

The role of the Papua New Guinea defence force : the development and transfer of military forces to an independent Papua New Guinea

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Publication Date:

1974

DOI:

<https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/6549>

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
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THE ROLE OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA DEFENCE FORCE -
THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF MILITARY FORCES
TO AN INDEPENDENT PAPUA NEW GUINEA

by

Paul Mench



Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Arts (Honours) in
the Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies,
University of New South Wales at Duntroon.

1974



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Dr B.D. Beddie, Professor of Government in the Faculty of Military Studies, University of New South Wales. I have benefitted greatly from his wisdom and advice whilst undertaking this study. I have also benefitted from the advice of Dr Robert O'Neill, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Dr Hugh Smith, Lecturer in Government, University of New South Wales and Dr Ulf Sundhaussen, Lecturer in Political Studies, University of Papua New Guinea.

In addition I would like to record my appreciation of the assistance given to me during my research by the Commander, officers and men of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and others in PNG and Australia who are unfortunately too numerous to mention by name here.

I should also like to acknowledge the assistance of the Australian Military Board which, by approving my appointment as a post-graduate student in the Faculty of Military Studies, made this study possible.

I must point out, however, that I alone remain responsible for the opinions expressed in this thesis which may not necessarily represent those of the Australian Department of Defence and Armed Services, the PNG Defence Force or any other Government or organisation.

This thesis is my own original work and has not previously been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

Paul A. Mench

THESIS SUMMARY

The thesis examines the development and role of indigenous military forces in Papua New Guinea. The principal theme of the study is the relationship of armed forces in the past, present and future to the Papua New Guinean polity. The subject is discussed against the background of the contemporary crisis in civil-military relations and the dominant political role of the military over a large part of the Third World. Comparisons are drawn between Papua New Guinea and the military development and political history of African states. The thesis consists of five chapters and three appendices which are bound separately. The chapters deal with the history of indigenous forces in PNG, the transfer of military power, the organisation and capabilities of the PNG Defence Force, national security problems and civil-military relations. The appendices provide evidence and illustrative material on which parts of the thesis argument depend.

Papua New Guinea's defence statistics are compared with those of twenty-six Tropical African states and Fiji, and two surveys of Papua New Guinean attitudes to defence issues are reported. The thesis does not take into account events beyond May 1974.

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INTRODUCTION

The intention of this thesis is to examine the development and role of indigenous military forces in Papua New Guinea.¹ The thesis is based on a diversity of sources. In 1965–66 and 1971–72 the writer served with the Australian Army in Papua New Guinea and these two periods provide the basis for some of the views that are expressed. During the preparation of the thesis in 1973–74 about three months were spent in PNG conducting field research which included visits to most parts of the country and discussions with members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and with PNG Government officials and politicians. In addition to drawing on material contained in previously published references and Australian and PNG Government Archives, the writer was granted limited access to the written records of the PNG Defence Force and its forerunner, the PNG Joint Force, and was permitted to conduct two attitude surveys involving serving members of the Defence Force and PNG Public Service. These surveys, which are included as appendices, provide what may be unique empirical data on the attitudes of educated Papua New Guineans concerning issues of national security and civil–military relations.

¹ The terms Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Papua New Guinean are used to describe the two territories of Papua and New Guinea and the indigenous inhabitants of these territories. It is nevertheless true that the formal distinction in law between the Australian Territory of Papua and the United Nations Trust Territory of New Guinea will remain until independence, although both territories have, in practice, been administered as one since 1942. The cumbersome description of the indigenous inhabitants as Papua New Guineans, rather than New Guineans or Niugineans, has been preferred because decisions on the future name of PNG and its inhabitants have yet to be made. The term Pacific Islander (PI) also appears. In early 1974 this term was still used to officially describe Papua New Guinean members of the PNG Defence Force, although it seemed unlikely to survive for much longer.

In spite of the sources of information that were available to the writer there were, nonetheless, considerable problems in regard to access to other relevant material. Because the thesis deals with current events the complete public record was not open and this has entailed reliance, in places, on published material, press reports and oral evidence. Secondly, as the thesis discusses defence problems and contemporary relations between the Australian and PNG Governments there are matters that still remain secret. For these reasons there are imposing difficulties in attempting to present a definitive account of more recent events. An associated difficulty is the documentation of sources of information. In cases where there might be possibilities of official or personal embarrassment, where the informants identified, they have been described anonymously. (A private list of such sources has been provided for the examiners' scrutiny).

Furthermore, as this thesis was written before Papua New Guinea became independent it is inevitable that aspects of the account are incomplete (events beyond May 1974 have not been included). Although it might have been better from the point of view of historical completeness to have undertaken the study after independence, advantages do exist in its present timing. Many trends in Papua New Guinea's political and military affairs are unmistakable, if not actually irreversible and, accordingly, the study may provide a basis for the analysis of future events as well as having some predictive value. The material in the thesis might also serve as a starting point for further research.

This is the first full scale study of the development and role of armed forces in Papua New Guinea and, because of the relative scarcity of published material on the subject, the

approach adopted in the thesis is comprehensive.¹ Additional detail has been provided for the benefit of subsequent researchers, chiefly in the form of footnotes, annexures and appendices. The thesis consists of five chapters and three appendices. The chapters deal with the history of indigenous military forces in PNG up to 1969 (chapter one), the transfer of military power between 1969 and 1974 (chapter two), an analysis of the organisation and capabilities of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (chapter three), a study of PNG's national security problems and the significance of the Defence Force to them (chapter four) and civil-military relations (chapter five). The three appendices which appear in a separate volume provide supporting evidence and illustrative material upon which parts of the thesis argument depend. In appendix one Papua New Guinea's defence statistics are compared with those of twenty six small Tropical African states and Fiji in order to identify common patterns in the security forces of small developing countries. Appendices two and three report the results of the attitude surveys on defence and civil-military relations.

The thesis contains a number of unifying themes; it is also written against the background of the contemporary crisis in civil military relations and the dominant political role of the military over a large part of the Third World. The principal

¹ Robert O'Neill's valuable study of the PNG Army, published in 1971, is relatively brief and has, to some extent, become outdated by subsequent developments. (See Robert J. O'Neill, The Army in PNG, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No 10, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1971). During the preparation of this thesis several other students were known also to be writing on the subject of the role of the military in PNG.

theme of the study is the relationship of armed forces, in the past, present and future, to the Papua New Guinean polity. The existence of armed forces in PNG, as is the case in all New States, generates problems which extend beyond a consideration of their designated, formal roles. The existence of the PNG Defence Force may have quite unintended consequences in the future and it will almost certainly exhibit complex interrelationships with PNG's internal political system and its relations with other states. These interrelationships are discussed in the last two chapters of the thesis in terms of civil-military relations, the political role of the PNG military and the implications for strategic policy and external relations. The Third World background is, at times, dealt with explicitly, especially in regard to Tropical Africa which seems to offer useful comparisons with PNG's status as a small, developing country about to gain independence. But even where comparison with the Third World and African states is not explicit, the approach of the thesis is influenced by comparative considerations. The study attempts to identify what is special to Papua New Guinea and what is common to the experience of other New States. Useful comparisons are identified in relation to colonial military policy, the devolution of military power, the problems of internal and external security and military politics.

The historical account of the development of military forces in PNG from the emergence of a "constabulary tradition" to the establishment of national armed forces reveals a pattern of development in which Australian strategic imperatives have predominated. In spite of pre-Second World War initiatives which aimed at the establishment under local ordinances of territorially - based forces on the British colonial pattern, the forces raised in PNG during and after the Second World War were integral units of the Australian Army and Navy, raised, commanded

and paid for from Australia. This linkage between Australian strategic objectives and military expansion in PNG was again highlighted in the nineteen-sixties during the period of Confrontation with Indonesia. Only when Australia embarked on an era of rapid decolonization after 1969 and the Indonesia "threat" was seen to recede did the nexus between Australian and PNG defence considerations weaken. Military policy in PNG then became increasingly directed towards the needs of an independent state. This process of the transfer of military power to PNG was also facilitated by strategic reappraisal and disengagement on the part of Australia.

Because of PNG's proximity to Australia, the traditional views that were held regarding PNG's strategic importance and a pattern of centralized rule from Canberra rather than a degree of colonial autonomy, military development in PNG, until very late in the day, suffered from a lack of policy direction and administrative control in PNG. The study argues that this pattern of military development, which is contrasted with British colonial practice favouring the establishment of colonial forces subjects to local control, may have profound implications for post independence civil-military relations.

Another theme that is developed in the first two chapters is the interaction between Australian and Papua New Guinean approaches to defence questions. The study concludes that for a variety of reasons the actual course since 1972 of military policy-making under a Papua New Guinean Government has differed remarkably little from earlier Australian expectations. Radical defence options such as a single, combined Police and defence force, a much smaller force, or a "peoples army" option were quickly discarded and, to that extent, the PNG

defence policy-making process may be seen largely as a legitimation of earlier Australian planning decisions .

An analysis of the composition and functioning of the Defence Force on the eve of independence shows that whilst it is able to meet the roles foreseen by the PNG Government, its military capability is limited, principally by a lack of certain types of air support and a shortage of infantry . It would, therefore, require external assistance in the event of other than quite minor security problems . Questions of rapid officer localization, military professionalism and ethnic diversity within the Defence Force point to organisational tensions which, if coupled with social instability in PNG, may have serious operational and political implications .

In regard to Papua New Guinea's national security, special problems are seen for PNG, as a small state, in relating its armed forces to external defence contingencies in the context of an asymmetric strategic environment in which its neighbours are either many times more powerful or inconsequentially small . For this reason diplomacy and the support of allies are seen as vital components in PNG's future national security . Although relations with Indonesia may provide an important source of concern, internal security problems are likely to be more important . Political instability, radical systemic change and a lack of political authority may give rise to the prominence of violence as a means of articulating and achieving political demands in PNG . If this occurs the Defence Force may become deeply involved in maintaining domestic order . Short term internal security problems may arise from tribal fighting and secession, whereas in the longer term future the political problems generated by increased economic inequality, urban over-population and rising expectations as a result of western education and rapid social change may lead to the emergence of radical political movements committed to the use of violence .

In the concluding chapter on civil-military relations which draws on the experience of the Third World, and black Africa in particular, it is argued that the future involvement of the Defence Force in PNG politics may be largely inevitable. A pattern of civil-military relations is, therefore, prescribed which, by seeking to contain the political role of the Defence Force, might permit the survival of civilian controlled government in Papua New Guinea. The integration of civil and military spheres of activity and the institutionalization of a limited military involvement in PNG politics are recommended.

CHAPTER 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS MILITARY FORCES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA UP TO 1969

PART A - THE BEGINNINGS

The Constabulary Tradition

The indigenous military forces in Papua New Guinea derive in a direct and continuous manner from the infantry units raised during the Second World War. It is, however, possible to discern an earlier tradition of bearing arms in the para-military native constabularies. Armed constabularies manned by Papua New Guineans were raised in the early colonial period in both Papua (then British New Guinea) and German New Guinea. These forces were quite unlike the so-called "kin" police of western nations in both their role and method of operation.

The Constabulary in British New Guinea had been formed in 1890 on para-military lines and initially manned by twelve Solomon Islanders and two Fijians.¹ In German New Guinea under Hahl, the native Constabulary was modelled on the British para-military lines and trained in rifle shooting and drill.² The constabularies in both colonies were armed with rifles and commanded by european officers and colonial officials and they performed vital roles in the colonial regimes. They assisted in the exploration of the interior

1

P. Hastings, New Guinea, Problems and Prospects, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969, page 48.

2

See P. Biskup, "Hahl at Herbertshoelie, 1896-1898: The Genesis of German Native Administration" in The History of Melanesia, Second Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, 1969, page 83.

and helped colonial field officers in the extension of administrative control and the enforcement of "law and order", often by punitive means. Quite frequently their role, in the early days of "pacification", involved the destruction of villages and armed clashes with natives.¹

In Australian-administered Papua during the long Lieutenant-Governorship of Sir Hubert Murray the Constabulary continued to be run on para-military lines, although the approach to pacification was, by then, less violent. In German New Guinea the para-military tradition was more closely observed. At the time of the German capitulation to the Australian forces in 1914, the native Constabulary in New Guinea numbered about one thousand men and was commanded by a regular army captain. There was also a special unit, one hundred and twenty five men strong, known as the Expedition Troop, which was trained for bush warfare and commanded by an army lieutenant. Under the Australian military administration from 1914 to 1921 the Constabulary continued to be regarded and used as a military force. Rowley remarks that: "Such an attitude was quite in accord with German precedent and with the traditions and training of the native police".²

1

Hastings (op. cit., page 48) observes that in British New Guinea Administrator (later Lieutenant Governor) Macgregor "laid waste villages without compunction". Biskup (op. cit.) writes that Hahl's (Imperial Judge, but de facto governor, in the Bismarck archipelago) approach to pacification was similar to that of Macgregor: he believed in a show of force. Biskup describes an operation undertaken in 1896 against the people of Salapin Island, near Kavieng, who were paralysing coastal trade by piracy. Hahl disembarked to negotiate but the villagers were disinclined to discuss matters and were unfriendly: "So we had to shoot so as to prevent losses on our side. Ten villagers were killed before they realised that all resistance was futile". (quotation from Hahl, Gouverneursjahre in Neuguinea, Berlin, 1937, page 40).

2

C.D. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, 1914-1921, Melbourne University Press, 1958, pages 206-207. As examples of para-military employment during the war, Rowley cites the guarding

In both territories, the roles which were allotted to the constabularies in defence planning in the inter-war period clearly showed the extent to which they were seen as para-military forces. By this time the Papua New Guinean members of these forces had proven themselves to be generally loyal and reliable coercive instruments of the colonial administration. They had, furthermore, demonstrated the ability of Papua New Guineans to absorb military training and operate in disciplined bodies. A "constabulary tradition" had thus been born.

The raising of actual military units in PNG seems to have first been suggested by Murray in Papua in 1913. The idea was not, however, pursued by him or the Commonwealth Government during the war which followed.¹ Further suggestions of raising PNG military units do not appear to have arisen until Australian defence contingency planning took place in the two territories during the 1930's. As will be seen later, this planning, although quite elaborate, foundered largely because of legal complications. This resulted in a lack of effective defence preparations, especially in regard to indigenous troops, when PNG was invaded by the Japanese in 1942.

Defence Planning and Indigenous Military Forces in Papua New Guinea

Australian attitudes toward the island of New Guinea, even before Australia became a nation, had been influenced primarily

1 (Continued)

of Bitu Paka radio station and garrison duty at Vaimo.

¹ Sir Hubert Murray wrote to the Commonwealth Government in 1913, suggesting the formation of a Papuan military unit to be commanded by European officers. (CAO, MP729, File 16/401/482. Referred to by Papuan Official Secretary in letter of 14 February 1939).

by strategic and defence considerations . The strategic relationship of the island to the Australian continent had led to the Queensland Government's illegal annexation of Papua, resulting in its proclamation as a British Protectorate in 1884 .¹ Later, after the First World War, the Australian Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes was able to consolidate Australia's 1914 conquest of German New Guinea under the provisions of a League of Nations Mandate . In Hughes' opinion New Guinea was vital to Australia's future security because: "... any strong power controlling New Guinea controlled Australia and that if Australia did not control the territory she could not feel safe" .² Nonetheless, because of the restrictive terms of the Mandate, Australia's defence powers in New Guinea were limited and she was forced to be content with a "dog-in-the-manger" policy there, that is, one of merely keeping other powers "out" of New Guinea .

In spite of the perceived strategic importance of PNG it was not until some time after the First War, during 1928-29, that active defence planning for the Commonwealth War Book led to the consideration of local defence measures in Papua and New Guinea .

1

John Mayo, "The Protectorate of British New Guinea 1884-1888, An Oddity of Empire" in The History of Melanesia, Second Waigani Seminar, op. cit., page 17 et passim . At the time the Australian Colonies were dissatisfied that the whole of eastern New Guinea had not been claimed, so leaving the way open for a German presence . No doubt Queenslanders were still impressed by Captain John Moresby's opinion of April 1873 (at Port Moresby) that: "occupation of this area by any foreign maritime power ... would be a standing menace to Queensland" . (P. Van der Veur, Search for New Guinea's Boundaries, Australian National University Press, Canberra, page 15.

2

Cited by David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, Vol 1, London, 1938 pages 519-520, quoted in W.J. Hudson, Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations, Sydney University Press, 1970, page 161 .

Eventually, in 1930, the Administrator of New Guinea and the Lieutenant-Governor of Papua were charged with the preparation and execution of Defence Schemes for their territories.¹ They were told that although it might be impossible for the territories to effectively resist an enemy attack because of their meagre defence resources there were fields in which valuable preparations could be made. These fields included intelligence, the protection of vulnerable points, censorship, control of aliens and detention of enemy shipping. In relation to New Guinea, which was administered under the League of Nations Mandate, it was noted that only local defence measures were permissible and military bases could not be constructed.²

The Administrations in both territories were given no specific instructions about the military training of Europeans or natives as a part of the defence preparations. In relation to Papua New Guinean natives, this was probably due to Australian scepticism concerning the reliability of native units. In 1924 a study of the defence of New Guinea by a sub-committee of the Australian Defence Council had recommended that the native constabularies should be given military training. Subsequently, however, the Council was advised that captured German documents had strongly criticised the stability of native units when under fire and therefore, "these troops do not seem to be worth the expense".³ The proposal was then dropped.

Apart from scepticism in Australia concerning the value of native units, Australian defence policy in regard to New Guinea was seen to be severely restricted by the provision of the C Class League

¹ CAO, MP729/6, Files 16/401/187 and 16/401/81.

² CAO, MP729/6, File 16/40/187, Commonwealth War Book, Paper No 2, Australian Territories Defence Schemes.

³ CAO, MP729/2, File 1851/2/211, Council of Defence Agenda No 13/1924.

of Nations Mandate which Australia had been granted in 1920. Under Article 4 of the Mandate local defence measures only were permitted:

"The military training of the natives, otherwise than for the purposes of internal police and the local defence of the Territory, shall be prohibited. Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established, or fortifications erected in the Territory".

Unlike the Territory of Papua, where Australia's defence powers were absolute, her defence powers in New Guinea were thus limited to local defence only. Australian Government sensitivity even in regard to her legitimate powers of local defence in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea inhibited realistic and effective local defence preparations right up to the onset of the Second War. During the whole of the inter-war period Australia continued to interpret her rights in relation to local defence in an extremely restricted manner.

Paradoxically, there was at the same time considerable awareness of the strategic importance of New Guinea in relation to Australia and the potential of New Guinea to provide an enemy with an offensive "springboard". The 1924 Defence Council sub-committee's study of New Guinea defence had drawn attention, with considerable foresight, to the significance of New Guinea in enemy operations against Australia:

"In the case of an oversea operation (by the enemy) it is essential that steps be taken to obtain safe anchorages for the troopships and an advanced base ... But in whatever form of attack that is being examined it is certain that the seizure by the enemy of a safe harbour among the islands is an essential preliminary step. Our possible enemy must be aware of this, and it is likely that he will occupy suitable islands early in the

war... It is likely that he will take advantage of the opening phase of the war, before our defensive measures are fully developed..."¹

In 1928, there was further informed public discussion of the strategic importance of New Guinea and similar conclusions were reached as to New Guinea's strategic significance, again with amazing percipience. In a paper written by a "Naval Expert" it was argued that:

"The most vital and valuable part of Australia is its eastern seabord (e.g., Newcastle, Sydney etc.) and the nearest means of approach to that part of Australia from the north is via the islands...

The proximity of the Japanese Mandated Islands - which can be used as an intermediate base - to the Australian Mandated Islands - is not generally realised. The distance from Truk in the Caroline Islands to Rabaul is only eight hundred miles."²

In the light of these commonly held strategic assessments and since strategic defensive measures were not permitted under the Mandate provisions, there would seem to have been good grounds for, at least, taking realistic local defensive measures. Such local defensive measures in PNG might well have made it more difficult

¹ CAO, MP729/2, File 1851/2/211, Report of sub-committee on New Guinea Defence, Agenda 13/1924.

² F.W. Eggleston (ed.), The Australian Mandate for New Guinea, Melbourne University Press, 1928, page 95. In another paper by a "Military Expert" the strategic importance of New Guinea was similarly argued:

"New Guinea's most important strategic asset was the large number of natural harbours which had to be regarded as potential bases for operations against Australia ... as an essential preliminary step ..." (page 97).

than it was in the event for the Japanese to occupy and control parts of New Guinea in 1942 .

Although they were never to be realised, quite ambitious plans were in fact laid in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea during 1930 for local defensive measures . These plans involved the establishment in the War stage of a proposed Defence Scheme of a european rifle battalion, eight companies of conscripted New Guinea native infantry, and a native labour battalion . The 1930 scheme had been drawn up by the New Guinea Superintendent of Police and District Inspector, Lieutenant-Colonel John Walstab . Walstab's plan was eventually forwarded to Canberra in January 1933 by the New Guinea Administrator, Brigadier General E .A . Wisdom .¹

1 (Continued)

Although the Military and Naval "Experts" were anonymous it is clear from the printed list of names of those who participated in the "round table" discussions that they were senior servicemen on active duty .

1

Lt Col John Walstab, DSO, (1885-1957) was given the task of preparing the NG Defence Scheme because of both his military and New Guinea experience . A Gallipoli veteran and former AIF battalion commander, he evidently possessed an imaginative military mind . Walstab envisaged that it was necessary to plan beyond the passive defence measures originally called for in the Commonwealth War Book plans . Resistance to large scale enemy attack should take the form of guerrilla operations with small mobile columns of native troops led and stiffened by european officers and machine gun teams . These columns would operate in the interior, live off the land and harass the invaders in control of the urban centres . They could only be defeated, he argued, "when the enemy had so established himself in the country as to be able to enlist and use the armed natives against them" . Walstab's concept of military operations in PNG was influenced by two things: his own extensive knowledge of the country's terrain as a result of leading police patrols and his appraisal of the successful guerrilla campaigns in East Africa of the German general, Von Lettow Vorbeck, during the First World War . Vorbeck had very successfully employed native troops led by German officers . (CAO, MP729/6, File No 16/401/187, Letter by Walstab to the Administrator, 11 April 1930) .

Administrator Wisdom enthusiastically endorsed Walstab's defence proposals and noted in a covering letter to the Australian Prime Minister that, apart from New Guinea's strategic value to Australia, its increasing economic significance (as a producer of gold, raw materials and foodstuffs) made it an attractive target to a potential enemy.¹ By September 1934 the Australian Defence Department had completed its review of the Wisdom/Walstab scheme and decided that the measures for the raising of native and european military forces would be omitted from the basic Defence Scheme, but included in a further separate scheme to be known as the Z Scheme which would cover defensive measures and armed resistance in time of war. The revised New Guinea Defence Scheme of 1934 was eventually promulgated in 1937 in the form of a Blue Book entitled "The Mandated Territory of New Guinea Defence Scheme".

It was not until May 1939, after another lengthy delay indicating the pace of tropical administration, that the Z Scheme proposals were forwarded to Canberra by the Administrator (then Brigadier-General Sir Walter McNicoll). It was proposed that two small european militia battalions should be raised and, together with the native Constabulary, should form the peace time organisational basis of a New Guinea Field Force.² In the second phase of the Z Scheme, it was planned that in time of war this force would be increased to some four thousand seven hundred combatant native and european troops. The full-sized Field Force was to consist of a New Guinea Native Infantry Regiment of three battalions,

1

CAO, MP729/6, File 16/401/187, Wisdom to the Prime Minister, January 1933; Secretary, Defence Department to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 7 September 1934; File 16/401/81, Secretary, Defence Department to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 6 February 1935.

² CAO, MP729/6, File 16/401/187, McNicoll to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 20 April 1939, enclosing Walstab's Z Scheme

/Continued

a headquarters battalion of Guerrilla Warfare Parties and Mobile Wireless Observation Units. The first native battalion would be formed from NG Constabulary personnel. A NG Native Labour Corps of four battalions was also planned. It was intended that the Field Force would be raised initially from volunteers and then, if necessary, by conscription. Legislation to enact the scheme was to be provided for by a "New Guinea (Local Defence) Native Forces" Ordinance, which would permit the raising of native military forces for the local defence of New Guinea. Amendment to the Australian Defence Act was also envisaged.¹

Although the European volunteer battalion (The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles-NGVR) was eventually authorised in September 1939, the proposals contained in the Z Scheme for the development of native units were not implemented. As McNicoll's son has written, the Scheme suffered a lingering fate. Clouded by legal uncertainties and legislative problems, it was neither accepted, nor rejected at the outbreak of war and the great local defence potential of the Z Scheme was thus never realised.²

2 (Continued)

proposals; and CAO, CRS A518, CF 16/2/1, File Summary, Territory of New Guinea, Defence Scheme dated 8 May 1941.

1

ibid. The scheme also provided that a third European specialist/headquarters battalion would be raised in war time. Of the two peace time militia battalions one was to be based on Rabaul, the second on Wau, which had been accepted as the pivotal point of NG defence because of the strategic vulnerability of the New Guinea Islands. The substance of this proposal to raise European military units was fulfilled in September 1939 when the Administrator was authorised to raise the New Guinea Volunteer Rifle (NGVR), a European volunteer battalion which was approximately the same size as the two smaller units proposed by Walstab in April 1939.

2

See Major General R.R. McNicoll, "Walter McNicoll as Administrator of the Mandated Territory", The History of Melanesia,

The legal uncertainties which hampered the implementation of the Z Scheme in New Guinea applied to Papua as well as challenging the operation of the basic Defence Schemes in both territories in relation to the use of the constabularies in a military role in times of emergency. In November 1940 the Australian Attorney-General argued that the projected use of the Papuan and New Guinean native constabularies for defence purposes was illegal in view of the extension of the Defence Act to both territories from July 1939. This decision created a further measure of uncertainty in the Defence Schemes and, as the legal issues were not resolved before the Japanese invasion, reduced their viability in a way which revealed an extraordinary degree of administrative ineptitude.¹

2 (Continued)

Second Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, 1969, page 129. The legal obstacles to the raising of native military units were, generally, as follows. In July 1939 the Defence Act had been extended to operate in the territories of Papua and New Guinea, largely in order to cover the raising of European militia units. But the further effect of this legislation was to prevent compulsory enlistment of New Guinea natives. And because they were deemed to be aliens and not British subjects they could not be voluntarily enlisted! Furthermore, it was considered that as New Guinea was now subject to the Defence Act it would not be legal to pass a local defence voluntary service ordinance in New Guinea. By 1941 a solution to this legal mish mash was seen in legislation for a native defence force under the National Security Act - which overrode the Defence Act. The solution was never adopted. (CAO, CRS, A518, File CF 16/2/1, Prime Minister's Department Summary, 8 May 1941, and AWM File 243/5/25, Letter by S.A. Lonergan, Assistant Government Secretary, New Guinea, to Commandant, 8th Military District, Port Moresby, 7 November 1940).

1

Under the NG Defence Scheme the Constabulary, quite independently from the Z Scheme proposals, had been allocated a local defence contingency role and there were supplies of rifles, machine guns and ammunition in New Guinea on loan from the Department of Defence for this purpose. As a result of the Attorney General's ruling it seemed that special empowering legislation would be needed before even this limited involvement of New Guineans in local defence could be permitted. This was not resolved before the war with Japan. In the latter half of 1941 legislation was drawn up under the National Security Act to form

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Turning to the Papuan defence plans, its 1937 Defence Scheme provided for a guerrilla defence role for the Constabulary. Port Moresby was seen by the Lieutenant-Governor, Murray, as both the key to the domination of Papua and the most suitable invasion base for operations against Australia and was, therefore, the focus of the defence preparations. It was intended, however, that if Moresby did fall, resistance would be continued against the enemy by the Constabulary acting in a guerrilla role.¹ District rosters of Europeans and Papuans suitable for military service were maintained after April 1937 but there were then no actual plans, as in New Guinea, for the formation of native military units.²

1 (Continued)

a Territories of Papua and New Guinea Defence Force which would have allowed the inclusion of each Territory's Constabulary in the Defence Force once a defence emergency had been declared. It was proposed that when an emergency was declared the constabularies and their officers would come under the military command of 8th Military District. The proposed legislation floundered on this aspect. Both Administrators (Papua was by then under the control of Administrator Leonard Murray) argued that control of their constabulary (and the Magistrates and Native Affairs officers that might also be co-opted) was vital to the continuance of effective civil administration. Once the constabularies were to be taken over by the military authorities (and this might be done prematurely and precipitously) civil administration could no longer continue. This objection, which was made by both Administrators, was thought, in Canberra, to be beyond resolution and the proposed legislation was dropped, thus leaving unresolved the implications for the Defence Schemes of both territories. (CAO, CRS 2663, File 243/5/25, Letter of 7 August 1941 from 8th Military District; and CAO, CRS A518, File 16/2/1, Letter of 16 December 1941 from Secretary, Department of Defence Coordination).

1

CAO, MP729/6, File 16/401/206, Secret Despatch, Murray to the Minister in charge of Territories, 27 April 1937. Murray appended a report by Mr Justice R.T. Gore which indicated that the concept of guerrilla defensive measures in the Papua Defence Scheme was largely Gore's and had been accepted by Murray. Kokoda was thought to be the best base from which to continue resistance against an enemy force lodged in Port Moresby.

2

ibid .

As the prospect of war appeared more imminent the Papuan Lieutenant-Governor, in July 1939, proposed the formation of a Volunteer Defence Corps which might have included both Europeans and Papuans. A special Papuan ordinance to establish this force was prepared but Murray was informed that the extension of the provisions of the Defence Act to Papua, from July 1939, removed the prerogative of the Papuan Legislative Council to legislate for a Defence Force. The plans for the Volunteer Defence Corps were shelved and the initiative for further defence preparations passed to the Australian Government.¹

PART B - THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Prelude to the Development of Indigenous Military Units

Although the planning for indigenous military units appeared more advanced in New Guinea, it was in Papua that the first unit – the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) – was actually raised in June 1940.² The proposal to form the unit initially came from the Australian Defence Department and the suggestion was enthusiastically taken up by the Papuan Lieutenant-Governor. Murray saw that a military unit would enable him to release numbers

¹ CAO, CRS A518, File CF 16/2/1, Territory of Papua, Defence Units Memo 24 October 1939.

² PIB was raised with an initial establishment of 2 officers, 5 warrant officers and 128 Papuan other rank. This establishment was expanded to a full battalion in February 1941. The first Commanding Officer was seconded from the Papuan Constabulary and most of the first recruits were Constabulary members. Prior service in the Constabulary counted for pay purposes and NCOs were appointed from amongst former senior policemen. Platoon Commanders in PIB were at first European warrant officers though the appointments were upgraded to lieutenant rank in October 1941. Rates of pay varied from 10/- per month for a first year native private to 40/- per month for a sergeant or skilled tradesman.

of the Constabulary from the growing number of security and guard duties around Port Moresby, thus allowing them to be reassigned to normal police duties which were being neglected.¹ The formation of PIB at this time coincided with gathering concern at the unsatisfactory state of Port Moresby's defences and in particular, the lack of any infantry troops for local defensive tasks.²

As the training and expansion of the PIB in Port Moresby proceeded and the risk of war increased, there was, rather strangely, no gathering enthusiasm in New Guinea for the establishment of native military unit. In February 1941, the Australian War Cabinet did direct that the question of raising a

2 (Continued)

Conditions of service were initially aligned with those of the Constabulary but the troops were subject to Australian Military Law. (CAO, MP729, File 1/121 and File 6/129, Letter from Commandant 8th Military District of 30 October 1941).

¹ CAO, CRS A518, File CF 16/2/1, Murray to the Minister in Charge of Territories, 13 October 1939 and 7 November 1939. Murray had also supported the proposal of the Officer Commanding 13 Heavy Battery, Major Chalmers, in April 1939 to form a Native Labour Corps of four platoons to assist in the construction of his battery's two six inch gun positions. Chalmers opined to Army Headquarters that:

"I am convinced from my observation of the Armed Native Constabulary that the Papuan, with necessary training, can be made an efficient infantryman".

The proposal was rejected without explanation the same month. (CAO, MP729, File 6/60, OC 13 Heavy Battery to AHQ, April 1939).

² CAO, MP 729, File 6/31. A defence appreciation of Port Moresby in May 1940 observed, in particular, that it could not be defended against small landing parties from Bootless Inlet and 'apart from the small number of coastal defence troops (13 Heavy Battery) there were no troops for land defence". Reinforcement by one Militia battalion was considered to be necessary. The formation of PIB helped to bridge this gap.

native infantry battalion in New Guinea was to be examined, at the same time agreeing to the dispatch of an AIF battalion to Rabaul to strengthen the defences there against the possibility of Japanese or German attack.¹ Emphasising the distinctly separate characters of the two pre-1942 territories, the New Guinea Administration, after protracted consideration, rejected the Australian proposal for the formation of a native battalion, even though the PIB had by then been in existence in Papua for over six months, contained more than three hundred men and was operating successfully.

Administrator McNicoll, no longer influenced by Lieutenant Colonel Walstab's advocacy of indigenous forces (Walstab had left New Guinea in May 1940²), accepted the advice of his "experienced Director of Native Affairs, Mr R. Melrose". Melrose recommended against the formation of native units essentially because they would be of dubious loyalty, not having "the slightest concept of patriotism in its wider sense". The Administrator's opinion was supported by the military commander in Port Moresby, Brigadier Basil Morris. The matter was finally closed in September 1941 when the Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters noted that the question of training a native battalion in New Guinea had been examined and rejected and the Cabinet had been advised accordingly.³

¹ P.M.C. Hasluck, The Government and The People, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1970, page 670. War Cabinet Minute 816 of 18 February 1941. The attack by German raiders on Nauru in December 1940 probably prompted this concern for Rabaul's security.

² Military Secretary Records, Army Headquarters, Canberra.

³ CAO, MP729/6, File 16/401/485, Letter from GOC Northern Command to Military Board, 15 September 1941, and SMH 26 October 1972, Article by Peter Hastings. Besides the question of loyalty it was argued that the battalion would take too long to recruit and train to be of real usefulness. The view expressed by Melrose and endorsed by McNicoll was, in all probability, widely and generally held in NG whereas that of Walstab was in the minority.

The failure to form native military units in New Guinea during 1941 was to prove crucial. The swift onset of the Japanese invasion early in 1942, the subsequent loss of control over the areas of recruitment in New Guinea and the confusion generated by the invasion removed the opportunity of forming a New Guinea battalion for some time and it was not until March 1944 that one was eventually raised. By that time, the worth of the PIB which by then contained both Papuans and New Guineans had been demonstrated in several campaigns.

With the benefit of hindsight the history of defence planning in regard to indigenous forces in both Papua and New Guinea may be seen as a combination of quite notable foresight and imagination on the one hand and on the other, administrative sloth and, until very late in the day, a lack of any sense of urgency. In New Guinea the involvement of New Guineans in defence preparation had been prevented not only by fears of violating the League of Nations Mandate¹ but also by deep-seated suspicion about the loyalty of the

3 (Continued)

A low opinion of the utility of native units was certainly contained in a letter written, ironically, by a future Commanding Officer of the Pacific Islands Regiment. In September 1939 Captain H.T. Allen a former Native Affairs officer in Rabaul and then serving in the AIF prepared an appreciation of New Guinea's defence for the Federal Country Party Leader, Mr A.G. Cameron. In this appreciation which Cameron later passed to the Minister for Defence, Allen observed:

"Natives to be enlisted as batmen, servants, cooks, mess waiters, runners, sanitation carriers, carpenters and car drivers... The natives are not reliable as fighting troops in their present stage of development when confronted with enemy european troops (This includes asiatic troops also)". (CAO, MP729/6, File No 16/401/202).

¹ The question of the legality of defence preparations under the Mandate should have been, but was not, finally settled in September/October 1938. At that time the Prime Minister sought the legal opinion of the Solicitor-General as to the legality of existing defence preparations in New Guinea and Nauru. The Solicitor-General affirmed the right to provide for local defence,

indigenous inhabitants, a suspicion which was quite clearly based on an ethnocentric prejudice.¹

Pre-war planning had identified the likely objectives of an enemy campaign in PNG – the seizing of ports and population centres – as well as proposing the most effective local defence strategy of withdrawal into the interior and waging guerrilla warfare. But because of the failure to organise the indigenous population for self-defence, both territories were unprepared when the attacks came. The potential military contribution of a properly organised, well-led force of indigenous troops at this time was suggested by incidents at Rabaul after the Japanese landings when several hundred NG Police had to be prevented by the European officers from attacking

1 (Continued)

which in the case of Nauru included the formation of a peace-time Defence Force. It would seem to follow logically that a native-manned local Defence Force in NG could have been raised without breaching the terms of the Mandate (A further parallel already existed in terms of the Defence Force established by the British in the Mandated ex-German colony of Tanganyika). (CAO, MP729/6, File 16/401/206, Solicitor-General to Attorney-General's Department, 29 September 1938 and Acting Prime Minister to Minister for Defence, 12 October 1938).

¹ Apart from the recommendations of Allen and Melrose, previously cited, in regard to proposals to form native military units, Allen's appreciation of the value of native troops drew an interesting response from a staff officer at Army Headquarters:

"Japanese occupation of NG and Papua would enable them to train a native army for (a) holding NG and Papua against us, (b) for invasion of Australia if led by Jap officers. This would not be an immediate possibility, but one that we would have to reckon with ere long".

Here was an even more serious argument against the development of a NG Army – apart from being unreliable, it might even become a treacherous double-edged weapon. (CAO, MP729/6, File 16/401/202).

the Japanese .¹ It might be argued in retrospect that the Australian failure to provide for the adequate local defence of New Guinea and her protection against invasion was as much a dereliction of the Mandate responsibilities as that posed by a hypothetical charge that Australia had incorporated New Guinea in her strategic defence system .

Expansion and Disbandment of the War Time Pacific Islands Regiment

It is not intended to recount here the military record of the PNG military units during the war time period . Only the more important aspects of the war period are discussed which relate to the decisions taken at the end of the war to disband the units .² The war time period of the native military units was marked by a growing acceptance, after an uncertain start, of the value of the Papua New Guinean infantryman in the specialised military roles of reconnaissance and long-range patrolling, roles for which european troops were not well-suited . There was also a belief that the increasing use of natives in this manner would save Australian manpower and casualties . On the other hand, problems experienced in the control and discipline of native units led to steadily mounting criticism of them, criticism which was finally to result in their

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P.M.C . Hasluck, The Government and The People, page 676 . European officers reported that they had "a devil of a job stopping the native police from making an attack" on the Japanese . There were 300 in the group . Instead, the police were ordered to bury their rifles and ammunition and disperse . (Evidence of Warrant Officer A.M. Sinclair before the Army Court of Inquiry convened to report on the Japanese landings) .

2

A history of the war time PIB and New Guinea Infantry Battalions (NGIB) of the PIR has been written by Captain Trevor McQuinn, Royal Australian Army Education Corps . (Unpublished MS .) For a summary of the war time period see: Major N.E.W. Granter, (ed .), Yesterday and Today: An Illustrated History of the Pacific Islands Regiment, South Pacific Post, Port Moresby, 1970 .

post-war disbandment. In fact the controversy which arose over the value of native units was initiated in the early Papuan campaigns of 1942.

The operational performance of the PIB in the Kokoda campaign was uneven. Whilst elements of the battalion provided useful early warning of the Japanese and delayed them, other groups of the PIB had "gone bush" at crucial moments.¹ In particular, elements of the PIB that had been cut off in the Kumusi River area were for a time without adequate European leadership and "many discreditable incidents had occurred".² As a result of the PIB conduct in this campaign, Australian Land Headquarters ordered that the PIB was to be disbanded. On this occasion, Major General Morris, (then Commander NG Force) later one of the PIB and PIR's sternest critics, wrote to General Blamey at Land Headquarters and argued that instead of disbandment, the unit should be withdrawn from operations, retrained and reorganised. Blamey agreed to Morris' proposal.³ The uneven showing of the unit was to be

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PIB was deployed to the north coast of Papua in June 1942 after several months of prosaic labouring and quarrying duties in Port Moresby during which time little military training could be conducted. Elements of PIB made first contact with the Japanese on 23 July 1942 and after a series of skirmishes, the major part of the unit withdrew over the Kokoda trail to Port Moresby. Large elements of the force were, however, 'cut-off' in the Kumusi and Waria River areas. (PIB War Diary, August 1940–April 1945. AWM, A2663, File No 8/4/4).

2

AWM, A2663, File No 419/5/22, Letter by Major General B. Morris, General Officer Commanding (GOC) ANGAU (Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit) to HQ NG Force, 11 August 1943. Morris had been Commander NG Force at the time of the incidents. Also, Personal Interview with General Morris, October 1974.

3

ibid.

explained in terms of a lack of thorough and realistic training before being committed to action and a lack of sound officer leadership in some quarters. In short, the unit was untrained and unprepared, rather than the soldiers being, in some way, racially unsuited to the job of infantry soldiering.¹

After a period of consolidation and experience of more successful military employment of the PIB in subsequent campaigns, it was eventually decided to form a New Guinea battalion in November 1943.² The words of the raising instruction were reminiscent of the years of pre-war defence planning:

"The Constabulary of the Territory of New Guinea received military training in peace time and it is considered that many natives from this service should be available."³

The new unit, known as First Battalion, New Guinea Infantry Battalion (1NGIB), was finally raised in March 1944 from a cadre of experienced New Guinean soldiers who had been serving with the PIB.⁴ At this time it was decided that Papuans and New Guineans would henceforth serve in separate units. This policy was short sighted and turned out to be both unpopular and disruptive, leading

¹ Although initially formed two years before it went into action, the great majority of this time had been spent, either in the preparation and manning of static defensive positions in Port Moresby, or in providing labouring parties. The Commanding Officer frequently complained in his War Diary during this period that there was inadequate scope for carrying on with essential military training. (AWM, A2663, File 8/4/4).

² Training of PIB recruits was further improved by the establishment of a PIB training depot at Bisiatabu on the Sogeri plateau east of Port Moresby in April 1943.

³ AWM, HQ NG Force War Diary, Instruction G. 5343 SD of 9 November 1943.

⁴ The unit was raised at Wampit in the Markham Valley.

to disciplinary problems in the new units that were formed.¹

After the formation of 1NGIB, the expansion of the native units took place as rapidly as decisions could be taken and recruits gained from recaptured territory. 2NGIB was raised in September 1944 and in November 1944 a special regimental headquarters, known as Headquarters Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR), was raised to administer the native infantry battalions. This headquarters had administrative, but no operational, control over the battalions.² A PIR training depot was established at Lae in March 1945 and 3NGIB was raised in August 1945 – too late to take part in the war. 4NGIB was authorized in May 1945 but plans for its establishment were cancelled with the Japanese collapse.³ General Blamey had also approved the formation of another native unit, a Papuan Maintenance Company, Royal Australian Engineers, in order to save Australian manpower but these plans were scrapped with the cessation of hostilities.⁴ Actual recruitment for the NGIB

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D. Barrett, "The Pacific Islands Regiment" in The History of Melanesia, Second Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, 1969, page 495. The last of the New Guineans in the PIB were not, however, removed until February 1945. Barrett writes that the decision to detach the New Guineans from the PIB was not only sad news to officers and men, but in the new NGIB units former PIB soldiers rebelled against new customs such as the order that NCO rank would be worn on lap laps rather than shirts (as in PIB) and the policy of splitting-up men from the same village.

2

General Blamey authorized the formation of HQ PIR, as a means of administratively grouping the native battalions, in a letter to Commander, First Australian Army on 2 October, 1944. (AWM, Blamey Papers, File 32-31). HQ PIR had administrative responsibilities to HQ ANGAU. See ANGAU War Diary, HQ ANGAU Instruction A200-5945, 24 November 1944. 2NGIB was raised at Camp Diddy adjacent to the Nadzab air base.

3

AWM, Blamey Papers, File 32-31.

4

AWM, Blamey Papers, File 32-3. Approved in July 1945.

battalions during this period of rapid expansion was greatly slowed by an acute shortage of native labour . This was caused by the heavy manpower demands of ANGAU, war time dislocation and the inaccessibility to recruitment of the populous highlands region of the country .¹

By the time of the Japanese surrender the units of PIR that had been actually engaged in operations – PIB, 1NGIB and 2NGIB – had gained a considerable military reputation . They had taken part in every major campaign in PNG with the exception of Milne Bay and had accounted for an impressive total of enemy dead at slight cost to themselves .² This performance won for the Papua New Guinean soldier a generally high regard as a brave and skilful jungle fighter, especially adept in reconnaissance of enemy positions, ambushing and aggressive long range patrolling .³

¹ AWM, Blamey Papers, File 32-31 .

² PIR units were responsible for a total of 2209 enemy dead for the loss of only 63 Australian and PNG servicemen . That is for each member of PIR killed, PNG soldiers had killed 35 enemy soldiers . 23 individual decorations for bravery were awarded to PIR units during the war . Granter, op . cit ., page 13 .

³ For example:

Commander of US 167 Infantry Regiment to A Company PIB after the Tambu Bay/Salamaua operations in 1943:

"... The troops of our regiment ... have developed an unusual respect and admiration for their (PIB) prowess and soldierly qualities ... Operating in twos and threes with our patrols and leading small units along the tracks, I feel that the PIB saved us many casualties and enabled us to move and obtain information in places which would have otherwise been inaccessible to european troops" .

The contribution of the PIR in the Bougainville campaign in 1945 was described as follows:

"The PIR contributed in no small way to the success of operations ... these native soldiers employed their intimate knowledge of the jungle to surprise and outwit the Japanese and, using modern weapons, fought with characteristic bravery and inflicted many casualties on the enemy" .

(T . McGuinn op . cit .)

There were, nonetheless, some senior Australian commanders who were critical of PIR operational performance and who believed that native units were afraid of artillery and, generally, racially unsuited to set-piece types of military operations, as opposed to patrolling tasks.¹ These views appear to have been effectively countered by the successful use of the NGIB troops in the Maprik area during 1945 in set-piece attacks employing artillery and mortar fire support.² It was argued by supporters of native troops that most incidents of unsatisfactory performance by the PIR units could usually be attributed to poor European leadership and more importantly, the tactical misemployment of the native units in "drips and drabs" in support of Australian units, rather than as complete units under the control of their own regimental officers.

Whilst the operational capabilities and performance of PIR were the primary interest of the Australian field headquarters, it was the ill-discipline when out of the line and the relationship of the PNG soldier to the native population which commanded the attention of ANGAU. ANGAU was responsible for the administration of the civil population in PNG and it was principally staffed by the native affairs officers of the pre-war administrations. It was, therefore, closely involved with the impact of the PIR on the population and more concerned with the longer-term effects of the war on the post-war government of PNG than were other elements of the Australian Army in PNG.

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During the Bougainville campaign 13 Brigade alleged that PIR troops feared artillery and would not accompany (artillery) forward observation officers on patrols. (McQuinn, ibid.)

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ibid.

It appears that ANGAU viewed the development of native military units with disquiet only until the formation of 3NGIB was mooted in early 1945. This attitude changed in March 1945 when the GOC ANGAU, Major General Morris, wrote to the GOC First Australian Army, Lieutenant General Sturdee, strongly criticizing the system of recruitment and inadequate training of PIR troops. To the letter, Morris appended a damaging report by his principal Native Affairs Adviser which called for the disbandment of PIR units.¹ This report, by Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Jones, listed numerous incidents of civil misbehaviour by PIR troops. Jones argued that it was ANGAU's responsibility to point out the post-war implications of training natives as soldiers. "The maintenance of native battalions is wrong in principle ... natives were not sufficiently developed mentally to be entrusted with a knowledge of modern weapons ... Australia's task was not just to win the war but ensure the future welfare and advancement of Papua New Guineans". Jones believed that the native units jeopardised these objectives. Unless disbanded, the PIR would lead to a developing antagonism between the civil population and soldiers. This would lead to a loss of respect for law and order and serious post-war consequences for orderly government.²

Jones was able to substantiate these charges with considerable evidence of conflict between the PIR and the Police at Annanberg in the Sepik district in February 1945³ and numerous incidents of rape

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AWM A2663, File 419/5/6, Report by Major General Morris to GOC First Australian Army, March 1945.

2

ibid. Report by Lieutenant Colonel J.H. Jones.

3

ibid. At Annanberg a platoon of 1NGIB had fired on a detachment of PNG police after a soldier had been arrested for allegedly raping the wife of a policeman. The soldier was "released" and the police did not return the army fire. It was alleged that NGIB europeans in the area took no action to intervene in the affray.

and pillage by PIR troops in the Madang¹ and Huon Gulf areas.²

General Sturdee replied in April 1945 to these allegations and Morris' recommendations for the PIR in terms which indicated a rather ruthless approach to questions of native welfare.³

Sturdee conceded that the arming of natives would create post-war problems for PNG but he considered that this burden would have to be borne in PNG, as it would be in other countries where fighting had taken place. PIR units had saved Australian lives and would prove economical for mopping-up operations. Sturdee observed, cynically, that rape was not peculiar to native soldiers and besides, in his view the allegations of misconduct was largely unproven.

He did "not regard the incidence of misbehaviour in PIR as unsatisfactory".⁴

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ibid. Report by Major J.H. McDonald, Legal Officer, HQ ANGAU, on complaints of PIB misbehaviour in Madang area during the Lae-Ramu campaign (21 June-4 August 1944) McDonald reported that "investigations showed that natives in the district were terrified of PIB men and several whole villages were afraid to sleep in their villages at night because of the numerous acts of rape, looting and assault committed by the PIR". McDonald recorded 52 complaints of alleged rape during his investigation. (He was informed by PIB that four soldiers had each been fined £1 by their Officer Commanding for the offence of rape and that no further action had been taken because the money had been given to the husbands of the raped women and all were satisfied')

2

ibid. In the Huon Gulf area Jones cited Major H.L.R. Niall who observed that the PIR had terrified villages and molested women in the Lae area in the latter half of 1943. Niall remarked "The natives must (sic) prefer to have the enemy in occupation as the women folk were then safe".

3

AWM, A2663, File 419/5/6, Letter to GOC ANGAU from GOC First Australian Army, 2 April 1945.

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ibid..

This exchange between ANGAU and First Army clearly showed that ANGAU's concern was based on long term post-war implications of the PIR, whereas Sturdee and his staff were primarily occupied, as might be expected in the case of a fighting formation, with the job-at-hand of defeating the Japanese.¹

Lieutenant General Sturdee was apparently not concerned that a reputation amongst the local people for rape, pillage and disorder might be a dangerous basis on which to develop post-war indigenous PNG military forces, nor was he concerned that PIR regimental officers appeared to treat the "indiscretions" of their troops with a considerable measure of indulgence. To First Army, PIR troops were merely a useful resource in defeating the enemy.

At the end of hostilities, Major General Morris and ANGAU returned once again to the question of the disbandment of PIR. During June/July 1945 there had been further serious problems of PIR ill-discipline and Morris believed that there were no longer operational imperatives which justified the maintenance of the Regiment.² Morris drew attention to the adverse effect "many

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In 1973, it was Major General Morris' recollection that "First Army would have preferred to see fifty native casualties in order to save an Australian life". Consequently, ANGAU disagreed with First Army on the employment of native troops. (Personal Communication, September 1973).

2

After one serious incident at Jacquinot Bay, New Britain, elements of an NGIB battalion were disarmed. A subsequent enquiry by Major J.A. Costello of ANGAU, revealed that the PIR did not respect the police and held scant regard for the native population. Major Costello recommended that PIR "should be disbanded at the earliest possible moment ... The PIR has produced a native soldier who will be a poor citizen and of neither use nor ornament in the post-war period". In mitigation of PIR behaviour at this time it may be said that the PIR were gravely dissatisfied with their pay and conditions which compared invidiously with those of Australian servicemen. The disparity was seen to be unfair because PIR fought alongside Australian units and bore the same risks. Because they had

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hundreds of untrained native soldiery were having (sic) on the economic development and life of PNG ... native members of the NGIB continue to be a source of trouble and are becoming more and more arrogant in their bearing and behaviour". The existing PIR units had "got off on the wrong foot". If native units were required in peace time then the correct course was for the units to be formed de novo. Morris believed that native units could be successfully raised, provided that they received suitable training and were commanded by european officers who were able to inculcate adequate standards of discipline.¹

General Morris' arguments for the disbandment of the PIR had finally won the day. Morris was informed by Sturdee, after consultation with General Blamey, that the post-war demobilization of the PIR units would be delayed so that the standard of discipline and civic responsibility in the PIR could first be raised to a satisfactory level before the soldiers were returned to village life. It was argued that prompt disbandment on the other hand would be likely to lead to the unrest which ANGAU feared. In this way, the ultimate disbandment of the PIR was accepted.² In January 1946 there was still a total of some two thousand three hundred

2 (Continued)

fought alongside europeans Papua New Guinean soldiers were less impressed by claims of european "superiority". They wanted a better deal from their "masters". In addition, PIR troops during this period were at times poorly led by a fatigued and understrength european contingent in the battalions. (ANGAU War Diary July 1945, AWM, A2663, File 419/5/6, T. McQuinn, op. cit. and Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1963, pages 262-265.

¹ AWM, A2663, File 419/5/6, Letter to GOC First Army from GOC ANGAU, 15 September 1945.

² AWM, A2663, File 419/5/6, Letter to GOC ANGAU from GOC First Army, 25 September 1945. Sturdee sharply censured Morris for intervening in the PIR issue which was held (rather unreasonably) to be outside his competence. Morris was informed that the PIR were to be employed in the guarding of Japanese prisoners of war, thus allowing the repatriation of Australian servicemen.

Papua New Guineans serving in the PIR, only slightly less than its peak strength of two thousand four hundred and fifty nine in April 1945 but demobilization did take place later in 1946. HQ PIR was disbanded in June 1946 and the last native troops had been demobilized and returned to their villages by the end of that year.

The decision by the Army to disband these units was strongly supported by the first post-war civil Administrator, Colonel J.K. Murray. In May 1946, Murray wrote to the Minister for Territories referring to rumours that the PIR would, after all, not be disbanded and sought his assurance that the decision to disband the PIR had not been reversed.¹ Murray was told that there had been no change of policy. Disbandment of the native military units was a victory for those in ANGAU and elsewhere who saw native troops as a potentially dangerous, destabilizing and unruly element within indigenous PNG society.² The worrying record of PIR misbehaviour had made the ANGAU case for disbandment a persuasive one in the post-war period and furthermore, apart from the need to achieve post-war defence economies,

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PNG National Archives, File 5/264. Colonel J.K. Murray to the Minister for Territories, 15 May 1946. Murray had heard rumours that one battalion of each of the PIB and NGIB were to be retained. It is likely that sections of the Army at this stage were reassessing the requirement for a native military unit in the post-war period but they were not successful in changing the policy which had been previously agreed upon.

2

Morris believed that most of the ANGAU Native Affairs officers he spoke to during the war were opposed to the concept of native military units. (Personal Communication, September 1973).

there was no apparent defence threat to justify the maintenance of the force.¹ If the need were to arise in the future it might be best if a fresh start were to be made, as had been recommended by Major General Morris.

Conclusion

This review of the war time PIR experience raises the question of the contribution native units made to the total war effort as well as the impact which these units had on the nation's future. The military contribution to the Allied war effort by the PIR was minor but not insignificant. Taken with the contributions of those Papua New Guineans who served with the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), the Police and as ANGAU workers, it forms the basis of a considerable tradition of national defence.² The war was, in effect, the first time that the people of Papua New Guinea had been organised and reacted in many ways as a single nation. To some extent the PIR may be seen as a symbol of an incipient nationalism and an early demonstration of cultural integration in PNG. The potential benefits of the integration which might have been obtained were limited during the war by the decision to segregate Papuan from New Guinean within the PIR and later by the decision to

¹ Although there may not have been a defence "threat" at this time, Britain had suggested a post-war role for indigenous Pacific Islands military and naval forces during 1944-45. It was argued by the British that indigenous garrison troops would be able to contribute to their own territorial integrity and at the same time reduce British, Australian and New Zealand defence costs and manpower burdens. The British suggestion received a lukewarm response in Canberra and the issue was dropped (CAO, A989, File 735/321/7).

² A total of 4409 Papua New Guineans served in the military units of the PIR and AIB (131 were killed and 201 wounded). A total of 1100 were serving with the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) in March 1945 and it was estimated that this organisation had killed over 5000 enemy soldiers in the course of its operations behind the enemy's lines and in contested areas. In all categories of assistance it was estimated that 49,500 Papua New Guineans had directly helped the Australian and Allied war effort in PNG.

disband the force . The integration of Papuan and New Guinean within the same unit in the early days of the PIB had been seen as a pioneering success . A former european member of the PIR has written:

"An outstanding feature of the PIB had been the way in which men from all parts of Papua and New Guinea had fought side by side ... Many of those who found themselves in action together had scarcely heard of one another's places . Here was the earliest example of a unity which is today sought after and talked about, but not yet achieved to the extent that it was by the soldiers of PIB" .¹

It is of course true that even in the PIB and NGIB units later in the war, which segregated Papuan from New Guinean, there was considerable inter-mixing of men from many Districts within each of the PIR units .²

2 (Continued)

(CAO, MP729, File 251/1/1889, Department of Army to Department of External Territories, 8 January, 1946 and AWM Blamey Papers, File 56:2, Allied Intelligence Bureau).

¹ Barrett, op.cit., page 495.

² In April 1945 the ethnic composition of PIR was reported to be as follows:

<u>Papua</u>		<u>New Guinea</u>	
Fly	128	Manus	22
Moresby	58	Bougainville	39
Tufi	27	Madang	210
Purari	47	New Britain	618
Samarai	95	Morobe	65
Mambare	188	Sepik	517
Lakekamu	253	New Ireland	18
Trobriand Islands	31	Huon	146

(Source: T . McQuinn, op cit.)

Apart from the nationalist tradition which the PIR helped to establish during the war period, the PIR units also provided a cadre of experienced soldiers and NCOs which formed the basis of the post-war PIR battalion when it was re-established. This group were able to pass on some of the military traditions which Papua New Guinean soldiers had established in war. In this way they formed a perhaps vital ingredient in the ethos of the post-war force. It is true nonetheless that the Papua New Guinean experience in the war time PIR was closely linked with the Australians who served with them. The PIR was a typical colonial military force in which the "black" bayonets were led and controlled by Europeans and there were limits therefore to what Papua New Guinean soldiers could claim as their "own" tradition even within PIR.¹ The PIR had at least shown the ability of men from the different areas of Papua and New Guinea to live and work together in a relatively harmonious manner.

The war time period of the PIR was to prove significant in a further respect in the future development of indigenous forces. The war time units had been an integral part of the Australian Army and their native members were subject to Australian Military Regulations and Orders.² This precedent was followed in 1951

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Both in training and operations considerable reliance was placed on the role of Australian officers and NCOs. There were PNG section commanders, platoon sergeants and company warrant officers, however, there was a "counterpart system" with both Australian and PNG NCOs sharing responsibilities at platoon level and above. All-Papua New Guinean sub-unit patrols were certainly sent out on operations and were often very successful.

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This issue was raised by GOC ANGAU in June 1944. General Morris strongly represented to General Blamey that the PIR should be placed under local regulations similar to those controlling the Constabulary, rather than remain under Australian Military Regulations. Blamey referred the matter to the Adjutant General but there was no change to the status of the PIR. (AWM, Blamey Papers, File 32.31, June 1944).

when the force was re-established, leading to later problems in PNG civil-military relations. An alternative pattern of development might have been found in the pre-war proposals for locally-raised forces and in particular, the proposal for the establishment of a Territories of Papua and New Guinea Defence Force. As it turned out, the post-war pattern of military development in PNG was to be largely determined by the past. Another aspect of the history of war time PIR units to reoccur later was the opposition to native military units on the part of ANGAU officers which would re-emerge both within the Civil Administration in PNG and the Department of Territories. This post-war opposition to the PIR was, in large measure, based on the experience of the war time PIR and its disciplinary troubles.

PART C - THE POST-WAR RE-ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIR - 1951-1962

In November 1950 Army Headquarters in Melbourne ordered the reactivation of the Pacific Islands Regiment as a single battalion force of the Australian Army. The first Papua New Guinean troops were enlisted in early 1951 and by August 1952 the unit was up to its full strength with a headquarters and principal base at Taurama Barracks, Port Moresby on the former site of an Australian war time General Hospital previously known as Eggys' Corner. Company outstations were later to be established in 1952 at Vanimo on the north coast adjacent to the Dutch/PNG border and in 1954 on Manus Island. The Manus Island outstation was later moved to Wewak in 1962.

Background to the Re-establishment

The Australian Government's decision to re-establish an indigenous military force in PNG was the result of increasing interest in the external and internal security of the region. There was concern at the time about the prospects of internal subversion

within PNG and within some quarters, a fear of PNG becoming a "second Malaya".¹ Australia was also influenced by heightened tension between a recently-independent Indonesia and the Netherlands over the future of Dutch New Guinea (now Irian Jaya). The problems of Indonesian/Dutch relations had apparently led to a fear of communist-, or Indonesian nationalist-inspired, subversion in PNG emanating from Dutch New Guinea.² These views were to be seen in contemporary newspaper reports and articles and reflected in ministerial statements.

¹ Front page articles in the Sydney Morning Herald on 14 May and 6 August 1950, for example, reported fears of Papua New Guinea becoming a "Second Malaya". Reports referred to communists sympathisers amongst the Chinese community in PNG, natives trained as agitators and foreign agents who had allegedly been recently infiltrated into PNG to subvert the native population. The 6 August article quoted a "reliable source" as follows:

"We are certain that these activities are part of the world-wide Communist plan to create disorder everywhere outside the Iron Curtain".

² See, for example, an article by Lieutenant Colonel F.P. Serong (later Brigadier and an acknowledged counter-insurgency warfare expert of the Vietnam war) in the Australian Army Journal, No 20, December 1950, entitled the "Defence of New Guinea's Land Frontier" for one indication of the military view of the problem.

"The weakness of the Dutch in New Guinea, the Communist boil-over in Asia and the all too apparent instability of the Indonesian Government have caused grave concern among the residents of Australian New Guinea". (page 7)

Colonel Serong saw two dangers: the likelihood of communist infiltration from an Indonesian held West New Guinea and the dangers of subversion of the native population by the Chinese community within PNG, many elements of which, he claimed, were "strongly communist". The colonel proposed a battalion-strong force of native troops to seal the land border:

"We visualize an enemy whose immediate object is by entering across the land frontier or in small coastal vessels, to contact and spread political disaffection among the native peoples, with the ultimate aim of precipitating an uprising against the white population ...". (page 9)

/Continued

The view of the Australian Government at this time was that PNG and indeed the whole of the New Guinea island was vital to Australian security and was the last ring of defence against aggression. The memory of the Japanese invasion of PNG was still fresh in Australian minds. The strategically vital nexus between PNG and Australia, in the wake of the second war, was moreover, common ground between the major Australian political parties. Speaking in relation to the United Nations Trusteeship granted to Australia over New Guinea, Labor Prime Minister Chifley had observed in August 1946 that:

"The territory of New Guinea ... is of such importance to the safety of this country that nothing but absolute control could be accepted by any Australian government".¹

2 (Continued)

Colonel Serong concluded, however, that "the first line of defence of Australian New Guinea lies at the western end of Dutch New Guinea and the maintenance of the Dutch in their position by political action, should be one of our major strategic aims". (page 15)

¹ W.E. Tomasetti, "Australia and the United Nations in New Guinea, Trusteeship Issues from 1946 to 1966", New Guinea Research Bulletin, No 36, ANU, Canberra, July 1970, page 5, quoted from C.P.D., Vol 188, 7 August 1946, page 3853. Although Labor may have held these views about PNG, the Labor Government under Chifley had taken virtually no action in the post-war period to establish defences in PNG. (T.B. Millar, "Australian Defence 1945-1965" in Australia in World Affairs, 1961-65, G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds.), Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, page 259). In contradistinction to the League of Nations Mandate provisions, the Trusteeship granted Australia very wide defence powers in NG under Articles 4 and 7 of the Agreement, viz:

Article 4 "The Administering Authority will be responsible for the peace, order, good government and defence of the Territory and for this purpose will have the same powers ... as if it were an integral part of Australia".

Article 7 "The Administering Authority may take all measures in the Territory which it considers desirable to provide for the defence of the Territory and for the maintenance of international peace and security".

/Continued

In March 1950, Sir Percy Spender in a ministerial statement on foreign policy reaffirmed this view of New Guinea's strategic importance. He told the House of Representatives that the Liberal-Country Party Government believed that New Guinea was an absolutely essential link in the chain of Australian defence and defence preparations in PNG would serve Australian security interests as well as those of the people of PNG.¹

In this environment of fear of subversion and a belief in the nexus between the defence of PNG and the Australian mainland the Government on 1 June 1950 announced its defence plans for PNG. Approval had been given for the formation of a PNG Division of the RAN, a European unit, open to volunteers of both territories, would be reformed as the Papua New Guinea Volunteer Rifles

1 (Continued)

Thus, unlike the situation under the Mandate, Australia's defence powers in respect of both territories were now virtually the same, and there was no barrier to the implementation of a common defence force for both territories. Although PNG was considered strategically important, Tomasetti points out that Australia did not seek to have New Guinea declared a strategic area under Article 83 of the United Nations Charter as in the case of the US Strategic Trust Territories in the Pacific (page 96).

¹ See the Statement on Foreign Policy by the Minister for External Affairs (P.C. Spender) of 9 March 1950 quoted in Sir Percy Spender, Politics and Man, Collins, Sydney, 1972, page 320:

"Australia has a duty to itself which must not be neglected. This is the duty of ensuring by every means open to us that in the island areas immediately adjacent to Australia, in whatever direction they lie, nothing takes place that can in any way offer a threat to Australian security, either in the short or long term. These islands are, as experience has shown, our last ring of defence against aggression ... New Guinea ... is an absolutely essential link in the chain of Australian defence ... As regards Australian New Guinea it is our duty to ensure that it is administered and developed in a way best calculated to protect the welfare of the native inhabitants and at the same time to serve Australia's security interests". (my emphasis)

(PNGVR) and the establishment of a native regiment as a part of the Australian Military Forces was also under consideration. The Minister for Territories added:

"It is most important that the Territories should be kept free of subversive influences, and steps will be taken by legislation and otherwise, to see that they are not exposed to this menace".¹

The PIR battalion was reactivated without a subsequent announcement in Parliament. In PNG the decision to form the battalion was generally welcomed by the Civil Administration and the expatriate community, although with some reservations. Some leading Europeans in PNG were still sceptical about the value of native troops and the memories of the disciplinary problems in the PIB and NGIB were still fresh in the minds of old "Papua New Guinea hands". In particular there was concern that the PIR would foster dangerously liberal and disruptive racial relationships between Papua New Guinean and Australian soldiers. Some expatriates saw the war time spirit of mateship and the "elder brother/younger brother" type of relationship which

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P.C. Spender, C.P.D., Vol 208, 1 June 1950, page 3652. Although the PNG Division of the RAN was raised at Manus Island in August 1951 it was not until December 1962 that PNG sailors manned a commissioned RAN vessel, HMAS Banks. (Australian Facts and Figures, No 31, September 1951 and No 76, December 1962). The PNGVR, the successor battalion to the war time NGVR, was established with bases in each of the major centres in PNG. Only European volunteers were permitted to join this unit until 1964 when enlistment was broadened to include Papua New Guineans and Asians resident in PNG. (Australian Facts and Figures, No 81, March 1964).

In addition to the establishment of these units security matters in PNG were reviewed. A PNG internal security committee was established with representation from the PNG Administration, Australian Services and Intelligence Organisations. Plans were drawn up for the security of key points and installations against "communist-inspired subversion". The Coastwatching service which had rendered invaluable war time service remained in operation. (Australian Facts and Figures, No 40, December 1953).

suffused dealings between Australian and PNG servicemen as seriously undermining the traditional masta/boi relationship of the pre-war period – which many believed could now be re-established. There was also local concern that, because the PIR would be officered by Australian Army officers, they would not be sufficiently expert in what was seen as the highly esoteric business of "handling natives".¹

Problems of Development

With the re-establishment of the PIR there appears to have been no consideration of it forming the nucleus of the Defence Force of a future independent nation. Rather, the PIR was seen as an adjunct to Australia's defence capacity and as the first line of Australian defence in PNG. It was of course unlikely at that

¹ See South Pacific Post, 19 February 1951. Editorial on the formation of PIR:

"... The formation of a native regiment is much belated but nonetheless welcome.

There can be no doubt that such a regiment, if well trained, would be of immense value in the event of any emergency ... But it is a project which needs the most careful handling and, above all, the full support of all those who know the Territory thoroughly and how to control natives ... only a fool will not admit that it takes years of experience to learn how to get the good out of natives and at the same time control the bad".

The first Officer Commanding of the new unit was thoroughly "briefed" by the PNG Administration and expatriate civilians on the need to maintain "correct" racial relationships. For example, he was advised not allow his european NCOs to unload stores at the wharf because of the "poor" example it would create in front of black Papua New Guineans. (Personal Communication, Lieutenant Colonel W.R.J. Shields, 4 December 1973).

time that the PIR would have been seen in any other terms. The ultimate future of the territories had not been determined and political independence lay in the far distant future, if at all.

The roles allocated to the reactivated PIR battalion reflected the experience which had been gained from the employment of PIR units during war, as well as reflecting the belief that PIR would, as before, operate as part of a larger Australian force. One of the peace time roles listed for the PIR battalion clearly did take account of the contemporary fear of subversion and internal disorder. . . The PIR was to assist the civil administration to maintain law and order if it became necessary.¹

During the period of the 1950s and until 1962, the PIR underwent a gradual process of consolidation. Younger and better educated soldiers were trained for more specialised jobs within the battalion such as clerks, storemen, and signallers. At the same time PNG NCOs developed in experience and ability and the unit slowly improved its standard of training and efficiency as a military organisation. The number of Papua New Guineans in it gradually increased from three hundred and ninety in June 1952 to six hundred and ninety five by June 1963.²

¹ See To Find a Path, The History of the PIR, no author, unpublished 1PIR unit precis. The roles of the units were listed as follows:

In Peace. Patrolling. To provide a basis on which other units could be formed. If required, to assist the civil administration to maintain law and order.

In War. Garrison duty and advisory unit to units from the mainland of Australia. Fighting as a unit to delay the enemy. Medium range reconnaissance fighting in Company sub-units in all phases of war.

² See Defence Report 1973. Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973. Table 1. The yearly figures were as follows:

There were, however, serious setbacks to this development caused by ill-discipline. Significant incidents of disorder took place within PIR in 1952, 1957 and 1961 which involved questions concerning the degree of tribal integration within PIR and the extent to which PNG soldiers were amenable to military discipline under the conditions of peace time soldiering.

In December 1952 about twenty Kerema soldiers were discharged from the Army after brawling with New Guinean soldiers at Taurama Barracks. Iron bars, sharpened stakes, bayonets and barbed wire "whips" were confiscated after the fighting. The Keremas believed that they were being treated unfairly by the Europeans within the unit and in turn, some Europeans who had war time New Guinea Infantry Battalion experience believed that the Kerema soldiers (Papuan) were arrogant, untrustworthy trouble-makers. In another view the origin of the disorder lay in the divisions amongst the European staff between the old PIB and NGIB hands and, the younger officers.¹ A report completed after the incident observed that further disturbances would continue to occur until discipline and esprit de corps overcame tribal affiliations. The report rejected the idea of banning Keremas from PIR in the future.²

Kerema soldiers were again the principal participants in another serious incident of ill-discipline in 1957. On Sunday

2 (Continued)

1951	79	1958	604
52	390	59	602
53	587	60	661
54	612	61	581
55	601	62	638
56	610	63	695
57	612		

By 1962, the Australian component of PIR was 74 officers and NCOs.

¹ Personal Communication, December 1972.

² 1PIR Archive Files, 1953.

15 December, two hundred soldiers marched on Koki market from Taurama. The raid, which had been launched without the knowledge of any of the European staff, was intended as a reprisal by Kerema soldiers and others on a group of civilian Keremas who had beaten up PIR soldiers (and the Australian Regimental Sergeant Major who had gone to their assistance) the previous afternoon at the market. The soldiers' rampage through Koki and the adjoining Badili villages was eventually quelled by Australian officers and NCOs and loyal PNG NCOs. In the sequel to this incident, a civil court convened at Taurama Barracks the following day to try the offenders was overturned in uproar by soldiers outraged at the severity of a sentence handed down by the magistrate. Eventually, one hundred and fifty four soldiers were punished, fifteen were discharged from the Army whilst only four were subsequently convicted of rioting and imprisoned by the PNG Supreme Court.¹

In January 1961, after a series of incidents concerned with dissatisfaction over pay and other rumours, some eighty soldiers

¹ PIR Unit Archive File. The decision to hold the civil trial at Taurama was unwise. Inadequate precautions were taken to maintain order and in addition, the proceedings were a travesty of justice which incited the soldiers to take action. Charges were not read out, defendants were tried in groups of twenty and the court proceedings were conducted in the English language which was not fully understood. Following the overthrowing of the magistrate's court, seventy one soldiers were tried for contempt of court; of these sixty were committed for trial before the Supreme Court for rioting. In the trial before Justice Gore, only four were subsequently convicted. Justice Gore commented that the incident was an outrageous and alarming affair and the soldiers had arrogated to themselves a position above the civil authority. The Judge testily observed that "the Crown had not been fortified in its efforts to get convictions by the Army".

left Taurama in order to march to Bomana civil gaol, to demonstrate for the release of seven ring leaders of pay dissatisfaction who had been arrested earlier, or be gaoled with them. The military demonstrators broke through a force of one hundred police en route, at Boroko. The disturbance was eventually quelled and a number of soldiers were sent to Bomana to join those previously arrested. Forty five soldiers, mainly younger men from the New Guinea Islands districts, were later discharged from the Army as a result of this incident.¹

The 1957 and 1961 incidents both generated considerable reaction in PNG amongst the Administration and European population, and in Australia at the political and defence planning levels. After the 1957 riot the PNG Administration called for closer liaison between the civil administration and the PIR, and the lengthening of the tours of duty of Australian officers with the PIR.²

¹ 1PIR Unit Archive File. A pay rise had been promised and long awaited. At this time a new civilian labour award of twenty shillings per week was announced. In the soldiers' view their own seven shillings per week compared very unfavourably. Besides this aspect, there was discontent over inequality with Australian rates of pay, pay being received monthly rather than fortnightly, the absence of a pension scheme, and a rumour of opposition, led by padres, to the introduction of soft mattresses for the indigenous troops'. The discontent smouldered during the normally inactive New Year period; the commanding officer learnt of "strike" planning and incarcerated seven of the leaders in an attempt to prevent such action.

² PNG National Archives, AD8, File 1/17/1. At the time of the riot the Acting Administrator (Mr J.T. Gunther) recommended that an experienced PNG Administration officer be appointed to command the PIR. (This proposal was not pursued). Gunther considered that the PNG Administration should be given a larger responsibility in regard to the Force's development:

"Speaking for myself I unhesitatingly say there must be a PIR. Believing sincerely in this, I believe I have a right to examine, criticise and make proposals for its better establishment.

My personal view is that the PIR should be expanded
/Continued

The non-official european reaction in PNG to the 1957 and 1961 incidents was alarmist and hostile to the PIR. In 1957 the Port Moresby Advisory Councillors called for the removal of PIR from the Port Moresby town area and salutary "showing-the-flag" visits by Australian troops. Another proposal, which was subsequently rejected by the Council, called for the matching of PIR, man for man, by Australian troops, "based on the British experience in India".¹ In 1961 there was another call for the matching of indigenous units with Australian troops whilst another group of expatriates called for the disbandment of PIR and the strengthening of the Police.²

After the 1961 incident which was viewed more seriously by the Administration because of the public conflict with the Police, Mr J.T. Gunther, as Acting Administrator, again called for the appointment of an experienced Native Affairs officer as Commanding Officer of the PIR. Gunther informed the Army that "some senior, experienced Administration officers recommend that the unit be disbanded and started anew."³ The Army agreed to the appointment of a Civil Administration official as temporary liaison officer to the PIR and his report of the incident was strongly critical of the Australian Army's administration of the PIR.

2 (Continued)

but not until it is a controlled disciplined body of men integrated into the pattern of Territory development proposed by Ministerial policy".

Later, in the PNG Legislative Council on 4 March 1958, the Administrator, Brigadier D.M. Cleland, expressed his confidence in the PIR and added that he hoped that, eventually, the PIR would be expanded to brigade strength.

¹ Courier, 30 December 1957.

² South Pacific Post 6 January 1961 and Radio 9PA News Transcript 13 January 1961 on 1PIR Unit Archive File. The Kokoda Town Advisory Council, on the Gazelle Peninsula, moved a motion suggesting to the Administrator that PIR be disbanded.

³ PNG National Archives, AD8, File 1/17/1, Acting Administrator /Continued

"Many people have been living in a 'fools paradise' by thinking that the troops of PIR have been fully and completely indoctrinated with that vital soldierly quality of complete and instant obedience to the orders of a superior officer .

That sort of discipline which is mental discipline rather than a physical one, can only be achieved in troops whose background and environment makes them susceptible to such restraints ...

Within the PIR we are dealing with men who have no warrior tradition whatever . The extent of their fighting lay in the treacherous sneak attack, or in some simulated battle in connection with tribal or clan ceremonial ...

Many of the present European members of PIR have had little or no experience of Native conditions here, nor of the men whom they have to control ...

The above adds to the urgent necessity of re-evaluating the disciplinary and training methods that are used with the PIR ...

Their proficiency and skill at arms, drill and jungle craft is not in doubt . It is in the civil responsibilities and disciplines of a soldier that they will require the most careful and concentrated instruction." ¹

3 (Continued)
to Secretary, Department of Territories, 7 December 1961 .

¹ ibid . Report by Mr M.B.B. Orken, Acting District Officer, Rabaul and Liaison Officer to PIR, Report of 24 December 1961 .

Both these incidents exposed a serious lack of professionalism in the military administration of the PIR. As a result of the 1957 affair certain policy changes were instituted. In future greater emphasis was to be placed on contact between officers and men, native customs were more keenly studied by european officers and europeans in the battalion were required to master Pidgin, the unit lingua franca. A new policy of selecting younger, better suited officers for service with PIR was also adopted.¹

The 1961 incident led to a more wide-ranging review of the future of PIR. The Commanding Officer of the battalion reported that independence for PNG was now being discussed and he called for the commissioning of PNG officers who could contribute to a stable PNG which was well disposed towards Australia. He argued that it would be wrong to consider the PIR purely as a military unit without recognizing the wide political and social ramifications of armed forces in newly independent states.

This view of the future importance of the PIR evoked a sympathetic response in Australian defence circles. It was believed that it was now time to take stock of military policy in PNG. PIR would be a vital element in the future of the country with a tremendous potential for good and a stable influence in a young country struggling with the problems of self-government. The PIR could become a training ground for national leaders in PNG and the country would benefit from the influence of former soldiers when they returned to their village homes.

This rather uncritical attitude towards the contribution of the PIR and a future "PNG Army" to the stability of PNG begged questions about the potentially negative contributions of an army

¹ 1PIR Archive File.

to political stability through interference in the political system. This issue was not taken up by the Army who believed that the PIR's previous disciplinary problems had largely been the result of poor conditions of service and inevitable "growing pains". It was believed that sound development policies in the future would ensure that the Army in PNG made a positive contribution to the nation's stability.¹ For this reason there is an increasing emphasis by the Army after 1961 on improving all aspects of service conditions in the PIR, ranging from pay to dress, equipment and rations. These improvements in conditions of service were to occur within the Army in PNG at a tempo which outpaced improvements in the conditions of the PNG Police. This pattern of development, which was accentuated with the rapid infusion of defence funds during the "Confrontation build-up", conflicted with the understanding reached at the time of the re-establishment of the PIR that there would be parity between Police and Army conditions in order "to preserve the economic balance of the native community", and produced disparities which exist to this day.

The considerable professional interest of the Australian Army leadership in the PIR's development, more pronounced in certain officers, was probably the result of the personal experience which many officers had in PNG during the war. The years of military service which most senior officers had spent in PNG during war with Japan generated a greater degree of interest, than in many other sections of the Australian community, in the future of PNG as a nation. The interest in PNG's future was complemented by a professional interest in contemporary political events of Africa, as seen from a military perspective. It was understandable that the military, who have been seen as a professional group who traditionally emphasise the repetitive nature

¹ Army Headquarters Memorandum of 2 February 1961.

of history and what can be learnt from it, would turn to the contemporary examples of decolonization in Africa.¹ It might be said, therefore, that whilst many Australians involved in the development of PNG still saw the country's pattern of future development as sui generis, it was in the nature of the military's approach to see PNG's future in terms of the political change in Africa and elsewhere.

It is not surprising therefore that Army planning for the future in PNG tended to outstrip the tempo of change in other government sectors and anticipated the actual course of development of the Force in PNG after 1962 as a result of Indonesian Confrontation policies. In 1960 the newly appointed Commander of the PNG Military District was invited to prepare plans for the future development of his Force and he was later given the task of designing the shape of an eventual "PNG Army" based on a three battalion force. The resultant plans called for a brigade group force to be developed from the PIR nucleus within either five or eight years from the commencement of expansion. It was envisaged that the "PNG Army" would be based on austere scales of equipment and accommodation suited to the economic resources and stage of development of the country. These 1962 proposals went forward to Army Headquarters and provided a basis for subsequent defence planning in PNG, but in the rapid expansion of PNG's defence forces after 1963 it is evident that the thrust of this early report towards simplicity, economy and military austerity was overlooked.²

Although Army planning for the long-term future of the Army in PNG awaited strategic imperatives before it was implemented, other practical development measures were initiated. In particular, there was increased emphasis placed on the training of Papua New

¹ See S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Fifth Printing, 1972, page 79.

² Personal Communication, 25 November 1973.

Guineans to replace Australian servicemen. After 1961 it was decided to pursue the localization of senior NCOs within PIR with greater vigour. Even so this took time and it was not until 1965 that the first PNG warrant officers were appointed.¹ In relation to PNG officers progress was also slow. In August 1960 the Military Board decided that suitably qualified Papua New Guineans should be commissioned as Australian Army officers for service in the PIR, but it was not until January 1963 that the first two PNG candidates commenced training at the Officer Cadet School, Portsea in Victoria.² This delay was due to the lack of educationally qualified volunteers as well as some measure of administrative inaction. As will be seen later, the failure to produce adequate numbers of officers in these early years led to a shortage of experienced local officers able to replace Australians at the senior level in the present day PNG Defence Force.

Although the Army's attitude to the prospects of change in PNG and the need to plan for the future might be described as "realistic", it also seems clear that the Army continued to see the PIR as very much an adjunct to Australia's military capability, both in peace and war. The Australian military's post-war experience with the PIR had confirmed its earlier respect for the effectiveness of PNG troops in certain roles. At the same time this experience tended to confirm some of the earlier cultural prejudices. In 1962 the PIR Commanding Officer was ordered by Army Headquarters to report on the capabilities of the PIR soldier for a study which was being conducted by the Department of

¹ Until 1965 the senior NCOs served as Top Sergeant understudies to Australian warrant officers.

² Australia in Facts and Figures, No 72, December 1961. These two officers, Lieutenant Colonel E.R. Diro and Lieutenant Colonel B.P. Lowa, were in January 1974, the two most senior PNG officers in the PNG Defence Force having graduated as Second Lieutenants in December 1963.

Defence on the future role of the PIR . His report highlighted the problems within the Army of the transition from a traditional to a westernized society . Australian praise of the military skills of the PIR soldier as a jungle fighter was unstinting; the limitations of the PNG soldier were seen, principally, in cultural terms:

"In his present stage of development, the Pacific Islander is a simple soldier . With a few exceptions in the unit at present, he is close to his primitive traditions . Because of the limited service of the native only a thin veneer separates the soldier and the villager in him . He requires leadership at all times ... Soldiers are still apprehensive of the local witchdocter or spiritman even after 15 years service ...

(In terms of) fighting ability ... It would be in these types of operations - harassing operations, guerrilla type operations and delaying operations - that the maximum value of the PI as a soldier would be obtained . His skill at swift movement over long distances, over rugged country, concealment, sense of direction and self-sufficiency would be best brought out in these operations . His ability to live off the land and endure hardships of exposure and a long time in the jungle gives him a decided advantage over the european soldier" .¹

The observation of the Papua New Guinean soldier during training and especially during arduous "showing-the-flag"

¹ Letter of 4 April 1962 . Pacific Islander (PI) is (and was still in January 1974) official Defence terminology for indigenous Papua New Guinean servicemen .

patrolling of the PNG interior produced a considerable measure of professional respect amongst Australian officers for the PNG soldier. At this time the PIR maintained a busy program of patrolling in addition to its routine training activities. These patrols frequently involved feats of physical hardship and endurance.¹ The growing military repute of the PIR also seems to have led to incipient notions amongst the military and others that, at least for the present, the PIR was the "Australian Gurkha", guarding Australia's strategic frontier. This attitude may even have been an underlying factor in the decisions taken to expand the PNG forces in 1963 as a result of Confrontation. PNG forces were, after all, economical to maintain as well as being conveniently located.² At least this approach to PNG defence forces may be seen to be symbolically represented in the regimental affiliation which took place between the PIR and a British Gurkha regiment during the early part of the period.³ Arguments for the expansion of the PIR

¹ In 1962 the PIR reported that a total of twelve patrols, each of platoon strength and not less than one month's duration, had been mounted during the previous twelve months period. Four of these patrols had been along the PNG/Dutch border.

² This view was, for instance, put by a Government backbencher in the Australian Parliament several time during 1961. He argued that the PIR should be expanded to brigade size:

"bearing in mind the valuable adjunct to our own defence effort that a sound force in this Territory would be, ... It may seem a big thing to suggest that the PIR be expanded to three times its present size but I think that the cost, compared with that of maintaining an Australian Army force of equivalent size, would be relatively small".

(E.D. Mackinnon, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 33, 5 October 1961, pages 1756-1758).

³ The PIR became "affiliated" with 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles in November 1954. Exchanges of officers for tours of duty with the affiliated regiment have taken place since 1962.

were, however, soon to be effectively reinforced by the events in Indonesia and the consequent defence threat which was seen to both PNG and Australia .

PART D - INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION AND THE EXPANSION OF THE PNG ARMY 1962-69

Introduction

In December 1961 Indonesia intensified its long standing campaign to gain Dutch West New Guinea as President Sukarno issued his command for the liberation of West Irian by force . The Indonesian military and diplomatic offensive, assisted by American diplomatic intervention, was eventually to lead to success for the Indonesian claims . In August 1962 an agreement between the Dutch and Indonesians provided for the transfer of West Irian to Indonesian administrative control by May 1963 after a brief period of United Nations administrative interregnum .¹

Indonesian success and Dutch capitulation in this issue produced concern in Australia and in greater measure within PNG about future Indonesian military intentions towards Papua New Guinea . Indonesia's apparent appetite for territorial expansion and a generally bellicose foreign policy generated anxiety amongst both Australian residents in PNG and those Papua New Guineans who took an interest in such matters . There was thus a gathering interest within PNG about Australia's future plans for PNG and especially about arrangements for the defence of PNG against the possibility of Indonesian aggression .

¹ See P. Hastings, New Guinea Problems and Prospects, pages 221-239 . Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian, under the terms of the 1962 Agreement was to be finally determined by an "Act of Free Choice" to be supervised by the United Nations before the end of 1969 .

In an attempt to dispell the unease about security matters in PNG the Minister for Territories, Mr P.M.C. Hasluck, in a speech delivered in Port Moresby in September 1962, assured PNG residents that PNG would be defended as if it were part of the Australian mainland. Hasluck emphasised that this undertaking had been cleared by Prime Minister Menzies personally. He added that PNG was included within the scope of the ANZUS treaty which guaranteed Australia powerful allies in the event of aggression.¹ The Minister's speech had been designed to allay fears within PNG and demonstrate Australian preparedness to meet with force any Indonesian military activities directed against PNG. The military preparations by which Australia might actually fulfil such a commitment were rather slower in eventuating. The decision to increase the size of military forces deployed within PNG was not announced until mid-1963.

The Expansion of Indigenous Military Forces in PNG

In May 1963 the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, announced that the size of the PIR would be doubled from its strength of about seven hundred, consistent with adequate training and equipment. He added that when this had been implemented, further developments would be considered. Menzies noted earlier in his speech:

¹ Paul Hasluck, "The Future in Papua New Guinea", Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1962. Text of an Address delivered at the annual congress of the PNG Public Service Association, September 1962.

The ANZUS treaty, concluded in September 1951, specifically included Papua and New Guinea and unlike SEATO, was not limited to "Communist Aggression" in its coverage. In 1963 the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr Averell Harriman was to publicly affirm that PNG was included under the terms of ANZUS. (See: Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965, Cambridge, 1967, page 134).

"It certainly cannot be stated that we have entered a period of stability in the area of immediate strategic concern to Australia . . . We have made this recent review in the light of our treaty arrangements, but particularly in reference to the security of our own country and of the territories of Papua and New Guinea . We will defend these territories as if they were part of our mainland; there must be no mistaken ideas about that".¹

In an election-eve speech in the House of Representatives in October of the same year, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr A.A. Calwell, announced Labor's defence policy for Papua New Guinea if it were to win the election. Labor's policy indicated a willingness to more than match the Government's defence expansion plans for PNG:

"We will raise the strength of the Pacific Islands Regiment in New Guinea, which the Government estimates to be only seven hundred strong. I have been asking the Minister for the Army for the last ten years to raise the strength of this Regiment to at least two battalions. We will raise it to brigade strength and later to a battle group of six thousand men. We will guarantee the territorial integrity of Papua and New Guinea with something more than words."²

¹ Sir Robert Menzies, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 38, 22 May 1963, pages 1669-1671, Ministerial Statement: Defence Review. The Prime Minister also announced plans to develop Boram airfield, Wewak, for defence purposes.

² A.A. Calwell, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 40, 22 October 1963, page 2071.

By November 1964, the Menzies Government had virtually accepted Labor's plans for a brigade-size force in PNG. In a ministerial statement the Prime Minister argued that there had been a deterioration in Australia's strategic position – partly as a consequence of recent Indonesian policies. The Government believed that in regard to Indonesia, Australia must prepare for all eventualities including the control and if necessary, defence of the frontier between West New Guinea and PNG. Menzies stated that in the existing strategic situation the Government attached a high priority to the strengthening of PIR. Accordingly, the Government would proceed with a plan to increase the strength of the PIR to three battalions and supporting units – a total approaching three thousand five hundred men – by June 1968. At the same time a twelve million pounds building programme was announced for the construction of barracks, workshops, engineering services and married quarters.¹ Apart from the Army build up, the formation of a PNG coastal security force was announced. The force was to consist of five patrol boats and its role would be the surveillance of PNG's shores and rivers. In addition there would be an airfield building and upgrading programme designed to improve PIR mobility in the border area and permit the use of Mirage type aircraft in PNG.²

The implementation of this ambitious programme of defence expansion, which was explained largely in terms of Australian security interests, proceeded gradually over the next several years. Practical limits to manpower expansion within the Army were experienced. There were limitations on training resources, a lack

¹ Sir Robert Menzies, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 44, 10 November 1964, pages 2715–2724, Ministerial Statement: Defence Review. Nadzab was to be extended for Mirage use, Daru was to be extended and "smaller airstrips between Boram and Daru brought to a higher standard".

² ibid.

of barracks and a shortage of Papua New Guinean leadership as a result of the expansion of what had been a small force. This problem was compounded by the loss, at about this time, of many of the older experienced war time PNG NCOs and this may have contributed to several further incidents of group disobedience by PNG servicemen during the period between 1966 and 1969. These incidents were principally concerned with pay and they were non-violent having more the character of "industrial action".

Nonetheless they provided further grounds for the criticism of the force by its opponents in PNG.¹ There was also the problem of generating a more complex infra-structure of technical and support units for the force. This required new skills and higher levels of education amongst the PNG soldiers. Previously the technical and support needs of the one battalion of PIR had been relatively simple and they had generally been met either from within the unit's resources or from Australia.

By 1968 the strength of the Army in PNG had risen from a strength of six hundred and ninety five in 1963 when the original decision had been made to double the Force to a total of two thousand four hundred and six officers and men.² Some forty million dollars

¹ There were sit-down strikes over pay in December 1966 at Murray Barracks and in April 1966 at 1PIR. In 1967 a company of 2PIR "sat down" over a dispute with their officers. In September 1969 two hundred and seventy soldiers failed to parade for work at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby because of long standing complaints over pay. In this incident there were some attempts by the strike ring leaders to coordinate their activities with soldiers in other locations but they were unsuccessful. Sixty two soldiers were dismissed from the Army as a result of the incident. In the aftermath it was evident that many of those involved had not been aware of the seriousness and inappropriateness of a military "strike" compared to an industrial strike.

² Defence Report 1973, op. cit. The yearly figures were as follows:

1963	695	1966	1732
64	812	67	2246
65	1415	68	2406

had been spent on the construction of five self-contained modern barrack areas: Taurama, Murray and Goldier River Barracks in the Port Moresby area, Igam Barracks in Lae and Moem Barracks in Wewak. Three million dollars had also been spent on the upgrading of refuelling and support facilities at the RAN base at Manus Island which had been developed as the PNG patrol boat base.¹

The Army in PNG in 1969 was organised as follows. The force was controlled by Headquarters PNG Command located at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby. The commander of the force was a brigadier, responsible directly to the Military Board in Canberra.² The major units were: 1PIR located at Taurama Barracks; 2PIR at Moem Barracks Wewak, with one company outstation at Vanimo; a training depot at Goldie River Barracks, near Port Moresby; the PNGVR battalion (open to PNG volunteers as well as europeans since 1964, it was about five hundred strong and had six major training centres); a battalion of school cadets; an engineer construction squadron; a signals squadron; and various administrative, supply, ordnance and repair units necessary to support the force.

¹ See: P.R. Lynch, "The Coming Army", New Guinea, Vol 4, No 1, March-April 1969, page 22 and F.A. Mediansky, "New Guinea's Coming Army", New Guinea, Vol 5, No 2, June-July 1970, page 38.

² PNG Command was formed in 1965. Up until 1963, PNG was known as 8 Military District and commanded by a lieutenant colonel. In that year the command was upgraded to a Military Area Headquarters. Both the Military District and Military Area commanders were responsible to the General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, located in Brisbane. The new command arrangement from 1965, giving the PNG Commander direct access to the Military Board, indicated the increased importance of the PNG forces.

In regard to naval development, the PNG Division of the RAN by June 1969 consisted of seven Papua New Guinean officers and one hundred and thirty sailors at the Manus Island base and under training in Australia. There were in addition forty eight PNG sailors who had been enlisted in an earlier period with lower educational standards. There was a total of thirty three PNG sailors serving at sea with the patrol boat squadron. These boats were all commanded by Australian officers and they also had Australian sailors filling specialists and senior billets.¹

The expansion of the force in PNG sharply increased the requirement for Papua New Guinean officers and this subject received considerable attention. By October 1968, although defence planning had shown a requirement for over three hundred PNG officers by 1984, there were still only six PNG officers serving with the PIR and a further six cadets undergoing training in Australia. The principal reason for this lack of progress was the shortage of educationally qualified volunteers able to successfully complete the Portsea training. In an attempt to solve this problem the Army established a Military Cadet School (MCS) in mid-1968 to educationally prepare candidates for officer training in Australia.³ It was not until the period 1970-72, however, that the numbers of PNG officers began to increase significantly.

¹ Defence Report, 1968, Department of Defence, Canberra, page 24. The first PNG Division patrol boat, HMAS Aitape, was commissioned in November 1967, the fifth boat arrived in March 1969 to complete the Squadron. (Australia in Facts and Figures No 96, December 1967 and No 101, March 1969).

² PNG National Archives, A82, File 8-1-8, Letter from Department of the Army to Secretary, Department of Territories, 15 May 1967.

³ P.R. Lynch, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 61, 23 October 1968, page 2224, Statement by the Minister for the Army. MCS was established at Igam Barracks, Lae. The course was eighteen months long and was designed to academically and militarily prepare PNG students for the OCS Portsea course.

The Army's efforts during the later half of the 1960s to recruit a larger number of PNG officer cadets led to conflict between the Army and the Civil Administration over manpower priorities. The Army believed that it was necessary to produce high quality officers, both well educated and well trained. In so far as this was possible it was thought that entry and training standards should, therefore, correspond to Australian levels. Whilst this general approach was accepted by the Civil Administration there was also a strong competitive demand by them for the still small educated PNG elite:

"Senior Army officers here have maintained that the Army should not only have the best available young men but also the numbers required as a priority.

The Administration needs are such that this priority is not acceptable ..."¹

Because of the shortage of suitable recruits the Administration suggested that the Army should upgrade the educational standards of its officer cadets in PNG before sending them to Australia and thereby, help to remove some of the shortfall in educated PNG manpower.² This proposal encouraged the Army to establish the Military Cadet School.

By the end of 1969 the plans for the expansion of the Army to a three battalion force, as announced, remained unfulfilled. Although the barracks for the projected 3PIR had been built at

¹ PNG National Archives, A82, File 8/1/8, Administrator to the Department of Territories, August 1967. The Administrator was also invited to comment on the desirability of establishing an Officer Cadet School in PNG to replace the Portsea course. The Administrator replied that there was merit in PNG officers being closely associated with Australian officers and this was best achieved by the training of PNG officers in Australia.

² ibid .

Lae, the third battalion had not been raised.¹ The Minister for the Army, Lynch, in answer to a question from Labor's shadow Defence Minister, Barnard, in October 1968, had referred to reports of the raising of 3PIR as merely "speculative and uninformed", although the previous Defence Review placed before the Parliament had retained the original proposal for a three battalion force. The Minister then hedged in his reply as follows:

"the Government has not decided not to raise a third battalion ... The forward role and composition of the PIR, as with all aspects of the Government's defence programme will be included in the formulation of the new three-year defence programme ..."²

There was, however, a new and significant emphasis in what followed:

"In the meantime the Army in the Territory is continuing to serve a dual purpose. I refer in the first instance to the development of a national army constituted of indigenes and capable of playing a vital part in the defence of the Territory. And secondly to the provision in the future of a well-trained force, well disciplined loyal and effective force which will be completely subservient to the legally constituted authority".³

There were indications of a developing awareness at the political level in Canberra that the Australian forces in PNG would comprise the future armed forces of an independent nation. The emphasis placed on the future loyalty and subservience of this force to the Civil Government also indicated an awareness that the

¹ P.R. Lynch, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 61, 28 November 1968, pages 3496-3497. The barracks was completed in August 1968 at a cost of some \$8.5 million.

² P.R. Lynch, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 61, 23 October 1968, page 2224.

³ ibid.

relationship between the civil and military leadership was likely to be of crucial importance in a new state . As to the hesitancy in the further expansion of the PNG Force to the previously planned level of three battalions, it may be attributed first, to a greatly diminished military threat from Indonesia and secondly and more importantly, to the need to proceed with defence planning in PNG on the basis of the country's future as an independent nation and not principally as an adjunct to Australian defence needs . There was by 1969 on the one hand less strategic urgency for further development and on the other a lack of policy direction . The development of this policy, involving consultation with Papua New Guineans in the evolution of a Defence Force for an independent Papua New Guinea, was to come later . Once again, however, Australian military planning seems to have to some extent, anticipated this process of change .

The Army had apparently already developed another blueprint for a PNG National Army based on a three battalion force with supporting naval and air elements and this plan, produced during 1969 by a special project team, was to contribute to subsequent planning in PNG in much the same way as the earlier 1962 proposals had influenced the post-1963 expansion .

The Papua New Guinean Response to Defence Expansion

At this stage of development some contemporary attitudes of Papua New Guineans towards questions of national defence and indigenous military units may be identified, although there is a difficulty in regard to the scarcity of articulated Papua New Guinean opinion on defence during the period . A review of the debates of the Legislative Council and of the House of Assembly after 1964 indicates that, with one important exception, the Australian policy of developing PNG defence capacity in response

to an "Indonesian threat" was enthusiastically supported by expatriate and indigenous members alike – at least in their public utterances. With the exception of the criticism of Australian defence policy in PNG delivered by Gaudi Mirau in June 1966, indigenous political opinion supported Australian policy. Papua New Guinean attitudes in security matters appear to have been conditioned by two factors. First, Papua New Guineans had in recent living memory experienced invasion and modern warfare within their own country. The need for defence forces and military preparedness, for many Papua New Guineans, especially those who had fought or otherwise been caught up in military operations, was not a philosophical abstraction but what seemed to be a fact of life. Besides, the need for self-defence against the "foreigner" was a basic reality of their traditional society. Secondly there appears to have been a quite general and pervasive suspicion, perhaps even fear, of Indonesia and its intentions in regard to PNG.¹ This dislike of Indonesians may have been reinforced by a vague concept of brotherhood felt by some Papua New Guineans towards the West Irianese, perhaps derived from the manner in which West Irian had

¹ For an indication, for example, of the attitude of Papua New Guineans living in the Port Moresby suburb of Hahola in 1962–63 towards Indonesia, see: Lynn Oeser, "Hahola, The Significance of Social Networks in Urban Adaptation of Women", New Guinea Research Bulletin, No 29, ANU, Canberra, June 1969:

"Relations with Indonesia were a current topic at the time of the Study when the Indonesians took over West New Guinea. Many rumours circulated about the nature and activities of Indonesians; one of the sample women, for example, said she had heard the Indonesians 'dont have one man, one woman, but anyone for anyone'. It was also rumoured that an Indonesian had been photographed on a hill in Port Moresby allegedly attempting to cut off all radio contact. American planes used in geodetic survey of New Guinea often flew over Hahola at night, provoking fears of an invasion. One woman reported having terrible nightmares of Hahola being overrun by Indonesians and everyone being killed except her ..." (page 83).

been acquired by the Indonesians . It may also have been fuelled by the generally anti-Indonesian attitudes of many Australians and of the media within PNG at the time .¹

Although Australia throughout this period retained control over PNG's defence and foreign affairs, speakers both in the Legislative Council and later the House of Assembly, did discuss these topics, albeit infrequently . During the period from 1960 to 1969 there was in fact only one debate involving several speakers on defence matters . This debate was sparked off by Mirau's speech . Nonetheless there were a significant number of individual speeches and questions in relation to Indonesia and PNG security which provide keys to indigenous and expatriate opinion on these subjects .

Following the Hasluck declaration of September 1962 several members in the Legislative Council spoke, warmly accepting the position taken by the Australian Government . One nominated member in touch with indigenous views, the Anglican Bishop of New Guinea, observed in relation to Indonesian actions in Dutch West New Guinea:

"All this I think naturally perturbed the peoples of the Territory, not only the expatriate people, but also the indigenous people . The Minister's clear, strong and firm statement that Australia will defend this Territory as it would the Australian mainland ... has now removed all doubts ... and given a stronger sense of

¹ See P. Hastings, New Guinea Problems and Prospects, pages 244-246 . Writing in 1969, Hastings considered the pan-Papuan sentiment should not be underestimated in relation to PNG attitudes towards Indonesia .

security to the peoples of this Territory, whether expatriate or indigenous, than they have had for many years past".¹

The following year in June 1963, an elected european member of the Council again called attention to the Indonesian military threat to PNG, claiming that PNG was inadequately defended and faced a nation which possessed formidable armed forces and had territorial ambitions.² In September 1963 a Papuan member rose to support several other Papua New Guinean speakers who were calling for the inclusion of indigenous recruits in the then all-white PNGVR. He argued that it was important that Papuans and New Guineans were trained in military techniques – he was sure there would be no shortage of volunteers.³

With the election of the first House of Assembly in 1964, indigenous members, on the infrequent occasions on which defence was discussed, continued to support Australia's policy of developing forces within PNG. There were also calls for an increased defence effort. In the June 1964 sittings of the House, Zure Zurechuoc, Member for Finschafen, recalled the tradition which Papua New Guineans had established during the Second World War, fighting alongside Australian troops in defeating the Japanese invaders. He observed that the country's defences were now inadequate:

"There are not enough Army personnel, the Naval Base at Manus has become just a small depot and we do not have an Air Force at all. I think that much work should

¹ Anglican Bishop of New Guinea, L.C.D., 6-10, 7 September 1962, pages 606-607.

² R. Slaughter, L.C.D., 6-10, 3 June 1963, pages 734-735.

³ R. Taureka, L.C.D., 6-10, 19 September 1963, pages 925-926. Taureka later became a medical practitioner and Minister for Health in the Somare Government. (This change to the PNGVR was made in 1964).

be done to build up the defences of Papua and New Guinea. It also concerns Australia because if this Territory is safe then Australia will be safe also... We cannot escape war if it starts. Our name is known throughout the world. Remember what the Papuans and New Guineans did during the war."¹

Zurecnuoc was supported in the same debate by a Papuan member, Dirona Abe, who agreed that it was a good thing for the people of PNG to know that Australia was willing to assist in PNG's defence.²

In February 1965, a prominent Highlands member, Tei Abal, reported the fear of Indonesian invasion felt by the people in his electorate in the Wabag area of the Western Highlands. Abal called for the PIR to be prepared for action and told the House that thirty four concillors and seven thousand village people gathered at Wabag had called for an army training school to be established in the area so that the people could be trained to fight:

"The people asked me to bring this matter up in the House and said that this school should be set up in Wabag because Wabag is close to the Indonesian border."³

Papua New Guinean political opinion opposed to Australia's defence policies in relation to PNG was heard for the first time in June 1966. In a speech which generated the first full-scale defence debate within the House of Assembly, Gaudi Mirau, a Papuan member and supporter of the PANGU party, claimed that Australian defence development in PNG was involving the country in issues which could

¹ Zure Zurecnuoc, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 1-6, 16 June 1964, page 118.

² Dirona Abe, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 1-6, 16 June 1964, page 119.

³ Tei Abal, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 1-6, 26 February 1965, page 594.

make it difficult in the future for PNG to live with her Asian neighbours. Mirau protested that the House of Assembly had not been consulted on defence issues – including the construction of bases in PNG which could be used to attack "our next-door neighbours".

"We are the ones who should decide whether to be friends or enemies of Indonesia. We should be able to think and act for ourselves. This House should decide whether we are Indonesia's allies or enemies. But it is Australia that is deciding this for us today."¹

Mirau argued that the development of expensive bases in PNG by Australia indicated that she intended to retain the bases for her own use after independence. Australia was thus seeking to provide for her own long term strategic interests. These interests, Mirau pointed out, might not necessarily accord with those of PNG which would have to live in the Asian region.

Mirau's views drew heated and unanimous opposition in the debate which ensued. Opposition by indigenous members indicated the extent to which the need for defence preparedness and fear of Indonesia were entrenched attitudes, although this opposition may well have been intensified by european members mobilizing support against Mirau's case. Mirau was accused of having been duped by academics and presenting the views of others – and by one european member, of having acted as the mouthpiece of a communist or draft-dodger seeking to embarrass Australia at the United Nations.²

Several Papua New Guinean members averred that Mirau's speech could not possibly represent the views of his electorate and his attempt to question the benefit of Australia's defence shield in PNG

¹ Gaudi Mirau, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 7-9, 7 June 1966, pages 1392-1393.

² O.I. Ashton, H.A.D., Vol 2, part 7-9, 8 June 1966, page 1423.

and her motives was "spoiling" the work of the House of Assembly. Pita Simogun, a PNG war hero representing the border electorate of the Sepik, told the House that he was concerned about border matters because of the location of his electorate and it was as necessary for PNG to prepare to defend itself as it was for other nations.¹ Another member recalled that in 1942 Australia had not adequately provided for PNG's security. He was now happy "because Australia is establishing defence bases here and I want this work to continue".²

Mirau's criticism of Australian policy evoked no manifest support from his fellow members in the House of Assembly. It did, however, result in a resolution moved by a Bougainvillean member, Mr Paul Lapun, and passed by the House of Assembly on 10 June 1966, recording appreciation of Australia's defence effort in PNG and satisfaction with the Australian defence policy in PNG.³ This manoeuvre was clearly designed to destroy the credibility of Mirau's arguments. While Mirau's attack on Australian policies may have been ill-conceived and ill-timed as a political tactic and susceptible to charges of outside influence, it did nonetheless

¹ Pita Simogun, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 7-9, 8 June 1966, page 1421.

² Ehava Karava, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 7-9, 10 June 1966, page 1421.

³ Paul Lapun, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 7-9, 10 June 1966, page 1468 and Sir John McLeay, C.P.D., H of R, Vol 52, 17 August 1966, page 105. The resolution stated in part:

"We are aware, and believe that the people of this country are aware, of the price of security. We realise that the geographical locality of this country on the fringe of the Pacific yet also on the fringe of South East Asia, demands an expenditure on security forces and installations which this country could not face alone ..."

raise several important defence and foreign relations issues which would need to be faced by a Papua New Guinean Government at some future time. If there was almost unanimity amongst Papua New Guineans up until 1966 on the defence policies which the Australian Government was pursuing in PNG, from 1967 onwards a measure of disquiet was occurring in the minds of both Papua New Guineans and Australians in PNG, about the consequence of these policies for the future of PNG.

In May 1967 an Australian Army major serving with the Pacific Islands Regiment argued, in a paper delivered at the University of Papua New Guinea, that in his view, the PIR was not only heading in the direction of what he termed rapid detribalization but, in destroying the links with the soldiers' cultural heritage, the Army might be in danger of creating a new and elite tribe - the PIR. This new tribe, he considered, might constitute a greater social gulf between the soldier and his village relatives than that which had formerly existed between tribes.¹ Bell did not explain what the political and social consequences of this gulf might be.

This concern about the elitist nature of the Army in PNG was taken up from another aspect by two European members in the House of Assembly later the same year. One member (Mr John Pasquarelli, representing the Sepik District) argued that the lavish scale on which PIR barracks had been constructed by the Commonwealth Government in PNG would create a rift between the peoples of PNG. The bases, in his view were:

"a huge complex of modern buildings of aluminium, concrete and stainless steel, with amenities which

¹ Major H. Bell, "Tribal Integration within the Pacific Islands Regiment", paper delivered at a Seminar on Indigenous Participation in Business, Industry and Community Leadership, University of Papua and New Guinea, May 1967 published in The Industrial Review, Vol 5, No 3, August and November 1967, Department of Labour, TPNG.

village people in the Sepik District will never be able to enjoy".¹

Pasquarelli went on to argue that in his experience soldiers within the PIR tended to forget about their village life and become a separate part of the community. What should be done, he felt, was divert some of the funds and manpower into a form of civil construction corps so that the village community could benefit directly from the training which Army men had received. Pasquarelli also called attention to the problem which a independent PNG government would, in due course, face in maintaining the PIR and its installations from within its own internal revenue resources. Whilst Pasquarelli did not deny that PNG should have an Army, he did doubt the wisdom of establishing it on what he called "such a magnificent scale".

Pasquarelli was supported by another european member, Mr J. Stuntz. Stuntz, an experienced former district administration officer, saw the problem of the Army as part of a growing disparity between the "haves" and "have-nots" within Papua New Guinean society. Stuntz argued that there were, however, graver problems associated with the development of a PNG Army:

"I realise the need for an efficient Army, but I think we must also bear in mind that we should endeavour to keep standards of that Army, somehow or other, relative to the standards that could be sustained and maintained by a future government of this Territory. Otherwise, we could be creating a considerable problem for that future government when it takes over, as has been seen in other parts of the world. It is quite possible here, should there be an occasion in the

¹ John Pasquarelli, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 13-15, 17 November 1967, page 2971.

future when funds were not available to maintain the standards that we are setting in our fighting services, then these very fighting services may also be quite unwilling to surrender what they consider to be their right, and that is when one creates the conditions that lead to the troubles that we read about in parts of Africa and other countries".¹

In September 1967 there was further public questioning by a Papua New Guinean of the relevance of an Army to a developing nation such as PNG. Writing under the pseudonym of Basita Heatu in the journal New Guinea, a PNG school teacher saw a PNG Army as merely "one of the many expensive activities that seem to be regarded as necessary to prove one's independence – such as a national airlines ...".² Basita Heatu was unimpressed with the conventional arguments justifying an army, arguing that internal security was the job of the police and if the army was to fight enemies, where were the enemies? In his view PNG was too small to effectively defend itself. He concluded that the army was "probably the biggest single threat to the peace, security and development of our country".³

These doubts about the future were reinforced by another Papua New Guinean contributor to New Guinea in June 1968. In Kokou Warubu's view,⁴ the cost of such an expensive organisation as the army should be justified in terms of PNG's needs – and PNG's problem was one of underdevelopment rather than defence.

¹ John Stuntz, H.A.D., Vol 1, part 13–15, 17 November 1967, page 2971.

² Basita Heatu, "New Guinea's Coming Army, To Prevent a Coup or Lead One?", New Guinea, Vol 2, No 3, September, October, 1967, pages 32–33.

³ ibid.

⁴ Kokou Warubu, "That Army Again", New Guinea, Vol 3, No 2, June, July 1968, pages 8–10.

Warubu argued that the PIR, which was based on elitist lines, would be likely to be more a divisive force in PNG society than a unifying one and it was likely to place itself above the law in its attempts to create esprit de corps within its ranks. Warubu's solution was for a PNG Army like the armies found elsewhere in developing countries rather than an army based on an Australian model – "armies of youth or (those) aimed at realistic national development". Such an army, he believed, would serve the interests of PNG rather than Australia. He was not optimistic about the prospect of such changes being implemented:

"Whichever way you look at it, it seems that self-government, independence, call it what you will is necessary before we gain an opportunity to use the imagination, skill and experience of others elsewhere in the development of our country".¹

Conclusion

By 1969 the era of Defence Force policy in PNG extending from the Second World War that had placed broader Australian strategic interests first was rapidly drawing to a close. It was becoming evident that the military forces in PNG would form the basis of a Defence Force of a nation which Australia had by now irrevocably accepted was bound for self-government and independence.² The military forces in PNG would therefore not only be required to provide for PNG's territorial security as in the past but would also need to become fully integrated within the Papua New Guinean political system and society.

¹ ibid.

² See P. Hastings, New Guinea Problems and Prospects, page 267 for a discussion of Australia's policy on the political future of PNG. Hastings considers that PNG was set on a course to independence and the vague option of seventh statehood for PNG finally discarded, as a result of the speech by the Australian Governor-General, Lord Casey, opening Federal Parliament in March 1968, and formally conveyed to PNG at the opening of the Second House of Assembly in June 1968.

This fundamental change in the perspective from which military forces in PNG were to be seen raised new sets of political as well as military issues for both Papua New Guineans and Australians – both for politicians and defence planners. It was now necessary to take account of the impact and wider social and political role of an elite military organisation on the polity of an independent PNG. Until then, civil-military relations had existed in a virtual political vacuum in PNG. The indigenous military units in PNG were raised as units of the Australian armed forces, financed, administered and commanded directly from Australia. The civil administration – the civil power in PNG – exercised no powers of control or financial management over these forces. The transition from colony to independent nation in the matter of defence would, therefore, involve the transfer of the complete range of civilian powers over the military establishment from Australia to PNG. This transfer could not build on any existing tradition of domestic defence responsibilities in PNG, as had been the case in former British colonies in Africa.

CHAPTER II

THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY POWER -
FROM 1969 TO THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE

PART A - INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the process of military decolonisation in PNG is discussed and some of the problems of defence planning are described. Defence development after 1969 has to be placed in the wider context of political change in PNG. Prior to 1969 political change in PNG was characterised by policies of "gradualism", emphasis on economic rather than political development and, at the same time, the granting of increased legislative and executive powers. After 1969, however, Australian policies were those of quite rapid decolonisation and disengagement from PNG.¹

In the pre-1969 era of gradual development, the House of Assembly had evolved as a "National" parliament with an embryo ministerial system in which proto-ministers exercised power jointly with officials over a limited range of subjects.² At the same time the Administrator's Executive Council was developing as a "cabinet" for the exercise of executive ministerial functions.

¹ For similar interpretations see: R. S. Parker, "Papua New Guinea 1966-70" in Greenwood and Harper (eds.), Australia in World Affairs, 1966-70, Cheshire for The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 1974; and D. W. Hegarty, "The 1972 Elections in Papua New Guinea", Australia's Neighbours, Fourth Series, No 80, April-June 1972, pages 5-8.

² In the first House of Assembly (1964-68) Parliamentary Under-Secretaries were appointed. Their role was little more than under-studying of officials. A system of Ministerial and Assistant Ministerial Members was introduced for the Second House of Assembly. Their powers, at first limited to the joint exercise of power with officials in the case of Ministerial Members and the right "to be consulted" in the case of Assistant Ministerial Members,

The accelerated tempo of political change after 1969 may be attributed to factors at work both in PNG and Australia. In January 1970 Australia's then Leader of the Opposition, Mr E.G. Whitlam, visited PNG and, breaking with the previously bipartisan approach in Australian politics to PNG matters, called for "home rule" as soon as possible after the 1972 House of Assembly elections. Whitlam argued that the fact of independence was not negotiable; the decision for independence was not one for the people of PNG alone but involved the responsibilities of the Australian Parliament and people as well.¹ By the time of Prime Minister Mr J.G. Gorton's visit to PNG in mid-1970 and the further devolution of power that he announced it was clear that both major political groupings in Australia were intent on rapidly disengaging from PNG.² In PNG there was also increasing evidence of pressure for political change marked by the turbulence and political activism on the Gazelle Peninsula, generated by the Mataungan Association and conflict on Bougainville between Bougainvilleans and the PNG Administration.³

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were substantially increased in March and August 1970. The areas of Ministerial responsibility were increased, the powers of the Assistants were increased and both categories were granted the right to act unilaterally, instead of jointly with their public service advisers. (P.J. Bayne and H.K. Colebatch, "Constitutional Development in Papua New Guinea, 1968-73. The Transfer of Executive Power", New Guinea Research Bulletin No 51, New Guinea Research Unit, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1973, pages 14-15, 22, 45, 64).

¹ See "Labor's Plan for New Guinea", Statement by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr E.G. Whitlam, Port Moresby, 12th January 1970.

² Bayne and Colebatch, op. cit., page 64.

³ Parker, loc. cit.

By 1971 the Australian Liberal Country Party Government had accepted the recommendation of the PNG Select Committee on Constitutional Development that full internal self-government should be sought during the life of the Third House of Assembly (1972-76). The Australian Government announced its willingness to negotiate on the timing of this change with the leader of any cohesive group which might emerge from the 1972 election.¹ Subsequently, these House of Assembly elections resulted in the country's first independently-formed government in April 1972 - a National Coalition of members from several parties and independents led by the Pangu Party leader, Mr Michael Somare.²

Soon after being elected to office, Somare announced that he would seek self-government within nine to eighteen months and, following negotiations in May 1973 between PNG and the newly elected Australian Labor administration, PNG was granted self-government on 1 December 1973.³ After the trouble-free introduction of self-government, which had confounded many expatriate "prophets of doom", Mr Somare announced to the House of Assembly in March 1974 that his Government would seek full independence by December 1974.⁴ Notwithstanding the declaration

¹ Hegarty, op. cit., page 5.

² ibid.

³ Post Courier, 9 May 1972 and Australian Foreign Affairs Record, May 1973, Text of a communique released on 22 May 1972.

⁴ During this period the Australian Government remained committed to a policy of early independence for PNG on the basis that the difference between independence and self-government was of little practical significance to PNG and independence flowed readily from self-government. Australia was also concerned to speed the transition to independence because of what the Australian Minister responsible for PNG affairs termed the "anomalous position which can only be resolved at independence" of Australia being formally responsible for PNG's law, order and good government whilst these responsibilities had been, in part, conferred on the PNG Government

of the PNG Chief Minister on the timing of independence doubt as to the prospective independence date persisted in mid-1974. There was opposition from PNG groups to independence during 1974 and the programme for the introduction of a "homegrown" Constitution for PNG lagged behind the schedule agreed to by the PNG and Australian governments in May 1973 and behind subsequently amended schedules.¹ At the time of writing it was likely that independence would be delayed until 1975. By 1974, however, the timing of independence was a question of months rather than years and early independence was recognised as inevitable.

In the defence sphere the first transfer of limited functions to local political authority took place in August 1972 with the appointment of a Ministerial Spokesman for Defence. Mr Somare assumed this function in addition to his other duties as Chief Minister, announcing that the introduction of the office would permit effective defence consultation between PNG and Australia in the development of PNG forces.² In August 1973 these limited defence responsibilities were assumed by Mr A.M. Kiki in a combined portfolio of Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade. The introduction of a measure of local political responsibility for defence matters from August 1972 onwards thus marked the first stage in the transfer of political

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by the act of self-government. (See Hon W.L. Morrison, MP, Minister for External Territories, "Labor's Policy for Papua New Guinea", address to the Victorian Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne, 2 April 1973).

¹ Communique of 22 May 1973, op. cit., and Canberra Times, 24 June 1974. The report of the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) is scheduled to be debated during the 1974 Budget session of the House of Assembly.

² Bayne and Colebatch, op. cit., Statement in the House of Assembly by the Chief Minister, Mr M. Somare, on the constitutional talks of July-August 1972, 31 August 1972, pages 163-165.

control over the defence power . With these changes defence was now to be seen as an important facet of the decolonisation process .

The transfer of defence and foreign affairs powers is almost always the hallmark of independence for former colonies and this was particularly true in the case of PNG whose colonial relationship to Australia had largely grown out of defence considerations . Because strategic matters were an important underlying basis of the relationship between PNG and Australia, defence disengagement was also likely to reflect the complexities of post-independence relations between the two countries .¹ The transfer of military power in PNG may be viewed in terms of three distinct processes: first, strategic reappraisal of PNG's defence significance to Australia; secondly, the development of an indigenous military organisation adapted to the defence needs and budgetary resources of PNG; and thirdly, the process by which the colonial military heritage is adapted to the PNG political system .² These three processes may be seen in relation to two identifiable periods after 1969 . The first period extends from 1969 until the assumption of office by Mr Somare's Government in April 1972 . Until then PNG defence planning and development had been conducted by Australia on a proxy basis without consultation with PNG's political leaders . The second period extending from April 1972 up to and beyond independence is characterised by

¹ See C . Crocker, The Military Transfer of Power in Africa: A Comparative Study of Change in the British and French Systems of Order, John Hopkins University Ph.D. Thesis, 1972, University Microfilms, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Crocker makes a similar point in relation to the African states:

"The Military transfer reflects the weight of Colonial history more clearly and for a longer period of time than do most other aspects of the transfer of power" (page 2) .

² These three aspects of the transfer of military power have been adapted from the three stages suggested by Crocker (op. cit.) in the transfer of military power to black African states .

increasing consultation between Australia and PNG and the actual transfer of defence responsibilities and initiative from the metropole to the colony.¹

A number of general issues emerge from a discussion of the transfer of defence power in PNG between 1969 and 1974. These issues concern the changing strategic relationship between Australia and PNG, the effect of the Australian style of colonial rule on defence administration and the relationship between Australian and Papua New Guinean approaches to defence force development in PNG.

The close strategic link between PNG and Australia described in Chapter I has been an important determinant in the transfer of military power in PNG. Post-Second World War defence arrangements in PNG (to describe them in terms of a policy would imply a status they probably never had) bore evidence of this defence nexus. The defence units in PNG, principally the PIR, were integral units of the Australian Services, under direct mainland command and paid for, totally, from the Australian defence budget. There was, therefore, no tradition in PNG similar to that in British colonies where indigenous military units were under some measure of local political control and in which military development was connected with the notion of colonial self-defence as a necessary pre-condition for self-government.

¹ Because the PNG defence planning process has been shrouded in secrecy and only occasionally illuminated by brief official statements and terse press releases, it is difficult to discuss the process critically or in detail. Even in a supposed era of "open government" after December 1972 there was no observable increase in Australian Government candour in relation to PNG defence, although PNG officials and politicians were often prepared to discuss these matters in university seminars and in interviews.

Although the close strategic link between Australia and her colony was prolonged into the 1960's by Indonesian confrontation, by 1969 changes in Indonesia as well as fundamental global trends had weakened this linkage; by 1974 these trends were even more clearly evident. There was a realisation that technological changes in a nuclear age, as well as changes in the character of international relations, had reduced the likelihood of conventional military invasion via PNG. Furthermore, the era of decolonisation and later the Vietnam war which demonstrated the political costs of strategies of "Forward Defence" forced change on Australian Governments in their attitude towards PNG. Political and strategic disengagement from PNG had been largely accepted by the end of the Liberal Country Party tenure in office but these changes were represented in a far more dramatic way by the coming to office of the Whitlam Government in December 1972 and its disavowal of many of the old foreign and defence policy stances. The fundamental change in Australia's strategic perspective, from that which saw PNG as a vital forward bastion to one which, perhaps out of necessity, saw PNG as no more than of "abiding importance", allowed defence devolution to take place in PNG.

A second important issue in the PNG-Australian defence relationship has been the pattern of post-Second World War colonial rule in PNG which was marked by strong political control from Canberra and, for a colonial situation, remarkably little local political and administrative autonomy in PNG. The centralised system of Australian Government control in PNG naturally extended to the realm of defence administration also, thereby impeding the growth of local political and administrative control over defence in PNG. In consequence of the colonial tradition of control from Canberra, when the time came from 1972 onwards to transfer defence responsibilities to PNG there was no local expertise in defence administration, policy making or financial control. This not only compounded the problems of

the transfer process but also reduced the ability of PNG leaders to influence the pattern of defence force development.

The third issue that surrounds the transfer of defence power in PNG is the relationship between Australian and Papua New Guinean defence orientations. Although this issue is clouded by a lack of public comment the trend is reasonably clear. From the outset of the defence planning exercise in the early 1960's Papua New Guineans, with few exceptions as shown in Chapter I, accepted Australian defence assumptions which were based on PNG defending itself in a conventional manner against an Indonesian border incursion contingency. These assumptions led to force level prescriptions that were logically based on a military appreciation of the defence forces required to defend the PNG border. Australian Government statements up to 1969 show that this force was thought to be of brigade strength with naval and air forces, amounting to a total of about five thousand men. Australian planning for PNG defence forces up to 1972 appears deficient in two respects. It suffered from the absence of any consultation with PNG politicians and, as a result of its Australian military bias, it placed inadequate emphasis on the likely political, economic and social consequences of a defence force of this size on PNG.

After 1972 the "Australian-centredness" of defence planning was challenged and, under the Somare Government and as a result of the defence consultations process in PNG, the Australian defence assumptions regarding role and size were re-examined and criticized. Nonetheless and in spite of this Papua New Guinean reassessment, by April 1974 it was evident that PNG defence solutions differed remarkably little from what Australia had planned and in some cases already developed and Australian defence planning had therefore, in great measure, been accepted by Papua New Guinean leaders. This cycle of acceptance, questioning and then ultimate acceptance of Australian planning may

be seen as a result of the rapid onset of independence which reduced the scope for radical defence changes, the constraints posed by the virtual Australian monopoly on specialist defence advice, the political decision making process in PNG which tended to result in minimum change and, finally, the cold reality that PNG's defence forces would depend initially on what Australia was prepared to support with manpower and finance.

The conclusion that is reached is that PNG's defence forces at independence end up pretty much as if they had been designed completely by Australia and, therefore, the elaborate processes of planning and consultation in PNG may be seen essentially as a legitimisation of the Australian-developed defence forces.

PART B - DEFENCE DEVOLUTION IN PNG

Australian Initiatives

In the period between the ending of the Indonesian Confrontation threat and the slow down in PNG defence development and, the election of the Somare Government in 1972, little is known publicly of Australian defence planning in relation to PNG. Although the Vietnam war almost certainly dominated the attention of the Australian defence community throughout the period from 1969 to 1972, it may be assumed that the development of PNG forces received considerable attention within the Defence group of Departments. Probably connected with this activity was the visit to PNG of the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Henry Bland in March 1969.¹ His visit was followed by the establishment, in August 1969, of an Army planning cell in PNG Command which had the task of studying the future requirements of the Army in PNG.

¹ The Secretary visited PNG from 16-22 March 1969.

Although it was recognised that fundamental issues about defence force size and roles could not be determined in the absence of consultation with PNG leaders, there was scope prior to 1972 for further administrative development in preparation for the ultimate establishment of separate PNG forces at independence. To this end the command arrangements in PNG were evidently reviewed towards the end of 1971. As soon as Army planning for a future force for an independent PNG commenced in earnest it would have been evident that the future of naval and air elements would need to be considered concurrently. Although Australian military tradition and practice had been one of separate Service organisations, it would be unlikely that a country such as PNG with only very small forces could afford the organisational luxury of separate defence services and command structures. Nonetheless there may have been doubts about the wisdom of a single unified defence force. Dangers of a coup d'etat might have been seen in a monolithic defence organisation and, in terms of compatibility with Australian single Service procedures and systems, it might have been thought preferable for Australia to train and support forces in PNG which organisationally and procedurally resembled her own Services.

In the probable absence of Service consensus on integration and as a conservative preparatory step it was decided, in 1972, to establish a Joint Force Headquarters located at Port Moresby and based on the Army Command Headquarters.¹ Under the

¹ Department of Defence Press Release 493/72 of 1 February 1972, Formation of Joint Forces Headquarters, Papua New Guinea (Statement by the Minister for Defence, the Hon. David Fairbairn, D.F.C., M.P.):

"... it had been decided to form a Joint Force Headquarters for the naval, army and air units in Papua New Guinea to replace the existing three Service command arrangements.

... as announced previously, the kinds of forces required to meet the needs of an emerging independent Papua New Guinea was under study. One matter on which it was

Joint Force concept the commander – an Army brigadier – would, with several minor exceptions, command the Army, Navy and Air Force units located in PNG. Command of the individual Service elements was to be exercised through Service Component Commanders. It was expected that the new command arrangements would lead to the better coordination of the activities and the future development of the three Services in PNG. The Commander would report directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and this relationship would facilitate more effective communication between the Commander of the Joint Force in PNG and the Department of Defence in Canberra which would, henceforth, exercise a principal and controlling interest in the development of PNG forces. Previously effective control had, in the first instance, resided with individual Services. By this change it was, however, still not evident whether there would ultimately be an integrated Defence Force in PNG, or three forces operating under joint command arrangements. Nor did the new arrangement apparently place the Commander under any form of local civilian control in PNG

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considered immediate action could be taken was to form a Joint Force Headquarters to facilitate economical and effective administration and control of the forces.

... such a Headquarters, with a Joint Force Commander, made practical sense for the relatively small forces Papua New Guinea would be likely to have in the foreseeable future, and it would also promote a greater mutual awareness among the PNG Defence forces themselves.

The Minister said that the Joint Forces Headquarters would be formed at Port Moresby today (1st February) and be established by the middle of the year.

The present Army Headquarters would be used as the basis on which to form the new Headquarters. The Army Commander, PNG Command, would become the first Joint Force Commander and would be responsible to the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee. He would discharge his responsibilities in respect of naval, army and air forces through Component Commanders."

although there may have been some strengthening of the consultative and liaison relationship between the Military Commander and the Administrator.

Events during 1970 had certainly called for closer cooperation between the civil and military authorities in PNG. Confrontation between the Mataungan Association and the PNG Administration and Police on the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain had involved preparations for the use of PNG forces, especially the PIR, to assist the Police in the maintenance of order. A Call Out order had been issued by the Governor-General (on the recommendation of the Administrator and advice of the Australian Government) and PNG troops were for a time held at a high degree of readiness. In the event they were not employed and the Call Out order was subsequently revoked.¹ This crisis may also have led to the reassessment of the future relationship of the indigenous military units in PNG to the civil administration. The Army in PNG had embarked on a crash programme of "aid to the civil power" training in riot control techniques and the possibilities of Army involvement in aid to the civil power in some future situation, which might prove beyond the capabilities of the Police to control, no doubt led to a fuller realisation that the PNG Army would henceforth need to be seen as an integral part of the security resources available to the PNG Administration. The need for a closer working relationship in PNG between the Administration and the military force was apparent and the likelihood of further incidents requiring military assistance to the civil administration would have made it advisable to specify the internal security role of the Force in greater detail.

¹ For a fuller account of these events, see R.J. O'Neill, The Army in Papua New Guinea, Current Role and Implications for Independence, ANU Press, Canberra, 1971.

Nonetheless there appears to have been no attempt, even at this comparatively late stage to place the Joint Force and its Commander in any way under the command of, or in some other form of subordination to, the head of the civil administration. There was, therefore, a continuation of the direct control of the military forces in PNG through exclusively military channels of authority to Canberra. Better liaison between the military and civil administration would have done nothing either, to change the visible system of command, or to establish a tradition of working civil-military relationships within PNG involving precepts of local civil control over the military. The introduction of a routine process of interaction between the military and local civil authorities in PNG which might have promoted a constitutional tradition of civil supremacy over the military was, therefore, further delayed.

Changes Under a PNG Government

To some extent the post-1969 pause in the development of policies for the structure and role of forces for an independent PNG ended with the formation of the Somare National Coalition Government in April 1972. Prior to April 1972 attempts to involve Papua New Guineans in defence planning and to devolve defence responsibilities had almost certainly been impeded by the absence of a truly responsible form of ministerial national government from which authoritative views on PNG's future defence orientation and policies could be derived. There may also have been an Australian Government inhibition, possibly involving security considerations, about discussing defence development proposals with PNG politicians when it was doubtful whether they would have national leadership responsibility in the future. After the formation of the Somare Government, however, the way was cleared for a process of government-to-government defence consultation and planning to be initiated. In August 1972, some four months after the formation of the Somare Government a

significant step in the transfer of military power was taken with the appointment of a Ministerial Spokesman for Defence . At the same time it was announced that a Defence Section would be established to support the Spokesman for Defence .

Although several commentators prior to 1972 had called on the Australian Government to devise the means whereby PNG leaders could become more actively associated with defence matters this demand was not strongly taken up in PNG by the principal political parties until the 1972 elections . Though none of the major political parties – the United, Pangu, and Peoples' Progress Parties – initially called for the appointment of a defence spokesman in their party policy statements published before the election, Pangu did subsequently call for the appointment of a Defence Spokesman during the course of the campaign.¹

The appointment of a Spokesman was formally proposed to the PNG Government by the Australian Defence Minister, Mr D.E. Fairbairn, during a visit to PNG in June 1972. Fairbairn proposed that a Defence Spokesman be appointed to represent the PNG defence forces in the House of Assembly, where he would answer questions and deliver statements on behalf of the Australian Government to the House . He would be consulted by the Australian Government on all matters affecting the development of PNG's defence forces . Fairbairn proposed that the Defence Spokesman would be serviced by a small section within the Department of the Administrator, to be known as the Advisory Defence Section and headed by a seconded senior officer of the Australian Defence Department.²

¹ See "House of Assembly Elections 1972 . What Do Political Parties Want for Papua New Guinea?", Department of Information and Extension Services, Port Moresby, January 1972 .

² SMH, 16 June 1972 .

Whilst the Spokesman's role was seen by the Australian Government to be initially educative and consultative, it was envisaged that, progressively, the defence views of the PNG leaders would be incorporated in further development of the forces. The Spokesman's role would therefore develop into that of de facto defence minister prior to independence even although the formal exercise of defence powers (together with foreign affairs) would remain with the Australian Government until the moment of independence. The Somare Government agreed in outline to the Fairbairn proposals and Mr Somare became the Defence Spokesman in August 1972. In September 1972, Mr N.L. Webb was seconded as the head of the "Defence Branch".

The appointment of the Chief Minister, himself, as Defence Spokesman may be interpreted as an indication of Somare's view of the importance of the PNG Defence Force as posing either, a potential source of power to a future independent government, or if mishandled, a threat to democracy. It may also have indicated the Australian Government's keenness to have Somare as the Defence Spokesman and negotiator because of his authoritative position within the Government as Chief Minister and Party leader and hence his powerful decision making role in government. The appointment of the Chief Minister himself to the office of Defence Spokesman no doubt also served to accelerate the process by which the office of Defence Spokesman grew in authority and prestige, perhaps more rapidly than the Australian Liberal-Country Party Government may have anticipated.¹ By the end

¹ It was initially announced that the Defence Spokesman would be limited to the following functions (Bayné and Colebath, op. cit., page 163):

- "(a) answer parliamentary questions and make statements on defence matters;
- (b) consult the Administrator, present submissions to the Administrator's Executive Council (AEC),

of 1972 it had become evident that Somare's defence power extended beyond the right to be consulted to one of veto over new proposals for the development of the PNG defence forces and an influential "watching brief" over routine defence activities. Nonetheless PNG Government influence over defence throughout 1972 was significantly hampered by a complete lack of thought-out policies.

It seems that it was initially envisaged by the Australian Defence Department that Webb, as civilian defence adviser, would operate within the Administrator's Department, providing policy advice through the Administrator, to the Chief Minister.¹ Webb's

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in regard to the development of the PNG forces and defence policies; and

(c) undertake ceremonial duties".

¹ (See Financial Review, 27 April 1973, Christopher Ashton, "PNG's Armed Dilemma") and Department of Defence Press Release 581/72 of 4 October 1972:

"Secondment of Australian Defence Officer to Head Defence Branch, Department of the Administrator, Papua New Guinea :

Mr. N.L. Webb, a senior officer in the Australian Department of Defence, is to take up duty as Head of the Defence Branch established within the Department of the Administrator in Papua New Guinea, to advise and support the Administrator and the Ministerial Spokesman for Defence recently appointed in the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly.

The secondment of Mr. Webb follows an offer made by the Minister for Defence, during discussions with the Administrator's Executive Council in June this year. In making this offer the Minister for Defence commented that it was hoped that the Australian officer could be understudied and replaced later by a suitably trained and experienced indigenous officer.

During the Constitutional talks in August this year between the Minister for External Territories and the Papua New Guinea Chief Minister, at which it was agreed to create a position of Ministerial Spokesman for Defence, the Chief Minister indicated his acceptance of the offer by

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appointment within the Administrator's Department was, however, overtaken by the tempo of developments in PNG, especially by the formation of the Chief Minister's Office which was seen as a PNG-oriented structure to some extent insulated from entrenched Australian Public Servant influence within other parts of the PNG Administration. It was later agreed that Mr Webb and the Defence Branch would be located in the Chief Minister's Office. Clearly this change was required in order to secure the confidence of the Chief Minister and the PNG Government in Webb's task of defence planning for PNG. Any direct responsibilities to the Administrator and the Australian Department of Defence could easily have confronted Webb (whose appointment was designated Assistant Secretary Defence) with irresolvable problems of conflict of interest and this problem should have been anticipated by the Australian Government when his appointment was first suggested.

Besides supporting the Defence Spokesman, the Assistant Secretary Defence was responsible for advice to, and liaison with, the Joint Force Commander and it was apparently envisaged that, based on Australian traditions of civil-military relations, the Force Commander would only tender professional military advice to the Defence Spokesman whilst the civilian adviser would advise in regard to policy. In fact the Joint Force (and later Defence Force) Commander continued to have free access to the Defence Spokesman across the range of defence policy and administrative matters, especially in so far as they affected developmental

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the Minister for Defence to provide an Australian officer to head the Defence Branch.

Mr Webb has recently held the positions of Principal Executive Officer in the Policy Planning Branch and Chief Executive Officer in the Defence Planning Division of the Department of Defence in Canberra".

issues. This was facilitated by the Force Commander's excellent social relations with the Chief Minister (and Defence Spokesman); whereas, the relationship of the civilian defence adviser to the Chief Minister may have been more formal.¹

Australian Approaches To Colonial Military Policy

The eventual introduction of the "Defence Spokesman" formula raises the question as to why the change was not introduced earlier. Although the demand for some form of Defence Force representation within PNG may not have been forcefully articulated, the matter was raised by indigenous members in the House of Assembly as early as 1969² and the importance of representation

¹ Age 6 July 1973 and Personal Communication, May 1973.

² In March 1969, Mr Traimya Kambipi, a member of the House of Assembly, asked why it was that the PNG Administration had no control over the Army. He was informed that:

"The Administration does not control the Army here simply because all Army units in the Territory, including PNG Command, are part of the Australian Commonwealth Military Forces, and their costs are born directly by the Australian Commonwealth Government".

The member was not satisfied with the reply and on 24 June 1969 asked if the Army was represented within the House by an official member, and what were the plans for the Army in PNG. He was told that the Army was not represented and the Army's future was a matter for the Australian Government.

On 27 June 1969 Mr Yakob Talis sought the appointment of an additional official member to the House to represent the Army. Talis was informed that:

"The Army in PNG is at present part of the Australian Army and it would not be appropriate for an officer of the Australian Army to sit in this House. Questions relating to the Army are answered by the Senior Official Member after consultation with responsible Army offices".

These replies gave little encouragement to indigenous politicians who sought to bring the Army in PNG under some form of local accountability. (See H.A.D., Vol 2, part 4-5, 12 March 1969, page 1020; 23 June 1969, page 1248; 24 June 1969, page 1287; and 27 June, page 1404.)

as a means of "indigenising" the loyalties of PNG servicemen had been emphasised by several observers of PNG affairs.¹ It therefore appears that there was a reluctance based on Australian colonial policy to devolve defence responsibilities on PNG authorities in advance of political development in other sectors of PNG Government.

Australian approaches to colonial military policy may, however, be distinctively contrasted with the practice in British colonies where powers of command, control and recruitment and financial responsibilities in regard to military forces usually resided with the colonial government. This policy was very different to the close metropolitan control which, as shown in Chapter I, Australia exercised over the indigenous forces in PNG. British colonial military policy was, moreover, not an accident of administration but, instead, flowed from the British pattern of colonial rule, which was quite different from the Australian pattern in PNG. The British way of doing things was that:

"... each territory, large or small, should constitute, in form, a separate kingdom of the British Crown, with its own laws, its own finances and its own public service".²

¹ See Mediansky, op. cit., and R.S. Parker, "Papua New Guinea, The Emergent State", New Guinea, Vol 6, No 1, January 1974. Before the introduction of responsible ministerial government in April, 1972, it would have been possible only for the Administrator or a senior official, rather than an elected politician, to have exercised any defence function.

² Sir Charles Jeffries, Transfer of Power, Pall Mall, London, 1960, page 42.

It was therefore normal British colonial practice, dating from before the First World War, that colonial military forces were, in peace time, paid for, either wholly or in part, by the colonial authorities under whose ordinances they were raised and commanded.¹ In contrast to the command situation in PNG, the civil head of government in the former British colonies usually possessed the powers of commander-in-chief over local military forces – this power being exercised primarily for internal security functions.²

Crocker has argued that the British approach to colonial military policy was founded both on reasons of expediency and doctrine. Colonial military self-reliance for local defence relieved the British treasury of heavy colonial defence burdens although in practice, in the post-Second World War period, Britain did contribute to colonial internal security costs as well as paying for the defence forces maintained for strategic purposes. Colonial self-reliance was, however, also connected to Gladstonian colonial doctrine that self-government entailed self-reliance and accordingly, political development required that colonial governments also assumed responsibilities for their defence forces.³ Defence devolution of this kind, however, to a PNG Administrator would

¹ Crocker, op. cit., pages 4 and 151-152.

² ibid., and O'Neill, op. cit., and Jeffries, op. cit., page 34.

³ Crocker, op. cit., pages 53, 151, 191, 244.

always have been difficult in the post-Second World War period and it may be doubted whether any scheme of relations between the civil administration and the military, which amounted to more than consultation and liaison, could have been devised which was at once practical, legal and acceptable to the Australian Government of the day in terms of Australian colonial practice in PNG.

Under the Liberal-Country Party Government's long standing policy from 1949 onwards of centralizing decision-making in regard to PNG in the responsible Minister and his Department, the consequent role of the Administrator was, unlike his British colonial counterpart, little more than that of "delegate" (rather than a more powerful "representative") of the Australian Government. This policy which was clearly enunciated by the Australian Minister for Territories, Mr P.M.C. Hasluck, in 1951, remained in force until the post 1969 era of rapid decolonization. Hasluck's policy of centralization, which also had unmistakeable implications for colonial military arrangements, was justified as follows:

"... For some years to come, it is inevitable that Papua and New Guinea will be administered as a territory and that the administration will become increasingly centralized in Australia. This is due to the fact of the constitutional superiority of the Commonwealth Parliament, to the fact that the expenditure in the Territory will be financed by the Commonwealth, to the fact that the Commonwealth Government alone holds the responsibility before the world and (in the case of New Guinea) to the United Nations for administering the Territory according to certain standards and cannot delegate that responsibility to anyone else, and to the fact that the Commonwealth Government must of necessity maintain the security of the Territory and the observance in the Territory of the fundamental principles of national

policy. This centralization of administration will also be promoted and facilitated by the improvement of communications ..."¹

In the light of this policy in regard to civil government in PNG it was unlikely in the extreme that a proposal for the Administrator to assume significant defence responsibilities would have received Australian political support. There were besides, other reasons why devolution of defence powers had not taken place on the British colonial model.

As previously argued the defence of PNG had been seen, especially since the war with Japan, as integral to the defence of Australia. The forces in PNG, expanded in the mid-1960s in response to the perceived military threat from Indonesia, were an integral component of Australian defence forces and it would not have made sound military sense at the time for civilian layers of control in PNG to be inserted between elements of these forces. Furthermore, it could have been argued that, in regard to Papua, it was a Territory of Australia and, therefore, a special defence relationship between the civil and the military powers was as inappropriate as such an arrangement would have been, say, in the Northern Territory. Until PNG's constitutional future, including the possibility of some form of statehood, had been finally clarified in the late 1960's there was therefore a weak and rather theoretical argument for preserving the same military command relationships in PNG as applied elsewhere in Australia.

Nonetheless, by 1969-70 the obstacles to a measure of defence devolution would seem to have significantly diminished. The "threat" from Indonesia was no longer relevant as a result of political change and the PNG forces were to be seen increasingly

¹ P.M.C. Hasluck, ("A Policy for New Guinea", Address by the Minister for Territories to the William McGregor Club, Sydney, 20 November 1951 from South Pacific, January-February, 1952).

in an internal security context. As for the Australia-PNG strategic nexus, the long established view that the security of PNG was vital to Australian security was now considerably weakened, if not actually discredited. The reasons for this change in the Australian assessment of PNG's strategic relationship to Australia's own security were to be found both in revolutionary advances in military technology, such as the advent of land and submarine launched nuclear ballistic missiles, and changes in world politics, including the protection afforded by the ANZUS alliance. The first factor appeared to reduce the potential military importance of "invasion springboard" bases such as PNG and the second seemed to reduce the probability of a conventional military invasion of Australia. The gradual process of strategic reappraisal which Australia had experienced in relation to PNG during the fifties and sixties was later to be accelerated and confirmed by the course of military intervention in Vietnam. The "failure" of forward defence concepts in this conflict served to further diminish the credibility of similar notions of "forward defence" or "defence shield" arguments in respect of PNG.¹ This new strategic assessment fundamentally differed from the Australian Government and Opposition views in the immediate post-war period when it had been argued that PNG was vital, and hence indispensable, to Australia's future defence.²

¹ For an interesting discussion of post-war changes in the Australian perception of PNG's strategic significance, see: Owen Harries, "Australia and an Independent Papua New Guinea", South East Asian Spectrum, Vol 2, No 1, October 1973, pages 34-42.

² Even in the period associated with Indonesian Confrontation the authoritative Australian defence analyst, Dr T.B. Millar, was arguing that in military terminology PNG was only essential rather than vital to Australian security, thus implying a significant downgrading of its importance. ("The Defence of New Guinea", New Guinea, Vol 1, No 1, March/April 1965). By 1970, another writer, Peter Hastings, argued that PNG could not be considered as even essential to Australia's continental security in any of the principal security contingencies that he could envisage, namely, nuclear war, conventional war in South East Asia, subversion, or internal rebellion in PNG. (The Future", New Guinea, Vol 5, No 1, /Continued

Strategic reappraisal facilitated the process of colonial disengagement by greatly reducing the "apparent!" costs to Australian national interests by withdrawal from PNG. Furthermore, by 1970 PNG's future as an independent nation had been sealed and this fact alone should have accelerated the devolution of defence responsibilities.

The failure to devolve at least some defence powers before August 1972 had several potentially far reaching consequences. First, it still further delayed the development of a tradition of civil control over the PNG forces in PNG which might have provided a more sound basis on which Papua New Guinean political, bureaucratic and military leaders would conduct their civil-military affairs after independence. Secondly, the absence of a working interaction between the civil and military in PNG resulted in the failure of the PNG forces to be effectively identified and accepted by the local people as an integral aspect of PNG Government. The force was, instead, widely seen as an Australian institution, operated,

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April 1970). In official defence papers the term "abiding" now generally replaced that of vital in relation to PNG's strategic importance to Australia and in the comprehensive Australian Government's Defence Review of 1972 the importance of PNG was even less precisely stated:

"... It may be assumed ... that, for historical as well as strategic reasons, Australia will always be closely concerned that its near neighbour in the North East are independent and secure from external threats ... It is to be hoped that it will share the interest of Australia and its other neighbours in cooperating to safeguard mutual interests". (page 5) "and ... If an option of strategic importance is not to be foreclosed, Australia will also need to sustain the ability of its forces to assist in the external defence of Papua New Guinea..." (page 21). (Australian Defence Review, Department of Defence, March 1972).

paid for, and controlled by Australia.¹ Thirdly, because there was no interaction between the military and the civil administration there had been no development of defence administration and policy expertise within the PNG bureaucracy. Consequently, when there was eventually the need for it after August 1972 with the appointment of a Defence Spokesman, it had to be hurriedly exported from within the Australian defence organisation, with the result that defence policy development was to take place at the official level in PNG without the background experience derived from working within the PNG Public Service and socio-political environment.

One may speculate that, if the pre-war proposals in both territories to establish defence forces under local ordinances (See Chapter I) had been implemented, a quite different relationship between the indigenous PNG military forces and the Australian Government might have emerged. A post-war force established under its own ordinance with, say, arrangements for the secondment of Australian servicemen and subject to financial management by the PNG Administration might have had a relationship closely resembling that of the PNG Police and the Civil Administration, rather than that which grew up between the Army in PNG, the Australian Services and the PNG Administration. The organisational identification of the indigenous military units with the Australian Army and command structure prevented the full adaptation to PNG conditions, whilst providing inadequate insulation from Australian procedures and political imperatives – especially those associated

¹ All defence costs incurred in PNG were included in the Australian defence budget and indistinguishable from other defence costs. Even by 1973 it was still not possible for officials to accurately determine the cost of PNG defence activities, partly because of invisible costs such as the training of PNG personnel in Australia and logistic support for the PNG forces from Australian ordnance depots. During 1973 there was still no effective official liaison permitted between the Defence Force Secretary (the official responsible for financial administration) and the PNG Department of Finance in regard to the adoption of common financial procedures.

with the employment of military units on internal security.¹

Initial Public Discussion of PNG's Defence Policies

Although by the appointment of the Defence Spokesman it had now been accepted that the PNG Government would henceforth play a major role in initiating, in consultation with Australia, new emphasis and directions in defence force development, PNG was handicapped in two respects. First, no clear defence policy had been evolved by PNG's political leaders as a basis for this development and secondly, the Somare Government was serviced by a small, newly formed, civilian defence staff which had not yet developed policy alternatives on which the PNG political leadership might base policy decisions. This lack of defence policy is reflected in PNG Government pronouncements on defence matters during the early months of the Coalition Government.

Immediately before coming to office and prior to assuming his Defence Spokesman role, Somare had argued publicly that, the PNG Army was already sufficiently large (with the implication that the establishment of a third battalion of the PIR, suggested

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(See: Defence Report 1973, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973, pages 33-43, and Personal Communication January 1974).

¹ Attitudes to the use of military units in PNG to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of security were largely determined in accordance with Australian practice rather than PNG conditions and bore little relevance to PNG's political future. Had PNG's military forces been subject to a measure of domestic control in PNG, Australia might have seen its law and order responsibilities, as PNG approached independence, as less politically onerous. This may have produced less pressure for precipitate independence by the Whitlam Government after December 1972 and may have altered the prospects for post-independence political stability.

by the departing Army Commander, Brigadier R.T. Eldridge, should not go ahead) and, that the Army was too expensive to maintain.¹ By December of 1972, however, Somare was discounting rumours of reducing the Army's size although there was still no policy on the role, size and shape of the PNG Defence Force.² The staff studies within the PNG Government's defence section had only just got under way, the views of his Cabinet had not been canvassed and because of Australia's crucial supporting role, PNG's future defence policy could only really be determined after extensive joint defence consultations which had yet to take place. There was also a new factor introduced by the election of a new Australian Labor Government in December 1972.

The Somare Government's new defence influence was, at best, largely exercised in terms of initiating public debate in PNG about defence, questioning existing policies and lines of development and exploring what might be the nature of the role of the Army in PNG after independence. These issues were discussed in a two-part programme entitled The Sword and the State and broadcast on ABC Radio in PNG during November 1972. The Chief Minister, the PNG Joint Force Commander (Brigadier J.W. Norrie) and other politicians and servicemen participated in these programmes. In them

¹ Post Courier 20 April 1972. Mr Somare made these comments on 17 April 1972, the same day that he announced that Pangu would be able to form a coalition government. His comments were based on a belief that the Army in PNG was 5,000 men-strong and that the Army budget was \$30 million per annum, whereas in fact there were only 3,200 men in the Army and the \$30 million figure was likely to have been a considerable over-estimate.

² See Ulf Sundhaussen, What Future Role for the Armed Forces in Papua New Guinea, paper delivered at the Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, May 1973, pages 13-15. See also the amended and updated version of this paper: "New Guinea's Army, A political role", New Guinea, Vol 8, No 2, July 1973.

Somare argued that the PNG Army should not change in size, admitting that he had previously argued whilst in opposition during 1971 that the Army should be much smaller. Somare also discussed the likely role of the Army in internal security and the relationship of the Army to politics. He conceded that in a "real national emergency" the Government would have to consider calling in the Army if the Police could not maintain law and order. In relation to civil-military affairs, whilst he agreed that the Police and Army should be kept out of politics, he said it would not be good to isolate the Army from the rest of the community.¹

In an address to PNG officer cadets at the Military Cadet School, Lae, in December 1972, Mr Somare argued that PNG would require a Defence Force able to defend itself against aggression until help arrived.² In the ABC programme in November he had already suggested that this help would come from Australia if required, thus introducing the issue of post-independence treaty arrangements between the two countries. At the address to the officer cadets and again on 15 December 1972 Somare saw the Army making a major impact on development and nation building through rural development projects. In the same month Mr Somare rejected a proposal for the PNG Army to become part of a United Nations force within the South Pacific and placed under UN control. Mr Somare argued that if PNG

¹ Post Courier, 10 November, 1972. As reported by Sundhaussen, op. cit., Mr Somare had presumably sensed some "simmering disenchantment" among local officers as a result of his early defence statements and, consequently, during the later half of 1972, placed emphasis on improving relations between the Government and the military. He did this most effectively in his role as Defence Spokesman by meeting with senior local officers both officially and socially. Somare's statements on defence in early 1972 and the imputed defence views of the Pangu-led Government had created considerable unease and mistrust amongst PNG officers and men in early 1972; this had dissipated by the end of the year. (Personal Communication, May 1973).

² PNG Government Press Release, No 3438, 4 December 1972.
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was to be an independent nation it would need its own defence force in order to protect its national interests.¹

By the end of 1972, therefore, Somare had presented views, if not policy, on the size, role, and civil-military relations of PNG's forces - views which were in varying degrees demonstrably Papua New Guinean in origin. These first months of the Somare Government which had witnessed the appointment of Defence Spokesman and increasing public discussion of PNG defence issues represented an initial politicization of defence as a PNG matter rather than an administrative function of the metropolitan power as it had been seen in the past. Although defence had been discussed by PNG politicians and others in a critical manner, there was as yet no actual policy development.

PART C - THE FORMATION OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA DEFENCE FORCE (PNG DF) AND THE EMERGENCE OF A PNG DEFENCE POLICY (JANUARY 1973-APRIL 1974)

Whilst the first months of the Somare Government saw public discussion of PNG defence issues but little evidence of Government policy, two events in early 1973 clarified PNG's future defence arrangements and cleared the way for further decision making. These were the formation of a single Defence Force and the visit of the Australian Minister for Defence to PNG during which Labor Government policy in relation to PNG's Defence Force was discussed.

The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNG DF) came into being on 26 January 1973 by the act of redesignating its forerunner,

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At this address Somare again discounted rumours that his Government was intending to reduce the size of PNG's forces.

¹ Post Courier, 13 December 1972. The proposal had been put forward by ALP Federal Parliamentarian Dr D.N. Everingham.

the PNG Joint Force.¹ The formation of the PNG DF, which was later described as "a logical step in the development of a local force and the closer identification of the force with PNG", finally resolved the issue of defence integration.² The decision to form an integrated single Defence Force, rather than persevere with three separate service components under some form of unified command, recognised the benefits of rationalization and economy which might be obtained in a country with meagre economic resources. This decision was in a way a bold one in recognizing PNG's own particular defence needs and in moving away from Australian defence practice.

The formation of the PNG DF was initially, however, an act of redesignation, not far-reaching change. The subsequent implementation of change occurred progressively and gradually through 1973 and 1974. Development of the new force was supervised by a significantly enlarged headquarters organisation. Paradoxically, the establishment of the PNG DF, although designed as a step forward in the development of a self-reliant local Defence Force, resulted in a very significant increase in senior and middle level Australian officers serving on the headquarters of the PNG DF.³

¹ Notified in the Commonwealth Gazette, 22 February 1973. Brigadier J.W. Norrie, OBE, the Joint Force Commander, was appointed to command the newly designated force. As under the former Joint Force Command arrangement, Brigadier Norrie, the Commander of the PNG DF, was responsible directly to the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee.

² Defence Report 1973, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973, pages 8 and 9.

³ The new expanded headquarters organisation had been designed during 1972 by the PNG Joint Force Commander and his staff and subsequently approved by the Australian Department of Defence. The responsibility for the development of the new organisation was primarily left in the hands of the "men-on-the-spot" so that it would be in harmony with local developments. Based on the pre-existing headquarters organisation, the new HQ PNG DF

During the January 1973 visit of the Australian Defence Minister, Mr L.H. Barnard, to inaugurate the PNG DF, the Minister served notice of the newly elected Labor Government's policy in relation to PNG's Defence Force. He announced that henceforth PNG would be expected to make the decisions on the role and future of her own Defence Force - PNG's own view of the roles and functions of this force would be paramount. PNG would be expected to exercise foresight to develop a Defence Force properly attuned to PNG's needs as an independent nation. The Australian Defence Minister also indicated the general course of future Australian-PNG defence relations. Australia would be prepared, after PNG's independence, to contribute to the maintenance of the PNG DF in such fields as: "staff, facilities, and courses for training; operational and technical assistance; supply of equipment". This assistance would not be completely open-ended. Barnard explained that he expected that PNG would wish to take on a gradually increasing share of her own defence burden. The Australian Minister suggested that a start could be made by PNG paying the day-to-day defence costs such as the pay and allowances of her own personnel.¹

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appeared to be a dramatic expansion in both the number of officers on the establishment and the escalation of rank levels. The development of what might have been seen as a top-heavy structure was justified on the grounds that the new rank levels bore comparison with other PNG Government departments and secondly, expansion was warranted in order to develop new spheres of administrative and planning capability now required because of the PNG DF's imminent status independent from the Australian defence organisation. (See Age, 6 July 1973).

¹ For Barnard's PNG defence statements see Post Courier, 26, 27, 29 January 1973. Mr Barnard suggested the maximum financial contribution that PNG could afford would be A\$4 million - the current estimate of the indigenous personnel wages and allowances bill. It was apparently not spelt out in negotiations whether the \$4 million figure was a target to be reached at once or over a number of years. Not long after the Barnard visit the indigenous wages and allowances bill was assessed to have risen to A\$6 million

In regard to ALP policy on PNG defence, by which the Minister was bound, the December 1972 election won by Labor had been contested on the basis of the Platform approved by the 1971 Federal Conference. In this document, Labor undertook to second and support skilled personnel as requested by PNG for her defence force. In addition the Party undertook to seek a defence treaty with PNG. This commitment was, however, later revoked at the 1973 Federal Conference after Labor came into office. In more general terms, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Whitlam, in his policy speech opening the 1972 election campaign had listed the achievement of "a secure, united and friendly Papua New Guinea" as the second of four principal foreign policy commitments.¹

The Australian Defence Minister's public commitment in January 1973 to provide support for the PNG DF was, therefore, consonant with ALP policy. In recognizing the continued necessity of reliance by the PNG DF on Australian resources, the Barnard policy was, furthermore, largely a continuation of policies enunciated by the previous Liberal-Country Party Government.

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- a more difficult figure to reach. Although Barnard alluded to the paramountcy of the PNG view of the future role of the PNG DF, the Minister volunteered his own opinion. He saw the role of the PNG DF as protecting PNG's security - a task which did not include the policing of internal order. Mr Barnard also saw a constructive, peaceful role for the PNG DF - he noted that he was attracted to the Chief Minister's idea "that the PNG DF should be capable of assisting in national development".

¹ The clause relating to a defence treaty was removed following the recommendations of the ALP Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Committee. The Committee Report did, however, restate the Party's commitment to financial and personnel support for PNG's Defence Force. It seems that the treaty provision was removed because of fears that a rigid treaty arrangement might possibly lead to Australian military intervention in PNG's internal affairs. A looser more informal type of defence arrangement was now

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The March 1972 Defence Review prepared under that Government, in foreshadowing the formation of the PNG DF, had observed that until independence "emphasis will need to be placed on the training and equipment of local forces, and arrangements for their administrative support in PNG, in order to provide a basic national force for defence and internal security". And, in the period after independence defence assistance to PNG might be required to continue at significant levels in the areas of "training, organisation and support of local forces, secondment of personnel to staff and technical appointments, and the supply of equipment and the development of technical infrastructure".¹

Despite the change of name, the introduction of the Bird of Paradise national emblem as the dress insignia of the PNG DF and the indications of Australian policy in relation to PNG defence, many questions about the PNG DF had yet to be decided – important among them were those of the size and shape, role, and function of the PNG DF within the PNG polity. As planning got under way during 1973 it became apparent that there was less scope for innovation than had been realized at the outset. Although Barnard had sought to encourage PNG to attune her defence forces to her own needs, defence was not a tabula rasa.

There were already forces and systems in existence in PNG and a small indigenous officer corps with entrenched professional attitudes. There was the matter of what changes Australia would be prepared to underwrite in financial and manpower terms in the

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preferred. This preference may now have been shared by the Department of Defence. See: Post Courier, 20 July 1973 and Claire Clark, (ed.), Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment, Cassell, Melbourne, 1973, pages 204, 211-212.

¹ Australian Defence Review, Department of Defence, Canberra, March, 1972, pages 21 and 29.

future . There was also the constraint on change posed by the rapid onset of independence . Besides the practical limitations of what could be achieved in the time remaining under Australian rule, there were indigenous political constraints to change . The PNG decision-making process at both the bureaucratic and political levels, based on a concept of Melanesian Consensus, in relation to defence matters frequently meant the politics of "minimum change" . Wider defence options were probably already foreclosed and radical defence restructuring had been pre-empted by the forces in existence . In that sense, therefore, many of the options which may have been thought to be available to PNG politicians and defence planners, including some form of "Peoples Army" model, drastically reducing the size of the defence force, or forming a single security force – with integrated Police and Defence components – were largely illusory .¹ It follows that the consultation and planning

¹ For instance in early 1973 the Speaker of the House of Assembly, Mr B.B. Holloway proposed that the PNG DF should be disbanded and replaced by a 250 man Special Services Unit . This suggestion seems to have been effectively countered in discussions with indigenous leaders principally on the grounds that such radical changes close to independence might have disastrous destabilizing effects . Mr Holloway later dropped the proposal . Similarly the reported suggestion by the Minister for External Territories (Mr W.L. Morrison) of converting one of the PIR battalions into a Police Field Force unit was not pursued, partly for the same reason . The concept of a single Security Force may have been considered by the Department of Defence during 1972 and appears to have had considerable civilian support, especially within the Department of External Territories . The concept was strongly opposed by the military in PNG who emphasised the discrete external defence function of a military force compared to that of the Police . The proposal was finally scotched in May 1973 when the PNG Cabinet agreed that a separate Defence Force would be needed in PNG . Radical reorganisation proposals for the PNG Public Service were also dropped . The prospects of early independence had tended to focus planning and problem solving on the practical issues of administrative development, localization and the transfer of formal responsibilities . (See SMH, 12, 19 March, 27, 30 April 1973, Canberra Times, 31 March 1973, Age, 6 July 1973) .

which subsequently took place was, in a way, largely an exercise in politically legitimizing the force which Australia had established.

The defence planning and policy development process in both PNG and Australia intensified from late 1972 onwards with the commencement of defence consultations between PNG and Australia at the official and ministerial level.¹ These initial discussions seem to have been primarily exploratory in character and allowed for the exchange of planning information. The planning process as it developed appears to have been conducted on the basis of coordinated and parallel studies in Canberra and Port Moresby and marked by a continual exchange of conferences, visits and exchange of documents. To support these consultations and to develop policy options on both sides, a quite elaborate committee structure evolved. Routine coordination of PNG defence matters within the Australian Defence Department was the responsibility of a small secretariat of civilian and military officers. Matters were referred by this staff, as necessary, to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Defence Committee and the Minister for consideration. Because of the increasing tempo of events in PNG it was evidently necessary late in 1972 to establish an inter-departmental committee on PNG defence matters so as to ensure proper coordination between the Service Departments on PNG defence planning and allow for consultation with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and External Territories who also had an interest in PNG defence arrangements.²

¹ Department of Defence Press Release, 85/73 of 17 May 1973 and 248/74 of 5 April 1974.

² A further organisational change was the appointment in January 1974 of a senior civilian defence official, Mr J. Bennetts, as Australian Defence Representative in Port Moresby. This official was responsible for representing Australian defence policy to the PNG Government as well as tendering Australian defence advice to the PNG High Commissioner (formerly, Administrator), relieving the PNG DF Commander of this function which was no longer appropriate to his role as Commander of a PNG-oriented organisation. (The commander of the PNG DF presumably

Whilst the Australian defence group involved with PNG matters consisted of a relatively homogeneous team (essentially the Service Departments with a Foreign Affairs input) the PNG side consisted of two semi-autonomous groups - the PNG DF (primarily a military group)¹ and the Department of the Chief Minister, which included the Assistant Secretary Defence and his Defence Branch staff (a civilian group). Because of this and the need to take account of an increasing Papua New Guinean contribution to the policy making process, the PNG defence planning environment was probably more complex than in the case of Australia.

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continued to have the responsibility for tendering professional military advice to the High Commissioner in relation to PNG defence matters). The appointment of a senior official in Port Moresby, reporting directly to the Secretary of the Defence Department, might have been expected to reduce the need to refer matters of a more routine nature to Canberra and to enhance liaison between the PNG Defence Branch and the Australian Defence Department. The appointment might also have been seen as a countervailing influence on "authority" of the Defence Force Commander who may formerly have been able to strengthen his bargaining position by claiming to represent the Australian Defence "view" in his dealings with the PNG political leadership and officials. After January, the Department was now represented personally at a senior level.

¹The civilian component of the PNG DF was headed by a Defence Force Secretary (a senior Australian public servant formerly with the Department of the Army). The Force Secretary was responsible for financial functions including pay and audit, (the Force Commander not the Force Secretary retained executive financial responsibilities), civil personnel and the registry. Whilst the Force Secretary or his delegate participated in virtually all planning activities, a military viewpoint, with which the Secretary did not always agree, usually predominated. (Personal Communication May 1973).

Within the Defence Force and the Joint Force prior to January 1973, development planning appears to have been the responsibility of a Director of Plans (colonel) and a small military planning staff.¹ Headquarters officers and unit commanders were also routinely consulted and involved in planning project teams; planning was not conducted in isolation by the planning group alone. In addition, the PNG DF Commander (Brigadier Norrie) and his predecessor (Brigadier Eldridge) devoted a considerable proportion of their time to development issues. The manner in which planning was conducted within the PNG DF, by the thorough "staffing" of papers and frequent planning conferences, meant that it was usual for a Defence Force "party line" to emerge on each issue, prior to discussions with PNG Government officials.

On the side of the PNG Government, defence planning was primarily the responsibility of the small Defence Branch which operated through 1973 with between two and four civilian officers.² The planning resources of this group were clearly limited in comparison to the large Defence Force headquarters staff. To augment this policy group and provide a forum for the discussion of issues, an inter-departmental committee, the PNG Defence Policy Working Group (DPWG), was established in December 1972 in preparation for the first official defence talks between PNG and Australia. This committee appears to have been an important body throughout 1973-74 for the discussion of policy and for the establishment of the official PNG defence view, integrating civilian and Defence Force contributions.

¹ This organisation, which grew out of the Army Planning Cell established in 1969 contained Land, Air and Maritime planning officers of the rank of major or equivalent.

² These were: The Assistant Secretary, another Australian member of the PNG Public Service (formerly an Australian Intelligence Corps colonel) and two indigenous public servants. In early 1974, Mr Webb was replaced as Assistant Secretary by Mr Noel Levy, the senior of the PNG public servants, but Webb remained as his adviser.

In a similar way to that in which the Defence Force established its policy position, the Defence Branch produced its own working papers for DPWG sessions. The Defence Branch position seems, usually, to have been established after consultation, much of it of an informal kind, with the Chief Minister's advisers.¹ In spite of this pattern of consultation some tension was evident between expatriate and Papua New Guinean officials, as yet in the minority, who were keen to approach defence issues with a more sceptical, if not antagonistic, frame of mind. There were also indications that senior local officers of the PNG DF, when they became more actively engaged in planning discussions, were sometimes willing to depart from the PNG DF positions and express views closer to those of local PNG public servants – perhaps in a spirit of Melanesian Consensus.²

¹ The Assistant Secretary Defence and his Branch were collocated with the remainder of the Chief Minister's Department at the Konedobu office complex. This facilitated informal consultation. The military had fought unsuccessfully during 1972 to have the Defence Branch located at Murray Barracks to ensure close liaison with the Force, but also, presumably, to prevent the civilian advisers from gaining any 'unfair advantage' as a result of their propinquity to the Minister and his staff.

² Selected Papua New Guinean officers had, by direction of the Force Commander, been actively consulted on defence planning matters from 1972 onwards and in 1973 there was a PNG officer posted to the planning staff. During 1973 the two senior PNG officers, (Majors Diro and Lowa) then attending the Australian Staff College, returned to PNG on several occasions during the year to participate in defence planning. This was specifically requested by Mr Somare in discussions with the Australian authorities, as a means of ensuring a senior-level indigenous military contribution to Defence Force planning. In April 1973 a Local Officers Group (civilian and military officers) of the DPWG was formed to reconsider the draft Cabinet submission on the proposed guidelines for the PNG DF because of inadequate indigenous participation in the formulation of the document. After several meetings of this Local Officers Group it was not necessary for it to be reconvened because of increased indigenous representation on the DPWG itself. At these early meetings, however, common military and civilian Papua New Guinean views emerged in relation to support for the concept of a separate PNG Defence Force with the primary

Both the military and civilian defence planning groups in PNG appear to have been willing to apply techniques of informal advocacy in order to advance their interests with the PNG political leadership and Cabinet. On the military side it was evident that Australian officers claimed to represent the views of the indigenous officer corps and in so doing were, by implication, suggesting that the PNG Government would not want to lightly override these views. Social contacts were also exploited as much as possible in a society which, after 1972, had become intensely political even in official circles. In this context also, two semi-private defence "Round Table" seminars may be mentioned. These seminars were conducted at the University of PNG, Port Moresby in May and August 1973 and they were attended by PNG politicians, public service advisers, military officers and academics. The seminars ostensibly provided a forum for the exchange of views and information on PNG defence matters but they were also excellent platforms for the Defence Force to express and attempt to gain support for its own special interests; namely, a wider public and official acceptance of its role in the PNG socio-political system. The seminars, in particular, provided a platform for advocating the integration of the military into the PNG political system, a policy favoured by the joint convenor of the seminars, Dr Ulf Sundhaussen, who had also publicly advocated this policy in order to avoid the excesses of military intervention in politics, as experienced elsewhere in the Third World.¹

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function of external defence, increased emphasis being placed on the nation-building potential of the Defence Force and the view that the Defence Force should not be isolated from the rest of PNG society merely in pursuit of a particular Australian formula of civil-military relations. A local military officer is said to have complained at a meeting in April 1973 that "Australians working on Defence Policy are trying to dump an Australian model on PNG". (Personal Communication, Port Moresby, January 1974).

¹ See U. Sundhaussen, op. cit.

The Emergence of a PNG Defence Policy

The first official defence consultations between Australia and PNG took place in December 1972 and following them it was decided to seek the political guidance of the PNG Cabinet on such fundamental questions as whether PNG was to have a separate defence force, what were to be its roles and how much could be spent on it. It was envisaged that after this initial direction from the Cabinet, detailed proposals would then be submitted to Cabinet and they would form the basis for later defence negotiations with Australia. Following consideration by the PNG inter-departmental committee on defence this initial "Defence Submission" went before the PNG Cabinet in May 1973.¹

After this preliminary Cabinet submission further defence decisions appear to have been made by the PNG Cabinet in August 1973 when the basic structure of the Defence Force based on a three thousand five hundred man force was resolved and it was determined that PNG civil-military relations would be based on a formula of co-equal status between the Defence Force Commander and the senior public servant in the Defence Department, who would both work to a Defence Minister.²

The results of the extensive period of planning, policy making and consultations since late 1972 finally became public on 25 April 1974 when the PNG Minister for Defence, Mr Kiki, made the PNG Government's first comprehensive defence statement.³ Kiki informed the House of Assembly of the Government's policy

¹ Personal Communication, Dr Ulf Sundhaussen and Mr N.L. Webb, December 1972 and August 1973.

² These planning decisions were evidently leaked to the press in PNG. See Age, 6 July 1973, "Mosquito Force Planned for PNG".

³ Mr A.M. Kiki, H.A.D., 25 April 1974, Ministerial Statement on Defence. See also the corresponding statement by the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr L.H. Barnard, Defence Press Release, 258/74 of 26 April 1974.

decisions and preparations for PNG to take over the defence function at independence and, at the time of writing, this statement provides the best public evidence of PNG Government defence policy. It therefore merits being quoted at length.

The Minister's statement commenced by justifying the need to maintain separate Defence and Police forces in PNG, thereby rejecting the view which had been put from time to time that PNG required only one security force. Kiki argued as follows:

'The country's security is at present guarded by two separate security forces with very distinctive and different roles – the Police Force and the Defence Force. One of the first questions the Government asked itself was whether Papua New Guinea should continue to maintain two separate forces or whether they should be combined into a single security force.

The Government decided that the roles of the two forces, their organisation, equipment and training and outlook were so different that the nation would be best served by keeping the two forces separate. We did not want policemen acting like soldiers or sailors, or vice versa.

The police operate for the most part as individuals dealing with individuals, whereas a defence force operates in groups and against groups of people. . . . Both are trained to use controlled force and are responsible individually and collectively for their actions, but Defence Force training gives greater emphasis to the more serious situations in which there is a greater likelihood of having to use lethal force. And whereas it must be the Government's constant

endeavour to avoid these very serious situations for which the Defence Force is required to train, the Police Force is constantly engaged in the role of community law preservation and enforcement, for which it is trained.

Another distinctive characteristic of a defence force, is its relative self-sufficiency in supporting services such as transport, communications, repair workshops, medical assistance and the feeding and quartering of its members. These services are expensive, but indispensable if the Force is to be able to deal with situations in which normal community services may be disrupted, or in areas remote from community facilities. Nevertheless the Government has had to look very critically at what this country can afford in this regard . . . Many of the arrangements and systems which were appropriate while the PNG Defence Force was an Australian Force are quite inappropriate for Papua New Guinea and are being changed."¹

The PNG Defence Minister went on to specify the roles of the Defence Force:

"In traditional terms, the Defence Force has three broad responsibilities:

1. To be able to defend the nation against external attack.
2. To be able to assist the police in the maintenance of public order and security as a last resort if the police cannot reasonably be expected to cope.
3. To contribute as required to economic development and the promotion of national administration and unity.

¹ ibid.

In the first two, it is always the hope that the presence of defence forces, and the ability to expand them if necessary, will be sufficient to deter, or frighten away, any threat to the nation. The third function can be performed as a normal activity when the force is not active in its first two functions, as additional permanent responsibilities using skills and facilities similar to those needed for the first two functions, or as incidental by-products of fulfilling the first two functions."¹

As to the size and composition of the Defence Force Mr Kiki told the House of Assembly that:

"The Government considered a variety of possible ways of structuring the future Defence Force. It decided that it should have a ceiling strength of three thousand five hundred uniformed men with two battalions, an engineer company, the patrol boat squadron and a landing craft squadron together with appropriate support."²

¹ ibid., See also Chapter III. Although PNG formally emphasised external defence rather than internal security, largely for domestic political reasons, the potential internal security application of the PNG DF was freely acknowledged by PNG officials in discussions. PNG representatives had complained during 1973, for example, that Australia appeared to be imposing a lack of flexibility on the possible employment of the Defence Force in internal security. It was argued that if the Defence Force was not able to contribute to internal security tasks, it would have its budget cut to ribbons after independence, in favour of the Police. (Personal Communication, May 1973).

² ibid., Mr Kiki also informed the House that the PNG Government was considering the Australian offer of four Dakota aircraft, instead of the Caribou in service with the RAAF in PNG, as the basis of a PNG DF Air Element. (See also Department of Defence Press Release, 258/74 of 26 April 1974). The Minister implied a preference for the more versatile Caribou but appeared to accept

In this way the Minister settled the issue of the various Defence Force structural options that had occupied the attention of civilian and military planners since early 1973. It was apparent that the Defence Force's public advocacy of a somewhat larger force of four thousand men had been unsuccessful, although the Cabinet had selected a middle range option between the PNG DF solution and other smaller options.¹ It was likely that the Cabinet had been influenced in this decision by a concern to hold down PNG defence costs as well as a general unease about the political consequences of a larger defence force. The three thousand five hundred man force approved by the Cabinet nonetheless did not differ markedly, in terms of capability, from the larger options considered and, only in the absence of a third battalion, did it significantly differ from earlier Australian blueprints.

Although not announced by Mr Kiki in April 1974 two quite important decisions on the future structure of the PNG Defence Force had already been taken in September 1973 after consultation between the PNG and Australian Governments. It had then been decided to disband the part time, volunteer PNGVR battalion and the high school military cadet system.² In spite of the strenuous lobbying of senior Australian CMF officers attempting to save the PNGVR, the PNG Government evidently believed that this type of unit was not suited to the defence needs of an independent PNG.

2 (Continued)

the Dakota offer subject to Cabinet approval. In fact PNG could do none other if it wanted an Air Element at independence.

¹ A four thousand man force was advocated by Defence Force spokesmen at the university "Round Table" seminar in August 1973.

² See Department of Defence Press Release, 141/1973 of 10 September 1973. It was stated that PNG's defence needs had been carefully reviewed and it had been decided that the PNGVR, an Australian CMF battalion, did not have a place in the country's defence priorities and would be disbanded. The unit could not be justified on the grounds of effectiveness or economy. It was later confirmed that the Cadet battalion was also included in the disbandment action.

Besides the officially stated reasons for the disbandment of the PNGVR on the grounds of economy and effectiveness, there were also problems of security and a shortage of suitable personnel. There were fears that the CMF battalion's widely dispersed sub-units (ten training depots in seven centres) weapons, ammunition and equipment might provide a security hazard in the future - by falling into the wrong hands. Secondly, the exodus of expatriate residents from PNG had led to a shortage of trained and experienced officers and NCOs in the unit and there were insufficient numbers of suitably educated Papua New Guinean volunteers available to replace them.¹

The disbandment of the PNGVR appears to have foreclosed, at least temporarily, the option of a militia component in the PNG Defence Force which might have been seen in terms of, a counter-vailing force to the PIR battalions or even the Police, or as a means of more directly associating the Defence Force with the civilian population by providing an avenue of civilian service. Both these points had been argued in support of the former PNGVR's role.² More realistically, however, it was extremely unlikely

¹ In May 1973 there was still only one indigenous officer in the PNGVR out of a unit total of thirty two. Nearly all expatriates serving in the battalion were officers or NCOs and they accounted for 25 per cent of the total strength of about 350. Part of the problem of recruiting educated Papua New Guineans for the PNGVR was that suitable people were already fully committed to their civilian careers in an environment of rapid promotion.

² In August 1971, in an unpublished paper in the possession of the writer a Papua New Guinean officer in the PNGVR saw a balancing role for the PNGVR:

"Should the PIR ever fail to support the civilian government then the CMF could be mobilized to join forces with the Police and any loyal Government troops to curb any attempted coup ... The CMF could also be used in any case of a Police attempt to take over the Government".

H. Nelson, (Papua New Guinea, Black Unity or Black Chaos, Pelican, 1972, page 207) claims that Mr Ebia Olewale, a Minister in the Somare Government, once supported the strengthening of the PNGVR as a means of linking the Army with the people.

that a highly dispersed unit of less than four hundred men would effectively resist any acts of sudden political violence by the regular Defence Force or the Police. It was also doubtful whether the part-time members of the former CMF battalion, who were largely recruited from an educated, urban base and who were thus unrepresentative of the PNG population at large, drew the Defence Force any closer to the PNG nation.¹ Finally, there was the danger that political leaders might have attempted to "play-off" one security force against another by various forms of preferment in order to neutralise them. Where this has been attempted, as for example in Ghana under Nkrumah, the results have usually been counter-productive, leading to violence and political conflict.² For these reasons the decision to disband the PNGVR was sound.

The disbandment of the School Cadet system in PNG (which had been modelled on that operating in Australia) may also have been justified in terms of the considerable costs involved in maintaining and supervising widely scattered and small School Cadet units.³ Although they may have performed valuable integrative social functions within the limited number of high schools in which they operated, they did nothing for the majority of PNG youth outside the High School system not exposed to citizenship-building influences and it would seem preferable that it be to this group (of non-high school attenders and high school drop-outs) that the training benefits of some form of military youth organisation should be directed in the future. (This is discussed in Chapter III).

¹ Because of the regional deployment of the PNGVR, as well as the urban pattern of recruitment, it seemed that PNGVR sub-units were, potentially, prone to infiltration and control (via a voluntary recruitment system) by either subversive, or secessionist political causes.

² See R. First, The Barrel of a Gun, Penguin, 1972, pages 197-200.

³ School Cadet units were first established in PNG in 1959. By 1973 there were about 1000 cadets in 15 schools. (Interview Officer Commanding 35 Cadet Battalion, Lae, May 1973).

The Higher Defence Organisation

In the April 1974 statement the PNG Defence Minister also publicly outlined the structure of civil-military relations that the Cabinet had agreed to in August 1973. In a justification of the co-equal status of civilian and military heads within the defence organisation, he argued that because military action was related to other spheres of Government activity the Government must have access to both civilian and military defence advice:

"... Expenditure on defence has to be related to other financial priorities. Account must be taken of the whole range of considerations bearing on the national interest - such matters as intelligence, international and domestic political interests, military aspects such as the capabilities of the forces, technical, economic and financial consideration. Both civilian and military abilities, training and backgrounds are essential for the proper moulding of such elements into coherent and consistent policies. Military officers are trained primarily for a military role. Formulation of defence policy demands a deep examination of the possible alternatives and their wider implications for the national good. Only if the Minister can tap directly both civil and military advice can he be properly equipped to control the nation's defence effort.

Accordingly the Government has decided that the Minister responsible for defence, that is I, should be advised directly by both the force commander and the senior civilian defence administrator, who should be of equal status, each having defined functions, and being required to work in a manner which brings together both the

civilian and the military contributions to the development of defence policy".¹

Mr Kiki explained that it was intended to combine the PNG Defence Branch and the PNG DF Headquarters in order to form the future PNG Defence Department. It was clear at this point that PNG defence planners had placed considerable emphasis on the formal relationship between Minister, Secretary and Military head, presumably because it was believed that the relationship at this level would set the general pattern of PNG civil-military relations. This decision indicated, further, that whilst it was the policy of the Somare Government not to isolate indigenous officers from the national leadership group, it did not intend to give the military the degree of corporate independence that they may have sought by means of military dominance of the defence organisation. On this issue politicians were encouraged by Australian officials who could be expected to advance arguments for strong civilian control in defence administration, based on the Australian practice.

It is of course arguable whether decisions settling the formal structure would necessarily have much bearing on the way the PNG higher defence organisation might actually operate and the manner in which power would be distributed. The PNG Cabinet may see dangers in the future in alienating the PNG Defence Force and its officer corps from the Government leadership, even though retaining the allegiance of civilians within the Force. It will be the officer corps and its senior officers which command the Defence Force and its loyalties, not the civilian secretary, and the Government might ultimately see it as more important to retain the political support of officers, rather than that of civilians working within the Defence Force.

¹ ibid.

There is a further reason why the defence public servant in future may not function as a countervailing influence to the military. In the same way that ministers are sometimes "captured" by their public service advisers, neutralising their independence and critical approach to policy matters, it is possible that the military in PNG may be able to "capture" the loyalties of civilians operating within the defence organisation – and perhaps the minister as well. Further, it is not unlikely that public servants will perceive their own career interests in regard to prestige and affluence as complementary to those of the officer corps – both groups forming part of an urban elite. The prospect of defence civil servants being either "captured" or impotent may be enhanced because of the lack of a tradition of strong civilian influence in PNG defence matters and because of a dearth of experienced public servants who might be effective in limiting military influence in quasi-civilian areas of defence policy and administration.¹

Although the integration of the Defence Branch and Defence Force Headquarters had been announced there was, as yet, no decision in regard to the establishment of a formal body for the collective management of defence, such as by a board or council. It is likely, nonetheless, that a collegiate defence body, involving at least the Minister, Defence Force Commander and civilian head, will become the future basis for executive decision making, whether arising out of convention or formal statute. Provision for such a body may be made in the PNG defence legislation which was

¹ Some of these factors are interestingly revealed in the attitudes of PNG public servants and Defence Force officers. (See Appendices 2 and 3; A Survey of Papua New Guinean Attitudes to Defence and Security Issues, May 1973 and, A Second Survey of Papua New Guinean Attitudes to Defence and Security Issues, January–February 1974). I am indebted to Mr E.P. Wolfers and a number of PNG politicians, public servants and Defence Force officers for interesting discussions on the likely course of post-independence civil-military relations.

prepared during 1974 but which has not yet been made public.¹

The PNG constitution, when finally adopted, may also make specific provision for a defence board and specify its relationship to whoever is (are) granted commander-in-chief powers over the Defence Force.²

Unresolved Defence Issues

In April 1974 there were several important defence issues which had yet to be finalised; these included PNG's post-independence defence relationship with Australia, the transfer of financial responsibility to PNG and defence aid arrangements. Because this has been written before independence it is inevitable that there are matters which remain in doubt and that the process of the transfer of military power remains unsatisfyingly incomplete.

¹ See Ministerial Statement of 25 April 1974 by Mr Kiki and Post Courier, 19 December 1973. Kiki announced that it had been decided that the Australian Defence Legislation and Disciplinary codes were not suitable for PNG. PNG was assisted in the drawing up of its own defence legislation by an Australian Department of Defence legal consultant. The defence legislation of countries such as Tanzania, Canada, Australia and New Zealand was studied in relation to PNG's own particular defence legislative requirements. The Defence legislation has probably been delayed because of the coordination required with the PNG Constitutional Planning Committee and its report.

² The Constitutional Planning Committee proposed in its report that there would be no separate office of head of state and the function of commander-in-chief should be exercised by the Prime Minister. In June 1974 Mr Somare, in an alternative constitutional proposal, suggested that the commander-in-chief powers should be shared by the President, Prime Minister and Defence Minister. This issue has yet to be finally resolved.

It has long been evident that there would be the need for post-independence defence arrangements between PNG and Australia, either embodied in a treaty or within a less formal framework, to cover a range of operational, training, personnel, logistic and financial matters.¹ But by April 1974 consultations were still only at a preliminary and exploratory stage.² This lack of progress relative to developments in other areas was understandable. Post-independence defence relations involved complex and sensitive issues of internal as well as foreign politics in both PNG and Australia and settled PNG defence policy

¹ As described earlier, from 1971 to 1973 the ALP platform included an undertaking to enter a defence treaty with an independent PNG. The previous Liberal-Country Party Government had foreshadowed a defence pact in June 1972 (SMH, 16 June 1972) and earlier in the March 1972 Australian Defence Review, (*op. cit.*, page 5). In August 1972 a formal defence agreement covering specific Australian and PNG defence interests was advocated by a prominent defence analyst (R.J. O'Neill, "Australia's Future Defence Relations with Papua New Guinea", Australian Outlook, Vol 26, No 2, August 1972, pages 193-203). In February 1973 a PNG-based commentator argued that whilst there was a need for post-independence defence arrangements, the O'Neill proposals were too Canberra-centric. That is, they were oriented too much to Australian defence interests and expectations and they might therefore jeopardize future relations between the two countries. (Ulf Sundhaussen, "Australia's Future Defence Relations with Papua New Guinea: A Second Look", Australia's Neighbours, Fourth Series, No 84, February-March, 1973).

² In the 25 April Statement Mr Kiki explained that "preliminary exploratory discussions" at the ministerial level on the future defence relations between PNG and Australia had been held. The Minister also observed that "Independent PNG and Australia will still be close neighbours and we will be looking to Australia for some years yet". In Mr Barnard's 26 April Statement (Department of Defence Press Release, 258/74 of 26 April 1974) it was stated that:

"Mr Barnard confirmed that Australian military personnel would continue to be made available to assist the PNG Defence Force for some time, particularly in specialist and technical positions.

There would also be a defence aid programme under which Australia would provide equipment, training and other support to the PNG Defence Force."

(See also Department of Defence Press Release, 248/74 of 5 April 1974).

in other areas was a prerequisite for determining post-independence relations between PNG and Australia . Post-independence relations were to be seen therefore as the keystone of the PNG defence policy-making process .

Although a formal defence treaty between PNG and Australia, once in some favour, was apparently no longer a public policy objective of either the Australian or PNG Governments, the likely extent of Australian personnel, logistic, and financial assistance to the PNG DF at independence pointed to considerable Australian defence involvement regardless of the formal basis under which it was to be sanctioned . Here, Australian defence planners have had to chart a difficult course between the basic policy and ideological position of the Australian Labor Government that Australia should not become militarily involved in an independent PNG, and at the same time, ensure the continued viability of the PNG DF . It was apparent that the most sensitive issue of future PNG-Australian defence relations would be the circumstances and conditions under which Australian service personnel might take part in PNG DF operations . Broadly speaking, two types of operations and three sorts of Australian roles might be envisaged . Australians might conceivably be involved, in operational units in command roles, (say, as infantry sub-unit commanders), in an operational support role (say, as helicopter pilots or engineers), or in staff and training roles . Operations might be either, against an external enemy, or of an internal security nature – the second possibility perhaps being the more likely one in the short term future .

Whilst it might be possible to remove the probability of Australian involvement in an operational command role at, or soon after, independence by rapid localization of command appointments, the support roles are likely to continue for a number of years . Australian planners have had to accept the fact that precipitate

withdrawal or non-participation of Australian personnel might jeopardise the success of PNG military operations. In this situation a wide-ranging prohibition by Australia on the employment of Australian troops within the PNG DF might force PNG to turn to mercenaries or other countries for defence personnel, or attempt to localize its forces at a pace which would lead to a serious reduction in effectiveness and reliability. Because of this crucial relationship between the role of Australians and the effectiveness of the PNG Defence Force it is understandable that the PNG Government might want to know the conditions under which Australians are to be permitted to operate in the PNG DF after independence. In this regard Australia appears to face several alternatives. It might elect to set out formal and predetermined restrictions on employment, such as no involvement by Australians in operations against certain secessionist groups; or alternatively, Australia might rely on a set of mutually agreed safeguards, such as insistence on the institution of proper legal procedures before Defence Force units could be employed on internal security operations. Australia might also want to insist on consultation and consent prior to certain types of operations of a particularly sensitive nature, such as internal security operations involving other foreign nationals.¹ In April 1974 there was as yet no announcement of policy by either side on this subject and, when decided, it may not even then be made public because of its extreme political sensitivity. It was apparent, however, that the continuing Australian personnel contribution to the PNG DF would be organised on the basis of an Australian Defence Assistance Group (ADAG) which would include and be administratively responsible for Australian servicemen serving with the PNG DF.²

¹ It would be very difficult for Australia to remain formally neutral in any conflict which involved the PNG DF (supported by Australian servicemen) and another state. Australia would be seen, internationally, to bear responsibility for the official acts of its own servants, that is, Australian servicemen in PNG.

² The formation of the ADAG and details of its functions have not yet been announced beyond the gazettal of the appointment of the PNG DF commander as Commander ADAG.

In relation to post-independence defence relations at a more general level it seems that whilst PNG will principally rely on Australia, PNG has already indicated that she will attempt to diversify her defence contacts, as well as establishing close relations with Indonesia. PNG is already receiving small scale personnel and training assistance from the New Zealand defence forces and it seems likely that contact between Indonesia and PNG will soon lead to defence links and exchanges.¹

The transfer of financial responsibility for the PNG DF from the Australian to PNG Governments and the details of post-independence defence aid arrangements have also yet to be finalized. A smooth transition in financial responsibilities for defence has been hampered by almost complete metropolitan control over defence expenditure and by considerable difficulty in actually determining the level of defence expenditure in PNG, arising out of the integration of Australian and PNG defence. In April 1974 Mr Kiki did, however, announce that a general formula of defence aid to PNG had been agreed upon in defence consultations between the two countries. This formula provided that:

"... for the financial year in which independence occurs the following arrangements would apply.

¹ See Age 14 November 1973, National Times 19-24 November 1973. Following the Indonesian Foreign Minister's visit to PNG in November 1973. Mr Kiki visited Indonesia and was accompanied by a military adviser, Major E.R. Diro. It is likely that PNG will soon be invited to send officers to Indonesia for training. In regard to New Zealand, there are several NZ military instructors at the Joint Services College, Lae, and there has been speculation that New Zealand officers might be sought for senior appointments within the PNG DF as a means of reducing the predominantly Australian image of the Force and to offset demands for precipitate localization of senior appointments before experienced PNG officers become available. (See Post Courier 18 April 1974).

Under a programme met directly from the Australian Budget and agreed between the Papua New Guinea and Australian Governments provision will be made to cover the personnel costs of Australian servicemen attached to the Defence Force, the cost of training Papua New Guinean servicemen in Australia and the cost of selected capital projects .

The remaining costs of the Defence Force which I might broadly describe as normal running costs will comprise the Papua New Guinea Budget defence vote . Half of this amount will be met from Papua New Guinea's budget resources and the Australian Government has promised to provide financial assistance in respect of the other half ." ¹

It was stated that this formula would be reviewed during the year of independence for application in following years .

The general problem which PNG leaders have faced in relation to the subject of post-independence defence aid has been that of how to secure the maximum Australian budgetary assistance from Australia without the PNG Defence Force appearing, in effect, as an Australian mercenary force . Papua New Guinea may have been attracted to the idea of a substantial proportion of her future defence budget being funded from aid grants not explicitly tied to defence so that PNG itself would then be able to allocate its resources as between defence, law and order and developmental priorities . In this way Papua New Guinean leaders might believe they would be seen to be exercising greater sovereignty over their own defence forces . This approach to PNG defence aid would involve Australia in taking into account

¹ ibid.

PNG's defence burden in determining levels of Australian aid. It would also be implicit in such an arrangement that Australia would have no control over defence expenditure. (PNG might, for example, decide that its security priorities lay in expanding the Police and down-grading its external defence capacity). If Australian priorities were disregarded, Australia might be reluctant to continue to provide substantial levels of aid based on Australian perceptions of PNG security needs. Australian foreign defence policy could depend, for instance, on a PNG capacity to deal with low-level military threats on its borders and the lack of this capability might, thereby, be seen as increasing the likelihood of requests for Australian support in situations in which it did not want to become embroiled. Because of these implications it is likely that Australia may want to retain a considerable degree of influence over the manner in which aid is applied to PNG's defence forces.

The issue of defence aid to PNG involves the wider question of all categories of aid to PNG and Australian and Papua New Guinean views on this subject reflect important differences. In April 1974 the Australian Minister for External Territories, in explaining Australia's future aid policy to PNG, argued that Australia would want to know precisely how the money was to be spent (in PNG) before grants were made and, therefore, project-oriented aid would be favoured to a budget-support approach.¹ In contrast to this approach, the PNG Chief Minister during a visit to Australia in June 1974 called for Australian "aid without strings". Mr Somare said his Government would resist any Australian action to use aid as a lever to guide PNG development plans.² It has been argued that Australian insistence on project

¹ Post Courier, 30 April 1974.

² Age, 15 June 1974.

forms of aid management would distort PNG's developmental priorities and similarly, project-oriented Australian defence aid might inhibit the development of a Defence Force best suited to PNG conditions and priorities.¹

A solution to the defence aid problem may lie in a proportion of PNG's defence budget being provided from earmarked Australian defence aid (perhaps for a specific project, for example, the development of an air element) and a larger proportion being received in the form of general aid which PNG might wish to apply to defence expenditure. Under such an arrangement there would be room for tacit understanding between Governments that a certain proportion of Australian aid would be applied to defence.²

There is also the issue of PNG's contribution to her defence budget from internally raised revenue. In January 1973 the Australian Defence Minister suggested an initial PNG contribution of about four million dollars per annum – an amount then judged to cover PNG DF indigenous wages, although these costs have subsequently risen above six million dollars. If PNG's defence budget, exclusive of costs attributable to Australian personnel and

¹ See J.A. Ballard, "The Relevance of Australian Aid: Some Lessons from PNG", paper presented to the Symposium on Development and Social Change. (The Relevance of Australian Aid to South East Asia), Forty-Fifth ANZAAS Congress, 16 August 1973, unpublished.

² Apart from reassurance over minimum levels of defence expenditure, Australia might, at some time in the future, be concerned that unduly large proportions of Australian aid were not misapplied to PNG's security forces. This problem might occur if there was a change to authoritarian or military forms of government in PNG. In any event, Australia will need to be careful not to rigidly apply her own political and social values to the governmental problems of an independent PNG. There would seem to be "neo-colonialist" as well as "idealist" traps here.

activities is placed in the year of independence at about fifteen million dollars, a contribution of six million would represent about forty per cent of the total. This level of Papua New Guinean contribution might increase to a notionally important "fifty-one per cent controlling interest" in a matter of a few years without undue dislocation to PNG's budget provided that, as promised, the level of Australian aid to PNG remains at about its present high level.¹ Whilst Australian defence aid to PNG after independence will probably amount to between only ten and fifteen per cent of the total Australian aid - a percentage which would not appear to be excessive² - PNG's total defence burden is by comparison with a number of small states, somewhat above average.³ The reasons for the relative "expensiveness" of the PNG DF are probably to be found in the Force's close integration with the Australian Services as well as the generally high PNG cost structure, although it is possible that the post-independence period will lead to some

¹ See, for example, Address by Hon W.L. Morrison, Minister for External Territories opening the 1973 Waigani Seminar, April 1973, Post Courier, 30 April 1973.

² In 1973/74 Australia provided a total of A\$178.5 million in aid to PNG compared to A\$143 million in 1972/73, (Post Courier, 22 August 1973) and a total of A\$500 million has been promised over the next three years. Assuming a PNG contribution of A\$6 million per annum to a total PNG defence budget of about \$15 million per annum, total annual Australian costs might range between say A\$15 and A\$20 million, taking into account the wages and salaries of Australian servicemen serving with the PNG DF, the training of PNG DF personnel in Australia and other administrative costs.

³ See Appendix 1. PNG's defence force and expenditure levels appeared to correspond more closely with African states which have had a background of military confrontation or armed conflict.

defence savings.¹

There are also procedural and administrative problems to be overcome in transferring defence financial responsibility from Canberra to Port Moresby. Even by early 1974 the process of "unscrambling" PNG defence costs from those of Australia had not been completed. Costs remained disguised, for instance, in the system by which PNG DF logistic units were supplied by Australian ordnance sources with stores, weapons and equipment. PNG officials have, for some time, sought increased financial independence and responsibilities in PNG for defence matters so as to provide a period of financial tutelage. Although financial devolution should have commenced earlier, the transitional arrangements for the management of the PNG defence budget for the 1974-75 financial year should improve the prospects of a smooth transition at independence.²

¹ The scope of post-independence defence economies should not be over-emphasised. For instance, it seems unlikely that Defence Force salary costs could be reduced in the post-independence period (because of the corporate dissatisfaction it might produce) except by a process of inflationary erosion of value. Whilst some costs might be reduced by austerity measures, there are only short-sighted economies to be gained from "cutting off all the money spent on maintenance" as suggested by one senior local Defence Force officer!

² An earlier transfer of financial responsibilities for defence would have been useful in familiarizing PNG Treasury officials with the management of defence funds before independence so that a situation did not arise at independence where, in the midst of strong pressures to cut-back or redirect Government spending, they controlled a large new item of Government expenditure for the first time. It might be argued that if it is only then that PNG politicians and finance officials see the full extent of defence funds, there may be precipitate action to cut defence spending, perhaps unwisely - leading to political conflict and military unrest.

PART D - CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this chapter, three stages in the transfer of military power in the decolonization process were postulated – strategic reappraisal, localization and military development. The transfer of military power in PNG, although not yet complete, is, in regard to the first two aspects, well-advanced whilst the decisions which have yet to be taken about post-independence developments will be heavily influenced by the defence structure already in existence in PNG and Australia's defence commitment there. The transfer of military power is, itself, a lengthy process rather than an act which is concluded at independence. Independence will merely mark the end in a stage of the relationship and not the end of the process itself.

Though PNG has been encouraged to develop defence forces and policies appropriate to its needs, there has been little fundamental change, so far, to the size, role and organisation of PNG's Defence Force. To a remarkable extent, PNG's own assessment of its defence needs have accorded with Australian perceptions of them. It is true that the more ambitious Australian military plans for PNG's defence forces produced before 1972 have not been adopted, but neither have PNG leaders sought radical defence alternatives to the solutions presented by Australia. This outcome is perhaps not unexpected since Papua New Guinean leaders have been so reliant on Australians, whether employed in Australia or PNG, for almost all of their specialist defence advice and secondly, the rapid onset of independence and the reality of an efficient force-in-being have combined to limit both the scope for, and willingness to institute, radical defence change. PNG has neither greatly expanded nor reduced the size of its Defence Force. It has accepted the need for a volunteer standing force and rejected, without ever seriously considering it, the option of some form of "People's Army" based either on conscription or

part-time service . It has adopted a formula of civil-military relations which resemble in formal terms those of Australia . These tendencies serve to emphasise the importance of the Australian military tradition in PNG and the fact that in the early years of independence, defence, like so many other aspects of the PNG polity, will be a syncretic Australian - PNG construct .

In reviewing the three stages in the transfer process, it is apparent that, whilst a substantial Australian strategic reappraisal of PNG's importance to Australia has taken place and the localization of the Defence Force is at a relatively advanced stage, the third stage of military development is as yet in its infancy . The change in Australian strategic attitudes to PNG, from that at the conclusion of the Second War when both major political parties in Australia saw Papua New Guinea's security as vital to that of regarding PNG of strategic importance but not vital has greatly facilitated the military decolonization process . Indeed it is difficult to imagine Australia being prepared to relinquish her military influence in PNG so absolutely if PNG was, today, still held to be as vital as it was once considered to be .

The second stage of the transfer process, has marched in step with successive advances in political development and as PNG's political future became more clear the tempo of localization increased . In this way defence localization was seen as one aspect of ensuring the ultimate preparedness of PNG to assume the responsibilities of independence which included sovereignty over PNG's own armed forces . This involved the growth of a military structure which Papua New Guineans could manage and which was judged to be within its budgetary resources .

Military development - the process by which the Australian military heritage in PNG is eventually adapted to meet the needs of PNG - could not be completed in the artificial political

environment of the decolonization period in which indigenous political forces in PNG were distorted by Australia's interests and policies in PNG. This point may be exemplified in relation to future levels of PNG defence spending. Because the PNG Government has so far not actually controlled defence spending, it has not yet seen money spent on defence as an opportunity-cost in relation to other areas of public expenditure and in this sense, at least, it has not had to locate defence within its national priorities. This problem is further complicated because, in the post-independence period, PNG's level of defence spending may still be determined more by what Australia is prepared to give than by what PNG is prepared to spend and it may not be clear whether there is symmetric opportunity cost relationship with Australian defence aid. That is, if PNG were to cut back on defence spending could she be sure of recouping these "savings" in the form of increased Australian economic aid, or would it merely be a case of defence benefits foregone if not sought?¹ This problem may impede the process by which PNG's defence forces are developed to conform to PNG's actual defence needs in terms of size, role and even conditions of service.

Because the third phase in the transfer of military power of PNG military development will occur within an independent polity,

¹ Answers to these questions appear to turn heavily on the policies of future Australian Governments, the foreign aid giving mechanisms and the influence and responsibilities of the Department of Defence in regard to future PNG defence aid. One could imagine, for instance, that Australia might be more willing to give aid for some purposes than others and, in particular, Australian concern about short term political stability in PNG might result in support for building up state institutions in PNG like the Public Service, Police and Defence Forces and at the same time the application of more stringent "effectiveness" criteria for economic aid projects.

the course of this development should be less subject to Australian political and military patterns. On the other hand, these changes will still be subject to strong Australian influences in the form of defence personnel and aid. Rapid removal of this influence, by replacing Australians by other foreigners, or by becoming self-reliant in defence, is likely to be unattractive to most Papua New Guineans in the foreseeable future. A strategy of national self-reliance would, in the short term, be likely to lead to considerable hardship and social unrest. And the problem of over-dependence (on Australia) is unlikely to be solved by moving to a situation of over-dependence on, say, Indonesia. It may be concluded, therefore, that further military development in PNG in the early years of independence is more likely to be influenced by tradition than by pressure for radical change and, for this reason, a study of the PNG DF on the eve of independence will be a useful guide to the post-independence performance of the organisation.

CHAPTER III

THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA DEFENCE FORCE IN 1974 - AN ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS

PART A - THE DEFENCE FORCE ORGANISATION

The thesis has so far traced the development of PNG military forces. This chapter examines the Papua New Guinea Defence Force on the eve of independence based on the situation which obtained in early 1974, although foreshadowed changes are also discussed. The worth of this organisational study of the PNG DF lies in the fact that PNG will soon be independent and the present Force will then constitute the Defence Force of an independent PNG. As the present Force is largely based on decisions taken by a Papua New Guinean Government it is unlikely to change dramatically in the immediate period after independence nor for some years afterwards.

The chapter is written in three parts: this part describes the organisation and deployment of the PNG DF, Part B examines the ability of the Defence Force to meet the roles which have been laid down by the PNG Government and Part C analyses the PNG DF's composition and social functioning.¹

The Papua New Guinea Defence Force is a unified, single defence force which has Maritime, Air and Land Elements within

¹ The chapter contains three annexes. Annex A contains a comparison of the PNG DF with the Police. Annex B shows the Land Element patrol and exercise programme for 1973-74 as an example of PNG DF activity. Annex C lists the Civic Action tasks completed by the PNG DF during 1973.

its structure. The Force had a total authorized establishment strength in January 1974 of three thousand six hundred and eighty one officers and men. There were also seven hundred and seventy five civilian employees authorized, making a grand total of four thousand four hundred and fifty six military and civilian employees. The uniformed strength of the PNG DF in early 1974 was, therefore, only slightly less than that of the PNG Police.¹

The Defence Force consisted of the following components:

A Defence Force Headquarters and Departmental Structure.

The role of this component might be described as the administration and command of the force, policy development and political liaison.

An Operational Component. This consisted of a Maritime Element containing a patrol boat squadron and a support squadron, an Air Element of one medium transport flight and a Land Element of two infantry battalions, one engineer company and a signals squadron.

A Logistic System. This consisted of a number of special purpose units designed to support the Force.

A Training System. The major training units included a training depot, apprentice and officer training units.

The detailed organisation of each of these components of the Defence Force is discussed later, but it will first be useful to remark briefly on the Force as a whole and on the Australian contribution to it. Like the PNG Public Service the Defence Force

¹ For further comparisons between the PNG DF and the PNG Police - The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) - see Annex A.

in 1974 remained heavily dependent on Australians. Of the total of three thousand seven hundred and eighty officers and men actually serving with the PNG DF in January 1974, six hundred and sixty three or about seventeen per cent of the total were Australians. The dependence on Australian leadership and expertise was more sharply drawn in regard to officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs). In January 1974 seventy five per cent of the officers serving with the PNG DF were Australians as were slightly over fifty per cent of the senior NCOs. The Australians serving with units of the PNG DF were, in December 1973, separately identified as members of an Australian Defence Assistance Group (ADAG). The role of this organisation was to provide the necessary personnel assistance to the PNG DF in order to allow it to operate and develop to the point when Australians were no longer required. In January 1974 there were also two hundred and twenty six Australian servicemen serving in units outside the PNG DF. There were several Australian Support Units involved in providing special types of support to the PNG DF, principally air support, and there were two Australian Defence units with particular tasks: a survey squadron engaged on mapping tasks for the PNG Government, and a small engineer unit which operated as a Public Works Office at Mendi in the Southern Highlands District.

The Maritime Element

The Maritime Element of the Defence Force consisted of two major units, a Fast Patrol Boat Squadron of five boats based at Lombrum Island in the Manus Island District and a Support Squadron equipped with a number of landing craft based at Port Moresby.¹ Although these two units accounted for only some

¹ Lombrum Island is adjacent to Manus Island and forms part of the Manus District of PNG. The principal Manus District civil airfield and former war time and post-war RAAF airfield at Momote is also on Lombrum Island. Both the naval base and airfield are joined with the District Headquarters at Lorengau by an all-weather road. The RAN shore base, officially known as HMAS Tarangau, will

ten per cent of the total manpower in the operational units of the Defence Force they performed the important functions of patrolling PNG's territorial waters and providing logistic support.

The Patrol Boat Squadron at Lombrum consisted of fifteen officers, ten senior NCOs and sixty five Other Rank. (The complement of each boat is three officers and fifteen men). In January 1974 all the captains of the patrol boats were RAN officers and a number of key enlisted men billets on each of the boats were also filled by Australians. The senior PNG officers were lieutenants (i.e., captains in army rank) and planning then called for complete officer localization some time in 1978, with Australian enlisted men being required at least until 1975. The Australian presence will therefore continue for some considerable time to come, unless officers of other navies or contract officers are employed in the task. Good progress in localization is also dependent on the retention of highly skilled PNG specialists within the PNG DF. Some of these men are reported to be tempted by better pay and conditions available to them in the merchant navy and their loss would be a serious set-back to the development of the Maritime Element.

The role and capabilities of the Patrol Boat Squadron are affected by technical considerations associated with the Fast

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be de-commissioned some time before or at independence. The base is commonly and incorrectly referred to as being located on Manus Island. I have followed the custom, generally, of describing it as the "Manus base". (The term 'Maritime' rather than 'Naval' has been preferred by the PNG DF as maritime operations in official usage incorporates operations, not only on the surface of the sea but also under and over it).

Patrol Boat.¹ The boats are limited to some extent in their coastal surveillance ability both by speed and endurance. Operating on both engines at fourteen knots, their best economical speed, they can cover only some five hundred and sixty nautical miles in about forty hours. On one engine at twelve knots the range is increased to eight hundred and forty miles in about seventy hours. Apart from fuel requirements they are able to carry enough water and supplies for about a sixteen days patrol and the boats experience logistic problems when operating at a distance from their base or a source of replenishment. Their effectiveness in a surveillance role is greatly enhanced if they are able to operate in conjunction with maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

The Patrol Boat Squadron was supported by a shore base establishment at Manus of over two hundred officers and men, although this number will be reduced with the planned de-commissioning of the RAN base. The shore facility formed part of the PNG DF logistic system and included a patrol boat maintenance section with engineering workshop facilities, a power house and other base services, including a hospital which also provides medical care for civilians in the area.

¹ There are 15 Fast Patrol Boats in service with the RAN as well as the 5 with the PNG DF. The boats in service with the PNG DF are:

<u>Age in 1974</u>		
PTF 84	Aitape	5½ years
PTF 94	Madang	4½ years
PTF 85	Samarai	5 years
PTF 93	Lae	5 years
PTF 92	Ladava	4½ years

Each boat displaces 146 tons and is equipped with one 40/60mm Bofors light automatic weapon. They have a maximum speed of approximately 23 knots and are powered by two diesel engines. (See Robert O'Neill and Robyn McLean, Australian Defence Capacity: A Compendium of Data, Australian National University, Canberra, 1972, page C.4.

The patrol boats are based at what was once a major United States war time base which was taken over by the RAN at the end of the war on a much reduced scale. This base, known as HMAS Tarangau, subsequently became the patrol base in 1964 when it was decided to form a PNG patrol boat squadron. HMAS Tarangau was also developed as an oiling station after a decision taken in 1964 and a major fuel oil installation designed for RAN fleet operations was established there.¹ Although this installation underwent major refurbishment in 1972, the Australian Government has apparently decided that it no longer has a strategic requirement for Tarangau and it is to be de-commissioned as an RAN base and handed over to the PNG DF before independence.

The Manus patrol boat base, whilst providing most of the necessary shore maintenance facilities (it lacks a slipway), is deficient for operational purposes. Because of its location it is not well suited as a base for PNG maritime operations in view of the long transit voyages that are required to reach patrol stations and this entails uneconomical use of the boats. The isolation of Manus from Port Moresby has also led to logistic and administrative problems so that the costs of maintaining a maritime base on Manus are probably considerably greater than they would be in a more central location. Measured against this, however, is the expenditure that would be required to reproduce the accommodation and maintenance facilities already in existence at Manus. Studies conducted in order to determine the best site for a PNG naval base have pointed to Madang, which already has an existing technical

¹ See R.J. O'Neill, The Army in PNG, page 6. The three fuel tanks at Manus have a total capacity of 11,500 tonnes. During the period of Australian military involvement in Vietnam, the Manus base was quite frequently used by RAN ships, but in February 1974 it had not been used by RAN ships for more than 18 months (and only once every 2 or 3 months by RN or USN ships). The current very low usage of Manus may be attributed, in part, to greater use of the western route to the Far East via Freemantle, rather than via the east coast.

support base and this would permit the centralized development of the country's nautical maintenance resources. Madang's harbour, although less suitable than Manus for very large vessels, is adequate for smaller craft.

Whilst the prospects of a naval base being developed at Madang at one stage seemed bright it is now unlikely. Estimates of the cost of a new base may have ranged up to eight million dollars and it is unlikely that this amount of money would be forthcoming from Australian Governments seeking to hold down defence spending. The option of concentrating both maritime units at Port Moresby has also been considered and discarded. Apart from the problems of congestion at the small ships facility in Port Moresby harbour and what was seen as the undesirability of placing too much of the Defence Force in the capital city, there was also an operational objection. For part of each year during the south east trade wind season the passage of patrol boats around the south east tip of Papua to the north coast is difficult due to sea conditions.

Aside from these financial and technical considerations it is likely that Manus will remain the PNG DF's principal maritime base for largely political reasons. The Manus base plays a significant part in the life of the District, supporting a community of about three thousand people. As Manus Island is one of the less developed Districts in economic terms (although education facilities are widespread and Manus Islanders are prominent in PNG national life), local and national politicians would not wish to see the base removed if it could not be replaced by some other economic activity. Indeed, Manus leaders might wish to see the naval base developed to provide a maintenance facility for other marine activity such as fishing, or oil exploration.

It could also be argued that Australia's interests might be best served by the PNG DF's retention of the Manus base. As

Australia does not wish to retain the fuel oil installation as a foreign base after independence, on the basis that the strategic benefits and possible political costs do not warrant it, it might, nonetheless, still be able to use the oil fuel facility on Manus if it should become necessary. Although no longer an RAN base, Australian personnel will still be required on Manus for a considerable number of years to assist in the operation and maintenance of the patrol boats and Australia may, therefore, obtain the best of both worlds - access to Manus without the odium attached to a foreign base.

The Support Squadron had an establishment strength of four officers, sixteen senior NCOs and fifty eight Other Rank. This unit, previously a water transportation squadron of the Australian Army, is currently equipped with three LCM-8 shallow draft landing craft and several small work boats.¹ Though the LCM-8 craft provide a valuable logistic capability, they lack crew facilities for long voyages and due to a lack of navigational equipment they have to be escorted on longer voyages. Because of these shortcomings and the view that more of the logistic burden might be borne by sea rather than by means of expensive air transport, the PNG DF has for some time sought to have the Maritime Element of the Defence Force equipped with larger sea-going transports of the Australian LCH type. It was eventually announced in November 1973 that Australia had agreed to provide two such landing craft to the PNG DF and it is expected that they will be delivered during late 1974 or 1975.²

¹ The LCM-8 has a range of 190 nautical miles at 8 knots (in a period of 24 hours). It can carry 50 tons of cargo or about 60 troops. Of the present group of 3 craft usually only two out of the three are available at any one time because of maintenance requirement.

² See Department of Defence Press Release No 174/73 of 7 November 1973. The LCH is an Australian designed heavy landing craft with an over-the-beach capability. Some 8 craft have already been built for the RAN. It has a 170-200 ton lift capacity and displaces

Besides these two major operational components of the Maritime Element - the patrol boat and support squadrons - there were a number of supporting units which have been classified here as part of the Defence Force logistic system. These units were the Patrol Boat Maintenance Section and the PNG Dockyard. The Dockyard under present plans will not only carry out maintenance on PNG DF craft but also utilise any spare capacity in maintaining PNG Government craft and it will probably be located at Port Moresby. Another small but important unit was to be raised during 1974 - an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit. Without this capability PNG would be reliant on Australia or another nation for the disposal of unexploded mines and bombs, largely a war time legacy which continues to cause a problem.

The Air Element

Until the decision taken by the PNG and Australian Governments in 1974 to develop a transport flight, the PNG DF had no Air Element. Instead, the air support requirements for the Defence Force were met by two Australian Support Units.¹ Under current planning, the RAAF Caribou detachment in PNG will form the nucleus of the organic PNG DF Air Element, becoming progressively localized as PNG servicemen are trained. Although the Caribou is preferred by the PNG DF and PNG Government because of its superior airfield performance and unique ability (amongst the aircraft types based in PNG) to carry certain awkward

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over 300 tons. The craft supplied to the PNG DF will probably have a troop carrying module which would allow the craft to each carry an infantry company or more and their equipment and vehicles over long sea voyages to all parts of PNG's coast and in the navigable rivers.

¹ These two units were: 38 Squadron, Detachment A, RAAF. (A detachment of 4 Caribou aircraft based at Jackson's Field, Port Moresby and; 183 Reconnaissance Flight (Australian Army) and its associated Workshop (total: 80 men. This unit was based

loads, the PNG DF will almost certainly be equipped with four Dakota aircraft.¹ Dakota was offered by Australia because it is less expensive to operate and is a more convenient gift. Australia has only limited numbers of Caribou, several have been lost during service with the RAAF and it would be difficult to purchase replacements as production of the type has ceased. On the other hand the RAAF has surplus numbers of Dakota aircraft (military variants of the civilian DC3). Whilst the Caribou aircraft are certainly more expensive to run, they can land in well over one hundred airfields, including a number of strategically important airfields in the Indonesian border area which are at present classified as unsuitable for Dakota. The Caribou and Dakota are, however, broadly comparable in terms of payload, speed and endurance, though the Caribou is greatly superior in regard to its short take off and landing characteristics and its ability to carry awkward loads.²

The RAAF Caribou detachment in January 1974 had no PNG servicemen attached to it, although there were PNG DF personnel in Australia undergoing training. A belated start to the training of PNG DF ground and air crew was made in 1973 with seven pilot trainees and eight technical ground crew trainees. This training had been delayed until the future composition of the PNG DF Air Element was decided, but the trainees eventually commenced

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at Lae and equipped with 3 Pilatus Porter turbo-engined fixed wing light transport aircraft and about 5 Bell Sioux light observation helicopters).

¹ See Mr A.M. Kiki, H.A.D., Ministerial Statement on Defence, 25 April 1974.

² The Caribou aircraft, operating in PNG conditions, are able to carry between 20 and 30 fully equipped troops, or up to about three tonnes of cargo, dependent upon airfield and fuel considerations. The RAAF Dakota aircraft which will be delivered to the PNG DF during 1975 will be modified in regard to their engines and avionics so that they are compatible with the DC 3s operated by Air Niugini. This will simplify servicing in PNG.

their courses before a decision was finally taken thus saving a little valuable time.¹ Some of the pilot trainees should complete their training by early 1975.

The Australian Army Aviation unit, 183 Reconnaissance Flight, based at Lae, was classified as an Australian Support unit and therefore not part of the PNG DF. There were no Papua New Guineans within its ranks and no plans for the unit to be localized. Current intentions are that the PNG DF Air Element will consist of medium transport aircraft only and not include the types flown by 183 Reconnaissance Flight. Because of the valuable air support provided by 183 Reconnaissance Flight in the fields of reconnaissance and liaison, casualty evacuation and resupply of troops in the field and, because of the training value to the Australian Army of having the unit there, the Flight will probably remain in PNG after independence under an arrangement between the two countries.²

¹ See Department of Defence Press Release, No 58/73 of April 1973.

² The turbo-engined Porter aircraft flown by the Flight are ideally suited due to their excellent take-off and landing performance to PNG conditions. Unfortunately the military version of the Porter is limited to a small effective payload of only 650 lbs (not including the pilot) compared to the significantly greater payload of the civil version. The Sioux helicopter, also flown by the Flight is now obsolescent in the Australian Army. It nevertheless provides the important capability of being able to take off and land in confined spaces. The Sioux is, however, only a small aircraft. It can usually only carry one passenger or about 300 lbs of stores in addition to the pilot and its speed and range lead to operating problems in PNG. If 183 Reconnaissance Flight remains in PNG, as suggested, it is likely that the Sioux will be replaced by the military version of the Bell Jet Ranger, the Koiwa. This aircraft has a significantly greater speed and range, can carry up to 5 passengers and may be equipped with a winch.

At present the transport detachment is based at Port Moresby whilst the Reconnaissance Flight is based at Lae. There have apparently been plans drawn up for a new PNG DF air base at Nadzab airfield in the Markham Valley near Lae, however, the expense involved in this project, together with the availability of the existing facilities at Port Moresby and Lae, make its adoption unlikely in the short term. In the longer term the development of Nadzab as the principal air base appears sensible. Nadzab is a better nodal point for air operations both in regard to the disposition of other PNG DF bases and the geography of the country and a base at Nadzab would be more economical and efficient.¹ Such a project might, after independence, merit Australian financial support.

The Land Element

The operational units of the Land Element accounted for a high proportion (eighty seven per cent) of PNG DF operational manpower. Here the PNG DF conformed to the pattern of black African armed forces in that the PNG DF was predominantly a Land force. The principal PNG DF Land Element units were 1PIR, 2PIR, the PNG DF Engineer Company, and a Signals Squadron. There was also a small PNG DF Intelligence Section.

The infantry battalions in January 1974 were each organised on the basis of a "restricted" establishment of twenty nine officers, forty two senior NCOs and four hundred and eighty one Other Rank. Each battalion had a headquarters, a combined administrative/support company and three (rather than the "usual" four) rifle

¹ The remarks about Nadzab equally apply to Lae but the future of Lae airfield is uncertain. Lae airfield, under present planning, is to remain open for light aircraft operations only when regular public transport flying is moved to Nadzab, however, noise problems and pressure on land use due to the expansion of Lae make it likely that the airfield at Lae will ultimately be closed.

companies. The administrative/support group included a mortar platoon (equipped with eighty one millimetre mortars), a signals platoon, medical assistants and an administrative element. The members of the battalion Pipes and Drums (a nice colonial touch) also had an operational role as stretcher bearers. The rifle companies, each commanded by a major, contained three platoons, each with an effective day-to-day strength of about thirty men. The combat strength of each battalion in terms of "bayonets" might, therefore, be reckoned at nine platoons, with an addition to this total of some or all the support company specialist platoons, depending on the type of operations. The PIR battalions were equipped with the current range of infantry weapons and equipment in service with the Australian Army. Indeed this range of equipment was to be found generally throughout the PNG DF.¹

The deployment of the two battalions was as follows. 1PIR was based at Taurama Barracks, Port Moresby, 2PIR at Moem Barracks, Wewak, with one of its companies located at Vanimu (this out-station company is periodically changed over with another Wewak-based company). Until 1974 1PIR had a company at Igam Barracks, Lae, but when the battalions were reorganised on a three rifle company basis to keep the PNG DF manpower level as close as possible to three thousand five hundred men, this out-station arrangement ceased. The deployment of the infantry

¹ The PIR battalions (and PNG DF) were equipped with the Australian 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle (SLR), 9mm F1 Sub-Machine Gun (SMG), 7.62mm Automatic Rifle (AR) and 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG). Plans were underway to equip the PNG DF with a modified, shorter version of the SLR, which would better suit the smaller stature of the PNG soldier.

The battalions were equipped with two types of radio sets, VHF and HF sets, the latter being required for the long ranges over which communications are required when sub-units of the battalions are away from their bases on patrols or civic action tasks.

battalions has not led to "specialization" by one or another of the battalions to certain parts of the country. It has been policy for both battalions to patrol, train and carry out civic action tasks in all parts of PNG, so that 1PIR has commonly operated in the Sepik districts adjacent to the 2PIR bases and 2PIR has operated in Papua. This has been justified on the basis of the need for both units to be familiar with the whole country, not just part of it. Apart from operational reasons, familiarity with the whole country has been seen as an aspect of the soldiers' civic education, promoting a sense of nationalism and an awareness of how the people live.

The mobility this policy entails has been possible because the battalions are each located by airfields and ports, RAAF transport has been available on a quite elaborate scale to airlift troops to all parts of the country and water craft have also been used.¹ Whilst the collocation of the infantry elements with airfields and ports facilitates rapid redeployment in an emergency, it would seem unlikely that the present extensive use of air transport for normal training will be sustained after independence when considerations of economy become more important. If this is so, the battalions will then tend to become more restricted to their own base and contiguous areas and it might become necessary to periodically change over the battalions in order to prevent any regionalist tendencies.

¹ Apart from the Caribou detachment and 183 Reconnaissance Flight aircraft, RAAF C130 Hercules transports, additional Caribou aircraft and Iroquois helicopters have, in recent years, supported PNG DF training, operational and logistic requirements. PIR company-size operational patrols are commonly mounted with Hercules support.

The concentration of most of the Land Element in Port Moresby and Wewak means that two key areas of PNG – the Highlands and New Guinea Islands – do not have Defence Force bases. If the Defence Force does become involved in internal security operations in either of these areas it may have to rely on air transport for its deployment. The original intention to locate a third infantry battalion at Lae (for which Igam barracks were constructed) would have meant that a battalion size force could have been rapidly deployed to most areas of the Highlands by road if air transport was not available. With a two battalion force this is not possible. In regard to the company base at Vanimo, its strategic location close to the Indonesian border makes it useful. It is a good location from which to mount surveillance patrols on the northern border region and if a border control problem were to arise in the future, the importance of Vanimo and its port and airfield would increase. The base at Vanimo also reduces the air support needed to deploy patrols in the border region.

The localization of the PIR battalions in January 1974 was well advanced. In each battalion there were only about seventeen Australians (of these, sixteen were officers and one was a warrant officer). Thus the process of localization below the officer level was virtually complete and about half the officer appointments had been localized. Of the higher appointments, the Commanding Officer of 1PIR in February 1974 was a Papua New Guinean and about half the total number of company commanders of both battalions were Papua New Guineans. On the other hand some Australian officers may be required in command positions in the PIR battalions into 1975 and staff or advisory positions beyond then.

The PNG DF Engineer Company, based at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby, had a strength of eight officers and one hundred and fifty nine men. Half of the officers and senior NCOs were Australian but almost all the Other Rank were PNG servicemen. The

Engineer Company was organised to provide combat engineer support (such as the construction of obstacles and the carrying out demolitions) as well as being able to carry out engineering construction tasks on a fairly limited scale (such as road and bridge building). To carry out construction tasks the company was equipped with some engineering plant, including bulldozers, graders and dump trucks. This unit provided the basis of the Defence Force's civic action engineer capability, however, its limited number of men and equipment constitute real limitations on the projects which may be attempted.

The Defence Force Signals Squadron is also based at Murray Barracks with detachments at Wewak, Manus and Lae. It contained eight officers and one hundred and forty nine men (of this total fifty five were Australians in January 1974). There was, therefore, some way to go towards full localization in PNG DF communications. The Squadron links all the PNG DF bases with voice and teleprinter communications and provides communications with ships and aircraft as well as with Land Element groups operating away from their bases. The squadron thereby provides for the effective administrative management and command of the PNG DF from the Port Moresby headquarters. Because the PNG DF communications system is independent of the communications provided by the PNG Posts and Telegraph Department (and of the Police which also has a radio network), the Defence Force is able to operate effectively in the event of the failure of civil communications.

The Logistic System

The logistic component of the PNG DF is both large and functionally important, accounting for forty per cent of total Defence Force manpower and some twenty seven per cent of total officer strength in January 1974. Most of the civilians employed in the Defence Force were also to be found in supporting

roles within the logistic system. Localization within the logistic system was considerably less advanced than within the operational section of the Force. There were over three hundred Australians employed within the logistic system – an indication of the complexity of many of the jobs together with the late start made in training Papua New Guineans. Most of the logistic units are based in Port Moresby with their sub-units located in other Defence Force bases in order to provide support to the units they contained.¹ Control

¹ The following logistic units were listed on the PNG DF Establishment:

Headquarters: Murray Barracks, Igam Barracks, Taurama Barracks, Moem Barracks.

Supply Platoons: Port Moresby, Wewak, Lae.

Transport Platoons: Murray Barracks, Taurama, Wewak, Lae, Goldie River.

General Engineering (GE) Workshops: Port Moresby, Lae, Wewak.
PNG DF Health Centre.

PNG DF Preventative Medical Platoon.

PNG DF Movement Agency.

Defence Supply Agency.

Manus base troops.

The following units were planned in January 1974 but awaited formal approval:

Patrol Boat Maintenance Section.

PNG DF Dockyard.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit.

The following units, formally classified as Administrative, may also be included here:

PNG DF Recruiting Organisation.

Military Police Unit.

Garrison Engineer Offices: North, and South.

of logistic units is generally exercised through senior staff officers within the headquarters although consideration has been given to the formation of a logistic battalion which would act as an intermediate logistic headquarters. It seems, however, that the present arrangements will continue. The Barracks Headquarters located in each of the Defence Force bases undertook the essential administrative "housekeeping" functions, thereby freeing the operational units from this responsibility.

Repair and maintenance of Defence Force equipment was carried out by the three engineering Workshops, the Patrol Boat Maintenance Section and Dockyard. The Workshop at Port Moresby was the primary installation and it handled the bulk of the work. In relation to maintenance of aircraft, the Caribou detachment had a small servicing cell attached to it and major work was conducted in Australia, the aircraft being rotated with the parent squadron for maintenance. When the PNG DF Air Element is formed most, if not all, major servicing will be conducted in Air Niugini workshops. Maintenance for the Reconnaissance Flight was carried out by its own workshop although aircraft were returned to Australia for major servicing and this will continue if the Flight remains in PNG after independence.

The Defence Force Supply Agency forms an important part of the logistic system. This organisation, of sixty eight servicemen and civilians, was responsible for the procurement of equipment and supplies from outside the Defence Force, working in cooperation with PNG Government Departments and with the PNG Supplies and Tenders Board. It will also presumably manage the flow from Australian sources of logistic assistance to the PNG DF after independence.

The Defence Force medical system has been designed to complement the civil medical resources available in PNG. It is,

however, quite elaborate and luxurious by PNG standards with medical centres staffed by doctors in all of the PNG DF bases (except Vanimbo) and small but well-equipped hospitals at Manus and Port Moresby. Defence Force dependants as well as servicemen receive free medical attention from these facilities. There is also a well established dental care system. In January 1974 all the medical and dental officers, with the exception of one dental officer, were Australians, but there were Defence Force-sponsored medical and dental undergraduates in training.

The PNG DF logistic system is the product of detailed logistic planning and, where possible, procedures have been simplified to lighten the burden for the future Papua New Guinean operators of the system. Even so, some Australian officers claim that the stores control and accounting procedures remain needlessly complicated and will prove difficult to manage. The problem is of course to design systems which are both simple and effective and also meet the criteria of financial accountability and the proper control of public funds. PNG politicians have already expressed concern about corruption within the Government and corruption will, no doubt, also have to be guarded against within the Defence Force.

The Training System

The PNG DF's training system accounted for only ten per cent of total Defence Force manpower, but twenty per cent of the PNG DF officer corps were employed within the system. In any Defence Force the training of leaders and skilled men is a large task and this is even more the case in the PNG DF which has to replace skilled and experienced Australians by PNG servicemen. To a significant extent the future efficiency of the Defence Force will depend on the effectiveness of the training system. Formal military training, in addition to the normal routine of individual and collective training within units, is carried

out at four locations as follows:

PNG Training Depot, Goldie River: recruit training, training in specialist skills, promotion courses and post-graduate training of officers;

PNG DF Apprentice Training Unit, Murray Barracks: training of Defence Force trade apprentices;

Manus Maritime Base: training of maritime members of the PNG DF after their recruit training;

Joint Services College, Lae: training of PNG DF officers .

The PNG Training Depot has a headquarters and three training wings including a Recruit Training Company, an Arms and Services Company and an Officer Training Wing . Initial Defence Force recruit training lasts for twenty four weeks and all recruits with the exception of some officer cadets, undergo it . Maritime recruits complete their training at Manus at the conclusion of the Goldie River training . The minimum education level for General Service entrants to the PNG DF is PNG Form Two and during their initial training recruits undertake further general education . Military instruction is conducted in English, supported as necessary by Pidgin . The twice yearly recruit entries vary in size between one hundred and fifty and two hundred and fifty men .

The Arms and Services Company conducts courses in signals, engineering, infantry, clerical, driver training, catering, supplies management and music . A ten week-long field engineering and civic action course, especially designed to increase the civic action capacity of battalion troops, has also been introduced .

Promotion courses required in order to qualify for senior NCO and warrant officer rank are also held at Goldie River, as well as in-service commissioning courses for NCOs who are thought to have officer potential.

The important role of the Training Depot is emphasised by the fact that more than eight hundred personnel pass through the Depot's training courses annually. The training techniques employed are modern, emphasising training objectives rather than ritualized instruction and the training facilities are excellent although there are problems in raising the standard of Papua New Guinean instructors, handicapped by a lack of formal education and poor English language ability.

The Joint Services College (JSC) represents a bold and innovative approach to officer training. Until 1974 PNG DF officers received their military training at the Officer Cadet School (OCS), Portsea. Prior to the year-long Australian course, officer cadets first underwent an eighteen months-long preparatory course at the Military Cadet School (MCS), which sought to bring the students to Form Four level of education, give them a basic military grounding and prepare them for Portsea. This mixed PNG/Australian training was not very successful. Australian training was not fully suited to PNG needs, learning was inhibited by problems of adjustment and communication at Portsea and the total cost of training was great compared to a PNG-based system.

The first initiatives aimed at the formation of a military college in PNG were taken in 1970-71 and after some resistance by elements of the Australian defence community, which cited the case of New Zealand as a small country which continued to successfully rely on overseas training for its officers, the proposal was eventually supported. The Joint Services College (JSC) was approved by the PNG and Australian Governments in

mid-1973.¹ It was agreed that the JSC would provide one year's common training for officer cadets of the PNG DF, Police and Corrective Institutions Service (CIS), and one year's advanced training for PNG DF entrants after the first year of joint training. Police and other non-PNG DF trainees, at the completion of the first year's training, proceed to their own special-to-service training at other places. The PNG DF cadets graduate at the end of the two year course as second lieutenants.

The benefits of a year of joint training with the Police were not seen as simply economic. It was hoped that common training would develop understanding between each group and serve the Somare Government's objective of integrating PNG's elite by providing a common core of knowledge, understanding of Government's aims and allegiance to Government. The staff of the JSC includes both Defence Force and Police officers. The Commandant is a PNG DF officer whilst the senior Police officer on the staff is the chief instructor of the Joint Training Wing. Further details about the organisation of the JSC and the content of the courses are provided in the footnote below.²

¹ A.M. Kiki, H.A.D., Ministerial Statement on Defence, 25 April 1974.

² The JSC Charter includes the following objectives:

"To provide instruction in the skills of leadership, general management and administration as a sound basis for later in-service training.

To provide such academic training as is needed to absorb the required professional training and subsequently, competently discharge his professional obligations with particular emphasis on:

- (1) A sound ability to communicate verbally and in writing.
- (2) A deeper understanding of the people, their culture, their government and national aspirations. . . ."

The joint training of Defence Force and Police officers is an interesting departure from Australian practice but not unique within developing countries. Whilst there may be obvious advantages in

2 (Continued)

The Organisation of the College

Training in the joint one year course consists of two elements: an education syllabus at Form 5 level in English, Social Science, Mathematics and Science and, Service training including, physical training, weapon training, bushcraft, leadership and a study of Police and PNG DF organisation. Equal time is devoted to both elements of the course. At the completion of the one year course the Police and CIS cadets "pass out" of the JSC to their own Services for a further year of training. The PNG DF cadets "pass out" to the Advanced Defence Training Wing (ADTW) in which there is also a civil and military education component in the syllabus. Cadets may either pursue a social science or military technology education, both conducted at Form 6 standard. (Successful completion of the course qualifies the cadet for admission to PNG universities). The military training is comparable to that formerly received at Portsea, however, some subjects such as armour and artillery which have no current relevance to the PNG DF are omitted or reduced in scope. Other subjects with special importance for PNG are given increased attention. The syllabus is designed to produce a "professional" PNG DF officer and traditional subjects such as military and naval history have been preserved. Maritime cadets also receive special training during this second year in subjects such as seamanship and terrestrial navigation. The two Wings of the JSC are separate and semi-autonomous, each with their own internal cadet rank appointments. Cadet intakes occur each 6 months. PNG DF officer cadets in the mid-year entry at present undergo recruit training at the PNG Training Depot, those of the January entry do not. Police officer cadets do 6 weeks pre-induction training. The Commandant of the JSC holds the rank of lieutenant colonel, the Chief Instructor of the Joint Training Wing, a Police Inspector First Class, heads a staff of 4 Police and 4 PNG DF officer instructors. There are also a number of senior NCO assistant instructors (both Police and PNG DF). In 1974 the Academic staff consisted of 14 Education Corps teachers. The eventual replacement of some or all these military personnel by civilian teachers has been proposed. The College curriculum, cadet selection procedures and organisational matters are the responsibility of a College Council. The members of the Council include the commanders of the PNG DF, Police and CIS, the JSC Commandant, a Public Service Board member and nominees of the Minister for Defence and the PNG Department of Education. (Source: interviews conducted at the JSC and Police Headquarters, Port Moresby, January 1974).

the arrangement such as developing a sense of nationalism and unity of purpose, there are also serious dangers such as the need to preserve a balance between traditional police and military approaches. Undue military influence in PNG Police training could lead to the development of an overly authoritarian, para-military force. Some might argue that the PNG Police, which have traditionally been an armed constabulary force, should be developed along these lines, however, this has been strongly resisted by Australians in the Police who look to the Australian model of kin-police, serving within the community, not apart from it. The success of the JSC may well depend on the manner in which Police and Defence Force interests are balanced. At present the location of the College on a Defence Force base, the collocation of the Advanced Defence Training Wing and the preponderance of military staff within the JSC point to a very strong Defence Force bias to the training which even an impartial College Council may not be able to prevent.

Apart from the PNG-based training resources of the PNG DF, the Force at present also has access to training courses conducted in Australia and this is likely to continue in regard to specialist training for which the facilities are not available in PNG and for advanced officer training. Radiologist and flying training courses might be taken as an example of the former, junior officers' staff courses and attendance at the Australian Staff College as important examples of the latter.¹

The Defence Force Headquarters and Departmental Organisation

The PNG DF headquarters is located at Murray Barracks, Port Moresby in smart concrete and steel buildings which contrast sharply with the disorderly sprawl of the PNG Government's office complex at Konedobu. The headquarters accounted for about

¹ See Department of Defence Press Release, No 127/73, August 1973.

one hundred of the three hundred and seventy seven officers in the PNG DF. In January 1973, the senior officers in the headquarters included a brigadier, five colonels and eight lieutenant colonels. The role of the PNG DF headquarters is threefold. As defence headquarters it is responsible for the complete range of policy formulation and defence administration. It commands and controls the PNG DF logistic system. And the headquarters exercises operational command over all Defence Force units. This last function is partly achieved through the manning of an operations room which is in radio contact with the PNG DF's ships, aircraft and Land Elements. These three functions and the absence of intermediate logistic or operational headquarters account for what might be seen as a fairly lavish, over-ranked organisation.¹

In early 1974 the headquarters was in a process of transition towards its planned shape based on a five branch organisation with integrated civil and military staffs. Operations, Logistics and Personnel branches will be headed by colonels, the Finance and Programming and, Policy and Planning branches are to be headed by public servants. The Commander of the Defence Force and the Secretary will be of co-equal status and both will have direct access to the PNG Minister for Defence. The allocation of responsibilities between the branches of the headquarters and the respective roles of the Secretary and Commander are listed in

¹ The Headquarters accounts for 75 per cent of the 20 officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above in the PNG DF. This ratio of senior executive to total organisation is, in fact, less lavish than most of the important PNG Government departments and comparable to the Police.

the footnote below.¹

¹ Duties of the Defence Force Secretary and Commander

The Secretary is to have the following duties: principal civilian adviser to the minister; responsible for the efficient administration, control and accounting of all expenditure and revenue in the Defence Force; responsible for the direction and control of all civilian and military personnel employed in respect of his functions.

The Commander's duties are: principal military adviser to the minister; command the Defence Force; responsible for the efficient administration and control of the Defence Force; in exceptional circumstances, to have the right of access to the Prime Minister.

The Branches

(The branches are co-ordinated in their activities by a Chief of Staff (Colonel), who has a small staff)

Operations Branch. (Military head): tactical operations planning; direction of military operations and training; military intelligence; survey and hydrography; military engineering; civic action; search and rescue; direction of civil disaster and emergency activities; communications.

Personnel Branch. (Military head): personnel management; recruiting, enlistment; individual and specialist training; officer production; manpower policy and control; conditions of service; dress and discipline; protocol and ceremonial; establishments; welfare; health; legal services.

Logistics Branch. (Military head): transportation, movements and removals; materiel development and planning; supply, policy and documentation; ammunition control; repair, policy and documentation; unit stores management; equipment, repair, maintenance and design; facilities, planning, supervision of design, construction and maintenance.

Finance and Programming Branch. (Civilian head) - (Formerly the Force Secretary's Branch until 1974): programming, use of resources; estimates, budgeting and expenditure control; contracts, policy and control; internal audit; office services; library; civil personnel, establishments and administration.

Policy and Planning Branch. (Civilian head): national strategic and defence policy; national military preparedness policy, force structure and development; policy in regard to the role and deployment of the force; external defence relations; liaison with national intelligence bodies; government coordination;

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PART B - THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE DEFENCE FORCE

In April 1974 the PNG Minister for Defence, Mr Kiki, told the House of Assembly that the PNG DF had three broad responsibilities as follows:

"to be able to defend the nation against external attack;

to be able to assist the Police in the maintenance of the public order and security as a last resort ...; and

to contribute as required to economic development and the promotion of national administration and unity."¹

The Government, in effect, allocated the three roles of external defence, internal security and nation building. In regard to external defence it was clear that the Government wanted a force which was capable of deterring and if necessary repelling those incursions into PNG which might be too minor to attract the intervention of friendly countries; it was believed that the other countries would expect PNG to have this minimum level of defence capability. There was also the view that the

1 (Continued)
parliamentary liaison; public relations.

The Secretary and Commander both have direct access to each branch however military branch heads are responsible in the first instance to the Commander and civilian branch heads to the Secretary. The military deputy of the Policy and Planning branch has right of access to the Commander. (Interviews conducted at HQ PNG DF, January/February 1974).

¹ A.M. Kiki, H.A.D., Ministerial Statement on Defence, 25 April 1974.

Defence Force should be able to scout out and identify more serious incursions as a basis for seeking the help of allies, thus playing the role of a "trip-wire" force. Beyond these situations, the Defence Force should be capable of playing an appropriate role in conjunction with allies in the defence of PNG against invasion. The approach to external defence therefore assumed the existence of close defence allies. In relation to internal security the PNG Defence Minister announced that the Police would retain principal responsibility for the maintenance of internal security, whilst the Defence Force role would be of a secondary back up nature, invoked only when the Police were no longer able to cope with the situation. In regard to the third role, the Minister stated that the fullest use of Defence Force resources was to be made in order to further the Government's nation building objectives.¹

External Defence

Australian defence planners have usually based appreciations of the size of the PNG Defence Force on the defence of the PNG/Indonesian border in a situation of low-level military confrontation. Thus it has been held that the PNG DF should be based on a three battalion force with one battalion able to operate north of the central cordillera, one south and a third required as a reserve, for retraining and rest. At present the Defence Force has only two battalions and some violence has, therefore, been done to this defence concept. On the other hand it might be argued that military confrontation with Indonesia now seems improbable and if a threat were to arise, a third battalion might be raised within a relatively short time. The question, however, remains as to what external defence capability PNG has with the present two battalion force of six rifle companies, compared to that of a full three battalion force? In mathematical terms the PNG DF Land Element now has only fifty per cent of the capability once thought

¹ ibid.

necessary by Australian military planners and it might be concluded, therefore, that the Force's external defence capability is indeed realistically represented as only a small "trip-wire" force which would soon need the assistance of allies .

Nonetheless, the present forces does seem adequate to deal with the minor operations that are envisaged . In quantitative terms, the PNG DF would be able to deploy a reinforced battalion group in the border area and logistically maintain it . This force might be deployed indefinitely, provided that elements of the group could be relieved from the battalion held in reserve and by other reserve units . This force, operating from company bases and supported by air, could effectively deal with small-scale border infiltration by small enemy groups or guerrilla bands . Incursions by groups above platoon size would probably tax its resources, although it would be within the capability of a battalion group to locate and identify larger enemy incursion forces, delay them and provide time to seek external assistance . The PNG DF therefore does appear to be able to meet its external defence responsibilities .

The Defence Force should also be able to effectively act as a border surveillance force, dealing, for example, with any attempts by dissident Irian Jayanese groups to use PNG territory as a sanctuary .¹ Provided that this type of situation was on a small scale, a one battalion force deployed in the part of the border affected should prove adequate . The present force would certainly be able to maintain the pattern of border patrolling conducted by the PNG DF over the past years .²

¹ See Chapter IV for a discussion of this issue .

² Since June 1965 there have been about 60 military patrols in the border area including about 10 patrols during 1973 . These patrols have covered over 13,000 kms of border tracks . (See Annex B) .

There are, however, two important provisos to this discussion of the border defence capabilities of the Land Element of the PNG DF. Defence Force operations will be greatly affected by the extent to which border incursions are localized and by the cooperation of PNG citizens in the border region. The PNG/Indonesian border is seven hundred and twenty five kilometres long, it is exceptionally rugged terrain over much of this distance, communications are primitive and population on both sides of the border is sparse. If border operations are focused in only several areas, the Defence Force task would be simplified, but if border incursions occur along the length of the border the situation could quickly escalate beyond the resources of the PNG DF. On balance, it is more likely that low-intensity operations would be confined to the more populated border areas where there are cross-border track systems and traditional border crossing areas.¹ Border control of several of these crossing areas should be within the

¹ PNG and Irian Jaya border area populations are as follows:

PNG. 13,050. Most of this population is in two areas: From the Fly River bulge" to the foothills of the main range 3,400; from the Sepik River north to the head of the Bewani mountains 4,400).

Irian Jaya. about 33,000. This includes a strip along the border about 25kms wide. The population is distributed as follows: Jayapura 7,000; Jayawijaya 6,000; Merauke 20,000. (The population of actual border people is considerably less). The West Sepik District Commissioner in May 1973 stated that there were about 500 non-Irianese Indonesians settled in the northern border region. There are seven major border crossing areas. Four are north of the central cordillera and three south. From north to south they are: Wutung, Sekotchiau, Imonda/Waris, Kamerataro (west of Amenab), Ningerum, Boset (south of Fly River bulge"), and Weam/Sota.

resources of the Defence Force whereas simultaneous control of all of them would not. Effective border operations would also greatly depend on information and assistance from the local people. Poor intelligence and the non-cooperation, or resistance, of local people might place even minor border infiltration beyond the capabilities of the present Defence Force.

In regard to external defence, generally, in areas other than the border region, the Defence Force could probably deal with small scale guerrilla infiltration from the sea or air, provided that the local population were helpful and operations were conducted on sound intelligence.

The Maritime and Air Elements of the PNG DF also have important surveillance and logistic roles in external defence. The transport flight would be committed to the logistic support of any force engaged in border operations where its tasks would include redeployment and resupply of sub-units in the operational zone. Apart from these tasks there would be a requirement for the type of support provided by the Australian Reconnaissance Flight aircraft. Light aircraft and helicopters would be needed for reconnaissance and liaison, casualty evacuation and resupply to small groups. If the Australian unit was not available the Defence Force might be forced to turn to civilian aircraft which might not be an effective expedient. Until now the PNG DF's operational doctrine has placed great reliance on the use of air support as a result of the rugged nature of PNG terrain, the lack of alternative means of transportation in many parts of the country and the influence of Australian air-minded tactical doctrine. Because of these factors the development of a PNG DF helicopter and light aircraft unit seems to be warranted. This type of unit might be developed slowly but until it is done PNG will remain dependent on Australian goodwill for an important aspect of its air support. It is revelant that almost all of the smaller defence forces in black Africa have helicopters and light aircraft as

well as transports in their air inventory.

Coastal surveillance where enemy incursion into PNG was expected would fall in large measure to the five patrol boats. In regard to border problems one boat could probably be maintained continuously on a patrol station off the north and south coasts, allowing for maintenance, rest and relief requirements. (This is not to assume that the boats would be used singly in this way but to state a capacity). The adequate surveillance of the rest of PNG's coastline could well be beyond the resources of the patrol boat squadron. Effective coastal surveillance would seem to depend on the complementary use of maritime reconnaissance aircraft, as well as the use of other craft for in-shore patrolling¹ and a shore-based reporting system.² Modern maritime patrol aircraft are probably beyond PNG's financial resources, however, PNG might be able to rely on Australian maritime aircraft which could operate from distant Australian bases in a manner unlikely to be a politically sensitive, so long as they did not employ offensive weapons. Alternatively, PNG might decide to develop a primitive maritime patrol capability based on transport aircraft equipped with a rudimentary radar module,³ or special aircraft such as

¹ PNG coastal surveillance might be supplemented by the small craft fleet of the PNG Department of Transport which includes eleven trawlers and over sixty launches and work boats.

² An Australian coastal information gathering and reporting system in the form of the Coastwatching Service operated until recently in PNG. (See Australian Facts and Figures, No 40, December 1953). The PNG Government may take over this service and operate it overtly rather than on a clandestine basis as in the past. Apart from the potential security value of such a system, it would also be useful for civil defence purposes, reporting incidents at sea and other civil disasters. A further task could be the reporting of the movements of foreign fishing fleets operating in PNG waters and unauthorized mineral exploration activities. The service could be based on schools and Government posts equipped with two-way radio.

³ This was suggested by H.L. Bell, "The Armed Forces of Niugini", October, 1971, page 10.

the Australian-built Nomad. In conclusion, the capabilities of the Defence Force indicate that it is able to meet the very limited external defence role seen for it by the PNG Government, but beyond this role the PNG DF would require expansion or the assistance of allies. Even in terms of the external defence role foreseen, the PNG DF is deficient in two areas. It is dependant on Australian maritime air reconnaissance and it lacks helicopters and light aircraft.

Internal Security¹

Although the Police have the primary responsibility for internal order, PNG leaders have accepted the fact that the Defence Force should also be prepared for internal security tasks. PNG Government policies will, hopefully, avoid serious threats to domestic security, but policies need to be underpinned by security forces trained and efficient in internal security duties. PNG's internal security in the future might be affected by a range of problems including urban violence, widespread tribal fighting or armed secession and it may be assumed that the Government will meet violence which threatens public order on a general scale with both political and coercive strategies.

Until independence, the participation of the PNG DF in internal security operations would be subject to the provisions of Australian law, specifically, under the terms of the Defence Act and its Regulations. After independence, the legal basis for Defence Force participation in internal operations will be subject to the PNG Constitution and PNG legislation, the provisions of which are not yet known. At present Defence Force internal security training doctrine is heavily conditioned by Australian law and practice. Since the 1970 Gazelle Peninsula confrontation

¹ Internal Security operations are defined in the Australian Department of Defence Joint Services Glossary as: "Military Assistance provided to the Civilian Authorities to maintain peace, restore law and order and safeguard essential services".

with the Mataungan Association, however, internal security training has been emphasised by the Defence Force.¹ In the future it is possible that the PNG DF will have a wider internal security role than now envisaged. PNG law may provide for a simplified procedure for the use of the Defence Force and wider powers for the Defence Force when acting in aid to the civil power. In spite of intentions to keep the PNG DF out of internal security, military aid to the Police may prove less exceptional in PNG than has been the case in Australia. The lack of military involvement in peace-keeping in Australia is increasingly exceptional in today's world and the Australian precept of using military force as an extreme measure of last resort carries less weight in other western countries such as Canada and Britain than it does in Australia.² The functional division in PNG between Defence Force and Police may also be blurred by the para-military character of parts of the Police Force, especially the Mobile Squads.

¹ See R.J. O'Neill, The Army in PNG, pages 14 and 15. During this crisis over 25 per cent of the Police were deployed on the Gazelle Peninsula and the Army was placed on stand by, but was not sent. In 1974, the infantry battalions in the PNG DF were devoting about 25 to 30 per cent of their training time to internal security training.

² Australian legal requirements for the use of military forces for internal security duties are based on Section 119 of the Australian Constitution and Section 51 of the Defence Act and this legislation applies in PNG until independence. Under these provisions, the military may be employed to restore order after a situation of domestic violence is proclaimed. The legal preliminaries to military involvement include the issuing of a Call Out notice by the Governor-General, acting on the advice of his Executive Council (i.e., the Australian Government). The detail of the procedure in the case of States and Commonwealth territories is set down in Part V (paragraphs 722-746) of Australian Military Regulations and Orders. The scope of aid to the civil power operations envisaged under these Regulations is essentially limited to the dispersal of "unlawful assemblies".

More grave threats to internal security have to be met by special laws defining the relations between the military and civil power in cases of insurrection as there is no provision beyond Call Out

The effectiveness of the Defence Force in internal security will depend greatly on the scale of disorder. Whilst the Force could enhance the logistic capacity and mobility of the Police, its usefulness in civil disturbances involving large numbers of people may be limited. It has a total of only eight infantry companies, or eight hundred men, readily available for these types of duties and, for this reason, it might be unwise to commit the Defence Force's manpower prematurely. To be successfully employed, the Force may need to be used resolutely with the object of achieving a decisive effect, otherwise its manpower shortage may render it ineffective.

2 (Continued)

procedure, such as a declaration of Martial Law. Troops called out to assist the civil power act under military law as soldiers, but are also subject, as citizens, to the civil law. Rioters remain wholly under civil law, not military law. (See Army Law Manual, 1964, Volume 1, Introduction, paragraphs 22 and 23). Aid to the civil power operations under Australian law are based on the dispersal of unlawful assemblies using the minimum force necessary to achieve dispersal. If warnings to disperse are futile, minimum force is generally taken to mean the firing of an aimed shot. This single aimed shot at a nominated target – "the man in the red shirt" – may be followed if necessary by as many more as required to achieve dispersal. The officer in command of the troops is, however, responsible to decide which weapons and how many rounds are to be fired. Each individual soldier is responsible before the civil law for his actions to the extent that he may exceed his orders. Officers in this situation are guided on their conduct by the specific provisions of AMR and O which provides that: the fire ordered must be effective, and there must be no firing over the heads of the crowd (as having the effect of "Favouring the most daring and guilty, and of sacrificing the less daring and even the innocent" (para 743). Humane discretion is to be exercised both in the number of weapons ordered to fire. (paragraphs 739(b) and 742). Military action is not to be punitive or retributive.

If the policy of generally keeping the PNG DF out of internal security duties is maintained the Force would only be used if the Police are unable to cope. The Police have the capability to deal with major disturbances, on the scale of the Mataungan confrontation, in only part of PNG at once and if problems arise which exceed this intensity, or occur in more than one place, the PNG DF would become involved. Even if the Defence Force were employed, widespread violence over more than about three Districts would be very difficult to control and the combined resources of the Defence Force and Police would be unlikely to "hold down" a PNG subject to widespread violence. The Defence Force, nevertheless, provides the Government with a valuable reserve of force for the maintenance of domestic order. This reserve of force may also be used most effectively to back up the Police where they are deficient, that is, in logistics, communications, air and sea transportation. The capabilities of the PNG DF acting as an internal security force in its own right are limited by three factors. It has little manpower suitable for employment in low-intensity situations (e.g., the control of unarmed rioters rather than armed dissidents). Also, the Defence Force, trained and equipped with lethal weapons, may be inflexible when employed in an internal security role. Finally, the employment of the Defence Force in situations of disorder may lead to both the destruction of the PNG DF as a symbol of national unity and problems of disunity in the Force.

The ability of the Defence Force to deal with secessionist problems merit specific consideration. It is well known that political leaders in PNG have previously advocated secession, however, questions concerning the actual likelihood of secession in PNG and the use of force by secessionists or Government forces are ignored here.¹ This discussion is only concerned with the

¹ See James Griffin, "Movements for Separation and Secession" in A. Clunies Ross and J. Langmore (eds.), Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1973, page 116.

capacity of the Defence Force to deal with a military problem which might arise out of armed secession.

Secession might be achieved by peaceful means. It might also be attempted by two violent strategies: either, by a sudden coup, or by a protracted campaign of insurgency and civil disobedience. A combination of these strategies might also be adopted. To speculate on the capabilities of the PNG DF in the case of a campaign of violence is difficult beyond the observation that such a situation would be unlikely to emerge quickly. Insurgent movements require time to develop a political base of support and acquire arms and leaders. The Defence Force would then become involved in long term operations to counter the usual tactics of insurgency in order to restore central government control. The history of counter-guerrilla warfare points to bitter and protracted campaigns in which superior morale often conquers over superior materiel. If insurgency developed in a place like Bougainville, it might well prove beyond the resources of both the PNG Police and Defence Forces (in terms of their current size) to control. The PNG security forces should, however, be capable of dealing effectively with a range of insurgency situations where the insurgents did not have wide popular support and logistic resources. The evidence of both Indonesia and black African states suggests that guerrilla movements are less successful when they are in revolt against indigenous governments, rather than colonial or white minority regimes.

Secessionists might also seek power by a sudden coup (by, for instance, seizing Government offices, disarming the Police and issuing a proclamation over the local radio station). In this situation the new regime would tend to gain legitimacy the longer

it survived and was thus able to mobilize domestic and internal support and consolidate its power. The effectiveness of the Central Government's attempts to put down the secessionists may well depend on the speed with which security forces were deployed to the area. Airfields might easily be obstructed and, in view of the lack of parachutists or troop carrying helicopters, the introduction of Defence Force units might take several days as air and sea transportation was organised to deploy the force.¹ In most cases, the PNG DF would probably be capable of putting down this type of local rising by operations on the scale of a one battalion force (if introduced speedily), although the re-establishment of Government control might require more troops.²

The deterrent value of the Defence Force in relation to armed uprisings may also be relevant. The value of the PNG DF lies partly in its existence as a national force with a reputation for efficiency and loyalty to the Government and a Force of almost any size might cause secessionists to pause and reckon the potential costs of violence. Deterrence might also be achieved by the deployment of troops to potential "trouble spots" on a permanent or

¹ The Central Government might simply decide to do nothing militarily and instead conduct political negotiations. A more likely possibility might be a mixture of military action and political bargaining. As in the PRRI rebellion in Indonesia, it might be the military who end up doing the political bargaining as well as conducting military operations. Not only do the military exercise the sanction of violence but they would also be vitally concerned with the effects of a violent anti-secessionist campaign on their own unity.

² This was also the view of H.L. Bell, "Armed Forces of Niugini", op. cit., page 7. Bell points to the pre-war Rabaul strike as an example of the capacity of Papua New Guinians to plan and act secretly.

semi-permanent basis, but as the Defence Force is concentrated in a small number of bases this is not practical. The concentration of the PNG DF on the other hand allows better training and supervision and it may also guard against isolated local units developing "regionalist" attitudes. On balance, the present deployment of the PNG DF is unlikely to reduce its capability to deal with secession and besides, the permanent deployment of Defence Force units to parts of PNG where there are secessionist causes might now be seen as provocative.

Intelligence

The PNG DF's effectiveness in internal security operations is likely to be very greatly affected by the quality and promptness of intelligence. Intelligence organisations are frequently seen in a sinister light as threats to civil liberties and instruments of political control as well as being unnecessarily shrouded in secrecy. Efficient intelligence and internal security organisations, however, may also perform a positive role in contributing to domestic order in developing countries – by increasing the effectiveness of security measures and perhaps even avoiding military operations. A government serviced by a poor intelligence organisation is more likely to respond too late, with force, to situations which might have been avoided, or remedied by changes of policy or negotiation. Without good intelligence and a proper framework for internal security decision-making and supervision, a government's developmental, administrative and security policies are unlikely to march together, so leading to greater security problems.

In early 1974 PNG's intelligence and internal security organisational structure was still in the process of evolution as Australia handed over these functions and as PNG planning was implemented. The formal organisational structure is also likely to change after independence as the system is adapted to the indigenous political system, local leaders and PNG's

particular internal security problems. The collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence in PNG are the responsibilities of the PNG Security and Intelligence Organisation (PNGSIO).¹ This organisation carries out the range of functions conducted within the Australian context by Police special branches, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO). Thus the PNGSIO has three broad roles. It is concerned with the monitoring of internal security. To do this it maintains a knowledge of PNG internal affairs by means of reports from its own officers and information received from the Police and most Government departments. Secondly, the PNGSIO is concerned with the broader issues of national intelligence including economic, political and foreign intelligence. Thirdly, the PNGSIO is responsible for the prevention of subversion, espionage and sabotage in PNG and the protective security of Government employees and the classified information to which they have access. As the PNGSIO carries out the functions of the former PNG Police Special Branch, Police operations are dependent on the intelligence provided by the PNGSIO, although a great deal of information received by the PNGSIO initially comes from the Police.² The PNGSIO also has the responsibility for servicing the interlocking structure of intelligence and internal security committees at the National and District level which have advisory and decision making functions.

At the National level the PNG Intelligence Committee advises the Government on all aspects of intelligence. This Committee,

¹ This section is based on interviews with PNG Government officials in May 1973 and February 1974. The PNGSIO comes under the ministerial responsibility of the Chief Minister.

² The PNG Police "special branch" was formed in 1965 and disbanded in 1971 largely because the Police Commissioner of the day considered that special branch functions were best separated from the normal Police organisation. (Interview, Deputy Police Commissioner, 11 May 1973).

which meets regularly, makes its own intelligence assessments based on material provided by its secretariat. Information is received from a diversity of sources including the PNGSIO, Police, Defence Force and relevant Government departments. The Defence Force is represented on this Committee. There is also provision for an Internal Security Committee of senior officials who are responsible for advising the PNG Cabinet. The Defence Force Commander is a member of this Committee, as is the Police Commissioner and PNGSIO head. At the District level, intelligence and internal security responsibilities are exercised by District Internal Security and Intelligence Committees which have both advisory and executive functions and are under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner. These committees also include Police, Defence Force, PNGSIO and relevant Departmental representation. (The Defence Force is represented under normal circumstances in only those Districts which have a Defence Force base).

This intelligence and security organisation appears to provide an adequate framework for PNG, indicating that the experience of other countries has been well applied by those responsible for the development of the PNG system. The representation and participation of the Defence Force in the system provides the basis for coordinated PNG DF participation in internal security operations, if this should become necessary, within the compass of civilian control. The quality of PNGSIO intelligence assessments is, however, crucial to the operation of the system. The PNGSIO head is now a Papua New Guinean but many of the officers are still Australians. If localization is rapid in this field there is a danger of reduced effectiveness which might be dangerous if it corresponded with problems of internal unrest after independence. The contribution of the Defence Force to the intelligence gathering task is valuable, supplementing PNGSIO assessments. PNG DF activities, such as civic action and patrolling and even the reports of soldiers returning from leave,

provide useful information from which security problems may be identified (for example, tribal fighting, or cargo cult activities).

Nation Building and Military Civic Action

The PNG DF contribution to PNG's economic development and national unity might be described as nation-building. This role includes the conduct of military civic action but goes well beyond it. The Defence Force also contributes to nation building indirectly. As a national organisation recruited from all parts of PNG, it is an example of integration to the rest of the country and a symbol of national unity. The Defence Force also contributes to nation building as a result of the skills and attitudes which Defence Force men acquire during their service. About two hundred and fifty men leave the Force each year and those that go back to their villages take with them non-traditional attitudes derived from military service about such aspects as hygiene, leadership and so on. Others leave the Defence Force with useful skills which may be utilized within the labour force. Training of drivers, mechanics, clerks and other tradesmen is part of this indirect nation-building contribution. The Defence Force in PNG may also be seen as a "crucible of citizenship" - preparing its members for the duties of civil life as well as giving them useful skills and attitudes. The value of these contributions to nation-building is somewhat reduced by the regular, volunteer character of the PNG Defence Force. If it were a conscript force, or even a volunteer force with short periods of service, the numbers of Papua New Guineans who benefitted from the experience of military service would be considerably greater. The proposals made during 1973-74 to establish a National Youth Scheme represent an imaginative, but as yet unrealised, means of promoting citizenship training within a corporate structure and if the scheme

is eventually adopted the Defence Force would be well placed to help run it.¹ Defence Force leaders and instructors, barrack facilities and stores could be used to support the scheme (accepting that it would add to defence costs), although it is uncertain whether the PNG Government will wish to establish a youth scheme with a predominant Defence Force influence. It may see in such an arrangement dangers in the expansion of military influence, as well as problems of reintegration when trainees complete their service.

The PNG DF makes a direct contribution to the nation-building objectives of the Government in two ways. It carries out civic action projects and it operates as an agent of national administration. In this latter respect, the Defence Force Maritime Element conducts fisheries and sovereignty patrolling as an agent of the PNG Government and the Land Element patrols remote areas of the country, representing the Government as well as carrying out Government tasks such as reporting on local medical problems.

¹ See Post Courier, 31 October 1973. The PNG Minister for the Interior appointed a Study Group in 1973 to investigate and advise on the feasibility of establishing a National Youth Service. The Study Group, which included a Papua New Guinean officer of the PNG DF as well as other Departmental representatives, was directed to determine whether the organisation should be para-military or civilian. The establishment of this Study Group followed proposals from within the Department of Social Development and Home Affairs during 1972 for a one year Youth scheme conducted by the Defence Force and based on 1000 recruits each year.

The report of the Study Group had not been released by March 1974, but it seemed that the Defence Force would not initially have a significant role in any scheme that might be introduced because of fears of increased military power. (Personal Communication, February 1974).

The fisheries and sovereignty patrolling activities of the Maritime Element are important functions in national terms. As an archipelagic state PNG is dependent on her maritime environment for economic wealth and communications. The rapid development of PNG's fishing is expected¹ and the growth of the industry will increase the requirement for fisheries surveillance in order to control fishing by foreign fleets. Secondly, PNG's position astride important trade routes will lead to an increasing volume of shipping passing through or adjacent to PNG waters and this is likely to impose responsibilities on PNG such as ensuring safe navigation, dealing with marine emergencies and controlling pollution. Thirdly, trends in international law towards extension of territorial waters will place increased demands on the maritime capability of the Defence Force.³ Some of the tasks which fall to the Maritime

¹ The value of exported marine products in PNG in 1968-69 was only A\$3.4 million but by 1972-73 it was 6.3 million and it is expected to grow to projected figures of 10.1 million in 1973-74 and 16.4 million in 1975-76. (Papua New Guinea's Improvement Plan for 1973-74, Central Planning Office, Port Moresby, 1973, pages 69-70).

² There are three principal shipping routes through PNG's archipelago:

The Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel.

Jomard Passage, north of Trobriand Island and Vitiaz Strait. (At present used by tankers and bulk ore carriers whose loaded draught is too deep for the Torres Strait).

East of Rossel Island across the Solomon Sea to the Bougainville Strait, or between Buka and New Ireland. (This route is used by all east coast Australian and New Zealand shipping to Japan, China, Philippines).

³ The extension of territorial waters 12 miles beyond coastal baselines or reefs exposed at mean low tides within the 12 miles, would, if implemented, considerably increase the waters which might require surveillance. Application of an archipelagic principal of delimiting territorial waters might include large areas off Milne Bay, the Bismarck Sea, possibly the Solomon Sea and areas to the north east of New Ireland and Bougainville. This

Element of the PNG DF have been carried out in other countries by coastguard types of organisations. This approach is unlikely to be adopted in PNG and the Maritime Element will probably continue to perform the resources protection role, supplemented where applicable by other Government agencies.¹ It is the opinion of PNG DF officers that the Force's fleet of five patrol boats is at

3 (Continued)

would constitute a very considerable area over which to exercise effective sovereignty. The prospect of a Economic Resources Zone, which has been discussed in the context of changes in International Law of the Sea, also poses important issues for PNG. A resources zone which extended up to 200 miles beyond archipelagic waters would include potentially valuable reef complexes (such as the Lyra and Eastern Fields reefs) in terms of mineral and oil wealth. A large resources zone might confer on PNG exclusive economic rights and would posit the requirement for effective surveillance. For a review of possible changes in International Law of the Sea (as it might relate to PNG) see: L.D.M. Nelson, "The Patrimonial Sea", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 22, Part 4, October 1973, pages 668-686; D.P. O'Connell, "The Legal Control of the Sea", Round Table, No 248, October 1972; M. Leifer and D. Nelson, "Conflict of Interest in the Straights of Malacca", International Affairs, Volume 49, Number 2, April 1973 for a discussion of Indonesian support for the Archipelago principle and the 1972 Manila agreement between Indonesia, Philippines and Fiji which set down principles for archipelago states to assert sovereign rights. For an indication of the Australian position see: C. Clark, "Labor's Policy at the United Nations", Australia's Neighbours, Fourth Series, No 89, February-March, 1974, pages 4-8.

¹ In June 1973 an inter-departmental study of the PNG DF Maritime Element noted the extent of the coastguard functions of the Maritime Element and reported that the merger of the PNG DF Maritime Element with the Marine Section of the Department of Transport would result in an economic and efficient solution to this problem. The report noted that a number of newly independent countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago - island states with similar maritime problems to PNG - had adopted a "coastguard" solution. The proposals were not accepted at the Ministerial level partly because of opposition to radical restructuring on the eve of independence and resistance to the idea of the PNG DF losing its Maritime Element. (Personal Communication, Port Moresby, February 1974).

present adequate for the natural resources protection role, but this may not be the case if PNG's territorial waters are extended, or if there is increased illegal fishing activity in PNG waters.

Fisheries protection is likely to be a subject of quite wide political interest in PNG as it touches on problems of conflict between local village fishermen and overseas fleets operating in PNG. Local politicians are likely to demand action where the fishing grounds of their constituents are poached and a measure of anti-Japanese sentiment may create a demand for tough fisheries policing by the PNG Government.

The patrol boats of the Maritime Element have taken part in an active fisheries protection patrolling programme in PNG since 1968 at which time there was an increase in illegal fishing activities in PNG waters, chiefly from Taiwanese and South Korean boats. Under present arrangements foreign boats (excluding Japanese boats) are not permitted to fish within a declared fishing zone (DFZ) which extends twelve miles from the coastline unless they have a permit. Under the terms of a Japanese-Australian Agreement, Japanese boats are permitted to fish within the DFZ but not inside the three mile limit.¹ Although the Defence Force's fisheries protection role is shared with the Department of Fisheries, the PNG fisheries inspectors are limited by their craft to coastal waters. This leaves the PNG DF with an important "open seas" role which may be measured by its share of arrests and "sightings" of trawlers

¹ The Australian-Japanese Fisheries Agreement which was concluded in August 1969 is valid until November 1975. Thus it will be necessary for PNG at independence to decide whether to allow the arrangement to continue in a similar form or renegotiate it. There are already indications that PNG might wish to administer the agreement in a different way to that followed by Australia. For example, in February 1974, a PNG DF patrol boat searched a Japanese boat within the DFZ. Under the agreement PNG has the right to board Japanese boats but this right had not previously been exercised and the incident caused some Japanese and Australian concern.

in the DFZ over recent years.¹

The Maritime Element is, at present, able to adequately carry out its role in cooperation with the marine resources of other Government Departments. This role is one which is valued by PNG politicians and constantly before the public eye as a Defence Force service. Because it is a service it will be possible to measure its effectiveness and any increase in illegal fishing in PNG may lead to charges that the Defence Force is not doing its job. An increase in PNG's territorial waters responsibilities may result in a need for more patrol craft (and perhaps a need for larger craft to take account of longer distances) and even maritime reconnaissance aircraft. PNG might, therefore, look to Australia for assistance in expanding the Maritime Element of the PNG DF in the future.

The civic action role of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force² and the use of military resources on civil

1	<u>Sightings</u>		<u>Arrests</u>		
	<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>PNG DF</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>PNG DF</u>
	1968	9	1	3	1
	1969	7	-	3	2
	1970	5	2	1	1
	1971	22	19	2	1
	1972	42	4	10	8
	1973	42	36	-	-

(Source: HQ PNG DF Fisheries Log).

² Military civic action is defined as:

"The use of military forces on projects useful to the general population at all levels in such fields as public works, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, agriculture, training, education and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces within the population".

(Australian Department of Defence Joint Services Publications, AS 101). Other terms which have been used to embrace military civic action include: The Peaceful Use of Military Forces (PUMF) and Military Assistance to the Civil Community (MACC). This last mentioned term incorporates use of the military for civil defence tasks including relief. See H. Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces, Praeger, New York, 1967.

projects in PNG allows the Defence Force to contribute to the Government's national developmental objectives. The extent of the Defence Force's contribution is, however, limited by its primary role as external defence force and it may be argued that if the nation-building role is over-emphasised the Defence Force might prove ineffective, if needed, in its primary task.¹ Apart from the economical contribution of civic action, it is useful for two other reasons. Civic action permits the members of the Defence Force to make a contribution to the social welfare of their country and in this manner the civic action programme is complementary to the PNG DF serviceman's citizenship training. It reinforces attitudes of social responsibility and service to the people and ensures that the members of the Defence Force, who live in comfortable urban conditions, do not lose sight of the realities of PNG village life. Secondly, civic action has an operational dimension. Success in military operations in PNG, both in regard to internal security and externally directed aggression, is likely to depend on the cooperation of the population. If Defence Force members look upon PNG villagers as "kanakas" rather than fellow citizens they are unlikely to gain their assistance when they need it.

¹ There is also a strong economic argument for limiting the role of the Defence Force in physical nation-building tasks. The nation-building role of defence forces seems to have been used as a justification for increasing defence forces in certain developing countries and defence budgets, as a consequence, have taken up increasing proportions of the national budget. The utility of nation-building by the military is thereby challenged on economic cost-benefit criteria. The problem here is to identify and quantify nation-building benefits which result from the military role, such as social integration which may off-set economic disadvantages (such as the higher labour costs and lower productivity of the military). This problem, with special reference to PNG, is interestingly developed by Commander W.S.G. Bateman, RAN: "The PNG Defence Force - A Development Role - Defence Economics in a Developing Country", M.Ec Qualifying Course Thesis, Department of Economics, University of PNG, 1973.

Civic action commenced in PNG on a limited scale with a post-war reactivation of the PIR. PIR patrols traditionally rendered assistance to the villages they visited, helping to build schools and local government council houses and tend the sick. From 1966 onward, however, emphasis on civic action increased.¹ Under current civic action policies, the range of projects undertaken includes the construction of bridges, fords and small airstrips, minor road and track construction, the building of school classrooms, local government council structures and medical aid posts and medical aid programmes. Apart from engineering and health, the Defence Force is able to make a useful logistic contribution by virtue of its maritime and air transport resources. The complete list of the PNF DF civic action tasks carried out during 1973 is impressive evidence of the scale of Defence Force assistance² and whilst there is a very definite symbolic importance attached to civic action it is no longer true to say that the value of civic action is more symbolic than economic.³

The principles governing civic action projects and the mechanics of implementation are as follows. Requests for assistance are usually received from members of the House of Assembly, Local Government Councils, Missions and officers of

¹ G. Hussey, "Army Civic Action", Australian External Territories, Volume 8, No 6, December 1968.

² See Annex C.

³ This was the view of F.A. Mediansky in 1970 ("New Guinea's Coming Army", New Guinea, Volume 5, No 2, June-July 1970, page 41. Whilst the annual "labour" contribution probably amounts to a total of about a month's effort by the equivalent of a battalion force, the effort, in terms of logistic assistance and contribution of skills amounts to a more significant nation-wide impact.

the District Administration. All requests are channelled through the Government's Central Planning Office where they are coordinated in consultation with the Defence Force, although, in practice, many tasks are carried out on an informal basis, especially where the tasks are of a minor nature and there is what appears to be a once-only opportunity (such as an unscheduled, unladen military flight, which might be able to fly in urgent civilian cargo). The formal system is also short-circuited because of inefficiency in collating civic action requests.

The Defence Force prefers to contribute manpower skills, design support, instruction, supervisory and equipment capabilities and it expects to see contributions of funds, materials, equipment and unskilled labour from the civil community – the mix of contributions depending on the nature of the project. So far, Defence Force policy has favoured civic action projects which are relatively minor in nature, which can be completed in a relatively short period of time and which have a high impact on the community which has been helped.¹ Whilst there may be sound organisational and psychological grounds justifying this approach, it limits the scope of the PNG DF's nation-building contribution and some senior PNG officers have argued that the PNG DF should also undertake major and long term developmental projects.² It is, nonetheless, difficult to see how the Defence Force could carry out major engineering tasks, given its small engineering resources, unless it was to rely on civilian manual labour.

¹ For example the PNG DF Engineer Company conducted a 10 week project in the Western District of Papua in March–May 1974 involving the construction of seven bridges and thirty six culverts and upgrading an airstrip. (Post Courier, 28 February 1974).

² Personal Communication, Port Moresby, February 1974.

Civic Action effort was also focused on rural areas and few projects have been carried out in urban areas. This is based on the assumption that the Defence Force, because of its logistic resources and mobility, is best used in remote areas where the Government is able to do the least. Whilst this may be a logically sound policy, the Defence Force's inactivity in its home areas does not help its image, which might, unfairly, be based on its comfortable barracks and elite status. There are, furthermore, increasing numbers of new urban dwellers living in squatter settlements who might profit from PNG DF small scale civic action projects. This raises the political implications of the Defence Force civic action role. PNG political leaders in the future may become concerned that the popularity which accrues to the military and the managerial, economic and even political skills, which may be the product of a civic action role, constitute dangers to the survival of civil government.¹ This fear would appear more likely to occur if there is an increase in the emphasis placed on civic action by the PNG Government and the PNG DF and a compensating reduction in emphasis on other Defence Force roles – for instance external defence. Because of the political dangers of an expanded civic action role, the Government may, therefore, be reluctant to see the Defence Force too active in this role after independence.

¹ Several commentators have noted the political implications of Civic Action. Hanning (op.cit., pages 11–23) has argued that civic action brings the military closer to the seat of Civil Power; O'Neill, (The Army in PNG, page 9) has noted that civic action has the potential to undermine the Civil Administration in the eyes of the local people: the defence forces are seen as friends and helpers, the Government official is seen, in comparison, as a man who comes to tax, arrest and inflict punishment. This may open the way for a political role by the military. Finally, Mediansky, (op. cit., page 41) has argued that the expansion of the Defence Force role beyond narrow professional boundaries in the field of civic action results in the acquisition of managerial and economic skills which may be politically useful. Balanced against these views is that of Perlmutter, (The Military and Politics in Israel, Cass, London, 1969), who has shown that in the case of the Israeli army, role expansion into non-traditional military activities has contained and even extinguished a desire for a

Civil Defence

In early 1974 Civil Defence formally remained a civil responsibility although there were quite advanced proposals for the PNG DF to take over this function.¹ The PNG DF has a very significant capability in regard to civil defence and emergency requirements in PNG. In the past its manpower, communications and command system, special equipment, logistic and transport resources have enabled it to make timely contributions in cases of emergency. The Defence Force has assisted in famine, epidemic and cyclone relief operations, searches for ships, aircraft and ground parties and its communications system have been useful in the rapid reporting and assessment of damage and disaster after civil emergencies.

Under reorganisation proposals a central Civil Defence radio communications net was to be established at the HQ PNG DF and, the Defence Force Commander was slated to take on the additional role of Civil Defence director, assisted by a civilian. A structure of National and District Civil Defence Committees was also proposed. Whilst such a system might be more efficient than the present arrangements, considerations of efficiency alone may not be a sufficient argument for a military takeover of Civil Defence, especially if they upset civil-military and police-military relations. For this reason it seems that the Civil Defence Force will, for the present, continue to be employed, as in the past, within a civilian framework, although the consequence of this may be duplication of effort and some inefficiency. The issue may eventually be resolved when civil-military relations have been stabilized some time after independence.

¹ (Continued)
greater political role by the military. Although the evidence is mixed, the potential political dangers of civic action should be recognised in PNG.

¹ Civil Defence was the responsibility of the Civil Defence and Emergency Services Director. See Annual Report PNG 1971-72, op. cit., page 17.

PART C - THE PNG DF MANPOWER COMPOSITION AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONING

Ethnic Composition

Defence Force recruits are drawn from all parts of the country and the policy objective is that, as nearly as practicable, each District's representation in the Force should be in proportion to its share of total PNG population. This policy has, in recent years, become more nearly possible as educationally qualified recruits have been available in the less developed areas. Nonetheless it remains true that specialist and more senior positions in the Force are over-represented by members from particular parts of the country.

Australian policy in the post-war period did not favour the exclusive recruitment of special "martial tribes" as had frequently been colonial practice elsewhere, though recruiting did favor the traditional areas of war time PIB and NGIB recruiting. As a result, in its early years, the PIR was dominated by Papuan NCOs (especially the Gulf District) and Tolais who had been recruited for their superior education.¹ This influence has to some extent persisted up to the present time. Whilst the situation in recent years has been one of more equitable distribution between Districts, there are, nonetheless, significant anomalies which challenge the assertion that the Force is truly national. The percentages of PNG DF members from each District compared with the District

¹ See H.L. Bell, "Tribal Integration Within the Pacific Islands Regiment" op. cit., for an explanation of the early post-war recruiting pattern.

as a percentage of total PNG population, as shown in Tables A and B below, illustrate this problem.

TABLE A¹

THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PNG DF
BY DISTRICTS - MAY 1973

<u>District</u>	<u>Percentage of PNG DF</u>	<u>District as Percentage of Total PNG Population</u>	<u>Percentage Under or Over Represent- ation in PNG DF</u>
<u>PAPUA</u>			
Central	6.5	6.1	+0.4
Milne Bay	5.5	4.4	+1.1
Northern	7.5	2.5	+5.0
Western	4.1	2.6	+1.5
Gulf	6.5	2.8	+3.7
Southern Highlands	3.6	8.1	-4.5
<u>NEW GUINEA MAINLAND</u>			
Eastern Highlands	5.0	10.0	-5.0
Chimbu	5.9	7.7	-1.8
Western Highlands	6.2	13.6	-7.4
Morobe	7.9	9.4	-1.5
East Sepik	7.1	8.2	-1.1
West Sepik	5.3	4.2	+1.1
Madang	6.8	7.5	-0.7
<u>NEW GUINEA ISLANDS</u>			
Manus	3.3	0.9	+2.4
East New Britain	6.8	4.0	+2.8
West New Britain	4.1	2.4	+1.7
New Ireland	4.1	2.1	+2.0
Bougainville	3.8	3.0	+0.2

¹ PNG DF Records Section information correct as at 4 May 1973. Population percentages are derived from population figures shown in the Papua New Guinea Report, 1971-72, Appendix 1, pages 264-266. Percentages do not quite add to 100 per cent due to rounding.

TABLE B
SUMMARY FOR THE PNG REGIONS

	<u>Percentage of PNG DF</u>	<u>Region as Percentage of Total PNG Population</u>	<u>Percentage Under or Over Represent- ation in PNG DF</u>
PAPUA	33 .7	26 .5	+7 .2
PAPUA Less Southern Highlands	30 .1	18 .4	+11 .7
NEW GUINEA MAINLAND	44 .2	60 .6	-16 .4
NEW GUINEA ISLANDS	22 .1	12 .4	+9 .7
HIGHLANDS	20 .7	39 .4	-18 .7

In general terms there is an over-representation of New Guinea islanders and Papuans in the PNG DF and an even more pronounced under-representation in relation to the New Guinea mainland and Highlands. The Highlands region has only about half the representatives to which it is entitled on a national population basis. If the Southern Highlanders are excluded from the Papua total, the over-representation of the Papuan Districts becomes even more pronounced. Apart from these examples of mal-distribution, a 1969 survey found that several backward Sub-Districts within the country had no representation at all within the PNG DF - namely Wonenara and Menyamya.¹ There is also a significant urban bias

¹ See Australian Army PNG Psychology Research Unit Research Report No 33, paragraphs 13-20. At the time, (June 1969) Rabaul and Manus had one member for each 257 and 222 head of PNG population respectively, whereas Menyamya (population 19,526) and Wonenara (14,048) had none. This imbalance has probably been significantly improved but not completely redressed.

to recruitment which is likely to increase as urban population expands and as the PNG DF tends to recruit from within the families of its members. The danger here is that the Defence Force might become too "urban" and not sufficiently representative of a mainly rural PNG population.¹

Whilst the present District imbalance in recruitment is partly due to a lack of educationally qualified volunteers, there may be strong political reasons for rapidly redressing the imbalance, especially in regard to the Highlands, even if it entailed a lowering of entry standard. Highland leaders have complained about their under-representation in the PNG Public Service and in national leadership positions² and, in spite of their later development pattern in comparison to other regions, PNG leaders will probably need to accept these demands in order to ensure the cooperation of Highlanders. Greater Highland representation in the PNG DF may, therefore, be predicted, even if it is at the expense of an overall expansion in the strength of the Force.³

It is theoretically simple to control enlistment on a proportional basis as between districts, but it is less easy and, in terms of efficiency, less desirable to control promotion on the same basis. Promotion should ideally be related to ability and

¹ In 1969 some 30 per cent were recruited, in that year, from Port Moresby and Rabaul, and together with Lae, Goroka, Mount Hagen, Wewak and Madang accounted for 60 per cent of enlistees. (*ibid.*) This trend may partly be due to recruitment taking place in High Schools usually located in town centres.

² See Post Courier, 28 November 1972, 19 October 1973.

³ The adjustment of ethnic representation seems to have been at least a factor in the considerable expansion of the Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian armies after independence. See J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order, Chatto and Windus, London, 1969, pages 5 and 44.

qualifications and these factors are unlikely to be evenly distributed. On the other hand it may be necessary to make concessions in the direction of a fairer regional distribution of rank in order to avoid ethnic political problems, as has been the African experience in relation to officer positions. A 1970 survey of the Land Element revealed that NCO rank was seriously mal-apportioned on a District-by-District basis. It showed that whereas about twenty nine per cent of the total force wore NCO rank, members from all the Highland Districts and the Western District were under-represented and the Central, Milne Bay, Northern, Manus and Bougainville Districts were over-represented. At both extremes, only eight per cent of Southern Highlanders wore rank whilst about forty eight per cent of Milne Bay soldiers did.¹ A further finding was that there was a tendency for those Districts under-represented to be even more seriously under-represented in the senior NCO positions which carried more authority and prestige.²

The PNG DF is a youthful force. As most recruits are enlisted directly from high school, they are a lot closer to the minimum enlistment age of sixteen than the maximum of thirty.³ The average age of the Force, taking into account the officers and senior NCOs and the Other Rank element is probably between twenty and twenty three.⁴ This average age may well rise in the

¹ Research Report No 30, July 1970, "Relationship Between Rank and Place of Origin".

² Regimental officers in the PIR have reported difficulty in overcoming this imbalance. It has been found that Highlanders are frequently unwilling to assume NCO responsibilities and some who have done so have proven themselves to be unsuitable. (Personal Communication, 1PIR, 1972).

³ Enlistment for Other Rank members of the PNG DF is for an initial term of four years followed by re-engagements of two year terms. (PNG DF Manual of Personnel Administration).

⁴ In 1969, 75 per cent of the army element were less than 25 years and 24 per cent less than 20. The average age of 600 soldiers of the 1964/65 recruit intake discharged during their four year period

future as trained personnel recruited in previous years elect to stay on in the Defence Force – especially if civil employment opportunities decline in the future. The maturing of the Force in this way might lead to improved stability, especially in the PIR.

Education

The PNG serviceman belongs to an educated elite in regard to both the distribution of educational opportunities in PNG and the minimum educational standard of Form Two for entry to the Defence Force.¹ Whilst there are many soldiers in the Defence Force who joined prior to the imposition of the Form Two standard, about ninety five per cent of the Force have received six or more years of education.² This represents a dramatic improvement since 1957 when most of the soldiers in the PIR were classified as illiterate.³ Educational standards affect the Defence Force in three ways, influencing the capacity of the Defence Force to cope with managerial and specialist tasks, the way in which the PNG DF perceives and responds to political issues and the contribution that Defence Force personnel make to PNG society when they ultimately return to civilian life.

⁴ of engagement was only 18.16 years. And the average age of a 1PIR company in 1972 was 19 years. (Date derived from: Research Reports, No 32, April 1972 Table 3; No 41, May 1970, paragraph 14; and a Survey of A Company, 1PIR in September 1972).

¹ The total PNG secondary education enrolment in 1973 was only 25,916 pupils and of these only about 10,000 were above Form Two. The elitist nature of the Defence Force educational requirements are placed in even sharper focus when it is noted that in 1973 only between 35 and 41 per cent of those of primary school age in the Highlands Districts attended school and not more than about 30 per cent of Standard Six pupils would reach Form One. (PNG's Improvement Plan, 1973-74, op. cit., page 33).

² In June 1969, 84 per cent had six or more years of education. The 95 per cent figure is an estimated based on the earlier figures and subsequent trends. (See Research Report, No 32, "PNG Army Census", paragraph 24).

³ ibid.

The educational level within specialist units of the PNG DF, such as the engineering units, is significantly higher than that within the infantry battalions. Even in the infantry and less technical areas, however, educational attainment levels are carefully considered in selection for promotion and minimum education standards are laid down in order to qualify for NCO rank. Within the PIR it is recognised that illiterate, or even non-English speaking, leaders are unable to function effectively in administrative and training roles, although they might well be excellent leaders in other respects.

In order to train professionals for the Defence Force in the fields of medicine, dentistry, law and engineering, an undergraduate trainee scheme has been instituted. Students at the universities of PNG and Technology are sponsored by the Force during their courses and, at the completion of them, become officers. This scheme is similar to that operated in PNG by the Public Service and schemes which operate in the Australian Services. Defence Force teacher trainees are also being sponsored at PNG teacher training institutions. These trainees will eventually replace Australian professionals but it will be several years after independence before PNG professional officers, in significant numbers, complete their training and replace Australians.¹

¹ A total of 27 students were recommended for sponsorship under the PNG DF Sponsorship Scheme in 1974. Sponsored students are enlisted as officer cadets, receive an allowance and have their university fees paid. They are required to serve as officers for a period of up to five years, depending on the length of their courses. (See PNG DF Brochure: "Papua New Guinea Defence Force Sponsorship Scheme").

In-service civil education programmes have been emphasised in the Force as a means of improving the capacity of the individual serviceman to absorb instruction and perform skilled tasks. Until the termination of the Australian National Service Scheme the civil education programme in the PNG DF was supported by large numbers of National Servicemen teachers.¹ With the ending of National Service, the reduction of education resources has led to concentration on more specific educational objectives.² Whereas during most of the National Service period all soldiers compulsorily underwent six weeks civil education each year, emphasis is now placed on those who show potential for further education which would benefit them in their Defence Force service, either through suitability for promotion or specialist employment. In addition, all servicemen are encouraged to at least reach Form One level.

Whilst there was some opposition in earlier years to increased emphasis on civil education, especially amongst some Australian officers who believed that a "cult" of education was developing at the expense of regimental efficiency, this view has since been discredited. It has been necessary to advance educational standards in the Defence Force merely to keep in step with rapid advances in the educational standards of other groups such as the Public Service and secondly, a well-educated force seems to be needed if it is to be able to administer itself and maintain its equipment as well as being able to fight.

¹ Trained teachers served as sergeants in the Royal Australian Army Education Corps (RAAEC). Some also served as officers alongside Regular Army RAAEC officers.

² There were nonetheless plans in March 1973 for the PNG DF to have a total of 36 PNG education officers; a ratio of one teacher to approximately 100 servicemen. (HQ PNG DF letter of 20 March 1973).

The continuing in-service education of the serviceman is also important from a national point of view. Servicemen who return to civilian employment are, in many cases, better suited to their new jobs as a result of the formal education they receive in the Defence Force. Although a 1969 survey of former PNG soldiers showed that only a comparatively small percentage of the 65 per cent in urban employment were able to directly apply their former military employment, the general benefits of military service were useful to them – that is, increased formal education and standard of social discipline and leadership as a result of their military training.¹ There are now, however, increasing numbers of Defence Force men who have skills in demand in the urban sector as a result of the diversification of PNG DF units from the infantry base of the early 1960s. These include: mechanics, plant operators and drivers, clerks and storemen. Nevertheless, there are still numbers of Defence Force men who do return to their villages, the majority of whom are engaged in subsistence and cash crop agriculture. There would, therefore, be considerable national benefit to be had in improving the agricultural and business skills of these men before they left the Defence Force. The Defence Force has, so far, placed little emphasis on vocational training to help servicemen to resettle in rural communities. This is unfortunate and more could be done. As he is likely to have favourable attitudes to change and some accumulated capital as a result of military service, the ex-PNG DF man who returns to his village is a potentially powerful agent of rural development, especially if equipped with agricultural knowledge and skills. Emphasis on vocational training in the Defence Force would, furthermore,

¹ Research Report, No 16 of February 1969, Table 7 and paragraph 29, 65 per cent of the 219 respondents to the question – naire said they were working in an urban area. The tendency is for the more highly skilled and younger men to remain in urban employment after discharge, whereas the less skilled and older servicemen tend to return to their villages.

complement the rural improvement objectives of the Somare Government which has acknowledged that most Papua New Guineans will continue to live in the subsistence sector of the economy.¹ A small scale farming project which has been in operation since 1969 at Moem Barracks may provide an example for further development. This project provides training in animal husbandry and agricultural techniques to interested soldiers and the expansion of this sort of programme on a Defence Force-wide basis would seem to be desirable.² It might be linked to a Government resettlement scheme for Defence Force personnel, involving assistance with land and loans.

Education within the PNG DF also plays a role in the training of servicemen as citizens. As described in Chapter I, Australians have believed that the PNG Defence Force might be educated to accept an apolitical role in the PNG political system. The assumption has been that if servicemen understood about the

¹ PNG's Improvement Plan 1973-74, *op. cit.*, 51-61.

² The 2PIR project is operated by an Australian sergeant, a qualified agricultural scientist, and based on a small model farm. Nine week courses are conducted on the theoretical and practical aspects of pig and fowl husbandry and food growing. Soil improvement techniques such as composting and manuring are taught, rather than the use of chemical fertilizer, emphasising the "village" orientation of the project. The present project might be expanded in three ways. It could form the basis of a pre-discharge farming training programme for all PNG DF members. (There are suitable areas to conduct a farm project in each of the PNG DF base areas). Secondly, the farm projects could be used to increase the self-reliance of the PNG DF in regard to growing some, or all, its own food on the model of other Asian armies. Thirdly, farm projects might be used to train Defence Force personnel for an agriculture and animal husbandry extension role as part of a civic action programme.

processes of democratic government and the relationship of the PNG DF to government, there would be little danger of a crisis in civil-military relations after independence. Nevertheless it seems to be a matter for speculation whether the political education of an army is more, rather than less, likely to develop a corporate political consciousness. Political education might prove counter-productive after independence, especially if the course of national politics does not correspond with soldiers' theoretical expectations of democracy, efficiency and honesty in government. Equally obvious are the dangers of no or little political education, as in Africa, where armies have so frequently seized political power and there seems to be no ready answer to this problem.

Under existing policy in 1974, political education was conducted within the framework of Civics and Ethics training. All units in the Force were directed to conduct periodic sessions dealing with subjects contained in a syllabus and most units conducted a Civics session once each week in which chaplains, education and regimental officers participated. Subjects ranged from "How the Government operates" to the "Need for Law" and "Who Controls the Army?"¹ This form of citizenship training has been intensified in recent years to meet the pressures which

¹ The 1973 PNG DF Training directive to units for the conduct of citizenship training included the following topics:

- PNG, history, geography and culture.
- Government of PNG – how it operates.
- PNG Economy.
- Types of Government – Democracy – Totalitarian (e.g., China).
- The Need for Law.
- International Relations.
- Why Have Armies?
- Who Controls the PNG Army?
- What does the Army give the Community?
- What are the Duties of the Citizen Soldier?
- PNG's Defence Force in the Future.

may be experienced at independence.¹

So far the citizenship training conducted in the PNG DF has been a mixture of Christian ethics and high school social studies. The content has therefore been non-ideological in character, other than for the intrusion of Christian and liberal-democratic values. Plans were afoot during 1974 to introduce a Code of Conduct booklet which was more explicitly ideological in approach, setting down social and military duties of Defence Force members. The danger of establishing an explicitly ideological Code of Conduct, given that it might have benefits in terms of building morale and esprit de corps, is that it might be misemployed in the future to justify unlawful political action by the Defence Force. These are problems which will be more appropriate for Papua New Guinean, rather than Australian, leaders to resolve.

Language

Like other national organisations the Defence Force is multi-lingual. English is the official language of command and of written communications. Pidgin is an important language for social communication and an auxiliary language for command and instruction. Apart from these two languages, Hiri Motu, the

¹ The function of citizenship training in the PNG DF as PNG approached independence was explained in the following terms by the PNG Commander:

"We must make sure as servants of the National Government that we understand our responsibilities to the Government and that there is no misunderstanding on our part regarding our responsibility both as citizens and as soldiers".

(HQ PNG DF Citizenship Training Directive 1973).

principal Papuan lingua franca,¹ and dialects (or Ples Tok, of which there are estimated to be about seven hundred) are spoken by members of the Defence Force amongst themselves, with their families and with civilian kinsmen.

Language issues are relevant to the functioning of the PNG DF in several ways. They bear on the pattern of communication in the Force and thus its effectiveness: if language is not comprehended adequately, orders may be misinterpreted and instruction not understood. Language also affects the social cohesion of the Force. It may be postulated that a common language unites in the way that a diversity of languages segments. Language use also affects the PNG DF's ability to communicate and establish rapport with other groups in PNG society.

English is PNG's official language of Government and it is also the official PNG DF language for command and all written communications, orders and instructions. It is the language of formal military instruction and command between officers and men as well as being the language of social intercourse between Australian and PNG officers and NCOs in the officers' and sergeants' messes. It is, however, also necessary to recognise the important use of Pidgin in the Defence Force. Whilst PNG officers and NCOs usually speak to PNG soldiers in the specialist and headquarters units in English, in the PIR battalions they are more likely to use Pidgin. This language, which is PNG's

¹ Hiri Motu is now more popular than the former description Police Motu. Hereafter, where I refer to Motu I mean the lingua franca, not the dialect spoken by the Motuans of the Port Moresby area from which the lingua franca has been derived. (These and the following remarks in this section on language are based on discussion with PNG DF officers and NCOs, and personal experience whilst serving in PNG during 1965-66 and 1971-72).

most widespread lingua franca, has had a strong tradition in the PIR as a language of command, instruction and off-duty communication between soldiers.¹ It was, from the beginning, an instrument of integration and a builder of esprit de corps as the PIR developed its own brand of Pidgin replete with slick idioms and military vocabulary. The use of Pidgin has continued strongly in the PIR battalions, although officially discouraged in recent years in favour of English. On the other hand, the use of Pidgin in specialist or headquarters units during duty hours has largely given way to English. This has resulted, to some extent, in the dichotomous situation of Murray Barracks being predominantly English speaking, Taurama and Moem (the PIR bases) being Pidgin speaking and Goldie River and Igam falling somewhere between the two. If this is the on-duty situation, the situation off-duty in the married and single quarters environment is less simple. Here Pidgin, Motu and dialects are used more and English less and it is, therefore, easy to over-estimate the extent to which the Force is in fact English speaking.² Few servicemen, other than some well-educated NCOs who also have educated wives and most (but not all) officers speak English at home, preferring to speak their own dialect when conversing

¹ In the 1966 PNG Census 36 per cent of the population claimed to be Pidgin speakers whereas only 11 per cent claimed English. H. Bell, "Language and the Army of PNG", Australian Army Journal, March 1971, page 37; and R.G. Ward and D.A.M. Lea (eds.), An Atlas of Papua and New Guinea, Collins, Longman, 1970, pages 20-21.

The relative difference between these figures is unlikely to have altered substantially. It would seem that many of those who complete their schoolings and subsequently return to their villages rapidly lose their English language facility through lack of practice, whereas they retain their Pidgin ability.

² For example, many English speaking officers, rather than eschewing Pidgin, frequently speak it in the officers' messes amongst themselves. This practice has increased in relation to the decrease in the number of Australian officers in the officers' messes. In short, the situation is one of multi-lingualism rather than an exclusive use of English.

with their own families and wontoks (i.e., those of the same language group). Pidgin or Motu are also used, especially if there are non-wontoks present.

Although most servicemen may prefer Pidgin, Motu and dialect when off-duty, they need English for their work situation. Many Australian NCOs and officers in the Defence Force are effectively non-Pidgin speakers and instructions and technical handbooks are written in English. Nonetheless Pidgin has continued to flourish in the Defence Force for several reasons. It is an expressive language with vocabulary and speech patterns that are easy to pick up, whereas many soldiers find English cumbersome and inadequate for many topics of social conversation. For the PIR soldier on patrol, Pidgin seems better suited to communicating with his fellow countrymen in the villages, with English he usually cannot. The use of Pidgin identifies the soldier with PNG villagers and establishes a rapport with them, English almost always sets him apart as a member of an alien elite. For these reasons the PIR soldier in most cases prefers to use Pidgin.¹

For functional reasons it seems that the PNG DF will remain in important respects multi-lingual. It will in this respect be no different from the PNG Public Service and Police.²

¹ Motu is required as a lingua franca in some of Papua, especially in parts of the Western District adjacent to the Irian Jaya border, where Pidgin is commonly not spoken. For this reason, and because of the sensitive political implications of Motu's relationship to Papuan separatism, it may be important that the use of Motu is also encouraged within the Defence Force.

² The Police also use Pidgin and Motu in addition to English. This is operationally important for the Police in order to deal with groups of people who cannot, or will not, speak English. For similar reasons the Public Service in adequately serving the people must be able to use lingua franca when dealing with non-English speakers as they do at present. Although English may be the official Public Service language, lingua franca perform a significant role in intra-Public Service communications especially at lower levels and when Australians leave this may become the pattern in the PNG DF units which are at present English speaking.

The Defence Force will be able to perform an important role in promoting the use of Pidgin as the principal national lingua franca and, in so doing, contribute to the process of national integration as more and more Papua New Guineans are able to understand and converse in one language. One important implication for Australia in these observations about the multi-lingual character of the PNG DF is that Australian servicemen attached to the PNG DF in the future may need to be trained Pidgin linguists in order to be fully effective in a training and advisory role.¹

Social Cohesion

The effectiveness of a military organisation ultimately depends on the quality of cohesion. That is to say, even when under operational stress armies have to function as a team with their authority and hierarchy unimpaired if they are to be successful in combat. The cohesion and corporate character of modern armies depends not so much on coercion but the indoctrination and re-socialization processes that result in their members accepting the norms and objectives of military organisation. Similarly, the cohesion of the PNG Defence Force derives not only from the patterns of organisation and authority but it is also a product of morale building activities.²

The Defence Force and its barracks may be described as a total institution in which almost all aspects of the servicemen's

¹ Bell, (op. cit., page 35) and other experienced officers believe that Pidgin will be likely to be used to the exclusion of English amongst troops in moments of stress, as for example, "... when the first shot rings out". It is important that Australian servicemen who do need to understand Pidgin are taught it properly rather than merely picking up the brutalised "baby talk" version known by Papua New Guineans as tok masta.

² See R.W. Little, (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions, Sage Publications, California, 1971, A.L. George, Chapter 9 "Primary Groups, Organisation, and Military Performance", page 293.

lives are the concern of the military authorities.¹ The barracks enclaves provide for the physical and spiritual needs of the soldiers as well as for those of their families. The barracks contain supermarkets and swimming pools, picture theatres and chapels in addition to being the servicemen's place of work. Married servicemen live within adjacent married quarters areas and their families are also part of the military community. Their houses are periodically inspected for cleanliness, their families receive free medical attention and their children attend schools within the barracks. Although there may be opportunities for outside social contact, such as visiting civilian friends, playing sport and shopping at the town markets, servicemen in PNG, far more than their Australian counterpart, are members of a total institution (symbolised by the cyclone wire fence which surrounds Murray Barracks in the midst of Port Moresby).

The total character of the Defence Force organisation provides the arena in which the indoctrination and socialization of Defence Force recruits take place. In basic training recruits undergo a process of disorientation followed by indoctrination into the mores of the PNG DF. Their civilian life patterns are disrupted, individual expectations are replaced by group objectives and they are taught to accept authority without question.² Eventually, military training in new skills and rituals produces in the successful recruits, new self-esteem and sense of group

¹ Goffman suggests that "total" institutions are distinguished by the following features: "all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same authority", activities are carried out in large homogeneous groups; all activities are purportedly designed to fulfil the official aims of the institution. Examples of total institutions include prisons, monasteries, boarding schools and army barracks. Irving Goffman, Asylums, Anchor Books, New York, 1961, pages 4, 5.

² These are the cited goals of basic training in most armies. See A. Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society, Harper and Row, New York, 1971, page 397.

participations – they have joined the team.¹ In this process the recruits' prior social characteristics are de-emphasised, their hair is cut, they don a strange uniform, are given a regimental number and placed in the strange company of fellow recruits. From the start of this re-socialization recruits are regarded impersonally as soldiers and not Chimbus or Tolais. In this manner the recruits' old primordial loyalties are, to some extent, replaced by a new loyalty to the Defence Force, their unit and leaders.²

During the recruits' subsequent service new loyalties and their acceptance into the organisation are reinforced by vocational, social and even religious activities within the Defence Force. In the social context, servicemen mix with Defence Force groups which cut across primordial groupings. They play, for example, in Defence Force football teams not Papuan or Highland ones. Their spiritual needs are met by Defence Force chaplains and the composition of their denominational congregations are broadly national.³

¹ See R.W. Little, (ed.), op. cit., M. Janowitz, "Occupational Socialization", page 202.

² Primordial loyalty is used to refer to the "givens" of blood, race and language.

³ Religion has been consciously and actively employed within the PNG DF as an integrative force and morale builder. Religious symbolism, for example, plays an important part in the annual re-dedication ceremonial parades held in the PIR and other military ritual involving Regimental Colours is enmeshed with religious symbolism (it is of course true that even in countries like Australia which have a relatively low proportion of active Christians religious symbolism is still emphasised in aspects of military ceremonial). In PNG the evangelizing character of the Christian missions, their role in education, and possibly the spiritual attraction of Christianity in replacing traditional magico-religious practices, has made religion important to the lives of many, perhaps most, soldiers. Religion also provides continuity and stability in the lives of servicemen between village and Defence Force. Apart from their religious

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In regard to their military duties, servicemen belong to units within which they are members of smaller primary groups - in the case of the PIR, a section of about ten men commanded by a corporal. These primary groups form part of larger groups such as platoons and companies. Whilst each of these groups command some of the soldiers' loyalty, it is probably at the section and platoon level that the indoctrination and socialization processes are the most intensive. Although these primary groups exist in all the Defence Force units they seem to be strongest in the infantry battalions, on board ships and in other units where the work situation involves sustained period of proximity and cooperative effort, as for example in the operation of a patrol boat at sea or within an infantry platoon on patrol.¹ For this reason it may be argued that these units are likely to be more cohesive and less likely than support and headquarters units to fragmentation along ethnic or other lines in times of stress.

In addition to the effects of indoctrination and the informal bonds of the primary group, the cohesion of the Defence Force

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function, PNG DF chaplains are effective social workers and morale-builders who are able to attend to complex personal problems involving aspects of traditional society such as sorcery. Because of their rapport with the troops they also provide valuable advice to regimental officers on morale and disciplinary problems. With the exception of one Lutheran chaplain all the full time chaplains in the PNG DF in January 1974 were Europeans. The denominational composition of the PNG DF mirrors that of PNG society. The Anglican and Protestant faiths account for about half the total (the principal Protestant denominations are the United Church and the Lutherans). Roman Catholics account for just under half the overall total. Very few PNG DF members claim to be non-Christian. (Source: discussions with PNG DF chaplains and officers, 1971-74).

¹ George (op.cit., pages 298-306) argues that the loyalty of members to the primary group is intensified the more isolated the group is.

organisation is reinforced by its formal structures. The demands of military discipline, the formal authority of NCOs and officers and the power which they wield through the disciplinary system all contribute to the corporate character of the PNG DF.¹ Each member of the PNG DF has "unit identity", he is part of a unit organisation in which he has his own superior officers and a functional role. He is, therefore, in both a formal and informal sense part of the Defence Force team. The cohesion of the Force is enhanced not only by the total nature of the institution, but also by the serviceman's awareness that he is part of a privileged group in PNG society which is well paid, well housed and which possesses excellent social amenities.

Discipline within the PNG DF is more severe and the scope of military regulations more comprehensive than is the case in the Australian Services.² This is justified on the grounds of the allegedly special need of Papua New Guineans for strong discipline, a view which is partially supported by the experience in PNG with both the Police and Defence Force. Discipline for both operational and support units in the Force is based on what has elsewhere been described as the combat ethic.³ Training with infantry weapons, drill and ceremonial is part of the routine for combat and support units alike and this seen as a means of building

¹ See Janowitz, (ed.), The New Military, Russell Sage, New York, 1964, page 23. Janowitz discussed the possibility of the primary group conflicting with the formal structure. This could occur in the PNG DF where there was poor communication between officers and men.

² Punishments for disciplinary breaches, especially drunkenness, are more severe, with greater emphasis on physical sanctions such as detention. Persistent disciplinary offenders are speedily discharged by administrative processes. Regulations provide for a large number of "routine" parades. There are even regulations specifying standards of civilian dress to be worn on leave by soldiers (for example, shorts and long socks).

³ See R.F. Rosser, "A 20th Century Military Force", Foreign Policy, No 12, Fall 1973.

esprit de corps and maintaining discipline. The standards of formal discipline demanded are probably highest in the infantry units. Discipline in the PNG DF appears to be founded on two assumptions about Papua New Guineans, one paternalistic, the other authoritarian. It is generally believed that the PNG soldier respects firmness and abuses concessions which he mistakes for weakness and that once a soldier "fouls" (that is, commits a serious disciplinary breach) he is unlikely to reform himself and, therefore, he should probably be discharged. For this reason discipline in the Defence Force, by Australian standards, is generally stern and unrelenting and high standards of conduct are maintained. This formal pattern is to some extent humanized by a paternal style of management of troops by their officers. Deriving from a PIR tradition, officers are required to know and "understand" their men and Australians in the Force are expected to steep themselves in PNG traditions and lore – in a sense, to love their troops in the way that British officers loved their Gurkha or Sepoy.¹

This pattern of leadership and discipline, which has developed in a colonial force, may not be suitable for a force commanded by black officers. The relationship between white officer and PNG soldier has, in a sense, resembled that of feudal lord and retainer and this is unlikely to be an effective or durable basis for relations between Papua New Guineans. It is evident that some PNG officers have a more informal and closer social relationship with soldiers, although the PNG officer on duty may be less inclined to interest himself in the total welfare of his troops. He is likely to be less paternalistic and more willing

¹ The close relationship between officer and soldier is more pronounced in the PIR than in most other PNG DF units where there is generally less opportunity for close contact between officers and men.

to let his fellow countrymen sort out their own problems. This attitude has led some PNG soldiers of the old school to feel that their own officers are "second rate", whilst other PNG officers who have emulated their Australian counterparts are regarded by some soldiers as "too Australian".

In this connection, Luckham has described how officer leadership in the Nigerian Army changed in important respects after independence, although many of the outward appearances and rituals remained seemingly unaltered.¹ This is likely to be the case in PNG also. The PNG officer will be closer to the social pressures and grievances of the men he leads and he will be subject to the influence of his own ethnic group within the Defence Force.² It is unrealistic to see the PNG officer corps isolated from the pressures and conflicts of PNG society at large. The closed nature of the Defence Force organisation may reduce these external influences but not remove them. Familial and ethnic linkages are likely to produce close bonds between Defence Force and Police officer, public servant and politician within what will continue to be a relatively small and interlocking elite. Evidence

¹ R. Luckham, The Nigerian Military, Cambridge University Press, 1971, Luckham has described the increased accessibility of the Nigerian officer in the post-independence period as follows "... at weekends ... there is a constant stream of "brothers", kinsmen, acquaintances from the same village ..., or the same ethnic group, who come to pay their respects at an officer's house and to drink his beer and Fanta orange ... They may include private soldiers and NCOs." (page 112). Whilst PNG officers formerly tended to live in the european dominated married quarter areas on "european terms", by 1974 a "Papua New Guinean" social pattern seemed to be emerging which bore resemblance to the Nigerian example.

² Luckham, op. cit., page 164 et passim has shown that in Nigeria, senior NCOs wielded considerable influence over young and inexperienced officers and this influenced the course of the July 1966 Coup. Although senior NCOs may influence junior officers in the Australian Army for example, the important distinction is that they are unlikely to do so on social or political issues.

Evidence of this was indicated by a survey of officer cadets at the Joint Services College. Over half the officer cadets had members of their close family either employed in positions within the PNG elite or attending high school and, therefore, probably destined for such employment.¹

The extent to which integration within the PNG DF has weakened, or actually destroyed, ethnic or regional loyalties bears examination. Are there, in fact, any ethnic "flaws" in an ostensibly well-integrated and cohesive organisation? This issue is especially relevant to the performance of the PNG DF in the case of involvement in PNG internal security problems with ethnic implications. Although armed forces in developing countries have been characterized as nationalist organisations which are least affected by the tribal divisions present in the rest of society,² there are dangers in over-emphasising this approach. Violent ethnic conflict within society at large, when it reaches a certain

¹ The survey was based on 102 of the 111 students at the JSC in February 1974. (92 per cent) The group included PNG DF, Police and Corrective Institutions Service officer cadets. JSC officer cadets seem to be non-representative of the PNG population in three ways. They come from families where their fathers are more likely to be in the workforce and less likely to be subsistence farmers. (31 per cent of the fathers were (or had been until they retired) employed). They come from families where other members were more likely to be employed in skilled occupations or at high school. (76 per cent had brothers or sisters in either skilled employment or at high school, teachers' college or university). And they come from families where their fathers, brothers and sisters are more likely to be employed in the Public Service (including the teaching profession), Police and Defence Force (32 per cent had members of their family in these occupations and 16 per cent had fathers or brothers in the Police or Defence Force).

² See E.W. Lefever, Spear and Scepter, Brookings, Washington, 1970, pages 20-21.

intensity, may spill-over into the military.¹ Ethnic or regionalist tensions in PNG society could also be reflected within the PNG DF and these tensions might conceivably result in anything from a minor reduction in efficiency to the unreliability of units, the defection of ethnic groups, or in an extreme case, internal revolt.

In spite of powerful Defence Force indoctrination and socialization processes it is an over-statement to see the Defence Force, or even the PIR element within it, as a new tribe. Whilst personal friendships do form across ethnic and regional lines and ethnic prejudices are reduced through barracks life, the importance of wontok loyalties is, in some respects, undiminished. On duty the soldier is part of a multi-ethnic environment and as a result his opportunities for wontok groupings may be reduced; off duty, however, wontok groupings may even predominate. Some officers believe that in recent years the soldier's preference for social mixing with wontok groups may, paradoxically, have increased rather than decreased. This has been attributed to the growth of the towns in which the PNG DF bases are located and the tendency for soldiers, like others in the community, to fall back on primordial allegiances in a time of rapid social and political change.³ The growth of urban population has meant that most PNG ethnic communities are

¹ Luckham, op. cit., page 8.

² H.L. Bell, "Goodbye to all That - Integration in the PIR", New Guinea, Volume 2, No 2, June-July 1967, pages 49-58.

³ See C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in C. Geertz, (ed.), Old Societies and New States, Free Press, New York, 1963.

represented and the soldier now has new opportunities for social mixing with his own group.¹

The influence of wontoks within the military system may also be seen in the line-boss system. Traditionally, line-bosses were the experienced, respected leaders of their own ethnic group, however, with the influx of large numbers of younger, well educated soldiers, the influence of these men is now confined largely to matters of custom and traditional affairs, rather than military duties. They do, nonetheless, provide an informal communications and intelligence network which is sometimes useful to regimental officers as a means of finding out what is occurring.² The line-boss system is an obstacle to complete integration in the PNG DF as well as being a possible means of group action in times of ethnic conflict. The term wontok itself has an imprecise meaning both within the PNG DF and PNG society. In the Defence Force the term more usually refers to an allegiance beyond one language group, such as a Sub-District or even District. Members of small ethnic groups are happy at times to become identified with a larger more prestigious group, for example, Tolais or Chimbus

¹ These observations are based on discussions with PNG DF officers and personal experience. The town wontok group provides hospitality, opportunities to discuss village affairs and to converse in the local language. In turn, the soldier is expected to honour his own reciprocal obligations which may include help with money and some soldiers find these reciprocal social obligations onerous. They may even try to evade them by applying for a transfer to another base.

² See Bell, "Tribal Integration within the PIR", page 7, for a description of the line-boss system. In the case of small language groups, the line-boss might operate for an aggregation of small ethnic groups. The line-boss system may be involved in such matters as a question of pay-back for the killing of a civilian or military member of their ethnic group, or making arrangements for the body of a dead wontok to be returned to his village for burial ceremonies.

and there is evidence that a process of regionalism, as a building block of nationalism, is under way in the Defence Force.

Nonetheless generalizations of these sort are likely to be misleading because of the situational character of these loyalties. As Parker and Wolfers have pointed out, political loyalties are in a process of rapid change in PNG and "a man's loyalties still tend to vary with the social content of a conflict"¹ and, in the Defence Force context, a Kerema soldier may see himself as a member of a Papuan drinking group in the canteen but later support his Moveave kinsman in a political dispute with other Keremas.

Evidence of the persistence of ethnic groupings in the Defence Force is provided by social distance surveys that have been conducted. These surveys show that there is considerable degree of ethnic stereotyping, both in the minds of PNG and Australian servicemen. In a 1970 survey, for example, Chimbus and Keremas were ranked low and Bukas and Tolais were ranked high in terms of social acceptability.² (Significant divergences were revealed in the opinions of PNG and Australian respondents). Another project in 1972 provided evidence of high regard for Bukas and poor regard for Gailalas.³ This is a complex issue, however, and the research which has been conducted so far is an inadequate basis for any broad generalization, other than to say that some Defence Force members are less acceptable than others as colleagues on purely ethnic grounds. Ethnic stereotyping has certainly been an aspect of the Australian experience in PNG and it has led to a belief amongst officers that certain behaviour is "typical" of particular ethnic groups and, therefore,

¹ Epstein, Parker, Reay, (eds.), The Politics of Dependence, ANU, Canberra, 1971; R.S. Parker and E.P. Wolfers, Chapter I, "The Context of Political Change, page 16.

² Research Report, No 39, "Attitudes to Tribal Groups", June 1970.

³ Research Report, No 62, "A Comparative Study of Social Distance", July 1972 and Addendum, August 1972.

that the behaviour of soldiers from "A" may be intuited. Whilst such beliefs may be based on experience and regimental lore, it is extremely doubtful if the relationship between ethnic groups has ever been as simple as that postulated by Bell in 1967:

"As a generalization it could be said that New Guineans have gained moral ascendancy over Papuans, Highlanders over fellow New Guineans and Bukas over all".¹

The significance of tribal prejudices within the Defence Force is that they are obstacles to complete integration and possible chinks in the cohesion of the PNG DF which have operational implications in the event of an internal security role.

Further doubt may be cast on the cohesion on the PNG DF because of the incidents of disorder that have occurred since the PIR was re-established. These incidents have revealed a lack of adjustment to military discipline, ethnic conflict, a reaction to perceived injustices in conditions of service and poor communication between officers and men. Some or all of these problems might reoccur in the future, especially those concerned with conditions of service in a time of post-independence austerity and some of the more recent disorders which have been more in the character of "industrial action" may provide a model for future disorders. The consequences of such action would be serious if "industrial action" leads the Defence Force to recognise its political strength.² The susceptibility of the Defence Force

¹ Bell, "Goodbye to all That", pages 49-58.

² The East African army mutinies provide an example of pay and conditions issues projecting the army into the political arena. Welch has argued that resentment and finally action over inferior conditions of service has been a stage in the process of military intervention in African politics. (See C.E. Welch, "The Soldier and the State in Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 5, No 3, November 1967, page 306).

to group disobedience emphasises the need for careful and thorough man management, so that soldiers' "worries" are talked out and trouble averted. It is also important that methods of determining pay and preserving pay relativity with the PNG Public Service and Police are fair and expeditious.¹ Whilst the formal organisation, the indoctrination and socialization processes and the strength of primary groups within units in the Defence Force have produced a well-integrated Force of high morale and esprit de corps, there are, nonetheless, traditional elements of ethnicity which also permeate the Force. Under certain social and political conditions in PNG which accentuated ethnic issues the cohesion of the Defence Force could not, therefore, be taken for granted.

Localization of the Officer Corps

Localization may be seen as a necessary aspect of PNG's social and political advancement to independence, enabling Papua New Guineans to find satisfying employment within their own country and allowing them greater control over their own affairs.² In virtually no area of PNG society, however, will localization be complete by independence and commerce, industry, the Public

¹ At present PNG DF conditions of service and pay are based on parity with the Police. This is achieved through an inter-departmental committee which meets regularly to consider the PNG DF, Police and Public Service implications of proposed changes in conditions of service. Previous incidents of disorder have occurred when long-awaited improvements in pay or conditions were unreasonably delayed. (Personal Communication, November 1973).

² Localization refers to the employment of Papua New Guineans in the place of Australians (and other expatriates) within both the public and private sector of the economy.

Service, Police and Defence Force will all still require expatriate manpower.¹ In this respect the PNG DF is like the defence forces of black African states at independence which also relied on manpower assistance from the former metropole. And like African states PNG's manpower shortage will be greatest in regard to officers – the managerial and command element of the military – because, in all cases, it has been this group which were recruited last into the defence forces.

Localization of the PNG DF officer corps involves two distinct aspects: the actual replacement of Australians by trained local officers and; the consequent effects on the military organisation in terms of efficiency, stability and professionalism. Although the first two PNG officers were commissioned as early as 1963 only between thirty and forty per cent of the officers in the PNG DF at independence will be Papua New Guineans and PNG will, therefore, gain independence with the Defence Force subject to a significant degree of expatriate control.²

In regard to black African states the pre-independence officer localization programme was characterized by neglect and mismanagement followed by a flurry of rapid localization in the post-independence period. In no British territory in Africa, apart from Kenya, did Africans fill more than one quarter of the officer posts at independence. (Forty eight per cent of Kenya's

¹ See PNG's Improvement Plan 1973-74, op. cit., Chapter 3; National Times 19-24 November 1973 "The Stranglehold Australia has – and will Keep on PNG"; "Police Assistance from Australia" Report of the Committee on the Future of the Scheme, Police Headquarters, Port Moresby, January 1974; and S. Pitoi, "Localization in the Papua and New Guinea Public Service", Public Administration, Volume XXXII, No 2, June 1973, pages 221-228.

² In January 1974 there were 79 PNG officers in a total officer establishment of 356 (22 per cent). There may be about 120 by December 1974.

officer corps was localized at independence).¹ In French colonies the situation was somewhat better. Because of the different defence policy pursued by France there were, by 1960, about five hundred black officers in Afrique Noir and this amounted to some two thirds of the total requirement.² Australia's failure in PNG to improve on the localization record of the African armies, in spite of a relatively early start, be attributed to neglect and mismanagement as well as the limited number of high school graduates that had to be shared amongst a range of occupations. To some extent the small number of PNG officers was, therefore, inevitable.

As in Africa, the pace of officer localization in PNG will accelerate after independence as a result of increasing numbers of educationally qualified candidates and the establishment of the Joint Services College. In January 1974 defence plans called for the PNG DF to have a complete complement of indigenous officers by 1977-78, based on an annual output of eighty officers from the JSC and a wastage rate of about ten per cent per annum. Under current planning, however, the rate at which Australian officers will be replaced is less spectacular. Numbers of

¹ See Luckham, op. cit., page 163; Lee, op. cit., page 44; W. Guttridge, The Military in African Politics, Methuen, London, 1968, pages 26, 34, for more detailed localization figures.

² M.V.J. Bell, "Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa", Adelphi Paper, No 85, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1972, page 8. Bell observes that there were only 55 black officers in 1955 and the subsequent programme of officer production was primarily designed to develop French military capability in Afrique Noir rather than prepare indigenous armed forces for independence. French officers remained in virtually all command appointments.

Australians may still be required up to the end of the decade if PNG officers are to progress through a range of career appointments and accumulate proper professional experience. On this basis, plans allow for about one hundred Australian officers in 1978, fifty in 1980 with only a few key specialist officers remaining beyond then.¹ It may be doubted whether such plans will be permitted to run their course because of political and nationalist issues, especially if African experience is any guide. Despite the low levels of localization at independence, African armies rapidly reduced the role of European officers within several years of independence. As the case of Ghana illustrates, a feature of the localization process has been the telescoping time frame on which planning is based.²

Officer localization not only concerns numbers but also involves seniority and experience levels. In the PNG DF the shortage of Papua New Guinean officers is even more evident in the senior ranks. Of the seventy nine local officers serving in January 1974, more than half were lieutenants or second lieutenants with less than two years commissioned service. Amongst the more senior group there were only two lieutenant colonels, eight majors and some twenty two captains.³ Most

¹ Personal Communication HQ PNG DF, January 1974.

² General H.T. Alexander, the last British commander of the Ghanaian Defence Force recounts that his British predecessor produced a plan for complete localization by 1970. Alexander's own plan aimed for completion by 1962. But neither date was to be soon enough: all British officers, including Alexander, were summarily relieved of command responsibilities by President Nkrumah in 1961. H.T. Alexander, African Tightrope, Pall Mall, London, 1966, pages 12-13 and 99; and Lee, op. cit., page 44.

³ The average years of commissioned service for each rank in January 1974 was: lieutenant colonel 10 years; major 6 years; captain 3 years. (By comparison Australian Army officers, have in recent years, been promoted to lieutenant colonel after 14-15 years service; major after 7 and captain after 3). PNG DF promotion regulations provide for the following promotion

of these officers will eventually fill the senior twenty appointments between the ranks of lieutenant colonel and brigadier and this will create vacancies in the middle ranks which will be filled by even younger officers. The officer corps of the PNG DF will, in consequence, be younger and less experienced than the Australian Services' officer corps in the post-independence period.

Localization policy in the PNG DF may also increasingly reflect tensions between conservative, professional arguments for prescribed career patterns, which take account of fixed periods of time in rank and rotation through career appointments to gain experience, and political and social pressures for adaptive careers marked by rapid promotion. As in Africa, the cautious advice of expatriate advisers, who might tend to place efficiency and stability goals foremost, is likely to give way to a process of rapid promotion. Indeed, rapid promotion is already under way, although the Defence Force, in early 1974, lagged behind the Public Service and Police in regard to senior level localization. Then, seven of the eighteen Public Service departmental heads were Papua New Guineans and there were two local Assistant Police Commissioners.¹ In May 1974 it was announced that a Papua New Guinean Police Commissioner would be appointed

3 (Continued)
requirements:

Promotion to lieutenant:	2 years, 3 months as second lieutenant.
Promotion to captain:	1 year, 9 months as lieutenant.
Promotion to major:	4 years as Captain; promotion by selection.
Promotion to lieutenant colonel:	by selection.

¹ See Canberra Times, 16 November 1973 and Post Courier, 24 December 1973.

in May 1975.¹ It is probable, in the light of these developments that pressure will mount from both the PNG elite and officer corps for more rapid advancement of PNG officers in the Defence Force. In the Public Service rapid localization at the senior levels has been justified on the basis that Australians face conflicts of loyalty in their dealings with the PNG political leadership and local men are required in order to apply Papua New Guinean, rather than Australian policies and solutions. This argument might be relevant to the Defence Force also. Furthermore, delayed Defence Force localization might lead to serious dissatisfaction in the officer corps as the peers of senior Defence Force officers rise to the top of the Public Service and Police.²

If rapid localization in the senior ranks does occur in the Defence Force as predicted, it is likely to produce similar problems to those experienced in the Public Service. Reduced efficiency and even psychological stresses in those who are rapidly promoted may be expected.³ Luckham has shown how rapid localization in the Nigerian Army led to serious organisational as well as political consequences. Rapid localization reduced

¹ Post Courier, 13 May 1974. It was announced that the newly appointed Australian Commissioner would only have a 12 months term and it was expected that he would be replaced by a Papua New Guinean.

² Alexander, (op. cit., page 77) has noted that slow promotion in the Ghanaian forces led to dissatisfaction, envy and jealousy. African officers saw their fellow countrymen, many of whom were less qualified in terms of experience and education, becoming highly paid civil servants. This led the black officers to covet the senior appointments held by the British. A similar situation might arise in PNG where the schoolday peers of the senior PNG officers, only lieutenant colonels in early 1974, in some cases are already departmental heads.

³ See, for example: Post Courier, 22 October 1973, 18 October 1973; Canberra Times, 16 November 1973; National Times, 3 November 1973 and 3 December 1973 ("Life in the new PNG takes its toll in mental illness.").

professionalism and produced tensions between senior and junior officers. Junior officers lacked respect for, and challenged the authority of, their "senior" officers whose formal status did not accord with their level of expertise.¹ At the same time the high rate of posting turnover, as a result of rapid promotion between ranks, prevented the development of the usual patterns of influence and authority of seniors over juniors. Luckham argues that in the Nigerian case this led to the spread of tribal antagonism and breakdown of loyalties and, ultimately, revolt.² Rapid localization in Nigeria also led to careerism and inefficiency. Accelerated promotion of officers in the first seniority echelon led to unrealistic career expectations. When the top posts became filled the opportunities for those who followed were greatly reduced and officers in junior posts saw that their advancement would be blocked for many years by another set of officers in the senior posts. Rapid promotion also led to a sense of anomie in which important appointments were devalued as mere stepping stones on an ascendant career. In the Nigerian case, the officer corps became restless as junior officers sought promotion but not necessarily the responsibilities that were entailed.³ These consequences of rapid promotion suggest similar potential problems in PNG. Captains and majors in the PNG DF may expect rapid promotion to the senior ranks of colonel and lieutenant colonel in a period of only several years and the present group of lieutenants are likely to quickly reach major rank, whereas, later graduates may see their promotion prospects

¹ Luckham, op. cit., page 164.

² ibid.

³ Luckham, op. cit., pages 170-73. Luckham defines this "careerist" anomie as follows:

"The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate ... (thus) ambition always exceeds the results and the unobtainable goal can give no pleasure."

blocked by young incumbents in senior posts.¹

Rapid localization may also erode the standards of professionalism in the PNG DF which have been nurtured by the presence of large numbers of Australian officers. The extent to which Papua New Guinean officers have absorbed the values and norms of western, military professionalism is a matter for speculation.² The brief careers of most of the officer corps and the short life of the Defence Force as an indigenous institution may render transmitted professional values unstable, especially under political stress. The reality of military professionalism in PNG may prove to represent little more than a veneer of inchoate, professional socialization.³ Luckham has contrasted the observance of

¹ The PNG DF is aware of this problem which might be reduced by a slower localization rate, earlier retirement of some officers and secondment or transfer of Defence Force officers into the Public Service. The possibility of employing Defence Force officers in other Government jobs, such as District Commissioners, has been the subject of public discussion in PNG.

² Huntington has defined military professionalism in terms of three characteristics: a body of expertise, social responsibility and corporate identity. (S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1972). The professional domain of the officer is the management of violence which distinguishes him from those within the military, such as NCOs and other ranks, who have subordinate roles and others such as terrorists and criminals who also employ violence. The professional is further distinguished by the high proportion of his career (estimated about one third) devoted to professional training and education. The traditions of Australian military professionalism transmitted to the PNG DF have involved the notion of an apolitical role in society. The PNG DF may not in fact, embrace this notion of apolitisme and the officer corps may be more integrated in PNG society and less a discrete social group than in the case of most western armies. (See Chapter V).

³ Luckham, op. cit., page 120.

officers mess ritual, the image of "officers and gentlemen" and the ritualised inter-personal relationships embodied in the military system, with the subsequent break-down of these values. He has suggested that the local officer corps was, on one level, enthusiastically adopting western military values but at the same time undergoing a process of antagonistic reactions to western military values in favour of indigenous social norms, racial images and nationalism.¹ It is possible that similar forces are to be found within the PNG officer corps and that the post-independence Defence Force will become progressively more localized, not only in personnel terms, but also in regard to social values which may be in conflict with those of western professionalism and so the officer corps is likely to become more Melanesian and less Australian in outlook. Incompletely digested professionalism may also lead to the development of naive political beliefs within the Defence Force based on "morbidly high self-esteem" and a view of the military as guardians of the nation and of public morality.²

¹ Mazrui has described an under-professionalized military force as the lumpen militariat which is characterized by inadequate internalization of professional norms, adherence to a professional ethic and submission to professional discipline. He argues that this was the case in the Ugandan army and the assumption of political power resulted in further deprofessionalization. (Ali Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as a New Political Class", Political Studies, Volume XXI, No 1, March 1973, page 9).

² The morbidly high self esteem of the military has been seen as one of the causes of military involvement in politics. See S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, Pall Mall, London, 1962, page 70. Luckham has argued that the political views of the Nigerian military were linked to its professional ethos:

"One can say with some confidence that nationalism, distates for corruption and mistrust of politics was greater in the military than in most groups outside it. This was linked to concepts of military honour".

(Luckham, op. cit., page 122).

Professionalism rather than performing the function of keeping the military out of politics, might conceivably lead to the opposite effect because of its incompleteness and vulnerability.¹

As discussed earlier in the chapter the proportional representation of Papua New Guinean ethnic groups within the Defence Force may assume political and organisational importance after independence. The primordial composition of the officer corps is potentially even more important in view of its command and managerial function and a divided officer corps is likely to lead to a similarly divided Defence Force. Furthermore, the weight of empirical evidence in regard to military intervention in politics in Africa and elsewhere indicates that military politics are largely those of officer corps politics. The officer corps usually contains the more politically conscious, it provides the "plotters" and leaders of the classical coup d'etat process and it provides the leaders of the new regime. The NCOs and Other Ranks usually perform the role of willing executants of the officer corps' political plans, although they may exercise a degree of influence on them.²

The ethnic composition of the PNG DF officer corps reflects the over-representation of Papuans and under-

¹ Although Huntington argues, generally, that high levels of military professionalism produce an apolitical military, incomplete professionalization may lead to the development of "pseudo-intellectualism" in elements of the officer corps based on naive political theorizing within the "hot-house" officers' mess and headquarters environment. This may be encouraged by political instruction of the military in the citizenship training and the traditional professional duty of the officer to "keep up" with politics and current affairs. Luckham, *op. cit.*, page 126, observes that the January 1966 Nigerian coup d'etat was blamed on officers "too clever by half" who read too many books on politics and were too close to intellectuals and university students.

² See R. First, The Barrel of a Gun, Penguin, London, 1971, and Eliezer Be'ere, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger-Pall Mall, New York and London.

representation of Highlanders that was a feature of the overall Defence Force ethnic structure. In the senior group of thirty officers of the rank of captain or above in the Force in January 1974, fifty per cent were Papuans and there was only one Highlander. (Seven of the ten officers of major and above were Papuans).¹ Whilst the regional distribution of the more junior officers and those in training at the JSC was more balanced it would seem that Papuan officers will continue to predominate at the senior levels on a seniority basis. Future recourse to the preferential promotion of New Guinean officers might well lead to the development of ethnic tensions within the PNG DF. The over-representation of Papuans in the senior ranks of the PNG DF is, furthermore, apparently mirrored in the PNG Public Service, though not in the Police where they may even be slightly under-represented.²

¹ Statistics derived from PNG DF records, February 1974. Among the Papuan group of senior officers seven were from the Central District and five of the ten officers above the rank of captain were from the Central District – all of them from the Rigo Sub-District. Although the prominence of Papuans in the senior ranks of the Defence Force is remarkable, its explanation is simple. Early recruitment of officers was virtually limited to the principal source of high school graduates, Sogeri High School, near Port Moresby, in which Papuan students were over-represented.

² The complete ethnic composition of the Public Service was not available in January 1974. For an indication, however, it was reported that, at a meeting of 60 senior public servants in Port Moresby in June 1973, the composition of the group was as follows: Central District (Papua) – 23; Other Papua Districts – 15; East New Britain – 10; Other – 12. There was only one Highlander present, emphasising the under-representation of Highlanders in the senior levels of the PNG Public Service. (See J.A. Ballard, "The Politics of Localization in PNG", Unpublished Paper, November 1972, page 26-27).

In June 1973, the regional composition of PNG Police officers and cadet officers was as follows: Papua (less Southern Highlands) – 16 per cent; Highlands – 18 per cent; New Guinea Mainland (including all Highlands Districts) – 48 per cent; New Guinea Islands – 36 per cent. (Personal Communication, PNG Police Department, 19 June 1973).

/Continued

Given that there are certain ethnic imbalances in the Defence Force, there is, nevertheless evidence that ethnic and regional affiliations may not play so important a role within the PNG DF officer corps as in other sections of the PNG polity. Surveys and interviews with Defence Force officers indicate that the Papua New Guinean officer appears to be strongly nationalist in his political outlook. Both senior and junior officers have spoken publicly and privately of their willingness to shoot their own wontoks if their duty as servants of the national Government demanded it in hypothetical situations.¹ The results of a survey of fellow PNG officers by a local officer show that there is an apparent consensus amongst the officer corps that, if necessary, secession should be met with force and, if required, the Defence Force should be used for internal security duties.² The results of two surveys conducted by the writer also show that the officer

2 (Continued)

Both Papua New Guinean Assistant Police Commissioners are New Guineans. (Post Courier, 12 July and 24 December 1973) and it is probable that the first Papua New Guinean commissioner may, therefore, be a New Guinean. The choice for the first local Commander of the Defence Force, will presumably, be between the two most senior officers, Lieutenant Colonels E.R. Diro, and B.P. Lowa. (Diro is from the Central District and Lowa is from the West New Britain District). The selection of the Defence Force Commander and Police Commissioner by the PNG leadership is likely to include political and ethnic considerations as well as those of a purely professional nature.

¹ These views are based on personal interviews.

² Personal Communication, May 1973. The survey included 32 of the 48 PNG officers then serving in the Defence Force. All the officers surveyed believed that PNG should stay together in order to become a "strong country". Only 14 out of the 32 believed that secessionist issues would not disappear after independence, however, all believed that PNG districts which attempted to secede should not be permitted to do so. 30 officers considered that the Defence Force would play an important role in holding the country together after independence.

corps at present hold strongly nationalist attitudes about the need for unity and internal order.¹ It seems that the PNG Defence Force and its officer leadership, like most African armies, will have a built-in inclination as nationalists to prevent separatism and the dismemberment of the country by secessionist groups.²

Conclusion

The social functioning of the PNG DF reveals tensions between the traditional and modern in PNG society which may effect the role of the Defence Force within the PNG polity. The PNG DF is, ostensibly, a cohesive nationalist organisation whose members are subject to intensive socialization and indoctrination within the environment of a total institution. This organisation is modelled on notions of western military professionalism in which universalistic criteria such as ability, efficiency and duty rather than particularistic criteria such as tribe and language are emphasised. At the same time, traditional values persist in the Defence Force. The wontok grouping remains relevant, personal relations are influenced by ethnic origins, and a degree of traditional authority resides in the line boss system. The PNG DF may, therefore, be seen as a transitional organisation, not traditional, but not yet modern. The persistence of the traditional values of PNG society in the Defence Force is almost certainly reflected in a similar manner in both the PNG Public Service and Police and it would be remarkable if it were otherwise.³

The key to the future stability and professionalism of the Defence Force lies in the officer corps. The successful development of the officer corps will largely depend on the tempo

¹ See Appendices 1 and 2.

² See Mazrui, op. cit., page 4.

³ See Annex A. "Some Comparisons of the PNG DF with the Police".

of localization, the quality of individual senior officers, and to some extent, the stabilizing influence of a continued Australian presence for several years after independence.¹ The significance of traditional ethnic loyalties within the PNG DF and its officer corps will primarily depend on the importance of these criteria within the PNG social and political environment. As the Nigerian case shows, an officer corps may remain substantially isolated from ethnic pressures until these issues escalate beyond a certain undefinable intensity and this would also seem to apply to PNG. The cohesion of the Defence Force under certain political conditions in PNG should, therefore, not be taken for granted.

¹ Foreign military advisory groups were welcomed by African states in the independence period to resolve the dilemma of rapidly localizing the officer corps and at the same time retaining a stabilizing military influence. Even after the expulsion of British officers from command positions in the Ghanaian Defence Force in 1961, a British training group was shortly thereafter formed and in 1968 there was still a total of some 500 British officers and NCOs on secondment or in training teams throughout the armies of independent Africa (M.V.J. Bell, "The Military in the New States of Africa", in Van Doorn (ed.), Military Professionalism and Military Regimes, Moulton, The Hague, 1969, pages 265-266). It needs to be noted, however, in relation to the future role of Australian military personnel in PNG that whilst foreign advisory teams may act as a stabilizing influence in a force undergoing rapid change, there is a limit to what they may accomplish. Advisers are largely cut off from the politics of the local officer corps and they may have limited powers of command and, for instance, a large British training team did not prevent the Ghanaian army overthrow of President Nkrumah in 1966.

ANNEX A

SOME COMPARISONS OF THE PNG DF WITH THE POLICE

A study of the PNG DF organisation and functioning invites comparison with its counterpart-institution, the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). The PNG Police is relevant to the study of the Defence Force in several ways. Both organisations comprise the total PNG security forces and their roles, especially in regard to internal security problems, are largely complementary. The Police, like the Defence Force and the PNG Public Service, is a major national institution and an instrument of modernisation and a national integration. And finally, the Police Force, like the Defence Force, has the potential to play a significant political role in PNG - either in conflict or in cooperation with the Defence Force.¹

The PNG Police force is a para-military, armed constabulary, not a kin-police force of the British or Australian type.² This derives from its colonial origin and PNG's diverse social structure. The Police force is comparable in size to the PNG DF, but its deployment is quite different. Whereas the PNG DF operates from only seven major bases in four centres, the Police are distributed over some fifty Police stations and fifty Rural Police Posts. On the other hand seventy five per cent of the force is disposed within Police zones based on urban centres and more than half the force

¹ See Christian P. Potholin, "The Multiple Roles of the Police Seen in the African Context", The Journal of Developing Areas, Volume 3, No 2, January 1969, pages 139-159. The Police already perform a continuous "political" role in representing the regime. In the future they might seek an active political role, or support or oppose a political role by the PNG DF. (See Chapter V).

² See Nigel Oram, "Administration Development and Public Order", in Clunies-Ross and Longmore, (eds.), op cit, page 34.

is usually located in the major PNG towns or nearby barracks.¹

The Police Force consists of three branches: the Regular, Field and Reserve Constabularies. The Field Constabulary consists of the field officers of the Division of Development Administration – the kiaps – who exercised Police powers and control Police detachments outside the Police zones. The Reserve Constabulary is a small force of volunteers, but it has so far not been actively used and its future is uncertain.² An important part

¹ Total Police strength in November 1973 was 3,862, made up of the following components:

Other Ranks	-	3,575 (All Papua New Guineans)
Officers	-	287 (Authorized Officer strength was 374 and there was, therefore, a shortage of 87 officers)

the composition of officer groups was as follows: Papua New Guinean officers – 98; Overseas Contract – 107; Permanent Overseas – 41; Seconded (Australian) – 35.

In addition there was a Police Administrative Branch of some 260 Public Servants.

In December 1973, 3,000 Police were deployed in Police Zones which accounted for some 15 per cent of PNG land area and 25 per cent of the population – including virtually all urban populations. Outside the Zones there were 686 Police deployed in 35 Sub-Districts headquarters and 81 Patrol Post in detachments of between 4 and 10 men. This included a total of 130 Police in the ten border administrative posts. (Papua New Guinea Report 1971–1972, op. cit., pages 12–14).

² ibid. Outside the Zones the force was supplemented by about 120 officers of the Division of Development Administration, the "Kiaps", who exercise Police powers as members of the Field Constabulary of the RPNGC. A programme was underway to increase the Police presence in the rural areas by greatly expanding the number of rural Police posts. (PNG's Improvement Plan 1973–74, page 45). In addition, the previous Police geographic command system based on 6 Police Divisions was changed during 1974 to a District basis with a Police Superintendent in command of the Police deployed within each of the Districts.

of the Regular Constabulary is the fourteen Police Mobile Units, also known as riot squads, each of thirty five men and commanded by an officer.¹

The Police unlike the Defence Force are not uniformly well endowed with good barracks, training and recreational facilities. They also lack an adequate logistic support system and they are dependent on a notoriously unreliable and slow-moving PNG Government stores system – all of which may be contrasted to the elaborate logistic structure of the Defence Force. Procurement of Police equipment has been seriously limited by budgetary constraints, imposed by the PNG administration, which have not affected the Defence Force,² and poor Police barrack accommodation due to lack of funds has led to morale and disciplinary problems.³

¹ The Mobile Units are equipped with batons and shields, gas guns, tear gas grenades, shotguns and rifles. They are trained to deal with riots and tribal fighting and they have had considerable experience in coping with both. The major Mobile Unit bases are:

Tomaringa (near Rabaul) – capacity to accommodate
8 units.

Port Moresby

Mount Hagen.

Individual units are deployed throughout PNG as required to meet policing problems.

² This point is made by Oram, *op. cit.*, pages 32–33. The degree of austerity in Police administration may be gauged from a comparison of the PNG DF and Police budgetary allocations. (Allowance has to be made for a larger expatriate salary component in the PNG DF budget and the fact that the Police capital works vote is contained under the Public Works vote). The comparative figures are approximately as follows:

	<u>1971/72</u>	<u>1972/73</u>
Defence Force	\$16.75m	\$23.0m
Police	\$ 9.26m	\$10.7m

³ *ibid.* Elements of the RPNGC struck over pay and conditions in 1964 and, more recently, other strikes have been averted.

The Police like the PNG DF is organised on the basis of integrated ethnic composition and recruiting is similarly aimed at producing a microcosm of the PNG ethnic situation. Like the PNG DF, however, the Police falls considerably short of achieving this balance. The Highlands districts are badly under-represented although, in contrast to the PNG DF, the degree of Papuan over-representation is minor.

TABLE A¹

THE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE RPNGC BY
DISTRICTS - MAY 1973

<u>District</u>	<u>Other Rank Members</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>District as a Percentage of Total PNG Population</u>
<u>PAPUA</u>			
Central	4.7	5.2	6.1
Milne Bay	1.9	4.6	4.4
Northern	6.2	2.9	2.5
Western	3.6	2.3	2.6
Gulf	4.8	1.1	2.8
Southern Highlands	2.1	2.3	8.1
<u>NEW GUINEA MAINLAND</u>			
Eastern Highlands	5.0	2.9	10.0
Chimbu	5.8	4.6	7.7
Western Highlands	4.7	8.1	13.6
Morobe	11.2	11.6	9.4
East Sepik	18.0	12.8	8.2
West Sepik	3.3	2.9	4.2
Madang	8.4	2.9	7.5
<u>NEW GUINEA ISLANDS</u>			
Manus	4.3	7.0	0.9
East New Britain	8.4	11.6	4.0
West New Britain	3.4	5.3	2.4
New Ireland	1.5	5.8	2.1
Bougainville	2.3	6.4	3.0

¹ This data is based on a sample of 88 per cent of the total Other Rank strength and all officers. (Personal Communication, Police Headquarters, Konedobu, 19 June 1973).

TABLE B

REGIONAL COMPARISON - PNG DF AND RPNGC

<u>Region</u>	<u>RPNGC (Other Rank Only)</u>	<u>PNG DF (Total)</u>	<u>Percentage Total PNG Population</u>	<u>Percentage Under or Over Represent- ation of Other Rank Category</u>
PAPUA	23 .3	33 .7	26 .75	-2 .2
PAPUA (less Southern Highlands)	21 .2	30 .1	18 .40	+2 .8
NEW GUINEA MAINLAND	56 .4	44 .2	60 .60	-4 .2
HIGHLANDS	17 .6	20 .7	39 .40	-21 .8
NEW GUINEA ISLANDS	19 .9	22 .1	12 .4	+7 .5

Amongst the officer group it is apparent that, although there is a similar under-representation of the Highlands districts, there is not a preponderance of Papuan officers in the senior ranks as in the PNG DF. Tolais are significantly better represented in the Police Force, especially at the more senior levels, than is the case in the PNG DF. The district distribution of younger officers and future graduates of the JSC will, like the PNG DF, more closely reflect the distribution of population between the regions in PNG as educated recruits are available in the less developed areas. There is, however, a clear and pressing need to recruit Other Rank, and to promote officers from the Highlands in order to redress the present the imbalance. This is especially important in view of the public order problems in the Highlands.

Compared to the Defence Force, the PNG Police Force is, on a man-for-man basis, older and less well educated. In May 1973 there were four hundred men with twenty or more years of

service and a total of over seven hundred and seventy five with sixteen or more years of service and this will lead to a strain on the organisation over the next few years as experienced men retire. The age of the Force also partly explains the lower level of education, which is especially pronounced among older members. Although the Police entry standard is now, in most cases, Form Two, in August 1973 about forty per cent of the Force was considered to be illiterate.¹ The level of illiteracy was even more marked at the sergeant level where important supervisory and record-keeping responsibilities reside. The lack of education in the Police has important effects on its efficiency and mode of operation. In particular, officers are forced to assume inappropriate clerical responsibilities and the more recent recruitment of younger educated men has led to a division between the experienced, non-educated "old-line" Police and the educated younger officers whose inexperience has led to leadership and man management problems. For this reason, it is apparently intended that some officers will continue to be drawn from the ranks of mature policemen.

Under current localization plans, the Police will be able to operate without expatriate assistance some time before that will occur in the PNG DF. Expatriate officers will probably not be required in an operational role after the end of 1974 although diminishing numbers of permanent, contract and seconded officers will be required in administrative, logistic and training roles until December 1976.²

¹ Canberra Times, 16 August 1973 and Personal Communication, Police Headquarters, 19 June 1973.

² Report on Police Assistance from Australia, Annex A, "Forecast of Officer Strengths, RPNGC", page 19 and Interview, Police Headquarters, Konedobu, February 1974.

The relative cohesion of the Police and Defence Force organisations makes an interesting subject of comparison. The processes of indoctrination and socialization in the Police are less obviously intensive. Apart from the Mobile Units (whose routine and disciplinary system, unlike other sections of the Police, is close to that of the Defence Force)¹, the policeman's duties place him in the community to a greater extent than his PNG DF peer. Whether it is in an urban Police Station, on traffic duty or in a rural Police Post, the PNG policemen deals with the public. The Defence Force member, by comparison, spends most of his time isolated from the community within barracks and in training and actual contact with the PNG population when on patrolling and civic action tasks accounts for a relatively small percentage of the serviceman's time. Even the larger Police barracks are less self-contained enclaves than the PNG DF bases and they lack the facilities and social amenities that exist in PNG DF bases. And furthermore, in the minor centres Police live as part of the civil community. The Police are, therefore, to a much lesser extent, separated from PNG society, although they do undeniably have a distinctive corporate identity. The Police is, as a consequence, less of a total organisation in which personal and "occupational" lives are joined.

This distinction between the Police and PNG DF may have important consequences. There may, as a result, be more scope for differences and ambiguities in regard to social and political attitudes within the Police than in the PNG DF. Whereas the more intensive and continuous indoctrination of the Defence Force is

¹ The Mobile Units in their training and role resemble an infantry platoon in important respects. Although the Police Force has tried to prevent the Mobile Units developing their own special esprit de corps (by such means as rotation of personnel and rostering mobile squad men for normal Police duties), Mobile Units tend to develop a para-military spirit because of their training and role. (Personal Communication, Tomaringa Barracks, May 1973).

likely to lead to a high level of consensus and uniformity and this degree of military cohesion may usually enhance potential political power of the Defence Force as a unified monolithic force. On the other hand, because the Police Force is less a total organisation, more permeable and socially decentralized, it may be able to withstand greater pressures of regionalism and tribalism than the Defence Force. In contrast the loss of the Defence Force's consensus in the face of extreme political tensions might lead to organisational collapse.¹ Because of the differences in the role and organisation of the Police it may as a result react quite differently from the PNG DF in response to social and political pressures in PNG.

The comparison between the two forces is most sharply drawn in relation to the nature of their roles. The role of the Police is continuous and recurrent, whilst the role of the Defence Force is essentially contingent.² The Defence Force is at present about the same size in personnel terms but it is better housed, better equipped and better supplied with amenities and it commands a greater share of resources. The Police Force, which stands in the first line of defence in terms of preserving public order, seems likely to press for a greater share of total

¹ Luckham, op. cit., page 107. This point is argued by Luckham to explain the collapse of the Nigerian Army's unity but the survival of the Police.

² A senior Papua New Guinean Police officer referred to the role of the PNG DF in a mildly disparaging manner as follows: "The PNG DF is like a fire brigade which one keeps and polishes." He advocated less money being spent on the PNG DF and more being spent on an expanded Police Force. (Personal Communication, Police Headquarters, Konedobu, February 1974).

PNG security resources in the future¹ and whether or not it is successful in this may to some extent depend on the relative political influence and power of the Police and Defence Force .

¹ If the PNG Police is to retain the present ratio of numbers of policemen to population, which is considered to be at least a crude guide of Police capability, the force will probably need to expand to about 4,500 by 1976 and 5,000 by 1980 (based on a projected natural increase in population of 2.8 per cent per annum). Provided the Defence Force does not expand at the same rate, the long term trend should be for the PNG Police to become significantly larger than the PNG DF .

ANNEX B

THE PNG DF LAND ELEMENT PATROL AND EXERCISE PROGRAMME¹ — 1973-74

This programme is included as an example of the normal pattern of recurrent activity carried out by the PNG DF. It represents the equivalent of over twenty company-sized movements by air or sea transport within PNG (involving about 2,000 troops) during the one year period.

LAND OPERATIONAL PATROL/EXERCISE PROGRAMME - JULY 1973 TO JUNE 1974

Unit	Date		Strength	Area	Remarks
	From	To			
1PIR	20 Jun 73	15 Jul 73	Company	Western District	Coverage of the area from KIUNGA to NINGERUM west of the Alice River.
2PIR	10 Jul 73	20 Jul 73	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of the area between VANIMO and PAGEI
2PIR	16 Jul 73	6 Aug 73	Battalion (minus)	West New Britain District	a. Battalion minus operational exercise. b. Coverage of south coast of West New Britain from KANDRIAN to GASMATA.

¹ Source: HQ PNG DF letter of 16 March 1973.

Unit	Date		Strength	Area	Remarks
	From	To			
2PIR	19 Jul 73	9 Aug 73	Company	New Ireland District	a. To include Taskul area . b. Watercraft Support required .
1PIR	23 Jul 73	13 Aug 73	Company	Gulf District	a. Coverage of coastal villages . b. Watercraft support required .
1PIR	30 Jul 73	20 Aug 73	Company	Northern and Morobe Districts	Coverage of Waria Valley area .
2PIR	1 Aug 73	11 Aug 73	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of PAGEI-OSIMA area .
2PIR	11 Aug 73	21 Sep 73	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between GREEN RIVER and AMANAB .
1PIR	5 Oct 73	26 Oct 73	Battalion	Central District	a. Battalion operational exercise . b. Cape Rodney area .
2PIR	9 Oct 73	19 Oct 73	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between IMONDA and AMANAB .
2PIR	29 Oct 73	19 Nov 73	Battalion	Northern District	a. Battalion operational exercise . b. Kokoda area .

Unit	Date		Strength	Area	Remarks
	From	To			
2PIR	6 Nov 73	16 Nov 73	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between PAGEI and IMONDA .
2PIR	8 Jan 74	18 Jan 74	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between IMONDA and IAFAR .
1PIR	15 Jan 74	5 Feb 74	Company	West New Britain District	a . Coverage of area west of line EMELINE BAY - KANDRIAN . b . Watercraft support required .
1PIR	16 Jan 74	6 Feb 74	Company	Eastern Highlands and Morobe Districts	Coverage of area between KAINANTU and MENYAMYA .
2PIR	5 Feb 74	15 Feb 74	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between AMANAB and KAMBERATORO .
2PIR	19 Mar 74	9 Apr 74	Company	Southern Highlands District	Coverage of area between TARI and LAKE KUTUBU .
2PIR	19 Mar 74	29 Mar 74	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between GREEN RIVER and MINIABURU .
2PIR	21 Mar 74	11 Apr 74	Company	Madang and Chimbu District	Coverage of BUNDI VALLEY .

Unit	Date		Strength	Area	Remarks
	From	To			
2PIR	9 Apr 74	19 Apr 74	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of border area west of VANIMO .
2PIR	7 May 74	17 May 74	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of border area west of PAGEI .
1PIR	14 May 74	4 Jun 74	Company	Milne Bay District	Coverage of coastal villages .
2PIR	19 Jun 74	29 Jun 74	Platoon	West Sepik District	Coverage of area between AMANAB and IMONDA .

ANNEX C

PNG DF CIVIC ACTION TASKS - 1973

The following list provides details of the civic action tasks carried out by each element of the PNG DF during 1973.

a. Maritime Element

- | | | |
|------|-----------|--|
| (1) | Jan | HMAS AITAPE and LAE supported malaria survey team in remote islands off New Ireland. |
| (2) | 20 Jan | HMAS AITAPE towed disabled merchant vessel to Argyle Bay. |
| (3) | 24 Feb | MV TAROOKI involved in rescue of survivors of private launch which exploded. |
| (4) | 7 Apr | MV TAROOKI supported 2PIR in Valif Islands on civic action tasks. |
| (5) | Apr | LCM8 assisted anti-malaria spraying team in Siassi-Umboi area. |
| (6) | Apr | Transported road building materials and plant from Madang to Saidor for PWD. |
| (7) | Apr | Transported stores for PWD from Wewak to Dio on the Sepik River. |
| (8) | May | HMAS LAE assisted in WRE oceanographic survey of Bismarck sea. |
| (9) | 18-20 May | HMAS LAE acted as radio relay vessel for Rabaul to Kavieng Yacht race. |
| (10) | 11 Jun | HMAS SAMARAI towed disabled Japanese fishing boat to Rabaul. |
| (11) | 17-24 Oct | Three LCM8's took stores from Port Moresby to Lumi for Catholic Mission. |

- (12) 28 Oct Stores transported from Lae to Finschhafen for vocational school .
- (13) 26 Nov Two LCM8 transported stores from Wewak to Oum Village on the Sepik River .
- (14) 20-21 Dec Two LCM8 transported 70 head of cattle from Port Moresby to Bereina for DASF .

b. Air Element

- (1) 5 Jan Transported PWD bulldozer Josephstaal to Madang .
- (2) 2 Feb School equipment transported for Education Dept Port Moresby to Mount Hagen .
- (3) 19 Feb Transported an Administration logskidder from Lae to Malulau .
- (4) 19 Mar Air Dropped 20 drums diesoline to Kanabea Catholic Mission .
- (5) 11-14 Mar Transported PWD vehicles and equipment from Tari to Mendi .
- (6) 24 Mar Transported PWD tractor from Daru to Balimo .
- (7) 24 Mar Transported a DASF Haflinger Morehead to Port Moresby .
- (8) 4 May Transported Stores for Lutheran Mission from Jahan to Bilou .
- (9) Transported Artifacts for Australian National University from Port Moresby to Richmond .
- (10) Transported Boy Scout equipment from Wewak to Port Moresby "opportunity basis" .
- (11) 7 Jun Transported a tractor/trailer Port Moresby to Tapini for Dept of Transport .

- | | | |
|------|--------|--|
| (12) | 17 Jun | Transported Generator from Port Moresby to Tari for Elcom . |
| (13) | 21 Jun | Transported tractor/trailer from Lae to Garaina for Dept Transport . |
| (14) | 29 Jun | Transported Xray fitted Toyota vehicle Port Moresby to Wewak for East Sepik Citizens Association . |
| (15) | 29 Jun | Transported Steel poles from Port Moresby to Wotape for Elcom . |
| (16) | 2 Jul | Practice drop of marine rescue kit to lifecraft in Port Moresby for DCA . |
| (17) | 5 Jul | Transported vehicle from Safia to Lae for PWD . |
| (18) | 8 Jul | Transported vehicle from Port Moresby to Tapini for PWD . |
| (19) | | Transported 400 lbs tear gas Port Moresby to Rabaul for Police . |
| (20) | 24 Jul | Transported J-Vasis equipment from Port Moresby to Madang for DCA . |
| (21) | 26 Jul | Transported 4800lbs building materials Vanimo to Amanab for DDA . |
| (22) | 26 Jul | Transported tractor from Port Moresby to Wotape for Dept of Transport . |
| (23) | 27 Jul | Transported School bus from Mount Hagen to Tari for Asian Pacific Christian Mission . |
| (24) | 30 Jul | Transported Landcruiser from Safia to Girua for PWD . |
| (25) | 30 Jul | Transported 5100lbs building materials Girua to Afore for DDA . |
| (26) | 13 Aug | Transported tractor/trailer and freezer from Port Moresby to Tapini for DASf . |
| (27) | 24 Aug | Transported 500lbs caustic soda Lae to Port Moresby for DCA . |

- | | | |
|------|-----------|--|
| (28) | 27 Aug | Transported 2 Trucks from Mendi to Tari for DDA . |
| (29) | 31 Aug | Transported 37cwt culverts and 15 x 44 gall distillate Wewak to Telefomin for DDA . |
| (30) | 1 Sep | Airdropped 18 x 44 gall of distillate to Kanabea Mission . |
| (31) | 12 Sep | Transported a trailer from Green River to Amanab for Dept of Transport . |
| (32) | 14 Sep | Transported 2914lbs of material for Madang for DCA . |
| (33) | 18 Sep | Transported generator from Wewak to Lumi for Elcom . |
| (34) | 18 Sep | Transported tractor/trailer Lae to Pindui for Dept of Transport . |
| (35) | | Transported 30 drums distillate Vanimo to Lumi for LUMI-AITAPE Road Development Authority carried out on opportunity basis . |
| (36) | 3 Oct | Transported tractor/trailer from Girua to Ioma for Administration . |
| (37) | 11 Oct | Transported tractor from Port Moresby to Safia for Anglican Mission . |
| (38) | 11 Oct | Transported 5500lbs building material Girua to Afore for PWD . |
| (39) | 13 Oct | Transported trailer and slasher from Port Moresby to Safia for Anglican Mission . |
| (40) | 13 Oct | Transported 5700lbs building materials Girua to Ioma for PWD . |
| (41) | 12-16 Oct | Transported observation party for active volcano Sule Area . |
| (42) | 29 Oct | Transported Toyota vehicle from Madang to Simbai for Administration . |

- (43) 2 Nov Transported Landrover Port Moresby to Sharimui for Lutheran Mission Hospital .
- (44) 8 Nov Transported 16000lbs bridging material Mendi to Tari for Local Govt Council .
- (45) 10 Nov Transported Ballot boxes Port Moresby to Richmond for Dept of Foreign Affairs .
- (46) 27 Nov Transported Landrover from Goroka to Menyamya for Lutheran Mission Hospital .
- (47) 3 Dec Transported tractor/trailer from Mendi to Tari for Local Govt Council and 700lbs stores for PWD .
- (48) 4 Dec Transported 2500lbs cement from Mendi to Kohiago for Administration .
- (49) 6 Dec Transported 1200lbs radio antennas for Dept of Posts and Telegraphs and a tractor De La Salle College Bereina from Richmond to Port Moresby .
- (50) 6 Dec Transported 1100lbs truck sections from Port Moresby to Menyamya for Kanabea Catholic Mission .
- (51) 10 Dec Transported 2 vehicles from Wewak to Lae for Seventh Day Adventist Mission .
- (52) 17 Dec Transported tractor from Madang to Aiome for Administration .
- (53) 18 Dec Transported Wolverine vehicles from Lae to Safia for PWD .

c. Land Element

- (1) 29 Oct-21 Dec Rock blasting for Kundiawa Local Government Council consisting of road realignment of 800 feet on Mountain side bench .

- (2) 2 Nov-8 Dec Construction and upgrade of Taurama Road including subgrade and sealing and insertion of culverts for Port Moresby City Council .
- (3) 2 Nov-18 Dec Sirinumu Dam Project including renovations to the community centre, tank construction and construction of a wharf .
- (4) 2 Nov-29 Aug In the Western District at Kiunga log felling, blasting for road project, shelter for waiting patients at local hospital . At Ningum construction of framework for an additional schoolroom and numerous small bridges for new road .
- (5) 30 Aug-22 Sep In Milne Bay District Assistance to Health Dept in combating outbreak of malaria .
- (6) Jan 73 60' x 14' School house at Waginara plus foundations for two teachers houses .
- (7) 10 Aug-19 Apr Construction of school house on Wallis Island and a 60' landing stage on Tarawai Island .
- (8) 15 May-15 Jun In Aitape/Wewak area:
- Concrete foundation of 80' x 20' at Sissano Lagoon Vocational School .
 - 4 Local material bridges between Paup and Suain .
 - Number of wells in Aitape area .
 - Permanent materials teachers house at Yakamul .
 - Demolition of a reef at Ali Island .
 - Drainage work at PES Mission .
 - Construction of 300 metres of cattle fence for Yarapos girls school .
 - Assistance in land clearing Lutheran Mission .

(9) 26 Jul-23 Aug

Whilst on exercise Marine Dump in New Britain.

Demolition in quarry to provide 30 tons of road building material.

Bridge decking on Airagapua road bridge.

Construction of 2 wells using 30" concrete pipes in Kilingi area.

Repair of a large hole in Sag Sag Road.

(10) Oct 73

Demolition of large log jam in Dio River in West Sepik District.

CHAPTER IV

DEFENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS IN AN INDEPENDENT PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PART A - NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PNG DF - QUESTIONS OF RELEVANCE

Papua New Guinea's national security problems are discussed in this chapter in the context of the relevance of the Defence Force to internal and external threats. "Threat" is used here to denote a security contingency which might be faced by PNG in the future but for which no specific degree of probability is assigned unless otherwise stated.¹ Papua New Guinea's national security may be defined as the ability of PNG to pursue its perceived legitimate national interests and to establish and maintain its own political, social and economic values, free from either external or internal disruption.² This definition raises questions as to the extent to which a small country like PNG is actually capable of establishing and maintaining its own national security, and the relevance of defence forces to the achievement of national security.

¹ In statistical terms, the probability associated with PNG security problems which have already occurred is at least greater than zero. As for unique future events which might involve PNG (e.g., nuclear warfare between the major powers), they can be assigned no meaningful probability.

² This definition may be amplified by the following quotations:

"A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war". (Walter Lippman, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Little Brown, Boston, 1943, page 51); and

Probably no state is able to obtain absolute security under the present system of world order and it may be argued that even in the case of the major powers, national security is a relative rather than absolute condition – somewhat regardless of the defensive measures that may be taken.¹ In the case of PNG it is self-evident that the definition of legitimate national interests need to be more constrained than those of a major power if these interests are capable of being successfully pursued. Whilst a super power may have the military and diplomatic resources to secure national interests far from its own shores, PNG, as a small state, is unlikely to be able to do little more than preserve its territorial sovereignty and the sovereignty of its coastal waters.

2 (Continued)

"... security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".
(A. Wolfers, Dischord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1962, page 150).

¹ Under a nation state system and according to Hobbes' dictum it follows that absolute security for one state entails absolute insecurity for other states. Bertrand Russell argued that absolute security could only be achieved under a "single world government with a monopoly of all the major weapons of war". In the meantime all states would face some risk to their security. (Russell, Authority and the Individual, The Reith Lectures for 1948-49, Unwin Books, London, 1970, page 68). It is possible that states which take measures intended to increase their national security may effectively reduce it, either by offering provocation to a potential enemy, or as a result of misinterpretation of their motives. Buchan argues, for example, that the powerful Soviet forces deployed in post-war Europe and Soviet policies of cold war belligerency increased the chances of an American pre-emptive nuclear attack before Soviet forces were equipped with nuclear weapons. Similarly, American containment policies involving a forward deployment of forces and nuclear weapons during the 1950s and 1960s may have effectively reduced American national security by increasing the prospects of a Soviet first strike. (See Alastair Buchan, War in Modern Society, Watts, London, 1966, page 27). The defence measures of a small state like PNG are similarly susceptible to misinterpretation and misjudgement by other states.

It is also evident that not all threats to PNG's national security, according to the definition which has been adopted, need necessarily have the character of a threat to physical security. The "values" embodied in PNG's national security might also be jeopardised by the effects on PNG's political economic and social life of so-called neo-colonialist structures and influences.¹ Thus, PNG might conceivably suffer a loss of national security from the consequences of foreign economic or cultural dominance. Whilst these problems may appear more acute in the decolonized states of the Third World, they might also be experienced by developed nations, as for example by Canada. The point is that armed force is not usually well-suited as a means of dealing with such non-violent and insidious threats to national security and the relationship between defence forces and this aspect of national security is, therefore, tenuous, except insofar as a deterrent military capacity is a factor in bargaining processes between small and larger states.²

PNG has already decided, as shown in earlier chapters, to maintain a standing defence force at independence in the belief that this will contribute to its security as a nation. This decision places PNG with the overwhelming majority of New States which

¹ For an example of this view see Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, Penguin, 1971, Chapter 1.

² The actual use of force by PNG against a larger state (say, Australia) on which PNG was dependent, would probably be a self-wounding strategy in most cases because of the severe internal effects resulting from disruption of the inter-dependence - for example, the cutting off of economic aid and the removal of skilled manpower. Alternatively, the use of a low level of force against a specific target might be helpful in gaining international sympathy and support for "the under-dog" where there was an exploitable grievance.

possess their own armed forces.¹ PNG's Defence Force, like the armed forces of other states, may be seen to contribute to national security by the exercise of three functions within the PNG polity. The existence of a PNG Defence Force will symbolise Papua New Guinea's sovereignty as an independent nation-state. The notion of organised military force as a necessary pre-condition for political independence is as old as the concept of the nation state² and this traditional, whilst not undisputed, view has been accepted in practice by those Third World states which maintain defence forces, often in the absence of a rationally definable external defence threat.³ Secondly, PNG's Defence Force constitutes

¹ Only five independent African states are reported not to have regular armed forces: Gambia, Lesotho, Swasiland, Botswana and Equatorial Guinea (National Guard only). Gambia, a micro-state, has a defence arrangement with Senegal which surrounds it. Botswana, Lesotho and Swasiland each has a small population and is, in effect, a strategic hostage of its powerful neighbour, South Africa; these states rely on a para-military contingent within their police forces. (R. Booth, "The Armed Forces of African States 1970", Adelphi Paper, No 67, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1970 and Appendix 1, "A Survey of the Defence Forces of Small States".

² See, for example, Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics, London, 1872, page 52.

³ A belief in the symbolic role of the armed forces as the hallmark of sovereignty is exemplified by these statements by African leaders:

"We cannot be an independent nation without an army of some sort", (President Olympio of Togo).

"... in the eyes of the whole world and of our own people you are the visible sign of our political independence and our proclaimed will of defence against all aggression". (President Diori of Niger addressing the Army). (M.V.J. Bell, "Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa", Adelphi Paper, No 21, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1965, page 3).

a constabulary external defence capability.¹ PNG leaders have reasoned that, although small, their Defence Force is capable of deterring potential acts of aggression by removing the temptation of an undefended "easy prize". PNG has also implicitly accepted the view that, in a world characterized by armed nation-states and an international society in which conflict resolution and peace-keeping mechanisms are of uncertain reliability, a "trip wire" force was needed so that PNG might earn the right to assistance from allies or international intervention in the event of aggression. Thirdly, the Defence Force, together with the Police, forms the PNG state's "legitimate monopoly of physical violence" – the Government's internal coercive resources – and the Defence Force therefore has a contingent role in enforcing the authority of the

¹ Janowitz has defined the constabulary concept of military forces as follows:

"... the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, (is) committed to the minimum use of force and seeks viable international relations rather than victory".
(M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, Free Press, New York, 1960, page 418).

The constabulary concept, therefore, emphasises the deterrent effect of an external defence capability rather than the successful conduct of military operations in which victory is the goal. This preventive military role has become of increasing relevance in modern society because of the destructiveness of warfare, especially nuclear weapons, and changes in socio-political attitudes in many countries where warfare is now seen as a potential catastrophe. The constabulary notion is readily adaptable to the role of PNG's armed forces which do not have the capability to gain a military victory against larger neighbours, but rather, may deter, or seek a politico-military solution in the context of "viable international relations". See also, Andre Beaufre, (Strategy of Action, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, pages 111–112) for his concept of strategy in the indirect mode in which national defensive or offensive strategic objectives may be achieved primarily by non-military means, that is, by ways in which the military play no more than an auxiliary role. This concept of national security is also relevant to PNG's limited military resources.

Government, by the use of force if necessary, over internal dissident groups.¹

In view of the three functions, what type of defence forces does PNG actually require and how big should they be in order to carry out these functions? As a working hypothesis it might be argued that PNG's present and future defence organisation and equipments should bear a rationally based relationship to its security environment. That is, PNG's perception of internal and external defence threats should inform the size and composition of the PNG DF. Such a rationalist approach to the determination of defence force levels, however, involves some form of quantification of defence capability against threat and hence a calculation of what is "enough"; this approach contains several problems for a small state like PNG.

The first difficulty is that what constitutes enough in terms of defence force capability usually depends on how much an opponent has.² In an adversary or confrontation situation between major powers what constitutes "enough" may, to a considerable degree, be calculated, whilst, in this sense, what is "enough" for PNG is not readily calculable. The actual quantification of defence capability is also more difficult for a small country like

¹ According to Weber:

"... a state is that human community which, within a given territory - 'territory' is one of its characteristics - claims for itself (successfully) the legitimate monopoly of physical violence" (my emphasis).

("Politik als Beruf", Gesammelte Politische Schriften, 2. Aufl (Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1958, S.494. Quoted and translated in E.V. Walter, "Power and Violence", American Political Science Review, Volume LVIII, No 2, June 1964, page 359).

² Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" in R.J. Art, and K.N. Waltz, (eds.), The Use of Force, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971, page 105.

PNG. In the case of a nuclear power like the United States, the decision to adopt a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction of its principal adversary, or the capacity to fight one-and-a-half or two-and-a-half wars simultaneously, calls forth quantifiable requirements in terms of numbers of strategic weapons systems, missile warhead numbers, targetting capacities and so on in relation to the capability of the potential enemy. Calculation of the potential of these high technology weapon systems and of conventional ground forces is clearly a vital ingredient in the central strategic balance between the major powers, but for a small state like PNG, whose forces are composed of more primitive weapon systems, the quantification of defence capability is, by nature, less mathematically meaningful.¹ Unlike missile systems whose performance may be reliably predicted, the capability of small conventional forces including infantry battalions depends on indeterminate factors of morale, training and mobility which render comparisons hazardous.

Furthermore, the quantification of defence capability and a determination of what is "enough" in the military sense for a

¹ The quantification and balancing of forces applies not only to the major powers but also the member states of the alliance systems. Thus, the military strength of NATO may be quantified in relation to the Warsaw Pact countries. Although there may be debate about what the desirable level of forces should be, the relative effectiveness of weapon systems and what should be the contribution of each country, quantification, despite these problems, is meaningful in the context of the adversary situation. Even the small military forces of NATO allies such as Canada, Belgium and Luxemburg are relevant in the context of total NATO forces, apart from their function as an earnest of political commitment. (See: Strategic Survey 1973. The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1974, pages 56-61).

small country is only meaningful in relation to specific defence threats which are within the theoretical resources of the country to deal with. A small state, regardless of the strategy of national defence adopted, short of the use of nuclear weapons, may not even possess a theoretical military capacity to successfully defend itself, unaided, against larger neighbours or potential aggressors.¹ That is, the total war efforts of a small state may still be demonstrably inferior, militarily, to an enemy's limited war capacities – limited both in terms of the level of mobilization and weapons employed, but "total" in its consequences on the small state. It follows that where a small state is part of the region in which there are much more powerful states, the small state's external defence capabilities are necessarily tailored to meet contingencies which are limited war options of the potential enemy. The small state is, therefore, faced with the problem of anticipating the aggressor's limited war calculations which involve difficult and conjectural questions about the relationship of military to political objectives. To decide what would constitute a credible defence deterrent, the small country has, essentially, to decide what level of damage or risk the enemy would have to sustain before his political and military losses would be out of proportion to the

¹ Other factors being equal, from the military point of view and leaving aside diplomatic considerations, it would seem largely immaterial to the eventual military result as to what national defensive strategy a small state employed against a vastly more powerful attacker; that is, whether it attempted to defend at the frontier or within strategically "vital" areas. Guerrilla or partisan warfare, in the light of Vietnam, might be a successful strategy for the weak against the strong, although in order to be waged successfully, it appears to require certain socio-political and geo-political preconditions which may not apply to PNG – namely a highly cohesive revolutionary movement and contiguous sources of logistic support.

objectives under dispute.¹ These are matters of political rather than technical military judgement that are highly circumstantial in character and involve assessments of the trends in international politics and the prospects of intervention by allies at a certain level of aggression.

This problem of small state strategic vulnerability is shared by PNG. PNG's particular national security problem is that it cannot ensure its security by military means against the range of regional security contingencies which depend on an assessment of the capability rather than the intention of potential adversaries. PNG's strategic environment is asymmetric. Its neighbours are either many times more powerful than itself, or insignificantly small. PNG shares a long frontier with Indonesia whose armed forces are, on paper at least, nearly one hundred times larger than those of PNG and whose manpower resources in a primitive war-fighting environment would, comparatively speaking, be limitless.² And, in relation to Australia, PNG faces a regional power with an equally formidable defence potential – based not so much on formed units as on technological and economic strength,

¹ Kissinger, op. cit., (page 107) argues that:

"The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute".

This would be the problem confronting PNG leaders in the event of military aggression. It follows that PNG's strategy would need to not only escalate the aggressor's military risks but also those of a political nature – arising from the prospect of PNG gaining, or the aggressor losing, allies and international support.

² See: The Military Balance 1973-1974, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1974, page 51. Indonesia's population is shown as 132.4 million (c.f. PNG's 2.7 million) and her total armed forces as 322,000. The Army of 250,000 includes about 100 infantry battalions although many of these may not be of "combat status". Whilst there would, admittedly, be considerable logistic problems in Indonesia maintaining a large

as well as small but modern and efficient forces.¹ On the other hand, PNG's own military power dwarfs that of her other Pacific Ocean neighbours, including her principal island neighbour, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, which has no defence forces at all.

PNG's strategic situation is significantly different from other small states which are themselves part of a region of small states in which there is the possibility of approximate local strategic parity. For example, in East Africa and parts of West Africa it is feasible for a small nation to possess armed forces which constitute a military insurance against attack by other regional states, whereas this military option is clearly beyond PNG's resources. PNG also suffers from a second form of strategic vulnerability shared by small states that are not of great geopolitical importance and thus unlikely to involve important national interests of the major powers (as do, for example, small states like Singapore, Israel and Cyprus). It is conceivable that PNG might become subject to military aggression which, because it involved no important major power interests, provoked no effective intervention or support by the major powers for international

2 (Continued)

force on the Island of New Guinea, it might still prove possible to deploy a large force over a period of time, especially if operations were conducted at a technologically primitive level.

¹ It seems highly improbable that PNG and Australia would become involved in military conflict in the short term, nonetheless, in the longer term PNG may see Australia as a potential aggressor in relation to PNG's special interests, as for example, in the Torres Strait. Even though PNG may be militarily weak she may possess considerable disruptive potential, for example, by sponsoring, or tolerating, the presence of terrorist and/or guerrilla groups in PNG operating against Australian shipping, oil rigs, etc, in the waters adjacent to PNG.

action.¹ The lack of interest by major powers in the destiny of PNG might also affect the capability of PNG's own allies to intervene on its behalf.

These are rather theoretical statements of strategic vulnerability which depend, essentially, on a comparison of military strength and there are also other factors which contribute to an assessment of a nation's strategic "risk". The most obvious of these is the existence of actual sources and motives for conflict.² There is the further important question of the dependability of allies and the effectiveness of international and

¹ This contrasts with the situation in regard to states like Canada and Australia where, at least in the present international environment, it is difficult to readily imagine serious aggression without the involvement of the major powers – either through the operation of formal alliances or arising from the geo-political significance of the countries concerned.

² This involves the step from assessing the defence capability of other states to determining their intentions. The problem for PNG, like most states, is that whereas capabilities generally take time to develop, the intentions of her neighbours may change relatively suddenly – by a change of government, a radical realignment of world powers or an unexpected and serious international incident. For this reason, states have commonly considered it prudent to plan for contingencies involving states which have the capability to attack them even though there may be the absence of a credible intention. (For two instances of a more bizarre nature: Canada maintained a defence contingency plan in the period between the First and Second Wars for the defence of Canada against United States attack. (See C.S. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance, Clark Irwin, Toronto, 1972, page 21) and at the end of the First War, planning staffs of the US Chief of Naval Operations were engaged in planning for war against the UK – considered to be the USA's most probable future foe because of her strong Navy and commercial interests. (Werner R. Schilling, "The Control of Force" in The Uses of Force, op. cit., page 465)).

regional mechanisms for conflict resolution.¹ Just because PNG's strategic environment is asymmetric it does not, therefore, necessarily mean that PNG will face the prospect of greater insecurity. What it does entail is that the question of PNG defence adequacy – the decision on what is "enough" – cannot be resolved on rational technico-military grounds but is a matter of political and bureaucratic value-judgement. There is, therefore, an arbitrariness from the military point of view in deciding whether a defence force smaller or larger than at present would constitute a credible PNG external defence deterrent when the forces against which it is to be compared are, in any case, many times larger than

¹ PNG might consider the prospects of UN assistance in the event of aggression to be at best uncertain. Although UN intervention has generally occurred where the major powers have been involved and had important national interests (e.g., the Middle East, Congo, and Cyprus) other instances of aggression in which the major powers have not had an interest have taken place without effective UN intervention (e.g., conflict between Rwanda and Burundi). As regards regional mechanisms for dispute settlement, it has already been suggested that PNG might form part of a regional grouping with Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. This body might have a role in the resolution of regional disputes through a formal mechanism, or merely by the goodwill and understanding the association generated. It has also been suggested that PNG might seek affiliation with, or membership of, ASEAN. At present ASEAN does not have a defence orientation although questions of collective security have been raised between the member states, but if PNG was a member of ASEAN its security (and relations with Indonesia) would be very likely to be of interest to other member nations. (See U. Sundhaussen in James Griffin, (ed.), A Foreign Policy for an Independent Papua New Guinea, Angus and Robertson, in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1974, pages 105–106). Apart from these two possibilities for international conflict management, Australia and Indonesia may attempt, as the two dominant states in the region, to collusively "manage" PNG security problems between themselves in the interests of Australia and Indonesia, but not necessarily in PNG's interests. For this reason PNG may well feel that her security interests were likely to be better met in the future by the "internationalization" of her external security problems.

the largest practical force option for PNG. In practice, therefore, the size of PNG's defence forces may only be meaningfully reckoned in relation to specific and limited contingencies; that is, an appropriate political definition of the external threat that PNG's forces are designed to counter. One might conclude that, to a considerable extent, the actual force level PNG needs in order to retain an external defence credibility is more a matter of political resolve, diplomacy and propaganda than of military assessment. There is in this way an inbuilt circularity of argument about PNG defence adequacy in that the credibility of the PNG DF depends on the sustaining of the confidence of PNG public opinion and the belief of allies and potential aggressors in the adequacy of its forces.

Because the level of force necessary to achieve very limited external defence objectives, such as those that the PNG Government has propounded, is so problematic in terms of international politics and diplomatic consequences (would a one battalion force be significantly less effective than two battalions in functioning as a trip-wire force?), it would appear that the external defence role provides no real force structure imperatives beyond that of a minimum "critical mass" on land, sea and in the air, in order to be seen as a viable defence force. It follows that the size of PNG's Defence Force in the future is more likely to be determined in practice by a set of factors which include the size forces already in existence, the accustomed economic burden of defence on the national economy, the effects of bureaucratic politics on resources allocation within the PNG Government and, in particular, the requirements of collateral defence functions. It is likely that on-going rather than contingent defence functions – that is, the provision of internal security, the maintenance of sovereignty over territorial waters, civic action and disaster relief – will constitute more persuasive political and bureaucratic justifications for altering the size of the PNG DF. This is likely to be the case even though

the existence of the Defence Force may continue to be legitimated in terms of its national territorial defence function. In the process of establishing and developing the PNG DF for these collateral defence tasks, a credible external defence force will, almost incidentally, be achieved.

Although the special problem which PNG has in relating the size of her defence forces to external defence requirements (in contrast to major powers and small states in a region of small states) has been emphasised, because of the nexus between the defence status quo and future defence decisions, it is probably true that no country manages its defence policy in a wholly rational way and this will be true for PNG also.¹ The forces in existence in PNG will, however, constitute a datum level about which argument for expanding or reducing PNG's defence capability will have practical meaning and a real life political and bureaucratic setting. Even if PNG's defence force size are not capable of being determined on a rational military basis, this is not to say that the contingencies they are designed to meet and the defence preparations taken are not realistic. Emphasis by PNG on external defence threats that her forces can deal with, such as low intensity military operations on the border, is realistic in terms of PNG's military capabilities. Beyond these minor scenarios, PNG's defence posture might also be seen as realistic in terms of either, a publicly declared reliance on the assistance of allies in the case of

¹ For a discussion of the basis on which small states appear to determine the size of their armed forces see Appendix 1, "A Survey of the Defence Forces of Small States", especially the conclusion. The overall conclusion reached in this survey, which analysed the defence statistics of 26 African states, PNG and Fiji, was that the factors influencing the size of a country's forces were, in each case, sui generis. The size and cost of forces was not related to parameters such as population, land area, GNP or GNP per capita in a statistically significant manner, nor was a relationship to factors such as internal or external security problems or the incidence of military rule evident.

more serious eventualities, or a more ambiguous position of reliance on the international community, or even the moral suasion of a posture of "strategic nakedness" against serious aggression.¹ But, because these options depend on the assumption that the political costs of an aggressor's actions increase with the extent of the military effort and that there is a threshold of military force at which international and/or allied assistance would be forthcoming, it follows from this analysis that PNG's external defence preparations are only realistic in a broader sense if the aggressor's limited war intentions and political costs, as well as the response of allies, are correctly assessed.

PART B - PNG'S NATIONAL SECURITY HERITAGE

The level of PNG's military forces will, to some extent, also be influenced by the perceptions of the PNG leadership and public in relation to national defence and these perceptions are, in turn, likely to be influenced by PNG's defence heritage - in particular the extensive period of Australian colonial rule. This part of the chapter discusses the circumstances of PNG's past which are likely to affect the perception of, and policy towards, future internal and external security problems.

¹ It is not yet clear which path PNG will follow. Although the Somare Government has spoken of a neutral option for PNG and appears not to want a "watertight" security pact of the ANZUS type with Australia, it similarly does not appear to be seeking an option of strategic nakedness. Mr Somare and Mr Kiki have on several occasions referred to an expectation of Australian assistance in the face of aggression and PNG has expressed interest in a regional grouping with Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. (See Post Courier, 5 December 1972, 11 September 1973, Age 3 November 1973 and House of Assembly Debates 25 April 1974, reply to a question by Mr A.M. Kiki, Minister for Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade.

In relation to external security, strategic considerations were, from the days of Queensland's illegal annexation of Papua, an important component of Australian policy in Papua New Guinea and it is reasonable to expect that some of these Australian preoccupations with security and "threats" have rubbed off on Papua New Guineans. More recently in the post-Second War period Papua New Guineans have been exposed to Australian attitudes about the "red menace" and the threat of communist expansion throughout South East Asia. Papua New Guineans have also been aware of a traditional Australian view of New Guinea forming Australia's strategic bulwark within a forward defensive framework and, somewhat regardless of the currency of these ideas in Australian politics today after the Vietnam experience, Papua New Guineans may nonetheless see themselves as situated in an exposed and strategically vulnerable position.¹

There are also substantial historical reasons that might lead PNG to regard the prospect of external aggression as a realistic contingency, even in the absence of an obvious and current defence threat. Apart from the "peaceful invasion" of PNG society by the colonial powers, PNG has experienced the violence of the Japanese military invasion of 1942 and the protracted allied military campaigns of reconquest which took place within the lifetime of most of the country's present political leaders. The period of Confrontation, tension in Australian-Indonesian relations under Sukarno and the hand-over of West Irian to Indonesia are also relevant to PNG security attitudes. These events led to

¹ For evidence of this view see the results of the attitude surveys conducted by the writer on PNG Attitudes to Defence and Security Issues. (Appendices 2 and 3) which indicated that the Papua New Guineans tested generally accepted "realistic" rather than "idealistic" attitudes about national security and the possibility of attack by another state. Individual responses appear to have been influenced by the experience of the Japanese invasion and the prevalence of armed conflict between groups in traditional society within which inter-clan and tribal relations resembled a largely anarchic international system.

military expansion in PNG and fears amongst the population of Indonesian military intentions . Though relations with Indonesia are now harmonious, it is not unreasonable to expect, and there is evidence to show, that some suspicion persists amongst Papua New Guineans .¹ Suspicion of "strangers" is, moreover, a salient aspect of traditional PNG society and this may influence the behaviour of PNG leaders in the conduct of their foreign relations with other countries including Indonesia . In addition to these factors, PNG shares a frontier with Indonesia and PNG leaders would be aware that common frontiers have historically been one cause of conflict between nations .

A further important element in PNG's security heritage has been the existence of defence forces in PNG – on a permanent basis since 1951 and of the present approximate size since the mid-sixties – and these forces constitute an established notion of defence adequacy in times of peace . Another fundamental PNG external defence orientation derives from Australia's traditional role in providing for PNG's external defence . Because Australia has been intimately and historically associated with PNG's external defence and, has developed PNG's present forces and declared its willingness to continue to do so after independence, it might be a reasonable and entrenched expectation amongst Papua New Guineans that Australian defence assistance would be forthcoming if they were attacked . This expectation might be reinforced by a Papua New Guinean belief that PNG was of strategic importance to Australia because

¹ See Post Courier , 16 October 1973 and 20 December 1973 for statements by the Somare Government on the need for close relations with Indonesia . For an example of the underlying suspicion of Indonesia see the speech and edited remarks by Mr A.M. Kiki at a seminar on PNG foreign policy in 1972 in James Griffin, (ed.), A Foreign Policy for an Independent Papua New Guinea , Angus and Robertson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1974, pages 77-78 .

of its historical prominence in Australian defence thinking as an invasion springboard and because of its proximity, separated as at present by only several hundred metres of shallows from Australian off-shore islands in the Torres Strait.

The assumption by PNG that there was some form of tacit Australian strategic commitment to PNG, somewhat in the manner of the British defence commitment to her former Dominions, might be tragically misconceived. There are a number of areas of potential miscalculation. PNG may misjudge Australian perceptions of PNG's strategic importance, the extent to which Australia is prepared to accept the international and domestic political burdens of maintaining forward strategic interests and the extent to which realpolitik rather than morality suffuses Australia's policies towards PNG. It would, for instance, require fine political judgement for PNG leaders to estimate the extent to which Australia would be willing to support PNG's security interests (even if, on balance, fair and just from PNG's point of view) where Australian support for PNG potentially threatened Australia's long term relationships with, say, Indonesia, a much larger and more significant state in the region.¹

¹ Australia could well be confronted with the similar sort of foreign policy choice in regard to PNG and Indonesia as she was concerning Dutch West New Guinea and Indonesia. In the absence of great power support for the Dutch position in the latter case Australia had little alternative but to accept the outcome of Indonesian diplomacy and military policies. This situation might conceivably reoccur. One factor which may become of increasing defence significance in Australian/Indonesian strategic relations is the vulnerability of industrial development and population centres along Australia's northern coastline (and in particular, off-shore oil rigs on the North West Shelf) to disruption by guerrilla or raiding tactics. Threats against these targets might form part of an Indonesian strategy aimed at Australian acquiescence in Indonesian policies towards New Guinea. PNG should be alert to the limitations of Australian support and the possibilities of policy reversals on the part of Indonesia. (For one view of the dangers in terms of betrayed expectations about Indonesia at some time

PNG might also have to face the prospect that Australia was unable, rather than necessarily unwilling, to retain her traditional strategic interests in the PNG area. Australia's predominant influence might be weakened or become untenable as a result of major power developments. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union, China, and a Japan whose military strength was expanding to meet her economic strength, might each develop interests in PNG¹ and Australia might not be capable of resisting, or alternatively might see its national interests best served by accepting, the introduction of major powers into PNG. Whilst such a development would seem to nullify Australia's long standing strategic objective of keeping the major powers, excluding the United States, out of PNG, she may be incapable of preventing such a development and incapable of fulfilling any commitment to PNG in that regard. The United States might even see merit, in spite of Australian interests, in balancing major power interests in the region (for example, a countervailing Soviet or Japanese interest to that of China in South East Asia). Secondly, American withdrawal from Asia in the post-Vietnam era might be accelerated, leading to a United States acquiescence in other major power moves in the area.

1 (Continued)

in the future arising from Australia's wholehearted and uncritical support of the present regime in Indonesia see Rex Mortimer, (ed.), Showcase State, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1974, pages vii-viii).

¹ T.B. Millar has commented:

"It is not unlikely that both China and the Soviet Union have considered the prospects for gaining or gaining access to maritime facilities in the area", (South West Pacific) (T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence, Melbourne University Press, 1969, page 181).

A rearming Japan may in the future wish to exert a military influence in a area where she already has extensive commercial interests and from whence she now derives important raw materials (for example, copper and timber) and where she may in the future process these and other key raw materials using cheap power and labour (as for example in the planned Purari river hydro-electric power project). One potentially important PNG strategic facility is the Manus harbour, airfield and refuelling complex. PNG might well come under pressure from a major power for access to this facility especially if it is not already being utilized by Australia, or another power.

This review of Australia's strategic relationship to PNG suggests that PNG's own national security in the future may importantly depend on the ability of PNG leaders to realistically and accurately assess the contribution Australia is likely to be able to make to PNG's external security, so that PNG may adjust its national security policies accordingly.¹

Papua New Guinean perceptions of internal security problems are also likely to be influenced by the past. The colonial era in PNG saw the imposition of the rule of law, enforced under an extremely centralized bureaucratic system. Under this system a high standard of civil order, relatively free from security problems, was established by a colonial regime with a virtually unchallenged monopoly of violence. If this situation of civil peace has been somewhat disturbed in the last years of colonial rule by increasing crime, tribal fighting and urban rioting, the overall internal security situation in PNG remains one of a high standard of public order maintenance within a centralized political and bureaucratic system.²

¹ In this connection B.D. Beddie concluded in 1965 that since Australia was probably not able to meet her own security needs from major threats in the Pacific and would have a limited military capacity to deal with a guerrilla warfare problem in PNG, any bilateral defence agreement would be likely to endanger rather than enhance the security of both PNG and Australia. (B.D. Beddie, "A Problem in Foresight", New Guinea, Volume 1, No 2, June-July 1965, page 21). In 1974 R.J. O'Neill argued that it needed to be borne in mind that Australia's military capacity to intervene in PNG was distinctly limited in terms of the current size of her armed forces. (R.J. O'Neill, "Foreign Policy and Defence", paper delivered at the Australian Institute of International Affairs Conference: Advance Australia - Where? Foreign Policy in the 1970's, Adelaide, 15-17 June 1974).

² The recent deterioration in PNG civil order has been attributed to developing social tensions are result of modernization and decolonization and a situation in which the departing colonial power has displayed a reduced willingness to govern. (See for example, Bill Standish "Attitudes to Self-Government and Independence in the New Guinea Highlands, A Preliminary Report". APSA Conference

Because this has been the traditional standard of public order in PNG, deviations from it after independence may be seen, both internally and internationally, as a significant failure of the independent PNG state to provide for civil order. A PNG Government that could not control civil disorder might risk both a collapse of public confidence as well as a loss of international credibility and this might result in serious repercussions in regard to commerce, economic development and the flow of international aid.¹

A second important traditional Australian approach to the maintenance of civil order in PNG has been the total reliance on civil instruments to keep the peace. Whilst, as recounted in Chapter I, Australia (like Germany and Britain in earlier times) has relied on constabulary forces organised in para-military formations and using para-military equipment, Australia has never, in peace time, employed military units to maintain order. The contingent internal security role of the Defence Force has never been exercised and this situation is likely to continue until independence. Even if an independent PNG Government shared the former Australian view that it was undesirable to use military forces in this way, if it did become necessary to employ military units to maintain domestic order, an important and potentially destabilizing precedent would have been created which would emphasise the seriousness of PNG's internal order problem in a

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Paper, University of NSW, August 1973 and Bill Standish "Warfare, Leadership and Law in the Highlands", Paper delivered at the Seventh Waigani Seminar, April 1973, and N. Oram "Administration, Development and Public Order", in A. Clunies Ross and J. Langmore, (eds.), Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1973, pages 1-58).

¹ See Lucian Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency" in H. Eckstein (ed.), Internal War, Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1964, pages 165-166. Pye argues that where there is a tradition of a high standard of internal order, threats to internal law and order are intolerable, whereas in countries where there has not been a recent tradition of high levels of internal order maintenance, the loss for protracted periods, of administrative control over some regions may be tolerated, provided that the central government is not directly threatened.

more dramatic way than had the use of military forces for internal order maintenance been a routine occurrence under Australian colonial rule .

The conclusion which may be drawn from this discussion of the external and internal security colonial heritage in PNG is that the Australian connection has produced expectations amongst PNG leaders and citizens which may not necessarily be met in the years of independence . PNG may no longer continue to loom large in Australian minds in strategic terms and this may reduce the reliability of Australian strategic protection to PNG . PNG may have to face the problem of being made "offers that can't be refused" by other major powers with strategic interests in the area and about which Australia was able to do little . In internal security matters, the high standard of civil order in PNG and the reliance on civil Police during the colonial period may provide a problem in terms of the contrast to the post-independence pattern of civil order .

PART C - EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

External Defence

External threats to PNG security may be considered first, not least for the reason that this defence responsibility has been emphasised by the PNG Government . The need to provide defence forces against the contingency of external military threats has been presented as the principal rationale for the maintenance of armed forces in PNG . Identifying PNG's external security problems might be regarded by some as an unnecessarily pessimistic exercise . This may be so, nonetheless, the suddenness with which new conflicts erupt and the abruptness of changes and new trends in international relations give little grounds for complacency, as events in the Middle East have recently shown . Whilst the present international situation in relation to PNG and her region may suggest a benign environment this should not preclude analysis of some future possibilities .

There is, firstly, the question of major power conflict. Like all nations, PNG has to at least face the prospect, although it can do little about it, of nuclear war between the major powers – as unlikely as it may seem in the present era of limited detente. As others have pointed out, PNG's actions, like those of most of the world's nations, would be irrelevant to the outcome of conflict between the major powers and PNG would be largely defenceless against the physiological effects of a global nuclear war. Beyond the prospect of a Hobbesian world of "war of all against all" in the aftermath of global nuclear warfare in which there was a removal of international constraints on inter-state violence and hence the need for states like PNG to defend themselves against military attack, super-power conflict has little relevance to a discussion of PNG defence problems.¹

There is, however, the question of aggression against PNG by a major power. (Together with the nuclear powers, Japan and India might be included here. Leaving aside the questions concerning Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons and/or conventional forces expansion, Japan, by virtue of its growing economic interests in the Pacific, deserves to be considered as a major power in the context of PNG's future). As O'Neill has argued, attack by the major powers is unfeasible under the present pattern of international politics because of the enormous political costs of such action,² nevertheless, there is the less drastic prospect of diplomatic coercion on the part of a major power backed by the sanction of force – coercion which PNG may find difficult to resist. As suggested in relation to Australian interests in PNG, the major powers might see the regional stability best served by the establishment of, say, a Japanese, Soviet or Chinese sphere of interest in PNG. The major powers may see the survival of the politics of detente depending on acquiescence in such new major

¹ See R.J. O'Neill, "Australia's Future Defence Relations with Papua New Guinea", Australian Outlook, Volume 26, No 2, August 1972, page 194.

² ibid.

power interests, perhaps in the content of a general balancing of major power influence within South East Asia, the Indian and Pacific Oceans . It appears to be an open question whether PNG's security resources – a small military deterrent, active diplomacy within the Third World and at the United Nations and the prospects of Australian or Indonesian support – would, in all cases, guarantee PNG against major power penetration .

Turning from the major powers, there are two security problems of a less specific nature associated with trends in international politics . First, there are the security problems which PNG might face in relation to exercising sovereignty over natural resources within territorial seas and economic resources zones, if eventually recognised under international law . The legitimate extent of national sovereignty in these matters is subject to opposing views at a time when the world's demand for maritime resources and improvements in the technology of extraction have increased the importance of the question . Consequently, the establishment and/or the policing of PNG's claims to resources in the sea, on and under the sea bed may provide the basis for future international tension and conflict .¹

¹ Disputes between PNG and other states, particularly those with important overseas fishing fleets (for example, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), may emerge as a result of a PNG decision to extend its sovereignty on an archipelago basis . The operation of foreign fishing fleets within what might be "declared" PNG waters might provoke the same sort of Cod-war confrontation (as occurred between Iceland and Britain), as a result of maritime operations by PNG to control foreign "poaching" . Besides illegal fishing, unlawful foreign mineral survey and even extraction activity in areas claimed by PNG, such as in outlying reefs whose sovereignty was disputed, might lead to conflict . At a less dramatic level, a quite low level of illegal fishing by foreign vessels could easily strain PNG's present fisheries protection resources, so leading to a degradation of PNG's sovereignty .

Secondly, PNG might become a target or an unwilling base for political violence and terrorism by extremist groups. Such a possibility might be seen in the context of a continuation of a world-wide trend towards the employment of private violence in international society, as exemplified by groups like the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.¹

The external defence problems which have so far been discussed – the role of the major powers and the vague threats to national sovereignty posed by foreign exploitation of natural resources and terrorism – may be seen as subsidiary to the two central issues of PNG national security. These are PNG's future relations with Indonesia and Australia.

¹ Extremist political groups may seek to subvert the PNG Government, or influence its policies, by the employment of techniques of private violence such as aircraft high-jacking, political kidnapping and terrorism. One scenario might be the intervention of groups based in Australia or Indonesia attempting to assist PNG revolutionaries in their struggle against a "corrupt" or "repressive" regime. One might expect the sympathies of the extreme Left in Australia to lie with any national liberation movement should it arise in PNG, although there may not necessarily be a willingness to support such a movement by arms and men. (see Owen Harries, "Australia and an Independent PNG", South East Asia Spectrum, Volume 2, No 1, October 1973 and the statement by Mr Laurie Aarons, National Secretary of the Communist Party of Australia in his opening report to the Party's Twenty Third National Congress in 1972, reported in Tribune, 4-10 April, 1972, page2:

"I believe that New Guinea will see a national liberation struggle and that the struggle will pose questions for Australian capitalism; it will be just as important, just as revolutionary as questions posed in America about the Vietnam war. Our work on this question must be developed further, not left to a few people to do something about New Guinea")

Harries argues that the Communist party might see similar opportunities for the radicalising of Australian politics through opposition to Australian Government support for a "pragmatic", but perhaps repressive, regime in PNG as that which existed in America as a consequence of Vietnam. A second scenario might be an extremist Irianese group attempting to force a PNG Government to adopt sympathetic policies towards issues of independence for Irian Jaya, or even pan-Papuanism – a single New Guinea island state. Neither of these scenarios appear totally improbable.

It may be assumed that PNG will see the threat posed by Australia in primarily non-military terms. PNG leaders might, however, see a "neo-colonist threat" to their country's national security as an independent nation as a result of Australian commercial and economic dominance and influence over PNG society as a consequence of linkages of an economic, manpower and aid nature.¹ A PNG Government that decided to pursue a neutralist or even anti-Australian foreign policy could regard the remnants of Australia's defence interests – an active role in the PNG DF and continued use of defence facilities in PNG – as a threat to PNG's security and an obstacle to the success of PNG diplomacy, especially within the Third World. Abrogation of defence agreements, as occurred soon after independence in the case of the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement, might follow on pressure from radical groups in PNG politics.² PNG reaction to perceived Australian threats to national security might also be motivated out of a need to find scapegoat issues to divert attention from pressing domestic political problems and, as a result, crisis-provoking PNG policies in regard to PNG/Australian relations may become part of the rhetoric of post-independence politics, important as a means of establishing the myth of nationalist struggle – a familiar problem to New States which have

¹ For a discussion of this point see P. Hastings, PNG Problems and Prospects, pages 260-262.

² See C.S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, North-Western University Press, Evanston, 1964, Chapter III. The agreement was dropped in response to pressure from other African states though the consequences of the abrogation were largely symbolic: British defence aid subsequently continued and indeed, broadened in scope. This might provide a key to the pattern of post-independence PNG-Australian defence relations.

achieved independence with little or no armed struggle.¹

There is also the potentially difficult question of the Torres Strait border with Australia.² Apart from the practical difficulties and even injustices which PNG may see in the present border, the readjustment of the border may emerge as an ideal nationalist cause célèbre – a cause in which justice might well be seen by sections of the Australian public to rest with the PNG claims. If the PNG Government, or local groups of Papua New Guineans in the border area, decided to employ even a low level of violence to draw attention to their cause in the face of Australian intransigence on the issue, Australia might be confronted with a difficult problem. Interference with the Australian administration of the Torres Strait population and, for instance, Papua New Guinean occupation of off-shore islands at present belonging to Australia, or illegal fishing by PNG craft in Australian waters, might confront Australia with difficult diplomatic and military problems.³

¹ On this point see R. Emerson ("Nation-Building in Africa", in K.W. Deutsch and W.J. Foltz, (eds.), Nation-Building, Atherton Press, New York, 1963, pages 110–111) who argues that many African states were granted independence so easily they were in effect cheated of their "revolution" with serious implications for post-independence national unity.

² For a discussion of the historical origins of the Torres Strait border and previous readjustment proposals see: P. Van der Veur, Search for New Guinea's Boundaries, ANU Press, Canberra, 1966.

³ The Torres Strait border adjustment problem might well be "solved" after independence by negotiations between the two national Governments involved – PNG and Australia. On the other hand the interests of the Torres Strait Islanders and the State of Queensland may preclude a settlement completely satisfactory to all parties in PNG. (See joint statement by Mr Somare and Mr Whitlam in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1973, page 41 and ministerial statement by the Australian Prime Minister on 24 May 1973 in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, May 1973, page 340 in which Mr Whitlam conceded that final agreement on the Torres Strait border "may have to await PNG's independence") The seriousness of PNG claims to a southward adjustment of the

The second and possibly the most difficult general strategic problem that PNG may face is that of her relationship to Indonesia and here four types of situations which threatened relations between PNG and her large neighbour may be envisaged. The border between PNG and Indonesia raises several specific contingencies. It is conceivable that Indonesian integrationist policies in Irian Jaya may not be successful in dealing with Irianese dissent. Although the present extent of the Irianese dissident organisation, the number of men under arms, the number of supporters and the nature of its political base are difficult to gauge, dissent in Irian Jaya might in the

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border and the lack of concern for the interests of Australian citizens in the Strait were publicly demonstrated by Mr Olewale, one of the ministers in the Somare Government in 1972 in the following terms:

"My main concern about moving this border line to 10 degrees south is not the people ... I am not interested in the people ... I just want the border removed to 10 degrees south so that the marine wealth which traditionally belongs to Papua will always be our marine wealth. Rightly and traditionally it belongs to us, so that is my only interest". (A Foreign Policy for Papua New Guinea, op. cit., page 86).

At the same seminar the present PNG Defence Minister, Mr A.M. Kiki, referred with lighthearted equanimity to the prospect of conflict between PNG and Australia in the Torres Strait over matters such as oil exploration, fishing rights and pollution control. Mr Kiki speculated:

"Australians will come with ships and guns; we will go with bones and arrows and our canoes", (page 29).

In such a confrontation it may well be that the weapons of David would be more effective politically than those of Goliath. The proximity of PNG to Australia in the Torres Strait also provides potential problems for both countries in relation to migration, health and customs controls and as a possible infiltration route for insurgents. The bizarre consequences of the present border delineation have been referred to as follows:

"Torres Strait Islanders can and do, frequent the mainland, where they have access to the liquor denied to them in aboriginal reserve(s). Conversely Papuans can enter Queensland, masquerade as aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders, join the Australian Army, and, in at least two cases get to Vietnam ...". (H.L. Bell, "Independent PNG and Its Relation to PNG Defence", Unpublished paper 1972.

future grow in effectiveness.¹ Political forces in Irian Jaya might be able to establish links with PNG groups by espousing irridentist causes such as "one island, one people, one nation". In this connection, the political role of the Irianese refugee community within PNG and its relationship to the PNG political leadership would be an important determinant of PNG Government policy on this question.² The present level of cooperation between the PNG and Indonesian Governments in the control of the border area and the prevention of the movement of dissidents into PNG may be difficult to justify in PNG if Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya is seen

¹ For published details of the Irian Jaya resistance movement see P. Hastings, *op. cit.*, pages 218-220 and 267. See also: Post Courier, 28 May 1973, 21 August 1973, 3 and 7 September 1973, 21 March 1974, Age, 23 July, 14 November 1973, SMH, 14 March 1973, National Times, 8-13 October 1973, and 19-24 November 1973. Reports of the strength of an Irianese armed dissident organisation vary between zero and a more significant force of several hundred armed insurgents depending on the source of the information. The sporadic reports of clashes with Indonesian security forces give the lie to premature obituaries for the movement and its causes. The Irianese dissidents are likely to retain a lasting potential to gain support and finance from other international organisations committed to the use of violence in order to achieve national liberation.

In May 1973, Indonesian estimates of the strength of the Irianese dissident movement in the border region was thought to be about 270 men and some of these had used PNG territory as a base in the Waris area. Indonesians have also claimed in private that the dissidents are principally made up of a school-drop out criminal element rather than of genuine political dissidents. In December 1972 there were reports of up to 3000 Indonesian troops on counter-dissident operations in the area of the PNG/Indonesian border. (Personal Communication, Vaimo, May 1973).

² There are about 500 Irianese refugees living in PNG, including a number with tertiary education qualifications who occupy positions in the PNG Public Service. (National Times, 19-24 November 1973).

in the future as repressive and political dissidence increases.¹

¹ In April 1973 Mr Somare publicly announced his Government's policy of cooperating with Indonesia in preventing the use of PNG as a base for anti-Indonesian dissident activity as follows:

"Because of our common border with Indonesia we must maintain close and harmonious relations with Indonesia. We believe the present leaders of Indonesia are too busy coping with their internal economic and political problems to think of aggressive actions against us. We on our part will continue to take steps to ensure that our territory is not used by opponents of the Indonesian regime to commit provocative acts against Indonesia".
(Address to NZ Parliament, 13 April 1973).

The Somare Government's decision was subsequently praised by President Suharto of Indonesia (Age, 14 March 1973). Suharto was quoted as saying that the ban on Irianese rebels using PNG as a base for hostile activities against Indonesia had been a great help in preventing the spread of the Free Papua Movement.

Mr Somare's policy statement followed closely on the signing of a border demarkation agreement between Indonesia and PNG on 12 February 1973 in Djakarta. (See: Australian Foreign Affairs Report, February 1973, pages 107-110). This agreement provided for a permanent land boundary between PNG and Indonesia and settled the territorial sea and seabed boundary on the south coast. (The seabed boundary on the north coast was previously agreed to in 1971). The agreement was subsequently ratified by the PNG House of Assembly in June 1973 after some criticism from members who drew attention to the problems of Papua New Guineans with traditional land rights in Irian Jaya (Post Courier, 20 June 1973).

Following the agreement on the delineation of the border, a Border Arrangements Agreement between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia was signed on 13 November 1973. (See: Australian Foreign Affairs Record, November 1973, pages 796-800). The agreement established principles for the regulation and administration of border security. It was agreed that "Governments on either side of the border agree to continue to cooperate with one another in order to prevent the use of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the border areas for hostile activities against the other ..."
(Article 7).

There are also security implications for PNG arising from Indonesia's political future after the present Suharto regime. Here there are manifold possibilities none of which should be totally discounted in the longer term future, namely, a radical revolutionary struggle, a process of national fragmentation and rebellion on the pattern of the 1958 PRRI and Permesta regionalist risings,¹ or even the return to a militant regime with expansionist foreign policy objectives. Although Indonesia's long term political future may well be one marked more by stability and less dramatic change, any of the above contingencies might well embroil PNG in Indonesia's internal affairs as a result of its proximity and common frontier.²

There is, furthermore, the question of how a regime of any persuasion in Indonesia might react, perhaps unilaterally, to extreme political instability, secessionism and civil disorder in PNG. Faced with such a problem, Indonesia might fear the risks of "contagion" within Irian Jaya and, in the emergence of a broken backed state in PNG, it might see a base for subversion against Indonesia and a danger in terms of a "demonstration effect" on the Indonesian polity. Lastly there is the prospect that Indonesia may interpret the growth of a prosperous, stable and democratically governed PNG state as an insidious threat to the security and stability of Indonesia's own political system – especially a threat to the legitimacy of her continued rule in Irian Jaya if economic and

¹ See Bruce Grant, Indonesia, Melbourne University Press, 1964, pages 31–32

² On this point see U. Sundhaussen, "Australia's Future Defence Relations with PNG – A Second Look", Australia's Neighbours, February–March 1973, pages 6–7). Whilst Sundhaussen may be correct in asserting that a drastic change in the composition of the Indonesian leadership is "utterly out of the question for the present", this situation might change in the longer term and, possibly, more suddenly than might be predicted.

political development there was seen to seriously lag behind that of PNG.¹

This discussion of potential sources of conflict between PNG and Indonesia suggests three levels of possible military action: low intensity border friction and conflict with insurgents, confrontation with guerrilla and small unit forces and thirdly, conventional military attack. Border friction might arise as a result of PNG deciding to prevent the use of PNG territory as a sanctuary for Irianese actions against the Indonesian Government. Dissidents might try to foment discontent in the PNG border region or terrorize PNG border populations in protest against a lack of official PNG sympathy for this cause. Alternatively, conflict might arise between PNG and Indonesian security forces as a result of Indonesian pursuit of Irianese dissidents into PNG territory in a situation where PNG sympathies lay with the dissidents. This type of confrontation might also result in attacks on villages and border administrative posts and deeper raids into PNG territory.

¹ See Hastings, *op. cit.*, page 266 (footnote 32). Indonesia might see greater merit in non-violent strategies in order to gain political influence over PNG if she desired it. Indonesian influence might be established by the development of extremely close relations between the two countries and PNG "understanding" of Indonesian national interests. Indonesia's present military-led Government might see merit in establishing close relations with particular sectors of PNG society – such as the Defence Force and Police – in order to influence the course of PNG political change – for example encouraging the development of a military role in PNG politics. (Indonesia's diplomatic representative in PNG is an Army Brigadier-General. (*Post Courier*, 4 September 1973) and on a visit to PNG in October 1973 President Suharto's personal assistant for political affairs, Major-General Ali Murtopo, called for close military cooperation between PNG and Indonesia, (*Post Courier*, 15 October 1973). Whilst the present Indonesian regime might feel happiest with a like-minded government committed to political stability and economic growth, PNG leaders are no doubt aware of the dangers of improper intervention. Furthermore, Indonesia has so far shown no indication of meddling improperly in PNG internal affairs.

The overall conclusion that is to be drawn from this discussion of external defence is that PNG faces a diversity of contingencies, most of which appear, today, to be in the category of possible but unlikely. In the longer term future there are greater uncertainties which are related to the nature of political change in Indonesia, Japan's future foreign and defence policies and major power relations in the Pacific area. Beyond the capacity, based on the present defence organisation, to deal with a very limited range of violence, PNG will need to rely substantially on its diplomacy to avert conflict and if that strategy fails it will need to look for allies and international support.

Internal Security

Useful speculation about PNG's future internal security problems involves an analysis of aspects of PNG's social, economic and political systems as a result of the inter-relationship of these factors and civil violence. Although PNG may apply the rationale of external defence in maintaining the PNG DF, there are grounds for believing that the most important responsibility of the Defence Force will be the maintenance of internal security.¹ Indeed, PNG political observers, public servants and indigenous members of

¹ The distinction between internal and external security problems is usually made, however, "internal" problems in PNG are unlikely to occur without entailing an international dimension as well. Opposing sides to internal conflicts – the Government, secessionists, dissidents of one form or another – may be expected to vie for international support of a diplomatic, financial or logistic nature. Other nations will, therefore, probably be obliged to adopt policies of some sort towards serious internal problems in PNG although these problems might be primarily domestic in origin.

the PNG DF officer corps have commonly assumed that threats to PNG's national security are more likely to be internal rather than external.¹

PNG's transition to independence has already involved considerable public speculation concerning the likelihood of political instability and civil disorder after independence and this speculation has been fuelled by reports of increased urban crime and tribal fighting, widespread discussion of secessionist claims and gloomy predictions of disorder by expatriate and indigenous residents in PNG. Credence has been lent to the predictions of post-independence

¹ In perhaps the strongest expression of this view, Ulf Sundhaussen, has argued that Australian Government leaders and defence planners should: "recognise that the foremost task of the PNG DF will be maintaining internal security rather than warding off invaders". ("Australia's Future Defence Relations with Papua New Guinea: A Second Look"). In a paper produced by syndicates of the ACT branch of the United Services Institution in June 1972, entitled "The Options for Australian Defence Policy in the 1970s Report from the Syndicates", it was concluded that the main problem for the Papua New Guinea (and the South-West Pacific area) would be internal security. "... Papua New Guinea represents the worst case for Australia because it is the first and most likely place where internal security problems could arise ..."

In 1970, Peter Hastings referred to internal security as "the greatest of New Guinea's post-independence problems ..."
(The Future, New Guinea, April 1970, Volume 5, No 1, page 20).

In a survey of 32 serving indigenous officers of the PNG DF conducted in late 1972 by a Papua New Guinean Defence Force officer, 27 of the 32 considered that internal disorder would be a "likely threat to Papua New Guinea". Two, only, considered an external threat to be more likely; three were unsure. (Personal Communication, May 1973). (For further evidence on this point see the two surveys of PNG attitudes to Defence and Security - Appendices 2 and 3).

troubles by what appear to be at least plausible comparisons with those black African states which, at similar stages of development, experienced political chaos and/or civil disorder. Apart from the pessimists, there have also been more optimistic observers who have pointed to PNG's own emerging political style and the relative political stability experienced so far in the progress towards independence. PNG's future may, therefore, be seen in terms of a debate between optimists and pessimists.¹ For the pessimists,

¹ On the generally pessimistic side see: P. Hastings, New Guinea Problems and Prospects, op. cit., Chapter 7, "The Future", especially pages 251-252. Hasting's comments:

"... (PNG) nevertheless appears to tremble uneasily on the brink of an Australian-style Congo.

To say this is to spell the end of a generation of white illusions rather than to predict collapse ..."

In "Administration Development and Public Order" Nigel Oram (Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea) concludes that:

"The future of Papua New Guinea after independence is uncertain. The possibility must be faced that Papua New Guinea may become in Tinker's terms, a "broken backed state". (page 57).

Robert Waddell has been sceptical of the fate of parliamentary democracy in PNG because of post-independence crises of legitimacy and integration. ("Constitutions and the Political Culture" in Alternatives Strategies ..., page 97). One expatriate settler in 1972 saw violence and chaos as the inevitable consequence of premature independence (John Watts, "Collision Course", New Guinea, Volume 6, No 1, January 1972, page 52). In September 1973 the President of the ACTU, Mr R. Hawke, was quoted on having stated on Australian television that he was very pessimistic in regard to the future in PNG:

"I think it more likely than not that difficulties and even bloodshed are going to emerge ..." (Post Courier, 14 September 1974).

A PNG politician in September 1973 predicted a "Congo-like" situation for PNG (Canberra Times, 6 September 1973) and witnesses before the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee freely speculated on the likelihood of Australian military involvement because of unmanageable internal problems in PNG (Post Courier, 17 September 1973).

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the problems of political order, secessionism and regionalism, controlling social change and maintaining civil order have appeared dauntingly unsurmountable. Whereas, for the optimists, the apparently, unique quality of PNG society, PNG's comparative economic affluence, the politics of Melanesian Consensus, and in some quarters, the prospect of the eventual establishment of a one party state, have provided grounds for believing in a non-violent and politically stable future.

Papua New Guinea's internal security appears to depend on the stability of the country's political system. Effective, stable government in PNG involves two aspects. The Government of the day needs to be able to claim the support of significant sections of the country's citizens and secondly, the Government needs to be able to command the legitimate monopoly of violence. Stable government in PNG therefore requires the establishment of political authority, that is, the acceptance by Papua New Guineans of the legitimacy of their Government's role in governing over the whole country.¹ And, apart from the cooperation of the citizens, the

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Foremost among those who have taken an optimistic position on PNG's future internal security has been the Chief Minister, Mr Somare, who has condemned those ... "predicting unimaginable catastrophes for our country"... and ... "three-day experts on our country laying down the law on the strife that is about to engulf the nation". (Post Courier, 26 September 1973). See also two optimistic, soothing articles by Rohan Rivett in the Canberra Times, 28 and 30 March 1973.

¹ See T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princetown University Press, 1971, pages 183-188. Gurr describes the Legitimization process, by which authority is created as, the long-term individual learning and socialization process resulting in a congruence and similarity in the structure and processes of decision making between those valued by the individual and those of political institutions in the state. Gurr argues that in this process citizens grow to accept the regime as the ultimate source of authority and thereby internationalise prohibitions against aggression towards the state. Other terms which have been used to describe government legitimacy include: consensus, primary consensus, authoritiveness, /Continued

PNG state must also be able, if necessary, to enforce its authority over criminals and dissident political groups who break the law, by legal sanctions, including the use of force .

The legitimacy of the PNG Government after independence may be subject to challenge as a result of separatist and secessionist pressures and also as a result of political dispute over the shape of PNG's political institutions . Although the constitution has yet to be decided the present form of government, which is based on liberal democratic traditions of parliamentary-cabinet government, relies on widely accepted conventions of political behaviour . Experience of parliamentary rule in other countries, however, points to the need for a mature, national political party structure in order to sustain this type of government and, in PNG, political parties are organisationally weak and in the main regionally, rather than nationally, based.¹ The future relevance and serviceability of recently introduced political conventions remains uncertain and the prospect has to be faced that PNG may not in fact constitute the sort of integrated community that is linked by affirmative attitudes to rules, leaders and conduct and the necessary degree of consensus which a parliamentary system needs in order to survive.² If this

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political myth and political community . (See also A . Mazrui, "Privilege and Protest as Integrative Factors" in R.I. Rotburg and Ali Mazrui , (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa , Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, page 1078).

¹ See David Stephen, "A History of Political Parties in New Guinea", Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1972, page 175 .

² In relation to New States, generally, Shils has commented:

"The constituent societies on which the new states rest ... certainly do not form a single civil society ... They lack the affirmative attitude towards rules, persons, and actions that is necessary for consensus ... The sense of identity is rudimentary, even where it exists . The sense of membership in a nation-wide society, and the disposition to accept the legitimacy of the government, its personnel, and its laws are not great" .

(Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States" in Old Societies and New States, The Free Press, New York, 1963, page 9).

is so, PNG's political system may be subject to radical systemic change after independence and this political change might involve widespread political violence .

The weakness of the central government in New States like PNG has been attributed to several factors . The narrow base of articulated and mobilised public support for the government and the dichotomy between politics at the centre, which are largely "westernised" , compared to village and regional politics which are largely "traditional" in nature, are both cited as factors contributing to fragile central political power .¹ Because the distributive capacity of the political system in a country such as PNG is low due to the shortage of economic resources and the problems of a new and inexperienced bureaucracy, the central government is limited in its ability to widen its base of political allegiance . This results in an accumulation of political demands and a tendency for the most pressing demands, often those backed by violence, to be met first . The limited resources available to the regime may also result in an intensification of the political struggle by fair means and foul in order to gain political power - because many of the political and economic spoils are to be had by those actually holding office . These tendencies may all lead to a situation in PNG where violence, or the threat of it, becomes a useful and necessary aspect of the political process because it is the most effective means of achieving political goals .

Apart from the ineffectiveness of order maintenance forces such as the police and intelligence organisations, which may be poorly trained, inefficient and not supported by the population, there is the special problem of the lack of countervailing institutions

¹ See A.R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", American Political Science Review, Volume LXII, No 1, March 1968, page 70 .

to balance the potential political power of the police, intelligence organisations and defence forces. Most New States are marked by associational groups such as political parties, trade unions and employer organisations which, in comparison to the coercive instruments of state power, are poorly organised and politically weak.¹ These types of political problems are also likely to confront an independent PNG which, like other New States, face two specific types of political crises. On the one hand, PNG may experience a lack of stable, legitimate central government. On the other hand it may suffer from the rise of coercive forces, the military and police, to political power as the result of a lack of political authority.

Whilst the cooperative and consensual aspects of the nation-state concept are frequently emphasised in relation to the modern, western democratic states which have strong liberal parliamentary traditions, a benign role for the state may not necessarily be the norm in New States where there is a lack of consensus about fundamental questions such as the composition and boundaries of the state and the means of resolving political disputes.²

¹ Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers as a new Political Class", page 12. Mazrui argues that it is not simply a problem of organisation that makes trade unions comparatively weak in developing countries but the fact that they lack the strategically powerful sanctions of key groups of workers in advanced technological societies – for example power station and transport workers.

² See: Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, University of London Press, 1968, pages 19–21 and Bertrand Russell, Power, A New Social Analysis, Allen and Unwin, London 1939, page 236; even Russell, however, conceded that without homogeneity and consensus, government by discussion would be unworkable:

"When a community is in fundamental agreement as to its form of government, free discussion is possible, but where such agreement does not exist, propaganda is felt to be a prelude to the use of force, and those who possess force will naturally aim at a monopoly of propaganda".

Instead, Lenin's dictum that "every state is founded on force" may be a more realistic and useful way of looking at the role of the state in newly independent countries where political integration and nation-building processes are incomplete.¹ The relationship

¹ Lenin's dictum is quoted in E.V. Walter, "Power and Violence", op. cit., page 359. Although the central role of force in the internal affairs of the state has been emphasised by writers such as Hobbes, Weber and political anthropologists, more recent scholarship has emphasised the consensual aspect of the state and some observers hold that political scientists have at times even been reluctant to treat force and violence as an integral part of politics: this view being expressed by the dictum where war starts, politics end (see A.C. Janos "Authority and Violence" in H. Ekstein, (ed.), Internal War, Free Press, New York, 1964, pages 130-131).

Hobbes argued that the control of coercion by the Sovereign was the very foundation of the state. The Sovereign, by the use of his power and strength, would be able to frame the will of his subjects to unity and concord among themselves under a reign of terror. The use of force would therefore not only maintain order but also terminate discord. (See Hobbes, Leviathan, pages 306-307).

Whilst Weber did not argue that physical violence was the essence of the state, he believed that it was the significant criterion. The state is distinguished from other forms of political association, not in terms of the social ends it pursues, which do not distinguish it from other forms of political associations, but in terms of its control of the coercive forces within the state. Where there is no such monopoly of force, either potential or actualised, there is no state. There is, by implication either a situation of political anarchy or civil war. (E.V. Walter, ibid.).

In relation to traditional polities, Radcliffe-Brown argued similarly that:

"The political organisation of a society is that aspect of the total organisation which is concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force", (Fortes and Evans Pritchard, (eds.), African Political Systems, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, Preface by A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, page xxiii).

The nexus between the instruments of violence and the state may also be seen in historical terms: the historical evolution of states depended to a considerable degree on the centralization of state power. To some extent the development of political consensus therefore took place within a coercive state structure. In relation to the New States the incomplete nation-building process which occurred under colonial rule was accomplished under strong civil

to political authority in the state therefore appears to be crucial to the understanding of challenges to political order in PNG. Huntington has observed that in many modernizing countries the primary problem of government is not liberty but the control of the governed and the creation of a legitimate public order.¹

Political and civil order appears to be interrelated in New States in that if there are no stable patterns of politics and political institutions which are seen as legitimate and confer political authority, the prospects of civil disorder appears to be increased.² In these

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bureaucratic and military structures, distinguished by their centralized organisation, strength and authoritarian emphasis on the role of a governor and an elite corps of administrators. The dismantling of this structure of state power, both in terms of the withdrawal of its coercive potential and the ending of the colonial power's writ to govern, which was involved in the decolonization process, has often subsequently led to a crisis of political authority in the post-independence era and problems of internal order.

¹ S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 1969, page 7. Huntington observes also that:

"Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited ..." (page 8).

See also: D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago Press, 1965, page 2. Apter observes that western political studies have been pre-occupied with the strengthening of democratic practices in New States; this has obscured the need for pre- rather than anti-democratic forms of government because certain institutions of coercion may be viewed as necessary to the organisation and integration of a modernizing community.

² Political stability (or order) and civil order may be seen as idealised goals rather than as reality. Nonetheless, the terms may be employed to gauge the degree of instability or disorder experienced by a state. Political order has been referred to as the process of institution-building and the creation of stable patterns of politics; civil order as a situation in which individual and group security is not threatened and disputes settled without violence. (See H. Bienen, "Public Order and the Military in Africa ...", op. cit., page 35).

situations political change is likely to be systemically radical and accompanied by violence.¹ Because such a political system is not reinforced by a general acceptance of its value and efficiency in satisfying political demands, those opposed to the government, or not represented by it, may be prepared to use violence to achieve political objectives and it may be argued, therefore, that where there is a lack of political order there is increased likelihood of civil disorder.² In the New States politically motivated violence has been widely recognised by participants in the political system as an effective technique for making political demands and effecting change and PNG might also be vulnerable to violence in this way.³

Violence might result from political instability in PNG in two ways. It might arise from the use of violence for political objectives within an environment of political disorder, or it could arise in the form of general lawlessness and chaos as a consequence

¹ Apter, op. cit., pages 392 and 461.

² This point is made by Bienen (i bid.), on empirical grounds from the experience of black African states. The linkage between a lack of political legitimacy and violence is argued by S.P. Huntington, (Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit. and T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit.)

³ See: A.R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", op. cit., page 70:

"In recent years, almost every new African states has experienced more or less successful military or civilian coups, insurrections, mutinies, severe riots and significant political assassinations. Some of them appear to be permanently on the brink of disintegration into several new political units".

At the same time, violence is not a phenomenon limited only to the New States. Between 1961 and 1968, some form of violent civil conflict occurred in 114 of the world's 121 nations and colonies ... Since 1945, violent attempts to overthrow governments have been more common than national elections. (T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, op. cit., page 3).

of the ineffectiveness of government and of its coercive instruments . Civil disorder might, therefore, ensue from violence which is politically motivated and also from violence which is not manifestly motivated by political causes . These two broad categories of potential violence in PNG may be classified as political and social violence .¹

The boundaries between political and social violence in PNG are not always likely to be clear . The motivation for violence in PNG may have deep psychological well-springs and not be articulated . Furthermore, the consequences of violence may be political whereas its motivation may not be . Whilst normal levels of urban or rural crime may not be politically motivated, violence directed at europeans, other ethnic minorities or black elites, arising out of a sense of relative deprivation² might have a political basis and political consequences such as the removal of social inequalities . There is also the matter of sporadic, spontaneous anomic violence . This form of violence may be formally leaderless but political in

¹ Political violence may be defined as the use of force in order to affect the civil and domestic political process . It might be used by individuals or groups to achieve a political objective - such as the overthrow of a government or an offensive policy . Or it might be employed by the state's coercive instruments against individuals or groups engaged in a political activity . (See Hedley Bull, "Civil Violence and International Order", Adelphi Paper, No 83, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1971, page 27 . Bull employs the term civil rather than political violence) . Political violence may embrace a continuum of violence extending from sporadic acts by groups or individuals in order to express political grievances or register political protest, through to rebellion, insurgency and revolution . Political violence excludes crimes without political motivation, although the boundary may be indistinct as in the case of traditional tribal fighting which may take on political implications . At the other end of the continuum, it excludes wars between nations and probably, developed situations of civil warfare .

² See T.R. Gurr, op. cit., pages 24-25, for a development of the concept of relative deprivation . "Relative deprivation is defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value

in its effects on government and identifiable with political causes.¹ The future pattern of violence in PNG is also likely to reflect tradition in the way that violence in all societies tends to take traditional forms. It may be argued that in societies which have a high level of traditional violence, violence is more easily adopted as normative political behaviour than in societies where the incidence of violence is low. Where certain forms of violence such as pay-back killings are normative behaviour, violence may be seen as the only acceptable and appropriate way of resolving disputes.² The forms of political violence which might occur in PNG are discussed in the context of these remarks.

2 (Continued)

expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping."

¹ See M. Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity, University of Chicago Press, 1968, page 190. Weiner defines anomic violence as: A condition of lawlessness in which participants have no explicit ideological rationale for the violation of the law. An anomic outburst is unplanned and analogous to the temper tantrum of a child. In a mob it is an expression of discontent either undefined or unclearly defined; an expression of inarticulate or poorly articulated demands on public policy. As an example of such violence one may take the Port Moresby football riots of July 1973 which seem to have been anomic in character, but, nonetheless related to political action by Miss Josaphine Abaijah in advocating Papua separatism and the discontent of Highland immigrants in the Port Moresby area. (See Bill Standish, The Moresby riots, "No ordinary sporting dustup but a serious Ethnic Dispute", National Times, 30 July 1973.

² See T.R. Gurr, op. cit., page 175. Gurr cites American Lynching, Parisien taking-to-the-streets and Ugandan kondoism (robbery with violence) as particularly traditional forms of violence. In the PNG context, pay-back killing and tribal fighting over land disputes may be cited.

Political violence already occurs in PNG particularly in the Highlands area, in the form of tribal fighting,¹ between clans and kin groups which may be seen as political communities.² Warfare therefore represents the breakdown of non-violent political relations and the continuation of a political dispute by violent means. The political nature of tribal conflicts, which may be over matters ranging from marriage disputes to compensation for vehicle accident injuries, is perhaps most sharply drawn in relation to disputes over land ownership. The last years of the decolonization process have seen an apparent increase in tribal fighting and this trend may continue after independence as part of a process of reduced regime authority coupled with increased economic justifications for conflict over land.³

¹ See Bill Standish, "Attitudes to Self Government and Independence in the New Guinea Highlands: A Preliminary Report", APSA Conference Paper, August 1973, University of NSW.

² See Report of the Committee Investigating Tribal Fighting in the Highlands, Port Moresby, 1973. Most tribal fighting in PNG and particularly in the Highlands is between clans and groups of clans. The term tribe may be applied in the PNG context to the aggregate of a number of clans having a common name, language and customs, and clan to the group of lineages recognising that the rights of members should be respected and wrongs compensated. Clans are, in this sense, political units. (See L. Mair, New Nations, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967, page 98).

³ The PNG Government Committee appointed to investigate tribal fighting in the Highlands in December 1972 reported that during 1972, an estimated 25,000 Highlanders were involved in 28 reported incidents of violence. 18 people were killed and 282 wounded. In its report the Committee emphasised that there was a need to link methods, justice and punishment with Papua New Guinean concepts as a means of reducing the incidence of violence. (Post Courier, 22 June 1973).

The advent of the colonial regime and its imposition of "law and order" resulted in a general freezing of land boundaries as at the time of contact. Although there has been more or less sporadic tribal violence since then to adjust these boundaries they have generally prevailed. Today, however, the relative power of contesting groups may have substantially altered in terms of population, leadership, economic and political resources. Moreover, the changed pattern of land usage since the introduction of economic cash crops may have dramatically increased the relative importance of land in dispute. Land formerly considered to be low in value, such as land used for ceremonial and warfare purposes, and land ceded to the civil administration and to expatriates, may now have an enhanced economic worth and thereby provide an issue for conflict and violence. Rapid political change in the period of independence involving uncertainties of a new regime and increased population and economic pressures on land may lead to an increased propensity in the future to revert to traditional means of resolving land conflict – that is by the use of violence.¹ The further danger as a result of increasing tribal fighting is that it will spill over into relations with the central government, leading to violent confrontation as a result of attempts to suppress it. Conflict between the central government and rural populations may also

¹ See Bill Standish, "Attitudes to Self-Government and Independence in the New Guinea Highlands", op. cit., and Bill Standish, "Warfare, Leadership and Law in the Highlands", Seventh Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, April 1973. Standish argued that land in the Highlands was formerly held by the constant exercise of armed force. The process of decolonization in the Highlands had, by 1973, reduced the aura of authority which surrounded the colonial administrative officer – the kiap – and his replacement, the black kiap was mistrusted. In an atmosphere of a lack of a "will to govern", Standish argued that Highlanders saw the use of violence as the only means of achieving justice and satisfaction for their demands. Tribal warfare also provided the means by which traditional leaders were able to reassert their influence over putative young leaders.

result from the politicization of traditional land ownership and tenure issues by political groups seeking to gain a political power base.¹

Political violence might also result from the activities of secessionist or regionalist political groups. Conflict with the central government over failures to meet demands for either a devolution of political power or outright secession, or alternatively, the employment of violent means by such groups in order to achieve these objectives may lead to violence. Political violence from this source has been a common phenomenon in New States which face problems of national unity and political integration and if regionalists see their cause in terms of absolute value criteria, such as race or religion, rather than in terms of pragmatic issues and interests, the scope for resolving these tensions without violence would seem to be reduced. In PNG, however, regionalist pressures (in Papua, Bougainville and the Highlands) seem to be based partly on problems of integration – of suspicion and mistrust between communities – and partly on pragmatic issues of economic development and claims for a share in political power.

Violence as a result of secession (either to achieve it or prevent it) posits the failure of political bargaining and compromise between the centre and the regionalists. If the commitments both

¹ See Age, 20 June 1973, (Editorial: "A Foretaste of PNG's Problems") and Canberra Times, 20 June 1973, (Report of Tribal Fighting in PNG). The involvement of Police riot squads attempting to suppress fighting might result in directing the hostility of Highlanders towards the PNG Government because of their interference in local affairs. The Age editorial commented on reports of weapons stockpiling in parts of the Highlands in the expectations of regaining lost tribal lands by force once the colonial period ends. Such a confrontation, if it occurred, would probably require the adoption of vigorous control measures by the central government.

to secession and "national unity" are pragmatically based, as they in part appear to be at present, then the prospects of violence may be reduced. It is not clear at present whether ostensibly secessionist groups in PNG really want complete political independence, or rather, more economic development and a greater devolution of political powers. Nor is it clear that PNG nationalist leaders at the central government level are necessarily prepared to guarantee the political cohesion of the nation by the use of force in the last resort. These relative probabilities may significantly alter if independence brings forth an intensification of nationalism, or if secessionist issues become engulfed in an atmosphere of emotion and appeals to the absolute values of race or language.¹

Political violence might also arise in PNG in the more distant future as a result of the development of radical political movements based either in rural or urban areas, or perhaps a combination of both. Such violence might take the form of terrorism or armed insurgency by urban, or rural-based guerrillas, or as a consequence of violent repression by the regime.² This form of extremism

¹ For further discussion of secessionist and regionalist forces in PNG politics see: P. Hastings, PNG Problems and Prospects, op. cit., especially pages 159-168; James Griffin, "Movements for Separation and Secession" op. cit.; James Griffin (ed.), A Foreign Policy for an Independent PNG, op. cit., Chapter 4, James Griffin, "Papuan Separatism" in Australia's Neighbours, September-October 1973, pages 5-8. J.R. Waddell, "Political Development: A plea for lateral thought", in R.J. May (ed.), "Priorities in Melanesian Development", Sixth Waigani Seminar, University of PNG, 1973, pages 27-31.

² Even in the absence of political repression, extremist political groups may elect to adopt violent methods as a means of generating the conditions for successful revolutionary change - after post-Marxist revolutionary theorists who have seen violence as functional in this way. For example, they might be influenced by Satre's belief that man can politically purify and ennoble himself through violence; and Debray's notion that small bands of guerrillas by their acts of terrorism would constitute foci of social revolution. (See Hedley Bull, "Civil Violence and International Order", op. cit., page 28; and Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin, 1969. Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, page 18).

probably requires the evolution of serious political grievances and inequalities in PNG society of a dimension which is not yet evident and, furthermore, it probably calls for sophisticated levels of political organisation, leadership and ideology as a pre-condition for the introduction of revolutionary rather than anomic violence in PNG.¹ Key groups in PNG society which might, in the future, form the basis of a radical critique of PNG politics and who were committed to violent means could possibly include students, the unemployed urban migrants and, in the rural areas, partially educated "drop-outs" of western education. The leadership of such groups might be provided by members of the educated "counter-elite" seeking a political base for radical political action. If it is still premature to make any predictions about the likelihood of radical political groups in PNG threatening internal security, it is already clear, however, that social change as a result of economic development, education and urbanization is creating considerable problems which may have serious security implications.

Although the present Government economic policies are based on an eight point programme emphasising equality, rural development and economic self-reliance, the long term economic trends may still be in the direction of increased rather than diminished socio-economic inequality.² Some observers have

¹ Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., Chapter 3. Johnson argues that a society requires a certain level of functional specialization before it is ripe for revolution; that is, there are discrete social, class, occupational interests represented. Where these do not exist a loss of political authority is more likely to lead to rebellion against the regime rather than social change of a revolutionary character, (page 46). Regarding the important role performed by ideology, as an alternative value system, in revolutionary politics, see page 83.

² See Papua New Guinea's Improvement Plan 1973-74, op. cit.

argued that unless PNG moves from a capitalist to socialist economic model, like, for instance, that of Tanzania, increased economic inequality and the development of underdevelopment will be inevitable.¹ Even if this is not true, the development of large scale economic projects like the Bougainville copper mine, the Ok Tedi and Frieda River copper projects and the Purari River hydro-power scheme, whilst they might make PNG less dependent on foreign aid and more self-reliant at the national budgetary level, also lead to serious social dislocation and inequalities. This dilemma has been a major theme in the continuing debate amongst PNG leaders over the Bougainville mine and the implications for future economic development.² Disparities in economic affluence between occupational and social groups and between regions are likely to lead to the rise of elites and increased sense of relative deprivation amongst those who are less well-off economically.³

¹ See Heinz Schutte, "Tanzania-Niugini Model", New Guinea, Volume 7, No 1, Parch/April 1972, pages 4-27.

² For both sides to this debate see F.F. Espie, "Bougainville Copper: difficult development decisions", Priorities in Melanesian Development, op. cit., pages 335-342. John Momis and Eugene Ogan, "Development Experience: A View From Bougainville", Change and Development in Rural Melanesia, Fifth Waigani Seminar, Port Moresby, 1971. Mitch Thompson, "Growth and Underdevelopment: The economics of underdevelopment in Niugini: Bougainville Copper and the New Imperialism", Niugini Reader; Helene Barnes, (ed.), Australian Union of Students, Melbourne, 1972, pages 12-29.

³ The term elite is here applied to functional groups in PNG society which have high status and relative economic affluence. It includes the national political leadership, the bureaucracy, military and police, commercial management and local businessmen. This national elite will be found principally in PNG's towns with representatives in the rural centres. From this group will be drawn what H.D. Lasswell defined as the political elite: the power holders in the body politic. (See T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, Watts, London, 1964, pages 7-9).

One aspect of the economic development problem is the so called tide of rising expectations which is generated by economic change and which, in turn, contributes to high rates of urban migration. Rapid urbanization, represented by growing urban squatter communities of rural people seeking the "bright lights", jobs and reputed economic opportunities of the towns, is likely to lead to considerable problems of civil order. Whilst the integrative effects of urban populations may, as argued by Mair,¹ provide the vital building blocks of nationalism, rapid urbanization may also place intolerable loads on government by way of demands for housing, employment and social services.² It would not seem

¹ See L. Mair, New Nations, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967, page 199. Mair argues that it is in the towns of the modernizing societies where the "melting pot" process occurs, where new loyalties and political associations which span primordial lines spring up and where new attitudes to nationalism develop.

² The population of PNG by 1991 is estimated to reach 4.294 million (even if there is a moderate scale birth control programme) based on a population growth rate of 2.7 per cent per annum. It is estimated that urban population by 1991 may be between 750,000 and 1 million (that is between 20 and 30 per cent of total population). Port Moresby may have a population of 250,000 by 1991. Although the PNG Government's development programme calls for a slow down in the rate of urban population growth (between 1967 and 1972 it was 12.5 per cent compared to rural population growth rate of 2.0 per cent per annum) there may be considerable difficulty in achieving this objective, short of stringent immigration control measures. As Ward argues, PNG may follow in the steps of other developing countries where urbanization outstrips the growth of urban employment opportunities. The shared poverty based on reciprocity between employed and unemployed kinsmen is often preferred and more exciting than shared rural poverty. The healthier medical environment of the towns may also increase the growth rate of PNG's urban population in the future. ("Population Growth and Socio-Economic Change", New Guinea Research Bulletin, No 42, September 1971. R.G. Ward, Chapter 7, "Internal Migration and Urbanization in PNG", pages 101-106 and J.C. Caldwell, Chapter 11, "Conclusions", pages 164-168 and Papua New Guinea's Improvement Plan, 1973-74, op. cit., pages 2 and 14).

unduly pessimistic to predict that within ten to twenty years PNG's towns and cities will have large communities of unemployed, poorly housed citizens whose economic plight will be cast in harsh juxtaposition to the employed, comparatively well-housed, affluent members of the bureaucracy, police, armed forces and business community. The danger is that urbanization may proceed in the future at a faster pace than the integration of the new migrant urban dwellers into new life styles and associational relationships. The de-stabilising influences of this type of rapid social change, the diminution of traditional authority and the lack of economic opportunities may lead to social frustration and increased violence – the sort of process which Johnson calls social disorientation and which is manifested by increased violence.¹

Aside from the political pressures which may flow from rapid urbanization in terms of a shortage of jobs, housing and social amenities, there is the spectre of communal violence between ethnic groups in urban areas. The belief that urbanization provides the foundations of nationalism depends on the success of the acculturative process. It is assumed that the new town dweller

¹ Social change and reduced traditional authority patterns, whilst they may result in reduced ritualised traditional violence such as the Tubaku killings in the Highlands (See SMH, 6 March 1973), reduce the traditional restraints and sanctions of traditional leaders in regard to non-traditional inter-personal violence. Crime in PNG has shown a significant rate of increase in recent years. Crimes reported per 1000 of population have risen from 9.3 in 1969 to 14.5 in 1971 (PNG's Improvement Programme 1973-74, op. cit., page 14). In 1972-73 crime increased by a further 25 per cent (Post Courier, 22 June 1973). For the significance of increasing levels of crime as an indicator of disequilibrium between social values and the environment see Chalmers Johnson, op. cit., pages 119-13.

when he leaves his traditional village society is subject to new social pressures and relationships in the town and, although he may retain many of his former traditional attitudes and loyalties, some attitudes will change and his loyalties will broaden.¹ In reality and in the short term, however, urban migration in PNG, rather than leading to the integration of tribal groups, may merely intensify primordial loyalties of clan and tribe as a result of these groups becoming politicized within the psychologically secure boundaries of tribe and clan.² This intensification of ethnic loyalties, if it occurs, will increase the likelihood of communally-based violence in PNG towns.

It was earlier argued in relation to Defence Force loyalties that in the transitional stage of the transference of loyalties from clan to nation, the effective loyalties of a Papua New Guinean are difficult to predict and may vary with the context of a conflict. The self-identification of the urban immigrant in the "hostile" town is likely to broaden to encompass new allies so that there is a tendency for, say, Chimbus to identify themselves with other groups of Highlanders when faced with a common external threat, for example, the hostility of the indigenous Papuans of Port Moresby. The consequence of this may be an increased potential,

¹ Mair, op. cit., page 133.

² See C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States, Free Press, New York, 1963. Geertz argues that in nations undergoing social and political change, primordial affiliations are prone to become intensified in the modernization process. The politicization process therefore increases rather than diminishes the importance of the bonds of language and ethnicity. L. and S. Rudolph, (The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India, Chicago University Press, 1967) have shown in this context how primordial groups may in fact provide an alternative route to that of the secular association and party to a form of representative democracy. The ethnically based welfare and community groups that have so far grown up in PNG's towns (for example groups of Kerema people) are examples of this form of political participation.

at least in the short term future, for violence between larger groups, in which case the frequently cited argument that the scale of communal violence in PNG is limited by the larger number of small tribal groups would be invalidated.¹

Two further problems which may effect PNG's internal security in the future are land distribution and ownership and the socio-political problems set in train by formal western education. Apart from traditional patterns of conflict which may arise over land disputes between clans, there is also the prospect of conflict over land for economic and social reasons. Whilst there is not an absolute land shortage in PNG, there are specific land problems - a local shortage of land in the populous Chimbu District, shortages of economically useful land in other parts of the Highlands (due principally to the altitude) and high levels of expatriate alienation

¹ See R.S. Parker and E.P. Wolfers, "The Context of Social Change" in A.L. Epstein (et al.), (eds.), The Politics of Independence: Papua New Guinea 1968, op. cit., pages 16-17.

"A man's loyalties still tends to vary with the social context of a conflict. At home he may fight for a fellow villager or clansman against a neighbour (as in pre-contact times), or with a fellow member of his language group or trading network in a wider conflict. Occasionally, and especially in town, the same man may fight for his district (as when a group of Sepik fight a group of Tolai in Rabaul), or even for his fellow Pidgin-speaking New Guineans against a Papuan out-group. The political loyalties of most indigenous people are in process of rapid change, and predictable only if the parties to the circumstances of a conflict, or of a cooperative situation are already closely known".

This assessment is borne out by the evidence of the rioting in Port Moresby during July 1973 when Highlanders and some New Guineans from coastal areas acted together in their attacks on Papuans in the Port Moresby area. (See National Times, 30 July 1973).

of land in the Gazelle peninsula.¹ Because land ownership and usufructuary rights in PNG are, by tradition, conferred on groups rather than individuals and there are few people in PNG who have no claims to land usage, it would initially appear that land questions are unlikely to give rise to the sorts of conflicts which has arisen elsewhere in the world.² On the other hand, however, there are long term factors which may lead to conflict, including the problem of natural population increase and the pressures this will place on existing patterns of land use.³ Although the consequent shortage of land may be relieved in certain areas by internal migration programmes, resettlement programmes may lead to conflict between migrants and indigenous populations, given the sensitivity of land as an issue in traditional PNG societies.⁴ Serious political problems may also emerge in areas where there is an absence of cash cropping opportunities, either through a lack of suitable land, isolation from communications, or even because of the state of world agricultural markets. Because affluence will be unevenly distributed in PNG almost regardless of Government policies, the potential for conflict will also be unevenly distributed although the problems of population density and shortages of arable land suggest that parts of the Highlands will be the focus of these problems.

Education may also have a fundamentally de-stabilizing effect on rural PNG by challenging traditional patterns of behaviour

¹ New Guinea Research Bulletin, No 42, op. cit., page 166.

² S.P. Huntington in "Civil Violence and International Order", op. cit., argues, for instance, that inequality of land distribution is a key factor in the potential for revolution in a country and hence an effective strategy for averting revolution is a socially just programme of land redistribution.

³ PNG's Improvement Plan 1973-74, op. cit., page 13.

⁴ On the problems of Chimbu use of land in the Karimui area, see: Roy Wagner, "A Problem of Ethnicocide: When a Chimbu Meets a Karimui", New Guinea, Volume 6, No 2, June-July 1971.

and authority and generating expectations of progress and affluence that will not be fulfilled for those Papua New Guineans who drop out of the school system, cannot find jobs in the urban areas, or who are simply not given the opportunity to go to school. The extension of western education and literacy has been a tenet of Australian colonial policy in PNG since the end of the Second World War but, even though less than half the eligible children receive primary level schooling, it is clear that most of those who do receive education are still destined to return to their village environment.¹ As the qualifications required for employment in the trained manpower categories in PNG rise to match the education levels of the work force, more and more of those with only primary or incomplete secondary education will be faced with the prospect of either, returning to their essentially traditional village societies, or moving to the urban areas to take on unskilled jobs. Many young Papua New Guineans will also face the prospect of "dropping out" of the school system whilst their peers go on to affluent and influential jobs within the elite.

Although it is true that this problem is being confronted by PNG Government attempts to adapt education to the needs of PNG society and by emphasising the continued social relevance of PNG rural life, it remains to be seen how effective these approaches are in adjusting the expectations of those in the education stream, especially those whose prospects are cut off by educational and economic limitations.² One may predict several likely developments. It is possible that the partially educated will return to their villages with notions which are in conflict with those of traditional society and its leaders and whilst some change might

¹ In 1972 only 34.3 per cent of the seven-year-old population entered school and only 7.5 per cent of the relevant age cohort entered High School. (PNG's Improvement Plan, 1973-74, page 14).

² See PNG Improvement Plan, 1973-74, op. cit., page 28 and Post Courier, 17 October 1973.

be accepted by these leaders and that some of the impetus for change will be dissipated, different attitudes will produce tensions between the educated and their tribal peers who have never left their villages nor received western education. To these groups may be added another, the educated elite who may seek to effect change from afar, or by leading political movements within village society on the pattern of the Mataungan Association, the Highlands Liberation Front and the followers of John Kasaipwalowa in the Trobriand Islands.¹

Whilst these forces of change and the influence of "political entrepreneurs" who lead such reforming movements may lead to radical social change and economic development in village society, it is difficult to imagine that this will be accomplished without political conflict. Some of this conflict might not be resolved by techniques of compromise, bargaining and "talking things out" – in the style of Melanesian politics. Standish has argued, for example, in relation to Highlands tribal fighting that fighting may be explained partly in terms of a leadership struggle between traditional leaders and young challengers, as a means of asserting leadership and of winning traditional leadership "spurs".²

Conflict may also arise between modernizing and traditionalistic forces in rural PNG over economic issues. Traditional PNG society places restraints on the "modernizer's" access to and use of village land, security of tenure over his land and in some cases his ability to pass on his wealth to his own sons. Thus there are limits to the ability of the village capitalist to

¹ See SMH, 10 March 1973, (Peoples' Government in the Trobriand Islands) and John Kasaipwalowa, "Modernizing Melanesian Society – why and for whom", R.J. May (ed.), Priorities In Melanesian Development, op. cit., pages 451–556.

² Standish has drawn attention to the participation in this fighting in leading roles of former PIR soldiers who, one might predict, would eschew such traditionalistic behaviour. (Standish, "Warfare, Leadership and Law in the Highlands", op. cit.).

innovate, generate wealth and pass it on intact. These sorts of constraints may provide the basis of conflict within village society between "big men", who generate political as well as economic power, and their poorer fellow clansmen. The rise of big businessmen in PNG society involves the development of networks of reciprocal obligation and patronage in which relatives and fellow clansmen become dependent on the fortunes and continued favour of the "big man". This sort of relationship has an almost feudal aspect and, as the fortunes and influence of the "big men" become consolidated, they may increasingly block off economic opportunities for others within the village: not all men can be "big men". If the consolidation of these business leaders results in their increasing domination of village wealth, especially land suitable for cash agricultural activities, a wealthy "Kulak" class might conceivably emerge in PNG society and this could lead to the development of class tensions and conflict between these "big men" (and their acolytes), and discontented poorer villagers who see their own future restricted by the dominance of black capitalists.¹

If PNG rural economic development does result in domination by individuals rather than alternative patterns of development based on cooperative, participatory economic/political organisations on the model of, say, the Mataungan Association, class tensions and land distribution problems may provide the political grievances around which radical political movements committed to violence might emerge. It might also be argued that the semi-educated youth in urban areas will provide a potential base amongst which revolutionary political movements might flourish, given the development of a structure of ideology, organisation and leadership.

¹ For a discussion of "big men" in PNG society see C.D. Rowley, *New Guinea Villager*, Cheshire, 1965. The economic role of Highlands "big men" is discussed in B.R. Finney, *Big Men and Business*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1973. Finney points out, however, that, in traditional society, this did not occur because wealth and power were redistributed when "big men" died.

Apart from economic inequalities, education will, itself, generate expectations of social change and, for those who remain in the rural areas and for many who move to the urban areas, these expectations are unlikely to be fulfilled. Comparisons with the affluence and status of an urban black elite and other affluent minorities may lead to the development of a sense of social frustration and radical political action to give vent to this deprivation may result.¹

Internal Security - Conclusions and Contingencies

Whilst this discussion has pointed to a number of potential causes of internal disorder in PNG after independence, it has not been argued that political change and economic development need necessarily lead to internal violence. Nor has it been argued that PNG is necessarily bound for a future as a broken backed state of the sort envisaged by Hugh Tinker.² The maintenance of civil order in post-independence PNG does appear to depend, however, on the establishment of stable, effective government at both the national and local levels. An important requisite for such effective government would appear to be the maintenance of equilibrium between change and tradition and a balancing of resources and priorities between the rural areas, which are likely to remain largely based on traditional economic and social patterns, and the urban areas which will be pockets of modernization and inhabited by Papua New Guineans in a process of more rapid transition to a

¹ See James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution" in G.A. Kelly and C.W. Brown (eds.), Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution, Riley, New York, 1970, pages 148-167 for a discussion of the relationship of rising expectations and internal violence.

² H. Tinker, Essays on Asia in Transition, New York, 1965, Chapter 7 "Reorientation".

westernised type of society.¹ The challenge to PNG's political leaders will, in essence, be to try to maintain what has been described as an homeostatic equilibrium within a changing and dual society.²

The success PNG leaders have in controlling violence and removing its underlying causes in the future will ultimately be affected by a wide range of variables about which little may be predicted with certainty. These variables include the capacity of the institutions and participants in the PNG political system to resolve conflict by peaceful means, allocate resources and claim political allegiances and, how wealth actually comes to be distributed within PNG society as economic development proceeds; that is, whether the trend is towards greater equality or whether inequalities grow. The future course of PNG politics and civil order will also be determined, in great measure, by the three problems of government postulated by Machiavelli, namely, the skill of political leaders, human fortune and the practical limitations placed on human choice.³

¹ The continuing importance of the village-based subsistence sector of PNG society is underlined by the fact that in 1971 only 25 per cent of economically active Papua New Guineans were engaged wholly or mainly in cash earnings activities. (PNG's Improvement Plan 1973-74, page 61).

² For an explanation of the concept of homeostatic equilibrium see Chalmers Johnson, op. cit., pages 53-58. Broadly speaking, homeostatic equilibrium posits coordinated social change - a moving equilibrium - in which the value structure and the environment change in synchronisation with each other.

³ Machiavelli's three concepts were Virtu, Fortuna and Necessita. See The Prince and The Discourses, The Modern Library, New York, 1950, pages 4-94 and Chalmers Johnson, op. cit., pages 88-89. Johnson points out that virtuosity, fortune and necessity are themselves interrelated and mutually influencing variables. It may be argued that the likelihood that political leaders will display high ability in times of crisis in PNG is related to their usual standard of performance in normal times and bad fortune may be mitigated by good leadership.

Because the actual direction of constitutional change remains unclear and the possibility of radical systemic change (including one party government or military rule) cannot be discounted, serious civil disorder should also be accepted as a possibility. The assertion that consensus and compromise, the so-called politics of Melanesian Consensus, provide the effective basis for PNG's political culture remains to be tested in situations of grave tension where seriously competing political interests are at issue and these testing situations have not yet occurred.¹ Other countries such as Indonesia which have claimed to base their politics on consensual styles have experienced widespread internal violence when political tensions have moved beyond certain limits and it is, therefore, necessary to acknowledge that PNG politics may also fail to maintain a consensually based unity.²

On the other hand PNG leaders may be able to develop the concepts inherent in Melanesian Consensus into the basic tenets of a political ideology which would have a useful integrating role and might be employed in the future to legitimize "tough" political decisions (which might not, in reality, be consensually based) without the use of violence. There is also the prospect that PNG may develop along the lines of a Palaver polity in the post-independence period in which there was endless political conflict and disputation between the regions and the central government and between political groups at the centre, and a great deal of posturing

¹ See National Times, 5-10 November 1973, Christopher Ashton, "The Land of Australia's Empire": "Temperament, traditional social customs and the fragmented character of the country suggest accommodation rather than confrontation", and Peter Kenilora "Political Development" in R.J. May, (ed.), Priorities in Melanesian Development, op. cit., pages 23-25.

² For a description of the violent breakdown in consensual politics in the wake of the abortive 1965 coup in Indonesia and the destruction of the Indonesian communist party and its supporters see J.M. Van der Kroef, Indonesia Since Sukarno, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971, Chapters I and II.

and threatening of violence, but little actual political violence.¹ For instance, continued threats of secession by regional political groups in PNG may largely represent a political technique as a means of gaining political concessions in other areas, rather than an actual demand for secession.

The problems of ethnic diversity and a lack of unity which at present loom large in a discussion of the prospects of internal violence might, alternatively, be overcome by the development of a form of consociational politics in PNG. This concept, which has been used in relation to other pluralistic polities, may take the form in PNG of cooperation at the central government level between members of a national elite whose political support was formally based on ethnic communities.² This elite might share the common interests of power, affluence and the benefits of western society and it might, thus, come to have little in common with village society, other than a diminishing ethnic loyalty. This elite would therefore become relatively isolated from the groups it formally "represented" and largely independent of them. From this pattern of politics a workable form of tutelary democracy could emerge which might reduce the prospects of political instability and violence.³

The above discussion of sources of internal violence in PNG society gives rise to a number of specific internal security contingencies that PNG may face. The danger inherent in the contingency or scenario approach is that by attempting to define a finite number of specific situations other possible contingencies

¹ See A.R. Zolberg, "Tribalism Through Corrective Lenses", Foreign Affairs, Volume 51, No 4, July 1973, pages 728-739.

² See A. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy" in World Politics, Volume 21, No 2, 1969.

³ E. Shils, Political Development in the New States, Mouton, The Hague, 1968, pages 60-64 discusses the important role of the political elite in a tutelary democratic regime.

are thought to be excluded and subtle variations and combinations of contingencies may be omitted from consideration. There is also the problem of the interrelated and complicating effects on internal problems that may be posed by external developments. Several of the more obvious internal security contingencies may, nonetheless, be listed.

National Political Crisis

A crisis of political authority might occur in PNG after independence as a result of conflict over the constitutional form of government, radical systemic political change, or as a result of a leadership succession crisis. The collapse of political authority might lead to a serious increase of both social and political violence.

Rural Warfare and Disturbances

Tribal warfare and disturbances to civil order, based on tribal cleavages in society, seem likely to continue in PNG and the focal area of this problem is likely to continue to be in the Highlands. One scenario might be Highlands tribal fighting, increasing in frequency and intensity and becoming increasingly directed at the agents of the central government in the urban areas. This might eventually lead to a collapse of administration and commerce and a political crisis.

Civil Strife in Urban Areas

Some of the possibilities here might be, conflict in urban areas between immigrant communities along tribal lines, or between immigrants and indigenous populations (e.g., Bougainvilleans in conflict with "Red Skin" outsiders on Bougainville). Alternatively, strife may be based on industrial or ideological grounds:

trade unionists rebelling against the government or business, unemployed immigrants seeking better conditions or student activists protesting against "black, elitist" government.

Insurrection by Secessionists

Secessionists in PNG may attempt to achieve their goals by the use of force. Possibilities might be Bougainville, Papua (or part of what presently forms Papua), or perhaps part of the New Guinea islands. Secessionist attempts might conceivably receive external assistance.

Military or Police Mutiny

The Military or Police, or both, may mutiny. This might occur because of a breakdown of discipline, or mutiny might take the form of organised corporate action as a technique of demanding improvements in their conditions of service or resolving other grievances. The example of the mutinies of the East African armies in 1964 comes to mind here. In the case of mutiny the civil government may lack the coercive resources to reestablish control over the mutineers. This may lead to the curtailment of the government's authority leading to an outbreak of civil disorder. Such a display of governmental impotence might encourage an eventual military or police/military takeover of the government. A civil government faced with the mutiny of its coercive instruments would, if it could, be likely to seek external assistance to reestablish order and save "democratic institutions".¹

¹ See W. Gutteridge, *The Military in African Politics*, Methuen, London, 1969, pages 24-40. Australia could find it difficult to

Military (or Police/Military) Coup d'Etat

The coup has been a common technique of political change in new states and PNG might not escape the phenomenon, however, the outcome of a coup might depend on the degree of cooperation between the PNG DF and Police and the cohesion amongst the officers of both. Further, to rule effectively the "Coupists" would seem to require the assistance of the PNG bureaucracy.¹

As stated earlier, it is difficult to quantify the capabilities of the PNG Defence Force and Police in relation to these internal security contingencies on a hypothetical basis. The capabilities of the PNG DF acting with the Police have already been discussed in general terms in relation to its internal security roles however, some of the broad conclusions which flow from both a consideration of military capabilities and the nature of likely internal security problems in PNG may be listed.

Besides factors of size and equipment which may be measured, there are subjective factors of morale, cohesion and leadership within the Police and PNG DF which will have a crucial bearing on the outcome of any internal security problem. Any assessment based on numbers alone is, therefore, only one of

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decline a request by the PNG Government to assist in putting down a mutiny which threatened a democratically elected government and public order. The problem would be, however, to distinguish between a mutiny and a situation that had matured into a coup d'etat.

¹ Civil-military relations in post-independent PNG and the prospects of a military role in politics are discussed further in Chapter V. Based on empirical observations, the coup d'etat is probably more likely some years after independence, and especially if there is a crisis of political authority, such as rapid changes of government or no effective government. A coup may also be more likely if there is increased reliance by the regime on the coercive resources of the military and police in order to stay in power.

the overall range of factors. Another major factor is the part which intelligence and a good intelligence organisation is likely to play in the maintenance of PNG's internal security. In general, one might predict that internal security problems in PNG are likely, for several reasons, to be very expensive in manpower terms. PNG's terrain is likely to require larger numbers of men, logistic support in remote areas will be costly in manpower and mediocre intelligence in the initial stages of operations would increase the manpower requirement.¹

While not an inconsiderable force the PNG DF could be quite rapidly and ineffectively swallowed up either in a situation of widespread civil strife in the Highlands, or in a protracted conflict with secessionists. In both these types of situations it could be dangerously easy to over-estimate the military capacity of the PNG DF two battalion force. Whilst in certain circumstances Defence Force intervention in localized, poorly organised, unsustained violence might result in a decisive outcome, this might not be so where an insurrectionary force was well organised and had the support of the people. In extreme circumstances, for example, a two battalion force might be able to control little more than one urban centre and its rural environs.

Because of what a PNG Government might consider to be quite meagre coercive resources available to it, it may tend to see its options in the face of internal violence largely in terms of bargaining, compromise and concessions – a reliance on

¹ For example, the 1970 Gazelle Peninsula confrontation with the Mataungan Association involved some 25 per cent of the Police force although there were, in fact, no significant acts of terrorism, nor systematic attacks on Government forces or minority groups. (O'Neill, The Army in PNG, op. cit., pages 14-15).

Melanesian political styles of conflict resolution . This is quite apart from other substantial reasons, including humanitarian ones, why such approaches might be preferred . It is likely that a PNG Government would only resort to a use of force, or agree to a significant escalation in the level of force usually applied in Police type activities, where there was the prospect of a decisive, rapidly achieved outcome and it seems plausible to argue that where the internal use of the PNG DF seemed likely to lead to protracted, inconclusive, nationally divisive operations, the Government would prefer to accept higher political costs in the form of concessions rather than attempt to resolve the problem by violence .

These may, nonetheless, be very conditional observations, unduly influenced by the "form" shown so far by the present PNG Government . A future PNG Government may take a firmer line in regard to "anti-government groups" as part of the process which has taken place elsewhere in newly independent states and described as the "erosion of democracy" .¹ Dr Guise, the present PNG Deputy Chief Minister, has for, example, warned on several occasions that separatism and disunity could be exploited by foreign powers and "Elements in the Community who attempt to create disturbances and threaten the peace or security of citizens of this land will be dealt with quickly and very firmly by the Government" .² Assumptions about the use of non-violent means may also prove unfounded because, in spite of Government policy, PNG's security forces might be quite easily drawn into a gradually deteriorating internal security situation in a piecemeal fashion . Under such circumstances, theoretical options of force or no force might become

¹ Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Beacon Press, Boston, 1962, pages 272-292 .

² Post Courier, 17 September 1973, and 24 January 1974 .

obscured. And under certain circumstances the PNG Government may not see any option available to it other than to use force; for example, in the case of a mutiny by its own security forces, or where extremists were using terrorist tactics. Furthermore, it has been generally observed that in crisis situations leaders see the options open to them in a restricted way and thus, at the time of a crisis, the obvious option of force may be preferred to less obvious ones.

In so far as predictions have any value in these matters, it seems more likely than not that internal security problems will arise in post-independent PNG which will need to be met by coercive strategies as well as Government policies in social, economic and political spheres. In the short term the threat may come from secessionists who are prepared at some point to use violence, from anomic violence in urban areas and tribal violence. Pressures may also be placed on the Police as a result of increasing urban crime levels and this may lead to serious problems in the allocation of scarce financial and manpower resources between rural and urban Police duties. The decrease in administrative efficiency as a result of rapid localization of official positions is also likely to add to rural and urban policing problems. In the longer term beyond the end of the decade, however, trends of population growth, urban migration and socio-economic change point to pressures on internal security as a result of both urban and rural unrest. This discontent may become successfully mobilized by political organisations prepared to employ techniques of violence. It also seems more likely than not that some of the internal security situations that may eventuate will pose problems beyond the capacity of the PNG Police to deal with and, therefore, the PNG DF will be required to assume an active internal security role.

CHAPTER V

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAPUA
NEW GUINEA - THE FUTURE

PART A - INTRODUCTION

"A Native army running riot could tie up and take control of Papua New Guinea within days. The troops have the weapons, and the marine and air transport. They also have the benefit of concentrated, high standard training. Unless the military planners are very careful, the Native troops will also develop the special kind of vanity which has made the Native soldiers of other developing countries think he (sic) can do a better job of government than the civilians".¹

The above quotation from John Ryan's Hot Land presents in a popular if sensational way one aspect of the problem of PNG's future civil-military relations. So far in this thesis the relationship between the Defence Force and the civil power and the question of the role of the military in Papua New Guinea's political system have only been indirectly raised. In this final chapter the problems and prospects of civil military relations in an independent PNG are considered in the context of some of the literature on the role of the military in the politics of New States. The central question of whether or not the PNG DF might come to play an important political role in PNG is tackled. The conclusion is prescriptive. A pattern of PNG civil-military relations is suggested which, taking into account the objective of civilian controlled democratic government, might contain the political role of the military in PNG's future political life.

¹ John Ryan, The Hot Land, Focus on New Guinea, Macmillan, Hong Kong, 1971, page 266.

Discussion of the role of the military in politics is bedevilled by the question of political values. Whilst some scholars have evidently believed that to discuss military politics, its strengths and weaknesses and how it comes about is, somehow, to advocate military rule, the reality is that merely to condemn the "anti-democratic", "repressive" or "corporate" character of military government is unlikely to prevent its occurrence, nor has it, in a succession of Third World states. There is also the troubling fact to be faced that civilian regimes in the Third World have sometimes shown themselves to be equally anti-democratic and in some cases equally incapable of dealing with the problems of national government.¹

¹ Robert Pinkney, ("The Theory and Practice of Military Government", Political Studies, Volume XXI, No 2, January 1973, pages 152-166) has argued, in this connection and in relation to the developing countries of black Africa, that the distinction between the performance of civilian and military government may be a distinction without a difference. Pinkney argues that:

"many of the shortcomings attributed to military governments would be seen in a less harsh light if observers compared military leaders with the alternative political talent actually available, rather than with the ideal type of politician whom it might be desirable to have in power" (page 152).

Pinkney concludes that in many African states, governments, whether civil or military, may be equally limited in their capacity to grapple with national problems:

"To criticise military governments for their failure to promote "modernization", "social mobilization" or "development" is, in most cases, only to criticise them for possessing the same limitations as civil governments, few of which have impressive records in the countries most prone to military coups" (page 166).

Arising out of this problem of political values two general schools of thought on military involvement in politics in developing nations may be identified.¹ One is essentially a negative view shared by writers such as Shils, Finer and Janowitz.² This group, whilst recognising that in the short run the military may be able to restore order and maintain stability, argues that in the long run military intervention in politics impedes genuine political development. Apart from the anti-democratic nature of military rule, writers in this school have focused on the unsuitability of the ascribed characteristics of the military to the task of government. It is argued that because of the authoritarian, hierarchical structure of the military, its insensitivity to public opinion, abhorrence of "political" compromise and a preoccupation with "honour" and "dignity", military government is unable to satisfactorily perform a political role; rather, military government attempts to rule the nation as though it were a large army camp. The second school of thought about military involvement in the politics of New States is more positive and approbatory. This school, represented by scholars such as Huntington, Pye and Emerson, has argued that the military is able to perform a useful dual role of promoting

¹ For a similar view see: review by J.C. Oh of Se-Jiu Keim The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1971 in American Political Science Review, Volume 67, No 2, June 1973, pages 674-675.

² See E. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States" in J.J. Johnson, (ed.), The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries, Princetown University Press, 1962; S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, Praeger, New York, 1962; and M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964. See also, Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun, Penguin, London, 1972.

"modernization" whilst at the same time maintaining political stability in the developing nation.¹ Other writers have argued, however, that this preference by a group of western, principally American scholars, for law, order and political stability and hence authoritarian military regimes in the countries of the Third World, reflects their own domestic political prejudices.² Yet another group of commentators hold that the tendency toward authoritarian military rule is in a sense inevitable and may be attributed to nothing more than a return to the sort of administrative regime that functioned during the colonial period.³

¹ See S.P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics" in S.P. Huntington, (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, Free Press, New York, 1962 and S.P. Huntington, Creating Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., L.W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" in J.J. Johnson, op. cit. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Beacon Press, Boston, 1962, Chapter XV. For a generally approving analysis of the developmental role of military rule in Latin America see: L.R. Einaudi and A.C. Stepan III, "Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil", Rand Report, R586-DOS, Santa Monica, 1971; and in Tropical Africa: E.W. Lefever, Spear and Scepter, The Brookings Institute, Washington, 1970.

² Donal Cruise O'Brien, ("Modernization, Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-70" The Journal of Development Studies, Volume 8, No 4, July 1972) argues that American political scientists in the early 1960s espoused democracy for the Third World as an article of faith, in the context of an ideological confrontation with communism. Later, a swing to authoritarianism occurred, partly as a result of a reflected concern for law, order and stability in their own country and partly out of a concern for political order in the New States as the political dimension of anti-communist counter-insurgency doctrine.

³ Edward Feit, ("Pen Sword and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political Institutions", World Politics, Volume XXV, No 2, January 1973) has argued that military rule in Africa may be seen as an attempt to return to the colonial administrative system without the colonial power. He notes that the most successful form of national government in Africa and the form which became institutionalised was colonial administrative rule. (Page 272). On this point, see also, James O'Connell "The Fragility

If western scholarship on the benefits of military rule in New States is fundamentally divided, so to is the scholarship on the question of the causes of military intervention in politics in the New States. But, since few, if any, Papua New Guineans at present advocate military government for PNG it will be more profitable in this chapter to analyse the causes of a military role in politics rather than discuss the benefits of such rule or influence should it come about.

PART B - THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PNG

Before commencing a general analysis of the causes of military involvement in politics it will be useful to define what is being investigated. Military involvement in politics may take many forms. It comprehends involvement by the military at four identifiable levels which begin at influence and extend to blackmail, displacement and finally supplantment of the civilian regime. These forms of involvement in politics, which are derived from Finer's The Man on Horseback, may be associated with various techniques of military involvement in politics, including constitutional means, collusion and competition, intimidation and violence.¹ The forms of military involvement and the various techniques of involvement may, in turn, be associated with different types of political regimes. According to Finer's

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of Stability: The Fall of the Nigerian Federal Government, 1966" in R.I. Rotburg and A. Mazrui, (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa, Oxford, 1970, pages 1013-105.

¹ Finer, op. cit., page 140. Finer's scale of the techniques of military involvement in politics extends from constitutional means, collusion and competition between the military and other political forces, intimidation of civilian leaders, threats of non-cooperation or violence, failure to defend the regime against violence from other sources and finally the seizure of power by violent means, that is, coup d'etat.

classification, again, these range from a regime where the political power of the military is indirect and limited to a regime in which the political power of the military is direct. The complete taxonomy is given in the footnote below.¹

This categorization of the forms and techniques of military involvement in politics and of the resultant regimes illustrates both the complexity and diversity of military politics. It also shows that the question of the political role of the PNG DF is a considerably more subtle question than a simple dichotomy between either, an apolitical military, or the situation of coup d'etat and outright military government by military officers.

The term civil-military relations also requires examination. Civil-military relations in PNG may be seen, essentially, as the power relationships between the military and civilian groups in society.² These relationships will have a formal dimension manifest in the departmental arrangements and constitutionally-provided role of the Defence Force; they will also have an informal

¹ Finer (ibid., page 166) predicates five types of regimes in which the military exercise varying degrees of political power. They are listed below with my suggestive examples added:

<u>Indirect, Limited</u>	(France, May 1958)
<u>Indirect, Complete</u>	(Post-Civil War Spain)
<u>Dual</u>	(Brazil 1974)
<u>Direct</u>	(Chile 1973)
<u>Direct Quasi-Civilianized</u>	(Indonesia 1974)

² In this context power means the ability to control the actions of others within the political system. Power may be possessed as a consequence of formally bestowed authority, or as the result of the informal patterns of influence and the possibility of sanctions either threatened or implied. (See Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pages 86-87 and R.A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Second Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1970, Chapter Three).

dimension in terms of the relationships between Defence Force personnel, the bureaucracy, the political leadership and PNG society at large. The political power relationships between the military and society in PNG may be seen to operate at three levels: at the macro-level between the military establishment as a whole and PNG society; at the officer corps-national elite level; and thirdly between the senior military commanders and the nation's political leaders.

By their very existence armed forces generate political implications which extend beyond a consideration of their formal national security role. The armed forces are a "heavy" institution because of their special relationship to the regime as the principal instrument of state violence and, for this reason, the PNG DF possesses great potential political power which under certain circumstances may be actualised.¹ The political power of the military in PNG at the present time may be seen as mainly potential because civilian control is maintained by a combination of moral and legal authority. Civilian control is legitimate because it carries with it the suasion of public opinion; it is, at present, also reinforced by consensus between the Government and the military leaders on the desirability of civilian rather than military government. Nonetheless the PNG DF's potential political power might be converted into actual power were the relationship between the military and civilian leaders to break down and the military were prepared to assume political power in its own corporate interests, or alternatively, at the invitation or with the connivance of other groups in society.

¹ On the military as a "heavy" institution in terms of political power see F. Green "Towards Understanding Military Coups", Africa Report, Volume 2, February 1966, pages 10-14. This relationship is succinctly put in the aphorism attributed to Aristotle:

"The ruler is an institution supported by soldiers".

See The Muqaddimah, trans. and ed. Franz Rosenthal, London, 1958, page 82.

PNG civil-military relations, in addition to being concerned with the distribution of power between civilian and military groups, may also be seen in terms of the balancing of national security needs against socio-political values. In this sense Huntington has argued that the institutional framework of civil-military relations reflects a compromise between optimising the nation's security at the least cost to the nation's values and by such a compromise most states are able to achieve an adequate level of defence preparedness without jeopardising their dominant social values.¹ On the other hand, states which face greater strategic risks, or when actually at war, commonly place greater emphasis on security needs at the cost of social values. There is also a third case where national security and social goals are perceived as largely compatible and the cases of Sparta, Switzerland and Israel might be cited here.²

PNG appears to fall into the category of a state which, in the absence of a pressing strategic danger or a military tradition such as that of a Nation-in-Arms, seeks a compromise between national security needs and socio-political values at the least cost to these values. Although PNG's military security might conceivably be enhanced by development along the lines of a Garrison state in which military imperatives and values predominated over civilian ones, such an increase in security would almost certainly be achieved with the cost of increased military

¹ S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, op. cit., pages 1-2.

² See D.C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types" in S.P. Huntington, (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, op. cit., pages 71-72. In the case of Switzerland and its concept of the Nation-in-Arms, the militia forces, based on onerous national service requirements, are held to serve important social as well as security goals by educating the citizens and by functioning as the chief civic bond. Similarly the conscript military forces in Israel perform an important integrative role besides being essential for national defence.

power in PNG society.¹ Without a strategic danger or a radical change in national political ideology away from liberal democracy such an increase in military power would appear unlikely.

This is the crux of the civil-military relations question in New States like PNG. The balancing of civil-military relations in PNG appears to have as its central objective not so much the maximisation of military security but rather the maximisation of civilian power and control over the Defence Force. This ordering of priorities provides a focus for the discussion of civil-military relations in PNG and reflects the concern that leaders of New States including PNG have expressed about the dangers of a coup d'etat, military rule and other forms of military involvement in politics.

The formal relationship of the Defence Force to the civil power in PNG, as in all states which profess to be constitutional democracies, is expressed by the principle of the primacy of the civil power over the military. This principle means that the military is required to be an apolitical institution which acts in a disciplined manner as the loyal, impartial instrument of those who exercise constitutional power. Baldly stated, the PNG Defence Force is expected, on every occasion and in every respect, to obey the civilian Government of PNG without attempting to influence the political, as distinct from technical and bureaucratic, decision-making processes in relation to the Defence Force and its role within society.

¹ See H.D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State Hypothesis Today" in S.P. Huntington, (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, op. cit., pages 51-70 and S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pages 346-350. Lasswell's original hypothesis of the Garrison State, in which all other purposes and activities in the state are subordinated to war and the preparation for war, depended on his analysis that the international trend was towards violence playing an increasingly important role in world affairs.

Notwithstanding the principle of the primacy of the civil power, it may be observed that the notion of a completely apolitical military is likely to be as much a theoretical fiction in PNG as it has proved to be in other states, including the developed western democracies. Even in countries like Britain which have long boasted a non-political army, the interrelationship of defence and foreign policies, questions of defence finance, and the very nature of defence decision-making within a bureaucratic system, have led to a significant political role on the part of the military.¹ To a rather greater extent, the military in the United States, although formally apolitical, wields considerable political power and the so-called Military-Industrial complex has excited contemporary concern even though there is a strong tradition of formal civil control over the military in the United States.² And whilst actual military involvement in politics may have been, in recent times, more common in the New States it has occurred in most countries of the world during their history, including the older states of Europe.³

¹ On the relationship of the British officer corps to the political elite see C.B. Otley, "Militarism and Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite" in J. Van Doorn, (ed.), Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, The Hague, 1968, pages 84-108.

² It was, ironically, a former general, President Eisenhower who first alerted the attention of the United States to the growing political power of the Military-Industrial complex and the dangers it posed to constitutional government. See J.K. Galbraith, How to Control the Military, NCLC Publishing Society, London, 1970.

³ The Cromwellian and Napoleonic periods are recalled. More recent events in Europe suggest that states thought to be immune to military politics because of their mature political culture, as the concept is employed by Finer (op. cit., page 139), may not necessarily be so. The consequences of the colonial wars in Indo China and Algeria dragged the Great Mute, the French Army, into politics (See G.A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-62, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1965 and J.S. Ambler, The French Army in Politics 1945-62, Ohio State University Press, 1966). Greece has, in recent years been ruled

In the New States the prominent political role of the military and the non-observance of the principle of the primacy of the civil power is a commonplace. In Asia the political role of the military has been widespread (India being the most significant exception) although the origins, traditions and the character of the military role in politics remain widely disparate.¹ In the Middle East, the central role of armies and officer corps in Arab politics has been a dominant feature of Arab nationalism.² And in Latin America, military politics, endemic since the days of the Caudillo, has more recently tended to expand from the role of constitutional guardian, arbiter and intermittent participant in politics to that of long-term agent of political control, social change and modernization.³

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by the military; a coup occurred in Portugal during 1974 and there has even been popular speculation about the future involvement of the British Army in politics, in the context of military involvement in Ulster, severe economic problems and industrial militancy.

¹ See J.R.E. Waddell, An Introduction to South East Asian Politics, Wiley, Adelaide, 1972, Chapter 13. In regard to Indonesia and North Vietnam the origins of the state and the military in anti-colonial struggles established the Army in politics. Whilst the Indonesian military have held power in their own right since 1965, the North Vietnamese military's political role is largely subsumed within party and state organs somewhat similar to the PLA in China (See D. Chambers, "Changing Role of the Chinese Army", Current Affairs Bulletin, Volume 50, No 5, October 1973). Military officers rule in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma under differing circumstances of origin, extent of regime civilianization and political ideology.

² The prominence of the military in Arab politics has, arguably, both sustained and been sustained by Arab confrontation with Israel. For a detailed account of Arab military intervention in politics see Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger, New York, 1970.

³ For example, in Brazil and Peru military involvement in politics has deepened and broadened, whilst in Chile, formerly held to be a strongly "constitutionalist" state, the military have entered politics to block radical political change. This new tendency in Latin American military politics has been interpreted in terms of the military's perceived role of "total defence"; a reaction to

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This brief review of the military in politics may be completed by turning to black Africa, a region which appears to offer the most suitable comparisons with PNG. To be sure, the military have not risen to power in every one of the states in post-colonial black Africa nevertheless the phenomenon of military politics, in statistical terms alone, lays claim to being the most pervasive and dominant political trend in the region.¹ Given that there are dangers in an overly simplistic comparison between the experience of military politics in black Africa and PNG, arising out of real cultural, historical and geopolitical differences, there are, nonetheless, similarities which may have a bearing on the future course of civil-military relations in PNG.² The principal difficulty in a

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the problems of political chaos and guerrilla insurgency and the attendant problems of national economic and social development. Total defence doctrines have involved the military, besides conventional security missions, in providing for national development by sponsoring programmes of change as an alternative to what the military see as corrupt, discredited civilian-led regimes, or the radical political forces of the Left and of communism. (See L.R. Einaudi and A.C. Stepan, op. cit.). Military involvement in Latin American politics in recent times has, furthermore, frequently possessed substantial support from sections of the public. (See Jack Davis, "Political Violence in Latin America", Adelphi Paper, No 85, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1972, page 8).

¹ Of the 34 independent states in black Africa in January 1974, 16 had experienced a successful coup d'etat. (47 per cent) and a total of 24 had at least one recorded incident of military involvement in politics (70 per cent of the total) since independence. (See Appendix 1, "A Survey of the Defence Forces of Small States ...")

² One such potentially simplistic comparison is that of the significance of tribalism, whereas the situation in black Africa and PNG is importantly different. African states, with important exceptions, generally contain a small number of large tribes whilst PNG has a large number of small tribes. (See P.C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change, Penguin, London, 1972, pages 26-27).

dispassionate comparison between PNG and black Africa in regard to civil-military relations is the fact that the African parallel, with relatively few exceptions, is so compellingly pessimistic in terms of the prospects for constitutional democracy and an apolitical military. For this reason the comparison is seen by many Papua New Guineans and others to be of itself prejudicial.¹

The fundamental point to be made in a comparison between black Africa and PNG is that in terms of political and military development, PNG is more closely similar to African states than to the states of Latin America and Asia – the other major regions of decolonization. Similarities between black Africa and PNG lie in the nature of the colonial background, the course of political change towards independence and the development of national defence forces. Unlike the colonial period elsewhere in the world, the period of colonial contact and development in black Africa and PNG has been relatively short.² In both cases colonial regimes were established where there had been in most cases in black Africa and in PNG no extensive central political units beyond the tribe and where state boundaries were arbitrarily determined, frequently cutting across ethnic divisions.³ In both black Africa

¹ See H.F. Colebatch and Roger Scott, "The Relevance of African Experience" in Roger Scott, (ed.), The Politics of New States, Allen and Unwin, London, 1970, pages 166-170.

² ibid., page 166.

³ Colonial boundaries in black Africa were largely determined in the so-called "partition of Africa" at the 1885 Treaty of Berlin. These territorial boundaries cut across major ethnic groupings and incorporated numbers of tribes (See P.C. Lloyd, op. cit., pages 21 and 59-66 and A.R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", American Political Science Review, Volume LVIII, No 1, March 1968, page 71). The boundaries of present day PNG, similarly, lie with German, Dutch, British and Australian colonial politics. The division of the island of New Guinea between its eastern and western halves originated in the 1828 Dutch claim to West New Guinea from

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and PNG the final stages of colonialism saw the rapid development of political institutions largely based on the liberal democratic traditions of the colonizer's own political system. These transplanted institutions, by which the New States were expected to govern themselves, contrasted with both the authoritarian colonial system by which the metropolises had previously governed and the lack of indigenous political institutions at the national level readily capable of adaptation in the independence period.¹ In both regions the transition to independence has also been similar in that, unlike Latin America, Asia and parts of North Africa, independence has generally been won without violent and protracted political struggle. The nationalist political forces have, as a result, been weaker, less well organised and fewer of the population have been mobilized into the political system.

The similar road to independence has also resulted in a similarity in the origins of the defence forces. The armies of black Africa, like that of PNG, were "colonial gifts", developed by the colonial power. In both cases they played no significant active part in their nations' nationalist movements and they possessed no

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141^o East. The inclusion of the islands of the northern Solomons - Buka and Bougainville - within PNG rather than the British-administered Solomon Islands Protectorate arose from deals between the British and Germans in 1886 and 1899 and as a consequence of the post-World War I League of Nations Mandate granted to Australia. Bougainvillians, today, express ethnic and cultural affinities with their fellow Solomon Islanders and this gives point to their secessionist claims. (See Van der Veur, Search for New Guinea's Boundaries, op. cit., pages 10, 66-67 and 74-79; and Hank Nelson, Papua New Guinea, Black Unity or Black Chaos, op. cit., pages 31-32). In the forest zones of pre-colonial West Africa, especially, centralized government was unknown and the largest political units were groups of villages. (See Lloyd, op. cit., pages 28-29. In PNG there were no extensive political units beyond the tribe and peaceful inter-tribal communication was principally confined to limited trade contacts, for instance, the Hiri voyages of the Motuan people. In both cases the process of building a wider polity awaited foreign invaders.

¹ Zolberg, op. cit., page 72.

revolutionary tradition. They were, and in most cases still are, small infantry based forces, dependent on a metropolitan country in logistic, financial and training matters.¹ The significant point here is that it has not only been strong, relatively large armies, active in the struggle for national independence, that have assumed political roles. Whilst the leadership groups of revolutionary "people's armies" have moved easily and naturally into the political vacuums created by the disappearance of the old colonial regime, it has also been the small previously apolitical black African armies, like the two hundred man Togo army, which have taken a decisive political role.² The manner in which the military rapidly assumed an important political role in many of the nations of black Africa after independence had not been widely predicted and surprised many commentators.³

¹ This argument is drawn from C.E. Welch, "The Soldier and State in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 5, No 3, November 1967, pages 306-309.

² See H. Crouch, "Military Politics under Indonesia's New Order", unpublished paper delivered at the 18th Annual Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Monash University, 18-20 August 1971, page 7 and U. Sundhaussen, "The Soldier and the Nation: Self Perceptions of the Indonesian Army and its Role in Politics", Europa Archiv, Bonn, Volume 1, No 6, March 1971, page 5. On the Togo coup d'etat see: W.F. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, Methuen, London, 1969, pages 42-47.

³ Edward Shils, for instance, has asserted ("The Military in the Political Development of New States" in The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries, 1962, op. cit., page 54) that sub-Saharan African states "... are not threatened, however, by military usurpation because they scarcely have any military forces. They certainly have no indigenous military elite". Gutteridge also made the same error in placing undue emphasis on the size of military forces in relation to their capacity to assume an important political role:

"While the armed forces of Africa remain small in proportion to the total populations and to the areas of the countries ... they are unlikely to be able to consolidate their positions and establish military

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If there are similarities between PNG and the states of black Africa what may be learnt from the experience of military politics in Africa? Considerable research has been conducted into the causes of military intervention in African politics and whilst some writers have tended to emphasise external factors in the polity, others have placed emphasis on factors within the military institution itself. Depending on the emphasis placed on these two broad causal categories, typologies have been constructed in order to classify different types of military intervention in politics.¹ It is, however,

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regimes ... This is almost certainly the answer to those who pose the question of the possibility of military coups in Nigeria or more particularly in Ghana ..."

(W.F. Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States, Raeger, New York, 1965, pages 143-144).

Gutteridge was later proven wrong in both cases and, consequently, small military forces are no longer seen by most commentators as necessarily a bar to successful intervention in politics. (See especially: Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, Princetown, 1971, Chapter 2, "The Size of the Military: Its Relevance for Political Behaviour").

¹ Luckham, (The Nigerian Military, op. cit., pages 6-7) contends that these two divergent traditions in the analysis of civil military relations are chiefly represented on the one hand by Finer, who has emphasised the political environment and on the other by Huntington and Janowitz who have emphasised questions of military professionalism. In regard to typologies of military intervention, Huntington, (Political Order in Changing Societies, op. cit., Chapter 4) has attempted to classify coups d'etat according to the class interests of the coup makers. In the Latin American context he identifies Anticipatory, Break Through, Consolidating and Counter-Revolutionary coups. In regard to black Africa this approach has not been productive largely because of the class structure of both the military and society is inchoate (See Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun, Penguin, London, 1971). Instead, a typology of involvement has been developed by Welch, based on the origins and objectives of political action by the military. Welch posits three broad levels of involvement: corporate action including strikes and mutinies, the Arbiter coup d'etat and the third level of coup d'etat followed by entrenched, protracted military rule. (See Welch "The Soldier and the State in Africa", op. cit.).

a "revisionist" analysis of military intervention which appears to offer the most satisfactory explanation. As argued by A.R. Luckham,

"The military role (in politics) ... is not the product of any single factor or set of factors. There is a complex interplay of changing pressures from the political and social environment; the professional doctrine and political ideas of the officer corps; and the coherence of the military ..."¹

Allowing that the sources of civil-military conflict lie both in the military and in society and in the inter-relationship between both groups, the discussion now turns to some of the potential causes of civil-military conflict in PNG. These causes are discussed under three broad heads: corporate causes, ethnic and regional causes and political causes.

The corporate causes of civil military conflict may be considered in two parts, professional causes and those of corporate self-interest. Conflict between the military and the government has commonly arisen elsewhere in relation to professional judgements by the military, especially where the ability of the military to carry out its mission or adequately provide for national security is perceived by the military leadership to be threatened. Conflict might, for

¹ Luckham, ibid, page 7. See also A.R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations", Government and Opposition, Volume 6, No 1, 1971, page 9. In this article Luckham attributes the causes of military intervention to the following three factors:

- ✦ the strengths and weaknesses of civilian institutions;
- the strengths and weaknesses of the military and the coercive, political and organisational resources at its disposal; and
- the nature of the boundaries and relationships between the military establishment and its socio-political environment.

example, arise over the future size of the PNG Defence Force, the types of units in it, their equipment and training. There might be professional resistance to the roles given to the Force by the PNG Government especially if they are non-traditional ones. It is possible that tensions may develop between the political leadership's view of the PNG DF primarily as an agent of improvised modernization and that of the PNG DF commanders who may prefer to see their primary role as a guarantor of national security and as an internal security reserve of force. Professional conflict with the political leadership may be expected to arise almost inevitably as a result of the military's "conservative realism" in security affairs and their demonstrated tendency to "prepare for the worst".¹ This will only rarely accord with the political leadership's assessments of security problems, conditioned by both the pressing and competing demands for resources in non-defence areas and a disposition to look toward "political" solutions, involving compromise and bargaining.

Political conflict between the military and the civilian regime may be generated by military requests for newer, better (and probably more expensive) materiel. Such demands may be seen by PNG politicians to jeopardise more important national priorities and may be attributed to the military just wanting "new toys to play with". The military may well be prone to seeing their demands in the narrow context of national security imperatives without considering broader national priorities. The risk would appear to be increased because the PNG DF have, in the past, generally been accustomed to receiving modern equipment from Australia

¹ For a discussion of "conservative realism", see S.P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, *op. cit.*, pages 62-79. For evidence of its applicability to the PNG DF, see Appendices 2 and 3.

on a fairly lavish scale.¹

Political tensions might develop over Government attempts to diversify the sources of international defence assistance. Although this policy may be based on sound foreign policy objectives it could be resisted by the military leadership for both logical reasons of uniformity in defence materiel and procedures and also out of a sense of loyalty on the part of the military leadership to their colonial military heritage. The attempt by President Nkrumah of Ghana, for example, to have his defence force officers trained in the USSR provoked a strong reaction from British trained Ghanaian officers who were opposed on ideological as well as purely professional grounds to the change.²

Several causes of civil-military may be considered under the heading of corporate self-interest, a familiar theme of writers on the subject of military involvement in politics. PNG DF personnel are likely to be sensitive about the standard and relativity of their pay and conditions in relation to other groups in society. The transition to independence and beyond may involve some deflation of these standards and this may be resisted by the military leaders under pressure from the members of the Defence Force who might see the issue as a test of the competence of their new local leaders. The Defence Force, as argued earlier, has occupied a position of privilege within PNG society and it has been the last institution to be placed under the control of local political

¹ It is of course not necessarily only the military who might want new "toys" but on occasions the political leadership – for reasons of national or personal prestige. President Nkrumah's desire for an expensive modern navy equipped with frigates as a symbol of his nation's independence is a case in point. (See R. First, The Barrel of a Gun, *op. cit.*).

² See R.E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development" in C. Leys, (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries, Cambridge, 1969, page 255.

institutions. It may resent and attempt to resist attempts by national leaders to reduce resource allocations to defence in favour of other developmental priorities. The PNG military may see their present "slice of the cake" as an irreducible minimum and fight strongly for it to be retained.¹ The Defence Force might also promote the need for expansion after independence both for logically argued professional reasons and for corporate reasons connected with the career ambitions of senior officers and the need to satisfy the promotion expectations of the second echelon of local officers.²

The central point about the potential of corporate and professional interests to cause strain on civil-military relations in PNG is that, whilst most of these interests are also present in a mature democracy, PNG is more vulnerable because the constitutional conventions and institutional restraints on military action are, relatively speaking, untested. The extent to which the PNG DF is willing to politically pursue its corporate interests in the future depends to some extent on its self-perception of its power as an institution and here past experience of success or failure will weigh heavily. If the Defence Force does, at some point, exceed the boundaries of constitutional action in order to achieve its goals then there would seem to be a significant chance that it will be encouraged to do so again in the future. As First has remarked, the "political virginity" of an army once assailed is probably never regained unless there is a radical change in

¹ As argued in Chapter III, political debate in PNG about the size of the defence budget may be distorted for several years after independence because the full extent of defence costs will be disguised by Australian defence aid. If foreign defence aid diminishes or foreign aid is not specifically tied to defence, the political debate on defence spending is likely to become more intense as the defence burden comes to be more clearly seen in terms of alternative costs.

² This problem was discussed in Chapter III.

the professional and political environment.¹

The experience of black African states has illustrated the significance of ethnic and regional tensions as a cause of civil-military conflict and they may also be important in PNG. Issues of ethnicity and regionalism in PNG are intimately connected with national policies concerning economic development, the distribution of resources and the preservation of law and order. If such issues do become intensely politicized and charged with emotion there is a considerable danger that they might spill over into the military also. Alternatively, the PNG DF leadership might feel compelled to involve itself in the political resolution of these questions out of a concern for the preservation of its own organisational cohesion. The Defence Force is likely to see the parochial exploitation of the politics of tribe or region as a threat both to national unity and to the unity of the PNG DF. A specific problem here is how the Defence Force might react to the imposition of ascriptive promotion criteria (based on ethnic origin) which may form part of Government policy to even up the representation of various regions in national organisations.²

A further consequence of ethnic and regionalist political issues in PNG may be an increasing tendency by the PNG DF to foster its own form of elitist "tribalism" as a means of insulating

¹ First, op. cit., page 20.

² The prominence of Papuan officers at the more senior rank level in the PNG DF, which was observed in Chapter III, provides a potential parallel with the Nigerian army and the Ibo. In that case, as tribalism increasingly became a political issue, the preponderance of Ibo officers in the senior ranks was widely interpreted as indicating favouritism in the promotion system, whereas it was in fact the consequence of the earlier pattern of recruitment, as is the case with the prominence of Papuan officers in the PNG DF.

the Defence Force from external divisive pressures . The resultant isolation of the Defence Force and its adherence to professional, western military values entailed in the building up of military in-group loyalties and esprit de corps might well bring the PNG DF into conflict with aspects of Government policy which sought, for example, to reduce urban elitism and privilege .

A third more diverse category of civil-military conflict may be subsumed under the head of political causes . The Defence Force might in the future be drawn into politics as a result of its involvement in internal military operations in PNG . Should the PNG DF be needed to restore internal security in a part of the country it will already, by implication, have assumed a de facto political role .¹ Once the military do assume an order maintenance role they become involved in the political as well as military aspects of the situation . The nature of such operations invariably involve issues concerning the civil law and the Government's social and economic policies . The internal security doctrines of the PNG DF, which have been influenced by the Australian Services' counter revolutionary warfare experience, emphasise the importance of "winning the hearts and minds" of the population and, consequently, a purely "military" approach to these operations would be seen by the military as nugatory .

Quite apart from the de facto political role of the PNG DF if it became engaged on internal security operations, there are two further ways in which such a situation may precipitate deeper political involvement by the Defence Force . Increased reliance by the civilian regime on the Defence Force to suppress political dissent and disorder would, of itself, indicate that the Government

¹ Luckham, (op . cit .), and Sundhaussen, (What Role for the Armed Forces in PNG, (op . cit .), both argue in this way .

was losing political authority.¹ That is, the more the civilian Government came to rely on violence, the more it would be obvious that it was dependent for its survival on the instruments of violence – the Defence Force and Police. This might easily lead to the exploitation of this power relationship by the Defence Force in terms of political demands on the civil regime. Second, there is always a greater possibility when the military are ordered to use force against their fellow countrymen that the military also becomes dissatisfied with the Government. If the PNG DF was seriously involved in internal operations to keep the peace, elements within it may come to believe that the Government was ineffective, unjust or in some other way not fulfilling the people's needs.² The dilemma which a PNG Government faces here is, on the one hand, to contain military influence in politics, but on the other, to identify and associate the Defence Force with PNG's political problems from the outset so that the Defence Force leaders are able to develop realistic assessments of the problems of government rather than a naive belief in simple panaceas which a military government might want to implement.

Attempts by the civilian government to balance other organised instruments of force such as the Police, or a form of militia, against the Defence Force, in an attempt to neutralise its political power might also lead to civil-military conflict rather than the resolution of it. It may lead to the setting up of dangerous rivalries and conspiracy bases for political factions, apart from

¹ This point is proposed by Hannah Arendt, On Violence, Penguin, London, 1970, page 53.

² First, (op. cit., page 153), for instance, argues that military involvement in internal security operations in the Tiv area of Nigeria, coupled with chaos in the civilian government, acted as a flash point for military intervention in politics.

the proliferation of organisations and financial waste.¹ The present policy of PNG Government has been, however, to preserve a parity between the Police and Defence Force and provided that it is generally maintained this problem is unlikely to eventuate.²

A key area of possible civil military conflict and of military intervention in PNG politics is that arising out of a national political crisis. It is conceivable that as a result of dead-lock or conflict between the PNG Parliament and the Cabinet, or between factions of the Cabinet, the Government (or elements of it) may attempt to employ the Defence Force under constitutional provisions to either maintain the status quo, or unseat an allegedly illegal government.³ The possibility of this type of military involvement in PNG depends to some extent on the distribution of constitutional powers between a head of state (if there is to be one) and the head of government and in whom commander-in-chief powers are to be vested and, at the time of writing, these issues have not been resolved. But, notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution, a political crisis may see one of the parties or external groups such as the bureaucracy or trade union movement invite the Defence Force to intervene to resolve it by force. A severe economic

¹ This policy of setting up rival security organisations was employed in Ghana by President Nkrumah. He established his own Presidential Guard Regiment and "colonized" the intelligence agencies but this was not successful in averting his subsequent downfall by coup d'etat. (See R.E. Dowse, op. cit., and also Colonel A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, Frank Cass, London, 1968.

² See Post Courier, 17 October 1973.

³ This situation arose in Nigeria in 1964 when the President sought the support of the Army commander in order to suspend the Prime Minister and his Government. In this case the Army Chief of Staff, a British officer, declined to support the President's actions on the grounds that he believed them to be unconstitutional. (Luckham, op. cit., pages 237-238).

crisis induced by political causes might also precipitate military involvement.¹

It is possible that conflict and military involvement in PNG politics may arise out of the formal structure of civil-military relationships entrenched in the country's constitution or adopted by legislation. Post-independence PNG institutional civil-military relationships, involving the power relationships between military officers and public servants within the PNG Defence organisation and the overall distribution of power between the political leadership (including the Defence Minister) the military and public servant officials, are unlikely to meet the apolitical expectations of Australian defence planners, nor conform in practice to Australian patterns of civil-military relations. The presently intended equal distribution of power in the PNG Defence organisation between the military commander and civilian secretary has been consciously modelled on Australian practice.² The fact is, however, that the Australian pattern of civil-military relations has evolved in an historical context; conventions of civilian control over the military have developed after considerable experience in both war and peace and there are established attitudes within Australian society to the military profession which are unlikely to be exactly shared by PNG society. Furthermore, civilian control in Australia is effected within a mature defence bureaucracy rather than one only now being established and the appropriateness or otherwise of the Australian model for PNG may only be tested with time. One of the situations which might lead to conflict in PNG is the development of personal antagonism and rivalries between minister, public servant and senior military officer within the Defence Organisation which lead to political consequences.

¹ As occurred, for example, in Dahomey (See V.T. Le Vine, "The Coups in Upper Volta, Dahomey and The Central African Republic" in R.I. Rotburg and Ali Mazrui, (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa, op. cit.)

² See Chapters II and III.

There are two themes that emerge from this review of the possible causes of civil-military conflict and military involvement in PNG. First, there is the danger that the corporate isolation of the Defence Force as a result of its distinctive institutional identity and values might lead it to take independent political action. Secondly, there is the danger, also arising from the Defence Force's corporate identity, that divergent political attitudes and values may develop within the military and in civilian leadership groups in PNG.

PART C - THE FUTURE OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PNG

It was earlier argued that the Defence Force might, conceivably, become involved in politics at four identifiable levels, following Finer, ranging from political influence to the supplantment of the civilian regime by a military one. Although the present position of the PNG DF is formally apolitical it may already be said to be capable of exercising political influence. The PNG DF's influence on political decisions in relation to the development and role of the Defence Force emerged during the transfer of military power and this influence is likely to increase as local officers assume senior appointments in the PNG DF and work more closely with their peers in the senior levels of the PNG Public Service, and with politicians, after independence. On the other hand, the presently limited integration of the PNG DF within the Government, advocated and practised by the Somare Government, may not go as far as some PNG DF officers might like and claims for a more extensive political role by senior officers have already been articulated.¹

¹ In September 1973 one senior PNG officer wrote, in advocating a more active involvement of the PNG DF in PNG, that:

"... it can clearly be seen that the Government must expect the senior Service officers to be involved in

Beyond the question of greater political influence by the military within a constitutional framework there is also the prospect of forms of political blackmail, such as for example, mutiny. If the likelihood of some form of corporate action cannot be predicted, it should not be altogether dismissed as impossible. Both the PNG DF and the Police have in the past experienced incidents of unrest involving a refusal to work and some of the Defence Force incidents have been in the nature of "industrial action" with some elements of organisation, leadership and specific claims.¹ These types of incidents, or more serious ones, might reoccur and, in an independent PNG which had no other coercive organisation to fall back on, their political potentiality would be unmistakable. Government austerity measures or economic problems might lead to the presently favourable conditions of service in the PNG DF and Police deteriorating, restraint on political action may diminish as the result of the widespread politicization of PNG society and the

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political matters and allow them to speak out when and where necessary accepting the fact that what is to be spoken may not be in keeping with Government views ... Experience has indicated that the ethos and rules governing the conduct of Service officers has been a direct take from the Australian concept ... PNG, therefore, should disregard this principle of total civilian supremacy over the Military and clearly recognise and appreciate the contribution Service officers can offer in the development of the country."

Earlier, in May 1973, another senior local officer in discussing future problems of civil-military relations wondered about the future loyalty of the members of the PNG DF in the case of harsh unpopular decisions by a civilian government. He thought that the solution to this problem was military representation at a political level "Having a military man as minister of defence would be a step in the right direction". The same officer pointed out that the problem of harmonious civil-military relations extended throughout the officer corps. In this connection he volunteered the view that a successful coup d'etat might initially be launched in Port Moresby by a force as small as one platoon. (Round Table Defence Seminar, Port Moresby, May 1973).

¹ See Chapters I and II.

Australian presence may be no more effective than that of the British in other circumstances in keeping the PNG DF out of politics. Furthermore, Papua New Guinean Defence Force officers may, themselves, be unable to prevent certain forms of corporate action and some local officers may even elect to lead it.

The prospects of a coup d'etat at some time in the future in PNG were briefly mentioned in Chapter IV in the context of threats to internal security. It has, in the past, been argued that the PNG DF is too small to conduct a successful coup and that the officer corps lacks adequate political motivation, but both these observations may be misleading.¹ In operational terms the coup d'etat – the seizure of political power by the military – may be seen as a problem of urban politics. To be successful in the first instance, a coup in PNG would need to be effective in the principal urban areas where the centres of political power – "the commanding heights" – are located. Once the "commanding heights" had been seized (including the political leaders, parliament, principal Government offices and radio stations) and the civil Government toppled, the process of consolidation and extension of power to

¹ In November 1972 the Commander of the PNG DF (then known as the PNG Joint Force) stated that there was no chance of the Army force of one battalion in Port Moresby engineering a successful coup without the full support of the Police and Administration. (Post Courier, 10 November 1972). It might be, however, that this one battalion force, together with the other military units in the Port Moresby area was a quite sufficient force, given the connivance or even inaction of the Police and Public Service, rather than their full support. Secondly, it seems conceivable that the military might concentrate forces in Port Moresby from other areas (using the transport resources at their disposal for bogus purposes) and thereby enhancing their capabilities. The argument that a coup would be impossible seems to rest too heavily on the assumption that such a move would be violently opposed by the Police and the bureaucracy.

the rural areas might take place more gradually. The point here is that in the initial seizure of power a small force may well be adequate, perhaps acting without the active support of other groups. It is in the second stage, the extension and consolidation of power, that a coup would need to broaden its political base. At this stage the support of the PNG Public Service (or significant elements of it) and of the Police would probably be of great importance in order to establish a viable pattern of administration over the country in the wake of the coup.¹

Although support by the Police and Public Service might be the sine qua non for a successful military take-over in PNG, it is relevant that this support has almost invariably been forthcoming in the black African experience and the reasons why this has been so may also apply in the PNG case. It is argued that the bureaucracy and police in black Africa have been willing to cooperate, or at least, not obstruct the military in their involvement in politics because these three groups represent a substantial community of interest – in terms of their status as members of an urban elite and in their perception of modernization and nationalism as key political issues. In addition, in the eyes of the bureaucrats, a military coup is often seen as resulting in the promotion of "administration above politics"; that is, increased power and

¹ O'Neill has argued that a successful coup in PNG would need to be broadened to include the Police otherwise the military might face "a larger if not so well armed force". (O'Neill, op. cit., page 26). Whilst this statement may be factually correct, it does not fully take into account the more dispersed nature of Police deployment in PNG, compared to the PNG DF's concentration in four main centres. A second factor is that apart from being less well armed, the Police, excluding the Police mobile units, are neither organised nor trained to operate in groups as is the military; this is likely to favour the PNG DF in the event of any armed conflict between the two.

opportunities for the Public Service to exercise its "rational" skills of administration and planning, replacing the politicians and their "political compromises and deals".¹

Apart from the question of how the PNG Public Service might respond to political intervention by the military, there is the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the Public Service might actually encourage or incite military intervention. That is, in terms of Janowitz's distinction between designed and reactive military intervention, the PNG DF leaders might be led to perceive the political situation in such a way that intervention was required for the good of the country as well as being called for by the Public Service and other groups.² Further, on the basis of the experience of the African armies, one might argue that a coup d'etat in PNG may not necessarily require a highly politicized or politically sophisticated officer corps. Junior officers in command of units and politically naive officers have led take-over bids merely out of a sense of "national duty" or from simplistic motivations of wanting

¹ These sorts of attitudes and generalizations are argued throughout by R. First, The Barrel of a Gun, op. cit. First characterises the attitude commonly found amongst the black African public servant as that of "politics" being a dirty game and hence government would be better without it; and that the public servant believes in the mystique of administrative efficiency which is capable of solving all the problems of government. (page 114).

² In relation to the bureaucracy taking an active part in the processes leading up to a coup d'etat, First quotes a Ghanaian civil servant (subsequently head of the National Economic Committee after the 1966 coup) as follows:

"... there are more ways of getting rid of a President than by holding general elections".

(First, op. cit., page 191). She earlier describes the crucial role of the civil service in the coup d'etat in African politics as follows:

"The civil service does not act directly to seize state power. But once the military does that, it is the civil service that closets the new regime in its shaky first hours and makes sure it survives". (page 114).

(See also, M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, op. cit.)

to "clean up the country", rid it of "corrupt" politicians, or even out of a naked self-interest in achieving power.¹ The coup in PNG might require only a relatively small cabal of politically motivated officers who were able, at the crucial moment, to claim the loyalty of their less "political" fellow officers and men.² In regard to the actual political attitudes of the PNG DF officer corps it has been

¹ Finer (op.cit., page 243) places great, possibly too great, emphasis on self-interest, pride, ambition and revenge as the prime movers of military intervention, whereas the military leadership, in Africa at least, seem to have been as frequently motivated by an albeit naive belief in a higher responsibilities to the state, as "saviours of the nation". The PNG DF might similarly be influenced by the view that they owe their primary allegiance to the nation rather than to the government of the day, somewhat after General MacArthur's views on the subject:

"I find in existence today a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of government rather than to the country and its constitution which they are sworn to defend".

(Address to Congress, General Douglas MacArthur, 1952, quoted in Finer, op. cit., page 26).

Similar views have also been current in the neighbouring Indonesian military (See A. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, Pall Mall, 1965, page 94). It is this concept of the higher national interest which is so dangerous, questioning as it does the principle of military responsiveness to political direction.

² The key group of officers in any planning would probably be the troop commanders who controlled the "bayonets" and personal loyalty of the troops. As the examples in Nigeria, Ghana and elsewhere illustrate, the most senior echelon of military commanders may even be bypassed in any plotting because of a belief that they are too close to the politicians or unsympathetic to the cause of the junior officers.

asserted, for instance, that whilst "... Papua New Guinean lieutenants will admit over their second beer their contempt for most politicians ... the Army is not yet anyway - a political force".¹ It is implicit in this sort of observation, however, that the evolution of political attitudes in the military may be both rapid and sudden in response to developments in the political environment. There is, moreover, considerable evidence that the process of politicization in the PNG DF, especially amongst the officer corps, is further advanced than the above quotation indicates and that this process is accelerating as PNG draws nearer to independence.

The survey conducted by a senior PNG officer amongst thirty two of his fellow Papua New Guinean officers in late 1972, referred to in Chapter III, yielded some interesting results in this connection.² Twenty eight officers agreed that the military should intervene in politics in the interests of the nation

¹ National Times, 5 November 1973, Christopher Ashton, "Special Report-Papua New Guinea, The End of Australia's Empire":

"For the present the Australian officers hold the Papua New Guinean officers in check from developing a political identity of their own. They are certainly conscious of the future political role assigned to them by journalists and academics alike and they feel resentment at the limited role assigned to the defence force in nation building. But for the present they lack the inclination, freedom and provocation to shape themselves into a separate political force".

It might rather be argued that PNG officers are unlikely to be prevented from developing political orientations and sympathies merely by the presence of Australian officers.

² Personal Communication, May 1973. The officer tested 32 of the 48 PNG officers then serving with the PNG DF. He stated that the remainder were either serving in a remote area, or not available because of other duties.

if a political impasse developed. Thirty officers believed that the military should intervene as the guardian of the nation if the nation suffered at the hands of politicians. Twenty six officers believed that PNG was not suited to a democratic form of government. Thirty one officers believed that a military officer should represent the Defence Force in the Parliament. Thirty respondents believed that the Army would play an important part after independence, especially in enforcing law and order. And significantly, thirty of the officers believed that the Defence Force would play an important role in holding the country together after independence. One specific implication of these results, if they are to be taken as generally representative of the PNG DF indigenous leadership, is that the political dismemberment of PNG after independence would severely test the cohesion and loyalty of the PNG DF to a national government which tolerated such developments without an attempt to use force.

The surveys conducted by this writer also reveal the development of political attitudes amongst the PNG DF officer corps and those about to become officers.¹ Although, in a survey conducted in January 1974, a majority of those questioned in the PNG DF firmly rejected the proposition that the Defence Force constituted a threat to civilian supremacy in government, there was widespread support for the expansion of the military role in PNG society. Those questioned wished to see military men employed in non-military areas of government in PNG and, specifically, in the operation of a national service scheme. More than half, in what would be a most significant deviation from an apolitical role, wished to see the PNG DF represented by its own member in the national Parliament. Given that it was unlikely that PNG DF officers and officer cadets would be completely

¹ See Appendices 2 and 3 for detailed results.

frank in these matters, especially where their attitudes were in conflict with their training and indoctrination, the overall picture which emerges from these surveys is that of considerable doubt about the persistence of apolitical norms in the PNG DF. It would also appear from the two surveys conducted that attitudes within the PNG DF and amongst the PNG civilian elite about questions of civil-military relations are in a process of evolution and this process may intensify after independence, making any predictions on the subject a hazardous undertaking.

Like Papua New Guinea, the development of armed forces in black Africa during the colonial period was based on what now seems to be an incorrect premise, namely, that armies in these states would naturally assume an apolitical relationship to the civil power and so remain outside politics. Such an assumption overlooked the historical evolution of the state in western society and the relationship of force to the state. In the absence of a developed political culture which established conventions and political traditions within the polity and concepts of professionalism within the military, it was unrealistic to place the military outside the political processes of the nation – as much as it might have been a very desirable philosophical objective. The recent political history in Africa and elsewhere in developing nations has pointed to the likely failure of this policy in PNG. The structure of relationships between the civil government and the military within any given state are largely determined by historical evolution. The prescription of rules alone, where they have no foundation in established conventions of legitimate political behaviour within the society, are unlikely to be respected when under stress. As argued by Rapoport, military and political institutions should not be regarded in isolation. Rather, they have an inter-dependent relationship and it is logical that the function the military performs

within the state will effect its relationship to the civil power.¹ The principal function of defence forces in most developed countries is their employment as instruments of foreign policy and for external national defence, whereas in the New States they have been more prominently involved in internal security and in nation building tasks, either as a consequence of their general administrative resources or through physical developmental tasks such as road building. This involvement of the military in day-to-day activities within the nation, rather than emphasis on a contingent role of national defence against an external threat, appears likely to be the case in PNG also, and this will in all probability contribute to the projection of the military into PNG political affairs. One might conclude that if the military in the New States are destined to continue to play an active political role, continued formal adherence to the concept of civil-military relations based on an apolitical military in a country like PNG is dangerously unrealistic.

In the developed states civil control over the military and the development of apolitisme has been achieved by one of two broad strategies; in Huntington's terms, by either the subjective or objective civilian control of the military.² The suitability of these two strategies as a means of limiting the political role of Papua New Guinea's Defence Force is discussed below.

Huntington argues that under a system of objective civilian control the maximization of military effectiveness may be achieved by a combination of a low, defined degree of military political

¹ D.C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types", S.P. Huntington, (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics, op. cit., page 97.

² See S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pages 80-97.

power and a high degree of military professionalism. Huntington cites as examples Britain and the United States since the Second World War. Australia also fits this model. On the other hand, Huntington argues that subjective civilian control is achieved by the maximization of civilian political power over the military professionalism and military values. The states in the communist bloc may be seen to generally follow this form of civilian control over the military.

In PNG, civilian control over the military is at present based on the objective model following Australian practice, but objective control would appear to depend on two pre-conditions which may not apply to PNG. These are, first, the existence of mature, stable political institutions through which civilian power over the military may effectively be exercised and, secondly, attitudes of professionalism within the military which impose normative restraints on political involvement. If the web of political institutions or the tradition of professionalism are not well established within the polity, as would appear to be the case in PNG, it is unrealistic to expect that objective civilian control will become reliably established.¹

¹ Kenya would appear to be a somewhat limited exception to this generalization. After the 1964 mutiny (a failure of objective civilian control) a dual policy of accelerated localization and intensified efforts to promote military professionalism along western lines was pursued. The result is that the military have become a privileged group within Kenyan society. This policy of keeping the military materially satisfied and relatively unfettered within their professional boundary has been moderately successful. There has subsequently been only one publicised instance of involvement in politics which was "nipped in the bud". On 8 June 1972 twelve Kenyans were convicted and gaoled for a conspiracy to topple the Kenyan Government. The leader of the conspirators was a former Army officer cadet. At the trial, the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Ndolo was alleged to have been involved in the plot; General Ndolo was subsequently "retired" on 1 July 1972. Later, during 1972, President Kenyatta advised members of the Kenyan armed forces "not to entertain

For this reason, hopes for effective civilian control over the military in the New States and in PNG might be better placed with subjective control. The political domination of the Defence Force by the political leadership in PNG would require that the leadership was able to retain the loyalty and allegiance of the Force by a pervasive ideology, or by dependence on the charisma of a leader. This would have to be backed up in either case by a control apparatus such as a network of political officers in the Defence Force and courses of political indoctrination. Because of this structure of political ideology, charismatic leadership and controls, it would be difficult to envisage such a system operating successfully in other than a Single Party State. PNG has not yet moved in that direction (although it has been advocated by some) and, therefore, subjective control does not seem to be a practical option in the immediate future. But even under a system of subjective civilian control of the military, as in Tanzania, the danger of military intervention in politics is not removed. The non-political role of the military under such a system still ultimately depends on the pervasiveness of the dominant state ideology and the control apparatus in ensuring military loyalty.¹ Although the integration

1 (Continued)

politics" and told officers to report any political instigators to their seniors. (Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 June 1972, pages 2135; 1-31 August 1972, pages 2205; and 1-31 December 1972, page 2315). There appears to have been some degree of breakdown in the post-1964 tradition of an apolitical army in Kenya.

¹ Subjective civilian control does not alter the pivotal relationship of the defence forces as the guarantors of state power to the civil leadership. Where there is a failure of ideology, or of loyalty, to the civilian leadership, the military are able to play a powerful political role once again. The case of Ghana after 1966 illustrates the potential instability of civilian control over the military where it is based on subjective political control only and has no significant support in terms of institutional and professional norms. In Ghana's case, the instrument of political control, the CPP, had become ineffective as a vehicle for mobilizing mass support and as a weapon of ideological control. At the same time, the formerly charismatic leadership of President Nkrumah was no longer able to retain the loyalty of the instruments of coercion.

of the military into the political system in Tanzania (by the appointment of a political commissar, by party membership for military leaders and party indoctrination) has so far averted military intervention in the political process, the armed forces in Tanzania still provide a potential source of opposition to President Nyerere and they apparently continue to occupy an elite status.¹

It appears, therefore, that there is no simple answer to the problem of civilian control over the military in PNG, either by so called subjective or objective patterns of control and there is a case for looking at an alternative pattern of civil-military relations in PNG.

¹ Apart from a number of Army arrests in September 1964 which have not subsequently been fully explained, the Tanzanian Army has remained loyal to the Nyerere Government, however, the Army may be a potential source of serious opposition to TANU rule. It is believed that the most numerically represented within the Army are the Chagga and Hehe tribes and these groups form a prosperous "Kulak" group of farmers opposed to the TANU Ujamaatisation program. Further:

"The loyalty of the Army ... is in a sense bought. Soldiers like civil servants, are an elite group in Tanzania, which means they are better paid, better fed, clothed and housed than the rest of the population. They also possess the petty privileges of power enjoyed by other soldiery in Africa, which so enrage civilian populations and which could perhaps be best summed up by saying that the man in the uniform expects to get served first; ..."

(Africa Confidential, Volume 13, No 7, April 1972).

PART D - CONCLUSION - THE CONTAINMENT POLICY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PNG

The central problem of military politics in PNG may be stated not so much in terms of keeping the military out of politics and apolitical but rather of containing the military's political role so that it does not dominate all other political groups in society. To the extent that some degree of military involvement in politics is inevitable (as is argued here) a solution might be found in channelling involvement so that it contributes to PNG's political life in such a manner that it does not wreck civilian political institutions. This approach might be described as policy of containment of the military roles in politics.¹

The containment approach to the problem of political involvement would begin by accepting the PNG DF as a centre of potential political power and then proceed to place the military within the political system with a defined role in much the same way that other groups such as the trade unions and political parties have legitimate political roles. The policy would seek to reduce

¹ The containment policy employs Sundhaussen's concept of politico-military integration (See U. Sundhaussen, "What Role for the Armed Forces in Papua New Guinea", op. cit., page 4 et passim). Sundhaussen argues that his policy of integration would:

"... centre on efforts to involve the military in the task of nation building, to enlarge the area of responsibility for the military, and to provide for a degree of participation of the military in the running of the state. Such a policy would lead officers to develop a stake in the maintenance of the political system. It would not, and should not, tie the military to a particular government but rather would create a loyalty to the state and the political system as such, and the army could thus become a guardian against any one particular group, hopefully including itself, trying to usurp power."

the Defence Force's corporate isolation and thus improve civil-military communications. In this way the potential for unilateral political action by the military might be significantly reduced. Similarly, there would seem to be a diminished likelihood of political action by the military if their political outlook and perceptions accorded more closely with those of the civilian leadership. This would be more likely if there were, in addition to an integration of leadership elites, legitimate and prescribed channels of political activity through which the military were able to articulate political demands in a similar manner to other groups possessing political power. Legitimate political activity by the Defence Force might also serve the added purpose of political education. In this process, the military leadership would be able to develop an awareness of the overall problems of government. It would, hopefully, thereby develop realistic expectations of what lay within the resources of government to change, of what was possible and what was impossible to achieve.¹

¹ This general approach was also advocated in an editorial on PNG in the SMH on 30 April 1973:

"The dangers inherent in any situation in which the Army is used for political purposes is that it acquires a political interest without a corresponding appreciation of political problems. Prudent civilian government will seek to identify the Army with national goals and aims, to involve it in political dialogue with civilian leaders, and above all to get the Army to see itself as an integral part of government rather than as some menacing alternative to it. The messy sometimes tragic intervention of African armies in African politics came about because, confined to barracks in the traditional, European "non-political" role, they were forced into the political arena, sometimes against their will and with no knowledge of the overall problems, because of the collapse of civil government".

In practical terms the containment policy would involve the expansion of the present role and formal powers of the Defence Force and it would follow on from the present limited policy of integrating the PNG DF leadership with the Government. The changes entailed in a containment policy might include the following sorts of proposals. The Defence Force would be consulted and actively involved in the development of national policies beyond narrow defence spheres. Thus, senior Defence Force officers might participate on Departmental and even Cabinet committees as advisors concerned with economic, social and foreign affairs policy questions. Defence Force leaders might also be associated with the civil Government by other measures such as the rotation of PNG DF officers in senior Public Service appointments, including District Commissionerships (or their post-independence equivalents). So as to provide for a suitable pattern of promotion and turn-over of officers and as a means of more closely associating the military with the civil community, officers could be permitted to retire early and be absorbed into the Public Service, commerce and industry under the provisions of special re-employment schemes.¹

The present system of dual headship within the Higher Defence Organisation is probably inappropriate to the containment policy of civil-military relations, which accepts the military as a political force; it would, therefore, have to be modified. The military head of the PNG DF might be placed in a superior relationship to the senior civilian either by law or under a de facto arrangement. The question of whether or not the Defence Minister should be a military man is more difficult. In one sense the Defence Force has the potential political power of veto over a civilian Cabinet regardless of whether or not the military is represented in the Cabinet and so the argument that a military

¹ It was argued in Chapter III that this type of arrangement, which operates in Israel, is one means of controlling the military's role expansion ambitions.

Defence Minister would be able to bring down the Government is not a key issue. On the other hand the Defence Minister in PNG, under a system of Cabinet Government, is involved in a range of non-defence political issues and he belongs to a political party and for this reason it may not be desirable to have an officer as Defence Minister. One possible solution could be to appoint either a serving or recently retired officer as Assistant Defence Minister. He would report and represent the views of the Defence Forces and its Commander on professional questions within the Cabinet and to the Defence Minister as required. The Assistant Defence Minister would be available to represent the Defence Force on Departmental and Cabinet committees as necessary and he would also have the task, with the Defence Minister, of presenting the Defence Force budget proposals to Cabinet and arguing for them. He might, or might not, have a nominated seat in the Parliament. The relationship, in this proposal, between the Assistant Defence Minister and the Defence Force Commander would need to be carefully specified to minimise conflict, however, the Commander would probably have to remain as the principal source of professional military advice to the Government, although the Government would also be able to draw advice from the Assistant Minister, who might well be retired and thus somewhat independent of the Defence Force.¹

PNG is confronted with a dilemma in its civil-military relations. It may seek either to achieve civilian domination of

¹ The concept of nominated officials holding appointments as Assistant Ministers might also be extended to the Police and Public Service. The Defence Assistant Minister could free the PNG DF commander from these more "political" tasks. Because the Assistant Defence Minister would occupy a powerful office, conflict between him and the commander might well arise, but on the other hand this might also provide opportunities for a countervailing influence on military role expansion and political power.

the military, or it may adopt policies of civil-military integration. Civilian domination in an underdeveloped state probably points towards subjective civilian control and whilst subjective control broadly preserves the principle of a non-political military it does not appear to be a practical option for PNG. Integration of the military and political leadership in PNG, as proposed in the containment policy of civil-military relations, necessarily discards the notion of military apolitisme by its recognition of the military as a centre of political power. It therefore offends against concepts of liberal democracy in which power is held to be derived from the electoral mandate of the people. (Military political power is representative only of the people within its organisation). On the other hand it has been argued here that the integration of the PNG DF within the PNG political system, the sharing of political power and the conferral of defined political roles on the military might offer a better prospect of limiting military intervention within PNG by developing closer cooperation between the civilian and military leadership groups. Limited participation in politics by the Defence Force might also be expected to lead to a commitment to the political system, the development of a common ideology amongst the military and civil elites and the emergence of conventions of military restraint in the political sphere.

It might be argued that opening the door to a political role by the PNG DF in this way would, in fact, lead to military domination of PNG politics and that to assert otherwise is just wishful thinking. If it is true that adoption of the containment policy does have an element of hopeful thinking in it, it may be compared to the prospects for civil-military relations in PNG based on an apolitical military which offers little grounds for hope indeed.

The history of the black African states show that the leadership of New States commonly place national priorities in the direction of building a unified nation by means of strong central government. In this task of forging national unity and consensus the military, as the coercive basis of state power, occupy a key role, especially if political compromise with dissenters fails. The history of the New States also shows that the creation of consensus and the development of viable political institutions is seldom without its procrustean aspect, as democratic values fall prey to expediency and necessity. In this phase of development the military is unquestionably a potential political force. When consensus is developed, institutions mature and norms of political behaviour become established, the military role in politics may be expected to diminish and civilian control over the military will become feasible. Until this occurs the political potential of the military is an at times unpalatable reality which should be faced. The threat posed by military intervention to the democratic values and institutions of PNG cannot be effectively met merely by the wording of constitutions or by the espousal of sentiments of democratic theory.

Papua New Guinea has, so far and like almost all New States, regarded its Defence Force as both an indispensable symbol of national sovereignty and, more practically, as the guarantor of state power. Because of the decision to maintain a Defence Force, PNG will also be faced with the problem of establishing a pattern of civil military relations which reflects the real distribution of political power.

As seen on the eve of independence the Papua New Guinea Defence Force possesses a limited military capacity, but a considerably greater political capability. The PNG DF will be a national organisation seeking to establish its own nationalist ethos within a newly independent state and this process is

likely to involve adjustment from its present formally apolitical status, based on its Australian heritage, to a political role as an important participant in PNG Government. The expansion of the Defence Force role may result either from conscious political decisions to involve the military more deeply in politics, as advocated under the containment policy, or from the force of events.

The overall conclusion of this study is that Papua New Guinea's Defence Force will be a significant political force which will probably come to share political power in PNG with civilian politicians and other groups including the Public Service, Police, trade unions and students. If the Defence Force is granted a legitimate political role, as advocated, then it would seem likely that it will be a force for stabilization, national integration and development and it will contribute to the establishment of a stronger institutional order in PNG. If, on the other hand, civil-military relations continue to be based formally and in substance on the imported model of an apolitical military then the future may bring military intervention in politics which is destructive of civilian political institutions and which leads to serious political instability in an independent Papua New Guinea.

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THE ROLE OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA DEFENCE FORCE -
THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF MILITARY FORCES
TO AN INDEPENDENT PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Paul Mench



VOLUME II

APPENDICES



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APPENDIX 1

A SURVEY OF THE DEFENCE FORCES OF SMALL STATES - A COMPARISON OF SELECTED DEFENCE STATISTICS IN 26 STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA, PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND FIJI

INTRODUCTION

The survey was undertaken in order to compare defence statistics in Papua New Guinea with those of independent states in Tropical Africa. Fiji was also included in the survey because of its presence in the Pacific region with Papua New Guinea with which it shares cultural and diplomatic links. The survey sought to identify factors in the "defence profile" of each country which may have affected the size of its defence forces and expenditure on them.

CONTENTS

The survey should be read in conjunction with the information contained in the tables and annex which are attached:

Table A Comparative Statistics of Selected Tropical African States, Papua New Guinea and Fiji in Relation to National Defence - States Ranked by Population (page 27)

Table B Part 2 - Comparative Data on Tropical African States, Papua New Guinea and Fiji in Relation to National Defence. (page 32)

Annex A Sources, Footnotes and Work Sheets (page 39)

The African Comparison

African states were employed in the survey for comparative purposes for three reasons:

- The nations of Tropical Africa provide a group of states with population, land area, economic development and armed forces sizes which are of the order of Papua New Guinea's own statistics in these areas.
- These states (with the exception of Liberia) were former colonies which have recently gained independence. Thus they share a similar political history with PNG, which is soon to become independent.
- With only five exceptions, all states in tropical Africa have their own regular armed forces. (These exceptions are Gambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Equatorial Guinea¹). Many of these armed forces are of similar size to those which exist in PNG.

Countries Included in the Survey

The survey embraces a selected group of states in Tropical (or Sub-Saharan) Africa². The criteria for the selection of the

-
1. These countries rely instead on a para-military element in the police. Gambia, a micro-state, has a defence arrangement with Senegal. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland each have small populations and are, in effect, strategic hostages of their powerful neighbour, South Africa. Equatorial Guinea does have a National Guard. (See R. Booth, "The Armed Forces of African States, 1970" Adelphi Paper No. 67, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1970).
 2. The terms Tropical, and Sub-Saharan, Africa are both applied to the African nations included in this survey.

states are discussed in detail in Note 11. Four very large states (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire and Sudan) in the region have been omitted, as have four micro-states which have no armed forces (Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Gambia, Swaziland). One state, Botswana, although it has no armed forces, has been included because of its large land area size and as an example of a state without defence forces. The remaining twenty six Tropical African, black independent states, together with PNG and Fiji comprise the survey group.

A Note on Sources and the Reliability of Information

A list of sources used in the compilation of the data is shown in Annex A. Some of the nations in this survey have little information available on their defence forces. Of that which is available, different reference sources sometimes give conflicting information. Statistics may also be unreliable and are frequently several years out of date. In spite of these difficulties it is likely that the ranking of states within the survey is generally reliable. The order of the statistics, rather than the absolute accuracy of the figures, has been relied on.

SURVEY RESULTS

Comparative Statistics - PNG and the Survey States

- (a) Population. Papua New Guinea's population of 2.58 million placed it 20th in the survey. There were,

however, 19 out of the 28 states which had a population under 5 million.

- (b) Urbanization. PNG's percentage of urbanization of 8.3 per cent placed it 18th in the Survey. There were only 9 countries less urbanized than PNG. (The median score was 12.6 per cent).
- (c) Land Area. PNG's land area of 178,260 square miles ranked it in the larger half of the survey nations, together with Congo and Cameroon. (Fiji was the smallest nation in the survey). The median score was 123,804 square miles. (Ivory Coast).
- (d) GNP. PNG's GNP of \$784 million ranked it in 10th place after Senegal and before Guinea. In gross economic terms, therefore, PNG was amongst the larger nations.
- (e) GNP per Capita. PNG's estimated per capita GNP figure of \$292 placed it, favourably, in the wealthier category of states, in 6th place after Gabon and Ghana and before Liberia. (Fiji's per capita figure of \$593 placed it in first place.)
- (f) Defence Budgets. PNG's estimated "independence defence budget" of US\$17 million placed it as the country with the 8th largest defence expenditure after Zambia, Senegal and Tanzania. The median defence budget was only \$8 million. (Chad).

- (g) Defence Burden (The Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP). PNG's defence burden of 2.25 per cent of GDP placed it in 7th position after Chad, Dahomey and Senegal. (For the purposes of this survey the total PNG defence budget was imputed as PNG budgetary burden, whereas in fact, Australia and possibly other nations will contribute defence aid. This will lower the actual "burden" somewhat)
- (h) Armed Forces Size. The target, localised strength of the PNG Defence Force of 3500 placed it with the 14th largest force, that is, exactly in the median position. (Fiji's force was the smallest after Botswana, which has no defence force). PNG shared its ranking with the Ivory Coast which also has a 3500 man-force.
- (i) Armed Forces per 1000 head of Population. PNG had 1.35 men in the armed forces for each 1000 in the population. It ranked 9th after Gabon (1.57), Guinea (1.49) and Senegal (1.4). (Fiji ranked 22nd with .63). The median score was Burundi (.83).
- (j) Armed Forces per 1000 square miles. PNG ranked 19th with 19.6 men per 1000 square miles, after Cameroon (27), Malawi (25), Zambia (20). The median score was Kenya (29).

- (k) Number of Frontiers. 24 states had frontiers with between 3 and 8 states. PNG and seven other states have frontiers with three states. Fiji and Malagasy both have no land frontiers. Whilst PNG has fewer frontiers with other states than 17 of the states, it has more miles of coastline than any other state, and its land frontier (with Indonesia) is a long one (725 kms).
- (l) History of Previous (or Present) Military Conflict of Confrontation with Another State. 9 nations were considered to have had previous, or present military conflict or confrontation. 19 nations (including PNG and Fiji) did not.
- (m) Military Intervention in Politics Since Independence 19 nations were considered to have had at least one case of intervention. 9 nations (including PNG and Fiji) did not.
- (n) Under Military Rule Jan 1974. 11 nations were under military rule; 17 nations (including PNG and Fiji) were not.
- (o) Internal Security Problems Since Independence (Not Including Coup d'Etat). 15 nations were considered to have had some internal security problems since independence. 13 nations (including Fiji and PNG) have not.

A Preliminary Analysis

In terms of the above comparison with the African states included in this survey, PNG is a middle-sized country in land area, but amongst the smaller countries in terms of population. In relation to economic wealth, it is comparable to the more wealthy African states and its per capita GNP figures places it in the above-average category. PNG spends more on defence than most countries in the survey both in absolute terms and in terms of its "defence burden" (that is, the defence budget expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Produce (GDP)). On the other hand, the size of PNG's defence forces place it amongst the middle ranking states in spite of its above-average defence expenditure. Although the size of the PNG defence force is average, the size of the PNG defence force, on a per capita basis, is somewhat above average.

The apparent "expensiveness" of the PNG defence force, that is, its size in relation to the defence budget, shows some similarity with the Ivory Coast. This country spends about the same amount on defence for a force of 3500 men. The Ivory Coast force, however, appears to have considerably more complex equipment in it (namely; tanks, armoured cars, scout cars, field artillery and anti-aircraft guns and a larger number of transport aircraft) compared to PNG's force. If one looks further, however, at the cases of Guinea (Defence Budget: \$15.5 million, c.f. PNG \$17.0 million), Tanzania (\$19.1 million) and Senegal (\$19.1 million) it becomes apparent that these countries appear to get more for their "defence dollar" than PNG.

Guinea has a force of 6100 men, an armoured battalion, four infantry battalions, three engineer companies and a quite significant navy and air force (at least on paper). Tanzania has a force of over eleven thousand men for defence expenditure only some \$2 million more than PNG. The general conclusion drawn from this comparison of PNG with African forces is that for a given level of defence expenditure, African states appear to have larger forces and, in many cases, a wider range of combat equipment.

There would seem to be four possible explanations of this situation. First, it is possible that the PNG defence force is significantly better paid and more elaborately maintained; that is, each man in the PNG DF is more expensive to maintain than his African counterpart. Secondly the budget of the PNG DF may have been overestimated, or falsely inflated, as a result of the Australian defence participation. Thirdly, the apparently better combat-to-support ratio of the African armies and the range of armoured, parachute and engineer units which some small African armies have, may indicate a lack of proper balance in these forces between combat and logistic resources. That is, the PNG Defence Force may have a better logistic support system (which may be an expensive defence budget item, but require few men to operate). Fourthly, it is possible that the true defence costs of some African countries are concealed either by external defence aid, or by budgetary malpractice.

It is likely that the pay and conditions of the PNG

Defence Force are better than most, if not all, African armies. The PNG defence forces have for long been an integral part of the Australian Services and Australians have served with them and led them. PNG forces, therefore, have been prone to take on the standards and conditions more applicable to a developed country. This pattern of development, unlike the pattern of development of colonial forces in Africa, may be attributed to Australian proximity and her administrative and economic domination of PNG. Furthermore, the PNG DF has not yet had to face a period of financial austerity as a result of independence and the cutting of ties with the former metropole, or try to become economically more self-reliant.

It is also possible, but on balance unlikely, that the US\$17 million estimate of PNG's defence budget is inflated by the inclusion of costs which are attributable to Australian personnel and defence functions. This issue may only be resolved after independence when the actual costs of the Defence Force to the PNG government become known and they are disentangled from Australian defence cost structure. The estimate of US\$17 million rests on the cost studies conducted during 1973 which aimed to produce a 3500 man force on an annual budget of about A\$14 million. This amount did not include the additional costs which were due to the Australian presence, for example the salary differential between PNG salaries and those of Australian servicemen who would be required in the force. It is already clear that the A\$14 million target has already been exceeded in the predicted "independence force" and so US\$17 million

may be a conservatively low estimate. It is also fair here to point out that Australia has announced that from the outset she will only expect PNG to pay in the order of A\$4-6 million of her own defence budget. The remainder will continue to be paid by Australia. PNG will, one assumes, be expected to assume a gradually increasing proportion of her defence costs. The point remains that PNG's total defence budget (that is, the part she pays for as well as the part paid for by Australia) may be considered as the ultimate defence burden PNG will be required to bear and it is this figure, US\$17 million, which may usefully be compared with the African states in the survey.

From an inspection of the composition of the African armies, which is shown in Part II of the Comparative table, it seems to be clear that there is a higher proportion of combat units to logistic units within these forces than in the PNG DF. To again take the example of the Ivory Coast, its 3100 man army has three infantry battalions, an armoured squadron, a parachute company and two artillery batteries. The PNG DF (the same size as the Ivory Coast force) has only two infantry battalions, an engineer company and a signals squadron as its combat force. The armies of Senegal, Kenya, Zambia and Guinea, amongst others, also display an apparently higher ratio of combat to logistic units.

The PNG DF has an actual combat/logistic support ratio of about 1 : 1, whereas the corresponding ratio in the armies of developed countries is much less favourable, that is to say, more men are required to support each combat soldier. The trend has been that as defence forces become more complex and

modern more men are required to logistically support the combat units. Thus, whilst the 1 : 1 ratio is considered by Australian planners to be workable for the relatively simple PNG force, it would seem doubtful whether ratios more than 1 : 1 would permit African armies to adequately maintain their equipment or conduct sustained military operations. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that many of these African armies which appear to have combat/logistic ratios of more than 1 : 1 (that is, more than one combat soldier to each support soldier), possess more complex equipment than the PNG DF, including tanks, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), artillery, missiles (Zambia) and combat aircraft. Indeed, The Military Balance 1973-1974¹ notes that the African states, particularly the smaller ones, have equipment serviceability problems due to lack of maintenance resources.

As to the possibility that African states' defence budgets are concealed by external defence aid or budgetary malpractice, this is difficult to prove. It is possible that some regimes, especially in states under military rule, spend more on their defence forces than they disclose. It is likely, therefore, that published defence spending figures are minimum figures and variations, if any, would be above these figures. In regard to external defence aid, two points may be made. First, most of the states in Tropical Africa have some form of defence relationship with developed countries - in most cases,

1. The Military Balance 1973-1974, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1973, pages 39-44.

the former metropole. This is especially true in regard to the former French dependencies. Typically, French military assistance is more formally based and British assistance has taken place more informally, on an ad hoc basis within the framework of Commonwealth relationships.¹ Generally however, this external aid is of a relatively modest nature and often takes the form of personnel in a training role. The principal exceptions

1. There are both Multilateral and Bilateral defence agreements in the Tropical African region:

a. Multilateral Agreements

- (1) Regional defence pact between France, Congo, CAR and Chad.
- (2) Five party defence agreement between France, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta. A Conseil de Defense de l'Afrique Equatorial has been set up.

b. Bilateral Agreements

- (1) US has security assistance agreements and provides military aid on either grant or credit basis to Zaire and Ethiopia.*
- (2) Soviet military assistance has been given to Guinea, Mali, Mauritania*, Nigeria and Somalia.
(The Soviet Union is not known to have any formal defence agreements).
- (3) China has a military assistance agreement with Congo. It may have an agreement with Tanzania to cover its military assistance there.
- (4) Britain maintains a defence agreement with Kenya and has given some aid to other states.
- (5) France has defence agreements with:

Camaroon	Senegal
Gabon	Togo
Malagasy	
- (6) France has technical military assistance agreements with:

Gabon	Niger	Upper Volta	Dahomey
Cameroon	Senegal	Chad	Ivory Coast
CAR	Togo	Congo	Malagasy
Mauritania*			
- (7) France has mutual facilities agreements with:

Dahomey	Ivory Coast	Niger
Gabon	Mauritania*	

(Source: Military Balance 1973-74 op.cit, page 39)

*Countries not included in this survey.

to this are in the "Horn of Africa" where there has been some Great Power competition with Ethiopia and Somalia in the role of protege states. Nigeria during the civil war period was also exceptional. The second, allied, point is that the total volume of arms imports to the Tropical African states is quite low. In the five year period to 1970 it averaged US\$40 million per annum.¹ As much of this probably went to the countries mentioned above, the volume of arms imports to the rest of Tropical Africa has been low indeed. The conclusion to be drawn is that there has not been a large-scale military aid program in Tropical Africa and there has not been an "arms-race" amongst these countries, supported by large scale arms imports. There has instead been a more modest system of defence assistance to these countries which has helped to keep down defence budgets. This pattern was especially evident in the early post-independence period during the 1960s when gifts of equipment were made to establish national forces. The present level of defence assistance to PNG is, therefore, in the context of African states exceptional.

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1. Arms Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, SIPRI, Almqvist and Wiksell, Uppsala, 1971, page 308.

Details of military assistance by major donor countries to African states are difficult to obtain on a state-by-state basis. The following information is indicative of the volume and pattern of total aid.

- a. In 1970, French military assistance to Tropical African states totalled US\$19 million. The bulk of this was devoted to training and there were then 1400 French military personnel serving with the armed forces of tropical African states. (The Arms Trade and the Third World, op.cit., page 615).
- b. Total British military assistance over the last four years has averaged about US\$9 million per annum. Only portion of this aid (perhaps less than half) would have been given to the countries in Tropical Africa (UK Statements on Defence Estimates, 1970-1973).

A Comparison of Defence Forces and Police Forces.

The relative sizes of Police forces, and other para-military organisations in each of the states may also be compared. PNG has only one law and order force, the Police, which had a strength of 3761 all ranks in June 1972. (This force does include 14 mobile units or riot squads totalling about 400 men). The PNG police is therefore, slightly larger than the defence force. If one totals the "security" agencies (other than the armed forces and excluding part-time peoples' militias) for each state, one finds that 14 states, including PNG, have total security forces larger than their defence forces and 13 have defence forces larger than their security forces (in Zambia both forces are of equal strength). There are, however, 11 states, including PNG, which have defence forces and security forces of about the same size (strengths within 25 per cent of the other force).

There are two patterns to be seen in the composition of these security forces. Either there is one police organisation, which contains para-military units (e.g. Kenya), or a number of separate security organisations, each with a specialised function (e.g. Rwanda, with a Gendarmerie, National Guard and Police force). It would seem that former British colonies usually have only one force, whereas French ex-colonies tend to have several security organisations. In this matter, PNG, with only a police force, follows the British tradition. Only one state, Burundi, has a combined police/defence force.

From the evidence available in this survey, it appears

that the balance, or imbalance, between defence forces and other security organisations does not affect the potential for military intervention in politics and the strategy of balancing forces or diversifying the number of security organisations as a means of controlling the military does not appear to be uniformly successful. Coups have occurred in survey countries where security forces have been smaller, about the same size, and larger, than the defence forces. Similarly, they have not occurred under this range of conditions. There are, evidently, more important factors at work in the situation such as the incidence of political instability and the political attitudes of the officer corps.

Statistical Approaches to Determinants of Defence Force Size

Inspection of the defence statistics shown on the accompanying tables shows a wide range of variation between countries in terms of defence force size, defence budgets and defence burdens. This raises the question as to whether these variations are related to particular determinants or whether they are the result of special factors which operate in each individual country.

Before attempting to identify defence parameters which might be shown, by statistical analysis of the data, to be key determinants of defence force levels, several introductory observations must be made. Defence forces would seem to be not so much the product of rational decisions and mathematically reducible data, but rather of a complex interplay of a number of factors at work in each individual country. These "factors"

might notionally be reduced to five sets of determinants, namely, historical, geographic, economic, political and strategic factors.

Defence force sizes and spending may be affected by military traditions and historical events in the nation's past. These factors seem to have had an uneven effect in black Africa. Whilst some forces have remained at or about independence levels (e.g. Mali or Upper Volta), others (such as Togo, Uganda and Zambia) have increased several-fold. On the other hand, none has diminished in size. Historical traditions have tended to survive, however, in the general composition of armed forces and para-military forces. Gendarmaries and National Guards are still characteristic of former French territories, single police forces of ex-British colonies.

It might also be expected that armed force sizes have some relationship to geographical determinants such as population, land area and frontiers. For example, larger populations may be able to support larger armies, larger land area may require more troops for internal security problems and longer (or more) frontiers may pose border control problems, or a greater possibility of a defence threat and hence a need for larger forces. Terrain and the country's transport systems may also be relevant to defence force sizes. A good transport system may, for example, allow a defence threat to be adequately met by fewer troops.

Broadly, it might be postulated that countries with more developed economies are able to support larger or more complex defence forces. They may also have "more" that needs to be defended.

Political determinants of defence force levels embrace the effect that various ideologies and regimes may have on the size and type of defence forces. Revolutionary regimes might have large militia forces, or there may be a tendency for states under military rule to have larger armies. In fact the evidence on this last point is, as will be shown, inconclusive.

Finally, strategic considerations might be expected to have an important relationship to defence force sizes. Armed force sizes may be related to current perceived strategic threats, or a carry-over from old ones. "Strategic" may be extended in its meaning here to include internal threats to stability and threats primarily "political" in character, such as Zambia's defence build-up to confront the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia.

Having made the important proviso that defence force sizes in various countries are unlikely to be attributable to single, key determinants, a number of specific factors were, in fact, examined to see if a significant relationship between them and defence force size was observable. In all cases the results were inconclusive, although of some interest in certain instances. The following factors were examined in relation to armed forces sizes:

- The incidence of internal security problems since independence.¹

1. This raises the question of what constitutes an internal security "problem". In the absence of reliable quantitative data on which to base such a category (e.g. incidence of political murders, riots, attacks on government officials) states were considered to have had an internal security problem if referred to, specifically, in the entry in the Europa Yearbook survey (op.cit.)

- The incidence of military intervention in politics.
(This included coups d'etat, successful and unsuccessful, and military mutinies).
- The incidence of military government (that is, a successful coup d'etat).
- The incidence of military conflict or serious confrontation with another state.

The Incidence of Internal Security (IS) Problems

Of the 28 countries in the survey 15 have had some form of internal security problem, 13 have not. Taking the ranking of states for numbers of armed forces per 1000, PNG is ranked 9th highest, with 1.35 men per 1000. Of the eight states with more men per 1000 than PNG, only two have had IS problems since independence, 6 have not. And of the 14 states higher than Burundi's median figure of .83 men/1000, 7 have had IS problems, 6 have not. Therefore there seems to be no significant relationship between IS problems and the size of defence forces on the basis of this evidence.

If one looks at defence burdens (military budgets as a percentage of GDP) and the incidence of IS problems, the situation is as follows. There are 14 states above the median score of 1.5 per cent of GDP (Malagasy), (PNG is ranked 7th at 2.5 per cent). Of these states, 7 have had IS problems, 6 have not. The result is again inconclusive and it is not possible to show that IS problems have necessarily led to either larger forces or bigger defence budgets.

The Incidence of Military Intervention in Politics and Military Rule

There are, at present, 11 states under military rule in the survey group. Of these, there are 7 which are over the median score of .83 soldiers per 1000 of population. However there are also 6 states under civil rule which rate higher than the median score. Four of the states under military rule score lower than the median.

In regard to defence burden (defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP) the position is as follows. Of the 13 states above the median score, 9 are under military rule and 4 are under civil government. Thus it seems that there may be some tendency for military government to lead to larger, more costly, defence forces. This evidence is, however, inconclusive.

If, instead, one considers all those states which have experienced military interference in politics, that is, successful and abortive coups d'etat and serious military mutinies, the situation is as follows: 10 of the 14 states above the median armed forces per 1000 population score have had an incident of military interference, whereas 9 below the median score have also. In regard to defence burden, 11 above the median score have had an incident of military interference, and 8 below the median score have. These results, whilst inconclusive, tend to show that a previous incident of military interference in politics does not necessarily lead to larger defence forces.

The Incidence of Military Conflict, or Confrontation

Of the survey group 9 states were held to have had past or present conflict or confrontation with another state. Of these, 7 had armed forces per 1000 scores above the median and 6 had defence burden scores above the median. Accordingly, there is some evidence, as one might expect, that previous or present military conflict or confrontation may lead to larger defence forces and greater defence expenditure. (In the case of old conflicts, forces which have been built up in response to a situation may not be dismantled and thus larger defence forces are retained). It may also be noted that 7 of the 9 states with past or present conflict or confrontation are to be found amongst the 14 largest military forces (of the 28 nation survey).

An Analysis of Ranking Correlation

A further attempt was made to identify determinants of defence force levels and defence spending by statistical means. Combinations of variables were tested to see if there was a correlation between the order of ranking of the states in the survey. Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Test was applied, and yielded the following information.¹

1. The following rankings were compared:

	<u>Correlation Coefficient</u> (R)
a. Defence Force size with Population	+.62
b. Defence Force size with Land Area	+.32
c. Defence Force size with Urbanization	+.53
d. Defence Force size with GNP	+.54
e. Defence Force size with GNP per Capita	+.10
f. Defence Force size with Defence Budget	+.87
g. Defence Budget with GNP	+.83
h. Defence Burden with Armed Forces per 1000 pop.	+.43
i. Defence Burden with GNP per Capita	-.41
j. Defence Forces per 1000 pop with GNP per Capita	+.30

Cont'd
page 23.

There is some evidence that defence force sizes in the survey states are related to population. That is, the larger the population, the larger the armed forces. However, the correlation coefficient of only $\pm .62$ indicates that the relationship between population and armed force size is not a strong one.

There is quite a strong positive correlation between GNPs and Defence budgets ($+.83$). This indicates that countries with larger GNPs spend more on defence.

As may be expected there is quite a high positive correlation between defence budgets and defence force size ($+.87$). That is, countries spend more on defence if they have larger forces. (The correlation here is also a measure of the fact that most of the defence forces in the sample were of a similar order of complexity and range of equipment, so that the defence cost/manpower ratio was likely to be fairly constant.)

In regard to GNP per capita, there is only a very weak positive correlation ($+.30$) between GNP per capita and defence forces per 1000 of population. That is, it would appear that countries which are better off on a per capita basis do not, to any marked extent, have more military per 1000, nor do poorer countries have fewer military per 1000. Similarly, there seems to be no correlation between GNP per capita and armed forces

Footnote 1 continued from page 22.

Method:
$$R = \frac{1 - 6 \sum d^2}{n^3 - n}$$

where: R = correlation coefficient
 d is the difference in rank.
 n is the number of observations.

and where:

R approaches -1.0 there is an inverse correlation
 R approaches 0.0 there is no correlation
 R approaches $+1.0$ there is a positive correlation

sizes. There does appear to be a weak negative correlation between GNP per capita and Defence Burden (-.41). Thus, there is some tendency for poorer countries on a per capita basis, to have a heavier defence burden.

There does not seem to be any significant correlation between Defence Force size and land area and urbanization percentages.

The results of the above analysis, whilst they may indicate a number of broad tendencies (mainly of an unexceptional nature) are inconclusive. One is left to conclude that defence force levels and expenditure in each country are, as mentioned above, largely determined by a complex of interacting factors and not merely determined on the basis of the statistically observable factors mentioned here. That is, defence forces in the survey countries appear to be the product of the particular mixture of historical, geographical, economic, political and strategic factors at work in each country.

It is therefore unlikely to be useful to construct a continuum of African Armed forces sizes and expenditure in order to determine the "correct" force levels and expenditure for PNG. PNG, along with the African countries, is to a large extent sui generis and the conclusions drawn from this survey need to be cautious and general in nature, using "Africa" as an empirical guidepost only.

CONCLUSION

This survey (and the accompanying tables which provide information on defence forces) gives rise to a series of empirical

comparisons with Papua New Guinea's own defence forces. In comparison with African states one might conclude that the size and budget of the PNG forces provide, at least, an adequate national defence force. If one goes further, and looks at those African states which spend as much ~~as or more than PNG~~ on defence, it seems that they are, in the main, countries with a background of armed conflict, or military confrontation. As these elements are at present absent in the PNG situation, this raises the question as to whether PNG's forces are unnecessarily large and expensive. One might question whether PNG needs to spend so much on defence, or have such large forces (in relative terms).

Of the countries in Africa which have the larger armed forces they have developed them because of a perceived threat from the white, minority-ruled states and surviving Portuguese colonies. Examples of military expansion for this reason are: Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal. This sort of reason for defence forces is unlikely to exist in PNG's environment. On the other hand, PNG's security threats may be seen, primarily, as internal security and the defence of the frontier with Indonesia. These possible tasks may justify the current forces. Two observations may be made here in relation to Africa. Some African states which have been confronted with internal security problems appear to have got by with, in some cases, smaller, less costly forces. Secondly, PNG has the task of establishing friendly relations with only one country with whom she shares a land frontier. African states on the other hand are, it would seem, in a potentially more problematic environment. They commonly have frontiers with 4 or 5 states, and in many cases even 6, 7 and 8

different states. In such a situation the probability of conflict with another state would seem to be increased and thus there might be a stronger case for larger defence forces.

These observations are all of a rather hypothetical nature and it may well be that Papua New Guinean strategic thinking will be dominated by the long land frontier it shares with a regional power, Indonesia, and the demands of maintaining sovereignty over what is, virtually, an archipelago state. For these reasons the PNG Defence Force and budget might be seen to constitute the minimum-sized, efficient and well-balanced force in the context of PNG's defence needs, heritage and economic structure.

TABLE A
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF SELECTED TROPICAL AFRICAN STATES⁽¹¹⁾
PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND FIJI IN RELATION TO NATIONAL DEFENCE -
STATES RANKED BY POPULATION

Country (Former Met- ropole & In- dependence Date)	Popula- tion ⁽³⁾	Land Area (Square Miles)	Per Cent ⁽³⁾ Urbanised	Armed Forces, Para Military ⁽⁴⁾ Forces & Police Totals			Gross ⁽⁵⁾ National Product (GNP) US\$	GNP ⁽⁶⁾ per Capita US\$	Military ⁽⁷⁾ Budget US\$	Defence ⁽⁷⁾ Burden Mil Bud- get as per cent of GDP	Armed ⁽⁸⁾ Forces per 1000 Popul- ation	Armed ⁽⁹⁾ Forces per 1000 sq miles Land Area
				Armed Forces	Para Mili- tary Forces	Civil Police						
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
Fiji (Britain 1970)	.47m	7,083	26.00	300	Territorial Force 500	Police Riot Squad	279m (1971)	593	.81m (1973)	.3	.63	42
Botswana (Britain 1966)	.63m	231,800	6.8	-	-	1000 (incl. 200 Field Force)	55m	87	-	-	-	-
Gabon (France 1960)	.95m	103,000	32.0	1500 (est)	Gendarmerie National 850	900	335m	350	3.4m (1969)	1.0	1.57	14.5
Congo (Brazzaville) (France) 1960	1.00m	132,000	-	2300	Gendarmerie 1500 Peoples Militia	850	194m (1971)	194	8.4m (1969)	4.3	2.30	17
Liberia (N/A 1847)	1.57m	43,000	26.2	5150	1300	750	436m (1972)	277	3.8m (1970)	.8	3.28	119

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
Central African Republic (CAR) (France 1960)	1.60m	240,000	26.6	3000	Gendarmerie	650	155.5 (1965)	97	5.7m (1971)	1.3 (1964)	1.87	12.5
Togo (France 1960)	1.95m	21,621	13.0	1500	Gendarmerie 600	500	259m (1972)	132	3.5m (1970)	1.1 (1966)	.76	69
Sierra Leone (Britain 1961)	2.18m	27,925	16.8	1600	300	2100	442m (1970)	202	3.4m	.7	.73	57
*Papua New Guinea (Australia 1974 or 1975)	2.58m	178,260	8.3	3500		3761 (Incl. 400 in Mobile Squad)	754m	292	17.0m ⁽¹⁰⁾	2.25	1.35	19.6
Dahomey (France 1960)	2.79m	43,480	12.6	3150	Gendarmerie 1200	800	218m (1971)	78	4.3m	2.5 (1966)	1.12	72
Somalia (Britain & Italy 1960)	3.00m	240,210	18.8	17300	Border Force 500	6000	182m (1970)	60	12.4m	2.9 (1963)	5.76	72
Burundi (Belgium 1962)	3.61m	10,747	2.0	3000 (Combined Army/Police)			160m (1970 Estimate)	48	3.4m (1970)	2.1 (1970)	.83	280

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
Rwanda (Belgium 1962)	3.72m	10,169	3.5	2750	Gendarmerie 400 National Guard 1000	500	233m (1971)	60	-	-	.73	272
Chad (France 1960)	3.98m	495,800	6.9	3700	National Guard 4000	900	195.3m (1971)	49	8.00m (1970)	2.5 (1967)	.92	7.4
Guinea (France 1958)	4.07m	94,926	10.7	6100	People's Militia 30,000	1700	717m (1971)	176	15.5m (1970)	1.8 (1963)	1.49	64
Senegal (France 1960)	4.22m	75,750	24.1	5900	Gendarmerie 1600	3250	860m (1972)	203	19.1m	2.3	1.4	77
Niger (France 1960)	4.24m	489,190	7.4	2100	National Guard 400 Gendarmerie 400	500	489m (1972)	115	3.6m (1969)	.9	.49	4.2
Ivory Coast (France 1960)	4.37m	124,504	21.0	3500	Gendarmerie 2000	800	2000m (1972)	457	16.6m (1970)	1.2	.80	28

* The projected total indigenous strength of the PNGDF is 3500.

Total strength, including Australian personnel, in December 1973 was 3778.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
Zambia (Britain 1964)	4.53m	290,586	30.4	6000		6000 includes 2000 para military force	1600m (1970)	390	19.6m (1970)	1.1	1.32	20
Malawi (Britain 1964)	5.14	45,747	5.0	1150		3000	434m (1972)	84	1.5m (1970)	.5	.22	25
Mali (France 1960)	5.36	478,767	11.3	3650	Gendarmerie 1500	1000	278m (1971)	51	5.6m (1969)	2.9 (1965)	.68	7.6
Upper Volta (France 1960)	5.43m	105,839	3.6	1800	National Guard 1200 Gendarmerie 1050	400	244m (1966)	44	3.6m (1970)	1.6	.33	17
Cameroon (France 1960)	6.18m	183,736	20.3	4450	Gendarmerie 3000 National Guard 2000	1800	1090m (1970)	180	23.1m (1971)	2.0	.72	27
Malagasy (France 1960)	7.40m	227,736	14.1	4250	Gendarmerie 4000	2500	1134m (1972)	153	12.2m (1970)	1.5	.57	18
Ghana (Britain 1957)	9.08m	92,000	31.0	18900	Border Guard Battalions 3000	18500	2970m	327	23.4m (1971)	2.0	2.08	205

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
Uganda (Britain 1962)	10.75m	91,451	7.0	12600		7000 includes 1800 para military force	1440m (1972)	133	22.3m (1970)	2.1	1.17	137
Kenya (Britain) 1963	12.43m	224,961	9.9	6730		11500 includes 1800 field force group	1800m (1972)	156	22.1m	1.1	.54	29
Tanzania (Britain 1961)	14.38m	362,821	5.5	11600	Police Marine Unit	8500	1510m (1972)	105	19.1m (1970)	1.3	.80	31

TABLE B
PART 2 - COMPARATIVE DATA ON TROPICAL
AFRICAN STATES, PNG AND FIJI IN RELATION TO NATIONAL DEFENCE

Country	Armed Forces			Defence Relations	Terrain description	Political History ⁽¹²⁾	Security History ⁽¹³⁾
	Army	Navy	Air Force				
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Fiji	300 Territorial (reserve) force of 500	-	-	New Zealand and some Australian small scale military aid.	Archipelagic state in Pacific Ocean (800 islands)	Civil Government	A plural society divided between Indian and Fijian population. Some history of minor internal security problems involving racial riots.
Botswana	-	-	-	Dominated by South Africa.	Land-locked. Frontiers with 4 states. Much arid terrain. Unde- veloped transport system.	Stable Civil Gover- nment. Because of location, Botswana is a "security hostage" to South Africa.	No Internal Security. problems.
Gabon	1500 (Esti- mate) One inf. bn.	Several small patrol craft.	One tpt sqn	Defence Agreement, technical military assistance agree- ment, and mutual facilities agree- ment with France.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 3 states. Transport system undeveloped.	Single Party State. Coup d'etat attem- pted. French military inter- vention in 1964	No Internal Security. problems.
Congo (Brazza- ville)	2000. 1 inf bn 1 para cdo bn 1 recce sqn 1 arty group (APCs and mortars	150 Small patrol boats	150 4 med tpts 3 lt tpts 1 hel.	Has a military assistance agreement with China and a technical military assistance agree- ment with France.	Almost land-locked with a small coast- al strip only. Frontiers with 5 states. Poor transport system.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	There is some internal security unrest.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Liberia	5000. 1 recce unit 5 inf bns 1 engr bn Scout cars Field guns Mortars.	150 2 gun. boats 2 patrol boats 2 small landing craft.	5 lt tpt acft	Defence Assistance Agreement with USA. (Received US\$6.9m military aid from USA between 1953 and 1967).	Coastal state. Frontiers with 3 states. Good transport system.	Stable civil Government.	Some IS problems. Emergency powers instituted in 1969 due to rioting.
Central African Republic	3000	-	-	Technical Military Assistance Agreement with France.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 5 states. Adequate transport system.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	-
Togo	1250 1 inf bn 1 engr coy	200 3 patrol boats 1 gun boat	50 1 med tpt 3 lt tpts 2 hels	Defence Agreement and also technical mili- tary assistance agreement with France.	Coastal state. (short coast line) Frontiers with 3 states.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	-
Sierra L Leone	1500	100		Dependent on UK military support. Has used training facilities in Nigeria.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 2 states.	Civil Government. Has experienced coup d'etat and unsuccessful attempt.	Has had some in- ternal security unrest.
Papua New Guinea	3230 (estimat- ed) 2 inf bns 1 engr coy 1 sig sqn log spt units (mortars)	240 (estima- ted) 5 Fast patrol boats 2 Hy landing craft (LCH)	30 3 C47 (or Caribou)	Continued Australian Defence assistance has been offered after independence. In 1973/74 Australia paid for <u>all</u> PNG defence costs. Some defence aid from NZ.	Archipelagic state. Frontiers with 3 states. (Frontier with Australia in Torres Strait and BSIP in Solomon Islands).	Civil Government Australia retains formal defence and foreign affairs powers until independence.	Para military police mobile squads only, have been used to control tribal fighting.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Dahomey	3000 2 inf bns 1 para cdo coy 1 recce sqn 1 arty bty (APCs, field guns and mortars)		150 1 C47 med tpt 3 lt tpts 1 hel	Technical Military Assistance Agreement and mutual facilities agreement with France.	Coastal state (short coast line) Frontiers with 4 states.	Military Rule. Has experienced several coups d'etat.	Has had some internal secur- ity unrest.
Somalia	15,000 4 tank bns 9 mech inf bns 1 cdo bn 2 field arty bns 5 AA arty bns	300 4 patrol boats 6 torpedo boats	2000 21 combat aircraft.	Has received exten- sive Soviet military assistance. Some western aid before 1963 and after 1967.	Coastal state. (long coast line) Frontiers with 3 states. Arid land. 80 per cent of pop- ulation is nomadic or semi nomadic.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	Military conflict with Ethiopia since 1961. Border clashes with Kenya.
Burundi	3000 Combined Army/Police Force.	-	-	Has received some Belgian aid.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 3 states. Poor transport system.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	Political and military con- frontation with Rwanda. Violent ethnic conflict at scale of civil war has occurred between <u>Tutsi</u> and <u>Hutu</u> . Army is all <u>Tutsi</u> .
Rwanda	2650 2 inf bns 1 recce sqn. (Armed cars)	-	100 2 C47 med tpts 1 hel	Has received some Belgian aid.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 4 states.	Civil Government.	Some violent tribal conflict between <u>Tutsi</u> and <u>Hutu</u> . Confronta- tion with Burundi.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Chad	3500 4 inf bns 1 para coy Camel corps (Mortars)	-	200 3 C47 med tpts 3 lt tpts 3 hels	Technical military assistance agreement with France. French military intervention em- ployed to suppress rebellion.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 6 states. Poor country, arid in north, wet in south.	Civil Govern- ment. Coup d'etat attemp- ted.	Armed internal re- bellion suppressed with French mili- tary assistance. Previously some border conflict with Mauritania.
Guinea	5000 1 armed bn 4 inf bns 3 engr coys (tanks, APCs and field guns)	200 6 torpedo boats 2 patrol boats 2 small landing craft.	800 8 combat aircraft 10 tpts, trainers	Has received Czecho- slovakian and Soviet military assistance and some western aid.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 6 states. Diverse terrain and peoples. Adequate transport system.	Single Party state.	Confrontation with Portuguese Guinea Bissau by mercen- aries and Guinean exiles.
Senegal	5500 3 inf bns 1 recce sqn 2 para coys 2 cdo coys 1 arty bty 1 engr bn (armd cars, lt field guns, mortars)	200 3 patrol craft 2 landing craft	200 4 med tpts 4 lt tpts 3 hels	Has a defence agree- ment and a technical military assistance agreement with France.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 5 states.	Single Party state. Experienced coup d'etat attempt in 1962.	Political and military tensions with Portuguese Bissau.
Niger	2000 1 recce sqn 4 mot inf coys 1 para coy 1 camel corps (armd cars, mortars)	2 patrol boats (part of Army	100 5 med tpts 4 lt tpts	Technical military assistance agree- ment with France.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 7 states. Sparsely populated and arid. Poor transport system.	Civil government. Coup d'etat attempt in 1963.	Guerrilla incidents in 1964.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Ivory Coast	3100 3 inf bns 1 armd sqn 1 para coy 2 arty bys (tanks, armd cars, scout cars, field and AA guns)	100 2 gun boats 2 landing craft	300 2 C47 med tpts 9 lt tpts 5 hels	Technical military assistance agreement and mutual facilities agreement with France.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 5 states. Adequate transport system.	Single Party state. Coup d'etat attempt in 1963.	Has had some internal security problems.
Zambia	5000 1 inf bde 1 recce sqn 2 arty btys 1 SAM bty 1 engr sqn 1 sig sqn (scout cars, field guns and RAPIER SAM)	-	1000 12 FGA acft 3 med tpts 10 lt tpts 6 hels	British military assistance ended in 1970. Commercial defence equipment purchases have been made since from Britain and Italy.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 7 states. Country is rich in copper. Adequate transport system.	Single Party state.	Has had some internal security problems. Political and military tensions with Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique.
Malawi	1150 1 inf bn (second forming 1972)	-	-	Has received some South African assistance.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 3 states.	Single Party state.	Has had some internal security problems. Practices "peaceful coexistence" with its powerful southern neighbours.
Mali	3500 3 inf bns 1 para coy 1 camel corps (tanks, armd cars, field guns and mortars)	50 3 patrol craft	150 6 combat acft 4 med tpts 2 hels	Has received US and Soviet military assistance. Also some assistance from China.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 7 states.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	-

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Upper Volta	1750 1 inf bn 2 inf coys 1 para coy 1 recce sqn 1 engr coy (mortars)	-	50 1 med tpt 2 lt tpts 1 lt acft	Technical military assistance agreement with France.	Land-locked state. Frontiers with 6 states. Fair transport system.	Military Rule. Has experienced several coups d'etat.	-
Cameroon	4000 4 inf bns 1 armd car sqn. 1 para coy engr and spt coys (scout cars, field guns and mortars)	200 3 patrol boats	250 3 C47 med tpts 4 lt tpts 2 hels	Defence Agreement and a technical military assistance agreement with France.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 6 states. Developed transport system.	Civil Government.	Has experienced some internal security problems.
Ghana	16,000 7 inf bns 1 mortar regt 2 recce sqns (armed cars, scout cars, field guns and mortars)	1300 2 corvettes 3 min-sweepers. 5 patrol vessles	1600 6 combat acft 8 med tpts 21 lt tpts 13 hels 9 trainers	Has received defence assistance from USSR, Britain and Canada.	Coastal state Frontiers with 3 states.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat.	-
Uganda	12,000 6 inf bns 1 border guard bn 1 mech bn 2 para/cdo bns 1 arty regt (tanks, scout cars and APCs)	-	600 21 combat acft 1 Caribou tpt 4 hels trainers		Land-locked state. Frontiers with 5 states.	Military Rule. Has experienced coup d'etat and army mutiny.	Political and military tensions with Tanzania. Some internal security problems.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Kenya	6000 4 inf bns 1 spt bn with para coy (armd cars, scout cars, mortars)	250 4 patrol craft	480 6 FGA acft 5 armd trainers 10 lt tpts 2 hels	Defence Agreement with Britain.	Coastal State. Frontiers with 5 states. Relatively good transport system.	Civil government. Experienced army mutiny in 1964, relatively stable politics since then.	Some internal security problems on Somalia frontier with <u>Shifta</u> tribe- smen. Ethnic problems.
Tanzania	10,000 3 inf bns (tanks, APCs field guns and mortars)	600 6 patrol boats	1000 13 med tpt acft. 7 trainers (12 MIG 17 to be de- livered 1973).	Has received Canadian and Chinese military assistance.	Coastal state. Frontiers with 8 states (includes off-shore island of Zanzibar). Large areas are sparsely populated. Transport system not well developed.	Single Party state. Armed Forces subject to Party indoctrina- tion since 1964 army mutiny.	Political and military tensions with Uganda and Portuguese Mozambique. Tanzania is used as a base for African Freedom Fighter organisa- tions.

ANNEX A

Sources

The survey data has been compiled from the following sources:

The Military Balance 1973-1974, The International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, 1973.

The Europa Yearbook 1973, A World Survey 1973, Volume II, Europa Publications, London 1973.

Africa South of the Sahara 1973, Europa Publications, London, 1973.

SIPRI Yearbook 1973, World Armaments and Disarmament, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Almqvist and Wiksells Boktryckeri, Uppsala, 1973.

The Arms Trade and The Third World, SIPRI, Almqvist and Wiksells, Uppsala, 1971.

Demographic Yearbook 1971, United Nations, New York 1972.

United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1972, New York 1973.

International Financial Statistics, January 1974, International Monetary Fund, Volume XXVII, Number 1.

Papua New Guinea's Improvement Plan 1973-74, Central Planning Office, Port Moresby, 1973.

African Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents 1972/73, C. Legum (Ed.) Collins, London, 1973.

R. Booth, The Armed Forces of African States, 1970, Adelphi Paper No. 67, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1970.

Notes

1. Some of the above data is of uncertain accuracy. This is unavoidable because of the quality of statistical information maintained on some of the countries included in the survey. The statistic is, however, likely to indicate the relative ranking.
2. In regard to military data it should be noted that maintenance facilities and skills may pose problems in the armed forces and spare parts may not be readily available. The total amount of military equipment may not therefore be that which is available for use.
3. Population Percentage Urbanised (column (f))

Percentages have been derived from the Demographic Year Book 1971 (op.cit.) pages 139-158. The definition of Urban population is given for each country. For countries not listed, estimates have been derived from the United Nations Yearbook 1972 (op.cit.) pages 80-88.
4. Armed Forces and Para-Military Totals (Columns (g) and (h)).

Details have been derived from The Military Balance 1973-1974 op.cit., and the Europa Yearbooks. Where there have been discrepancies between sources, the Military Balance figure have generally been preferred. For example the figure of 4,250 cited for the Malagasy armed forces by the Military Balance has been preferred to the estimate of 10,000 by the publication, Africa South of the Sahara 1973. (op.cit.)

5. Gross National Product (US\$) (Column (i))

Figures have been derived from the Military Balance (op.cit.) and International Financial Statistics (op.cit.) for countries not shown in the first reference.

6. GNP per Capita (Column (j)).

Figures have been obtained by dividing the GNP statistics by the population of each country.

7. Military Budgets and Defence "Burdens" (Columns (k) and (l))

(a) These figures have been derived from the SIPRI Yearbook 1973 (op.cit.), pages 244-246, Tables 7A16 and 7A17.

Defence Budget figures are 1971 figures except where otherwise shown. Defence Burden figures are for 1969, the latest year available except where otherwise shown. (See Note 10 for PNG).

(b) Some comparative figures of "Defence Burden" (Defence Expenditure as a percentage of GDP) in other countries are shown below (1969 figures):

Australia	3.6
New Zealand	2.1
Indonesia	3.1
Malaysia	4.8
Phillipines	1.8

(c) Total arms imports to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1970 totalled US\$40 million. This amount represented only about 25 per cent of Total Arms imports to

the African continent. The average five-yearly figure of arms imports to Sub-Saharan Africa was US\$40 million per annum to 1970.

(Arms Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, op.cit.
page 301).

8. Armed Forces per 1000 Population (Column (m))

Derived by dividing Armed Forces totals by the population figures.

9. Armed Forces per 1000 sq. miles land area (Column (h)).

Derived from Armed Forces and land area statistics for each country.

10. PNG Defence Expenditure

The figure of US\$17 has been estimated on the basis of current total Australian defence expenditure in PNG which excludes additional costs attributable to Australia personnel and defence functions.

11. The Selection of Tropical African States

The states in the survey have been selected on the following basis. There is a total of 50 territories or states in Africa. This includes the remaining metropolitan territories and the island Republic of Malagasy.

Of these 50 territories seven territories have been excluded, as they are located north of the Sahara viz:

Morocco

Mauritania

Algeria
 Tunisia
 Libya
 Egypt
 Spanish Sahara

Of the remaining 43 territories, nine non-sovereign territories, or states under minority white rule, have been excluded for the purposes of this survey; viz:

French Somalia (Djibouti)	French
Mozambique	Portuguese
Angola	Portuguese
Guinea-Bissau	Portuguese
Ceuta	Spanish
Melilla	Spanish
Namibia (South West Africa)	South Africa
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	White Minority Rule
South Africa	

Of these remaining 34 states, there are 30 which have armed forces. Of these, four states have been excluded because comparison with PNG was not considered fruitful due to their size: viz:

Nigeria	pop 59.4m	Armed Forces:	157,000
Ethiopia	pop 26.5m	" "	44,570
Zaire	pop 24.4m	" "	50,000
Sudan	pop 17.0m	" "	38,000

The following micro-states which do not have armed forces have been excluded:

Equatorial Guinea

Lesotho

Gambia

Swaziland.

Botswana which does not have any armed forces has been included as an example of such a state. This leaves the 26 tropical African states which make up the survey group (with PNG and Fiji):

Botswana	Zambia
Gabon	Malawi
Liberia	Mali
Central African Republic	Upper Volta
Togo	Cameroon
Sierra Leone	Malagasy
Dahomey	Ghana
Somalia	Uganda
Burundi	Kenya
Rwanda	Tanzania
Chad	Congo
Guinea	Senegal
Niger	
Ivory Coast	

North African states have been excluded as they do not provide a useful basis of comparison with PNG. The armies of the Islamic states are affected by the special relationship of the state and army to Islam in the Arab world, the active role of armies in the independence struggle, and confrontation with

Israel. The large African states, which have been omitted from the survey (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire and Sudan), similarly do not provide useful comparisons with PNG, in terms of the size of their defence forces (ranging from 157,000 to 38,000 men), and their defence and security problems which are those of important regional powers, not those of small states.

Non-self-governing territories have been excluded because the defence forces in these territories are related to both the defence needs of the metropole and special defence problems which are a consequence of colonial rule (e.g. the guerrilla conflict in Portuguese territories). Similarly, the white-ruled independent states in Africa, because of their special defence and internal security problems, do not provide useful comparisons with a black, independent PNG.

The African micro-states, which have no defence forces, have been excluded from the survey as they do not provide useful comparisons with PNG in terms of either size, population or economic wealth. Botswana is included because, although it has no armed forces and is sparsely populated, has a large land area and does provide an example of an independent state with no defence forces.

12. The Incidence of Military Intervention in Politics
amongst Tropical African States

The following sixteen states have experienced at least one successful coup d'etat:

Central African Republic

Malagasy

Togo

Ghana

Sierra Leone	Uganda
Dahomey	Congo
Somalia	Nigeria*
Burundi	Zaire*
Mali	Lesotho* (civil and police coup)
Upper Volta	Sudan*

These additional eight states have had unsuccessful
coup d'etat attempts or military mutinies:

Ethiopia*
Gabon
Chad
Niger
Ivory Coast
Tanzania (1964 army-mutiny in Tanganyika)
Kenya (1964 army mutiny)
Senegal

Thus of the 34 states in tropical Africa 16 have experienced a successful coup d'etat, (that is 47 per cent) and a total of 24 have had at least one recorded incident of military interference in the political system (that is 70 per cent of the States in Tropical Africa).

13. States with Internal Security Problems

The following eleven states of Tropical Africa have experienced significant internal security problems involving the actual employment of armed forces:

* States not included in the survey but included here to provide a comprehensive list for the African continent.

Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) 1964 Army mutiny put down by British military intervention. (2) Border conflict with <u>Shifta</u> tribesmen on Somali border.
Uganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) 1964 Army mutiny put down by British military intervention. (2) Conflict with Buganda Kingdom. (3) Conflict with dissident force from Tanzania. (4) Internal security problems.
Gabon	French military intervention to suppress <u>coup d'etat</u> attempt.
Chad	Operations assisted by French troops to suppress rebellion.
Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo)	UN, Belgian, US and mercenary operations 1961-65, Mutiny, secession and revolt.
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Civil War (2) Internal security problems.
Sudan	Rebellion.
Burundi	Ethnic conflict at the scale of civil war.
Rwanda	Violent ethnic conflict.
Niger	Some guerrilla incidents in 1964.
Malagasy	Internal violence.

The following additional ten states have experienced some internal unrest involving violence:

Liberia	Zambia
Sierra Leone	Malawi
Dahomey	Cameroon
Ivory Coast	Congo
Ghana	Ethiopia*

14. States with External Defence Problems

The following states have been involved in armed conflict or have been in a state of political and military confrontation with neighbouring states:

Ethiopia*	border conflict with Somalia
Somalia	border conflict with Ethiopia
Chad	border conflict with Mauritania
Burundi	conflict with Rwanda over ethnic issues
Rwanda	conflict with Burundi over ethnic issues
Guinea	(1) armed incursion from Guinea Bissau by Guinean dissidents and mercenaries. (2) Confrontation with Guinea Bissau.
Uganda	Military tension with Tanzania partly as a result of invasion from Tanzania by dissident force.
Tanzania	(1) tension with Uganda. (2) tension with Portuguese Mozambique (Tanzania has been used as a base for guerrilla groups operating in Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia).

* Not included in the survey.

Sengal Political and military tension with Portuguese
Guinea Bissau.

Zambia Political and military tension with Portuguese
Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. (Zambia
has developed her armed forces as a result of
this confrontation. For example, it now
has a missile air defence capability and
12 Fighter/Ground Attack aircraft.

15. Conclusion

Of the 34 states in Tropical Africa, 21 states have
experienced internal security problems since they became indepen-
dent (62 per cent of the total number of states) and 10 states
have had some form of external defence problem. (29 per cent
of the total number of states). Of these 10 states, three
cases may be attributed to the existence of colonial or minority
white regimes, namely: Tanzania, Senegal and Zambia.

16. Ranking Lists

1.	<u>Population</u>	<u>Millions</u>
	Tanzania	14.38
	Kenya	12.43
	Uganda	10.75
	Ghana	9.08
	Malagasy	7.40
	Cameroon	6.18
	Upper Volta	5.43
	Mali	5.36
	Malawi	5.14
	Zambia	4.53
	Ivory Coast	4.37
	Niger	4.24
	Senegal	4.22
	Guinea	4.07
	Chad	3.98
	Rwanda	3.72
	Burundi	3.61
	Somalia	3.00
	Dahomey	2.79
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>2.58</u>
	Sierra Leone	2.18
	Togo	1.95
	CAR	1.60
	Liberia	1.57
	Congo	1.00
	Gabon	.95
	Botswana	.63
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>.47</u>

2.	<u>Land Area</u>	<u>Square Miles</u>
	Chad	495,800
	Niger	489,190
	Mali	478,767
	Tanzania	362,821
	Zambia	290,586
	Somali	240,210
	CAR	240,000
	Botswana	231,800
	Malagasy	227,736
	Kenya	224,961
	Cameroon	183,736
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>178,260</u>
	Congo	132,000
	Ivory Coast	124,504
	Upper Volta	105,839
	Gabon	103,000
	Guinea	94,926
	Chana	92,000
	Uganda	91,451
	Senegal	75,750
	Malawi	45,747
	Dahomey	43,480
	Liberia	43,000
	Sierra Leone	27,925
	Togo	21,621
	Burundi	10,747
	Rwanda	10,169
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>7,083</u>

3.	<u>Urbanization Percentage</u>	<u>Per Cent Urbanised</u>
	Gabon	32
	Ghana	31
	Zambia	30.4
	CAR	26.6
	Liberia	26.2
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>26.0</u>
	Senegal	24.1
	Ivory Coast	21.0
	Cameroon	20.3
	Somalia	18.8
	Sierra Leone	16.8
	Malagasy	14.1
	Togo	13.0
	Dahomey	12.6
	Mali	11.3
	Guinea	10.7
	Kenya	9.9
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>8.3</u>
	Niger	7.4
	Uganda	7.0
	Chad	6.9
	Botswana	6.8
	Tanzania	5.5
	Malawi	5.0
	Upper Volta	3.6
	Rwanda	3.5
	Burundi	2.0
	Congo	Not known

4.	<u>GNP</u>	<u>Millions US\$</u>
	Ghana	2970
	Ivory Coast	2000
	Kenya	1880
	Zambia	1600
	Tanzania	1510
	Uganda	1440
	Malagasy	1134
	Cameroon	1090
	Senegal	860
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>754</u>
	Guinea	717
	Niger	489
	Sierra Leone	442
	Liberia	436
	Malawi	434
	Gabon	335
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>279</u>
	Mali	278
	Togo	259
	Upper Volta	244
	Rwanda	233
	Dahomey	218
	Chad	195.3
	Congo	194
	Somalia	182
	Burundi	160
	CAR	155.5
	Botswana	55

5.	<u>GNP per Capita</u>	<u>US\$ per Capita</u>
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>593</u>
	Ivory Coast	457
	Zambia	390
	Gabon	350
	Ghana	327
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>292</u>
	Liberia	277
	Senegal	203
	Sierre Leone	202
	Congo	194
	Cameroon	180
	Guinea	176
	Kenya	156
	Malagasy	153
	Uganda	133
	Togo	132
	Niger	115
	Tanzania	105
	CAR	97
	Botswana	87
	Malawi	84
	Dahomey	78
	Rwanda	60
	Somalia	60
	Mali	51
	Chad	49
	Burundi	48
	Upper Volta	44

6.	<u>Defence Budgets</u>	<u>US\$ millions</u>
	Ghana	23.4
	Uganda	23.3
	Cameroon	23.1
	Kenya	22.1
	Zambia	19.6
	Senegal	19.1
	Tanzania	19.1
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>17.0</u>
	Ivory Coast	16.6
	Guinea	15.5
	Somalia	12.4
	Malagasy	12.2
	Congo	8.4
	Chad	8.0
	CAR	5.7
	Mali	5.6
	Dahomey	4.3
	Liberia	3.8
	Upper Volta	3.6
	Niger	3.6
	Togo	3.5
	Gabon	3.4
	Sierre Leone	3.4
	Burundi	3.4
	Malawi	1.5
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>.81</u>
	Botswana	-
	Rwanda	Not known

7. Defence BurdenMil Budget as Percentage of GDP

	<u>Per Cent</u>
Congo	4.3
Mali	2.9
Somalia	2.9
Chad	2.5
Dahomey	2.5
Senegal	2.3
<u>PNG</u>	<u>2.25</u>
Uganda	2.1
Burundi	2.1
Ghana	2.0
Cameroon	2.0
Guinea	1.8
Upper Volta	1.6
Malagasy	1.5
Tanzania	1.3
CAR	1.3
Ivory Coast	1.2
Togo	1.1
Zambia	1.1
Kenya	1.1
Gabon	1.0
Niger	.9
Liberia	.8
Sierre Leone	.7
Malawi	.5
<u>Fiji</u>	<u>.3</u>
Botswana	-
Rwanda	Not Known

8.	<u>Armed Forces Sizes</u>	<u>Men</u>
	Ghana	18,900
	Somalia	17,300
	Uganda	12,600
	Tanzania	11,600
	Kenya	6,730
	Guinea	6,100
	Zambia	6,00
	Senegal	5,900
	Liberia	5,150
	Cameroon	4,450
	Malagasy	4,250
	Chad	3,700
	Mali	3,650
	Ivory Coast	3,500
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>3,500</u>
	Dahomey	3,150
	CAR	3,000
	Burundi	3,000
	Rwanda	2,750
	Congo	2,300
	Niger	2,100
	Upper Volta	1,800
	Sierra Leone	1,600
	Togo	1,500
	Gabon	1,500
	Malawi	1,150
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>300</u>
	Botswana	-

9.	<u>Armed Forces per 1000 Population</u>	<u>Men per 1000</u>
	Somalia	5.76
	Liberia	3.28
	Congo	2.3
	Ghana	2.08
	CAR	1.87
	Gabon	1.57
	Guinea	1.49
	Senegal	1.4
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>1.35</u>
	Zambia	1.32
	Uganda	1.17
	Dahomey	1.12
	Chad	.92
	Burundi	.83
	Ivory Coast	.80
	Tanzania	.80
	Togo	.76
	Sierra Leone	.73
	Rwanda	.73
	Cameroon	.72
	Mali	.68
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>.63</u>
	Malagasy	.57
	Kenya	.54
	Niger	.49
	Upper Volta	.33
	Malawi	.22
	Botswana	-

10.	<u>Armed Forces per 1000 sq miles</u>	
		<u>Men per 1000sq miles</u>
	Burundi	280
	Rwanda	272
	Ghana	205
	Uganda	137
	Liberia	119
	Senegal	77
	Somalia	72
	Dahomey	72
	Togo	69
	Guinea	64
	Sierra Leone	57
	<u>Fiji</u>	<u>42</u>
	Tanzania	31
	Kenya	29
	Ivory Coast	28
	Cameroon	27
	Malawi	25
	Zambia	20
	<u>PNG</u>	<u>19.6</u>
	Malagasy	18
	Upper Volta	17.6
	Congo	17
	Gabon	14.5
	CAR	12.5
	Mali	7.6
	Chad	7.4
	Niger	4.2
	Botswana	N/A

11. Previous (or Present) Military Conflict or
Confrontation with Another State

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Somalia	Botswana
Chad	Gabon
Burundi	Liberia
Rwanda	CAR
Guinea	Togo
Uganda	Sierra Leone
Tanzania	Dahomey
Senegal	PNG
Zambia (9)	Niger
	Ivory Coast
	Malawi
	Mali
	Upper Volta
	Cameroon
	Malagasy
	Ghana
	Fiji
	Congo
	Kenya (19)

12. Military Intervention in Politics Since Independence

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
CAR	Liberia
Togo	<u>PNG</u>
Sierra Leone	Rwanda
Dahomey	Guinea
Somalia	Zambia
Burundi	Malawi
Mali	Cameroon
Upper Volta	<u>Fiji</u>
Malagasy	Botswana (9)
Ghana	
Uganda	
Congo	
Gabon	
Chad	
Niger	
Ivory Coast	
Tanzania	
Kenya	
Senegal (19)	

13. Under Military Rule (January, 1974)

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
CAR	Botswana
Togo	Gabon
Dahomey	Liberia
Somali	Sierra Leone
Burundi	PNG
Mali	Rwanda
Upper Volta	Chad
Malagasy	Guinea
Ghana	Niger
Uganda	Ivory Coast
Congo (11)	Zambia
	Malawi
	Cameroon
	Tanzania
	Fiji
	Kenya
	Senegal (17)

14. Number of Frontiers

Malagasy	-
Fiji	-
Sierra Leone	2
PNG	3
Gabon	3
Liberia	3
Togo	3
Somalia	3
Burundi	3
Malawi	3
Ghana	3
Botswana	4
Dahomey	4
Rwanda	4
Kenya	5
Congo	5
Uganda	5
Senegal	5
CAR	5
Ivory Coast	5
Cameroon	6
Chad	6
Guinea	6
Upper Volta	6
Niger	7
Zambia	7
Mali	7
Tanzania	8

15. Internal Security Problems Since Independence.(Not including coup d'etat)

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Liberia	Botswana
Sierra Leone	Gabon
Dahomey	CAR
Burundi	Togo
Rwanda	PNG
Chad	Somalia
Niger	Guinea
Ivory Coast	Mali
Zambia	Upper Volta
Malawi	Ghana
Cameroon	Tanzania
Malagasy	Senegal
Uganda	Fiji (13)
Congo	
Kenya (15)	

APPENDIX 2

A SURVEY OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA ATTITUDES TO DEFENCE

AND SECURITY ISSUES - MAY 1973

INTRODUCTION

The survey was conducted by the writer in Papua New Guinea during May 1973 and was designed to determine attitudes to defence and security issues amongst two groups of Papua New Guineans. These two groups were:

a. Members of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

A group of officer cadets from the Military Cadet Schools, Lae (MCS), and a group of Papua New Guinean officers of the PNG DF based in Port Moresby; and

b. Members of the PNG Public Service. Students in the first and second years of the two year Diploma of Public Administration course at the PNG Administration College, Port Moresby, and students of the Magistrates' Course, also conducted at the Administrative College.

Respondents were asked to either Agree or Disagree with each of nine propositions contained in a written questionnaire. They were also invited to make written comments in relation to each proposition. The aim of the survey was to produce information on Papua New Guinean attitudes to defence and security. It was expected that the results of the survey

would take two forms: empirical data on the attitudes of Papua New Guineans and secondly, statistical analysis of these attitudes¹.

The researcher working on PNG defence questions is limited by a lack of information about the attitudes of Papua New Guineans to matters of national defence and internal security. Until very recently, defence and security matters have been controlled by Australians, not Papua New Guineans (formal powers will reside with Australia until independence). Even amongst the educated in PNG, views on these subjects have, until recently, seldom been articulated and little is known of them. Amongst the traditional PNG village society even less is known of national defence and security attitudes, if, indeed, they exist in a meaningful way.

It is possible to see two main groups in PNG society: an educated, emerging national elite and a village-based, largely traditional type of society.² This survey is directed at elements of the first group, the elite, on the basis of assumptions about PNG politics and as a consequence of methodological necessity. The systematic surveying of PNG villagers would prove a considerable task in itself and because of literacy

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1. I am indebted to Mr. D.L. Hoffman, Lecturer in Mathematics, Faculty of Military Studies, Duntroon and Lieutenant Colonel B.C. Milligan, Australian Army Psychology Corps, Duntroon, for advice and assistance in the statistical treatment of this survey.
 2. There is also a rapidly growing third group in PNG society, an urban population of skilled and unskilled workers and unemployed urban migrants, which also lay outside the scope of this survey.

and linguistic problems, it would entail many hours of oral interviewing. Furthermore, apart from these methodological problems, it is doubtful whether the attitudes of "village PNG" are likely to be in any way as important as the attitudes of PNG's elite to these issues.

My assumptions about PNG's politics, for the purpose of this survey are firstly, that effective political power in PNG is likely to be exercised by a national political elite. Secondly, political power within this elite is likely to be distributed between group such as the Public Service, Defence Force and Police¹ and, in this sense at least, what I have referred to as a national elite may be composed of a number of sub-elites with both cooperative and competing interests, rather than a monolithic unity of interests and political action.

Further assumptions are implicit in the survey as to the significance of the attitudes to defence and security held by the PNG elite. An understanding of PNG attitudes should disclose the extent to which these attitudes accord with the type of defence forces established in PNG under Australian colonial rule and the approaches to defence and security inherent in them. Secondly, the divergence, if any, between the PNG leadership's attitudes and the current defence policy and institutions may indicate the direction of future change and

1. The concept of elites, first developed by Pareto and Mosca, is now generally applied to functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status in a society. H.D. Lasswell has defined the term political elite as: the power holders in the body politic and I have used the term elite in this sense. See T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, Watts, London 1964, pages 1-9.

development. Thirdly, a comparison of the attitudes held within the national elite by members of various groups such as the Defence Force and Public Service may indicate the scope for cooperation or conflict. Finally, scrutiny of the attitudes held by the military may provide answers (and new questions) about the ideology, or value systems of the officer corps and the possibilities in the future of military intervention in politics. As has been argued, the value systems of the officer corps may be an important determinant of the way in which civil military relations are worked out in the state.¹ Given these assumptions about the possible significance of defence and security attitudes, it is also necessary to introduce a note of scepticism. There are obvious dangers in attempting to read too much into data on attitudes and, more especially, in making the step from determining peoples' attitudes to attempting to predict behaviour.

1. For a statement of this view see, for example, U. Sundhaussen, "The Soldier and Nation, Self Perception of the Indonesian Army and Its Role in Politics", Europa Archiv, Bonn, Vol 1971, No. 6, March 1971.

SURVEY METHOD

The Sample

As discussed, it was decided to limit the survey to two groups of PNG's educated elite those selected were the officers and trainee officers of the PNG DF and PNG Public Servants who were students at the Administrative College. The samples selected for the survey were chosen on the basis of accessibility. The student group at the Administrative College was the only group of PNG Public Servants available to the researcher. Similarly, the officer cadets of the Defence Force were available, but only a smaller group of officers in the Port Moresby area was available.

In the military group, the Military Cadet School officer cadet sample consisted of the thirty members of the Intermediate and Senior Classes (in May 1973). This sample included all the eleven members of the Senior Class who were due to graduate in June 1974 and all the nineteen members of the Intermediate Class due to graduate in December 1974. Only six of the total of the forty-eight PNG DF officers then serving could be surveyed and this represented only 12.5 per cent of the officer population. All the officers tested were serving in the Port Moresby area but they included all ranks from second lieutenant to major.

In the PNG Public Servant group, the three student groups tested - the first and second year Diploma of Public Administration students and the trainee Magistrate group - each consisted

of about twenty (20) students. The number of returned questionnaires represented samples ranging from just under fifty per cent of the first year Diploma students, to about eighty-five (85) per cent of the trainee Magistrate group. The sample sizes on which the survey depends for its statistical analysis are considered to be adequate, viz:

Military Group	- 36 questionnaires
Public Servant Group	- 41 questionnaires

There is also the broader question of the extent to which the two sample groups are representative of elements of a PNG elite. The degree of representativeness is capable only of assertion not proof. The respondents were all, however, of at least PNG Form Four educational level (with the possible exception of one or two trainee Magistrates whose formal education may well have been compensated by Public Service work experience) and they were therefore all, arguably, part of an educational elite. Furthermore, the Public Servant group were all at the "middle management" stage and, on completion of their courses it was expected that Diploma students, many of whom had quite extensive public service experience, would rise rapidly to senior executive positions within the Public Service. It might be held, therefore, that, although a very small sample of the total number of PNG Public Servants, the forty-one who were tested did represent portion of an elite likely to be in powerful and influential positions within the bureaucracy in the early years of independence.

The same might be said of the military group of

officers and officer cadets of the PNG DF. The majority amongst the officer cadet group who successfully complete their training course will all have graduated as officers by December 1974 and, under the present promotion system within the PNG DF, they may be Captains two years later and many, majors four years after that. This group therefore will soon be part of the leadership cadre of the Defence Force which will have an officer corps strength of less than 400 officers. In regard to the importance of the attitudes of this group of officers and potential officers within the overall Defence Force organisation of about 3500 men, it may be assumed that the views of the officer corps will largely determine the conduct of the Defence Force in the political arena. Military politics in PNG, if there are any, are likely to be those of officer politics.

To conclude this discussion of the survey sample, it might be said that the sample tested, although less than ideal in terms of both the level of the respondents within a putative PNG elite and in terms of numbers, was nonetheless likely to be indicative of attitudes held by the wider groups to which they belonged.

Conduct of the Questionnaire

It was not possible to conduct the questionnaire in a uniform manner for all groups. The officer cadet sample were handed the questionnaire at the beginning of a class, the purpose of the survey was explained and they were then requested to complete it without further discussion. The PNG DF officers were handed the questionnaire individually at their place of work

and invited to complete and return it in their own time by mail. They thus had the opportunity of a period of deliberation and discussion before completing the questionnaires. The PNG Public Service groups were collectively issued with the questionnaires but were permitted to complete them in their own time and then hand them in. Although there were opportunities for discussion before completing the questionnaire, it is not known to what extent this took place.

Composition and Structure of the Survey Questionnaire

The survey questionnaire consisted of nine propositions about PNG defence and internal security issues. Respondents were asked to show whether they Agreed or Disagreed with each proposition. A space of several lines was provided under each proposition for written comments (hereafter referred to as manuscript responses). The survey instructions stated that the answers were to be anonymous. The proposition statements were each less than 100 words, written in the English language at a standard which could be comprehended by someone of PNG Form Four educational standard. The questionnaire is reprinted below in its original form:

SURVEY OF PAPUA NEW GUINEAN ATTITUDES TO DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES

The attached survey raises some of the current issues of defence and security in PNG. You are invited to indicate whether you generally agree or disagree with each proposition. I would

also be very pleased to receive any written comments on these statements or related subjects. The results of the survey will be treated on an anonymous basis.

Your views will be included in an academic study I am conducting on the Role of the Defence Forces in P.N.G.

Yours sincerely,

PORT MORESBY
MAY 1973.

(P.A. MENCH)

Issues of Papua New Guinea Defence and Security

Proposition I

"Papua New Guinea at Independence will be a poor country trying to develop economically, politically and socially. It will be short of money and skilled manpower. There will be no external military threat to the nation, rather the principal threat will be one of internal disorder. A defence force is therefore an expensive luxury which cannot be justified. What is required is a better police force."

(Note: The current size of both the police and PNG DF is about 4,000 men. The Police budget for 1972/3 is about \$12m.; the Defence budget is about \$23m.)

Agree

Disagree

Proposition II

"Defence threats can emerge suddenly and unexpectedly. It is then often too late to start to form an army. Although PNG is small, other nations would expect it to try and defend itself first before they would be prepared to come to its assistance."

AgreeDisagreeProposition III

"The PNG Defence Force is a well organised, well led, stable force which will be required after independence to hold the country together. It is a real symbol of national integration and it will be used by the government in the task of developing the nation, together with the Public Service and the Police."

AgreeDisagreeProposition IV

"Military forces are always a political danger in developing countries because they 'control the guns'. After independence, political institutions are likely to be unstable and the Defence Force may seek a political role. In other countries where this has occurred, the military are frequently supported by the Public Service and the Police. This may occur here."

AgreeDisagreeProposition V

"An academic at the recent Waigani Seminar argued that all

potential centres of political power should be incorporated in the political system. For this reason he argued that the Defence Force should be integrated into the government structure and encouraged to participate in the government of the country. This would be a sound policy for PNG."

Agree

Disagree

Proposition VI

"After independence, the central government will not want, or be able, to enforce its will on the regions because of the dangers of national fragmentation, and the lack of power and authority possessed by the central government. Administrative influence will therefore contract. Lawlessness and tribal disorder may be tolerated in the more remote regions. Secessionist movements will not be opposed with force."

Agree

Disagree

Proposition VII

"The police and if necessary, the Defence Force will be used by the government to maintain public order. It will be the prime responsibility of the central government to preserve public order so that national development, education and health services, and business can go on in all parts of the country, without interference from troublemakers."

Agree

Disagree

Proposition VIII

"The PIR and the PNG DF generally, are an elite force, maintained on Australian conditions, which the country cannot afford. They need to adapt themselves to PNG standards and ways of doing things."

AgreeDisagreeProposition IX

"The political control of the military in Australia is achieved through the convention of the primacy of civil power. This has come to mean that the public service departmental head is placed in a superior relationship to the professional military man. This practice should be adopted in PNG also."

AgreeDisagree

The content of each of these propositions had received either public discussion or official consideration during the previous months in PNG and they were, therefore, to some extent issues of current interest, namely:

- a. Internal order in PNG as a result of tribal fighting in the Highlands;
- b. Bougainville Secession;
- c. The size and role of the Defence Force, including discussion of the dangers of future military intervention in politics; and
- d. The role of the PNG police especially in relation to a. above.

As to the formulation of PNG defence policy, the timing of the survey was apposite. The National Coalition Government, during 1973, was engaged in developing a defence policy. Mr. Somare had been appointed Ministerial Spokesman for Defence in August 1972 and since that time defence matters had increasingly been a matter of some public discussion amongst educated Papua New Guineans.

The propositions contained in the survey dealt with two central issues. These were: attitudes to PNG security and civil military relations. Each of the propositions raised a number of related issues, however, the basic question in each of the propositions was as follows:

Cluster A

- Propositions:
- I. Does PNG need an Army or Defence Force?
 - II. Should PNG be prepared to defend herself?
 - III. Does the PNG Defence Force unify the country?
 - VI. Should the central government be strong and use force if necessary?
 - VII. Should the Defence Force be used, if necessary, to maintain internal order?

Cluster B

- Propositions:
- IV. Is the PNG Defence Force likely to be a threat to civilian government?
 - V. Should the PNG Defence Force be given a political role?
 - VIII. Should the PNG Defence Force be modelled on Australian standards and methods?

Propositions: IX. Should PNG follow Australian civil-military customs?

Cluster A.

It was postulated that the propositions contained in Cluster A formed a set of questions and that if respondents answered in accordance with the indicated direction of response to each proposition they might be described as conservative realists in their approach to issues of PNG defence and security.

The concept of conservative realism is drawn from the work of S.P. Huntington and M. Janowitz on the military profession and adapted to this survey.¹ Huntington has typified the professional military ethic as, amongst other things, emphasising the irrationality, weakness and evil in human nature, the importance of order in human affairs, the continuity of history and the likelihood of wars among states, the acceptance of the nation state as the highest form of political organisation, and the need for strong defence forces. In short, Huntington argues that the military ethic is pessimistic, collectivist, and nationalist: both realistic and conservative. This concept was developed by Huntington after detailed historical analysis of civil-military relations in the United States and the concept is, therefore, especially applicable to one country

1. See S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1964, pages 59-79 and especially the summary of Conservative Realism on page 79; and M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, Free Press, New York, 1960, pages 233-255.

and comprehensive in its embrace of social, economic and political aspects. For my purpose, however, the concept of conservative realism in regard to PNG has been taken in a more restrictive sense. It borrows from Huntington and Janowitz the notions that man is often irrational, weak and "evil", that the events of history are often repetitive, that the nation state needs to be defended both against external and internal threats and that national defence forces are needed. It is nonetheless limited to attitudes about defence and security, and is not extended to other social, economic and political spheres where, for cultural reasons at least, the attitudes of Papua New Guineans are likely to be significantly different. For the conservative realist hypothesis to be validated, it required respondents to agree that: A defence force was required (P.I). PNG should be prepared to defend herself because threats did arise unexpectedly (P.II). The Defence Force (a collectivist organisation) helped to unify the country (P.III). The central government (as the instrument of power within the nation state) should be strong and preserve the nation against threats to its integrity (P.VI). Finally that the Defence Force should be used, if necessary, against internal threats in order to preserve the state (P.VII).

Cluster B.

It was postulated that if respondents answered in accordance with the indicated direction of response to each proposition then they might be described as accepting the notions of a westernised, pseudo-Australian apolitical military for PNG.

This hypothesis is relatively explicit, namely, that the defence force of PNG should be modelled on that of Australia, or some other western country and that the PNG Defence Force should also be apolitical on the Australian model and play no part in politics. This hypothesis sought to establish whether or not Papua New Guineans had accepted the role and pattern of development for the Defence Force mapped out for them by Australians, based on their own national experiences; or whether they would substitute some other pattern of development based on their own polity, or the experience of other new states. If respondents were to accept notions of a westernised military closely paralleling the Australian military (pseudo-Australian), and having no political function or potentiality (apolitical), they would have answered as follows. The defence force was not a political danger to the government (P.IV). The defence force should have no political role (P.V). It should continue to be modelled on Australian conditions and methods (P.VIII) and Australian concepts of civil-military relations should be followed (P.IX).

RESULTS

The results of the survey may be summarised as follows:

Cluster A.

Both the Military and Public Servant groups appeared to hold Conservative Realist attitudes on defence and security matters at a statistically significant level.

Cluster B.

Neither the Military nor Public Servant groups accepted or rejected the notions of a pseudo Australian, apolitical military in PNG. That is, the level of agreement or disagreement was not statistically significant and there appeared to be a lack of consensus within both groups over the issues involved.

Statistical Results

The results of the responses to each proposition by the Military and Public Servant groups are shown in Tables A. and B. below:

TABLE ACLUSTER A. (CONSERVATIVE REALISM HYPOTHESIS)DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES

Proposition	Group	Indicated Direction of Response		Against Indicated Direction of Response		Not Sure/ No Answer		Total in Sample
I.	Military	24	(67%)	11	(30%)	1	(3%)	36
	Public Servant	28	(68%)	13	(32%)	-		41
II.	Military	34	(94%)	2	(6%)	-		36
	Public Servant	38	(93%)	3	(7%)	-		41
III.	Military	34	(94%)	2	(6%)	-		36
	Public Servant	29	(71%)	12	(29%)	-		41
VI.	Military	25	(69%)	10	(28%)	1	(3%)	36
	Public Servant	31	(76%)	9	(22%)	1	(2%)	41
VII.	Military	33	(92%)	2	(5%)	1	(3%)	36
	Public Servant	34	(83%)	7	(17%)	-		41

Notes: 1. Indicated Direction of Response for validation of hypothesis of Conservative Realism:

I. Disagree. II. Agree. III. Agree. VI. Disagree.
VII. Agree.

TABLE A Cont'd

Notes: 2. Percentage figures are shown to enable comparison.
They have been adjusted to nearest percentage point.

TABLE BCLUSTER B. (WESTERNIZED, PSEUDO AUSTRALIANAPOLITICAL MILITARY HYPOTHESISDISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES

Proposition Group		Indicated Direction of Response		Against Indicated Direction of Response		Not Sure/ No Answer		Total in Sample
IV.	Military	19	(53%)	16	(44%)	1	(3%)	36
	Public Servant	19	(46%)	22	(54%)	-		41
V.	Military	20	(55%)	13	(36%)	3	(9%)	36
	Public Servant	19	(46%)	22	(54%)	-		41
VIII.	Military	11	(30%)	22	(61%)	3	(9%)	36
	Public Servant	16	(39%)	24	(59%)	1	(2%)	41
IX.	Military	23	(64%)	11	(30%)	2	(6%)	36
	Public Servant	21	(52%)	18	(44%)	2	(4%)	41

Notes: 1. Indicated Direction of Response for Validation of Hypothesis of Western pseudo-Australian Apolitical Military:

IV. Disagree. V. Disagree. VIII. Disagree
IX. Agree.

2. Percentage figures are shown to enable comparison.
They have been adjusted to the nearest percentage point.

Statistical Analysis.

Using Chi Square Goodness of Fit test it was found that:

- a. For Cluster A. Both the Military and Public Servant respondents' responses were statistically significant at the 95 per cent level. That is, both groups answered in the indicated direction of response and

appeared to validate the conservative realist hypothesis. (See Tables C. and D. below).

- b. For Cluster B. Both the Military and Public Servant responses were not significant, either at the 95 per cent or 5 per cent level. That is, they neither accepted nor rejected the hypothesis at the statistically significant level and the hypothesis of a westernised, pseudo-Australia apolitical military thus appears to have been invalidated. (See Tables E. and F. below).

The responses of the Military and Public Servant groups for Cluster A were then tested for Correlation using t it was found that the Correlation between Military and Public Servant Groups was statistically significant at the 95 per cent level.¹

$$1. \quad \text{Formula } r = \frac{E - \frac{1}{n}A \times B}{\sqrt{\left[C - \frac{1}{n}A \times A\right] \left[D - \frac{1}{n}B \times B\right]}}$$

Where A = Sum (PNG DF Military Group)
 B = Sum (Public Servant Group)
 C = Sum (PNG DF)
 D = Sum (Public Servants)
 E = Sum (PNG DF) x (Public Servants)
 n = Number of Groups

Values were:	<u>Military</u>	<u>Public Servants</u>	
P.I	24.7	28	A = 152.3
P.II	34	38	B = 160.8
P.III	34	29	C = 4731
P.IV	19.5	19	D = 5236
P.V	21.8	19	E = 4939
P.VI	25.7	31.7	n = 5
P.VII	33.9	34	
P.VIII	12	16.4	
P.IX	24.3	22.1	

Cont'd

This test was reapplied to Cluster B (where it had already been shown that, within each group, the responses were not statistically significant). It was found that the correlation was significant at the 95 per cent level ($t = 6.91 (4.303)$).¹ This indicated that the order of disagreement within both the Military and Public Service about the propositions contained in Cluster B was not dissimilar. This was borne out by an inspection of the results and comparative percentages shown in Table B. It is readily apparent that both groups were to an extent evenly divided on all questions. This is further borne out by an inspection of Tables E. and F.

Footnote 1 cont'd from page 83.

$$r = .89$$

$$\text{and } t = 5.22 \text{ where } t = \frac{r \sqrt{n - 2}}{\sqrt{1 - r^2}}$$

$$t_3 (95\%) = 3.182$$

See M.G. Kendall and A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Volume 2, page 292 and 296.

1. Values for Cluster B were as follows:
- | | | |
|--------------|---|--------|
| A | = | 77.6 |
| B | = | 76.5 |
| C | = | 1590 |
| D | = | 1479 |
| E | = | 1518.5 |
| n | = | 4 |
| s | = | .98 |
| t | = | 6.91 |
| $t_1 (95\%)$ | = | 4.303 |

TABLE C: CLUSTER A - CONSERVATIVE REALISM HYPOTHESIS

PNG DF MILITARY GROUP

Propos- ition	Respondent Number																																				Total	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36		
I	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	$\frac{14}{19}$	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	24	
II	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	34		
III	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	34		
VI	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	$\frac{5}{7}$	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	25	
VII	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	$\frac{(1)}{1}$	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	33	
TOTAL	4	4	5	4	4	5	3	3	4	5	5	4	4	3	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	3	4	5	4	4	4	3	3	5	5	3	3	5	5		
							$(3\frac{5}{7})$					$(4\frac{14}{19})$																										

Chi Square Goodness of Fit test¹

$$\text{Chi}^2(33) \text{ (95 per cent)} = 20.9$$

Observed Goodness of Fit Statistic is 8.14.

Therefore: There is a statistical significance in the answering of the questions in the Cluster in the indicated direction of response.

* Explanatory notes for this and subsequent tables are given on page 89.

1. ibid, page 421. Using $\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(E-O)^2}{E}$

TABLE D: CLUSTER A - CONSERVATIVE REALISM HYPOTHESISPNG PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP

Propo- sition	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	<u>Respondent Number</u>										26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	total
I	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	28				
II	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38					
III	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	29				
VI	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	($\frac{1}{2}$) -	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	31				
VIII	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	34				
TOTAL	5	3	3	2	3	3	4	2	3	5	5	4	5	2	4	4	4	5	3	4	5	5	5	3	2	4	4	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	3	5	2	2	5	5	5	3.5			

Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test

$$\text{Chi}^2_{(40)} (95 \text{ per cent}) = 28.06$$

Observed Goodness of Fit Statistic is 19.45

Therefore: There is a Statistical significance in the answering of the questions
in the Cluster in the indicated direction of response.

TABLE E: CLUSTER B (WESTERNIZED, PSEUDO AUSTRALIAN APOLITICAL MILITARY HYPOTHESIS)

PNG DF MILITARY GROUP

Propo- sition	<u>Respondent Number</u>																																				Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	
IV	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	($\frac{5}{8}$)	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	19
V	(<u>0</u>)	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	(<u>1</u>)	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	($\frac{3}{5}$)	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	20
VIII	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	($\frac{1}{2}$)	0	($\frac{1}{4}$)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	(<u>1</u>)	0	1	1	0	0	1	11
IX	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	($\frac{5}{7}$)	($\frac{3}{4}$)	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	23
TOTAL	0	2	2	2	4	3	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	3	2	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	0	1	2	3	2	1	2	2	
	(0)						($\frac{5}{8}$)	(2)		($2\frac{1}{2}$)	($\frac{25}{7}$)	(1)													($1\frac{3}{5}$)				(2)								

Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test

$$\text{Chi}^2_{(27)} (95 \text{ per cent}) = 16.15$$

Observe Goodness of Fit Statistic is 36.13.

With the hypothesis reversed the Statistic is 49.02

Therefore: The responses to this Cluster are not significant.

TABLE F: CLUSTER B (WESTERNIZED, PSEUDO AUSTRALIAN APOLITICAL MILITARY HYPOTHESIS)

PNG PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP

Propos- ition	Respondent Number																																									Total	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	41	41		
IV	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	19	
V	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	19	
VIII	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	(0)	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	16	
IX	0	0	1	(2) <u>3</u>	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	(6) <u>7</u>	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	21
TOTAL	1	0	2	1	1	3	2	2	3	1	1	1	3	1	2	3	1	1	2	2	2	2	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	4	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	4	1	1		

Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test

$$\chi^2_{(38)} \text{ (95 per cent)} = 25.7$$

Observed Goodness of Fit Statistic is 54.33

With Hypothesis reversed $\chi^2 = 25.7$, Goodness of Fit Statistic is 43.38

Therefore: The responses to this Cluster are not significant.

Proposition: V Disagree

VIII Disagree

IX Agree

Manuscript Responses Analysis

Respondents were invited to make manuscript answers to the propositions, in addition to indicating whether they agreed or disagreed with each proposition. There was a total of 204 manuscript answers and 83 per cent of the respondents made one or more such answers. This does not include those limited number of manuscript answers which were incoherent or those that merely restated phrases in the proposition in a positive or negative manner. All manuscript responses and a statistical summary are shown in Annex A. In the following section the manuscript responses to each proposition are discussed in order to identify some of the themes and ideas presented.

Conservative Realist Hypothesis

a. Proposition I

(1) Disagree Responses. (The indicated direction of response).

Two themes were recurrent through all groups. First, it was widely stated that it was not possible to judge whether or not there would be an external threat to PNG's security, therefore it would be wise to be prepared. The example of the Second World War in PNG was cited as an example of the sort of eventuality which might have to be faced, e.g.:

"We should always assume that there will be an external

military threat. 1939-45 war in PNG is an example"
(PNG DF Officer (1)).

Several emphasised the deterrent function of a defence force, e.g.:

"A defence force is always needed in a country whether in peace or at war. It is a deterrent to external aggression...." (Admin College 2nd Year (13)).

The second theme was that of the separate roles of the defence force and police. The defence force was for external defence and to back up the police in an internal emergency.

"Army and Police are different things ..."

(Magistrate (11)), and:

"... In the case of external threat the Police won't be able to withhold the threat; it will be the PNG DF." (PNG DF Officer (6)).

One respondent (PNG DF Officer Cadet (28)), noted that PNG will face the problems of disorder experienced by every developing country and hence the defence force was for the security of "our countrymen", not for foreign threats.

(2) Agree Responses

The smaller number of answers which agreed with the proposition in the main fell into two categories: those who contended that PNG could not afford a defence force (e.g., Admin College 1st year (3)) and

those who doubted the emergence of an external threat (e.g. Admin College 1st year (8)). There was one in this later group, however, who conceded that a sudden change of policy was possible..." Our next door neighbour might all of a sudden change tactics and flood the country with paratroopers" (Admin College 1st year (9)).

b. Proposition II

(1) Agree Responses (The indicated direction of response)

In this proposition the example of the Second World War in PNG was again cited in order to demonstrate the need for defence forces. (PNG DF Officer Cadets (9), (27), Admin College 2nd year (13)).

Two respondents linked the possession of defence forces with a nation's status of "independence":

"... the world recognises you as a country with a defence force" (PNG DF Officer Cadet (10), and also (13)).

Several believed that PNG, although small, would need to be able to meet some of its own defence needs.

(Magistrate (6) and PNG DF Officer Cadet (5)).

Other defence options were mentioned. One believed that there would be no threat from Indonesia because of the present good relations with them (Admin College 1st year (6)).

Another believed that PNG could declare itself neutral

and seek U.N. assistance in the event of aggression
(Admin College 2nd year (5)).

Another doubted external aggression could emerge in
the "atomic age" (Magistrate (15)).

(All in this group had agreed with the general
proposition).

(2) Disagree Responses

Only two responses were given. One questioned the
need for a well-equipped army before independence
(PNG DF Officer Cadet (17)). Another argued that
PNG would be defended against external attack by
those with investments in PNG (Admin College 2nd
year (8)).

c. Proposition III

(1) Agree Response (The indicated direction of response)

There was general consensus amongst the Agree responses
that the Defence Force was a nationalist organisation
which helped to integrate the peoples of PNG, e.g.:

"A very good example for people to see how the army
has successfully brought different people together".
(Admin College 2nd year (13)).

Several saw the "holding together of the country"
done by example and by working alongside the
government, rather than by means of violence.
(PNG Officer Cadet (1) and Magistrate (12)).

Several mentioned the value of the Defence Forces'

work in the civic action field. (Admin College 2nd year (2) and PNG DF Officer Cadet (20)).

(2) Disagree Responses

Answers were sceptical of the value of the Defence Force in nation-building. One argued that the PNG DF should not be involved in national development or work with the Public Service or Police. (PNG DF Officer (3)).

Two respondents argued that the PNG DF could not build a nation by force. (Admin College 1st year (2)), or merely by the PNG DF being a symbol. (Admin College 2nd year (5)).

One doubted whether the Defence Force had really broken down the suspicions which existed between men of different areas of PNG. (Magistrate (11)).

d. Proposition VI.

(1) Disagree Responses (The indicated direction of response)

The answers spanned a large range of responses.

Several argued that the government would be strong and would not tolerate disorder. (PNG DF Officer Cadets (11), PNG DF Officers (5) and (6), Admin College 2nd year (13), (14), Magistrates (5), (15)).

Two argued that secessions would be successfully opposed: one, by force if necessary (PNG DF Officer Cadet (20)), another, that both force and peaceful

means could be employed (Magistrate (8)).

One saw the central government working through regional governments in order to achieve order (Admin College 1st year (5)), whereas another saw the question of maintaining order dependent on how much power was devolved on district and local governments. (Admin College 1st year (6)).

(2) Agree Responses

There were only two answers. One argued that if force was used, the people would become more violent (Admin College 1st year (3)). The other believed that the power of the government should be decentralized, but the defence force should be controlled by the central government to "suppress" opposition. (Admin College 2nd year (5)).

Westernized, Pseudo Australian Apolitical Military Hypothesis

a. Proposition IV

(1) Disagree Responses (The indicated direction of response).

There appeared to be two sorts of answers to this proposition. Some believed that because coups d'etat had occurred elsewhere this did not necessarily mean that they would happen in PNG (e.g.: PNG DF Officer Cadets (17), PNG DF Officers (1), Magistrate (10)). Another group indicated that the military would only intervene in politics if invited, or if there was a

grave deficiency in the civil government:

"It may happen only if the government itself is in a real problem, or the citizens (are) trying to overthrow the government" (PNG DF Officer Cadets (20)) or:

"Defence Force will not take part in any political roles unless it is asked" (PNG DF Officer Cadets (21)). Two PNG DF officers acknowledge that corruption in the civil government could lead to a military role in politics. (2) and (6).

One public servant believed that the Public Service and police would not support the Army if it attempted a take-over because the Army was too remote from the people. (Admin College 1st year (6)).

(2) Agree Responses

Several agreed to the proposition but, as above, argued that "just because it happened in other developing countries doesn't mean necessarily that it will happen here" (Admin College 2nd year (13) and (14)). On the other hand, one Magistrate believed that "It is always a fact in developing countries (that) this kind of crisis comes up" (1).

Others saw a coup likely, if the government "stuffs up" (PNG DF Officer Cade (22)), if the government is weak (PNG DF Officer Cadet (24)), if there is no proper communication between the military and civil leaders (PNG DF Officers (5)), if there is corruption

(Admin College 1st year (5)) or, if the politicians by-pass the public service (Admin College 1st year (1)).

The manuscript responses to this proposition tended to indicate considerable doubt and division of opinion, as did the totals of Agree/Disagree responses to the proposition.

b. Proposition V

(1) Disagree Responses (The indicated direction of response)

Answers represented a range of opinion. Some saw military involvement in government as undesirable because the "army was not a political organisation" (PNG DF Officer Cadets (28), and (11), PNG DF Officers (2) and (3)).

Others saw the proposal leading to greater political intervention, or fear of it by civilians. "This would create the feeling among the people of other countries that the PNG government is weak and the army is taking over". (PNG DF Officer Cadet (14) and Magistrates (15)). and:

"There is a danger that the military may exercise too much power ... (this) may lead to (the) military overthrowing the government" (Admin College 2nd year (7) and (13)).

Two respondents Disagreed, but suggested some half-way measures. An Officer Cadet argued that:

"The Defence Forces should have a spokesman but not

take part" (20). A public servant suggested that a military man should be the Secretary of the Defence Department (Admin College 1st year (1)).

(2) Agree Responses

Several Agree answers saw the need for some role in government for the defence force: "Some military men may perhaps be seconded to civil authorities" (PNG DF Officer Cadets (27)), and (Magistrates (12)). The dangers of frustration in the military if excluded, were mentioned by several respondents (Admin College 1st year (5) and Admin College 2nd year (5)).

One PNG DF Officer answered at considerable length on the need for the Defence Force to be identified with the government's policies and share in the development task, so that it would remain loyal to the government (6).

Once again in this proposition there was an evident division of opinion within each group on the issues.

c. Proposition VIII

(1) Disagree Responses (The indicated direction of response)

Those who agreed generally did so because they saw the maintenance of westernized standards as necessary for a defence force. (e.g. Admin College 2nd year (7) and (15)). This problem was put by a PNG DF Officer Cadet as follows:

"We cannot adapt to our own ways. We are living in a modern world and everything has to be modern. Whether we like it or not we have to keep pace with other nations' standards ... " (22).

On the question of the PNG DF as an elite force within PNG, several PNG DF officers ((3) and (6)), argued that whilst the Defence Force appeared to be "better off" than the police and public service; this was largely because of its buildings and camp layout which had been constructed by Australia. Little could be done to redress the imbalance other than to pull the buildings down!

One Magistrate (9) asked how standards could be lowered now that the defence force had become used to them under the Australian regime.

Another (16) said it was now too late to change.

(2) Agree Responses

Two respondents doubted whether it would now be possible to change over to PNG standards (PNG DF Officer Cadet (7) and Admin College 2nd year (12)). Another believed that the defence force would "break down" if lowered to PNG conditions (Admin College 2nd year (9)).

One thought that the organisation of the PNG DF was already changing toward PNG standards (PNG DF Officer Cadets (12)), another PNG DF Officer doubted

whether the PNG DF had been fully maintained on Australian conditions (1).

One public servant advocated reduction of the PNG DF "to the size that we can afford" (Admin College 2nd year (6)), and another wanted to see fuller localization within the defence force without loss of efficiency (Admin College 2nd year (13)).

d. Proposition IX

(1) Agree Responses (The indicated direction of response).

Those who Agreed believed, in the main, that this would be an effective way of keeping the military out of politics, e.g.:

"If PNG has such an organisation there should be no problem of a coup ..." (PNG DF Officer Cadets (25)) and:

"It will prevent too much military influence in the government" (Magistrate (7)).

One public servant saw the resentment which such an arrangement might lead to in the military as "a normal thing and I think it will eventually wear out" (Admin College 2nd year (13)).

(2) Disagree Responses

Members from all groups expressed disagreement. Some believed that it would be better in PNG's case if the Defence Force was headed by a military man (e.g.: Admin College 1st year (1), (2), (7), Magistrates (10), (17)

and PNG DF Officer Cadets (20), (29)).

Another group believed that the military officer and public servant should be of equal status, each having a distinct but valuable contribution to make (PNG DF Officer Cadet (30), PNG DF Officers (5), Admin College 2nd year (5))).

One magistrate suggested that public servants within the defence department should be given some basic military training so that they knew of the PNG DF's functions (3).

CONCLUSION

The survey has produced empirical data about the way in which two groups of Papua New Guineans think about defence and security matters. Statistical treatment of the data has produced evidence that Papua New Guineans within both the Defence Force and Public Service have similar attitudes about a set of defence and security issues. These attitudes have been described as Conservative Realist. This finding appears to support the contention that members of PNG's elite are likely to perceive security issues in a similar way because of the similar way in which they affect their personal interests. The PNG elite is likely to see its interests lying in the westernized, modern sector of the nation and any threats to the nation, or to its careers and personal security, are likely to be seen as a common danger.

Secondly it was shown that, in May 1973, Papua New Guineans

in the sample did not accept the notion of a westernized, pseudo-Australian apolitical military and that there was a similar order of disagreement within both the Military and Public Servant groups about these issues.

Whilst it is possible that the inconclusive findings for Cluster B resulted from poor construct validity (that is, the four propositions may not have comprised a set of related issues answerable in a discernable pattern), it is more probable that the issues of civil-military relationships inherent in Cluster B were matters over which there were differences of opinion amongst the groups sampled, confronted as they were with choices between Australian customs and practices and the innovations and experiences of other developing countries. May 1973 may, in fact, have been a transitional point in changing attitudes on this question.

A major conclusion to be drawn from the survey is that within the PNG elite, Public Servant and Military groups appear to hold a similar range of attitudes about defence and internal security. The disagreement revealed in both groups in relation to Cluster B may either indicate the possibility in the longer term of intra-elite conflict, or it may simply represent part of the process of attitude formation as PNG moves to nationhood. The similarity of attitudes between the two groups may indicate that, despite the differing processes of professional socialisation in the Defence Force and the Public Service, the national elite in May 1973 remained well integrated. This might be attributed to the interlocking bonds of family, language, region and common educational experience between members of what is, after all, a numerically small group of people.

If the PNG national elite does remain integrated and interlocking (through inter-marriage and self-perpetuation - as the children of the elite join their ranks), then it is probable that attitudes held by elements within the elite, such as the Public Service and Defence Force will remain congruent. (The British case might provide a somewhat paradoxical example of such an elite¹).

It is also possible, based on the evidence of Cluster B, that any divisions within the PNG national elite, if they do occur, will be reflected through all elements of that elite. These possibilities may affect the scope for political cooperation or conflict within the PNG elite and they also affect the role the PNG military may play in politics. An ideologically united PNG elite seems likely to lead to a sympathetic and united military. On the other hand, a disunited PNG elite may lead to a similarly disunited military, with dissident factions paralleling divisions within the national elite.

The relatively small sample tested in this survey points to the need to confirm the results by a further survey. It would also be useful to confirm these results by surveying more senior members of the PNG elite and including the Police and the PNG political leadership.

1. See C.B. Otley, Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite in J. Van Doorn (ed) Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, The Hague, 1968, pages 84-108.

ANNEX AMANUSCRIPT RESPONSES

The responses of those who answered the questionnaire with any comments in addition to Agree or Disagree are listed in the following section. Responses which simply restated the proposition (or a portion of it) affirmatively or negatively are not listed but there were only a small number of such responses. Similarly, a small number of incoherent responses have not been shown. Responses have, in some cases, been edited for reasons of clarity of meaning and brevity, however, care has been taken not to change the meaning of the replies and hence some responses remain somewhat enigmatic or ambiguous. Conjunctions and articles of speech have been added in parenthesis to aid the reader's comprehension of some responses. The distribution and frequency of manuscript responses to the questionnaire as between the military and public servant groups are shown in the tables below:

A. Distribution of Manuscript Responses as between the Propositions:

Group	P.I	P.II	P.III	P.IV	P.V	P.VI	P.VII	P.VIII	P.IX	Total
PNG Military Group	19	8	7	7	9	16	14	12	10	102
PNG Public Servant Group	14	10	9	14	11	7	11	11	15	102
Total	33	18	16	21	20	23	25	23	25	204

Average number of manuscript responses for questionnaire:

a. Military Group : 2.8

b. Public Servant Group : 2.5

B. Frequency of Manuscript Responses per Questionnaire:

Group	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
PNG Military Group	5	8	7	5	1	4	3	2	-	1	(36)
PNG Public Servant Group	8	7	9	6	3	5	1	1	-	1	(41)
Total	13	15	16	11	4	9	4	3	-	2	(77)

From an inspection of the above tables there would appear to be no significant difference between the Military and Public Servant group in either the distribution or frequency of manuscript responses to the questionnaire. Consequently, one might reason that the manuscript responses of both groups are likely to represent a cross-section of articulated opinion held by the groups on the subjects canvassed.

PROPOSITION I

"Papua New Guinea at independence will be a poor country trying to develop economically, politically and socially. It will be short of money and skilled manpower. There will be no external military threat to the nation, rather the principal threat will be one of internal disorder. A defence force is therefore an expensive luxury which cannot be justified. What is required is a better police force. (Note: The current size of both the police and PNG Defence Force is about 4000 men. The police budget for 1972/73 is about A\$12 million, the defence budget is about A\$23 million)."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	No answer/ Not sure
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	9	20	1
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	2	4	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	11	24	-
4.	Administrative College Students (1st year)	8	1	-
5.	Administrative College Students (2nd year)	3	12	-
6.	Trainee Magistrate Group	2	15	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	13	28	-

The Indicated direction of response to this question for the Conservative Realist hypothesis was: Disagree.

1. Disagree Responses

a. Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "... There is no one who can say that we will have no external threat, because no one knows the future. Both the police and PNG DF must be made better." (5)
- (b) "... the police is trained to deal with public matters e.g. Murder, Robbery, Rape and Driving accidents, whereas the PNG DF is there to help the Govt with internal problems. In the case of external threat the Police won't be able to withhold the threat; it will be the PNG DF." (6)
- (c) "... Defence force should be better because it will be the final resort to combat internal threat. Also the better we are the stronger and stable government we will have." (9)
- (d) "... Mad for a country without defence force because police can't do anything to stop external threats." (10)
- (e) "... At independence the Defence Force will be very useful. Although it is expensive to run, the men are well trained and capable of completing their task much better than the police will." (11)
- (f) "... I strongly believe there will be external threat over the PNG/West Irian border.

Often the police can't stop internal violence,
e.g. Highlands fights were never controlled."

(13)

(g) " ... The defence force should exist, no
bigger no smaller." (18)

(h) "... Even if its a luxury thing to run it
is much better to have a defence force than
be without it. We cannot say there will
be no external threats because we do not
know. We might be rich in some mineral
... and other countries might want to take
over." (19)

(i) "... We don't know if there may be an external
threat. As we are not sure we must be
ready for it. The present defence force
has done some development work in the Country,
e.g. building schools, bridges etc. There-
fore the PNG DF in an independent PNG is
needed." (20)

(j) "... To the economist the Defence Force
looks like an expensive luxury but to a
developing country like PNG the defence
force is a very good resort for the Govern-
ment to use in emergency..." (21)

(k) "... Of course there will be external mili-
tary threat. We may never know what is ahead
of us. Let us keep alert ..." (22)

(1) "... if there is very big trouble within the
country I don't think the Police will stop

it. The people are not afraid of the police, but when they hear a bit about the army they become afraid. The people of PNG like the Defence Force most (sic) than the Police." (24)

(m) " We do not always trust other countries and hope that no aggression will take place. The police and Defence Force have completely different roles." (25)

(n) " Every developing country has had internal disorder and PNG will face the same problem. This (PNG DF) is not for foreign threats but for the security of our countrymen." (28)

(2) PNG DF Officers

(a) " We should always assume that there will be an external military threat. 1939-45 war in PNG is an example." (1)

(b) " Since no one can accurately predict the future, it is better to have a foot on the ground than to have both feet up! (5)

(c) " Defence force is not an expensive luxury. Standards and conditions can be modified to suit PNG requirements. To have a better police force means to create an elitist group which is what the PNG government is trying to avoid." (6)

(b) PNG Public Servant Group(1) Administrative College Students, 1st year

- (a) " But the size of the defence force must
(be) reduced to meet (the) needs of PNG." (1)

(2) Administrative College Students, 2nd year.

- (a) " (But) I do agree that the defence force
is expensive; there should be ways and means
to overcome this." (2)
- (b) "...other countries which are much poorer
than PNG are looking after themselves." (3)
- (c) " No one can assume that there is going to
be NO external threat. After all a country
must have a Defence Force to defend itself
in case of outside interference." (8)
- (d) " A defence force is always needed in a
country whether in peace or at war. It is
a deterrent to external aggression. A
defence force is not a luxury. It is another
arm of the government." (13)
- (e) "...the people need protection." (14)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

- (a) " (we) still require some form of security
in the country." (2)
- (b) " We told you that we will be poor?" (9)
- (c) " (but) don't expand the size of the defence
force." (15)
- (d) " Defence force is needed." (16)

- (e) " Army and Police are different things ...
As PNG approaches independence some strong
steps should be taken to strengthen both
forces." (17)

2. Agree Responses

a. Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "Agree however, since PNG already has a defence
force it should be kept until some time
after independence. We have been in the
hands of Australia and to some extent this
was a threat to some others who might have
wanted to invade. Why not wait a while
after independence and then decide on defence
issues in PNG." (23)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "(The) Army is expensive but the army has
the requirement for the best equipment and
training facilities to carry out its role." (3)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

- (a) "... a large army in a country like PNG
is not needed because we cannot afford to
maintain a large army with limited resources."
(3)

- (b) "PNG by itself cannot be able to spend that much money on the Defence Force. So its good enough to have only (a) police force." (5)
- (c) "Probably there will not be external threats to the nation." (8)
- (d) "... but this is not to say that we must believe that there will be no external military threat. That is, one never knows for certain that, e.g. our next door neighbour might all of a sudden change tactics and flood the country with paratroopers." (9)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

-

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

-

PROPOSITION II

"Defence threats can emerge suddenly and unexpectedly. It is then often too late to start to form an army. Although PNG is small other nations would expect it to try and defend itself first before they would be prepared to come to its assistance."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	No Answer/ Not Sure
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	29	1	-
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	5	1	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	34	2	-
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	8	1	-
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	13	2	-
6.	Trainee Magistrates Group	17	-	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	38	3	-

The indicated direction of response to this question
for the Conservative Realist hypothesis was: Agree

1. Agree Responses

a. Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "No country will assist you if you can't do something for yourself." (5)
- (b) "...Example in World War II. Australia wasn't ready when Japanese invaded New

Guinea. Therefore they took over main centres without any strong resistance." (9)

(c) "... the world recognises you as a country with its forces for defence." (10)

(d) "It is unwise for a country like PNG to have independence if it has no form of defence." (13)

(e) "The Defence Force can delay the enemy while help comes from other friendly nations." (20)

(f) "PNG should have learnt the lesson of the Second World War. When the Japanese marched in, Australia, the colonial master, realised that it couldn't raise an army overnight." (27)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

(a) "Although PNG and Indonesia are in a friendly and harmonious relationship, continuance of such a relationship cannot be guaranteed. It only needs an unexpected change of government, an emergence of a new militant regime perhaps of Sukarnoist ambitions." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

(a) "Agree but the strength of the present defence force is enough ... \$23 million is too much for the economic capacity of independent PNG

to afford." (2)

(b) "... but usually there must be some talks before an attack so that other nations will know before the attack." (3)

(c) "... but PNG is now trying to establish good relations with its neighbours. In such (a) case there is no external threat from them." (6)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

(a) "... but if this country does not have a defence force it could declare itself neutral and for any emergency threat should seek help from the United Nations." (5)

(b) "This happened in the second world war." (13)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

(a) "Even though PNG is a small nation we must not depend on other nations." (6)

(b) "(but) you haven't developed our army to the standard you promised." (9)

(c) "(but) The current size of men in the force now would not defend this country." (11)

(d) "...but I doubt very much whether this could happen as we are living in the atomic age."

(15)

2. Disagree Responsesa. PNG Military Group(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "We don't necessarily need a well-equipped army with every equipment it needs before independence." (17)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers. -b. PNG Public Servant Group(1) Administrative College Students 1st year. -(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year.

- (a) "Other countries who have or might have investments in PNG will certainly step in to help as soon as possible when asked."
(8)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group. -

PROPOSITION III

"The PNG Defence Force is a well organised, well led stable force which will be required after independence to hold the country together. It is a real symbol of national integration and it will be used by the government in the task of developing the nation, together with the Public Service and the Police."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	No Answer/ Not Sure
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	29	1	-
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	5	1	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	34	2	-
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	5	4	-
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	13	2	-
6.	Trainee Magistrate Group	11	6	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	29	12	-

The indicated direction of response to this question for the Conservative Realist hypothesis was: Agree

1. Agree Responses

a. Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "Agree but not by means of violence" (1)

(b) "This is the only organisation in PNG where national and regional integration and cooperation are exercised ..." (9)

- (c) "... in the PNG DF there is a greater feeling in the national sense than in the public service and police force." (11)
- (d) "The defence force has been working to develop the nation by building schools bridges, helping people like during the Highlands famine." (20)
- (e) "... at the moment everyone in the force comes from different tribes or districts but yet they all work as brothers or one people." (28)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "We are a most coherent body which can play an important role in holding the country together. Our efforts over the years throughout the country especially through civic action patrols have demonstrated to the ordinary villager that it is not impossible for various tribal groups to live and work together." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

- (1) Administrative College Students 1st year. -
- (2) Administrative College Students 2nd year
 - (a) "There has been some good work done in parts of PNG by DF." (2)

- (b) "The PNG Defence Force should be good stopping tribal fighting." (3)
- (c) "A very good example for people to see how the army has successfully brought different people together." (13)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

- (a) "But PNG DF should try and train plenty of local men to take over high positions as soon as possible before independence." (5)
- (b) "Agree but not really to hold the country together but work along with the government". (12)

2. Disagree Responses

a. Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets. -

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "The Army should not be employed in development tasks or work together with the Police and Public Service." (3)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

- (a) "... it is not a satisfactory way to build a nation by military force. Nation building can be achieved by other political social and economic means." (2)

- (b) "(The DF is) too remote and isolated
from the general public." (6)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

- (a) The defence Force cannot hold the
country together just by being a symbol."
(5)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

- (a) There is always a conflict as to whether
a man is a Papuan or a New Guinean amongst
the people of this country. This feeling
also lies between the men in the Defence
Force too." (11)

PROPOSITION IV

"Military forces are always a political danger in developing countries because they "control the guns". After independence political institutions are likely to be unstable and the Defence Force may seek a political role. In other countries where this has occurred the military are frequently supported by the public service and the police. This may occur here."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	No Answer/ Not Sure
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	13	16	1
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	3	3	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	16	19	1
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	4	5	-
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	11	4	-
6.	Trainee Magistrate Group	7	10	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	22	19	-

The Indicated direction of response to this question for the Westernised, pseudo-Australian, apolitical military hypothesis was: Disagree

1. Disagree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "Military forces may seek a political role when the civil government can't do the job correctly. This doesn't mean military

government. If its stable and loyal to the government then later it will hand over to the civil authorities." (4)

- (b) "The military takes over the government only when people think their leaders are not doing the right thing to them." (16)
- (c) "... other countries face different problems and think differently." (17)
- (d) "After independence the army will only be called to run the country if the government is unable to control when the people are trying to overthrow the government by force. (18)
- (e) "It may happen only if the government itself is in a real problem, or the citizens (are) trying to overthrow the government". (20)
- (f) "Defence force will not take part in any political roles unless it is asked." (21)
- (g) "A military take-over is unwise as far as democratic trends are concerned." (27)
- (h) "The army is the servant of the government and it will always be loyal to the government." (28)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "... usually a snake only bites when somebody steps on it. ...African instances should not be expected to happen here as we have

different cultures and live in a different environment." (1)

(b) "Military only take over when civil government is a corrupt one." (2)

(c) "The military are a safeguard of such political institutions when the civil government becomes unstable. I believe that when civil government becomes unstable because of various reasons as corruption, bribery, intimidation etc., the Defence force should seek a political role on the condition that it is requested by the people ... and that the role of government be eventually handed back to the civil government." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

(a) "Due to Army's remoteness from the public, the Public Service and police will not support its move." (6)

(2) Administrative College students 2nd year. -

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

(a) "It doesn't mean that (because) it has occurred in other countries it will happen here in PNG." (10)

2. Agree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "If the present government 'stuffs up' and the country is in disorder the defence force can step in and control until it can be handed back to the people." (22)
- (b) "It may occur here if the government is weak ... (but) no one in the Force really knows how to run a country." (24)
- (c) "When the leaders are good then the country is stable." (25)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "It is the job of the politicians to make sure it doesn't happen here."
- (b) "It seems that where there has been a military take-over it was due to no proper communication between the civil and military." (5)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

- (a) "Yes. If the politicians by-pass the Public Service." (1)
- (b) "If there is corruption then this is more likely to happen." (5)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

- (a) (but) "The fact that this sort of thing happened in other developing countries does not mean necessarily that it will happen here."

(13)

- (b) (but) "Just because this has happened in some countries we cannot presume that the same thing will happen in PNG." (14)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

- (a) "It is always a fact in developing countries (that) this kind of crisis comes up." (1)

PROPOSITION V

"An academic at the recent Waigani Seminar argued that all potential centres of political power should be incorporated in the political system. For this reason he argued that the Defence Force should be integrated into the government structure and encouraged to participate in the government of the country. This would be a sound policy for PNG."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure/ No Answer
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	10	17	3
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	3	3	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	13	20	3
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	4	5	-
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	10	5	-
6.	Trainee Magistrates Group	8	9	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Service Group	22	19	-

The indicated direction of response to this question for the Westernised, pseudo-Australian, apolitical military hypothesis was: Disagree

1. Disagree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "The PNG DF has nothing very important whatever to deal into politics. By seeing

other African countries which are now in miserable state of ruling a country." (2)

- (b) "This will not be a good thing if the Defence Force participate in politics otherwise most people will think that the Defence Force may take over." (5)
- (c) "... An army is raised only for the purpose of defence and must not be involved in politics." (11)
- (d) "The army must not be involved in politics ... If it (is) involved in politics then it will surely be a danger to the country." (12)
- (e) "The role of the army is not to run the country ... This would create the feeling among the people of other countries that the PNG government is weak and the army is taking over." (14)
- (f) "The Defence Force should have a spokesman but not take part." (20)
- (g) "The Defence Force shouldn't be integrated into the government structure and participate in politics ... as the Defence Force is just the arm of the country and shouldn't be disturbed with politics." (21)
- (h) "If this idea was constituted I believe the government would become fragile..." (25)
- (i) "... the Army is not a political organisation." (28)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "The DF is not a political group and it must always help the government of the day." (2)
- (b) "This is encouraging military take-over of the country. The army should remain a separate, non-political organisation." (13)

b. PNG Public Servant Group(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

- (a) but "... remove civilian supremacy and appoint a military man as Secretary to the Defence Department. This will solve the problems as the departmental head is responsible to the minister of defence." (1)
- (b) "This is encouraging military take-over of the country. The army should remain a separate, non-political organisation." (13)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

- (a) "This would cause disruption in the country." (1)
- (b) "If the government integrates with the army, ordinary people will think that our government is an army government." (15)

2. Agree Responsesa. PNG Military Group(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "But not to an influential extent. Some

military men may perhaps be seconded to civil authorities as advisers." (27)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

(a) "... this is the only way the Defence Force can be well informed and kept in the picture."

(1)

(b) "At present the defence policy decisions are in the hands of the Australian government and it is a fact of life that it is very hard to convince the ordinary soldier that he is part of the government in PNG. He knows he is outside the control of the PNG government because he has nobody in that government representing his interests. It is most important that the DF is given a part in developing the country and is involved in the running of the country. (The) officer corps must be involved and whenever an unpopular decision is made, the officer corps can explain to the troops that it is a necessary decision. If the military are separated and kept in barracks it will do exactly what the civil government does not want to happen - military coup." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

(a) "... especially for nation building." (3)

- (b) "If the defence force is completely out-voiced in the country's politics, its frustrating for them." (5)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

- (a) "Once DF is not represented in the government there will be frustration. To counter-act this, (the) army must have a say in the affairs of this country." (5)
- (b) "Agree (but) ... to a certain extent where the army is not given too much power." (8)
- (c) "Agree (but) ... It is a danger to have Defence Force integrated into the government structure." (15)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

- (a) "... there is a place for the army in the government structure." (12)

PROPOSITION VI

"After Independence, the central government will not want, or be able, to enforce its will on the regions because of the dangers of national fragmentation, and the lack of power and authority possessed by the central government. Administrative influence will therefore contract. Lawlessness and tribal disorder may be tolerated in the more remote regions. Secessionist movements will not be opposed by force."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure/ No Answer
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	10	19	1
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	-	6	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	10	25	1
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year.	2	7	-
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year.	3	11	1
6.	Trainee Magistrates Group	4	13	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	9	31	1

The indicated direction of response to this question
for the Conservative Realist hypothesis was: Disagree

1. Disagree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "It is true that tribal disorder and lawlessness will arise however this does not mean

that the government will slacken because
it is responsible to the people." (11)

(b) "Secessionism should be opposed by force to
keep the nation as one." (20)

(c) "If the leaders are weak trouble will come." (25)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

(a) "There must be a strong police and defence
force in PNG". (2)

(b) "... but force should only be used if all
attempts at settlement have failed." (3)

(c) "Of course the government will have power
and authority, therefore it will not tolerate
any lawlessness from anyone including
secessionists." (5)

(d) "The central government must enforce its will,
if necessary by force. Any central govern-
ment who does not believe in enforcing its
will is not a good government. Defence
forces with the help of the police should be
used by the government to oppose any
secessionist movements." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

(a) "Force will be used as a last resort." (1)

(b) "The Central Government has the police force
to back it up when needed." (2)

- (c) (but) "Central government will work through Regional governments." (5)
- (d) "... (but it) depends on how much power is devolved to subordinate authorities like district and local governments." (6)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

- (a) "In cases of emergency the government will rely on the Army to enforce its laws." (13)
- (b) "For the good of the whole, where it is necessary the government must take action." (14)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group

- (a) "The central government will want to enforce law and order. The Police and PNG DF should work side by side." (5)
- (b) "(but) I do believe secessionist movements can be opposed (both) by force and peaceful means." (8)
- (c) "I am confident that our government will always have power and authority to combat lawlessness if it occurs in our country." (15)
- (d) "... Police are available in remote areas." (16)
- (e) "This would not happen here as long as law and order is enforced in remote areas." (17)

2. Agree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

- (1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets. -

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers. -

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

(a) "If force is used the people will become more violent." (3)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year.

(a) "Administrative influence should be decentralized and the Defence Force controlled by the central government in order to suppress any opposition." (5)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group. -

3. Not Sure Responses

a. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 2nd year.

(a) "If it happens that the government fails in her dealings with the people then it is wise (that) we should look for our Defence Force to give aid." (15)

PROPOSITION VII

"The police and, if necessary, the defence force will be used by the government to maintain public order. It will be the prime responsibility of the central government to preserve public order so that national development, education and health services and business can go on in all parts of the country without interference from troublemakers."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure/ No Answer
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	27	2	1
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	6	-	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	33	2	1
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	7	2	-
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	14	1	-
6.	Trainee Magistrate Group	13	4	-
6.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	34	7	-

The indicated direction of response to this question
for the Conservative Realist hypothesis was: Agree

1. Agree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "(but) I don't agree with the Defence Force taking part in maintaining public order. It will be the police job." (5)

- (b) "If the police force is not able to handle the matter." (11)
- (c) "(but) the PNG DF should not be used unless the problem is too large for the police." (12)
- (d) "If the police can't handle it, then the PNG DF will come in." (13)
- (e) "Only when there is an emergency and then at the government's request should the PNG Defence Force be used." (25)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "(but) Defence Force should not be used for such things as crowd dispersal." (3)
- (b) "... (but) it is not the prime object of the government to use force in the first instance." (5)
- (c) "... the police carries out its normal functions to maintain public order and the DF has the secondary back up role. By their presence the DF can indicate to the public that the government ... means business." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

- (a) "... but the DF should be used in this situation at the last resort if the trouble is beyond the capacity of the Police force." (2)

- (b) "... but the Defence Force is not really needed when a stable police force can handle the job." (6)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

- (a) (but) "This can only work effectively if Police and DF merge together as the DF, designed to counteract external threats, will lose support in the face of the public." (5)
- (b) (but) "I firmly believe that the DF will have no major task to play internally. This can be controlled by the police. However in the long run there is a possibility." (7)
- (c) "The police force itself is not properly trained and in times of internal disorder, the Army could be used on reinforce the Police." (13)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

- (a) "... but I do not think that our defence force would be necessary." (4)
- (b) "In this way troublemakers will realise that somebody is standing behind them and (they) might not cause trouble." (16)

2. Disagree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "Leave the Defence Force out or otherwise trouble will arise. People might think the Defence Force is going to take over."

(7)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers. -

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

(a) "Why not give full responsibility to the Police force only, its less expensive to maintain." (5)

(b) "Police can maintain public order without Defence Force." (8)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year. -

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

(a) "The police only is necessary to be used by the government inside the country." (1)

(b) "Why (should) the DF be engaged.

That is, will they do a bit of gun play in the street? Is that what the central government's proposed plan is, for the future of this country?" (11)

PROPOSITION VIII

"The PIR and the PNG DF generally, are an elite force maintained on Australian conditions, which the country cannot afford. They need to adapt themselves to PNG standards and ways of doing things."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	Not sure/ No answer
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	19	8	3
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	3	3	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	22	11	3
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	9	-	1
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	9	5	1
6.	Trainee Magistrates Group	6	11	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	24	16	-

The indicated direction of response to this question for the Westernised, pseudo-Australian, apolitical military hypothesis was: Disagree

1. Disagree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) If they try to adopt their own ways of doing things this is not going to make an efficient force. They should remain with Australian ways of doing things." (5)

- (b) (because) "Australia and PNG might want to sign some sort of defence treaty after independence." (6)
- (c) "We must maintain this status in order to reflect our power to the troublemakers." (9)
- (d) "We cannot adapt to our own ways. We are living in a modern world and everything has to be modern. Whether we like it or not we have to keep pace with other nation's standards. We can always get help from Australia." (22)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "PIR are getting more or less the same treatment as other public servants." (2)
- (b) "PNG DF are not maintained on Australian conditions. It is the layout of the camps, maintenance and general turnout of the soldiers that make people get such an impression. Talking about PNG standards, the Army must have the necessary amount of modern equipment in order to carry out its role effectively." (3)
- (c) "The PNG DF is an elite in terms of organisation and coherence, training, skill and discipline etc., this is true and so it is in the case of the Police and Public Service. Our conditions of service are relative to the police. It is true that our accommodation

is of a higher standard than any other group but you cannot blame the local members of the Defence Force because it is not their doing. The Australian government put them up and there is nothing anyone can do about it (Unless one wants to pull all the existing buildings down and put up new ones in line with PNG standards.)" (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year -

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

- (a) "I believe there is a trap if the PNG DF is to adapt to PNG standards. If soldiers are to be satisfactorily trained they need to be fully trained." (7)
- (b) "It is wise (that) PNG DF has some knowledge beyond PNG standards so that it is efficient in carrying out (its) duties." (15)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

- (a) "They must be elite forces in order to meet international powers, or else we won't cope with external forces." (8)
- (b) "How can they adapt to the PNG standard if they have been (used) to such colonial standards?" (9)
- (c) "So far what is maintained in the defence

force of PNG is quite OK for the conditions
and standards of this country." (15)

(d) "It's too late (to change)." (16)

2. Agree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "But having got used to Australian
conditions, I would say it will not work
if (an) attempt is made (to adapt)." (1)

(b) "... but the PNG DF is changing now." (12)

(c) "I think it would be better for us to do
things in our own way." (16)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

(a) "... but I do not think this force has been
maintained 100 per cent on Australian
conditions." (1)

(b) "... (but) standards of discipline must be
maintained." (5)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year -

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year

(a) "The Army does not have true meaning in this
country." (5)

(b) "We should reduce (the PNG DF) to the number
or size that we can afford.

(c) "But if the standard is lowered to PNG style the whole organisation will break down."
(9)

(d) "Localize wherever possible. This does not mean that all expatriate soldiers are retrenched, rather maintain standard at present level." (13)

(3) Trainee Magistrate Group. -

3. Not Sure Response

a. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Student 2nd year

(a) "Partly Agree ... (but) They have been trained in your way and got used to the conditions that existed. ... wouldn't their morale be low if they are told to change and run their force according to PNG standards and ways." (12)

PROPOSITION IX

"The political control of the military in Australia is achieved through the convention of the primacy of the civil power. This has come to mean that the public service departmental head is placed in a superior relationship to the professional military man. This practice should be adopted in PNG also."

Summary of Results

Serial	Group	Agree	Disagree	Not sure/ No answer
1.	PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets	20	8	2
2.	PNG Defence Force Officers	3	3	-
3.	Total: PNG Military Group	23	11	2
4.	Administrative College Students 1st year	5	3	1
5.	Administrative College Students 2nd year	10	4	1
6.	Trainee Magistrates Group	6	11	-
7.	Total: PNG Public Servant Group	21	18	2

The indicated direction of response to this question for the Westernized, pseudo-Australian, apolitical military hypothesis was: Agree

1. Agree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

(a) "Yes it should be practiced in PNG. If the defence force is going to be loyal to the government." (5)

(b) "If PNG has such an organisation there should

be no problem of a coup or any other threats at all. The government would have complete control of the Defence Force..."

(25)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers.

- (a) "I believe this will be the only way government will contain the army..." (2)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year -

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year.

- (a) "He (the military chief) will then be more of an adviser to the public service departmental head." (7)
- (b) "(but) ... only if it serves its purpose." (9)
- (c) "... so that both parties should have closer ties." (12)
- (d) "Civil Servant will act as coordinator. He will be on neutral grounds and will be able to coordinate and act as middle man. There will of course be resentment by the military personnel but this is a normal thing and I think it will eventually wear out." (13)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

- (a) "It will prevent too much military influence

in the government." (7)

- (b) "... Civil government can (thus) control the army's activities." (15)

2. Disagree Responses

a. PNG Military Group

(1) PNG Defence Force Officer Cadets

- (a) "Not at this stage when there is misunderstanding and confusion." (9)
- (b) "The future PNG DF should only be headed by members of the force. They could have outside people assisting but the control should be left to the Defence Force." (20)
- (c) "It will be better if one of the senior officers represents the Army." (29)
- (d) "Australia is a Western type of country and what she is doing is according to her way of thinking and doing things but in PNG I think it will be different ... the military professional is just the same as the public service departmental head. These two men have different fields and each of them is just as good as the other." (30)

(2) PNG Defence Force Officers

- (a) "This may not work here." (1)
- (b) "There should be one level (only) but military men must understand that they are an organisation in the civil government machinery." (5)

- (c) "Primacy of civil power is applicable to Australia and not to PNG situation because Australia has (a) strong and fairly efficient public service whose departmental heads are appointed not because of political expediency but through (their) own ability and integrity. I personally believe our Public Service in PNG will be susceptible to corruption, bribery etc. For this reason alone I do not believe in primacy of civil power as an adequate concept in (the) PNG situation. At present it is almost impossible for PI* soldiers to accept any important decisions that may be made by politicians. This therefore indicates a requirement for someone, a military person, to sit in the Cabinet, in the policy making body." (6)

b. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 1st year

- (a) "A professional military man should head the Defence Department." (1)
- (b) "The public servant should not be placed superior to professional military man. The

* PI (Pacific Islander) is the military abbreviation used to describe Papua New Guinean Servicemen.

army should have direct contact with the politicians, likewise politicians should have direct (lines) down to permanent professional army personnel. ... (The) Army should have a seat in Cabinet." (2)

- (c) "... this will cause frustrations ... It is best that the military man brings his ideas straight to the Cabinet." (7)

(2) Administrative College Students 2nd year.

- (a) "They should be more or less on the same line so that a professional military man will be able to maintain good relationships with (the) public service departmental head." (5)

(3) Trainee Magistrates Group

- (a) "Those public servants transferred - I mean department heads - should be given some training first. How to salute, marching, weapon drills, so that at least they know something about the functions ... of (the) PNG DF." (3)
- (b) "This idea is wrong. Why not let it stay as it is now where we regard DF as an independent body. Why (are we) adapting it with Public Service departments. This might bring conflict among people as to who is who." (10)
- (c) "(but)... the public service and military

forces must work together." (16)

- (d) "I think this would cause disagreement and ill-feeling in the Army. A professional military man would be (more) suitable in this career than a civilian." (17)

3. Not Sure Response

a. PNG Public Servant Group

(1) Administrative College Students 2nd year.

- (a) "Not sure. If this suits the country then PNG may keep the Australian pattern. Otherwise departmental and military heads (should) be given equal footing so that both will feel that they have equal responsibility to the country." (14)

APPENDIX 3A SECOND SURVEY OF PAPUA NEW GUINEAN ATTITUDES TO DEFENCE AND
SECURITY ISSUESJANUARY-FEBRUARY 1974INTRODUCTION

During May 1973 I conducted a survey of defence and security attitudes amongst two groups of Papua New Guineans - a group of Public Servants undergoing training at the Administrative College and a group of PNG DF officers and officer cadets. This earlier report (Appendix 2) pointed to the benefits of another survey which employed a broader sample of Papua New Guineans. This second survey, conducted in PNG during January-February 1974, has accordingly been carried out in order to further examine PNG attitudes to defence and security.

During the eight months interval between the two surveys, PNG continued along its road to political independence at an accelerated pace under the Somare Government and it is probable that the course of political events in PNG would have had some effect on the Papua New Guinean attitudes since the earlier survey. Some of the more important political trends during the period were the growing stature of Mr. Somare and the increasing authority of the government, marked, in particular, by the trouble-free introduction of self government on 1 December 1973; and secondly, the emergence of an apparently workable and indigenous style of government in PNG, commonly known as Melanesia Consensus. By this means which involved the "talking-out" of problems and political

comprise, the Bougainville secession issue (as seen in January 1974) appeared to have been defused if not finally solved. In addition, tribal fighting and lawlessness in the Highlands, which had been seen as a major problem in early 1973, was by January 1974, receiving less coverage in the news media and was less a cause of concern to the central government. Balancing these "improvements" in the security situation, the Papuan separatist cause appeared more active under the leadership of Miss Josephine Abaijah, MHA, and her Papua Besena movement. In general, however, it seemed that the successful introduction of self government may have increased the confidence of many Papua New Guineans about the future prospects of the country and produced a more optimistic outlook about internal security problems. Papua New Guinean attitudes to defence may also have been influenced by the PNG government's steadily increasing interest in, and influence over, defence matters, represented by Mr. A.M. Kiki's appointment as Defence Minister in August 1973, replacing Mr. Somare in the former office of "Defence Spokesman".

SURVEY METHOD

The Sample

The sample was selected on the basis of the assumptions set out in the May 1973 Report (Appendix 2) about the important potential roles of a PNG political elite. The sample included: a Military group composed of PNG DF officers and officer cadets of the Joint Services College (JSC)¹ and a group of senior PNG DF

1. The JSC was opened in January 1974 replacing the Military Cadet School (MCS) which was its forerunner.

NCOs,¹ a "Law Enforcement" group composed of Police officer cadets and Corrective Institutions Service (CIS) officer cadets of the JSC and; a Public Servant group composed of first and second year Diploma of Public Administration students attending the Administrative College and a group of senior PNG Public Servants attending a Policy Workshop seminar in Port Moresby during this period (This gave a total of 238 Papua New Guineans as compared to only 77 in the May 1973 survey.²) It will be seen that the Police sample consists of officer trainees only: this was because it was not possible to obtain official approval to survey Police officers and for this reason the "representativeness" of the Police group is suspect.

1. The senior NCO group was included to determine the extent to which NCO attitudes in the PNG DF were similar to those of the officer corps. The evidence of other armies has shown that NCOs may sometimes play an important political role influencing the officer corps' actions.
2. The sample details were as follows:
 - a. Military Group. (n = 151)
 - (1) PNG DF Officers (n = 46). PNG officers serving in Port Moresby, Lae and Wewak were surveyed. They represented about 50 per cent of the total PNG officer corps. All ranks from major to second lieutenant were reached.
 - (2) PNG DF Officer Cadets at the JSC, Lae (n = 77)
 - (a) Joint Training Wing (First Year trainees) (n=42)
 - (b) Advanced Defence Training Wing (First Year trainees) (n = 35).
 (All officer cadets at JSC were surveyed).
 - (3) PNG DF Senior NCO group (n = 28). These were Sergeants and Warrant Officers serving in the Murray Barracks area.
 - b. Law Enforcement Group. (n = 28)
 - (1) Police Officer Cadets at the JSC (n = 20). These were officer cadets undergoing the first year of Police officer training at the JSC.
 - (2) CIS officer cadets at the JSC (n = 8).
(In both cases all JSC trainees were surveyed.)

Cont'd.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire consisted of thirty two questions each requiring either an Agree or Disagree response. A specimen questionnaire is shown at Annex A. The thirty two questions covered a group of related issues as well as a number of miscellaneous defence and security issues. The related issues were grouped so as to test a number of hypotheses about defence and security issues. Two of these hypotheses were designed to further examine the findings of the earlier May 1973 survey.

The following hypotheses were examined by the grouping of related questions:

- ONE That Papua New Guineans have adopted Conservative,
Realistic attitudes towards the establishment of
security forces in PNG. (11 questions)
- TWO That Papua New Guineans have accepted westernised
notions of an apolitical defence force, modelled on
Australian lines. (5 questions)
- THREE That Papua New Guineans have a favourable perception
of the PNG DF's role in PNG society. (8 questions)
- FOUR That Papua New Guineans have a favourable perception
of the Police's role in PNG society. (4 questions)

Footnote 2 cont'd from page 152.

c. Public Servant Group. (n = 59)

- (1) Administrative College Diploma of Public Administration Students (First and Second Year) (n = 43). This sample represented about 50 per cent of the total number of students enrolled in these courses.
- (2) Senior Executive Policy Workshop Program. (n = 16). There were believed to be about 35 attending the course, including a number of departmental heads and other senior men.

FIVE That Papua New Guineans have "realistic" (that is, generally pessimistic) attitudes about security problems in PNG. (5 questions)

SIX That Papua New Guineans have confidence in the defence relationship with Australia. (2 questions)

Some questions formed a part of several of the above hypotheses. For full explanation of the notions involved in hypotheses ONE and TWO see the Report of the May 1973 survey. (Appendix 2).

Conduct of the Questionnaire

In all cases, copies of the questionnaire was issued to the organisations involved, who then arranged for them to be completed. It is believed that in most cases they were issued and completed at a group meeting without the opportunity for discussion or deliberation.

SURVEY RESULTS

The aggregated responses for each question within each sub-group and group are shown at Annex B, Appendices 1 to 8. Appendices 1 to 6 contain the results of the questions grouped by hypotheses, Appendix 7 contains the results for the miscellaneous issues and Appendix 8 contains a summary for all questions. The responses to the questions which form part of the six hypotheses were tested for statistical significance within each sub-group (e.g. PNG DF officers) and group (e.g. the Military group) using the Chi Square Goodness of Fit Statistic.¹ The summarised results of

1. I am greatly indebted to Major M.J. Eley and Captain P. O'Brien, of the Department of Defence (Army Office), Canberra, who generously undertook the task of computer programing and calculation.

these statistical tests are shown at Annex C.

Some Comparative and Preliminary Conclusions

The following observations are based on the statistical data shown in the Annexes and should be read in conjunction with them.

Hypothesis ONE. Of the three groups in the survey, the Military and Police groups accepted this hypothesis at a statistically significant level. The Public Servant group did not, although a majority agreed with each question in the hypothesis. This, to some extent, confirms the findings of the May 73 survey in respect of the Military and Public Servant groups and extends this finding to the Police group. Whilst there was general agreement in all groups that PNG needed a Defence Force in order to become a "really independent nation" (Ques.3), almost half the Public Servant group and about one third of the other two groups agreed to the proposition in Ques. 23 that, "In today's world, it is no longer possible for a country to defend itself by force of arms".

Hypothesis TWO. None of the groups accepted the notions of a westernised, apolitical role for the PNG military, at a statistically significant level. (This accords with the findings of the May 1973 survey which indicated considerable disagreement within Military and Public Servant groups on these issues). Whilst, in all groups, most agreed that the PNG DF would not threaten civilian government in PNG (Ques. 4) and (Ques. 12) and "must stay out of politics"

(Quest. 15), a majority in each group considered that members of the PNG DF should be employed outside their traditional defence role. Secondly, both Military and Police majorities believed that the PNG DF should be represented by its own member in the House of Assembly. As neither of these proposals accord with Australian civil-military practice, it appears that there is either some inconsistency in attitudes or, more likely, significant potential deviation from Australian patterns of civil military relations. It does seem that the Somare Government's policies have been successful in reducing the suspicion amongst Public Servants of military intervention in politics which was, to some extent, evident in the May 1973 survey.

Hypothesis THREE. This group of questions tended to show (with several exceptions) that the PNG DF was favourably regarded by all groups, but only by the Military group at a statistically significant level. This higher degree of self-esteem by PNG DF members is hardly surprising! Divergences of opinion between the groups was most marked over the amount of money spent on the PNG DF (Ques. 6), the ability of PNG DF members to become good village leaders when they retire (Ques. 7) and the superiority of Defence Force training compared to other organisations (Ques. 5). Whilst 80 per cent of the Military group did not agree that "too much money was spent on the PNG DF, more than half in each of the other two groups did agree. Similarly, although about three-quarters of the Police and

Public Servants believed that Defence Force pay and conditions were good (Ques. 30), in the Military group, more than half were dissatisfied with their "Pay and Conditions". In regard to Questions 5 and 7 only about one third of the Public Servants were prepared to concede that Defence Force veterans made good village leaders, or that military training was superior to that of other PNG organisations. (The Police group rated the PNG DF significantly more favourably than had the Public Servants in both these questions).

Hypothesis FOUR. As with the PNG DF, all groups regarded the Police favourably, although in this case each group did so at a statistically significant level. It is of interest to note that the Public Servant group believed that retired policemen were considerably more likely to make good village leaders (Qes. 25) than would retired servicemen (c.f. Ques. 7).

Hypothesis FIVE. The results for this hypothesis showed that only the Military group held "realistic" attitudes to PNG security at a statistically significant level. The questions in this hypothesis, moreover, indicated considerable divergences of opinion between groups in regard to some of the questions. Whilst a high percentage in each group disagreed with the proposition that the PNG DF was not needed because "there is no chance of threats or attacks from other countries" (Ques. 14), significant minorities in each

group agreed with the view that "In today's world it is no longer possible for a country to defend itself by force of arms" (Ques. 23). Furthermore, majorities in each group (with the PNG DF group the most prominent) agreed that PNG was "too small to be able to defend herself" (Ques. 16). (This response may be linked, interestingly, to the results of the next hypothesis which indicated considerable "security reliance" on Australia). Questions about secession and tribal fighting problems indicated a greater degree of "realism" (or pessimism) amongst the Military group in comparison to the Public Servants, and, to a lesser extent, the Police group. Whilst 76 per cent of the Military group believed that the PNG DF would "be needed in preventing secession in PNG" (Ques. 9) only 39 per cent of the Public Servants agreed with this proposition. Similarly, 71 per cent of the Military group thought that the PNG DF would be needed in the future "to control tribal fighting and lawlessness" (Ques. 10) whereas only 56 per cent of the Public Servants (and 35 per cent of the Police group) agreed with this proposition.

Hypothesis SIX. Each of the Groups were in agreement at a statistically significant level that "Australians must be kept in the PNG DF for some time to come" (Ques. 26) and that "If PNG was threatened or attacked, Australia would always come to her assistance" (Ques. 31). The responses thus tended to indicate a high measure of confidence in the defence relationship with Australia.

Miscellaneous Issues

Police/Defence Force Relations (Ques.8). More than half the Military and Public Servant groups agreed that "The Police and Defence Force do not get on well together," although more than half the Police group disagreed with this proposition. The responses to this question may have unduly reflected a recent incident of Police/Defence Force conflict and, thereby, to some extent have over-emphasised the extent of the possible rivalry.¹

A National Service Scheme. (Ques. 24) A majority in each group agreed that PNG needed "a form of National Service scheme run by the PNG DF". Rather surprisingly, support for the proposal was marginally weaker within the Military group.

Voluntary Versus Compulsory Military Service. (Ques. 29)

Although only about one third of the Military and Police groups agreed that "A Volunteer Defence Force (as at present) was not as good as some system of compulsory military service for Papua New Guineans", slightly over half the Public Servant group supported the concept of compulsory service.

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1. In January 1974 confrontation between Police mobile units and Defence Force elements occurred in the Murray Barracks environs involving the discharge of tear gas grenades. The incident followed Police attempts to arrest several soldiers on leave outside the Murray Barracks area. In the state of strained Police/Defence Force relations at the time of the survey this question was probably unfair, however, the questionnaire had been devised and produced several weeks before this incident and could not conveniently be altered.

Defence Relations with Indonesia. (Ques. 27) The proposal that "The PNG DF should train with the Indonesian armed forces and have close relations with them" was generally, but not unanimously, supported by the Military and Public Servant groups, but rejected by a majority of the Police group who seemed more conservative on this issue.

CONCLUSION

The results of this survey, which canvassed a broader range of issues than the May 1973 survey, have shown that there is a substantial measure of agreement between the three groups sampled on the need for defence forces in PNG and on their place in PNG society. This finding generally accords with the results of the earlier survey. At the same time this survey revealed the tendency of the Military group to see PNG's future security problems more pessimistically than the other two groups. It might be argued that this is characteristic of the military as an institution and not, therefore, unique to PNG.

In regard to the issue of the PNG DF's possible political role in society, the disagreement within each group which was noted in the May 1973 survey now seems to have been resolved to some extent. In all groups, a majority rejected the notion of the Defence Force constituting a threat to civilian supremacy in government. On the other hand, there is general support for the expansion of the military role in society - by employment of military men in other government fields and by the establishment

of a National Service scheme. Furthermore, more than half the Military and Police groups and a significant minority of Public Servants want to see the Defence Force represented by its own member in the national parliament.¹ It seems, therefore, that given these attitudes, PNG civil-military relations may be rather less likely to follow Australian patterns - based on a strict apolitisme, and a clearly delineated boundary between military and civilian roles. As mentioned in the May 1973 report, it is likely that PNG attitudes on civil-military relations are in a process of evolution and this process may intensify in the early period of political independence.

Another significant finding of this survey is the confidence which the Papua New Guineans who were surveyed displayed in Australia's strategic protection of PNG and the contribution of Australians in the Defence Force. (One may of course ask whether this satisfaction with Australian assistance may operate against PNG's long-term interests by slowing down the broadening of defence relations with other countries in the region and thereby perpetuating dependence on Australia).

1. It is possible that some may have misinterpreted this question and agreed to the suggestion for a Defence Minister within the House of Assembly, rather than the proposal for a member nominated or elected to represent the Defence Force (and who might or might not be a member of cabinet). This misunderstanding seems somewhat unlikely as the PNG Government had, in fact, had a Defence Spokesman since August 1972 and a Defence Minister since August 1973.

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Annex A. Specimen Questionnaire

Annex B. Collected Statistical Results:

Appendix 1: Conservative Realism towards Defence
Forces in PNG.

2: Westernised, Pseudo Australian, Apolitical
Military.

3: Favourable Perception of the PNG DF in
Society.

4: Favourable Perception of the Police in PNG
Society.

5: "Realistic" Attitudes to PNG Security
Problems.

6: Confidence in Defence Relationship with
Australia.

7: Miscellaneous Issues.

8: Summary of results for all Questions.

Annex C. Results of Chi Square Goodness of Fit test for the
Survey data.

ANNEX AQ U E S T I O N N A I R EPERSONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PNG DF

This questionnaire has been compiled by me to gather material for an MA thesis on the development of Defence Forces in PNG. The research is being conducted at the University of N.S.W. at Duntroon.

Names are not required.

You may leave if you wish when all the questions have been answered.

Thank you for your assistance.

(P.A. MENCH)
Department of Government,
Faculty of Military Studies,
University of N.S.W.,
DUNTROON. A.C.T.

PERSONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PNG DF

Instructions:

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with each statement by placing a cross in the relevant column.

You may not completely agree or disagree with some statements, however try and force yourself to answer one way or another.

	<u>Question</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
1.	The Police have an important job in PNG.		
2.	The PNG DF does not have an important job in PNG.		
3.	To become a really independent nation PNG must have a Defence Force.		
4.	The Defence Force will be a threat to civilian government in PNG.		
5.	The PNG DF trains its members better than do civilian and other government employers.		
6.	Too much money is spent on the PNG DF.		
7.	When Defence Force men retire they make good village leaders.		
8.	The Police and Defence Force do not get on well together.		
9.	The PNG DF will be needed in preventing secession in PNG.		
10.	The PNG DF will not be required in future to control tribal fighting and lawlessness.		
11.	Too much money is spent on the Police in PNG.		
12.	A military take-over of the government in PNG is very unlikely.		
13.	The PNG DF teaches people from all parts of the country to live and work well together.		

	<u>Questions</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
14.	The PNG DF is not needed because there is no chance of threats or attacks from other countries.		
15.	The PNG DF must stay out of politics.		
16.	PNG is too small to be able to defend herself.		
17.	PNG DF men pass on useful skills and knowledge when they return to civilian life.		
18.	Natural disasters (like the Highlands famine) have shown how the PNG DF is useful in peacetime.		
19.	Defence Force men should not be used in other government jobs.		
20.	The PNG DF should have fewer men in it.		
21.	The Police are efficient and do a good job in PNG.		
22.	The PNG DF carries out valuable national development work with its Civil Action program.		
23.	In todays world it is no longer possible for a country to defend itself by force of arms.		
24.	PNG needs a form of National Service scheme run by the PNG DF.		
25.	When Policemen retire they make good village leaders.		
26.	Australians must be kept in the PNG DF for some time to come.		
27.	The PNG DF should train with the Indonesian armed forces and have close relations with them.		
28.	The PNG DF is efficient and does a good job.		
29.	A volunteer Defence Force (as at present) is not as good as some system of compulsory military service for Papua New Guineans.		

<u>Questions</u>		<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
30.	Pay and conditions in the PNG DF are not good.		
31.	If PNG was threatened or attacked, Australia would always come to her assistance.		
32.	The PNG DF should have its own member in the House of Assembly.		

ANNEX BCOLLECTED STATISTICAL RESULTS

Note: 1. All percentages have been adjusted to the nearest percentage figure.

2. Scoring:

- a. Answers in hypotheses' indicated direction of response score: 1.
- b. Answers against indicated direction of response score: 0.
- c. Questions not completed score: 0.

Hypothesis ONE: "CONSERVATIVE REALISM" TOWARDS DEFENCE FORCES IN PNG.

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC(JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC(ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
2. The PNG DF does not have an important job in PNG.	Disagree	46	39	33	27	145 (96%)	18	5	23 (81%)	30	15	45 (76%)
3. To become a really independent nation PNG must have a Defence Force.	Agree	36	36	30	26	128 (85%)	18	7	25 (89%)	24	12	36 (61%)
13. The PNG DF Teaches people from all parts of the country to live and work together	Agree	42	40	34	26	142 (94%)	16	6	22 (77%)	29	15	44 (75%)
14. The PNG DF is not needed because there is no chance of threats or attack from other countries	Disagree	44	41	31	26	142 (94%)	20	7	27 (96%)	37	15	52 (88%)

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC (JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC (ADTW) CAdeets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
17. PNG DF men pass on useful skills and knowledge when they return to civilian life.	Agree	41	35	33	25	134 (89%)	13	5	18 (64%)	26	13	39 (66%)
20. The PNG DF should have fewer men in it.	Disagree	40	39	28	23	130 (86%)	17	7	24 (85%)	28	11	39 (66%)
22. The PNG DF carries out valuable national development work with its Civic Action program.	Agree	44	35	34	28	141 (94%)	17	7	24 (85%)	28	11	39 (66%)
28. The PNG DF is efficient and does a good job.	Agree	43	36	33	27	139 (92%)	17	8	25 (89%)	29	14	43 (73%)
18. Natural disasters (like the Highlands famine) have shown how the PNG DF is useful in peace time.	Agree	45	38	35	28	146 (97%)	18	7	25 (89%)	37	16	53 (90%)
23. In today's world it is no longer possible for a country to defend itself by force of arms.	Disagree	28	28	23	19	98 (64%)	14	6	20 (71%)	22	10	32 (54%)

Hypothesis TWO: ACCEPTANCE OF A WESTERNISED, PSEUDO AUSTRALIAN, APOLITICAL MILITARY IN PNG.

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC (JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC (ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Snr. NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
4. The Defence Force will be a threat to civilian government in PNG	Disagree	40	30	33	16	119 (79%)	17	5	23 (81%)	31	14	45 (76%)
12. A military take-over of the government in PNG is very unlikely.	Agree	39	29	29	19	116 (76%)	15	3	18 (64%)	32	9	41 (70%)
15. The PNG DF must stay out of politics.	Agree	34	28	20	25	107 (71%)	19	5	24 (85%)	39	14	53 (90%)
19. PNG DF men should not be used in other government work.	Agree	14	9	14	9	46 (30%)	3	4	7 (25%)	17	4	21 (38%)
32. The PNG DF should have its own member in the House of Assembly	Disagree	17	16	10	4	47 (31%)	7	3	10 (35%)	24	11	35 (60%)

Hypothesis THREE: FAVOURABLE PERCEPTION OF THE PNG DF IN PNG SOCIETY.

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC (JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC (ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
2. The PNG DF does not have an important job in PNG.	Disagree	46	39	33	27	145 (96%)	18	5	23 (81%)	30	15	45 (76%)
5. The PNG DF trains its members better than do civilian and other government employers.	Agree	33	33	28	21	115 (76%)	14	7	21 (75%)	16	4	20 (34%)
6. Too much money is spent on the PNG DF.	Disagree	39	31	31	20	121 (80%)	9	5	4 (50%)	14	4	18 (30%)
7. When Defence Force men retire they make good village leaders.	Agree	35	34	22	24	115 (76%)	13	8	21 (75%)	11	5	16 (27%)
17. PNG DF men pass on useful skills and knowledge when they return to civilian life.	Agree	41	35	33	25	134 (89%)	13	5	18 (64%)	26	13	39 (66%)

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Responses	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC (JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC (ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servant (n=16)	Total (n=59)
20. The PNG DF should have fewer men in it.	Disagree	40	39	28	23	130 (86%)	17	7	24 (85%)	28	11	39 (66%)
22. The PNG DF carries out valuable national development work with its Civic Action program.	Agree	44	35	34	28	141 (94%)	17	8	25 (89%)	35	14	49 (83%)
28. The PNG DF is efficient and does a good job.	Agree	43	36	33	27	139 (92%)	17	8	25 (89%)	29	14	43 (73%)
30. Pay and conditions in the PNG DF are not good.	Disagree	18	25	16	9	68 (45%)	15	5	20 (71%)	29	13	42 (72%)

Hypothesis FOUR: FAVOURABLE PERCEPTION OF THE POLICE IN PNG SOCIETY.

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC(JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC(ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
1. The Police have an important job in PNG.	Agree	45	39	33	26	143 (95%)	20	8	28 (100%)	40	15	55 (93%)
11. Too much money is spent on the Police in PNG.	Disagree	35	15	23	10	84 (55%)	17	4	21 (75%)	24	11	35 (60%)
21. The Police are efficient and do a good job in PNG.	Agree	25	25	14	20	84 (54%)	18	7	25 (89%)	20	12	32 (54%)
25. When Policemen retire they make good village leaders.	Agree	30	32	20	20	102 (68%)	15	8	23 (81%)	23	12	35 (60%)

Hypothesis FIVE: "REALISTIC" ATTITUDES TO PNG SECURITY PROBLEMS

Questions	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSE BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC(JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC(ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
9 The PNG DF will be needed in preventing secession in PNG.	Agree	31	36	23	24	114 (76%)	15	4	19 (68%)	16	7	23 (39%)
10. The PNG DF will not be required in future to control tribal fighting and lawlessness.	Disagree	29	30	28	21	108 (71%)	8	2	10 (35%)	22	11	33 (56%)
14. The PNG DF is not needed because there is no chance of threats or attacks from other countries.	Disagree	44	41	31	26	142 (94%)	20	7	27 (96%)	37	15	52 (88%)
16. PNG is too small to be able to defend herself.	Disagree	12	23	13	3	51 (33%)	7	3	10 (35%)	16	5	21 (38%)
23. In todays world it is no longer possible for a country to defend itself by force of arms.	Disagree	28	28	23	19	98 (64%)	14	7	21 (75%)	22	10	32 (54%)

Hypothesis SIX: CONFIDENCE IN DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP WITH AUSTRALIA

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC(JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC(ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
26. Australians must be kept in the PNG DF for some time to come.	Agree	43	37	32	28	140 (93%)	20	8	28 (100%)	34	10	44 (75%)
31. If PNG was threatened or attacked, Australia would always come to her assistance.	Agree	41	37	33	27	138 (91%)	19	8	27 (96%)	32	13	45 (76%)

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Question	Hypothesis Indicated Direction of Response	RESPONSES BY GROUPS (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE)										
		MILITARY GROUP					LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUP			PUBLIC SERVANT GROUP		
		PNG DF Officers (n=46)	JSC(JTW) Cadets (n=42)	JSC(ADTW) Cadets (n=35)	PNG DF Senior NCOs (n=28)	Total (n=151)	JSC Police Cadets (n=20)	JSC CIS Cadets (n=8)	Total (n=28)	Admin College (n=43)	Senior Public Servants (n=16)	Total (n=59)
8. The Police and Defence Force do not get on well together	Disagree	25	20	6	13	64 (42%)	11	6	17 (61%)	14	8	22 (37%)
24. PNG needs a form of National Service scheme run by the PNG DF.	Agree	23	37	17	19	96 (63%)	15	7	22 (81%)	31	12	43 (73%)
29. A volunteer Defence Force (as at present) is not as good as some system of compulsory military service for Papua New Guinea.	Agree	12	14	20	7	53 (35%)	4	6	10 (35%)	24	8	32 (54%)
27. The PNG DF should train with the Indonesian armed forces and have close relations with them.	Agree	30	27	23	16	96 (63%)	11	1	12 (43%)	28	9	37 (64%)

Appendix 8.SUMMARYPNG ATTITUDE SURVEY ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES

GROUP	RESPONSES TO EACH QUESTION (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE) <u>AGREED</u> (A) or <u>DISAGREED</u> (D)															
	1 (A)	2 (D)	3 (A)	4 (D)	5 (A)	6 (D)	7 (A)	8 (D)	9 (A)	10 (D)	11 (D)	12 (A)	13 (A)	14 (D)	15 (A)	16 (D)
1. PNG DF Officers n=46	45	46	36	40	33	39	35	25	31	29	36	39	42	44	34	12
2. Offr Cadets (JTW) n=42	39	39	36	30	33	31	34	20	36	30	15	29	40	41	28	23
3. Offr Cadets (ADTW) n=35	33	33	30	33	28	31	22	6	23	28	23	29	34	34	20	13
4. Senior NCO n=28	26	27	26	16	21	20	24	13	24	21	10	19	26	26	25	3
5. <u>TOTAL</u> MILITARY GRP n=151 <u>PERCENTAGES</u>	143 95	145 96	128 85	119 79	115 76	121 80	115 76	64 42	114 76	108 71	84 55	116 76	142 94	142 94	107 71	51 33
6. Police (JTW) n=20	20	18	18	17	14	9	13	11	15	8	17	15	16	20	19	7
7. CIS (JTW) n=8	8	5	7	5	7	5	8	6	4	2	4	3	6	7	5	3
8. <u>TOTAL</u> ENFORCEMENT GRP n = 28 <u>PERCENTAGES</u>	28 100	23 81	25 89	23 81	21 75	14 50	21 75	17 61	19 68	10 35	21 75	18 64	22 77	27 96	24 85	10 35
9. ADCOL Group n=43	40	30	24	31	16	14	11	14	16	22	24	32	29	37	39	16
10. Senior PS Grp. n=16	15	15	12	14	4	4	5	8	7	11	11	9	15	15	14	5
11. <u>TOTAL</u> PS GROUP n=59 <u>PERCENTAGES</u>	55 93	45 76	36 61	45 76	20 34	18 30	16 27	22 37	23 39	33 56	35 60	41 70	44 75	52 88	53 90	21 38

SUMMARYPNG ATTITUDE SURVEY ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES

GROUP	RESPONSES TO EACH QUESTION (INDICATED DIRECTION OF RESPONSE) AGREED (A) or DISAGREED (D)															
	17 (A)	18 (A)	19 (A)	20 (D)	21 (A)	22 (A)	23 (D)	24 (A)	25 (A)	26 (A)	27 (A)	28 (A)	29 (A)	30 (D)	31 (A)	32 (D)
1. PNG DF Offrs. n=46	41	45	14	40	25	44	28	23	30	43	30	43	12	18	41	17
2. Offr Cadets (JTW)n=42	35	38	9	39	25	35	28	37	32	37	27	36	14	25	37	16
3. Offr. Cadets (ADTW) n=35	33	35	14	28	14	34	23	17	20	32	23	33	20	16	33	10
4. Senior NCO n=28	25	28	9	23	20	28	19	19	20	28	16	27	7	9	27	4
5. <u>TOTAL</u> MILITARY GRP. n=151	134	146	46	130	84	141	98	96	102	140	96	139	53	68	138	47
<u>PERCENTAGES</u>	89	97	30	86	54	94	64	63	68	93	63	92	35	45	91	31
6. Police (JTW) n=20	13	18	3	17	18	17	14	15	15	20	11	17	4	15	19	7
7. CIS (JTW) n=8	5	7	4	7	7	8	6	7	8	8	1	8	6	5	8	3
8. <u>TOTAL</u> ENFORCEMENT GRP n=28	18	25	7	24	25	25	20	22	23	28	12	25	10	20	27	10
<u>PERCENTAGES</u>	64	89	25	85	89	89	71	77	81	100	43	89	35	71	96	35
9. ADCOL Group n=43	26	37	17	28	20	35	22	31	23	34	28	29	24	29	32	24
10. Senior PS Grp n=16	13	16	4	11	12	14	10	12	12	10	9	14	8	13	13	11
11. <u>TOTAL</u> PS GROUP n=59	39	53	21	39	32	49	32	43	35	44	37	43	32	42	45	35
<u>PERCENTAGES</u>	66	90	38	66	54	83	54	73	60	75	64	73	54	72	76	60

ANNEX C
RESULTS OF CHI SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST
FOR THE SURVEY DATA

(*SIG. Significant)

Serial	Sub-Groups and Groups	Hypothesis ONE	Hypothesis TWO	Hypothesis THREE	Hypothesis FOUR	Hypothesis FIVE	Hypothesis SIX
1.	PNG DF Officers ($\chi^2_{45}(95\%) = 30.630$)	11.700 * <u>SIG.</u>	41.200 NOT SIG.	19.667 <u>SIG.</u>	22.500 <u>SIG.</u>	44.800 NOT SIG.	4.000 <u>SIG.</u>
2.	JSC Cadets (JTW) ($\chi^2_{41}(95\%) = 27.355$)	14.000 <u>SIG.</u>	56.800 NOT SIG.	20.555 <u>SIG.</u>	32.750 NOT SIG.	20.400 <u>SIG.</u>	6.00 <u>SIG.</u>
3.	JSC Cadets (ADTW) ($\chi^2_{34}(95\%) = 21.698$)	7.000 <u>SIG.</u>	36.200 NOT SIG.	14.556 <u>SIG.</u>	27.000 NOT SIG.	29.000 NOT SIG.	3.500 <u>SIG.</u>
4.	PNG DF Senior NCOs ($\chi^2_{37}(95\%) = 16.150$)	4.700 <u>SIG.</u>	38.600 NOT SIG.	14.000 <u>SIG.</u>	20.000 NOT SIG.	20.600 NOT SIG.	.500 <u>SIG.</u>
5.	Military Group ($\chi^2_{150}(95\%) = 121.100$)	37.400 <u>SIG.</u>	172.800 NOT SIG.	68.779 <u>SIG.</u>	102.250 <u>SIG.</u>	114.800 <u>SIG.</u>	14.000 <u>SIG.</u>
6.	Police Cadets, JSC (JTW) ($\chi^2_{19}(95\%) = 10.200$)	9.000 <u>SIG.</u>	17.800 NOT SIG.	18.333 NOT SIG.	4.000 <u>SIG.</u>	16.800 NOT SIG.	.500 <u>SIG.</u>
7.	CIS Cadets, JSC (JTW) ($\chi^2_7(95\%) = 2.170$)	5.200 NOT SIG.	12.800 NOT SIG.	3.778 NOT SIG.	1.250 <u>SIG.</u>	11.200 NOT SIG.	.000 <u>SIG.</u>
8.	Police (Law Enforcement Group) ($\chi^2_{27}(95\%) = 16.150$)	14.200 <u>SIG.</u>	30.600 NOT SIG.	22.111 NOT SIG.	5.250 <u>SIG.</u>	28.00 NOT SIG.	.500 <u>SIG.</u>

ANNEX C Cont'd

Serial	Sub-Groups and Groups	Hypothesis ONE	Hypothesis TWO	Hypothesis THREE	Hypothesis FOUR	Hypothesis FIVE	Hypothesis SIX.
9.	Admin College (Public Servants) $\chi^2_{42}(95\%) = 28.160$	69.110 NOT SIG.	31.200 NOT SIG.	93.888 NOT SIG.	35.250 NOT SIG.	62.400 NOT SIG.	13.000 <u>SIG.</u>
10.	Senior Public Servants $\chi^2_{15}(95\%) = 7260$	8.700 NOT SIG.	12.000 NOT SIG.	22.333 NOT SIG.	6.000 <u>SIG.</u>	16.800 NOT SIG.	5.500 <u>SIG.</u>
11.	Public Servant Group $\chi^2_{58}(95\%) = 41.504$	77.800 NOT SIG.	43.200 NOT SIG.	116.222 NOT SIG.	41.250 <u>SIG.</u>	79.200 NOT SIG.	18.500 <u>SIG.</u>

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