

Iran and the triumphant Great Powers, 1921-1979 : an exploration of the role of a smaller power in a situation of Great Power rivalry

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Iran and the Triumphant Great Powers; 1921-1979

*An Exploration of the Role of a Smaller Power in a Situation of
Great Power Rivalry*

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Degree: Ph.D. in Political Science

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Acknowledgment

The idea of this thesis originated some years ago in class discussions of Iranian-Soviet Relations. This was endorsed when the result of my MA dissertation came out suggesting in part that an accurate analysis of Iranian foreign relations with one super power could only be achieved when at least equal attention is paid to its foreign relations with the other super powers or rival Great Powers as well.

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At last, I would like to emphasise that none of the individuals or institutions I have mentioned are in any way responsible for facts and interpretations in this study. The responsibility for these is solely mine.

Bahram Navazeni

Sydney, Australia

June, 1994

The System of Transliteration

The system of transliteration adopted in this study is a modified version of the format approved by the Library of Congress and the American Library Association. I have chosen to delete all the diacritical marks with the exception of the ayn (') and the hamzah (') when they appear in the middle of a word, e.g., Shi'i, Qashqa'i. In this system, the "al" and the hyphen are not used but are replaced by the "i" and the "o," where pronounced differently. Persian or Arabic words are spelled as they commonly appear in Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, in Webster's Third International Dictionary, in Webster's Geographical Dictionary, or in ordinary English usage. Examples include Islam, Quran, Muhammad, bazaar, Tehran, and Tudeh. Well-known Iranian proper names are generally presented as they commonly appear in the English literature. e.g., Reza Shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Musaddiq, Sayyid Ziaeddin Tabataba'i, Amir Abbas Hoveida and Ayatollah Abul Qassim Kashani. Sharpeyed readers will note occasional inconsistencies, but such is the nature of transliteration system and language.

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Introduction

The Subject and its Importance

Modern Iran¹ at different times in its history, has faced situations of severe rivalry between different Great Powers, on the one side a large country which was its neighbour on the whole northern border, Russia, and on the other, a powerful nation, first Britain and then the United States, whose governments had vital interests in the other areas bordering Iran. The history of foreign rivalry in Iran goes back to the time when two strong foreign neighbours, the Ottoman and the Russian Empires, competed with each other to gain influence in Iran.

The study of the history of the Great Power rivalry suggests that there are at least three factors that affected this behaviour. The first and foremost of all can be sought at the international level. By the end of the First World War and with the establishment of several international organizations, the most important of which was the League of Nations, it was hoped that international relations would be built thereafter on mutual understanding and equality together with mutual respect for each party. Unfortunately however, this did not come about; instead the old system persisted with more vigour than ever, characterized by inequality, international disunity, enforcement and Great Power rivalry over smaller powers. A similar situation occurred when the Second World War ended. The world was still dominated by the Great Powers triumphant in the war and the international organisations including the United Nations Organisation were controlled by their concert. Nothing could be passed without their consent and everything could be done with their mutual agreement.

The second factor was in Iran itself as a smaller power. Iran was not strong enough relative to the Great Powers to stand against this world wide rivalry. Having suffered from political disunity, a disastrous economy and wide-ranging suppression, Iran was faced with considerable dissatisfaction permeating the country. This continued even after the considerable increase in oil prices in 1973, when the country seemed rich enough to declare its wish to become the fifth great country of the world. The outcome of popular dissatisfaction was the February revolution of 1979.

In addition to the inequality of states in international relations and the power vacuum in Iran, as a smaller state, there was a third factor which played a major role

in encouraging Great Power rivalry. The natural position of Iran was a vast reserve of oil vital to the Great Powers. As a geopolitical and geostrategic territory Iran was a corridor for the Russians to organize the Eastern Revolution after the end of the First World War, and for the British to attack Russian territory or at least put a barrier in this corridor, a “cordon sanitaire,” as they named it. This position did not lose its importance after the Second World War when the Soviets aimed at Persian Gulf oil reserves and the United States appeared to establish containment, the policy of surveillance and defense of its vital interests in the Gulf. Direct or indirect intervention of Great Powers in smaller nations’ affairs is an aspect of systemic influences.

This rivalry has caused serious damage to both the Iranian people and natural resources so that dealing with Great Power rivals and a perpetual struggle to survive became a key factor of Iranian foreign policy and characterized the modern history of Iran. This policy, however, did not work properly because in securing the oil resources and territorial integrity, the Iranian oligarchy of policy makers, mostly influenced by the Shah, had always focussed on possible threats from the north (the Russians) and aligned with the West, either with the British during the inter-war period or with both the British and the Americans after the Second World War.

Objective

As recent evidence shows the three factors underlying Great Power rivalry affecting Iran are inequality in the international system, the vulnerable domestic situation of Iran as a smaller power and its important natural resources which still influence Iran’s position today. If it is true that Iran’s oil reserves and geographical importance as a corridor motivated the Great Powers’ rivalry in the country, then Iran’s current position as oil producer and as gateway between east and west ensures a continuance of that rivalry.

The implications of this situation have encouraged me to examine the modern history of Great Power rivalry. My purpose, therefore, may be clarified as an attempt to examine the factors causing Great Power rivalry and to establish the reasons for the pro-Western alignment of foreign policy initiatives of Iran. I hope to suggest the basic elements of a foreign policy which will enable Iran, while having an active role in the international system, to survive and maintain its political stability in its national affairs against any rivalry between the Great Powers. In this way, a clear understanding of the international system and its changes; of domestic powers in terms of stability, participation of people and relative high economic growth, together with that of effectiveness of foreign policy techniques would be of great benefit for this study of Iranian foreign policy in dealing with the situation of Great Power rivalry.

Hypotheses

Two hypotheses are proposed in this study. The first and preliminary one concerns the major factors of rivalry between the Great Powers over Iran. Inequality of states at the international level, vulnerability or a power vacuum at the national level and the crucial natural resources of Iran, particularly its oil and its role as a corridor, seem to be the three variable factors which contribute to the Great Power rivalry. Therefore, it seems that if these three factors co-occur then Great Power rivalry would be inevitable.

The second hypothesis concerns the foreign policy of Iran facing the situation of foreign rivalry. In order to secure the national interest, the foreign policy making units (the Prime Minister, Majlis and the Shah) were primarily engaged with arranging the protection of oil and the territorial integrity of Iran. Different policies were adopted to accomplish this, the result of which were all identical. While both the great rivals were competing over oil and the corridor in Iran, the Iranian government took sides with one rival (the United States) to secure its interests from the other (Russia). Iranian foreign policy, regardless of the declared neutrality, had always relied on the West in its protection from neighbouring Soviets. Equilibrium was not observed. Iran was not impartial regarding the refusing or granting the demands of both the Great Power rivals.

Limitations

This study has been limited in time and space. This thesis covers the period from 1921 up to 1979. In 1921 a new Soviet political system was recognized internationally and until the end of that period played a great role in the global affairs. Furthermore at this time the international system of the Balance of Power or the Concert of the European Great Powers was supposed to be replaced by the Collective Security system through the League of Nations. 1921 was also a turning point in Iranian social and political life. A coup d'état brought Reza to power enabling him to introduce a modern way of life and to institute a new order of disciplined administrative, economic and social behaviour.

The end of the period is 1979 when, following the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, there was an important shift in attitude on the part of the Western Powers (especially the United States) towards the Soviet Union. The cold war which had shifted towards the deterrence resumed again. Moreover, contrary to the spirit and principles of the proposed collective security system, the direct military intervention in Afghanistan, (a Member of the United Nations), was committed by a Permanent Member of the Security Council and one of the founders of the so-

called new system of the post-World War II era. Also 1979 was a year in which a great change, “the Islamic Revolution,” occurred in Iran and to a great extent this affected the foreign policy and the internal factors in Iran itself.

Iran has been chosen as a single case-study because it was (as it is now) one of the areas of considerable geo-strategic importance from the viewpoint of natural resources, such as oil, transportation resources, such as water ways, and geographic location, as a bridge between Europe and Asia and between the Soviet Union and India, the ice-free waters of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian oil-rich countries. Moreover, inspired by the coup of 1921, Iran was in transition to modernization and fundamental domestic change.

Methodology

This study is not intended to be the kind of single-country description and analysis that might interest only area specialists concerned with Iran and the Middle East. Rather it represents a case study of foreign policy in modernizing societies that will interest foreign policy analysts in general. Needless to say, Iran has not been and is not a unique case in this regard and almost all “middle” and “small powers,” in different regions, have had to sustain a more or less similar transformation. This broader concern is reflected in Chapters 1 and 2, which provide a macro approach to the relevant conceptual problems and in the tables that have been prepared as a statistical comparison of Iran’s social and economic developments with those of numerous other nations including the Great Power rivals, Middle and Small powers.²

This work is a study of historical events of this period because those forces and relations are difficult to identify and impossible to understand, unless their roots are discovered in their true locations. It is not a political history of Iran nor a history of Iranian foreign relations; it is an empirical approach which studies selective events and data which have caused Great Power rivalry over a smaller power like Iran and its reaction to cope with this situation. This involves an interdisciplinary approach; it implies an orientation toward solving real problems; it uses qualitative as well as quantitative evidence in its evaluations when appropriate; it combines the use of theory and practice, history, legal interpretation and statistical data in its arguments and expositions and merges analysis with description.

To that end, I will first explain in Chapter 1 the reforms in the international system which were supposed to take place during 1921-1979 and discuss in Chapter 2 the system of international relations in practice. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the Iranian situation of vulnerability, dissatisfaction and instability during the

coup régimes of Reza Shah followed by his son, Muhammad Reza, in that same period. Chapters 5 and 6 elaborate upon the rivals' objectives in Iran and analyse the direction of Iranian foreign policy in that situation. The conclusion will then take up the reasons which led to Iranian foreign policy aligning with the West against the Soviet Union.

¹ Iran formerly was known as Persia. In 1939 Reza Shah prohibited foreigners to call the country Persia, but later in 1949 permission was given again.

² For a quantitative comparison between the Great, Middle and Small powers refer to the Appendices.

Part I

Survey of the International System; 1921-1979

As a macro approach to the situation of Great Power rivalry in smaller countries it is necessary to examine the international system in which the inter-state relations of the Great Powers as well as the Smaller Powers are conducted. This survey suggests that the system of international relations is a basic factor in the situation of rivalry and without this suitable ground such rivalry would not occur.

The first chapter of this part will explain the nineteenth century system of the concert of European Great Powers and how it was transformed into a world-wide system formally linked together by universal institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. The anticipated functioning of these two universal institutions will be discussed in Chapter 2 which will examine how with the failure of the ideas and hopes for the collective security system, the Concert of Triumphant Great Powers managed the most crucial issues of the globe and conducted the whole system of international relations both inside and outside the League of Nations and the United Nations.

Chapter I

Collective Security; International Relations in Theory

With the end of the First World War the old system of the European Balance of Power or the Concert of European Great Powers seemed to be over and a new era of universality and equality to emerge. The League of Nations in the inter-war period and the United Nations Organisation in the post World War II period were regarded as a new system of relations among nations basically set up on the basis of equal sovereignty of all members which were to be all the free nations of the world. The new organisation was conceived of as a new start in the work of international collaboration in which international peace and security would be maintained by collective recourse, peaceful and friendly relations, based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination among the nations of the world. In this system the Great Powers hoped to establish their cooperation and the small powers would be able to make their voices heard in free and democratic atmosphere. In the following sections the structure of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisations will be discussed as the theoretical structure of the collective security system with a background of the nineteenth century system of the concert of European Great Powers.

Background: Concert of European Great Powers

The Pre-World War I international system, established in September 1814 at the Congress of Vienna, was based on the first and the second Treaties of Paris (30 May 1815 and 20 November 1815) and the Quadruple Alliance of the Great Powers of the time, namely; Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austrian Empire and later France.¹ The major task of the new order was to maintain the *status quo* against attack from abroad and revolution from within.² In the first sixty years, except for a few inter European wars,³ the arrangements of the congress preserved Europe from any destructive total war.

Austrian Empire, France and Prussia, at the time, had strictly continental interests and enough problems to occupy themselves within European boundaries.⁴ Russia pursued Asian interests rather than dealing with European obstacles to expansion. This made way for Great Britain, to adopt the policy of

concentrating its efforts upon overseas concerns and maintaining equilibrium among European Great Powers, a policy of “free hand and timely intervention.”⁵

Since the early nineteenth century, the Great Powers had well understood the need to recognise and respect each other’s interests when making diplomatic agreements and “arbitrary compromise,”⁶ as in the Congress of Berlin, as Hayes calls it. This harmonisation, nevertheless, tended to be ignored by the Great Powers whenever European dominance was expanded beyond its continent.

In Berlin in 1878 there was another Great Power congress in which the European Great Powers led by Germany put concerted pressure on Russia to give up its excessive gains provided by the two-year war with the Ottoman Empire and to prepare a common scheme for colonial compromises. The Congress of Berlin produced a treaty typical of nineteenth century diplomacy in its attempt to ignore the growing force of nationalism and of self-determination. It also applied the concept of “the buffer state,”⁷ another characteristics of nineteenth century diplomatic technique, in Rumelia.⁸

However, by the 1870s the wealth derived from industrialisation and trade led to the problem of “deciding how to use the new power conferred by this wealth.”⁹ The idea of Free Trade and economic *laissez-faire* provided a suitable way of using this wealth, although there was a strong nationalistic reaction against that. These two opposing forces channelled Great Powers into the arms race and new imperialism¹⁰ in Africa, Asia and the Far East. Moreover it was a good chance for France to use colonial troops against a more populated united Germany.

Thus the international system which was established in Europe, was now being expanded all over the world and territories in Africa-Asia were connected to this system by diplomatic techniques like Protectorate, Condominium and Colony.¹¹ By 1900, most of the profitable colonial territories were seized by Great Britain and then, in the second instance, by France. Apart from China, nothing useful remained for Germany which had newly realised that its poor colonial gains were linked to the weakness of its navy.¹²

In the late 1890s and the early twentieth century, inter state relations can be characterised by the compensation theory, i.e. diplomatic shopping lists headed “we want.” Based on this formula, Northedge explains that “each nation had a list of interests and better relations between states could be achieved by a compensatory exchange which would give a more logical or easily worked state periphery.”¹³

Because of this international trend, the Congress of Berlin, unlike the Congress of Vienna, could neither satisfy Russian desires nor help the Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman Empires. The progressive compensatory trends made the Balance of Power¹⁴ too rigid so that the states could not switch their alliance in accord with changes in the power of individual states. Once this flexibility disappeared, with the creation of the Triple Alliance of 1882 (consisting of Germany, Austria and Italy) and the Dual Alliance of 1893-94 (consisting of France and Russia) the system of international relations based on the Balance of Power tended to favour war rather than peace.

To conclude, although the policy of compromise among the Great Powers shifted to a process of compensation and, because of imperialism, non-European affairs became connected with European inter state relations, at least two facts remained unchanged. Firstly, the Pre-World War I European “golden age of diplomacy”¹⁵ was conducted by a few Great Powers in close relation with each other, such that none of them could think of overthrowing the rest even with an ally or two. The other important point is that, Great Power rivalry both within Europe itself and outside was the major and constant subject of both the Vienna and Berlin congresses of Great Powers which continued to the First World War

With the commencement of the War, whatever the causes might be, the concert of European Great Powers disbanded and the international system became a mass of tensions. An epoch-making war, as Oppenheim emphasises, it engaged all states, great and small powers, democratic-constitutional and autocratic-militarist governments, in a way that they were compelled to mobilise all their possible resources¹⁶ and hardly any decision could be made without government approval. The effective application of economic weapons such as blockade and destruction of the enemy's foreign trade, alongside military operations had become common practice among powers. Mobilisation of millions of people in the army was taken for granted.

By the end of War, the fear of any similar catastrophe in future and the desire to keep the new *status quo*, strongly supported the need for the establishment of a new and different system of international relations on the basis of collective security. The fundamental structure of this collective security system was the proposed League of Nations. In the following section the structure of the League of Nations will be examined.

The League of Nations

In 1920, the League of Nations was established in Geneva. The work of the League was carried out according to the Covenant, with an Assembly, a Council and a Permanent Secretariat.

The Assembly

The Assembly comprised of the representatives of the 32 triumphant signatory states together with 13 other neutral states which were invited to accede to the covenant.¹⁷ The Assembly could deal “with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.” (Article 3(3))

The Council

The Council, consisted of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and Italy, together with those of four other members of the League. With the failure of the United States in 1920 to ratify the Covenant and with the withdrawal of Japan in 1933 and Italy in 1937, only Britain and France remained till the official end of the Council in 1946. Dealing with “any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world” was regarded as the major mission of the Council. (Article 4(4))

Secretariat

The Permanent Secretariat at Geneva was considered to be the executive branch of the Assembly and the Council.

A permanent commission was constituted to “receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of Mandates.” Article 22 also identified the régime of Mandates as “the first method of giving practical effect” to the principle that the destiny of defeated powers’ colonies and territories which were inhabited by “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” should be entrusted to “advanced nations who can best undertake this responsibility.”

There were three different types of Mandates corresponding to the degree of “the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.” A great shift in the concept and administration of the colonial system was that “these territories” as Fieldhouse argues “were to be granted not as full colonies but as mandates under the supervision of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League.”¹⁸

Contracting powers, according to the Article 23, undertook to secure “the fair and humane conditions of Labour for men, women and children,” to guarantee “just treatment” of their native inhabitants and furthermore, to entrust the League with the general supervision of “the traffic in women and children and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs ... the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary.”

Above all, undertakings based on Articles 8 to 21 were the most significant in terms of keeping international peace and security with the aid of all member states. Accordingly, any member state, in the first place, should reduce its national armament “to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action” (Article 8). A permanent commission was designed to advise the Council on the execution of this reduction and on “military and naval questions generally” (Article 9).

In the case of an act of external aggression, Members were obliged to defend “the territorial integrity and existing political independence” of all members (Article 10). Any war or even the threat of war was declared a matter of concern to all members and the League was authorised “to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations” (Article 11). However, Members were agreed that in the event of any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they would “submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council” (Articles 12, 13 and 15). Furthermore, a Permanent Court of International Justice, having legal competence “to hear and determine any dispute of an international character,” was proposed and this plan was submitted to the Members as well (Article 14).

Automatic sanctions machinery ¹⁹ was contained in Article 16. Accordingly, in the case when any state resorted to war without complying with the procedure for the pacific settlement of disputes described in Article 12, 13 and 15, other states, whether Members or not, would be obliged to prevent “all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse” with the Covenant-breaking state. Members, moreover, agreed to “support one another in the financial and economic measures,” which were taken under this Article, in order to “minimise the loss.” They were also obliged to take any necessary steps to “afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League.” All these procedures were identical for every state, no matter whether the state was a member of the League or not (Article 17).

Obligations, derived from past and future inter state treaties which might be inconsistent with the terms of the covenant were not acceptable (Article 20) and the

League had the authority to advise “the reconsideration ... of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world” (Article 19).

Finally, inspired by the popular slogans of the day “open covenant, openly arrived at,”²⁰ whereby Members undertook to refrain from any secret agreements, it was agreed that only those treaties “registered with the Secretariat” could be binding. These treaties were to be published by the Secretariat as soon as possible for the information of all other states.

The idea of the collective security of the League of Nations and its early functions was supported by scholars of international relations. In this regard, Oppenheim’s argument and conclusion are worth considering. He critically discusses the objections to the constitution of the League and concludes that:

Its establishment has inaugurated a new epoch in the development of mankind, by organising the Family of Nations. The Assembly ... is an organ of the Family of Nations through which the civilised States can give their consent to all treaties which may be necessary to secure joint international action, and ... can amend and even codify the hitherto customary Law of Nations. The Council is a kind of executive of the Family of Nations which although its decisions are in the main only recommendations, will exercise an important influence and authority. In the Permanent Secretariat a kind of international Civil Service has [been] called into existence. ... Through the adoption of the principle that the parties to a dispute must not resort to war, ... war should occur less frequently than in former times and should not break out suddenly like a bolt from the blue. By securing the reduction of national armaments ... the League should not only diminish the danger of war, but should free the world from an oppressive economic burden. By the acceptance of the principle of open diplomacy, the relations of civilised States should be relieved from suspicion and mistrust. The principle of guardianship over certain undeveloped peoples is a new and progressive step in International law. By setting itself a number of tasks of international cooperation regarding matters of common interests, the League has opened a wide prospect of development for International Law.²¹

The work of the League of Nations was halted by the Second World War. The war caused heavy losses even greater than those in the First World War. The Allied and Axis powers devoted all their resources to winning the war so that the whole world was in flames. However the idea of equality in international relations and a collective security system was never forgotten. Thus as soon as efforts to stop the war began, the renewal of an organisation based on these ideas was pursued as well. In this situation the Allies gathered together in several conferences not only to draw up plans for military operations to defeat the foes, but also to declare their hopes and wishes for the future after the defeat of the Axis Powers.

One of the most important decisions taken in these conferences was the establishment of the United Nations, an international organisation based on the sovereign equality of all of its Members to maintain peace and security between

nations. It was regarded as a revised version of the League of Nations, excluding its inefficiencies, to take a collective action against any threat or aggression disturbing peace around the world. In the following section the structure of the United Nations Organisation as the post World War II international system will be discussed.

The United Nations Organisation

The draft charter had originally been signed at San Francisco by the representatives of fifty-one Allies and Associated powers (including Poland) but for it to enter into force, after the ratification of each signatory, it required:

... the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. (Article 110)

Therefore, on 24 October 1945, when the majority of the original signatories ratified the Charter and, together with the Five Great Powers deposited their ratification, they made up a total of twenty nine and completed the necessary requirement for it to be announced that "the United Nations Charter is now a part of the law of Nations."²²

From now on the United Nations Organisation as a collective security system was to replace the actual system of inequality, rivalry and the old inefficient system of international relations. To Cordell Hull and his fellow planners of the Post World War II international system, the United Nations was an organisation in which "a reign of law and morality,"²³ not power, was to hold dominion over the actions of all nations. The drafters of the Charter had decided to plan for a new organisation rather than a revived or remodelled League of Nations leaving out all its defects and ambiguities. According to Article 1 of the Charter, the new system was created:

... to maintain international peace and security;... to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression;... to bring about by peaceful means, and with conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes;... to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;... to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems;... [and] to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations on the attainment of these ends.

In pursuit of these purposes, the Charter adopted certain principles of "the sovereign equality of all its Members" and required that they:

... shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter;... shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means;... shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; ... shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes;... shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action;... [and] shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles.(Article 2)

unlike the League of Nations which was part of the Treaty of Versailles, the founders tried to avoid creating close relationship between the peace settlements and the Charter,²⁴ while taking the opportunities of wartime unity among the Allies to make them sit down together.

The United Nations Organisation, according to the Charter, originally consisted of six principal organs, a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly as the centre-piece of the United Nations was the one organ in which all member states were to be represented. Each nation admitted as a member could send five representatives to sit in the Assembly but the delegation could only cast a single vote. While the Covenant had given the task of dealing with “any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world” to both the General Assembly and the Security Council (Article III, IV), the Charter placed the main responsibility of peace-keeping upon the Security Council. According to the Charter, the General Assembly “may discuss any questions or matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs” but it “may make recommendations to the Members ... or the Security Council or both,” (Article 10) only if the Security Council is not “exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it.” (Article 12) According to Article 24 the state members have conferred “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” on the Security Council as an actor on their behalf.

The Security Council

Originally eleven in number, its membership increased to fifteen on 1 January 1966. Five of these are permanent members, namely the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. (Article 23)

It was these nations which bore the brunt of the fighting against Germany, Italy, and Japan and which did so much to bring about the formation of the United Nations. In addition to a permanent place in the Security Council, each of the five also gained a special voting privilege, the right of veto. Accordingly, on all matters, except procedural questions, the affirmative vote must include “the concurring votes of the permanent members” (Article 27) The remaining members were elected for a period of two years by the General Assembly in the first instance based on “the contribution of Members to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organisation,” and also on “equitable geographical distribution.”(Article 23)

One of the major reasons for the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in maintaining peace was because it had no way of enforcing its decisions. In its Charter, the United Nations ensured that it would compensate that imperfection by giving the Security Council powers to apply measures including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” or even to raise an international military force if it considered it would maintain or restore international peace and security.

Every Member of the Organisation undertook to make available “armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage” where necessary to the Security Council.²⁵ As a result of these undertakings, United Nations troops could be in action in many parts of the world, for example, in Korea, on the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours, in the Congo, in Kashmir, and in West New Guinea.²⁶

Since the Security Council might need to act promptly when a dispute threatened international peace, delegates were expected to be constantly on hand and it was so organised as “to be able to function continuously” (Article 28) The presidency of the Security Council was held for one month, in rotation, by member states following the English alphabetical order.

One of the most important chapters of the Charter which dealt with the practical issue of preventing the parties from committing war was that concerned with the pacific settlement of disputes. The Charter recommended that in a situation of dispute which is likely to endanger international peace, the parties shall, in the first place, “seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” (Article 33) When they fail to settle the matter by the means specified, they “shall refer it to the Security Council.” (Article 37)

In order to determine whether the continuance of a dispute or situation is going to endanger international peace and security, the Charter gave the Security Council even the right to "investigate any situation which might lead to international friction"(Article 34) and recommend "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment," at whatever stage a dispute might be.(Article 36)

Although the Charter recommended to the Security Council that in making recommendations it should take into consideration any peaceful procedures that have already been adopted or as a general rule refer the parties to the International Court of Justice, (Article 36), Article 38 explicitly confirms the unlimited authority of the Security Council to be used for the peaceful settlement of a dispute.

The Economic and Social Council

When drawing up the Charter, the designers realised that in order to keep the peace and maintain friendly relations among nations, it would not be enough to act when trouble broke out. They felt it necessary to remove the causes of war. Prominent among these causes were found to be disease, illiteracy, poverty, malnutrition, and unemployment. As long as those remain in the world, there can be no lasting peace or stability.

The Economic and Social Council was an organ consisting of eighteen Members of the United Nations (increased to fifty-four in 1971) elected to it by the General Assembly. The Council sought to raise international living standards and, through its agencies, tried to increase food production, to provide better education, and to improve health in those areas of the world where shortages existed. It could also set up commissions for the promotion of human rights and other commissions as might be required for the performance of its functions. (Articles 55-72)

The Trusteeship Council

In 1945, when the United Nations was born, a number of mandated territories still existed. In addition there were now some colonies previously governed by the Axis states of World War II. The Trusteeship Council was established to supervise the administration of these; all were to be known as trust territories. Each territory was placed in the trust of a member state accountable to the United Nations for the way in which it discharged its duties. Trusteeship was to be temporary, lasting only as long as it was needed to prepare the people of the mandated territory for self-government, the preparation of which was to be the responsibility of the guardian power. (Article 86-91)

Initially there were eleven trust territories; ten Trusteeship Agreements had been approved by the General Assembly and one by the Security Council with a total population of about twenty millions.²⁷ The major administering authorities were Belgium, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the United States.

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations formed an integral part of the Charter and functioned according to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. It consisted of fifteen judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state, elected to office by the Security Council and by the General Assembly, both sitting independently.

The Charter tried to build up a body of laws which were acceptable to its Members. For the purpose of peaceful settlement of disputes, each Member of the United Nations undertook "to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party." (Article 94) The Security Council was given enough authority to "make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgement," if any party to a case refused the judgement rendered by the Court. (Article 94)

Therefore, legal action in this system was preferable to military action as a means of settling disputes and, since its foundation, the International Court of Justice has considered a variety of cases including disputes about oil, deep-sea fishing, the right of political asylum, and the use of territorial waters.

The Secretariat

The Secretariat comprised a Secretary-General who was appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council and such staff as the Organisation might require. (Article 97) As the Civil Service of the United Nations its function was to see that the machinery of the Organisation ran smoothly.

Having an exclusive international character, the Secretary-General was considerably more than the head of the clerical department as Article 99 of the Charter made clear: "the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

Therefore the Secretary General could and should prepare and execute political decisions and when appropriate advocate them both before and after they are taken. However, when he was called upon to take them himself, he was liable

to undermine not only his personal influence in the particular situation, but the authority of his office and his status as the impartial servant of the United Nations. The term of his office was determined for five years, though with the approval of the Security Council and the assent of the Assembly he could be re-elected.

In conclusion the United Nations Organisation was regarded as a new system of relations among nations basically set up on the basis of equal sovereignty of all members which were to be all free nations of the world. People of all nations were looking at the new system optimistically so that the American public, for example, was to cling to the dream of the liberal-democratic principles of "one world" and were convinced to vote for the ratification of the Charter and their government's entry into the Organisation.

Earlier Roosevelt addressing both houses of the congress on March 1945 declared that the unfortunate sphere of influence policy of previous years had been brought to an end and that the Charter would form the basis for a lasting peace "based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter."²⁸ This attitude was well illustrated by a passage in the report of the American representatives to the London Conference of November 1945:

It was very strongly the opinion of the [American] Delegation that the new Organisation should be conceived of as a new start in the work of international collaboration and that nothing in its location or personnel should relate it directly to earlier undertakings in its field.²⁹

At the beginning of the first General Assembly of 10 January 1946 held at London, Dr. Zuleta Angel, the Columbian Chairman, addressing the Assembly, indicated his optimism that:

... determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which, twice in our lifetime, has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and imbued with an abiding faith in freedom and justice, we have come ... to constitute the General Assembly of the United Nations and to make a genuine and sincere beginning with the application of the San Fransisco Charter. That instrument, having been freely and democratically debated, has been unreservedly accepted by all in the knowledge that the machinery set up under its provisions will prove adequate to the achievement of its historic purpose; this, in a word, is the maintenance of peace and security by collective recourse, when needed, to the use of land, sea and air forces and the establishment, through cooperation in the economic, social, educational and humanitarian fields, of those conditions of stability and well-being which will ensure peaceful and friendly relations, based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination among the nations of the world ... The five great powers ... will bring not only the immense power of their military, financial and industrial resources, but ... that spirit of co-operation.... The small Powers will be able, year in, year out, to make their voices heard in as free and democratic an atmosphere as that which prevailed at San Fransisco and London.³⁰

The idea of collective security as shown in both the Covenant and the Charter, regardless of the exact meaning of the term, clearly involved certain

prerequisites or assumptions in particular: 1) the system should consist of all nations of the world; 2) respecting the others' form of social and political régimes, nations should have equal rights in the system; 3) seeking peaceful means of settling disputes, nations should avoid any use of armed forces; 4) all nations in the system should be in unity to act against aggression to any member or any threat to international peace and security and if some were undertaking the task it should be done on behalf of the other members; 5) in the case of any aggression or threat, all members should be responsible to support each other to remove the threat and to suppress the aggressor and 6) all nations should, to a rational extent, commit themselves to disarmament and not to exceed the armament level of the collective security system.

Although the general cooperation of nations in social, economic and political activities was included in the proposed system, the idea of collective security, as was apparent from its name, was basically designed to undertake the peace-keeping process and this task was to underpin the other responsibilities. In brief, collective security found its measure in the simple doctrine of "one for all and all for one [and] war anywhere ... is the concern of every state."³¹ However there were too many inconsistencies between this idea and practice of both the drafting conferences and the League or the United Nations in terms of universality, equality, solidarity and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the following chapter the function of the drafting conferences of the Covenant and the Charter and the practices of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation will be examined to establish the extent to which the system was in fact new and whether the interwar and post War II international systems were based on the proposed principles in practice and conducted by the collective action of all nations or whether the Great Powers were in control.

¹ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 8.

² Ibid, p. 8; R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 148.

³ C. Hayes, "The Historical Background of the League of Nations," p. 42.

⁴ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, pp. 6-7.

⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶ C. Hayes, "The Historical Background of the League of Nations," p. 43.

⁷ **Buffer State** is a small state established or preserved between two greater states to prevent direct clashes between them.

⁸ For details refer to Ibid, p. 25.

⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 36-69.

- 11 **Protectorate** is a territory, not formally annexed, over which the protecting state has power and jurisdiction but not full sovereignty. A protecting state does not usually permit other states to enter into relations with the protectorate. **Condominium** is the common rule of a territory by two or more countries. **Colony** is an area of land which, with its inhabitants, is entirely subject to the rule of an independent state, of which it does not form an integral part. It is not itself an independent state, though it may, according to its degree of political maturity, be given some self-government.
- 12 Ibid., p. 61.
- 13 F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 79.
- 14 **Balance of Power** is a **status** in which no single state is powerful enough to interfere with the interests of others. It is a **theory** that the strength of one group of powers should be equal to the strength of the other group, thus preventing any hegemony and ensuring peace. It is also a **system** in which only nation states participate and in which states are predominantly security oriented. States attempt to increase their capabilities - by war if necessary; to enter into alliances to protect their interests; to shift alliances as their interests shift; to form counter-alliances against nations striving for predominance; to limit their gains in war to preserve the existence of other major nations; and to treat all other nations as acceptable alliance partners.
- 15 J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, p. 3.
- 16 L. F. L. Oppenheim, *The League of Nations and its Problems*, p. 11.
- 17 R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 380.
- 18 D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, p. 236.
- 19 F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, pp. 154-155.
- 20 Edward M. House, "The Versailles Peace in Retrospect," p. 435.
- 21 L. F. L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. 1, pp. 355-356.
- 22 *US Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 13, 28 October 1945, pp. 679-680.
- 23 C. Hull, *The Memoirs of C. Hull*, vol. 2, p. 1651.
- 24 Ibid., vol II, pp. 1294-1295.
- 25 For more details concerning the responsibilities of the Security Council in a situation of threat to peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression refer to Articles 39 to 51 of the Charter.
- 26 For details refer to United Nations, *Everyone's United Nations*, pp. 48-58.
- 27 Ibid., p. 341.
- 28 S. Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 13, pp. 570-586.
- 29 The Defenses of Peace, State Department Publication 2457 Conference Series 80, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946, part 1, p. 8, quoted in Inis Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, p. 60.
- 30 General Assembly, *Official Records*, 1st year, 1st meeting, 10 January 1946, pp. 37-39, quoted in J. Laruse, *From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy*, pp. 217-218.
- 31 K. W. Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," p. 287.

Chapter II

Concert of the Triumphant Great Powers; International Relations in Practice

The League of Nations in post-World War I international system could hardly represent the whole system. The process of drafting the Covenant and the League's practice prevented the maintenance of international peace and security from being collective. Similarly in the post-World War II period, it became evident that the process of drafting the Charter and the function of the United Nations Organisation failed to make a sensible change to the work of the proposed collective security system.

There was always another factor, though informal, which could intervene in the formal functioning of the system. This factor enabled its actors not only to check and balance the components of the formal one but also to keep in their hands all key issues around the world and even to engage in another total war. The concert of the Triumphant Great Powers (TGP) was a more practicable and real factor which could not only initiate the Covenant or the Charter and bring all small powers together in the form of the League of Nations or the United Nations Organisation but also enabled its actors to show an independence in solving the major issues of the world.

In this chapter the drafting process of the Covenant and the Charter, the collective security functioning of the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation, the conduct of the system in practice by Triumphant Great Powers in concert and their relations with other Member and non-Member States will be examined to find out to what extent the international system was kept collective and, as it was maintained, different and new.

Drafting the Covenant and the Charter

With the separate signatures of armistice between the engaging powers - the Ottoman Empire on 30 October 1918, Austro-Hungary on 3 November 1918 and Germany on 11 November 1918¹ - the armed conflict came to an end. But, in order to determine the new boundaries for Europe based on the principle of self-determination and Germany's interests outside its borders and furthermore to "promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security" a

conference of Great Powers was necessary. Confirming this point, Colonel Edward M. House, representative of the United States on the Armistice Commission and commissioner plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference, affirmed that “we had taken the position of overthrowing the old order and bringing a new and different diplomacy into play.”²

With the failure of the League of Nations in preventing aggression and the start of the Second World War, a series of Allied conferences was held to revise the idea of the interwar system of international relations. To understand the proposed system of the League and the United Nations, it is worth analysing these conferences and observing how the formation of the post war system was linked to the process of the war.

The Paris Peace Conference

No definite agreement was reached in advance as to the method by which the conference should be directed. On 13 January 1919, at the French Foreign Ministry in Paris, it just happened that the Supreme War Council of the five triumphant Great Powers of the war namely, the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and Italy, formed themselves into the Council of Ten consisting of ten plenipotentiaries, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, of each of the “Big Five.” Before the official opening of the Conference on 18 January 1919, they started discussing the proposed drafts for forming the League of Nations including the Draft Convention of Lord Phillimore’s Committee submitted to the British government on 20 March 1918, as “the first formulation of League of Nations suggestions in a definite text under Governmental direction”³ and the American delegation proposal of 1 December 1918, based on President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.⁴

The Peace Conference was a new feature of the Post-War international system in that, with the emergence and participation of two non-European Great Powers, the United States and Japan, the destruction of the primacy of Europe in the international system began. The importance and international scale of this gathering was so great, that it can be compared with the Congress of Vienna.⁵

With the attendance of 27 small powers on January 1919 the Conference opened officially. After a long and serious discussion over the constitution of the Commission on the League of Nations, they reached the compromise that the Commission would be increased up to nineteen members. From 3 to 13 February, the Commission held ten meetings and on fourteenth of February submitted its proposal to the first Plenary Session.⁶ Four more meetings were held

to consider the final criticisms and the Commission finished its work on 24 March 1919.

In the second plenary session, special commissions consisting of military and legal experts were established to work on specific issues but the crucial discussions, such as the régime of Mandates, were still left to the representatives of the Big Five.⁷ Of course, with regard to world-wide and open covenants, this Great Power directorate had promised to consult the smaller states when their interests were affected and established a large number of expert territorial commissions to deal with frontier questions.⁸

On 24 March 1919, Japan left the Conference over the problem of certain privileges in China on which the other Great Powers could not agree,⁹ and with the Italian withdrawal on 7 May 1919 after Fiume and Monte Nevosa were not awarded to Italy,¹⁰ the council of the three remaining Great Powers was left alone to deal with the discussions.

The Conference officially ended on 21 January 1920,¹¹ during which time the Allied and Associated powers on one side, and Germany on the other side, signed the Treaty of Peace known as Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919. The outstanding feature of the fifteen-part treaty was the creation of the League of Nations as the basic structure of the post-War I international system. It was understood as "the corner stone of a new world system."¹²

The Allies Conferences

The idea of the interwar system of international relations and its revision was initiated in the Inter-Allied Declaration of June 1941 and was continuously emphasised in the other 12 conferences of the Allied Great Powers the last of which was the San Fransisco Conference of June 1945.

Inter-Allied Declaration

The first of the specific steps that led to the establishment of the United Nations was the Inter-Allied Declaration, signed on 12 June 1941 in London, by representatives of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom and of the exiled Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, and France. Recognising that "the only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security," they stated in the Declaration their intention "to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end".¹³

The Atlantic Charter

Consequently, for the first time since the commencement of the war, Churchill and Roosevelt held a series of meetings on board ships in Argentia Bay and Newfoundland from 9 to 12 August 1941. The result of these meetings was a joint declaration: Atlantic Charter of the Anglo-American principles issued on 14 August 1941. It concerned the conduct of the war and their aims for the future of the international system. It formally renounced the seizure of territory and other forms of aggrandisement and the two powers expressed their opposition to any territorial changes made against “the freely expressed wishes of the peoples.” The right of “all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live” was respected. Moreover, they both expressed their belief that “all nations of the world ... must come to the abandonment of the use of the force” and since they believed there was no future peace in armaments, they suggested the “establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.”¹⁴ Later on 1 January 1942 the Atlantic Charter was supported by a joint declaration put out by twenty-six states, known as the United Nations fighting the Axis powers.¹⁵

Casablanca

The next meeting of Churchill and Roosevelt was at the conference of Casablanca on 14 January 1943. Its purpose was to achieve American and British accord upon their combat plans for the future. Some military decisions were taken to secure the sea communications to Britain, to supply the Soviet forces and some operations in North Africa and Italy,¹⁶ but the crucial dilemmas were left open for some time ahead.

Quebec (I)

At Churchill's initiative it had been agreed that he and Roosevelt should meet again for determining anew the progress of their war program. The conference took place in Quebec on 14 August 1943 and after ten days of negotiations they planned the Cross-Channel invasion on 1 May 1944 against Germany. At the proposal of the British Prime Minister, the United States would have to assume leadership in that operation under an American commander. Giving major attention to the war against Japan, for the first time, the conference approved and scheduled important air and naval operations in the central and south-east Pacific.¹⁷

Moscow (I)

The Moscow conference of October 18, 1943 was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China (then

controlled by the Nationalist Government). In a joint declaration released at the end of the conference the participants stated their united determination not to make peace with the common enemy and that each should keep the others promptly informed and try to act in concert with others.¹⁸

For the first time in this Declaration the four powers recognised:

... the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large or small for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁹

Intensive preparations were carried out by the American planning machinery to provide a proposal draft for the organisation.²⁰ These talks about the conduct of post war international system were animated by the sense that the war was rapidly being won and it was expected that some other members of the Axis would soon follow Italy and seek to break the connection.

Cairo (I)

Before the start of the final attack against Germany, consultation for concerted military action had become essential. Besides, there were still some questions upon which the Foreign Ministers at Moscow had not reached any agreement, such as Poland, and it was hoped to continue the alliance in war forward into the peace. According to President Roosevelt, such a meeting of the three; "would have a far-reaching effect on opinion in the three countries and hurt Nazi morale; it would destroy any anticipation Hitler, Goebbels, and the rest had that their enemies would divide."²¹

It had now become necessary, not only for the better disposition of immediate matters of common interest, but also for the future peaceful world, that the Heads of the great Allied powers gather together. Since, on medical advice, Stalin could not go farther than Tehran,²² or to any of the other places proposed by Roosevelt and Churchill, they came to an agreement to meet one another at Tehran.

But before having any meeting with Stalin, according to the repeated advice of Churchill that he regarded it as essential that the British and American staffs should have "many meetings" before being joined by the Russians and the Chinese,²³ Roosevelt and Churchill met each other at Cairo on 22 November 1943. Later, on 25th of that month, both entered into negotiations with Chiang Kai-Shek, the Head of the nationalist China. In the latter discussions, Vishinsky, deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union attended as an observer.

In the Far East, decisions of great moment were being reached. Plans were made for military operations in the China-Burma-India Theatre and all agreed that, without any thought of territorial gain for themselves, Japan should be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which had been seized since the beginning of the First World War in 1914; Korea should become free and independent and all territories taken from China such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores should be restored to China. Furthermore, it was agreed that China be assigned a place in the Executive Council (then spoken of as the Four Policemen) of the International Security Organisation which was to be set up in the near future.²⁴

Tehran

For the first time the Heads of the three Great Powers, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union got together on 28 November 1943 in Tehran to discuss the decisions taken at Cairo and in general to arrive at an accord upon their combat plans for the present war and for the future. In Tehran the main areas of discussions were three: 1) the plans for a concerted military operation against Germany, 2) the conception of the future international security organisation and, 3) the growing number of unsettled political situations in the Balkans.

In a joint public statement issued on 6 December the three Great Powers expressed their determination that their nations "shall work together in war and in peace."²⁵ With regard to their military operation against Germany their joint strategic plan was the great invasion to start in the coming May to make a landing in Southern France (Overlord). The Red Army was to undertake offensive operations at the same time. Stalin had reaffirmed that his government would enter the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated.²⁶

Concerning the future international security organisation, they stated their consensus to establish a world-wide Association of Free Nations rather than a regional one, under the supervision of the Four Policemen. They fully recognised its "supreme responsibility ... to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations."²⁷

The case of nationalist China headed by Chiang Kai-Shek initiated in Cairo was discussed with Stalin and its vast areas, great potential influence, major responsibilities in the Pacific area and role as one of the Four Policemen were agreed upon.²⁸ A rather crucial subject of these discussions concerned territorial claims which arose as the military plans for the final assaults on Germany were being completed. The apparent achievement of this conference, however, may be

regarded as the fact that they decided what they could agree on and postponed what they could not. Thus they postponed any controversial cases of this kind to future meetings.

Cairo (II)

On their return from Tehran, Churchill and Roosevelt stopped at Cairo for the second time to review the various executory decisions of the great operation Overlord.²⁹ This was the 8th attempt by the Allied Great Powers to concert their decisions of great concern.

Dumbarton Oaks

Since the plan for an international security organisation had been confirmed by the Heads of the three Allied Great Powers in Tehran, American drafting committees together with the British constitution-makers had gone hard at work on it and had begun to exchange ideas.³⁰ The proposal draft said that: 1) the organisation was a fully representative body, 2) the organisation would not be a superstate with its own police forces, but the members would merely agree to possess forces available for joint action when necessary to prevent war, and 3) it was expected that after the Four major Allies' provisional agreement upon a plan, it would be discussed with other members of the United Nations and this might lead to further talks between the Four Allies.³¹

On 21 August 1944, after the Soviets asserted their readiness to start discussions on the draft proposal, the delegations of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union sat down to their task at Dumbarton Oaks. The three participants were in concordance of purpose and they agreed that in the Assembly, every member should have a place; the ultimate powers of decision and action were to be concentrated in the Security Council; Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union would have exclusive permanent places in that body, similar places to be kept open for France and China; of the eleven members of the Council, the other six should be elected by the Assembly for short terms and the five permanent members of the council would have the exclusive right to veto any action by the Council.³²

Although so many matters had been settled at the conference, there were some differences of opinion about the range of activity of the Assembly, the countries belonging to the organisation at the start and the limits of the veto right, all of which needed another conference of Great Powers. On 9 October the participants released a short statement expressing their hope to have further meetings to solve the unsettled differences. It said:

The governments which were represented in the discussions in Washington have agreed that after further study of these proposals they will as soon as possible take the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations conference.³³

Quebec (II)

After the victorious Overlord operation another meeting of the three Allied Great Powers was essential to secure the joint planning for the joint action against Germany and the Japanese invasion in the Far East. Stalin's response was that he could not leave Russia while the Red Army was involved on so wide a battle front.³⁴ The Soviets were busy moving forward fast in a sustained drive along on 1300-kilometre front from Finland to the Black Sea. The German defence line had been smashed and the Germans had either been forced to retreat or been isolated. As described by Churchill:

Wheeling to the west, the Russian armies drove up the valley of the Danube and through the Transylvanian Alps to the Hungarian border, while their left flank, south of the Danube, lined up on the frontier of Yugoslavia. Here they prepared for the great westerly drive which in due time was to carry them to Vienna.³⁵

With the smashing advances of the Red Army, Churchill kept on expressing, in worried messages, his sense that another British-American review of strategies was urgently needed. Therefore with the absence of Stalin, the joint military decisions were left to Churchill and Roosevelt. They chose Quebec as a pleasant and convenient place for meeting on 13 September 1944 while the conference at Dumbarton Oaks was going on.

In this conference, for the first time, priority was given to the war in the Pacific and the mainland of Asia against Japan and a strategic program determining the major lines of effort for the rest of the war in Europe was set.³⁶ Although nobody in this conference consulted the Soviets while reaching these decisions, as soon as they were made, on 23 September, a joint message was sent to Stalin telling him about them. This was a continuation of the effort to arrange more thorough coordination of military action with the Soviet Union in both Europe and the Far East.

Moscow (II)

The Red Army had so far made great advances in Eastern Europe which were, according to Churchill, "pressing heavily upon the Balkan scene and Romania and Bulgaria were in their power."³⁷ Therefore, after making some arrangements with Roosevelt to "divide responsibilities for looking after particular countries affected by the movements of the armies"³⁸, Churchill attended Moscow on 9

October 1944. This time he had to come to a conclusion with his Russian ally on “spheres of responsibilities” in the liberated territories of the Balkan states and Poland.³⁹

Crimea (Yalta)

When the Soviet troops were only about fifty kilometres from Berlin the Conference of Yalta was held (5 February 1945); Germany was at the point of final collapse and the cease-fire in Europe was becoming imminent. In this situation the Heads of the three Great Powers; the Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union felt necessary to concert their plans for the future. This conference was a further step toward making clear the future of the international system after the war.

The first decision made at this conference was to open the discussion on the future of Germany. The military operations in Europe and in the Pacific were also discussed and the participants agreed to have more consultations between the military staffs in the interests of closer coordination in both strategy and operations. Furthermore, Stalin confirmed the Soviet forces' entry into the Pacific war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany. With regard to the future of Germany, they all agreed that after the victory, supreme authority was to be executed by the British, American, the Soviet and the French Commanders-in-Chief, each in his own zone of occupation and also jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole.

Unsettled situations in the smaller countries such as Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and their frontiers were of great concern to the conference. In “the Declaration on Liberated Europe” which was released at the end of the conference, the Heads of States affirmed:

Their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.⁴⁰

The United Nations Organisation and those related matters which had not been solved at Dumbarton Oaks were of major priority to the Heads of States. Among the unsettled matters were: the voting system in the Security Council, the question of initial members of the organisation and the territorial trusteeships in the Charter. With regard to the voting system, Churchill and Stalin confirmed Roosevelt's proposal which in sum provided that:

1) The Security Council ought to be able to determine "procedural matters" by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council (out of a total of eleven); 2) for decision on all other matters, the concurrence of all permanent members should be required; but 3) while the Security Council was trying to bring about a voluntary peaceful settlement of a dispute by advice, conciliation or adjudication, then any member of the Council, including the permanent members, who was a party to the dispute should abstain from voting.⁴¹

About the initial members, it was decided to invite "the United Nations as they existed on 8 February 1945 ... and such of Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March 1945."⁴² The Soviets had requested already at Dumbarton Oaks that all sixteen constituent states of the USSR be admitted as original members and be given places in the Assembly, now they were insisting on at least two: the Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Therefore, the delegates of Great Britain and the United States agreed "to support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Republics."⁴³

Concerning the trusteeships, they came to an understanding that any such trusteeships should apply only to: 1) Existing mandates of the League of Nations; 2) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; 3) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.⁴⁴ However they agreed to have more consultations together with the other two permanent members of the Council in order to provide a machinery in the Charter for trusteeships before the United Nations Conference.⁴⁵

At Yalta they also agreed to discuss the procedural matters along with other preliminary issues at a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation which should be summoned for 25 April 1945 in the United States.⁴⁶ In the final declaration of the conference, the participants announced that their "unity of purpose and of action ... has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war." In this way, the United Nations Organisation was considered by the Allied Great Powers a replacement of the old inefficient system of international relations.⁴⁷

San Francisco

The conference at San Francisco opened on 25 April and lasted till 26 June 1945, when the victory of the Allies in the Pacific seemed certain, but not necessarily imminent. In this conference, the representatives of the United Nations drew up the Charter of the United Nations and its main judicial organ, the International Court of Justice. Moreover a preparatory Commission of the United Nations consisting of one representative from each government signatory to the Charter was established to make:

Provisional arrangements for the first sessions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council, for the establishment of the Secretariat, and for the convening of the International Court of Justice.⁴⁸

Therefore the thirteen Allied conferences which at least two of the Great Powers had always attended, as well as dealing with their war time concerns to keep unity against the Axis Powers, paved the way for the establishment of a general international organisation consisting of all free nations fighting against the Axis powers in order to maintain peace and security among the nations collectively. This international organisation was to constitute the basis for the post-War international system. In the following section the failure of both the League of Nations and the United Nations in practice will be discussed.

Security Lacked Collective Action

The study of the drafting conferences in both the inter-war and the post-War II period shows that the drafting process of the Covenant and the Charter which were deemed to be universal and based on certain key principles such as the equal rights of nations, was in the hands of the particular great powers who had won the war. The post war system of international relations had been initiated by the Triumphant Great Powers and the smaller powers had little, if any role to play. In the following section the function of both the League and the United Nations in compliance with the principles of the proposed collective security namely, universality, equality, solidarity and the peaceful settlement of disputes will be examined.

Universality

The 1918 cease-fire was declared on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points in which the first point began with the prohibition of secret pacts and "private international understanding of any kind." The point emphasised that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view". But, contrary to this recommendation, the Covenant was drafted behind closed doors. Approximately 500 special correspondents had been sent from all over the world to cover the Conference, but none "had direct access to the decision-makers."⁴⁹ Nicolson dramatically expressed the situation when he wrote:

From the outset, they protested that the Covenants which were being negotiated were being secretly arrived at. The Supreme Council were much perturbed by this protest. They decided that the Press should be admitted to all Plenary Meetings. As a result, only six Plenary Meetings were held and, of these, only that which dealt with the Covenant of the League was of anything more than a purely fictitious character. In order to assuage the indignation of their own national correspondents, the plenipotentiaries were thus forced to provide tit-bits of information on their own. This led to mutual accusations of "leakage" and to much bitter recrimination. Yet here again was an instance of timidity in facing facts. The Press should have been warned before the Conference opened that it would not be worth their while to send special correspondents to Paris. They should have been told that the discussions would have to be conducted in secret, and that only agreed communiques would be issued for publication. There are only two ways of dealing with a democratic Press. The best way is to tell them everything; that bores them stiff. The second best way is to tell them nothing, which at least provides a highly pleasurable form of news value. The worst method is to tell them half-truths in the form of conciliatory leakages. It was this flabby method which was adopted by the Conference of Paris.⁵⁰

As with the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations, neither the Allied Conferences, nor the United Nations Organisation constituted a "general international organisation." The task of drafting the Charter at the conferences, instead of being entrusted to a universal conference of all interested nations, was initiated and run by a commission exclusively composed of representatives of the few Allied Great Powers; the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. On some occasions as in the Four Power Declaration at Moscow, in Cairo (I) and in Dumbarton Oaks, China participated and for the first time, as a world mandatory power, the French Committee of National Liberation was allowed to participate in the trusteeship committee of the United Nations prior to the San Francisco conference in company with the other four permanent members of the Security Council.

The drafting process starting from Moscow and ending in Yalta was exclusively carried out by participant Allies. In spite of the formal equality of the nations "the informal colloquium of the Big Five" as Inis Claude affirms "had the ultimately decisive voice in the formulation of the Charter."⁵¹ In all these conferences like the drafting of the Covenant, even the press was not allowed to get close to the conferences. It was only following the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of October 1944, that the proposed "general international organisation" was made public; later at San Francisco the Charter was opened to the public forum. Churchill in his diary clearly explains this secrecy at the Tehran and Yalta Conferences: "at Tehran it had been very difficult for the press to get near the meeting-place, and at Yalta it had been impossible."⁵²

Neither the conferences; Paris Peace Conference and Allied Conferences, nor the League and the United Nations were the “general association of nations.” In the Conferences the task of drafting the Covenant and the Charter was not entrusted to a universal conference of all interested nations but to a commission exclusively composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Several groups of states were not admitted to the League for different reasons; the former Central powers for reasons of “political expediency,”⁵³ and the USSR for the totalitarian nature of its régime.⁵⁴ The common viewpoint of the Allied powers, revealed in Wilson’s war message, was that “a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with or observe its covenants.”⁵⁵ Some Latin American states were also kept out because their governments had not been recognised by some of the Allied and Associated Powers.⁵⁶ In fact, the directing agency of the peace was the directing agency of the war itself.⁵⁷

During the official working of the League not all powers, including some great powers, were involved. The United States withdrew as soon as the peace treaties were signed and except for limited efforts in peace-enforcement in the 1930s had no cooperation with the League.⁵⁸ Japan, a permanent member of the Council also withdrew from the League in March 1933. The Soviet Union was also out of the League until 18 September 1934 when it was admitted. But at the end of 1939 it was expelled from the League after its attack on Finland. When Hitler came to power, Germany left the League in October 1933.⁵⁹

With regard to the membership to the United Nations Organisation, different attitudes were revealed by the Allied powers or more precisely a series of changes in the idea of membership occurred. At first in the Atlantic Charter the two Allies, Great Britain and the United States, addressed “all of the nations of the world” to the abandonment of the use of force but later, in the Four Power Declaration and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the membership was limited to “all peace-loving states.”

Further restrictions were put into action when the result of the Yalta Conference was revealed. It was determined that the nations to be invited to the Conference of San Fransisco should be either: “... the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February 1945” or “the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March 1945.”⁶⁰ Therefore, in San Fransisco, there were only fifty-one signatories of the Charter to be regarded as the original members of the United Nations Organisation.

When the United Nations was established in 1945, 750 million people, almost a third of the world's population, living in Territories that were non-self-governing and dependent on Colonial Powers, were excluded from having a seat in the proposed universal organisation. Even states of full independence were deprived of membership. Several groups of states were not admitted for different reasons; among them were the former Axis powers and States associated with them and the States which had remained neutral. From Asia and Africa because of the continued colonial status there were only eleven states originally admitted.

The conditions for admission of new members became so difficult that they required a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of at least seven members of the Security Council, including Permanent Members. Therefore, in the four-year period between 1946 to 1950, only nine new members could be admitted. There was then a stalemate in the admission of new members for five years until 1955 as the Security Council could not achieve to the concurring votes of the Permanent Members. In 1955 sixteen States admitted were in four groups; Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania; Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; Jordan and Libya; and Cambodia, Ceylon, Laos and Nepal.

During 1956 to 1967 thirty-four new African and four new Caribbean States were admitted to membership of the United Nations Organisation which increased the number of members to 123.⁶¹ But it still was not representative of all nations. Firstly, Indonesia had withdrawn from the United Nations in 1965 and did not return until after twenty months on 28 September 1966. Secondly, the continued recognition by the United Nations of the National Government established in Taiwan as the government of China was so to disfranchise the Communist People's Republic of China in all United Nations procedures as virtually to exclude mainland China also from membership until 1971. In a comparison Wilfred Jenks writes: "the United Nations of 123 Members was significantly less representative of the effective political forces of 1968 than the United Nations of fifty-one Members had been of the effective political forces of 1945."⁶²

From 1968 till 1979 there were still 29 states applying for the membership of the United Nations, 8 of which were out of the United Nations for more than a year, the most important ones being Germany (both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic) who were admitted on 18 September 1973 and then Viet Nam on 20 September 1977. (For a list of states that did not join the UN for more than a year after their independence see Table 2-1)

Table 2-1. States not a Member of the United Nations for More Than a Year

States	Date of Admission to the U.N.O.	Date of Independence
Afghanistan	19/11/1946	-
Iceland	19/11/1946	17/06/1944
Sweden	19/11/1946	1000
Thailand	16/12/1946	-
Yemen	30/09/1947	-
Indonesia	28/09/1950	27/12/1949
Spain	14/09/1955	-
Sri Lanka	14/09/1955	04/02/1948
Bulgaria	14/12/1955	05/10/1908
Cambodia	14/12/1955	-
Finland	14/12/1955	06/12/1917
Hungary	14/12/1955	1001
Ireland	14/12/1955	18/04/1949
Italy	14/12/1955	-
Jordan	14/12/1955	22/03/1946
Laos	14/12/1955	1949
Libya	14/12/1955	24/12/1951
Nepal	14/12/1955	1846
Portugal	14/12/1955	1200
Romania	14/12/1955	1918
Japan	18/12/1956	200
Malaysia	17/09/1957	-
Cyprus	20/09/1960	-
Mongolia	27/10/1961	13/03/1921
Kuwait	14/05/1963	19/06/1961
Yemen (Democratic)	14/12/1967	-
China (People's R.)	1971	-
Oman	07/10/1971	1744
Germany (FRG)	18/09/1973	1955
Germany (GDR)	18/09/1973	1955
Bangladesh	17/09/1974	12/1971
Angola	01/12/1976	11/11/1975
Samoa	15/12/1976	01/01/1962
Viet Nam	20/09/1977	-

Source: Brian Hunter, *The Statesman's Year-Book*, 1991-1992.

Furthermore there were still some states such as Korea (both Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea) that did not join the United Nations Organisation in the period of study from 1945 to 1979. (See Table 2-2)

This was the case when the most acute political problems in both Europe and Asia related to areas outside the membership of the United Nations, Germany in the case of Europe and Viet Nam and Korea in the case of Asia, and every solution for any of the major long-term problems, including disarmament and the control of nuclear testing, was in any case impossible without Chinese participation.

Table 2-2. States Not a Member of the U.N.O. up to 1979

States	Date of Independence	Area (sq. km.)	Population (76-77)
Andorra	1278	453	30,000
Korea, Republic of	1945	98,484	34,688,000
Korea Democratic People's Republic of	08/08/1945	120,538	16,246,000
Liechtenstein	23/01/1719	157	24,715
Monaco	1889	1.5	25,029
Nauru	1968	21	7,000
San Marino	1800	61	19,168 ^a
Switzerland	1648	41,293	6,346,000
Taiwan	1950 ^b	35,961	16,293,000
Tongo	04/06/1970	699	90,000
Tuvalu	01/10/1975	25	6,000
Vatican City	11/02/1929	0.44	1,000
Total		297,693.94	22,736,000

^a 20,000 citizens live abroad. ^b Taiwan (Republic of China) was the first representative of China in the UNO. However when on, 25 October 1971, the People's Republic took over the China seat in the UN from the Nationalists, Taiwan refused membership.

Source: John Paxton, ed., *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1979; *The Europa Yearbook*, 1979; Brian Hunter, ed., *The Statesman's Year-Book*, 1991-1992.

Equality

The difference between the Great Powers on one side and the small Associated Powers on the other side was quite obvious in the process of drafting the Covenant and in the functioning of the League, so that the League appeared as an “instrument in the hands of the victorious powers.”⁶³ In the Peace Conference, the Great Power Commission of Ten had exclusive authority to discuss crucial and serious affairs like Mandates and to submit the Covenant to the Plenary Session. Concerning the small powers’ interests, the Leaders of the attendant states “were reduced to pleading their case, either in writing or in person before these Ten plenipotentiaries.”⁶⁴ The draft Covenant was submitted to the public several times for comment and each time a flood of criticisms and suggestions were received

from all quarters. But the Commission on the League of Nations regarded the criticisms from the United States as the most important.⁶⁵

This predominant position of the Great Powers at the Conference was affirmed in the Covenant of the League. In order to maintain the dominance of “the principal victorious powers,”⁶⁶ the League formed itself into two meetings; the Great Power meeting (Council) and that of the small powers (Assembly). While the small power members in the Assembly had only one vote of equal value, the principal body of the League had a special decision-making power for securing international peace. Regarding “the requirement of unanimity” Keylor asserted that “each permanent member could veto any proposal that threatened to impinge upon its national interests.”⁶⁷

As in the inter-war period, there were differences in the process of drafting the Charter and of the United Nations’ function between the Triumphant Great Powers on one side and the small Associated Powers on the other side. In the Conferences, the Great Power Commission of Heads or/and Ministers of Foreign Affairs had exclusive authority to discuss crucial and serious world affairs such as: accepting the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France which subsequently could recreate its old colonial empire; letting it and China participate in the talks over the future of the international system; setting trusteeship system and determining the destiny of trust territories.

The Charter, too, confirmed these matters in putting China and France in the seat of the Security Council beside the other Great Power Allies. The United Nations Organisation, like its predecessor, was formed into two meetings; the Great Power meeting (Security Council) and that of the small powers (General Assembly). While the small power members in the Assembly had only one vote of equal value to that of those Great Power members, the principal body of the proposed universal organisation had an exclusive decision-making power, the so-called right of veto, for securing international peace.

Solidarity

The United Nations, like the League of Nations was confronted from the beginning with immediate political difficulties of the first magnitude. The assumption that there would be a continuing solidarity among the nations had become untenable even among the perception of the Allies during the San Francisco Conference itself. When the Charter entered into force on 24 October 1945, “the international cooperation” necessary to fulfil the United Nations system “was already undermined,” as Ruth Russel affirms.⁶⁸

The radical change in the nature of war caused by the invention of atomic bomb of mass destruction also occurred after the drafting of the Charter and tended to invalidate international measures based on the older concept of war. Thus both the form in which the problem of threats and acts of aggression was foreseen and the method proposed to deal with them, collective action, forceful if necessary, soon proved not to be strictly applicable to the realities of the post-war world.

The most distinctive and original part of the Charter which could only be achieved by the solidarity of all nations, particularly the Great Powers, was that comprising the articles concerning the maintenance of peace and the meeting of threats of aggression, in particular Chapter VII which provided for military forces to be put at the disposal of the Security Council and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These provisions, based on the assumption of the continuing unanimity of the powers which had won the Second World War, quickly proved to be illusory.

Peacekeeping

The United Nations' peace-keeping operations which attracted the most attention were those which employed military personnel. Such operations fall into two broad categories- those with an observatory function, as in Cyprus in 1964, and those which were more in the nature of police and peace enforcing operations, as in the Congo. However, all these operations had certain features in common. They could take place and their personnel could operate only with the consent or at the request of the governments in whose territory they were to function. None of these military teams were permitted to interfere with the internal affairs of a country and were exclusively concerned with the matters prescribed for them in resolutions of the Security Council or General Assembly. The use of arms or of force was restricted to ultimate self defence only, and in no case was the object of one of these groups to fight or to counter violence by force, (except in the case of Congo in which this limitation expanded to include the prevention of civil war)

The Korean case has been claimed as the Security Council's only exercise in collective security.⁶⁹ But it should be born in mind that the Council engaged in this exercise only because the Soviet Union, which was then boycotting the Council in protest against the United Nations' non-recognition of Communist China, was absent and its absence was not counted as a veto. Even in such circumstances, when the Secretary General, supported by the Europeans, attempted to involve the UN more deeply in the defence of South Korea, the United States' rejection limited the UN "supervision" over the forces in Korea to the receipt of periodic reports from the United States.⁷⁰

In spite of John Murphy's claim that "the Council served a role as a focal point for world reaction to the aggression,"⁷¹ in several major instances of international aggression, the Security Council failed to act. Prominent examples would include the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979.

Definition of Aggression

The primary principle to suppress aggression, at which both the League and the United Nations have never arrived was a clear cut definition of "aggression." Many efforts made in 1953-54, 1956-57, 1959-67 and 1968-74 by Special Committees of the United Nations on the question of defining aggression and various draft definitions were considered. However, it could not adopt anything but an ambiguous report.⁷² Until after "extremely delicate compromises,"⁷³ "a historic achievement," as Benjamine Ferencz named it,⁷⁴ was gained and the thirty-five members of the Fourth Special Committee adopted by consensus the definition of aggression on 12 April 1974 which later approved by the General Assembly on 14 December 1974. In defining the aggression, Article 1 of Resolution 3314 (XXIX) reads: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition."⁷⁵

This was still imperfect. As Benjamine Ferencz expresses his doubt "whether governments and people will be wise enough to make of the definition a useful tool with which to build a better world only time and experience will tell,"⁷⁶ there were still many juridical loopholes and pretexts in the definition of which an aggressor could take an advantage. According to Julius Stone the loopholes and pretexts were even "extended rather than closed off."⁷⁷ Situations in which the Security Council's action was blocked by the lawful use of the Great Power veto in face of an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51, are only the best known and least disputed examples. In spite of the consensus definition, the matter of conflicting interpretation among the Great Powers in particular, the question of the relevance of intention and purpose to commission of aggression, economic coercion, indirect use of armed forces, imperialism and police action contrary to the right of self-determination, military activities of volunteers, disputed frontiers, are still subjects of debate.⁷⁸

Therefore in addition to the importance of defining aggression, the procedures for reaching such a definition are crucial in determining the extent of the commitment of the respective parties to observe the spirit of the definition and to avoid

misusing the loopholes. Otherwise the definition will remain an empty expression of idealism.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC)

Another prerequisite necessary for dealing with aggression was MSC. Based on Article 47 of the Charter, the MSC was: "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security." But it never came to realisation. From 1945 to 1948 the MSC case was discussed, but the political impasse of the Permanent Members of the Security Council in the estimates of strength of the armed forces available to the Security Council; composition of these forces; location; provision of base; time of withdrawal and organisation of command, all developed difficulties in reaching any agreement so that the work ceased in July 1948.⁷⁹

Excessive Use of the Veto

Another significant issue of discord in the proposed collective security system was the excessive use of the right of veto. The Security Council as the principal organ in which the collective security system of the United Nations Organisation had left the exclusive authority to act on its behalf, had a few achievements to its credit, and failed in the discharge of its high responsibilities, mainly because "of the excessive and almost irresponsible use of the veto by one Permanent Member of the Council" as Herbert Evatt maintain,⁸⁰ or the other. From 16 February 1946 till 16 March 1979 the veto had been exercised by the USSR on 119 occasions, the USA on 21, the UK on 18, France on 11 and China on 6,⁸¹ either in circumstances when the vital interests of each of these Permanent Members or their allies were in danger or in apparent breach of understandings given at San Fransisco by the other Great Powers.

A substantial number of vetos cast during the Council's early existence were made by the Soviet Union. Yet, until 1979, a great number of draft resolutions failed to be adopted because, according to Anjali V. Patil "the Western Powers, headed by the United States invariably managed to muster the required majority to defeat those draft resolutions."⁸² This is what he names "hidden veto" contrary to the "open veto" or "real veto."⁸³ As a result, a large number of decisions supported by a majority of the Council have been rendered quite inoperative.

Settlement of Disputes

According to the Atlantic Charter, the signatories had agreed to “respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live” and to “come to the abandonment of the use of force.”⁸⁴ The major principle of the Charter of the United Nations also confirmed this notion where it invited nations to “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another” and never use their “armed force” against each other in the settlement of the disputes. In spite of this, the Allied powers not only did not respect the form of government in the Axis powers but also constantly used armed forces for destroying the enemy and for settling the disputes.

Early in 1 January 1942 the Allies and their United Nations declared that “each Government pledges itself ... not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.”⁸⁵ Moreover the only condition for cease-fire, that was always asserted in all the conferences by the Allied powers, was “destruction of Nazi tyranny” and “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers. In the report of the Crimea Conference at Yalta on 11 February 1945, the Allies announced their “inflexible purpose to ... wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militants from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people.”⁸⁶

The International Court of Justice, it was hoped, would become a primary institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations, whereas in practice like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, it was a great disappointment to its most ardent supporters. When the Court reached a decision the governments involved in the case were expected to obey the judges’ ruling; but it was difficult to compel acceptance. A procedure did not exist whereby the Security Council may be asked to ensure that a particular state complied with the ruling of the court. Thus, a large majority of Member states favoured giving the court compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes, but both the United States and the Soviet Union strongly opposed this proposal and declared that they would not become parties to the Court’s statute if the proposal were adopted.⁸⁷

Consequently, the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the Court was limited to situations where the states concerned expressly consented to such jurisdiction, either on an *ad hoc* basis, or in advance of the dispute through a declaration. As of January 1979, there were only forty-five states that had filed declarations recognising the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction (see Table 2-3).

Table 2-3. Member States Accepted Compulsory Jurisdiction

Year	States Accepting Compulsory Jurisdiction	States Parties to the Statute
1925	23	36
1930	29	42
1935	42	49
1940	32	50
1945 (ICJ)	23	51
1950	35	61
1955	32	64
1960	39	85
1965	40	118
1970	46	129
1975	45	147
1978	45	154

Source: United Nations, *Everyone's United Nations*, p. 37.

During the thirty-three years (up to 1979) that the Court was functioning, it had on the average only one contentious case a year and one advisory opinion every other year.⁸⁸ While there were many disputes since the start of this system, which were settled by other methods including force or a threat of force, economic sanctions or some form of economic pressure, there have been many which remained unsettled, with a high actual or potential tension level, such as the conflict in Palestine between the Jews and Arabs.

In addition to all these inconsistencies between the theory and practice of the collective security system of the United Nations Organisation, the Charter's ineffectiveness was compounded by the fact that it kept silent on a number of vitally important matters such as the allocation of armed forces to serve the organisation, arrangements for the control and limitation of armaments, a scheme for the International protection of human rights, the pattern of relationships between the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies, the territorial scope of the Trusteeship System. In these and other respects, according to Inis Claude, "the Charter was an unfinished document."⁸⁹

TGP's Conduct of Great Concerns

The failure of an idealistic collective system of international relations to enforce peace and guarantee security, did not prevent the Great Powers from enforcing their traditional system of relations which were more realistic and practicable. This system which worked effectively both inside and outside the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, the Allied Conferences and the United Nations

Organisation is what I refer to as, the Concert of Triumphant Great Powers. (TGP) In this section I will focus on the concert of TGP in the inter-war period and in the post-World War II period, especially on the crucial issues of the destiny of defeated powers in Europe, of the Far East, mandate and trusteeship, and of Latin America.

Concert of the Inter-War Period

By the end of the First World War, the Allies consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and Italy, had gained an unquestionable authority to make decisions on important affairs of the whole world. The destiny of the defeated Central Powers in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Far East and the American Continents was the subject of their disputes. The point to be considered is that the decisions were taken in a context which was the exclusive mission of the League of Nations. This resulted in the fact that for maintaining the *status quo* and securing national interests, the small powers become the subject of the Great Powers' rivalry.

Europe

In Europe, Germany was the major issue of interest for the Great Powers. According to the 434-Article treaty of Versailles of 1919, the Great Powers imposed⁹⁰ certain obligations on Germany. In the West, Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France. The West Bank of the Rhine was occupied by the Allied Powers for fifteen years after which a referendum was to decide its future. A strip of territory running 50 kilometres east of the Rhine was demilitarised. A new frontier was fixed in the North, on the Danish-German frontier and Germany lost large territories to the new Polish state in the East. The most intolerable territorial loss for Germany was that which separated Germany from East Prussian territories and gave Poland an outlet to the sea.

The reduction of national armaments to "the lowest point" applied to Germany only, for the Great Powers especially France had always a fear that Germany may rise again. Keylor in confirming this point adds that it was derived from France's "vulnerable geographical and demographic situation at the end of the Great War."⁹¹

This fear was so great that the League and its organs could never satisfy France. The only way to reduce French worries was through a compromise between the Great Powers.⁹² In this way the Anglo-American guarantee was formulated at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles, to support France against Germany's aggression. This guarantee and the demilitarisation and occupation of the eastern frontiers and partition of Germany into pieces was the price of a stable

international order which become possible with the aid of the Great Powers. In this regard, Birdsall argues that "the Anglo-American treaty of military guarantee was to cease when the League itself was thought strong enough to provide general security."⁹³

The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles made Germany virtually defenceless so that it was easy for France in conjunction with Belgium to attack and occupy the industrial nerve centre of Germany in the Ruhr Valley due to Germany's failure to pay reparation.

As a matter of fact the Great Powers needed some other means to support their claims which the League organisations could not do. In this regard Schwarzenberger wrote:

As it seems to be out of question, for the time being at least, to realise such a universal system of collective security, some method had to be found to satisfy states which were in need, or believed themselves to be in need of stronger guarantees for their security than those offered by the application of the Covenant in the practice of the League.⁹⁴

Four other treaties between the victorious and the defeated powers were needed: the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria on 10 September 1919, the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria on 27 November 1919, the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary on 4 June 1920 and the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey on 10 August 1920. The execution of these peace treaties to make a stable international order, was so important that Lansing remarked "the chief argument for the League's existence has been almost lost to sight."⁹⁵

Mandates

According to the treaties of Versailles and Sèvres all Germany's colonies in Africa, and the Far East and the Arab portion of the Ottoman Empire were separated and divided among the Great Powers. A régime of Mandate, which was based upon the resolution of the Commission of Ten on 30 January 1919,⁹⁶ covered the legal form of these territorial gains. Accordingly, the Mandates were divided into three categories; A, B and C, depending on the type of their geographical situation and the degree of their socio-economic development⁹⁷

The Arab portion of the Ottoman Empire had been promised independence, either in an independent Arab State or a confederation of Arab States, in return for their support for Allied troops against the Empire.⁹⁸ Article 22 of the Covenant explicitly stated that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory." However the conference of San Remo in April 1920 completely ignored this when it divided the area into the

French and British zone.⁹⁹ Moreover “without consulting the Arab leaders,”¹⁰⁰ the British Foreign Minister, Balfour’s declaration of 2 November 1917 was released which favoured “the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people” and promised “to facilitate the achievement of this object.”¹⁰¹ The other four Great Powers subsequently approved this declaration.¹⁰²

Although some believe that the idea of mandates was “markedly different from the idea of timeless domination” and could be regarded as “an evolutionary arrangement which one day would come to an end,”¹⁰³ others argue that the actual distribution of territory of the defeated Central Powers following the wartime arrangements was a “mere hypocritical cloak for the operation of traditional imperialism, adapting itself to the climate and verbiage of the day”¹⁰⁴ or as a means of “draping the crudity of conquest in the veil of mortality.”¹⁰⁵ There are several supporting points that are worth considering. Firstly, although Great Britain and France were the greatest colonial powers and although the colonial possessions of the United States, Japan and Italy were no less than those of the defeated powers, the régime of the Mandate was established for the defeated powers’ colonies.

Secondly, the régime, which was the innovation of the Great Power Commission of Ten, had its origins in some secret wartime agreements such as Sykes-Picot,¹⁰⁶ even before the official opening of the Conference. Thirdly, the Permanent Commission in charge of the Mandates was obliged to “receive and examine the annual reports” of only “the mandatories,” and this shows the fact that the international supervision of mandates was “left to the discretion of the mandatory power.”¹⁰⁷ Finally, if the régime was mainly for the benefit of the mandates themselves, it would be hard to understand the reason for the serious quarrels among the Great Powers over the Japanese question of Shantung and for the Italian dissatisfaction with the partition of Europe or the reason for not applying to the Triumphant Great Powers’ mandates.

On the whole, whether it was an evolutionary step or the same imperialism in a new mask or a “half way-house between Allied Annexation and their internationalisation,”¹⁰⁸ establishment of the régime and distribution of mandates, as a matter of “ingenious compromise,”¹⁰⁹ as Albricht-Carrie calls it, is further evidence supporting the dominating role of the Great Powers.

The Far East

The Far East and China especially were the other areas in which the Great Powers needed to concert to keep peace and security. This concert happened

beyond the League's influence and with no attention to the wishes of the native inhabitants. By the time of the war, the Great Powers had already gained a great number of concessions: extra-territorial rights, control of customs, leases of railway lines and ports in China. But Japan, having certain interests in the Manchurian railway, was a disturbing power hindering European domination of the Far East. By the end of the war, this situation was still maintained in addition to the new Japanese demands on the German colony of Shantung.

The neighbouring Associated powers, such as Australia, wanted "not ... to see the former German presence in the Pacific replaced by a Japanese presence or for that matter by any other non-British presence."¹¹⁰ The Chinese government had opposed any colonial claims in return for its war declaration against Germany. Meanwhile the Chinese nationalist party, Kumingtang, had started a popular movement aiming at freedom from foreign, especially western interferences.¹¹¹

It was up to the Great Powers to attend a conference in Washington from November 1921 to February 1922 to deal with this matter. On 6 February 1922 the five Great Powers, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy and the United States came to an agreement on naval disarmament. The outcome was the clipping of Japan's wings or rather its ships in the area. They agreed to interrupt the building of capital ships, for ten years and after that build ships based on a ratio of 5: 5: 3: 1.75: 1.75 for Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy, respectively.¹¹²

In another treaty, signed on the same day among the nine powers including four other smaller powers, China, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, they undertook to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of China. In this way Japan was forced to retrocede the German concessions in Shantung to China.¹¹³ But no guarantee was given concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria and the annulment of certain foreign concessions. They merely promised not to extend them.¹¹⁴

Latin America

There was a strong feeling in the United States that by including the "reservation of the Monroe Doctrine"¹¹⁵ the Covenant should secure the exclusive rights and interests of the United States in that continent. Otherwise, the Covenant certainly would not be ratified.¹¹⁶ On the contrary, the Latin American delegates to the drafting conference made various attempts "to invoke the League's protection against interference by the United States in their internal affairs" but as they were representatives of small powers their claim "fell on deaf ears."¹¹⁷ In the end, Article

21 of the Covenant gave effective validity to the Monroe Doctrine as a “regional understanding ... for securing the maintenance of peace.”

In this doctrine, which was released as an annual message by President Monroe on 2 December 1823, in order to “cultivate the best understanding” with the Russian and British Imperial governments while confirming “the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power” (Paragraph 48), President Monroe asserted that: “As a principle in which the right and interests of the United States are involved, that the American Continents ... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers.” (Paragraph 7). He then explained the non-interference policy of the United States in the “internal concerns” of any European powers on the understanding “that other powers will pursue the same course.”

This non-interference policy being a compromise among the Great Powers at the time of release, was ratified at the time of drafting of the Covenant as well. Article 21 of the Covenant declared that “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of ... regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, ...” Being part of the actual system of conducting international order, this understanding excluded all peace activities of the League on the American continent.¹¹⁸

Soviet Russia

Revolutionary Russia was also a subject for the Great Powers’ concert. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded with Germany on 3 March 1918, Russia formally accepted its defeat in the war and accordingly lost Poland, Finland, Ukraine and the Baltic Lands together with other promises given by the secret inter-Allied agreement of February 1915.¹¹⁹ As soon as Germany collapsed, all these areas changed to a number of small independent states namely Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia under the protection of the Allied powers. Bessarabia was also annexed to the Kingdom of Rumania and the Curzon line was established at the Paris Peace Conference “as a suitable ethnographic frontier”¹²⁰ between Poland and Russia.

But following the defeat of Germany, in order to keep Germans busy on the Eastern fronts and to prevent army stores from falling into the hands of the enemies, the Allies occupied the Russian ports of Murmansk, Archangel and Vladivostok. The “fear of the spreading of Bolshevism,”¹²¹ was another excuse for this intervention as well. When the Bolsheviks came to power, Russia had changed to “capture the imagination of the Asian and African population,”¹²² and had become

an ideal for some small powers to follow to achieve independence and improve their socio-economic programs. The Great Powers had also large investments in the form of loans and in industrial enterprises in Russia,¹²³ which, without exception, were “unconditionally annulled.”¹²⁴

Regardless of the desired peaceful settlement of disputes and the League’s responsibilities in such cases, the Great Powers not only kept continuing their occupation of the ports: the British forces in the Caucasus until July 1920 and the Japanese in Vladivostok until October 1922 and in Sakhalin until 1925, but also aided the anti-Bolshevik armies militarily and financially.¹²⁵ They had even promised these armies that they would admit Russia into the League, if they won.¹²⁶

Soviet Russia was also one of the main topics on the agenda of the Great Powers in Cannes on 6 January 1922. In this conference for the first time the Great Powers proclaimed their readiness to accept “the principles on which they [nations] are to regulate their system of ownership, internal economy and government.”¹²⁷ They also agreed to invite Soviet Russia to an international conference to “consider the complicated issues on a broader basis.”¹²⁸ Therefore, it was only with the invitation of the Great Powers that revolutionary Russia could obtain permission to attend Geneva in April-May 1922 and be recognised officially in 1922 by Germany and in 1924 by Great Britain, Italy and France.¹²⁹

There were many other cases until the dissolution of the League which demonstrate that a small power could not change the *status quo* or interfere with the system created and conducted by the Great Powers. Cases such as the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier incident in 1921 and the Greco-Bulgarian dispute of 1925 were condemned because each of the parties lacked Great Power support. But if a Great Power itself was involved such as the Italian attack on the Greek island of Corfu in 1922, the Japanese invasion of the Chinese province of Manchuria in 1931 or the Italian occupation of the League member-state, Ethiopia, in 1935 or even in the case where a small power was supported by a Great Power, like Poland in the war against Russia in 1920, the situation was quite different.¹³⁰

Concert of the Post-World War II Period

Quite similar to the Pre-World War II period, the main task of keeping international peace and security was conducted outside the United Nations, in Summit Meetings and in the Council of Foreign Ministers of TGP. It was up to the Triumphant Great Powers to resolve all unsettled problems of the world in concert with each other either through compensation or compromise. The problematic questions of concluding peace treaties with defeated Axis powers in general and

the determination of frontiers, war criminals, reparation, legitimate political systems, the atomic bomb, possession of important strategic points, trusteeship, admission of members to the United Nations, in particular, were all the subject of competitive discussions among TGP. This was going on when such missions, according to the principles of the collective security system, were supposed to be exclusively the responsibility of the United Nations Organisation. As in the past, the small powers not only had no right in securing their national interests (let alone equal rights to the Great Powers), but also under the cover of “the sphere of interests” and “sphere of responsibility” remained objects of the rivalry among TGP.

War-time Alliance

In the Post-World War II period, the three TGP, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were all anxious to keep their unity to govern the world after the war. Churchill on 30 November 1943 remarked that it seemed to him important that:

... the nations who would govern the world after the war should be satisfied ... if that question could be settled in a manner agreeable to the great powers, he felt that the world might indeed remain at peace. So he appeared to regard Soviet proposals about its western frontiers unobjectionable.¹³¹

In his report on 27 February 1945 to the House of Commons, he said: “the Crimea Conference leaves the Allies more closely united than before both in the military and political sphere. ... We have all three set out hands to far reaching engagements at once practical and solemn.”¹³²

The same theme which always dominated Stalin’s remarks was that “to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and ... therefore, ... to secure their unity for the future the Covenant of the new World Organisation should have this as its primary task...”¹³³

In response to Churchill’s agreement with Stalin at Moscow in October 1944 on their “interests, missions and agents” in the Balkan countries and to avoid getting “at cross purposes in small ways,”¹³⁴ (See Table 2-4) Roosevelt sent off a letter to Stalin assured him that:

In this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions¹³⁵

Furthermore, the United States’ assumption from the start, as Ruth Russel says was that “if the great powers were basically agreed, the peace could be kept; if they were not, it could not.”¹³⁶ Even though the United Nations was erected upon

the fundamental assumption of the need for Great Power unity, an assumption which was expressed in the Charter by provisions elaborately setting forth special responsibility and privileges for the Big Five.¹³⁷ In this regard Inis Claude’s remark is worth considering when he says:

Instead of accepting international democracy, the giants of the earth conspired to establish themselves as global dictators. At San Fransisco ..., the great powers forced their hegemony upon a world which had fondly but vainly hoped for the dawn of a new day of international equity and justice.¹³⁸

Table 2-4. Triumphant Great Powers’ Area of Interests in the Balkans

Area	TGP	Percentage of Interests
Romania	Russia	90%
	The Others	10%
Greece	Great Britain (In accord with USA)	90%
	Russia	10%
Yugoslavia		50-50%
Hungary		50-50%
Bulgaria	Russia	75%
	The others	25%

Source: Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 198.

They made a supreme effort to promote Great Power unity and to capitalise upon the chance that the wartime alliance might prove cohesive enough to uphold world peace. In the final communique of Yalta, the Allies announced their intention “to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war.”¹³⁹ To this end they set up a “permanent machinery” of meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries for regular consultation. These meetings held after the United Nations Organisation had already begun its work officially.

The Cold War Era

In 1945, the same year in which Germany and Japan capitulated, the war coalition effectively broke up and the confrontation between the two new world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union began to determine the course of international politics. From this moment any change in the *status quo* or any solution for the unsettled problems of the world concerned them in the first degree.

The Red Army, having finally halted the Nazi armies and decisively defeated the Germans at Stalingrad in late 1942, began slowly to drive the enemy out of the Soviet Union and then pursued the retreating Germans to Berlin. The Soviet

Union, which on the eve of world war II had absorbed the three Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) expanded into Eastern and Central Europe and began to impose its control upon Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania, even before the end of the war. In each of the nations of Eastern Europe where the Soviets had their troops, they unilaterally established pro-Soviet coalition governments. For the Soviet Union control of Eastern Europe and especially Poland, the corridor through which Germany had attacked Russia twice in a quarter-century, was essential. This area constituted a vital link in its security belt. The Soviet concept of sphere of interest in Eastern Europe involved more than the establishment of friendly régimes; it also brought the brutal transformation of their social systems. Any hope that the United Nations or any other Great Powers' diplomacy could mitigate this fact was soon dispelled.

Russian stubbornness in dealing with the occupied territories in Eastern Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean together with British withdrawal from Eastern Mediterranean shattered Roosevelt's "Grand Design" and the hope that a new international order could be established on the basis of cooperation among all nations including Soviet-American cooperation. To the State Department of the USA, based on George F. Kennan's "long telegram,"¹⁴⁰ the Soviet's claims on Turkey including a revision of the Montreux convention of 1936 governing the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits in favour of a joint Soviet-Turkish administration and defence,¹⁴¹ was conceived "the Russian nit" and its demands on Turkey was regarded as:

... a desire to control and dominate that country, that according to these demands would be followed next by infiltration and domination of Greece by Russia with the obvious consequences in the Middle East and the obvious threat to the line of communications of the British to India [which] ... should firmly resented."¹⁴²

All this led Truman to the decision to create a Western hemisphere in response to the Soviet security sphere. On 5 January 1946 for a serious talk with Byrnes the Secretary of State, Truman noted down that:

I do not think we should play compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognise Rumania and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements; we should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms and we should continue to insist on the internationalisation of the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube waterway and the Black Sea Straits and we should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific. We should rehabilitate China and create a strong central government there. We should do the same for Korea. ... I'm tired of babying the Soviets.¹⁴³

On 12 March 1947 requesting from the Congress \$300 million in aid to Greece and \$100 million for Turkey, where the former faced Communist pressure

on the government from within, and the latter external pressure from outside, President Truman spelled out the two alternative ways of life existing at the time;

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of minority forcibly imposed upon the majority, it relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.¹⁴⁴

He then declared his plan, later known as his doctrine that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugations by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”¹⁴⁵

In response to containment and “against American imperialism against its English and French allies against the Right-Wing Socialists, above all in England and France,”¹⁴⁶ The Soviets established the Communist information Bureau (Cominform) for coordinating policies and attitudes between the Soviet Union the Communist régimes of Eastern Europe and Communist parties elsewhere

As it appeared that the United Nations was not sufficient to secure international peace and security the West European states formed the West European Union (WEU) in order to maintain their independence from the USA against the possibility of aggression from Soviet-dominated East Europe, by the Brussels pact of March 1948. However a decisive shift in this situation was brought about with news of the elimination of non-Communist elements in Czechoslovakia at the end of February 1948. By now the West European democracies were threatened by a combination of subversive activity at home and military threat from outside. There was now no more doubt about the necessity for a military alliance with the USA.

The shared conviction of West European countries and the USA, that Soviet aggression could now no longer definitely be ruled out, made them sign the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949. The signatories agreed to commit themselves to regard an armed attack on one or more participant countries “as an attack against them all” and to practice “such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”¹⁴⁷ To the US Administration it was necessary to preserve good relationships with the “fringe” countries in Europe: Belgium, France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands etc because otherwise “Communism could infiltrate into all of them.”¹⁴⁸

The conflict between East and West was no longer understood simply as a power political struggle for sphere of interests and security requirements, but increasingly in terms of a battle for survival between two opposing social orders

and life-styles. Consequently the limited containment reached global dimensions following the twin shocks of 1949: the fall of China to communism and the Soviet development of the atomic bomb.

The American National Security Council's reassessment of global strategy (NSC-68) prepared in the spring of 1950 argued that "the assault on free institutions world-wide and in the context of the polarisation of world power, a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere". But still it needed another event to bring about the militarisation of containment and to end many of its previous political limits, the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950¹⁴⁹ caused the US administration to develop the containment from a Europe-centred and a Western Pacific focus to become global.

With the Communist intransigence into Indo-China, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, attempted to draw a line in Asia. They formed the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 including the United States, Britain France, Australia, New Zealand and three Asian States: the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. A Protocol to the Treaty added an umbrella of protection over Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

In the Middle East the United States policy in addition to containment and limiting Soviet influence was to maintain access to oil and to protect Israeli security. President Eisenhower according to biographer Stephen E. Ambrose felt "the Middle East was immeasurably more within an area vital to the interests of the United States than the Far East ever would be."¹⁵⁰

A National Security Council study in 1956 concluded that "the United States cannot afford the loss to communist extremist of constructive nationalist and reform movements in colonial areas of Asia and Africa."¹⁵¹ Therefore efforts to apply containment in the Middle East region were awkward. In early 1957 Congress passed at the President's urging a resolution known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. It stated that the United States considered the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Middle Eastern nations vital to American security and that it was prepared to use armed force to assist any nation or nations "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by International Communism."¹⁵²

The resolution was directed at the possibility of either overt Soviet aggression or internal coups organised by the Communists. Because in practice it was the beginning of an anti-Nasser alliance, organised by the United States. The United States sent a package of economic and military aid to the then pro-Western States of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. At the same time the US

supported the Baghdad Pact group which included Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain and pointedly excluded Egypt.¹⁵³

In response to the North Atlantic Treaty and its consolidation around the world, the representatives of the East European governments and the Soviet Union signed in Warsaw in 1955 a "treaty of friendship cooperation and mutual assistance."¹⁵⁴

Thus the Second World War had left the world divided into two opposing camps, the United States and its forty-two allies around the world linked together in the great pacts encircling the communist world, and the USSR at the head of Warsaw pact and its allies around the world. Each of these blocs lived in fear of the dominance of the other side and each thus sought to weaken the other, specifically by encouraging national differences and contradictions in the other camp and strove to incorporate more and more regions of the world into its own side.¹⁵⁵ It almost seemed as though the prophecy made by Stalin in his Lectures on the Foundations of Leninism had come true:

Thus in the course of the further development of international relations two centres will form on the world's surface, one centre drawing to itself the countries that gravitate towards capitalism, the other drawing to itself the countries that gravitate towards socialism.¹⁵⁶

The Detente Era

By the early 1960s nuclear weapons were developed and the intercontinental missiles were equipped enough to deliver these weapons to the most remote areas of the other side. The Soviet Union had now acquired a "second-strike" capability - a capability to retaliate with a crushing strike on North America even in the hypothetical event that the United States struck first in a surprise blow. The issues on which the super-powers were willing to fight each other to death were gradually reduced until the only one left was that their own national security. The balance of terror and nuclear bipolarity had made the US Secretary of State, Christian Herter, who succeeded Dulles in May 1959, to state that "I cannot imagine ... any circumstances in which the American President would order the firing of our nuclear arsenal except in defence of the continental security of the United States."¹⁵⁷

On the one hand, these issues together with the assassination of President Kennedy and the increasing US involvement in Viet Nam which led Johnson's administration to focus his attention on domestic problems; and on the other the Soviet's humiliating withdrawal from Cuba in 1962 which was blamed on the strategic superiority of the United States, caused both the USA and the USSR to

seek a relaxation of tensions. This produced a period of mutual deterrence between them which was vigorous until 1979.

Deterrence superseded defence as the key to security. Defence retaliation, a “war-winning” capability or even a “damage-limiting” capability were now secondary to deterring or preventing war. Deterrence depended upon the world balance of power. As a Soviet military discussion put it:

... the party views peaceful coexistence not as a result of arbitrary wishes and decisions of certain parties or governments, but as an objective necessity resulting from the contemporary relations of forces between the two systems and the only alternative to a world thermo-nuclear.¹⁵⁸

President Ford also had an explanation of the policy of detente:

... no nation can profit from confrontations that could culminate in a nuclear war ... detente is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union ... We must be mature enough to recognise that to be stable a relationship must provide advantages to both sides ... The policy of detente is designed to promote peace ... [and] we will be flexible and cooperative in settling conflicts ... that have turned the globe for a generation.¹⁵⁹

Although this was not the first time of detente in the history of war, it was the most enthusiastically publicised and most conscientiously pursued with agreements being reached on a number of outstanding East-West issues. The improvement of Soviet forces in the late 1960s had gone so far that deterrence was necessary to be taken seriously. In an overview of the US foreign policy it was stated that the Soviet Union “achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States in nuclear forces. This required the development of a new, more flexible strategy and lent a renewed sense of urgency to negotiating agreements on strategic arms.”¹⁶⁰

Subjects of the Concert

In the era of confrontation, in spite of the ideological and social differences between the two camps and their conflicting interests around the world, TGP had to keep their concert, their meetings and their talks. Even if they could not come to an immediate conclusion, they would agree to postpone it to some other meeting to leave it for a new situation which the relation of forces might create. The same happened in the detente era. Of the most important results of the detente era was that both rival camps had secured their sphere of influence and neither was able to coerce the other against its will on important issues. The Triumphant Great Powers had been forced to recognise each other’s sphere of interest. From now on they had institutionalised their unquestionable right to resolve the crucial problems around the world. The periodic summit meetings of TGP were decisive and the smaller countries would look forward to hearing what had been decided for them.

President Nixon in a speech delivered in February 1970 on American foreign policy for the 1970s said: "the time is past when any power would seek to gain strategic advantages in Eastern Europe against the USSR."¹⁶¹

There were still wider consequences of the hardening of the *status quo* between TGP. One of these was the search to maintain the military balance of power and the whole costly structure of deterrence at a lower price and with lower risk. This was attempted at a four-power heads of government meeting; the United States, the United Kingdom the Soviet Union and France in Geneva on 18-23 July 1955, followed by foreign ministers' meetings in the same city for three weeks from 17 October 1955 to translate into detailed action directions approved by the heads of governments.

The Council of Foreign Ministers of November-December 1947, which had been interrupted by a deadlock on reparations, adjourned without a date being set for the next meeting. Nevertheless there was always a tendency by TGP to gather together and keep themselves in a concert. This happened in June 1959 when a Foreign Ministers' Meeting held to discuss Berlin and the German question. A further Summit Meeting was to have been held in Paris in May 1960 but after the American U2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union, it was postponed to sometime later in 3-4 June 1961 when Khrushchev met Kennedy in Vienna.

For the first time since the beginning of the open confrontation between East and West the heads of governments of the Big Four consulted in a "polite manner" as Wilfried Loth describes it¹⁶² as well as emphasising their fundamental willingness to cooperate and only acting according to the maxim of not wanting the cold war to turn into a real war. This was also articulated publicly. It was after this meeting that the Berlin Wall was constructed on 13 August 1961 with no free access between the sectors and with a rampart built to seal off West from East Germany day and night along the 1360-kilometre border between them.¹⁶³

At some further Soviet-American summit conferences, namely Glassboro in June 1967, Moscow in May 1972, Washington, San Clemente in June 1973, Moscow in July 1974, Vladivostok in November 1974, Vienna in June 1979, emphasis was placed on certain areas of agreement, that is the establishment of a "hot line" between the Kremlin and the White House for the purpose of quick communication in a crisis, the limitation of nuclear weapon systems, the non-proliferation Treaty, technological and trade relations, etc ¹⁶⁴. In areas where disagreement continued and both sides for a variety of reasons were interested in publicising it (for clients, public opinion, internal or other reasons), wide publicity was received. There were also those subjects that were apparently not discussed

at all, or at least not reported as being discussed, because they ranked lower in the super powers' list of priorities; thus neither Latin America nor Eastern Europe were brought up on the agendas.¹⁶⁵ The most important issues discussed by TGP were as follow:

Europe

The Potsdam Conference of 2 August 1945 consisting of the Heads of Governments of the USSR, the USA and the UK, laid down the procedures for arriving at peace settlements and established the Council of Foreign Ministers to be composed of the foreign Ministers of the three participants together with France and China. The Council was authorised "to draw up ... treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland." It had also authority "to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe." The Foreign Ministers were to draft the treaties and then submit them to the other Allies for approval. But all three Heads of Government had agreed that "reference to the United Nations could only be made after the five powers had agreed among themselves."¹⁶⁶ In this way "the special position of the Great Powers in their peace-making role" as Grenville says "was thus emphasised as it had been at the earlier peace conferences at Vienna in 1814-15 and at Paris in 1919."¹⁶⁷

Germany was one of the great objects for the concert of TGP. At Potsdam the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union established the Allies' "Control Council" in order to "exercise jointly the supreme authority in Germany as a whole." The reparation demands of the Western powers and the Soviet Union would be met primarily from dismantled industrial plants in the respective occupation zones. However the USSR was entitled in addition to 10 per cent of industrial plant from the western zones without exchange and 15 per cent in exchange for an equal amount of food, coal, minerals and so on from the Soviet Zone. The city of Konigsberg and part of East Prussia were handed over to the Soviet Union.

The Great Powers also laid down some principles to govern the treatment of Germany politically and economically including decentralisation, demilitarisation, destruction of the National Socialist Party, reconstruction of Germany on a democratic basis, the arrest and trial of all Nazi war criminals and so on. The German navy and all its Merchant Marine was to be divided equally among the USSR, the USA and the UK and to fulfil the historical wishes of the USSR; the three governments recognised that "the convention concluded at Montreux [which gave

the control of the Black Sea Straits to the Turkish Government] should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.”¹⁶⁸

During the eighteen months after the end of the war there were six major rounds of Allied negotiations: the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September - October 1945), the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow (December 1945), the Council of Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris (April - May 1946 and June - July 1946), followed by the Paris Peace Conference of twenty-one nations (29 July - 15 October 1946) and a final Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in New York (4 November - 12 December 1946). From these meetings there emerged the drafts of peace treaties which were formally concluded in February 1947 with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

The peace treaties brought about a number of territorial changes and military restrictions. Italy was re-established in its frontiers of 1 January 1938. The Fascist conquests of Albania and Ethiopia were annulled. Some Italian Islands in the Adriatic were transferred to Greece and to Yugoslavia. Italy was enforced to renounce all its rights concerning the territorial possessions in Africa, that is Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The entire Italian Navy could not exceed 67,500 tons, and the total personnel of its Navy could not exceed 25,000 men. The Army was limited to a force of 185,000 personnel and the Air Force restricted to a force of 200 fighter and 150 other aircraft. It was also obliged to pay reparations to the USSR and some Associated Powers.¹⁶⁹ With regard to Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, the Council of Foreign Ministers also made some territorial changes on 10 February 1947 and made them pay reparations to the USSR and some Associated Powers as well.

Germany's example, “a headless trunk fallen on the table of the conquerors” said dramatically Churchill,¹⁷⁰ was good evidence of how TGP members never attempted to confront each other or to dissolve their concert of action. When the differences between the Allies over Germany and the rest of the world increased at the London Conference of February - March 1948, the Western powers and the Benelux countries agreed on the establishment of a Federal Republic of Germany. In reaction in May of that year the German Democratic Republic was established. Both the West and the Soviet Union desired a united Germany behind it. This could upset the distribution of power in Europe decisively but there was no other choice except division as “Germany was becoming a stake in the competition between the powers.”¹⁷¹

Further improvement in the relations between East and West Germany depended upon TGP. Negotiations between the United States, the United

Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union on Berlin began in March 1970 ending with the signature of the Quadripartite Agreement on 3 September 1971. The key features of the Berlin Agreement were the retention by the three Western powers and the USSR of their status, rights and responsibilities; complete uninterrupted transit for persons and goods to West Berlin; and continued links between West Germany and West Berlin.¹⁷²

The Far East

The Far East was another object of the Concert of TGP. With the unconditional surrender of Japan¹⁷³ on 14 August 1945, Japanese armies throughout Asia surrendered to the Allied troops. The seven Allies which had been at war with Japan were represented on the Far Eastern Commission in Washington which came into being in the spring of 1946 together with an Allied Council in Tokyo.

In 1946 a new constitution was promulgated for Japan. Its preamble pledged the people to maintain the high ideals of the democratic constitution dedicated to peaceful cooperation among nations and the blessings of liberty. The Emperor's powers were limited to those of a constitutional monarch; henceforth he became only "the symbol of the state of the unity of all the people" and his position derived "from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power."

In Article 9 of the constitution war was renounced and armed forces were to be maintained only because Japan was "aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order," and the Japanese people forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling territories' disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential would never be maintained. The right of belligerence of the state was also not recognised.

The *status quo* had limited Japanese sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku together with some minor islands. The Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin were administered by the Soviet Union. In Korea, Japanese forces north of latitude 38 degree surrendered to the Russians and south of the line to the Americans, thus creating two military zones. Soviet forces withdrew from North Korea in October 1948 after the establishment of a communist North Korean Government. The United States withdrew from South Korea in June 1949 where a government was also established under UN auspices. Formosa and the Pescadores were handed over to China; the Ryukyu islands including Okinawa were placed under US administration and the Japanese trusteeship of Germany's

former Pacific Islands became a United Nation trust territory under American administration.¹⁷⁴

The Middle East

Among the subjects of the concert of TGP was the Middle East area, particularly Egypt. Following Nasser's Pan-Arabism undermining the British influence in the Arabian countries and his nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956, tensions increased. Regardless of the existing formal system of conflict-solving, a British, French and Israeli "conspiracy"¹⁷⁵ formed itself at Sèvres for joint military operations against Egypt. According to this "understanding," named Grenville,¹⁷⁶ an attack took place by the Israelis followed by an Anglo-French ultimatum on 30 October to both Egypt and Israeli troops to withdraw from each side of the Canal. As the Egyptians rejected the ultimatum on 31 October, the British and French forces intervened militarily without declaring war. As both British and French could use their rights of veto in the Security Council, there was no use relying on the Council. Therefore the United States and the Soviet Union separately sent an ultimatum asking Anglo-French military operations to be stopped. This resulted in British and French troops withdrawing from the Canal zone by 23 December 1956 to let a United Nations force replace them.

Latin America

With respect to the American Continent the same point was made as had been accepted during the interwar period. There was no Article in the Charter concerning the American Continent. But since Article 21 of the Covenant had recognised that as a "regional understanding ... for securing the maintenance of peace" basically according to the Monroe Doctrine (and all other TGP including the Soviet Union had accepted that "understanding") there was no doubt that the same policy would be run by the United States after the Second World War. Moreover, several times the USA used the Doctrine to justify its military intervention in Latin America so that neither the United Nations nor compromise among TGP¹⁷⁷ could prevent its actions or provide other solutions. Although the Soviets condemned the Monroe Doctrine as a product of "aggressive capitalism and national militarist bourgeoisie,"¹⁷⁸ this topic was never brought up on the agenda of the summit meetings of TGP. There is a fair explanation of the Latin American situation in the eyes of John Spanier who says:

The United States has exercised its hemispheric domination indirectly, usually by alliance with the wealthy landowning governing class ... The Monroe Doctrine had turned the southern part of the hemisphere into a US sphere of influence; the United States did not have to resort to direct colonial rule. Invested American capital spoke louder than guns, and the US government did not have to give political orders when a nation remained backward, undiversified and agrarian. ... Their livelihood was affected directly by the fluctuations of the business cycle, and by their sensitivity to American interests.¹⁷⁹

Trusteeship

One of the most crucial problems after World War II was the trusteeship system which was officially the responsibility of the United Nations Organisation. After the First World War certain territories previously held by the defeated powers were placed in the care of one or other of the victors, who were to act as international guardians. Under the Charter, the Security Council was responsible for all United Nations activities concerning Territories designated as "Strategic Areas" with the General Assembly being responsible for all other decolonisation matters.

However, here as in the other cases, it was up to TGP to designate the strategic areas, to determine the terms of the Trusteeship System and to administer the trust territories. In 1945 a number of mandated territories still existed. In addition, there were now some colonies previously governed by the Axis powers. In San Fransisco the sponsoring powers and France, formed a "Five Power Consultative Group" and started the long-delayed "preliminary" discussions on trusteeship. They finally came to an agreement in two parts: the first dealing with general policy and containing a statement of principles applicable to all non-self-governing territories, (Chapter XI) and the second dealing with the principles and machinery of a new trusteeship system applicable only to certain categories of non-self-governing territories (Chapter XII and XIII).

The Trusteeship Council was established to supervise the administration of these; all were to be known as trust territories. Each territory was placed in the trust of a member state accountable to the United Nations for the way in which it discharged its duties. Trusteeship was to be temporary, lasting only as long as it was needed to prepare the people of the mandated territory for self-government or independence, the preparation of which was to be the responsibility of the guardian power.

According to Articles 73 and 74, Members who assumed responsibility for the administration of such territories had recognised "the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount," had accepted as "a sacred trust the obligation to promote [this] to the utmost" and had also agreed that, in respect of these territories, their policies "no less than in respect of their

metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good neighbourliness.” According to the Charter, the trusteeship or the control of the strategic points around the world was originally intended to improve the standards of the inhabitants socially, economically, politically and to keep peace and security in the critical points of the world.

Nevertheless, in practice, Members could only renew their mandates as trusteeships which had been colonies in the 19th Century. The area of Great Powers’ influence in the 19th Century, which had been renamed as the area of interests after the First World War, was now translated into a psychologically more pleasant term: the area of responsibility. Initially, the trusteeship contained 750 million people in an area of 27 million square kilometres, eleven of which were trust territories. The major administering authorities were the United States, Britain and France.¹⁸⁰

In a similar fashion to the inter-war period the struggle over mandated or trust territories was not inspired by the declared Articles of the Charter. Forrestal the Secretary of Navy explains in his diary how he warned Truman that they should “not repeat the mistakes of 1918-19 when the formerly German-owned islands of the Pacific were turned over to Japan and Australia ... under a secret agreement between England and Japan without American knowledge until after it was a *fait accompli*.”¹⁸¹ But this had to be expressed in more logical terms: “the United States is to have the major responsibility for the Pacific Ocean security and if this premise is accepted there flows from it the acceptance of the fact that the United States must have the means with which to implement its responsibilities.”¹⁸²

Therefore the strategic areas of the Pacific had to be trusted to the USA. The Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, in respect of the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific was granted to the United States. As these islands were designated strategic areas, the Security Council approved this on 2 April 1947.¹⁸³ The territory which covers some 1,850 square kilometres of the Western Pacific north of the Equator had in 1973 a population of about 115,000. Known collectively as Micronesia, there were more than 2,100 islands and atolls and three major archipelagoes: the Marianas, the Carolines and the Marshals.

Table 2-5 Territories of Trust and Non-Self-Governing in 1979

Administering Power	Non-Self-Governing Territory	Trust Territory	Area (sq. km.)	Population
Australia	Cocos (Keeling) Islands		14	548
New Zealand	Tokelau		10	1,603
Portugal	East Timor		14,925	550,000
Spain	Western Sahara		266,000	117,000
U.K.	Bermuda		53	56,000
	British Virgin Islands		153	11,055
	Belize		22,965	136,000
	Cayman Islands		260	10,460
	Falkland Islands		11,961	1,905
	Brunei		5,765	147,000
	Antigua		443	70,000
	St. Lucia		616	108,000
	St. Vincent		389	100,000
	Gilbert Islands		684	52,000
	St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla		401	66,000
	Zimbabwe		390,580	6,400,000
	Montserrat		98	13,000
	St. Helena		122	5,056
	Turks and Caicos Islands		430	7,000
	Gibraltar		6	29,934
	Pitcairn		5	92
	Hong Kong*		919	4,500,000
U.K. & France	New Hebrides		14,763	101,070
U.N.O.	Namibia		824,296	852,000
U.S.A.	U.S. Virgin Islands		340	100,000
	American Samoa		197	30,900
	Guam		549	107,331
		Pacific Islands (Micronesia)	1,854	115,000
TOTAL:	27	1	1,558,798	13,688,954

* After 1972 information was no longer submitted to the UNO.

Source: United Nations, Everyone's United Nations, 9th ed., pp. 334-335.

Moreover, it is hard to believe that from the end of the World War II till 1979 the circumstances had not been appropriate for the right of the inhabitants to choose their way of life together with social, political and economic institutions of

their own. It is worth of bearing in mind that most of the so-called Trust and Non-Self-Governing territories freed from the trusteeship system, such as Indonesia, were those who had fought for their independence. Together with quite a few Non-Self-Governing Territories, Micronesia is still under the control of TGP. (See Table 2-5)

Besides the trusteeship system which was applied to the Non-Self-Governing Territories, the Great Powers initiated the régime of military base leases of important strategic points in areas of self-government. This policy was based on the idea that "if Germany moved a muscle" as Roosevelt said "she could be quickly stopped."¹⁸⁴ To this end the Americans wished "naval and air bases in the Pacific, the Philippines, Formosa, and perhaps some of the Japanese mandated islands," according to Hopkins.¹⁸⁵

It was at the Crimea Conference that Stalin in the most rigid secrecy stated his government wished to have "preservation of the *status quo* in outer Mongolia restoration of the Russian rights lost in the year 1904...[and] recovery of Southern Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it."¹⁸⁶ As Churchill explained, Stalin insisted at Potsdam that "if you find it impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could we not have a base at Dedeagatch?" Churchill added that he contented himself with saying "I will always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year round."¹⁸⁷

Disarmament

The other most crucial series of negotiations ever conducted to settle one of the most critical international problems after the Second World War was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as "a central element in [the US] ... policy toward the Soviet Union."¹⁸⁸ SALT I which was conducted by Nixon and Brezhnev in May 1972 had taken two and a half years to negotiate and incorporated two agreements.¹⁸⁹ According to these agreements the two powers agreed to hold further negotiations to formulate a final, overall strategic arms treaty. "SALT I" according to John Spanier "was to be the beginning of a process, a continuing dialogue and effort to control the arms competition."¹⁹⁰ The further meeting of Brezhnev and Ford, in 1974 at Vladivostok, initiated guidelines for further a reduction of arms which led to the signature of SALT II agreements by Brezhnev and Carter in 1979.

In nearly all the important cases of global tension since the Second World War, regardless of whether they were part of the Cold War or deterrence period, TGP had to satisfy themselves with a compromise solution or compensation if the

former was not possible. In many cases thus occurred after a confrontation at the level of conventional weapons; in some after skirmishes; and in others only after a period of high tension in their diplomatic relations.

Conclusion

The system of International relations, as examined in Chapters 1 and 2 of this part, has undergone a number of changes since the 19th century, but the basic characteristics of the system, especially with regard to the non Great Power world, remained unchanged. The transformation of a traditional European system of states into the world-wide system formally linked together by universal institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, the increase in number of dependent states, the increasing tendency of democratisation and socialisation covering almost every branch of political, economic, strategic, social and cultural activities proceeding within the modern state, were all changes which had important effects on the international system.

However, the actual leadership of the system though informal, remained in the hands of TGP in the form of the Commission of Ten and the League Council in interwar period. It was therefore rather a continuation of the old Concert of Europe than the creation of a new system, with the exception that two non-European Great Powers took the place of the three defeated European powers. The major feature of the Pre-World War I international system remained: the strong Great Power concert in opposition to many small scattered powers. Compromise among Great Powers enabled them to continue to regulate the rivalry over the small powers.

In the Post-World War II era too, the proposed United Nations' system of collective security proved to be ineffective. It could not maintain unity among nations, particularly among the Great Powers, and it failed to keep international peace and security through its collective proceedings. The Charter too, like the Covenant, registered the predominant position of TGP which they already possessed during the two world wars. The Charter understated the actual disequilibrium of power between the great and smaller nations, but the United Nations by itself had no greater success than TGP, whether alone or in cooperation with each other. This fact had overridden the responsibilities of the United Nations as an ultimate system of collective security. In practice, with the failure of the collective security system to work, the process of conducting the international system remained in the hands of TGP. Regardless of the cold war or detente and the Great Powers' differences in ideology and national interests, they had to always keep themselves in concert with each other either inside the United Nations, in the Security Council, or outside, in their consultations at the summit meetings.

This concert would help prevent direct confrontation as well as pave the way for dividing their sphere of influence. As in 19th century where the Great Powers expanded their areas of influence to their overseas colonies, in the modern era of international relations the areas of special interests were always intended to be extended to their areas of direct and indirect influence. Despite the existence of the United Nations, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Far East remained under TGP's aegis and sphere. The unequal power of nations in terms of international relations and the Great Power's concert to control the international system together provide one of the three factors which in my opinion have made the Great Power rivalry in the smaller countries inevitable. In the Part II the internal situation of a smaller state (Iran in this study) in this international situation will be discussed.

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- ¹ For the text of these Armistice treaties refer to J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 38.
 - ² E. M. House, "The Versailles Peace in Retrospect," p. 435.
 - ³ D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 3.
 - ⁴ R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, pp. 352-353.
 - ⁵ W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 74.
 - ⁶ D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 118.
 - ⁷ Ibid., pp. 101-118.
 - ⁸ J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 41.
 - ⁹ H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, pp. 118-120.
 - ¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 146-149.
 - ¹¹ J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 40.
 - ¹² P. Birdsall, *Versailles: Twenty Years After*, p. 15.
 - ¹³ United Nations, *Everyone's United Nations*, p. 5.
 - ¹⁴ Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 37-38.
 - ¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 38-39.
 - ¹⁶ H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 105.
 - ¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 149-151.
 - ¹⁸ R. Russel, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 128-144.
 - ¹⁹ Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, p. 39.
 - ²⁰ For details of this planning refer to I. Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, p. 52.
 - ²¹ H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 244.
 - ²² Ibid., p. 240.
 - ²³ Ibid., p. 245.
 - ²⁴ R. Russel, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 150-153; H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, pp. 248-253.
 - ²⁵ Ibid., p. 277.
 - ²⁶ Ibid., pp. 253-264.

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- 27 Ibid., p. 277.
- 28 R. Russel, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 160.
- 29 H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 257-269.
- 30 For details refer to R. Russel, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 205-401.
- 31 H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 429.
- 32 For the full text of the draft proposal refer to Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 40-48. For the debates of the participants refer to H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, pp. 430-436.
- 33 Ibid., pp. 436-437.
- 34 Ibid., p. 393.
- 35 W. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy*, p 74.
- 36 Ibid., pp. 129-137.
- 37 Ibid., p. 181.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 For details of the discussions refer to Ibid., pp. 197-212.
- 40 H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 549.
- 41 Ibid., p. 551. For the text of the Yalta protocol refer to Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 49-50
- 42 Ibid., p. 49.
- 43 H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 554.
- 44 Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, p. 50; H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 556.
- 45 For details of the work of the Five Power Consultative Group and their agreement on Trusteeship refer to R. Russel, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, pp. 808-842.
- 46 Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, p. 49.
- 47 For details of the discussions refer to W. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 302-353.
- 48 For the text of the agreements refer to Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, p. 50.
- 49 W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 77.
- 50 H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919*, p. 101.
- 51 I. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 56.
- 52 W. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 562.
- 53 G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 40.
- 54 Ibid, p. 67.
- 55 D. F. Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920*, p. 18.
- 56 G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 36.
- 57 R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 362.
- 58 F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 138.
- 59 M. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History*, pp. 526-527.
- 60 For the text of Yalta Declaration refer to Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, p. 49.

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- ⁶¹ For details refer to United Nations, *Press Release*, 22 May 1992.
- ⁶² W. Jenks, *The World Beyond the Charter*, p. 93.
- ⁶³ G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 22.
- ⁶⁴ W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 76.
- ⁶⁵ D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 276.
- ⁶⁶ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 145.
- ⁶⁷ W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 76.
- ⁶⁸ R. Russel, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 964.
- ⁶⁹ F.S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *A Hundred Years of International Relations*, 261; J. Murphy, *The United Nations and the Control of International Violence*, p. 31.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- ⁷² For details refer to Ahmed M. Rifaat, *International Aggression*, pp. 229-262.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 279.
- ⁷⁴ B. B. Ferencz, *Defining International Aggression*, vol. 2, p. 15.
- ⁷⁵ For the text of the definition of aggression and some comment refer to B. B. Ferencz, *Defining International Aggression*, vol. 2, pp. 14-53; Ahmed M. Rifaat, *International Aggression*, pp. 264-277.
- ⁷⁶ B. B. Ferencz, *Defining International Aggression*, vol. 2, p. 53.
- ⁷⁷ J. Stone, *Conflict Through Consensus*, p. 139.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-152; A. Cassese, *The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force*, pp. 9-167.
- ⁷⁹ For more details refer to the L. M. Goodrich and A. P. Simons, "The Rise and Fall of the Military Staff Committee," pp. 219-225.
- ⁸⁰ H. V. Evatt, *The United Nations*, p. 53.
- ⁸¹ See Appendices for more details. For details of the origin of the issue, Security Council's action on membership, political questions and situations and organisational matters of the United Nations and its operations refer to Anjali V. Patil, *The UN Veto in World Affairs, 1946-1990*, pp. 19-457.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 458.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*
- ⁸⁴ Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, *Review of the United Nations Charter*, p. 37.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- ⁸⁶ J. Grenville and W. Bernard, *The Major International Treaties Since 1945*, p. 28.
- ⁸⁷ L. M. Goodich and others, *Charter of the United Nations*, p. 547, quoted in J. Murphy, *The United Nations and the Control of International Violence*, p. 16.
- ⁸⁸ *International Court of Justice*, pp. 104-107.
- ⁸⁹ I. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 73.
- ⁹⁰ R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 364.
- ⁹¹ W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 79.
- ⁹² R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 368; Paul Birdsall, *Versailles: Twenty Years After*, p. 295.
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

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- ⁹⁴ G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 166.
- ⁹⁵ Quoted in G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 22.
- ⁹⁶ D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 101.
- ⁹⁷ H. Grimal, *Decolonization*, pp. 14-18.
- ⁹⁸ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 194; D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires*, p. 235.
- ⁹⁹ J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, pp. 51-54.
- ¹⁰⁰ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 194.
- ¹⁰¹ D. H. Popper, *The Puzzle of Palestine*, P. 31.
- ¹⁰² Ibid., p. 31.
- ¹⁰³ H. Grimal, *Decolonization*, p. 17.
- ¹⁰⁴ R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 379.
- ¹⁰⁵ Fisher, quoted in H. Grimal, *Decolonization*, p. 15.
- ¹⁰⁶ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 107 and J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 49; W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 77.
- ¹⁰⁷ H. Grimal, *Decolonization*, p. 18.
- ¹⁰⁸ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 139.
- ¹⁰⁹ R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 375.
- ¹¹⁰ H. Grimal, *Decolonization*, p. 13.
- ¹¹¹ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 131.
- ¹¹² Ibid., pp. 128-129; J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 54.
- ¹¹³ F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 130.
- ¹¹⁴ J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 54.
- ¹¹⁵ D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, pp. 276-277.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 277.
- ¹¹⁷ W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 77.
- ¹¹⁸ For the attitude of the US government towards peace activities on the American continent by the League, refer to G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 119-174.
- ¹¹⁹ R. Albricht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, p. 358; F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, pp. 97-98.
- ¹²⁰ W. R. Keylor, *Twentieth-Century World*, p. 90.
- ¹²¹ M. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History*, p. 465.
- ¹²² H. Grimal, *Decolonization*, p. 143.
- ¹²³ A. G. Mazour, *Russia: Tsarist and Communist*, pp. 639-641.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 641.
- ¹²⁵ M. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History*, p. 465.
- ¹²⁶ G. Schwarzenberger, *The League of Nations and World Order*, p. 39.
- ¹²⁷ A. G. Mazour, *Russia: Tsarist and Communist*, p. 639.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 639.
- ¹²⁹ M. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History*, p. 473.

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- 130 For details refer to F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *Hundred Years of International Relations*, pp. 157-160; Quincy Wright, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute of 1931-1933," pp. 91-108; Alfred Zimmern, "The Italo-Ethiopian dispute of 1935-1936," pp. 125-136.
- 131 H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 272.
- 132 W. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 350-352.
- 133 Yalta Documents 666, quoted in H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 553.
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- ¹⁷⁰ F.S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *A Hundred Years of International Relations*, p. 251.
- ¹⁷¹ G. J. Leuan, "From a Divided to a United Germany," p. 20.
- ¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 38-39.
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- ¹⁷⁵ As Grenville explains: the British "Prime Minister Eden wanted no signed agreement as evidence that might be found later of a conspiracy. Nevertheless, a senior Foreign office representative was prevailed upon by the French and Israelis at Sèvres to sign a secret protocol of their negotiations which in effect set out an agreed timetable for Israeli, French and British joint military operations." For details refer to J. Grenville and W. Bernard, *The Major International Treaties Since 1945*, p. 350.
- ¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 350.
- ¹⁷⁷ E. Kaufman has provided a comparative analysis of the superpower's behaviour in their spheres of direct influence in the Eastern Europe and Latin America. See Edy Kaufman, *The Super Powers and Their Spheres of Influence*, pp. 21-46.
- ¹⁷⁸ B. Dymtryshyn and J. B. Gilmore, *The Monroe Doctrine: A Soviet View*, quoted in Edy Kaufman, *The Super Powers and Their Spheres of Influence*, p. 41.
- ¹⁷⁹ J. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, p. 150.
- ¹⁸⁰ See Appendices.
- ¹⁸¹ W. Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 137.
- ¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 61.
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- ¹⁸⁴ H. Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 273.
- ¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 271.
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- ¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 579.
- ¹⁸⁸ Department of State, *United States Foreign Policy*, p. 23.
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Part II

Anatomy of Power in Iran 1921-1979

The second factor, in addition to the inequality of states at the international level, which has the way for the Great Power rivalry in smaller powers, is the instability and vulnerability of the latter *vis-à-vis* the great powers. Iranian anatomy of power in general and the structure of its government in particular will be discussed in this Part as a single case study which consists of two chapters each devoted to one period. Chapter III will discuss the anatomy of power in Iran during Reza's period and Chapter IV will deal with the same subject in that of Muhammad Reza's.

In each chapter the general situation in which the Shahs came to power, their personal characteristics which were determining factors in their decisions; their behaviour towards the opposition consisting of self-autonomous, communist, religious and democratic movements; the structure of their governments, and finally the economy of the country will be examined.

Chapter III

Reza Shah's Rule; 1921-1941

In studying the structure of power in Iran, it is also necessary to investigate the situation in which Reza came to power and the basis of his rule. His personal characteristics were also important in his dealing with the opposition and his running of both the internal and foreign decision-making units.

Since the time of Reza Khan's coup on 22 February in 1921, almost 5 years before he could legalise his own monarchy, he established his rule on the basis of despotism and dictatorship.¹ He began his program of expanding and modernising the government administration with no attention to any party and did not allow any to emerge as he was not in favour of them. The only party which received permission was *Hezb-i Iran Now*, the New Iran Party, headed by the Court Minister, Teimur Tash, but as soon as Reza found the party was a power base for its leader not the Shah, it was dissolved.² The opposition groups including Muslim clergy and self-autonomous minorities, communists, and even some of his sincere colleagues, all of whom stood in the way of his modernisation process, were brutally suppressed. The effectiveness of the suppression and application of centralisation to a country in chaos was, no doubt, due to the personal characteristics of Reza himself.

A Monarchy Built on Chaos

The foreign intervention which had started with the rivalry of the British and Russian Empires to gain influence in Iran was disrupted after the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, when the movement was to establish the rule of law and to unify the country, after which Iran suffered a continuous series of civil wars as well as foreign intervention for about fifteen years.

On the outbreak of the First World War in Europe, Iran declared itself neutral;³ but its neutrality was violated and it became a battleground. In 1914, Ottoman troops, aiming to seize control of the oil pipelines in the western parts of Iran especially Khuzistan,⁴ which was under control of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), occupied Azarbaijan. By 1915 German agents had achieved significant success in organising tribal resistance against Britain in southern Iran. Moreover, as Avery claims, Prince Reuss, the German Minister in Iran, "was negotiating secretly"

with the Prime Minister regarding Iran's membership in the Central Powers' Alliance.⁵

To meet these threats and to hold the Caucasus where the oil-fields of Baku were situated and to protect Indian supplies, British and Russian forces invaded Iran in 1915. Furthermore, each established a large body of local recruits under its officers. They expanded the Cossock Brigade to a division and established the South Persian Rifles (SPR). Therefore, by 1915 Iran was occupied by the Turks in the north-west, by the Russians in the north, and by the British in the east and the south.

Although Iran was still known as *Shahanshahi*, Empire of Iran, the Iranian government was extremely weak and poor, so that Tehran could make no effective decisions and could not exercise authority over the rest of the country. "In the provinces," Banani affirms "the consulates of Russia and Britain and the British-owned telegraph offices were the real seats of power."⁶ The Iranian National Consultant Assembly, the *Majlis*, had been dissolved on 24 December 1911 by the Russian ultimatum and did not reconvene until 1 November 1914.⁷ The third *Majlis* came to an end shortly after the outbreak of the war which forced the *Majlis* into a long recess lasting until June 1921. Several cabinets were formed briefly, one after the other, the longest one being that of Vosuqoddowleh which lasted for about 11 months (from August 1919 till June 1920). The government lacked an "administratively efficient political organisation"⁸ and according to Shuster there were no "civil services."⁹

From an economic point of view, Iran had always been close to the margin of financial subsistence. Natural resources were practically untouched and revenue which was basically derived from the customs tariffs, internal taxes and the oil royalties was inadequate to meet the needs of the country. The customs revenue which represented almost half of the nation's revenue was built on the forced imposition of "free trade" as Avery names it, basically from the treaty of Turkomanchai with Russia in 1828 and then according to the principle of most favoured nations, from treaties with other European countries. Consequently, Iran imposed a duty of no more than 5 to 8 per cent on foreign imports. This revenue was so limited that it "became dangerously near to defeating its own object."¹⁰

There had never been a budget before the arrival of the first American financial mission in 1911 and up to 1921 most of the revenue was collected and spent by the provincial governors independent of the central government.¹¹ As a result the country faced an increasing deficit from about \$400,000 in 1911¹² to approximately \$3.5 million in 1923.¹³ The country lacked a united national army of

its own. The two Iranian forces, the Cossack Division and the Gendarmerie were headed by Russian Commanders and Swedish officers. Neither of them were sufficiently capable of keeping domestic order let alone of defending the country against outside invasion.

On 26 February 1917, the Turkish troops started to evacuate the occupied province and following the October revolution in Russia, the Russian troops withdrew in July 1917.¹⁴ In this way, the British troops were left alone in the field to fill the vacuum. They moved into northern Iran and constituted the only significant force, the North Persian Force (NORPERFORCE) for the maintenance of order in the that area. According to J. M. Balfour, the British Minister in Tehran, besides the expenses of the SPR which were borne by the British and Indian governments, the regular expenses of the Persian government were being met "to a significant extent by monthly advances amounting to 225,000 pounds, including a sum for the upkeep of the Cossack Division."¹⁵

Iranian statesmen were different in their attitudes. Beside those who were accustomed to the use of foreign connections for their personal ends, some who had more honourable intentions were in favour of the fact that the national interests could be secured by cooperation with a particular foreign power. Consequently, they were known as Opportunists, Anglophiles, Russophiles, Germanophiles or Patriots.

On 9 August 1919 Vosuqoddowleh, the Prime Minister, in return for a loan from Britain, signed an agreement by virtue of which Britain was to become responsible for the organization of the Iranian army and treasury and a number of British advisers were to assist in the work of various Iranian government departments.¹⁶ The agreement provided for the virtual military and financial protection over the country as a result of which patriots revolted in Gilan and Azarbaijan against the new plot of the Anglophiles and installed autonomous governments.¹⁷ Rebellions in Kashan and Isfahan followed and tribal chiefs were also in control over much of Kurdistan, Khuzistan and Baluchestan.

Revolutionary Russia sent envoys to Tehran to apologise for past Russian misdeeds and to promise compensation,¹⁸ but soon realised there was a British dominance in Iran. The Red Army supporting the Gilan revolution, invaded northern Iran in May 1920 and in November sent an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of British troops.¹⁹ The prospect of disorder was so strong that British civilians were advised in January 1920 to leave the country.²⁰ Therefore Vos uqoddowleh was abandoned and Lord Curzon's policy, of making Iran a well-adjusted partner of

Britain in Asia,²¹ was repudiated. There was no choice left to the British except to encourage a coup (see Chapter 5).

In this way, as soon as the British relinquished their control over the Cossacks in 22 February 1921, Reza Khan arranged a coup d'état which brought him to power first as the Chief Commander of the Cossacks and then as the Minister of War in April of that year. He became the Prime Minister in October 1923 and finally on 31 October 1925, received the title of *ShahanShah*, King of Kings of Iran.

In sum, the domestic situation of Iran before the Coup d'état was in chaos. Foreign intervention together with maladministration were aggravated by civil wars, the First World War and by the subsequent economic depression. During the war, the country was overrun by foreigners, a portion of the territory was devastated and the government thrown into chaos.

Some Personal Characteristics of the Shah

There is little known concerning Reza's life before the coup. According to a document in his military file,²² he was born on 15 March 1878²³ in *Alasht*, a small village lying in the mountains between Firouzkouh and the Caspian Sea. His parentage was modest, from the lower strata of the military class. He lost his father, a Cossack Colonel, when he was only forty days old and his grand father was killed later in a fight with the Afghan rebels.

Following his father's career, which was usual for youths, Reza entered the Cossack Brigade of Tehran in 1889.²⁴ He was promoted several times reaching the highest rank as Colonel in 20 September 1920. On 22 February 1921 he was nominated Commander of the Cossack Division and chance plunged him into the political arena.

From the physical point of view, he was unusually tall for an Iranian (1.96 m) and in general "an extraordinary phenomenon."²⁵ He possessed everything that made him outstanding and won him the support of the hero-worshipping lower classes. In this regard, Melvin Hall who had once an interview with him wrote:

He was a big man, physically powerful, large-featured, with cold brown eyes set in a greyish face. There was little humour in that face, no trace of human kindness. It was an immobile face that very rarely smiled but could express the savage temper he often loosed."²⁶

His personal morals were above reproach. However, he was "strong willed and impatient, quick-tempered and uncouth."²⁷ He occasionally took advantage of opportunities to offend the position of the clergy and of zealots, as basically he was apathetic to religion.²⁸ Describing his second mission, Millspaugh affirms that:

“when I knew Reza, it seemed to me that he was unmoral, rather than immoral.”²⁹ In a country where alcohol was banned and religiously considered unclean, he had the habit of drinking a glass of five-year Koniok every day at 6 pm and a glass of red and white wine in case he could not sleep.³⁰ Towards foreigners he was very suspicious so that the representations of the British and Soviet governments could not influence him even if they could ever reach him.³¹

He lived simply, almost austere and without ostentation.³² Reza married four women, two of them at one time. Nevertheless he did not like to live with his wives; he had been indifferent to females since he was 35, about 5 years before the coup.³³ He loved the army uniform so much that he was never seen in public in any other form of clothes and his uniform was specially distinguished from the usual uniforms. Von Blucher, the German Minister in Iran wrote down his observations after a presentation of his credentials to the Shah:

I saw opposite me a tall man in military uniform. Heavily-built and with broad shoulders, he stood erect, both hands in his broad leather belt. He wore a plain uniform, consisting of a yellowish-brown blouse which almost reached his knees and blue riding britches. Heavy high boots, a curved sword and a kepi, which he kept on, completed his outfit. Across his chest ran a ribbon of an order and aside from that there were two or three simple decorations. I could discover no insignia of rank ... On the Herculean body was a head which was highly interesting and bore a certain resemblance to that of a bird of prey.”³⁴

Reza's native language was Persian, though he had picked up a smattering of Russian and Turkish in the course of his service, but in none of these languages did he receive an adequate formal education. This is why he seldom made public speeches and if it was essential for him to do so, they never extended for more than a minute. Of his intelligence, Banani wrote: “He possessed a keen mind, an excellent memory and an unusual ability to absorb information and briefings even if of highly technical nature.”³⁵

Nevertheless, he wrote no articles and left no political testament which could be considered his program or a specific ideology, although nationalism was a great source of power for him against religion and religious leaders. He was not, therefore, the leader of an organised or ideologically based movement, he was only the product of the lack of such movements in the country. The practice of terror as natural means for the realisation of his ideas was quite usual. Von Blucher in his writing tells of an incident when the Shah knocked down a Turkoman rider at the Tehran races, in the presence of the entire diplomatic corps.³⁶

Reza, who at first seemed to be not only the last choice but also the best choice to “affect the fate of his country so greatly,”³⁷ by putting Iran on its feet, developed a voracious greed as he grew in power and became very suspicious

and ill-tempered. During his reign thousands were illegally imprisoned and hundreds were murdered, some the latter by his own order.³⁸

Pervasive Movements in Opposition

As soon as Reza came to power, he was preoccupied with the primary task of suppressing revolts and restoring order and governmental authority throughout the country. There was a complete absence of the western type of political party. "There are various groups in *Majlis*," (the Parliament), Millsaugh wrote, "but these groups do not extend outside the *Majlis* and except for their parliamentary leaders, they have no organisation".³⁹ Those which were active outside the *Majlis* had not developed naturally but had been either created or banned by the government and did not represent a useful basis for the political opposition of that time. What remained were informal groups that raised their voice against the existing political system.

In a series of apparently successful campaigns, Reza was able to put down all the most outspoken political opposition: self-autonomous revolts, communists, religious and democratic movement. He used military action, imprisonment and murder, methods revealed his character.

Self-Autonomous Revolts

In 1921 when Sayyid Zia, the Prime Minister and one designer of the 1921 coup, decided to arrest all Qajar aristocrats, he sent a letter to Colonel Taqhi Khan, the chief of Gendarmerie in Khorasan asking him to arrest Qavamosaltaneh, his superior in the government of Khorasan and send him as a prisoner to the Sayyid. But after Qavamossaltaneh became Prime Minister, the Colonel rejected the central government and manoeuvred into a position of rebellion. In KermanShah the Qajar Governor, Saremoddowleh, established control over his state. Kuchik Khan and the Soviet-organised Jounghlies who had declared the Soviet Republic of Gilan started their march toward Tehran to liberate the whole country from the prison of the British troops.⁴⁰

Sheikh Khaz'al of Mohammareh who "had for years been a good friend" of Britain, providing sufficient security for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the field had been given assurances by the Britain *vis-à-vis* the intentions of the central government.⁴¹ Sheikh Khaz'al, now together with other Arab chiefs in Khuzistan, was against Reza Khan and refused to obey the central government. Turks, Lurs, Kurds, Balouchis, Qashqa'is and Bakhtiyaris also revolted.⁴²

Reza's response to all these rebellions was military operation on a large scale. He himself commanded the military operation in Gilan and Khuzistan. Colonel Taqi Khan and Kuchik Khan were killed and the rebellions were suppressed with extreme brutality. The tribal populations were forced to abandon their customary practices of roaming and to bow down to conscription, disarmament and permanent settlement. For the nomadic tribes it was the beginning of the end. Martial law was established in the areas to cope with their periodic rebellions. The tribal chiefs were taken away and kept under house arrest in the capital. Many of them, such as Sheikh Khaz'al, died under suspicious circumstances and those who survived, like Khosrow Khan Qashqa'i, were not released until they abdicated. Although state lands were made available and free seed was distributed among the tribes to encourage modes of agriculture rather than herding, because the army and the gendarmerie were in charge of the distribution, the tribes could not expect any other treatment than brutality.

As a result of this persecution and fear Reza's government had no legitimacy among the tribal population. In August 1941 when the tribal chiefs were released, a terrible revenge was exacted on government troops in the areas. Avery affirms that "fifty settlements were at once destroyed and abandoned."⁴³ Tribal leaders free of Reza Shah's restrictions, returned to their traditional lands, resumed their traditional wanderings, rearmed themselves with weapons captured from government arsenals or purchased from deserters and finally re-established their traditional self-autonomous authority.

Communists

Communists were another major opposition group which aimed to overthrow Reza Shah's dictatorship and establish a workers' and peasants' government in Iran. This group, which was inspired by Revolutionary Russia, held its first meeting at Anzali in June 1920. They showed at first a firm resistance in northern Iran to the events in the Soviet Republic of Gilan, but after a defeat suffered at the hands of Reza Khan's troops, went underground in Azarbaijan and Khorasan. Some returned to Tehran to lead trade-union activities. They had enough freedom to celebrate Labour Day with public meetings until 1930. In that year George Agabekov, the Soviet resident general of the Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (GPU)⁴⁴, the Soviet State Security Service in Iran from 1927 until 1929, sought asylum in France. He published a series of articles describing the secrets of Soviet espionage in Iran and included the name of the Iranian agents of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ In the aftermath all active communists were arrested.

The industrial working class was also discontented because of their low wages, long hours, high consumer taxes and general slave-like labour conditions. The trade-unions were banned, but on Labour Day in 1929, about eleven thousand workers in the oil refinery went on strike to protest against the bad working conditions. The reaction of the government was again to arrest a great number of workers.

A Bill was passed by the *Majlis* in 1932 to prohibit any individual plotting to overthrow the government by force. The struggle continued between the communists and industrial workers, accompanied by students, and the police.⁴⁶ As a result, the communist leaders and strike organisers were jailed until 1941 and some of them such as Dr. Arani died in prison. Later, on 30 January 1942, these freed communists constituted the nucleus of the *Tudeh* Party (the Party of Masses.)

Religious Movement

As has been mentioned, Reza was indifferent toward religion, although he was nominally and officially Muslim. He did not hide his hostility towards the religious leaders, who had a great role in and influence over people's affairs and government institutions. Religious leaders were not clearly organised and only a few of them were interested in political activities. But Reza Shah's reforms were so extensive and radical that almost all found themselves in a position of dissatisfaction and protest.

There were two official systems of law, the *Shari'at*, a system of canon law which had jurisdiction in matters of personal status and *Orf*, a customary law of a more secular order, which was supposed to operate in cases involving the state. As the former system had acquired almost entire legal authority, the judicial system was tied completely to the religious leaders.

In the education system, which was not quite under government supervision, the religious leaders had obtained almost exclusive rights to run the private schools such as *Howzeh* or *Maktab*. Moreover they were strong in the *Majlis* and exercised an extreme influence on public opinion so that for example a simple sentence released by a *Marja'a-i Taqlid*, high religious leader, could cause a public uprising which led to banning the consumption of tobacco in 1890.

Reza, aware of this, had decided to put an end to the position of the religious leaders. Mudarris, the famous religious leader and the most popular representative in the *Majlis*, was exiled and then murdered. Avery describes an event which shows clearly the degree of Shah's hostility toward them:

Early in [1928] ... the Queen ... inadvertently let her veil slip to show part of her face during a ceremony in the Shrine Mosque at Qum. The officiating preacher denounced her for it. The Shah was in Qum the next day with two armoured cars and a party of troops on call. He entered the Mosque without taking his boots off and thrashed the Mulla."⁴⁷

In order to disestablish the religious authority and weaken the people's religious emotions and loyalty, he first instituted a judicial system, which was largely inspired by the Code Napoleon. With regard to education, he established modern schools around the country and made literacy compulsory. According to his own political bias, great emphasis was placed on nationalist propaganda, which modelled pre-Islamic Iran⁴⁸ and modernisation aiming at Western social and industrial reforms.⁴⁹

In this way the religious leaders were cut off from both education and judicial systems. Several laws were made to prohibit people from practicing certain religious customs, such as men wearing traditional headdresses or to enforce certain secular behaviours, such as women not wearing *chador*. Pre-Islamic thought together with the westernisation of the society caused huge clashes in the traditional society of Iran.⁵⁰ The greatest clash was the popular protest in Mashhad against the new secularisation policies, especially the dress laws for women. The army units violated the sanctuary of the Shrine of Imam and killed 25 and wounded about 40 civilians.⁵¹

Consequently not only the religious leaders but ordinary Muslims also could not support for Reza Shah's reforms and as history proved later in 1941, they constituted one of the active opposition political groups. They advocated a repeal of Reza Shah's secular legislation and a pan-Islamic alliance against the West. The economic problems represented the last factor causing dissatisfied people to prefer foreign occupation of the country rather than tolerate or support the existing order.

Democratic Movement

In addition to the above mentioned groups which had their own reasons to protest against Reza Shah's policies, there was a spontaneous movement that in my view took its inspiration from radically different sources. I would call this the democratic movement as it reacted generally against dictatorship. This movement included the press, certain urban and rural citizens, and certain modern middle class citizens, including those statesmen who had for a long time served the new order.

As the quality of the printed media and their circulation were very poor, they had become the lever of personal enmities for those who paid them well enough. Reza Khan and his dictatorship were unused to the press and had to cope with it.

As soon as he came to power, he adopted less expensive measures, in accordance with his general policy. In this regard Avery writes:

The director of one paper had his teeth knocked out. The editor of Sitareh-yi-Iran was severely whipped. The editor of Vatan, Mirza Hashim Khan, was attacked by soldiers and left more dead than alive ... 'Ishqi, the poet, was murdered.'⁵²

The urban and rural people were strongly opposed not only to the secular laws, but also to the conscription of youth into the military and the high consumer taxes. As there was no safety valve, their violent opposition to the régime burst into the open in 1926-27 and again in 1935-36. The modern middle class, which had supported the régime energetically to create the new order during the early 1930s - particularly the pacification of the tribes, the secularisation of the society and the centralisation of the state, lost much of their enthusiasm. They saw that their enthusiasm had "intensified his [the Shah's] quest for dynastic wealth, caused widespread inflation with his military expenditures and concentrated power in his own hands by banning all political parties."⁵³

Teimur Tash, the Minister of Court and Firouz Mirza, the Minister of Finance, were arrested, accused of espionage and bribery and murdered. Davar, the Minister of Justice committed suicide, in anticipation of being murdered. Taqizadeh lost his ambassadorship to Paris. Soleyman Iskandari, governor of Kerman was forced to retire. Farrokhi, the outspoken poet, died in a prison hospital and Kasravi lost his provincial judgeship. It was not only the political prisoners, but their families as well experienced the brutality of his dictatorship. Dr. Abdo, the Attorney General, explains how the police, under the Shah's order, had put the whole families of political prisoners, even for example including a dumb daughter, in jail.⁵⁴ By 1937, therefore, few of the early reformers remained in power in public life.⁵⁵

All in all, towards the end of Reza Shah's reign most people with different group interests found themselves in opposition to the Shah and his government. Reza's astonishing loss of nerve in the face of the Allied invasion of Iran may be explained in terms of his complete lack of any popular power base. As Mohsen Sadr, his one-time Justice Minister and confidant, put it:

His links with the nation had been severed to such an extent that when foreign troops took him away as a captive, the people not only showed no sorrow but rejoiced in his departure and congratulated each other, and in no way must this be taken as proof of the disloyalty of the Iranian people.⁵⁶

The way he chose to stand against these opposition groups was always the same: he used brutal, selfish and martial methods. Reza's methods destroyed both possible leaders and anybody's capacity for leadership. It was as if he had

followed the advice given to the Greek dictators, to go through the wheat-field and lop off all the heads that rose above the rest. However these methods could not be effective if there was no centralised bureaucracy.

Military Government

Article 27 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law (dated 8 October 1907), had divided “the powers of the State” into three categories: first “the legislative power” to make and modify the laws; “the Judicial power” to determine the rights belonging exclusively to the ecclesiastical and civil tribunals; and last, “the executive power.” These powers were to “remain separate and distinct from one another.”(Article 28)

According to the Constitutional Law (dated 30 December 1906), the National Consultative Assembly, *Majlis*, had “the right in all questions to examine and discuss, ... ruling by the majority, in complete security and confidence, whatever it considers in the interests of the country and the nation.” (Article 15) It was its exclusive authority to approve “all laws necessary for the consolidation of the foundations of the State and of the Throne for the regulation of the affairs of the country and for the establishment of ministries,” (Article 16) to draft “such Bills as may be necessary for the creation, modification, completion or repeal of existing laws,” (Article 17) and to regulate “financial questions, adjustment of the budget, changes in taxation, the acceptance or rejection of duties, charges and new assessments instituted by the Government.” (Article 18)

Although, according to Article 27, the legislative power was “derived from the king, the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate” and the laws were only to come into force when they had been approved by the Senate and signed by the Shah, (Article 17) the approval of the *Majlis* was maintained as necessary for “all transfers or sales of the revenues or properties of the State or the country, and for all modifications of the frontiers of the country” (Article 22). Grants of “any concession for the creation of any kind of company and public partnership,” (Article 23) or “conclusion of treaties and agreements, the granting of commercial, industrial, agricultural or other concessions (monopolies), whether the concessionaire is a national or a foreigner,” (Article 24) and “State loans at home or abroad” (Article 25) were also subject to the authorisation and approval of the *Majlis*.

One of the most important institutions to influence the Executive was Question Time. This opportunity to make ministers of the cabinet in “violation or negligence in the application of the laws” to appear in the *Majlis* and answer oral or written questions (Article 27) was designed by the Constitution as a form of

debate, as a means of criticism and as a source of information. Moreover, the *Majlis* could re-enforce the law by “a majority vote of three fourths of the members present in the Capital,” when the Shah, “without ever having the power to delay or postpone their enforcement” had withheld his signatures from Bills passed by the *Majlis* and returned the laws for re-examination.⁵⁷

With regard to the Executive, it was not given many formal powers. Article 27 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law had reserved to the King the way the laws and decrees were to be carried out by “the Ministers and State officials,” and their activities were restricted “in such manner as the Law defines.” The ministers being “appointed and dismissed by the decree of the King,” (Article 46) were responsible to the two Chambers individually and collectively (Articles 60-61) and each Chamber could “call Ministers to account and bring them to trial,” (Article 65) or declare itself dissatisfied with the Cabinet or a Minister by a full majority of votes. In this case the Cabinet or Minister was to be “considered as dismissed.” (Article 67) After the coup d'état and the change of dynasty in Iran, the constitution remained the fundamental law (except the Articles 36, 37, 38 and 40 concerning the Qajar dynasty that were modified) and the constitutional king was subject to it.

Reza did not annul the Constitution, substitute decrees for laws, close the *Majlis* or abolish the cabinet. All survived according to the Constitution, but in practice, he acted completely as he felt necessary, even if it was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. In practice, however, it was for the first time that government was able to apply its sovereignty over society effectively through extensive instruments of administration, regulation and domination. Without a consolidated power, Reza could never hope to embark upon his ambitious program of social, cultural and economic reforms. Therefore it is necessary to look beyond the constitution and deal with Reza's practical conduct, in other words, his military bureaucracy.

Right after the coup d'état, even though he was not the legal supreme power, he applied practically any measure he saw fit in his clashes with Seyyid Zia, the coup Prime Minister who then went in exile from Iran,⁵⁸ and even with Muhammad Hassan Mirza, the Crown Prince.⁵⁹ When Reza came on to the political scene of Iran the fourth *Majlis* was in session. There were held nine more *Majlises*, until he left the country. From the fifth *Majlis* Reza's influence on candidates started and except for those from the capital all candidates were obedient to him. By the time of the seventh *Majlis* inaugurated in 1921, the Representatives were all elected by his consent.⁶⁰ Only the twelfth *Majlis* raised its voice and that was when he had

already resigned in 17 September 1941. In this regard, Millspaugh's comment is worth considering:

Elections took place, but the Shah controlled them. The puppet Parliament, cowed and corrupted, passed laws in due form, but strictly in accordance with the King's orders. The Prime Minister and ministers took their appointments and instructions from Reza and resigned at his bidding. He destroyed such freedom of the press as had previously existed, as well as freedom of speech and of assembly.⁶¹

He attended personally to the affairs of state from the highest policies to the minutest details. As a monarch, he would "take the map of a town and draw two parallel pencil lines across it where the new avenue was to be."⁶² Millspaugh, too, affirms that without Reza's support, he could not overcome general opposition against his work and constructive financial reforms remained impossible.⁶³ His crown prince, Muhammad Reza, who was to discuss all details of Iran's domestic and foreign policy with his father hastily wrote later:

I, and all the officials of my father's Government, had such respect for him and were so much in awe of him that 'discussion' with him had none of the give-and-take the word implies. I advanced my views and made hints and suggestions, but discussion in any usual sense was out of the question.⁶⁴

Reza gradually changed the old bureaucracy made up of traditional *Mustaufis* (Courtier senior clergy), hereditary *Mirzas* (Courtier junior clergy) and central ministries without provincial branches into a new order of "some 90,000 full-time government personnel"⁶⁵ employed in the ten civilian ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, Education, Trade, Post and Telegraph, Agriculture, Road and Industry. The Ministries of Justice and Education were entirely reorganised,⁶⁶ and others were expanded to cover the whole country.

The Interior Ministry was appointed to supervise police, internal administration, medical services, elections and military conscription. Instead of the old division of the few *Ayalat* (large provinces) and numerous *Vilayat* (small districts), the country was reorganised into eleven *Ostan* (provinces), forty-nine *Shahrestan* (cities) and numerous *Bakhsh* (towns) and *Dehestan* (rural districts).⁶⁷

But Reza's main concern was with the army and the internal security of the country, for it was his belief that "the armed forces had been disgraced by the governments" and that "it was up to the army to rejuvenate the country."⁶⁸ In his attempt to realise this idea, to suppress internal revolts and deter foreign intervention, he found that a strong, united army depends on another simultaneous factor: re-establishing the sovereignty of the central government throughout the country.⁶⁹ Thus he maintained the superiority of the military forces in the government bureaucracy.

To this end, he made use of martial law to raise the Minister of War above all other ministers in the government and give him the power of arresting the Prime Minister, too, if he wished. Moreover, he appointed military officers of high rank as provincial governors. Some other officers were given the task "in civilian garb to inspect the various public works"⁷⁰ and to exercise control on Reza's behalf, in every government department. According to General Fardust, the Crown Prince's sincere friend and confidant, the army commanders possessed such power that "the civil administrators were appointed under the condition that they would observe the instructions of the division commanders."⁷¹

He merged the various scattered foreign-commanded military forces into a one hundred thousand united army with eighteen divisions and one independent mechanised brigade⁷² located in the different provinces of the west, east, north, south and the centre, each commanded by officers directly responsible to himself. Beside the army, he established a uniform police force in all the large cities and about sixty thousand gendarmerie, "*Amniyeh*," were stationed along the highways and rural areas.⁷³ Owing to the law of compulsory military conscription (dated 6 June 1925), the regular army personnel of 40,000 men in 1921⁷⁴ had increased to 127,000 in 1941.⁷⁵ The Army was equipped with motor-trucks, a few armoured cars and tanks. To this ground force was added a navy on the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea with a few gunboats and an air force with the aircraft all purchased from abroad: Italy, Russia, Britain, Germany, Sweden and Czechoslovakia.⁷⁶

As a result of this trend in expansion, the official budget figure allocated for military purposes, having been more than tripled amounting to four times the civil appropriations by August 1921,⁷⁷ remained an annual average of 35.5 per cent of the total revenue until 1941.⁷⁸ It is worth mentioning that the official figure for the Ministry of War did not represent the real amount used for the military budget. For this department was not exclusively responsible for all military activities. Police activities, for example, were covered by the Interior Ministry until 1939.⁷⁹ Moreover, other sources of income, such as state properties and oil royalties, were treated as a separate reserve fund, not included in the budget. From 1935 onward, items of "communications" and "other" expenditures with averages of 23.7 per cent and 6.6 per cent respectively were very suspect till 1941 because they "conceal payments for military activities."⁸⁰ The Table 3-1 indicates clearly the degree of financial attention that the army was being paid in the government.

Table 3-1 Budgetary Allocations 1928-41 (% Share of the Total)

Ministry	1928	1930	1934	1936	1938	1940
War	40.4	41.6	38.3	27.5	26.5	15.6
Finance	22.0	23.2	27.5	19.6	18.0	4.7
Industry, Trade and Transport	1.1	0.3	3.5	7.6	21.0	24.1
Interior	9.0	10.8	6.4	5.2	4.6	3.5
Education	6.5	6.2	7.5	6.8	5.3	4.2
Post and Telecommunications	8.0	5.7	4.5	3.4	2.8	2.3
Justice	5.4	5.1	4.0	2.9	2.8	2.1
Foreign Affairs	3.3	3.4	3.5	2.7	2.0	1.1
Imperial Court	4.3	3.4	2.2	1.4	1.0	0.5
Agriculture	-	0.3	0.5	2.7	3.1	2.3
Health	-	-	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.1
Communications	-	-	^a	17.8	10.5	32.1
Other	-	-	-	-	-	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^a Included in the figure for Post and Telecommunications.

Source: H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, pp. 114, 130.

The expansion of the army and its priority over everything else made military personnel a definite privileged class with corresponding arrogance. Army commanders were encouraged by the Shah to appropriate as much as land they could by whatever means they pleased while the civilians had no right of redress.⁸¹ Half of the army personnel and most well trained and modernised divisions were concentrated in the capital to protect the Shah against any rebellion. Furthermore, these divisions were divided into a northern and a southern division within Tehran and were encouraged by the Shah himself to oppose each other.⁸² There was no intelligence service organisation and the police force, although they were not been organised for this kind of operations, was in charge of obtaining information. However the most crucial information was being received from the British, as in case of Teimur Tash.⁸³

What the new order had brought to the people was a dictatorship of a military man, suppression of popular uprisings and disunity with the society. As a result, in 1941, when it came to defending the country against foreign intervention, the ordinary soldiers were "indifferent to the fate of the régime".⁸⁴ Although the expanded army could well suppress internal revolts, it could not resist the well equipped foreign armies for more than a week, and the senior officers of the most cherished product of the "Architect of Modern Iran" were reported to "have

escaped by wearing the hitherto forbidden women's veil."⁸⁵ That was why Churchill wrote: "thus ended this brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient state."⁸⁶

National Economy in Deficit

In 1922, as Reza Khan was progressively suppressing violence and imposing order, the *Majlis* asked A. C. Millspaugh, the American financial advisor, to assist the Iranian government in improving national finance. In the next five years, he and his twelve colleagues succeeded in reorganising and reintegrating Iran's financial structure, and in centralising revenues, expenditures and accounting. They were able to propose new tax laws and establish an effective administration of the tax collection and of the state properties.

As a result the government was enabled to balance the budget and to finance new constructive undertakings. "With the finance in order" Millspaugh explicitly stated that "we turned to the revival of economic life and the encouragement of trade."⁸⁷ The Trans-Iranian railway was a preliminary constructive undertaking of this kind. This project, running from Bandar Shah, a Caspian port to Shahi in central Mazandaran then through Tehran to Andimeshk in northern Khuzistan to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Shahpour, ended in 1931. In 1941 by linking Teheran to Semnan, which is half way to Mashhad and Zanjan, which is half way to Tabriz, a general distance of 1,394 kilometres,⁸⁸ was completed. In a country where, in 1925, there were no more than 3,200 Kilometres of highway, much of it in disrepair, by 1941 some 20,400 kilometres of roads in comparatively good condition had been constructed. The number of industrial plants, less than twenty in 1921 only five of which were relatively large with more than fifty labourers, had increased to 346 by 1941. One hundred and forty six of these plants were major installations, such as textile mills, sugar refineries, match-making factories, chemical enterprises, modern glassworks, tobacco and tea processing plants, all of which increased the number of wage earners employed from fewer than 1000 in 1925 to more than 50,000 in 1941.⁸⁹ The growth of these industrial installations was impressive enough for Millspaugh to observe, "how he could have done so much building of such variety in so short a time must remain a mystery."⁹⁰

Another notable economic institution, when Reza Khan was Minister of War, was the creation of the first Iranian financial institution named *Bank-i Sepah*, the army bank, financed by army funds and controlled by military personnel. Then in 1927, the first national bank of Iran, *Bank-i Melli-yi Iran*, which later in 1932 took over the

privilege of note issue from the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia, was established.

To improve agricultural methods and introduce them into the country, an agricultural college in Karadj was founded in 1929, which in 1939 was followed by an institute for veterinarian research, production of serums and inoculation of livestock in the same city. In all these economic reforms the need to utilise foreign advisers in the development of the national economy was obvious. Hundreds of engineers (about 200 only for the construction of the railway)⁹¹ from USA, Britain, Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were thus employed to assist each government department.

The ambitious programs of centralising the bureaucracy, uniting the army and modernising the national economy required a regular and expanding state revenue. As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of Reza Khan's rule, the state revenues consisted of state lands, internal taxes and customs tariffs on foreign trade. The oil royalties received from APOC were never accounted for in the official budget.

In this regard, Reza in his twenty year reign adopted two different policies; first the application of an efficient order to absorb the existing resources into the state treasury. This was followed by the employment of the American financial mission and retention of the Belgian customs officers who had been managing the Customs Department since 1911. The second was the expansion of government sources of revenue. In order to put the latter policy into action, the government began to sell large amounts of state lands for immediate cash in several stages in 1924, 1933 and 1937.⁹² To increase the internal taxes, new levies were introduced by the *Majlis*, such as the sugar and tea tax of 1925 for the railway construction. In 1928 tariff autonomy was declared which rejected the 5 to 8 per cent imposed on foreign imports since 1882.

Regarding the oil royalties, according to the concession of 1901 given to an Englishman called W. K. D'Arcy, the government had been receiving sixteen per cent of the net profits. After the dramatic decline in oil revenues in 1931 the government abrogated the concession. After two years of tense negotiation, a new agreement was concluded in 1933. Accordingly, the basis of revenue payment aiming to improve Iran's share over the concession period was changed to 4 shillings per barrel produced which was directly paid to the treasury. This increase was excluding the extra amount of £1 million for 1931 and £1 million for the conclusion of the treaty which the company agreed to pay the government.⁹³

Despite all these reforms, although most of them were conceived to lead the country to modernisation, the economic situation in 1941 was in chaos and in

general resembled that of the time when he first came to power. Reza's reforms were not the consequence of a rational and relevant approach to economic development, and his despotic behaviour meant that "he did things to the people and for the people," but that "little was done by them."⁹⁴

The area covered by the oil agreement of 1933, though it consisted of only a quarter of the D'Arcy concession, included all the areas under exploitation and most of the proven reserves. It also extended the concession from the remaining 27 to 60 years. The agreement was such an abysmal failure, that even the signing Minister of Finance, Seyyid Hasan Taqizadeh, later rejected responsibility and declared that he had been merely "an organ."⁹⁵ Moreover the certain increase of revenue on the new basis of 4 shillings per barrel *vis-à-vis* the previous 16 per cent of the net profit was mostly squandered on excessive amounts of armament.

The extreme emphasis on industrialisation caused an increase in the number of industrial workers, which up to 1941 constituted a modern working class of over 170,000 workers (excluding 20,000 workers of the oil industry). Although this number did not represent more than 4 per cent of the total labour force, the heavy labour concentration in a few major cities caused social problems. As a result of the migration of workers from rural areas to Tehran, for example, this city's population increased from 196,255 in 1922 to almost 700,000 in 1941.⁹⁶ Furthermore, as the factories belonged to the state and were managed by state officials and departmental bureaucrats, there was as much corruption as elsewhere, for "managerial positions were insecure and ... production targets and pricing were arbitrary and haphazard."⁹⁷ Avery believes:

Wrong siting of the factories, poor communications, the pressure of cheaper manufactured articles from abroad, of better quality than home products, the lack of efficient labour, lack of experience, local apathy were among the causes of their failure."⁹⁸

In the shadow of the quick move toward industrialisation, little emphasis was put on agriculture. The graduates from the agricultural college were not trained to work on land but to complete the cadre of desk experts for the Ministry of Agriculture. The *Majlis* filled with *Khans*, landlords, never paid any attention to land reform. There were many *Khans* who owned estates of "500 square miles containing 96 villages ... [with] an income of about \$150,000 income a year."⁹⁹

The Shah, who was himself a "land-eating wolf,"¹⁰⁰ had transferred all fertilised lands in northern Iran by force and some times had bought them very cheaply. In 1940, according to General Fardust, his net annual income from these assets was about \$9 million.¹⁰¹ As far as Reza's acquisition of land is concerned there are different estimates: some have estimated his villages up to 10 thousand, while in

his trial Dr. Musaddeq accounted for 5600¹⁰² and Dr. Abdo wrote that on his abdication he left estates totalling 2400.¹⁰³ Millspaugh confirms that in addition to his possession of a considerable part of the fertile lands in Mazandaran, he had over \$20 million in the bank.¹⁰⁴ Baqer Aqeli says that he had 680 million rials (around \$11 million).¹⁰⁵ But his bank book of *Bank-i Melli-yi Iran* reads that on 22 July 1941, approximately a month before abdicating he possessed an amount of 104,632,058 rials (equivalent to \$1,743,867)¹⁰⁶

The only land Act, passed by the *Majlis*, was the Land Development Act of 16 November 1937 which sought to vest authority for regional planning and grant power to the landlords, rather than to safeguard the interests of the peasants.¹⁰⁷ In the process of selling the state lands, the most desirable ones, especially those nearer the capital, were sold to senior army officers, which gradually developed into a new aristocracy.¹⁰⁸

The government as the monopolist for the main agricultural products such as wheat, barley and tea kept their prices as low as possible to subsidise the few privileged cities at the expense of the rural society. The restrictions placed on the nomadic tribes, which at that time comprised nearly 18 per cent of the country's rural population,¹⁰⁹ led to a serious drop in the pastoral economy.¹¹⁰

The greatest monument of Reza's period, the 1,394 kilometre railway, was entirely financed from domestic funds because Reza Shah hated foreign loans. In a country where income tax had not been introduced, the tax on tea and sugar, two of the most indispensable and complementary items in the daily diet, increased the cost of living for the peasants and for a large number of people around the poverty line.

The cost of the \$140 million railway was "conducive to inflation"¹¹¹ because no economic reason was at the basis of this project. As a matter of fact, as Banani emphasises, "too much prominence was given to strategic considerations at the expense of economic ones."¹¹² Reza was looking for rapid military access to Khuzistan and other tribal regions toward the south, for internal security purposes, and for less military purposes, toward the north, to access to his personal extensive estates or to those he was to acquire there. It was objected by Dr. Musaddeq, then a Member of the *Majlis*,¹¹³ that the railway would have been more economically viable if it had been built to connect cities, or industrial and agricultural areas. Furthermore, rail heads were located far from the borders for military defence purposes, and as its standard did not comply with the wider Russian railroads or the narrower British-owned system in Iraq, it could not be linked with foreign railways.

As a result of all these expensive and irrelevant economic programs and unsuitable reforms imposed on the real needs of the society and its problems, the country faced a serious shortage of money. These ambitious projects had increased the government budget by almost eighteenfold, from less than 245 million rials in 1925 to more than 4.3 billion rials in 1941.¹¹⁴ The fall of the rial began in 1930 and the government's new policy to mobilise foreign trade and to monopolise it under its control not only failed to operate a deficit budget but made matters worse.¹¹⁵ By 1941 the revenue amounted to £45 million and the expenditure running at over £50 million, whereas in 1924 the revenue was just over £5 million and expenditure had exceeded this by about £250,000.¹¹⁶

In conclusion, Reza Khan came to power through the British backed coup d'état of 22 February 1921 after which time the structure of power underwent a notable change. The "new order," which was built on numerous reforms in the bureaucracy, economy and army, did not introduce a great degree of modernity. Reza Shah was then deposed by the occupying Great Powers and left the country in a situation similar to that before the coup. In fact, Reza Shah by an effective control over the army, over the *Majlis*, over the cabinet and the political oppositions, transformed himself into the supreme decision maker in both domestic and foreign affairs. However, he had not gained legitimacy among the people most of whom had opposed him either overtly or covertly. The despotic Shah ruled the country brutally and suppressed every kind of opposition; from that of tribal uprisings to that of communist movements, from Muslim clergy to that of his sincere friends. His expanded military government, caused corruption and was only capable of suppressing internal violence. In defending Iran against the offensive Great Power armies he was powerless, and caused the national economy to suffer a deficit which all together generated popular dissatisfaction and destabilised the power base of his government.

In the following chapter the anatomy of power in Iran in the period of Muhammad Reza will be examined.

¹ **Dictatorship** is a system of government in which one person, office, faction or party is empowered to dictate all political action and compel obedience from all other citizens without the necessity of the consent of the governed. This term is not truly distinct in modern usage from despotism, although possibly it has the added implication that the ruling agent is active in commanding things, and not merely obstructive in resisting them. Modern dictatorship is either personal or that of a group or class (party, army, proletariat), but even in the latter case it is usually embodied in the person of a leader.

² General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 76.

³ P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 179; J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 17.

⁴ P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 182.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

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- 6 A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, p. 34.
- 7 J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 39.
- 8 A. Millspaugh, *American Task in Persia*, p. 54.
- 9 M. Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, p. 38.
- 10 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 242.
- 11 A. Millspaugh, *American Task in Persia*, pp. 58-76.
- 12 M. Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia*, p. 43.
- 13 A. Millspaugh, *American Task in Persia*, p. 72.
- 14 J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, pp. 39-40.
- 15 J. M. Balfour, *Recent Happenings in Persia*, p. 109.
- 16 *Asnad-i Mahramaneh-yi Vezarat-i Khareje-yi Britania dar Bare-yi Qarardad-i 1919 Iran va Englis*, (hereafter referred to as *Asnad-i Mahramaneh*), pp. 293-294.
- 17 For details refer to Ibrahim Fakhrai, *Sardar-i Jangal*; Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-e Hejdah Sale-yi Azarbaijan*.
- 18 B. Navazeni, *Ahdnameh-yi Mavaddat-i Iran va Showravi*, 26 February 1921, pp. 73-92.
- 19 A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, p. 35.
- 20 J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 44.
- 21 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 209.
- 22 For the document refer to the Appendices.
- 23 M. Ali Grami, *Tarikh-i Eqtesadi, Siyasi, Ejtemai va Nezami*, p. 18; there is a controversy on the date of birth, but this date is more reliable as it is consistent with the document mentioned.
- 24 See the document in the Appendices.
- 25 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 26.
- 26 Quoted in J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 148.
- 27 A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, p. 39.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
- 29 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 36.
- 30 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 71.
- 31 R. Bullard, *Britain and the Middle East*, p. 132.
- 32 J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 50.
- 33 General General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 73-75.
- 34 Quoted in J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 150.
- 35 A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, p. 40.
- 36 Quoted in J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 147.
- 37 Lord Ironside, *High Road to Command*, p. 149.
- 38 J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Mo'aser Iran*, vol. 1, p. 115. For more accounts on some murders in the prison refer to J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, pp. 156-173.
- 39 A. Millspaugh, *American Task in Iran*, p. 142.
- 40 For details of these revolts refer to J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Mo'aser Iran*; Ibrahim Fakhrai, *Sardar-i Jangal*.
- 41 R. Bullard, *Britain and the Middle East*, p. 123.

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- 42 For these and other tribal revolts refer to Setad-i Bozorg Arteshtaran, *Tarikh-i Artesh Novin-i Iran*.
 43 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 285.
 44 Russian State Political Administration.
 45 Georges Aghabekov, *OGPU*, pp. 73-178.
 46 For details refer to Donald. Wilber, *Iran; Past and Present*, pp. 234-238; E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 154-163.
 47 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, Ibid., p. 288.
 48 M. Hasan Rajabi, *Zendeginame-yi Siyasi-yi Imam Khomeini*, vol. 1, pp. 54-78.
 49 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 79-92.
 50 For details refer to A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, pp. 44-51.
 51 General H. Fadoust, *Zohour va Soqut-i Selseleh-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 68-70.
 52 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 261.
 53 E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 153.
 54 J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, p. 164.
 55 For details refer to E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 152-153; J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, pp. 58-60.
 56 M. Sadr, *Khatirat-i Sadr-ul Ashraf*, p. 379.
 57 Article 49 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1906.
 58 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 253-254.
 59 Ibid., p. 260.
 60 J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Mo'aser Iran*, vol. 1, p. 121; B. Aqeli, *Zoka-ol Molk-i Forouqi*, p. 173.
 61 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 36.
 62 M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, pp. 298-299.
 63 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 22.
 64 M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, p. 64.
 65 *Khvandaniha*, 19 September 1947.
 66 For Details Refer to A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, pp 68-112.
 67 E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 137.
 68 D. Wilber, *Iran; Past and Present*, p. 125.
 69 J. Limbert, *Iran at War with History*, p. 85.
 70 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 259.
 71 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 78, 480-481.
 72 General M. Kazemi and Colonel M. Alborz, *Tarikh-i Panjah Saleh-yi Nirou-yi Zamini-yi Shahanshahi-yi Iran*, p. 220; Setad-i Bozorg Arteshtaran, *Tarikh-i Artesh Novin-i Iran*, p. 78.
 73 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 480.
 74 A. Millspaugh, *American Task in Persia*, p. 147.
 75 War Office to the Foreign Office, "Memorandum on the Persian Army," cited in E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 136. Number of the army personnel is controversial in some resources. One has numbered it to "nearly 400,000 men" (Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, p. 57) while another has estimated it to "a figure of 200,000" (L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "The Pahlavi Era" in J. Boyle, ed., *Persia; History and Heritage*, p. 52). But the figure which has been submitted by Abrahamian is more reliable because of its accurate reference.

- 76 For details refer to Setad-i Bozorg Arteshtaran, *Tarikh-i Artesh Novin-i Iran*, pp. 81-102.
- 77 J. M. Balfour, *Recent Happenings in Persia*, p. 265.
- 78 *Majmu'e-yi Qavanin-i Mouzu'eh va Mosavvat-i Majlis*, 1921-1941. Budget figures appear at the end of each volume.
- 79 Setad-i Bozorg Arteshtaran, *Tarikh-i Artesh Novin-i Iran*, p. 79.
- 80 H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 131.
- 81 General Fardust explains a case in which when the Shah's mother took him a complaint from Karim Bouzarjomehri, Reza while leaving the room angrily said: "I do not allow anyone took complaint from any of my officers. They do not make any mistake." See General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, p. 78.
- 82 Ibid., p. 76.
- 83 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
- 84 J. Limbert, *Iran at War with History*, p. 88.
- 85 H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 135.
- 86 W. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, vol. 4, p. 428.
- 87 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 24.
- 88 Bank-i Melli Iran, Bulletin, May - November 1940, pp. 82-91.
- 89 Ministry of Labour, *Amar-i Sanaye-i Iran*, 1948.
- 90 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 32.
- 91 *Majmu'e-yi Qavanin-i Mouzu'eh va Mosavvat-i Majlis*, 7th Sess., 1929-1931, pp. 375-380; Ibid., 8th Sess., 1931-1933, pp. 512-522; Ibid., 10th Sess., 1935-1937, pp. 501-520; Ibid., 11th Sess., 1937-1939, pp. 443-462; Ibid., 12th Sess., 1939-1941, pp. 490-494.
- 92 Ibid., 5th Sess., 1925-1927, pp. 433-435; Ibid., 11th Sess., 1937-1939, pp. 2-3.
- 93 H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 119.
- 94 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 35.
- 95 M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 32.
- 96 For details refer to E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 147-148.
- 97 H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 131.
- 98 P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 242.
- 99 J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 55.
- 100 Taqhzadeh's discretion of the Shah, quoted in Homa Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 121.
- 101 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 111.
- 102 B. Aqeli, *Zoka-ol Molk-i Forouqi*, 150.
- 103 J. Abdo, *Chahel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, p. 273.
- 104 A. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 34.
- 105 B. Aqeli, *Zoka-ol Molk-i Forouqi*, p. 190.
- 106 Reza Shah's bank book has been revealed to the public in an exhibition on "The Occupation of Iran and the Violation of its Neutrality," 25th August 1941," Dafineh Museum, Tehran, 12-27 December 1991.
- 107 For details refer to A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, pp. 123-124.
- 108 Ansari, "Malekiyat-i Arzi dar Iran," pp. 91-97; P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 273.

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- ¹⁰⁹ Hadary Gideon, "The Agrarian Reform Problem in Iran," pp. 181-196.
- ¹¹⁰ J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 80.
- ¹¹¹ P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 304.
- ¹¹² A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, p. 134.
- ¹¹³ The speech is reprinted in Hussein Makki, *Duktur Musaddiqh va Nutqha-yi Tarikhi-yi U*.
- ¹¹⁴ Nouruzi, "The development of the budget in Iran", quoted in E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 148.
- ¹¹⁵ For more details refer to A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, pp. 129-132; P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 307.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid.

Chapter IV

Muhammad Reza's Rule; 1941-1979

The second era in this study of the domestic situation of Iran as another factor in Great Power rivalry starts from the occupation of the country by the Allied forces in 1941. This era was to some extent different from that of Reza's. From the start, as mentioned above, Reza had consistently attempted to enforce his command and undermine the constitutional law. However, Muhammad Reza's rule is divisible into three periods which can be characterised as follows: from 1941 to 1947 the period of foreign occupation and direct intervention, he had little interest in government affairs and most of the decisions were taken by the prime minister and the *Majlis*; from 1947 to 1953, the period of the power struggle between the Shah on one hand, the prime minister and the *Majlis* on the other; and from 1953 when the royalist coup renewed the dictatorship of the Shah and maintained the superiority of his command over the cabinet and the *Majlis* until 1979.

Nevertheless, since the largest segment of his reign (26 years after the coup of 1953) was run by his despotic government and from six years prior to the coup he had started to take an active role for himself, there is not much to choose between the two eras. Moreover, the reforms of "the White Revolution" he started in 1961 and "the Great Civilisation" he mounted later in 1970s were quite similar to Reza's project of the expansion, modernisation and centralisation of the "New Order." In both the cases the major architect and director was the Shah himself.

Like his father, Muhammad Reza was not tied to any party and did not allow any to emerge. During the first period, in the chaotic situation of foreign occupation and release from the Shah's despotism, there emerged many parties. But in his long period of dictatorship, only a few parties were permitted for example; *Iran Novin*, the New Iran, headed by Mansur, and *Mardum*, the people headed by Eqbal, the then prime Minister. These constituted something of a two party system. However, in 1975 he dissolved the two parties and established a single party *Rastakhiz*, the Resurgence headed by Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the then Prime Minister, and wanted all people to join it.

The opposition groups including autonomous minorities, communists, the Muslim movement and democratic movement who had raised their heads from the long suppression period of Reza were now in a strong position to thwart the

dictatorship. There were several clashes between the government forces and the opposition through which the people were brutally suppressed. This chapter will examine the situation in which Muhammad Reza came to power, the personal characteristics which contributed to his decision making process, the opposition movements and his counter-action together with the structure of his administration and the national economy.

A Monarchy Built on Chaos

On 25 August 1941 when the British and the Soviet forces jointly invaded Iran, the Soviets occupied the north and the British took over the south, while the capital and the sovereignty of the whole country (though formally acknowledged as being with Tehran government) were placed provisionally under the joint protection of the two powers.

Iran was humiliated and lost its real sovereignty. The conduct of its domestic and foreign affairs were directly subjected to the dictates of the occupying forces. Regarding Iran as an occupied territory they subjected all decisions to their will from arresting the pro-German Iranians to appointing the ministers and representatives of the *Majlis*.¹ Under the threat of occupying Tehran and punishing the Shah², Reza abdicated on 16 September 1941, in favour of his son, Muhammad Reza, and went into exile in South Africa; as Kapuscinski remarked: "empire giveth; empire taketh away."³

Once again "the ruler of Iran was determined in London." The new régime was established after two weeks of various negotiations concerning the different candidates, their personal characteristics and their degree of dependence upon the occupying powers. A change from monarchy to presidency was even considered.⁴ At last when the occupying powers agreed to put Muhammad Reza on the throne they reasoned that "he could always be replaced if he did not do as required ... After all he would have no real power."⁵

In an effort to legalise the presence of the foreign troops and ensure the domestic support of the country, Iran was made to enter the Tripartite Pact with the British and the Soviets. The government was also under pressure to dissolve the *Majlis* and to re-elect the new one,⁶ as they were "confident" that the *Majlis* represented a "serious threat" fearing that it "might make nationalistic declarations and perhaps cancel their ratification of the Tripartite treaty."⁷

The end of Reza Shah's absolute rule and the beginning of Allied occupation opened a new phase in the development of Iranian politics. With the general amnesty about 2,000 political prisoners, including 52 were communists, were

released from the jails.⁸ Consequently, numerous social and political groups reappeared in the Iranian political scene with demands for domestic reforms and tribal autonomy. Some followed either the British or Soviet line. Some sought the evolutionary institution of some sort of “democratic” mass participatory system with the retention of monarchy; some demanded revolutionary “socialist” structural changes, with the establishment of a republic; others favoured a return to the pure Islamic culture and law.⁹ Tehran lost control over a large part of the country and Iran sank into growing social disorder, political disarray, and economic hardship.¹⁰

By the end of the war, the situation was so bad that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union set up a tripartite commission to investigate the internal problems of Iran in general, and the situation of Azarbaijan in particular.¹¹ Although the government formally rejected the scheme, this had revived the spectre of the 1907 Agreement (in which the Great Power rivals had divided the country into areas of their influences without the knowledge of the Iranian government)¹² and provoked great fear and hostility among Iranian politicians and journalists of all shades of opinion.¹³

Some Personal Characteristics of the Shah

Muhammad Reza was born in Tehran in 26 October 1919. He replaced his father as Shah of Iran at the age of twenty-two. The Shah's behaviour towards the opposition movements and his application of social and economic reforms together with his widespread military administration were, without doubt, due to his personal characteristics.

When he was six years old he was entrusted to a French governess, Madame Arfa, who was married to one of his Iranian compatriots. She taught him some knowledge of the French language. Far from “the debilitating atmosphere surrounding the court,”¹⁴ he was sent to Le Rosey secondary school in Switzerland at the age of twelve for six years. He had been “gripped by French history”¹⁵ and his character had been moulded by the democratic Western environment to an extent “that was second only to ... father's influence,”¹⁶ wrote Muhammad Reza.

Unlike his father, from the childhood, he was a “small pale boy, frail, nervous.” Comparing the father to the son, R. Kapuscinski portrays the personal characteristics of Muhammad Reza as if the father wanted his son to resemble him in as many details as possible. However, he was “by nature weak and hesitant,” though the son sensed the intention to turn him into an image of his father. Therefore, from the early moments of his life “two natures began to develop and coexist in the boy: the inborn one and the parental one.”¹⁷

Because of his weak disposition, shortly after he became crown prince, he was struck by typhoid fever and wavered near death for weeks. His frail nature and childhood illnesses, Marvin Zonis argues, “heightened the protective and almost isolated atmosphere in which he was raised.”¹⁸ The milieu of this upbringing had a considerable impact on his character and outlook. In the words of M. Zonis the young Shah was “filled with self-doubt and fears of his own weaknesses,” which resulted from “personal sickliness; enforced separation from his mother and father; a stern, powerful, and dominating father; and a milieu replete with sycophants.”¹⁹

In 1936, under his father’s wish, Muhammad Reza entered the Military College at Tehran where he graduated two years later. In 1938, with the rank of second-lieutenant he was appointed by his father to be an army inspector and he was also to spend several hours a day with him, studying the king’s role as military leader.²⁰ But he was less enthusiastic about succeeding his father’s position. He took more interest in good times and sports than in politics. The young monarch who was busy “playing soccer, flying his private airplane, organising masked balls, ... and going skiing in Switzerland,”²¹ remained inexperienced, and wielded little real power, but as Amin Saikal affirms “was suited the Allied forces in their desire to legitimise their actions in Iran.”²²

Although Reza personally was happy to see that at last his son was going to take over the monarchy,²³ he doubted if he could handle it successfully. Later in 1981, Muhammad Reza wrote:

One day my father told me that he wanted to leave me an empire ‘which could exist because of its solid institutions which could practically govern itself’... I interpreted it as meaning that he lacked confidence in me. I thought then that Reza Shah was expressing doubts as to my capabilities as a ruler.²⁴

Like his father, Muhammad Reza was indifferent toward the religion. Telling his life story he wrote: “I remained there [in Switzerland] until 1936, scrupulously faithful to our religion,”²⁵ whereas his companion there, General Fardust later rejected that.²⁶ Furthermore, according to Mas’ud Foruqi, the Iranian ambassador to Morocco, Muhammad Reza used to drink whiskey one glass after another.²⁷ Concerning women, he married three in succession while enjoying lots of other domestic and foreign pretty “gifts”.²⁸ The first two of his wives “resented their husband’s infidelities.”²⁹

Such behaviour caused some irresponsible courtiers such as the Minister of Court and his twin sister Ashraf to interfere in the government administration.³⁰ Even in his reign certain Rasputin types, such as Ernest Pron, his Swiss companion in Switzerland and later in the Court, and Dr. Ayadi, his special physician³¹ appeared

to have close contact with his family and had the most influence in the government appointments and dismissals. Though Muhammad Reza was feared by all his top civil servants and high ranking officers, he did not dare to lay down the law to his relatives who often did just as they pleased.

One of his greatest weaknesses was his jealousy which had been firmly rooted in his character. He was jealous of a wide range of people from US presidents to his own prime ministers and of his wife.³² Even after he had taken his third wife to ensure the continuity of the dynasty, which could only be passed on to a male heir, he was dissatisfied with his oldest son. He feared assassination that his heir might rule.³³

There were several attempts on his life in addition to some other incidents which had certain effects on his attitude. After each incident, he became increasingly proud of himself so that he believed "only that which is written can come to pass" and gradually got the feeling that his "life was protected."³⁴ The most important of these incidents was the sequence of events proceeding the 1953 coup which provided him the opportunity to intervene more in the government affairs. This in its turn, involved him in every common problem of the administration which together made him, like his father, increasingly suspicious of Iranians. He spoke to very few people, except for various foreigners and become aloof, even from his own family.

Pervasive Movements in Opposition

Since 1941 the many political parties founded have waxed and waned. The first to be formed, some of which were sponsored by merchants and landowners and used Tehran newspapers for their party organs, were weak in organisation and their programs. The parties of this first period offered either socialistic or liberal programs. During the war years the most active and influential parties were the *Erade-yi Melli*, or National Will, and the *Tudeh*.

There were also some parties established, later in the 1950s, mainly to support the Shah in his efforts to control the *Majlis*, and to produce an illusion of the party system. The *Melliyun*, or Nationalists' party was founded in 1957 by Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, then the Prime Minister, to be the majority party in the *Majlis*. In the same year the *Mardum*, or Peoples' party was established by Asadullah Alam, the Court Minister. In 1963 the *Iran Novin*, the Modern Iran party displaced the *Melliyun* party, at first headed by Hasan Ali Mansur, then the Prime Minister, and from January 1965 it was led by Amir Abbas Hoveida, when he was Prime Minister. Both these parties strove to enlist broad public participation, holding

congresses and party celebrations, and maintaining scores of branches throughout the country. The nationalistic *Iranian* party was also founded in January 1971, led by a former head of the Pan-Iran party, and was hostile to Communism.

But none of these parties had a vast popular social base: some were created by foreign support as in the case of the *Erade-yi Melli* party while others were supported by the government. A clear example of the illusory nature of the party system as a whole was the two party system of *Iran Novin* and *Mardum* which soon disappeared to be replaced by the single *Rastakhiz* party. Therefore it seems clear that, similarly to Reza's era, the parties did not represent a picture of effective political opposition of the time. All important opposition occurred in the unorganised groups that continuously raised their voices against the existing political system.

In a variety of apparently successful campaigns, Muhammad Reza suppressed the most outspoken political opposition: self-autonomous revolts, communists, religious and the democratic movements and kept himself in power, by means of military action, imprisonment and murder.

Self-Autonomous Revolts

During the 1941-1946 period, when Iran was occupied by the Allied forces and the central government at Tehran had lost its control over the country, a number of self-autonomous revolts took place which, apart from foreign involvement, had some popular base amongst the national minorities.

In the past the tribes such as *Afsharis*, *Zulfaqaris* and the *Shahsavans*, who regarded the Shah as their patron, like other tribes throughout the country, had benefited from a general amnesty which gave them the right to carry arms without licence.³⁵ At the beginning of July 1943, 900 government soldiers were overwhelmed and disarmed by *Qashqa'i* and *Boir Ahmadi* tribesmen in the southern town of *Simirum*, which became known as Simirum disaster.³⁶

The situation in the tense and disorderly *Bakhtiari* area had also caused some concern. Earlier in March 1942 a *Bakhtiari* leader, in conversation with the British Vice-Consul in Isfahan, had spoken of the unity of the Bakhtiaris and the formation of a government of their own.³⁷

Following the general amnesty, some communist prisoners established *Ferqeh-yi Demokrat-i Azarbaijan*, the Democrat Party of Azarbaijan, and on 3 September 1946 announced their demand for "self-autonomy for the people of Azarbaijan while they respect the territorial integrity and independence of Iran."³⁸ They also wanted the affairs of Azarbaijan to be conducted by the Turks and the

Turkish language became the official language. They had not only occupied the government offices in Azarbaijan but also disarmed the army garrisons there.³⁹ The National Government of Azarbaijan was formally established in Tabriz and a National Assembly convened, to which Premier Pishihvari introduced his Cabinet, composed of ten ministers.⁴⁰

Similar events occurred in the Kurdish territory. The Kurds resented the centralising policies of the government and wanted provincial autonomy.⁴¹ After the army reoccupied the Kurdish areas in 1946, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran went underground and it claimed that up to 15,000 people were killed in the subsequent repression.⁴² These Kurds began their guerrilla campaign in the winter of 1967 and continued fighting for eighteen months in the mountains between Mahabad and the towns of Baneh and Sardasht.

With regards to the *Tudeh* and the Democrat sympathisers, they were believed to have joined in alliance in Mazandaran and Gilan in December 1945, and there were rumours of an imminent uprising in these provinces. Moreover the *Tudeh* party which had three cabinet minister in Qavam's cabinet (January 1946-December 1947) was reported to be preparing a proclamation for an "independent Tabaristan."⁴³ The growth of the *Tudeh* influence and the *Tudeh* inspired general strike in the Khuzistan in 1946, where the oil fields were in danger, frightened the British-supported southern tribes. Later in 1958 Jabhatottahrir Khuzistan (the Front for the Liberation of Khuzistan) was established and called for the liberation of the Arab areas of Iran from Iranian rule. In the middle 1960s and on some occasions in the 1970s. the front was also able to launch some armed actions against the government in the southern areas.⁴⁴

Another tribal revolt started in September 1946 in the south.⁴⁵ Among the tribal leaders, Nasser Khan and Khosrow Khan Qashqa'i, who had also been released in 1941 from political prison, were most successful in uniting their co-tribesmen and alarming the central government. A great revolt also occurred in the Fars province in 1961 following the government's decision on disarmament of the southern tribes. This revolt lasted six months and ended with hundreds of dead and casualties.⁴⁶ The government reaction to all these self-autonomous uprisings and the nomad revolts was like Reza's. All were to be suppressed by military forces.

Communists

Under the general amnesty of 1941, fifty-two leading members of the communist party were released from prison. With Soviet help, they soon reorganised the party in September of that year and renamed it *Tudeh* (the Masses), with its base in the north, the Soviet zone. The renaming was largely as Tabari and Iskandari noted “because of the anti-communist law of 1931 and the social form of Iran which would prevent any communist grouping.”⁴⁷ The party was established, like the outlawed communist party on two ideological and institutional bases: the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and the policy of both overt and covert activity which meant practice of illegal violence and plotting under the cover of legal peaceful behaviour.⁴⁸

The party was at first determined to contain both communists and the nationalists in its organisation and avoid rejecting national capitalism and petty Bourgeoisie.⁴⁹ At the beginning because of some nationalist personalities such as Soleyman Muhsen Iskandari and Nuroddin Alamuti, the party advocated a program of socio-economic reforms, emphasised its non communist character and reiterated its commitment to the existing Constitution.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, after the death of Soleiman Muhsen in 1942, the nature of the party gradually changed as the “national and democratic” framework gave way to a more Marxist pattern.⁵¹

Whether it was a national party or just had an international sympathy with the USSR, or was controlled by the Soviets, later, on 14 October 1984 Iraj Iskandari one of the *Tudeh* leaders revealed the two groupings inside the party which were formed on different ideological bases. One, which headed by Kiyanuri and Kambakhsh had the policy of dependence on and waiting for orders from the Soviets, Comintern and a variety of contacts with the Komitet Gossudarrstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Russian Committee of State Security, KGB). The other, democratic and independent wing lead by Iskandari and Radmanesh, insisted on Internationalism and in their support for the USSR and the socialist states, believed that the party’s policies should derive from the bottom and be taken at the top.⁵²

The party was in the beginning a major critic of the Tehran government, and opposed the institution of monarchy and the British “colonial imperialist” presence and its interference in Iran. It advocated socialist reforms and autonomy for the provinces of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan against the Tehran government. Later after the coup of 1953, there was confusion in adopting a proper and absolute decision which itself was due to the doubtful position of Moscow.⁵³ Some leaders of the *Tudeh* were in favour of advocating the collapse of the anti-nationalistic and anti-people régime of the Shah while the others just wanted the elimination of the

dictatorship and the establishment of democracy which itself would demolish the Shah's régime.⁵⁴

The *Tudeh* Party strove for a tight organisation and was exceedingly vocal, soliciting members from the newly formed trade unions. By mid-1943, when the elections for the Fourteenth *Majlis* began, the *Tudeh*, according to British officials, was the only party with a determined policy, a well-designed structure, and a nationwide organisation so that it could command eight seats of the 1944-1946 session of the *Majlis* for its candidates.

The *Tudeh*'s most notable success was in organising labour. On May Day 1944, a group of veteran Labor organisers closely associated with the *Tudeh* announced the merger of four union federations into *Showra-yi Motahedeh-yi Markazi-yi Karegaran*, (Central Council of Federated Trade Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers). This council began with sixty affiliates, some hundred thousand members, a newspaper and the determination to organise as soon as possible all urban wage earners except those employed in the military sectors. According to E. Abrahamian, the *Tudeh* party was the first party in Iranian history which "had reached down below the middle classes."⁵⁵

The *Tudeh* reached its zenith in August 1946, when Qavam in his second cabinet gave three ministries to the *Tudeh* leaders: Fereydun Keshavarz, Morteza Yazdi, and Iraj Iskandari. In the words of some *Tudeh* leaders there were about one million members and advocates of the party and its peripheral organisations and Yazdi promised that after the entrance of the camel's head (the three *Tudeh* Ministers in the Cabinet) the whole body will go (the *Tudeh* will occupy the whole power).⁵⁶

From October 1946, following the tribal revolts in the south and the reoccupation of the northern provinces, four years of intermittent repression of the *Tudeh* began and later, after an attempted assassination of the Shah while attending a ceremony at the Tehran University on 4 February 1949 by an accused *Tudeh* member Nasser Fakhr Arai,⁵⁷ the *Tudeh* Party suffered a more serious blow by being outlawed. The government invoked the 1931 law to ban the *Tudeh* as a communist organisation. It also charged the *Tudeh* with undermining the constitutional monarchy during 1944-1946 by inciting riots in Abadan, organising strikes in Khuzistan, arming workers in Mazandaran, and encouraging secessionists in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan.⁵⁸ Most of the members of its Central Committee managed to flee abroad, including ten who escaped from detention at Tehran at the end of 1950.

Nevertheless, although forced underground, the party continued its growing activities. The banned party paper, *Mardum*, continued to be printed secretly since October 1949, reaching an estimated circulation of 4000 in Tehran and 2000 in the provinces.⁵⁹ In 1950 other parties with a socialist program on their agenda were established, such as Toiler's party by Dr. Mozaffar Baqai, to speak for the Industrial workers of Iran and the Third Force by Khalil Maleki, a previous *Tudeh* leader, but the *Tudeh* Party was the dominant socialist grouping of intellectuals.

The rise of Dr. Musaddeq offered the party a new lease of life. The anti-British nationalism of the Musaddeq régime was most welcome to the *Tudeh* party enabling it to exploit the situation and direct part of its effort to discrediting the United States. Although the *Tudeh* party was officially opposed to the Musaddeq government,⁶⁰ it directed its major effort to helping it stay in power. In so acting, it followed a tactic of encouraging a bourgeois nationalist movement, attempting in due course to form a common front with the movement, and planning to take over from that movement should the opportunity present itself. Thus on 21 July 1952, the party took part in a mass demonstration in favour of Dr. Musaddeq, and a year later celebrated the anniversary of the occasion with a huge rally. The *Tudeh* demonstrators wanted a republic and pulled down every monument of the Shah in the streets.⁶¹

After the military coup of 1953, in September 1954 the so-called Organisation of *Tudeh* Officers came to light, and within a few days some 640 officers and non-commissioned officers of the armed forces were under arrest.⁶² Following military trials, a score of officers were executed and many others sentenced to long prison terms. The *Black Book* published by the government, traced connections of the group with the USSR and listed confessions of espionage activity. In addition, the organisation planned to assassinate Dr. Musaddeq after he had been successful in eliminating the monarchy from Iran and then stage an armed communist take-over of the government. According to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, they had even printed postage stamps in the name of "The People's Iranian Republic which was then to be proclaimed."⁶³

The shock of these disclosures spurred the *Majlis* to pass a Bill directed against organisations that promoted communism, that attacked Islam and the constitutional monarchy and that contained members of the *Tudeh* party or other groups declared to be illegal. Hereafter leaders of the *Tudeh* party who had fled from Iran established the headquarters of its Executive Committee at Leipzig, Soufeyeh and Baghdad broadcasting its attacks on the government of Iran from Radio *Peyk-i-Iran* (Iran Courier).⁶⁴

In 1965 in wake of the Sino-Soviet dispute, in order to revise Marxism into an “opportunistic non-revolutionary ideology,”⁶⁵ a new group called *Sazman-i Marksist-Leninist-i Tufan* (the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Storm) was formed by Qasemi and Foroutan, two of the Tudeh leaders.⁶⁶ Denouncing the Soviet theory of peaceful coexistence, this group aimed at Mao’s teachings to organise the peasantry for a mass armed struggle.⁶⁷ In 1966 members of the *Tudeh* youth section left the party and formed their own *Sazman-i Inqilabi-yi Hizb-i Tudeh dar Kharej* (Revolutionary Organisation of the *Tudeh* Party Abroad).⁶⁸ Although both the Storm group and the Revolutionary Organisation viewed themselves as Maoist, they were kept apart by generation differences⁶⁹ and doctrinal conflicts.⁷⁰ Despite these defects and setbacks, the *Tudeh* managed to survive and even regain some ground during the early 1970s. They were able to manage another attempt on the Shah’s life, on 10 April 1964 by Shams-Abadi, a young soldier, while he was at work.⁷¹

Referring to the tactics introduced by Lenin in his book entitled “Two tactics for the Social Democracies in a Democratic Revolution” which became the basis for the People’s United Front and the theoretical focus of the Conferences of the Communist Parties of the world in 1957, 1960 and 1969, the *Tudeh* party adopted the policy of unity with all forces fighting against the common foe so that in the meantime they could strengthen their positions and then in a “proper time” capture the political power from their previous associates.⁷²

Religious Movement

I call upon God Almighty as witness, and I swear upon the Quran and upon all that is respected by God to use the best of my power for the preservation of the independence of Iran and to defend the frontiers of the country and the rights of the nation, to be the guardian of the Constitutional Law of Iran and to rule according to it and the established laws, and to endeavour to protect the Ja’fariyah religion, and in all that I do to remember God, and not consider anything but the happiness and greatness of the state and nation of Iran. And I seek the aid of God, who helps mankind, to serve the progress of Iran. I seek the help of the souls of the great Masters of Islam.

This was the oath of office which Muhammad Reza took on the day of taking over the monarchy on 17th September 1941. According to the Article 39 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907, this oath afforded the Sovereign a wide scope of responsibility, especially in making him the guardian of the Constitution. Noticeable also is its emphasis on the religious background. Later in 1980, when the Shah had left the country for ever he wrote:

I have always considered that one of my most important duties was to preserve our religion and to give it its rightful place. An atheist civilisation is not truly civilised and I have always taken care that the White Revolution to which I have dedicated so many years of my reign should, on all points, conform to the principles of Islam. Religion is the cement which enables the social structure to stand up. It is the very basis of family life and the life of a nation.⁷³

Despite his oath to be the guardian of the Constitution and to protect the religion, and his notion to give the religion "its rightful place," he attempted several times to undermine the Constitution, to violate the Islamic law and to destroy the spiritual leadership of the Muslim Clergies (*ʿUlama* or *Ruhaniyat*).⁷⁴ This behaviour resulted from his character, his early training and his religious disbelief, which left a decisive majority of the people dissatisfied and make them hope for the overturn of the Shah's régime, as will be indicated below.

A revival of attention to religion had begun immediately after the fall of Reza Shah in the form of the reassertion of its position in various spheres, a reassertion of Islamic law, the re-establishment of those religious practices previously banned, and the publication of a large number of books on Islam. Most women for example had returned to the *chador*.

In 1943 *Anjoman-i Tabliqat-i Islami*, the Association of Islamic propaganda, had been established in order to propagate Islam, and publish Islamic literature. By 1957, the membership of the association had reached 10,000.⁷⁵ In the 1941-57 period the religious revival was still apolitical and concerned mainly with matters of faith and theology, although there were a few *Rohani*, such as the anti-British Ayatollah Kashani, opposing growing foreign influence and control.

In 1937, Sheikh Abdolkarim Ha'iri, a high religious leader and the founder of the theological school at Qum, died and the religious institution was temporarily headed by a triumvirate of his closest senior associates: Ayatollahs Sadr, Hujjat, and Khwansari. Soon, however, a single leader succeeded to the role of Ha'iri, Ayatollah Borujerdi. Although he was a religious leader of great piety and administrative ability, he remained almost totally inactive in political matters. Nevertheless, the Shah and his government could not initiate any radical changes in the social, economic and political affairs before they received his consent.

By contrast, in the early 1960s, following the death in 1960 of Ayatollah Borujerdi, there were signs of increasing political thought and activity among the *Ruhaniyat*. The Shah, seemingly relieved from religious pressure, embarked upon his secular plans. The major clerical figure who emerged from among the *Ruhaniyat* in 1962 and voiced the opposition of both kinds of the clerics was Ayatollah Khomeini.

Ayatollah Khomeini had long been active against anti-clerical trends and Western influence in Iran. While the others felt that the clergy should avoid “the dirty business” of politics and should concentrate on spiritual concerns, such as preaching the word of God, studying within the seminaries and training the future generation of theologians,⁷⁶ he insisted that in Islam legislation is a divine affair and called for the government to be closely guided by the *Holy Shari’at*.⁷⁷ Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that legislation would be valid only if passed by the *Majlis* and approved by the *Ruhaniyat* according to the Constitution.⁷⁸ He made this clear in 1962 when he stated:

We speak to the régime in its own accepted terms, not that the Constitution is, in our view perfect. Rather, if the *ulama* [*Ruhaniyat*] speak in terms of the Constitution, it is because Article 2 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law does not recognise any legislation opposed to the Quran as law otherwise than what is it to us. The only accepted law to us is the law of Islam ... the Traditions of the Prophet and the Imams. Whatever is in accord with the law of Islam we obey and whatever is opposed to Islam, even if it is the Constitution, we oppose.⁷⁹

On 8 October 1962, when the Shah promulgated a law abolishing the requirement that candidates for election to local assemblies be Muslim and the oath to be upon Quran, Ayatollah Khomeini, joined by religious leaders elsewhere in the country, protested vigorously against the measure as “it opposed the *Holy Shari’at*” and “explicitly contradicted the Constitution” calling it a plot “to abolish the holy Quran.” In response, the Shah, officially the protector of the religion, at first regarded these as “unimportant changes ... due to circumstances of the time,”⁸⁰ but, under the popular pressure, the law was ultimately repealed.

The next step toward secularism and the undermining of the religious institutions was taken in 1963, when the Shah began to promulgate a series of measures for reshaping the political, social, and economic life of Iran that were collectively designated the “White Revolution.” Regardless of vast opposition raised from the *Ruhaniyat*, the appearance of popular approval was obtained by a referendum held on 26 January 1963 in which, according to the daily newspapers, 5.6 million against 4150 people voted for the reformation.⁸¹

Muhammad Reza, in a speech delivered in Qum two days prior to the referendum, called the clergy a “black reaction” worse than a “red reaction” and a “hundred times more treacherous than the Tudeh party.”⁸² In a report prepared by the security police (SAVAK) in 1963, the number of *Ruhaniyat* and the theologian students throughout the country was estimated at 350,000.⁸³ The Shah’s practical reaction to this wide opposition appeared on 22 March 1963 when he sent paratroopers to attack Feyziyeh Madrasa. A number of theology students were

killed and the Madrasa was ransacked. This event marked the beginning of a new period of determined struggle that was directed not only against the errors and excesses of the régime, but against its very existence.

Throughout the spring of 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini continued to denounce the Shah's régime. He concentrated his attacks on its tyrannical nature, its subordination to the United States, and its expanding collaboration with Israel.⁸⁴ He referred to Iran and Islam and the threat to them from Western colonialism. He declared :

All the problems facing Iran and other Muslim nations are the work of America. Until recently, the British enslaved the Muslim nations; now they are under American bondage ... The Americans appoint *Majlis* Representatives; and attempt to eliminate Islam and the Quran because they find the *ulama* to be a hindrance to colonialism.⁸⁵

He denounced the régime for living off corruption, rigging elections, violating the Constitutional Law, stifling the press and the political parties, destroying the independence of the universities, neglecting the economic needs of merchants, workers, and peasants, undermining the country's Islamic belief, encouraging *qarbzadegi* - indiscriminate borrowing from the West - granting "capitulations" to foreigners, selling oil to Israel, and constantly expanding the size of the central bureaucracies.⁸⁶

The confrontation reached a new peak in June 1963 with the onset of Muharram.⁸⁷ On the tenth day of the month (2 June), Ayatollah Khomeini in a speech in Qum, repeated his denunciations of the Shah's régime, warning the Shah not to behave in such a way that the people would rejoice when he should ultimately be forced to leave the country. Two days later, he was arrested at his residence and taken to confinement in Tehran. The arrest of Imam Khomeini brought popular disgust with the Shah's régime to a climax. In a major uprising on 5 June in Qum, Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Kashan and other cities, unarmed demonstrators confronted the army, which upon the command to shoot to kill, slaughtered between 4 to 15 thousand people, (according to different sources,⁸⁸) in the space of a few days. The uprising was suppressed brutally.

The date on which this uprising began, 15 Khordad according to the solar calendar used in Iran, marked a turning point in the modern history of Iran. It established Ayatollah Khomeini as national leader and spokesman for popular aspirations, provided the struggle against the Shah and his foreign patrons with a coherent ideological basis in Islam,⁸⁹ and introduced a period of mass political activity under the guidance of religious leadership instead of the secular parties that had been discredited with the overthrow of Musaddeq. To Hamid Algar the

seriousness of this uprising “foreshadowed the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979.”⁹⁰

If further proof were needed of the Shah’s tutelage to the US, it came in October 1964, when judicial immunity (Capitulation) was granted to American personnel for all offences committed in Iranian territory. Even the *Majlis* had ratified this measure. On 27 October Ayatollah Khomeini furiously denounced this open violation of Iranian sovereignty and independence. It had by now become apparent to the Shah that Ayatollah Khomeini could not be intimidated into silence, and it was decided to send him into exile in Turkey and then Iraq, in the hope of destroying his influence. Khomeini’s fame and popularity was such that SAVAK took the unusual step of issuing the following public statement:

Since according to reliable information and sufficient evidence, Mr. Khomeini’s attitude and provocations have been considered contrary to the interests of the people and to the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the State, he has been exiled from Iran effective November 4, 1964.⁹¹

The régime continued its assault on the religious institutions. In 1967, the *Majlis* disregarding the *shari’at*, passed the Family Protection Law. This law gave secular courts jurisdiction over family disputes and restricted men’s rights over their wives. It stipulated that men could not divorce their wives without valid reasons and could not enter into polygamous marriages without written permission from their other wives. It also stipulated that wives had the right to petition for divorce and work outside the home without their husband’s permission. These clauses were henceforth to be inserted into all Muslim marriage contracts. This action by a constitutional government was not important because it deprived a sector of the society of any particular privilege, but it was an unforgivable contradiction of the Islamic law which the government was supposed to put into action and which the Shah had taken an oath to support. The Family Protection Law became associated with an increasingly unpopular régime and with Western-style mores disliked by religious people.

Furthermore, the Rastakhiz party, the single government party, claimed the Shah to be a spiritual as well as a political leader; denounced the *Ruhaniyat* as “medieval black reactionaries”; and, in declaring Iran to be on the road to the Great Civilisation, replaced the Muslim calendar with a new royalist calendar allocating 2,500 years for the whole monarchy and 35 years for the present monarch. In this way, Iran jumped overnight from the religious year 1355 to the royalist year 2535.

The Rastakhiz party also discouraged women from wearing the chador on university campuses; sent special investigators to scrutinise the accounts of the

religious endowments; announced that only the state-controlled *Sazeman-i Uqaf*, Organisation of Endowment, could publish theology books; encouraged the College of Theology in Tehran University to expand the recently created *sepah-i din* (religious corps), and sent more cadres into the countryside to teach peasants "true Islam."

These activities caused a sharp reaction among the *Ruhaniyat*. An exiled newspaper closely associated with the *Ruhaniyat*, accused the Rastakhiz party of nationalising religion; monopolising the publication of theology books and turning the farmers against the country's spiritual authorities.⁹² Feyzieh, the main seminary in Qum, closed down in protest; but the government reaction was the same as to any other opposition. Ayatollah Hassan Qaffari, a sixty-year-old cleric in Tehran, was arrested for writing against the régime. While in prison, he died mysteriously. Hojjatolislam Shamsabadi, a prominent cleric in Isfahan, was murdered a few days after preaching against the new calendar. This resulted to a general strike in the Isfahan bazaar organised by the local *Ruhaniyat*. What is more, Ayatollah Khomeini, from his exile in Iraq, advised all true believers to stay away from the Rastakhiz party. This party, he argued, not only violated individual rights, constitutional liberties, and international laws, but also intended to destroy Islam, ruin agriculture, waste resources on useless weapons, and plunder the country on behalf of American imperialism.⁹³ A few days after this proclamation, the government arrested and imprisoned Khomeini's close associates in Iran, including many clerics who were to play prominent roles after the Islamic revolution.

Ayatollah Khomeini's central thesis, as an alternative to the Shah's régime, was developed in his exile in Iraq. In his treatise entitled *Velayat-i Faqih: Hokumat-i Islami* (The Theologian Jurisprudent's Guardianship: Islamic Government), he put forward the idea that only *Faqih*, a theologian with the knowledge of the Divine Law, could be the legitimate ruler. Accordingly there would be no separation between secular and religious powers in Islam.⁹⁴ The Ayatollah contended that the most important aspect of Islam does not concern private religion and individual salvation but the political life of the state.⁹⁵ To him:

Islamic government is not dictatorial or absolutist but limited and conditioned. Of course not constitutional in its present ordinary sense in which legislation is based on the votes of the individuals and the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are bound by a collection of conditions defined by the Quran and the Traditions of the Prophet. ... Thus, Islamic government is the rule by the Divine Law of the people ... No one has the right to legislate and no such legislation can be put into execution. ... In this system of government sovereignty originates in God, and Law is the word of God. In this regard the ruler must have two characteristics; knowledge of the Law and Justice. He must have the knowledge of the Law because the Islamic government is the rule of law and not the arbitrary rule of persons. In this sense only the *Faqih* can be the righteous ruler.⁹⁶

On 7 January 1978, one week after President Carter had been in Tehran lauding the Shah as a wise statesman beloved of his people, the government-controlled press printed an article attacking Ayatollah Khomeini as a foreign agent.⁹⁷ The public reaction was immediate outrage so that General Fardust, who headed the Shah's intelligence office (Daftar-i Vizheh) regarded it "the beginning of the revolution."⁹⁸ The following day in Qum, demonstrations broke out that were suppressed with a heavy loss of life. This was the first of a series of demonstrations that progressively unfurled across the country until in the end, barely a single region remained untouched by revolutionary fervour.

Thus the Rastakhiz party, whose aim was to strengthen the régime, further institutionalise the monarchy, and firmly anchor the state into the wider society instead weakened the whole régime, cut the monarchy further off from the country, and intensified resentment among diverse groups. Mass mobilisation meant mass manipulation, which, in turn, produced mass dissatisfaction. Instead of forging new links, the party destroyed the few existing ones and in the process stirred up a host of dangerous enemies.

When the disturbances began, the demonstrations were held under purely religious slogans, the main one of which was Allah o Akbar, (God is Greater). Then political slogans began to appear. The centrality of the Ayatollah in the revolutionary movement was obvious from the beginning. His name was constantly repeated in the slogans that were devised and chanted in the demonstrations. The name of Khomeini as the leader of the movement was mentioned with increasing frequency. Allah o Akbar, Khomeini Rahbar, (God is Greater, Khomeini is the Leader). The name of Khomeini as leader was "on the lips of Iranians throughout the country."⁹⁹ The demonstrators demanded the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic government under the leadership of the Ayatollah, who was now referred to as Imam Khomeini.

Democratic Movement

In 19th and first half of the 20th century Iranian intelligentsia had advocated extreme nationalism, democracy and socialism, while Islam as a political ideology had very little appeal for them. From the early 1960s however, the spread of political Islam and the revival of interest in Islamic themes among the intellectuals turned it into an influential political ideology. The development and spread of political Islam amongst a segment of the modern intelligentsia began to surface in a new revolutionary ideology aimed at a radical alteration of the *status quo*. This movement could be distinguished from the previous Islamic movement as it reacted mainly against dictatorship and despotism.

In 1950 the National Front included the Iran party, the Toilers' Party, some religious leaders, and independent Representatives in the *Majlis*. The parliamentary nucleus of the National Front was made up of the small *Fraksiyon-i Vatan* (Fatherland Faction), composed of the seven National Front Representatives and Allahyar Salih, a Representative for Kashan. Yet this faction was qualitatively superior to all its rivals: none of its members was susceptible to charges of corruption, incompetence, allegiance to foreign powers¹⁰⁰ or lack of moral integrity or courage, and no one could deny the authenticity of their election to the *Majlis* or the strength of their social prestige and popularity. The National Front Representatives enjoyed the sympathy of a number of their parliamentary colleagues, but the real source of their support and inspiration lay outside the *Majlis*, among various urban middle class strata: the intelligentsia, the politicised merchants, shopkeepers and artisans of the bazaar, and certain guilds in particular.

The National Front's ideology was broadly anti-authoritarian, with a strong nationalist component; its immediate policy was to oppose the Supplemental Oil Agreement in particular, and British influence in Iran in general. Its ultimate aim was the consolidation of parliamentary institutions and properly observed constitutional principles, as well as the establishment of real independence.

After the coup of 1953, Dr. Musaddeq was sentenced to three year's imprisonment, and after his release he was confined on his estate at Ahmadabad until his death in 1967. He never again played an active role in politics, although he remained a symbol around which others mobilised support. His most vehement nationalist followers gathered into the underground *Nehzat-i Moqavemat-i Melli* (National Resistance Movement) which put out a clandestine paper, *The Path of Musaddeq*, in 1956 and in 1957.

In July 1960 when political control was relaxed, the National Front II was reactivated in order to contest the elections for the twentieth *Majlis*. It was

composed of the Iran party, the Pan-Iran Party, elements of the Third Force, the National Resistance Movement and the People of Iran party. Their demand was "restoration of the constitutional government" and an estimated 80,000 people attended their first public meeting.¹⁰¹ The Second National Front did not propose anything except that it wanted a "free poll," and even in that case they had no chance of success,¹⁰² for with the exercise of economic and social reforms in the White Revolution the weapons had been taken out of the hands of the National Front and its followers did not know whether to confront the reform proposals or to vote for the referendum. H. Katouzian, explaining the political stand of the Front, says how in the last days of the referendum, a communique was released and incompletely distributed in Tehran and one or two cities which asked the people to say yes to the land reform and no to the dictatorship.¹⁰³ Yet after this interlude, the National Front II adopted a cautious "wait and see" policy and in the end it was crushed as its predecessor had been, by repression, in June 1963. Nevertheless following the uprising of June 1963 the National Front, including *Nehzat-i Azadi*, the Freedom Movement, formed the Third National Front and continued to hold secret meetings in Tehran and to organise abroad, particularly in North America and France.

In the category of democratic movement were some individuals such as Dr. Shari'ati (1933-77), Dr. Bani-Sadr (1933-), Jalal-i Al-i Ahmad (1923-69), and groups such as the Party of the Islamic Nations, the Revolutionary Movement of the Muslim People, the Islamic Movement of Councils and other groupings emerging from among urban educated youth predominantly from bazaari backgrounds in the mid 1960s. Some of these organisations were military in nature such as Sazeman-i Mojahedin-i Khalq (the People's Fighters) but they were all opposed to Western capitalism and imperialism, class inequalities and the Shah's despotism as the main long-range enemies, and offered a radical interpretation of Islam bordering on social democracy.¹⁰⁴ They advocated the establishment of an Islamic order based on popular councils, which they considered to be the main form of government in Islam. For instance Dr. Payman, the head of National Freedom Movement and associate of Dr. Shari'ati offered arguments similar to that of Bani-Sadr about the communal nature of property in Islam.¹⁰⁵

Except for the self-autonomous revolts which were carried out at times in the bordering provinces, the two communist and democratic movements were forced to keep themselves in line with the popular opposition of the *Ruhaniyat*. These two movements accepted the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and rallied behind him thereby creating a broad alliance of social forces ranging from the bazaars and the clergy to the intelligentsia and the urban poor, as well as of political

organisations varying from the religious Freedom Movement and the secular National Front to the new guerrilla groups emerging from Shari'ati's followers in the universities. To Ervand Abrahamian, Ayatollah Khomeini "was a major innovator in Iran both because of his political theory and because of his religious-oriented populist strategy."¹⁰⁶ In the face of this pervasive opposition, the Shah's régime was becoming increasingly unpopular and fragile.

The reaction of the Shah was to suppress all of these movements. In early 1975, the London-based Amnesty International found that Iran was one of the world's "worst violators of human rights". The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva took the régime to task for "systematically using torture" and "violating the basic civil rights of its citizens." Likewise, the UN-affiliated International League for Human Rights sent an open letter to the Shah in which it accused the régime of intensely abusing human rights and called upon him to "rectify the deplorable human rights situation in Iran."¹⁰⁷ Even influential newspapers that had previously praised the Shah now were encouraged to criticise his police methods. For example, the Sunday Times of London ran a series of exposés on SAVAK and concluded that "there was a clear pattern" of torture used not only against active dissidents but also against intellectuals who dared whisper criticisms of the régime."¹⁰⁸

Finally, Jimmy Carter, in the 1976 presidential primaries, while championing the cause of human rights throughout the world, specifically named Iran as one of the countries in which America should do more to protect civil and political liberties. Carter's election certainly had an immediate impact on both the Shah and the opposition.¹⁰⁹ The former did not want to jeopardise his "special relations" with Washington and his access to American arms. Moreover, he was convinced that his reforms were so popular that he could relax controls without endangering the whole régime. As he confidently told foreign correspondents in early 1975, the opposition was limited to a handful of nihilists, anarchists, and communists.¹¹⁰ The latter also felt that the White House-for the first time since Kennedy's administration-was willing to protect moderate dissenters from SAVAK onslaughts. As Bazargan, the first post-Revolution Prime Minister, put it after the Revolution: Carter's election made it possible for Iran to breathe again.¹¹¹

The program to relax police controls began in early 1977 included amnesty of 357 political prisoners in February and permission for the International Commission of the Red Cross to visit twenty prisons and see some 3,000 prison inmates in March of that year. In April the Shah also promised to improve prison conditions and in late May, he agreed to amend court procedures to better protect the rights

of political detainees.¹¹² In July, the Shah dismissed Hoveyda and gave the premiership to Jamshid Amouzegar, who headed the more liberal “progressive wing” of the Rastakhiz party. However despite this relaxation, he still excluded the most effective opposition movement, the religious movement which vigorously continued to aim at the destruction of the Shah’s régime and establishment of an Islamic régime. As a result martial law took the place of the relaxation policy and military suppression continued with even more brutality against the religious uprisings of Qum, Tabriz, Yazd, Shiraz and Isfahan. The outstanding massacres were the Rex Cinema in Abadan on 19 August 1978 and Friday 8 September 1978 in Tehran (later became known as Black Friday) including Jaleh Square where 400-700 people were burned alive in a sealed cinema and an unknown number of protesters were shot dead respectively.¹¹³ In the following section the structure of the government of the Shah will be examined.

The Military Government

As explained above in Chapter 3, the Constitutional Law had provided a ceremonial position for the Shah and vested the superior power in the *Majlis*. Up to the nineteenth session of the *Majlis*, inaugurated in 1956, some 136 members were elected for terms of two years. Then the term was increased to four years¹¹⁴ and the number of Representatives was periodically increased in proportion to the rise in the population to provide one Representative for every 100,000 people. Thus, the twenty-third *Majlis*, inaugurated in 1971, had 268 members. Although the Senate was provided for in the Constitution, it was not brought into legal being until 1949 and first met in 1950. It numbered 60 members: 30 were appointed by the Shah, 15 elected from Tehran and 15 from the rest of the country. Its role was to act, if necessary, as a conservative check upon the more exuberant *Majlis*.¹¹⁵

Following the abdication of Reza Shah, the Shah’s position and its sphere of influence were considerably reduced to what the Constitution had already defined as purely ceremonial. The Shah was formally charged to nominate the prime minister and after he had chosen his fellow ministers, to obtain a vote of confidence from the *Majlis* who had the right to refuse to giving its vote of confidence to the prime minister.¹¹⁶ He was to sign decrees which were already signed by a minister. He could pardon criminals, send diplomatic delegations abroad and receive foreign emissaries; and he could hold ceremonial consultations with Ministers of the Cabinet or Members of the *Majlis*.

He appeared at first to be genuinely interested in the Constitution and in democracy. His succession to the throne was publicised as the dawn of a new era of parliamentary government and the strict enforcement of the Constitution. The

Shah was expected to respect his undertakings in regard to the Constitution and he frequently spoke publicly of his democratic convictions.

However Muhammad Reza did not restrict himself to this ceremonial position as the Cabinet sessions were often held in his presence. His most significant role was his incumbency of the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces¹¹⁷ which accounted for much of his influence. These two were the major pillars from which he tried to expand his authority throughout the country, as he continuously attempted to increase his control over society and politics and suppress any opposition movement especially since the 1953 coup. In the words of one American observer:

The entire reign of the Shah [Muhammad Reza], with temporary setbacks can be characterised as a quarter century in which the civil and military bureaucracies have continually expanded their control over the activities of the population at large, while the Shah has even more relentlessly expanded his power over the bureaucracies [W]ithout the aid of advisory councils, alter egos, or close confidants, [he] makes the thousands of decisions that allow the government to function. From the appointment or promotion of officers in the army to the decisions as to whether or not to pave the main street of Tabas, His Imperial Majesty is the arbiter.¹¹⁸

After his trip to London on 18 July 1948, despite his privileged power position, Muhammad Reza began to enhance his prerogatives¹¹⁹ formally through the revision of the Constitution aiming to maximise his control over the executive. Therefore, in a speech from the throne in February 1950, he expressed "his desire to promulgate a new Constitution ... to give the sovereign the power to dissolve the Chamber of Representatives."¹²⁰ Article 48 of the revised Constitution of 1950 gave him what he called "this absolutely essential power."¹²¹

From the time of his restoration, Muhammad Reza was determined never to allow a Musaddeq type of situation to recur. This meant emulating his father in ignoring the main thrust of the Constitution. Therefore elections of the eighteenth *Majlis* early in 1954 were firmly controlled and candidates were chosen by the government so that it, like subsequent *Majlises*, was subservient to the Shah. In 1955 the Shah dismissed Zahedi, the Prime Minister, whom the Americans had seen as Iran's real strongman, and the Shah became Iran's single ruler.

Before the coup there were two political parties, SUMKA and Arya, which were established to support the Shah and maintain the key government positions.¹²² Despite the fact that a formal party system had existed since 1957, after the coup no independent political activity of any kind was allowed. From that event until 1975 the Shah allowed two political parties to operate: the "government" Melliyun, later Iran Novin Party, and the "opposition" Mardum Party.

Each proposed candidates for the *Majlis*. But these parties were not allowed to suggest any candidates without these first being approved by SAVAK, and the limits of criticism were laid down. The *Majlis* to which they were elected were powerless, and the prime minister was an appointee of the Shah. No one really believed that this system represented anything like a two-party system, but the Shah himself claimed to take it seriously and declared that: "If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organised or such as you find today in communist countries."¹²³

In practice these organisations were without substance and both wholly under the Shah's domination. On a couple of occasions when the leaders of the Mardum Party did step out of line and voiced serious criticisms, they were dismissed; in 1972 Ali Khani was sacked, and in 1974 his successor Nasser Ameri met the same fate.¹²⁴

Under Muhammad Reza's direction, the dramatic growth of the bureaucracy enabled the state to penetrate more deeply into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. In the towns, the state expanded to the point that it hired as many as one out of every two full-time employees. The state bureaucracy grew from 12 ministries with some 90,000 civil servants in 1941 to 19 ministries with some 350,000 government employees in 1973.¹²⁵ The new ministries included that of Labor and Social Services, Art and Culture, Housing and Town Planning, Information and Tourism, Science and Higher Education, Health and Social Welfare, and Rural Cooperatives and Village Affairs. By the same token, the number of provinces increased from 10 to 23. They consisted of Tehran, Gilan, Mazandaran, Zanjan, Semnan, West Azarbaijan, East Azarbaijan, Khorasan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Hamedan, Isfahan, Chahar Mahal and Bakhtiyari, Boir Ahmad, Kerman, Sistan and Baluchestan, Fars, Bushehr, Yazd, Ilam, Hormozgan, Luristan, and Khuzistan.

In the countryside, the government extended its reach into distant districts, and, for the first time in Iranian history, supplanted the local khans, kadkhodas, and landlords as the real ruler of the rural masses. For centuries, intermediaries such as local magnates had acted as buffers between the rural population and the government. Now nothing stood between the rural population and the gigantic government bureaucracy that not only regulated agricultural prices, water distribution, and the few remaining migratory routes, but also administered state farms and closely supervised 8,500 state cooperatives with 1,700,000 members. In the words of one anthropologist who has studied the remote Boir Ahmadi tribe, the state finally fulfilled its ancient dream of gaining absolute control over the rural masses:

One is amazed at the high level of centralisation achieved within the last decade. The government now interferes in practically all aspects of daily life. Land is contracted for cash by the government, fruits get sprayed, crops fertilised, animals fed, beehives set up, carpets woven, goods sold, babies born, populations controlled, women organised, religion taught, and diseases cured-all by the intervention of the government.¹²⁶

The bureaucracy so thoroughly penetrated the rural population that in 1974 the government drew up plans to reorganise the whole countryside, depopulating some regions, repopulating others. A senior official told an American visitor, "there are too many villages in Iran. A lot of them are inaccessible. We can't get to them. We are planning them into what we call poles."¹²⁷

By 1975, however, the Shah had decided to finish this charade, to undertake a more active policy designed to mobilise support for the régime and to strengthen his political role, not merely in a passive but in an active way within Iranian society. In an unanticipated initiative on 4 March 1974 he announced the establishment of a new single party, called the Rastakhiz or Rastakhiz Party. The thinking behind the founding of the Rastakhiz Party, according to Muhammad Reza was that:

For the time being, this one party, by including members of every social class and people of every shade of opinion, and by its constructive liberalism, would save time and men. Since there would be no opposition, no important personalities would be excluded from government whenever their party lost an election. I could depend on the service of all the most able men.¹²⁸

But Fred Halliday believed that the party was designed "to generate support for the régime and to provide a means of forcing people to compromise themselves by declarations of loyalty."¹²⁹ Whereas the two earlier entities had little real organisation outside the *Majlis* this was to become a mass party. Hereafter all Iranians were pressured to join it. The Shah's own words on the matter were blunt enough:

We must straighten out Iranians' ranks. To do so, we divide them into two categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the Constitution and the Sixth Bahman Revolution [the date on which the White Revolution was announced in 1963] and those who don't ... A person who does not enter the new political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles which I referred to, will have only two choices. He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organisation, or is related to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words is a traitor. Such an individual belongs in an Iranian prison, or if he desires he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees; he can go anywhere he likes, because he is not an Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to the law.¹³⁰

The state's control extended more than ever into all areas of Iranian public life. The press was under state control and no individual or other political organisation could operate since SAVAK was to crush all individuals and organisations critical of

the régime. By the end of 1975, twenty two prominent poets, novelists, professors, theatre directors, and film makers were in jail for criticising the régime. And many others had been physically attacked for refusing to cooperate with the authorities. Similarly, a report published by the highly reputed International Commission of Jurists in Geneva concluded that the régime systematically used censorship and torture to intimidate the public.¹³¹

As a result of these pressures, by 1977 it was claimed that five million Iranians had joined the party¹³² and local cells were established throughout the country.¹³³ When foreign journalists pointed out that such language differed sharply from the pronouncements in favour of the two-party system, the Shah retorted: "Freedom of thought! Freedom of thought! Democracy, democracy! With five-year-olds going on strike and parading in the streets! ... Democracy? Freedom? What do these words mean? I don't want any part of them."¹³⁴

The Cabinet as a collective body in which the executive branch was invested, had been characterised by Cabinet instability. During the 37 year course of this period, 22 prime ministers formed 30 Cabinets which underwent several major reshuffles. The average duration of each Cabinet, irrespective of reshuffles, was 14 months. Although cabinet instability greatly vitiated the efficacy of the government, it did not significantly affect the position of the Shah. Most of the decisions were still taken by the Shah on his own. He did his utmost to discourage criticism, even among his closest advisers. In these circumstances, rather than expose themselves to his wrath, his ministers preferred to submit even the most trivial problems to him in advance. F. Hoveyda explains how Muhammad Reza expected to be consulted by the Minister of Health even on the most minor detail.¹³⁵

Reports of cabinet meetings or of other government discussions between the Shah and his subordinates suggest that these were stilted affairs, in which little adequate or open discussion took place.¹³⁶ And it may be this as much as deliberate exaggeration on his part which accounts for the Shah's ability to make wholly unreasonable predictions about Iran's future capacities in the economic and military field.¹³⁷ Amir Abbas Hoveida, being appointed as Prime Minister in January 1965, lasted at the post until 1977 - the longest tenure for any prime minister in modern Iran. Nevertheless he never regarded himself more than a secretary to "the Boss."¹³⁸ Although SAVAK functioned under the office of the prime minister, it was only nominally attached to it. Legislative and Judiciary were both "silent executives"¹³⁹ of the Shah's order because the Shah could not stand anyone criticising him.¹⁴⁰

The army as the second major pillar of his government was of a great importance which in practice had more priority to that of the state bureaucracy. Muhammad Reza, a second-lieutenant in the time of his father, as a monarch was referred to as the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. The War Ministry had been assigned a major role in coordinating the activities of the government with the wishes of the Shah-army complex. After Reza's abdication, although the Ministry lost its importance, it remained a one-way channel which did not extend the authority of the executive over the army, but the influence of the Shah over the Cabinet. The real centre of gravity in the army became the office of the Chief of General Staff, which was beyond effective governmental control. The Chief of General Staff, along with all other senior officers, was installed or dismissed on the direct order or with the knowledge of Muhammad Reza, and all movement of personnel as well as promotions and demotions were carefully controlled and assessed by him. Not only the army but all military forces were directly under the Shah's control so that even the Prime Minister had no influence over them.¹⁴¹

The function of the army was not simply to safeguard "law and order": nor was its vocation a purely military one. It was, as F. Azimi argues: "a strategic instrument of considerable bargaining value in the hands of the monarchy in its attempt to outweigh its rivals and defeat and chastise its enemies."¹⁴² The army was an indispensable instrument at election times, as it could influence the outcome of elections.¹⁴³ Therefore the Shah had every reason to make the army his prime political concern and to maintain its expansion and morale. According to the British Legation:

[Ibrahim] Zand was the first civilian to be Minister of War for a long time, and the general opinion was that the Shah was determined to become commander-in-chief of the army in fact as well as in name, and to circumvent the weak civilian Minister by issuing orders through its Chief of Staff, despite the decree he had signed in spring [1943] making the General Staff subordinate to the Minister of War.¹⁴⁴

Yet the concentration of power in the office of the General Staff was essential if the Shah was to maintain his position as the effective commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the army to play a significant role in Iranian politics. As a British official perceptively observed: "As long as the present Shah remains on the throne, the Army will play an increasingly preponderant role in all the country's affairs, and will remain as at present, the main instrument of internal policy."¹⁴⁵

Martial law remained imposed on Tehran and other areas during the greater part of period 1941-53 until a military coup in 1953 brought about the complete domination of the Shah and his army. He placed the coup d'état leaders in key positions; for example, General Zahedi became Prime Minister, General Bakhtiyar

military governor of Tehran. From 1963, the armed forces assumed wider responsibilities for the administration of civilian actions such as building roads, and of noncombat "corps"- the Literacy Corps, Health Corps, Development and Rural Extension Corps, and Justice.¹⁴⁶ Senior officers were assigned to traditionally civilian posts and enjoyed privileged positions, accumulating considerable wealth, and appeared to recognise no object of loyalty but the throne. Even though the army did not intervene on the streets between 1963 and 1978 when the army officially took control of the cabinet, it remained ready to do so. The Shah used martial law, military tribunals, and the 1931 decree against "collectivist ideology" to crush all opposition movements. Provincial governors used the gendarmerie and the town police to tightly supervise parliamentary elections and thereby control both the *Majlis* and the Senate.

With the substantial oil revenues, together with \$500 million worth of military aid sent by the United States between 1953 and 1963, the Shah was able to expand the armed forces from 120,000 men to over 200,000 and raise the annual military budget from \$80 million in 1953 to nearly \$183 in 1963,¹⁴⁷ to \$1.8 billion in 1973, and after the quadrupling of oil prices, to \$7.3 billion in 1977.¹⁴⁸ The law providing for compulsory military service was enacted in 1971 according to which the national military conscription was for 25 years: 2 years of active military service, 6 years of stand-by military service, 8 years of first-stage reserve, and 9 years of second-stage reserve. Therefore the size of the military forces increased to 413,000 in 1978.¹⁴⁹

Buying more than \$16 billion worth of Western-manufactured arms between 1972 and 1977 alone¹⁵⁰, the Shah built up a vast ultra sophisticated arsenal that included, among other weapons, dozens of fighter and transport planes, helicopters, hovercrafts, tanks, and naval destroyers. By 1977, Iran had the largest navy in the Persian Gulf to "reach the farthest shores of the Indian Ocean,"¹⁵¹ the most up-to-date air force in the Middle East "which would have been superior to that of any European NATO country,"¹⁵² and the fifth largest military force in the world and was "the only country in that part of the world capable of building up such a deterrent power".¹⁵³ As if this were not enough, the Shah placed orders for another \$12 billion worth of arms to be delivered between 1978 and 1980. These included hundreds of fighter planes, helicopters and nuclear submarines. The Shah also earmarked \$20 billion for a crash program to build 12 nuclear plants in the course of the next decade. This program had military implications, since it would have enabled Iran to produce enriched uranium- a vital element in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁴

The Shah's military interests were not confined to arms purchases and annual budgets. He continued to take a keen interest in the wellbeing of his officers, supervising their training, participating in their military manoeuvres, and giving them attractive salaries, generous pensions, and sundry fringe benefits, including frequent travel abroad, modern medical facilities, comfortable housing, and low-priced department stores.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, he personally checked all promotions above the rank of major. He performed most state functions, even totally civilian ones, such as the distribution of land reforms deeds, wearing a military uniform; and often praised the officer corps for saving the nation in the 1953 coup. Furthermore, he assigned to senior officers the task of running the much-publicised literacy corps and the large state enterprises, particularly the major industrial installations. The destiny of the monarchy and the officer corps became so interwoven that the Shah, in an interview with an American academic, described himself not as the state, like Louis XIV, but as the army, in the true tradition of Reza Shah.¹⁵⁶

A component of the military system, responsible for everyday repression was a new secret police named *Sazman-i Ittela'at va Amniyat-i Keshvar* (The Intelligence and Security Organization of the Country), under its acronym SAVAK. To bolster the military power base and "to combat communist subversion,"¹⁵⁷ as Muhammad Reza put it, SAVAK was instituted in 1957 and expanded to a total of over 5,300 full-time agents and a large but unknown number of part-time informers.¹⁵⁸ Directed mostly by General Nasiri, one of the Shah's old associates, SAVAK had the power to censor the media, screen applicants for government jobs and, according to reliable Western sources, use all means necessary, including torture, to hunt down dissidents.¹⁵⁹ In the words of one British correspondent, SAVAK was the Shah's "eyes and ears, and, where necessary, his iron fist."¹⁶⁰

In addition to SAVAK, the security organisations included the Imperial Inspectorate and the J2 Bureau. The former, established in 1958, was under the control of General Fardust. Its main function was to watch SAVAK, guard against military conspiracies, and report on the financial dealings of the wealthy families. The latter organisation, created in 1963, was modelled after the French Deuxieme Bureau. A part of the armed services, it not only gathered military intelligence, but also kept a close watch on both SAVAK and the Imperial Inspectorate.¹⁶¹ With jail, torture, or even death as the possible stakes, it is not surprising that even underground or exile opposition groups were decimated and suspicious or that within Iran people were increasingly hesitant to discuss politics at all.

According to General Fardust out of 2,200 billion rials of annual revenue in 1971, the military forces including army, gendarmerie and the police were allocated

690 billion rials which constituted almost 31.4 per cent of the revenue.¹⁶² Throughout the 1973-8 Five Year Plan, the Shah continued to spend 31 per cent of the revenue on military expenditure.¹⁶³

Counting his monarchy as an alternative both to anarchy and dictatorship, Muhammad Reza had come to the belief that it was his right to rule in this way. In his own words: "when there's no monarchy, there's anarchy, or a dictatorship. Besides, a monarchy is the only possible means to govern Iran. ... To get things done, one needs power, and to hold on to power one mustn't ask anyone's permission or advice."¹⁶⁴

Table 4-1. Budgetary Allocations 1943-1963 (in thousand rials)

Ministry	1943	1948	1955	1959	1963
War	1,000,000	1,719,900	4,500,000	8,217,000	12,643,000
Culture	251,850	710,300	2,537,261	5,233,446	9,683,400
Interior	553,585	1,098,000	1,959,869	4,002,151	4,750,100
Finance	269,810	1,301,281	1,694,815	1,293,076	1,451,100
Justice	98,007	184,320	565,267	842,124	1,536,650
Health	83,620	234,000	529,300	1,197,930	1,456,918
Trade	25,400	42,649	95,379	82,984	1,525,900 ^a
Agriculture	130,671	81,198	314,475	776,390	1,185,510
Post & Telegraph	133,000	215,000	390,160	866,321	970,000
Road	143,690	117,749	441,151	1,557,780	894,800
Foreign Affairs	45,500	79,000	160,000	513,025	419,600
Imperial Court	7,792	20,000	47,778	129,528	152,000
Industry & Mining	-	-	-	143,293	-
Labour		20,000	32,370	86,616	126,000

^a: Included Industry as well.

Source: Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Planning and Budget, *Majmoueh-yi Qavanin Budgeh*, [Collection of Budgetary laws].

National Economy in Deficit

Reza Shah's detailed program of industrialisation, which was interrupted by World War II resumed at an even faster pace, aided first by funds supplied by agencies of the United States, and then financed by the budgets of the Plan Organisation, by funds from ordinary government revenues, and by local and foreign investors. By a law approved by the *Majlis* on 12 November 1942, Millspaugh was employed as the Director-General of Iranian finances for a period of five years with extensive authority to regulate finances deal with the problems of food supply and shortages, stabilise and freeze prices, improve transportation and

modify the budget. Millspaugh arrived in Iran in February 1943. Approximately three weeks later Millspaugh submitted an income tax Bill to the *Majlis*.

In 1949 the *Majlis* approved the First Seven-Year Plan and empowered a Plan Organisation to implement it. Beginning in 1950, the Plan Organisation was to receive all the income from the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The nationalisation of the oil industry and the resulting loss of oil income had a damaging effect on this plan so that "only 16 percent of the projects were executed, most of them of the so-called impact variety."¹⁶⁵

Including part of the first program, the Second Seven-Year Plan ran from September 1955 to September 1962. Its authorisation was for \$930 million, later increased to \$1.10 billion, of which amount \$1 billion was actually spent in the fields of transport and communications, agriculture and irrigation, the construction of several large dams, and industry and mines. The oil revenue going to the Plan was cut to 80 percent of the total and then to 60 percent: this short fall in funding was met in part by long-term loans totalling \$362.9 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund, and other sources.

The Third Plan ran from September 1962 until March 1968. It differed radically from the first two in that instead of being a series of individual projects of widely varying magnitude it represented a comprehensive scheme to integrate all normal and development expenditures and programs in order to increase the GNP by at least 6 percent a year. It was to be financed mainly from oil revenues, starting from 55 percent of the total in 1962 and rising to 80 percent in 1968. The success of this Plan was reflected in the fact that the GNP grew by more than 8 percent annually.

The Fourth Plan ran from March 1968 until March 1972. It envisaged the spending of \$6.4 billion on new development projects, continuing expenditure on Third Plan Project, external debt repayment, administrative expenses and sundry projects. The major source of its funds were represented by 80 percent of oil revenues. During the course of the Plan the GNP grew over 10 percent annually.

The Fifth Plan ran from March 1973 until March 1978. It envisaged total expenditures of \$32.4 billion. The text of the law authorising this Plan enabled the government to obtain foreign loans and verdicts of up to \$6 billion and \$5 billion from local borrowing, from banks and other sources. Allocations for social welfare were five times as great as in the Fourth Plan, and those for agriculture nearly three times as large. The GNP was expected to grow at 11.4 percent annually.¹⁶⁶

Besides these economic development plans, other programs of socio-economic reforms were anticipated which were put into action together under the name of the White Revolution. On 9 January 1963, the Shah introduced to the first national congress of agricultural co-operatives which was meeting in Teheran, the six principles of his White Revolution which later amounted to nineteen. Taking as his motto of "To every man according to his work and his effort,"¹⁶⁷ he stated that he wished to do something which seemed impossible with the seven-year economic plans:

no one can ever revive the régime of slavery to which our peasants were subjected; so that a minority can never again exploit the riches of the nation for their profit alone, so that the private interests of an individual or a group of individuals may never destroy nor alter the effects of these revolutionary changes.¹⁶⁸

The major emphasis in these reforms was on economy and the improvement in the standard of living of the peasants and labours, which constituted the majority of the people and industrial working class. The principles were as follows:

1. Agrarian reform: the distribution of land to those who worked on it,
2. Nationalisation of forests and pasture land,
3. Transformation of state enterprises into anonymous companies, the shares of which would serve to guarantee agrarian reform,
4. Workers sharing in company profits,
5. Electoral law reform. Universal suffrage and particularly votes for women,
6. The creation of an Education Corps made up of bachelor conscripts who render a civil service by teaching in the villages,
7. Creation (21 January 1964) of a Hygiene Corps. Conscripted medical and dentistry students and nurses etc. to give free services and teach in the villages,
8. Creation (23 September 1964) of a Development and Reconstruction Corps. Conscripts collaborate in agricultural modernisation and in modernisation of villages and towns,
9. Institution of village tribunals called "houses of justice,"
10. Nationalisation of water,
11. National plan for urban life with the collaboration of the Development Corps,
12. Administrative reform, tied to the reform of national education,
13. Sale to workers of up to 49% of shares in large production companies. Shares were bought with State loans which were repaid from dividends (implemented in August 1975),
14. Defence of the consumer: struggle against inflation by price control (implemented in August 1975),

15. Free and obligatory primary education for eight years and further education for those undertaking to serve the state for the same length of time as their secondary and university education lasted (implemented in December 1975),

16. Free food for needy mothers and new-born babies for up to two years (implemented in December 1975),

17. Extension of social security and old age pensions to all Iranians (implemented in December 1975),

18. Fight against speculation in land and real estate: it was a question of preventing or slowing down the rise in the cost of land, flats and rent etc.(implemented in 1977)

19. Fight against corruption, bribery, etc.(implemented in 1975),¹⁶⁹

At the end of all these long-term plans and the White Revolution, many improvements appeared in the area of transportation such as railways and merchant shipping fleets, industrial production such as iron, cement and aluminium (see Table 4-1).

Table 4-1. Some indicators of economic growth; 1949-1978


Items of Growth	1949	1961	1970	1978
Railway Lines Open (in passenger-kilometres)	324			2,981
Railway Lines Open (in net ton-kilometres)	761			4,083
Merchant Shipping Fleets (in thousand gross registered tons)			129	1,207 ^a
Iron Ore production (in thousand metric tons)		21		610
Aluminium Production (in thousand metric tons)	-			26.0
Sulphuric Acid production (in thousand metric tons)			22	348 ^b
Cement production (in thousand metric tons)	53 ^c			6,500
Natural Gas Production (in teracalories)		850 ^d		182,971
Crude Petroleum Production (in thousand metric tons)			166,030 ^e	262,808

^a: Figures as available in 1979. ^b: Figure as available in 1975, ^c: Figure as available in 1948, ^d: Figure as available in 1960; ^e: Figure as available in 1969.
Source: United Nations, Statistical Year-Book; 1958-1979.

There was also much improvement in reducing the degree of illiteracy in both city and countryside on a national scale from 80% in 1941 to 25% in 1979.¹⁷⁰ The statistics was so pleasant to Muhammad Reza, that he wrote: "Iran was no more than a vast building site."¹⁷¹ As a result some local and foreign economists emphasising Iran's very high rate of economic growth [13.3%] over the decade of 1960s, had considered it especially remarkable since it was accompanied by general price stabilisation.¹⁷² The socioeconomic policies of the consolidated autocratic régime in the later 1960s and early to mid-1970s appeared to many as a

great success story, and in support of this contention they could point to large increases in Iran's GDP, impressive industrial, agricultural, and infrastructural projects, and a number of social welfare activities, which had substantially increased the GDP per capita from around \$204 in 1960 to \$1,607 in 1975¹⁷³ (see also Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. Gross National Product; 1958-1977 (in million \$US)



a: Anticipated.


Source: Wilber, *Iran Past and Present*, p. 259.

The Shah indeed followed a general economic strategy, which was much influenced by increasingly large oil revenues. The growth in government revenues and the rise in the development plans, accordingly, had their basis in oil revenues which in its turn increased the economic dependence on oil and consequently, shaped the limitations of the economic development. Oil revenues, which in 1962-3 represented 12.3 per cent of GNP, increased at a high rate (rising to over a quarter of GNP in 1971-2), and suddenly, because of the fourfold increase in oil prices in 1973, exploded to nearly half of GNP. In 1977-8 it was still representing 34.7 per cent which was over one third of GNP¹⁷⁴ (see Figure 4-2). In 1977 it accounted for 77 per cent of government revenue and 87 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.¹⁷⁵

Services made up a large proportion of GNP since the initial period and grew at the same rapid pace as the national income itself.¹⁷⁶ This heterogeneous group of activities included in many cases wasteful and expensive expenditure on education and housing. Road construction was excluded from this category and transport and communications had a small share of the total services. State services, including much of the SAVAK budget and a part of other bureaucratic and

military expenditures, constituted one fifth of the total services in 1963 and grew to up one third of the total service expenditure in 1978.¹⁷⁷ According to H. Katouzian, the service sector provided “the meeting point of the strong links between oil revenues, the state and its clientele.”¹⁷⁸

Figure 4-2. Sectional Distribution of GNP 1963-1978 (% of GNP)



Source: Bank-i Markazi-ye Iran, *Amar-i Saliانه*, 1963-1978.

Although the rate of industrial growth in recent years was one of the highest in the world, and rose further with the impact of huge oil revenues since 1973, all this did not mean that the government's industrial policies produced only positive results for it is also important to pay attention to how modernisation was carried out, and the results of these policies. While industrial output had expanded, it only contributed to 18.5 percent of GNP in 1978. Construction had a permanently large share of this and it generally grew faster than manufacturing and mining output. The share of construction in GNP almost caught up with manufacturing and mining itself and the manufacturing and mining included everything from gas to other non-oil minerals.

Governmental strategy from the 1960s included rapid development of import substitution industries, especially large enterprises that used much modern and Labor-saving technology. Although in industry, large mechanised enterprises made up a minority of total units, the important point is that investment and efforts were heavily concentrated on such units while small producers were disfavoured. What was questionable was the continuation of preferential policies toward Western-style industries and the downgrading of small crafts and industries, which contribute to production, to employment, and to greater income equality. Foreign

investments; the kind of production requiring a huge foreign presence and the underwriting of heavy consumer durables were also favoured.

The position for agriculture speaks for itself. The output of all agricultural and industrial goods put together was only about one fifth of the entire national output of the country.¹⁷⁹ Despite many previous reliable estimates that well over half of Iran's land belonged to large landlords with over one village, the best estimate was that only something like 9 percent of Iran's peasants got land in the first phase of the Agrarian reforms.¹⁸⁰ Even for the favoured peasants of the first phase of reform not enough was done to make available to them appropriate means of increasing production so that most of them could become significantly more prosperous. Government price controls increasingly favoured city dwellers, considered politically volatile, with a few exceptions, but disadvantaged the peasants by effectively subsidising foreign grain growers, paying them world market prices. As for the labourers who received no land in villages affected by the first reform phase, they were less likely to be hired by cultivating peasants than by the old landlords, and most of them joined in the swelling migration to the cities, which repeatedly reached over 8 percent of the population between 1972-73, well above the average 1956-76 rate.¹⁸¹

The second phase of reform, after its revision under conservative pressure, amounted more to a regularisation of the existing system than redistribution of wealth. While the small and middle peasants were increasingly starved of government help and discouraged from managing their own affairs on a comprehensive cooperative basis, from the late 1960s most government economic and technical aid and encouragement went into a small number of large agricultural units. Therefore in a more reasonable estimate agricultural production rose about 2-2.5 percent a year, population 3 percent, and consumption of agricultural products about 12 percent.

Similar problems were experienced by tribal-pastoral peoples. Although it was probably tribal khans who instigated a revolt related to land reform among the Qashqa'i and Boir Ahmadi of Fars province in 1963, ordinary tribal people also suffered from the government's agricultural policies. The nationalisation of pasture, one of the points added to the White Revolution, took away tribal control of pasture land and made tribes increasingly subject to governmental whims, policies, and gendarmes. Agricultural and other projects spread at the expense of pasture, and tribal people were less and less able to support themselves by a primarily pastoral existence.

In the 1970s especially, the government became increasingly convinced that instead of relying on the nomads' sheep for much of Iran's meat, the government should underwrite the creation of large meat, poultry, and dairy farms, with expensive imported equipment, cattle and feed. Like other large agricultural projects these were both costly and unproductive, besides the fact that Iranians prefer fresh sheep and lamb to the beef and imported frozen meat that the government's policies toward the pastoralists increasingly forced on them. In fact Muhammad Reza, like his father, pursued a policy of settling the nomads by depriving them of their livelihood so that they had increasingly to become agriculturalists or enter the sub proletariat of the urban slums.¹⁸²

If the government favoured the big over the small in both city and countryside, it also favoured the cities over the countryside. This was shown particularly in price controls on basic food products, which for a time kept down the vocal discontent of the volatile urban masses. These controls were often based on fixed low prices paid to producers for certain agricultural products - prices that further depressed agricultural incomes relative to urban ones. From the 1960s, income inequalities in Iran, which were already great on a world scale, increased and this increase was particularly dramatic after 1974, when the oil income sustained a great price rise.¹⁸³

An increasing proportion of the oil income had been spent in ways which did not contribute to developing Iran's productive capabilities. The most obvious examples of these were arms expenditure and services. The Shah's expectation in the 1970s that Iran would become one of the world's five top powers of the century and his "virtual mania," as it was widely known, for buying large amounts of up-to-date and sophisticated military equipment from abroad had free rein from 1972, when the Nixon administration underwrote the Shah as "the Policeman of the Gulf," and agreed to sell him whatever non-nuclear arms he wished.

Western eagerness to sell billions of dollars of military equipment to Iran each year was reinforced by the economic drain on the West caused by the OPEC price rise; arms purchases seemed a fine way to recycle petrodollars. After the British pullout from the Gulf, the British and American governments were happy to see Iran become the gendarme of the area, fighting leftist-led rebels in Oman's Zhoffar province and threatening other potential disturbers of the *status quo*. The British provided Iran with more Chieftain tanks than they had in their own armed forces, and the United States let the Shah be the first to buy a series of sophisticated fighter planes, often before they were in production or their reliability had been proved.

Along with all this equipment, as well as numerous less sophisticated items like Bell helicopters,¹⁸⁴ went a large number of expensive foreign technical advisers and instructors and their families, who contributed to inflation and whose behaviour often caused justified indignation among Iranians. In order to protect himself and his many palaces, the unpopular Shah had to construct a large guard, Guard-i Javidan, which in its turn constituted a great part of the budget.¹⁸⁵ Arms expenditure had taken a consistently higher percentage of available funds than industry and agriculture and despite some indirect benefits to the economy, was a "net drain" on Iran's economic development, as F. Halliday has put it.¹⁸⁶

The economic crisis had been brewing since 1954, when the government, discovering that the oil revenues could not pay for the Second Seven Year Plan as well as for the escalating military expenditures, resorted to deficit financing and heavy borrowing from abroad. Deficit financing, compounded by a bad harvest in 1959-60, forced the cost-of-living index which had been fairly stable in 1954-57, to climb to over 35 percent between 1957 and 1960,¹⁸⁷ from 100% in 1970 to 126% in 1974, further to 160% in 1975, and further to over 190% in 1976.¹⁸⁸ The rise was even steeper for such essentials as food and housing, especially in the cities. For example, a report published by the London Economist in 1976 estimated that rents in residential parts of Tehran rose 300 percent in five years, and that by 1975 a middle-class family could be spending as much as 50 percent of its annual income for housing.¹⁸⁹ Iran was thus obliged to seek emergency aid from both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US government.

IMF promised \$35 million and regardless of the money invested by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 1953 Coup, the US government paid \$60 million in 1954, \$53 million in 1955 and \$35 million in 1956 for the current budget deficit.¹⁹⁰ By the end of fiscal year 1961, Iran had received from the United States some \$1.3 billion, recorded under general headings of a Mutual Security Program and a Non-Mutual Security Program for economic aid, military assistance, and other grants and loans. In October 1964 the *Majlis* passed a Bill to grant diplomatic immunity to American military personnel and advisers and a permission for a \$200 million loan from the United States as well for the purchase of military equipment.

By 1972 Iran had obtained \$1.745 billion in long-term loans. Additional loans were negotiated in 1972, and others were anticipated during the Fifth Plan. The repayment of the interest and principal amounts of these loans already represented a very heavy drain on Iran's foreign exchange holdings. Major suppliers were the Export-Import Bank of the United States; the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development, consortiums of foreign banks, France, Great Britain, and West Germany. In addition, the USSR and the Socialist states of Eastern Europe extended \$1.310 billion in loans, of which sum \$700 million came from the USSR. These loans drew only 2.5 percent interest and were repayable in goods rather than in hard currency.

To all these wasteful investments and financial difficulties were added a number of financial abuses of officials. General Fardust, the head of the Imperial Inspection Organisation, explained how he had recognised around 4,000 cases of financial abuses in excess of \$1.5 million and appealed to the courts but none were investigated.¹⁹¹ However, in August 1978 when Sharif Imami become Prime Minister, he together with the Shah affirmed it was in these financial abuses that were the causes of the popular uprisings.¹⁹² Kapuscinski gives a clear example of the behaviour of these bureaucrats:

A Lufthansa airliner at Mehrabad airport in Tehran. ... all the seats are sold. This plane flies out of Tehran every day and lands at Munich at noon. Waiting limousines carry the passengers to elegant restaurants for lunch. After lunch they all fly back to Tehran in the same airplane and eat their suppers at home. Hardly an expensive entertainment, the jaunt costs only two thousand dollars a head.... Those in somewhat higher positions ... an Air France plane brings lunch, complete with cooks and waiters, from Maxim's of Paris. ... Everyone in authority stole. Whoever held office and did not steal created a desert around himself; he made everybody suspicious. Other people regarded him as a spy sent to report on who was stealing how much, because their enemies needed such information. ... This class [was] ... exporting money and buying property in Europe and America... Many of the houses cost more than a million dollars.¹⁹³

The Shah's case was, however very special. Reza Shah had acquired, mostly by dubious means, a huge fortune¹⁹⁴ which was transferred to Muhammad Reza after his abdication in return for ten grams of lump sugar.¹⁹⁵ By a Bill passed in the *Majlis* this fortune was to return to its former owners. In a letter to the *Majlis*, the Shah turned over the land to the *Majlis* for disposition,¹⁹⁶ but almost eight years later with the excuse that it had not been profitable, took it back¹⁹⁷ and inaugurated his own sale of these lands to cultivating farmers.¹⁹⁸ It was not widely known that the money realised from these sales remained under the Shah's control or that about a third of the land was given to wealthy favourites and members of the royal family.

The Shah never revealed the true extent of his wealth, of course, but Western estimates place the fortune accumulated by the royal family, both inside and outside Iran, at anywhere between 5 and 20 billion dollars,¹⁹⁹ derived from four major sources: the farm lands left by his father, the oil revenue,²⁰⁰ business,²⁰¹ and the last but not least the well-known Pahlavi Foundation²⁰² whose mere annual subsidy was over \$40 million and was considered as "a means of exerting

influence on key sectors of the economy; and as a conduit for rewards to supporters of the régime.”²⁰³ Further evidence of great wealth was the Shah’s coronation. The huge celebration in 1971 of a mythical 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy especially showed up the discrepancy between the seemingly unlimited wealth the Shah could use, and the poverty, however slightly mitigated, of most of his subjects. This celebration accented for \$300 million where, as William Shawcross reported, every thing was imported from France apart from guests and caviar.²⁰⁴

A complex combination of factors caused this inflation: lack of housing and the influx of over 60,000 well-paid foreign technicians; the failure of agricultural production to keep up with the rising population; the sudden jump in food prices on the world markets; the crash industrialisation program and the continued growth in the military establishment, which in turn created labour shortages, raised wages in the rural sector, drained labour from the rural sector, and thus further aggravated the agricultural problem; and, most important of all, the overheating of the economy once the oil billions were poured into ambitious development projects. In 1974-1975 the government had tripled its development investments and increased the money supply by over 60 percent.²⁰⁵ When economists warned of the dangers of overheating, the Shah declared that statesmen should never listen to economists.

However complex the causes of inflation, the régime found a simplistic solution: it placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the business community. In the words of the London Economist, “inflation began to gain momentum in 1973, and by the summer of 1976 had reached such alarming proportions that the Shah, who tends to look at economic problems in military terms, declared war on profiteers.”²⁰⁶ At first, the Shah took aim at big businessmen, arrested with much fanfare “industrial feudalists” such as Elqanian and Vahhabzadeh, and thereby frightened many others to transfer capital to safer territories.

According to Guardian correspondent, the “anti-profiteering campaign” caused schizophrenia among rich entrepreneurs: on one hand they benefited from the socioeconomic system, especially the development plans; on the other hand they suffered from the political system, which placed their wealth and futures in the hands of one man.²⁰⁷ Discovering that war on rich entrepreneurs did not end inflation, Muhammad Reza aimed next at shopkeepers and small businessmen. The government imposed strict price controls on many basic commodities, and imported large quantities of wheat, sugar, and meat to undercut local dealers.

Meanwhile, the Rastakhiz party organised some 10,000 students into “inspectorate teams” and dispatched them into the bazaars to wage a “merciless

crusade against profiteers, cheaters, hoarders, and unscrupulous capitalists.”²⁰⁸ Similarly, the so-called Guild Courts set up hastily by SAVAK gave out some 250,000 fines, banned 23,000 traders from their home towns, handed out to some 8,000 shopkeepers prison sentences ranging from two months to three years, and brought charges against another 180,000 small businessmen.²⁰⁹

By early 1976, every bazaar family had at least one member who had directly suffered from the “anti-profiteering campaign.” One shopkeeper told a French correspondent that the White Revolution was beginning to resemble a Red Revolution. Another told an American correspondent that “the bazaar was being used as a smokescreen to hide the vast corruption rampant in government and in the bosom of the royal family.”²¹⁰ The formation of the Rastakhiz party had been an affront to the bazaars; the anti-profiteering campaign was a blatant invasion of the bazaars. Not for the first time, the bazaar community increasingly turned to its traditional ally, the *Ruhaniyat*, for help and protection.

Conclusion

From the time of Reza’s coup, the structure of power in Iran, (Chapter 3), underwent a notable change; however the general situation of Iran after Muhammad Reza came to power did not change considerably and the main features remained the same (Chapter 4). Reza and his son Muhammad Reza did not allow any political party to emerge naturally and brutally suppressed every kind of opposition including Muslim clergies and self-autonomous minorities, communists and democratic movements. In both eras the major architect and director of both internal and foreign affairs was the Shah himself. Both Shahs interfered with every detail of the administration and gave priority to the army and army personnel. Foreign policy making in Iran, therefore, despite being the legal responsibility of the *Majlis*, devolved in practice to the Shah.

The Reza’s “new order,” and the “White Revolution” or “Great Civilisation” mounted by Muhammad Reza, which built on numerous reforms in social behaviour, bureaucracy, economy and army, were all aimed at transforming Iran into a modern country. The changes, however, were fraudulent; growth benefited mainly the rich, and there were no structural changes. The reforms did not introduce a universal degree of modernity and instead generated popular dissatisfaction.. They destabilised the power base of the Shah’s government and left the country vulnerable to the Great Power rivals.

In the following Part another factor which encouraged the Great Powers to focus their rivalry in Iran will be examined and the foreign policy of Iran will be

discussed in that content. The major objectives of the Great Power rivals in Iran were the vital oil resources and its geostrategic location as a corridor.

¹ B. Aqeli, *Zokaolmolk-i Foruqi*, pp. 74, 155.

² Ibid., p. 133; Richard A. Stewart, *Sunrise at Abadan*, pp. 327-335.

³ R. Kapuscinski, *Shah of Shahs*, p.25.

⁴ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, pp. 100-106; I. Zowqi, *Iran va Qodratha-i Bozorg dar Jang-i Dovom-i Jahani*, pp. 107-108; According to the British records revealed in 1981 the British began to find a successor for Reza Shah and in this way candidated different people such as Sayid Zia, Sa'ed Mara'ei, even Muhammad Hassan Mirza, the crown prince of the old Qajar dynasty and his son Hamid. But later after consulting with their Russian partners preferred Muhammad Reza to the crown as he seemed to be more obedient. See H. Aboutorabian, "Introduction," p. 11; W. Shawcross, *The Shah's Last Ride*, p. 59. For the change to presidential refer to B. Aqeli, *Zokaolmolk-i Foruqi*, pp. 96-102.

⁵ W. Shawcross, *The Shah's Last Ride*, p. 59.

⁶ I. Iskandari, *Khaterat-i Siasi*, pp. 353-359.

⁷ Bulard to FO, 5 August 1942, FO371 EP31385, quoted in F. Azimi, *Iran the Crisis of Democracy*, p. 67.

⁸ B. Aqeli, *Zokaolmolk-i Foruqi*, 157.

⁹ For details refer to H. Kayostovan, *Siyasat-i movazene-yi Manfi*, pp. 285-308; P. Alanur, *Hezb-i Tudeh-i Iran Sar-i do Rah*, pp. 21-57.

¹⁰ For details refer to I. Zowqi, *Iran va Qodratha-i Bozorg dar Jang-i Dovom-i Jahani*, pp. 71-89.

¹¹ For details refer to Chapter 6.

¹² For details refer to Chapter 6.

¹³ *Keyhan*, 16 January 1946; *Darya*, 7 January 1946; *Mardum*, 8 January 1946.

¹⁴ M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, p. 19.

¹⁵ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 40.

¹⁶ M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for my Country*, p. 60.

¹⁷ R. Kapuscinski, *Shah of Shahs*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁸ M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, p. 19.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁰ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 41.

²¹ R. Kapuscinski, *Shah of Shahs*, p. 29.

²² A. Saikal, *Rise and Fall of the Shah*, p. 26.

²³ B. Aqeli, *Zokaolmolk-i Foruqi*, p. 100.

²⁴ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 149.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁶ For details refer to General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 48-51.

²⁷ B. Aqeli, *Zokaolmolk-i Foruqi*, p. 100.

²⁸ F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, pp. 101-103; General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 205-209.

²⁹ For details refer to F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, pp. 103-105.

³⁰ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 228-231.

³¹ For details on Ernest Prown refer to Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 46-48, 58-60, 187-197. For details on Ayadi refer to Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 199-205.

- For details refer to F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, pp. 98-100.
- General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 209.
- M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 39.
- Jibhih*, 28 December 1945.
- J. Mehdinia, *Nokhost Vaziran-i Iran*, vol. 2, pp. 445-561.
- Cited in F. Azimi, *Iran; The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 56.
- I. Zowqi, *Iran va Qodratha-i Bozorg dar gang-i Dovom-i Jahani*, p. 255.
- For more details refer to *Ibid.*, pp. 255-261.
- Bullard to FO, 15 December 45, FO371 EP45439, quoted in F. Azimi, *Iran; The Crisis of Democracy*, pp. 137-138.
- I. Zowqi, *Iran va Qodratha-i Bozorg dar gang-i Dovom-i Jahani*, pp. 261-265; General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 500-504, F. Halliday, *Iran; Dictatorship and Development*, p. 223.
- Ibid.*, p. 221.
- FO to Moscow, 22 December 1945, FO371 EP45439, quoted in F. Azimi, *Iran; The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 138.
- For details refer to General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 377; F. Halliday, *Iran; Dictatorship and Development*, pp. 223-224.
- H. Makki, *Khaterat-i Siyasi*, p. 549.
- General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 505-508.
- I. Iskandari, *Khaterat-i Siasi*, pp. 298-336; Ihsan Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, p. 43.
- Ibid.*, p. 25.
- Ibid.*, p. 43; S. Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, p. 73.
- I. Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, pp. 44-45; I. Iskandari, *Khaterat-i Siasi*, p. 124; Khamih'i, *Forsat*, pp. 16-24; *Rahbar*, 12, 14 February 1943, Institute of Cultural Research and Studies, *Siasat va Sazman-i Hezb-i Tudeh*, pp. 102-105.
- I. Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, p. 45.
- I. Iskandari, *Khaterat-i Siasi*, pp. 587-597; According to Tabari, one of the Tudeh leaders, in addition to the close relations between the Party and the Comintern, the party's policies even its general secretariats were assigned under the influence of the Comintern and the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. Ihsan Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, pp. 22, 27-8, 31, 39, 43-44, 57.
- Ibid.*, pp. 262-263.
- Ibid.*
- E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 293.
- I. Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, p. 30.
- Muhammad Reza being uncertain about the real attackers wrote that Fakhr Arai was "closely involved with some pseudo-religious men belonging to the ultra-conservative camp." See Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 39. But some accounts released later show that the assassination was designed and conducted by the pro-British forces including Razm Ara, the Chief of Military Staff. Institute of Cultural Research and Studies, *Siasat va Sazman-i Hezb-i Tudeh* 123-32; General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, pp. 164-167.
- Ittila'at*, 2 March-22 April 1949.
- Le Rougetel to Bevin, 18 February 1950, FO371 EP82310, cited in F. Azimi, *Iran; The Crisis of Democracy*, p. 214.
- I. Iskandari, "What did we mean by National Bourgeoisie?" pp. 10-15.

- ⁶¹ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, p. 179.
- ⁶² M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 57.
- ⁶³ Ibid., p. 57.
- ⁶⁴ I. Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, pp. 211-23, 254-5.
- ⁶⁵ A. Qassemi, and Q. Forutan, "Proclamation to Members of the Tudeh Party" n.p., April 1965.
- ⁶⁶ I. Tabari, *Kazh Rahe*, pp. 232-238
- ⁶⁷ A. Qassemi, "What Really Happened" *Tufan*, no 23, March 1966, pp. 1-3.
- ⁶⁸ "A Revolutionary or a Reformist Program" *Tudeh*, 1 April 1966, pp. 1-3.
- ⁶⁹ "The Communist Movement in Iran," *Tudeh*, no. 21, August 1971 pp. 1-92.
- ⁷⁰ "The Revisionist and the Revolutionary Organization" *Tufan*, no. 40 December 1970, pp. 3-4; Tufan Marxist-Leninist organisation, *Nemune-yi Manfi* (Negative Symbiosis) (n.p. 1970), pp. 1-78, quoted in E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p 454; Revolutionary Organisation, *Mosavabat-i Dovomin Konferans* (Regulation for the Second Conference) (n.p. 1965), pp. 1-15.
- ⁷¹ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 169.
- ⁷² Institute of Cultural Research and Studies, *Siasat va Sazman-i Hezb-i Tudeh*, pp. 157-159.
- ⁷³ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 39.
- ⁷⁴ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 484.
- ⁷⁵ As described in Y. Armajani, "Islamic Literature in Post-War Iran," pp. 279-280.
- ⁷⁶ M. H. Rajabi, *Zendeginame-yi Siyasi-yi Imam Khomeini*, pp. 250-260; E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 473-475.
- ⁷⁷ R. Khomeini, *Kashfolasrar*, pp. 80-81, 186.
- ⁷⁸ Article 2 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907 required at least five (learned theologians) to be constantly present in the *Majlis* to "discuss and deliberate the Bills proposed in both Houses, and reject those that contravene the holy principles of Islam, so that they shall not become law." For details on Article 2, its application and the position of the Shah and the *Majlis* refer to Muhammad Torkaman, "Nezarat-i Heiat-i Mojtahedin bar Qovve-yi Qanoungozari,"
- ⁷⁹ Howzeh-yi 'Ilmiyeh, *Zendeginameh-yi Imam Khomeini*, p 95.
- ⁸⁰ Muhammad Hasan Rajabi, *Zendeginame-yi Siyasi-yi Imam Khomeini*, p. 254.
- ⁸¹ *Ittela'at* and *Kayhan*, 27 January 1963; M. R. Pahlavi, *Shah's Story*, p. 76.
- ⁸² M. H. Rajabi, *Zendeginame-yi Siyasi-yi Imam Khomeini*, p. 264.
- ⁸³ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi* vol I, p. 517.
- ⁸⁴ For details on secret relation between the Shah's régime with Israel refer to Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 364-371.
- ⁸⁵ Howzeh-yi 'Ilmiyeh, *Zendeginameh-yi Imam Khomeini*, vol. 1, p. 95.
- ⁸⁶ For Khomeini's speeches and declarations in 1963-1964, refer to Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 1-177.
- ⁸⁷ The month in the Islamic calendar when the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, is commemorated and aspirations to emulate his example, by struggling against contemporary manifestations of tyranny, are awakened.
- ⁸⁸ Cited in J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Mo'aser Iran*, vol. 1, p. 47; According to H. Katouzian, "the official estimates put the number of casualties below ninety(!) as against unofficial estimates of 5,000 to 6,000. For the country as a whole, the figure must have been at least a couple of thousand." See H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 228.
- ⁸⁹ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, p. 583.

- 90 R. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 17.
- 91 Kayhan International, Tehran, 5 November 1964.
- 92 *Mujahed*, 3:29, March 1975.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 R. Khomeini, *Velayat-i Faqih*, pp. 28, 39-40, 77-79, 89-93, 106-107, 190.
- 95 Ibid., p. 195fn.
- 96 Ibid., pp. 52-54, 58-60.
- 97 "Iran and the Black and Red Reactionaries," *Ittila'at*, 7 January 1978.
- 98 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi* 575.
- 99 V. Kuzichkin, *Inside the KGB*, p. 238.
- 100 Muhammad Reza Pahlavi in his story explicitly accused Musaddeq of being tied to the British. See M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, pp. 50-54.
- 101 S. Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran*, p. 239.
- 102 K. Maleki, *Khaterat-i Siyasi*, p. 134.
- 103 Ibid., p. 148; H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 226.
- 104 For more details about the ideas of Dr. Shari'ati refer to E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 464-473.
- 105 For more details about the ideology of these individuals refer to H. Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran*, pp. 70-73 and of the parties Ibid., pp. 125-166; E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 462-473.
- 106 E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 479.
- 107 Amnesty International, *Annual Report for 1974-75*, (London. 1975); International Commission of Jurists, *Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran*, pp. 1-72.
- 108 *Sunday Times*, 19 January 1975.
- 109 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 565.
- 110 Cited in Kkabarnameh, no. 42 June 1475, p. 1.
- 111 *Ittila'al*, 7 February 1980.
- 112 W. Butler, "Memorandum to the International Commission of Jurists on Private Audience with the Shah of Iran," 30 May 1977.
- 113 For details refer to J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Mo'aser Iran*, vol. 2, pp. 235-269. According to the military authorities, the day's casualties totaled 87 dead and 205 wounded. But the opposition declared that the dead numbered more than 4,000 and that as many as 500 had been killed in Jaleh Square alone, cited in E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, p. 516. In the words of the Guardian newspaper correspondent, "the scene resembled a firing squad, with troops shooting at a mass of stationary protesters." See *The Guardian*, 17 September, 1978.
- 114 Article 5 of the Constitutional Law of 1906.
- 115 Articles 41-53 of the Constitutional Law of 1906.
- 116 At the beginning of his rule, on the advice of Foruqi the Prime Minister, the young Shah had given up his right and in practice it was the that elected the Prime Minister and introduced him to the Shah. refer to B. Aqeli, *Zokaolmolk-i Foruqi*, p. 213.
- 117 Article 50 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907.
- 118 Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, p. 18.
- 119 J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, p. 278.
- 120 M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 49.

- 121 Ibid., p. 49.
- 122 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 140-142.
- 123 M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for my Country*, p. 173.
- 124 *The Times*, 16 October 1972.
- 125 D. Wilber, *Iran; Past and Present*, p. 248.
- 126 R. Loeffler, "From Tribal Order to Bureaucracy," p. 21.
- 127 F. FitzGerald, "Giving the Shah What He Wants," p. 74.
- 128 M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, pp. 154-155.
- 129 F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, p. 48.
- 130 *Kayhan International*, 3 March 1975.
- 131 International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran, pp. 21-22.
- 132 J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, p. 574. But SAVAK claimed the party had about 20 million member in just a few months since its establishment. See General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 484.
- 133 For details on the structure and functions of the Rastakhiz party refer to *Kayhan International*, 31 May 1975.
- 134 Quoted by Fitzgerald, "Giving the Shah What He Wants," p. 82.
- 135 F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, p. 61.
- 136 Concerning the functions of the National Security Council refer to General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 395-402.
- 137 Concerning the Shah's intervention in economy refer to J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol I, p. 283.
- 138 "He had called the Shah by this name ever since joining the government." See F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, p. 19.
- 139 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, p. 487.
- 140 J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, pp. 427-428.
- 141 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 483; F. Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah*, p. 21.
- 142 F. Azimi, *Iran the Crisis of Democracy*, p. 20.
- 143 A. Matin-Daftari, "Majara-yi Intikhabat dar Iran" *Salnamih-yi Dunya*, vol. 12, 1955, pp. 3-11.
- 144 Bullard to Eden, 6 April 1944, IOR:L/P&S/12/3472A, quoted in F. Azimi, *Iran the Crisis of Democracy*, p. 94.
- 145 Lscelles to FO, 6 September 44 FO371 EP40164, quoted in Ibid., p. 95.
- 146 M. Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, pp. 113-115.
- 147 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: Year Book for 1972*, p. 86.
- 148 E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, , p. 435.
- 149 F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, p. 95.
- 150 *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 January 1978, p. 5.
- 151 M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 130.
- 152 Ibid., p. 129.
- 153 Ibid., p. 131.

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- ¹⁵⁴ For details on Shah's expectations and orders of purchase refer to *Ibid.*, pp. 127-131.
- ¹⁵⁵ In the midst of the economic crisis of late 1964, for example, the Shah increased the salaries of the army officers which was estimated to cost the government an additional \$2_ million per year. See *Echo of Iran*, Daily Bulletin: Political Edition, 12, no. 264, Dec. 14, 1964, p. 6.
- ¹⁵⁶ B. Bayne, *Persian Kingship in Transition*, p. 186.
- ¹⁵⁷ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, pp. 174-175; General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 147.
- ¹⁵⁸ *Iran Times*, 31 August 1979.
- ¹⁵⁹ *New York Times*, 21 September 1972; *Newsweek*, 28 April 1972.
- ¹⁶⁰ R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, p. 143.
- ¹⁶¹ For detail on the security organizations and their functions refer to F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, pp. 75-90; General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 281-473.
- ¹⁶² *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 221-222.
- ¹⁶³ F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, p. 94.
- ¹⁶⁴ *New Republic*, 1 December 1973, p. 16.
- ¹⁶⁵ D. Wilber, *Iran; Past and Present*, p. 257.
- ¹⁶⁶ The statistics used in this section have most been compiled from: The Plan and Budget Organisation of Iran, *Salnameh-i Amar-i Keshvar*; A. Ashraf, *Shakhesha-yi Ijtimai'-yi Iran*; Interior Ministry, *Amar-i Umumi*, vol. 2; Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, *Fifteenth Annual Report*; G. Lenczowski, ed., *Iran under the Pahlavis*; J. Jacqz, ed., *Iran: Past, Present and Future*; H. Amirsadeqi, ed., *Twentieth-Century Iran*; J. Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile*.
- ¹⁶⁷ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 81.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- ¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.
- ¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 151.
- ¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- ¹⁷² D. Wilber, *Iran; Past and Present*, p. 258; E. Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, pp. 426-446.
- ¹⁷³ United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics*, 1979.
- ¹⁷⁴ Bank-i Markazi Iran, *Annual Reports*, 1962-1978.
- ¹⁷⁵ F. Halliday, *Iran: dictatorship and Development*, pp. 138-139.
- ¹⁷⁶ For critics of the growth of services in economic development refer to H. Katouzian, "The Development of the Service Sector: A New Approach," pp. 362-382.
- ¹⁷⁷ Bank-i Markazi Iran, *Annual Reports*, 1962-1978.
- ¹⁷⁸ H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 258.
- ¹⁷⁹ See also F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, p. 157.
- ¹⁸⁰ See the calculations in Nikki Keddie, "The Iranian Village before and after Land Reform," in H. Bernstein, *Development and underdevelopment*, p. 165.
- ¹⁸¹ See the calculations from Plan Organization and Central Bank data in J. and A. Carey, "Iranian Agriculture and Its Development:1952-1973," *IJMES*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1976.
- ¹⁸² See L. Beck, "Economic Transformation Among the Qashqa'i Nomads, 1962-1977," in M. Bonine and N. Keddie, eds, *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change*, Albany, 1981.

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- 183 For the increases in income inequality in all major dimensions refer to M. H. Pesaran and F. Gahvary, "Growth and Income Distribution in Iran," pp. 231-246.
- 184 For the military budget of the Shah refer to the previous section.
- 185 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, pp. 135-139.
- 186 F. Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*, p. 157.
- 187 Bank-i Markazi-yi Iran, Bulletin, 8 June 1970, pp. 673-693.
- 188 The Plan and Budget Organization of Iran, *Salnameh-i Amar-i Keshvar*, Tehran, 1977.
- 189 Cited in M. Field, ed. Middle East Annual Report, pp. 150-158.
- 190 W. Shawcross, *The Shah's Last Ride*, p. 80.
- 191 General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 465.
- 192 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 569.
- 193 R. Kapuscinski, *Shah of Shahs*, pp. 63-65.
- 194 For details refer to Chapter 3.
- 195 J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, p. 152.
- 196 Ittela'at, 21 September 1941.
- 197 Ibid., 23 June 1949.
- 198 For details refer to J. Abdo, *Chehel Sal dar Sahneh*, vol. 1, pp. 271-274; J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Mo'aser Iran*, vol. 1, pp. 135-136.
- 199 *Washington Post*, 17 January 1979.
- 200 Ibid.
- 201 For a detailed listing of Pahlavi holdings in Iran, refer to Shahab, "The Octopus with One Hundred tentacles," 3 November 1978, pp. 1-5.
- 202 M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 119.
- 203 *New York Times*, 10 January 1979.
- 204 W. Shawcross, *The Shah's Last Ride*, pp. 38-43.
- 205 *Economist*, 20 December 1975.
- 206 Cited in M. Field, ed. Middle East Annual Report, p. 14.
- 207 *The Guardian*, 31 October 1976.
- 208 *Donya*, 3 January 1976.
- 209 *Ittela'at*, 6 October 1979.
- 210 *Iran Times*, 8 December 1978; *The Guardian*, 31 October 1976; *New York Times*, 17 December 1978.

Part III

Rivalry and Counter-Rivalry: Implementing Oil and Security Diplomacies

The discussion of Great Power rivalry so far has suggested that inequality, international disunity, enforcement and Great Power rivalry over Smaller Powers did not alter the characteristics of the international system during the past century. The world was dominated by the Great Powers triumphant in the war, and the international organisations, namely the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation, were controlled by their concert. Little could be passed without their consent and almost anything could be done with their mutual agreement. The study of the domestic situation of Iran as a smaller power also suggests that Iran itself was not strong enough relative to the Great Powers to stand against this world-wide rivalry. Having suffered from political disunity, a disastrous economy and wide-ranging suppression, Iran was faced with considerable dissatisfaction throughout the country.

In addition to these two factors, the geopolitical position of Iran with regard to its vast oil resources and its geopolitical and geostrategic territory as a corridor, was important enough to play a major role in encouraging the Great Powers to rivalry. Iranian foreign policy makers, mostly influenced by the Shah, had always focussed on possible threats from the north (the USSR) and adhered to the West, either with the British during the inter-War period or with both Great Britain and the USA after the Second World War. In this Part I shall examine the oil interests and security concerns of the Great Power rivals in Iran and the counter action of Iranian foreign policy to secure its oil and territorial integrity.

Chapter V

Rivalry and the Oil Politics

Oil always constituted a great interest and a serious concern for TGP. The exploitation of oil in Iran was linked to great power rivalry for influence, beginning with the British concession in the south. Oil concessions were at the root of the inter-War British-Russian rivalry, which was followed after World War II by the Anglo-American alliance on one hand and the Russians on the other. In this chapter I shall discuss the oil interests of TGP in Iran and their rivalry to gain a new oil concession or to obtain better provisions in their previous oil concessions. In this regard, the British interests in the D'Arcy concession and its aftermath, the Russian interests in the oil concessions of Khushtaria, Kavir Khurian and of the five northern provinces, together with the American activities to enter into the oil rivalry, separately or in joint action with Britain will be examined in the interwar period and post World War II respectively. In every oil dispute and in any grant of oil concession or any conclusion of an agreement with a great power, some unchanging characteristics are clearly observable, namely the coercion and enforcement of the relevant Great Power, the active presence and opposition of the other Great Power rival to any concession, and the visible vulnerability of the Iranian government in securing its interests.

Background: the D'Arcy Concession

In 1892, M. de Morgan, head of the French archaeological mission, published a report in *Les Annales des Mines* in Paris, after a few months spent exploring the province of Kermanshah. The report indicated the existence of oil, which had been known in Persia since antiquity as naphtha, in the subsoil of the region Qasr-i Shirin.¹ Inspired by this venture, W. K. D'Arcy succeeded in obtaining a concession in 1901 from the Shah. The concession was valid for sixty years, covering the whole territory of Iran except the five northern provinces. The concession gave D'Arcy the exclusive right to construct pipe lines and access to all non-cultivated lands belonging to the state that might become necessary for the work of prospecting. On 26 May 1908, the first geyser of oil gushed at Masjid-i Suleyman (called Solomon's Mosque because of its proximity to the ruins of the temple), and in April 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed to exploit this field and the remainder of the concession. Pipe lines were laid down linking the oil

fields with the Persian Gulf port of Abadan, where at that time, one of the largest oil refineries in the world was under construction. Without much delay, the Company began oil exportation in 1912.

The security of the oil deposits and its installations were of great concern. Since they were situated in territory inhabited by semi-nomad tribes over which the central government had little if any influence, the company and British consular authorities in the region entered into negotiations with the local tribes to secure their friendship or at least non-interference with the company's work. Agreements with Sheikh Khazal and the Bakhtiyari tribe leaders were concluded, and in order to protect the field operation from future molestation from the tribes, "a small contingent of troops from the British Indian Army was sent,"² in the beginning without the knowledge of the Iranian government. Oil and its management in Iran were so important for British policy that, as Lenczowski notes,

To watch the company's operations and to maintain friendly relations with the local potentates, a number of able public servants had to be employed by Great Britain in these regions. This meant deeper penetration of British consular and intelligence authorities into the area, the establishment of certain customs and usages, and generally a greater influence.³

Two important decisions about the oil destiny of Iran were made by the British government. The first was the decision to replace coal with oil as a fuel for the navy in 1913.⁴ The second was a parliamentary Bill that gave the British government the right to take over control of APOC in 1914. Just a few months before the outbreak of the First World War, the British government bought 51 per cent of the company's shares for £ 2,200,000. The importance of this investment was clearly announced when Winston Churchill, then Lord of the Admiralty, told the House of Commons on 7 June 1914:

Nobody cares in wartime how much they pay for a vital commodity, but in peace- that is the period to which I wish to direct the attention of the committee- price is rather an important matter ... I can not feel that we are not justified ... in considering how in years of peace, and in a long period of peace, we may acquire proper bargaining power and facilities with regard to the purchase of oil. The price of oil does not depend wholly, or even mainly, on the ordinary workings of supply and demand.⁵

The real obstacle to the British domination of northern Iran before the war was the might of the Russian Empire. The importance of the northern provinces of Iran to Russia was not only strategic, but also economic. As long as Tsarist Russia was a great power, Britain had agreed to a free Russian hand in Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astrabad and Khorasan. On 9 March 1916,⁶ with the help of Britain and the support of Tsarist troops in Iran, a Russian citizen, Akaky Mededievitch Khushtaria, illegally⁷ obtained from the Iranian government the right, for a period of

seventy-five years, to drill oil in the districts of Gilan, Mazandaran and Astrabad, three of the five northern provinces of Iran, bordering Russia. This concession was a part of the manoeuvre which gave the neutral zone to Great Britain.⁸ But as a result of the war, oil was never exploited there.

With the beginning of the First World War and the wide use of oil by the British forces, especially its navy, it was proved that the production of the company was of great importance for the successful prosecution of war. World War I had proved to the world that petroleum was a critical resource for any nation that aspired to greatness. Such a realisation called special attention to the countries of the Middle East in general and to Iran in particular. Hereafter the British government was directly involved in APOC and was officially defending its interests whenever necessitated by any kind of threat.

The Khushtaria Concession

The Royal Dutch Shell and French oil companies had refused to buy Khushtaria's concession,⁹ as it was illegal. However, APOC, which by then had established its domination over southern Iran and was fighting the American oil interests in Mesopotamia (presently Iraq) and Palestine, assumed that this was a good time to establish its monopoly over the whole of Iran. The company thought that it would be years before Russia and Iran would be sufficiently strong to challenge its authority in the northern provinces. The Americans were newcomers and thousands of miles away from Iran. Therefore, on 8 May 1920, APOC organised a new British company, North Persian Oil Company "to work in conjunction with APOC and to develop further concessions obtained from the company."¹⁰ Furthermore, APOC tried to acquire oil concessions in the other two northern provinces of Iran.¹¹

But the British penetration was greatly resented by the United States and Revolutionary Russia. The United States government protested against the purchase of the Khushtaria concession and contended that the deal paved the way for the monopolisation of the production of essential raw materials such as petroleum, by means of exclusive concessions or other arrangements. This purchase was in effect, contrary to the principle of the "open door"¹² and of equal treatment of the nationals of all foreign countries. The State Department thereupon advised the government of Iran, on 12 August 1920, to postpone any further grants of its oil resources until an opportunity could be given to the American companies to enter into negotiations regarding such grants.¹³ It was also informed that the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey desired to "operate in northern

Persia, if a satisfactory agreement could be reached with the Persian government.”¹⁴

On 29 November 1920, APOC sent a special representative to Tehran to negotiate with the Persian government for a concession in Azerbaijan and Khorasan. He was to obtain the consent of the government to the Khushtaria concession which had already been transferred to APOC. This brought a protest from the American minister in Teheran. He asked the Iranian government to wait for the arrival of representatives of the American companies.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the British government, in order to keep the Americans out of Iran, and to intimidate the government of Iran, followed its traditional policy by resorting to financial and economic pressure. All payments to the Iranian government, including the royalties of APOC, were stopped.¹⁶ This policy of financial coercion to bring any government in Iran into line and force it to “crawl on its knees and accept British dole,” had been from the beginning the key to costly British rivalries in Iran. The seriousness of these measures could be compared, as Henry F. Grady noted, with the “colonial state of mind [which] was fashionable and perhaps even supportable in Queen Victoria’s time.”¹⁷

The Early American Oil Interests

In an attempt to disregard this opposition from the British and the Russians, on 22 November 1921, the *Majlis* granted a fifty-year concession to Standard Oil of New Jersey for the exploitation of oil in the five provinces of northern Iran. According to Article 5 of the Bill, the American company could not “under any circumstances assign or transfer this concession to any foreign government or company or individual.”¹⁸

This led to immediate opposition from both the British and Russians. The day after the granting of the oil concession, the British strongly opposed it, based on the claim of APOC to the Khushtaria concession. The Russian note, submitted on the same day as the British note, stated that in view of the fact that the Russo-Persian treaty had not yet been ratified by the *Majlis*, the action of the government of Iran in submitting a Bill to the *Majlis* for granting of the concession to the American companies was a violation of property rights. Furthermore, the Russian note added that Article 13 of the treaty did not allow a grant of the concession of the oilfields of northern Iran to the citizens of a third government.¹⁹ Therefore, to the Russians the grant of the concession to the American companies would be unlawful even if the Russo-Persian treaty had been ratified.²⁰

Discouraged by the turn of events in Iran, the British government appealed to the United States for help. In a long note to the State Department, the British ambassador in Washington said that reliable reports had been received by the British government to the effect that Iran was offering an oil concession in the northern provinces to an American group. The rights to these provinces, according to the British note, had been sold to APOC and the foreign office had already informed the Iranian government that the British right to the concession was valid and would receive the support of the British government. The British government did not hesitate to threaten that any American company contemplating negotiation of the oil concession with the government of Iran should be cognisant of the risks involved.²¹

Consequently, Sir John Cadman was sent to the United States, and Bedford of the Standard Oil Company was invited to London, to settle the differences with APOC. Cadman was commissioned to invite Standard Oil to develop the five northern provinces on a 50-50 basis with APOC under Khushtaria's concession. In the second place he was advised to take up discussion of the plan, suggested originally by the British, of allotting Standard Oil some participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company.²² The British also agreed to allow Standard Oil to explore provisionally the areas in Palestine over which it claimed a prospecting license, without prejudicing the question of validity of the claim and without any actual exploitation until the political status of that part of the world had been readjusted.²³

As a result of this truce, the Standard Oil Company and APOC reached a compromise. On 22 December 1921, the British embassy in Washington informed the Secretary of State that APOC and the Standard Oil Company had come to an agreement whereby their interests in the Persian fields would be pooled.²⁴ A few days later on 31 December, without the knowledge of the Iranian government, the British embassy at Washington and the State Department reached the following understanding:

If it became necessary for either the United States government or His Majesty's government to ask any action in connection with the Khushtaria Persian concession, neither government should take any action in connection with the northern Persia concession, neither government should take any definite step without first informing the other.²⁵

Van Engert, the American chargé d'affaires to Teheran, informed the Iranian government that an agreement had been signed between the Standard Oil Company and APOC providing for their joint participation in the new "Perso-American Petroleum Company."²⁶ Based on this agreement Standard Oil was to have voting control of the board of directors and was to control the management of the company. According to Engert, the State Department had not participated in

the actual negotiations concerning this concession but it had been kept informed of their progress. According to Engert, the American government had approved cooperation between American and British interests²⁷ because of maintaining the “open door” in Iran for its nationals.

Thus, the British, after two years of futile intrigues, intimidation, protests to the American companies and government and threats to the Iranian government to keep this British preserve, suddenly became a friend of the United States and promised to cooperate in an area from which Britain had been pushed out.

British opposition could not be overlooked by the Standard Oil Company for the important reason that APOC had the exclusive right to oil transportation throughout Iran, with the exception of the five northern provinces. Also without use of its facilities, Standard's oil could not reach world commercial markets. Furthermore, the Standard Oil Company was not enthusiastic enough about the concession at this stage, because Iran attached the condition that the company obtain a loan for the Iranian government.²⁸ The Standard Oil Company therefore yielded to British pressure by consenting to APOC's participation in its concession.

On the Russian side, on 15 January 1922, Rothstein, the Soviet Minister in Tehran, declared his government's opposition to the compromise on the basis that any concession formerly given to a Russian subject cannot be transferred to foreign capitalists.²⁹ The Russians argued that according to Article 13 of the Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Iran had undertaken: “not to cede to a third power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.”³⁰ The declaration, which in theory was a new policy contradicting the old policy of “the robber imperialists” toward Iran, in practice meant that if Iran desired to exploit the northern natural resources, it would have had to do it either by itself (without contracting any other foreign countries or foreign subjects) or with the aid of the Soviet Union, which was more practical. Otherwise the oil had to be left beneath the earth. As a consequence of this opposition, and in order to resolve “political difficulties,”³¹ caused by this rivalry, the Iranian government was forced to break off negotiations with the American Standard Oil Company.

After some time had elapsed, another attempt was made by the Iranian government to acquire much-needed funds. Negotiations with another American company (Sinclair Oil Company) whose new draft concession was compatible with the requirements of the Bill passed by the *Majlis*,³² began on 20 August 1922 and on 20 December 1923. The oil concession for the provinces of Azerbaijan, Khorasan, Astrabad and Mazandaran (four out of the five northern provinces) was

granted to the Sinclair Oil Company on the condition that the concession could not be assigned to any foreign government or foreign company, nor to one or more subjects of any foreign government, without the consent of the government of Iran.

Although it was supposed that both Britain and Russia would accept this concession as a *fait accompli*, the two Great Power rivals intensified their war of nerves. The British had now changed their tactics. Their plan now was to throw the Americans out and win a "negative victory." The British Minister in Tehran again, on 27 April 1924, protested against the negotiations with the American companies. Britain renewed the Khushtaria claim and warned the Iranian government against "its careless and discriminatory measures in excluding APOC from the northern provinces."³³

When the Iranian government denied the charges, the British government resorted again to political and economic pressures. First, Sheikh Khazal declared himself independent of the central government and asked for the dismissal of the Prime Minister. Then the British government informed American financial circles that it would not consent to a pledge of Anglo-Persian royalties and southern customs for a loan in the United States. This announcement and troubles in Khuzistan interrupted the negotiations for the loan so that the representative of Blair and Company, who was in Tehran to sign a loan agreement with the government, had to return to America to confer with his company.³⁴

Rothstein, in turn, declared that Russia had no objection to the grant of a concession to Sinclair, but he wanted to develop Iranian oil without the participation of the British companies. According to Rothstein the reason that Standard Oil Company was opposed by his government was that it came to terms with the British without taking into consideration the Iranian fear of British domination of the northern provinces or paying any attention to the Russian contention that the presence of the British in the Caspian region was a direct threat to the safety of Russia. The exclusion of Gilan from the concession of the Sinclair Oil Company had also pleased the Russian minister at Teheran. He hoped that Russia might later be able to get the concession, or to share it with an Iranian company. According to the Russian minister, Russia would never tolerate the extension of APOC to the Russian border, but it would be prepared to give consideration to the proposals of Standard Oil or Sinclair, provided that those two companies were not used as a cats-paw for British imperialism.³⁵

Since the company already had an oil concession on Sakhalin Island and the right to sell Russian oil products on the world market, it seemed that the Iranian concession would be granted with no opposition from the Russian side. However,

Izvestia, the official organ of the Russian government, charged that American oil interests were engaged in aggressive activities aimed against the Russian government, and that the American capitalists had been evidencing particularly intensive activity in the Near and Middle East.³⁶ The Russian government at this point, in order to put pressure on Iran, raised some questions regarding the use of frontier water supplies, the fisheries, the disputed claims between Iran and the Russian citizens, and the question of dismissal of Russian subjects from the service of the government of Iran. The Russian government, in the note to the government of Iran, charged that the hostile activities of the American oil interests and American financial mission had prevented an amicable settlement between the two countries. In many instances, continued the note, the members of the American mission had attempted to interrupt the work of the economic institutions of the Russians in Iran.³⁷

Sinclair's engineers had no sooner started to drill wells in Astrabad, than the company decided to abandon its concession. The murder of the American vice consul, which was alleged to have been planned by APOC,³⁸ the implication of Russia by Sinclair itself³⁹ and the loss of its concession on Sakhalin Island, as well as the right to market Russian petroleum products by the summer of 1924, made it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain permission from both the Soviet Union to transport the oil from Iranian fields over Russian territory to world markets and from APOC who held the exclusive right of transporting oil in the southern part of Iran.⁴⁰

Wallace Murray, the American chargé d'affaires, in a long and comprehensive report told the State Department what went wrong in Iran. This report is so clear and pointed that even today its study is of great importance for those dealing with the oil dispute in Iran. According to Wallace Murray, any company that obtained the concession must have made its peace, at least in the economic sense with Soviet Russia. In his report, Wallace Murray brought to the attention of the State Department an important point which had been the keynote of the British policy in Iran - "negative victory" that is, to keep the Americans out. Great Britain's interest in Iran dates from the seventeenth century, and its policy might be said to be geared to centuries, whereas the United States policy in Iran only dated from the beginning of the twentieth century. The British always adopted a policy of "wait and see." Britain could wait in Iran and get what it wanted by the passage of time and frustration of its rivals.⁴¹

Further efforts were made to acquire a concession in the province of Khorasan and Sistan by Amiranian Oil, a subsidiary of the Seaboard Oil Company, in 1937 and by Standard-Vacuum Oil (today's Mobil) in 1940. Although these efforts failed, they demonstrated the deep American interest in Iranian oilfields. American

companies failed to get land concessions during this twenty-year period, in large part because of British and Russian opposition. In 1920 Earl Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, referred to Standard Oil as "that omnivorous organisation endeavouring to secure a foothold on Persian soil." In a conversation with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Curzon warned him very strongly against any attempt to introduce the Standard Oil Company into Persia, assuring him that "this would mean a competition which would be a source of certain trouble in the future and which the British government could not be expected to regard with any favour."⁴²

The Russian opposition was firm too. Although, at this time, the company had the right to process and transport oil to the Persian Gulf, (due to the reduced area of the 1933 concession) it renounced this right in 1938, apparently due to the uncertain world situation.⁴³ It was obvious that Russian territory was naturally out-of-bounds for the American company. In addition, the Russian press which "was not loath to attribute this withdrawal to Russian pressure on the Iranian government"⁴⁴ supported the increasing Russian encroachment upon the Iranian oil reserves.

The Kavir Khurian Concession

Another subject of the oil conflict was the Kavir Khurian concession. In 1924, the Russian government claimed a concession in the district of Semnan in an area called Kavir Khurian on the strength of an awarded concession in 1878 and its confirmation of the Iranian government in 1924. After 1901, this concession was a bone of contention between APOC and the Russians. The company, on several occasions, claimed that Semnan was a part of the D'Arcy concession, although at the time of this concession the area was a part of Khorasan and therefore outside the territory of the company. At first the Iranian government refused to recognise the claim, but later, due to the trouble with the British in Khuzistan, accepted that a Kavir Khurian Company be established with 65% of the stock shared by the Russian government. In 1926, after failure in its task of developing the area, a new arrangement was made. Both governments agreed to sell some stock to French interests and use French technicians and know-how. A new company was established with capital of six million francs. As it was feared that Khurian might become the centre of the Communist activities in northern Iran, this arrangement was never ratified by the *Majlis*. No oil was found in Kavir Khurian, but the Russians kept a staff of forty men and some materials in a temporary camp near Semnan. This was only an overture to a vast demand which was divulged in 1945: the concession of the whole of northern Iran.

The British Oil Arrangements of 1933

The oil agreement of 1933 between Iran and Britain was another subject of contention and marked a struggle to survive by the Iranian government. It was back in 1914, when APOC pressured the Iranian government to change the terms of the D'Arcy concession regarding the royalties and to extend the contract to the year 2000.⁴⁵ The company contended that the concession did not attempt to define the basis on which the annual net profits were to be arrived at in calculating Iranian government royalties. On 19 October 1919, the company backed by the British Minister urged the pro-British government of Vosuqoddowleh to change the terms of the D'Arcy concession and to accept a new agreement. It was suggested that in the new agreement a charge of so much per ton should be substituted for the royalty of 16 percent of profits stipulated in the D'Arcy concession. But the Iranian government rejected the company's proposals because of the absence of the *Majlis*. The company did not like the arrangement and, therefore, paid no regular royalties for thirteen years. When it offered the royalties in 1920, the manner in which the net profits were calculated was not acceptable to the Iranian government.

In 1928 the company proposed the so-called "Three Star Draft Agreement." This draft proposed a provision according to which up to 25 percent of the stock of the company would be transferred to the Iranian government. It also provided for an extension of the concession by an additional thirty years. But this draft too received no consideration because of the already existing distrust of the company's accounting practices and because of its provision for the extension of the concession to 1990.⁴⁶

On 3 June 1932, when the company's accounts for the year 1931 had been completed, the Iranian government was told that its royalty from APOC had dropped from £1,288,312 in 1930 to £306,970.⁴⁷ This alleged decrease in profits was neither justified by production, which by prearrangement with other companies had been 4 percent less than that of the preceding year, nor by any considerable drop in oil prices. Furthermore, the company, which in violation of the D'Arcy agreement, had always resented the participation of the government of Iran and the inspection of its books by the Iranian government, did not allow a representative of the government of Iran to examine the accounts and the books. The company in its letter to Teimurtash, the Court Minister, declared it could not open its books and especially its contract with the admiralty for the inspection of the representative of the Iranian government with the excuse that nobody in Iran knew anything about its terms.⁴⁸

Consequently, the Iranian government charged that the 1931 financial statement was incorrect and thus invoked the arbitration article of the D'Arcy concession. This contention was well supported "by the fact that in the following three years from 1932 to 1935 the depth of the depression - the company paid royalties averaging \$10 million, and yet managed to show average annual profits, after paying royalties, of \$20 million," as N. S. Fatemi wrote.⁴⁹

There were other grievances related to a wide variety of questions, ranging from the general charge that the concessionaire had not complied with the terms of the contract to the specific complaint that the company refused to pay income taxes to the Iranian government. By 1932 two other major issues embittered the relations of the government and the company: the issue concerning responsibilities for the cutting of the pipeline by the Bakhtiyari tribes during the First World War and the resultant damages, and the issue relating to the Armitage-Smith agreement signed on 22 December 1920.⁵⁰ But APOC refused arbitration and indirectly encouraged the despotic Shah to cancel the concession on 27 November 1932. As N. S. Fatemi argues,

... if the disputes were submitted to arbitration the company would have to open its books and pay millions of pounds sterling for the royalties in arrears to the Iranian government. The only way for the company to get over this hurdle and to achieve its purpose without paying a high price for it was to get the Iranian government to cancel the contract and then put pressure on the Shah for a new concession.⁵¹

On 2 December 1932, the British government protested the cancellation. The British minister in Tehran in his meeting with the Shah, according to the newspaper *Shafaq-i Sorkh*, threatened to land troops.⁵² The British government demanded that Iran immediately withdraw the cancellation of the concession. Furthermore, the British government made it clear that it would not hesitate, if the necessity arose, to take all legitimate measures "to protect her just and indisputable interests."⁵³ On 9 December reports received in Tehran showed that the British had strengthened the naval forces of the Persian Gulf. Two destroyers were anchored three miles from Abadan and a gunboat had been dispatched to Bushihr.⁵⁴ On 13 December news of the outbreaks among the Baluchi tribes, neighbouring British India and the Arabs of Khuzistan reached the centre. The newspaper *Iran* charged that British agents were smuggling arms and munitions along the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf. Commenting on the reports, the British press stated that the rebels wanted freedom from the oppression and tyranny of the government of the Shah.⁵⁵

Finally, as a result of direct negotiations, although the British government agreed to increase the amount of the Iranian royalty on a different basis and to decrease the area of the concession to 100,000 square miles, Iran succeeded in

extending the remaining 27 years of the D'Arcy concession to 60 years until 31 December 1993, and Iran deprived itself of the sovereign right of annulling the contract at any time. According to the D'Arcy concession, all properties of the company were to be turned over to the government, without compensation, in 1961. Thus, Iran, after 1961, would have derived the full benefit of the exploitation of its oil resources, and all of the assets in the company, both in Iran and abroad, would be turned over to it without financial obligation in 1961. The termination of the D'Arcy concession was then only 28 years away. On the contrary, the 1933 agreement provided no enforceable sanction for default by the company. The agreement gave the company the right to annul the contract whenever it so desired, by simply giving two years' notice. The Iranian government, on the other hand, agreed to have no right of annulment through legislation, even if the provisions of the agreement were not carried out by the company.⁵⁶

Although an evaluation of the new agreement, based on a comparative analysis of the terms of the old and the new agreements, seems to indicate that neither Iran nor the company emerged with decided advantages over the other,⁵⁷ it certainly upheld the power position of Britain *vis-à-vis* Iran at the time. The disadvantageous terms, such as the excessive period of extension of the contract, could be explained by this power factor. The cancelling of the D'Arcy concession and the careless conclusion of the new agreement is evidence of the fact that the Iranian government was only "twisting in the tail of the British lion," as R. Ramazani put it.⁵⁸ The manner by which the concession was negotiated also confirmed once more that APOC was not a business concern but a representative of the British foreign office assigned with the task of the economic and political domination of Iran.

World War II Oil Concerns

In August 1941 when the war spread to Iran, there were only two valid oil concessions in the country: the first was operated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)⁵⁹ and the second, of minor importance, was operated by the Kavir Khurian Company. The Anglo-Iranian possessed an area of 100,000 square miles in south-western Iran. The Kavir Khurian Company's terrain near Semnan was negligible in size. The remaining territory of Iran was free from foreign concessions. Thus not only the northern provinces in the Russian zone but also the south eastern area, especially the Iranian province of Baluchistan, were potential areas of oil exploitation.

On 22 June 1941 when Germany attacked Russia, Britain became an ally of Russia. The British were suspicious of the Shah's attitude regarding their interests in Iran, as Reza Shah had kept friendly relations with Germany. It was due to this fact

that on 22 July 1941, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, reported to Churchill, the Prime Minister:

The more I examine the possibilities of this, the clearer it becomes that all depends upon our ability to concentrate a sufficient force in Iraq to protect the Iranian oilfields. It would be highly dangerous even to begin economic pressure until we were militarily in a position to do this, for the Shah is fully conscious of the value of the oilfields to us, and if he sees trouble with us brewing he is likely to take the first step ...⁶⁰

Churchill's main concern at this time was the protection of APOC. He was disturbed lest the Iranian troops around APOC's installations seize all the British employees of the company and hold them as hostages. He wanted to know whether the traditional policy of using the tribes against the government of Tehran was still feasible. Therefore, he asked his colleagues in the cabinet, "What attitude is expected from the Bakhtiari and other local inhabitants? Is there any danger of the oil wells being destroyed rather than that they should fall into our possession?"⁶¹ The British took the opportunity of joining hands with the Russians and proposed to them a joint campaign against Iran.

The Russians were also concerned about the Iranian oil. In their occupation note of 25 August 1941, the Russian government had asked the Iranian government to facilitate their exploitation of the oil resources of Khurian,⁶² and they now demanded an oil concession that would cover all five northern provinces of Iran under Russian occupation. During World War II Russian occupation forces operated drilling rigs at Semnan, east of Tehran, and along the Caspian coast, and Russian geologists formed definite opinions regarding the potential fields of northern Iran. In fact Russian soldiers were stationed at a drilling site near Semnan for several years after the end of the war in order to assert Russian claims to a nineteenth-century inoperative concession covering this Kavir Khurian area.⁶³

In January 1943 an extremely thoughtful memorandum that analysed America's developing role in Iran was prepared in the Department of State. This document decried British and Russian interventionism in Iran: "Although Russian policy has been fundamentally aggressive and British policy fundamentally defensive in character, the result in both cases has been interference with the internal affairs of Iran, amounting at times to a virtually complete negation of Iranian sovereignty and independence."⁶⁴ Noting that Iran had appealed desperately and persistently to the United States, the January 1943 memo responded to these representations thus:

So far, we have rested our response to this appeal primarily upon our interest in winning the war. I wonder if we should not also begin, privately, to base our response upon our interest in winning the peace? The United States, alone, is in a position to build up Iran to the point at which it will stand in need of neither British nor Russian assistance to maintain order in its own house.⁶⁵

With regard to the American oil interests in Iran, Secretary of State Cordell Hull summarised them even more pointedly in a communication of August 1943 to President Roosevelt. After discussing the moral and humanitarian reasons for an American presence in Iran to offset British and Russian ambitions, Hull wrote: "Likewise, from a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia."⁶⁶

As early as October 1943, James Byrnes, then Director of the Office of War Mobilisation, wrote a letter to President Roosevelt decrying Britain's control over Iran's oil. According to Byrnes, the government should request Britain to assign the United States one-third of its interest in Iranian oil as compensation for American contributions to the war effort.⁶⁷ Although the President took no action on this recommendation, it was clear that the United States had an eye on Iranian oil. While Roosevelt denied to Churchill early in 1944 that America had "sheep's eyes" on the Iranian oil fields, it is probably true that the United States had at least one "eagle's eye," as J. Bill affirms,⁶⁸ on these reserves.

Politically, however, Britain and the United States cooperated in an alliance against the Soviet Union. This cooperation increased significantly as the Russians responded by pursuing a heavy-handed policy of lengthened military occupation and direct intervention in north and north-western Iran. Thus the economic competition for Iranian oil that marked the early and mid 1940s quickly and directly blended into political rivalry. It was this economic and political competition involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain that marked the earliest manifestations of the Cold War.

American Oil Interests After World War II

In the Fall of 1943 the British Shell Company sent a representative to Iran to negotiate an oil concession for the southern and eastern areas. But the Iranian government suspended the British proposal until it was well aware of the attitude of the American companies. In the spring of 1944 the representatives of two American companies, Standard Vacuum Oil Company⁶⁹ and Sinclair Oil Company, arrived in Tehran without informing either the British or the Russians. The first official news about these negotiations was given by Sa'ed, the Prime Minister, to the

Majlis in August 1944. It was also rumoured that a northern concession would be given to Standard Vacuum as soon as the country was rid of the Russian troops.⁷⁰

The growing American presence in Iran in the early 1940s sharply increased tension between the United States and Britain. In response to Churchill's questions about America's interest in Iranian oil, Franklin Roosevelt wrote in March 1944 that "I am having the oil question studied by the Department of State and my oil experts, but please do accept my assurances that we are not making sheep's eyes at your oil fields in Iraq or Iran." Churchill responded: "Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheep's eyes at our oil fields in Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by giving you the fullest assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia."⁷¹

However, Standard Vacuum, with the encouragement of the Iranian government and the Department of State, was actively seeking a concession in Iran and throughout 1943 was deeply involved in negotiations toward this goal. Among those pushing hard for American economic intervention in Iran was General Patrick Hurley, the President's ambassador-at-large, who was a consultant to Sinclair Oil. In the words of one observer: "Anxious because Russian communism and British imperialism threatened Iran, Hurley believed that a good dose of American capitalism would cure Iran's ills."⁷² As a consequence, in mid-1944, the State Department assisted the Iranian government in hiring two well known petroleum consultants, Herbert Hoover Jr., and A. A. Curtice, who were to advise on the granting of concessions.

The British monitored this American initiative. One Shell board director put it bluntly when he advised that "Britain keep up our end before the Americans get all there is left."⁷³ In order to check Standard Vacuum's advance, Royal Dutch Shell sent two representatives to Iran in November 1943 to seek the same concession that Standard was after. The rush for concessions in Iran was complicated in early 1944 when Sinclair joined the hunt.

The rapid growth of American involvement in Iran added to the discomfort of the Russians, who had already been troubled by the increasing influence of APOC, the biggest oil company in Iran. In a countermove, a Russian delegation headed by Sergey I. Kavtaradze suddenly arrived in Tehran on 15 September 1944. The Russians had already asked Iran in their occupation note of 25 August 1941 to facilitate the task of the Russian government in exploiting the oil resources of Khurian. They now demanded an oil concession that would cover all five northern provinces of Iran under Russian occupation.

The Russian objective in this demand for oil concessions was to undercut the influence of these two powers in Iran.⁷⁴ The Russians also wished to combat the Western monopoly of Persian Gulf/Middle Eastern oil, and its possible future use by the Western powers against the Soviet Union in the arena of international politics. The pressure from the Russians was so great that the Shah later wrote: "we found ourselves confronted by a Russian proposition, which was so firm that it closely resembled an order: an oil-producing Soviet-Iranian society (51-49%) had to be created at once."⁷⁵ The Russian proposal was "a sudden and quick manoeuvre, [that] frustrated everything"⁷⁶ when the oil negotiations were approaching their final stage.

The Russian Struggle for Northern Oil Concession

The Russian proposals for the oil concession were brief and vague. First the area of concession was to consist of the five northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astrabad and Khorasan. Secondly the duration of the concession was to be seventy-five years. Thirdly the Russian government would begin, within five years, exploratory work in the whole area, which covered about 270,000 square miles. After a geological survey of the region had been made, the Russian government would redefine the concession area and would notify the Iranian government of the regions in which oil resources were assured. Fourthly the details of the concession regarding royalties, payments to the Iranian government, capital, management, personnel, purchase of land from individuals, the number of Russian technicians and their relations with the government of Iran, and other details, were to be decided after the ratification of the concession by the *Majlis*.⁷⁷

In response to these oil demands, on 16 October 1944, the Iranian government informed the British, Russian and American embassies that negotiations regarding the oil concessions would be deferred to the post-war period. But this announcement led to an intensification of Russian activities in the *Majlis* and the press and the unleashing of a torrent of criticism in which the Russian press was the leading assailant. As for the decision to grant no concession until after the war, Kavtaradze thought that this decision came as a result of the Russian proposals. However, Kavtaradze suggested that Sa'ed, as the Prime Minister, write him a letter promising that a concession would be granted to the Soviet Union after the termination of the hostilities. He even promised that the letter would be kept a secret throughout the war.⁷⁸

Kavtaradze remained in Tehran despite Iran's refusal, and his mere presence constituted a form of pressure. On 24 October 1944, Kavtaradze, in a press conference, made it clear that the disloyal and unfriendly position adopted by

Sa'ed precluded the possibility of further collaboration with him.⁷⁹ The Russian embassy became the centre of conspiracy against the Sa'ed government. Riots broke out in various parts of the country. In Teheran, Russian Army trucks carried Tudeh demonstrators to a mass meeting before the *Majlis*, while Red soldiers and Russian tanks protected the demonstrators, thus frustrating any attempt by the Iranian police to repress the demonstrations.⁸⁰ Radio Moscow and Radio Baku vilified the ruling class of Iran and incited the workers and peasants to revolt against the Sa'ed government.⁸¹

On 4 November 1944, *Izvestia* charged that Sa'ed was being encouraged by the foreign powers to resist and defy Soviet Russia. The paper then asked how the presence of American troops on Iranian soil without any agreement complied with Iran's sovereignty and independence.⁸² This brought an angry reply from the United States government which told Russia that the American troops were in Iran in connection with the delivery of Lend-Lease⁸³ supplies to Russia. In reaction, the US Ambassador Leland B. Morris announced that the United States government recognised the decision of the Iranian government as entirely just and within the rights of the country.⁸⁴ As the *New York Times* revealed on 7 November no one in Washington was hiding his apprehension about the explosive potentialities of the Soviet-Iranian dispute, which also involved Britain and the United States.⁸⁵

The British government also recognised the decision of the Iranian government. However, the United States was ill-prepared to deal with the oil struggle and stumbled somewhat clumsily into an unfavourable situation. Although the Department of State and such envoys as Hurley, Hoover, and Curtice worked together to encourage American entry into the Iranian oil scene, this was done ineffectively. The State Department did not, for example, attempt to coordinate the competing bids of Standard Vacuum and Sinclair. Besides competing with the British and the Russians for concessions, the Americans found themselves in competition with one another. The British blocking manoeuvre of sending Shell out to Iran also seriously hampered the American effort. At the same time, American attempts at penetration, even though neutralised by the British, alarmed both the Russians and the Iranians, who saw clear evidence of American-British collusion.

Sa'ed was forced to resign on 9 November 1944 and it was not until 20 November that the *Majlis* elected his successor, Bayat. This pressure continued until Musaddeq's Bill of 2 December 1944, which forbade the government from granting any oil concessions without legislative approval.⁸⁶ It ensured that no government would dare to make an arrangement in secret and would prove to the

Allies that Iran was prepared to resist any undue pressure. Enraged by the new measure, the Russian embassy in Tehran and the Tudeh papers throughout Iran turned from indirect unfriendly comments about the United States to overt attacks. The newspaper *Azhir* accused the Americans of conspiracy against Soviet Russia in Iran. Every now and then the name of Britain was used in connection with the United States. According to the Communist press, Britain was a dying villain. It no longer had a place in the council of the Big Powers and was so unpopular throughout the Middle East that the moment the war ended, "all the enslaved nations of Asia and Africa would rise against the tyrannical and toppling empire."⁸⁷

On 8 December Kavtaradze invited Bayat and his ministers to a gala dinner in the Russian embassy. There he called this measure a grave mistake which was forced on the people of Iran by the foreign interests and the enemies of Irano-Soviet friendship.⁸⁸ He told Bayat that the ratification of the Bill was inconsistent with the existence of AIOC in the south and that the Russian government was confident that Bayat would correct this unwarranted discrimination. To the Russians the moratorium on concessions only favoured the British, who already possessed a petroleum position in Iran. If equilibrium was sought, then the only way to balance British influence in the south was to grant the Soviet Union a concession in the north. Kavtaradze concluded by saying that because of the deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations he was obliged to leave Iran promptly. On 9 December 1944 Kavtaradze left Iran for Moscow. "The first round of the Iranian-Soviet duel" after the Second World War, as Lenczowski called it, was over; it was also a "Soviet-Western duel."⁸⁹

The tone of the Communist press in Iran after Kavtaradze's departure testified eloquently to this fact. These points of disagreement between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union that had been simmering throughout the war now flared out into the open as far as the Iranian press was concerned. The civil war in Greece, which had just begun, the Polish problem, and the over-all problem of oil in the Middle East were now volubly discussed, first by the Communist press and then, as a countermeasure, by the nationalist press. As time went on Britain found accusations of imperialism thrown at it. Britain was charged with aiding reactionary régimes throughout the world, with oppressing India, and with exploiting Iran through the medium of AIOC.

The Russians did not give up hope and insisted on a concession through the Irano-Soviet Joint Stock Company. Qavam, the Prime Minister, who had been in Moscow from 19 February until 8 March 1945 to discuss the withdrawal of the Russian troops (as will be discussed in Chapter 6), was told by Stalin, smiling

cynically, that he was afraid that the British were so stupid and so slow that they would neither give Iran its just benefits from APOC, nor would they allow others to come to the aid of Iran.⁹⁰ Molotov, the Russian Commisar for Foreign Affairs, suggested in his negotiations with Qavam that:

The Soviet government would abandon its demand for an oil concession. Instead an Irano-Soviet joint stock company would be established. During the first 25 years, 51 percent of the shares would be owned by the Soviet and 49 percent by Iran, during the second 25 years each would own 50 percent of the shares.⁹¹

As the Russians wanted to use their military presence in the northern part of Iran as a lever, Qavam rejected the proposal and even refused to sign any joint communiqué.⁹² However in order to reach some understanding, he continued negotiations with Sadchikov, the new Russian ambassador in Tehran, though in "informal and simply courtesy meetings."⁹³ In March 1946 when the Russians announced their withdrawal from the northern occupied zone, Stalin stated: "As to what concerns the question of withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran, it is known that this has been decided upon in a positive way by an understanding reached between the Russian government and the government of Iran."⁹⁴

At last on 4 April 1946, Qavam and Sadchikov's negotiations reached an agreement according to which the Iranian government in return for the Russians' evacuation of the occupied areas by 6 May 1946 and their consent to view the Azerbaijan question as an internal affair of Iran, agreed to the establishment of a joint Irano-Soviet Oil Company for the development of the oil resources of the northern provinces. The Russian government, according to the Agreement, would own 51 percent and the Iranian government would possess 49 percent of the company's stock for the first twenty-five years, and then each party would own 50 percent of the stock of the company for the second 25 years.⁹⁵

In Washington there was optimism and confidence that no agreement detrimental to Iranian interests would ever be concluded.⁹⁶ London had a different opinion, insisting that there were some secret arrangements between Qavam and the Russians, and the British newspapers considering the settlement as a Russian victory. They argued that the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement was a *fait accompli* and that the Russians by coercion and seduction had gained what they wanted in fact, if not in form. They also complained that the principle of equality of economic opportunity for the principal powers had gone by the board, and that the northern provinces of Iran would become more than a sphere of influence; the area would become a closed economic preserve for Russia.⁹⁷ In an editorial, the *Times* of London renewed its favourite subject of harmonious partition of the Iranian oil

resources between Russia and Britain as the Great Powers interested in Iran. It read:

One of the first aims of agreement should be to substitute for the competitive scramble for oil which has played havoc with Persian politics in the past a concerted arrangement for the orderly exploitation of Persian oil resources which are vast enough to provide an adequate quota for all.⁹⁸

However this long debated agreement broke sdown when the 15th Majlis (inaugurated on 16 August 1947) refused ratification on 22 October 1947.⁹⁹ This brought several protests from the Russian government in which the Russians hinted at the possibility of a rupture of diplomatic relations. These notes were also accompanied by a campaign of threats by the Soviet press and Radio Moscow.¹⁰⁰ This Russo-Iranian oil dispute continued until the end of 1947. On 11 September 1947 Ambassador Allen had released a strong statement in which he had addressed the Iranians saying that they were the masters of their home and were free to accept or reject the concession to Soviet Russia or any other nation. Allen also assured the Iranians that if they chose to reject the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement, they could count on American support against Russian intimidation and bullying.¹⁰¹ Relying on this statement and backed also by Truman's Doctrine, which had been formulated by this time, Iran was able to resist Russian pressure and to warn the Russians that it might take the case to the Security Council again.¹⁰²

The Western Consortium of Iranian Oil

With the closing of the Russian oil demand a new chapter in the Anglo-Iranian oil problem was opened, which brought the participation of American companies into the oil destiny of Iran. The refusal of the *Majlis* to ratify the Qavam-Sadchikov Agreement brought several protests from the Soviet government. The Russian notes were curt but not uncompromising and made a particular point of recognising the continued existence of the British oil concession in the South.

In response to pressure from the opposition, Qavam started negotiations with AIOC, calling for revision of the 1933 agreement and a new arrangement for sharing profits between the government of Iran and the company. On 1 December 1947, Qavam broadcast to the nation a warning that Iran should remain neutral between the two Great Power blocs and added, "I have pursued the case of AIOC concession and will persist as long as necessary to secure satisfaction for the Iranian nation."¹⁰³

Although the resistance of the British, the indifference of the Americans and the Shah's effective undermining of Qavam's power among the members of his cabinet and that of the *Majlis* had forced Qavam to resign thus stopping

negotiations, late in 1947 Iranian government resumed its proposal to AIOC that there be a discussion of subjects of mutual interest, in particular the participation of Iran in its management and a new general plan whereby Iranian income from oil would compare to that of the Venezuela.¹⁰⁴ The terms of the 1933 concession in net profit, royalties, taxation, gold clause, production, area of exploitation, the period, access to the accounts, domestic employees and prices in Iran were also examined to point out how the company had misused them to the disadvantage of Iran.¹⁰⁵ On an estimated production of about 23 million tons in 1948, the company's profit was \$320,000,000; Iran's royalty, including taxes and 20% of excess dividends, was about \$36,000,000; while the British government received from the company more than \$120,000,000 in excess profit and corporation taxes. Furthermore, a sum of \$70,000,000 was deposited in the reserves.¹⁰⁶

Therefore the Iranian government proposed that the company accept an arrangement similar to the one concluded between the American companies and Venezuela. It reminded the company that it was true that Article 21 of the contract provided that "the concession shall not be annulled by the government, and the terms therein contained shall not be altered either by general or special legislation in the future," but this clause, according to the Iranian government, could not deprive a country from exercising its right of nationalisation.¹⁰⁷ The company, in response, refused to discuss the profit-sharing system established in Venezuela. It offered to make an immediate additional payment as compensation, which was refused by Iranian government.

When Prime Minister Sa'ed asked the *Majlis* for a vote of confidence, the majority passed a resolution providing that the government should proceed with immediate negotiations with the company and submit a report to the *Majlis* as soon as possible. Sa'ed therefore appointed a Commission headed by Golshayan, the Minister of Finance, to enter into negotiations with AIOC.¹⁰⁸ After prolonged negotiations, although AIOC offered some increase in the payments to the Iranian government, the company found it impossible to accept Iran as a partner with a voice in the management of the company and also insisted that the gold clause of the 1933 agreement be discarded.¹⁰⁹ Therefore the Commission, according to the minutes of the council of ministers, considered the company's offer inadequate and unacceptable.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, as it could no longer resist the British pressure, it accepted the supplemental agreement on 17 July 1949.¹¹¹

In spite of some small advantages according to some opponents, the supplemental agreement did not serve the interests of Iran. The supplemental agreement was the same as the 1933 contract in giving Iran no participation in the

management; also it did not guarantee an end to the company's interference in the internal affairs of the country. They charged that:

1. The agreement had confirmed the invalid agreement of 1933, which had been forced upon Iran.
2. By fixing the amount to be paid by the company as royalty and taxation for the year 1948, and retroactive to the previous year, the gold clause which had been subject of dispute had been tacitly interpreted according to the views of the company.
3. By this interpretation of the gold clause Iran was deprived of the 50 percent difference of the price of the gold and paper sterling.
4. It established a legal and definite justification for British taxation, whereas according to international practice no government could levy taxes upon another government.
5. In case a stoppage continued for a whole year no sum would be paid as minimum, whereas under the former agreement Iran continued to receive a minimum of £750,000 under any circumstances.
6. All the claims of the Iranian government against the former company would have been settled without any specific reference to the auditing of accounts and examination of claims.
7. Although in accordance with the 1933 agreement Iran had a 20 percent share in all reserves of the company, the supplemental agreement limited Iran's rights to the general reserve, and deprived her of rights in all other reserves entirely and forever.
8. The new agreement deprived Iran of her share in the reserves of subsidiary and allied companies (20% of whose assets were claimed by the government of Iran).
9. While the supplemental agreement saved Iran 1 shillings a ton, the government of Iraq was negotiating for a new agreement which would bring that country 18 shillings per ton. In Venezuela, the government was receiving approximately 30 shillings per ton.¹¹²

On 12 December, the Oil Commission of the 16th *Majlis* headed by Dr. Musaddeq, then a Member of the *Majlis*, began a study of nationalisation and asked Razmara the Prime Minister to withdraw the Supplemental Agreement on the grounds that anything short of nationalisation of the oil industry would be detrimental to Iranian interests. In the meantime, the negotiations between the Arabian American Oil Company and the Saudi Arabian government had begun and, in January 1951, resulted in a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement. Razmara again reminded the company that it must change its attitude and agree to an arrangement similar to that of Saudi Arabia. The company took two months to make a decision but by then it was too late and the new offer was considered too little. As Fatemi argues, "if the company had heeded Razmara's warnings at this time and had offered a 50-50 proposal with some Iranian participation in the management, the more moderate elements in the country could have averted the nationalisation of the oil industry."¹¹³

On 15 March 1951 the *Majlis*, after prolonged debate over the recommendations of the Oil Commission, unanimously voted to nationalise the oil industry, a decision confirmed by the Senate on 20 March. The nationalisation resolution charged the government with the responsibility of carrying out all operations of exploration, extraction, development and exploitation of oil throughout the country. According to the contention of the Iranian government in

taking this action, the *Majlis* responded to the public will. On 29 April the *Majlis* passed the “nine-point” Act to implement the nationalisation law. This was also confirmed by the Senate on 2 May and signed by the Shah. The new law provided that the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) take over the oil industry.

The contagious nature of the Nationalisation Act in Iran was a matter of concern for the Truman administration. If Iran could nationalise the powerful British oil company in Iran, why then couldn't the other oil-producing countries do the same thing to American companies? On 24 May 1951 Arthur Krock reported the following revealing conversation with President Truman:

But these foreign oil countries have a good case against some groups of foreign capital. The President said he thought Mexico's nationalisation of oil was “right” even though so at the time; but it was regarded as “treason” to say so. If, however, the Iranians carry out their plans as stated, Venezuela and other countries on whose supply we depend will follow suit. That is the great danger in the Iranian controversy with the British.¹¹⁴

Although many have argued for America's disinterest in Iranian oil, given the conditions of glut that then prevailed, Middle Eastern history demonstrates that America had always sought such access, glut or no glut. In 1921-22, for example, the United States struggled for access to the rich Iraqi oil fields then controlled by British and Dutch interests. Despite a heavy glut of oil on the world market, America fought for a share of the action in order to ensure that its citizens were given equal economic participation in the former Ottoman Empire. “The underlying objective,” as B. McBeth argues, “was that the US would not accept the prohibition of her citizens' participation in the economic development of areas hitherto barred to American capital.”¹¹⁵

In this case not only did the Americans want access to Iranian oil, but they also attempted to push an agreement in order to weaken AIOC *vis-à-vis* the large multinational American companies. In August 1950, the British Foreign Office reported that “the State Department may have been over much influenced by the American oil companies, who wish to see our companies driven into an uncompetitive position by constant pressure to raise their royalties and labour conditions.”¹¹⁶

Therefore the Truman administration was reluctant to adopt the threatening tactics contemplated by key British officials to counter the nationalisation movement in Iran. Finally in October 1952, just three months before the Eisenhower administration was due to take over from President Truman, Acheson decided that the United States should try an independent initiative to end the crisis quickly, and to try to save Iran from further political and economic disasters that could pave the

way for a communist to take over. By now Acheson believed that "Iran was on the verge of an explosion in which Musaddeq would break relations with the United States, after which nothing could save the country from the Tudeh party and the disappearance behind the Iron Curtain."¹¹⁷

Although international opinion favoured Musaddeq, the situation began quickly to sour for him at home. The British blockade of Iranian oil and that country's intervening actions in Musaddeq's downfall resulted in serious economic hardship and polarisation of Iranians into pro- and anti-Musaddeq forces. The anti-Musaddeq forces were centred around the monarchy which had the support of a large section of the armed forces. The situation worsened when, amid increasing unrest inside and outside the *Majlis*, Musaddeq attempted to take over the constitutional position of the Shah as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to rule by emergency powers legitimised by a referendum, and to bypass the responsibility of the *Majlis*. He thus isolated himself from some of his close colleagues, including Ayatollah Kashani, the speaker of the *Majlis* and laid himself open to criticisms of dictatorial rule, inviting a direct confrontation between his government and the conservative forces.¹¹⁸

By now the Eisenhower administration, under the growing pressure of the American global strategy against communism, and of British propaganda (supported by the Iranian conservatives) to the effect that Musaddeq was being influenced by the Tudeh, had been convinced that a reliable alternative to Musaddeq's administration would be a government headed by the anti-communist but pro-Western monarchy. Thus Washington hardened its position against Musaddeq. When Musaddeq appealed directly to Eisenhower on 28 May 1953 for American economic assistance against Iran's "great economic and political difficulties" because of the "action taken by the former company [AIOC] and the British government," Eisenhower did not respond for a month; when he did, the answer was negative. Eisenhower wrote that in the wake of the "failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with regard to compensation ... it would not be fair to American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran."¹¹⁹

The intersection of interventionary ideas occurred in November 1952, when the British approached the United States both in Washington and London concerning a covert operation. In Washington, the primary British operative, C. M. "Monty" Woodhouse, met with American officials at the State Department and CIA and made his proposal for what the British termed Operation Boot. The basis

argument of Woodhouse's discussions with American officials in Washington was the threat of communism. As he wrote,

Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, I decided to emphasise the Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry. I argued that even if a settlement of the oil dispute could be negotiated with Musaddiq, which was doubtful, he was still incapable of resisting a coup by the Tudeh Party, if it were backed by Soviet support. Therefore he must be removed.¹²⁰

American foreign policy makers were somewhat awed by the British experience and expertise in Iran. Eden, for example, had read Oriental languages at Oxford, with Persian and Arabic as his languages of study. He was extremely knowledgeable about Iranian history and culture, and his diplomatic experience with Iran dated back to 1933, when he was Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office during the tense negotiations with Iran over the oil agreement. With few exceptions - primarily American citizens from missionary backgrounds who had lived in Iran - the United States was still largely illiterate in matters Iranian. The personal connections that American and British officials maintained with one another because of Britain's special knowledge of Iran combined to pull America to the British position. Anthony Eden himself stated that he knew "that the United States's Ambassador took the view that the United States ought not to intrude its views too much in a matter where large British interests were at stake."¹²¹

The idea of intervention originated with the British Secret Intelligence Services (SIS) and the Foreign Service Military Intelligence Service (M16) now needed American support which was provided when the Eisenhower administration came to power. Eisenhower, with the full knowledge and support of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, decided to intervene directly to overthrow the Musaddiq government. The key link in the operation, called "Ajax" was Kermit Roosevelt, head of CIA operations in the Middle East, who connected Washington with the field.¹²²

Following a series of wild political events in mid-August 1953, Musaddiq and his government were overthrown on 19 August. General Fazlollah Zahedi headed a military government so that the Shah, who had fled the country on 16 August, could return on 22 August and the monarchy was reinstated. The new military government approached the United States for economic aid on 26 August and, on 5 September, Eisenhower granted \$45 million for immediate assistance on an emergency basis, encouraging Iran to settle the Anglo-Iranian dispute as soon as possible.

These oil considerations were centrally involved in the American decision to assist in the overthrow of the Musaddiq government. Clearly the oil companies (both American and European, both majors and independents) which had the capacity to buy and market Iranian oil, all cooperated in boycotting it and thus succeeded in putting enormous pressure on the Iranian economy. In addition, the US government seriously entertained a plan for a consortium of American oil companies to purchase oil from Iran and then sell it to other international companies, including AIOC.¹²³ To J. Bill, "the United States clearly had an interest in gaining entry to the Iranian oil business."¹²⁴

Given the desperate need of the Shah's régime for capital and the West's desire to keep the Communist bloc from having any share in Iranian oil resources, both US and Iranian governments deemed cooperation desirable and necessary. But the Anglo-American coordination was of higher priority. Thus between August and October of 1953, British and American government officials and petroleum executives met in Washington to discuss a new arrangement for the exploitation of Iranian oil. The negotiators quickly recognised that three conditions had to be met if an agreement was to be forthcoming: (1) the nationalisation of Iranian oil was a fait accompli and had to be allowed to stand; (2) the British single-company control of the Iranian oil industry had to be replaced by a multi company American-British arrangement; and (3) satisfactory compensation had to be paid to AIOC both for its losses and for the transferal of its facilities to the Iranian government. Within this context, it was deemed essential that the overriding presence of AIOC be shaded, its influence diluted, and that the Iranian government be allowed to save face.¹²⁵ The participation of the American companies in the consortium was contrary to American antitrust laws, but Eisenhower had already overruled the laws for the sake of national security and the fight against communism.¹²⁶

In April 1954, the consortium of Western company representatives began negotiations with the Iranian government in Tehran. The arrangement was urgently accepted by all parties concerned, and an agreement to this effect was signed in November 1954. The original consortium agreement provided the following line up: British Petroleum-AIOC (40%), Royal Dutch-Shell (14%), Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (6%), and the five American companies of Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon), Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, and Standard Oil of California (8% each).

Just as the American major companies entered the consortium to dilute the concentrated influence of AIOC, the American independents wanted a share. Finding themselves completely frozen out of the agreement, the independent oil

companies immediately began an intensive lobbying campaign with the Department of State. This campaign was led by Ralph K. Davies, president of the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), which was composed of interests held by nine independents, including Phillips Petroleum, Signal, and Ashland. In letters to both Secretary of State Dulles and Attorney-General Herbert Brownell, Jr., on 15 October 1954, Davies reminded the government of the mutual agreement reached when they had accepted the State Department's request not to do business with Musaddiq's Iran.¹²⁷ As a result of this effective lobbying, the five American majors each relinquished 1 percent of their shares, so that Richfield, Aminoil and other small companies could obtain 5 percent ownership.¹²⁸ In this way the major architects of this arrangement, Dulles and Hoover, hoped to keep everybody happy, and meanwhile seriously undercut the chances for a recurrence of actions like Musaddeq's against a single monopoly.

The Consortium Agreement, although securing the resumption of oil outflow and the hoped for necessary capital inflow which Iran needed badly, fell far short of achieving nationalisation on Musaddeq's model. Theoretically, the consortium was to act as a customer of the NIOC. It was to operate in an area of 100,000 square miles; its contract was to be for fifteen years, renewable for three more five-year periods; and AIOC was to receive handsome compensation in cash and assets from both NIOC and the eight consortium members. As for Musaddeq's nationalisation, the consortium was to acknowledge Iranian ownership of its oil industry and NIOC's right to operate and produce oil outside the consortium's area, together with the Kirmanshah Refinery and the refinery of Naft Shah, with whatever local or foreign interests it wished to include. The NIOC was charged with the management of the internal distribution of petroleum products, and with non-basic operations, such as housing, education, and medical care of oil industry employees. Moreover, the Iranian government was to receive more in royalties than it had in the past, and was to share the consortium's profit on a fifty-fifty basis.¹²⁹

In practice, however, the deal gave the United States "a new and malleable form of influence over the Iranian government and over Middle Eastern politics in general."¹³⁰ The termination of British monopoly was largely seen as the diversification and intensification of Iran's dependency on the West, rather than its elimination. The agreement enabled the United States for the first time to secure a key position in Iran's leading economic sector, which was heavily to influence both the direction and intensity of Iran's future economic development and, for that matter, political changes. Against the backdrop of the American oil companies' failure in the early 1920s and the 1940s, the American oil interests finally got a foothold in the Iranian oilfields, helping the resumption and continuation of the flow of

“embargo-proof” Iranian oil supplies to the markets of its West European allies and friends, and to its own markets as well. Assured access to Iranian oil was considered beneficial to the industrial democracies not only in economic terms, but also in political and strategic terms: the defence of the Western alliance was considered to be strengthened thereby. It also enabled Washington to strengthen the American position against the USSR and British interests in the region. Sir William Fraser and Sir Anthony Eden had finally to accept the fact that Britain was a declining power, not only in relation to the Soviet Union but also in relation to the United States. From now on, any event in Iran that affected oil either directly or indirectly concerned the United States.

American intervention in Iran ensured that no communist takeover would take place and that Iranian oil reserves would be available to the Western world. It bought twenty-five more years for the Pahlavi dynasty and enabled the international oil industry to export 24 billion barrels of oil at favourable terms during this period. Western consumers paid very low prices for this precious resource during these years. The average posted price of Iranian crude was about \$1.85 between 1954 and 1960 and \$1.80 between 1960 and 1971.¹³¹ Insofar as the Iranian objections against a single monopoly (AIOC) were concerned, the monopolistic structure did not really change. Indeed, Iran was in a weaker position, facing eight majors rather than facing a single major oil company. By crushing the nationalisation movement, the United States and Britain discouraged further movements toward unilateral nationalisation of the oil industry in the Third World. Although the Suez Canal was nationalised in 1956, it was almost two decades before any more major oil industries were nationalised.

As to the nationalisation principle accepted by the Consortium, this did not change the picture at all. The assets belonged to NIOC, but were exploited as any other concession by the Consortium. The consortium assumed full control of the Iranian oil industry from production to pricing and marketing. It did so through its capital, expertise, managerial capacity, tanker fleet, and above all, through its right to operate outside the consortium area. Since it had neither the necessary capital nor the know-how and access to markets, it had to undertake joint ventures with foreign companies, all of which happened to be American except one, the *Societe Irano-Italienne des Petroles* (SIRIP). The international oil companies were placed, in fact, in such a powerful position that they could run the Iranian oil industry as their interests dictated. Iran was unable to exercise any effective control. Important decisions on the level of production, the expansion of domestic reserves, and purchase prices were left to Consortium members. In this way they could control

supply and demand in markets, to whatever degree and in whatever way suited them best.

It has come to light that for this project, the Consortium even embarked upon a clandestine operation under a “participant agreement” which was signed by its eight member companies, and was kept secret from the public and the Iranian government until 1974. The agreement described not only the terms under which the member companies would buy oil, but also how they would restrict production to avoid a glut and decline in their profits, even though this was detrimental to Iran because any drop in production or sale of oil meant less revenue for Iran. The aim of the “participant agreement” was achieved largely by the formula of the “Aggregate Programmed Quality” (APQ). Anthony Sampson explains:

The APQ calculated total amount of oil that was to be ‘lifted’ from Iran in the following year, and it was reckoned by listing the needs of each participant, divided by their percentage share in the consortium, in order of magnitude, and then taking the last figure after seventy percent of the holdings had been listed. A company wishing to take more than its quota would have to pay more for it ... [This system] “effectively held down production in Iran to the levels required by the least demanding of the companies. If Exxon and Texaco, for instance, were to want less oil (as they always did) because of their commitments in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, BP and Shell would have to restrict their production, too.”¹³²

The Consortium was the best the Iranian government could have negotiated given the time and circumstances. In the words of Fatollah Naficy, “Iran had to choose between the devil and the deep blue sea, between chaos and humiliation. What happened is they chose humiliation rather than chaos, leading possibly to communism.”¹³³ In this struggle the British and the International Petroleum Cartel came out victorious,¹³⁴ leaving a catastrophic defeat for Iranian national aspirations. For this reason, the Consortium Oil Agreement of 1954 “effectively destroyed the spirit of the oil nationalisation even though it kept the appearance of it,” as H. Katouzian has commented.¹³⁵

Conclusion

Oil in Iran was of great interest and concern to the British, Americans and the Russians and each competed with the other to obtain a concession. In this rivalry the great power involved demanded an exclusive right of exploitation or at least a share in some parts of the country. TGP rivals used every means of coercion from economic and diplomatic pressure to military manoeuvres, coups and occupation to gain, maintain and extend their concessions.

On the other hand, the Iranian government, which had no support from its people, felt vulnerable to this wide ranging rivalry. It could neither resist all nor one by itself. All it did was to put its oil at the disposition of the British or the Anglo-

American alliance in order to secure it from Russia's intentions. The exploitation of oil by APOC, AIOC and the consortium is the best example of the direction of oil politics in Iran.

The other important role of Iran, as a corridor which attracted the Great Power rivals, will be examined in the following chapter.

- ¹ Cited in G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 77.
- ² L. Mosley, *Power Play: Oil in the Middle East*, p. 24.
- ³ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 78.
- ⁴ For details refer to L. Mosley, *Power Play: Oil in the Middle East*, pp. 22-23.
- ⁵ Quoted in E. Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East*, p. 98.
- ⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 74.
- ⁷ According to Article 24 of the Constitutional Law, "The conclusion of treaties and agreements, the granting of commercial, industrial, agricultural or other concessions (monopolies), whether the concessionaire is a national or a foreigner, must be authorised by the National Consultative Assembly [*Majlis*], ..." whereas the concession was obtained under absolute duress and coercion, it was granted at the time when Iran was occupied by the Anglo-Russian troops and while Sepahsalar, the Prime Minister, was a Russian protégé. The Shah and his ministers were prisoners in Teheran. The *Majlis* had been dissolved in November 1915 and its members had to escape the capital for their lives. For the Text of the Concession refer to M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, pp. 326-330. This concession was annulled by Samsamus-Saltanah's cabinet in 1918. See Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Tasvib-namehay-i Hiat-i Vozara*, 1918.
- ⁸ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 73.
- ⁹ See M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 330.
- ¹⁰ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 76; G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 81.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- ¹² The policy at the turn of the twentieth century was that all trading nations should have equal trading rights with any given government with all respecting that country's territorial integrity. This policy which became the slogan of the English opponents of the idea of "spheres of influence" in China in 1898, has its place in the Bible (1526 Tyndale Revel. iii. 8.; Isaiah 60.11; Acts 14.27) as a symbol for free access to salvation. This policy was interpreted in a partisan way by those who were pushing it; while trying to open the door for themselves, they closed it to others.
- ¹³ M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 331; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 77-78.
- ¹⁴ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1920, vol.3, p. 353.
- ¹⁵ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 79.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80; M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 333.
- ¹⁷ H F. Crady, "What Went Wrong in Iran?" *Saturday Evening Post*, 5 January 1951.
- ¹⁸ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States of the United States*, 1921, vol. 2, pp. 643-649. See also H. Makki, *Tarikh-i Beest Saleh-i Iran*, vol. 1, p. 344.
- ¹⁹ For the text of the Treaty in part refer to the Appendices.
- ²⁰ For the text of the Russian protest, refer to *Oil Concessions in Foreign Countries*, p. 94.
- ²¹ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 112.
- ²² E. H. Davenport and Sidney R. Cooke, *The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations*, pp. 112-117.
- ²³ W. Churchill in the House of Commons, 1922, cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 117.

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- ²⁴ Cited in Ibid.
- ²⁵ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States of the United States*, 1921, vol. 2, p. 655.
- ²⁶ R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 207.
- ²⁷ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 119.
- ²⁸ B. Shwadran, *The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers*, p. 88; M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 333.
- ²⁹ R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 205; G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 83.
- ³⁰ The text of the Treaty of Friendship is in part in the Appendices.
- ³¹ For the text of the then Prime Minister's letter refer to *Oil Concessions in Foreign Countries*, p. 101.
- ³² For the text, refer to US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1923, vol. 2, pp. 721-736. See also M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 338.
- ³³ Quoted in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 125.
- ³⁴ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1924, vol.2, p. 546; M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 338-9; BenjA. Shwadran, *The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers*, p. 94.
- ³⁵ Cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 121-123.
- ³⁶ Quoted in Ibid., p. 125.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ H. Makki, *Tarikh-i Beest Saleh-i Iran*, vol. 3, pp. 92-107; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 131-137.
- ³⁹ See G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948*, p. 84.; A. Millspaugh, *The American Task in Persia*, p. 293.
- ⁴⁰ M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, pp. 341-342; BenjA. Shwadran, *The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers*, p. 93-94.
- ⁴¹ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1924, vol.2, pp. 548-551.
- ⁴² Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran), no. 85 (191069/150/34), Foreign Office; 10 April 1920 in Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, pp. 466-467.
- ⁴³ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, pp. 84-85; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 230 fn.
- ⁴⁴ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 85.
- ⁴⁵ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 153; According to Taqizadeh, the then Minister of Finance and the head of the Iranian negotiators, it was only "at the last day of the negotiations" that APOC representatives "suddenly mentioned the extension of the period of the concession and threatened to stop the negotiations and to leave Iran." Taqizadeh's parliamentary speech, quoted in M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 296.
- ⁴⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 157-158.
- ⁴⁷ B. Shwadran, *The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers*, p. 51; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 159; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey*, 1934, p. 237; M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Naft-i Iran*, p. 291.
- ⁴⁸ For detail refer to N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 158.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 159.
- ⁵⁰ For details of dispute refer to Ibid., p. 151-178.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p. 159-160.

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- ⁵² Cited in G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 79; see also N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 165.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 166.
- ⁵⁴ *Ittila'at*, 11 December 1932.
- ⁵⁵ Cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 168.
- ⁵⁶ Fore details refer to H. Katouzian, *Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 118; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 179-83; Abulfazl Lizani, *Tala-yi Siyah ya Bala-yi Iran*, pp. 239-383. For the text of the agreement, refer to League of Nations, *Official Journal*, 1933, pp. 1653-1660.
- ⁵⁷ B. Shwadran, *The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers*, p. 56; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey*, 1934, pp. 243-47.
- ⁵⁸ R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 256.
- ⁵⁹ After the 1939 prohibition of Reza Shah to call Iran, Persia, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company changed its name to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
- ⁶⁰ W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, p. 478.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁶² For the text of the Soviet memorandum after the invasion refer to Ahmad Bani Ahmad, *Tarikh-i Shahanshahi-ye Pahlavi: Reza Shah-i Kabir*, vol. 3, pp. 502-509; *Moscow News*, no. 47, 25 August 1941; *Manchester Guardian*, 26 August 1941.
- ⁶³ D. N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present*, p. 269.
- ⁶⁴ Memorandum by J. D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, "American Policy in Iran," p. 95.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.
- ⁶⁷ See M. B. Stoff, *Oil, Water, and American Security*, p. 131. For the Byrnes' letter refer to M. Fateh, *Panjah Sal Nafti Iran*, p. 500.
- ⁶⁸ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 80.
- ⁶⁹ Owned jointly by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Vacuum Oil Company.
- ⁷⁰ American chargé d'affaires to the State Department, 3 April 1944, *Foreign Relations of the United States of the United States*, vol.5, p. 446.
- ⁷¹ This exchange is in Bruce R. Kuniholm, *Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, p. 184.
- ⁷² M. H. Lytle, *American-Iranian Relations*, p. 107.
- ⁷³ The words of Sir Frederick Godber as reported in Public Record Official FO 371, 23 September, 1943, in M. B. Stoff, *Oil, War, and American Security*, p. 104. See also Mark H. Lytle, *American-Iranian Relations*, p. 125.
- ⁷⁴ According to the Tudeh party, "the Soviets had contributed the North Oil concession to frustrate the oil negotiations between Iran and the USA." See Dr. H. Jowdat cited in Institute of Cultural Research and Studies, *Siasat va Sazman-i Hezb-i Tudeh*, vol. 1, p. 166.
- ⁷⁵ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 48.
- ⁷⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 234.
- ⁷⁷ Sa'ed's report to the *Majlis*, 17 October 1944 cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 236-237.
- ⁷⁸ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 239.
- ⁷⁹ For details refer to *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.
- ⁸⁰ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, pp. 220-221.

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- ⁸¹ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 28; E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 211; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 247.
- ⁸² Cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 253.
- ⁸³ An Act passed on 11 March 1941 by the US Congress to promote American defence. It authorised the President to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise dispose of any defence article including goods, weapons and services, to any nation fighting the Axis. This made the United States the arsenal of the Allies.
- ⁸⁴ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 246.
- ⁸⁵ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 253.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 251.
- ⁸⁷ *Rahbar*, 16 January 1945; *Zafar*, 3 February 1945; *Mardom*, 6 December 1944.
- ⁸⁸ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 222.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.
- ⁹⁰ Cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 294.
- ⁹¹ This was reported to a closed session of the 14th *Majlis*. For details refer to *Majlis Proceedings*, 29 March 1946, vol. 17, p. 67; It was also submitted to the Security Council on 28 March 1946.
- ⁹² *Majlis Proceedings*, 29 March 1946, vol. 17, p. 67.
- ⁹³ *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 21 February 1954, cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 308.
- ⁹⁴ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 309.
- ⁹⁵ The full text of the Agreement is in the Appendices.
- ⁹⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 312.
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 316.
- ⁹⁸ *The Times*, 5 April 1946.
- ⁹⁹ For the text of the historical parliamentary bill introduced by Dr. R. Zadeh Shafaq, a representative from Tehran, refer to N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 326.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 326.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 324-325.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 327.
- ¹⁰³ Faramarz S. Fatemi, *The USSR in Iran*, p. 167.
- ¹⁰⁴ For details refer to N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 328.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 328-329.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 329-330.
- ¹⁰⁷ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 330.
- ¹⁰⁸ For the base of discussions refer to *Ibid.*, p. 332.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹¹ Denise Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs*, pp. 471-475.
- ¹¹² H. Makki, *Kitab-i Siah*, pp. 332-340, 426-431.
- ¹¹³ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 337.
- ¹¹⁴ A. Krock, *Memoirs*, p. 262.
- ¹¹⁵ B. S. McBeth, *British Oil Policy, 1919-1939*, p. 75.

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- ¹¹⁶ G. McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World*, p. 322.
- ¹¹⁷ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 603.
- ¹¹⁸ For a more detailed account of these developments, refer to Avery, *Modern Iran*, pp. 416-439; Bahman Nirumand, *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action*, pp. 73-86; M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, pp. 93-110; H. Arfa, *Under Five Shahs*, pp. 396-410.
- ¹¹⁹ D. D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 161-162.
- ¹²⁰ C. M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured*, p. 117. Woodhouse stresses this strategy, writing in earlier, "I was convinced from the first that any effort to forestall a Soviet coup in Iran would require a joint Anglo-American effort. The Americans would be more likely to work with us if they saw the problem as one of containing Communism rather than restoring the position of AIOC" (p. 110), quoted in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 86.
- ¹²¹ Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 224.
- ¹²² For details refer to J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, pp. 85-93.
- ¹²³ For details on other proposals, refer to Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 8 October 1952, Papers of Dean Acheson, H. S. Truman Library. Independence, Mo., and Department of the Interior, confidential memorandum, "Iranian Oil Problem," Charles Rayner to C. S. Snodgrass. 22 October 1951, Papers of Dean Acheson. H. S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo, cited in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 81.
- ¹²⁴ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 81.
- ¹²⁵ Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters*, p. 135.
- ¹²⁶ D. D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 1953-56, p. 166.
- ¹²⁷ The texts of these letters are reproduced in Senate Committee on *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Multinational Corporations, pp. 249-252 cited in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 111.
- ¹²⁸ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 111.
- ¹²⁹ For details refer to J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 108; H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, pp. 201-207, R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran*, p. 27.
- ¹³⁰ Frances Fitzgerald, "Giving the Shah Everything He Wants," pp. 55-82.
- ¹³¹ Calculated and provided by Fereidun Fesharaki in a personal communication of 13 February 1981, cited in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 93.
- ¹³² Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters*, p. 157.
- ¹³³ In a personal communication on 10 July 1985, quoted in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 109.
- ¹³⁴ BenjA. Shwadran, *The Middle East Oil. and the Great Powers*, p. 188; A. Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah*, 1941-1979, pp. 98-99; Fereidun Fesharaki, *Development of the Iranian Oil Industry*, pp. 59-60; Jerrold L. Walden, "The International Petroleum Cartel in Iran: Private Power and the Public Interest," pp. 51-52.
- ¹³⁵ H. Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, p. 202.

Chapter VI

Corridor and Security Alliances

The second most important point of attraction for great power rivalry in Iran was its geographic location. As a buffer between Russia and the British colonies, and later after World War I, between the Russians and the Western interests in the region, Iran had great strategic value.

The reaction of the Iranian government mostly influenced by the Shah's personality, was not strong enough. It could neither be neutral or non-aligned to the great power rivals nor stop them from rivalry. On the contrary, Iran adopted a policy of alignment with the West and entered into regional military alliances to fill the gap in containment, and into a bilateral alliance with the United States against Russia.

In this chapter the role of Iran's territory as the British front-line base, the Soviet "Suez Canal" and centre of aspiration, the British barrier, the Allies aid corridor to Russia, the Russian pretext for self defence, American concern for the rich oil region and the Anglo-American case of regime reinforcement will be examined.

Background

The Anglo-Russian rivalry which had started toward the end of the 18th century reached a peak after the Russian expansion into Central Asia. Russia's expansion has been attributed to a wide variety of factors. One of the main factors was to solve the Eastern Question and create a "detour on the royal road to Constantinople and the Straits." Since the straits had been barred by Britain, Russia had to put pressure on the enemy at the heart of the Empire, India. The fact that a vast power vacuum stretched all the way from the Caspian Sea to the borders of China, from Afghanistan to the edge of the Siberian plain was also attractive to Russia. Another object of Russian policy may have been the attainment of an outlet to the ocean both in the Near and Middle East.¹ This was linked to the Persian Gulf where Russia wished to obtain a foothold.² These Russian objectives posed a serious challenge to Britain.

Britain's interests in Iran were manifold, as were its interests in the Persian Gulf itself, such as the monopoly of the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports, and political agreements with the Gulf states.³ India itself was considered "the heart of the

Empire"⁴ which had to be protected at almost any cost. The safest way to protect India was to establish on her frontiers a chain of territories that would be "either under British ascendancy or free from the influence of another Big Power."⁵ Hence Iran had become of great value for Britain. In this respect Iran's role, in the view of Sir H. Rawlinson, was so important that he warned: "The Persia of today is not, it is true, the Persia of Darius, ... but it is a country which for good or ill, may powerfully affect the fortunes of Great Britain's Empire in the East."⁶

Because of these objectives, the British government preferred the *status quo* in Iran, rather than its being under shared domination. The pursuit of this policy often required advancing British influence. But on the whole this influence was sought primarily in order to counter the Russian threat to the independence of Iran. Iran's existence had always been a key factor in the security of the India; now Iran's strength had become a "military requisite."⁷

Great Power rivalry in Iran continued until the Russian Bolshevik revolution, apart from a period of essential rapprochement in 1907 in which for the sake of their "greater interests" Britain and Russia had to leave their age-old rivalry aside and cooperate with each other on their "special interests" in Iran. To this end they divided Iran into zones of influence separated by a central buffer zone, under the administration of the Tehran government, which was to be vulnerable and responsive to their pressures and needs. Each zone was to be dependent on its respective patron for protection and the conduct of its political and economic affairs. Later in 1915 they removed the buffer itself and distributed it among themselves.⁸

After the October revolution of 1917 the theories with which Lenin had been haranguing the masses became for a short time the basis of Russian foreign policy. Lenin argued that "imperialism is the last stage in the development of capitalism." Lenin explained the failure of the proletariat to revolt against the government of the imperialistic European countries as due to the profits obtained by the capitalists from exploitation of the colonial peoples in the East, passed on to certain members of the European working class as "bribes". Therefore, according to Lenin, to attack capitalistic imperialism most effectively it must be deprived of the benefits obtained from exploiting the peoples of the East, through incitement of the colonial and semi-colonial countries to revolt. To Lenin the road to Paris and London was through Peking, Delhi, Tehran, Constantinople and Cairo. In order that the people of the East might more readily accept the Russian pleas to revolt against their foreign masters, Lenin advocated an immediate peace without territorial annexations and recommended that the Russian government take the action

necessary to undo the hate and distrust which Russia had engendered by centuries of Tsarist imperialism.

The British Front Line Base Against Red Russia

The withdrawal from the occupied parts of Iran by Turkish troops on 26 February 1917 and by Russian troops in July 1917,⁹ following the October revolution of Russia, left Britain to fill the vacuum. It was important for the TGP, especially Britain "with their traditional interest in the Caucuses and Baku oil fields,"¹⁰ to help the nationalist movements of the Dashnaks, Mussavatists and Caucasians that had led to the proclamation of independent Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Bolshevik régime and its ideological bid for worldwide revolution was also a serious threat to the existence of the British Empire and to the political and economic values that it upheld. Therefore to help the small newly independent states in its anti-Bolshevik campaign, the British decided on armed intervention against the Bolsheviks and that required Iran as a front-line base.

To this end, during the spring and the summer of 1918, Britain rushed additional troops into the north-west and north-east parts of Iran. With the aid of some Russian counter revolutionary forces who had established bases in northern Iran, the British constituted the only significance force, the North Persian Force (NORPERFORCE). They established a military headquarters in Qazvin and under the command of General Dunsterville invaded Russian Azerbaijan, occupying the oil centre of Baku. Commodore Norris of the British navy supported General Dunsterville's raid on Baku and succeeded in gaining temporary control of the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, another British force invaded Georgia and established its headquarters in Tiflis.¹¹ A cordon of British troops thus stretched from Batum on the Black Sea to Enzeli on the Caspian Sea, from Qazvin extending to Mashhad and from there to Turkistan.

No other power shared with Britain in the economic and political domination of Iran. This presented a challenge to the Lloyd George government. For many years, especially since the last decade of the nineteenth century, British diplomats had watched with concern as Tsarist Russia extended its domain south toward the Persian Gulf and British India. A school of statesmen, whose leader was Lord Curzon, had dreamed of creating a chain of vassal states stretching from the Pamirs to the Mediterranean in order to halt the Russian advance. To this end British foreign policy throughout the previous fifty years had played for high stakes. Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister in 1919, for example, wrote: "Turkistan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia and Persia - to me they are pieces of a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the domination of the world."¹²

Britain could either revert to its old policy of economic exploitation of Iran - a policy which allowed the Iranian government nominal freedom of action as long as British concessions were secure - or alternatively could attempt to establish a protectorate over Iran. On 30 December 1918 a meeting of the eastern committee of the British War Cabinet, presided over by Lord Curzon, debated the dilemma of justifying the defeat of Germany and Turkey and the convening of the Peace Conference and the maintenance of armed British detachments on Iranian territory. This maintenance of British troops, according to N. S. Fatemi, had "no purpose other than the creation, in a neutral country of a front against Red Russia."¹³

In 1919, with the central powers defeated and Russia in the throes of revolution, it seemed as though Lord Curzon's dream for the establishment of British hegemony in Iran was finally to be realised. The majority of the members of the cabinet believed that British commitments in Iran should be liquidated as soon as possible. People in England were war-weary and clamoured for the return of their sons and fathers from abroad. In Asia a rising tide of disillusionment against the aims and intentions of European imperialism was spreading throughout the countries. In spite of the insistence of the cabinet that Britain should retrench, Lord Curzon was able to obtain from the Prime Minister authorisation to maintain a nucleus of British forces in Iran. More importantly Curzon was authorised to negotiate an agreement with Iran to regularise Britain's status as a special protector in Iran.¹⁴

On 9 August 1919 the Anglo-Persian Treaty was concluded between Sir Percy Cox, the British Minister in Tehran, and Prime Minister Vosuqoddowleh, according to which the British government was to undertake to "supply at Persian Government cost" whatever "expert advisers" may, "after consultation between the two governments", be necessary for "the several departments of the Persian administration ... the formation of a uniform force," for improving communications by means of "railway construction and other forms of transport" and for revising "the existing customs tariffs."¹⁵

In the preamble of this treaty, the British guaranteed, in general terms, the independence and integrity of Iran. However, the rest of the treaty outlined methods best suited to "consolidate Great Britain's position in Iran", as N. S. Fatemi argues, and to establish complete military and economic domination of that country."¹⁶ The treaty was in fact "a thinly disguised instrument for a protectorate,"¹⁷ or as J. Sheikholislami comments, it was "a régime of advisers and an indirect instrument to dominate Iran."¹⁸ The agreement was to guarantee Iranian prosperity but "in tutelage to Great Britain," as P. Avery notes.¹⁹ According to the Agreement,

which had no time limit,²⁰ decisions would have to be made by British advisers, and nothing could be done before British approval was granted. Britain was so serious in its policy that even before the ratification of the *Majlis*, General Dickson and Armitage Smith, heads of the British military and financial missions, started to reorganise the army and the treasury respectively and a group of British engineers entered the country for railway construction. Describing this situation, J. Upton wrote: "Persia was not only under British protection, but the regular expenses of the government were being met."²¹

British authorities in Tehran had forced the installation of a pro-British government which was completely dominated by Sir Percy Cox. The introduction of martial law throughout the country ensured that British policy in Iran would be effectively executed. In Khuzistan, Isfahan and Fars all resistance to the British authorities had collapsed. British censors controlled the press and dominated the postal and telegraph system. British domination of Iran was complete.²²

Despite these exceptional and harsh measures, reaction and resistance to the agreement was immediate and continued to grow both within Iran and abroad. The Agreement as the latest manifestation of "British imperialism" became a focus of criticism. Enormous pressure was exerted on the British government to abandon the foreign policy of Lord Curzon and to commence the liquidation of its interests in Iran. Opposition to the agreement was intensified by the American stand. Secretary of State Lansing told his ambassador in London that the Anglo-Persian Agreement had caused a very unfavourable impression upon both the President and the Secretary of State. The US Minister in Tehran expressed his surprise at the conclusion of the agreement. He was afraid that the agreement might harm the cause of the "open door" policy in Iran.²³ But the most effective opposition to this plan was from the Bolshevik side which was militarily pressing both the British and the Iranian Anglophiles to abandon the agreement and to prepare for the Treaty of Friendship.

The Soviet "Suez Canal" for the Revolution of the Orient

Inspired by revolutionary fever, the Bolshevik Government on 26 June 1919 sent an envoy, Kolmietzieff, to Tehran to deliver revolutionary Russia's apologies for past Russian misdeeds and to promise compensation. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks offered to cancel all Persian debts to the Tsarist government, to abolish the "capitulations" in Iran, and to compensate for the damage done in Iran by Russian troops. He also expressed the willingness of his government to conclude

new treaties with Iran on the principle “of free accord and mutual respect of peoples.”²⁴

Meanwhile, the revolutionary forces had crushed all separatist movements in the Caucasus after the British and White counter revolutionaries had reached the Iranian border. They came up against a British dominance in Iran. For the purpose of “awakening the millions of peasants,” the First Congress of the People of the East held in Baku introduced a clear picture of the ideological ends of revolutionary Russia as regards the East and the Eastern people. The Congress expected a full communist revolution in the East even though it had not passed through the stage of capitalism.

Zinoviev, the chairman of the Congress, made it clear that: “from the moment when a single country managed to throw off the chains of capitalism ..., China, India, Turkey, Persia and Armenia also can and must make a direct struggle to obtain a Soviet system.”²⁵ Zinoviev concluded that the Congress “must here and now declare a true holy war against the English and French robber-capitalists.” In this Congress “the stream of workers and peasants of Persia, Turkey and India,” regardless of their government, were encouraged to “unite with Soviet Russia” in order to “lead them to common struggle and to common victory.”²⁶ Radek, the second speaker of the Congress adhering to the Leninist line of the inevitable clash between the communist and capitalist systems, argued: “The oriental policy of the soviet government is not an opportunistic manoeuvre but a sincere endeavour to help the downtrodden masses of the East in their struggle against the oppressors.”²⁷

As the frequent references to Iran in the speeches indicate, Iran had an important role in the strategy of the oriental revolution. As early as 1918 the Bolshevik writer K. Troyanousky assigned a precise role to Iran in his *Vosloki Revolusia*:

If ... the primary task of Persia is to constitute the natural “basin” for the movement of political emancipation of Central Asia, it is necessary that this basin be freed of the sediment and waste which accumulate in its reservoirs and likewise in its canals. Then only will Persia be in a position to fulfil the mission which history and nature assigned to her. ... If Persia is the door through [which] one has to go in order to invade the citadel of the Revolution of the Orient, that is to say India, we must foment the Persian revolution. ... The Persian uprising will be the signal for a series of revolutions that will spread through all of Asia and part of Africa. ... India is our principal objective. Persia is the only path open to India. The Persian revolution is the key to the revolution of all the Orient, just as Egypt and the Suez Canal are the key to the British domination of the Orient. Persia is the Suez Canal of the revolution. This precious key to the uprising of the Orient must be in the hands of Bolshevism, cost what it may ... Persia must be ours; Persia must belong to the revolution.²⁸

This was exactly the terms usually imputed to have been formulated by Peter the Great:

Approach as near as possible to ... India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world ... and in the decadence of Persia penetrate as far as the Persian; re establish if it be possible, the ancient commerce with the Levant, advance as far as India. Arrived at this point, we shall have no longer need of England's gold.²⁹

The past history of Russian expansion in the Middle East and especially in Iran clearly confirms that Russia needed this corridor to attack India, regardless of whether the above-mentioned testament was falsified or not.

In order to pave the way for the revolution in Iran and the neighbouring countries, the Red Army, after the British and the White counter revolutionaries, entered into northern Iran in May 1920. In a short time, Gorgan and Mazandaran were occupied by the Bolsheviks. In Gilan, the Soviet Republic of Gilan had been proclaimed and was on the march toward the Capital. Russian agents and spies poured into Iran. The Soviet propagandists smuggled printed material into Iran from Baku and spread their information by word of mouth, which was by far most effective in Gilan and Azerbaijan.³⁰ The Iranian forces were weak and the British had abandoned Gilan to the Russian forces following the unsuccessful negotiations between the British and the Iranian government concerning the defence of northern Iran.

In November the Bolsheviks sent an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of British troops,³¹ and in response to the Iranian government's demand for the withdrawal of their forces,³² they even stated that their troops would stay in Iran as long as the British remained there.³³ Meanwhile, the tribes of Fars and Bakhtiari were in revolt. Azerbaijan was ruled by Kheyabani who headed a self-autonomous government. The prospect of disorder was so strong that British civilians were advised in January 1921 to leave the country.³⁴

In this situation, while Iran was partly occupied by British troops and partly by the Red Army, the Iranian government felt it necessary to sign a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union on 26 February 1921. The conflict, which was resolved outside the League of Nations, signified an implicit understanding between Britain and revolutionary Russia.

Under the terms of this treaty, Soviet Russia renounced the policy of "force with regard to Persia followed by the imperialist government of Russia" and branded as criminal those agreements made with states which had as their object the gradual seizure of small Asiatic countries. Furthermore, the treaty declared null and void all treaties concluded by Tsarist Russia with Iran, and with the third powers

affecting Iran; all Iranian debts to Russia were cancelled; and extra-territorial rights for Russians in Iran were denounced. In addition, the Bolshevik government annulled all the concessions “whether already being worked or not” and economic privileges in Iran. The treaty, among other advantages, established an atmosphere in which such vital questions as the withdrawal of Russian troops, the suppression of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, and the resumption of trade with Russia could be discussed against the background of Russia’s declared good intentions.

However, the Russians maintained their revolutionary intentions by insisting upon three items vital to them. In addition to the mutual undertaking of the parties to prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of “any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility” against Iran or Russia, and to prevent a third party from stationing military forces in either country or importing material which could be used against either of them (Article 5), Iran unilaterally undertook to prevent any third party military intervention in its country or any use of Iranian territory as a base against Russia, or any threat to the frontiers of Russia. More importantly it accepted that:

... if the Persian government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence (Article 6).

Secondly, according to Article 7, Iran agreed that “the considerations set forth in Article 6 have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea” and that Russia “has the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.” Thirdly, according to Article 13, the Russians annulled all their economic concessions on condition that Iran “not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects ... and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.” This condition was taken as a lever of pressure for their own economic and political demands, which will be discussed later in this Chapter.

The last but not least intention, which was among the secret articles proposed by the Soviets, was the freedom of socialistic propaganda and trade unions in Iran.³⁵ This was refused by the Iranian government and then was changed to the non-intervention clause of Article 4, which was deemed to prevent the two from any intervention in the internal affairs of each other.

The 1921 Coup: The British Barrier

The 1919 agreement which had been intended as a means of extending and consolidating the British position in Iran in reality became the focal point of such intense opposition that the British were forced to postpone it. Now a general policy of retreat and withdrawal was adopted by Lloyd George's cabinet. Britain was under no obligation and no one asked British troops to resist the revolutionary Russians. Vosuqoddowleh was abandoned and Lord Curzon's policy to make Iran a well-adjusted partner of Britain in Asia³⁶ was repudiated. A few days after the fall of the Vosuqoddowleh government, Sir Percy Cox was replaced by Sir Percy Loraine and left Tehran for Baghdad. His departure was followed by the evacuation of Khorasan and the general termination of the numerous military missions throughout the country. Withdrawal of the British troops from Qazvin had also begun.

Nevertheless the bulk of the troops stationed in Qazvin, Hamadan and Ahwaz remained in Iran as a deterrent to possible Russian penetration from the north,³⁷ and increased agitation for the creation of a Persian republic by Russian agents throughout Iran. Unless the British could prevent the spread of the Soviet-inspired doctrine, India and the Middle East would soon be clamouring for national self-determination. The so-called Constantinople Agreement of 1915 made it clear that the British desire to keep Russia out of India and the Persian Gulf was even more important to Britain than preventing Russia from controlling the Turkish straits.³⁸

When in October 1920 the Iranian troops were driven out of Rasht by the Bolsheviks, Britain accused Staresselsky, the White Russian Commander of the Cossack Division, of treachery. It placed its loan and subsidies to the government as conditional on the dismissal of Staresselsky and all the White Russian officers in the service of the government of Iran. These enforcements were shortly afterwards followed by the arrival of the British Captain E. Noel. His mission was "to help erect a Southern Persian Confederation"³⁹ in the event of the establishment of a Soviet State in the north. Under these heavy pressures, the Shah dismissed the Russian commanders and the British took over the Cossack Division on 4 November.

Britain had not abandoned all hope of securing at least a partial domination of the country if the whole country could not be saved. There was no choice left to Britain except a coup. Jumping at the opportunity of internal chaos in the country, the British encouraged Reza Khan to stage a coup d'état. British officials had been denying any intervention in the internal affairs of Iran, claiming that "there is no evidence that the British had anything to do with the coup d'état of 1921, which seems to have taken both the British government and the Legation in Tehran by

surprise.”⁴⁰ However, the main designer of the coup, Major-General Sir Edmund Ironside, the British commander of NORPERFORCE, confessed to his role later in 1972 when he wrote that he prepared the ground for the dismissal of the White Russian commander of the Cossack Division and then for his arrest, following which he appointed Reza Khan to the command.⁴¹ Ironside pretended that he had asked Reza Khan to promise “not to take or allow to be taken any violent measures to depose the [existing Qajar] Shah,”⁴² but this dialogue implicitly indicates that Reza wished to take such violent action. Furthermore, he knew Reza “openly ... dislike[s] ... the politicians who controlled the *Majlis* for their own benefit.”⁴³

To General Ironside, Ahmad Shah, the last shah of the Qajar Dynasty, was a “young man in a grey frock-coat wriggling with nervous jerks.” He thought that “it was painful to see such a wretched specimen of a man in so great a position,”⁴⁴ when Persia “that badly needed a leader in the difficult times ahead, ... here [Reza Khan, the commander of the Tabriz troop] was undoubtedly a man of outstanding value.”⁴⁵ Harold Nicolson, who was at that time a counsellor of the British Legation in Tehran, affirms that:

It was to Lord Ironside that Reza owed his elevation from the ranks ... It was largely owing to another Englishman, Sir Percy Loraine that he owed his subsequent rise to power. After the collapse of Lord Curzon's Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 it was evident that Persia was heading for complete disintegration; the only hope was that she could be renovated under strong leadership from within; Sir Percy rightly foresaw that Reza Khan was capable of such regeneration.⁴⁶

In this way, as soon as the British released the Cossacks in 22 February 1921, Reza Khan arranged a coup d'état which brought him to power, at first as Chief Commander of the Cossacks, then as Minister of War in April of that year, then as Prime Minister in October 1923, and finally on 31 October 1925 he received the title of *Shahanshah*, King of Kings of Iran.

The consolidation, centralisation and modernisation of Reza's régime, including his determination to re-establish Iran's long-neglected authority in the south as well as in the north was, in the British view, “a welcome development.”⁴⁷ Reza Khan's firm dealings with the Russians in the north of the country as well as with various rebellious factors constituted a guarantee that Iran would not become a corridor for anti-British operations. For the next twenty years the régime of Reza Shah was hostile to the Soviet Union. Iran became allied to Britain and the British used the Shah effectively to block Russian intervention in Iran before World War II.

Even Reza's campaign and his strong commitment to Sheikh Khazal which, on the surface, had arisen out of British interests in the Persian Gulf and oil in the south, was not strongly criticised by the British. Khaz'al or “as the English called him

... the Sheik of Muhammerah,"⁴⁸ had received assurances of British protection from Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British Minister in Tehran,⁴⁹ as early as 1903. In October 1910 Khaz'al received an assurance that Britain would not merely safeguard him to the best of its ability against unprovoked attack or encroachment by a foreign power, but would also support him in obtaining a satisfactory solution "in the event of an encroachment by the Persian Government on his jurisdiction and recognised rights or on his property in Persia."⁵⁰ This had been renewed in November 1914, after Sheikh Khazal had sided with Britain upon the intervention of Turkey in the war and had assisted the British Expeditionary Force in the capture of Basra.

Relying on this support, the sheikh had always refused to pay taxes to the government, but this time he failed to get support from the British in his campaign against Reza on the pretext that on both occasions the assurance had been conditional: the Sheikh and his descendants (to whom the assurance was extended) must not fail "to observe their obligations towards the Persian Government," and in 1910 when the promised support was to "be confined to diplomatic action."⁵¹ The British government which had learned about Reza's determination to terminate the autonomy of Khaz'al. For the British, then, Reza's personal assurances to compensate the British with vigour and firmness if his action should cause any damage to APOC⁵² were convincing enough to remove any worry⁵³ concerning the military operations that might have resulted "incidentally in damage to the company's plant or interruption of their operations-involving, as this would have heavy financial losses to the British shareholders and incidentally to the British government, which held a controlling interest in the company."⁵⁴

Another reinforcement of the British strategy to put a barrier against Russian penetration southward was made some years later, on 8 July 1937. "Implicitly directed against Russian infiltration of the area"⁵⁵ and with thinly disguised hostility by Russia who believed it to be another type of cordon sanitaire, Iran initiated a Treaty of Non-Aggression with three other newly established neighbouring countries, namely Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey, at the Shah's palace in Sa'dabad of Tehran. The four powers stated officially that they were "actuated by the common purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Near East by means of additional guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations."⁵⁶

By this treaty, the parties undertook (1) to abstain from interference in each other's internal affairs, (2) to respect the inviolability of their common frontiers, (3) to consult in international disputes affecting their common interests, (4) to refrain from aggression against one another either singly or jointly with one or more other

powers, (5) to bring any violation or threat of violation of Article 4 of the pact before the Council of the League of Nations, without prejudice to their own exercise of the right of self-defence, and (6) to have the right to denounce the pact in respect of a signatory who commits an act of aggression against a third power. Each of the signatory states also undertook to prevent in its territory "the formation or activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change the constitutional systems of such other Party."

The Soviet Centre of Aspiration

Thus while the British were consolidating their Iranian base, the Russians were pursuing their revolutionary intentions in Iran. The Treaty of Friendship between Iran and revolutionary Russia had been signed in February 1921 and following the complete evacuation of the British troops in May 1921, the Russians' last detachment boarded ships on 30 October provided by the Soviet government.⁵⁷ Theodore A. Rothstein had arrived in Tehran on 25 April 1921 as the first Soviet Ambassador. However, despite the fact that Article 4 of the Treaty obliged the Russians "to abstain from any intention in the internal affairs" of Iran, which implicitly referred to the support of the Gilan revolution, some communists in Baku and Moscow still urged the "sovietisation" of Iran.⁵⁸ This caused such a severe problem for the Iranian government that Ahmad Shah had to emphasise on it to Rothstein in his presentation of credentials and ask him to exert every effort, as soon as possible, toward the termination of "the deplorable episode in Gilan." According to the Shah, this would indicate clearly the sincerity of the newly signed Treaty of Friendship.⁵⁹

Although the problem was eventually resolved by resort to force rather than diplomacy, the change of behaviour and the Soviet tactics in dealing with these sorts of situations were remarkable. In a letter to Kuchik Khan, the leader of the Gilan Revolution, Rothstein stated:

Soviet Russia at this time regards all revolutionary movements as not only fruitless but also harmful. Therefore, Soviet Russia has adopted a new form of policy as evidenced by its new Treaty with the government of Iran. Although it has been only a few months since the signing of the Treaty and my arrival in Iran, one can already see the progress of our policy. There is no doubt that their [British] prestige has suffered not only in the North but also, to some extent; in the South.⁶⁰

The Russian Ambassador then proceeded to make certain proposals, making it clear that at that time Soviet Russia was in favour of a "strong central government," because only such a government, "which would be inevitably

dependent on Soviet Russia,” could prevent the “imperialist” activities of Britain in Iran.

Affirming this tactic, Ihsanollah Khan, one of the Bolshevik intruders, told the spectators as he boarded the ship supplied by Russia for the withdrawal of its last detachment: “Dear fellow-citizens, the betrayal of the government authorities prevented us from offering our services. We, therefore, postpone the fulfilment of our great mission [communism] to a very near future date.”⁶¹ To further the new policy, Rothstein, who was a former editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, set up “an elaborate apparatus of propaganda.”⁶² Revolutionary films, papers, and books were distributed and under his effective support the Iranian communists found the opportunity to oppose the ruling class, the aristocracy, capitalism and ultimately the British interests in Iran, causing quite a few diplomatic incidents with the British legation in Tehran as well as with the Iranian government.⁶³

After eighteen months, Boris Shumiatsky, was nominated to continue Rothstein’s task. This unceasing propaganda, which was partly directed against the Iranian government in general, was also aimed at British imperialism in the region. The Russian agents in Afghanistan and India were also active in this oppositional propaganda. In February 1923 Shumiatsky sent a dispatch to his Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in which he declared:

Our mission, in putting into practice the instructions indicated in your telegram, has decided to follow those political directives especially in northern Persia and in Tehran. There has been organised a good group of propagandists who will be able to develop a really effective anti-British action. If the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs approve the programme of the mission, it will be necessary to have for the initial expenses 300,000 tomans ... of credit to begin the work.⁶⁴

Russian operations in the region, mainly in Iran which was the corridor through which British interests were opposed in the region, were a violation of the non-propaganda clause of the Soviet-British Trade Agreement of March 1921, and were so serious that Britain gave a ten-day ultimatum to the Russian government on 2 May 1923. In response the Russian government released a note of conciliation and compensation which although it satisfied British demands,⁶⁵ did not deny the British accusations but pointed out that: “similar material is at the disposal of all governments and if they use them for creating conflicts and as a foundation for protests, then friendly relations between any two governments could hardly exist.”⁶⁶ This reply clearly meant that the Russians intended to preserve the right to embark on similar operations in future, as in the case of the Communist party of Iran⁶⁷ and Agabekov.

After the British ultimatum, Agabekov, who was at first the Soviet general inspector of the Commercial Delegation in Khorasan, was sent to Tehran at the end of April 1927 by OGPU, a “sword of the revolution,” as a “legal” General Resident for Persia. Agabekov was given a set of instructions that provided for centralisation of OGPU activities in Iran in the hands of the General Resident. In practice this meant that hitherto independent OGPU agents in Tabriz, Bandar Pahlavi, and Khorasan-Baluchistan had to sever their direct links with Tiflis, Baku, and Moscow and come under the command of the Tehran Resident.⁶⁸ In this way the OGPU wanted to intensify its activity in Iran and desired to combat more effectively the nationalist movements of the Dashnaks and Mussavatists,⁶⁹ as well as to keep an eye on the Kurds. According to Agabekov, a “network of agents” was spread over their “scattered lands” and “the good will of their chief men” was “skilfully” attracted and the Kurds were persuaded “to conclude a secret treaty with us [the Russians] engaging them to assist us [the Russians] against our [the Russians’] enemies. “In the likely event of a collision between Great Britain and Russia,” Agabekov revealed that “the attitude of these tribes would be of capital importance to the great belligerents.”⁷⁰

He was also charged to organise the OGPU apparatus in southern Iran and “to bribe the tribal chiefs of frontiers and to prepare secret depots of arms and munitions for supplying the tribes,” with a view to facilitating contact with India and Iraq, so that “in case of a conflict with Britain,” he would be capable of “fomenting revolt on the Indian border and even beyond.”⁷¹ While “keeping a close eye on the oil fields,”⁷² a special extension of activity was also made to Khuzistan, the area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession. In this regard, Moscow wished “to make contact with the Arab tribes to reach understandings with them.”⁷³

Mashhad was also a very important place to the Russians, because it was “the place of places” for getting “fingers on the British mail,”⁷⁴ and “to investigate routes to India.”⁷⁵ In explaining the importance of this Russian platform Agabekov wrote: “not a letter nor a note sent out by the Persian Government, not the most insignificant document entering or leaving the British Consulate escaped our inspection.”⁷⁶ That was why Vincent Sheean, an American who had visited Iran in 1927, wrote:

In Persia the Soviet Union interferes to an extent which would not be credible in Western Europe or America. Russian agents are everywhere; Russian money pays for the most incongruous assortment of political movements, popular upheavals, dynastic flurries, tribal agitations. Most of the crop of rebellions which have been harvested by Reza Shah's seizure of the imperial crown have had legitimate and natural bases, of course; but in some of them - particularly those which have been taking place in the north, in Gilan and Mazandaran, and in the north east, toward Turkistan - Russian influence is so obvious that it would be silly to disregard it.⁷⁷

These espionage activities and secret intentions continued until 1939 when they surfaced openly. Molotov, the Russian commissar for Foreign Affairs, suggested to Hitler that:

the Soviet government was prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact which the Reich's Foreign Minister had outlined in his conversation of 13 November regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support ... provided that the area south of Baku and Batum in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognised as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸

The World War II Aid Corridor

In 1941, Hitler's war machine had put the USSR in an extremely critical position such that it became evident that it could only survive if the Allies came to its aid. While it was difficult for supplies to come from the north through Murmansk, it was impossible for them to come through the Mediterranean: Turkey had closed the Straits, Rommel and his African forces were about to threaten Alexandria, and the Germans were masters of Bulgaria and Greece. It was well known that during the summer of 1942 motorised German units had reached the petroleum centre of Maikop in the Caucasus.

Under heavy pressure from the advancing German forces, Moscow requested London to open a second front against Germany in Europe. Churchill did not consider this to be politically or militarily expedient; instead, he promised all possible help to the Soviet Union in carrying on the war on its own front. He was determined to keep the Russian front viable. The British were also worried about Iranian oil, which was vital in fuelling the British fleet, and the Russians were afraid the Germans would land in Iran and attack in the region of the Caspian Sea. There was also a coup by the pro-German Rashid 'Ali in Iraq who, after its suppression by British troops, fled to Iran.⁷⁹ This together with 690 German industrial experts contracted in different parts of Iran,⁸⁰ made the Allies fear a coup in Iran to link it with the Central Powers or at least to disturb the direct supply line to the Russians.⁸¹

Iran, with its railway connection from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea as the most suitable and quickest corridor, could not be neglected. The Russians were in serious need of supplies and the Trans-Iranian railway remained a major concern.

Pointing at the huge number of American troops, 30,000, sent to participate in the dispatch of aid to Russia in November before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Sir Reader Bullard, the head of the British Legation at Tehran, argued that "this proved to be of the highest significance for the procession of the war, for by far the most important of the five routes for aid to Russia was the one through Persia."⁸² Iran became, once again, a strategic if not tactical, area of prime importance. Churchill later wrote that:

... the need to pass munitions and supplies of all kinds to the Soviet government and the extreme difficulties of the Arctic route, together with future strategic possibilities, made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia. The Persian oilfields were a prime war factor."⁸³

For these, Churchill asked Stalin to join him in making a request to Reza Shah to expel all the German experts from the country as an excuse to make the railway available to Allies.⁸⁴ On 2 September 1939, the Government declared Iran's neutrality in the war⁸⁵ wishing to preserve its friendship with Germany, and later after the second joint request of the two Allies was received on 16 August 1941, the Shah accepted the Allies use of the railway and the roads with their spectators stationed along the way to watch the transportation of the weapons,⁸⁶ while the security of ways would rest upon the Iranian government.⁸⁷ However a problem was that the Allies did not trust Reza and wanted to take full control of this vital corridor themselves.⁸⁸

Without further ado, on 25 August 1941, the British and the Russian forces with American support invaded Iran. The Russians occupied the north and the British took over the south in almost the same pattern as had been prescribed by the two powers' agreement of 1907 and 1915, with one major difference: their respective zones of influence were now transformed into zones of occupation. On 30 August, the British and Russian representatives in Tehran asked the Iranian government "to order its military forces to retreat to the zones not occupied by the Anglo-Russian forces [the neutral zone]."⁸⁹ On 31 August Russian troops effected a junction with British troops at Mahabad in Kurdistan and Qazvin. By virtue of the occupation, Iran was divided into three zones: the British zone including Baluchistan, Sistan, a part of Kerman, Khuzistan, Arak, Qum, Kermanshah and southern Kurdistan; the neutral zone consisting of Isfahan, Fars, Luristan, Yazd and the western part of Kerman; and the Russian zone, including Azerbaijan, northern Kurdistan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Qazvin, Zanjan, Semnan, Shahrud, Gorgan and Khorasan.

The Russian Pretext for Self-Defence

It was not until 21 years after 1920 that the Russians tried seriously again to infiltrate Iran. After the outbreak of the Second World War, the Russians found a golden opportunity to revive their long cherished hope for a drive to the Persian Gulf. In the Russian note of invasion dated 25 August 1941, it was claimed that "the group of German agents organised by the German embassy in Tehran is threatening the Baku oil industry and other most important Soviet border places," and that therefore "the Soviet government has ... been forced to take the necessary steps to implement its rights in accordance with paragraph 6 of the 1921 Agreement, and to dispatch its troops on to the territory of Iran in self-defence."⁹⁰ The Russians had another demand which was to set up a Republic,⁹¹ but as Russia was at that time in much need of ammunition and any domestic disorder could break down the central authority (which meant burdening the road and railway communications), Stalin agreed to Churchill's notion that his "decisive indications in this direction will speed forward the already favourable trend to ... [their] affairs in this minor theatre."⁹²

Once the Russians realised that their republicanism would be much interfered with by the British and might lead to domestic disorder, they tried other means of infiltrating Iran in order to revive their long cherished hope for a drive to the Persian Gulf. In November 1939, when their attitude was hostile to the British and friendly to Germany, the Russians had asked the Iranian government for air bases.⁹³ But now during the Tehran Conference, Stalin paid a courtesy visit to the Shah and as a token of his friendship he offered the Shah "a regiment of T34 tanks and one fighter planes."⁹⁴ However after a few weeks, when Stalin's offer was stated in more specific terms, "some onerous conditions" were laid down, namely,

Russian officers and NCOs [Non-Commissioned Officers] would have to come with the gifts. The Russians alone would decide where the tanks and planes would be located, the tanks to be based only at Qazvin, and the planes in Meshed. Until the end of a training period whose duration was not specified, both the tanks and planes were to be under the direct command of the Russian General Staff in Moscow."⁹⁵

The occupation of northern Iran was all the Russians needed to carry out their well formulated plans for access to the Persian Gulf. Soon after the invasion of Iran by the Anglo-Russian forces it became apparent that the Russians were trying to consolidate their position in Iran in order to incorporate northern Iran into the Communist zone. Shortly after their occupation, the Russians closed their zone to free entry; except for Iranians all foreigners, including their British and American Allies, who wished to visit the zone were required to obtain special passes from the Russian embassy in Tehran.⁹⁶

The Russians embarked upon a number of long-range policies designed to effect basic socio-economic and political changes in the northern Iranian provinces under their control, especially in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. They suppressed the pro-government newspapers in Tabriz, Mashhad and Rasht. Early in 1942, they took steps to set up a Communist party called the Tudeh and they also organised a Communist trade union.

Under the auspices of the Soviet political officers, trade unions in Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad and Isfahan were organised and united into a central committee under the control of the Tudeh party. The Tudeh party soon became the largest, the best disciplined and the most powerful party in the country. Most of the fifty communists and socialists who had been imprisoned in 1937 but released during the Anglo-Russian occupation formed its leadership. In the Russian zone the people were forced to join the party and pay monthly dues. Moreover, Tabriz, Ardabil, Rezaieh, Mashhad, Rasht and even Tehran were flooded with thousands of Armenians, Georgians, Russian Azerbaijanis and Assyrians who were sent to these cities to help the local communist groups in their demonstrations and activities. During the third year of occupation, in order to intimidate the Iranians, Russians kidnapped several White Russians and many anti-Communist Iranians and Armenians. The red-controlled press of the occupied zone and the so-called free press of Tehran for some time did not dare to publish a word about these kidnappings and Russian atrocities. The mere mention of the names of the Russian agents or criticism of Allied behaviour in Iran brought either direct retaliation from the Russian authorities or suppression of the paper by the Iranian government.

British cooperation and American indifference at the time also emboldened the Russians. Defeated in their air base, republican and oil demands, the Russians now resorted to a new tactic, the separation of Azerbaijan from Iran and the creation of a puppet government in Kurdistan. The Tudeh party was officially dissolved on 3 October 1945 and its members joined the Democrat Party of Azerbaijan.⁹⁷ On 12 December 1945 Pishehvareh formally inaugurated a government with all the customary ministries, except that of foreign affairs, but including that of war. He set up a Supreme Court and announced his intention to levy new taxes. He confiscated all the deposits of the National Bank of Tabriz. Turkish was to be the official language of the new State, and an army appeared to be in the process of formation. The army was under the control of Gholam Yahya Daneshyan, a Soviet officer. Other members of the government of Azerbaijan either came from Russian Azerbaijan or were Iranians who had spent many years in Moscow.⁹⁸ Members included Beeria, educated in Russia; Sadiq Padegan, educated in Tiflis; Hassan Adalat, born and educated in Baku; Elhami, born in Turkey and educated in

Moscow; Kavian, a communist from Russian Azerbaijan; and General Daneshyan, a native of Georgia who spoke no Persian and even in his negotiations with Prime Minister Qavam, and other Tehran officials had to speak through an interpreter.⁹⁹

Due to Russian interference, the Iranian soldiers in Tabriz were not able to leave their barracks. The movement was efficiently planned and executed with the aid of the Red Army in Tabriz. The Democrats were organised, armed and supported, and the Iranian forces in the region were speedily rendered powerless, by the Russians. The Russian embassy was not only opposed to any dispatch of Iranian armed forces to Azerbaijan but also refused to allow any governor-general of the central government to proceed unless he was acceptable to the "democratic elements in Azerbaijan."¹⁰⁰ On 5 December 1945, the Russian embassy in Tehran for the second time told the Iranian government that no Iranian troops would be allowed to enter the Russian occupied zone. Contrary to the Iranian government's view that Azerbaijan was an integral part of Iran and Iran's demand for a hands-off policy in Azerbaijan by the Russian troops, the note added that if Iran would treat the Azerbaijan question as a matter concerning only Soviet Russia and Iran, the Russian government would be prepared to discuss some of the disputed problems.¹⁰¹

The Iranian refusal to negotiate directly with the Russian government angered the Russians and resulted in a tightening of the Russians' noose in the occupied zone. On 16 December 1945 in a report to the *Majlis*, Prime Minister Hakimi, stated that "due to interference of the Red army" the garrisons in Tabriz and Rezaieh, which were under occupation by the Red Army, had surrendered to the forces of the Democrats.¹⁰² Iranian senior officers were either arrested or fled to Tehran. According to Colonel Hodayun, chief of the Azerbaijan gendarmerie, in an interview with correspondents on his arrival in Tehran on 18 December, "the Iranian soldiers, numbering 900, had been surrounded by ten thousand Russian troops and by the Democrats."¹⁰³

The Democrat separatists, whose first demand was that "while recognising the central Persian government, the national government of Persian Azerbaijan will carry into effect all measures which do not contradict the autonomy of Persian Azerbaijan,"¹⁰⁴ shortly after the publication of the manifesto, changed the flag of Iran into the new flag of Azerbaijan, abolished the national anthem, replaced the Iranian army uniform with the Red army uniform,¹⁰⁵ and entrusted the training of the new army to Russian officers. The Russians then started to extend the Azerbaijan revolt to Gilan, Zanjan, Qazvin and Semnan. There were several disturbances in Zanjan and Qazvin. On 14 January 1946 a telegram from Rasht to Allahyar Saleh, the

Minister of Interior, stated that the Russians were encouraging some insurgent elements to declare a "Republic of Gilan."¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile Saif Qazi with the support of the Red Army declared a "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad."

In addition to all these disturbances, the refusal of the Russian government to withdraw its troops from the northern occupied zone had become another great concern for both the Iranian government and the Anglo Americans. In this case too, the vulnerability of the Iranian government in dealing with the TGP rivalry is obvious. Without the support of the West, especially the US government, the Iranian government could not withstand the Russian pressure.

As required by Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between Iran, Britain, and the Soviet Union on 29 January 1942, the forces of the Allied Powers should have been withdrawn from Iranian territory "not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them whichever date is the earlier." The withdrawal issue was later discussed on both a formal and an informal basis at the Malta, Yalta, Potsdam, London, and Moscow conferences that took place between February and December 1945, and the Allies finally agreed that all their forces were to be out of Iran by 2 March 1946, six months after the Japanese surrender.¹⁰⁷

Although the British, early in 1945, had suggested an early gradual withdrawal, the Russians were unenthusiastic and the Americans took a generally passive position during the early meetings.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the US troops departed by 1 January 1946 and the British forces withdrew before the deadline came, whereas the Russians not only refused to withdraw by the deadline, but also dispatched fresh troops to the northern occupied zone the following day. The Russian government also officially informed Qavam that it had decided to retain its forces in Azerbaijan, Gilan, Astrabad and Mazandaran until the situation had been clarified.¹⁰⁹ According to the Russian government, while the provisions for its military activities in Iran came under the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, the right of the introduction, stationing and the withdrawing of these troops from Iran was envisaged by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921.

The new reinforcements stationed at Qazvin, 150 kilometres north-west of Tehran, moved to Karaj, 30 kilometres from the capital. Russian tanks and planes arrived at Garmsar, 50 kilometres west of Tehran.¹¹⁰ Confirming this, the American air attaché at Tehran, who was accompanied by three correspondents, made a flight over the Russian zone on 14 March 1946 and estimated that some 2,000 Russian soldiers were camped only 24 kilometres from the capital.¹¹¹ On 15 March

Qavam told reporters that Russian troops not only still occupied the country but had penetrated deeper into Azerbaijan, which was now independent of Tehran.¹¹²

All these developments in the north caused fear and consternation in Tehran. It was believed that some 4,000 Russian officers and men, supported by 2,000 refugees from Russian Azerbaijan, remained in Tehran in plain clothes ready to launch a coup against the government at the appropriate time. Iranian army intelligence reported that Russian arms were distributed among members of the Tudeh party and the Caucasians residing in Tehran. The Russian garrisons of Semnan to the east, estimated at 20,000 men, and Qazvin to the west, stated to be another 10,000, were watched with apprehension. For a time there were rumours in Tehran that the Shah and the government would be forced to move to safety in the south.¹¹³ Nobody could guess what the ultimate intentions of the Russians were. To many Iranians who had misgivings about the Russian plan for the northern provinces, the Russians would in due course swallow the northern provinces up, "like the Baltic States and Bokhara and Khiva" had been. In support of this argument it was contended that in spite of the refusal of its demand for an oil concession in 1944, the Russians were drilling for oil in the north.¹¹⁴ Others speculated that the Russian government would be content to leave a pro-Russian administration in Iran and ensure the election of a majority of the Tudeh members to the fifteenth *Majlis*.

The continued presence of Russian forces in certain parts of northern Iran was therefore in no way in conformity with the said pact nor with the constitutional law of Iran, nor with the treaties between Iran and Soviet Russia. While Qavam was in Moscow between 19 February and 8 March 1946 to negotiate the dispute, Molotov proposed a draft agreement to him which read:

1. Soviet troops would stay in some parts of northern Iran for an indefinite period.

2. Iran would recognise the autonomous government of Azerbaijan. The prime minister of Azerbaijan would also act as the governor-general, in his relations to the central government of Iran.

3. Azerbaijan would have no minister of war or minister of foreign affairs. The commander-in-chief of the army of Azerbaijan would be appointed by the central government.

4. Thirty percent of the Azerbaijan revenues would be paid to the Iranian government.

5. The official language in the schools, courts and the local offices would be Turkish, but all the correspondence with the Tehran government would be in Persian.

6. The Soviet government would abandon its demand for an oil concession. Instead an Irano-Soviet joint stock company would be established. During the first 25 years, 51 percent of the shares would be owned by the Soviet and 49 percent by Iran, during the second 25 years each would own 50 percent of the shares.¹¹⁵

Although oil was an important term which the two parties were to negotiate in this proposal, a survey of the proposal reveals that it was not the sole or major interest of the Russians in Iran. It seems that the oil concession was rather a pretext for a broader scheme. The Soviet Union, which had "rich fields on its own soil at Baku, north of Azerbaijan, on the Caspian Sea and altogether holds 18 percent of the world's total estimated oil reserves, as compared with 15 percent held by the United States, the second-ranking nation in oil resources," had, according to the *New York Times*, "fought a four-year war wasteful in fuel without incurring an oil famine and surely needs less oil for peace than for war."¹¹⁶ George F. Kennan, the US chargé d'affaires in Moscow at the time, told the State Department that:

... [the oil of northern Iran] is important not as something Russia needs, but as something it might be dangerous to permit anyone else to exploit. The territory lies near the vital Caucasian oil centers which so closely escaped complete conquest in the present war. The Kremlin deems it essential to Russian security that no other great power should have even the chance of gaining a footing there.¹¹⁷

In this regard J. A. Bill argues:

First, the Soviets were concerned about the security of their rich oil fields in Baku on the Caspian Sea. They were uneasy about the unpredictable policies of the various unstable Iranian governments that seemed linked to the British and Americans. Second, the Soviet Union sought to maintain its protective military umbrella in Iran in order to help promote indigenous Iranian communist movements, which were thriving both in Tehran and in the important north western province of Azerbaijan. Third, the Soviets hoped to offset the British presence and oil concession in the south by establishing something similar in the north. Finally, the USSR undoubtedly thought that it could use military presence as leverage to achieve future favourable political and economic accommodations with Iran.¹¹⁸

Russia was interested in the existence of crude oil in Iran, because it feared the extension of British and American influence in the region, which could ultimately endanger its own oil production in Russian Azerbaijan, on the north Iranian border. This was why Radmanesh, one of the Tudeh Members of the *Majlis*, in his speech to the *Majlis* on 19 October 1945, stated that "northern Iran was a cordon sanitaire of the Soviet Union and therefore that country could not remain indifferent to the intrigues and conspiracies of the ruling classes who in conjunction with the foreign governments were threatening the safety and stability of Soviet Azerbaijan."¹¹⁹ Some pro-Soviet newspapers such as *Rahbar*, *Zafar* and *Razm* also contended in their editorials that northern Iran was Russia's cordon sanitaire. They warned the

government and the *Majlis* that a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union might force that country to invoke Article 6 of the Irano-Soviet treaty of 1921.¹²⁰

Britain was already in competition with the Russians but now American involvement in Iran had weighted the scale to the benefit of the former. The US involvement and American reaction in support of the Iranian government to the Russian refusal to withdraw will be discussed in the next section.

American Concerns for the Neighbouring Oil Rich Region

Before the start of the Second World War, as was discussed earlier in this Chapter, the American involvement in Iran was not successful because of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the country. After the War however, with the decline of British power in the region, the ground was cleared for the full involvement of the United States in Iran.

After the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 and the establishment of the new government, the Iranian and the British governments were very concerned because of the Russian occupation of the country. Although earlier Churchill had believed that “there is no need to fear undue Russian encroachments, as their one supreme wish will be to get a through route for American supplies,”¹²¹ he was later convinced to put pressure on the Russians to make an intimate efficient working arrangement with them and to settle the Allies’ alliance with Iran. In response to Soviet reluctance, which openly assumed that the agreement suggested by Britain would serve only British designs and aspirations,¹²² Churchill cabled Stalin:

I pledge the faith of Britain that we will not seek any advantage for ourselves at the expense of any rightful Russian interest during the war or at the end. In any case, the signing of the Tripartite Treaty is urgent to avoid internal disorders growing with consequent danger of choking the supply route.¹²³

The Tripartite Pact was thus drafted on 29 January 1942 by the British with the consent of the Russians, and Iran was simply presented with a *fait accompli*. In this way, with no agreement with the United States, Iran joined the Allies.

The British were not excessively concerned about the Russians in the north as long as British influence in the south remained unchallenged. In addition, Britain clearly lacked the power and credibility to alter the Russian position. In the words of an American correspondent in London, Britain was an “exhausted” and “second rate power” whose only hope in confronting a “dynamic, expanding Russian imperialism” was “international action and control.”¹²⁴ British historian Peter Avery makes the same point in more measured terms: “This plain sailing for Russia was

little marred by a Great Britain exhausted and faced by many problems more pressing than Persia.”¹²⁵

As a result, the British had resorted to their past policy of “divide and rule” in Iran, which meant the reinforcement of the politics of “conservatism “ and “tribalism” against the forces that sought “radical” changes either against the British position or in favour of the Russians. In this way, the British sought to check both the activities of the anti-British forces and the Russian influence in Iran. In this context A. Saikal writes: “they exploited conservative beliefs against radical ones, Islamic beliefs against conservative convictions, and nationalist feelings against religious ones.”¹²⁶ They also eagerly assisted the formation and activities of a pro-Western but anti-communist political party called Erade-yi Melli (National Will).

According to a policy memorandum prepared as early as 23 January 1943 by the division of Near Eastern Affairs and approved by the Secretary of State, the British had proposed that the Allies declare themselves as having power to modify the Iranian cabinet at will. However, the United States did not agree with the proposal. The American memorandum, further, affirmed that “nowhere else in the Middle East is there to be found so clear-cut a conflict of interests between two of the United Nations, so ancient a tradition of rivalry” as that existing in Iran between the Soviet Union and Britain. The American note made it clear that with American goods, advice and services, Iran could be built up “to the point at which it will stand in need of neither British nor Russian assistance to maintain order in its own house.”¹²⁷ General Hurley’s recommendations, in May 1943, were so consistent with the policy of the division of Near Eastern Affairs that they concurred with its plan of assuring Iran that the United States would insist that the principles of the Atlantic Charter apply to Iran, that Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis, and that the American legation be raised to the status of an embassy.

After the occupation of Anglo-Russian forces, the first major American presence in Iran¹²⁸ was begun by establishing the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC), headed by General Donald Connolly. The PGSC consisted of nearly 30,000 non-combatant American troops who began arriving in Iran in December 1943 to aid the Allied cause by providing the Russians with badly needed wartime supplies over the Iranian land bridge. The Americans and the British were to take care of the railway from the Persian Gulf to Tehran, and the Russians from Tehran to Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea. An Anglo-American agreement specified that British troops would provide security, and the Americans would handle technical

operations. These troops played a vital role in supplying the Russians with more than five and a half million tons of goods during the war.

The first American service troops arrived in Iran without any previous notification to the Iranian government and throughout the war, the American troops in Iran enjoyed *de facto* extraterritorial rights and were immune from prosecution under Iranian law. In response to the consistent protest of the Iranian government,¹²⁹ as to serious infringements of Iran's sovereignty, a series of discussions took place at the Tehran Conference for the preparation of a declaration concerning Iran. The declaration was finally signed in the late hours of the night of 1 December 1943 by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill. In this declaration the heads of the Allies declared "the mutual agreement of their three governments regarding their relations with Iran." They recognised the assistance which Iran gave "in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union." The three governments also declared that they are "at one with the government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."¹³⁰ The declaration, by "having reassured Iran as to the powers' respect for its sovereignty," as V. Motter argued, was an "attempt to define the status of American troops in Iran ... a matter in which Iran had once felt its sovereignty infringed."¹³¹

Toward the settlement of the self-autonomous movement in Iran and Azerbaijan in particular, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, presented a plan to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in October 1943, to be used as a basis for discussions. This proposal, after confirming the guarantees provided in the Tripartite Agreement and the Declaration of Tehran, suggested that a commission composed of the representatives of the Big Three should visit Iran and study the situation in that country. The commission would recommend certain reforms, such as the establishment of the provincial legislatures for the provinces, the teaching of minority languages, and the amendment of the laws concerning the power of the central government. The post-war election in Iran would have been supervised by the commission. The mixed commission would have paved the way for a quick evacuation of Iran by foreign troops.¹³²

This proposal, if accepted, would have put northern Iran under Russian domination. The Tripartite Agreement provided that the foreign troops would be out of Iran by 2 March 1946, whereas the Bevin proposal left in doubt the date for the withdrawal of troops. Moreover, there was nothing in the plan which could ensure that the Russians would abide by the findings of the commission. The Russians were against it as they believed that the Iranian affair should be treated as

one that concerned only Iran and the Soviet Union.¹³³ The Americans had little enthusiasm for Bevin's plan as it left in doubt the date for the withdrawal of troops.¹³⁴ W. Murray, the American minister in Tehran, also, in his talk with the Prime Minister made it clear that even if Iran refused the Bevin proposal, it still could count on the support of the United States government and the United Nations Organisation.¹³⁵ Nevertheless Britain was pressing Iran to take the initiative in inviting the three powers to send a mixed commission to Iran and to settle its problems according to the Bevin plan.¹³⁶

The United States had scrupulously avoided direct confrontation with the Russians on this issue. Roosevelt also exhibited his lack of knowledge of Iran and the geopolitics of the region when he recommended a scheme whereby there would be international control of the Trans-Iranian railroad with a free port to be constructed on the Persian Gulf.¹³⁷ This could have provided an open highway of Russian influence into Iran for years afterwards. Although the Department of State managed to lay this idea to rest, it is one example of the misunderstanding of the Iranian situation that existed in high places in the United States.

However, as time passed, the United States became more enthusiastic about Iranian affairs and increasingly conscious of the growing strategic importance of Iran to the West, and its economic importance with respect to oil. America's perceived interests, in addition to gaining access to the petroleum wealth of Iran,¹³⁸ lay in protecting the Iranian corridor. A number of American policy makers understood that if Iran fell to Soviet communism, all Western economic and political interests in the Persian Gulf region would become vulnerable to Russian penetration. In the early 1940s, a report had been submitted to President Roosevelt by an American Commission of experts, which stated that the centre of gravity of the world's petroleum output was shifting to the Persian Gulf. In his diary, Forrestal wrote:

I said that Middle East oil was going to be necessary for this country not merely in wartime but in peacetime, because if we are going to make the contribution that it seems we have to make to the rest of the world in manufactured goods, we shall probably need very greatly increased supplies of fuel. Brewster said that ... Europe in the next ten years may shift from a coal to an oil economy, and therefore whoever sits on the valve of Middle East oil may control the destiny of Europe.¹³⁹

The importance of the Persian Gulf oil region can be understood well when attention is paid to the cost of incremental production of oil in the region in comparison with other oil producing countries (see Table 6-1). Although the figures are for the year 1993, they indicate the considerable lower cost of the incremental production in the Persian Gulf region and Iran, in particular, comparing with the higher costs in Russia, Britain and America.

Table 6-1. Estimates of Costs of Incremental Production* in Countries of the Persian Gulf Region and Non-Persian Gulf Region (\$ per bbl in 1993)

Country	Low	High
Iran	0.50	1.00
Iraq	0.50	1.00
Saudi Arabia	0.50	1.00
Kuwait	1.00	2.00
Abu Dhabi (On Shore)	2.50	3.75
Libya	3.00	5.00
Nigeria	3.00	5.00
Venezuela	3.00	5.00
Indonesia	5.00	8.00
Gabon	9.00	15.00
Mexico	3.00	5.00
Malaysia	4.00	5.00
Oman	4.50	5.50
Alaska (On Shore)	5.00	7.00
Russia	5.00	8.00
UK North Sea	12.00	15.00
Norway	13.00	17.00
US Offshore	17.00	21.00
Alberta	20.00	25.00
US Lower 48	24.00	35.00

* Does not include operating costs.

Source: Thomas R. Stauffer.

Russian control of Iranian territory and resources would provide an immediate strategic advantage merely by keeping Iran's assets out of the hands of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and other potential rivals. The establishment of a secure Russian foothold in the Persian Gulf would permit the Russians to exert their influence more effectively not just over Iran but over the contiguous waters of the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea and throughout the oil-rich Middle East region. The significance of that fact is revealed by the list of holders of concessions (see Table 6-2).

If the Soviet Union, with its rapidly expanding industries, were to look towards the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf and to advance in that direction, it could tread on an oilfield at every step: North Iran, Iraq, South Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar. Thus, as J. Grenville argues, "the continued control of the oil industries of Iran through the Anglo-Iranian Company, "now believed vital

economically as well, namely the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal, were considered essential.”¹⁴⁰

Table 6-2. Oil concession holders in 1943

Concession	Holder
South Iran	UK
Kuwait	Half UK, half USA
Bahrain	USA
Saudi Arabia	USA
Iraq, and various concessions along the Arab shore of the Gulf	One-quarter UK, one quarter USA, one quarter Holland-UK, one quarter France (management UK)

Source: Reader Bullard, *Britain and the Middle East*, p. 164.

Four of the Western Powers, chiefly Britain and America, held between them all the oil concessions so far granted in the Middle East (see Table 6-3).

Table 6-3. World’s proved oil reserves in 1943

Area	Percentage of World Total
Middle East	42.3
USA	33.9
Caribbean (Venezuela, Mexico and Trinidad)	10.0
USSR	9.0
Other	4.8
Total	100.0

Source: *Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East*, p. 164.

In August 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull summarised the American interest in Iran even more pointedly in a communication to President Roosevelt. After discussing the moral and humanitarian reasons for an American presence in Iran to offset British and Russian ambitions, Hull stated: “Likewise, from a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia.”¹⁴¹

Supporting these notions, Truman later wrote of the issues concerned with the American involvement in Iran. One was “the control of Iran’s oil reserves.” Truman believed that the “Russians had an eye on these vast deposits” and warned, “if the Russians were to control Iran’s oil, either directly or indirectly, the raw-material balance of the world would undergo a serious change, and it would be a serious loss for the economy of the Western world.”¹⁴² The Russian activities in Iran, according to Truman, had “threatened the peace of the world.”¹⁴³

Affected by these preoccupations, on 1 November 1944, the US ambassador in Tehran told the Russians that the US “policy in this case is based on the American government’s recognition of the sovereign right of an independent nation such as Iran, acting in non-discriminatory manner, to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory.”¹⁴⁴ On 24 November 1945, the United States government delivered a note to the Soviet Union proposing the evacuation of the foreign troops from Iran by 1st January 1946. The note also reminded the Russians of the Tehran declaration regarding Iran and added:

The government of the United States realises that any Soviet commander in the areas concerned who may have prevented the free movement of Iranian forces may have been acting without the sanction of the Soviet government ... In any event the solution which has arisen has convinced the American government that it would be in the common interest for all, Soviet, British, and American troops to be withdrawn immediately from Iran. As long as any of these troops remain in the territory of a friendly government, incidents and misunderstandings are likely to occur.¹⁴⁵

It had become clear now for Byrnes, the Secretary of State, that the Russians were shifting from political subversion to military invasion, so that he told his colleagues in the State Department: “now we’ll give it to them with both barrels.”¹⁴⁶ A few months later Stettinius, Under-Secretary of State, told the American embassy at Tehran that the President and the State Department had considered Iran as something of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and for the good faith of the United Nations. He continued:

There were important reasons why our present heightened interests in Iran should be extended into the postwar period ... America’s position in Iran is not intended to lapse again in any way to that of relative unimportance ... The impression should be avoided at all costs that we intend to stand at the side of Iran as a political buffer to restrain our Allies, the British and Russians, with regard to Iran.¹⁴⁷

In 1946, the failure of the Moscow Conference convinced the American government to change the policy of “appeasement and ... one-way street”¹⁴⁸ and adopt a “tough policy” toward Russian aggression. Truman thought that appeasement in Iran would be a prelude to a third World War, and he therefore decided to make the Iranian case a test for the post-war policy of insisting “that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration.”¹⁴⁹ Byrnes, commenting on the “tough policy” of the United States toward Russia, claimed that it was Russia’s attitude toward Iran that convinced the United States government that a firmer policy had to be adopted:

The Soviet attitude toward Iran ... confirmed the ambition Molotov had expressed to Hitler for the control of the territory south of Baku. These things inspired my speeches beginning in February 1946, speeches which were correctly interpreted as reflecting a firmer attitude toward the Soviet government. No longer was there any wisdom in minimising our differences because no longer was there common purpose of an early peace.¹⁵⁰

In this way, the prelude to full US involvement in Iran first came out publicly against the Russian pressure over the Russian withdrawal and oil crisis of 1945-46 in spite of the wartime alliance between Washington and Moscow. In December 1945, through the Iranian Minister in Washington, Truman assured the Iranian government that it would receive the unflinching support of the United States, provided that it itself did not surrender to Communist threats and pressure.¹⁵¹ Further support was given on 15 January 1946, when the American ambassador told Prime Minister Hakimi, that if Iran would submit its case to the United Nations, the government of the United States would support the Iranian position and would see that the case was heard at the Security Council. Therefore Hakimi instructed Ambassador Hassan Taqizadeh at London to file the complaint at once.¹⁵² For the first time, W. Murray, with an independent and hopeful American policy, proceeded to fight Russian infiltration. This bold and forceful support filled the vacuum created by the defeatist attitude of the British embassy.

The Russian government had ignored all the Iranian protests and it had taken no notice of the United States note which suggested that foreign troops should leave Iran by 1 January 1946. Meanwhile the Russian operations in northern Iran had been reinforced heavily by tanks, artillery and cavalry in the shape of three prongs, the westward movement which could be pointed toward the Turkish border or Iraq, the southward movement which approached within 30 kilometres of Tehran, and the eastward march toward Gilan and Mazandaran.¹⁵³

To Truman these operations were plain signs that "Russia was determined to have her way and that she intended to ignore the US and the UN alike."¹⁵⁴ The United States, in a note of 6 March to the Soviet Union said that the decision of that country to retain troops in Iran beyond 2 March, the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty, had created a situation with regard to which the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Declaration of Tehran, "could not remain indifferent." The note demanded that the Russian government to do "its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote the international confidence which is necessary among the peoples of all nations." It also requested that the United States be "promptly advised of the Soviet decision."¹⁵⁵ In March 1946 H. Ala, the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, reported to Qavam that the State Department now had come to the conclusion that

the Russian manoeuvres in Iran were designed to force that country to give Moscow domination over the northern provinces.¹⁵⁶

The strong political support of the US government,¹⁵⁷ which was now being backed by the British,¹⁵⁸ led to the decision of the Security Council on 4 April 1946, in the absence of the Soviet representative, to adopt Secretary Byrnes' resolution fixing 6 May as the date for the unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran, and to reserve the right to consider the case further in the event of new developments.

Hence, when many people expected the occupation of Tehran by Russian troops, on 24 March Moscow announced that the withdrawal of all Russian troops would be made from Iran at once, and "can be completed in five to six weeks if nothing unforeseen occurs."¹⁵⁹ In a statement on 5 April Radio Moscow said that the agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union "strikes hard at those who are out to start a war" and that it proved how much can be achieved by direct negotiations. The outcome of the Russo-Iranian negotiations, according to Radio Moscow, followed naturally the line adopted by Soviet foreign policy, based on principles of peace, cooperation and respect for every nation's right to independence.¹⁶⁰

Years later Truman, on 24 April 1952, told a press conference that in 1946 he had been forced to send an ultimatum to the head of the Soviet Union with "a certain day on which the Russians had to evacuate Iran," asking him to comply with the terms of the Tripartite Treaty. The troops got out, he claimed, because the United States was then "in a position to meet a situation of that kind."¹⁶¹ On 25 August 1957, Truman repeated this claim by saying: "I personally saw to it that Stalin was informed that I had given orders to our military chiefs to prepare for the movement of our ground, sea and air forces. Stalin then did what I knew he would do. He moved his troops out."¹⁶²

Relying on the press conference and his personal interview with Truman, N. S. Fatemi strongly wrote that "on March 21, he sent an ultimatum to Stalin."¹⁶³ According to Fatemi, the Russian withdrawal was a prompt "reaction to President Truman's ultimatum."¹⁶⁴ However some researchers have now demonstrated that there was no such ultimatum,¹⁶⁵ and one expressed his doubt by saying that: "I have not been able to verify this claim."¹⁶⁶ Moreover, documents published by the Department of State reveal that: "No documentation on the sending of an ultimatum to the Soviet Union has been found in the Department files or in the files of the Department of Defence, nor have several of the highest officers of the Department in 1946 been able to affirm the sending of an ultimatum."¹⁶⁷

On the whole, however, there is no doubt that full US support for the Iranian government, within and outside the United Nations, helped decisively in the eventual withdrawal of the Russian forces from Iran on 6 May 1946, even though Stalin claimed that “this has been decided upon in a positive way by an understanding reached between the Russian government and the government of Iran.”¹⁶⁸ This “understanding” was reached upon a draft agreement signed on 4 April 1946¹⁶⁹ between Qavam and Sadchikov, in which the Russians pledged to evacuate Iran. With the Russian troops out of Iran and with Russian agreement that Azerbaijan was an internal Iranian affair - the two important points which were considered a victory for Iran - the government was sure that the separatist movements could be destroyed in no time. In the meantime, Qavam had neutralised the threatening power of the neighbouring Soviet Union and, on 12 December 1946, the two communist separatist régimes in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan collapsed in the face of internal disaffection and of the military challenge from Tehran backed by American political support.

Russian influence in Iran suffered a decline in 1947, although Tudeh remained active, particularly among trade unions, students, and intellectuals. But the United States was now directly involved in the internal political affairs of Iran. The United States assumed a position of major influence which enabled it to move into the partial vacuum and to play the role of external balancer. Although the British influence in this episode was minimal and lacked credibility, it remained active behind the scenes and backed American activities whenever it could. A prime example is British complicity in the tribal uprisings in the south that helped to precipitate the government’s moves against the Tudeh party in September and October 1946 (as discussed in Chapter 5). This pattern of the United States moving out front with the British following and pushing in the background became an important part of the Iranian political scene in the years that followed.

The Anglo-American Regime Reinforcement

In the late 1940s, the United States and Iran continued to strengthen their relationship. This strengthening connection was to be soldered around the personality and office of the Shah that consistently bypassed the formal governmental apparatus of Iran (namely the Majlis and the Prime Minister), and was to take the form of technical and military aid, advisers and defence and intelligence pacts. George Allen, the US Ambassador in Tehran, developed a close personal and professional relationship with the Shah. In Allen’s words, “the Shah usually asked me to stay for a cup of tea or a whisky, when he would discuss the local situation in an informal and, at times, intimate manner.”¹⁷⁰

An important technical aid agreement was negotiated between Iran and America in October 1950 under the Point Four program. Although the sums of money involved were limited at the beginning, this agreement was significant because it was in keeping with Iran's "long-standing objective of deepening American involvement in Iran for ultimately political ends."¹⁷¹ This complex American organisation, the largest of its kind in the world, focused on technical aid in the fields of agriculture, health, and education, and its activities were spread throughout the Iranian countryside.

The primary emphasis was also placed on military aid and advisers.¹⁷² The underlying goal of this relationship, therefore, was to strengthen the monarchy against internal challenges. In the words of John C. Wiley, the US Ambassador in Tehran from 1948 to 1950: "Iran needs an army capable primarily of maintaining order within the country, an army capable of putting down any insurrection-no matter where or by whom inspired or abetted."¹⁷³

In light of all this, Washington had already decided that Musaddeq should be overthrown and his government should be replaced by one under the control of the Shah as a means of preventing the threat of a "communist coup d'état." By now the Eisenhower administration, under the growing pressures of American global strategy against communism, and of British propaganda to the effect that Musaddeq was being influenced by the Tudeh, was convinced that a reliable alternative to Musaddeq's administration would be a government headed by the anti-communist but pro-Western monarchy. Therefore Washington hardened its position against Musaddeq and support a joint operation with the British to overthrow Musaddeq and his government on 19 August 1953 (as discussed in Chapter 5). The fall of Musaddiq marked the new era of intervention.

With the Pahlavi throne restored and an oil agreement signed, the Eisenhower-Dulles administration chose to pursue a policy of régime reinforcement in Iran. American foreign policy-makers implemented this policy through a strong emphasis on economic and military aid. On 22 August the Shah returned to Iran and the monarchy was reinstated. The US government granted \$45 million to the government of General Zahedi (September 1953), intended to induce the Zahedi government to "move quickly toward a settlement with Britain."¹⁷⁴ Between 1953 and 1960, these transfusions amounted to \$567 million in economic aid and another \$450 million in military aid.¹⁷⁵

With regard to the advisers, between 1952 and 1956 unprecedented numbers of American technical advisers moved into Iran. According to published Foreign Service lists, in January 1952 fewer than 10 technical advisers were

attached to the US Embassy. By October 1952, the number had increased to 26, but it was after the fall of Musaddeq that the major increases occurred. In October 1953, the number of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) advisers listed by name reached 133, and by January of 1956 the number had ballooned to 207.¹⁷⁶ The actual number of ICA staff working for the Point Four in Iran at the beginning of 1956 was 308 technicians and support personnel, including almost 100 local nationals. Another 100 technicians were employed under contracts with American educational and professional organisations. Above and beyond this were another 3,800 Iranian employees working for American missions and programs.¹⁷⁷ By the end of 1977 the number of Americans had increased from 8,000 in 1970 to nearly 50,000.¹⁷⁸

Iran as a defender of American interests manning the barricades for America in the Persian Gulf region received an unprecedented promise to purchase any conventional weapons from the American inventory including the extremely sophisticated F-14, F-15 and AWACS aircraft.¹⁷⁹ Between 1972 and 1978, the transfer of arms from America to Iran took place at levels never before known in international political history. Between 1972 and 1977 alone, the value of US military sales to Iran amounted to \$16.2 billion.¹⁸⁰ The Iranian defence budget increased from \$1.4 billion in 1972 to \$9.4 billion in 1977- an increase of 680 percent. By 1977 the military and security establishments in Iran were absorbing over 40 percent of the Iranian budget.¹⁸¹

The March 1975 economic accord committed Iran to the expenditure of \$15 billion on American goods and services over the next five years. The largest agreement of its kind ever signed by two countries, it emphasised the construction of eight large nuclear power plants, which were to provide Iran with some eight thousand megawatts of electricity. By April 1975 American officials were privately estimating that Iranian-American non-military and non-oil trade could reach \$23 to \$26 billion over the next six years. When added to the unprecedented level of US military sales to Iran, this highly publicised agreement “seemed to weld the two countries into one huge, commercial, binational conglomerate,” as James Bill has put it.¹⁸²

The policy of regime reinforcement in Iran could never be ignored as long as the threat of a Russian intervention or a pro-Soviet coup was deemed possible. Following this policy in 1955 the Baghdad Pact was formed as an economic and political alliance among Britain, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq. This alliance was in line with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ policy of forcing as many Afro-Asian countries as possible to commit themselves to pro-Western treaty

agreements and formal defence pacts building a solid bar of allied countries along the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The alliance continued in the form of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) on 21 August after Iraq withdrew in March 1959 following its revolution. Although the United States did not become a formal member of the pact, it contributed financial assistance and had representation on three of the standing committees, including the economic and military committees.

The pact was described in Britain and the United States as a “northern tier” of defence for the Middle East against the Soviet Union and, in the eyes of the Americans, Iran was a central member of the Baghdad Pact primarily for strategic and military reasons having to do with the Soviet Union. An important memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee on 13 April 1955 graphically described the position that dominated the thinking of key Washington policy makers concerning the importance of Iran to United States’ interests:

From the viewpoint of attaining US military objectives in the Middle East, the natural defensive barrier provided by the Zagros Mountains must be retained under Allied control indefinitely. Because Western Iran includes the Zagros Mountain barrier, geographically, Iran is the most important country in the Middle East, excluding Turkey. Iranian participation in a regional defence organisation would permit the member countries to take full advantage collectively of the natural defensive barrier in Western Iran and would permit utilisation of logistical facilities of the area. The relative importance of Iran in relation to other countries of the Middle East would be significantly increased if she became a partner in a regional defence organisation which included Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan.¹⁸³

Although the parties of the Baghdad pact had stated that they “will cooperate for their security and defence,” there was no provision in the pact that each member should regard an attack on another as an attack on itself, or that a member which was attacked must be helped. The Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958 also increased doubts about the strength and significance of the pact. The Shah, who in 1957 had announced his enthusiasm for the Eisenhower Doctrine, now was working on other more reliable ties with the United States. Between 1957 and 1959, there was a flurry of intense American-Iranian political activity that resulted, on 5 March 1959, in a bilateral defence agreement that strongly guaranteed an American military commitment to Iran:

In the case of aggression against Iran, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Iran at its request.¹⁸⁴

This agreement, following the Baghdad Pact, alienated the Russians, who had been actively courting Iran and had been seeking to sign a fifty-year nonaggression

pact of its own with Iran.¹⁸⁵ The 1959 bilateral defence agreement ended the thaw in Iran-Soviet relations. To the Russians, the United States was to convert Iran into its own military base from which it could exploit Iran's petroleum resources and threaten the independence of other Middle Eastern countries.¹⁸⁶

Meanwhile, in Iran, America had expanded its electronic listening-post capacities along the Russian border. American firms like Rockwell International began work on sophisticated electronic surveillance systems, such as the half-billion-dollar IBEX system, which could be used to gather information about dissidents within Iran as well as about the activities of other nations on the Persian Gulf. Many of the Americans recruited for this project were former employees of the National Security Agency and the Air Force Security Service.¹⁸⁷ The close relationship of the two countries' security services was such that General N. Nassiri, the head of SAVAK, was referred to by Kermit Roosevelt as "our General Nassiri."¹⁸⁸

This increasing American presence and its interventionary policy became integral parts of the Iranian political process after 1945-1946 and especially after the coup of 1953. This "support" from "the British and American ambassadors ... whenever they saw" the Shah continued until 1979,¹⁸⁹ when he was overthrown by the Islamic Revolution. Nevertheless, the Russians and their sympathisers in Iran, including the Tudeh party, never stopped plotting to take over power. In 1962, as the Russians were disappointed by the Shah's pro-American alliance and his anti-Soviet activities, the KGB was commissioned to plan an assassination "where a car bomb explosion was designed on the way of the Shah's daily trip in Tehran."¹⁹⁰ To Khrushchev, Iran was an example of a country headed for revolution despite its very weak communist party. In his words, the misery of the masses and the corruption of the government added up to certain revolution: "You will assert that the Shah has been overthrown by the Communists, and we shall be very glad to have it thought in the world that all the progressive people in Iran recognise that we are the leaders of the progress of mankind."¹⁹¹

Americans in Iran became serious targets of anti-régime violence. On 30 November 1971, opposition guerrillas boldly attempted to kidnap Douglas MacArthur II, the US ambassador in Tehran. Opposition killed Lt. Colonel Lewis Hawkins, a military adviser in Tehran, on 2 June 1973. On 21 May 1975, Paul Shaffer and Jack Turner, US Air Force colonels, were assassinated as they drove to work in a US military staff car. Finally, in August 1976, three American civilians working on IBEX were killed in the streets of Tehran. Americans in Iran were increasingly subject to surveillance, harassment, and physical attack. Thirty-one

bombings and threatened bombings alone were directed against American organisations and facilities in Iran between 1971 and 1975. Opposition groups bombed the facilities of the US Information Service and its subsidiary, the Iran-America Society, six times, while they hit the US Embassy in Tehran twice and the Peace Corps offices once during these years.¹⁹²

Strong Russian reaction to the influential role of the USA in Iranian affairs appeared in November 1978. Commenting on the early signs of the Iranian anti-American revolution, the Soviet Union gave a warning in *Pravda*:

The Soviet Union, who maintains a neighbourly relationship with Iran, resolutely announces that she is against interference in Iran's internal affairs by whomsoever, under whatsoever form and on whatsoever pretext. Purely internal problems of law and order have arisen, and these problems must be settled by the Iranians themselves. All countries must abide by the principles of the United Nations charter, as they must by other fundamental, international documents, and they must respect the sovereignty and independence of Iran and the Iranian people. It must be clear that any intervention, a fortiori military intervention in the affairs of Iran, a country which shares a frontier with the USSR would be considered as an attack on Russia's own interests and security.¹⁹³

The Russians reacted again when General Huyser, the Deputy Director of NATO, arrived in Tehran on an unofficial visit. On 29 January 1979, as soon as the rumours of his presence spread, the Soviet press revealed that "the USA has dispatched General Huyser to Iran ... to foment a military coup."¹⁹⁴ Moreover, *Pravda* accused the General of "being responsible for the daily massacres in Tehran and other cities of Iran."¹⁹⁵ This was considered in some sense another but "unofficial warning"¹⁹⁶ from the Kremlin.

Conclusion

As examined in this Part, Iran's oil and territory was a source of impetus for Great Power rivalry. Like its oil, access to Iran's territory was not only important for the Russians but also for the British and Americans. Through Iran, the British were able to attack the Bolsheviks and help the nationalist governments of the Caucasus to maintain their independence. The Russians supported the Revolution of the Orient against Western Imperialism and attempted to acquire a foothold in the Persian Gulf, and the Americans completed a containment of Russia and organised a wide range of surveillance activities.

In facing this situation, Iranian foreign policy was primarily engaged with the protection of oil and the territorial integrity of Iran. The Iranian government took sides with one rival (USA) to secure its interests from the other (USSR). Iranian foreign policy, regardless of its declared neutrality, always relied on the West in its protection from the neighbouring Russians, and the Iranian government was not

impartial regarding the refusal or granting of the demands of both the great rival powers.

- ¹ G. Drage, *Russian Affairs*, p. 564.
- ² R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 38.
- ³ Ibid. p. 90.
- ⁴ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 43.
- ⁵ Ibid. p. 43.
- ⁶ Quoted in Lord G. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, vol. 2, p. 588.
- ⁷ A. P. Thornton, "British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890," pp. 554-579.
- ⁸ For more details about the Anglo-Russian Agreements of 1907 and 1915 refer to B. Navazeni, *Ahdnameh-yi Mavadat-i Iran va Showravi, 26 February 1921*, pp. 55-61; R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, pp. 89-94. For the text of the 1907 Agreement and Anglo-Russian-French official correspondence of 1915 refer to J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. 1, pp. 219-249.
- ⁹ J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, pp. 39-40.
- ¹⁰ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 111.
- ¹¹ For details refer to Lord Ironside, *High Road to Command*, pp. 119-178; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 87.
- ¹² Quoted in Ibid., p. 88. For the British and Russian interests and concerns, refer to Lord G. Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, vol. 2, pp. 585-634.
- ¹³ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 88.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 89.
- ¹⁵ *Asnad-i Mahramaneh-yi Vezarat-i Khareje-yi Britania dar Bare-yi Gharardad-i 1919 Iran va Englis* (hereafter referred to as *Asnad-i Mahramaneh*), pp. 293-294.
- ¹⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 90.
- ¹⁷ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 46.
- ¹⁸ *Asnad-i Mahramaneh*, vol. 1, p. 14.
- ¹⁹ P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 205.
- ²⁰ According to J. Madani "it was considered permanent." See J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Siasi-i Moaser-i Iran*, vol. 1, p. 78.
- ²¹ J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 41.
- ²² N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 90-93; J. Madani, *Tarikh-i Siasi-i Moaser-i Iran*, vol. 1, p. 78-95.
- ²³ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1919, vol. 2, p. 701.
- ²⁴ For details refer to B. Navazeni, *Ahdnameh-yi Mavadat-i Iran va Showravi, 26 February 1921*, pp. 73-92.
- ²⁵ Record of the First Congress of the peoples of the East, quoted in G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 7.
- ²⁶ Ibid., p. 7.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p. 8.
- ²⁸ Quoted by A. Palmieri, *La Politica Asiatica dei Balscevischi*, quoted in Ibid., pp. 9-10.
- ²⁹ For the entire alleged testament refer to P. Sykes, *History of Persia*, vol. 2, p. 244.
- ³⁰ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 85.
- ³¹ A. Banani, *Modernization of Iran*, P. 35.
- ³² For the text of the manifesto refer to H. Makki, *Tarikh-i Beest Saleh-i Iran*, vol. 1, pp. 125-129.

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- ³³ R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 189.
- ³⁴ J. Upton, *History of Modern Iran*, p. 44.
- ³⁵ For details refer to B. Navazeni, *Ahdnameh-yi Mavadat-i Iran va Showravi*, 26 February 1921, pp. 133-138.
- ³⁶ P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 209.
- ³⁷ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 94.
- ³⁸ For the text of the correspondence between the rival powers refer to J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. 2, pp. 7-11.
- ³⁹ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, p. 429.
- ⁴⁰ R. Bullard, *The Camels Must Go*, p. 229.
- ⁴¹ Lord Ironside, *High Road to Command*, p. 149.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. 161.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 152.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 161.
- ⁴⁶ H. Nicolson, *Friday Morning*, p. 7.
- ⁴⁷ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 47.
- ⁴⁸ G. Agabekov had found it during the intercept of the British official correspondence. See Georges Agabekov, *OGPU*, p. 114.
- ⁴⁹ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs* (London, 1927), vol. 1, p. 540.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² R. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran*, p. 202.
- ⁵³ This position was repeatedly stated to Reza Khan by the British consuls in Isfahan and Shiraz while he was on his way to Khuzistan. For details refer to Reza Khan's own accounts as reproduced in H. Makki, *Tarikh-i Beest Saleh-i Iran*, vol. 3, pp. 203-204, 209-210.
- ⁵⁴ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1927, vol. I., p. 540.
- ⁵⁵ G. Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 524.
- ⁵⁶ Preamble of the treaty. For the text refer to League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, CXC, pp. 21-27.
- ⁵⁷ M. Manshur Gorgani, *Siasat-i Doulat-i Shouravi dar Iran*, vol. 1, pp. 139-144.
- ⁵⁸ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, vol. 1, p. 429.
- ⁵⁹ For the text of the Shah's speech refer to Hussein Makki, *Tarikh-i Beest Saleh-i Iran*, vol. 1, p. 190.
- ⁶⁰ For the text of the letters exchanged between Rothstein and Kuchik Khan refer to Ibid., pp. 394-395; H. Makki, *Tarikh-i Beest Saleh-i Iran*, vol. 1, pp. 312-317.
- ⁶¹ For the complete statement refer to Muvarikhoddoleh Sepehr, *Iran dar Jang-i Buzorg*, p. 394. The significance of this statement became clearer at the time of the Azerbaijan crisis in 1945-46 which will be dealt with next.
- ⁶² G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 65.
- ⁶³ For details refer to Ibid., p. 66.
- ⁶⁴ *British Blue Book*, quoted in Ibid., p. 67.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 68.

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- ⁶⁶ *British Blue Book*, quoted in Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ For details on the Communist movement refer to Chapter 3.
- ⁶⁸ G. Agabekov, *OGPU*, p. 101.
- ⁶⁹ G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, pp. 114-116.
- ⁷⁰ G. Agabekov, *OGPU*, p. 101-102.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., p. 91.
- ⁷² Ibid., p. 97.
- ⁷³ Ibid., p. 120.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 80.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 83.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 90.
- ⁷⁷ *The New Persia*, p. 212, quoted in G. Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, p. 114.
- ⁷⁸ *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*, p. 259.
- ⁷⁹ R. A. Stewart, *Sunrise at Abadan*, pp. 54-84.
- ⁸⁰ General M. Kazemi and Colonel M. Alborz, *Tarikh-i Panjah Saleh-yi Nirou-yi Zamini-yi Shahanshahi-yi Iran*, p. 217. The number of German industrial advisers was always a matter of controversy. To the British, "German agents ... were believed to have reached the number of 2000." See Christopher Buckley, *Five Ventures*, p. 143.
- ⁸¹ For details refer to I. Zowghi, *Iran va Ghodratha-i Bozorg dar gang-i Dovom-i Jahani*, pp. 28-32.
- ⁸² R. Bullard, *The Camels Must Go*, p. 238; the five routes for aid to Soviets in the battle against the Germans were 1) Port of Murmansk, 2) Port of Arkhangel, 3) Port of Vladivostok, 4) Through the Turkish Bosforous and Dardanelis Straits and 5) through Iran. In another account, of the other four, Iran was considered as the only "way round" that "if the Nazi Germany were to be defeated, Russia must be aided to the full; and full assistance to Russia required the opening up of the Persian route." See Christopher Buckley, *Five Ventures*, p. 143.
- ⁸³ W. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, p. 423.
- ⁸⁴ *Newsweek* 22 August 1941.
- ⁸⁵ For the text of the official statement of Mahmoud Djam, the Prime Minister on 2 September 1939 refer to Ahmad Bani Ahmad, *Tarikh-i Shahanshahi-ye Pahlavi: Reza Shah-i Kabir*, vol. 3, p. 466.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 479.
- ⁸⁷ B. Aqeli, *Zokaol Molk-i Foruqi*, p. 60.
- ⁸⁸ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 89, The British had always viewed the Shah, his government and Iranian public opinion in favour of the Germans who saw Hitler as a mythical hero. For details refer to Sir R. Bullard, *The Camels Must Go*; p. 222; Christopher Buckley, *Five Ventures*, pp. 159-160.
- ⁸⁹ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 193.
- ⁹⁰ For the text of the Soviet memorandum after the invasion refer to Ahmad Bani Ahmad, *Tarikh-i Shahanshahi-yi Pahlavi: Reza Shah-i Kabir*, vol. 3, p. 502-509; *Moscow News*, no. 47, 25 August 1941; *Manchester Guardian*, 26 August 1941.
- ⁹¹ Revealed by M. Ali Foruqi, the Prime Minister, cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 194. General Arfa, at the time Iranian Joint Chief of Staff, alleged that the Soviet's ultimate aim was to establish a pro-Moscow government in Tehran. See H. Arfa, *Under Five Shahs*, pp. 374-376.
- ⁹² W. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, p. 484.
- ⁹³ Revealed by Dr. Matin Daftari, the then Prime Minister, as cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 186.

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- ⁹⁴ M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, p. 80. In another account the number of tanks and airplanes had been reported to be 40 and 30 respectively at the disposal of 250 Soviet instructors whose mission's duty was to train a tank brigade and build up an air force in Iran. See R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran*, p. 9.
- ⁹⁵ M. R. Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country*, p. 80.
- ⁹⁶ I. Zowghi, *Iran va Qodratha-i Bozorg dar Jang-i Dovom-i Jahani*, p. 130.
- ⁹⁷ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 266.
- ⁹⁸ *Rad-i Amrouz*, 28 December 1945.
- ⁹⁹ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 264.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 266.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 276.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 277.
- ¹⁰³ *Setarah*, 24 December 1945.
- ¹⁰⁴ For the text of the "National Government of Persian Azerbaijan" manifesto refer to *The Times*, 18 December 1945.
- ¹⁰⁵ F. S. Fatemi, *The USSR in Iran*, p. 176.
- ¹⁰⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 286.
- ¹⁰⁷ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, pp. 31-32. For the text of the Allies Protocols and Communiques refer to J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, pp. 32-38.
- ¹⁰⁸ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 32.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Compilation of Documents*, prepared by Iran, p. 7, quoted in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 295.
- ¹¹⁰ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 296.
- ¹¹¹ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 299.
- ¹¹² Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 299.
- ¹¹³ For details refer to *Ibid.*, p. 287.
- ¹¹⁴ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 287.
- ¹¹⁵ This was reported to a closed session of the 14th *Majlis*. For details refer to *Majlis proceedings*. It was also submitted to the Security Council on 28 March 1946.
- ¹¹⁶ *New York Times*, 13 January 1946.
- ¹¹⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1944, vol.5, pp. 470-471, quoted in R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran*, p. 9.
- ¹¹⁸ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 32.
- ¹¹⁹ *Majlis Proceedings*, 20 October 1945.
- ¹²⁰ *Rahbar*, 3 December 1945.
- ¹²¹ W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, p. 484.
- ¹²² N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 196.
- ¹²³ W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Grand Alliance*, p. 485.
- ¹²⁴ K. Tabari, *Iran's Policies Toward the United States during the Anglo-Russian Occupation*, pp. 210-211, quoted in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 32.
- ¹²⁵ P. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 385.
- ¹²⁶ A. Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah, 1941-1979*, p. 28.
- ¹²⁷ T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, pp. 440-443.

- ¹²⁸ For details about the US military advisers refer to *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1943, Diplomatic Papers, IV: 550-51; G. Kirk, "The Middle East in the War", pp. 150-151; J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 20.
- ¹²⁹ Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Tehran Conference, Declaration regarding Iran, December, 1944.
- ¹³⁰ The full text is in the Appendices.
- ¹³¹ T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, pp. 444-445.
- ¹³² *Ittila'at*, 6 January 1946.
- ¹³³ For more details refer to J. F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 120; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 280-282. According to Truman, "When Byrnes was in Moscow for the conference of Foreign Ministers later in December [1945], the Russians refused even to discuss the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran." See H. S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Decisions*, vol. 2, p. 115.
- ¹³⁴ For more details refer to J. F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 120; N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, pp. 280-282.
- ¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 284.
- ¹³⁶ Prime Minister Hakimi's speech to the *Majlis*, cited in *Bakhtar*, 6 January 1946.
- ¹³⁷ Cited in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 47.
- ¹³⁸ Revisionist historians have argued impressively that US interests in Iran were primarily economic in nature and that policy was largely determined by major petroleum corporations. See Lloyd Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945*; Justin D. Doenecke, "Revisionists, Oil and Cold War Diplomacy," pp. 23-33.
- ¹³⁹ W. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 266.
- ¹⁴⁰ J. A. S. Grenville, *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973*, p. 348.
- ¹⁴¹ Memorandum by J. D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, "American Policy in Iran," Washington, D.C. 23 January 1943, p. 104.
- ¹⁴² H. S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Decisions*, p. vol. 2, p. 117.
- ¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ¹⁴⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 462-463, quoted in R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran*, p. 9.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Compilation of Documents* (prepared by the Representative of Iran: Notes to the Soviet government, November 17, 1945, Iranian Embassy, Washington, D. C., 1946) (note from the United States to the Soviet Union, November 24, 1945), pp. 49-50. For the note from the Soviet Union to the United States refer to *Compilation of Documents* (prepared by the Representative of Iran: Notes to the Soviet government, November 17, 1945, Iranian Embassy, Washington, D. C., 1946) (note from Soviet Union to the United States, November 29, 1945), pp. 54-55, quoted in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 271.
- ¹⁴⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1944, vol. 7, pp. 336-347.
- ¹⁴⁷ T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, pp. 445-446.
- ¹⁴⁸ Commenting on the new policy, President Truman stated: "Byrnes got the right act after Moscow. I told him our policy was not appeasement and not a one-way street." See Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence*, p. 310.
- ¹⁴⁹ *New York Times*, 7 April 1946.
- ¹⁵⁰ J. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 255.
- ¹⁵¹ *Bakhtar*, 1 December 1945.

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- ¹⁵² J. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 290. For the text of the first Security Council's resolution refer to the United Nations Organisation, *Security Council Official Records*, No. 1, 17 January to 16 February 1946, pp. 70-71.
- ¹⁵³ This has been speculated upon by *Rahbar*, 9 March 1946; Truman in his memoirs claims that this reinforcement was reported to the State Department during the month of November 1945. See H. S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Decisions*, vol. 2, p. 115.
- ¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 117.
- ¹⁵⁵ *Compilation of Documents*, prepared by Iran, p. 14, quoted in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 273. For details also refer to H. S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Decisions*, vol. 2, pp. 116-117.
- ¹⁵⁶ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 304.
- ¹⁵⁷ The United States Ambassador in Tehran told Qavam that if he did not submit the case to the Security Council, the United States itself would ask that the Iranian case be placed on the agenda of its forthcoming meeting in New York. See N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 300.
- ¹⁵⁸ United Nations Organisation, *Security Council Official Records*, No. 2, 25 March to 2 June 1946, pp. 14-16.
- ¹⁵⁹ Official communique declared on 25 March by Radio Moscow, cited in *Ittila'at*, 27 March 1946.
- ¹⁶⁰ Cited in N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 315.
- ¹⁶¹ *New York Times*, 24 April 1952.
- ¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 25 August 1957.
- ¹⁶³ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 305.
- ¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 307.
- ¹⁶⁵ See, for example, J. A. Thorpe, "Truman's Ultimatum to Stalin on the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis, Fact or Fantasy?". For the text of the telegram of 6 March 1946, sent by Secretary of State J. Byrnes to Soviet Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov, refer to Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, *United States and Iran*, pp. 162-163.
- ¹⁶⁶ R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran*, p. 10.
- ¹⁶⁷ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, p. 349.
- ¹⁶⁸ N. S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 309.
- ¹⁶⁹ The text of the Agreement is in the Appendices.
- ¹⁷⁰ G. V. Allen, "Mission to Iran," manuscript, G. V. Allen Papers, H. S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. pp. 37-38, quoted in Richard Pfau, "Containment in Iran, 1946," pp. 361-362.
- ¹⁷¹ R. K. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973*, p. 157.
- ¹⁷² J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 40.
- ¹⁷³ US Department of State, *Bulletin*, 26 June 1950, p. 1048.
- ¹⁷⁴ R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran*, p. 22.
- ¹⁷⁵ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 114.
- ¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 124.
- ¹⁷⁷ House of Representatives Committee on Government operations, Hearing before a Subcommittee on United States Aid Operations in Iran, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., May 2, 31, June 1, 5, 8, 11-13, 18-19, 25-27, 29, July 16, 1956, p. 999, cited in *Ibid.*, p. 125.
- ¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- ¹⁷⁹ *Newsweek*, 23 August 1976, p. 52.
- ¹⁸⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 January 1978, p. 5.

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- ¹⁸¹ J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 202.
- ¹⁸² Ibid., p. 204.
- ¹⁸³ "Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Committee Memorandum for the Joint Strategic Plans Committee and the Joint Logistic Plans Committee [Enclosure Draft]." 13 April 1955, p. 273.
- ¹⁸⁴ "Agreement of Defence Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Iran," 5 March 1979, in Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, *United States and Iran*, pp. 306-307.
- ¹⁸⁵ For details refer to J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 119.
- ¹⁸⁶ *International Affairs*, 4 April 1959, pp. 47-52.
- ¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 214.
- ¹⁸⁸ K. Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*, p. 173.
- ¹⁸⁹ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 186.
- ¹⁹⁰ V. Kuzichkin, *Inside the KGB; Myth & Reality*, pp. 279-282.
- ¹⁹¹ Cited in W. Lippmann, *The Coming Tests with Russia*, p. 16.
- ¹⁹² These data are drawn from two special reports prepared by the US Air Force Office of Special Investigations in December 1975. Entitled "Terrorist Movements in Iran" and "Anti-American Terrorism in Iran", cited in J. A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion*, p. 191.
- ¹⁹³ Quoted in M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 186.
- ¹⁹⁴ Quoted in General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 600fn; M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 187.
- ¹⁹⁵ General H. Fardust, *Zhohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi*, vol. 1, p. 601.
- ¹⁹⁶ M. R. Pahlavi, *The Shah's Story*, p. 187.

Conclusion

The Nature of the International System

The system of International relations, as examined in Chapters 1 and 2, has undergone changes since the 19th century, but the basic characteristics of the system, especially with regard to the non Great Power world, remained unchanged. The transformation of a traditional European system of states into the world-wide system formally linked together by universal institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, the increase in number of independent states, the increasing tendency towards democratisation and socialisation covering almost every branch of political, economic, strategic, social and cultural activities within the modern state, were all changes which had important effects on the international system. But the inequality remained the same.

The system of international relations in the 19th century was created and maintained by the European Great Powers in close concert, so that the Concert of European Great Powers properly identifies the Pre-World War I international system. The characteristics of this system were primarily the compromise and compensation policies among the European Great Powers, and the practice of imperialism toward the other continents. But a constant feature was Great Power rivalry in both Europe and outside over the small powers.

By the end of the First World War a new idea dominated international relations which was to establish a system based on the collective wishes of all nations so that it could function as the institutional manager of a fully fledged collective security system, capable of bringing collective forces to bear against any aggressor. The idea was formed at the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations was established. Many scholars saw the new international organisation as a new system of international relations.

However, the actual leadership, though informal, remained in the hands of the Great Powers in the form of the Commission of Ten and the League Council. Therefore, it was rather a maintenance of the old Concert of Europe than the creation of a new system with the exception that two non-European Great Powers took the place of the three defeated European powers. The major feature of the Pre-World War I international system remained: the Great Power concert strengthened in opposition to many small scattered powers. Compromise among

the Great Powers enabled them to continue to regulate their rivalry over the small powers.

In the Post-World War II era too, the proposed United Nations' system of collective security proved to be ineffective. It could not maintain unity among nations, particularly among the Great Powers, and it failed to keep international peace and security through its collective proceedings. The Charter too, like the Covenant, registered the predominant position of the Triumphant Great Powers (TGP) which they already acquired during the two world wars. The Charter understated the actual disequilibrium of power between the great and smaller nations. But the United Nations by itself had no greater success than the TGP whether alone or in cooperation with each other. This fact had overtaken the other responsibilities of the United Nations as an ultimate system of collective security. In practice, with the failure of the collective security system to work, the process of conducting the international system remained in the hands of the TGP. Regardless of the cold war or detente and the Great Powers' differences in ideology and national interests, they had to always keep themselves in concert with each other either inside the United Nations, in the Security Council, or outside, in their consultations for the summit meetings. This is quite similar to a concert of music in which harmony is the basic characteristic. Although every instrument plays a different sound, the outcome is a musical effect, sometimes soothing, sometimes exciting.

This concert could help prevent them from direct confrontation as well as to allow them to divide their spheres of influence. As in the 19th century when the Great Powers expanded their areas of influence to their overseas colonies, in the modern era of international relations the areas of special interest were always intended to be extended to their areas of direct and indirect influence. Despite the existence of the United Nations, most states in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Far East remained under the TGP aegis. The unequal power of nations in terms of international relations and the Great Power's concert to control the international system together provide one of the three factors which have made the Great Power rivalry in the smaller countries inevitable.

The Power Vacuum in Iran

The internal situation in which both Reza Khan and his son came to power, as described in Chapters 3 and 4, was dominated by revolts permeating the country and by the occupation of the country by foreign troops. Reza Khan came to power through the British backed coup d'état of 22 February 1921 and Muhammad Reza

by the direct support of the occupying powers which was later endorsed by the Anglo-American funded and planned coup of 1953.

After Reza's rise to power, the structure of authority underwent a notable change. This "new order," which was built on numerous reforms in the bureaucracy, economy and army, were all aimed to transform Iran into a modern country. The changes, however, did not introduce a great degree of modernity. Reza Shah, forced to abdicate by occupying foreign powers, left the country in a situation similar to that before the coup. The despotic Shah had ruled the country brutally and had suppressed every kind of opposition; from that of tribal uprisings to that of communist movements, from traditional Muslims to that of his sincere friends. His expanded military government was corrupt and was only capable of suppressing internal violence. In defending Iran against the offensive Great Power armies it was powerless, and caused the national economy to suffer a deficit which all together generated popular dissatisfaction and destabilised the power base of his government.

In fact, Reza Shah whose personal characteristics had driven him to despotism, by an effective control over the army, over the *Majlis*, over the cabinet and the political opposition, transformed himself into the supreme decision maker in both domestic and foreign affairs. However, he had not gained legitimacy among the people. Most people had opposed him either overtly or covertly, in writing or by word of mouth, or even through violence. The economic reforms aimed at improving the general standard of living did not work well and caused it even to fall. Therefore it was only military force and widespread suppression, which sprang from the Shah's personal characteristics, which held the government on its feet.

The general situation of Iran after Muhammad Reza came to power in 1941 did not change considerably and the main features remained the same. Despite the early years, most of his reign was despotic. Moreover the reforms of "the White Revolution" he started in 1961 and "the Great Civilisation" he mounted later in the 1970s was quite similar to Reza's expansion, modernisation and centralisation of his "New Order." Similar to his father he was not in favour of political parties and did not allow any to emerge naturally. The opposition groups including the Muslim clergy, the self-autonomous minorities and the communists and democratic movements, who were concerned not to allow any dictatorship to develop, were brutally suppressed. The effectiveness of the suppression and application of Social reforms in a country in chaos were, with no doubt, due to the personal characteristics of Muhammad Reza himself.

In Chapter 3 and 4, partly, we focused on who influenced the making of government policies in Iran and how they were made. There were a large number of actors who influenced decision making, from the official policy formulating units including the *Majlis*, the Prime Minister and the Shah, to that of the informal and unofficial actors such as those who have been known as Rasputins. In both cases, internal and foreign affairs, the major architect and director was the Shah himself. Foreign policy could not be divorced from domestic politics. The two were inextricably joined together. Foreign policy making in Iran, despite it being the legal responsibility of the *Majlis*, revolved in practice around the Shah.

Rivalry and Counter-Rivalry in Iran: Oil and the Strategic Corridor

The history of Great Power rivalry clearly indicates that the geopolitical position of Iran was of great interest to the Great Powers. Iran's geographic location and its massive economic and strategic potential ensured that it became the object of the struggle between the contending powers. Oil concessions and the territory of Iran as a strategic corridor were at the root of inter-War British-Russian rivalry which was followed by the Anglo-American alliance on one side and the Russians on the other after World War II. The Soviet pressure on Britain at the heart of the Empire - India - to encourage the Eastern Revolution and to attain an outlet to the ocean and its rigid opposition to any oil concession to the western powers constituted a serious challenge to both Britain and the United States. The latter's interests in Iran and in the Persian Gulf and India were significant enough to warrant protection at almost any cost. As a result, Iran grew in value for both contending Great Powers.

In the international environment an independent sovereign state is simply one among many. To optimise the achievement of their objectives, all nations must factor in such variables as their resources, capabilities, reputation, domestic sentiment and vulnerability. It is important to know what freedom of action this international system allowed Iran, as a case in point, and how it could manage to survive in the situation of severe rivalry between the Great Powers and how to conduct itself in that relationship. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse in part, Iran's attempt to develop a counter policy towards the rival Great Powers in order to secure its oil and territorial integrity, the two important objectives in its foreign policy. These objectives had over time evinced a number of persistent threats.

Before Reza Shah came to power, British prestige and influence in Iran had deteriorated, though it was in occupation of the country, so that the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was not passed by the *Majlis*. At the same time, revolutionary Russia had attracted the view of Iranian nationalists and intellectuals. Communist agents throughout Iran had infiltrated Iraq, Afghanistan and India. Nevertheless, by

1941, Reza Shah had not only stopped the communists but had also protected the oil interests of Britain in the south. Reza Shah resented the Russian influence and had always remained calm and friendly to the British. This situation continued to the benefit of the western bloc after the Second World War when Muhammad Reza Shah was in power. Like his father, he outlawed the communist Tudeh party while the British and American advisers had access to all key government departments as well as the Iranian officials who were pro Anglo-Americans had occupied the top government positions. In this period, too, Iran granted oil concessions to the western bloc and aligned with the West in a number of regional alliances, such as CENTO, and bilateral alliances, such as the 1959 defence agreement against the Soviet Union.

Why Iran Implemented a pro-Western policy

The three factors of Great Power rivalry examined previously suggest that there are several important reasons why Iranian foreign policy was aligned with the West. Firstly, there was no popular participation in the politics of the country. People had no faith in the government and vice versa. When the coups occurred no strong resistance was made by the people around the country. The capture of the government forces in the capital meant the victory of both coups. Even though some uprisings occurred in a few provinces, the objectives of all were autonomy not to resist the coups.

In the second place, a small oligarchy came to power in both the coups. Taking advantage of a situation of chaos, this small group was easily able to rule over the divided people and interests. Without having a strong popular base, this oligarchy had to accept its vulnerability in coping with foreign troops, as in the case of Reza Shah, or depend on foreign countries for its badly needed requirements such as in the case of Muhammad Reza.

Thirdly, most of the statesmen, most importantly Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah, had plenty of fertile lands of northern Iran in their possession. These lands were close to the Soviet borders and there was always the fear that Soviet aggression would result in a great loss to their personal fortunes.

Psychologically, too, both Shahs were in a weak position. They knew that they owed the throne to the British and Americans, a liability that, despite the so-called mystique of the monarchy, cast a dark shadow on their claim to legitimacy.

Fifthly, the religious element had a conflicting views to that of Marxist-Leninist Russia. Belief in one God is the heart and soul of Islam, as is submission to the will of the Almighty. The Muslim believes in Muhammad as the prophet of God, in the

Quran as the revealed word of God, in life after death, and in divine justice with rewards for the righteous and punishment for the wicked, all of which were closer to the Christian West rather than the dialectical materialism of communism that appealed very little to Iranians and they had nothing but hatred for Red imperialism. It was due to this fact that the religious leaders, alongside the government, realised that the country's existence was in danger. For example, they denounced the Tudeh party openly and organised strong opposition against communist activities.

In this study I examined the unequal nature of international relations and the Triumphant Great Powers of the World Wars in domination of the major international issues. The vulnerable domestic situation of Iran as a smaller power paved the way for Great Powers to play their rivalry over Iran's oil resources and its strategic corridor that were also considered vital to them. To benefit more from this situation, the Great Power rivals consistently neglected Iranian public opinion and supported a small and corrupt oligarchy to suppress the pervasive opposition movements. A very common Persian proverb portrays this situation; "They saw the Headman and plundered the village."

Appendices

Appendix I

Quantitative Comparisons Between Some Great, Middle and Small Powers

Table 1. Area km2 and Population (in thousand)

Country	1928		1979	
	Area	Population	Area	Population
USSR	21,176,000	153,956	22,402,200	264,108
USA	7,839,000	120,700	9,363,123	220,584
UK	243,000	45,850	244,046	55,883
Egypt	1,000,000	14,500	1,001,449	40,983
Iran	1,645,000	9,000	1,648,000	36,938
Turkey	763,000	13,850	780,576	44,236
Iraq	302,000	3,300	434,924	12,767
Oman	212,400	-	212,457	864
Afghanistan	635,000	7,000	647,497	15,488

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook*, 1929; United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 2. Wheat production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1930	1969	1979
USSR	251,619	92,804	90,211
USA	199,129	40,034	58,080
UK	13,928	4,140	7,170
Egypt	11,738	1,509	1,856
Iran	15,914	3,946	5,800
Turkey	25,346	11,423	17,619
Iraq	3,563	1,080	880
Oman	-	2	4
Afghanistan	-	2,150	2,663

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 3. Meat production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1969	1979
USSR	11,130	13,218
USA	16,540	17,065
UK	2,076	2,218
Egypt	262	284
Iran	284	445
Turkey	535	655
Iraq	96	104
Oman	-	-
Afghanistan	173	191

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 4. Steel production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1969	1978
USSR	110,330	151,453
USA	128,152	124,314
UK	26,846	20,311
Egypt	300	601
Iran	-	-
Turkey	1,170	1,628
Iraq	-	-
Oman	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 5. Sulphuric acid production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1969	1978
USSR	10,665	22,411
USA	26,795	34,854
UK	3,287	3,453
Egypt	29	33
Iran	4	...
Turkey	30	193
Iraq	6	-
Oman	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 6. Aluminium production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1969	1978
USSR	1,050	1,670
USA	3,258	5,875
UK	260	550
Egypt	-	100
Iran	-	26
Turkey	-	-
Iraq	-	-
Oman	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 7. Cotton production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1925	1969	1979
USSR	2,158	2,132	2,821
USA	33,104	2,225	3,185
UK	-	-	-
Egypt	3,442	520	484
Iran	175	155	97
Turkey	213	441	481
Iraq	6	14	6
Oman	-	-	-
Afghanistan	-	26	38

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook*, 1929; United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 8. Crude petroleum production (in thousand metric tons)

Country	1930	1970	1978
USSR	18,451	353,039	572,460
USA	123,117	475,289	429,195
UK	-	83	52,932
Egypt	285	16,404	24,417
Iran	6,036	191,296	262,808
Turkey	-	3,542	2,731
Iraq	121	76,457	125,629
Oman	-	16,583	14,733
Afghanistan	-	-	-

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 9. Natural gas production (in teraclories)

Country	1930	1970	1978
USSR	366	1,598,402	3,108,905
USA	56,039	5,460,005	4,839,103
UK	-	103,813	362,617
Egypt	-	792	121,417
Iran	-	115,018	182,971
Turkey	-	-	-
Iraq	-	7,307	15,000
Oman	-	-	-
Afghanistan	-	24,074	23,905

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 10. Imports & Exports (in million \$US)

Country	1926		1938	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
USSR	389	362	159	148
USA	4,408	4,712	1,151	1,806
UK	5,421	3,173	2,478	1,359
Egypt	251	205	106	85
Iran	78	109	50	83
Turkey	123	97	70	68
Iraq	34	17	27	11
Oman	-	-	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-	-	-

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook*, 1929.

Table 11. Merchant shipping: fleets (in thousand gross registered tons)

Country	1929	1970	1979
USSR	441	14,832	22,900
USA	14,377	18,463	17,542
UK	20,166	25,825	27,951
Egypt	39	238	542
Iran	-	129	1,207
Turkey	172	697	1,422
Iraq	-	37	1,328
Oman	-	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-	-

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook*, 1929; United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 12. Railways: length of lines operated (in kilometres)

Country	1921	1928
USSR	67,531	76,874
USA	404,228	401,223
UK	32,640	32,845
Egypt	4,355	4,600
Iran	241	370
Turkey	3,040	4,637
Iraq	1,205	1,205
Oman	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-

Source: League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1939-40; League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook*, 1929.

Table 13. Railways: Traffic (in millions)

Country	1970		1976	
	Passenger-kilometres	Net ton-kilometres	Passenger-kilometres	Net ton-kilometres
USSR	265,406	2,494,721	315,061	3,295,399
USA	17,284	1,116,602	15,688	1,112,689
UK	35,576	26,807	28,500	20,590
Egypt	6,529	3,333	8,748	2,201
Iran	1,800	2,720	3,511	4,877
Turkey	5,561	5,556	4,615	7,278
Iraq	469	1,310	797	2,254
Oman	-	-	-	-
Afghanistan	-	-	-	-

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 14. National accounts (in \$US purchasers' values)

Country	1960		1975	
	Total GDP in millions	GDP per capita	Total GDP in millions	GDP per capita
USSR	108,750	-	272,475	1,071
USA	506,696	2,804	1,526,508	7,148
UK	71,401	1,358	230,453	4,123
Egypt	3,355	129	12,432	334
Iran	4,388	204	53,061	1,607
Turkey	5,220	190	35,659	884
Iraq	1,685	245	13,635	1,226
Oman	-	-	2,099	2,726
Afghanistan	-	-	2,809	200

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Table 15. Gold reserves (in thousands of fine troy ounces)

Country	1970	1979
USSR	-	-
USA	316,340	264,600
UK	38,540	18,250
Egypt	2,430	2,470
Iran	3,740	3,900
Turkey	3,630	3,760
Iraq	4,100	-
Oman	60	190
Afghanistan	990	960

Source: United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1958-1980.

Appendix II

Number of Vetos in the Security Council by type of vetoing power & case

Vetoing Power	Cases	Number
China	Appointment of the Secretary General	3
	Membership Question (Bangladesh)	1
	Membership Question (Mongolia)	1
	Situation in the Middle East (Israel)	1
Subtotal		6
France	Relationship Between The United nations and South Africa	1
	Indonesian Question	1
	Question of Namibia	2
	Situation in Comoros	1
	Situation in South Africa	3
	Situation in the Middle East (Israel)	2
	Spanish Question	1
Subtotal		11
UK	Appointment of the Secretary General	1
	Relationship Between The United nations and South Africa	1
	Question of Namibia	2
	Situation in South Africa	3
	Situation in Southern Rhodesia	9
	Situation in the Middle East (Israel)	2
Subtotal		18
USA	Membership Question (Angola)	1
	Membership Question (North Vietnam)	3
	Membership Question (South Vietnam)	2
	Relationship Between The United nations and South Africa	1
	Panama Canal Question	1
	Question of Namibia	2
	Situation in South Africa	3
	Situation in Southern Rhodesia	2
	Situation in the Middle East (Israel)	6
Subtotal		21

Number of Vetos in the Security Council by type of vetoing power & case (cont.)

Vetoing Power	Cases	Number
USSR	Appointment of the Secretary General	6
	Atomic Energy Commission	1
	Complaint by Kuwait Against Iraq	1
	Complaint by Lebanon Against United Arab Republic	2
	Complaint by Malaysia	1
	Complaint by Portugal (Goa)	1
	Complaint by the USSR (RB-47 Incident)	2
	Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea	2
	Complaint of Bombing by the United States Air Force of the Territory of China	1
	Investigation of Alleged Bacteriological Warfare	2
	Membership Question (Austria)	3
	Membership Question (Cambodia)	2
	Membership Question (Ceylon)	4
	Membership Question (Finland)	3
	Membership Question (Ireland)	4
	Membership Question (Italy)	6
	Membership Question (Japan)	4
	Membership Question (Jordan)	1
	Membership Question (Kuwait)	1
	Membership Question (Laos)	2
	Membership Question (Libya)	2
	Membership Question (Mauritania)	1
	Membership Question (Nepal)	2
	Membership Question (Portugal)	4
	Membership Question (Republic of Korea)	3
	Membership Question (South Korea)	1
	Membership Question (South Vietnam)	4
	Membership Question (Spain)	1
	Membership Question (Transjordan)	3
	Question of Guatemala	1
	Situation in the Indian-Pakistan Subcontinent (Bangladesh)	3
	Berlin Question	1

**Number of Vetos in the Security Council by type of vetoing power & case
(cont.)**

Vetoing Power	Cases	Number
	Corfu Channel Question	1
	Czechoslovak Question	3
	Greek Question	6
	Indian-Pakistan Question (Kashmir & Jammu)	2
	Indonesian Question	2
	Question of United States Military Aircraft Armed with Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in the Direction of the Frontiers of the Soviet Union	1
	Regulation and Reduction of Armaments	3
	Situation in Cyprus	1
	Situation in Hungary	1
	Situation in Kampuchea	1
	Situation in South East Asia (China & Vietnam)	1
	Situation in the Middle East (Israel)	6
	Situation in the Republic of Congo	6
	Spanish Question	7
	Suez Canal Question	1
	Syrian and Lebanese Question	1
	Thailand Question	1
Subtotal		119
Total		175

Source: Anjali V. Patil, *The UN Veto in World Affairs*, 1946-1990, pp. 17-449.

Appendix III

Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories Achieved Independence Before 1979

Administering Power	Non-Self-Governing Territories	Trust Territories	Area (sq. km.)	Population in Year ()	Date of *
Australia		Nauru	2,080	7,254(1977)	1968
		Papua New Guinea	461,693	2,600,000(78)	1975
Belgium	Zaire		2,345,409	25,600,000(76)	1960
		Rwanda & Burundi	26,338	4,820,000(70)	1962
Denmark	Greenland		2,176,000	46,530(70)	1954
France	Chad		1,264,000	3,869,000(73)	1960
	Gabon		267,000	95,000(74)	1960
	Congo		342,000	1,416,020(77)	1960
	Central African Republic		606,000	1,637,000(71)	1960
	F. Establishments in India		-	-	1947
	F. Establishments in Oceania		-	-	1947
	French Guiana		91,000	57,600(74)	1947
	Djibouti		23,000	125,000(74)	1977
	Benin		115,641	3,200,000(76)	1960
	Guinea		245,861	5,143,284(72)	1958
	Mali		1,162,910	6,300,000(76)	1960
	Ivory Coast		322,463	6,673,013(75)	1960
	Mauritania		1,166,000	1,481,000(77)	1961
	Niger		1,187,000	4,992,000(78)	1960
	Senegal		197,109	7,300,000(73)	1960
	Burkina Faso		274,002	6,147,363(75)	1960
	Guadeloupe		1,702	334,000(72)	1947
	Cambodia		181,000	8,000,000(77)	1947
	Laos		235,700	3,000,000(78)	1947

Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories Achieved Independence Before 1979 (cont.)

Administering Power	Non-Self-Governing Territories	Trust Territories	Area (sq. km.)	Population in Year ()	Date of *
	Viet Nam		329,566	47,150,000(76)	1947
	Madagascar		594,180	8,000,000(77)	1960
	Comoros		1,862	344,000(76)	1975
	Martinique		1,106	339,000(72)	1947
	Morocco		659,970	18,359,000(77)	1956
	New Caledonia		19,103	133,233(76)	1947
	Reunion		2,510	59,095(72)	1947
	St. Pierre and Miquelon		483	6,100(76)	1947
	Tunisia		158,400	5,770,000(75)	1956
		Cameroon	470,000	7,663,246(77)	1960
		Togoland	87,283	2,300,000(77)	1960
Italy		Somaliland	-	-	1960
Nether-lands	Indonesia		1,900,000	133,000,000(78)	1949
	Irian Jaya		420,000	824,064(71)	1963
	Curacao		444	150,008(72)	1951
	Suriname		181,525	414,000(76)	1975
New Zealand.	Cook Islands		241	18,112(76)	1965
	Niue Island		259	4,901(71)	1974
		Samoa	2,841	27,769(70)	1962
Portugal	Angola		1,246,700	5,673,046(70)	1975
	Cape Verde		560	360,000(76)	1975
	Coa		3,693	857,180(71)	1961
	Guinea-Bissau		36,125	800,000(78)	1974
	Macau		16	248,636(70)	1972
	Mozambique		782,827	8,233,834(70)	1975
	Sao Joao Batista de Ajuda		-	-	1961
	Sao Tome and Principe		963	82,750(76)	1975
South Africa	Namibia (Mandate terminated to UN Administration)		825,762	908,800(77)	1966

Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories Achieved Independence Before 1979 (cont.)

Administering Power	Non-Self-Governing Territories	Trust Territories	Area (sq. km.)	Population in Year ()	Date of *
Spain	Equatorial Guinea		25,455	290,000(76)	1968
	Ifni		1,500	46,000(71)	1969
U.K.	Yemen Democratic		160,376	1,663,170(75)	1967
	Bahamas		11,406	218,000(77)	1973
	Barbados		430	248,000(78)	1966
	Lesotho		30,340	1,246,815(76)	1966
	Botswana		575,000	630,739(71)	1966
	Brunei		5,800	201,260(78)	-
	Guyana		215,000	800,000(77)	1966
	British Somaliland		-	-	1960
	Cyprus		9,251	639,000(75)	1960
	Fiji		18,275	588,068(76)	1970
	Gambia		10,381	524,000(75)	1956
	Tuvalu		26	5,887(73)	1978
	Ghana		238,305	9,600,000(76)	1957
	Hong Kong		1,045	4,500,000(77)	1972
	Jamaica		11,525	2,084,500(76)	1962
	Kenya		582,000	13,800,000(76)	1963
	Malayan Union		-	-	1957
	Malta		316	308,942(77)	1974
	Mauritius		1,166,000	1,481,000(77)	1968
	Nigeria		923,773	73,000,000(74)	1960
	Sabah		76,115	655,295(70)	1963
	Zambia		752,262	5,138,000(76)	1964
	Malawi		95,830	5,310,000(77)	1964
	Sarawak		124,970	975,918(70)	1963
	Seychelles		550	62,000(77)	1976
	Sierra Leone		72,326	3,000,000(74)	1961
	Singapore		583	2,308,200(77)	1965
	Solomon Islands		29,800	196,823(76)	1978
	Swaziland		17,366	527,791(76)	1968

**Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories Achieved Independence Before
1979 (cont.)**

Administering Power	Non-Self-Governing Territories	Trust Territories	Area (sq. km.)	Population in Year ()	Date of *
	Trinidad and Tobago		-	-	1962
	Uganda		236,860	11,171,900(74)	1962
	Dominica		751	70,302(70)	1978
	Grenada		311	106,219(70)	1974
	Zanzibar ^a		-	-	1963
		Tanganyika ^b	942,004	1,7551,925(78)	1961
		Cameroons	470,000	7,663,246(77)	1961
		Togoland	-	-	1957
U.S.A.	Alaska		151,776	302,173(70)	1959
	Hawaii		16,706	769,913(70)	1959
	Panama Canal Zone		1,675	41,800(77)	1947
	Puerto Rico		8,897	2,712,033(70)	1952
Total	37	10	27,405,233	750,000,000	

* The year of accession to independence or other change in status as a result of which information was no longer submitted to the UNO.

^a, ^b Area and population of Tanganyika and Zanzibar calculated in combination..

Sources: John Paxton, *Statesman's Year-Book: World Gazetteer*, United Nations, Everyone's United Nations, 9th ed., pp. 274-282.

Appendix IV

Some Parts of the Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic

Signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921¹

Article 1

... the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.

Article 2

... Federal Russia, therefore, in accordance with the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 4 of this treaty, declares its refusal to participate in any action which might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaty; and conventions concluded by the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country.

Article 4

In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two Contracting Parties formally expresses its desire to abstain from any intention in the internal affairs of the other.

Article 5

The two High Contracting Parties undertake:

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories, of any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia.

They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the afore-mentioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third Party or any organisation, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.

(3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their Allies of all armies or forces of a third Party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

Article 6

If a third Party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

Article 7

The considerations set forth in Article 6 have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

Article 13

The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.

Article 26

The present Treaty shall come into force immediately upon signature.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Moscow February 26, 1921

(Signed) G. TCHITCHERIN

L. KARAKHAN

MOCHAUVER-OL-MEMALEK

Appendix V

The Anglo-American-Soviet Declaration Concerning Iran Issued at Tehran, December 1, 1943

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States of America, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognise the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The three Governments realise that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they agreed that they will continue to make available to the Iran Government such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have continued to subscribe.

WINSTON CHURCHILL

J. V. STALIN

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Appendix VI

Qavam-Sadchikov Agreement of 4 April 1946²

1. A joint Irano-Soviet Oil Company would be established for the development of the oil resources of the northern provinces. The Soviet government would own 51 percent and Iranian government would possess 49 percent of the company's stock for the first twenty-five years and each party would own 50 percent of the stock of the company for the second 25 years.

2. The evacuation of Iran was to be completed by May 6, 1946.

3. Terms of the agreement for the joint company would be valid after the ratification of the Majlis.

4. The Qavam government provided to submit to the Majlis the Bill for the ratification of the joint oil company within seven months after the signature of Qavam-Sadchikov agreement.

5. The Azerbaijan question was considered an internal problem for the government of Iran.

Appendix VII

Agreement of Co-operation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Iran. Signed at Ankara, on 5 March 1959³

The Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Iran,

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958;⁴

Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955,⁵ the parties signatory thereto agreed to cooperate for their security and defence, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the interest of world peace, agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that Declaration or their security and defence;

Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;

Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is associated with the work of the major committees of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955;

Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as vital; to it national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Iran;

Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East; and

Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan respectively,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Imperial Government of Iran is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Iran, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Iran at its request.

Article II

The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States of America and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran, reaffirm that it will continue to furnish the Government of Iran such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran, in order to assist the Government of Iran in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

Article III

The Imperial Government of Iran undertakes to utilize such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United State of America in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Iran and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

Article IV

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran, will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

Article V

The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation between the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

Article VI

This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate the agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.

For the Government of the United States of America

Fletcher WARREN

[SEAL]

For the Imperial Government of Iran

General HASSAN ARFA

[SEAL]

Appendix VIII

Document on Reza's Birth

۱۳۰۳/۲-۳

قرینت گروم

موفق به محرابه که جانی بر جان فرزند است به که آفرینش خوارانه اند در تاریخ بهلولی درج می‌نمایند

بانیات احمد از اطلعات خود را در حدیثین می‌نویسد

۱- تولد زینب حضرت ابرو غلام رخسار در (عقدت) از ملاکات برادره .

۲- تاریخ تولد در ماه ربیع اول سنه (۱۲۹۵) هجری .

۳- اسم مرحوم دالد (جلیلی) سرکشت فرخ برادره که کسوت برادره (۱۳۰۸) زینب

۴- اسم صد و مراد علی (۱۳۰۸) فرخ برادره که در جنگ هرات شهادت می‌یابد (۱۳۰۸)

۵- تاریخ و محل خدمت در قزوین سنه (۱۳۰۷) هجری فرخ برادره که کسوت برادره (۱۳۰۸)

تبدیل قزوین می‌نماید و از آن تاریخ بدین تاریخ و قه شریک خدمت نقایمی بهراند

در خانه اشراف فایده را قدم بهراند
سرکشت

۲۸ دلو ۱۳۰۳

۱۱ ۳۰۹

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- ¹ Translated by the Secretariate of the League of Nations. For the complete text of the treaty refer to League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 9, pp. 401-413.
- ² Security Council Recods, No. 2, pp. 88-9; *Times* (London), 5 April 1946; Nasrollah S. Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy*, p. 315.
- ³ Official text is English and registered by the United States of America on 23 April 1959; No. 4725.
- ⁴ United States of America: Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4084; 9 UST 1077.
- ⁵ United Nations, treaty Series, Vol. 233, p. 199.

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