Improving Thinking About Grand Strategy: Devising a Grand Strategy Diagnostic Process for Policymakers

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Improving Thinking About Grand Strategy: Devising a Grand Strategy Diagnostic Process for Policymakers

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Improving Thinking About Grand Strategy

This thesis develops a diagnostic process for policymakers to use when thinking about grand strategy. Drawing upon Alexander George's work about how International Relations (IR) theories could best assist policymakers, the thesis proposes a two-part process that incorporates IR theories into a structured, logical and useful policy analysis framework. There are some daunting practical difficulties in implementing George's proposed approach. This thesis suggests overcoming these by stepping up to a higher level of abstraction to generate three broad types of grand strategy: denial, engagement and reform. This approach makes George's desired policy-relevant knowledge both more feasible to build and more useable by busy policymakers.

The thesis has a four-part structure: a thematic review, a cognitive frame development section, a case study section, and a final evaluation section. A critical review determines that the principal function of grand strategy from a policymaking perspective is to create purposeful change and to build the power needed for implementation. An evaluation concerning 'how policymakers think' suggests that the poliheuristic choice decision-making architecture is the preferred policymaking approach. Using this foundation, a grand strategy typology is developed and offensive realism, new liberalism and agentic constructivism operationalized into three schemas suitable to guide policymaking. The schemas are then assessed through an empirical examination of nine case studies.

George's general appeal to 'bridge the gap' between theory and practice in policymaking is realised through the populating of a poliheuristic choice model with optimized grand strategy schemas. In this way, George's seminal work in the field has been extended through the development of a diagnostic process that can help policymakers' structure their initial thinking about grand strategy alternatives. The case study analysis demonstrates that the process is applicable to real-world examples; reveals the scope of the three grand strategy types, their dynamics and outcomes; has utility for greater and lesser powers, and non-state actors; and meets George's specifications for a diagnostic process. In this, the thesis cautions against formulating grand strategies using historical analogies or some combination of theoretical perspectives devised using analytical eclecticism.

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Thesis Abstract

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

"…there is no escaping the need for an integrating conceptual framework."

Henry Kissinger, 1979 [1]

The Research Task And Why It Is Important

Policymaking concerns purposeful change; it is "is an assertion of …will, an attempt to exercise control, to shape the world."[2] Such an ambitious undertaking however requires the policymakers involved understanding how the world works and how to create the changes sought but such knowledge seems increasingly difficult to obtain. Instead, the contemporary international system with its diverse array of actors of many different scales and capabilities appears bewilderingly complex, beset by contradictions and ultimately unfathomable.

In Syria, the Assad regime is trying to deny rebel groups from gaining control of the country with all parties drawing on military, economic, informational and diplomatic support from external states and non-state groups. In so doing, the conflict is spreading across the Middle East, threatening to create a regional war driven by religious differences. In Afghanistan, the United States and its allies are working to thwart the return of the Taliban, a renewed civil war and the destabilization of nuclear-armed neighbour Pakistan. In East Asia, China is deepening its engagement with Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN nations through closer economic ties and wide-ranging free trade agreements while simultaneously working to deny the sovereignty many of these nations claim over islands in the East and South China Seas. In Europe the E.U. is trying to deny Russia from dominating Eastern European nations while seeking to keep America deeply engaged in European affairs though creating an ambitious Atlantic free trade zone. Concurrently, many European countries are deeply involved in efforts to substantially reform the governance of numerous states across the African continent. The governance of North Korea is also becoming of growing concern with new United Nations investigations highlighting extensive human rights abuses analogous to those of Nazi Germany. Some are calling for the international community to take direct action under the "responsibility to protect" doctrine and finally reform this 'rogue', nuclear

1. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*; Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979, p. 130.
2. Robert E. Goodin et al., 'The Public and Its Policies', in Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 3-38, p. 3.

weapon–armed, totalitarian state.

Such a confusing array of contemporary challenges each with their own intricacies, inconsistencies and complexities is difficult for policymakers both to adequately comprehend and to devise coherent, consistent policy responses to. In many respects the bi-polar international order of the Cold War era was simpler for policymakers to contemplate. Indeed as the conflict ended, International Relations theorist John Mearsheimer warned that policymakers would miss the structure the Cold War had brought to thinking about international affairs.[3] His warning was borne out when post-Cold War grand strategic policymakers found the new challenges:

> difficult to think about in systematic terms, ranging from rogue states to anarchical societies, with warlords and terrorists in-between. Strategists [now] had to make a cake from crumbs - to find some coherent unity in a fragmented, incoherent…world.[4]

The difficulties inherent in modern high-level policymaking were extensively examined theoretically and empirically both during the Cold War and after by Alexander George, a major International Relations thinker.[5] He also saw that policymakers were often presented with a confusing mass of conflicting, contradictory and ambiguous information that made devising sound policies difficult. Even so, George believed there are ways to aid policymakers make sound judgements concerning strategies to address contemporary issues. In this, there are two major, interrelated strands in George's work that are pertinent: his research into policymakers' cognitive processes and his determination of the importance of the diagnostic task to sound

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3. John J. Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', *The Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. 266, No. 2, August 1990, pp. 35-50.
4. Jeremi Suri, 'American Grand Strategy from the Cold War's End to 9/11', *Orbis,* Vol. 53, No. 4, Fall 2009, pp. 611-27, pp. 614-15.
5. George's major works include: Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*; New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*; Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*; Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*; Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Third Edition*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security; Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. Also of note are: Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George, *Political Psychology,* Vol. 15, No. 1, March 1994. Special Issue: Alexander L. George: In Perspective, *Political Psychology,* Vol. 29, No. 4, August 2008.

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policymaking.

Cognition is the process of thought. In 1969 George published a seminal work on the role of beliefs in shaping the thinking of policymakers.[6] George held that an individual's beliefs about how the world works - their operational code - acts as a screen through which information is filtered. An individual's beliefs and attention sets are active agents in determining how information is evaluated. These belief sets may be viewed as "knowledge structures", usefully defined by James Walsh as "a mental template that individuals impose on an informational environment to give it form and meaning."[7] George considered that a policymaker's diagnosis of a complex situation was considerably shaped by how they interpreted the available information.[8] Given this, he considered that a nation's international policies could be seen as being addressed to the "image of the external world" as perceived by the policymaker, not necessarily simply in response to the objectively real world.[9]

George considered that the academic discipline of International Relations could assist policymakers build their image of the external world. George determined that modern policymaking comprised two basic tasks: the diagnosis of the situation and the prescribing of actions to address the situation. International Relations thinking, he strongly advocated, could most effectively assist in the diagnosis task.[10] His notion was to give policymakers a mental template that they could use to structure their thinking when they first diagnosed complex issues and tried to gain an understanding of them. This mental template in being informed by International Relations studies would also help 'bridge the gap' he perceived between policymakers and academia.

George's mental template for the diagnostic process included two principal elements: abstract conceptual models of each potential strategy a policymaker might consider to address a complex situation and the associated generic knowledge of the

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6. Alexander L. George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making', *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 13, No. 2, 1969, pp. 190-222.
7. James P. Walsh, 'Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down Memory Lane', *Organization Science,* Vol. 6, No. 3, May-June 1995, pp. 280-321, p. 281.
8. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, pp. 240-41.
9. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice,* p. 55.
10. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*; Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, p. 17.

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conditions that might favour each strategy succeeding. The crucial element though was the abstract conceptual models that he conceived of in a specific way: such models were only the starting point for constructing a strategy, they only identified the general logic, they were incomplete and they were "not full-fledged deductive models." [11] Indeed, he thought that fully developed deductive models of the various strategies both did not exist and would be particularly difficult to develop. He continued that: "And it is by no means clear that even if a deductive theory could be adequately operationalized it would be able to predict the outcomes of efforts to employ the strategy." [12]

Given George's sharply constrained notion of what he meant by the expression "abstract conceptual models", and that the purpose of them was to provide a mental template to help in the diagnostic task of policymaking, they are conceived in this thesis as performing the function of cognitive frames. Policymakers would use these cognitive frames as a lens through which to consider an issue and gain a policy-relevant understanding of the problem's salient features as George advocated.

Crucially, these cognitive frames would structure the thinking of policymakers in ways that relate to addressing the problem. The determination by policymakers of what is relevant in the large amount of complex information normally present in most situations, how this fits together and what further confirmatory information should be sought is inevitably influenced by the needs of the potential strategies that could be employed to address it. The cognitive frames thus act as screens that filter out extraneous information. For this function though, the design of the frames needs to be determined by their purpose. The frames need to be appropriate to the matters they are meant to assist policymakers with.

George thought academics, should set to work developing such "policy-relevant knowledge" however his approach presents some daunting practical problems. There are many dozens of strategies that potentially could be considered by policymakers including containment, spheres of influence, offshore balancing, coercive diplomacy, compellence, deterrence, liberal internationalism, cooperative security, collective security, appeasement, imperialism, rollback, humanitarian interventions, self-determination, and counterinsurgency.

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11. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 118-119.
12. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 119-120.

Given such a bewildering array, it would be a major task developing cognitive frames that covered all, or even most, policymaking possibilities. Moreover even if undertaken, policymakers would then need to understand the many dozens of frames sufficiently to be able to determine which particular strategies might be useful in the specific circumstances they faced. George's policy-relevant knowledge construct could unintentionally make policymaking more complicated and confusing.

A way around this problem is to step back from George's suggested approach to assisting policymakers. Academics could instead return to focus on developing a universal theory however, the difficulties with this that George noted still seem germane. He thought such theories were too general to assist policymakers and gave little indication of the conditions under which they apply. In this regard, he held that neorealism, the "dominant theory of international relations in American political science", was useful but was insufficient in itself in terms of assisting policymakers make good diagnoses of foreign policy problems.[13] An alternative may be to reverse George's notion of focusing on assisting the diagnosis of a situation and stress instead the other basic policy task, that of prescribing actions. Assisting policymakers through prescription has some strengths but also some real shortcomings. Assisting policymakers in *both* the diagnosis and prescription phases of the policy task seems necessary as is discussed more fully shortly.

A third way of addressing the problem identified is to broadly accept George's suggested approach but, rather than developing policy-relevant knowledge for many separate individual strategies, step up to a higher level of abstraction. In the conventional hierarchy of strategic planning, above the strategy level there is that of grand strategy. In this conception, a grand strategy develops and guides its lower level subordinate strategies.[14] This notion underlies important strategic thinker Colin Gray assertion that "all strategy is grand strategy."[15]

Focusing not on the numerous individual types of strategies at hand but rather on the grand strategy guiding them could both make building George's policy-relevant

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13. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 267.
14. John M. Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*; Dulles: Brasseys Inc, 2002, pp. 3-5.
15. Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 28.

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knowledge more feasible and make such knowledge more useable by busy policymakers. More feasible, in that the academic focus could be on developing policy-relevant knowledge for only one type of strategy rather than many. More useable, in that policymakers need only have readily to mind one cognitive frame and its associated generic knowledge rather than dozens. Importantly, focussing on the grand strategy level in such a way is in harmony with George's thinking. He realised that strategies such as deterrence, coercive diplomat and crisis management were undertaken and subsumed within an overarching grand strategy.[16]

This move considerably simplifies matters but the grand strategy level arguably lacks the fine level of detail found at the level of individual subordinate strategies. Policymakers may still benefit from having a large array of cognitive frames available but given an overarching grand strategy framework would not need to be aware of the intricacies of each individual one. The grand strategy framework could then guide policymakers to examine in more depth only those specific lower-level strategies that they thought appropriate.

This thesis accordingly aims to develop a diagnostic process appropriate for grand strategy policymaking and comprising a cognitive frame and its associated generic knowledge. The overall intent is to assist policymakers in the initial policy analysis phase through introducing policy-relevant International Relations knowledge in a structured, logical and useful manner. The methodology used in this is to develop a grand strategy typology from International Relations theoretical thinking, use this typology to develop a cognitive frame, apply this frame to selected case studies to generate the necessary associated generic knowledge and then assess the cognitive frame and generic knowledge against predetermined criteria. While not before undertaken for grand strategy, this is a similar process to that George used in developing policy-relevant knowledge for a specific type of strategy termed coercive diplomacy.[17] It is also broadly similar to that George and Richard Smoke used when examining the strategy of extended deterrence.[18]

The thesis also draws deeply on analysis techniques that George employed

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16. Levy, 'Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contribution of Alexander George', p. 538. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 321.
17. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*.
18. George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*.

including operationalizing specific abstract theories, developing typologies, making use of structured, focussed historical case study comparisons and employing process tracing in theoretically driven case studies.[19] Moreover, the thesis further incorporates George's concerns over the impact of human cognitive shortcomings on policymaking. In mitigating these, George thought Simon's bounded rationality concept was useful but insufficient.[20] Recent studies confirm this and suggest that the poliheuristic choice decision-making architecture is preferable.

This approach of focusing on grand strategy makes the overall task of building policy-relevant knowledge more manageable albeit adds a certain new complexity. Grand strategy also involves developing the resources and power its subordinate strategies need. George considered the conceptual models of strategies and associated generic knowledge could be developed wholly using International Relations theories. If now stepping higher to apply his ideas to the grand strategy level, other schools and in particular International Political Economy will need consideration.

In this, an important matter is the limited scope of the diagnostic process and its use in the initial analysis phase of policymaking. The diagnostic process is only intended to help policymakers structure their preliminary thinking about grand strategic matters. The process will not in itself make decisions in some manner, merely assist policymakers in the consideration of the various issues involved. To determine the range of options in specific situations and to prescribe policies to address them, policymakers must apply to the diagnostic process both the context of the problem and their judgment. George saw the diagnostic process as:

> an *aid, not a substitute for policy analysis and for judgments that decision makers make when choosing a policy.* Even the best theoretical conceptualization of a problem and the most highly developed generic knowledge of a strategy cannot substitute for competent analysis by governmental specialists who must consider whether some version of a strategy is likely to be viable in the particular situation at hand. …for policymakers to judge what action to take, they must take into account a number of

19. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, 'Deterrence and Foreign Policy', World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1989, pp 170-182, pp. 171, 175. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 67-72, 205-262.
20. George and Smoke, 'Deterrence and Foreign Policy', pp 170-182, pp. 175-176.

> considerations that cannot be anticipated or addressed in generic articulations of strategies.[21]

The principal importance of this thesis rests on the significance of the policymaking it seeks to assist. In some circumstances the penalty for policymaking failure may be very high making any research that even slightly improves the probability of success worthwhile. In such matters, George took a rather pragmatic view of the usefulness of scholarly knowledge. He considered that it could only be expected to make an indirect, limited contribution to policymaking, even if sometimes this might be critical for the development and choice of sound policies.[22]

The secondary importance of this thesis is in further developing George's proposal for a useful way that academic thinking can 'bridge the gap' and assist policymakers. Many policymakers now disregard much of the theoretical work done within international relations, considering it irrelevant, inaccessible and unable to contribute to the 'real' world.[23] Indeed, many international relations scholars concede that this gap between academia and policymakers is steadily widening.[24] Various solutions have been proffered, generally involving structural or educational changes to the academic side of the academic-policymaker divide. [25] In this regard, noted realist theorist Stephen Walt shrewdly remarks that:

> The literature on the gap between theory and practice addresses most of its recommendations toward reforming the academic world, for two obvious

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21. Emphasis in the original. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 276.
22. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 285.
23. Stephen M. Walt, 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations', *Annual Review of Political Science*, No. 8, 2005, pp. 23-48, p. 24.
24. Joseph S. Nye, 'Scholars on the Sidelines', The Washington Post, 13 April 2009 pp. A15. Stephen Walt, 'The Cult of Irrelevance', <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/15/the_cult_of_irrelevance>, accessed 20 May 2010 Michael C. Desch, 'Professor Smith Goes to Washington', *Notre Dame Magazine*, Notre Dame, Spring 2009. http://magazine.nd.edu/news/11174-professor-smith-goes-to-washington/, accessed 4 May 2014. Michael Barnett, 'In Need of Nuance: What the Academy Can Teach', *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp-48-52.
25. Bruce W. Jentleson, 'The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In', *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2002, pp. 169-83. Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, *Beyond the Ivory Tower*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Lawrence Summers, 'Bridging the Divide: When Policy Profits from Research', *Harvard International Review,* Vol. 28, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 62-64. Johan Eriksson and Bengt Sundelius, 'Molding Minds That Form Policy: How to Make Research Useful', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2005, pp. 51-71. Thomas G. Mahnken, 'Bridging the Gap between the Worlds of Ideas and Action', *Orbis,* Vol. 54, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 4-13.

reasons. First, scholars are more likely to read these works. Second, policy makers are unlikely to be swayed by advice to pay greater attention to academic theory.[26]

While perceptive, there may still be merit in not too hastily ruling out exploring the possibilities inherent in changes to the policymaker side of the academic-policymaker split. The diagnosis process developed in this thesis is one such approach that potentially may be able to bring contemporary International Relations thinking directly into policymakers' deliberations in an integrated and structured manner.

Bounding Grand Strategy

The overall aim of developing a cognitive frame and associated generic knowledge as envisaged by George shapes the manner in which the concept of grand strategy is examined, developed and used in this thesis. Accordingly, there is a concentration on the theoretical, generic and policymaking aspects of grand strategy rather than on any particular grand strategy and its implementation in a specific historical circumstance.

The general understanding of grand strategy commonly accepted is an amalgam of a short description by strategic thinker Basil Liddell-Hart in 1929 and some additional thoughts by Edward Meade Earle in 1943 and Paul Kennedy in 1991.[27] In being derived from the experiences of World War One, World War Two and the Cold War, this notion of grand strategy may not necessarily meet the needs of policymaking in today's differently structured international system. Moreover, since Liddell-Hart's time the shortcomings, practical implementation difficulties and problematic implications of policymakers using the grand strategy methodology have progressively become more evident. The idea of grand strategy could therefore be usefully re-examined to determine if it might need revising, deepening or broadening to be made more appropriate to, and useful for, modern policymaking. This task is undertaken in Chapter 2 as part of the literature review. Until then, a working definition is proposed

26. Walt, 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations', p. 41.
27. B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd Revised edn.; New York: Penguin, 1991, pp. 321-22. Edward Mead Earle, 'Introduction', in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*; Princeton Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. vii-xi, p. viii. Paul Kennedy, 'Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition', in Paul Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 1-7, pp. 2-5.

to allow the boundaries of what may initially be considered a somewhat expansive, apparently all-encompassing concept to be set out.

Grand strategy is the art of developing and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the order existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities. Under this definition grand strategy is considered simply as a policymaking methodology potentially suitable for addressing specific problems involving intelligent adaptive others and for which future end states can be defined. If these two criteria are not meet, another policymaking methodology may be more appropriate.

In terms of the contemporary International Relations thinking that George sought to bring into policymaking, grand strategy involves agents acting within and constrained by structure. Grand strategy is, to use Daniel Ritter's striking term, "structurally situated agency."[28] Viewed this way, the introduction's opening quote concerning policymaking being about changing the world appears more rhetorical than literal.

The notion of changing the world in International Relations theory is often associated with examining how major structural changes to the international system are induced. Some have for example studied the change from the heterogeneous medieval international system of independent communities, city-states, urban leagues, monarchies and empires to that of the heterogeneous modern international system of sovereign territorial states.[29] Similar macro changes also feature in Robert Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* where a typology is devised that encompasses fundamental changes in the nature of the actors comprising the international system, the governance of the system and in its interstate processes.[30]

In contrast, grand strategy is concerned with inducing markedly less significant

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28. Daniel Philip Ritter, *PhD Dissertation: Why the Iranian Revolution Was Nonviolent: Internationalized Social Change and the Iron Cage of Liberalism*, The University of Texas at Austin, May 2010, p. 14.
29. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Andrew Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
30. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* pp. 39-44.

changes. Policymakers rather than standing outside the structure and seeking to mould it, reside firmly within the international system and try to devise what they consider realistic grand strategies appropriate to their individual responsibilities and abilities to create change. These responsibilities and abilities vary depending on the particular state, organisation or agency within which the policymaker operates. For practical reasons, most policymakers only devise grand strategies for rather limited purposes.

In the working definition of grand strategy proposed, the purpose is seen as changing the order, the political relationship, existing between two or more entities. The 'or more' qualification seems to suggest that this could include as expansive an example as changing a particular state's relationship with all the other states in the current international system, some 200 or more. Grand strategies however, are rarely so far reaching. Most seek to address a country's relationships with only a small number of states.

America's Cold War containment grand strategy is often seen as the foremost modern exemplar of grand strategies and of their assumed all-encompassing nature, but even it by no means aspired to change the whole international system. The grand strategy gradually grew to involve taking actions across the globe however, it was consistently focussed on a single bi-lateral relationship, that between the U.S. and the USSR. For the U.S., the rest of the world comprised other entities who could help, hinder or distract from its containment grand strategy but were considered unimportant in themselves, being seen instead in terms of the relationship between America and the USSR. This thinking is well illustrated in the candid comments during the Cold War by U.S. National Security Council staff member Marshall Wright.[31] In discussing the Nixon Administration's polices towards Africa and the many third world states that dominated most U.N. forums, Wright advised Henry Kissinger that:

> both in Africa and in the U.N. our policy is essentially defensive. Neither is central in any way to U.S. foreign policy operations or interests. We deal with

31. Such thinking is also evident in a Department of State report written in 1950 by George Keenan, the originator of containment. He observed that: "It is important for us to keep before ourselves and the Latin American peoples at all times the reality…that we are a great power; that we are by and large much less in need of them than they are in need of us; that we are entirely prepared to leave to themselves those who evince no particular desire for the forms of collaboration that we have to offer; …and that we are more concerned to be respected than to be liked or understood." Quoted in Gabriel Marcella, *American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment*; Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007, pp. 2-3.

> them because they are there, not because we hope to get great things out of our participation. We aim at minimizing the attention and resources which must be addressed to them. What we really want from both is no trouble. Our policy is therefore directed at damage limiting, rather than at accomplishing anything in particular.[32]

If grand strategies are mostly constrain in scope, they are also not necessarily only for great powers such as the U.S. Instead, and as further examined in the next chapter, with grand strategy being at its core a problem solving methodology the technique may be employed by states, organisations and agencies of varying types and sizes. The working definition does not in itself prescribe who can use grand strategies. Importantly though, the abilities to practically implement grand strategies varies considerably between entities effectively constraining the aspirations of most.

Extending this, and noting that most entities have limited resources that may have the greatest impact if focused on achieving specific outcomes, some suggest that grand strategy is a methodology particularly suited for those with constrained or declining resources.[33] Beyond great powers or even states, grand strategies are seen as used by non-state actors including insurgencies[34], terrorist groups[35] and commercial companies.[36]

The functionally focused nature of the working definition of grand strategy has a further significant implication. Using this as a basis means that grand strategy is not considered 'grand' because of meeting some arbitrary gauge of scale whether in terms of magnitude, time period or size of entity using it. Grand strategy is instead a particular type of methodology unrelated to a quantitative measure.

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32 Marshall Wright, 'Memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 10 1970 ', in Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler (eds.), *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976: Volume I; Washington: Department of State, 2003, p. 163.
33. Hew Strachan, 'Strategy and Contingency', *International Affairs,* Vol. 87, No. 6, November 2011, pp. 1281-96, pp. 1283-84.
34. Matthew Connelly, 'Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of the Algerian War of Independence', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 33, 2001, pp. 221-45.
35. Mary Habeck, 'Attacking America: Al-Qaida's Grand Strategy in Its War with the World', *Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs*; Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3 October 2013.
36. Michael J. Ward et al., *Driving Your Company's Value: Strategic Benchmarking for Value*; Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004, pp. 122-27.

Current Assistance To Policymakers Thinking About Grand Strategies

The proposed definition of grand strategy further assists in determining whom the policymakers are that this thesis seeks to assist. Grand strategy involves '*developing* and *applying* diverse forms of power' but it is only at a particular level of a government or organisation that both these aspects can be understood, integrated and directed as a whole. As John Gaddis observes, formulating grand strategy "requires the ability to see how all of the parts of a problem relate to one another, and therefore to the whole thing" and this is only possible at the highest levels of a government or organization. [37]

In this regard, in contemporary states, organisations or agencies, policies are rarely determined solely by an individual but rather by groups operating within a bureaucratic structure.[38] The term 'policymaker', while commonly used almost as a form of shorthand across the International Relations discipline, obscures the reality that policy is generally devised by policy staffs composed of numerous individuals each with different expertise and as discussed earlier, distinct mental templates. Decision-makers may approve policy but this is usually on the basis of the problem analysis and solution recommendations made by such policy staffs. In an example of this, a recent survey of Australian foreign policy making found that while policy staff members agreed that senior Cabinet Ministers made the final policy decisions, about 85% of the some 240 members responding considered they were influential in shaping the policies that Ministers approved.[39]

The majority of works seeking to assist such policy staffs formulating grand strategies fall into the second category of policy analysis that George discerned: the task of prescribing solutions to a problem situation.[40] As earlier noted, George favoured diagnosis declaring in an influential work that:

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37. Gaddis, 'What Is Grand Strategy? Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture ', p. 9.
38. Steven B. Redd, 'The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Study', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 3, June 2002, p. 343.
39. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 268.
40. There is a third broad type, that concerned with the structures and organisational processes involved in devising grand strategies. While popular in the 1970s, there has been little work undertaken in this area recently with a notable exception being: Daniel W. Drezner (ed.), *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy*; Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009.

> theory and generic knowledge may most feasibly and usefully contribute to the *diagnosis* of the specific situations with which policy-makers must deal, rather than to *prescriptions* for action. My assumption is that correct diagnosis of a policy problem should precede and - as in much of medical practice - is usually a prerequisite for making the best choice from among policy options. The analogy with the medical profession is an apt one, since the policymaker, too, acts as a clinician in striving to make a correct diagnosis of a problem before determining how best to prescribe for it.[41]

George's advice can be usefully contrasted against recent grand strategy prescriptive advice works. These works generally propose, examine and support only one specific grand strategy option.[42] They propose a particular solution, not a way to understand and apply the information that policymakers possess in a more complete manner.

In such prescriptive approaches there are two specific risks. Firstly, the policymakers may hold important information not available to the author of the proposed grand strategy. Secondly, there are always political aspects that surround such complex issues that scholars could be unaware of or consider differently to the policymakers involved. In either circumstance, the grand strategy solution offered may be disregarded as inappropriate.

Moreover in aiming to convince rather than educate, the proposed solutions are generally derived from a single particular theoretically informed perspective on how the world works and, given this, only the single grand strategy option suggested logically fits. There are multiple examples of this in Michael Brown's *America's Strategic*

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41. Emphasis in the orginal. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 17-18.
42. Examples include: Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. G. John Ikenberry, 'An Agenda for Liberal International Renewal', in Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2008, pp. 43-60. Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Barry R. Posen, 'A Grand Strategy of Restraint', in Michèle A Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*, pp. 81-102.

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Choices, both in the revised and original editions.[43] The policymakers involved in considering grand strategic alternatives however, may not necessarily hold the particular worldview espoused or be convinced that it is the only one to examine the issue against. If the same fundamental intellectual underpinnings are not shared, the solution may again be disregarded.

The prescriptive works being based on a specific worldview do though generally clearly specify the particular international circumstances that the suggested grand strategy is fit for. The difficulty is that the policymaker may not be assisted in their thinking when encountering other situations, as the specific worldview used originally may be inappropriate for these other cases. This may especially be the case when the worldviews offered are idiosyncratic in merging theoretical perspectives in an eclectic manner. Posen's 'A Grand Strategy of Restraint' proposal in *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy* is an example of this. The proposal while built around state-centric realism carefully integrates identity politics that in being 'first image' would not normally be considered.[44] Posen's proposal arguably fits only the unique worldview he has devised. There is a further, related issue in that being built on specific worldviews, merging different grand strategy solutions that have been proposed may be problematic as the various multiple worldviews may be incompatible and conflict.[45]

There are also some secondary shortcomings related to the concept of grand strategy. In general the prescriptive works consider only how the grand strategy proposed will induce change; the development of the resources and the power needed to implement the grand strategy is generally assumed. Examples of this are found in two similar articles, the first by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross and the second by Pascal Vennesson that respectively assess competing grand strategy options for the U.S. and the E.U.[46] Across the eight alternatives examined there is no discussion of developing

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43. Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), *America's Strategic Choices: Revised Edition*; Cambridge: The MIT Press; 2000. And Michael E. Brown et al. (eds.), *America's Strategic Choices*; Cambridge: The MIT Press; 1997.
44. Posen, in Flournoy and Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*, pp. 81-102, pp. 84-86.
45. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, 'Competing Visions of U.S. Grand Strategy', *International Security,* Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 3-51, pp. 50-51.
46. Ibid. And Pascal Vennesson, 'Competing Visions for the European Union Grand Strategy ', *European Foreign Affairs Review,* Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010, pp. 57-75. In a further example, in two prescriptive papers that offer nine options there is also little on developing the means: see Michèle Flournoy and Shawn

the resources or power necessary. This approach aids conciseness but especially in a time of economic and financial austerity can be seen as limiting.

More abstractly some of the prescriptive advice works could be considered as only indirectly linked to the notion of strategy. Some develop their grand strategy proposals from an examination of national interests and potential threats that are then combined and expressed quite broadly, such as 'protecting the nation from attack'. This approach though seems more closely related to risk management then grand strategy. Risk management focuses on being well prepared so as to limit the losses a risk may cause if it eventuates, whereas grand strategy works assiduously towards realizing a desired specified end-state.[47] The particular prescriptive advice works that use a risk management construct may be useful for policymakers but may not be proposing grand strategies in the full meaning of the term.

Robert Art's *A Grand Strategy for America* is an example.[48] Art determines America has five significant national interests and these then drive him recommending selective engagement as the optimum grand strategy. Art's proposal does not suggest striving to build a specific international order but rather deeply considers being prepared to respond to unfavourable events and how to limit any negative impacts.

The grand strategy prescriptive advice works have a range of shortcomings but also some strengths in particular offering busy, time-constrained policymakers a readily understood, pre-processed, context-specific solution with a thought-provoking and evocative 'bumper sticker' title. George's approach of applying policy-relevant knowledge to diagnosing grand strategic problems takes a distinctly different tack but similarly has strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths include comprehensiveness, utility across many circumstances and the clear evaluation of alternatives but it has weaknesses in being more complex, time-consuming to use and requiring careful judgements to be made. Moreover, while George usefully divided the policy analysis into two distinct functions, he realised that there is often a certain overlap between the diagnostic and prescriptive tasks.

Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*. And Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration*; Washington: Center for a New American Security; May 2012b.

47. Peter Layton, 'An Australian National Security Strategy: Competing Conceptual Approaches', *Security Challenges,* Vol. 8, No. 8, Spring 2012, pp. 103-20, pp. 105-10.

48. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America,* pp. 45-81, 121-71.

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For policymakers, using both approaches could potentially bring positive benefits. If there was a grand strategy diagnostic process in the manner as George recommended, this could usefully complement the prescriptive advice approach many current works take.

BUILDING A GRAND STRATEGY DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS

The aim of this thesis is to develop a diagnostic process potentially useful for grand strategy policymaking and that comprises a cognitive frame and the associated generic knowledge. The overall intent is to assist policymakers in the initial policy analysis phase through bringing in International Relations knowledge in a structured, logical and useful manner.

Following George, the overall role of the cognitive frame is to identify the critical variables of a strategy and its general logic for policymakers. In this, the cognitive frame is not itself a strategy but simply the starting point for constructing one. Its usefulness for policy-making is limited to providing an understanding of the general requirements for designing and implementing a strategy. The cognitive frame then "identifies only the general logic - that is, the desired impact on the adversary's calculations and behaviour - that is needed for the strategy to be successful.[49] These functions are supported by that of the associated generic knowledge; this identifies the circumstances and conditions that favour a strategy being successful or lead to its failure.[50] Such generic knowledge helps policymakers in that:

> The favouring conditions for a strategy constitute in effect a checklist that policy analysts can use in diagnosing a problematic situation; the analyst can examine whether the favouring conditions associated with the strategy…are present in the case at hand.[51]

Importantly, George thought both types of policy-relevant knowledge should incorporate the "manipulable variables over which policymakers have some leverage" and can use to achieve the specific changes they seek.[52] Policymakers are primarily

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49. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, p. 118.
50. Alexander L. George, 'The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap', *Political Psychology,* Vol. 15, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 143-72, p. 161.
51. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, p. 125.
52. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 279.

concerned with creating change, making including how to induce change crucial.

George's counsel is a carefully circumscribed, unambitious way to use international relations theories in policymaking. The policy-relevant knowledge he sought is only meant to aid policymakers diagnose a problem at the very initial stages of policy formulation. Such knowledge does not replace, or suffice for, the deep context-specific information provided by intelligence, academic, or journalistic sources.[53] Neither does such types of policy-relevant knowledge replace the need for decision-makers to make judgments that take into account the broader political aspects that surround complex issues and the various trade-offs that may be necessary across other policy areas.[54]

George at times also included a third type of policy-relevant knowledge: actor-specific behavioural models of adversaries. He considered these context-specific and to be provided by area specialists rather than by drawing upon International Relations theories.[55] Given such models then vary with each adversary and each situation, this kind of knowledge is considered outside the scope of this thesis with its focus on generic matters not particular grand strategies. Actor-specific behavioural models of adversaries are accordingly not examined.

As the thesis draws so deeply on the work of Alexander George, an obvious question is why didn't George develop a diagnostic process for grand strategy? While such counterfactual questions are ultimately unknowable, George in the majority of his work focused on high-level decision-making and the processes and techniques that could be employed to improve it. In the small number of his works particularly related to strategy he mainly concentrated on matters appropriate to specific American Cold War and immediate post-Cold War concerns including deterrence, coercive diplomacy and crisis management.[56] Indeed for much of George's professional career, the matter of U.S. grand strategy seemed decided in favour of containment with the main issues being around the subordinate implementation strategies. New grand strategies were not

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53. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, p. 132.
54. Ibid., pp. 19-28. Alexander L. George, *On Foreign Policy: Unfinished Business*; Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006, pp. 63-77.
55. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 125-31.
56. George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Third Edition*.

considered as pressing an issue as other matters in the context of his time.

George did though develop a diagnostic process for a specific strategy in the manner as he recommended in a short handbook intended principally for policymakers.[57] This book addressed the coercive diplomacy type of strategy and showed the value in the approach he proposed but also suggested the practical difficulties. The diagnostic process involved a cognitive frame that featured eight contextual variables with associated generic knowledge encompassing seven favouring conditions. Such numbers though might be too many for policymakers to easily make use of in many situations.

In the development of the grand strategy diagnosis process it is important to bring in the strand of George's work concerned with cognition. George's work and that of his successors in the Foreign Policy Analysis subfield indicates that in order for such a process to be effective it needs to take into account that the thinking of policymakers is impacted by their beliefs and vulnerable to the cognitive biases all have. The cognitive processes of policymakers will influence the use they make - and can make - of the proposed diagnostic process. The cognitive frame in particular, needs to be designed with this aspect in mind. How policymakers think about issues is as important as what they think about.

This position, and the general notion of developing this type of diagnostic process, appears strongly supported in a recent authoritative work by Sir Lawrence Freedman that evaluates the historical development of strategy. Freedman determines that devising good strategy may require developing optimised cognitive scripts that set out how strategies generically function and achieve success.[58] These scripts would incorporate the human cognitive factors that influence the development of new strategies. Freedman now proposes a research project that "will explore the extent to which [a broad range of] strategies can be presented as scripts, rather than as plans, and how this might be a useful device for translating research into policy…." [59] This thesis, while based on George's work, broadly aligns with Freedman's thinking and in his terminology is simply developing a grand strategy script. The term 'script' is not used

57. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.*
58. Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013a, pp. 618-22.
59. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, 'Research Projects: Strategic Scripts for the 21st Century ', viewed 24 February 2014, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/professors/freedman.aspx.

in this thesis as it has certain cognitive science meanings as is discussed in Chapter 3; 'cognitive frame' is used instead as being more accurate for the purpose envisaged. Importantly however, Freedman's analysis comes from a deep historical perspective whereas George employs International Relations thinking. This noticeable and helpful convergence from the two different disciplines supports the general direction taken in this thesis.[60]

Even so, there are several important cautions to this work. Firstly, the thesis in building from George's seminal research inherently assumes, albeit in common with several other scholars, that the specific type of policy-relevant knowledge that he identifies is broadly useful for policymakers.[61] In this regard, a recent wide-ranging survey of the many different approaches advocated to make research more useful for policymaking does specifically recommend academics focus on addressing the same policy-relevant knowledge areas that George proposed.[62]

Secondly, the thesis draws extensively upon American academic work for reasons discussed in Chapter 4 and critically evaluated in Chapter 9. From a different perspective though, this also impacts the secondary value of the thesis in helping bridge the gap between academia and policymakers as noted earlier. American authors have mainly highlighted this gap and, given this, it may suggest that other nations may not have the same difficulties. A recent work however that also considered European nations indicates that similar issues exist there as well.[63] Furthermore, some have identified such a gap in Australia; Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley write that here:

> the gap between foreign policy academics and practitioners is large. They speak

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60. In a less direct manner, a recent work by political psychology Philip Tetlock also broadly supports this thesis's approach. Tetlock argues that the type of people that make more accurate predictions about the future are Isaiah Berlin's hedgehogs not foxes. The diagnostic process this thesis devises forces policymakers to be hedgehogs in the sense of considering more than just a single theoretical tradition like a fox might. Tetlock's work suggests that the pluralist position the thesis adopts might be the right one. Philip E. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

61. Scholars continuing to see merit and importance in George's research include: Bruce W. Jentleson and Ely Ratner, 'Bridging the Beltway–Ivory Tower Gap', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 13, No. 1, 2011, pp. 6-11, pp. 8-9. Joseph S. Nye, 'Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy', *Political Psychology,* Vol. 29, No. 4, August 2008, pp. 593-603, pp. 593, 96-99. Walt, 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations', pp. 29-31. Jentleson, 'The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In', pp. 181-82.

62. Eriksson and Sundelius, 'Molding Minds That Form Policy: How to Make Research Useful', pp. 99-100.

63. Eriksson and Sundelius, 'Molding Minds That Form Policy: How to Make Research Useful', pp. 51-71.

> different languages. Empirical to their bootstraps, [Australian] foreign policy practitioners tend to regard theory as an artificial template imposed on an uncertain world. For their part, [Australian] international relations theorists consider practitioners dangerously limited by their failure to understand, or to have regard for, the broader patterns shaping international events.[64]

Even so, not all nations may have a gap between International Relations scholars and academia and policymakers as that evident in America. Globally, there are many different political systems making the relations between academic and policy makers quite diverse and their interactions often dissimilar.

Thirdly, the grand strategy diagnostic process being developed and comprising a cognitive frame and associated generic knowledge is not intended to be an explanatory device or theory. In line with George's notions, the diagnostic process is not a fully developed deductive theory that can be used to predict whether a grand strategy would succeed or fail in a particular situation. As he observes, a fully developed deductive theory:

> would be invaluable to policymakers, since it would remove uncertainty and guesswork. However, to have this capability the [cognitive frame] would have to be "operationalized" – that is all its variable-components as well as the interaction amongst them would have to be capable of being specified and measured. …And it is by no means clear that even if a deductive theory could be adequately operationalized it would be able to predict the outcomes of efforts to employ the strategy.[65]

This specific caution has further important implications for how the case studies can be, and are used, to both assess the cognitive frame that has been devised and build the associated generic knowledge. This issue is discussed in more detail shortly.

Fourthly, there is considerably more to grand strategic-level decision-making than just the initial thinking of the policymakers involved, including small group dynamics, organizational process, bureaucratic politics, culture, national identity and domestic politics. While the interplay of these other aspects however have a significant

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64. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p. viii.
65. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 119-120.

bearing upon which ideas are eventually selected for implementation, they do not in themselves originate the preliminary ideas. In the first instance, ideas spring from the cognition of individuals, not from the group and organizational processes that decide which particular ideas live or die. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Constitution observes "wars begin in the minds of men…."[66] Arguably, so does grand strategy.

This dynamic is well illustrated in Graham Allison's seminal work in Foreign Policy Analysis, *Essence of Decision,* on why specific policies were chosen during the 1962 Cuba Missile Crisis.[67] Individuals initially determined a range of potential alternative courses of action. These several options were then debated and analysed in groups of varying sizes with the final decisions taken on which to adopt being influenced, so Allison determined, by numerous interacting organizational processes and the impact of bureaucratic politics.

Much of Foreign Policy Analysis seeks to understand the ongoing decision making process. This thesis is instead concerned with the initial grand strategy formulation phase when individual policymakers think about the possibilities and the range of alternative courses of action, not about the later group evaluation of these and the specific decision-making events. As Allison's book illustrates, many of George's other works explore and Foreign Policy Analysis encompasses, there is much more beyond the preliminary thinking phase before a grand strategy is actually adopted by a state or some other actor. But grand strategies begin somewhere – and that somewhere is in the minds of policymakers.

Fifthly, this thesis builds upon George's work and is accordingly situated in Foreign Policy Analysis. The topic's broad scope however, means extensive use also needs to be made of insights from the subfields of International Security Studies, International Relations theory and International Political Economy. Foreign Policy Analysis has a fundamentally different basis to much of the work done within the International Relations discipline and this dissimilarity is important for this thesis.

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66. 'UNESCO Constitution', 16 Nov 1945, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
67. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*; Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971.

Contemporary International Relations thinking generally minimizes the role of human agency and focuses instead on developing, improving or validating elegant, parsimonious theories with a minimal number of variables.[68] Most theoretical perspectives accordingly give considerably more insight into structure than agency, with Foreign Policy Analysis the major exception.[69] This International Relations sub-field boldly asserts that human policymakers, their behaviours and actions matter.[70] Foreign Policy Analysis however, has a persistent minority status in the International Relations discipline and is not wholly engaged by the other subfields.[71] Foreign Policy Analysis is though valuable to this thesis in offering unique and pertinent insights into the formulation of grand strategies at the individual policymaker level.

Sixth, Foreign Policy Analysis has a weakness from the point of view of this thesis. The subfield tries to understand and predict foreign policy outcomes through a focus on processes.[72] For example, Allison's seminal work noted earlier did not examine in detail the various alternative ways of potentially addressing the Cuban Missile Crisis but rather revealed how human psychology, small group dynamics, governmental processes and bureaucratic politics influenced which alternative option triumphed. Foreign Policy Analysis focuses primarily on understanding and explaining how particular decisions are made with less focus on the content of these decisions. The subfield is therefore central to this thesis concerning how policymakers think but to discuss what they should think about means turning to other International Relations subfields.

The study of grand strategy has traditionally been included within Strategic Studies, an International Relations subfield that developed during the Cold War with a

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68. J. Furman Daniel and Brian Smith, 'Statesmanship and the Problem of Theoretical Generalization', *Polity,* Vol. 42, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 156-84, pp. 167-76.
69. Walter Carlsnaes, 'Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis', in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 85-100, pp. 90-94.
70. Valerie M. Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-First Century', in Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp. 1-20, pp. 3-6. Richard C. Snyder et al., 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics', in Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited),* pp. 21-152, p. 59. Valerie Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations', *Foreign Policy Analysis,* Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-30, p. 21.
71. David Patrick Houghton, 'Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach', *Foreign Policy Analysis,* Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 24-45, pp. 24-26.
72. Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*; Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2007.

particularly realist perspective, an emphasis on rational choice theory, a strong statist and military focus, and a certain narrowness of vision.[73] Post-Cold War, Strategic Studies has evolved into the more broadly based International Security Studies that now includes constructivism, non-state approaches such as human security, critical security studies, and discursive security through the Copenhagen school.[74] In many respects though, the study of grand strategy has yet to incorporate these changes and innovations in theoretical perspectives.

International Relations theory has similarly evolved since the end of the cold war when neo-realism dominated both the field and conceptions of grand strategy.[75] International Relations theory has progressively embraced constructivism, become less dominated by rationalist approaches, become less state-centric, more open to the impact of domestic factors and can now conceive of ideas, norms, values and identities as instruments of inducing change.[76] International Relations theory has become more open to accepting that a diversity of means - not just military power - is needed to purposefully create change in the international system.

Post-Cold War International Political Economy (IPE) developed differently to International Security Studies and International Relations Theory. If the later two became pluralistic, IPE converged on neo-liberalism although with the rise of China there has been a renewed interest in economic nationalism. A grand strategy involves developing the resources and power necessary for its implementation. For considering this aspect from a policymaking perspective IPE is important and becoming more so as deepening globalization and growing interdependence further blurs the earlier sharp division between the international and the domestic.

Lastly, in more broadly considering the use made of International Relations

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73. Craig A. Snyder, 'Contemporary Security and Strategy', in Craig A. Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy,* 2nd edn.; Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, pp. 1-13, pp. 1-7.
74. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 187-225.
75. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, 'Beyond Realism: The Study of Grand Strategy', in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 3-21, p. 6.
76. Steve Smith, 'Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory', in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 1-12, pp. 5-6. Ole Wæver, 'Still a Discipline after All These Debates', in Dunne, Milja and Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, pp. 288-308, pp. 302-05.

thinking in this thesis a significant issue may be revealed. The thesis's overall approach has a strong normative dimension, explicitly in providing problem-solving advice to policymakers but also implicitly in choosing to use only particular international relations perspectives. Given the overall intent is to develop a policy-relevant proposal, this thesis, like most policy studies, is then organized around what 'ought' to be, not what 'is'.[77] The thesis therefore proposes a particular way to address the identified problems but this should not be confused with the manner prescriptive advice works offer their chosen solutions.

The prescriptive advice works generally propose a specific single grand strategy be adopted. In contrast, the thesis develops an approach that policymakers can use as an input to their decision about which grand strategy alternative is preferred. The prescriptive works make the key grand strategy judgements for the policymakers; the diagnostic process conversely leaves the policymakers to make such judgments. Even so, it is expected that as the thesis progressively develops the cognitive frame and generic knowledge that some normative positions will be revealed. These will be discussed in the evaluation in Chapter 9.

Methodology and Case Study Approach

The thesis aims to develop a diagnostic process appropriate for grand strategy policymaking that comprises a cognitive frame and its associated generic knowledge. The key initial work to develop the cognitive frame takes as the starting point, the central issue in grand strategy from a policymaking perspective: the purposeful inducement of change. From this function a typology is developed that relates specific change methods to types of grand strategy. The development path moves from the more general to the specific and in being so derived, the cognitive frame may be best appraised through empirical examination.

Importantly and as earlier stressed, this typology in particular and the diagnostic process overall is not, nor intended to be, a fully-fledged deductive theory. Accordingly, the empirical appraisal is simply intended to illustrate that the cognitive frame can be usefully applied across a variety of cases. While the specific appraisal

77. Michael Moran et al., 'The Public and Its Policies', in Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 3-35, pp. 5-7.

criteria are explained in more depth shortly, using such an approach will help ascertain if the typology that has been derived from the generic change function is pertinent to real-world grand strategy examples.

For the empirical appraisal task there are two main alternatives: quantitative or qualitative analysis. A quantitative analysis has some advantages, in particular in potentially allowing a large number of grand strategy examples to be considered and illuminating matters such as the temporal distribution and frequency of use of the different types of grand strategy. However, this methodology is unsuitable for delving deeply inside the thinking behind a grand strategy to verify if its design logic can be understood in the framework's terms. As Dan Reiter notes, the limitation of most "quantitative work is that it demonstrates by correlation, leaving the black box of decision largely unexplored."[78] Moreover, given the conceptual complexity of international politics it is also inherently difficult to measure many key grand strategy concepts - such as power - making undertaking quantitative analysis problematic.[79]

Conversely qualitative methods and in particular case studies are well suited for studying complex phenomena including policymaking.[80] In particular, case studies are preferred when examining processes and how change comes about.[81] Given that the need is to appraise a diagnosis process that is deeply concerned with how to create change, a qualitative analysis approach in which the cognitive frame is applied to case studies is accordingly favoured.

In this, historical case studies are preferred for two main reasons. Firstly, such cases are particularly important in being able to be used to observe the operation and evolution of a grand strategy through time, and to allow the outcomes achieved to be related to the types of grand strategies used. Only historical case studies can offer this temporal perspective and allow the dynamic nature of grand strategy to be appreciated

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78. Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs : Learning, Alliances, and World Wars*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 122. A similar concern was expressed thirty years earlier in Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', *World Politics,* Vol. 18, No. 3, April 1966, pp. 361-77, pp. 366-68.
79. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *Leaving Theory Behind: Why Hypothesis Testing Has Become Bad for IR*, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RW13-001; Cambridge Harvard Kennedy School January 2013, pp. 27-28.
80. Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 'Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield', *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 40, No. 2, February 2007, pp. 170-95, p. 171.
81. John S. Odell, 'Case Study Methods in International Political Economy', *International Studies Perspectives,* Vol. 2, No. 2, May 2001, pp. 161-76, pp. 170-71.

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and discussed. By comparison using a case study that applied the cognitive frame to a current problem could only examine potential grand strategies from the present circumstances and offer a snapshot perspective looking forward into an unknown future. Moreover, the outcomes would be unknown. While the cognitive frame's usefulness in revealing design logic might be illustrated by applying it to a current issue, the dynamic nature of grand strategy would be neglected.

Secondly, and even more importantly, the use of historical case studies allows the development of the generic knowledge needed to complement the cognitive frame and complete the building of the diagnostic process. Examining contemporary problems would not. George thought that:

> abstract theory…can guide policymakers only to a limited extent. What is needed in addition is generic knowledge of how and why variants of [the strategy] do or do not work in practice, what challenges and obstacles the strategy can encounter, under what conditions it is likely to succeed or fail. Therefore, one must study historical experience with [the strategy]…to understand what it is about this phenomenon that the general theory has oversimplified or left out but that the policymaker ignores at his peril.[82]

The case studies therefore have a dual function, cognitive frame appraisal and associated generic knowledge development. Even so, the use of historical case studies in this manner comes with a caution that both reveals their utility for this thesis but also warns against considering thinking about grand strategy in some overly formulaic and minimalist manner. Historian Williamson Murray observes that:

> grand strategy is easier to recognize after the fact, when events have clarified the landscape, uncertainties have disappeared, and only historians remain to pick over the bones. The balancing act that statesmen confront between the means available and the ends desired disappears, and only the results drive the conventional wisdom of historians. What appeared difficult and complex when statesmen were charting an intelligent course in a complex and uncertain environment now appears simple and obvious in the aftermath of events. Herein lies the great danger in historical analysis…grand strategy may appear to be a

82. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War,* p. 15.

> simple matter, but given the enormous uncertainties within which it must work and the prevailing forces that work on it…is exceedingly difficult.[83]

The choice of the particular historical examples to use as case studies was influenced by two over-arching factors. The first factor was the need to individually examine each generic type of grand strategy that has been determined. These three types of grand strategy (denial, engagement and reform) are each distinctly different in terms of design and logic and therefore requiring individual confirmation through historical case studies. Moreover, the case studies are used to develop the requisite generic knowledge and this varies with, and is directly related to, each type of grand strategy. This further reinforces the need to examine each type of grand strategy separately.

The second factor shaping the case study choice was the requirement to limit the negative impacts arising from the shortcomings inherent in the qualitative case study approach. The principal shortcoming of the case study methodology is that only small numbers of cases can reasonably be examined and this can lead to criticisms of a case selection bias that has artificially skewed the test results. In using case studies there is an in-built tension between "…achieving high internal validity and good historic explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad populations."[84] A diverse array of types of case studies is used to attempt to limit the problems this aspect creates, even if small-n remains an inherent problem of qualitative methods.[85]

The case studies are varied between those involving great powers, lesser powers and non-state actors, and between having a global, regional or individual actor focal point. Within this, the particular historical case studies examined are divided into most-likely and least-likely cases.[86] Most-likely cases encompass state-on-state situations in which grand strategies are traditionally envisaged as being solely employed, whereas least-likely cases involve non-state actors using grand strategies against states or other non-state actors. The case studies can also be compared against each other as they are examined using the same cognitive frame; this cross-case characteristic further

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83. Williamson Murray, 'Thoughts on Grand Strategy', in Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey (eds.), *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 1-33, p. 10.
84. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 22.
85. Odell, 'Case Study Methods in International Political Economy', p. 172.
86. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 121-22.

ameliorates small-n concerns.[87]

Case studies of unsuccessful grand strategies are also discussed, as these provide a subtly different way with which to appraise the cognitive frames while also revealing some further specific issues useful to generic knowledge development. To lessen the impact of the small-n problem, these failure cases are similarly varied across three different types of failures and the three types of grand strategy.

Each case study chapter accordingly examines a most-likely, a least-likely and an unsuccessful case; the specific case studies used are respectively as follows. The denial grand strategy case studies are the U.S. Iraq War grand strategy 1991-1992, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam grand strategy 1990-2002 and the USSR's Détente grand strategy 1965-1980. The engagement grand strategy case studies are the U.S. grand strategy to revitalize Western Europe 1947-1952, the Iranian-Hezbollah grand strategy 1982-2006 and the British Appeasement grand strategy 1934-1939. The reform grand strategy case studies are the British Malayan Emergency grand strategy 1948-1960, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines grand strategy 1992-1999 and the U.S. Iraq Regime Change grand strategy 2001-2003. The rationale for choosing each specific case study and particular time period is explained in each corresponding chapter.

In general however, the particular time periods in themselves are not a primary determining factor in case study selection. As the main issue is ascertaining if the cognitive frame when applied to a historical grand strategy reveals its design and logic, the historical start and end points of any particular grand strategy are of less import to the appraisal process. As an example, Paul Kennedy argues that appeasement became established as British policy option from 1865 and this continued until 1939 albeit with a break for and during the First World War.[88] The British Appeasement grand strategy used as a case study in this thesis though only looks at the period 1934-1939. While additional reasons for choosing 1934-1939 are explained in Chapter 7, this period is sufficient to achieve the aim of appraising the cognitive frame. This same purpose informs the historical time periods chosen across all the case studies.

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87. Bennett and Elman, 'Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield', pp. 176.
88. Paul Kennedy, Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945: Eight Studies*; Aylesbury: Fontana Paperbacks, 1984, p. 13-39.

The combination of examining different grand strategy types, a variety of most-likely and least-likely examples and the consideration of failure cases is intended to support the inference that the cognitive frame is broadly applicable across a range of circumstances.[89] If so, the cognitive frame should then have transferability in terms of being able to be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings.[90]

The use of historical case studies to appraise the cognitive frame may appear at odds with concerns expressed later in Chapter 3 over the use of historical analogies by policymakers, which has a long record of failure.[91] The intent of the case studies though is to assess the cognitive frame and develop generic knowledge, not to provide policymakers with specific historical examples to use in particular circumstances. Analogical reasoning involves incrementally matching segments of the historical analogy, the base domain, against the new situation, the target domain, until a valid match is considered achieved.[92] This bottom-up approach is quite different to the top-down application of the cognitive frame to historical events for assessment purposes. Historical examples can be useful for illustrative purposes and for providing insights albeit that the use of specific cases to inform policymaking is problematic.

The methodology employed and the qualitative case study approach used aim to develop a diagnostic process for a specific and limited policymaking purpose. The value of the diagnostic process beyond this should not be exaggerated or inferred. In particular, the process may suggest that it can predict with some confidence the outcome of a grand strategy but this is both incorrect and not intended. George's concerns over what he termed "quasi-deductive theories" that make only very general probabilistic predictions are pertinent to this thesis's research design. George wrote that:

> Strictly speaking, a finding that the outcome of cases are consistent with probabilistic predictions is not an adequate basis for assuming a causal relationship exists *unless* other explanations for the outcomes are considered and

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89. Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 'Case Study Methods', *Oxford Handbooks Online (Oxfordhandbooks.Com)*; Oxford: Oxford University Press,, September 2009, pp. 9-10.
90. Vache Gabrielian et al., 'Qualitative Research Methods', in Gerald J. Miller and Kaifeng Yang (eds.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Public Administration, Second Edition*; Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, 2008, pp. 141-68, pp. 159.
91. Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 3-13.
92. Mark T. Keane et al., 'Constraints on Analogical Mapping: A Comparison of Three Models', *Cognitive Science,* Vol. 18, No. 3, 1994, pp. 347-438.

> eliminated. And even when support for some kind of causal relationship can be mustered, one must still establish whether the independent variable is either a necessary or sufficient condition for the outcome in question, and how much it contributes to a full explanation of the outcome.[93]

George considered that partial, incomplete deductive theories in lacking systemic empirical analysis across a large, representative sample of cases inherently could not express outcome probabilities in statistical terms and were accordingly "little more than a statement of likelihood."[94] George though as earlier discussed thought even fully fledged deductive theories, even if they could be developed, would struggle to predict outcomes of the implementation of specific strategies. While the use of the diagnostic process when combined with context and judgement in the manner George advised, may suggest success or failure, this is at best indicative only.

Appraisal Criteria

The cognitive frame developed in Chapters 4 and 5 is used to structure a focused examination of the pertinent grand strategy aspects of each historical case study. These structured examinations are directly related to the purpose of this thesis, developing a diagnostic process. Importantly, the case studies are not intended to be the comprehensive, balanced deep studies of particular historical events, which the building of a fully-fledged deductive theory that sought to predict outcomes might require. Instead the case studies used involve succinct, focussed examinations across a broad range of selected cases. This is a form of the structured, focused comparison case study approach; this:

> is 'structured" in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 'focused' in that it deals only with certain aspects of the…cases being examined.[95]

93. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 202-203.
94. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, p. 109.
95. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 67.

The intent of this structured, focused examination is to determine if the cognitive frame when applied to a variety of diverse historical examples can provide an understanding of the design and logic of the grand strategy used in a manner that is potentially useful to busy, time-constrained policymakers. These examinations of each grand strategy case study are then subjectively appraised against predetermined criteria. The criteria chosen are intended to be germane to the thesis aim of developing a diagnostic process potentially useful in structuring the thinking of the policymaker involved in the initial phases of grand strategy formulation. The appraisal criteria used are as follows.

Firstly, the use of the case studies should show that the three ideal types of grand strategies developed are recognisable in the real world. The cognitive frame that has been devised is an abstraction whose validity can only be confirmed by ascertaining if the design and logic of historical grand strategies can be understood using it.

Secondly, the case studies in applying the cognitive frame to specific historical examples should both develop the necessary generic knowledge and illustrate for policymakers the scope of the different types of grand strategies, their dynamics and outcomes.

Thirdly, the case studies in supplementing the theoretical framework with practical examples should demonstrate how great powers, lesser powers and non-state actors may use grand strategies instrumentally as a way to achieve their objectives.

Fourthly, the case studies should confirm if the diagnostic process developed is as George envisaged. In *Bridging the Gap*, he set out several requirements; these have been slightly modified here to cover grand strategy. The diagnostic process, comprising both the cognitive frame and the associated generic knowledge, should:[96]

a. provide a basic framework for understanding the nature and general requirements for designing a successful grand strategy;

b. identify the critical variable-components of the grand strategy;

c. identify the general logic associated with successful employment of the grand

96. This listing is complied from George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 117-25 and 37-43.

strategy;

d. include variables over which policymakers have some leverage;

e. be plausible;

f. should identify the circumstances and conditions that favour a grand strategy being successful and those that may lead to its failure;

g. be in the form of conditional generalizations; and

h. identify any cases of equifinality where the same outcome may be reached by several different ways.

The nominated criteria directly relate to the aim and intent of this thesis and are reasonably comprehensive. Even so, there are shortcomings in the case study method and in particular that the limited number of cases examined may artificially skew the results. Given this, the appraisal undertaken in Chapter 9 is inherently unable to provide a definitive or exhaustive validation but has rather more modest objectives.

If across the nine studies most of the criteria are met, it may be inferred that a diagnostic process has been devised that is potentially useful for assisting grand strategy policymaking in the manner George broadly recommended. In so doing, the cognitive frame and the generic knowledge would then seem to be a suitable complement to the prescriptive grand strategy work approach and the aim and intent of the thesis would accordingly appear achieved.

Structure

The thesis uses a four-part structure: a thematic review (Chapter 2 and 3), a cognitive frame development section (Chapter 4 and 5), a case study section (Chapter 6,7 and 8), and a final evaluation section (Chapter 9 and 10).

Chapter 2 examines the literature on grand strategy within the International Relations field and in pertinent historical studies to determine a rigorous and robust definitional foundation upon which to construct a cognitive frame. The basis used means that grand strategy is not ‘grand’ because of some difference in scale whether in

size, time period or type of entity using it; grand strategy is instead a particular type of strategy unrelated to a quantitative measure.

Chapter 3 examines the particular insights that Foreign Policy Analysis provides into how policy-makers think and conceive of issues such as grand strategy. The generally preferred policymaking approach is the rational choice model that assumes actors assess all alternatives before choosing the specific course of action with the highest anticipated utility. In reality however, the human mind has only a limited capacity to process complex information and so must use cognitive shortcuts albeit at some cost in effectiveness. The recently developed two-stage poliheuristic choice model usefully integrates both information-processing approaches. The first stage in using decision heuristics relates to the cognitive school of decision making while the second stage in using analytic processing relates to rational choice theory.

In addition to exploiting information processing architectures the mind also uses knowledge structures that match new circumstances against stored, memorized information rather than be considered anew each time. Historical analogies are knowledge structures but while they are powerful, the use of them by policymakers when considering grand strategic issues has led to numerous significant policy failures.[97] The alternative knowledge structures are schemas: general, abstracted representations that impose top-down structure on complex and ambiguous situations. A carefully defined grand strategy schema may be more useful for policymakers than gambling on choosing the correct analogy.

Chapter 3 recommends the proposed cognitive frame use the poliheuristic choice architecture with the first stage being a suitable heuristic based on a high-level characteristic of grand strategy and the second stage involving analytic processing of specially developed grand strategy schemas.

Chapter 4 suggests that in considering inducing change in established relationships with others, there are essentially three ways: try to stop another achieving their desired objective, try to work with another to achieve a jointly desired objective, or try to reform another. These three effect-based courses of action, labelled for ease as

97. Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 3-13.

denial, engagement and reform, may be conceptually linked with realism, liberalism and constructivism.

Chapter 4 argues that the cognitive frame built from the poliheuristic choice structure should comprise a first stage using the three courses of action as heuristics and a second stage consisting of grand strategy schemas derived from realism, liberalism and constructivism. The schemas are operationalizations of certain selected aspects of each theoretical school shaped by the purpose of a grand strategy being inducing change from the present towards a preferred future order. The principal theoretical perspectives used to build the schemas are for denial grand strategies: John Mearsheimer's offensive realism, for engagement grand strategies: Andrew Moravcsik's new liberalism, and for reform grand strategies: Martha Finnemore's and Kathryn Sikkink's agentic constructivism.

Crucially the schemas are developed to be the view of 'how the world works' that policymakers should adopt depending on the logic of the grand strategy being considered. The schemas are thus images to stimulate thinking not theories intended to explain and predict events. The cognitive frame developed in this chapter is designed to assist policymakers make judgments on the design and general operating logics of new grand strategies. Annex A describes the schemas developed in Chapter 4 in more detail.

Chapter 5 develops a cognitive frame for building the material, and non-material resources that a grand strategy needs to be implemented, and then allocating these resources as the grand strategy directs. The initial stage of building the material resources of a grand strategy requires political decisions concerning the distribution of finite resources accessed from the domestic and international environment. Robert Gilpin's economic nationalist-economic liberalist typology from his seminal work on International Political Economy is employed. Under economic nationalism a state actively manages the distribution of resources; economic liberalism by contrast involves using market forces to distribute resources.

The building of the non-material resources of a grand strategy involves constructing legitimacy and soft power. While both social rules, legitimacy concerns foreground judgments made by others about a state's actions and behaviours; by comparison soft power involves influencing others' background perceptions of a state's

international image. No single theoretical perspective adequately encapsulates these ideational constructs and so eclecticism is embraced.

Given sufficient time, states and organizations can actively shape the material and non-material resources they need to have available in the future. Situations can therefore be broadly divided into near-term in the sense that only existing internal dimension resources are available, or longer-term where these resources can be actively generated to meet expected future demands. Chapter 5 argues that time in terms of being near-term or longer-term can be usefully combined with Gilpin's economic nationalist-economic liberalist typology to produce four distinct 'making power' schemas for policymakers to consider when formulating grand strategies. Annex B describes the schemas developed in Chapter 5 in more detail.

Chapter 6, 7 and 8 examine the denial, engagement and reform grand strategy case studies in the manner and for the purpose discussed in the previous section.

Chapter 9 reviews the theoretical aspects and the empirical results to substantiate the overall utility of the suggested grand strategy diagnostic process. While there are strengths, there are conceptual limitations and shortcomings in particular in being only a diagnostic tool intended to assist initial thinking about grand strategic alternatives. The policymaker must still apply context and judgment to the model to determine sensible, practical options.

Chapter 9 assesses that the case studies indicate that the diagnostic process developed is potentially useful for policymakers involved in formulating grand strategies. There is though a significant methodological limitation in that grand strategies have been classified according to a typology, but this is not a typological theory. The typology used differentiates amongst grand strategies based on a single independent variable: the course of action of the grand strategy. A typology, unlike a typological theory, does not link independent and dependent variables in a causal relationship. This methodological shortcoming makes the grand strategy classification scheme both used less reliable and not a fully complete deductive theory.

The thesis develops a cognitive frame that is the "how-the-world works" view that policymakers should use when considering a grand strategic problem. The thesis argues that for ontological reasons the cognitive frame should offer three potential

"how-the-world works" images to the policymaker with them choosing one based upon the context and their judgment. There is however, an appealing alternative position. Instead of using three images, the cognitive frame could use just one. A single perspective might be created: firstly by combining different theories through an analytic eclecticism approach, secondly devising one single all-encompassing international relations theory or lastly accepting one theory as being a hegemonic paradigm. Intuitively, many find this notion of combining theoretical perspectives or merging grand strategy types (effectively the same path) an attractive option when considering real-world problems but this appears unwise as discussed in Chapter 9.

The principal alternative to the pluralist approach appears analytic eclecticism, which combines different theoretical schools in a blend appropriate to the issues being examined. A major concern is though that blending different theories can produce an internally incoherent and logically inconsistent mixture. Avoiding this is difficult when policymakers initially consider new grand strategies for several reasons but mainly because a comprehensive understanding of a problem is needed to ensure a sound blend of theoretical perspectives. At the stage for which the cognitive frame is designed however, matters are generally confusing, intelligence is patchy and all aspects are not yet realized or understood. Applying an eclectic cognitive frame built from incomplete or incorrect information may yield the same disappointing results as choosing an incorrect analogy.

Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of further potential applications of the diagnostic tool, some theoretical implications of the diagnostic process and some areas of possible further research that these implications suggest.

PART ONE: THEMATIC REVIEW

This section reviews the relevant literature to build the knowledge base appropriate to, and necessary for, the development of the grand strategy cognitive frame in Part Two.

Chapter 2 examines the literature concerning grand strategy within both the International Relations field and in historical studies. The chapter determines that grand strategy is the art of developing and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the order existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities. As such grand strategy is a problem solving methodology suitable for addressing problems where two criteria are both met: it involves interacting with intelligent adaptive others and it is possible to define a desired future end state. Importantly, in considering the idea of grand strategy there is little to assist policymakers concerning the ways, the courses of action a grand strategy may employ, or about the specific ends that a grand strategy may seek

Chapter 3 examines the particular insights that Foreign Policy Analysis provides into how policymakers think and conceive of issues such as grand strategy. While the generally preferred policymaking approach is the rational choice model, the human mind has only a limited capacity to process complex information and so must use cognitive shortcuts albeit at some cost in effectiveness. The recently developed two-stage poliheuristic choice architecture usefully integrates both the rational choice and cognitive processing approaches. This chapter recommends the proposed cognitive frame use the poliheuristic choice architecture with the first stage being a suitable heuristic based on a high-level characteristic of grand strategy and the second stage involving analytic processing of specifically developed grand strategy schemas.

CHAPTER 2: THE IDEA OF GRAND STRATEGY

The formal use of the term 'grand strategy' in the modern sense only begins in the early 20th Century although the problem solving methodology was apparently employed centuries before. Amongst many other examples, historical studies have discerned the use of grand strategies by the Romans during 1st-3rd Century AD, the Byzantine Empire across 395-1204, in Phillip II's reign in Spain 1554-1598, in the Russian Empire during 1650-1831 and by the English in the War of the Spanish Succession 1702-1712.[1]

The modern understanding of grand strategy represents an amalgam of ideas that arose from the experiences of World War One, World War Two and the Cold War.[2] In being so shaped by these earlier times of global conflict and warring political ideologies, the idea of grand strategy may not appear germane to the policymaking environment of the early 21st Century. Certainly the international system is now structured very differently with more nation states, a multiplicity of transnational non-state actors, the end of empires, the decline of many authoritarian states and the proliferation of democratic governments. The idea of grand strategy could, it seems, be usefully re-examined to determine if it might need revising, deepening or broadening to be made more appropriate to modern policymaking.

The push for a re-examination gains further impetus given that many recent studies have used the idea of grand strategy without deeply examining it or developing the concept further. Avery Goldstein grumbles that:

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1. Kimberly Kagan, 'Redefining Roman Grand Strategy', *The Journal of Military History,* Vol. 70, No. 2, April 2006, pp. 333-62. Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*; Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. John P. Ledonne, *The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. John B. Hattendorf, *England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy, 1702-1712*; New York: Garland, 1987.
2. The expression was used in the 19th century but this was principally in the sense of military strategy in the Jominian tradition with its emphasis on lines of operation and the taking of territory. Examples include: James H. Ward, *A Manual of Naval Tactics: Together with a Brief Critical Analysis of the Principal Modern Naval Battles*; New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1859, p. 153. George Ward Nichols, *The Story of the Great March: From the Diary of a Staff Officer*; New York: Harper & Brothers 1865, p. 17. W.T.Sherman, 'The Grand Strategy of the War of the Rebellion', *The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine,* Vol. 36, 1888, pp. 597-98. George W. Nichols, 'How Fort Mcallister Was Taken', *Harper's Magazine,* Vol. 37, June-November 1868, pp. 368-70, p. 368.

> Although much has been written about grand strategy, little has dealt with it as a general concept or theorized about its meaning and significance. The literature discussing grand strategy instead is comprised mainly of historical analysis examining the grand strategies that states have adopted in the past, or policy analysis examining the merits of alternative grand strategies that today's states might consider. Typically, authors stipulate a definition of grand strategy (sometimes briefly identifying its advantages and occasionally acknowledging its limitations) and then use it to frame the case they are studying.[3]

The picture is perhaps not as dire as Goldstein paints but his point is well-taken. In most recent studies, the meaning of grand strategy has generally been directly related to the topic and context being analysed. In some respects this could be expected as grand strategy as a methodology has an instrumental purpose. It is not unreasonable then that authors also use the meaning of the term in an instrumental manner and alter it to advance their argument. For policymaking however, there are some difficulties with this.

Varying the meaning of the term depending on the issue being examined can be confusing as policymakers deal with numerous diverse policy issues simultaneously. Moreover, adopting such an idiosyncratic approach to defining grand strategy makes contrasting and comparing grand strategies across several different issues problematic. For policymakers the meaning of term needs to be independent of both the object and the subject of the grand strategy. The context in which the meaning of grand strategy is analysed and evaluated in this chapter is that related to its use by policymakers formulating grand strategies in the contemporary international system.

This chapter accordingly initially undertakes a focused examination of the literature to allow an understanding of the germane aspects of grand strategy to be built up. The meaning of grand strategy developed and its intended use by contemporary policymakers are then closely linked. Others though may use different understandings of the term at different times for their specific purposes. To further assist in clarifying the concept and its relationship to policymaking, the chapter's second section discusses some criticisms and shortcomings of the grand strategy methodology. This discussion

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3. Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security*; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 17-18.

allows a more complete understanding of the complexities of the idea than examining definitional aspects alone.

The chapter concludes with a suggested definition of grand strategy that is appropriate for policymaking. The definition proposed is that: *grand strategy is the art of developing and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the order existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities.* The rationale for the definition is developed across the chapter.

An important implication of this definition is that grand strategy is thus considered a methodology suitable for addressing problems that involve interacting with intelligent adaptive others and it is possible to define a desired future end state. If these two criteria are not meet, another methodology may be more appropriate. A conjecture further suggested by the definition is that given there are different types of order that can exist between entities, there may also be different types of change.

WHAT MAKES STRATEGY GRAND?

As the term suggests, grand strategy is a particular type of strategy, a word whose meaning has evolved across time and through use. In initially discussing grand strategy, 'strategy' is usefully examined separately and then as modified by the adjective 'grand'.

The crucial issue that defines a 'strategy' is that it involves interacting with intelligent and adaptive others, whether friends, neutrals or adversaries. Strategy entails an interdependent relationship where each party continuously modifies their position, intent and actions based on the perceptions and actions of the others participating. Thomas Schelling in a seminal work applying game theory to strategy observed that these interactions "are *essentially bargaining situations*…in which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent …on the choices or decisions the other participant will make."[4] Strategy is fundamentally an interactive social activity.

In operation a strategy constantly evolves in response to the other actors implementing their own countervailing or supportive strategies. Edward Luttwak

4. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*; New York: A Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press 1963, p. 5.

termed this "the paradoxical logic of strategy" where successful actions cannot be repeated as the other party adapts in response to ensure the same outcome cannot be gained in this way again.[5]

A simple model devised by Art Lykke in 1989 is often used to understand the scope of strategy. Lykke deconstructed the art of strategy into ends, ways and means where the 'ends' are the objectives, the 'ways' are the courses of actions and the 'means' are the instruments of national power.[6] The 'means' are used in certain 'ways' to achieve specific 'ends'.

Some extend this model further conceiving of strategy as principally being a balance between ends and means. Christopher Layne for example writes that "grand strategy is simple: it is the process by which a state matches ends to means."[7] Strategy however, being an interactive social activity, is inherently difficult to reduce to some form of equilibrium. Material means and intangible desired political ends are not so easily summed.

Historically, nations with great means have often found it surprisingly difficult to convert these into achieving their desired ends.[8] Given its great means, the U.S. should have readily been able to achieve its objectives in Iraq after the country was occupied in 2003 or indeed in the 1960s in South Vietnam. The outcomes actually achieved though suggest that strategy is more than the simple balancing of ends and means. The ways also need consideration.

Sir Lawrence Freedman has devised a valuable definition of strategy that incorporates this viewpoint. He defines strategy as "about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power." Good strategy then involves an astute course of action, a shrewd 'way', that is

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5. Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*; Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1987, pp. 7-65.
6. Jr. Arthur F. Lykke, *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*; Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1989, pp. 3-9. Harry R. Yarger, 'Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model', in Jr. J. Boone Bartholomees (ed.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*; Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006, pp. 107-114
7. Christopher Layne, 'Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?', *World Policy Journal,* Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 8-28, p. 8.
8. Critics of this power-as-resources model decry it as a 'vehicle fallacy'. David Macdonald, 'The Power of Ideas in International Relations', in Nadine Godehardt and Dirk Nabers (eds.), *Regional Powers and Regional Orders*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp. 33-48, p. 34.

additive to the available power; the impact of the means is magnified. His definition further suggests that a poor strategy detracts from the available means.

Freedman's definition may be expressed in a simplified form as *Ends = Ways + Means* albeit it is essential to recall the inherent impossibility of actually summing unlike objects. Nevertheless such an expression does reveal if a strategy fails it may not be solely due to inadequate means; there could be shortcomings in the ways the means are used as well. If the means are meagre, the ends may still be achievable through using the means in more clever ways without needing to adjust the ends downwards to be brought into some balance. Freedman writes that such:

> underdog strategies, in situations where the starting balance of power would predict defeat, provide the real tests of creativity. Such strategies often look to the possibility of success through the application of a superior intelligence which takes advantage of the boring, ponderous, muscle-bound approach by those who take their superior resources for granted.[9]

The word 'strategy' is ultimately derived from ancient Greek and in originally concerning the art or skills of the general is directly related to the 'ways' in Lykke's model.[10] The addition of the adjective 'grand' to 'strategy' however, does not in some manner amplify the 'ways' used. Instead, adding 'grand' to 'strategy' enlarges the term principally as concerns the ends and the means. In grand strategy the ends sought are beyond the current issue and focus instead on the desired future sought. Concerning the means, grand strategy encompasses both a greater diversity of means and their development. The new term entered use in response to a belief in the early years of the 20th Century that the word 'strategy' was becoming increasingly inadequate.

While the modern usage of 'grand strategy' was implied in the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late 19th Century, the meaning of the term was first made explicit by fellow navalist Sir Julian Stafford Corbett in 1906.[11] In his "Strategical Terms and Definitions Used in Lectures on Naval History" Corbett divided strategy into major or grand strategy dealing with the "whole resources of the nation for war" including

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9. Freedman, *Strategy: A History* p. xii.
10. Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 4.
11. Lukas Milevski, *The Modern Evolution of Grand Strategic Thought*, PhD Thesis submitted at the University of Reading, 2014, pp. 57-93.

military, economic, diplomatic and political matters, and minor strategy focused on operational plans.[12]

Corbett's perceptiveness was not fully appreciated until after the First World War. The war had ushered had ushered in a new style of conflict that was not just between armies but rather between whole nations and which necessitated the mobilization, organization and control of the societies and economies involved. After the conflict it seemed likely that all future such wars would be 'total' and draw on the full potentialities of societies and economies to the point of exhaustion.[13] Given this, earlier conceptions of strategy were now considered seriously out of step with the demands of the times.[14] In 1929 British General Sir Frederick Maurice wrote that strategy needed to be: "defined anew to meet our broadened views of what the conduct of war entails…."[15] Strategy as a term seemed in need of some elaboration in order to give the abstract thinking of policymakers and officials more precision, clarity and sophistication.

In his 1923 book "The Reformation of War", Colonel, later Major General, Fuller introduced three different types of strategy: grand, major and minor. Fuller's grand strategy directed a nation's "military aspects, the moral [sic] of the civil population, the commercial and industrial resources…[and] the element of spirit".[16] This was an expansive vision that extended the notion of strategy well beyond military matters deep into the nation's civilian fabric. Fuller's articulation of "the first duty of a grand strategist" well illustrates this; it was to "appreciate the commercial and financial position of his country; to discover what its resources and liabilities are…"[17]

For Fuller grand strategy was to be undertaken at the highest level of the government and involved coordinating the material and social forces of the Empire in peacetime to be well prepared for any future conflict. In this Fuller drew upon the

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12. Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* Classics of Sea Power Series; Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1911 (reprinted 1988), p. 308.
13. Maurice Pearton, *The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology since 1830*; London: Burnett Books, 1982, pp. 155-76.
14. H. De Watteville, 'The Conduct of Modern War', *The RUSI Journal,* Vol. 75, No. 497, 1930, pp. 70-81, pp. 70-73.
15. Sir Frederick Maurice, *British Strategy: A Study of the Application of the Principles of War*; London Constable and Co, 1929, p. 62.
16. Col. J.F.C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War*; London: Hutchinson and Co, 1923 p. 214.
17. Ibid., p. 218.

seminal thinking of the 19th Century German strategist Carl von Clausewitz who saw war as an instrument of policy; war for Clausewitz had its own grammar "but not its own logic."[18] Fuller agreed, conceiving grand strategy similarly as an instrument of government policy.[19]

Basil Liddell-Hart made Fuller's innovative concept more lucid in his 1929 book "Decisive Wars of History" and in so doing provided what has proved to be the seminal description of contemporary grand strategy:

> the term 'grand strategy' serves to bring out the sense of 'policy in execution.' For the role of 'grand strategy' is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation towards the attainment of the political object…defined by national policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of the nation…. So also with the moral resources, for to foster and fortify the will to win and to endure is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. And it should regulate the distribution of power between the several Services and between the Services and industry. Nor is this all, for fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy. It should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure to weaken the opponent's will. A good cause is a sword as well as a buckler. Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use so as to avoid damage to the future state of peacefulness.[20]

In incorporating Liddell-Hart's definition with the earlier discussion, grand strategy therefore seeks specific ends, employs a diverse set of means, and involves the building of the means it requires to be implemented.

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18. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War: Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 605.
19. Jay Luvaas, 'Clausewitz, Fuller and Liddell Hart', *Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol. 9, No. 2-3, 1986, pp. 197-212, pp. 200-01.
20. B.H. Liddell-Hart, *The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy*; London: G.Bell & Sons, 1929, p. 150. This description would be repeated with some minor word changes in his later, more famous work: Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, pp. 321-22.

The Ends of Grand Strategy

Liddell-Hart's formulation brings out that grand strategy has grand ambitions in endeavouring to purposefully construct a preferred future order beyond the current problems. Grand strategy is about taking a planned series of successive actions to create a preferred future world; it is "a conceptual road map" that leads to a desired destination.[21] Deepening this, Steven Metz neatly brings in grand strategy's interactive nature; for him grand strategy:

> entails order extended in time, space, and milieus. [It] attempts to impose coherence and predictability on an inherently disorderly environment composed of thinking, reacting, competing, and conflicting entities.[22]

A grand strategy accordingly attempts to bring an improvement to the international order existing between the various states involved, even if this improvement is only from the activist state's viewpoint.

International order is a vexed term in International Relations theory and is sometimes conceived rather expansively in the International Relations discipline as was discussed in the Introduction. This thesis though is considering grand strategy and in particular the use of this as a policymaking methodology that may be chosen by policymakers to solve certain problems. Accordingly, the more constrained definition of international order used by John Ikenberry in his recent examination of potential American grand strategies appears apposite.

Ikenberry defines international order as "a political formation in which settled rules and arrangements exist between states to guide their interaction."[23] This definition in being somewhat limited usefully sets the boundaries of international order in terms of what policymakers can practically use grand strategies for. In this construct then, grand strategy's primary purpose is to attempt to change the current 'political formation' into a more desirable one from the implementing state's perspective. Grand strategy is fundamentally about creating change.

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21. Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 11.
22. Steven Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*; Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2008, p. xviii.
23. G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 36.

There are further nuances that may be discerned within Ikenberry's formulation. Ikenberry looks outward from the state as policymakers do. His international orders are 'political formations' that each state creates with others, individually or in some larger grouping. This approach helpfully focuses attention on the importance of defining the object of a grand strategy. The ends of a grand strategy need to be quite clear on who the target is, in terms of sub-state actors, single states, alliance partners, regional groupings or the complete international system.

Ikenberry further considers order as the 'settled rules and arrangements between states.' The use of 'settled' suggests that the rules and arrangements are at least tacitly agreed to between the parties involved and have some degree of durability. This introduces the notion of time, although Ikenberry does not address for what duration such rules and arrangements need to be in place to constitute an international order. Grand strategies are sometimes described as being long-term actions but there is little discussion concerning how long their outcomes should be sustained to be considered successful. This has echoes in the somewhat narrower debate about the decisiveness of battles and war; in such circumstances achieving finality over the longer term is rare.[24]

In considering this, perhaps success in terms of changing an international order to that desired needs to focus on being 'settled' in a qualitative not quantitative sense. If the new order created is both acknowledged by the entities involved and becomes the basis on which their future policymaking is undertaken then the original grand strategy may be considered successful. This measure of success, while usefully generic, has some shortcomings in that new orders thus deemed successful might still be actively revised at some indeterminate future time. This problem seems inherent, as policymaking involves future actions and what these may be is ultimately unknowable.

In summing up, the ends of grand strategy may be considered from a policymaking viewpoint as being to change the present order existing between the object and the subject of the grand strategy. This order is a "a political formation in which settled rules and arrangements exist between [all those involved] to guide their interaction."[25] Success is achieved when the new order created is both acknowledged by

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24. Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 199-204. Russell F. Weigley, *The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*; London: Pimlico, 1991, pp. 537-40.
25. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, p. 36.

all concerned and forms the basis on which their future policymaking is undertaken. In considering this, four specific concerns may arise.

Firstly, the focus on changing the extant international order between various entities may suggest that grand strategy as a methodology is ill-suited for status quo powers.[26] The counter argument is that the status quo does not just happen, rather it must be maintained and sustained. The international system contains some two hundred states and innumerable sub-state groups all jostling for their place in the sun and to advance their objectives. In such a complex and dynamic system, trying to avoid change requires applying power in a measured and focussed way rather than avoiding using power. Grand strategy accordingly has a function for status quo powers that simply want the current order to remain unchanged for as Donald Kagan remarks:

> A persistent and repeated error through the ages has been the failure to understand that preservation of peace requires active effort, planning and the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice....[27]

Secondly, the idea of a grand strategy being directly determined by the future international order sought may seem at odds with ideas of a grand strategy instead being directly determined by what is in the 'national interest.' Anne-Marie Slaughter sees the "initial step in developing any grand strategy is to identify vital national interests that the [grand] strategy must protect and advance."[28] The term, 'national interest' is intended to denote a policy that is beneficial to the nation as a whole not solely to individuals or groups within it, to other countries or to some greater ideological or religious good. The term has however, long been criticized. In 1952 Arnold Wolfers in a seminal article complained that:

> when political formulas such as "national interest"…gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same things to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. …they may be

26. Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, 'Fifty Shades of Purple? A Risk-Sharing Approach to the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review', *International Affairs,* Vol. 89, No. 5, 2013, pp. 1183–202, pp. 1191-92.
27. Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace*; New York: Anchor Books, 1996, p. 567.
28. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration', in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, May 2012, pp. 43-56, p. 46.

> permitting everyone to label whatever policy [they] favour with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.[29]

More recently, Scott Burchill in an extensive theoretical evaluation concluded that the term 'was "largely devoid of substantive meaning and content." [30] Echoing this, in a detailed examination of the grand strategy used by the U.K. to change the international order between it and the states of Western Europe in 1945-1963, Alan Milward found that the concept of national interest was "heuristically useless" to the policymakers of the time.[31] As declarations of 'national interest' included no causal path by which they were realised, he considered such pronouncements as being more akin to expressing a national aspiration.

Such criticisms create doubt that some declared national interest should directly drive grand strategy however the term may still have some limited utility. Declarations of national interests may be used indirectly to inform policy decisions made on the international order objectives set for a grand strategy. In so doing though, national interest declarations are being consigned to have a distinctly secondary role in influencing grand strategy formulation.

Thirdly, in a similar manner to that made for national interests, some hold that perceived threats should directly drive grand strategy. An example is Barry Posen's oft-used description of grand strategy:

> A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best "cause" security for itself. ...A grand strategy must identify likely threats to the state's security and it must devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for those threats. Priorities must be established among both threats and remedies because given an anarchical international environment, the

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29. Arnold Wolfers, '"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 67, No. 4, December 1952, pp. 481-502, p. 481.
30. Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 206. The practical utility of the term for contemporary policymakers is further discussed in: Simon Williams, *The Role of the National Interest in the National Security Debate*, Seaford House Paper; London: Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2012.
31. Alan S. Milward, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963: The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume 1*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, pp. 6-7.

number of possible threats is great, and given the inescapable limits of a national economy, resources are scarce.[32]

Countering this, Timothy Edmunds argues that in the contemporary era the logic of threat has been replaced by the logic of risk, as there are no major threats, only the possibility of some developing.[33] Threats may then be better-handled using risk management approaches that seek to limit the damage that may be inflicted if the feared threat eventuates.[34] More fundamentally, labelling something as a threat, like articulating a national interest, does not in itself explain how that threat will be countered. Defining a threat can provide policy guidance that informs choosing an approach to manage the threat but in itself is simply a declaration. Such a labelling though may be a useful rhetorical device to rouse the populace.

Fourthly, in further discussing the ends of grand strategy there has been some debate about whether grand strategy is only applicable to making war. The initial 20th Century usage of the term arose from the experiences of World War One and thus the grand strategy process may at first seem most appropriate for such circumstances. Liddell-Hart's definition reflected this focus on war but then crucially grew to encompass the peace beyond. A further expansion of the concept's applicability came in the early 1940s when Edward Mead Earle argued for grand strategy's usage to be broadened to include the times of peace before a conflict.[35] In espousing this, historian Paul Kennedy thought Earle had massively extended the realm of inquiry about grand strategy into peacetime national policies.[36] There remains however, a question over whether grand strategy is still concerned only with war as Earle, like Fuller before him, devised his more expansive definition around the idea of the nation being better prepared for armed conflict.

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32. Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 13.
33. Timothy Edmunds, 'British Civil–Military Relations and the Problem of Risk', *International Affairs,* Vol. 88, No. 2, 2012, pp. 265-82, p. 266.
34. Layton, 'An Australian National Security Strategy', pp. 107-109, 111-115.
35. Edward Mead Earle, 'Political and Military Strategy for the United States ', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* Vol. 19, No. 2, January 1941, pp. 2-9, p. 7.
36. Kennedy, in Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 1-7, p. 2.

Indeed, many contemporary neoclassical realists[37] remain strongly attracted to grand strategy staying closely related to military threats and making war.[38] This position though, confuses threats and means with ends; policy ends not armed threats or military means should drive grand strategy. War is an instrument of policy, and as a means may be used by a grand strategy to achieve an objective set by policy, but war is not the totality of grand strategy nor should drive it. If grand strategy serves policy, that policy does not necessarily have to be only concerned with wars, military matters or armed threats. Grand strategy is ends-oriented not threat-centred and is, as grand strategy historian John Gaddis observes, a type of strategy rather than being tied to any particular means:

> grand strategy is …about how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it is one wants to go. Our knowledge of it derives chiefly from the realm of war and statecraft, because the fighting of wars and the management of states have demanded the calculation of relationships between means and ends for a longer stretch of time than any other documented area of collective human activity. But grand strategy need not apply only to war and statecraft: it's potentially applicable to any endeavour in which means must be deployed in the pursuit of important ends.[39]

The Means of Grand Strategy

A grand strategy tries to create a favourable change in the international order existing between the various parties involved using a diverse array of instruments of national power. As Liddell-Hart observed grand strategy directs all the instruments including diplomatic, informational, military and economic, and importantly this is more than simply intra-governmental being whole-of-nation. Colin Gray agrees writing

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37. Neoclassical realists acknowledge the role of agency in shaping how states respond to structural pressures. Domestic and other factors can influence a state's choice of policies although structure is considered ultimately decisive.
38. Examples include: Posen, 'A Grand Strategy of Restraint', in Flournoy and Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, June 2008, pp. 81-102, p. 84. Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy,* p. 10. Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II,* p. 1. Layne, 'Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century?', p. 8. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, p. 13.
39. John Lewis Gaddis, 'What Is Grand Strategy? Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture ', *Conference on American Grand Strategy after War*; Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, Duke University 26 February 2009, p. 7.

that: "Grand strategy refers to the employment of all the assets available…."[40] European and U.S. former-defence chiefs concur, considering that: "A grand strategy comprises the carefully coordinated and fully integrated use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social, moral, spiritual and psychological power available."[41]

Harold Lasswell offers a simpler but still useful listing that is a compromise between identifying and clarifying options without becoming confusing through using a large number of categories.[42] Laswell's listing will be used in this thesis as a matter of convenience as it is comprehensive and concise. There are others that are more verbose but Laswell's list is preferred due to its brevity and, by implication, ease of use by policymakers. Lasswell considered that a:

> fourfold division of policy instruments is particularly convenient when the external relations of a group are being considered: information, diplomacy, economics and military (words, deals, goods and weapons.)[43]

These four separate categories may be briefly expanded upon to allude to their individual breadth and depth albeit that this expansion is indicative not exhaustive and there are always new forms of policy instruments arising. The informational instruments grand strategies can use include strategic communication, public diplomacy, psychological operations and information warfare. The main instruments of diplomacy include negotiated agreements, international organizations, international law and alliances. In considering economics when used as an external instrument of national power, the principal elements include foreign aid, financial regulations, trade policy and sanctions. Military instruments primarily employ the threat of, or the use, of violence. There are however, some activities difficult to easily place into a single category. Civil police provided for a peacekeeping operation may be considered as a military instrument or related to diplomacy but could be essential to a state restoring its economy.

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40. Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy*; Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 82.
41. General (Ret.) Dr. Klaus Naumann et al., *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*; Lunteren, Netherlands: Noaber Foundation, 2007, p. 91.
42. David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 12-14.
43. Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, pp. 204-05.

The classification scheme does not imply any division into ends sought; economic instruments for example can be used for many different purposes not just those associated with economic matters. As an illustration, economic sanctions applied against Iraq in the 1990s were intended to constrain the nation's military potential, aid diplomatic initiatives and reinforce strategic communication, not simply cause economic damage.

Dividing national power into various categories suggests that no single instrument is sufficient, that consideration should be given to all and that the relative effectiveness and efficiency of each should be compared when assessing grand strategic options. In general, grand strategies typically employ an integrated blend of these instruments, with different emphasis placed depending on the policy ends sought. The timing of when these instruments are applied, and for how long, similarly varies. Importantly, the same generic instruments may be used in any type of grand strategy but the way they are used varies depending on the specific grand strategy employed. Different grand strategies seek different effects by using the same instruments in different ways.

Grand strategy however, looks beyond the means being simply diverse and also includes their building and mobilization. Fuller observed that: "While strategy is more particularly concerned with the movement of armed masses, grand strategy…embraces the motive forces which lie behind...."[44] This idea was elaborated upon by Liddell-Hart who saw grand strategy involved in building the material and non-material resources that it needed to be implemented, and then allocating these resources to the particular instruments of national power.

The instruments of national power are constructed from the material resources of manpower, money and materiel, and the non-material resources of legitimacy and soft power, both properly considered as " constitutive of power, [and] not merely a veil."[45] In this, different types of resources exert different forms of power.[46] To develop the necessary resources, the domestic and the international can both be exploited. The

44. Fuller, *The Reformation of War,* p. 219.
45. Christian Reus-Smit, 'International Crises of Legitimacy', *International Politics,* Vol. 44, No. 2-3, 2007, pp. 157-74, p. 161. Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*; New York: PublicAffairs 2011, p. 82.
46. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', *International Organization,* Vol. 59, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 39-75, pp. 57-66.

international system is as much a potential source of grand strategic resources for states and organizations as their parent societies are.

In considering the development of the means for a grand strategy however, the role of the state is somewhat concealed. In this, the interactions between the grand strategy process and the state are complex, important and of concern. Strong states, those with greater institutional capacities and greater control over their societies, have some decided advantages as the following example illustrates.

One of material resources grand strategies extract from their societies is money. There are however, significant extraction differences in terms of tax collection and tax structures between states with strong or weak institutional capacities. For weak states, the proportion of taxes collected in relation to their GDP is around 13-14% compared to some 30% for strong states.[47] For weak states, there are few tax collection options for as Lewis Snider writes:

> weaker states' tax structures are based far more heavily on trade taxes as a percentage of total revenue than domestic taxes on goods and services or direct taxes on income and profits. ….Such revenues are easy to extract...a government does not have to be very effective in establishing its authority throughout the realm…in order to collect them.[48]

By comparison, strong states are able to make greater use of direct taxation and can extract considerably more money with much greater efficiency, flexibility and responsiveness from their domestic societies.[49] The more sophisticated extraction mechanisms of strong states, and their broader revenue bases, allows these states to adjust more rapidly than weak states to changes in the international environment, to be less vulnerable or sensitive to external shocks, to take advantage of opportunities and to respond to threats. Strong states accordingly have a considerably more diverse range of practical grand strategic alternatives available to them than weak states.

In this, the ambitions of the state and its desire for ever-more expansive grand

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47. Lewis W. Snider, 'Identifying the Elements of State Power: "Where Do We Begin"?', *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 3, October 1987, pp. 314-56, p. 325.
48. Ibid., p. 326.
49. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*; Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 87-90.

strategies have often positively interacted. Reflecting Charles Tilly's famous maxim 'that war made the state and the state made war'[50], the evolution of the state has been paralleled in grand strategy. Strong states have made stronger grand strategies and strong grand strategies have made states stronger. This ratcheting up effect has been particularly noticeable since the 16th Century, as states have gradually become the dominant political grouping in the international system. The demands of the absolutist 'total war' grand strategies employed during the two World Wars of the 20th Century continued this; by 1945 the state had gained significantly more control over its society than ever before.

Since the Second World War however the situation has changed somewhat. The development of a global marketplace has potentially allowed states and non-state actors access to the considerable manpower, money and materiel resources external to them. This cuts both ways making states and non-state actors more dependent on outside resources to implement a grand strategy but also allowing them to use the global marketplace to compensate for some shortcomings in the state and its parent society. The external accessing of technology and finance illustrates both aspects.

To support their grand strategies, state and non-state actors of any size, type and sophistication can readily obtain new technology. Previously states needed a certain scale to allow them to develop their own advanced technology, now this is almost immediately available from the global marketplace. Stephen Brooks notes that even in the traditionally state-centric environment of weapons production with globalization:

> the scales have decisively shifted against a strategy of autarkic defence production: no state, including the great powers, can now effectively remain on the cutting edge in military technology if it does not purse significant internationalization in the production of weaponry.[51]

Similar considerations apply to finance; states can potentially access almost inexhaustible funding for their grand strategies from the global market making domestic extraction less important or even necessary. In the 'new wars' within weak and failing states non-state actors have taken this to its extremes; the financing of these conflicts

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50. Ibid., pp. 67-95.
51. Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 6.

flows from the outside inwards rather than the traditional reverse. Mary Kaldor, originator of the term, notes that in those countries beset by intrastate 'new wars':

> there is no [state] production and no taxation. Instead external support to ordinary people, in the form of remittances and humanitarian assistance, is recycled via various forms of asset transfer and black-market trading into military resources. Direct assistance from foreign governments, protection money from the producers of commodities and assistance from the diaspora enhance the capacity of the various fighting units to extract further resources from ordinary people and thus sustain their military efforts.[52]

Globalisation has to some extent adjusted the balance between strong and weak states in their respective abilities to undertake the more expansive grand strategies. This change is even more marked in the case of non-state actors as the 'new wars' example indicates. Non-state actors can now conceivably undertake grand strategies that were previously impractical.

The material means of a grand strategy may attract the most obvious attention however the non-tangible resources of legitimacy and soft power are also of importance. Grand strategies are undertaken within a particular all-enveloping social context. These social structures "can be thought of as constituting a field (or fields) in which the (interdependent) strategies of actors are pursued. This terrain consists of the inter-subjective norms and rules that constitute meaning…. "[53]

A state's grand strategy can be more effectively and efficiently advanced when it is compatible and well matched with the social structure it operates within. Other actors will be innately supportive of the grand strategy because of the power applied to them by the favourable background social structures. Conversely a grand strategy that acts in contradiction to the social structure's norms and rules may experience friction with other actors and encounter difficulties in implementation. A grand strategy in this situation would need to attempt to overcome this structural drag through building and using greater material resources.

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52. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p. 104.
53. Edward Lock, 'Soft Power and Strategy: Developing a 'Strategic' Concept of Power', in Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (eds.), *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 32-50, p. 44.

A grand strategy aims to exploit and if need be build a supportive social structure within which to operate. In social structure terms, the two important social rules for a grand strategy are legitimacy and soft power. Legitimacy concerns foreground judgments made by others about a state's actions and behaviours, whereas soft power involves influencing others' background perceptions of a state's international image. Building legitimacy calls for asserting that the actions of the grand strategy being undertaken meet current best practice, that the group has commendable values and suitable expertise, that the actions are effective and persuasively articulating that implementing this grand strategy is the correct course of action. Building soft power for a grand strategy involves exploiting popular culture, using public diplomacy and place branding and involving groups such as businesses, NGOs and civil society.

Integrating Ends, Ways and Means

The combination of Liddell-Hart's description, Lykke's framework and Freedman's definition illuminates the constitutive elements of grand strategy but in so deconstructing unintentionally conceals a crucial aspect. In reality, the essence of grand strategy is its integrative nature. Grand strategy is concerned with integrating the application of the diverse means with their development and allocation into a coherent, cohesive whole. John Gaddis observes that:

> Grand strategy is an ecological discipline, in that it requires the ability to see how all of the parts of a problem relate to one another, and therefore to the whole thing. It requires specialization to some extent - the mastery of certain parts - but it also demands generalization, for without that skill there can be no sense of how an entire system works, where it's been, and where it's going.[54]

Gaddis makes a key point albeit he has long been attracted to system theorizing.[55] In a conceptual sense, a grand strategy is a system: a set of interdependent elements where change in some elements or their relations produces change across of the system, and the entire system exhibits properties and behaviours different from the constituent parts. In systems, as Robert Jervis observes: "outcomes cannot be understood by adding together the units or their relations, and many of the results of

54 Gaddis, 'What Is Grand Strategy? Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture ', p. 9.
55. An example is John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', *International Security,* Vol. 10, No. 4, Spring 1986, pp. 99-142.

actions are unintended."[56] Being a system, a grand strategy can only be understood in its totality, not as set of disaggregated elements or units.

As a system the various elements of grand strategy interact in complex ways that interweave and overlap, producing results that are sometimes quite different to that anticipated. These interactions are not merely additive involving new developments being added to the existing structure, or interconnecting where a change in one part leads to a corresponding change in another, but rather interdependent where there are reciprocal effects between elements and the system as a whole evolves. This characteristic is evident when considering grand strategies in times of war and cold peace.

Alan Milward determined that not only did the grand strategies of World War Two's major combatants impact their domestic societies but that the grand strategies adopted were also influenced and shaped by their respective domestic foundations.[57] Milward developed a useful concept termed 'strategic synthesis' that involved states purposefully striking a balance between the demands of their chosen grand strategies and the ability of their domestic resource base to meet these demands.[58] In this the development of the means and their application were not simply opposite sides of the same coin but were instead mutually determining elements.[59] The domestic base and a state's application of a grand strategy were interdependent therefore a successful synthesis must: "take into account, military, political, military, social and psychological [factors]. The more factors which are correctly assessed and incorporated into this synthesis the greater the chance of success."[60]

Aaron Friedberg later applied Milward's strategic synthesis to American grand strategy to argue that during the Cold War America progressively developed a suitable grand strategic synthesis, while the Soviet Union did not. The Soviet Union with a strong statist political culture chose a grand strategy that made it into a "garrison state", where primacy was given to military preparation at significant detriment to society and

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56. Robert Jervis, *Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 6.
57. Alan S. Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945*; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
58. Ibid., pp. 19-23.
59. Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 65.
60. Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945*, p. 19.

the ultimate collapse of the USSR.[61] Conversely, the U.S. with an anti-statist ideology was more prudent and struck a better balance between military preparedness, long-term economic growth and societal prosperity. The U.S. became a "contract state", limiting extraction and mobilization to very specific areas of the economy and becoming reliant upon private enterprise for the necessary research, development and manufacture of armaments.[62] The American grand strategy as it evolved progressively imposed less of a burden on its society and this gave the U.S. greater resilience and robustness than the increasingly brittle Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's strategic synthesis was fatally flawed while America better balanced grand strategy demands and power creation and in due course prevailed.

The concept of a grand strategic synthesis cleverly captures the notion of the integration of ends, ways and means in a materiel sense. The Second World War and the Cold War though were contests of ideologies making the integration of material aspects with ideas an important step in the development of coherent grand strategies. As Liddell-Hart's description alluded to, a compelling vision that integrates the ends, ways and means in the minds of people "is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power." [63]

Across the long, difficult, costly Cold War, America continued to implement a grand strategy of containment originally suggested by George Kennan in 1946. Daniel Drezner writes that "containment's [lasting] appeal was that it offered a coherent *vision* for how to deal with the Soviet Union, as well as concrete policy steps that flowed from that vision."[64] Keenan's vision was not just compelling but also durable in remaining potent across decades and numerous changes in government and within the broader society. A compelling vision that plausibly integrates ends, ways and means is now seen as an important element when formulating a grand strategy. The recent American Deputy Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy writing with others about the need for a new American grand strategy observed that:

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61. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State,* pp. 75-80.
62. Ibid., pp. 341-51.
63. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, p. 321.
64. Emphasis added. Daniel W. Drezner, 'The Grandest Strategy of Them All', *The Washington Post,* 17 December 2006, p. B03.

> Even as the specifics of how to best implement a grand strategy may be hotly debated, the broad contours of the vision, if shared, can help set a direction for the country that can be sustained over time and across administrations.[65]

Articulating a vision does not necessarily prevent grand strategy evolving as necessary. Keenan's vision remained powerful and compelling but the actual implementation of the containment grand strategy varied considerably over the time, both in taking advantage of new opportunities and responding to Soviet initiatives.

The appeal of the visionary construct has deepened in recent years with interest in developing a so-called national strategic narrative. This approach seeks to overcome criticisms that grand strategies like the U.S. National Security Strategy are "written by specialists for specialists."[66] National strategic narratives are meant to be grand strategies written in a manner able to be clearly understood by all.

Such narratives tell a story about the proposed grand strategy in a way that frames issues and policies in a consistent conceptual framework. The narrative provides an interpretive structure that people can use to make sense of historical facts, current problems and emerging issues. In this, a strategic narrative is intended to have a strong sense of time and of our deliberate progress through it, while including a consistent logic chain that appeals to both the rational and emotional components of human cognition. Including this emotional 'hook' engages audiences and brings life, meaning and legitimacy to an otherwise abstract logic chain. The visionary nature is thus accentuated in the search for achieving greater coherence of actions and behaviours across the targeted audience.

Crucially the audience is greater than simply that of the group for which the grand strategy is developed. Such visionary grand strategic narratives aim to frame issues and policies not simply for the nation involved but for much broader international audiences including neutrals, undecided groups and those against which the grand

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65. Michèle A. Flournoy et al., 'Making America Grand Again', in Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2008, pp. 123-50, p. 126.
66. Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, *A National Strategic Narrative by Mr.Y*; Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011, p. 2.

strategy is aimed.[67] This is ostensibly to garner the support of these distant audiences but this process also has a darker side in being a discursive device able to shape and control the behaviours of others through their self-regulation by internalizing the narrative.[68]

Making Grand Strategy

From the nature of grand strategy as integrating the development and application of diverse means further aspects emerge in terms of making grand strategy. Some hold that only great powers can make grand strategy.[69] There is however, nothing inherent in grand strategy as a problem solving methodology that policymakers may use that restricts its use only to certain kinds of state. Indeed smaller states with more constrained resources may have a greater need for a grand strategy than great powers.

Others hold only states can make strategy although with states varying so much in scale, capabilities and capacities it may seem unusual to group them all as equals in this field.[70] There seems no compelling logic however, that suggests only states can undertake the functions related to making grand strategy. Instead any organization or agency that can meet the criteria of developing and applying diverse means can choose to make grand strategy. In this, the implementation can be expected to differ greatly from that of most states because of the much more limited power and dissimilar environmental context of many non-state actors. Even so, as Freedman noted earlier "underdog strategies…provide the real tests of creativity" and are admired for it.[71]

Matthew Connelly convincingly writes of the grand strategy employed by the Algerian insurgents in the 1950s that successfully developed, coordinated and employed military, diplomatic, economic and informational instruments to achieve major political

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67. Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics*; London: Hurst, 2012, pp. 179-226.
68. Danica Dupont and Frank Pearce, 'Foucault Contra Foucault: Rereading the 'Governmentality' Papers', *Theoretical Criminology,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 2001, pp. 123-58.
69. Kennedy, in Kennedy (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 1-7, p. 6, Footnote 18.
70. Those who consider only states can make grand strategy include International Relations scholars, strategic studies thinkers, Foreign Policy Analysis academics and historians: Art, *A Grand Strategy for America,* p. 1-2. Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy,* p. 11. Kevin Narizny, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007, p. 9. Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy*, p. 82. Sherle R. Schwenninger, 'Revamping American Grand Strategy', *World Policy Journal,* Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall 2003, pp. 25-44, p. 25. Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II,* p. 1.
71. Freedman, *Strategy: A History* p. xii.

objectives.[72] Mary Habeck does similarly with non-state actor Al Qadea.[73] As could be expected, the concept of grand strategy has also permeated business studies thinking, particularly in the area of corporate-level strategic management of multiple subordinate business firms.[74] The integration of power development with the instruments of power and the careful balancing of resources with goals seems important to all, perhaps even more so for businesses and small organizations with limited resources.

While states and non-state actors may be able to make grand strategy, this leaves undetermined where in a government or organisation is the appropriate place. Edward Luttwak insightfully talks of a grand strategy 'level', as it is only at a particular level of a government or organization that the appropriate knowledge and capacity to determine and direct grand strategy is located.[75] John Gaddis similarly observes that making grand strategy "requires the ability to see how all of the parts of a problem relate to one another, and therefore to the whole thing" and this is only possible at the highest levels of a government or organization. [76] The policy 'ends' that stimulate a grand strategy are determined at the organizational level at which the development and application of power are integrated and directed as a whole.

While policy ends drive a grand strategy, which then guides its subordinate levels, there is more complexity in this than immediately apparent. Greg Foster makes a most useful observation that while policy is normally seen as informing grand strategy, in fact grand strategy provides the grand design into which specific pieces of lower-level policy fit. He writes that grand strategy is "the overall mosaic into which the pieces of specific policy fit. It provides the key ingredients of clarity, coherence, consistency over time." [77] In this conception, grand strategy flows downward through an organization informing new policy development and guiding action.[78] As the grand

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72. Connelly, 'Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization'.
73. Habeck, 'Attacking America'.
74. Examples include: Ward et al., *Driving Your Company's Value: Strategic Benchmarking for Value*; pp. 122-27. Gary R. Heerkens, *The Business-Savvy Project Manager: Indispensable Knowledge and Skills for Success*; New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, pp. 49-53. David H. Fater, *Essentials of Corporate and Capital Formation*; Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010, pp. 271-75. William G. Forgang, *Strategy-Specific Decision Making: A Guide for Executing Competitive Strategy*; Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2004, pp. 132-35.
75. Luttwak, *Strategy,* pp 177-78.
76. Gaddis, 'What Is Grand Strategy? Karl Von Der Heyden Distinguished Lecture ', p. 9.
77. Gregory D. Foster, 'Missing and Wanted', *Strategic Review*, Vol. 13, Fall 1985, pp. 13-15, p. 14.
78. Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 12.

strategic concept cascades downwards through a governmental hierarchy, objectives and goals become progressively more narrowly and more precisely defined as a means to direct and control the subordinate levels.

This idea of a hierarchal structure with policy at the apex informing grand strategy which then guides subordinate levels managing lower-level implementation tasks has been particularly strongly embraced within strategic studies. Across the field there is common use of a downward flowing structure of policy, grand strategy, strategy, operational level and tactics.[79] For example in the 1960s, Andre Beaufré developed a pyramidal structure that had grand strategy, or as he termed it "total strategy", at the apex guiding several subordinate strategies that each allocated tasks and coordinated the activities of a single element of national power, while below this level again was the "operational strategy."[80]

The Life Cycle of a Grand Strategy

There is sometimes a perception that grand strategies are set-and-forget methodologies that once started continue unchanged for an indefinite but protracted period. This is a serious misunderstanding and instead grand strategies remain dynamic throughout their life.

A grand strategy fundamentally involves interacting with intelligent others, all seeking their own objectives. A grand strategy as first conceived will inevitably decline in effectiveness and efficiency over time as others take actions that oppose it, either deliberately or unintentionally. Moreover, the complex environment within which the grand strategy operates remains continually evolving and changing. Accordingly, as Richard Fontaine and Kristin Lord observe: "Grand strategies are not, and should not be, static."[81]

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79. Collins, *Military Strategy,* pp. 3-5.
80. Andre Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 30-32. Andre Beaufre, 'The Dimensions of Strategy', *The Intercollegiate Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2-3, January-March 1968, p. 83.
81. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, 'Debating America's Future', in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, May 2012a, pp. 3-12, p. 6.

The crucial need to continually develop longer-term strategies throughout their lives was grasped by business management planners as the long-post Second World War economic boom was succeeded in the 1970s by a series of rolling financial crises and economic shocks. In this newly complex, volatile and uncertain environment the earlier systemized, formal strategic planning approach proved inadequate. Accordingly, there was a shift from a strategy-as-a-design approach to a strategy-as-an-emergent-process approach.[82] In the later bottom-up approach, new high-level strategies were envisaged arising from those successful initiatives undertaken by middle-level managers more cognizant of market conditions and customer needs than distant strategic planners.

With experience, the deliberate design approach and the emergent approach were combined to try to get the best from both techniques. The deliberate strategy was now intended and designed to learn from the positive and negative results of being implemented. Strategists were enjoined to be "open, flexible and responsive, in other words, willing to learn."[83]

This concept goes some way to addressing difficulties fully comprehending the continually changing relationships between ends, ways and means in a functioning grand strategy. This relationship may only become known progressively as the grand strategy is implemented. If a grand strategy starts to incur costs at variance with the initial thinking and beyond that justified by the ends sought, the grand strategy should be altered. Policymakers should be continually refining the grand strategy through integrating the rational design and emergent processes.

In this perspective the view of grand strategy as a long-term plan changes markedly. Grand strategy is now properly conceived as:

> a process of…developing clear objectives, understanding available resources…and then putting resources against tasks in an iterative fashion,

82. Robert M. Grant, 'Strategic Planning in a Turbulent Environment: Evidence from the Oil Majors', *Strategic Management Journal,* Vol. 24, No. 6, 2003, pp. 491-517.
83. Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, 'Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent', *Strategic Management Journal,* Vol. 6, No. 3, July/September 1985, 257-72, p. 271.

> adjusting objectives, approaches, and resource allocation as appropriate to the changing situation.[84]

Seeing grand strategies as a process suggests that grand strategies have a distinct life cycle: they arise, evolve through learning and then at some point finish. The grand strategy in use would then transition to another grand strategy or some other methodology.

A grand strategy may finish when it reaches its desired objective although an earlier termination may be as likely given a grand strategy is characterised by interaction with intelligent and adaptive others. Minor adjustments may only go so far in addressing steadily changing situations and eventually the extant grand strategy may reach a point at which its utility is less than its costs.[85]

Clausewitz's notion of a culminating point captures this idea. For Clausewitz an offensive strategy continued until it could no longer advance and then the strategy needed to transition to the defensive.[86] Applying this to the mater of grand strategy, at some time in its life cycle a grand strategy will reach a culminating point where it has achieved the greatest effect for the effort expended. Beyond this point greater efforts will yield diminishing effects and bring only marginally greater benefits. The culminating point may then be thought of as a point of diminishing marginal utility. There are two broad alternatives that may be considered when a grand strategy reaches its culminating point. The grand strategy may be terminated, with a careful transition to a replacement new grand strategy or some other methodology. Conversely, the grand strategy may be continued if there are reasonable expectations it will still achieve the desired objectives. The focus may then shift to optimising the grand strategy's effectiveness and efficiency to shift its culminating point further into the future.

Such a perspective though, implies that grand strategies work in sequence, one following another, but not in parallel, that is two or more together seeking the same goal. Inherent in the idea of grand strategy is that there is only one grand strategy

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84. Frederick W. Kagan, 'Grand Strategy for the United States', in Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (eds.), *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, June 2008, pp. 61-80, p. 63.
85. A grand strategy may though also reach such a point of diminishing returns because of poor implementation not just due to the original conception losing effectiveness.
86. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 528.

coordinating a series of subordinate strategies. More than one grand strategy trying to seek the same goal could lead to incoherence and confusion.

The concept of grand strategies having a life cycle further suggests they will be progressively implemented across some time period. As such it may be reasonably expected that crises may arise during this period and they should be prepared for. The options available to grand strategy policymakers include exploiting any new opportunities that may have arisen to help advance the grand strategy, ignoring the crisis if it has no particular impacts on the issue at hand or ending the extant grand strategy if the situation has now significantly changed. In planning to meet a crisis outside of the grand strategy framework methodology, the alternative methodologies of risk management or opportunism both discussed shortly may be chosen.

In discussing the issue of the life cycle of a grand strategy, the question as to how long is this life cycle may arise. In terms of some precise temporal measurement – a month, six months, a decade – no definition of grand strategy has so far provided advice. This may be because defining a specific time period would immediately raise the question of what if the grand strategy being considered is a fraction shorter or longer, is it not then a grand strategy? Instead definitions of grand strategy, in common with those discussed in this chapter and adopted by this thesis, have classified grand strategy on the functions it performs.

The functionally focused nature of the working definition of grand strategy has some implications. Using functionality as the definitional basis means that grand strategies are not 'grand' because of some measureable dimensional characteristic whether in terms of magnitude, time period or size of entity using it. Grand strategy is instead a particular type of methodology unrelated to a quantitative measure. A grand strategy may have a life cycle and operate across time but this time is not defined in terms of numbers of days, weeks, months or years.

Multiple Grand Strategies

For policymakers, an attraction in using the grand strategy methodology may be that it can bring a useful coherence in the use of the diverse instruments of power. With a grand strategy, these may be focused on a particular objective rather than them unintentionally working at cross-purposes to each other. Hal Brands though observes

that this can be a "double-edged sword. The fact that grand strategy provides a focus is usually a good thing, but the flip side of the focus can be distortion or myopia."[87] There may be too much attention on a single issue leaving others unaddressed or overlooked.

In the contemporary international system there are many different problems, concerns and issues that trouble policymakers. Some argue that it is unlikely one approach, one grand strategy, can satisfactorily address them all, or even manage the most important.[88] Countering this however, states may have the capacity to undertake many tasks simultaneously, suggesting more than simply a single grand strategy may be able to be undertaken when managing the complexities evident in the modern international system. The implication is that a state may implement several grand strategies simultaneously, each with different objectives and addressing different matters.

As was discussed earlier, the primary function of a grand strategy is changing the order existing between two or more entities. The object of a grand strategy can therefore vary from only another single entity to the entire international system. A state may then have a grand strategy to try to shape the wider international system to its advantage, and several more grand strategies specifically focused on particular states or regions deemed important whether based on geographic proximity, alliance relationships, economic importance, threat posed or cultural linkages. In such a case, the overarching grand strategy would inform the objectives set for the nested less-expansive grand strategies and would not have the same objectives as them. While the nested grand strategies would function simultaneously with the over-arching grand strategy, the objectives of the former would be guided by the latter to avoid incoherency and confusion.

Such a concept is an extension of Ikenberry's classification of grand strategies as milieu or positional. Under this perspective, a milieu grand strategy is focused on

87. Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014, p.192.
88. Stephen Krasner, 'An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy: The Deficiencies of Grand Strategy', *Policy Review*, No. 163, October 2010, p.9. Fareed Zakaria, 'Stop Searching for an Obama Doctrine,' *The Washington Post*, 6 July 2011, p.7.

shaping the general international environment while positional grand strategies aim to address a specific state or group of states.[89]

Crucially, this notion of multiple grand strategies rests on the understanding that a grand strategy is a problem solving methodology. It is not a form of strategy that only applies in a particular environment or context but rather is a device policymakers may choose to use to tackle issues of concern. These issues may be multiple and various, and need addressing using several grand strategies. The Malayan Emergency grand strategy 1948-1960 examined as a case study later is an example of the nesting of a less-expansive grand strategy addressing the problems of a specific colonial state within an broader overarching grand strategy concerned with global order.

This top down approach while having a certain logic and 'tidiness' may not necessarily be found in the somewhat confused and messy arena of time-compressed policymaking. As two other case studies examine, the U.S. grand strategy to revitalize Western Europe 1947-1952 and the U.S. Iraq Regime Change grand strategy 2001-2003, were devised before an overarching 'milieu' type grand strategy was fully set in place. Indeed, the two 'positional' grand strategies appear to have provided insights useful in the development of the overarching grand strategy conceptually above them. While perhaps ad hoc, this pragmatic approach achieved the desired coherence.

There remains a further twist in the complex matter of making policy. Grand strategy is one methodology but this thesis holds there are others possible as discussed shortly. A state may have not just more than one grand strategy, but could also choose to deal with some remaining unaddressed issues using risk management or opportunistic approaches.

PROBLEMS WITH THE IDEA OF GRAND STRATEGY

If grand strategy is considered an instrument that states, organisations and agencies can use for deliberate purposes the idea also can be reversed to reveal aspects of the entities that use grand strategies. Implicit in the concept is the assumption that grand strategy is an instrument of a strong activist state or organization with a rationalist foundation and an effective and efficient bureaucracy. There are though some troubling

89. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, p. 164, pp. 349-350.

issues buried within this assumption that in being discussed can lead to a more complete understanding of grand strategy.

The archetypal grand strategist of the late 20th Century, Henry Kissinger likened making grand strategy to a journey through space and time with his favourite metaphor being Plato's ship of state.[90] Gerard Toal writes that for Kissinger:

> Nixon is the helmsman of the good ship 'United States' and Kissinger is his principal navigator. Together they, with a small hand-picked crew, navigate the ship of state through dangerous times and stormy seas, all the while striving for balance and equilibrium (against the dangers of wild fluctuations and oscillations). Crises, both domestic and international, are experienced as stormy weather.[91]

This ship-of-state metaphor is useful as a means to further discuss grand strategy as it throws up the anti-democratic connotations of the concept, some notable rationalist shortcomings, and two potential alternatives: opportunism and risk-management.

Grand strategy can be seen as a form of governance in being about the guiding of the whole-of-the-nation towards a particular goal. In this, Plato's ship of state metaphor relates to the best manner to govern, to stay afloat and on course. His ideal was rule by philosopher steersmen; a form of elite technocratic management with considerable expertise, knowledge and foresight that rules for the good not of themselves but of the ship and its sailors, the citizens of the city.[92] Instead, Plato saw his contemporaneous city-states as being ships with an unruly crew commanded by ineffectual and intoxicated captains unfavourably influenced by shrewd, ambitious men who sought power over the ship's wealth and material goods through rhetorical skills that incited and exploited factional conflict.[93]

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90. Plato, *Plato: Republic, Volume II: Books 6-10*, Edited and Translated by Christopher Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, Loeb Classical Library; Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2013, pp. 2-105.
91. Gerard Toal, 'Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series,* Vol. 19, No. 3, 1994, pp. 259-72, p. 265.
92. David Keyt, 'Plato and the Ship of State', in Gerasimos Santas (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic*; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008, pp. 189-213, p. 201.
93. Zena Hitz, 'Degenerate Regimes in Plato's Republic', in *Plato's 'Republic': A Critical Guide* (ed.); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 103-31, p. 107.

Plato's distinction between the two alternatives is considered as representative of his opinions about the shortcomings of democracy compared to the benefits of elite governance. There are dangers in such an approach as Toal further observed about Kissinger's policymaking:

> The metaphor of the ship of state ascribes an absolute power to the President and represents any political challenge to that power as hazardous weather not legitimate dissent (thus the preoccupation with 'damage control'; megalomania and paranoia soon developed in the Nixon White House). [94]

The metaphor can go deeper though than just one administration, being also extended to forms of government. In the first half of the 20th Century the concept of grand strategy became intertwined with notions of total war that required total mobilization of the society regardless of whether these had authoritarian or democratic governments. Totalitarian states, fascist and communist, were seen as well suited to this new era compared to the internally fractious democratic states that struggled throughout the 1920s and then almost collapsed with the economic travails of the Great Depression. The concept of grand strategy steadily became implicitly linked with totalitarianism.

Fuller, as noted an early grand strategic thinker, become attracted to fascism in the 1930s but before this in his 1923 book *The Reformation of War* he wrestled with how counties with a Westminster parliamentary system could undertake grand strategies.[95] He saw a fundamental tension between elected politicians as amateur Government Ministers making high-level grand strategic decisions and the deep knowledge and specialist skills necessary to develop effective grand strategies. His solution was to suggest a retired General – a "generalissimo' - being a Cabinet member, not as an elected representative as conventionally but as an appointed, long-term professional grand strategy adviser and confidant.

This tension between elected representatives and professional officials continues to perplex those who seek to make grand strategy in a Westminster system. In the U.K. a 'community of strategists' has been suggested to better support Cabinet grand

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94. Toal, 'Problematizing Geopolitics', p. 265.
95. Fuller, *The Reformation of War,* pp. 220-28.

strategic decision-making but this concept, as in the similar Australian governmental structure, clashes with the prerogatives of the elected Ministers.[96]

There are some counters though to the arguments that grand strategy has anti-democratic connotations. Grand strategy clearly sets out the ends, ways and means. With such a benchmark, leaders and the performance of governments can be assessed, questioned and called to account by parliament or the public today, and later by historians. In writing the Official History of British relations with the Western Europe in the post-World War Two period, Alan Milward found that being able to compare outcomes against the grand strategy governments followed was invaluable in allowing him to make reasoned judgments of the policies, politicians and civil servants of the time.[97] By comparison the alternative problem solving methodology of risk management inherently does not have a suitable benchmark for accountability purposes.[98] The nature of risk management moreover, arguably even more than grand strategy, is to rely on the judgements of technocratic experts unable to be called to account for their performance.

Addressing the concerns over latent authoritarianism in the grand strategy methodology however, does need the grand strategy to be made public in some manner to make accountability possible. Gaddis thinks that between the time of Pericles at the start of the Peloponnesian War advocating a grand strategy for Athens and recent times, most grand strategies have been kept secret and from the public gaze.[99] He sees a change in 1947 when George Keenan, writing anonymously, revealed in an article in a public journal the rationale for the containment grand strategy.[100] Such disclosures have sometimes caused some discomfort but are the basis of accountability in democratic states. While many may disagree with the grand strategies of President George W. Bush

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96. Public Administration Select House of Commons and Committee, *Strategic Thinking in Government: Without National Strategy, Can Viable Government Strategy Emerge? Vol.I*; London: The Stationery Office Limited, 24 April 2012, pp. 21-36. Peter Layton, 'A Better Way to Make National Security Decisions', *The Drum,* Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Commission, 26 April 2013, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4651120.html.
97. Milward, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963: The United Kingdom and the European Community Volume 1*, pp. 6-7.
98. Edmunds, 'British Civil–Military Relations and the Problem of Risk', pp. 268-72.
99. Pericles speech to the Athenian Assembly in 431BC as understood by Thucydides is given at: Thucydides and Robert Strassler (eds.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*; New York, Free Press; 2008, pp. 80-85.
100. John Lewis Gaddis, 'A Grand Strategy of Transformation', *Foreign Policy*, No. 133, November - December. 2002, pp. 50-57, p. 50.

2001-2008, they were available for all to ponder and represent a new benchmark in the area of grand strategy accountability.

If Plato fretted over the best forms of government, Michel Foucault discussed how governments used techniques - of which grand strategy was potentially one - to dominate civil society at the most fundamental level. For Foucault, governmentality involves the "way in which one conducts the conduct of men" and this is achieved through individuals becoming self-regulating in that their ideas are structured and shaped to consider matters only from a particular perspective.[101] Such social domination though may be an effect of the "technologies of government" not necessarily just an outcome of particular actions.[102] Foucault wrote of the *captaining*, or governance, of a ship that having left a safe harbor with cargo bound for a distant port:

> It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also the boat and the cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors who are taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on; this is what characterizes the government of a ship.[103]

The operation of a grand strategy in sailing towards a specific objective - its rationality - could have much deeper impacts than that deliberately sought. A grand strategy in itself may seek to systematize, stabilize and regulate the power relationships between those governing and those being governed. Foucault's use of the ship of state metaphor though warns that in so doing a grand strategy may have unintended consequences - both positive and negative - that are far-reaching and extend deep inside ones' own society.

Foucault's use of the ship-of-state metaphor in this manner may suggest that grand strategies are, in being a technique for governing, rational designs. The seeming

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101. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-1979*; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 186. Dupont and Pearce, 'Foucault Contra Foucault'.
102. Thomas Lemke, 'Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique', *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society,* Vol. 14, No. 3, 2002, pp. 49-64.
103. Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michael Foucault*; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 87-104, p. 93-94.

ends-means rationality of grand strategic plans has however some logical shortcomings when more closely examined.

Historical cases of the ends-means rationality of grand strategies can be examined with the benefit of hindsight, but policymakers must choose grand strategic alternatives looking forward in time. The real outcomes from their grand strategic choices are obviously unknown, but the very large number of variables involved in a grand strategy suggests that estimated outcomes are more likely to be incorrect than accurate. However, without a good understanding of the outcomes, the ends-means cost relationship cannot be sensibly comprehended.

If it is unknown if the ultimate outcomes will be worth the costs, it is intrinsically impossible to weigh costs in any objective fashion. There is no agreed unit of 'currency', no market value that can be placed on the actual, and the opportunity, costs that implementing a grand strategy imposes. Grand strategy inherently is more than just materially based, as there are issues of values, of fears, of hopes, of honour and of credibility that defy translation into quantitative measures. Ends and means cannot be readily reconciled in the microeconomic-like manner that the rationalist approach of grand strategy suggests. Indeed, the value of grand strategies in terms of effectiveness and efficiency can only be known in retrospect. In the conception stage, grand strategic alternatives can only be assessed using qualitative measures.

Moreover, there are doubts that the policymakers and the organizations that implement the grand strategies can have an understanding of the desired ends that is not distorted by personal or bureaucratic imperatives. Writing about the individual shortcomings of leaders, Richard Betts observes that "unconscious emotions and unclear motives, cognitive problems, and cultural biases [can all] prevent strategy from integrating means and ends."[104] Combined with these issues, the necessity of implementing grand strategies through large, complex bureaucracies brings further difficulties.

Organizations can distort grand strategic ends and means, making use of these to further their own bureaucratic objectives of growth in power, importance, size, budgets

104. Richard K. Betts, 'Is Strategy an Illusion?', *International Security,* Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, pp. 5-50, p. 22.

and control of their environment.[105] Moreover, organizations can consciously or unconsciously implement grand strategies using their standard and desired repertoire of actions, even if these have little linkage to the ends sought in a particular circumstance.[106] The means an organization employs can become its own ends allowing any task the organization can perform to be considered as meeting the policymaker's grand strategic goals. The instruments and priorities of the bureaucracy can become perceived as the ends of the grand strategy itself.

These problems extend into the policymakers themselves. In some political systems they are assumed to be apolitical while in others they may be political appointees, but such differences may have only limited impact on grand strategy development. The technocratic nature of grand strategy formulation should not obscure the reality that all policymakers, as their label suggests, are influenced at some level by political considerations. Grand strategy being an interactive social activity is at its core deeply political and the development of grand strategies should be seen in this light. An inherent problem in formulating grand strategy is that there may be biases introduced through the people involved holding particular political views. Grand strategy as a methodology may seem a technocratic, politically neutral approach but is instead subject, as many other methodologies are, to value judgments.

Non-Grand Strategies

In Foucault's metaphor a captain steered the ship of state to a specific distant harbor in much the same manner as a government directed the implementation of a grand strategy towards a desired future. In this regard though, what if the metaphor is a misleading one for contemporary states. Should modern ships of state steer towards any port? The ship of state could simply stay at sea with the captain still responsible for taking care of the sailors, the cargo and the ship. In so doing the captain could either choose to take advantage of favourable winds or avoid the worse effects "of all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on."[107] The two options suggest states

105. Allison, *Essence of Decision,* pp. 144-84. Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*; Washington Brookings Institution Press, 1974, pp. 26-62.
106. Allison, *Essence of Decision,* pp. 67-100.
107. Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Burchell, Gordon, and Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michael Foucault*; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 87-104, p. 93-94.

have viable alternatives to grand strategies; they could choose policies of opportunism or of risk management.

The intent of opportunism is to seize opportunities and address challenges as they arise rather than work assiduously towards some defined objective as grand strategy does. Under an opportunistic approach, a state's policies change, shift and evolve as circumstances require. The ship of state is not heading towards a desired landfall but rather the captain – the government – is simply seeking to take advantage of any favourable winds. In an example of this, Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, observed near the highpoint of the British Empire that: "English policy is to float lazily downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions."[108] Seizing opportunities and addressing challenges as they arise overcomes the objection to grand strategies that the future cannot be predicted and thus any prior grand plan is inherently doomed to failure.

Charles J. Esdaile argues in a provocative article on Napoleon, that unlike many other works considers his Continental System of economic warfare as well as the battlefield, argues that the General was an opportunist: "guided…by the needs of the moment and swayed…by circumstance."[109] He continues that "To search for a pattern in his actions – to look, in short, for a grand strategy – is futile, for strategy there was none other than to strike out in one direction or another as opportunity offered."[110] In analysing the U.S. grand strategy in the Persian Gulf since 1975, Steve Yetiv determined that there actually was no grand strategy simply a continuing reaction to unexpected events and surprises.[111]

Away from the great powers, some see the Australian governments in the mid-1960s and the early 2000s similarly eschewing grand strategies and instead adopting an approach of taking advantage of opportunities that arose as events

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108. Lord Salisbury, 'Letter to Earl of Lytton, 9 March 1877', in Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury Vol. 2*; London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1921, p. 130.
109. Charles J. Esdaile, 'De-Constructing the French Wars: Napoleon as Anti-Strategist', *Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol. 31, No. 4, 2008, pp. 515-52, p. 515.
110. Ibid., p. 550.
111. Steve A. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005*; Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp. 192-97.

transpired.[112] Others note the use of opportunism in Denmark's involvement in the 1991 Gulf War and in Russia's actions in South Ossetia in August 2008.[113]

The difficulty with opportunism is that it is a policy that is reactive to events and other's actions. The counter point to Salisbury's description of British policy as "floating lazily downstream" is that this immediately raises questions of whose stream, taking the nation where and how fast? The state using opportunism does not initiate and must accept the boundaries set by others; the state becomes directly or indirectly a part of another's projects and must be responsive to these. The activist party sets the grand strategic agenda and determines the framework of the debates cognizant of its own goals and capabilities. The opportunist entity can only be ready to react as circumstances dictate.

An alternative to opportunism is to adopt a risk management approach that guides actions to mitigate the impact of calamities that are deemed ultimately unavoidable. Foucault's ship of state is not being steered towards any particular destination instead attention is directed towards minimizing any harm that will at some stage inevitably be done to sailors, cargo and ship by the sea's elemental forces. With a risk management approach the ship as it exists is simply being safeguarded against an anticipated harm. There is no well-crafted grand strategic plan guiding the ship of state towards a safe harbor, and neither is the captain taking advantage of favourable opportunities to make the crew more secure or more prosperous. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen observes that in adopting a risk management approach:

> politics is no longer about initiating a social, economic or political process and bringing an end to a particular problem, as Foucault's ship metaphor implied. Governments no longer master ends, only means. Politics is about managing the process. In Foucault's metaphor, the rationale of government is to keep the ship of state afloat. [114]

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112. Lloyd Cox and Brendon O'Connor, 'Australia, the US, and the Vietnam and Iraq Wars: 'Hound Dog, Not Lapdog'', *Australian Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 47, No. 2, June 2012, pp. 173-87. Paul Kelly, *Howard's Decade: An Australian Foreign Policy Reappraisal*; Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006, p. 47.
113. Fredrik Doeser and Joakim Eidenfalk, 'The Importance of Windows of Opportunity for Foreign Policy Change', *International Area Studies Review,* Vol. 16, No. 4, 2013, pp. 390-406.
114. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 37.

This focus on means is conceptually quite different to governments using grand strategies to achieve defined and specific ends, as the Netherlands National Safety and Security Strategy reveals.

The Netherlands government uses a risk management strategy to prepare the country to manage internal and external threats that could cause serious social disruption. Wide-ranging human security threats are considered including climate change, transnational crime, Muslim radicalization, societal polarization, cyber-disruption, economic crises and terrorism.[115] These threats are assessed in terms of risks to vital interests, prioritized in terms of possible consequences and assessed likelihood, and incorporated into a national risk assessment. The Netherlands' Government then determines which particular risks will be addressed through building and sustaining the necessary national capabilities to manage these risks should they eventuate.[116] The overall intent is to reduce the impact of the selected risks down to a level considered both acceptable and controllable if they eventuate.

Foucault's 'ship of state' will at some time scrape the rocks but taking specific actions before this could reduce the damage done by the impact to passengers, cargo, crew or ship. Risk management is all about loss control. If risks eventuate there will be losses and associated costs but risk management tries to control these to tolerable and manageable levels.[117] The high-level objectives of such anticipatory action can vary from building capabilities and capacities to survive shocks, to allow operations to continue in the presence of external stresses, to recover from shocks to the original form, or to absorb shocks and evolve in response.[118] States may always be sensitive to

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115. Dr. Hans Bergmans et al., *Working with Scenarios, Risk Assessment and Capabilities: In the National Safety and Security Strategy of the Netherlands*; The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, October 2009, pp. 11-12.
116. Programme National Security, *National Security: Strategy and Work Programme 2007-2008*, The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, May 2007, p. 10, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/Estrategia_Nacional_de_Seguridad_NL_2007.pdf.
117. Paul Hopkin, *Fundamentals of Risk Management: Understanding Evaluating and Implementing Effective Risk Management*; London: Kogan Page, 2010, pp. 148-152, 253-276.
118. Brenton Prosser and Colin Peters, 'Directions in Disaster Resilience Policy', *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management,* Vol. 25, No. 3, July 2010, pp. 8-11, p. 8.

certain stressors but risk management aims to reduce their vulnerability to the external shocks that do occur.[119]

The separations here between grand strategy, opportunism, and risk management may at first glance appear flawed as the alternatives of opportunism and risk management could be deemed to be grand strategies in themselves. The principal issue however, is the policy that animates these three distinct conceptual approaches. A grand strategy has a defined objective – a specific desired international order - whereas opportunism and risk management instead await external events; they do not deliberately progress to some particular preferred endpoint. Opportunist or risk management policies still require resources to be developed and allocated, but the purpose for which this is done is imprecise and generic; the emphasis is instead on the means.[120] Opportunism and risk management are means-focused whereas grand strategy is uniquely ends-oriented.

CONCLUSION

The idea of grand strategy remains evolving. In this chapter, an understanding of the term has been established appropriate to the purpose of this thesis and its policymaking focus. Others in different contexts may subscribe to different meanings.

The examination in this chapter suggests that grand strategy may be defined concisely as follows: *grand strategy is the art of developing and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the order existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities.* Given this, grand strategy is then a methodology suitable for addressing problems that meet two criteria: the problem involves interacting with intelligent, adaptive others and it is possible to define a desired future end state.

These criteria help in distinguishing between a grand strategy policymaking methodology from those that that are not. Policymakers use the risk management and

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119. There may appear to be a similarity between states using grand strategies to maintain the *status quo* as discussed earlier and risk management. A grand strategy though, tries to build or maintain a desired international order while risk management seeks to limit the damage particular events may cause. Limiting damage may not in itself ensure a preferred order is maintained. Indeed, the order may still change undesirably from other causes even if the identified risks do not eventuate. There are distinct, if at times subtle, differences between the two methodological approaches.
120. Layton, 'An Australian National Security Strategy: Competing Conceptual Approaches', pp. 107-11.

opportunism methodologies when developing approaches that can respond to specific events by respectively limiting the damage caused by feared events or by being able to take advantage of helpful ones. By contrast, grand strategy methodologies are used when policymakers seek to create a specified desired future. A plan methodology sets out actions to take but is intended for addressing issues that do not involve continuing interaction with intelligent, adaptive others. A plan can then be a 'set and forget' approach whereas a grand strategy is by its nature an always evolving, dynamic process.

The chapter has discussed some significant qualities of grand strategy that would need to be incorporated in some manner into a generic grand strategy cognitive frame developed to assist the thinking of policymakers. The key significant qualities are:

a. A grand strategy involves interacting with intelligent others. It is fundamentally an interactive social activity where all are seeking their own objectives.

b. Grand strategy encompasses ends, ways and means where the 'ends' are the objectives, the 'ways' are the courses of actions and the 'means' are the instruments of national power. All three are interdependent in that if one changes, the others may need to also. If the ends are too ambitious for the ways and the means, the ends may need to change. Similarly, if the means are scant, the ways may need to be more innovative if the same ends are sought.

c. The 'ends' of a grand strategy are to change an international order – the political formation - existing between parties involved. This order can be the whole international system or a subset of it.

d. The 'means' that a grand strategy uses are diverse and may be simply divided into the four policy instruments of information, diplomacy, economics and military. Different grand strategies seek different effects by using the same generic instruments in different ways.

e. Grand strategy involves building the material and non-material resources needed to be implemented, and then allocating these resources to the particular instruments of national power.

The list though hides in plain sight two important areas that are relatively neglected, at some real cost to sound policymaking. Firstly there is little discussion about the 'ways' and yet this is actually the core of a grand strategy. Grand strategy is all about the course of action taken; it is the *way* the means are used to achieve the ends. What possible ways are there? How do policymakers choose the right one? Secondly, if grand strategy is all about ends, there is little debate about what they may be. What possible ends are there? And again, how do policymakers know which one to choose? These two interrelated, interdependent areas will be developed much further in Chapter 4 when examining how to change an international order.

Importantly however, policymakers in considering using grand strategy as a methodology to address a particular problem should be aware of the alternatives such as opportunism and risk management, and of the inherent problems of the technique including the risks of an unintended authoritarian stance and the dangers of cognitive bias.

CHAPTER 3: THE MINDS OF POLICYMAKERS

The international system is complex, complicated and dynamic. How do busy, time-constrained policymakers manage to adequately comprehend it? The answer is with some real difficulty. This is concerning, particularly when policymakers are considering matters of great import such as grand strategies. The grand strategic options may be examined in a manner that directly leads to a poor outcome, and worryingly, implementing a flawed grand strategy can be disastrous. The British grand strategy in the 1930s failed to address the challenge of Hitler's Germany and led to a cataclysmic World War devastating for all involved. The USSR's détente grand strategy of the 1970s simply accelerated the end of the Soviet Union while the 2002 U.S. regime change grand strategy in Iraq failed in its ambitions to install a new democratic government within several weeks of the invasion. All were cases where the thinking of the policymakers involved proved flawed, and arguably could have been improved.

How can policymakers' thinking be improved? Grand strategies are simply mental roadmaps devised by people. Such policies begin in the minds of men and women and it is this thinking process that could be improved, as it is the foundation of all that follows. Intuitively, policymakers would rather this be done well than not.

The approach in this chapter focuses on pre-decisional cognition. This phase of policymaking involves the initial consideration of the problem by individuals before the matter enters the group and organisational processes that decide which particular ideas are adopted by the entity concerned. Most of the techniques currently available to mitigate the impact of cognitive biases on policymaking focus on these later stages rather than the pre-decisional phase.

In the pre-decisional phase of most issues there is considerable information seemingly available but it is initially difficult to determine what is relevant, how this specifically relates to the problem and the additional confirmatory information that may need to be obtained before settling on a preferred policy response. This is a crucial stage in policy formulation, although George held that "the importance and difficulty of [this] situational analysis in policymaking is…not well enough understood by many

academic scholars…"[1] In this, he considered that a correct diagnosis of a complex situation depended much more on how the available information was interpreted by policymakers than on any simple collection of facts and figures.[2] Recent scholarship building on the Rubicon Model of decision-making supports George in suggesting that in this pre-decisional phase individuals use a cognitive orientation involving a deliberative mind-set sharply different to that used after they have decided on the matter being considered.[3]

Contemporary International Relations theories have minimized the role of human agency with the major exception of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).[4] This International Relations sub-field boldly asserts that the detailed analysis of human policymakers, their behaviours and actions is necessary to comprehensively understand policymaking.[5] Building from this perspective, FPA scholars and researchers have extensively examined the political psychology of policymakers and the manner in which they think.

This chapter discusses *how* policymakers do and should think. Succeeding chapters then add *what* policymakers should think about. The chapter examines the literature that considers how policymakers think and conceive of complex issues such as grand strategy beginning with rational choice theory before moving on to discuss the cognitive school. The chapter recommends that the thinking of policymakers may be improved by structuring their thinking in the manner of the *poliheuristic* choice architecture that integrates rational choice and cognitive school thinking. The term is a play on words - poli for 'many' and heuristic for 'shortcuts' – but highlights that this architecture's principal advantage is its ability to simplify the mind's information

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1. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* p. 240.
2. Ibid., pp. 240-41.
3. Peter M. Gollwitzer, 'Mindset Theory of Action Phases', in Paul A. M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski, and E Tory Higgins (Editor) (eds.), *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume One*, Sage Social Psychology Program; London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012, pp. 526-46, pp. 529-37. Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, 'The Rubicon Theory of War', *International Security,* Vol. 36, No. 1, Summer 2011, pp. 7-40, pp. 12-18.
4. Carlsnaes, in Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 85-100, pp. 90-94.
5. Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Touchstone for International Relations Theory in the Twenty-First Century', in Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*; New York Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp. 1-20, pp. 3-6. Snyder et al., 'Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics', in Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited)*; New York Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp. 21-152, p. 59. Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations', p. 21.

processing.

Rational choice theories were originally derived from mathematics and are conceived of as the model for how policymaking should ideally be done. Rational choice theory consists of three principal components: actors are goal-oriented; their preferences can be ranked, are consistent (invariant) and are transitive (if 'a' is preferred to 'b' and 'b' is preferred to 'c', then 'a' is preferred to 'c'); and actors choose actions that give the maximum utility.[6] A rational actor is an individual whose behaviour is driven by maximizing benefit and has the ability to make conscious choices. Importantly, the actor has extensive knowledge of the situation being considered, well-understood preferences and can calculate the optimal choice.[7]

Rational choice is about selecting the best option to achieve earlier defined objectives. With these desired ends considered both given and exogenous, the rational choice process simply determines the best way to achieve them. This decision-making approach then appears particularly appropriate for decision makers contemplating the optimal grand strategy needed to achieve a preferred outcome.

In only considering subjective utility however, rational choice models do not examine the origins of the beliefs and expectations that decide how a specific choice is made from the alternatives. Rose McDermott observes: "rational choice models cannot identity the nature and sources of the interests and preferences that they assume as given in order to derive utilities."[8] In this respect, rational choice appears an incomplete model.

Moreover, rational choice models have not been validated in practice, and are unsupported by well-established studies into human psychology and recent work in neuroscience. Instead of being demonstrably 'rational' actors, people in reality instead attempt to simplify complex issues, have difficulty coping with ambiguity and prefer consistency, are intuitively poor estimators and are significantly more reluctant to

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6. Paul K. Macdonald, 'Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory ', *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 97, No. 4, 2003, pp. 551-65, p. 552.
7. Kristen Renwick Monroe, 'Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective', *International Political Science Review,* Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, pp. 151-72, p. 153.
8. Rose Mcdermott, *Political Psychology in International Relations*; Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004, p. 14.

accept loss than seek gain.[9] In response to this growing understanding of the shortcomings and deficiencies in rational choice theory, the cognitive school has steadily developed within FPA. Even so, rational choice remains important as will become apparent in discussing the poliheuristic choice architecture.

Cognition is "the process of thought" and while usage of the term can vary amongst scientific disciplines, in FPA it refers to how decision makers process information. The concept has developed into two distinct streams, one examines various information processing architectures while the other focuses on the knowledge structures – in computer parlance, the algorithms - the mind uses. Both streams assume that the mind has a limited capacity to process complex information and therefore makes use of information-processing techniques to be more efficient, albeit at some real cost to effectiveness.

The seminal work on information processing architectures was that by the influential social scientist Herbert Simon in the 1980s. The rational choice model assumes that rational actors choose the specific course of action that has the highest anticipated utility from the complete range of alternatives. Simon termed this substantive, or objective, rationality while advocating 'bounded rationality': the idea that rational actors will instead only consider a limited range of alternatives that they have chosen subjectively. Simon observes that:

> There is a fundamental difference between substantive and procedural rationality. To deduce the substantively, or objectively, rational choice in a given situation, we need to know only the choosing organism's goals and the objective characteristics of the situation. We need to know absolutely nothing else…. To deduce the procedurally or boundedly rational choice in a situation, we must know the choosing organism's goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it

9. Janice Gross Stein, 'Foreign Policy Decision Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Models', in Steve Smith (ed.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors and Cases*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 101-16, pp. 102-04.

possesses. We need know nothing about the objective situation in which the organism finds itself….[10]

Bounded rationality therefore conceives of policymakers as selective in the information they base their policies upon, using incomplete information search techniques and more likely to select a satisfactory than an optimal solution to a problem.[11] In this, several types of bounded rationality have been identified: cybernetic, satisficing, prospect theory and poliheuristic choice.

In the cybernetic model, a policymaker perceives a problem as a simple one with few realistic alternatives and therefore requiring little thought to address. Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen note "with only few options available, the cybernetic approach takes on the appearance of a programmed response."[12] In the satisficing model, policymakers search for a solution until they find the first acceptable one and then embrace that regardless whether this is the optimum one or not.[13] A 'good enough' solution is adopted rather than continuing the search for the best option.[14] In the prospect theory model, decision-making outcomes depend on how information is presented in terms of method or order, and how the expected outcomes compare to a pre-determined reference point, most often the status quo position.[15] Policymakers favour policies that avoid losses rather than make gains; they willingly take risks to minimize losses but are reluctant to in search of gains.[16]

Since the 1990s interest has steadily developed in a particular decision-making architecture that usefully combines both objective and bounded rationality. Alex Mintz, central to the model's development explains the merits of a poliheuristic choice architecture:

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10. Herbert A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science', *The American Political Review,* Vol. 79, No. 2, 1985, pp. 293-304, p. 294.
11. Alex Mintz and Karl Derouen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*; New York: Cambridge University Press 2010, p. 68.
12. Ibid., p. 69.
13. Herbert A. Simon, 'Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science', *The American Economic Review,* Vol. 49, No. 3, June 1959, pp. 253-83.
14. Barry Schwartz et al., 'Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* Vol. 83, No. 5, 2002, pp. 1178-97, p. 1178.
15. Mcdermott, p. 70-71. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk', *Econometrica,* Vol. 47, No. 2, March 1979, pp. 263-91.
16. Jack S. Levy, 'Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 41, 1997, pp. 87-112, p. 90.

> poliheuristic choice theory integrates elements of the cognitive psychology school of decision making with elements of the rational choice school. The first stage of poliheuristic theory involves a noncompensatory, nonholistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to the cognitive school of decision making. The second stage involves analytic processing of surviving alternatives. It corresponds to rational choice theory. Cognitive heuristics are more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process.[17]

Underpinning the poliheuristic idea is the aspiration to develop an architecture that allows policymakers to quickly eliminate unsuitable alternatives when complex issues are being considered. [18]

There is though, a potential problem. In its original formulation the first stage initial screening process of the poliheuristic theory was linked to specific domestic political considerations such as the likelihood of gaining electoral success and the associated risks.[19] In the case of grand strategy policymaking, the poliheuristic theory's first stage would need to change and be considerably opened up beyond this narrow scope. In particular, given the many considerations that could affect grand strategy formulation, the first stage of the poliheuristic model would need to be able to be varied depending on the specific needs of each individual policymaker user.

Recent critiques of poliheuristic theory have considered opening up this first stage. Eric Stern advised that in this regard "the sensitivity of policymakers to the domestic context should be seen as a contingent rather than a general phenomenon."[20] Jonathon Keller and Edward Wang deliberately investigated the stage one process and concluded that:

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17. Alex Mintz, 'How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 48, No. 1, 2004, pp. 3-13, p. 4.
18. Alex Mintz and Nehemia Geva, 'The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking', in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decision-Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive - Rational Debate*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1997, pp. 81-102, p. 86.
19. Steven B. Redd, 'The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Study ', p. 337.
20. Eric Stern, 'Contextualizing and Critiquing the Poliheuristic Theory ', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 48, No. 1, February 2004, pp. 105-26, p. 110.

> We advocate 'filling in the gaps' in poliheuristic (PH) theory rather than abandoning the theory, because its fundamental architecture is sound. … Our theoretical critique and empirical findings suggest that PH theory's conception of the stage one screening process is not fundamentally flawed but merely incomplete. …PH theory, as originally formulated, is agnostic regarding (1) the identity of the stage one screening dimension (2) potential variation in noncompensatory thresholds along the screening dimension, and (3) individual-level and contextual variables that might lead to variation in these screening dimensions and thresholds. [21]

Keller and Wang further verified their contention in an examination of case studies of U.S.-China and U.S.-Iraq relations using a first stage filter where the noncompensatory, screening dimension is empathy.[22] They found that if policymakers empathised with an adversary the policymakers would screen out policy alternatives that their opponent considers unacceptable in the first stage; the second stage will then only examine policy options that meet this criteria.[23] Importantly, Keller and Wang's empirical and theoretical analyses suggest that the poliheuristic model may be able to be modified to include a first stage dimension tailored for thinking about grand strategy.

In the specific case of thinking about the complex and consequential issue of grand strategy policymaking, the poliheuristic model appears more effective than the cybernetic, satisficing and prospect models. The cybernetic model is too simplistic in disregarding most aspects and recommending simply choosing an immediately intuitive solution. The satisficing model is not favoured because in choosing the first satisfactory option, a much more effective and efficient solution may be disregarded and, in grand strategy where potential opportunity costs can be high, a better solution may be greatly preferred. Prospect theory is also not supported as the model tends to constrain the consideration of options to those that favour defending the status quo and at times grand strategy needs to look beyond this.

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21. Jonathan W. Keller and Yi Edward Yang, 'Leadership Style, Decision Context, and the Poliheuristic Theory of Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 52, No. 5, October 2008, pp. 687-712, pp. 706-07.
22. Jonathan W. Keller and Yi Edward Yang, 'Empathy and Strategic Interaction in Crises: A Poliheuristic Perspective', *Foreign Policy Analysis,* Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 169-89.
23. Ibid., pp. 186-87.

The preferred information processing approach for policymakers thinking about grand strategy appears the poliheuristic model as this combines both rational and cognitive approaches, is more methodical and crucially can be specifically tailored for the purpose.[24] The model's architecture though by itself is insufficient without an understanding of the knowledge structures that determine how policymakers perceive and conceive issues.

In addition to the use of information processing architectures to overcome cognitive limitations, the mind also uses simplifying mechanisms that allow new circumstances to be matched against stored, memorized information rather than be considered anew each time the same situation or circumstance arises. Computational capacity does not have to be expended trying to comprehend situations that have been encountered previously and are already known. Social psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross observe: "Objects and events in the phenomenal world are almost never approached as if they were *sui generis* configurations but rather are assimilated into pre-existing structures in the mind of the perceiver…."[25]

Every individual develops a set of beliefs that provides a relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of the confusing environment. These mental constructs necessarily simplify and structure the external world. While such beliefs can change they are relatively stable and new information is interpreted in ways that reduces the inconsistencies between these beliefs and reality. Considered this way, the mind is in Joseph Jastrow's arresting phrase essentially "a belief seeking rather than a fact seeking apparatus".[26]

Importantly the behaviour and actions of individuals are shaped by the way they perceive, evaluate and interpret incoming information. An individual's beliefs and

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24. Political scientist David Brule agrees that poliheuristic choice theory is better than its 'old competitors' like cybernetic theory, but then remarks that the theory should also be compared to the 'new competitors' of political survival perspective, audience costs perspective and the operational code. These 'new competitors' have merit in explaining events but they are not information processing architectures in the sense used in this chapter; nor are they intended to be used by policymakers thinking about grand strategic alternatives. David J. Brule, 'The Poliheuristic Research Program: An Assessment and Suggestions for Further Progress', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp. 266-93, pp. 284-87.
25. Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment*; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980, p. 36.
26. Joseph Jastrow quoted in George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, p. 57.

attention sets are active agents in determining how information is evaluated. These belief sets may be viewed as "knowledge structures", usefully defined by James Walsh as "a mental template that individuals impose on an informational environment to give it form and meaning."[27]

The world is as perceived by an individual through their knowledge structures, not necessarily as it materially is. A nation's international policies can therefore be considered as being addressed to the "image of the external world" perceived by policymakers, not necessarily simply in response to the objectively real world as a rational choice model might suggest.[28] Paul Chilton observes: "the foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world, but to the image of the external world that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy."[29]

Accepting this perspective, Michael Brecher, Berlma Steinberg, and Janice Stein conceive a policymaking system as the linkage between the psychological environment of the decision makers and the actual operational environment in which decisions are implemented.[30] However, the influence of the knowledge structures should not be exaggerated. Ole Holsti cautioned that:

> it is not very fruitful to assume direct linkages between beliefs and foreign policy actions, because the role beliefs play in policy-making is likely to be a much subtler and less direct one. Rather than providing direct guides to action, they are one of several clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision-making behaviour. They may serve the policy maker as a means of orienting him to the environment; as a lens or prism through which information is processed and given meaning; as a diagnostic scheme; as one means of coping with the cognitive constraints on rationality; as a source of guidelines that may guide or bound – but not necessarily determine – policy prescriptions and choices. Thus attention should be directed to the linkages between beliefs and certain decision-making tasks that precede a decision –

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27. James P. Walsh, 'Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down Memory Lane', *Organization Science,* Vol. 6, No. 3, May-June 1995, pp. 280-321, p. 281.
28. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, p. 55.
29. Paul Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*; New York: Peter Lang, 1996, p. 27.
30. Michael Brecher et al., 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1969, pp. 75-101, p. 81.

definition of the situation, analysis, prescription, and the like. The manner in which these tasks are performed is likely to establish the boundaries within which the decision is made.[31]

Holsti then considers that the influence of knowledge structures is primarily pre-decisional. Policymakers use knowledge structures for several important cognitive purposes but the structures are most influential in the early stages. Joanne Spear and Phillip Williams make a similar determination. In their view knowledge structures perform three complementary functions for the policymaker: they assist in defining a situation and identifying its most significant characteristics; they provide a way to comprehend the international system and the opportunities within it; and they set the parameters which establish the range of possible actions and the priorities among them.[32]

Extending his thinking on knowledge structures, in a contemporaneous article Ole Holsti determined seven specific policymaking situations in which knowledge structures may play an important role: non-routine situations requiring more than applying SOPs; decisions made by high-level leaders relatively free from organizational constraints; long range planning that inherently involves uncertainty and in which normative conceptions are central; ambiguous situations; situations of information overload; unanticipated events; and situations in which stress impairs complex cognitive tasks associated with decision making.[33] Many of these situations are encountered when policymakers consider selecting and developing grand strategies.

Knowledge structures encompass several different but interrelated and interacting cognitive features including beliefs, values, schemas, scripts, analogies and stereotypes. This multiplicity of terms arises because there is considerable disagreement about the precise terminology to use to denote the various simplified mental

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31. Ole R. Holsti, 'Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically', *The American Behavioral Scientist,* Vol. 20, No. 1, 1976a, pp. 11-32, p. 20.
32. Joanna Spear and Phil Williams, 'Belief Systems and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Carter and Reagan', in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), *Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations*; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp. 190-208, p. 192.
33. Ole R. Holsti, 'Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively ', in R. Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of Decision*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976b, pp. 18-54, p. 29-33.

representations that decision makers employ.[34] To avoid any confusion arising in this thesis, an individual's knowledge structures in a rather broad sense are considered to comprise simply beliefs and schemas.[35]

Beliefs are that which we hold to be true.[36] Beliefs are used by the mind as a device for understanding aspects of the social environment. In a sense they are personal explanations that enable individuals to comprehend and cope with a particular phenomenon.[37] Belief systems set the bounds within which interpretations are accepted or rejected. In this way belief systems can become cognitive maps through which decision makers structure the environment around them. Significant implications flow from how beliefs operate. Robert Jervis observed:

> First, people are strongly influenced by their expectations: people tend to see what they expect to see…. The second implication…is that a proposition is most likely to be accepted when it is seen as plausible—i.e., when it fits with more general beliefs. The third…is that judgments of plausibility can be self reinforcing as ambiguous evidence is taken not only to be consistent with pre-existing beliefs, but to confirm them.[38]

Accordingly, beliefs are used to perceive and make sense of the external world. In this though, beliefs are general in content and usually include broad principles and general ideas on the nature of the social environment that constitutes the policymakers field of action. The core beliefs relevant for political analysis and action are the operational code beliefs – both philosophical and instrumental – that have diagnostic and prognostic roles.[39]

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34. Philip E. Tetlock, 'Social Psychology and World Politics', in Daniel T. Gibert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology: Fourth Edition*; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998, pp. 868-913, p. 876.
35. Deborah Welch Larson, 'The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making', Political Psychology', *Political Psychology,* Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994, pp. 17-33, pp. 29-30.
36. Jonathan Renshon, 'Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 52, No. 6, 1980, pp. 820-49, p. 822.
37. Spear and Williams, in Little and Smith (eds.), *Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations*; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp. 190-208, p. 192.
38. Robert Jervis, 'Understanding Beliefs', *Political Psychology,* Vol. 27, No. 5, 2006, pp. 641-63, pp. 650-51.
39. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Decision-Making*; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 115. George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making'.

Beliefs form the background against which policymakers view the world and the international environment but in being a general perceptual tool are less applicable for use as a problem-solving instrument. For thinking about specific and particular grand strategic issues rather than broad philosophical issues, schemas may be more appropriate. Intuitively this appears so as schemas include analogies, and historical analogies in particular have frequently been used in considering grand strategic policymaking.

Schemas are inclusive and individualistic being the result of an active reconstruction of experiences and other knowledge structures such as values and stereotypes into a general, abstracted representation, rather than being a filtered, pictorial representation of a situation like beliefs. Leading social psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor describe schemas as:

> a cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of stimulus. A schema contains both the attributes of the concept and the relationships among the attributes.[40]

In facilitating problem solving, a schema can fulfil several cognitive functions including imposing a configuration on a situation so it can be comprehended, reducing the time taken to understand a situation, aiding recall of memorized schema-relevant information and developing a more complete picture by filling in any missing information gaps using default knowledge.[41] Schemas therefore structure situations by imposing a "known" cast of actors and their relationships to each other onto an event. This enables policymakers to not only organize a complex stimulus in their own mind in a manner that aids comprehension, but importantly also allows the mind to make additional inferences using pre-existing knowledge and concepts.[42]

Analogies are a form of schema but in comparison, analogies are not conceptual and nonspecific but rather particular and concrete. The most common forms of analogy in policymaking are historical, although analogies separated in space - that is to other events occurring elsewhere at the same time - may also be used. Historical analogies are

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40. S. T. Fiske and S. E. Taylor, *Social Cognition*; Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1984, p. 140.
41. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds,* pp. 156-57.
42. Larson, 'The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making', pp. 19-22.

based on the "inference that if two or more events separated in time agree in some aspect, then they may also agree in others."[43]

Analogical reasoning involves incrementally matching segments of the historical analogy, the base domain, against the new situation, the target domain, until a valid match is considered achieved.[44] This matching is then used to inform the understanding of the target circumstance for as the seminal work by cognitive psychologists Mary Glock and Keith Holyoak observed:

> The essence of analogical thinking is the transfer of knowledge from one situation to another by a process of mapping - finding a set of one-to-one correspondences (often incomplete) between aspects of one body of information and aspects of another.[45]

As we shall see, policymakers are attracted to the use of analogies as they have considerable heuristic or diagnostic versatility. Analogies can simultaneously perform for policymakers several critical diagnostic functions including better defining a situation, helping to assess the stakes, offering prescriptions, predicting their chances of success, evaluating their moral rightness and warning about dangers associated with the options.[46] While analogies have great utility the most important recent academic work in this field considers that the 'dominant' view of international relations scholars and historians has been that policymakers generally use analogies poorly and that numerous significant policy failures can be traced to this.[47]

There are many examples. Robert Jervis considered that President Truman's immediate linking of the North Korean invasion of South Korea to the analogy of Nazi aggression in the late 1930s made him insensitive to examining the causes of the invasion more closely, shaped his intervention decision and led to him placing more emphasis on the early use of armed force.[48] Abraham Lowenthal determined that the U.S. policy towards the Dominican Republic in the mid-1960s was badly distorted by

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43. Khong, *Analogies at War,* p. 7.
44. Keane et al, 'Constraints on Analogical Mapping'.
45. Mary L. Glock and Keith J. Holyoak, 'Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer', *Cognitive Psychology,* Vol. 15, 1983, pp. 1-38, p. 2.
46. Khong, *Analogies at War,* pp. 21-22.
47. Ibid., p. 9.
48. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 218-20.

understanding the country through an analogy with Communist Cuba, and this eventually led to a major military intervention.[49] Daniel Houghton examined the Carter administrations decisions on the U.S. embassy hostages held in Iran in 1979 and concluded that an analogy to the Israeli Entebbe raid had unhelpfully shaped U.S. policy.[50]

In an influential in-depth analysis, Yuen Khong determined that the Korean War analogy proved particularly influential in shaping policy options for the ultimately disastrous U.S. intervention in South Vietnam.[51] Importantly Khong also demonstrated that the analogies used were not chosen to justify policies already decided on other grounds as some had postulated, or were used purely for rhetorical purposes, but instead truly were pre-decisional.[52] Analogies shaped policymaking.

In another seminal work that focused on helping policy makers use historical analogies better, historians Richard Neustadt and Ernest May wrote in 1986 that:

> most of our illustrations are horror stories. Amongst such instances are the Bay of Pigs affair, the Americanization of the Vietnam War, Gerald Ford's effort to protect the country from a swine flu epidemic that never came, various episodes of the Carter administration, and the Reagan regime's misadventure with social security costs.[53]

The use of analogies continues to have disappointing results in terms of enhancing high quality policymaking. Steven Metz considered the administration of George W. Bush drew inappropriately and to its detriment upon five analogies in its policymaking on Iraq in 2002.[54] The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War showed for democracy to arise only the removal of an authoritarian regime was needed; secondly, the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s showed that allies

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49. Abraham F. Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention*; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 152-155.
50. David Patrick Houghton, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 164.
51. Khong, *Analogies at War,* p. 253.
52. Ibid., p. 252.
53. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decisionmakers*; New York: The Free Press, 1986, p. xiii.
54. Steven Metz, *Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force*, Operation Iraqi Freedom Key Decisions Monograph Series; Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2010, pp. 44-46. See also: David B. Macdonald, *Thinking History, Fighting Evil: Neoconservatives and the Perils of Analogy in American Politics*; Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

would help with stabilization and reconstruction; thirdly the recent Afghanistan war showed how easy regime change could be; fourthly, Nazi Germany showed that unaddressed threats worsen so Saddam's Iraq needed near-term action and lastly as Al Qaeda had used terrorism against the U.S. homeland therefore so would Saddam Hussein. All were questionable analogies that gave questionable insights to policymakers. Crucially, such misuse should not be disregarded as only being limited to those with limited knowledge of history or a rigorous academic education. Vertzberger makes a telling point in arguing that:

> The use of faulty epistemology is not limited to the layman who has had no experience in using scientifically valid procedures but is shared by individuals who entered the political arena from an academic background with a distinguished record of research experience. Such was the case for example with the 'best and the brightest' who served as advisers to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson [during the Vietnam War] and who had impressive academic backgrounds. It seems that the temptation of careless use of historical knowledge overpowers acquired epistemological and methodological skills.[55]

There have been several proposals intended to minimize the problems knowledge structures can cause to policymakers including multiple advocacy, devil's advocacy, organizational solutions and murder boards.

Multiple advocacy envisages an executive receiving advice from multiple actors representing differing viewpoints; the executive exposed to different thinking then can chose the optimal outcome.[56] Devil's advocacy makes use of a member of the group who deliberately takes a contrary position and forces the other members of the group to better explore and consider their viewpoints.[57] Formal options organizationally separates the policy analysis phase from the policy choice point in requiring the bureaucracy to develop alternative and competing policy options.[58] Murder boards

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55. Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, 'Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings ', *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1986, pp. 223-47, p. 241.
56. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, pp. 191-208.
57. Ibid., pp. 169-74.
58. Ibid., pp. 175-89.

review a proposal with the intent of uncovering sufficient flaws to 'kill' it; having knowledge of these shortcomings allows for revision.[59]

These various methods can all lessen the negative impacts of cognitive biases although not necessarily reliably or consistently. Such approaches add to the complexity of policymaking making additional, unwanted demands on organizational resources and time. The compartmentalizing of policymaking functions may also prevent interaction between the different phases of policymaking with potentially good solutions being overlooked or ignored. Moreover in being more complex, the various approaches to minimize cognitive biases may be reserved for only those problems where timeliness is less important. Faster evolving situations may become managed by more ad hoc methods that produce solutions suffering from all the well-known shortcomings of knowledge structures and cognitive constraints.

Running counter to the basic intent of organizational processes and procedures intended to counter cognitive biases is that these methods rely greatly on personalities. There are inherent difficulties with making organizational elements purposely set up to oppose the deliberations of other parts of an organization function properly. While creative tension may be the organizational intent, the intrinsic dysfunctionality perceived by the members of an organization may lead them to adopt 'better' work practices to impose order and resolve apparent unpleasantness.

The desire to avoid policymaking 'messiness' can be a particular problem within the type of hierarchical bureaucracies and formally ranked groups that typically consider grand strategies. Senior staff or leaders may simply ignore the internally or externally generated dissent, as they are confident their understanding of the situation is correct. Their knowledge structures and position in the hierarchy may be stronger than an organization's counter-methodologies.

Of course, in terms of knowledge structures many, if not all, of the members of an organization having been selected, promoted and rewarded on similar criteria may have come to hold the same beliefs, values, schemas and scripts. In such circumstances,

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59. Jonathan Renshon and Standley A. Renshon, 'The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making', *Political Psychology,* Vol. 29, No. 2, 2008, pp. 509-36, p. 530.

the commonly advocated process solutions may be completely ineffective as the organization 'is as one' in what needs to be done.

Other proposals to minimize negative impacts of knowledge structures focus on the individual however, many cognitive distortions are resistant to 'de-biasing' although there have been some short-term successes in training individuals in overcoming a small number of specific biases including attribution bias, overconfidence and unrealistic optimism. The difficulty with such training is that policymakers rarely have sufficient free time. Moreover, by this stage of their lives individuals have firmly consolidated cognitive preferences and strategic outlooks and may be resilient to education.[60] Indeed, there is evidence that training individuals to consistently counter biases over an extended period may be impossible.

Psychologists endeavoured to teach test subjects to overcome the specific bias of hindsight but the results six months after the training were poor. Richard Heuer observed:

> Experimental subjects with no vested interest in the results were briefed on the biases and encouraged to avoid them or compensate for them, but could not do so. Like optical illusions, cognitive biases remain compelling even after we become aware of them.[61]

The various group and individual approaches to overcome the known problems of knowledge structures have significant limitations. In some respects these shortcomings are inherent in that the solutions all try to work against the mind's cognitive limitations rather than to accept them. Ideally, decision makers would like a process or methodology that improved policymaking in a manner that worked with the cognitive constraints of the human mind and its way of perceiving reality, did not add to organizational complexity, was less reliant on personalities and was not time-consuming. In meeting these criteria, a conceptually different approach to those discussed appears needed.

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60. Ibid., pp. 531-32.
61. J. Heuer Richards, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1999, viewed 5 May 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/index.html.

POLIHEURISTIC CHOICE MODEL

Policymakers use information processing architectures and knowledge structures to address complex issues such as grand strategies. Accepting this, and thus working with the cognitive strengths and weakness of the human mind, a possible solution is to make use of the most sophisticated information processing architecture available and then populate this with a knowledge structure specifically tailored for thinking about grand strategy.

The poliheuristic choice theory is the most sophisticated model available and usefully combines the goal-oriented approach of rational choice theory with an acceptance of human cognitive constraints. In this model the initial stage involves a noncompensatory, nonholistic search with the parameters determined by the problem being examined; the second stage then analytically assesses alternatives bounded by the first stage.

These second stage alternatives could be derived from optimized knowledge structures, with the alternatives being beliefs, schemas or analogies. As discussed beliefs act as a lens to filter information; they can be considered as perceptual tools to reduce cognitive overloads and so appear inherently unsuitable. The real choice of the knowledge structure type to use in the poliheuristic model to optimize grand strategic thinking is between schemas and analogies.

Schemas are problem-solving tools that impose a top-down order. They are a general, abstracted representation that imposes structure on complex and ambiguous situations. Analogies are a form of schema but in comparison, analogies are particular and concrete.

In having great heuristic and diagnostic utility, historical analogies are extensively used in high-level policymaking but there are numerous problems inherent in so doing as discussed earlier. The crux of the matter is that historical analogies are very context dependent. In situations of high uncertainty and great ambiguity choosing the most appropriate historical analogy is at best serendipitous. Moreover, even if the optimal analogy is selected, the policymaker may not have sufficient knowledge of the casual relationships of the base domain analogy to properly transfer and map this information onto the target domain. In this the constrained parameters of historical

analogies allow little flexibility for fitting the analogy into new and unexpected circumstances.

If analogies have intrinsic problems though, schemas in being less individualistic, more general and higher-level may be able to replace them. The difficulty with schemas from the perspective of this thesis is that there are no suitable and useful schemas available for thinking about grand strategy. If there were suitable schemas, this form of knowledge structure would have an advantage over beliefs in that schemas can more readily change through policymakers learning.

Historical analogies could be replaced in the cognition of policymakers by specific schemas specially developed for thinking about grand strategy. While such schemas would aim to offer the high heuristic and diagnostic utility of historical analogies, they are not likely to be as powerful. Historical analogies offer policymakers a particularly appealing level of finality and certainty, although this appearance is quite misleading. The likelihood of a policymaker having a relatively better heuristic and diagnostic process in making use of an optimized schema appears higher than gambling on making the correct choice of a specific historical analogy.

In the tailored poliheuristic model envisaged, the choice of the particular schema to employ in a specific situation would not be determined by a policymakers' memory distorted by representativeness or availability biases, but rather by the matter being examined, that of grand strategy. The specific optimized schemas determined would then bound the second stage of the poliheuristic model where the rational choice theory analytical processing of alternatives was undertaken. The schemas would fulfil the same purpose as analogies and be used in the same way.

Yuen Foong Khong's work on analogies suggests that the point in the decision-making process where these schemas would play their greatest role would be "during the selection and rejection of policy options …by influencing the assessments and evaluations that policymakers must make in order to chose between alternative options."[62] Replacing analogies with schemas and using the poliheuristic information-processing model would introduce a more structured process to how grand strategy was thought about.

62. Khong, *Analogies at War,* p. 253.

This approach is an unusual one in the manner in which it proposes to contribute to better policymaking. The approach focuses on pre-decisional cognition and is thereby conceptually very different to those techniques already used to attempt to mitigate the negative effects of knowledge structures on policymaking. This emphasis placed on pre-decisional thought processes incorporates earlier observations by important FPA thinkers Ole Holtsi and Alexander George.

In a quote discussed earlier, Holtsi observed that attention should be focused on the influence of beliefs and schemas on pre-decisional tasks as these bound the policy alternatives considered by decision makers.[63] This has echoes in George's view of the importance of the diagnostic function of International Relations theoretical perspectives. George also considered that decision maker behaviours and actions were constrained and shaped by many organizational, bureaucratic, domestic political and external factors. The specific influence of theoretical perspectives could accordingly be difficult to discern but this did not mean they could not be influential if they were correctly focused on pre-decisional tasks. George wrote that:

> scholars interested in contributing to improved policymaking often have bypassed the task of developing theories that aid in diagnosing situations and turned directly to rational choice theories for policymaking….But rational choice theories often only make a limited contribution, since in making his choice the decision maker typically must be responsive to variables not considered in the available theories. In any case, correct diagnosis of emerging situations should precede – and indeed is usually a perquisite for – efforts to make the best choice amongst policy options. The diagnostic function of a policy theory may be more important in many cases than its quite limited ability to prescribe the choice of the correct course of action in complex settings.[64]

Focusing on improving the pre-decisional aspects of policymaking may be uncommon, but could have real benefits.

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63. Holsti, 'Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically', p. 20.
64. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, p. 240.

The tailored poliheuristic model proposed for the pre-decisional phase of policymakers thinking about grand strategy meets the earlier specified criteria. In being based upon the insights of scholars active in the psychological and decision-making strands of FPA, the proposed model works with - not against - the cognitive constraints of the human mind and its way of perceiving reality. Moreover, in making use of existing information processing architectures, the model does not add to organizational complexity, does not rely on personalities and should not be more time-consuming than the current use of historical analogies. There should be better outcomes in terms of more structured thinking about grand strategy and evidence of this will be sought in later chapters.

Supporting this concept, Sir Lawrence Freedman in approaching the problem from a historical perspective has reached a similar conclusion to that proposed in the tailored poliheuristic model. Freedman proposes strategic scripts that would be generically optimised (effectively through knowledge structures) for various types of strategies and combine what he terms System 1 and System 2 thinking processes, broadly the cognitive thinking and rational choice approaches respectively.[65] The scripts are envisaged as being used by policymakers when they are initially formulating a new strategy to orient themselves to the situation, to determine what was relevant and to assist in suggesting appropriate responses.

The concepts of rational choice theory, information processing architectures and knowledge structures are important to gaining a comprehensive understanding of how policymakers think. Such perspectives make apparent that *how* policymakers think can be as important as *what* they think of. Decision makers considering grand strategies can be viewed as exhibiting a bounded rationality shaped by the goals sought, the processing architectures used and the constraints of their knowledge structures.

The bounded rationality of the human mind makes finding the right solution to grand strategic problems problematic. The mind often chooses the first seemingly adequate solution, or one that broadly satisfies the need, rather than the most effective alternative. However, seeking a methodology for policymakers that consistently and unquestionably leads to a maximum utility solution may be overly ambitious given the

65. Freedman, *Strategy: A History* pp. 600-05, 618-22.

many variables involved and the foibles of human nature. A more practicable approach may be one that accepts the limitations of bounded rationality and aims to produce better, albeit not perfect, grand strategic thinking.

The poliheuristic choice information processing architecture appears to meet this objective. This model in being structured in a way that is cognizant of human decision-making processes and policymaking practices has the potential to usefully guide *how* policymakers think about grand strategy.

The *what* of grand strategy is missing though, and while policymakers have traditionally used historical analogies these have significant shortcomings. Schemas in being generalized abstracted representations appear more likely to lead to better outcomes. The poliheuristic choice model populated with optimized grand strategy schemas could potentially improve the thinking of policymakers when they first consider formulating new grand strategies. For this though, schemas appropriate for grand strategy need to be developed.

PART TWO: DEVELOPING THE COGNITIVE FRAME

Grand strategy has two major elements: the creating of change through the application of power and the building of this power.

Chapter 4 determines that in creating change in an established order there are three ways: try to stop another achieving their desired objective, try to work with another to achieve a jointly desired objective, or try to alter another's thinking. These three ways define the types of grand strategy: denial, engagement and reform. A grand strategy cognitive frame is built using the poliheuristic choice structure with the first stage using the three ways as heuristics and a second stage consisting of operationalized schemas. The schemas are derived for denial grand strategies from Mearsheimer's offensive realism, for engagement grand strategies from Moravcsik's new liberalism and for reform grand strategies from Legro, Finnemore's and Sikkink's agentic constructivism. The schemas are images to stimulate thinking not theories to explain and predict events. The cognitive frame developed is to assist policymakers make judgments on the design requirements and general operating logics of new grand strategies.

Chapter 5 develops a cognitive frame for building the material and non-material resources that a grand strategy needs to be implemented. The cognitive frame is built using the poliheuristic choice structure with the first stage using time available, urgency and certainty as a heuristic and a second stage consisting of optimised building power schemas. The schemas devised for building the material resources (money, manpower, and materiel) necessary make use of Robert Gilpin's economic nationalism-economic liberalism typology. Under economic nationalism a state actively manages the distribution of resources; economic liberalism by contrast involves using market forces to distribute resources. As no single theoretical perspective adequately encapsulates the building of the non-material resources (legitimacy and soft power), eclecticism is embraced.

CHAPTER 4: CREATING CHANGE COGNITIVE FRAME

Policymakers want "to exercise control, to shape the world."[1] But how can this be done? To shape the world in a certain way requires knowing what part to push so that the world ends up in the new shape sought. This shaping requires knowledge of how the world works to discern those specific parts of the international system that might be suitably responsive to the instruments of national power. Alexander George thought that policymakers needed knowledge of the particular variables that could be exploited and manipulated to produce the results wanted. George wrote that U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson:

> believed that many problems could be solved if the statesman discovers the missing component, the introduction of which would make a difficult situation manageable. The art of finding the missing component lies in mastering the knowledge of all present and potential elements in a situation and determining what new element, if added by …policy, would make the difficult situation more manageable.[2]

But how to find the "missing component", that element that if pushed and altered in a certain way will reshape the world to our liking? Policymakers may be busy and time constrained but much work on answering these questions has already been done. Sophisticated theories on the workings of the international system that examine the way changes in variables alter the international system are readily available in the academic discipline of International Relations.

This purpose – helping policymakers – indeed motivated the initial setting up of the modern field of International Relations in the aftermath of World War One. The study of International Relations it was hoped would actively assist policymakers in avoiding similar disastrous conflicts in the future.[3] In 1923, Charles Webster, the then holder of the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics, the first such position in

1. Goodin et al., in Moran, Rein, and Goodin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 3-38, p. 3.
2. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 280.
3. William Olson, 'The Growth of a Discipline', in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969*; London: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 3-29, pp. 10-13.

the world, observed that if the academic field of international relations had existed in 1914 "the catastrophe might have been averted…"[4]

Yet today many policymakers consider much International Relations theoretical work irrelevant, inaccessible and unable to contribute to the 'real' world.[5] As George observed, "the eyes of policy specialists quickly glaze over at the first mention of the word 'theory' or the phrase 'scientific study of international relations.'"[6] Creating change in international order though requires knowledge of what to change and this knowledge is buried within International Relations, a field of study created for such a purpose. For policymakers to make use of this knowledge it needs presenting in a digestible form. How then can useful International Relations theoretical knowledge be made more accessible to policymakers when they consider new grand strategies to generate change in international order?

Overcoming this gap between International Relations theoretical perspectives and policymakers – between theory and practice - was the basis for Alexander George's proposals for developing cognitive frames that would bring theory deeply into the policymaking world in a relevant and accessible manner. This chapter builds such a cognitive frame for creating change in international order through using the policy tool of grand strategy. The next chapter develops an accompanying cognitive frame for building the power a grand strategy needs.

To create change you first need to know what levers to push and that is the focus of this chapter. Building from the previous chapter that discussed *how* policymakers think, this chapter now adds *what* they should think about when they formulate grand strategies to change international order. This chapter is in three sections: the first section focuses on the ways grand strategy can create change, the second devises three grand strategy schemas: denial, engagement and reform; the last develops a cognitive frame based on the poliheuristic choice architecture discussed in the previous chapter.

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4. Ibid., p. 10.
5. Walt, 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations', p. 24. See also: Jentleson, 'The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In'. Lepgold and Nincic, *Beyond the Ivory Tower*. Summers, 'Bridging the Divide'. Barnett, 'In Need of Nuance: What the Academy Can Teach'. Desch, 'Professor Smith Goes to Washington'. Nye, 'Scholars on the Sidelines'. Walt, 'The Cult of Irrelevance'. Mahnken, 'Bridging the Gap between the Worlds of Ideas and Action'.
6. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, p. 6.

CREATING CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Grand strategy's primary purpose is to try to change the current international order – the 'political formation' - between the entities involved into a more desirable one. This is a specific type of change though, in seeking to influence "thinking, reacting, competing, and conflicting entities" each with their own agendas and intentions.[7] Schelling noted that this type of interaction is essentially a bargaining situation where the change that is attempted is impacted by the choices the other participants make.[8] This notion of creating desired change in a complex social relationship is at the core of all grand strategy policymaking, rather than a feature of only particular grand strategies.

This characteristic being universal lacks the specificity and granularity necessary for a cognitive frame useful for policymaking. For this purpose it is necessary to add qualifications to this high-level change characteristic and drop down Sartori's ladder of abstraction into the medium level categories of general classes and create a typology.[9] Considering the universal category of creating purposeful change in a social relationship, there seem only a limited number of possible ways:

a. a state can seek to stop another state, or group of states, achieving a desired objective,[10]

b. a state can work with another state, or group of states, to achieve a jointly desired objective, or

c. a state can seek to reform the thinking of another state or group of states.

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7. Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*, p. xviii.
8. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, p. 5.
9. Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *The American Political Science Review,* Vol. 64, No. 4, December 1970, pp. 1033-53, pp. 1040-46.
10. This type of 'way' that tries to deny others achieving their objectives denial may raise two particular concerns. Firstly, the term has a certain negative quality that may seem to imply it neglects positive change. In using a grand strategy, positive change from the perspective of the originating entity is sought. If others oppose this, then a denial grand strategy would seek to create the desired order against their wishes; it would seek to deny them their objectives. If others also support this change then an engagement grand strategy discussed later may be preferred. On the other hand, if the positive change desired does not involve others then the matter does not meet the criteria discussed in Chapter 1 for when a grand strategy methodology is appropriate. Another methodology might be better employed. Secondly, there may appear some confusion with the notion of risk management discussed earlier. Risk management seeks to limit damage inflicted if a particular event occurs; it is an after the event action. This contrasts with denying another achieving their objectives, which is broader in scope and intent, and may be proactive.

These three high-level ways of creating change can be labelled for ease and simplicity as denial, engagement and reform: denial entailing stopping another achieving their objectives, engagement implying working with another and reform as transforming another's thinking in a particularly desirable way.[11] These actions involve the application of power in particular ways that consciously creates change and builds towards a specific, preferred end state. These three terms - denial, engagement and reform – shape the cognitive frame as it is developed and progressively become the evocative 'bumper sticker' titles able to make this approach to grand strategy formulation readily accessible to policymakers.

The concept of power is complex and deeply contested in International Relations theory. Conceptually, power may be considered as both a resource and as an ability to create effects.[12] This dual nature is comparable with that of grand strategy that seeks both to develop and apply the instruments of power. Power as a resource is considered more fully in the next chapter; this chapter concentrates on the use of power to achieve effects, to create change. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have usefully examined this later aspect of power and devised an important taxonomy.

Barnett and Duvall define power in international politics as "the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate."[13] Their two-dimensional taxonomy accordingly conceives different types of power that vary based on aspects of the social relationships between the actors involved. In the first dimension, the use of power can be direct where the actors involved are "in physical, historical, or social positional proximity", or indirect where the relationship between the actors involved is "detached and mediated, or operates at a physical, temporal, or social distance."[14] In the second dimension, the use of power can be to

11. While this discussion has concentrated on states, as has been discussed earlier, there is nothing to prevent grand strategies being both implemented by non-state actors or being directed against non-state actors. The discussion in this section has been limited to states to avoid overly complicating the presentation of the argument.
12. Felix Berenskoetter, 'Thinking About Power', in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (eds.), *Power in World Politics* Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-22, p. 6. Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 7-10.
13. Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', p. 45.
14. Ibid., pp. 47-48.

exercise control over others, or to define and constitute who actors are in an ideational sense.[15] These two dimensions break the concept of power as an effect into four types:

> Compulsory power exists in the direct control of one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another. Institutional power exists in actors' indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a direct and specific—hence, mutually constituting—kind. Productive power works through diffuse constitutive relations to produce the situated social capacities of actors.[16]

Of these four, three – compulsory, institutional and productive - are agent-centred concerning the use of power by one actor over another and directly relate to the application of power being considered in this chapter. Structural power though is subject-centred and will be examined from a resource perspective in the next chapter.

The three types of agent-centred power that Barnett and Duvall examine may be extended and incorporated into the abstract ways of creating change discussed earlier. Compulsory power involving an actor imposing its will on others over their resistance and objections can be related to a state seeking to stop others achieving their desired objectives. Institutional power in being collective and working through socially extended, diffuse relations can be associated with a state working with others to achieve jointly desired objectives. Lastly, productive power involving the shaping and fixing of norms, customs and social identities of others can be connected to a state seeking to reform another.[17] Importantly, the three forms of power also have broad conceptual linkages respectively with the International Relations theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism.[18]

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15. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
16. Ibid., p. 48.
17. Lipschutz elaborates further that: "Productive power is…that power rooted in the language and practices that construct and organise social life, individual and collective identities and membership in a political community." Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'On the Transformational Potential of Global Civil Society', in Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (eds.), *Power in World Politics* Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, pp. 225-43, p. 230.
18. The forms of power do not map precisely onto the different theories but "…each theoretical tradition does favour an understanding of power that corresponds to one or another of the concepts distinguished by our taxonomy." Barnett and Duval relate compulsory power to realism and institutional power to liberalism however, they are more circumspect with constructivist thinking being associated with both structural and productive power. Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', pp. 49-57. Others

Extending these associations suggests that the three ways of creating change - denial, engagement and reform - could be broadly and cautiously related to realism, liberalism and constructivism. These theoretical schools are though 'broad churches' with many different positions, beliefs and opinions; for the moment the linkage identified is simply suggesting a general relationship.

The denial course of action involves taking action to stop another achieving a desired objective and this is broadly attuned to realism. Realism considers that actors have an inherently competitive and conflictual nature and that this drives them to instinctively try to thwart the ambitions of other states. Given the first concern of states under realism is to maintain their relative position in the international system, there is a predisposition to resist change.[19] Realism has a "status quo bias" with continuity emphasized over change.[20] Modern realist paradigms are best at describing how the *status quo* is maintained and change is actively prevented.[21]

The denial course of action though can apply to circumstances more expansive than simply preventing change. This course of action can also apply to more extreme cases such as stopping another achieving their objective of survival, retaining control of territory or political independence. Realism reflects this encompassing in its theoretical perspective states that seek to revise the *status quo* against others opposition and make "at a maximum, [a] drive for universal domination."[22] The key criterion is that of actively stopping others achieving their objectives.

Conversely, liberalism's notion of the operation of the international system being fundamentally cooperative is compatible with the course of action of working with another to achieve desired common objectives.[23] This is not to deny that realism does allow for cooperation particularly in alliances, but realism is fundamentally built

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concur with this approach see: Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches: 4th Edition*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 165.

19. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st edn., New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1979, p. 162.

20. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc 2001, p. 20.

21. Barry Buzan et al., *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*; New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 26.

22. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* p. 116.

23. Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands ', in Charles W. Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*; New York: St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 107-50, pp. 117-20.

upon conflictual relations. Liberalism in contrast is based on the possibilities of, and the opportunities for, cooperation.[24] All of liberalism's strands stress the importance of beneficial collective outcomes.[25] Brian Rathbun writes:

> liberalism is generally understood as a set of arguments that expect either increasingly or at least potentially greater cooperation in the modern world. The stress on potential cooperation is the…core definition that links together all…variants and generations of liberalism.[26]

Similarly, the constructivists concept of the state as being malleable and subject to being altered through changes in societal norms and identities is broadly compatible with the reform change objective of transforming another's thinking in a particularly desirable way. Unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism includes the possibility of rapid, radical change and that national identity in being socially constructed can be remade, altered or reinforced.[27] There is across the different types of constructivist thinking "a shared commitment to a transformational logic…"[28]

The broad and imprecise relationships built between the three International Relations schools and the three change courses of action with their associated types of grand strategy simply reflects that each school has differences implicit in the way they understand international relations. Peter Katzenstein writes that:

> In contemporary international relations scholarship constructivist, liberal, and realist explanatory sketches differ greatly in terms of the kinds of insights they offer. …These differences do not merely represent competing empirical claims. They reveal also differences in problem focus and in the capacity to solve

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24. Robert Jervis, 'Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate', *International Security,* Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 42-63, p. 46.
25. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 'Liberal Approaches', in Jennifer Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006b, pp. 55-61, p. 56.
26. Brian C. Rathbun, 'Is Anybody Not an (International Relations) Liberal?', *Security Studies,* Vol. 19, No. 1, 2010, pp. 2-25, p. 8.
27. Sterling-Folker, 'Constructivist Approaches', in Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006a, pp. 115-22, pp. 115-19. Matthew J. Hoffmann, 'Social (De) Construction: The Failure of a Multinational State', in Jennifer Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 123-38.
28. Sterling-Folker, 'Constructivist Approaches', in Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006a, pp. 115-22, p. 120.

particular kinds of problems.[29]

International Relations theories are genuinely dissimilar at the level of ontology.[30] They conceive different worlds that function in disparate ways. Their underlying premises about how-the-world-works vary across the diverse theoretical perspectives. Building specific relationships between the identified ways of creating change and the three major theoretical perspectives therefore attempts to match each school's ontological capacities to the particular grand strategic 'way' they are considered most useful for. This is a form of 'methodological pluralism' that allows for the use of different methods of inquiry as different types of questions are posed, but makes no judgments on which theory is superior or right.[31]

Milja Kurki and Colin Wight observe that a pluralist approach recognizes that as: "the social world is ontologically highly complex, and there are many ways to come to know the world, it is better that one does not restrict methods *a priori*."[32] Such an approach follows the counsel of Barry Buzan that:

> A choice of theory should depend on what one wants to think about rather than having the question depending on the *a priori* chosen theory. One does not attack a flat tire with a chainsaw, simply because one takes a liking to chainsaws.[33]

A particular way of creating change is then broadly related with a theoretical perspective's distinctive and unique ontology. These associations are usefully inclusive from a policymaking viewpoint. Thinking about grand strategic alternatives using such broad, abstract ways of creating change allows for introducing different focuses of attention, for bringing in considerations of national interests and for concerns about

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29. Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, 'Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*; Oxon: Routledge, 2008, pp. 249-85, p. 266.
30. Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 291.
31. Fred Chernoff, 'Critical Realism, Scientific Realism, and International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* Vol. 35, No. 2, 2007, pp. 399-407, p. 402, Footnote 17.
32. Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, 'International Relations and Social Science', in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 13-33, p. 24.
33. Peer Schouten, 'Theory Talk #35: Barry Buzan on International Society, Securitization, and an English School Map of the World', *Theory Talks,* School of Global Studies, Göteberg, 19 December 2009, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html.

threats and opportunities. This conceptual approach has a functional logic while being consistent with common public and professional usage, being easily comprehendible and potentially providing rich insights.

The approach however, still remains lacking in specificity and granularity and a further step down Sartori's ladder of abstraction is necessary.[34] In this, the concept is roughly reaching the rungs in the ladder comparable to that where policymakers are when they use historical analogies to inform their thinking about grand strategies. This use by policymakers was discussed in Chapter 3 and a determination made that given the disappointing results obtained using historical analogies that using schemas would be preferred.

Accordingly, in this next step involving adding more specificity and granularity the opportunity will be taken to develop this lower rung in the form of schemas. This is a crucial move as it brings the work on human cognitive processes and how to improve them discussed earlier deep into the development of the cognitive frame. This step will allow later integration of these schemas into the poliheuristic choice information processing architecture that Chapter 3 also discussed and recommended. This will ensure that the cognitive frame that is developed addresses both *how* policymakers should think when formulating grand strategies and *what* they should think about.

The schemas that are being constructed need to be optimized for the specific purpose envisaged. As discussed in Chapter 3, such schemas are intended to provide the bounded rationality of policymakers initially considering grand strategic choices and alternatives. The schemas in effect become how policymakers should view the world and consider how-the-world-works. The schemas are therefore analogous to the readily understood, pre-processed solutions that prescriptive works utilise and in being paired with the evocative 'bumper sticker' titles of denial, engagement and reform help make the cognitive frame this thesis develops more accessible to policymakers.

The schemas being a further step down in the approach being taken concerning creating change will be individually developed by operationalizing realism, liberalism and constructivism. An important advantage of this is that the three schemas in being derived from three International Relations theories should be robust, deep and rich. The

34. Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', pp. 1040-46.

end result of this operationalizing step will mean that policymakers using the completed cognitive frame will view the world through the lens of the specific worldview schema that the frame recommends for the particular type of change being considered.

Crucially, this usage means that the schemas will be stylized to specifically assist policymaker's cognition, mainly by replacing the functions that historical analogies often perform. These schemas then are not meant to be theories or models in the sense of explaining outcomes or predicting events. The subtleties, nuances and caution often used when discussing realist, liberal and constructivist theoretical perspectives are not accordingly appropriate to the use envisaged.

The intention instead is to create three distinct images from the three theoretical paradigms. These images will be word pictures intended to stimulate and provoke policymakers' cognition when initially diagnosing new grand strategic issues. Such images are not meant to be comprehensive or well rounded but rather to draw attention to certain important aspects while excluding less significant others. Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan write:

> An 'image' is not a reasoned proposition; rather it is impressionistic or suggestive of what is important…. It is a picture that draws us to what is thought to be an important feature. It seeks to simplify, and to influence, and to depict a complex reality.[35]

The three theoretical perspectives of realism, liberalism and constructivism simplified into such stylized images will accordingly elaborate each theory's concepts of creating change in a purpose specific manner that relates to grand strategy deliberations. These theories though are as noted earlier, broad churches. Each has numerous sub-schools and theoretical positions, some of which conflict or are inconsistent. Indeed none of the three paradigms makes coherent claims about how states do and should act. Instead, deciding which sub-schools to operationalize is influenced by the intended use as perceptual lenses for policymakers to use when diagnosing issues. Such a function calls for avoiding overlapping theoretical perspectives and a concentration on each viewpoint's unique attributes in a

35. Greg Fry and Jacinta O'Hagan (eds.), *Contending Images of World Politics*; Basingstoke, Macmillan Press Ltd; 2000, p. 5.

parsimonious manner that shuns the vagueness and ambiguities that policymakers find unhelpful.[36] In so doing, the images developed will be distinctly reductionist.

This hard-edged image approach is noticeably different to that which George suggested. George saw that eyes of policymakers glazed over at the mention of theory and so he strived to make these theories less abstract and more meaningful for practical policymakers.[37] This approach added the nuance and subtlety found in the real world but moved the theories away from being well differentiated models to instead being hard to tell apart. This meant that when George tried to provide policymakers with succinct advice on formulating coercive diplomacy strategies he gave them eight contextual variables and seven favouring conditions.[38] This was a variety and number that would confuse most policymakers. This thesis reverses George's approach, employs greater not less abstraction, and makes the theories into hard-edged, images to try to reduce the complexity for time-constrained policymakers.

The key issue for policymakers is creating purposeful change and for this the worldview schemas to be useful must clearly identify the particular levers that policymakers are able to manipulate to create change. Descriptive power as a retrospective analysis tool has value, but for policymakers looking forward to the impact of future policies the schemas should give insights on how change can be actively brought about using the instruments of national power. This is a deliberate use of operationalized theoretical perspectives to stimulate the thinking of busy, time-constrained policymakers.

Three specific perspectives are selected to be operationalized from within the broad churches of realism, liberalism and constructivism. While these perspectives have been chosen for the various reasons discussed, there still remains a degree of arbitrariness. Another examination of the three schools, or of different schools entirely, may yield other perspectives that on further analysis seem better suited for the task envisaged. Accordingly, the particular perspectives chosen to be operationalized for the schemas in this thesis should be considered as indicative or illustrative rather then definitive. The thesis overall though, should indicate if the design of the cognitive frame

36. Walt, 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations', pp. 35-37.
37. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, p. 6.
38. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*.

developed to assist grand strategy policymaking has some merit. If so, other replacement perspectives should be readily able to be inserted if such improvements appear necessary and sensible.

The principal realist theoretical perspective used to develop a denial grand strategy schema is John Mearsheimer's offensive realism.[39] Realism's present vitality rests on its distinctive structural approach.[40] In significantly extending neo-realism, Mearsheimer offers distinct, sharp-edged policy advice that details which instruments of national power are most important and how they should be employed, including in future grand strategies.[41] Mearsheimer only addresses change in the international system in a limited indirect manner and for this aspect Robert Gilpin's perspectives are preferred.[42]

An alternative would be the other major strand of contemporary realist thought - neoclassical realism - that also includes structure but introduces additional domestic and ideational factors.[43] Neoclassical realism thus blurs the boundaries between the three International Relations schools making it difficult to devise the three desired distinct and sharp-edged schemas. A neoclassical realist schema would overlap with the others as liberalism and constructivism have at their core domestic and ideational factors. Accordingly, neoclassical realism is not used as the basis for schema development. The issue is though examined further in Chapter 9.

The principal liberal theoretical perspective operationalized into an engagement grand strategy schema is Andrew Moravcsik's new liberalism, which stresses the role of sub-state groups and domestic factors in international relations.[44] Liberalism at its core is a political theory - rather than an International Relations theory - with a strongly

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39. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
40. John M. Schuessler, 'Should Realism Return to Its Roots?', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 583-89, p. 588.
41. Peter Toft, 'John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power', *Journal of International Relations and Development* Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 381-408. Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism as Tragedy', *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 30, No. 3, July 2004, pp. 427-41. Glenn H. Snyder, 'Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay', *International Security,* Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, pp. 149-73.
42. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*. William C. Wohlforth, 'Gilpinian Realism and International Relations', *International Relations* Vol. 25, No. 4, December 2011, pp. 499-511, pp. 504-06.
43. Brian Rathbun, 'A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism', *Security Studies,* Vol. 17, No. 2, 2008, pp. 294-321.
44. Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organization,* Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53.

normative position defined by the centrality of individual human rights, private property and representative government.[45] For the diagnostic function envisaged though, Moravcsik's work most usefully recasts liberal theory in positivist terms, emphasizes strategic interaction, has heuristic utility, develops causal generalizations and addresses international politics.[46]

Crucially, the engagement grand strategy is not a liberal grand strategy. A liberal grand strategy would incorporate the normative positions of liberal philosophers whereas the engagement grand strategy does not. The engagement grand strategy proposed here uses Moravcsik's work as the basis for how different groups within democratic or authoritarian states shape an entity's social purpose through preference formation. He holds this is more than simply 'second image' domestic politics being instead focused on the importance of state-society relations and the ultimate primacy of the societal context.[47] Moravcsik concentrates on explaining state preferences and behaviors rather than defining types of international orders and so for this Keohane, Ikenberry, Russett and Oneal are used.[48] Moravcsik's insights inform how these orders may be achieved using an engagement grand strategy but the characterization of the particular international orders is derived from work of the others noted.

An alternative to using new liberalism could be to develop a schema based on institutionalist liberalism however in this thesis institutions are conceived as both an end and a means of grand strategy.[49] Institutions are considered as an end, in the sense of being a type of international order in the engagement grand strategy schema and as a

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45. Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics Revisited', in Charles W. Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*; New York: St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 83-106.
46. Adam R. C. Humphreys, 'What Should We Expect of a Liberal Explanatory Theory?', *Journal of International Political Theory,* Vol. 8, No. 1-2, April 2012, pp. 25-47. Christian Reus-Smit, 'The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory ', *European Journal of International Law,* Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001, pp. 573-93.
47. See Note 55 at: Andrew Moravcsik, 'Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment', *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Papers*; Cambridge: Harvard University, 2001, p. 55.
48. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd edn., Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001.
49. Zacher and Matthew, in Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*; New York: St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 107-50, pp. 133-36.

means by which grand strategy is implemented, and thus included in all three schemas. Accordingly this variant of liberalism does not form the basis of a schema.

The principal constructivist theoretical perspectives operationalized for the reform grand strategy schema are those of Jeffrey Legro, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink that take an instrumental, strategic approach to changing social rules.[50] Such agentic constructivism is "concerned with how agents – that is real people and organizations – promote new ideas and practices."[51] Using constructivism may appear problematic as it is not a substantive theory of politics like realism and liberalism however, in offering a framework for thinking about social interaction and change, constructivism is appropriate for a process in which the user adds the context.[52]

An alternative could be to develop schemas based on critical theory, to use the distinction made by Ted Hopf in classifying constructivist thinking as being either critical or conventional.[53] Critical social theory often uses inductive techniques and deconstructive methodologies, and questions how social structures arise rather than why.[54] Conventional constructivism by contrast has a positivist epistemological orientation and appears better suited to devising grand strategy schemas and is used albeit the agentic sub-school, rather than the dominant structural approach.[55]

There is a key matter of ontology in this development and use of the three schemas. Each schema is derived from a different International Relations school that conceives different international systems that function in dissimilar ways. Given this, the denial schema focuses on states as the key actors in the international system, the

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50. Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization,* Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887-917.
51. Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*; New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011, pp. 236-37.
52. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics', *Annual Review of Politcial Science,* Vol. 4, No. 1, June 2001, pp. 391-416, p. 393.
53. Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security,* Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 171-200, p. 172.
54. Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)*; ARENA Working Papers 15/03, University of Oslo, Oslo, 2003, pp. 2-3.
55. There is a normative dimension to this classification system that should not be overlooked. This suggests that critical constructivism may at some stage be considered useful when conceptualizing grand strategies. See: Nik Hynek and Andrea Teti, 'Saving Identity from Postmodernism? The Normalization of Constructivism in International Relations', *Contemporary Political Theory,* Vol. 9, No. 2, 2010, pp. 171-99.

engagement schema focuses on sub-state groups within the societal context[56], while the reform schema strategy focuses on ideas across the societal, state and global system levels.

In turning to the operationalization of the three selected theories into grand strategy schemas, the approach taken is shaped by the purpose of a grand strategy being creating change from the present towards a preferred future order. Thinking about how to create a change that achieves a specific outcome involves understanding the present order, the new desired order and the path between the two. The future must be comprehended in the terms of the present to allow definition of the type of change necessary and determination of the steps necessary to get there.

This notion is deeply embedded in international relations. In a seminal work, the fourth and most famous Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics, ex-diplomat E. H. Carr, declared that international relations "is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be."[57] He considered that International Relations should provide visions of ideal futures but achieving these required understanding the realities of the present time. Focusing solely on 'what is' is ultimately barren with an essential part of purposeful change towards a better future understanding 'what ought to be.'[58]

The approach used to build the schemas is to consider a grand strategy as a conceptual roadmap from the present 'what is' to a desired future 'what ought to be' and in a metaphorical sense encompass the starting point, the journey and the end. The starting point might consist of a description of the external world including the system structure, the key change mechanisms of this system, and the key actors and their interrelationships. The journey segment of the roadmap may focus on the instruments of national power that could create a change, how they may achieve their effect, which instruments are most effective and their advantages and shortcomings. Finally, the end point might be an understanding of the alternative future orders possible and which destination is preferred.

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56. See Note 55 at: Moravcsik, 'Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment', 2001, p. 55.
57. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd edn., New York: Harper & Row, 1939, p. 5.
58. Ibid., p. 10.

Earlier in this chapter three distinct ways of creating purposeful change were determined. Accordingly, three roadmaps devised through operationalizing offensive realism, new liberalism and agentic constructivism are necessary: one each for denial, engagement and reform. In these schemas built using a roadmap structure, the instruments of power are for ease divided into information, diplomacy, economics and military.

Importantly, and to reiterate, these schemas are not meant to be new theories or a critical analysis of existing theories. Instead they are intended to be sharp edged, stylized word pictures that might stimulate and provoke a policymaker's cognition. The schemas are not designed to be comprehensive, well-rounded or balanced but rather draw attention to certain aspects important to grand strategy policymaking while excluding others. Moreover, the subtleties, nuances and cautions often found in International Relations theories are disregarded and a sharply reductionist approach adopted to ensure the schemas do not overlap.

The description given here of the schemas is brief to both allow the general idea to be grasped and avoid making the presentation of this thesis's argument overly convoluted. Annex A gives a more complete description of each schema and is intended to provide the depth, detail and granularity that policymakers may need when considering grand strategic issues, especially when they use the diagnostic process for the first time.

Denial Grand Strategy Schema

The fundamental assumption underpinning a denial grand strategy is that the behaviours and actions of states and non-state actors reflect their power relative to one another. Change in the international system is determined by changes in the distribution of relative power, especially that of the great powers. States can change this distribution through increasing their own power by internal and external means. Internally states can seek to better exploit their resources, develop economically, acquire greater military power and increase societal cohesion. Externally states can enter into alliances to gain access to increased power or undertake wars.

The structure of the international system is defined not by the sum of all the actors within it but rather by the most powerful. Weak states can be effectively

disregarded as operating in the margins of the international system and being simply objects of the major powers' actions.

States are the most important unit of the international system. In this, the nature of a state, democratic or authoritarian, its internal political structures and domestic groups are unimportant. All states act according to the same logic of relative power conflicts regardless of their national culture, political system or leaders.

All though must be sensitive to the costs involved of pursing their objectives; actions should strengthen, not weaken, their power relative to others. As rational actors, states only attempt change if their expected gains exceed the expected costs and so those that wish to counter change should raise the costs to the revisionist entities of actively seeking change.

In a denial grand strategy, the instruments of national power should be used to influence external events in ways that increase one's own national power relative to other states. In assessing another's power, their capabilities - especially military forces - are closely examined. The means of states, not their ends, matter most.

The military instrument of power should be directed against adversary military capabilities but in ways that increase the state's relative power; war is both a legitimate and important strategy. Apposite strategies include blackmail involving making threats of war while avoiding the costs to oneself of actually waging war, 'bait and bleed' through provoking long and costly wars between rivals and 'bloodletting' in ensuring a war is deliberately prolonged and costly for the adversaries.

The economic instrument of power can be used similarly. Geo-economic actions can enlarge one's own economic might while deliberately impeding the growth of others. The preferred situation is one where one's growth is rapid but that of rivals is negligible or even negative. Intra-alliance trade can deliver positive benefits through the increased economies of scale gained growing the total economic power, and thus potentially military strength, of an alliance. Such considerations also suggest that trade with potential adversaries should be strictly limited as this may have the undesirable effect of increasing their relative power.

The diplomatic instrument can be used to create alliances that increase a state's relative power. This carries risks: firstly, an alliance may entrap them in another's conflicts, secondly abandonment is a constant concern, and thirdly all will try to pass the costs of any action onto others rather than undertaking this themselves.

International institutions are of value mainly as instruments to bind others to specific agreements, and to control their behaviour and actions in advantageous ways. In institutions the central issue is how maximise the gains for oneself and how to limit the gains of others. Given this conflictual basis, cheating by members is a particular concern.

The denial grand strategy's potential types of international order are a balance of power, a concert of powers and hegemonic stability. In a balance of power order, states or non-state actors develop internally and access external resources to balance the power of others sufficiently to achieve a rough equilibrium. While often involving alliances, these are impermanent as the continually changing relative power between all parties involved often necessitates new alignments. Conversely in a concert of powers order the system's great powers act together to manage it to ensure a stable political equilibrium; none seeks system dominance, there is a sense of equality and security, systemic roles are not endangered, and each possesses meaningful influence. A hegemonic stability order envisages a uniquely powerful state or non-state actors providing systemic leadership. The sharply uneven distribution of power allows the hegemon to establish and maintain desired norms across the international system through providing collective goods, enforcing rules and co-opting others to burden-share.

Engagement Grand Strategy Schema

The fundamental assumption underpinning an engagement grand strategy is that within other states or non-state actors there are groups whose ambitions can be exploited. The behaviours and actions of states and non-state actors reflect their domestic circumstances.

The social purpose of each state and non-state actor is determined by their preferences, and these reflect the capture and recapture of the states or non-state actors by influential coalitions of self-interested, rational individuals and groups. This social

purpose determines what states and non-state actors do. An engagement grand strategy cooperates with useful internal parties to try to ensure their state's or non-state actor's social purpose is as we both desire.

Change in the international system is created by a change in the distribution of the constituent states' and non-state actor's social purposes, with changes in their individual preferences coming "bottom up" as a product of internal politics and pressures. External factors can also be influential in offering windows of opportunity for domestic individuals and groups to take advantage of or in providing stimuli for change.

The international system is composed of numerous states each with their own individual state preferences that reflect their capture and recapture by their own particular domestic actors. Accordingly, every state is different and distinctive making the international system intrinsically complex. This complexity is exacerbated as states may act at the same time as either unitary or disaggregated actors depending on the issue areas being considered. In some circumstances they will exhibit strong internal cohesion. In other matters different elements within each may interact with other countries in a semi-autonomous manner.

Multiple transnational linkages can form between a country's sub-state actors and interested foreign parties; these linkages may support, undercut or go around state lines of communication. In these linkages cooperation is important and involves the different individuals and groups seeking absolute gains irrespective of the distribution of these gains. All will cooperate when each can achieve beneficial outcomes, even if of differing scales.

The ends of states or non-state actors matter most, not their means. In relationships between states and non-state actors some will have stronger preferences over certain outcomes then others. The more motivated states and non-state actors will be more willing and able to mobilize and expend national resources for their desired objectives then states with less strongly held attitudes. This difference in intensity can give a state and a non-state actor greater power to decide an issue than any apparent deficiency in relative power capabilities might suggest.

In an engagement grand strategy the instruments of national power should be focused on constructing and supporting useful influential domestic interest groups in other states or non-state actors. The overall intent is to strengthen those groups that hold desirable preferences so that they capture the state or non-state actor and determine its social purpose to be as we desire. Simultaneously, those groups that hold disagreeable preferences should be actively weakened sufficiently enough so that they do not prevail. An engagement grand strategy is based on cooperation in the sense that it seeks to help advance the ambitions of others when these are useful to achieving our objectives.

The diplomatic instrument can be used to gain an understanding of the internal complexities of another state or non-state actor and determine the important individuals and groups, their interests and preferences. Having identified these, the diplomatic instrument can then be focussed on shaping and helping key useful individuals and groups through on-going support and encouragement, while actively undermining others.

The economic instruments can be used to provide incentives or apply negative sanctions to those domestic interest groups that profit from transnational economic interactions. Incentives support these domestic groups who then work to sustain these linkages through favourable national policies. Negative measures in imposing costs can instead lead these groups to exert pressure on the state to alter the national behaviours and actions that led to the sanctions.

International institutions can be used instrumentally to advance already established preferences. They are created to realize common interests, advance specific mutual preferences, avoid sub-optimal outcomes and to maximize the potential gains for all parties involved. Such institutions in involving ongoing interaction and information exchange can also build trust and knowledge of others' intentions.

The informational instrument can be used to assist and reinforce the advancement of the preferred individuals and groups. The information means may be able to develop a normative perception in the state or non-state actor targeted that the preferred internal individuals and groups are on the 'right' path whereas others are at best misguided, or at worse have sinister motives detrimental to the parent society. The

deliberate branding of particular individuals and groups may help support shaping perceptions within the state or non-state actor.

The military instrument may be targeted upon what helpful or opposed domestic groups in other entities value most, which generally would be related to their economic or financial interests. Groups within friendly or adversary countries holding unhelpful preferences can be actively undermined; conversely those with useful preferences should be supported and strengthened.

An engagement grand strategy can build three types of international order: complex interdependence, institutionalism and the liberal peace. A complex interdependence order has three defining characteristics: multiple channels connect states ensuring any actions taken have reciprocal effects, there is no hierarchy of issues, and military force is not threatened. Each party involved perceives benefits but their asymmetrical interdependencies provide useful sources of influence for actors in dealing with another. They can influence another's preferences by establishing linkages between issues, manipulating the setting of agendas to determine how issues are framed, penetrating those domestic groups who shape the preferences of state and non-state actors, and making use of international institutions.

Situated within a stable political system, an institutionalist order involves a shared agreement between all concerned on the order's underpinning principles, the operating rules and the norms. An institutionalist order connects state and societal elites in transnational linkages that benefit those involved and gives them a stake in its continuance. A liberal peace order deepens and extends the other types of order in combining democratic representative governments, international institutions and transnational economic interdependence.

Reform Grand Strategy Schema

The fundamental assumption underpinning a reform grand strategy is that the behaviours and actions of states and non-state actors reflect the social rules that animate them – and these rules can be changed. Such rules arise through social interaction. The actors shape their own social context (structure) and this then shapes the interests, identities, and behaviours of the actors. States behave and act in a manner appropriate to these social rules rather than seeking to maximize desired outcomes.

Change in the international system is driven by changes in norms and identities albeit that the social rules advocated by great powers are more noteworthy than those of lesser states and non-state actors. Norms are shared understandings of what kinds of actions are appropriate; they define and bound the range of acceptable policy choices and instrumentally rational behaviour. Identities define an actor's characteristics, distinctiveness and uniqueness and are formed by how actors conceive of themselves compared to others. Changing a social structure requires altering a tightly integrated network of social expectations and obligations that is mutually reinforcing with an inbuilt resistance to change.

The emergence of a new social rule requires ideational entrepreneurs - individuals, organizations or states - to engage in strategic social construction involving two connected stages: ideational collapse and replacement. A suitable environment is essential for a change in social rules; the old ideas must be understood to have collapsed. Existing ideas are not simply eliminated when they fail. These rules had a social purpose that remains and they must be actively replaced. The new ideas need to advanced by advocates who are prominent and authoritative in terms of the social rule being advanced, and able to make use of their organizational platforms to give the desired rules credence and authority. This is influencing ideas from the top-down through the ideational elites.

Ideational entrepreneurs need to progressively persuade enough influential advocates sufficient to reach the ''tipping'' point at which a critical mass adopts the new rule and redefines appropriate behaviour for the social entity concerned. For the new social rules though to permanently change mass attitudes the rules need to enter the public sphere and be institutionalized. The new rules should also appear to address the problems that caused the old social rule's collapse. Negative results can lead to renewed ideational turmoil or a return to the old ways.

In a reform grand strategy, the instruments of national power are used to advance and support those social rules they deem attractive. The focus of these instruments should be on the advocates and promoters of new ideas who shape and influence their parent society's social rules. Initially the aim is convincing these ideational elites of the efficaciousness of the new social rules and then as the tipping point is approached, on supporting their efforts to advance the rule cascade and

consolidation. A combination of ideational measures and material support is generally needed. New ideas alone unsupported by material means are usually insufficient to have an existing social rule replaced.

The military and economic instruments of power are oriented to support the message of the 'goodness' of the desired particular social rule. The significance of military and economic actions in advancing the desired ideas is more important than the actions themselves. Actions taken must be seen as legitimate in the context of the social rules being advanced; actions considered 'illegitimate' will work against the rule change sought. The ends do not justify the means, instead the means justify, or rather legitimate, the ends.

With social interaction driving change, the diplomatic instrument of national power is important. Interaction is necessary for others to understand and embrace your preferred social rules; without meaningful interaction change is impossible. However, actors at the system, unit, or individual level can readily employ varying means of deception to shape and manipulate others. The face presented in a social interaction may not be the real face. In a reform grand strategy deception may be effective.

The informational instrument is significant both in further assisting productive social interaction but more importantly in ensuring the key ideational messages that explain and justify the desired social rule are understood by all. The use of words is not just to describe or represent events and actions but rather to create a desired understanding of them. Institutions in being mutually constituted can be used to advance desired new identities and norms being internalized by others.

States can take action to build the international orders they prefer based on widening the circle of states that have their desired norms and identities. Those with different social rules can appear particularly illegitimate and dangerous, and requiring action to change.

CREATING CHANGE COGNITIVE FRAME

The three high-level grand strategy potential courses of action were determined to be denial, engagement and reform. These three generic ways were related with three specific forms of power - compulsory, institutional and productive - that have broad but

imprecise conceptual associations to realism, liberalism and constructivism. These theoretical perspectives were then operationalized into optimised grand strategy schemas: stylized images able to provide policymakers with a bounded rationality more efficacious than historical analogies. In this it should be recalled that each schema uses a different ontology: the denial schema focuses on states as the key actors in the international system, the engagement schema conversely focuses on sub-state groups while the reform schema focuses on ideas. These schemas in being linked to specific grand strategy 'ways' are intended to provide a lens through which policymakers view a particular problem.

Chapter 3 determined that the poliheuristic choice model was the preferred information processing architecture for the cognitive frame. In the poliheuristic choice architecture, the first stage screens out unsuitable options using noncompensatory, dimension-based processing while the second evaluates the remaining policy options using rational choice optimization.

In applying this architecture to the specific case of creating change in international order, policymakers in the first stage determine the grand strategy 'way' that will act as a screen, and in the second stage diagnose the issue by applying the schema related to the way they have chosen. The first stage involves a single dimension search while the second involves expected utility maximisation. In linking 'ways' with the schemas within the poliheuristic choice information processing architecture, the 'how' and the 'what' of policymakers thinking about grand strategy is encompassed.

The grand strategy selection process is illustrated diagrammatically in the simple flow diagram below. The second stage in the diagram includes the alternative grand strategic objectives, the ends, to reinforce that the ambition of a grand strategy is to create a particular desired international order and that these outcomes are tied to specific courses of actions. The ends and the ways are connected not independent.



Figure 1. Creating Change Cognitive Frame

The creating change cognitive frame has a wide potential domain of application. A grand strategy seeks to build and establish a desired political formation that constitutes a particular type of relationship between the different states involved. Order in this sense may mean a system wide international order but also the kind of order in the relationships between a smaller number of states. Many grand strategies address

relationships between only one state and another; in these dyadic interactions 'order' has a more localized context.

The grand strategy cognitive frame adopts a scalable view of 'systems' derived from regional security complex theory, as elaborated by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. They conceive of such complexes as hierarchically lying between the global system and the state level, having distinct socially constructed boundaries, involving two or more autonomous states and being interoperable with realist, liberal and constructivist thought.[59] In the cognitive frame, the system dimensions for the three schemas developed are those that the grand strategy encompasses. Within these variable scale systems, the insights flowing from realism, liberalism and constructivism as operationalized into worldview schemas apply.

Buzan and Wæver focus on states but some also apply similar concepts to the sub-state level. Anthony Vinci conceives closed political communities such as terrorist groups, insurgents and warlords as being subject to realist dynamics. In a similar manner to states, such sub-state actors function in an anarchical environment and are autonomous, independent and sovereign.[60] In this regard, Chapter 2 noted that there was no particular logic that suggested only states could make and implement grand strategies although the environmental context will be different between states and other organizational forms. Accordingly, the 'international' system of a grand strategy could be sub-state and encompass mainly or even wholly non-state actors.

Combining Buzan's and Wæver's security complex theory with Vinci's work, suggests that the cognitive frame could be used to inform the thinking of non-state actor policymakers formulating small-scale grand strategies. In this however, it should be noted that smaller scale entities have smaller scale resources. While their means may be generically classified as diplomatic, economic, military and informational these are likely to have much less capabilities and capacities than the means of states. This aspect is discussed further in the next chapter on building power.

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59. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 40-82.
60. Anthony Vinci, *Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.

The grand strategy cognitive frame also has a certain domain of abstraction. The apex of the ladder of abstraction used here as discussed earlier is creating change in a complex political relationship; this is the universal class of action. Below this are the three medium level general categories of creating change - denial, engagement and reform - that have been closely examined and operationalized in the process of developing the cognitive frame, but below this is a lower rung. In this lower level additional qualifications can be added to allow even greater granularity and precision. The lower level groupings are those contextual grand strategies that aim for the same type of change and have the same conceptual basis as their associated generic middle level grand strategy category.

In Figure 2, many oft-used terms that relate to context-specific grand strategy examples are placed in the configurative conceptualisation level. This placement is for indicative and illustrative purposes, and usefully connects this thesis's general grand strategy classifications schemes to more common, if contested and often confused, usage. Figure 2 below diagrammatically illustrates the cognitive frame's domain of abstraction.



Figure 2: Grand Strategy Taxonomy

The diagram may imply that the three different types of grand strategy are equivalent. In one important aspect this is not so. As the case studies reveal later during the appraisal process, the denial grand strategy type seems distinctive in that the state taking action is in some respects independent of the targeted entity. Both engagement and reform grand strategies rely on the involvement of those within the object of the grand strategy be they states, organisations or non-state actors. A denial grand strategy though being based on relative power where the potential, threatened or actual use of armed force looms large can be implemented with little support or participation from those on whom the grand strategy is focused. The implementing state can choose and undertake this course of action with little regard to others' concerns or wishes. The engagement and reform grand strategies may leverage off and exploit others' concerns or wishes but they nonetheless must take these into account in grand strategy formulation.

The utility of the three grand strategic types and their associated schemas is assessed later through applying the fully developed cognitive frame to several historical case studies. At the moment, an assumption will be made that the creating change cognitive frame has potential, but needs additional demonstration and further substantiation. Changing an international order is though only part of the grand strategy problem. Building the power needed to create change is also required and this aspect will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: BUILDING POWER COGNITIVE FRAME

Policymakers try to create change through the selective use of power. But where does this power come from? Manpower, money and materials must be extracted and mobilized, and people convinced that the ends are both necessary and just, for without such resources a grand strategy cannot be implemented. This is an area often overlooked.

The limited consideration of the need to build power was a major deficiency of the Bush Doctrine grand strategy of the first decade of the 21st Century.[1] At the time many prescriptive works advocating expansive American grand strategies simply assumed the easy availability of any level of power required. The Bush Doctrine grand strategy followed suit, with undesired consequences:

> U.S. primacy was …damaged by the unexpected cost of the protracted wars, recently estimated by the Congressional Research Service to be $1.3 trillion dollars and mounting. It was eroded by the debts that accrued… the U.S. debt held by foreign governments climbed steadily, from about 13 percent at the end of the Cold War to close to 30 percent at the end of the Bush years. U.S. financial strength and flexibility [was] seriously eroded. Rather than preventing peer competitors from rising, the United States' interventions abroad and budgetary and economic woes at home put Washington at a growing disadvantage vis-à-vis its rivals, most notably Beijing.[2]

The Bush Doctrine stressed creating change in Iraq and assumed that the power necessary would be readily at hand. The succeeding grand strategy of the Obama administration reversed focus and stressed not changing international order but building power.[3] The Bush Doctrine's problems, arising through focusing on creating change and devoting less attention to building power, were reminiscent of the Johnson Administration's Vietnam War grand strategy. Historian Jeffrey Helsing thought that the end result of the persistent neglect of building the power necessary meant that President Johnson left "office under a heavy cloud; with no credibility left; a bloody,

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1. Robert D. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars*; New York: Times Books, 2007, pp. 251-79.
2. Melvyn P. Leffler, '9/11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy, Reconsidered', *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 90, No. 5, September/ October 2011, pp. 33-44, p. 38.
3. Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*; Washington: The White House, May 2010.

unpopular and lost war in Southeast Asia; an overheated economy; and the shell of a Great Society [Johnson's signature program]."[4]

There are costs - both monetary and otherwise - involved in trying to create change but benign neglect or avoiding the issue does not mean no costs are incurred or that there are no undesired secondary effects. In terms of making good policy, building power is an important matter and needs examination, although in practise this has rarely been undertaken in International Relations theory leaving the matter mainly to historians.

The limited examination of building power in International Relations falls principally within the neoclassical realist school with its focus on activist states responding to systemic imperatives.[5] In contrast, historical works of grand strategy generally devote considerable attention to building power but this analysis is deeply contextual and generally does not develop generic building power concepts universally applicable. The crucial importance of building power as part of a successful grand strategy is though well recognized in historical studies. Perhaps the most influential and widely quoted work in this regard is Paul Kennedy's magisterial *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.[6] Kennedy argued that while great powers generally actively sought to change international order in their favour, success both initially and in preserving their achievements, hinged on building the requisite power and sustaining it. A state's ability to create and maintain a desired change in international order rested on the power it built.

This chapter develops the cognitive frame for building the power a grand strategy needs to be implemented. The combination of the creating change cognitive frame from Chapter 4 and the building power cognitive frame of this Chapter comprise the complete grand strategy cognitive frame.

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4. Jeffery W. Helsing, *Johnson's War/Johnson's Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap*; Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000, p. 256.
5. The two most important works on building power are: Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State*. And Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Two useful additional works are Michael Mastanduno et al., 'Toward a Realist Theory of State Action ', *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 33, No. 4, December 1989, pp. 457-74. Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
6. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*; New York: Vintage Books, 1989.

To build power you need to know what levers to push, which is the focus of this chapter. Building from Chapter 3 that discussed *how* policymakers think, this chapter now adds *what* they should think about when they consider building power. As this is a matter of assisting the cognition of policymakers, the chapter makes use of the poliheuristic choice architecture. The chapter is in two major sections: the first discusses the relationship of time, urgency and certainty to building the power a grand strategy needs; the second develops appropriate ways and matching schemas for building power. The chapter concludes with a cognitive frame similar to that developed in the previous chapter.

BUILDING POWER THROUGH TIME

Grand strategies operate through time. The resources needed to support and implement a grand strategy need to be available when required but not before, or indeed after. Mark Brawley observes:

> One must know *when* power needs to be maximized…. Policies attempting to maximize power for a specific point well in the future do not resemble policies maximizing power for today. The former policies demand economic investment, while the later require forgoing investments to achieve greater expenditures at the present time.[7]

In this regard, a grand strategy may be considered a complex adaptive system in having multiple elements that ideally will each be ready at the correct time and in the correct sequence.[8] Some elements will need to work in conjunction and so need to be developed in parallel; other elements may be required individually and so can be developed in series. In this, some elements may inherently be able to be developed quickly while others may take decades. Furthermore, the elements of a grand strategy each start from a different baseline and thus need varying amounts of time to reach the

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7. Mark R. Brawley, *Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 2, 4.
8. Complex adaptive systems are characterized as being a set of interrelated parts, with each part an autonomous agent able to take actions that can impact other agents. The interrelationships between agents creates the system, the capacity of these agents to break with routines and initiate unfamiliar actions makes the system complex, and the capacity of these agents to collectively evolve to cope with new challenges makes the total system an adaptive complex system. James N. Rosenau, 'Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs', in David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (eds.), *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*; Washington: National Defense University, 1997, pp. 73-100, p. 84.

requisite capability and capacity. Throughout all of this, there are differential rates of change.

A national economy may take decades to offer the capabilities and capacities a grand strategy may need, a new alliance may be several years in the making while a diplomatic initiative could be realized in months. A grand strategy has distinct ends though and, if the required means will not be available at the correct time for the necessary duration, then a different grand strategy will need to be devised. Moreover, the international system is inherently dynamic. As the state is building its grand strategic means, the original situation is evolving in both a relative and absolute sense. Some of this evolution will be helpful, some will not be. In this sense grand strategies are always forward looking; current circumstances are relevant only as a departure point.

Time is therefore central to thinking about building power in relation to grand strategy. In addressing near-term matters, states may be forced to make the best use of the resources they have at hand. Conversely, given more time, states can choose to actively take measures to shape the capabilities and capacities they need to have available in the future. Accordingly, situations may be functionally divided into those that are near-term in the sense that only existing power capabilities and capacities are available for use, and those that are longer-term where the power needed can be built to meet the expected future demands.

In considering grand strategies addressing near-term situations, Sir Lawrence Freedman and Richard Haass have valuably differentiated between those circumstances where policymakers feel compelled to act and those they perceive they have other alternatives.[9] Importantly, the distinction is a perception of the policymakers concerned rather than a categorization based on some absolute criteria.[10]

Situations of necessity are those policymakers believe of vital importance, are time-urgent and which definitely require high priority action. Conversely situations of

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9. Lawrence Freedman, 'On War and Choice', *The National Interest*, No. 107, May-June 2010, pp. 9-16. Richard N Haass, *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars*; New York: Simon & Schuste, 2009, pp. 9-11.
10. Porter argues that the distinction is flawed in being ahistorical, mischievous and not factually verifiable. Patrick Porter, 'A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II', *Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol.35, No 3, May 2012, pp. 317-343.

choice are those viewed as of lesser import and without pressing time imperatives thereby allowing a real choice to be made between taking action or not. Situations of choice are discretionary and there is no strategic imperative, but that does not mean that left ignored the eventual consequences will necessarily be favourable. There can be costs in inaction including in opening up the situation to a wider range of potential futures. Taking action in a situation of choice may constrain the future to being one of only a few possible more desirable outcomes. The shadow of the future can influence grand strategic thinking even if the issue is not pressing.

In considering grand strategies addressing longer-term situations, the major constraint when thinking about the building power is that the future is ultimately unknowable. In some circumstances though broad trends may be able to be discerned and provide some basis for logical, rational planning. In this, the influential conceptualizations of uncertainty devised by business strategy thinkers Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie are useful. They discern four different types, or levels, of uncertainty: Level 1 is a "clear-enough future" with a single expected outcome, Level 2 envisages a future of only a few possible alternatives, Level 3 perceives that a range of non-discrete futures are possible but that this range is bounded, and in Level 4 any future is possible as any outcome may occur.[11]

In thinking specifically about building power, the four levels of uncertainty can be simplified to two distinct kinds. There are situations where the future appears sufficiently discernible to form a reasonable basis for long-term planning. This would broadly equate to Level 1 and 2 types of uncertainty where one or a small number of alternative futures are anticipated. Conversely, there are also situations where the longer-term future is unclear and, while the relevant variables are known, a range of alternative outcomes appears possible making undertaking detailed long-term planning unrealistic. This approximates to the Level 3 uncertainty of a bounded future. Level 4 envisages a limitless range of possible futures where even the variables cannot be identified.[12] For such circumstances where policy ends are difficult to define, grand strategy processes seem inappropriate; opportunistic or risk management approaches

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11. Hugh Courtney et al., 'Strategy under Uncertainty', *Harvard Business Review,* Vol. 75, No. 6, November-December 1997, pp. 66-79, pp. 69-71.
12. Hugh Courtney, *20/20 Foresight: Crafting Strategy in an Uncertain World*; Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001, pp. 32-33.

may be preferable. Accordingly, in considering building power for a grand strategy aiming to address a longer-term situation, the crucial issue is whether the future is conceived of as being relatively certain or is instead uncertain but bounded.

In combining these various factors, urgency and uncertainty can be related to the initial division into near-term or longer-term grand strategy issues. Near-term issues involve using the power at hand; this is further influenced depending on whether the situation is a compelling matter of necessity or a situation of choice. Longer-term issues involve building power for a particular use at some specific future time; this is further influenced depending on whether the future is conceived as a small number of discrete alternative possibilities or is uncertain although bounded. To allow policymakers to readily incorporate these aspects into their thinking, a cognitive frame broadly similar to that used in Chapter 4 can be developed. This involves populating a poliheuristic choice architecture with appropriate knowledge.

The initial step involves the architecture's first stage screen that bounds policymaking thinking. This screen is derived from the integration of time, urgency and certainty and encompasses two interrelated steps: Firstly, is the issue near or long term? Secondly, if near term is the situation one of necessity or choice, while if long term is the situation certain or uncertain?

The first stage screen in the building power cognitive frame accordingly differs conceptually from that used in Chapter 4 in the creating change cognitive frame. The screen in the building power cognitive frame is based on the nature of the issue rather than the way by which a desired change will be created. Importantly, the critical factor in both cognitive frames determines the construction of the first stage screen.

With the first stage screen constructed, schemas now need to be devised for the second stage of the building power poliheuristic choice model. The schemas need to be optimized to provide the bounded rationality of policymakers considering alternative ways of building the power a grand strategy needs. As in the previous chapter's creating change schemas, the building power schemas are meant to be stylized lenses through which policymakers should view the pertinent issues. In building the second stage schemas, the foundational concepts that underpin them will first be examined.

WAYS TO BUILD POWER

A grand strategy needs to build the material and non-material resources required for its implementation, and then to allocate these resources to the various instruments of national power as necessary.

The building of the material means of a grand strategy, as with all public policies, concerns the development and allocation of the finite resources of a society.[13] Grand strategy involves making choices under material, social or political constraints, characteristics broadly shared with the economics discipline, which is often described as "the science of allocating scarce resources."[14] In being about harvesting and harnessing a society's material resources, it is perhaps not surprising that Jonathan Kirscher considered that devising a grand strategy is a "fundamentally economic question."[15]

Robert Gilpin in his seminal work *The Political Economy of International Relations* noted that modern political economy thinking could be encompassed in three general, abstracted representations: economic nationalism, economic liberalism and Marxism.[16] In a follow-up publication Gilpin considered that Marxism's relevance had greatly declined and "its doctrine of how to manage an economy has been thoroughly discredited…"[17]

Nationalist and liberalist approaches are now the two principal ideas of contemporary International Political Economy (IPE) however, Open Economy Politics (OEP) is now seen as the dominant paradigm and the 'new IPE'.[18] OEP is in some respects similar to Foreign Policy Analysis in concentrating on processes; OEP examines group interests, the aggregation of these interests in institutions and how such

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13. Moran et al., in Moran, Rein, and Goodin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy; New York: Oxford University Press*, 2006, pp. 3-35, p. 21.
14. John Quiggin, 'Economic Constraints on Public Policy', in Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 529-42, p. 529.
15. Jonathan Kirshner, *Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War;* Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, April 1997, p. 8.
16. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, pp. 26-33.
17. Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 13.
18. David A. Lake, 'International Political Economy: A Maturing Interdiscipline', in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 757-77, pp. 757-63. Robert O. Keohane, 'The Old IPE and the New', *Review of International Political Economy,* Vol. 16, No. 1, February 2009, pp. 34-46, p. 34.

institutions bargain.[19] While offering an improved explanation of how the world political economy works, OEP has been criticized in being weak on how interests are constructed, the impact of structure and on how change occurs.[20]

OEP may be stronger in explaining the mechanisms of economic policymaking but the nationalist-liberalist typology, in focusing on two distinct and competing types of state policies, is cognitively richer when thinking about grand strategic options. Unlike the nationalist-liberalist typology, OEP does not seek to describe how states could build power for grand strategic purposes. The nationalist-liberalist typology is a grand strategy problem-solving tool with heuristic and diagnostic utility whereas OEP is not.

The central difference between economic nationalism and economic liberalism is the manner in which societal resources are allocated. Under economic nationalism the state actively manages the distribution of resources; economic liberalism by contrast involves the state manipulating market forces to distribute resources. This difference may be broadly labelled as a managerial approach and a market approach respectively to allow the typology to have utility to more groups than only states and to remove any ideological bias implicit in the terms 'economic nationalism' and 'economic liberalism'.[21] Managerial or market then relates to the approach used in building power for a grand strategy not to any particular form of political organization.

In moving between the managerial and the market approach alternatives, there is movement between the ways that scarce resources are allocated. This difference between market and managerial approaches relates to the knowledge concerning the allocation of resources. The managerial approach assumes a complete and perfect knowledge that allows the command of resource allocation precisely and efficiently in accordance with a rational plan that builds power for the grand strategy. The market approach in contrast assumes that its knowledge is at best imperfect and so entrusts the allocation of scarce resources to the operation of the market driven by price signals

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19. David A. Lake, 'Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review', *The Review of International Organizations,* Vol. 4, No. 3, 2009, pp. 219-44.
20. Keohane, 'The Old IPE and the New', pp. 36-40.
21. Gilpin noted that in economic nationalism and economic liberalism "…each position entails a total belief system…they provide scientific descriptions of how the world does work while they also constitute normative positions regarding how the world should work." Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 26.

based on supply and demand. The market approach then seeks to manipulate the operation of the market and exploit its scarce resource allocation processes as part of building power for the chosen grand strategy.

Within these two approaches, the ways that material resources can be accessed vary between extraction and mobilization.[22] Extraction aims to create today's power to shape the international environment and encompasses taxing, recruiting, acquiring requisitioning, or expropriating resources. Conversely mobilization creates future power. States mobilize resources and intervene in the economy to stimulate national economic growth and enhance societal prosperity that can later be extracted. Mobilization involves areas such as industry, technology, research and development, and education.

While Kirscher may have considered economic matters fundamental, a grand strategy can be more efficacious if supported by the non-material resources of legitimacy and soft power. Grand strategies are undertaken within a particular all-enveloping social context. These social structures "can be thought of as constituting a field (or fields) in which the (interdependent) strategies of actors are pursued. This terrain consists of the inter-subjective norms and rules that constitute meaning…. "[23] A grand strategy is in these terms structurally situated agency.[24]

A state's grand strategy can be more effectively and efficiently advanced when it is compatible and well matched with the social structure it operates within. Other actors will be innately supportive of the grand strategy because of the power applied to them by the favourable background social structures. It is this accommodating support which a grand strategy seeks to exploit and if need be build. Conversely a grand strategy that acts in contradiction to the social structure's norms and rules may experience friction with other actors and encounter difficulties in implementation. A grand strategy in this situation would need to attempt to overcome this structural drag through building and using greater material resources.

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22. Mastanduno et al., 'Toward a Realist Theory of State Action ', p. 463.
23. Edward Lock, 'Soft Power and Strategy: Developing a 'Strategic' Concept of Power', in Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (eds.), *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 32-50, p. 44.
24. Ritter, *PhD Dissertation: Why the Iranian Revolution Was Nonviolent: Internationalized Social Change and the Iron Cage of Liberalism,* p. 14.

The two important social rules for a grand strategy are legitimacy and soft power. Legitimacy concerns foreground judgments made by others about a state's actions and behaviours, whereas soft power involves influencing others' background perceptions of a state's international image.

Legitimacy is a quality others grant. Building legitimacy involves determining the social grouping from which legitimacy is sought.[25] This group can then be influenced through a series of actions: claims that the action being undertaken is in accordance with extant social rules, the institution involved is built on core principles justifiable by these social rules, the institution has suitable expertise, the actions are demonstrably effective in addressing the issue and that the reasons for claiming legitimacy are persuasive.[26] This last dimension is key for at its core "legitimacy requires consent, and consent requires persuasion."[27] The principal exception to this is securitization, a particular kind of rhetorical device that seeks legitimacy through claiming specific policies and actions are security issues.[28] It involves labelling an entity as a security threat through a speech act by an acknowledged actor to a relevant and accepting audience.[29] Securitization does not operate through providing persuasive reasons but rather through the legitimacy accorded the acknowledged actor.

Building soft power is inherently different in that it involves uploading norms and rules to the social structure, which then indirectly influences other nations' elites and public. The specific norms and rules that are sought is to have the uploading state viewed favourably, seen as important to work cooperatively with, and allowed to set the agenda of the relationship between the states concerned either overtly or more surreptitiously.[30] The ultimate intent is, in Graham Murdock's evocative phase, to annex others' imagination, so they can only conceive of certain, desirable ways of relating to the state employing soft power.[31] Those being successfully influenced by

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25. Reus-Smit, 'International Crises of Legitimacy', p. 164.
26. Andrew Hurrell, 'Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?', *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 31, Supplement S1, December 2005, pp. 15-31, p. 23.
27. Mlada Bukovansky, 'Liberal States, International Order, and Legitimacy: An Appeal for Persuasion over Prescription', *International Politics,* Vol. 44, No. 2-3, 2007, pp. 175-93, p. 178.
28. Juha A. Vuori, 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 14, No. 1, 2008, pp. 65-99, p. 71.
29. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, p. 491.
30. Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 20-21.
31. Graham Murdock, 'Notes from the Number One Country: Herbert Schiller on Culture, Commerce and American Power', *International Journal of Cultural Policy,* Vol. 12, No. 2, 2006, pp. 209-27, p. 210.

soft power are positively attracted to the other state and its agenda because they cannot conceive of alternative courses of action.

Shaping the structure may involve making use of culture, public diplomacy and place branding. Culture is the main arena of soft power as this permeates all social relationships, institutions, discourses and media and generally operates unobtrusively in establishing "frames that shape the way we see the world, telling us what is important, and informing us about options and solutions."[32] Popular culture is particularly effective in communicating to others what constitutes success and the good life, but can be two-edged in providing symbols able to be recast by others for their own purposes. Public diplomacy involves governments engaging foreign publics and their leaders through regularly explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions, undertaking strategic communications, and developing lasting relationships with key foreign elites through education, training and conference programs.[33] Public diplomacy extends beyond simply telling people news using modern media techniques in being more about creating a wider foreign community "which is susceptible to a way of thinking that is considered desirable."[34] Place branding seeks to shape the image and perception others hold of the state employing it. States use place branding to manipulate their reputation as seen by others using techniques similar to that used by commercial brands.[35]

While an appealing concept, soft power is not as readily wielded as other forms of power. In a manner different to material power, the building of nonmaterial soft power is at least partly reliant on the target group for as Terence Casey observes: "the efficacy of soft power…turns on the receptivity of others to the values and goals espoused."[36] More pithily, Joseph Nye remarks that "soft power is a dance that requires partners."[37] Further difficulties can rise because the building of soft power may be time-consuming and demanding, and not fully under the control of the governments devising grand strategies.[38] Building soft power may involve mainly commercial companies, non-governmental organizations, private groups and civil society. All can

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32. Peter Van-Ham, *Social Power in International Politics*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, p. 48.
33. Nye, *The Future of Power*, pp. 105-06.
34. Van-Ham, *Social Power in International Politics,* p. 117.
35. Ibid., pp. 136-41.
36. Terence Casey, 'Of Power and Plenty? Europe, Soft Power, and 'Genteel Stagnation'', *Comparative European Politics,* Vol. 4, No. 4, 2006, pp. 399-422, p. 417.
37. Nye, *The Future of Power*, p. 84.
38. Ibid., p. 83.

be reticent and resistant to state direction while being able to damage existing soft power reserves intentionally or unintentionally relatively easily and quickly.

Soft power has the potential to be an important instrument of national power within a grand strategy but the difficulties of wielding it and focusing its' power suggests that it is best considered supportive rather than central. Soft power's main purpose may then be simply to actively "tilt the playing field of international politics" in a favourable direction.[39]

BUILDING POWER SCHEMAS

The building power schemas integrate the time available to build the power required to implement the grand strategy with the various approaches to constructing material and non-material power. The schemas are accordingly devised by contrasting the type of issue in terms of time – near or long term – against the type of economic approach – managerial or market – and then incorporating legitimacy and soft power.

As discussed earlier, near-term is when the envisaged grand strategy's time constraints mean that only existing power capabilities and capacities can be used. Conversely, longer-term is when the grand strategy anticipates there is sufficient time available to progressively develop the power needed to meet the expected future demands. The second aspect, to further reiterate, is the choice between a managerial or market approach. In the managerial approach the entity concerned becomes deeply involved in developing the necessary resources and actively directing its society. In a market approach the entity concerned manipulates and exploits local and global market forces by using inducements, incentives, regulations and rules to develop the resources the grand strategy needs.

Combining these two aspects develops four alternative schemas for building power. The near-term managerial approach schema involves the state or non-state actor becoming deeply involved in actively directing society. While often highly effective in the short-term, this approach is invasive, bureaucratic and over the longer-term inefficient. The near-term market schema approach involves the state or non-state actor manipulates and exploits market forces may be favoured. This draws on the global market allowing quite expansive grand strategies however such markets are inherently

39. Van-Ham, *Social Power in International Politics,* p. 167.

skittish and unpredictable, and may act in unexpected ways harmful to the grand strategy.

The long-term managerial approach schema involves the state or non-state actor planning, mobilizing and directing building the kind of society and economy needed to meet the anticipated demands. This builds independence and self-reliance in the areas chosen but this may not be useful if the future does not turn out as anticipated. The long-term market approach involves the state or non-state actor varying demand across particular societal and industry sectors, shaping market forces to reallocate resources and attempting to grow a society and economy balanced to handle the range of possible futures considered likely. This gives the most flexibility however keeping global markets confident and comfortable calls for long-term high-quality policymaking.

Building the non-tangible resources of legitimacy and soft power is intrinsically dissimilar but is integrated into each schema to assist easy application by policymakers to grand strategic problems. Building legitimacy calls for the activist state or non-state actor asserting the actions being undertaken meet current best practice, that the group has commendable values and suitable expertise, that the actions are effective and finally persuasively articulating that this is the correct course of action. Building soft power involves exploiting popular culture, using public diplomacy and place branding although this is time-consuming and needs to involve many outside groups such as businesses, NGOs and civil society, all of whom may be reticent to be part of the grand strategy.

The four different schemas are summarized in Table 1 below. Each cell is the schema, the bounded rationality, that is suggested a policymaker use when thinking about their particular situation. The policymaker would then apply context and judgment to the preferred schema to develop the most advantageous implementation strategy. These schemas are not designed to be comprehensive, well-rounded or balanced but rather draw attention to certain aspects important to grand strategy policymaking while excluding others. They are intended to be sharp edged, stylized word pictures that might stimulate and provoke a policymaker's cognition.

	Managerial Approach	Market Approach
Near-Term Issue	Most responsive to needs Provides considerable national autonomy and independence Motivates people by fear, through direct and indirect coercion and emphasizing awful consequences if the strategy fails Finance using principally direct and indirect taxation Maximum use of domestic sources of material Best suited for times of necessity when success is essential	Provides good access to the vast global resources available Limits national autonomy and independence Motivates people through securitization of issue as a serious threat to their individual security and prosperity Finance using taxation, domestic bonds and international bonds subject to market acceptance Maximum use of foreign and domestic commercial sources of material Best suited for situations when the level and timing of involvement and actions can be controlled to keep markets content
Long-Term Issue	Grows considerable national autonomy and self-reliance Limits responsiveness to unforeseen challenges Motivates people by appeals to nationalism or a statist ideology Finance using principally taxation and domestic bonds Directed nation-building emphasizing those industries the grand strategy needs Best suited for developing essential capabilities and for lessening both the dependence on others and the constraints on future actions they could impose	Make's best use of the vast global resources available Diminishes autonomy and independence Motivates people through appeals to being in an individual's best self-interest over the longer term Finance using minimum taxation supplemented by bonds, international preferred Most effective method to grow national prosperity. Increasing sensitivity to external shocks over time Best suited for times of uncertainty

Table 1. Building Power Schemas

The description given here of the building power schemas is brief to both allow the general idea to be grasped and avoid making the presentation of this thesis's argument overly convoluted. Annex B gives a more complete description of each schema and is intended to provide the depth, detail and granularity that policymakers may need when considering grand strategy building power issues, especially when they use the diagnostic process for the first time. Annex B also notes historical examples of each of the four schemas.

The four schemas make use of the same theoretical perspectives and accordingly can be combined without problems of incommensurability, unlike the earlier creating change schemas that each had different ontology's. While the building power cognitive frame may suggest a managerial or market approach, policymakers in examining a specific context and the constraints it imposes may choose a blend of approaches. A grand strategy can be resourced using one, or a mix of, the four schemas devised moreover the resourcing approach used may evolve over time as the demands of the grand strategy change. Importantly, in considering resourcing there is the possibility of equifinality. There may be several potential resourcing paths that are feasible, albeit of varying effectiveness and efficiency.

ISSUES IN BUILDING POWER

The modern idea of grand strategy arose as result of the large-scale mobilization of societies to meet the demands of the total wars in the first half of the 20th Century as was discussed in Chapter 2. This process gave even liberal democratic governments much greater power and control over their societies and suggests that the more authoritarian the government the better a state can resource a grand strategy.[40]

Considered in terms of grand strategy policymaking the different types of government could be recast as relating to agential power. John Hobson sees states as possessing varying degrees of domestic agential power, defined as the ability of "the state to determine policy and shape the domestic realm free of domestic structural

40. In Chapter 2 there was a short discussion of building power as related to strong and weak states. These states were so labeled depending on their institutional capabilities and capacities to extract men, money or material from their parent societies. For examples, strong states had effective, diverse tax collection regimes; conversely weak states had grave difficulties collecting tax. This is conceptually different to the distinction between authoritarian and democratic forms of government.

constraints or non-state interference".[41] Hobson's conceptual framework suggests that a state with strong agential power would have more grand strategic power building options open to it than a state with weak agential power. Simplistically an authoritarian state might then be considered to have stronger agential power than a democratic one.

In implementing a grand strategy though, the state requires the support of its parent society, if only as a passive resource base. Rather than the type of the government, it is the state-society relationship that is central to resourcing a grand strategy. Importantly, this relationship is not static but can vary as the grand strategy resource requirements demand.

Michael Barnett determined that states have three broad options in developing and guiding their societies resources: an accommodational strategy that utilizes the existing extraction and mobilization policies albeit these may be broadened or extended; a restructural strategy that changes the state-society relationship to increase the society's contribution; and an international strategy that instead relies on foreign sources. In undertaking a restructural strategy the state can become stronger or weaker in a domestic agential sense. The state can choose to centralize or liberalize its control over society as a way of resourcing its desired grand strategy. Consequently, "the government's adoption of an accommodational, a restructural, or an international strategy carries important implications for the trajectory of state power."[42]

Barnett's 'three strategies' approach is useful in thinking about the manner in which the domestic agential power of a state may evolve as the state seeks to resource its chosen grand strategy. Barnett considers that states generally start with an accommodational strategy adjusting their grand strategies to the level of extraction and mobilization supportable by existing societal arrangements.[43] If these arrangements prove insufficient, an international strategy can become attractive as being less disruptive to state-society relations however, willing external sources are not always available and even if they are, the conditions and constraints on a state's grand strategy these sources may impose could be unacceptable. The final alternative involves the state being forced into adopting a problematical restructural strategy, the most difficult

41. Hobson, *The State and International Relations,* p. 6.
42. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel*, p. 37.
43. Ibid., pp. 31-35.

to accomplish.

A restructural strategy should not necessarily been seen as always meaning an increase in a state's domestic agential power. Barnett notes that the democratic Israeli state purposefully chose to weaken its domestic agential power though liberalization as this was needed to adequately resource its desired grand strategy; he observed that in:

> a subtle yet important reversal after 1967…the government's neo-mercantilist policies led not to the state's increased control over society…but rather the opposite – its very erosion. This was a consciously produced strategy, as Israeli leaders believed that excessive state intervention had actually stymied the state's security interests. That the state's attempt to increase its economic and security goals would lead to its diminution is a possibility [often] overlooked….[44]

Barnett also found that after 1973 Egypt, governed by a military dictatorship, followed Israel in liberalizing and relaxing its domestic agential power to allow the state to better resource its grand strategies.[45] Communist China's progressive adoption of liberal economic policies in the 1980s is another example of a state deliberately lessening its domestic agential power to increase its overall national power as part of its grand strategy. For these states with varying types of government, greater agential power was less important than building a larger economy and more sophisticated society.

In summing up, greater agential power may allow the state to undertake a more comprehensive extraction and mobilization of societal resources. Conversely, such power may be more than offset if these societal resources are limited. This seems to suggest that a balance needs to be struck between the degree of agential power and developing the scale and sophistication of societal resources. The North Korean state may have great agential power but has limited ability to resource grand strategies whereas Taiwan with a similar population may have weaker state agential power but a much greater grand strategy resourcing ability. The type of government in itself is less important than the history of grand strategy might imply.

In extending this argument further, the discussion so far has concerned states but

44. Ibid., pp. 259-60.
45. Ibid., pp. 260-61.

as been noted non-state actors can also use the grand strategy methodology. In terms of resourcing a grand strategy, non-state actors in conceptual terms can modify the building power approaches as appropriate for their scale, abilities and circumstances. The same fundamentals apply in terms of manpower, money, materiel, legitimacy and soft power as the case studies of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Chapter 6), Hezbollah (Chapter 7) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) (Chapter 8) reveal. Even so, non-state actors having much more limited capabilities and capacities than states can have some real difficulties in resourcing grand strategies.

The case studies in this thesis suggest that to overcome these intrinsic resourcing difficulties, non-state actors will more than states seek to exploit external, international sources, and particularly for money and materiel. The LTTE made extensive use of the Tamil diaspora for funding and the global marketplace to acquire military equipment. Hezbollah relied heavily, especially in its initial formative stages, for Iranian funding for Hezbollah welfare and social programs, and further depended on Iranian supply of military equipment, supplies and training. Initially Iran also provided military personnel however, given that Iran was at that time attempting to establish Hezbollah as a viable entity, this may not normally be broadly representative of non-state actor resourcing approaches. Lastly, the ICBL as its grand strategy progressed and resource demands rose received funding from several states. The problem in such external resourcing is that the external sources may then have some undesired influence and control.

The resourcing difficulties of non-state actors suggest that their ends and ways of their grand strategies will be more than states shaped by the actions taken to develop the means. Non-state actor grand strategies are likely to be less robust and less able to recover from internal and external shocks than those of states. For non-state actors even more than states, devising an effective strategic synthesis that integrates and balances the demands of the grand strategy and its required resourcing will be critical.

Material Resource Allocation

The material resources once developed are allocated to the subordinate strategies that individually direct a particular instrument of national power – diplomatic, informational, military or economic –in accordance with the overarching grand strategy.

Allocation involves a balance of investment decision where some instruments of national power will be emphasized and receive proportionally more resources than others. The resource prioritization and apportionment will be guided by the grand strategy's needs. Policymakers in using the building power cognitive frame to structure their thinking can make judgments on the actual qualities and the quantities of means that are required to achieve the grand strategy's intent.

The lower-level strategies include the processes for transforming the material and non-material resources into the more specific capabilities (qualities) and capacities (quantities) required. The manpower provided will need additional task-specific training, the money supplied will need to be appropriately managed and used, and the particular equipment determined to be needed will need to be manufactured and acquired. The building of legitimacy and soft power will similarly require the use of manpower, money and material precisely focused by the lower level strategies on the grand strategy's allocated tasks.

BUILDING POWER COGNITIVE FRAME

To be most useful to policymakers, the schemas that have been developed need to be placed within the two-stage poliheuristic choice information processing architecture. The first stage of the building power cognitive frame uses time and its related variables of certainty and choice as the noncompensatory, nonholistic search. This search is not a single dimension as the creating change cognitive frame developed in the previous chapter. As in the earlier cognitive frame though, the issue that motivated the search for a solution is exogenous.

The nature of the grand strategy determined in the creating change cognitive frame informs the first stage of the building power poliheuristic choice architecture. From the grand strategy under consideration, the policymaker can initially ascertain if the matter is near-term or long-term. If the problem is a near-term issue the options for the policymaker then vary depending if this is judged a matter of necessity or choice. If the problem is a long-term issue, the options vary depending on whether the future seems certain enough to plan upon or not. The issues of necessity, choice and levels of uncertainty where discussed earlier in this chapter. This first stage poliheuristic choice

architecture design connects the applying power part to the building power part of grand strategy.

The second stage of the building power cognitive frame corresponds to rational choice decision-making and involves analytic processing of the particular building power approach that the first stage search process selects. Again, this is somewhat different to the previous chapter's creating change cognitive frame where the second stage used expected utility maximization. By comparison, the building power cognitive frame uses lexicographic choice, which involves optimization along the dimension considered most important; David Brule further describes the differences in the two rational choice approaches:

> When expected utility decision rules are employed, a final choice is made on the basis of an alternative's expected net benefits across all dimensions. Lexicographic choice identifies an important dimension that is given greater weight than the others.[46]

In the building power cognitive frame the first stage chooses one of four approaches that have been derived from the managerial and market schemas. In terms of lexicographic choice, the four approaches are the two schemas with weight applied to the temporal dimensions of near-term or long-term.

The creating change cognitive frame informs the building power framework in the sense of framing the issue on which to determine resource requirements. The building power cognitive frame is then used to assess these requirements and produces a suggested approach as an output for further consideration and development. The building power cognitive frame is illustrated diagrammatically below:

46. Brule, 'The Poliheuristic Research Program: An Assessment and Suggestions for Further Progress', pp. 269.



Figure 3. Building Power Cognitive Frame

In using the cognitive frame to structure thinking about how to build the power a grand strategy needs, policymakers initially consider if the matter is a near-term or long-term issue. If it is a short-term issue, the alternatives vary depending on if the problem is a matter of necessity or choice. If it is a necessity, a managerial approach is suggested where the state takes charge, becomes deeply involved itself in developing resources and actively directs society; legitimacy may be sought by motivating people through fear. If it is a matter of choice, the suggested option is a market approach where the state manipulates market forces and uses incentives and regulations to access and allocate the resources it needs; legitimacy may be sought through securitization of the issue as a threat. The extant soft power resources will have to be accepted, as time does

not permit these to be further developed; if these are unhelpful and impede the grand strategy compensatory measures may need to be taken.

If it is a longer-term grand strategic issue, a distinction can be made between the future being reasonably certain or instead moderately uncertain. If the future is reasonably certain, a managerial approach allows the state to plan, mobilize and build the society and economy needed to meet the known demand; legitimacy may be sought through appeals to a centralist ideology. If the future has some real uncertainties, the suggested market approach would allow the state to vary demand across particular societal and industrial sectors, shape market forces to reallocate resources and attempt to grow a balanced society and economy capable of handling the full range of possible futures; legitimacy may be sought through appeals to the self-interest of individuals. Soft power resources may be developed although when the future is reasonably certain, the enveloping social structure can be more precisely targeted for modification; when the future is uncertain a more broadly based, less focused approach is needed.

This building power cognitive frame is the second element of the overall grand strategy cognitive frame. The first creating change element was developed in the previous chapter. The two elements are connected as grand strategy is concerned not just with the application of resources but their development as well. The sequence begins with the issue that policymakers have determined should be potentially addressed through using a grand strategy. After working through creating change (Figure1, Chapter 4), policymakers then consider building power (Figure 2, this chapter).

Crucially, grand strategy involves a synthesis where the ends and the means are interdependent. If, in using the building power part of the overall cognitive frame, the policymaker determines that the resources are not available for the creating change grand strategy envisaged, the complete process should begin again. A grand strategy that cannot be resourced is one only of hope not of practicality. In such a case, the ends, ways or means will need adjusting.

Grand strategy is a process that integrates the development of resources, their allocation and the application of diverse means in a unified manner to achieve a specific

end. In this, the component of a grand strategy that builds power is crucial. An understanding of grand strategy cannot be gained without closely examining this aspect. In many ways the building power component is a further validation of Colin Gray's assertion that "all strategy is grand strategy" for without the development of the means no strategy could be implemented.[47]

47. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*, p. 28.

PART THREE: GRAND STRATEGY CASE STUDIES

In this section, the cognitive frame is applied to nine case studies and appraised against criteria specified in Chapter 1. The case studies are further used to develop the associated generic knowledge needed to complement the cognitive frame and complete building the overall diagnostic process.

The particular case studies examined are divided into most-likely cases that encompass state-on-state situations, least-likely cases involving non-state actors using grand strategies against states or other non-state actors, and failure cases where unsuccessful grand strategies reveal important aspects.

Chapter 6 examines the denial grand strategies of the U.S. Iraq War grand strategy 1991-1992, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam grand strategy 1990-2002 and the USSR's Détente grand strategy 1965-1980.

Chapter 7 examines the engagement grand strategy case studies of the U.S. grand strategy to revitalize Western Europe 1947-1952, the Iranian-Hezbollah grand strategy 1982-2006 and the British Appeasement grand strategy 1934-1939.

Chapter 8 examines the reform grand strategy case studies of the British Malayan Emergency grand strategy 1948-1960, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines grand strategy 1992-1999 and the U.S. Iraq Regime Change grand strategy 2001-2003.

CHAPTER 6: DENIAL GRAND STRATEGIES

A denial grand strategy aims to stop another achieving its objectives through exploiting a relative power advantage. The denial grand strategy schema suggests that a state or non-state actor needs greater material power relative to the others involved to achieve its desired national objectives. Impeding an entity gaining a useful relative power advantage through altering or reinforcing the distribution of power in the international system can prevent it from gaining its objectives. This does not mean that the other state or non-state actor will permanently alter its intentions, simply that it now lacks the requisite relative power superiority and cannot achieve them.

This chapter applies the grand strategy cognitive frame developed in Chapter 4 and 5 to three historical case studies. The most-likely case is that of the U.S. grand strategy in the Iraq War of 1991-1992. This is an undemanding, short-duration example intended to efficiently introduce the case study approach and structure being employed in this and later chapters. The time frame chosen is from the originating of the grand strategy until it reached the desired end state. The key issues are the desired international order sought, the 'way' this was to be achieved, the use of the four different type of means and the approach taken to build power.

The least-likely case is more complex and protracted and involves the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgency against the Sri Lankan government during 1990-2002. The LTTE case was chosen both as they were the most sophisticated insurgent non-state actor of the post-Cold War period and because the group made unusually extensive use of globalization. Both aspects are at variance with notions of grand strategy being for great powers only and being concerned mainly with territorially constrained internal mobilisation. The time frame chosen begins from the withdrawal of the Indian peacekeeping force when the LTTE became the dominant separatist group battling the Sri Lankan state. From this time the LTTE was able to single-mindedly apply the grand strategy until 2002 when a Norwegian-brokered ceasefire came into effective. While it had not yet created its desired international order, with the ceasefire the grand strategy reached its culminating point. At this point, the Sri Lankan state was clearly beginning to develop an effective counter grand strategy in response and there were significant adverse changes in the international and domestic environment.

The within-case failure is that of the USSR's détente grand strategy during

1965-1980 where the order desired was matched with an incompatible use of the instruments of national power and an inappropriate approach to building power. The Soviet denial grand strategy case examined begins in the period when the USSR appeared a rising great power that could plausibly overtake a declining U.S. and become the dominant state in the international system.[1] The case study covers the complete life cycle from the early development of the grand strategy when Leonid Brezhnev gained power as Communist Party Secretary in late 1964, past its culminating point in 1972 when the Basic Principles treaty was signed with the U.S., through its progressive decline across the mid-1970s, until its final demise in late 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

There are two reasons to apply the grand strategy cognitive frame to these case studies. Firstly, to ascertain if the appraisal criteria set out in Chapter 1 are met. These criteria include determining if using the cognitive frame to view these examples through allows an understanding to be gained of the design, general operating logic and the circumstances that favoured the grand strategy's success. In this, it is important to note that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects.

Secondly, Alexander George thought that policymakers needed not just an appropriate cognitive frame but also generic knowledge of the strategy being contemplated. This chapter accordingly also develops this necessary generic knowledge.

U.S. IRAQ WAR GRAND STRATEGY 1991-1992

On the 2nd of August 1991 Iraq invaded neighbour Kuwait, seeking to incorporate the oil-rich state as Iraq's 19th province; the economic benefits were seen as great and the costs low from such action.[2] Three days later the American President George H. Bush declared that: "This will not stand. This will not stand, this aggression

1. William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 185.
2. Andrew T. Parasiliti, 'The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment', *International Political Science Review,* Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003, pp. 151-65. F. Gregory Gause, III, 'Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990', *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 56, No. 1, 2002, pp. 47-70. Fred H. Lawson, 'Rethinking the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait', *The Review of International Affairs,* Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-20.

against Kuwait."[3] A new American grand strategy was hastily formulated to give substance to the President's words.

Several years before this, Iraq did not loom large in U.S. thinking although it did feature in the American denial grand strategy of containing Iran. As part of this, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war the U.S. on occasion provided limited intelligence information, gave diplomatic support and sold dual-use equipment and primary produce trying to deliberately shift the balance of power towards Iraq.[4] In this though, the U.S. focus remained fixed on Iran. When building its relationship with Iran demanded, the U.S. abruptly began providing intelligence and selling arms to Iran for use against Iraq.[5]

With the end of the war and a new American President, a new grand strategy focused on Iraq was formulated with rather ambitious and as it eventuated unrealistic objectives. Steve Yetiv observed America: "tried to alter Iraq's behaviour with a strategy that leaned strongly towards placating it in the hope of co-opting it."[6] The social purpose of the Iraqi state would now be deliberately shaped through an engagement grand strategy. The intent, as National Security Directive 26 (NSD 26) elaborated upon, was to establish normal relations with Iraq, moderate Iraq's behaviour, increase U.S. influence and promote regional stability. This was to be achieved through commercial activities in conjunction with limited military assistance to develop "access to and influence with the Iraqi defence establishment."[7]

Constructive engagement remained in force until the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. While "pursued with few hopes and fewer hopes that it could work", this grand strategy in leading to a major war is ultimately indefensible.[8] The cognitive frame developed in this thesis would suggest that such a grand strategy would require determining a suitable and willing Iraqi partner that held ambitions useful to America. In this regard, the American grand strategy was somewhat confused. The group within Iraq the grand

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3. George Bush, 'Remarks and Exchange with Reporters, August 5, 1990 ', *Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush*; College Station: George Bush Library, viewed 5 May 2014, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2135&year=1990&month=8.
4. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005,* pp. 50-64.
5. Ibid., p. 58.
6. Ibid., p. 65.
7. George Bush, *National Security Directive 26*; Washington: The White House, 2 October 1989, pp. 2-3.
8. Zachary Karabell, 'Backfire: US Policy toward Iraq, 1988 - 2 August 1990 ', *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 49, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 28-47, p. 47.

strategy would work with was not made explicit with Saddam Hussein seen as much as the object as the subject of the grand strategy. Even so, Saddam and his group seemed an unlikely partner to work with. A senior administration official observed that: "Everybody knew Hussein's reputation, and no one thought he was a potential member of the Kiwanis Club. But could he become a better member of the region? It was worth exploring the possibility, and we didn't have a lot to lose."[9] The cognitive frame would suggest the policy was confused and flawed in its original design.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait overturned the engagement grand strategy's rationale and made imperative a new approach. Iraq's actions also sharply elevated the nation's importance in American foreign policy. The invasion changed the regional balance of power, worryingly threatened Saudi Arabia and its immense oil reserves and directly challenged American management of the wider international order. Iraq though bordered the USSR and had for many years been a client state. While Eastern Europe was quickly moving out of the communist orbit, the USSR remained intact under First Secretary Gorbachov. The USSR however was now espousing a new basis for international relations including the "de-ideologization of interstate relations", a strengthened United Nations, a democratic world order and entry of the USSR into a range of international institutions.[10]

In determining how to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President George Bush's thinking and that of his inner decision-making team was strongly influenced by two key historical analogies: the appeasement period of the 1930s and the Vietnam War. The appeasement period was considered to show that dictators were untrustworthy; that left longer they would become stronger, more threatening and problematic; and that military force was the only viable option. Bush wrote later that: "I saw a direct analogy between what was occurring in Kuwait and what the Nazis had done…."[11] The Vietnam War analogy showed that using overwhelming force was needed to succeed and in devising policies based on this, Bush hoped that at the conflict's end "we will have kicked, for once and for all, the so-called Vietnam

9. Interview 27 May 1992 quoted in ibid., p. 33.
10. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Excerpts of Address by Mikhail Gorbachev;* 43rd U.N. General Assembly Session, New York, 7 December 1988, viewed 5 may 2014, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/1988-1107.Gorbachev.pdf.
11. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*; New York: Knopf, 1998, p. 435.

syndrome."[12] Historian Scot MacDonald argued that historical analogies significantly influenced how the crisis was framed and policymaking determined albeit not always favourably.[13] Barbara Spellman and Keith Holyoak wrote that: "It would not be a great exaggeration to say that the United States went to war [against Iraq] over an analogy."[14]

President George Bush's "this will not stand" off-the-cuff remark to reporters "became the defining statement of American aims for the duration of the crisis."[15] The primary objective of the U.S. throughout remained stopping Iraq from achieving its objective of permanently annexing Kuwait. In the terms of the proposed cognitive frame this goal would suggest a denial grand strategy focused on Iraq and indeed this was rapidly instituted. The American response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was formalized in the hastily devised NSD-45 that directed a range of diplomatic, economic, energy and military measures to be taken with the primary aims of the:

> the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait [and] the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq....[16]

To achieve this a change was sought in the new balance of power order that Iraq had created in the region. The relative power of the U.S. would be increased and that of Iraqi's decreased aiming to coerce Iraq into leaving Kuwait. In the chosen denial type of grand strategy the threat of conflict is fundamental and this was evident from the start in the American grand strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell later commented that on hearing George Bush's "this will not stand" remark he felt war had been already been declared. This was a "widespread reaction" with George Bush himself "certainly [feeling] that force *could* be necessary."[17] The U.S. objective of changing the international order though involved using the full range of the instruments of national power - diplomatic, economic, military and informational.

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12. George Bush, 'Remarks and Exchange with Reporters, August 5, 1990 '.
13. Scot Macdonald, 'Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait', *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 29-59.
14. Barbara A. Spellman and Keith J. Holyoak, 'If Saddam Is Hitler Then Who Is George Bush? Analogical Mapping Between Systems of Social Roles', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* Vol. 62, No. 6, 1991, pp. 913-33, p. 913.
15. H. W. Brands, 'George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991', *Presidential Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 113-31, p. 121.
16. George Bush, *National Security Directive 45* ; Washington: The White House, 20 August 1990.
17. Emphasis in the original. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, p. 333.

The initial actions involved diplomatic means seeking to gain the active support from as many nations as possible for American actions while simultaneously isolating Iraq. In this the U.S. achieved remarkable success both in bilateral negotiations and at the United Nations; throughout the grand strategy's duration almost all U.N. member states voted in favour of supportive resolutions.[18] Co-sponsored by Malaysia and Ethiopia, the seminal Resolution 660 passed on 2 August was aligned with the American position in strongly condemning the invasion and calling for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.[19] Critically the support - or at least acquiescence - of the USSR and China was gained ensuring that the U.N. Security Council consistently approved of U.S. intentions and actions. In this America was helped by the rapidly changing international environment. Then-Secretary of State James Baker wrote that it was "apparent that the entire world suddenly wanted to get closer to the United States. The Soviet Empire was gone. …It seemed as though everybody wanted to be America's best friend."[20]

The initial diplomatic activity was focused on not just censure of Iraqi actions but also on instituting a comprehensive range of negative sanctions. Prompted by the U.S., the U.N. on 6 August passed Security Council Resolution 661 imposing sweeping mandatory economic sanctions and establishing the 661 Committee to oversee their implementation by member and non-member states. In late August Security Council Resolutions 665 and 666 provided for an armed naval blockade to prevent Iraq exporting oil and importing most goods while setting guidelines for the safe passage of medical and humanitarian aid. Resolution 670 extended this embargo to air cargo.[21] On 29 November in an historic vote that gained the very rare agreement of all the Permanent Members of the Security Council, Resolution 678 was passed authorizing member states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660…" and by implication permitting the use of military force.[22]

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18. James A. Baker with Thomas M.Defrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992*; New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1995, pp. 275-328.
19. David M Malone, *The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 60.
20. James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992,* p. 414.
21. Malone, *The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005,* pp. 60-65.
22. Brands, 'George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991', p. 127.

The U.S. deployed significant military forces to the region initially to reassure Saudi Arabia that it would be defended from any further Iraqi actions and then to progressively build up a capability to force Iraq out of Kuwait. To assist both objectives the U.S. persuaded some 34 states to send combat forces to the Gulf region. While some were long-time allies such as the U.K. and France, major Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria also actively participated. Ultimately the force comprised almost one million personnel with about 70% from the U.S. While a multinational coalition though, the operation was firmly commanded by the U.S. not by some collective system. The National Security Adviser, Brent Scrowcroft observed that:

> The U.S. had to be the leader. No one else could be a focal point for dealing with aggression, but it was not coercion. It was infinite consultation, cajoling, and listening to their views. We led and got our way….[23]

The informational instrument was employed to persuade others of the legitimacy of American actions and the illegitimacy of Iraq's. Stress was placed on Iraq's violation of the U.N. Charter that outlawed aggression, that Iraq had disregarded human rights and arms limitations agreements and that the rights of small states against large hostile neighbours should be upheld. In this process President Bush described Saddam Hussein as evil, morally reprehensible and comparable to Adolf Hitler.[24]

The combination of the perceived illegitimacy of Iraq's actions, that the USSR was now keen to cooperate with the U.S. on global affairs and the apparent failure of the communist paradigm progressively induced a more expansive outlook for future American global influence. On 11 September 1990 President Bush in a speech to a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit added a new American objective, that of helping establish:

> a new world order…freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony. …A

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23. Interview quoted in Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, 'The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition', *Presidential Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 56-68, p. 63.
24. Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*; New York: PublicAffairs, 2008, pp. 230-31.

> world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. … A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.[25]

President Bush's conception was that the Iraq War grand strategy could provide a model of how the U.S. would provide post-Cold War leadership of the international system. This model had three elements: the offensive use of force would be checked, the U.S. would lead collective action by coalitions and the great powers would cooperate in this. The "new world order" construct helped legitimize the Iraq War grand strategy both domestically and internationally although the different audiences may have heard different messages: American exceptionalism versus a new U.N.-led era. In examining the role the new world order concept played Eric Miller and Steve Yetiv observed that it "allowed Washington to crystallize positive feelings about a new era into more palpable vision and approach while advancing its national interests and asserting its global primacy."[26]

The denial grand strategy applied the means in ways that grew American power by exploiting alliances, partnerships and friends while degrading Iraqi power through isolation and broad-ranging sanctions. Simultaneously, America also acted to develop its own power and limit the costs involved through leveraging off others. The building-power part of the cognitive frame uses two criteria in advising which approach to consider: whether the matter is near or long term and whether the matter is one of necessity or choice.

In terms of time, the U.S. thought that its ability to evict Iraq would lessen over time making near-term action crucial. Throughout the crisis, calls to wait until sanctions had been given time to act where consistently discounted. In terms of choice, the Iraq War was considered a matter of choice in that America was not itself threatened by the invasion and the U.S. obtained little oil from the region. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan called it "a small disturbance in a distant part of the world."[27] This lack of a

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25. George Bush, *The Public Papers of the President, 1990. Vol. 2*; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 1219.
26. Miller and Yetiv, 'The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition', p. 58.
27. Speech of 10 January 1991 quoted in Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*, p. 226.

compelling rationale to become deeply involved and risk war did create difficulties for President Bush in gaining domestic support.[28]

In being near term and a matter of choice, the cognitive frame suggests a near-term market approach that makes use of existing domestic and global resources and this approach was indeed used. The access to global resources proved crucial as the U.S. at the time had significant worries over the burgeoning fiscal deficit inherited from the previous Regan Administration in which George Bush had been Vice-President. The grand strategy promised to exacerbate this through being very costly. Baker commented that:

> We knew that, even without going to war, these costs would be staggering. We were mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers and shipping them and their equipment to the Gulf by air and by sea. Once we had them there, we had to keep them in everything from missiles to mouthwash for months on end. Our preliminary projections of the direct costs to the United States Treasury ran into the tens of billions of dollars. Moreover, we felt an obligation to come up with the money to help offset the severe economic hardship the trade embargo would impose on several coalition partners, especially Egypt and Turkey.[29]

To overcome this, the U.S. actively sought to extract considerable financial support from its wealthy allies and friends. The war cost the U.S. some $61bn but coalition partners, especially Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany and South Korea, provided some $48bn in financial transfers. Moreover, these countries also made in-kind contributions of materiel, fuel and other supplies valued at almost $6bn as well as assisting several nations economically damaged by the embargo.[30]

The money extracted markedly reduced the war's impact on the Federal Government's budget but in relying on a market based approach there were other concerns. In the initial days of the grand strategy, it was realized that the oil supply disruption arising from the U.N. sanctions and a naval blockade of Iraqi oil exports while not directly impacting American stocks, would adversely impact the economy. At a National Security Council meeting on 6 August Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady

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28. Brands, 'George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991', pp. 127-30.
29. James A. Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992,* p. 288.
30. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars,* p. 255.

declared that: "The financial markets are down badly. The price of oil is rising. The effect of petroleum and home heating oil price increases is already 0.5% in the Consumer Price Index, or 0.6-0.7% of GNP. This would bring our growth down toward zero."[31] It was quickly realized that to avoid a recession in the U.S., that the Saudi Arabia needed to be requested to increase crude oil production. A market based approach to building-power for a grand strategy to be successful needs to be undertaken in a manner that keeps markets comfortable.

The American denial grand strategy was successful in comprehensively changing the relative balance of power in the region away from Iraq but even so military power had to be used to forcibly eject it from Kuwait. The marked advantage in relative power though meant that the military operation from the U.S.-led coalition perspective was effective and efficient. The Iraqi armed forces collapsed when the ground offensive started after having been the target of incessant air strikes for almost a month. The ensuing rout and a perception that too many retreating Iraqi soldiers were being killed led to a swift end to the war.

The war's conclusion quickly proved controversial with some commentators declaring later that the war stopped too soon or that the Allied force should have marched on Baghdad and removed Saddam Hussein from power.[32] The denial grand strategy adopted though perhaps made inevitable such second thoughts. The overall intent was to change the balance of power in a way that stopped Iraq occupying Kuwait not to have American forces occupying Iraq.

The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time, Charles Freeman, warned Colin Powell before the fighting started that: "For a range of reasons we cannot pursue Iraq's unconditional surrender and occupation by us. It is not in our interest to destroy Iraq or weaken it to the point that Iran and/or Syria are not constrained by it."[33] Scowcroft similarly thought the grand strategy's aim was to "to damage his [Saddam's] offensive capability without weakening Iraq to the point that a vacuum was created, and

31. Brady quoted in Brands, 'George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991', p. 116.
32. An example is Robert A. Divine, 'The Persian Gulf War Revisited: Tactical Victory, Strategic Failure', *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 129-38.
33. Freeman quoted in: Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey*; New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, p. 527.

destroying the balance between Iraq and Iran."[34] Additional contributing factors were that a march on Baghdad would have spilt the Arab partners from the coalition some of whom were contributing basing rights and considerable funding, exceeded the U.N. mandate and risked American forces being embroiled in a long-lasting occupation.[35]

Applying the cognitive frame to the U.S. Iraq War grand strategy allowed an understanding to be gained of the design, general operating logic and the circumstances that favoured the grand strategy's success. America sought to evict Iraq from Kuwait through implementing a denial grand strategy that sought a revised balance of power order and built the requisite power using a near-term market approach. American use of its' instruments of national power, its approach to building power and the grand strategy's outcomes both positive and negative could have been reasonably envisaged using the cognitive frame.

The American denial grand strategy was successful because particular conditions favoured its success. The ends set by President Bush, that Iraq would not achieve its objectives of annexing Kuwait, were appropriate to a denial grand strategy type that seeks to stop another state achieving a desired objective. This type of grand strategy stresses the importance of relative power and America made astute use of diplomatic, informational, military and economic means to decisively shift the power balance towards it for the time it needed to succeed. Given a more lengthy confrontation, the relative power balance may have eroded.

The success of the American denial grand strategy against Iraq though also illustrates this type's shortcomings. The limited grand strategic ends chosen skilfully matched available ways and means, but the underlying causes of the conflict remained. Stopping Iraq achieving its objectives was a negative goal that produced a more favourable balance of power, but did not have more positive or enduring results such as a change in the social purpose or the social rules of the Iraqi state may have had. This seeming deficiency led some to charge that the President's grand strategy won the war but lost the peace.[36] There is some truth in such criticism of this type of grand strategy.

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34. Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, p. 383.
35. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005,* p. 88.
36. Divine, 'The Persian Gulf War Revisited: Tactical Victory, Strategic Failure', pp. 137-38.

Even though the grand strategy succeeded, the U.S. could not disengage from the region and return to the *status quo ante* as many wished. Iraq remained a problem in persecuting the Kurds who had staged an unsuccessful uprising that the U.S. encouraged; America now felt obliged to remain and provide humanitarian assistance. Moreover, Iraq's development of Weapons of Mass Destruction now needed to be stopped and this required constant military pressure on the country from coalition forces based in the Gulf to ensure that U.N. weapon's inspectors could achieve this. In the end, there was little confidence that Saddam no longer posed a threat to regional peace and security.[37]

The denial grand strategy created the kind of peace that was sought. If this was ultimately unappealing, a new grand strategy needed to be fashioned to continue from where the denial grand strategy had reached its desired international order end state. Grand strategies are not a set-and-forget approach.

THE LTTE GRAND STRATEGY 1990-2002

The civil war waged in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 2009 was principally between the national government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE sought to create a separate, independent state for the local Tamil community[38] in the northeast of the island adjacent to the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.[39] Sri Lanka for the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, comprised only two nations - the Sinhala and the Tamil - and accordingly for him:

> The argument is simple – the Tamils are peaceful people who wish to live in peace in their traditional homeland. However they are subjugated, colonized, and oppressed by the Sinhala nation, from which the Tamils want freedom, and

37. Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*, pp. 252-53.
38. The Tamil population of Sri Lankan is divided into those resident in Ceylon when the British colonized the island in 1796 termed Sri Lankan Tamils, and those that migrated from Tamil Nadu in the 19th and 20th Centuries to work in plantation agriculture termed 'Indian' or 'Estate Tamils'. In 1997 the ethnic composition of Sri Lanka was estimated to be 74% Sinhalese, 12.7% Sri Lankan Tamils, 7% Moors (Sri Lankan Muslims), 5.5% 'Indian' Tamils and 1% others. This division was based on religion, caste and language differences as originally discerned by the British. Few Indian Tamils are involved with the LTTE, which was comprised mostly of Sri Lankan Tamils. Deborah Winslow and Michael D. Woost, 'Articulations of Economy and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka', in Deborah Winslow and Michael D. Woost (eds.), *Economy, Culture, and Civil War in Sri Lanka*; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 1-30, pp. 4-5, 25 Note 9, 26 Note 12.
39. P. Sahadevan, 'Sri Lanka's War for Peace and the LTTE's Commitment to Armed Struggle', in Omprakash Mishra and Sucheta Ghosh (eds.), *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region*; New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2003, pp. 284-315, p. 304.

their right to live in peace in their homeland.[40]

In the shorter 1990-2002 period the LTTE could have chosen between denial, engagement or reform grand strategies. Considering the engagement option, in the three years prior the LTTE had worked with the Sri Lankan government to force an Indian military peacekeeping force deployed to the island under the Indo-Lanka Accord to leave. To achieve this joint goal, the Sri Lankan government covertly provided the LTTE with arms and money and involved them in political negotiations.[41] Even so, the LTTE never attempted an engagement grand strategy, probably because they would not accept any compromise over secession and the various Sri Lankan governments involved only offered autonomy and devolution.[42] The two sides ultimately proved unable to work together for mutual benefit as they could not find common ground and shared objectives. An engagement grand strategy requires finding partners with which to cooperate and this provide impossible.

Similarly a reform grand strategy was not adopted either, although given the narrow and fragmented elite base of Sri Lankan national politics there may at times have been some opportunities for the LTTE to have acted to transform the extant norms in a favourable direction. In such a grand strategy though the secession agenda would have again proved problematic. Advancing this agenda would have required the idea of a single government ruling the entire island to collapse, and this always seemed unlikely. Accordingly, the LTTE embraced a denial grand strategy aiming to stop the Sri Lankan government retaining control over the whole island.

The denial grand strategy of the LTTE was particularly evident and efficacious in the period 1990-2002 from the Indian Peacekeeping Force withdrawal and until the Norwegian-brokered ceasefire agreement signed on 22 February 2002. This period includes Eelam War II and III, and several ceasefires. The LTTE employed a grand strategy focused on changing the existing relationship with the Sri Lankan state into a balance of power order. In such an order the state would no longer dominate the

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40. Kasun Ubayasiri, 'An Illusive Leader's Annual Speech ', *Ejournalist: a refereed media journal,* Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 1-27, p. 14.
41. Rohan Edrisinha, 'Trying Times: Constitutional Attempts to Resolve Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka', in Liz Philipson (ed.), *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives - Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka*, No. 4; London: Conciliation Resources, 1998, pp. 28-36, p. 30.
42. Sahadevan, in Mishra and Ghosh (eds.), *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region*; New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2003, pp. 284-315, p. 310.

domestic sub-state system. In this, the LTTE was a revisionist non-state actor endeavouring through improving its power relative to the Sri Lankan state to gain the independence of the Sri Lankan Tamil nation.

The LTTE believed that the Sri Lankan state could not impose its will militarily and could be balanced against; academic Sahadevan observed: "It is this factor that determines the Tiger's preference for war…."[43] The preference for this kind of grand strategy however was also partly influenced by the thinking of its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, who dominated LTTE central committee decision-making.

While Prabhakaran's thinking was not shaped by a philosophy or ideology, he drew a close analogy between the Tamil struggle for an independent Eelam and the Indian nationalist movement that defeated the British colonial state.[44] In this though he considered the armed resistance approaches of Subash Chandra Bose and Bhagath Singh more appropriate to defeat the Sinhala dominated government than the non-violent methods of Mahatma Gandhi.[45] The colonial era analogy may have been historically recent but there were significant differences between the two conflicts and overlooked by Prabhakaran was that the British were not eventually defeated by armed force.

The LTTE's denial grand strategy made extensive use of its military, diplomatic and informational instruments of power although as the denial grand strategy schema suggests military power was the central element. The LTTE did not employ positive or negative economic sanctions.

The LTTE's military power was principally directed at the Sri Lankan state's opposing military forces although some attacks were made on supporting civilian infrastructures including the Central Bank and the international airport, and against specific political and military leaders.[46] Compared to other contemporary secessionist

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43. Ibid., p. 297.
44. 'Obituary: Prabhakaran', *The Economist* 21 May 2009, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.economist.com/node/13687889.
45. Chellamuthu Kuppusamy, *Prabhakaran: The Story of His Struggle for Eelam*, 24 October 2013, Kindle Edition, Amazon Digital Services, 2013, Chapter 2. Alastair Lawson, 'The Enigma of Prabhakaran', *BBC News,* London, BBC, 2 May 2000, viewed 5 May 2014, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/212361.stm
46. Uniquely, the LTTE assassinated three heads of government: Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, and former Sri Lankan Prime Minister and presidential hopeful Gamini Dissanayake in 1994. Cécile Van De Voorde, 'Sri Lankan Terrorism:

groups, the LTTE emphasized more conventional military operations uniquely involving land, sea and air units. The LTTE also formed a specialist suicide arm – the Black Tigers – that undertook numerous attacks; in the 1990-2002 period, the LTTE were the most significant non-state actor globally using this technique. The military instrument positively supported the grand strategy with the LTTE leader declaring in his 1999 Hero's Day Speech that:

> The spectacular victories that we gained…have turned the balance of military power in our favour. The massive effort made by [Sri Lankan President] Chandrika over the last five years to weaken the LTTE and to achieve military hegemony was shattered by us in the matter of a few days.[47]

The diplomatic instrument was focused on enhancing the LTTE's relative military power, as the denial grand strategy schema would suggest. While several ceasefires were announced and negotiations entered into with the Sri Lankan government, these episodes were used simply to resupply and rebuild the LTTE's armed forces. Jonathan Goodhand wrote that nothing suggested that the LTTE ".acted in good faith in the interests of peace….in spite of the political rhetoric of returning to talks, primacy [was] still accorded to a military course of action in shaping the process."[48]

Internationally, the LTTE established a quasi-diplomatic presence in some 54 countries, principally concentrating on those with large Tamil migrant populations. This presence aimed to harness and integrate international political support for LTTE objectives. Eelam House in London was the LTTE's principal headquarters outside of Sri Lanka, from here overseas political activity was coordinated and all official Tiger statements, memoranda and promulgations originated.[49]

The informational instrument was extensively used by the LTTE with their message disseminated through e-mail, internet, telephone hot lines, community

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Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)', *Police Practice and Research,* Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2005, pp. 181-99, p. 187.

47. V. Prabhakaran, *LTTE Leader Calls Upon Sri Lanka to End Military Oppression for Peace Talks*, International Secretariat of LTTE, London, 27 November 1999, viewed 5 May 2014, https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/cjesa/conversations/messages/4000

48. Jonathan Goodhand, *Aid, Conflict and Peace Building in Sri Lanka*; London: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King's College, University of London, July 2001, pp. 42-43.

49. Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*; Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, p. 44.

libraries, mailings, Tamil TV and radio, and political, social and cultural gatherings.[50] Websites were established to give the LTTE a: "truly global presence, permitting the group to 'virtually' and instantaneously transmit propaganda, mobilize active supporters, and sway potential backers."[51] The LTTE promulgated a consistent three part ethno-nationalist message: Tamils are the innocent victims of Sinhalese discrimination and government instigated military repression; only the LTTE can defend and promote the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamil community; and there can be no peace until Sri Lankan Tamils are granted their own independent state governed by the LTTE.[52]

The approach taken to building power was shaped by the ongoing war, the certainty it would continue and that this was a matter of necessity. As the cognitive frame would suggest, the LTTE implemented a near-term managerial approach that emphasized extraction. In this, the LTTE was not limited to simply the territory of Sri Lanka. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1948, there had been five successive waves of chain migration with the third and fifth waves that occurred after the 1983 ethnic riots particularly supportive of the LTTE. During 1987-2002 in the fifth and largest wave, some 300,000 Tamils migrated and by 2002 an estimated one-third of the three million Sri Lankan Tamils lived overseas.[53]

Gaining legitimacy presented a particular problem. The LTTE was an authoritarian military organization with no accompanying political party so the option of using democratic means to gain input legitimacy was unavailable.[54] Accordingly, legitimacy was sought through the LTTE presenting itself as the only group able to defend Sri Lankan Tamils from a predatory government. By the early 1990s, the LTTE was the dominant Sri Lankan Tamil insurgent group having actively eliminated most other opposition groups, large and small, through marginalization, assassinations and targeted violence both within Sri Lanka and internationally; this program left the LTTE

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50. Ibid., p. 45.
51. Ibid., p. 46.
52. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
53. Rohan Gunaratna, 'Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers', in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 197-224, pp. 200-02.
54. Liz Philipson and Yuvi Thangarajah, *The Politics of the North-East: Part of the Sri Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessment 2005*; Colombo: The Asia Foundation, 2005, pp. 28-29.

uniquely positioned to claim resistance legitimacy.[55] The claim of output legitimacy was further advanced though deliberately cultivating an appearance of serving those under its control. NGO researcher Shawn Flanigan writes that:

> The LTTE…accomplished this…through an elaborate effort to direct the service activities of the local and international NGO communities, create its own NGOs, and appoint steering committees to Sri Lankan government agencies that provide services. By creating this public image of a welfare 'state', the LTTE ensures that the population under its control sees it as the primary provider of relief and rehabilitation.[56]

The LTTE had to primarily rely on Sri Lankan Tamils living in Sri Lanka under its control for the majority of its manpower needs as of the others under its control, the group persecuted Muslim groups and Indian Tamil participation was marginal.[57] The Sri Lankan Tamil population under LTTE control during 1990-2002 probably oscillated between a half to one million people; by comparison the state's population was around 17 million people.[58] By 2002, the LTTE could only sustain some 8,000-10,000 armed combatants with a core of 3,000–6,000 trained fighters.[59] Many had volunteered in the early phases of the insurgency motivated by Tamil nationalism and indignation against state repression. As enthusiasm waned and losses mounted however, the LTTE introduced conscription and progressively made much greater use of women and children.[60]

About a third of the LTTE were women who undertook many of the suicide

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55. Gamini Samaranayakea, 'Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka', *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies,* Vol. 30, No. 1, 2007, pp. 171-83, pp. 174, 77.
56. Shawn Teresa Flanigan, 'Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* Vol. 31, No. 6, 2008, pp. 499-519, p. 504.
57. Samaranayakea, 'Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka', p. 174.
58. The key population centre for the LTTE was the city of Jaffna where some 800,000 people lived; across this period the city was often under LTTE control. The estimates of the LTTE population base are derived from: Tamil Information Centre, *Exodus of Tamils from Jaffna: The Displacement Crisis*; Tamils True Voice, December 1995, viewed 10 July 2011, www.tamilcanadian.com/article/469.
59. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*; Washington: United States Department of State, May 2002, p. 100, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf.
60. Sahadevan, in Mishra and Ghosh (eds.), *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region*; New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2003, pp. 284-315, p. 306.

attacks and were prominent in conventional military campaigns.[61] RAND military analyst Christine Fair noted that "in the LTTE's 2000 offensive to retake the Jaffna Peninsula, the LTTE engaged the Sri Lankan Army with about 7,000 light infantry cadre. Of this figure, it is estimated that 3,000 were women."[62] Manpower shortages also saw extensive use of children across the period; by early 1996 half the recruits were between 12 and 16 years old.[63] The child soldiers were reportedly involved in major combat actions from the early 1990s and by 2000 some 2,000 were estimated to be serving in the LTTE. [64]

The LTTE's revenue was derived internally (40%) and externally (60%). The internal funds meet immediate expenses whereas the external funds were mainly used for arms procurement.[65] Internally, the LTTE taxed Sri Lankan Tamils on an individual income basis and at times solicited or coerced extra donations. There was further taxation of individuals migrating and of those families that had family members abroad.[66] Within LTTE areas, commercial businesses, private passenger buses and lorries transporting food and supplies were also taxed. While outside LTTE areas there was a clandestine tax collection from Tamil business enterprises.[67]

Externally, funds came from four main sources: direct contributions from migrant communities; funds siphoned off contributions given to NGOs, charities, and benevolent donor groups; people smuggling; and investments made in legitimate, Tamil run businesses.[68] In later years, the LTTE also started commercial businesses to obtain a regular funding source.[69] The largest funding source though was from a tax imposed on Sri Lankan Tamils living abroad. This tax was preferred to be given voluntarily but if not, threats were made to family members in LTTE- controlled areas in Sri Lanka or

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61. Voorde, 'Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)', p. 186.
62. C. Christine Fair, *Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan*; Santa Monica: RAND, 2004, p. 25.
63. Voorde, 'Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)', p. 186.
64. *Child Soldiers of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi, India, 2001, viewed 5 May 2014, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/child_solders.htm.
65. Gunaratna, in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 197-224, pp. 209-10.
66. Ibid., p. 210.
67. Ibid., p. 211.
68. Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,* p. 49.
69. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, *Ramifications of Crackdown on LTTE in Switzerland*, Toronto, Canada: viewed 5 May 2014 dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/1952.

to the unwilling contributors themselves.[70] The tax collectors, while initially volunteers, later worked on a commission basis that encouraged coercion and intimidation.[71]

In the extraction of external funds, the deliberate LTTE manipulation of Tamil diaspora organizations played the central role. In this, there was also a strong focus on supporting gaining output legitimacy through providing services. Rohan Gunaratna writes that:

> Diaspora organizations provided the medium for the LTTE to permeate diasporas and migrants with Tamil nationalist, secessionist, and pro-LTTE rhetoric. The key LTTE strategy aimed at enhancing control over Tamils overseas was to make them dependent on LTTE services for their basic needs and to provide social and cultural fulfilment.[72]

Material was also obtained internally and externally. Internally, arms were captured from the Sri Lankan Army and a rudimentary manufacturing capability was established that could supply mines, grenades and mortar shells[73] for low-intensity guerrilla warfare.[74] Most arms came from overseas, initially from India but after 1987, when overt Government support ceased, from global sources.[75] To support this, the LTTE developed a large-scale shipping organization involving at least 11 deep-sea freighters sailing under Honduran, Liberian or Panamanian flags of convenience.[76] The main logistical transhipment base was in Thailand with supplies purchased using bank accounts in Germany, Netherlands, Norway, the U.K. and Canada.[77]

The use of the diaspora for funding military procurement was skilful but may have had some unintentional side effects. The strategic synthesis saw more resources flowing from overseas than domestic sources and this grew in importance as in-country

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70. Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,* p. 50.
71. Jeyaraj, *Ramifications of Crackdown on LTTE in Switzerland*.
72. Gunaratna, in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 197-224, pp. 206-07.
73. Sahadevan, in Mishra and Ghosh (eds.), *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region*; New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2003, pp. 284-315, p. 306.
74. Gunaratna, in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 197-224, p. 208.
75. The major weapon sources were Cambodia, Myanmar and Afghanistan with ammunition supplied from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and North Korea, and explosives from Ukraine, Croatia and South Africa. Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,* p. 118, 20-21.
76. Ibid., p. 119.
77. Ibid.

sources became less able or willing to contribute. Stephen Battle writes that overtime:

> the LTTE became less concerned in actually representing local Tamil interests and more concerned in selling the perception of being the sole representative of the Tamil struggle to the vast Diaspora. …it purported itself as the sole representative...not to win a war of succession, but to facilitate the continual flow of monetary support to its coffers. The actual plight of local Tamils became less and less of a concern to the LTTE.[78]

The LTTE saw less need to sustain in-country legitimacy and resorted to the easier option of increasing coercion as a means to extract resources from the in-country Tamil community.[79] The access to external resources allowed the LTTE to be less responsive to local pressures and avoid any reassessments of their grand strategy and its likelihood of long-term success.

Applying the cognitive frame to the LTTE grand strategy allows an understanding to be gained of the design, the general operating logic and the circumstances and conditions that favoured the grand strategy's success. The LTTE sought secession for the Sri Lankan Tamil minority through implementing a denial grand strategy that included a near-term managerial approach. The use by the LTTE of its instruments of national power, the group's techniques of building power and the grand strategy's outcomes both positive and negative could have been reasonably envisaged using the conceptual model.

The denial grand strategy was successful because particular conditions favoured success. In the 1990-2002 period the ends sought of denying Sri Lankan government control over the entire island were appropriate to a denial grand strategy type but its ability to be successfully implemented depended on being able to achieve and sustain a suitable relative power balance. The LTTE was able to achieve this by reducing the Sri Lankan government's power through the use of military, diplomatic and informational means and by building up its own power though a near-term managerial approach. The relative weakness of the Sri Lankan military means was particularly important in the

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78. Stephen L. Battle, *Lessons in Legitimacy: The LTTE End-Game of 2007–2009*, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010, pp. 43-44.
79. Jannie Lilja, 'Trapping Constituents or Winning Hearts and Minds? Rebel Strategies to Attain Constituent Support in Sri Lanka', *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol. 21, No. 2, 2009, pp. 306-26, pp. 314-18.

grand strategy's success. At the end of the Eelam III war in 1999 an external observer noted that:

> The official army is weak strategically, poorly led, poorly paid, demoralized by danger and sustained lack of success, and allegedly riddled with corruption. Strategically, its major handicap is a scarcity of intelligence about the enemy. It has few resources for gathering intelligence, few Tamils to do it, and very few trained analysts of the intelligence that is gathered. So the Sri Lankan army fights a committed, even fanatic, cadre of guerrillas with overwhelming numbers but with insufficient training, knowledge, and motivation.[80]

While achieving its strategic objectives in the 1990-2002 period, the LTTE however, was arguably unwise to continue with a denial grand strategy that stressed relative military power. The Sri Lankan state was inherently much stronger than the LTTE could ever aspire to be making the grand strategy particularly vulnerable to governmental policy changes. A grand strategy involves interacting with intelligent others that can learn from their failures and adopt new or evolved grand strategies in response. The change in the relative balance of power when it came took time and was duly noted by the LTTE leadership but the denial grand strategy remained in place.[81]

Beyond the period discussed here, the relative power balance changed dramatically as the Sri Lankan government adopted a new grand strategy that used military, diplomatic, informational and economic means to weaken the LTTE while sharply building up its own military power.[82] For the LTTE, this external challenge came at a time when its internal power had passed its peak and was weakening. The LTTE's near-term managerial approach was highly effective in allowing a small non-state actor drawing on a very limited population base to successfully balance against a much larger state but only for a time. Waging permanent war necessitated the recruitment of women and children and to growing war weariness in the populace.

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80. Robert I. Rothberg, 'Sri Lanka's Civil War: From Mayhem toward Diplomatic Resolution', in Robert I. Rothberg (ed.), *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*; Washington: Brookings Institution Press;, 1999, pp. 1-16, p. 2.
81. Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers*; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, pp. 132-89.
82. Ashok Mehta, *Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: How Eelam War IV Was Won*, Manekshaw Paper No.22; New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2010. Sinharaja Tammita-Delgoda, *Review Essay: Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict*, Manekshaw Paper 22a; New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies, 2010.

The Sri Lankan state progressively developed overwhelming military power, took advantage of declining legitimacy to split the LTTE, and in 2009 simply annihilated the intrinsically much weaker non-state actor.[83] The LTTE grand strategy over time played to the Sri Lankan state's fundamental strengths, as Sahadevan had prophetically observed in 2003 the LTTE "is invariably a loser in any conventional battle."[84] This was an outcome the use of the cognitive frame may have envisaged.

A denial grand strategy simply aims to stop the actions of another state succeeding and therefore has a negative goal. This type of grand strategy does not seek to change the social purpose of the other state or its social rules. For the LTTE to create a secessionist Tamil state it needed to move at some time from a denial to another type of grand strategy. When the Sir Lankan government decided to change the relative balance of power, the LTTE denial grand strategy had reached its culminating point and needed to be replaced or sharply change. Instead, the LTTE stuck with the denial grand strategy until complete failure. Grand strategies are dynamic not static and must evolve to suit the times. In this case study the cognitive frame proved both useful in analysing a non-state actor's grand strategy, and insightful in predicting the results.

THE USSR'S DÉTENTE GRAND STRATEGY 1965-1980

By the mid-1960s, the USSR was one of the most successful economies in the world and was militarily rapidly gaining on the Western alliance.[85] To observers both within and outside the USSR, the macro-tends appeared to indicate a dynamic and growing USSR and a declining America; the future seemed bright.[86] Soviet political thinking swung to favour the "stability of the post-war great-power alignments. Even the official ideology…now busied itself with glorifying the status quo as the best of all

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83. Sergei Desilva-Ranasinghe, 'Victory at the Battle of Kilinochchi', *Defence ReviewAsia,* Vol. 2, No. 6, December 2008/ January 2009, pp. 7-8. Sergei Desilva-Ranasinghe, 'Good Education: Sri Lankan Military Learns Insurgency Lessons', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 2009, pp. 3-7. Sergei Desilva-Ranasinghe, 'Land Warfare Lessons from Sri Lanka', *Asian Defence & Diplomacy,* Vol. 16, No. 6, December 2009/January 2010, pp. 29-37. Sergei Desilva-Ranasinghe, *Strategic Analysis of Sri Lankan Military's Counter-Insurgency Operations,* Future Directions International, Perth, 12 February 2010, viewed 5 May 2014, futuredirections.org.au/admin/uploaded_pdf/1266992558-FDIStrategicAnalysisPaper-12February2010.pdf.
84. Sahadevan, in Mishra and Ghosh (eds.), *Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in South Asian Region*; New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2003, pp. 284-315, p. 299.
85. Robert C. Allen, 'The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy', *Canadian Journal of Economics,* Vol. 34, No. 4, November, 2001, pp. 859-891, p. 861.
86. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* p. 185.

possible solutions."[87] The new First Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev led a confident Communist Party that sought to maintain this newly favourable international situation.

The Soviet leadership's thinking was influenced by concerns over the brinkmanship of the previous Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev and more distant memories of the Second World War. Brezhnev dismissively talked of Khrushchev's approach to the Cuban missile crisis declaring that: "We almost slipped into nuclear war! And what effort did it cost us to pull ourselves out of this…."[88] This event reinforced his beliefs that arose from his World War Two experiences that wars should be avoided at all costs and that the U.S. and the USSR had a special responsibility to together prevent future major wars.[89]

Using newly available Soviet sources, Vladislav Zubok determined that "Brezhnev's [détente] strategy came from a disarmingly straightforward premise: two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, had a joint obligation to maintain a stable world order."[90] Brezhnev though, like the rest of the senior Soviet leadership, also drew an historical analogy from the Second World War that maintaining the peace and building military strength in the circumstances of the mid-Cold War were not contradictory. This cognitive dissonance was to later cause the détente grand strategy mortal difficulties.

The Soviet leaderships' predilections and their view that conflict was inherent in the contemporary international system suggested their adopting a denial grand strategy from the beginning. While ostensibly global in coverage, the grand strategy was focussed on changing the relationship with the U.S. The international system was considered by the Soviets to be strongly bipolar with "the U.S.-Soviet relationship…the central one in world politics." [91]

In considering potential international orders to strive for, the hegemonic stability order appeared impractical as the Soviet bloc patently did not, at least yet, have the combination of overwhelming political, military, economic and social power needed to

87. Ibid., p. 193.
88. Brezhnev quoted in Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*; Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009, p. 203.
89. Vladislav Zubok, 'The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s', *Cold War History,* Vol. 8, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 427-47, pp. 430-31.
90. Ibid., p. 431.
91. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* p. 201.

dominate the international system. By contrast a satisfactory balance of power had already been achieved. Partly from default but also because it conformed to the leadership's world view, Brezhnev decided to use a denial grand strategy to create a concert of power order. Historian John Lewis Gaddis observes détente was all about "turning a dangerous situation into a predictable *system*…to freeze the Cold War in place. Its purpose was not to end the conflict…but rather establish rules by which it should be conducted."[92]

For the USSR these rules were formally codified in the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.[93] U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called it a roadmap that established "clear rules of conduct."[94] The two states agreed their relations would be based on "the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in one another's internal affairs, and mutual advantage."[95] Contentious issues would now be resolved not by threats or force but as Brezhnev declared "by peaceful means, at a conference table."[96] Historian Jeremi Suri writes that it created:

> a framework that gave priority to the "security interests" of the superpowers. The signatories rejected spheres of influence…but the provisions for assured boundaries and stability legitimated the current division of authority between East and West….The United States and the Soviet Union would, in essence, [now] collaborate as fireman, putting out flames of conflict around the globe.[97]

As the cognitive frame would suggest, the military instrument in the Soviet grand strategy was "the primary element of power."[98] The Soviets believed that building military power comparable to the U.S. was central to the strategy's success as without this America would once again resort to intimation and blackmail as it did in

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92. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*; New York: The Penguin Press, 2005, p. 198.
93. Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*; London: Routledge, 1999, p. 75.
94. Henry Kissinger 29 May 1972 news conference quoted in Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 257.
95. Raymond L. Gathoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*; Washington: Brookings Institution Press, Revised Edition 1994, p. 327.
96. "The Outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula; Speech of L. I. Brezhnev," Pravda, 19 January 1977 quoted in ibid., p. 40.
97. Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*, p. 257.
98. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* p. 201.

the 1950s.[99] The denial grand strategy with its goal of a concert of power order only "became possible because of a new correlation of forces in the world arena…."[100] In 1968 when Soviet tanks crushed the Prague Spring and the West did not intervene, Brezhnev felt the USSR had now developed the military strength to bargain effectively. The new KGB head Yuri Androprov advised that: "Nobody wants to talk to the weak."[101] Brezhnev thought that only strong Soviet military power could convince the U.S. that "not brinkmanship but negotiation…not confrontation but peaceful cooperation is the natural course of things." [102]

The grand strategy led to an impressive military build-up, but this unintentionally worked against the desired concert of powers order in which no state seeks system dominance, the states involved feel reasonably secure and their status is recognized and not endangered. The rapidly growing Soviet military strength could be misinterpreted as excessive for a concert of powers order and suggestive of a striving for a more ambitious different order. Cold war historian Melvyn Leffler observed that:

> Between 1965-1970, [Soviet] defence expenditures increased by more than a third and, according to some estimates, came close to doubling. The numbers of strategic weapons…intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and long range bombers…soared from approximately 472 in 1964 to 1,470 in 1969. The annual production of tanks rose from 3,100 in 1966 to more than 4,250 in 1970; armoured vehicle production grew during these same years, from 2,800 to 4,000. Yet Brezhnev and his colleagues did not want to wage war. They yearned for American respect…and demanded equal security.[103]

If the new correlation of forces were held to have bought the West to reason, within this the nuclear forces were considered to have the central role.[104] Deputy

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99. Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War*; New York: Hill and Wang 2007, p. 254.
100. Brezhnev, Lenninskim kursom, 5:317, 1975 quoted in R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991*; Ithaca: Cornell University, 1992, p. 256.
101. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, pp. 207-11.
102. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy", 24 February 1976 quoted in: Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War*, p. 254.
103. Ibid., p. 238.
104. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War*, p. 191.

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Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii asserted that: ”the nuclear equilibrium of the two powers forms the basis of the international equilibrium.”[105] The grand strategy accordingly, gave primacy to the strategic missile force, which by 1968 was consuming almost 20% of the Soviet defence budget. The ICBM acquisition program was the “largest single weapons effort in Soviet history and the most expensive.…”[106]

The concert involved considerable diplomatic activity with an important role for institutions including regular summit meetings, international treaties, and new protocols and processes. The Soviet grand strategy became most clearly defined in terms of specific international agreements including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Basic Principles Agreement, various trade agreements, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction agreements. For the USSR these agreements supported the concert of powers order and were important to keeping the favourable relative balance between Soviet and U.S. military power, in gaining international agreement to the post-World War Two division of Europe and in building economically useful relations with Western nations.

As the cognitive frame might suggest, the economic and informational instruments of national power were distinctly secondary. Unlike in earlier eras, the USSR now accepted the capitalist world’s continuance and there was a reduction in covert and overt agitation in foreign trade unions, academes, and political parties. Economic support remained in place for Soviet client states and this became progressively more draining, but was not a major feature impacting the denial grand strategy in this period.

The grand strategy adopted the long-term managerial approach to create and distribute the required resources, as the cognitive frame would suggest in these circumstances. The problem was long-term while the future was considered certain in that the bi-polar competition was assumed to continue indefinitely. An international strategy was attempted that selectively accessed Western money and material to avoid domestic change. Valerie Bunce observed that:

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105. V. Petrovskii, "Novaia struktura mira: Formuly i real'nost'," MEiMo, 1977, no.4, 18 quoted in ibid., p. 192.
106. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, p. 205.

> The possibility of greater economic contact with the West…provided an optimal solution for political as well as economic reasons. The prevailing [internal] distribution of power…could be maintained, by using the West to plug up holes rather than engaging in economic reforms which would undercut planner and Party sovereignty.[107]

The long-term managerial approach to building power extracted men, money and materials from Soviet society using corporatist policies that gave distributional preference to the state-owned defence and heavy industries. These corporatist policies of 'developed socialism' envisaged a consensual society managed by an activist state that aimed to:

> maximize productivity by incorporating dominant economic and political interests directly into the policy process, while cultivating the support of the mass public through an expanding welfare state.…[and] the extension of benefits by the State to all those groups considered vital to the functioning of the economy. In return, the State demanded compliance, moderate demands, and support for the prevailing distribution of power, status, and economic resources.[108]

Output legitimacy was stressed and reinforced by appeals to the universal statist, communist ideology that promised a better future of security and prosperity. This approach recognized that gaining input legitimacy was problematic given the state's authoritarian state nature.

The denial grand strategy was successful for several years in that Soviet Union now felt more secure than during any earlier part of the Cold War.[109] Moreover, the USSR was now more respected globally with considerably more international prestige and consequence. In 1971 Brezhnev declared that:

> At the present time no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might. Never before in its entire history….has our country enjoyed such

107. Valerie Bunce, 'The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 2, April 1983, pp. 129-58, p. 148.
108. Ibid., p. 131.
109. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War*, p. 220.

authority and influence in the world.[110]

There were though intrinsic difficulties in the USSR using this type of grand strategy. As the U.S. extracted itself from the debilitating Vietnam War and made use of an emerging China, the utility for America of a concert with the USSR declined. China was important for both the U.S. and the USSR in this period. Growing worries over the erratic path that Mao was taking and emerging concerns about a possible armed conflict strengthened Soviet interest in détente with the U.S.[111] The Soviet leadership thought that having a friendly, or at least a neutral, America in some future conflict with China would be advantageous.

The Americans in contrast thought they could enlist Chinese support. In the late 1960s President Nixon and National Security Adviser Kissinger sought Chinese help to extract America from Vietnam and then as Sino-Soviet tensions deepened and armed conflict emerged on their borders realized that China could be turned into a useful ally. For China itself these developments offered new opportunities; Yang Kuisong writes:

> Being threatened with war by Moscow and enticed by diplomatic overtures by Washington created a new environment in which Mao would change some of his fundamental views about China's external relations. …the unprecedented war scare from August 1969 pushed him to alter Chinese foreign policy in unprecedented ways….[112]

With China now a partner in containing Soviet military power, détente steadily became of less importance to the U.S. While the USSR prized continued military parity with the U.S., America focused on other elements of national power to explain why it alone was uniquely central to world politics.[113] America's position had moved, the USSR was not now seen as an equal and so, as Hedley Bull commented, the U.S.: "shifted away from the attempt to fashion international order on the basis of an 'adversary partnership' with the Soviet Union…."[114]

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110. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom, 1971, 6: 245-46 quoted in ibid., p. 187.
111. Zubok, 'The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s', p. 429.
112. Yang Kuisong, 'The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement', *Cold War History,* Vol. 1, No. 1, August 2000, pp. 21-52, p. 47.
113. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War*, pp. 211-18.
114. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd edn., New York: Columbia University Press 1995, p. 220.

By the late 1970s Secretary of State Cyrus Vance observed that Soviet leaders displayed "a deepening mood of harshness and frustration at what they saw as our inconsistency and unwillingness to deal with them as equals."[115] Soviet leaders though, even after noticing this crucial change in perspective central to a concert of powers order, stuck doggedly with their grand strategy. There was no "comparable shift in the policy of the Soviet Union."[116]

Worse for the Soviets, their continuing arms build-up so central to their denial grand strategy acted against them in convincing the U.S. that the USSR was untrustworthy and harboured bad intentions. Not just no longer seen as broadly equal in terms of jointly managing global affairs, the Soviets' now appeared to many in the U.S. as deceitful and treacherous. It seemed demonstrably evident that the massive military surge ran counter to creating the stable political equilibrium that underpinned a concert of powers order.

American critics and military experts publicly campaigned about the growing "Soviet military threat", progressively undermining relations.[117] Deepening Soviet involvement in the Third World throughout the mid-to-late 1970s exacerbated this deterioration. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, ironically to try to return a worsening political situation to the *status quo ante*, finally seemed to confirm Western fears.[118]

The Soviet leadership did not realize that their grand strategy had passed its culminating point by the mid-1970s and in being continued was now creating - not addressing - problems. The opportunity to devise a new grand strategy or to evolve the old one was missed. The USSR was now seen as a revisionist power attempting to change the overall international distribution of power in its favour.

At the end of the 1970s, the U.S. and its allies embarked on a new arms build-up and a series of counter-interventions in Third World states governed by avowedly communist parties. If the Soviet's believed their stress on relative military power

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115. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*; New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983, p. 101.
116. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, p. 220.
117. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, p. 203.
118. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 316-26.

allowed the concert, it was also instrumental in undermining the grand strategy's objective of maintaining the status quo. Moreover, their approach to building power became progressively less viable over time as the previously high GDP growth rates steadily weakened.[119]

The Soviet leadership, while privileging the military instrument as the denial grand strategy cognitive frame suggested they would, failed to properly appreciate the importance of matching this with the essential supporting domestic economy. There was a poor grand strategic synthesis inappropriate for the desired concert of powers order.

A long-term managerial approach was adopted as the cognitive frame would recommend, but there was an over-emphasis on military power to the detriment of the overall industrial base and the economy. The policies adopted towards building military power were what would be suggested for a short-term managerial state impelled by a strong sense of urgency and necessity. The concert of power order though was one where the Soviet Union as a joint global manager should have felt secure albeit needing to be prudent.

The on-going very large defence expenditures undertaken misdirected investment into the defence and heavy industries, damaging the development of other sectors of the economy. [120] In analysing the economy of the USSR in this period, economist Robert Allen wrote that:

> The [Soviet] growth rate dropped abruptly after 1970 for external and internal reasons. The external reason was the Cold War, which diverted substantial R&D resources from civilian innovation to the military and cut the rate of productivity growth. The internal reason was the end of the surplus labour economy: unemployment in agriculture had been eliminated and the accessible natural resources of the country had been fully exploited.[121]

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119. Allen, 'The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy', pp. 861-62.
120. "Growth began to slow down in the 1960s, and success turned to failure after 1970, when the growth rate dropped dramatically. GNP grew in excess of 5 per cent per year from 1928 to 1970, but the annual rate dropped to 3.7 per cent in 1970–75, then to 2.6 per cent in 1975–80…." Vladimir Kontorovicha and Alexander Weinb, 'What Did the Soviet Rulers Maximise?', *Europe-Asia Studies,* Vol. 61, No. 9, 2009, pp. 1579-601, pp. 1594-95.
121. Allen, 'The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy', pp. 878-79.

The grand strategy's use of global financial resources also proved at odds with the long-term managerial approach that recommended financing through domestic means to lessen dependence on others and any constraints they might impose. While the USSR was relatively fiscally prudent, the grand strategy neglected the financial needs of its Warsaw Pact allies. Foreign policy analyst Matthew Ouimet observed that:

> Eastern Europe's collective debt rose by 480 percent during the period 1973-1978….Investment funds either went to pay for consumer imports or simply dissipated in the hands of inefficient or corrupt bureaucratic managers. Consequently, the long run impact…was an economic catastrophe in Eastern Europe that invited indebtedness, ensured wide-scale industrial obsolescence, and constrained exports.[122]

These economic woes significantly added to the difficulties of maintaining the status quo in the Eastern Bloc. The political instability in Poland in the late 1970s was fuelled by economic decline and eventually proved to be particularly damaging to the USSR's long-term viability.[123]

The institutionalization of the concert was also particularly problematic. There was no attempt to map out a joint strategy to define common objectives and share burdens, nor agreement on "any theory or ideology of world order…that would give direction and purpose to a Soviet-American concert."[124] Moreover, the denial grand strategy type's position on institutions that cautions that their use reflects relative power differentials was too easily disregarded in an intense desire to gain Western recognition of the borders of Eastern Europe. To achieve this, the USSR signed the Helsinki Final Act that in enshrining human rights norms ultimately undermined the internal legitimacy of the Soviet state, calling into question all its actions and policies.[125]

Applying the cognitive frame to the Brezhnev grand strategy allows the design requirements, the general operating logics and the circumstances and conditions that favour the grand strategy's successes and failures to be understood. In this the outcomes

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122. Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*; Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 82.
123. Ibid., pp. 109-13.
124. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, p. 219.
125. Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*; Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001, pp. 257-86.

both positive and negative could have been reasonably envisaged. In this, it is important to note that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects.

The Soviets adopted a denial grand strategy seeking to change the relationship with the U.S. into a concert of powers order. A denial grand strategy emphasizes the importance of relative military power but the level of superiority needs to be carefully considered to be appropriate to the order sought. The rapid arms build-up was highly effective in allowing a comparatively underdeveloped country to create large-scale, highly sophisticated military forces and did make the USSR feel more secure. At some point though, the USSR needed to cut the growth in arms spending and accept the favourable military power status quo.

The large-scale, seemingly open-ended military build-up unintentionally worked against the desired concert of powers order in which no state seeks system dominance, the states involved feel reasonably secure and their status is recognized and not endangered. The rapidly growing Soviet military strength was misinterpreted as suggestive of a concealed, covert striving for a more ambitious different order – the Americans feared possibly a hegemonic one. The grand strategy in indefinitely continuing a large-scale military was inappropriate for the order sought as well as gravely damaging for the domestic base.

Implementing a short-term managerial approach for building military power but a long-term managerial approach for the remainder of society and the economy created a damaging level of incoherence. The general managerial approach was effective in allocating massive resources to the favoured military and supporting heavy industry sector. In a manner like the cognitive frame cautions however, this led to the USSR facing growing inefficiencies, declining productivity, and constraints arising from an inappropriate use made of its limited access to global resources. The grand strategy's incoherence in terms of building power simply expedited the process of collapse.

Overall the Soviet grand strategy while initially successful in constraining the U.S. progressively acted to undermine the desired stable political equilibrium and its own domestic strength across the period 1965-1980. This was the direct opposite to that intended. While the détente grand strategy had internal contradictions working

against its success, given that the U.S. was the stronger state by all measures, the weaker USSR was arguably unwise to use a denial grand strategy that privileged relative power. Other options were possible; the Chinese Communist Party used a successful engagement grand strategy while Mikhail Gorbachev implemented a reform grand strategy, albeit perhaps unsuccessful from the communist party's viewpoint. The most enduring legacy of the détente grand strategy appears to have been its considerable contribution to the internal collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s.[126]

The use of the cognitive frame suggests the grand strategy as actually implemented by the USSR would probably fail, an outcome historically validated. In retrospect, the cognitive frame highlights elements of the USSR's grand strategy that were in conflict with each other. The desired concert of powers order was undermined by the large-scale military build-up more appropriate to the initially gaining of a satisfactory balance of power in a highly threatening situation. On the other hand the grand strategic synthesis was also flawed in using a mixed short-term and long-term managerial approach.

In the end the grand strategy failed due to internal incoherence. Inappropriate use of the instruments of national power can work against achieving the desired order, while success is made more unlikely if the strategic synthesis is also defective. In the USSR's détente grand strategy, the USSR's reconciliation of ends, ways and means lacked coherence and consistency; a mistake that the use of the cognitive frame with its embedded generic theoretical insights may have revealed.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has applied the grand strategy cognitive frame to specific case studies as part of the test process: the U.S. grand strategy of the Iraq War 1991-1992, the LTTE grand strategy during 1990-2002 and the USSR's détente grand strategy 1965-1980. The American Iraq War grand strategy sought a balance of power order and used a near term market approach. The LTTE case similarly sought to create a balance of power order although drawing in this example on a near-term managerial approach. The USSR grand strategy aimed to build a concert of powers order, but implemented

126. Vladislav Zubok, 'The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s', *Cold War History,* Vol. 8, No. 4, November, 2008, 427-47, pp. 438-44.

policies appropriate for another order, and combined this with a damaging blend of short-term and long-term managerial approaches. In these examples the grand strategy cognitive frame seemed a useful diagnostic process to aid analysis, and the outcomes of these grand strategies appeared consistent with what could have been reasonably envisaged using it.

The use of the three case studies also provides generic knowledge useful to policymakers about grand strategies in general and denial grand strategies in particular. In general all three case studies revealed the dynamic nature of grand strategy. A grand strategy involves interacting with intelligent others that learn from their failures and can adopt new or evolved grand strategies in response. Grand strategies need to be continually monitored to determine if they have reached their culminating point beyond which their utility diminishes. The time to reach this point is determined by the speed with which the targets of the grand strategy respond although notice may also need to be taken of changes in the external environment as well. Grand strategies are not a set-and-forget approach.

In the Iraq War case, Iraq was never going to be able to match America in relative power terms when the U.S. decided to act and focus its diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of power on the problem. Similarly the LTTE could only maintain a relative power advantage while the much larger Sri Lankan state allowed it to by not building and employing its latent greater national power. For Iraq and the LTTE to have any reasonable likelihood of success they needed to change their grand strategies or adopt completely new ones when it became apparent that their adversaries were marshalling their might.

The Détente grand strategy case is an interesting variation. The relative *military* power balance between the two sides did not fluctuate greatly. Instead, the U.S. decided to change the rules of the game in determining that the USSR was not its equal across all measures of national power and never would be. A concert of power international order was therefore not an order the U.S. now wished to be a party to making. This order has the greatest degree of interdependency of the three denial grand strategy alternatives in that both sides have to agree to be mutually supporting.

The case studies further highlighted specific generic knowledge about the denial

type of grand strategies. The ends sought must be appropriate to the way used of taking action to stop another achieving a desired objective. This type of grand strategy stresses the importance of relative power and this can be changed by either side internally or externally balancing. There is an interdependency between all participants although, this is least in the denial grand strategy type compared with the engagement or reform types, as later case studies will discuss. Relative power has a degree of absoluteness.

Even so, the inherently unstable nature of the relative power balance lies behind the greatest shortcoming of the denial grand strategy type. While a denial grand strategy may be appropriately chosen and skilfully implemented it is fundamentally unable to resolve the underlying causes of a conflict. The Iraq War was decisive in stopping Iraq achieving its objectives but this did not have more positive or enduring results such as a change in the social purpose or the social rules of the Iraqi state may have. The result of this grand strategy was that critics with the benefit of hindsight later asserted that the grand strategy won the war but lost the peace and accordingly failed.

Particular types of grand strategy can only create particular types of international orders, particular kinds of 'peace'. A denial grand strategy can only be used to create a balance of power, a concert of power or a hegemonic stability order not some other kind. The way that the means are used does influence the outcomes possible. In the Iraq War and LTTE case studies, the denial grand strategies used across the periods examined created the kind of peace that was sought. If this was ultimately unappealing, new or evolved grand strategies needed to be fashioned to continue from when the denial grand strategies had reached their culminating or end point.

The Détente grand strategy case is again a variation worthy of note. The order sought was within the choices that a denial grand strategy offers but the desired concert of powers order was undermined by the large-scale Soviet military build-up more appropriate to highly threatening situation. Success requires judicious use of the instruments of power even within the same type. Moreover, when the Soviet leadership became aware that the U.S. was moving away from supporting a concert of powers order, they did not significantly adjust their grand strategy in response. Ultimately they proved unable to learn and instead inflexibly stuck to a fixed course. Continually reviewing and integrating the ends, ways and means is important.

The case studies were an informative application of the cognitive frame and helped develop useful generic knowledge of the operation of this type of grand strategy. There are two major provisos however: firstly, given the small sample size further application is needed to give greater insight and secondly, this chapter only examined the case of a denial grand strategy, the other types also need to be studied.

CHAPTER 7: ENGAGEMENT GRAND STRATEGIES

An engagement grand strategy seeks to change another's social purpose in a particular way. This grand strategy's schema considers that a state's purpose is the aggregate of the various preferences of domestic groups mediated by the preferences of other states. Using an engagement grand strategy a state can work with and through like-minded domestic groups within another to bring desired change to their state's social purpose. These like-minded sub-state groups can be strengthened and opposing sub-state groups weakened to create a new, more-favoured aggregation. The ultimate aim is to influence another's social purpose in a manner whereby the entity willingly cooperates in achieving your desired outcomes, as these are now perceived as being mutually beneficial. In this way the social purposes of others can be made use of to advance one's own national preferences.

The term engagement though implies that other states have, or can be made to have, willing domestic sub-state groups that can be encouraged to achieve your desired outcomes. There is a mutuality that the other types of grand strategies do not share. The types of order an engagement grand strategy can build are complex interdependence, institutionalism and the liberal peace.

Crucially, as discussed earlier in chapter 4 the engagement grand strategy in this thesis is not a liberal grand strategy. A liberal grand strategy would incorporate the normative positions of liberal philosophers whereas the engagement grand strategy does not. The engagement grand strategy proposed here uses Moravcsik's new liberalism as the basis for how different groups within democratic or authoritarian states can shape an entity's social purpose.[1]

Furthermore, working with and through domestic groups within a state is conceptually dissimilar to the state-based approach in the denial grand strategy, which includes alliances. The engagement grand strategy schema focuses on sub-state groups, the denial on states. Indeed, consistent with its offensive realism origins, the denial grand strategy schema effectively treats states as billiard balls. In having such different foundations, the international orders the two grand strategy types can be used to create are also fundamentally unalike. In this discussion, the use of the term 'states' is for ease

1. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics'.

and to avoid confusion; the grand strategy cognitive frame can also apply to non-state actors as argued earlier.

This chapter applies the grand strategy cognitive frame developed in Chapter 4 and 5 to three historical case studies. The most-likely case is the U.S. grand strategy of 1947-1952 to revitalize Western Europe, a particularly well-known example of an engagement grand strategy. The centrepiece of this regional grand strategy was the Marshall Plan, a long-term program of American economic assistance to Western Europe. The time span chosen for this case study is from the start of the grand strategy with the announcement of the Marshall Plan at Harvard University in 1947 until the Plan finished and the grand strategy culminated in 1952.

In thinking about grand strategy the Marshall Plan is often used as an exemplar with numerous 'new' Marshall Plans proposed over the last thirty years for many regions and nations. For many the Marshall Plan is considered to have been highly successfully and so most worthy of replication. In this the Plan is often used as an analogy when a new international problem develops both to frame the key issues and to illustrate potential solutions.[2] Applying the cognitive frame that has been developed to this historical grand strategy can allow policymakers to better understand its design and logic suggesting circumstances were it may or may not be able to be repeated.

The chapter further examines a least-likely case of Iran's grand strategy in partnering with the Hezbollah non-state actor in Lebanon during 1982-2006. The engagement grand strategy cognitive frame developed is based upon new liberalism, which may be considered relevant only to democratic states. Accordingly, this case study was chosen to include authoritarian governance systems and assess the cognitive frame's wider applicability. In choosing the Hezbollah case a further factor was that this involved the long-term advancement of a non-state actor by an external state.

The time span of this case study is from the Iranian grand strategy beginning with the deliberate construction of Hezbollah in 1982 in response to the Israeli intervention in Lebanon until 2006 when Israel again intervened and the grand strategy

2. New Marshall Plans have been proposed over the last 30 years for many regions and nations including Latin America, eastern Europe, the former USSR, the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and the Philippines. Barry Machado, *In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today*; Lexington: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007, p. xiii. Curt Tarnoff, *The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Relevance to the Present*, Report 97-62; Washington: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1997, p. CRS-1.

reached a new maturity but not yet its culminating point.

The failure case examined is that of the U.K.'s interwar appeasement grand strategy 1934-1939, selected as this is a seminal case in International Relations examined by many leading International Relations scholars to explain and validate their theories.[3] The U.K. used an engagement grand strategy but combined this with elements of a denial grand strategy in an approach Christopher Layne considers "was logical in its: definition of Britain's interests, ranking of the threats to those interests, and allocation of the limited resources available to meet the strategic challenges that Britain faced."[4] The grand strategy completely failed though, and the application of the cognitive frame to this case reveals inherent and irreconcilable contradictions in its design that may have contributed to this.

The time span chosen is from 1934 when the British Cabinet formally decided on a grand strategy that cast Germany as the principal threat to the Empire and Britain's position as world power until the start of the Second World War in September 1939. This period covers the grand strategy's beginning, past its culminating point that probably occurred around March 1936 with the German remilitarization of the Rhineland but not later than German military intervention in mid-1937 in the Spanish Civil War, until its obvious failure with the start of the major war that it was designed to avoid. The grand strategy arguably continued in a fashion after this with forlorn hopes German moderates would yet stop the war, until the German invasion of France in mid-1940 bought Churchill into power in Britain and a new grand strategy was instituted.

There are two reasons to apply the grand strategy cognitive frame to these case studies. Firstly, to ascertain if the appraisal criteria set out in Chapter 1 are met. These criteria include determining if using the cognitive frame to view these examples through allows an understanding to be gained of the design, general operating logic and the circumstances that favoured the grand strategy's success. In this, it is important to note

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3. Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
4. Christopher Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited', *Security Studies,* Vol. 17, No. 3, 2008, pp. 397-437, pp. 399-400.

that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects.

Secondly, Alexander George thought that policymakers needed not just an appropriate cognitive frame but also generic knowledge of the strategy being contemplated. This chapter accordingly also develops this necessary generic knowledge.

U.S. EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM GRAND STRATEGY 1947-1952

The regional grand strategy employed by the U.S. in Europe during 1947-1952 is a particularly well-known example of an engagement grand strategy. The centrepiece of this regional grand strategy was the Marshall Plan, a long-term program of American economic assistance to Western Europe.

The Second World War had left Europe devastated with growing concerns over the possibilities of widespread starvation, chaos and revolution. In 1946 Winston Churchill declared that Europe was " a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground for pestilence and hate."[5] While the USSR had done little to create this dire situation, the Soviets were perceived to be well-organised and positioned to benefit from it. The U.S. European Recovery Program Grand Strategy aimed to address this through creating a "liberal peace" international order that strengthened democratic representative governments, developed institutions, and built transnational economic interdependence. The emphasis was not on building alliances and military forces as the later global containment grand strategy adopted but rather stressed rebuilding "the war-ravaged economic, political, and social institutions of Europe that made communist inroads possible."[6]

Senior American policymakers drew upon the analogy of the New Deal in thinking about how to assist European reconstruction. From this pre-war policy initiative, policymakers took the underlying assumption that in extreme economic crises government spending was essential. In extending this thinking into the post-war environment, the New Deal analogy directly informed the formulation of strategies to

5. Winston Churchill quoted in Norman Davies, *Europe: A History*; London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 1065.
6. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, p. 181.

deal with the emerging set of problems in Europe.[7] Mills writes that underpinning the Secretary Of State's thinking about reconstruction options was his "belief in the application of New Deal-style government economic intervention to American foreign policy.[8]" In reviewing the grand strategy 50 years later, Dianne Kunz held that senior policymakers at the time thought that: "The New Deal had made America safe for capitalism: the Marshall Plan would do the same for Europe."[9]

Crucially, American assistance was not to be unilateral; the recipients were deeply involved in planning and implementing their own assistance. U.S. Secretary of State Marshall in announcing the Plan in June 1947 declared that:

> It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.[10]

The success of the grand strategy hinged on working with the European states and in particular those domestic interest groups that held preferences compatible with the broad American desires. American grand strategic aims were to be advanced through directly and indirectly helping others achieve their preferences. The grand strategy was only viable if domestic interest groups could be found in the countries of interest willing and able to use the assistance being offered. The engagement grand strategy was to be as the Head of the Marshall Plan noted " a catalytic agent and never the driving force."[11]

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7. Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 45.
8. Nicolaus Mills, *Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower*; Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2008, p. 25.
9. Diane B. Kunz, 'The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of Motives', *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 76, No. 3, May-June 1997, pp. 162-70, p. 164.
10. George C. Marshall, *The "Marshall Plan" Speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947*; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.oecd.org/general/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm.
11. Paul Hoffman, 'The Marshall Plan: Peace Building-Its Price and Its Profits', *Foreign Service Journal* No. 44, June 1967, pp. 19-21, p. 20.

European governments were from the start enthusiastic participants in the Marshall Plan as the funding provided significantly addressed many of their economic problems, and helped buttress them politically. This willing cooperation and collaboration was matched by the rapid acceptance by their voters of the underlying goal of the engagement grand strategy of advancing the prospects of a unified, economically integrated Europe. Opinion polls in 1948 found some 74% of the public favoured such a goal, compared to 16% opposed.[12] Moreover, a unified Europe was also the grand objective of influential government officials and politicians such as Monnet and Schuman in France, Adenauer in Germany and de Gasperi in Italy; all of whom would significantly advance European integration.[13] The engagement grand strategy was able to be successful because of supportive domestic groups and elites in the targeted region holding similar preferences.

The economic assistance that defined the engagement grand strategy allowed friendly governments to exclude communists from their cabinets as it became evident that the crucially-important U.S. aid was conditional on Communist-free Western European governments. The electoral positions of the non-communist parties were thus very usefully strengthened.[14] By comparison, the USSR's parlous economic situation meant it could offer nothing similar and so could not help local communist parties in any meaningful way. In the grand strategy, economic health was considered directly linked to political stability in the sense of limiting communist parties electoral gains in the democratic countries of Western Europe.

The engagement grand strategy also included a deliberate informational element that aimed to keep the European public "sufficiently informed…to assure their cooperation and conversion."[15] The grand strategy in addition guided focused covert activities. The newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided discreet funding to the American Federation of Labor allowing them to actively support

12. Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*; London: The MacMillan Press, 1980, p. 73.
13. Ibid., pp. 101-28.
14. Machado, *In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,* p. 11.
15. Ibid., p. 26.

U.S.-friendly labour organizations and unions in Western Europe and undermine labour movements that had communist sympathies in several Western Europe countries.[16]

In terms of the diplomatic instrument of power, the grand strategy's goal was reflected in the Truman administration's support for the Brussels Pact, the European Defence Community (EDC) and the Schuman Plan.[17] The 1948 Brussels Pact bound the U.K., France and the Benelux countries into a security relationship, the EDC of the early 1950s sought an integrated European army, and the Schuman Plan proposed integrating French and German coal and steel production, and eventually lead to the establishment of the European Community (later E.U.) institutions.[18] In the military sphere, the NATO agreement signed in April 1949 was also from the American perspective consistent with, and understandable in the terms of, their regional engagement grand strategy. Ikenberry writes that the NATO pact's "purpose was to lend support to European steps to build stronger economic, political, and security ties within Europe itself. In this sense, the NATO agreement was a continuation of the Marshall Plan strategy…"[19]

The American grand strategy was only viable if suitably cooperative domestic leaders and interest groups holding appropriate preferences could be made use of and worked with. Marshall initially also offered the aid to the Soviets however, they were unwilling to be involved and moreover also prevented their Eastern European satellites being involved. Without cooperative domestic interest groups with compatible preferences the grand strategy could not have been implemented in these nations.[20] In this regard, Machado in analysing the Marshall Plan observed that while often overlooked in American accounts, the Plan's "ultimate success depended as much on the attributes of Europe's leadership as on America's role."[21] An engagement grand strategy is dependent for success on being able to work with and through cooperative partners holding compatible, or at least exploitable, preferences.

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16. Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945*, p. 69.
17. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, p. 208.
18. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*; New York: The Penguin Press, 2005, pp. 149, 156-57, 244-45.
19. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, p. 197.
20. Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963*; Princeton Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 63-64.
21. Machado, *In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,* p. 114.

The grand strategy used a long-term market state approach as the cognitive frame might suggest. In terms of resources, the centrepiece and most costly element was the Marshall Plan where the U.S. provided grants (90%) and loans (10%) to some 15 managerial state West European countries. In GNP terms, the program transferred some 2.1% of American GDP in 1948, 2.4% in 1949 and 1.5% in the remaining two years.[22]

The U.S. Federal Budget at the time was in deficit, and so the monies used came from a mix of taxation and domestic bonds. Across the period Federal taxes constituted about 12% of GDP of which some 7% were individual income taxes and 5% corporate taxation.[23] An accommodational strategy was used although there was limited choice in this; an international strategy would have been impractical as in this period few nations had excess funds for investment abroad.

The Marshall Plan took a Keynesian approach to restoring and revitalizing the Western European market economies disrupted by World War Two with a long term intent of creating a single, integrated market across the continent that was envisaged to lead to economies of scale, high growth and robust democracies.[24] While Government funded, in keeping with the market states' distrust of government bureaucracies' effectiveness and efficiency, the government's role was carefully constrained. Historian Michael Hogan in a major work on the Marshall Plan wrote that:

> the Marshall Plan carefully delimited the [American] government's role in the stabilization process. This role was perceived as a national security imperative and as an aid to private enterprise. It was to be performed as far as possible in collaboration with private elites. Policymakers ruled out a government aid corporation to administer the recovery program and established an independent agency, staffed it with managerial talent from the private sector, and linked it to private groups through a network of advisory committees. Marshall Planners

22. Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51*; London: Routledge, 1987, p. 72.
23. C. Eugene Steuerle, *Contemporary U.S. Tax Policy: Second Edition*; Washington: Urban Institute Press, 2008, p. 34.
24. Machado, *In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,* pp. 12-14.

> then urged participating countries to replace this administrative system. The result was a series of partnerships that blended public and private power…[25]

The purpose of the Marshall Plan monies changed over time moving from the initial focus on immediate food-related items such as food, feed, fertilizer and fuel towards an emphasis by 1949 on raw materials and production equipment. While the purchasing decisions were made in Europe, Barry Machado notes that: " relatively few dollars ever left the United States, or even passed through foreign hands – by program's end an estimated 83% of all dollar purchases were spent in the United States."[26] This spending aided the stability and long-term development of the U.S. economy, and helped gain support for the Marshall Plan in Congress and with American businesses, significant beneficiaries of the plan.

Input legitimacy was sought although given the Congressional funding and the strong involvement of private companies there was a focus on elites rather than the mass of the people. The government formed the Harriman Committee that included representatives of business, labour and academia to principally focus on moulding elite opinion. An ad hoc group was felt to be more effective than using the government bureaucracy because of distrust in Congress.[27] The quasi-private "Citizens Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery" carried out much of the public effort through using mass media and speaking to select audiences. The legitimacy of the Marshall Plan grand strategy was based on appeals to "idealism, self-interest and ideology" with a growing emphasis on the need to protect the free world from communism and all that this political system entailed.[28]

The European Recovery Program grand strategy 1947-1952 is an exemplar of engagement grand strategies, often seen as being worthy of emulation across other regions. Considering the program through the cognitive frame allows the design requirement, the operating logic, and the circumstances and conditions that favoured the grand strategy's success to be understood in a generic manner useful to policymakers. Policymakers are then able to view other contexts and determine if such an engagement grand strategy is feasible in these new circumstances and likely to be successful. This

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25. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952,* p. 19.
26. Machado, *In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,* p. 41.
27. Ibid., pp. 16-18.
28. Ibid., pp. 19-22.

application indicates that the cognitive frame can be satisfactorily applied to most-likely engagement grand strategy types.

The American engagement grand strategy was successful because the U.S. was able to find and work with pre-existing domestic interest groups and governments within European nations that held preferences compatible with the broad American desires. These useful partners were assisted in growing, becoming more influential in their respective countries and in achieving their ambitions. Conversely the domestic interest groups and governments that did not hold preferences useful to American grand strategic objectives where directly and indirectly hindered. American instruments of national power were employed to make these unhelpful groups less and less influential within their individual national political, economic and social systems.

The success of the American engagement grand strategy further illustrates a potential gain from this type of grand strategy; it can be enduring. The grand strategy in working with and through useful others led to their capturing the future of their respective countries. The grand strategy's objectives effectively became self-reinforcing across Europe and no longer needing continuing support, effort and resources. Over the longer term an engagement grand strategy may be a lower cost option than other types although, in this example at least the start-up costs were significant.

This particular grand strategy though also illustrates the principal shortcomings of an engagement grand strategy. This type is only viable if domestic interest groups willing and able to use the assistance being offered can be found in countries important to the grand strategy. In the USSR and their Eastern European satellites, access to useful domestic interest groups was denied and so such in those areas the grand strategy was unsuccessful but also inappropriate.

In considering the concept of grand strategy as a policymaking methodology, the European Recovery Program grand strategy is an example of a regional grand strategy within a broader, overarching grand strategy as discussed in Chapter 2 albeit retrospective. The European Recovery Program grand strategy did not begin this way, instead being commenced before the overarching and very different denial grand strategy of containment was devised, agreed and formalised. Secretary of State Marshal announced the plan named after him at Harvard in June 1947. George Kennan

however, did not draw together the basic ideas underlying the new overarching containment grand strategy until 5 November 1947 in Planning Policy Statement (PPS) 13 "Resume of World Situation", a strategic overview prepared for Marshal.[29] Moreover, it was not until early 1948 that this new containment grand strategy began to influence wider policy matters within the Truman Administration, initially as regards the relationship between the U.S. and newly communist mainland China.

While the European Recovery Program grand strategy had a different and considerably narrower focus than the containment grand strategy that took a global perspective, it does though seem some ideas from it informed the later overarching grand strategy.[30] In this manner, a suitable level of coherency was achieved between the two grand strategies. Even so, it is striking that throughout the long Cold War that the highly regarded European Recovery Program grand strategy remained *sui generis* and that this approach was not used again.

IRANIAN HEZBOLLAH GRAND STRATEGY 1982-2006

The 1979 Islamic revolution completely reoriented Iran's foreign policy. The state became strongly opposed to Israel and the United States and developed a strong desire to export the revolution both to gain prestige and influence for the new regime, and to help fellow Shia co-religionists elsewhere. These multiple objectives came together in Lebanon, which had a large Shia community with deep religious linkages to Iran dating back to the 16th Century[31], bordered Israel, and in undergoing significant political instability suggested revolutionary change might be possible. Iran began supporting the Shiite nationalist movement Amal ('Hope'), the most powerful organization within the Lebanese Shia community and perhaps the largest such non-state group in the country.[32]

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29. Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, pp. 29-30.
30. Not all of the European Recovery Program grand strategy ideas informed the containment grand strategy. For example, it is inconceivable that under the global containment grand strategy Marshal Plan aid would have been offered to the Soviet Union like it was under the European Recovery Program grand strategy.
31. Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 80-81.
32. Kenneth Katzman, 'Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon', in Stephen C. Pelletiere (ed.), *Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front*; Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, pp. 5-27, p. 24 n22. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*; New York: Random House, 2005, p. 131.

In many respects this was a poor fit. Amal did not propose a revolutionary Islamic state but was instead a secular movement trying to unite Lebanon's Shia along communal rather than religious lines.[33] Amal worked inside the extant political system, and was uninterested in taking actions outside Lebanon's borders.[34] Worse, as Middle Eastern specialist Augustus Norton writes:

> Amal tacitly welcomed the Israeli invasion of June 1982 because it broke the power of the Palestinian fighters in the South. Amal leaders…sought a modus vivendi with Israel and the United States. [Their] participation in the National Salvation Committee…created by Lebanese president Elias Sarkis….was castigated by young radicals…who described the Committee as no more than an "American-Israeli bridge" allowing the United States to enter and control Lebanon.[35]

The Lebanese state and Iran's chosen ally in the country were seemingly going in a direction diametrically against Iranian objectives. A new grand strategy was needed.

In considering Iranian options using the cognitive frame a reform grand strategy would have been impractical as Iran had limited ideational influence over elites in the secular Amal or in the Lebanese state. The Government furthermore was led by a Maronite Christian and supported by Western governments strongly opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. A denial grand strategy to stop Israeli and U.S. actions using mainly military force was also impractical given Iran's very weak regional military presence and complete lack of allies. In this regard, Ali Muhtashimi, Iran's ambassador in Syria between 1982 and 1985, recalls discussing his strong personal preference for a denial grand strategy approach with Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's Supreme Leader:

> The Imam cooled me down and said that the forces we send to Syria and Lebanon would need huge logistical support….Reinforcement and support would need to go through Turkey and Iraq. We are in a fierce war with Iraq. As for Turkey, it is a NATO member and an ally of the United States. The only

33. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, pp. 82-83.
34. Eitan Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, pp. 62-63.
35. Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 23.

> remaining way is to train the Shia men there, and so Hezbollah was born.[36]

Iran decided to work with and through like-minded domestic non-state actors to shape Lebanon in the direction Iran preferred. This engagement grand strategy accordingly focused on developing these specific groups' social influence and political power so that they could favourably shape, from Iran's perspective, Lebanon's social purpose. With this grand strategy Iran created a complex interdependence order that deliberately connected the state and society through multiple channels to particular Lebanese non-state groups that shared Iranian values and goals. Iran made use of the distinctive political processes within complex interdependence to influence these non-state group's preferences through linking issues, controlling the setting of the agenda to determine how issues were framed, operating within these groups to shape their organizational preferences and making use of institutions. Iran developed and then took advantage of its inherently asymmetric relationship with these non-state groups

Iran deliberately exacerbated and exploited fissures developing within Amal.[37] In late June 1982 the second in command broke away and formed Islamic Amal, which was more attuned to Iranian objectives. To support him, Iran dispatched some 1500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military personnel to instruct the Islamic Amal militia in fighting Israel, together with some 35 clerics to strengthen ties and build Iranian political and religious influence.[38] With Islamic Amal as the core, an assortment of small pre-existing Shiite organizations rapidly coalesced into Hezbollah (Party of God)[39] which, while officially created in a June 1982 meeting of Islamists and other religious clerics, was not announced publically until 1985.[40] Hezbollah's general secretary, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, explains that:

> This new group or new framework had the conditions for its formation before the Israeli invasion. But the invasion accelerated its existence, and Hezbollah

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36. Ali Muhtashimi interview with Shargh (Tehran), 3 August 2008 quoted in Michael Rubin, *Deciphering Iranian Decision Making and Strategy Today*, Middle Eastern Outlook; Washington: American Enterprise Institute, January 2013, pp. 7-8.
37. Frederic Wehrey et al., *Dangerous but Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East*; Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009, pp. 88-90.
38. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,* p. 131. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion*; London: Pluto Press, 2002, pp. 14-15.
39. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,* p. 132.
40. Krista E. Wiegand, 'Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* Vol. 32, No. 8, 2009, pp. pp. 669-80, p. 670.

> was born as a resistance force in the reaction to the occupation…. Contrary to the accusations…that it was Iranian – it was a Lebanese decision, founded by a group of Lebanese with Lebanese leadership, Lebanese grassroots, and the freedom fighters are Lebanese…. Naturally we asked for assistance. From any party…From then on relations began with…Iran.[41]

Norton is less charitable observing that: "at the beginning, Hezbollah was hardly a popular movement, but a conspiracy of a handful of men funded by the nascent Islamic Republic of Iran."[42] Certainly Iran provided the new organization with considerable support and assistance. In addition to military training, and ideological indoctrination provided by the IRGC personnel and clerics, there was substantial Iranian funding for community services such as schools, clinics, hospitals, and cash subsidies to the poor. While the Iranian revolutionary paradigm was deeply inspirational, Iran's material assistance was crucial to Hezbollah's development. Lebanese academic Amal Saad-Ghorayeb in her major study of Hezbollah observed:

> without Iran's political, financial, and logistical support, [Hizbu'llah's] military capability and organisational development would have been greatly retarded. Even by Hizbu'llah's reckoning, it would have taken an additional 50 years for the movement to score the same achievements in the absence of Iranian backing.[43]

Iran "deserves considerable credit for Hezbollah's political successes and large social network" however Hezbollah also significantly helped Iran achieve its objectives.[44] Hezbollah brought Iranian Islamic revolutionary ideology and theology deep into Levantine politics, and made Iran politically more influential. Hezbollah was central to Iran's war with Israel as the group provided a unique toehold for Iran in the region. If Iran had not been involved against Israel, it would have been hard to portray itself as being at the revolutionary vanguard of the Muslim world.[45] Iranian prestige and influence in the Muslim and Arab worlds at the time rested significantly on the benefits

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41. Hassan Nasrallah from "An Interview with Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah" *Middle East Insight*, Vol.12, Nos. 4-5, May-August 1996 quoted in: Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,* p. 132.
42. Augustus Richard Norton, 'Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon', *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 30, No. 1, 2000, pp. 22-35, p. 24.
43. Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion,* p. 14.
44. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, p. 98.
45 ibid., p. 94-96.

gained from its astute development of a complex interdependent relationship with Hezbollah.

In the engagement grand strategy cognitive frame, economic and institutional instruments of national power are more important than military means. The case of Iran and Hezbollah in the 1982-2006 period is consistent with this.

Economically, Iran consistently provided Hezbollah with significant support. Of the Hezbollah annual budget of some US$500m, direct funding from Iran constituted about US$100-$200m.[46] This money allowed Hezbollah to sustain a large social welfare network that included schools, clinics, agricultural cooperatives, TV and radio stations, hospitals and mosques. In the mid-1980s Iran was financing an estimated 80% of Hezbollah's social programs.[47] This involvement was more than by the Iranian state alone with the extensive involvement of Iranian parastatal charitable foundations in building hospitals and schools, and aiding widows, orphans, and the disabled. [48] Iranian direct and indirect funding and support allowed Hezbollah to have a deep and continuing influence on Lebanese society.

Iranian economic aid was also pivotal in helping Hezbollah support the Lebanese Shia community in recovering from several conflicts with Israel.[49] In the 2006 conflict, Christine Hamieh and Roger Mac Ginty observed that:

> As soon as the fighting came to a halt…Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah appeared on television pledging that his organisation would help to rebuild homes and compensate those whose homes had been destroyed. Well in excess of US$100 million in cash was distributed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities. Hezbollah seemed the most effective on-the-ground actor as it directed bulldozers to raze damaged buildings and its volunteers staffed registration centres to assess the needs of returnees…for many Lebanese,

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46. Apart from Iranian funding, Hezbollah also receives money from charitable fund raising, legitimate commercial activity, enforced tax levies, criminal activity, financial defalcation, and transfers from the Lebanese government. Martin Rudner, 'Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence,* Vol. 23, No. 2, 2010, pp. 226-46, p. 232. US Department Of Defense, *Report on Military Power of Iran*; Washington, US Department of Defense, April 2010, p. 8.
47. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, p. 88.
48. Abbas William Samii, 'A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship', *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 62, No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 32-53, p. 41.
49. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, pp. 111-12.

> Hezbollah's reconstruction activism contrasted with the seeming inefficiency of the state.[50]

The Iranian government declared it would assist in the reconstruction without any funding ceiling. The Lebanese media later estimated some US$1 billion was provided directly through Hezbollah - rather than through the Lebanese state - giving Iran and Hezbollah an enormous reconstruction presence.[51] Hezbollah's use of Iranian reconstruction funding allowed it to make:

> connections to citizens, political parties, and other groups, and because reconstruction assistance was regularly disbursed through municipalities, it oiled the traditional patronage and clientelistic political system. Thus, it reinforced the existing political system….[52]

The Iranian funding was used by Hezbollah to build output legitimacy amongst the Lebanese Shia. The organization was accordingly perceived as competent in service delivery and responsive to the community's welfare needs. Iran did not seek legitimacy directly but rather indirectly through funding Hezbollah. This overcame any problems Iran may have had in this regard in being perceived as a Persian power involving itself deeply in an Arab country.

The leverage Iran received from its economic instrument was reinforced by astute use of the diplomatic instrument, particularly in institutionalizing Iranian influence. Across this period, Hezbollah's governing body, the Shura Council, was composed of nine members, two of whom were Iranian representatives.[53] Moreover, whenever Hezbollah's leaders were deadlocked, Iran's Supreme Leader was asked to make the final decision.[54] Reflecting this integration, in 1995, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei appointed the leader of Hezbollah as his deputy in Lebanon.[55] Hezbollah officials and Iranian government leaders also regularly talked and met to

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50. Christine Sylva Hamieh and Roger Mac Ginty, 'A Very Political Reconstruction: Governance and Reconstruction in Lebanon after the 2006 War', *Disasters*, Vol. 34 (S1), 2010, pp. S103−S23, p. S106.
51. Ibid., p. S108.
52. Ibid., p. S119.
53. Rudner, 'Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile', p. 227.
54. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, p. 89.
55. Graham E. Fuller, 'The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni Resistance', in Alexander T. J. Lennon (ed.), *The Epicenter of Crisis: The New Middle East*; Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008, pp. 207-20, p. 211.

discuss their mutual interests.[56]

The formal ties though understated Iran's institutional influence. Hezbollah was deliberately structured in accordance with the Iranian model and established on the principle of the authority of the religious sage.[57] The majority of the Lebanese members of the leadership were Shia clerics with strong religious linkages with senior Iranian clerics, many of whom they had studied with in Najaf.[58] The Shia concept of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists reinforced these linkages. At the time Martin Rudner observed that:

> Hizbullah shares its political and religious ideology with Iran and the doctrines of the late ayatollahs Baqir as Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, who held that a religious jurist should hold supreme authority over the Shia community. Hizbullah looks to Iran's Supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and to Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the leading Lebanese Shia religious authority, for political and policy guidance in advancing the Islamic revolution in Lebanon.[59]

These links cut both ways though. Religious factions within Hezbollah at times were involved in clerical power struggles in Iran.[60]

Militarily, the main Iranian involvement was in providing supplies and training. Iran gave large quantities of arms including sophisticated missiles and rocketry and the maintenance items needed to support these. Hezbollah would have been hard-pressed to pay for these with its own resources. Iran also provided training for Hezbollah members in both Lebanon and Iran, making them considerably more skilled and allowing the movement to undertake highly effective combat operations.[61] There were reportedly close ties with Hezbollah's terrorist wing with Iranian officials involved in coordinating and directing Hezbollah terrorist operations especially outside Lebanon, and some

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56. Wiegand, 'Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party', p. 671.
57. Azani, *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization,* p. 179.
58. Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*; Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997, p. 181.
59. Rudner, 'Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile', p. 226.
60. Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis,* p. 181.
61. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, p. 98.

favoured Hezbollah terrorists having Iranian diplomatic passports.[62]

In passing it is important to note that Hezbollah across this period also received considerable assistance from Syria. This was mostly indirect and, with Hezbollah and Iran not sharing similar ideological or religious values, the aid given was for more tactical and short-term objectives than that with Iran.[63] The relationship between Syria and Hezbollah was described as a: "loveless marriage that endures because their common interests demand it."[64] The association between Syria and Hezbollah was of a denial grand strategy alliance type relationship rather than a engagement grand strategy complex independence type.

To implement its engagement grand strategy, Iran embraced a long-term managerial approach as the cognitive frame might advise and used an accommodational strategy that made use of existing extraction policies. The Iranian state at this time played a major role in the economy through central planning, making extensive use of five-year plans and having significant involvement through large public and quasi-public enterprises in the manufacturing and finance sectors.[65] During this period, Hezbollah's annual fiscal demands of some US$100-200m was readily manageable within the Iranian government revenue base (US$29.6 billion in 2005/6) although, some three quarters of this revenue base was derived from oil sales and varied considerably with oil prices. The revenue from oil was US$11 billion in 2001/2 but had almost doubled to US$21.3 billion in 2005/6.[66]

While funding for Hezbollah was relatively stable and meagre, occasionally large unanticipated sums were required, such as in 2006 for Lebanese reconstruction, and at these times Iranian generosity appeared more generous when oil prices were high. The Iranian manpower and material needs during this period were readily met

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62. Ibid., pp. 87, 90.
63. Samii, 'A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship', pp. 37-40. Rola El Husseini, 'Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria', *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 31, No. 5, 2010, pp. 803-15, pp. 810-11.
64. Al-Nahar (Beirut), 5 April 2001 quoted in: Gary C. Gambill and Ziad K. Abdelnour, 'Hezbollah between Tehran and Damascus', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin,* Vol. 4, No. 2, February 2002, www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0202_l1.htm.
65. World Bank, *Iran Country Brief,* World Bank, September 2010, viewed 5 May 2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIRAN/Resources/Iran_Web_brief.pdf.
66. In 2005/6 Iran had a GDP of some US$188.5 billion and was the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa after Saudi Arabia. Juan Carlos Di Tata et al., *IMF Country Report No. 07/101: Islamic Republic of Iran: Statistical Appendix*; International Monetary Fund, Washington, March 2007, p. 3, viewed 5 May 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07101.pdf.

internally by the armed forces and Iranian industry. State ownership of the necessary armament factories allowed most of Hezbollah's needs to be accommodated although, some equipment like anti-ship missiles were acquired from foreign sources. The limited domestic legitimacy required was gained by the Iranian state through some input legitimacy granted based on the country's constrained electoral processes, but mainly through claiming output legitimacy based on being the most appropriate institution to support foreign Shia groups and by its demonstrated competence.

Iran achieved a durable grand strategic synthesis with its order building well matched with its power building approach. Iran's use of an engagement grand strategy produced outcomes that other grand strategy types would have struggled to achieve, especially with such a low impact on the Iranian domestic base. This was only possible because of the existence of Lebanese domestic groups that shared Iranian objectives and which were able to be assisted to become sufficiently influential and powerful that they were able to achieve tangible outcomes.

While Iran initially supported Amal, its values and goals steadily diverged from Iran's and it became progressively less useful in meeting Iranian objectives. Iran's decision to create Hezbollah and then actively support the group - especially with economic aid - was crucial to Hezbollah being able to realistically challenge Amal for leadership of the Lebanese Shia community. Even so, much of Hezbollah's success must be accredited to the movement itself. Hezbollah consistently generated inspiring and competent leaders able both to rally and unite their community, and wield a deft political touch that has enhanced their stature in Lebanon.[67] Hezbollah and Iran had a complex interdependent relationship where both relied on each other to achieve their shared objectives. As Norton writes:

> The rapid growth and popularity of the Hiz'ballah…was achieved not only by a successful combination of ideological indoctrination and material inducement by Hizb'allah through the infusion of Iranian aid and military assistance. It was also achieved by the ability of the Hizb'allah leaders to mobilize a destitute Shi'a community, disaffected with the continuing Israeli occupation, and unite it within the framework of an organisation with clearly defined and articulated

67. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, p. 99.

> political objectives. This was achieved through the provision of concrete and workable solutions to the fundamental political, social, and economic needs of the Shi'a community in the absence of any central Lebanese authority and in the presence of the civil war.[68]

In the later years of the grand strategy period, there was a perception that with Hezbollah joining the political process, contesting elections and having representatives in Parliament that the organization had been Lebanonized and was moving away from being as useful to Iran.[69] However the engagement grand strategy schema suggests that Iran was keenly self-interested in making Hezbollah steadily more influential in Lebanon as the organization inherently shared Iranian values and goals, even as these evolved over time. Iran's fundamental interest was to shape Lebanon's social purposes and having Hezbollah embedded deep in the country's political structures undoubtedly advanced this.

The decision to enter the Lebanese political process was contested within Hezbollah's leadership Shura Council. The deadlock was only resolved in favour of participation by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei during a large conclave held in 1989 in Tehran; this decision being also supported by President Rafsanjan.[70] The Shia religious and the Iranian state networks both agreed on the direction Hezbollah should take indicating that from a grand strategy perspective this step was considered advantageous to Iran. The cognitive frame could have reasonably forecast this development.

Considering the program through the cognitive frame allows the design requirement, the operating logic, and the circumstances and conditions that favoured the grand strategy's success to be understood in a generic manner useful to policymakers. The Iranian engagement grand strategy was successful because Iran was able to work with domestic interest groups that held preferences compatible with broad Iranian desires. In the early 1980s though Iran's Lebanese partners were few in number and

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68. Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis,* p. 39.
69. Wiegand, 'Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party', pp. 673-78. Husseini, 'Hezbollah and the Axis of Refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria', pp. 809-10. Wehrey et al., *Dangerous but Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East,* pp. 100-02. Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, pp. 102-05.
70. Nizar Hamzeh, 'Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation', *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 14, No. 2, 1993, pp. 321-37, pp. 323-25.

politically marginalized. In response, Iran actively created the Hezbollah group and then assisted it to grow dramatically in size, to become much more influential in Lebanese society and to be able to shape the country's social purpose. Conversely, those Lebanese groups that did not hold preferences useful to Iranian grand strategic objectives were directly and indirectly targeted. Iran worked to make these unhelpful groups progressively less influential within Lebanon's political, economic and social systems.

Iran's successful grand strategy further illustrates that this type of grand strategy can be enduring. Iranian grand strategic objectives to a large extent became self-reinforcing as Hezbollah progressively deeply embraced them and incorporated them within Hezbollah's own social purposes. An important aspect of this case study was that lacking an effective Lebanese partner to advance its aims Iran carefully crafted one, but this partner was intended from the start to be more than a puppet. The building of a complex interdependent order meant that Hezbollah as it developed and grew remained loyal to the social purposes that Iran wished advanced. Iran did not need to instruct or run its partner, rather Hezbollah even when acting alone and independently could be relied on to act in a manner that Iran would generally agree with.

Iran's grand strategy proved to be remarkably cost-effective. The majority of the resource costs over this period were borne by Hezbollah rather than Iran although there were some start-up costs that Iran alone paid. Even so, the key shortcoming of this type of grand strategy remains: viable domestic interest groups in the society of concern must be able to found or built. If not, then this type of grand strategy is impractical.

BRITISH APPEASEMENT GRAND STRATEGY 1934-1939

In the 1930s the British government adopted a grand strategy of appeasement to counter the dangers evident from a rearming and revisionist Nazi Germany.[71] The grand strategy carefully combined elements from both the denial and engagement grand strategy types. In this typology, appeasement could be considered as a variety of engagement grand strategy. To avoid confusion however, and accord with common usage, this British grand strategy will be labelled the Appeasement grand strategy. The denial grand strategy type component will be considered as one of the two strands of the

71. In the 1930s appeasement referred to the ends sought rather than the means used as it often does now. David Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 18.

all-encompassing Appeasement grand strategy.

The Appeasement grand strategy employed sought to pacify Germany through conciliation and negotiation and hopefully avoid war but, as insurance, in parallel also implemented a measured rearmament program. At worse, the denial strand of the Appeasement grand strategy would mean the U.K. was able to defend itself against German military actions.[72] While intuitively sensible, this hedging strategy in merging grand strategic perspectives proved a significant failure, as the cognitive frame may have suggested.

By the interwar period the British Empire had grown to its largest ever extent and sprawled around the globe. Britain was a satisfied great power whose national interest lay in maintaining the status quo. In 1926 a Foreign Office memorandum observed: "We have got all that we want, perhaps more. Our sole object is to keep what we have and live in peace."[73] In the early 1930s though the Great Depression led to a breakdown of globalization, the rise of economic nationalism, a turning away from free trade towards protectionism, and the formation of semi-autarkic currency and trading blocs. The severe economic woes strengthened a broad societal move towards authoritarian governments, with those of Japan, Italy and Germany potentially posing particularly worrying security problems for the British Empire. A grand strategy was needed to meet the gathering storm.

The objective of stopping other states from taking actions that interfered with the British Empire initially suggested adopting a denial type grand strategy. In this time of economic hardship though, British resources were considered insufficient to meet the threats posed by the three dictatorships if they made war against Britain simultaneously. The resource shortfall suggested that the perceived threats from the three nations needed to be prioritized with men, money and material focused on addressing the most serious problems. Accompanying this was a debate over adopting a grand strategy involving changing several interstate relations or a grand strategy addressing the most important bi-lateral relationship.

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72. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, 'Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?: The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s', *International Security,* Vol. 33, No. 2, Fall 2008, pp. 148-181, pp. 159, 66-67.
73. Keith Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39*; Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972, p. 17.

While the protection of the security and interests of the British Empire was global in scope perhaps implying a multilateral grand strategy, some held that Britain could better solve the matter on a bilateral basis. Historian Michael Roi writes: " In other words, Britain should approach Germany, Japan and Italy directly to settle outstanding disputes. [Others believed though that]…the interdependence of events in every region of the globe militated against bilateral solutions."[74] Even so, many preferred a bilateral approach that would give Britain greater autonomy and flexibility compared to dealing with several states in an integrated multilateral manner which would inevitably impose constraints on the national freedom of action. In the 1930s, a major cause of the First World War was considered to be entangling alliances that prevented timely action to settle differences; multilateralism appeared dangerous, even provocative.[75] For policymakers, this historical analogy was compelling.

British policymaking moreover deliberately discounted any contribution allies might make to the balance of power with reliance placed solely on national military capabilities.[76] The strategic culture further favoured bilateralism for as historian David Gillard notes: "the traditional preference of British governments [at the time was] for a diplomacy of deals rather than one of alliances."[77]

In 1934 the British Cabinet decided on a grand strategy that focused the nation's scarce resources principally towards meeting the German threat.[78] The grand strategy devised and implemented drew upon appeasement to try to avert war and rearmament to deter war should diplomacy fail. The engagement and denial types were merged into a single comprehensive grand strategy colloquially labelled Appeasement. There was a strong perception that another great European war would finish the Empire, and Britain's systemic position as a great power. War was to be avoided if at all possible.[79] Neville Chamberlain, initially as Chancellor of the Exchequer and from June 1937 as

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74. Michael L. Roi, *Alternative to Appeasement: Sir Robert Vansittart and Alliance Diplomacy, 1934-1937*; Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1997, p. 162.
75. Gustav Schmidt, *The Politics and Economics of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy in the 1930s*; New York: St Martin's Press, 1986, p. 371.
76. Ripsman and Levy, 'Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?: The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s', p. 180-81.
77. Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939,* p. 18.
78. 'Appeasement Reconsidered: Some Neglected Factors', *The Round Table,* Vol. 53, No. 212, 1963, pp. 358-371, p. 362.
79. Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited', p. 409.

Prime Minister emerged as the primary architect of Britain's new grand strategy.[80]

The grand strategy's engagement strand aimed to change the social purpose of the German state.[81] Britain was aware that alone it could not militarily coerce Germany and the country did not seek the political reform of the Nazi state. Instead, as historian David Gillard observed:

> The essential problem…was how to convince Hitler or any post-Nazi leadership that it was in Germany's long-term interests to exercise restraint in its use of power and to rely on negotiated change in the international order, despite Germany's undoubted power to disrupt that order.[82]

British governments of the period considered that Germany had some legitimate grievances arising out of the 1919 Peace Treaty of Versailles that necessitated revision. The Foreign Office wrote in 1935 that: "from the earliest years following the war, it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew were untenable and indefensible."[83] The belief was that working with Germany to resolve the shortcomings of the Peace Treaty would convince Germany that her goals could be achieved peacefully rather than through using force.[84] Such Anglo-German cooperation would led to more durable and lasting results than relying on a balance of power grand strategy built on armaments could.

Historian R.A.C. Parker noted that the British "relied on a sympathetic treatment of German grievances to win Hitler, or failing him, influential Germans, to peaceful ways."[85] In this, the Nazi leadership was not seen as monolithic. There were considered to be four distinct power centres: firstly the officer class of the armed forces led by the Commander in Chief Bloomberg; secondly the economic policy bureaucrats, bankers and business heads especially those from the heavy industries in the Rhineland and

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80. Ibid., p. 403.
81. In an oft-quoted definition grand strategy historian Paul Kennedy declared that appeasement is "…the policy of settling international…quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to armed conflict which would be expensive, boldly, and possibly very dangerous. It is in essence a positive policy, based upon certain optimistic assumptions about man's inherent reasonableness…." Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945: Eight Studies,* p. 16.
82. Gillard, *Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939,* p. 18.
83. Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39,* p. 11.
84. Ibid.
85. R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993, p. 346.

Ruhr; thirdly the Nazi party; and lastly the SS led by Himmler.[86] The British believed that there were struggles between the moderate and the extremist power centres that could be exploited.[87]

The British grand strategy's engagement strand sought to strengthen the moderate's position in the German state through working with them to address their concerns about the Peace Treaty and by offering tempting political and economic policy incentives. Chamberlain felt that Britain should "do all in its power to encourage the moderates."[88] Crucially in this grand strategy, "Hitler was thought to be a comparatively moderate exponent of German discontents so that the more unquestioned his power the easier appeasement would be."[89] Until September 1939, Chamberlain had a particularly strong belief in Hitler as a moderate, and so helping him achieve his demanded revisions to the Peace Treaty without using force was considered likely to lead to better relations and positive policy responses, including disarmament.[90]

The type of order that the British Appeasement grand strategy sought to build over time was a complex interdependence one where the British state could favourably manipulate the German state's preferences, where there were multiple influence channels and the use of military force was inconceivable. This was an engagement grand strategy type of international order however, the British grand strategy had a dual nature that included a denial component; "For Britain, appeasement was…a complement to a strategy of rearmament and balancing, not an alternative to it."[91] Chamberlain believed this double policy gave the best chance of Britain avoiding war.[92]

Rearmament though implied seeking a denial grand strategy balance of power order where military power was privileged, war was a legitimate instrument of policy and states created alliances to counter systemic threats. The engagement grand strategy complex interdependence order and the denial grand strategy balance of power order are

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86. C. A. Macdonald, 'Economic Appeasement and the German "Moderates" 1937-1939: An Introductory Essay', *Past & Present*, Vol. 56, No. 1, August 1972, pp. 105-35, p. 110.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 121.
89. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, pp. 23-24.
90. Ibid., p. 186.
91. Ripsman and Levy, 'Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?: The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s', p. 180.
92. Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited', p. 412.

inherently mutually incompatible. It was not surprising then at the 20 November 1938 cabinet meeting Chamberlain remarked that: "In our foreign policy we were doing our best to drive two horses abreast, conciliation and rearmament. It was a very nice art to keep these two steeds in step."[93] The difficulties inherent in seeking incompatible orders are particularly evident when the use of the instruments of national power in implementing the grand strategy is considered.

Britain primarily internally balanced against Germany by re-equipping and expanding its armed forces. While Britain had limited resources, the dual policy militated against using external balancing as making firm alliances with other European nations would be seen under Appeasement as militarily threatening Germany through encirclement. Germany would then perceive that Britain harboured aggressive intentions justifying large-scale military build-up. Accordingly, the important entente with France progressively waned.[94] In early 1938 the Service chiefs rejected military-to-military talks with France, as these would cause "the very situation we wish to avoid, namely the irreconcilable suspicion and hostility of Germany."[95] The other large European power, Russia, was disregarded as: "western association with the USSR would annoy and provoke, rather than restrain, the Nazis and non-Nazi Germans."[96]

The logic of the engagement strand of the grand strategy meant allies were not allowed to contribute to the denial strand's balance of power element; a stance in strong opposition to the fundamental operating logic of the denial grand strategy. This disregard of allies was reflected in the military strategy that downplayed any formal continental commitment of large-scale land forces in the event of war, instead the British Army was to concentrate on imperial policing and home defence.[97] The armed forces as a whole were to adopt a deterrent posture with the Royal Air Force the primary element re-equipped to threaten German civilian industrial targets.[98] The Royal

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93. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, p. 291.
94. Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39,* pp. 2-3. Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, *The Appeasers*, 2nd edn., London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1967, pp. 8-9.
95. Michael Howard, *Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars*; London: Temple Smith, 1972, p. 118.
96. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, p. 347.
97. Howard, *Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars,* pp. 96-118.
98. Ibid., pp. 110-12.

Navy would contribute by threatening to blockade German raw material supplies, and by ensuring Germany could not cut off Britain's crucial lines of supply. Keeping the sea trade routes with the Empire open was considered essential for Britain to win what was envisaged to be a long war if it came.

The economic instrument of the grand strategy was focused on strengthening the position of the German moderates. In the 1930s, Britain and Germany were the two largest capitalist economies in Europe, and strong economic connections existed between the major financial and commercial institutions in London and Berlin.[99] These "informal channels between British and German business and industrial groups lay at the heart of efforts towards economic appeasement."[100] British government economic management and Foreign Office officials encouraged the intensification of commercial interactions to assist tipping the domestic balance of political power in favour of the moderate German groups.[101] To help this, the British government granted an increasing volume of export credits to firms involved in commerce with Germany right up to late August 1939 immediately before the war started.[102] This commercial activity was in accord with the grand strategy; Scott Newton observes:

> [the] private interests of finance and large-scale industry worked with the grain of public policy. Indeed the level of political access enjoyed by organizations such as the Anglo-German Fellowship and the extent of ministerial support for the industrial diplomacy of the Federation of British Industries make it hard to distinguish between the international interests of the state and the foreign policy of powerful economic pressure groups.[103]

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99. Steven E. Lobell, 'The Second Face of Security: Britain's 'Smart' Appeasement Policy Towards Japan and Germany', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,* Vol. 7, No. 1, 2007, pp. 73-98, p. 84.
100. Frank McDonough, *Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War*; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998, p. 135.
101. Lobell, 'The Second Face of Security: Britain's 'Smart' Appeasement Policy Towards Japan and Germany', pp. 84-85.
102. Scott Newton, 'The 'Anglo-German Connection' and the Political Economy of Appeasement', *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* Vol. 2, No. 3, 1991, pp. 178-207, pp. 196-97.
103. Ibid., p. 191. The Anglo-German Fellowship was formed in 1935 to foster good relations between Britain and Germany. The Fellowship became a powerful lobby group that provided the City with a source of domestic pressure for harmony between the two countries additional to the one created by the German Central Bank's historic, but more informal, ties with the Treasury. Corporate members included large firms, such as Firth-Vickers Stainless Steels, Unilever and Dunlop, whilst the directors of leading industrial concerns, for example Imperial Chemical Industries, Anglo-Iranian Oil, Tate and Lyle and the Distillers Company, joined as private individuals, as did Lord Stamp and Sir Robert Kindersley, both

Inter-governmental activities actively complemented this. The Standstill negotiations of the early 1930s had generated an unusually close working relationship between the banking representatives of each nation. The Governor of the Bank of England held that behind the new Nazi regime were sensible financial figures able to steer Hitler towards less militaristic policies.[104] One of the central German moderates targeted was Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank (German Central Bank, 1933–1939) and Minister of Economics (1934–1937). Schacht asserted that economic concessions bolstered him and the other moderates within the inner-German power struggle.[105] In mid-I937, the British also began cultivating Herman Goring, then Commissioner for the Four Year-Plan and an important Nazi Party figure.[106]

The British stressed the strong linkages between economic possibilities and their sought-after political agreements. This continued right up until mid-1939 with the British offering a full-scale economic partnership, including a very large loan, provided Germany stepped back from the use of force to achieve its political aims.[107] McDonald writes:

> Chamberlain attempted to demonstrate to this group that Germany would benefit economically from a political settlement, which led to the termination of autarky and rearmament. He hoped that this section of German opinion would then use its influence with Hitler in favour of a negotiated settlement, in contrast to Party "extremists" like Goebbels and Himmler, who argued that Germany could only attain its aims by war.[108]

Economic appeasement though worked against the logic of the denial grand strategy strand that underlay Britain's rearmament. Germany used its economic and financial relationship with Britain to help build and finance its rapid military build-up.

Governors of the Bank of England, and Lord Magowan, Chairman of the Midland Bank. Ibid., pp. 186-87.

104. Ibid., pp. 185-86.

105. British officials approached other German moderates such as Helmut Wohltat, a senior official of the German Economics Ministry, Field Marshal von Blomberg, Dr Frick, Minister of the Interior, Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the former Foreign Minister, Walther Funk, Schacht's successor, and Ernst von Weizsacker under-secretary in the Foreign Office. Lobell, 'The Second Face of Security: Britain's 'Smart' Appeasement Policy Towards Japan and Germany', pp. 85-86.

106. Macdonald, 'Economic Appeasement and the German "Moderates" 1937-1939: An Introductory Essay', p. 110.

107. Newton, 'The 'Anglo-German Connection' and the Political Economy of Appeasement', pp. 196-97.

108. Macdonald, 'Economic Appeasement and the German "Moderates" 1937-1939: An Introductory Essay', p. 105.

The 1931 Standstill Agreement, renewed annually, aided German bank solvency and provided important credit. [109] Trade with Britain furnished crucial international currency needed to pay for essential food and raw material imports. As was recognized at the time, this all facilitated German rearmament[110]; Reginald McKenna chairman of Midland Bank and Member of Parliament in 1936 campaigned against economic concessions to Germany on these grounds.[111] The Foreign Office countered though that this economic and financial interaction "strengthened the peace party" helping "reasonable people in Germany to exert their influence."[112]

The diplomatic instrument was used as part of the programme of political appeasement under the engagement strand. Britain assisted, or at least acquiesced, in the German, often unilateral, violation of the Peace Treaty provisions. These included the Germans reintroducing conscription, full-scale rearmament including the building of a new navy and air force, the March 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland, and the progressive annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland and the non-German lands of Czechoslovakia. Only in the case of the Sudetenland annexation did Britain gain some promises of future cooperation as part of the Munich Agreement.[113] These political compromises undoubtedly strengthened Hitler's position as leader but did not lead to moderate policies as envisaged. Worse, diplomacy further worked against the denial grand strategy strand and Britain's rearmament. The violations of the Peace Treaty all acted to strengthen German military might relative to Britain's and the balance of power steadily tilted Germany's way. Steven Lobell commenting on the example of dismemberment of Czechoslovakia writes:

> The Munich Agreement, intended to defuse the immediate danger of war, strengthened Germany's immediate warmaking capacity by granting Berlin

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109. Newton, 'The 'Anglo-German Connection' and the Political Economy of Appeasement', p. 183.
110. Macdonald writes that" "The commercial attaché in Berlin, Magowan, advocated denouncing the Anglo-German Payments Agreement, on the grounds that Germany was only using it to procure raw materials for rearmament. He believed that the Nazi regime was now openly hostile to Britain, and that its main prop was the Payments Agreement. Denounce the agreement and German rearmament would collapse for lack of foreign exchange." Macdonald, 'Economic Appeasement and the German "Moderates" 1937-1939: An Introductory Essay', p. 121.
111. Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and the Breaking of the Nazi Economy,* p. 233.
112. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, Head of the Economic section of the Foreign Office quoted in Macdonald, 'Economic Appeasement and the German "Moderates" 1937-1939: An Introductory Essay', pp. 116-17.
113. After the Munich talks, Chamberlain thought he had convinced Hitler of the need for peaceful negotiated change rather than change by force and that the U.K. now had a central role in European affairs. Hitler post-Munich bitterly regretted his agreement. Gillard, p. 19.

> foreign exchange, strategic raw materials, industrial power (especially the Skoda armament works), and equipment to arm forty German divisions.[114]

Moreover Britain, which at the time only had some five Regular Army divisions, lost a potential ally with some thirty-five well-equipped divisions.[115]

The engagement strand of the Appeasement grand strategy did though boost the effectiveness of the informational instrument in supporting the British position. Few could doubt that Britain had tried very hard to avoid conflict, albeit sometimes at the expense of others such as Austria and Czechoslovakia. Britain hoped that in appearing willing to settle genuine grievances without war, Germany's leaders might find it harder to mobilize their people for war. Indeed, there is evidence that the German people would have welcomed a settlement built on the 1936 status quo.[116] Gustav Schmidt writes that the Appeasement grand strategy reasoned that:

> Whereas…economic offers would help to upvalue the position of the 'moderates' in Germany and would further Germany's willingness to compromise, the political approach [sought]…to bring the German people into play and that this, accompanied by the measures suggested, would restrain Germany's ruling classes from adventurism.[117]

This approach however, again worked against the logic of rearmament and the denial strand of the grand strategy. The British public where not rallied to support the sacrifices needed to expedite rearmament.[118] Even after the 1938 Munich Agreement, Chamberlain opposed mobilizing the public as this would work against better, more productive relations with Germany.[119] Moreover, the elections of the period were not fought on preparing the country for war but rather for avoiding it through appeasement; gaining the necessary input legitimacy for the dual policy was inherently problematic.

Britain never achieved a sound grand strategic synthesis; there were consistently

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114. Steven E. Lobell, 'The Grand Strategy of Hegemonic Decline: Dilemmas of Strategy and Finance', *Security Studies,* Vol. 10, No. 1, 2000, pp. 86-111, p. 104.
115. Howard, *Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars,* pp. 125-30.
116. Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and the Breaking of the Nazi Economy,* p. 205.
117. Schmidt, *The Politics and Economics of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy in the 1930s*, p. 201.
118. Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39,* p. 412.
119. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, pp. 182-86.

tensions between the engagement and denial strands and the building of power to support them. As the cognitive frame would suggest, the Appeasement grand strategy initially adopted a long-term market state approach that reflected the uncertainties of the course future developments would take. Conveniently, such an approach was also in harmony with the liberal, free trade beliefs of the government. Over time however, as the earlier uncertainties steadily resolved themselves and the future became clearer if darker, Britain moved progressively towards a managerial approach, much as the cognitive frame would propose.

In this evolution, the building of power for the Appeasement grand strategy was dominated by concerns over finance. The British experience reflected an attempt to limit the impact of the grand strategy on the society through using an accommodational strategy initially, then seeking foreign monies and only then as a last resort moving to a restructural strategy.

The economic orthodoxy of the time stressed balanced budgets and Britain's experience of a relatively quick recovery from the Great Depression seemed to support this.[120] Existing income and indirect taxes were steadily raised to support a measured rearmament program constrained to stay firmly within balanced budget limits.[121] Deficit financing was to be avoided if at all possible.[122] In 1937 when this accommodational strategy was clearly inadequate, the Government passed the Defence Loans Act that sought to borrow a limited sum of money from private domestic and international sources.[123] In this though, the 1934 Johnson Act meant that unlike during World War One the American government was prohibited from loaning Britain money.[124] With other nations also rearming and seeking foreign monies, the lingering effects of the Great Depression, and the need to enforce rearmament priorities Britain

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120. Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39,* p. 126.
121. Judged in relative terms however, the British commitment to defence increased consistently from 1935. The British defence budget increased by some 35 percent in 1936 and a further 38 percent in 1937. Defence spending as a percentage of total government expenditures rose to 21 percent in 1936, and 26 percent in 1937. Ripsman and Levy, 'Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?: The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s', pp. 176-77.
122. Chamberlain was particularly proud of the balanced budgets achieved while he was Chancellor of the Exchequer; he was disdainful of deficits which he thought were accompanied by "deepening depression and by a constantly falling price level." Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39,* p. 126.
123. F. Coghlan, 'Armaments, Economic Policy and Appeasement. Background to British Foreign Policy, 1931-7', *History,* Vol. 57, No. 190, June 1972, pp. 205-16, p. 213.
124. G.C. Peden, *Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 133.

then finally adopted a restructural strategy that moved the country decisively towards a managerial state.[125]

The overall economy was strongly oriented towards international trade albeit since the Great Depression mainly with the Empire. Britain needed to import food and acquire the raw materials required for its exporting manufacturing industries. Britain's exports then financed the essential imports needed for the denial strand of the grand strategy but worryingly rearmament in itself meant greater imports and potentially less exports. Layne observes that:

> As rearmament began, British policy makers were impaled on the horns of an economic dilemma. The armaments and export industries competed directly against each other for scarce factors of production such as raw materials, skilled labor, and factory floor space. Simply put, if the tempo of rearmament was increased, the volume of British exports would decrease. As its export earnings declined, it would become more difficult for Britain to pay for rearmament.[126]

A stable currency and sound fiscal management were considered central to the planned long war strategy. British war planning was based on a belief that if hostilities broke out Germany given its economic and raw material constraints could only fight a short war.[127] If Britain could hold out long enough it would prevail. In a long war international loans would be easier to secure if the British peacetime balance of payments were strong while, if loans were unavailable, then the gold reserves built up from peacetime surpluses would be the only financial alternative to selling British capital assets overseas. A strong balance of payments had the leading role in reinforcing what the Treasury and the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Thomas Inskip, called the 'fourth arm of defence'.[128] Economic historian G.C. Peden observed, Britain: "had

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125. David Edgerton, *Warfare State: Britain 1920-1970*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 15-190. Peden, *Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs,* pp. 125-44.
126. Layne, 'Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited', pp. 406-07.
127. British policy makers assumed that if Germany did not win a war quickly that the superior economic and financial strength of the British Empire and France would result in an Allied victory. British policymakers believed that for economic reasons, principally a shortage of key raw materials, that Germany could not wage a prolonged conflict. Chamberlain observed that "The Allies are bound to win in the end…the only question is how long it will take them to achieve their purpose." ibid., p. 408.
128. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, p. 275.

to try to strike a balance between financing armaments now and maintaining sufficient economic strength to finance a war later."[129]

The result was that the rate of the military build-up was limited to that which did not cause interference with normal civilian production. [130] Rearmament was added to existing production and did not substitute or replace any of it.[131] Rearmament was further delayed by a significant lack of both skilled labour and the requisite industrial capacity.[132] In keeping with its market economy Britain relied mainly on its private industry for rearming. [133]

The combination of an engagement grand strategy and a denial grand strategy patently failed resulting in for the British Empire a cataclysmic war. The pre-war fears of the British government were fully validated. The ultimate reason for the failure of the grand strategy was that British:

> hopes [for peace] rested on a reasonable but incorrect interpretation of the way the Third Reich worked. Hitler, this view assumed, must be interested in keeping power and the policies that set off the Second World War did not seem a sound method; if he were foolish enough to follow them, however, sensible Germans would stop him.[134]

An engagement grand strategy to be successful needs to work through others to achieve mutual beneficial goals. The British Cabinet made a profound error in assuming that Hitler and the Nazi state held to the same assumptions as they did and shared their strong interest in peace and prosperity.[135] At the same time, the adoption of an engagement grand strategy strand meant that the building of a balance of power order and of greater relative power as the denial strand sought was actively prevented. The British Appeasement grand strategy 1934-1939 was fatally flawed in trying to blend

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129. G.C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939*; Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979, p. 66.
130. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, p. 274.
131. Ibid., p. 273.
132. Ibid., p. 274. Coghlan, 'Armaments, Economic Policy and Appeasement. Background to British Foreign Policy, 1931-7', p. 214.
133. Coghlan, 'Armaments, Economic Policy and Appeasement. Background to British Foreign Policy, 1931-7', p. 213.
134. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War*, p. 346.
135. Middlemas, *The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Germany, 1937-39,* p. 413.

two mutually incompatible grand strategy types. The Appeasement grand strategy was deliberately, if unknowingly, designed from the start to be incoherent. The likelihood of failure in terms of avoiding war, maintaining the British Empire and keeping Britain a first-rate power was built-in.

There is a strong case to be made that regardless of the grand strategy Britain adopted war with Nazi Germany was inevitable. Choosing a different grand strategy in 1934 though may have made the war less total and prevented that which British policymakers most wished to avoid: the loss of the Empire and the relegation to being a second-rate power. A denial grand strategy may have lead to an earlier war in 1938 over the Austria *Anschluss* or the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia but such a grand strategy in stressing building up military forces and building alliances may have seen Britain much better prepared and the conflict may have been more contained. Moreover, Britain ceasing trade and finance with Germany may significantly have impeded German rearmament. The relative power balances may have been much more favourable. Conversely a fully-fledged engagement grand strategy may have seen a stress placed on collective defence and working with like-minded states across Europe, perhaps even with Russia, again allowing Britain to leverage off others. There is no doubt though that the confused and incoherent grand strategy chosen failed to achieve its aim.

Applying the cognitive frame to this case study allowed an understanding of the grand strategy's design, its operating logic, and the circumstances that led to its failure. In this, it is important to note that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects.

Policymakers at the time would have gained from being aware that mixing the two types of grand strategy would create fundamental conflicts with a danger of complete failure. This was an inherently risky grand strategy. Moreover, from the position of this thesis, this case study supports the contention that for policymakers separating grand strategy types is more likely to lead to success than merging them in some integrated manner.

In terms of developing generic knowledge about engagement grand strategies,

the British Appeasement grand strategy reveals the dangers of deciding to work with the wrong domestic interest groups that do not hold your desired preferences. The British unintentionally strengthened the Nazi Party's grip on power and supported Hitler's ambitions to create a reordered Europe through military might. The catastrophic results of the British grand strategy suggests that very close attention needs to be paid to the domestic interest groups an engagement grand strategy is supporting to ensure their ambitions accord with yours.

In this regard, the earlier Chapter 3 on the cognition of policymakers is particularly germane. People can worryingly see what they both expect to see and wish to see. Chamberlain continued to give Hitler the benefits of any doubts even when presented with lucid counter-arguments. In early 1938 when reading Stephen Robert's 'The House that Hitler Built' Chamberlain observed that it was "an extremely clever and well informed but very pessimistic book. If I accepted the author's conclusions I should despair but I don't and won't'."[136]

In crafting an engagement grand strategy policymakers need to draw a sharp distinction between the availability of an influential interest group in a country of interest and their fundamental suitability. Easy access may not be the same as utility. A related consideration is that domestic interest groups by their nature will generally always seek out external help and assistance. Such groups will be looking to exploit others as much as others may seek to exploit them. The key issue is whether they hold preferences that the grand strategy can usefully and confidently take advantage of.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has applied the grand strategy cognitive frame to three historical case studies as part of an appraisal process. These were the: the American European Recovery Program grand strategy 1947-52, the Iranian-Hezbollah grand strategy 1982-2006 and the interwar British Appeasement grand strategy 1934-1939

The American grand strategy sought a liberal peace order and used a long-term market approach, while the Iranian grand strategy sought a complex interdependence

136. Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 30 Jan. 1938. NC 18/1/1037 quoted in Erik Goldstein, 'Neville Chamberlain, the British Official Mind and the Munich Crisis,' *Diplomacy & Statecraft,* Vol. 10, No. 2-3, 1999, pp. 276-92, p. 287.

order and used a long-term managerial approach. In the failure case, the British attempted to merge denial and engagement grand strategies to build a complex interdependence order while using a long-term, market approach that evolved into a long-term, managerial approach. In the three examples, applying the cognitive frame helped an understanding to be readily gained of each grand strategy's design, its operating logic, and the circumstances and conditions that favoured its success. Moreover, in the British case study, the grand strategy failed in a manner that the cognitive frame could have reasonably envisaged.

The use of the three case studies also provides generic knowledge useful to policymakers about grand strategies in general and engagement grand strategies in particular. In terms of general knowledge, the failure case of the British Appeasement grand strategy highlights that policymakers may be more successful if they build a coherent grand strategy rather than attempt to combine types in an attempt to make some optimum blend. There is a real danger that in being ontologically different that the various elements of some integrated grand strategy may unintentionally work against each other, make the situation worse and lead to grand strategic failure.

The case studies also highlighted particular knowledge about the engagement type of grand strategy. Engagement grand strategies rely on being able to find and work with domestic interest groups that hold preferences compatible with the broad grand strategic objectives. The grand strategy then aims to assist these useful partners in developing, becoming more influential in their respective countries and in achieving their ambitions to favourably alter the social purpose of their state. Conversely unhelpful domestic groups should be actively hindered and damaged to ensure they do not prevail in shaping the social purpose of their country. In this, the Iranian example revealed that groups useful for an engagement grand strategy to exploit do not need to be pre-existing but can also be created, and from a very small base.

The success of the American and Iranian engagement grand strategies further illustrates a feature of this type of grand strategy: they can be enduring. This grand strategy type in working with and through useful others can lead to them deeply embracing the grand strategy's objectives. These may then become self-reinforcing and no longer needing continual support, effort and resources. Over the longer term an

engagement grand strategy may be a more affordable type of grand strategy then a denial type although, initial start-up costs may be significant.

Both grand strategy case studies though also illustrate the principal shortcomings of an engagement grand strategy. This type is only viable if domestic interest groups willing and able to use the assistance being offered can be found in countries important to the grand strategy. In the Marshall Plan only those nations outside the Soviet orbit could participate while, in the Iranian case, the absence of a suitable pre-existing group meant one needed to be created before the grand strategy could fully commence.

The British Appeasement grand strategy showed some of the real dangers inherent in an engagement grand strategy type. The interest groups that will be worked with and through need to be carefully chosen; their suitability, not just their availability, needs deep consideration. In trying to exploit useful others, there is a danger that these domestic groups will reverse this and try to exploit the grand strategy for ends opposed to those the engagement grand strategy seeks. Actively supporting the wrong groups can be potentially catastrophic as the British example shows.

CHAPTER 8: REFORM GRAND STRATEGIES

A reform grand strategy aims to change another's social rules. These rules are malleable as norms and identities can be shaped through social interaction and deliberate intervention. The transformation sought could be as fundamental as establishing a wholly new political culture, or much less consequential in simply altering some specific social rules that concern a single issue. Reformed social rules may not necessarily change a state's capabilities or social purpose, but the state's actions and behaviour will be different.

Reform has an appealing finality but in being so ambitious is the most problematic of all grand strategies. The most important example of a recent reform grand strategy may be the way the Cold War ended which some argue eventuated from the particular beliefs, norms and identities that Mikhail Gorbachev and other high-élites of the USSR embraced as part of perestroika.[1] In the reform grand strategy, the international system is conceived as structured in terms of the distribution of shared social rules with orders based on shared norms (understandings of appropriate actions) or shared identities.

The earlier case studies involved applying the types of grand strategies with schemas based on rationalist, materialist International Relations theoretical perspectives. This chapter though examines reform grand strategies that have a schema built around the reflectivist, ideational theoretical perspective of constructivism.

This chapter applies the grand strategy cognitive frame developed in Chapter 4 and 5 to three historical case studies. The most-likely historical case is the U.K. grand strategy of 1948-1960 that defeated the communist insurgency in Malaya through shaping conceptions of national and adversary identity. The Malayan Emergency was chosen as this is often seen as being a counterinsurgency exemplar but also as this involved two parties both seeking to gain the ideational edge over the other. As a colonial power the United Kingdom may be considered as unlikely to prevail and achieve its grand strategic objectives. The time span chosen is from when the need for a grand strategy was first realised with the start of the insurgency in 1948 until the

1. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System', *International Organization,* Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 215-47.

insurgency's effective finish in 1960 and the grand strategy's end. The grand strategies used by the British both changed and progressively evolved making this also a useful case study of the life cycles of grand strategies.

This chapter further examines a least likely historical case of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines grand strategy during 1992-1999, chosen because this involved a unique coalition of non-state actors that sought an international humanitarian law reform objective. The campaign faced considerable opposition from many states and the use of materialist International Relations theories in crafting a grand strategy would offer little insight and suggest certain failure. The time span chosen is from the realisation that a new grand strategy was needed until it culminated with achieving its desired end state.

The failure case is that of the U.S. Iraq regime change grand strategy 2001-2003. This grand strategy to achieve regime change in Iraq has been much discussed and debated in terms of its rationale, it seeming failure and potential success. This case study examines simply the regime change grand strategy devised and then implemented and does not go beyond the first month of the invasion and occupation. This is a most useful failure case though as the aim, changing Iraqi political norms, was attempted using a denial grand strategy rather than, as the grand strategy typology would recommend, a reform grand strategy. The diagnostic process suggests the grand strategy should not have been fully successful and more importantly that the grand strategy should have failed in a particular manner: the Iraqi regime would not realize its objectives of survival but the American desired change in Iraqi social rules would not be achieved. The time span chosen is from the initial thinking about the grand strategy in 2002 to its culmination with the collapse of the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the realization that the grand strategic end state desired had not been achieved.

There are two reasons to apply the grand strategy cognitive frame to these case studies. Firstly, to ascertain if the appraisal criteria set out in Chapter 1 are met. These criteria include determining if using the cognitive frame to view these examples through allows an understanding to be gained of the design, general operating logic and the circumstances that favoured the grand strategy's success. In this, it is important to note that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover

others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects.

Secondly, Alexander George thought that policymakers needed not just an appropriate cognitive frame but also generic knowledge of the strategy being contemplated. This chapter accordingly also develops this necessary generic knowledge.

BRITISH MALAYAN EMERGENCY GRAND STRATEGY 1948-1960

The reform grand strategy in Malaya was nested within a much broader U.K. engagement grand strategy concerning Cold War decolonization. The British concept was that cooperative pro-Western governments could be installed in many countries as they dismantled their Empire if the process of decolonization was carefully managed and avoided a divisiveness that left openings for pro-communist groups. The U.K. sought to prevent communists from capturing anti-colonialist movements as this would, it was thought, lead to the new states falling under unwanted Soviet influence.[2] This global grand strategy required a capacity to regulate and control the course of events as countries decolonized. The global grand strategy used an engagement approach of working with and through local preferences for, as Nicholas Tarling wrote:

> The British would not frustrate initiatives, but would aim to shape them, trying to work with those who would collaborate, to adopt regional approaches, to influence rather than dominate.[3]

The development of a communist insurgency in the 1940s led to the British colonial government in Malaya declaring a state of emergency in mid-1948. After the Second World War, the Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) had progressively developed an effective and efficient support base albeit mainly only amongst the ethnic Chinese population. While some 40% of the overall population were Chinese, they constituted some 90-95% of the armed MCP insurgents.[4]

In October 1948 a new British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, was

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2. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, *Imperial Endgame: Britain's Dirty Wars and the End of Empire*; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 2.
3. Nicholas Tarling, "Ah-Ah': Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 74-111, p. 74.
4. Karl Hack, 'British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya', *Intelligence and National Security,* Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 124-55, p. 125.

appointed and he initially attempted an engagement grand strategy. Gurney sought to build up a Chinese political party that would act as a means to bring the Chinese community and their grievances into the mechanism of government.[5] The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formally established in February 1949. Gurney's approach was based on an assumption that the wealthy urban elite of the new MCA had useful connections with the poorer rural Chinese and could favourably influence them; this turned out to be untrue.[6] In reality the MCP it seemed were more widely known and trusted.[7] While the MCA gradually developed in importance, at this stage as a useful domestic group they had inadequacies including in lacking a well-defined political role and a constituency, "initially the MCA was a group of leaders in search of followers."[8] The later Briggs Plan though partly addressed these shortcomings and incorporated the MCA into its reform grand strategy.

At first the MCP implemented a denial type grand strategy that stressed armed struggle to mobilize the people and win independence from the British.[9] The British in response also adopted a denial grand strategy that stressed counter-force activities involving offensive operations to seek out and destroy armed Communist guerrillas operating in particular areas.[10] By 1950 though it was apparent that this grand strategy was failing; Colonel Richard Clutterbuck wrote that:

> the Communists were fast building up their strength…[they] could get all the support they needed…[and] there was a growing danger that the …civilian population would lose confidence in the government and conclude that the guerrillas must in the end win.[11]

To wrest the initiative from the MCP, the newly appointed General Briggs in May 1950 issued the *Federation Plan for the Elimination of the Communist*

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5. Kumar Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958*; Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002, p. 58.
6. Ibid.
7. Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 248.
8. Ibid., p. 203.
9. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* pp. 26-53.
10. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* pp. 66-93. John A. Nagal, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp. 66-67.
11. Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long. Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam*; New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1966, p. 89.

Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya, often referred to as the Briggs Plan. The plan held that the MCP relied mainly upon the rural Chinese communities for recruitment, food, funding and material and that without this support the insurgency would fail. The intention was to physically separate the rural Chinese from the MCP but more importantly in so doing convince the rural Chinese to identify with the state as their protector and provider. Briggs wrote that "we must give [them] security and…we must win them over".[12] The earlier denial grand strategy had treated the rural Chinese as a community to be denied the MCP. As the cognitive frame would suggest, this approach was insensitive to the social rules of rural Chinese and did not see these as important to success.[13] Under the Briggs Plan though, British actions would now address previously overlooked ideational matters and deliberately try to change the identity of the rural Chinese.

The rural Chinese at this stage had few dealings with the state, which they saw as distant and irrelevant. They had more in common with the MCP and were inclined to take grievances to them to be resolved, even if only because they were known to them, close by and also Chinese.[14] The Briggs Plan now sought to change this. General Briggs wrote that:

> One of the most vital aims throughout the Emergency must be to commit the Chinese to our side, partly by making them feel that Malaya and not Red China is their home. Without their cooperation it will indeed be difficult to bring the Emergency to a successful conclusion.[15]

The constitutive norms of the rural Chinese that defined the boundaries and practices of the group, their social purposes and worldviews would now be reoriented away from including the MCP and their ideology to instead only that of the British colonial state. Importantly, a sharp ideational distinction would be made between the

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12. Lieutenant-General sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April 1950-November 1951, Kuala Lumpur, 1951, pp 3-5, quoted in Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960*; London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1975, p. 235. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* p. 89.
13. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* p. 57.
14. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* p. 248.
15. Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, CAB 21 / 1861, Federation Plan for the Elimination of the Communist Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya, May 24, 1950 quoted in Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960,* p. 240.

rural Chinese and the MCP who would become the 'other'. This was not a simple undertaking as the extant Chinese social rules favourably viewed the MCP who had earned considerable goodwill resisting the Japanese in the Second World War, were persuasive in the post-war period in arguing for social and economic improvements, included close relatives and were part of many people's friendship networks.[16]

The rural Chinese were dispersed along the internal frontier in numerous small communities but under the Briggs Plan a massive program of resettlement was undertaken that relocated 570,000 people into some 480 new villages and created 216 new urban centres.[17] There was also a 'regroupment' of some 600,000 estate labourers into more secure communities.[18] Over one seventh of the entire population of Malaya were moved during the emergency, reversing the demographic effects of the Second World War and transforming the rural Chinese into townsmen. The urban element of the Chinese population increased from about 40% to almost 75%.[19]

The resettlement broke up old established communities, some of which went back centuries, undermining social cohesion and causing existing identities to fracture and collapse.[20] Briggs replacement, General Templer, decreed that the resettlement areas were to be renamed as New Villages emphasising the sharp break with the old, abandoned communities.[21] With resettlement new, sharply more heterogeneous communities abruptly came into being, comprised of Chinese of many different backgrounds, occupations and language dialects.[22] The resettlement program in completely disrupting the old community leadership structures allowed new influences from new ideational advocates to readily enter the public sphere.

These constructed settlements provided a captive following for the kind of

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16. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* pp. 89-90.
17. Of the 570,000, some 86% were Chinese, 9% Malaya, 4% Indian and I% others. T. N. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 175-76. Cheah Boon Kheng, 'The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: Contesting the Nation-State and Social Change', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies,* Vol. 11, No. 1, June 2009, pp. 132-52, pp. 144-45.
18. Hack, 'British Intelligence and Counter Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya', p. 126.
19. Kheng, 'The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: Contesting the Nation-State and Social Change', p. 145.
20. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya,* pp. 168, 77.
21. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* p. 126.
22. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya,* p. 177.

Chinese leadership the British desired, a role the British encouraged and supported the MCA to play. The urban business elites of the MCA were provided an opportunity to work to re-establish their authority across the Chinese communities that they had lost in the aftermath of the Second World War. [23] The British incorporated the MCA into the new village programmes and instituted new local governance structures that featured a mix of democratically elected representatives and government officials.[24] These structures had mixed successes but brought the state deep into the lives of the rural Chinese and provided them a ready way to have their grievances addressed. This had the critical effect of freezing the MCP out of the picture.[25]

Importantly, this was materially supported and buttressed by the wide range of government services that the Briggs Plan sought to be provided to the new communities. The Briggs Plan envisaged that the local administration would be improved to be more effective and efficient than anything the MCP could offer.[26] Schools, medical services, sporting facilities and community centres were to be built and staffed, an adequate water supply established, effective security provided and roads constructed.[27] These material actions would it was hoped help convince the people affected that the government both protected and provided for them. Meeting concrete needs was seen as central to winning rural Chinese hearts and minds.[28] Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon wrote: "The key aspect of this strategy was to inculcate within the population a sense of British benevolence contrasted with Communist autocracy."[29] The program succeeded, at least in that most people given the choice later choose to stay living in the New Villages.[30]

The dominant theme of the Briggs approach to which material and non-material

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23. Ibid., p. 151.
24. Ibid., p. 188. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* pp. 129, 208.
25. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* p. 170.
26. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, 'Securing the Colonies for the Commonwealth: Counterinsurgency, Decolonization, and the Development of British Imperial Strategy in the Postwar Empire', *British Scholar,* Vol. II, No. 1, September 2009, pp. 12-39. Clutterbuck, p. 57.
27. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* p. 173.
28. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* pp. 2, 127.
29. Grob-Fitzgibbon, 'Securing the Colonies for the Commonwealth: Counterinsurgency, Decolonization, and the Development of British Imperial Strategy in the Postwar Empire', p. 29.
30. R. W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*; Santa Monica, RAND, 1972, pp., pp. 54-58.

means were employed was "the creation of community" although this was a very particular community deliberately constructed.[31] Historian T.N.Harper continues that:

> Community development was an invitation to citizenship, but also a statement of the rules to which civic life had to conform. …the aim was to absorb individual citizens, and thereby whole communities, into a common identity with the state through identifying a constructive civic role for the individual in his community. The ideal was 'a sense of oneness' with the government.[32]

While raising the salience of the state's ideas in the social rules of the rural Chinese, the Briggs Plan also sought to make the MCP and its ideology seem unattractive, insignificant and inappropriate. Considerable effort was made to discredit the MCP on an ideational level through the use of "good propaganda, both constructive and destructive."[33] General Briggs considered that while striving to win over the rural Chinese a simultaneous effort needed to be made to destroy Communist confidence in their beliefs.[34] Over time the rural Chinese identified with the state not with the MCP, and the MCP's influence progressively declined.

In considering the use of the instruments of national power the key matter was to ensure that as this was a reform grand strategy that all actions taken supported the words. The full range of instruments was used, with military actions seen at the time to represent "only 25 per cent of the struggle against the Communists."[35] While coercion was used to counter the armed communist insurgencies this was meant to be undertaken in a manner that supported the overall grand strategy, albeit at times the coercion involved was unhelpfully heavy-handed.

All actions and activities undertaken taken were intended to support the message that the government was legitimate and helped the people, and it was the MCP instead that was uncaring, vindictive and violent. The U.K. Secretary of State for War, J.

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31. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya,* p. 310.
32. Ibid., p. 313.
33. Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, CAB 21 / 1861, Federation Plan for the Elimination of the Communist Organisation and Armed Forces in Malaya, May 24, 1950 quoted in Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960,* p. 237.
34. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* p. 102.
35. Sir Rob Lockhart, Deputy Director of Operations quoted in: 'Winning the Shooting War in Malaya', *Observer,* 4 January 1953 quoted in David French, *The British Way In Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.174.

Strachey, noted that it was important "to appear in the role of protectors of the population against the Communists and their destructive and terrorist activities."[36] It took time for government actions to be so focused, at some detriment to the state's message however, the arrival of General Templer in 1952 considerably reinvigorated the Briggs grand strategy in this regard.

The military instrument, which included the police and the Home Guard, undertook defensive and offensive operations. In both, the gradual identification of the rural Chinese with the state led to them providing increasingly more actionable intelligence. Defensively the resettlement of the rural Chinese concentrated them allowing for higher levels of protective security to be enforced. This also allowed food denial and control operations to be practised that helped cut supplies reaching the MCP in the surrounding jungle.[37] These security activities were led by a greatly expanded and professionalized police force supported by the Home Guards, volunteer part-time armed personnel from the settlements being protected.[38] By 1952 the Chinese Home Guard had some 50,000 personnel with units in almost all New Villages. While of variable effectiveness, the Home Guard in involving and arming the rural Chinese proved useful in further identifying them with the state, its control and its administration.[39]

The principal role of military forces was offensive operations although there was significant support given to the police in their defensive activities and military engineers built roads into the more isolated areas to better connect all Malayans to the British state structure.[40] Under the Briggs Plan, military operations largely involved jungle penetrations by small army units to disrupt MCP camps, recruitment, training and logistics. The military response to the insurgency though emphasized the primacy of

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36. Nagal, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,* p. 71.
37. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* pp. 166-67.
38. Briggs wrote "Security of the population and the elimination of the Communist cells must be the primary tasks of the Police." Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April 1950-November 1951, Kuala Lumpur, 1951, pp 3-5, quoted in Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960,* p. 236.
39. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* p. 156-59.
40. Briggs wrote: "The primary task of the Army must be to destroy the bandits and jungle penetration." Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April 1950-November 1951, Kuala Lumpur, 1951, pp 3-5, quoted in Short, p. 236. Grob-Fitzgibbon, 'Securing the Colonies for the Commonwealth: Counterinsurgency, Decolonization, and the Development of British Imperial Strategy in the Postwar Empire', p. 28.

the civilian government and that the government was provider and protector. All measures were meant to be undertaken within a recognized legal framework that stressed impartiality, was carefully modulated, subject to public debate and firmly enforced.[41] Major Joel Hamby noted in an assessment of civil-military relations:

> Operating under these rules, published for all the population to see, the security forces were able to establish the perception that their actions were honourable, legitimate, and right for Malaya. Safeguards such as judicial appeal and the view of a benevolent hand in charge of the Emergency simplified the task of convincing the people that the government was acting in their best interests.[42]

The economic instrument was employed to make payments directly to rural Chinese to help ease their resettlement difficulties. The MCP was also directly targeted through a rewards-for-surrender program that handsomely bribed insurgents to capitulate. The Government had greater economic resources than the MCP and made effective use of them leading Edgar O'Ballance to remark "the war was won by bribing the rank-and-file Reds to give up".[43]

Diplomacy was used to try to prevent other states supporting the MCP. The main concern was the border with Thailand but the Thai government was supportive and while the Thai border police had shortcomings this potential resupply route was progressively closed off.[44] In the late 1950s though the MCP sought sanctuary in southern Thailand where they were little troubled by the Thai authorities providing they avoided causing local difficulties.[45] The Emergency was declared won in 1960 although the small group of MCP remaining in Thailand occasionally undertook cross-border skirmishes for the next couple of decades.[46]

In early 1950 British diplomacy worked against the Briggs Plan in recognizing the Chinese Communist Party as the legitimate government of mainland China. Elite

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41. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort,* p. 34.
42. Joel E. Hamby, 'Civil-Military Operations: Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency ', *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 32, Autumn 2002, pp. 54-61, p. 58.
43. Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War: 1948-1960*; London: Faber and Faber, 1966, p. 151.
44. Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960,* p. 373-75.
45. Ibid., p. 487.
46. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* pp. 241-42.

urban Chinese became concerned about whether the British would continue fighting until a local government was established. While rural Chinese with memories of World War Two thought that perhaps the British would collapse allowing Communist Chinese forces in.[47]

The diplomatic instrument in its broader sense was used in the negotiations with the MCP in late 1955. The MCP sought an amnesty, recognition as a legitimate political party and the right to contest elections. The Malayan Government at this stage was not British but indigenous and the Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman rejected the MCP's proposals. After 1957 there was no further such diplomatic interaction with the MCP.[48]

The informational instrument played a crucial role. A highly sophisticated propaganda operation was undertaken to convince all of the virtues of the state and the vices of the MCP. In a major study of the Malayan Emergency Kumar Ramakrishna considered that its success owed much to the close coordination of the state's actions with the message being broadcast.[49] The actions reinforced the 'words' that the British colonial government was both protector and provider. The operation was greatly helped by the new technologies of film and radio particularly as many rural Chinese were illiterate. The government installed some 700 low-cost battery powered radios in the New Village community centres and coffee shops. By the end of 1951 Radio Malaya reached into the rural areas for the first time, becoming an important medium of information, education and entertainment for the more isolated populations who had been outside of its coverage. [50] The rural Chinese though placed considerable store on personal contact as a demonstration of the value of the informational message. The placement of government officials into resettlement camps greatly assisted with this as the merit of the state could be assessed locally.[51]

The term used to describe the insurgents was given careful thought to ensure this dovetailed in with the overall shaping of the societal social rules. The labelling of the

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47. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* pp. 85, 119.
48. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960,* pp. 226-27.
49. Ramakrishna, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958,* p. 205.
50. Ibid., p. 119.
51. Ibid., p. 109.

MCP by the government as 'bandits' was important in framing the public's perception of the MCP's identity; historian Phillip Deery notes:

> In all instances the aim was to deny the legitimacy of the opponent. The term 'bandit' is an epithet which invokes negative reactions and which, if it sticks, can isolate and detach the guerrillas from the population they are trying to influence or penetrate. … the vocabulary employed became …a critical part of counterinsurgency operations.…The political motivations of the communist insurgents could be stripped, their widespread support from the Malayan Chinese diminished, and their nationalistic credentials maligned. The aura of patriotism would be replaced by the stigma of illegitimacy.[52]

The term 'bandit' though was replaced in 1952 with 'Communist terrorist' when the U.K. Government wanted to reframe the perception of the Malayan Emergency in the outside world. 'Bandit' seemed to downplay the seriousness of the situation, although by this time the situation had clearly turned in favour of the British. The use of the 'Communist' adjective however firmly located the Emergency in the Cold War struggle, assisting efforts to obtain American support for what appeared a purely colonial issue. The word also helped justify to the British public the not inconsiderable material, financial and personnel resources being expended. Conversely, the noun 'terrorist' was intended to demonize the MCP and further emphasize their illegitimacy.[53] The securitization of the threat was an issue whose importance was well understood during the Malaya Emergency.

This description of the reform grand strategy has focused on the rural Chinese however beyond this other activities were underway. Significant efforts were made to bring the urban Chinese and ethnic Indian elites into Malayan political life. The British encouraged the growth of the Malayan civil service and the formation of political parties to contest elections for local government. Local élites were co-opted through being given important administrative and political responsibilities. The overall MCP objective of full independence was undercut when the British Government announced

52. Phillip Deery, 'The Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya, 1948-52', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* Vol. 34, No. 2, June 2003, 231-47, p. 236.
53. Ibid., pp. 244-46.

this would be granted after a series of phased steps over ten years.[54] Advancing the target date for independence allowed the population's incipient but growing nationalism to be directed against the MCP rather than driving them towards supporting the communists. The U.K. was able to create the idea of a particular kind of imagined Malayan state amongst the population.

The Malayan Emergency was a near-term matter and perceived as an issue of necessity. A near-term managerial approach was adopted as the cognitive frame would suggest. This approach has the least dependence on others for its accomplishment and suits times when success is deemed essential, as was the case of the Malayan Emergency.

The Emergency's start found a Labour Government in the U.K. and a colonial government in Malaya that were both managerial states. The colonial government saw its role as accelerating national development through activist measures and direct intervention in society and the economy.[55] A partnership between public and private capital was envisaged with the Government aiming to "attract or guide private enterprise to directions which are the most desirable for progress in accordance with decided policy."[56]

The colonial government borne the majority of the war's financial costs with a significant portion of its spending diverted annually into the Emergency.[57] At its peak in 1952, some 40% of GOM outlays went to the conflict.[58] Fortuitously, the colonial government immediately before the Emergency had significantly revamped taxation policies including introducing new income, corporate and export taxes to meet demands for reconstruction, social services and economic development. The state had gained considerable extractive powers and was able to use these to increase taxes as Emergency funding demands necessitated; this was an accommodational strategy that extended extraction when needed. The quantum of extraction was further dramatically

54. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort,* p. 64.
55. Nicholas J. White, 'The Frustrations of Development: British Business and the Late Colonial State in Malaya, 1945 -57 ', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, March, 1997, pp. 103-19, pp. 105-10.
56. 1947 Colonial Government document quoted in ibid., p. 106.
57. The U.K. government also provided some direct grants when Malay's finances became stretched.
58. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, p. 22.

increased with the Korean War export boom. Nicholas White writes that:

> in 1951 there was an eight-fold increase over 1949 in revenues from exported rubber, while that from tin doubled over the same period. ….the improved fortunes of rubber and tin during the Korean War, combined with fiscal reforms, provided the funding needed for the Federation's resettlement policy, the seven-fold increase in police numbers, the raising of 240,000 Home Guards and an extra four battalions of the Malay Regiment, and additional funds for social and economic development.[59]

The Malay Army was gradually built up through volunteer recruitment and eventually provided about half of the infantry deployed. Assisting the Army was a considerable force of part-time Home Guards recruited locally and constituting almost five percent of the population. The majority of the police force of 60,000 was also recruited locally. The security forces equipment was mainly of British origin as Malaya had little industrial capacity.

The British Government provided the majority of the military forces with deployed Army units reaching some 30,000 troops in 1952. These forces included considerable numbers of conscript national service soldiers; by 1952 "many of the British Army battalions serving in Malaya…were virtually National Service battalions."[60] The costs were met from annual Government budgets through an accommodational strategy focused on extraction. In this period Britain had significant defence commitments with defence spending consuming some 25% of general government expenditures. Government spending was about 35% of the GDP with revenues roughly split halfway between direct and indirect taxation.[61] However, large defence spending contributed to Britain running deficit budgets of some 2-3% GDP in this period.[62] This was funded by domestic and international borrowings, including significant American Marshall Plan grants during the 1948-1951 period which represented some 1.3% of GDP annually.

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59. Nicholas J. White, 'Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57 ', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Feburary, 1998, pp. 149-77, p. 175.
60. Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1960*; London: Routledge, 1991, p. 45.
61. Tom Clark and Andrew Dilnot, *Long-Term Trends in British Taxation and Spending*; London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2002a, pp. 3-6.
62. Tom Clark and Andrew Dilnot, *Measuring the U.K. Fiscal Stance since the Second World War*; London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2002b, pp. 4-6.

In the 1947-1952 period of continual British economic crisis, Malaya was economically very important in the defence of Sterling and the reconstruction of the British domestic economy. With British companies dominating Malay's rubber industry, businessman Sir John Hay in 1949 remarked that:

> Malaya's rubber production ... produces dollars to an amount that exceeds in total value all…exports from Britain to the U.S. ... if, for any reason, the operations of the great rubber industry are interrupted or seriously impaired, Britain's dollar situation would be rendered more acute than ever. This country would then have less food, less clothes, and there would be fewer dollars with which to buy raw materials - and that would mean unemployment. All of us are thus deeply concerned in what is happening in Malaya.[63]

As in Malaya though, the funding of the demands of the Emergency was undertaken at a time when the British state was strongly expansionist particularly in welfare and public health spending.

The reform grand strategy was ultimately successful because the ideas advocated by the British gained acceptance whereas the MCP was unable to convince the population of the value and legitimacy of theirs. The British reform grand strategy ensured that the identities of both the state and the MCP that prevailed were those the U.K. sought. The British desired social rules were embraced by Malayan society and in particular the rural Chinese. The U.K. was able to successfully create and inculcate its idea of a particular kind of Malaya state amongst the population.

The grand strategy cognitive frame proved productive in usefully structuring this examination of the British Malayan Emergency. In this, it is important to note that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects. The intention in considering the British Government's actions through the grand strategy cognitive frame is rather to allow the key aspects relating to this particular grand strategy to be efficiently and effectively exposed. In this case study using the cognitive frame permits a high-level understanding of the design of the grand strategy, its general logic and the

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63. Sir John Hay in a BBC Radio Broadcast 3 January 1949 quoted in: White, 'Capitalism and Counter-Insurgency? Business and Government in the Malayan Emergency, 1948-57 ', p. 152.

circumstances and conditions that lead to its success to be comprehended in a manner useful for policymakers.

The Malayan Emergency is often examined in terms of being a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Applying the cognitive frame to this case study though reveals the grand strategy that allowed this seemingly military success. In this case the international order that was to be changed was within the geographic state of Malaya but the power to be built to achieve this rested in both Malaya and the distant colonial power of the United Kingdom. This case study confirmed the usefulness of the cognitive frame in examining a historical reform grand strategy example.

The Malayan Emergency reform grand strategy was successful because particular conditions favoured its success. The population structure, the ethnic groupings and the nature of the MCP adversary allowed the British to focus their efforts on a readily identifiable subset of the overall population: the rural Chinese. This group was of a scale appropriate to British resources, allowing them the ability to deliberately fragment the group's identity and then rebuild it in the desired form. If the target group had been significantly larger the fragmentation of the identity would have been even more difficult and costly to achieve. Changing the identity of the rural Chinese was further aided by the earlier formation of the MCA that meant the British could make use of the wealthy urban elite as ideational advocates in the New Village Chinese communities when the time came.

In more general terms however, the British owed their success to their on-going assessment of the effectiveness of their three successive grand strategies. The initial response to the Communist challenge was to attempt an engagement grand strategy but it was soon realized that a suitable domestic partner was not readily available and there was insufficient time to develop the MCA to meet this role. The British quickly shifted to a denial grand strategy in a symmetrical response to the now armed insurgency but after several months it became apparent that this new approach was failing to win over the civilian population and the MCP was gaining the political and military initiative. To reverse this, the British then developed and began implementing a sophisticated reform grand strategy.

The British reform grand strategy continued to evolve throughout the

Emergency as continuing self-assessment revealed new ways to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. In terms of timing the British took two years of trial and error before adopting the reform grand strategy, a further two years before this grand strategy had reached a suitably refined stage, and another two to three years to achieve demonstrable success. A grand strategy is not a set-and-forget approach but rather needs continuing monitoring, critical assessment and on-going improvements to succeed.

The success of the Malayan Emergency reform grand strategy also illustrates this type's shortcomings. The key to success is the collapse of existing norms and identities and this requires some external shock that demonstrates these ideas need replacing. The British implemented a large-scale resettlement campaign and set up hundreds of New Villages to achieve this. It was a costly, difficult and controversial program – and remains so.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES GRAND STRATEGY 1992-1999

At the end of the Cold War, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in humanitarian work in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Somalia encountered significant difficulties caused by the very large numbers of anti-personnel landmines sown across these countries. Landmines were causing large numbers of deaths and injuries to non-combatants and severely hampering reconstruction efforts.[64] As these NGOs shared information with other NGOs working across the world, it became apparent that this was a global issue.[65] Accordingly, in October 1992, six NGOs created an umbrella organization, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), that sought an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines, and greater resources for humanitarian mine clearance and victim assistance.[66]

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64. Jody Williams and Stephen Goose, 'The International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Maxwell A. Cameron, Brian W. Tomlin, and Robert J. Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-47, pp. 20-21.
65. Richard Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines', *International Organization,* Vol. 52, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 613-44, p. 622.
66. The six NGOs were: Handicap International (France); Human Rights Watch (US); Medico International (Germany); Mines Advisory Group (UK), Physicians for Human Rights (US) and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (US). These six NGOs became the steering committee of the ICBL and appointed Jody Williams as the coordinator. Williams and Goose, 'The International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-47, p. 22.

The NGOs agreed that the campaign's core identity should be the ban as the problems of mined areas and victims would not be resolved until deployment and production permanently stopped.[67]

The ICBL achieved remarkable success. The convention banning landmines entered into force on March 1, 1999, the swiftest major international agreement at that time to enter into force.[68] To achieve this, the ICBL adopted a grand strategy to build a broadly based international coalition of NGOs that would: firstly, educate publics, mobilize domestic support and apply pressure on national governments and other relevant parties; and secondly urge governments worldwide to work for a complete ban.[69] At the time, states were unconcerned about landmines as an important arms control issue although, there were some minimal international legal restrictions on their use arising from the Landmines Protocol of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[70]

In considering grand strategy types, the ICBL could not coerce states to outlaw landmines, and no state was strongly supportive or indeed concerned. This suggested that the denial and engagement grand strategy types were inappropriate. Instead given the goal of changing the international social rules that related to a very specific type of military equipment, a reform grand strategy was suggested. This was a reform grand strategy of changing norms, the shared understandings of what kinds of actions are appropriate, not of changing identities which define an actors' characteristics, distinctiveness and uniqueness. In this, the grand strategy was somewhat ambitious in trying to change a social rule across the complete international system. In the seeking to purposefully change the existing order, the ICBL emphasized the use of the informational and diplomatic instruments; the ICBL's characteristics precluded using

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67. Kenneth R. Rutherford, 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Landmine Ban', in Richard Anthony Matthew, Bryan Mcdonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 51-66, p. 57.
68. Kenneth R. Rutherford, 'The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines', *World Politics,* Vol. 53, No. 1, October 2000, pp. 74-114, p. 74.
69. Richard A. Matthew, 'Human Security and the Mine Ban Movement 1: Introduction', in Richard Anthony Matthew, Bryan Mcdonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 3-20, p. 6.
70. The International Committee of the Red Cross was instrumental in having these restrictions enacted. Rutherford, 'The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines', p. 81.

military instruments and the campaign decided not to use economic ones. The informational instruments produced ideational change with the diplomatic instrument institutionalizing this change.

The ICBL's informational strategy was to shift the debate about landmines from being a political or military matter to being a humanitarian issue.[71] During the Cold War, intrastate conflict in the Third World was perceived in terms of ideological and geopolitical competition with the USSR however, in the post-Cold War era such conflict became depoliticized and was seen instead in humanitarian terms. The focus shifted from state security to human security, and this allowed non-state actors to legitimately discuss the impact of landmines, not only governments and the professional military.[72] In opening up this space in the social system for norm changes, the ICBL used extant norms as the basis for arguing that landmine use was inhumane and not legally justifiable as the humanitarian impact was more severe than its military utility.[73] The old norms were held to be no longer appropriate and, having collapsed, in need of replacement

International laws of armed conflict stress that the damage inflicted by the use of force must be proportional to the expected benefits, and that force must be used discriminately with any accidental harm to non-combatants minimized. The ICBL argued that landmines in being designed to kill and injure remotely at an indefinite time in the future were weapons that inherently did not allow military commanders to abide by the dictates of proportionality and discrimination.[74] The ICBL informational strategy accordingly emphasized the impact of landmines on civilians, women and children. The campaign claimed that 80% of the victims of landmines annually were civilians[75] and that of this almost half were women and children.[76] The ICBL

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71. Ibid., p. 87.
72. Miguel De Larrinaga and Claire Turenne Sjolander, '(Re)Presenting Landmines from the Protector to Enemy: The Discursive Framing of a New Multilateralism ', in Maxwell A. Cameron, Brian W. Tomlin, and Robert J. Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 364-91, p. 371. Rutherford, 'The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of Ngos in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines', p. 94.
73. Rutherford, 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Landmine Ban', in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 51-66, p. 57.
74. Rutherford, 'The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines', p. 92.
75. Ibid., p. 87.

continually featured landmine victims prominently in their educational, fundraising, and promotional literature and sponsored their participation in international conferences.[77] The military utility of landmines was not disputed, simply that it was significantly less than the long-term human security costs.

Landmine supporters were left to argue that the military utility was sufficiently high to outweigh the well-publicized unintentional deaths and maiming landmines caused. In this moral argument, the ICBL's ideational framing went uncontested. International Relations academic and landmine victim, Ken Rutherford wrote that:

> There was no real attempt by states opposed to the ban to dispute the humanitarian arguments. Instead, these anti-ban states made strong military and political arguments as to why landmines should not be banned but at the same time expressed humanitarian concern for the landmine victims. These strategies produced incoherent policies that were not compatible with how and why the landmine issue was established [by the ICBL] on the international agenda.[78]

The informational campaign further exploited existing weapon ban norms. Landmines were linked to other already determined indiscriminate weapons such as poison gas explicitly noting that as these had already been banned, a similar norm against landmines would be both feasible and right.[79] The ICBL held that landmines were not a 'normal' weapon but belonged in a special class about which there were already strong taboos.

The informational campaign's thrust did not question the state's role in the humanitarian problems landmines caused but rather was designed to lead to landmines being seen as an enemy against which both the state and civil society must stand together.[80] The role of the state as protector was reinforced, not questioned, and this

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76. Larrinaga and Sjolander, in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 364-91, p. 376.
77. Rutherford, 'The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines', p. 91.
78. Ibid., p. 105.
79. Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines', p. 629.
80. J. Marshal Beier and Ann Denholm Crosby, 'Harnessing Change for Continuity: The Play of Political and Economic Forces Behind the Ottawa Process', in Maxwell A. Cameron, Brian W. Tomlin, and Robert J. Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 269-92, p. 276.

helped states distance themselves from landmines.[81] Richard Rice writes that:

> Through framing the issue as a humanitarian disaster and educating the public and policymakers about the indiscriminate nature of the weapon, these moral entrepreneurs [of the ICBL] set the stage for a widespread and rapid response. This sense of crisis made a ban seem desirable; however, it was the grafting of taboos from previously delegitimized practices of warfare, especially chemical weapons, that allowed a ban to be considered the art of the possible for many states.[82]

Changes to social rules to be both advanced and made permanent need to be embedded in institutions. The ICBL made use of the diplomatic instruments of persuasion and negotiation in both interacting with states and in partnering with specific like-minded states.

The ICBL grand strategy required pressure to be placed on individual states to persuade them of the need for a landmine ban. In this, while the ideational message was consistent across all ICBL members, the actual lobbying methods to be employed were left up to the NGOs in each country. Similarly, there was no overarching media strategy, simply a common message.[83] Each country's NGOs were responsible for determining the best approach to use. American NGOs were able to work with sympathetic congressmen and thus did not need to build extensive public support. European NGOs by contrast gave higher priority to directly engaging the public than working with government officials or members.[84] This reliance on the knowledge and expertise of local NGOs was particularly important in convincing non-state groups to give up landmines. Paul Wapner observes that:

> the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines, both of which were staffed by local people but financed with international funds, worked to convince the Taliban that antipersonnel mines were un-Islamic. In 1998, the Taliban issued a statement to this effect and both

81. Larrinaga and Sjolander, in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 364-91, p. 380.
82. Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines', pp. 639-40.
83. Williams and Goose, 'The International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-47, p. 23.
84. Ibid., p. 28.

> campaigns reported no subsequent use of landmines by the Taliban (though the opposition Northern alliance continued to deploy mines within Afghanistan through 2001).[85]

Internationally, the ideational message was pressed through a series of ICBL convened large-scale international conferences and seminars held in the U.S., Europe, Asia and Africa. [86] These publicized the landmine cause and also help bring international organizations like the United Nations, and especially UNICEF, into giving active support.

The ICBL diplomatic strategy made good use of celebrities to pressure governments and advance the landmine ban agenda. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela's and U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf's support of a landmine ban proved influential; the later in helping counter domestic military utility arguments.[87] In the U.K. Princess Diana brought the issue to the media's attention; Rutherford writes that:

> Princess Diana's support of NGOs and their arguments to ban landmines helped transfer the issue from a political to a humanitarian problem. Moreover, she was able to leverage the media into covering the landmine issue from locations such as Angola and Bosnia and thereby helped to marshal public support for the ban and against the British [government] anti-ban position. Each of her trips to landmine infested states was organized and planned by humanitarian NGOs.[88]

The ICBL grand strategy had initially been based on working through the existing United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) institution to achieve change however this proved impractical. The CCW relied on a consensus-based approach that meant that reform proposals were stymied by the larger states that opposed a ban such as the U.S., India, China and Russia and the September 1995 meeting stalemated. In response the ICBL developed a strategy that involved working

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85. Paul Wapner, 'The Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines and Global Civil Society', in Richard Anthony Matthew, Bryan Mcdonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 251-68, p. 255.
86. Maxwell A. Cameron, 'Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model', in Maxwell A. Cameron, Brian W. Tomlin, and Robert J. Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 424-47, p. 431.
87. Rutherford, 'The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines', p. 102.
88. Ibid.

with like-minded middle-power states outside the CCW framework.[89]

While only a small number of states were persuaded about the landmine ban, there were sufficient to develop an alternative institution, termed the Ottawa process, able to progress the ban proposal outside of the normal diplomatic forums for international humanitarian law. In January 1996 Canada agreed to host a meeting in October that year involving eleven likeminded states and the ICBL. This meeting proved seminal and quickly lead to several more involving ever-increasing numbers of states and the ICBL.

The ICBL was given invited observer status and became an active participant being deeply involved in the development and negotiation of the proposed convention as it evolved.[90] The organization developed its own draft treaty proposal and attempted to have as much of this as possible incorporated into the final ban treaty.[91] In bringing the ICBL coalition into the Ottawa process however, policymakers were exposed to criticism from civil society and made to feel compelled to provide public reasons for their activities.[92] At the successful conclusion of the Ottawa process in December 1997 when the convention was signed, a survey of state delegates revealed that the pressure exercised by the ICBL, particularly at the negotiating table, had been a very significant influence.[93] Even so the Ottawa process was a state-based approach that made extensive use of traditional diplomatic methods tools albeit enhanced by the selective use of NGOs.[94] This institutionalization of the landmine ban objective was crucial for success.

The ICBL was adroit at using domestic pressure on states and as the Ottawa process continued with more states joining, there developed a feeling of inevitability.

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89. Kenneth Rutherford, 'Post-Cold War Superpower? Mid-Size State and NGO Collaboration in Banning Landmines', in Kenneth Rutherford, Stefan Brem, and Richard Matthew (eds.), *Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy*; Westport Praeger, 2003, pp. 23-38, p. 25.
90. Cameron et al., 'To Walk without Fear', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 1-19, p. 5.
91. Williams and Goose, 'The International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-47, p. 35.
92. Cameron, 'Democratization of Foreign Policy: The Ottawa Process as a Model', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 424-47, p. 443.
93. Cameron et al., 'To Walk without Fear', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 1-19, p. 10.
94. Larrinaga and Sjolander, in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 364-91, pp. 381-82.

States could not isolate themselves from what was perceived to be a powerful and growing world movement against mines. States began to feel: "that in the end they would be forced to conform and sign."[95] As the number of crucial states supporting a ban reached critical mass, concerns of reputation and identity fostered emulation, which as the reform grand strategy schema would suggest, became an increasingly powerful mechanism through which the new norm was adopted.[96]

The ICBL grand strategy devised a successful grand strategic synthesis where the way changes to the existing order were sought and the way power was built were well integrated. For the coalition of NGOs, resources were always problematic with success requiring their careful employment. The issue was a matter of choice and near-term; the ICBL could be involved as much or as little as desired. These factors suggested a near-term market state approach would be employed and it was. In terms of strategies to develop resources, the ICBL started with an accommodational strategy that made use of the coalition's internal resources of people, money and material but as the campaign's momentum grew and the call on resources increased an international strategy that sought significant funding external to the ICBL was adopted.

The ICBL made the maximum use of internal resources through being a collection of self-organized national campaigns under the auspices of a coordinator.[97] The grand strategy provided the guidance and coherence but the campaign used a decentralized and informal organizational structure. There was no central headquarters, secretariat, or authority and the ICBL did not dictate the direction of campaigns in other nations.[98]

At the top of the ICBL structure was a 13-member coordination committee made up of rotating members and representatives from every continent that oversaw campaign strategy and set general policy.[99] Below this were some 1,000 NGOs worldwide which

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95. Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines', pp. 639-40.
96. Ibid.
97. Nicola Short, 'The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines', *International Negotiation,* Vol. 4, No. 3, 1999, pp. 481-502, p. 483.
98. Lesley Wexler, 'The International Deployment of Shame, Second–Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty', *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law,* Vol. 20, No. 3, 2003, pp. 561-606, p. 589.
99. Wapner, in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 251-68, p. 261.

shared the overall objective of working towards a comprehensive landmine ban but who were allowed to choose and implement the tactics they considered best suited for their local circumstances. ICBL coordinator Jody Williams noted that members: "met regularly to plot out overall strategies and plan joint actions, but beyond that each NGO and each National Campaign was free to develop its own work best suited to its mandate, culture, and circumstances."[100]

While there were many NGOs involved, the ICBL spoke for them as a single entity and represented them at international conferences for states; "A multitude of voices arose with a single viewpoint on a narrow issue." [101] During the Ottawa process, the ICBL was highly centralized particularly in its interaction with the Canadian government and functioned as a single, homogenous bargaining voice with a unitary position. This distinguished the ICBL from other NGO efforts to affect international policy making, which have been characterized more as a constellation of concerns.[102] Moreover, the ICBL functioned as a single actor for the media coverage surrounding the negotiations, with the ICBL coordinator responsible for all official ICBL press releases while the national campaigns dealt with their respective national media.[103]

The ICBL's manpower came from the many diverse NGOs that included people with many different interests including human rights, arms control, humanitarian assistance, the environment, veterans' affairs, women's and children's rights, demining, and victim rehabilitation.[104] Most people joined the campaign driven by a belief that banning landmines was the right thing for governments to do. They generally contributed social power and authority rather than any specific expertise on landmines.[105] The ICBL assisted them in developing useful campaign skills through providing specific training and capacity building workshops. The ICBL built deliberately around a self-organizing mass participation model intrinsically had

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100. Wexler, 'The International Deployment of Shame, Second–Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty', p. 589.
101. Rutherford, 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Landmine Ban', in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 51-66, p. 60.
102. Short, 'The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines', p. 484.
103. Ibid.
104. Wexler, 'The International Deployment of Shame, Second–Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty', p. 589.
105. Rutherford, 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Landmine Ban', in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 51-66, p. 57.

considerable input legitimacy.

Without significant financing the ICBL would not have been able to play as central a role as it did, and becoming deeply involved in the Ottawa process proved particularly expensive. The campaign was financed through many sources although the grand strategy also meant that costs were widely dispersed.

Initially the ICBL depended solely on money from well-established member NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Save the Children and the Lutheran World Federation; foundations such as the Open Society Institute, Merck, and Dianna Princess of Wales Fund; and the public at large. All the NGOs involved paid no dues to the ICBL to be part of the campaign but were expected to be self-financing in their participation. These various NGOs seconded and funded individuals who worked on the campaign.[106] While there were many small NGOs with sharply limited funding some, like the founding members, were organizations with significant budgets. The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) alone contributed over $4.5 million to the effort across 1992-1997.[107] The ICBL Coordinator worked through the VVAF during the campaign, functioning as a non-profit NGO that received funding from government and private sources.[108]

In the late 1990s, the ICBL began receiving funding from the several governments including Canada, Switzerland and Denmark.[109] Of these, the Canadian government actively championed the involvement of NGOs in the Ottawa Process and made significant funds available specifically for participation.[110] Across the complete campaign period the ICBL is believed to have received roughly one third of its funding from the Open Society Institute, one third from governments (particularly Canada, Norway, and Sweden) and one third from other NGOs and international organizations

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106. Stephen Goose and Jody Williams, 'The Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines', in Richard Anthony Matthew, Bryan Mcdonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 239-50, p. 242.
107. Short, 'The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines', p. 493.
108. Ibid., p. 484.
109. Wapner, in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 251-68, p. 260.
110. Short, 'The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines', p. 492.

such as UNICEF. [111]

The grand strategy was heavily reliant on communications both to keep the coalition coherent and working together effectively, and in the implementation of the informational competent. From the start it was apparent that a grand strategy built upon a large number of diverse NGOs widely dispersed across the globe could only be effective if each NGO felt an immediate and important part of the campaign.[112] Constant exchange of information was key to give members a sense of overall campaign activities and to create and sustain the momentum.[113] For this, the ICBL made extensive use of fax technology and then from 1996 the Internet; Rutherford observes that the:

> Internet allowed the ICBL to reach out to NGOs across geographic space in an effort to broaden and expand its membership base to the [global] South, most importantly the internet allowed the ICBL to expand to southern states at minimal cost. The low cost and easy use of the internet enhanced the ICBL's political strategy to get as many states on board to counter the opposition of the major powers – China, Russia, India and the United States.[114]

Quickly and efficiently sharing successes and failures empowered the whole organization and lessened the isolation of distant NGOs. With a strong communication backbone, the ICBL often knew of developments before governments, which made it a focal point of information for states and NGOs alike.[115]

While e-mail was used heavily internally, most external meetings were face-to-face. The ICBL built a strong network amongst states and international organizations and applying pressure to these groups necessitated travel. The holding of large-scale international conferences and seminars also required considerable

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111. Ibid., p. 484.
112. Williams and Goose, 'The International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-47, p. 24.
113. Ibid., p. 23.
114. Rutherford, 'Nongovernmental Organisations and the Landmine Ban', in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 51-66, p. 58.
115. Goose and Williams, in Matthew, Mcdonald, and Rutherford (eds.), *Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War's Hidden Legacy*; Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, pp. 239-50, p. 244.

organization. This eased when for the second conference UNICEF provided all logistical support, meeting accommodation and support staff.[116]

The case of the ICBL is a least likely example of the cognitive frame in involving non-state actors. The ICBL to achieve its objectives required the development, allocation and application of resources and this necessitated adopting a grand strategic approach. Investigating this specific case suggests that the cognitive frame has utility in circumstances where a state or non-state actor seeks to reform the social norms of global society.

Using the cognitive frame helped an understanding to be gained of the ICBL's grand strategy design, its general logic, and the circumstances that lead to eventual success. The ICBL reform grand strategy was successful because some particular conditions favoured its success. The end of the Cold War led to third world conflicts being conceived as humanitarian crises rather than geopolitical battlefields. This major shift in public and governmental attitudes was cleverly exploited by the ICBL to cause the norms supporting land mine usage to almost completely collapse with no real attempt made to dispute their arguments. The external shock of the Cold War ending though was an essential precursor; without this it is very unlikely the ICBL would have been successful.

The ICBL's grand strategy was further aided by being able to take advantage of existing institutions, governmental structures and public society organizations to quickly advance their new ideas. Moreover, the specialized nature of the issue allowed the ICBL to both determine and then focus their efforts on persuading a relatively small number of potential ideational advocates that held germane authoritative positions within these institutions and structures. Reaching a critical mass of relevant actors that had accepted the new norm was therefore achieved reasonably quickly.

This grand strategy in its startling success also highlighted some shortcomings of the reform type of grand strategy. If the existing norms had not been ripe for complete collapse, it is doubtful the ICBL would have had the ability or the resources to succeed; there was a degree of fortuitous involved. Moreover if the key issue in a

116. Williams and Goose, 'The International Campaign to Ban Landmines', in Cameron, Tomlin, and Lawson (eds.), *To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*; Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 20-47, p. 28.

reform grand strategy is this ideational collapse, there must also be a suitable new idea at hand ready to deploy to fill the gap. The ICBL relatively quickly developed comprehensive and apparently well-considered ideas that seemed to meet this need and proved broadly acceptable. The ICBL was lucky though to operate in a virtually uncontested field. Not having developed new ideas earlier to be at hand immediately the old order collapsed could have proved fatal had other groups been ready at that time to push their new ideas. In other circumstances there may be true clash of opposing ideas that are seeking to fill the gap left by the collapse of the old ideas. This would be a considerably harsher environment to operate and succeed within than the ICBL faced.

U.S. IRAQ REGIME CHANGE GRAND STRATEGY 2001-2003

The 1991 multinational war against Iraq liberated Kuwait but left the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein in place and subject, with Iran, to an American-led dual containment grand strategy. In October 1998 the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which changed U.S. policy towards Iraq to include regime change to be mainly undertaken by providing aid to dissent groups.[117] This was effectively a small-scale engagement grand strategy.

Motivated by the Al Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush administration on 29 September 2001 began developing plans to remove the Iraqi regime using American military forces.[118] The successful replacement of this authoritarian regime by a democratic government would it was believed usher in a new era of peace and prosperity in Iraq and permanently ensure the country posed no threat to the US.[119]

In the cognitive frame, the reform grand strategy is proposed when seeking to reform another state through changing its social rules. The schema for this grand strategy type privileges ideas, not states or sub-state groups as the denial and engagement types do respectively. The American objective was to reform Iraq by putting in place a new type of government that the Iraqi people considered legitimate but the U.S. implemented a denial grand strategy. The cognitive frame suggests that a

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117. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005,* pp. 111-12.
118. Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*; New York: Harper, 2008, pp 218.
119. Ibid, pp. 236-237

denial grand strategy is suitable only when trying to actively stop a state achieving its desired objectives, not to reform it.

This case study is an important example in testing that the international order sought can best be achieved by using the matched grand strategy type. If the cognitive frame is correct, the 2003 American regime change of Iraq should have failed in a particular manner: Iraq should have been stopped from achieving its objectives – regime survival in this case - but the social rules of the society should also not have been changed in the way sought by the U.S.

The order sought was for Iraq to adopt liberal democratic norms that other countries, in particular the U.S., used. In sharing these norms Iraq would be secure, prosperous and not pose a danger to other states.[120] The order sought was outlined in a classified document signed by President Bush in August 2002 titled "Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy." Michael Gordon and retired General Bernard Trainor write that:

> the document proclaimed that the United States would midwife a new Iraq whose society would be "based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy." With his reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the president's father had vowed to preserve international norms against the forces of chaos; this new president would upset the established order to spread the gospel of freedom.[121]

The effort taken by the Bush administration to clearly define the grand strategy's objectives and desired end state was commendable. As well as guiding grand strategy development however, it also gave a benchmark against which the grand strategy could be judged. The later aspect is one of some importance to democratic states as was discussed in Chapter 2.

To change the existing international order with Iraq, the U.S. adopted a denial grand strategy. The schema associated with this type of grand strategy judges states mainly on their relative military power, considers war a legitimate policy means, that a state's actions should be judged solely by their results, and that military power is the

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120. Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*, pp. 286-289.
121. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama*; New York: Vintage Books, 2013, p. 8.

key determinant of change. The American Iraq regime change grand strategy accordingly privileged the military instrument of national power, and employed the diplomatic, economic and informational instruments principally as supporting elements.

The policy planning to impose regime change on Iraq began shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and gained momentum in the first quarter of 2002 after the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was overthrown. The operational planning for the post-Saddam Iraq of "moderation, pluralism, and democracy" though was only begun in earnest in January 2003, some three months before the war began, when a decision was finally made that the Department of Defense, and in particular Central Command (CENTCOM), would be responsible.[122]

The CENTCOM Commander General Franks saw the overthrow of the Saddam regime as a separate issue both fundamentally distinct from events beyond its' demise and more important than them.[123] The post-Saddam period when Iraq would become an embryonic democracy was called Phase IV as it was seen as an integral part of the overall invasion and subsequent occupation in terms of meeting the President's specified objectives. This phase focussed on regime replacement but received only limited attention within CENTCOM compared to Phase III, the intense combat phase that sought regime removal.[124] Colonel Benson, the chief Combined Force Land Component Command planner said later that: "We were extraordinarily focused on Phase III. There should have been more than just one Army colonel, me, really worrying about the details of Phase IV."[125]

In accordance with the denial type grand strategy's schema the military strategy was a counter-force plan focused on defeating the Iraqi army. The military campaign was designed to damage as little of Iraq's infrastructure as possible, focusing instead on the regime's centres of power. The oil sector, the power grid, and other key aspects of Iraq's infrastructure were planned to be mostly unaffected by the war, requiring only

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122. Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005*; Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2008, p. 70.
123. Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*, pp. 129-30.
124. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*; New York: Pantheon Books, 2006, p. 139.
125. Wright and Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005*, p. 76.

minimal reconstruction required afterward.[126] A military planner at the time explained that: "Our interest is to get there very quickly, decapitate the regime, and open the place up, demonstrating that we're there to liberate the country."[127]

The post-Saddam plan assumed that the Iraqi people would greet the American forces as liberators and support the U.S. presence, that the institutions of the government including the army and the police would remain intact and functioning, and that Iraqi exiles recruited by America would assume political power and quickly form the desired new democratic government.[128] The National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice explained that:"the concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police…You would be able to bring in new leadership but we were going to keep the body in place"[129]

A temporary organization, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance headed by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, a humanitarian aid and relief expert, was set up to assist the new Iraqi government during the envisaged short transitional period.[130] With only limited planning elsewhere, ORHA quickly devised its own post-war plan focused on addressing the four most likely crises anticipated to occur after regime overthrow: oil field fires, large numbers of refugees, food shortages, and the outbreak of epidemics.[131] None was related to regime replacement.

As the denial grand strategy schema would suggest, the economic instrument was used to support the military instrument. While economic sanctions on Iraq remained in place from the earlier grand strategy, the new regime change denial grand strategy also used positive and negative economic sanctions in an endeavour to favourably influence American allies, partners and friends. The U.S. offered to increase or cut economic and military aid, sign trade agreements[132] and help forge investment

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126. Nora Bensahel et al., *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*; Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 234.
127. Thomas E. Ricks, 'War Plans Target Hussein Power Base: Scenarios Feature a Smaller Force, Narrower Strikes ', *Washington Post*, 22 September 2002, p. A01.
128. Bensahel et al., *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq,* pp. 234-35.
129. An Interview with Condoleezza Rice quoted in: Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, p. 142.
130. Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*, pp. 131-32.
131. Wright and Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005*, p. 70.
132. Supporters such as Singapore and Australia had free trade agreements expedited while dissenters such as Chile had theirs conspicuously delayed. Randall Newnham, '"Coalition of the Bribed and

links[133] depending on the support given by foreign nations for the war. States were also offered reconstruction contracts and a more likely repayment of Iraqi debts post-war if they participated.[134]

The largest aid packages directly linked to specific states supporting the regime change grand strategy military action went to Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey. Jordan received $700 million in economic aid and $406 million in military support, Egypt received $300 million in economic aid and Israel gained a billion dollars in military aid.[135] Geographically important Turkey was reportedly offered up to $24 billion, but the government felt obligated to take the matter to the Turkish parliament, which voted against supporting the war.[136] The Turkish government though did allow overflights, use of airbases and other quiet support; accordingly the annual American military aid increased to some $50m, and Turkey received some $200m to mitigate economic stress from the Iraq war.[137] States in Micronesia, Eastern Europe and the Gulf region also received monetary assistance to support the American grand strategy.[138]

Diplomacy was similarly used principally to support the planned military action. The main focus was to secure basing and staging rights to allow U.S. forces to deploy into the region. While considerable diplomatic pressure was applied to regional nations, most remained reticent but did provide limited support.[139] Ultimately the institutions of

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Bullied?'' U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition', *International Studies Perspectives,* Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008, pp. 183-200, p. 189. Ian Jackson, 'The Geopolitics of President George W. Bush's Foreign Economic Policy', *International Politics,* Vol. 44, No. 5, 2007, pp. 572-95, p. 577.

133. Romanian and Bulgarian support was rewarded with a major effort by the Bush administration to portray them as attractive investment sites. Newnham, ''Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?'' U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition', p. 192.

134. Bulgaria, for example, was owed $1.7 billion. After President Bush visited in February, 2003, Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha remarked: "The President said very clearly and categorically that … the countries which have provided support or assistance in the joint effort and have helped the US, and to which Iraq owes a debt, will have a priority when those sums are repaid….''Ivan Vatahov, 'US Recognises 'Functioning' Economy', *The Sofia Echo,* 6 March 2003, viewed 5 May 2014, http://sofiaecho.com/2003/03/06/630528_us-recognises-functioning-economy.

135. Newnham, ''Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?'' U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition', p. 188.

136. Ibid., p. 187.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid., pp. 186, 89. Anders Wivel and Kajsa Ji Noe Oest, 'Security, Profit or Shadow of the Past? Explaining the Security Strategies of Microstates', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2010, pp. 429-453, p. 446. Atsushi Tago, 'Is There an Aid-for-Participation Deal?: US Economic and Military Aid Policy to Coalition Forces (Non)Participants', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,* Vol. 8, No. 3, 2008, pp. 379-98, p. 380.

139. For example: "The US wished to put 14,000 troops into Jordan, only 5,000 were eventually allowed due to internal Jordanian domestic unease. Similarly Egypt, while formally opposing the war, gave

diplomacy, as the denial grand strategy schema suggests, served the interests of the most powerful state. This approach though was at variance to the grand strategy objective of regime change where such institutions under the cognitive frame would have been used to advance and support the desired social change in Iraq. Regional state and societal support for the Iraqi war's regime change objectives may have considerably assisted in giving a sense of legitimacy to the occupation.

Instead the denial type grand strategy approach that guided American diplomacy was mirrored regionally, especially by the Gulf States. From the start, regional nations where ambivalent about regime change in Iraq as many were authoritarian regimes themselves and fretted that if Iraq succeeded their own populations might grow restive.[140] Under diplomatic pressure regional states acted to sustain their relationships with America, granted military basing and overflight rights, and provided some support to combat operations. This did not though imply their support for the reform goal; Jon B. Alterman commented:

> these governments supported U.S. efforts in order to preserve the status quo—a weak and self-absorbed Iraq—rather than impose a new one. These governments have little interest in catastrophic failure in Iraq, but their interest in the broader goals that the U.S. government… articulated has been similarly limited. …the leaders of the countries neighbouring Iraq…supported U.S. war efforts as a quest for stability, not radical positive change.[141]

Reflecting their denial grand strategy type underpinnings, American diplomatic efforts were more muscular than calculated to enlist regional support for reform of Iraqi political norms. Rhetoric by U.S. government officials spoke of the post-Saddam Iraq being an exemplar to the region that as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said would: "cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, but across the whole Arab world…."[142] This was echoed by prominent individuals with ex-CIA Director James Woolsey declaring:

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access to the Suez canal and accepted US cruise missile strikes fired from the Red Sea." Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, pp. 110-12.

140. Jon B. Alterman, 'Not in My Backyard: Iraq's Neighbors' Interests', *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 149-60.

141. Jon B. Alterman, *Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear*; Washington: United States Institute of Peace August 2007, p. 6.

142. Bill Keller, 'The Sunshine Warrior', *The New York Times Magazine,* 22 September 2002, pp. 50-54, p. 52.

> As we move toward a new Middle East …we will make a lot of people very nervous. And we will scare, for example, the Mubarak regime in Egypt, or the Saudi royal family, thinking about this idea that these Americans are spreading, of democracy in this part of the world. They will say, you make us very nervous, and our response should be, good. We want you nervous.[143]

In Europe, similarly denial grand strategy type impulses motivated American diplomacy and its use to support the military instrument. The U.S. sought specific NATO assistance to be given to particular regional nations. While NATO had operated throughout its history on a consensus basis, Nicolas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, now demanded that NATO comply with these U.S. desires.[144]

The use of the informational instrument was perceived in the grand strategy as a secondary matter. There were concerns over the legality under international law of the war given its preventative nature.[145] To offset this, an effort was made to obtain U.N. approval for the invasion and thereby establish the war as legitimate if not strictly legal although, in agreement with the denial grand strategy schema, the U.N. granting of approval was not seen by the Bush administration as essential.[146] The informational campaign stressed widely accepted, but unverified, beliefs about the existence, scale and future potential use of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability.[147]

In early November 2002 the U.S. received unanimous U.N. Security Council support for Resolution 1441 that called on Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations or face serious consequences. However, a second resolution introduced by the U.S. in February 2003 calling for the Council to authorize military action against Iraq was eventually withdrawn in March amidst acrimonious debate. This setback had a significant impact on the international community's perception of the legitimacy of the

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143. Seth Leibsohn et al., *Transcript: America, Iraq and the War on Terrorism*, The Claremont Institute, Claremont, 2 April 2003, viewed 3 November 2011, http://www.claremont.org/projects/pageID.2499/default.asp
144. Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, p. 113.
145. David Krieger, 'The War in Iraq as Illegal and Illegitimate', in Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.), *Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges*; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006, pp. 381-96, pp. 383-86.
146. Charlotte Ku, 'Legitimacy as an Assessment of Existing Legal Standards: The Case of the 2003 Iraq War', in Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.), *Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges*; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006, pp. 397-412, pp. 397-99.
147. Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*, pp. 416-22.

invasion but as the denial grand strategy schema would suggest had only a limited effect on the grand strategy's implementation.

Considering the approaches used concerning building power, the grand strategy was both one of choice and near term. In agreement with the cognitive frame, the U.S. adopted a near-term market approach. This approach was nested within, and conformed to, the approach of the wider Global War on Terror (GWOT) grand strategy.

Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, the administration had sharply reduced taxes and increased subsidies as part of a plan to address sluggish economic growth. After the attacks this general approach continued with Republican House majority leader Tom DeLay declaring that "…nothing is more important in the face of war then cutting taxes."[148] The tax cuts did stimulate economic growth as their advocates predicted but this was insufficient to offset the loss of Federal Government revenue caused by the tax cuts.[149] The grand strategy was accordingly funded through deficit financing using domestic and international bonds.[150] Of this, some 40% of the grand strategy's financing is estimated to come through the sale of U.S. Government bonds to foreign governments and international companies.[151] The government used an accommodational strategy that extended existing polices but when this proved insufficient complemented this with an international strategy. The success of the international strategy meant a more problematic restructural approach was not needed.

The GWOT involved significant military deployments of volunteer professional soldiers however the U.S. Armed Forces could not meet the demands for the required logistic and security functions. Extensive use was made of private military companies to support and supplement deployed U.S. military personnel; many of the contractor

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148. *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 108th Congress First Session April 30, 2003 to May 13, 2003 Volume 149 Part 8,* Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2003, p. 10080.
149. George W. Bush, *Economic Report of the President*; Washington: United States Government Printing Office, February 2003, pp. 56-57.
150. Marc Labonte and Mindy Levit, *CRS Report for Congress: Financing Issues and Economic Effects of American Wars*; Washington: Congressional Research Service, July 29, 2008, p. CRS-16. Steven Kosiak disputes this in holding that the grand strategy is funded out of the total Federal Government budget and thus it is impossible to say which portion is specifically funded by deficit-financing. If this argument is accepted, it would nevertheless still be correct to state that the GWOT grand strategy was unaffordable without deficit-financing. See: Steven M. Kosiak, *Cost of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Other Military Operations through 2008 and Beyond*; Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008, p. 67.
151. Kosiak, *Cost of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Other Military Operations through 2008 and Beyond,* p. 63.

staff employed where non-American nationals.[152] The GWOT grand strategy, which grew to include the occupation of Iraq, would have been impossible without this large-scale use of domestic and international private military companies and personnel. Richard Fontaine and John Nagl observed that:

> By 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that at least 190,000 contractors were working in the Iraqi theatre on U.S.-funded contracts, pushing the ratio of contractors to members of the U.S. military to greater than 1:1.[153]

The use of contractors was mirrored by the extensive use of commercial industry for material. In the main this was provided by American sources, although some specialist equipment and components were sourced internationally.

The motivation of American society to support the grand strategy was initially provided by the 9/11 attacks when authoritative Government leaders and officials determined that Al-Qaeda located in Afghanistan was responsible and posed a continuing danger of catastrophic terrorist attacks. The more difficult task was the securitization of Iraq sufficient to justify invasion. While several explanations were proffered, the claim that Iraq sought Weapons of Mass Destruction and might have ties to Al-Qaeda formed the core of the securitization argument.[154] This was an argument based not on any specific Iraqi action, but rather on the potential risks to individual security and prosperity of any U.S. inaction. President Bush in 2002 declared:

> America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof - the smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. … As Americans, we want peace - we work and sacrifice for peace - and there can be no peace if our security depends on the will and whims of a ruthless and aggressive dictator. I am not willing to stake one American life on trusting Saddam Hussein.[155]

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152. David Isenberg, *Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy*, PRIO Report 1/2009; Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2009, pp. 19-20, 29-30.
153. Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, *Contracting in Conflicts: The Path to Reform*; Washington: Center for a New American Security, June 2010, p. 11.
154. Andrew Flibbert, 'The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War', *Security Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 2, 2006, pp. 310-52, p. 316.
155. President George W. Bush address at the Cincinnati Museum Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 in John W. Dietrich (ed.), *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary*, Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 2005, p. 92.

This argument was greatly assisted by engendering a strong sense of urgency through creating a sense of impeding crisis, Steven Metz writes: "This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis—a very high threat and limited decision time."[156] Deliberately shifting to a crisis decision mode though noticeably strengthened the authority accorded to high-level Bush administration officials and in setting tight parameters minimized public and elite debate over the given rationale or the alternatives.[157] Input legitimacy was relied upon.

The grand strategic synthesis was appropriate for the grand strategy actually implemented, removing the Ba'athist regime, but would probably have been unsuitable for achieving the desired grand strategic outcome of reforming Iraqi's social rules. The Iraq regime change grand strategy was envisaged as short term, with most reconstruction costs to be met by the Iraq state itself through oil sales on the global market. Those resource costs to the U.S. that arose where seen as being able to be easily met using mainly domestic and international bonds, the extensive use of short-term contract staff in limited duration organizations such as the OHRA, and through accessing material needs from American commercial companies.

The American grand strategy for regime change in Iraq succeeded brilliantly in overthrowing Saddam Hussein but failed to quickly replace the regime. Widespread looting and crime erupted immediately after the regime fell. U.S. troop numbers were adequate to overthrow Saddam but were both insufficient to prevent this civil disturbance or arranged in place to undertake protective functions. Accompanying this upheaval, the institutions of the Iraqi state collapsed, the OHRA quickly proved inadequate, the U.S. decided not to install favoured Iraqi exiles as an interim government and a hastily devised Coalition Provisional Authority was put in place to administer a country seemingly on the verge of falling apart. Clearly, the regime change grand strategy had failed to create a new Iraq " based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy" as it was intended and designed to.[158]

Ambassador Paul Bremer, the head of the new CPA, quickly developed a new grand strategy to address the now well-evident failings of the Iraq regime change grand

156. Metz, *Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Removing Saddam Hussein by Force*, p. 48.
157. Ibid., pp. 47-53.
158. Gordon and Trainor, *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama*, p. 8.

strategy.[159] He envisaged a seven step, 540-day,'outside-in' approach that would progressively put in place a new Iraqi-led government.[160]

Using the cognitive frame helps an understanding to be gained of the Iraq War regime change grand strategy design, its general logic, and the circumstances that lead to eventual failure. In this, it is important to note that the cognitive frame is not intended to be a robust explanatory device; moreover others using different frameworks may validly highlight other aspects.

The cognitive frame suggests a reform grand strategy in those circumstances where changing the social norms of a state or other entity is sought. While the American Iraq regime change grand strategy had a social norm changing agenda, policymakers used the cognitive frame's denial grand strategy schema to frame their diagnosis and analysis. In doing this, there was no consideration about the need to change the social rules of the society, its beliefs, norms or identities. The denial grand strategy schema is based on realism, a materialist theory not an ideational one, and thus such aspects were completely outside the policymakers' cognitive frames.

In the denial grand strategy schema used by policymakers, American military power was in any relative material power comparison overwhelming and thus would of course dominate post-war Iraq ensuring that the country would be largely stable during the reconstruction phase, allowing U.S. forces to start withdrawing after only a few months. Such assumptions fitted the logic of the denial grand strategy schema's offensive realism underpinnings but in this case the paradigm was being misapplied. Realism and the grand strategic goal of regime change are inherently mismatched; Steve Yetiv writes that:

> Regime change policy…aims, in addition to eliminating the regime, to reshape society, to alter the ideological foundations and orientation of the people. [The realist] balance of power does not include these motivations….If realism and the balance of power stand for anything, it is not to meddle in the internal affairs of other states. Regime change, especially when achieved through military

159. Ibid., pp. 8-15.
160. Bremer 's 'outside-in' approach was derived from a 2003 RAND study into earlier American experiences of nation-building after wars. See Note 19 in ibid., p. 702.

invasion, blatantly violates that core notion.[161]

The denial grand strategy schema's notions were appropriate for the overthrow of the Saddam regime. Indeed, the cognitive frame would recommend using a denial grand strategy if the objective was solely to stop Saddam undertaking some action or simply continuing in power. A denial grand strategy though is inappropriate for the more expansive regime replacement policy where reform of social rules is sought. This cognitive frame insight was usefully tested in the Iraq regime change case. Sir Lawrence Freedman remarks that:

> There were two distinctive influences on the U.S. conduct of the war in Iraq….the first was about removing the regime, the second about inserting a new regime. If the two concerns had been mutually supportive, together there would have been about regime change. Unfortunately, the opposite was the case.[162]

The cognitive frame would suggest that policymakers in applying the incorrect grand strategy schema for the desired objective of a new Iraq "based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy" should have produced an unsatisfactory diagnosis and analysis. The consequent failure of the American Iraq regime change grand strategy is in retrospect neither unsurprising nor unexpected. Moreover, and importantly, the grand strategy failed in the manner that the cognitive frame would suggest.

In considering the concept of grand strategy as a policymaking methodology, the Iraq regime change grand strategy is an example of a grand strategy focused on a single state within a broader, overarching global grand strategy as discussed in Chapter 2. In a similar manner to the European Recovery Program regional grand strategy examined in an earlier case study, this nesting occurred retrospectively. The Iraq regime grand strategy was approved for serious development beginning in late September 2001 however, it was another year until the overarching global grand strategy, the 2002 National Security Strategy, was formalized.[163] While the Iraq regime change grand strategy focused solely on a single country and the overarching 2002 National Security Strategy grand strategy took a global perspective, some ideas from the Iraqi grand

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161. Yetiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005,* p. 114.
162. Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*, p. 423.
163. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*; Washington: The White House, September 2002. Hal Brands, *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, pp. 154-155.

strategy appeared to informed the later, particularly democracy promotion as a way to permanently address potential and real threats.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has applied the grand strategy cognitive frame to three specific case studies: the British Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1992-1999, and the U.S. Iraq regime change grand strategy 2001-2003. The British grand strategy sought to change the social rules of Malayan society and build an internal order around a desired identity; a near term managerial state domestic base approach was used. The landmine campaign grand strategy aimed to create a global international order where all shared a norm that outlawed the production, distribution or use of antipersonnel landmines; the grand strategy used a near-term market state domestic base approach. The U.S. Iraq regime change grand strategy sought the adoption by Iraq of liberal democratic norms. The grand strategy used a near-term market approach albeit in this case the object of the grand strategy was intended to finance most of its own reform. In all three cases the application of the cognitive frame helped in gaining an appreciation of the design, operation and logic of a reform grand strategy.

The discussion of the three case studies also provided generic knowledge useful to policymakers about grand strategies in general and engagement grand strategies in particular. In terms of general knowledge, the failure case of the U.S. Iraq regime change grand strategy highlighted that trying to achieve an objective through using an inappropriate type of grand strategy is unlikely to lead to success. The three types of grand strategy each have their own limited sets of international orders they are matched with. Trying to cross these boundaries in terms of seeking an international order associated with a particular grand strategy type and then using a different grand strategy type to try to achieve this outcome appears imprudent.

The British Malayan Emergency grand strategy also provided general generic knowledge in reinforcing comments made earlier that grand strategies need continual monitoring and refinement. In the British case, two other grand strategy types were first implemented and evaluated before the reform type was finally settled upon. Even then the chosen grand strategy was kept under review and continually improved to enhance

its effectiveness and efficiency. To reiterate, a grand strategy is not a set-and-forget approach.

The case studies further highlighted specific generic knowledge about the reform type of grand strategy. The success of this type of grand strategy requires the existing ideas to collapse due to some external shock and for desired new ones to replace them. As the ICBL case showed, the initial collapse phase may be achieved fortuitously by some other event but, while this may substantially reduce overall resource and time demands, the replacement ideas and the plan to have them accepted should be already developed. The alternative is to deliberately engineer the shock however, as the British example in Malaya showed this can be a costly, difficult and time-consuming business. The advantage in this though is that the ideational replacement program can then be accurately timed and therefore more efficiently implemented. Choosing between these two alternatives may depend on the resources the organization implementing the grand strategy can command and the size of the targeted advocate group that needs persuading. Those organizations with few resources and a large target group may need to be ready to exploit external shocks whereas those with large resources and a smaller target group may prefer to be proactive.

The case studies also reveal some shortcomings in this type of grand strategy. Deliberately changing the ideas of a selected target audience requires suitable and timely access to them. The British achieved this through resettling several hundred thousand rural Chinese close to Malayan towns. The ICBL achieved a similar outcome by being granted regular access to their carefully chosen decision makers working within existing structures and institutions albeit this was difficult or impossible in some authoritarian states. Given suitable access is crucial to success, not all circumstances will lend themselves to the use of reform grand strategies.

A related matter is that the target audience at least initially may not be large. In the early stages the focus is principally on influencing potential ideational advocates within the broad target group who are prominent and authoritative in terms of the idea being advanced and who are able to use their organizational platform to give the new ideas credence and clout. This will probably be in most cases a relatively small number of people. While this makes a reform grand strategy more practical than may at first be thought, determining who these key potential ideational advocates are requires deep

insight into the broader target group. This intelligence may be problematic to achieve in some situations.

In considering the three grand strategy types, a reform grand strategy is the most dependent on the other party to succeed. While a denial grand strategy can simply use force to coerce others, and an engagement grand strategy can make use of another's pre-existing ambitions, it is more difficult to change people's minds. For this, there needs to be a certain degree of acceptance of the need for change and agreement with the new ideas. As discussed, this issue extends deeper when issues of adequate and timely access and the need for deep knowledge of the broad target group are considered. The success of a reform grand strategy very much depends on adequate interaction between the parties involved and on the receptiveness of the target group.

PART FOUR: EVALUATION

In this section the application of the cognitive frame to the case studies is reviewed and to ascertain if the thesis's aims have been met.

Chapter 9 reviews the theoretical aspects and the empirical results to substantiate the overall utility of the suggested grand strategy diagnostic process. While the process has strengths, there are some limitations and shortcomings. There is also a significant methodological limitation in that grand strategies have been classified according to a typology rather than a typological theory. The chapter determines that the principal alternative approach to the pluralist approach used in the diagnostic process may be analytic eclecticism but this has several shortcomings when used for the purpose envisaged. The chapter determines that, on balance, a diagnostic process has been developed that could help bring International Relations knowledge into the policy analysis phase of policymaking in a structured, logical and useful manner. George's work on improving policymaking seems usefully extended. Moreover, the work appears a useful complement to the alternative oft-used prescriptive approach currently used to assist policymakers formulating grand strategies. The aim of the thesis appears realised.

Chapter 10 includes a brief overview, a discussion of further potential applications of the diagnostic process, some theoretical implications and some areas of possible further research.

CHAPTER 9: DOES THE GRAND STRATEGY DIAGNOSTIC PROCESS WORK?

In the theory section of this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), a grand strategy cognitive frame was developed. In Chapters 6,7 and 8, the frame was applied to several historical case studies for assessment purposes and to develop the necessary accompanying generic knowledge. The cognitive frame and the associated generic knowledge together comprise a diagnostic process that policymakers can use when formulating grand strategies.

With the case studies complete, the assessment of the full diagnostic process now needs to be undertaken. Specific assessment criteria for this task were laid out earlier in Chapter 1. While there may be circumstances for which the diagnostic process is well suited, it is to be expected that in certain situations the process will be less efficacious. Furthermore, there may be expected to be some limitations inherent in the diagnostic process's design and some areas of apparent inconsistency. In undertaking this assessment, the purpose for which the process has been designed remains important. George saw the diagnostic process as:

> an *aid, not a substitute for policy analysis and for judgments that decision makers make when choosing a policy.* Even the best theoretical conceptualization of a problem and the most highly developed generic knowledge of a strategy cannot substitute for competent analysis by governmental specialists who must consider whether some version of a strategy is likely to be viable in the particular situation at hand. …for policymakers to judge what action to take, they must take into account a number of considerations that cannot be anticipated or addressed in generic articulations of strategies.[1]

The diagnostic process is only intended to help policymakers structure their initial thinking about grand strategic alternatives. The policymaker must still apply context and judgment to the diagnostic process to determine sensible, practical options. In evaluating the process's overall suitability this chapter appraises the case study results against the four criteria laid out in the Introduction, examines the limitations that

1. Emphasis in the original. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 276.

the case study application revealed and that arise from the research methodology used, and potential alternative theoretical approaches.

CASE STUDIES APPRAISAL AND REVIEW

The first assessment criterion outlined in Chapter 1 involved determining if the three ideal types of grand strategies - denial, engagement and reform - were recognizable in the real world. The cognitive frame was applied to three cases of each of the deductively determined three types of grand strategy. In each circumstance the frame was both able to be applied and proved useful in highlighting important aspects that may have been overlooked otherwise. The three ideal types could be found in the real world beyond the abstract analysis although, in this, the nine case studies provided only a small sample size as discussed in Chapter 1. While perhaps surprising, there is no comparable model suitable for the purpose of analysing grand strategies using a common framework. The cognitive frame developed in this thesis now potentially allows sensible and informed like-for-like comparisons to be made between historical examples.

The second criterion in the appraisal process was to determine if the cognitive frame could illustrate the scope of the different types of grand strategies, their dynamics and outcomes. The application of the cognitive frame to the nine case studies involving the three types of grand strategy did usefully reveal the scope of each type, its requirements and demands. The cognitive frame however, is a static device that in some respects offers only a snapshot view. The use of case studies importantly allowed observation of the operation of several grand strategies through time, providing an important temporal perspective and allowing the dynamic nature of the grand strategy methodology to be better appreciated. This dynamic nature was well illustrated in the British Malayan Emergency grand strategy case study where the type of grand strategy in use changed three times as the situation developed and became progressively better understood. In a similar manner, but within the grand strategy in use, the British Appeasement grand strategy of the 1930s further showed that the building power approach being employed might also evolve as circumstances change. Beyond addressing the appraisal criteria, this part of the case study process was additionally important in being used to develop the necessary generic knowledge that is needed to complement the cognitive frame when it is being employed by policymakers.

The third criterion was that the case studies, in supplementing the theoretical cognitive frame with practical examples, should demonstrate how great powers, lesser powers and non-state actors use grand strategies instrumentally as a way to achieve their objectives. A range of actors were examined varying between great powers to non-state actors including one comprising unpaid civil society volunteers. The three that applied particularly to the use by a great power of grand strategy - the U.S. grand strategy to revitalize Western Europe 1947-1952, the U.S. Iraq War grand strategy 1991-1992 and the U.S. Iraq Regime Change grand strategy 2001-2003 - spanned more than half a century and were in a way an unremarkable demonstration. These were most-likely cases that should and did readily demonstrate how great powers use grand strategies instrumentally as a way to try achieve their objectives.

The more demanding cases were the non-state actors who are seen by some as inherently unable to employ a grand strategy. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam grand strategy 1990-2002 though illustrated a grand strategy being used by a non-state actor over a significant period. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) grand strategy 1992-1999 further revealed that a diverse grouping of non-state actors working together could employ a grand strategy approach to successfully achieve global social norm change. The spread of examples both supplemented the theoretical cognitive frame with practical examples and demonstrated how a wide range of actors can use grand strategies instrumentally.

The inclination is to therefore conclude that the cognitive frame is valid for any scale of actor between the two extremes of superpower American and non-state actor ICBL. In this though, while other case studies analysed grand strategies used by USSR and Great Britain, only Iran unarguably falls into the lesser power category. There must accordingly be some doubts that the third criterion has been completely met.

The final appraisal criterion was for the case studies to confirm that the overall diagnostic process developed meets the requirements George laid out in *Bridging the Gap* and detailed in Chapter 1.[2] This list includes the diagnostic process providing a basic framework for understanding the nature and general requirements for designing a successful strategy, identifying the critical variable-components of the strategy;

2. This listing is complied from George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, pp. 37-43, 117-25.

identifying the general logic associated with successful employment of the strategy; incorporating variables over which policymakers have some leverage and lastly being plausibile.

The application of the cognitive frame to the nine case studies demonstrated to some degree of confidence that George's comprehensive and to some extent overlapping requirements have been met. In each case study the first four requirements were established by the ability to understand the design, logic and operation of the three different types of grand strategy when related to the diverse historical examples. The diagnostic process requirement of being plausible is more subjective but, with the process meeting George's other requirements and the other three appraisal criteria used in this thesis, seems credible.

George also set out requirements for generic knowledge including that it should identify the circumstances and conditions that favour a strategy being successful and those that may lead to its failure, and be in the form of conditional generalizations. The former requirement seems addressed by the generic knowledge developed from the case studies for each type of strategy; specific circumstances have been determined that favour a strategy being successful or unsuccessful. The later requirement is more technical. George considered conditional generalizations were: "more useful in policymaking then generalizations that merely assert a probabilistic relationship between two variables without identifying the conditions under which the relationship does and does not hold."[3] The generic knowledge developed is considered to meet this requirement.

George's final requirement was that the diagnostic process should identify any cases of equifinality, where the same outcome may be reached by several different ways. The case studies did not specifically address this requirement as the ways of the three different types of grand strategy are distinctly different. It seemed improbable that the same outcome, the same international order, could be achieved using two or more of the types of grand strategy. This may be strictly true but considering the matter abstractly rather than using historical case studies, a circumstance where equifinality could occur has been tentatively identified.

3. Ibid., p. 120.

Thinking abstractly, there appears no reason why, in order to stop a state achieving a desired objective, an engagement or reform grand strategy could not also be used. In the case of an engagement grand strategy, the initiating state could work with and through like-minded domestic groups within another state to bring change in the original state's social purpose and stop the undesired actions being undertaken. Similarly in the case of a reform grand strategy, the initiating state could concentrate on changing the social rules of the other state in such a way as to prevent the undesired actions.

The difference in the three alternative grand strategies would then be the 'way' the outcome was achieved: either exploiting a relative material power advantage in the denial type, using another state's domestic interest groups to advance a desired social purpose in the engagement type or favourably changing another state's social rules in the reform type. Importantly, as well as ways, the international orders each alternative type of grand strategy would seek to create in this circumstance would also be distinctly different. While it may be that the denial objective can be meet by the other types of grand strategies, this is only true at one level as the ends achieved would vary across grand strategy type.

The matter of equifinality seems resolved albeit from a policymaking perspective this may be of little practical import. The three types of grand strategy do not at the implementation level produce the same ends or use the same ways. Moreover, the reform and engagement types cannot be subsumed into solely the denial type while this example of equifinality is not true of reversed circumstances. A denial grand strategy is not appropriate to change a state's social purpose or social rules. Material power works upon certain elements of a target state in a manner that does not lead to change in a state's social purpose or a society's social rules, as the British appeasement and Iraq regime change grand strategy case studies support. On balance, this specific case of equifinality case seems able to be discounted for practical policymaking purposes.

The four appraisal criteria were in the main met. In applying the cognitive frame to the case studies however, some additional important features were noted in both the nature of grand strategy and in the internal logic of the frame itself.

The denial grand strategy type seems distinctive in that the state taking such action is in some respects independent of the other entity. Both engagement and reform grand strategies rely on the involvement of those within the other states. A denial grand strategy though being based on relative power can be implemented with little support or participation from those on whom the grand strategy is focused. The implementing state can choose and undertake this course of action without regard to others' concerns or wishes.

In considering means, the three types of grand strategies examined in the case studies all used the four broad categories of diplomatic, informational, military and economic. The case studies though revealed that while the same instruments were used, the manner and the purpose for which the instruments were used notably differed. A state could use its economic instruments to gain a relative power advantage over another state when employing a denial grand strategy, or if using an engagement grand strategy to strengthen or weaken another state's domestic interest groups, or if using a reform grand strategy to carefully shape another's beliefs, norms or identities through reinforcing or weakening certain ideas held by ideational leaders or the wider society.

Even so, while in each case study the same four instruments were used, the theoretical underpinnings of each type of grand strategy tend to privilege particular instruments making these seem first amongst equals. For denial grand strategies military power is stressed, for engagement grand strategies economic power is emphasized, while for reform grand strategies informational power stands out. The particular mix of instruments used in a situation though will be driven by the context. While a theoretical construct may favour one instrument, it is for the policy maker to determine if this is the most appropriate for the specific circumstance.

In term of the cognitive frame's internal logic, the failure cases were instructive. The cognitive frame is explicitly structured on the proposition that the three grand strategy types should be considered as mutually exclusive, that is that the goal sought can only be met by one particular type of grand strategy the specific paradigm it is paired with. This was at least partly tested in the U.S. Iraq Regime Change grand strategy 2001-2003 case study and the British Appeasement grand strategy 1934-1939 case study.

In the U.S. Iraq regime change case, the cognitive frame suggested that the reform objective was matched with the wrong grand strategy type and should fail in a particular way: the grand strategy should be successful in overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime but fail to replace it with a new government considered legitimate by the Iraqi people. This expectation was met. In the British case, an attempt was made to use a combination of denial and engagement grand strategies to achieve the objective sought. The result as the cognitive frame might suggest was grand strategic incoherence with the instruments of national power used in a discordant manner.

These two expected failures at the cognitive frame's macro-level was replicated at the micro-level in the remaining failure case study. In the USSR détente denial grand strategy case study, the order chosen could not be achieved through using the instruments of national power in a way that was more appropriate to a different type of order - even though the order was within the same type of grand strategy. The desired concert of power order called for the states involved to feel reasonably secure and to have their systemic roles recognized and not threatened. The USSR though stressed rapidly expanding military power in a manner more suitable to rushing to create either a balance of power order appropriate to a dangerous international situation or, even more worrying to the Americans, a hegemonic order. The large-scale, seemingly open-ended rapid arms build-up worked against the Soviet intent of creating a concert of power order, as applying the cognitive frame to this situation may have suggested.

The Soviet building power approach was moreover poor. The cognitive frame would advise a long-term managerial approach for the circumstances the USSR encountered and this was indeed adopted for most of society and the economy. A damaging level of incoherence though was created when the military build-up was undertaken using a short-term managerial approach. This incoherence simply expedited the overall grand strategy's overall failure.

Importantly however, the proposition that the three grand strategy types should be considered as mutually exclusive has not been adequately proven. Only three cases were examined; there may be other cases that could disprove the supposition. This is an area requiring further analysis using a broader range of cases.

The cognitive frame has been applied to the nine case studies and in general seems to have demonstrated satisfactory results. The frame met the four criteria albeit with some doubts.

Secondary Outcomes

In the development of the cognitive frame some further secondary matters were highlighted.

In devising the cognitive frame it was necessary to comprehensively consider the concept of grand strategy in a manner seldom done. Most grand strategy works advocate a particular grand strategy rather than examine the concept in depth. In so doing it became apparent that, while many states and organisations intentionally or unintentionally use a grand strategy methodology to address particular problems, there are other methodologies that are equally valid and sometimes used. Most entities indeed seem to use a variety of methodologies including risk management and opportunism. Moreover, a potential new approach termed orienting principles has also recently emerged.[4] The factors and considerations determining the correct mix of methodologies for states and organisations is though uncertain and indeed grand strategy may be more rarely used then this thesis implicitly suggests.

In this regard, it is important to consider that the variety of methodologies used may have broader implications than is at first apparent. With the modern concept of grand strategy arising from the experiences of total war, it is not surprising that totalitarianism as a form of governance is sometimes associated with this methodology. Certainly the use of grand strategy suggests an activist state that both deeply penetrates and controls a society. Even so, some consider grand strategy may potentially be more compatible with representative democracies than some other techniques such as risk management.[5] The methodological mix used may seem an esoteric matter but potentially could either damage or helpfully reinforce forms of democratic governance.

In a different matter, in taking a policymaking perspective concerned with implementing grand strategies over an extended period, it was realised that little thought

4. Max G. Manwaring, *Ambassador Stephen Krasner's Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy (and Military Management) - Responsible Sovereignty*, Advancing Strategic Thought Series; Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012.
5. Edmunds, 'British Civil–Military Relations and the Problem of Risk', pp. 268-72.

had been given to the life cycle of a grand strategy. Some examine how a particular grand strategy was devised while many more analyse whether success or failure resulted. These efforts though usually take a 'snapshot in time' approach rather than discuss the whole life cycle from birth to death. This thesis has developed a certain perspective on the life cycle including drawing on Clausewitz and micro-economic ideas. While a seemingly simple concept, it cuts to important matters of how to monitor the success and suitability of a grand strategy as it runs over time. Such ongoing assessment is an area of some difficulty and rarely studied.[6] Moreover, it also relates to the matter discussed earlier about varieties and mixes of methodologies. When a grand strategy terminates what should succeed it? Should this be another grand strategy or a different methodology?

In discussing success, the manner in which the cognitive frame was devised connects the ends of grand strategy to the ways this is achieved. In so doing it was necessary to attempt to find an approach to describe success that was generic and broad while at the same time sufficiently precise to be able to provide meaningful policy guidance. In the thesis success is defined as the grand strategy achieving one of eight types of order based on International Relations theoretical thinking. Using International Relations thinking is this manner is a normative position that then significantly influences the use of the cognitive frame. International relations perspectives though appear the most appropriate and suitable. There is some work on success in war but this by its intent focuses on military victory and has limited applicability across the full range of grand strategies this thesis addresses.[7]

COGNITIVE FRAME AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The case studies demonstrate that in considering grand strategy alternatives that the decision on the type of order desired is important. In some discussions of grand strategy, enduring interests or values are considered central and indirectly this is also true of this thesis's conceptualization of grand strategy. The key issue in the conceptualization used here though, is the translation of the broadly stated and less

6. A notable exception is: Scott Sigmund Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War*; Binghamton: Yale University Press, 1997.
7. Examples include: Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein*. William C. Martel, *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy*, 2nd edn., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

tangible national interests and values initially into specific goals, and then into the desired type of order. The cognitive frame forces policymakers to be quite precise about the outcomes they wish to achieve from implementing a grand strategy. If grand strategy tries to impose a preferred state of order on the future, the cognitive frame drives the policymaker to carefully consider this aspect.

In so doing however, a contemporary policymaker's judgment of the desired order to strive for will be influenced by the constraints set by operating within the current liberal world order. Grand strategy is at its core simply structurally situated agency.[8] The extant liberal world order structure will accordingly restrict a contemporary policymaker's choice of order in terms of practical implementation considerations and cognitive constraints. In considering the practicality of implementation, as was discussed earlier in Chapter 5, a grand strategy can work with or against structure. The former alternative has less demanding means requirements, whereas the later is more problematic. Broadly speaking, the less powerful an entity is, the more it may find working with the structure advantageous. In terms of cognitive constraints, the current liberal world order structure has particular normative dimensions that a policymaker will find it difficult to envisage options beyond. In this sense, today's liberal world order may annex a policymaker's imagination reducing the conceivable range of possibilities.

The types of order the diagnostic process is designed to consider are indeed limited and contained well within the boundaries of contemporary international system expectations. The grand strategy diagnostic process may be all about approaches to change the international system, states and societies but the changes envisaged as the case studies reveal are limited. The realist thinker Robert Gilpin usefully devised a typology of macro-changes that encompasses changes in the nature of the actors, in the governance of the system or in interstate processes.[9] Others have also examined such events however, understanding or creating these types of major systemic changes is well

8. Ritter, *PhD Dissertation: Why the Iranian Revolution Was Nonviolent: Internationalized Social Change and the Iron Cage of Liberalism,* p. 14.
9. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, pp. 39-44.

beyond the boundaries of the proposed grand strategy diagnostic process.[10] In this sense, the diagnostic process is one for changing the world a little, not a lot.

There are further limitations inherent in the linking of realism, liberalism and constructivism to particular change goals. This approach is deliberately designed to ensure policymakers do not create incoherent grand strategies through adopting a worldview incompatible with their objectives. This overcomes a problem identified by Katzentein and Sil that: "assumptions deemed valuable for solving the kinds of problems favoured by a given research tradition will be hoisted upon the analysis of other kinds of problems for which these assumptions may not be well suited."[11] However, this intentional constraint also means that the other worldviews are deliberately disregarded in the particular problem being considered. There is a risk that the particular International Relations theory used may focus the policymaker's gaze strongly on one aspect at the expense of other aspects that may be more or equally important in a particular situation.

In this, the absolute success of a theoretical position is less significant. To meet the needs of policymakers in providing useful insights for grand strategy formulation it is not necessarily important that these International Relations theoretical perspectives be fully coherent, consistent or comprehensive. As George noted, "policymakers will settle for more modest levels of precision."[12] The critical information the three theories need to provide are concepts about ways to create change albeit that this is an area where realism, liberalism and constructivism each have some severe deficiencies. Jack Snyder observes that: "none of the three theoretical traditions has a strong ability to explain change…."[13]

This shortcoming though does not remove the value to be gained from providing policymakers with a better way to think about grand strategy. The content of the solution may not be as absolutely robust as ideally sought but the utility of the solution

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10. Major systemic changes are examined in Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*. Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*.
11. Katzenstein and Sil, 'Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism', in Katzenstein (ed.), *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions*; Oxon: Routledge, 2008, pp. 249-85, p. 268.
12. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 279.
13. Jack Snyder, 'One World, Rival Theories', *Foreign Policy*, No. 145, November/ December 2004, pp. 52-62, p. 61.

remains relative to traditional practices such as using analogies. Moreover, in linking the idea of grand strategy directly to the three International Relations perspectives, as these schools develop to better address change these new insights will be more able to be readily incorporated into the grand strategic thinking of policymakers.

In this regard, as noted in Chapter 4 the particular perspectives chosen to be operationalized for the schemas used in the cognitive frame are considered as indicative or illustrative rather then definitive. Other, potentially better perspectives could be determined through a different analysis path or be later developed. The design of the cognitive frame is such though, that it allows other perspectives to be inserted at some later time if improvements appear necessary and sensible.

In considering cognitive frame design, the approach taken in the thesis is similar to that adopted by the positioning school of business management that also seeks to use generic strategies to inform decision makers thinking.[14] In critiquing the positioning school Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand and Joseph Lampel make several criticisms also potentially pertinent to the cognitive frame.[15]

Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel firstly consider the positioning school's approach "has not been wrong so much as narrow" with a focus on quantifiable economic matters rather than also including the political and the social.[16] They secondly hold that the school is biased towards large companies, "the big, the established, and the mature."[17] Thirdly they fret that those following this school will create a strategy and not refine this as circumstances evolve.[18] These criticisms are useful criteria to compare the cognitive frame against. In addressing the first two concerns the grand strategy cognitive frame in being about specific type of strategy is intentionally designed to be

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14. The school's exemplar is considered to be Michael Porter's Competitive Strategy that developed three generic strategies - cost leadership, differentiation, and a market segment focus - that businesses could choose between to survive and prosper. See: Henry Mintzberg et al., *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management*; New York: The Free Press, 1998, pp. 99-106. Michael E. Porter, *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors*; New York: The Free Press, 1980.
15. Their major criticism of the positioning school relates to analysis supplanting the place of the synthesis that underpins making strategy. This criticism is not pertinent to the poliheuristic choice framework, which is only considered as an element of the grand strategy making process, not encompassing the whole process. Context and judgment remain essential additional elements. Mintzberg et al., *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, p. 112.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 114.
18. Ibid., pp. 115-16.

applicable to both a broad set of matters and also to entities of small or large scale. Concerning the third issue, the generic knowledge developed through the case studies has also highlighted that a grand strategy is a dynamic approach and that 'learning' from circumstances is essential. The concerns of Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel over the positioning school of business management seem addressed in the grand strategy cognitive frame but give more confidence in it. However, a final criticism of the positioning school does appear as a definite limitation of the cognitive frame.

The frame deliberately creates distinct and individual grand strategy packages directly related to extant International Relation theoretical perspectives. These packages "are, of course, based on existing behaviours. And so, managers and researchers alike are tempted to become codifiers of the past rather than inventors of the future."[19] The cognitive frame is ultimately based on analysis of historical examples whereas some future grand strategy may be successful precisely because it is new, innovative and does not conform to past instances.

Creating taxonomic categories is inherently dangerous in potentially constraining creative thinking. A new approach that falls outside of the three different types of grand strategy identified may have unique characteristics that a new situation needs. The rejoinder that the cognitive frame remains preferable to the use of historical analogies by policymakers may be valid, but the problem remains. This criticism of potentially constraining creative thinking seems inherent in the approach the cognitive frame takes and must be considered a definite limitation.

There is a further extension of this limitation in that the cognitive frame may appear somewhat deterministic. It may seem that only if a grand strategy can be categorized in the frame's terms is it valid and will succeed.[20] The cognitive frame though is intended simply to inform policymaking; context and judgment need to be carefully applied in all situations. The use of the cognitive frame can at best only improve the probability of policymaking success through helping policymakers avoid cognitive biases in the pre-decisional stage of grand strategy formulation.

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19. Ibid., p. 117.
20. Ibid., p. 118.

The final limitation is intrinsic to the problem of developing a cognitive frame to assist policymakers in structuring their thinking when formulating grand strategies. It is literally ideas all the way down. The frame is an ideational construct used by a policymaker's cognitive processes to devise another ideational construct, a grand strategy. Ideas are by their nature malleable and easily influenced by innumerable factors. The technocratic nature of the conceptual grand strategy cognitive frame should not obscure the reality that all policymakers in using it will be further influenced by self-interest and extraneous political, social and economic considerations. Grand strategy as a methodology may seem a technocratic, politically neutral approach but is as subject to value judgments as many other methodologies are. The cognitive frame is intended to reduce some specific biases caused by human cognitive limitations not create some idealised form of policymaker.

Limitations of the Research

The methodology employed in developing the cognitive frame and tested in the case studies also has some limitations. The grand strategies have been classified according to a typology, but this is not a typological theory. The typology used differentiates amongst grand strategies based on a single independent variable: the goal of the grand strategy. A typology, unlike a typological theory, does not link independent and dependent variables in a causal relationship.[21] This methodological shortcoming makes the grand strategy classification scheme used less reliable.

The use of the case study qualitative analysis approach has some inherent shortcomings that impact determining the robustness of the typology developed. Does the typology really account for all or even the main grand strategy types? The use of nine case studies chosen for variety and diversity using criteria discussed in Chapter 1 suggests so, but this can only be an indication not rigorous confirmation. The small 'n' shortcoming of qualitative analysis remains an issue to being fully confident that the three categories determined are both correct and complete. To address this concern, quantitative, large-n, studies examining the cognitive frame developed in this thesis would appear necessary, although determining a neutral and impartial coding approach might be problematic.

21. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 237-39.

The case study qualitative analysis approach has a further limitation in being used to demonstrate that the cognitive frame fits particular historical circumstances. However, the cognitive frame was deliberately designed to frame grand strategies so verifying that it does is not necessarily proof of its validity in an absolute sense. This thesis, as intended, made a lens through which to conceive grand strategies, but now to say it functions as intended is really only saying that the lens is a lens. This is an inherent limitation in the case study validation methodology but nonetheless limits the robustness of the confirmation process. Extending this, and recalling the discussion in Chapter Three that human beings use cognitive shortcuts that means they 'see' what they both expect to see and want to see, this issue runs much deeper than simply being a deficiency of the case study qualitative analysis approach. This issue of authors finding what is being looked for runs deep and is a difficulty across International Relations works and historical studies.

In giving policymakers a suggested 'better' cognitive frame there are also implicit problems. Firstly, in being unable to positively determine if the cognitive frame is appropriate for all circumstances, use of the cognitive frame in some situations may cause a poorer diagnosis and thus a less efficacious grand strategy than if the cognitive frame had not been used. The focus in this thesis has been on building a diagnostic process and then testing it; the case study methodology used cannot though completely answer if this process is correct at all times.

Secondly, the very building of a cognitive frame may give an unwarranted degree of confidence in the outcomes. The cognitive frame can seem real, but it is not in that sense. Hedley Bull cautioned, albeit about causal models: " The very intellectual completeness and logical tidiness of the model-building operation lends it an air of authority which is often misleading as to its standing as a statement about the real world." [22] The case studies are not a test of completeness as important factors or relationships may have been unintentionally disregarded or less emphasized. The cognitive frame may be useful as far as it goes, but not go far enough, with some unknown critical dimension yet to be incorporated. The case study methodology is unlikely to have revealed an unknown unknown.

22. Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', p. 11.

Thirdly, applying the cognitive frame produced certain results. The case study methodology did not explore if these results could have been obtained by another method. The issue of equifinality was not examined. Another type of cognitive frame may be as, or more, efficacious.

Finally, in the development of the cognitive frame using International Relations theoretical sub-schools there is an undeniable U.S. bias. The International Relations discipline has itself been criticized as being dominated by U.S. thinking with the International Relations thinking of other nations only peripheral.[23] Some argue that a country's International Relations thinking is influenced by the nation's policymaking practices. [24] In this view, U.S. International Relations thinking both reflects the foreign policy needs arising from the state's present unipolar position and is intellectually hegemonic because of the nation's structural placement.[25]

A meta-theoretical examination comparing U.S. International Relations thinking against that of Europe, the largest non-U.S. contributor to the discipline seems to broadly support this contention. U.S. thinking is rationalist and deliberately instrumental with the specific intention of informing policy making, whereas European thinking is reflectivist and asks fundamental questions of self-definition and self-shaping.[26] Given this practice-discipline link, the: "American influence on the discipline is…as a structural constraint defining the boundaries of the discipline and serving as a major source of global theoretical trends."[27]

This weighting towards U.S. thinking may though be both inevitable and appropriate. Inevitable because this thesis makes use of positivist International Relations theories that are dominated by U.S. thinkers and aims to be policy relevant, an

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23. Originally asserted by Hoffman but validated periodically thereafter. Stanley Hoffman, 'An American Social Science: International Relations', *Daedalus,* Vol. 106, No. 3, Summer 1977, 41-60. Steve Smith, 'The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: "Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline"', *International Studies Review* Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer, 2002, pp. 67-85.
24. A recent empirical analysis finds this practice-discipline link seems to hold in non-Western cultures. Xiaoming Huang, 'The Invisible Hand: Modern Studies of International Relations in Japan, China, and Korea', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, No. 10, Vol. 2, 2007, pp. 168-203.
25. Smith, 'The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: "Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline"'.
26. Ole Wæver, *Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New 'Schools' in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core and Periphery*; Montreal: Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 17-20 March, 2004, pp. 11-17.
27. Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch and Anders Wivel, 'Understanding National IR Disciplines Outside the United States: Political Culture and the Construction of International Relations in Denmark', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 7, December 2004, pp. 414-43, p. 414.

area in which U.S. International Relations work is strong. Appropriate because in grand strategy, U.S. practices are conspicuously evident. In having a U.S. bias however, there is a danger of unhelpfully narrowing the perspectives offered policymakers, particularly including in their diagnosing of grand strategic issues that involve non-Western cultures

While this is inevitable in a field so dominated by U.S. theory and practice, it remains a limitation that is potentially significant. The cognitive frame deeply incorporates Western, and especially U.S., International Relations thinking and therefore may be less germane to non-Western cultures. In this though, there do not seem to be any significant non-Western International Relations theories. There are some non-Western contributions but these do not, at least at the moment, meet the criteria of a theory. Instead contemporary work by non-Western scholars appears to mostly involve testing Western theories in non-Western settings.[28] The non-Western case studies that were used in the grand strategy case studies could also be criticized in this way.

Partly countering this stance, Alastair Johnston's seminal study of Chinese Ming dynasty strategic culture suggests – but does not prove - that potentially form may follow function and that contemporary International Relations thinking could be more applicable to other cultures than may at first be thought.[29] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan have also tacitly accepted this position. They see no compelling need for Western International Relations theory to be replaced or substantially supplemented. Instead Acharya and Buzan perceive the solution is in International Relations theory becoming more inclusive, more firmly situated within world history, and more balanced in priorities, perspectives and interests.[30] Jayashree Vivekanandan has taken just such an approach in a recent work using realism, liberalism and constructivism that successfully examined the implementation of Mughal grand strategy.[31] Western International Relations theory may be broadly suitable universally, suggesting the

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28. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, 'Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction', in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010b, 1-25, pp. 10-15.
29. Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 259-66.
30. Acharya and Buzan, 'On the Possibility of a Non-Western International Relations Theory', in Acharya and Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2010a, pp. 221-39, pp. 229-39.
31. Jayashree Vivekanandan, *Interrogating International Relations: India's Strategic Practice and the Return of History*, New Delhi: Routledge, 2011.

cognitive frame may be similarly useful across a wide array of circumstances.

There is a potentially important exception to this judgment. Scholars in China are devoting considerable effort to developing a Chinese theory of International Relations. This may be as result of China's recent geopolitical rise or individuals carving out a distinct intellectual niche to advance their personal ambitions.[32] Either way, a so-called Chinese School is developing although, there is on-going debate about whether this should be a China-specific 'International Relations theory with Chinese characteristics' or a more universally applicable 'Chinese School of International Relations theories'.[33] Whichever prevails, the new Chinese School may offer an alternative to the current U.S. dominance or be able to be combined with the current schools to provide a more balanced foundation.

ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The thesis has developed a diagnostic process built around the use of a cognitive frame. The cognitive frame is considered the "how-the-world works" view that policymakers should use when considering a grand strategic problem. This thesis has argued the position that for ontological reasons the cognitive frame should offer three potential "how-the-world works" images to the policymaker with them choosing one based on the context and their judgment. In this, each "how-the-world works" image is paired with a different grand strategy type.

There is an alternative position, instead of using three theoretical informed images the cognitive frame could use just one. There seem to be at least three ways a useful single image might be created: firstly by combining different theories through using analytic eclecticism, secondly devising one single all-encompassing international relations theory or lastly accepting one existing theory as being a hegemonic paradigm. These three alternatives to taking the thesis's pluralist approach are examined below.

This examination is important for demonstrating theoretical robustness but has a major practical purpose as well. Intuitively, many find the notion of combining

32. Peter M. Kristensen and Ras T. Nielsen, 'Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory: A Sociological Approach to Intellectual Innovation', *International Political Sociology,* Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, pp. 19-40, pp. 22-30.
33. Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan, 'The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations: Comparisons and Lessons', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics,* Vol. 7, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1-46, pp. 15-19.

theoretical perspectives an attractive path when considering real-world problems. Moreover, some may consider merging or combining the three types of grand strategy into one or two types might be sensible. This section discusses why combining theoretical perspectives or merging grand strategy types (effectively the same as merging the theoretical perspectives) developed in this thesis may be unwise.

Analytic eclecticism may be used for many different purposes and in many different circumstances. Indeed, discussions with policymakers educated in International Relations theory indicate they have a predilection towards merging theories in an eclectic manner, although older policymakers less schooled in constructivism seem less inclined to include it, relying simply on combining various types of realism and liberalism. However, in the specific case of a diagnostic process to assist policymakers in the analysis phase of considering grand strategy issues there are some shortcomings.

Analytic eclecticism envisages different theoretical schools being combined in a blend most appropriate for the issue being examined. Leading advocates Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein consider analytic eclecticism an "intellectual stance" with three defining characteristics:

> First, it proceeds…on the basis of a pragmatist ethos, manifested concretely in the search for middle-range theoretical arguments that potentially speak to concrete issues of policy and practice. Second, it addresses problems of wide scope that, in contrast to more narrowly parsed research puzzles designed to test theories or fill in gaps within research traditions, incorporate more of the complexity and messiness of particular real-world situations. Third, in constructing substantive arguments related to these problems, analytic eclecticism generates complex causal stories that forgo parsimony in order to capture the interactions among different types of causal mechanisms normally analysed in isolation from each other within separate research traditions.[34]

These three characteristics suggest that analytic eclecticism might be well suited as an approach to assist policymakers formulating grand strategy. Grand strategies

34. Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions', *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 411-31, p. 412.

inherently are "concrete issues of policy and practice", are problems situated in the messy real world and involve multiple complex interactions. Indeed, if a single grand strategy schema could be devised using analytic eclecticism, this approach would appear potentially more accessible to policymakers than that proposed in this thesis of using three separate schemas that compartmentalize realism, liberalism and constructivism.

The central problem with analytic eclecticism is the problem of incommensurability. Paul Feyerabend held that if two theoretical perspectives were incommensurable they were conceptually incompatible, that is the main concepts of one could "neither be defined on the basis of the primitive descriptive terms of the other, nor related to them via a correct empirical statement."[35] Combining different theoretical traditions with their own unique ontological and epistemological principles can produce a mixture that is internally incoherent and logically inconsistent. Sil and Katzenstein accept this as a valid concern but argue that this "is not insurmountable if proper care is taken to consider the premises upon which specific analytic components are operationalized in relation to the empirical world."[36] The task of avoiding incommensurability is easier the narrower the specific 'concrete' circumstance to which analytic eclecticism is applied, but this approach has several shortcomings in the specific case of aiding policymakers' initial thinking about grand strategic alternatives.

Firstly, a different cognitive frame would need to be constructed for different problems. This is the converse of the approach taken by this thesis where the same frame is used across multiple problems, albeit there are distinct pathways within it. Using analytic eclecticism suggests there would be as many cognitive frames as problems, which would add complexity and impede policymaker cognition. Secondly, there needs to be a comprehensive understanding of the developing problem to ensure the blend of theoretical perspectives crafted using analytic eclecticism is soundly based. For policymakers initially considering a new problem a key difficulty is that the issue is generally confusing, intelligence is patchy and all aspects are not yet realized or understood. Crafting an analytic eclecticism cognitive frame on the basis of incomplete

35. Paul Feyerabend, 'Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism', in Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg (eds.), *Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings*; London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 141-63, pp. 152-53.
36. Sil and Katzenstein, 'Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions', p. 415.

or incorrect information could well lead to a flawed framework being devised that, in shaping perceptions wrongly, may lead to a poor grand strategy. A flawed analytic eclecticism cognitive frame may have the same impact as choosing an incorrect analogy.

Thirdly, the crafting of new cognitive frames is a complex business. Such conceptual development must positively avoid incommensurability as this could lead to the grand strategy devised using a flawed cognitive frame that lacked coherence, and when implemented have unintended and undesired consequences. Devising a robust and validated cognitive frame then is probably not a function busy policymakers could, or should, undertake suggesting that the default position of policymakers is most likely to be to ignore the concept completely. Fourthly, policymakers are time constrained and have a tendency to employ the first apparently suitable heuristic available whether it is satisficing, prospect theory, analogies or some other. Creating and verifying new analytic eclecticism cognitive frames will take some time; by then policymakers could well be beyond the stage in their thinking when cognitive frames can bring benefits. Fifthly, foregoing parsimony may make thinking about the future environment much more difficult; proliferating independent variables can add significant complexity. There is a point where analytic eclecticism could become so rich that it takes an ecological view of a situation and effectively becomes a historical study, rather than remaining usefully reductionist like International Relations theory.

Lastly, analytic eclecticism may not be as all encompassing as the name suggests. Some combinations of theoretical positions may be ruled out on incommensurability grounds irrespective of the issue area they are being used to examine. Katzenstein thinks that while combining constructivism with realism or liberalism can be very useful, "the combination Liberalism-Realism, the public domain favourite, is not coherent because of the conflicting normative positions the combination implies."[37] This suggests that at best, there would be at least two separate theoretical frameworks needed if policymakers sought the insights from both realism and liberalism.

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37. Peer Schouten, 'Theory Talk #15: Peter Katzenstein on Anti-Americanism, Analytical Eclecticism and Regional Powers'; *Theory Talks*, School of Global Studies, Göteberg, 28 August 2008, viewed 5 May 2014, http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/08/theory-talk-15.html.

If analytic eclecticism may have some shortcomings for the specific use envisaged in this thesis, theory synthesis is another approach that aims to eliminate the problem of multiple theoretical schools. Theory synthesis envisages a progressive convergence of International Relations theories into a single grand all-encompassing theory.[38] From a policymaker's viewpoint this would be an easier diagnostic process than the three theories used in the grand strategy cognitive frame. While the International Relations discipline appears a considerable distance from developing such a unified synthesis, there is also some scepticism about the concept's fundamental practicality and a corresponding preference for problem-driven pluralism.[39] Steve Smith writes that:

> The core assumption involved in a commitment to…synthesis is the belief that [this will] lead to better knowledge, even that [this will] lead to the truth about the one world out there. In contrast, much reflectivist work assumes that theories represent different views of different social worlds rather than different views of the same social world, meaning that there can be no neutral ground on which to judge rival accounts… No research agenda can lead to synthesis, simply because different approaches see different worlds….[40]

Convergence may not lead to a synthesis but there is an alternative path where a hegemonic paradigm becomes the 'common sense' of International Relations.[41] Katzenstein and Sil envisage this as: " a single metatheoretical framework [that] generates substantive theories concerning diverse social phenomena, while marginalizing or subsuming the insights offered by pre-existing traditions about many of these same phenomena."[42] In some respects this may be currently happening in the

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38. There is some confusion between analytic eclecticism and synthesis. Some use the term 'synthesis' when they appear to mean analytic eclecticism as this is now defined. For example, in 2003 Andrew Moravcsik considered synthesis had occurred in several instances but these now appear perhaps better described as examples of analytic eclecticism; see Andrew Moravcsik, 'Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not Metaphysical', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003, pp. 131-36, p. 132.
39. Nuno P. Monteiro and Keven G. Ruby, 'IR and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations', *International Theory,* Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009b, pp. 15-48. Nuno P. Monteiro and Keven Ruby, 'The Promise of Foundational Prudence: A Response to Our Critics', *International Theory,* Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009a, pp. 499-512.
40. Steve Smith, 'Dialogue and the Reinforcement of Orthodoxy in International Relations', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003, pp. 141-43, pp. 142-43.
41. Mark I. Lichbach, *Is Rational Choice All of Social Science?*; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003, p. 116.
42. Sil and Katzenstein, 'Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions', p. 415.

progressive development of neoclassical realism that is gradually incorporating constructivist concepts and liberalist domestic variables into a structural realist framework.[43] This suggests that a single broadened neoclassical realist school could in time replace the three separate theoretical schools in the cognitive frame.

While appealing, there seem similar problems to the application of the steadily evolving neoclassical realism to analytic eclecticism in the sense that new variants of neoclassical realism seem tied to certain examples.[44] This may be necessary considering the difficulties of avoiding incommensurability when different schools are merged. While in specific historical case studies such integration might be consistent and coherent, this appears unlikely to be true across all situations.

Moreover, as neoclassical realism broadens to both encompass more insights that other schools may offer and to achieve greater explanatory power, the number of variables and their interdependencies increase. This complexity makes it more difficult to project these variables into the future and make forecasts, and runs the danger of obscuring the principal methodological difference between history and International Relations. Neoclassical realism may be able to generalize about a specific issue in a similar manner to history, but become less convincing in terms of providing universal generalizations applicable to the full range of circumstances that policymakers might use the diagnostic tool to consider.

The approach that this thesis takes is a form of methodological pluralism that uses different theoretical perspectives to answer different questions and which tries to exploit the particular analytic strengths of each theory in performing a diagnosis. This

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43. For a combination of neoclassical realism and constructivist see: Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 'Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit across the Taiwan Strait', in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 99-138. For a combination of neoclassical realism and domestic matters commonly associated with a liberalism see: Norrin M. Ripsman, 'Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups', in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 170-93. See also: Norrin M. Ripsman et al., 'Conclusion: The State of Neoclasscial Realism', in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 280-99, pp. 287-92.

44. For example Layne's development of modified defensive realism "that shades almost imperceptibly into liberal IR theory" appears closely related to the specific case of recommending a particular US grand strategy for managing China. Christopher Layne, 'The Influence of Theory on Grand Strategy: The United States and a Rising China', in Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison, and Patrick James (eds.), *Rethinking Realism in International Relations*; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 103-35, p. 109.

is a commonly held - some say conservative - approach.[45] Seminal realist thinker E.H. Carr held idealism was more useful then realism when considering some situations.[46] In this regard, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson declares that:

> the proper response to methodological diversity is an engaged pluralist attitude that seeks neither to maintain different methodological traditions in their splendid isolation from one another nor to rest content with eclectic assemblage of notions and concepts drawn from different cells in the typology of philosophical – ontological wagers. An engaged pluralism brings to the foreground…contentious conversations….[47]

From a policymaking viewpoint there are gains from having different, opposed perspectives available when diagnosing a problem. Using the cognitive frame forces policymakers to consider all three quite different conceptual grand strategies in searching for the most practical policy goal. Once the most sensible goal had been determined a single perspective is employed to take the deliberations on a potential grand strategy further, but this narrowing down of theoretical viewpoints is done only after applying context and judgment in an examination of all three.

This approach of using three different perspectives lies within a realist philosophy of science that assumes all three theories are discussing the same reality. Ole Waever criticizes this approach in noting that while the theories have shared references they are given different meanings within the different theories and so they do not see the same world; the theories "do not compete for explaining the 'same'."[48] The three theoretical perspectives of realism, liberalism and constructivism are constructed so they discuss three quite different worlds and therefore as Steve Smith writes:

> If our theories so constitute the social world, then there can be no [Kuhnian scientific] foundation for deciding between rival portrayals….[instead]

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45. Steve Smith, 'The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992, pp. 489-506, p. 493.
46. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,* pp. 89-94.
47. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics*; Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, p. 207.
48. Ole Waever, 'The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 149-85, p. 174.

> normative issues are involved in your choice of issue to study, and therefore in your choice of paradigm….[49]

This observation applies to the cognitive frame as choosing a policy objective based on an assessment of the practicality of a potential grand strategy deeply involves taking normative positions. This problem is compounded given that much International Relations theory is infused with normative assumptions. Chris Brown writes that "such recent mainstream concoctions as the 'theory of hegemonic stability' or the neo-realist account of the balance of power…are clearly grounded in normative positions, whether acknowledged or not."[50]

The use of the cognitive frame then must be accepted to involve explicit and implicit normative positions. While this thesis and the International Relations theories used in the cognitive frame may seek to take a positivist stance, the frame is deeply permeated with normative assumptions. This aspect should be borne in mind when it is applied; this is not necessarily arising from a disciplinary failing but is rather inherent in the problem being examined. Colin Wight wrote that: " The subject we study is not wholly empirical, hence philosophy constitutes part of what we study, part of what we are and helps inform what we do."[51]

CONCLUSION

The cognitive frame and the generic knowledge were assessed against four criteria and met with a reasonable level of success. Given this, it may be inferred that a diagnostic process has been devised in the manner George recommended. There are a number of limitations however, that are a product of the design of cognitive frame and the manner in which it was developed. On balance, a diagnostic process comprising a grand strategy cognitive frame and associated generic knowledge has been successfully developed that can potentially help bring scholarly knowledge of International Relations into the policy analysis phase of policymaking in a structured, logical and useful manner. George's work on improving policymaking seems to have been usefully

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49. Smith, 'The Forty Years' Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations', pp. 493-94.
50. Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*; New York: Columbia University Press 1992, p. 3.
51. Colin Wight, 'Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*; London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2002, pp. 23-51, p. 41.

extended. Moreover, the diagnostic process appears to be a suitable complement to the prescriptive approach currently used and discussed in Chapter 1. The aim and intent of the thesis as laid out on Chapter 1 accordingly appears realised.

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION

This thesis's principal contribution has been to develop a grand strategy cognitive frame, and the associated generic knowledge, able to help bring International Relations knowledge into policy analysis in a structured, logical and useful manner. The diagnostic process constructed builds upon the work of Alexander George in particular his recommendation that academic studies could most usefully assist policymakers in the diagnostic phase of policy analysis. In so doing, George's work has been extended in this thesis by firstly developing a diagnostic process for grand strategy rather than as he suggested for numerous individual lower-level strategies, and secondly by making use of greater abstraction to ensure easy policymaker comprehension rather than following George's advice to limit abstraction.

The pertinent literature was reviewed from a policymaking perspective. Grand strategy was found to be a complex term that for the purposes of the thesis could be defined as: *the art of developing and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the order existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities.* In examining how to reduce the human cognitive biases that can distort the thinking of policymakers formulating grand strategies, it was determined that the design of the diagnostic process should be based on the poliheuristic choice architecture. Additionally given the poor results from policymakers using historical analogies for formulating grand strategies, these should be replaced by schemas.

The schemas were envisaged as the lenses through which policymakers should view grand strategic problems. The definition of grand strategy featured two linked functions, 'developing and applying' power and the cognitive frame was developed to reflect this. The creating change schemas drew from International Relations theoretical thinking and were linked to a grand strategy typology of denial, engagement and reform. The perspectives that informed these schemas were: for denial John Mearsheimer's offensive realism,[1] for engagement Andrew Moravcsik's new liberalism[2] and for reform Jeffrey Legro's, Martha Finnemore's and Kathryn Sikkink's

1. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
2. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics'.

agentic constructivism.[3] The building power schemas drew mainly from the work on economic nationalism and economic liberalism by Robert Gilpin.[4]

The cognitive frame was applied to nine selected case studies to both assess the frames against predetermined criteria and to generate the necessary associated generic knowledge. The case studies used varied between those involving great powers, lesser powers and non-state actors, and between having a global, regional or individual actor focus.

The core of the diagnostic process is the cognitive frame developed in Chapters 4 and 5; the associated generic knowledge was discussed in the conclusions of Chapters 6,7 and 8. The conceptual process and its broad sequence of steps is visually represented and summarised in Figure 3 below:

3. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'.
4. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*.



Figure 4. Grand Strategy Cognitive Frame

Having now outlined the thesis's development and outcomes, the reminder of this chapter discusses further potential applications, academic implications arising from the thesis and potential areas for further research.

FURTHER APPLICATIONS

The intention of the cognitive frame and the generic knowledge is to help bring International Relations knowledge into the policy analysis phase of policymaking in a structured, logical and useful manner. This focus however, does not include several other situations where policymakers may adopt an unhelpful perspective

unintentionally. The thesis discussed the use of historical analogies however, there are other circumstances where a policymakers' perspective is fixed and the situation is then framed in a manner that fits this perspective. Robert Jervis observed that "people are strongly influenced by their expectations: people tend to see what they expect to see…."[5]

In examining policymaker's cognition, Alexander George in 1969 further developed Leites original 1951 idea of an operational code.[6] There are two elements to a policymaker's operational code: philosophical beliefs related to the assumptions an actor makes about the fundamental nature of political conflict and the role of the individual, and instrumental beliefs concerned with the best way for an actor to achieve their goals. George held that an individual's operational code acts as a screen through which information is filtered. Each individual's unique operational code leads to information being processed or screened in different ways resulting in different actions.

In perceiving all situations through their operational code, policymakers are likely to only consider a small range of grand strategy choices and alternatives. All problems will not only look the same, but the options for managing it will also be unintentionally self-constrained. Other options will literally not be able to be conceived. The cognitive frame in forcing three different theoretical perspectives to be used while analysing a problem can significantly address the narrowness of vision that each individual's unique operational code imposes.

Similar problems occur in bureaucracies where individuals may be subject to groupthink, or the 'where you stand depends on where you sit' syndrome. Groupthink is most prevalent in high-level policy groups that are highly cohesive and in competition or conflict with external groups, are dominated by a strong leader or have a strong culture of hierarchy.[7] In such situations, a consensus view forms around a single perspective and becomes self-reinforcing across the organization through individuals

5. Jervis, 'Understanding Beliefs', pp. 650-51.
6. George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making'.
7. Paul 'T Hart and Marceline B. R. Kroon, 'Groupthink in Government: Pathologies of Small-Group Decision Making', in James L. Garnett and Alexander Kouzmin (eds.), *Handbook of Administrative Communication*; New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc, 1997, pp. 101-40, p. 122.

conforming to group norms; other views are shunned as threatening to group unity.[8] The 'where you sit' syndrome means individual's perspectives are determined by their bureaucratic position and again their vision narrows to a single perspective.[9] In both cases the cognitive frame in focusing attention on specific external goals has the potential to counteract the negative impacts of such tunnel vision however, in these instances pressures to conform to the group or to the bureaucracy's demands are quite strong and thus better outcomes are not certain.

A further influence that narrows perspectives is the strategic culture evident in a bureaucracy or a society. Individuals can be socialized to such cultures very effectively and adopt worldviews that conform to particular formal and informal norms. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs for example has a culture that favours a realist worldview while by contrast the American foreign policy establishment elite culture favours a liberal worldview.[10] In such instances, policymakers may be influenced by their organisation's strategic culture in diagnosing particular problems where this single perspective is not the optimum choice.

Societal strategic cultures can further influence policymakers thinking, particularly in constraining them within an extant worldview, in resisting change and in framing alternative policy options.[11] Alastair Johnston observes that:

> Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols...that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences…and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.[12]

Policymakers may become trapped in a certain way of thinking that means they can conceive of no other. Again the cognitive frame in forcing problems to be examined using different perspectives may improve policy development.

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8. Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, 2nd edn., New York: Houghton Mifflin Company 1982, pp. 3-5.
9. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,* p. 176.
10. Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 71-74. Daniel W. Drezner, 'The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion', *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 6, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 51-70, pp. 63-64.
11. Jeffrey S. Lantis, 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 87-113, p. 109. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire,* p. 90.
12. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History,* p. 36.

On a different level, the problem solving techniques employed to address particular issues may develop a constraining culture. All issues are embedded in context and most will have already been earlier subject to various policy decisions and debates. There will inevitably be a pre-existing framework within which the matter has been examined previously. These initial interpretations will strongly influence new considerations and make starting thinking afresh about an existing issue difficult. In many situations, there may almost be a conditioned response to most new issues arising from earlier policy pronouncements and implementations. In such circumstances the cognitive frame may be useful in bringing a fresh perspective to an existing issue.

Beyond the support for policymaking application, the cognitive frame would also be useful to scholars interested in analysing and understanding grand strategies using a common perspective. The case studies show such comparative examinations can readily be undertaken, especially for historical cases. Lecturers may also find utility in having a well defined grand strategy model able to inform didactic purposes.

IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The cognitive frame is intended to have utility for policymakers but may also have implications from a theoretical viewpoint. Since the inter-paradigm debate of the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a move in International Relations theory building towards seeking a convergence of the various theories.[13] The usefulness of the cognitive frame indicates that while convergence may remain a worthy goal in itself, from a policymaking perspective divergence has some real utility and should not be overlooked.

The cognitive frame also indicates that the key aspect of policymaking in terms of grand strategy is how to create change in the external environment. Policymakers use the instruments of national power to seek to change the world in the way they desire; as Karl Marx observed: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world…. the point, however, is to *change* it."[14] International Relations theories though are weak at explaining both how change occurs and on how to achieve the change desired.

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13. Kurki and Wight, in Dunne, Kurki, and Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 13-33, pp. 19-20.
14. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1845 reprinted in: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology, Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*; Amherst Prometheus Books, 1998, p. 574.

Theory building as relates to grand strategy formulation needs to concentrate more on understanding change to become of real importance to policymakers.

The cognitive frame makes use of constructivism as the central paradigm in the reform grand strategy type. Constructivism though is often thought of as more a process rather than a theory; it can be conceived as not being a normative theory and thus as an explanatory, rather than a prognostic, device. Nicholas Onuf writes that:

> Constructivism is a way of studying social relations…. Constructivism is not a theory as such. It does not offer general explanations for what people do, why societies differ, how the world changes.[15]

The cognitive frame and the reform grand strategy case studies though indicate that conventional constructivism, at least in its agentic form, can be applied to circumstances beyond such narrow constraints. Constructivism in considering ideas as endogenous, rather than exogenous and pre-existing as realism and liberalism does, fills a definite conceptual gap in grand strategy formulation. Constructivism remains a dynamic theoretical perspective and as this field matures there may be wider applications in grand strategy thinking. Some useful work already done may provide a foundation for advancing in this direction.[16]

These theoretical implications however also suggest areas where further research may be useful. The interest in theoretical convergence has been noted however, the cognitive frame warns that if applied to developing a grand strategy that it may become incoherent. A contemporary case of such convergence in the field of grand strategy is the development of a grand strategy to manage the emergence of China in the international system.

Some consider this grand strategy should combine a neorealist half that addresses concerns over growing Chinese military power in conjunction with an engagement half built around liberal notions of building a deeper relationship with

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15. Nicholas Onuf, 'Constructivism: A User's Manual', in Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World*; Armonk: M.E.Sharpe 1998, pp. 57-78, p. 57.
16. Examples include: Phillips, *War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders*. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*. Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*.

China mainly through trade.[17] This proposed hedging grand strategy has worrying parallels to that of the failed British Appeasement grand strategy of 1933-1939 that similarly tried to blend denial and engagement grand strategy types. Hedging is an area in International Relations however, where there has been only limited theoretical work, with the concept originating elsewhere in the discipline of financial risk management.[18] In this, the notion of hedging now appears an area of growing interest in International Relations theorizing beyond solely the China case.[19]

The theoretical development of the diagnosis process seemed to suggest that such hedging involving merging different types of grand strategy schemas is conceptually flawed, although the proposition was not adequately proven in this thesis. While the failure cases studies examined seemed to indicate that the three grand strategy types should be considered as mutually exclusive, the sample size was small. There may be other cases that could disprove this supposition. This is an area requiring further analysis using a broader range of cases.

Further research could usefully examine potential grand strategies for managing China's rise to help assess if the cognitive frame's concerns over converging theoretical perspectives and mixing grand strategy types is valid. As well as researching such future-facing grand strategies, this work could further examine relevant historical case studies to give a useful temporal dimension. Through this research, a particularly significant aspect of the diagnosis process that is of some importance to contemporary policymaking would be evaluated and possibly verified. Moreover, in so assessing the diagnosis process a deeper and more robust conceptualization of the utility of hedging in international affairs could be developed that might be more broadly applicable.

In discussing China, the emergence in International Relations of a Chinese school was noted earlier when discussing the limitations of the grand strategy cognitive

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17. See Seng Tan, 'Faced with the Dragon: Perils and Prospects in Singapore's Ambivalent Relationship with China', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics,* Vol. 5, No. 3, 2012, pp. 245-65. Jae Jeok Park, 'The US-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against Potential Threats or an Undesirable Multilateral Security Order?', *The Pacific Review,* Vol. 24, No. 2, May 2011, pp. 137-58. Evan S. Medeiros, 'Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability', *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 29, No. 1, Winter 2005-06, pp. 145-67.
18. Park, 'The US-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against Potential Threats or an Undesirable Multilateral Security Order?', p. 139.
19. Brock F. Tessman, 'System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu', *Security Studies,* Vol. 21, No. 2, 2012, pp. 192-231.

frame in being based on Western, particularly U.S., thinking. There appears some scope to examine this issue in much greater depth through examining both non-Western International Relations thinking and the grand strategies of non-Western states and non-state actors. Such an examination would build on this thesis to determine if there were fundamental differences in either or both non-Western conceptualisations of international order and the practice of non-Western grand strategies across actors of varying scale, capabilities and capacities. While China is an obvious candidate for study, there have recently been promising grand strategy debates in India, Turkey and Brazil.

In such a study, it may be possible to develop non-Western grand strategy schemas that may be more efficacious than the schemas used in this thesis or which simply represent an alternative perspective. The design of the cognitive frame is such that it readily allows other such perspectives to be inserted. It may be possible to inset these non-Western schemas then apply these to pertinent case studies to develop the associated generic knowledge. Such an approach may improve the diagnostic process or more intriguingly develop a non-Western grand strategy diagnostic process. In the latter case, it may be possible then to at least partly see the world as non-Western policymakers might conceive it.

It will be recalled that George's vision of a policy-relevant knowledge included area specialists providing policymakers with context-particular, actor-specific behavioral models. A diagnostic process tweaked to represent how Chinese, Indian, Turkish or Brazilian policymakers might see the world when formulating their grand strategies might be a useful complement to such behavioral models.

Lastly, concerns of the impact in the international system of the BRIC nations having different perspectives to those of non-Western nations have also recently emerged in relation to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. R2P is experiencing some difficulties as the relative material power of Western states declines and opposition emerges from the BRIC nations concerning Western military interventions on humanitarian grounds. Recent splits in the world community over the best action to take in Libya and Syria reflect these growing difficulties. While the R2P doctrine is now widely agreed with, the ways and means of implementing it are less so. It may be timely to consider alternative methods of intervening in R2P situations through using

the cognitive frame and concepts developed in this thesis.

Grand strategy is concerned with the integration of ends, ways and means and some variations in these that differ from the recent R2P interventions may be possible and yet still achieve reasonable outcomes. If the military means are causing friction, changes to ways or indeed ends may be able to resolve the problems being experienced. In this, any variations would need to take into account recent, and potential, changes in the liberal world order structure within which future R2P grand strategies would be undertaken.

This thesis has developed a grand strategy cognitive frame and associated generic knowledge that could help bring International Relations knowledge into the policy analysis phase of policymaking in a structured, logical and useful manner. This work also useful complements the alternative oft-used prescriptive approach. The grand strategic thinking of policymakers can now be more purposefully structured; policymakers can know both *how* to think, and *what* to think about grand strategy.

This thesis aimed to be policy-relevant through producing useful knowledge. I hope this has been achieved and now as realist theorist and academic Stephen Walt enjoined "policy makers will want to know about it." [20]

20. Walt, 'The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations', p. 41.

ANNEX A: GRAND STRATEGY SCHEMAS

Chapter 4 developed three grand strategy schemas that formed a cognitive frame, a lens, through which policymakers could view grand strategic issues. The description of these given in Chapter 4 was brief to both allow the general idea to be grasped and avoid making the argument overly complicated. This Annex gives a more complete description of each schema and is intended to provide the depth, detail, granularity and logic that may be necessary for policymakers approaching the task of grand strategy formulation, especially when they use the diagnostic process for the first time.

Importantly, as noted in Chapter 4, these schemas are not meant to be new theories or a critical analysis of existing theories. Instead they are intended to be sharp edged, stylized word pictures that may be able to stimulate and provoke policymakers' cognition. The schemas are not designed to be comprehensive, well rounded or balanced but rather draw attention to certain aspects important to grand strategy policymaking while excluding others. Moreover, the subtleties, nuances and cautions often found in International Relations theories are disregarded and a sharply reductionist approach adopted to ensure the schemas do not overlap.

The approach used to build the schemas is to consider a grand strategy as a conceptual roadmap from the present 'what is' to a desired future 'what ought to be' and in a metaphorical sense encompass the starting point, the journey and the end. The starting point might consist of a description of the external world including the system structure, the key change mechanisms of this system, and the key actors and their interrelationships. The journey segment of the roadmap may focus on the instruments of national power that could create a change, how they may achieve their effect, which instruments are most effective and their advantages and shortcomings. Finally, the end point might be an understanding of the alternative future orders possible and which destination is preferred.

Accordingly in this Annex, three grand strategy 'roadmaps' are devised through operationalizing offensive realism[1] , new liberalism[2] and agentic constructivism[3] : one

1. This principally draws on Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.
2. This principally draws on Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organization,* Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53.

each for denial, engagement and reform. In the three schemas built using a roadmap structure, the instruments of power are for ease divided into information, diplomacy, economics and military.

A DENIAL GRAND STRATEGY SCHEMA

Framing Today's World - The Starting Point

The behaviours and actions of states reflect their continual striving for increased relative power, primarily to protect national sovereignty against the predations of other states but when able also to permit expansion at the expense of weaker states. Power is fundamental to national security and success; its acquisition drives a state's internal and external policies. However, power is important only in relation to other states; being relatively more powerful allows states to dominate or at least influence states of lesser power. As a nation's relative power rises against others it is able to adopt progressively more expansive ambitions and aspirations.

The international system is anarchical in the sense of there being no legal or police constraints enforced by a global government to keep the more powerful states from dominating or influencing lesser ones. Each state is responsible for its own continued existence and must continually look after itself and its interests; conflicts are inevitable, endemic and a necessary part of the working of the system. This environment compels states into a self-reinforcing, spiralling security dilemma; John Hertz writes that states:

> Striving to attain security…are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.[4]

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3. This principally draws on Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization,* Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 887-917.
4. John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157-80, p. 157.

In such an environment, states must be sensitive to the costs involved of pursing their objectives; actions should strengthen, not weaken, their power relative to others. This is a particular issue in matters of interstate cooperation. States will cooperate if this increases their relative power, or at least does not diminish it for as Kenneth Waltz observed: "The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the [international] system."[5] If the distribution of gains through cooperation means others advance further, states will be reticent to be involved; "states may even forego increases in their absolute capabilities if doing so prevents others from achieving even greater gains."[6]

System Structure. The structure of the international system is defined not by the sum of all the actors within it but rather by the most powerful.[7] Weak states can be effectively disregarded as operating in the margins of the international system and being simply objects of the major powers' actions. The complex international system then functions "in terms of the logic of small-number systems."[8] International systems therefore are organized either around a single hegemonic power (unipolar), two superpowers (bipolar) or several great powers (multipolar).

All states act according to the same logic of relative power conflicts regardless of their national culture, political system or leaders. In essence states are like billiard balls that all behave in the same way, varying only in scale.[9] States are therefore functionally undifferentiated, being distinguished predominantly by the differences in the power they possess. It does not matter if their character is "revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic."[10]

Change Mechanisms. At the international system level, the direction and rate of change is determined by changes in the distribution of power, especially that of the great powers.[11] States can change this distribution through increasing their own national

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5. Waltz, p. 126.
6. Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*; New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 116-40, p. 127.
7. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* pp. 93-95.
8. Ibid., p. 131.
9. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 18.
10. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* pp. 97-98.
11. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* pp. 9-49. K.R. Dark, *Long-Term Change and International Relations*; London: Pinter, 1998, pp. 10-12.

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power by internal and external means. Internally states can seek to better exploit their resources, develop economically, acquire greater military power and increase societal cohesion; externally states can enter into alliances to gain access to increased power or undertake wars.

War plays a major role in creating change, and is both acceptable behaviour and a legitimate means of realist statecraft. John Mearsheimer observed that: "War is the main strategy states employ to acquire [greater] relative power."[12] The converse though is also true: changes in relative power can also lead to war. Thucydides in examining the causes of the Peloponnesian War declared that: "The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable."[13]

With economic power able to be readily translated into military power, indications that a state is becoming wealthy can trigger concerns. Mearsheimer writes that: "great powers are likely to view especially wealthy states, or states moving in that direction, as serious threats, regardless of whether or not they have a formidable military capability."[14] Economic growth is conceived as an early indicator and warning of future conflict.

States as rational actors will attempt to change the structure of the system if the expected gains exceed the expected costs. A state will seek change until an equilibrium is reached where the marginal costs roughly equal the benefits. Change in the relative cost of the objectives sought by a state will then cause a change in state behaviour.[15] If rising relative power allows a state to more cheaply obtain previously unattainable objectives than it may act decisively; conversely if a state is declining, objectives that were once seemingly within its grasp may fall away.

States that wish to counteract change should attempt to raise the costs of change to the revisionist states. They may do this by adopting internal and external balancing approaches themselves, or by reducing the revisionist state's power through interfering with the other state's internal balancing or external alliances. The inherent difficulties in

12. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 138.
13. Thucydides and Strassler (eds.), *The Landmark Thucydides,* paragraph 1.23, p.16.
14. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 144.
15. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* pp. 10-11, 18-23.

changing the distribution of power means most states are perceived as being status quo oriented; states that are actively revisionist are comparatively rare.

The basic dynamics of the international system are enduring with change a constant and repetitive series of cycles. Great powers repeatedly arise and decline in repetitive cycles that continually alter the distribution of power and consequently the equilibrium in the international system.[16]

Means – Instruments of National Power

In a denial grand strategy, the instruments of national power should be used to influence external events in ways that increase one's own national power relative to other states. In determining relative position, Waltz remarked that: "States spend a lot of time estimating one another's capabilities, especially their abilities to do harm."[17] Relative military power is the key determinant; with all states animated by the same logic, their capabilities, not intent, is the central issue. The means of states, not their ends, are the focus of attention. Mearsheimer observes that:

> States have two kinds of power: latent power and military power. … Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power; it is largely based on a state's wealth and the overall size of the population. … In international politics, however, a state's effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states….[18]

Within this, land forces are the most important type of military power as they alone can conquer and control foreign territory. Mearsheimer writes that "measuring the balance of land power by itself should provide a rough but sound indicator of the

16. G. John Ikenberry and Michael W. Doyle, 'Conclusion: Continuity and Innovation in International Relations Theory', in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 266-80, p. 276.
17. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* p. 131.
18. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 55.

relative might of rival great powers."[19] Naval power by contrast is of decidedly less concern.[20]

Military force is accordingly most efficacious when applied directly against adversary military capabilities. Application against adversary economic power is only a secondary, indirect path to reducing a hostile state's relative power. Counterforce targeting is favoured for as E. H. Carr noted:

> Few of the important wars of the last hundred years…have been waged for the deliberate and conscious purpose of increasing trade or territory. The most serious wars are fought in order to make one's own country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another country becoming militarily stronger….[21]

The manner in which wars are conducted further reflects this drive for relative power. Apposite military strategies include blackmail using threats of war that avoid the costs to oneself of actually waging war, 'bait and bleed' through provoking a long and costly war between two rivals and 'bloodletting' in ensuring a war is particularly prolonged and costly for an adversary.[22]

While secondary, the economic instrument of national power may also be used externally to advance the fundamental objective of increasing a state's relative power. Economic nationalist policies can limit imports, maximise exports and create a favourable balance of trade that increases one's own economy while impeding the growth of other states' economies. Mearsheimer observes that: "The ideal situation for any state is to experience sharp economic growth while its' rivals grow slowly or hardly at all."[23]

While useful as a general policy, economic nationalism can disadvantage alliance partners, unhelpfully weakening an alliance's aggregate power. In this case intra-alliance trade can deliver positive benefits through the increased economies of scale gained growing the total economic power, and thus potentially military strength,

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19. Ibid., p. 83.
20. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, 'Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?', *International Security,* Vol. 35, No. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 7-43.
21. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939,* p. 111.
22. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 152-55.
23. Ibid., p. 144.

of an alliance.[24] Such considerations also suggest that trade with potential adversaries should be strictly limited as this may have the undesirable effect of increasing their relative power.

The diplomatic instrument of national power can be used to build alliances that increase relative power but they carry some significant risks: firstly, that a state's alliances will trap them in the wars of other states that they would prefer not to fight, secondly that their alliance partners may abandon them at any time[25], and thirdly that other states will try to pass the costs of fighting to rebalance the system onto them rather than engaging in war themselves.

Diplomacy can also be used to build international institutions. These are of value mainly as instruments to bind other states to specific agreements, and to control their behaviour and actions in advantageous ways. Member states of an institution though must always consider both how to maximise the gains for their state and how to limit any gains by any other member state. Given this conflictual basis, cheating by members is a particular concern.

A state's prestige in the international system can aid its use of institutions. Prestige involves the perceptions of other states about relative power; it allows negotiations to be determined as the more powerful states wish without them having to overtly threaten or employ force.[26] Having prestige makes a state's actions appear more legitimate, making other states and peoples more supportive and useful than they might otherwise be.[27] Prestige both leverages off a state's relative power and adds to it, allowing states to exercise power without the risks and costs involved in actually employing force.

The uses of the instruments of national power in a grand strategy are generally constrained by perceptions of their legitimacy. For realists, the survival and expansion of the state are the key normative values. In states having such social purposes, Machiavelli advised that any action was valued that advanced the state. The national

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24. Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
25. Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 180-92.
26. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* p. 31.
27. Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005b, pp. 175-78.

interest, not any specific moral code, should drive a state's actions but these actions should be judged against the results achieved. This is 'the morality of results' where actions that weaken the state, that are reckless and that are indifferent to the range of possible consequences are deemed imprudent.[28] In a normative sense the results achieved justify the actions taken; success has a morality all of its own.

Ends – The Desired Order

A denial grand strategy type can be used to build three types of international orders: a balance of power, a concert of powers or a hegemonic stability order.[29] Significantly the relative power position of the states or smaller units in such systemic structures determines their behaviour and actions.

In a balance of power order across a system the states (or units) concerned can have a range of objectives ranging from "at a minimum…their own preservation [to]…at a maximum, [a] drive for universal domination."[30] The states constituting the system can use various internal and external means to balance the power of others sufficiently to achieve their objectives. This balancing usually involves using alliances to allow groups of states to aggregate power as necessary to achieve their aims. These alliance patterns must be adaptable as the international system is dynamic with states continual gaining and losing relative power. Adopting a balance of power order therefore means impermanent alliances, being willing to ally with any other state on the basis of calculations of interest rather then ideology, shared values or history, and to the use of war as a normal instrument of state power.[31]

A different balancing behaviour operates under bi-polarity where the two polar powers balance through mobilizing their own economies and populations (internal balancing) rather than through alliances (external balancing). In such a system, alliances become principally a means for the bi-polar powers to control and direct lesser states

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28. Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, 'Ethical Realism and Contemporary Challenges', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 28, No. 6, 2006, pp. 413-20, p. 418.
29. John A. Hall and T.V. Paul, 'Introduction', in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 1-15, pp. 4-7.
30. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* p. 116.
31. In a refinement of the concept of balancing, an analysis by Walt suggested that states balance against threats, not power alone. While the distribution of power remains important, the level of threat is also influenced by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 5.

whose contributions, while perhaps useful, are not decisive. The major risk for the two bi-polar powers is that they may overreact to the activities of the other superpower in distant regions of marginal importance and thereby engage in irrelevant 'bait and bleed' conflicts in the peripheries of the international system.

If in a balance of power system states may jostle to maintain their independence, in a concert of powers order the great powers act together in the management of the system to ensure a stable political equilibrium.[32] In such equilibrium no state seeks system dominance, all the major states feel reasonably secure, have a certain sense of equality, their status and systemic roles are recognized and not endangered, and they have meaningful influence.[33] Schroeder writes that in simplified terms a stable political equilibrium means: "a balance of satisfactions, a balance of rights and obligations, and a balance of performance and payoffs, rather than a balance of power."[34]

A concert of power order protects the rights, freedom of action and sovereignty of the great powers through actively maintaining system-spread respect for their agreed international institutions. In this though, while they "impose the law, they are themselves above it."[35] The legitimacy of their actions depends instead on the concert collectively authorizing such steps, albeit this action could be multi- or uni-lateral.[36]

A hegemonic stability order envisages a system where there is a single very powerful, great power – the hegemon – that provides systemic leadership. The hegemon's structural position allows this state to establish and maintain its preferred norms and values across the entire international order through providing collective goods, preventing cheating and free riding, enforcing its rules and encouraging others to

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32. Hall and Paul, in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 1-15, p. 8.
33. The concert of power order may seem to be better placed to be part of an engagement grand strategy (discussed next). A concert of power order though is built upon a view that interstate relations are primarily conflictual and feature zero-sum gains. Conversely, an engagement grand strategy assumes interstate relations are cooperative and feature absolute gains. A concert of power order is accordingly considered within a denial grand strategy.
34. Paul W. Schroeder, *Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe*, eds David Wetzel, Robert Jervis, and Jack S. Levy; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 233.
35. Martin Wight quoted in: Ian Hall, *The International Thought of Martin Wight*, Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 128.
36. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 108-24.

help with burden-sharing.[37] The anarchical international environment thus takes on some characteristics of a hierarchical environment where states have assigned roles and responsibilities.

The sharply uneven distribution of power can make such an international system noticeably peaceful[38], and incline the behaviour of lesser states towards being generally cooperative towards the dominant power rather than balancing.[39] In a unipolar system, bandwagoning may be an appealing alliance strategy for many states in being undemanding and requiring limited effort, while potentially offering tangible rewards.

AN ENGAGEMENT GRAND STRATEGY SCHEMA

Framing Today's World - The Starting Point

In the engagement grand strategy schema the behaviours and actions of states reflect their domestic preferences. The social purpose of each state is determined by its preferences, which reflect the capture and recapture of the apparatus of the state by influential coalitions of self-interested, rational individuals and groups.[40] In this schema, states are pluralistic entities whose interests and policies are determined by bargaining between groups composed of individuals.[41] Andrew Moravcsik writes that this:

> " …rests on a "bottom-up" view of politics….Socially differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests independently of politics and then advance those interests through political exchange and collective action."[42]

The 'bottom up' approach of this schema disaggregates the state into bureaucracies, political parties and branches of government but also allows for nonstate actors "admitting activists in non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities

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37. Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*; Princeton: Princeton University Press International, 1987, pp. 72-80.
38. William C. Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', *International Security,* Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 5-41, pp. 23-25.
39. Michael Mastanduno and Ethan B. Kapstein, 'Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War ', in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*; New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 1-27, pp. 15-16.
40. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', p. 517.
41. Zacher and Matthew, in Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*; New York: St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 107-50, p. 118.
42. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', p. 517.

of technical experts, and international organizations."[43] The interests of these disparate groups are not all the same and are advanced under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values and variations in influence. These factors induce a measure of competition with the competing groups' ability to realize their objectives depending greatly on them forming influential coalitions.[44]

The importance of cooperation is central and involves all parties seeking absolute gains irrespective of the distribution of these gains. This is in contrast to that underpinning the denial grand strategy schema's relative gains emphasis where one side loses while the other wins.[45] The engagement grand strategy schema holds that all groups, including states, will cooperate when everybody can achieve beneficial outcomes.

System Structure. The system is composed of numerous states each with their own individual state preferences that reflect their capture and recapture by their own particular domestic actors. Accordingly, every state is different and distinctive making the international system intrinsically complex. This complexity is exacerbated as states may act at the same time as either unitary or disaggregated actors depending on the issue areas being considered.

In some circumstances a state will exhibit strong internal agreement and coordination in addressing certain issues whereas, for other matters different elements within the state may interact with other countries in a semi-autonomous manner.[46] Multiple transnational linkages may form between a country's sub-state actors and their counterparts in other nations; these linkages may undercut or go around the official lines of communication. Such linkages may actively work against the state bureaucracy and the formal political leaders as the sub-state groups within a country try to leverage off their transnational relationships to ensure their preferences are acted upon instead.[47] Whether a state will appear to behave as a unitary or a disaggregated actor will depend

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43. Rathbun, 'Is Anybody Not an (International Relations) Liberal?', p. 10.
44. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', p. 517.
45. Sterling-Folker, 'Liberal Approaches', in Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006b, pp. 55-61, pp. 55-56. Rathbun, 'Is Anybody Not an (International Relations) Liberal?', pp. 6-9.
46. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', pp. 521-22.
47. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics,* Vol. 27, No. 1, October 1974, pp. 39-62, pp. 46-55.

on the particular preferences held by its societal actors and how they believe their interests might be best advanced.

Change Mechanisms. Change in the international system is created by a change in the distribution of preferences, which in itself reflects the combination of the social purposes of the system's constituent units. Accordingly, to change the system requires changes in the social purposes of the states involved. In seeking such change, the society-state relationship is the key.

The change in state preferences comes from the "bottom up" as a product of internal politics and pressures. External factors though may also be influential either through offering windows of opportunity for domestic individuals and groups to take advantage of, or in providing stimuli for change. In this way, a state's preferences "emerge not from a solely domestic context but from a society that is transnational – at once domestic and international."[48] However, the core of the argument is that to create change in the behaviour of states it is necessary to delve deeply into the character of societies to determine how they construct their objectives and expectations.

The choices states make reflects the varying patterns of state preferences however, the internally generated desires of states are not always the primary determinant of what they do in the international system. State preferences when translated into policy are often modified by the preferences of other states. In this, there is significant policy interdependence between states.[49] Policymakers must consider their state's position within the structure of an international system composed of the preferences of other states and make concessions and compromises just as they would do in the domestic arena.

In relationships between states some will have stronger preferences over certain outcomes then others. The more motivated states will be more willing and able to mobilize and expend national resources for their desired objectives than states with less strongly held attitudes. This difference in intensity can give a state greater power to decide an issue than any apparent deficiency in relative power capabilities might

48. Andrew Moravcsik, 'The New Liberalism', in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 234-54, p. 248.
49. Moravcsik, 'Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment', 2001, p. 7.

suggest. Crucially "ends, not means, matter most…. What states want is the primary determinant of what they do."[50]

Means – Instruments of National Power

The instruments of national power should be used to influence the formation and maintenance of favourable preferences in the other state through focusing on its constituent domestic interest groups. In this, states can make use of diplomatic, economic, institutional, informational and military means.

The diplomatic instrument can be used to help understand the internal complexities of another state or non-state actor and determine the important individuals and groups, their interests and preferences. Having identified these, the diplomatic instrument can then be focused on shaping and helping the key groups that hold desirable preferences through providing on-going support and encouragement. Simultaneously, other activities can focus on undermining other groups that hold opposing or unhelpful preferences.

The economic instrument can be used to shape and influence the preferences of other states by applying pressure upon those domestic interest groups that profit from transnational economic interactions. Such manipulation may be through the use of positive or negative economic measures.

Positive sanctions exploit international trade to create domestic constituencies in the countries involved that will favour and actively work towards maintaining the desired international order. The domestic groups that benefit from trade and financial transactions will work to have their preferences for continuing supportive international relationships implemented as state policies. Negative economic measures work in a similar manner. A state imposes costs on the other state's particular domestic constituencies who benefit from international trade and financial interactions. To avoid these costs and to regain earlier benefits, these domestic groups will then pressure their government to alter the national behaviour and actions that led to the negative sanctions. The use of negative and positive economic measures relies on the premise that

50. Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', pp. 521-22.

self-interested, rational individuals and groups will seek to maximize their gains through having their preferences realized through capturing the state.

The use of institutions also builds from this insight. Institutions can be created to realize common interests, advance specific mutual preferences, avoid sub-optimal outcomes and to maximize the potential gains for all parties involved. Moreover, institutions through involving ongoing interaction and information exchange can be used as a way to build trust and knowledge of others' intentions, and if concerns are raised the institutions can be used to address them.[51] Importantly, the preferences that create and guide institutions are exogenous, that is they come from outside and prior to the institution. Institutions, as an instrument used by states, simply reflect and implement already established preferences.

The informational instrument can be used to assist and reinforce the advancement of the preferred individuals and groups. The information means may be able to create a normative perception in the state or non-state actor targeted that the preferred groups are on the 'right' path whereas others are at best misguided or at worse have sinister motives detrimental to the parent society. The deliberate branding of particular groups may help support shaping perceptions within the state or non-state actor.

The emphasis on the pluralistic nature of states where interests and policies are determined by bargaining between groups composed of individuals leads directly to the purpose of applying military force being to change the preferences of these groups. The military instrument may be targeted upon what helpful or opposed domestic groups in other states value most, which generally would be related to their economic or financial interests. Accordingly, those groups that benefit economically from a conflict should be actively undermined in a way that changes their preferences to favour peace. Conversely, those groups that did not support continuing a conflict should be supported and strengthened. In such a way, the overall preferences of a state can be changed as these simply reflect the aggregation of the various domestic sectoral preferences. Under this construct targeting the supporting foundations of the political power of the hostile

51. Sterling-Folker, 'Liberal Approaches', in Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006b, pp. 55-61, pp. 57-58.

domestic groups – possibly using a counter-value approach - is conceived as the most efficacious and direct method.

When considering the military instrument armies may be of lesser importance as taking other territory is not usually an objective. Instead, the emphasis on the importance of transnational trade, economics and domestic sectoral interests suggests that navies may be favoured. Navies can maintain sea lines of communication ensuring the national ability to wage a conflict over a long period is sustained. The preference for targeting the supporting foundations of the political power of the hostile domestic groups may though also lead to an interest in air forces.

Ends – The Desired Order

The preferences of each state predispose them toward particular international actions and behaviours, albeit influenced to a greater or lesser degree by systemic opportunities and constraints. The three mechanisms of international order - complex interdependence, institutionalism and the liberal peace- reflect this key place accorded preferences.[52]

Complex interdependence has three defining characteristics: multiple channels connect the societies and states involved ensuring any actions taken have reciprocal effects, there is no hierarchy of issues between the states, and military force is not threatened or used.[53] These characteristics give rise to distinctive political processes that states can exploit to influence another state's preferences including establishing linkages between issues, controlling or manipulating the setting of the agenda to determine how the issues are framed, penetrating the domestic groups who shape state preferences by using the blurred boundaries between domestic and international politics, and making use of international institutions.[54]

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52. Hall and Paul, 'Introduction', in Paul and Hall (eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 1-15, pp. 8-10.
53. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 24-25.
54. Some examples of such practices are discussed in: Timothy J. McKeown, 'The Big Influence of Big Allies: Transgovernmental Relations as a Tool of Statecraft', in Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds.), *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 204-22. Chung-In Moon, 'Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States', *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 32, No. 1, March 1988, pp. 67-89.

Each state's perceptions of the benefits obtained drive the system, with asymmetrical interdependencies providing useful sources of influence for actors in dealing with another. Such asymmetries "make countries vulnerable, and thus are a potential power resource for the side that is less dependent."[55] An asymmetry in gains may make the state with the most to gain more willing to compromise, while the other state may be able to impose conditions or make linkages to other matters.[56] Importantly though, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye warn that:

> interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy….Nothing guarantees that [interdependent] relationships…will be categorized by mutual benefit.[57]

An institutionalist approach to managing international order has three major characteristics: a shared agreement amongst states over the principles and rules of order, the agreed rules and institutions set binding and authoritative limits on the exercise of power, and these rules and institutions are enmeshed in a wider political system not easily altered.[58] Such an order may entail a grand bargain amongst the states involved in setting up the institutions.

The leading state obtains a legitimate and predictable order based on agreed rules and institutions. Lesser states acquiesce as the leading state agrees to open up its domestic political process, allowing the lesser states to represent their interests directly to the leading state's domestic constituencies.[59] In this regard, institutions build an international order through connecting state and societal elites in transnational linkages that directly benefit those involved. These individuals and groups are then obliged by rational self-interest to act to maintain this beneficial order.

The character of a state underpins the third mechanism of liberal international order. A "liberal peace" can be created by the combination of republican democratic

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55. Helen V. Milner, 'Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics', in Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds.), *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 3-27, p. 15.
56. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 7-8.
57. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 9-10.
58. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, pp. 30-31.
59. Ibid., p. 57.

representative governments, international institutions, and transnational economic interdependence.[60] The three factors working together can create a virtuous circle where each strengthens the other and increases the probability of enduring peaceful, mutually beneficial relations.[61] In seeking to build such a peace, the specific factor to actively develop initially will vary depending on the context. In post-World War Two Europe economic interdependence seemed the most effective entry point while in Latin America in the 1990s the revival of democracy appeared key.[62] In this way, as Kant postulated in 1795, liberals see the potential to purposefully create of a zone of peace – a "pacific union" - within the international system.

A REFORM GRAND STRATEGY SCHEMA

Framing Today's World - The Starting Point

In the reform grand strategy schema, the behaviours and actions of states reflect the social rules that animate them, and these rules arise through social interaction. The actors shape their own social context (structure) and this social context in turn shapes the interests, identities, and behaviours of the actors (agents).[63] The actors' actions and how they interact determines the nature of the international system, which in turn shapes who the actors are, what they want, and how they behave.[64]

The international system is a permissive anarchy shaped by the social practices and rules of the actors that compose it; the anarchical international system is "what states make of it".[65] Social rules constitute and regulate all aspects of world politics; they tell us what is possible (constitutive) and they tell us what to do (regulative). This is a "logic of appropriateness", where states and the system's principal actors are driven

60. Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace,* pp. 35-42.
61. Leading democratic peace thinker Michael Doyle holds that the three factors are instead republican democratic representative governments, liberal norms, and transnational economic interdependence. The Russett and Oneal listing is preferred in this thesis as their work empirically tested their propositions. Moreover, as Doyle notes, while Russett and Oneal's coding did not include liberal norms specifically, the presence of these norms are probably included within their coding for democratic representative governments. Michael W. Doyle, 'Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace', *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 99, No. 3, 2005, pp. 463-66, p. 466.
62. Russett and Oneal, *Triangulating Peace,* pp. 40-41.
63. Theo Farrell, 'Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program', *International Studies Review,* Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp. 49-72, pp. 50-51.
64. Alice Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann, 'Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 15-33, p. 21.
65. Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization,* Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425.

by the rules extant in the social structure to behave and act properly.[66] States do not *a priori* know what their interests are, rather these are shaped by their social normative structures; national interests are malleable and are reshaped as the state's social rules change.[67] Materially dissimilar states can act in similar ways, as the state's social rules are the basis of action rather than the quantum of national power.

System Structure. The international system can be considered as structured in terms of the distribution of ideas; states that share norms and identities may be conceptually grouped together. Norms are shared understandings of what kinds of actions are appropriate. Norms shape a state's actions and make actions taken similar across the international system, regardless of the material circumstances of each individual state. In themselves, norms do not necessarily determine outcomes, but rather help define and bound the range of acceptable state policy choices and instrumentally 'rational' behaviour. States will act appropriately as understood in the context of the systemic and domestic norms.

Identities define an actor's characteristics, distinctiveness and uniqueness. An identity "is whatever makes a thing what it is" and is a unit-level quality formed by how an actor conceives of both himself and others.[68] Crucially an identity is intrinsically relational in being defined compared to other identities and not existing independently of others.[69] Identities broadly consist of formal and informal rules that define the group's membership, social purposes and ambitions that are shared by members of the group, relational comparisons that define the group by what it is not, and cognitive models that give the group's members a shared worldview that allows them to make sense of external conditions.[70] Internal group identities are not fixed nor predetermined but are rather the outcome at any particular time of on-going social contestation within the group.

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66. This contrasts with the realist and liberalist 'logic of consequences' where states act rationally to maximize desired outcomes. Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; Ithaca: Cornwell University Press, 1996, p. 29.
67. John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 146.
68. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 224.
69. Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 7.
70. Rawi Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable', *Perspectives on Politics,* Vol. 4, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 695-711, pp. 696-700.

States are conceived as imaginary domestic communities that while seemingly appearing unified and harmonious are actually incoherent and constantly fragmenting. The state tries to form and maintain a unitary domestic society through creating arbitrary distinctions between the "self" and outside "others" to create an appearance of unity. This process is ongoing, the state has to be constantly made and remade, imagined and re-imagined to produce a state that is considered legitimate, natural and complete.[71] Roxanne Doty writes: "national identity is never a finished product; it is always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed."[72] The identity of a state is variable, dependent on its socially constructed ideational framework, and inherently malleable.

Change Mechanisms. Ideas, not material power, determine the direction of change in international relations. Not all ideas are equally significant however, it does matter which states are advocating what ideas. Ideas implemented by great powers are more significant than the ideas of lesser states unable to directly implement them. Lesser states must make greater use of their 'soft' power to advance preferred ideas with less likelihood of broad acceptance.

With ideas being intersubjectively developed there is an inbuilt resistance to change. The inertia inherent in the existing social structures hampers the ability of a state or the international system to take up new ideas. Changing a social structure will depend on changing a tightly integrated network of social expectations and obligations that is mutually reinforcing. Hopf observes that existing ideational structures have:

> the power to reproduce, discipline and police. When such power is realized, change…is very hard indeed. These intersubjective structures however although difficult to challenge, are not impregnable. Alternative actors with alternative identities, practices and sufficient material resources are…capable of effecting change.[73]

The emergence of a new social rule requires active advocacy by ideational entrepreneurs, actors who may be individuals, organizations or states and who engage in

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71. Hobson, *The State and International Relations,* pp. 157-61.
72. Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 121-47, p. 123.
73. Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', p. 180.

‘‘strategic social construction’’.[74] Such rational actors seek to deliberately change other actors towards the entrepreneur’s desired ideational position. Importantly, this is:

> strategic action…defined by the orientation towards achieving predefined egoistic ends, treating the other as an object to be manipulated, [and unlike] communicative action [which is] …characterized by the orientation towards achieving understanding, treating the other as an equal participant.[75]

In considering ideationally change strategically it is important to conceive this process as involving two separate but connected stages: collapse and replacement.[76] Ideational entrepreneurs seeking to intentionally change a particular set of social rules need to create the right environment; the old order must be understood to have collapsed. Ideational replacement, a separate phenomena, may then broadly follow Martha Finnemore’s and Kathryn Sikkink’s process that involves a norm emergence, a threshold or ‘‘tipping’’ point at which a critical mass of relevant actors adopts the norm, a broad norm acceptance (a ”norm cascade”) and a norm internalization.[77] Jeffrey Legro usefully highlights the importance of norm consolidation, which in this sequence would occur between norm acceptance and norm internalization.[78]

Creating the right environment requires a perception that the particular extant social rule is no longer adequate. Such a perception may be easiest to induce in times when the old verities are fragmenting, or split through some external shock or new opportunity.[79] Unforeseen incidents or deliberately designed actions can be exploited although these in themselves are not sufficient to create social rule change. There must usually be a compelling reason to overturn traditional ideas, especially as existing ideas generally favour some group. Events must be interpreted in a way that is seen as a crisis for the extant social rule. The ideational entrepreneurs need to convince defenders of the

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74. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 910.
75. Marc Lynch, 'Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 8, No. 2, 2002, pp. 187-230, p. 192.
76. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order,* pp. 28-38.
77. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 895. Matthew Hoffmann applies the norm dynamic framework to an examination of changing national identities in the breakup of Yugoslavia in: Hoffmann, in Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 123-38.
78. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order,* pp. 15-16.
79. Ibid., pp. 13-16.

status quo that the old ideas are so badly flawed that change is essential.[80] These ideational entrepreneurs:

> use ideas instrumentally as weapons to contest the status quo and delegitimize the beliefs supporting it. When…entrepreneurs successfully construct a crisis, the result is uncertainty. When the old rules of the game can no longer be taken for granted, actors seek guidance as to how to understand and behave in an unfamiliar situation.[81]

Given such ideational uncertainty, ideational entrepreneurs can then strive to make a potential new social rule emerge through taking a top-down approach. The entrepreneurs to begin with need to determine appropriate advocates for the new ideas. Such advocates should be prominent and authoritative in terms of the social rule being advanced, and able to make use of their organizational platforms to give the desired new ideas credence and authority.[82] The likelihood that such actors will find an idea appealing is mainly shaped by its significance to that actor's distributive and ideational preferences although, support by external elites, foreign government officials and private-market actors can also be important.[83]

In deliberately seeking to form a group of advocates, a cohesive group characterized by likeminded members is often stronger than a heterogeneous group.[84] A group motivated by a single issue can be more effective than a coalition of multiple causes, even if they all seek the same broad outcome. Having determined the target group, a dialogue can be undertaken that defines the crisis and its causes in a manner that supports the desired social rule change. In this dialogue "the same ideas employed

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80. Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, 'How Do Crises Lead to Change? Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia', *World Politics,* Vol. 62, No. 3, July, 2010, pp. 496-527, p. 499.
81. Ibid.
82. Hoffmann, in Sterling-Folker (ed.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 123-38, p. 124.
83. Chwieroth, 'How Do Crises Lead to Change? Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia', pp 501-02. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order,* pp. 164-65.
84. Jeffrey Chwieroth, 'Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets', *International Organization,* Vol. 61, No. 2, Spring, 2007, pp. 443-63, p. 447.

as weapons to implicate the pre-crisis *status quo* as responsible for the crisis can reduce uncertainty by narrowing possible causes of the crisis to a significant degree."[85]

With the need for ideational replacement defined and agreed, ideational entrepreneurs need to have readily available new ideas appropriate to the circumstance at hand. Preparation is important because when a crisis occurs, policymakers:

> tend to cast about quickly for suitable responses and to make a choice from the current stock of conventional wisdom. They look to the latest and best thinking because events occur too fast and ideas mature too slowly for responses to be devised anew for each pressing situation. …politicians tend to select their bullets from the supply that happens to be available at any given time, and these typically are the results of the intellectual efforts of the preceding years.[86]

The old ideas do not simply vanish when they have seemingly failed. These rules had a social purpose that remains and they must instead be actively replaced by new ideas. Such new ideas will appear more readily acceptable if they resonate because of some affinity to already accepted frameworks, if they connect to established ideas, if they have sufficient distributive and ideational appeal, offer an effective plan related to the crisis, and if they appear able to generate desirable results (although this does not need definitive proof).[87] The new ideas though will face competition from other alternatives and will need to be actively advocated. Ideational entrepreneurs can influence the chosen prominent or authoritative actors to embrace the desired new ideas using persuasion or manipulation.

Persuasion involves not simply a logical extrapolation from earlier beliefs but is instead a reasoned replacement of them by weight of argument. An individual may be persuaded by the intellectual force of a new concept, by some quality of the ideational

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85. Chwieroth, 'How Do Crises Lead to Change? Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia', p. 500.
86. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, *The Politics of Deregulation*; Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985, p. 57.
87. Rodger A. Payne, 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001, 37-61, pp. 38-39. Chwieroth, 'How Do Crises Lead to Change? Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia', p. 498. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 204-05. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order,* p. 36.

entrepreneur, or by an indirect "fit" of the new concept with existing ideas or norms.[88] The technique of framing is viewed as a central element of successful persuasion and involves providing a singular interpretation of a particular situation and indicating the appropriate behavior for that context.[89]

Manipulation by contrast involves individuals simply rationalizing an idea imposed by a more powerful actor, as it is impractical and unrealistic to adopt a different one. These individuals have not been persuaded of the idea's normative value but rather accept it given it is difficult to conceive shifting to an alternative.[90] Persuasion entails the actor consciously agreeing to a new set of beliefs but manipulation involves the actor first agreeing for interested reasons and then gradually internalizing the new practices.[91]

Ideational advocates need to progressively influence through persuasion or manipulation enough influential prominent or authoritative actors to reach a threshold or ''tipping'' point at which a critical mass adopts the rule. This critical mass comprises a set of actors most interested in the particular outcome of this collective enterprise, or that for some other reason has a strong incentive to act.[92] At this point enough influential and important actors now endorse the new social rule to redefine appropriate behavior for members of the social entity concerned. However, while accepted by influential elites, for the new social rules to tip mass attitudes, the rules need to both enter into the public sphere and be institutionalized.

The public sphere is the arena where a change in public cues from the advocacy group publicized through the mass media can send new signals to the population and encourage a bandwagon towards the new social rules.[93] In this, the mass media does not need to present a monolithic set of messages. New frames do not necessarily

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88. Rawi Abdelal et al., *'Constructivist Political Economy: Chapter One: The Case for a Constructivist International Political Economy'*; pp. 31-32, viewed 5 May 2014, ducis.jhfc.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/archive/documents/ABP.pdf.
89. Payne, 'Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction', pp. 38-39.
90. Abdelal et al., 'Constructivist Political Economy: Chapter One: The Case for a Constructivist International Political Economy', 14 January 2005, pp. 33-34.
91. Lynch, 'Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement', p. 214.
92. Susanne Lohmann, 'Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991', *World Politics,* Vol. 47, No. 1, October, 1994, pp. 42-101, p. 47. Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders,* pp. 204-05.
93. Marc Lynch, 'Explaining the Awakening: Engagement, Publicity, and the Transformation of Iraqi Sunni Political Attitudes', *Security Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 1, 2011, pp. 36-72, p. 58.

immediately persuade, but a proliferation of competing frames can create an opening in the public sphere through which the new social ideas being advanced can be grasped and interpreted.[94]

In this newly open, albeit contested, public space the advocacy group can actively promote the new ideas through using a mixture of material incentives, symbolic appeals, public discourse and speech acts. Crucially, a combination of ideational measures and material support is generally essential. New ideas alone unsupported by material means are usually insufficient to have an existing social rule replaced.[95]

The aim is to trigger a cascade, a steady self-generating broad and progressive acceptance where multiple agents outside of the critical mass of significant actors accept the appropriateness of the new idea. The dominant mechanism of this cascade is socialization, a diffuse process that involves an entity working its way collectively to a new idea.[96] Socialization involves repeated social interaction that reorients an individual in a relatively incremental, evolutionary way. This requires relatively low levels of contestation and variation within the entity, "since such irregularities would disrupt the repetitive rehearsing or "social learning" by which…norms and ideas enter individual thinking and action."[97]

Importantly though, to become permanently embedded the institutional structures that govern the state must also embrace the new social rules. Martha Sikkink notes that while: " Powerful individuals are important for the adoption of ideas,…if these ideas do not find institutional homes, they will not be able to sustain themselves over the long term."[98] Moreover, these institutions also need both autonomy and continuity for new ideas to become entrenched and influential. Preferably, the new ideas will have a specific affinity with particular existing state institutions.[99] New ideas that cannot readily find a home can lead to new supporting institutions being created, but this is intrinsically problematic.

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94. Ibid., p. 68.
95. For a recent empirical example of this see: ibid.
96. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 902.
97. Abdelal et al., *Constructivist Political Economy: Chapter One: The Case for a Constructivist International Political Economy*, pp. 35-36.
98. Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 248.
99. Ibid., pp. 248-51.

When existing state institutions adopt new ideas, their extant relationships to domestic groups can automatically create supportive interest groups. Commercial businesses, labour organizations and other non-governmental groups that have long-standing symbiotic relationships with the state institutions may all find reasons to also embrace new ideas.

The broad acceptance of a new social rule though is insufficient for the rule to become permanent. The new rules need to appear to demonstrate their efficacy in addressing the problems that caused the older social rule to collapse. Legro observes that:

> Any initial success, whether the product of the [new] ideas or not, will help to solidify the new orthodoxy…Such results need not always be immediate, especially if the new orthodoxy has a logic of 'pain then gain' (as do many economic austerity programs or long-term reconstruction plans). But such plans are unlikely to be institutionalized as a new orthodoxy until their supporters can claim that the expectations generated have been met. The more successful the result, the more likely the new thinking will become embedded in rules procedures, symbols, and collective memory. Negative results can lead to a renewal of the [ideational] struggle or even a default to the old.[100]

Given apparent success and broad societal acceptance the new social rule may eventually be internalized, with the rule so widely accepted that it achieves:

> a ''taken-for-granted'' quality that makes conformance almost automatic. For this reason, internalized norms can be both extremely powerful (because behavior according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to discern (because actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether to conform).[101]

The process of changing social rules may therefore be envisaged as rule collapse, rule emergence, a cascade, acceptance, consolidation and eventual internalization. In considering intentional ideational change, this process may be easier in some respects to apply at the international system level as this is an area of less dense social rules compared to the domestic levels; the web of beliefs, norms and rules are

100. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order,* p. 36.
101. Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', p. 904.

less tightly integrated and internalized.[102] Changing social rules at the system level may be relatively less demanding.

The dynamics of the international system involves a continual cyclic ascent and replacement of dominant ideas and social rules.[103] This cycle varies though in how the dynamics of ideational change are conceived. Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons observe that:

> [those] who see a great deal of socialization will tend to have an incremental, evolutionary, relatively consensual and uncontested view of political dynamics and change. Those who see a world dominated by persuasion will tend to see order and change in terms of punctuated equilibria, with crises delegitimating previous thinking and charismatic innovators forging new order (à la Weber). Those who see widespread patterns of manipulation...will tend to see an inherently contested world, with instrumental manoeuvring going on within overlapping, logically incoherent, taken-for-granted bounds. The incoherence of these bounds may itself be a source of change.[104]

Means – Instruments of National Power

States should make use of their instruments of national power to advance and support those social rules they deem attractive or replace those considered objectionable. The focus of these instruments needs to be on the ideational elite - the advocates and promoters of new ideas - who shape and influence their societies' social rules. In the initial stages, the intention is to convince the ideational elites of the efficaciousness of the new social rules and then, as the new social rules approach the tipping point, on supporting these elites in advancing the rule cascade and consolidation.

Military and economic actions can be oriented to support and reinforce particular norms and identities deemed desirable, or to change them if they are considered obstructive. Under this approach though, the message concerning the

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102. Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military Power in Postwar Japan*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 20, 42
103. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe*. Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity*; New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
104. Abdelal et al., *Constructivist Political Economy: Chapter One: The Case for a Constructivist International Political Econom*y, p. 38.

'goodness' of the particular social rule targeted becomes the centrepiece, instead of the material effects of the military forces or economic measures employed. The significance of the actions is more important than the actions themselves; the message takes precedence in formulating and taking actions. The signal to be communicated is determined prior to the use of military or economic measures, which are carefully devised to support and further the desired social rules. Actions support words, rather than words explaining actions taken. In this, care needs to be taken that actions taken do not work against the intended message.

Military and economic actions taken must be seen as legitimate in the context of the social rules being advanced; actions considered 'illegitimate' will work against the objectives sought. Being considered as hypocritical will be particular unhelpful in shaping norms and identities. In the reform grand strategy schema, the ends do not justify the means. Instead, the means justify, or rather legitimate, the ends.

Moreover, the intersubjective nature of social rule creation and development means that the actions of a state can be expected to shape the future actions of others. Taking harsh actions for the sake of expediency or convenience may create a new social rule empowering all states to take similar harsh actions. This outcome may be the opposite of the effect originally intended. The intersubjectivity of social interaction means there are dangers of unintended outcomes from precipitate or ill-considered actions.

Diplomacy is an important instrument of national power in a reform grand strategy to advance productive social interaction. As ideas cannot be changed by force, interaction is necessary for others to understand and embrace the preferred social rules. Without interaction, no real ideational change is possible. This interaction may be made difficult however by the social rules both sides have already embraced. Adversaries may find meaningful interaction difficult as they have mutually constructed rules that makes the 'other' unacceptable. All concerned may need to alter their social practices to be more cooperative and less conflictual for meaningful interaction that advances the desired social rules. This focus on interaction progressively shaping the ideational context may favour the use of arms control negotiations, confidence building measures and second track diplomacy approaches.

In this regard, placing emphasis on social interaction perhaps suggests that all are truthful in presenting their norms and identities. However, actors at the system, unit, or individual level can readily employ varying means of deception to shape and manipulate others. The face presented in a social interaction may not be the real face. In a reform grand strategy deception may be effective.

Institutions can be used to advance social rules, as institutions are " cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actor's ideas about how the world works."[105] The actors involved mutually constitute the institution and in this process allows new identities and interests to be cognitively internalized. This process can be made use of to further desired new identities and interests, and to reinforce existing helpful social rules. Institutions though, in being defined intersubjectively, can be cooperative or conflictual; it is up to the actors concerned to construct them as they wish.

Institutions that are intersubjectively determined to be legitimate can provide new arenas for both cooperation and conflict. Actors can seek to make the actions of other actors in these institutions appear legitimate or illegitimate and so advance their aims. There can develop a symbolic politics that structures the terms of political competition. In discussing Libya's success in having U.N. sanctions overturned through exploiting the perceived legitimacy of international law and organizations, Ian Hurd noted that

> The pursuit of legitimation and delegitimation is conducted by either deploying or reinterpreting the symbols of legitimated institutions. Even for actors who do not themselves believe in the legitimation of the institution, there may be power to be gained by using its symbols—to the extent that others do believe in it, these will be effective instruments.[106]

The legitimacy of international organizations can create powerful symbols that are strategically useful to states. For materially weak states in particular, norms can be useful intersubjective resources.

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105. Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', p. 399.
106. Ian Hurd, 'The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1993–2003', *International Organization,* Vol. 59, No. 3, Spring 2005, pp. 495-526, p. 523.

The informational instrument of national power can make use of speech-acts to construct the social rules that determine the significance of certain objects, events and actions; "verbal statements constitute social action."[107] The use of words do not just describe or represent reality but rather can 'create' a reality.[108] Three different types of speech acts can be used to shape social rules: "*Assertion* rules convey knowledge about the world. *Directive* rules tell us what we should do and often include consequences for disregarding them. *Commitment* rules are promises to act in a particular way."[109]

The legitimacy of particular uses of the instruments of national power in a grand strategy is important but there are inherently no defined impermissible actions; legitimacy is a malleable ideational concept also. While the reform grand strategy schema is based on "an ontology asserting the existence of social rules; it cannot tell us the content of those rules."[110]

Ends – The Desired Order

States can take action to build the international orders they prefer based on widening the circle of states that have their desired social rules. States may consider they would be more secure and prosperous if an increasing number of states, maybe even all, shared the same social rules as they have embraced. This may especially be as states with different social rules can appear particularly illegitimate and dangerous. International order may then be built around the deliberate creation of like-minded states that share similar norms (understandings of appropriate actions) or identities (understanding of who they are).

Importantly though, in thinking about grand strategy states can use their instruments of national power to influence other states to adopt specific social rules whether these are shared with the originating state or not. States can seek to change another's social rules in whichever direction they wish, for whatever purpose.

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107. Brian Frederking, 'Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security', *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 363-78, p. 366.
108. Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 83; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 153.
109. Frederking, 'Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security', p. 366.
110. Ibid., p. 367.

ANNEX B: BUILDING POWER SCHEMAS

Chapter 5 developed four building power schemas to assist policymakers when they consider matters relating to building the power necessary to implement a grand strategy. The description given in Chapter 5 was brief to allow the general idea to be grasped and avoid making the argument overly convoluted. This Annex gives a more complete description of each schema and is intended to provide the depth, detail, granularity and logic that may be necessary when policymakers approach the task of considering building the power necessary to implement a grand strategy, especially when they use the diagnostic process for the first time. The annex also notes historical examples of each of the four schemas.

The four alternative building power schemas are a near-term managerial approach, a long-term managerial approach, a near-term market approach or a long-term market approach. These four alternatives form the cognitive frame – the bounded rationality - policymakers could employ to structure their thinking about the problem of building the power a grand strategy needs. Importantly, these schemas are intended to be sharp edged, stylized word pictures able to stimulate and provoke policymakers' cognition. The schemas are not designed to be comprehensive, well rounded or balanced but rather draw attention to certain aspects important to grand strategy policymaking while excluding others.

Near-Term Managerial Approach Schema

The near-term managerial approach is appropriate for situations of necessity, when the issue is vitally important and time-critical; urgent action is necessary. Given the matter's urgency, extraction of manpower, money and material is the primary means to resource the grand strategy. Legitimacy must be quickly gained through the most expedient means; the extant soft power resources on the other hand will either support or impede the grand strategy, possibly requiring compensatory measures. Use is made of what society can provide today with much less attention given to preparing for longer-term issues. The grand strategy must direct and guide society in the most suitable manner to meet the compelling and vital issue of national concern.

Legitimacy. The quickest and most reliable means for the managerial approach to build legitimacy is through securitization. The people are motivated to support the

grand strategy through the use of direct and indirect coercion, and through the creation of a widespread sense of alarm and anxiety. The people are advised that if the grand strategy fails, terrible events will befall them; accordingly they need to support the determined policies, if only as the lesser of two evils. This threat can be one that results in any form of insecurity; threats to prosperity and political values can be securitized as readily as the more obvious military threats.

Soft Power. Soft power involves favourably influencing others' background perceptions of a state's international image. For a near-term matter the existing soft power resources will need to be relied upon but this may help or hinder the grand strategy. If the grand strategy is compatible with the enveloping social context it is operating within than the soft power resources will help make it more effective and efficient. Conversely if the extant soft power resources are incompatible with the grand strategy progress will be impeded; greater material resources or more coercive means may be needed in compensation.

Manpower. In terms of allocating labour, the population are actively managed through directing employment into the important sectors of the economy and society, if necessary using various types of conscription. In this regard, the grand strategy's need has primacy for both labour allocation and in the type of targeted training individuals receive. Domestic labour is seen as a resource to be exploited.

The international labour base can be accessed through controlled immigration driven by state assessments of the critical skills the nation needs. Territorial expansion may allow short-term extraction of a labour force from newly conquered regions.

Money. Given the short-term focus, the financial emphasis is on raising funds quickly through a balance of direct and indirect taxes, and the issuing of bonds. In this approach the proportion of the grand strategy funded by taxes is likely to be significantly higher than if using any of the three other approaches; taxation is likely to be more comprehensive and more invasive. Inflation may become a concern as demand rises sharply, but not necessarily the supply. The increased taxation and the issuing of more domestic bonds will assist resisting inflationary pressures although some form of income-price policy will probably be needed. The exchange rates can also be managed and manipulated to support the short-term needs.

In the bond market, domestic bonds are preferable to seeking money internationally both to combat domestic inflation but also to avoid a dependence on offshore financial markets and any constraints they may impose. Grants from overseas sources are preferred over loans, although the mercantilist policies of the managerial approach do allow defaulting on overseas borrowings if short-term circumstances necessitate. In a similar vein, the managerial approach can make use of territorial expansion for the short-term extraction of money from conquered states in literally robbing those accessible financial assets of the other nation.

Materiel. The managerial approach is inclined to focus on making better use of existing domestic production through more intrusive and invasive state planning and control of the national economy. The national sector would grow in both scale and coverage with a strong tendency towards nationalization of key industries and a general in-sourcing of functions. The state, in being best able to command the economy for the national good, has primacy. In this regard, the main goal is increasing near-term outputs. The efficiency of production and the effectiveness of the goods produced are of less importance.

Selective use may be made of international sources especially of technology not available onshore however, the preference is for national sources as expeditiously as practical to avoid unwanted constraints on the grand strategy. Territorial expansion may also be used, focused on the short-term extraction of primary produce and raw materials such as oil, coal and iron ore.

Implications. This grand strategic approach is the most responsive and provides the greatest independence of action. Considerable autonomy can be gained allowing greater freedom of action and an enhanced ability to choose a course in international affairs largely indifferent of others' wishes or concerns. A major shortcoming is that there are real limits on the scale and sophistication of resources able to be accessed locally and thus an over-reliance on these sources may be disadvantageous. Moreover, in making the state administration and bureaucracy responsible for resource allocation there may be considerable inefficiencies introduced, as this is a complex and complicated matter difficult to direct in detail from a position that is both disconnected and high-level. Over time, the emphasis on raising outputs regardless of cost will also lead to structural problems. Together, the combination of

the growth of the state sector and the focus on near-term outputs is likely to adversely impact long-term national economic and societal development. Over the longer-term, this is a high cost grand strategy building power approach but in those pressing situations where action is essential there may be no other alternative.

The near-term managerial approach has the least dependence on others and thus suits those times when success is deemed essential. Historical examples of this approach include Germany[1], the U.K.[2] and the U.S.[3] during World War Two and the U.S. during the American Civil War[4] and World War One.[5]

Long-Term Managerial Approach Schema

The long-term managerial approach is appropriate for situations of certainty, when the future is sufficiently constrained that only a small number of alternative futures are considered realistically possible. There is time to prepare for these anticipated future challenges and opportunities and this favours using mobilization of manpower, money and material as the primary means to resource the grand strategy. Similarly legitimacy and soft power can be progressively built to the level and for the purpose needed at a defined point in the future. The long-term managerial approach knows its future needs and can confidently plan and build a society to meet these envisaged demands.

Legitimacy. The grand strategy's legitimacy is built on rhetoric that stresses that the action undertaken is in agreement with the extant social rules, the organization undertaking the grand strategy is the correct institution for dealing with this problem and has suitable expertise, and that action is being taken for reasons of a suitably supportive centralist ideology. While coercion is available, over time this becomes progressively less effective with undesirable secondary effects. Ideational appeals are both stronger and more enduring motivators.

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1. Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945*, pp. 24-25; 28-30; 35-53; 59-71; 75-82; 113-17; 220-28. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and the Breaking of the Nazi Economy*; New York: Viking, 2007, pp. 513-89.
2. Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945*, pp. 19-21; 29; 33-35; 39-41; 52-55; 84-87; 90-91; 107; 219.
3. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars,* pp. 134-72. Milward, *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945*, pp. 22-24; 63-74; 72-75; 103-04; 241-43.
4. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars,* pp. 56-93.
5. Ibid., pp. 111-33.

Soft Power. With time, efforts can be made to favourably influence others' background perceptions. Grand strategies operate within an enveloping social context (structure) and this may be able to be made more accommodating and supportive. Moreover, the long-term managerial approach assumes an understanding of future requirements making it possible to define the particular soft power resources that would be most helpful. The social structure may be able to be deliberately shaped by making use of culture, public diplomacy and place branding to upload carefully considered apposite norms and rules. Modified in this way, the social structure could then potentially indirectly influence other elites and publics. Soft power is difficult to wield and focus though so the most realistic intent of soft power development activities may be to simply incline elite and public attitudes in a positive direction.

Manpower. In terms of allocating labour, the national workforce and employment is actively managed but with an incentive of cradle-to-grave welfare for those that accept and embrace the grand strategy. As part of this, corporatist management approaches based around high-level cooperation between government, business and labour groups are likely. In this regard, the populace is viewed as a mass, rather than as a group of individuals, that needs to be trained to have the requisite skills in sufficient quantity to meet national needs. The population is to be employed and trained for the greater collective good; the people are a resource to be shaped for the long haul.

The international labour base can be accessed through controlled immigration driven by national skill needs. However, territorial expansion is unlikely to prove a satisfactory long-term source of labour, as these individuals are unlikely to be helpfully motivated by nationalist or ideological appeals; the reverse is more probable.

Money. Over the longer-term, the long-term managerial approach will prefer financing using domestic sources as it has greater control over these in terms of altering repayment conditions and schedules. The balance between direct taxes, indirect taxes and bonds may be changed over time to provide the necessary capital, combat inflation and limit unhelpful private expenditure on consumer goods. The use of indirect taxes such as excise duties and tariffs may be particularly favoured as these can also support the fostering of domestic industries. The exchange rates will be carefully managed and

manipulated to maintain the desired balance of payments and to further the states longer-term nation-building objectives.

The global financial markets may be used for long-term loans to supplement domestic sources albeit with continuing concerns over the unwanted constraints on the state's actions that these loans may impose. This factor, may lead to a preference for inwards foreign investment that can be channelled into desired nation-building projects and activities. Conversely, private investment outwards would be generally discouraged, as this would reduce the domestic capital available for national use. Territorial expansion is unlikely to prove beneficial over the longer-term for enhancing domestic financial resources as such predatory behaviour will both alienate global financial sources and lead to the diversion of domestic finance into meeting the costs of occupation.

Materiel. Economic nationalist preferences incline the long-term managerial approach to focus largely on carefully directed nation building, mainly in selected primary and secondary industries. The intent would be to pick winners, providing sizeable incentives to encourage the growth of specific desired industries. Protectionist trade policies are likely to be embraced to offset international competition in key or particularly vulnerable industrial sectors. As part of this, steps would be taken to encourage production by private companies to be kept onshore.

Economies of scale would be achieved through rationalization of domestic production sources and the favouring of big business and large companies with the intention of creating 'national champions'. State-owned and operated industries may be created especially in those sectors with little private investment; to assist this nationalization of foreign-owned businesses may be undertaken. The reliance on long-term planning is likely to lead to a progressively larger bureaucracy while the demands for greater information to inform this planning can lead to the state becoming more invasive throughout the society.

As part of the long-term nation-building focus, access to the global technology base by the private sector may be deliberately constrained through tariff and taxation policies. The intent would be to shape the use of overseas technology by companies to

that which best fits the national plan, is necessary, aids self-sufficiency and does not lead to unwanted dependence

While domestic industry is favoured, exports can significantly assist nation-building objectives. Exports can help assist balance of payments, improve economies of scale, make existing industries larger and build new industries. Exports can be assisted through subsidizing outputs intended for export, currency exchange management and adopting dumping policies.

Implications. This grand strategic approach progressively grows future national autonomy and self-sufficiency, albeit at some cost in short-term responsiveness to emerging challenges. The emphasis on planning tends to limit responsiveness to unforeseen circumstances as a certain rigidity and inflexibility is built in. In particular, this grand strategy approach may be particularly unsuited to times of significant uncertainty. Moreover, the output focus of the managerial approach inevitably leads to substantial inefficiencies with scarce resources being squandered. Accepting these shortcomings, this grand strategic approach can significantly advance national independence and self-reliance.

The long-term managerial approach seems suited for circumstances such as when the need for particular sovereign capabilities and capacities to survive and prosper in the future is clear, there is a desire for fewer constraints on possible future courses of action, or a need to lessen dependence on the international system. Historical examples of this approach include Germany 1945-75[6] , the U.K. 1945-1979[7] , Japan 1945-75[8] and the U.S. during the 1890s[9] .

Near-Term Market Approach Schema

The near-term market approach is appropriate for situations of choice, when the issue is of lesser importance with no time imperatives. The matter is near-term however, and if decisions are made to act, resourcing the grand strategy will require the timely extraction of manpower, money and material. The grand strategy must use what society

6. Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*; New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, pp. 16-19, 321-26.
7. Ibid., pp. 4-9, 74-103.
8. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*; Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 58-65; 69-70; 72-75; 335-39.
9. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars,* pp. 94-101.

can provide today, but as the matter being addressed is not the most compelling issue, attention can still be given to other near-term and longer-term issues. In general the market approach seeks to manipulate the operation of the market and use it to allocate scarce resources as part of building power for the chosen grand strategy.

Legitimacy. The grand strategy can gain legitimacy through defining a specific problem as a dangerous security risk (versus immediate threat) and creating a certain level of societal apprehension and concern. The intensity of the securitization of this problem should appear at least roughly proportionate to the sacrifices in manpower, money and material being sought. The extraction sought is then balanced by a comparable public belief in the seriousness of the risk and the likelihood of the threat eventuating. In seeking this balance however, there is a serious possibility of threat inflation. The discourse and the extraction quantum sought can become somewhat disconnected.

Soft Power. As noted earlier, in near-term matters the existing soft power resources need to be relied upon but this may assist or impede the grand strategy. The considerations remain simple: if the grand strategy is compatible with the enveloping social context than the extant soft power resources will make it more effective and efficient. Conversely if the extant soft power resources are incompatible progress will be impeded; the soft power resources will hamper the implementation of the grand strategy and measures to ameliorate this may be needed.

Manpower. In the near-term market approach reliance is placed on manipulating market forces by increasing demand in sectors important to the specific problems being addressed. There is an individual focus in the sense that individuals are expected to willingly and enthusiastically take advantage of these new opportunities that have been created. These opportunities may be made more attractive and compelling through the use of direct tax concessions and targeted financial incentives. The supply of labour and skills then automatically alters based upon the new priorities set by market forces. The demands of the grand strategy and the ambitions of individuals can be advantageously aligned at the micro-level.

Market forces can also be used to access the international skilled labour base. Incentives can be put in place that attract offshore skilled workers for the time required.

This may also be indirect through the hiring of foreign firms to supply skilled labour where and when required by the grand strategy. Given the short-term nature, immigration is less useful or necessary; the near-term market approach can readily access the global labour supply by other much more responsive means. Market approaches intrinsically possess a considerable ability to take advantage of the global workforce when implementing grand strategies.

Money. Given the short-term focus, money is likely to be extracted from both internal and external sources however there are some constraints. There is a real need to be cautious so that the methods chosen to increase extraction are compatible with the market-centric focus, especially as market-states' use of floating currency exchange rates can make a national economy particularly vulnerable to short-term financial fluctuations. The market can punish ill-considered, rushed or risky policies by moving money quickly out of the domestic economy to offshore investments and accounts considered safer. There are real constraints on the extraction methods available inherent in keeping global financial markets confident about future financial, economic and strategic policies.

The market approaches' natural preference is to limit direct taxes on individuals, and to favour a greater emphasis on domestic bonds and international financial sources when increasing extraction. Given this, and the need to continually reassure markets, direct tax rates may be lowered and financial incentives provided to businesses in an attempt to create a short-term boost to GDP growth. This may be undertaken in conjunction with the sharply increased use of short-term international bonds to quickly provide greater liquidity.

Such policies may fuel inflation, although opening international trade further can provide greater competition and limit this inflation to only particular sectors, as well as pleasing global financial markets. A more serious difficulty is that raising the sector's financial deficit may limit future spending potentially impairing GDP growth prospects. Moreover, if debt repayment becomes seemingly problematic, the possibility of sovereign debt default may cause significant financial turbulence making accessing international financial sources much more costly and difficult.

Materials. The primary reliance is on private industry and commercial sources, as these are considered inherently more effective and efficient than any state-owned entity. The most competitive commercial sources, domestically or internationally, will be favoured although competitiveness may be framed more in terms of timeliness than efficiency or effectiveness. In this, increased demands on the private sector may lead to a larger administrative bureaucracy as the need to manage new contracts grows.

A major advantage of a market approach when implementing a grand strategy is this remarkable ability to rapidly access the immense material resources of the international system, albeit at a price. These resources are not just on a large scale, but also can be expected to be of a quality and technological sophistication not generally available nationally.

Implications. This grand strategic approach allows access to considerable resources relatively quickly allowing the implementation of more expansive grand strategies than be practical using domestic resources alone, although these grand strategies must be limited to those that are acceptable to the markets. Increased responsiveness is therefore offset by some loss of national autonomy and independence. In basing resource allocation on the market there is potential for high efficiency although the pressures of time may mean less than optimum solutions are adopted.

In this approach there is a premium placed on intelligent and sophisticated policymaking and administration, as success is dependent on both continuing market concurrence and ensuring high-quality implementation of aspects of the grand strategy by commercial enterprises. This grand strategy can quickly unravel if the market perceives this policymaking as incoherent and contradictory. In combination, the various factors suggest the use of this grand strategic approach in situations and matters where there are some choices on where, when and how they act.

Historical examples of this approach include America during the Presidencies of Johnson (1964-1968)[10] and Reagan (1980-1988)[11], and the German grand strategy focused on Russia (1990-1994)[12].

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10. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*, p. 187-92; 235-36. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars,* pp. 207-26.

Long-Term Market Approach Schema

The long-term market approach is appropriate for situations of uncertainty, when a range of different futures are possible, accurate definition is problematic, and the future needs are unsure. There is time to prepare, although the precise future is uncertain, and accordingly mobilization of manpower, money and material is favoured. Similarly legitimacy and soft power can be progressively built up although with some intrinsic difficulties as the specific purpose is unknown. The long-term market approach while unsure of its future needs endeavours to grow its parent society to be in a position to be able to confidently deal with any of the range of alternative futures that actually occur. In general the market approach seeks to manipulate the operation of the market and use it to allocate scarce resources as part of building power for the chosen grand strategy.

Legitimacy. The legitimacy of the grand strategy is sought through appeals to long-term personal self-interest; the grand strategy will make individuals better off in terms of creating lasting security and prosperity. The positive benefits of the grand strategy for individuals are stressed rather than the dangers of some determined menace. In this regard, the issue is expressed more in human security terms than as being simply about wider group interests. People must be willing to actively support over the longer term the mobilization sought to implement the grand strategy. An apparent personal vested interest will ensure more enduring support than relying on securitizing a threat that, over time, will be intensely analysed and debated in the public discourse and may progressively become of less tangible concern.

Soft Power. As discussed earlier, given time, efforts can be made to favourably influence others' background perceptions of the state's international image. In this case though the future is less well known and so the particular direction that the grand strategy enveloping social structure should be shaped is less certain. A broad approach may be necessary to attempt to make the social structure at least partly accommodating across the range of possible alternative futures. Culture, public diplomacy and place

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11. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*, pp. 236-44. Hormats, *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars,* pp. 227-50.
12. Randall E. Newnham, *Deutsche Mark Diplomacy: Positive Economic Sanctions in German-Russian Relations*; University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002, pp. 227-87. Celeste A. Wallander, *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War*; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 41-58; 70-83.

branding can be used to upload appropriate norms and rules to modify the social structure in an attempt to incline elite and public attitudes in a positive direction.

Manpower. In the allocation of people to the implementation of specific grand strategies, market forces can be manipulated by increasing demand in sectors deemed important over the longer-term. There is time to shape the domestic manpower base in terms of encouraging population growth and through national skills development. Individually focused incentives can be used to persuade people to take up the new opportunities emerging. In this regard, the logic of the market impels the deregulation of labour markets to encourage labour flexibility and mobility but also to support the use of all members of a society. In a market approach, no sector of the population can sensibly be denied access to employment or skilling though outmoded laws, regulations or traditions, rather the market should decide. Given time, the long-term market approach can make unimpeded use of all of the society.

In this situation, market forces drive accessing the global labour force however, from the viewpoint of mobilization focused immigration becomes more attractive. Incentives can be put in place to attract the quantity and quality of individuals that best fit the long-term demands of the grand strategy. National demand can be manipulated to drive international supply over a protracted period.

Money. The long-term market approach will prefer to constrain government spending aiming to reduce deficits, lower taxes and limit the need for government bonds. Encouragement is given to private funds to invest in productive commercial enterprises rather than transfer capital through taxes or bonds to less beneficial state sector activities. This consideration holds for both domestic and international financial sources however, if there is a need to use deficit financing, global sources are favoured to avoid using scarcer domestic funds. International finance sources are seen as a most useful complement to domestic savings.

The market approach conceives that GDP growth is critical but that this can best be accomplished over the longer-term by actively encouraging private businesses. Financial polices are accordingly directed towards this end and include a floating currency, low inflation targets and independent central banks as a means to impart a market discipline across society. Given the emphasis on individuals seizing

opportunities themselves and being less dependent on the group, lower direct taxes and a limited role for government are favoured. The combination of these factors mean that over the longer-term the demands of the market can exert considerable direct and indirect influence on the grand strategy; national autonomy and independence is qualified.

Materiel. The market approach is focused on domestic consumption by individual consumers with the long-term development of the economy and of society accomplished mainly through market forces. Winners are not backed, instead use is made of micro-level deregulation to enhance overall national productivity and economic growth.

The long-term market approach does not mandate that production should be onshore, preferring instead that it should be located where the domestic businesses can become most globally competitive. In particular, exports need to be kept competitive as the market approach favours reciprocal free trade rather than subsidies. If subsidies are needed, they are likely to be targeted to advantage particular types of individuals and companies in certain industrial sectors; the inputs to exports are subsidized not the quantum of outputs. In this regard, the state may find its role principally in contracting services that can lower overall business costs such as a nation-wide medical care system that achieves economies of scale, shares the costs between all taxpayers, and keeps the national workforce vigorous.

There is less planning and provision of services and so the bureaucracy and administration can be smaller and quite restricted in areas of responsibility. There is a strong tendency to outsourcing functions and to making the maximum use of private companies as these are considered inherently the most effective and efficient option. Public-private partnerships and privatization are favoured. The bureaucracy associated with the state can be limited and regularly subject to efficiency programs, including fixed budgets and external reviews. However, the gradual impact of this approach can be to make the state sector less capable and less competent. This may make the limited national policymaking expertise available unhelpfully restricted to narrow specific areas rather than being broadly based and capable of taking a wider, more comprehensive perspective.

Implications. This grand strategic approach allows access to considerable resources in a timely manner although again the grand strategy alternatives are limited to those that are acceptable to the markets. High responsiveness is offset by a loss of national autonomy and independence. In sustaining such an approach the global and domestic markets must have considerable confidence that over the longer-term the grand strategy implementation will continue to favour the market. If there is some market uncertainty, there may be unhelpful investments in only those industry sectors where flight can be both easy and quick. The national economy may become progressively less balanced and robust, with the society increasingly vulnerable to global events in which it has no involvement and become particularly sensitive to international shocks. In this, the grand strategy may become progressively more fragile over time.

The long-term market approach has the lowest cost in that there is a high potential that the least inefficiencies will be introduced into the economy and society. This grand strategy though calls for consistent long-term high-quality policymaking that successfully integrates political, economic and strategic decisions. Historical examples include America during the Presidencies of Madison (1809-1816),[13] Truman (1945-1952),[14] Eisenhower (1953-1960)[15] and Clinton (1993-2000).[16]

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