

Is Political Islam a work in progress? From Islamic Social Movement to Substantive Political Islam: The Political Trajectory of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam

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Is Political Islam a work in progress? From Islamic Social Movement to Substantive Political Islam: The Political Trajectory of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam

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**Dissertation in completion of requirements
of PhD Degree,
for the School of Humanities & Languages,
Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences
University of New South Wales**

Submitted 05/09/17

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The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the development of political Islam in Indonesian politics by employing a social movement approach to study the political trajectory of Indonesia's oldest and largest Islamic student movement Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), The Islamic Students Association. For the last 30 years, the alumni of HMI have risen to become the most influential political actors in Indonesian political life. However, unlike other Islamic organisations in Indonesia that have influence in the country's political life, there is a dearth of research in the extant literature on HMI and its domination of Indonesian politics. To carry out this research, a review of the development of the political thinking of the Kaum Santri, commonly translated as the 'Pious' Community of Indonesia, was first undertaken as it is from this community that HMI was spawned. This study is subsequently divided into a prism of three sections. In the first section, it is shown that as a socio-political community, the Kaum Santri, through its thinkers, organisations, politicians and public officials occupy the role of maintainers and developers of political Islam in Indonesia. So, the origins of Islamic political thinking in Indonesia, its subsequent inception and development by the Kaum Santri are discussed. The development of Islamic political thinking from a 'scripturalist' outlook to that of a 'substantive' one and its affect on political Islam in Indonesia is addressed. In addition, due to its similarities, a comparison to the current development of political Islam in Turkey is analysed. The second section of this dissertation then examines how the legacy of Kaum Santri Islamic political thinking has influenced HMI and in turn HMI's influence on Indonesian politics. The dissertation demonstrates that through the adherence and implementation of its variant of political Islam, HMI has been successful in the infiltration of its alumni within the corridors of power — including the army, bureaucracy, inside political parties as well as in Government departments and bodies which has led to the increasing 'santrification' of political life in Indonesia. However, in line with the social movement approach, as the practice of oligarchical democracy and decentralised clientelism have consolidated Indonesia's post-Suharto political landscape, whereby personal wealth and/or the ability to access state resources determine political influence, the final section evaluates whether the success HMI alumni have had through its infiltration of Indonesian politics, has translated to a success for the cause of political Islam in Indonesia and helped enrich Indonesian political society in general.

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Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the development of political Islam in Indonesian politics by employing a social movement approach to study the political trajectory of Indonesia's oldest and largest Islamic student movement *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI), The Islamic Students Association. For the last 30 years, the alumni of HMI have risen to become the most influential political actors in Indonesian political life. However, unlike other Islamic organisations in Indonesia that have influence in the country's political life, there is a dearth of research in the extant literature on HMI and its domination of Indonesian politics. To carry out this research, a review of the development of the political thinking of the *Kaum Santri*, commonly translated as the 'Pious' Community of Indonesia, was first undertaken as it is from this community that HMI was spawned. This study is subsequently divided into a prism of three sections. In the first section, it is shown that as a socio-political community, the *Kaum Santri*, through its thinkers, organisations, politicians and public officials occupy the role of maintainers and developers of political Islam in Indonesia. So, the origins of Islamic political thinking in Indonesia, its subsequent inception and development by the *Kaum Santri* are discussed. The development of Islamic political thinking from a 'scripturalist' outlook to that of a 'substantialist' one and its affect on political Islam in Indonesia is addressed. In addition, due to its similarities, a comparison to the current development of political Islam in Turkey is analysed. The second section of this dissertation then examines how the legacy of *Kaum Santri* Islamic political thinking has influenced HMI and in turn HMI's influence on Indonesian politics. The dissertation demonstrates that through the adherence and implementation of its variant of political Islam, HMI has been successful in the infiltration of its alumni within the corridors of power — including the army, bureaucracy, inside political parties as well as in Government departments and bodies which has led to the increasing '*santrification*' of political life in Indonesia. However, in line with the social movement approach, as the practice of oligarchical democracy and decentralised clientelism have consolidated Indonesia's post-Suharto political landscape, whereby personal wealth and/or the ability to access state resources determine political influence, the final section evaluates whether the success HMI alumni have had through its infiltration of Indonesian politics, has translated to a success for the cause of political Islam in Indonesia and helped enrich Indonesian political society in general.

Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations, non-English terms and key organisations cited

<i>Abang</i>	Lit. ‘elder brother’, hence sometimes ‘patron’.
<i>Abangan</i>	Nominal Muslims upholding syncretistic mix of pagan animism and an Islamic veneer.
<i>Adat</i>	Traditional laws in West Sumatra
<i>Agama</i>	Monotheistic religion with belief in the existence of One Supreme God, a holy book, a prophet, and a way of life for its adherents.
<i>Ahadith</i>	Verified statements or accounts of something done by the Prophet Muhammad. (Plural of <i>Hadith</i> .)
<i>Akar kaju</i>	Stone age.
<i>an-Naskh wal Mansukh</i>	The abrogated and the abrogating [Qur’anic verses].
<i>Ansar</i>	Helpers of the Prophet Muhammad native to Yathrib (Medina).
<i>Aliran</i>	Faction, or stream of thought.
<i>Batik</i>	Traditional Javanese cloth.
<i>Bid’ah</i>	Innovations in Islam (a negative term used by <i>santri</i> Muslims).
<i>Bid’ah hasanah</i>	Good innovations in Islam (a positive term used by Modernist or Liberal Muslims).
<i>Cominsariat</i>	Entry level in the HMI.
<i>Dakwah</i>	Calling, educating and proselytising for Islam.
<i>Dalil ‘aqli</i>	Rational evidence in Islamic knowledge.
<i>Dalil naqli</i>	Transmitted evidence in Islamic knowledge.
<i>Demokrasi banyak keblasan</i>	Overworked democracy.
<i>Devletçilik</i>	State capitalist.
<i>Dwifungsi</i>	Dual function.
Episteme	Knowledge: a philosophical term derived from the Ancient Greek word ἐπιστήμη.

<i>Fatsun Abang</i>	Obedience to big brother [patron]
<i>Fatwa</i>	Ruling of qualified Islamic scholar.
<i>Fiqh</i>	Islamic jurisprudence.
<i>Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya)</i> <i>GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia)</i>	The Greater Indonesia Movement The Indonesian Christian Students Movement
<i>GMNI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional)</i>	Indonesian Nationalist Students Movement
<i>Had-had</i>	Islam's permanent rules and boundaries.
<i>Hadith</i>	Verified statement by, or account of, something done by the Prophet Muhammad.
<i>Hijab</i>	Modest clothing worn in public by Muslim women; the religious code that governs the wearing of the <i>hijab</i> .
<i>Hujjat</i>	Proof.
<i>Ibu pertiwi</i>	Love of the motherland (Indonesia).
<i>ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia)</i>	The Association of Muslim Intellectuals
<i>Ijma'</i>	Unanimous consensus of Islamic scholars.
<i>Ijtihad</i>	Logical deduction/opinion of an Islamic scholar from Islam's foundations.
<i>IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah)</i>	Muhammadiyah Students Association
<i>Jahada</i>	Hardship.
<i>Jalan</i>	To walk, move.
<i>JIB (Jong Islamiten Bond)</i>	Islamic Students Union
<i>Jihad</i>	Islamic military activity to defend or liberate Islamic territory.
<i>Jinn</i>	Spirits.
<i>Hanura (Hati Nurani Rakyat)</i>	The People's Conscience Party
<i>HTI (Hizb-ut-tahrir Indonesia)</i>	Liberation Party Indonesia
<i>Kaedah</i>	Alternative maxim/foundation/method.
<i>Kaffah</i>	Thorough/holistic
<i>KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia)</i>	Indonesian Student Action Union
<i>KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia)</i>	Indonesian Islamic Students Action Union
<i>Khalifah</i>	The political authority that ruled over the Muslims.
<i>Kolot</i>	Old Fashioned/conservative
<i>Kyai</i>	<i>Pesantren</i> religious leader.
<i>Kaum Santri</i>	The Pious/Orthodox Muslim Community.
<i>Khilaf</i>	Lit. error also a term to denote juristic

	differences among Islamic jurists.
<i>KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)</i>	General Elections Commission
<i>Laicism</i>	Secularism.
<i>Laïcité</i>	Secularism.
<i>Latihan Kader</i>	HMI members' training sessions.
<i>Maqasid as-Shari'ah</i>	Divine purpose of Islamic Law.
Masyumi	The Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council.
<i>Maha-kuasa</i>	All-Powerful [God].
<i>Maha-rief</i>	All-Wise [God].
<i>Maha-tahu</i>	All-Knowing King of the universe [God].
<i>Mazhab</i>	School of Islamic thought.
<i>Mencari proyek</i>	Looking for projects; clientelist reward system.
<i>MIAI (Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia)</i>	The Islamic Council A'la Indonesia
<i>Modernisasi Islam</i>	Islamic modernisation.
<i>Muhajirrin</i>	Muslims from Mecca who immigrated to Yathrib (later renamed Medina).
<i>MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia)</i>	Indonesian (Islamic) Scholars Council
<i>Mujtahid</i>	A Jurist of high caliber able to perform <i>ijtihad</i>
<i>Musyawarah</i>	Consultation.
<i>NDP (Nilai Dasar Perjuangan)</i>	Core Values of the Struggle
<i>NU (Nadhatul Ulama)</i>	The Renaissance of the Scholars
<i>Orde Baru</i>	New Order; Suharto dictatorship era in Indonesia.
<i>PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional)</i>	National Mandate Party
<i>Pancasila</i>	Five point secular nationalist creed of postcolonial Indonesia.
<i>PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang)</i>	Crescent and Star Party
<i>Pesantren</i>	Islamic boarding school in Java.
<i>PD (Partai Demokrat)</i>	Democrats Party
<i>PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia dan Perjuangan)</i>	Indonesian Democracy and Struggle Party
<i>Piagam Jakarta</i>	The Jakarta Charter
<i>PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia)</i>	Islamic Students Indonesia
<i>PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)</i>	National Awakening Party
<i>PK/PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)</i>	Justice and Prosperity Party
<i>PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia (P</i>	The Indonesian Communist Party
<i>PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia)</i>	Indonesian Islamic Students Movement
<i>PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa</i>	The Indonesian Catholic Students

<i>Katolik Republik Indonesia)</i>	Association
<i>PPP (Partai Persatuan Perbangunan)</i>	United Development Party
<i>Politik abang-abang</i>	Patron politics.
<i>Priyayi</i>	Colonial era Indonesian aristocracy.
<i>PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)</i>	Indonesian Socialist Party
<i>PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia)</i>	The Islamic Union Party of Indonesia

<i>Qathi</i>	Absoluteness of text and meaning.
<i>Reformasi</i>	Reformation or post-Suharto era in Indonesia.
<i>Riwayat</i>	Transmitted doctrine.
<i>Santri</i>	Orthodox devout Muslims.
<i>Shar'iah/Sjari'at</i>	Islamic law.
<i>Shu'rah</i>	consultation between rulers and masses
<i>Sirath</i>	Path
<i>SMI</i>	Social Movement Industry
<i>SMO</i>	Social Movement Organisation
<i>SMS</i>	Social Movement Sector
Sultan	Literally 'the one in authority'; synonymous with <i>Khalifah</i> .
<i>Sunnah</i>	Verified accounts of the Prophet Muhammad.
<i>Surau</i>	Islamic Boarding schools in West Sumatra
<i>Taqlid</i>	Blind imitation/following an Islamic scholar or school of thought.
<i>Tariqth</i>	Way.
<i>[Jamaah] Tarbiyyah</i>	The congregation for Islamic) Education
<i>Tradisi fatsun abang</i>	Obedience to big brother [patron] tradition.
' <i>Ulama</i> '	Islamic scholars.
<i>Ulum ad-Diniyyah</i>	Religious science.
' <i>Ummah</i>	Global Islamic community.
<i>Ummatun wassaṭan</i>	Middle nation/nation of the middle way.
<i>Usul ul-Fiqh</i>	Principles of jurisprudence.
<i>Wadah</i>	Base.
<i>Zakat</i>	Tithe, alms for the poor

Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

This dissertation examines the political influence of one particular Islamic modernist Islamic social movement organisation — *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI — Islamic Students Association) — on Indonesian politics. HMI is an under-rated force in Indonesian political life. The present dissertation demonstrates that HMI has been successful in the infiltration of its alumni within the corridors of power — including in the army, the bureaucracy, inside political parties as well as in Government departments and bodies. In turn, this has led to Indonesian political life becoming increasingly '*santrified*', the process whereby the *Santri* political community of Indonesia's political ideas, policies and practices come to overwhelm national politics.

Research hypotheses

Social movement theorists advance several distinct paradigms for understanding and explaining the existence and behaviour of these movements. These competing approaches suggest organisational and political explanations for social conflict — thereby breaking sharply from the previous dominant approach focusing on psychological and behavioural factors (Gamson 1968; Tilly & Rule 1965; Zald & Ash 1966). Some of these theoretical approaches might contribute to an understanding of how and why one specific social movement — HMI — emerged, the circumstances in which collective political action by HMI has occurred, and the relationship between HMI, Indonesian political parties, and the State. The role of resources (both human and material), the level of individual and institutional support and numbers of conscience and beneficiary constituents, the longevity or otherwise of a Social Movement Organisation (SMO), competition for support and members by rival organisations, SMO income flow levels, the comparative size of the SMO and its degree of isolation and even

the amount of 'discretionary time' available to SMO members are arguably all factors in an SMO's development that warrant investigation. All of these factors will be addressed via the research hypotheses advanced herein. It will be demonstrated that a social movement analysis has much to contribute to understanding the historical cultural and political evolution of HMI and its current condition.

This dissertation therefore seeks to explore a number of research hypotheses, to explain the behaviour and development of HMI. The hypotheses are given below. These hypotheses are based on scholarly hypotheses first developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977) for understanding social movements through a resource mobilisation approach. The significance of McCarthy and Zald's hypotheses to this dissertation is that, as will be elaborated in chapter 3 and 7, this dissertation argues that from HMI's initial beginnings to its growth and consolidation as a major contributor to Indonesian political life, the movements success is best assessed by analyzing HMI's development within the orbit of societal support, resources, level of dependence and its relationship with the state and state regimes. As McCarthy and Zald (1977:1213)

'The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements.'

The hypotheses will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 3 herein and in the dissertation's Conclusion, which will compare the social movement theories stated in Chapter 3 with the realities of HMI as a particular social movement, which will itself be examined throughout the dissertation. Through investigation of the research hypotheses and the organizational development of HMI, it will be seen that the latter functions as a rather distinct form of social movement.

Hypothesis 1: As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics

increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to HMI has increased. This hypothesis will be investigated in the course of the present dissertation.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the absolute amount of resources available to HMI, the greater the likelihood that new student movements will develop to compete for these resources. This hypothesis will also be investigated in the course of the present dissertation.

Hypothesis 3: McCarthy and Zald (1977) posit that, regardless of the resources available to potential 'beneficiary adherents', the larger the amount of resources available to 'conscience adherents', the more likely is the development of student movements that respond to preferences for change. Contrary to this understanding, it will be argued herein that that HMI has in practice steadily abandoned any conscience-based foundation.

Hypothesis 4: The more a Social Movement Organisation (SMO) is dependent upon isolated constituents, the less stable will be the flow of resources to it, concluding that the more an SMO depends upon isolated constituents to maintain a resource flow, the more its shifts in resource flow resemble the patterns of consumer expenditures for expendable and marginal goods. Contrary to this understanding, it will be shown that HMI leaders communicate to their members and alumni using personal, informal channels.

Hypothesis 5: An SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organisation is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict. It will be shown that, alternatively, for HMI, sources of 'tension and conflict' flow from quite different, less idealistic sources.

Hypothesis 6: Older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI (Social Movement Industry) growth and decline. It will be shown that the well-established HMI has indeed persisted and prospered successfully throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline.

Hypothesis 7: The more competitive a SMI is, the more likely it will be that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies. It will be seen that HMI's competitors offer comparatively narrower goals and strategies.

Hypothesis 8: The larger the income flow to a SMO, the more likely it will be that cadre and staff are professional and tend towards being one of the larger such groups. The present dissertation will establish that HMI's professionalism also arises from sources other than mere large-scale fundraising.

Hypothesis 9: The larger the SMS is, and the larger the specific SMIs, the more likely it is that SM careers will develop. It will be demonstrated that HMI — a large organisation and network — has indeed fostered the SM careers of a great many persons. However, it will also be seen that this has perhaps not occurred in the manner that it might operate in other SMOs.

Hypothesis 10: The more that an SMO is funded by isolated constituents, the more likely it is that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes, rather than for organisational work. It will be demonstrated that, while HMI's fundraising methodology at least opens the door to the corrupt use of SMO resources, HMI's beneficiary constituent workers are apparently recruited for strategic purposes, rather than for organisational work.

Hypothesis 11: The more a SMO is made up of workers with discretionary time at their disposal the more readily it can develop transitory teams. It will be seen that the student movement HMI is very able at selecting transitory teams which build greater

networks with powerful members of Indonesia's elite and political and bureaucratic community.

Dissertation plan

Chapter One concentrates primarily upon an historical exposition of Political Islam in Indonesia, including the role of nationalism in Indonesian Islamic religious and political thinking. The rise of political *Alirans* (factions, or streams of thought) in early Twentieth Century Indonesia is discussed and the importance of one such faction — the *Santris* — is demonstrated. Current tendencies in Indonesian Political Islam are outlined and the future role of Islam in Indonesian politics assessed.

Of necessity, this dissertation's first two chapters set the historical and theoretical background to modernist Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Chapter One also states the dissertation's research hypotheses.

Chapter Three theorises a social movement approach for understanding HMI, while Chapter Four discusses Islamic political thinking and its legacy on Indonesian Islamic social movements.

Chapter Five looks at the transition from Islamic Modernism to Neo-Modernism by a section of Muslims (the *Santri*), and how the political thinking of this group has affected the cause of Political Islam in Indonesia.

Chapter Six examines whether Substantive Political Islam is only isolated to Indonesia, by comparing political developments in Indonesia on the part of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkey, which might reflect a shift towards Substantialism.

Chapters Seven and Eight examine HMI directly. Chapter Seven introduces HMI's theory of 'Substantive Political Islam' and shows how this has played out in practice. Chapter Eight looks at HMI as a case study whereby HMI's role and influence on Indonesian political culture is summarised. Chapter Nine is a critique of Substantive Political Islam's function since its inception within Indonesian political systems. Chapter Ten then draws final conclusions for the dissertation as a whole.

The dissertation proves that the evolution of Political Islam in Indonesia has led to its 'capture' by vested interests over time. Like all other political factions in Indonesian politics, HMI has fallen victim to the pursuit of money and power that the system promotes.

On Political Islam

According to Fuller, even the most common political behavior can take on an Islamic guise in the Muslim world. Fuller argues that Political Islam as an expression of political activism should be viewed from the process of the goals and objectives of political actors. These actors in political Islam, whom Fuller terms 'Islamists', are defined by him as those who believe 'that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion'. Fuller contends that Political Islam is by no means monolithic and that the policies and behavior of Islamists range from those who follow a literal and narrow reading of Islam's holy book the Qur'an and the traditions (*Sunnah*) of the Prophet Muhammad to 'those who interpret Islam in a more modern or liberal sense' (Fuller, 2003: xii).

It is important to note that this definition by Fuller is more inclusive than that given by other academics in the field. In agreement with Fuller's definition is Mohammad Ayoob,

however, Ayoob concedes that Fuller's definition lacks analytical utility and considers more practical Guilian Denoeux (2002:61) explanation of Islamism as 'a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition'. Thus, both writers allow for greater inclusion of what can be considered within the realm of Islamism and by default political Islam as an expression of its activism.

In contrast, for Noorani the term 'Islamism' of which 'the Latin suffix attached to the Arab original more accurately expresses the relationship between the pre-existing reality (in this case a religion) and its translation into a political ideology' (Noorani, 2002: 68). This is supported by Fealy, who describes this ideology as 'the application of Islam to society, state, culture and the economy, through strict application of *Shari'ah* (Islamic law)¹ to order society according to Islamic principles (Fealy & Borgu, 2005:13). Evidently, focusing on (state) power and law, Noorani and Fealy continue in the tradition of Olivier Roy's contention (1994:9-10) that 'in the Islamic political imagination there is not liberty but justice' by way of power through *shari'ah*. Such literature explains why there has been a focus on analysis that draws attention to socio-political narratives and the reactionary tendencies towards modernity as the reason for political Islam. It may be due to the fact that the lenses through which most of these narratives are being deconstructed, as Volpi (2009:22) admits, is done so through 'western concepts and methodologies'.

However, the work of Salwa Ismail (2006) attempts to move beyond the above metanarratives by arguing that 'Islamism' can be 'used to encompass both Islamist politics as well as re-Islamination, the process whereby various domains of social life are

¹ *Shari'ah* literally means 'a non-exhaustive source' which in Islamic discourse refers to the Qur'an and *Sunnah* as a source for all laws.

invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions' (p.2). The relevance of Ismail's argument is that it opens the possibility that labels such as 'Islamism' or even 'political Islam' itself can develop beyond the rubric of ideology, *shari'ah* and power. That is why for this dissertation the definition of 'Islamist' and 'political Islam' as argued by Fuller is a more accurate reflection of the kind of dynamics that have taken shape in Indonesia since the beginning of the Twentieth Century. As Fuller defined above, Political Islam in Indonesia has never been a monolithic entity, and ranges from the 'literal' to the 'liberal'. However, in Indonesia the thinking, activism and constituency of Political Islam has been the legacy of certain identifiable communities in Indonesia, known as *Kaum Santri* (The Pious Community), which will be defined and discussed later in the present chapter. However, let us first define 'Islam' in Indonesia and its strength in that country's political society.

Political Islam has been a formidable force in Indonesian political life, yet it has never been able to capture state power. However, the forces of Political Islam in Indonesia are strong and have been able to continually re-invent themselves in the face of many challenges and obstacles put before them. Political Islam's strength comes from its constituency, networks and affiliated organisations, whose reach had been the most extensive of all political orientations in the Indonesian archipelago for many decades (Hefner, 2000: 43).

Islam in Indonesia; The *Aliran* Model

Approximately eighty-five per cent of Indonesia's population professes the Islamic faith, with the majority following the Sunni branch of Islam (Azra, 2004).² However, in the past not all of its adherents observed beliefs and practices found elsewhere in the Islamic world (Woodward, 2001: 31) and many local beliefs, rituals and customs were incorporated alongside other more universal Islamic ones. Geertz's study of the Muslim

² Mainstream Islam is divided into two major sects, Sunni Islam and Shi'a Islam and in Indonesia it is the former that has long been institutionalized in the archipelago for over three centuries (see Azra, 2004)

community in Java of the 1950s classified three distinct '*Aliran*': the *Santri* (pious Muslims); *Abangan* (nominal Muslims, who upheld a syncretistic mix of pagan animism, with a veneer of Islam), and *Priyayi* (the aristocratic class) (Geertz, 1976: 5-15).

Lanti, on the other hand, notes that academics have criticized Geertz's initial findings as being both simplistic and a generalization of communities in Java and of Indonesia in general. Scholars have been accused of leaving out the non-Muslim communities such as the Chinese, Protestant Christians, Catholic and Hindu communities, many of whom, such as in Ternate, live in districts neighbouring Muslim areas. Furthermore, in terms of political orientation the *Aliran* model excludes the Chinese and Catholic communities, who were well known to have developed their own political cultures. Nevertheless, Lanti argues that with these reservations in mind, many scholars agree that the '*Aliran*' model has and can still be used primarily as the location from where this research into the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia and its role can begin (Lanti, 2004: 67-68, Baswedan 2004: 670).

The *Santri* of Indonesia

The focus of this study centres on the current tendencies of the *Santri* community, as it is they who have represented the Islamist faction in Indonesian politics since the struggle for national independence in Indonesia at the beginning of the Twentieth Century began (Fuller, 2003: xi).³ It is important to note that the term '*Santri*' — which was originally a Javanese word used to refer to students who study at a *Pesantren* (Islamic Boarding School) in Java — was broadened and generalized by Geertz. Samson's research would further extend the use of the word to describe not only communities, but also a political culture and distinct political orientations within Indonesian society at large (Samson, 1971-72: 549). The *Santri* communities were considered by the larger

³ The definition of 'Islamist' is taken from Graham Fuller as 'one who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion'.

society as being the religiously orthodox and pious communities, as their beliefs, rituals and customs were less syncretic and the form of Islam they practiced was an institutionalised one that could be traced back to the established *Sunni* institutions of Islam in Mecca and Cairo.⁴ The importance of the Cairo connection for Islamic modernism in Indonesia will be explored in Chapter 3.

The origins and evolution of Islam in Indonesian politics

As the most populous Muslim country in the world, the role Islam plays in Indonesian politics has been — and continues to be — an important topic of interest for local and international scholars. Much has been written since the movement for independence from colonial rule began at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, and Islam through its representations has been a formidable force in Indonesian political affairs. A clear reflection of this argument can be seen in the amount of research that has already been conducted since Indonesia gained its independence over seventy years ago.

To begin with, it is important to first locate the origins of Indonesia's Islamic political community and of the political developments that have occurred since the struggle for independence began. As an archipelago, Indonesia incorporates a multitude of people of various ethnic backgrounds, speaking a multitude of languages and dialects, practicing many local and imported religions, customs and traditions. The rise of Islam in Indonesia as a social movement transformed Indonesian society as the influx of ideas came into the archipelago due to the colonial government's adoption of the 'Ethical Policy', which was inaugurated in 1901. As Benda explains, the creation of a Western-educated native population exposed them to modern political ideas such as nationalism and was a major factor in helping to solidify the struggle for independence and national

⁴ The city of Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula houses the holiest site in Islam, the Ka'bah, which is not only a hub for ritual devotion but also for religious intellectual activity (see Noer, 1980). Whereas Cairo houses one of the most well-known Islamic Universities in the Islamic world, al-Azhar University, where students from around the world enrolled to be trained in the various Islamic sciences (see Abaza, 1994).

sovereignty. Moreover, it was also unsurprising that much of this movement towards independence attracted the establishment of a modern state — based not on the old model of kingship and clergy but, like much of the political activism in Europe at the turn of the Twentieth Century, on a sovereign nation-state ruled by a national government (Benda, 1983: 35-40).

In the archipelago at the time there was, as in Europe, an established educated class that advocated secularism as the political future for the nation. For the archipelago, this educated class was represented predominately by the aristocracy (*priyayi*) and *abangan*, largely residing in the heartland of the colonial administration on the island of Java (Scherer, 1985). United as they may have been towards the struggle for independence, these advocates were by no means monolithic in terms of ideology and policy. These revolutionaries subscribed to the many models of governments being advocated in Europe at the time, from liberal democracies (Hering: 1985) to socialist (Legge, 1988) and communist forms of governments (Groves, no date).

In contrast to the advocates of secular forms of government, but in line with their quest for national independence, there was also a powerful bloc that advocated for a nation-state based on the teachings of Islam. As Noer and Benda indicated, these advocates were also by no means monolithic in both their outlook and policies, as some advocated a more theocratic style of government while others a more inclusive state, sensitive to the archipelago's multi-ethnic reality. Furthermore, like the secularists they too imported their ideas, in their case mainly from the Middle East, while also borrowing some modern political concepts — such as the nation-state, modern parliament and democracy — from the West.

Beginning from the Twentieth Century, thus, there has always been a political force representing and protecting what it perceives to be the interest of the Muslim community (*'ummah*) with regards to the affairs of state. However, Benda has argued

that this political force was a small faction within a much larger Islamic movement developing at the time in the Indonesia. At the beginning, this movement was predominately a socio-religious trend — but one in which the momentum for independence gained speed, particularly with the expulsion of the Dutch at the onset of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia. From that point, the movement became increasingly political. This culminated with the transformation of the Islamic movement's peak body Masyumi (The Consultative Council of the Indonesian Muslim Community) from an advisory body to the Japanese occupying forces into a national political party after the cessation of hostilities with the Dutch forces in 1949. Masyumi will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

The *Santri* community and politics

In the world of Indonesian socio-political life, this representation of so-called 'Islamic interests' has and continues to be organised and articulated by groups and thinkers who belong to the *Santri* community of Indonesia. As previously stated, this community is by no means monolithic either in its thinking, which will be elaborated further in chapter 4, or its practice. However, their commonality was that all the various organisations and groups that sprang out of this community claimed to have Islam as their inspiration, using Islam as their symbol for action (Muchtarom, 1975: 143-44; Riklefs, 2012: 81-85, 268-71).

With the birth of political activism in Indonesia at the turn of the century, the Sarikat Dagang Islam (Union of Islamic Traders) has been noted as constituting the first politically orientated *Santri* organisation. It was initially formed in 1912 as a lobbying group towards the colonial government in order to address the interests of Muslim *batik* (traditional Javanese cloth) traders against their Chinese rivals. Establishing itself first in the city of Solo in Central Java, it soon expanded to many cities throughout Java and beyond. Under the leadership of Oemar Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim, Sarikat Dagang Islam evolved from being just an organisation that represented traders. The

group was swept up in the movement for national independence and dropped the term *Dagang* or Traders from its name to Partai Sarikat Islam (PSI — Islamic Union Party) (Benda, 1983: 42-48) — often shortened to simply SI. SI will also be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Other organisations also crucial in creating the *Santri* political orientation were established shortly after SI, with the most important according to Noer and Benda being the Muhammadiyah in 1912. The significance of Muhammadiyah was not its political activism but rather its role in Islamic revivalism, as it aimed to purify Islamic beliefs and rituals as well as establishing social services such as schooling and hospices as an alternative to those run by Dutch missionaries. Those involved with Muhammadiyah, like many other civil associations at the time, often held memberships in multiple groups and so some also belonged to political groups that were Islamically-oriented (Alfian, 1989). Furthermore, it was the reaction towards Muhammadiyah by the old guard of Islam that was of greater significance than the grouping itself at the time. Muhammadiyah's quest to purify and reeducate the *Santri* community was one of the reasons that led to the formation by the established scholarly class at the time of NU or *Nadhatul Ulama* (The Renaissance of the Scholars)⁵ in 1926 (Noer, 1973: 126).

Muhammadiyah's work to purify Islam from the beliefs and practices that they considered un-Islamic was part of a wider trend developing in the archipelago at the time. Thus, in Java Muhammadiyah became the vanguard of a wider religious movement dubbed by Noer as 'Islamic Modernism'. This movement was at loggerheads with the established Islamic hierarchy of the day, namely those scholars that ran the many *pesantrens* in East Java. They became known as the traditionalists, with NU as their chief organisation. Over the course of time, however, the momentum for national independence would see these two orientations unite under a coordinating body. This

⁵ '*Ulama*' (pl) are scholars of one or more Islamic disciplines. The Nadhatul Ulama (Awakening of Scholars) is an organisation that turned into a political party in Indonesia during the first decades of Indonesian independence.

body would first unite along with the secular nationalists against the Dutch during the war of independence of 1947-1949, and later against the secular nationalists in parliament, to work for establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia from 1949-52 (Boland, 1971).

Islam in Indonesia: religion and nationalism

With the founding the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, the role of Islam in modern national political life became a subject of concern in both the academic and political world. A theme running through Gordon P. Means's (2009) study is his suggestion that politics and Islam have reciprocally interacted throughout Indonesia's history. The young Republic consolidated itself with the withdrawal of Dutch claims to the archipelago by 1950. Immediately, the polemic of the basis of the new republic resurfaced, with Indonesian society being divided between proposals for an Islamic State ruled by Islamic *Shari'ah* or alternatively for a secular state based on the *Pancasila*⁶ — a doctrine that recognises the importance of religion in Indonesian political life, without conforming its laws and policies to any one religion, including Islam (Means, 2009: 3).

The situation came to a climax, and by 1952 several provinces dominated by Islamic-minded provincial leaders rebelled against the Jakarta Government, beginning in West Java with the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by Kartosuwiryo that was joined by the provinces of Aceh and South Sulawesi, who insisted that Indonesia become an Islamic State (Dijk, 1981). Within Government the two largest Islamic factions, the Masyumi Party and Nadhatul Ulama Party, continued to strive for the conversion of Indonesia into an Islamic State, as well as to insert into law the abandoned 'Jakarta Charter' of 1945 that obliged Muslims to abide by *Shari'ah*. The importance of this, cannot be

⁶ '*Pancasila*' meaning five principles: belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice.

understated, Robin Bush (2009:53-55) in her extensive study on the NU describes how even with the growing estrangement and competition between the two *santri* camps during this time, the issue of the basis of the state and the 'Jakarta charter' was one in which both sides had unanimity.

The first decade of the Republic was to be a turbulent one, with stagnation and decline being the predominant features of the period. During this time, two national referendums were held to finalise the long dispute issue concerning the basis of the state. At stake was whether Indonesia would remain a *Pancasila* state or become an Islamic one. Both referendums resulted in stalemates. Furthermore, this period witnessed between 1950-57 a total of six governments holding office, only to be dissolved one after the other, due to the inability of Members of Parliament to approve legislation and policy needed for the governments to function. By 1959, it all came to a head, with Indonesia's first President Sukarno suspending parliament and replacing it with his authoritarian control under his system of 'guided democracy'. The system was one based not on elections but on representation by different Indonesian political parties, so long as they conformed to Sukarno's policies. As a result, further insurrections broke out, this time led by leading members of Masyumi and also the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), as well as sections of the armed forces, known collectively as the PRRI Rebellion against Sukarno's increasing dictatorial rule (Means, 2009: 68-69).

By 1960 the Darul Islam and PRRI rebellion had largely been put down and the largest Islamic party within parliament, Masyumi (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council), was outlawed by Sukarno for its part in the rebellion against the Jakarta Government (Samson, 1968: 1003). Thus, by 1966, Indonesia's *Santri* Islamist cause was largely doomed, as Indonesia's second president Suharto, coming to power during a period of civil unrest, was able to curb all opposition. Suharto marginalised the role of Islam in politics by forbidding the return of Masyumi, and threatened any subversion to the unity of the Indonesian Republic with sheer force of arms (Samson, 1968: 1002; Lanti,

2004: 27). Eventually, the Suharto regime curbed all political and ideological dissent by forcing the merger of political parties in 1973, and the forced adoption of the secular state doctrine *Pancasila*⁶ by all organisations in the country by 1985 (Liddle, 1996; Means, 2009: 65).

It has been argued by van Bruinessen and Baswedan that Indonesia's Islamist factions then either went underground or focused their resources on Islamic '*Dakwah*' (calling, educating and proselytising for Islam) (van Bruinessen, 2002: 117; Baswedan, 2004: 673). Apart from this, Hefner argues that some of the new generation of *Santri* began to nurture a different approach from the old guard. Funded and encouraged by the Suharto regime, these new *Santri* promoted a more pluralistic and contextual approach to Islamic thinking, popularly referred to as 'neo-modernist Islam'. They were disillusioned with their predecessors' 'preoccupation with winning state power', which 'led them to neglect the long legacy of civility and independent association in Muslim civilisation and Indonesian society'. They espoused an agenda that aimed to take Islam out of Indonesian politics without removing it from Indonesian political life (Cone 2002: 54-58; see also: Barton, 1995, 503). In the past, the *Santri* division centred on religious rituals, with the NU following a traditionalist *Aliran* approach and Masyumi adopting a Modernist *Aliran*. In 1955, being pro-Shari'ah and Islam-statist united both *Alirans* and their respective political parties in a similar political posture. Suharto's forced adoption in 1985 of the *Pancasila* for all political and social organisations contributed to successfully marginalising the Islam-statist and pro-Shari'ah faction (Means, 2009: 65). Thus, with neo-modernist Islamic thinking, a new dimension to the role of Islam in political life had been added (Saleh, 2001: 678).

The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, and the national elections of 1999, led to what many analysts consider to have been the only free and fair election in Indonesia, since the Republic's very first election in 1955. Analysts recognised the resurgence of Islam in Indonesian politics during these elections, as almost half the competing political parties

were openly or implicitly Islamic. Even though the response to these parties by the electorate was quite dismal in 1999, compared to the elections of 1955, analysts still note the importance of Islam in Indonesian political life (Means, 2009: 292; Fealy, 2001: 132; Woodward, 2001: 30; Baswedan, 2004: 684).⁷

Current tendencies

Thus, the *Santri* camp of Indonesian society has resurfaced with greater complexities and competing legitimacies since the downfall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. The *Santri* political aspirations of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary liberal democracy period has again entered the open public domain (Feith, 1962: 135). However, unlike Masyumi and the NU of the 1950s, the contemporary political thinking of the *Santri* camp ranges from support for an Islamic State to support for the total secularisation of politics.

Tanthowi has labelled this current trend in *Santri* politics as being a growing pluralism in the way *Santri* politics is being conducted. The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy need not be viewed as a further fragmentation of the *Santri* political community nor of disarray in current *Santri* political thinking and practice, but rather a blossoming of pluralism that adds wealth to Indonesia's political capital in general. Moreover, it is envisioned that this pluralism will help to keep Political Islam in Indonesia from stagnating and becoming fossilised in its thinking and practice (Tanthowi, 2005: 225).

However, as the last point suggests, the type of activism by the post-Suharto *Santri* political community is unlike the political Islam of the 1950s, which was heavily dominated by the ideas of Masyumi and its leader Muhammad Natsir (d1993). The

⁷ Although two parties, PPP and the PKS still acknowledge Islam in their party constitutions, the words 'Islam' or 'Muslims' do not appear in any of the 'big four' Muslim-based parties — PKS, PPP, PKB, PAN and the lesser PBB. Other smaller parties who hold to Islamic lexicons do not pass the 2.5% election threshold needed to compete in elections.

source of Natsir's political thinking, his influence on later Islamic thinkers and legacy to Political Islam in Indonesia will be further discussed in chapter four. In contrast, current *Santri* communities do not come with an ideological objective and thus, in reference to Fuller's model of political Islam (see footnote 2), Indonesia's contemporary Islamists possess the traits that Fuller has identified. Therefore, a more localised and practical terminology has been given to the make-up of contemporary *Santri* politics in Indonesia that serves to elaborate on Fuller's more general model.

Although the ideological challenge of making Indonesia an Islamic State has not been at the forefront of any political discussion, there was in the year 2000 lobbying in parliament led by parties that officially claimed themselves to be Islamic, particularly the PBB (Moon and Crescent Party) and PPP (United Development Party) to have the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) reinstated into the constitution. In practice, this would have meant adding to the first principle 'Belief in One God', the phrase with 'the obligation of the Muslim community to abide by Islamic Law' (*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Sjari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*).

Currently, many actors are engaging in the role of Islam in Indonesian politics from the *Santri* community on various platforms, from NGOs and civil society groups to political parties. In formal politics, some have openly declared themselves to be Islamic such as the PKS, PPP and the PBB, while others that have not still have as their basis constituents coming from *Santri* circles such as the PKB and PAN. Moreover, like Tanthowi, Baswedan argues that *Santri* politicians no longer confine themselves to political parties set up by *Santri*-affiliated associations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, but also fill up the ranks of other major political parties in Indonesia such as Golkar and PDI (Baswedan, 2004: 678). The soundness of Baswedan's 2004 argument is further supported by the ascent of *Santri* politicians, primarily from the *HMI*, during the presidency of Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono between 2004 – 2014 which will be analysed in chapter seven and the subsequent presidential election that followed between Joko

Widodo and Prabowo Subianto in chapter eight.

However, as recent studies have confirmed, since the departure of neo-modernist Islamic thinker and former HMI chairman Nurcholish Madjid (d2005) whose political thinking, influence on contemporary Islamic thinkers and legacy to HMI political culture will be further discussed in chapter 5 and 7, not much has been said or written regarding the position or policies that would distinguish *Santri* politics from others as in the past. Thus, since those first elections after the fall of the New Order regime, the role of Islam within Indonesia's political system has become increasingly symbolic. Lanti's study of the first general election in 1999 and his argument of the re-emergence of Indonesian politics along *Aliran* lines did not predict that the increasing loss in future elections would only be visited upon *Santri* parties (Lanti, 2002: 227).

However, Tanthowi's and Baswedan's models of *Santri* politics can provide us some clues as to what has been occurring in terms of political activism. *Santri* politicians no longer confine themselves to traditional *Santri* constituents and parties and have become less bipartisan in their approach to politics. It is the aim of this research to study whether this new pluralism has any common theme or political objectives behind it other than Madjid's ideal of Islam being the 'moral and ethical platform' that these politicians claim to conduct themselves by.

Nevertheless, the patronage to Islam is still strong by way of its symbolism in Indonesian public life, especially in the political arena. Moreover — and at times more influential than the political parties that are seen as coming from the *Santri* camp — non-party Islamic pressure groups continue to have an impact in the way politics is being conducted in Indonesia, such as the government-funded *MUI* (Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) *fatwa* (religious edict) of 2005 against Religious Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism, as well as the passing of the 30th October 2008 *Pornography Bill* by the government.

Conclusion

Thus, since the country's beginning, Islam has always had a role in Indonesian politics. In fact, PSI, the archipelago's first mass based political party, used Islam as its national symbol. The *Santri* communities in the archipelago took up this Islamist mantle. The developments, political outlook and articulation of *Santri* communities arguably still remain their concern.

As a result, this research aims to analyse what are the current tendencies of the *Santris* and what is seen as Islam's role in politics today. Not since Natsir led a movement to make Indonesia an Islamic State have the *Santris* had a clear political goal, nor has there been an alternative perspective put forward as to the current policies that are of primary concern to *Santri* politics. Thus, what is the future role of Islam in Indonesian politics?

Chapter 2: Research on the political influence of Islamic organisations on Indonesian politics and the significance of this study

This chapter assesses the principal literature available on the appearance of modernist Islamic thinking in Indonesia. After very briefly citing the origins of Islamic modernism in the Islamic lands, the chapter will outline how some Indonesian Muslims took up these ideas, seeking to adapt them to Indonesian conditions, with differing levels of success. The chapter closes with a brief comparative examination of the work of a contemporary organisation, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI — Islamic Students Association).

Studies of Islamic modernism

Ahmad Syafii Maarif traces the emergence of modernism in Islamic thinking to the efforts of such figures as Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani', Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad 'Asad — especially in the commitment of all to 'socio-educational reforms'. Despite political divergences, all these men advocated the use of human reason to facilitate a return to a way of life based on the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* (verified accounts of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad). The emphasis generally placed by Islamic modernists of the use of reason matches the emphasis that most place on consultation between rulers and masses — or *Shur'ah* in Qur'anic terms — leading some to support forms (or aspects of) democratic functioning (Maarif, 1983: 62-78).

Maarif observes the 'Muslim hostility' and 'hatred' of Muslim Indonesians for the Dutch colonisers, who attempted to assert control over the entire archipelago for some three and half centuries. In some regions, most notably in Aceh, this resulted in ongoing violent resistance (*jihad*) or in the withdrawal of Javanese Muslims to rural areas, led by the conservative religious scholars, especially those of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) rather than submit to direct rule by non-Muslims (Maarif, 1983: 80-86). NU's almost passive initial

response was indicative of the movement's traditionalism, based on the solid bedrock of a network of mostly rural Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), in which the *kyai* (*pesantren* religious leader) reigned supreme, being regarded as virtually infallible. Needless to say, within such a claustrophobic atmosphere it was 'almost impossible to develop and stimulate' independent minds (Maarif, 1983: 79-86), making it effectively 'impossible to expect from this learning system' that it could develop Muslims' 'creative inner faculties ... capable of dealing positively, and with full responsibility, with the problems of man in light of the Qur'an' (Maarif, 1983: 93-94). Emblematic of this mind-set, Maarif cites Zuhri's definition: 'Islam cannot be modernized. A modernized Islam is no longer Islam', adding proudly: 'Islamic modernisation (*modernisasi Islam*) has never touched upon the gate of the *pesantren*' (Zuhri, 1980: 616, 618, cited in Maarif, 1983: 91, 92).

Maarif paraphrasing his own mentor Fazlur Rahman (d1988), asserts that to counterposes conservative '*ulama*' [*Islamic scholars*] and practices, the modernist goal was 'intimately approaching the Qur'an' to the point where man's 'inner faculties' are refined 'in such a way that all the knowledge gained by him will become organic to his total creative personality (Rahman, 1967: 315, cited in Maarif, 1983: 94). Trapped in a narrow study to merely memorising the opinions of a few derivative Islamic scholars, he argues, *pesantren* students were incapable of reaching such creative pinnacles. On the other hand, Indonesian modernism remained flawed by its inability to develop a wide-ranging analysis, based on a thoroughgoing Qur'anic investigation, that could serve as a comprehensive alternative (Maarif, 1983: 94-97).

Despite having had a significant impact on the political culture of the country, not a great deal of scholarly research is available on the role and influence of Islamic organisations in Indonesia apart from Indonesia's two of the largest Islamic organisations the *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU) and the *Muhammadiyah*. With reported memberships estimated at thirty million and twenty million respectively, the two

organisations represent at times competing, as well as uniting, aspirations within the Muslim communities of Indonesia. On NU, the most significant contemporary analysis was completed by Robin Bush. Her 2002 dissertation entitled *'Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia, the case of Nahdlatul Ulama'* focuses on its long and active history in Indonesian political and social life, culminating in its *'kembali khittah 26'*, Return to the Guidelines of 1926 movement which under its late chairman Abdurrahman Wahid, led NU's emergence as a pro-civil society watchdog towards the state. The study also explores how under Wahid's leadership, the NU was reawakened from political marginalization to a powerful political force climaxing with Wahid's ascendancy to the presidency. Another, less relevant study to this dissertation is Su'aidi Asy'ari's (1999) *'The role of Muslim groups in contemporary Indonesian nationalism; A study of the Nahdlatul Ulama under the New order, 1980s-1990s'*, which focuses on the development of NU as a vehicle for the protection and promotion of the interests of 'traditionalist' Muslims in Indonesia' to its role in the formation and consolidation of Indonesian nationalism including its significant role in resting the country's long disputed *Asas Tunggal*, 'Sole Basis', when it finally succumbed to the nationalist *Pancasila* state ideology over Islam.

With regard to the Muhammadiyah, much more literature is available and this is likely due to its standing as an urban based organisation whose main cause has been the purification of the Muslim community through education. Interestingly, research into Muhammadiyah's role and influence in Indonesian politics has waned since the latter part of the twentieth century. During this period Alfian's (1989) study entitled *'Muhammadiyah: The political behavior of a Muslim modernist organisation under Dutch rule'*, explores how, as an overtly non-political organisation, it responded to Dutch colonialism in relation to its support for Indonesian nationalism and independence. Another important study is Syamsuddin's (1991) *'Religion and politics in Islam: The case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order'*, which importantly for this dissertation has similar themes as it concerns itself with Muhammadiyah's struggle to

reconcile its Islamic political thoughts with Suharto's New Order regime at a time when Islam continually being 'depoliticized'. Syamsuddin's research culminates by analyzing the successes and failures of Muhammadiyah's response through its policy of 'allocative politics' which is described as 'political activity that attempts to instill certain values within the framework of the state ideology that enjoys a national consensus'. Furthermore, Syamsuddin introduces a new concept into modernist Islamic political thought, that 'substantive political Islam, when he claims that 'allocative politics' 'observes the substantivist mainstream of Indonesian political Islam, while absorbing the modernist paradigm of modern Islamic political thought'. (Syamsuddin, 1991:237).

Other important contributions to the field are Howard Federspiel's investigation into Persis (Persatuan Islam — Islamic Union) and Deliar Noer's (d2008) (1963) *The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942)* provides an extremely useful overview of the beginnings of Islamic modernism in Indonesia. Supplemented by more recent works that stand on its shoulders, such as Yudi Latif's (2008) *Indonesian Muslim: Intelligentsia and Power*, Alfian's *Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: the Muhammadiyah Movement during the Dutch Colonial Period (1912-1942)*, and Barbara Harvey's (1996) 'Diplomacy and Armed Struggle in the Indonesian National Revolution: Choice and Constraint in a Comparative Perspective', it provides a handy roadmap to the emergence of modernist Islamic movements in Sumatra and Java.

The Minangkabau factor

Concentrating his analysis initially in the Minangkabau area of West Sumatra, Noer locates the dual origin of Islamic modernism in Indonesia in both the Minangkabau and in thinkers from the Arab community, 'as embodied in the movements Persjarikatan Ulama, Muhammidjah [Muhammadiyah], and Persatuan Islam' (Noer, 1963: 45), he underlines the existence of an enduring connection between the Minangkabau and

'*ulama*' trained by contemporary modernist Arab scholars, and with the eminent al-Azhar institution in Cairo, headed by Muhammad 'Abduh between 1877 and 1879. 'Abduh became Mufti (supreme Islamic authority) of Egypt in 1899.

Minangkabau Islamic modernism did not result in a single united conception, as might be expected, since this was an atmosphere seething with ideas, which saw 'a competition between *ulama* of varied opinions' (Noer, 1963: 64). Despite this, schools established by this broad movement at first found it difficult to move beyond the limited traditional curriculum: the study of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), memorisation of the principal *fatwa* of scholars from the four Islamic schools of thought ('rather than the understanding of how these *fatwas* were produced'), and the study of the Arabic language (Noer, 1963: 67). The initial system of instruction was, from all accounts, extremely haphazard. The nationally renowned Indonesian Islamic Scholar Hamka (Professor Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, d1981), a product of one of these schools, notes that there were 'no desk, no chair, no slate, no chalk. All sat on the floor' and the curriculum made little distinction between students' ages or levels of learning (Noer, 1963: 68).

Influenced by modern schools in the Arab Middle East (and sometimes in Europe) that they attended, some Indonesians who had studied abroad gradually introduced reforms into Indonesian schools upon their return home. Fearful of losing students to Dutch colonial schools, the latter's format also influenced the traditionalist Islamic schools. Counselling by a Dutch colonial adviser, the orientalist Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch established a number of government schools that were officially neutral in matters of religion. Christian missionary schools also existed (Noer, 1963: 65ff).

Yudi Latif sees the Thawalib school as 'the most influential reform school'. Explaining how its founder, Abdul Karim Amrullah ('Hadji Rasul') returned home in 1906 after

seven years in Mecca, Latif explains how Hadji Rasul ‘forcefully attacked local customs’ and the system of West Sumatran traditional laws based on them (*‘adat’*) ‘for their deviation of true Islamic doctrine’. From 1916 he introduced a modern system of ‘graded classes and classroom teaching’, to convey what he believed was the true Islamic knowledge, ‘as well as general subjects’. Travelling to Java, he established contact with Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah, becoming the latter’s ‘main propagandist’ in West Sumatra upon his return. Similar work was done elsewhere in West Sumatra by Djaluddin Thaib, Zainuddin al-Junusi, M. Djamil Djabat, Ibrahim Musa, Latif Sjakur, M. Thaib Umar and Mahmud Junus (Latif, 2008: 81).

By 1919 the Sumatera Thawalib (literally: Students of Sumatra) organisation had emerged in the Padang Pandjang region of the Minangkabau, soon growing to incorporate an important school in nearby Parabek. The latter school stood on the shoulders of the Muzakarul Ichwan (Conference of Brothers), which met weekly and briefly published a periodical, *Al-Bajan*. In 1920, Noer shows, the Sumatera Thawalib and the Muzakarul Ichwan combined in one united organisation, under the rubric of Sumatera Thawalib. Other, neighbouring, schools were incorporated into the movement before long. Importantly, this expanding movement was determined to utilise modern teaching methods and materials, importing textbooks from Egypt for this purpose. Advanced senior students were also given texts by the prominent Islamic reformer Ibn Taymiyya (d1328) to study and any religious matter of community concern could be discussed (Noer, 1963: 69-72). The Muslims’ minds were being widened.

Perhaps inevitably in the circumstances — and given Islam’s nature as an all-embracing system — the students and teachers of Sumatera Thawalib developed a growing interest in political matters. Abdul Moeis, a central leader of the organisation Sarekat Islam (to be discussed below), was a native of this area, which he visited often ‘for propaganda purposes’ (Noer, 1963: 71-73).

Sarekat Islam

Sarekat Islam (SI — also known as Syarekat Islam) was the first nationwide political organisation established in Indonesia (Alfian, 1969). SI was an openly political Muslim organisation. Descended from an organisation established to protect Indonesian traders from Chinese businessmen favoured by colonial authorities, in 1912 this transformed itself into Sarekat Islam (SI), led by H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, who believed that Islam was the 'binding factor and national symbol' that would lead Indonesians to independence. (SI did not proclaim this objective until 1917, however.) At least initially, SI reflected al-Afghani's approach, while Muhammadiyah continued to follow 'Abduh's, although both organisations aimed at the complete 'Islamisation' of Indonesians. Under Tjokroaminoto's leadership, SI argued forcefully for independence (Maarif, 1983: 122-24).

SI spread quickly in all sectors of society, even recruiting in Javanese villages, accruing over two million members in a few years (Maarif, 1983: 125-26). W. F. Wertheim remarks that the enthusiasm of peasants for the new organisation demonstrated that the rural aristocracy 'was gradually losing its grip upon Javanese society' (Wertheim, 1965: 233, cited in Maarif, 1983: 126). Dutch authorities responded to this looming threat to their rule by decreeing SI's dismemberment, such that only SI's individual branches had legal existence, and collective action by the whole organisation was thereby illegal. SI sought to counter this via a legal maneuver, but the decree had weakened it, and a new enemy profited from this — Marxist radicals, who infiltrated SI branches (Maarif, 1983: 124-35).

In 1914 Indonesian Marxists were initially organised in the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV — Indies Social Democratic Organisation), which later renamed itself the Partai der Komunisten Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party), before settling on the name Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI — Indonesian Communist

Party) in 1920 (Vlekke, 1960: 358, cited in Maarif, 1983: 135). Communism was brought to the Indies by a small cell of Dutch Marxists, led by H. J. F. Sneevliet (Maring). The Marxists made contact with left-wing elements inside SI, successfully converting them to Marxism. By 1920 the PKI had been formed, led by one of the SI Marxists, Semaun. In a systematic campaign, the PKI set about undermining SI's leadership and bringing its membership under their influence. Their success was spectacular, and the PKI was even headquartered in the Semarang branch of the SI, with many other branches (the 'Red SIs') also succumbing to the infiltrators (Maarif, 1983: 135).

Sarekat Islam was fatally weakened by the communist infiltration and it never regained its former strength. Maarif suggests that the enfeeblement was not merely organisational, but above all ideological, since the Muslim leaders of SI were unable to meet the intellectual challenge of the PKI's leadership. Furthermore, the communists had the advantage of being able to point to a successful communist revolution in Russia. SI now lost its position as the pre-eminent anti-colonialist party of Indonesia's masses. Even assurances by SI leaders such as Tjokroaminoto and Salim that the SI was socialist, since Islam is 'naturally' socialistic, could not prevent many departing the Muslim organisation. All SI's pro-communist members split from SI, now openly adhering to the PKI (Maarif, 1983: 135-40).

SI soon faced a new challenge — this time from secular nationalists in the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI —Indonesian National Party) founded by Sukarno on 4 July 1927, demanding national independence, but insisting on secularism (Maarif, 1983: 140-42). Noer explains how a section of Sarekat Islam around the individual Datuk Batuah were accused of being influenced by Communism, providing an excuse to the Dutch, in turn, to restrict the Thawalib and ban several Padang Panjang teachers from teaching (Noer, 1963: 73-74). A 1927 communist-inspired anti-Dutch uprising in Silungkang, West Sumatra, and a related Communist uprising in Banten, Java, during the same period, shook colonial authorities, who already referred to the nearby Kota Lawas as a 'little

Soviet'. Nevertheless, the Dutch realised that the central inspiration of the insurrectional movement lay in the Islamic Padang Panjang, noting with concern that the PKI-influenced Sarekat Rakyat already boasted 660 members by late 1924 (Schrieke, 1928: 109, 113; Kahin, 1963: 69).

Barbara Harvey remarks that the split of the PKI elements from Sarekat Islam in 1921 resulted in many branches of the latter forming a new organisation, Sarekat Rakyat. Some — including religious teachers — even moved from Sarekat Islam to the PKI (Harvey, 1996: 72; see also: Benda, & McVey, 1960: xv-xvi). She adds:

Sarekat Rakyat members were nearly as prominent as PKI members in the abortive 1926-27 revolts in Banten and West Sumatra, if arrest records are an accurate indication of involvement. Kiai played a notable role as leaders of the rebellions in both areas (Harvey, 1996: 72).

Some calm returned to the Minangkabau Islamic reformist organisations after the repression of the 1926-27 events. Reformist Islamic leadership in the Padang Panjang Thawalib was strengthened by the return of students from Egypt who joined the teaching staff 'and began to direct the institution into the political field' (Noer, 1963: 77).

John Richard Bowen observes the difference between Thawalib and Muhammadiyah schools — which became 'sharper' after Thawalib transformed itself 'into the more explicitly nationalist political party Permi (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslims)' at Thawalib's Congress, in Padang Panjang in 1930 (Bowen, 1993: 60, footnote 25). At its 1932 Congress Thawalib formally changed its name to the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or simply Permi PMI) (Kahin, 1999: 53).

Permi

A nucleus of Permi had already been formed the previous year by the party's initiators. The 1930 Congress decision represented the endorsement of this course by Thawalib as a whole (Noer, 1963: 79). Permi 'soon became the strongest and most influential political party in West Sumatra'. Ideologically, Permi upheld both nationalism and Islam (Kahin, 1999: 53). Thawalib had in the vicinity of 1,300 students in 1930, hailing not only from the Minangkabau, but from Malaya, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, as well. Many of these students imitated their teachers, by joining established Islamic organisations (especially Muhammadiyah) and continuing to propagate modernist ideas wherever they were in Indonesia (Noer, 1963: 78-79).

Nonetheless, these swiftly moving organisational, theoretical and ideological developments also highlight the heightening differences between the Thawalib/Permi and consciously less-political organisations such as Muhammadiyah. In the 1930s, Bowen observes:

Thawalib teachers accused Muhammadiyah of neglecting political activity, while Muhammadiyah suspected Thawalib of diluting religious activities with political concerns, and even having lingering pro-Communist sympathies (Bowen, 1993: 60, footnote 25).

So far, the schools discussed were all schools open to instruct young males, although the political movements mentioned had both male and female members. In 1915 a new development occurred, when the Djinijah school for girls was established (Noer, 1963: 80).

Muhammadiyah and Islamic Modernism

The insights offered by Alfian and Federspiel focus on the period before and/or up to independence. Alfian's (1969) 'Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics: the Muhammadiyah Movement during the Dutch Colonial Period (1912-1942)', is important,

as it relates the trials and tribulations of 'Islamic reformism' in the early part of the Twentieth Century. Alfian's (1969) study is an historical piece that importantly outlines the birth, rise and subsequent prominence of Muhammadiyah in Indonesian politics during this period.

Maarif cites various Indonesian Islamic modernist movements, concentrating primarily upon the largest and most influential, Muhammadiyah. Officially eschewing 'politics', Muhammadiyah strongly impacted upon the consciousness of its students, who themselves become involved in politics. Muhammadiyah was very successful in spreading modernist Islamic ideas, developing social and economic (primarily educational and welfare) projects throughout the archipelago. With Dutch colonial officials not realising that the Muhammadiyah schools were inculcating hatred of colonialism among their students, the organisation was able to function without much interference from the former. But unlike the rote learning typical of the *pesantren*, Muhammadiyah schools utilised Western educational methods, developing 'well-balanced' persons imbued with both religion and science. Muhammadiyah founder K. H. A. Dahlan — who had studied in Arabia — was inspired by 'Abduh's and al-Afghani's socio-religious ideas, according to which Islamic education must be modernised before the *'ummah* could be reconstructed to meet the challenges of the modern age. Favouring the unadulterated Qur'an and Sunnah, he shunned religious innovations. Dahlan was wary of the traditionalist *'ulama'*, whom he suspected were riddled with superstitions, which caused Muslims' 'hearts to be fossilized'. The movement began operating in 1912 (Maarif, 1983: 97-112).

The core themes presented in Alfian's assessment of Muhammadiyah's struggle during this period are anti-colonialism, independence and moderation, all of which are inseparable to the organisation's broad reform agenda. With regards to the first theme, Alfian importantly distinguishes the birth of Islamic modernism as originating separately to that of secular nationalism in Indonesia. It was the colonial government's 'Ethical

Policy' that allowed all these ideas to flourish, unlike the mindset of secular nationalist, Islamic anti-colonial reformism, which was rooted in the ideas of late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century Islamic thinkers Jamal-ul-Deen Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. All of these thinkers were concerned with both internal reform as well as political reform in the Muslim world.

In contrast, secular nationalists looked to modern European ideas of nationalism and socialism and to pre-Islamic ideas for the inspiration of their struggle. Alfian provides the reader with an insight into the discriminatory behaviour and policies of the Dutch administration during this period, especially towards Muslims, as well as the socio-economic hardship facing the colony at the time. Thus, the idea arose of self-empowerment and preservation, through countering the colonial government's discrimination towards Muslims in education (which Alfian details, citing primary evidences from victims) and missionary work, by establishing modern schools and hospitals, helped solidify its anti-colonial outlook.

On the issue of independence, Alfian refers to Muhammadiyah's split from Sarekat Islam. The result was significant, as it meant that Muhammadiyah was no longer the arm of a political party and could set out its own political strategy and vision under its own leadership. Thus, lastly, as an independent organisation Muhammadiyah was distinguished from other Islamic modernist groups in that its politics was never confrontational. Ironically, this at times put them at odds with other anti-colonial groups, since the former was often open to compromise and thus more moderate. Alfian's research was complemented by a 1978 study by Peacock: *Purifying the Faith: The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam*. In Peacock's latter study, Muhammadiyah's role in national development through its socio-educational programs is placed alongside its vision to reform Islamic thinking and practice. Peacock's assessment is an anthropological study, and so his analysis is not confined to a specific time period. Interestingly, both studies observe Muhammadiyah's pragmatic approach

to furthering its cause.

This pragmatism, which has become the traditional approach of Muhammadiyah with regards to politics and policy, is the focus of M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin's (1994) *Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order*. This latter study provides the historical background surrounding the politicisation of Islam, and establishes its origins and traditions. However, like Alfian and Noer, Syamsuddin uses a narrative grounded on an Islamic modernism prognosis. In Din Syamsudin's estimation:

Islamic political thought is the result of Islamic philosophical inquiry into the nature and role of government as it relates to the pursuit of religious and worldly affairs, and in its relation to social change and revolution in the Muslim world. In this context, socio-cultural reality influences political ideas, and political ideas have a role in the emergence of political culture (Syamsudin, 1991: 11).

Syamsudin observes that Muhammadiyah is 'officially, a non-political organisation'. Nevertheless, he adds:

its activities do have political implications. This leads to the interesting hypothesis that Islamic ideals can be achieved without having to be linked to an Islamic political vehicle (Syamsudin, 1991: 12-13).

Importantly however, Syamsuddin not only reflects on Muhammadiyah's pragmatism but also the changing relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesian society. Through Syamsuddin, we learn that this pragmatism is based on four political objectives:

(1) the revitalization of Islamic culture in order to prepare a groundwork for Islamic polity, (2) the politicization of Islam through its involvement, though indirectly, in practical politics, (3) the "depoliticization" of Islam in the sense of a withdrawal from practical politics, and (4) the repoliticization of Islam, by exercising allocative politics (Syamsuddin, 1991: 222).

Syamsudin defines Muhammadiyah's 'allocative politics' as 'political activity that attempts to instill certain values within the framework of the state ideology', by 'the

instilling of Islamic principles into the process of political development based on Pancasila' (Syamsuddin, 1991: 237-38).

Such a model also explains the developments in Islamic political thought and its affect on Indonesian society under the Suharto regime, which experienced strong levels of economic growth and national development. Muhammadiyah has had impressive impacts upon ordinary Indonesians. Maarif asserts, however, that Muhammadiyah was only able to change the condition of the Muslims comparatively superficially. Lacking a holistic vision, it was only able to affect peripheral matters, and quite unable to provide the comprehensive intellectual leadership required (Maarif, 1983: 112-22).

Persis

Howard H Federspiel's *Persatuan Islam (Persis): Islamic Reform in Indonesia*, describes a radically different approach to the themes of anti-colonialism and independence. Moreover, Federspiel's account of its confrontations with Muslims from different sects, as well as with Christians and secular nationalists, provides an insight into a movement with a more aggressive approach to reform. This approach could explain why in the past Persis members had greater representation and influence in practical politics, when Indonesia first experimented with a liberal democracy during the first decade of the republic, as opposed to Muhammadiyah, who were later more effective in furthering the 'political goals of Islam' under the more repressive Suharto regime.

Another interesting aspect of Federspiel's study is the profile and analysis of Ahmad Hassan, the chief figure responsible for Persis's particular Islamic orientation. Unlike Alifan's profile on Muhammadiyah founder Ahmad Dahlan, which focuses on the formulation of the latter's activism, Federspiel's (1966) analysis centres on Hassan's Islamic epistemology — thus allowing us an insight into the formula used by Persis to interpret the political issues of the time in accordance with Islamic texts or what is known in Islamic law (*Shari'ah*) as *ijtihad* (Federspiel, 1970: 59-60). (*Ijtihad* itself is

discussed below, in Chapter four herein.)

The Japanese interlude

Social and political pressures of the Dutch colonial authorities intensified during the 1930s and into the 1940s. Many Indonesians — especially ‘the leaders of the *umma*’ — consequently found themselves sympathetic to the Japanese invasion of March 1942. Japanese forces remained in the Dutch West Indies until 1945. Seeing the widespread attachment to Islam by ordinary Indonesians, the invaders adopted the intelligent approach of cultivating support among the leaders of the *‘ummah*, with the aim of securing their support for Japan’s war aims. The tactic worked — although not always as the Japanese expected. Certainly, leading Muslims participated in the occupation administration, gaining valuable political experience that had previously been denied to them (Maarif, 1983: 150-56):

The hierarchical order maintained during Dutch rule among the administrators was thus knocked down. The separation between church [sic] and state practically came to an end. Islam obtained a privileged position in the political system in which, next to the secular administration, a religious apparatus had been created. The Japanese thus brought about a fundamental change in the traditional method of governing, by the increase of power in Islam (Aziz, 1955: 206, cited in Maarif, 1983: 154).

Muslim administrators developed precious self-confidence in the administrative and political abilities through this experience. At least as valuable, in the light of the later need to physically resist the Dutch return, was the opportunity to obtain modern arms training and form armed Muslim militia units, the *Hizbullah* and *Sabillah* (Maarif, 1983: 150-56).

The Japanese, understandably, hoped they could control and manipulate the Muslim leaders. It is probably true that these Muslim leaders ensured co-operation by ordinary Indonesians with the Japanese that would not always have been so easily obtained by the Japanese acting by themselves. And yet the Muslim leaders tried to work on their

own terms, for their own ends, as much as possible — refusing to bow to the Japanese deity Tenno Heika, for instance (Maarif, 1983:155).

In September 1937 Muhammadiyah had already joined with some other modernist Muslim groups to jointly found an umbrella organisation, the *Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia* (MIAA —Islamic Council A'la Indonesia), to oppose encroachments by the Dutch on Muslim rights. MIAI ultimately represented the fruit of growing co-operation between modernists and traditionalists, as NU joined the MIAI in 1939 (Menchik, 2013: 21).

MIAI was never permitted to function fully by Dutch colonial authorities. To curb anti-colonial tendencies among the Muslims, between 1942 and 1943 the Japanese dissolved the MIAI, transforming it into a new Islamic political party, the Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi — Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) (Maarif, 1983: 155). Both Noer and Menchik note that the coalition of Islamic organisations in MIAI was sustained in Masyumi (Noer, 1978: 244 fn. 106; Menchik, 2013: 22). Importantly, the Japanese took care to entrench the institutional structures of a 'proto-state', via their 'Department of Religion'. The end of the Japanese occupation in 1945 saw 'the Islamic organisations that had formed MIAI only seven years earlier became the governing religious authorities in the new state' (Menchik, 2013: 22-23). These organisations' control over the *Agama* Department, together with 'its penetration into every level of government' enabled it to 'shape the meaning of religion and its place in public life' (Menchik, 2013: 23). The department's tasks were defined as:

- 1) To make belief in the One and Only God an operative principle in public life.*
- 2) To be watchful that every inhabitant is free to adhere to his own religion and to worship according to his own Agama.*
- 3) To assist, support, protect and promote all sound religious movements (Boland, 1982: 108, cited in Menchik, 2013: 23).*

'*Agama*', it is worth noting is defined as 'a monotheistic religion with belief in the existence of One Supreme God, a holy book, a prophet, and a way of life for its adherents' (Abalahin, 2003: 121, cited in Menchik, 2013: 23).

Student activism: *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Islamic Youth Union)

Just as in the anti-colonial movements in Asia, students made a noticeable contribution and were present in many of the movements surveyed in the present chapter and the literature discussed within it (Weiss & Aspinall, 2012). Special mention must be made of one movement, however, which comprised entirely students and made memorable contributions to both Islamic modernism and to the Indonesian independence movement.

On 1 January 1925, young Muslim intellectuals at Dutch educational institutions inspired by Islamic modernism formed the *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB) in Jogjakarta. JIB's founders had previously belonged to *Jong Java* (the Java Youth Association). Jong Java had recently refused to hold lectures for its Muslim members, when this was proposed at Jong Java's seventh congress in December 1924. Jong Java already provided lectures for its members on Theosophy and the teachings of the Catholic Church (Kahfi, 1996: 114; *Serbasesjarah*, 19 October 2012). JIB published a magazine *Het Licht/An-Nur* (The Light), which emblazoned its front cover with the Qur'anic verse: 'They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah refuses except to perfect His light, although the disbelievers dislike it' (Qur'an, 9: 32). *Het Licht/An-Nur* fiercely opposed a rival magazine, *Bangoen*, which printed articles that the Muslims considered insulted Prophet Muhammad's wives. JIB activists co-organised a rally in Batavia with other Muslims to protest this affront.

JIB spread throughout Java and many other islands. In fact, it was Indonesia's first nationwide youth organisation (Kahfi, 1996: 116). Samsurijal, elected as the group's initial chairman, promised the first JIB Congress in Yogyakarta:

In the courses, lectures and debates that we hold, it will be sought as far as possible to enhance the understanding of the political especially from the Islamic point of view. But JIB will not join political action (Serbasejarah, 19 October 2012).

The modernist leader Agus Salim frequently conducted JIB's lecture courses, while JIB congresses also advocated Salim's modernist ideas (Kahfi, 1996: 119). Interestingly, Fred R. von der Mehden asserts that JIB was affiliated to the modernist political organisation Sarekat Islam (of which Salim was a leader) (von der Mehden, 1963: 194-95), although other scholars do not repeat this claim in their own accounts.

JIB members were initially recruited from students at secondary schools, advanced vocational schools, the College of Law in Batavia and from Bandung Technical College (Niam, December 2010: 305). JIB organised a number of branches, each of which conducted Islamic religious courses. The organisation was determined to engage the sense of brotherhood among educated Muslim youth from different regions of the archipelago. In 1931 JIB also opened two schools (Serbasejarah, 19 October 2012).

Syamsuridjal declared at the organisation's founding congress:

Almighty and Exalted Allah requires that we not only fight for our state and nation, but also for Muslims around the world. Only, as should be ... we always make room for nationalistic groups. In addition to this primary obligation, we shall fight for the Muslims entirely, because we Muslims are slaves of Almighty and Exalted Allah. And we only serve Him, the All-Powerful [Maha-kuasa], All-Wise [Maha-arief], All-Knowing [Maha-tahu] King of the universe. This is the principle that animates JIB (Serbasejarah, 19 October 2012).

JIB began a systematic study of 'Islam as a complete way of life', becoming the pre-eminent producer of modernist conceptions in the Indies, which later formed the leaders of several modernist organisations, including Mohammad Natsir, Mohammad Roem, Kasman Singodimedjo, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, and

B. C. Kartosoewirjo (Niam, December 2010: 304; Maarif, 1983: 142-45; *Serbasejarah*, 19 October 2012).

At its third congress from 23 to 27 December 1927, JIB discussed the issue of Islam, nationalism and ethnicity, from the viewpoint of Islam's love of homeland, nation and religion (*Serbasejarah*, 19 October 2012).

Together with all other Islamic organisations, JIB was suspended by the Japanese occupiers — only to later reappear in post-independence Indonesia, *circa* May 4, 1947, under the name of Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII — Indonesian Muslim Students) (*Serbasejarah*, 19 October 2012).

JIB considered that Islamic solidarity was the sole solution to social problems worthy of being pursued by young Muslim intellectuals (*Serbasejarah*, 19 October 2012). Niam remarks that 'the JIB developed into a self-confident organisation of young Muslim intellectuals' (Niam, December 2010: 304). This student organisation acted as 'an important catalyst for the transmission of political traditions from the first generation of Muslim intellectuals to the second generation of the Muslim intelligentsia' (*Serbasejarah*, 19 October 2012); it was 'the nucleus' of the future Muslim nationalist leadership (Husni, 1998: 2). The group was certainly an important early standard bearer of Islamic modernism — constituting the vanguard of modernist attempts to define Islam as an ideology (Husni, 1998: 1), and being the most important organisation to oppose the ideological Westernisation of the Indies through Western organisations (Kahfi, 1996: 113).

Emergence and rise of HMI

One contemporary Muslim modernist organisation, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI — Indonesian Students Association), has not only been able to maintain its

influence in Indonesian politics but also to overwhelm it through the work of its alumni. Interestingly, unlike the Muhammadiyah and NU, HMI has been able to do so without having a constituency to turn to for support. Rather, HMI success has been through the infiltration of its alumni within the corridors of power. This has included the army, bureaucracy, political parties as well as in government departments and bodies.

Although numerous academic studies on the HMI are available in the Indonesian language, much, if not all, have been written by HMI alumni, making objectivity and independence limited. However, this does not imply that transparency is missing, as literature on HMI by their alumni is often highly critical on the organisation. However, the shortcoming arises due to the fact that in such studies the criticism is internal, that is, from an individual alumnus's perspective, thus limiting its scope. The only known study conducted outside HMI circles is that of Victor Immanuel Tanja, (1982) *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di Tengah Gerakan-Gerakan Muslim Pembaharu di Indonesia* (Muslim Students Association: History and Position in the Muslim Middle Renewal Movements in Indonesia). Like many other later studies on the HMI, much of it focuses on the organisation's role as a student movement espousing Islamic modernist views on politics. Written at a time when the Suharto Government viewed Islamic organisations with suspicion, the study's findings do not address the role of its alumni in infiltrating the government structure, nor does it forecast its future domination of it. Tanja's main objective is to elaborate on the structure of the organisation and how it has confronted and adapted to change both as a student and religious organisation.

It can be argued that the significance of HMI's influence in the political scene has been overlooked since, as a student organisation, the life span of their members' activism ends with their graduation. However, the present dissertation contends that their influence extends beyond their time as HMI members and cadres. By the time of their departure from HMI many of them have already acquired an enlightened view of their

purpose as Muslims, graduates and citizens of Indonesia — a deep understanding of the political situation in the country, as well as the training and experience to further their cause and their careers in Indonesian public life.

Similar to the organisations analysed by Alfian and Bush, in terms of size and reach, as a student organisation HMI is significant, being the largest student organisation in the country (and probably the world), with over 100 branches spread out from West Papua in the far east of the archipelago, to its furthest western frontier in Aceh. Furthermore, having been in operation since 1947, the sheer number of alumni it has to its name and could add to its credentials would justify a study in itself. However, the present research focuses on the gains made by HMI in terms of its top-level influence. The present dissertation limits itself to investigating the influence Islamic political thoughts have had on its political culturing, how this is realised and how it practices politics. This thesis also examines what it is about the HMI that has led to their alumni's' domination in Indonesian politics. Lastly, it seeks to critically evaluate whether its alumni have by and large been captured by the State, or whether the former has contributed to the growing conservatism that Indonesia has been experiencing since the fall of Suharto in 1998.

The significance of this investigation is to understand how a student organisation without grassroots support has been able to maintain its influence in Indonesian politics throughout the Indonesian political landscape. In the tradition of Alfian's (1969) research on Muhammadiyah, Federspiel's (1970) work on Persis and Bush's (2009) study on the NU, this dissertation aims to fill a gap in the literature relating to Islamic organisations and their influence on Indonesian political culture. Moreover, with the increasing irrelevance of religious parties to the lexical discourse of Indonesian politics, an explanation as to how HMI has managed to dominate much of the political landscape in the last twenty years is timely.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the principal literature available on the appearance of modernist Islamic thinking in Indonesia. The origins of this modernism in other Islamic lands were outlined and the manner in which Indonesian modernist Muslims adopted these ideas discussed. It was shown that certain regions — West Sumatra's Minangkabau area and Java's Batavia (modern Jakarta), Banten, Semarang and Jogjakarta — were pivotal for the emergence of Islamic modernist individuals and organisations. Influence from modern schools and thinkers in the Arab Middle East were also seen to be important elements.

The chapter demonstrated that Western Sumatra's influential Thawalib School introduced modern educational methods, which later facilitated the work of crucial modernist organisations such as Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah. The former was explicitly political, while the latter was only indirectly so — yet had an important political influence.

The chapter also showed the significant effects of the Japanese military occupation during World War II, leading to Islamic modernists receiving both weapons training and direct experience in governmental administration. Japanese occupation policies led to the emergence of Masyumi and to modernist Islamic organisations becoming the governing religious authorities in the post-occupation state.

The modernist student organisation JIB was shown to be an important early standard bearer of Islamic modernism. JIB was shown to be an important, intergenerational, catalyst for the intergenerational transmission of political traditions. It formed the nucleus of the future Muslim nationalist leadership and constituted the vanguard of modernist attempts to define Islam as an ideology.

The chapter closes with a brief comparative examination of the work of a contemporary organisation, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI — Indonesian Students Association).

The next chapter will theorise a social movement approach to understanding the Himpunan Mahasiswa, theorising that HMI success has been through the infiltration of its alumni within the corridors of power. This has included the army, bureaucracy, and political parties, as well as government departments and bodies.

Chapter 3:

Methodology: Theorising a Social Movement Approach to Understand the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam

Introduction

Numerous paradigms are offered for understanding and explaining the existence and behaviour of social movements. These include resource mobilisation theory, cultural framing theory and Max Weber's and Émile Durkheim's interlinked conceptions of charismatic leadership, as well as the theorisation of the routinisation of the latter. In some respects, these (and other) theoretical approaches overlap each other. Yet each is nevertheless distinct in itself and thus tends to offer analyses that compete with other paradigms for validity and acceptance.

Evoked somewhat by the social and political upheavals from below in Europe and the United States in the mid-to-late Sixties, the various approaches that emerged were a sharp break from the previous dominant approach that focused on psychological and behavioural factors. Led by scholars such as William Gamson, Charles Tilly and Mayer Zald, the new theories switched attention to organisational and political explanations for social conflict, which saw social protests as rational, strategically calculating, politically instrumental action (Gamson 1968; Tilly & Rule 1965; Zald & Ash 1966).

This chapter will consider how some of these theoretical approaches might contribute to an understanding of how and why one specific social movement — the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam — emerged, the circumstances in which collective political action by HMI has occurred, and the relationship between HMI, Indonesian political parties, and

the State. It will be found that a social movement analysis has much to contribute to understanding the historical cultural and political evolution of HMI and its current condition. All this will be preceded by a necessary outline of HMI's structure.

HMI's structure

The function of HMI is to prepare tertiary educated students to become servants (*mengabdikan*) of the 'ummah and State and thus the primary activities of HMI are three. Firstly, it seeks to equip its cadres in the skills of organisation. Secondly, it strives to bring awareness of the role of the State, its functions and structure. Third, it upholds issues critical to the wellbeing and interest of the 'ummah and the nation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, activities related to the first two functions — those of organisational skills and State awareness — take precedence over public campaigns and protests.

Unlike other Islamic student movements such as PMII (Indonesian Islamic Students Movement) or Indonesian Muslim Students Movement (an Nahdlatul Ulama affiliate), IMM or Muhammadiyah Students Association (Muhammadiyah), KAMMI or Indonesian Students Action Union (Prosperous Justice Party affiliate) and GMII or Indonesian Islamic Students Movement (Hizbut Tahrir affiliate) that have centralised organisational structures, in HMI each branch functions autonomously. Nationally, HMI is divided into 3 tiers, the executive, branches and the *cominsariat* level. Beginning at the *cominsariat*, which is the supply tier, students are recruited from various tertiary institutions and are placed under the tutelage of branches. The size of HMI branches throughout the country varies according to the number of tertiary institutions at a given locality and the size of the given area's tertiary population. Thus, the capital city Jakarta has 3 branches and its surrounding districts Bekasi and Depok have one each (interview with Hariqo Wibawa Satria, 22 March 2013).

As mentioned earlier, branches function autonomously, and the only reprimand the

executive can place over a branch is if it fails to conduct a cadre-training program. Such a reprimand can demote the status of the branch to that of a mere affiliate. Leading politicians, bureaucrats and other public officials, often conduct HMI cadre-training sessions, as well as their seminars and conferences, a large proportion of whom are themselves HMI alumni. It is at these cadre-training sessions and subsequent seminars and conferences that HMI cadres are taught necessary organisational skills and learn about the various arms of Government and the structure of the State.

The executive is voted in through the ballots received from 101 branches throughout the country, and also functions autonomously. However, at this tier executive members receive the third and most illustrious cadre-training program (LK3). Each executive term sets the target of having its own mission statement or focus agenda. Government transparency and reviving the HMI tradition of publishing academic writing by HMI's members and cadres were the 2011-2013 executive's themes (interview with Hariqo Wibawa Satria, 22 March 2013).

With all other forms of agendas, activities and internal regulations, however, branches have the right to conduct themselves in the manner they see fit. Thus, in relation to regulations, it would not be uncommon to witness varying levels of conservatism and openness. From petty issues such as smoking and the wearing of tight jeans during cadre-training, to whether or not a branch allows students who belong to minority religious sects in Indonesia such as Shi'a Muslims or the Ahmadiyyah to become members, will be matters of concern for the branches in question. Thus, as long as the branches uphold the three stated functions of HMI they can set their own agendas.

HMI branches' autonomy has implications for hypothesis 8, already cited in Chapter 1, and to be examined later in the present chapter. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 8 — and in the context that HMI attracts large income flows — the organisation is able to interest large numbers of recruits and tend to imbue them with professional cadre

training. Moreover, this autonomy will explain HMI's diverse array of ideas, opinions and policies during their time as members as well when the alumni enter the public and professional sector.

Importantly noticeable though not officially present as part of the HMI structure is the obvious division among HMI members and Alumni between the 'intellectuals/academics' and the 'politicians/administrators' or what the present writer refers to as the two unofficial wings of HMI, that is the 'intellectual' versus 'pragmatic' wings. However, these two sometimes overlap, more so with those among the intellectual wing being wooed over to the pragmatic one. The case of Chicago University Alumnus professor Nurcholish Madjid (d.2005), a central figure in HMI intellectualism, who was also a member of parliament during between 1987 – 1997 and more recently the North Illionis University PhD graduate and former rector of Paramadina University Anies Baswedan, a nascent politician who was Minister of Education and Culture in 2014 -2016 and is currently Governor elect of Indonesia's capital Jakarta. As with the pragmatic wing, they refer to those members who from their time as member within the tier HMI tier system were attracted by HMI's organizational character and used their time in HMI to gain experience in the art of statecraft not only at a student level but also elevate them beyond branch or province to that of the national level (interview with Ciputat Study Group, 27 May 2012).

Having sketched HMI's basic organisational structure, it is now possible to consider the theoretical approaches that will help to explain how and why HMI emerged, the circumstances in which collective political action by the latter has happened, and the relationship between HMI, Indonesian political parties, and the state.

Resource mobilisation theory

Resource mobilisation (RM) addresses how people engage in collective action, and seeks

to identify the conditions under which people identify common concerns and join together in political movements to bring about change. This entails developing an understanding of how crucial resources — defined by McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1220) as ‘legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor’ — are mobilised, the mechanics of social movement organisation, and an organisation’s adherents, constituents and beneficiaries (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1212-41).

The RM paradigm is the principal theoretical approach for understanding the phenomenon of social movements within the social sciences. McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) and Oberschall (1973, 2004) founded this approach, with several other scholars subsequently seeking to improve and critique it, including Marx and Wood (1975), Perrow (1979), Jenkins (1983), Feree and Miller (1985) and Goodwin (2004).

What is a social movement?

Tarrow (1998: 4) defines a social movement as one that entails ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities’. But this is only a description of some aspects of such a movement in action, not an analysis of what its objectives may be. M. Diani’s definition is hardly more comprehensive, although it contains more detail:

a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity (Diani, 2000: 13, cited in Kavada, January 2003: 7).

McCarthy and Zald’s definition addresses the goals of a social movement, but does not address its *modus vivendi*:

a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1217-18).

It is suggested by the present author that all three of the above definitions are in some way deficient — albeit correct in defining the narrow areas they address. The above definitions need to be combined, in order to produce a comprehensive definition. It is asserted herein, therefore, that a social movement is a network of informal interactions between individuals and groups, a shared collective identity that engages in a political and/or cultural conflict entailing sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities, for the express purpose of changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.

It will be argued in this dissertation that HMI is a social movement organisation that maintains a very loosely structured network of individuals, with the capacity to mobilise a network of individuals and groups, including sustained interfaces with elites and authorities, with the aim of achieving changes in society and the latter's reward distribution system, that mesh with its broadly conceived Islamic ideology.

Analysing the recent social movement phenomena of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Halim Rane and Sumra Salem, (2012: 97-111) utilise diffusion theory to argue that these social movements for political reform and regime change were indeed facilitated to some extent by social media such as *Twitter*, *Facebook* and *WhatsApp*, by allowing activists to disperse details of unfolding events, and to access medical assistance. However, these two authors insist that mainstream mass media played the central role in informing and mobilising demonstrators — although it was via social media that the mass media was fed timely information and multi-media files about the protests. In Egypt, for instance, only 8 per cent of the population followed incidents online via social media, yet some 81 per cent followed them on state television, while a further 63 per cent relied on the cable channel *Al-Jazeera*. Perhaps significantly, the national level of *Facebook*

penetration in the region in fact varies approximately between 1 to 45per cent in December 2010 (Rane & Salem, 2012).

Furthermore, domestic factors and broader geopolitical contexts were immensely significant for the success or otherwise of the uprisings. An important supplementary role was played by NGOs and human rights groups, whose information dissemination and lobbying of Western powers helped to frame the uprisings as social movements for democracy and freedom. This analysis concurs with that of Alterman (2011) and Stepanova (2011), but run contrary to the research of those who have argued enthusiastically for social media's pivotal role in 'mobilizing, triggering, and momentum-maintaining role in the 2011 popular uprisings' (Brynen *et al*, 2012: 239).

Distinguishing between revolutions and uprisings, Rane and Salem (2012, 98) also observe that both 'revolutions and uprisings may similarly begin as social movements in response to similar conditions but they tend to evolve differently, specifically on account of how the ruling regime responds and how both the protest actions and the state response is perceived by the broader social, cultural and political environment'. Rane and Salem thus demonstrate how across the Arab region, results have been distinctly different from each other, as Arab regimes and Western powers have managed to limit some social movements to the uprising stage, although some movements of the Arab Spring have arguably developed into revolutions which overthrew incumbent regimes (Rane & Salem, 2012).

Social movement theorists typically pose a three-stage evolution of all social movements: emergence, coalescence and bureaucratisation (Blumer 1969; Mauss 1975). Once a movement emerges, thus, it is argued, it next faces 'coalescence', in which phase it seeks to define itself, by developing an ideology — a set of 'theoretically articulated propositions about social reality'. This is a crucial development in all social movements (Berger, Berger and Kellner, 1973: 159). (The theory of the stage of alleged

inevitable bureaucratisation — or ‘routinisation’ — will be dealt with below.)

The social movement approach

A phenomenon such as HMI is regarded as one form of a general pattern or framework of ‘contentious politics’. Some social movement theory argues for an ‘integrative’ approach to all forms of political contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996, 2001; Tarrow 1998). According to this analysis, all forms of political action — whether from ‘above’ (from government, bureaucrats, and other elites) or ‘below’ (such as by opposition social movements) contend with each other. This understanding of mutual contention perceives the panoply of tactics, movements, and actors employed by all players ‘arrayed along a spectrum of related phenomenon rather than boxed in by formal, discrete categories’ (Beck, 2008: 1568). An entity that engages in political action (naturally in its own, distinctive manner), with the perspective of influencing ‘political processes and outcomes’, should be seen as one such mode of collective action (Beck, 2008: 1568).

Through a consensus among many of its advocates, social movement theory has developed three cardinal concepts or pillars: mobilising resources, political opportunities, and framing (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996).

Mobilising resources and political opportunities

In contrast with the earlier model (Smelser 1962; Marx and Wood 1975), known as the ‘collective behavior’ paradigm, which focused on the role of grievances or social strain in producing social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977), without denying the necessity for grievances, stress that these are inadequate for explaining how and why some movements manage sustained contention, while others fail to do so. The key, they

assert, is to grasp the role that resources play. Many social movement theory analysts see organisation as the key to obtaining and mobilising such resources for prolonged contention (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1982; Oberschall 1973; Tarrow 1998).

Success by social movements does not occur in a vacuum, but in a given conjuncture of opportunity and resource mobilisation. The second pillar of contemporary social movement theory is therefore the concept of political opportunity. Devised by Peter K. Eisinger (1973), this complements the model of McCarthy, Zald, et al with the insight that social movements are shaped by wider political environments — which provide opportunities to social movements to advance their interests at particular conjunctions.

Thus, for example, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimoun*), persecuted and outlawed for decades by the State, was able to use the opening provided by the downfall of dictator Husni Mubarak to mobilise its extensive network to successfully muster support for its candidate in a presidential election and emerge as the winner. (See also research by Mohammed M. Hafez (2003) and Jillian Schwedler (2006) for discussion of analogous examples of Islamic social movements seizing opportunities presented by changed contexts.) Similarly, and this will be discussed further in chapter 8 (p.160-2), during the final decade of the New Order regime, as president Suharto became increasingly estranged from the military establishment, he sought a new alliance which he tried to cultivate with the rising *Santri* Muslim intelligentsia and middle class many of whom had come from HMI in order to mobilise them for his support (Porter, 2002: 87-95). However, the mobilisation of the *Santri* continued past the fall of Suharto with the initial years that were to follow witnessing *Santri* politicians reaching positions of power, not seen since the enforcement of guided democracy by Sukarno in 1957. Thus, accordingly, it seems apparent that social movements require both the successful enlistment of appropriate resources, as well as favourable political or social conditions in order to achieve success (McAdam, 1982).

Framing theory

For at least some theorists, even this is not enough for social movements to succeed. Scholars such as Erving Goffman (1974) (who pioneered framing theory), William A. Gamson (1975, 1992) and Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000), direct attention to the claims used by movements to achieve mobilisation. They emphasise that claims must 'resonate' with wider social narratives to gain broad acceptance (Gamson 1975, 1992). They term this process 'frame alignment' (Snow *et al* 1986).

Framing is a process in which actors in a social movement produce, arrange, and disseminate discourse that may resonate among those they intend to mobilise. Thus, through framing, issues and symbols are selected and contextualised to achieve 'frame resonance', that is, sufficient responses that will transform mobilisation potential into actual mobilisations. According to Melucci (1996:70-74), resonant collective action frames provide the foundation whereby actors in a social movement produce their collective identity. Framing is thus an interactive and shared definition concerning the orientation of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which such action is to take place.

Frames deployed for mobilisation are not static, but vary in changing situations. These include opportunities for discourse (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004) and interaction with counter-movements and elites (Moaddel, 1992). But, it is argued, none of this matters if frame alignment does not occur, since success for the social movement attempting change will then not meet success.

Some advocates of framing theory emphasise non-structural factors in movement mobilisation, especially cultural factors. These scholars criticise what they see as reliance on purely structural factors in earlier social movement theory. Roger V. Gould (1995) views it as crucial that social movements forge an 'identity' that permits the

creation of a broad and motivated base of participants. Cultural factors can be imperative for the same reason. Religion can provide a collective identity, as Mervyn F. Bendle (2003) and others observe.

Framing theory has implications for hypothesis 8, already cited in Chapter 1, and to be examined later in the present chapter. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 7 and as has been mentioned earlier, the constants in HMI discourse are the themes of Islam and nation building. However, as other SMOs compete with HMI within this discourse each successive executive term set its own mission statement for the sake of mobilisation.

Network theory

A collective identity is arguably particularly important for sustaining collective action in the absence of formal organisations. This draws attention to the role of social networks in social movement mobilisation. Anastasia Kavada observes:

in current social movement theory, the notion of networks has become central in the definition itself of what constitutes a social movement (Kavada, 1 January 2003: 4).

Kavada (1 January 2003: 4) thus defines the current anti-globalisation movement ‘as a network of individual activists and organisations’. Despite agreeing with M. Emirbayer and J. Goodwin (1994: 1414) that ‘Network analysis is not a formal or unitary “theory” that specifies distinctive laws, propositions or correlations, but rather a broad strategy for investigating social structure’, Kavada argues that network analysis holds a number of basic, shared, theoretical assumptions — most importantly with respect to what she and others term the ‘anti categorical imperative’:

This imperative rejects all attempts to explain human behavior or social processes solely in terms of the categorical attributes of actors, whether individual or collective (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994: 1414, cited in Kavada, 1 January 2003: 6).

Social networks theorists aspire to overcome what they perceive as gaps in much social movement research hitherto, generated by what they believe is that research's over-concentration on purely structural aspects, instead of grasping that social movements are complex, living organisms, with dynamic, fluid, natures that interact with other entities and each other and themselves undergo change. Previous research, it is argued, ignores the importance of interaction and communication for the production of movement identities (Kavada, 1 January 2003: 6 and Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994: 1414).

As a form of collective organisation, a social movement lacks formal boundaries, argues Emirbayer and Goodwin, allowing:

participants to feel part of broad collective efforts while retaining their distinctive identities as individuals and/or as specific organisations (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994: 1414).

Kavada makes an important observation:

Lacking in formal boundaries, social movements have a hard time defining their members. As a result, membership to a movement ultimately depends on the mutual recognition between participants (Kavada, 1 January 2003: 9).

Eschewing the 'abstruse terminology and state-of-the-art mathematical sophistication' of early network theory (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994: 1446, cited in Kavada, 1 January 2003: 9), Kavada identifies with a newer strand in social networks theory that stresses the 'link between social networks and culture' (Diani, 2003: 5, cited in Kavada, 1 January 2003: 9). Roger V. Gould (1991) maintains that network ties among participants augment both solidarity and the intensity of contention.

Evolution of social movement organisations

McCarthy and Zald (1977) pointed out long ago that social movement organisations tend to evolve over time from their original, barely structured, form to more formal entities. Amplifying this observation, Debra C. Minkoff (1999) remarks that it is this evolution that actually permits movements to endure.

These are hardly new observations. In the process of analysing political leadership, Max Weber contributed powerfully to the scholarly understanding of the evolutionary process of political groups. (See Eisenstadt, 1968; Weber, 1927; Weber, 1964; Weber, 1968; Weber, 1978b: 194-97, and Weber 1978c in Runciman, 1978: 174-91.) Weber's analysis of political authority, or leadership, proposes that the most unstable leaders (the 'charismatic' variety) rest upon devotion to a particular figure that is regarded in some way to be exemplary (Weber, 1964: 328). He notes that the leaders of opposition political groups operate in this manner (Welsh, 1979: 18-20).

Since then, William A. Welsh — who agrees that political leaders can also make use of charismatic political authority, in certain circumstances — has classified leadership types somewhat differently, arguing that each of his three types operate on either a formal, legal basis, or on a comparatively informal moral basis. The latter instance is possible 'when leaders command authority among their followers in the absence of any legal sanctions'. He notes that the leaders of opposition political groups operate in this manner (Welsh, 1979: 18-20).

It is not proposed in this dissertation that the leader of HMI operates in a charismatic manner. Nevertheless, Edward A. Tiryakian (1995) has shown that charisma need not be invested in discrete individuals, but can be the property of collective groups, in certain circumstances. Tiryakian uses the theories of both Weber and Émile Durkheim. Durkheim describes the *collective effervescence* that accompanies the founding of new

social movements, or the *emergence stage*, which he asserts produce not only a sense of solidarity but also provide the ‘collective excitement’ that is vital for the launching of a social movement (Durkheim, 1965).

Tiryakian (1995: 272) notes how both Weber and Durkheim stressed that a charismatic leader appears in ‘extraordinary’ circumstances, with the latter apparently agreeing with the former that this is either ‘in moments of great distress’ (Weber, 1978a: 1111, cited in Tiryakian: 1995: 272), or in an:

unusual, especially political or economic situation, or from extraordinary psychic, particularly religious states, or from both together. It arises from collective excitement produced by extraordinary events and from surrender to heroism of any kind (Weber, 1978a: 1121, cited in Tiryakian: 1995: 272).

Tiryakian argues that Weber’s notion of ‘charisma’ and Durkheim’s ‘collective effervescence’ concept are ‘complementary’, and together:

provide an understanding of how social actors in coercive secular states, confronted by a seeming monopoly of the use of physical force, are able, in certain exceptional circumstances, to mobilise and disarm the state (Tiryakian: 1995: 269).

Tiryakian concedes that charisma and ‘collective effervescence’ are ‘not identical’, yet nevertheless ‘overlap’, with the difference between the two paradigms being ‘slight’. He adds that an ‘extraordinary situation’ (for him the anti-communist revolution in Eastern Europe beginning in 1989), has an ‘effect ... on the individuals who participate’ in the moment of ‘revolutionary or creative moments of general effervescence’, such that men are now moved by events to ‘passions ... that cannot be satisfied except by ... actions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism’ (Durkheim, 1965: 241, cited in Tiryakian: 1995: 273; emphasis in Tiryakian).

Tiryakian (1995) also observes:

In Durkheim and Weber there is one unstated aspect that merits our attention. It is that being in and part of the charismatic/effervescent tradition gives the charismatic community a sense of power — power not based on control of physical or material resources, but effective power nonetheless by virtue of being part of a moral community. I am tempted to say that this sentiment of empowerment, which occurs only in certain moments, transforms the group into a charismatic community, transforms, ultimately, social structure into agency... (1995: 274; emphasis in original)

Some ‘hundreds of thousands’ (or on one occasion two million people) participated in demonstrations of collective ‘effervescence’ against entrenched dictatorships throughout Eastern Europe in and around 1989, points out Tiryakian (1995: 278) and both those participating directly in these collective protests and those passively supporting them at home were collectively empowered.

Consequently, Weber’s examination of the inevitable process (‘routinisation’) when a charismatic group must face up to the question of what he terms the ‘routinisation of authority’ still requires examination. For a group headed by a charismatic leader, this process begins when it faces the dilemmas of leadership succession. By so doing, however, it takes the first step away from reliance upon pure charisma, and towards institutionalisation, or the ‘routinisation of charisma’. This implies the loss of the group’s original impetus, as its initial charismatic vision becomes blunted. The group experiences a process ‘through which the charismatic qualities are transferred from the unique personality or the unstructured group to orderly institutional reality’ (Eisenstadt, 1968: xix).

Robert Michels (1911) developed his famous ‘iron law’ of oligarchy, which theorised that organised movements had inherent tendencies towards conservativisation, bureaucratisation and accommodation with the established order. Since then, other scholars have asserted what is sometimes referred to as a ‘natural history’ theory of

organisations, according to which the latter, precisely like trees, humans and other living entities, eventually grow old and become conservative. Religious denominations, trade unions and advocacy movements have been put forward as models of this theory (Messinger, 1955; Sills, 1957; Gusfield 1955; Lipset *et al.*, 1956; Wilson 1961).

Others have challenged the inevitability of this schema, asserting that organisations can retain their initial drive and commitment over the long haul, pointing out that each movement is subject to numerous circumstances, each of which can affect its development and trajectory (Gusfield 1955; Lipset *et al.*, 1956 & Wilson 1961).

Bureaucratisation of social movement organisations

Bureaucratisation inevitably follows the coalescence stage of a social movement, however, according to many scholars. This stage sets the organisation's future development path and simultaneously marks the decline of the organisation as a vibrant social movement, even though (as paradoxical as this might appear) it may be accumulating prestige and resources.

Perhaps interestingly, Megan Doolittle notes:

The decline of a social movement does not necessarily indicate its death. Decline refers to a loss of the inherent dynamics of a movement. The people within the movement will not perceive the decline; they may even see this stage as an era of success, since many of the movement's goals have been realized at the expense of co-optation... (Doolittle, 1996: 62).

This bureaucratisation of SMOs which HMI has no doubt undergone has implications for

hypothesis 3, already cited in Chapter 1, and to be examined later in the present chapter. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 3, the consolidation of HMI into the most dominant student movement in the country with the most prestigious pedigree of alumni has resulted in its abandonment of the initial commitment to striving for an Islamic society and for many of its 'beneficiary constituents' the cumulative focus of successfully attaining power and influence. Thus, the success of HMI's power and influence has meant the suppression of vibrancy and dynamism to the detriment many of its 'conscience adherence'.

Fundamental tenets of social movement paradigm: hypotheses

This dissertation seeks to explore a number of research hypotheses, to explain the behaviour and development of HMI. The hypotheses are given below. These hypotheses are based on scholarly hypotheses first developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1212-41) for understanding the social movement sector (SMS), social movement industries (SMI), and social movement organisations (SMO), which they argue explain what resource mobilisation theory means in practice. As outlined in Chapter One herein, their schema has not been without its critics and modifications, nevertheless, given the continuing paradigmatic status of their approach, it would seem useful at this point to cite their hypotheses and to briefly investigate their relevance for understanding HMI's trajectory and current situation.

Hypothesis 1:

As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to HMI has increased. This hypothesis will be investigated in the course of the present dissertation.

HMI has clearly grown in size and influence since the association's founding in February 1947, maintaining its budget through constantly seeking donations to fund their activities at the branch and national level. The organisation does not have accumulated funds, as at all levels committee members hold posts for only two years. Funds must be spent to meet the needs of HMI's daily operations as well as all its other activities. The cadres' ability to seek funds and use them optimally during their time in these posts apparently benefits their ability to campaign and move up the ranks of the organisation. This could indicate that this SMO's cadres are actively encouraged to develop outstanding networking and fundraising skills at a very developed level, enabling HMI to continue functioning as a loosely structured network of individuals, capable of sustaining both themselves and HMI through unstable political eras.

Hypothesis 2:

The greater the absolute amount of resources available to HMI, the greater the likelihood that new student movements will develop to compete for these resources. This hypothesis will also be investigated in the course of the present dissertation.

There is fierce competition for resources between student movements, especially among Muslim organisations. Most important is the contest for membership and cadres. In the past, HMI has had the most branches, particularly outside Java. However, other intra-campus student organisations (also SMOs), such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Tarbiyyah (supporters of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood), Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (these last two being the biggest Muslim organisations in the archipelago) are increasing due to the increasing grassroots support of the above SMOs throughout the archipelago.

In terms of financial resources, HMI rely on their prestige of being the student movement that is the oldest, largest and best connected with Indonesia's elite.

Although HMI's share has obviously been affected by the appearance and growth of other student-based SMOs, their cadres are well trained in seeking contributions in order to meet their activities. This could be indicative of HMI's resilience, based on its cadres' resourcefulness, even in the face of rising competition from rival SMOs.

Hypothesis 3:

Regardless of the resources available to potential 'beneficiary adherents', the larger the amount of resources available to 'conscience adherents', the more likely is the development of student movements that respond to preferences for change.

Contrary to this understanding, it will be argued herein that that HMI has in practice steadily abandoned any conscience-based foundation. Given the (at least) initial commitment to Islam by the HMI, it is accurate to assume the HMI was founded based on 'conscience adherents' — that is, persons motivated by moral and ideological concerns. There are indications that the organisation's conscience-based foundation has been steadily abandoned, in practice, due to: (i) HMI's adoption of the moderate 'substantive Islam' perspective (to be discussed in chapter 4 pp 66-7; 78-81); (ii) the result of abandoning an unequivocal commitment to striving for an Islamic society, and (iii) the cumulative effect of successfully attaining power and influence, the effects of which is thoroughly analysed in chapter 9. This could signify HMI members' slide towards more pragmatic and bureaucratic bases, compared to the founding principles of the SMO, in response to opportunities and challenges faced by the organisation. This dissertation will seek to ascertain the accuracy of these perceptions. Interestingly, what has developed over time in HMI are two wings: the 'practical politics' wing (politicians and bureaucrats) and the 'intellectual' wing (academics, think tank investigators and NGO researchers). The views of these two wings frequently overlap in practice.

Hypothesis 4:

The more a Social Movement Organisation (SMO) is dependent upon isolated constituents, the less stable will be the flow of resources to it, concluding that the more an SMO depends upon isolated constituents to maintain a resource flow, the more its shifts in resource flow resemble the patterns of consumer expenditures for expendable and marginal goods.

Contrary to this understanding, it will be shown HMI leaders communicate to their members and alumni using personal, informal channels. In fact, the HMI has neither been dependent upon isolated constituents at any time, nor ever resorted to advertising, to campaign its concerns. HMI leaders communicate to their members and alumni by private personal communications and internal newsletters, as well as through various events organised by influential individuals as well as HMI and KAHMI, which include, seminars, conferences, *iftars* (meals marking the breaking of Ramadan fasts), *'Eid* (Muslim festival at the conclusion of Ramadan) gatherings, and so forth. This method of loose affiliation can also be seen through domination by HMI alumni of other associations and networks such as the Cipayang Group, PARMUSI [The Family of Indonesian Muslims] and importantly ICMI [The Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals]. As will be discussed in chapter 8, this loose affiliation makes it possible for HMI alumni to infiltrate and accommodate themselves between and within different organisations, institutions and political parties. As for HMI itself, it uses these various networks to maintain its resource flow.

Hypothesis 5:

An SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organisation is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict. It will be shown that, to the contrary, sources of 'tension and conflict' HMI flow from quite different, less idealistic sources.

Some hard questions must be posed, in the light of HMI's possible degeneration from its initial idealistic 'effervescence', as suggested above: does HMI actually have any 'conscience adherents' remaining? Is it true to suggest that HMI's only source of internal tension is competition for internal posts and for external roles as MPs and senior bureaucrats? If so, this could evidence an opportunistic turn by this SMO over time away from its founding ideals, towards pragmatic short-term goals.

As argued in response to McCarthy and Zald's third hypothesis above, members of HMI's academic wing would see themselves as being 'conscience adherents'. Most likely, these individuals largely remain 'conscience adherents' after they have entered the professional world as journalists or academics, analysts and researchers for government bodies, think tanks, NGOs, universities and research institutes.

In chapter 9, this dissertation will argue that the implication is more about the 'capture' of such individuals by the elite forces they are trying to influence or manipulate. This is also true of members of HMI's 'practical' wing and was brought up by several HMI alumni academics/activists from Paramedina University and the Syrarifhidayatullah UIN (Islamic State University), in interviews conducted with HMI 'intellectual wing' activists by the present writer. These activists and academics stated that they were often quite irritated by their colleagues from the practical wing, who seemed to them to be too concerned with securing positions (interview with Ciputat Study Group, 27 May 2012).

Hypothesis 6:

Older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline.

HMI has certainly benefited from its years of experience and accumulated resources. HMI intellectual resources include the network that it has built up, its training curriculum that to this day has produced cadres best prepared for public life, its many academics and their published works both on HMI and within their respective fields. In

terms of financial accumulation, however, HMI constantly seeks contributions to fund all of its events. As Golkar Party legislative member and former HMI Branch leader Ade Komarrudin states: ‘we have to be thankful that the HMI seek outside contributions from their alumni first. At times HMI protest against the same alumni they sought contributions from’ (interview).

Hypothesis 7:

The more competitive a SMI is, the more likely it will be that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies.

The milieu in which HMI swims has always been competitive, but has become more so in the recent period. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, HMI’s rivals were identified along *Aliran* lines — that is, along clearly ideological lines. As stated above, the term ‘*Aliran*’ refers to the religious, cultural and religious division in Javanese society between ‘*abangan*’ (nominal or non-practicing Muslims attached to traditional Javanese animist beliefs) and ‘*santri*’ (orthodox, devout, Sunni Muslims) that arose post-1945 (Ricklefs, 2012: 80-81, 509 and 512).

However, within the Modernist Islam camp, the *santri* HMI had little competition, especially outside Java. Within Java, however, NU’s PMII could be seen as a rival, yet NU students on campuses were considerably lower in number than those of the urban modernists. Today, competition is stiff, since Muhammadiyah, NU, HTI (Hizb-ut-Tahrir Indonesia) and Jamaah Tarbiyyah (Congregation for (Islamic) Education) compete with HMI for student membership and all groups have ample financial and intellectual resources, as well as mass followings from sections of Indonesian society.

Hypothesis 8:

The larger the income flow to a SMO, the more likely it will be that cadre and staff are professional and tend towards being one of the larger such groups.

HMI is a large SMO and appears to operate quite professionally, albeit mostly behind the scenes. It has professional cadre and staff, but — contrary to McCarthy and Zald's schema — none of these are employed by the organisation for a wage. HMI's professionalism can be attributed to the organisation's long history and experience in the field as well as, and controversially, its successful fundraising.

HMI has three stated criteria for financial resources: (i) from the members who contribute Rp5000 monthly; (ii) from regular and irregular donations from alumni, and (iii) from donations, which are given through Islamic tithing (*zakat*) (interview with Hariqo Wibawa Satria 20 May 2012). Thus, controversially, part of HMI's apparent professionalism can be attributed to contributions given by powerful individuals and groups. This matter is discussed further below, in response to McCarthy and Zald's Hypothesis 10.

Hypothesis 9:

The larger the SMS is, and the larger the specific SMIs, the more likely it is that SM careers will develop.

As indicted in the response to Hypothesis 8, above, HMI does not employ any professional staff. Nevertheless, HMI has become a stepping-stone for future careers and is seen as such by many who join it. As an SMO it functions to train its members and cadres for eventual public life — that is, purportedly to prepare educated Muslims who 'breathe Islam' and are at the service of the *'ummah* and the nation (Solichin, 2010: 51-58; Farid Akhwan On Line, 15 September 2010). However, the mere fact that this SMO has acted as a successful launching pad for lucrative careers potentially opens the door for such successful individuals to seek to curtail HMI's idealism, limiting it to pragmatic, short-term goals — as the discussion of hypotheses three and five above appear to evidence.

Hypothesis 10:

The more that an SMO is funded by isolated constituents, the more likely it is that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes, rather than for organisational work.

The situation described here by McCarthy and Zald is especially common at the HMI Central Committee, when funding of major seminars and conferences is needed. It is also normal when both Central Committee and Branch Committee members seek funds during their campaigns for important internal positions and posts. Although HMI has treasuries at both the Branch and Executive levels, there is little transparency, as donators do not demand receipts, there is no auditing system, and members are not usually questioned as to the source of the contributions (Hariqo Wibawa Satria, 20 May 2012).

However, in 2008 controversy arose when it was revealed that money given to the then HMI national chairman, Arip Mostopha, for victims of the Jogjakarta earthquake, came from the State of Israel. (A country regarded as anathema by most Muslims.) Arip defended his actions by arguing he was duped, as he was supposedly told that it came from individuals who held Israeli citizenship and not the State itself. Also in 2012, HMI chairman Fadli Noormansyah attended the commemoration day for the birth of Israel in Singapore leading to speculations as to the sources of his funding, especially the campaign funding which led to his selection as national chairman (Starbrain Indonesia, 7 June, 2012)

HMI's lack of fundraising transparency at least opens the door to the corrupt use of SMO resources, as beneficiary constituent workers are apparently recruited for strategic purposes, rather than for organisational work.

Hypothesis 11:

The more a SMO is made up of workers with discretionary time at their disposal the more readily it can develop transitory teams.

HMI obviously has many students with time on their hands at its disposal. It is worth noting that HMI differentiates between members and cadres. Thus, transitory teams are largely made up of cadres who are singled out by senior members, who consider them as having the skills needed to be on these teams. Thus, these teams are the ones who move up the ranks and from the Branch to the National levels. The incentive is centred on power, influence and network.

As cadres move up the ranks they gain more power and influence internally, thus they are able to set and influence the policy agenda of the SMO. They gain prestige and are able to build greater networks with powerful members of Indonesia's elite and political and bureaucratic community. As will be demonstrated in the following analysis of HMI, this is indeed what has occurred.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the dominant social movement paradigm of resource mobilisation theory, and Durkheim's and Weber's interlinked conceptions of charismatic leadership, and the theorisation of routinisation and bureaucratization. These notions have been supplemented by outlining political opportunity and cultural framing theories and the network approach. It has been suggested that these approaches are some basic ways of conceptualizing HMI as a social movement.

The analysis of the present chapter raises the matter of how HMI achieves its goals. It is suggested by the present author that HMI achieves its goals by the smooth functioning of all its organs — from the Branches to the Provincial and National — and through

having its policies heard and recognised by various arms of government. HMI also achieves its aims through the visible success of its alumni in securing positions of power and influence, so that government in Indonesia is shaped by HMI's vision. Nothing succeeds like success.

As a social movement organisation, HMI clearly fits within the parameters of the classic paradigm — albeit with some interesting variations. The remainder of this dissertation will investigate HMI's development and essential character, using social movement theory and other relevant theoretical instruments to interrogate and interpret hard data on this organisation that will be collected.

The next chapter will place into context the evolution of Islamic political thinking in order to frame the discourse by which the *Santri* community and in particular the SMIs and SMOs that represent them operate under. For the purpose of establishing a narrative to help contextualize the objectives and 'collective effervescence' that sustains *Santri* SMO's such as HMI, the next two chapters will focus on the relationship between Islamic intellectual thinking and its affect on Islamic political thinking, its leading intellectuals and its influence on contemporary Political Islam as understood and practiced by SMO's in Indonesia.

Chapter 4: Narrative on the Development of Islamic Political Thinking

This chapter sketches out the development of a branch of Islamic science known as *Usul ul-Fiqh* by revivalist Muslim intellectuals in the late Nineteenth Century, and the impacts that this had upon Indonesia. The chapter charts the rise, fall and rediscovery of *Usul ul-Fiqh* as a working science, especially with the issue of *ijtihad*, in order to understand the developments of the contemporary world. The chapter then looks at how this science was brought to Indonesia and became the spark for the Modernist *Santris'* anti-colonialist struggle and their call for a nation-state based on Islam. Finally, the chapter discusses the thinking of Muhammad Natsir, to show how his ideas are based on *Usul ul-Fiqh*. This, in turn, sets the scene for what would to come, with HMI chief political thinker Nurcholish Madjid and his adoption of hermeneutics in order to understand Islam, in Chapter Five.

Studies of Islamic Modernism

When it comes to labelling political groups as 'fundamentalist', 'radical' and 'moderate', the available scholarly literature on political Islam in Indonesia has not offered any concise exposition as to what it is about their way of thinking that warrants them to be labelled as such. Liddle's (1996a) analysis on the Indonesian *Media Dawkah*⁸ magazine is an example of many such shortcomings within the field. The title, "*Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form Islamic of Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia*" offers so much in the way of assessing what he terms 'Scripturalism' as one form of Islamic political thought, but depressingly fails to deliver any real analysis concerning the thought structure and principles of 'Scripturalism' — prioritising

⁸ *Media Dakwah* — a journal described by Liddle — is well known for its anti-US, anti-Indo-Sino Christian views.

scriptural texts and the necessity of *Usul ul-Fiqh* (the principles of jurisprudence) in interpreting it.

Rather, Liddle's analysis primarily focuses on the polemical stance of many of the *Media Dakwah* (MD)⁸ writers towards what he terms 'Substantialist'⁹ Islamic thinkers in Indonesia as well as national and international issues facing Muslims. Liddle's analysis presents arguments in support of MD's Scripturalist outlook as being 'insular', 'defensive' and 'conspiratorial', but offers no real explanation of the thinking process that produces such perspectives. In all, Liddle's nineteen-page assessment really devotes only one paragraph into the Scripturalist way of thinking, when he states:

The scripturalists do not see themselves as engaged primarily in the intellectual activity of adapting the message of Muhammad with and the meaning of Islam to the social conditions of the late 20th century. Rather they believe that the message and meaning are for the most part clearly expressed in the Quran and Hadits [Hadiths] and need only to be implemented conscientiously. They are thus very syari'ah minded (Liddle, 1996: 270).

This assessment is quite brief and rather vague, as it does not provide any understanding about the scriptualist way of thinking about issues. It merely implies the notion that Scriptualists want nothing more than to just re-apply medieval laws to a modern country, without considering at all whether or not there is any fluidity in their thought structure.

In contrast, 'substantialist' thinking is elaborated well and Liddle provides a clear description of this mode of thinking, when he explains that:

⁹ With regards to Islamic thinking in Indonesia the term 'substantialist', coined by Liddle, refers to interpreting Islam using hermeneutics — an approach that is historically and culturally imbedded, where language, customs and norms are just as important as the text itself. This term has now become synonymous with Neo-Modernist, Pluralist and most recently with Liberal Islam. More recently in post-Suharto/reformation Indonesian literature, this type of Islamic thinking has become more commonly referred to as 'substantive', rendering the term 'substantialist' obsolete. Thus, this dissertation only employs the term 'substantialist' when referring to the concept pre-1998 and 'substantive post-1998.

the substance or content of belief is more important than the form. Literal adherence to Quranic injunctions ... is less positively valued than behaving morally and ethically in accordance with the spirit of the Quran (Liddle, 1996: 268).

In this assessment, before even introducing the political and social interpretations of the Substantialists, we have been given an insight into the philosophy behind their thoughts — that is, their way of thinking. In all, his assessment devotes two pages in elaborating both the political thinking and views of the Substantialists. Liddle states:

the message of the Quran and Hadith (statements of the Prophet), while timeless in its essence and universal in its meaning, nonetheless needs to be re-interpreted by each succeeding generation of Muslims in the light of social conditions prevailing in their time (Liddle, 1996: 268)

As will be discussed latter in the chapter, the lines cited above are an assessment of a hermeneutic approach to sacred/historical text that the Substantialists use to interpret Islam, by subjecting the Quran and Hadiths to it.

Thus, when commenting on the variants within political Islam in Indonesia, no attempt has been made to approach the topic by looking at the kind of thought structures that produce so-called ‘scripturalist’ Islamic political thoughts, in comparison to that which produces substantialist ones. As will be elaborated further in this chapter, the scripturalist approach adheres to an Islamic political thinking that can be traced to a branch of Islamic science known as *Usul ul-Fiqh*, whereas substantialist thinking adopts a hermeneutical approach. In spite of this, Liddle’s identification of the Scripturalists as being those who are ‘*Shari’ah* minded’ is significant, since it is a rare attempt by Western academia to classify a way of thinking outside of the fundamentalist/radical paradigm.

It will be argued that a more refined classification of the ‘*Shari’ah* minded’ Islamic camp

should be ‘positivistic-Scripturalism’. This is discussed below, under the sub-heading ‘Islamic thinking and Positivism’ as within the sphere of classical Islamic academia, Islamic scholars have for centuries legitimised this type of political thinking. The reason being was that, since the subject of politics was closely related to law (*Shari’ah*), it was the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence who best had the ability to understand the best political course of action. Thus, the science of Islamic jurisprudence known in Arabic as *Usul ul-Fiqh* was employed in the realm of Islamic politics.

Following from this discussion, the inception and development of Islamic political thinking into Indonesia will then proceed. Importantly, in order to place Liddle’s ideas of ‘Scripturalist’ and ‘Substantialist’ into their proper context, this will then be followed by a discourse analysis into the literature of the two Indonesian Islamic intellectuals who had been at the forefront in shaping Islamic political thinking in Indonesia for over half a century — Muhammad Natsir and Nurcholish Madjid. The significance of these individuals is that for Natsir, as Chairman of the Masyumi during the first decade of the Republic, his thoughts and policies on state and society were the mainstream position of the *Santri* political community, whose legacy continues to this day among Scripturalists. Whereas Madjid’s legacy represents substantialist Islamic political thinking — whose inroads have, since the last decade of the Twentieth Century up to today — had the greatest influence on politics from among *Santri* politicians and parties within Indonesia’s political establishment. Madjid’s political thinking, as well as an assessment of the current trends in Islamic political thinking taken by two contemporary substantialist *Santris*, will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Islamic political thinking and Positivism

In order to understand the source and methodology of ‘scriptualist’ Islamic political thinking this study argues that ‘scriptualism’ epistemologically conforms to some of the tenets of ‘positivism’ because it adheres to an objective epistemology, employing the

tools of deductive reasoning to solve issues relating to it (Smith (1996:14-5). However, Islamic thinking is only positivistic in that it demands of the interpreters, who have traditionally been of the scholarly class, to be objective and rational when applying the Qur'an and Hadiths to an issue of concern.¹⁰ Thus, a more correct way of classifying classical Islamic thinking would arguably be to use the term 'positivistic-Scripturalism'.

In Islamic discourse, this intellectual endeavour is termed *Usul* (methodology/principles and foundations), and was identified early in Islamic history by the Ninth Century AD scholar and jurist as-Shafi'i, in his book *ar-Risala fi Usul ul-Fiqh* (The Book Concerning the Methodological Principles of Jurisprudence). As-Shafi'i's book concerned the foundations or principles for jurisprudential methodology, but it was his enquiry into the source, theory and methodology for thinking (*Usul*) about jurisprudence that led to his approach being adopted by others in the field (an-Nabhani, 2003: 501; Khadduri, 1961: 41-42).¹¹

Islamic epistemology as outlined by as-Shafi'i's positivistic approach to *Usul* would remain the consensual approach utilised by orthodox Islamic scholars for over a millennium. An-Nabhani argues that the purpose of study undertaken in as-Shafi'i's book was to define the nature of and approach to jurisprudence, rather than to legitimise his own judicial formulas and rulings. The secular western scholar of Islam Joseph Schacht broadly agrees. This *Usul* approach to a given Islamic discipline has been the consensual epistemological outlook of orthodox Islamic scholars since as-Shafi'i, up to modern times (An-Nabhani, 2003: 503; Schacht, 1977: 1). This methodology will be discussed next.

The Science of *Usul* and its ontological implications

There is no exact translation in the Arabic language, or orthodox intellectual Islamic discourse, for the term 'epistemology'. Although the idea of epistemology is part of Western intellectual discourse, it has striking similarities with the term '*Usul*' in Islamic

intellectual discourse. For the sake of this dissertation, the understanding of the word *Usul* when discussing the idea of epistemology in Islamic intellectual thought will be utilised. Arkoun defines the Arabic word *Usul* as ‘the plural of the word *’aṣl* [أصل], meaning roots, basic foundations, primary sources, origins’ (Arkoun, 2002: 26-27).

The study of *Usul* in Islamic thought is related to the study of *ijtihad* (deductive reasoning from the sources and foundations). *Ijtihad* is a method of deduction used in the field of *Usul ul-Fiqh* to derive knowledge primarily in the field of law. Norman Calder states that in:

underlying this definition [of ijtihad] there is an important epistemological principle. It concedes that most of the details of the law are not known (not certain) but are a matter of skilled (and preferably pious) deduction on the basis of principles that are themselves subject to debate and incapable of providing certainty (Calder, 1998).

The Development of Islamic Epistemology

Every science where the student cannot get at its crucial points and foundations at the outset leaves him no chance of attaining its inner secrets and aspirations (al-Ghazali, 1987, reproduced in Hammad, 1987: 305).

Abu Hameed al-Ghazali (d. 1111) often referred to in Islamic academia as the ‘*hujjat*’ (proof) of Islam, stresses emphatically in the above statement the necessity of having at the outset an established episteme or knowledge, in order to conduct any scientific endeavour. His declaration is not only evidence of the level of precision and rigorous detail Islamic scholars used in order to perform research in Islam, but of the universal necessity to do so for any scientific endeavour (Hammad, 1987: 253).

As al-Ghazali argues:

Yet the noblest knowledge is where Reason and Tradition are coupled, where rational opinion and the Sharî’a are in association. The sciences of jurisprudence [fiqh] and its principles [usûl] are of this sort, for they take from

the choicest part of the Sharî'a and Reason. They can be neither manipulated purely by Reason, such that the Sharî'a could not accept them, nor based upon blind following, where Reason could not attest to their sanctity or rectitude (al-Ghazali, cited in Hammad 1987: 303-04).

In the tradition of al-Ghazali, the contemporary scholar an-Nabhani (d. 1979) explains with precision the arrangement of knowledge in Islam stating that evidence is of two kinds, rational (*dalil 'aqli*) or transmitted (*dalil naqli*). The subject determines whether the evidence for a rule should be based on the *'aqli* or *naqli*. Thus, if the subject were accessible by the senses, and the senses could perceive it, the evidence would be rational not transmitted, whereas, if the subject were inaccessible by the senses, then transmitted evidence is necessary (an-Nabhani, 2003: 22).¹⁰

Thus, as-Shafi'i first identified the process of textual exhumation used by jurists for their juristic inquiries. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) notes the scholastic significance of as-Shafi'i's study of *Usul ul-Fiqh*, claiming that before as-Shafi'i, practical application was the norm among scholars for understanding texts (Khaldun, 1958: 6). As-Shafi'i's book was a breakthrough, in that it was the first to perceive the need to discuss and rigorously explain the philosophy behind the practice of jurisprudence in terms of its sources, doctrines, foundations, methodologies and principles (an-Nabhani, 2003: 501).

Within the sphere of orthodox Sunni Islam, as-Shafi'i's work became the model followed by other scholars in his field, even if they disagreed with him on certain principles and/or methods (Lowry, 2013: xv; Saeed, 2008: 17). This gave scholarly worth to the term *Usul* in the discourse of Islamic intellectual thought, especially within the field of jurisprudence. Every intellectual endeavour by scholars that gives birth to ideas, concepts, laws and actions was guided and legitimised by the *Usul* that they subscribed

¹⁰ *dalil itu ada dua macam, yaitu dalil 'aqli (akal) dan dalil naqli. Yang menentukan apakah dalil itu 'aqli atau 'naqli adalah fakta dari permasalahan yang ditunjukkan untuk diimani. Apabila permasalahannya adalah fakta yang bisa diindera maka dipastikan dalilnya 'aqli bukan 'naqli. Namun jika permasalahannya tidak dapat diindera maka dalilnya adalah naqli'. (An-Nabhani 2003: 22)*

to.

Thus, Islamic *Usul ul Fiqh* is Positivistic, because it is governed by a rational approach and committed to an objective outlook concerning the relationship between source, methodology and evidence. The methodology uses a rational formula, sourced primarily from what Muslims believe to be divine revelation, the Qur'an (Islam's holy book) and the Hadith/Sunnah (prophetic sayings/injunctions),¹¹ in order to derive ideas, rituals and laws. The aim of Muslim scholars was to allow the scripture to guide a hopefully objective assessment of any issue that was referred to the Islamic doctrine.

Usul ul-Fiqh was 'perfected and became a craft and science' with the addition of Arabic linguistics to the study (Khaldun, 1958: 4). By employing the sciences of grammar, semantics, lexicography and rhetoric to the Qur'an and/or the Prophetic injunctions, scholars were encouraged to exert an objective and empirical derivation (known as *ijtihad*) from the sources. The Thirteenth Century jurist and political scientist al-Mawardi (d. 1250), best summarises the science of *Usul ul-Fiqh* by outlining the knowledge necessary to be a jurist [*mujtahid*]:

The principles from which the laws of the shari'ah are based are four in number: first, he should have knowledge of the Book of Allah, may He be exalted, in such a way as to enable him to attain a proper knowledge of the various kinds of laws contained within the Book, be they of the abrogating or abrogated type, clear or equivocal, general or particular, undetermined or precise; second, he must have knowledge of the authentic sunnah of the Messenger of Allah, may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, that is his sayings or deeds, and the way in which they have been transmitted — in multiple chains of transmission or isolated ones, a knowledge of whether such transmissions are sound or false, and whether they may be applied only to specific circumstances or in all cases; third, he must have a knowledge of the interpretations arrived at by the first generations — both regarding what they have agreed upon and what they differ about — in order that he can follow the consensus and strive to apply his own intellectual judgement in cases of difference; fourth, he must have a knowledge of analogy enabling him to

¹¹ For a precise definition for the meaning of *Hadith* and *Sunnah* see this dissertation's Glossary

refer matters about which the law is silent to clearly formulated principles accepted by all, such that he knows how to deal with new situations and is able to differentiate the true from the false... (al-Mawardi, 1996: 100).

Thus, should a jurist's knowledge comprise these four principles of *Shari'ah* law, al-Mawardi continues immediately, 'he is entitled to make *ijtihad*' (al-Mawardi, 1996: 100).

Period of Stagnation

The use of *ijtihad* led to juristic differences (*khilaf*) among jurists during this intellectual period, resulting in the establishment of various schools of thought, called '*mazhab*' in the field of jurisprudence. Debates arose over the benefits of *ijtihad*. Hence, by the Eleventh Century, scholars and their students began to write manuals codifying all the known rules and opinions for a given *mazhab*. By the Thirteenth Century, the development of rote learning became the norm, where memorisation of the codified rules and regulations of various *mazhab* defined the criterion of scholarship (an-Nabhani, 2003: 543-44). Hence the popular idea in the late 20th century of the medieval period of 'the doors of *ijtihad*' being closed and thus ending the relationship between sacred text and reason (Hallaq, 1986:129).

This deteriorating development in creative intellectual Islamic thinking can be illustrated by considering the distinguished Eleventh Century jurist Abu Zayd ad-Dabbusi's (Dabbussi, cited in Hammad, 1987: 189), argument that:

The milestone which points you to Satan's way, is blind imitation of authority in religion [taqlid]. One scholar imitates another out of appreciation for the former's opinion. He follows his understanding [fiqh] and believes that following him is Godly conviction. Alas! The real motive is laziness, laziness because he cannot investigate. If he strives to investigate a question, he arrives at his predecessor's answers, and the ignorant see him and follow him because they assume that he is a man of knowledge, a man of proofs... And the evil of the

'ulama' are the critical cause; they are the underlying reason because they imitate [rather than investigate], and they crave authority and position... Certainly taqlid is the capital of ignorance. It arises out of the individual's ignorance of his own human worth (Hammad, 1987: 189).

This period of codification and consensus became the norm for over six centuries, as scholars and the Muslim masses separated themselves into different *mazhab*, and importance was placed on *taqlid* or blind imitation to these *mazhab*. Ad-Dabbusi's assessment is noteworthy, as this feeling of despair and stagnation would be the spark that would ignite the intellectual revivalism in the Islamic world beginning in the late Nineteenth Century — popularly referred to as the 'Modernist' movement.

The Modernist movement: renewing Islamic thought

Beginning in the late Nineteenth Century, Islam witnessed a revival of Islamic thought and activity, which would be the catalyst for revivalist movements right across the Islamic world. Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) — popularly referred to as Islamic Modernists — led the revivalist discourse. These thinkers argued for the revival of the role of intellectual reasoning and analysis (*ijtihad*) in Islamic thought, contending that such analysis and reasoning had been part of Muslim intellectual culture in the first place, and that the culture of reasoning and analytical thinking had ended with the domination of *taqlid*.

But, as will be argued in the next chapter, epistemologically, the Modernists did not challenge the Positivist doctrine that the early Ninth Century scholars had defined, rather they aimed to re-invigorate it. This hope for re-invigoration was to be achieved by removing *taqlid*, which led to the dogma and irrationality that consumed much of Islam's intellectual activities during this period. Moreover, this culture of obedience and *taqlid* also allowed what were perceived to be erroneous ideas and practices becoming institutionalised as part of Islamic culture (An-Nabhani, 2003: 545). This will be further elaborated below.

An example of criticism against the predominant mode of thinking in Islamic intellectual circles in the tradition of Modernist Islam is apparent in the argument by the Indonesian Modernist Natsir, who maintains that Muslims can validly use their minds to defend the practice of making the call to prayer at the grave site and other practices, for example, ‘although, the Messenger of Allah never ordered or showed them a ritual like that, and this is not a worldly matter, which can be left to Muslims today. However, in worldly matters, they retreat from the prophylactic era, to the era of ‘*akar kaju*’¹² (stone age), with the excuse that they are ‘following the Prophet’s example’. In matters of religious ritual and orders where the methods and tools have already been established, they play the ‘rationalism card’, with the excuse of ‘good innovations’ (so-called ‘*bid’ah hasanah*’). Natsir questions whether this might be a paradox. ‘It could be!’ he concluded (Natsir, 1954: 216).¹³

Natsir here demonstrated how *taqlid* had engulfed Islamic intellectual culture and how far removed traditional Islamic scholarship had become from analytical thinking. He identifies three crucial points, which he believes show the inability of the scholars of his time to employ rational thought:

That they imitate rituals blindly without direct evidence of support for their practice from the primary sources of Islamic law (the Qur’an or the Sunnah) in areas of religious rituals that have been clearly defined by the text. That in

¹² *Akar kaju*, or ‘primitive source’. Here it is the present author’s opinion that Natsir uses the term in order to also imply the use of a twig common in Arabia called ‘*siwak*’. During the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the people of Arabia including the Prophet himself utilised a ‘*siwak*’ to brush their teeth, and there are many *Hadiths* supporting its use. But the word ‘*siwak*’ comes from the verb ‘*miswak*’ which means ‘to brush’ and it could be understood that Prophet’s encouragement was to brush one’s teeth as a form of hygiene.

¹³ *Mereka bisa mempergunakan akal mempertahankan umpamanja azan dikubur dan lain2. Sedangkan Rasulullah tidak pernah suruh atau tjontohkan melakukan peribadahan (ritus) jang sematjam itu dan ini bukan satu urusan dunia jang boleh diserahkan kepada kita. Dalam urusan keduniaan mereka hendak kembali dari zaman prophylactic zaman akar-kaju dengan alasan „menurut Sunnah Na- bi“; dalam urusan peribadahan dan perintah2 jang sudah ditetapkan tjara dan alatnja, mereka memakai „rasionalisme“ dengan alasan „bid’ah-hasanah“ Paradoxaal? Boleh djadi!*

worldly matters, they then will continue to use outdated practices, arguing that it was the method of the Prophet Muhammad. That they rationalise their imitation of practices that are not supported by texts from Islamic sources with the excuse of 'good innovations' (bid'ah hasanah)¹⁴ (Natsir, 1954: 216).

Above all, Natsir's statement is of epistemological significance, as it is in line with the noble quest of Islamic intellectual thinking, as explained by al-Ghazali earlier, of combining reason with *Shari'ah*. More than just criticising the incoherence of the thinking of older generation of Islamic thinkers of his time, Natsir's quote signifies that elusive quest in the science of *Usul* for the very nature of thought and the 'correct way' of thinking in Islam.

Therefore, the Modernist aim was to revive the positivistic approach to Islamic political thinking that had become fossilised by centuries of *taqlid*. As Natsir's ideas show, the challenge was not to question the methodology for Islamic political thinking itself, as the Modernists remained positivistic in their outlook. Natsir further clarifies the modernist positivist approach to Islam, by relating a *Hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad:

'When Mu'adz was sent as judge to Yemen, he was asked by the messenger of Allah (peace be upon him):

"By what will you rule with?"

"By the book of Allah", he answered.

"If you do not find it there (an explanation from the Quran)?"

"By the sunnah of the Messenger", he then answered.

"If you do not find an explanation from the sunnah of the Messenger?"¹⁵

"I will perform ijtihad using reason, and I will not despair" (Natsir, 1954: 228).

¹⁴ 'Bid'ah' literally means 'innovation', in Islamic discourse. When the word is mentioned alone it is often presented negatively to imply decadence. Thus, the term 'bid'ah hasanah' was supposed to imply innovations that were considered of benefit.

¹⁵ Waktu Mu'adz hendak dikirim ke Jaman menjabat khadi, ia ditanya oleh Rasulullah s.a.w.: Dengan apakah engkau menjalankan hukum? Dengan Kitab Allah! djawabnja. Kalau engkau tak dapati (keterangannja dari Al-Quran)? Dengan sunnah Rasul!", djawabnja lagi. Kalau engkau tak dapati pula keterangannja dalam sunnah Rasul? Saja beridjtihad dengan akal saja, dan saja tidak berputus asa!

Hermeneutics; the epistemological shift

In Islamic intellectual thought, the shift against *Usul ul-Fiqh* Positivism that had for so long dominated the thought structure of Islamic intellectual activity came from academics such as the Sorbonne's Muhammad Arkoun (d. 2010) and Chicago University's Fazlur Rahman (d. 1989), whose Western training had exposed them to the epistemological approach of hermeneutics. In Indonesia, their ideas were adopted by academics that had mostly passed through the various State Islamic Institutes (IAIN), now called National Islamic University (UIN), throughout the country, many of whom then continued their higher tertiary studies in Western universities.

Hermeneutics was an alternative to Positivism as an approach to understanding Islamic ontology. Hermeneutics is an epistemology that is devoid of Positivism's rational objectivity (Smith et al, 1996: 20). It seeks a 'holistic' contextual understanding as the Greek word in *hermeneuein*:

means to express, explain, translate or interpret; hermeneia is interpretation and so on [sic], often the interpretation of a sacred message. Plato called poets the hermenes — interpreters — of the gods' (Ast, in Inwood, 1998).

In its modern form hermeneutics means an interpretation of texts that fuses the relationship between language, history, and the environment of time.

Hermeneutics was adopted in the West by the Eighteenth-Century philosopher Johann Ernesti and the Nineteenth Century thinker Friedrich Ast, particularly in the field of biblical interpretations. As an episteme, hermeneutics challenges Positivist ideas of 'objectivity' and 'rationality'. Hermeneutics argues, '... that notions of truth and reason are historically constituted (embedded)'. Thus, all analysis is subjective, embedded in language and history. The hermeneutical approach advocates a contextual understanding of the world and its development. Accordingly, people think and act 'within the beliefs, pre-conceptions and situated ness [sic], which enables them and constrains them' (Smith et al, 1996: 27).

Biblical scholars argued that hermeneutics, in the area of biblical interpretation, appealed to Protestantism's challenge against Roman Catholicism's more allegorical interpretations of historical scriptures. As Ernesti argues in his '*Manual of Hermeneutics*' (1761: 7), the 'verbal sense of Scripture must be determined in the same way in which we ascertain that of other books'. Alongside scriptures, other texts in need of interpretation were legal documents and the works of 'classical antiquity, and these disciplines also contributed to hermeneutics' (Ernesti, 1761, cited in Inwood, 1998).

Thus, hermeneutics could be applied to Islam's legal volumes, as well as its theological and scholastic manuals, ontologically reassessing them through a different epistemological approach. The breadth of Islamic intellectual culture would now be analysed from a criterion that 'distinguished different levels of understanding a text'. According to Ast, in hermeneutics there are three different levels of understanding: historical, grammatical and spiritual:

- Historical: 'establishing the authentic text by comparing different manuscripts and deploying knowledge of the history and other writings of the period; to this understanding corresponds the 'hermeneutics of the letter'.
- Grammatical: 'corresponding to the 'hermeneutics of the sense': we understand the meaning of the words and sentences in the text'.
- Spiritual: 'ascending from the literal meaning to the spirit (*Geist*) of the author and of their society ('spirit' means 'outlook', 'mentality' or 'worldview'; it need have no theological or psychological connotation)' (Inwood, 1998).

Rahman's hermeneutical approach to Islam in the tradition of Ast envisages 'different levels of understanding' for the Qur'an. This can be seen in the following passage from Rahman's work, *Islam and Modernity*:

First one must understand the import or meaning of a given statement by studying

the historical situation or problem to which it was the answer. Of course before coming to study of specific text in the light of specific situations, a general study to the macrosituation [sic] in terms of society, religion, custom, and institutions, indeed, of life as a whole in Arabia on the eve of Islam and particularly in and around Mecca — not excluding the Perso-Byzantine Wars — will have to be made (Rahman, 1982: 6).

Therefore, the epistemological shift from positivism to hermeneutics radically challenges the very foundations (*Usul*) from which Islamic intellectual inquiry proceeds. Unlike *Usul ul-Fiqh*, which views injunctions in religious scripture as transcending time, hermeneutics argues that interpretation of a scripture must be placed in its historical context, related to the time of articulation, and that the ‘spirit’ of the text is more relevant than the ‘literal’ meaning. This process of relating text to historical setting is done ‘so that each given meaning understood, each law enunciated, each objective formulated will cohere with the rest’, when it comes to ontology (Rahman, 1982: 6).

The latest stage of development in Islamic intellectual thought is thus uniquely radical, in that it goes beyond Modernism’s reformist aim of reviving Islam’s positivist intellectual approach. The hermeneutical position is a dramatic departure from what has been established by transmission (*riwayat*) and consensus (*ijma’*), by scholars engaged in orthodox Islamic intellectual thinking from one generation to the next. Also, it ultimately challenges orthodox Islamic scholarship, by providing alternative interpretations and understandings, resulting in different ontological positions and worldviews.

Indonesia’s Islamic heritage: the *Santri/Abangan* divide

The history of Islamic intellectual activity in the Indonesian archipelago since Islam’s arrival some six centuries ago, has continued to be that of recipient, as there is no evidence to suggest that the archipelago (unlike the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia), has contributed Islamic thinkers whose writings are of influence in other parts of the Muslim world. Indonesian Muslims have continued to absorb Islamic

ideas and trends that flow into the archipelago from the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. Thus, when intellectual stagnation and *taqlid* became prevalent in the main intellectual centres of the Islamic world, it also engulfed Islam in Indonesia (Azra, 2004: 6; Alfian, 1969: 119-23).

As briefly discussed in chapter one, the Indonesian Muslim community before World War Two was divided into groups of *Aliran*, primarily consisting of either *Abangan* Muslims or *Santri* Muslims. By the 1930s, the *Santri* Muslims were further split into two distinct camps: those who upheld the established order commonly referred to as ‘Traditionalists’, and the emerging ‘Modernist’ *Aliran*. The political legacy of the both these camps has been Islam-statist, pro-*Shari’ah* law and predominantly democracy-friendly (Noer, 1973: 228). The Traditionalists represented the established order of *Santri* Islam, commonly referred to in Java as *Kolot* (conservative) Islam. The peak body representing the Traditionalists was *Nadhatul Ulama* (The Awakening of the Scholars), established in 1926 in Surabaya. The major schism between the two camps concerned the issue of *taqlid*, a practice the Traditionalists upheld. Instead, the Modernists argued for the need to revive the use of *ijtihad* — a practice the Traditionalists considered had been closed for over 600 years — to solve issues concerning contemporary life, (Noer, 1973: 6, 233).

The resumption of *ijtihad* by the Modernists was crucial in revitalising the educational and socio-political atmosphere of pre-independence Indonesia. In the century before the Modernist movement, Islamic dissent against colonialism had been actuated either through armed struggle or by isolationism. The Java War (1825-29), and the practice of entering rural *pesantren* (Islamic Boarding Schools) at a physical distance to the colonial authorities, were the means used by dissenters of the Nineteenth Century. Through *ijtihad*, the Modernists in Indonesia restructured the school curriculum by including non-religious subjects such as mathematics, and via dissent through political means, such as by establishing political parties (Taylor, 2003: 177; Riklefs, 2001: 151-54 & 214-18).

The Modernists appealed to those who recognised the need to lift society out of

intellectual and technological backwardness, as well as ending the colonial subjugation of their homeland by Christian Europeans. Furthermore, Modernist Islam's methodology for societal progress and development was seen through the prism of rejuvenating and reviving Islamic intellectual thinking and practice. In Indonesia, Islamic modernism provided an alternative avenue for progress, unlike many of the *Abangan* intelligentsia, who adopted European methods and ideas (Noer, 1973: 108; Alfian, 1969: 177-79). For example, as mentioned in chapter 1, the establishment of both Islamic student movements *Jong Bond Islamiten* and HMI drew its origin to the peripheral and dismissive attitudes felt by educated *Santri* towards their religion among the student movements of those respective eras.

The legacy of Modernist activities is a result of the pioneering efforts of three groups of Modernists in Indonesia. Firstly, from the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra, which produced autonomous '*ulama*' that initiated a modern school curriculum as part of their '*surau*'¹⁶ system. Second, the establishment of Muhammadiyah — a mass educational and welfare organization in Java, that promoted education along the lines of the '*surau*' system and Islamic learning based on the Modernist *Aliran*. Lastly, the Sarekat Islam party mobilised societal grievances towards colonialism through political means (Noer, 1973: 234).

In the field of intellectual activity, Muhammadiyah and a smaller Modernist organization Persis were the two main intellectual bodies. Persis began as a study club in Bandung, and with its publication *Pembela Islam* (Islam's Defenders), engaged aggressively' in polemical debates in areas of religion, society and politics. Federspiel argues that Ahmad Hassan (d1958) of Persis was 'responsible for its particular orientation on Islamic questions' (Federspiel, 1970: 28).

According to Federspiel, 'writings of other Persis leaders indicate a basic agreement with

¹⁶ In West Sumatra, Islamic boarding schools were called '*Surau*'.

his (Hassan's) stated beliefs'. Though Persis's appeal was considerable, it still remained marginal compared to the size and reach of the Muhammadiyah and SI. But knowledge of the benchmarks that Hassan and Persatuan Islam used in politics is vital in order to grasp the future ideas of Muhammad Natsir, Modernism's most articulate Islamic politician, (Federspiel, 1970: 28).

Ijtihad and the Modernist political discourse

The above discussion has mainly concerned itself with the consequences that the use of *ijtihad* by the Modernists have had, on instigating reform in the educational curriculum for 'Santri' Indonesians, and on revolutionising public association by creating independent, non-governmental 'civil society' organisations, such as Muhammadiyah, the *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Islamic Youth Group) and Persis. In the area of political thinking, *ijtihad* was used to understand modern political ideas and concepts such as independence, nationalism and the nation-state, parliament and democracy, and secularism.

As 'in an era of nations, with parliaments, treasuries and various installations', which Natsir argued, 'did not in essence conflict with the will of Almighty God, but are in fact given by Islam, Muslims are able to use *ijtihad* for the modern state and society, as long as these do not contravene Islam's permanent rules and boundaries (*had-had*)' (Natsir, 2001:114).¹⁷ Thus, Modernism in Indonesia pioneered the use of *ijtihad* in order to assess modern political ideas and practices. Natsir's political *ijtihad* would be at the forefront of Islam's political future in Indonesia during the Republic's first decade.

Muhammad Natsir: Islamic Modernism and Political Islam

Muhammad Natsir was born in 1908 in West Sumatra, the son of a junior clerk in the colonial administration. He was one of the few of his time to have received a Dutch

¹⁷ dalam negara abad ke-20 ini, dengan berapa parliamen, department-department anggaran belanja negara, dan bermacam-macam instellingnya, yang pada hakekatnya sekali-kali tidak bertentangan dengan kehendak agama Islam, malah diberikan oleh Islam, kita berijtihad tentang itu, asal tidak melanggar had-had dan aturan-aturan yang sudah tetap. Natsir (2001: 114)

secondary education. Upon completion of his secondary education, he earned a scholarship to study law in Holland but instead opted to undertake a diploma in teaching in Bandung, on the island of Java. While in Bandung, he first joined the elite study club JIB, comprising Western-educated Muslims, before joining Persis (Kahin, 1993:159, 165; Federspiel, 1970: 28 & Mahendra, 1995: 119). The significance of Natsir to modernist Islamic political thinking is that he was its main articulator and propagator in both writing and in practice. Muhammad Natsir's relationship with Indonesian politics spans over 60 years from writer to revolutionary, politician to rebel and to becoming an honoured Islamic figure in Indonesia and the Islamic world in latter life. Thus, in order to assess the development of Islamic political thinking in Indonesia his contribution to it is worthy of examination.

In Persis, Natsir's Islamic education and affiliation led him to what was probably the most aggressive, puritanical and extreme of the Modernist camps, under the guidance of Ahmad Hassan. Persis, in line with Islamic Modernism's positivistic epistemology, emphasised the importance of *Usul ul-Fiqh* (Federspiel, 1970: 9). Hooker (2003: 48) confirms this, viewing Hassan's approach to legal verdicts (*fatawa*) as literally consisting of 'Quran (basic source), language and *ahadith*' [plural of Hadith], all being related to 'grammar and etymology' as the 'foundations'.

Many of Natsir's significant contributions to modernist Islamic political thinking were made during his time as a writer for Persis. He later joined Masyumi during the Japanese occupation of 1942-45 and not long after the end of hostilities against the Dutch in 1949, he became party Chairman in 1952. Within parliament, he continued his role as the main political mouthpiece of the Modernists, delivering some of his most historic speeches on the position of Islam in regard to the State.

Even before independence, the Traditionalists had not possessed thinkers able to offer solutions to the problems of intellectual stagnation and colonialism through modern means. The NU did not possess articulate thinker-activist leaders, but rather traditional

'Kiai',¹⁸ who may have possessed the scholarly brilliance of Kiai Hasyim as-Asyari, but without the political astuteness of the Modernists. The Traditionalists lacked the ability to confront and develop their own political postures on events shaping the dynamics of Indonesian society during these times (Noer, 1969: 226; Feith & Castles, 1970: 203).

In parliament, Natsir represented not only the Islamic Modernists, but also the Traditionalists' NU, in the quest to make Indonesia an Islamic state. As Feith and Castles (1969:203) argued, the NU — unlike Masyumi and Natsir — did not produce a political ideology or an ideologue who could articulate their ideas in modern political discourse. NU's political policies were often opportunistic and their statements in parliament were 'traditional and scholastic' or mere restatements of positions that had been formulated by the 'reformist' Masyumi (Noer, 1969: 203).

This dissertation argues that Natsir's political legacy is more practical than theoretical — not being confined to the lofty abstract ideals of academics and thinkers. Natsir's activities and polemics may lack the sophistication (Hefner, 2000: 103, 106) of empirical academic analysis, but even his neo-Modernist predecessor Nurcholish Madjid acknowledged them as a brilliant contribution to the dialectics of the times, Natsir's *ijtihad* on the ontology of Islamic political thinking concerning modern concepts such as the nation-state, nationalism and patriotism, the state ideology *Pancasila*, as well as on democracy and secularism, shed light on the political aspirations of the *Santri* divide in Indonesian politics and society at the time — a legacy that still continues today (Hefner, 2000: 103 & 106; Madjid in Harjono 2000: 90-96).

A collection of Natsir's early writings and speeches were first published in 1954 titled *Capita Selecta*. This was further added when the second volume of *Capita Selecta* was published in 1957. For the purpose of this dissertation, two recent collections of Natsir's writings and speeches — *Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara* (Islam as the Basis of the State) published in 2000 and *Agama dan Negara; Dalam Perspektif Islam* (Religion and State

¹⁸ A term of respect for 'ulama' in Java

in an Islamic Perspective) published in 2001 — have also been employed. In all, these collections span over five decades, and are the legacy of Modernist thought in Indonesia (Natsir, 1954; Natsir, 2000; Natsir, 2001).

In 1957, as a member of the Indonesian parliament and Chairman of Masyumi, Natsir made two key speeches during the constitutional debate concerning state ideology. The significance of these addresses were that it comprehensively defined the modernist views towards secularism and the state ideology *Pancasila* by arguing for its replacement with Islam, as both the basis of the state and state ideology, *Pidato Dalam Sidang Pleno Konstituante Tanggal 12 November 1957*. (Speech made before the Plenary Constitutional Session date 12 November, 1957)

After his retreat from formal politics, Natsir continued to speak out against the further secularisation of Indonesian politics and was part of the ‘petition of 50’ of influential Indonesians that petitioned President Suharto against the government policy of applying the ‘Government guidelines for understanding and practicing the *Pancasila*’ which was social program to be implemented on all layers of society and was seen by many among the *Santri* camp as an attempt to sacralise the state ideology, thus taking away the public and private space of citizens and organisations (Ismail, 1995: 162 – 199, Bourchier 1987: 7-10). His speech *Anti Pancasila Sangat Mudah dipakai Sebagai Alat Pemukul* (Anti-*Pancasila* Used Easily as a Weapon), on behalf of the delegation representing Islamic leaders to parliament and *Jangan Meng-Agamakan Pancasila dan Sebaliknya, Jangan Mem-Pancasilakan Agama*’ (Do not Religion-ize Pancasila and Vice-Versa, do not Make *Pancasila* a Religion) written in 1982 in response to the mandatory enforcement of the PMP (Morals of Pancasila Education), as curriculum in all schools in Indonesia (Natsir, 2001).

For Natsir, the culture of blindly following (*taqlid*) higher religious authorities plagued the Muslim community, resulting in the lack of progress. His opposition to his way of thinking was in the tradition of the earlier Lebanon-born Modernist Rashid Rida (d1935) (viz: Kurzman, 1998: 81), who considered independent thinking or *ijtihad* a necessary

part of Islamic renewal, as it is ‘the instinct of independence, which is the opposite to imitation, and the tendency for discovery and invention’. For Natsir, abandoning imitation and reviving independent thinking through *ijtihad*, was crucial for the sake of progress and development in the Twentieth Century (Kurzman, 2002: 81; Natsir, 2001: 114).

Natsir and other Persis writers often upset other *santris*, especially the Traditionalists. In 1932, Natsir published an article titled ‘Keadaan Udara Muslim Sekarang’ (The Prevailing Atmosphere of Muslims) defending Persis’s right to criticise the Traditionalists, whom he called the ‘*Kaum Furu*’¹⁹ (branches group) (cited in: Kurzman, 2002: 31-39) for their adherence to *taqlid*. Natsir further states that the Traditionalists were imbued with *bid’ah* (decadent innovation), and lacked both political awareness, and independent thinking. Thus, Natsir challenged the Traditionalist camp by advocating the substitution of *taqlid* with *ijtihad* based on the pristine sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunnah, to assess modern political ideas and concepts. In Natsir’s articulation of each issue, he provided explanations constructed anew, by utilising both the Islamic text and an independent mind to formulate his outlook. Utilising the main epistemology arrived at by the scholars of *Usul ul-Fiqh*, Natsir — like the scholars of *Usul ul-Fiqh* before him — recognised that *ijtihad* was practiced by understanding the issue at hand, and relating it to the Qur’an and Sunnah (Natsir, 1954: 228).

Before elaborating on Natsir’s political literature it is important to become familiar with his perspective on the ‘role of the mind’ when endeavouring to undertake research into political issues. Natsir’s thinking demonstrates his allegiance to *Usul ul-Fiqh* in his early writings ‘Rationalism in Islam and the Reaction Towards It’ (Natsir, 1954:177-205) and ‘Islam’s Attitude Towards Independent Thinking’ (Natsir, 1954: 206 -232).

¹⁹ Natsir applies this term derogatively to mean ‘the faction who follow others’. ‘*Furu*’ in Arabic literally means ‘branches’, and, like a tree, the branches depend on the trunk for support. In Islamic intellectual discourse ‘*Kaum furu*’, refers to those, or that faction in the Islamic community, which concerns itself with following the rules and rituals that have already been expounded without recourse to reasoning whether or not there is evidence for them.

In 'Rationalism and the Reaction Towards it', Natsir presents his advocacy for the return to *Usul ul-Fiqh* in his polemics against the 'free thinking' secular nationalists of the time. Natsir explains how the ideas of early Muslim philosophers, free thinkers and rationalists had already been evaluated and rejected by the prominent scholar of theology al-Asyari (al-Ashari) (d. 935). He argues that the mind is not a source of evidence rather; its role (through the medium of Arabic linguistics) was to understand the text, and not place judgement upon it (Natsir, 2001: 205).

Natsir explains his ideas concerning thinking, which are consistent with an-Nabhani's formula of understanding whether the subject to be proven requires transmitted evidence (or '*dalil 'aqli*') or rational evidence (or '*dalil aqli*'), in his polemics with the secular nationalist Sukarno in '*Sikap Islam Terhadap Kemerdekaan Berfikir*' (Islam's attitude towards independent thinking) (Natsir, 1954: 217 - 223). Natsir explains how a simple incident, the contact of a dog's saliva with a bowl,²⁰ could be understood in three ways. Firstly, it could be understood through employing reason to judge the order in a text. Secondly, it could be grasped by using the text alone, to understand the Holy Prophet's order. Finally, it could be perceived by utilising the mind to understand the order of the text.

In the first understanding the rational mind independent of the text would state that the order of the Prophet to wash seven times with dirt and once with soil was due to the filth of the dog's saliva and because of the ignorance of the effect of using kerosene at that time. It is therefore no longer valid if kerosene is available. Thus, the mind becomes the arbiter of right and wrong according to the dynamics of the time. Whereas in the second, the text has defined how to specifically perform this ritual.

²⁰ The *Hadith* from the Prophet states that if a person came into contact with the saliva of a dog then the person must wash the area that came in contact with the dog's saliva seven times with water, one of which has to be with dirt (sand or soil).

There is no specific indication given by the Prophet Muhammad that filth was the reason for the ritual, so therefore the Muslim does that which is ordered, nothing more nor less. Alternatively, the third understanding is that if there is no certain indication that filth is the reason behind the order mandated by the Prophet and because of our knowledge today of the effect of kerosene, we should perform both the ritual and employ the use of kerosene (Natsir, 1954: 221)

For Natsir, the last example demonstrates how the place of mind is in conformity to the text — as opposed to the second example, which refuses to allow the mind to play a role. But most dangerous of course to Natsir is the first example, as it illustrates the use of the mind to judge the text. ‘As using the mind alone to interpret a text is an example of utterly free thinking, which does not draw boundaries and an example of the mind wanting to control everything, to critique everything, to destroy everything, apart from free thinking itself’ (Natsir, 1954: 223).²¹

Therefore, in the above discussion, Natsir’s understanding of the role of the mind sets the boundaries by which all his thinking is formulated. His epistemological adherence to the formula of *Usul ul-Fiqh*, which he exemplifies in the discussion above, reflects his ontological positions concerning Islamic political thinking, as the rest of this chapter will discuss. The *ijtihad* of Natsir in the field of politics can be described as Islam-Statist and pro-*Shari’ah* law, in line with the dominant *Santri* view at the time.

Natsir’s concept of nationalism

During this period, Both Modernist and Traditionalist *Santri* were united in the struggle for Independence against Dutch colonialism. But Modernists such as Natsir articulated well the reservations that the *Santri* camps had on the type of national solidarity that

²¹ “Akal-merdeka 100% tidak menggariskan batas buat dirinja sendiri. Semua ia mau atur, semua ia mau kritik, semua ia mau runtuhkan, ketjuali dia (akal-merdeka) itu sendiri”. (Natsir 1954: 223)

would replace colonialism. Natsir argued that Islam had already understood quite early on that there is a negative aspect to the value mentioned earlier. That is, love of a nation or nationalism, which is excessively arrogant and conceited, chauvinistic, racist and xenophobic (Natsir, 2000: 92).²²

For Natsir, the fear is not nationalism itself, but a chauvinistic understanding of it that is against the aims of Islam. Natsir argues that 'love of motherland' or *Ibu Pertiwi* is something instinctual in humanity, but should not replace the bond of religion or lead to racism. In Natsir's perspective, nationalism in Islam does not sacralise the motherland in the way the secular nationalists do, as this is considered *shirk* (putting something else on the same level as Almighty Allah), a grave sin for Muslims (Natsir, 2001: 51-52).

Instead, Natsir argued from a Qura'nic verse ('For of surety the believers are the brothers of other believers' — Qur'an, *Surah al-Hujuraat*, 49:10) for uniting the strength of Muslims in the archipelago and worldwide. This quite evidently conflicts with the secular notion of nationalism. Natsir did not agree with the principle of defending 'my country right or wrong', since Islam teaches (Qur'an, *Surah al-Hujuraat*, 49:13) that Almighty Allah created mankind 'from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another' (see Natsir, 2000: 27). Natsir's nationalism was based on what he considers the natural human inclination that individuals have towards their homelands (Natsir, 2001: 44-47).

This conception of nationalism lead to a direct conflict between Natsir and the secular nationalists, as for the latter, 'purity of religion' meant separating it from the state. Natsir argued from the Qura'nic verses 'I have created *jinn* [spirits] and mankind only to worship Me' (*Surah ad-Dharyat*, 51: 56), to mean that the aim of life, just as in the struggle for independence, is different for Muslims to that of secular nationalists.

²² *Disamping itu Islam pun telah lebih dulu dan mengetahui adanya bagaian yang negatif daripada nilai tadi. Yaitu cinta bangsa atau katakanlah kebangsaan yang berlebih-lebihan kecongkakan dan kesombongan bangsa, chauvinisme rasialisme dan xenofobi.* Natsir (2000: 92)

Muslims live and struggle for the sake of Almighty Allah and not the State, as the State is merely a means to live life accordance with God, and not an end in itself (Natsir, 2001: 72, 78).

Natsir argued that the struggle for independence against Dutch colonialism was for the Muslims a 'community obligation' or '*fardu kifayah*' a juristic maxim or '*kaedah*' in *Usul ul-Fiqh*. For Natsir, the struggle of the Muslims was the same as that of the secular nationalists, but their aims and objectives were different. Natsir explains that nations or '*bangsa*' have always existed since the beginning of civilisation and that the Prophet Muhammad's aim was not to establish a State but to organise nations in accordance with the principles of Islam (Natsir, 2001: 65, 69-70).

The State was a means of establishing the justice of Islam through implementing the heritage of Islamic culture and *Shari'ah* law in society. Natsir argued that for any nation 'the laws must be strongly rooted in the people's hearts and minds — that is, strongly rooted in the realm of thought, feeling and belief, as well as the life philosophy of the people of our country' (Natsir, 2001: 55)²³, which in Indonesia, according to Natsir, was Islam. Thus, the Muslims' involvement with the struggle for independence was to establish a nation based on Islam (Natsir, 2000: 11, 25).

According to Natsir, Islam is not merely a religion but an ideology that would be the basis of an independent nation-state in the archipelago, in line with the majority of the population who were Muslims. Natsir argued that the religion of Islam is different from other religions, since it has within it several parts that connect to the laws and punishments of the State, or several regulations which relate to transactions and the

²³ undang-undang itu harus berurat-urat berakar dalam kalbu, yakni berurat berakar dalam alam pikiran, alam perasaan dan alam kepercayaan serta falsafah hidup dari rakyat dalam negara kita ini. (Natsir 2000: 55)

like, which are all one entity, which cannot be separated from Islam (Natsir, 2001: 69).²⁴

This again conflicted with the secular nationalists' position, which cited modern Turkey as an example of the need to separate religion from the State. The argument put forward by Sukarno was that history showed how the Ottoman Caliphate, the last bastion of Islamic governance, was dismantled to make way for the secular Republic of Turkey, in order for the country to modernise. Natsir responded by advocating the *Usul-ul-Fiqh* position, that history is not a source of evidence, as to the correctness of an idea or policy. For the Muslims, history should not decide whether religion and state must be separated. Instead the sources of Islam (Qur'an and Sunnah) are the determining factors (Natsir, 2001: 115).

Natsir's ideological conflicts with secular nationalism continued in parliament, especially in relation to the State ideology and the source of the constitution. As the Pancasila became the basis of the Indonesian Republic, Masyumi under Natsir argued that the Pancasila was conceived to please the minority of the population and did not represent the vast majority who were Muslims. Throughout his career in parliament, he argued the case for making Indonesia an Islamic State, and warned against the further secularisation of the society, especially through Pancasila (Natsir, 2001: 165).

In the case of secularism, like that of his contemporaries Sayiid Qutub (d1966) and Maulana Maududi of Pakistan (d1979) Natsir argues that Islam is vehemently against such a 'way of life' as secularism would remove the moral, ethical, religious and cultural values from society. According to Natsir, humanity needs a permanent set of beliefs which secularism fails to provide. Secularism would make the social, economic, educational and legal affairs of the state purely materialistic, thus removing the spiritual connection to life. Secularism 'separates the sciences from moral and cultural values'

²⁴ Agama Islam berlainan dengan agama lain, mempunyai dalam stelselnya beberapa bagaian yang berkenaan dengan hukum-hukum kenagaraan (staatsrecht) dan uqubat (stafrechts) beberapa peraturan yang berhubungan dengan muamalah (publik dan familierecht) dan yang semacam itu, yang mana semua itu adalah satu bagaian yang tak dapat dipisahkan dari agama Islam. (Natsir 2000: 69)

teaching ‘that ethics should be divorced from science’, thus removing the role of religion from morality (Calvert, 2008:6-7; Natsir, 2001: 204-05; Feith & Castles, 1970: 216).

That is why Masyumi under Natsir argued extensively for Islam to be the basis of the State ideology, as the notion of *Pancasila* upheld by the secular nationalists only amounted to a ‘small part’ of the principles that Islam upholds. Moreover, Natsir claimed that the concept was so abstract that even the Indonesian Communist Party accepted it, knowing full well that the first principle is ‘Belief in One Almighty God’. He argued that *Pancasila* was a concept that had no roots in Indonesian society — unlike Islam (Natsir, 2000: 59).

For Natsir, Islam was a comprehensive system, the religion of eighty-five per cent of the population and the way of life of the majority of Indonesians. In his understanding of Islam, it thus becomes incumbent on the Muslims of Indonesia to make the country an Islamic State implementing *Shari’ah* law. Natsir argues that if those who hold authority, and the right to implement laws between inhabitants of a country, do not take divine laws as a basis, obeying instead the climate of the time and the dynamics of unrestricted rationalism, then they are not separating religion from state. Instead, he asserted, they are throwing away the laws of religion — a grave crime against Almighty Allah (Natsir, 2000: 57; Natsir, 2001: 117).²⁵

Islamic State and Theistic Democracy

Though Natsir argued that a State based on Islamic principles, implementing *Shari’ah* law, was the only viable option for Indonesia, in other areas in which Islam had not ruled

²⁵ dan berhak memberi hukum antara penduduk negeri, tidak mengambil undang-undang ilahi sebagai dasar, tetapi menurut hawa zaman dan kedinamisan rasionalisme yang tak ada batas, maka dia itu bukan memisahkan Agama dari negara tetapi melemparkan hokum-hukum agama. (Natsir 2001: 117)

it was the duty of parliament through consultation or '*musyawarah*', to legislate and bring forth policies. The Islamic ideology, according to Natsir, was both viable and practical enough to meet the challenges of a modern nation-state through *ijtihad*. Unlike the democracy espoused by the secular nationalists that removes religion from politics, Natsir's approach to democracy was constrained by the guidelines of Islam. Natsir based democracy in Islam within the guidelines of *Usul ul-Fiqh* maxims or boundaries ('*Hud*') (Natsir, 2001: 219). Thus, from a *kaedah* (maxim) taken from the Qur'anic verse 'We have made everything on earth for you' (*Surah al-Baqarah*, 2: 29), Natsir developed the concept of 'theistic' democracy. With this concept Natsir stressed, in his assessment, the democratic nature of the Islamic ideology, and the absence of a clergy in Islam. Unlike a theocratic state, whose policies were decided by a priestly class, a theistic democracy would have an elected *majelis* (council) that would employ *ijtihad* and *musyawarah*, in implementing the policies of the State (Natsir, 2001: 220-57).

As with contemporary debates about the nature of the divide between the private and the public, post-Suharto Indonesia has witnessed an ever-increasing Islamic revival in both the private and public sphere (Fealy, 2008:15). There is an obfuscating between the private and public Islam as public piety of and open political expression for Islam continue to rise which has given rise to calls for the return of the original Jakarta charter (*Piagam Jakarta*, see chapter 1) and other such Islam inspired policies which will be discussed in chapter 8.

Conclusion

As demonstrated above through the discussion of Natsir's writings, the Modernists did not challenge the Traditionalists' epistemology. The major dispute between the Modernists and the Traditionalists was the issue of *taqlid*. The discussion above shows that the Modernists simply revived the practice of *ijtihad* that had been abandoned by Islamic intellectual scholarship and applied this methodology to new issues that the Muslims of the archipelago were encountering.

Natsir's writings on Islam's intellectual tradition of rational thinking were constrained by the boundaries of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, confirming his allegiance to the use of *Usul ul-Fiqh*'s positivistic epistemology when constructing Islamic perspectives on modern political issues. His ontological positions on nationalism, the nation-state, state ideology, law, secularism and *Pancasila* were derived by using the process of *ijtihad* in line with the formula that classical Islamic scholars in the field such as as-Shafi'i had laid down a millennium earlier. Thus, the Islamic Modernist political thinking of Natsir was a fresh attempt to understand the modern complexities of the world, through the prism of a revived Islamic intellectual tradition of rational thinking and inquiry.

This chapter has charted the rise, fall and rediscovery of *Usul ul-Fiqh* as a working science, especially with the issue of *ijtihad*, in order to understand the developments of the contemporary world and its consequences for Indonesia. It was also shown that this science of *Usul ul-Fiqh* evoked the modernist *santris'* anti-colonialist struggle and their call for a nation-state based on Islam. The thinking of Muhammad Natsir was elaborated, showing the foundation of his ideas upon *Usul ul-Fiqh*. The following chapter discusses the significance of Nurcholish Madjid's adoption of hermeneutics in order to understand Islam and its rise to prominence, in particular among many contemporary *santri* political activists, actors and thinkers.

Chapter 5: From Modernist to Neo-Modernist Islamic Political Thinking: National Stability, Neo-Modernism and Liberal Islam

This chapter examines Nurcholish Madjid's adoption of hermeneutics in order to understand Islam. It will be shown that this development towards Substantialism was not organic, but due to the support that individuals with this type of thinking received from powerful vested interests. The same forces fostered the logical extension of Madjid's thinking which — as demonstrated in Faisal Ismail's dissertation — pressured much of the *Santri* community into accepting the *Pancasila*, by disrupting the internal unity of different organisations through intervention and intimidation. Madjid's Neo-Modernist epistemology, which was introduced to Indonesia during the Suharto period, and has been nurtured by a self-proclaimed network of Islamic liberals — the first generation of *Santri* youth raised by the P4 (Guidelines for the Understanding and practice of the Pancasila) and PMP (Pancasila Morals Education) under the auspices of Suharto's authoritarian rule.

Liberal Islam's activities and writings are thus analysed, investigating how this tendency wrestles with both Islamic epistemology and ontology head on. This examination is preceded herein by a review of Liberal Islam's literature and recent history, so as to place this tendency in its intellectual context. This discussion includes examination of the views of Luthfi Assyauckanie and Moqsith Ghazali. Liberal Islam will therefore be further elaborated in this chapter, showing how it advances beyond Madjid's approach of bridging an understanding between orthodox Islamic thinking and hermeneutics, by directly challenging the relevancy and legitimacy of some of the methodological maxims and understandings in *Usul ul-Fiqh*, as well as classical and Modernist political jurisprudence in general. Interestingly, in relation to HMI, though most of Liberal Islam's theological interpretations have not been readily received in general, its political outlook closely resembles the practices of many HMI alumni within government since the time in 1973 when Nurcholish Madjid's protégé Akbar Tanjung became the first HMI

National Chairman to join the non-denominational party Golkar, rather than the Islamic PPP (Means, 2009: 292).

Political Islam and the New Order Regime

Since Suharto embraced *Pancasila* as being the ideology necessary to safeguard Indonesia from future upheaval, political Islam as practiced by the *Santri* bloc at the time had to be subdued. Muhammad Kamal Hassan notes that ‘by 1968 Muslim leaders and political parties became aware of the fact that they were not to be accepted as partners in power and that a politically powerful Islam was to have no place in the new political system of Pancasila Democracy’ (Ismail, 1995: 130-31). This meant disallowing the rehabilitation of the Masyumi in order to remove the most noticeable party within *Santri* politics and banning influential members of the Masyumi party — such as former Deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Roem, who had not taken part in the PRRI rebellion — from taking leadership roles in the regime approved *Parmusi* or the Indonesian Muslims Party

Furthermore, in order not to challenge the *Pancasila*, the government used political machinations through its secret operatives, to place its candidates Jaelani Naro and Imran Kadir as *Parmusi* chairman, which led to internal conflicts. When this did not work, the State took executive decision, appointing former HMI leader H. M. S. Mintaredja to the position. Mintaredja at the time was also serving as a government minister for the regime. Thus, Ismail (1995: 131) quotes the words of Ajip Rosidi: ‘the party had been set up to serve the interests of the government rather than fulfill the needs of the Islamic community’. Under this leadership, the party garnered 5.36% of the vote in the 1971 election — a far cry from the glory days of Masyumi’s 20% during the 1955 election. The 1972 political restructuring sealed the coffin for Masyumi-style political Islam, as the multi-party system was abandoned, and political parties forced to amalgamate, with the Nationalist Party fusing with the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party) to become the Indonesian Democracy Party or PDI and the various Islamic parties merging

to become the United Development Party or PPP on 5 January 1973.

As the 1970s continued, the authoritarian nature of the New Order regime continued to place demands on the *Santri* communities. With the insistence of the *P4* (Guidelines for Understanding and Practice of the *Pancasila*), a mandatory program to be taught to all government workers and school age students, several high-profile members of the *santri* bloc, as well as its last political bastion the PPP, held reservations concerning the forced implementation of the *P4*, viewing the government's coercive tactics as a plan to place the *Pancasila* above Islam as their religion (Ismail, 1995: 183;173). However, the regime saw the *Santri* attitude, especially that of the PPP, as evidence that many among the *Santri* camp had not fully accepted *Pancasila* and still had Islamic State visions for Indonesia (Ismail, 1995:147-48).

The importance of solidifying *Pancasila* was experienced in the language of intimidation used by Suharto to those who may have posed an opposition to *Pancasila*, culminated in the outlawing of Muslims organisations that refused to accept government line, and the imprisonment of *Santri* individuals who questioned the *Pancasila*. As Suharto warned: 'Due to its truth, any group which would change the Pancasila will meet with destruction', (Ismail, 1995: 143). Although not mentioning it by name, Suharto clearly saw the *Santri* camp as the greatest threat to the *Pancasila*. Deliar Noer observes this intimidation during the 1977 election when:

many of their 'ulama' have been banned from preaching at one time or another. Some of them have even been imprisoned. In 1978, about the time when the MPR was to convene for the election of the country's president, a number of Muslim leaders, including Mahbub Djunaedi (a former prominent member of the Indonesian Journalists' Association and current secretary of the PPP), Ismail Sunny (professor of constitutional law at the University of Indonesia and rector of the Muhammadiyah University), and Sutomo (well-known as Bung Tomo the Surabaya hero, who in 1977 defended the Darul Islam movement against excessive accusations from certain government quarters), were detained. So was Imaduddin A. Rahim, a lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology who had been active in dakhwah (missions) at home and abroad. They were released only about a year later (Noer in Ismail, 1995: 163).

By 1980, the Suharto regime was still unconvinced of the *Santris'* commitment to the *Pancasila*. As Suharto stated in Ismail (1995: 169):

two-thirds of the members of the [MPR] (legislative body) can, if they wish change to the constitution. [But] ABRI does not wish to have a change, and if there is a change, it is its duty to use weapons... Rather than using weapons in facing a change of the 1945 constitution and Pancasila, we had better kidnap one out of the two-thirds who wish to make the change, because two-thirds minus one is not valid according to the 1945 constitution.

Thus, many from the *Santri* bloc evinced reluctance towards Suharto's implementation of *Pancasila*, and the regime continued to perceive them as thorns in its ideological plans. Even though by 1986 the *Santri* party PPP in parliament and all of the mainstream Islamic mass organisations, including Muhammadiyah, NU and Persis, had forgone Islam and adopted *Pancasila* as the basis of their respective organisations, the inability to totally depoliticise Islam was still a cause of concern. Moreover, during the forced drive for all mass organization to accept the *Pancasila* as their sole basis, two well-established and popular *Santri* student organisations, the PII and HMI, further strengthened the regime's suspicions. The PII was a secondary education Islamic organization that refused to accept the *Pancasila*. A section of the HMI set up a rival national committee and its various branches split on factional lines (Ismail, 1995: 260-69).

However, on the political thinking front, the rise of authoritarianism allowed a new form of Islamic political thinking, the 'Neo-Modernism' movement, to prosper. The effects of this movement would manifest in allowing a new generation of *Santri* political actors to function beyond the confines of *Santri* political parties, or in the case of the New Order era, the PPP provided different approaches for the *Santri* political expression and participation.

Neo-Modernist Islamic political thinking

Prominent Muslim intellectuals who espoused what Liddle termed as 'Substantialist' interpretations of the Qur'an and *Sunnah* — challenging once again the boundaries of Islamic thinking — have in more recent times been termed as 'Neo-Modernist Islamic

political thinkers'. However, in contrast to the heated ideological climate of the colonial, revolutionary and liberal democracy periods of the 1950s under which the Modernists conducted their activities, Malcolm Cone states that the development of Neo-Modernist Islamic thinking was nurtured, funded and encouraged by President Suharto's New Order authoritarian regime, under a climate of political stability and economic development (Cone, 2002: 52-67). This new approach to Islamic thinking has been identified by Robert Hefner as arising out of the chaos of the 1960s — which first resulted in the disbanding of Masyumi, followed by the anti-communist witch-hunt, costing an estimated half a million lives (Cribb, 2004: 133). Many Neo-Modernists, such as Nurcholish Madjid, were the offspring of the Modernist camp. Thus, the failure of their predecessors to have made Islam either a uniting or stabilising factor in the socio-political life of the nation contributed to the Neo-Modernists' initial retreat from state politics (Hefner, 2001: 503).

The Neo-Modernists were also more highly educated than their Modernist predecessors. Thus, Nurcholish Madjid's father, for example, was merely a traditionalist *Kiai* who stayed with Masyumi even after the NU split.²⁶ Madjid was better educated than even Muhammad Natsir, who had turned down a scholarship to study Law in the Netherlands, to undertake a diploma in teaching. Like the New Order Government, Madjid was suspicious and antithetical towards Islam having a formal political role or involvement in matters of state (Madjid, 1998b: 90).

Nurcholish Madjid

From Young Natsir to Neo-Modernist

As will be discussed later in Chapter 7, the brainchild behind the HMI creed was its

²⁶ The Masyumi Party for the first years of Indonesia's liberal democracy period included both the Traditionalists and Modernists *Alirans*, including the NU and Muhammadiyah. In 1953 the NU split from Masyumi and formed their political party under the same name, NU. For more on NU's split from Masyumi see Noer (1965).

former two-term National Chairman, Chicago University-trained Professor Nurcholish Madjid, who is among one of the most highly regarded intellectuals of the Neo-Modernist outlook. He has been considered the pioneer and most consistent promoter of Neo-Modernist thinking in Indonesia. Madjid rose to both notoriety and prominence with his 1974 speech on the issue of secularisation and his stance against Islam's formal role in politics (Kartanegara, 2003: 234), which will be examined later in the present chapter.

Madjid grew up in Islamic Modernist surroundings. His father was a prominent member of Masyumi and he was educated in predominately modernist educational institutions. During Madjid's early university years, his intellectual brilliance was noticeable and he became the president of the influential HMI, often regarded as the 'young Natsir', and the would-be successor and defender of Natsir's Modernist intellectual legacy. But as Madjid began to codify an independent outlook, his ideas began to estrange him from his Modernist predecessors, who attacked him vehemently (Madjid, 6 October 2013).

Madjid's intellectual strength lies in the way he combined both his traditionalist family orientation with his modernist education at the secondary Modernist *Pesantren* 'Gontor'²⁷ in East Java. He further developed his thinking through undertaking his undergraduate study at the newly established State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in Jakarta, and crystallised his intellectual orientation under the guidance of Chicago University professor Fazlur Rahman (Madjid, 1992: 613). Madjid's epistemological loyalty to Fazlur Rahman's episteme is evident if one compares Madjid's methodology for study to that of Fazlur Rahman in the first chapter of the latter's *Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy* (Rahman, 1992: 26).

In the Introduction to his book *'Islam Doktrin Dan Peradaban'* (Islam, Doctrine and

²⁷ 'Pesantren' is the Javanese equivalent to 'Surau' or Islamic boarding school. In Java, the *Gontor* is considered a 'modern *pesantren*', as it includes as part of its curriculum non-Islamic related subjects as opposed to the 'traditional *pesantrens*' that only instruct students with Islam-related subjects.

Civilisation) Madjid explains the importance of a contextual approach to *ijtihad* takes into consideration language, environment and historical circumstances, which, according to his analysis, evoke the teachings of Islam in Indonesia. In his text '*Usul ul-Fiqh to historical contextualism: the epistemological challenge*', he states that one:

*must take into consideration the socio-cultural condition, the principle features being its growth, development and complexities... this is related to awareness of history, that is the awareness that all events concerning affairs of mankind is closely connected to the different eras and place [in which they live] (Madjid, 1992: lxi).*²⁸

Madjid has been at the forefront of calling for a re-evaluation of Islamic thinking in Indonesia. He explains there is a need to free 'oneself of traditional values and seeking values which are oriented towards the future' (Madjid, 1998: 286). Such values would be inclusive and dynamic, derived by liberating Islamic thought from the rigidity of classical Islamic epistemology and the modernist movement, which Madjid considered had become stagnant. Madjid's challenge to established epistemology is hermeneutics, an episteme that is devoid of Positivism's rational objectivity (Smith, Booth & Zalewski, 1996: 20).

The basis of Madjid's worldview is that Islam came to de-mystify humanity from the ignorance of superstition and mythology. Therefore, Madjid's works aimed to 'de-sacralize' the study of Islam by re-constructing modernist views concerning *Pancasila* and democracy, Islam and politics, law, ideology and secularisation. Madjid articulates all his understandings of the above issues using a more 'holistic' approach that takes into consideration context, language, culture and environment (Madjid, 1992: xii).

Epistemologically, Madjid recognises that the source of all Islamic ideas and concepts is the Qur'an and Sunnah, as 'all dialogue will refer to the highest of authorities'. However,

²⁸ *Melaksanakan ajaran Islam di Indonesia harus memperhitungkan kondisi sosial-budaya yang ciri utamanya, ialah pertumbuhan, perkembangan dan kemajemukan...ini terkait dengan masalah kesadaran historis, yaitu kesadaran bahwa segala sesuatu mengenai tatanan hidup manusia ada sangkutnya pautnya dengan perbedaan zaman dan tempat (Madjid, 1992: lxi).*

Madjid's lack of adherence to a methodology or '*usul*' detracts from the established orthodoxy. Outside the realm of that which concerns religion, is what Madjid calls the realm of 'secular transactions' — an area that needs *ijtihad* that is relevant to the given time and social environment. Madjid argues that all the prophets continually brought new lessons that were relevant to societal growth and development in accordance with their time and place. This meant leaving behind ideas that had become fossilised or stagnant (Madjid, 1992: lxxv; lxii).

Thus, Madjid argues for the need to continually re-interpret and re-articulate the understanding of Islam, to make it relevant to modern life. For Madjid, people cannot be separated from their environment, as the latter influences their character. The test of a religion's ability to be relevant to time only lends support to religion. Madjid argues that the substance, or in hermeneutics 'the spirit of the text' (Ast, 1989: 39-56), of the religion will continue to be relevant, even if the literal text itself does not necessarily remain so (Madjid, 1992: 576-79).

It is therefore important to become familiar with Madjid's philosophy on Islam and knowledge, before discussing Nurcholish Madjid's political thinking. Using the Prophet Muhammad's saying (collected by Tirmidhi in his *Jami'at-Tirmidhi*) that 'knowledge is the lost property of the Muslim', Madjid argues that Islam is the religion that is most in tune with modernity, as its earlier legacy shows that it has always been open to adopting new ideas. This is because, unlike all other religions (including Judaism and the Christianity), Islam has 'demythologised itself from all forms of paganism by radically promoting the secularisation of things outside God' (Madjid, 1992: 469).

Madjid on Islam and Knowledge

Madjid perceives that with Islam, religion is not an obstacle for mankind or against the nature of humanity. Rather, the Islamic lack of human hierarchy after the Prophet Muhammad, its promotion of literacy and encouragement towards political

participation by its adherents, are all evidences of its de-sacralised legacy. Madjid defines this understanding of de-sacralising everything outside the realm of religious rituals as the process of secularisation. Secularisation is different from secularism, an ideology seeking to remove all trace of religion from socio-political life, whereas 'secularisation' is the process of de-mythologising and de-sacralising everything that is within the realm of the mundane (Madjid, 1992: xxxix).

Thus for Madjid, secularisation does not mean removing the ethical and moral influence of religion from life, in fact Madjid considers this to be Islam's most important role for society (Madjid, 1998a: 37). Instead, he calls for the scrutiny of everything outside of the realm of ritual worship to be evaluated and interpreted contextually. Madjid argued for secularism in his book *'Islam Keindonesiaan dan Kemoderanan'* (Islam, Modernity and Indonesianism):

In other words, secularism is a concept which states that God has no right to control worldly problems... So secularism is an understanding that there is no God in humanity's worldly affairs. So, a consistent and perfect secular person is an atheist. A secular person that lacks consistency will experience a split personality' (Madjid, 1990: 179).²⁹

Thus, Madjid endorses the Modernist view that the stagnation in the Muslim world was directly due to the closing of the doors of *ijtihad*, an intellectual tool that Muslims could use to maintain relevance. Madjid says that God has given mankind a tool that — whenever it is used — will give a little more understanding of the laws. That tool is the special ability of mankind, which is called the mind, rationality or intellect (Madjid, 1990:

²⁹ dengan perkataan lain, sekularisme adalah suatu paham yang mengatakan bahwa tuhan tidak berhak menguasai masalah-masalah duniawi...Jadi sekularisme adalah paham tidak-bertuhan dalam kehidupan duniawi manusia. Maka seorang sekular yang konsekuen dan sempurna, adalah seorang aties. Dan seorang sekular yang kurang konsekuen, akan mengalami kepribadian yang pecah [split personality] (Madjid, 1990: 179).

246).³⁰ Thus, *ijtihad* was a necessary endeavour in order to revive Islam in Indonesia.

In discussing the meaning of the word 'Islam', Madjid argues that in the Qur'an, it always appears connected with the words *shirath* (*siraat* in Arabic) or 'a path' and *tariqth* (*tariqat* in Arabic) or 'a way', something that requires movement. He then elaborates that like the Indonesian word *jalan*, 'to walk' or 'to move'; this movement demands *jihad*, which in Arabic literally means 'effortless struggle'. Thus, Islam is a 'path' that requires continual 'movement' through 'effortless struggle' and *ijtihad*³¹ — a word derived from the same root word as *jihad*, *jahada* or 'hardship' — must continue to maintain Islam's relevance (Madjid, 1992: lxiii & lxiv).

To argue the case for this progressive nature in Islam, Madjid often cites Robert N. Bellah, who stated that the Prophet Muhammad was too modern for his time. The Prophetic model was too egalitarian, too pluralistic and democratic and thus doomed to failure, as the necessary societal infrastructure did not exist at that time, to support such a model. The social structure of the time could not support the Prophetic model's continuance for long and it was to be replaced by a more kin-based authority (Madjid, 1992: lxxiv; xl; see also Bellah, 1991: 147-67).

The Prophetic model is evidence of Islam's relativity to time and place, because Islam is a humanistic religion (since it has a natural disposition), which has ideals that are parallel to universal human ideals. These ideals will not stop at a certain stage in time, as one of the most important aspects of humanism is development. Because of this characteristic of development, there will never be a permanent solution to the problems of humanity (Madjid, 1999: 51). Therefore, the most important aspects in Islam are those principles that transcend time and place that enable one to perform *ijtihad* to

³⁰ *tuhan memberikan kepada manusia suatu alat yang, apabila digunakan, ia akan dapat sedikit banyak mengerti hukum-hukum tadi. Alat itu adalah kemampuan khusus pada manusia, yang di sebut akal, rasio atau intelek* (Madjid, 1990: 246).

³¹ In Arabic lexicography words are often related by their root structure (Madjid, 1992: lxiii & lxiv).

meet the vicissitudes of human society.

Substantialist Islam and Modern Politics According to Madjid

Continuing this radical departure from the Modernists in politics, Madjid's hermeneutical approach is the source of his rebellion against the symbolic use of Islam in formal political life. Nurcholish Madjid famously coined the term 'Islam yes, Islamic (political) parties no', in arguing that Indonesian society at large no longer saw the relevance in politicising Islam. Thus, Madjid's re-evaluation of many other political issues diverged from mainstream Modernism, as upheld by the old guard such as Muhammad Natsir, who considered Madjid's thinking irrelevant and dangerous to Islam (Madjid, 1990: 204 & Sukandi, 2003: 278).

However, Madjid was defiant, arguing that such political attitudes towards Islam and politics were due to the domination of 'Jurisprudence-ism' within the Islamic community, so that even reform (Modernist) movements in general still focused their goals towards that area. The formation of these laws (through jurisprudence) is also referred to as *Shari'ah*. As a result, an Islamic state becomes an apologia, where the Islamic community expects to obtain indications for rules and other laws. Whereas, he added, it is clear that this jurisprudence, even though being held by the reform faction, has lost its relevance to the pattern of life for this era (Madjid, 1990: 225).³²

For Madjid, the ideals of pluralism, inclusivism and democracy embody the substance or 'spirit' of Islam's political legacy of 'justice'. Substance meaning that the principle of 'justice' is more relevant than what is stated in the text itself, thus inner meaning rather

³² *fikihisme ini begitu dominan di kalangan umat Islam, sehingga gerakan-gerakan reformasinya pun, umunnya masih memusatkan sasarannya ke bidang itu. Susunan hukum ini juga kadang-kadang disebut sebagai syariat. Maka, negara Islam itu pun satu apologi, di mana umat Islam berharap dapat menunjukkan aturan-aturan dan hukum-hukum lainnya. Padahal sudah jelas bahwa fikih itu, meskipun telah ditangani oleh kaum reformasi, sudah kehilangan relevansinya dengan pola kehidupan zaman sekarang (Madjid, 1990: 225).*

than the literal. Madjid argues that this tradition of pluralism and inclusiveness set a trend, and helped create one of the most pluralistic societies for five centuries during medieval times in Spain under Islam (Madjid, 1992: 278). That is why, for Madjid the form is not as important as the substance and is the reason why this form of political thinking is referred to as 'substantialist'. Relevant are the broad principles, as they will allow new *ijtihad* to solve contemporary problems and issues. The juristic principle of the abrogated and the abrogating or '*an-Naskh wal Mansukh*', where in the Qur'an some verses revealed early during Muhammad's Prophethood are abrogated and replaced by later revealed verses, is proof of Islam's recognition of the need for change due to the changing circumstances (Madjid, 1992: lxi).

Madjid, Pancasila and Democracy

Madjid's attitude to state ideology differs drastically from that of the early Modernists such as Natsir, since Madjid considers the *Pancasila* a 'common platform' in upholding the democratic values necessary for Indonesia's pluralistic and diverse society (Madjid, 1992: 412). As Madjid explains, 'we choose democracy as an ideology not only because of principled considerations (that is, we believe that those democratic values are justified and supported by the spirit of Islamic teachings) but also because of its function as a set of open political rules' (Madjid, 1999: 69).³³

For Madjid, the *Pancasila*, combined with the virtues of democracy, are the means to build a society that adheres to the spirit of Islam (Madjid, 1998: 89). Madjid's discussion on democracy in Islam, as practiced by the second successor (*Khalifah*) to the Prophet Muhammad, his companion 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab, exemplifies the important principle of the leader undertaking *musyawarah* (consultation — *mushawarah* in Arabic) and accepting advice from among those whom he ruled, as well as the principle of applying rules relative to the socio-economic circumstances of the time (Madjid, 1992: 402).

³³ *kita memilih demokrasi sebagai ideology tidak hanya karena pertimbangan prinsipil yaitu karena nilai nilai demokrasi itu menurut kita dibenarkan dan didukung oleh semangat ajaran-ajaran Islam- tetapi juga karena fungsinya sebagai aturan permainan politik yang terbuka* (Madjid, 1999: 69).

To illustrate this point, Madjid recanted the Muslims conquest of Iraq under 'Umar's reign, which led to the possession of large tracts of cultivable lands as war booty. The Qur'an states that a fifth of war booty is placed under the control of the Prophet (and at his death passed to the treasury), a fifth share to the poor, orphans, debtors, travellers, and the rest to those who fought the battle. 'Umar spent several days in consultation with the two groups of the Prophet Muhammad's companions, the migrants from Mecca or '*Muhajirrin*', and the helpers of the Prophet in Medina or '*Ansar*', involving himself in heated discussions. Umar decided to abandon an apparent textual rule mentioned in the Qur'an, and opted to use *ijtihad* from a different Qura'nic verse: 'let not the wealth be circulated within the wealthy among you'. Instead, he ruled that all the land confiscated during battle be returned to the owners, and that endowments be provided for soldiers and their offspring (Madjid, 1992: 401-14).

This event in history proved to Madjid that 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab embodied in his rulership the democratic principle of discussion and consultation (*musyawarah*) with his peers. 'Umar sets the standard of how to apply the political legacy of the Prophet Muhammad. Importantly, 'Umar's refusal to apply the 'literal' understanding of a rule from the Qur'an was evidence that 'Umar's understanding was contextual and an example of how the dynamic nature of *ijtihad* could be used to recognise the social and cultural environment of the times (Madjid, 1992: 406 & xi).

Moreover, Umar's openness in consulting with people with different ideas and opinions is in line with Madjid's claim concerning the inclusive and pluralistic nature of the Prophetic model. This is because Madjid stated, 'in other words, a Muslim is supposed to be a person that is always ready to accept new truths from other people, with full

sense of *tawadhu* (desire and closeness)³⁴ towards God. Moreover, the Prophet Muhammad himself insists, that each and every truth is the valuable property of every Muslim'... 'So a Muslim is a person who should be modern, forward-looking, progressive, continuously expending effort to improve himself and society' (Madjid, 1990: 175).³⁵

The above discussion is relevant to Madjid's stance towards the implementation of divine or *Shari'ah* law. For Madjid, the letter of the text plays less of a role than its substance (or spirit). As the principle of contextual understanding dominates his thinking, and because he considers that the only thing permanent is that which concerns worship rituals, everything else falls within the category of relevance and re-evaluation. Therefore, Madjid argues that *Shari'ah* law is understood as that rule of law, which is in line with the principal purpose of the Qur'an and Sunnah: the idea of justice (Madjid, 1992: lxxvii; Madjid, 1998: 37-40, Madjid, 1999: 164-65).

Natsir and Madjid: legacy of thought

Madjid's Neo-Modernist epistemology was introduced to Indonesia during the Suharto period, and is today nurtured by a self-proclaimed network of Islamic liberals — *Santri* youth born and raised during the heyday of Suharto's authoritarian rule. While Madjid sought to forge an understanding between mainstream Islamic thinking at the time and hermeneutics, these liberals directly contest the legitimacy of some methodological maxims and understandings in *Usul ul-Fiqh*, as well as classical and Modernist political jurisprudence in general.

³⁴ *Tawadhu/Tawadud* means wanting, desire, closeness and love.

³⁵ *dengan perkataan lain, seorang Muslim semestinya menjadi seorang yang selalu bersedia menerima kebenaran-kebenaran baru dari orang lain, dengan penuh rasa tawadhu (andap-ansor) kepada tuhan. Apalagi Nabi Muhammad sendiri menegaskan, bahwa setiap kebenaran adalah barang-nilai-nilainya seorang Muslim... Jadi seorang Muslim adalah seorang yang senantiasa modern, maju, progresif, terus-menerus mengusahakan perbaikan-perbaikan bagi diri dan masyarakat (Madjid, 1990: 175).*

As a counter to the inroads being made by this new movement, Natsir's legacy of political Islam also resurfaced after thirty years of stagnation and oppression under the Suharto regime. Represented by PBB (Star and Crescent Party) PPP (United Development Party) and PKS (Justice and Prosperity Party), these parties continue the Masyumi and early NU tradition of the 1950s as parties that represent political Islam and uphold the view that Islam should be the basis of the State and its ideology (Mujani, 2002).

Thus, the *Santri* camp of Indonesian society has resurfaced with greater complexities and competing legitimacies, since the downfall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. The *Santri* political aspirations of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary liberal democracy period of the 1950s concerning political Islam have again entered the open public domain (Feith, 1962: 135). But, unlike Masyumi and the NU of the 1950s, the contemporary political thinking of the *Santri* camp ranges from support for an Islamic State to support for the total secularisation of politics.

The next political Aliran?

Liberal Islam's activities and writings have attracted media attention nationally, due to the daring views it advocates through its writings in books and short articles posted on the Website islamlib.com, and often published in various Indonesian newspapers. But before beginning, a review of this tendency's literature and recent history is necessary, in order to have more fully grasped its significance.

The division within the *Santri* camp in contemporary Islamic political thinking is the result of both an upsurge of local academic involvement in Islamic intellectual thinking, and the effect of mandatory state indoctrination with the ideals of the *Pancasila* by the former Suharto regime. But — unlike the abstract notion of *Pancasila* coined by Sukarno, and criticised by Natsir during the parliamentary debates of the 1950s — by 1982 the Suharto regime had turned *Pancasila* into a fully-fledged ideology, enforcing it

onto the public educational curriculum, and obliging all political parties and NGOs to adopt it as the basis of their organisation (Natsir, 2000: 294).

As mentioned in the previous chapter (pp 86;91-2), Natsir foresaw the danger of *Pancasila* being interpreted for political means. In 1982, as part of a delegation to parliament, Natsir became more adamant claiming that the forced indoctrination of *Pancasila* by means of the *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* (*PMP* — The Studies of the Morals of *Pancasila*), a twelve-volume educational curriculum, would cause confusion among children of different religions in Indonesia. Natsir questioned whether ‘this means then that children will be taught that the comprehensive manual and understanding of Pancasila (education program for indoctrination of state ideology) which was proposed by the government and passed through the People’s Consultative Council of 1978 is higher in value than the laws of State, sacralised in the same manner as revelation from the One Almighty God’ (Madjid, 2001: 287).³⁶ Natsir also complains that criticism against the *PMP* was being used as a way of labelling political rivals ‘anti-*Pancasila*-ist’, as a means of political expediency.

Qodir points to the majority of Liberal Islam’s notable activists and thinkers, men such as Budi Rahman, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Saiful Muzani, Bachtiar Effendi, Deny J. A., Sukidi, Zuhairi Misrawi, Ikhsan Ali Fauzi, Rizal Mallarangeng and Rizal Panggabean are on average youth born in the mid-Sixties/Seventies, who in Qodir’s view fit right into the age group of *PMP*-indoctrinated youth. Thus, in his opinion, it is not surprising that among the loudest proponents of *Pancasila* in Indonesian political society, and the most vocal opponents of Islam’s formal role in politics today, are these *Santri* children of the Suharto era (Qodir, 2003: 77). Inspired by Charles Kurzman’s book *Liberal Islam; a Sourcebook*, a critical look at innovative Islamic thinkers of the Twentieth Century, these young *Santris* have adopted for themselves the new title of ‘Liberal Islam’ (Kurzman,

³⁶ apakah dengan ini dimaksud supaya anak didik percaya bahwa Pedoman Penghayatan dan pengamalan Pancasila yang diusulkan pemerintah dan ditetapkan MPR tahun 1978 lebih tinggi nilainya daripada undang-undang negara, di ‘sacral’kan seperti wahyu dari Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (Madjid, 2001: 287).

2000: 15-21). Qodir (2003: 71-73) argues that they have the potential to be the next challenge to Islamic political thinking in Indonesia which could mean the development of yet another division within the *santri aliran*.

However, since its inception in early 2000, Liberal Islam's thinking continues to be confined to an exclusive niche segment of Indonesian society although the political influence of their substantive ideas have become more welcomed among politicians. Consisting mostly of academics, Islamic liberals have had the luxury of over 20 years to crystallise their thoughts under the umbrella of the Suharto regime's State Islamic Institutes (IAIN). Their public face JIL (The Network of Islamic Liberals) is largely funded by the San Francisco-based Asia Foundation, to the tune of \$AUD2 million annually (Hidayatullah, 6 December, 2004).³⁷ In the tradition of Nurcholish Madjid's Neo-modernist hermeneutical approach, Liberal Islam also advocates a contextual understanding of Islam in order to make the Qur'an and Sunnah a 'living text', relative to time and place. As will be explained in this chapter, these Indonesian Islamic Liberals have further elaborated on Madjid's theme of substance over form, and the role of *ijtihad* in making Islam relevant to contemporary society. Importantly, JIL is a network that brings together the thinking of likeminded academics, using accessible means to reach a wide audience, as it disseminates its views and those of likeminded academics through the mass media and Internet (Abshar-Abdalla, 2005: 424-25).

Liberal Islam

Liberal Islam: from embryo to infancy

The Neo-Modernist approach was championed by the State Islamic Institute (IAINs)

³⁷ Such funding is quite substantial considering the fact that JIL is a small niche network of individuals whose main activities centres around their Website and radio broadcasting, as well as academic and media publications (Damanik, 2005). Also, when one considers this amount of AUD\$2 million, to Indonesia's GNI per capita for 2003 of just over AUD\$5,000, this fund is an effective outreach for JIL's program (*Globalis* — Indonesia, 14 July 2007).

around the archipelago established under Suharto's behest,³⁸ the most important of which being IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta and IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. Former Suharto Ministers of Religion Ali Mukti of Sunan Kalijaga and Syazali Munawir of Syarif Hidayatullah personally oversaw the IAIN curriculum. Qodir argues that in the 1980s and 1990s they had become the centres of new *Mazhabs* (schools of thought) for Islamic intellectual thinking in Indonesia. Under the tutelage of these IAINs and Suharto's two ministers, there arose a generation of *Santri* intellectuals, trained with a hermeneutical outlook towards the study of Islam. Madjid was an early New Order product of the Syarif Hidayatullah IAIN, who would go on to set up his own foundation for higher education, Paramadina. Thus, by the end of the Suharto era, Sunan Kalijaga IAIN, Syarif Hidayatullah IAIN and Paramadina were the three key academic institutions for the acculturation and dissemination of Neo-Modernist thinking in Indonesia (Qadir, 2003: 62-70).

JIL: Challenging the boundaries of Islamic political epistemology

For JIL, politics has become a central issue of their literature as part of their struggle against positivistic Islamic thought. This discussion of the epistemology of JIL's political thinking will focus on two contemporary articles: Assyaukanie's 'Is Political Jurisprudence Still Relevant? New Perspectives on Islamic Political Thinking' and Abd Moqsith Ghazali's 'Formulating Alternative Maxims (*kaedahs*) for *Usul ul-Fiqh*' (Assyaukanie, 2005; Ghazali, 2005). In these papers, both writers directly challenge the dominance and validity of established *Usul ul-Fiqh*, especially in the political arena. For the purpose of this dissertation, both articles are good examples of the epistemological challenge that hermeneutics poses to orthodox Islam's positivist *Usul*, and will be analysed in greater detail below (Assyaukanie, 2002; Ghazali, 2005: 352-73).

Liberal Islam: Questioning the relevance of Usul ul-Fiqh

Assyaukanie argues that the domination of *Usul ul-Fiqh* scholarship in dealing with

³⁸ On the link between Suharto and the IAIN see Cone (2002: 52-67).

political issues has resulted in the rigidity and stagnation of political thought in Islam. For Assyaukanie, the evolution of Islamic political thinking culminated with the book *The Laws of Islamic Governance*, by Thirteenth Century Shafi'i Jurist al-Mawardi, written at the behest of the Buwayyid Sultans of the period. In the book, al-Mawardi, a prestigious jurist of his time, derives all his political regulations for the conduct of an Islamic Government using the juristic approach — a method that Assyaukanie believes became the favourite of authorities (Assyaukanie, 2002: 254)³⁹.

Assyaukanie argues that this relationship between jurists and authority removes scholars' autonomy, together with their ability to create an independent piece of writing in the field. This makes them apologists for the State system (Assyaukanie, 2002: 261-62). He also argues that Mawardi's book set a precedent, by making the culture of political thinking the realm of *Usul ul-Fiqh* and therefore of jurists. In contrast, Assyaukanie states that with regards to politics the generation of Muslim philosophers of earlier periods, such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (d. 980), al-Farabi (d. 950) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (d. 1190), were more attracted to philosophy's concept of an 'ideal state and society', as opposed to jurist such as Mawardi whose political literature focused on an 'ideal ruler' (*Khalifah*) and a 'just state'. (Assyaukanie, 2002: 254).

Assyaukanie further comments that the works of the above Muslim philosophers are more appreciated by the West than Mawardi's work. Thus, Assyaukanie argues that the realm of Islamic political thinking should be transferred away from jurists to philosophers, as 'philosophy is a knowledge discipline that is closest to theology, a discipline that has become the future (direction) of thinking about politics and Islam' (Assyaukanie, 2002: 254).

³⁹ It is noted by the writer that this claim put forward by Assyaukanie regarding the 'marginalisation of medieval 'Muslim philosophers' is a highly significant topic and though brief, a reading of Assyaukanies article can validate his argument. However, though the writer is grateful for the recommendation put forward by an anonymous review to explore this topic further, it is beyond the scope of this presentation as it is the aim of the writer to present the rational behind JIL thinkers protests of *usul ul fiqh* based thinking dominant within modernist Islamic political thinking.

He contends that the epistemological freedom of philosophers, as opposed to the methodological rigidity of the *Usul ul-Fiqh* jurist, is the major reason why Islamic political thinking should be the realm of philosophy. The *Usul ul-Fiqh* formula is filled with rigid linguistic and juristic maxims such as *qathi* (absoluteness of text and meaning) and *Maqasid as-Shari'ah* (the Divine purpose of Islamic Law) that restricts creativity. Like Madjid, Assyaukanie argues that Islamic ontology should be understood through the process of history (Assyaukanie, 2002: 257).

Assyaukanie argues that *Usul ul-Fiqh's* shortcomings lay in its character and in the disposition of the discipline itself, which is imaged upon God. It is correct to say that *fiqh* is a rational endeavour (*fiqh* literally means 'understanding that fully utilises the support of intellect and reason'), but its position as a religious science (*Ulum ad-Diniyyah*), makes it difficult (if not impossible) to move out of its godly and sacral quality (Assyaukanie, 2002: 265).⁴⁰ Because of this godly and sacral quality, Assyaukanie argues that *fiqh* (jurisprudence) has always fallen behind in assessing the developments of the time and is limited by its rigid epistemology.

Another important work by Liberal Islam activist in the area of Islamic political thinking is Abd Moqsih Ghazali's (2005) 'Designing alternative maxim for *Usul u Fiqh*' [*Merancang (Kaidah) Ushul Fikih Alternatif*]. Whereas Assyaukanie argues for the transfer of political thinking from the realm of jurists to philosophers, Ghazali offers an alternative to some of the 'outdated' *Usul ul Fiqh* maxims. As a principle, he refers to a *Hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad 'let your heart be your guide', and so claims that the *Maqasid as- Shari'ah* (the objectives of law) are 'within the soul of all humanity'. Thus, the rigid scripturalist ideas such as placing rational evidence after textual evidence (see

⁴⁰ *sifat dan karakter disiplin ini yang penuh dengan citra ilahi. Benar bahwa fikih itu merupakan produk rasional (fikih sendiri artinya 'pemahaman' yang sepenuhnya ilmu-ilmu keagamaan ('ulum al-diniyyah')) membuatnya sulit keluar (atau tidak bisa) dari kesan ilahiah yang sacral* (Assyaukanie, 2002: 265).

pp73) should not be considered binding, and need to be replaced, because the mind can guide one's understanding of the 'true purpose of divine law' (*Maqasid as Shari'ah*) (Ghazali, 2005, 354-56). Thus, for Ghazali this detail criterion is part of Islamic political thinking's thousand-year-old obsession with the form rather than with the universal substance of the text.

Therefore the alternative maxims that Ghazali proposes aims to liberate Islamic political thinking from this rigidity as it line with substantive Islamic political thinking. For example, one alternative maxim is

- *Al ibrah bi al-Maqashid la bi al-Alfazh* [The Clarity of the Outcome Depends on the Objectives not on the Rhetoric]. This means that the attention of the *mujtahid*, in preferring one understanding of a revelation as opposed to another, should not be based on the words used, but the moral and ethical ideals conveyed in the text. This is in line with the hermeneutical argument, that the contextual understanding of a text is more relevant than the textual understanding (Ghazali, 2005, 358-60).

A second important maxim developed by Ghazali is

- *Jawaz Naskh al-Nushush bi al-Maslahah* [It is Allowed to Abrogate for the Sake of Benefit], meaning that Islam's overall objective is none other than the universal benefit of humanity. This is because Ghazali argues that the underlying purpose of *Shari'ah* is to benefit humanity in terms of 'interests, justice, grace and wisdom' and this must therefore be the principle of all future rules. Thus, a clear statement in the text may be abrogated if it no longer benefits humanity (Ghazali, 2005, 361).

The third significant maxim is

- *Tanqih al-Nushush bi al-Aql al-Mujtama' Yajuzu* [Understanding of the Text is Relevant to the Mind of the Public]. This means that public opinion has the wisdom to amend all dogmatic doctrines in the Qur'an and Sunnah that impinge on all public matters. Thus, rules such as amputation and whipping for criminals in the Qur'an and Sunnah can be replaced through public wisdom (Ghazali, 2005,

365-66).

Interestingly, although Ghazali supports maxims which are clearly substantive, he uses the terminology most familiar among modernists as it may be that he is trying to use the rhetoric which can appeal to the Modernist way of thinking.

Thus, Assyauckanie's and Ghazali's re-evaluation of Islamic intellectual and political thinking are important in understanding the epistemological discourse from which they begin their challenge to *Usul ul-Fiqh's* domination of Islamic intellectual and political thought. When compared to the positivistic approach (as outlined by classical scholars and explained in Chapter Four), revived by Modernists such as Hasan and Natsir as outlined in the present chapter, above, the proposed alternatives above are a clear break from the legacy of Islamic thinking. Assyauckanie and Ghazali's approach cannot be viewed as a continuation of the development of Islamic thinking, but an alternative intellectual construct to the field of Islamic political thinking.

The Islamic hermeneutics of Mohamed Arkoun

Indonesian scholars such as Moqsith Ghazali and the grouping Liberal Islam stand on the shoulders of certain Western scholars of Islamic hermeneutics — in particular Mohamed Arkoun (b. 1928, d. 2010). Arkoun believed that the Qur'an was limited in its literal applicability to seventh century Arabia, providing only general guidelines for contemporary humanity. Over the ages since it was revealed, he argues, people of power (rulers and scholars — the 'managers of the sacred') took advantage of the Qur'an's alleged limitations to wield it for their own purposes. Jon Armajani (2004: 117) suggests that Arkoun may even have believed that the Qur'an was not the pure word of Almighty Allah, but also included some content interpolated by the Prophet of Islam.

Arkoun questions that Shari'ah law is 'rooted in revelation' (Arkoun, 1994: 112) and predicts that what he terms 'emerging reason' will deconstruct what he considers to be a highly dogmatised religion, the understanding and interpretation of which is

dominated by a 'hegemonic reason' (Arkoun, 2002: 38). He strives to construct an 'historical epistemology' capable of decoding the meanings in sacred texts (Qur'an and *Ahadith*) in the contexts of the modern world. He stresses that this 'historical epistemology' is constantly evolving:

It is concerned with the philosophical subversion of the use of reason itself and all forms of rationality produced so far and those which will be produced in the future so as not to repeat the ideological compromises and derivations of the precedent postures and performances of reason. In that sense, E.R. [Emerging Reason] will be continuously emerging to reassess its critical function (Arkoun, 2002: 23-24.)

Arkoun's focus is the Islamic history of ideas, advocating the recovery of 'the dignity of man'. This is a struggle to hermeneutically unlock the 'official closed corpus' of Islamic revelation — which is nothing less than 'a spiritual responsibility':

For the human spirit, assuming a spiritual responsibility means providing oneself with all the means, and at all times the necessary conditions, for resisting all activities (once they have been duly identified) that aim to alienate it (the spirit), enslave it, mutilate it or mislead one or several of its faculties in an attempt to achieve an end contrary to what makes it the seat, the agent and the irreducible sign of the eminent dignity of the human person (Arkoun, 2006: 284).

In Arkoun's hermeneutical analysis, the Qur'an has been reduced to a limited number of 'signs and symbols' and he calls for these to be decoded anew, adding that no interpretation can exhaust the text (Arkoun, 1996: 145). He considers that revelation continues, in this work to subvert the dominant interpretations of revelation. He stresses that this liberation can only be achieved by human beings (as opposed to Divine entities), since humans are inherently endowed with 'creativity and innovative boldness' (Arkoun, 1994: 113): 'There exists a liberal, critical Islam open to change, an Islam still little known and rarely taken into consideration' (Arkoun, 1994: 3).

The JIL Website is full of political analysis and criticism of the political resurgence of Islam in Indonesian political life. A review of ten articles on their Website,⁴¹ with the theme of politics, democracy and *Shari'ah*, shows vehement distaste for Islam's formal role in politics. As will be elaborated below, all were against the way Islam was represented by 'hardliners', stressing the inconsistency and danger of the latter's approach to Islamic intellectual thought, through *Usul ul-Fiqh*. Thus, JIL's writers are all advocates of hermeneutical interpretations, aiming to construct a more 'civil society' understanding of Islam (Qodir, 2003: 138 & 149-50).

In the area of political Islam, JIL articles challenge the wisdom of Islam's role in politics or of creating an Islamic State. Misrawi disavows the danger of the Islamic religion being used as a tool to further the interests of *Khalifahs*⁴² and Sultans in the past (Misrawi, 2014). In a more recent example, A'la cites the coup waged by the Algerian army against the Algerian Islamic political party FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) as evidence that modern experiments with political Islam have failed internationally, and Indonesian Islamists should take that as a lesson (A'la, 2002).

Articles relating to the role of Islam and state politics were all critical of the way Islamic political parties use religion as a way to gain political leverage. The successful Islamic party PKS, which during 2004 election increased its seats in parliament by six hundred per cent, is viewed with suspicion, using a clean government campaign platform to attract voters, while having a long-term agenda of making Indonesia an Islamic state (viva.co.id, 25 January 2014). The PKS stressed good governance and joined presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's 'rainbow coalition' — thereby sidelining its own

⁴¹ See reference list for article and their Internet addresses.

⁴² In Chapter Five I used the term '*khalifah*' in reference to the Prophet Muhammad's companion and second political successor 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab. Thus, the term '*Khalifah*' was widely used in Islamic discourse to refer to the political authority that ruled over the Muslims. The word 'Sultan' — meaning 'the one in authority' — has become synonymous with '*Khalifah*' in that they are designated positions of political authority presiding over Muslim society (Misrawi, 2014)

explicitly Islamist founding ideology (Means, 2009: 316). The PKS's success is in direct opposition to the cause of Liberal Islam, as Hidayat argues that the primary objective of JIL is to counter the resurgence of 'fundamentalist' pro-*Shari'ah* Islamists in Indonesia (Hidayat & Gaus, 2005: 489).

Another issue vehemently criticized by JIL writers has been the aspiration for the implementation of *Shari'ah* law by constituents of several provinces, and the re-emergence in parliament of the Jakarta Charter (Wahid, 2004: 73). For JIL, the formal implementation of *Shari'ah* law in Indonesian society amounts to discrimination against the non-Muslims and female population of the country, as well as a deterioration in society towards injustice and intolerance. Moreover, JIL questions the validity and relevance of *Shari'ah* law in contemporary times (Hosen, 2004; Ghazali, 2004). But as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, JIL's thinking is still confined to an upper spectrum of Indonesian society, as their issues are often academic in nature, and employ anthropological, sociological and philosophical ideas in their discourse. Qodir argues that the next big challenge for Liberal Islam will be whether it can convey its thinking to the masses, who are often more susceptible to the rhetoric of Positivist Islamic thinking employed by Islamic political parties such as PKS (Qodir, 2003, p168).

JIL's challenging literature and its growing influence on the Indonesian intellectual community is evidence of an optimistic future for the Liberal Islam movement. Added to the already explained momentum of JIL, Liberal Islam's central *Mazhabs* for hermeneutical Islamic activities continue to grow in Indonesia. Hefner's 2000 (120-21) analysis mentions the growth of the IAIN — whose academic staff doubled between 1979 and 1991 amounting to some 2,200, so that 'today, student enrolment in Indonesia's fourteen IAIN comprises 18 percent of the student population in higher education'. Moreover, since 2002, beginning with Syarif Hidayatullah, 11 IAINs have been upgraded to university status called UINs (State Islamic Universities). While promoting Neo-Modernist Islamic political thinking on the one hand, the New Order regime also repressed and/or denied funding to *santri* Islamic organisations and

individuals. The regime was keen to exclude ‘politicized Muslims’, believing that they would constitute a threat to regime stability of the country, if their influence increased on government affairs and within society (Machmudi, 2006: 23-24; Crouch, 1986: 15).

From Persis to JIL: dynamic development or decadent innovations?

Like JIL currently, Persis was seen as confrontational and the most ‘radical’ from among the Modernist camp, whose members at one stage were reprimanded by the more popular Sarekat Islam for their polemics against other Muslims. Persis was also never a mass organization with the membership levels of NU or Muhammadiyah, but its political influence in the *Santri* community through Natsir was clearly greater at the time than these two mass organizations (Noer, 1980: 239; Federspiel, 1970: 16). The rise of JIL has also caused a stir among mainstream Islamic scholars that the Neo-Modernists of the Suharto era never provoked. JIL’s activism is reminiscent of the ‘aggressive’ and ‘extreme’ character of *Persis* literature of the 1930s, which resulted in their condemnation by the traditional ‘*ulama*’ of their time. Today mainstream Islamic scholars see JIL literature as provocative and in 2002 a death sentence *fatwa* was considered against the liberal thinker Ulil Abshar Abdullah for insulting the Qur’an. More recently a *fatwa* was issued by the semi-official body the MUI (the Indonesian Council of Scholars) against his way of thinking in general (Muzakki, 2006).⁴³

As was the case with *Persis*, the controversy and media exposure surrounding the intellectual vigour and radical activism of JIL’s cadre of academics has the potential to make them a powerful intellectual influence in Indonesia’s *Santri* community. Qodir argues that the major factor in determining the acceptability of Liberal Islam’s views and how the *Santri* community at large is receiving it will depend upon whether they can win

⁴³ The MUI was an official advisory council set up by the Suharto Government. It was a rotating council consisting of a wide range of scholars from the Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis, DDII and non-aligned ‘*ulama*’. Why I argue as to the significance of the *fatawa* against JIL is because since the *reformasi* era, the MUI is under no pressure to conform to an authoritarian regime and can issue *fatawa* autonomously, unlike during the Suharto era.

over more Islamic intellectuals (Qodir, 2003: 141-42)⁴⁴ to their epistemological persuasion, and the masses to their ontological positions. Another major factor will be whether or not political Islam's positivist Islamic thinking can counter by providing sensible and palatable answers or alternatives for contemporary realities through *Usul ul-Fiqh*.

Conclusion: from *Usul ul-Fiqh ijtiḥad* to contextual *ijtiḥad* and 'Substantialism'

Madjid's ontology in the field of Islamic thinking is a radical departure from the *Usul ul-Fiqh* position as espoused by Natsir, that of adhering to the boundaries (*had-had*) of the language and text. As stated in Chapter four, the Modernists understood that the role of the mind was to understand the text in order to deliberate over contemporary issues or problems. For Madjid, the boundaries consisted of what the mind perceives as relevant in order to solve a contemporary issue or problem within the context of time and circumstances. 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab's example demonstrates for Madjid that an explicit rule coming from an explicit text can be cancelled in place of a more relevant rule, due to changing circumstances.

Though Madjid endeavours to prove that his methodology is in line with the 'spirit' of past Islamic intellectual activity, his epistemology is a radical departure from Modernism's positivist approach to Islamic thinking. Even though evidenced by the Prophet Muhammad's statement concerning the universality of knowledge, those who adhere to *Usul ul-Fiqh* reject Madjid's use of hermeneutics. Thus, in the endeavour to understand and perform *ijtiḥad* for modern political issues, Natsir the Modernist and Madjid the Neo-Modernist approached the study of Islam from two different epistemologies.

This chapter has shown that Nurcholish Madjid's mobilisation of hermeneutics enabled him to forge new (so-called 'Substantialist') 'less rigid' understandings of Islam, which

⁴⁴ At this point I must include the Indonesian idiom '*Tokoh-Tokoh*' Islam or prominent Islamic figures as it better explains the Indonesian culture of referring to those of higher prestige (Qodir, 2003: 141-42).

continue to vie with the older, positivist approach, based directly on Qur'an and Sunnah. State forces centred in Suharto's New Order regime promoted this trend, directly supporting the development of neo-modernist Islam through the government enforced P4 program and the IAINs around the country which then in-turn fostered the birth Liberal Islam which took Madjid's approach to its arguably logical conclusion, to the extent of attempting to reconcile the *Pancasila* to Islam. To buttress these developments, it was shown that the state through both coercive and non-coercive means contributed to the dislocation of the internal unity of different organisations.

The next chapter looks at the success of the Substantialist political Islam as practised in Turkey has had in capturing state power. Since the ascendancy of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), it has continued to use Turkey's Islamically pious communities as its base, but has steered Turkish political discourse from topics such as *Shari'ah* law and Islamic state while at the same time upholding Turkey's secular polity. The Turkish model could have future implications on how Substantive Political Islam develops in Indonesia.

Chapter 6: The trend towards Substantive Political Islam in Turkey

Introduction

This chapter examines the trend in political Islam towards values, ethics and working within the system and the constitution as opposed, to striving for '*Shari'ah*' law or an 'Islamic state'. The chapter asserts that substantive political Islam is not isolated to Indonesia, by comparing political developments in Indonesia on the part of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP — Justice and Development Party) in Turkey, which might appear as a shift towards Substantivism.

It will be seen that, while formally 'secular', AKP leader Erdoğan has enacted laws similar to what HMI alumni have been doing within Indonesia's parliament. For example, Erdoğan lifted the ban on *hijab* in at Universities and placed heavy taxes on the sale of alcohol — reminiscent of the education bill and pornography laws introduced by HMI alumni. Both the HMI and the AKP have evolved from profoundly Islamic pasts — for which they suffered persecution (HMI under Sukarno's regime) and both have adapted ideologically and methodologically to achieve specific Islamically based goals, but now under the name of 'democracy'. As the present chapter will show, however, HMI and the AKP have done this in distinctly different ways.

In both Indonesia and Turkey, the HMI and the AKP work for purportedly Islamic values, while working within the system and the constitution, and eschewing the project of constructing an 'Islamic state'. These have created the impression that Substantive Political Islam is not isolated to Indonesia, but is also evident in at least Turkey. The present chapter will demonstrate that the reality is more nuanced than this.

Secularism, nationalism and state capitalism

The Republic of Turkey was founded on 29 October 1923, with Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) as its first President. Atatürk demolished the Ottoman Islamic Khilafah State, outlawing

religion in all spheres of public life. The new state was based on a mix of approaches known collectively as Kemalism, after Kemal Atatürk.

Secularism, virulent Turkish nationalism and state capitalist (*devletçilik*) economic development became the new state's central principles. However, the official definition of secularism has evolved over time in Turkey. Religious columnist Ali Bulaç describes how modern Turkey's founders interpreted secularism in practice: 'religion was suppressed and tradition was disrupted under interventions by the enlightening state' (Bulaç, 13 July 2007). The Kemalists initially defined secularism as 'irreligiosity', although they later refined this to simply 'a way of life' (Dağı, 2013: 98).

Although at times brutal, Kemalism succeeded in holding together the young republican Turkish state. By the late 1970s, however, Turkish state capitalism was quite evidently collapsing — as indicated by the trebling of the country's foreign debt (Waterbury, 1993: 77-78; Hansen, 1991). The military responded by endorsing the partial modification of state capitalism via neo-liberal economic reforms (Yilmaz, 1986; Boratov, 1990: 199-229; Hansen, 1991). The new approach did not succeed initially, with inflation remaining sky high. The Coalition Government led by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel paid the price for this, when it was removed in a military coup on 12 September 1980. Demirel's coalition was accused of not implementing the reforms (Hansen, 1991: 385; 387).

Turgut Özal begins dismantling *devletçilik*

The economic reform package was the brainchild of US-trained economist Turgut Özal. Özal was Deputy Prime Minister from 20 September 1980 to 14 July 1982, and then succeeded to the role of Prime Minister on 13 December 1983, remaining Prime Minister until 31 October 1989. He became President of Turkey on 9 November 1989,

remaining President until his death on 17 April 1993. Under direct military dictatorship Özal had a free hand to implement the partial dismantlement of *devletçilik*. His reforms resulted in the share of wages in the national income dropping by around 15 per cent by the mid-1980s, and social spending being slashed severely (Keyder, 1987: 225). Determined to shrink Turkey's domestic market, Özal forcibly lowered wages, declared strikes illegal, subsidised exports and devalued the Turkish Lira. Workers, small peasants and even many small capitalists were ruined. Some sections of business adapted well to the new climate, allowing Özal to build a constituency based on these bourgeois and on a new, enlarged middle class. He significantly liberalised trade and foreign exchange dealings and privatised public housing (Waldner, 1995: 40). Özal's neo-liberal economic policies 'empowered small-scale merchants, small industrialists and new emerging textile industries, while undermining the state-dependent urban bourgeoisie. Society-centric Islamic movements were also strengthened' (Alidina, 2014: 8). The same scholar continues:

A variety of Islamic businesses were formed and found a broad base to appeal to. Islamic fashion stores proliferated, as religiosity began to be expressed through consumer patterns... As the appeal of political Islam grew, sales in Islamic dress did too; these two phenomena are mutually-reinforcing. The economic elite also helped fund such Islamic publications as Türkiye Zaman, and Yeni Safak. In effect, civil society, rather than the state, was being Islamized through the modern mediums of print, television, education and fashion. While the assertive secularism of Kemalism had confined religion to individual life, economic liberalization had created a new buffer zone between the state and the private sphere. Enabling civil society expanded political society in a way that did not threaten the secular nature of the state (Alidina, 2014: 9).

As a newly expanding bourgeoisie looted the public sector, 'new consumption patterns' emerged (Yavuz, 2012: 32; see also: Alidina, 2014: 9), leading to:

the proliferation of independent television, radio, and newspaper outlets. These new opportunity spaces allowed and even required Islamic groups to engage with other groups and diverse issues. As a result of political and economic liberalization in Turkey, an Islamic public discourse contributed to Turkey's expanding civil society. In this discourse, Islam was reconstituted in the context

of a free market economy, democracy, globalization, and the discourse of human rights (Yavuz, 2012: 32).

M. Hakan Yavuz argues that Özal's neo-liberal economic policies 'created conditions conducive to the emergence of a more tolerant Islam' (Yavuz, 2012: 32). Significant players (and beneficiaries) in these events were 'new Islamist intellectuals, communication networks, and pro-Islamic bourgeoisie', who assisted Özal in prising the economy and the Turkish mass media from state control. New financial networks were formed and new opportunities eventually emerged in politics, culture, and the economy, enabling 'identity groups' to express themselves in public and 'new lifestyles, identities, and codes of conduct' to surface. Congruent with these multiple liberalising processes, a '*shari'ah* free Islam' began to arise. Yavuz claims: 'As a result of globalization, market forces and democratization have helped to consolidate liberal Islam' (Yavuz, 2012: 31-32; see also: Alidina, 2014).

Yavuz asserts that this process continues to the present day, under current President Erdoğan (to be discussed further in the current chapter, below), however he stresses that this process as it has actually played out in Turkey

demonstrates how economic development does not lead to secularization ... but rather to de-secularization and to religion's transformation into a significant force in the market, political space, and the public sphere (Yavuz, 2012: 29).

In Yavuz's assessment, Turkey's strong State, 'booming economy' and 'powerful bourgeoisie' has evoked 'a different form of Islamic politics'. A further vital factor in such an evolution in his perception, is the development of an Islam based on solidarity, in place of legal [*Shari'ah*] prescriptions. Turkey today in Yavuz's evaluation is 'more Islamic', although support for *Shari'ah* law has declined (Yavuz, 2012: 29-31): 'Islam in Turkey has become bonding, not binding: a religion reduced to a moral code without legal obligations' (Yavuz, 2012: 31). it is 'an ethical rather than a legal Islam which has become the dominant form of religious expression in Turkey... (Yavuz, 2012: 33)

Writing in 2012, Yavuz asserts: ‘in its own way, Turkey is becoming more Islamic. Islamic identity, norms, institutions, and practices are much more extant in the public sphere’. The AKP Government ‘pursues a domestic policy of “Islamization,” which also informs its foreign policy’, but does not advocate restoring *Shari’ah* law (Yavuz, 2012: 33).

The primary debate is about identity (who we are), morality (communal obligations and responsibilities), social justice, and the Islamic way of life. Due to the specificities of the Ottoman/Turkish history, the discourse of Islam is more focused on the inner self, raising one’s consciousness, the articles of faith, and iman (belief); it does not focus as much on the externalities of religion such as shari’a (Yavuz, 2012: 33).

The AKP has thus separated Islamic religious norms for a Muslim way of life, from the non-voluntary binding religious rules, Yavuz asserts. Like the average Turk, Yavuz claims, the AKP identifies Islam ‘with personal ethics, construed in a manner that is voluntary and not defined by the state’ (Yavuz, 2012: 33).

Turkey is evolving, Yavuz asserts, from the homogeneity implicit in a society dominated by a strong state, now becoming ‘a society that is heralding the anxious emergence of a civic culture’ (Yavuz, 2012: 33). This is true, yet as the steady mobilisation of the ruling AKP’s enemies against its rule (most centrally the Ergenekon conspiracy and the 15 July 2016 failed coup attempt) demonstrate, Turkey’s embrace of ‘civic culture’ is not secure yet.

Emergence of Turkey’s mainstream Islamist parties

Similar to Indonesia, explicitly Islamic (‘Islamist’) political parties appeared relatively early in the history of the Turkish Republic. In both cases, however, they paid for their boldness with political repression (Bubalo *et al*, 2008: 81, 83).

The mutual ancestor of all Turkey’s mainstream Islamist parties (or all the parties

examined in the present chapter) is the organisation İslam Toplumu Milli Görüş Teşkilâtı (İTMGT — Organization of the Islamic Society of the National Opinion), generally known simply as Milli Görüş (National View). Founded by Necmettin Erbakan in the late Sixties, Milli Görüş promotes conservatism and is marked by its ‘support for moral development, religious education, Islamic economy, proximity with the Muslim world, and opposition to the west and westernization’ (Köni, 2013: 215, fn 2; see also: Atacan, 2005: 187-99).

Inspired by Milli Görüş, political parties inspired by Islamic values began to emerge publicly from the late Sixties. The first of these was the Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP — National Order Party), founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969, with the goal of forming an Islamic state. Closed by the State in May 1971, the MNP was succeeded by the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP — National Salvation Party) in October 1972. The MNP attracted enough votes in the 1973 elections to force the larger mainstream parties to soften the sharp edges of their supposedly secular policies (Turan 1991: 45; Atacan, 2005: 45). The MSP was invited to form a coalition administration with the mainstream Kemalist (secularist and nationalist) Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP — Republican People’s Party). This coalition was succeeded the following year by the equally secular Nationalist Front coalitions of 1975 and 1977, with the MSP also participating in these. The MSP was closed down in the wake of the 1980 military coup (Atacan, 2005: 45).

The MSP regrouped in 1983 as the Refah Partisi (RP — Welfare Party), and slowly accrued strength (Atacan, 2005: 45). Erbakan was able to re-enter political life following the success in 1987 of a referendum after the lifting of the 1980 ten-year ban on former politicians. Erbakan now became the leader of the Refah Partisi. In 1994, a leading Refah Partisi member, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was elected mayor of Istanbul (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 2015).

Refah’s growing electoral support was enough to prompt Turkey’s Military General Staff

to persuade Tansu Çiller's centre-right Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) and Mesut Yılmaz's Anavatan Partisi (ANAP — Motherland Party) to form a governmental coalition in January 1996, in order to prevent Refah sweeping to power via a new coalition. Within less than six months the DYP/ANAP coalition collapsed, however, and Refah emerged as the junior partner in a coalition on 28 June 1996 with the arch-secularist Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP — True Path Party) (Yeşilada, 1999: 123-24).

At this time, the military still retained formidable power and an appetite for political intervention in civilian administrations. Despite some speculation of a new military coup in defense of secularism, the military did not displace Refah from its Coalition role. Faced with what it considered steady undermining of its Kemalist blueprint for Turkey, however, the military threatened a full-blooded military coup, forcing the Erbakan/Çiller coalition to resign in June 1997 (*Çandar/Hürriyet Turkish Daily News*, 8 January 1997).

Legal proceedings were now launched to outlaw Refah. As often happens in Turkey when a party is illegalised, Refah now rebranded itself as the Fazilet Partisi (FP — the Virtue Party) in late 1998. Denying any continuity with Refah (*Turkish Daily News*, 22 December 1998), the FP very pragmatically went out of its way to make its peace with secularist forces. The FP now asserted that Islamic veiling was not compulsory for women, and that Kemal Atatürk would be a member of FP, if he were alive! (White, 2000: 37).

Refah was outlawed on 16 January 1998 (Yeşilada, 1999: 124). Handing down this decision, the Constitutional Court declared that secularism was both 'a civilized way of life' and 'Turkey's philosophy of life' (Dağı, 2013: 98). Refah's outlawing only caused the FP's pragmatism to deepen. The party's leader Recai Kutan claimed that the organisation was 'a new party with a new understanding', which wanted Western-style democracy (*Turkish Daily News*, 22 December 1998). In effect, the FP sought to portray itself as originating in Islam, but as being simultaneously open to secularism and Turkish

nationalism. As the present dissertation will demonstrate, FP's pragmatic adaptation to the secular State was mirrored in Indonesia by HMI's substantive ideology — albeit via a different mechanism.

The Fazilet Partisi was itself closed down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001, prompting the FP to split (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008: 45). Those wishing to continue the FP's anti-Western legacy formed the Felicity Party (SP — Saadet Partisi). But fifty of the FP's Members of Parliament joined the new party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP — Justice and Development Party), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and formed by some of the Fazilet Partisi's leaders in August 2001 (Jang, 2006: 105; *Turkish Daily News*, 22 December 1998; Atacan, 2005: 46; Turan 1991: 45; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008: 45-46). Nine of the AKP's founding members were also Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (MÜSİAD — Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) (Jang, 2006: 106).

This marked a turning point for Islamist parties in Turkey. The Milli Nizam Partisi, the Milli Selamet Partisi, the Refah Partisi and the Saadet Partisi never relinquished their commitment to traditional values and institutions and to the construction of a national Islamic order, which was antithetic to the West and to Westernisation. However, their experiences of repression and of the exigencies of being partners in coalition governments arguably softened the hard edges of their Islamism over time. Similarly, in Indonesia, HMI has visibly adjusted to the new decentered clientelism of the post-*Orde Baru* era (Aspinall, 2013: 30).

Erdoğan anti- secularist past

Erdoğan attracted support, due to his being perceived as a man who had proven he was incorruptible and committed to Islamic principles (Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 2015). In 1994 Erdoğan remarked: 'Thank God Almighty, I am a servant of the *Shari'ah*' (Parlar, 2006: 247; *Middle East Quarterly*, 2007: 89). Charged with

allegedly ‘inciting hatred based on religious differences’, Erdoğan was imprisoned in 1999 for reading a supposed ‘anti-secularist’ poem at a 1997 political rally in Siirt:

*Our minarets are our bayonets,
Our domes are our helmets,
Our mosques are our barracks.
We will put a final end to ethnic segregation.
No one can ever intimidate us.
If the skies and the ground were to open against us,
If floods and volcanoes were to burst,
We will not turn from our mission.
My reference is Islam.
If I am not able to speak of this,
What is the use of living? (Aslaneli, 27 March 1999).*

Erdoğan insisted in this 1997 speech that only Almighty Allah holds true authority on humankind. He denounced secularism as a ‘big fat lie’ — taking direct and explicit issue with the article in the Turkish Constitution which states, ‘Sovereignty belongs absolutely to the people’, as the article denies the authority of God over the people (All Roads Lead to Holly [*sic*] Mecca, 21 September 2011).

Erdoğan was accompanied to the prison in 1999 by a convoy of 2,000 vehicles (Aslaneli, 27 March 1999). Within only two years of this, during its first ever election campaign, the AKP assured the military that it would never utilise religion for legislative purposes. The party also promised not to challenge the headscarf ban (Alidina, 2014: 6). The AKP, too, was learning to adapt to the exigencies of working in Kemalist Turkey.

Erdoğan’s party won the 2003 general elections and — very unusual for a ruling party ‘tainted’ by Islam in Turkey — the AKP stayed in power following the 2007 and 2011 general elections and even achieved overall domination of municipalities in the 2004 and 2009 local elections (Tezcur, 2011). Erdoğan was Prime Minister between 14 March 2003 and 28 August 2014. Legally prohibited from a further term as PM, he successfully sought the country’s presidency. He has served as President of the Republic of Turkey

from 28 August 2014 up to the present.

HMI in Indonesia has never held political power in its own name, preferring to be the ‘power behind the throne’, as its alumni assume positions as leaders of formally secular mainstream political parties and in key administrative roles — as will be explored further in Chapter 9, below.

Erdoğan reinterpretation of secularism

Despite his reassurances to the secularist establishment, once in power Erdoğan began challenging the Turkish State’s understanding of secularism, causing the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP — Republican People’s Party) and the Kurdish nationalist Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP — Peoples’ Democratic Party) to trenchantly criticise Erdoğan’s reinterpretation. Erdoğan’s detractors accuse him of seeking to systematically reverse secularism in practice. There is some evidence for this claim. In a 2012 parliamentary speech Erdoğan declared that his government wanted to ‘raise a [generation of] religious youth’ (*National Post/Reuters*, 9 February 2012). In 2013 the AKP passed a law outlawing all advertisements for alcohol, tightens restrictions on its sale and requires health warnings on packaging ([Ozbilgin](#), 2013). In 2014 ardent Kemalists were stunned when the first veiled lawmaker entered Turkey’s parliament, the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey). In September 2014, female students as young as ten years of age were permitted to wear *hijab* to school. A professor who barred a headscarf-wearing student from university in 2012 was jailed two years later (Tremblay, 29 April 2015).

Erdoğan has vigorously promoted religious vocational schools known as İmam-Hatip high schools. These have the same curriculum as state high schools, with the exception of added religious subjects (Tremblay, 29 April 2015). Some critics fear that these schools represent only the thin edge of the Islamist wedge, given that in 1994 Erdoğan was reported as pledging: ‘We will turn all our schools into İmam Hatips’ (*Cumhuriyet*, 9

September 1994, cited in *Middle East Quarterly*, 2007: 89). Enrolment in these schools jumped to almost a million from just 63,000 during Erdoğan's twelve years as Prime Minister (Akyol, 1 October 2013; Peker, 14 December 2014; Tremblay, 29 April 2015; *The Economist*, 13 September 2014). When hundreds of people protested in cities across Turkey against Erdoğan's education reforms in February 2015, they were roughly dispersed by police, who used water cannon for this purpose in at least one city (*Al-Akhbar*, 13 February 2015).

Predictably, Erdoğan's challenges to the previously accepted interpretation of secularism have brought accusations that he intends to 'de-Turkify the nation' (Yavuz, 2009: 133). In response, Erdoğan has repeatedly stressed his extreme devotion to Turkish nationalism. The clearest exemplar of such behaviour is a television election advertisement commissioned by the then Prime Minister Erdoğan for the 30 March 2014 municipal elections, depicting 'Turkish citizens all but hypnotized by a giant Turkish flag flying across the sky, compelling them to follow it' (*Belfast Telegraph*, 21 March 2014). One woman on the video has tears streaming down her face at the sight of the giant flag. An elderly farmer stops work in his field to proudly make supplications to Allah for his nation when he sees the flag, thus cleverly linking Turkish nationalism and Islam as compatible partners. The video concludes with the slogan: '*Millet Eğilmez Türkiye Yenilmez*' (Turkey is an Invincible Unbending Nation) (*Belfast Telegraph*, 21 March 2014).

Given that 'the video went viral with over one million views within the first 36 hours of its release' (*Belfast Telegraph*, 21 March 2014), it was clearly very popular with Turks. However, the virulent nationalism of the video stands in utter contrast to well-known verified statements (*hadith*) of the Prophet Mohammad, completely rejecting nationalism in all its forms, such as 'Leave it. It is rotten', and:

People should give up their pride in nations because this is a coal from the coals of hell-fire. If they do not give this up Allah (swt) will consider them lower than

a lowly worm which pushes itself through khur (feces) (The Muslim Bricks', 2015).

Erdoğan has clearly deviated very much from Islamist norms here, in pursuit of a pragmatic goal.

The AKP's victory in the 12 June 2011 general elections also stirred tremendous concern in the Kemalist military and judicial establishment. The AKP responded by making determined efforts to neuter these institutions — undermining the generals' ability to dictate policy by staging coups or threats of coups. (Tezcur, 20 September 2011). Erdoğan removed the military's ability to veto government policies and abolished the generals' judicial immunity, making them vulnerable to prosecution. Beginning in 2007, the AKP instituted a string of criminal investigations into highly placed officers in what became known as the so-called Ergenekon conspiracy to bloodily overthrow Erdoğan's Government. By September 2011 over 15 per cent of all generals were imprisoned (Tezcur, 2011). Turkey voted on a successful constitutional referendum on 12 September 2010, placing further limitations on the military. After the successful referendum and the further endorsement of the 2011 general election, the AKP imposed restrictions precluding the promotion of generals hostile to the government. In short, the AKP succeeded in consolidating its power over the presidency, the high judiciary, and the armed forces (Tezcur, 2011).

The avowed Sunni Muslim Erdoğan is legally required by Turkey's Constitution to advocate and implement secularism — the separation of the State from all religious identity or influence. However, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has engaged in a somewhat creative redefinition of the term 'secularism' since attaining power. Ahmet Kuru argues that the AKP has sought to render the Kemalist establishment's assertive conception of secularism into a 'passive secularism' (Kuru, 2009: 173-78; see also Dağı, 2013: 98).

The vision of secularism held by Erdoğan and the AKP still continues to evolve. When the

AKP first took office in 2003, it described itself as a conservative party that fully accepts Turkey's secular system of government (*Turkish Daily News*, 23 October 2003, cited in *Middle East Quarterly*, 2007: 89). Erdoğan distanced himself from his militant Islamist 'Our minarets are our bayonets' speech of 1997. Stressing that 'secularism is not a religion but Islam is', Erdoğan has asserted that only the State is required to be secular, not individuals, who should be free to follow their beliefs, otherwise democracy will be impaired (Dağı, 2013: 100; see also Mahjar-Barducci, 28 September 2011 & Yavuz, 2009: 133). In a 2011 media interview Erdoğan proclaimed:

In Turkey, the Constitution defines secularism as an equal distance to different religions. Laïcité [secularism] absolutely does not mean atheism. I, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, consider myself a Muslim, not a laic [a secularist]. However, I am the Prime Minister of a secular state. In a laic system, people have freedom to be a believer or an unbeliever. I hope to see a laic Constitution in Egypt because secularism does not mean animosity against religion. Don't be afraid of secularism! I hope that the new regime in Egypt is going to be secular. I hope my statements on secularism would change the opinion of Egyptians on secularism (Erdoğan, 14 September 2011, cited in Yavuz, 2012: 28).

Erdoğan's remarks caused a furor among Islamist intellectuals and movements throughout the Muslim world. Turkey's secular daily *Hürriyet* commented:

It is ironic to say that Erdogan, as the sworn opponent of classical laicism in Turkey since he appeared on the political scene, is now bringing a new air of laicism to the heavy atmosphere of the Arab Spring. Perhaps that is the reason why Islamist and conservative intellectuals in Turkey have started to criticize Erdogan strongly (cited in Mahjar-Barducci, 28 September 2011).

Hürriyet at this time referred to Erdoğan's approach to secularism as 'neo-laicism'. The newspaper's editorial writer, Murat Yetkin, argued that the Turkish prime minister wants to 'revise' the definition of secularism. Lale Kemal in the Saudi-owned Website of *Al-Arabiya* reports:

Erdogan later clarified that his party's definition of secularism is not new, which is that the state can be secular but not the people. This definition has run

contrary with that of Turkey's secularists, who are of the opinion that the people should also be secular (Mahjar-Barducci, 28 September 2011).

Bulent Arinc, who co-founded the AKP with Erdoğan, has frequently clashed publicly with the latter (Ergin, 13 November 2013; Çongar, 17 November 2013). Arinc has an even more liberal interpretation of secularism than Erdoğan:

to build social peace a reinterpretation of secularism is required. We do not have any objection to the principle of secularism but we must define what we make of secularism. Rigid secularist policies should not turn social life into a prison. The understanding of secularism as a matter of peace and liberties and recognize it as the freedom of religion and conscience while not interfering in their beliefs will serve to build social peace (cited by Dağı, 2013: 99).

In Indonesia, of course, the HMI has never confronted a rigid state-centred cult of secularism as has existed in Turkey. Nevertheless, as shown elsewhere in the present dissertation, it faced repression from Sukarno's secularist nationalists in the past, and adjusted its methodology accordingly by formulating and adopting the approach of Substantive Political Islam.

Unlike HMI but similar to the AKP, the PKS in Indonesia bases itself on Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The AKP has evolved from its origins, however, and its members reportedly 'bristle at being labelled Islamist' (Bubalo *et al*, 2008: 15; see also Bubalo *et al*, 2008: 71 & 73).

Erdoğan's business constituency

It has been shown above that Özal worked deliberately to build a constituency based on the bourgeoisie and a new, enlarged middle class. Similarly, Erdoğan and the AKP have toiled actively to do the same — albeit with an 'Islamic' twist. Business analyst Selcan Hacaoglu reports:

New entrepreneurs are emerging with ties to Erdogan's government. While established businesses have benefited too, their share is shrinking. In the decade under Erdogan, the benchmark Istanbul share index has jumped about 600 percent. Koc Holding AS and Haci Omer Sabanci Holding AS, the two biggest diversified groups with roots in the early republic, rose about 375 percent (Hacaoglu, 16 November 2012).

Erdoğan has also pledged to boycott the business federation Tusiad, favouring instead the pro-Islamic MÜSİAD business group. MÜSİAD is a private confederation of mostly small and medium-sized enterprises founded in May 1990, with the aim of promoting both and universal values in Turkey, and achieving global respect for Turkey (MÜSİAD 2013a & b). MÜSİAD's 'members are typically smaller [enterprises] and more likely to be from outside Istanbul' (Hacaoglu, 16 November 2012). Interestingly, Ayse Bugra contends that differences between secularist and Islamist businessmen are related not only to their ideological differences, but also to their respective economic interests (Bugra, 1998: 521-39)

Due to its base among the petty bourgeoisie, the urban poor and rural sectors, the AKP naturally opposes that section of the urban bourgeoisie that benefits from *devletçilik* (Tepe, 2006: 110). MÜSİAD does not seek to introduce Islamic economics into the marketplace, merely to 'propagate Islamic business', as it reinterprets the story of the Prophet Muhammad's early life as a trader 'to legitimize their liberal free-market approach. They chose to emphasize the Prophet's teachings in ethical business and to also promote the position of his first wife, Khadija, who was a wealthy merchant herself' (Alidina, 2014: 8). Many of MÜSİAD's leaders are close to the AKP (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008: 52).

Seda Demiralp concludes that the AKP's experience shows that Islamist groups' hostility to their country's previous secularist regimes resulted not only from 'political elites' scepticism towards Islam, but also to the clientelistic state that favoured urban actors'. In the end, the matter was resolved, she suggests, 'through a neoliberal bargain that allowed 'provincial entrepreneurs' to enlarge 'their share of the economic pie'

(Demiralp, 2009: 331).

In Indonesia, HMI alumni have become the masters of the country's patron-client political culture; HMI's cadres are skilled in sourcing patrons, networks and funds. However, as will be discussed further in Chapter 9 herein, in the context of Indonesia's *abang* culture, HMI cadres now tend to seek a patron (*abang*) who can fund their election campaigns. This makes successful HMI contenders for public office potentially vulnerable to control by their patrons. In contrast to clientelistic developments in Turkey, therefore, where 'provincial entrepreneurs' have been invited to enrich themselves through supporting the AKP, in Indonesia the HMI has arguably allowed its upwardly mobile cadres to fall prey to their patrons.

Conclusion: Erdoğan, the AKP and the HMI

Turgut Özal was certainly the catalyst of Turkey's very dynamic de-statification process, but it has been Turkey's successive Islamic parties that brought it to fruition, once they broke from explicitly Islamic policies and endorsed a pragmatic approach that encompassed a restyled secularism, Western-style democracy and Turkish nationalism. The Fazilet Partisi from late 1998 was the originator in Turkey of this new methodology, but Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi has been the veritable vector of this approach.

Despite his formal supposed 'secularism', many of the laws that Erdoğan has enacted could be considered similar to what HMI alumni have been doing within Indonesia's parliament. For example, Erdoğan lifting the ban on *hijab* in at Universities and placing heavy taxes on the sale of alcohol could be compared to the education bill put forward by Akbar Tanjung and pornography laws, as in both cases *Shari'ah* and Islam were not used, rather universal ideals were given as justifications for them. Nevertheless, as a political party the AKP has not developed an ideology of hermeneutically informed

Substantive Political Islam but its platform for its pro-Islamic reforms on the pragmatic basis of the democratic rights of Turkey's Muslims as individuals is reflective of what will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7 and 8 as HMI shift from using overtly Islamic rhetoric to more universally inclusive language such as rights to put forward 'Islam-inspired' policies.

Both the HMI and the AKP have strong roots in profoundly Islamic past. Both have endured adversity (the former under Sukarno's regime) and both have concluded from the formidable military-based opponents confronting them, that it behooved them to modify their methodologies, in order to achieve specific Islamically based goals, albeit under the name of 'democracy'. In the AKP's case, the party explicitly renounced challenging secularism, during its 2001 election campaign.

However, unlike the HMI, the AKP's conversion to moderation is apparently not permanent; the AKP has indicated since at least 2012 that it is not averse to challenging the secular basis of the Turkish state, to the extent that this is possible. M. Hakan Yavuz's analysis that globalization, market forces and democratization have worked together to promote 'liberal Islam' under successive AKP administrations has been cited above. In his understanding, the AKP has eschewed Islamism altogether, in favour of a democratic rapprochement with secularism. Yet, even as he was writing his contribution to the *Review of Faith & International Affairs*, the so-called Ergenekon conspiracy to bloodily overthrow Erdoğan's Government was unfolding, only to be exposed the following year as a plot to eject the AKP in a bloody *coup d'état* — proving that the Kemalist establishment was neither completely neutralised, nor that the Kemalist establishment had reconciled itself to the unwinding of secularism in Turkey.

Yavuz's evaluation also omits consideration of Erdoğan's creeping challenges to secularism: the outlawing of alcohol advertisements; the entry of a veiled lawmaker into the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi; permission for female students to wear *hijab* to school

— once again defended with the full force of the law, and the Imam-Hatip high schools, which the AKP has literally defended with water cannon. Furthermore, the ‘civic culture’ that Yavuz celebrates in present day Turkey has certainly emerged, but it is important not to omit the very serious challenges to its stable establishment in modern Turkey.

It will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters that HMI has successfully utilised substantive political Islam as an alternative to ‘old style’ political Islam, via partisan politics based on Qur’an and *Sunnah*. Similar to the AKP model of law reform, as will be shown in chapter eight (p180), HMI alumni have used substantivist political Islam to achieve several Islamic political goals. However, in contrast, the AKP has achieved a number of Islamically inspired reforms, by itself becoming the ruling party and securing both the Prime Ministership and the Presidency. Nevertheless, it has been shown that substantive political Islam is practiced in Turkey by the ruling party not as an intellectual endeavour through its pragmatism and abandonment of notions of *shari’ah law* the existence of which has several parallels with HMI’s practice of politics to be discussed in chapter eight.

This chapter has compared the HMI and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. A substantive trend in both Indonesia and Turkey, though not explicitly conceptualized in the latter, has been discerned that favours striving for values, ethics and working within the system and the constitution, as opposed to ‘*Shari’ah*’ or an ‘Islamic state’.

The next chapter will provide an overview of HMI’s history from its establishment in February 1947 on the eve of the Dutch return to reclaim Indonesia. This will be set against an outline of Indonesian history for the same period, to enable HMI’s evolution and milestones to be understood in the context of the relevant ‘big’ history for the relevant period. Both the present and later chapters will facilitate a clear understanding of HMI’s development and essential character to be established over the course of subsequent chapters.

Chapter 7: HMI in Politics — an Intellectual Background

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the development of Indonesia's oldest and largest Islamic Student Organisation, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, and how its alumni have come to dominate Indonesia's public and political sector. This dissertation argues that HMI's development into the most influential students organisation in Indonesia was built on its ability to maintain relevance in the course of time by being both its own instigator and reactor of changing circumstances as well as the trial and tribulations it has overcome since its establishment in 1947. The most important of these trials and tribulations have been its ability to maintain its existence and independence.

Currently, HMI remains the only organisation outside the Indonesian military that utilises a cadre-training system for its members and it will be argued that this along with its substantive political thinking, are the major reasons for its alumni' domination of Indonesia's public sector, significantly within government and the bureaucracy. This chapter also provides a background for the next chapter as to how, with much adversity and struggle, the political ideas of Nurcholish Madjid were able to gain prominence in Indonesia. The chapter also examines how the HMI has become the vehicle for the dissemination of Madjid's thoughts, which in time would mainstream a more substantive form of political Islam in Indonesian political life.

At the outset, the national situation profoundly affected the birth of Indonesia's first Islamic student movement. Just short of five years since the founding of the Republic in 1945, adult literacy rates in Indonesia stood at just below twenty per cent of the population and even less those who received a tertiary education (UNESCO, 2006:193). Moreover, since its introduction at the beginning of the twentieth century, modern education in Indonesia had predominantly been afforded to the children of the *priyayi* (aristocrats) and, through the endeavours of missionaries, to the Christian communities of the archipelago. Thus, students of *Santri* backgrounds were still a minority at this

time and so HMI naturally became the organisation where these students could find an outlet for inter-campus activism.

At its foundation, it has been argued in chapter three (see pages 49-52), that an SMO experiences the 'emergence stage', providing it with both solidarity and the 'collective excitement' of a shared 'charismatic vision'. For the HMI, the sense of necessity on two fronts brought about solidarity. As a root in the *Santri* community, its founders felt the need for '*wadah*', a venue for young *santri* students to gather and interact in order to interpolate the wider socio-political issues being discussed at the time within the framework of Islamic modernist socio-political discourse (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Also, as Gould (1995) and Bendle (2003) suggests, HMI *wadah* became a central point whereby students from *santri* backgrounds could find other likeminded individuals who shared their practices and traditions. In fact, The HMI was at the time recognised by all the major Islamic organisations, both modernist and traditionalist as representing the *Santri* bloc on campuses (Mukhtar, 2006: 1-5).

The second front that brought about this solidarity was the wider geo-political climate of the country at the time. The HMI was founded in February 1947 on the eve of the Dutch return to reclaim its former colony, resulting in hostilities between the two sides that would last for another 2 years. Hariqo Wibawa Satria, biographer of HMI's founder Lafran Pane, asserts that all campus student groups were secular-nationalist in orientation at the time and so Pane believed that there was a need to establish an association for *Santri* students (interview with Hariqo Wibawa Satria, 24 April 2012). Indonesian academic Azyumardi Azra argues that it was in these conditions that HMI was born, during a time of revolution and a heightened sense of nationalism in Indonesia (Azra, 2002: xi).

Thus, the struggle for independence against colonial rule and safeguarding the newly formed Republic left a lasting impact on the nature of HMI's activism. Being acutely

aware the nation was in the midst of war and revolution, the founders of HMI injected their energies into the revolutionary struggle for the purpose, as stated in their constitution, of preserving the State and for the emancipation of the Indonesian people, as well as to uphold and develop the teachings of Islam. This commitment to nationalism and Islamism was the theme of their first congress on 30 November 1947. The first objective was to work with the Indonesian people in general and with the armed forces in particular, to safeguard the Republic. The second objective was to work with the various Islamic bodies and political parties as well as other political parties generally with the aim of improving the political and economic life of the people and the Islamic *'ummah* (Sitompul, 1976: 20).

The HMI's commitment to the well-being of the *'ummah* and the new Republic were not mere slogans, as with the impending Dutch return many of HMI's core functionaries joined the *Corps Mahasiswa* (Students Corps), a student militia trained by the Indonesian military to act as the frontline of defence against a Dutch attack. The significance of HMI's contribution was such that, during the first anniversary of its establishment in 1948, Indonesia's armed forces commander General Sudirman (d1950) heralded HMI as 'the hope of Indonesian society'. A year later, the Islamic *Ummah* Congress held in Yogyakarta proclaimed the HMI as the student organisation that officially represented Indonesia's *Santri* communities (Metareum, 1997:37)

During the revolutionary war, HMI officials supported the call to defend the new Republic against the Dutch between 1947 and 1949. Ismail Hasan Metaruem, co-founder of the association and HMI's second Chairman, claimed that the war of independence paralleled the consolidation of the organisation. This historical involvement with national political life has influenced the dynamics of HMI's cadres till this day. Former HMI national chairman and leading thinker for the HMI, Nurcholish Madjid, admitted that although it has never been a political organisation, from its beginnings HMI had always aspired towards fostering an organisation of cadres, in the

hope that political cadres would uplift the potential of the nation's generations to the high ideals of becoming the ethical and moral leaders of the country. For Madjid, it was a consequence of its cadre system that gave the HMI as individuals and as an organisation a strategic position as an elite youth body, possessing the capacity and capability needed to enter the corridors of power (Madjid, 1997: 99-104).

By 1960 HMI had established itself as part of Indonesia's political community with an ever-growing independent voice in its assessment of the needs and aspirations of the nation. It was in this setting that Nurcholish Madjid, then a member of HMI, began to question the current 'scriptualist' political thinking and practice of the *Santri* bloc and in particular that of the Modernist camp to which he belonged. Along with fellow HMI members Djohan Effendi (b.1939) and in particular Ahmad Wahib (d.1973), Madjid's independence began to take shape especially in the area of Islamic political thinking and practice. He went on to become the longest serving HMI Chairman, presiding over the association for two consecutive terms for a total of eight years. His time as Chairman served to influence a whole generation of HMI members and continues to do so till this day. A clear example of this was the HMI doctrine formulated by Madjid while he was the Organisation's chairman known as the *Nilai Dasar Perjuangan* [Core Values of the Struggle] or the *NDP*. This doctrine is the vehicle that would in time mainstream Madjid's understanding of Islam's role in Indonesian political life (Mukhtar 2006: 11 & 111). The *NDP*, which will be revisited later in this chapter, is also an example of how Madjid left a huge imprint on the Organisation.

Establishing the cadre system for Islamic activists

Although Pane had not initially intended to establish a cadre-based organisation, the HMI recognised its usefulness. It witnessed the rise and efficiency of the Indonesian Communist Party's (PKI's) political machinery, as by 1960 the cadre system had helped it to become the largest communist party outside the Soviet Bloc, with an estimated membership of 1.5 million. For HMI, it was not until the first national elections in 1955

that an embryo model was being conceived. However, planning the rise of the HMI as a systematic and modern cadre organisation did not begin until 1958, with this cadre system becoming the basic education of the organization (Mukhtar 2006: 4).

In order to establish a working curriculum, members of the HMI's executive body were sent overseas to be trained in the cadre system in other countries. Aisjah Aminy, Mahboub Junaidy and Mahmud Yunus were sent to Aloka, in India and Ibrahim Madylo and Nursal were sent to the USA to study the methods of cadre training. Their studies became the basis for the development of the cadre system henceforth. Metareum, HMI's Chairman during the period 1957-60, argued that the significance of the association was that it initiated a pioneering step, as no student organisation in the country had at that stage undertaken a planned study into cadre formation. The national cadre workshops which were initiated in the city of Pekalongan in Central Java at the beginning of the 1960s would then produce the standard leadership training material by the time of the HMI's seventh congress in 1963 (Metareum, 1997: 38 – 39).

As tertiary institutions and tertiary educated individuals during this early period of Indonesian nationhood were scarce, HMI thus represented a vehicle for a considerable number of the 'young educated elite'. According to Fachry Ali, the emergence of the cadre system not only unified the social and political views of the educated young, but was also a source of political education, which in the future could function as the machine that would orbit the urban middle class in Indonesia (Ali, 1997: xxxvii). Being an organisation established just two years after Indonesia's independence, HMI cadres would in time dominate strategic positions of power, whether in government or in the public sector, and therefore have the potential to influence future State policies (Saleh, 2001).

HMI and Political Expediency

Through infiltration of various arms of the State by its alumni, HMI have had the

networking ability to sustain themselves through the passages of Indonesia's turbulent political periods. The first challenge for HMI as an organisation saw them overcome the PKI's call for their dismantling during the final years of the Sukarno era. Following the fall of the Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime in 1965, Suharto's New Order regime would initially place restrictions on the activities of Islamic organisations — including the HMI (Ali, 1997: xxxviii-xxxix). However, in line with the political restructuring that occurred during these periods, the HMI recognised the need to maintain relations with the establishment and participate within it, by having their cadres enter the various arms of government institutions, in particular within public and economic governing bodies. Under the tutelage and within the fold of government technocrats such as the noted economists Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Widjojo Nitisastro, they represented the second tier within the above-mentioned institutions.

Among those who held strategic government positions during this period were Deliar Noer, Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Barli Halim, Madjid Ibrahim, Bustanul Arifin, Zainul Zasmi and Umar Tusin. Also, there were those from among its cadres who went on to join political parties and hold ministerial positions such as Abdul Gafur, Akbar Tanjung, Ma'rie Muhammad and Mintarejo. However, in such instances, the HMI never formally endorsed any political party, be they Islamic or not. Moreover, in line with the idea of political independence, the HMI never sought to foster formal relationships with any political party (Hassan, 1998).

According to Mukhtar, HMI's political accommodation under President Suharto can be attributed to HMI's role as a leading student force, in particular the class of 1966 who participated in the overthrow of the Sukarno regime, even though they had in the past accommodated the controversial policies of Sukarno — a stance Indonesian political historian Hassan considers not unusual for large Islamic organisations (Hassan, 1998). Participation was thus the aim of this period of HMI development, that saw its cadres enter the bureaucracy steadfast in the support of the new regime's modernisation

policies but without, as Mukhtar argued, much intellectual discussion as to its merits (Mukhtar, 2006: 8).

Moreover, with the Suharto regime's consolidation of power, a comparison can be made between HMI's relationship with a strong authoritarian state to that of NU's. The forced merger of political parties in 1973 which led to the establishment of PPP (United Development Party) and by default the amalgamation of Modernist and Traditionalist *santri* would once again cause schisms between the two camps. As in the past, this schism was caused by the ability of the Modernists to not only outmaneuver the traditionalists but also build working relationships with the New Order regime, an example being the 1978 walkout of the NU faction within the PPP from an MPR session due to two decrees, one of which had officially given 'mystical belief systems' (*Aliran kepercayaan*) equal religious status to other mainstream religions (Porter, 2002:45)

In contrast, as Porter contest the NU faction within PPP's unwillingness to be submissive eventually led to their demise within the party. However, it can also be understood that Modernists, and importantly among them HMI alumni such as Ismail Hassan Metareum (d.2005), had refined abilities in statecraft and were willing to compromise which helped to orbit the Modernist domination within the PPP. This can be deciphered from the waning years of NU's participation in PPP to its eventual withdrawal from formal politics. Although Bush (2009:28) argues the withdrawal was based on the organisations unwillingness to be 'sullied by the dirty and mundane world of politics', she also describes it as a victory within NU for 'a group of intellectuals and activists over the politicians who had dominated NU for decades'. Thus, unlike HMI co-founder Ismail Metareum, who would eventually rise to become PPP chairman in 1987 for two consecutive terms, NU's lack of accommodation towards the Suharto regime and the success of the NU 'intellectuals' and 'activist' over NU 'politicians' is quite the reverse to the HMI 'intellectual' vs 'pragmatic' wings dichotomy (see chapter 3, p41).

By the early 1970s HMI's intellectualism began to bear fruit and there arose a generation of activist and thinkers from among them. These figures included Nurcholish Madjid, Utomo Dananjaya, Ekky Syahrudin, Djohan Effendi, Dawam Raharjo, Ahmad Wahib, Imaduddin Abdurrahim, Adi Sasono and other intellectuals. Azra argues that the founders of HMI would never have guessed that these individuals would have taken their political education from the HMI (Azra, 2004: 26-28). Within HMI circles, many of these thinkers believed that since large numbers of HMI cadres continued to enter the realms of political power, as a consequence, their cadres have marred HMI's mission. With many HMI alumni having occupied strategic positions inside the political establishment, a weakening of HMI's social and national role can be argued, especially its function of monitoring and criticising the various arms of government due to the fact that a large pool of these alumni went on to become a 'reservoir' for the New Order regime's power.

The political thinking of HMI and the relationship between Islam and the State

Although HMI has become most noticeable for being an organisation whose cadres are, by nature politically inclined, their activism has extended beyond practical politics. Since the consolidation of the Suharto regime, members of HMI have also been at forefront of the Islamic (thought) renewal movement. Mukhtar claims (2006: 49-50) that this concern with Islamic political thought has been with the HMI since its origins and that they trace their roots to an earlier Islamic youth group, the *Jong Islamieten Bond*, which was active during the colonial period (between 1924-45). As discussed above in Chapter Two, the JIB was established in 1925 by the famed revolutionary thinker KH Agus Salim and helped produce prominent political figures such Muhammad Natsir and Muhammad Roem. The latter, one of the founding fathers of the republic and the former, was one of the greatest politicians in Indonesian history known for his influence and high morals (Rahardjo, 2005a, 2005b, & 2005c). According to Syafii Maarif (1997), in spite of having been a short-lived outfit, the JIB was a forward thinking and visionary Islamic generation whose influence lives on.

However, during the 1920s and 1930s the concern of JIB centred on the issue of national liberation and the role Islam would play in it. By the time HMI had begun to relay its Islamic political thought, it was already seeking to forge a different path than its predecessors. HMI's Islamic ideals, which had been silenced during the Sukarno era, would then be given space to be heard with the New Order focus on national development through industrialisation. The issue of modernisation was considered of importance to the New Order regime, since the economic crisis left by the Old Order, national development and political stability were the former's main objectives. According to Kemal Hasan, HMI thinkers began pioneering ideas as to the role of Islam for these changing times, which were different from what had been expected by the *Santri* community (Hassan, 1987: 7-8).

Needless to say, their approach to modernisation clashed with others from within the Islamic camp in Indonesia, primarily concerning modernising the relationship with Islam and the State. In this context, the HMI largely adopted the ideas of the prominent international Islamic thinker Fazlur Rahman, whose work was discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Rahman's ideas were popularised within HMI circles through none other than Nurcholish Madjid. Rahman, who would go on to supervise Madjid's doctoral dissertation, identified several concepts that have developed in the field of Islamic renewal. The first of these was a revivalism, in response to the moral decadence within the Islamic community, as well as to the intellectual stagnation engulfing it. Second was the 'classical' modernism movement that assessed the parameters of development through educational institutions modelled on the West. In these above models the Qur'an and Sunnah were applied to justify the use of Western concepts. The third development was the postmodern revivalism that utilises concepts from the West whose meanings are in accord with Islamic ideals (Rahman, 1982).

Indonesia's modern history witnessed the rise of modernism, arriving simultaneously

with anticolonial nationalism, as well as the progress being made in the Islamic community. According to the Islamic modernist Syamsuddin, the political perspective of Islam is to address the nature and role of government in tackling issues that concern both the religious and worldly. Furthermore, Syamsuddin adds that there are only two spectrums in Islamic political thinking in Indonesia: generally, history has written that those in power, such as the Sultan, had absolute authority and a certain level of divine sovereignty. Other institutions such as the scholarly class were socio-politically weak and therefore were used to justify the ruler's legitimacy using religious means (Syamsuddin, 2001).

With regards to the issue of the relationship between Islam and the State, the well-known Liberal Islam thinker Bachtiar Effendy argues that from the outset the founders of the nation were in disagreement as to the path that they wished Indonesia to take. In one camp, there were those who wanted Islam to be the basis of the State and on the other, those concerned with justice, equality, participation and consultation, but within a secular framework (as reflected in the *Pancasila*) (Effendy, 1998). This disagreement would continue to be reflected during the New Order era and would be a source of tension with regards to the relationship between the Islamic community and the nation. This resulted in political Islam being sidelined during the early years of the New Order, as proven by the fact that strategic national positions were not held by anyone who had in the past been affiliated with an Islamic movement. Moreover, many of the early policies initiated by the New Order were less than accommodative to the aspirations of the Muslim community, in spite of the fact that the vast majority of Indonesia's population are Muslims. In turn, a psychological burden was placed on the leaders of the Islamic community, specifically that of the new generation of Muslim intellectuals.

In order to overcome this psychological condition, there arose the new intellectual movement, interestingly enough driven by the HMI. This movement not only addressed the relegation of the Islamic community but also other social issues and sought for a

way out in order to reignite the psychological momentum of the Islamic community. According to Effendi and Natsir, in this regard HMI's intellectual discourse was of relevance for several reasons: firstly, to review the theological or philosophical basis of political Islam. Secondly, to redefine the ideals of political Islam, and, lastly, to reassess the methods needed to effectively achieve those political ideals (Effendi & Natsir, 1982: 129-31).

The young generation of HMI thinkers held differing opinions to that of their older generation, due to the fact that the former became disheartened with the older generation's strategy and Islamic political ideals concerning the relationship between Islam and the State. The younger generation rejected the idea of Islam being a state ideology, though they continued to acknowledge the idea that Islam as a religion also provides a socio-political doctrine. The HMI cadres upholding these opinions included Dawam Rahardjo, Ahmad Wahib, Djohan Effendi and of course Nurcholish Madjid. What they specifically rejected from the older generation was its use of formalistic and legalistic orientation in order to form religious views concerning political affairs.

The leading figures of this new generation stressed the need for both a renewal and rejuvenation in religious understanding in the Muslim community. They believed that HMI as a cadre organisation was the best vehicle for informing students, in order that the latter would be well versed in the social issues facing the country generally and the Muslim community specifically. However, Effendy stresses that this renewal in Islamic thinking was not the official policy of the HMI (Effendy, 1998). This argument needs to be remembered, as there are differences of opinions as to the nature and substance of the policy (which will be explained below) (Amirullah, 2011).

This movement by the younger generation, often referred to as the *Kaum Muda* (the youth group), was a cultural initiative in Jogjakarta that was mobilised initially via discussion circles known as *Lingkaran Limited Discussion Group*, often also referred to as

‘Limited Group’, initiated by later minister of religion Mukti Ali which comprised of Djohan Effendi, Mansyur Hamid, Ahmad Wahib and Dawam Raharjo. This forum discussed social, political, cultural and religious issues in a free environment. They were able to arrive at general conclusions (see Effendi & Natsir, 1982: 133). Their thoughts moved beyond the limits of religious thinking and would become commonplace even among Muslims outside their circle of influence.

The fundamental idea arrived at by this group was to struggle for the cause of Islam in a ‘Substantial’ way, that is, to have a ‘substantialist’ approach and in particular concede that there already is a nation based on *Pancasila* and not on Islam. In this respect HMI did away with the longstanding conflict between Islam and the State (that is the conflict that had begun during the time of Sukarno). Thus, in order to implement this ideal, the HMI spearheaded the call for *Pancasila* being the ideal ideology of the nation, in line with the call at that time for *Pancasila* to be made the basis for all groups in Indonesian society. Therefore, they asserted that commitment to Islam was a commitment to the principal values of Islam, not to an Islamic organisation, be it a mass organisation or a political party. This acceptance of the *Pancasila* would result in a split within the HMI, (during what is known as the 1982-1985 period), which will be discussed below.

Azis Thaba (1996: 165) uses the term ‘period’ in relation to specific episodes in time regarding the relationship between Islam and the State in Indonesia. According to Thaba, these periods were threefold:

- The period of antagonism in the relationship between Islam and the State (1966-81).
During this period, there was first an expectation by the Islamic community that normalization would return to the relationship between Islam and the State, after Sukarno had relegated it to the sidelines during the Old Order era. Thus, during the New Order period, there was the desire to resurrect the Masyumi party as the force for the Islamic community. These efforts also coincided with

the issues pertaining to the relationship between Islam and the State, through the implementation of Islamic Law. There was also a proposal spearheaded by Mohammad Hatta and HMI alumni to establish a new political party — ‘The Islamic Democracy Party of Indonesia’ (PDII). However, all these efforts would eventually not be successful. Rather, control would then become more repressive by the State.

- The second period was what Thaba considers to be as a relationship of critical reciprocity (1982-85). During this period, the State forced all political parties and organisations to adopt the *Pancasila* as the organisation’s “sole basis”, the primary reason given being to prevent the re-emergence of fanatical groups (see Thaba, 1996: 101). As mentioned earlier, this topic would create major discord within HMI, leading it to split into two: HMI Pancasila (or HMI Dipo) and HMI Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi (HMI MPO — Organisation Rescue Assembly). HMI Dipo accepted the sole basis criteria set by the State, whereas HMI MPO, also known as HMI Islam, rejected it. During HMI’s fifteenth congress in 1983, a heavy debate ensued concerning this subject. At this event Abdul Gafur, the Government Minister for Youth and Sports, an HMI alumnus, urged the congress to accept the sole basis criteria. This conference then witnessed a debate between two prominent HMI figures, HMI co-founder Lafran Pane and former HMI National Chairman Deliar Noer (Amirullah, 2011). Lafran argued that at its core, HMI was primarily a nationalist movement and only then an Islamic one. However, Deliar Noer put forward the argument that the sole ‘basis criteria’ would stifle social pluralism as well as the relationship between religion and politics that he argued was in conflict with the Islamic point of view.
- The third and current period is referred to as that of accommodative relationship with the State (1985-). According to Thaba (1996: 290-293), the State’s experience with HMI became the determining factor of this relationship. During this period,

the Government enacted several policies in favour of the Islamic community, such as allowing the formation of ICMI (Association of Muslim Intellectuals) as well as the Government's sixth development Cabinet, which included a substantial number of HMI figures. This development drew criticism from other prominent figures, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Arbi Sanit, who accused ICMI of serving as a front for preparing HMI members, through their alumni, to fill up the upper echelons of the government and bureaucracy. Moreover, ICMI was headed by Indonesia's third president B. J. Habbie, who had been handpicked by Suharto (Hefner, 2002:137).

HMI confronting the political realities of the times

If the journey of the HMI were to be analysed from era to era, its political orientation would be its most apparent feature, in contrast to its Islamic vision, which is not as easily detectable. Nurcholish Madjid (HMI National Chairman 1966-71) states that in its struggle, the cause of HMI is both Islamic and nationalistic, so that HMI's development as an organisation is always in line with the development of the nation itself. Madjid viewed HMI as the child of the whole Islamic community, which is why the HMI has always asserted its independence in thought. Moreover, Madjid argued that as a 'national' cadre organisation, HMI's pattern of participation has been based on a good understanding of the nation's problems and ideals, especially with regards to Indonesia's diverse ethnic make-up and political orientations. These ideals were on a par with the political ideals of HMI — political participation and pluralism. Furthermore, Madjid describes HMI's participation in the life of the nation and the State is an active one and this is evident in its critical attitude towards the problems concerning the nation and state. Thus, according to Madjid, HMI participates independently both within (the Islamic community) and externally, that is within other political camps (Durin, Saripudin & Zernal: 2002: xvi-xvii).

Greg Barton's (1999) research has shown how HMI's independence influenced the

relationship between HMI and the different factions within the Islamic community, specifically with Masyumi, even though they had both shared the same cause and platform. Despite being accused by the PKI of being the brainchild of Masyumi, HMI truly was an independent outfit. Barton argues that from early on, HMI has always been critical of all political parties, including Masyumi, whose relationship with HMI continued to worsen when HMI opted to support all four Islamic parties during the post-independence period (Masyumi, NU, PSII, Perti) (Barton, 1999: 58-61). HMI supported the Indonesia/Netherlands Renville Agreement, during the discussions leading to the agreement. As mentioned earlier, HMI also supported the popular constitution (*Pancasila*), not Islam, being the basis of the state.

Thus, HMI was mindful of the importance of national integration, recognising that Indonesia was a nation made up of an amalgamation of many islands of strategic value. Apart from this were the many ethnic groups, religions, traditions and languages that needed to be considered when assessing the reality of the country's pluralism. In relation to the post-independence period, Agussalim Sitompul explains that during the Guided Democracy era of 1959-65, there was a major intellectual contest between the Islamic camp, the Nationalists and the Communists. The relationship between Islam and the State, which was dominated by the nationalist camp, was not harmonious. Also on the fringes separatist movements arose among those using the banner of Islam, such as the Darul Islam (DI/TII) movement, led by Kartosuwiryo in West Java (Sitompul 1997:294), which was discussed above, in Chapter One.

According to Sitompul, there are three central themes in HMI political thinking. The first being the relationship between Islam and the State, the second is that of organisations and their relationship with real politics, meaning the approach of the organisation in dealing with the government, and finally the Islamic position when confronted by those who oppose Islam's socio-political role in Indonesia. Regarding the first theme, Sitompul's analysis is in line with Barton's; that from the beginning HMI has had no

problem supporting the *Pancasila* as the state ideology and has done so since early post-independence times, as it believed that originally, Islam's role was to fulfil the purpose of independence (Sitompul, 1986). Therefore, the position of HMI as a cadre organisation was to formulate a civil and humanitarian vision for the Islamic community. With regards to the second, that of its relation to real politics, its dominant feature is pragmatism — attesting to its moderate nature; always adjusting in order to suit the dynamics of the political realities of the day. As an example, when the Islamic community was being marginalised during both the Old Order and New Order eras, the position of the Islamic community within the nation became weak. Accordingly, the HMI effectively implemented a cadre system for its members in order for generations of educated Muslims to fill up the apparatuses of the state and its positions of authority, so that in time the political reality would become more accommodative towards Islam and those from the *Santri* communities. As for the third theme, HMI would critically attack any opposition to Islam having a socio-political role in Indonesia. Although HMI in 1957 had supported the resurrection of The Jakarta Charter, Mukhtar argues that it was an issue specific to its time and that all Islamic groups supported it. However, what has been most important is the idea that HMI would always continue to support the principle that religion and politics are inseparable and that Islam should always have a role in some shape or form in Indonesia.

The origins of HMI's political thoughts and its development

Sitompul asserts that the origins of HMI political thoughts are based on two ideas; first the abolition of colonialism and the importance of national unity; second the importance of HMI in recognising its social function. With regards to the former the issue was clear, for as long as the Dutch were trying to re-colonise the country, then such a calamity would result in there being no nation to unify. HMI considered Dutch colonialism as not merely physical but also spiritual, as the latter also brought along missionaries with the aim of Christianising the population.

The second origin can be interpolated from the speech given by the HMI's National Deputy Chairman Ahmad Tirtosudiro (d.2011) during their first anniversary in Yogyakarta on the 8 February 1948. During this oration, Tirtosudiro urged those students who intended to enter the public field to grasp the necessity of understanding the nature and character of their society. Sitompul quotes the end of Tirtosudiro's oration when the latter says that 'a politician who does not understand sociology is similar to that of a captain blindly steering a ship, not knowing the direction of the tides and when he runs into reefs becomes as victim' (Sitompul, 2002:307)

The type of thinking mentioned above was on a par with that of Lafran Pane's thoughts, as at the time he and his colleagues founded HMI, the Yogyakarta Student Union (PMY), did not utilise the Islam label. In a speech given at the PII (Islamic Students Union) conference held in Ponogoro from 4 to 6 November 1947, Pane declared:

HMI ... is a vehicle for inviting students to learn and explore the teachings of Islam, so that their future as candidate graduates, community leaders and statesmen would be to balance the task of the world and Hereafter, the mind and heart, as well as faith and science as the present state of student affairs in Indonesia was being threatened by the extremely dangerous crisis of balance which is attributed to the Western educational system. Knowledge of Islam needed to be spread beyond Higher Islamic Schools (STI) and throughout the student

community, especially to the PMY (Jogjakarta Students Union) which was founded on a non-religious platform (Sitompul, 1976: 29-30).

What sprang forth from the HMI was a new form of intellectualism that would alter older forms of political activism. This new activism proceeded hand-in-hand with the changing circumstances of the time. The HMI camp, with their focus on the bureaucracy, insisted that the Islamic community had to work within the processes of political life; that is within the state system. At the same time a cultural faction in the HMI was eager to help empower the bottom layer of society. Their hope was that if society became empowered economically and politically, it would then support the Islamic community due to the just, egalitarian, consultative and *Pancasila* qualities that they displayed.

As the Old Order collapsed and made way for the New Order, the latter built their ideology on the idea of 'developmentalism', where progress was measured in terms of materialism and statistics. Economic development became the measurement of the nation's progress, even though an increasing gap in the economy continued to widen. Along with this, came the privilege of one specific economic group, often to the detriment of the nation's economy. To sustain its authority, the Suharto New Order primarily used the support of industrial tycoons, and the nation's foreign debt became a major foothold of the economic development. On the political front, Golkar, which at that time was known as 'the functional groups', refusing to be referred to as a political party, nevertheless became Suharto's primary support base. This 'party' was used as an instrument to control the lives of citizens as well as being an instrument for legitimizing Suharto's rule. In the meantime, the many political parties that once existed in Indonesia were compulsorily amalgamated by the State into two simplified parties: The United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI). Meanwhile, the interpretation of the *Pancasila*, which was born in the midst of a long struggle over the plurality of the nation, came to be monopolised by the New Order through its *Pancasila* Appreciation and Practice Guidelines (P4).

On another front, the military's '*dwifungsi*' (dual function) role was made to 'protect' projects undertaken by the conglomerates, ready to quell the dissent of any who dared to challenge the Government. Thus, it was no surprise that buildings, factories and centres of entertainment became the mortgaged legacy of the coming generation through exploitation of the country's natural resources. In the meantime, the public would be mere spectators in the process and at times victims in the name of this development (Sitompul, 1986).

During this New Order Era, HMI was regarded as the organisation whose cadres had the ability to subvert the Old Order Regime. At this time, there was a momentum towards regeneration by the class of '66 HMI functionaries in order to take care of the developments happening in the world. The '66 generation could be considered 'the new energy' that brought about HMI's lasting legacy in the world of Indonesian socio-political life. The stability and effective quashing of dissent during this period resulted in this HMI generation placing more emphasis on the development of intellectual ideas. Hence, it was during this period that HMI's distinctively independent and intellectual character was established.

A new flourishing development in HMI political thoughts: The era since Nurcholish Madjid

HMI generation '66 was part of the movement that succeeded in helping to topple the Old Order regime. Thus, it was no surprise that HMI was hugely popular on the university campuses and experienced a significant increase in its membership numbers. This intellectual era for the HMI was fostered by the leadership of Nurcholish Madjid, who became HMI's National Chairman for the two periods 1966-69 and then again 1969-71. At the time, he was a student at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic Institute in Jakarta (IAIN). Born into a traditionalist family, with the benefit of a classical or traditionalist Islamic education accompanied with the dialectics of the modern environment, he was regarded as a well-rounded intellectual, referred to by Greg

Barton as a 'neo-modernist' (Barton, 1999). His elucidation on secularisation and the controversy surrounding argumentation for "Islam yes, Islamic Parties no" became a major polemic in the mass media due to the harsh criticism that it drew from other sections of Islamic thinkers as well as from within the HMI. Moreover, a HMI magazine was also established during this period as an outlet for the exchange and development of ideas one of them being Islamic political thought.

On an international level, HMI's existence became more apparent as part of the World Assembly of Youth (Way). HMI was also a founding participant of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations, or IIFSO. For the sake of HMI's international recognition, Madjid travelled to the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany and the Middle East to represent HMI. Another prominent figure that would go on to represent the HMI at this level in the late 1970s was Akbar Tanjung. At the time, Tanjung was a medical student at the University of Indonesia and a signatory to the Cipayung Pact. The Cipayung camp was an 'inter-students' movement forum, which included the HMI, PMKRI (Indonesian Republic Catholic Students Association), GMNI (Indonesian National Student Movement), PMII (Indonesian Islamic Students Movement) and GMKI (Indonesian Christian Students Movement). This forum played a profound role in developing the ideals of pluralism in Indonesia. Many prominent critics accused the Cipayung Camp of being a regime initiative to co-opt the student movement into its cause.

Understanding the purpose of Madjid's role, Barton categorises his thoughts into three fields: 1. Islamic Renewalism; 2. Islam and the modern industrial public, and 3. Islam between faith and science. Madjid argued that without the principle of God, secularism would be born and a secular person as a consequence would be an atheist. Accordingly, in the Islamic context it was perfectly understood that there be no separation between religion and politics.

According to Dawan Rahardjo, within the Islamic camp Madjid was considered a controversial figure (Rahardjo, 2005a, 2005b, & 2005c). Many attacked him, including Mohammad Rasyidi, a prominent Muhammadiyah figure and a former Minister for Religion. Rasyidi responded to such ideas with a book critiquing and correcting Madjid's thoughts. Apart from him, others who attacked Madjid were Anwar Haryono (former secretary general of Masyumi and Ismail Hasan Metareum (former General Chairman of the PPP). The first attack concerned Madjid's promotion of the concept of secularisation as, according to Professor Rasyidi, secularisation could not be separated from secularism (Rasjidi, H. M./Institut Pemikiran & Perabadian Islam Surabaya, 2011). Rahardjo argued that 'what was meant by Madjid by secularisation was the profanity of worldly issues which were by their nature rational-objective or in other words that which separated the religious with the rational' (Rahardjo, 2005a, 2005b, & 2005c). Madjid never directly responded to Rasyidi's criticism but rather continued to develop his concepts, which would be adhered to by the younger Islamic camp. More recently, many have moved beyond his thoughts and ideas of religious liberalism have sprung up from groups such as Liberal Islam, Cultural Islam and Emancipatory Islam.

Madjid, who was once referred to as the young Natsir, further solidified his thoughts when he elaborated on his ideas on the difference between rationality and rationalism in the ITB's magazine *Mimbar Democracy* (Rahardjo, 2005a, 2005b, & 2005c). In this article Madjid argued that Islam encouraged rationality, which he interpreted as being a system for thinking and the way of life for a materialistic world with rationalism as its lesson. Madjid emphasized rationality and faith, where rationality encompassed the sphere of the temporal, whereas faith encompassed the transcendent. This concept would flourish to become the basic framework of HMI's struggle.

Apart from the concepts mentioned above, Madjid also stressed the importance of learning from the past. For example, lessons could be learnt from the Guided Democracy era, where democracy in time came to serve the interests of Sukarno, then

resulting in Sukarno serving the interest of communism. So for Madjid, learning materials from intellectuals of the past are of use for lessons in democracy for the future.

However, there was also the issue that troubled Madjid as to why it was that Islamic organisations were crumbling from within at a time when Islam as both a religion and a social ideal was experiencing growth. Concern over the movement's model was then what triggered Madjid to give birth to these new ideas as the means of motion and movement for HMI's cadres. In connection with this, there are two issues that HMI would face: that HMI's members by and large would expect its young Muslim intellectuals' ideas to be consistent with the morals of their religion and the possibility of politicising the basic character of the organisation as a sphere for its cadres and for the religion. That is why Madjid emphasised the political necessity of 'give and take', as opposed to the perceptions of other Islamic politicians, who considered their program as being the overarching agenda for Indonesia.

The direction of HMI's cadres within the organisation: From intellectuals to politics

A cadre is a member of an organisation that acts as the locomotive for its movement. Thus, a cadre's view must be in line with that of the vision, mission and ideology of his or her organisation. From this perspective, the HMI can be viewed as a student body that mentors national cadres in the various fields, be that within the executive or the legislature. HMI have a systematic and organised curriculum and program in order to train its cadres. There are three elements of the HMI's cadre program: 'cadre training'; 'intellectual tradition', and 'independence'. HMI's vision has remained even with the changing eras as well as changing leaderships. For many of HMI's members, this vision has been the inspiration for their involvement in the struggle to uplift themselves, the people and the nation. According to Mukhtar (2006:84), as a cadre-training organisation HMI aims to impart certain qualities to its members:

- Academically minded individuals with a high level of intellect able to think critically and rationally;
- To be 'Movers and Shakers' as their cadres are to be at the forefront of developments, giving birth to new concepts and possessing the creativity that would allow them to interpret the teachings of Islam in the Indonesian context;
- To be a servant that aim to be in the service of the community and the nation, and
- An individual who 'breathes' Islam, that is one who is equipped with the understanding of the Qur'an and Hadith.

Therefore, in order to attain these qualities, HMI trains its cadres using its three basic training modules: Basic Training (LK), Intermediate Training (LK II) and Advanced Training (LK III) (Solichin, 2010: 51-58).

The Islamic character of the HMI cadres of the 1970s and early 1980s

As shown earlier, the Islamic ideas put forward by Nurcholish Madjid had a profound effect on the nature of Islamic political thinking at the time and was used by many other HMI writers. Within HMI circles, many of its cadres have commented on and promoted the ideas of Madjid in their literature. The works of Madjid became a primary reference for them and hence their writings, rhetoric and ideas largely mirror those of Madjid's. In this respect, the position of Madjid's ideas in the movement continues unabated and this has led many to consider the younger generation after Madjid as having a lack of intellectual independence, for continuing to stand under Madjid's umbrella of ideas. Within HMI training, Madjid was a key figure in training HMI's junior cadres to think intellectually and produce such literature (Urbaningram, 2011: xxiv).

Madjid's influence continued to be felt, since he added material to the HMI training curriculum specifically related to Islam, which was at that time felt to be out of place as the materials of the curriculum centred on politics and organisation. This material put

together by Madjid would become known as Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan (NDP — the Core Values of The Struggle). In these writings, Madjid explains that if ever the NDP were to be referred to as ‘the Fundamental Values of Islam’, or that it was the foundation of Islam, then it should be sidelined, as it is not at par with the purpose of HMI’s activism which is to uphold the just (Solichin, 2010: 222).

Madjid took the inspiration of this material from a book written by Willy Eichler (1966) entitled *The Fundamental Values and Basic Demands of Democratic Socialism*. It was from this book that he took the term ‘Fundamental Values’ and it was from a book of poetry entitled *Our Struggle* that he created the title of his piece *The Fundamental Values for Struggle*. This concept was brought before the HMI’s 9th Congress in Malang 1969, which was then formalised, making it into an official document of the organization.

According to Madjid, apart from it being Indonesian and a student movement, HMI was also an Islamic one, and thus apart from its support of being Indonesian and student-oriented was it had to put forward credentials as an upholder of Islam. That support for the values of Islam could not be separated from it being Indonesian and student-oriented. Therefore, as HMI members enjoy the prestige of being part of the *civitas academica*, their appreciation for Islamic values should not be detached from the environment that it engages in, the Indonesian and student environment (Madjid in Sitompul, 1997:152-3).

The Islamic values argued by Madjid in the NDP are framed in several chapters, which include topics such as: The foundations of faith; free will and destiny; the individual and the society; social and economic justice; Islam and science. The motivation for Madjid in creating the NDP syllabus was for the sake of allowing HMI cadres to have a better understanding of Islam for those under his leadership as well as for future HMI generations and so to be able to perceive Islam in a more comprehensive and rational

manner (Solichin, 2010: 242-312).

Hence till the present, the NDP continues to be part of the HMI curriculum and is an important source for interpreting its activism. In line four of its constitution, the HMI declares Islam as its foundation, and the NDP as an important source in the training of its cadres, specifically with regards to its training in the core values of Islam. The HMI allocates a specific period of time to this training in order that its cadres receive a deep and comprehensive understanding of the NDP (Saleh, 2001: 241).

It is also important to note that in the NDP, no training is given on the technical understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, rather the focus is on universal values that often make it difficult to interpret. Madjid explains that it was his intention make the NDP difficult, as it dealt with universals rather than rules and regulations often associated with Islamic jurisprudence. This way, the understanding of the module would be deep and uniform throughout all of HMI's branches (Solichin, 2010:236).

Conclusion

The present chapter looks at HMI's evolution, showing how from its beginning, HMI have been proactive in maintaining its relevance, especially in the political life of nation. This chapter shows that in time, its alumni have risen to prominence within Indonesia's public and political sector. It is shown that Madjid's thoughts, that of the substantialist form of political Islam, have become a part of the political mainstream by way of the NDP as HMI's political ideology (Mukhtar, 2006:94). The next chapter examines substantialist political Islam in practice, by conducting a case-study of HMI Alumni. However, as indicated in its this dissertation's initial discussion on the term 'substantialist', in Indonesian literature it has been replace with 'substantive' with all its meanings and nuance. As the next two chapters focus on the post-Suharto also commonly referred to a *reformasi* era, from here on the term 'substantive' will be used instead of 'substantialist'.

Chapter 8: Case-study — HMI Alumni and the Practice of Substantive Political Islam

Introduction —the case study

The present chapter examines Indonesian ‘neo-modernist’ political concepts of Substantive political Islam in practice by conducting a case study of HMI Alumni. It is seen that HMI’s deployment of substantive political Islam continues to influence political Islam in Indonesian political culture leading to the increasing *santrification* of Indonesian politics. This discussion concludes with an assessment of substantive political Islam’s success in achieving its goals.

Since the fall of the New Order regime, Indonesia has succeeded in holding four free and democratic general elections, as well as three direct presidential votes, greatly altering the dynamics in Indonesian politics. Within this context, it has become clearly evident that mainstream Islamic political thinking as practiced by the *Santri* camp of Indonesian politics has in time become less ideological and more policy-oriented. It is important to note that this development was initiated from within due to the rise of the younger generation of *santri* influenced by the changing dynamics they have confronted. The type of political Islam that has emerged as a result of this development in Indonesia since the 1990s, and more so during the post-Suharto reformation period, is the focus of this case study. Moreover, similar to the discussion on Turkey’s *AKP* in chapter 6, the case study aims to show how the political activities of HMI alumni substantiate Fuller’s (2003) definition of political Islam as an applicable explanation of the possible variations in political Islam itself.

The post-Suharto period has also resulted in the return of overt Islamic parties and their ‘interest’ into everyday politics to Indonesia. However, unlike the political Islam of the Old Order period, those who claim to represent Islam no longer have a united strategy or objective. Fuller uses the terms ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ synonymously and

argues that 'an Islamist is one who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion', and that expression 'runs the gamut from radical to moderate, violent to peaceful, democratic to authoritarian, traditionalist to modernist' (Fuller, 2003). In the field of Political Science, this definition has been criticized for its 'arbitrariness'; nevertheless, it still provides the best working model for a researcher to discover variances since, as Fuller's research itself has shown, political Islam is neither stagnant nor monolithic and will vary from country to country (Ayoob, 2008).

Therefore, this case study includes Indonesian 'neo-modernist' political concepts into the fold of political Islam, by tracing the movement's political ideas and its practice of politics in Indonesia. For the Neo-Modernists, Indonesian academic and HMI alumnus Bachtiar Effendy argues that they saw Islam's role as working for the development of the country's socio-political system since they believed that the general principles of Islamic political values, such as justice, consultation, egalitarianism, and participation, what they termed 'substantive Political Islam', should be reflected in Indonesian politics (Effendy, 1998). Thus, the final objective of this case study is to show how substantive political Islam, as advocated by Nurcholish Madjid and put into action largely by the alumni of HMI, has come to dominate Islamic political thinking in Indonesia, and increasingly influences the kind of political Islam taking shape in Indonesian political culture. This chapter will end with a brief discussion as to the success of substantive political Islam in fulfilling its goals as an alternative to political Islam via partisan politics.

HMI: nation-building and substantive political Islam

In the case of Indonesia, Effendy (1998) describes the political Islam that advocates the implementation of Islam as a State as being legal-formalistic, or what Liddle defines as 'Scripturalism' as it places importance on what is written in the scripture and the necessity of *usul ul-Fiqh* (the principles of jurisprudence) in interpreting it. This type of

Islamic political thinking was the mainstream of political Islam and was used during the 1950s by Masyumi, in particular by Muhammad Natsir, to articulate its position with regards to Islam having a formal role by being the basis of the state. In contrast, Effendy explains that substantive political Islam, which advocates bureaucratic reform and socio-political transformation in state and society, began as a cultural movement which argued that the substance of Islam as being of more relative importance than the text itself. To this effect, this movement's thinkers and political actors do not see the need for Islam to have a formal role in state politics as they have interpreted justice, egalitarianism, consultation and participation as core values in Islamic politics and see the development of such values as being the goal of political Islam.

The importance of HMI with regards to the latter form of political Islam is that it was through the intellectual activism and pioneering efforts of two of its former chairmen, Nurcholish Madjid and Akbar Tanjung, respectively, that the understanding of mainstream political Islam in Indonesia was to shift away from scripturalism and towards Substantivism. As will be discussed below, HMI became a training ground and vehicle for substantive political Islam for those intending to enter the public service, whether as politicians or bureaucrats.

Selecting HMI alumni as a case study

HMI alumni was selected as a case study due to three factors: The first factor is due to the reality that HMI is not only the oldest Islamic student organisation in Indonesia, established in 1947, but also because it is the largest, with an estimated membership of 100,000 students. It also boasts the largest number of branches, 106 throughout the archipelago. In terms of ethnic composition, HMI members are the most diverse, in that from Sabang to Merauke their rank and file are drawn from many different ethnic groups. A comparison could be made to fellow student organisations such as the NU backed PMII (Islamic Students of Indonesia) whose members mostly comprise of ethnic Javanese, and the Catholic-based PMKRI (Indonesian Republic Catholic Students

Movement), whose membership largely comprise of ethnic Bataks, Javanese and ethnicities from eastern Indonesia.

The aim of the interviews was to discuss with HMI alumni who have entered the world of politics their viewpoints with regards to Islam's role in shaping Indonesian political culture and the future of political Islam in Indonesia. However, at the outset the confronting question of how to find the most suitable participants for interviews presented itself. Fortunately, in the Indonesian political community, HMI alumni are not unfamiliar to many and so initially a reliance on recommendations made by several political consultants were accepted. This in turn led to 'snowball effect interviewing', whereby the arguments of participant recommendations were considered as to making further decision on who within HMI to communicate with concerning the subject of political Islam.

The case study is drawn from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions from a broad range of HMI alumni including current, former and aspiring politicians, present and former members of parliament, political party chairmen and members, as well as political attachés and advocates. Also among the interviewees are former national and branch chairmen of the HMI, academics and intellectuals as well as HMI cadre trainers. In total 20 interviews were conducted (drawn from) 30 participants, with the central theme of HMI's role in championing the cause of substantive Islamic political thinking, how it has shaped the pattern of political Islam and as a result the kind of role and influence Islam has in Indonesian political culture. Significantly, the case study sought out HMI alumni who were affiliated with secular political parties such as Golkar and the Democrat Party.

The alumni of HMI

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the HMI established in 1947 has continued to play an active role in Indonesia's socio-political life. Thus, it is surprising that so little

academic research has been conducted about this organisation by academics outside of Indonesia, more so in the English language, as it is of no exaggeration to state that Indonesian politics since the fall of the Suharto Regime has been dominated by the alumni of HMI. It is also no exaggeration to state that HMI alumni today largely dominate the state machinery of the country. For example, from October 2009 till October 2014 during President Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono's Second United Cabinet, a host of HMI Alumni held strategic government and political positions that included:

- Mafud MD — Head of the Indonesia's Constitutional Court
- Hatta Ali — Head of Indonesia's Supreme Court
- Eman Suparman — Head of Indonesia's Judicial Commission
- Basri Arief — National Attorney General
- Abraham Samad — Head of Indonesia Corruption Eradication Commission
- Andi Mallarangeng — Minister for Sport and cultural Affairs
- Anas Urbaninggrum — Democrat Party Chairman (Ruling Party)
- Husni Kamil Manik — Head of Indonesian Elections Commission
- Marzuki Ali — Chairman of the Peoples Legislative Assembly (lower house)

(source: Ensiklopedi Tokoh Indonesia, 2012).

At one point, a 2006 study by Mukhtar (p99) noted that in 1999 two-thirds of the 500-member People's Representative Council (DPR) were HMI alumni. According to HMI's Advisory Committee Board member, as of 2012 it was estimated that seventy per cent of all personal attaches to national members of parliament were HMI alumni (interview 4 May 2012). As a result, recent years have seen competition for strategic positions in Indonesian politics often contested between HMI alumni. Recent examples include the 2010 election for the Democrat Party Chairman, which was contested by three HMI alumni — Anas Urbaninggrum, Andi Mallarangeng and Marzuki Ali— as well as the 2011 election for the National Corruption Eradication Commission Chairman (ketua-KPK), of whom six of the seven candidates were former members of HMI.

However, it should be noted that HMI alumni are by no means monolithic, hierarchical or united in their practice of politics. HMI alumni are present in a wide spectrum of Indonesian political parties from the Islamic modernist based PAN (National Mandate Party) such as current Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly Zulfiki Hasan⁴⁵, to former [Minister for Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform](#) (2014-2016) Yuddy Chrisnandi for non-ideologically based Hanura (People's Conscience Party). However, the majority of HMI Alumni can be found in parties that are seen by Baswedan as 'inclusive', in that they are not dominated by any religious ideology (Baswedan, 2004: 173). A major factor for this is due to the HMI dogma that stresses the HMI goal of building cadres of educated Islamic activists that would go on to 'dedicate' themselves to the nation and not to the interests of a sectarian faction within politics. In fact, the majority of HMI alumni can be found in what Baswedan terms 'secular inclusive' parties such as Golkar and after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second term as president, made inroads into his Democrat Party (PD).

This now thirty-year tradition can be traced to the role played by the former Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly or MPR (1999-2004) and current head of Golkar's Advisory Council, Akbar Tanjung, as it was he who put the political ideas of Nurcholish Madjid into practice. Before Akbar Tanjung, HMI alumni still sought PPP as its outlet, due to- the fact that it had originally been an amalgamation of Islamic parties and had close ties to former Masyumi figures such Muhammad Natsir. Tanjung replaced Madjid as head of HMI in 1971, and by the end of his term was sought out by Golkar. His entry into Golkar gave precedence to the idea that one did not need to enter into an Islamic political party in order to serve the interest of Islam in politics. Rather, according to Nurcholish Madjid, Islamic political parties served sectarian interest — an idea which caused controversy when expressed with his statement 'Islam yes, Islamic Party no'. Thus, Madjid advocated the idea that the interests of Islam were best served when one

⁴⁵ He is also PAN's current party chairman and the former Minister of Forestry (2009-2014)

advocated the higher values of Islam, which were universal to all religions, such as justice, transparency and good governance. Madjid argued that these were values that not only the *Santri* community agreed with, but also the nation at large. Tanjung sought to show that *Santri* politics did not have to be identical with the call for an Islamic state or the *Shari'ah*, rather Islam should function as the moral and ethical value by which politics should be practiced in Indonesia (Ridwan & Muhajirin, 2003).

Tanjung's Islamic background and Golkar's developmentalist program fit the HMI model, as HMI members also saw themselves as the nation's children whose purpose it was to serve the *'ummah* and the nation. Thus, Tanjung is considered a pioneer, in that he was the first HMI member to enter a non-*Santri*-affiliated political party. Since Tanjung's entry into Golkar, a steady stream of HMI alumni have entered into politics and has since dominated the Indonesian political scene. In fact, since the return of free elections in 1998, three of Indonesia's five vice-Presidents have been HMI alumni, with Hamzah Haz serving between 2001-2004 and the current incumbent Jusuf Kalla serving between 2004-2009 in the Yudhoyono Administration and again with current President Joko Widodo.

The rise of substantive political Islam in Indonesian political culture

According to HMI chief researcher and cadre trainer Professor Agussalim Sitompul (d2014) of Yogyakarta State University, the movement of HMI alumni to the world of politics continues to be a natural progression. This being a result of the training they receive during their time with the HMI of which can be seen in the HMI motto of creating 'educated cadres who breathe Islam and are devoted to the nation' (Interview, 2 March 2012). During cadre training sessions or LK (*Latihan Kader*) HMI members are trained in the ideals of substantive Islamic political thinking through their 'Five doctrines for struggle' (*Lima Doktrin Perjuangan*) module. Within this module, the NDP is of primary importance. Apart from this, the training also includes instruction in technical

and organisational skills such as lobbying, drafting proposals, searching for donors and funds as well as preparing seminars and conferences. As former HMI national chairman (1983-86) and Member of Parliament (1999-2004), Dr Zaky Siradj argues that HMI alumni come equipped into the world of politics with the academic and technical capacity needed by political parties but most importantly the moral and ethical foundation as instilled in the NDP and thus practice politics with Islamic values in mind (Interview 26 May 2012).

Thus, in the last 30 years, a steady stream of HMI Alumni have entered the government to fill up the bureaucracy and parliament. Within the Indonesian political landscape, their role in shaping Indonesian political culture is unique since they carry with them the understanding that devotion to the *'ummah* and the nation is their priority. According to both Siradj and former long-serving Diplomat Nazar Nasution (Interview 20 May 2012), until the beginning of the 1990s, being both a devout Muslim within government and HMI alumnus were considered obstacles that had to be overcome. Within the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and government, their HMI backgrounds were often a liability against promotions. However, as the HMI alumni continued to enter government branches and with Suharto's endorsement of ICMI (Association of Muslim Intellectuals), their gradual dominance within the system began to shift the balance of power (Tanthowi, 2005: 86).

Academics such as Schwartz (1994), Liddle (1996) and Porter (2002) have written on the return of Islam and in particular the rise of *Santri* actors in politics in the 1990s culminating with the establishment of ICMI — an organisation headed by then Minister of Industry and Technology and Suharto protégé B. J. Habibie. These academics argue that this phenomenon was a result of Suharto's need to find a new support base due to his increasing distance from the Indonesian military establishment. However, Siradj, one of the founders of ICMI and current board member argues, the need was twofold. In a time when basic facilities for devout Muslims such as prayer rooms within both

government and society were scarce, and religious rights such as the wearing the veil for female government workers and high school students were banned, this growing relationship with Suharto helped to foster acceptance within government and society of devout Muslims' needs and interests and help solidify the Islamisation of Indonesian society (Tanthowi, 2005: 62). Thus, for Siradj, rather than being a one-sided affair where the *Santri* were captured by Suharto through establishing ICMI, not only were the *Santri* interests being served, but Suharto, the man who ruled Indonesia with complete authority, was also becoming increasingly *Santri* himself (Interview with Ahmad Zacky Siradj, 26 May 2012).

Furthermore, with the fall of Suharto, the *Santri* element in government had become overwhelming, so much so that by the time of the 1999 elections, of the top seven parties who had contested the elections five were led by HMI alumni. This included three of the top five party Chairmen. In order of their party's election results, these HMI alumni included Golkar Chairman Akbar Tanjung, PPP (The United Development Party) Chairman Hamzah Haz and PAN (The National Mandate Party) Chairman Amien Rais, as well as the chairmen for the 2 smaller parties, Yuzril Izha Mahendra of PBB (the Crescent Moon Party) and Nur Hidayat Wahid of PK (the Justice Party). As the Presidential vote in Indonesia at the time was undertaken by the members of parliament, this coalition later coined the term 'middle axis' (*poros tengah*), was able to sideline Megawati Sukarno the Chairwoman of PDIP (The Indonesian Struggle for Democracy Party) from the presidency, even though her party had garnered the highest number of votes in the 1999 general elections, in favour of a fellow *Santri* Abdurrahman Wahid (d2009), chairman of PKB (The National Awakening Party) (Tanthowi, 2005: 62). This coalition of HMI alumni would also lead the charge for Wahid's impeachment from the presidency two years later.

Though at this early stage it was still the case that apart from Golkar all the other parties mentioned above are *Santri* affiliated parties, only the PBB and PK had overt Islamic

agendas. However, as will be discussed in this chapter, the steady nascent towards substantialist politics had arrived due to both the declining support for overtly Islamic political parties and the dispersion of *santris* primarily from the HMI into other political parties. Unlike members of other organisations *Santri* organisations be they student-based such as IMM (Muhammadiyah Students Bond) or community-based like the Muhammadiyah whose members only considered Islamic parties as the natural *wadah* (venue), HMI alumni substantive character afforded them the foresight to accommodate themselves with non-*santri* parties.

The Independent Character of HMI

In contrast to other Islamic organisations, the most distinguishing character of HMI is its independence. Other Islamic student organisations such as KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Students for United Action), PMII (Union of Islamic Students of Indonesia) and IMM, function under the umbrella organisations of Tarbiyah, Nadhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively. Unlike these organisations, HMI from the beginning set out to be an independent student organisation free from the tutelage and direction of any Islamic movement or political party. Although it has been commonly referred to as being of Modernist *Santri* orientation and had been closely affiliated with the Masyumi party in the past, HMI from its early days showed its independence, refusing to exclusively endorse Masyumi during the 1955 elections but rather supporting all the Islamic political parties contesting. Moreover, since the time of Sukarno's Old Order regime, HMI has always sought to build relations with authorities, rather than challenge or distance themselves from it, whoever they may be. Thus, during Sukarno's guided Democracy era (1959-1965) HMI maintained good relations with both Sukarno via Member of Parliament and Dahlan Ranuwihardjo and the military through Major General Achmad Tirtosudiro, both of whom were HMI Alumni. Thus, HMI has from early times approached politics with a level of pragmatism and this continued into Suharto's New Order Era. As the Suharto Regime perceived political Islam as a threat to national

stability, the alumni of HMI used their academic credentials to first enter into the bureaucracy and later spread themselves into all the branches of government. This character of independence and pragmatism thus becomes a defining feature of HMI Alumni.

Another organisational character which is groomed by the HMI is the culture of competition between its members. Part of the LK module includes being instructed in what is term '*stratak*' (strategy and tactic) and HMI members are encouraged to apply this skill by learning to be competitive. Within the organisation, they are encouraged to compete against each other for positions within the organisation itself at the branch level or to become the HMI representative on campus at the faculty and campus-wide levels. On campus, they then contest these positions against other student organisations. Thus, as attested by politician and current member of parliament and Vice-Chairman of the Indonesian political party Gerindra (the Greater Indonesian Movement) upon leaving HMI the alumni are best equipped with the skills needed to be party cadres (Interview with Fadli Zon, 22 May 2012). With this they bring both their organisational abilities as well as the political thoughts that in the last thirty years have helped mainstream a new practice in political Islam.

A training ground for future leaders

Thus, HMI has been the training ground for many recent notable figures in Indonesian politics. However, more importantly is the type of political culture that has manifested due to the influence of HMI alumni on the Indonesian political scene. The first kind is the idea held by many HMI alumni who argue that Islam's political expression need not be realised only via Islamic parties. This leads to the second idea that the tenets of the State ideology *Pancasila* is compatible with Islam and that therefore any political party that upholds it should be accessible for aspiring *Santri* politicians. This idea justified the entry of many HMI Alumni into Golkar and the PDI during the New Order period which has resulted in the widening of the political playing field for the *Santri*, who now believe they are justified in searching for a base outside the Islamic party syndrome, thus

encouraging the proliferation of Islamic actors across the board into the many layers of government.

In interviews conducted for this dissertation, it was often argued by interviewees that HMI's position with regard to the *Pancasila* resolved a long standing 'split personality' within the *Santri* mind, as coming to terms with the notion that the *Pancasila* was compatible to Islam meant finalising the *Santri* identity and its place within the context of the Indonesian nation itself. Not surprisingly, of the twenty politicians interviewed, none felt that their Islamic values would be at odds with the non-Islamic parties and all felt that Islam's interests could be served in all the major political parties in Indonesia. Moreover, many participants did not have any strong convictions when it concerned the ideology of a certain political party. In contrast, Golkar Member of Parliament Ade Kommarudin's concern was with Islamic ideology, which he felt could never be achieved in an ethnically and religiously plural society (even between Muslims) like Indonesia. In contrast, Democrat Party Chairman Anas Urbaningrum believed that party ideology was important in order to consolidate party objectives. He further stated that he had not joined an Islamic party because he had too many 'friends' in these parties (Interview with Anas Urbaningrum, 6 June 2012).

An interpretation of this statement was given by a fellow HMI alumnus, who was of the opinion that it may have been due to the difficulty he would have faced in moving up the ranks in these parties as they were often filled with fellow *santri* activists from not only HMI, but also from other Islamic organisations such as IMM, PMII and GMII. As mentioned earlier, former *santri* student-activists see the Islamic political parties as the natural corridor into politics and so limit their capacity to enter politics. Also, a further limitation is placed when considering the fact these students organisations are affiliate to larger social movements. Thus, it therefore necessitates that members of PMII and NU would flow into PKB (The National Awakening Party) or PPP and activist of Muhammadiyah and IMM streaming into PAN, PK or PBB. It must also be considered that patronage, grooming and scouting was done by these parties not to mention the

role seniority as well as possible KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) that went into promoting up and coming politicians.

HMI substantive political thinking did not confine its alumni within the walls of the *santri* parties and so they were able by-pass the rank and file they may have been placed had they joined such Islamic parties. Indeed, the rise of Urbaningrum to the top position of the Democrat Party is a testimony substantive political Islam's liberation of the *santri* to pursue their own paths and more directly to the political astuteness among the HMI Alumni. A relative newcomer to the world of practical politics, he rose from being the National Chairman of HMI in 1998 to the head of the KPU (The General Elections Commission) in 2004. During this period, the Democrat Party made its first appearance and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became Indonesia's first directly elected president. Urbaningrum then joined the Democrat Party a year later and by 2010 he had become the party Chairman, bypassing veteran politicians Andi Mallarangeng and Marzuki Ali, both of whom were also HMI alumni (however, at this time the number of HMI alumni in the Democrats was few). Among the interviewees, he was the also only one who seemed uncomfortable with the label 'Islamic politician' (This may have been due to the corruption controversy he had been named in) and similarly ambivalent as to the use of classifications, although Urbaningrum did agree that working for the 'values' of Islam was a form of political Islam.

HMI: A vehicle for Nurcholish Madjid's pluralism and political thoughts

The most practical example of how substantive Islamic political thinking is disseminated can be understood through the HMI LK1 and LK2 (second tier training), when sessions on the NDP are thoroughly discussed and debated. Many case study participants gave answers that could be explained as based on the topics covered by the NDP, clearly showing how it colours their political thoughts. During interviews and discussion groups, participants displayed maturity in their ability to articulate the basic ideas of the NDP. It was interesting to discover how different generations interpreted the NDP as a doctrine for substantive political Islam. As Ade Komarrudin confessed 'those of us such as

myself, Akbar (Tanjung) and Urbaningrum, who uphold substantivist ways in politics, have to openly admit that we are guided by Cak Nur (Nurcholish Madjid) thinking (interview 2 May 2012).

The participants who had spent their time with HMI during the 1980s were more versatile, as they displayed a great ability to articulate their politics by combining the Qur'an and Hadith with rational arguments. For example, Dr. Zaky Siradj put forward the argument that the educated class had a socio-political responsibility to the nation, more so HMI and their alumni because as educated Muslims, it was their duty to represent the welfare of the Indonesian majority, who were also Muslims. Siradj asserts that this is a reality that must be understood by the educated and says that it is rooted in the Quranic verse 'Say, are those with knowledge of the same caliber as to those who are ignorant (of it), indeed this is a sign for those who understand' (Holy Quran, *Az-Zummar*: 9) (Interview 28 May 2012). Thus, Siradj interprets being educated as a trust from God and not a privilege.

In contrast, later generations seemed to rely on more practical arguments apparently grounded more in pragmatism to explain their positions, but agreed that their political philosophy was taken from the NDP. An interesting argument put forward by current Golkar MP Ade Komarrudin as to the importance of substantive political Islam's role, is due to the failure of other religions in confronting what he defined as the current hegemony of capitalism on the world stage. Thus, he asserts that Islamic politicians continue to struggle for the greater values which he argues are present in all religions, that of economic justice and social welfare (Interview 2 May, 2012).

Thus, HMI alumni interpret the NDP according to their own understanding and, as one Golkar MP and former HMI National Chairman argues, their own personal capacities. Yet, one theme that continually arose during interviews was what Lanti (2004: 220) termed Islamic Modernism's 'Majoritarian' trait. All interviewees believed in the idea of working for the majority's interest, as this was seen as serving the interests of the *'ummah*, who are the majority in Indonesia.

Unlike other Islamic groups, however, neither the HMI nor its alumni organisation KAHMI holds a monopoly on what are perceived to be in the interests of the majority. Thus, because their concerns often relate to issues of policy, differences of opinions are seen to be natural, as HMI alumni interpret issues according to their differing capacities and levels of understanding. As former Golkar MP Musfihin Dahlan (interview 25 May 2012) reasoned, this was acceptable, as long as these differences were thought to be over what was best for the majority. Indeed, for the HMI, this characteristic of accepting differences of opinions is also unique in comparison with all other Islamic organisations in Indonesia, be they student or otherwise. In fact, the former National Chairman of Al-Ansor NU (The NU Youth Organisation) and Golkar MP (2009-2014), Nusron Wahid was pressured to leave HMI by his family due to its strong ties with the NU, even though, as he mentions, HMI members come from a diverse background (interview 22 May 2012).

As the interviewees attest, the background and orientation of HMI members range from liberal, modernist, traditionalist and conservative Islamic trends, as well as those from the Shi'ite sect. However, as Nusron argued, their politics become modernist, in that they place a high value on modern ideals of professionalism and developmentalism, as opposed to patronage. Furthermore, they are indoctrinated with the HMI ideals of being opinionated, critical and open-minded. Nusron argues the importance of these values in breeding individuals who are aware of differences, open to dialogue and value the importance of participation and being inclusive.

HMI shifting political Islam: from ideology to policy

Since its early days and over the decades, HMI's intra-political culture has marked it as the Islamic organization in Indonesia most willing to re-evaluate its position. For instance, HMI was the only major modernist organisation that committed itself to the Pancasila ideology after the failure of all Islamic groups to make Islam the basis of the state in the 1957 referendum. Subsequently, as Sukarno's guided democracy grew more authoritarian between 1959-65, unlike Masyumi and PSII, HMI avoided taking a

confrontational stance towards the regime but instead engaged with it and — as its chairman at the time Sulastomo claims (interview 4 May 2012) — was given protection against calls from the PKI for HMI to be disbanded.

By the late Sixties HMI thinkers such as Nurcholish Madjid were at the forefront of calls for renewal in Islamic thinking, and in particular whether the political interests of the Islamic community had to be conducted by an Islamic party characterised by Madjid's catch cry: 'Islam yes, Islam Party no!' Controversial and highly divided as it was at the time, the success of Akbar Tanjung's acculturation into Golkar in 1975 would over time see an influx of HMI cadres seeking political careers outside the traditional *Santri* divide as the goals of substantialist political Islam need not be achieved through the avenue of an Islamic party, which in the case of Indonesian politics during the New Order era meant the Development and Struggle Party (PPP).

The attraction of Golkar for HMI alumni was natural since by the late Seventies and into the Eighties, the HMI had established its own mature and dynamic organizational culture distinct from other *Santri* organisations which continued to harbour ideologists and ideological policies from the pre-Suharto days. As developmentalism was the ideology of the New Order, Golkar as its vehicle was a logical destination for young highly educated *santris* whose academic credentials were more in line with Golkar's vision as opposed to political Islam's ideological concerns. Therefore, HMI alumni saw their role in Golkar as merging the aspirations of Islam with national development in order for the nation's prosperity to be intertwined with its values (Interviews with Zacy Siradj, Musfihin Dalhlan, 28 May 2012). By the end of Suharto's rule, HMI alumni had come to dominate the political landscape within parliament to the point that the majority of the legislative assembly was from among its alumni (Mukhtar, 2009: 199, Baswedan, 2004: 676).

The emphasis on being opinionated, critical and open-minded is the reason why HMI alumni forge their own interpretations and are often more concerned with state policies

than with State ideology. For example, during debates in Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) over an amendment to article 29 of the 1945 constitution, on whether to re-insert the Jakarta Charter, HMI alumni distanced themselves from the debate, as it was ideologically inclined (*Beingmoslem's Weblog*, 11 August 2000). Even when it came to the topic of Government policies, Ade Kommarudin advises that if such policies are based on religion, religious rhetoric should not be used as the logic for it (Interview 2 March, 2012).

In contrast, similar to the tactics of Turkey's AKP of banning alcohol advertisement discussed in chapter six (p132) for the purpose of public order and health rather *shari'ah* law, participants point to the regulations passed between 2004 and 2005 on public morality, which were supported by legislators from Golkar, many of whom were at the time HMI alumni, as an example of substantive political Islam at work. However, Robert Hefner has accused these regulations as being "*Shari'ah* inspired'. These by-laws tightened control on gambling, the consumption of alcohol and the movement of women, and were articulated as being in the interests of public morality (Hefner, 2011: 281-90).

Another example of substantive political Islam in practice which on par with Erdoğan program for Turkey, illustrated by a Board member of HMI's Communication Body (BADKOHMI), Rudi Gani, was during the amendment of article 31 of the constitution on education in 2003, which stipulated that all school children receive religious education (Interview with Rudi Gani, 16 February 2012). This amendment created an outcry as it meant that the many Catholic and Christian schools would also have to provide appropriate religious education for their Muslim students, but also vice-versa. Hefner attributed this to the work of Islamic parties when in fact from interviews with members of the Golkar Party who were present during this session — including Akbar Tanjung — Rudi Gani asserted that, although the amendment itself was proposed by the PPP, it was Akbar Tanjung (at that time Chairman of Golkar and the DPR), who put forward the idea of making religious instruction in all schools mandatory (Interview with Akbar Tanjung,

29 June 2012). Moreover, the vote — which resulted in a walkout by the PDIP — would not have passed had the Islamic parties not had the backing of legislators from Golkar, many of whom were HMI alumni.

Importantly, the amendment with its stated aim ‘to increase faith and people’s consciousness of God’ (Salim 2008:105) carried the kind of wording that appealed to HMI alumni, as its goal was again universal and not sectarian. Although the number of Christians who attended schools run by Muslim organisations were not as large in proportion to that of the Christian and Catholic schools and thus catered more to Muslims, the amendment appealed to national concerns rather than sectarian goals, as Musfihin Dahlan argues (Interview 28 May, 2012). According to Dahlan, the education bill is a prime example of how through substantive political Islam, advancing national goals favour the Muslim interests.

A further example of this substantive Islamic politics interpreted by Dahlan is understood through Golkar’s stance on the annual allocation of the national budget on education. Dahlan asserts that it is only Golkar that has been consistent on insisting that a minimum of twenty percent of the budget is allocated for education. The logic is that the allocated funds Indonesia’s public education system and so largely benefits those who fall into the lower middle class and below of Indonesian society which not only comprises two thirds of Indonesia’s population but also the majority of Indonesia’s Muslim population. Dahlan further states that this issue has largely been overlooked by the Islamic and Islam oriented parties since the stronghold of these parties lie in private Islamic schools, be they modernist or traditionalist, such as those affiliated with Muhammadiyah, Persis and NU. As Dahlan argues, ‘how can we uplift the *Ummat* in Indonesia when they are the least educated among the population’

The Policies and Politics of the ‘Middle Path’

The policies discussed above are two examples of the politics of ‘the middle path’, an ideal adopted by many within the *Santri* community as a decision-making principle. The

concept of the middle path is taken from the Quranic verse (2:153) ‘and we have made you a middle nation (*ummatun wasaṭan*) so that you may be a witness over the people and the messenger a witness over you’. In the field of religious exegesis, the term ‘middle nation’ has often been interpreted as a metaphor for ‘a just nation’ in its religious outlook. In terms of religiosity, it is a reference to the position of Jesus in Islam, in comparison to its monotheistic counterparts Christianity and Judaism. Unlike Judaism, Islam does not reject Jesus as the messiah, yet does not elevate Jesus to the status of a deity, as has been the case with Christianity, thus taking a middle position.

Politically, its idiomatic interpretation is inextricably linked to its literal verbatim meaning that in terms of policies, the ‘middle path’ is the ‘just’ course of action. Thus, it could be argued that the 2001 Education Bill, as well as Golkar’s stance on the national budget for public education, both fall within the realm of middle path politics. The Education Bill’s rationale is that it would be an injustice for any student to receive the religious instruction of a faith that they were not affiliated with, as opposed to the right of private schools to conduct religious education of their pupils as they saw fit, since the law applied to all schools. The allocation of the national budget for public education is seen as social justice, as it affords the ability for public schools to maintain its standards on a par similar to that of more affluent private schools, thus minimising the education gap between private and public. In the Indonesian language, the idea is also referred to as the middle path or road (*‘jalan menengah’*), and was a common reference during many interviews including those mentioned above, as well as Rudi Ghani and Anies Baswedan referring to it as a general criterion for negotiation and policy. It can be argued that the idea is a justification for the pragmatism needed in dealing with politics and applying HMI’s internal political culture of competition and compromise, making it a prime example of the middle path politics.

HMI meeting the changing dynamics and challenges of Indonesian Politics

Further development would soon follow as Suharto’s regime made way for the *reformasi* era in 1999, which led to the end of the three-party parliamentary-guided

democracy institution and the restoration of the multi-party democratic system. At this point, Baswedan's analysis of the political landscape is crucial for understanding the fluidity by which HMI alumni are able to meet the changing dynamics and challenges in Indonesian politics. Published in 2004 Baswedan's paper offers a development from the traditional *aliran* political model that has often been associated Indonesian politics, by claiming the post-Suharto political construct now consisted of only two major political orientations, that centering on either Islam or secularism, which is in turn divided into two further orientations he terms as Islam-exclusive, Islam-inclusive, secular-inclusive and secular-exclusive. Islam-exclusive parties explicitly reference Islam as the basis for their parties, such as the PPP, PKS and PBB, whereas Islam-inclusive parties were established by notable Islamic leaders, whose members have strong affiliations with Islamic organisations but do not reference Islam as the basis of their parties and are open to non-Muslim membership such as PAN and PKB. As with the secular-inclusive parties, they are secular in orientation but accommodating to religious aspirations such as Golkar and later PD, whereas the secular-exclusive parties do not accommodate religious aspirations in politics (Baswedan, 2004: 672-675).

Although Baswedan's analysis focuses on the transformation of Political Islam and 'its future trajectory', he singles out the significance of HMI alumni involvement in this change, especially with reference to its alumni, since they took key roles in the establishment of most of major parties, such as Amien Rais and National Mandate Party (PAN), Yusril Izha Mahendra and the Crescent and Star Party (PBB) as well as Anis Matta and the Justice Party (PK), later to be renamed the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) (Baswedan 2004: 676). Already impressive as it stood, HMI's further domination of the political system would continue to be enhanced as the *reformasi* era progressed, with its alumni continuing to move up the ranks of non-*Santri* political parties such as the staunchly secular Indonesian Democracy Party for Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati Sukarno, the daughter of Indonesia first president Sukarno. During the presidential term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) from 2004-2014, HMI cadres led by Andi Malarangeng, Ali Marzuki and later Anas Urbaningrum transformed SBY's Democrat

Party (PD) from a small party largely filled by former military and business affiliates of SBY to a party with a broad representation at the national, provincial and district levels of Indonesian politics. Furthermore, during his first tenure as president in 2004-2009, former HMI South Sulawesi branch chairman Jusuf Kalla would join SBY as his Vice-President.

However, reformasi has also brought along with it changing politico-business relations, particularly in the area of political patronage, which has witnessed the growth in the number of people with business backgrounds who have greater access to funding political campaigns contending for seats in parliament. As Fukuoka explains, although Indonesia's political system is presidential, the role of both houses of parliament have strengthened since the fall of Suharto — who in his time treated parliament as a rubber stamp for his authority (Fukuoka, 2012: 89-91). This empowerment of parliament has led to it being sought after, as business no longer sees the need to fund one particular party for rent seeking as it did with Golkar in the past, since better funded entrepreneurs now compete with activists, academics and career bureaucrats for political seats, appointments and positions, with many of the bureaucrats being former HMI cadres. To this end, many junior HMI alumni, who are often not from politically connected or financially well-endowed backgrounds, have met these challenges by seeking different roles within the political apparatus. HMI alumni fill positions as attaches, assistants, secretaries and consultants for many MPs, high level bureaucrats and government ministers, to the point that one in every three people of all personal staff for MPs are HMI alumni.

The 2014 Presidential Elections: an HMI playground

At the top end of the political strata, Jusuf Kalla has since been re-elected as Indonesian President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) running mate and Vice-President for the 2014-2019 presidential term. Interestingly, a year before teaming up with Jokowi, a member of PDIP, it had been publically well documented that Kalla did not approve of a Jokowi candidacy, stating that Jokowi should first prove himself as Jakarta's Governor

(Republika.co.id, 26 May 2014). Such pragmatism can again be attributed to middle path politics, as well as being an example of HMI's sleek ability to meet the challenges of Indonesia's changing political environment, given that, before accepting to run with Jokowi, Kalla was the Ethics Committee Chairman of HMI's peak alumni body KAHMI. According to fellow KAHMI ethics committee member Chamaidi Romas (Interview January 2015), Kalla was encouraged and endorsed to run alongside Jokowi to provide a balance to PDIP's more secular political outlook.

Furthermore, during the presidential race, both candidates surrounded themselves with HMI alumni who led their campaign teams that it could as well have been a HMI National-Board election since two factions within HMI (the pragmatic wing against the intellectual wing) battled it out for supremacy. On the Prabowo Subianto side were notables such as Akbar Tanjung, Mafud M. D., former Youth and Sports Minister Mahadi Sinambela, MP Bambang Soesatyo, MP and head of Indonesia's regional representative council (DPD) Ahmad Yani and former social affairs minister Bachtiar Chamzah, all of whom were HMI alumni of the Seventies and Eighties generation. In contrast, the Jokowi camp was filled with HMI alumni academics such as Soegeng Saryadi (died 30 Oct. 2014), former Rector of Muhammadiyah University in Malang and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Malik Fajar, nationally respected intellectual Professor Syafii Maarif, Former Rector of Paramadina University, Andalas University professor Prof. Saldi, as well as noted researchers Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Ahmad Qodari. In addition, Jokowi's camp also included post-Suharto politicians such as Yudy Chrisnandi based in the HANURA (Heart of the People) Party and Ferry Mursyidan from NASDEM, the National Democrat Party and interestingly Anies Baswedan who became the campaign's spokesman.

Within Jokowi's first working cabinet (2014 – 2016) also sat four HMI alumni whose political history also testifies to HMI's middle path politics as elaborated by Anies Baswedan — who himself held the Ministry of Education portfolio along with Yudi Chrisnandi who was given the Ministry for State Apparatus Empowerment and

Bureaucratic Reform portfolio and Ferry Mursyidan Baldan as Minister for Land Affairs party member of Nasdem (National Democrats) another new non-religiously affiliated political party. Thus, HMI alumni was able to show resilience and gain the confidence of a president whose party, the PDI, was characterised by current Education Minister and HMI alumni Anies Baswedan of being secular-exclusive and hostile to religious influence in government. It is apparent that HMI alumni have continually been able to utilise HMI's substantive political Islam to adapt to the changes and developments that may occur in Indonesian politics, be they the challenges occurring within the system or actual changes of government.

Intriguingly, all three ministers were replaced in Jokowi's first cabinet reshuffle in August 2016 which apart from possible poor performance may indicate two other likely scenarios. The first could be that the cabinet reshuffle may have been a strategic maneuver by Jokowi and in particular the PDIP to limit the HMI alumni influence in the cabinet, especially that of Anies Baswedan whose rising popularity has been noticeable since his time as moderator of the presidential debate during Yudhoyono's second re-election campaign in 2009. However, the second and most likely scenario is due to the fact that all three were rewarded for their contribution to the organization of Jokowi's presidential campaign and since Baswedan was an independent and the other two belonged to minor coalition parties, this correlates with what has been put forward by Mietzner (2016:227) that Jokowi's post-election success in coercing three major opposition parties Golkar, PAN and PPP gave his government a majority with 69% of the seats in parliament. It therefore, rendered him the power to remove those elements that were expendable. Moreover, Warburton (2016:317-8) argues that because Jokowi's focus has changed from 'institutional reform' to 'national development', it requires he simply chart 'the course of least resistance'.

However, in the case of Baswedan, Warburton (2016:303) also suggests the reason behind his removal may have been to sideline 'the charismatic minister' in order to hinder the possibility of Baswedan running against him in 2019. Nevertheless, the move may have backfired as Baswedan quickly resurfaced to win the Jakarta Gubernatorial

Election of 2017, a position that also helped propel Jokowi to the presidency, against Jokowi's endorsed candidate and former deputy governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. More compelling is the recent revelation, leaked to the media by HMI alumni and chairman for the People's Consultative Assembly Zulkifli Hasan⁴⁶, that he catalysed who positioned Baswedan as fellow HMI alumni vice President Jusuf Kalla by way of recommending him to the head of Purnama's campaign rival and *Gerindra* (Greater Indonesia Movement) chairman Subianto Prabowo (Kompas.com, 2017). It is still unclear whether Hasan's action was meant to damage Baswedan and Kalla's image or inform the public of the schisms that still exists within Jokowi's administration and communicate the President's need to keep the HMI alumnus within his inner circle. Either way, Baswedan and Kalla's future relationship may provide an indication as to Hasan's motive. Thus, the repercussions from Jokowi's removal of Baswedan clearly demonstrates the political astuteness and networking capacity among HMI alumni as through crisis they shrewdly continue to master the art that they have been well trained for, that of political positioning.

The HMI connection

Since substantive political Islam is an expression put forward by actors who are bound by their religious affiliation, its championing of inclusiveness and plurality needs to be questioned. Interviewees were also questioned as to the accusation that, especially in the case of both the bureaucracy and government, HMI and their alumni (particularly those associated with ICMI) were often in cahoots to undermine or apply political pressure to those outside the HMI sphere of influence. Spearheading this notion was former Indonesian President and NU National Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid (Porter, 2002:163). In interviews, former high-ranking PKB and GMII officials also blamed the work of HMI for the demise of Gus Dur, due to the fact that politicians leading the call for his impeachment — Yusril Izha Mahendra of the PBB, Amien Rais of PAN, Akbar Tanjung of Golkar and to a lesser extent Nur Hidayat Wahid of PK — were all HMI

⁴⁶ Hasan is the current chairman of PAN, an important opposition party whose support Jokowi was able to acquire with Hasan's ascension to the leadership in 2015.

alumni (Gatra.com, 2001; Interview with former GMII Jogjakarta branch chairman, 29 May 2012,).

In answer to this, all HMI alumni participants refuted such accusations, believing that HMI alumni were in their positions due to their individual capacities. As Akbar Tanjung and Zaky Siradj contend, the preparation they received during their time at HMI was the reason for their selection, rather than their affiliation itself (interview with Akbar Tanjung 29 May 2012, Zaky Siradj 28 May 2012). During conversations with Ade Kommarudin, he admitted that there was a mutual respect and understanding that could be drawn between alumni as they had been indoctrinated with the same political values. As an example, Kommarudin, an MP for Golkar, claims that he was able to sway PD Party Chairman Anas Urbaningrum towards the individual favoured by Golkar regarding the selection of the Deputy Governor of Indonesia's Reserve Bank. In turn, Urbaningrum instructed his party to change its preference. Kommarudin asserts that even though a great deal of political communications occurs in this manner, the ease by which HMI alumni converse on issues is due to the shared 'substantive' political values they hold (Interview 2 May 2012).

Therefore, although many younger participants no longer viewed the term 'HMI connection' as a negative and acknowledged that even though there is a strong network among current and former HMI members, this did not amount to outright patronage or collusion. However, when questioned, former and current MPs who were interviewed agreed that being an HMI alumni was seen as a plus when selecting a candidate after taking all other considerations into account. Surprisingly, all the participants comfortably said the same when 'an HMI' was replaced with 'a Muslim', as opposed to someone affiliated to another religion.

Thus, it is the opinion of the researcher that the HMI connection lies somewhere between patronage and aptitude. A case in point was the selection of Burhanudin Abdullah, the former Governor of Indonesia's reserve bank, who had been

recommended to Akbar Tanjung by none other than Nurcholish Madjid himself. Although Abdullah touted his HMI background, he was quite unknown in HMI circles and so, then Golkar MP Musfihin Dahlan was tasked with the assignment of cross-checking Abdullah's claim, who, as it turned out, was indeed an alumnus. Burhanudin Abdullah went on to first serve as Deputy Governor and then as Governor of the Reserve Bank of Indonesia. In the first instance, he ran against Aulia Pohan, who among other credentials also claimed to have been an HMI Alumnus, however Dahlan could not find verification for this claim. In the second round for the Governor's post, Abdullah ran against Miranda Goeltem, a Christian and won (Interview with Musfihin Dahlan 28 May, 2012).

Participants also acknowledged that many people have sought to include or even exploit their HMI backgrounds and that there are those who use it as a stepping-stone to further ones' career prospects in politics or the bureaucracy. Thus, it seems clear that an inclination to people of the same organisational or religious affiliation is a factor in determining a candidate's selection and gives slight credit to Gus Dur's charge. However, participants contend that such practices were seen as normal in Indonesia and contributed to the spirit of competition within Indonesia's political community.

Thus, like other Islamic organisations, the HMI community becomes an extended family for its members and alumni, and a uniting force by which members can 'feel' their nationality. As one participant explains: 'I'm from Central Java, but my wife is from Riau [a Sumatran Province], however when I go to Riau I can rely on HMI members and their alumni there; we have a sense of solidarity and familiarity with one another' (Ciputat Discussion Group, 27 May 2012). However, unlike other Islamic organisations, HMI members and alumni publicly disagree and criticise one another, be it their seniors or juniors (Sitompul, 1997).

Indeed, for many, their time with HMI solidified their Indonesian identity, a concept, according to Nurcholish Madjid (Madjid, 1993), that the *santri* community has struggled

with since the concept of the nation-state entered the political dialogue in the archipelago (see also Chapter 3). As Musfihin Dahlan contends: 'being HMI meant truly being an Indonesian citizen as HMI breaks down the divisions among us'. Thus, the accusation levelled at HMI Alumni by many within the Islamic camp of being political opportunists is somewhat premature (Interview, 25 May 2012).

The Democrat Party East Jakarta Chapter Secretary, Irfan Gani, further adds: 'if you attend a GMII gathering, even outside of Java, you will notice that its members will still be ethnic Javanese and discussions would be held in the Javanese and not the Indonesian language. This is true for most student organisations; most official discussions would be held in languages according to the branch's location. This is virtually impossible for HMI, as our membership is so diverse that it must be done in Indonesian' (Interview May 2012).

HMI: The successes and failures of substantive political Islam

It is therefore argued that HMI has bridged the gap the *Santri* community has struggled with for so long, that of identity, loyalty and political affiliation. The substantive political Islam espoused by HMI breaks down the political *Aliran* divide, as HMI Islamic political thought contends that any political party which is not explicitly anti-religion and has an agenda towards improving the conditions of the nation is suitable for any Indonesian citizen.

However, apart from the 'HMI connection' accusation, how well substantive political Islam has fared in uplifting the nation through its ideas is rather contentious. Even within HMI there have emerged two orientations — the political bent and the intellectual bent, with the former being interested with practical politics, and the latter more concerned with thoughts and ideas. Many among the intellectual bent are critical of the political bent, viewing them as bringing down HMI's image and of not being brightest political recruits (Liddle, 1996:61-62). As former member of parliament (2004-14) and HMI chairman (1983-86) Haris Azhar Aziz acknowledged, HMI alumni in politics

are often seen as opportunists and HMI is accused of having become a means to enter politics through its extensive network (Aziz in Mukhtar, 2006: xx). Participants from the Ciputat focus group, all of whom were of the intellectual orientation, perceived this to be the situation and during the discussion expressed contempt for many of their 'friends' who had allegedly become part of the corruption within the system.

Thus, using HMI as a model would suggest that substantive political Islam argues that Islam should not have a formal role but rather work to uphold the political values of Islam, so that Islam becomes the moral and ethical value by which politics is to be conducted. In practice, however, Islam has been overtaken by the political system itself. During Suharto's New Order period, many perceived the HMI alumni influx into the apparatus of the regime as being the source of Suharto's authoritarian sustenance. In contrast, as both Adam Schwartz (Schwartz, 1994: 73-76) and Robert Hefner (Hefner, 2000: 121-27) noted, many saw the *santri* entry into the regime as a positive influence and the reason behind the '*santrification*' of Suharto and Indonesian society in general.

It cannot be ignored however that much of the criticism that has been levelled at HMI is due to the high-profile corruption cases involving its alumni. These include the case of high-level bureaucrats Beddu Amang (*Hukumonline.Com*, 1 March 2001) and Burhanudin Abdullah (*Jakarta Post*, 9 November 2002), as well as politicians Akbar Tanjung (*Jakarta Post*, 9 November 2002) and most recently Anas Urbaningrum (*Kompas.Com*, 12 March 2012). These cases have tainted the cause of substantive political Islam, even though Tanjung was finally cleared of the charges after appealing to the High Court, and at the time of many of my interviews Urbaningrum's status was still that of a witness. Despite the evidence against him, many of the interviewees said they would give him the benefit of the doubt although, the Ciputat focus group who consisted largely of Journalists, writers and thinkers, believed that Urbaningrum was guilty, referring to the private wealth that he had amassed, in particular his two residential properties that 'were positioned opposite one another for which he plans to build a bridge over the road between them' (interview 27 May 2012). Furthermore, in

the case of Urbaningrum, fellow HMI Alumni and KPK chairman at the time, Abraham Samad, made clear his views on 20 May 2012: that he believed it was only a matter of time before Urbaningrum would be considered a suspect. As one political advocate and HMI Alumni jokingly told me: 'a study into the HMI is a study into corruption, because seven out of ten corruptors in this country are HMI Alumni'.

Nevertheless, an important aspect of HMI culture, that of transparency, can be seen with the scenario between Urbaningrum and Samad. As one participant noted, transparency is possible because HMI Alumni are spread everywhere in politics and society. HMI alumni can take to account their peers from many different platforms within and outside the political establishment, such as through NGOs and the media, in which many HMI alumni are present. Thus, in addition to Samad, many of Anas Urbaningrum's harshest critics have also come from within HMI circles (Ciputat Discussion Group, 27 May 2012).

Moreover, in-terms of both internal checks and balances as well as accountability HMI are by far much more transparent as opposed to other organisations, be they student groups or the social organisations which function under groups such as NU or Muhammadiyah, as well as Islamic political parties. An aura of exclusivity still pervades these organisations and criticism is scarce, as patronage is strong. A case in point can be seen by the attitude of Gus Dur's Presidency, whereby criticism of his 'erratic' behaviour as President was mute by the NU and all its affiliated bodies (bbc.co.uk, 2001). In contrast, HMI have embedded in their cadres a culture of accountability that permeates and continues to thrive long after their formal ties to the organisation. Being opinionated and critical are qualities HMI nurture in their cadres and in Indonesian political society; HMI alumni are at the forefront of this culture.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the Indonesian 'neo-modernist' political concept of substantive political Islam as practiced by HMI alumni and presented both arguments

and evidence to show that HMI's deployment of substantive political Islam continues to influence political Islam in Indonesian political culture. By clearly establishing the rising domination of HMI alumni on the Indonesian political landscape and putting forward the arguments for the increasing *santrification* of Indonesian politics as a result of substantive political Islam, this chapter testifies to the validity of Fuller's (2003) definition of political Islam as both a workable set of concepts that can be used to examine variants within political Islam. The following Chapter will continue to discuss how an SMO that thrives on isolated constituent such as HMI has been able to flourish under two different political systems in Indonesia, one authoritarian and the other liberal though both predatory.

Chapter 9: The HMI Model, Money Politics and Substantive Political Islam in A Decentred Clientelist Indonesia

The previous chapter analysed how HMI's diversion of mainstream Islamic political thinking of the *Santri* variety since the 1990s resulted in it becoming less ideological and more policy-oriented. It was shown that this adoption of 'Neo-Modernist' political concepts was initiated from within HMI, by a rising younger generation of *Santri* activists in the movement. This trend has only accelerated with the end of the New Order regime, so that substantive political Islam, as advocated by Nurcholish Madjid and put into action largely by the alumni of HMI, has come to dominate Islamic political thought in Indonesia, and continues to influence the kind of political Islam taking shape in Indonesian political culture.

With key actors among all major Indonesian parliamentary political players, HMI is able at times to have a great deal of influence on policy decisions. The present chapter will examine whether HMI has in fact been successful in utilising substantive political Islam to fulfil its founding political goals. In other words, to what extent has substantive political Islam proven in practice to be a viable alternative to 'old style' political Islam, via partisan politics based on Qur'an and *Sunnah*. In order to do so, this chapter will consider the strengths and weaknesses of the substantive political Islam model as practiced by HMI alumni since the consolidation of Suharto's New Order regime to the current post-Suharto *Reformasi* era.

Substantive political Islam: The way forward?

Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani (2010:6) acknowledge the 'transformation of political Islam', whereby the 'normalisation of Islamic political parties', with the prevalence of single issue Islamic parties whose political strategies are inclusive — such as public morality and clean government — have overtaken Islamic parties that are focused on fulfilling ideological objectives such as *Shari'ah* law or an Islamic State. However, the above researchers, one of whom, Saiful Mujani, is an alumnus of HMI, overlook the

contribution of HMI, in particular its alumni, in pioneering this transformation and mainstreaming it into the wider Indonesian political society.

Individuals such as Akbar Tanjung, Musfihin Dahlan and Ade Kommarudin admitted in their interviews (see Chapter Eight) that it was Nurcholish Madjid's NDP which became part of the HMI's training manual in 1969 that had persuaded them to enter Golkar rather than Islamic political parties, since they felt the interest of both the '*Ummah* and nation could be served through policy instead of ideology. As presented in Chapter Seven of this dissertation, the reorientation from exclusive Islamic political agendas, as used by Islamic political parties and politicians of the past, towards more inclusive practices, was put forward by the HMI '66 generation whose intelligentsia concerned themselves with alternative ideas and avenues for the future role of Islam in Indonesian politics.

Thus, from the analysis and discussion already presented in this dissertation, the argument can be made that it is HMI through its training, activism and network that has successfully reoriented political Islam from ideology to a focus on policy (see Chapter Eight). And, as Islamic political parties have now by and large adopted inclusive political strategies, shedding the goals which once distinguished them from non-Islamic parties, it seems likely that HMI's future role from within the political establishment will continue in the direction of substantive political Islam which is policy-focused and inclusive in its rhetoric and stated objectives.

Pancasila and the importance of Islam having a political role

As Islam is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the country, and due to the fact that a section of Indonesia's political community places great value in Islam having an influence over Indonesian politics, substantive political Islam helps to maintain the notion that the *Pancasila* is not antithetical to Islam, thus making the participation and aspirations of the *Santri* community appear as part of the greater Indonesian political society. Thus, HMI's activism, intellectual contribution and their alumni's political

participation have all helped to foster closer ties with other sections and orientations within broader Indonesian society. At the university level, the relationship that HMI builds through joint student activism, such as protests, seminars and conferences with other student groups on campuses, helps to build bridges between students of different ethnic, political and religious persuasions and backgrounds. Moreover, competition for various student body positions on campuses promotes the open exchange of ideas between students on a campus level, thus removing suspicion and hearsay among the various ethnic, religious and political groups there.

KAMI (Indonesian Student United Action Front), and the 'Cipayung Group', were student bodies on campuses which had joint co-operation committees that included major student movements of various religious and ideological persuasions — primarily HMI, the Catholic PMKRI, Christian (Protestant) GMKI, the NU-affiliated PMII and the secular-nationalist oriented GMNI. Of particular interest is the Cipayung group, which was conceived of and originally chaired by Akbar Tanjung during his tenure as the National Chairman of HMI. It consists of the heads of the major student organisations mentioned above and is used as a forum, whereby the various action committees present discussions from research undertaken through joint co-operation or independent endeavours from among the various organisations. Conceived during the New Order era, Cipayung Group discussions centre on development and nation building. Former colleagues from both KAMI and the Cipayung Group then meet again in parliament and the public sector with the incentive that they are not foreign to each other's ideas and policies, therefore removing suspicion and doubt from one another and validating each other to their respective parties.

That is why, also, the presence of HMI alumni in political parties that are not Islamic is common and these alumni are not considered religious or ideological threats, especially by colleagues of different religious backgrounds. Moreover, the rise of both Akbar Tanjung and Anas Urbaningrum into leadership positions of two major non-Islamic political parties with large non-*Santri* and non-Muslim membership is testimony as to

how substantive political Islam has helped to solidify the larger *santri* community with the goals of the *Pancasila*.

Keeping pluralism alive

As indicated by the research of Lanti (2001: 6), during the early years of the '*Reformasi*' era, in particular the elections of 1999, it seemed that political culture in Indonesia was reversing back to its primordial ways, with the Indonesian electorate returning to the 1955 *Aliran* political lines of demarcations of *Santri* versus *Priyayi* versus *Abangan* politics. However, what has gradually flourished is the development of a political culture from among the *Santri* camp that is less confrontational with regards to their ideological objectives. The failure of the bill to re-instate the Jakarta Charter in the year 2000 is a case in point, as since then no Islamic political party has attempted to revive the issue of *Shari'ah* or any such demands to parliament explicitly. Rather, policy with inclusive overtures has been the common rhetoric, thus enabling the wider political community to consent or disagree with them on policy grounds — not ideological or religious ones. As a result, it has been argued by substantive political Islam practitioners such as the HMI alumni interviewed that a climate in favour of the 'universal teachings' of Islam is being accepted by the wider Indonesian political society, as a considerable swag of legislation favouring them, such as the Education and Public Morality Bill, has passed through parliament.

Moreover, such policies are not worded in Islamic rhetoric, thus making it possible for anyone from within the political and the wider society to accept, critique or reject such policies, thus building a pluralistic political society whereby differences are accepted and labels such as 'heretic', 'anti-Islam', or religion in general are not attached to these differences. Indonesia's political society now has the ability to communicate political dialogue without the religious dogma of the past that once led to deep suspicions and accusations between Indonesia's various ethnic and religious communities. Therefore, it can be argued that this political environment fostered by HMI alumni, in particular those within non-Islamic parties such as Golkar and more recently the PD, make *santri* political

aspirations more in line with and inclusive of the wider political society, thus making it more palatable for outsiders to understand and discriminate. And as, Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani (2010) have corroborated, Islamic political parties who have removed Islamic slogans from their policies have also begun to adopt this approach.

A constructive avenue of expression for the *santri* of Indonesia

In the upheavals of the attempted 1965 coup, precipitated by the murder of six high-ranking Indonesian army generals and the subsequent communist purge that resulted in the deaths of over five hundred thousand people, ideology was treated with suspicion. In comparison, the aspirations represented by the *santri* community could be seen as non-sectarian or progressive, as their attention has focused on issues that the wider Indonesian society could relate to, such as an end to poverty, increased education and an end to widespread corruption in all sectors of Indonesian society. This progress, in terms of a national psyche, was clearly absent from the minds of the establishment during the early period of Suharto's New Order rule of the late Nineteen Sixties and early Seventies. During this time, Islam as an ideology and the community that upheld it was treated with great suspicion and hostility from within the political establishment, which at this stage was dominated by the military, minority religious groups and technocrats from *priyayi* and *abangan* backgrounds.

As has been discussed in Chapters Four and Five, during this New Order period, while the older generation of *santri* continued to push forward for the ideological objectives of political Islam, the younger generation began to focus on the subject of accommodation and progress under a repressive system that was suspicious of it. They sought ideas and avenues that would allow them to retain their Islamic identity and character whilst channeling the ideals of Islam to help the nation progress and develop. Although Substantive political Islam's ideas were initially and for a long time subsequently considered an aberration of true political Islam by the older generation and those who followed them, by the Nineties it evolved into being seen as another avenue of expression — such as the politics practiced by the likes of Akbar Tanjung. The

ideas of Nurcholish Madjid became well regarded, not only within *Santri* circles, but also within the wider Indonesian academic and political communities.

The price of political accommodation in a decentred clientelist Indonesia

However, since ‘substantialist’ political Islam in Indonesia was conceived during a period of dictatorship, with accommodation being the former’s hallmark trait and patronage being that of the latter, an examination into the nature of Indonesia’s political economies and how HMI alumni have been operating under them needs to be considered. The following discussion examines HMI’s response to the evolution of Indonesian civil and political society under Suharto and Post-New Order. It is shown that HMI previously adapted to the old *aliran*-based pattern of centralized clientelism, but has more recently adapted to the new decentered clientelism of the post-*Orde Baru* era. This will be backgrounded by reviewing the evolution of relations between patrons and clients over the same period.

Fukuoka classifies the New Order as a ‘sultanistic regime’ — a regime lacking the restraint of even a distinctive ideology and based on a mix of fear and rewards to its collaborators (Fukuoka, 2013: 54). A sultanistic regime is based on personal rule, but lacks a guiding ideology or distinctive mentalities. A ‘mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators’ motivates loyalty to the ruler. Also, the ruler exercises power ‘without restraint, at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules or by any commitment to an ideology or value system’ (Fukuoka, 2013: 54). Another important feature is the fusion of state and regime, as the binding norms and relations of bureaucratic administration are ‘constantly subverted by arbitrary personal decisions of the ruler’ (Fukuoka, 2013: 54). As Houchang Chehabi and Juan Linz observe, state and regime are fused in a corporatist sultanistic regime, with regime staff being constituted of ‘people chosen directly by the ruler which often include members of his family, friends, business associates, or individuals directly involved in using violence to sustain the regime’ (Chehabi & Linz, 2000: 7 cited in Fukuoka, 2013: 54).

Edward Aspinall observes that 'patronage distribution for organizing political life and mediating class relations' has long been a central factor in Indonesia (Aspinall, 2013: 28). Patronage is defined by him 'as a material resource disbursed for particularistic purposes and for political benefit, typically distributed via clientelist networks, where clientelism is defined as a personalistic relationship of power' (Aspinall, 2013: 28). Under Suharto, however, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the legislatures, the military and the state-owned enterprises were all co-opted into Suharto's economy-wide 'franchise' — 'a system of government designed to redistribute income and wealth from the weak to the strong while maintaining rapid growth' (McLeod, 2005: 367).

Indonesia under the New Order was a 'powerhouse state' (Schiller, 1996, cited in Aspinall, 2013: 33), that is, it was a very 'powerful and autonomous actor that to a large degree shaped the emergence of a capitalist class' (Aspinall, 2013: 33; see also: Robison, 1986). Patronage under the *Orde Baru* was a highly centralized pillar of the regime's 'coherence and resilience'. Patronage was 'distributed downwards through a pyramidal structure that centered, at its apex, on the presidential palace' (Aspinall, 2013: 34; see also Crouch, 1979).

The New Order exercised state corporatism, in an attempt to depoliticize civil society and absorb intellectuals and student activists into the state apparatus (MacIntyre, 1994; King, 1977, 1979 & 1982). Corporatism has been defined as:

A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter, 1979: 13).

A range of strategies was utilized by the state under Suharto to rein-in students and intellectuals. The overall approach was to keep them isolated from their natural societal social bases. The regime sought to depoliticize them and when necessary it did not

shrink from openly repressing them. The upshot of all this was that — starved of any other alternative — students and intellectuals tended overwhelmingly to cling to the New Order regime (Dhakidae, 2003). Cadres from Operasi Khusus (Opsus — Special Operations) were utilized to control and co-opt universities and student organisations at the local level. Opsus was particularly active in this regard at the University of Indonesia, where it reportedly deployed Aulia Rahman, Freddy Latumahina, Posdam Setiasih and Leo Tomaso, to engineer Hariman Siregar becoming Chairman of the Student Council of the University, in a very narrow victory over Ismet, the HMI candidate. This signaled a major change in student life at this influential university, which had previously been dominated by HMI. Hariman Siregar was considered preferable at that time to the HMI candidate by the regime (*Konfrontasi*, 30 April 2015).

In 1978 the New Order declared its '*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan*' ('Campus Life Normalization/Student coordinating Board') decree. The then Education Minister, Daoed Joesoef, admitted that the purpose of this diktat's stringent rules on university student bodies was to render student activism virtually impossible on campus. Indeed, for the most part the decree did successfully prevent students from openly organizing activities on campus against the regime (Aspinall, 2005: 120).

The New Order also mobilized scholars and professional organizations such as Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia (ISEI— Indonesian Economists' Association) and Himpunan Indonesia untuk Pengembangan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (HIPIS — Indonesian Association for the Development of Social Science), and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to intervene in intellectual life, by disseminating data favouring the New Order and suppressing alternative approaches, when students became increasingly vocal during the 1970s (Dhakidae, 2003). The regime in particular advanced aspects of modernization theory which favoured its own authoritarian perspectives, in particular Samuel P. Huntington's notion of the benefits of authoritarian regimes for developing states, so as to create order and stability for optimizing development. Alternative

analyses were excluded from the education system, in order to maintain the dominance of the military apparatus elites. As a further step, the regime redefined the nationalist state ideology of *Pancasila*, which was promoted throughout universities, in order to further insulate society from critical ideas (Heryanto, 2005; Hadiz and Dhakidae, 2005).

Academics with close connections to the New Order worked with the state apparatus to implement social control mechanisms in higher education — affecting even the highest university levels. Scholars were intimidated by being required to submit to ‘screening’ processes, supposedly established to discover whether academics or their families were involved with the PKI (the outlawed Communist Party of Indonesia). Intellectuals who criticised the state were summoned by the military, and some were imprisoned. The regime also infiltrated the student movement with New Order agents, dividing student groups into extra- and intra-university organisations (Aspinall, 2005: 120-21).

Corporate and military-bureaucratic power were thus fused under the New Order, opening the door to rent-seeking and other predatory behaviour. The 1974-82 oil boom stimulated predatory activities such as the grabbing of state resources for private capital accumulation. Centralized patronage distribution was a defining feature of Suharto’s Indonesia (Aspinall, 2013: 28).

How HMI and Nurcholish Madjid adapted to the New Order

It has already been shown in an earlier chapter that HMI leader Nurcholish Madjid — a leading thinker for the HMI, who chaired the organization in the late 1960s and early 1970s — opted for dialogue and co-operation with the Suharto regime, with the goal of gradually mollifying the New Order’s hostility towards Islamic social movements (Hefner, 2000: 114-15). During the 1980s this led to Madjid nurturing alliances with Suharto era Religious Affairs Minister Munawir Syadzali (Minister 1979-82), as well as with other regime officials. The payoff for Madjid and the HMI was the acquiring of a degree of influence over the Ministry’s policies on Islamic groups in Indonesia (Kersten, 2009: 980; Arifianto, 2012: 190).

Madjid worked with Minister Syadzali to implement moderate policies reflecting his own increasingly moderate outlook on Islam and modernity within the state-run Institut Agama Islam Nasional (IAIN — National Islamic Religion Institute), which runs Indonesia's Islamic higher education system (Kull, 2005: 172; Arifianto, 2012: 190). According to Alexander R. Arifianto:

reforms initiated by Madjid and Syadzali during the 1980s tried to integrate Islamic studies in IAIN with Western-based sciences and institute a new curriculum that promotes the critical study of Islamic theology and philosophy, using ijihad-based methodology reformers (Arifianto, 2012: 190-91; see also: Feener, 1999: 164-65, cited in Kull, 2005:180).

Leong asserts that Madjid and the HMI were prepared to sacrifice even their most central goals, in order to achieve economic and political benefits by building alliances with Suharto and his regime (Leong, 2009: 297). This achievement — and the pragmatic reforms it produced — was no mean feat, given that universities were tightly controlled by the regime in this period. For instance, Madjid was Rector of Paramadina Mulya University, and Arifianto reports that the university's major supporters initially included eight government ministers, who were later succeeded by 'high-ranking officials or wealthy businessmen closely connected to the Suharto regime' (Arifianto, 2012: 199; see also: Hefner, 2000: 125; Hassan, 1982: 121-23). This is alleged evidence of serious rent-seeking and state patronage on Madjid's part (Arifianto, 2012: 198-200). However, as an HMI alumnus, especially one that had been able to reach the top, Madjid would have had a team of fellow senior HMI activists, skilled in the art of drafting proposals and seeking funds. He would also have had the political foresight not to seek direct support from the state but to channel it through other means. Arifianto cites Kull (2005: 264) who asserts that 'Paramadina University prides itself on the fact that its independent status (both legally and financially) means that it is not affiliated or dependent on any sociopolitical groups within the Indonesian society', (Arifianto, 2012: 202). In the process, Arifianto maintain, 'Madjid acquired a reputation as a person who

lives simply with a strict moral conduct' (Arifianto, 2012: 202).

Nevertheless, Arifianto suggests that — despite their closeness to the regime — 'Madjid and other reform supporters ... were not hesitant to condemn and criticize the regime when it violated the reform principles they advocated' (Arifianto, 2012: 198-200). However, he fails to cite any concrete evidence of this. He cites an alleged 'interview conducted in October 1998' but fails to mention that this date was after Suharto had already stepped down. Indeed, it is on public record that Madjid was foremost among a group of Islamic scholars that Suharto sought consultation with, just before stepping down (Perlez, 1 September 2005). Speaking of this occasion, Amien Rais (at that time the head of *Muhammadiyah* who, together with Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid, led the anti-Suharto movement), recounts how Madjid asked Suharto whether his fellow Chicago University (and HMI) alumni should join in the consultation, to which Suharto replied in the negative, thus showing Madjid's close and personal relationship with Suharto (Mietzner, 2008: 126).

Madjid clearly used the training and skills (such as how to build relationships with people in positions of authority) attained during his long service at HMI — which included eight years as its Chairman — to promote his Neo-Modernist theology. He discovered that the Suharto regime increasingly became the right environment for it, as increasing numbers of *Santri* (who did not share his Neo-Modernist views) were also co-operating with the State. Therefore, though it was highly unlikely that Madjid purposefully built these relationships for the sake of material benefit, it is plausible that in the spirit of competition as taught by HMI, he used patronage in order to help mainstream his neo-modernist thoughts in competition with that of Islamic Modernism and Traditionalism.

A decentred clientelist post-Suharto Indonesia

Suharto resigned as president of Indonesia in May 1998, following mass student

protests and financial chaos in the country. Significantly, however, Robison and Hadiz point to the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis as the significant factor behind Suharto's resignation, downplaying democratic bottom-up mobilization as a significant factor. Key oligarchical backers (patrons) of the regime simply withdrew their support, 'and played the collective role of Brutus', so that:

When Suharto's own position became vulnerable, elements of the very oligarchy he had nurtured, and which he had resolutely protected against International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions of assistance, decided that their own survival could only be assured by reorganising themselves within a new regime and with new allies. In other words, Suharto had become redundant (Robison & Hadiz, 2004: 166).

Proof of this contention was readily apparent, when the regime's fall did not evoke the increased social power of ordinary Indonesians, who continued being 'excluded from the process of political contestation' (Hadiz, 2003: 605). Predatory interests that had previously been fed by the Suharto regime now simply reorganized themselves to the new conditions, blocking the emergence of 'coherent liberal democratic forces in the post-Suharto era' (Fukuoka, 2013: 58). The country has thus seen many changes, following the demise of the New Order regime, with the most significant of these arguably being the further 'weakening of alternate modes of organizing and imagining political identity'. Social life is now increasingly commodified, with patronage now 'the most important glue of political relations in Indonesia' (Aspinall, 2013: 28). Suharto's corrupt system of patronage 'has disintegrated, its various component parts now working at cross-purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing fashion' (McLeod, 2005: 367). For the first time ever, Indonesia's politics are now dominated more 'by oligarchs than by fractious elites' (Winters, 2011: 182). Indonesia post-Suharto has therefore witnessed the 'consolidation of an illiberal type of democracy: oligarchical democracy', based on decentralized predatory oligarchs (Fukuoka, 2013: 62; see also: Aspinall, 2013: 128-34).

Aspinall notes the significance of neoliberalism, which can be defined (in contemporary

usage) as a methodology in economics and the social sciences that privileges control of economic factors being transferred from the public to the private sector, and advocates reduced deficit spending, tax law reform, subsidy minimization, eliminating fixed exchange rates, limiting protectionism, mass privatizations and deregulation. Neoliberalism is a salient aspect in the post-Suharto ideological, economic and political constellation. As Daromir Rudnycky explains, neoliberalism is ‘a relatively mundane but increasingly ubiquitous practice of making economic calculation a universal standard for the organization, management, and government of human life and conduct’ (Rudnycky, 2001: 21, cited in Aspinall, 2013: 28). Aspinall observes:

neoliberalism and clientelism are linked and in some senses mutually reinforcing, at least in the effects that they generate for Indonesian political life. In the new democratic period, both neoliberalism and clientelism work to strip Indonesian politics of its ideological trappings and reveal the workings of economic calculation at its core (Aspinall, 2013: 29).

Indonesia post-Suharto is formally democratic, but clientelism continues in an altered framework under the new conditions. Indonesian political life now is ‘decentred’ — that is, it now lacks powerful, enduring poles of attraction (Aspinall, 2013: 35). Society in all its aspects is now radically decentralized. Thus, when Indonesia democratized, the country had 341 districts but the figure stood at 497 by 2010 (Aspinall, 2013: 39; see also Kimura, 2007:71).

Ordinary Indonesians — especially marginalized citizens — ‘require organization to muster social and political influence’. However, civil society organizations (parties and NGOs) remain heavily marked by the enduring legacy of the Sukarno era’s thoroughgoing divisive and destabilizing assault on political and social life (Aspinall, 2013: 50). As Jeffrey Winters pithily observes, this is a system in which ‘the only actors who can dominate the political stage are oligarchs with massive personal wealth, and elites with a capacity to attract or extract sizeable resources from the state’ (Winters, 2011, 180, cited in Aspinall, 2013: 49). Only predatory political elites are able to mobilize ‘various forms of corruption and patronage to accumulate political power and cement

coalitions' (Aspinall, 2013: 49; see also: Ambardi, 2008; Buehler, 2010; Davidson, 2009; van Klinken, 2009; Mietzner, 2007 & Slater 2004). As for student organizations and NGOs, they remain atomized and reformist national coalitions are still unable to emerge. Realizing their powerlessness, NGO and student activists conclude 'they have little choice but to join the existing elite-dominated political parties, effectively fragmenting and dispersing their efforts yet further' (Aspinall, 2013: 50).

An all-pervasive expression of this phenomenon is what Indonesians term '*proyek*', or project. In post-Suharto Indonesia, this refers to:

a self-contained, collaborative, and funded activity intended to achieve a designated end and which is to be attained through at least the formal performance of a competitive process — is now a pattern that permeates not only the bureaucracy but also the wider world of political actors and their organizations that cluster around the state (Aspinall, 2013: 30).

Although the term has earlier roots, it is today applied to those intellectuals, NGO activists, party functionaries, local government bureaucrats, journalists, educators, religious leaders, and others who pursue rent-seeking in the name of constraining the state; always ready to convert social need into private gain. *Mencari proyek* (looking for projects) is 'a key mode in the neoliberal approach to governance, with government bodies and international agencies dispensing significant parts of their funds in this way' (Aspinall, 2013: 30). Simultaneously, looking for projects is 'a central target of patronage hunters, encouraging competition and factionalization' (Aspinall, 2013: 30).

Societal and political fragmentation is deepened by *mencari proyek*, because such activity is constructed 'on the basis of personalistic exchange of political loyalty and material rewards', instead of being based on ideology or even on identity, so that there are few constraints on whom (or how many) can be taken as a patron or client. Aspinall (2012: 51) consequently observes that Indonesia displays 'a pattern ... in which patronage networks are relatively fluid and crosscutting'. A perpetual search can emerge for the 'most generous' patrons — instead of rent-seekers 'being constrained by

a supreme patriarch, as they were under Suharto'. Neoliberalism has a 'multiplying effect on sources of patronage and political authority' (Aspinall, 2013: 30-31). Every level of Indonesian civil society is now affected by so-called 'money politics' — in which positions are literally bought in return for substantial sums of money. Even the country's Supreme Court is reportedly plagued with this scourge. Rumours of vote buying circulated when fifty-four justices prepared to elect a new Chief Justice in 2012. Some media sources estimated that the cost of one vote in this selection process could be as high as Rp. 5 billion (\$US 555,555) (Parlina, 7 February 2012). In October 1999, Islamic leader Abdurrahman Wahid famously justified running for Indonesia's presidency by alleging that opposition rival Megawati Sukarnoputri's (secular PDI-D) campaign could be tainted with money politics, but offered no evidence to sustain his claim (Pura, 12 October 1999). Ironically, in July 2001 Indonesia's parliament removed President Abdurrahman Wahid from office partly due to corruption allegations. Because of decentralization, however, such rent-seeking is particularly prevalent at the local level, where 'the patronage-based nature of local politics remains deeply embedded' (Aspinall, 2013: 38; see also: Hadiz, 2002, 2004 & 2010; Buehler, 2010).

Post-Suharto political Islam and Clientelism

The emergence of 'more assertive strands of Islamism and Islamic conservatism' in the current era has seen the further division of Islamic social and political organization, as the country now moves on from the previous simple counter position between traditionalist and modernist *Aliran* groups. Islamic political organizations have descended into rancorous factional fights, and blatant patronage-seeking has stricken Islamic political parties (Ufen, 2008: 5-41; Aspinall, 2013: 46-49). Given that in this political war of the jungle only actors who possess 'massive personal wealth, and elites with a capacity to attract or extract sizeable resources from the state' (Winters, 2011, 180, cited in Aspinall, 2013: 49) can survive, it should not surprise that the prevailing dynamic pushes all would-be players towards oligarchs with extensive resources and power. Vedi R. Hadiz cites the example of the supposedly Islamically based Partai

Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS —Justice and Prosperity Party), which he notes:

operates within a system of power where a particularly predatory form of democratic politics entails ad-hoc alliances with an assortment of interests at the national and local levels. These alliances are typically characterized by murky elite-level wheeling and dealing, and cemented by the deployment of money politics. Such alliances are always quite fluid because they are rarely about common policy agendas or ideological compatibility. Instead, they are about the establishment of coalitions of power embroiled in competition for control of public institutions and resources for the purpose of private capital accumulation. It is partly for this reason that political Islam splintered quickly into different political parties after 1998, each of which has become the basis for attempts to build new patronage networks that compete for the spoils of state power (Hadiz, 2011: 9-10).

Hadiz concludes that ‘the ideological “softening” of the PKS has been due as much to the demands of operating in a corrupt system rife with money politics, for instance, by taking part in predatory alliances, as it has been the result of liberalizing values within the party’ (Hadiz, 2011: 10).

In a spectacular downfall, after a decade of being recognized as the only party within government without any significant record of corruption, PKS’s incorruptible image came to an end when its chairman Lutfi Hasan Ishaq was indicted on corruption and money laundering in December 2013. Acting as patron, Lutfi used his position in persuading Minister of Agriculture (2009-2014) and fellow party colleague Suswono to increase the import quota for meat importing company PT Indoguna Utama (*The Jakarta Post*, 10 December, 2013). Lutfi became the first sitting party chairman to be arrested by the KPK in a graft case. However, it will be shown in what follows that the PKS is not the only Islamic organization that now operates in this manner, nor is it the first political party to have had its chairman convicted of graft in the post-Suharto era.

HMI post-Suharto clientelism

As for the HMI, it has entered all the major political parties, holding down senior positions in several of them. Thus, Dirk Tomsa remarks on the ‘huge presence’ of HMI

former leaders, members and alumni in Golkar. HMI's entrance into Golkar began under Suharto, escalating in the early 1970s, following the ascension of Akbar Tanjung to the post of Golkar Chairman in 1972. On the back of 'clientelistic connections with Akbar Tanjung', the HMI's Ferry Mursyidan and Ade Kommaruddin rose up Golkar's ranks swiftly, now being 'seen by many' — together with some other young Golkar luminaries — 'as possibly the next generation of party leaders' (Tomsa, 2008: 99-100). Of the early post Suharto era, in describing Akbar Tanjung's 'sway in parliament', Jeffrey A Winters claims that 'No other political figure in Indonesia had a stronger reputation for being an effective party player, a tireless party networker, and a master of party politics and maneuvers than Akbar Tanjung'. According to Winters, Akbar's institutional base within Golkar was so powerful that 'Hundreds of party officials from across the archipelago owed major political debts to Tanjung for his favors and assistance to them over the years. Many could not have moved up in the party without Tanjung's help' (Winters, 2011: 187-89).

However, eleven years before PKS chairman Lutfi Hasan Ishaq's conviction on graft, then Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung was the first acting party Chairman to be indicted for graft in the post-Suharto era for the misappropriation of 40 billion *rupiah* (approximately \$US5 million). During the saga, Akbar's 2002 conviction was first upheld by an appellate court, only to be overturned in his appeal to the Supreme Court in 2004, which maintained that as Minister he had transferred money on behalf of then president B. J. Habibie. Unfortunately for the public purse, the money was never recovered as Akbar claimed to have forgotten which fund he had assigned the money. Although Akbar was by no means the first HMI alumni to have had allegations or been convicted of corruption placed upon them, as the cases Ahmad Tirtosudiro, Bustanul Arifin S. H., Ir Beddu Amang and many others during the New Order era illustrates (Alam, 2011), the former's case is noteworthy due to Akbar's position as Madjid's protégé and pioneer practitioner of HMI's substantive political Islam. Moreover, as Winters argues:

At the height of Suharto's sultanistic rule, falling within the personal orbit of the intimidating president provided oligarchs with maximum protection. No one in the government, and especially not in the legal system, dared to pursue legal matters against individuals known to be linked favorably to Suharto (Winters, 2011: 187).

However, since the Akbar episode, other instances of how HMI's substantive political Islam has flared under Indonesia's current 'oligarchic democracy' must be mentioned, beginning with the Hambalang sports complex '*proyek*' that indicted, among others, two HMI stalwarts of the post-Suharto political system, the then Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs, Andi Alfian Mallarangeng and the Democrats Party (PD) Chairman Anas Urbaningrum. The former was found guilty of accepting bribes of US\$550,000 from contractor Global Daya Manunggal in order to manipulate the procurement and budgeting process of the Hambalang sports complex, so as to fund his campaign for the election of PD's Chair (*The Jakarta Globe*, 1 August 2013). During Mallarangeng's trial, Urbaningrum's lawyer submitted the allegation of using bribe money for the sake of party vote buying. Ironically, a panel of judges would use the same argument as evidence to convict Urbaningrum of money laundering in among others the Hambalang bribery affair (*The Jakarta Post*, 24 August, 2014).

The above episode was especially damaging for HMI's reputation in particular with Urbaningrum's conviction, as his meteoric rise from political unknown to party Chairman, as mentioned above, was a source of great pride and emulation for the HMI and its alumni still moving up the ranks — only to tumble from the heights of political ascension to the obscurity of political pariahs. Urbaningrum has become the second HMI alumni and former Chairman to be convicted of corruption while chairing a major political party since Akbar. To the wider socio-political community in Indonesia, the demise of Akbar and Urbaningrum re-emboldened the notion that HMI alumni who enter the world of politics are mere operatives with political skill and training, driven by power through the *proyek* system, having become major players in the world of

Indonesian political patronage. As former Golkar House of Representative member Musfihin Dahlan alluded to in his interview with the present author (interview 25 May 2012): ‘in politics the aim is budget allocation (*politik itu muaranya alokasi anggaran*)’.

Another HMI alumnus is Irfan Ghani — whose inner circle staff and affiliates is comprised of fellow HMI alumni, all of whom joined in the conversation during his interview by the present author. He remarked that — unlike other Indonesian political organizations — HMI had no patrons for the group overall: ‘We have no such patrons, we are forced to survive (politically); first survive then look for a patron’ and in the case of Ghani it was Urbaningrum, admitting that as part of the latter’s PD chairman election campaign team (or “*timsukses*” in Indonesian), he used his own finances for travelling around Indonesia to sway the party branches towards his candidate. As a reward, Ghani was assigned the post of Secretary of PD Jakarta’s Regional Representative Council, DPD (Interview with Irfan Ghani, 29 May 2012).

Thus, the key to all these achievements appears to be HMI’s unabashed pursuit of *politik abang-abang* (patron politics). HMI alumnus Chaerul Aman asserted:

There is no one (from HMI) that is willing to protest that the democracy we have now is an overworked democracy [demokrasi banyak kebablasan], moving in the direction of finance, moving in the direction of violence. None. If there are, they are those affiliated with the ‘Freedom Institute’ [Liberal Islam think tank], or Paramadina [University] or affiliated with an NGO. Now what is the orientation of our friends at HMI, patron politics [politik abang-abang]; they are busy looking for a successful patron [abang]’... That’s the job [activity] of HMI chairmen: look for affiliations but [in particular] economic affiliations (interview 27 May 2012)

Thus, Ghani and Aman reveal that the process in HMI is for its activists to each locate a patron, so they can gain access to the corridors of power in order to move up the ranks, and then work their way up to themselves becoming patrons. As the discussion in Chapter Eight of the dissertation concerning the 2014 Presidential Elections shows, this model has been successfully applied by HMI activists when they become alumni and

enter the political and bureaucratic systems — as evident in the power and influence of HMI alumni within all levels of the Indonesian government system.

Another HMI alumnus, Taufik Z. Karim, author of the 2012 book *Otokritik Terhadap HMI* (Self-Criticism of HMI), discusses HMI's *tradisi fatsun abang* (obedience to big brother [patron] tradition), writing: 'The strength of the HMI *abang* is evident during an HMI election, where they all gather to display their authority over the HMI landscape' (Karim, 2012: 37). Karim also observes:

This immature attitude among and towards our (HMI) big brother has hurt the cadre process in HMI, whereas ironically, they have always said that priority is to the cadre, while they, whether consciously or unconsciously, teach us to harm the process. I still remember the meeting at the residence of one of the big brothers, when he more or less said the following: 'you do not need to spend your energy to win this fight. It is impossible to [lose to] opponents. A cat in a sack, if nominated as Chairman of HMI will win, because they have the power due to both their large network and funding (Karim, 2012: 37).

Karim asserts that the HMI 'elder brother should be to the cadre an avenue to exchange ideas and provide motivation so that the wheels of the cadre system in HMI remain dynamic in order to serve Indonesian society' (Karim, 2012: 38). However, the conduct of some of HMI's most notable former chairmen has simply re-enforced the notion of '*abang*' as patron mentioned earlier, rather than as mentor.

Significantly, no other example could be as relevant as the precedent that was set by HMI seniors towards their juniors in the wake of the aftermath of the Akbar Tanjung corruption saga, during the fiasco that was the 2004 Golkar party convention. In having the foresight as to the direction that inter-party politics was heading in Indonesia, and taking a lesson from their seniors, both Mallarangeng and Urbaningrum saw the need to have at their disposal 'the availability of large campaign war chests' in order to compete for the PD chairmanship (Mietzner, 2013: 131). As the removal of Akbar Tanjung from his party as chairman by fellow HMI alumni and then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla has

shown, even the most politically indebted leader can be out mustered by the power of patronage and money politics. Leaked US diplomatic cables from WikiLeaks that suggest Kalla paid US\$20,000 to district branches and US\$30,000 to provincial chapters are presented in Marcus Mietzner's (2013: 131) study. Kalla admitted to having used approximately US\$228,000 of his personal wealth on the 3,000 fellow executives during the convention, but insisted it was for plane tickets and the fees for the hotel meeting venue (*Jakarta Globe*, 11 March 2011). However, Winters has a different take on the convention by way of his informant, who claims that:

At the Denpasar [Bali] National Congress, money was brought out in the toilets! People were wavering in the vote. And you know what they did? They took hand phones into the voting booth to prove that they voted for "A" or for "B." So you were given half [the promised cash], and then after that when you showed that you had voted for Jusuf Kalla, they will give you the rest' (cited in Winters, 2011: 188).

Thus, both Kalla's position as Vice-President and money were too powerful as factors, even though his bid for the Chairmanship was a final attempt, after recognizing that their preferred candidate, Indonesian media magnate Surya Paloh, could not defeat Akbar, despite having greater financial resources through his business enterprise and the fact that Akbar had been financially depleted after two years in three court cases to clear his name (*Suara Merdeka*, 20 December 2004). Jusuf Kalla is once again Vice-President of Indonesia in the administration of PDIP backed President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who during his first working cabinet of 2014-2016 included three HMI alumni, all of whom were major players of the president's *timsukses* and are from the same HMI generation as Anas Urbaningrum. As discussed in the previous chapter, information of the fall out of the two HMI alumni Ministers from parties led by powerful oligarchs, with Yudy Chrisnandi based in the HANURA (Heart of the People) Party of former General Wiranto and Ferry Mursyidan from NASDEM (the National Democrats Party) of media magnate Surya Paloh, is still forthcoming. As for Anies Baswedan, his rescue from political downfall by fellow HMI alumni, Vice President Jusuf Kalla may indicate that in 2017, the 'HMI connection' is still a powerful political tool. Needless to say, considering

the the Party of outgoing president Yudhoyono had offered to support Baswedan as their candidate even though he was not party member for the 2014 elections, Jokowi's sacking of one of the most promising prospects in Indonesian politics could have seriously tainted Baswedan's image were it not for his comeback victory in a highly controversial and polarising gubernatorial election (Arifin, 2016). However, though Baswedan continues to remain an independent, he is undoubtedly indebted to Kalla, and this could sow the seed for a future *fatsun abang* or patron-client working relationship.

Conclusion

The present chapter has reviewed the evolution of relations between patrons and clients during and since the Suharto era. The chapter has demonstrated that HMI not only adapted to the old *aliran*-based pattern of centralized clientelism, but has also, more recently, adjusted to the new decentered clientelism of the post-*Orde Baru* era. Aspinall (2013: 30) observes that the origins of the *proyek* phenomenon 'go back at least to the 1970s'. Interestingly, this was precisely the time of Madjid's liberal turn, as shown earlier in the present dissertation.

It should not surprise that HMI alumni have become the masters of Indonesia's patron-client political culture, as the best among HMI's cadres are well skilled and experienced in sourcing patrons, networks and funds. However, it is important to note that HMI is still handicapped in that, apart from current vice-President Yusuf Kalla, even Akbar Tanjung, the most astute political player of the early post-Suharto period, does not possess the wealth of other major oligarchs within the political system. Karim's critique explains how the role of the *abang* has transformed HMI culture from one of moving up the ranks through merit, to that of seeking a patron with the network and funding to make them viable contenders. HMI alumni have also taken advantage of the fact that the role and tradition of the *abang* has evolved from that of mentor and advisor to their juniors, to that of patron in patron-client relationships.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

This chapter draws general conclusions for this dissertation as a whole, by drawing general conclusions on HMI as a social movement — comparing accepted social movement theories stated in Chapter 3 with the realities of HMI as a particular social movement. The chapter then addresses the specific research hypotheses stated in earlier chapters of this dissertation, in the light of later chapters' subsequent research findings. The hypotheses assessed were originally based on scholarly hypotheses first developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977) for understanding social movements. The chapter finishes by drawing general conclusions for the dissertation as a whole.

General conclusions on HMI as a social movement

HMI has been designated and analysed herein as a social movement. For the purpose of the present dissertation, a social movement has been defined as a network of informal interactions between individuals and groups. It is a shared collective identity that engages in a political and/or cultural conflict entailing sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities, for the express purpose of changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society. It has been argued herein that HMI as a social movement maintains a very loosely structured network of individuals, with the capacity to mobilise a network of individuals and groups, including sustained interfaces with elites and authorities, with the aim of achieving changes in society and the latter's reward distribution system that mesh with its broadly conceived Islamic ideology.

It has been related that social movement theorists assert three cardinal concepts or pillars to explain SMO activities: mobilising resources, political opportunities, and framing. Social movements require both the successful enlistment of appropriate resources, as well as favourable political or social conditions in order to achieve success. Such movements' campaigns must achieve 'frame resonance', in order to achieve

effective action to accomplish goals, arguably needing to forge an 'identity' based on cultural factors (including religion) that permits the creation of a broad and motivated base of participants. Cultural factors can be imperative for the same reason. Due to their peculiar nature as informal networks rather than party structures, SMOs must be able to imbue their participants with the feeling that they are part of a broad collective effort (united around support for a common cultural outlook), while retaining their distinctive identities. It has been shown that HMI as a social movement has consistently managed to secure necessary human and financial resources, as well as utilising favourable political or social conditions in order to achieve 'frame resonance'.

The movement's ability to imbue its broad network of activists with the impression that they form a portion of a broad co-operative effort united around support for a common cultural (very broadly conceived Islamic) outlook has been demonstrated herein. HMI now wields extensive influence and presence throughout Indonesia's mainstream political arenas. It has the ability to significantly influence many policy decisions, allowing HMI to have an ongoing influence over the variety of political Islam taking shape in Indonesian political culture. HMI is now plainly expert at framing its campaign goals with wider social narratives to gain broad acceptance, as verified in this dissertation.

Social movement theorists typically pose a three-stage evolution of all social movements: emergence, coalescence and bureaucratization. Once a movement emerges, thus, it has been argued in thesis that, it next faces 'coalescence', in which phase it seeks to define itself, by developing an ideology — a set of 'theoretically articulated propositions about social reality'. As SMOs evolve over time, they can become increasingly structured, in response to the exigencies of worldly success. At its foundation, it has been argued, an SMO experiences the 'emergence stage', providing it with both solidarity and the 'collective excitement' of a shared 'charismatic vision'. These are progressively replaced with the 'routinisation of charisma', as the group moves towards institutionalisation and the initial charismatic vision diminishes, being

replaced by an 'orderly institutional reality' (Eisenstaedt, 1968: xix). Paradoxically, it has been claimed, the group loses its founding idealistic vitality at the very time that it is achieving policy goals, resources and worldly success.

HMI's emergence phase was certainly marked by both solidarity and the shared 'charismatic vision' of Islamic politics in action. As has been shown herein, HMI at its founding phase was defined by its profoundly Islamic vision and commitment. HMI's strong commitment to lofty goals in practice led it swiftly to success. It has been shown how Indonesia's armed forces commander General Sudirman heralded HMI in 1948 as the hope of Indonesian society. One year later, HMI was proclaimed the student movement that officially represented Indonesia's *Santri* communities by the Islamic 'Ummah Congress.

By 1955 HMI was entering the phase of coalescence, as it began considering ways to train its membership as sophisticated cadres. By 1960 the group had evolved to the point where it instituted the refined cadre-training system throughout the group that has been one of the pillars of its subsequent successes. As shown in an earlier chapter, 1960 was also the year when HMI established itself as part of Indonesia's political community with an ever-growing independent voice. At this point that Nurcholish Madjid began to lead HMI towards the 'routinisation of charisma', as the group moved towards institutionalisation and the initial charismatic Islamic vision diminished, being steadily replaced by an 'orderly institutional reality'.

HMI today has clearly entered the phase of charismatic institutionalisation and subordination to 'orderly institutional reality'. The movement's journey from its founding phase has arguably resulted in the abandonment of the group's initial traditional *Santri* values, which it has increasingly replaced with the doctrine of Substantive Islam. The latter doctrine enabled it to adapt to the conflicting perspectives of: Sukarno (President of Indonesia from 1945 to 1967); the Suharto regime's *Orde Baru* (1965 to 1998); B. J. Habibie (President from 1998 to 1999); Abdurrahman Wahid ('Gus

Dur', President from 1999 to 2001); Megawati Sukarnoputri (from 2001 to 2004); Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (from 2004 to 2014) and currently under President Jokowi (from 2014 onwards).

Despite attaining the stage of institutionalisation and subordination to 'orderly institutional reality', however, HMI and its alumni remain a very loosely structured network of individuals, as they have always determined to remain. Now however, major players in Indonesian political life stud its ranks: the current Vice-President; current Cabinet members, and senior bureaucrats.

HMI has been proven to function as a social movement — albeit one which behaves in some ways differently from social movements as these are classically conceived. This is clearly shown by addressing the specific research hypotheses stated in earlier chapters of this dissertation, in the light of later chapters' subsequent research findings. This dissertation will therefore now turn to this analytical task.

Conclusions on research hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to HMI has increased. It has been argued consistently in this dissertation that HMI is a social movement organisation with a very loosely structured network of individuals, who demonstrate the capacity to mobilise a network of individuals and groups, including interacting seriously with elites and authorities, with the aim of achieving changes in society and the latter's reward distribution system, that mesh with its own broadly conceived Islamic ideology. Nevertheless, the HMI's 'looseness' has never meant that it has lacked the capacity to steadily accumulate resources (both financial as well as members).

It has also been demonstrated how, beginning in 1955, HMI's cadre system enabled the organisation to infiltrate various arms of the State with its alumni. Its training system provided HMI with the practical means to develop effective cadres — capable of

sustaining themselves through all of Indonesia's turbulent political periods. HMI has clearly succeeded in attracting increasing resources both from Indonesia's successive (and often mutually hostile) political configurations and in terms of support from university students and from key power centres in the country. HMI has continued to grow in influence and at times exercises considerable influence in political matters; despite the emergence of rival intra-campus student organisations (also SMOs), HMI still has the most branches, particularly outside Java, of all student SMOs.

The passage of time saw HMI's influence only increase, as shown herein. During the presidential term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from 2004 to 2014, HMI cadres transformed SBY's Democrat Party from a small party largely filled by former military figures and SBY's business affiliates, to a party with a broad representation at the national, provincial and district levels of Indonesian politics.

Even more impressively, HMI alumni have also exercised considerable ability at times to determine whom will be Indonesia's President. Thus, it has been seen herein that a coalition of HMI alumni in the late Nineties sidelined Megawati Sukarno, the Chairwoman of the Indonesian Democracy Party for Struggle (PDI-P), from the presidency. Megawati's party had secured the highest number of votes in the 1999 general elections, but the HMI coalition saw that she was bumped aside, in favour of a *Santri* candidate. This same coalition of HMI alumni spearheaded the charge for Wahid's impeachment from this position two years later.

It is apparent that the resources available to HMI have continued to increase, since it now stands at the peak of its power, as demonstrated by the facts that Indonesia's current Vice-President and several Cabinet members are HMI alumni. Former HMI South Sulawesi branch chairman Jusuf Kalla had earlier been Vice-President under SBY. This hypothesis is therefore proven.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the absolute amount of resources available to HMI, the greater the likelihood that new student movements will develop to compete for these

resources. Fierce competition between student movements (especially among Muslim organisations) for resources has been demonstrated in this dissertation. Rival student SMOs (all newer than HMI) such as those affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Tarbiyyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have increased due to these movements' growing grassroots support throughout the country. However, HMI's cadres are well trained in seeking contributions in order to meet their activities, relying on HMI's prestige of being the student movement that is the oldest, largest and best connected with Indonesia's elite. In reality, HMI is no different from all other currently existing Muslim student SMOs, in its openness to adapting to the needs of Indonesia's secular governments. New student movements have certainly developed — and competed for resources with HMI, in the face of the increasing openness of successive governments to using student Islamic SMOs for their own purposes. This hypothesis is thus also proven.

Hypothesis 3: McCarthy and Zald (1977) posit that, regardless of the resources available to potential 'beneficiary adherents', and the larger the amount of resources available to 'conscience adherents', the more likely is the development of student movements that respond to preferences for change. Contrary to this understanding, it has been shown herein that that HMI has in practice steadily abandoned any conscience-based foundation; it has been argued that HMI has steadily abandoned any conscience-based foundation, in practice. This is apparent through HMI's adoption of the moderate 'Substantive Islam' perspective, which has been shown to lead it away from its profoundly Islamic roots, in favour of political expediency. It has also been demonstrated that HMI's abandonment of a conscience-based foundation is the result of it abandoning an unequivocal commitment to striving for an Islamic society, as well as of the cumulative effect of the organisation successfully attaining power and influence. This hypothesis is therefore unproven.

Hypothesis 4: McCarthy and Zald postulate that the more a Social Movement Organisation (SMO) is dependent upon isolated constituents, the less stable will be the

flow of resources to it, concluding that the more an SMO depends upon isolated constituents to maintain a resource flow, the more its shifts in resource flow resemble the patterns of consumer expenditures for expendable and marginal goods. Contrary to this understanding, it has been shown HMI leaders communicate with their members and alumni using personal, informal, channels.

It has also been demonstrated that HMI has never depended upon isolated constituents at any time, nor has it ever resorted to advertising. HMI leaders communicate to their members and alumni using personal, informal, channels, which is reflective of HMI's method of loose affiliation. In contrast with McCarthy and Zald's understanding, the flow of resources to HMI has been proven to increase over time, as this loose network grows in authority. This hypothesis is therefore also unproven.

Hypothesis 5: McCarthy and Zald suggest that an SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organisation is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict. It has been shown that, in fact, sources of 'tension and conflict' within HMI flow from quite different, less idealistic sources. In fact, it has been shown that HMI's 'conscience constituents' are few and far between, and the organisation's only source of internal tension is competition for internal posts and for external roles as MPs and senior bureaucrats. This dissertation proves that like all other political factions in Indonesian politics, HMI has fallen victim to the pursuit of money and power that the system promotes. In HMI, it has been seen, incentive centres on power, influence and network. Therefore, while HMI is an SMO that attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organisation and endures high levels of tension and conflict, these negative features have been demonstrated to arise from sources quite dissimilar to those attributed by McCarthy and Zald when an SMO seeks to connect both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organisation. In the final analysis, thus, this hypothesis is unproven.

Hypothesis 6: McCarthy and Zald argue that older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist throughout the cycle of SMI growth and decline. This dissertation has demonstrated that HMI's years of experience and accumulated intellectual and material resources have permitted it to advance its political fortunes. HMI's patiently constructed network, combined with its ability to train cadres fully prepared for public life, and its many academics and their intellectual production have all built the organisation's prestige and powerfully spread its influence. HMI thus verifies this hypothesis of McCarthy and Zald.

Hypothesis 7: McCarthy and Zald contend that the more competitive a SMI is, the more likely it will be that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies. As has been shown herein, HMI's field of action has always been competitive — although HMI's self-identification as orthodox, *santri* Sunni Muslims meant that it could initially operate within the *santri* milieu, in which they at first met few serious competitors — especially outside Java. However, newer organisations with ample resources such as Muhammadiyah, NU, HTI and Tarbiyyah now compete with HMI for student membership. Compared to HMI, these newer SMOs offer narrower goals and strategies. This hypothesis is therefore proven.

Hypothesis 8: according to McCarthy and Zald, the larger the income flow to a SMO, the more likely it will be that cadre and staff are professional and tend towards being one of the larger such groups. HMI is a large SMO and appears to operate quite professionally, but — conflicting with McCarthy and Zald's schema — none of these are employed by the organisation for a wage. HMI's professionalism can be attributed to the organisation's long history and experience in the field as well as, and controversially, its successful fundraising — instead of simply the large income flows that it attracts. This hypothesis is thus not verified.

Hypothesis 9: in McCarthy and Zald's estimation, the larger the SMO is, and the larger the specific SMIs, the more likely it is that SM careers will develop. As already noted,

despite HMI employing no professional staff HMI has become a springboard for promising careers and is seen as such by many who join it. As an SMO it functions to train its members and cadres for eventual public life. However, this potentially opens the door for such successful individuals to seek to curtail HMI's idealism, limiting it to pragmatic, short-term goals — as the discussion of hypotheses three and five above appear to evidence. This hypothesis is arguably verified, although perhaps not in the manner that it might operate in other SMOs.

Hypothesis 10: McCarthy and Zald postulate that the more that an SMO is funded by isolated constituents, the more likely it is that beneficiary constituent workers are recruited for strategic purposes, rather than for organisational work. This dissertation has shown that the HMI Central Committee seeks funding of major seminars and conferences, and both the Central Committee and Branch Committee members seek funds during their campaigns for important internal positions and posts. HMI provides little transparency, there is no auditing system, and members are not usually required to divulge the sources of contributions they collect — although this dissertation has also demonstrated that scandals can erupt if it is proven that contributions have been sourced from donors considered inimical to Islam. HMI's general lack of fundraising transparency at least opens the door to the corrupt use of SMO resources. However as shown herein, HMI's beneficiary constituent workers are apparently recruited for strategic purposes, rather than for organisational work. This hypothesis is therefore verified.

Hypothesis 11: The more a SMO is made up of workers with discretionary time at their disposal the more readily it can develop transitory teams. The present dissertation has shown that senior members of HMI select transitory teams consisting of trained cadres, who consider them as having the skills needed to be on these teams. It has been demonstrated that these teams move up the ranks — from the Branch to the National levels, accruing enhanced power and influence internally en route to the top. — including the increasing ability to set and influence the policy agenda of the SMO HMI.

They gain prestige and are able to build greater networks with powerful members of Indonesia's elite and political and bureaucratic community. This hypothesis is thus also verified.

Many of the research hypotheses of this dissertation are thus proven, while others are clearly disproven or apply not in the manner that other SMOs might operate. This seems to indicate that HMI is an SMO with certain unique features, while generally operating as within the standard parameters of a Social Movement Organisation.

Conclusion

HMI has followed the classic paradigm for social movement development, of emergence, coalescence and bureaucratization. As this dissertation has shown — and the conclusions on research hypotheses underline — HMI has in some ways evolved differently from how social movements are classically conceived. The investigation being finalised and the research hypotheses having been interrogated, this dissertation is now complete.

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List of Interviews

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- Chaerul Aman, HMI alumni, researcher and Journalist, 27 May 2012
- Ciputat Study group, 5 current and former HMI members (names withheld), 27 May 2012
- Name withheld, HMI Advisory Committee Board member, 4 May 2012