned events have awakened me, and on the 7 May 70 I returned to the GVN and I was treated well. I sincerely call on you who are still with the VC, to awaken quickly and return to the GVN in order to be reunited with your family and don't let the VC use you anymore.

The Dao Van Dol case has interesting elements to it. He was a Montagnard by birth whose parents were killed when he was a baby. A childless Vietnamese couple adopted him. The Vietnamese community shunned him because he was Montagnard and he was also shunned by the Montagnard because he could not speak their dialect and was living with a Vietnamese family. His adopted parents gave him some basic education and after leaving school before the age of twelve, he worked as a 'buffalo' boy requiring him to take the animals to graze in the countryside each day, wash the animals and generally

look after them. It was during this time that he encountered the Viet Cong. They would come out of the jungle and ask him about the South Vietnamese government forces and of other allied troop movements. They tried many times to coerce him into joining their group. In 1964 he joined the Viet Cong Main Force unit D445 and served in the mortar platoon that was one of the VC units opposing the Australians in the Phuoc Tuy province and remained with them for six years. He fought with D 445 against the Australians at the battle of Long Tan where half of his mortar platoon was killed. Originally his platoon consisted of eighty soldiers, but it shrank thereafter and a new section leader was appointed for which position he was overlooked because, he said, of his Montagnard background and in spite of his long experience. He became disillusioned and disbelieved the unit's political officer that the VC were winning the war. He then rallied under the Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme. Because of his long experience in the VC, he was sought out during his time at the provincial Chieu Hoi Retraining Centre by the Vietnamese government officials and invited to become a Kit Carson Scout under the Vietnamese Government scheme, Luc Long 66. He completed the course and as his unit (D 445) had been working in the Phuoc Tuy province area, he was offered to the Australians as a scout. At this time the Australians employed a few ex-Viet Cong members in the infantry battalions whom they called 'bushman scouts'. Their role was to support the Australians about the areas in which the enemy units operated, the tactics used when confronting the Australians and, more importantly, the meaning of any signs or markers used by the VC in the jungle. Dol came to work with the Australians at the psychological operations unit on 7 July 1970. Vietnamese and American units employed ex-Viet Cong members in teams known as Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's). Dol worked with the writer for the next four months and continued to work with the ground teams until the unit redeployed to Vung Tau in October 1971 prior to returning to Australia. After careful coaching and training he was of use to the ground teams in talking to families in villages who had relatives in the Viet Cong. He provided firsthand information of how the VC units lived in the jungle, their lack of food and medical treatment, how they were misled by the political officers and how they always lived in fear of being killed. By joining as scouts and working for the Australians, these ex Viet Cong soldiers were given draft deferment from serving in the South Vietnamese Army. They were given Australian uniforms, armed with an M16 rifle, allowed three days rest a month, provided with an Australian ID card permitting them to enter the Nui Dat base area and were paid seven thousand five hundred piaster a

month. In 1970 this was about sixty three Australian dollars a month, but inflation increased over the next year and reduced its real value. They were supplied with accommodation, food and medical care. As a direct result of Dol's voice-appeals and from the leaflet drops another VC soldier from his unit named Tran Van Duc returned to the government on 22 July 1970 which, he said, was the first opportunity he had to escape to rally. This was the first known result of the exploitation of Dao Van Dol in leaflets and voice broadcasts.

Another important leaflet to be produced by the unit was prepared in order to maximise the impact of the incursion by US and South Vietnamese ARVN forces against the VC logistics areas in Cambodia. Most of the more modern arms and supplies for the conduct of the VC operations against the Saigon government and its allies were sourced from these sites. This region was also the location of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) headquarters and the operation was one of the early exercises in the American Vietnamisation of the war. John M. Shaw's book *The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War 2005* evaluates this campaign and the lasting effects it had over the next few years on the Government of South Vietnam. These series of battles were a test of the capability for the main force units of the ARVN. However in America it increased the 'anti-war movement' protests against President Nixon. The Australian leaflet was designed to inform people on some positive results of that offensive and raise the standing of the Saigon government with the people. The translation of the leaflet described the strength of the allied forces, how they would hit hard at the sanctuary areas and demonstrate how the VC's war effort could be crippled by destroying its supply routes:

Front of Leaflet

News Report For the People of Phuoc Tuy GVN Military Operations in Cambodia

1. As you know for many years now the communist aggressors of the NLF and Lao Dong have waged war against the peace loving peoples of South Vietnam. From sanctuaries in Cambodia where they keep large forces, weapons, ammunition, medicines, food and other essential supplies.

2. In response to a call for help from the Cambodian Government the GVN ordered ARVN to cross over to Cambodia and the Communist forces and their base areas.

3. The result of the GVN and allied military operations have been even greater than was expected up to 31 May 70.

7519 Communist soldiers have been killed

11641 Weapons of different types captured.

184 Vehicles destroyed.

Huge quantities of ammunition, medicines and other essential military supplies captured.

4. The ARVN has also saved many Vietnamese immigrants who are now safe and happy back in South Vietnam.

Rear of Leaflet

5. What will be the effect of these successful military operations:

a). The communist aggressors have lost many men and most important base areas. This will seriously reduce the potential for combat of both the VC and NVA.

b). By destroying sanctuaries in Cambodia, the GVN brought peace closer for the people of South Vietnam.

c). The lives of many Vietnamese immigrants living in Cambodia have been saved.

d). The ARVN have proved how powerful it is to the whole world. It has proved to the communists that they cannot resist such strength and fire power.

6. President Thieu said on Monday 11th May "We will continue to operate in Cambodia. Perhaps then the communists will learn they can not establish bases there again."

WE ALL SALUTE THE MAGNIFICENT VICTORIES OF THE ARVN IN CAMBODIA.

The leaflet was intended to have a strong psychological impact by revealing the extent of arms and equipment that had been seized and to serve as a warning to the VC that their means of conducting warfare had been severely undermined. The statistics of the VC's defeat was demonstrated in the following table as shown in later posters.

Causalities

Killed in Action	11,369
------------------	--------

Prisoners and ralliers	2,328
------------------------	-------

Material and Supplies

Individual weapons	22,892
--------------------	--------

Crew-served weapons	2,509
---------------------	-------

Installations, shelters destroyed	11,688
-----------------------------------	--------

Small arms ammunition, mortar	16,762,167 rounds
-------------------------------	-------------------

Hand Grenades	62,022
---------------	--------

Explosives	83,000 pounds
------------	---------------

Anti-aircraft ammunition	199,552 rounds
--------------------------	----------------

Mortar Ammunition	68,593 rounds
-------------------	---------------

Rockets, 107mm and 122mm	2,123
--------------------------	-------

Rockets B40 and B41	43,160
---------------------	--------

Recoilless rifle ammunition	29,185
-----------------------------	--------

Vehicles all types	435
--------------------	-----

Pharmaceutical products	110,800 pounds
-------------------------	----------------

Rice	14,046,000 pounds
------	-------------------

Other leaflets prepared by the Australians were of a more humanitarian nature and the one shown below was appropriate warning to the villagers about safety and the necessity to watch out for hidden land mines.



Figure 29 : Australian Leaflet ATF-013-70

Mines

Many people, soldiers and civilians, have been killed or wounded by mines. Parents - tell your children not to play with strange metal objects. Report anything that could be a mine to GVN or Allied authorities. This could save your life or the lives of your children. Rewards are paid for information about mines. The identity of the people will be kept a secret.

Air Dropping of Leaflets

Leaflet drops were planned by the unit in consultation with the GSO 2 (Psyops/CA) and the GSO 2 Operations at HQ 1 ATF with additional input from the intelligence staff officer when required. There were generally two methods of selecting targets. The first method was when an enemy unit was identified, either through intelligence information or from documents from killed or captured Viet Cong, and the second method was from information received about known or suspected unit locations. Leaflets were dropped over identified areas for a specified period of time. Known or suspected enemy base areas were popular selections because the Viet Cong were known to move about in the vicinity of their base areas. Other drops were made as immediate responses to the

surrender (under the Chieu Hoi program) of a Viet Cong soldier (Hoi Chanh) or in response to a contact with the enemy by an Australian sub-unit where there were VC soldiers killed or captured and their enemy unit was quickly identified. An aircraft tasking sheet was prepared and aircraft ordered from several sources. The United States could supply either an Iroquois helicopter (UH-1H Huey)²⁷⁴ (usually referred to as a Huey) or an O2B Push/Pull Cessna Skymaster (Cessna 01 Birdog was used in the early days of the conflict) a specially designed psyops aircraft. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) could supply an Iroquois helicopter or the Australian Army 161 Reconnaissance Flight (161 Recce Flt) could supply a Pilatus Porter aircraft. The American Cessna O2B and the Australian Pilatus Porter aircraft were restricted to loads of about 100,000 leaflets per a sortie.



Photograph 31 : Iroquois Helicopter (UH-1H)

²⁷⁴ Note. Models UH-1B and UH-1E helicopters were used until early 1968



Photograph 32 : United States Air Force O2A Push /Pull Cessna 'Skymaster' aircraft. The O2B model is the same aircraft but without the forward air controller rocket pods under the wing. On the left-hand side behind the pilot built into the fuselage was an external speaker for broadcasting.



Photograph 33 : Pilatus Porter aircraft with underneath hatch open. This is where the broadcast speakers protruded from the aircraft.

Clearance to fly the mission would be sought from the Task Force Headquarters Air Cell and if air and artillery clearance was given, the tasking approval would be signed by the Duty Officer 1 ATF and the approved form would be given to the pilot on him being briefed on the mission. If the leaflets were dropped from a helicopter then a chute would be fitted to its left hand side, to assure the leaflets would be safely dispatched from the aircraft. If a chute was not available, the psyops operator had to lean out of the aircraft whilst lying on the floor and throw handfuls of leaflets down and away from the aircraft in order to achieve a proper dispersal pattern.



Photograph 34 : Psyops operator Tony Schick and colleague about to dispatch leaflets out of an Australian RAAF helicopter using a chute to aid dispersal²⁷⁵

Only on some occasions did the aircraft loadmaster provide safety harnesses for the psyops crew. One psyops operator told the writer that he experienced his first ever flight in an aircraft and had to perform the task of throwing leaflets down from the helicopter. He was terrified every time the aircraft changed direction in flight because he thought he would fall out. No one had told him that this would not occur. Generally on the return flight back to the Nui Dat base the helicopter would hover close to the ground in a safe area just outside the base perimeter and this would rid the underside of the aircraft of any leaflets that had been sucked close to the outer hull of the aircraft.

²⁷⁵ Photograph provided by Mr. A. (Tony) Schick to the writer. Mr. Schick is in the foreground.



Photograph 35 : Leaflet mixture including 'safe conduct passes' falling from the helicopter dispatch chute. The chute was provided by US forces²⁷⁶



Photograph 36 : Leaflets falling away from the helicopter. Note the start of the distribution pattern.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ Photograph provided by Mr. A. Schick to the writer.

²⁷⁷ Photograph provided by Mr. A. Schick to the writer.

Returnee Interviews

Hoi Chanh's during their interviews by intelligence or psychological warfare personnel after returning to the government were asked to gauge the effectiveness of leaflet and voice missions they might have heard or seen. These returnees were asked to identify the leaflets they had encountered in their area of operations in the jungle. Reactions to this technique were many and varied. Illiterate returnees could identify leaflets by colour or the images printed on them, but not the words. When questioned about what they thought the images portrayed, they were generally able to identify the theme. The literate identified quite a number of leaflets. The Viet Cong superiors and political officers forbade their troops to read leaflets, but some members read them when they thought they were not being watched. If a soldier was caught reading a leaflet and it was their first offence they were given a verbal reprimand. The second offence was a beating, and if there was a third offence the offender was shot. In one instance a returnee from 8th Signal Company reported that a person who had left the unit to desert, or return under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme, was recaptured prior to surrendering and was incarcerated in an open bamboo cage in the unit's area. The main obstacle to those who wanted to return to the GVN was fear of punishment. This was reinforced by the punishment given to the deserter.²⁷⁸ A number of returnees were targeted by the Viet Cong after leaving the Chieu Hoi centre and if caught they would be assassinated as a lesson to others. Many returnees thought the messages on the leaflets were lies, because the unit or visiting Political Officers bombarded them with internal propaganda reinforced by chanting of slogans. Many who returned for medical reasons or hunger still believed in the communist ideals. Those who were members of the communist cadre had been so indoctrinated in their past that they remained wedded to the communist cause. VC political cadre members told many of their soldiers that if they rallied they would be killed by their captors. A few returnees informed the Australians when they rallied that they had been told that they would be eaten by the cannibal Australians or flown out to sea in a helicopter and dropped into the South China Sea. This indoctrination made some think it would be better to die for the communist regime than return to the GVN.

²⁷⁸ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 103 [359], *US Department of Defence: Intelligence Information Reports Jun – Nov 1970: Effectiveness of Allied Psyops*

Others who returned stated that the reason for returning was not the message in the leaflet as such, but more the continuous harassment of US, ARVN and Australian forces during their aggressive patrolling and ambushing. After several defeats such as the TET 68 and 69 offensives, many stated that their unit's morale was low. Many believed that those who had returned and those still in the Viet Cong would return if the opportunity was given because of low morale, the fear of death, particularly from artillery, bombs or helicopter gunships, shortages of food and medical supplies, and the constant moving around the jungle from camp to camp. In a growing number of cases there were instances of conflict between VC and NVA personnel because of custom differences and because VC personnel resented the fact that NVA personnel were assigned to the best and safest jobs while the VC personnel drew all the dangerous assignments²⁷⁹. This is something that Australian forces appear not to have exploited. Disenchantment with the continuing length of the war, discontent with the oppressive communist control and concerns for family members, whom they had not seen for a number of years in many cases, were not exploited by the Australians as the means to undermine the morale of the enemy.

Viet Cong leaders or visiting political officers from their higher headquarters spent much of their time in the continuing communist indoctrination and also in discrediting the allied and Vietnamese leaflet claims and aircraft broadcasts. It had been reported on a number of occasions that those enemy soldiers who had disappeared from their unit were said to have been transferred to other units. But the lie would be exposed later when their faces appeared on leaflets and their voices were heard from aerial broadcasts.

Many who returned feared retribution sometime in the future against themselves or against their family? This was another reason that many stayed for longer times in the jungle and why many never returned. Even though some feared being caught by the VC with leaflets on them, many of those who surrendered had a leaflet of some type with them or they carried a 'safe conduct pass'.

²⁷⁹ Australian War Memorial, AWM Series 103 [359], loc. cit.

Evaluation of Leaflet Operations

The psychological operations conducted by the Australians at the 1st Australian Task Force prior to the appointment of Major F. Cross could be seen as less than ideal. The lack of highly trained staff and resources contributed to this lack in the conduct of operations. Ideas for leaflets reflected more the ideas and language of the officers involved and in many cases copies were taken from US leaflets or they were designed by personnel not trained in psychological operations or product development. These members lacked training in psychological warfare, leaflet product development and had little understanding of Asian culture, superstitions, language and customs. However, in spite of this the unit had a number of successes.

The successes of the leaflet operations was due to its linkage to victories of the Australian forces, Vietnamese forces and the Americans in the north and west of Phuoc Tuy province where they had been so successful in wresting from the Viet Cong the control of the contested areas and returning them to the government of South Vietnam. These military successes reinforced what were the small gains obtained through the psyops unit and other forms of non-military assistance provided by the civil affairs unit. What gains were made through the impact of the leaflet operation were probably accounted for by the volume of leaflets distributed to every corner of the province. And this coverage was due greatly to the work of Major Cross in building up the capacity of the unit to print hundreds of thousands of leaflets and to expand the unit from a its small staff of one officer and two soldiers to a unit of three officers and nineteen other ranks.

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Leaflets

The Viet Cong also engaged in leaflet propaganda against the Australians and Americans. They seemed to work on the principal of telling the 'big' lie. They exaggerated the truth especially where there were numbers of people killed or wounded and losses of tanks (the VC generally labelled armoured vehicles and APCs as tanks) and aircraft. It is clear that the claims were inaccurate and exaggerated. They produced these leaflets in jungle camps or may have had them printed by sympathisers in the major centres where printing facilities may have existed. They were generally printed

on poor quality paper with many grammatical mistakes. The two leaflets displayed below are examples. The grammar used in some leaflets was poor. These leaflets were dropped by Viet Cong or Viet Cong sympathisers along jungle trails where United States and Australian troops were thought to be operating. At times they were also dropped outside Vietnamese Government buildings, compounds, bases and in village market places. These were places where they were likely to be picked up and given to Vietnamese, US and Australian authorities.





Figure 30: Viet Cong Leaflet aimed at US and Australian Servicemen²⁸⁰



²⁸⁰ Leaflet from the Writer's collection of Propaganda Leaflets

Figure 31: Viet Cong Leaflet aimed at US and Australian Servicemen²⁸¹

Many of the leaflets aimed against the Australians up until about the mid 1970s were in typical Marxist language, using terms such as ‘running dogs of the US imperialist aggressors’, ‘lackeys of the US imperialists’ or ‘puppets of the corrupt Saigon officials’

Sometime in the mid 1970s the language changed to ‘Aussie go home’. There seems to be no investigation as to how, when and why the language changed to the more Australian phraseology. It is not known how they learnt to change the language as most propaganda themes came from the NLF in the north or from COSVN.²⁸² Professor Pham Xuan Xuan, Head of Department of Modern Contemporary History of Vietnam, Vietnam National University, Hanoi local Party Officials during the war had to produce the same message as was being delivered from COSVN, but did have some discretion to change it.²⁸³



Figure 32: Sample of Viet Cong jungle junk mail ‘Aussie Go Home’²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ Leaflet from the Writer’s collection of Propaganda Leaflets

²⁸² Interview Professor Pham Xuan Xuan, de Heer 5 June 2005.

²⁸³ Associate Professor Ngo Dang Tri, *ibid.*

²⁸⁴ John Rowe, *Vietnam: The Australian Experience*. Time Life Books (Australia) Pty Ltd, North Sydney, 1987, p. 143

As the language and grammar on VC propaganda leaflets, or as the Australians dubbed it 'jungle junk mail', changed towards the end of 1970 one must wonder how and why it changed. The following is the written message accompanying the image above.

Australian Servicemen

There is no resentment whatsoever between the Vietnamese and the Australian people! Why do you come here to kill our people and do harm to the Vietnamese revolutionary movement?

You yourself have been deceived! The Australian reactionary government are making profit on your bloods and bones by sending you to SVN to serve as cannon-fodder for US imperialists!

Since stationing at Nui Dat base (Baria), you have committed untold crimes to our compatriots, especially to those of Long Phuoc, Hoa Long, Long Tan, Long Dien, Dat Do, Minh Dam area, terrorized, killed them, destroyed their houses and orchards!

All of that are but odious crimes that bring to you any profit but only terrible death!

Only in 20 days, from May 2nd to 22nd, at Minh Dam mountain area, hundreds of Australian troops were shamefully killed, tens of tanks or armoured cars destroyed, and it is you yourselves have witnessed by your own eyes!

US defeat is evident! Nixon, US President, has been forced to withdraw 25,000 soldiers from SVN! What do you think of that?

To avoid useless and senseless death, commit no more crimes against the Vietnamese people, you should resolutely:

Oppose the War! Demand to be sent back to your families!

Refuse to go raiding or for US-puppet troops!

When in contact, cross over to the front's side, you will be well treated and be guaranteed your safe repatriation!

Stay on your camps at Nui Dat Base! Refuse to go for ambush, do not harm the Vietnamese people!

BARIA LIBERATION ARMED FORCES²⁸⁵

The attempt here is the same as what the US and FWMAF forces were trying to do, that is to separate the fighting forces from their leaders and government. The Australians examined the claims of 'hundreds of troops killed between 2nd and 22nd May' and found them to be untrue. These exaggerations meant that the leaflet has lost its impact immediately through its distortion of facts. The inappropriate English expression would have led the Australian soldier to ignore the message contained therein. An examination of the propaganda leaflet showed it to contain some language that was very Australian.

²⁸⁵ John Rowe, 1987, *ibid.* p. 143.

For example, in the second paragraph the use of the word '*cannon-fodder*' was more likely to be an Australian term than one used by the Viet Cong. They also know the term for the Australian base '*Nui Dat*'. This term in Vietnamese meant '*small hill*' but it was well known around the provincial capital and other villages that this was the term for where the Australians were located. There were three '*Nui Dats*' within the province. A small hill in the area to the east of the Task Force base where the battle of Long Tan was fought was also referred to as Nui Dat on the Australian produced topographical maps. The other Nui Dat was much further to the east near the most eastern village of Xuyen Moc. As the leaflet is signed '*Baria Liberation Armed Forces*' it could indicate that the makers of the leaflet were in contact with the VCI of Baria or it was produced by the VCI. Whether their small clandestine printing and production facilities were located in the populated area of Baria was never known or suspected. If it had been, then it was the job of the Australian intelligence in conjunction with the Vietnamese authorities to try to track it down. In the last paragraph the word ambush appears. The Americans were more likely to use the term '*search and destroy*' and the Viet Cong usually called their ambushes '*attacks*'. Some of the language seems to indicate assistance from someone who knew or who worked closely with Australian forces. Generally, the Australian base at Nui Dat only housed Australians and a few US servicemen except for Vietnamese Bushman Scouts (who did not speak English) ²⁸⁶ or a small contingent of Vietnamese (ARVN) soldiers in a military intelligence detachment located and under command of Detachment of 1 Division Intelligence Unit. This unit was 10 Military Intelligence Detachment (10 MID). Some of the lower ranks of 10 MID did not live in Nui Dat, but lived at Van Kiep Military Camp which was east of the province capital Baria. It may have been some disgruntled person from this unit that had an association with the Baria Liberation Front or with someone in the Viet Cong. They commuted to the Australian base each day.

Another explanation given to the writer by an academic from Hanoi and from an ex Viet Cong section leader in Phuoc Tuy, was that school children may have translated the text from Vietnamese to English. This explanation is to be doubted because although some

²⁸⁶ Bushman Scouts were the same as the American Kit Carson Scouts. They were ex Viet Cong members who had returned to the government under the Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme. As Hoi Chanh's (returnee) they had been through the Chieu Hoi re-indoctrination Centre and were deemed suitable to serve with US, Australian and other forces in units as scouts and advisors on VC tactics in the field.

children were taught some English in schools by Australians from the Civil Affairs unit education section, and they may have been able to translate individual words, they would have been unable to produce the sentence structure needed for the leaflets.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁷ The writer visited the province in Vietnam where the Australians operated in (now called Baria / Vung Tau province) from April to May 2005 in an attempt to interview ex Viet Cong members who were either Communist Party Officials or worked in the Propaganda and Training Sections of Viet Cong Units. The writer was able to identify two senior members of Chau Duc District Unit at the time of Australia's involvement in the province. One was Nguyen Van Kiem also known as (aka) Nam Kien (now aged about 81 years old in 2005) Secretary of Chau Duc District Party Committee (Huyen Uy) and the other was his wife Thi Hai Loan, Secretary of Hoa Long Party Chapter (Chi Bo Xa)(now aged about 65 years old). Party officials would not allow them to be interviewed. Although some low level Viet Cong members were interviewed, these two senior members of Chau Duc District Company were located but were prevented from speaking to the writer by attending officials.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion and Epilogue

*One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skilful.
Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skilful.*

*Sun Tzu. 500 B.C.
From Chapter 3, Strategy of Attack.²⁸⁸*

Conclusion

The Question of Effect and Overall Assessment of Psychological Operations

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of 'conflict propaganda' or 'psychological warfare' as it is a complex task to satisfactorily demonstrate that propaganda has a direct impact on a particular battle or the war overall during the time Australian forces operated in Bien Hoa and Phuoc Tuy provinces in South Vietnam. Psychological effectiveness cannot be isolated because the source of actions shaping the morale of the Vietnamese people are associated with the tangled developments in the political, military, economic and psychological domain that occurred before and over the time the Australians were involved in the conflict. In the province controlled by the Australians, no study was undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the public affairs and propaganda operations conducted by any of the forces, whether by leaflet, poster, radio or television. Even if undertaken, what effect would have been by the influence on the study by covert members of the VCI or families who had sons and daughters serving in the Viet Cong.? Those who had relatives killed, accidentally or otherwise by the FWMAF or who had been killed or injured as innocent civilians caught up in a battle, and particularly when the Tet offensives came to the villages and hamlets. Previous authors writing on propaganda tend to agree that the use of propaganda during a conflict is important, that it

²⁸⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War: Book and Card Deck*. Trans. The Demma Translation Group, Shambhala Publications Inc. Massachusetts. 2003

has an effect, and most previous attempts to evaluate its effectiveness were based on non-scientific evidence. What type of evidence should be relevant to a researcher? How should any response to psychological operations be measured? Does the measuring of the number of ralliers from the Viet Cong and to a lesser extent the North Vietnamese Army indicate the true success of any propaganda programme? If this is the measure, then can a researcher discount the effects of combat on those returnees? I do not think so. There seems no way of calculating the immediate or lingering effect of 'face-to-face' contact with relatives of the communist forces. This information was not collected by the forces collating data in the province and even if collected, how could it be assessed as being as a direct result from a psychological operation. The lack of pertinent data collected by interrogators and interviewers of Hoi Chanh is another factor in the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of any programme. The lack of detail collected about a returnee's literacy capacity was another problem in assessing the effectiveness of any propaganda message. The question is, how did they understand the messages they saw? Although the psychological warfare staff and operators at different levels within the task force developed many of the skills to wage effective persuasive propaganda messages, most were ill prepared to deal with the cultural predispositions of the Vietnamese people. Australian efforts in psychological operations in Phuoc Tuy province were generally in support of combat operations conducted by 1 Australian Task Force and pacification programmes conducted by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit. Much of the ground team operations were working with South Vietnamese communities, by themselves, or with the support of South Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces.

In the early years, psychological warfare officers were posted to the task force headquarters on an ad-hoc basis and they conducted psychological operations from the Task Force headquarters. These officers were untrained in psychological operations and much of their time was consumed as 'duty officers' in the headquarters 'operations centre'. These Australian officers worked with a detachment of US Army psychological warfare operators who were attached to the Australian forces and they exclusively used United States Army assets and product. As the establishment increased in staff to conduct these operations, it can be shown that there was an increase of returnees under the Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme. There seems to be a direct correlation between losses in battle by the enemy and the continuous follow up harassment by Australian combat forces combined with intense psychological warfare operations using aerial broadcasts

and leaflet drops that led to increases in returnees under the South Vietnamese national Chieu Hoi amnesty scheme. The Chieu Hoi returnee statistics are shown in Volume 2 Appendix 10. The figures show a low number of returnees in 1965 and these figures increase dramatically over the remaining time the Australians were in the province. There were lower figures in 1968 as the military defeat of the VC during the Tet offensive made the VC retreat to their sanctuaries to retrain, rearm and convalesce. The returnee figures for early 1971 again are low and this could be represented by the war being handed back to the Vietnamese under the Vietnamisation programme and the subsequent withdrawal of the Australians from the province. The collection of intelligence and subsequent psychological exploitation of returnees under the scheme combined with 'face-to-face' operations against the families of the enemy using proven political warfare techniques that were learnt on-the-job added to the success of psychological operations in South Vietnam. The positiveness of civic action projects that brought benefit to the people of the province like those projects undertaken by 1 Australian Civil Affairs Unit and publicised by the Village Information Service and psychological operations operators throughout the province also added to the winning of the 'hearts and minds' of the people. This was reflected in over ninety percent of the people in the province feeling safe enough to vote in the South Vietnamese government national elections in 1971 compared with sixty-seven percent on the 1967 elections. Any adverse actions by the coalition forces such as those described in a previous chapter is likely to harden the attitudes of the enemy and likely to increase attacks by fire against local forces and increase assassinations against government officials and people working for the FWMAF.

Cultural geography

The failure of the Divisional Intelligence unit, Australian Task Force staff officers and successive Psychological Operations unit commanders to consider, before and during the Army deployment to Vietnam, a comprehensive study in cultural geography is evident. Cultural geography is about understanding people and the places they occupy by analysing their cultural identities within their cultural landscape. It derives from an interest in culture, especially the geographic expression of culture in landscape as a causal mechanism and from a concern with cultural politics, especially the social and

spatial constitution of culture.²⁸⁹ However, it appears that none of this was taken into account in any meaningful way by Australian forces. In 1971 and under the direction of Major Twigg-Patterson the psychological operations unit updated and carried out a comprehensive survey of all the villages and hamlets of the province. This is of value from a historical point of view, but as this task was conducted and completed in the months prior to the withdrawal of Australian forces from Nui Dat to Vung Tau and subsequently returning to Australia it was too little too late. However, the Phuoc Tuy Province Survey is a positive comprehensive reference document to those who will study the people of the province in the future.

Use of Psyops when entering a new area and relocation of people

In the future, and prior to Australian forces entering any area of conflict, the government of Australia needs to define in consultation with any host government the conditions under which the assistance required by that host country will be provided. Determining the needs of the host country for Australia's participation will require input from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Defence. There needs to be clearly defined responsibilities for Australia's armed forces about how, where and when they operate. When operating as part of a coalition or joint force, the Australian Military Forces must settle what responsibilities it will provide on behalf of the Australian government to the host country government and to other coalition partners, specifically if Australia is not the lead military force.

The positive aspect of the Australians entering the province of Phuoc Tuy was that they were able to use the American psychological unit to print leaflets and handbills to inform the local people as to the reason they were in the province. The leaflets produced by the Americans requested the support of the villagers in the fight against the communists. However, the Australian and coalition forces needed to understand the conflicting pressure on the local population through the communist front organisations. When a front organisation included villagers in any collective organisation or excluded a

²⁸⁹ William Norton., *Cultural Geography: environments, landscapes, identities, inequalities*. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, Ontario, 2006. p. 1.

person, then it placed that person in a position of insecurity. Any action taken by a villager that was seen as detrimental to the communist forces placed them and their families in a position of danger. In the early years in the province, the Australians permanently removed or relocated illegal residents and Viet Cong sympathisers from Viet Cong controlled areas into other villages, or into the specially designed village of Suoi Nghe. While this may have been desirable from a military standpoint, the consequence was to remove people permanently from their land. Some of these villages, such as Long Tan to the east of Nui Dat were completely destroyed. The people relocated from Slope 30 and Hat Dich area were relocated to the Australian designed and built village of Suoi Nghe. These relocated people were already sympathetic to the communist cause. A Vietnamese Regional Force unit was located nearby to oversee and protect these people from further communist influence. This was a job the South Vietnamese Regional Force soldiers did poorly. They were unable to interdict the contact between the communist forces and the villagers.

At this time there were only staff officers at the Headquarters of 1 Australian Task Force conducting psychological operations in the province with US printing and tape production support. Two of the officers who served in the position of Staff Officer Grade 3 Psychological Operations said that they designed and produced their own leaflets at the headquarters. The American psyops team attached to the Task Force produced these leaflets with their limited portable printing facilities. Unfortunately, no copies of the leaflets or the translations were retained and no information could be found as to whom or what was the target of those leaflets. There was a need to continue to conduct psychological operations on the local populace in and around Suoi Nghe, but it appears that there was very little carried out after the relocation of the illegal residents by the Australians or the Vietnamese Information Service. This was an opportunity lost and was not capitalised on by the Australians because they were untrained and had no psychological operations unit conversant with this type of support of civic action projects. Again, it appears that the lack of training of Australian officers combined with the Task Force priority in carrying out combat operations against the enemy appeared to be the only priority.

Although there was to be a concerted effort in the 'Pacification' phase of the conflict, there appears to be little or no proactive support in the later years of the conflict for the

civil action projects carried out by 1 Civil Affairs Unit by the psychological staff officer. Any future deployment by Australian forces will need to consider the short and long-term effect of any forced relocation of local inhabitants whether this is a temporary or permanent situation. Any forced relocations of citizens in any society has political implications for the government. Local 'information public affairs officers' and military psychological warfare operators need to coordinate and operate together, and to independently advise the population what is happening and then continue to explain to the people the programmes that the government is offering. Their message has to be the timely, consistent, truthful and be able to be defended. The population for a long time will not support a government unless government programmes properly support them, there is adequate security provided, and opportunities to prosper are presented.

Psychological Operations need to be a part of any deployed force

The Australians were aware of psychological operations from the time they entered the conflict in South Vietnam. Initially the Australians were attached to the American 173 Airborne Brigade in Bien Hoa province. As part of that Brigade, they were exposed to psychological operations, particularly those undertaken by the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information Chieu Hoi amnesty program. Training in Australia for officers and soldiers warned for overseas service did not reflect any psychological warfare training other than training undertaken by those attending intelligence and advisor courses. Brigadier David Thomson, the Director of Infantry²⁹⁰ during the Vietnam conflict, confirmed that no psychological warfare training was carried out to equip commanding officers, officers and soldiers of infantry units about psychological warfare. This was also the same in other corps. Any future recommendations for units to serve overseas in any type of conflict should include a combined intelligence/psychological warfare unit/group which will give commanders the necessary means to win or positively influence the 'hearts and minds' of the people in their area of operations.

²⁹⁰ Interview by the writer of The Honourable Brigadier David Thomson MC. MID (Retired) of October 2005.

HQ Staff – skill sets, experience, time extended for key personnel attached to HQ and other units

The Intelligence Centre conducted a small number of courses for Intelligence Corps personnel and for other military soldiers proceeding to Vietnam as advisors on the Australian Army Training Team. This basic training course gave them minimal information about these agencies and how their services could be sourced if and when needed. No intensive skill training in psychological operations was conducted at the Intelligence Centre. It is essential that military specialists have comprehensive training in these and other specialised fields of endeavour.

In any conflict it is imperative that selected specialised personnel such as high level planners, intelligence personnel and psychological warfare specialists not only be highly trained, but that they be retained in any operational theatre for longer periods of time. Only when this occurs will the forces be able to plot changes in the operational environment without any loss of continuity of action. To complement this, and to make sure that continuity of operations continue without interruption any new staff posted to the area of conflict must remain in place with current staff for a period of time. This allows for familiarisation with the area of operations and ensures that detailed briefings on current operations are given. This is particularly important in Asian cultures when it is desirable to introduce those newly arrived key personnel to the military and civilian contacts that field commanders/operators will work closely with.

Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam

The Headquarters of Australian Force Vietnam knew that the United States under the agreement between the two countries did not have to supply or assist the Australian Forces when conducting psychological operations. There had been a number of requests to Army Headquarters in Canberra for some type of psyops component to be formed so these types of operations could be conducted. It was not until the comprehensive proposal in 1969 was submitted and the imminent withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam that HQ AFV more actively lobbied Canberra who became motivated enough to approve the project to form 1 Psychological Operations Unit. The Australian task

force based in Nui Dat was under operational command on II Field Force Vietnam. The late inclusion of the psyops unit on the Australian Order of Battle meant that many opportunities were lost in gaining operational experience in a major conflict.

In assessing the operations of the past, research indicates that opportunities should not be lost in unconventional insurgent conflicts to try new and creative methods of operations. Any future deployments of Australian forces should include at the highest level legal advisors, public affairs officers, intelligence and specialist psychological operations personnel who will advise the deployed commander on the strategic directions of psychological warfare that is in accordance with agreements and are acceptable to the Australian and home governments.

HQ 1 ATF

The evidence indicates it was some time before there was recognition that the task force headquarters needed full time dedicated psychological operations staff. Depending on the person posted into the position, it appears that much of their time was devoted to being tasked as a 'duty officer' in the Task Force Command Post. This misuse of specialised staff had an ongoing effect in the conduct and planning of psychological operations. When Captain Bruzga put forward his proposal for a psychological operations unit, the idea had been discussed for a number of years without success. The withdrawal of US forces required the Australian forces to urgently rethink the need for a psychological operations unit of some type. In future, there needs to be greater consideration when Australian troops are deployed for any future military/civilian action for specialised psychological warfare personnel to be included at the participating headquarters as advisors and at the local command level as advisors and field operatives. Major Twigg-Patterson was the only Australian psychological operations trained staff officer at the task force headquarters and he filled the position of General Staff Officer Grade 2 Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs from October 1970 to May 1971. The continuing success of the subordinate 1 Psychological Operations Unit in this period is evidenced by the comprehensive directions and guidance Twigg-Patterson gave to the unit during that time. Although the war was being handed back to the Vietnamese the unit under his direction produced a comprehensive province area study.

1 Psychological Operations Unit

None of the Officers commanding the psychological operations unit were formally trained in psychological warfare techniques and operations. The last commanding officer of the unit, Captain Hudson was a commissioned officer in Australian Army Psychology Corps. There appears to be a genuine need for a psychologist and an intelligence corps officer in the unit; however, the officer commanding the unit should understand, be trained in or have experienced combat operations. Future commanders of a psychological operations unit should understand front line combat operations and the pressure and situations operational teams are likely to experience in the field. The unit's work was underutilised by the task force and the officers commanding combat units. In many ways the unit's initial field teams planned their own work around the province. Some of their essential tasks were to broadcast and publicise in villages where the 'civilian access' areas were and the hours the curfews that were imposed around the village. These initial teams also assisted Vietnamese and Australian forces when conducting cordon and searches of hamlets or villages.

There was a need for all of the commanding officers of the psychological operations unit to 'tell and sell' the services offered by the unit to those commanders of the combat arms deployed in theatre as well as to any unit involved in civic action and nation building projects. The greatest problem encountered in conducting operations was that no Australian staff could speak or read the Vietnamese language, with the exception of one Sergeant who had attended the long language course at Point Cook in Victoria, Australia. The complete reliance on ARVN interpreters who were required to translate Australian messages may have created unintentional opportunities for psychological communications which were incongruent with Vietnamese cultural dispositions, or which may have contained messages, which suggested or contained elements of foreignness. The intention of the unit's work should represent the policies of the South Vietnamese government. As the unit initially worked independently and without direction from 1 ATF some interpretation of messages produced may have been lost because of the lack of direction and of any understanding of the Vietnamese government policies and direction.

Another major problem was that some key establishment positions in the unit such as intelligence officer, psychological operations team leaders and interpreters should have their operational tours extended in an effort to counter the problem of lack of maintaining continuity of operations. It is important that the collection of psychological intelligence information should be of prime importance to the unit, 1 ATF and the Detachment 1 Div Int Unit. This collection effort is needed so the unit can operate effectively in the field with Australian units or other coalition members.

There is a need for a better designed in-depth interview survey report with returnees, prisoners of war and illegal residents captured or removed from non-civilian access areas. The interviews that were conducted by members of the unit amounted to collecting data only. Without proper formal training and subsequent experience the collection of data without proper analysis is a waste of the intelligence collection process. The interview survey needs to be better aimed towards the collection of information that can be exploited by the unit in any follow-up campaign. The use of the interview reports can lead to new subject areas being identified and then those areas being targeted or exploited. The need for the refinement of previous messages can be identified through the interview process or may lead to new messages or themes being developed. The weakness in securing adequate feedback led to no adjustment to previous messages, correction of any obvious errors, such as the language being too formal, and dissemination of messages through the correct channels in optimum quantities, which may have affected the message effectiveness.

1 Psychological Operations Unit produced 118 different leaflets and posters from April 1970 until October 1971. The total unit production and ordering in of product from the US forces amounted to between 14-16 million leaflets, handbills and posters. Therefore, the Australian production was one leaflet or poster produced approximately every four and a half days. This shows an underutilisation of the printing capability of the unit. The printing of leaflets diminished dramatically in 1971 as the unit withdrew services in support of the Vietnamese Information Service and CORDS Advisory Team 89 as part of giving the war back to the Vietnamese. Most quantities of single leaflet production leaflets were about 60,000, although some were in larger quantities. It appears from the examination of the unit files shows that it cannot be ascertained how the unit concluded

that 50,000 to 60,000 leaflets was the correct quantity to produce from each production run. Each area of operations where the leaflets were dropped varied in size. No post operational assessment of the targeted area was undertaken, and as such it cannot be ascertained that the amount of leaflets dispatched was too many or too little for a good distribution pattern for the area targeted. The unit leaflet production was underutilised as the unit could have produced more leaflets and in greater quantities. In the early days, there should have been more support to the Vietnamese Information Service during the 'pacification' period of the war. The lack of counter propaganda against the blatant falsehoods contained in Viet Cong propaganda aimed at the Australian forces seems to suggest that it was not necessary. Some of the VC propaganda was in English only, whilst many other leaflets dropped around villages within the province were in English on one side and Vietnamese on the other. As the intelligence unit had a 'counter-intelligence' section, then psychological operations needed to have the capability to counter enemy propaganda whenever and whenever it occurred. The leaflets produced by the unit were of greater quality and in larger quantities than those produced by the provincial Vietnamese Information Service. It was seen by some observers that the Australians attempted to substitute themselves for the Saigon government in the province as a communicator to the enemy. This was as counterproductive as the dropping of leaflets by Australians as this demonstrated the South Vietnamese government's weakness and inability to communicate face-to-face with the people in the countryside. As the leaflet messages and aerial broadcasts were dispatched from aircraft, was it a sign of military weakness? It was seen by some as an indicator that the communists might be winning their struggle against the government.

Leaflet development / approval process

When the Australian forces are operating overseas in support of a home country or in cooperation with other coalition forces, there needs to be clear policies and procedures on the development and approval processes of leaflets. The Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon issued all of the policies and procedures that the unit should have operated in accordance with. Although these directives were issued to the task force headquarters, many did not make their way by distribution to the unit, and therefore were not followed. Leaflets that may be acceptable to a home country or

coalition partners, may not be acceptable to the Australian government. Particular attention needs to be taken in regard to the time constraints and any administrative procedures in the production of 'quick reaction' leaflets. The production of quick reaction leaflets used in the exploitation of the returnees was one measure of success of the unit. These leaflets were produced quickly after the returnee had been interviewed and exploited by the intelligence sergeant or field team leaders and the leaflets promptly dropped in targeted areas. Proper guidelines were needed and were to be followed when producing these quick reaction leaflets. Procedures need to be agreed upon when Australian psychological operations personnel are required to work with other forces in the theatre of operations, and in particular with civilian agencies. Much of the work undertaken by the field teams were in Vietnamese communities. What authority do the teams have, where do they operate, and when do they operate? The unit had no 'standard operating procedures' and none were produced over the time the unit was in operation.

There is a need for any psychological operations unit operating in a third country to have attached to it a locally trained artist for the production of leaflets, posters and billboards. There is an additional requirement for an in-country university trained social scientist to research the leaflets and posters produced to ascertain if the correct message is being presented and social and cultural norms are being adhered to. Failure to adhere to social and cultural norms is likely to have an adverse effect on the relationships with the local people when trying to win their 'hearts and minds'. In 1971, a social scientist from a Vietnamese university was to have visited the unit to carry out these tasks, but was cancelled as the war was being handed back to the South Vietnamese forces under 'Vietnamisation', which was the final phase of the war prior to Australian forces withdrawing from Vietnam. The social scientist can also undertake attitudinal surveys on the local population on various subjects. These surveys are an important indicator as to the effectiveness of the product development by the unit.

Another problem with the leaflets was that as they were numbered with an Australian Task Force (ATF) identification number they could have been dismissed by the communist political officers as coming from 'American imperialists or their lackey's', and therefore any message portrayed on them may have been lost, or at least diluted.

The same issues arise as with the leaflets when voice tapes are being produced for use in a country. Particular attention needs to be made with cultural sensitivities in mind.

Concluding Remarks

Finally, the undertaking of psychological operations by the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy province, South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972 is assessed as being reasonably successful for two main reasons. First, the continued success on the battlefield by Australian combat forces putting continuous pressure on the enemy in the province: and, success by the personnel of the psychological operations unit who were posted officially or unofficially to positions where they planned, supported or carried out psychological warfare. The initial support that was ongoing throughout the deployment to access American leaflets, poster and voice tapes was essential. Prior to the Australians forming their own psychological operations unit they not only had unlimited access to US product but were able to have the Americans produce leaflets and tapes of Australian design. These were particularly successful, particularly when the Australians first entered Phuoc Tuy province. Initially the tasking of US Air Force and Army aircraft to carry out leaflet drops and voice missions assisted the Australian forces in carrying out their mission. When the Australian Army formed their own psychological operations unit they became self sufficient, although the Americans still provided some product and air assets when requested. The biggest failure by the Australian Army was the lack of training of the officers and soldiers in the specialised areas of psychological warfare. Even if they had attended the Intelligence Centre courses on civil affairs and psychological operations it would not have been enough as the courses had been designed for staff officers and personnel who were being posted to South Vietnam as advisors on the Australian Army Training Team. In retrospect, the unit should have employed a locally engaged artist to assist in the production of leaflets and posters. The failure to conduct any research by a South Vietnamese Social Scientist into the production of leaflets and tapes allowed the unit to believe it was correct in the product it produced. This is substantially true and the evidence was able to be produced through captured documents, particularly about bodies being left on the battlefield. Another indication of success was the number of Viet Cong who returned under the Chieu Hoi

amnesty scheme to Australian, American or to South Vietnamese government forces as a result of the combination of military and psychological warfare operations.

Situation After Australian Troops had Withdrawn

The conflict in Vietnam was lost in many ways. The withdrawal of all foreign troops after the peace agreement was reached in Paris in 1973 was in vain. The communist north regrouped, rearmed, retrained and invaded the south in large formations in 1975. The promise of assistance from the United States in the form of economic aid was severely reduced or it never arrived and the promise that United States forces would return if there was aggression from the north did not materialise. Richard Nixon, President of United States of America, wrote in a letter to Nguyen Van Thieu the President of South Vietnam on the 5 January 1973 (released on 30 April 1975) said *'Should you decide, as I trust you will, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post settlement period that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam'*.²⁹¹ When the North Vietnamese were attacking Saigon in 1975 President Thieu wrote to the President of United States of America after it became obvious that US forces would not return to support the South Vietnamese and said *'If the Americans do not want to support us anymore, let them go, get out! Let them forget their humanitarian promises!'*²⁹² Some observers might say that the Americans sold out the Vietnamese because the United States population was tired from the war and the politicians looked for new domestic directions.

Disbandment of 1 Psychological Operations Unit

The last Officer Commanding 1 Psychological Operations Unit, Captain Peter Hudson, returned to Australia and passed the unit records and equipment to the Army Intelligence Corps, Intelligence Centre located at Woodside, South Australia. Even though it had been agreed during the conflict that the psychological operations unit should be on the Australian Army Order of Battle, the unit was disbanded. Many of the files the unit

²⁹¹ www.vietnamwar.net/Nixon-1.htm accessed 17 March 2006.

²⁹² Ibid

created were destroyed when the Intelligence Centre moved from South Australia to Canungra in Queensland. All of the voice tapes that were produced by the unit after exploitation of the returning Hoi Chanh's were also destroyed. Psychological operations were not undertaken in the Australian Army until the 1990's. The lessons of the past had been lost and Major Dougal Mount, Australian Intelligence Corps was sent to the United States in the early 1990's to relearn all that had been forgotten. Major Mount designed the new psychological warfare courses to be taught to intelligence corps personnel who are now tasked with conducting psychological operations.²⁹³

²⁹³ Interview by writer with Lt Col Dougal Mount at Intelligence Centre, Canungra

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Mr Ian Smith
Mr Michael Dudley
Mr Roger Snuggs
Mr Russel Tetlow
Mr Harry Hoogkamer
Mr Clyde Lawson
Mr Phillip Quin Chan



**VICTORIA PER MENTUM: PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN
ARMY IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE SOUTH
VIETNAM 1965 – 1971**

VOLUME 2

APPENDICIES

DERRILL DE HEER

BA Admin, BA Adult Ed, Dip Teach.

MASTER OF ARTS (RESEARCH) HISTORY

**THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY
Northcott Drive Canberra ACT 2600**

2009

Table of Contents

<i>VICTORIA PER MENTUM: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</i>	
<i>CONDUCTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE</i>	
<i>SOUTH VIETNAM 1965 – 1971.....</i>	<i>1</i>
Table of Contents.....	2
<i>Appendix 1.....</i>	<i>4</i>
Herbicides Used In Vietnam.....	4
<i>Appendix 2.....</i>	<i>6</i>
Known Psychological Leaflets Printed by US forces for 1 Australian Task Force prior to formation of 1 Psychological Operations Unit in April 1970.....	6
<i>Appendix 3.....</i>	<i>13</i>
List of Australian Personnel Associated with 1 Psychological Operations Unit.	13
Members of 1 Psychological Operations Unit.....	14
<i>Appendix 4.....</i>	<i>16</i>
Vietnamese Beliefs in Spirits and Trees.....	16
Vietnamese Beliefs in Spirits and Trees.....	17
General	17
Special Beliefs and Practices	18
Ghosts	18
Friendly spirits	19
Water Spirits	19
Fire Spirits, Meteors and Trees.....	21
Spirit of the Soil.....	22
Spirit of Heaven.....	22
Trung Nguyen (Wandering Souls' Day).....	22
Talismans Rituals and Evil Spirits.....	24
Points for Consideration	25
<i>Appendix 5.....</i>	<i>26</i>
Use of Superstitions	26
JUSPAO Policy 36	26
<i>Appendix 6.....</i>	<i>30</i>
1 Psychological Operations Chieu Hoi Questionnaire.....	30

PSYOPS QUESTIONNAIRE.....	31
PART 1 - PERSONAL PARTICULARS.....	31
PART 2 – UNIT	32
Unit Routine	32
Morale.....	32
PART 3 - ALLIED PSYOPS.....	34
Political Training	34
Leaflets	35
Loudspeaker.....	35
Radio.....	36
General	36
Countermeasures	36
PART IV - EXPLOITATION	38
<i>Appendix 7.....</i>	<i>39</i>
Leaflets and Posters Produced by 1 Psychological Operations Unit.....	39
April 1970 to November 1971	39
<i>Appendix 8.....</i>	<i>259</i>
Psychological Operations Sample Voice Broadcast Scripts.....	259
<i>Appendix 9.....</i>	<i>277</i>
The People Liberation Committee of Chau Duc District, Binh Ba Village	277
SENTENCE OF NGUYEN VAN KIEN	277
The People Liberation Committee of Chau Duc District, Binh Ba Village	278
<i>Appendix 10.....</i>	<i>280</i>
Chieu Hoi Returnee Figures	280
Chieu Hoi Returnee Figures	281

Appendix 1

Herbicides Used In Vietnam

Herbicides Used In Vietnam

Figures represent millions of US gallons

Agent	1962 to Jul 1965	Aug 1965 to Dec 65	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Total
Orange		0.37	1.64	3.17	2.22	3.25	0.57	0	11.22
White		0	0.53	1.33	2.13	1.02	0.22	0.01	5.24
Blue		0	0.02	0.38	0.28	0.26	0.18	0	1.12
Total	1.27*	0.37	2.19	4.88	4.63	4.53	0.97	0.01	17.58

Notes:

- 1 From 1962 to July 1965 the type of herbicide used was not recorded
- 2 Primary delivery vehicle: USAF C-123 Provider transport aircraft
- 3 Other delivery vehicles: Helicopters and river patrol boats

Source: <http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwmdef.htm> Downloaded June 2006.

Appendix 2

**Known Psychological Leaflets Printed by US forces for 1
Australian Task Force prior to formation of 1 Psychological
Operations Unit in April 1970**

**KNOWN PSYCHOLOGICAL LEAFLETS PRINTED BY US FORCES FOR 1 AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE PRIOR TO
FORMATION OF 1 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNIT IN APRIL 1970**

Leaflet Number	Name of Leaflet	Date of Leaflet	Comments	File Number
152	The Choice is up to you		The VC bring about death and sickness	AWM304 [431]
246-1-68	VC Road Blocks	1968	Blocking of Route 23	Ditto
16/68	Appeal to 274 Regt	1968	Rally appeal	Ditto
246-16-68	Safe Conduct	1968	Safe conduct	
246-17-68	Reprint of captured letter (person is sick)	24/7/1967	Same as US leaflet 246-17-68	
246-20-68	Family appeal	1968	Same as 246-20-68	
246-21-67	Appeal after Allied attack	1967	Same as 246-21-67	
246-040-1	Appeal to VC		Same as 246-040-1	Aust used last few numbers
246-45-68	Rally appeal	1968	Same as 246-45-68	
246-042	We will get you			
246-70-68	Weapons Rewards	1968		
246-74-68	Appeal	1968	About Phuoc Tuy province	

246-83-68	Appeal Villages of Slope 30	1868	About Phuoc Tuy Province Picture and Letter signed by either Province Chief or District Chief	
246-84-68	Slope 30 now a Non Civilian Access Area	1968	Picture and Letter signed by either Province Chief or District Chief	
246-101-68	Appeal	1968		
246-112-68	Listen to Radio	1968	Counter propaganda by US against VC forbidding the people to listen to Vietnam Radio	
246-122-68	Aust troops patrolling around villages	1968	Keep within civilian access areas	
246-145-68	Bodies killed by commandos (SAS)	1968	Designed for SAS to leave in area of the killing	
246-146-68	Leaflet showing Baria hospital	1968	Rally appeal based on the enemy being sick	
246-339-68	Chieu Hoi Tran Luan	1968	Chieu Hoi Appeal by Tran Luan	
246-246-67	Message to Vietnamese from Commander 1 ATF	1968?	Apology by Brigadier Graham for having to remove people – Operation Ainslie (100,000 printed) 14 / 9/ 1967	

246-273-68	Appeal – Where are your Children Now	1968	Appeal to VC to return to their families, especially children	
246-287-67	Death by Napalm	1968		This leaflet was used by 1 ATF 3 times – caused controversy in Aust – Reported in Canberra Times – caused an uproar by certain anti-war factions. Questions were raised by Australian Government with Embassy and Defence staff with AFV. Defence replied to by DCOMAFV signal and copy of leaflet sent separately. Signed off 2/9/?

				Could be 67 or 68. File also indicates that there was a GSO 2 Psyops / CA
246-290-68	Rally Appeal	1968	Produced for operation Santa Fe. To be scattered by ground troops and dropped from the air.	Printed by 246 POC for 1 ATF.
246-312-1968	Prohibited Access Area	1968	Keep out of Long Tan. Several locals have been shot in this area accidentally	
246-322-68	Chieu Hoi Appeal	1968	Appeal to VC Commanders to rally – good reward programs	
246-352-68	We come as friends	1968	Aust Task Force operating in area	Aust and Vietnam Flag – on psywarrior web site
246-353-68	VC to steal upcoming rice harvest.	1968		
No Number	Report on TET Offensive	1-2-68	Appeal to people to report VC who are trying to return to the jungle after TET	
	Appeal by Vietnam Govt		Appeal by Govt as per above	
O4AH2268	Results of 3 days of	Feb 68	Results of 3 days of fighting during Tet	

	fighting during Tet		31/1/68 to 2/2/68	
O3AH2268	Appeal to VC	Feb 68	270 VC have rallied you should	
SP 927A	Appeal		Come home to your family	
SP 1252A	Chieu Hoi		Meaning of Chieu Hoi	
SP1389A	Chieu Hoi instructions		Instructions how to rally	
SP1431	Doubt in minds of VC		People are free in SVN and reported on by the VC	
SP2079	Chieu Hoi instructions		Instructions	
SP2080			Could be Chieu Hoi instructions	
SP2081			As above	
SP2088				
SP2141				
SP2250	1968 Tet Season	Dec 67?	New Year returns to the countryside and the people	
SP2247	Happy New Year / Weapons rewards		Weapons rewards prices are as at 12 July 1967	
	The Peoples War	Dec 67?	JUSPAO Theme and Propaganda –	

			addressed to the people of Phuoc Tuy	
	Appeal to Hoi Bai hamlet	Dec 67?	Operation Forrest – Cordon & Search Hoi Bai	
SP2246	Appeal Tet		Benefits of Chieu Hoi for TET	
SP2248	New Year Greeting		Instructions for Chieu Hoi	
SP2251	New Year New Hope		Instructions for Chieu Hoi	
SP2253	Happy New Year		Happy New Year and appeal to Chieu Hoi	
SP2228	Chieu Hoi		Chieu Hoi appeal and instructions to rally	
SP2244	Chieu Hoi – Tet message		Appeal	
SP2245	TET and Chieu Hoi			
SP2249	TET Fortune Telling			
SP2254	Happy New Year			
	Quick Reaction Leaflet Hoi My		Quick reaction leaflet and tape was made in response to a child being shot at a MedCap at Hoi My	

Appendix 3

List of Australian Personnel Associated with 1 Psychological Operations Unit

Members of 1 Psychological Operations Unit

Number	Rank	First Names	Last Name	From	To
311622	Captain	Brian William	Cloughly	8-Jan-71	2-Feb-71
2788247	Captain	Peter	Hudson	1-Feb-71	25-Nov-71
57084	Captain	Frank Leslie	Meredith	6-Apr-70	30-Jul-70
47051	Captain	Anthony John	White	19-Jul-70	6-Jan-71
17141	Lieutenant	Darrel Miles	Hodda	15-May-70	15-Oct-70
374185	Lieutenant	Geoffrey Seymour	Green	17-Sep-70	17-Sep-71
3109303	2 Lieutenant	Jeffrey Douglas	Cardwell	12-Feb-71	18-Nov-71
2794172	2 Lieutenant	Christopher John	Madden	5-Aug-71	14-Oct-71
44316	2 Lieutenant	Malcolm Leslie	Morrison	18-Nov-70	25-Nov-71
1732791	2 Lieutenant	Ian Victor	Smith	14-Apr-70	10-Nov-70
36662	WO 2	Michael Burke	Dudley	16-Oct-70	2-Dec-70
42546	Sergeant	Gavin Ronald	Beauchamp	14-Apr-70	1-Jan-71
37643	Sergeant	Derrill Vivian	de Heer	14-Apr-70	12-Nov-70
15731	Sergeant	Lawrence Riley	Johnstone	12-Oct-70	12-Jan-71
43828	Sergeant	Malcolm Leslie	Pool	6-Jan-71	7-Oct-71
42812	Sergeant	Roger Anthony	Snuggs	4-Nov-70	10-Dec-71
621700	Sergeant	Wayne Eden	Stone	28-Oct-70	7-Oct-71
*15186	Sergeant	Russel William	Tetlow	14-Apr-70	3-Nov-70
2792352	Corporal	Ian Christopher	Botham	14-Apr-70	3-Dec-70
3797207	Corporal	James Anthony	Conley	20-Jun-71	5-Aug-71
4720314	Corporal	David John	Everitt	14-Apr-70	30-Jul-70
2792367	Corporal	David Keith	Finlay	14-Apr-70	21-Jan-71
3798574	Corporal	Harry	Hoogkamer	9-Nov-70	7-Oct-71
4721451	Corporal	Wesley James	Hooper	21-Oct-70	7-Oct-71
*61583	Corporal	Clyde Francis	Lawson	14-Apr-70	4-Jun-70
3797185	L/Corporal	Phillip Ivan	Chinquan	12-Sep-70	15-Jul-71
2793680	L/Corporal	Authur James	Feltham	9-Sep-70	12-Aug-71
1735720	L/Corporal	Colin William	Lane	15-Jul-70	2-Jun-71
424063	L/Corporal	David	Lyon	21-Aug-70	2-Jun-71

1735630	Private	Anthony Ian	Bates	25-Nov-70	9-Jun-71
1736171	Trooper	Paul Anthony	Bishop	8-Jun-71	7-Oct-71
5716189	Trooper	Barry David	Blake	14-Apr-70	27-Aug-70
2795105	Private	Carmine (Charlie)	Carbone	27-Jan-71	7-Oct-71
3799575	Private	Kenneth Edward	Colbert	18-Aug-71	25-Nov-71
218953	Trooper	Anthony George	Cullen	14-Apr-70	1-May-71
2796039	Private	Robert George	Dayhew	25-Aug-71	25-Nov-71
1736927	Private	Trevor John	Dowdle	8-Jun-71	25-Nov-71
3796278	Private	Wladyslaw Andrew	Koscielecki	14-Apr-70	4-Feb-71
3797457	Private	Michael Henry	Marie	21-Aug-70	22-Jul-71
3798672	Private	John Norman	McPherson	20-Jan-71	7-Oct-71
32161	Private	Frederic John	Milroy	5-May-71	16-Jun-71
3800157	Private	Allan Neville	Monks	15-Sep-71	25-Nov-71
4720375	Private	Geoffrey Warburton	Mosey	14-Apr-70	1-Oct-70
1734779	Trooper	Mervyn John	Reid	2-Oct-70	2-Jun-71
4720656	Private	Anthony Graham	Schick	14-Apr-70	22-Oct-70
312662	Gunner	Harold Kenneth	Smith	14-Apr-70	22-Oct-70
2794572	Private	Graham John	Stone	29-Jul-70	7-Oct-71
3796787	Trooper	Brian Peter	Turner	8-Jun-71	6-Oct-71
218157	Private	James David	Wandless	4-Jul-70	10-Dec-70
45037	Private	Allan Charles	White	14-Apr-70	10-Sep-70
55953	Private	Daniel Anthony	Wright	14-Apr-70	25-Nov-71
4721317	Private	Neville Charles	Wuttke	6-Feb-71	7-Oct-71

Note:

1. The dates shown are for the time spent in the Psychological Operations Unit. Some soldiers served in other units prior to or after serving in the unit.
2. A number of the soldiers served second tours in Vietnam before or after the unit was formed.
3. Those names that are indicated by an * means that they do not appear on the official nominal roll of the unit.

Appendix 4

Vietnamese Beliefs in Spirits and Trees

Vietnamese Beliefs in Spirits and Trees

Fact Sheet Number 7

**Issued by United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam
(USMACV) Saigon dated 1 December 1969¹**

General

Apart from many religions practiced in Vietnam, many of the people believe in spirits. There are good spirits and bad ones, funny ones and stupid ones. There are spirits of people, rocks, animals, trees, of the heavens, kitchen spirits, hearth spirits, master spirits and subordinate ones. The list of spirits and what they supposedly can do approaches infinity.

Vietnamese people deal with the spirits as the need arises. They have all kinds of ceremonies in which spirits are appeased, scared, tricked, flattered, paid off, fed, or whatever is called for in the particular case. Appeasing the spirits is most important at Tet, the lunar New Year.

Each small village has its own guardian spirit, and he is worshipped by the whole village in annual ceremonies. Many times, shrines, temples, and buildings called '*dinhs*' are built for the worship of spirits. *Dinhs*' usually have a high pointed roof. Each occupation such as various handicrafts, fishing, etc. has a guardian spirit.

Many Vietnamese customs, such as not touching another person's head or shoulder, stem from the belief that spirits reside there.

¹ Australian War Memorial Series 304, File R249/1/1. Customs and Habits, Vietnamese Customs and Habits

Unusual, very old trees are objects of veneration among the Vietnamese and villagers explain that the inviting shade attracts wandering spirits. For this reason, children are cautioned to avoid these trees, particularly around noon.

Diviners specialise in spirits and are often called in to ‘diagnose’ which one is causing difficulty and what ceremonies are necessary to appease the spirit.

Spiritism is prevalent in all parts of Vietnam, but is especially strong in the mountain areas with the Montagnard tribes.

Special Beliefs and Practices

According to Vietnamese beliefs, there are three souls and nine vital spirits, which collectively sustain the living body. The primary soul maintains life itself, the second is the seat of intelligence, and the third is related to the senses. The nine vital spirits have no particular properties. When all souls and vital spirits are present, the individual experiences a sense of well-being, but if one or all should depart, sickness, insanity, or death could result. The souls and vital spirits are targets of evil demons, and when the healer first approaches his patient he usually intones, “Three souls and nine spirits return as quickly as possible”. After death, if there is no cult honouring the deceased, he becomes an errant spirit, wandering endlessly and doing great harm to the living.

The Pantheon of other spirits are complex. It includes the *ma*, *yeu*, *quy*, *tin*, *con*, *hoa*, *tien*, and several deities such as *Thien Loi* (the Thunder Spirit). *Ba Thuy* (the Water Goddess), and *Ba Giang Ha* (the Falling Goddesses). These are differentiated in a variety of ways – some are inherently wicked, some occasionally wicked, and others capricious or benevolent.

Ghosts

The supernatural beings most commonly discussed among the villagers are the *ma*, phantoms or ghosts, and they command fear, although their degree of wickedness varies. Among the least malevolent are those, which once were living animals – *ma heo* (pig ghost), *ma cho* (dog ghost), and *ma meo* (cat ghost). Villagers believe they swarm over fields after sunset, often getting tangled in the legs of those who tarry too long on the paths. *Ma dung* is the collective term for ghosts associated with horses, oxen, and buffalo, but unlike the other animal *ma*, they are harmful, and strange occurrences in a village are often attributed to the *ma dung*. *Ma Than Vong* is a specific ghost, the ‘tightening- knot ghost’ which goads people into suicide by muttering ‘*co co*’ (neck, neck) into their ears. *Ma A Phien* is the opium ghost, related to addiction and eventual ‘death in the pleasures’.

Yeu and *quy* are capricious, often wicked supernatural beings, capable of doing unguarded humans great harm. Of all these beings, however, none is so malevolent as the *tin* who villagers claim use a variety of tricks to induce their intended victims to open their mouths, whereupon the *tin* draw out their souls, leaving them insane. Villagers believe that the *yeu* and *tin* inhabit great trees, often appearing as human shadows.

Friendly spirits

While the supernatural beings are fearful genres are divided into somewhat finely distinguished categories, good supernatural beings are of one kind – the *tien*, who are considered happy and delightful beings. For example, a common proverb in the village is ‘to eat well and sleep well is to be like a *tien*’. The *tien* are thought capable of passing on special gifts such as literary genius, and some impart medical secrets.

Water Spirits

In the Delta area of the country, the many watercourses around the villagers and the large number of ponds make drowning a very real threat. To villagers it is a particularly horrible death, for drowning may indicate *noi*, a curse on another member of the victim's family. *Noi* implies an irresistible urge to plunge one's face into water, and it falls on the immediate kin of a drowning victim. According to villagers, whole families have been drowned as a result of the curse. Some drowned in earthen water jars, one man cursed with *noi* is supposed to have drowned in a cup of water, and villagers cite the case of a man who stumbled on a road and, because he was cursed with *noi*, his face was fatally drawn into water that had seeped into a buffalo print.

Noi is attributed to a number of water spirits, among them *Ba Thuy*, the Water Goddess, who can dispel as well as cause *noi*. While all villagers know of *Ba Thuy* or *Long Than*, the Dragon King usually associated with her, few offer periodic rituals, and none maintains a cult to either deity. Boat dwellers on the larger streams such as the Mekong or the Vaico are conscientious in their rituals to *Ba Thuy*, and most have gilded alters honouring her. Throughout the year ritual offerings are made at prescribed times, and fierce weather always provokes rituals to *Ba Thuy*. Some villagers contend that *Ba Thuy* protects drinking water from contamination, although this belief is not manifest in any ritual act.

Ma Troi is the ghost of drowned persons who, not having being restored to a family tomb or to the alter of the ancestors, has become an errant spirit. *Ma troi* manifests itself by a phosphorescent glimmer over a body of water or near a fire where villagers say it is attempting to warm itself. Normally the *Ma troi* is the ghost of a victim whose body could not be recovered, and its manifestation is a sign that the victim's kin should continue the search. If the search is futile, a ritual is performed by a sorcerer, to bring peace to the tormented ghost. It consists of summoning the ghost from the depths and capturing it in a jar which is placed on the alter of the ancestors.

The most fearful of the water spirits – those associated with *noi* – are the *ma da*. These are ghosts of the drowned who cannot find peace until they have secured another victim to replace them in their misery. The *ma da* lurk in the water,

awaiting a victim, usually a kinsman, and their favourite prey are children. Children are cautioned about the *ma da*, and many wear metal bracelets to repel the *ma da* who may attempt to pull a child into the water. From time to time one hears the expression '*drowned by the ma da*' in reference to a drowned child. Often *ma da* manifest themselves as large, ominously black amorphous masses which hover over the water wailing 'Its cold – so cold'.

There are numerous other water spirits and deities known by villagers, although they receive no special form of veneration. Among them are the Wave Spirits, which lie at the bottom of large rivers and periodically ascend, causing great waves and agitation, and Lord Whale, Lord Crocodile, etc.

Fire Spirits, Meteors and Trees

Ba Hoa, the Fire Goddess, and *con hoa*, ghosts of those who died by fire, are greatly feared by villagers because of their destructiveness. Thatched houses are a favourite target of the fire spirits, who are supposed to cause the fire themselves or induce someone else to start it. New houses are never constructed on a site of a house that burned. There are no prescribed cult practices to propitiate *Ba Hoa* or *con hoa*, but rhinoceros horns or horns from a mountain goat are known to be very effective talismans against the fire spirits.

Villagers refer to thunder as a 'blow from heaven', believed to be directed by the Spirit of Heaven against evil spirits on earth. Associated with this is the Thunder Spirit, sent to earth to mete out punishment to evil spirits and criminals. He carries an axe and is known as *luoi cam set*; he uses a bronze one against animals and evil spirits. According to popular belief, if one digs deeply in a place where lightning has struck, it is possible to find the *luoi cam set*, which may be used as a powerful talisman. Many sorcerers carry small axes which they call *Luoï cam set*.

Meteors are believed to be manifestations of goddesses descending to earth. Villagers refer to them as Goddesses of the Nine Heavens, the Mistresses of the

Spirits, or simply the Buddhist Goddesses. When a falling meteor disappears behind trees, it is thought that the goddesses are descending via the tree, so in their honour a small shrine should be constructed at the base of the tree. There are many such shrines in the villages. Some are constructed and maintained for a limited time whereas others, usually constructed by well-to-do villagers, are of masonry with a tile roof and are scrupulously looked after for a long period.

Spirit of the Soil

There are many occasions when the family pays homage to the Spirit of the Soil. This deity is honoured prior to construction of framework for a new house and before a bride and groom enter the groom's house for the wedding ritual. Also, before planting rice seedbeds, most farmers continue to make five small ritual offerings to this spirit.

Spirit of Heaven

Altars of the spirit of Heaven are found before most village houses, and may range from a single planks set on a post or tree trunk to rather elaborate concrete shrines, models of pagodas. On the first and fifteenth day of each lunar month, offerings of three cups of tea or rice alcohol, a small dish of rice, a small package of salt, and some burning joss should be placed on the alter to entice the spirits to remain there and protect the house and its occupants. The spirit in the alter also observes the behaviour of those in the house and reports it to the King of Hell, the deity who judges the dead. The rigidity with which the villagers make the prescribed offerings varies considerably. Some altars are noticeably devoid of offerings throughout most of the year, while others are heaped with food at the prescribed times.

Trung Nguyen (Wandering Souls' Day)

This is the second largest festival of the year. (Tet is first). Although it falls on the 15th day of the seventh lunar month, its celebration may be held at any convenient time during the latter half of the month. The festival is celebrated throughout the country, in Buddhist Pagodas, homes, businesses, factories, government offices, and Armed Forces units. It is not just a Buddhist holiday, but is celebrated by all Vietnamese who believe in the existence of gods, good and evil.

Many Vietnamese believe that every person has two souls; one is spiritual (*Hon*), and the other material (*Via*). When a person dies, his soul is taken to a tribunal in hell and judged by ten justices. When punishment is rendered, the soul is sent to heaven or hell, as a reward or punishment for the persons conduct on earth.

They believe that sinful souls can be absolved of their punishment and delivered from hell through prayers said by the living on the first and fifteenth of every month. Wandering Souls' Day however, is believed to be the best time for priests and relatives to secure general amnesty for all souls.

On Trung Nguyen the gates of hell are opened and the errant spirits return to earth where they wander aimlessly in the hope of finding a cult being offered to them. They cause misfortune if they remain unsatisfied, so the object of the Trung Nguyen is to provide ritual offerings for the errant spirits to propitiate them and grant them rest in death.

To appease the errant spirits a family heaps offerings on the alter dedicated to the Spirit of the Soil, which stands before the house. The head of the household begs the permission of the spirit to make ritual offerings to the errant spirits. A mat is then placed upon the ground and offerings of rice, fruit and rice alcohol are put on it. Before the 1955 Law forbidding opium in Vietnam, a pipe was prepared as part of the offerings. The errant spirits are summoned to partake of the offerings by striking a gong or two pieces of wood. Members of the family hold burning joss as the kowtow, after which they burn votive papers on the altar. This ritual is performed outside the house because of fear that, given the opportunity to enter, the errant spirits might install themselves on the altar of the ancestors.

Talismans Rituals and Evil Spirits

There are many household talismans found in Vietnam, their use depending on a number of circumstances. Some are employed because of illness or persistent misfortune while others are geomantic or are designed to provide general protection against evil spirits. The most common is the ‘crossbeam talisman’ so named because of its place in the house. Within the octagonal frame, the central circle is divided into the white Ye (light and the male principle) and the black Yang (darkness and the female principle) (the Yin and Yang of Chinese cosmology). The remaining part of the talisman contains the eight elements – thunder, wind, mountains, water, fire, earth, torrents and storms – spelled out in black Sino-Vietnamese characters on a red background. Geomantic talismans are similar, but instead of the divided circle, they have a mirror in the centre. Another very common household talisman is a print of the powerful legendary sorcerer Ong Tu Vi perched atop a tiger, holding the crossbeam in his right hand. His left hand clutches a box containing his credentials and seal issued by the Celestial Court.

Probably the most widespread techniques aimed at preventing ill health are rituals, which either request protection of a deity or propitiate an evil or errant spirit. Within the framework of formal religions, many women maintain special shrines to the Buddhist goddess Quang Am for protection of children and for easy childbirth. Cao Daists observe the same practice, and some of the Catholic families give special veneration to the Blessed Virgin.

There are numerous family rituals concerned with prenatal and natal practices. Ritual offerings on the their shrines before every house, the Cult of the Spirit of the hearth, and the Cult of the Ancestors all involve protection of family health among other things. Also the annual ritual of Trung Nguyen, observed by the family, is designed to placate errant spirits capable of causing illness, and there are numerous amulets available to protect against evil spirits that cause ailments.

Points for Consideration

An awareness of Vietnamese beliefs in spirits and trees is important for personnel involved in face-to-face contact in rural areas. Such an awareness should help in guarding against inadvertent abuses of Vietnamese beliefs such as taking a Psyop poster to a venerated tree.

Because of the wide range and variations in Vietnamese beliefs in spirits, any psychological exploitation in this area should be handled at the local level. Psyop field teams in collaboration with VIS personnel can if possible associate enemy activity with recurring evils and the visitations of evil spirits. If this is attempted strict reliance on the advice of Vietnamese VIS personnel must be practiced by U.S. Psyop elements.

Source: Australian War Memorial Series 304 file R249/1/1. Customs and Habits.

Vietnamese Customs and Habits. US Department of Army. Headquarters, 4th Psychological Operations Group, APO San Francisco. 96243.

Appendix 5

Use of Superstitions

JUSPAO Policy 36



PSYOPS POLICY

**PSYOP POLICY
NUMBER 36
10 MAY 1967**

Below is a reprint of PSYOP POLICY No. 36, dated 10 May 1967. This mission psychological operations policy and guidance was prepared by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), the military agency that directed U.S. propaganda efforts from Saigon in accordance with US mission directives, and was to be implemented as pertinent by all U.S. Elements in Vietnam.

THE USE OF SUPERSTITIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

PROBLEM:

- a. To devise guidelines for the exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities provided by superstitions and deeply-held traditional beliefs.
- b. To be aware of and accommodate those superstitions of friendly forces and populations that may have a bearing on military operations.

DISCUSSION:

A strong superstition or a deeply-held belief shared by a substantial number of the enemy target audience can be used as a psychological weapon because it permits with some degree of probability the prediction of individual or group behavior under a given set of conditions. To use an enemy superstition as a starting point for psychological operations, however, one must be sure of the conditions and control the stimuli that trigger the desired behavior.

The first step in the manipulation of a superstition as an enemy vulnerability is its exact identification and detailed definition of its spread and intensity among the target audience. The second step is to insure friendly control of the stimuli and the capability to create a situation that will trigger the desired superstitious behavior. Both conditions must be met or the PSYOP effort will not yield the desired results; it might even backfire.

As an illustration, one can cite the recent notion spread among combat troops in

the First Corps area that VC and NVN troops were deathly afraid of the "Ace of Spades" as an omen of death. In consequence soldiers, turned psy-warriors with the assistance of playing card manufacturers, began leaving the ominous card in battle areas and on patrols into enemy-held territory. The notion was based on isolated instances of behavior among Montagnard tribesmen familiar from French days with the Western deck of cards. A subsequent survey determined that the ace of spades does not trigger substantial fear reactions among most Vietnamese because the various local playing cards have their own set of symbols, generally of Chinese derivation.

Here then was an incorrect identification of a superstition coupled with a friendly capability to exploit the presumed condition. It did not work.

For a correct identification of a superstition coupled with an inability to exploit same, one could postulate the case of an enemy dictator or ruling group with deeply-held beliefs in astrological predictions of the future. Unless the favored soothsayer can be motivated to say the desired things - an unlikely possibility - the accurate knowledge of this enemy weakness could not be turned to friendly advantage.

In a minor key, PSYOP use of the venerated figure of Tran Hung Dao, victor in 1285 over the Golden Horde led by Kublai Khan's Chinese vassal, satisfies both requirements. We know the supernatural qualities with which the heroic figure of Tran Hung Dao is endowed in the popular mind, and the GVN has the capability of invoking him in patriotic appeals aimed against the invaders (see JUSPAO Poster # 1271) which are among the most popular produced in the PSYOP field to date.

On the accommodation of friendly superstitions it is instructive to quote from the First Corps after-action report: ... "As we started on the patrol we heard a lot of noise as the men walked. The advisor, who was brand new, stopped them and found hanging around their necks, dangling from their belt or in their pockets objects of stone, wood and metal. The noise would have surely revealed our position, so the advisor collected all the amulets and sent them back to the camp area. This proved to be a bad mistake. Before we had penetrated deeply into the forest we had lost half the men. The other half would have been better off lost, because they believed it was their time to die. They had been deprived of the protection of the good spirits. Needless to say, we came back without accomplishing our mission..."

An experienced advisor would have balanced the noise factor against the morale effect of depriving the soldiers of their magical protection. A compromise could possibly have been found in wrapping the amulets in some sound absorbing material.

In summary, the manipulation of superstitions is a delicate affair. Tampering with deeply-held beliefs, seeking to turn them to your advantage means in effect playing God and it should only be attempted if one can get away with it and the game is indeed worth the candle. Failure can lead to ridicule, charges of clumsiness and callousness that can blacken the reputation of psychological operations in general. It is a weapon to be employed selectively and with utmost skill and deftness. There can be no excuse for failure.

GUIDANCE:

1. To exploit enemy superstitions, PSYOP personnel must be certain that:

a. The superstition or belief is real and powerful.

b. They have the capability of manipulating it to achieve results favorable to the friendly forces.

2. As a corollary, the PSYOP effort must insure that the audience against which a superstition campaign is launched is sufficiently homogeneous in their beliefs to be susceptible to this kind of manipulation. Superstitions vary widely; for example, among city and country people and the inhabitants of different regions of the same country, both in kind and in degree of intensity.

3. Would-be superstition manipulators must be prepared to face a credibility test if their efforts are traced to the source. Additionally, the triggering device of the superstition response must seem entirely credible to the target audience. As an example, many Vietnamese, particularly in rural areas, are provoked into a fear response if startled at night by the hoot of an owl or the call of a crow. These are considered death omens. The response will not occur, however, if the sound can be detected in any way as originating from an artificial source, such as a loudspeaker.

4. A PSYOP operator's desire to take advantage of manipulating enemy superstitions surreptitiously must be balanced against the counterproductive effects of possible failure and exposure of the attempt by the mass media. The U.S. image and the effectiveness of future PSYOP might lose more than the commander might hope to gain by successful execution of the plan.

5. In summary, enemy superstition manipulation should not be lightly employed by field PSYOP personnel. Proposals to make appeals based on superstitions or otherwise manipulate target audience beliefs will be forwarded in each case to JUSPAO and/or MACPD through the respective channels of their originators. They will be carefully analyzed there in the light of the considerations spelled out in this guidance. No PSYOP campaign in the area of superstition manipulation will be undertaken without JUSPAO/MACPD approval.

6. Where the superstitions of friendly forces and populations are concerned, PSYOP personnel will assist commanders as required or called upon in devising indoctrination materials familiarizing troops with these beliefs and counseling respect for and sensitivity to local beliefs and traditions.

Appendix 6

1 Psychological Operations Chieu Hoi Questionnaire

PSYOPS QUESTIONNAIRE

PART 1 - PERSONAL PARTICULARS

- | | | | |
|-----|---|----------------|-----|
| 1. | Name | AKA | Sex |
| 2. | Marital Status | | |
| 3. | Dependents | | |
| 4. | Date of Birth | Place of Birth | |
| 5. | Schooling: | a. Grade | |
| | | b. Literate | |
| 6. | Religion | | |
| 7. | Civilian Occupation | | |
| 8. | Last Unit | Name | |
| | | Location | |
| | | Strength | |
| 9. | Rank and Appointment | | |
| 10. | Weapons brought in | Number | |
| 11. | Date of Rally | | |
| 12. | Location of Rally Point | | |
| 13. | Circumstances of Rally | | |
| 14. | Operations with GVN / FWMAF units since Rally | | |
| 15. | When did the subject join the Viet Cong? | | |
| 16. | What were the circumstances of his joining? | | |
| 17. | Has the source any Relations working in the VC Ranks? | | |

18. Has the source any Relations working in the GVN?

PART 2 – UNIT

Unit Routine

19. Why did the Source join the VC?
20. In what units has he served?
21. From where did the Source Unit receive his orders?
22. What were the units Normal Tasks?
23. What other unit did they have contact with?
24. What civilians did they have contact with?
25. What did they do during these contacts?
26. How many meals a day did the source normally get?
27. At what time does the unit normally eat?
28. Did they normally cook each meal to have it hot?
29. Has the unit got enough food at the moment?
30. When did the unit rest?
31. When did the unit move?
32. When did the unit sleep?

Morale

33. What entertainment was available?
34. What were the pay arrangements?
35. Where did the food come from?
36. Was there always enough food?

37. Did it come regularly?
38. Could the unit get clothing readily?
39. Could the unit get arms and ammunition?
40. Where did they get arms and ammunition?
41. Were the soldiers well equipped?
42. Could they get medical treatment readily?
43. If not, why not?
44. Where did the soldiers get their medical treatment?
45. What were the main shortages of equipment and supplies?
46. Could the married men visit their families?
47. What restrictions were placed on the soldiers visiting their families?
48. When did source last see his family?
49. Was sources family in a safe area?
50. How did the families get money to buy food to feed themselves?
51. Could the unmarried men get married?
52. Was sex available to soldiers?
53. Was there a regular mail service?
54. When did source expect to go home?
55. Why did source rally?
56. What difficulties were encountered while trying to rally?
57. What did the unit fear most – Artillery, bombs, helicopters, others?
58. Does he know of any of his friends who would want to rally?
59. Why don't they?
60. What did your friends say about the Chieu Hoi program?
61. What did your leaders say about the Chieu Hoi programme?

62. What did the Political Cadre say about the Chieu Hoi programme?
63. What were the most unpleasant aspects of fighting with the VC / NVA?
64. What was the most distasteful thing asked of the soldier by the cadre?
65. How was the units' morale? (Probe)
66. What is his opinion of his superiors?
67. How long will the war last?

PART 3 - ALLIED PSYOPS

Political Training

68. Has the source had any political training?
69. How much?
70. Who gave it?
71. What form did it take?
72. How often was it given?
73. What theme did the instructor dwell on?
74. What was the source told about the Progress of the Revolution?
75. What was the source told about the Chieu Program?
76. What are the communist plans after the revolution?
77. Why haven't the communists won yet?
78. What is sources reaction to the continued lack of real success of the revolution?
79. How many of the sources unit were Party members?
80. What benefits were gained by being Party members?
81. What did your Cadre say about how long will the war last?
82. Did the Cadre say the VC / NVA were winning or losing the war?

83. Did the source believe them? Why?

Leaflets

84. Has source seen any leaflets?

85. How many times has source seen leaflets?

86. Could source understand what the leaflets were saying?

87. Which leaflets can source remember seeing?

88. Did source believe the leaflets?

89. Which ones did he think were most credible?

90. Which one did source not believe?

91. Did source discuss any leaflets with anyone? Reaction?

92. Did any leaflets in particular induce the source to rally?

93. Did source have any leaflets in his possession when he rallied?

94. Did any leaflets lower his or his units' morale?

95. What are the best kinds of leaflets?

96. Did source find any leaflet obvious?

Loudspeaker

97. Has source heard any loudspeaker broadcasts?

98. How often?

99. Where did the source hear them?

100. Were the broadcasts clear?

101. Could source understand all of the message?

102. Could source understand only part of the message?

103. Did source believe the message?

- 104. Which message did the source believe?
- 105. Which message didn't the source believe?
- 106. Did source discuss any of the broadcasts with friends?
- 107. Did the broadcasts have any effect on sources morale?
- 108. Did the broadcasts have any effect on the units' morale?
- 109. Did the broadcasts have any effect on the sources decision to Rally?
- 110. Were any of these broadcasts offensive?
- 111. What are the most effective types of broadcasts?

Radio

- 112. Has source ever listened to the radio?
- 113. Has the source heard non-communist broadcasts?
- 114. How often could source listen to the radio?
- 115. Did the source notice any difference between communist and non-communist broadcasts?
- 116. Did the source believe non-communist news broadcasts?
- 117. Did the broadcasts induce source to rally?

General

- 118. Does the source know anyone who has rallied?
- 119. What was source's old unit's reaction when someone rallied?

Countermeasures

- 120. Was source / unit ever told not to read leaflets?
- 121. Did source ever receive political training as a result of a leaflet drop?
- 122. Did source ever receive a reprimand as a result of reading leaflets, or does he know of anyone who has?

123. Did source ever receive political training as a result of loudspeaker broadcasts?
124. Was source required to create any diversionary measures during a loudspeaker broadcast?
125. Was source ever given any instructions about listening to the radio?
126. What were the most effective types of rally appeals or psy war activities source has experienced?
127. What is your opinion of the GVN now?

128. EXHIBIT – REACTION: (Maybe inserted at anytime during the interview using appropriate Psyop material)

- a. What is your opinion of this? (tape, leaflet, poster etc)
- b. If you were in the field, would you believe it?
- c. How can we make it more convincing?

PART IV - EXPLOITATION

Interrogated by:

Interpreter:

Location:

Date:

Date registered at Chieu Hoi Centre:

Leaflets recognised:

Tapes remembered:

Face to Face contact:

Eligibility for rewards:

a. Value

b. Action

Cooperation of source during interrogation:

Intelligence:

Miscellaneous remarks:


Appendix 7

Leaflets and Posters Produced by 1 Psychological Operations Unit

April 1970 to November 1971

Poster ATF-001-70

Civilian Populace - Safety – Protect Your Family





TRÁNH ĐỪNG CHO TRẺ NÍT CHƠI VỚI BOM, ĐẠN



ĐỪNG CHO TRẺ NÍT ĐÀO BÓI NHỮNG LỖ CHÔN RÁC

NẾU BẠN KHÔNG NGHE NHỮNG LỜI KHUYÊN CAN NÀY
GIA-ĐÌNH VỞ CON CÁC BẠN SẼ BỊ LÂM VÀO CẢNH NGUY.

ATF-001-70

Leaflet Number ATF-001-70

Safety - Protect Your Family

ID Number:	RC02890
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-001-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 316 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-001-70: Protect your family
Size:	Overall: 8.4646 x 12.9921 in.; 21.5 x 33 cm
Colour:	Red and yellow white, red on white
Date Produced:	24 April 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Protect Your Family You live in an illegal area. Therefore you live outside the protection of Province and District Forces. You expose yourself to danger from forces on both sides. The GVN advises you to stay in your houses at night. Keep away from military camps.
Back:	Keep your children away from bombs, bullets, hand grenades. Don't allow your children to dig up old allied rubbish tips. If you don't take these precautions you expose yourself and your children to danger.
Theme:	Safety
Target Audience:	Local population and illegal refugees
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Safety of the population
Method of Dissemination:	By hand
Number Produced:	400

Leaflet Number ATF-002-70
Hoi Chanh – Rally Instructions

QUYỀN-LỢI CUA, NGƯỜI

HỒI CHÁNH

1. BẠN SẼ NHẬN ĐƯỢC TIỀN THƯỞNG CHO MỖI VŨ-KHÍ MÀ BẠN MANG VỀ.
2. ĐƯỢC HƯỞNG ĐẦY ĐỦ QUYỀN-LỢI CÔNG-DÂN
3. BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC SUM-HỌP VỚI GIA-ĐÌNH
4. BẠN VÀ GIA-ĐÌNH BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC BẢO VỆ
5. BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC GIÚP ĐỠ VỀ TÀI CHÁNH

ATF-002-70


Leaflet Number ATF-002-70

Rights of a Hoi Chanh

ID Number:	RC02836
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-002-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 245/317
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-002-70: Rally
Size:	Overall: 4 x 5 in.; 10.16 x 12.7 cm
Colour:	Red
Date Produced:	29 April 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Rights of a Hoi Chanh
Back:	1. You will be rewarded for weapons that you bring in. 2. You will have full citizenship. 3. You will be reunited with your family. 4. You and your family will be protected. 5. You will be assisted with finance.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi Benefits
Target Audience:	Viet Cong
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Inform VC of Chieu Hoi benefits
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	1,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 003 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Rally Instructions




Lời Chỉ-Dẫn Khi Ra Hối-Chánh

1. GIẤU VŨ-KHÍ CỦA BẠN VÀ ĐẾN TRÌNH-DIỆM VỚI CÁC LỰC-LƯỢNG CỦA CHÍNH-PHỦ VNCH HOẶC ĐỒNG-MINH ĐƯA HAI TAY LÊN TRỜI VÀ HÔ TỌ:
"CHIEU-HOÏ"
Hoặc
2. SAU KHI GIẤU VŨ-KHÍ, BẠN HÃY Ở LẠI VỚI NGƯỜI MÀ BẠN QUEN BIẾT TRONG VÙNG NÀY. YÊU-CẦU NGƯỜI ĐÓ TIẾP-XÚC VỚI LỰC-LƯỢNG CỦA CHÁNH-PHỦ HOẶC ĐỒNG-MINH ĐỂ CHO HỌ BIẾT RẰNG BẠN MUỐN CHIEU-HOÏ.


H
O
I

3. VÀO SÁNG SỚM HÃY ĐI ĐẾN QUẬN ĐỨC-THANH HOẶC XÃ-BANG. KHI THẤY PHI-CƠ BAY TRÊN ĐẦU, HÃY PHÁT TỔ TRUYỀN-ĐƠN NÀY HOẶC BẤT CỨ TỔ TRUYỀN-ĐƠN NÀO KHÁC ĐỂ LÀM HIỆU. PHI-CƠ SẼ HƯỚNG DẪN CÁC BẠN RA CHIEU-HOÏ AN-TOÀN. CÓ NHIỀU ĐỒNG-CHÍ CỦA BẠN ĐÃ LÀM ĐIỀU NÀY VÀ BÂY GIỜ HỌ ĐƯỢC AN-TOÀN VÀ MẠNH-KHOE.



CHÚY-Y:

Nếu Bạn Lắm Theo Những Lời Chỉ Dẫn
Trên Đây, Bạn Sẽ Được An-Toàn



ATF-003-70


Leaflet Number ATF-003-70

Rally Instructions

ID Number:	RC02837
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-003-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 246/318
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-003-70: Rally instructions
Size:	Overall: 8 1/2 x 6 1/2 in.; 21.59 x 16.51 cm
Colour:	Green on black
Date Produced:	30 April 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Rally Instructions 1. Hide your weapons and go to the GVN or Allied Forces. Raise your hands and shout 'Chieu Hoi'. 2. After hiding your weapons, stay with a friend in this area. Ask him to contact the GVN or Allied Forces and let them know you want to Chieu Hoi.
Back:	3. Go to DUC THANH District or Xa Bang early in the morning. When aircraft flies overhead, wave this leaflet or any other leaflet to attract his attention. The aircraft will help you rally safely. Many of your comrades have done this and they are now safe and well. NOTICE: IF YOU FOLLOW THESE INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL BE SAFE
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Viet Cong
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce enemy to rally
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Date Produced:	30 April 1970
Number Produced:	250

Leaflet Number ATF-004-70

Demoralise – Progressive Grave Scene




Leaflet Number ATF-004-70

VC Killed – Grave Leaflet

ID Number:	RC02838
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-004-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 247
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-004-70: Progressive grave scene
Size:	Overall: 3 x 6 in.; 7.62 x 15.24 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	6 June 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Who will be next! Soldiers of the VC and NVA! Why do you continue this senseless struggle? Already this year many of your comrades have been killed in Phuoc Tuy Province. Will you be next!
Back:	Will you be next! Months - Jan (113), Feb (105), Mar (51), Apr (87), May (88), Jun (?), Jul (?), Aug (?).
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	VC and NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise the enemy by speculation on Number of killed in Phuoc Tuy Province. Will you be next.
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000

Tôi là Hoi Chanh
TRẦN THỊ SINH



ATF-005-70

Chúng các bạn trong hàng ngũ
Đồng Sĩ
Tôi tên là Trần Thị Sinh thuộc đơn
vị quân giới ra hoi chanh ngày
14-4-1940 tại Xã Hòa Sơn
Tôi đã được chính phủ Việt Nam
công hoà tiếp đón nhờ Hàn xã Sơn
Sóc sức khỏe an toàn.

Chúng các bạn còn lại thuộc đơn
vị quân giới, tôi thành thiết kêu
gọi các bạn hãy mau mau quay
về và chính nghĩa quốc gia để
sớm gặp lại gia đình và bạn
hữu.

Vì chiến với kẻ chính sách
nhân đạo của chính như hiện
của giúp các bạn còn đang làm
đường.

Thiết tha kêu gọi các bạn
hãy quay về cùng sớm để tránh
cái chết vô ích.


Trần Thị Sinh.

Leaflet Number ATF-005-70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Tran Thi Sinh

ID Number:	RC02839
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-005-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 248/320
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-005-70: Hoi Chanh - Tran Thi Sinh
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	18 May 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	I am Hoi Chanh TRAN THI SINH
Back:	To my friends in the Communist Army! I am TRAN-THI-SINH of the Ordinance Section. I rallied on the 14 April 1970 at Hoa Long. I was well treated by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. I sincerely call on you who are still in the ordinance section to return quickly to the National Just Cause in order to be reunited with your family and friends. As Chieu Hoi is honourable policy of the government to reinstate the ones who have gone the wrong way. I sincerely call upon you to return quickly in order to avoid a terrible death.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Chau Duc District C41
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Tôi là Hoi Chanh

DÀO VĂN DOL



Tôi thuộc
B3, C4, Tiểu Đoàn
D445

B
ATF 006-70

Tâm thư gửi các bạn Đoàn D445.
Tôi là Đào Văn Dol thuộc B3
C4, Tiểu Đoàn D445.
Trước ngày tôi đi theo Việt Cộng, họ
tuyên truyền tôi tôi rằng đi theo Việt Cộng
là giải phóng đất nước, mang lại
thanh bình và hạnh phúc cho dân tộc,
trong đó có tôi. Nhưng sau hai năm
đi theo Việt Cộng, tôi nhận thấy sự
thất vọng toàn trái ngược. Tôi chỉ thấy
cảnh nhà cửa, cầu cống, đường xá bị
tàn phá. Dân chúng bị bắt bớ, Núi đồi
có Việt Cộng lên là nơi đó có nhiều thân
những điều trên đây đã làm tôi thức
tỉnh, nên vào ngày 4 tháng 5 năm 40
tôi đã bỏ về với chính phủ quốc gia
và là thuộc lực lượng tự vệ.
Tôi thành thật kêu gọi các bạn còn
lại trong hàng ngũ Việt Cộng hãy
bám hình ngũ trở về với chính phủ
quốc gia để được sum họp với gia đình
Thân mến
Dol
Đào Văn Dol

F
PC02797

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PC02797

Leaflet Number ATF-006-70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Dao Van Dol

ID Number:	RC02797
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-006-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 249 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-006-70: Hoi Chanh - Dao Van Dol
Size:	Overall: 7 x 4 in.; 17.78 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on White
Date Produced:	18 May 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	A letter to D445 Battalion I am Dao-Van-Dol, a soldier of B3, C4, and D445 Bn. Before I joined the VC, the communists were saying that joining the VC is to help liberate the country and bring peace and happiness to the people. Now after 6 years with the VC, I have realised that their facts are completely contrary. All I see is houses, bridges and roads being destroyed, innocent people being killed. Wherever the VC go and spread hatred. The above mentioned events have awakened me, and on the 7 May 70 I returned to the GVN and I was treated well. I sincerely call on you who are still with the VC, to awaken quickly and return to the GVN in order to be reunited with your family and don't let the VC use you anymore.
Back:	Photograph of Dao Van Dol
Theme:	Chieu Hoi (Open Arms program)
Target Audience:	Enemy Unit D 445
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Demoralise – Report Successes on Cambodian Campaign

**Bản tin đặc-biệt cho cán-binh Cộng-Sản về
cuộc hành-quân của Quân-Đội Việt-Nam
sang Cam-bốt**

1.- Trong những năm qua, những nguồn tiếp
tê của các bạn đều được đưa lên từ những
căn cứ tiếp liệu đặt trên lãnh thổ Cam- bốt

2.- Chính quyền Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa đáp lời
cầu viện của Chính-phủ Cao-Miến là gửi Quân
Lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa hành quân sang Cam-bốt
để tiêu diệt những bộ chỉ huy, những vùng căn
cứ và mật cứ của Cộng-Sản.

3.- Sau đây là những kết quả mà Quân - Đội
Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và Đồng-Minh đã thu hoạch
được trong những cuộc hành quân trên lãnh-
thổ Cam-bốt từ ngày 01/5/1970 đến 13/5/1970.

- 5500 giắc Cộng bị hạ
- 9070 vũ khí đủ loại bị tịch thu.
- 1859 tấn gạo bị tịch thu.
- 163 xe cam-nhông bị tịch thu.

Một số lớn đạn dược và thuốc men cùng với
một số dụng cụ quân sự quan trọng bị tịch
thu.

4.- Tổng Thống Thiệu đã tuyên bố vào ngày
12/5/1970 rằng: "Quân-Đội Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa
sẽ duy trì trên Cam-bốt khi nào mà Cộng-sản
xâm-lăng còn những cứ điểm và lực lượng
quân sự của họ tại đó".

Sự Việc Xảy ra có ý-nghĩa là bây-giờ

1.- Các bạn đã mất hết những nơi nương tựa
chính, yếu trên lãnh thổ Cam-Bốt. Đây là một
thất bại nghiêm trọng với các lực lượng
Việt-Cộng và Cộng-sản Bắc-Việt xâm-nhập.

2.- Các bạn đã bị mất rất nhiều vũ khí, đạn
dược, y-dược và lương thực.

3.- Bây giờ sự gian khổ của các bạn sẽ trở
nên trầm trọng.

4.- Quân-lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa đã chứng tỏ
cho Thế-giới biết sức dũng mạnh đối với
quân Cộng-sản xâm-lăng. Không sớm muộn, các
bạn sẽ bị tiêu diệt vì sự hùng mạnh của
Quân-lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và thân xác của
các bạn sẽ bị chôn vùi trong rừng núi hoang
vu xa cách, nơi mà những người yêu các bạn
sẽ không bao giờ biết đến.

Các bạn hãy suy-nghĩ

Tương-lai sẽ đến với các bạn như thế nào ?

Leaflet Number ATF – 007 – 71

Demoralise – Report Successes on Cambodian Campaign

ID Number:	RC03357
AWM Reference:	AWM304 250/322 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1 Psych Ops(maker); 1st Psychological Operations Unit(maker)
Title:	ATF-007 Cambodian campaign
Size:	Overall: 7 in x 5 in
Colour:	Red on yellow and white
Date Produced:	19 May 1970
English translation:	
Front:	News report for Communist soldiers. ARVN operations in Cambodia. 1. For years your supplies have come from bases in Cambodia. 2. In response to a call for help from the Cambodian Government the GVN ordered ARVN to go to Cambodia and destroy communist headquarters, base areas and caches. 3. These are the results of the Cambodian Operation by the ARVN and allies from 1 May to 13 May: 5,500 Communist soldiers killed. 9,076 different weapons captured. 1,859 tons of rice captured. 163 trucks captured. Large quantities of ammunition, medical supplies and other essential military equipment have been captured. 4. President Thieu said on 12 May that the GVN forces will remain in Cambodia so long as the communist aggressors maintain bases and military forces there.
Back:	This means that now: 1. You have lost your sanctuaries in Cambodia. This is a very serious defeat for the VC/NVA forces. 2. You have lost large quantities of weapons, ammunition, medicines and rice. 3. Your hardships will become even greater now. 4. The GVN has proved to the whole world that it is too powerful for the communist aggressors. Sooner or later you will fall victim of the mighty ARVN and be buried in the jungles or in the hills away from your loved ones. Think about this! What will happen to you now?
Theme:	GVN success
Target Audience:	Communist troops
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Objective:	Demoralise
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	100,000

Leaflet Number ATF-008-70

Civilian Populace – Cambodian Campaign

TIN ĐẶC BIỆT

DÀNH CHO ĐỒNG BÀO TỈNH PHƯỚC TUY. VỀ QUÂN ĐỘI VIỆT NAM HÀNH QUÂN TRÊN CAM-BỐT.

1. Như các bạn đã biết trong nhiều năm qua, Cộng-Sản xâm lược dưới chiêu bài Giải-phóng miền Nam của Đảng Lao-Động đã phát động chiến-tranh vào miền Nam yêu chuộng hòa-bình của chúng ta từ nơi "Bát khá xâm phạm" Cao-Miên, nơi đây chúng đã trữ một số lớn quân-lực, vũ-khí, đạn dược, y-dược, thực phẩm và các tiếp tế phẩm nhu yếu khác.

2. Đếp lời cầu viện của Chính-quyền Cao-Miên, chính phủ ra lệnh cho Quân-lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa hành quân qua Cao-Miên để tiêu diệt các lực lượng Cộng-Sản và các vùng căn-cứ.

3. Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và Đồng-Minh đã đạt được kết quả ngoài sự mong muốn của mình, trong những cuộc hành quân tính đến 14 tháng 5 năm 1970:

- 5500 giặc Cộng bị hạ
- 9076 vũ khí đủ loại bị tịch thu.
- 1859 tấn lúa gạo bị tịch thu.
- 163 xe cam-nhông bị phá hủy.

một số lớn vũ khí, đạn dược, lương thực, y-dược và các tiếp tế phẩm nhu yếu khác bị tịch thu.

4. Quân-lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa còn che chở cho một số Việt-Kiều được an toàn trở về miền Nam.

ATF-008-70

Kết quả mỹ mãn của những cuộc hành quân nói trên sẽ ảnh hưởng như thế nào?

5. a. Cộng-Sản xâm lược đã mất nhiều nhân mạng và hầu hết các căn cứ quan trọng. Điều này sẽ làm suy giảm nghiêm trọng tiềm năng chiến-dấu của các binh sĩ Việt-Cộng và Cộng-San Bắc-Việt.

b. Quân-Đội Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa phá hủy những căn cứ bất khả xâm phạm của Cộng-Sản trên Cam-bốt là để được đem lại hòa-bình sớm hơn cho nhân-dân miền Nam Việt-Nam.

c. Nhiều sinh mạng của Việt-kiều bên Cam-bốt đã được bảo toàn.

d. Quân-Đội Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa đã chứng minh sự hùng mạnh của mình với thế-giới, và cũng để chứng-minh cho Cộng-San biết rằng chúng không thể nào cự lại với Quân-lực có một hỏa-lực hùng-mạnh.

6. Tổng Thống Thiệu đã tuyên bố vào ngày 11/5/70 rằng "Chúng ta sẽ tiếp tục hành quân tại Cam-bốt" như thế để Cộng-Sản có thể nhận thấy rằng chúng không thể gây dựng căn cứ nào trên lãnh thổ Cam-bốt nữa.


TOÀN DÂN CHÚNG TA NHỊT LIỆT HOAN NGHÊNH NHỮNG CHIẾN

Leaflet Number ATF-008-70
Civilian Populace – Cambodian Campaign

ID Number:	RC02891
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-008-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 251/323(Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-008-70: Cambodian campaign
Size:	Overall: 8 1/2 x 7 1/2 in.; 21.59 x 19.05 cm
Colour:	Red on white
Date Produced:	2 June 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	<p>News Report For the People of Phuoc Tuy GVN Military Operations in Cambodia 1. As you know for many years now the communist aggressors of the NLF and Lao Dong have waged war against the peace loving peoples of South Vietnam. From sanctuaries in Cambodia where they keep large forces, weapons, ammunition, medicines, food and other essential supplies. 2. In response to a call for help from the Cambodian Government the GVN ordered ARVN to cross over to Cambodia and the Communist forces and their base areas. 3. The result of the GVN and allied military operations have been even greater than was expected up to 31 May 70. 7519 Communist soldiers have been killed 11641 Weapons of different types captured. 184 Vehicles destroyed. Huge quantities of ammunition,</p>

	<p>medicines and other essential military supplies captured. 4. The ARVN has also saved many Vietnamese immigrants who are now safe and happy back in South Vietnam.</p>
Back:	<p>5. What will be the effect of these successful military operations: a). The communist aggressors have lost many men and most important base areas. This will seriously reduce the potential for combat of both the VC and NVA. b). By destroying sanctuaries in Cambodia, the GVN brought peace closer for the people of South Vietnam. c). The lives of many Vietnamese immigrants living in Cambodia have been saved. d). The ARVN have proved how powerful it is to the whole world. It has proved to the communists that they cannot resist such strength and fire power. 6. President Thieu said on Monday 11th May "We will continue to operate in Cambodia. Perhaps then the communists will learn they can not establish bases there again." WE ALL SALUTE THE MAGNIFICENT VICTORIES OF THE ARVN IN CAMBODIA.</p>
Theme:	GVN Image
Target Audience:	Civilians
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Inform people of ARVN success. Boost confidence in GVN
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	2,000

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Leaflet Number ATF-009-70

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Tu

ID Number:	RC02892
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-009-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 252/324 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-009-70 Hoi Chanh: Nguyen Van Tu
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	29 May 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Hoi Chanh - Nguyen Van Tu
Back:	Guerrilla friends of Ap Hai, Duc Thanh District I am Nguyen Van Tu alias Dong formally a guerrilla member of Ap Hai Duc Thanh District. I returned to the GVN at Kim-Long outpost, Duc Thanh, on 17-5-1970. I was warmly welcomed and well treated which is contrary to what the VC told us. I realise the things I have done previously were of no good to me, my family or to my country, but brought suffering to innocent people. I sincerely call upon you who are still in the VC ranks, to return quickly to the National Cause so that you can be re-united with your family.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Ngai Giou Guerrillas
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet ATF-010-70

Demoralise – Unburied Communist Dead

Chiến-sĩ công-sản

chết ngoài

trận-địa

không ai chôn cất



CÁC CÁN-BỘ VÀ CHIẾN-SĨ CỘNG-SẢN THUỘC D440, D445,
C25, C41 VÀ NHỮNG ĐƠN-VỊ KHÁC THUỘC TỈNH BÀ-LONG

Trong thời-gian gần đây, đặc biệt là từ ngày 04 tháng 05 đến ngày 23 tháng 05 năm 1970, Quân-Lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và Đồng-Minh trong Tỉnh Phước-Tuy đã tìm được 15 xác chết của các chiến-sĩ Cộng-sản bị bỏ lại ngay nơi mà họ chết tại chiến-trường. Một vài người chỉ được phủ lên bằng một tấm ny-lon.

Chắc không bao lâu nữa rồi cũng đến phiên các bạn phải chết và sẽ bị bỏ lại giữa rừng mà không ai chôn cất.

ATF-010-70

Leaflet ATF-010-70

Demoralise – Unburied Communist Dead

ID Number:	RC02798
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-010-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 253/325
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-010-70: Unburied Communist Dead
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black and Red on White
Date Produced:	4 June 1970
English Translation:	SOLDIERS AND CADRES OF D440, D445, C25, C41 AND OTHER BA LONG PROVINCE UNITS Lately especially from 4 May to 23 May, GVN and allied forces in Phuoc Tuy have found 15 bodies of communist soldiers lying where they died on the battlefield. Some had a sheet of plastic only over them. Will you die shortly and be left unburied in the jungle.
Title:	Unburied Communist Dead
Theme:	Death without proper burial
Target Audience:	Ba Long Province Units
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise the enemy by the thought of being left dead and unburied on the battlefield.
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000

**CHIẾN-SĨ CÔNG-SẢN
THUỘC CÁC ĐƠN-VỊ TỈNH BÀ-LONG**

ĐÂY LÀ NHỮNG SỰ THẬT, HÃY HỎI CHÍNH-TRỊ-VIÊN LÊ-MINH-VIỆT,
CÁC BẠN SẼ RÕ.

KỂ TỪ ĐẦU NĂM 1970



- Nhiều Sĩ-Quan và Chiến-Sĩ Công-Sản đã trở về với Chính-Phủ Quốc-Gia hoặc đã đào-ngủ.
- Nhiều chiến-sĩ bị mất tích trong khi đi công-tác.
- Các đơn-vị đã bị giao-động vì thiếu an-ninh và thiếu lãnh-đạo.
- Nhiều người trong các bạn đã bị đưa về những đơn-vị không tác-chiến vì tình-trạng sức khỏe tồi-tệ.

RC02 799 ATF-011 '70

Leaflet ATF-011-70

Demoralise – Question Beliefs – Facts on Ba Long Units


ID Number:	RC02799
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-11-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 254/326
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-11-70: Facts on Ba Long Units
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	20 June 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Soldiers of BA LONG Province Units These are the true facts, ask the chief of your political section LE MINH VIET.
Back:	Since the beginning of 1970, - many officers and soldiers have defected or deserted. - many soldiers are missing in action. - units are effected by poor security and poor leadership. - many of your men have to be re-assigned to non-combat positions because of bad health.
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	Ba Long Province Units
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise the soldiers of Ba Long Province Units
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000



Leaflet Number ATF – 012 - 70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Ro

ID Number:	RC03358
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-012-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 255(Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit(maker)
Title:	ATF-012-70 Hoi Chanh: Nguyen Van Ro
Size:	Overall: 6 in x 3 in
Colour:	Black and white
Date Produced:	25 June 1970
English translation:	
Front:	Hoi Chanh - Nguyen Van Ro (photograph)
Back:	I am Nguyen Van Ro of B3, C2, D-445. I rallied to the GVN on 8th of June 1970. The following reasons induced me to rally. 1. I realised that the way of the VC was wrong and futile. 2. The harshness and injustice given by Liem (Political cadre) and Long (Coy Comd) to men and other soldiers. I was warmly welcomed and well treated by the GVN. I encourage you to rally at the next opportunity.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	D-445
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Objective:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	150,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 013 -70
Safety – Mines – Explosive Safety



Leaflet Number ATF – 013 -70
Safety – Mines – Explosive Safety

ID Number:	RC02800
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-013-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 256/328
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-013-70: Mine (explosive) safety
Size:	Overall: 8 x 6 1/2 in.; 20.32 x 16.51 cm
Colour:	Black and red on white
Date Produced:	7 July 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Mines Many people, soldiers and civilians, have been killed or wounded by mines. Parents - tell your children not to play with strange metal objects. Report anything that could be a mine to GVN or Allied authorities. This could save your life or the lives of your children. Rewards are paid for information about mines. The identity of the people will be kept a secret.
Theme:	Safety by those who come into contact with mines.
Target Audience:	Vietnamese civilians
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To educate the civilian population about the danger of mines.
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Date Produced:	7 July 1970
Number Produced:	3,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 014 -70
Safety – Mines – Protect Your Family

**MÌN : SÁT HẠI !
MÌN : TÀN PHÁ !**

CÓ NHIỀU ĐỒNG-BÀO TRONG TỈNH PHƯỚC-TUY ĐÃ CỨU ĐƯỢC
MẠNG SỐNG CỦA HỌ BẰNG CÁCH BÁO CHO CHÍNH-QUYỀN
VIỆT-NAM HOẶC ĐỒNG-MINH BIẾT NƠI CÓ MÌN, BẦY VÀ NHỮNG
ĐẦU ĐẠN TRỌNG-PHÁO.

*NÊN NHỚ RẰNG CÓ THỂ CON CÁI HOẶC
BẠN-HỮU CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO SẼ BỊ CHẾT VÌ MÌN.*

**HÃY GIÚP CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA BẢO-VỆ
ĐỒNG-BÀO VÀ GIA-ĐÌNH CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO.**

HÃY BÁO-CÁO VỚI CHÍNH-QUYỀN VIỆT-NAM HOẶC ĐỒNG-MINH
GẦN NHÚT TẤT CẢ NHỮNG TRÁI MÌN, BÔM VÀ BẦY TÊN HỌ CỦA
ĐỒNG-BÀO SẼ ĐƯỢC GIỮ KÍN VÀ ĐỒNG-BÀO SẼ ĐƯỢC THƯỜNG

ATF 014 -70

Leaflet Number ATF – 014 -70
Safety – Mines – Protect Your Family

ID Number:	RC02802
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-014-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 257/329 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-014-70: Mines: Protect your family
Size:	Overall: 8 1/2 in x 12 in
Colour:	Red and yellow on white: Black and yellow on white
Date Produced:	21 July 1970: 18 Sept. 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Mines kill. Mines mutilate. Many good people of Phuoc Tuy have saved lives by informing the GVN and allied authorities of the location of dangerous mines, booby traps and artillery shells. Remember it could be your child or your friends that is killed by mines. Help the GVN to protect you and your family. Report all mines, bombs and booby traps to the nearest GVN or allied authorities. Your identity will be kept secret, and you will be suitably rewarded.
Theme:	Protect your family.
Target Audience:	Village people.
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To encourage the people to give information about mines.
Method of Dissemination:	By hand
Number Produced:	1,200 and 2,000.

**BẢN TIN ĐẶC-BIỆT GỬI CHO TẤT CẢ CÁC
CÁN-BINH THUỘC ĐƠN-VỊ QUẬN CHÂU-ĐỨC**
*Chánh-Phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa nắm nhiều
tin tức của các bạn*

ĐƠN-VỊ CỦA CÁC BẠN KHÔNG CÒN ĐỦ SỨC ĐỂ KHÁNG-CỰ LẠI CHÍNH-
PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA NỮA.
MỘT SỐ CÁC BẠN TƯ HỎI CÓ PHẢI ĐANG CHIẾN-ĐẤU CHO CHÍNH-NGHĨA
KHÔNG.
MỘT SỐ CÁC BẠN NGHĨ RẰNG SỰ HY-SINH CỦA CÁC BẠN SẼ TRỞ NÊN
VÔ NGHĨA.
MỘT SỐ CÁC BẠN NGHĨ VỀ HÒI-CHÁNH VỚI CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM
CỘNG-HÒA. BẠN ĐÃ TỎ RA KHÔNG-NGOAN KHI CÓ Ý-ĐỊNH TRÊN.
CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA DÀNH CHO CÁC BẠN MỘT LỐI THOAT DANH-DỰ.


CHIEU-HOI

CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA DÀNH CHO MỖI NGƯỜI TRONG CÁC
BẠN MỘT LỐI THOAT DANH-DỰ TRONG HOA-BÌNH VÀ HẠNH-PHÚC
VỚI CHÍNH-NGHĨA QUỐC-GIA
CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC TIẾP ĐÓN NÓNG-NHIỆT VÀ ĐÔI XỬ TỬ-TẾ.
CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC HOÀN-TOÀN THA-THỨ, VÌ CÁC BẠN ĐÃ BỊ BỌN
CỘNG-SẢN PHÌNH-GẠT.
CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC ĐOAN-TU LẠI VỚI NHỮNG NGƯỜI THÂN YÊU CỦA
CÁC BẠN.
CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC MỌI SỰ GIÚP-ĐỖ ĐỂ XÂY DỰNG LẠI CUỘC ĐỜI
HẠNH-PHÚC VÀ HỮU-DUNG VỚI NHÂN-DÂN.

ATTN 015-70

Leaflet ATF – 015 -70
Demoralise – Enemy Units – Chau Duc Special


ID Number:	RC02893
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-015-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 258/330 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-015-70: Chau Duc special
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 1/2 in.; 15.24 x 8.89 cm
Colour:	Black on white: Red on white
Date Produced:	25 July 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	A Special Message To All Members Of The Chau Duc District Unit The GVN has much information on you. 1. Your unit is no longer strong enough to resist the GVN. 2. Many of you wonder if you are fighting for the right cause. 3. Many of you think that the sacrifice will be in vain. 4. Many of you think about rallying to the GVN. You are wise to consider this. The GVN makes you an honourable offer.
Back:	1. The GVN makes an honourable offer to each one of you to Chieu Hoi for peace and happiness with the just cause. 2. You will be warmly welcomed and treated very well. 3. You will be completely forgiven because you were misled by the communists. 4. You will be reunited with your loved ones. 5. You will be given every help to establish a happy and useful life with the people.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Chau Duc District Unit
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000 and 80,000.



Leaflet Number ATF – 016 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Tran Van Duc



ID Number:	RC02894
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-016-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 259/331 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-016-70: Hoi Chanh - Tran Van Duc
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	22 July 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	I am Hoi Chanh Tran Van Duc
Back:	Soldiers of D445. My name is Tran Van Duc. I belong to B3, C3, D445. If any of you wish to rally, do it now with complete safety. I rallied on the 15 July 1970, and was warmly received. Do not be bullied by your commanders. I have realized that to rally means a better life. Why don't you do the same.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	D 445
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 017 – 70
Demoralise – Progressive Grave Scene
Update of Leaflet ATF – 004 – 70



Leaflet Number ATF – 017 – 70
Demoralise – Progressive Grave Scene
Update of Leaflet ATF – 004 – 70



ID Number:	RC02895
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-017-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 260/332 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-017-70: Progressive graves scene (Update of Psyops Leaflet Number: ATF-004-70)
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white, red on white
Date Produced:	6 August 1970
Linked Media:	552646.JPG; 552714.JPG
English Translation:	
Front:	Who Will Be Next! Soldiers of the VC and NVA Why do you continue this senseless struggle. Already this year many of your comrades have been killed in Phuoc Tuy Province. Will you be next!
Back:	Will You be next! Months: Mar (51), Apr (87), May (88), Jun (64), Jul (53), Aug (?) , Sep (?), Oct. (?)
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	VC and NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise the enemy by speculation of No. KIA in coming months
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000



Leaflet Number ATF – 0118 -70
Demoralise – Setback for Local Viet Cong Force

ID Number:	RC02840
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-018-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 261
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-018-70: Local VC Force
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Red on white
Date Produced:	11 August 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Local VC Forces suffer a further severe set back
Back:	On 11 August you again suffered heavily in contact with GVN and allied forces. You have many wounded, your medicine and food was captured. How are you treating your wounded now. Will they lie amongst the hills in agony waiting for death. Save them and yourself, rally to the GVN or allied officials. To Chieu Hoi is a new life.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Local VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce VC to Rally
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 019 -70
Demoralise – Chau Duc Unit
8 RAR Ambush outside Hoa Long Village





Leaflet Number ATF – 019 -70
Demoralise – Chau Duc Unit
8 RAR Ambush outside Hoa Long Village

ID Number:	RC02841
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-019-70
AWM Reference:	AWM:304 262
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-019-70: Local VC force
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	12 August 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Attention Chau Duc! You were warned many times! On the 11th and 12th August you lost 22 killed, 5 prisoners of war and many wounded.
Back:	You are not safe. The GVN and allies will continue to attack you. Surely the operations of the 11th and 12th August are a lesson to you. Rally before it is too late to the true and just cause of the GVN.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Local VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Quick reaction follow up contact. To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 020 -70

Demoralise – Glorious Victories





Leaflet Number ATF – 020 -70

Demoralise – Glorious Victories

ID Number:	RC02803
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-020-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 263 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-020-70: Glorious Victories
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black and red on white
Date Produced:	13 August 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Your leaders tell you of the glorious victories of the North Viet Army and the Viet Cong. THINK! Have you seen the glorious victories?
Back:	(visual images)
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce enemy to question own propaganda / induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 021 – 70
Counter Propaganda – Medical Care




Leaflet Number ATF – 021 – 70
Counter Propaganda – Medical Care

ID Number:	RC02804
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-021-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 264 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-021-70: Medical Care
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	17 August 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photo of Initial Care) Tender Australian medical care for a former enemy, 10 August 1970.
Back:	This soldier was found by allied forces on 10 August 70. He had been separated from his comrades and was suffering from a serious wound to his foot. He is now safe. What will happen to you if you are seriously wounded far from home?
Theme:	Consideration of fate if wounded
Target Audience:	Enemy Unit D 65
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To counter enemy propaganda concerning treatment of POW's and Hoi Chanh's
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	70,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 022 70

Counter Viet Cong Propaganda – Treatment of PW – Medical Care



Leaflet Number ATF – 022 70

Counter Viet Cong Propaganda – Treatment of PW – Medical Care

ID Number:	RC02842
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-022-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 265
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-022-70: Medical care
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	24 August 1970
Linked Media:	552661.JPG
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photo of PW in hospital) Remember a former comrade. Recovery in hospital 13 August 1970. [Note: Image on front of leaflet has faded and has poor definition]
Back:	Remember your former comrade. The man with a serious wound in the foot. The man was found alone, and in great pain. He is now recovering in hospital. Will you be able to recover?
Theme:	Consideration of fate if wounded
Target Audience:	D 65
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To counter enemy propaganda concerning treatment of POW's and Hoi Chanh's
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	70,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 023 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans





Leaflet Number ATF – 023 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02843
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-023-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266/338
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-023-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
English Translation:	Chieu Hoi so you can have a better life.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 024 - 70


Chieu Hoi – Slogans



Leaflet Number ATF – 024 - 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02844
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-024-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266/338
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-024-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
English Translation:	Chieu Hoi so you can be reunited with your family.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000



Leaflet Number ATF – 025 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02845
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-025-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266/338
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-025-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
Linked Media:	552633.JPG; 552701.JPG
English Translation:	Chieu Hoi to avoid death and hardships.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 026 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans





Leaflet Number ATF – 026 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02846
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-026-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266/388
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-026-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
Linked Media:	552634.JPG; 552702.JPG
English Translation:	To Chieu Hoi is the shortest way to peace.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 027 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans





Leaflet Number ATF – 027 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02847
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-027-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266/338
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-027-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
English Translation:	Chieu Hoi to save "life".
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 028 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans



Leaflet Number ATF – 028 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02848
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-028-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266-338
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-028-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
English Translation:	Rebuild your life - Chieu Hoi.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 029 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans



Leaflet Number ATF – 029 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Slogans

ID Number:	RC02849
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-029-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 266/338
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-029-70: Slogans - Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 August 1970
English Translation:	Your family is longing for you.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

DỒNG BÀO TRONG KHU-VỰC NÀY: LƯU Ý!

VỚI MỤC-ĐÍCH QUÉT SẠCH CÁC PHÂN-TỬ CỘNG-SẢN, CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA ĐÃ RA THÔNG-CÁO CẤM DÂN CHÚNG SINH SỐNG QUANH KHU-VỰC NÀY. NHƯ VẬY, QUÂN-LỰC VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA VÀ ĐỒNG-MINH SẼ PHÁ-HỦY NHỮNG ĐỒNG RỪNG MÀ ĐÓ LÀ NHỮNG NGUỒN TIẾP-TẾ THỰC-PHẨM CHO BỌN CỘNG-SẢN.

DỒNG BÀO KHÔNG ĐƯỢC Ở ĐÂY NỮA



KHI ĐỒNG BÀO GẶP QUÂN-LỰC VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA VÀ ĐỒNG-MINH, XIN BỪNG ĐÓ CHẠY. ĐỒNG BÀO SẼ KHÔNG BỊ ĐÀN ÁP NẾU ĐỒNG BÀO ĐÓ CAO TAY VÀ VẶT SẼ RA DẤU CHO HÌNH SĨ. RỒI DÂY ĐỒNG BÀO SẼ SẴN GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỂ XÂY-ĐỘNG MỘT ĐỜI SỐNG MỚI, CŨNG NHƯ BAO NHIỀU ĐỒNG BÀO KHÁC ĐÃ TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÍNH-PHỦ.



CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA MONG MUỐN TẤT CẢ ĐỒNG BÀO HÃY TRỞ VỀ, VÀ CHÍNH-PHỦ SẼ GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỒNG BÀO XÂY-ĐỘNG CUỘC SỐNG TỐT ĐẸP VÀ AN LÀNH HƠN.



DỒNG BÀO HÃY TỚI GẶP BINH SĨ HAY QUẬN XUYỀN-MỘC ĐỂ TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÍNH PHỦ.

DỒNG BÀO SẼ ĐƯỢC TIẾP ĐÓN NIỀM NỞ.

www.bwmi.gov.vn


PH.02850

Leaflet Number ATF – 030 – 70

Safety – Illegal Residents

ID Number:	RC02850
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-030-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 267
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-030-70: Illegal residence
Size:	Overall: 16 x 10 1/2 in.; 40.64 x 26.67 cm
Colour:	Black, yellow and red on white
Date Produced:	27 August 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Poster 3 images) Attention People in this area. In order to rid the people of the communist enemies, the GVN has declared that this area is unauthorised for civilian population. Consequently, the GVN and allies have destroyed these crops which are a potential source of food for the (communist (VC) enemy) forces. YOU CANNOT STAY HERE ANY LONGER When you see the GVN and allied forces, do not run away. You will not be harmed if you raise your hands and wave to the soldiers. You will be given a new life the same as many others from this area. The GVN wants all its people back and will help you to rebuild a better and safe way of life. Return to the Government. Go to the soldiers or to Xuyen Moc. You will be welcomed.
Theme:	Explanatory (about crops and benefits of Chieu Hoi)
Target Audience:	Illegal residence east of Xuyen Moc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	2,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 031 70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Tran Van Vinh





Leaflet Number ATF – 031 - 70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Tran Van Vinh

ID Number:	RC02851
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-031-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 268
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-031-70: Hoi Chanh - Tran Van Vinh
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	30 August 1970
Linked Media:	552628.JPG; 552696.JPG
English Translation:	
Front:	(Picture) Hoi Chanh. Tran Van Vinh
Back:	My name is Le-Vinh aka Tran Van Vinh, of C41. I returned to the GVN at Hoa Long on 26 August 1970. I was warmly welcomed and well treated by the GVN. I call on you, friends of the same unit, to rally so that you can avoid being sacrificed uselessly for the lost cause of communism. Aug 27, 1970.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	C41
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 032 – 70

Demoralise – Progressive Grave Scene

Update of Leaflet ATF 004 and ATF 017



Leaflet Number ATF – 032 – 70
Demoralise – Progressive Grave Scene
Update of Leaflet ATF 004 and ATF 017

ID Number:	RC02805
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-032-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 269/332 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-032-70: Progressive Graves Scene (update of leaflet Psyops Leaflet Number ATF-004-70 and ATF- 017-70)
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	6 September 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Who will be next! Soldiers of the VC and NVA! Why do you continue this senseless struggle? Already this year many of your comrades have been killed in Phuoc Tuy Province. Will you be next!
Back:	Will you be next! Months: Apr(87), May (88), Jun (64), Jul (53), Aug (63), Sep (?), Oct (?), Nov (?).
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	VC and NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise the enemy by speculation on number of killed in action (KIA) in coming months
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 033 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers - Love letter to Tran Van Long
(Company Commander of C2/D445)

Mến gửi
Anh Long.

Nay tôi biên thư này gửi thăm anh, trước
hết là thăm hỏi sức khỏe có mạnh ở?, và công
tác có vui =?

Anh Long, Chỗ gần tôi đã bị giải bắt, tôi
nằm trong bốn bức tường đến tôi, tôi cũng tưởng
rằng anh vẫn chờ đợi tôi, đến ngày tôi về,
chúng ta gặp sẽ nói sau, đâu có ngờ giờ này
anh lại tôi thay. Nhưng mà chuyện đi đường đã
qua rồi, tin ai hứa đúng như xưa.

2) Tôi thường nghe anh nói, anh đi cách mạng
là một cơn, một dạ, ở lao giờ thay đổi,
chơi có lẽ hai ba năm này, nó đã phai rồi.
Anh ở còn nhớ xưa phải ở anh? ATF-033-70

www.arm.gov.au PC03359

Anh Long: Tôi mới, sao anh ở nơi, bây giờ
anh nói làm chi, có nói cũng đã qua rồi,
tôi thấy như người vô cơ cũng có anh vẫn
có vô như như thường, muốn chi tôi với anh mới
quen biết, tôi ở trong ai cả!

Chỉ thôi đây giờ chuyện đã qua rồi, anh
cũng đừng gửi thăm tôi là vô chưa cưới, hay
đó là mới hứa hôn, tôi mong anh cũng từng
nói ai cả, Chỗ bây giờ anh coi tôi cũng như
quen ở biết vì cả coi như người xa lạ là
được rồi.

Tôi nhớ anh trong lời tôi thăm tất cả
cái anh trong lòng vì niềm mạnh và hạnh
phúc thành tích trong năm. Chào anh.

ATF-033-70
www.arm.gov.au


PC03359

Leaflet Number ATF – 033 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers - Love letter to Tran Van Long

(Company Commander of C2/D445)

ID Number:	RC03359
AWM Reference:	AWM304 342(Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit(maker)
Title:	ATF-033-70: Love letter to Tran Van Long (Company Commander of C2/D445)
Size:	Overall: 5 in x 4 in
Colour:	Black & white
Date Produced:	15 September 1970
English literal translation:	"To: Dear Long, Today, I write this letter to you. Firstly I would like to know how your health is and if you interest in working? Long, during the period of time that I was captured by the enemy and living in the 4 walls of darkness, I thought that you still waited for me until I came back so that we can meet and talk to each other. I did not know that you change. But the story has passed, I want no one to remind me. I have heard that once you joined the Revolution you would never change your allegiance. It was possible that late 2 or 3 years, you changed already, you did not remember anymore, did you? Long, why didn't you tell me before. Now you tell me, it has already passed. I have seen many men who has been married but they still have concubines. You and I just knew each other, I do not blame you. The story has passed, you shouldn't introduce that I am your fiancée or that we just engage. I hope that you say nothing. See me as a stranger. Please send my regards to brothers in unit, I wish them well and gain many achievement during the year. Bye. Your acquaintance without name."
Theme:	Life is hard - it takes us away from the one we love.
Target Audience:	D445 BN
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Objective:	Exploitation of contact/letter
Method of Dissemination:	Unknown
Number Produced:	40,000



Leaflet Number ATF – 034 – 70

Safety – Viet Cong Taxation

ID Number:	RC02852
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-034-704
AWM Reference:	AWM304 270/343
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-034-70 Taxation
Size:	Overall: 10 x 8 in.; 25.4 x 20.32 cm
Colour:	Red and black on white
Date Produced:	21 September 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	VC use your money themselves. VC Use your money for destruction and war. Help protect your family and children. VC taxation must be reported. VC take money from hard working people. Report instances of illegal taxation. Don't be afraid. Your name will be kept secret
Theme:	Avoid Taxation
Target Audience:	Village people
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To persuade the people that there is a defence against VC / NVA taxation.
Method of Dissemination:	By hand - house to house
Number Produced:	5,000

BẢN TIN-TỨC

GỎI CÁC CÁN BINH THUỘC HUYỆN-ĐỘI CHÂU-ĐỨC.

- Người thay thế cho NĂM KIỀM đến chưa ? NĂM KIỀM cần phải được đưa đến một bệnh-viện có đầy đủ dụng-cụ, nói đo mới có thể trị bệnh lao phổi một cách thích-nghĩ.
- Chương-trình Bình-Định và phát-triển đang tiến-triển tốt đẹp tại Tỉnh Phước-Tuy và đồng-bào càng ngày càng có một đời sống thanh-bình hơn.
- LÊ-THỊ-BA gọi lời thăm người anh họ là BẦY GIANG và hy-vọng rằng anh ấy có đầy đủ đồ ăn.
- Đứa con của GIỎI rất mạnh khỏe và càng ngày càng lớn lên.
- Vừa rồi, thiếu-nhi trong Tỉnh Phước-Tuy đã mừng Tết Trung-Thu. Tết Trung-Thu rất đẹp và tất cả thiếu-nhi rất vui mừng được ăn kẹo và bánh Trung-Thu.
- Quên gọi lời thăm THỊ-CÚC.
- Anh NGUYỄN-VĂN-SÁU có thể đi được không ? Anh ấy cần có một chân giả.

ATF 036 70


- Bức thư mà THỊ-BA đã gọi cho SÁU-XUÂN chứa đựng nhiều sự thực. Chắc là các bạn phải hết sức khó khăn trong việc di-chuyển để lẩn tránh Quân-Lực Việt-Nam Công-Hoà và Đồng-Minh. Đặc biệt là những người bị thương và bị bệnh.
- Còn BÀ HAI VĨ ra sao ? Chắc bây giờ bà ấy già rồi và cũng muốn có một cuộc sống an-nhàn hơn là đời sống hiện nay trong rừng.
- "Tinh-thần Quốc-Gia" của người Việt-Nam càng ngày càng lớn mạnh. Tỉnh này là một thí-dụ : mới đây 37.253 cử-tri trong Tỉnh Phước-Tuy đã đi bầu những người đại-diện của mình vào Thượng-Viện trong một bầu không khí thanh-bình và tự-do.
- Tháng này, Trong Tỉnh Phước-Tuy, có 14 người đã trở về với Chính-Phủ Việt-Nam Công-Hoà. Bây giờ họ đang ở tại Trung-Tâm Chiêu-Hồi. Các bạn đã nghe một vài người trong số những người này nói chuyện với các bạn từ trên phi-cô. Họ sẽ lại nói chuyện với các bạn nữa trong vài ngày sắp tới. Tại Trung-Tâm Chiêu-Hồi, có nhiều phương-tiên để học nghề. Tuần qua, một lớp dạy cắt may đã bắt đầu, có nhiều phụ-nữ tham-dự lớp học này nhưng cũng có một vài người khác lại thích trở về với những công việc của họ trước đây hoặc bắt đầu lại cuộc sống của một người vợ và một người mẹ.

Leaflet Number ATF – 036 - 70
Demoralise – Chau Duc – Newsletter

ID Number:	RC02853
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-036-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 271
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-036-70: Chau Duc Newsletter
Size:	Overall: 6 1/4 x 4 in.; 15.875 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	20 September 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	<p>Newsletter for Chau Duc Will the replacement for Nam Kiem arrive soon? It is very necessary to get Nam Kiem to a good hospital where tuberculosis can be properly treated. The Pacification Programme is working well in Phuoc Tuy, and the people are more and more able to lead peaceful lives. Le Thi Ba sends her best wishes to her cousin Bay Giang, and hopes that he is getting enough to eat. The baby of Gioi is very well, and is growing bigger every day. The children of Phuoc Tuy recently celebrated the mid-autumn festival. The lanterns were very pretty, and the children all enjoyed their cakes and sweets. Quon sends his love to Thi Cuc. Is Nguyen Van Sau able to walk properly? He should be given a proper artificial leg.</p>
Back:	<p>The letter which Thi Ba Thao wrote to Sau Xuan on 10 Sep contains much truth; it must be very difficult to move quickly to avoid GVN and allied troops. Those of you who have to carry some of the wounded and sick must have especial difficulties. How is Ba Hai? Now that he is becoming older, he must surely wish to lead a peaceful life instead of existing in the jungle. The national spirit of Vietnam is</p>

	<p>becoming greater by the day; this province is one example: 37,253 people of Phuoc Tuy recently voted in peace and freedom for the people to represent them in the Senate. This month, 14 have rallied to the GVN in Phuoc Tuy alone. They are now at the Chieu Hoi centre; you have heard some of them talk to you from the air. They will talk to you again within the next few days. Listen to them: they are free, and enjoying new lives. At the Chieu Hoi centre there are facilities for learning a trade; last week a course in tailoring was started, many women joined but some preferred to go back to their old jobs or to start once again as a proper wife and mother.</p>
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	Members of Chau Duc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise by our intimate knowledge of personalities
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	140,000

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
Leaflet Number ATF – 037 – 70

Safety – Medical Care – Don't Shoot at Red Cross Helicopter

ID Number:	RC02806
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-037-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 272 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-037-70: Medical Care
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white with red cross
Date Produced:	1 October 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Picture of DUSTOFF Chopper). The helicopter ambulance saves lives.
Back:	This is a helicopter ambulance. You can see by the picture that the helicopter ambulance doesn't carry any weapons. Whenever or wherever any soldier is wounded, this helicopter will take him to hospital. This is not only allied soldiers if you are wounded and need help, the helicopter will take you to hospital. The helicopter ambulance saves lives. The helicopter ambulance saves lives.
Theme:	Explanatory
Target Audience:	VC and NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To discourage ground engagement of casevac helicopters.
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 039 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Long Dat Map – Follow the Arrows



Leaflet Number ATF – 039 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Long Dat Map – Follow the Arrows

ID Number:	RC02854
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-039-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 273/348
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-039-70: Long Dat map
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Green and red on white
Date Produced:	3 October 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Follow the Arrows (Map of Long Hai hills, Route 44 and Long Hai Village)
Back:	Do you enjoy a life of hardships and running? Are you really happy hiding in the hills and living in caves? Come and join a happy way of life. Go to the RF at Long Hai village in daylight and you will be welcomed.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Enemy in Long Hai
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers from the Long Hai to go to the Southern end of the Long Hai village.
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000



Cuộc tranh đấu của bạn đã đạt được
những gì ?

Cuộc tranh đấu của bạn có đưa
đến hòa bình không ?

Miền Nam Việt Nam ngày càng trở nên
Phồn thịnh

Hãy góp Phần vào Sự thành công
của Tổ Quốc

Miền Nam Việt Nam đang cần đến
Các bạn






Leaflet Number ATF – 040 - 70

Demoralise – Question Beliefs

ID Number:	RC02896
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-040-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 274/349 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-040-70: Question beliefs
Size:	Overall: 21 cm x 28 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	2 October 1970
English Translation:	Is your struggle producing anything? Is your struggle leading you to peace? South Vietnam becomes more prosperous day by day. Join in the success of your country. South Vietnam needs you.
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	VC / NVA (Produced for 7 RAR)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To make enemy question own beliefs and to sow the seeds of doubt
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	250

Các bạn đang làm gì ở đây ?
Có Phải các bạn đang giúp đỡ gia đình
tại nơi đây không ?
Gia đình các bạn có cảm thấy
Sung Sướng vì sự hiện diện của các
bạn lại đây ?
Gia đình các bạn có được no ấm hơn
bởi Sự hiện diện của các bạn
tại đây Các bạn có đang giúp đỡ
gia đình các bạn không ?




www.baa.gov.au RC02855

Leaflet Number ATF – 041 – 70

Demoralise – Question Beliefs


ID Number:	RC02855
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-041-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 275/350
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-041-70 Question beliefs
Size:	Overall: 10 1/2 x 8 1/2 in.; 26.67 x 21.59 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	2 October 1970
English Translation:	What are you doing here? Are you helping your family being here? Does your family eat well, while you are here? Does your family feel happy while you are here? Are you helping your family?
Theme:	Demoralisation
Target Audience:	VC / NVA (Produced for 7 RAR)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To make the enemy question his own beliefs & to sow the seeds of doubt.
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	250



Leaflet Number ATF – 042 – 70

Demoralise – Question Beliefs

ID Number:	RC02856
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-042-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 276/351
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-042-70: Victory
Size:	Overall: 10 1/2 x 8 1/2 in.; 26.67 x 21.59 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	2 October 1970
English Translation:	You seek Victory (Photo of Bodies) Is this Victory? They could be living peacefully. You, too, could be leading peaceful lives. Let us stop this senseless killing.
Theme:	Demoralisation
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To make the enemy of 2 minds and to question his own beliefs.
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	250



Leaflet Number ATF – 043 – 70

Demoralise – Question Beliefs

ID Number:	RC02857
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-043-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 277/352
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-043-70 Question beliefs
Size:	Overall: 10 1/2 x 8 1/2 in.; 26.67 x 21.59 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	2 October 1970
English Translation:	Why are you here? What are you achieving? You are not helping the people to live happy lives. The people do not really want you.
Theme:	Demoralisation
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To sow the seeds of doubt in the mind of VC / NVA
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	250




Leaflet Number ATF – 044 – 70

Demoralise – Question Beliefs – Difference Between War and Peace

ID Number:	RC02858
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-044-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 278/353
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-044-70: War and peace
Size:	Overall: 10 1/2 x 8 1/2 in.; 26.67 x 21.59 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	2 October 1970
English Translation:	(Photo of three bodies) Remember your former comrades! They could be living a peaceful lives
Front:	(Poster of 5 images)
Theme:	Demoralisation
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To play on the comparison between normal Viet Life and the result of continual resistance
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	250

Leaflet Number ATF – 045 - 70


Demoralise – Chieu Hoi – Chau Duc



Leaflet Number ATF – 045 - 70

Demoralise – Chieu Hoi – Chau Duc



ID Number:	RC02807
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-045-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 279
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-045-70: Why continue!
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and red on yellow
Date Produced:	16 October 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Chau Duc Unit. More of your comrades died 8-10 October.
Back:	Why continue? Your comrades who rallied are safe and well. If you rally, you loose nothing - you gain a new life.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi program
Target Audience:	Chau Duc (VC Unit)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Follow up leaflet on previous contact. To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000



Leaflet Number ATF – 046 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Produced for SAS

ID Number:	RC02859
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-046-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 280/355
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-046-70: Base camp poster
Size:	Overall: 8 1/2 x 5 1/2 in.; 21.59 x 13.97 cm
Colour:	Black and red on white
Date Produced:	3 October 1970
English Translation:	VC Cadre and Soldiers. This your base camp has been discovered by RVNAF and its allies. From now on, you will not have any place called 'safe' for you to hide. We always follow you and we know your activities. Friends Chieu Hoi now, so that you can avoid the hardships and hunger and death. Your families are waiting for you.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA (Produced for SAS)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers and to spread doubt of secrecy of VC Movements
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	200

Leaflet Number ATF – 047 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Chau Duc – Ap Tay Hamlet



Leaflet Number ATF – 047 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Chau Duc – Ap Tay Hamlet

ID Number:	RC02860
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-047-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 281-356
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-047-70: Ap Tay leaflet
Size:	Overall: 5.78 x 3 in.; 14.6812 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	9 October 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	At 0315 hours on the morning of 9th October, a number of your comrades were attacked by allied soldiers while moving out of Ap Tay Hamlet of Hoa Long Village. We captured two POW and many of your comrades were killed or wounded.
Back:	The GVN has appealed to you many times. How many of your comrades were killed because they ignored these messages. How many more will be killed. Once again the GVN offers you a chance to rally.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Chau Duc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers (Quick reaction contact leaflet)
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Chieu Hoi – Family Life




Leaflet Number ATF – 048 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Family Life

ID Number:	RC02861
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-048-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 282/357
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-048-70: Family life
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and red on yellow
Date Produced:	12 October 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Nothing is more happier than to be re-united with family.
Back:	Nothing is more sadder than living in jungles all the year round without seeing loved ones.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Encouragement to rally by family appeal
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 049 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Appeal – Chau Duc



Leaflet Number ATF – 049 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Appeal – Chau Duc

ID Number:	RC02808
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-049-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 283
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-049-70: Chau Duc general
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black and red on yellow
Date Produced:	28 October 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Fellow Vietnamese of the Chau Duc Forces We call on you to discuss your situation with your comrades. We call on you to discuss the Chieu Hoi offer we make to you. You have an important decision to make.
Back:	So many of your comrades have rallied. They now have an opportunity to build a new life of peace with their loved ones and friends. This opportunity we give to you. When you rally you can make up for the many years you have given to a cause that is no longer worthy of your loyalty and bravery. Rally to the GVN. You will be treated with respect and re united with your loved ones.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Chau Duc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers from the remains of Chau Duc
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 050 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Chau Duc – Hoi Chanh –




Leaflet Number ATF – 050 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Chau Duc – Hoi Chanh –

ID Number:	RC02809
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-050-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 284
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-050-70: Nguyen Thi Gai
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	5 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photo of family on bed) Meaning of Chieu Hoi
Back:	Reunited with her family. Medical Care. New Life. Don't wait until its too late.
Theme:	Meaning of Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Chau Duc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers from the remainder of Chau Duc.
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 051 – 70

Chieu Hoi – The Way to Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers



Leaflet Number ATF – 051 – 70

Chieu Hoi – The Way to Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers

ID Number:	RC02862
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-051-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 285/360
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-051-70: The way to Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and red on yellow
Date Produced:	12 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Drawings): 1.VC walking through the jungle 2. VC listening to the voice aircraft and picking up leaflets 3. VC rallying to GVN outpost 4. HOI CHANH being given house
Back:	CHIEU HOI (symbol)
Theme:	Chieu Hoi Inducement
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 052 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Inducement – Remember the Family




Leaflet Number ATF – 052 – 70


Chieu Hoi – Inducement – Remember the Family

ID Number:	RC02810
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-052-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 361
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-052-70: Remembering the family
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	10 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	I wonder what my family is doing to-day?
Back:	I wonder where and what my husband is doing today?
Theme:	Chieu Hoi Inducement
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000


THỰC - PHẨM




CÂY BO-BO




THUỐC UỐNG






CÂY BO-BO thích-hợp trồng-trọt
tại Việt-Nam và có thể cung-cấp
thực-phẩm cho loài người lẫn
thú-vật ngoài ra còn có thể dùng
làm rượu


Để chỉ-dẫn nhiều hơn về
CÂY BO-BO cho đồng-
bào một buổi thuyết-trình
sẽ được **TY CANH-NÔNG**
và **Đoàn Dân-Sứ Vụ Úc-Đại-Lợi**
tổ-chức tại **BÌNH-GIÁ**





Vào ngày 1 tháng 12 năm 1970
Sẽ có phương-tiện miễn-phí đưa đón
tới **BÌNH-GIÁ** cho những đồng-bào
nào muốn tham-dự buổi thuyết-
trình.
Đồng-bào hãy đợi xe tại Trụ-Sở
Hành-Chánh xã. Nhân-viên xã sẽ
cho biết về thời-khóa-biểu.

www.avim.gov.au



RC02353

Leaflet Number ATF – 053 – 70
Rural Development – Civil Affairs – Sorghum

ID Number:	RC02863
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-053-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 286/362
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-053-70 Sorghum
Size:	Overall: 10 1/2 x 16 in.; 26.67 x 40.64 cm
Colour:	Black, red and green on white.
Date Produced:	20 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Poster 6 images) 1. FOOD 2. SORGHUM 3. DRINK 4. Sorghum is suitable for growing in Vietnam and provide food for human and animals. It can also be used for wine. 5. To teach you more about Sorghum a demonstration is being held at BINH GIA by the GVN Agricultural Service and Australian Civil Affairs Unit. 6. On the 1st December, 1970, free transport to and from Binh Gia will collect anyone interested in attending the demonstration. Come to Village Administration HQ where you can wait for transportation. You will be told the programme of the demonstration by village members.
Theme:	Rural Development
Target Audience:	Local Population (Produced for 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To publicise sorghum as a crop and advertise a special demonstration
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	500

Leaflet Number ATF – 054 – 70

Demoralise – Divisive – Where Do We Go Now



Leaflet Number ATF – 054 – 70

Demoralise – Divisive – Where Do We Go Now

ID Number:	RC02811
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-054-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 287
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-054-70: Where do we go now?
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	28 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Drawing) Where do we go now?
Back:	(Symbols) Chieu Hoi Symbols. Your leaders cannot perform their tasks because they know that they do not fight for a just cause.
Theme:	Divisive VC / NVA
Target Audience:	VC and NVA Units
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To create dissention amongst VC / NVA units between cadre and soldiers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000


BỌN CỘNG-SẢN ĐÃ LÀM ĐƯỢC
① NHỮNG GÌ CHO ĐỒNG-BÀO?

② HỌ ĐÃ GÂY RA ĐAU KHỔ, ĐỐT PHÁ NHÀ CỬA VÀ GIẾT HẠI ĐỒNG-BÀO BẰNG CÁCH PHÁO-KÍCH VÀ BẮN PHÁ BỮA BÀI.

③ HỌ KHÔNG LÀM ĐƯỢC GÌ ĐỂ GIÚP VÀO SỰ TIẾN-BỘ CỦA ĐẤT NƯỚC CẢ.

④ HỌ THU THUẾ BẤT-HỢP-PHÁP VÀ DÙNG TIỀN THUẾ THU ĐƯỢC ĐỂ NUÔI SỐNG CHÍNH HỌ. HỌ KHÔNG DÙNG TIỀN THUẾ ĐỂ LÀM ĐƯỜNG SÁ, XÂY CẤT TRƯỜNG HỌC VÀ NHỮNG ĐIỀU KHÁC CÓ ÍCH LỢI CHO ĐỒNG-BÀO.

⑤ **HÃY GIÚP CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA LOẠI-TRỪ BỌN THỔ-PHỈ NÀY. HÃY BÁO-CÁO VỚI CHÍNH-QUYỀN NHỮNG TIN-TỨC VỀ BỌN CỘNG-SẢN MÀ ĐỒNG-BÀO BIẾT. ĐỒNG-BÀO SẼ ĐƯỢC TƯỜNG-THƯỞNG VÀ TÊN HỌ CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO SẼ ĐƯỢC TUYỆT-ĐỐI GIỮ KÍN.**

www.awm.gov.au  RC02812

Leaflet Number ATF – 055 – 70
 Civilians – Viet Cong Informants

ID Number:	RC02812
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-055-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 288
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-055-70: VC Bandits
Size:	Overall: 12 1/4 x 10 1/2 in.; 31.115 x 26.67 cm
Colour:	Black, red and yellow on white
Date Produced:	23 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Poster) What have the communists done for you? They have caused sorrow, destroyed homes and killed people by their senseless rocketing and fighting. They are doing nothing to help the progress of the country. They take illegal taxes that they use for themselves. They do not use taxes to build roads, schools and other things for the people. Help the GVN to rid of these bandits. Give any information about the communists that you know to the GVN officials. You will be rewarded and your name will be kept absolutely secret.
Theme:	Anti VC / NVA. Volunteer Informants.
Target Audience:	Civilians
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce the civil population to give information about VC activities and to discredit communist taxation activities
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known

**CÙNG NHAU HỢP-TÁC, CHÍNH-
PHỦ V.N.C.H. VÀ ĐỒNG-BÀO
MIỀN NAM VIỆT-NAM SẼ KIẾN-
TẠO MỘT QUỐC-GIA MỚI VÀ
HÙNG MẠNH.**

2 NHỮNG NGÔI NHÀ MỚI VUA ĐƯỢC XÂY
CÂY TRONG KHU BỆNH-VIÊN BÀ-RIÀ ĐỂ
SÂN-SỐC BỆNH-NHÂN.

3 MỘT BỆNH-XÁ MỚI ĐANG ĐƯỢC XÂY
CÂY TẠI XÃ TÂN-PHƯỚC.

4 MỘT TRONG NHỮNG CON ĐƯỜNG MỚI
ĐƯỢC SỬA CHỮA ĐỂ ĐỒNG-BÀO DỄ DÀNG
ĐI ĐẾN CHỢ BÚA.

5 NHỮNG ĐẬP NƯỚC DẪN THỦY NHẬP
DIỆN ĐỂ MÙA MÀNG CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO
ĐƯỢC TỐT ĐẸP HƠN.

6 MỘT TRƯỜNG KỸ-THUẬT MỚI VUA
ĐƯỢC XÂY CÂY ĐỂ HUẤN-LUYỆN
CON EM CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO.

7 **CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-
HOÀ ĐANG KIẾN-TẠO THÀNH-
BÌNH VÀ THỊNH-VƯỢNG CHO
TẤT CẢ ĐỒNG-BÀO MIỀN NAM
VIỆT-NAM**

www.awm.gov.au

PC02854
ATF-056-70

Leaflet Number ATF – 056 – 70


Civilian – Increase Confidence in Government of South Vietnam

ID Number:	RC02864
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-056-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 289/365(Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-056-70 Development in Phuoc Tuy
Size:	Overall: 10 1/2 x 16 in.; 26.67 x 40.64 cm
Colour:	Black, red, yellow, green
Date Produced:	25 November 1970
English Translation:	Together, the GVN and the people of South Vietnam will build a strong and new nation. New buildings at Baria hospital to treat the sick. A new dispensary at Tam Phuoc Village. One of the new roads for you to bring your goods to market. Irrigation dams to give you bigger and better crops. New Technical Schools to give better education to your children. The GVN is working for peace and prosperity for all the people of South Vietnam.
Front:	(Poster 5 photographs and 4 drawings)
Theme:	GVN Image
Target Audience:	Civilian Population
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To increase civilian confidence in the GVN development programme.
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	750

Leaflet Number ATF – 057 – 70


Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van So

HỘI CHANH




CHIEU HOI

VIÊN



HOI CHANH



NGUYỄN

VAN

SO.

ATF-057-70.

Tôi là nguyên văn So,
đã bị viết công bắt đi
dân công cho quân long
đất, trên 2 tháng nay.
Tôi đã chịu quá nhiều
cực khổ và đói khát.
Vào ngày 27-11-70-
tôi đã trốn khỏi hàng ngũ
viết công ra hội chanh.
Tôi đã được chanh
quyền quốc gia tiếp đón
tử tế.
Tôi thành thật kêu
gọi các bạn trong đoàn
dân công và các chiến
sĩ quân long đất hãy
tiến cách trốn khỏi hàng
ngũ viết công trở về với
chanh như một gia đình
tránh cảnh chết chóc và
được sum họp với gia đình
28-11-70.
So.
nguyên văn So

Leaflet Number ATF – 057 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van So

ID Number:	RC02813
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-057-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 290
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-057-70: Returnee Nguyen Van So
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	28 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph) Returnee Nguyen Van So
Back:	I am Nguyen Van So who was captured by the VC and worked for the Long Dat District as labourer more than two months ago. I have learned many experiences of hardships, hunger and thirst. On 27 November 1970, I escaped from the VC ranks and Chieu Hoi. I was warmly welcomed by the government. I sincerely call upon you, friends in the labour group and soldiers of Long Dat District, to escape from the VC ranks and return to the GVN to avoid death, and be united with your family. (signed) Nguyen Van So
Theme:	Chieu Hoi Inducement
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 058 – 70
Civilians – Voluntary Informant – Weapons Rewards

NO IMAGE AVAILABLE

Leaflet Number ATF – 058 – 70

Civilians – Voluntary Informant – Weapons Rewards

ID Number:	RC02865
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-058-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 367
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-058-70: Weapons rewards
Size:	Overall: 16 x 10 1/2 in.; 40.64 x 26.67 cm
Colour:	Black, yellow and red
Date Produced:	30 November 1970
English Translation:	Note: No final product/image available, only mock up of poster. Poster text: Attention people of Xuyen Moc. You will be properly rewarded if you report to the authorities information leading to the capture or destruction of weapons of communists, such as mortars, mortar ammunition, rocket launchers, machine guns etc. In addition you will be contributing your effort in making your village secure. Report all information about Communists to District authorities, National Police, ARVN or Allied Forces. Your identity will be kept secret. Individual weapons rewards.
Theme:	Volunteer Informant
Target Audience:	Civil Population, Xuyen Moc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce civilians to give information about VC / NVA weapons locations
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not known

Leaflet Number ATF – 059 – 70
Civilians – Warning of upcoming TET Festival

No Image Available



Text for a leaflet was drafted but was never produced as a leaflet.

Leaflet Number ATF – 059 – 70

Civilians – Warning of upcoming TET Festival

ID Number:	RC02897
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-059-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 430 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-059-70: Peace and prosperity does not come from violent revolution
Date Produced:	25 November 1970
English Translation:	NOTE: No image available. Text for a leaflet was drafted but was never produced as a leaflet. See AWM Reference: AWM 304 430 Official records.
Front:	Peace and Prosperity does not come from violent revolution (Pictures of TET Type destruction) It comes from hard work and involvement by the people with their country's plans and achievements Bridges, roads, market places, housing Once before the people of the free South witnessed wanton destruction and inexcusable murder by the communists in their attempt to destroy the homes and lands of the people. But the people drove them away and have now rebuilt the damage and we are achieving new goals in progress.
Back:	1. Peace and prosperity does not come from violent revolution 2. It comes only from hard work and involvement by the people with their countries plans 3. Before, more than once, the People of the Free South Vietnam witnessed violent destruction and inexcusable murder by the communists in their attempt to invade South Vietnam. But our military and people broke their attempt and have now rebuilt the damages and are achieving new goals in progress
Theme:	To Warn the People of TET
Target Audience:	Local Population
Language:	Vietnamese
Number Produced:	Nil. Not produced

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanhs' – Nguyen Van Buu and Nguyen Van Ngoc




Leaflet Number ATF – 060 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanhs’ – Nguyen Van Buu and Nguyen Van Ngoc

ID Number:	RC02866
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF 060-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 291/368
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-060-70: Ralliers Nguyen Van Buu, Nguyen Van Ngoc
Size:	Overall: 6 x 4 1/2 in.; 15.24 x 11.43 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	5 December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photo) Friend of C205 Reconnaissance Sub-Region 4. I am NGUYEN-VAN-NGOC, platoon leader of C205. I Chieu Hoi at Nui Dat on Nov 8, 70. I was warmly welcomed and treated by the GVN and its allies, I was warmly welcomed at the Chieu Hoi centre as well. Besides the favour of material for example clothes, houses and facility of entertainment; everybody here treats me with the love of the people. I call on you: Manh, Tam, Thich, and Miss Thanh to return to the National just cause. Do not let the Communists take advantage from you any longer.
Back:	Photo Friends of F600 VC Sub Region 4 I am NGUYEN-VAN-BUU. section leader of F600. I returned to the GVN on November 8, 70. I have been treated well and have had everything for my daily needs. I call upon you, friends in F600, not to let yourself to be exploited by the Communism any longer. Your parents, your wife and children, your brothers and friends are waiting for you. Come back here so that we can gather together to rebuild our life, rebuild our country that has been desolated too much by this war that caused that caused by Ha-Noi. The people of South Vietnam do not need our liberation, they need only peace so that they can live peacefully with their beloved families. (Signed)
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000

- HỒI - CHÁNH
VIÊN



NG.-
ĐỨC-
KÍCH.

ATF 061 70

Xôi tên là Ng. Đức Kich
Hạ Sĩ thuộc Quân đội
chính quy Bắc Việt.
tôi đã Ra Hoi Chanh
tại cấp Trung tá Ngã
8-12-1970. tôi đã được
chính quyền VNCH tiếp đãi
tuyệt vời. tôi khám phá Ra
Rằng: Được sống tại Miền
Nam. tốt đẹp hơn tại MBẮC
tôi đã được ăn uống đầy
đủ, Ngủ nghỉ đầy giấc.
tôi thiết tha kêu gọi các
bạn cán binh Bắc Việt
Hãy Ra Hoi Chanh, để
được một cuộc sống tốt
đẹp hơn.

Ng. Đức Kich
Ngày 9/10/70

Leaflet Number ATF – 061 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Duc Kich

ID Number:	RC02898
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-061-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 292/369 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-061-70: Rallier - Nguyen Duc Kich
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	15 December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Picture) Caption - Rallier Nguyen Duc Kich
Back:	I am Nguyen Duc Kich, a former corporal in the NVA. I returned to the GVN at Ong Trinh on 8 Dec 70. I was warmly welcomed by the GVN. I reveal that living in the South Vietnam is much better than the North. I eat good food and sleep well. I heartily call upon you, cadre and soldiers of NVA to return to the GVN, so that you can have a better life.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	NVA Units
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce VC / NVA to rally
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

TIN TỨC HÒA BÌNH.

VÀO THÁNG NĂM VÀ THÁNG SÁU
VỪA QUA, TRUNG-ƯƠNG CỤC MIỀN
NAM NÓI RẰNG CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐẠT
ĐƯỢC CHIẾN THẮNG CUỐI CÙNG
TRONG THỜI GIAN NGẮN, CHO ĐẾN
GIỜ, CÁC BẠN ĐANG ĐỢI CHIẾN
THẮNG ĐÓ.

CÁC BẠN CHỈ CÓ THỂ TẤN-CÔNG
CÁC ĐỒN BÓT LỄ TÈ MÀ THÔI, NHƯ
VẬY CÓ KHÁC GÌ VẾT ĐỐT CỦA CON
MÒNG CÁN MŨI TRÊU.

NHƯNG ĐÂU LÀ CHIẾN-THẮNG
CUỐI CÙNG?
ATF-062-70

HÒA-BÌNH CÔNG-CHÍNH SẼ ĐẾN VỚI VIỆT-NAM BẮNG SỰ ĐOÀN- KẾT CỦA MIỀN NAM.

SỰ XÂM-LẤN VÀ NHỮNG GIẢI-
PHÁP CỦA MIỀN BẮC KHÔNG NGHĨA
LÝ GÌ ĐỐI VỚI DÂN CHÚNG MIỀN
NAM. TỰ-DO CHẤM-CHÍNH SẼ ĐẾN
BẰNG SỨC CHIẾN-ĐẢO CHÔNG LẠI ÁP
LỰC CỘNG-SAN.

GÓP SỨC CHO VIỆT NAM TỰ-DO.



CHIÊU-HÔI ĐỂ XÂY DỰNG QUÊ HƯƠNG

Leaflet Number ATF – 062 – 70

Demoralise – Chieu Hoi – News Leaflet – COSVN

ID Number:	RC02814
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-062-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 293 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-062-70: News leaflet
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	21 November 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	The COSVN Resolutions of May and June have said that you will win a "'decisive' victory in a very short time". You are still waiting for that victory. You can strike at small outposts, just as a flea nips a buffalo. But where is the decisive victory. (Chieu Hoi Symbol)
Back:	(Chieu Hoi symbols) True peace can come to Vietnam. It will come through unity in the south. Northern aggression and Northern ideas mean nothing to us. True freedom will come by combating the communist menace. Join Free Vietnam. Rally to help your country!
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To create doubts in the minds of VC / NVA and to induce VC / NVA to rally
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000

Chieu Hoi – Rally Benefits – Money Rewards

QUYỀN LỢI KHÍ HỘI CHÁNH.



CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CÔNG-HOÀ
THẤU HIỂU RẰNG KHÍ CÁC BẠN
RA HỘI CHÁNH, CÁC BẠN KHÔNG
MANG THEO QUẦN ÁO, HAY TIỀN BẠC.
MỘT VÀI BẠN BỊ THƯƠNG HAY ĐAU
ỒM, MỘT SỐ BẠN KHÁC CÓ GIA ĐÌNH
CẦN SỬ NUÔI DƯỠNG.

VÌ VẬY CHÍNH-PHỦ VIỆT-NAM
CÔNG-HOÀ CUNG-CẤP QUẦN ÁO VÀ
THUỐC MÈN CHO CÁC BẠN. CHÍNH
PHỦ VIỆT-NAM CÔNG HÒA GIÚP ĐỖ
CÁC BẠN CHO ĐẾN KHÍ TỰ CÁC BẠN
CÓ THỂ CHĂM SÓC GIA ĐÌNH.

ATF-063-70.

QUYỀN LỢI CỦA HỘI CHÁNH VIÊN

TIỀN THƯỞNG NHỮNG VŨ KHÍ
MANG THEO.

2 BỘ QUẦN ÁO HAY 1500\$00
1200\$00 LỘ PHÍ KHÍ HOÀN-HƯỞNG
50\$00 PHỤ-CẤP ĂM-THỰC CHO
VỢ CON,
25\$00 PHỤ-CẤP CHO MỖI ĐỨA
CON
150\$00 PHỤ-CẤP HÀNG THÁNG
CHO MỖI NGƯỜI THUỘC
GIA-ĐÌNH HỘI CHÁNH
VIÊN, TRONG SUỐT THỜI
GIAN LỮU-TRÚ TẠI
TRUNG-TÂM CHIÊU-HỘI

NHỮNG GIA-ĐÌNH HỘI CHÁNH
VIÊN NÀO MUỐN ĐỊNH-CƯ TẠI LÃNG
CHIÊU-HỘI SẼ ĐƯỢC CẤP PHÁT VẬT-
LIỆU VÀ 12000\$00 ĐỂ LÀM NHÀ
NGOÀI RA CÒN ĐƯỢC TRỞ-CẤP SÁU
THÁNG GAO.

Leaflet Number ATF – 063 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Rally Benefits – Money Rewards

ID Number:	RC02815
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-063-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 294
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-063-70: Rally Benefits
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Red on white
Date Produced:	21 December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Chieu Hoi Symbols) The GVN understands that when you rally you do not have clothing or money to buy clothes. Some ralliers are sick and wounded. Some ralliers have wives and children who depend upon them for food. So the GVN provides clothes and medical care. The GVN provides for your family until you can provide for them yourself.
Back:	Benefits for a Rallier: Money rewards for weapons; 2 sets of clothing or 1500\$00 for clothing; 1200\$00 for repatriation; 50\$00 for food for wives and older children; 25\$00 for each young child; 150\$00 a month for each member of the family while staying at the Chieu Hoi Centre; Families who wish to settle in the Chieu Hoi Hamlet will be given materials and 12,000\$00 to build a house and a supply of rice for six months.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Number of Ralliers This Year



Leaflet Number ATF – 064 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Number of Ralliers This Year

ID Number:	RC02899
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-064-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 295/372 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-064-70: Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in; 15.24 x 7.62 cm.
Colour:	Brown on white
Linked Media:	c December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	More and more of your comrades are rallying to the GVN. In Phuoc Tuy this year 252 people have rallied. You have seen their photographs on leaflets. They have spoken to you from the air. 252 people.
Back:	Ralliers who have rallied to the GVN are well treated. You have always been told when one of your comrades have rallied: either you have read messages from them in their own handwriting or have heard them talk from the sky. They are living normal lives in Free Vietnam. Rally to freedom. Rally to be with your families.
Theme:	Rally
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	100,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 065 – 70



Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – South Vietnamese Solutions



Leaflet Number ATF – 065 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – South Vietnamese Solutions

ID Number:	RC02900
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-065-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 296/373 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-065-70: South Vietnamese leaflet
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Red and yellow on white.
Date Produced:	December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Map of South Vietnam; National Flag; Chieu Hoi symbols. Text (overprinted): SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLUTIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROBLEMS.
Back:	We are building a Free South Vietnam. The GVN is achieving much. We can achieve more with your help. The GVN is sincerely committed to solving the problems of South Vietnam, our country. Rally to help build our country. CHIEU HOI. (Chieu Hoi Symbols)
Theme:	Rally
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000




Leaflet Number ATF – 066 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Appeal by Government of South Vietnam

ID Number:	RC02901
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-066-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 297/374 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-066-70: Appeal by GVN
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	Dear Countrymen and GVN Officials in Phuoc Tuy
Back:	The GVN would launch a campaign on the occasion of the Coming Lunar New Year to appeal to people on the VC side to return to families and the national cause. Like other years, a campaign entitled 'Returning to the Source' will be carried out throughout the Republic of Vietnam from 4th December 1970 to the end of February, 1971. In order to get more results from the campaign the Operational Committee wish to remind people, military men and GVN cadres of the goodwill and the nice purpose of the Government of Vietnam and to participate earnestly in the great human campaign through talking with one another about the Chieu Hoi policy, distributing magazines, booklets and inducement activity and prayers so that the VC combatants will drop their weapons earlier to live with us in peace and harmony. The Operational Committee of the Campaign 'Tro ve Nguyen' Returning to the Source
Theme:	Rally
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	500,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 067 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Two Minds





Leaflet Number ATF – 067 – 70
Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Two Minds

ID Number:	RC02816
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-067-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 298
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-067-70: Two Minds
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Brown on white
Date Produced:	December 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	(Sketch of group of VC with mortar trained on village. Village to be ultra peaceful: Dinh, church, oxcarts, etc.) Caption: (Thought bubble over VC head) 'These are my people'. Chieu Hoi Symbols
Back:	Chieu Hoi Symbols. Look at the peaceful lives of the people. The land reforms mean that everyone who wishes may till his own land. Rally to Freedom in Free Vietnam.
Theme:	Rally
Target Audience:	Viet Cong
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	200,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 068 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Duong





Leaflet Number ATF – 068 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Duong

ID Number:	RC02817
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-068-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 299
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-072-71: Hoi Chanh Nguyen Van Duong
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	14 January 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph of Nguyen Van Duong. Chui Hoi Symbols)
Back:	I am Nguyen Van Duong, aka Ba Nam (3Nam), Adjutant of C4, D445. I brought one AK 47 and three magazines when I rallied to the Australian forces. I was warmly welcomed, which was contrary to the teachings of our Hai Khanh in the Battalion Command Group. I was with the VC for eight years. I suffered hardship, hunger and thirst, but without the victory the VC had propagandised about. I myself, as well as my family, received nothing. At the present time I realise that our ranks are disintegrating. The above are the reasons for which I rallied. I sincerely appeal to all those remaining in the VC ranks to rally early to the GVN to avoid a useless death and to be reunited with their families. 8 January 1971. Yours sincerely, 3 Nam
Theme:	Rally
Target Audience:	VC (D445 Local Force Battalion)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000

Leaflet Number ATF – 073 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Chieu Hoi for TET




Leaflet Number ATF – 073 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Chieu Hoi for TET

ID Number:	RC02818
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-073-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 300
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-073-71: TET, 1971
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	19 January 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Picture of a hamlet during TET; much gaiety.)
Back:	There are two groups of people who will not be spending TET in a peaceful manner: you and the soldiers hunting you. TET is the time of family togetherness, the time when the year that is gone is remembered, and planning for the family's future is done for the year to come. How many TETs have you spent in the jungle? Chieu Hoi for TET! Chieu Hoi!
Theme:	Rally
Target Audience:	NVA / VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 074 – 71
Demoralise – Chieu Hoi – D445 Ghosts





Leaflet Number ATF – 074 – 71
Demoralise – Chieu Hoi – D445 Ghosts

ID Number:	RC03362
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-074-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 301(Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit(maker)
Title:	ATF-074-71: D445 ghosts
Size:	Overall: 5 in x 4 in
Colour:	Black & white
Date Produced:	25 January 1971
English translation:	
Front:	Sleeping VC; grave in the background; shade of former comrade in attitude of appeal; names of dead D445. (Top) The shadow of death continues to seek more of your brave compatriots. (Below) The shadow of death is looking for you.
Back:	The shadow of death is searching for more members of D445. Many of your brave compatriots have been killed by the GVN forces recently. You have been told that such people have been given other tasks. This is not true. These people are dead. Each day the task of getting enough food and supplies becomes more difficult. You labour hard to achieve victory but GVN forces destroy your effort. Chieu Hoi before the shadow of death reaches out for you. Chieu Hoi symbol.
Theme:	Anti-morale/Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	D445 LF Bn.
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Objective:	Encourage D445 to think of their dead comrades, to affect morale, but to give the Chieu Hoi alternative to death.
Method Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Unknown

Leaflet Number ATF – 078 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Three Hoi Chanhhs




Leaflet Number ATF – 078 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Three Hoi Chanhs

ID Number:	RC02819
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-078-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 303
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-078-71: Three Hoi Chanhs
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	28 January 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Pictures of three Hoi Chanhs, Ba, Be and Dat.
Back:	On 27 January 1971, Hai Luc, Tran Van Be and Cao Van Ba rallied to the Australian Forces. We have been warmly received and well treated. You have heard our voices talking to you. Rally now before it is too late. Chieu Hoi. (Chieu Hoi symbols).
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	Enemy elements in the Viet Cuong area
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Encourage / induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not known

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Meaning of Chieu Hoi




Leaflet Number ATF – 079 – 70

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Meaning of Chieu Hoi

ID Number:	RC03360
AWM Reference:	AWM304 304/432 Part 1(Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit (maker)
Title:	ATF-079-71: The meaning of Chieu Hoi
Size:	Overall: 6 in x 3 in
Colour:	Black & white
Date Produced:	2 February 1971
English translation:	
Front:	Chieu Hoi symbols; What does this symbol mean?
Back:	The meaning of Chieu Hoi; The Chieu Hoi programme is organized by the GVN which has Chieu Hoi centres in each province. The GVN wants the people who have been coerced to work and fight for the VC/NVA to return to their families so that everyone may live in peace. It is a shame to see the people of one nation destroying each other. Rally to the GVN forces or her allies where you will be warmly welcomed.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC/NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Objective:	Explanatory for Chieu Hoi Programme
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Unknown

Leaflet Number ATF – 080 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Le




Leaflet Number ATF – 080 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Le

ID Number:	RC02902
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-080-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 382/432 Part 1
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-080-71: Nguyen Van Le
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	8 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph - Hoi Chanh). Nguyen Van Le. (Chieu Hoi symbols).
Back:	I, Nguyen Van Le of D445, C4, rallied 17 January 1971, at Nui Nhom. After six years serving with the VC I realise what communism is. I have suffered many hardships and hunger, then I rallied to the GVN, and I was warmly welcomed and well treated. I appeal to other people in the rest of my unit in the VC ranks - Rally quickly in order to be reunited with families and rebuild the country.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC (D445, C4)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	100,000

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Are You Sick and Weary

**CÁC BẠN ĐANG
ÔM ĐAU VÀ
MỆT MỎI Ừ ???**



**CHIEU-HOI – TRỞ VỀ ĐOÀN-TỤ VỚI
GIA-ĐÌNH ĐỂ HƯỞNG MỘT CUỘC SỐNG
THOẢI MÁI, YÊN ƠN.**

081-71.

**CÓ AI AN-ỦI CÁC BẠN KHI CÁC BẠN
ÔM ĐAU VÀ MỆT MỎI KHÔNG.**

Các bạn vẫn tiếp-tục cuộc tranh
đấu chống lại chính-phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-
Hòa. Đời sống càng ngày càng trở nên
khắc-khổ vì sự thiếu-thốn lương thực và
thuốc men, đó chính là những thứ cần-
thiết để duy-trì sự chiến-đấu của các bạn.

Có ai an-ủi các bạn khi các bạn
ôm đau và mệt mỏi không? Chỉ có gia-
đình các bạn mới có thể chia sẻ nỗi
thống-khổ cùng các bạn.

Khi nào bạn mới trở về đoàn-tụ
với gia-đình.


Đâu là những chiến-thắng to lớn
mà các bạn thường được tuyên-truyền
từ bấy lâu nay? Thực sự đó chỉ là
những lời tuyên-truyền láo khoét, hãy
trở về với gia-đình hưởng ứng chính-sách
Chieu-Hoi các bạn sẽ được đón tiếp tử-tế
và ..ồng-nhiệt.

Leaflet Number ATF – 081 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Are You Sick and Weary

ID Number:	RC02903
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-081-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 305/383/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-081-71: Are you sick and weary?
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	9 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Are you sick and weary? (Chieu Hoi symbols). Chieu Hoi - Return to your family for comfort.
Back:	When you are sick and tired does anyone comfort you. You and your friends continue to struggle against GVN forces. Day after day living becomes more difficult because you lack food and medical supplies which are needed to keep you fighting. When you are sick and tired does anyone comfort you? If you were with your family they would share your troubles. How long will it be before you can return home? Where are these great victories that you have been told about? There are none. Return home: Chieu Hoi to the GVN where you will be warmly welcomed.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC/NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Not known


Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Weapons Rewards



Leaflet Number ATF – 082 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Weapons Rewards



ID Number:	RC02820
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-082-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 306
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-082-71: Weapons Rewards
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	15 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Weapons reward for Hoi Chanh
Back:	<p>Friends, when you Hoi Chanh you will receive rewards for your weapons. Pistols (all types) 1200\$ Rifles (SKS, AK47, M16) 3000\$ Machine Gun (Light) 10000\$ Machine Gun (Heavy) 7.62mm or .30 cal 17500\$ 60mm Mortar Barrel 20000\$ 81 ı 82mm Mortar Barrel 24000\$ 81 - 82mm Mortar (Complete) 60000\$ Anti-tank mine (each) 4000\$ Individual mine (each) 500\$ Claymore mine (each) 1500\$ The rewards for Chieu Hoi are generous and will help you start your new life.</p>
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	All elements of NVA and VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Encourage ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not known



Leaflet Number ATF – 083 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Nguyen Van Chien

ID Number:	RC02821
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-083-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 307
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-083-71: Nguyen Van Chien
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	17 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Photograph of Nguyen Van Chien. Hoi Chanh. Vien Nguyen Van Chien. (Chieu Hoi Symbol).
Back:	Cadre and soldiers of C1 / D445 My name is Nguyen Van Chien of C1 / D445. I rallied to the GVN at Dat Do district on 19 February 1971 and was warmly welcomed and treated well. This is contrary to the communist propaganda that returnees will be tortured by the GVN. Today I really enjoy a free life. I do not have to be hungry and thirsty in the deep jungles anymore. I heartily call upon you who are still in the VC ranks to shake off sleep and return to the National just cause to enjoy a happy life with your family. Affectionately Yours Nguyen Van Chien
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	C1 / D 445
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	50,000


Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Where To Rally – Duc Thanh



Leaflet Number ATF – 084 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Where To Rally – Duc Thanh

ID Number:	RC02822
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-084-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 308
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-084-71: Where to rally (Duc Thanh)
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and red on white
Date Produced:	18 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Sketch map showing area bounded by Eastings 35-59 and Northings 73-93 showing NDP Garth, Duc Thanh Phuoc Tuy / Long Khanh border Duc Thanh / Xuyen Moc border Major Rivers Route 2 Arrows from VC areas pointing to Garth and Duc Thanh, (second colour) Slogan 'Follow arrows' (second colour)
Back:	(Slogan) 'Follow the arrows to peace and prosperity' Rally now Chieu Hoi symbols
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known



Leaflet Number ATF – 085 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Cambodian Campaign

ID Number:	RC02823
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-085-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 309/432 Part 1
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-085-71: Cambodia
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	19 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Last year Cambodian sanctuaries were destroyed. The Kompong Son supply was cut off. RVNAF operations in Laos mean that your last supply line for food, medicine, and other supplies from the outside is in jeopardy!
Back:	Rally before it is too late. CHIEU HOI! CHIEU HOI! (Diagram of Chieu Hoi Symbols)
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Rally Rewards – Beginning of Your New
Life



Khi các bạn hồi-chánh Chính-
Phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-Hoà sẽ
cung-cấp cho các bạn:


Tiền ăn mỗi ngày	50\$
Tiền quần áo (2 bộ)	1.500\$
Tiền làm việc cho Chính- Phủ VN hoặc Đồng Minh (mỗi ngày)	80\$
Tiền mua nhà ở	10.000\$
(Hoặc sẽ được cấp cho một ngôi nhà do Chính- Phủ VNCH xây cất sẵn)	
Tiền mua đồ đạc	2.000\$
Gạo đầy đủ trong sáu (6) tháng. Tiền hoàn hướng	1.200\$

086-71

Leaflet Number ATF – 086 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Rally Rewards – Beginning of Your New Life

ID Number:	RC02824
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-086-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 310
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-086-71: The beginning of your new life
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Blue on white
Date Produced:	20 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	The Beginning of your New Life, (Chieu Hoi Symbol)
Back:	When you rally the GVN will give you: Food Allowance 50\$ VN per day. Clothing allowance (2 sets of clothes) 1500\$ VN. Allowance for working for GVN or Allies 80\$ VN per day. An allowance of 1000\$VN for a house or previously built GVN home. Furniture allowance of 2000\$VN. Enough rice for 6 months. Graduation at end of course 1200\$ VN. Chieu Hoi
Theme:	Rally Rewards
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known




Leaflet Number ATF – 087 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Cambodia and Laos Operations

ID Number:	RC02904
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-087-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 311/389/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-087-71: Cambodia
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Blue and black on white
Date Produced:	23 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	You have heard of the successful RVNAF operations in Laos. Large RVNAF units are also operating in Cambodia to close this supply and escape route.
Back:	Rally to the cause. CHIEU HOI. CHIEU HOI. (Diagram of the Chieu Hoi symbol)
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC/NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Not known

Leaflet Number ATF – 088 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Map of Xuyen Moc – Where to Rally




Leaflet Number ATF – 088 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Map of Xuyen Moc – Where to Rally

ID Number:	RC02825
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-088-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 312
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-088-71: Xuyen Moc (Rally directions)
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Green and red on white
Date Produced:	4 March 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Sketch map of area bounded by Eastings 57-77 and Northings 61-92 showing: Xuyen Moc and Thau Tich, Nui May Taos, Province and District Borders, Major rivers, Roads: Route 23 and 329, Red arrows pointing to Xuyen Moc from VC areas, with text in red: 'Follow the arrows'.
Back:	Rally to the just cause now. Follow the arrows to prosperity. Rally now. (Chieu Hoi Symbol)
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Cambodian Campaign




Leaflet Number ATF – 089 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Cambodian Campaign

ID Number:	RC02826
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-089-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 313
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-089-71: Chieu-Hoi (Cambodia campaign)
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Red on white
Date Produced:	10 March 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Your leaders have told you that the VC / NVA control most of the RVN and that the RVNAF is a ghost army. But the ghost army is the one closing the noose around you by attacking your last supply routes.
Back:	The RVNAF grows stronger while your side grows weaker. Rally before it is too late. CHIEU HOI. CHIEU HOI.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 090 – 71


Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Map of Long Hai's – Where to Rally



Leaflet Number ATF – 090 – 71



Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Map of Long Hai’s – Where to Rally

ID Number:	RC02801
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-090-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 432 Part 1
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-090-71: Long Hai
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Blue and red on white
Date Produced:	15 March 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Follow the arrows: Map of Long Hai hills, Route 44 and Long Hai village. (As for front of leaflet number Psyops Leaflet Number: ATF-039-70)
Back:	(Slogan) Follow the arrows to peace and prosperity. Rally to the GVN now. Chieu Hoi. (Symbol) Chieu Hoi
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known



Leaflet Number ATF – 091 – 71
Demoralise – Death Notice – Made for SAS

ID Number:	RC02905
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-091-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 393/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-091-71: Death notice
Size:	Overall: 8 x 6 in.; 20.32 x 15.24 cm
Colour:	Red and black on white
Date Produced:	26 February 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Your camp has been discovered: You are no longer safe. Fill out the spaces on the back of this notice and keep it with you. When we find your body we will use it to give you a proper burial. (Leaflet red printing over drawing of skulls)
Back:	Full Name; Rank; Religion; Next of Kin; Date of Birth; Unit. (Leaflet printed red over drawing of vulture and dead body.)
Theme:	Demoralising
Target Audience:	VC / NVA (Produced for SAS)
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralizing
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known




Leaflet Number ATF – 092 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Phung Xuan Ho

ID Number:	RC02906
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-092-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-092-71: Phung Xuan Ho
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	2 March 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph and Chieu Hoi symbols). Hoi Chanh Vien Phung Xuan Ho.
Back:	I am Phung Xuan Ho, a farmer Association Leader of Hamlet 1 Binh Chau Village. I rallied to the GVN at Cau Dai at 0600 hours on 1 March 1971 was warmly welcomed, as one of the family, by a military unit and I have been treated well by the GVN. Living with the VC you do not have enough food and clothes and medicines. Therefore, if you are still in the jungle you should rally quickly to the GVN, then your life will be safe. Your wife and children are waiting for you. Rally as soon as possible. (signed) Phung Xuan Ho. Date, 2/3/71.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known


Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – How To Rally

LỜI CHỈ DẪN KHI RA HỒI CHÁNH



1. Bạn có thể ra hồi-chánh với bất cứ đơn-vị hay cơ-quan nào của chánh-phủ, dân-sự hay quân-sự, Việt-Nam Công-Hoà hay Đông-Minh.
2. Hãy ra hồi-chánh lúc ban ngày, đừng ra ban đêm.
3. Hãy cắt dấu võ-khí trước khi hồi-chánh.
4. Nếu có thể, bạn hãy mang theo tờ truyền-đơn này. Nhưng nếu không có cũng không sao.
5. Trường-hợp không thể tự mình ra trình-diện với nhà chức-trách được, bạn có thể nhờ dân-chúng địa-phương liên-lạc giúp bạn hồi-chánh.

Chính-sách Chiêu-Hồi chủ-trương
đón-tiếp tử-tế, giúp đỡ các bạn
đoàn-tụ gia-đình và sống an-
toàn để lập lại cuộc đời.



Hãy hồi-chánh ngay
từ bây giờ. 101-71

Leaflet Number ATF – 101 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – How To Rally

ID Number:	RC02907
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-101-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 398/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-101-71: Rally instructions
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	24 March 1971
(Text is the same as US leaflet number 2775.) English Translation:	
Front:	1. You can rally to any unit or installation, military or civilian, of the GVN or its Allies. 2. Rally during day time, not night time. 3. Hide your weapons before you rally, later you can show the authorities where to get them, and you will be rewarded. 4. Take this leaflet with you if you can. But if you do not have a leaflet, not to worry, you can also rally. 5. In case you can not report yourself to the authorities, you can ask the local people to help you.
Back:	The Chieu Hoi programme will welcome you warmly and will help you to reunite with your family, and live peacefully so that you can rebuild your life. Chieu Hoi now.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

**CÁC BẠN CÁN BINH
TIỂU-ĐOÀN D 445.**

Một lần nữa, các bạn đã thất bại trong mưu toan gấp gở
lại các đồng đội trong C. 1 trú ẩn tại Long Hải.

Đơn vị các bạn hiện tại bị phân-tán như các bạn, là
những đứa con, xa gia-đình. Các bạn chiến đấu cực khổ để
dành chiến thắng. Nhưng làm thế nào các bạn có thể thành
công khi quân-số đơn vị các bạn bị thiếu hụt vì sự phân
tán này.

103-71

www.avrm.gov.au

PC02908

**CÁC BẠN CÁN BINH
TIỂU-ĐOÀN D. 445.**

CUỘC CHIẾN ĐẤU CHO CÔNG-SẢN LÀ MỘT CUỘC CHIẾN
ĐẤU VÔ GIÁ TRỊ.

Khi chết không được chết gần gũi gia-đình đã là một
sầu thảm cho tất cả mọi người trong gia-đình.

Hãy chấm dứt sự xa cách này và xum họp lại với gia-
đình các bạn để bắt đầu lại cuộc sống mới.

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PC02908

Leaflet Number ATF – 103 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Rally Appeal – Viet Cong Unit D445

ID Number:	RC02908
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-103-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 400/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-103-71: Rally Appeal
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	3 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Officers and soldiers of D445. Once again you have failed to join your comrades in C1 who are located in the Long Hais. Your unit remains separated like you do as a son from the family. You fight hard to achieve victory, but how can you do this when your strength is sapped by separation.
Back:	Officers and soldiers of D445. The fight for communism is a worthless fight. To die without seeing your family again causes great sorrow throughout your family. You fight hard to achieve victory, but how can you do this when your strength is sapped by this separation.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC / NVA
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

ĐỒNG BÀO CHÚ Ý

Chiến dịch lưu thông an toàn phối hợp Việt Mỹ trên Quốc Lộ 316 nhằm mục đích bảo vệ tính mạng và tài sản của đồng bào. Để chiến dịch có thể mang lại thành quả tốt đẹp, chúng tôi kêu gọi sự hưởng ứng và hợp tác tích cực của đồng bào.

1. Lái xe cẩn thận, coi chừng trẻ em.
2. Giữ tốc độ vừa phải.
3. Đừng lái xe khi say rượu.
4. Tài xế giỏi phải trông chừng xe khác.
5. Đọc những bảng chỉ dẫn lưu thông.
6. Lịch sự và nhã nhặn khi lái xe.

www.awm.gov.au PC02909

ATTENTION CITIZENS

The joint Vietnamese-US traffic safety campaign on highway 316 is designed to save your life and prevent injury to yourself and your property. The success depends on you. Please co-operate:


1. Drive carefully. Children use this highway.
2. Slow down — and live.
3. If you drink, don't drive.
4. A good driver watches the other driver.
5. Read road signs; they are for your benefit.
6. Drive courteously.

AWM 204 404/432 PT 2 104-71
www.awm.gov.au PC02909

Leaflet Number ATF – 104 – 71
 Civilians – Safety – Traffic Safety

ID Number:	RC02909
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-104-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 401/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-104-71: Traffic safety
Size:	Overall: 17 cm x 12.5 cm
Colour:	Black and orange on yellow
Date Produced:	3 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	In Vietnamese. Is the same message front and back.
Back:	(In English) The joint Vietnamese-US traffic safety campaign on highway 316 is designed to save your life and prevent injury to yourself and your property. The success depends on you. Please cooperate: 1. Drive carefully, Children use this highway. 2. Slow down - and live. 3. A good driver watches the other driver. 4. Read road signs; they are for your benefit. 5. Drive courteously.
Theme:	Drive Safely
Target Audience:	Civilian population and military drivers
Language:	Vietnamese and English
Purpose / Object:	Increase traffic safety
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 105 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh - Ngo Van Na



Hồi Chánh Viên

NGÔ VĂN NÀ

CHIEU-HOI

105/71

www.bwim.gov.au RC02910

Tôi Ngô Văn Nà. Bị dạn
Đông Lãng - Chai me Quãng
Hưng H10 PKH. Đã ra hồi
Chanh ngày 3/4/71. Đuối bu
tiếp đón tử tế. Vậy tôi kêu
gọi các anh em còn ở lại trong
hàng ngũ Việt Cộng hãy mau
trở về hồi Chanh với Chanh Pleu
Việt Nam Cộng Hòa. Không cần
chết chóc và đau khổ nữa.
Vậy các bạn hãy tạo mọi
điều kiện trở về hồi Chanh
Đừng nghe lời tuyên truyền
của Cộng Sản mà chết oan.
Mong gặp được các bạn ngày
gần đây. Tôi muốn nhất là
các bạn như Ba An. Thấu hiểu
và các bạn quen biết hãy ra
hồi Chanh


Ngày 3/4/71. *Tôi*
Ngô Văn Nà

B

www.bwim.gov.au RC02910


Leaflet Number ATF – 105 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh - Ngo Van Na

ID Number:	RC02910
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-105-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 402/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-105-71: Hoi Chanh, Ngo Van Na
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	4 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph and Chieu Hoi symbols) Ngo Van Na
Back:	I am Ngo Van Na aka Dong Sang, position medical specialist of H10, PK4. I rallied on the 3rd April 1971, and was well treated. I appeal to the people still in the VC ranks to rally quickly to the GVN and avoid death and hunger. Therefore look for the opportunity to rally. Don't listen to the Communist propaganda that causes a useless death. I hope to meet you in the near future. I especially want my friends Ba Trinh and Thanh Dong and all the friends that I know to rally. I am Ngo Van Na Date 3/4/71
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	H10, PK4
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known



Leaflet Number ATF – 106 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Tran Van Minh

ID Number:	RC02911
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-106-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 403/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-106-71: Hoi Chanh, Tran Van Minh
Size:	Overall: 5 x 3 in.; 12.7 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	5 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Name and photograph; Chieu Hoi symbols) Tran Van Minh
Back:	Comrades of C7 PW Camp Unit. I am Tran Van Son aka Mink, a protection soldier of C7 PW Camp Unit and I rallied on 31/3/71 at Xuyen Moc. I was warmly welcomed and treated by the GVN. Nobody has beaten or ill treated me as the VC propaganda said would happen. Now I am away from the death and hunger of the deep jungle. I sincerely call upon you who are still in the unit, awaken and return quickly to the national just cause in order to be able to reunite with your family.
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	C7 PW Camp Unit
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known



Hội Chánh Viên
TRẦN
VĂN
QUANG
107-71

www.awm.gov.au

Tôi là Trần Văn Quang tự
sai phot. Nguyễn h' thu Chi
h' Lã Hắc Dịch.

Tôi đã đi theo Việt Cộng
từ năm 1963. Tôi đã chịu rất
nhiều cực khổ và đói khát nhưng
bản thân tôi và gia đình tôi
không nhận được lợi ích gì cả.
Tôi đã bình tĩnh và nhận thấy
rằng mình đã đi lầm đường,
mới vào ngày 9/4/71 tôi đã
ra Chiếu hội tại đồn Phú Mỹ
và đã được Chánh quyền quốc
gia tiếp đón tử tế.


Tôi thành thật kêu gọi các
bạn còn lại trong Hàng ngũ V.C
hãy trở về với Chính quyền Đ.Đ
để được Sum Họp với gia đình.

10.4.71 Trần Văn Quang

www.awm.gov.au

Leaflet Number ATF – 107 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Tran Van Quang

ID Number:	RC02912
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-107-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 404/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-107-71: Tran Van Quang
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	11 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph of Hoi Chanh; Chieu Hoi Symbols) Tran Van Quang
Back:	I am Tran Van Quang alias Sau Phot, former Party Chapter Secretary of Hat Dich Village. I joined the VC in 1963 and had many experiences of hardship, hunger and thirst, but myself and family received nothing. I woke up and realised that I had gone the wrong way. Therefore, on the 9th of April, 1971, I returned to the GVN at Phu My outpost and was warmly welcomed by the GVN. I sincerely call upon you who are still in the VC to return to the national cause so that you can be reunited with your family. (signed) Tran Van Quang date 10/4/71
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known



CHẤT NỔ

Đã có nhiều người, binh-sĩ
cũng như thường dân, bị chết
hoặc bị thương vì các chất nổ.

Các bậc làm cha mẹ hãy
bảo con cái mình đừng đùa
giỡn với những vật lạ khả-nghi.

Nếu thấy vật khả-nghi,
hãy báo-cáo địa-điểm của nó
với Chính-Quyền VNCH hoặc
các cơ-quan Đồng-Minh.

**Hãy cứu lấy con cái của
đồng-bào khỏi sự chết**

108-71

www.avim.gov.au

P.C02913

ĐỀ - PHÒNG !

Vật này có thể sát-hại sinh-mạng.



Các loại đầu đạn có chất nổ.

ĐỀ - PHÒNG !

Vật này có thể sát-hại sinh-mạng.



Các loại lựu-đạn.

ĐỀ - PHÒNG !
Vật này có thể sát-hại sinh-mạng




Mìn chống cá-nhân M16A1.

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Leaflet Number ATF – 108 – 71

Civilian – Safety – Explosives


ID Number:	RC02913
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-108-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 405/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-108-71: Explosives
Size:	Overall: 6 1/2 x 3 1/2 in.; 16.51 x 8.89 cm
Colour:	Orange and black on white
Date Produced:	13 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Explosives! Many people, soldiers and civilians, have been killed or wounded by explosions. Parents tell your children not to play with strange objects. If you see this object, report its location to the GVN or Allied authorities. Save your children from death.
Back:	Beware! This object can kill. (4 versions of this leaflet were produced. The front is the same in each but the backs are different photographs of mines: anti-personnel M16A1 mine, grenades, explosive shells, Chicom Anti-tank mines (Plus Captions))
Theme:	Warning on Explosives
Target Audience:	Civil Population
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce civilians to report explosives
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known



Leaflet Number ATF – 109 – 71
Civilian Populace – Safety – Money for Mines

ID Number:	RC02914
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-109-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 406/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-109-71: Money for mines
Size:	Overall: 6 1/2 x 7 1/2 in.; 16.51 x 19.05 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	14 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Vietnamese) Money for Mines The Australian Forces will reward you when information is given to them about the location of mines. Take this leaflet to the Australian Forces and they will go with you to the location of the mine. You will be rewarded after the mine has been located and destroyed.
Back:	(English) Money for Mines The Australian Forces will reward you when information is given to them about the location of mines. Take this leaflet to the Australian Forces and they will go with you to the location of the mine. You will be rewarded after the mine has been located and destroyed.
Theme:	Mine location rewards
Target Audience:	Civil Population
Language:	Vietnamese and English
Purpose / Object:	Induce civilians to report locations of mines.
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 110 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Bui Van Be



Leaflet Number ATF – 110 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Bui Van Be

ID Number:	RC02915
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-110-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 407/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-110-71: Bui Van Be
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	12 April 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	(Photograph; Chieu Hoi Symbols) Bui Van Be
Back:	To C1 / D445 I am Bui Van Be, former PSDF member of Phuoc Thanh village, who was captured on the 22 December 1970, when they attacked Phuoc Thanh Village Office, and was sent to C1/D445. I could not live with the VC because of hardship, hunger and thirst, and was frightened of death. On 10th April 1971, I rallied to Dat Do Sub Sector and was warmly welcomed by the GVN. I call upon you who are still in the VC ranks to return to the national just cause so that you will not die needlessly. (Signed) Bui Van Be 12/4/71
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 112 – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Bau Ham Guerrillas



Leaflet Number ATF – 112 – 71
Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Bau Ham Guerrillas

ID Number:	RC03397
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-112-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 409 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit (maker)
Title:	ATF-112-71: Bau Ham guerrillas
Size:	Overall: 5 in x 4 in
Colour:	colour
Date Produced:	c June 1971
English translation:	
Front:	Return to your home. Return to the Republic of Vietnam. Rejoin your family and live a peaceful life.
Back:	A picture story depicting VC finding leaflets, reading the message, and rallying to the GVN forces.
Theme:	Ralliers
Target Audience:	VC north of Xuyen Moc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Objective:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Not known


Leaflet Number ATF – 113 – 71
Civilian Populace – Safety – Illegal Farming



Leaflet Number ATF – 113 – 71
Civilian Populace – Safety – Illegal Farming



ID Number:	RC02916
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-113-70
AWM Reference:	AWM304 410/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-113-71: Illegal farmers
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and green on white
Date Produced:	c 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Return to the Republic of Vietnam. Return to your loved ones and live a meaningful life.
Back:	(A picture story depicting an illegal farmer finding a leaflet, rallying to the GVN, and eventually returning to his family.)
Theme:	Illegal Farmers
Target Audience:	Illegal Farmers of Xuyen Moc
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 114 – 71
Civilian populace – Safety – Mines



Leaflet Number ATF – 114 – 71
Civilian populace – Safety – Mines

ID Number:	RC02917
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-114-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 411/432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-114-71: Mines
Size:	Overall: 6 x 5 1/2 in.; 15.24 x 13.97 cm
Colour:	Black, red and green on white
Date Produced:	c 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Danger. This area may contain mines
Back:	Mine clearing teams recover most mines when a minefield is cleared. Not all mines can be recovered. Do not enter these areas. Any strange objects should be reported to GVN officials.
Theme:	Mine Warning
Target Audience:	General
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Create awareness of mines
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known



Leaflet Number ATF – 115 – 71



Demoralise – Chieu Hoi - Demoralise 274 MF Regiment

ID Number:	RC02918
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-115-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 432
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-115-71: Demoralise 274 MF Regiment
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black and red
Date Produced:	24 August 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE 274TH MAIN FORCE REGIMENT!!! Your weapons rust due to lack of stores to maintain them. You are continually threatened by the enemy. You have no victories, there is no glory and even in death, your spirit will find no peace.
Back:	You lack medical care. You have difficulty in obtaining food supplies. There is confusion in your leadership. Your Political Cadre lack enthusiasm and give you little guidance.
Theme:	Demoralise
Target Audience:	274 Main Force Regiment
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Demoralise 274 Main Force Regiment
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

Leaflet Number ATF – 115 – 71 (Duplicated Number)

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh - Truong Dinh Hanh

Target - Convalescent Group, SR4



Leaflet Number ATF – 115 – 71 (Duplicated Number)

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh - Truong Dinh Hanh

Target - Convalescent Group, SR4


ID Number:	RC02919
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-115-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 412 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-115-71: Convalescent group
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Green and black on white
Date Produced:	August 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Photograph of Truong Dinh Hanh and Australian medical assistant.
Back:	Comrades of Convalescence Group, SR4, I am Truong Dinh Hanh, soldier of Convalescence Group. Three days ago, I went out with this group and was ambushed by Allied troops. I was wounded and lay in the jungle for three days and three nights without medicines or food. The unit did not come to save me either. The Australians found me and took me to hospital. At present, I have been treated at the Australian hospital in Vung Tau. I have been treated very well. I call upon you, comrades who are still in the VC ranks, even if you were wounded or not, especially sister Hoa, try and contact the Australian troops in this area and ask for Chieu Hoi. I believe you will be warmly welcomed. I hope to see you again. (Signed) Truong Dinh Hanh Also on
Back:	Rally to the Australian Forces. Move to the Road and every time you see an aircraft or vehicle wave your hands to indicate your position. You will be warmly received.
Theme:	Rally to Australian Forces
Target Audience:	Convalescent Group, SR4
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known

TỰ - TỨC PHÁT - TRIỂN XÃ


Các lực-lượng Đồng-Minh trong Tỉnh Phước-Tuy đang giúp Chính-Phủ Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa xây-
dựng một thôn làng tốt đẹp hơn để đồng-bào sinh sống.

Những kế-hoạch này được thực-hiện để đồng-bào có thể sống một cuộc sống tốt đẹp hơn


MỘT SỐ TRONG NHỮNG CÔNG-TÁC CỦA CÁC KẾ-HOẠCH NÀY ĐỀU CÓ :



VIỆC XÂY CẤT NHÀ
CỦA CHỢ BÌNH-SÌ . .



BẮT GIẾNG NƯỚC CÓ QUẠT XỬ-DỤNG
BẰNG SỨC GIÓ VÀ CÁC ỒNG BƠM NƯỚC
ĐỂ DẪN TRONG LÀNG CÓ THỂ LẤY
NƯỚC DỄ DÀNG . . .



Phá huỷ các dụng - cụ hoặc đồ trang - bị của những kế - hoạch này là từ chối sự giúp đỡ
của những người bạn của đồng - bào. Hãy giúp đỡ và yểm - trợ chương - trình phát - triển
của Chính - Phủ Việt - Nam Cộng - Hoà cũng như duy - trì và bảo - vệ những kế - hoạch này.

Av 11 304 432 PT 2.
www.avim.gov.au

PC02920

Leaflet Number ATF – (Not Numbered) – 71



Civilian Populace – Village Self Development - Do Not Destroy Equipment

ID Number:	RC02920
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-Not Numbered
AWM Reference:	AWM 304 432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF- (not numbered) Don't destroy equipment
Size:	Overall: 15 1/4 x 19 1/2 in.; 38.735 x 49.53 cm
Colour:	Yellow, green, red and black on white
Date Produced:	c August 1971
English Translation:	VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT Allied Forces in Phuoc Tuy Province are helping the GVN to build a better place for you to live in. The building of houses for your soldiers Windmills and pumps so that the villagers can get water easily. To destroy parts and equipment from these projects is to deny assistance to your friends. Help support the GVN development programme, and maintain and protect these projects.
Theme:	Village Self Development
Target Audience:	Civilians
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To inform the civilian population to maintain and protect these projects
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known, usually 500

CÁC CHẤT NỔ NGUY HIỂM

Đã có nhiều người, binh-sĩ cũng như thường dân, bị chết hoặc bị thương vì các chất nổ này.



CÁC BẬC LÀM CHA MẸ :- hãy bảo con cái mình đừng đùa giỡn với những vật lạ khả-nghi.



ĐỀ-PHÒNG

CÁC VẬT NÀY CÓ THỂ GIẾT HẠI SINH-MẠNG.

HÃY CỨU LẤY CON CÁI CỦA ĐỒNG-BÀO KHỎI SỰ CHẾT.



Nếu đồng-bào thấy những vật khả-nghi này, hãy báo-cáo địa-điểm của nó với Chính-Quyền VNCH hoặc các cơ-quan Đồng-Minh.

www.awm.gov.au AWM 304 413 PC02921

Leaflet Number ATF – (Not Numbered) – 71
Civilian Populace – Safety – Dangerous Explosives

ID Number:	RC02921
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF- Not numbered
AWM Reference:	AWM304 413 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-Not numbered: Dangerous explosives
Size:	Overall: 15 x 11 in.; 38.1 x 27.94 cm
Colour:	Black and orange
Date Produced:	c August 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Dangerous explosives - There are many people, soldiers and civilians, have been killed by these explosives. Parents tell your children not to play with these strange objects. PRECAUTION. These objects can kill. Save your children from death. If you see these strange objects, report their location to the GVN or Allied installations.
Theme:	Warning against dangerous explosives
Target Audience:	General
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Hand
Number Produced:	Not Known, usually 500



Leaflet Number ATF – (Not Numbered) – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Rally to the Government of South Vietnam

RC 02922

Leaflet Number ATF-

ID Number:	RC02922
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-
AWM Reference:	AWM304 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF- (Not numbered) Rally to the GVN
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	c August 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Your morale is low because you lack equipment to fight, and your units are under strength; because of this you fail to have any victories. Resolution No. 9 of the Party also proves the above mentioned is distressing to them. The defeat of the communists cannot be avoided and the war will become hopeless with no way out. You, the people, know the situation better than anybody else and realise how distressing war can be. It is better to realise the bitter, resentful, truth in order to find a way to save your life. Leave the communists and return to the republic's cause in time. You will, be warmly welcomed and well treated.
Theme:	Unavoidable Communist Defeat
Target Audience:	VC - Phuoc Tuy Province
Language:	Vietnamese
Origin:	American/1 Psychological Operations Unit
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known, usually 50,000 to 60,000



Leaflet Number ATF – (Not Numbered) – 71

Chieu Hoi – Hoi Chanh – Pham Van Le

ID Number:	RC02923
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF- (Not Numbered) - 71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 432 Part 2 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF- (Not numbered) Rallier Phan Van Le
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	c August 1971
English Translation:	
Front:	Photograph
Back:	To the comrades of Long Dat and Xuyen Moc District. I am Phan Van Thao aka Pham Van Le, Deputy Agriculture Association of Long Dat District. I have followed the VC since 1962, I've borne hardship, hunger and thirst while the VC still ill-treated me. I have realised that I have gone the wrong way, therefore I came to Xuyen Moc to rally on 10-8-1971. The GVN welcomed me warmly, now I am not afraid of death anymore. I sincerely call upon 7 Loan, 10 An, 2 Vu, 2 Quang, 6 Thanh, 9 Hoang, 7 Thang, 8 Binh, 3 Bo to come back quickly to the GVN and avoid dying and reunite with your family.
Theme:	Rally Appeal
Target Audience:	Long Dat VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	Induce other ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known, usually 50,000 to 60,000

Leaflet Number ATF – (Not Numbered) – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers - To Comrades in the Communist Party

NO IMAGE AVAILABLE

Leaflet Number ATF – (Not Numbered) – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers - To Comrades in the Communist Party

ID Number:	RC02924
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF- (Not Numbered) - 71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF- (Not numbered) To comrades in the Communist Party
Size:	Overall: 6 x 3 in.; 15.24 x 7.62 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	c August 1971
English Translation:	The South Vietnamese war has been protracted for some time. You know that the party's decision has been extended and studied; many victory notices disseminated have enlarged upon a military success which occurred upon the battle field in a contrary manner. In reality they have suffered the worst casualties of the war, and these still continue. You never really forget the casualties and wailing during an operation under gunfire and the terrible sight in the battlefield. Your comrades were sacrificed and many other comrades rallied to the GVN. You were hungry, food, ammunition and medicine caches were permanently empty guerrillas were separated and the local cadre were incapacitated.
Theme:	Poor Battle conditions
Target Audience:	VC - Phuoc Tuy Province
Language:	Vietnamese
Origin:	American / 1 Psychological Operations Unit
Purpose / Object:	Induce Ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known, usually 50,000 to 60,000



Leaflet Number ATF – R – 3942 (Reprint of US Leaflet)



Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers – Appeal by Peoples Self Defence Force

ID Number:	RC02925
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-R-3942
AWM Reference:	AWM304 417/424 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF-R-3942: PSDF leaflet
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on yellow
Date Produced:	16 September 1970
English Translation:	
Front:	<p>Friends in the Communist Ranks: - You have been misguided by the Communist doctrines. - You are living a lonely life at secret bases along the border areas. - You have seen the Communist duplicity and ruthlessness deceive you into committing crimes of death and destruction to innocent compatriots. We, the members of the PSDF, are ready to help and welcome you back to the national fold with clemency from the government. We, the members of the PSDF, stretch out our arms and welcome you return to the people of the anti-communist civilian ranks. We, the members of the PSDF, volunteer to serve as the bridge of understanding to help you rejoin your families and loved ones just as soon as possible. Together we will reconstruct our country in peace and prosperity.</p>
Back:	(Same text as front of leaflet)
Theme:	Chieu Hoi
Target Audience:	VC & NVA with families in South Vietnam
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose / Object:	To induce the VC / NVA to rally to the GVN by a personal appeal from the PSDF members
Method of Dissemination:	By Air
Number Produced:	Not Known, usually 50,000 to 60,000



Leaflet Number ATF – D1 – 71
Civilian Populace – Safety - Non-Civilian Access Area

ID Number:	RC02936
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-(D1)-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 432 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF- (D1) -71 Non civil access
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Red and black on white
Date Produced:	23 October 1971
English translation:	
Front:	You are in a Non Civilian Access area and liable to be shot
Back:	This is a Restricted Area Keep Out!
Theme:	Warning to civilians entering a restricted area.
Target Audience:	Civilians
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Not known.



Leaflet Number ATF – D2 – (Not Numbered) – 71

Chieu Hoi – Induce Ralliers - Binh Ba Guerrillas and Party Chapter

ID Number:	RC02937
Psyops Leaflet Number:	ATF-(D2)-71
AWM Reference:	AWM304 432 Part 2 (Official Records number)
Maker:	1st Psychological Operations Unit
Title:	ATF- (D2) Binh Ba Guerrillas and Party Chapter
Size:	Overall: 5 x 4 in.; 12.7 x 10.16 cm
Colour:	Black on white
Date Produced:	9 October 1971
English translation:	
Front:	MEMBERS OF THE BINH BA GUERRILLAS AND PARTY CHAPTER Recently your refuge was discovered and you were forced to find another area which would give you safety. Your numbers are small and you have much difficulty in getting food, supplies and support from your fellow villagers.
Back:	Because you hide in the jungles you are separated from your families and have become sad and lonely. Demand your leaders, Huynh Van Phuong and Nguyen Tri Dung to let you to return to your homes to live a life of peace and happiness.
Theme:	Disillusionment
Target Audience:	VC
Language:	Vietnamese
Purpose/Object:	Induce ralliers
Method of Dissemination:	By air
Number Produced:	Not known.

Appendix 8

Psychological Operations Sample Voice Broadcast Scripts

Used by

1 Psychological Operations Unit

April 1970 to November 1971

Note: Voice Scripts not complete

Voice Broadcast 1
Theme: Condon and Search

THEME : Cordon and Search.

Attention Compatriots !! The ARVN and Allied Forces are sealing off the area to search for the VC. The operation is aimed at bringing you security and a happy life. We are sorry to inconvenience you while operating but we ask for your assistance. Remain in your homes until you receive further instructions, do not attempt to leave the area. Inform the local authorities of any information you have concerning VC activities in the area.

(1)

ĐỀ TÀI : Bao vây và lục soát.

Đồng bào chú ý !! Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đang mở một cuộc bao vây lục soát Việt Cộng. Cuộc hành quân nhằm đem lại an ninh và đời sống yên vui cho đồng bào. Chúng tôi rất tiếc đã làm thiệt hại đồng bào trong khi hành quân nhưng chúng tôi đã hỏi sự giúp đỡ của đồng bào. Hãy ở nhà đến lúc đồng bào nhận thấy một chỉ thị mới, đồng bào chớ mắc mưu mà rời vùng này. Thông báo cho giới thẩm quyền địa phương biết bất cứ mọi thông báo nào mà đồng bào thấy nằm trong hoạt động của Việt Cộng tại vùng.

(1)

Voice Broadcast 2

Theme: Condon and Search

THEME : Cordon and Search

Attention Compatriots !! The ARVN and Allied Forces have sealed off the area. No one will be allowed to enter or leave until further notice. The operation is aimed at providing happiness and security to this area. We are sorry to cause you any inconvenience while conducting the search. Remain in your homes until instructed to move to the (Market) (School house). Report any information you have concerning VC activities to the local authorities.

(2)

ĐỀ TÀI : Bao vây và lục soát.

Đồng bào chú ý !! Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đã bao vây vùng này. Không một ai được liên lạc để xâm nhập hoặc trốn đến lúc có một thông cáo mới. Cuộc hành quân nhằm đem lại an vui và an ninh cho vùng này. Chúng tôi rất lấy làm buồn khi gây ra bất cứ một thiệt hại nào trong khi hướng dẫn cuộc lục soát. Hãy ở nhà đến lúc có chỉ thị di chuyển đến chợ hoặc trường học. Báo cáo tất cả mọi hoạt động của Việt Cộng mà đồng bào nhận thấy cho giới thẩm quyền địa phương.

(2)

Voice Broadcast 3

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention Attention : You are now surrounded by ARVN and Allied Forces. Escape is impossible - to continue your senseless struggling will only result in your death. You may Chieu Hoi or allow yourself to be captured at this time. Lay your weapon down !!! Raise your hands in the air and walk slowly toward the ARVN and Allied Forces. You will be treated well. If you have been wounded, you will receive immediate medical attention. Do not die a needless death, Chieu Hoi or allow yourself to be captured.

(3)

Ề TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng. Việt Cộng và cán binh Bắc Việt.

CHÚ-Ý !! CHÚ-Ý !! Các bạn cán binh đang bị Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh bao vây. Các bạn không thể nào trốn thoát được để tiếp tục cuộc chiến vô nghĩa, cuộc chiến đó chỉ kết thúc bằng cái chết của các bạn. Các bạn có thể hồi chánh hoặc chính bạn tự nạp mình trong thời gian này. Hãy vứt bỏ vũ khí !! Giơ tay lên và tiến từ từ về phía Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh. Các bạn sẽ được cư xử nhân hậu. Nếu các bạn bị thương, các bạn sẽ được săn sóc thuốc men. Chớ nên chết cho cái chết vô nghĩa, hãy chiêu hồi hoặc tự nạp mình.

(3)

Voice Broadcast 4

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention Attention - You are now surrounded by ARVN and Allied Forces. Escape is impossible - soon we will call artillery and air-strikes in on your position you will be bombed by powerful war-planes - death and destruction will rain down upon you from the air. There is no place to run or hide. Lay your weapon down and Chieu Hoi or allow yourself to be captured. If you have been wounded you will receive immediate medical attention. Chieu Hoi now to save your life. (4)

Đề-Tài : Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Chú-Ý !! Chú-Ý !! Các bạn cán-binh đang bị Quân-Đội Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa và Đồng-Minh bao-vây. Các bạn không thể nào trốn-thoát. Quân-Đội sẽ gọi pháo-binh và phi-cơ oanh-tạc ngay vào nơi cư-trú của bạn rất gần đây. Các bạn sẽ bị phi-cơ chiến-đầu oanh-tạc.

Cái chết và sự tàn-phá từ trên không sẽ xảy ra. Ở đó không có một chỗ nào để chạy hoặc trốn cả. Hãy vứt bỏ vũ-khí và Chiếu-Hồi hoặc bạn tự nạp mình. Nếu bạn bị thương, các bạn sẽ nhận ngay sự săn-sóc thuốc-men. Chiếu-Hồi là cứu đói sống của bạn. (4)

Voice Broadcast 5

Theme: Surrender Appeal – NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - NVA

Attention NVA Soldiers - Attention NVA Soldiers -

Once again you have suffered heavy losses by ARVN and Allied Forces - there is no escape left for you. The men who fight for freedom and the National Just Cause do not wish you to die a needless death. Do not die here and become just another body left on the battlefield by your leaders. Lay your weapons down and allow yourself to be captured - do not sacrifice yourself needlessly. Surrender to the GVN and you will be well treated. You will receive immediate medical attention if you have been wounded.
(5)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Các bạn cán binh Bắc Việt chú ý !! Các bạn cán binh Bắc Việt chú ý !! Một lần nữa các bạn chịu một thiệt hại nặng nề do Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh gây ra. Không một ai trong các bạn có thể trốn thoát. Những người chiến đấu cho tự do và Chính Nghĩa Quốc Gia không muốn cho bạn chết một cách oan uổng. Đừng chết như vậy và các bạn chỉ còn một cái xác bị các cấp chỉ huy của bạn bỏ rơi trên chiến trường. Hãy vứt bỏ vũ khí và tự nạp mình. Đừng hy sinh một cách oan uổng. Hãy đầu hàng Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và các bạn sẽ được xử tử nòng hậu. Nếu các bạn bị thương các bạn sẽ nhận ngay sự săn sóc thuốc men.
(5)

Voice Broadcast 6
Theme: Rally Appeal – VC

THEME : Rally Appeal - VC.

ATTENTION SOLDIERS OF THE VIET CONG !!!

Will you choose death or life ? There is no escape for you now ! Your suffering gets greater every day. You choose now. will it be death or Chieu Hoi ?

DEATH OR CHIEU HOI ? DEATH OR CHIEU HOI ?

DEATH OR CHIEU HOI ? (6)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi hồi chánh

CÁC BẠN CÁN BINH CỘNG SẢN CHÚ Ý !!

Các bạn chọn đường sống hay chết ? Không một ai trong các bạn có thể trốn thoát sự chịu đựng của bạn ngày thêm gian khổ. Các bạn hãy chọn đi, chịu chết hay Chiêu Hồi ?

CHẾT HAY CHIÊU HỒI ?

(6)

Voice Broadcast 7
Theme: Rally Appeal – VC

THEME : Rally Appeal - VC

Attention Communist Soldiers. The GVN's Chieu Hoi Program welcomes our misled brothers with open arms. You can return without fear of punishment. The GVN will reward all ralliers with food, clothing, and medical attention. They will teach you a trade, reunite you with ~~your~~ family, and allow you to start a new life. Chieu Hoi now, don't sacrifice yourself for a lost cause. Chieu Hoi !

(7)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi hồi chánh.

Các bạn cán binh Cộng Sản chú ý -!! Chương trình Chiêu Hồi của Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa sẽ đón tiếp nồng hậu các bạn lầm lạc. Các bạn không sợ hành hạ khi trở về. Chính Phủ Việt Nam sẽ tặng thực phẩm, quần áo và thuốc men cho tất cả các bạn hồi chánh. Chính Phủ sẽ hướng dẫn thương mại cho bạn, bạn sẽ được sum họp với gia đình và các bạn sẽ bắt đầu một cuộc đời mới. Hãy Chiêu Hồi, đừng hy sinh cho chủ nghĩa mớ hồ. Hãy Chiêu Hồi.

(7)

Voice Broadcast 8

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention NLF and NVA Soldiers !! You are now surrounded by Allied Forces. You have seen what the powerful firepower of the ARVN and Forces can do, soon artillery and airstrikes will bring death and destruction to you. Your commander may try to send you out in small groups to try and escape. Save your life, there is no escape. Lay your weapon down and allow yourself to be captured or Chieu Hoi. Live to see your families and loved ones again. You will receive immediate medical attention if you have been wounded. If you want to live, Chieu Hoi or surrender now.

ATTENTION AMERICAN SOLDIERS - This message has just appealed to the VC to surrender. They have been instructed to lay down their weapons and surrender. (8)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng..

Các bạn giải phóng và cán binh Cộng Sản chú ý !!

Các bạn đang bị Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hoà và Đồng Minh bao vây. Các bạn đã thấy thế nào về sự phản pháo mạnh mẽ của Quân Lực Việt Nam và Đồng Minh, một ngày gần đây pháo binh và oanh tạc cơ sẽ đem cái chết và sự tàn phá đến cho bạn. Cấp chỉ huy của bạn sẽ cố gắng chia các bạn ra từng nhóm nhỏ để các bạn có thể trốn thoát. Hãy cứu lấy bạn, các bạn không thể nào trốn thoát. Hãy vứt bỏ vũ khí và tự nạp mình hoặc chiêu hồi. Gia đình bạn sẽ vui vẻ khi thấy bạn trở về và bạn sẽ được sung sướng. Nếu bạn bị thương bạn sẽ nhận ngay sự săn sóc thuốc men. Nếu bạn muốn sống, bạn hãy chiêu hồi hay đầu hàng ngay bây giờ.

BINH SĨ HOA KỲ CHÚ Ý !! Bản văn này chỉ nhằm vào kêu gọi Việt Cộng về đầu hàng. Họ sẽ được chỉ thị để vứt bỏ vũ khí và đầu hàng. (8)

Voice Broadcast 9

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention NLF and NVA Soldiers !! You are now surrounded by Allied Forces. You have seen what the powerful firepower of the ARVN and Allied Forces can do. Soon you will die for an unjust cause - die and be doomed to lie forever in an unmarked grave. You may choose life by allowing yourself to be captured.

Return now, Chiêu Hoi. Your time to choose is fast running out. Save your soul from the unmarked grave.

Surrender now.

(9)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Các bạn cán binh Cộng Sản chú ý !!

Các bạn đang bị Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đang bị bao vây. Các bạn không thể nào trốn thoát được. Hãy chọn lấy sự sống hay cái chết không tên. Cấp chỉ huy của bạn sẽ để bạn chết cho chủ nghĩa của họ, chết và luôn luôn chịu một số mạng vô vọng. Các bạn có thể chọn đời sống bằng cách tự nạp mình. Hãy trở về Chiêu Hồi. Thời gian bạn lựa chọn sẽ qua mau. Cứu lấy linh hồn bạn ra khỏi nắm mồ vô chủ để được siêu thoát.

Hãy đầu hàng ngay !!

(9)

Voice Broadcast 11

Theme: Chieu Hoi Instructions – VC & NVA

THEME : Chieu Hoi Instructions – VC & NVA

Attention Communist Soldiers – The GVN's Chieu Hoi Program allows all the misled sons of our country to live in peace. As a rallier you will be given many benefits and an opportunity to start a new life. Follow these instructions to Chieu Hoi :

1. Hide your weapon. 2. Stay hidden in the brush until the contact is broken; after the fighting is over, stand up and shout Chieu Hoi – Chieu Hoi. 3. If you cannot escape from the Communist Forces now, escape the first chance you get. Report to any ARVN or Allied outpost or to any GVN official. 4. You will be warmly received and well treated by the GVN, if you turn a weapon in – you will be paid for the weapon. 5. Remember, you may Chieu Hoi to any ARVN, Allied or GVN official. By following the above steps you can insure a peaceful future for yourself and your family. Chieu Hoi. (11)

ĐỀ TÀI : Chỉ dẫn Chiêu Hồi.

Các bạn cán binh Cộng Sản chú ý !! Chương trình Chiêu Hồi của Chính Phủ Việt Nam tiếp nhận tất cả những đứa con lầm lạc của xứ sở trở về sống trong hòa bình. Các bạn sẽ hưởng nhiều đặc ân và có phương tiện tốt để bắt đầu cuộc đời mới. Các bạn hãy theo những chỉ dẫn dưới đây để Chiêu Hồi :

1. Cất giấu vũ khí. 2. Núp trong bụi đến khi cuộc chạm súng bùng nổ; sau khi cuộc đánh nhau chấm dứt, bạn hãy đứng dậy và hô to: Chiêu Hồi – Chiêu Hồi.
3. Nếu bạn không thể nào trốn thoát hàng ngũ Cộng Sản ngay bây giờ, các bạn hãy trốn khi có dịp may. Báo cáo cho bất cứ đồn bót Việt Nam và Đồng Minh hay nhà cầm quyền của Chính Phủ Việt Nam. 4. Các bạn sẽ được đón tiếp nồng hậu và được Chính Phủ VN cử xử tử tế, nên bạn đem vũ khí khi về, các bạn sẽ được thưởng.
5. Hãy nhớ các bạn có thể Chiêu Hồi ở bất cứ giới thân quyền VN, Đồng Minh hay Quân Đội VNCH. Theo những chỉ dẫn trên bạn sẽ có một tương lai bảo đảm cho chính bạn và gia đình. Chiêu Hồi. (11)

Voice Broadcast 17
Theme: Civilian Warning

THEME : Civilian Warning

Attention woodcutters (and fishermen) you are in a restricted area.

Leave this area immediately. ARVN and Allied Forces are conducting operations to rid the VC from this area. Return to your village. Check with your village Chief, he will tell you where you may (fish) or (cut wood). People in this area may be mistaken for VC and shot by the helicopters (or river patrol boats).

(17)

ĐỀ TÀI : Lưu ý đồng bào.

Đồng bào đồn cù và đánh cá chú ý !!

Đồng bào đang ở trong khu vực cấm. Đồng bào nên rời bỏ khu vực này ngay. Quân-Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đang mở những cuộc hành quân tiêu diệt bọn Cộng Sản trong vùng này. Đồng bào hãy trở lại xã ấp và liên lạc với chủ tịch xã hay ấp để biết rõ nơi nào đồng bào có thể đánh cá hay đồn cù. Nếu còn ở khu vực này, đồng bào có thể bị trục thẳng bắn vì lầm tưởng là Việt Cộng.

(17)

Voice Broadcast 18
Theme: Civilian Warning

THEME : Civilian Warning

Attention Citizens.

The VC and NVA are presently being pursued by the tremendous fire power of the GVN and her allies. For the safety of yourselves and your families, the Province Chief ask all citizens to return to their homes and stay there. Do not move until directed to do so by your Province Chief, GVN, or Allied officials. For your own safety, return home immediately.

(18)

ĐỀ TÀI : Lưu ý đồng bào.

Cùng đồng bào thân mến.

Bọn Cộng Sản đang bị hỏa lực vũ bão của Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh bao vây. Vì an ninh cho đồng bào, chánh quyền kêu gọi đồng bào nên trở về nơi đồng bào cư ngụ và đừng di chuyển. Đồng bào chỉ di chuyển cho tới khi có lệnh của Tỉnh trưởng, Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và giới thẩm quyền Đồng Minh đưa ra. Vì an ninh cho đồng bào, đồng bào hãy trở về nhà ngay.

(18)

Voice Broadcast 20
Theme: Population Control

THEME : Population Control

Attention Citizens.

ARVN and Allied Forces are conducting road clearing/mine sweeping actions between your village and (_____). The road will be safe to travel once the operation is complete. Help the GVN help you, report any information you may have concerning VC activity in the area to the ARVN/Allied unit as it passes through your village.

(20)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kiểm soát dân chúng.

Đồng bào chú ý !

Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đang mở những cuộc hành quân gỡ mìn và khai thông đường lộ trong làng xóm của đồng bào. Sự lưu thông và an ninh trong thôn xóm sẽ được tái lập ngay sau khi cuộc hành quân chấm dứt. Vậy đồng bào hãy giúp đỡ chính quyền bằng cách báo tất cả mọi tin tức, hoạt động của bọn Cộng Sản trong vùng cho Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh biết. Báo cáo mọi tin tức hoạt động của Cộng Sản với Quân Đội VNCH và Đồng Minh để tiêu diệt bọn chúng là đồng bào tự bảo vệ tánh mạng và tài sản của mình vậy.

(20)

Voice Broadcast 21

Theme: Post Air Strikes – VC & NVA

THEME : Post Air Strike - VC & NVA

Attention Cadre and Soldiers who are still on the other side;

You have just witnessed an artillery and gunship strike. Look around you. How many of your comrades now lay suffering? Can you stop their bleeding and save their lives? We have medical personnel who can and will aid them if you throw down your arms and surrender now. Give them and yourselves a chance to live.

Surrender now or your loved ones will mourn your death. (21)

ĐỀ TÀI : Sau khi dội bom.

Các bạn cán binh Cộng Sản chú ý !

Chắc các bạn đã biết sức hỏa lực vũ bão của phi pháo. Hãy nhìn quanh biết bao đồng chí các bạn đã phơi thây trên trận địa và biết bao đồng chí khác bị thương. Cấp chỉ huy đối gạt bắt các bạn hy sinh oan uổng cho tham vọng điên cuồng của họ. Các bạn nhìn đồng đội hy sinh thảm thương mà đành chịu chung một số phận như họ sao? Hãy ra hồi chánh với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa hoặc tự để mình bị bắt để được giải thoát và tránh cái chết oan uổng. Các bạn sẽ được tiếp đãi niềm nở và giúp đỡ tận tình. (21)

Voice Broadcast 22

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention Cadre and Soldiers still on the other side;

You are surrounded by ARVN and Allied Forces.

You have seen what our firepower can do. If your commander told you to escape in small groups he is sending you to your death, for there is no road to escape only a road to death. Throw down your weapons and come forward with your hands over your heads. Do not try to escape or there will be more artillery and air strikes.

(22)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Các bạn cán binh còn ở trong hàng ngũ Cộng Sản chú ý !

Các bạn đang bị Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh bao vây. Hẳn các bạn đã biết sức vũ bão của hỏa lực như thế nào ! Nếu cấp chỉ huy bảo các bạn phân tán ra từng toán nhỏ để trốn thoát, điều đó chỉ đưa các bạn đến cái chết. Các bạn không còn đường để lẩn trốn vì Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh đang bao vây và sẵn sàng tiêu diệt các bạn bất cứ lúc nào.

Vậy để tránh cái chết oan uổng, các bạn hãy ra hồi chánh với Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa sẵn sàng giúp các bạn tạo lập một đời mới ấm no và hạnh phúc. Hồi chánh là con đường sống của các bạn vậy.

(22)

Voice Broadcast 23

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention Cadre and Soldiers still on the other side;

Once again you have seen that your cause is lost. Your leaders have deceived you and are willing to sacrifice you needlessly. Don't die here and become just another lost son or husband who died for a cause that is worthless to you. Surrender to the GVN and live in peace.

(23)

ĐỀ TÀI : Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Các cán binh còn ở trong hàng ngũ Cộng Sản chú ý.

Một lần nữa các bạn nhận rõ con đường sai lầm mà các bạn đang đeo đuổi. Cấp chỉ huy đối gạt xô đẩy các bạn vào cuộc chiến vô nghĩa, đấu tranh cho tham vọng điên cuồng của họ để rồi các bạn bị hy sinh oan uổng. Hỡi các bạn cán binh, các bạn hãy ý thức đầu là Chính Nghĩa. Chính sách Chiêu Hồi của Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa mở ra để giúp các bạn có cơ hội lập lại cuộc sống. Hồi chánh cùng Chính Phủ Việt Nam Cộng Hòa hay tự để mình bị bắt. Các bạn sẽ được sống trong ấm no và an toàn.

(23)

Voice Broadcast 24

Theme: Surrender Appeal – VC & NVA

THEME : Surrender Appeal - VC & NVA

Attention Cadre and Soldiers still on the other side;

Using the night as cover your leaders sent you on a foolish mission. They knew the guns of the GVN and its allies never sleep, that darkness could not hide you. Yet they told you to attack. As a result some of your comrades will never see another sunrise, while others of your unit lay suffering. The GVN salutes your courage, but the GVN does not wish more brave men to die. Surrender now. If you are wounded make some noise to attract attention. We have medical personnel waiting to treat your wounds. Surrender now and live in peace. (24)

ĐỀ TÀI: Kêu gọi đầu hàng.

Cùng các cán binh Cộng Sản chú ý!!

Cấp chỉ huy của các bạn biết sức vũ bão hỏa lực của Quân Đội Việt Nam Cộng Hòa và Đồng Minh sẵn sàng tiêu diệt các bạn bất cứ lúc nào, bất kể ngày đêm, nhưng cấp chỉ huy các bạn vẫn ra lệnh buộc các bạn phải tấn công vào đồn vị của Quân Đội V.N.C.H. và Đồng Minh. Nhưng kết quả chỉ đem đến cho các bạn những thảm bại với bao xác đồng chí bị phớt thay trên trần địa và bao đồng chí khác bị thương. Các bạn là những chiến sĩ dũng cảm, Chính Phủ V.N.C.H. mong muốn các bạn quay về với Chính Nghĩa Quốc Gia để cùng toàn dân xây dựng hòa bình cho đất nước hơn là bị hy sinh oan uổng cho tham vọng điên cuồng của cấp chỉ huy. Các bạn hãy ra hồi chánh cùng Chính Phủ hay tự để mình bị bắt, các bạn sẽ được tiếp đãi niềm nở và giúp đỡ tận tình. (24)

Appendix 9

The People Liberation Committee of Chau Duc District, Binh Ba Village

SENTENCE OF NGUYEN VAN KIEN

The People Liberation Committee of Chau Duc District, Binh Ba Village

The Republic Revolutionary Temporary Government of South Vietnam
Sentence of Nguyen Van Kien.

Name	: Nguyen Van Kien
Aka	:
Date of Birth	: 1952
Place of Birth	: Diem Tru Ong, Quan Nam
Residence	: Binh Ba Village, Chau Duc District, Baria Long Khanh Province

For over 17 years, SVN has a total of 6 lackeys working for the Americans, from the time of Diem. Nhu to Thieu, Ky, Khiem. With the US made label of Republic of Vietnam government, these lackeys unhesitatingly exploit our people. They dared to make themselves slaves and received the imperialist Americans in our country to transform our people into their slaves. Since the time of the Geneva agreement, the US imperialists once more invaded our country and with their lackeys have been using a huge amount of bombs and ammunitions, poisonous chemicals, modern weapons and war equipment to beastually (sic) slaughter our people, along with their houses and gardens. However, the Americans have been defeated and must pull their troops out, and carry out the “Vietnamisation program”. Their crimes are higher than mountains and longer than rivers and have been condemned by the Vietnamese people and the people in the world, including the American people. Nguyen Van Kien is one of the lackeys in the countryside. He has worked with the GVN village “mechanism”, which they call “people elected council” and in the Phuong Hoang Intelligence Agency. He is a devil lackey who directly surveys the people in Binh Ba village. He also sends daily reports to Duc Thanh district, and has served the aggressors and the unpatriotic elements.

Guilt: Being the “Chairman of the People Elected Council” and concurrently Phuong Hoang Intelligence Committee.

Section 1: The subject has worked for the puppet government as chairman of the People’s Elected government, earning 5,000\$VN a month, and for the Phuong Hoang Committee.

In 1969 Chairman of the People’s elected council and had been warned by the Revolution. He promised in front of the Revolution that he would quit. But then did not keep his promise and clandestinely worked for the enemy to earn his wage. He did not show any respect to the people and demonstrated a very positive cooperation with the GVN official, especially the police of Duc Thanh village.

His wife and himself took the opportunity of Thi Hoa rallying to the GVN to insult the Revolution and propagandize the Chieu Hoi campaign for the enemy.

Section II: As mentioned above, Nguyen Van Kien was once instructed by the Revolution, but he stubbornly kept serving the enemy as their lackey to fight against the Revolution and the hope of the people.

Section III: (We have taken action) due to the devil actions from the part of Nguyen Van Kien, and based on the policies applied by the Temporary Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the “People’s” Liberation Committee”, which has two main policies:

Clemency: We tolerate those who are on the wrong paths by mistake, or forced by the enemy to be their lackeys, but repent on time in front of the Revolution and abandon the slavery path.

Punishment: We unhesitatingly punish evil and stubborn elements who do not want to quit the slavery path and try to hide the crimes committed by themselves.

Section IV: Carrying out the instructions of the People Liberation Committee of Baria Long Khanh province and of Chau Duc District.

Basing on the crimes committed by Nguyen Van Kien

Basing on the policies of the Revolution and also the wish of the people.

Representing the people of Binh Ba village, the people liberation committee of Binh Ba village decides: Nguyen Van Kien receives the death sentence and must be executed in front of the people to make an example to those who are still working for the enemy against the Revolution and the people.

Appendix 10

Chieu Hoi Returnee Figures

Chieu Hoi Returnee Figures

By Year, Military Region, and Province

CORDS/CHD/SAIGON

02-June-1971

Annual Returnee Figures	Total Number Returnees 1965	Total Number Returnees 1966	Total Number Returnees 1967	Total Number Returnees 1968	Total Number Returnees 1969	Total Number Returnees 1970	Total from 1 Jan to 29 May 1971	Total For six years five months
Military Region 1								
Regional Center	0	0	0	0	0	74	0	74
Danang City	8	106	77	73	269	121	27	681
Quang Nam	369	398	604	366	1724	953	164	4578
Quang Ngai	143	524	747	323	1268	1655	329	4989
Quang Tin	179	404	516	625	2313	1728	350	6115
Quang Tri	141	104	177	415	210	35	27	1109
Thua Thien & Hue	386	198	391	1227	212	55	9	2478
Regional Sub Total	1226	1734	2512	3029	5996	4621	906	20024

Military Region 2								
Regional Center	0	0	0	0	0	77	0	77
Binh Dinh	1089	4649	2546	570	998	658	59	10569
Binh Thuan	204	401	809	114	250	163	124	2065
Cam Ran City	0	1	16	10	6	11	3	47
Dar Lac	323	438	433	273	361	239	262	2329
Khanh Hoa	160	360	295	113	110	33	21	1092
Kontom	78	235	149	249	256	229	58	1254
Lam Dong	31	34	55	52	31	22	7	232

Ninh Thuan	8	18	31	31	52	54	8	202
Phu Bon	30	49	65	49	127	129	99	548
Phu Yen	234	2473	2315	270	434	148	68	5942
Pleiku	133	363	357	127	480	619	168	2247
Quang Duc	12	42	87	11	15	76	104	347
Tuyen Duc & Dalat	6	5	10	47	30	31	5	134
Regional Sub Total	2308	9068	7168	1916	3150	2489	986	27085

Military Region 3								
Regional Center	0	0	0	0	0	91	0	91
Bien Hoa	196	221	396	159	392	376	77	1817
Binh Duong	* 446	445	1130	318	968	346	74	3281
Binh Long	98	121	100	220	391	251	22	1203
Binh Tuy	289	220	199	45	111	227	26	1117
Gia Dinh	196	305	1145	540	512	209	46	2953
Hau Nghia	164	447	1142	256	1831	1330	179	5349
Lang An	508	566	1681	449	2429	935	71	6639
Long Khanh	46	81	84	49	145	201	36	642
Phuoc Long	140	130	164	189	296	389	110	1418
Phuoc Tuy	77	278	317	45	121	196	28	1062
Saigon	63	120	675	144	137	96	29	1264
Tay Ninh	473	626	694	203	632	1220	128	3976
Vung Tau	28	153	327	196	122	56	3	885
Regional Sub Total	2278	3713	8054	2813	8087	5923	829	31697

Military Region 4								
Regional Center	0	0	0	0	0	71	0	71
An Giang	76	115	116	381	628	624	240	2180

An Xuyen	131	200	495	596	2919	2653	1130	8124
Bac Lieu	102	271	777	263	2247	1194	421	5275
Ba Xuyen	334	341	668	507	1963	817	347	4977
Chau Doc	1073	276	1229	703	674	328	169	4452
Chuong Thien	144	381	607	394	2638	1720	709	6593
Dinh Tuong	691	664	947	851	2130	904	281	6468
Go Cong	435	514	679	1416	854	161	56	4115
Kien Giang	304	752	817	808	2509	1342	1362	7894
Kien Hoa	346	456	660	716	2087	4036	699	9000
Kien Phong	235	408	428	697	666	686	224	3344
Kien Tuong	88	85	103	76	366	505	61	1284
Phong Dinh	256	563	722	839	2774	2195	558	7907
Sadec			283	520	2597	639	243	4282
Vinh Binh	323	308	332	322	1012	586	235	3118
Vinh Long	328	393	581	1294	3726	1197	215	7734
Regional Sub Total	4866	5727	9444	10383	29790	19658	6950	86818
Grand Total	10678	20242	27178	18141	47023	32691	9671	165624

*

Binh Bong Province 1965 total 446 includes total of 93 for the former province of Phuoc Thanh

1963 total with no province breakdown 11248

1964 total with no province breakdown 5417

Plus Grand Total as of 29 May 1971 165624

182,289

Reference:

1. Australian War Memorial AWM Series 98 file R569/1/185 accessed 21 July 2007
2. United States CORDS complied figures
3. There is an error in Military Region 3 -
The US figures show an additional 446, and could have occurred in counting Binh Duong Province twice.
4. The US quoted figures total indicates 182,735, when it should be 165624

South Vietnamese Figures

1963	11248
1964	5417
1965	11124
1966	20242
1967	27178
1968	18171
1969	47023
1970	32661
1971	20357
1972 Estimate	8000

201,421

Reference:

Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Chieu Hoi, *The Policy of Greater Unity of the People: Results of Chieu Hoi Activities*. (Saigon:1971), page 13.

Note:

In addition to these official statistics, many South Vietnamese serving in the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLFSVN) also referred to as Viet Cong returned to their villages without going through the Chieu Hoi amnesty program.