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Author:

Jamrozik, Adam

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Sydney, 5-7 July 1989

Volume 3: Concurrent Sessions
Ideology, Philosophy and Political
Environment of Social Policy

edited by

Adam Jamrozik



Social Policy Research Centre

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FOREWORD

This report is one of six published by the Social Policy Research Centre and based on papers presented to the National Social Policy Conference held at the University of New South Wales on 5-7 July 1989. The overall theme of the Conference was **Social Policy in Australia: What Future for the Welfare State?** The six reports are published in the Social Policy Research Centre **Reports and Proceedings** series with the following numbers and titles:

No. 79 Volume 1: Plenary Sessions, edited by Peter Saunders and Adam Jamrozik.

No. 80 Volume 2: Concurrent Sessions. Contributions from the Social Policy Research Centre, edited by Peter Saunders.

No. 81 Volume 3: Concurrent Sessions. The Ideology, Philosophy and Political Environment of Social Policy, edited by Adam Jamrozik.

No. 82 Volume 4: Concurrent Sessions. Social Policies in Australia and New Zealand, edited by Russell Ross.

No. 83 Volume 5: Concurrent Sessions. Income Maintenance and Income Security, edited by Peter Whiteford.

No. 84 Volume 6: Concurrent Sessions. Community Services: Policy and Practice, edited by Sara Graham.

The papers included in this report cover issues relating to ideological, philosophical and political aspects of social policy in the late twentieth century Australian welfare state. They are issues which are of great significance, even if many of them are often lost sight of by those who focus on narrow economic aspects of the welfare state. Some of the papers raise important theoretical and conceptual issues that are too often neglected in a discipline which has become increasingly focused on practical policy analysis. Fundamental concerns about such matters as citizenship, political equality, corporatism, and gender are also important in the broader social policy debate, as the papers in this report illustrate.

The Conference on which this report is based was designed to bring together a range of individuals, researchers and practitioners working throughout Australia on contemporary social policy issues, and to provide a national forum for the exchange of ideas, information, analysis and results. The Conference was always seen by the Centre as a way of raising the profile of debates on social policy research and analysis, rather than as a platform for the expression of definitive conclusions or particular points of view. If the social policy debate in Australia is to be taken as seriously as the economic policy debate is currently, there is not only a need for more research, but also for more critical debate and assessment of the issues raised by that research.

It was extremely encouraging to see from the total number of contributed papers presented at the Conference, as well as from the many stimulating discussions generated during the Conference, that social policy research in Australia is already attracting a good deal of attention from individuals from a broad range of disciplinary perspectives. In publishing the papers in this and the other reports from the Conference, the Social Policy Research Centre aims to make available to a wide audience a body of work on social policy that reflects the state of the discipline in Australia at the end of the 1980s. The Centre itself does not assume responsibility for the views expressed in the papers in this and its companion reports. It does, however, hold firmly to the view that a healthy research environment is crucially dependent upon publication and critical review of research papers and results.

The Centre is already planning a second National Social Policy Conference to take place in July 1991. These plans, along with the release of this report, are part of a broader strategy designed to enhance the nature of the Australian social policy debate, thereby creating a more conducive climate for the development of social policies that address our social problems.

Peter Saunders
Director

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POVERTY AND SOCIAL THEORY

Peter Beilharz
Department of Sociology
La Trobe University

1. INTRODUCTION

Poverty has always been a marginal issue in modernity, in public life and in social theory alike. This paper sets out to worry about the connection; because it is arguably the case that poverty is marginal in sociology because it is marginal to social theory. Social theory - classical and modern - places the division of labour at its core; it provides little assistance to those who wish poverty to be a central issue. Postmodernism contributes further to this process by reproducing in theory the division between economy and culture. What this suggests is the need for a new approach to social theory, which begins from citizenship rather than industrial function, and integrates ethics, economy and culture rather than sundering them.

The emergence of the public sphere is one of the defining events of modernity. Henceforth there is a public agenda, which needs in principle only to be set. Modernity offers prospects yet to be fulfilled, for this public sphere has since its inception been less than adequately exercised. The economisation of politics and the functionalisation of society mean that the agenda is set in economic or administrative ways by groups which dominate the economic system (Triado, 1984). In this context what is surprising is not that poverty keeps slipping off the agenda, but that it ever gets on at all.

There is no single explanation for the perpetual marginalisation of poverty in modernity. In some ways it is merely to be expected that the priorities of the socially marginalised will themselves remain marginalised politically. If we are to get beyond the tautologies of functionalism, however, we need to ask what role social theory has in all this. What I want to propose here is that rather than merely 'reflecting' the status quo, social theory has been actively complicit in the process of marginalising poverty. This is not just a problem of the division of labour between sociology and social administration or social work. Rather it is a problem to do with social theory's own obsession with the division of labour as such. This fascination has led to an overwhelming concentration upon the social system understood as economic system, and a corresponding concern with inequalities within the labour market constructed by this system to the detriment of those outside that system.

If we imagine, as I believe we ought, that there is a direct relationship between the way in which we construct images of the world and the way in which we think about policy, then the issue becomes more clearly significant (Beilharz, 1987). Theory matters, not because of any allegedly talismanic powers, but because it is more, or less, helpful. Better theory enables, potentially, whereas limited theory is disempowering. In short, proposals concerning the centrality of poverty are constrained by the limits of social theories for which poverty is marginal.

2. MARX AND POVERTY

How does social theory foreclose on poverty? For simplicity of argument, I focus here on marxism and fabianism, referring briefly to postmodernism and what follows critical theory. Marx is a central figure in this scenario, because the path of his life's work shows a growing and fatal embrace with industrial civilization via the systems-theory that is **Capital**. Across the period from the 1840s to the late 1860s Marx redefines poverty by inserting pauperism into capitalism, in the figure of the proletarian. As Heinz Lubasz has shown, poverty was a central issue for the young Marx, arguably the issue which took him to socialism in the first place. The young Marx is confronted by two forms of poverty, that experienced by the incorporated and the unincorporated masses in Prussia. The unincorporated are without welfare rights because they are without estate, excluded from civil society. Marx's spleen was vented on proposed changes to the wood gathering laws exactly because people deprived of economic rights are deprived of citizenship as well (Marx, 1842; Lubasz, 1976).

The theme of social insiders and outsiders is part of the air in the 1840s. Disraeli, Gaskell, Kingsley and others also felt it. In Marx the theme is lost, eventually, as Marx subsequently 'discovers' or constructs a new category, the proletariat. Paupers, those without estate or rights are now subsumed under this new category (Lovell, 1988). Marx's proletariat is based on a trick of definition - it is the last class, the class which is in bourgeois society but not of it, internal and external to it at the same time. The focus is on the incorporated alone. By the time Marx finishes *Capital*, the proletariat is very clearly internal to the economic system of capitalism. The two fundamental classes are given by the two fundamental categories, labour and capital. Citizens are replaced by proletarians, in this argument; poverty is subsumed to class and the surplus population recast as the reserve army of unemployed (Marx, 1867: Chapter 25). Now plainly Marx makes here a practical observation, that poverty occurs *within* the labour market, too. What we lose, however, is any sense of society outside the economic system. 'Proletariat' replaces 'poverty'. Individuals, the sensuous, suffering social beings who populate Marx's early work, are now reconstructed as the structural bearers of class roles, theatrical character-masks of labour and capital alike. The social system is read as the economic system, citizenship subsumed to class. And thus opens the long marxisant farce which culminates in recent bizarre disputes about 'productive' and 'unproductive' labour, class belonging and the moral and social privilege of the proletariat, as though this really made any difference to issues of how we live and how we ought to live (Beilharz, 1987/1988).

Marx's fascination, in this context as in others, is in the transitional character of his thought. For the early, romantic Marx, as for Schiller, the self-developing individual was the measure of all things (Schiller, 1795; Kain, 1982). Poverty makes more sense to Marx in this context than it does later. By *Capital* the division of humans was fate, if not yet destiny, and class was the primary manifestation of the division of labour. Outsiders to the system figured only as lumpen proletarians, residuals, like the petty-bourgeoisie, from an earlier mode of production. Individuals were now defined by economic function; the bourgeoisie was itself anachronistic, because labour had the world-historic task of reclaiming its function from capital. By the turn of the century, the language of function had become more widely used, not least of all by fabianism and its secret theorist, Durkheim.

3. THE FABIANS AND DURKHEIM

For the Fabians function was the essential determinant of citizenship, only capitalists, too, had their function. Social inclusion meant possession of function in the social machine (Webb, 1889). Durkheim's sociology provides a symmetrical, if more developed view: the division of labour is now destiny, and only those who partake in it experience human interdependence and thus assist in the production of the morality which holds society together (Durkheim, 1893). For Durkheim, as for the Webbs, merit should overwhelm inheritance, and function confer meaning. For Durkheim, the hope of reform rested with the notion of just contract (Durkheim, 1893:316-332). The argument was still corporatistic, for it presumed economic role to perform political rights even in the best of all possible situations. As Anna Yeatman argues, with Durkheim natural right becomes functional right, which marginalises activity construed as non productive, and thus marginalises spheres of activity such as state and family (Yeatman, 1988:19).

Durkheim's hope was that the spread of professional ethics throughout the division of labour would produce social morality (Durkheim, 1890). For the Webbs, in addition, function could be viewed in terms of service. Function became a central theme in British socialism (Wright, 1983); the function of individuals was to serve each other through the division of labour. Service summoned up medieval ethics against those of capitalism. The result of this argument is mixed. On the one hand, function defined in terms of reciprocal relations between individuals of differing talents represents an advance on the productivism or workerism bequeathed us by the late Marx. Fabianism, arguably more in the hands of G. D. H. Cole than the Webbs, thus offers the prospect of an alternative functionalism, or the image of a society where people's places are defined by their social function rather than their economic function. On the other hand, a functional theory of citizenship which is not subsumed to the principles of political economy still defines humans by their places, not by their own attributes. As the early Marx understood, we need to define humanity empirically, not categorically. Even if we widen function to take in, say, the work of caring or domestic labour, we are still privileging some kinds of social activities over others and using these as the benchmark of citizenship.

For the moment, in any case, we suffer a functional theory of citizenship constructed within the symbolic universe of bourgeois civilization. The idea of service, like that of civics, may have some rhetorical use as a strategy against

bourgeois notions of function, but for now we still struggle against both. What this means is that, in sociology, we still labour within a conceptual framework for which inequality is located between classes (Marx) or between those who inherit property and those who do not (Durkheim, the Webbs). Consequently sociology is ill-equipped to address the problem of individuals outside the economic system as it is defined by bourgeois society. The fact that we have no category more precise than that of the 'underclass', itself an echo of the nineteenth century 'underworld' to cover the socially excluded bears pathetic testimony to this identification of social system with economic system and of citizenship with 'productive' function. Exclusion becomes an anomaly, rather than a problem warranting analysis, or resolution. Thus contemporary marxism can tell us about the labour process in the factory but not about work in the home, or can speak to us of alienation in labour but tell us nothing about social alienation from the system, as the inheritors of fabianism may assure us that the solution to *anomie* is to universalise productive status by inserting all into positions within the labour market, as though that were either possible or desirable.

4. POSTMODERNISM AND POVERTY

The dominant trend in modern social theory is no more helpful. Postmodernism frequently argues that image becomes 'reality', culture replaces economy, relativism explodes judgement. Few theorists attracted to the category relate it to the market, a hilarious lapse given that postmodern culture is so conspicuously mediated through markets. Both major classes within capitalism may be able to purchase different component parts of postmodern culture, but those outside the system are effectively precluded from access to it. Within sociology there are few attempts to make sense of these problems. Exceptions include *Legislators and Interpreters* by Zygmunt Bauman and the work of Jeremy Seabrook (Bauman, 1987; Seabrook, 1985). Both, significantly, return to the theme of the two nations. Scott Lash and John Urry also usefully attempt to connect up the analysis of economy and postmodern culture in *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Such attempts to make sense of contemporary social problems are obliged to contest certain fundamental premises in bourgeois thinking. They return implicitly to classical considerations, for example to the question of what exactly constitutes economic activity - the factory, or also the *oikos*? And they implicitly question fundamental premises of classical liberalism, for example the notion that poverty is a problem of the private sphere rather than the public sphere. Postmodernity is less than helpful here because it too often seems to read interest in economy as interest in bourgeois economy. Thus it tends to posit culture where classical social theory privileged economy. Bryan Turner, for example - hardly himself a postmodernist *furieux*, shows the influence of postmodernism when he argues that the cultural realm 'becomes somewhat dissociated from the economic and political systems, and the competitive struggle within the cultural field produces an explosion of cultural signs and a cacophony of lifestyles' (Turner, 1988:77-78). At this moment Marx returns with a vengeance - for the message of his brilliant insight, 'all that is solid melts into air', is exactly that the characteristics postmodernism believes to be radically new, are themselves an essential attribute of capitalism itself (Marx and Engels, 1848; Berman, 1983). And as soon as we cease to speak of capitalism, poverty effectively 'disappears'.

5. AFTER MARX, AFTER MARCUSE

Citizenship calls on individual self-development. Property vitally constrains or facilitates the attainment of autonomy. The marginality produced by capitalism is not to be admired, contrary to Marcuse; those outside the system cannot overthrow it, but themselves need citizenship (Marcuse, 1964). Others, who come after critical theory, can help to clarify some of these problems. Jurgen Habermas and Agnes Heller develop in different ways the claim of Max Weber, that modern societies are best understood as coexisting and plural spheres of existence (Habermas, 1987; Heller, 1988; and see Walzer, 1984). These premises allow us to argue that the functional status conferred upon us, say, in the division of labour, ought not determine our identity as such, in other spheres of existence. The theory of Alain Touraine can also contribute to the process of rethinking poverty within social theory as a prerequisite to arguing afresh for its social significance (see for example Touraine, 1989), though it may be that what we need is a para-industrial rather than post-industrial sociology; the problem may be less to transcend industrialism than to return it to its appropriate sphere.

To argue in this way is to call for a new reformism. Reform, like liberalism and the Enlightenment, is a project we still work within. What is interesting is how little we have allowed reformism to actually exercise our minds. Anthony Giddens backs into some of these issues in a paper entitled 'Nine Theses on the Future of Sociology'

(Giddens, 1987). **Contra** Foucault, we are stuck with social engineering; to vacate the space around it is merely to give it over to other hands (Rorty, 1985). As Giddens proposes, we need not only to take social movements seriously, but also to rethink the field between theory, research and policy which has traditionally provided a safe home for fabians. After Foucault, the idea of policy engineers as a belatedly Hegelian universal class is something less than attractive. Marx's hope for a utopia without politics or classes clearly will not help either. But all social theories are formed by utopias, and so, by extension, are arguments within policy: they necessarily rest upon, and summon up different images of the good society (Beilharz, 1989).

Contrary to the presuppositions of generations of radicals, it is in fact Weber who begins to provide grounds for rethinking theory here. For too long Weber has been read either as the geographically misplaced founder of American sociology or, more lately, as the nihilistic philosopher of rationalization. For our purposes, Weber is arguably useful because his theory does not rest on a fascination with divisions of labour, but rather with power as such, and action. The limits of his own, liberally-welfarist political views need not constrain us (Mommsen, 1987) for notwithstanding his own commitment to ideas of work, and vocation, Weber understood action, and not work to be the central sociological category (Offe, 1985). Opening the optic of social theory in this way is as expansive a gesture as is that of Castoriadis, in returning us to the proposition that it is creation, and not work, which is the key attribute of humanity (Castoriadis, 1987). What these thinkers share is a refusal of system and of evolution (the partial exception being Habermas). Consequently they each, in different ways, invite us to think about the person and his or her place in the good society. It is this which helps explain the only superficially surprising sympathies between radical social theory today and English 'ethical socialism'; both spring from German idealism, in different ways, and both take antiquity seriously, because they view the human condition as a perpetual problem. Both view citizenship as a primary issue, and commence from subject toward system (via intersubjectivity). Both view the nation as the practical unit to which citizens belong; citizens belong to the national community and not to the 'social system' or economic system. It is belonging, on this view, which confers rights and responsibilities, and not the place in the division of labour. It is ethics to which we appeal, here, and no longer science.

So where does this leave us? Theory itself possesses no great riches, it does nothing in itself. What social theory does do is offer us terms of discourse for making sense of the world and arguing about policies in that world. My argument here has been that classical social theory, especially in Marx and Durkheim, is effectively hostile to the problem of poverty, because it constructs it as an issue marginal to the core problems of the social system. I do not believe that changing the terms of discourse will have any radical effects in itself. I am proposing, however, that our capacities to affect agendas are only likely to be as good as the arguments we develop over the next generation. As Weber understood, the challenge is on us to choose our values and argue for them, in theory and in policy alike. The confluence of bourgeois political economy and systems theory which has dominated much of modern social theory has left us ethically speechless before such central problems as poverty. It is well nigh time to put social theory to work, in order to develop a vocabulary that might enable us to break this silence by placing the discourse concerning the good society back onto the public agenda.

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POLICY, DOMESTIC LABOUR AND GENDER: CONFLICTS, CONTRADICTIONS AND CHANGE

Paul Close
Department of Social Policy
Massey University, New Zealand

In this paper I present an argument about the links between family life, gender relationships and economic structures and processes as mediated by the state and social policy. The paper focuses on the way 'the family-gender-economy-state nexus' operates through the social activities and processes of domestic labour (housework, childcare). The argument is strongly influenced by critical structuralism (as found in, for instance, recent Marxism and feminism), and accordingly utilises the notions of **control**, **conflict** and especially **contradiction** to account for the character and changes exhibited by this nexus. Essentially, the argument is that the social relationships directly associated with domestic labour have a twofold-contradictory character which is dialectically related to

- a) the economy centred on capitalist production and accumulation, and
- b) (changes in) the state, social policy and social welfare, but which in the final analysis presents an irresistible driving force towards fundamental change in favour of women.

I would like to begin by presenting a model I am in the process of developing of what, at least for the time being, I regard as the principal, proximate structural elements associated with the social activities and processes of domestic labour. I wish to emphasise that the model is not meant to be an exhaustive representation of all the (even major) items which are in some way related to these activities and processes. It is designed to spotlight core or nodal elements which then (as a package) relate in some way to - need to be examined and understood in terms of - such further social features as the state, culture and ideology (topics touched on later in the paper).

Domestic labour	Labour power	Public (capitalist) production (surplus value, profits, capital accumulation)
Housework and childcare	Parenting	People production (Anthroponomic process)
Division of (domestic) labour	Gender (identities, roles, relationships)	Sex/gender system
Responsibility	Control/power	Patriarchy
Contradiction	Human potential	Social change/progress

My argument about the development of social policy and social welfare in Australia - as in Western capitalist societies of 'liberal democracies' in general - hinges on a view of the state as engaging (not necessarily uniquely) in the dual and double-edged activities of

- i) individual care (through which it intentionally and effectively contributes to the satisfaction of human needs and the realisation of human potential), and
- ii) social control (through which it intentionally and effectively helps maintain social order and the status quo, and in particular the prevailing overall distribution of power and control).

Immediately, the possibility arises of the dual activities of care and control being mere analytical distinctions: of, in practice, the two activities occurring as the Janus-headed manifestations of the same social activity (perhaps mirroring the Janus-headed - consensual and coercive - character of a society overall). It is possible that in practice care entails and requires a degree of control; and that control is - if not wholly dependent upon care - facilitated and enhanced by the provision of care. At the same time, this does not preclude the further possibility of, in practice, either care or control having primacy as a goal or purpose or mechanism: with, moreover, the balance in favour of one side being

(not constant, but) socially variable and contingent. Thus, in practice, the balance may be dependent upon (if not dictated by) broader social concerns and interests linked to the overall distribution of power and control in society (and so upon the interests of, say, the capitalist class or the collectivity of men), and accordingly may be understood in terms of its ('functional') contribution to the maintenance of social order and the status quo (of capitalism or patriarchy). In other words, perhaps control will have (empirical and theoretical) primacy over care, whereby the latter is pursued largely to the extent that it contributes to the former, and thereby social order, and so on. Even so, it needs to be emphasised, that the everyday operational details, experience and meanings of care and control will be far from completely identical or congruent. The differences which distinguish 'what it means to care' and 'what it means to control' are abundantly detectable at the level of 'human agency', and need to be recognised and taken into account at the level of theorising about (developments in) the state and social policy in relation to domestic labour. Thus, one writer reflects the everyday experience and meanings of 'care' in the following way:

Caring helps to ensure life goes on by producing primary goods and a positive environment for children and adults. Caring helps ... prevent disease, promote health, [protect] the vulnerable, educate the population, and raise human relationships to satisfying experiences of pleasure, security, trust, growth and positive activity. Love, hate, fear, happiness, anger, pleasure, or any other human emotion may have the growth-producing, energy generating, motivating and consistently positive effects of caring. [But, whereas] all other human feelings have potentially negative effects as well as positive ones, ... caring by its nature and definition is only and always positive.
(Olivia Bevis, 1981)

This one-sided and idealised representation of care, in stressing the positive side and ignoring the negative (associated with social control), is consistent with that approach to the interpretation and definition of social policy indicated in the words used by W. H. Oliver to open the Introductory Chapter of Volume 1 (New Zealand Today) of The Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy, April 1988, (p. 3):

This paper takes 'social policy' to include all those things deliberately done by government to promote well-being and to limit the effects of misfortune, primarily in terms of material advantages and disadvantages.

This affirmative and prescriptive conceptualisation of social policy can be contrasted with a variety of more rounded but critical versions, such as those of a Marxist persuasion (Gough, 1979; Cole, 1986; Rodger, 1988). For these writers, social policy is primarily about managing social control and maintaining social order in the interests of capitalism: through, for instance, the provision of social welfare (social care) to ameliorate deprivation, oppression and exploitation just enough to defuse the imminent disruptive, rebellious and revolutionary responses of (in the first instance) the working class. In accordance with the Althusserian framework, the state, social policy and the social services are part of the 'ideological state apparatus', helping to secure (following Gramsci) capitalist hegemony.

The control approach to state social policy has widespread appeal, as indicated in a recent (unpublished) article by Elisabeth Bunyan on 'The function of Article 25, the "right to subsistence", of the Japanese constitution: or "Is poverty legally recognised in Japan?"' (November, 1988). (Elisabeth Bunyan is the author of 'Down and out in Tokyo. A study of Japan's homeless people and the process of negative social mobility', written as an Honours thesis in the Department of Japanese Studies, Monash University, 1987):

Throughout the paper ... the assumption that the Japanese welfare system can be explained adequately in terms of traditional Japanese values is queried. It is my contention that under the guise of welfare the state actually seeks to maintain social inequalities, thereby buttressing the system and its own ideological control. In the hands of the Japanese state, welfare becomes a tool which will work against the supposed beneficiary, when it suits the overall schema to do so. (Bunyan, 1987, p. 2)

I wish to argue that the caring facet of state social policy is accompanied and conditioned by a social control facet (the latter having intentional, effective and explanatory primacy over the former), which then entails contradictions. However, I will be more precise - moving beyond the vague, ambiguous and catch-all way in which the notion of 'contradiction' has been used in various places elsewhere (see, for instance, (Gough, 1979, pp. 11-15; Offe, 1974) by

- i) specifically defining 'contradiction', and
- ii) proposing that the (development of) state social policy and social welfare may be understood as the source of and, in turn (dialectically), a response to a 'critical' combination of contradictions.

For me, the best (or sociologically most relevant and rewarding) way of defining 'contradiction' is:

the occurrence of the simultaneous affirmation (support) and negation (denial) of an issue, item or element within 'the social' (such as parental autonomy and control, childhood development towards independence, and female emancipation and equality).

In the case of (the development of) state social policy and welfare in modern Western societies, there occurs by virtue of the state's two-faced care-control activity a twofold-contradiction. On the one hand, the state through care affirmatively furthers the satisfaction of human needs and the realisation of human potential, but through control partially (negatively) denies human needs and stifles human potential. On the other hand, the state through control affirmatively supports social order, but (negatively) through care contributes to the problematic character of social order - if only by virtue of the way in which care elevates the aspirations and expectations of 'the need' or it actually satisfies human needs and helps realise human potential. (Here I am alluding to the sociological pertinence and value of the notion of 'relative deprivation' as used in reference group theory. See, for instance, W. G. Runciman's *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, 1972; and K. Kumar's *Revolution*, 1971.)

The resulting twofold-contradiction in turn (dialectically) becomes the spur for sustained (albeit undulating) state intervention, social policy and social welfare designed to provide (and perhaps re-dress the balance within) care-control, in that it (re)generates at the level of 'human agency' (individual, collective) dissatisfaction, tension and conflict - seeds of social disruption; threats to social order and the status quo.

Social contradictions are, by virtue of being (eventually), self-resolving (by way of human agency, consciousness and action), the driving mechanism behind social change and progress. In particular, there is a twofold-contradiction driving the state through changes and stages in social policy and social welfare, forever seeking and trying 'something new' in the face of the failures and threats associated with the prevailing and previous stages. Thus, recently, the state in Western societies has 'drifted to the new-Right', and so towards the policies of decentralisation, deinstitutionalisation and deregulation.

The continuing need for state intervention, social policy and social welfare - and moreover the continuing need for these things to be modified and adapted - may well reflect the double-edged, care-control and twofold-contradictory character of social policy in relation to, primarily and principally, class as the major locus of dissatisfaction, tension, conflict and change in Western societies. However, I will pursue the same theme within the area of gender relationships, division and inequalities (the sex-gender system), in particular as these impinge upon the performance of domestic labour. I will do this if only because of the relatively recent (re)discovery of the social importance and sociological significance of these trends of social life - especially since the 1960s. Thus, due to the emergence and influence of **radical feminism**, the sex-gender system competes with class over empirical and theoretical primacy in the context of Western (and perhaps all) societies. Certainly, at least, there is a far from resolved debate over the balance and links between class and gender in social (sociological) theory, and perhaps progress can be made in this regard with the help of the notion of 'contradiction'.

A bridging point might be made. I strongly support a particular interpretation of the impact on gender relationships of the state's recent move to the new-Right in Western societies, as exemplified in its social policies (in relation to the economy and social welfare) of decentralisation, deinstitutionalisation and deregulation. According to this interpretation, despite (contrary to) the state's purported interest in shifting the burden of (responsibility for) care to the individual, the family and the community, in practice this burden has been (further) shifted onto the shoulders of women (see Close, 1989; Ungerson, 1985; Dalley, 1988; Lewis and Meredith, 1988). In other words, the new-Right has, in practice (consistent with its conservative values in this regard) relied on, confirmed and strengthened the 'traditional' gender division of domestic labour, albeit in a somewhat disguised fashion. That is, the strengthening of women's traditional 'triple shift' of care (for children and husbands [partners]; the elderly; the sick), is being accomplished behind the mask of an ideological emphasis on the rights, responsibilities and opportunities of the individual, the family and the community.

At the same time, as well as this shift in the burden of care from the state to women being hidden under the mantle of (traditional, conservative, reactionary) ideology, in a compound fashion it is being disguised by an apparent (countervailing) progressive shift in the gender (conjugal) division of domestic labour. This (I will argue) superficial redistribution of domestic labour from women towards 'the New Man' effectively hides a persistent (and strengthened) 'traditional' division of domestic labour at an underlying, more fundamental and sociologically significant level (to be clarified) of participation in housework, childcare, parenting and so on. Of course, this may well be far from surprising to those who are influenced by feminist analyses of the state, according to which there is a degree of association and unity between state social policy and the collective interest of men as manifested in the persistence of patriarchy.

For much of the course of the 1980s, I was involved in a research project on domestic labour in the north-east of England. The study, being about domestic labour, covered (in crude terms) housework and childcare (parenting). At the same time, domestic labour can be conceptualised more technically as that labour which creates and re-creates (produces and re-produces, intra-generationally and inter-generationally) labour power. The latter then has use value, and under capitalism, exchange value. In capitalist society, after being exchanged on the market for wages, labour power is consumed by capitalists (or their agents) at the point of capitalist production, where it becomes the source of surplus value and so of capitalist profits and accumulation.

The project included fieldwork using a mail questionnaire sent to 1,000 households (married couples with young children), resulting in about 350 usable responses, followed by in-depth interviews with a 10 per cent sub-sample.

The derived data clearly suggests that the performance of domestic labour in modern Britain (as in other Western societies, such as Australia - see Lois Bryson, 1985; and Lois Bryson and Michael Bittman, 1989) is firmly gendered. However, the data also lends itself to the (perhaps novel) conclusion that gender is superimposed upon the performance of domestic labour in a very particular, somewhat socially hidden, and thereby sociologically significant way. Essentially, the performance of domestic labour remains gendered in a highly biased fashion towards (or against) women along the basic and most important dimension or level of participation, that of BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR the social activities and process covered.

The significance of this bias is that it reflect and reinforces a patriarchal distribution of power in modern society despite, and contrary to, any changes which may have occurred in the division of domestic labour at other levels of participation. Changes will have been largely confined to the relatively superficial (and less demanding) level of 'merely doing' or 'helping with' domestic labour. Even so, such changes will have the effect of contributing to the ideological apparatus which masks and 'functionally' serves the persistent traditional division at the underlying and more fundamental level being responsible for domestic labour - in the sense of being obliged or duty-bound to make sure that domestic labour is carried out and completed in some way and by someone in an effective and satisfactory manner.

The study strongly supports the claim that the persistence of a gendered division of domestic labour at the level of responsibility signifies the perpetuation of a patriarchal distribution of power, whereby men (collectively) are able to delegate everyday 'managerial responsibility' for the performance of domestic labour, and thereby are able to ultimately monitor, regulate and control its performance. The notion of 'managerial responsibility' is being used in this context figuratively and loosely - in recognition of the way in which some (but not all) of the features which characterise the distribution and exercise of power, control and responsibility within the **private sphere of domestic production** are similar to those which characterise the parallel distribution within the **public sphere of capitalist production**. Whatever the limitations (outlined later) of applying the notion of 'managerial responsibility' to the domestic arena, the analogy involved helps establish the crucial (and 'critical') point that women's control, in other words, is simultaneously both affirmed (supported, delegated) and negated (tightly bounded, closely scrutinised, constantly checked, highly conditional). Moreover, the contradictory character of women's control over domestic labour may have become more entrenched (not less, as much common-sense, as well as [malestream] sociology, would have us believe) with recent changes in the gender division of domestic labour, which in turn underscores it as (an experiential) source of social development of a long-term, progressive kind through the state social policy and welfare.

Just as there remains in modern 'liberal democracies' an overall distribution of power within which capitalists have ultimate, directive control (despite the **managerial revolution**), so there remains such a distribution within which men (perhaps co-jointly with capitalists - see M. Barrett, *Women's Oppression Today*, 1980) - in the final analysis -

exercise domestic domination. This 'ultimate power and control' is variously indicated, such as by men's ability to make unilateral decisions simply **not to do, or to leave or to avoid** domestic labour ('knowing that it will get done anyway'). Men's domination is also shown in their decisions about what, in the first place, are the 'more important' areas of decision making: whether these include, for instance, moving house, buying a car, going on holiday, or **going out to work**. With regard to the latter, Stephen Engell (*Middle-Class Couples*, 1980) has found that 'If married women elect to enter the labour market, they often have to gain the approval of their husbands' (p. 105). This is an instance of the way in which men's domination over family life, relationships and labour is about, in the end, their ability to draw and re-draw the boundaries marking the province within which their wives have the responsibility for domestic labour, and connectedly wield their 'domestic power'.

Women as wives and mothers have (conditional, regulated and delegated) domestic power, which is limited to being exercised within the boundaries marking the private sphere of the family. But men as husbands have domestic dominance, which entails holding and exercising power **over** family life - **and** beyond it. That is, men's domestic dominance is held and exercised in conjunction (is **articulated**) with the sources, distribution and exercise of power within the public arena of, for instance, the 'external economy'. Or, to put it another way, the ultimate power and control exercised over (the private sphere of) family life, relationships and labour is **articulated** with the main contours of power and control exercised in public sphere of the economy, the state and so on, by way of the mediating presence and advantage of men (as husbands and other partners, fathers, employees, employers, managers, capitalists, civil servants, Members of Parliament, the judiciary, and more). Men represent the human embodiment and agency of this power articulation. Men enjoy overall and ultimate power and control in both spheres, where that which they hold in each is supportive of the other (even though the principal, perhaps explanatory, source may lie on one particular side, such as within the 'external economy'). It is on these grounds that the application of the notion **patriarchy** is warranted in the sense defined by Heidi Hartmann (1979). For Hartmann, the term patriarchy is used to refer to

a set of social relations between men which have a material base and which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enables them to dominate women.

She adds that

the material base upon which patriarchy rests is most fundamentally in men's control over women's labour power

- within both the public and the private spheres of society.

The term patriarchy refers to men's domination (power and control) over women, including most importantly over women's labour power, throughout the scope of the structures and processes which constitute modern Western societies. But, more precisely, it refers to men's **collective** (or **collectively based**) power and control which, in the first instance, is a feature of the public (social and **socialised**) sphere of society and labour, even though it then finds its way into the **individual** gender (conjugal and other) relationships which make up the private sphere. Whatever the underlying or basic sources of power and control which (may) lie in the public sphere of the economy, men constitute a **collectivity** (or stratum) within the public sphere which itself provides a resource for (ultimately) dominating women (collectively and individually). Following the kind of conceptual and analytical approach to social stratification for which Frank Parkin in particular has become known (Parkin, 1978 and 1979), men are able to collectively 'close' themselves and their power off to (excluding) women within the public sphere, which in turn allows them to be dominant within (to carry patriarchy into) the private sphere of family life, relationships and labour.

What this approach to the definition and use of the notion of patriarchy permits is the (conceptual) possibility of finding in practice (individual, private) conjugal relationships that do not **appear** to be 'patriarchal', but instead even 'matriarchal'. This does not diminish the proposition that patriarchy exists as a system of **collective** (socialised) power which men can make use of in various ways and in varying degrees in their individual, private relationships. Men can, if and when necessary (or in the end), rely on the **male dominated** public (socialised) arenas of law and order (such as in connection with marital violence), the state, the economy and employment, the mass media with their stereotypical views, and so on. This system, as a readily available resource, then facilitates and enhances the chances husbands have of avoiding the need to resort to the thin ground of **individually** asserting power through, in particular, macho displays of strength, brute force, violence, and the like (although, of course, in practice husbands do frequently resort to these 'solutions').

Whereas women have highly circumscribed private domestic power, men are privileged through sharing in an overarching pool of **collective** power, perhaps basically as an outcome of their common advantages within the arena of **socialised** economic production, structures and processes. This 'in the final analysis' enables them to delegate **domestic responsibility** largely to women: their wives and the mothers of their children. It is as if their wives are consigned to being responsible for domestic labour, along with holding and exercising domestic power, on their (men's) behalf (directly and indirectly, such as through their wives' childcare activities); in trust; as agents. As already indicated, perhaps an apposite way of viewing the resulting relationship between wives and domestic labour has been alluded to by A. H. Halsey (1987, p. 14) when suggesting that 'women still bear the main burden of domestic **management**' (my emphasis).

The value of an analogy drawn between

- a) the part played by the wife and mother in the performance of domestic labour, and
- b) the part played by the manager within the division of labour and hierarchical order which characterise enterprises in the modern external economy,

can perhaps be assessed with reference to the continuing debate about the virtues and limitations of the **managerial revolution thesis** (see Giddens, 1980; Scott, 1982 and 1986). The thesis spotlights the differences in property rights which are attached to being

- i) a **capitalist owner** and
- ii) a **managerial controller**,

where the former has **ultimate** power and control over the means of the latter's **immediate**, day-to-day power and control. Accordingly, pursuing the analogy, women as 'managers' within the private sphere of family life will have immediate **but delegated** domestic power for the ('functional') purpose of performing their assigned role of being **responsible** for domestic labour. As such, women will be overseen, monitored and **ultimately manipulated** by men in their role as **surrogate capitalists**, given their overall power by virtue of their **ultimate possession and control** in relation to the 'domestic forces of production', including domestic labour or, more precisely, **domestic labour power**.

However, maybe this is as far as the **managerial analogy** can be taken. In the first place, manager within the public sphere of the external economy will be located within a division of labour and 'functions', as well as an associated hierarchy of power, authority and control (within a set of relations of production) entailing further, distinct 'strata' or 'classes' of both

- a) capitalist owners and
- b) waged workers.

The second of these classes labour or 'function' to produce (following Marx) surplus value, which the first then expropriates (or has expropriated on its behalf) as its source of profits. This inherent conflictual process of expropriation and exploitation (the basis of an 'objective' clash or conflict of interests) is facilitated through the immediate possession and accompanying control activities of (the middle class of) managers. Managers have power, authority and control over 'the workers', but are nonetheless like the latter in being employees. They are employed by capitalist owners after having exchanged their labour power on the labour market for remuneration out of revenues acquired through sales on the commodity market. Women (in the role of 'domestic managers' or whatever) simply do not enter into an exchange of this kind with their husbands in exchange for remuneration, income or whatever. Men within family and conjugal relationships cannot be equated with capitalist owners of the (socialised) means of production; men do not make (in the strict sense) a profit by way of their wives' domestic labour and responsibilities; they do not expropriate surplus value created through the application and consumption of their wives' labour power; they do not **exploit** their wives' within relations of production akin to those which occur between classes in the CMP. Because of the limitations of the managerial analogy, perhaps it would be more suitable and instructive to view 'the wife-mother' as occupying, instead, a position in the division of domestic labour and the associated distribution of power, control and authority which is similar to that of the caretaker within the 'external economy'.

However, for the time being, continuing to follow the Marxian conceptualisation and analysis, there is simply no equivalent to the **working class** within the sphere of **domestic production**: to, in other words, the class which produces surplus value. Unlike wage labour, domestic labour does not produce surplus value **at all**: it plays no direct part in the production of surplus value within the Capitalist Mode of Production. The private sphere of domestic labour is distinct and separate from the public sphere of (socialised) wage labour because, apart from anything else, **domestic labour power** is not exchanged (bought and sold) for wages on **any** labour market. The upshot is that neither domestic labour nor (therefore) **the family** are 'productive', and so integrated, within the CMP. This particular point more or less sums up the outcome of the so-called Domestic Labour Debate of the 1970s, which has been well-documented elsewhere (see Close and Collins, 1983). Thus, according to the neat summary provided by Christopher Harris:

One of the few consensus that seem to have emerged from the debate is that domestic labour does not produce [any of the exchange value of] labour power. What it produces are use-values which are consumed within the household. It transforms commodities purchased out of wages received by the household members. The effect of the consumption it makes possible is the reproduction of labour power both daily and generationally and the production of the household to which the wage labourer belongs. The family, therefore, is located between two markets: the market for labour [power] which it supplies, and market for consumer goods ('wage goods') which it consumes. Hence, domestic labour mediates these two markets and brings them into relation. However, whereas household members sell labour power to capital, engage in social labour and consume wage goods produced by social labour, labour within the household is private labour ... Domestic labour [has] no direct relation with capital. (Harris, 1983, p. 187)

Essentially, domestic labour and the family have no direct relation with capital and so do not directly produce any surplus value: they are not productive within the CMP; they are not (structurally) integrated within the CMP. However, Harris's summary invites two accompanying comments or riders. First, his statement is 'gender neutral', whereas the performance of domestic labour is strongly 'gender biased' towards women. Second, although domestic labour is not productive within the CMP, it is nevertheless productive in relation to the CMP through the creation and recreation of labour power, and thereby articulates the family with the dominant economic structures and processes. Thus, just as men mediate the articulation between the power distributions in the public and private spheres of modern society, so women are responsible for that labour - domestic labour - which articulates 'private production' and 'public production'.

In that, however, the domestic labour performed by women within the private arena of family life does not bring them into 'relations of production' with their husbands which can be counted as (equivalent to) 'capitalist', or therefore inherently 'exploitative', there is no basis (at the underlying, fundamental point of production) for an 'objective' clash of interests, one which will inevitably and constantly emerge and re-emerge at the overt, experiential and observable level - as in the case of class relationships. This is not to say that there will be no conflict: conflict may well occur at the overt level, but if so it will be confined to this level. The conflict which takes place will be distributional conflict, concerned with the actual distributions of such things as the responsibility for the performance of domestic labour, and the accompanying rewards, enjoyments, privileges, and power; as well as with such associated issues as the appropriateness, legitimacy and justice of the actual distributions - given that, for instance, it is women who perform and are responsible for the bulk of domestic labour which, after all, serves the interests and advantages of men (as well as of children, and eventually capitalists).

Distributional conflict will then be highly variable and contingent: it will be highly conditional upon the influence and operation of other factors at the same (relatively) overt and superficial level(s) of modern society, including ideational factors manifested as culture, attitudes, ideology, and so on. There is nothing about the patterns of domestic labour, gender relationships, or the distribution of patriarchal power in modern society which makes distributional conflict either continuous or inevitable. Accordingly, such conflict cannot be viewed as providing a driving force towards inevitable, fundamental (revolutionary) change in the sex gender system.

Despite this, on the other hand, there **does exist** in modern society an inherent source - an 'objective' driving force - towards fundamental change in gender relationships, divisions and inequalities. This source is the **contradictory** character of the sex-gender system, family life and domestic labour (or, briefly, gender) in modern society.

David Morgan contrasts the notion of 'conflict' with that of 'contradiction' in the following way :

Contradiction is ... to be distinguished from 'conflict'. 'Conflict' is often too ambiguous a term: it may be manifest or latent, individual or collective, overt or covert. Conflict may also be seen as something which is pathological or residual or as something which can be overcome within the existing system. Conflict may be a manifestation of a contradiction but it is not the same thing. A contradiction may exist in a system without there being any overt manifestations of conflicts. (1975, p. 97)

Morgan adds that:

A contradiction is resolved dialectically bringing about a major change in the system of which it is a part. The term 'contradiction' is therefore ... dynamic and includes the notion of change at its heart: 'the basic cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal and lies in its internal contradictions'. (Mao Tse-Tung, On Contradiction, 1988, p.4) (Morgan, 1975, p.97)

Conflict involves (by definition) opposition between at least two sides, separated by a dividing line (perhaps within one or more social distributions, such as that concerned with participating in and being responsible for domestic labour; as well as that involving the enjoyment of rewards, resources, privileges, and power), so that each side strives to acquire more (gain ground) at the expense of the other; to drive the other back; to dislodge, damage and even destroy the other.

The upshot of the occurrence of conflict in any situation is that each side may remain roughly intact, battling on - at least for the time-being - or may be finally destroyed and obliterated. The existence of conflict within gender (as within any other social) relationships provides the possibility of mutual annihilation. There is nothing about conflict which promises a positive outcome for at least one side or faction - that is, nothing about conflict by itself.

In this way, the presence and implications of conflict may be contrasted with the presence and implications of contradiction. The contradictory character of gender inherently provides the prospect of positive change, judged in terms of the fundamental re-modelling of the sex-gender system along the lines of equality and equity, and thereby the untrammelling of the full range of human potential (independent of gender identity) and, needs. Gender (relationships, identity and experience, development, and so on) in modern society is pervaded by contradictions - but more precisely by one core contradiction - acting as an irresistible driving force towards its own progressive resolution.

The core contradiction of gender may be summed up in a simplified way. In modern society there is on the one hand a pressure (a combination of pressures) towards clear and rigidly distinct gender identities - centred on such items as doing and being responsible for domestic labour; exercising power and control within and over family life and obtaining paid employment and acquiring wages. But on the other hand, there is a concomitant, contradictory pressure towards the dilution and withering of distinct ('traditional') gender identities. For instance (and perhaps most importantly), especially over the last 50 years, women have been subjected to a growing, combined push-pull pressure to participate in and have a commitment to paid labour, and to do so in a manner which is on a level with that of men (this is not to underestimate the current importance in practice of the dual labour market). Referring to the north-east of England project (together with further studies from Britain and elsewhere, this latter pressure on women has occurred in conjunction with a trend towards men playing an ever greater part in domestic labour (which in turn is due to some extent to labour market changes), albeit that this trend has been largely confined to the one, superficial level of participation: that of 'merely doing' and 'helping with' domestic labour. As such, this trend with regard to the gender division of domestic labour entails both

- i) a diminution and
- ii) in a contradictory fashion, a consolidation

at the more fundamental and important level of being responsible for domestic labour - of a strictly drawn distinction between gender identities.

Within the sex-gender system in modern society, there has been both

- i) a progressive development, affirming emancipation, liberation and the realisation of human potential (needs); along with
- ii) a contradictory development, further inhibiting this realisation through the confirmation and consolidation (at the level of responsibility) of firm, transitional gender divisions and inequalities in the interests of men and the disadvantage of women.

The core contradiction which pervades gender proceeds to affect women within their various social relationships: fashioning their social experience, awareness and knowledge; providing a source of experiential (interactional, overt, superficial) conflict and psychological tension. However, it is then by way of such conflict and tension, that the core contradiction strives to be eased, relieved and resolved. It thereby constitutes an inherent driving force for change of a necessarily progressive kind. The contradiction will be resolved only in the event of the **full** realisation of human potential and satisfaction of human needs, and therefore only in the event of a fundamental re-modelling of the sex-gender system along the lines of equality and equity.

In even more abstract terms: the positive pressure and development, on the one hand, and the contradictory, negative pressure and development, on the other hand, dialectically drive the sex-gender system towards a synthesis, the **form** of which will be affirmative with regard to human potential and needs even though the details or **content** involved will depend upon the presence and influence of the other features which comprise the total social formation of which it is part. The major influence (following Marx) will derive from the character (including the contradictory character) of the underlying, basic economic structures and processes of the total social formation, which in capitalist society will be the Capitalist Mode of Production.

Essentially, the CMP is characterised by a contradiction which thereby operates as the basic contradiction in capitalist societies. As such, this contradiction will be the major source of influence on the sex-gender system, and its core contradiction. This influence will be, in part, indirect by way of state social policy and welfare, which in modern Western societies entails a twofold-contradiction with respect to care and control.

The basic contradiction within the CMP is that which occurs between the two principal constituent elements or levels of the **economic base or infrastructure**. That is, it occurs between

- a) the forces of production and
- b) the relations of production (whereby the latter distinguish one mode of production, such as the capitalist, from another, such as the feudal).

They can be said to contradict one another in the sense that whereas one element, the forces of production, affirm or are conducive to (are 'functional' in relation to) the satisfaction of human needs (in particular, the needs of those who labour and produce), the other element - the relations of production (which in a capitalist society are also class relations) - negate or impede (are dysfunctional in relation to) this satisfaction.

It is this basic contradiction which is, for Marxists, the principal feature of the CMP shaping the character and course of capitalist social relations and total social formations (societies), and so doing towards their demise by way of fundamental change (through a socialist revolution). This basic contradiction is then the principal source of the occurrence of further contradictions - such as those pervading gender - which enhance the prospect of fundamental (economic-class and sex-gender) change. This is the case even though the mediating presence of the state, social policy and social welfare (intentionally and in effect) provide a moderating influence on the (experiential) impact of the **compound** contradictions.

In the words of Claus Offe, even though

... revolutionary potential may well be controlled and kept latent through various adaptive mechanisms of the system, at least temporarily ... contradictions will finally result in a crisis of the capitalist mode of production [because] there is no actor or agency within the capitalist mode of production that is sufficiently unaffected by those contradictions ... to be able to act in such a way as to counteract [reconcile] them.
(Offe, 1984, p. 133)

The basic contradiction in capitalist society is the unstoppable source on its own eventual resolution and abolition by virtue of the way in which it is experienced by those affected by it - by those (principally the working class) whose needs could be met by way of the development of the forces of production, but are not because of the operation of the prevailing relations of production: experienced in the long-term despite the presence and impact of 'control mechanisms', such as those which operate by way of the state, ideology, and so on.

In response to the basic contradiction (in capitalist formations) as a source of disruption and conflict, the state intervenes with a combined but variable (contingent) package of economic and social (welfare) measures and policies. This entails the state employing the kind of two-faced, care-control activity referred to earlier. In turn, the outcome is a (society-wide) twofold-contradiction with regard to care and control, which helps compound and exacerbate the core contradiction which distinguishes and pervades the sex-gender system. More specifically, given that the core gender-contradiction is about the way in which women's control over domestic labour; women's control over their lives in general; women's 'human needs' (care); and women's 'human development' (care) are simultaneously affirmed and denied, then the state's care-control activity will feed into this contradiction.

The state is then required to (dialectically) respond to and control (with the help of care) the results of the very contradictions it has in effect fuelled - both the basic (economic, class) contradiction and the core gender-contradiction - in turn, further compounding and exacerbating each. Here lies the inherent foundation in modern Western 'capitalist-patriarchal' societies of a simultaneous drive towards a combined onslaught by the working class and women towards fundamental change in favour of the full satisfaction of human needs and realisation of human potential.

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**FEMINISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN AND GENDER
IN THE SOCIAL POLICY LITERATURE**

Anne Edwards
Department of Sociology and Women's Studies Centre
Monash University

1. INTRODUCTION

As the title indicates, this paper will be concerned with a particular set of issues, namely those raised by feminism, and a particular body of material, specifically, welfare and social policy texts. To put the paper in context, my starting point is the assumption that feminism, as a social movement with a critical theoretical perspective, has been, is, and should be an important influence both on the development, evaluation and modification of the whole range of social policies and programs now found in western capitalist societies and on the academic social science literature on social policy and the welfare state. Here I propose to focus on the latter and I have taken, as my data base, British and Australian academic texts published over the period from 1975 to the present day, a period which has seen a large and diverse volume of writings in this field and, since the late 1970s, an increasingly significant feminist contribution. Key articles in mainstream journals and major feminist publications in this field first appeared in England in 1976-78 (Land, 1976, 1978; Wilson, 1977; McIntosh, 1977; 1978; Donnison, 1978) and further articles in 1980 and 1981 (Finch and Groves, 1980; McIntosh, 1981; Rose, 1981). In the subsequent analysis, 1982 is therefore taken as a significant date, and comparisons are made of books produced before and after that year. (In the Australian context, this is the date of the first clearly feminist publication in the welfare area, by Keens and Cass for the Social Welfare Research Centre, but one that draws on the English material.) In this study, I have included both single- and joint-authored books and edited collections, and books written by both women and men, by feminists and non-feminists, a total of 60 texts (which are listed at the end of the paper).

There are three main types of books, all dealing primarily with either Britain or Australia: first, descriptive accounts of policies and provisions in the welfare, social security and social service areas (both historical and contemporary); secondly, discussions of principles and philosophies of welfare and social policy and of relevant concepts, such as need, freedom, equity and equality, and justice; and, thirdly, critical theoretical analyses of alternative approaches to and/or models of welfare systems. It was decided not to use government reports but only academic texts as source material for this paper, not because books are necessarily more important but because different expectations relating to form, content and readership apply to these two types of written documents. One consequence of this decision worth noting was that Townsend's (1979) study of poverty and related welfare issues in England was included but not the 1975 Report of the Australian Commission into Poverty chaired by Henderson or indeed the Social Security Review chaired by Bettina Cass.

Though it should no longer be necessary to provide a full intellectual justification for taking feminism seriously in academic work, it may be helpful at this point to make explicit what precisely I take the phrase feminist scholarship to refer to, before going on to outline the methods and findings of my study. Feminism started with an analysis of the position of women in culture and society and moved on to mount a major critique of the treatment of women in academic and scientific work. Feminists have identified a number of serious limitations and biases in traditional malestream knowledge.¹ The simplest and most obvious is the exclusion, neglect and/or misrepresentation of women as a distinct category of human beings: sometimes this takes the form of omitting women from consideration, sometimes there is just no differentiation between male and female subjects. The result is that one source of human diversity is systematically ignored and the specificity and uniqueness of women's identity and experience is hidden. As feminist thinking developed during the 1970s, the focus of attack moved from the primarily descriptive to the theoretical level, from a concern over the absence of women to the need to understand the centrality of gender. Having initially found the concept of gender useful as a way of making a relatively simple distinction between

1. An early feminist critique of sociology with a comprehensive list of its theoretical and methodological weaknesses in Millman and Moss Kanter (eds) (1975).

biological and social differences between men and women, feminists came to see gender (or in some cases sex/gender as a composite notion) not as a social variable but rather as a principle of social organisation, as an analytical construct, as the underlying dimension of male-female differences and relationships as these are culturally defined and socially regulated.² Feminism also advanced its own particular theory of power and social structure, centred on men, masculinity and male institutions. According to this, what is variously described as male dominance, patriarchy or androcentrism is held to be the determining force shaping the ideas, practices and organisational forms in all sectors of society.

Hilary Rose puts the case for a feminist perspective in the welfare and policy field particularly clearly in her key article in the *Journal of Social Policy*: the task, she says, is 'to construct a materialist account of social policy which is no longer willing through its theoretical silences and empirical neglect to reproduce the unequal sex gender relations of the social formation itself' and one that is capable '... of grasping **theoretically** the specific positions of women within both the domestic and the socialised sectors of welfare' (1981:478, 501, her emphasis).

When examining the chosen social policy texts from a feminist standpoint, we will look separately for references to women, gender, patriarchy, and to feminism itself (as well as to other indicative concepts such as sexual division of labour, sexism, motherhood, female dependency). I have only discovered three studies of published material in a given field which attempt a detailed and systematic evaluation of feminist content.³ One is a review of sociology journal articles in America, the authors of which (Ward and Grant, 1985) devised a threefold categorisation the criteria of which are not dissimilar from those employed here. Another is a survey of articles in the journal *Social Studies of Science* by Evelyn Fox Keller which she reports on briefly in a recent (1988) theoretical paper on gender. The third is a critique by Lois Bryson and Betsy Wearing (1985) of the Australian community studies since the 1960s which employs some of the same measures as this study. My method was to analyse the overall orientation of each book, the content, the topics to which chapters are devoted, and index entries. (Index entries are a useful source of data, since the decision to include a particular word or item is based on some assessment of its significance; this means, however, that because it is selective, the index is not an accurate measure of what appears in the text.⁴) By applying the above criteria, though relying more on a qualitative than on a quantitative method of assessment, authors and texts will be placed in one of five categories, which reflects their position on a feminist awareness scale (I hope the acronym FAS will appeal to an audience such as this).

The purpose of this exercise is to explore the range of different ways in which mainstream social science in this field has responded to feminism and the varying degrees to which feminist insights have been incorporated. It seems to me there is little that is constructive in simply documenting over and over again sexism and gender-blindness in our academic disciplines. What may, however, be of value is a serious attempt to understand something about what influences the impact feminism can have on an established body of knowledge over time, by looking at the development of ideas in a particular substantive area, that of welfare and social policy.

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2. There is a vast feminist literature on 'gender'; particularly relevant given the way gender is conceptualised and used in this paper, are Acker et al. (1983); Stacey and Thorne (1985); Scott (1986); Keller (1988). The concept remains, however, controversial; for a critical discussion of its place and value in feminist theory see Gatens (1983); Lake (1988); Edwards (1989).
 3. There have been, of course, a number of critiques of the literature in many substance areas in sociology from a feminist standpoint which do not apply the kind of textual analysis and rigorous categorisation as was employed here. Some, nonetheless, pay particular attention to the way women, gender and gender relations are portrayed; for example, on the family (Thorne and Yalom (eds), 1982); on criminal justice and the law (MacKinnon, 1982, 1983; Heidensohn, 1985); on work (Walby, 1986); and on politics (Walby, 1988).
 4. Very little has been written to my knowledge on the subject index in books as a methodological tool. Bryson and Wearing (1985) use it in their review of Australian community studies and Lake (1988:8) comments on the significance of 'men's absence from the index' by contrast with 'the specific inclusion' of women in history texts.
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The paper will proceed by describing the typology used as the basis for the analysis of texts and information will be given to show how the allocation to categories was done. Though the five categories are not directly equivalent to points on an ordinal scale, when comparing the first, the second and third, and the fifth categories, a clear progression in levels of feminist awareness can be discerned. The general pattern in the categorisation of texts over the period will be examined in order to detect any trends. Then, in an attempt to account for some of the changes in the way texts have dealt with the issues of women, gender, and feminism over the fifteen or so years covered, certain factors will be identified. The following will be shown to have some influence on feminist awareness: when the book was published; whether the authors are men or women; whether the book is edited or not; its subject-matter; its approach and focus.

2. FEMINIST AWARENESS TYPOLOGY

Category I

This category is the largest, with 20 out of the 60 texts, 15 British and 5 Australian, 37 per cent and 26 per cent respectively of totals (the Australian texts being Scotton and Ferber (eds), 1978; Graycar, 1979; Tulloch 1979; Dickey, 1980; and Watts, 1987). Category I texts contain the lowest level of feminist awareness. Typically, there is an absence of evidence that feminist ideas are known or relevant to authors in this category, and hence no mention of concepts like gender, patriarchy, sexism or feminism itself. All that may be found is a passing reference to empirical differences between men and women on some dimension of relevance to policy, most commonly cited are rates of work-force participation. In extreme cases, women may not be referred to in the text at all. Where women do receive attention, it is usually as a side remark, often in the context of a discussion of the family in relation to policy. A classic example occurs in Moroney (1976:21-3), where in the middle of a discussion of the 'caring function' of the family, that treats the family as an undifferentiated unit, he suddenly talks of women as 'the caretaker pool' and expresses concern that recent demographic and social changes have reduced this pool. His other mentions of women are where he is giving figures for various groups with welfare needs, such as the elderly. In most cases women are not mentioned as an item in the index nor is there even an entry for the family (e.g. Moroney, 1976; Graycar, 1979; Higgins, 1981; Jones et al. 1978/83; Walker (ed.), 1982b). In none of these texts is there any discussion of underlying social patterns associated with sex and gender. This is a pattern found in three out of the five Australian books in this category, the exception being the most recently published, by Watts.⁵ Interestingly as time passes, the texts in this category (e.g. Gough, 1979; Hill, 1980) contain slightly more references to women and on a wider range of topics (though still of a descriptive nature and scattered through the text) and those which deal with family policy or informal and community care are more likely to comment on the importance of gender differences.

A small number of texts in this category are theoretical treatments of the welfare state and social policy in general rather than discussions of the development or functioning of particular policies or services. Here too, though, authors tend to avoid any consideration of the specific position of women or of gender divisions either in relation to welfare or as a component of modern society and often dealing with concepts such as altruism, equality, the family, the public/private division and social justice. This is particularly true of those published between 1975 and 1981 (e.g. George and Wilding, 1976; Room, 1979; Mishra, 1977/81; Pinker, 1979; Higgins, 1981). The more recent examples of such writings in this category may explicitly and respectfully acknowledge the influence of feminism, both as a social movement and a theoretical critique (and this is a notable advance), but the authors still maintain their own non-feminist positions. Several examples of this exist. For instance, Mishra says the

problem of sexual stratification in society [is] a problem, like race and class, too large to be considered within the confines of this book. (1984:24)

Wilding at the end of his book simply says

What the feminists have achieved is the exposure of sexist assumptions [which is] ... a significant factor in the welfare state policies. (1986:142)

5. Watts, in his recent account of the 'foundations' of the Australian welfare state, has one reference to feminist analysis, Cass's work on the relationship of the family wage to child endowment.

but does nothing with the insight. Hindess admits that feminism raises important questions with respect to equality and the gendered nature of social relations, but then dismisses it as a view to be incorporated in his analysis. As he puts it,

Feminism gets little mention in most general discussions of approaches to social policy, and this book is no exception, but there is a growing feminist literature on a whole range of issues relating to social policy ... It would have made for a different, more complex kind of book and, perhaps for a better one. It would certainly have been much longer. (1987:7-8)

Category II

This category contains 10 texts, 6 of which are Australian (the percentages being 10% of the British total and 32% of the Australian), which suggests a proportionately far greater representation of Australian texts in Category II and greater representation of British texts in Category I. (The Australian texts in this category are Roe (ed.), 1976; Mendelsohn, 1979; Scotton and Ferber (eds), 1980; Jones, 1980/83; MacIntyre, 1985; Manning, 1985).

The main criterion for inclusion in this category is that the text recognises women as a category meriting some sustained attention, but sex and/or gender are treated only as variables with empirical significance and often rather selectively, depending on a particular author (in an edited volume) or topic. The major difference between texts in this category and some of those in the previous category is one of degree: how much weight is placed on male-female differences in empirical analysis, description and commentary. In a number of cases, sub-sections of chapters are devoted to consideration of women, sometimes with side-headings; this is typical of the Australian text in this category. Index entries also reflect this pattern, with more female-related items. Women invariably have a separate entry, but often there are entries also for mothers and unmarried mothers, for female-specific benefits (such as widows' pension, maternity allowance) and for the family; in a few remarkable cases, men get an index entry, though this may be partly because direct comparisons are being made between males and females, certainly the same pages are usually cited for both (Townsend, 1979; Manning, 1985).

The kind of texts we are considering are those which consistently report on the differential roles of men and women in the domestic sphere and in the labour market and link these to poverty and/or to particular welfare needs, benefits and services, and this is, reflected in the number and range of index entries. None of the authors, however, treats gender as a major theoretical dimension of social policy or the welfare system, or as a primary focus of concern or mode of explanation. In some cases, this is made explicit: as, for example, by Townsend who lists a number of factors associated with poverty ('employment status of adults in income unit or household, ratio of dependants to earners in households, forms of tenure, value of assets, individual disablement' (1979:917)), talks of the institutions of marriage, and the family, in the context of differences between the sexes (1979:781-783), but then argues that 'inequalities between the sexes in marriage, social policy and the labour market reflected class inequalities' (1979:782). An Australian example in this category is Jones whose major text on the welfare state was first published in 1980 and subsequently revised several times. Jones considers the position of women in a number of contexts throughout the book - social security policy in general, unemployment, poverty, retirement and ageing, changes in family structure, and employment patterns - and even suggests women and children could constitute a class, but does not link these insights together to form the basis of a proper gender analysis. A different case is Jordan (1987) who, in a major think-piece on welfare and the welfare state in the late 1980s, introduces a discussion of the place of women and of gender roles in the family and caring at a number of points. Again, however, although the author draws on feminist work, he fails to build up from a series of essentially empirical observations into full theoretical recognition of the gendered nature of social conceptions and social order. The edited collection by Jill Roe is interesting, in view of the fact that, although it was one of the earliest texts on Australian social policy, it has a more extensive coverage of women and welfare and a wider range of index entries referring to women and the family (such as childbirth, domestic service, fallen women, girls, mothers and motherhood, wives) than later comparable books (such as Dickey, 1980), perhaps because the editor was a woman. Overall what is characteristic of these texts is a tendency to treat women as a 'special', 'minority' or 'disability' group (along with the aged, Aborigines, migrants, or children) and this seems to provide the justification for the separate attention they receive. This is particularly prevalent in Australian texts (e.g. Mendelsohn, 1979; Patience and Head (eds), 1980; Henderson and Scotton and Ferber (eds), 1980; Graycar in Henderson (ed.), 1981; MacIntyre, 1985, Chapter 7) but occurs also in Townsend (1979) and Walker (ed.) (1982a).

Category III

As was the case with the previous category, the decision whether to place certain texts in this category or in Category I, is somewhat arbitrary, since it rests on a subjective assessment of the degree to which the authors give women gender and feminist issues a significant place in their work. By contrast with Category II (where texts simply presented descriptive material about women) texts that fall into Category III demonstrate their feminist awareness through discussion of the sociological and theoretical implications of feminist work. Not surprisingly, these books are all themselves highly theoretical. There are 6 only in this category, all by British authors (15%). Though it is worth mentioning that one of these books (by Bill Jordan) was published as early as 1976, 4 out of the 6 have been published in the last three years (Hill and Bramley, 1986; Johnson, 1987; Loney (ed.), 1987; Lee and Raban 1988). Except for some of the chapters in the edited volume by Loney, all the authors are male. The other book in this group, by Taylor-Gooby and Dale (1981) is of interest, since the book is divided into two parts and it is only in the second part, by the female author, Jennifer Dale, that the references to women, patriarchy and feminism, which justify the book's inclusion in this category, occur.

The main difference between books in Category III and some comparable books in Category I, all of which are relatively abstract, theoretical treatments of social policy issues and the welfare state (and have British authors) is how much emphasis they place on feminist analysis and critique and this may depend largely on when the book is written and hence how far feminist ideas have spread. Concepts used in these texts (but not always included in the indexes), such as patriarchy, sexual division of labour, women's oppression, women's movement, indicate a broader level of feminist awareness. Most writers draw mainly on marxist feminist writing which they then attempt to integrate into their own typically marxist or socialist oriented perspective. A typical example is Lee and Raban, who introduce feminist ideas at a number of points in their argument and in their final chapter, under a heading 'sensitising concepts' where they look at some questions which may require modification of marxist theory in the policy field, they include 'accounting for women's oppression' (1988:187-191).

Category IV

Categories IV and V contain texts which on the measure used here demonstrate high levels of feminist awareness. The difference between these last two categories is that in the case of Category IV we are dealing with edited volumes in which particular chapters are written from a feminist perspective, while in Category V the whole book has a feminist orientation. In all these volumes, there are one or sometimes two chapters devoted to women and/or feminism (those with two chapters, but these are not necessarily both written by women, are Glennerster (ed.), 1983; Graycar (ed.), 1978; Kennedy (ed.), 1982; Klein and O'Higgins (eds), 1985; Walker (ed.), 1982a)). It is therefore, quite possible for a book which has been allocated to Category IV on the basis of one or more chapters to contain other chapters which show little appreciation of feminist work. This is a common pattern across all fields of knowledge and has been described as the 'women and ...' solution to the problem of neglect and misrepresentation of women and gender in traditional 'malestream' academic work.⁶ Having given women and feminism a voice in one part of the book, the material presented in the rest of the book, and more importantly the overall orientation and emphasis of the editor(s) and other contributors, frequently appears to be totally unaffected by the presence of this 'special' chapter, feminism thus being effectively marginalised. This is clearly revealed by scrutinising the index and looking whether the page numbers given indicate that references to women, gender and feminism occur only within the particular chapter(s). Examples of this are found in several of the texts assigned to this category, such as Bean and McPherson (eds) (1983); Bean et al. (eds) (1985); while in others, there is only an occasional passing reference in any of the other chapters (e.g. Henderson (ed.), 1981; Loney et al. (eds), 1983). An Australian volume on the social policies of Labor and Liberal Governments in the 1972-78 period, edited by Patience and Head (1979), has a chapter simply titled 'Women' and no entry on women as such in the index. This evidence seems to suggest there is no general interest in women or in gender issues in a number of these texts.

6. Though a number of feminists have discussed the inadequacies of the early 'additive' or 'compensatory' types of women's studies, the phrase "the women ..." syndrome' comes from Stanley and Wise (1983:31).

There are 13 books in Category IV, of which 6 are Australian, 32 per cent of the total, compared with 17 per cent for the British, which means that, like Category II, Australian texts are over-represented. (The Australian books are Graycar (ed.), 1978; Patience and Head (eds), 1979; Henderson (ed.), 1981; Kennedy (ed.), 1982; Sydney Labour History Group, 1982; Graycar (ed.), 1983.) Twelve of the thirteen are edited volumes, one has a single author (Townsend, 1976) and is somewhat difficult to categorise since it contains a single chapter devoted to 'women and social security', originally written in 1956 well before second-wave feminism. Apart from the books described above, there are several which give even greater weight to feminist ideas. This may mean including more than one chapter with a specific focus on women (e.g. Kennedy (ed.), 1982; Walker (ed.), 1982a; Klein and O'Higgins (eds), 1985), or having several chapters in which, though gender issues are not their exclusive concern, these are given importance (e.g. Graycar (ed.), 1983), and/or then referring to their significance in the introduction and elsewhere in the volume, this also being reflected in the index entries (e.g. Sydney Labour History Group, 1982).

Looking more carefully at the way material is handled by various authors in this category, there are signs of a shift in orientation particularly during the 1980s. In the earlier writings the content and even the titles of chapters suggest the position of women in some context is the primary concern of the author(s), while after 1982 the purpose seems to be explore gender and feminist aspects and issues in policy areas (compare, for instance, Meredith Edwards in Graycar (ed.), 1978; Anne Summers in Patience and Heads (eds), 1979; and Bettina Cass in Henderson (ed.), 1981, with Miriam David and Hilary Land in Glennerster (ed.), 1983; Elizabeth Wilson in Loney et al. (eds), 1983; and Hilary Land and Hilary Rose in Bean et al. (eds), 1985; these last do not even have women, sex or feminism in their title).

Category V

In this category are placed monographs and edited books where the volume as a whole is written from an explicitly feminist theoretical perspective, where women and gender relations are the major focus of concern, and where male domination, female subordination, and women's oppression are taken to be the most important features of modern western capitalist societies. There are 11 books meeting these criteria, 9 British and 2 Australian (22% and 11% respectively). Four of the British and both the Australian books are edited volumes, and one British book is co-written by one feminist and two men (Clarke et al., 1987). All the texts have been published since 1982, with one notable exception, Elizabeth Wilson's 1977 book which has had an enormous influence on all later work. (The two Australian texts are Baldock and Cass (eds), 1983; and Broom (ed.), 1984.) A large number of individual authors are involved, of whom the vast majority are women.

Any of these writers could be used to provide illustrative material. Titles of books, chapter headings and content, underlying themes and issues, key phrases and concepts, types of empirical data, and the number and range of relevant index entries all reflect a high level of what I have here called feminist awareness. There is only time in this paper to give a few brief quotations which capture the essential argument of the feminist perspective. They are somewhat arbitrarily selected, since in every text there are many suitable examples. Starting with Wilson, who makes the following claim:

Only feminism has made it possible for us to see how the state defines femininity and that this definition is not marginal but is central to the purposes of welfarism. (1977:77)

A number of feminists have taken up the issues of gender-blindness in academic scholarship, including marxist writings, and of the importance of exposing the relationship between the social policies of the welfare state and gender inequality. Clare Ungerson, the editor of one of the texts in this category and author of a recent monograph that is also included here, says:

There is more to a feminist approach to knowledge than the documentation of the role of women in a set of social processes; while this is important, it is also necessary (and even exciting) to use issues of sex and gender to illuminate those very social processes. (1987:2)

Or Hilary Rose again, this time in a paper jointly authored with Hilary Land (in the edited volume by Bean et al. included in Category IV):

Social policy ... has a long history of lovingly detailing the self-sacrifice of women, above all poor women, and yet it sees neither the engendered character of the act nor does it feel it necessary to determine its social origins. (1985:79)

Or as an Australian author, Sheila Shaver, expresses it:

... social security and the taxation system which supports it are not sex-blind functions of citizenship but rather constitute a systematic mechanism of women's oppression. (1983:146)

Since the categorisation of these particular texts is straightforward and unlikely to be contentious, and in view of space limitations, no further details will be given here of the kinds of material they contain.

3. ANALYSIS OF PATTERNS AND TRENDS

The overall distribution of texts between the five categories was as indicated in Table 1. This shows a higher proportion of Australian texts in Categories II and IV, and a higher proportion of British texts in Categories I, III and V.

Another useful distribution is between single-authored, jointly authored and edited volumes. Overall there were 26 single-authored and 24 edited books and 10 jointly-authored (see Table 2). There were no Australian jointly-authored books, and a higher proportion were edited volumes (58% Australian, compared with 32% British); to some extent this latter figure simply reflects the relatively higher proportion of Australian texts in Category IV and the higher proportion of British in Categories I and III. Of the total number of texts, 12 per cent had female authors, 42 per cent male authors and 47 per cent (which included jointly authored books and the contributions to edited volumes) were mixed. In Categories I and IV the authors in edited texts were predominately male, in Categories I and III they tended to be more equally mixed, while in Category V they were mainly but not exclusively female (except for one book, that edited by Baldock and Cass).

An obvious question to ask is whether there is a tendency for books published later in this period to be more likely to manifest higher levels of feminist awareness than those published earlier. A simple comparison was, therefore, made between those appearing before 1982 and those published in 1982 or later (it was earlier noted that there were several important feminist writings in this field between 1977 and 1981).

Not surprisingly there is evidence for such a trend (see Table 3): whereas around two thirds of the texts in Categories I and II were published before 1982, only one third of the texts in Categories III and IV were, and 10 per cent (1 in 11) of those in Category V. In Category I, which included 20 books, Australian books constituted over one quarter (4 out of 13) of those published before 1982 and only 14 per cent (1 in 7) of those published from 1982 on. At the other end of the scale, three out of four books in Category IV published before 1982 were Australian. However, leaving aside Category V which is looking very healthy, one cannot conclude that as the years pass the literature as a whole is becoming progressively more responsive to feminism. It needs to be remembered that some of the collected volumes that were allocated to Category IV show little sign elsewhere in the text of being influenced by feminism. There seems to have been a high period for the production of books that fall into Category IV (between 1979 and 1982 in Australia and 1982 and 1985 in Britain), and none since, and there are still books being written which unequivocally belong to Category I.

Whether the author(s) are male or female is another relevant consideration. In all three of the Australian texts in Category IV that were published before 1982 (those edited by Graycar, 1978, Patience and Head, 1979, Henderson, 1981) the authors of the chapters which were responsible for these texts being placed in this category were women. However, all the editors were men and in other comparable books around the same time on similar topics, such as Scotton and Ferber (eds), 1978, 1980, the fact that one of the editors was a woman did not result in any chapters on women (though there were chapters by women). Similarly, of the 7 books in Category I published from 1982 on five have entirely male authors (these are, George and Wilding, 1984; Hindess, 1987; Mishra, 1984; Walker (ed.), 1982b; and Watts, 1987), one edited book has almost all male authors (Wilding, 1986), and one is jointly authored by a man

and a woman (Golding and Middleton, 1982). There are also no examples of single or jointly authored books by women which fall into the low feminist awareness categories after 1982 (see Table 4).

A significant pattern was revealed by an analysis by category, sex of authors, dates and countries. Though a number of male writers of books in Categories II and III and of chapters in edited volumes in Categories IV (not the obviously feminist chapters) have passages running to several pages devoted to women and/or feminist ideas, apart from Townsend (1976) who is an exceptional case in other ways, there are no instances even in recent years of a whole chapter of gender-focused or feminist material in a male-authored book. And, when we look more closely at those male authors who did give some coverage to women and feminism, we find that the pre-1982 examples were Australian (Mendelsohn, 1979, Chapters 2 and 4 and Sheehan and Stricker, and by Henderson and Lewis in Scotton and Ferber (eds), 1980; Chapter 5 by Graycar in Henderson (ed.), 1981), though there is also one such Australian case in the later period (MacIntyre, 1985), and British examples occur only in the post-1982 period (Chapter 1 by Walker in Walker (ed.), 1982a; Walker in Glennerster (ed.), 1983; Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Jordan, 1987; Lee and Raban, 1988).

It would, however, be simplistic to suggest a direct association between such factors as date and sex of authors and the degree of feminist awareness found in academic texts. The focus and subject-matter of the book and the overall orientation of the author also have some influence. The review of academic texts reported on here has revealed some interesting patterns. Those texts which are primarily concerned with descriptive accounts of the full range of government social expenditure in the modern state, or of the welfare needs of particular categories of the population (families, the aged, etc.), or of particular areas of social policy (social security, personal social services, health, housing, etc.) are unlikely to ignore women totally as a social group (particularly in more recent years), but are highly unlikely to develop a gender perspective out of a basically empirical and pragmatic approach (examples quoted earlier would be Michael Jones, 1980/83 and Townsend, 1979). On the other hand, those with a highly theoretical or philosophical approach and focus of concern (which was far more characteristic of British than of Australian texts, and tended to mean they were located in Categories I and III) are not necessarily any more inclined to modify their framework of analysis to take account of feminist ideas, though there is some evidence, particularly in the British texts, that in recent years those working from a marxist perspective (such as Taylor-Gooby, 1985; Clarke and Cochrane, 1987; Lee and Raban, 1988) are recognising the contribution of at least some feminists since they are addressing some of the contribution of at least some feminists since they are addressing some of the same concerns and are involved in the same academic and political circles.

Also relevant is the broader socio-political and intellectual context in which a book is produced. While dividing texts into those appearing before and those appearing after 1982 allows us to distinguish between those who could have had access to published feminist ideas on welfare and social policy developments and debates occurring during the 1970s and 1980s, such as proposals for welfare cutbacks, changes in income transfers for families and sole supporting parents, rising unemployment, the rediscovery of poverty, a shift away from institutional care for at least some categories of dependency and towards community and family care. There was also a more public airing of many of these issues. All this, in conjunction with certain demographic patterns, lower fertility rates, higher proportions of married women in the work-force and the size of the aged sector of the population, unavoidably directed attention on to the family or household unit, and in particular its female members. In turn this is reflected in the literature we have been reviewing. Books published in the 1980s were far more likely to see the need for a serious discussion of the role of the family and of women in connection with a range of policy areas and to make the link between the family, the labour market and the taxation and welfare systems.

In the Australian context specifically, there was also the impact of the Whitlam Labor Government in the early 1970s, with its program of reforms, some explicitly aimed to meet the demands of women - child care, equal pay, refugees, health centres, supporting mothers' benefit, the Women's Adviser - most of which continued under the subsequent Coalition Government (Summers, 1979). This was partly in response to the women's movement and women's lobby groups but in turn resulted in women's issues and feminism gaining a place on the political agenda and hence affecting public and academic thinking about welfare and social policy matters. It was this, I would suggest, that was responsible for the earlier appearance in Australia as compared with Britain of passages in male authored books in this area and whole chapters in edited volumes specifically devoted to women (e.g. Mendelsohn, 1979; Scotton and Ferber (eds), 1980, though it is interesting that it is the second of the two volumes edited by Scotton and Ferber that deals with the Fraser years which contains the specific material on women and not the earlier one on the Whitlam era).

To end on a more pessimistic note, there is another important trend over this period which has also had some impact but in the opposite direction. As governments and their advisers develop more complex technical arguments about

how to manage the modern economy and the welfare state, so the academics working in the field of social and economic policy have to take on new theoretical approaches and modes of analysis. (This is discussed, for example, by Head, 1988.) In some cases, and there are examples of this among the texts reviewed here (for example, Walker (ed.), 1982b; Manning, 1985; Klein and O'Higgins (eds), 1985), this has meant the adoption of highly abstract and non-personal categories and concepts, usually drawn from economics, with the inevitable result that human beings as such disappear and so do such social components of people's identities and circumstances as class, race, ethnicity, and of course gender (see Sharp and Broomhill, 1988).

The fact that levels and spread of feminist awareness in the welfare and social policy field appear to have stabilised since the mid 1980s may also be part of a more general phenomenon in social sciences. In the study of sociology journal articles in America between 1974 and 1983 by Ward and Grant cited earlier, the conclusion there was that, in their words, there has been a 'tapering off in recent years of gender articles' (ibid:151) and they note with concern a decline in female authors (not something which has occurred in the book sector of academic publications at least in the policy area), which they found to be associated with women's participation in journal production.

TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTS OVER THE FIVE FAS CATEGORIES (I = LOW)

	British		Australian		Total Texts	
Category I	37%	(15)	26%	(5)	33%	(20)
Category II	10%	(4)	32%	(6)	17%	(10)
Category III	15%	(6)	0%	(0)	10%	(6)
Category IV	17%	(7)	32%	(6)	22%	(13)
Category V	22%	(9)	11%	(2)	18%	(11)
Total	100%	(41)	100%	(19)	100%	(60)

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTS BY CATEGORY AND TYPE OF AUTHORSHIP

	British			Australian			Total		
	Single	Joint authored	Edit	Single	Joint authored	Edit	Single	Joint authored	Edit
Category I	22% (9)	10% (4)	5% (2)	21% (4)	0% (0)	5% (1)	22%(13)	7% (4)	5% (3)
Category II	7% (3)	2% (1)	0% (0)	21% (4)	0% (0)	11% (2)	12% (7)	2% (1)	3% (2)
Category III	5% (2)	7% (3)	2% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	3% (2)	5% (3)	2% (1)
Category IV	2% (1)	0% (0)	15% (6)	0% (0)	0% (0)	32% (6)	2% (1)	0% (0)	20%(12)
Category V	7% (3)	5% (2)	10% (4)	0% (0)	0% (0)	11% (2)	5% (3)	3% (2)	10% (6)
Total	43%(18)	24%(10)	32%(13)	42% (8)	0% (0)	59%(11)	44%(26)	17%(10)	40%(24)
		100%(41)			100%(19)			100%(60)	

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTS BY CATEGORY AND DATE OF PUBLICATION

	British		Australian		Total	
	Pre-1982	1982 on	Pre-1982	1982 on	Pre 1982	1982 on
Category I	56% (9)	24% (6)	36% (4)	12.5% (1)	48% (13)	21% (7)
Category II	19% (3)	4% (1)	36% (4)	25% (2)	26% (7)	9% (3)
Category III	11% (2)	16% (4)	0% (0)	0% (0)	7% (2)	12% (4)
Category IV	5% (1)	24% (6)	27% (3)	37.5% (3)	15% (4)	27% (9)
Category V	5% (1)	32% (8)	0% (0)	25% (2)	4% (1)	30% (10)
Total	100% (16)	100% (25)	100% (11)	100% (8)	100% (27)	100% (33)

TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTS BY CATEGORY, DATE AND SEX OF AUTHOR

	British						Australian						Total					
	Female		Male		Mixed		Female		Male		Mixed		Female		Male		Mixed	
	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post	pre	post
	1982		1982		1982		1982		1982		1982		1982		1982			
Category I	1	0	7	3	1	3	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	9	4	2	3
Category II	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	3	4	3	0
Category III	0	0	1	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	1
Category IV	0	0	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	1	0	3	9
Category V	1	3	0	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	4	0	0	0	6
Total	2	3	10	8	3	15	1	1	4	3	6	4	3	4	5	11	9	19

TEXTS

Category I

- Dickey, Brian (1980), **No Charity Three**, Melbourne, Nelson.
- George, Vic and Wilding, Paul (1976), **Ideology and Social Welfare**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- George, Vic and Wilding, Paul (1984), **The Impact of Social Policy**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Golding, Peter and Middleton, Sue (1982), **Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty**, Oxford, Martin Robertson.
- Gough, Ian (1979), **The Political Economy of the Welfare State**, London, Macmillan.
- Graycar, Adam (1979), **Welfare Politics in Australia**, South Melbourne, Macmillan.
- Higgins, Joan (1981), **States of Welfare: Comparative Analysis in Social Policy**, Oxford, Basil Blackwell and Martin Robertson.
- Hill, Michael (1980), **Understanding Social Policy**, Oxford, Basil Blackwell and Martin Robertson.
- Hindess, Barry (1987), **Freedom, Equality and the Market: Arguments on Social Policy**, London, Tavistock.
- Jones, Kathleen, Brown, John and Bradshaw, Jonathan (1978/83), **Issues in Social Policy**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mishra, Ramesh (1977/81), **Society and Social Policy**, London, Macmillan.
- Moroney, Robert M. (1976), **The Family and the State: Considerations for Social Policy**, London, Longmans.
- Pinker, Robert (1979), **The Idea of Welfare**, London, Heinemann.
- Room, Graham (1979), **The Sociology of Welfare: Social Policy, Stratification and the Political Order**, Oxford, Basil Blackwell and Martin Robertson.
- Scotton, Richard B. and Ferber, Helen (eds) (1978), **Public Expenditures and Social Policy in Australia, Volume I: The Whitlam Years**, Melbourne, Longman.
- Tulloch, Patricia (1979), **Poor Policies: Australian Income Security 1972-77**, London, Croom Helm.
- Walker, Alan (ed.) (1982b), **Public Expenditure and Social Policy**, London, Heinemann.
- Watts, Rob (1987), **The Foundations of the National Welfare State**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.
- Wilding, Paul (ed.) (1986), **In Defence of the Welfare State**, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Category II

- Hall, Phoebe, Land, Hilary, Parker, Roy and Webb, Adrian (1975), **Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy**, London, Heinemann.
- Jones, Michael A. (1980/83), **The Australian Welfare State: Growth, Crisis and Change**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

Jordan, Bill (1987), **Rethinking Welfare**, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

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Manning, Ian (1985), **Incomes and Policies**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

Mendelsohn, Ronald (1979), **The Condition of the People**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

Roe, Jill (ed.) (1976), **Social Policy in Australia: Some Perspectives, 1901-75**, Stanmore, NSW, Cassell.

Scotton, Richard B. and Ferber, Helen (eds) (1980), **Public Expenditures and Social Policy in Australia, Volume II: The First Fraser Years, 1976-78**, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire.

Taylor-Gooby, Peter (1985), **Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Townsend, Peter (1979), **Poverty in the UK**, London, Penguin.

Category III

Hill, Michael and Bramley, Glen (1986), **Analysing Social Policy**, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Johnson, Norman (1987), **The Welfare State in Transition: The Theory and Practice of Welfare**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Jordan, Bill (1976), **Freedom and the Welfare State**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Lee, Phil and Raban, Colin (1988), **Welfare Theory and Social Policy: Reforming or Revolution**, London, Sage Publications.

Loney, Martin (ed.) (1987), **The State of the Market: Politics and Welfare in Contemporary Britain**, London, Sage Publications and Open University Press.

Taylor-Gooby, Peter and Dale, Jennifer (1981), **Social Theory and Social Welfare**, London, Edward Arnold.

Category IV

Bean, Philip and MacPherson, Stewart (eds) (1983), **Approaches to Welfare**, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bean, Philip, Ferris, John and Whynes, David (eds) (1985), **In Defence of Welfare**, London, Tavistock.

Glennister, Howard (ed.) (1983), **The Future of the Welfare State: Remaking Social Policy**, London, Heinemann.

Graycar, Adam (ed.) (1983), **Retreat from the Welfare State**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

Henderson, Ronald F. (ed.) (1981), **The Welfare Stakes: Strategies for Australian Social Policy**, Melbourne, University of Melbourne, Macmillan.

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Category V

Baldock, Cora V. and Cass, Bettina (eds) (1983), **Women, Social Welfare and the State**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

Broom, Dorothy H. (ed.) (1984), **Unfinished Business: Social Justice for Women in Australia**, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

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POLICY, PRACTICE AND SOCIAL THEORY: TOWARDS AN AGENDA*

Gillian Fulcher
Association for the Blind, Victoria

This paper begins with some concerns and seeks to move to an agenda based on an analysis of those concerns. It has four parts: concerns, theorising, two examples and towards an agenda.

1. CONCERNS

I have three major concerns and out of these arise some others. The first is the increasing regulation which the evidence suggests emanates from both left and right government level policy across a range of policy areas. That regulation derives, for instance, and not surprisingly, from Thatcher policy on industry, despite a rhetoric of rolling back the welfare state (Gamble, 1988) but equally, and locally, it derives from government level policies with, at least in part, a clear democratic intent: for instance in Victoria, the 1984 **Integration in Victorian Education** report. Similarly, the Commonwealth and State government level policy, in what is known as the national Home and Community Care Program (HACC), for the frail, elderly and younger people with severe or moderate disabilities, seems likely to result in more regulation of those targeted groups through more professional and bureaucratic control. This raises the second concern.

A host of writers have noted the professionalisation of welfare services and the way in which those services tend to work in the interests of government and of professionals as providers; locally, for example, Adam Jamrozik (1987) has noted this trend.

The third, and related, concern is social theory's problem in dealing with politics and in particular with social policy. This has been long standing (see for instance, Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Lassman, 1986). Social theory's problems in dealing with social policy derive in part from the dominance of administrative paradigms which talk about policy and implementation, as though implementation were apolitical, and in part from the denigration of policy as a meaningful category in social life: by, for instance, until quite recently, Marxist based theory. In the latter, the idea of policy has often dropped out of a conceptual focus which is preoccupied by class and class struggle, though there are some notable exceptions, such as Offe (1984); however he too, talks about implementation but puts this in a context of relations of power. Difficulties in theorising mean we cannot move beyond identifying issues to agendas.

2. THEORISING

In recent attempts to theorise social policy, Lee and Raban argue that combining Fabianism with a more practical Marxism will help solve problems in the welfare state (1988), and, in a wide ranging survey of 200 community development health projects (and their failure), Rifkin suggests the key theoretical political issue (though it's not framed in those terms) must come from a change in attitudes on the part of planners and agencies and key people in communities (1986); while Hewitt (1983) argues that Foucault's account of welfare and social policy, as constitutive of both power and the 'social', offers strategies of resistance.

Locally, Hindess (1986) states that policy is made at all levels, under certain institutional conditions, by social actors (both individuals and groups able to make decisions) and that social actors deploy discursive means to achieve their objectives in political struggles. This is a non-determinate, non-reductionist view of social policy, which asserts, for instance, that 'national policy' does not determine what happens at other levels: the evidence on education policy affirms this (Rizvi et al. 1987; Fulcher, 1986b, 1989 various), as does observing say, two welfare officers working

* The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Association for the Blind.

(differently) under the 'same' policy; commonsense attests to this: some teachers do this and some do that, but this theorising can be taken further. Beilharz argues against maintaining social policy and social theory as separate concerns (1987, p. 405), that policy matters (p. 394), and for a better dialogue between political and social theory (1988, p. 164), a view which Castles has adopted (e.g. 1985). Importantly, in an overtly political presentation of theory, James articulates social theory's task as that of **theorising the possibilities of political practice** (1987, p. 90). It's this view which makes agenda the objective, rather than critical social theory as an end in itself, although of course no agenda is useful unless it's rigorously theorised.

The theorising I argue for draws on Hindess' work, sees policy as political struggle, puts discourse and its institutional bases at the centre of its theorising, and appears to work with a concept of power related to Foucault's ideas despite other views, sympathetic to Hindess, that 'the notion of power is not worth retaining, [and] that political analysis is best undertaken without it' (Wickham, 1987). This theorising locates social policy, at whatever level, as social practice, in a wider theory of social relations as consisting of practical projects: in each of these we struggle to achieve our objectives (these are not necessarily those of self-interest) and as a means to which we deploy discourse. Our discourse is both tactic (Macdonell, 1986) and theory about how that particular aspect of the social world we wish to influence works (Fulcher, 1989c; 1989d).

Much hinges on whether our social theory of that bit of the social world which we wish to influence, is accurate. If it's not, we fail to achieve our objectives. That means identifying the real issues in those objectives, the right discourse as well as the institutional bases from which our discourse might be deployed.

Discourses are not equally available to social actors (Hindess, 1986), though this is not to say our social being determines our consciousness. We can replace the notion of social position or being determining one's consciousness with the notion of social actors deploying **available** discourses. The predominant discourses in Australian social policy are **professionalism**, the claim that experts know best, the key tactic in professionalisation, the historical struggle to gain control of an area of occupational life,¹ and more recently, a **corporate discourse**, or what Davidson has called the New Managerialism (1989): this discourse proposes '**economic rationalism** as the model of public reason' (Giroux, 1984, p. 187).

This theorising avoids the empirical inaccuracy of class-structural accounts of professionals in which it is asserted that broadly speaking, they work in their class interests (e.g. Walker, 1981). Not all professionals deploy professionalism: a very few appear to work in a highly self-abnegating way to do themselves out of a job or in a way which genuinely seeks to empower the person defined as their client. Other professionals, some teachers, for instance, may deploy professionalism because they do not see the difference between a discourse on pedagogy, which is about **technical competence** in teaching, and a discourse on professionalism, as ploy, thus politics to persuade others to one's preferred course of action.² Professionals may not have available a democratic discourse or, if they do, its social theory may not be adequate for achieving their objectives: for instance, it may include a theme of participatory decision making yet fail to deal with power in those arenas and its effects.

Further, we engage in practical projects in arenas; these can be encounters between two people or wider forums in which social actors struggle to achieve their objectives. Policy, as the outcome of a struggle in an arena, is action of whatever form: it may be a written or verbal statement, or it may mean sending a child from a regular classroom, because s/he's 'disabled', or sending a Home Help worker to an older person's home rather than admit that older person to a nursing home: these are all policy.

Discourses have **institutional bases**, some of them more institutionalised than others. Professionalism, as the key tactic in professionalisation, has had a strong institutional base in Australian training institutions which have sought to achieve professional status for their graduates and, increasingly, in administrative arenas of state apparatuses which provide allegedly human services. This is not surprising: bureaucracy, as a form of organisation based on alleged expertise, provides a key institutional base for deploying professionalism. Economic rationalism, a discourse

1. See also Fulcher, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d.

2. On the politics of professionalism, see Fulcher, Footnote 1.

deployed for some time in corporations and increasingly in government and welfare arenas, has an increasingly strong, although unevenly developed (as one would expect) institutional base in the Australian welfare state.

This theorising dissolves the distinction between policy and practice or implementation: policy is a form of social practice. It integrates theory and practice: practice always involves some form of theory (however inaccurate) about the social world, and people engaged in theoretical tasks are engaged in a practical project; moreover, theory is always about practice. This view departs, for instance, from James' idea that the 'reconstitution of practice ... has to begin in practice not just in theory (1987, p. 105): practice involves theorising. This approach casts policy broadly, as an instance of social practice, rather than as something government makes (as the top-down model suggests). Should the term policy then drop out of our conceptual array? We should retain it, both because it is widely used (though the evidence suggests not well understood) and because it directs our attention to those discursive practices which loosely relate to officialdom.

This puts discourse, institutional bases, policy struggles and objectives at the centre of theorising. It suggests an agenda which features these concepts and it provides a methodology for unearthing policy struggles, through an analysis of the discourse and practices social actors deploy in various arenas; such an analysis uncovers other issues: discourse is both tactic and theory about how that bit of the social world we want to influence works. The methodology provides an alternative to a *literal* reading of policy and goes beyond reading policy as a text, since it relates discourse to objective in policy struggles in a range of arenas. It avoids deductions about social policy which lead to statements about unintended consequences, or gaps between policy and practice; it moves beyond tentative skirmishes with the notion of power in social policy (cf. Korten, 1980) and the evidence seen from this theorising refutes the view that only government makes policy. While Wickham (1987), who also draws on Hindess' ideas, argues that power is not a necessary concept and that agendas emerge from engaging with specific objectives in policy, the following analysis suggests that both a Foucauldian concept of power and a concern with specific objectives are relevant, and that what those are becomes clear when we decode those policy struggles. In Hewitt's account of Foucault's work (1983), social policy and welfare are constitutive of power: it arises in discursive formations, thereby providing both the site from which power may be exercised and the object on which power can be wrought. This draws our attention to the targeting of groups, and the emergence of categorical systems in Australian social policy such as the 'frail elderly' or schoolchildren who allegedly have 'special educational needs'. It adds discursive formation to the notions of discourse, institutional bases, policy struggles and objectives.

The relevance of this theorising to the possibilities of political practice in social policy can be illustrated through two examples.

3. TWO EXAMPLES

The two examples are the 1984 Victorian government level policy on integrating schoolchildren called disabled, which initially took the form of a report called **Integration in Victorian Education**, and a program called Home and Community Care, a so-called joint Commonwealth and State policy, now known as the national HACC program, which is targeted at the frail elderly and younger people with severe or moderate disabilities. The focus here is on the frail elderly. While I am much less familiar with HACC, having done only limited research compared with research on integration (see Fulcher, various), the comparisons are instructive. Increased regulation of students called disabled, and more called that, has followed the 1984 Victorian policy on integration, and increased regulation of older, frail people seems likely to follow the way HACC is being pursued at other levels in various arenas. In both policies, discourse and its institutional bases is crucial, as is language as a materiality. To HACC, first.

HACC emerged in two pieces of legislation, the Home and Community Care Act, 1985, and Home and Community Care (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1985. This legislation essentially cobbled together a set of disparate, pragmatic programs running in the late 70s and 80s in various localities, such as meals on wheels, etc., and it amended four other Acts.³ However, the 1985 legislative decisions formalised the development of a highly significant

3. These were the State Grants (Home Care) Act 1969; State Grants (Paramedical Services) Act 1969; Home Nursing Subsidy Act 1956; Delivered Meals Subsidy Act 1970.

politics in the way it seems the Australian welfare state will regulate its growing population of older people⁴ into the twenty-first century.

The policy aims to keep the frail elderly in their homes for as long as possible, in the name of self-reliance, dignity and independence, and 'to avoid their premature or inappropriate admission to long term residential care' (Home and Community Care Act 1985, Part III, section 5 (1) (a)). Thus the covert aim is to postpone possibly forever, older, frail people going into a government subsidised nursing home. Respite care, or short-term occupancy of an institutional bed, is one of the new programs in HACC. The key objective is to reduce the present per capita expenditure by government on nursing home beds or more broadly, to reduce the costs of the older population on government by reducing the numbers of older, frail people (and younger people with severe and moderate disabilities) in government subsidised nursing home beds.⁵ This aim can be justified from various positions in the debate on the welfare state but the central concern here is not with rights or wrongs but with the regulatory effects which seem highly likely to follow this objective, given the discourses through which it is pursued.

That cutting costs of services for older people is the key objective of the legislation is evidenced by the intense struggles between levels of government about their relative financial contribution: two-thirds of the legislation concerns funding formulas; the lengthy reviews and research to 'develop guidelines' on various programs within HACC: these are tactics to mask struggles between the three key players or social actors in HACC in Victoria: the Commonwealth and State governments and the Municipal Association of Victoria;⁶ by portended changes (reductions) in subsidies to nursing homes (as well as a concern to close down more disreputable provision); by statements which note that reports to the Commonwealth government in the early 80s (the Auditor-General's Efficiency Audit of the Commonwealth Administration of Nursing Home Programs (1981) and the Mcleay Report from the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure, *In a Home or at Home* (1982) 'forecast a resource demand scheme, based on current service patterns, that could not be supported' (Sisely, 1988, p. 5); and, in Victoria, by the Commonwealth funded research projects called Victorian Linkages, which are clearly an attempt to hurry the State, local government and agencies in the direction they want responsibility for organising services to go, which is locally (see Victorian Linkages Project, A, B, C). The likelihood that more regulation of the frail elderly, as well as of agencies, will be the outcome of these politics rests on the following analysis.

Regulation began in the legislation with targeting the 'frail, elderly', as well as younger people with moderate or severe disabilities: the frail, elderly signifies the emergence of a 'new' part of the social body, a new discursive formation, a site of 'intersecting specific objectives' (Wickham, 1987, p. 149), where power arises and can be wrought. Secondly, the legislation deployed a corporate discourse of economic rationalism, allied with themes of 'client focused monitoring' and 'assessment' 'to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency' of services: this focus invites those technologies of control which can be exercised on individualised bodies through versions of the individualistic gaze:⁷ in health policy, although HACC is not accurately or altogether a health policy,⁸ via the clinical gaze.

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4. Equity describes this as follows. In 1901 the population aged 65 and over represented just 4.0 per cent of the total. By 1933 it had increased to 6.5 per cent and in 1987 it has increased to 10.7 per cent. Between 1987 and 2021 the population aged 65 and over is projected to increase to between 13 and 17.6 per cent.

Projection of the age dependency ratio which is the ratio of older people (over 65) to people of younger age (15-64) and a crude indicator of the capacity of the working age population to support the older population, is predicted to rise steadily and then increase quickly, about 2011 and peak about 2041 (1989, p. 14).

5. Nursing home beds, as one kind of long term institutional residence, are more costly than a place in a hostel: for instance, the numbers of nursing staff are higher. These differences and numbers in the different kinds of accommodation are part of what government hopes to regulate more closely via HACC as it develops.
6. Compared with other States and the Northern Territory, local government in Victoria is a much stronger player or social actor; this affects the politics of HACC in Victoria quite markedly.
7. Foucault talks of the clinical gaze in medicine (1972). Lee and Raban refer to the judicial gaze (1988). In education, the meritocratic gaze both constructs, and is based in, a notion of individual ability (Fulcher, 1989).
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Those individualised technologies of control are instanced in present proposals to establish geriatric assessment teams (GAT) in all areas so that GAT gets to the consumer on time before some unwitting, or perhaps political, general practitioner admits his/her patient to a nursing home as unable to cope, for whatever reason, with living at home: some GPs in some areas are still able to do that. It's proposed that GAT - who will consist of at least four people - go into the older, frail person's home to 'review' progress and needs: particularly for the present generation of 80 plus year olds, who are used to one-to-one relationships with their doctor (some good, some not so good), such an occurrence may seem to that person to be a massive intrusion on their privacy: much depends on the members of each GAT, their sensitivity to issues of regulation and assessment (for instance, the lengthy forms which are administered at various stages of an assessment, the tools of assessment, etc.), the numbers who enter an older person's home to assess and so on. The potential for intrusion and regulation is there: the outcome depends on the assessors: whichever the outcome, the assessment procedures have become more formalised, more bureaucratic, more rational some would say. This is called case-management and review and is justified as **needs specific and consumer-driven** and as part of a user rights strategy (Victorian Linkages Project B, p. 9.0).

Recent HACC documents and talk are informed not only by discourses of economic rationalism and consumer rights but by a **discourse on social justice**. This is framed as equity, participation, rights and dignity for older, frail people (Victorian Linkages, B). Lynn calls it 'extraordinary', the Commonwealth espous[ing] conflicting social justice and economic rationalist arguments in the same breath [and], hope[s] the Cain Government never follows that line (1989, p. 20). It has: for example in a paper on performance indicators (Social Justice Strategy Unit, 1988). However, others argue that equity and efficiency are compatible (Saunders, 1988).

The recent Victorian Linkages documents are also informed by a **consumer-driven** approach, a discourse potentially opposed to economic rationalism provided it grapples, as economic rationalism deliberately avoids doing, with issues of power and goes beyond themes of participation and advocacy, since these are fragile protectors of democratism, and provided it avoids individualising bodies and the administrative technologies which are 'mechanisms for the specific operation of power' (Hewitt, 1983, p. 148). Moreover, the corporate discourse in Linkages proposals now includes an extensive theme of researched information: a theme which occludes the nature of this information: this is more accurately described as post hoc information about the contingent arrangements made for Mr Binks when there was a scurry around to organise services to keep him at home. This information will be deployed as a rationale for shifting from the relatively higher costs to government of subsidising residential beds to the lower costs in HACC services.

To what extent can this weakly articulated consumer discourse, with its themes of needs and rights, challenge the potential regulation which will follow a discourse of economic rationalism and its individualised technologies of control?

First, various writers have noted the politics of needs interpretation (Cooper, 1982; Tomlinson, 1982; Fraser, 1987) but few appear to argue that rights, too, may merely politicise issues rather than achieve those alleged rights (but see Hewitt, 1983; Fulcher, 1989 various). Second, the GAT proposals invite more regulation than was the case potentially between doctors and patients in a traditional clinical situation via the likelihood of either bureaucratic covenant, or of struggles in GAT arenas, between workers with competing objectives. Third, the GAT proposals also instance, as Cohen put it some ten years ago, in discussing the re-emergence of dispersed provision, a new (for the twentieth century) mode of control (of the frail, elderly) and 'in the long run- as they say - social control is in the interests of the collective, not the individual' (1979, p. 360). Fourth, the possibilities of withholding power, a possible definition of kindness, seem less likely in GAT arenas than it does in the two person arena of patient and doctor. It is clear then, that the attenuated consumer discourse which informs some actors' objectives in some HACC arenas, in face of the assessment proposals is inadequate for its task: in its present form, **it seems likely only to assist regulation**: as Saunders notes, the form of intervention is crucial (1988, p. 19). Part of the answer as to why the consumer discourse in HACC seems likely to assist regulation lies in the relative institutional bases of the various discourses.

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8. As evidenced by the Commonwealth Minister concerned with it: they include the Minister for Health and Community Services (Neil Blewett), and the Minister for Housing and Aged Care (Peter Staples).

HACC's corporate discourse finds an extensive institutional base in Canberra, in the Municipal Association of Victoria,⁹ and in Community Services Victoria, where it provides not only an objective of rational administration, and thus control of consumers and agencies but also a tactic, whereby its language, which is silent on politics or power and conflict, occludes both the contingent, if not chaotic, provision of services, as well as struggles between levels of government and between agencies and government. While a discourse of economic rationalism is extensively deployed, as the theorising outlined above would suggest, other discourses are deployed at high levels in government: economic rationalism is not the only discourse deployed or available in government arenas.¹⁰ However, Commonwealth and State government apparatuses, through their bureaucracy provide secure institutional bases, not only for a corporate discourse but also for professionalism; similarly, some agencies provide an institutional base for both discourses though, again, a consumer rights discourse may be deployed: but we should ask to what effect? In contrast to discourses of economic rationalism and professionalism, HACC's weakly articulated consumer discourse has no clear institutional base in the welfare state apparatus. Who will be a genuine advocate for older frail people? And is the inherent control which emanates from a clinical gaze, especially where practiced by bureaucratic covenant via a 'review team' such as GAT, properly understood?

In sum, HACC creates a new discursive formation, the frail elderly. The policy, at all levels, is predominantly informed by a corporate discourse which finds clear institutional bases in the state apparatus: this includes arenas in which the Commonwealth and State governments and the Municipal Association of Victoria variously contest. The more weakly articulated consumer discourse, with its themes of needs and occasionally rights, allied with assessment proposals, not only fails to challenge the politics of welfare (Hewitt, 1983; Fulcher, 1989) but, through its focus on individualised bodies, invites those technologies of control which are specific mechanisms for the operation of power: these deflect attention from an alternate subject and object: for instance, the nature and quality of services, whether at home or in institutions, that older people might want.

If the institutional base of a consumer discourse is weak and its themes inappropriate, we should ask: Why a consumer discourse for the frail elderly? That question is all the more urgent if rights merely politicise issues and in the context of controlling individual bodies in the collective interest (Cohen, 1979). Is a weakly articulated consumer rights discourse, which has no clear institutional base, a tactic to avoid a more difficult politics of government directly regulating those who provide services? Are consumers to be protagonists on their own behalf in a context where they are clearly disadvantaged by being the object of bureaucratic review and a discourse of professionalism? Is a consumer rights discourse which has no discourse on power a tactic of evasion deployed by government? The politics of regulating services directly rather than via the consumer are difficult: recent media reports attest to this.¹¹ This suggests that a consumer rights discourse, where it is both weakly articulated and deployed by bureaucrats, reflects an easier politics for government.

Turning to the 1984 government level policy, *Integration in Victorian Education*, the evidence shows that despite the report's objective to enable schoolchildren called disabled to achieve their rights to an education in a regular school, more regulation has occurred of those called disabled, and the number potentially subject to this regulation has increased (Fulcher, various). Regulation has taken a number of forms: more schoolchildren have been marginalised (Fulcher, 1988b; Lewis, 1988), 'integration' children have suddenly been discovered in regular classrooms (Tschiderer, 1986), some schools have attempted to suspend those students, and 'delayed admission' has been introduced: a student called disabled may enrol in but not enter a regular school if the resources deemed necessary for that student are not 'in place' (Fulcher, 1986a).

9. See for example, the reported comments of the newly appointed HACC adviser in the Municipal Association of Victoria person, *The Age*, 1 July, 1989.

10. As the theorising and commonsense suggest, and as discussions with a member of EPAC confirmed.

11. For example, *The Age* (1 July 1989, p. 3 and 5 July 1989, p. 5) reports Community Services have been wanting to bring a case against a nursing home for some years (because of the appalling conditions for residents) but legislation is not sufficiently precise.

This regulation has occurred despite the predominantly democratic discourse the report deployed, despite its critique, not wholly successful of professionalism and despite the recommendation to establish participatory democratic decision-making structures at various levels in the educational apparatus. It's now procedurally much more complex for someone with an identity of disabled to negotiate their schooling: Integration Support Group procedures now appear in booklet form; the lives of schoolchildren called disabled have become increasingly contingent on those who hold power in bureaucratic procedures.

Theorising these effects and those in other educational apparatuses - in the US, UK, Denmark and Norway, which also have a range of integration or mainstreaming policies at government level - draws attention to discursive formation, specific objectives and their struggles, discourse as tactic and theory, and the institutional bases of integration: significantly, various discourses deploy a theme of integration but their objectives vary.

Of these five educational apparatuses, only one, Denmark, has avoided outcomes of increased bureaucratisation and politicisation in its educational practices surrounding an integration objective, in the sense of including more children in the social and educational life of regular schools. Significantly, both for theorising and its inseparable political agendas, the Danish government level policy did **not** target some schoolchildren as disabled, it avoided professionalism and it instituted, instead, a discourse on pedagogy or competent teaching. Ministry of Education documents stated that all children were firstly pupils, and they provided a clear critique of a discourse which divides schoolchildren into the allegedly able and the allegedly disabled or handicapped (for example, Hansen, 1982, pp. 156-157; Hansen, p. 4). The Ministry provided an institutional base for a discourses on central, substantive, educational issues - how to teach inclusively: this was its objective. Moreover, it researched good teaching practice and disseminated this information to schools. While this tactic may not have avoided a discourse of professionalism being deployed at other levels of its educational apparatus (how can I teach that child? I haven't the training, he's yours not mine), it did not legitimise that discourse at government level. In addition, the Danish Ministry's careful handling of the political process, negotiating over several years with those concerned, compares with the expedient, short term consultancy which occurred in the Victorian Ministerial Review of Educational Services for the Disabled (Fulcher, 1989c; 1989d).

In contrast to the Danish objective and discursive practices, the Victorian government level report was received at other levels and in other arenas as about integrating 'disabled' schoolchildren. In these arenas, a discourse of professionalism, where the object was disability and its alleged implications for teaching, was extensively deployed: in schools, between senior bureaucrats and representatives from teacher union, in professional associations, to block the intent of the 1984 policy document. As Shapiro notes, the rules which constitute a discourse on disability are inevitably about exclusion (1981): a discourse on disability thus has a political logic (Fulcher, 1989a; 1989c). That political logic is one of assumed impairment, deficit, difference, marginality and marginal presence (in this case, in regular classrooms), contingent resources and thus, if the resources are not available, exclusion. Professionalism, where it has disability as its central theme, deploys this logic. This tactic contrasts with a discourse on pedagogy which, combined with an objective of adopting inclusive styles of teaching, does not constitute a basis for excluding children from the regular classroom but of including them. Finally, those who have deployed professionalism in the Victorian educational apparatus have instituted further than was already the case, a discourse on disability.¹²

In the education apparatus, a discourse on disability finds an institutional base firstly, in teaching training institutions where there are courses based in notions of differences between 'types' of children, which assume different pedagogies apply and which credential teachers accordingly. Secondly, the bureaucracy, the Victorian Ministry of Education, as a form of organisation based on alleged expertise and specific responsibilities, provides a secure institutional base for a discourse of professionalism whose object is disability: it has provided a base for new discursive practices to regulate disability (integration procedures, delayed admission, separate budget lines, and so on). The bureaucracy failed to provide an institutional base for a discourse on teacher competence or pedagogy, as primarily a technical and substantive issue, a matter of teaching competence and therefore different from

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12. See, for example, the most recent policy document from the Australian Association of Special Education which, compared with earlier statements, extensively deploys the theme of special education needs as the basis which its expertise on professionalism, is directed. See also the deployment of a theme of socio-emotionally handicapped in a recent report from a Faculty of Special Education for the Catholic Education Office of Victoria.

professionalism. The politics of this are not hard to guess. The failure, despite setting up an Integration Unit following the 1984 report, to establish a basis for a discourse on and objective of integration, in the sense defined above, reflects both the stronger institutional base for professionalism and the representative bureaucratic politics rather than democratic procedures which other researchers, such as Rizvi et al. (1987), found emerged when democratic educational policies were contested in schools and other arenas.

In sum, the 1984 government level integration policy, by targeting and formally sanctioning the category of disabled schoolchildren, established more powerfully than before the Review, a discursive formation from which new regulatory powers emerged and on which they could be deployed. The report initiated conflict at other levels of the educational apparatus where a discourse on disability was deployed in various arenas, thereby deflecting attention from alternate discourses and themes such as pedagogy: on this the report was silent. The absence in the Danish Ministry's policy, of a targeted group, and a discourse of professionalism about disability, and its consequent relative progress towards an objective of integration in the sense defined above, compares with the Victorian experience and that of Britain, the US and Norway (Fulcher, 1989c; 1989d).

4. TOWARDS AN AGENDA

What agenda does this theorising and analysis suggest about the possibilities of political practice concerned with integrating students and with how and where older people are able to live in late twentieth century Australia? The possibilities seem clearer for an objective of integration, so I shall pose questions about, and suggest only a tentative agenda for, the possibilities concerning older, frail people.

First, while conventional wisdom in social policy and in managerial economic rationalism, assumes that targeting groups, identifying categories of need, are the way to proceed in social policy, it is clear both from Foucault's arguments about power and discursive formations, and experience or evidence from the 1984 Victorian and other government level integration policies, that such targeting merely constitutes a new aspect of the social body which can be regulated. Significantly, the Danish Ministry avoided this: it argued against dividing children into those with alleged handicaps and those without. Some recent Victorian evidence, though far from systematic or extensive, shows that schools that are most successful in integrating schoolchildren are those that don't target some children, either as integration child, or as disabled. These schools adopt inclusive teaching styles and co-operative relations in schools (Fulcher, Semmens, Slee (forthcoming); Slee (1989)).

Similarly, it is clear that targeting older, frail people in HACC policy may not be in their interest: this target institutes a relatively new discursive formation, a group on whom more bureaucratic forms of regulation may be deployed, such as GAT, and a new categorical system in the professionalisation of social policy: for instance, the major local government position for HACC, the Community Services Officer for the Aged and Disabled, numbered 23 positions in 1973 and in 1988, 173 (Municipal Association of Victoria, 1988, p. 6): an increase of 752 per cent in 15 years. This compares with increases in the overall Victorian population between 1973 and 1986, of 15.6 per cent, and in the population aged 80 and over, of 79 per cent.¹³ But it also needs noting the increase in what local government has provided: for instance, in 1971, 7,034 people had received home help, and in 1984/85, 43,218 (MAV 1988, p. 1).

Secondly, and this relates to Wickham's **specific objectives**, unearthing the struggles which followed the 1984 report, which were replayed in various arenas in the Victorian educational apparatus, revealed that **integration is not about disability, it is about discipline and curriculum** (Fulcher, 1988b). It is these two central issues which constitute the politics of integration and why the policy is generally resisted: they are historically the two central concerns of teachers. Those who have deployed a discourse on disability, difference, expertise and a separate teaching profession, have deflected attention from those issues. The logic of this paper's theorising, as well as the Danish experience, suggests a focus on, an objective of, inclusive teaching styles should replace a discourse on disability: an agenda which some Victorian schools have already adopted and which is receiving some support in the Ministry, in a number

13. The population aged 80 and over in June 1973 (revised estimates) was 52,683, and in June 1988 (preliminary estimates) 94,372. The total Victorian population in June 1973 was 3,684,499 and in June 1988, 4,260,300 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, verbal information, 14 and 17 July 1989).

of reports it has commissioned and in the appointment of an historian, with a PhD critical of special education, as number two in a new group of people developing integration policy.

Where specific objectives in a policy for older, frail people are concerned, the substantive issues or specific objectives seem less clear. These people may have impairments for which they often need pragmatic adjustments in their living conditions, rather than health services, or they may want disability aids: even these pragmatic issues are part of the political struggles underlying HACC. But if the Commonwealth and State governments' objective is to cut costs and redistribute them (between levels of government and to agencies), then two specific objectives suggest themselves. The first is to shift from an individualising gaze on older, frail bodies to a concern with the nature and quality of services, without pretending that these individualised bodies, at 80+, can or want to exercise any real political influence on these services nor that a weakly articulated consumer rights discourse in the context of a discourse of economic rationalism, can do that. Given the present dominance of individualistic gazes and discourses, translating this objective into a new conceptual framework which is about services rather than individualised bodies, presents problems: having this as an objective is a more difficult political task than deploying a clinical gaze on older, frail people and it has to be asked, not entirely cynically, whether those who are making this policy have deliberately adopted that tactic, and ranked that issue higher, because it is politically less controversial than engaging directly with social actors in agencies. Achieving this objective means, initially, pointing to the regulatory effects on consumers of this consumer discourse.

The second specific objective for older frail people is to resist reductions in government monies for a range of community and residential services: one strategy might be to focus on the costs of present proposals for regulating, older frail people: as Liggett says, the costs of regulating disability, for example, employing people to do that, are rarely considered (1988). Economic rationalism is not only silent on power and conflict but also on the expense its regulation incurs.

A third aspect of the agenda concerns the institutional bases which allow regulation of, in this instance, schoolchildren called disabled and older, frail people. In both, we confront the institutional bases of professionalism. Part of the answer to resisting professionalism lies in getting teaching institutions, both secondary and tertiary, to teach intending workers that there are technical, substantive issues which have to do with occupational competence (an ability to do something which works) which is separate, though rarely articulated as separate, from 'professionalism', the ploy professionals adopt to persuade others not only of their competence but of their right to do that (on the other); it also involves teaching intending workers and the disempowered that politics is about struggle, objective and discourse, that it concerns power arrangements, rather than voting and that consumers need to deploy tactics which go beyond themes of advocacy and participation where these do not openly confront power. This involves considering political constructs in social policy such as disability,¹⁴ and in agencies it involves considering how to move from practices which deploy professionalism towards working alliances with clients. This is a difficult agenda but in Britain, Brechin and Swain (1988), and in the US, Liggett (1988), have made contributions which go beyond notions of normalisation where the objective is to change the client.

In tertiary institutes which train professionals and paraprofessionals, the curriculum would include a critique of the position of professionals in the welfare state. Again, this is controversial. It would mean some systematic presentation of the debate about the welfare state and its politics, about the historical point this debate and the future of the welfare state has now reached, and the place of professionals and professionalism in all of this.

Confronting the institutional bases of economic rationalism deployed in HACC is a more difficult task, given the present dominance of this discourse in Australian political debate and its extraordinarily powerful institutional base, it seems, at all levels of government, in political parties, and in corporate arenas. Nevertheless, decoding it for the tactic of persuasion and occlusion it is, can empower those who negotiate with bureaucrats. Australian debate against the tenets of economic rationalism seems slow to emerge: its fallacies, such as economic growth promoting collective well-being and high employment, or an overall economic recession occurring, when what is happening is that some people's position in relation to the economy is worsening while others' is improving: these should be argued against; its irrationalities (ignoring the social costs of economic rationalism) and its potential consequences for policy areas

14. On the analytical advantages of distinguishing between impairment, as physical lesion, and disability, as political construct, see Fulcher 1989a, 1989b.

like disability where, in America, for instance, it's been proposed that, to cut costs, animals should be trained to feed people bed-ridden with disabilities (Zola, 1988), all of these ought to be argued against.

Economic rationalism, where it is perpetrated by people with tertiary teaching backgrounds in social and political theory, instances Foucault's critique of the control effects of dispersed forms of critical knowledge (Hewitt, 1983). This seems to apply to HACC, where it needs to be asked whether the institution of a new site of power relations, the frail elderly, and the regulation which follows a corporate discourse of economic rationalism and bureaucratic practices for individualising bodies and issues, is properly understood. Whether it is, or whether we're dealing with self interest, discourse analysis, done on the spot in a policy arena where a discourse of economic rationalism is being deployed, will help move, even if only a little, towards an agenda with different objectives.

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THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE CASE OF THE AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW

Peter Gunn
School of Social Work
University of Melbourne

1. INTRODUCTION

At the opening of the Social Justice in Australia Conference in 1988 the Minister for Social Security, Brian Howe, had this to say:

In the 1970s we saw the paradise offered by Whitlam not only postponed but turned into a nightmare of alienation and poverty within a few short years. We cannot, whether we want to or not, return to either Chifley and/or Menzies. We have to look to the challenges of the future, recognising that this will require us all to re-examine our assumptions and to consider the possibilities of change. ... [This] depends on the recognition of new models or paradigms for the welfare state. (Howe, 1988: 13-14)

Earlier in 1988 Mrs Thatcher oversaw the introduction of the British Social Security Act 1988, seen by some as the effective dismantling of the British welfare state. In reporting this, one Australian newspaper described the Thatcher Government as using the language of an 'enterprise culture' to legitimate this dismantlement (Yallop, 1988). Another article written in the same week and entitled 'Thatcherist Verbal Hijack Holds Language Hostage' (Callick, 1988), declared that whilst '... television images capture the vote ... words continue to capture the political argument'.

The writer of this second article went on to identify the political Right as having 'won the war of words outright during this decade'. He listed what he called the 'strategic dictionary' of the Right; the words which the Right has 'captured' by successfully excluding meanings alternative to those which accord with a rightist political strategy.

These various observations about the state of the welfare state in Australia and Britain encapsulate both the central concerns of this paper and its political bias.

This paper has two aims. The first is to present a methodology for policy analysis which claims to provide a basis for close analysis of the assumptions which are built into the language of social welfare debate and of policy making in particular. The second is to briefly demonstrate this methodology by applying it to a reading of some aspects of the Social Security Review.

2. A METHODOLOGY FOR DISCURSIVE POLICY ANALYSIS

Staying with Thatcher's Britain for the moment, Christopher Norris, the literary critic and populariser of French deconstruction, has, apparently with unintended irony, compared the socially constructive power of political discourse in contemporary Britain with that of 'Newspeak' in George Orwell's 1984.¹ Orwell would however have probably agreed with Norris in rejecting any facile optimism which would seek to discount the socially constructive power of political discourse. A familiar strategy here is to invoke some discursive ground framed on the basis of notions of 'common decency', 'common sense' or other essentialisms:

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1. Ironies abound here. Despite being a socialist, Orwell's writings were of course adopted as propaganda by the Right, with some validity, since they were intended, at least in part, as a denouncement of Stalinist totalitarianism. It is thus a further ironical twist that they should be marshalled in a critique of Thatcher's *laissez faire* vision for Britain.

'Common sense' ... amounts to nothing more reliable or permanent than the various ideologies that claim to represent it. There is simply no bedrock guarantee that something must survive - 'essential humanity' or 'democratic values' - against all the encroachments of ideological power. (Norris, 1987: 6)

Norris' proposition, posed at the level of substantive analysis, is emblematic of the recent recognition of the significance of discourse for political and historical understanding in the English speaking world. There has in addition been a growing recognition of the way one's methodological orientation, and in particular the discursive practices of one's methodology, act to constitute the ostensibly objective domain of substantive inquiry (Shapiro, 1981: 199).

In general, as Laclau puts it, '... theoretical practice has been greatly hindered by ... two obstacles ... : the connotative articulation of concepts at the level of common sense discourse and their rationalist articulation into essential paradigms' (Laclau, 1977: 10). What is required of critical policy analysis therefore is, to paraphrase Watts (1980), a double transcendence: of the common sense discourse of the policy processes of the welfare state, and of the discourse of mainstream policy analysis which takes that common sense for granted.

The alternative approach to policy analysis outlined here approaches this project by directing its attention simultaneously to these two tasks. It comes to the analysis of the discourse of policy processes informed by a kind of second order policy analysis; informed, that is, by reflection on the discourse of mainstream policy analysis. And lest this appear to be leading in the direction of academic abstractions, it is well to note, as Watts' formulation suggests, that second order policy analysis can be at the same time first order policy analysis; any critical reflection on a particular instance of policy analysis is immediately an alternative analysis.

I call this alternative approach to policy analysis 'discursive policy analysis'.

This approach has its roots in recent re-orientations in broad areas of social philosophy, social theory and social linguistics. These influences include not only the Continental traditions of phenomenology and of structuralism and its antecedents, but also Anglo-American ordinary language philosophy, ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism, and developments in the theory of ideology both within and beyond the various denominations of Marxism. Examples of the application of a synthesis of these various theoretical strands which go to make up what may broadly be called ideology-critical discourse analysis to more substantive study of politics and policy making are however still few in number.²

What does this approach have to say about first order or substantive policy analysis? It is clear that policy development cannot be seen simply in terms of the prevailing input-output models of organisational processes and behavioural-pluralist models of the political context. It is one thing to accept the importance in a policy process of, for

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2. Of the literature in English, two of the essays in Laclau (1977) might reasonably be regarded as case studies in political history which are informed by a discourse theoretic orientation. More unequivocally qualifying as substantive political discourse analyses are Burton and Carlen's (1970) treatment of the reports of certain official British inquiries and Green's (1983) study of British Poor Law Reports.

In French, of particular note is Faye's (1972) massive study of the discourses of Nazism. An English translation of one of Faye's essays is available (Faye, 1976). Pêcheux and his associates have also carried out extensive empirical work, partial reports of which are available in English (1971, 1978). Thompson's essays (1984) are valuable for an appreciation of this work (and much else).

Hawkesworth (1988) is a good introduction to the theoretical presuppositions of mainstream policy analysis and to alternative approaches. Dallmayr (1986) and Dillon (1976) also provide useful reviews of prevailing modes of policy analysis as well as setting out specifically discourse theoretic alternatives. The alternative frameworks outlined by Fischer (1980, 1985, 1986) and Forester (1982a, 1982b, 1985) are also relevant.

In the Australian context, Beilharz (1987) has recently provided a sketch of how social policy documents might be analysed from a discourse analytical perspective.

example, 'market forces' and the pragmatics of implementation because of their importance for policy actors, but quite another to leave such categories unexamined. Additional, second-order questions need to be asked about the nature of such factors.

A methodology is required which enables one to discern the socially constructive power of the 'practical' discourses of the economic marketplace and the formulation and implementation of policy within that context. Such a methodology must acknowledge and try to account for the socially and ethically non-neutral character of such discourse. It should try to throw some light on such things as how, in Mrs Thatcher's rhetoric, a word like 'equity' comes to be a pejorative term connoting the maintenance of the bureaucratic incompetence of the welfare system and its socially incompetent clients (Callick, 1988), or on how, in the Australian context, 'rationalism' can act to legitimate the irrationality of 'economic rationalism' (Stilwell, 1989).

2.1 An Epistemological Basis for Discursive Policy Analysis

The discourse of contemporary mainstream policy analysis is embedded in an instrumental and economistic model of rational action. Discursive policy analysis, on the other hand, is based on a value-oriented epistemology founded in turn on what I call a 'constructivist' ontology. Fischer, quoting Riley, summarises this position well in terms of adherence to three principles:

The first is the 'belief that perception, rather than being conceptually neutral, is structured by both linguistic categories and the mental attitudes and interests of the observers'. Second is the epistemological assertion that 'the categories in terms of which experience is organized and, in turn, known, as well as canons of truth and validity, reflect the values and interests of different groups at different times in history'. Third is the claim that the social actor 'does not encounter reality as uninterpreted but rather as something mediated or constructed by conceptual schema', whether paradigms, ideologies, or language games. (Fischer, 1980: 25)

I would merely add to this summary the need to emphasise the recursive nature of these processes. If the categories of social reality are to be taken as discursively articulated, the concept of the discursive must be expanded to take account of the active relation we have with the world. Such an expansion requires a radical re-conceptualisation of being. As Frow puts it:

The distinction between the 'real' and 'symbolic' realms is not ontologically given but is a social and historical result. The discursive is a socially constructed reality which constructs both the real and the symbolic and this distinction between them. It assigns structure to the real at the same time as it is a product and a moment of real structures. (Frow, 1985: 200)

Both perception and 'mental attitudes and interests' as well as 'reality' itself need to be seen as being structured and restructured through action by linguistic categories and vice versa. It is this general epistemological orientation which I call 'constructivism'.

But whilst rejecting the positivist model for social inquiry, nor do I see myself as engaged in the traditional kind of ideology analysis or critique. Ideology critique is, as Theweleit says, 'based primarily on the [usually unacknowledged] assumption that one's own level of culture [or one's own value-position] is "superior"' (Theweleit, 1987: 442).

Unlike the traditional ideology critic, the approach to inquiry adopted here does not begin by taking a critical position in relation to a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970; 1977) or the ideologies which flow from it. It begins by taking a paradigm seriously as a discursive universe with its own meaning effects. To a limited extent a paradigm is discursively available to the actors; actors are knowledgeable. But what is not discursively available must, following Giddens (1979), be embedded in reality-constituting practice, some of which is of course discursive practice.

At the outset then, the emphasis is on immanent rather than extrinsic analysis. Taking a paradigm seriously the investigator will be in a position to pay attention to the discursively available dimension, both manifest and latent. She or he will thus pay attention to the strategies, and in particular the ideologies, espoused either overtly or covertly by actors. But an additional area of investigation will be those 'strategies', and in particular ideologies, which are not intended either overtly or covertly by any actor, and which are a consequence of elements of practice not discursively available. In both cases the focus is on the 'social production of ideology' (Smith, 1974c; emphasis added).

But however sophisticated the methods of data analysis, the 'discovered' constructed reality remains an interpretation. It can satisfy no absolute requirement of 'representational accuracy', to use Dorothy Smith's term, or even comprehensiveness. Just because it seeks in part to explicate that which could not be said by the actors, there is a need to import, either overtly or covertly, a ground against which to display actors' discursive practice. Such a ground will necessarily construct the interpretation.

In the end therefore greater reality must be assigned to certain aspects of the actors' paradigm or practico-cognitive *Gestalt* than others. This most closely corresponds to the practice of traditional ideology critique. But this is a critique informed by having taken the actors' discursive universe seriously. And it is one which is based on a constructivist rather than an essentialist ontology.

Policy analysis based on this epistemology is in part a response to a methodological double-bind. This is the one Stanley Cohen encountered when analysing the stories of social control agents: 'to take these stories seriously (seldom are they based on total delusion, fantasy or fabrication), but also to explore their connections with the reality [or better, realities] they are meant to signify' (Cohen, 1985: 157).

2.2 Discursive Policy Analysis in Practice

In more programmatic terms the project of discursive policy analysis is to apply what Ched Myers calls a 'socioliterary reading strategy' (Myers, 1988: 31-36) to the task of analysing policy processes. Policy texts (whether these be actual documents, actors' accounts, or researchers' or third-party reports) need to be approached from the outset as ideological narratives. A policy document, in particular, must be understood as drawing the reader into its own realm of reality or discursive universe much as does an overtly fictional text, but without that process either being acknowledged (or even understood as such) by the author, or consciously observed by the reader. In addition the text claims for its reality the status of an unproblematically truthful reflection of an external social reality.

This is the phenomenon Smith calls **textual reality construction** (Green, 1983; Smith, 1974a, 1974b, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1984). As Eagleton describes this process, 'every text intimates by its very conventions the way it is to be consumed, encodes within itself its own ideology of how, by whom and for whom it was produced' (Eagleton, cited in Myers, 1988: 35).

The first step therefore is to describe the context of the policy process. This may variously be called, depending on what one wishes to emphasise, the paradigm(s), epistemic community, practico-cognitive *Gestalt*, or social relations within which the policy process has taken place. In order to try to avoid prejudging the subsequent analysis, the emphasis in this phase should be on **description** rather than analysis, so far as it is possible to distinguish these.

The subsequent steps comprise an inductive analysis of the text or texts. This analysis attempts to hold to the interpretative discipline appropriate to each step and thereby to avoid the pitfalls of more presumptuous ideology criticism. But it is also a synoptic process, continually moving back and forth between a close examination of the text and more comprehensive views of the text in context from a variety of perspectives.

The inductive steps may be divided into two categories, **narrative discourse analysis**, or simply **narrative analysis**, and **social discourse analysis**, or **social analysis**. Narrative analysis is concerned with **what** the text tells us, describing both the 'story' and the more local discursive universes within which the story is located. It is also concerned with **how** the text tells its story, describing the means or discursive genre chosen for the story-telling, and analysing its narrative structure.

The last of these elements, narrative structure, is studied from three perspectives: the text as a whole, at the level of substantive sections of the text as they stand in relationship to each other, and from within individual sections. The analysis of the internal structure of individual sections may involve selective use of techniques for micro-reading such as ethnomethodology's conversation analysis.

Social analysis involves more interpretative forms of textual analysis. It seeks to uncover the what and how of textual reality construction. The analysis of what reality is being constructed by the text involves analysing sociologically and historically (not just describing) the text's local discursive universes. The results of this analysis are then applied to the task of construing the semantic codes³ which render the discourse intelligible within those local universes.

The method for analysing how the text constructs its reality is to look first for any faults in the fabric of that reality. Any narrative or semantic lacunae, incoherencies or inconsistencies in the text are used as a way of uncovering latent discursive strategies. These strategies are then explained in terms of the socio-historical paradigm within which the text is located. This leads, in a circular process, to a more interpretative understanding of that paradigm and of the text's place within it.⁴

3. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW

There is no space in a paper such as this to present anything like a full illustration of discursive policy analysis. I will instead concentrate on trying to suggest the general power of the methodology, and in particular the way in which it links levels of analysis.

To do this, I will not attempt to proceed in the step-wise fashion outlined above. I will assume knowledge of the contextual background of the Review and of the Review documents and focus largely on social analysis. I will draw on, but only partially exhibit, one possible narrative analysis. I will also cheat, in order to further shortcut the analytical process, by moving far too rapidly from micro to macro interpretation.

In addition, I will limit my presentation by structuring it around a pair of semantic codes from contemporary social policy discourse. The latter is the discourse which constitutes the local discursive universe or paradigm within which the Review is located.

The first of these semantic codes, 'equity'⁵, is present throughout the Review documents. The other, 'efficiency' is, I maintain, very present in the discourse of the Review, but largely in the guise of an unacknowledged semantic cousin. This latter circumstance constitutes a peculiarity by means of which the process of textual reality construction can be unmasked.

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3. The term 'code' may be used in a general way to mean the set of rules, explicit or implicit, by which humans effect a given act of communication. Codes may therefore be 'as complex as [that of] primitive myth, as subtle as [that of] an artistic genre, as overt as a written grammar or as mundane as the competences which sustain the conversational glossing practices (i.e. the ethnomethods of everyday talker-hearers)' (Green, 1983: 72).

By prefixing the adjective 'semantic' however I mean to suggest and emphasis on the more overt of the alternatives mentioned by Green, much in the way that 'sign' is used by the structuralists, but without wishing to break the link with the wider connotative field which he describes. (See also Giddens, 1979, Chapter 3.)

4. There is no space here to do more than give a highly condensed account of the method. It may be however, that an example, even a sketchy one such as that which follows gives a better appreciation of at least the style of analysis. For more detail I refer the reader, as a starting point to Green (1983), Myers (1988) and Smith (1988). These three authors approach the same general problematic from rather different perspectives.
5. I will enclose the names of semantic codes in quotation marks throughout, both to identify them as such and to indicate their 'essentially contested' character (Gallie, 1956; Connolly, 1983).

The code 'equity' was presented at the outset of the Review under the rubric 'redistribution'. The first 'Background/Discussion Paper', in describing the redistributive questions posed for the Review, equates 'equity' with 'fairness':

To what extent are tenets of fairness, or equity, fulfilled by the social security system in the light of changed economic and social conditions? How can the inter-related taxation and social security systems be directed towards the alleviation of poverty, and towards the protection of the most vulnerable periods in the life-cycle when needs are greatest and access to income restricted? (Cass, 1986a: 10)

In subsequent documents 'equity' is decomposed into three subsidiary codes two of which, 'horizontal equity', 'vertical equity', are also part of the paradigmatic social policy discourse, and one, 'intra-family equity', which is less familiar and also less widely used in the Review.

An early background paper (Whiteford, 1986), devoted in part to the task of setting and elucidating the terms of the Review's discourse, keeps faith with the paradigm by tracing the genesis of the first two of these subsidiary codes to the normative principle encapsulated in the code 'ability-to-pay' from the economic theory of taxation. This principle is then transmuted to 'helping-those-in-need' in order to provide the basis for using the same two codes in the discourse of social security policy. The codes are formulated for that discourse as follows:

A concern with horizontal equity implies that people in like circumstances should be treated alike. In practice this is taken to support different treatment of people with the same income but differing calls on that income, particularly differing family responsibilities. Vertical equity is the concern that those who are more well-to-do should shoulder greater burdens than the less-well-off, or that the poor should receive greater assistance than those better-off. In practice this implies varying social security payments according to income and/or capacity to pay. (Whiteford, 1986: 24-25)

'Intra-family equity' is formulated in the first of the 'Issues Papers', or main reports, as the requirement 'to provide resources to the parent primarily responsible for children's care' (Cass, 1986b: 5).

'Equity', its surrogate 'fairness', or one or other of the three subsidiary forms (but particularly 'horizontal equity' and 'vertical equity'), appear in the chapter sub-headings of only those issues papers dealing respectively with 'families with children', 'older people out of work', and 'retirement' (Cass, 1986b; Crompton, 1986; Foster, 1988).⁶

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6. Lest it be objected that 'adequacy' effectively covers for 'equity' in the other Issues Papers, it is important to note, first of all, that both Cass and Whiteford distinguish 'equity' from 'adequacy'. 'Equity' includes an ostensibly redistributive element, comparisons being made either between different income groups ('vertical equity'), different 'need groups' ('horizontal groups'), or different members of a family ('intra-family equity'). Whiteford (1986: 24) formulates 'adequacy' in terms of comparisons of levels of income support with some external criterion, in his case 'poverty line'.

But what is of more discursive interest is that Cass' formulation of 'adequacy' (1986a: 9) is less clear and not distinguishable from 'horizontal equity'. This confusion is continued with the first Issues Paper where adequacy is conflated with 'vertical equity' (Cass, 1986b: 68). This is in itself significant of course, suggesting some further tension, and some ensuing incoherence, in the Review which I have not examined. But although such an examination would undoubtedly be valuable, this would extend and refine rather than conflict with the analysis presented here.

One focus of this kind of analysis is the fact that particular codes (such as 'equity'), or those which the text explicitly declares as correlates (such as 'vertical equity' and 'horizontal equity'), are used in some places and not others. Whereas for the innocent text codes are conceptual resources which may be mistakenly confused one with the other, for the discursive policy analyst such 'mistakes' and 'confusion' are data (see Bilmes, 1986: 106).

The background paper by Whiteford is also the only place where any explicit formulation is given for the code 'efficiency'. Once again this involves a similar, but two-tiered, decomposition which also does not, at least in itself, step outside the discursive paradigm:

There are four basic concepts of efficiency - target efficiency, technical efficiency, administrative efficiency and economic efficiency. Concern with target efficiency, which is usually taken as the most important of these issues, leads to the consideration of what proportion of the benefits of a program go to the non-poor as well as the poor (vertical efficiency), and what proportion of the poor or other target groups actually receive the intended benefits (horizontal efficiency). (Whiteford, 1986: 25)

But at this point something odd begins to be noticeable. On the same page of this background paper the code 'incentive effects' is treated as a separate item in the list of criteria for evaluating alternative social security arrangements. This code is formulated as the 'effects ... programs have on work, savings and investment, family size and composition or family formation and dissolution, economic growth and national productivity' (Whiteford, 1986: 25).

What is significant about this is that in the paradigmatic discourse 'incentive effects', or alternatively 'income effects', is usually treated as a subsidiary code of 'efficiency', and more particularly of 'economic efficiency'.⁷ Such a minor thing, if it is noticed at all, might seem to be best dismissed as an idiosyncrasy of the particular text. But before we do dismiss it, let us take a closer look.

Something which might suggest that this is more than an idiosyncrasy is the fact that in another, rather more peripheral, background paper the paradigmatic treatment of 'income effects' is followed (O'Donohue, 1988: 26). But of much more interest is the fact that apart from these two papers the code 'efficiency' in any of the variants listed by Whiteford hardly appears at all in the Review.⁸ On the other hand the codes 'incentives' or 'disincentives' are found in the chapter subheadings of all six Issues Papers (Cass, 1986b; Crompton, 1986; Raymond, 1987; Cass, 1988; Cass et al., 1988; Foster, 1988).

Once again, one might well argue that this is of no significance since the reports cover what is of substantive importance whatever the language that is used. But this simply begs the question that discursive policy analysis seeks to pose and address. This perspective maintains that what is of 'substantive importance' is, at least in part, a discursive, and in this case a textual, construct. What needs to be determined therefore is whether what is going on here is textual reality construction.

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7. (See e.g. Podger, 1989: 5.) In the paradigmatic discourse it applies to taxation theory 'economic efficiency' is formulated in terms of 'neutrality':

... efficiency requires that the resources available for public use ... [be] transferred [in a manner which involves] minimal 'waste'. ... In so far as it can be presumed that, left to their own devices, individuals will spend their incomes wisely, and business will choose the most efficient means of production, the minimisation of waste requires that the tax system should not influence individual and business choices. This is the requirement that the tax system should be neutral. Thus the tax system should not ... alter ... the relative attractions of work and leisure ... (Taxation Review Committee, 1975: 16)

See also Edwards (1984) and Saunders (1982).

8. Apart from the O'Donohue and Whiteford papers the code 'efficiency' appears in none of the headings or sub-headings of any of the Review papers. As for the body of various texts, without making an exhaustive search I have only found three other places where the code 'efficiency' or one of the subsidiaries listed by Whiteford, is used (Cass, 1986b: 11; Cass, 1988: 271, 284).

What then is the constitutive nature of the texts of the Review and the Review as a whole? This is not a question which should really be raised at this point, when we have only just begun to trace one thread in a highly patterned cloth. But space limitations force a departure from the relative rigour of interpretative induction.

As is the case with most reports on public policy one of the most heuristically useful things to note about the Review is its tendency to constitutive innocence (Green, 1983). It tends to present itself as a more or less dispassionate and factual report on an aspect of social reality. Indeed, it attempts to 'make an absent phenomenal context present on paper for reading' (Green, 1983: 77). As an hypothesis serving analysis, if nothing more, it is the advancing of this as the superordinate characteristic of the reality such reports seek to construct which is generally helpful for a deductive strategy.

Thus the Review may be read as seeking to invest its presentation of the issues with the authority of objective empirical inquiry. It does this firstly by the use of plain, impersonal, workperson-like prose. This is the transparent medium through which this unproblematically objective empirical reality may become present. There is also the frequent citation of statistics and other supposed distillations of that reality, and the use of typographical techniques, such as dividing the text into sections and sub-sections, in order to mirror the supposed ordering of empirical reality.⁹

Is it possible to discern any kind of break in that process of reality construction in the use of the semantic codes discussed above? The ostensible function of these codes in the Review is as analytic devices for substantive policy analysis. This fits with the strategy of reality construction. These are technical, and therefore objective, terms from the economic lexicon of authorised public policy discourse. That discourse is located in the tradition of technical rationality which attempts at once to efface the normative character of its categories and to mirror in its ordering the moral and political, and hence irrational, domain with which public policy is concerned. This tradition may be traced back to the 1834 Poor Law Report (Green, 1983).

In the case of the Review, a break occurs in this mirror because the way in which the codes in question are deployed is not consistent with their constitutive rationality. Technical rationality is the same rationality which Weber described as underpinning the authority of administrative bureaucracies; it requires disinterestedness, uniformity and consistency in its deployment. What we have in the Review is inconsistency.

'Equity' is used significantly only in the discussions of the welfare of the old and families, particularly large families, and of women, as the primary child-care givers within families.¹⁰ 'Incentives' is used in reference to all of the Review's categories. In all but two of the Issues Papers it is used solely to refer to the relative attractiveness of work. In the case of the paper on retirement incomes, it is used in relation to saving. In the case of the paper on sole parents it is used in reference to the 'attractiveness' of family breakdown, teenage motherhood and re-partnering. In some form or other however the code is used most extensively in the papers on sole parents and the unemployed.

9. In case I might be misunderstood, I need to issue a disclaimer here about what these kind of statements might seem to be suggesting about the author or authors of Review reports. I am making no suggestions about authorial intentions or omissions and nor, therefore, about either authorial deviousness or naivety. In particular, I am making no assumption about authorial philosophical or sociological sophistication. Such considerations may of course be of some relevance for analysis of a text, but what is of interest at the moment are **textual** reality effects. (On this issue see e.g. Green, 1983: 38-57.)

10. It should be noted however that 'women' is not a category which receives much **explicit** attention in the Review. Women are subsumed under other categories, the principal one being of course 'family'. This is in itself a textual phenomenon which would repay investigation, but it is not one which I have undertaken here.

But apart from one background paper 'efficiency' itself is absent from substantive discussions in any of the Review documents. This is despite it being initially presented as a primary criterion by which to review social security programs.¹¹

This odd circumstance cannot be accounted for from within the most local of the discursive universes within which the Review is located. It is necessary to step outside the normative effacement of that universe.

Two rather more global, but still reasonably socio-historically precise, discursive universes are relevant. The first is that associated with the rise of welfare states, and particularly the British welfare state. It may be called the 'social pragmatic' universe. It includes within its domain Fabianism and what is sometimes called the 'reluctant' or 'moderate' collectivism of figures such as Keynes, Beveridge and Galbraith (George & Wilding, 1985; Mishra, 1984).

The second universe is the discursive correlate of two strands of feminist thought and practice identified by Eisenstein as 'progressive liberal feminism' and 'radical liberal feminism' (Eisenstein, 1981: 230-231). This is also what Glennon, in a more analytical (and pejorative) vein, calls 'instrumental feminism' (Glennon, 1979: Chapter 2). I will call the associated discourse 'feminist pragmatism'. This universe has had a more ambivalent relationship with the rise of the welfare state (see e.g. Pascall, 1986).

Stepping out into these universes it is now possible to distinguish codes such as 'equity', 'efficiency' and 'incentives' valuatively. The distinctions are not however uniform or unambiguous.

For the Fabian strand of social pragmatic discourse 'equity', or its analogue in this universe 'equality', is of course the central and superordinate code; 'efficiency' and its correlates are subsidiary but important, reflecting Fabianism's positive valuation of rational planning. For reluctant collectivism however 'equality' must defer to economic categories (Clarke et al., 1987; George & Wilding, 1985).

In feminist pragmatic discourse the androcentric cast which all the codes have in social pragmatic discourse is moderated. Here 'woman' is primary, the classical liberal version of 'equality' being consequently extended to include women, both in public and domestic life. 'Efficiency' is subsidiary to both 'woman' and 'equality', but remains important, this discourse being characterised by much the same instrumental rationality as that of social pragmatism (Glennon, 1979: Chapter 2; Jaggar, 1983: 45).

These two discursive universes, social pragmatic and feminist pragmatic, may be thought of as intersecting sets. Their intersection constitutes the space of legitimated discourse. Placing the Review within that intersection provides a discursive space within which to interpret the use of the codes in the Review.

There are two tensions or indeterminacies in this space, reflecting two elements of incompatibility between the discourses. Both centre around constructions of the code 'equality', the first in its relation to 'woman', the second in relation to 'efficiency'.

What we end up with in this intersecting space is the result of Fabian and reluctant collectivism being reduced to their lowest common denominator and assimilating in turn feminist pragmatism. What we appear at first sight to be left with are the categories of some kind of pragmatic, mainstream, twentieth century liberalism. In this reduced discourse, one supposes, the less orthodox liberal elements of the intersecting discourses are distilled out or attenuated.

The classical form of liberal discourse is concerned with the public world of the *laissez-faire* marketplace, frequented exclusively by calculating male social atoms. This public world is divorced from the private expressive world of the 'traditional' male-headed family (Jordan, 1985: Chapter 4; Nicholson, 1986). In the present intersection of discourses then two constructions of 'equality' would appear to be in danger. First, 'equality' comes under pressure to cede the

11. Crucial to some of the discussion below is the proposition that 'incentives' is **not** and **innocent** stand-in for 'efficiency', and in particular 'economic efficiency'. But if one accepts that it is, there is still the question of why the Review chose to restrict its consideration of efficiency in the way that it did; in particular, why did it not give any significant consideration to administrative efficiency? Such questions of course lie outside the domain of this paper, which is restricted to discourse analysis of the Review texts alone.

place of valiative precedence it holds in Fabian discourse. Second, feminist 'equality' is confronted by androcentric dichotomies.

If this is a correct characterisation of this discursive space then the categories to which the code 'equity' may unambiguously be legitimately applied are those which fall outside the realm of instrumentality which is the public world: 'the family' and 'the old'. Ambiguity about the relationship of 'equality' to instrumentalism means however that there is no clear warrant to apply this code to categories within the public realm.

But this account of the discursive space is too consensual and determinate. Feminist pragmatism can surely not allow a complete effacement of its primary code 'woman'. Women must be construed as fully equal, in both the private and public sphere. The instrumentalism of feminist pragmatism thus provides a warrant to oppose mainstream liberalism to the extent of applying 'equality' at least selectively outside the private domain; to apply it, that is, to women in the public sphere. This understanding of the first of the discursive tensions partially explains the use of 'efficiency' in the Review.

Within modern, orthodox liberal discourse the reference of 'efficiency', or its surrogates, is restricted to those categories which fall outside the private realm. 'Sole parents', and 'the unemployed' satisfy this criterion. But in the dichotomous discourse of liberalism these categories must not only fall outside the private realm but also fall inside the public realm. And this status has yet to be established.

For classical liberal discourse, single mothers, not being male, and the unemployed, not being economic atoms, are what Green calls 'illegible objects'; these are categories which cannot be construed within the discursive taxonomy (Green, 1983: 117f). But in the discourse of modern liberalism the taxonomies are however less individualistic. For males the status of being unemployed becomes legible as a deplorable, but inevitable, episodic concomitant of the dynamics of the capitalist system (Jordan, 1985: Chapter 4; Macpherson, 1977: Chapters 3 & 4; Schumpeter, 1987: 69-71). Women as unemployed remain illegible however. But if, as required by feminist pragmatism, women are to be legible as in the public sphere, and indeed equally as legible as men, the categories 'sole parents' and 'the unemployed' must be fully recognised.

This is, as already indicated, no warrant to break with liberalism by applying 'equity' uniformly, or even overtly, to the public realm. Nor is it a warrant to subvert the fundamental public/private dichotomy. In its interaction with social pragmatism feminist pragmatism can however attempt to increase the public legibility of women indirectly by applying the codes applicable to the public domain uniformly to both women and men. And in general it can attempt to move the relevant codes in a more androgynous direction.

One would thus expect to see 'efficiency' applied without gender bias. Making the assumption for the moment that 'incentives' when it refers to work stands in for 'economic efficiency', it is of interest then to see how the categories 'unemployed' and 'sole parents' fare in the Review in this respect. The special application of such a code to these categories might be expected in order to promote their incorporation into the public domain through association with the labour market.

Clearly the unemployed, a category not specifically identified with women, are treated in this way. Here 'incentives' does stand in for 'economic efficiency'.

In the case of sole parents discursive tension is evident. 'Incentives' is used here in two rather specific ways. It is used with reference to the private domain of the 'traditional' family, when considering the threat to that institution posed by incentives to sole parenthood. It is used in relation to the public domain when considering disincentives to (overt) repartnering, but in a way somewhat synonymous with administrative efficiency rather than economic efficiency.

Consideration is given in the relevant issues paper to disincentives to entering the work force posed by the supporting parents' benefit, but in terms of the code 'poverty traps' rather than 'incentives'. In effect then, for this category the discussion takes place not simply in terms of incentives to work but in terms of incentives to adopt the strategy of avoiding poverty which work is taken to represent. The difference in the moral accounting is clear. The illusion of discursive uniformity has also broken down.

Sole parents remain illegible. In a defensive posture within the conflicted discursive space of the Review, feminist pragmatism hastens to position the category in a way which poses no threat to the private realm occupied by the traditional category 'family'. The use of the code 'incentives' to frame the discourse of the section of the paper where this discussion occurs does bring with it the general association with 'efficiency'. But at the same time feminist pragmatism wishes above all to defend its primary category 'woman', which the category 'sole parent' (unlike 'unemployed') stands for. This defence is carried out using the code 'poverty traps' rather than the more instrumental and judgmental character the code 'incentives' takes on when it acts as a stand in for 'economic efficiency'. The cost however is that the category 'sole parent' is not granted legibility by one of the few devices legitimately available: fully subsuming it under one of the discursive codes of the public domain.

I would like to conclude this paper with a brief consideration of the absence of 'efficiency' as an explicit code in the Review. This absence is bound up with the second of the tensions of interest in this intersection of discourses: the relative precedence to be assigned to 'equality' and 'efficiency'. This has already received some attention, but on the assumption that the code 'incentives' stands in rather innocently for 'efficiency' in the Review.

Both 'equality' and 'efficiency' undoubtedly have a high valuation in both social pragmatism and feminist pragmatism. But although constructed differently in each case, 'equality' is granted precedence over 'efficiency' both in feminist pragmatism and the sub-universe of social pragmatism represented by Fabian discourse. As far as these two discourses are concerned it is 'equality' which is to be privileged. The difficulty is how to allow for reluctant collectivism's privileging of 'efficiency'. The Review's 'solution' is to make use of discursive masking.

We have seen that 'equality' is much in evidence in the Review in its policy discourse analogue 'equity', but that neither 'efficiency' nor its analogue 'economic efficiency' make any significant explicit appearance. The problem with these latter codes is that their extensive use would tend to constitute a challenge to the privileging of 'equality'. On the other hand, there needs to be a significant incorporation of 'efficiency' if reluctant collectivism is to be assuaged.

To overcome this dilemma the Review substitutes for 'efficiency' the alias 'incentives', and at the same time attempts to efface the discursive (and hence valuative) link between the two. Firstly 'incentives' is in any case a somewhat less severely instrumental code than 'efficiency', and hence one which less blatantly opposes 'equality'. The codes 'incentives' and 'efficiency' are also treated separately in the paper by Whiteford which seeks to define the terms of discourse. This separation is strengthened by giving the code 'incentives' a gloss which extends its reference beyond that of those related codes from the master discourse which are so clearly subsumed under 'efficiency': 'incentive effects' and 'income effects'. Indeed the gloss given the code, and its actual use, extends its reference even beyond the public domain, which is the realm of those codes. The incorporation of the private, expressive world of the family within its reference gives to what is otherwise still a highly instrumental code a rather more ambiguous character, while still retaining the necessary connotative associations with 'efficiency'.

In this guise 'efficiency' is thus able to be covertly privileged over 'equity' in the consideration of those beneficiary categories which are to be located in the public sphere. Although taking different forms in each case, 'incentives' is nevertheless used more extensively than 'equity' in the issues papers on sole parents and the unemployed, always carrying with it the unremarked connection with 'efficiency'.

I will end with a remark by Mary Douglas on the association between taxonomic illegibility and dirt in symbolic discourse. If the analysis just presented has any validity, perhaps the extraordinary convolutions which it reveals are best understood as symptomatic of the confusion resulting from any discursive strategy which sets out to reject traditional classifications but ends up accepting them, and engaging in a vain defence against the consequent pollution behaviour:

Dirt is the by-product of a systemic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. ... Our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications. (Douglas, cited in Myers, 1988: 72)

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POLITICAL EQUALITY AND SOCIAL POLICY

Barry Hindess
Department of Sociology
Australian National University

1. INTRODUCTION

Talk of equality has played an important part in the history of the welfare state, featuring prominently at times in the formulation of public policy and in critical assessments of its achievements. In the Fabian tradition of social policy analysis equality as a policy objective has frequently been interpreted in utilitarian terms having a distinctly quantitative and distributive character.¹ It is in these terms that many critics on the left have argued that the welfare state has not in general had the redistributive effects that were intended and are still sometimes claimed for it. Numerous studies have shown that the overall effect of public provision in a wide variety of policy areas is not to redistribute towards the poor and that it is frequently the reverse. Le Grand and others have gone on to suggest that a more radical egalitarian approach is required in order to overcome this redistributive failure.² This theme of egalitarian failure has been taken up by critics on the right who argue both that the pursuit of equality has been unsuccessful and that it has further damaging consequences for the economy and for personal freedom and independence.

I argue that this emphasis on quantitative and distributive issues directs attention away from a different understanding of equality with roots in the democratic and republican tradition of Western social thought. This concerns the idea of citizenship, in the sense of full and equal participation in the political life of a self-governing community, and the idea of justice, meaning that all members of the community are treated according to their deserts. The first of these senses of equality is arguably more central than the quantitative and distributive ideas that have been so influential in the critical literature on the welfare state. Indeed, it is difficult to see how equality in other respects might be secured at all in the absence of something approaching political equality.

In these terms the critique of the welfare state in terms of its redistributive failure is rather beside the point. The distributive implications of political equality are by no means as clear cut as the utilitarian interpretation might seem to suggest. In questioning the significance of the argument from redistributive failure I do not of course intend to suggest that welfare states do in fact provide the conditions of free and equal participation in political life or that they are without serious problems in other respects. My point rather is that these problems are not best approached in quantitative and distributive terms.

2. EQUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP

At one point in *Citizenship and Social Class* Marshall suggests that the role of the social services in the welfare state of post-war Britain should not be seen primarily as a means of equalising incomes. 'Equality of status is more important than equality of income' (p. 56). There are many problems with Marshall's treatment of citizenship³ but on this point he is certainly correct. The idea of equality that Marshall presents as an attribute of citizenship can be traced

1. On the connections between political equality and a utilitarian concern with benefits see R. Goodin, *Reasons for Welfare*, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 85, and more generally, H. Phelps Brown, *Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality*, Oxford University Press, 1989.
2. See B. Hindess, *Freedom, Equality and the Market*, Tavistock, 1986 for critical discussion of the political conclusions drawn from the evidence of redistributive failure by Le Grand and others on the left.
3. B. Hindess, 1986 and J. M. Barbalet, *Citizenship*, Open University Press, 1988 and B. Hindess, 1986

back at least to the development of democratic republicanism in early modern Europe and it has played an important part in subsequent political developments. Two central elements are first, free and equal participation in government and secondly, justice, meaning that all members of the community are treated by government according to their deserts. Both have wide-ranging implications.

The ability to participate in the political life of a community clearly requires the absence of legal impediments to such participation, but there is far more to the republican idea of participation than this merely negative requirement. What citizens participate in is the political life of a self-governing community and their participation serves to ensure that all interests are represented in its government. It also serves another purpose, which is to defend the republic both against the internal threats of corruption and domination by merely sectional interests and against external enemies. These ideas played an important part in the public life of revolutionary France, and the idea of a citizen army remained influential in the Western democracies until well in to the second half of the twentieth century.

Participation then is a right and it is also a duty. It serves the interests of the community as a whole and it follows that the health of the community depends on the personal qualities of its citizens. In this sense the republic, and therefore each of its citizens, has an interest in ensuring that citizens develop and maintain appropriate personal qualities and capacities. The republic must also be concerned to prevent or at least to minimise corruption of its citizens and public officials - a condition in which they pursue private or sectional interests without concern for the common good. Traditional concerns here have been with the consequences of injustice and with the effects of wealth and poverty. The absence of justice was regarded as posing a threat to civil peace because of the potentially disruptive actions of disgruntled groups within the community. The good of the community was therefore regarded as requiring that all are treated equally, that is, strictly according to their deserts. As for wealth and poverty, equality, in a rather different sense, is seen as a means of controlling their potentially corrupting effects. Rousseau puts the point clearly:

By equality, we should understand, not that the degree of power and riches be absolutely identical for everybody, but that ... no citizen be wealthy enough to buy another, and none poor enough to be forced to sell himself.

The idea of citizenship as a matter of participation in the political life of a self-governing community therefore provides powerful reasons why the republic (that is the citizens) might wish to interfere in the lives of its citizens in the interests of the citizens as a whole. There is an obvious tension between the requirement that citizens participate in political life as independent agents and the temptation to ask government to interfere in their lives in what are thought to be the interests of the citizens as a whole. The liberal tradition, with its concern for individual liberty, has been suspicious of the powers this temptation would have us leave in the hands of government, and it has proposed a variety of individual rights and constitutional devices as means of constraining potentially excessive uses of public power. Much of democratic political thought is an uneasy compromise of republican and liberal elements.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND WELFARE

The various senses of equality involved in the ideas of citizenship and justice have played an important part in the politics of democratic and socialist movements in the history of the modern West. In particular, they have played a part in the development of social policy in Western societies and in the idea of the welfare state. However, once formal legal and political equality has been achieved the practical implications of these ideas are far from clear. Neither free and equal participation nor justice need be interpreted as requiring a quantitative equality of distribution. What they do require has been subject to a considerable variety of interpretations. Utilitarianism as a political project can be understood as an attempt to remove some of the more contentious issues of public welfare from the realm of political debate by means of a system of objective measures and an overall standard based on the idea of the greatest good of the greatest number. This too has played a part in Western social thought, for example, in welfare economics and in the Fabian and related traditions of social policy discussion - but it has not succeeded in producing a generally accepted account of what the pursuit of equality might imply by way of public policy.

These various senses of equality do not yield clear and unambiguous policy prescriptions in most areas of public policy. This is an inescapable consequence of the role of ideas of equality in the political life of Western societies. Equality as a matter of the capacity to participate in the political life of the community has a bearing on policy in a number of areas. It suggests, for example, that the republic should ensure that all citizens are educated up to some

minimum standard, that they should not be allowed to fall below some minimum level of material well-being, and so on. However, neither the content of such minima nor the institutional means by which they might be secured can be derived from the idea of free and equal participation alone. In the case of education, say, the idea of participation suggests that citizens should be in possession of certain basic skills and a fair knowledge of the workings of their own society. Precisely what basic skills and knowledge might be at issue here remains a matter of debate. So too are a host of questions concerning the provision of education above these minimal levels. Or again, the idea of justice tells us that no member of the community should suffer unfair discrimination at the hands of the republic. Fine - but in a society that is far from homogeneous it would be unreasonable to expect agreement on what fairness and unfairness might consist in. What one group perceives as a matter of equity will often appear to others as the pursuit of merely sectional interests.

It would require some highly contentious assumptions and a remarkably focused use of policy instruments to make these ideas of equality require a quantitative equality in the distribution of particular goods and services. Except in the limited but important case of equality before the law, equality as a matter of justice or of participation must be supplemented by a number of other assumptions before it can be made to yield clear policy implications. First, equality as an objective must be interpreted in terms of the operation of some identifiable set of policy instruments and the criteria of performance that might reasonably be set for them: so many years of compulsory education, for so many hours per day throughout the school year; so many hours of English, mathematics, religious instruction, or whatever; such and such a level of attainment as measured by examinations and other tests. Secondly, a variety of policy concerns other than the pursuit of equality will invariably be at issue in these same policy instruments. This means that the link between the idea of equality and the detailed activity of particular policy instruments will be an attenuated one at best. At worst, reference to equality in policy documents and in preambles to Acts of Parliament will be little more than tokens serving to placate some relevant political constituency.

A different, and less restrictive, understanding of the participatory notion would be that the possession of certain capacities and the conditions which allow them to be exercised are required for effective participation in political and social life to be possible. In the modern period this understanding has been associated with the idea of securing at least a minimum provision of education, income, and health to act as a safety-net below which effective participation is regarded as impossible to sustain. Except in the case of some forms of income transfer there is nothing in the idea of minimum provision to require that it be financed by vertical redistribution in favour of the less prosperous. This is the sense of Marshall's view of the social aspect of citizenship as intended to secure membership of a common civilisation, and of Townsend's attempted definition of poverty in terms of what is required to participate in normal social life.

I have noted that there may well be disagreement about where the line should be drawn below which effective participation should be regarded as unduly restricted. Nevertheless the link between the idea of participation and that of a safety-net is not without consequences for the manner in which questions of social welfare policy are frequently discussed. First, the argument that certain welfare benefits should be provided as of right is predicated on the view that citizens should participate as independent agents, not as dependents of the state. It is also predicated, of course, on the view that such provision will secure independence.⁴ Part of the attraction of the idea of targetting welfare benefits to those with well-defined and clearly identifiable needs is that it appears to minimise the risk of inducing others into a state of dependence. Secondly, the particular animus directed against those who are regarded as welfare cheats and against sections of the unemployed can also be understood in these terms. They are not simply breaking the rules, as tax-dodgers also do, but they are independent agents dishonestly playing on our sympathies. Finally, the link between equality and citizenship plays a part in two apparently contradictory attitudes towards welfare beneficiaries. On the one hand there is the view that those who depend on welfare are at the same time demonstrating their lack of independence as citizens, thereby justifying the paternalistic treatment to which they are often subjected. On the other is the argument that they should be given cash benefits rather than benefits in kind, precisely so that they will then be enabled to act as independent agents in deciding for themselves how the benefits are to be used.

4. See C. Murray, *Losing Ground, American Social Policy 1950-1980*, New York, 1986 for a forceful challenge.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Where does this approach to equality leave the critique of the welfare state based on the argument from redistributive failure? The short answer is 'nowhere'. It asks the wrong questions and comes up with answers that may be technically valid but are nevertheless misleading in their political implications. Since the sense of equality that bears on participation has no necessary redistributive implications it should not be surprising that political concern with that objective has not led to significant vertical redistribution. Equality in the sense of justice as fairness might well have redistributive implications but, *pace* Rawls valiant efforts to establish what reasonable persons would agree to, there is little prospect of agreement on these matters in the societies of the modern world.

My purpose here has been to suggest that a currently fashionable critique of the welfare state on the grounds of its alleged redistributive failure is misconceived, not to defend contemporary welfare states from criticism. The argument from redistributive failure may be beside the point but it hardly follows that the welfare state must be judged to have succeeded in providing the conditions of free and equal participation. Marshall's understanding of citizenship as a status that has largely been secured certainly carries that implication. So too does Townsend's definition of poverty in terms of the absence of the conditions of participation. In the advanced capitalist societies, where he judges the poor to be a minority, the implication of that definition is that the rest of us are in fact free and equal participants in the social and political life of society. The idea of an underclass in the recent writings of Dahrendorf and others carries a similar implication: it consists of those who are excluded from what the rest of us are supposed to share.

It would be difficult to provide a reasoned demonstration of that view of contemporary Western societies. They are not the democratic, self-governing communities of republican doctrine. I have argued elsewhere that there is an important sense in which ideas concerning the workings of particular social institutions may be embedded in those institutions and play an important part in their day to day operations without properly describing them. The idea of the person as rational actor, for example, plays an important part in the institutions of contract and employment, in education and the legal system. Or again, the ideas of disinterested exchange of opinions and of reasoned argumentation are embedded in many parliamentary norms and procedures but they hardly describe how parliaments conduct themselves. The suggestion that the welfare state helps to secure equality is part and parcel of the representation of Western societies in terms of ideas of democracy and popular sovereignty. These ideas may not be descriptively accurate but they play an important part in the way these societies operate.⁵

What future for the welfare state? A concern for equality has been, at most, one element in the development of contemporary welfare states. The question is far too broad to be answered solely by reference to the fate of that concern. What, then, of the future of political movements concerned to pursue equality through public policy. I have suggested that the central significance of the idea of equality in Western social thought relates to the ideas of participation and of justice derived from the republican tradition. It follows that we should expect the scope and significance of such movements to depend on the strength of the idea of democracy in the public life of Western societies.

5. cf Weber's discussion of the role of democratic ideas in the system of legitimate domination characteristic of modern Western societies.

SOCIAL WELFARE: RECONSTITUTING THE POLITICAL?

Kevin McDonald
Department of Sociology and Politics
Phillip Institute of Technology

1. INTRODUCTION

As we approach the 1990s it is becoming clear that our society is entering a context signifying a rupture with the model of economic, social and cultural development dominant throughout the postwar period. Contemporary social reorganisation involves our culture, the economy, household patterns, conceptions of age and gender, public and private pace, city life, politics and welfare.

Social policy has attempted to interpret these changes in terms of a 'crisis of the welfare state'. Neoconservative theories of 'overload' and 'excess democracy' have converged with Marxist-functionalist theories of fiscal crisis to create the new consensus of the welfare state in crisis.

I wish to reject this new consensus, but not for the reasons that the welfare state is far more embedded in social life than was at first realised, and therefore far more resistant to 'rolling back' than either Thatcher or Reagan imagined (King, 1987). This new consensus fails on two grounds. Firstly it is an inadequate theorisation of the nature and extent of social change occurring. We are not dealing with a crisis of the welfare state, but with the emergence of new patterns of social and economic development. Secondly, this state-centred critique fails to consider the relationship between patterns of welfare and social actors, conceived of as social classes or social movements. I wish to argue here that a reconceptualisation of the relationship between social movements and patterns of welfare is the central task facing social policy today.

This approach emphasises the role of social welfare in reconstituting social relationships, and in constituting the terrain where new social actors can emerge. It is now generally accepted that the origins of the welfare state cannot be understood apart from the social struggles of the working class in the initial periods of capitalist industrialisation (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981; King, 1987). Remarkably, however, contemporary theorisations of welfare neglect the terrain of contemporary social actors and social conflicts.

This paper can only sketch the outlines of such a theorisation. It does so while considering the two most significant forms of 'post-crisis' social policy, namely the basic income or universal grant debates, and what I term 'tripartite modernisation' which may be in the process of becoming the new post-Keynesian welfare consensus. I argue that both of these approaches represent partial, and inadequate, theorisations of both contemporary social change and the possibilities open to social policy.

2. THE CHALLENGES TO CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL POLICY: THE DUALISATION OF SOCIETY, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SECURITY CULTURE

The central problem confronting social policy is the pressure towards the dualisation of the labour market and society more generally, with on the one hand some social groups integrated into a high profit, high wage, internationally competitive sector, while other groups become locked into low productivity, low wage work increasingly interconnected with a third sector of economic activity described as the informal or black economy.¹

1. The extent of this development has recently been examined by Therborn (1985).

This pattern of dualisation is also accompanied by the decline of the central social actors of industrial society, firstly the labour movement and secondly the dominant class whose social power was based on the control of industrialisation.

The response of trade unionism to the decline of the workers' movement has been to seek to develop a presence at the level of the political system (Touraine, 1988; McDonald, 1988). The social power of the dominant class can no longer be grasped within the Marxist categories of exploitation of labour. Prior to industrial capitalism social power was based on the control of land. With the development of capitalism this shifted to the control of labour. Clearly this is shifting again, where social power lies in the ability to shape wider patterns of meaning and action, whether that be the development of biotechnologies or the shape and meaning of cities (Castells, 1985).

Central aspects of this development have been highlighted by the recent analyses of the development and decline of 'Fordism', namely those patterns of economic and social life centred on Taylorian mass production and mass consumption of standardised goods (Lipietz, 1989; Lipietz and Leborgne, 1988; Piore and Sabel, 1984). What we have here is the development of an economic pattern that is also a cultural pattern and one based on conceptions of gender. One only need consider the development of housing under Fordism (Florida and Feldman, 1988) or the gender patterns at the base of the Fordist urban form (Allport, 1986).

It is the convergence of the decline of Fordist patterns of production with the decline of the social movements of industrial capitalism that is at the base of what appears to be the dissolution of the social. This sense of the decline of social relationships, the image of society as a video clip, is of course related to the intellectual rise of postmodernism often of the most exaggerated form (Baudrillard, 1978).

What appears as the dissolution of the social can be illustrated by changes in contemporary cities. In the global reorganisation going on today the manufacturing city has become redundant just as did centuries before the walled military city (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1989). New economic patterns of flexible accumulation, capital mobility and internationalisation have meant the decline of the managerial city and the rise of the 'entrepreneurial city' (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1989).

This new urban form is one of increasing social polarisation (New York is the end point), and has been described by Harvey as the city of the spectacle, of harbour developments, of 'the ephemeral, of display, of transitory but participatory pleasure' (Harvey, 1987, p. 226). Melbourne's bid for the Olympic Games and the various Australian State governments' persistent overruling of their own planning guidelines with the 'fast-tracking' of development projects (read exclusion of the democratic process won by urban movements in the 1970s) point to the attempt by governments and business to integrate the city into international flows of capital and images.

The city of the spectacle is one where public life and public space is being undermined, where the street becomes privatised in the mega-shopping centre or the enclosed walkway. The city of the tourist spectacle is the city of the property developer in a way unimaginable last decade. It is also a city that increasingly excludes the poor. Here we come to the third problem facing social policy, the development of a 'security culture'. Berman has argued powerfully that the roots of democratic culture lie in a society's public life, in the possibility of all social classes mixing and communicating in the street (Berman, 1986). Street culture, or more widely the culture of public spaces in our society, point to the extent to which social conflict, the basis of democratic life, can exist. The dualisation of society linked with the privatisation of public space points towards the development of a security culture where 'the poor' become in the popular middle class imagination a source of threat. The decline of the social conflicts of industrial society which were able to structure democratic life is undoubtedly linked to the return of the image of 'the dangerous classes', an image that preceded the rise of the working class and the labour movement (Dubet, 1987).

The aspects of this new context that I have sketched point to the disorientation of classical social policy. Two new directions, the basic income approach and tripartite modernisation, attempt to go beyond this current disorientation. They are important because they seek to address the problem of social dualisation. Both, I argue, constitute only partial responses.

3. THE LIMITS OF THE 'BASIC INCOME' APPROACH

In the basic incomes debates one can identify two premises: the first, explicit, emphasises the inevitability of unemployment, either because of the international division of labour or the development of technology (Jordan, 1987; *Bulletin du MAUSS*, 23, 1987; Przeworski, 1987).

Hence the labour market can no longer be relied on to offer every citizen an income. As a result a form of basic income needs to be introduced, this claim associated with an argument about the rights attached to citizenship.

The second premise, while not explicit is equally central. This is the theme of the decline of the labour movement. It is significant that basic incomes debates have essentially developed in countries where the decline of the labour movement is most advanced, such as Britain or Belgium, or in countries where there is a political consensus that high levels of unemployment are inevitable: France or Holland.

The culture of the labour movement is based on the theme of social participation through paid labour. Welfare theorists, who conceive of societies as systems of income distribution, have been struck by what appears to be Australia's exceptionalism where distribution is achieved mainly by the wages system and less by the State (Castles, 1985). This is secondary to the more central issue for the labour movement, namely the basis of social participation. This is clear in the Australian labour movement's insistence on wages for work, and is equally clear in the Swedish traditions associated with the importance of work: evidenced by the use of coercive measures associated with receipt of unemployment benefit in Sweden that would be opposed as the arbitrary exercise of administrative power in Australia.

The basic income approach is a break with this tradition. It is not only a response to unemployment or poverty-level wages, but also points to the decline of the labour movement and of its conception of social participation in certain countries. Proponents of the basic income are aware that it is an approach opposed by the labour movement (Jordan, 1987).

It is important to recognise, as Gorz argues, that there are proponents of the basic income on the right as well as on the left (Gorz, 1987). In France, for example, the Guaranteed Minimum Income proposal was first launched by neoconservatives as a way of opposing egalitarian themes then central to the left of the late 1960s, and was long opposed by the left for that reason (Donzelot, 1988). Gorz points out that as an isolated measure a universal grant would likely serve to consolidate the dualisation of society, and represents a right-wing post-crisis scenario: on the one hand a productive elite while on the other a sector of society locked into odd jobs, temporary work and the informal economy.

This critique underlines the question of what measures, particularly in terms of restructuring work patterns, would need to accompany any universal grant scheme to avoid such dualisation. Gorz argues for a dramatic reduction of the hours spent in paid labour. A more interesting approach has been put forward by Lipietz, who while arguing for some reduction in paid labour hours, calls for the development of a third sector of economic activity that would take up the place currently occupied by the informal or black economy: as he points out, many current forms of welfare payment are in fact a subsidy to the black economy. He argues for a reversal of this pattern, calling for the development of a subsidised sector of economic activity aimed at meeting social needs, rather than the present case where the expanding (effectively subsidised) odd job sector generally meets the needs of the powerful: domestic cleaners, baby sitters etc. (Lipietz, 1989). Clearly gender issues are crucial in the development of the informal economy.

This issue of restructuring work (effectively removed from the scope of the Social Security Review, a removal that the 'welfare sector' has far too easily accepted) is central, and a more viable path to pursue than the current debates around 'citizenship' currently emerging in the welfare tradition. Potentially, if linked to new social movements, the development of new forms of economic activity could contest new forms of power and draw on collective or local identities. In a context where as Castells argues, powerless places are increasingly opposed to placeless power (Castells and Henderson, 1987), local economic initiatives open out the possibility of reinventing social space and local identities, opposing the cultural domination of 'the entrepreneur' that seeks to reduce society to a market and monopolise social creativity.

The welfare citizenship debates run the risk of defining citizenship in terms of receipt of a benefit rather than as a capacity of action. To the extent this is the case they may constitute a serious regression politically and culturally.

4. THE LIMITS OF TRIPARTITE MODERNISATION

Tripartite modernisation may be in the process of emerging as the new consensus in Australian welfare. Its central proposition is that welfare systems need to be conceived of as part of labour market programs. Sweden is the key reference point (Castles, 1988).

The basic thesis is that labour market programs similar to those of Sweden will have the same result in Australia in the 1990s as they had in Sweden in the 1960s. This rests on a linear conception of economic development for which there is very little evidence. Sweden's programs centred on ensuring the mobility of capital and labour into the international sector of the economy, and during a period of the expansion of Fordist manufacturing systems resulted in a very high comparative proportion of both labour and capital in the monopoly internationalised sector of the economy (Friedland and Sanders, 1986).

Proponents of a 'Swedish solution' consistently fail to consider changing economic patterns, particularly the dualisation appearing at the centre of new systems of production.² The movement of labour and capital to Sweden's monopoly sector took place during the process of vertical integration and Fordist expansion of manufacturing. Economic reorganisation is now increasingly dominated by what Scott (1986) has identified as vertical disintegration, and combined with the development of Japanese production systems³, and the move from an energy/raw materials based economy to an economic system structured by information flows, there is very little evidence to support the claim that Australia in the 1990s will resemble Sweden in the 1960s. The issue that needs to be confronted is how to ensure that the development of flexible accumulation not lead to a dualisation of society.⁴

Putting trust in high participation rates and low unemployment levels is not adequate, as the United States under Reagan shows. Nor is the 'Massachusetts miracle', something of a reference point in Victoria before the collapse of the Victorian Economic Development Commission (VEDC).⁵ While the ideology of economic development in Massachusetts is the language of high-tech manufacturing (manual, male, unionised work) as in Australian tripartite modernisation, the reality of employment creation in Massachusetts has predominantly been in low-wage service industries (Graham and Ross, 1989).

Graham and Ross point to a situation in Massachusetts similar to that under Labor in Australia when they argue 'it is difficult for economic policy-makers to acknowledge that economic growth, employment growth, low unemployment, and poverty are increasingly found in close association' (1989, p. 133). The Australian evidence equally points to the increasing link between poverty and participation in the labour market.

5. RECONSTITUTING THE POLITICAL: RECONNECT THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIA NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social policy will only be able to deal with the originality of these issues when it frees itself of its nostalgia for the Keynesian welfare state, and when it comes to terms with the role of the welfare state within the context of the Fordist mass production-mass consumption society and with the imposition of the new forms of patriarchy that accompanied its development. Not only did the social planners of the welfare state seek to 'unburden' the population, they also sought to 'deactivate' the population, reducing citizens to the 'objects of administrative care' (Granow and Offe,

2. See Fainstein and Fainstein (1989) and Hill (1987).

3. See Kenny and Florida (1988).

4. R. Mahon (1987) develops a comparative discussion of the role of trade unions in this context and emphasises industrial relations systems. I consider the Australian case in McDonald (1988).

5. The VEDC was modelled on the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, MTDC.

1982). The tendency of social policy to conceive of the population as the objects of State programs points to the persistence of such an approach.

The Keynesian welfare state can be understood as the expression of a class compromise between business and labour (Rosanvallon, 1981). This class compromise took the form of full (male) employment, economic growth centred on standardised production, and the household, gender, life cycle and urban patterns that characterised the postwar period.

This form of analysis argues that economic and cultural patterns are to be understood as the product of the conflict of social movements and social classes to appropriate forms of social creativity (Touraine, 1985). The development of the Keynesian Welfare State cannot be separated from the class compromise between business and labour, and the cultural, economic and gender forms of social organisation that compromise produced.

It is clear that the labor-business opposition no longer structures political life (Flanagan and Dalton, 1984), and as a result the political system appears disconnected from social actors and dominated by the State-mediated imperatives of the international economy (Touraine, 1987). Reconstituting the political cannot take place without the reconstitution of social actors, and means moving beyond the dominant images of society as a market or video clip.

Social policy has a central role in this reconstitution. Currently dominant social actors are in the process of reshaping our culture and social life, whether through the production of cities or biotechnologies. At the same time there are new social actors, represented by new social demands such as conservation, health consumer movements, the women's movement. As well as new social actors based on a positive identity, there are new forms of social protest that are more the expression of social marginalisation and loss of meaning.

What is decisive about the workers' movement as a social movement is that it achieved the synthesis of the positive capacity of action and identity of skilled workers with the negative identity of powerlessness and domination of unskilled workers (Touraine, 1988; McDonald, 1988). If these remain separated the positive capacity for action becomes a competing or modernising elite (lacking a critique of power), while negative forms of action take the form of revolt, violence or the self-destruction of the actor.

What dominates the contemporary situation is the separation of these identities. On the one hand there are new cultural orientations represented by conservation groups, able to defend forests but lacking a critique of the city, while on the other there are new forms of revolt represented by youth protest at social exclusion and loss of meaning (Dubet, 1987).

A central dimension of social policy needs to be creating the social space where these forms of action can converge, and where social relationships can be reconstructed. This can take place in debates around the shape of cities, the form our media should take, the social organisation of growing old, what meaningful work involves, around the control of health systems. This points to creating forms of economic activity able to reconnect social and economic life. At the level of practice this analysis points to the task of creating social spaces where new social demands can converge with new forms of revolt and marginalisation. It is the reconstitution of such social space that is central to the emergence of other forms of economic development and postfordist welfare.

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THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL POLICY

John Murphy
Department of Sociology and Politics
Phillip Institute of Technology

1. INTRODUCTION

In his critical survey in 1977 of T. H. Marshall's theory of welfare as citizenship, Ramesh Mishra spelt out what might be called a strategic view of citizenship in social policy. The concept was useful 'for legitimating the principle of universal, comprehensive, "as of right" social services'; it thus had a strategic function in the 'struggle against residual policy', resources irrespective of the market. Like Titmuss, and distinctly unlike Marshall, Mishra saw the values of welfare policy and those of market capitalism as 'quite inimical'. In this conflict, citizenship was useful in a directly instrumental sense: it was, in effect, a good way to win the argument against residualism (Mishra, 1981, p. 37).

This strategic and instrumental view of citizenship has ensured the concept a place in arguments about universal versus targeted services, and in more recent debates about, and against the New Right. This paper attempts to identify the different versions of citizenship which are being employed, and to identify some of the limitations of these; in particular, Mishra's instrumental approach suggests citizenship as simply the administrative unit of welfare policy, rather than as a moral of political participation. This is a limitation going back to Marshall's own formulation of the problem.

It is unnecessary here to rehearse the arguments on the relative merits of universal and selective systems of welfare (see for example Ife, 1987 and Jamrozik, 1983) though it is worth restating that the debate remains significant, particularly in a political climate in which targeting has been established by the New Right as 'common sense'. Targeted services, of course, have their own legitimating rationale, meeting the right's argument against 'churning'; in which middle class taxes return as 'middle class welfare', in an apparently nonsensical cycle (Freebairn et al., 1987). But the continuing tradition in Australia of the residualisation of social services and transfers, in the name of efficiency and fiscal restraint, runs the well-known risk of undermining for social services the legitimacy and political support they acquire from both middle class consumption and the assertion of universal rights. As Ife puts it:

... by selecting particular policy options rather than others, the government may be only serving to depend on the crisis [of legitimacy], by effectively reducing public support for its welfare role, rather than finding a way out of the crisis. (Ife, 1987, p. 83)

The means-testing of Family Allowances has left Medicare as the only major area of social policy based on universalism and it is worth noting that public support for Medicare has risen steadily since its introduction in 1984, with the approval of 67 per cent of the citizens in 1988 (Health Issues, 1988).

This level of acceptance reflects the sense of social solidarity often associated with universally provided services, but is the exception in a welfare tradition based on a labourist emphasis on arbitrated wages and conditions, organised around the 'family wage' concept, with welfare transfers markedly residual to the labour market. The result has been what Frank Castles calls a "wage-earners" welfare state', in which wage-labour has remained the key organising principle and cultural value (Castles, 1985). There is a sense in which the Australian polity has always peripheralised notions of citizenship, which have only been developed in the colonial liberal tradition, for which citizenship meant a particularly middle-class conception of public spiritedness and participation in public discourse. In place of citizenship, when the labour movement and the left wanted to speak of a constituency broader than workers, they spoke the language of populism, in which 'the people' were posed against their enemies (Murphy, 1987). It is this sort of historical background which suggests why - despite continued endorsement of universal principles by at least part of the welfare constituency (for a recent example, Harris, 1989) - citizenship and universalism are far from the centre of Australian welfare politics.

2. INTERPRETATIONS OF MARSHALL

In Britain in particular, theories of citizenship have begun to play a central role in arguments about welfare rights. There must be some doubt whether T. H. Marshall is a writer of sufficient substance to bear the weight this attention has placed upon his work. Nevertheless, his essay of 1950 'Citizenship and Social Class' (Marshall, 1983) has been examined and criticised by a range of writers, generally in a quest to establish rights to welfare without needing to adopt Marshall's distinctly liberal formulation of the issue. For the key contradiction of Marshall's argument - that the equality of citizenship status under the welfare state could coexist with, and even come to legitimate, the inequality which he accepted was integral to class society - has convinced few.

Similarly, Marshall's cheerfully Whiggish teleology - which presents social rights to welfare as developing through an evolutionary march from civil to political to social rights - minimises the extent to which rights can be lost and are only gained and defended through social action. Yet both these limitations contributed to Marshall's attractiveness to post-war functionalism, for example, in Talcott Parsons and Ralf Dahrendorf. Citizenship could be seen as a functionally integrative category. Despite these limitations, Marshall has been appearing frequently as the writer on citizenship in the welfare state, as writers of different political perspectives jostle - not over his memory - but to establish citizenship without liberalism. Several different interpretations seem to be emerging.

The first sees **citizenship as social policy against the market**. Thus Mishra, as already mentioned has a lengthy discussion, in which he makes the points above about Marshall's evolutionism and his functionalist accommodation with class. Mishra appears to judge citizenship as simply a strategic argument to be made against residualism when useful, but without any more principled commitment. Barry Hindess (1987) emphasises the ways in which Marshall evaluated positively the conflict between class and citizenship: Hindess points out the common ground between Marshall and other post-war writers on social policy, such as Titmus, who shared Marshall's sense of welfare as social integration, but saw class and citizenship as more fundamentally incompatible.

Marshall emerges as virtually a metaphor for social democratic welfare in the recent work of Desmond King (1987), which examines the decline of the Keynesian welfare state and attempts to argue against British and American versions of neo-liberalism. Social citizenship rights, King argues, derive from the extension of welfare state activities in the post-war period, are more easily defended when universally (or 'institutionally') based and are subject to direct attack from Thatcher and Reagan. This is a useful enough argument, but tends to end up vaguely describing citizenship as welfare. Posing citizenship against markets in this case leads to a Scandinavian style notion of 'social democratising' society, principally through establishing the right to work, and labour market strategies which compensate and stabilise this part of the market. In an eagerness to resuscitate Keynes, and to concede the efficacy of markets to the right. King reduces citizenship to an appendage of the labour market.

A second, more active view, that of **citizenship as a universal subject of modernity**, is a theme pursued by Bryan Turner, who employs Marshall's citizenship as a 'basic definition of modernisation', in the sense that citizenship is the contractual bond of a modern society, with the erosion of pre-modern relations based on ascribed status and tradition. In Turner's argument, the citizen is the subject of modernity, which is why he recasts the concept in more active terms, as 'civil, political and social participation' (rather than rights) since 'becoming a citizen involves a process of, as it were, getting into society as an outcome of social struggles' (Turner, 1986, p. 59 and 85). Citizenship is both formal and active in Turner's reading; it involves a universal and formal, rather than ascribed and particularistic, status, and its expansion is the outcome of social action. A compatible, but gloomier, theory of citizenship as a dynamic was developed in the 1970s by Ralf Dahrendorf (1974).

Turner's version of citizenship sees it as a measure of the erosion of pre-modern forms of exclusion from society. Thus he distinguishes 'waves of citizenship' - as phases of social movements struggling for social participation and access to social resources. The first wave reduces 'the formal role of property' in defining citizenship and would correspond with the enfranchisement of adult males and the legitimisation of unions; the second 'had the consequence of demoting gender as the definition of citizenship', and presumably corresponds to the first wave of the feminist movement. Turner's third wave is more difficult to identify historically, consisting of 'the redefinition of age and kinship ties within the family' and involving social legislation on children and the rights of the elderly. Turner finally discerns a fourth wave, which redefines the relations between society and nature, and at times involves 'ascribing rights to nature and the environment' (pp. 97-98).

Viewing citizenship as the social unit of modernity in this way gives a more dynamic conception than the first interpretation. Whether defined by Max Weber (as the development as rationalisation and bureaucracy) or by Agnes Heller (as the historical confluence of democracy, capitalism and industrialisation) modernity implies the atomisation of social relations, through the erosion of feudal ties based on tradition and religious sanction. Because social ties in modernity are contingent, or 'formally free', they are also historical, in the sense of being socially created, and citizenship as a principle of social solidarity and integration is more intentional, and hence potentially equitable, than integration based on tradition. Finally, Turner's emphasis on citizenship rights as the outcome of social struggles is closer to classical conceptions of citizenship as political activism rather than as an attribute of the administered subject.

But this view of citizenship as contract, useful as it is, raises the question suggested by feminist writers - that dependency within the private sphere is a prescribed, pre-modern status which survives into modernity, and which is even entrenched and reproduced by social policies based on modern notions of social rights (Pascall, 1986). This raises a third interpretation, of **citizenship as a public category**. Feminist writers have been understandably sceptical of Marshall and of theories of citizenship; just as notions of the equality of citizens can be seen to obscure structured inequalities of class, so citizenship similarly conceals gender inequalities. Consequently, citizenship is a distinctly public category, an attribute which limits its usefulness in thinking about the gendered relations of citizenship by family, domestic work and the private sphere.

Carole Pateman has developed this further, discussing not Marshall and welfare but the original liberal relation between civil society and the state, from which conceptions of rights develop. She suggests that civil society is two spheres, only the public of which - that of civil freedoms (or citizenship) - is considered in liberal accounts of social contract, while the other half - that of the private sphere, of the 'sexual contract' - is concealed yet functional to it; hence 'civil freedom depends on patriarchal right', in the sense that women's full participation as citizens in public life still depends on changes in the domestic sphere (Pateman, 1988, p. 4). Feminist arguments which dispute the value of citizenship are consequently based on the insight that a liberal strategy of equality contains such an entrenched respect for the separation between public and private spheres that it produces as many blockages as openings. One result is to go beyond citizenship by emphasising autonomy over universality - a strategy which contains a tension between the vulnerability of particularistic options and the legitimacy of universal ones.

3. RIGHTS TO SERVICES/RIGHTS TO SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Conceptions of citizenship have been revived because they provide arguments for rights to welfare. Neo-liberalism has argued that no such rights exist, preferring to draw the line after the 'natural liberties' of civil and political rights. In asserting social rights of citizenship, however, one of the central tensions is that between, on the one hand, citizenship as simply and administrative criteria of eligibility, a 'status' or qualification in Marshall's terms, and on the other, citizenship as the exercise of rights to participate in society and its power relations. It is primarily the first of these which has been mobilised against neo-liberalism, and while this meets half of the neo-liberal argument (by asserting rights against the market), it has a limited capacity to meet the other half of the critique of the bureaucratic welfare state - a critique exemplified in Thatcher's populist assault on the state as an infringement of freedom.

The limitations of this approach can be quickly illustrated. As one of the elders of neo-liberalism, Hayek denies any notion of rights to welfare, insisting that welfare is benignly charitable or socially functional but cannot be claimed on the basis of redistributive justice and rights. This principally because Hayek argues that injustice only occurs when it is an intentional result of action, and inequality which is the aggregate result of market transactions is a paradigm case of impersonality and unintentionality - but not irresponsibility. Because market distribution of resources is, for Hayek, unprincipled, to speak of rights to resources is irrelevant.

Raymond Plant's work still provides the best critique of these arguments, re-establishing citizenship rights on the basis that when we can see the inequality inflicted by the market and when

... it is in our power to do something about this by way of compensating mechanisms and we fail to do so, we are involved in injustice because this is not to treat these individuals with equal concern and respect. (Plant, 1985, p. 15)

In these circumstances, indifference to people's welfare is unjust. This first part of Plant's defence of welfare rights effectively recasts the argument of new liberalism at the turn of the century - that citizens had a right to expect the ethical state to remove socio-economic hindrances on the full development of autonomous individuality (see Freedman, 1976).

But the second half of Plant's argument is equally relevant to conceptions of citizenship - he argues that Hayek or Thatcher are right when they argue that a bureaucratic welfare state reduces freedom in the name of greater equality. His response is that

... if the freedom of individuals in the welfare state is not to be seen as lip-service, this must be reflected in the institutional structures of such a state. (Plant, 1985, p. 23)

This then goes to the issue of whether we see citizenship as limited to a criteria of eligibility to be administered by the welfare state, or as a principle of political activity by citizens.

Mishra's interpretation of citizenship as synonymous with social policy is consistent with this more limited view and seems to accord with Marshall's own theory. Thus the latter argued that 'citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community'; by status he clearly means social standing in terms of eligibility. Citizens qualify for social services. In addition, social services are not primarily intended to equalise incomes, but to equalise status. 'Equality of status is more important than equality of income ...' because the function of social rights is to enhance social solidarity and value consensus (Marshall, 1983, pp. 253 and 8). Apart from legitimising inequalities of outcomes, the chief limitation here is that citizenship is only a qualification to be an administered unit under the welfare state; it has no impact on the conditions under which services are delivered or designed. If we were speaking only of policy choices between universal or selective services this might matter less, but the success of neo-liberal attacks on the bureaucratic nature of the welfare state indicates the need to think of citizenship in more than this impoverished and instrumental form (Ferris, 1985).

A second theme of citizenship as participation in the decision-making processes which shape our lives has an ancient heritage though relatively few modern realisations. The Aristotelian conception of the citizen as a ruler and ruled, as only fully developed humanly when actively participating, has its derivations in work such as John Keane's, arguing for a radical conception of citizenship. Keane does not argue for a return to the conception of citizenship. Keane does not argue for a return to the polis, but for a maximisation of choices to participate, and for a 'division of decision-making powers into a variety of institutions within and between civil society and the state' (Keane, 1988, p. 13).

There are ways in which this dialectic of the citizen as the administered subject or as the participating subject is built into the welfare state. For example, Keane has discussed the ways in which the welfare state is inherently self-contradictory, both creating the conditions of regulated, administered social stability - in ways which are antithetical to democratic public life - while simultaneously generating oppositional and autonomous public spheres (Keane, 1984). Similarly, Offe has developed the argument in more specific detail, pointing out that extending social rights to, for example, health care or child care, has meant the politicisation of such areas, which are in part taken out of the market and become 'decommodified spheres' of social life subject to democratic political criteria (Offe, 1984). The link to themes of citizenship is both in terms of autonomous public spheres in which citizens can participate, and equally in terms of the modernity of democracy.

Offe is one of those optimistic souls who believe that the historic compromise of welfare state capitalism is substantially irreversible, despite the market advocates. Even given our unpromising contemporary conditions of both neo-liberalism and corporatism, the dynamics of citizenship, as a feature of modernity and as a demand often made more possible by welfare state interventions, suggest that full citizenship for all is a less intractable goal than we often suppose.

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CRITICAL RESPONSES TO THE 'FAILURES' OF THE KEYNESIAN WELFARE STATE*

Elim Papadakis
Department of Political Science
Australian National University

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper considers responses to the attempts by governments in the 1980s, particularly the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom, to overcome the apparent deficiencies of the Keynesian Welfare State. The approaches considered fall under three headings: pragmatic welfare pluralism, defensive Fabianism and radical reformism. What they share in common is their reaction shifts in policy, shifts in values and, above all, shifts in society and the economy. Under policy we note the questioning of post-war patterns for the delivery and distribution of social services, health care and education. Under values we note a shift away from the apparent consensus over the role of the welfare state towards an attempted compromise between individualistic and collective goals. In relation to the social and economic structure we refer to profound changes in the occupational structure which have been paralleled by significant changes in political organisation and mobilisation.

These trends have led to a degree of convergence in attempts to reformulate the aims of the welfare state. However, there remain significant differences between the various approaches. This paper maps out some of the most important similarities and differences. (The reader may also find it helpful to refer to Figure 1.)

2. POLITICS

Welfare pluralists have been the least critical of the pressure placed by government on traditional arrangements for welfare provision. Defensive Fabians have been much more divided over future directions and some have suggested a defence of essential elements of the welfare state (see Goodin, 1988); they have tended to accept the 'necessity' for more targeting of resources and a residual rather than universalistic ethos of social welfare. Radical reformists have questioned the foundations of the socialist tradition. Although there are parallels between this critique and that of the New Right, radical reformists have been inspired by the growing influence of new social movements and their contribution to popularising the weaknesses of state-administered socialism (Keane, 1988).

Any attempt to group these approaches on a left-right continuum has to be qualified by a discussion of values, the role assigned to various social actors, specific responses to the social policy of the Right, reform proposals and suggested alternatives for the organisation of services.

3. VALUES

Scepticism towards collectivism based on centralised state organisations underlies all the approaches discussed in this paper. Notions of individual freedom and autonomy have come to play a more prominent role (Weale, 1983). The advocacy by Mishra (1984) for a corporatist model for universal welfare provision has not gained widespread acceptance; rather, it is seen as a threat to the development of citizenship and autonomy (Keane, 1988; Ferris 1985) and to popular interests and experiences (Hall, 1983). The general direction has been towards decentralisation and a reduction in the role of the state as a direct provider of services.

* A more detailed version of the arguments presented in this paper will be published in **Reactions to the Right**, edited by Barry Hindess, Routledge and Kegan Paul (1990).

FIGURE 1: CRITICAL RESPONSES TO THE 'FAILURES' OF THE KEYNESIAN WELFARE STATE

	PRAGMATIC WELFARE PLURALISM	DEFENSIVE FABIANISM	RADICAL REFORMISM
POLITICS	Centre-Right	Centre-Left	Left
VALUES	Autonomy and individual freedom (economic); self-reliance Consumer sovereignty (economic)	Autonomy and individual freedom (economic and political) Consumer sovereignty (defensive reaction to the New Right)	Autonomy and individual freedom (concern with democracy, community, environmental destruction and technological change) Consumer sovereignty (political, including democratisation of parties and control of media)
	Freedom and security	Freedom and equality (redistributive notions)	Freedom and equality (democratic notions)
PRINCIPAL ACTORS	Elites; the state; sovereign consumers	The state; enlightened elites; new collective actors	New collective actors; the state
RESPONSE TO SOCIAL POLICY OF THE RIGHT	Adaptation; flexibility	Some adaptation coupled with attempt to retain core of post-war welfare state; much questioning of previous positions	Redefine the welfare state; concern with its 'moral bankruptcy'
REFORM PROPOSALS	Concern with bureaucracy, centralisation and lack of accountability Fairly straightforward adaptation; 'purposeful opportunism'	Questioning of bureaucracy, centralisation and lack of accountability Conflict over future directions; economic strategies to tackle poverty and inequality	Concern with bureaucracy, centralisation and lack of accountability Absence of medium-term strategy; reliance on shifts in values, democratisation, revival of civil society
STRUCTURES/ ORGANISATION	Voluntary and informal networks, state involvement but largely residual, expand private sector New mixed economic enterprises	Conflict between state involvement/universal provision and development of residual, targeted services; reduction of beneficial middle-class involvement in welfare state Market socialism; local initiatives	Universal provision; redefinition of welfare state, beyond market/state dualism

None the less, all these notions are subject to diverse interpretation. The critique by the welfare pluralists of centralised and bureaucratic services forms part of a strategy to promote greater self-reliance, to bring about a new mixed economy of welfare which draws to a much greater extent than hitherto on the 'great reservoir of voluntary and private effort' (Judge, 1987). However, the overall framework for autonomy and individual freedom will continue to be guaranteed by the state, with social service departments occupying a key strategic position as regulators, coordinators and providers. Autonomy, individual freedom and consumer sovereignty are largely understood in economic terms. For example, Bosanquet (1984) has challenged the suitability of the Keynesian Welfare State for future decision-making because of the apparent scarcity of revenue from taxation, the inefficiency of management, the inflexibility of work patterns in state organisations, the diseconomies of scale and the lack of accountability. The alternative vision is based on new 'mixed economic enterprises' which involve an injection of private funding, the appointment of 'independent' committees to which managers, who are no longer public employees, are accountable, the establishment of pay and employment conditions at a local level and the decentralisation of management decisions (Bosanquet, 1984). Entrepreneurship, cost effectiveness and targeting of resources are central to the restructuring of a welfare state that will provide freedom and security.

The divisions among Fabians over notions of autonomy and individual freedom are profound. Plant (1984) has suggested that an even stronger state is necessary in order to secure freedom and equality, although others have opposed such moves (Forbes, 1986) and called instead for a new synthesis between freedom and equality, for greater emphasis on democratic rights. Consumer sovereignty, a theme that was until recently largely ignored by Fabian Socialists, has been added to the agenda for change (Miller and Estrin, 1986).

The espousal of consumer sovereignty appears to be a defensive reaction to the New Right. By contrast, radical reformists have linked it to notions of democratisation, particularly of political parties and the electoral system, and to control of the media (Keane, 1988). Notions of individual freedom are placed at the forefront of alternative strategies. Links are made between individual freedom and a concern with communities, environmental destruction and technological change.

4. POLITICAL ACTORS

The emphasis on consumer control filters through to the role assigned to consumers as political actors. Even the welfare pluralists are keen to investigate citizens' views over complex issues like the social implications of ageing (Judge, 1987). However, the welfare pluralists are clearly intent on accepting the status quo and assign centre stage to existing elites and to the state. Unlike the Fabians, they have not expressed enthusiasm for new social movements that have challenged many of the prevailing assumptions and structures of the welfare state.

There has been a distinct shift among Fabians towards greater involvement of citizens in the delivery of services. Donnison (1984) has identified a number of projects that have developed mutual aid and self-management techniques. Miller and Estrin (1986) have stressed the importance of individual desires as part of a new synthesis between markets and planning. Walker (1984) has argued that the creation of smaller administrative units would enhance accountability and the role of professionals would be diminished in order to allow for greater citizen involvement. None the less, the faith in enlightened administrators, characteristic of earlier Fabian approaches, has continued to prevail in some quarters (Goodin et al., 1987).

Whereas some Fabians have continued to place excessive faith in elites and the state, the radical reformists have pinned their hopes on ordinary citizens. There is a concern, among the latter, about the formation of alternative bases for power to counter 'monopolies of state power' (Keane, 1988; Ferris, 1985). This does not necessarily imply a rejection of the state. Rather it is concerned with 'creative reform and planning guided by state action, and the innovation from below guided through radical social initiatives which expand and equalise civil liberties' (Keane, 1988, p. 27).

5. REACTION, REFORM AND PROPOSED CHANGES

In their response to the social policy of the New Right, radical reformists have focused on the 'moral bankruptcy' of the welfare state. According to Ferris (1985) the Keynesian Welfare State has failed both on economic and moral grounds. Marxists and Fabians have drawn attention to the failures in redistribution and in creating new forms of dependency. The major defect has been in the moral sphere, in the failure to create the conditions for personal autonomy. In addition, normative consensus was bought through economic growth. Problems of legitimation were temporarily solved through the creation of a 'social bribery fund' (Gellner). The message from Ferris is unambiguous: the state-centred and élitist approach of the Fabians has posed a threat to citizenship through its reliance on corporatist forms of bargaining, its encouragement of 'consumerist conceptions of citizenship' and by ignoring the dangers of technological developments on human beings and the natural environment.

The Fabian responses to the New Right have been characteristically flexible. In some quarters there is new focus on redistributive outcomes of the welfare state (towards the middle classes and away from the working classes) and political realities (namely, the necessity of attracting middle class support for the welfare state) (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987). Goodin and Dryzek (1987) have pointed to the limitations of support of the welfare state, to risk-sharing and uncertainty rather than altruism as the main motivation for support. This argument underlies a shift towards a 'defensive' defence of the welfare state, the concern with residualism and targeting of resources rather than with universalism.

The defence of the welfare state by Goodin and Le Grand is based on the following premises: the beneficial involvement of the 'non-poor' in the welfare state is inevitable; a distinction needs to be drawn between the goals of egalitarianism and the achievement of minimum standards; political strategies for achieving realistic changes are of secondary importance; and it makes sense to draw a distinction between the poor minority and the mass of non-poor people.

There are problems with attempting to distinguish between egalitarian goals and the achievement of minimum standards in service provision. Egalitarianism, it is argued, would best be served by exclusion of the middle class (namely, by targeting resources towards those in greatest need). Minimum standards would best be achieved by involving the middle class.

This contrast is of course open to challenge: the egalitarian goal is not necessarily served by exclusion of the middle class because they might withdraw their support for the welfare state. Selectivity in provision has reduced neither poverty nor inequality and the absolute level of provision may end up 'well below that prevailing under alternative arrangements' (Saunders, 1987, p. 418).

The most striking aspect of the Fabian responses is their diversity - from defensive adaptation (to the onslaught by the New Right) to the espousal of complex models for achieving a reconciliation between markets and planning, between individual desires and communal loyalties. The main advantages of a new mixed economy lie, according to the proponents of market socialism, in the enhanced opportunities for worker participation in the management of enterprises, a more egalitarian distribution of income than at present and the socialisation of capital (Miller and Estrin, 1986).

The central themes in the response by welfare pluralists have been adaptation and flexibility. For Judge there is a need for greater diversification away from the state and towards commercial, voluntary and informal sectors for the supply and financing of welfare. The theme of flexibility in arrangements for public provision is particularly important to the pragmatic welfare pluralists, especially if one accepts that western economies will grow slowly over the coming decades and that it will become more difficult to secure funding for long-term programs. The acceptance of this form of reasoning and of the assumptions that perpetuate the status quo underlies the strategy of 'purposeful opportunism' advocated by Klein and O'Higgins (1985). Since the Keynesian Welfare State has been unable to anticipate changes in the structural conditions upon which it was founded (full employment and a growing economy), Klein and O'Higgins have argued that governments should anticipate the unexpected, be alert to the surprises and unintended outcomes that lie hidden in the future, be prepared to revise estimates on demographic changes, levels of economic growth and popular expectations.

One way of coping with these uncertainties, it seems, is to do away with previous certainties. For instance, in order to counter the self-perpetuation of service providers as a powerful group with vested interests, governments are advised

to establish programs on a short-term basis and to retain the option of either dissolving or perpetuating them according to the availability of resources. One example would be the way in which expenditure on housing has been restructured and how the abandonment of a long-term commitment to promote public housing was partially replaced by a system of loans to individuals for the purpose of repair and maintenance of their homes. It was relatively straightforward to bring this program to an abrupt halt.

The impact of the New Right on alternative strategies is most evident in the new consensus over the need to tackle problems of bureaucracy, centralisation and lack of accountability. This is particularly true of the welfare pluralists and the radical reformists.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The welfare pluralists have proposed a fairly unambiguous adaptation to the constraints on policy. Although welfare pluralists are not dissimilar to radical reformists and to Fabian defenders in demonstrating that a critical response to the failures of the Keynesian Welfare State need not to be monopolised by the New Right, they are the least reflexive in trying to develop coherent alternative institutional arrangements that might allow their ideals to be put into practice. As Johnson has pointed out, the welfare pluralist debate has prompted not so much an expansion of the voluntary sector but of the commercial sector. Most innovative schemes have in fact been initiated by state agencies (Johnson, 1987).

The hallmark of Fabian responses has been their continued adherence to the principle of redistribution - whether through centralised or decentralised arrangements. This has tended to lead them towards economic rather than political solutions to social problems (see Goodin and Le Grand, 1987) and to circular arguments over the conflict between altruism and self-interest, between markets and planning without sufficient attention given to the empirical study of how people actually experience the delivery of services, be it in the private or state sector. By contrast, Foster (1983) has provided an incisive account of how people may become alienated from the producers of state services and Walker (1984), from a radical Fabian perspective, has developed a model for countering the development of social control, attitudes of dependency and patronising and authoritarian relationships.

The major drawbacks of the radical reformist approach are its tendency to exaggerate the moral bankruptcy of the welfare state and the absence of short to medium term policy proposals. Its main advantage is that it takes us beyond some of the simplistic distinctions between states and markets which underlie sterile debates over the future direction of the welfare state. Welfare pluralists have attempted to go beyond these distinctions by advocating the development of voluntary and informal networks. There is, as indicated above, a strong emphasis on the emergence of new mixed economic enterprises. A parallel development, espoused by some Fabians is the advocacy of market socialism and local initiatives. Yet the most striking aspect of the welfare pluralist and defensive Fabian approaches is the drift towards a residual notion of welfare provision and the inadequate consideration of its social and political implications.

Radical reformism has, paradoxically, accepted wholeheartedly the criticism that the welfare state has posed a threat to individual freedom and autonomy. However, its critique is based less on economism and more on arguments about democracy, the values of community and the dangers emanating from technological change and damage to the environment. Whereas some welfare pluralists and Fabians have focused mainly on the need for public policy initiatives and retained much of the statist and elitist bias in the formulation of social policy, some Fabians have moved towards the radical reformists in turning to new collectivities of social actors organised at the local level and to new social movements.

Radical reformism has provided clues about the complex nature of reforms and institutional changes that would be required in order to ensure greater democratic control and accountability. Yet, it has told us little about the specific ways in which services might be delivered. Although it presents laudable arguments on democracy and a useful conceptualisation of different social forces, it lacks the detailed understanding of specific service areas shown by some Fabian defenders.

The approaches considered in this paper represent only some of the intellectual responses to the new right. The feminist critiques, for instance, have not been discussed under separate headings, although welfare pluralists have been

the least open and the radical reformists the most sympathetic to feminist demands. It would at any rate be misleading to speak of a concerted feminist response.

Although the dominance of the new right in government has not provoked a massive backlash or an upsurge in collective action, participation is not a dead issue (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby, 1987). Analysis of changes in values, in the occupational structure and in political organisation and mobilisation suggest that there are powerful counter-tendencies to the contradictory policies of the new right.

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UNDERMINING CITIZENSHIP: THE SEPARATION OF INCOME FROM WORK

Jocelyn Pixley
School of Sociology
University of New South Wales

In the situation where high levels of unemployment have a fixity unimaginable before the 1970s recession, my concern is about the way work and citizenship are related. The so-called 'post-industrial' writers propose that the separation of income from work is the most desirable solution to chronic unemployment. These writers claim that such a divorce from the labour market will **not** be to the detriment of citizenship but just the reverse: political participation will be enhanced. The question which I want to consider here is whether there is an alternative to wage labour that does not undermine the citizenship of whole categories of the population. The argument, taken from the longer work of my thesis, has led me to reject this possibility.

Now, after well over a decade of unemployment at 7-8 per cent levels,¹ the presence of a permanent 'underclass' is widely accepted as a fact of modern life. While this marginalisation of so many to the fringes of society clearly plays no part in the post-industrialists' vision, a reassessment of their claims about 'work' is long overdue. For it is not that their provocative arguments have been ignored by the powerful, but rather that they have been heeded too much, for quite different, conservative reasons. Since governments have formulated 'employment', or rather, 'employment-free' policies based on these popular arguments, we can now see the practical implications of these utopias. They show that the post-industrial strategy has itself caused grave problems to the detriment of the unemployed. Although the outlook for future employment is not encouraging, the proposition that Full Employment is undesirable and should not even be an aim in policy, has further eroded the rights and chances of political participation of those already excluded from the labour market.

What has been happening here? During this lengthy period of recession and unemployment, the most progressive debates on the issue have divided sharply about 'work'. The one school of thought which emerged as the recession set in, is a new generation of 'post-industrialists' (particularly Barry Jones, Andre Gorz, Fred Block, John Keane and Claus Offe, who are in broad agreement here). They began to speak urgently about how the changes wrought by the slump were apparently hastening the process towards a 'post-industrial' future. Full employment will not return mainly because new technology has decisively displaced labour. They urged that the grim facts of joblessness, the cause of such wasted lives in the short term, could be the basis of a societal transformation in the long term. In their view, it was time for 'sleepers' to wake and take the path to 'liberation from work', for a revolution was inaugurating a system change to 'post-industrial society'.² The liberation from wage labour could be preferable, they suggest, if the unemployed were supported financially by governments, for with the greater free time, they are likely to become politically active and transform these societies.

The opposing school refuses to accept that unemployment is a permanent fact of life. The situation facing the unemployed could be at least improved by political will and, if the old Keynesian strategies are insufficient and problematic, by various schemes for creating jobs.³ Though both sides deplore the effects of chronic unemployment,

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1. On the issue of employment figures, the percentages have fluctuated, whilst the form of data collection has also been altered in several ways. They still compare starkly with the past. For example, in 1970 the unemployment rate in Australia was 1.4 per cent. In 1975 it had nearly doubled from the year before to 4.6 per cent. Even without the numbers of hidden unemployed, by 1983 the rate had risen to 9.9 per cent, in 1984, 8.6 per cent, 1985, 7.9 per cent and 1986, 8 per cent. In 1989 it is below 7 per cent (see Fisher, 1987). The figures are also averages: for some sectors of society, such as teenage girls, recently arrived migrants and Aborigines, the unemployment rates are comparable with those of the Depression of the 1930s.
 2. For a lucid and critical summary of the post-industrial debate of the 1960s see Kumar (1978). The most well-known representatives of the position are Bell, 1973 and Toffler, 1970. The new post-industrial position, after the recession, is amplified by the titles used, such as Andre Gorz, **Paths to Paradise: On the Liberation from Work** (1985), and Barry Jones, **Sleepers Wake! Technology and the Future of Work** (1982).

those favouring full employment seriously doubt that the unemployed could participate actively in politics, on the grounds that people who are excluded from mainstream work are likely to be marginalised from the society.

These assertions and counter-assertions have gone on ever since the prevailing political message insisted that unemployment must be tolerated to 'cure' inflation. What can we make of these claims given that unemployment rates in Australia have barely improved in the meantime? I have found that government employment strategies have been closely related to the post-industrial position. Although the recent Labor Governments insist that they are committed to full employment, this supposed commitment in fact began with a pursuit of 'alternatives to paid work', only to further marginalise and silence the unemployed, as well as to cut back welfare budgets. The post-industrial claims about the future of work, claims which are still being popularly followed by those favouring a guaranteed income (see, for example, Mathews, 1988; Altman, 1988) are therefore seriously flawed, for they neglect the effects of intervention by governments and leave the ground open for conservative redefinitions. The results, in each case, are that the unemployed - the weakest groups in the society - are in even worse positions than before, and far from participating actively in political life, are more and more facing the authority of governments as powerless clients.

Given that this is the case, it has to be recognised that the issue of employment concerns the right to participate in the society and the possibility, however slight under the prevailing social arrangements, for everyone to have some political influence as well as control over the quality of one's life. My central theme, therefore, concentrates on the way that citizenship and work have become closely related in capitalist societies. If 'liberation from work' undermines people's rights, as I believe it does, then it should no longer influence those who look for progressive solutions, nor lend legitimation to governments who have used the post-industrial strategy. In a climate where unemployment appears insoluble, debates are at an impasse, and apathy and pessimism remain as widespread as when unemployment 'took off', it is time that we assessed the 'reality' that is becoming increasingly bleak. To do this, we must first critically examine the attack on 'work', so publicly visible and attractive at face value, for all the complex and far-reaching consequences, particularly for the underclass that is excluded from the 'mainstream' of work and social participation.

The new generation of 'post-industrial' writers have none of the earlier, simplistic faith in 'technical' solutions to the contemporary problems of unemployment. Their line, in a very broad summary of their work, is that 'deindustrialisation' and the micro-electronic revolution are irreversible, whilst the service sector, especially according to Barry Jones, is incapable of generating a job growth to make up for the decline of manufacturing jobs. While their position is sympathetic about the plight of the unemployed, it opposes all the proposals for a new commitment to full employment on the grounds that such policies can only lead to an increasingly authoritarian and unworkable defence of the *status quo*. In this view, unemployment is permanent and irreversible.⁴ An actual breaking of the cash/work nexus is, however, considered potentially desirable. As John Keane, for example, argues, this nexus is a defining characteristic of modern 'employment societies', where the possession of a job is the only (or predominant) way to secure the right to an income. Jobs, however, are created for their profit-making potential, hence the constant moves to drive down wages and control the work process. Unemployment is endemic to societies where profit is the sole determinant of an investor's calculation about buying labour power, or not.

Most of the post-industrialists assume the possibility that 'employment societies' could be undermined with the separation of income from work. Being aware that the existing form of unemployment cannot achieve this transformation, Keane and Offe especially emphasise **two conditions** that are necessary for such a change. The first

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3. An opposition to the post-industrialists emerged in debates in the USA and Britain by the mid 1980s, with representatives such as the following: Rustin, 1985; Schor, 1985a and Schor, 1985b. In Australia, the most well known employment advocate, Keith Windschuttle, whilst not addressing the post-industrial argument, has a full employment position that could be termed as 'realistic' as that of Michael Rustin. He is, for example, no more optimistic about Keynesian strategies than the post-industrial line of John Keane, and sees them as labour displacing and as more expensive than other job creation schemes. See Windschuttle's (1986), paper at a Conference held by the Department of Employment on Local Employment Initiatives, Canberra, July 16-17.
 4. The more recent arguments, whilst taking their cue from Barry Jones' earlier suggestions, are even more adamant that full employment is impossible and undesirable (see Keane and Owens, 1986; Keane, 1988, especially Chapter 3; Gorz, 1985; Gorz, 1982; Block, 1985; Offe, 1984; and Offe, 1987).
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would provide an alternative source of income. Hence, wage labour should be abandoned only if an income was guaranteed for all, irrespective of 'activity'. Second, 'work' should be redefined as housework, hobbies, informal work, subsistence farming, Do-It-Yourself like home building and so forth, through the more autonomous self-regulation of these activities within communes, co-operatives, and other modes of 'networking' and self-help. This 'non-mainstream' work should be institutionally supported by the state: recognition should be given to 'useful' work irrespective of remuneration.

Following from all this, they assert that the unemployed would be likely to be politically active if their incomes were guaranteed (by the state). The result would be a societal transformation through the greater free time for participation that would challenge the political system and enhance personal autonomy, also through training for leisure and co-operation. Such a combination would also undermine the mainstream commodity markets. It would, according to Offe, serve as a solution both to the systemic problems facing advanced capitalist societies and to the situation of the unemployed. There are variations amongst these utopias, though all emphasise alternative ways of living and working, drawing particularly upon the earlier debates and experiments of the counter-culture with rural communes and worker co-operatives. Most also demonstrate an awareness of the feminist movement's drive to politicise domestic labour, by seeing that it is necessary and useful work, but devalued for not being paid. They are unanimous in demanding the right not to engage in paid work. The assumption is that the exclusion of a significant number from the workforce can be ameliorated and even improved by other forms of societal participation, especially in the stress on liberation from the cash/work nexus and the 'politics' of free time, a phrase of Andre Gorz.

Although in most cases the post-industrial strategy is a careful, sympathetic attempt to confront the serious problems of today in an innovative, provocative manner, the questions to ask are whether it actually does offer a progressive solution or whether the strategy is flawed in various ways.

What are the major problems with this diagnosis and strategy? One of the most important flaws is its neglect of the role of governments. The strategy needs state intervention, yet governments have no difficulty in using the exact same proposals to reinterpret the goals and marginalise the powerless even more. In these contexts, the provision of a guaranteed and adequate income by the state is unimaginable. Indeed, the debates on the guaranteed income schemes indicate that no government in the Western world has introduced a guaranteed income **above** the minimum wage - the aim of radicals - and that this state concern with work incentives is unlikely to change. Governments might introduce a guaranteed **minimum** income or negative tax (that is, below the minimum wage), but this would further reinforce the cash/work nexus, for with a meagre income any work must be sought. The state can also set the income level to suit various purposes (for example, lower it to reduce inflation, or raise it slightly to introduce indirect taxation, or to cut back services-in-kind and reinforce the 'user-pays' principle). Yet this direct control over the income of the powerless would bring little electoral backlash from those who are already marginalised, for 7-8 per cent is still a small minority who would be given some level of cash transfers. Again, the commune and co-operative schemes of government departments aimed to relieve the state of even maintaining sections of the unemployed on cash benefits of any sort. The Hawke Government's 'hunt for alternatives to paid work' was expressly designed for the groups or categories already marginalised and unemployed for various reasons (for example teenagers, female sole parents, redundant and deskilled male workers). These sections of the population were merely intended to find an alternative source of income to social security benefits.

The other major flaw comes equally from this evidence, which eases the problems in trying to assess the current position or the likely future motivation of the unemployed, for that neither proves nor disproves the post-industrial claim that the unemployed **might** become politically active were their incomes guaranteed. We can only make inspired guesses about the possible political involvement of the 'underclass', an issue that most research into the plight of the unemployed has attempted to confront. It is well-known, for example, that the human costs of unemployment are shunted down the labour market to those with the smallest scope for choice or effective political involvement, a fact which is usually used against the argument for breaking the cash/work nexus. This problem has not been dealt with adequately by post-industrialists. As we saw, they merely stress that were there a guaranteed income and other institutional supports from the state, as well as political links between the unemployed and the unions (as Keane proposes), the strategy would be more desirable than the traditional one calling for full employment.

Accordingly, instead of attempting to predict what the unemployed might - or might not - accomplish, it could be more fruitful to examine the effects of the schemes that have been already implemented by the state. In Australia, the formal commitment to full employment was abandoned in 1975. It coincided with the time when different elements in the counter-culture had been mounting an attack on the cash/work nexus, promoting the idea of communes, guaranteed

income schemes or worker co-operatives, as alternatives to wage labour, for what they saw as their democratic potential. With the worsening of the employment crisis, and therefore for vastly different reasons, a number of state policies directed at implementing such schemes were also formulated (For a longer discussion of this issue, see Pixley, 1988). The impact of this government interest has yet to be faced by those who, under present conditions, take refuge in a total rejection of the idea of full employment. **The critical problem is that Australian governments were able to transform the challenges to wage labour into a further development of marginalisation for those already poor and unemployed.** The implications of these government designs for alternatives to mainstream work provide, therefore, the 'counter-factual' argument against the likelihood that the unemployed could become politically active. In effect, the post-industrial strategy of liberation from wage labour has failed to consider that governments have already taken on similar positions to legitimise a form of 'non-participation' in no way connected with ameliorating the plight of the unemployed. Equally, the evidence presented here seriously questions the assumptions that alternatives to wage labour could 'radicalise consciousness' or undermine the existing power relations of the market and the state that their advocates had supposed. These alternatives have, instead, undermined the citizenship of particular categories of the population.

How did this happen? During the 1970s and 1980s, state agencies at Federal and State levels spent a considerable time formulating guaranteed income schemes, worker co-operatives and communes as alternatives to 'paid work'. The Whitlam Government was involved in guaranteed income proposals, which were promoted by the 'new' libertarian right-wing both to prevent the building of a proper welfare system in Australia, and to bifurcate the labour market. The Hawke Government flirted with communes and co-ops in response to the suddenly more urgent demands for proper jobs in 1983. Policy-makers envisaged the possibility of reducing the workforce by sending jobless teenagers to fend for themselves on 'kibbutzim', and by making redundant workers pay for their own jobs by buying **failed** enterprises and converting them into co-operatives. Despite the many similarities, these government strategies for 'coping' with unemployment have not been systematically set out before to investigate the post-industrial claims of the supposed desirability of separating income from work.

In fact, the governmental interests in the 'alternatives' were neither to change values nor to undermine the mainstream market, but rather to maintain and reinforce the **status quo** of accepted levels of unemployment (that is, accepted by governments). Since I am looking at the employment issue in terms of the relation of work to citizenship, it is important to remember that post-industrialists assume that citizenship can be defended without individual recourse to the mainstream labour market. Citizens who are jobless ultimately rely on support from governmental institutions and cash transfers. A brief look at the past struggles over the cash/work nexus, shows that state support was equally vital for regulating wage labour and defending workers' rights, that is, for **weakening** the nexus. But those who were excluded from the labour market, such as women and, far more totally, Aborigines, were also dependent on the state, but in the position of passive clients. Can we assume, as post-industrialists tend to do, that future governments will be benign and more accountable to the 'work-free'? It appears, rather, that whether the state is democratic or not, it will intervene, and the more powerless the citizens, the less defences they will have in checking the authoritarian and non-democratic tendencies of governments, and the dull compulsion of the market.

It is not possible in this paper to look, even in a cursory way, at the past struggles over the income and job nexus. In Australia it can be traced back to the last century, including some experiments with communes and co-operatives. But the end of full employment in 1974 obviously transformed the bases of previous struggles. Unemployment itself always reinforces the cash/work nexus to some degree, though the relatively generous provision of Unemployment Benefits (compared with many other OECD countries) has been exceptionally problematic for governments of both the right and the left. There was a variety of largely ineffectual 'job creation' schemes at the time. Reducing participation was preferred, especially by the Fraser Government's policy of keeping women out of the workforce through tax rebates, and this contrasted starkly with the growing feminist movement's efforts to weaken the cash/work nexus by improving women's rights at work with maternity leave, flexi-time, equal opportunity and redefinitions of skill.

When the level of male unemployment worsened, the Fraser Government's 'fight inflation first' strategy finally met with electoral defeat. The Hawke Government, while insisting on its commitment to 'jobs, jobs, jobs', straightway turned to alternatives to jobs, especially communes. The result of the state interest in the 'post-industrial' strategy was evident by the time of the Work-for-the-Dole debate in 1986. If unemployed teenagers did not like the idea of Kibbutzim, they still 'owed' society 'work'. But 'dole-work' is indentured labour which both excludes people from the labour market and punishes them. Governments have taken an increasingly harsh position against the unemployed, to the extent that considerable numbers of those eligible have been deterred from claiming Unemployment Benefits.

There is new talk in government circles, about workfare for sole parents and teenagers' eligibility for the dole was replaced, in 1987, by a smaller job search allowance.

So, whilst post-industrialists present a utopia of informal networking and mutual aid, they admit that the whole scheme requires complete governmental underpinning. But governments pick up the 'liberation from work' theme for vastly different reasons that, far from 'solving' the problems facing the unemployed, only further weaken their 'rights' as citizens. By contrast, unemployment is a state problem in systemic terms, for reasons that are quite unrelated to the problems for the unemployed.⁵ If unemployment carried the threat of starvation, the labour market would be 'naturally' corrected since wages would be driven down, inflation 'cured' and the demand for labour would rise again. The struggles for unemployment benefits date back to the advent of popular democracy: and specific cash transfers do indeed weaken the cash/work nexus. Hence, Western democracies currently find unemployment a problem, not just for its long-term effects on state budgets and on the economy, but also in the perennial problems for the state of legitimisation from below at election times. Governments are forced to maintain the unemployed with cash transfers rather than risk an increase in violence or allow embarrassing public scenes of starvation. Labour power is in this way 'decommodified' (since the human beings attached to it can survive without jobs), but it hence does not allow the 'cure' of unemployment to be effected. Budget deficits become larger and larger, partly from the increases in social security cash transfers, while the corporate sector, in supposed alliance with tax-payers, responds by using 'The Deficit' to castigate and blackmail governments. Consequently, governments become further dependent upon 'business confidence' about new investment, since their basic revenue comes from the taxation and finances from the capitalist economy.⁶ Marginalising sections of the unemployed away from labour force participation (that is, away from claiming unemployment benefits), whilst not appearing to be that harsh, may reduce the budget deficit and inflation, if those so marginalised have to take any work at any price. The post-industrial strategy in a number of points coincides with state interests. It legitimises the redefinitions of work by governments and gives a simplistic and popular 'solution' to the very real problems of low paid, dull and routine jobs, a consequence of the lack of control in most workplaces, as well as of unemployment itself.

I am not disputing that worker co-operatives are one of the genuine solutions to hierarchical work structures, when they can provide workplace democracy within a viable co-operative. I find it equally desirable to seek new ways of organising everyday life, such as communal housing arrangements. These alternatives, though, are not a 'solution' to unemployment for those who are unemployed. For governments, the alternatives are what Hawke called supply-side 'solutions' to unemployment, which assumes a fixed demand for labour by employers. Alternatives to 'paid work' do not increase the number of proper jobs at all, but reduce the workforce participation rates. The question one has to ask is alternative to what.

It is necessary then to recognise that once wage labour became a defining characteristic of societies like Australia, a new social order was created that permeated all other aspects of these societies. New values emerged as the new institutional structures were established, so much so that the formal sphere of wage labour has become the principal sphere of social participation today. This means, therefore, that when we consider the possible alternatives for the future, we have to think about **moving beyond** the present, and not about any form of returning to the past. In this sense social trends are irreversible. The economy no longer consists of small-scale units of production, but is now composed of highly centralised labour and capital markets, and the modern state is highly complex and centralised, performing a vast range of tasks throughout the society. It is very difficult to participate in such a society at all without participating in both arenas.

In addition, the post-industrial attacks on the service sector undermine the current feminist agenda for redefining and recognising women's traditional skills and promoting the collectivisation of many facets of domestic labour. There is considerable scope for employment creation in areas of community/communal childcare, education, health care, catering, laundries, cafes and clothes, and the more individualised care of the sick and elderly. Raising the status of housework so that it is recognised as useful **work**, still unpaid, is the demand of post-industrialists. It is not the same

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5. Offe's (1987) article, does not make this distinction between the systemic problems of unemployment, and the problems facing those without jobs.
 6. This, in other words, is one of the legitimisation problems stemming from fiscal crises facing Western Governments. See Offe and Ronge, 1979; Habermas, 1975; and O'Connor, 1973.

as the current feminist demands to organise different domestic tasks into the employment arena, and it sharply contrasts with the expectations of the majority of women today to a place in the labour market. The alternative to wage labour for most women is poverty and passive dependence on the state or individual men (whose wages now cannot support housing). The 'informal economy' is hardly a viable option when most commodities are cheaper than the home-made variety. It is equally problematic for post-industrialists to rely on the 'servile' aspect of much service sector work as a reason for its abandonment. To be sure, most women work in this sector, but it strongly resembles the conditions in the manufacturing sector of last century (and today in the Third World). Many of these conditions are union issues which are always more effectively challenged when full employment is the aim and trend. Furthermore, a guaranteed income (above the minimum wage), whilst highly improbable, is a greater drain on government revenue than the cost of job creation. Arguments for expanding employment opportunities, moreover, do not necessarily have to rely on the traditional 'labourist' ones based on productivist visions, where woodchipping is simply part of 'progress' (Habermas, 1986). By contrast, the caring services and environmental enhancement are inherently non-destructive forms of employment.

More generally, employment should not be a **privilege**, because the labour market is stratified, though it remains more the question that the society should continue to try to define work rather than have definitions imposed from above. It is fair to say that the meaningless and dull aspects of paid work can only be transformed from within work. There is no doubt that one of the ideological messages of the 'work ethic' does indeed blame the victims of meaningless work, by suggesting that they are not 'successful' for they have not worked 'hard enough' (Offe, 1977). But, if most paid work is never going to provide a meaningful or successful 'career' no matter how hard a person works (because of deskilling and non-performance related criteria), the criticism of this false equation between work and 'effort' often avoids the fact that social reality is partly created and shaped through work. It is a commonplace that most people identify with their work when it is interesting and not when it is dull. The moral demand that is still widespread, that one should live on one's own work and not at other people's expense, is the cause of the victim blaming of dole 'bludgers', and it is quite different from the 'work ethic'. Indeed, unions have consistently resisted the imposition of dull and routine work

So, although my defence of paid work may appear from an emancipatory viewpoint to be a defence of dull, powerless work, the onus is on the post-industrialists to show that the flight from wage labour will not make the situation worse. My position only recognises that alienation within work is never absolute. **If 'being there' by no means guarantees the possibility of active and conscious participation in paid work and even less, any control over the process, the problem is that 'being absent' or excluded from it makes this quite impossible.** This is the paradox that work structures cannot be transformed through concerted, collective action, unless one is employed in them. Entry into a multiplicity of other spheres of life is, moreover, closely connected to one's participation in the everyday work structure.

What then, are the general results of the post-industrial separation of income from work? It is virtually indistinguishable from the state's interest in developing **non-participation**, which aims at the further marginalisation of the poor and unemployed. Their claims on the state have been thus rendered less visible and in that sense actually subside. There is now a widespread acceptance of punitive action against the unemployed, as the popularity of the work-for-the-dole scheme demonstrates. They are blamed when they have no other option but to survive on a meagre income from the state. Yet their chances for political protest are extremely limited from the position of exclusion, where it is very difficult to develop a consciousness of subordination or for a real adversary to emerge. It is possible to do so, as the feminist slogan the Personal is Political suggests, though the feminist movement itself erupted again when women's work participation was expanding rapidly. Nevertheless, our chief historical examples of action by those with the self-created identity of 'unemployed', are of the Hunger Marches. It does seem to me that the only content possible for demands 'from without' is the demand for inclusion, for jobs and for the right to participate. Restructuring work from within work, which also involves the politicising of new needs from work has, as I see it, more potential than the abandonment of work, and the related supposition that the unemployed may become politically active if only governments would guarantee their financial security.

So, though unemployment does seem to be with us, and a society actually based on Full Employment is no utopia for me, we have to maintain full employment as an objective. Those who suffer joblessness are in the weakest positions and therefore full employment, as an aim and a trend to move towards, serves for their defence, at least, and for their own politicisation, at best. My argument, then, does not defend wage labour as such, but it does stress that neither the dull compulsion of the market nor the technocratic tendencies of the state can be effectively challenged by those who are excluded from the labour market. Social movements must therefore practice a complex politics of participation in

both arenas. I do not present any simplistic solutions to these serious problems for increasing the potential for democratic participation, but I am concerned that we must consider the directions of social change that enhance, rather than detract from citizenship. The chances of women and men to a multi-faceted life include the choice of belonging to the major arena available today for sociability and solidarity. The assumption that 'mere work' is inferior to political life confuses the instrumental problems of productivism with the potentialities of participation and control, in an elitist refusal to recognise that work and politics are inter-related, and that the whole material conditions of our lives, including our needs, are created within the process of work and production.

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**'REVIEWING THE REVIEW':
THE SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN FIN DE SIECLE AUSTRALIA**

Rob Watts
School of Community Services and Policy Studies
Phillip Institute of Technology

In their anxiety to leave behind the dated past they unwittingly fall into it. (Russell Jacoby, 1975)

The present welfare state is, in a sense, a monument to the first Industrial Revolution, to the problems it created, and to the values which shaped it. Future social policies will, however, have to cope with the consequences of the second Industrial Revolution. (Rudolf Klein and Michael O'Higgins, 1985)

1. INTRODUCTION

In December 1985, Social Security Minister Brian Howe announced the establishment of a Social Security Review (SSR) with a wide ranging brief to carry out an extensive review of Australia's social security system. It was heralded as the first such 'fundamental re-examination of existing programs and priorities' in over forty years. And Howe drew particular attention to 'the dramatic increases over the past ten years in child poverty, in hardship among sole parents, and the growth of long term unemployment' (Howe, 1985). At its head Howe placed Associate Professor Bettina Cass, one of, or perhaps the most highly regarded of the younger generation on Australian social policy writers. In the context of the much discussed 'crisis of the welfare state', the peculiar political, fiscal and legitimisation problems in Australia's political culture, and given Cass' pre-eminence, much was expected.

In terms of volume we have certainly not been disappointed. Six major issues papers and in excess of thirty Background/Discussion papers later, (and one final overview paper to come), the SSR has produced a good deal of closely argued, highly detailed exploration of a range of issues in Australia's income support system. It has also already had some impact on government legislative and program change. The Federal Government itself has summarised this impact thus:

The Social Security Review has been the prime focus for developing and considering changes to revise outmoded provision within the Social Security Act, target assistance where most needed, encourage and assist clients to enter or return to the workforce and develop child support and assistance to low income families. The Review has provided a structured backdrop for considering social security issues in the previous two Budgets and May Statements ... and will continue to play this role for at least the 1988-89 and 1989-90 Budgets ... (Howe, 1988:2)

The Hawke Government has not been slow or backward in locating the SSR at the centre of its self-defined commitments to 'Social Justice': Prime Minister Hawke, e.g. spoke in 1988 of his Government's

unswerving commitment to a fairer Australia [which] is demonstrated by our social achievements to date. One million new jobs. Reviewing the tax links for the privileged and using the proceeds to help the needy. Universal health cover. Better education. More housing. Alleviating child poverty ...

The Government is committed to continuing and sharpening its social justice strategy - drawing in particular on the findings of the Government's Social Security Review. (Hawke, 1988, i-xi)

And yet.

For many intelligent and perceptive Australians this is not the picture they see. Graham Maddox sees another Hawke Government.

Hawke gladly presided over an economy in which as the fortunes of our richest people rose and fell by hundreds of millions of dollars and entrepreneurs made millions in overnight deals, real wages continued to decline, poverty traps closed sharply over the unemployed and the employed poor and propertyless pensioners despaired over an inadequate subsidy.

More and more the Hawke Government's attitude to wage-earners and cultural minorities seemed to signify a waning concern for human dignity and personal integrity.
(Authors stress) (Maddox, 1989:183)

Such a divergent perspective raises sharply the question of the extent to which talk of social justice is merely rhetoric, and by implication how much the SSR has been used as window dressing by a Government desperate to preserve its traditional voting base. And to raise this question is to open a wider set of other questions about the SSR. Does it have a vision of a 'just society'? How much has it been implicated or compromised by its inclusion within the politics of legitimization? How far reaching has its analysis been? Given that it is the first review in forty years, how well has it done, especially in comparison with its predecessor, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security, which begun to dream the future of a welfare state linking full employment and a social security system even in the early 1940s?. Such questions demand to be asked in a context shaped by the immanent novelty of a systems crisis.

2. CONTEXT OF CRISIS

A review of the SSR has to grapple with serious and large questions. Without doubting the value of such a task per se, I am not persuaded that we should only be interested in assessing the extent to which the SSR has successfully influenced the direction of current Government policy in terms either of new legislation or of policy changes. I would argue that our current context of crisis necessitates a larger critical framework because we should take seriously Social Security Minister Howe's own repeated calls for new approaches/ideas about welfare. At the December 1988 Social Justice Conference, for example, Howe spoke of the need to put the debate about welfare

within a theoretical context which is relevant to contemporary Australian economic and social life

as well as the need for 'new models of paradigms' of welfare policy (Howe, 1986:6). The current context in which the SSR has been operating itself suggests the need to go beyond the taken-for-granted.

Indeed, as the SSR itself has acknowledged, the Australian 'welfare state', established in the 1940s is dead. That 'welfare state' presupposed the achievements of full employment and, under a more or less fully mobilised labour force, was to be strung an income support 'safety net' to catch the putatively short term victims of unemployment, sickness or some other 'misfortune'. This welfare state, unlike its Northern European counterparts, was a trim and underdeveloped pattern of state interventions which recognised no inherent citizen rights to income support, and presupposed a fully employed (male) wage labour force. Poverty itself was by definition to be abolished by the achievement of full employment. And for nearly thirty years the illusions stayed intact. That 'welfare state' has been decisively bypassed by the recrudescence of economic crisis, itself part of a wider and deeper systems crisis which has exercised social theorists from Habermas and Offe to O'Connor and Touraine since the early 1970s.

Not the least of the signs of this immanent crisis is a loss of faith in the older 'naïve whig' commitment to both producing and reading social policy as a reformist project, enacting a welfare telos by incremental adjustments. That social policy texts like the SSR's productions can now be 'read' in any number of ways is therefore in its own small way testimony to the intellectual crisis which the SSR is part of - albeit unwittingly.

The SSR itself was from the outset concerned to reflexively locate itself in its context. In its first discussion paper it asked 3 questions:

- what are the social, economic and demographic changes which have placed the need for review on the policy agenda?
- what perspectives inform the choice of issues to be addressed and on what principles are the objectives of the review based?
- is the time right for a review? (SSR BDP1:1)

There are undoubtedly today many ways of 'reading' social policy. In the new terrain of discourse theory, social policy texts from the granddaddy of them all, the 1834 Poor Law Report, through the Beveridge or Marsh Reports on into our own time to the products of the Social Security Review can be read in a number of ways. They can be used to 'read off' Government policy at its most general, or even used to reconstruct (or deconstruct) the zeitgeist of a whole period of history (Dean, 1988) or a set of social tendencies (Gunn, 1989; Beilharz, 1987). Gone forever, and perhaps rightly, is the 'naïve' view that such texts can or should only be used as a guide to, or indicator of, what Governments might or will do in the way of legislation or policy implementation. Epistemological and social theoretical innocence is ours no longer; we know, or ought to, that social policy texts are elements of a discursive practice with political and social aspirations interests, values and strategies embedded and coded in the language itself. Recognising this is, of course, no excuse for introspective and idealist analysis which in its unravelling of discursive codes and practices ends up with a marvellously intricate analysis of the text at the cost of cognising its place in the real world of actors and social conflicts, or of people actually doing policy work.

So how then should we read the SSR?

I would want only to suggest here that we need to ask how well the SSR has grasped the unfolding context of crisis. In fin de siècle Australia, we face new emergent forms of both organising and representing social, economic and political production and relations. We can, I would suggest, no longer assume an automatic linkage between the sphere of wage labour organised under the conditions of a capitalist labor market and an economic ensemble oriented to endless growth and mass consumption in which the 'welfare state' sought to bind together that moral and economic nexus as a normative achievement for those who slipped out or away from that nexus. Sharpe has well characterised the essential policy mythos of the 1980s:

In the short cycle of the 1980s this has been the central reference point: the hope of a return to full employment, to reasonable job security and to a renewal of that rising pattern of material expectations which had become integral with an Australian way of life. (Sharpe, 1989:6)

My own reading of our context suggests, in a necessarily narrowly focused way, that full employment and an economy geared to constant growth can no longer be read out into our immediate future.

Two sets of considerations, of a markedly different order of seriousness suggest that full employment will not be regained before the end of the century, if ever.

Firstly, it is clear that even without others taking into account certain turning environmental constraints Australia's economic system will not sustain a return to full employment.

As EPAC (1986:26) pointed out, Australia will need to maintain a very high rate of growth in GDP to put any significant dent in its current level of unemployment. Projecting 3 possible rates of growth in GDP and making a number of assumptions about demography and the workforce participation rate, EPAC came to a somewhat optimistic conclusion (represented below) that if high rates of economic growth can be sustained, reduction in the unemployment rate can be achieved by the late 1990s.

TABLE 1: PROJECTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 1991 - 1996

Participation Rate (per cent)	Real GDP Growth (per cent per annum)		
	3.5	4.0	4.5
In 1991	Unemployment Rates		
61.50	6.7	5.5	4.4
62.00	7.4	6.3	5.1
62.50	8.2	7.0	5.9
In 1996			
61.75	4.0	1.6	-
62.25	4.8	2.4	-
62.75	5.6	3.2	0.8

Source: EPAC

This hope of EPAC's conforms to what Offe has called the 'orthodox' perspective 'which embraces the proven wisdom of the past judging this knowledge to be generally capable of indicating paths leading to the Future'. (Offe, 1985:81) In Australia, this orthodoxy confronts both the specific problems of a long dependent, staples-based economy and the general reduction in labour utilisation arising out of new work organisations and technologies.

Certainly much of the macro-economic policy of the 1980s has been founded on the hope that a revival of exports especially in manufacturing and aided by exports of services would turn the economy around. This has not happened. New investment has not been located in productive enterprise; the economy remains reliant on the exports of agricultural products, minerals and fuel, and between 1986-88 high international prices in these have fuelled a distorted kind of economically 'overheated' growth characterised by large paper investment/profit-making, and the import of capital equipment especially in the financial services. Employment growth itself has continued to take place in part time work, especially for women, with major growth in the service industries, including financial, tourism and community services, whilst the manufacturing sector continues its slow glide downwards. EPAC continues to urge wage restraint (to maintain international competitiveness) but to little effect:

The long term terms of trade movement against commodity exporters and the fairly poor outlook for some commodities in the medium term, highlight the importance for Australia of maintaining international competitiveness. (EPAC, 1985:35)

Secondly, it is apparent that major environmental constraints are emerging. These must raise wholly new questions whether low growth, no growth, or even negative growth must not become now a new national economic imperative.

Given either one or both of these considerations, one might have expected a major opening up of debate about the centrality of wage labour over the next few decades. As will be indicated later, the SSR has yet to engage in such a debate.

In this context of a defunct 'welfare state' and a profound systems crisis, throwing up new forms of culture, labour and social relations, the Social Security Review has emerged. Is it to be understood as a mortician, sent in to rouge the cheeks of the corpse and so preserve the appearances of life? Or is it a radical, imaginative and innovative voice asking new questions and calling for far reaching changes? Regrettably, the Social Security Review has struggled and largely failed to go beyond cosmetics.

After six major Issues Papers and numerous Discussion Papers, we still await a comprehensive and compelling suggestion as to the construction of a framework of state policy which will take us into the 21st century with confidence.

This criticism is offered mindful of the current difficulty with criticism as an activity. To date there has been little critical response to the Social Security Review, especially by academics. Maddox has usefully reminded us that one of the Hawke Government's major 'achievements' has been a retreat from 'two-party adversary politics characteristic of the form of democracy we have known in this country' (Maddox, 1989:67). 'Consensus' has certainly become synonymous with pragmatics and opportunism; more insidiously it has led to the identification of criticism with being anti-labour or even unpatriotic. It is equally apposite to note that the crisis of legitimacy around the 'welfare state' has produced a kind of intellectual paralysis, in which sometimes it seems, we can only go on defending the old 'welfare state' without really knowing how to go beyond this. We might have hoped that the Social Security Review would begin to chart these unknown waters.

And perhaps for some of us there is a sense that the resurgence of a conservative culture is not an excuse for quietism but a call to intellectual and political renewal: As Przeworski puts it:

.... the current offensive of the Right is not simply a question of taxes ... The plans for relaxing taxation of profits, abolishing environmental controls eliminating welfare programs, removing Government control over product safety ... and weakening the labour unions ... constitute a project for a new society, a bourgeois revolution.
(Przeworski, 1986:21a)

This is neither the time nor the place to develop an exhaustive or detailed critical review of the Social Security Review's numerous reports, or of attempts to implement some of its proposals. Rather, certain general observations seem called for with a special focus on establishing what the Social Security Review means when it talks of integrating economic and social policy.

Firstly, there is no doubt that within certain limitations, the Social Security Review has done a good job. It has reminded us that there are numerous Australians whose lives are damaged through lack of economic and social resources. It has called for some moderate increases in benefit levels (such as in Issues Paper 6, the increase to 30% of average (male) weekly earnings of the old age pensions). It has sought in a context shaped by a revanchiste 'new right' and individualist rhetoric, to defend minimal state interventions on behalf of citizens' rights. None of this is wrong or irrelevant, but so much more might have been done, given the awesome challenges our current and likely future context poses.

The Social Security Review has been resolutely, even stubbornly incremental and reformist in its approach. It has strongly refused any imaginative broad-brush attempt to start new debates or pose new questions.

This refusal has its origins or basis in a number of conceptual and political dispositions, to do with

- i) accepting an incrementalist framework;
- ii) focusing on poverty and
- iii) establishing a linkage between social policy and an (absent) economic policy.

The Social Security Review's own account of the reasons why a review was needed, points to its acceptance of an incrementalist framework. It early established the case for a review of social security in terms of an alleged mismatch between the original system of social security and a limited - and largely unexplicated, because of descriptive account, of changes such as unemployment, changes to family composition, increasing poverty, and an aging population. In the light of these changes, it announced a commitment to an administrative review. This nicely begged the question of why the social changes observed were occurring, just as it begged the question of the enormous political impact of a resurgent 'new right' ideological apparatus which has worked to crank up a deep intellectual crisis around the old Keynesian-liberal values and practices of the post-war era. It is, therefore, no paradox to assert that the Social Security Review ignores the real enemy. That enemy is the 'welfare state' itself, in the context of a capitalist-patriarchal society. Peter Taylor-Gooby remind us of what the SSR would have us forget.

The enemy is the same dull enemy (i.e. the welfare state) and the 'new right' is a new distraction from the enduring struggle. The ideology of individualism in interests, and of

reformism in politics, generates the contradiction in mass attitudes that have always been present. (Taylor-Gooby, 1985:3)

In this sense, the Social Security Review establishes a continuity in reformist politics, a politics which has long been unable to by-pass the residual and second order priority of social policy. Post-war governments under the Keynesian banner, and the melange of new-right/capitalist governments 'a la Fraser/Hawke alike' have tended to see 'economic management' as taking priority over social policy, be it by 'demand stimulation' or by 'demand dampening', even if the results of economic management are profoundly inequalitarian. Thus, inflation was allowed to bloom (ca 1947-1951) or unemployment allowed to rip loose (ca 1974-1984) as a matter of priority whilst 'social policy' was there simply to mop up the damage. Reformist politics begins by privileging the economy. The economy is either sacred or subject to nature-like laws. Whether God-like or natural, the economy is not to be subject to criticism or alteration. Reformism, from the architects of the 1945 White Paper to the numerous authors of Social Security Review papers alike, begin by denying that the 'economy' is about either power or choice. Reformists compound this error by refusing to see that the 'economy' thrives on systematic inequality whilst its ideologues speak about 'individual choice', 'needs', or 'incentives'. At best the Social Security Review allows and encourages a model of social policy which sees government moving in to pick up the pieces after the economy has done its worst. The result is usually a good deal of contradictory waffle about the real effects of social policy. At least the early generation of social policy writers, like T. H. Marshall, would not permit themselves such perversity as the Social Security Review commits when it simultaneously argues that:

- i) the social security system plays a significant role in reducing income inequality by providing income support for the lowest income households (Discussion Paper 1:3);

and

- ii) that there has been an increase in the number, and change in the composition, of people in poverty between 1972-1973 to 1981-1982 (ibid:6)

In England at least, from Marshall to Le Grand, there has been an acknowledgement that in a profoundly unequal economy/society, social policy cannot be egalitarian.

A focus on 'poverty' per se has proven, long before the SSR came on the scene, to be a major obstacle to grasping the real nature of the problem, i.e. a capitalist-patriarchal society in which inequality in the distribution of resources, power, knowledge and access to these enabling components of the 'good life' are the sine qua non of a healthy capitalist-patriarchal order of things. As Cass has indicated.

... the review itself must focus on income maintenance provisions and their key role in redistributing income to the poorest households and through life-cycle vulnerabilities. (SSR 1P2:3)

This is said in spite of the equally well accepted proposition first advanced by Marshall and apparently accepted by the SSR that 'inequality' or 'gross economic inequality' is not a consequence of the social security system, but of the economic order itself: Ogburn observes, however coyly and misleadingly, that:

... gross economic inequality is not so much a result of inadequate social security payments as lack of sufficient access to the rewards of the labour market and it is necessary to look at the underlying problems there. (SSR 1P3:2)

Now as Marshall pointed out long ago, the labour market itself under the conditions of capitalist commodity production, is intrinsically unequal; it is simply not clear whether Ogburn believes that if everyone who wanted wage work got it, that 'gross economic inequality' would disappear, or not. More to the point, the awesome concatenation of institutional arrangements, social practices and discursive cultural activities which go into the making of a profoundly unequal society are simply bypassed.

The SSR is plainly right to stress that the linkage between economic and social policy is to be devoutly wished for. What is deeply worrying however throughout the whole canon of the SSR is its narrow sense of what economic policy

consists of: The linkage between 'social' and 'economic' policy is largely, if not entirely, understood in the terms offered by the OECD's 'active society' model where:

The income support program can ... [encourage] 'self provision', facilitating entry and re-entry to the workforce and easing the often harsh transition to a new phase in people's lives (such as widowhood, sole parenthood, invalidity and retirement. (SSR 1P2:4)

Its limits to a model of economic policy are drawn early and appear to be confined to industry restructuring and industry training/retraining. Absent here is even a minimalist Keynesian project of state interventions. And indeed, this is one of the essential problems with the broad policy context of the Hawke Government. The Hawke Government's economic policy is an 'absence-of' economic policy, in terms of deliberate and purposive Government interventions into the economic sphere. Instead the Hawke Government's economic policy is like the hole in the doughnut: economic rationalism invokes the mysterious Hidden Hand of a rational market system setting out to rectify the economy's problems.

This absence strikes at the very heart of the otherwise unexceptionable commitment present in the SSR to integrate economic and social policies.

In contrast with the older Keynesian frameworks, which began to integrate economic and social policy, albeit at the cost of residualising social policy, the SSR, whilst it speaks of integrating economic and social policy, but fails to do so. It is at best a partial blue print with the most important components strikingly absent. It devoutly wishes for the return of full employment without being able to say how or when such an objective will be achievable. So much of this document's proposals rely on the achievement of full employment that this omission has the most serious consequences for those who might 'benefit', should its approach be adopted.

The absence of a detailed blueprint for achieving full employment is indicative of the trajectory which 'public' policy has been taking since 1975. There has been a commitment to cutting back on Government intervention, signalled by the reneging on the long traditional commitment to full employment by the Fraser and Hawke Governments. Since 1975 there have been a consistent series of attempts to deregulate and privatise important aspects of public policy, and to promote a culture of 'new right' entrepreneurship, small government and individual responsibility. These currents of ideas and policy cut deeply into the whole discourse and practice of public and community responsibility which has sustained the relatively weak and indecisive welfare state apparatus Australia has developed. In a context where governments, the media, and the dominant voices of public opinion have combined to erode the public sphere a more forthright and courageous and leading role might have been expected from the SSR. An opportunity to begin to reconstruct the tenor of public debate about the public sphere has been lost, though I do not believe that even now it is too late to begin this process.

In general terms, we might all support the proposals to link the unemployment benefits schemes as outlined in Issues Paper 4, and a range of labour market programs.

However, a detailed reading of the Issues Paper suggests that there is a vagueness and lack of concrete detail about the nature of these linkages or the nature of the government's future commitments to labour market programs. As Farrar pointed out:

... the most common criticism (of the SSR paper) is one that goes straight to the heart of an 'active system' - its tight links to labour market and training programs. Precisely because the review is limited to social security, while training is the prerogative of John Dawkins, absolutely none of the essential details of the system can be spelled out. (Farrar, 1988:2)

At the heart of the Review is a combination of precise policy targeting, and an implied trade-off expressed in terms of citizenship rights and responsibilities, aimed at integrating previously 'passive' income support programs with labour market programs largely designed and administered separately. For all groups, the restructured system promises a variety of labour market programs, structured and provided in a manner appropriate to the diverse needs of different groups of the unemployed. The trade-off involves, for the young and the 'prime-age' workers, income support in return for participation in labour market programs if work is not found.

This integration of income support and labour market programs is in itself desirable, and the proposed expansion of more precise targetting of labour market programs is to be welcomed. Yet, there are a number of substantial difficulties with the Review's proposals.

Firstly, there appears to be a trend in place against the continued expansion of labour market programs. The Kirby Reports proposals for more labour market programs have been imperfectly realised. Spending by the Hawke Government on labour market programs between 1983 and 1987 has declined by 21 per cent, and the future of such programs is unclear. For confidence in such a linkage to be well founded the labour market programs would have to be put in place and the Department of Employment, Education and Training would have to be fully involved in a co-operative policy framework with the Department of Social Security. These Departments do not have a good track record on such co-operative policy development.

Secondly, even if labour market programs are being developed and funded adequately, the central issue of jobs remains. Training programs only work finally when jobs are available for people who have come out of these programs. Again, the point is a simple one; for these proposals to be taken seriously, they have to be put in a larger policy framework which acknowledges the return to full-employment as the national policy priority along with a comprehensive statement about how it will be achieved. The long exhibited hostility by Governments and employers to comprehensive 'manpower' policies suggests how far we can support confidently these proposals.

In short, underlying all questions about labour market programs is the question of generation of jobs in much larger numbers than is presently occurring. A comprehensive and appropriately designed package of training programs would be a valuable contribution to both overall economic recovery and the employment prospects of the disadvantaged by increasing the stock of community skills.

However, unless the net stock of vacancies increases more rapidly than the expansion of the labour force, more and improved labour market programs serve only to re-organise the queue of competitors for jobs, 'leaving those who are successful with an increase in skills, and those who are unsuccessful with an increasingly well-informed despair'.

While the efforts of the government to expand the number of jobs have been fruitful, as the Review itself points out, a net shortfall of more than 450,000 jobs remains and is likely to remain for some time to come. The only genuinely 'active' system of income support for the unemployed remains increased employment.

The Review itself makes the same point, commending the social investment policies outlined in the ACTU/TDC's *Australia Reconstructed*. Yet as the Review also points out, current Government policy accepts continuing high levels of unemployment until the end of this century despite an expected economic recovery.

The Review is again stymied by its failure to deal with the full employment debate.

If on the other hand, the SSR has come to the view that full employment will neither spontaneously recur or be the consequence of deliberate policy, then it should say so and spell out the social policy implications of the continuation of high levels of unemployment. And all of these considerations fall into a totally different framework, if we take seriously the prospect of an imperative need to scale down economic growth.

If the impression has been created that the SSR is only a reformist cosmetician tinkering with different rouges this is not quite accurate. The SSR is alert to a future scenario, and one largely shaped by European thinking.

Yet the Social Security Review is more than just another link in a reformist chain. It has moved, largely unnoticed, to embrace an emergent conception, promoted by that quintessentially capitalist think-tank, the OECD (based in Paris), of the 'active society' in the latest bit of chrome plated semantic magic to emerge from the OECD. The 'active society' is what you get when you marry 'economic rationalism' (i.e. new right values about 'active individuals' who have stopped being dependent on the State), and a desperate attempt to deny that there is anything essentially wrong about the reconfiguration and shrinkage of the labour market away from productive labour outputs.

As the OECD indicated at a mid-year meeting of Social Security Ministers in Brussels, in 1987, an 'active society' is a wonderful place. It's about first, 'integrating' economic policy with 'social policy'. Then it's about ensuring that everyone can be valued and can be 'active' even if wage labour is disappearing in a post-industrial society. Poverty, inequality and distress are all conceptually banished in the discourse about an 'active society'. For an 'active society'

sees heroic citizens brought into job retraining programs with incentives for such involvement provided through social-policy frameworks. (Note: the 'active society' is not about the state creating jobs, because that smacks of Keynesianism or worse, socialism. No, it is about labour market programs.) Crudely put, the 'active society' sets up treadmills for the young, the prime aged or the elderly wage workers, which takes them in and out of retaining schemes. We are not to ask if jobs will ever be there. As for things like inequality or poverty they too are conceptually banished in a flurry of 'activity'. The Social Security Review, regrettably, has bought into this silliness, most notably in its Issues Paper 4.

It has failed to subject the notion of the 'active society' to any critical thought, and surely reflects that failure Jacoby spoke of when observing earlier failures, refusals or inabilities 'to theorise in the name of a new era that has left behind traditional political categories. More exactly, new theories are advanced ... but these turn out to be substanceless inasmuch as they are constructed out of a sham confrontation with past theory. In their anxiety to leave behind the dated past they unwittingly fall into it ...' (Jacoby, 1975:7).

As Gunn (1989) has rightly pointed out, the SSR's somewhat uneasy acceptance of a mainstream productivist culture sits alongside a recognition that the economy and its waged workforce is altering dramatically, even though as he also suggests the SSR is unwilling to project itself into a future of more of the same. Certainly in terms of its linkage of social security and the labour market, it is plain that it continues to privilege waged labour and its income potential over the social security system. Gunn is right then to see the SSR offering a fordist paradigm for a post-fordist world.¹

Equally significant, however, is the complete silence on the part of the SSR of an emergent environmentalist/oppositioned paradigm/practice which presumes that a sustainable society will only be possible into the 21st Century if we address the facts of the 'degeneration of the most basic conditions of life as air, water or the qualities of food.' (Sharpe, 1989:8).

The concept of an 'active society' and the work of the Social Security Review alike has two fundamental questions at the end of this century and the beginning of the new: How, in the face of the apparent and/or desirable shrinkage of the wage labour force, will people live? and How will the imperatives of fair play, and equity, be addressed in the radically unequal society such as shrinkage entails? (Note: Job sharing schemes do not address this issue; they merely spread the damage.)

In this respect, the Social Security Review camouflages this critical question, because it has become complicitous in the general movement by corporate capital to displace or dispense with human labour.

Economic rationality involves, amongst other preconditions, a smaller workforce (as well as a more flexible, retainable workforce). It is especially appalling that in its sixth Issues Paper, the Social Security Review ends up promoting this logic. For part of the recurrent cutback in the workforce focuses on the aging worker. As McDonald points out, the logic of the 80s is 'superannuate rather than retrain'. The use of disability pensions and of early weapons used by the state and capital to refashion the desired smaller workforce. (Note: 50-% of male workers aged 55+ are on disability benefits cf with 16% on unemployment benefits.)

The Social Security Review's recommendations for dealing with the aged takes on a doubly sinister ring. On the one hand its call for more occupational superannuation (designed to reduce the call on government pensions, and by implication of government revenue) will not address the problems of low paid, part-time, unskilled male/female workers who right now are largely denied access to superannuation. These relatively vulnerable workers will not benefit from 'private' superannuation schemes, and an expansion of superannuation schemes will only widen the gulf between the 'two nations'. Secondly, the Social Security Review's framework plainly envisages social policy becoming an even more refined weapon to force the kinds of changes which the economic rationalist push envisages for Australian workers. And the contradictions worsen. In Issues Paper 6, the Social Security Review wants to lift the retirement age for women from 55 to 60 to encourage women to stay in the workforce longer. Yet it has already, in

1. Fordism refers to society structured around wage labor organised around certain basic work practices and processes and oriented to mass production/mass consumption. The post-fordist notion refers to both the use of service industries and to an increasingly flexible part time secondary labour force.

Issues Paper 4, called for increasing the value of the Unemployment Benefit for 'older workers' over 55 to parallel benefits obtainable on the old age benefit. In effect, this would change the provision of old age pensions without being seen to do so. In this respect, the Social Security Review is modelling the new relation between economic and social policy envisioned by the OECD in its conception of an 'active society'.

The Social Security Review's affirmation of a linkage between economic and social policy is empty rhetoric. In effect, the Social Security Review speaks about the need to integrate economic and social policy when there is no economic policy to speak of. It chatters on about social policy well enough when it speaks about means tests, eligibility tests, categories of need, levels of benefit and the rest, but it does so in the absence of an economic policy, if by that we mean deliberate, and purposive interventions by the state to direct economic activity. Economic policy in the 1980s is an absence; it is about letting market forces rip loose and refusing to even think about 'manpower' policies whilst governments conspire with capital to 'encourage' it, through vast tax rip offs and riots such as negative gearing and superannuation tax concessions.

To make the point simply we should remember that social policy has always been residual and second order, but at least in the heroic 1940s there were the bare outlines of an economic policy drawing on the experiences of governments at war which directed and integrated resources, social investment and 'manpower' planning. In the 1980s in a context of massive deregulation and permission given freely to the squandering of natural resources to unproductive investments in speculative activities (including the nation's currency) and to significant levels of investment outside Australia, economic policy has become an absence. In the 1940s Labor Governments were keen to try to guide our national destiny: in the 1980s their successors are content to 'integrate' Australia into a global economy which is intrinsically unstable and likely to provoke both profound investment and credit crises and a global environmental crisis. The linkage between economic and social policies propounded by both the OECD and the Social Security Review is a nonsense. Rather than a brave beginning, the Social Security Review threatens a profound foreclosure on a future we must all continue to struggle for.

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CORPORATISM, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE STATE

Rob White

Department of Youth Work Studies
Western Australian College of Advanced Education

1. INTRODUCTION

Any discussion of the future of the 'welfare state' must take into account the complex relationship between the state, the market, and informal community activities and networks. The aim of this paper is to explore issues relating to the role of the state in the areas of economic policy, social policy and policies relating to law and order, each of which affect the general welfare and well-being of residents of Australia. Specifically, it is argued that 'consensus' ideology, as manifested in corporatist types of political arrangements, is being used to impose state authority over those who are most apt to resist and oppose recent austerity measures and the imposition of further financial hardships.

In a period of capitalist restructuring and crisis on a world scale, the role of the state is even less that of apparent welfare provider than that of enforcer of a particular kind of social order. Indeed, the combination of economic liberalisation and political reaction is creating the conditions for 'authoritarian statism' (Poulantzas, 1978) in the Australian context. The 'authoritarian' character of contemporary developments involving the state can be defined in terms of the disenfranchisement of the bulk of the population from the political process, the severe limitations being placed on a range of political and social rights, and the dearth of accountability mechanisms in relation to key political decision-making processes.

Under capitalism the central mechanism for the distribution of economic resources is the private market sector. The economic role of the welfare state is thus residual at the level of household/individual, with government benefits and programs compensating for the shortfalls in resource distribution in the market sector (Watts, 1987). A third area in which economic and other resources are transferred is that of informal community structures and networks. This can refer to the informal waged sectors of the economy which, although illegal in nature nevertheless constitute yet another aspect of the market; the criminal economy; or the sharing of resources and costs within a particular living arrangement or household (Mattera, 1984; White, 1989a; Jamrozik, 1984, 1987).

In order to gauge the nature and direction of transformations in the social control functions of the capitalist state (see Dominelli, 1988; Ginsburg, 1979; Baldock and Cass, 1983; George and Wilding, 1976), consideration has to be given to any changes occurring in the availability of resources from the market, from the state, and from informal community networks. Changes in each of these spheres will affect the relationship of resources available to an individual from all three. Hence, any shift in resources in one sphere will alter the ability of people to make up for shortfalls in other aspects of their economic lives.

The phenomenon of widespread unemployment constitutes the biggest single factor, but by no means the only factor, in the current relationship between the market, the state, and informal community sectors (Freeland, 1987). This in turn has placed considerable pressure on the state to balance the demands of 'the economy' through fiscal, monetary and wages policies, and 'social policy' demands stemming from the continued decline in living standards accompanying the movement of people out of work and into the welfare queue, or into work of a low paying nature. One consequence of this tension at the policy level has been a combination of increasingly selective welfare provisions targeted at families, a shift in support responsibilities from the state to the family, and increasing regulatory action by the state in relation to the claiming of benefits, trends which are creating a 'cash crisis' for many households, especially for low-income households and individuals living in poverty.

The key issue confronting the state is how can the legitimacy of the capitalist system and of the state itself be maintained in the face of increasing disparities of wealth and income in Australia, while at the same time resource allocation favourable to capital accumulation is to be maintained. One answer has been to extend control and regulation over individuals in each sphere of resource allocation - the market, the state and the informal community networks - and to do so in ways which will stifle resistance or shift the focus of political debate away from structural questions of inequality and oppression.

2. CORPORATISM AND BUREAUCRACY

The concept of 'corporatism' has received considerable attention in recent years, particularly since the setting up of the 'Prices and Incomes Accord' in the early months of 1983 (Stilwell, 1986; Triado, 1984). The concept has been used at a theoretical level to connote a range of different phenomena, from distinct economic systems to particular state forms (Panitch, 1986). For present purposes the main concern is to highlight the **form of relationships** that such structures embody. Corporatism, here, refers to a political structure which involves the non-conflictual integration of organised interest groups (e.g., central trade union and business organisations) in the planning and the administration of state policy.

The centre piece of any 'market sphere' corporatist political arrangement is wages policy. In return for restraint and 'co-operation' on the wages and working conditions front, trade unions are to have more say in state planning and policy. This has, at least superficially, been the case in Australia since 1983, as witnessed by the activities and formal role of the Economic Planning Advisory Council, the National Labour Consultative Council, and the National Board of Employment, Education and Training. Simultaneously, however, wages and working conditions have dramatically declined since the Hawke Government came into power, and it is highly questionable as to how much real say union leaders have had in setting, rather than simply responding to the economic and social agenda established by the forces of capital.

There is much that could be said about how 'corporatism' has been implemented in the Australian context, including the broad direction of many different policy documents (e.g., ACTU/TDC, 1987; National Labour Consultative Council, 1988; Dawkins, 1988), and the debates that have accompanied the unfolding of the corporatist project over the last six years (Stewart, 1985; Flew, 1989; Bolton and Dunstan, 1987; Ewer and Higgins, 1986; Beilharz and Watts, 1986). Of special significance to this paper are those features of corporatism which appear to be relevant to analysis of how the state is becoming more 'authoritarian' in nature.

- First, a corporatist model implies the **centralisation of decision-making**. This simplifies the ability of the state, in conjunction with other bodies, to impose discipline on those people 'represented' under the tripartite or extra-parliamentary umbrella.
- Secondly, the centralisation of decision-making also tends to consolidate the **power of senior bureaucrats and officials** who are in a position to execute and implement the policies decided upon.
- Thirdly, since participation in corporatist political structures is premised upon a **consensus approach** and to some degree notions of 'social harmony', each participating group will have to exercise 'self-discipline' as a 'responsible' member of the negotiating party.
- Fourthly, the corporatist project is orientated toward public policy making in such a way that notions of the 'needs of the nation-state as a whole' and the '**national interest**' are highlighted, while issues of the dominance of the capitalist class specific sectoral interests are downplayed or ignored.
- Fifthly, since the need is defined in terms of national economic interest, rather than as being political in nature, the solution is by and large seen in '**technocratic**' or '**economic rationalist**' terms, a phenomenon which once again puts more power and control in the hands of senior level bureaucrats and 'experts'.

The main aspect of the distribution of community resources via the market over the last few years has been a decided shift in income distribution and the polarisation of Australian society along wealth and poverty lines (Raskall, 1987; Burdekin et al., 1989; Bradbury et al., 1988; Macintyre, 1988/89). The biggest winners in this shift have been the large corporate enterprises and those individuals at the upper end of the income scale. The political framework within which this economic shift has occurred has been that of corporatist relationships involving the main 'defenders' of working class living standards, the unions - and the state and business. At a political level, one of the outcomes of these arrangements has been a virtual de-mobilisation of union rank-and-file, and concentrated attacks on those workers opposed to capitalist austerity measures through court action, ACTU censure, and the use of the police.

3. CORPORATE PLANNING AND SOCIAL WELFARE

The form of state involvement and intervention in the market sector has been characterised by corporatist types of activities and structures. The rationale and practical implementation of such a model is also evident in the social welfare arena.

The overt concern of the government to save costs in the welfare area, as well as to control a potentially disruptive section of the population, has manifested itself in a general tightening up of security regulations and greater monitoring and surveillance of potential 'abuses' of the system as a whole (Howe, 1988; White, 1990). Under conditions where a large number of people are reliant on state welfare of some kind, and where the state is actively seeking to cut the proportion of its spending on welfare as well as transforms the accessibility criteria for this welfare, it would be expected that representatives of community welfare groups will work toward mobilising public sentiments against such measures.

What needs to be explored are the reasons why such bodies have been constricted in taking up the political challenge posed by the advent of 'New Right' labourism. Such a challenge would necessarily have to present issues not only in terms of the structural basis of inequality in Australian society, but also with respect to the activity of the state, under ALP government control, in creating and reproducing the conditions for the inequality that exists.

In practice, lobby groups such as the Australian Council of Social Service have effectively been sidestepped by the Hawke Labor Government through a series of constructed 'safety valves' which give the appearance of input into state decision-making while doing little to change the status quo. Thus, for example, studies of the operation of the Economic Advisory Planning Council have indicated its role as an ideological screen designed to be a 'disorganising' institution for groups outside the main framework of the Accord (Stewart, 1985). It has been further suggested that such institutions play a major part in processes of persuading the co-opting potential protagonists to the policy directions of the state (Singleton, 1985).

The problems experienced by non-government bodies of this kind stem initially from the fact that often they are funded by the very same entity that is the focus of much of their critique. Other problems are internal to the functioning of such community organisations (e.g., reliance on professional staff for political decisions, burn-out due to extensive workloads, etc.). Examined from a broader perspective, however, the limitations imposed upon such bodies can be seen to be related to such factors as the concentration of decision-making into the hands of a few people; the exclusion of certain groups from decision-making processes and consultations; the emphasis on compromise and negotiation in state-community group relations, even though conflict may be necessary for change to occur; participation on ministerial committees and the like where loyalty to the committee over and above that to the 'field' may be demanded, and so on. Certainly the ideology of corporatism (and of the importance of tripartite and extra-parliamentary decision-making institutions), of consensus styles, and the preeminence given to 'conflict resolution' would appear to have a major impact on political strategies and tactics.

At a 'peak body' political level, the, bilateral negotiations and broader corporatist-style institutional structures have been used to privilege some groups over others because of power imbalances among representatives (e.g., business sector over community interest groups), to force compliance with government priorities by fostering competition between community groups for the limited funding available, or to provide legitimacy to state action that is taken 'after consultation' with the 'appropriate' bodies (see White, 1990; Sandercock, 1983).

At the 'service delivery' level, the construction of an apparent harmony of interests among key players in the welfare sector and the co-option of community agencies is presently a matter of considerable concern. Perhaps the most pervasive mechanism which is creating the conditions for even greater state control over political opposition in this sector has been the revamping of bureaucratic structures and administrative procedures. This has affected both government and non-government welfare providers, and sparked discussion on issues such as equity, social justice and management effectiveness (Pusey, 1988; Bryson, 1987). Without a doubt the biggest result of recent transformations in administrative practice has been a re-affirmation of elite management models, coupled with an ascendancy of the ideological principles of the profit-oriented private sector.

The concentration on notions of 'efficiency' and 'productivity' has had a major impact on the objectives and operation of many community based welfare agencies. The introduction of corporate models into the public service has shifted the pendulum back to autocratic precepts of management, consolidated power in the hands of senior staff, created a

demand for orthodoxy in program objectives and implementation, reduced the extent of consultation and decision-making involving people at the local level, and re-defined 'accountability' as being of the community (Considine, 1988). One result of the new way of managing has been 'the closure and censure of many projects whose aims extend beyond simple service delivery and embrace such values as advocacy and community development' (Considine, 1988:24).

The selectivity now apparent in state welfare benefit provision is thus being replicated at the level of community agency, that is, the direct service providers. Just as 'welfare need' has been redefined to suit the fiscal needs of the welfare state, so too 'community need' has been redefined in technocratic terms, subject to quantitative assessment and the de-politicisation of many pressing issues at the local level.

4. THE STATE AND COMMUNITY

Informal community networks and activities are of considerable economic importance as a means of resource allocation. This is particularly so in a period which is seeing the transfer of financial responsibilities and resources from the market to the state (because of unemployment and wage restraint), and from the state to the family (because of fiscal constraints and 'economic' priorities). Not all households are able to cope with the extra economic pressures placed upon them by market and social welfare developments. The consequences of this include increases in such things as domestic violence, social alienation, suicide, personal breakdown, and feelings and experiences of insecurity and fearfulness.

At the level of economic resources, notions of charity and the ideology of 'volunteerism' are being used to legitimate and encourage greater 'community' support for the disadvantaged and the dispossessed (Baldock, 1983; Mowbray, 1985). The caring side of welfare is to thus be taken on by volunteers and homeworkers, in order to compensate for this decline in the efforts of the state in the meeting of social needs (McIntosh, 1985).

Another side of informal community life consists of various kinds of criminal activity. The cash crisis affecting many households has meant an increase in familial/household tensions, and in desperate measures to keep afloat financially - both of which feed risk-taking and illegal types of behaviours (White, 1989a). As is often the case with community 'care', the state has assumed the dominant role in community 'coercion'. State police powers, for example, have been extended in areas of monitoring and surveillance through the expansion of such 'community' schemes as Operation Noah and Neighbourhood Watch. A corporatist type of framework is evident in this sphere as well. For example, the development of Neighbourhood Watch schemes is based upon bringing together three main players: the state (in the form of the police); business (in the form of insurance companies); and community (in the form of the property holders). Recent analysis of such schemes points to the ways in which they expand the power of insurance industry as a force of social regulation (O'Malley, 1989), and raises major issues relating to accountability and democracy at the local level.

Another aspect of the regulation and control of informal community activities is the use of 'welfare' measures, as well as 'police' measures, to establish conformity and public order. This is perhaps the most evident in the case of measures directed at young people in Australian society at the moment. With unemployment and poverty affecting a significant number of young working class people, the state has intervened in several different ways to exert its authority over youth behaviour and attitudes. The regulation of young men and young women is being undertaken via state programs and benefits administered by government and non-government agencies (e.g., Job Search Allowance, Young Homeless Allowance), and by stepping up the surveillance and control of young people at school, on the street and in any social space they may claim as their own (see White, 1989b, 1990).

As in the case of the other two spheres of resource allocation (i.e., the market, the state), the informal community sector has been subjected to increasing state intervention and the exercise of direct state authority in instances where no formal representative bodies are taking responsibility for 'care' or 'coercion'. This is evidenced primarily in increases in police department personnel, the extension of surveillance and monitoring powers of the police, and the political backing provided for greater police presence and involvement in different spheres of public and private life.

5. CORPORATISM, IDEOLOGY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Corporatism as a form of ideological and political relationship, and corporate management as an administrative model, share a number of things in common. Perhaps the most notable of these is the concentration of power into the hands of relatively few people, a significant proportion of whom are members of a hierarchically-ordered institution or organisation. The main beneficiaries of this sort of decision-making process are those who directly participate in talks (if only because such high profile positions are further sustained and legitimated by participation of this kind); those who stand to gain particular benefits from being involved as powerful players in the process; and ultimately, the stability of the system as a whole.

The centralisation of state power, to the detriment of representation and accountability structure that express interests beyond those of capitalist profit and state bureaucratic control, raises serious questions about democratic rights and processes. Recent structural transformations in the form of the state have been described by Poulantzas (1978) as being aspects of the trend toward 'authoritarian statism'. According to Poulantzas, trends involving the capitalist state include such phenomena as a growth in repression and the use of real and symbolic violence, the playing up of authoritarian themes such as 'law and order', the concentration of real power in governmental and administrative structures, and the shift in formal state power away from parliament to unelected bodies. He also points out the growing distance between political democracy and socio-economic democracy. That is, large sections of the population are not only disenfranchised from the economy and adequate living conditions, but their participation in the institutions of political democracy is increasingly fragile as well.

It can be argued that such trends are not transitory in nature. They are indicative of much deeper transformations in **the form of the state**, and they stem from pressures associated with contemporary international economic processes. To put it differently, the politics of the Accord, of corporatism, and of corporate management, are 'hegemonic' at this point precisely due to support provided by and the requirements of the dominant sections of capital; furthermore, they have been shaped by wider economic developments that necessitate approaches that will assist in the maintenance of public order and capitalist social relations.

One of the major outcomes of these developments has been a general de-mobilisation of workers and community action groups against capitalist austerity, even while at a formal institutional level there has been increased participation by sectoral representatives in tripartite and broadly-based corporatist types of bodies. Another result has been the seizure of initiative by the state in regards to the imposition of bureaucratic control over both community organisations and individual welfare recipients. Autonomous, politically active groups need to secure wide support for their actions if they are to have any chance of generating resistance to the imposition of further state controls. With 'consensus', 'pragmatic realism', and technocratic 'solutions' the catchphrases of the day, this has proved very difficult to achieve.

One of the intentions of this paper has been to raise a number of questions and issues relating to the functioning of the welfare state in a period of economic and political uncertainty. It has been argued that recent changes in political structures at the level of market relations, state welfare activity, and informal community activity, have tended to consolidate the power of the state over the less powerful in Australian society. This shift in the form of state power has been to the benefit of capital, both in terms of economic return and with respect to the maintenance of public order and social stability.

Given present developments, alternatives to 'authoritarian statism' need to be seriously considered. These alternatives would have to include the setting up and fostering of institutions of 'dual power' - that is, alternative institutions and countervailing forces formed alongside existing formal institutions and traditional political and industrial organisations, and which can offset any rise in state power. Already examples of these kinds of forces have been evident in the Tasmanian elections and in the activities of many of the new social movements. However, if real and fundamental change is to occur, the question of 'state power' will need to be linked to the crucial issue of 'class power'. For the extension and protection of democratic rights and freedoms, and the politicisation of debates over 'human needs', will require concerted class struggle - in the marketplace, within the context of the welfare state, and at the local neighbourhood level.

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