

# Labourism Versus Social Democracy? Attitudes to Inequality in Australia and Sweden

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## Labourism Versus Social Democracy?: Attitudes to Inequality in Australia and Sweden

by  
Stefan Svallfors



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## Foreword

Among the countries which form the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Sweden and Australia are often seen as belonging to opposite ends of the spectrum. While the levels of taxes and government spending in Sweden are the highest in the OECD, Australia is amongst the lowest taxers and spenders. Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study also reveals considerable differences in the distribution of economic well-being, with Sweden having the most equal income distribution and Australia coming towards the bottom of the income inequality ranking of countries included in the Study.

This report asks to what extent these and other differences between Australia and Sweden have been accompanied by distinctly different attitudes to inequality. Using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) various dimensions of attitudes to inequality are mapped and analysed.

The research underlying the report extends two strands of work reported on in earlier publications in the SPRC Reports and Proceedings series. The first of these uses comparative methods in order to place Australian issues, concerns and responses in an international context. The second investigates public attitudes to social issues, how they are formed, what causes them to change and what their impacts are. In bringing together these two strands of research, this report is a valuable contribution to the series, particularly given its specific focus on attitudes to inequality.

The findings from the comparisons point to both similarities and differences in the way attitudes are structured in Australia and Sweden. Those expecting these two nations to be strikingly different may be surprised by some of the noteworthy similarities that are presented, such as the egalitarian views on what income ranges are considered legitimate. On the other hand, those expecting all industrialised nationals to display similar values and commitments may be struck by some clear differences between attitudes in the two countries, such as the more narrow Australian view of the welfare responsibilities of the state, especially when it comes to unemployment.

The report is an imaginative piece of research, making an important contribution in a field of growing interest. By placing Australian attitudes in a comparative perspective, it helps us to locate our national experiences in a wider context. It deserves a wide readership, not only among academics but also among the wider Australian public.

Peter Saunders  
Director

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# Acknowledgements

Doing comparative research is a safe way to increase your intellectual debts, since you get involved in an international network of scholars without whose advice you would be lost. Going abroad is a safe way to increase dependence on helpful people, as anyone who has tried can confirm. Combining both, as I have done during the last months, threatens to create a gargantuan list of people who should be thanked. If I should have missed anybody, I hope they take it as proof of my complete internalising of their advice.

The Australian data on which the report is based was compiled at Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung in Köln and made available by Rolf Uher with his usual efficiency and kindness. The original survey was conducted by Jonathan Kelley, Mariah Evans and Clive Bean at the Australian National University. Neither Zentralarchiv nor ANU bear any responsibility for my analyses or interpretations. Additional data were provided by Clive Bean, Eero Carroll and Joakim Palme. Information on Australian and Swedish occupation codings was supplied by Michael Emmison and Janne Jonsson.

Sheila Shaver and John Western acted as formal assessors of the report, and they both provided several very helpful comments and criticisms. A number of other people, both at SPRC and scattered around the globe, also read the manuscript and provided everything from sharp criticisms to cheerful encouragements: Clive Bean, Bruce Bradbury, Jonathan Bradshaw, Francis G. Castles, Richard M Coughlin, Jonas Edlund, Sol Encel, Michael Fine, Chris Harrington, Gordon Marshall, Jocelyn Pixley, Steinar Stjernø, Peter Taylor-Gooby, Peter Travers and Rune Åberg. The final manuscript was edited by Diana Encel and word-processed by Lynda Pawley.

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It is common to thank ones family for their contributions to the research, the range of influence normally stretching from 'decisively shaping' to 'patiently enduring'. I do not think my fellow travellers and *livskamrater* Maria, Hugo and Signe have in any way shaped my research and, I am glad to say, patient enduring is an activity to which none of them take lightly. Their role has rather been of constantly reminding me that there are indeed more important things in life than sociological research.

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# 1 Introduction

As once remarked by Schumpeter (1942-1976), 'attitudes are coins that do not readily melt' (Castles, 1988:133). Far from being flimsy reactions to the public discourse of the day, perceptions and values often show a striking resistance to change. The legacy of past power struggles, and their contemporary manifestations in institutional frameworks, leave their imprint not only in how rewards and life-chances are distributed, but also in different interpretations and world-views among ordinary citizens.

This means that national histories and institutions are central if we want to understand the way in which people come to understand and organise the world in which they live. There are two principal ways in which institutions may matter for attitudes (Douglas, 1986; March and Olsen, 1989). On the one hand, institutions forge norms. They create ways of thinking about the 'natural' order of things, about how society works, about what constitutes justice. On the other hand, institutions matter for translating attitudes into action. Different sets of attitudes are transmitted into actions such as voting, demonstrations or revolutions by the means of institutional devices.

It is not, however, at all clear in what ways national institutions are important. Do they really matter in the actual forging of attitudes, or do they matter principally in the ways in which attitudes are translated into action? This question links to wider debates on differences and similarities among industrialised nations. Are the similarities among Western nations so great as to mould attitudes in a fairly uniform manner across nations, or are there profound differences in the way citizens in various nations have come to understand the society in which they live? (See Coughlin, 1980; Gallie, 1983.)

One way to approach problems such as these is by comparative research. By comparing nations that are to some extent similar in their basic economic structure but different in the historical development of their institutions, we may be able to explain or interpret why attitudinal differences and similarities occur. In this work, Australian and Swedish attitudes to inequality will be compared. Australia and Sweden, in spite of their geographical distance, share the fate of being small, industrialised nations highly exposed to world markets. However, the paths along which they have attempted to ameliorate adverse affects from this exposure differ quite substantially, as will be argued later.

It is therefore most interesting to see whether these differing paths have been followed by substantial differences in the ways in which ordinary citizens perceive and judge their society. In this report, the main focus of interest is on attitudes to inequality. How and why do Australians and Swedes differ in the explanations they give for inequality, in their views on the role of the state in adjusting market outcomes, in the factors they think should determine earnings and in the magnitude of income differences they consider legitimate?

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Questions such as these have for a long time, either explicitly or implicitly, been of interest for comparative research. The research has however often been hampered by the lack of adequate data. As the result of the multinational cooperation within the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) there is now a fairly substantial body of data, covering both a large number of nations and a broad range of topics (Davis and Jowell, 1989). Surveys posing exactly the same questions have been fielded in a number of nations, a number that increases year by year. In this way, theses that previously could only be qualified guesswork or at best supported by very limited data, can now be empirically assessed in a thorough manner.

The specific data on which this report rests are from the 1987 ISSP survey on 'Attitudes to inequality', which was conducted in Australia and eight other nations. The survey was replicated in Sweden in 1991. The time lag, as will be argued below, does not seem to be a major problem, but still one that should be kept in mind when assessing the results of the data analysis.

The report is organised in the following way. Section 2 is a summary of the existing research on attitudes to inequality and redistribution in Sweden and Australia. Section 3 provides a sketch of the political economies of Sweden and Australia, serving as a background for interpreting the findings in later sections. The distinct institutional profile of each nation is emphasised, and some figures on the actual amount of inequality and redistribution and strength of organised actors are presented. Section 4 presents the data material on which the analysis is based and discusses some problems in interpreting and comparing attitudes.

Sections 5 and 6 are the central parts of the report. In Section 5, the coherence and dimensionality of the attitudinal spectrum is compared. Apart from presenting simple distributions on a range of items, this section focuses on how different attitudes correlate with each other in order to construct a number of indices measuring various aspects of attitudes to inequality. Section 6 uses these indices in order to assess how various structural determinants, such as gender, class, income and so on, organise attitudes in Sweden and Australia. This section also analyses how political choice is related to attitudes to inequality. The concluding section summarises the main findings and tries to connect these to wider issues both specifically of the Australian and Swedish 'models' and more generally of comparative research on attitudes.

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## **2 Attitudes to Inequality in Sweden and Australia: Previous Research**

In popular mythology, both Sweden and Australia are associated with egalitarianism of manners and values (see Graubard, 1986; Western, 1991). It has frequently been asserted that the class divisions and value clashes characteristic of continental Europe do not apply to the open, status-free, egalitarian societies of Sweden and Australia. Whatever evidence there has been for persistent or even widening differences in rewards and life chances, the popular vision of both these nations has been predominantly one of adherence to values of equality of opportunity and outcome.

However, neither in Australia nor in Sweden has this alleged egalitarianism been the subject of much serious empirical scrutiny. Attitudinal studies on inequality and the welfare state have not had any prominent place in social research in either of the two nations. To begin with, it is clear that attitude research has for some time not been at the forefront of social research. Furthermore, what little attitude research there is, has only dealt to a limited extent with the kind of issues that are raised here.

In Australia, it was not until the 1980s that any national surveys dealing with attitudes to inequality and welfare policies were conducted (Papadakis, 1990a; Bean, 1991a; Baxter et al, 1991). Before that, most attitudinal research was conducted as local studies dealing with 'class consciousness' in one or other guise (Davies, 1967; Encel, 1970, ch. 6; Hiller, 1975a, 1975b; Chamberlain, 1983; summarised in Baxter et al., 1991, ch. 1). The debate about whether there was a 'dominant ideology' in Australia raged between Marxists committed to some variant or other of Gramsci's theory of hegemony (e.g. Connell, 1977; Connell and Irving, 1980; Graetz, 1986), and their critics pointing to the limited extent of empirical evidence for any mass acceptance of fundamental capitalist ideological components (Chamberlain, 1983; Turner, 1990).

Sometimes interesting in its own right, most of this research is not immediately relevant for the issues raised in this report. More directly interesting is the research by Smith and Wearing (1986, 1987) that uses opinion poll data to assess the support for Australian welfare policies over time. Their conclusion is that central aspects of welfare universalism, contrary to many assumptions, have been supported by a majority in the population throughout the post-war era. However, when asked to identify the most important political problems, the electorate tends to see these as economic rather than welfare issues, which means that the support for welfare policies is submerged in the political arena and may not have any real impact on people's political choices.

The first Australian nationwide survey on attitudes to welfare policies, conducted by Elim Papadakis (Papadakis, 1990a, 1990b, 1993), supports some of Smith and Wearing's conclusions. Papadakis' survey deals mainly with attitudes to health,

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education and pensions. It is specifically focused on attitudes to the mix of, and possible conflicts between, private and public welfare policies. The main conclusion of Papadakis' study is that there seems to be a widespread support for public services and benefits in these three areas, but that this support does not preclude support for private welfare as well. In general, the private sector is seen as superior to the public one on issues of service quality. When it comes to attitudinal differences between various groups in the population, Papadakis concludes that these are generally small, and specifically that class differences in attitudes are very small. This finding is contrasted with the findings of a British survey, where class differences were more pronounced (Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby, 1987).

It is doubtful, however, how far the findings on negligible class differences can be extended. Papadakis' survey deals with issues that are less prone to produce clear class differences, given their character of 'public goods' and the fact that the main issue in the survey is the perceived relation between public and private service delivery rather than redistribution. As we will find later, on some issues Australian attitudes are clearly determined by class position. Furthermore, the indicators of class location used by Papadakis, an occupational prestige scale and a variable dividing the employed from self-employed, are hardly sustained by up-to-date class analysis (e.g. Wright, 1985; Goldthorpe, 1987; Marshall et al., 1988; Baxter et al., 1991; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992a). The use of prestige scales in class analysis has been thoroughly criticised, and their validity can be questioned on several grounds (Goldthorpe, 1984).

The most immediately relevant research for our concerns here is (the so far sparse) evidence from the Australian cooperation within the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, see Section 4 below). Castles (1989a), quoting evidence from the 1987 ISSP survey (later published in Kolosi, 1991), argues that the Australians show a peculiar attitude mix, in being more opposed to redistribution and radical explanations of inequality than citizens of European nations, at the same time as they believe themselves to have a rather egalitarian income distribution. According to Castles, the latter belief explains why there is so little support for redistribution compared to Western Europe.

Castles suggestions are supported, but modified, by a more thorough analysis by Bean (1991a). Bean, using evidence from the 1985 ISSP survey on attitudes to the role of government, shows that Australia is distinctly less supportive of welfare policies and redistribution than European nations,<sup>1</sup> in this respect looking more like the United States. However, when it comes to attitudes to government intervention in the economy, the picture is different. Australians in this respect look even more interventionist than Europeans, and quite different from the Americans. Many Australians support government intervention to control wages or prices or to support new industries.

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1 The 1985 ISSP survey includes West Germany, Britain, Austria and Italy together with Australia and the United States.

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While Bean's analysis is interesting, he does not have any reasonable explanation for this distinct Australian attitude pattern. As we will see later, the way Australian public institutions have been designed and have evolved can help us understand what, from a European perspective, stands out as a peculiar mix of attitudes.

A study by Kelley and Evans (forthcoming) adds a further dimension, by noting that the Australians are the most egalitarian of the non-communist nations in the 1987 ISSP survey when it comes to views on legitimate income ranges between various occupations (see Table 5.6 below).

Turning to Sweden, one would have expected the most advanced welfare state in the world to produce lots of research on its legitimacy, or to induce researchers to ask to what extent redistribution and welfare commitments have affected everyday understandings of inequality among its citizens. The actual picture is far from that. Until the early 1980s there were only a few scattered survey questions on these topics (summarised in Korpi, 1983), and hardly any comparative work at all.<sup>2</sup>

In the 1980s there was, however, a growing interest among researchers to ask whether the large Swedish welfare state really had public support or if there actually was a 'welfare backlash' in the Swedish population. The evidence, coming from both election surveys (Gilljam and Nilsson, 1985) and from surveys specifically dealing with attitudes to taxation and welfare policies (Hadenius, 1986; Svallfors, 1989), showed that the latter was hardly the case. The general support for Swedish welfare policies was, however, mixed with criticisms of bureaucracy and suspicions of welfare abuse (Svallfors, 1989, 1991). This picture was remarkably stable from 1986 until 1992 as shown in a recent survey (Svallfors, 1992).<sup>3</sup>

There is almost no comparative evidence to be found in any of these studies. The findings by Scase (1974a, 1974b, 1977) indicating profound differences between Swedish and British workers thus went unchallenged for a long time. Scase found that a sample of male manual workers in Sweden were much more aware of differences in power and rewards in society than a similar group of Britons, and also more prone to radical explanations and remedies for these differences. Scase argued that his findings were at least indicative of wider attitudinal patterns in Sweden, pointing to the wide dissemination of social democratic ideology in Swedish society as a whole.

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2 The lack of interest from social scientists can probably to some extent be explained by the fact that the expansion of the welfare state was taken for granted in Swedish politics for a long time in the 1960s and early 1970s (Svallfors, 1989). Furthermore, the critique of naive positivism within Swedish sociology led to attitude surveys being discredited for a long time among sociologists.

3 The dramatic negative opinion change of the early 1990s, pictured in Hadenius and Nilsson (1991) and Nilsson (1992), is based on a single very generally formulated question. It is hard to assess what their registered opinion shift really implies.

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Using evidence from the ISSP, I have recently questioned the validity of some of Scase's conclusions (Svallfors, forthcoming a and b). When representative samples of Swedes and Britons are compared, using a wide range of questions on inequality and redistribution, their answers are quite similar. There are certainly no signs of any firm British support for Thatcherist principles nor any wholehearted endorsement of Social Democratic ideology in Sweden. The results also point to the clear class differences in attitudes to inequality, something which emphasises the fact that reliable conclusions about the whole population cannot be drawn from samples of only workers.

The only effort so far to actually compare Swedish and Australian opinion, a paper by Smith and Wearing (1990) comparing welfare attitudes in Australia, Britain and Sweden, clearly illustrates the dangers involved in comparative attitude research. Using results from the same survey as I used in previous studies (Svallfors, 1989; Svallfors 1991), they end up interpreting the results on Sweden in almost the opposite way. According to them, 'there is substantial public support in Sweden for reduction or stabilisation of expanding welfare programs' (Smith and Wearing, 1990:12). This seems to be the result of their reliance on a single question in the questionnaire as a basis for their conclusions.<sup>4</sup> However, the question they use shows, on closer inspection, a high correlation only with questions on bureaucracy and state interference, but not with issues of redistribution and specific welfare programs (Svallfors, 1989, Table 3.2). Using comparative data without being able to analyse them oneself is always a risky business, especially if one has only scant knowledge of the nations that are compared.

In conclusion, it seems as if the state of the art of attitudinal research is not impressive either in Australia or in Sweden, in spite of valuable contributions from various authors. The shortage of comparative research is striking, considering the fact that both Australia and Sweden must be considered as 'outliers' in their public policy profiles and distributional regimes (Castles, 1989b; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mitchell, 1991a; and Section 3 below). Furthermore, there is a lack of interpretation in the comparative pieces that do exist. There is clearly a need to look more deeply into the histories of the political economies of Australia and Sweden in order to be able to interpret the analytical results. Lastly, at least in the Australian case, the analytical techniques used have often been very crude, typically staying at the level of simple percentage distributions or cross tabulations. In all these respects, the present report can hopefully add something to the existing body of research.

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4 Their claim that Swedish welfare programs were expanding in the 1980s is also wrong. The 1980s were a period of small-scale cutbacks in the welfare state.

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### 3 Paths Toward Social Protection: The Australian and Swedish Models Revisited

Both Sweden and Australia have at some time in their history been hailed as models of pragmatic socialism. The Australian reputation stems from the late 19th and early 20th century, when foreign observers were impressed by what they, in the words of the French socialist Albert Metin, saw as *socialisme sans doctrine* (Metin, 1901-1977). The relatively high living standards and small class differences compared favourably with what was found in the old world of Europe.

From the 1930s onwards the role of model country was gradually transferred to Sweden. The dominance of Social Democracy, the institutionalisation of an encompassing welfare state and an increasing equalisation of incomes and life-chances were features that made Sweden the Mecca for reformist pilgrimages in the post-war era. In Australia, Sweden has had a privileged position as model of how to escape the impasse of the Australian model from the 1970s onwards (Castles, 1987; ACTU, 1987).

While both the Australian and the Swedish models have by now ceased to exist in anything like their 'pure' form, it is still of value to revisit them, and try to distil the specific characteristics that have been left as a legacy for the future. In the context of this report, there is a special interest in trying to sketch the institutional framework in which attitudes to inequality are formed. As we will find, while the political economies of Sweden and Australia share some features, there are even more that separate them. The overarching question in this report is to what extent these have had implications for perceptions of and attitudes to inequality.

#### 3.1 Domestic Compensation Versus Domestic Defence

One important basic fact about small nations such as Sweden and Australia is that they are highly exposed to the impact of world markets. However, while the predicaments of economic vulnerability are shared, the institutional means to cope with them have differed quite substantially. As Castles, following Katzenstein (1985), has put it in several works, while Sweden endorsed a strategy of **domestic compensation**, the path followed by Australia has been one of **domestic defence** (Castles, 1987, 1988, 1989c).<sup>5</sup>

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5 The term 'domestic defence' is used in Castles (1988, 1989c). In Castles (1987) the term 'domestic stabilisation' was used to denote the same thing.

The strategy of domestic compensation tries to adjust to world markets in order to promote economic growth, while at the same time compensating the victims of economic transformation through an extensive set of labour market and welfare policies. In Sweden, there has been an emphasis on transferring labour power from less productive to more productive uses through a variety of labour market policies, such as retraining and financial aid for labourers moving in search of employment (Furåker, 1979). While many of these policies have been pursued in the name of social justice, they simultaneously helped to promote growth by lessening union resistance to economic transformation (Fulcher, 1991).

Coupled with these extensive welfare policies, the Swedish model has also included a tradition of collective bargaining, where the highly centralised peak organisations of workers (LO) and employers (SAF) for a long time struck central agreements on wages (Swenson, 1989; Fulcher, 1991). It has also had a more direct corporatist streak, with labour market organisations being represented in the boards of various central state agencies (Rothstein, 1992). In this way, a two-pronged approach to ameliorate the vicissitudes of the market has been pursued under the guidance of a long social democratic rule: one implying the institutionalisation of an extensive welfare state, the other relying on collective bargaining and a solidaristic wage policy.

The strategy of domestic defence is, in contrast, a deliberate attempt to shut the world market out, to protect the domestic economy from any disruptive effects. The Australian form of domestic defence stems from the early 20th century, where a comparatively strong labour movement could reach a strategic compromise with capital and the state, including the trilogy of wage arbitration, tariff protection and highly regulated immigration policies. The living standards of the working man (sic) and, it was assumed, his dependent family would thus be regulated by court rulings rather than the brute force of market logic. At the same time, tariff protection for industry would ensure that its capacity to pay was not undermined by low-wage overseas competitors. The 'White Australia' policy, finally, was designed to keep labour markets tight by preventing job competition from (mainly Asian) poor immigrants.

In explaining why such blatantly different strategies were chosen by two strong labour movements, Castles points to the importance of timing. When the basic compromise behind the 'Australian model' was struck, Australia was a comparatively wealthy nation, and its working class enjoyed a better standard of living than its counterparts in Europe. Social protection in these circumstances became first and foremost a question of defending what they already had from deteriorating. Sweden in the early 20th century was a 'fortress poorhouse' and any rise of the standard of living for those worst off was therefore seen to require substantial economic growth.

The early establishment of wage and welfare policies in Sweden and Australia shaped subsequent developments to a significant degree. The welfare residualism and inherent assumptions about male breadwinners and female dependency that were

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built into the Australian model precluded any significant development of welfare policies. From being a welfare pioneer in the early part of the century, Australia has become a welfare laggard in the post-war era. The Swedish model propelled the nation into world leader in terms of welfare rights and spending. In summing up the differences, Australia may be characterised as a wage-earners welfare state, relying on court arbitration to adjust wages and working conditions and supplying only a limited safety-net beneath the labour market (Castles, 1985). Sweden, on the other hand, may be said to approach the social democratic citizenship model of welfare. Even if many benefits in the Swedish welfare state are delivered in accordance with achievement principles (Marklund and Svallfors, 1987), it is still the case that the total set of welfare policies implies a wider conception of welfare citizenship than is the case in Australia.

Both models have by now ceased to exist in the strict sense. The Australian model was challenged in subsequent waves, the first one being the large immigration program that was launched after the war (Castles et al., 1992). The Whitlam government's (1972-5) reduction of tariff protection and stalled attempts at establishing a European type of welfare state was a second. The hesitant neo-liberalism of the Fraser government further undermined basic tenets of the model, above all through the fast rise in unemployment. The Labor governments of the 1980s have in one sense further departed from the model, both by establishing a semi-corporatist structure through the Accord on wages and taxes with the trade union peak organization ACTU and through further tariff reduction and financial deregulation. On the other hand, the inherent selectivity of the Australian welfare state has been accentuated under the banner of 'targeting'. Most universal programs that existed have been abolished and by now the whole range of welfare policies is income- and asset-tested, with the health insurance Medicare as the sole exception (Saunders, 1991; Travers, 1991). The Liberal opposition are firmly committed to the deregulation of industrial relations, which would spell the death for most of the remaining features of the Australian model if they should manage to gain office in the 1990s (Cass, 1992; Cass and Freeland, 1992).

The breakdown of the Swedish model began later. The late 1970s saw challenges from the right through an invigorated employers federation and a Moderate Party committed to neo-liberal policies. However, with the strong position of the labour movement, both in terms of government incumbency and in trade union strength, it was not until the late 1980s that the model really crumbled. The break-down of peak-level bargaining, the withdrawal of employers from corporatist decision-making, the creeping cutbacks in the welfare state and, maybe most important, the rapid rise in unemployment, mean Sweden in the early 1990s looks increasingly less the ideal picture of a welfare state (Fulcher, 1991; Marklund, 1992).

What legacy have the different approaches left Australia and Sweden? As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, there are profound differences between the two nations in the distribution of incomes and other social and economic indicators. Even if not all of them are the results of public policies, nevertheless, it can be argued that such policies have been instrumental in creating these distributions.

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**Table 3.1: Income<sup>(a)</sup> Distributions in Sweden (1987) and Australia (1985): Gini Coefficients<sup>(b)</sup>**

	Sweden <sup>(c)</sup>	Australia <sup>(c)</sup>
Whole population:		
Factor income <sup>(d)</sup>	0.433(6)	0.439(7)
Disposable income <sup>(e)</sup>	0.215(1)	0.310(9)
Redistribution (%) <sup>(f)</sup>	0.503(1)	0.293(8)
Population 20-64:		
Factor Income <sup>(d)</sup>	0.324(2)	0.388(6)
Disposable Income <sup>(e)</sup>	0.194(1)	0.301(8)
Redistribution (%) <sup>(f)</sup>	0.401(2)	0.224(6)

- Notes:**
- a) The income measures are based on family incomes and corrected for family size according to the OECD standard equivalence scale.
  - b) The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality. Higher coefficient means more inequality.
  - c) Numbers in parentheses show the relative position among eleven nations in the second wave of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
  - d) Factor Income = Income from work and capital.
  - e) Disposable Income = Factor Income + transfers - taxes
  - f) Redistribution = (Gini coefficient(FI) - Gini coefficient(DI))/Gini coefficient(FI).

**Source:** Palme, 1992.

**Table 3.2: Some Economic and Social Indicators in Sweden and Australia (%)**

	Sweden <sup>(a)</sup>	Australia <sup>(a)</sup>
Taxes (of GDP 1989)	56.1(1)	30.1(17)
Government outlays (of GDP 1989)	60.6(1)	34.3(16)
Social security transfers (of GDP 1989)	21.3(3)	9.7(18)
Labour market participation (1990) <sup>(b)</sup>	86.1(1)	73.9(10)
Female labour market participation (1990)	83.5(1)	61.9(8)
Unemployment (mean 1980-90)	2.4(2)	7.2(10)

- Notes:**
- a) Numbers within parentheses show the relative position among 18 OECD-countries.
  - b) Labour market participation = People 16+ in the workforce/Total population 16-64.

**Sources:** OECD, 1991a; OECD, 1992; Oxley et al., 1990.

As shown in Table 3.1, the Swedish income distribution is the most equal among the nations included in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Australia, on the other hand, dwells among the bottom third of the LIS nations. The low inequality in Sweden seems to be a combined effect of a fairly equal pay distribution due to the effects from the solidaristic wage policies (Hibbs, 1990; Bradbury, 1993) and the equalisation effects from the welfare state (Ringén and Uusitalo, 1992; Åberg, 1989). Australia, on the other hand, combines a fairly equal pay distribution among 'core' workers with a rather large overall inequality (Bradbury, 1993; Saunders, forthcoming). The sources of larger Australian inequality are thus likely to be found in some combination of the following: (a) a large share of people with marginal attachment to the labour market, such as part-time workers and the periodically or permanently unemployed, (b) the effects of capital incomes on the overall inequality (Saunders et al., 1991) and (c) the limited redistributive effects of such a small welfare state as the Australian one (Mitchell, 1991a, 1991b; Saunders, forthcoming).

The development during the 1980s has been towards greater inequality in both nations. Swedish income inequality decreased until the beginning of the 1980s (Fritzell, 1991), but has increased again from then onwards (Fritzell, 1992; Jansson, 1990). In Australia, the trend towards increased inequality seems to have begun earlier, at least from the later part of the 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s (Raskall, 1993; Saunders et al., 1991).

From Table 3.2, we can see that Sweden and Australia, in different respects, may indeed be considered 'outliers' among the OECD nations. In terms of taxes, government outlays and social security spending Australia and Sweden belong to the opposite ends of the OECD countries rank order. Sweden's outstanding position is further confirmed by its rank in labour market participation and unemployment. Labour market participation is almost as high for women as for men, a pattern that is shared only with Denmark and Finland among the OECD countries. Australia is, in these respects, in the middle range among the OECD nations.

The unemployment figures have worsened considerably in both Sweden and Australia in the early 1990s. At present (April 1993), the Australian figure is hovering around 11 per cent while the Swedish unemployment has risen rapidly to about 7 per cent. These developments are not immediately relevant to the attitudes analysed here, however, since they occurred after the surveys were conducted. What is reflected in Table 3.2 is the fact that Australians have had to get used to much higher unemployment figures throughout the 1980s than the Swedes.

### **3.2 The Structure of Organised Interests**

The strength and structure of organised actors in Sweden and Australia is, of course, closely linked to the characteristics of their dominant institutions. It was to a large extent the relative strength of political parties and labour market organisations that historically decided how these institutions were set up. Once established, these institutions then helped to undermine or enhance the positions of these very actors, at

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the same time as they, in their turn, tried to reproduce or transform the institutional framework.

At the same time, the structure of organised interests is also affected by factors largely independent of institutions. The basic economic structure may facilitate or hinder cooperation among the employers. Changing world market conditions alter the domestic balance of power between various actors. Linguistic and religious cleavages may make trade union and labour party organisation difficult.

One of the things Sweden and Australia do have in common are historically very strong labour movements. Measured as trade union density, or as national votes for parties on the left, they should probably be judged as the two strongest in the world in the 20th century.<sup>6</sup> As shown in Table 3.3, they both rank quite favourably even if we only take the period after World War II into account.

The similarities in labour movement strength vanishes, however, as soon as we focus on government incumbency. The Swedish social democrats were in power from 1932 until 1976 and then again from 1982 until the last election in 1991, although most of the time as coalition partner or minority government. The Australian Labor Party was out of office from 1949 until 1983 with the exception of the Whitlam government, which lasted just three years from 1972 until its spectacular fall in 1975. In the eighties and nineties Labor has been much more successful. The party has managed to stay in government since 1983, which makes it perhaps the most successful labour party in the world since the beginning of the 1980s.

Two factors in particular seem to account for the disparity in ability for the Social Democratic/Labor parties to translate their electoral strength into government incumbency (Castles, 1978, 1985). The first is the division of the political right in Sweden compared with the permanent coalition of the Liberal/National(Country) parties in Australia. The decisive factor behind this is the structure of pre-industrial, pre-democratic representation in Sweden, where the independent farmers had a strong position and an independent political representation. This has survived into modern times, with the establishing of the Agrarian Party (Bondeförbundet), later to become the Centre Party. The Agrarian Party was for a long time (1932-40, 1951-57) the coalition partner with the Social Democrats and the Centre Party has later proved a notoriously unreliable coalition partner for the other non-socialist parties. The challenge from the labour movement in Australia, on the other hand, forced an early political fusion of the urban and rural capitalist interests, resulting in the permanent coalition surviving into the politics of today.

The other factor, crucial in maintaining the differences between the political right in the two nations, is the difference in electoral systems. In Sweden, a system of

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6 With possible competition from Norway.

**Table 3.3: Political and Union Mobilisation in Sweden and Australia (%)**

	Sweden <sup>(a)</sup>	Australia <sup>(a)</sup>
Union density: <sup>(b)</sup>		
1985	78(1)	46(7)
Mean 1950-85 <sup>(d)</sup>	71(1)	51(7)
Left <sup>(c)</sup> share of....:		
votes	50.5(1)	45.9(5)
seats in parliament	51.1(1)	44.2(9)
seats in government (means 1950-85) <sup>(e)</sup>	81.4(1)	26.2(9)

- Notes:**
- a) Numbers within parentheses show the relative position among 18 OECD-countries.
  - b) Union density is expressed as union members as share of labour force outside farming.
  - c) The political 'left' includes social democratic, socialist and communist parties.
  - d) Means are counted for every fifth year.
  - e) Means are counted for each year.

**Source:** SSIB

proportional representation was established, and in spite of several changes, has remains substantially the same during the pre- and postwar period.<sup>7</sup> Small parties have been able to survive, and the present seven-party composition of the Swedish parliament is the most splintered that has ever existed.

In Australia, the one-member constituencies have forced the non-labour parties to stick together, in spite of sometimes considerable ideological differences. They have probably also contributed to the overall coherence of the Labor Party, in spite of the secession of the Democratic Labor Party in the 1950s. On the other hand, compared to a first-past-the-post system such as the British one, the system of preferential voting has allowed the National Party to survive and cultivate its own separate identity.<sup>8</sup>

Turning to the structure of labour market organisations, we also find interesting differences between the two nations. As shown in Table 3.3, both Australian and Swedish trade unions must count among the strongest of the OECD nations in the post-war period. Swedish trade unions are probably the strongest in the world, both in terms of union density and with regard to the strong links between the blue collar unions and the Social Democratic party (Kjellberg, 1983). Australian unions did not

7 The most important changes took place in 1970 when the one-chamber parliament was established and the present strictly proportional electoral system and the 4 per cent limit for parties to gain representation in parliament were introduced.

8 The debate about the effect of the electoral system on party coherence is summarised in Goot (1985).

have any established links to a government in power before the 1980s. The Accord that was struck between the Labor opposition and the ACTU in 1983, and since then renewed several times, was the first attempt at establishing strong links between the peak-level trade union organisation and a ruling Labor party (Singleton, 1990; Manning, 1992). The Australian unions have, on the other hand, lost members since the early 1980s, which has weakened their bargaining position (OECD, 1991b).

The strong unions in Sweden have been countered by an unusually strong and combative employer federation. In terms of its centralisation, coherence and resources, the SAF is more powerful than most other national employer federations. After a long period of accommodation to the Social Democratic government, the SAF turned to the right in the seventies, and has developed a strong neo-liberal stance in opposition to most aspects of 'the Swedish model' (Söderpalm, 1976; Hansson, 1984; Fulcher, 1991). Large ideological campaigns, intended to influence both policy-makers and public opinion, have been launched on various issues, such as taxation and the wage-earner funds, from the late 1970s onwards.

Compared to this, the ideological weakness and organisational divisions among Australian employers are striking (Matthews, 1991). The early economic and cultural conflicts between the urban bourgeoisie and the pastoral interests precluded any early national organisation compared to the Swedish one. No dominant organisation, speaking for all the employers, has been established even after the political coalition between urban and rural capital. The peculiar position of Australian industrial employers, sheltered from world market competition through the tariff policies probably lies behind much of the lack of strong anti-state stances.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the success of the political right in keeping Labor out of office has also meant that the need for a strong employer federation has been less strongly felt than in Sweden.

In summary, we find asymmetries of an interesting kind in the overview of political parties and interest organisations.<sup>10</sup> The political right in Australia has been strong and coherent, holding office during most of the post-war period until the 1983 election, while the Swedish right has been divided and mostly kept out of government. The Social Democrats in Sweden have been able to translate their electoral strength into government incumbency and forged strong links with the trade unions, while Labor was for a long time unable to do either. The employer federation in Sweden has been strong and ideologically vigorous, while the Australian employers have been organisationally divided and ideologically hesitant.

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9 It was interesting to note the hesitant support coming from Australian employers for the neo-liberalism of the Liberal-National 1993 election platform.

10 One further difference between Australia and Sweden is of course the fact that Australia is a federation, with considerable constitutional powers at the state level. This obviously opens the door for intra-party conflicts between state and federal level. However, to some extent this is countered by the strong position of the municipalities in Sweden, which have independent taxation rights and handle a large part of the welfare state services.

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### 3.3 Implications for Attitudes to Inequality

What implications does the summary of the Swedish and Australian political economies carry for the present study? On the one hand, it leads to the interesting question of whether such strikingly dissimilar nations in terms of welfare efforts and outcomes will also show distinctly different attitude patterns among their citizens. The modes of social amelioration pursued by Australia and Sweden, that is, welfare policies vs wage arbitration and collective bargaining vs legal rulings respectively, could be expected to leave traces not only in distributive outcomes but also in views among ordinary people on inequality and redistribution.

The inherent **labourism** in the Australian tradition could be expected to produce a different pattern of attitudes compared to the tradition of **social democracy** distinguishing Sweden. Labourism in this context should be understood as an ideological and strategic perspective that looks less to a redistributive welfare state in correcting market outcomes and more to regulating work rewards and conditions, while social democracy places more emphasis on the importance of citizenship and welfare state efforts. When it comes to views on the role of the state in redistribution we should therefore expect Sweden and Australia to be quite dissimilar.

In spite of their differences, there are a few things that Australia and Sweden do have in common that should produce similarities rather than differences in views of inequality and redistribution. The first is that the processes of pay determination imply at least some delegitimation of market determination of incomes. The famous words by Justice Higgins from the 1907 Harvester Judgement, that pay should be determined by 'the normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized community' (Castles, 1988: 99) clearly introduces an element of need rather than pure market logic in the determination of incomes. The Swedish solidaristic wage policies, pursued by the trade unions in collective bargaining, evokes notions of distributive justice to correct the pay distribution that would result from a strict market determination of incomes (Swenson, 1989).

Beilharz' assertion that the Australian model relies exclusively on the market as 'the ultimate and fundamental provider of welfare and social justice' (Beilharz, 1989a: 91) is thus far from correct. The same goes for Castles' claim that the strategy of domestic compensation depends 'almost exclusively on state intervention after the point of the initial market allocation of incomes and wealth' (Castles, 1988: 105).<sup>11</sup> Both the Australian and the Swedish models are, in fact, ways of introducing clearly non-market elements into initial pay determination. We could therefore expect Australian and Swedish attitudes to pay differences to be rather similar and distinct from nations with less intervention in market distributions.

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<sup>11</sup> Strangely enough, on the following page Castles then goes on to state the implications of solidaristic wage policies in Sweden in a way that clearly contradicts his own previous assertion (Castles, 1988: 106).

A second important feature that Sweden and Australia share is that the notion of state intervention has historically enjoyed a substantial amount of legitimacy. The state acted as creator of capitalism in both nations, quite literally in Australia as a colonial settlement, but also in Sweden due to the large role of the state in organising infrastructural and financial preconditions for the industrial take-off in the late 19th century (MacIntyre, 1985: 52-8; Castles, 1987: 276). Through the pursuit of a system of wage arbitration on the one hand, and through the development of an extensive set of welfare policies on the other, the idea that the state can and should act to affect economic outcomes has survived in both nations, albeit in widely different forms.

The relative strength of political parties and interest organisations is of course clearly linked to attitudes of inequality. The question is whether the stronger political left in Sweden in terms of government incumbency and union density has been matched by a distinctively different set of attitudes in Sweden compared to Australia. The small differences found between Swedish and British attitudes suggest that this cannot be taken for granted (Svallfors, forthcoming a and b).

However, a number of authors have commented on the narrow definition of citizenship prevalent in the Australian debate, and the inherent welfare conservatism in the Australian Labor Party which clearly distinguishes it from West European social democratic parties (Castles, 1985; Beilharz, 1989b; Beilharz et al., 1992; Pixley, 1992). Following this lead, we could expect attitudes to welfare and redistribution to be substantially more conservative in Australia than in Sweden. As we saw in Section 2, however, the assumption of an Australian welfare conservatism remains a very contested one among Australian researchers, and one on which the present report can hopefully shed some more light.

It is by now time to state more specifically the empirical questions that are dealt with in the following sections. They can be summarised as follows:

- What explanations and interpretations of inequality are dominant in Sweden and Australia? Is the fact that some groups are more rewarded than others explained as necessary incentives or as unjust exploitation?
  - What responsibility is the state seen to have in correcting market outcomes? What support is there for redistribution in Australia and Sweden?
  - What factors should determine earnings, according to the public? Should the character of the work done, the qualifications and credentials of individuals, or their ascribed characteristics be most important in determining their pay?
  - What is the legitimate range of earnings in Australia and Sweden? How much distance should there be between top and bottom in the earnings hierarchy according to Australians and Swedes?
-

- What relations are there between various attitudes? Are people who see inequality as a necessary incentive also opposed to redistribution or are these totally separate aspects? How tightly integrated is the whole attitude spectrum in Australia and Sweden?
- What group differences in attitudes can be found in Sweden and Australia? Are different cleavage structures dominant, or are the patterns largely of the same kind?
- What relation is there between various attitudes and political party affiliations in Australia and Sweden? What implications for political choice do attitudes to inequality have?

While these questions cover a broad spectrum of attitudes, they are of course not the only ones that could be of interest to survey. One of the most interesting aspects not covered very well is the question of what assumptions about gender and division of labour within the family are produced by the different models. The strong 'male breadwinner' assumptions inherent in the Australian model have recently begun to crumble (Shaver, 1992), but the legacy in views of gender issues is probably still there.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> These issues will be better covered in the 1994 ISSP survey, which will be on 'The Family and Changing Gender Roles' and include both Australia and Sweden among 21 nations.



## 4 Data and Methods: Problems of Measurement and Interpretation

The use of quantitative indicators to study perceptions or values has often been criticised for being superficial and not capable of capturing the actual processes behind attitude formation (e.g. Marshall, 1983)<sup>13</sup>. While much of this critique is correct, survey methods are still useful to map the larger picture, which then, of course, can be detailed by using more intensive and small-scale methods. Especially when it comes to international comparisons, use of survey techniques seems a necessary first step in order to grasp the overall similarities and differences.

The data sets on which this comparison is based stem from the multinational cooperation within the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). ISSP is an attempt to create a truly comparable dataset for attitude studies. Surveys posing exactly the same questions in a number of industrialised nations have been conducted on various topics since 1985 (Davis and Jowell, 1989; Alwin et al, 1990). The cooperation has grown rapidly. From a beginning of four nations, there are currently 21 nations involved in the ISSP (see Appendix One).

The 1987 module on attitudes to inequality includes Australia among nine nations and was replicated in Sweden in 1991 (ISSP, 1987; Kelley and Evans, 1991a; Stenberg and Svallfors, 1992). In the Australian survey, a number of additional questions to the standard ISSP questionnaire were posed (included in NSSS 1987-8). Some of these were replicated in the Swedish survey, and the comparison here includes these to create a broader base for conclusions.

International comparisons are never easy, even when it comes to such seemingly straightforward matters as social mobility and income distribution. Things are obviously even more complicated when attitude surveys are analysed. Comparative research on attitudes, despite its great fruitfulness, is fraught with difficulties which may make analyses fragile. While none of these seem to create insurmountable problems, they suggest cautious interpretations.

The most serious problem is probably how to find equivalent indicators in various nations. Even identical questions may evoke quite different meanings in various national settings. This is of course something that may be of analytical interest in itself, but at the same time it raises problems that should be taken seriously.

A second problem, which applies to most attitude surveys, is the generally large rate of non-responses. Postal surveys or drop-offs, even if carefully designed and implemented, rarely get more than 75 per cent returns, and most often the response

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13 Given Marshall's (1983) fierce critique of survey methods, it seems a bit ironic that his later research has largely been based on precisely such methods (for example Marshall et al., 1988).

rate in considerably lower. In this case, the response rates are 63 per cent in Sweden and 60 per cent in Australia.<sup>14</sup> Analyses of non-responses in Sweden show a higher degree of non-responses among elderly people, people with low incomes and residents in the two largest cities (Stenberg and Svallfors, 1992). A comparison between the Australian sample and the 1986 Census shows a slight over-representation of people with high education and professional occupations (Bean, 1991b). In general, however, both samples seem to be fairly accurate representations on a number of background variables.<sup>15</sup>

A third problem concerns the time lag between the Australian 1987 ISSP survey and the 1991 Swedish replication. It could be possible that Australian attitudes had changed so much in these three years that results may be wrongly attributed to national differences when it is actually a question of changes over time. However, attitudes to basic issues such as inequality generally change very slowly. Local studies in Sweden and the US show surprisingly little attitudinal change even over several decades (Caplow et al., 1982; Åberg, 1990). National surveys in Sweden show very little change in attitudes to welfare policies from 1986 to 1992 (Svallfors, 1992). A comparison of the Australian attitudes to government also indicates a fairly stable attitude pattern from 1985 to 1990 (compare Bean, 1991a with ISSP, 1990).<sup>16</sup> In all, the time lag, therefore, probably does not create any overwhelming problems for the analyses.

A fourth and last note of caution is about the occupation codings used in the surveys. Since class may be expected to be an important factor behind attitudes to inequality, it is important to create comparable class categories. This is difficult since various national classification standards have been applied. In the Australian survey, the Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) was used, while the Swedish surveys used the Socio-economic classification (SEI) along with the Nordic classification of occupations that was used in the 1985 census (FOB85), which resembles the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). Thanks to the efforts of the Australian Class Project and the Swedish Level-of-living survey it is possible to convert both the Australian and the Swedish classifications into a

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14 Both the Swedish and the Australian surveys were postal, in the Swedish case with a telephone follow-up of non-responses. There seems to be no general difference in response rates between postal surveys and drop-offs in the ISSP.

15 The usual habit of correcting biased response rates through weighting responses is not applied here since it is not possible to create a comparable weighting for both nations. Tests on the Swedish data show small deviations from the results presented, and the same goes for the Australian data (Bean, 1991b; tables for Sweden available from author). Furthermore, it is by no means certain that weighting make results any more reliable, since they rest on the unproved assumption that those not responding would answer in the same way as their group peers who did respond.

16 The 1987 ISSP survey was replicated in 1992 but data are not yet available. When they are, it will be possible for a more thorough assessment of the attitudinal stability on these specific issues.

variant of the class schema designed by John Goldthorpe and used in the comparative CASMIN project (Goldthorpe, 1987; Erikson et al., 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992a).<sup>17</sup>

In some respects, the ISSP data are not quite as detailed as required for a 'full' Goldthorpe model, so it was decided to stay with a six-class model as reported in tables. A recoding schema using SPSS-PC statements is provided in Appendix Two, for checks and the convenience of other ISSP users.

What all these cautions point to is not that comparisons of attitudes are impossible, but that there are a few considerations that should be kept in mind when analysing and interpreting data. One is that it is essential to have a good understanding of the contexts in which attitudinal surveys are carried out. Without a fairly accurate understanding of the historical, structural and institutional conditions of the nations that are compared, it is virtually impossible to make sense out of attitude surveys. Much work on attitudes is haunted by lack of knowledge about the nations that are compared. The necessity of contextual information obviously gears the comparative study of attitudes toward strategic comparisons of a few selected nations rather than large-scale comparisons involving many nations.

The second advice is not to put too much importance on small differences in gross percentage distributions on single questions. The emphasis should instead be put on larger patterns, both in how different attitude items relate to each other, and how they are structured by various background factors. Furthermore, the use of compounded indices instead of single indicators wherever possible is one possible way of lessening the impact of single semantic idiosyncrasies on the results.

The strategy of analysis in the following sections proceeds from displaying simple percentage distributions, to the charting of attitudinal patterns through the use of principal components analysis, and finally to using multiple classification analysis (MCA) in order to test the impact of various background factors on attitudes. The assumptions, shortcomings and interpretations of the various methods and their output will, where necessary, be commented on in connection with the actual tables.

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17 Michael Emmison supplied information on the recoding of the Australian data and Janne Jonsson did the same for the Swedish data. The Australian recoding schema was designed by Michael Emmison and Mark Western and the Swedish one by Robert Erikson, Janne Jonsson and Michael Thålin.

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## 5 Dimensions of Inequality: A Mental Map

The way in which inequality is interpreted and explained is the first topic on which we will compare Swedish and Australian attitudes. In Table 5.1 a number of propositions concerning the nature of inequality are shown.

The table points to similarities as well as differences in the way in which inequality is interpreted in the two nations. One difference is that Australians are even more inclined than Swedes to argue that inequalities are necessary in order to induce qualification and responsibility (nos 1, 2 and 4).

Before proceeding any further, it is interesting to ask to what extent these various interpretations of inequality correlate. One may easily imagine that people who are inclined to see inequality as a matter of distributive struggle between various groups would be less willing to accept incentive arguments about inequality. This is, however, far from correct, as indicated by the dimensional analysis in Table 5.2.<sup>18</sup>

The table shows results from a principal components analysis, in which the variation among variables is reduced to a few underlying dimensions (factors). The entries in the table are factor loadings with decimals omitted. They can be read as correlations between the single items and the factor. The first factor correlates clearly with the three questions dealing with individual incentives aspects of inequality, the second one includes items dealing with inequality as a distributional problem or struggle, and the last one incorporates questions on the alleged macroeconomic benefits of inequality. The very last item, on income differences being too large, correlates highly with this last factor in spite of basically 'belonging to' the second one.

A first principal components analysis, in which the standard solution of extracting only factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was applied, only extracted two factors in Sweden. They could be interpreted as one 'incentives' and one 'redistribution' factor, with the two items on macroeconomic effects correlating with both factors. In order to create a more readily interpretable solution, and to achieve greater comparability with Australia, a second forced three-factor solution was then applied to the Swedish data, with results shown in Table 5.2. The fact that only two factors were extracted in the first round is an indication that Swedish attitudes are slightly more integrated than the Australian ones, something which we will return to later. It is still hard not to be struck by the great similarities in attitude pattern in the two nations. The relative insulation of incentive aspects from redistributive aspects,

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18 In the analysis, all variables retained their five original answer categories (see ISSP, 1987). Those answering 'don't know' were excluded.

**Table 5.1: Attitudes to Inequality in Sweden and Australia: Percentage Agreeing With Certain Propositions**

	Sweden	Australia
1. People would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they were paid for it	75.5	84.5
2. Workers would not bother to get skills and qualifications unless they were paid extra for having them	69.0	82.9
3. Inequality continues because it benefits the rich and the powerful	53.5	56.9
4. Noone would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers	72.6	83.2
5. Large differences in income are necessary for Sweden's/Australia's prosperity	29.7	29.0
6. Allowing business to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone's standard of living	44.4	54.6
7. Inequality continues to exist because ordinary people don't join together to get rid of it	37.1	32.4
8. Income differences in Sweden/Australia are too large	61.1	60.5
Number	915	1663

Source: ISSP, 1987; Stenberg and Svallfors, 1992.

**Table 5.2: Dimensional Analysis<sup>(a)</sup> of Attitudes to Inequality in Sweden and Australia: Factor Loadings X 100<sup>(b)</sup>**

	Sweden			Australia		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
1. Extra responsibility	<b>85</b>	-10	02	<b>85</b>	-01	03
2. Qualification	<b>82</b>	-01	16	<b>87</b>	-02	01
3. Benefits the rich	17	<b>80</b>	-15	11	<b>79</b>	-22
4. Study for years	<b>63</b>	30	24	<b>66</b>	22	25
5. Differences necessary	31	-32	<b>71</b>	15	-12	<b>80</b>
6. Good profits	10	-01	<b>88</b>	05	-06	<b>81</b>
7. People not joined	-09	<b>76</b>	08	05	<b>77</b>	19
8. Differences too large	01	<b>71</b>	-41	-04	<b>72</b>	-39
Eigenvalue	2.51	2.00	0.92	2.20	2.06	1.09
Explained variance (%)	31.4	25.0	11.5	27.5	25.9	13.7

Notes: a) Principal Components Analysis with Varimax rotation  
b) Factor loadings >40 bold.

as further discussed below, is a finding that is replicated not only in Sweden and Australia but also in Germany and Britain as previous analyses show (Svallfors, forthcoming a and b).<sup>19</sup>

Following the results from the dimensional analysis, three additive indexes were constructed for further analyses. One 'Redistribution index', composed of the questions 3, 7 and 8, one 'Incentives index' composed of questions 1, 2 and 4, and one 'Macroeconomic index' composed of the remaining two questions (5 and 6). In the Redistribution index, the answers 'agree' and 'strongly agree' are assigned the value 2, 'neither agree nor disagree' and 'don't know' the value 1, and 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' the value 0.<sup>20</sup> For the other two indexes the values 0 and 2 are interchanged. This means that high values on all the indices mean more 'leftist' viewpoints, something which makes interpretation easier. A person with generally high index values tends to agree that inequality is the outcome of distributional struggle, and tends to disagree with propositions about beneficial incentive or macroeconomic effects from inequality.<sup>21</sup>

Apart from comparing various interpretations of inequality, it is also interesting to compare what responsibility Swedes and Australians want the government/state to have in correcting market outcomes and achieving redistribution. Table 5.3 provides a number of propositions on these matters.

Swedes are generally more inclined to argue for redistributive measures than Australians. This is especially clear regarding both questions dealing with unemployment (3 and 5). It could easily be imagined that this points to the pervasive influence of Social Democracy in Sweden, were it not for the fact that Sweden actually resembles other European ISSP nations in this respect (Smith, 1990; Svallfors, forthcoming a and b). Rather, it is Australia that is characterised by a narrow conception of the government's role in affecting distributional outcomes, in this respect looking quite similar to the United States.

A dimensional analysis (not shown) indicates that all the items are part of a single dimension and may be summarised in one index. One interesting difference to note,

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19 Martinussen (1988) comes to almost the same conclusion in his Norwegian study: that an 'achievement ideology' coexists with an 'equalising ideology' in Norwegians' attitudes to welfare policies. Szirmai (1984, 1988) also comes to a similar conclusion in his study in the Netherlands, discerning one 'distributive context' and one 'achievement and reward context' in the Dutch respondents' attitudes to income inequality.

20 An alternative would be to use the factor scores in order to weight the items in the indices. Analyses using such factor indices result in virtually identical results as those achieved by using ordinary additive indices.

21 The three indices seem to be reasonably reliable, with the exception of the 'Macroeconomic index' in Australia (see Appendix Table A3.1). The low reliability coefficient (Alpha) for this index is worth having in mind for the further analyses.

**Table 5.3: Attitudes to Redistribution in Sweden and Australia: Percentage Agreeing With Certain Propositions**

	Sweden	Australia
1. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences between people with high incomes and those with low incomes	53.7	43.7
2. The government should provide more chances for children from poor families to go to university	66.9	74.1
3. The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one	74.1	39.7
4. The government should spend less on benefits for the poor	10.7	14.3
5. The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	61.2	36.0
6. The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income	45.5	37.9
Number	915	1663

**Source:** ISSP, 1987; Stenberg and Svallfors, 1992

however, is that the question on 'less benefits for the poor' shows only medium correlations with the other questions in Sweden, while it is highly correlated with them in Australia. This probably can be explained by the organisation of welfare policies. In Sweden, support for the worst off is regarded as residual, for those in need who are not protected by the core social insurances. The Australian welfare system has the same residual safety-net characteristics across the board, and support for those worst off is thus given on the same terms as any other welfare provision. The fact that Swedish attitudes in this respect resemble the German ones, while the Australians look more like the Britons, lends further credibility to this interpretation (Svallfors, forthcoming a).

Summarising all the questions in a single additive 'Government index' in the same way as the previous indices were constructed nevertheless seems reasonable. As shown in Appendix Table A3.1, the mean in Sweden is considerably higher than in Australia, and both indices have reasonably good reliability.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Leaving out the question on 'benefits for the poor' in Sweden results in a somewhat more reliable index ( $\alpha=0.67$ ). All other results remain virtually identical.

One topic where a comparison between Swedish and Australian attitudes should be especially interesting concerns the factors that are considered more or less legitimate as grounds for determining pay. The collective bargaining tradition in Sweden clearly gives more weight to union muscle and internal solidarity, while the Australian tradition of wage arbitration implies a different conception of fairness as linked to specific phases in the life-cycle and to various ascribed factors, as outlined above.

Unfortunately, the Swedish and Australian data are far from ideal for comparing these issues. For reasons too complicated to go into here, only a subset of the questions posed in Australia were also posed in Sweden, while three other additional ones were included in the Swedish survey. Some of the items that were included in Australia but not in Sweden would have been interesting to compare. This is especially so for some items which ask how important the pay of other workers in the firm or in other industries should be in determining pay. The items that were posed in both nations, as listed in Table 5.4, include a number of characteristics of jobs and the qualifications of their incumbents together with a number of ascribed characteristics of job incumbents.

Furthermore, the answer categories are not exactly the same in the two surveys. The Australian data have a 'longer tail' on the positive side, discerning between four categories of importance. Since it proved impossible to find such a fine grained translation in Swedish, the Swedish data only contain three such categories.<sup>23</sup> This may have the unfortunate effect of 'dragging' Australian figures towards the positive side among those who think that a certain thing should have at least some impact on pay. The solution applied in Table 5.4 is to show the percentage thinking a certain factor should **not** be important in determining pay. This share should not be affected by the number of positive answer categories.

In Table 5.4, the common items from Sweden and Australia are listed. Two findings in particular seem interesting. One is that in both nations characteristics of jobs and their requirements are viewed as highly legitimate grounds for pay compared to ascribed characteristics of the job incumbents. Age, sex, civil status or number of children are generally not considered legitimate grounds for pay differences, while responsibility, complexity and danger involved in the work situation are.

While that is the case in both Sweden and Australia, we find substantial differences when we look at the proportion of the sample who think that various ascribed characteristics should be relevant in determining pay. These shares are much larger in Australia. While very small minorities in Sweden think that being a man or woman or being married or not should have any impact for pay, there are rather

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23 The Australian data have the following answer categories: 'the most important single thing', 'extremely important', 'very important', 'fairly important', 'not very important' and 'should not matter at all'. The Swedish data have no 'extremely important' category.



**Table 5.4: Attitudes to Wage Determination in Sweden and Australia: Percentage Who Think Each of These Things Should Not be Important**

	Sweden	Australia
<i>In deciding how much people ought to be paid, how important should each of these things be?</i>		
1. How much responsibility goes with the job	3.4	0.8
2. How complex and difficult the job is	3.3	0.9
3. The numbers of years spent studying	25.1	7.8
4. How much practical experience it takes	4.6	3.4
5. Whether the job requires supervising others	8.2	5.5
6. How old the worker is	63.7	49.5
7. Whether he or she is married	94.7	72.2
8. Whether the worker is a man or a woman	97.0	82.4
9. Whether he or she has children to support	79.3	43.4
10. How dangerous the job is	3.1	2.9
11. How dirty and unpleasant the working conditions are	10.1	9.3
Number	915	1663

Source: NSSS, 1987-8; Stenberg and Svallfors, 1992.

substantial minorities thinking so in Australia. Less than half of the Australians think that age or responsibility for children are irrelevant for pay, while there are clear majorities of this opinion in Sweden.

It seems, indeed, as if there is an ideological legacy from the conciliation and arbitration system in Australia, with its strong assumptions about male bread-winners and its stronger emphasis on ascribed factors in the primary income distribution. The Swedish collective bargaining tradition seems instead to create attitudes that almost exclusively emphasise the character of the work done as legitimate grounds for pay determination.

These issues will be further dealt with below when different groups' attitudes to these issues are compared. Before that we need to ask how the attitudes to wage determination fit together. Are they actually part of the same pattern, so that people who give greater weight to various qualification characteristics also tend to respond in a certain way when asked about, for example, the importance of being a man or a woman? The dimensional analysis in Table 5.5 gives some indication.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> When conducting the analysis, the three categories 'the most important single thing', 'extremely important' and 'very important' were collapsed to one in Australia. The same goes for the corresponding two categories in Sweden.

**Table 5.5: Dimensional Analysis<sup>(a)</sup> of Attitudes to Wage Determination in Sweden and Australia: Factor Loadings X 100<sup>(b)</sup>**

	Sweden			Australia		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
1. Responsibility	<b>75</b>	-03	07	-04	<b>78</b>	-05
2. Complex and difficult	<b>72</b>	-09	16	-02	<b>79</b>	-06
3. Years of studying	<b>58</b>	24	-02	21	<b>57</b>	18
4. Practical experience	<b>58</b>	09	08	09	<b>64</b>	27
5. Supervising others	<b>72</b>	09	09	03	<b>56</b>	30
6. How old	31	<b>46</b>	07	<b>72</b>	14	21
7. Married	04	<b>84</b>	02	<b>88</b>	03	05
8. Man or woman	05	<b>82</b>	-01	<b>82</b>	04	-03
9. Children	-02	<b>72</b>	09	<b>83</b>	00	06
10. Dangerous	20	05	<b>84</b>	02	16	<b>80</b>
11. Dirty and unpleasant	07	09	<b>86</b>	14	11	<b>81</b>
Eigenvalue	2.92	1.93	1.27	3.19	2.24	1.19
Explained variance (%)	26.6	17.6	11.6	29.0	20.3	10.8

**Notes:** a) Principal Components Analysis with Varimax rotation  
b) Factor loadings >40 bold.

Two things follow from the table. The first is that the attitudinal pattern in Sweden and Australia is very similar. The same items go together and separately in the two nations. The second is that the factors separate (a) issues of qualification requirements (factor I in Sweden and factor II in Australia) from (b) issues of ascribed characteristics of jobs incumbents (factor II in Sweden and factor I in Australia) and (c) issues of compensating wage differences (factor III).<sup>25</sup>

With support from the dimensional analysis it seems reasonable to construct three additive indices from the items. The first is the 'Qualification index', composed of items 1 to 5; the second is the 'Ascription index', made up of questions 6 to 9; the third is the 'Compensation index', composed of the two last items. All items are recoded so that the three (Australia) or two (Sweden) categories implying 'very important' get value 3, while 'fairly important', 'not so important' and 'should not matter at all' are ranked from 2 to 0. In this way, higher index values indicate greater willingness to see the items in the index as legitimate grounds for pay differences. The index distributions are shown in Appendix Three. It is worth noting that the

<sup>25</sup> A factor analysis for the whole range of questions in the Australian data reveals that apart from these three dimensions, there are three additional ones. The first of these concerns notions of comparative wages to other workers. The second includes questions on hard work and efforts from the employed, and the third separates questions on the importance of the work to others (NSSS, 1987-8). It would have been valuable to have included some questions, especially from the first of these factors, in the Swedish survey.

difference between Swedish and Australian figures may be somewhat inflated because of the difference in answer categories that was discussed above.<sup>26</sup>

The last aspect of attitudes to inequality we will be dealing with is the range of income differences that is considered legitimate. In Table 5.6, a number of occupations and their perceived and legitimate incomes are indexed in relation to the perceived and legitimate income for an unskilled factory worker.

A number of interesting things can be deduced from the table and by comparing it to results from other ISSP nations. One is that, using this measure, both Sweden and Australia stand out as rather egalitarian among the ISSP nations. With the exception of then still communist Hungary<sup>27</sup>, they are the most egalitarian in the whole 1987 module (Kelley and Evans, forthcoming). It seems as if the non-market component in pay determination in Sweden and Australia is indeed accompanied by more egalitarian views on income ranges.

A second is that the **perceived** and the **legitimate** orders of occupations are very similar, both within and across the two nations, something which applies to the other ISSP nations as well (Kelley and Evans, forthcoming). On the other hand, both Swedes and Australians, like the citizens of other ISSP nations, want to diminish the magnitude of inequality they perceive quite considerably (Kelley and Evans, forthcoming; see also Headey, 1991). We lack information on how **perceived** income distribution relates to **actual** income distribution in Sweden and Australia, but we can confidently conclude that the perceived range from top to bottom, about 3.5 times in Sweden and 4.5 times in Australia, is a gross underestimation of actual income differences. So both Australians and Swedes want to diminish underestimated income differences even further.

The legitimate range of income from top to bottom will in the following section be used as an indicator of how legitimate income differences are determined by various socio-economic factors.<sup>28</sup>

Finally in this section it will be asked how all the indices correlate with one another. This may be interpreted as a measure of how integrated the whole attitudinal

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26 The alternative strategy of dichotomising items before adding them, separating those who do think an item should be important from those who do not think so, results in badly skewed indices, something which makes computations unreliable. Tests using these indices instead of the ones in Table 6.3 show main results to be the same, but most group differences to be smaller.

27 The peculiar attitude structure of Hungary has been explored by Tóth (1992), who argues that the whole reward structure in late communist Hungary was so highly illegitimate that the kind of measures provided by Table 5.6 tend to exaggerate Hungarian egalitarianism.

28 More technically sophisticated, but less readily interpretable, measures are provided by Kelley and Evans (1993) and Tóth (1992).

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**Table 5.6: Perceived and Legitimate Differences in Income in Sweden and Australia.**

	Perceived <sup>(b)</sup>		Legitimate <sup>(c)</sup>	
	Sweden	Australia	Sweden	Australia
Unskilled factory worker <sup>(a)</sup>	100	100	100	100
Farm worker	105	110	114	119
City bus driver	109	124	108	119
Secretary	110	128	108	123
Bank clerk	123	144	112	131
Skilled factory worker	127	148	121	143
Owner of a small shop	131	181	129	178
Bricklayer	140	176	124	154
Doctor (GP)	230	402	195	320
Cabinet minister	339	410	226	295
Chairman of a large national company	357	455	239	354

- Notes:**
- a) Unskilled worker = 100
  - b) Perceived income for unskilled worker: Sweden 11238 kr/month; Australia 17550\$/year.
  - c) Legitimate income for unskilled worker: Sweden 12800 kr/month; Australia 19738\$/year.

**Source:** ISSP, 1987; Stenberg and Svallfors, 1992.

spectrum is on matters of inequality. The higher correlations we find between various indices, the more likely is the case that persons having, for example, certain attitudes about government redistribution also have common views about wage ranges, about what constitute legitimate grounds for pay and so on.

The correlations displayed in Table 5.7 indicate a number of things. The first, as could be expected from the previous dimension analyses, is that the attitude spectrum is not highly integrated in either Sweden or Australia. Some of the correlations are low ( $<.20$ ), some of them are medium ( $.20 - .30$ ) and only a small portion of them are high ( $>.30$ ). To what extent this fragmentation points to incoherence or contradiction, or merely to the fact that complex and multi-faceted issues such as inequality are highly unlikely to produce clear-cut attitude patterns, remains an open question.

The second is that Swedish attitudes on the whole are somewhat more integrated than the Australian ones. The average correlation in Sweden is  $.181$  while it is  $.161$  in Australia. However, on closer inspection, the higher average correlation in Sweden stems solely from the 'Macroeconomic index' having higher correlations with the other indices than in Australia. If we leave these correlations the average correlation is exactly the same in both samples ( $.166$ ). It would therefore be somewhat risky to base any far-reaching conclusions on the higher Swedish correlations.

Table 5.7: Correlations Between Indices: Pearson's R X 100

INDEX	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Redistribution Swe Aus							
2. Incentives Swe Aus	-04 -08						
3. Macroeconomic Swe Aus	31 23	31 18					
4. Government Swe Aus	55 53	03 02	33 22				
5. Qualification Swe Aus	-09 03	-28 -27	-23 -10	-07 04			
6. Ascription Swe Aus	08 21	-16 -11	-08 -08	08 23	22 17		
7. Compensation Swe Aus	13 14	-08 -11	05 02	20 14	27 32	17 21	
8. Wage Difference Swe Aus	-28 -27	-07 -06	-28 -19	-34 -25	14 13	-08 -12	-12 -05

The third is that the relative insulation of incentive questions from other issues of inequality that were spotted in the previous analyses is further underlined here. The 'Incentives index' hardly correlates at all with the 'Government index' or the 'Wage difference index', which indicates that incentive issues are completely insulated from issues of government redistribution or legitimate wage ranges in the minds of Swedes and Australians.

Lastly, the 'Ascription index' shows some interesting differences between Sweden and Australia. In Australia, it seems as if this index has a somewhat more 'leftist' tendency, as indicated by its higher correlation with the 'Redistribution' and 'Government' indices. Australians who want to give greater weight to factors such as

these in wage setting are also more in favour of redistribution generally, while this is not the case in Sweden. This again indicates that the Australian answers to this set of questions are different from the Swedish ones, pointing to a different legacy from the arbitration tradition compared to the collective bargaining tradition.

All the indices from Table 5.7 will be used in the following section in order to compare various groups' attitudes to various aspects of inequality. The findings from this first empirical section can then be fleshed out further before reaching conclusions on the mental maps of inequality in Sweden and Australia.

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## 6 Structural Determinants, Attitudinal Cleavages and Political Choice

Explanations of why different groups endorse different values and perceptions usually take as their starting-point the interaction of self-interest and norms (Etzioni, 1988; Elster, 1989). While it would be erroneous to think that attitudes form simply as calculated responses to self-interests, there is obviously some truth in the idea that attitudes and perceived self-interest are linked. The impact of self-interest is moderated, however, both by norms arising in the social networks in which people are involved, and by the frameworks for interpretation which people bring to bear on their experiences.

We would, nevertheless, expect those better off in the stratification system to endorse more favourable views of inequality: to be opposed to redistribution and support arguments about the necessity or inevitability of inequality. Empirical studies have also shown over and over again, in a variety of settings and using different indicators, the clear correlations between positions in stratification systems and views about inequality (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Marshall et al., 1988; Svallfors, 1991, 1992, forthcoming b; Western et al., 1991; Wright, 1985; Wright and Shiin, 1988; Wright et al., 1989).

Three indicators of position in the stratification system will be used in the following analyses: class, income and education. The class variable, as indicated above, is coded into a variant of the Goldthorpe class model (Goldthorpe, 1987; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992a).<sup>29</sup> It separates six classes following the schema's logic of separating groups in terms of their work conditions and market positions. The salariat is divided into two classes: Service Class I and Service Class II. These two groups consist of employees normally enjoying secure and long-term employment conditions and substantial freedom in the pursuit of work tasks. Class I consists of occupations often engaged in the exercise of authority and higher-grade professionals. Class II consists of lower-grade professionals and lower-level managers.

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29 Contrary to the suggestions put forward by Goldthorpe (1983; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992b), it was decided to use the individual's occupation as base for class codings. Those presently outside the labour force, such as unemployed, housewives and pensioners were coded by their previous occupation, if any. Where no present or previous occupation was documented, the occupation of the spouse (if any) was used. Alternative classifications, using the occupation of the 'household head', both in its classic male sense and in the sense of the person in the household with the highest class position, showed attitudinal differences between individual and family class codings to be very small. On average, however, the individual coding fared somewhat better (computer output available from author). It would be an interesting task in itself to investigate why the strong indications of family class being a more discriminating factor than individual class reported by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992b) fail to materialise here.

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Two groups of routine non-manual occupations, IIIa and IIIb, are also coded. Their work and market conditions are normally more circumscribed than is the case in the Service class. Still, in terms of career opportunities and employment prospects at least, group IIIa differs clearly from the manual workers. Class IIIb consists of occupations, typically filled by women, that have low qualification requirements and small career opportunities, thereby being rather close to the manual worker category.

The self-employed, Class IV in the Goldthorpe schema, obviously differ from other classes in owning their means of production and not being employed by someone else. In the Goldthorpe class model, employers with more than 20 employees are included in the Service class. Since the Swedish data lack information on number of employees, all employers except professionals are included in Class IV. Since there are very few farmers in both samples, and attitudinal differences between farmers and other self-employed showed to be small, farmers are included with the other self-employed.

Manual workers, finally, groups VI and VII in the Goldthorpe model, are characterised by having more short-term and subordinate working conditions and more insecure market conditions. The information in the Swedish survey is insufficient to separate Class V, Foremen and Technicians. Some occupations classified as Class V in the Australian class project schema have been reclassified as Service Class II here. Since the division between skilled and unskilled workers seems to be somewhat fluid in the Australian case, it was decided to include all workers in one category. The analysis by Evans (1992), which in other respects gives strong support to the validity of the Goldthorpe schema, shows differences in work and market conditions to be slight between skilled and unskilled workers in Britain. Separate analyses on the Australian and Swedish attitudes showed differences between unskilled and skilled manual workers to be small.

While the class variable tries to capture the resources and risks allocated to groups in terms of their **labour market and work** conditions, a more direct measure of their positions in **consumption markets** is their income. Family income proved to be clearly more linked to attitudes than individual income, a fact that indicates at least some pooling of resources within the family. Problems of standardisation are immense here, too, since 20 categories of yearly family income in Australian dollars 1987 should be compared to 7 (respondent's income) + 7 (spouse's income) categories of monthly income in 1991 Kronor in Sweden. The admittedly somewhat crude strategy chosen was to transform the variable into categories as close to quartiles as possible in both nations, thereby making income into a pure relative good.

Problems of standardisation exist also when it comes to the third stratification indicator, education. National education systems are quite idiosyncratic, which makes it a hard task to compare 'like with like'. In the following analyses, three educational categories have been created. The first separates people with only primary education and those with a secondary education mainly preparing for manual and routine non-manual occupations (two year 'gymnasium' in Sweden and

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incomplete secondary or trade certificate in Australia). The second includes those with secondary education of a more theoretical kind, preparing for service class occupations and tertiary education (three or four year 'gymnasium' in Sweden and complete secondary in Australia). The last one includes those with any kind of tertiary education.

It has often been argued that the relevance of class and other 'class-related' factors, such as income and education, is being complemented or even replaced by other cleavage structures. Gender conflicts, conflicts between public and private sector employees, conflicts between age groups or generations, conflicts between urban and rural regions and other various alternative conflict lines have been envisaged as surpassing class as the basic cleavage in advanced (post)industrial society.

Some of these have, on closer inspection, an almost negligible impact on the way attitudes to inequality are structured in Sweden and Australia. This goes for the often asserted fundamental conflict between public and private sector employees. Many have argued that conflicts of interest between private and public sector employees get more salient as fiscal constraints and tax burdens increase (Dunleavy, 1980, 1986; Zetterberg, 1985). It has also been suggested that a specific welfare ethos should be prevalent among those employed by the welfare state in contrast to private sector employees (Hoel and Knutsen, 1989; Lafferty, 1988). In particular, Sweden has been identified as a nation where conflicts between private and public sector employees should be acute, taking into consideration the large public sector and ensuing high tax rates (Taylor-Gooby, 1991; Zetterberg, 1985).

In fact, attitudinal differences between public and private sector employees are close to negligible on the indices we are analysing here in both Sweden and Australia. Ideological differences might, however, be thought to exist not between public and private sector employees, but between those employed by the welfare sectors of the state and those not (Wright and Cho, 1992). A second attempt was therefore made in the search for the welfare ethos, where various welfare professions were separated from other occupations. It yielded virtually the same negative result (computer output available from author). It was decided, therefore, to leave out both the public-private variable and the welfare professions variable from further analyses. The result on small sector differences has been reproduced using other data materials and issues in Sweden (Svallfors, 1991, 1992, forthcoming a and b). It seems as if the perception of Sweden as the home of sector conflicts cannot stand up to empirical scrutiny.

A second possible source of attitudinal differences also has a minor importance. This is regional differences in attitudes, that could be expected to be clearly salient in a federal nation with vast geographical distances such as Australia. In fact, regional differences are generally small and, furthermore, somewhat more pervasive in Sweden than in Australia. It does not seem as if the existence of a federal structure, and the different political cultures at the state level, have much impact on the ways in which inequality is perceived and valued by individuals.

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In fact, there are only three additional factors among those available for comparison that, in at least some respects, add something to the structuring of attitudes in the two nations: gender, age and the urban-rural cleavage. Differences in political interests and attitudes between men and women are often asserted to be especially salient in the area of welfare policies (Hoel and Knutsen, 1989). It is on the one hand argued that women, in their roles as clients, workers and relatives, are more reliant on the welfare state than men (Borchorst and Siim, 1987; Hernes, 1987a, 1987b). On the other hand it is assumed that women, due to socialisation experiences at home and in the wider community, display specific qualities captured by concepts such as 'rationality of caring' (Waerness, 1987). Both in defending their own interest, and in taking into account the interest of others in need, we could expect women to differ from men in their views of welfare policies and redistribution.

Conflicts around redistribution are also pertinent between various age groups. These could be understood as structured along the life-cycle, where possibilities for sustaining oneself through labour vary through the life course. In this perspective, the youngest and the oldest could be expected to support redistribution to a larger degree than the middle-aged. One could also imagine age group differences to be signs of a generational shift in views of inequality. If the generational shift in values pictured by Inglehart (1979, 1990) has any bearing on views on inequality, we would expect younger cohorts to be less interested in redistribution, but on the other hand less impressed by incentive arguments about inequality than older ones. In the following analyses, five age groups will be separated in order to compare their attitudes.

A classic division in society, the one between urban and rural areas, also has some implications for views on inequality. It has been argued in the Swedish debate, that this old division is regaining influence as a new international division of labour makes the metropolitan areas and university cities into centres for knowledge-based production, at the same time as other regions lose employment opportunities and slowly decay (de Geer et al., 1987). It could also be asserted that rural life generally, being both geographically and socially peripheral, would induce more egalitarian spirit than urban life. If either of these arguments carry at least some force, we would expect the metropolitan areas to be generally less inclined to support redistribution and more accepting of the necessity of inequality than more rural areas. On the other hand, rural life has also been associated with greater conservatism, especially in cultural matters.<sup>30</sup> If this has any implications for attitudes to inequality we should expect those living in more rural areas to have a more favourable view of inequality than those living in metropolitan areas.

In the following analyses, the most detailed level on which we can create comparability between Sweden and Australia is one where we distinguish between (a) metropolitan areas (cities over 500 000 inhabitants in Australia, the regions of

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30 The continuing relevance of the cultural aspects of urban-rural conflicts in Sweden is indicated by the success of the film 'House of Angels' (Änglagård), picturing the conflicts raised by the appearance of two urban avantgarde performers in a sleepy rural town.

Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö in Sweden), (b) cities (100 000 - 500 000 inhabitants in Australia, more than 90 000 inhabitants within 30 km of the municipality centre in Sweden) and (c) small cities, towns and countryside.

It is important to keep in mind comparisons both across groups, across indices and across nations in the following analyses. As will be shown, the group patterns are more complicated than could be expected from the simple assumptions just stated.

The analytical technique used to compare attitudes in different groups is Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA). MCA is a convenient method for comparing values between groups when the independent variables are categorical data, and the dependent variable is at least interval level (Andrews et al., 1973). MCA produces means and coefficients both for simple bivariate correlations (empirical means and *etas*), and controlling for the impact of other independent variables (adjusted means and *betas*). A limitation of MCA is that an additive model is assumed; that is, it is assumed that no significant interaction effects are present. This is, of course, hardly ever the case. Interactions can be handled by constructing new 'compounded' variables and including these instead of the original variables.

Interactions are generally of very minor importance in the Australian data. In Sweden, however, there are clearly some present. In the tables, results from additive models are displayed, and results from estimations using compounded variables including statistically significant (0.01-level) interactions are commented on in footnotes. In general, the interaction effects seem to be of little importance for the substantive conclusions. None of the main effects from variables are much affected by introducing interactions in the equations.

The Beta-coefficients provided by MCA should also be interpreted with some caution. They cannot be directly compared across different indices and variables, but they do give a rough picture of the contribution from various variables to the amount of explained variance (see Pedersen, 1983; Halleröd and Stern, 1991).

## 6.1 Structural Determinants and Attitudinal Indices

In Table 6.1, MCA results are displayed for the three indices that were constructed from the questions on interpretations/explanations of inequality. Turning first to the Redistribution index, we find that group patterns are largely of the kind we would have expected. Service Class I and the self-employed are generally less inclined to accept these arguments, as shown by their lower index values, and the same goes for people with higher income and education. The three stratification variables class, income and education are by far the most important in structuring attitudes.

While this goes for both Sweden and Australia, attitudes are clearly more patterned in Sweden, which is shown by the rather substantial amount of explained variance. Both class, income and education categories discriminate more clearly in Sweden,

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and there are also discernible age differences in that the old are more prone to agree with the statements than are the young.<sup>31</sup>

Turning to the Incentives index, the picture is an entirely different one. First of all, group differences are smaller, very small in the case of Australia. Second, patterns are to some extent reversed compared to what we found on the first index. Members of the service class have higher index values than workers and those with higher education are less prone to accept incentive arguments about inequality than those with lower education.<sup>32</sup> Those more favoured in the stratification system seem less inclined to argue for the necessity of inequality! In Sweden, the old accept incentive arguments to a higher degree than the young, thus showing more 'rightist' tendencies compared to their more 'leftist' stands on the Redistribution index.

The fact that group patterns are so entirely different on these two first indices further underlines the importance of treating redistributive aspects of inequality separately from incentive aspects. Groups who have 'leftist' leanings on redistributive matters do not automatically show the same tendencies when it comes to incentives and vice versa.

Turning to the last index in Table 6.1, we find the largest differences between the two nations. In Australia, group differences are extremely small, almost the only difference to be found is that the self-employed are more prone than other classes to accept arguments about beneficial macro-economic effects from inequality.

In Sweden, we find that class, income and gender differences are quite substantial, and there are also clear differences between the categories of the urban-rural variable. Men, self-employed and members of Service Class I, those with higher incomes and living in the metropolitan areas are more inclined to argue for the necessity of large income differences and high profits than women, workers and routine non-manuals, those with lower education and living in rural areas. The pattern in Sweden is thus one more resembling the first Redistribution index than the second Incentives index.<sup>33</sup> One important difference, however, is that gender differences are much more substantial on this last index.

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31 This is especially pronounced among the self-employed, as indicated by the significant interaction effects between the class and age variables. This obviously must be explained by the fact that older groups of self-employed contain more present or former small farmers. Bringing in a compounded 'age-class' variable raises the amount of explained variance to 28.7 per cent.

32 In Sweden, there are two significant interaction effects that qualify these findings. Among the routine non-manuals and workers, education signs are reversed in that those (few) with university education are the most 'rightist'. The same goes for the oldest age group (65+), while differences between education categories are small in the next oldest group. Bringing in compounded 'education-class' or 'education-age' variables increases the amount of explained variance to 10.7 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectively.

33 A fact that is to some extent obscured in the more compounded analysis in Svallfors (forthcoming b).

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Table 6.1: Attitudes to Inequality in Sweden and Australia: Multiple Classification Analysis, Empirical and Adjusted Index Means

	Redistribution Index				Incentive Index				Macroeconomic Index			
	Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta
Grand Mean	3.75		3.74		1.23		0.71		1.97		1.79	
Men	3.67	3.64	3.63	3.70	1.13	1.16	0.69	0.66	1.76	1.77	1.74	1.74
Women	3.83	3.85	3.86	3.78	1.32	1.30	0.71	0.77	2.18	2.17	1.85	1.84
Gender <sup>(a)</sup>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.04</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(3.14*)		(.60)		(1.16)		(1.56)		(16.43***)		(1.71)
Service Class I	2.34	2.88	2.63	3.03	1.80	1.71	1.16	1.11	1.50	1.62	1.54	1.66
Service Class II	3.20	3.65	3.65	3.85	1.43	1.33	0.79	0.75	1.89	1.93	1.92	1.97
Routine non-man IIIa	4.20	4.16	4.05	4.02	0.96	1.01	0.66	0.65	2.39	2.40	1.85	1.84
Routine non-man IIIb	3.93	3.62	4.00	3.86	1.19	1.20	0.64	0.62	2.04	1.87	1.80	1.74
Self-employed IV	3.36	3.24	3.32	3.18	0.80	0.89	0.65	0.71	1.35	1.38	1.55	1.55
Workers VI; VII	4.51	4.27	4.27	4.10	1.15	1.19	0.53	0.58	2.19	2.19	1.91	1.88
Class <sup>(a)</sup>	<b>.41</b>	<b>.27</b>	<b>.28</b>	<b>.21</b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.25</b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.10</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(10.80***)		(10.54***)		(2.35*)		(2.65*)		(7.80***)		(2.42*)
Quartile 1	4.19	3.99	4.16	4.01	1.32	1.43	0.67	0.80	2.19	2.18	1.80	1.84
Quartile 2	4.13	4.00	4.15	4.01	1.22	1.31	0.74	0.81	2.10	2.10	1.91	1.90
Quartile 3	3.78	3.80	3.77	3.78	1.19	1.17	0.60	0.59	1.92	1.88	1.86	1.84
Quartile 4	2.57	2.99	2.88	3.15	1.20	0.95	0.88	0.73	1.58	1.65	1.55	1.56
Income <sup>(a)</sup>	<b>.33</b>	<b>.21</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.09</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(12.02***)		(11.70***)		(2.06)		(1.90)		(4.56**)		(3.13*)

cont./

Table 6.1 cont.

	Redistribution Index				Incentive Index				Macroeconomic Index			
	Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta
Primary/Manual Sec	4.21	3.97	4.08	3.90	1.04	1.09	0.53	0.59	2.03	1.96	1.82	1.79
Complete Secondary	2.96	3.18	3.55	3.59	1.32	1.28	0.86	0.84	1.84	1.91	1.78	1.78
Tertiary	2.76	3.40	3.14	3.58	1.84	1.67	0.93	0.81	1.85	2.05	1.73	1.80
<b>Education<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.36</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.20</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.19</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.01</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(10.60 <sup>***</sup> )		(3.78 <sup>*</sup> )		(4.55 <sup>*</sup> )		(3.84 <sup>*</sup> )		(.36)		(.02)
-29	3.72	3.49	3.86	3.73	1.47	1.42	0.74	0.73	2.04	1.87	1.88	1.84
30-39	3.44	3.62	3.65	3.72	1.42	1.38	0.79	0.79	2.03	2.08	1.82	1.82
40-49	3.55	3.92	3.58	3.72	1.27	1.25	0.67	0.69	1.93	2.11	1.74	1.78
50-64	3.94	3.86	3.74	3.70	1.02	1.11	0.73	0.74	1.96	1.98	1.81	1.80
65-	4.19	3.90	4.07	3.98	0.88	0.86	0.45	0.42	1.84	1.74	1.54	1.57
<b>Age<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.05</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(2.04 <sup>*</sup> )		(.48)		(2.21 <sup>*</sup> )		(1.46)		(1.55)		(.83)
Metropolitan	3.45	3.60	3.49	3.59	1.17	1.10	0.81	0.78	1.82	1.84	1.82	1.78
City	3.77	3.73	3.79	3.76	1.18	1.20	0.63	0.63	1.95	1.92	1.78	1.79
Town/Country	4.00	3.91	4.01	3.90	1.33	1.38	0.62	0.66	2.13	2.15	1.73	1.80
<b>Urban-Rural<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.01</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(2.26)		(3.78 <sup>*</sup> )		(1.93)		(1.25)		(3.89 <sup>***</sup> )		(.05)
Explained Variance (%)		25.5		13.0		7.2		3.8		11.1		2.5

## Notes:

a) Eta and Beta values in bold

b) F-Statistics in parentheses; \*\*\* = P&lt;0.001 \*\* = P&lt;0.01 \* = P&lt;0.1

Turning to attitudes to government redistribution in Table 6.2, we find clear similarities in group patterns between Sweden and Australia, in spite of Swedes being generally more supportive of redistribution. There are clear gender, class and income differences of the expected kind in both nations. One interesting difference is that attitudes seem to be more determined by class in Sweden, while income is more important in Australia. Differences between education categories are reduced, in Sweden virtually obliterated, as soon as we control for class and income. Age differences are present in both nations, but while in Australia they clearly follow a life-cycle pattern, with young and old having higher values, in Sweden it seems to be the older generations who are more supportive of welfare policies. In Sweden, there are also differences between urban and rural areas, where the periphery is more supportive of redistribution than the centre.

In Table 6.3, group differences are displayed on the three indices that were constructed from the questions on legitimate grounds for pay determination. The patterns are quite different from those found on the previous indices. Group differences are small, in Sweden much smaller than before. This is above all due to the fact that class differences are very small indeed in Sweden on all these three indices. While different classes in Sweden differ markedly when it comes to issues of redistribution, they hardly differ at all when it comes to questions about which factors should determine pay.

On the 'Qualification index', attitudes in Sweden are structured mostly by education. People with higher education are more willing to let qualification requirements have an impact on pay determination than people with low education. It is perhaps not surprising to find that 'meritocratic' values are stronger among those with higher education. There are also age differences, where the older groups are more willing to let these factors determine pay.<sup>34</sup> This is the case also in Australia, where other group differences are close to negligible.

Turning to the 'Ascription index', we again find some interesting differences between Swedish and Australian patterns. This index is the only one where Australian group differences in attitudes are clearer than in Sweden. In particular, we find that in Australia, workers, self-employed and routine non-manuals IIIb are more inclined to give weight to ascribed factors in wage setting than Service Class and IIIa members, while class differences are virtually nil in Sweden. People with low education and low incomes in Australia are also clearly more in favour of letting these factors determine incomes, while it is only the lowest income quartile that display any such tendencies in Sweden. There are also clear age differences, where

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34 There are also interaction effects between the class and urban-rural categories. Differences between urban and rural areas are reversed among routine non-manuals IIIb compared to those displayed in Table 6.3, while differences are small among the self-employed. Neither of these results are easily interpreted. Bringing in a compounded variable increases the amount of explained variance to 8.6 per cent.

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**Table 6.2: Attitudes to Redistribution in Sweden and Australia: Multiple Classification Analysis, Empirical and Adjusted Index Means**

	Government Index			
	Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta
Grand Mean	8.54		7.11	
Men	8.27	8.23	6.77	6.84
Women	8.81	8.84	7.47	7.40
<b>Gender<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.09</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(9.47**)		(9.28**)
Service Class I	7.20	7.57	5.65	6.27
Service Class II	7.74	7.97	6.84	7.15
Routine non-man IIIa	8.69	8.67	7.30	7.24
Routine non-man IIIb	8.90	8.53	7.66	7.28
Self-employed IV	8.00	8.05	6.45	6.32
Workers VI; VII	9.51	9.39	7.98	7.77
<b>Class<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.30</b>	<b>.24</b>	<b>.24</b>	<b>.17</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(6.48***)		(7.06***)
Quartile 1	9.36	9.01	7.95	7.69
Quartile 2	8.88	8.75	7.79	7.59
Quartile 3	8.19	8.30	7.08	7.12
Quartile 4	7.52	7.98	5.71	6.11
<b>Income<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.24</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.27</b>	<b>.19</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(4.15**)		(12.68***)
Primary/Manual Sec	8.98	8.62	7.64	7.35
Complete Secondary	7.71	8.23	6.71	6.76
Tertiary	7.61	8.48	6.39	7.08
<b>Education<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.08</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(.85)		(4.17*)
-29	8.52	8.15	7.44	7.21
30-39	8.04	8.27	7.10	7.22
40-49	8.18	8.60	6.41	6.66
50-64	8.74	8.73	7.22	7.16
65-	9.52	9.21	7.71	7.51
<b>Age<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.08</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(2.91*)		(2.12*)
Metropolitan	7.98	8.14	6.90	7.06
City	8.80	8.80	7.23	7.18
Town/Country	8.76	8.63	7.32	7.14
<b>Urban-Rural<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.01</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(4.33*)		(.13)
Explained Variance (%)		15.1		12.2

Notes: a) Eta and Beta values in bold  
b) F-statistics in parentheses; \*\*\* = P<0.001 \*\* = P<0.01 \* = P<0.1



**Table 6.3: Attitudes to Wage Determination in Sweden and Australia: Multiple Classification Analysis, Empirical and Adjusted Index Means**

	Qualification Index				Ascription Index				Compensation Index			
	Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta
Grand Mean	12.32		13.71		2.48		4.13		5.00		5.28	
Men	12.20	12.22	13.67	13.68	2.62	2.62	4.01	4.08	4.99	5.02	5.22	5.24
Women	12.44	12.42	13.75	13.74	2.36	2.36	4.26	4.18	5.01	4.98	5.34	5.32
<b>Gender<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.01</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.04</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(1.33)		(.37)		(2.79*)		(.23)		(.20)		(1.34)
Service Class I	12.61	12.20	13.55	13.54	2.15	2.20	3.28	3.53	4.86	4.83	5.04	5.11
Service Class II	12.55	12.32	13.80	13.84	2.36	2.52	3.55	3.87	4.86	4.86	5.25	5.28
Routine non-man IIIa	12.32	12.31	13.86	13.85	2.44	2.43	3.64	3.63	5.07	5.10	5.35	5.34
Routine non-man IIIb	12.30	12.38	13.76	13.80	2.37	2.36	4.48	4.39	5.11	5.14	5.43	5.37
Self-employed IV	12.68	12.83	13.48	13.41	2.83	2.68	4.65	4.40	4.86	4.86	5.18	5.18
Workers VI;VII	11.93	12.17	13.74	13.69	2.65	2.60	4.73	4.57	5.10	5.09	5.21	5.33
<b>Class<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.08</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(1.16)		(2.03*)		(.57)		(3.09**)		(1.31)		(1.45)
Quartile 1	12.28	12.30	13.88	13.83	3.07	3.07	5.16	4.73	5.19	5.13	5.40	5.37
Quartile 2	12.32	12.36	13.68	13.69	2.27	2.19	4.38	4.22	5.00	4.98	5.39	5.36
Quartile 3	12.14	12.18	13.75	13.77	2.33	2.38	3.84	3.93	4.93	4.95	5.23	5.23
Quartile 4	12.61	12.47	13.50	13.52	2.40	2.46	3.37	3.78	4.89	4.96	5.14	5.19
<b>Income<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.19</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.08</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(.53)		(1.52)		(5.36**)		(3.79**)		(.93)		(1.93)

cont./

Table 6.3 cont.

	Qualification Index				Ascription Index				Compensation Index			
	Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia		Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta
Primary/Manual Sec	12.14	12.11	13.79	13.73	2.62	2.54	4.72	4.45	5.02	4.97	5.31	5.27
Complete Secondary	12.28	12.37	13.60	13.63	2.30	2.40	3.51	3.64	4.96	4.97	5.29	5.29
Tertiary	12.96	12.99	13.68	13.78	2.14	2.34	3.57	4.09	4.97	5.10	5.18	5.30
Education <sup>(a)</sup>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.01</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(5.81**)		(.62)		(.34)		(6.65**)		(.56)		(.06)
-29	12.18	12.18	13.51	13.47	2.32	2.20	4.07	4.01	5.12	5.05	5.36	5.31
30-39	12.30	12.19	13.56	13.56	2.06	2.12	3.59	3.75	4.93	4.95	5.29	5.31
40-49	12.07	11.98	13.71	13.76	2.44	2.51	3.80	3.90	4.97	5.03	5.17	5.21
50-64	12.49	12.57	13.97	13.97	2.73	2.78	4.55	4.48	4.92	4.92	5.28	5.29
65-	12.65	12.81	14.17	14.15	2.99	2.89	5.73	5.38	5.13	5.12	5.30	5.30
Age <sup>(a)</sup>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.04</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(2.86*)		(5.05***)		(3.20*)		(5.82***)		(.70)		(.42)
Metropolitan	12.65	12.59	13.69	13.70	2.66	2.74	3.92	4.08	5.04	5.04	5.23	5.25
City	12.25	12.28	13.97	13.93	2.57	2.58	4.13	4.07	4.96	4.96	5.28	5.27
Town/Country	12.09	12.12	13.77	13.65	2.22	2.14	4.37	4.21	5.00	5.00	5.34	5.32
Urban-Rural <sup>(a)</sup>	<b>.11</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.12</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.02</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.03</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(2.89)		(1.64)		(5.14**)		(.22)		(.39)		(.60)
Explained Variance (%)		5.6		3.3		6.3		8.2		2.3		2.2

Notes: a) Eta and Beta values in bold

b) F-statistics within parentheses; \*\*\* = P&lt;0.001 \*\* = P&lt;0.01 \* = P&lt;0.1

the older groups in both nations are more willing to let ascribed factors have an impact on pay. This is especially clear for the oldest age group in Australia, which diverges quite substantially from the other age groups.

Combining the stratification and age differences in Australia, what is found is likely to be the ideological legacy of the arbitration system. People worse off in the stratification system are more likely to give weight to various ascribed characteristics in Australia, while these differences are small in Sweden. The oldest age group in Australia, whose working lives occurred during the heyday of the Australian model, also display a markedly higher support for these factors in wage setting.

The last index in Table 6.3 shows no distinctive group differences whatsoever in neither Sweden nor Australia.<sup>35</sup> That is indeed surprising, since one would have expected the groups most likely to suffer from dangerous and unpleasant working conditions, such as workers and people with low education, to be willing to give greater weight to such factors in pay determination. This is, however, not the case, an interesting finding in itself.

Turning finally in Table 6.4 to the index of legitimate income relations, we find that in Sweden class and income categories discriminate very clearly. Service class members and those with higher incomes are more likely to see large income differences as legitimate than workers and people with low income. The pattern is the same in Australia but differences are smaller. Gender differences are present in both nations, but clearly more pervasive in Sweden. Differences between various age groups are on the other hand much more pervasive in Australia. Younger age groups are considerably less accepting of large income differences than older ones, a finding that was, to an even greater extent, replicated in Britain as well (Svallfors, forthcoming b).

Summarising the results so far, a mixed pattern emerges. There is on the whole a clear dominance by stratification cleavages, especially class, in structuring attitude patterns. When it comes to matters of redistribution, it is clearly the case that workers and people on low incomes are the most 'leftist'. These differences are stronger in Sweden than in Australia on all aspects except the indices on wage determination, where very small class differences were found in Sweden.<sup>36</sup> I will come back to these findings in the concluding discussion.

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35 There is a significant interaction in the Australian data between education and class variables. Class differences are more pronounced among those with tertiary education in that the self-employed among them have lower index values. Bringing in a compounded 'education-class' variable increases the amount of explained variance to 3.9 per cent.

36 Connoisseurs of the Goldthorpe class schema may note the peculiar attitude pattern among routine non-manuals IIIa in Sweden. This group shows clear 'leftist' leanings on the 'Redistribution', 'Government', 'Macroeconomic' and 'Wage difference' indices. In the two latter cases they are even more 'leftist' than workers. On the other hand, second to the self-employed, they are the most 'rightist' on the 'Incentives index'. The middle position of this group, being quite close to the workers in terms of pay and working conditions, but in some cases with substantially better career prospects, may to some extent explain their attitude mix.

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**Table 6.4: Legitimate Income Relation Chairman/Unskilled Worker in Sweden and Australia: Multiple Classification Analysis, Empirical and Adjusted Index Means**

	Wage Difference Index			
	Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta	Emp means Eta	Adj means Beta
Grand Mean	240		354	
Men	268	265	371	366
Women	211	214	334	341
<b>Gender<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.18</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.09</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(15.93 <sup>***</sup> )		(8.91 <sup>**</sup> )
Service Class I	358	335	426	398
Service Class II	257	246	363	354
Routine non-man IIIa	211	213	349	352
Routine non-man IIIb	195	223	327	347
Self-employed IV	258	249	358	362
Workers VI; VII	212	216	328	333
<b>Class<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.31</b>	<b>.24</b>	<b>.22</b>	<b>.14</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(5.84 <sup>***</sup> )		(3.89 <sup>**</sup> )
Quartile 1	196	216	336	338
Quartile 2	221	224	331	340
Quartile 3	252	253	359	362
Quartile 4	304	277	383	368
<b>Income<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.23</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>.09</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(3.84 <sup>*</sup> )		(2.77 <sup>*</sup> )
Primary/Manual Sec	221	236	336	345
Complete Secondary	279	266	359	361
Tertiary	279	235	389	364
<b>Education<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.17</b>	<b>.07</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.06</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(1.53)		(2.00)
-29	216	233	335	343
30-39	249	244	339	333
40-49	249	230	366	360
50-64	244	243	368	371
65-	246	262	404	406
<b>Age<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.08</b>	<b>.06</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.15</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(.59)		(6.15 <sup>***</sup> )
Metropolitan	271	264	373	366
City	222	226	365	366
Town/Country	233	234	329	336
<b>Urban-Rural<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>.13</b>	<b>.10</b>	<b>.15</b>	<b>.11</b>
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(3.63 <sup>*</sup> )		(6.85 <sup>**</sup> )
Explained Variance (%)		14.9		10.1

**Notes:** a) Eta and Beta values in bold.  
b) F-statistics in parentheses; \*\*\* = P<0.001 \*\* = P<0.01 \* = P<0.1

Gender differences are on the whole less pervasive. They are clearly more important in Sweden than in Australia, lending support to the notion of the Swedish model creating sharper gender clashes than the Australian model. As argued by Esping-Andersen (1990), a welfare state such as the Swedish one, with women largely employed in the welfare services thus created, would produce clearer political divisions between men and women than a more residual welfare state such as the Australian one, organised mainly around class. As indicated by the clear class differences in attitudes in Sweden, and by the negligible impact by any sector cleavages, Esping-Andersen's argument is not particularly sound (Svallfors, forthcoming a), but there seems to be some support for the notion that women in Sweden are radicalised by their specific labour market locations. It is worth noting that where clear-cut gender differences do occur in Sweden, they are little affected by holding class positions constant. That means that gender differences in attitudes are not an effect of women's inferior class positions compared to men's, but are largely independent gender effects.

Age group differences are quite pervasive, but point in various directions. In Sweden, older people are more supportive of governmental redistribution and more persuaded by radical interpretations of inequality in a way that seems to suggest the existence of generational shifts leading to the right. On the other hand, younger people in Sweden are less convinced by incentive arguments than older people are. In Australia, the age groups differ little except when it comes to factors that should determine wages, where older people are considerably more inclined to let both qualification requirements and ascribed factors play a role.

The urban-rural attitude differences were rather small, in Australia close to negligible. In the cases where some differences could be detected, they clearly supported the view that rural areas have a more egalitarian mind than urban ones. No support for the assumptions of greater conservatism in these matters in rural areas could be found.

## 6.2 Attitudes and Political Choice

The link between attitudes to inequality and political choice is obviously one of great importance. Do the attitudes people hold translate into political sympathies, and do political alignments affect the way in which attitudes are formed? While the question is easy to pose, it is hard to answer due to the fact that the link is of a very different kind from the links between various structural positions and attitudes. On the one hand, attitudes determine political sympathies. People choose between parties at least partially on the ground of these parties' perceived closeness to their personal views and values. On the other hand, parties actively shape the way in which reality is perceived. Supporters of a political party tend to adopt the party's way of interpreting the world, and their attitudes to specific issues may sometimes be as much an effect of their political allegiances as a cause of them.

Unfortunately, these complications are often ignored in analyses. Even otherwise sensible analysts tend to treat the links between attitudes and political sympathies as

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if they were of the same kind as, for example, the links between class position and attitudes (Hadenius, 1986; Western et al., 1991). In cross-sectional surveys, it is of course not possible to solve what then amounts to a virtual chicken-and-egg problem. But at least there seems to be good reasons not to compare correlations between party sympathies and attitudes with those found between various structural variables and a set of attitudes.

Table 6.5 shows the correlation between all the attitudinal indices that were constructed and political party sympathies, divided into right and left. The data from Sweden are unfortunately weak on this point. The survey was conducted in a period (early 1991) of great shifts in political allegiances in the electorate. There was a sharp downturn in the support for the Social Democratic party, and a lot of former Social Democratic voters lost their old sympathies without shifting to any new party. This is shown in our data as an abnormally high proportion, a little more than 30 per cent, of the sample answering that they did not have sympathy for any of the political parties.

Separate analyses on this group show that it is quite close in attitudes to the group including Social Democratic sympathisers, which indicates that it contains a large share of disillusioned former Social Democrats. For the analyses presented in Table 6.5, the only reasonable strategy nevertheless was to exclude them, just as was done with the much smaller group of undecided in Australia. The working samples on this particular question were thereby reduced to 575 in Sweden and 1531 in Australia. The figures in Table 6.5 should be interpreted with caution, keeping in mind these data problems.<sup>37</sup>

Another potential problem for comparing the Swedish and Australian attitudes is the large difference between their party systems. However, this turns out not to be a great problem after all. Regardless of whether we use the division into political left and right as here, divide the sympathisers into 'left' (Left Party and Social Democrats) 'middle' (Centre Party and Green Party) and 'right' (Moderate Party, Liberal Party and Christian Democratic Party), or leave those seven parties as separate categories, the correlations with attitudinal indices, as measured by Eta coefficients, stay mainly the same. The traditional division between left and right in Sweden, or socialist and bourgeois parties as they are often termed, seems indeed to make a lot of sense when it comes to issues of inequality.

The links between attitudes and political choice are on the whole similar in both nations. Except for the three last indices, links are very clear in Sweden. In Australia, incentive arguments about inequality have almost no connection whatsoever to political choice, as indicated by the figures on the 'Incentives' and 'Qualification' indexes. Links between political sympathies and the other wage determination indices are also tenuous.

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37 The change in Swedish data compared to Tables 6.1 to 6.4 is shown by the 'rightist' drift in most grand means when those without sympathies for any party are excluded.

**Table 6.5: Party Choice and Attitudinal Indices in Sweden and Australia: Multiple Classification Analysis, Empirical and Adjusted Index Means**

	Sweden		Australia	
	Emp means	Adj <sup>(a)</sup> means	Emp means	Adj <sup>(a)</sup> means
Redistribution Index	3.52		3.74	
Left	4.35	4.08	4.39	4.33
Right	2.91	3.11	3.07	3.13
Eta/Beta	.37	.25	.36	.32
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(36.60***)		(125.82***)
Incentives Index	1.16		0.67	
Left	1.42	1.53	0.73	0.75
Right	0.97	0.88	0.61	0.59
Eta/Beta	.14	.20	.05	.06
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(18.26***)		(4.13*)
Macroeconomic Index	1.78		1.75	
Left	2.38	2.32	2.00	1.97
Right	1.33	1.38	1.50	1.53
Eta/Beta	.39	.34	.19	.16
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(63.23***)		(26.58***)
Government Index	8.38		7.09	
Left	9.47	9.21	8.24	8.13
Right	7.57	7.77	5.90	6.01
Eta/Beta	.34	.26	.38	.34
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(34.58***)		(141.10***)
Qualification Index	12.48		13.73	
Left	11.78	11.78	13.77	13.76
Right	13.00	13.00	13.69	13.70
Eta/Beta	.29	.29	.03	.02
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(39.01***)		(.57)
Ascription Index	2.56		4.15	
Left	2.37	2.32	4.35	4.37
Right	2.70	2.74	3.85	3.84
Eta/Beta	.08	.10	.06	.06
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(3.89*)		(4.34*)
Compensation Index	4.94		5.29	
Left	4.90	4.90	5.41	5.39
Right	5.00	4.99	5.17	5.19
Eta/Beta	.04	.04	.11	.09
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(.64)		(9.09**)
Wage Difference Index	244		354	
Left	215	231	330	336
Right	267	254	380	373
Eta/Beta	.17	.07	.18	.14
(F) <sup>(b)</sup>		(2.39)		(19.05***)

Notes: a) Adjusted for all variables from tables 6.1-6.4.  
b) \*\*\* = P<0.001 \*\* = P<0.01 \* = P<0.1

Considering the fact that we have excluded those not sympathising with any party in Sweden, it would still be an exaggeration to argue that there is a much clearer link between attitudes to inequality and political party choice in Sweden than in Australia. In both nations, there are strong and persistent relationships between attitudes and political sympathies, pointing to the fact that issues of inequality loom large on the political agenda in both nations. One clear difference, however, exists and that is again connected to the 'Ascription index'. Those sympathising with the political right in Sweden are more inclined to argue for the legitimacy of these ascribed factors in determining pay, while the opposite is the case in Australia. This is probably because these factors are emphasised in conservative circles in Sweden, in order to underpin the role of the family. In Australia, those sympathising with the left are more inclined to support the notion of fairness in pay determination as connected with various ascribed characteristics, a notion that has been embodied in the arbitration system ever since the Harvester judgement.

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## 7 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is not my intention to reiterate all the findings from the previous sections. It is rather to try and discern the broader patterns that emerge from comparing the Swedish and Australian attitudes to inequality, and relate these to ongoing discussions, both of the fate of the Swedish and Australian models, and of comparative research on attitudes more generally.

As with beauty, the question of difference and similarity is at least partly in the eye of the beholder. Someone expecting Swedish and Australian attitudes to inequality to be fundamentally different, since their public policies differ so much, may be surprised to find that the way attitudes are structured turned out to be as similar as they were. The way in which various attitudes correlate, the dominance of class and 'class-related' determinants in structuring attitudes to distribution, the egalitarianism in judging legitimate wage ranges, and the strong links between attitudes and political choice, clearly indicate some noteworthy similarities between Swedish and Australian views of inequality.

Someone expecting all industrial societies to be fundamentally similar, may instead be struck by some of the clear differences that were found: the more narrow Australian conception of the welfare responsibilities of the government, especially when it comes to unemployment; the complete insulation of issues of incentives in Australia, both from other aspects of inequality and from political choice; the clearer class differences in attitudes in Sweden, except on issues of pay determination; the greater legitimacy in Australia of ascribed characteristics in pay determination; the differences in how these latter questions were linked to political choice in the two nations.

Summing up the similarities and differences traced across the report, there seems some semblance of truth in the title, inspired by the work of Castles. The Australian conception of inequality is indeed a labouristic one, at the same time egalitarian in arguing for small wage differences and hierarchical in the views of governmental redistribution and in the wholesale acceptance of incentive arguments about inequality. The last component, the view that inequality is necessary to induce qualification and responsibility, may indeed be considered as a ruling ideology in Australia, since it is widespread in all groups and among all political persuasions.

In characterising the Swedish attitudes as social democratic, it is important not to perpetuate the myths about Sweden as being 'consensual' or imbued with a Social Democratic Party 'hegemony'. It would be more accurate to see the Swedish attitudes as part of a broader West European pattern, where the existence and achievements of the welfare state have to some extent come to be taken for granted, at the same time as some basic capitalist notions about the nature of inequality have not been challenged. In this sense, even Thatcherist Britain or the Christian Democratic Germany display a social democratic attitude set among ordinary citizens (Svallfors, forthcoming a and b).

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It is still important to remember that the importance of the Australian and Swedish defining institutions in affecting values and views is one on the margin, leaving large tracts of common characteristics on their mental maps. The pervasive influence of work and market relations, as expressed by the clear attitude differences between various classes and income strata, is certainly something Sweden and Australia do have in common, in spite of popular mythology and some social scientists stating otherwise. The persistence of class differences in attitudes is an uncomfortable fact for those who wish to argue that class conflicts are being replaced by other, more horizontal, cleavages.<sup>38</sup>

One interesting question is why the clear class differences in attitudes to distribution in Sweden are not replicated when it comes to questions about what factors should determine pay. On the face of it, issues such as these would seem to have just as much class relevance as redistribution and wage ranges. In explaining the small class differences, it is necessary to point to the importance of political articulation to activate possible structural cleavages. There has been a notable lack of political mobilisation around these issues in Sweden, compared to the strong emphasis on matters of redistribution and relative pay. The failure to produce any guidelines for wage setting for individuals, that could underpin and supplement the solidaristic wage policy, is indicative of this. The negligible class differences that were found on the three wage determination indices in this report may therefore be considered as a result of lack of political articulation from the Swedish labour movement.

When we compare the age patterns in attitudes, there is further reason not to exaggerate the differences between the two nations. The lower support for redistribution and for radical explanations of inequality among young people in Sweden, and the lower support for ascribed factors in pay determination among younger people in Australia suggest that generational changes in attitudes may weaken the nationally specific traits in attitudes in the long run. It is of course not possible to rule out that these trends are merely related to the life-cycle, but they clearly look more like generational shifts in attitudes.

Apart from any intrinsic interest, the analysis of Swedish and Australian attitudes to inequality raises two sets of questions to be discussed finally in this report. First, what does it say about commonality and variation in values among citizens of capitalist nations more generally? Second, what relevance, if any, do these attitudes have for policy outcomes, specifically for the most recent developments on the political scenes of Sweden and Australia?

On the first question, the analysis should underline the fact that Western nations, in spite of substantial differences, are surprisingly similar in many regards. Even two nations such as Sweden and Australia, which in many respects represent 'outliers' among the OECD nations in terms of public policies and distributional outcomes,

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38 For a spirited defence of the continuing relevance of class analysis, see Goldthorpe and Marshall (1992).

display a substantial commonality in the way in which attitudes to inequality are structured.

The assertion by Ringen, that the more developed comparative research becomes, the more it will 'come to emphasise difference rather than similarity' (Ringen, 1991: 39), therefore needs qualification. It can just as well be exactly the converse, that differences between nations are found to take place within a broader framework of similarity. The conclusion from perhaps the most impressive result from comparative social research yet accomplished, Erikson's and Goldthorpe's *The Constant Flux*, clearly emphasises the importance of explaining the large commonalities they find in the mobility regimes of industrialised nations (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992a: 389-97).

Whether research using ISSP data for studying attitudes and values in industrialised nations will reach similar conclusions is to a large extent still an open question. But it would seem necessary not to be captured by the obsession with variation sometimes found in comparative research, and instead try to catch both the variation and the similarity between various nations in these respects.

On the question of the policy relevance of attitudes it is important not to exaggerate this. There are quite tenuous links between political articulation and attitudes on the one hand, and between attitudes and policies on the other. As put by March and Olsen:

Influence over the development of a worldview is difficult to establish, and the influence of a worldview over specific actions is indirect and often subtle. (March and Olsen, 1989: 64)

The naïve view of politics, in which elected representatives pursue policies directly emanating from the values and preferences of their constituencies, needs to be replaced by a more qualified one. Attitudes are merely the raw material from which politics are made, which due to their often ambivalent, complex or even contradictory characteristics can be articulated in quite different directions. Both the media, the political parties and other organised interests are crucial in transforming privately held attitudes to public opinion, and in linking public opinion to public policies. A comparison of these aspects of Swedish and Australian societies would be a very interesting task in itself, which however goes far beyond the scope of this report.

This does not, of course, mean that attitudes among ordinary citizens, or the study of them, lack interest or importance. Even if attitudes do not directly link to policies, they constitute boundaries and barriers for political action. Different political articulations are possible to pursue from a given set of attitudes, but this does not mean that **any** political articulation is possible. Policies that lack basis in values and commitments among citizens are not likely to succeed, at least not in the long run.

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The latest political developments in Sweden and Australia may illustrate some of this. The failure of neo-liberalism in both nations, illustrated by the severe slide in opinion polls for the present Swedish government, and the spectacular failure of the Australian Coalition to gain office in the midst of a severe recession in the 1993 election, is clearly indicative of the difficulties of neo-liberalism to ground policies in any real value changes in the population. On the other hand, the failure of Swedish social democracy in substantially altering views of inequality among the higher non-manual employees, and the inherited welfare conservatism in the Australian public, constitute barriers to social democratic reform strategies.

Both the Swedish and the Australian models have suffered serious problems in the 1990s, and new reform strategies seem urgent. After the rejection of neo-liberalism, the challenge for Australian and Swedish political leadership would seem to be finding formulas for sustained economic growth that do not contradict the inherent, although qualified, support for equality among their voters. As the nations stagger towards the next millenium, they carry the unmelted coins of their citizens' attitudes with them, as a counterweight to any abrupt shift in policy priorities.

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# **Appendix One: International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Members and Topics**

## **Members:**

1984: West Germany, USA, Britain, Australia  
1985: Italy, Austria, Netherlands, Hungary  
1986: Ireland  
1988: Norway, Israel  
1989: New Zealand, Philippines, (former East Germany)  
1990: Soviet(Russia)  
1991: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Japan  
1992: Poland, Slovenia, Sweden

## **Topics:**

1985: The Role of Government  
1986: Social Networks and Support Systems  
1987: Social Inequality  
1988: Family and Changing Sex Roles  
1989: Work Orientations  
1990: The Role of Government II  
1991: Religion  
1992: Social Inequality II  
1993: Environment  
1994: Family and Changing Gender Roles II  
1995: Nationalism and National Identity  
1996: The Role of Government III

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# Appendix Two: Class Coding of Occupations

## Australia

COMPUTE CLASSIND=V75.

COMPUTE CLASSPOU=V102.

VARIABLE LABELS CLASSIND 'RESPONDENT'S CLASS'/CLASSPOU  
'SPOUSE'S CLASS'.

RECODE CLASSIND CLASSPOU(0,000000=99)(1011 1101 1103 1201 1301 1303  
1305 1307 1309 1311 1313 1315 1317 1319 1399=1)(1401 1501 1503 1505 1507  
1599 1601=2)(2000 2101 2103 2105 2107 2109 2199 2201 2200 2203 2205 2207  
2209 2211 2213 2215 2217 2219 2301 2303 2305 2307=1)(2309 2311 2313 2315  
2317 2319 2321=2)(2323=1)(2399 2400 2401 2403 2405 2407=2)(2500  
2501=1)(2503 2505 2601 2603=2) (2605 2607 2701=1)(2703 2705 2707 2799 2800  
2801 2803 2805 2807 2809=2) (2811=1)(2815 2817 2819=2)(2901  
2903=1)(2905=2)(2907 2909=1) (2911 2999 3000 3101 3103 3200 3201 3203 3205  
3207 3299=2)(3301=1)(3303=2) (3305=1)(3307 3401 3501 3901 3907 3913 3903  
3905 3999=2)(3909 3911 3915 4000 4101 4103 4201 4203 4205 4207 4209 4211  
4213=8)(4301 4311 4315=2)(4303 4305 4307 4309 4313 4399 4401 4403 4405  
4407 4409 4411 4413 4501 4503 4505 4507 4509 4511 4601 4603 4605 4607 4609  
4701 4703 4705 4799 4801 4803 4805 4901 4903 4905 4907 4909 4911 4913 4915  
4917 4919 4921 4923 4925 4999=8) (4927=4)(4929 4931=10)(5000 5101 5103  
5105=3)(5201 5203=4)(5300 5301 5303 5305 5401 5499 5501 5503  
5505=3)(5403=9)(5601 5603 5605 5999 6000=4)(5901 5903 5905 5907 5909  
6201=3)(6101 6103 6105 6199=2)(6301 6401 6403 6405 6501 6503 6505 6507  
6599 6601 6603 6605 6607 6609 6699=4)(7000 7300 7477 7531=8)(7101 7103  
7105 7107=9)(7205 7209=10)(7107 7201 7203 7207 7211 7299 7301 7303 7305  
7307 7309 7311 7313 7315 7317 7399 7401 7403 7405 7407 7409 7411 7413 7415  
7417 7419 7421 7423 7425 7427 7429 7431 7433 7435 7499=8)(8000 8010 8101  
8103 8105 8107 8109 8199=9)(8201 8203 8205 8299=10) (8301 8401 8403 8405  
8407 8409 8411 8413 8415 8499=9)(8901 8903 8915 8921=4)(8905 8907 8909  
8911 8913 8917 8919 8923 8925 8999=9).

IF (V72 EQ 1 AND CLASSIND NE 1) CLASSIND=5.

IF (CLASSIND EQ 5 AND V75 EQ 1401) CLASSIND=6.

IF (CLASSIND EQ 5 AND V75 EQ 4801) CLASSIND=6.

IF (CLASSIND EQ 5 AND V75 EQ 4803) CLASSIND=6.

IF (CLASSIND EQ 5 AND V75 EQ 4805) CLASSIND=6.

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IF (V103 EQ 1 AND CLASSPOU NE 1) CLASSPOU=5.  
 IF (V103 EQ 2 AND CLASSPOU NE 1) CLASSPOU=5.  
 IF (CLASSPOU EQ 5 AND V102 EQ 1401) CLASSPOU=6.  
 IF (CLASSPOU EQ 5 AND V102 EQ 4801) CLASSPOU=6.  
 IF (CLASSPOU EQ 5 AND V102 EQ 4803) CLASSPOU=6.  
 IF (CLASSPOU EQ 5 AND V102 EQ 4805) CLASSPOU=6.  
 IF (CLASSIND EQ 99) CLASSIND=CLASSPOU.  
 RECODE CLASSIND (6=5)(8,9,10=6)(99=SYSMIS).  
 VALUE LABELS CLASSIND 1 'I' 2 'II' 3 'IIIA' 4 'IIIB' 5 'IV' 6 'VI,VII'.

## Sweden

COMPUTE CLASSIND=V84SEI.  
 COMPUTE CLASSPOU=V93SEI.  
 VARIABLE LABELS CLASSIND 'RESPONDENT'S CLASS'/CLASSPOU  
 'SPOUSE'S CLASS'.  
 RECODE CLASSIND CLASSPOU(56,57,60=1)(46=2)(36=3)(33=4)  
 (79=5)(89=6)(21,22=8)(11,12=9)(0,SYSMIS=99).  
 IF ((CLASSIND NE 1 AND CLASSIND NE 6) AND (V85 EQ 1 OR V85 EQ 2))  
 CLASSIND=5.  
 IF ((CLASSIND EQ 9 OR CLASSIND EQ 8) AND (V84NYK GE 400 AND  
 V84NYK LE 499)) CLASSIND=10.  
 IF (V84SEI EQ 33 AND (V84NYK GE 400 AND V84NYK LE 499))  
 CLASSIND=10.  
 IF (V84SEI EQ 22 AND (V84NYK EQ 105 OR V84NYK EQ 106 OR V84NYK  
 EQ 107 OR V84NYK EQ 111 OR V84NYK EQ 112 OR V84NYK EQ 123 OR  
 V84NYK EQ 131 OR V84NYK EQ 912 OR V84NYK EQ 913)) CLASSIND=3.  
 IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V84NYK GE 12 AND V84NYK LE 239))  
 CLASSIND=4.  
 IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V84NYK GE 261 AND V84NYK LE 269))  
 CLASSIND=4.  
 IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V84NYK GE 311 AND V84NYK LE 321))  
 CLASSIND=4.

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IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V84NYK GE 332 AND V84NYK LE 339))  
CLASSIND=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V84NYK GE 911 AND V84NYK LE 929))  
CLASSIND=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V84NYK GE 941 AND V84NYK LE 949))  
CLASSIND=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 33 AND (V84NYK GE 931 AND V84NYK LE 949))  
CLASSIND=4.

IF ((CLASSPOUS NE 1 AND CLASSPOUS NE 6) AND (V94 EQ 1 OR V94 EQ 2)) CLASSPOUS=5.

IF ((CLASSPOUS EQ 9 OR CLASSPOUS EQ 8) AND (V93NYK GE 400 AND V93NYK LE 499)) CLASSPOUS=10.

IF (V84SEI EQ 33 AND (V93NYK GE 400 AND V93NYK LE 499))  
CLASSPOUS=10.

IF (V84SEI EQ 22 AND (V93NYK EQ 105 OR V93NYK EQ 106 OR V93NYK EQ 107 OR V93NYK EQ 111 OR V93NYK EQ 112 OR V93NYK EQ 123 OR V93NYK EQ 131 OR V93NYK EQ 912 OR V93NYK EQ 913)) CLASSPOUS=3.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V93NYK GE 12 AND V93NYK LE 239))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V93NYK GE 261 AND V93NYK LE 269))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V93NYK GE 311 AND V93NYK LE 321))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V93NYK GE 332 AND V93NYK LE 339))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V93NYK GE 911 AND V93NYK LE 929))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 12 AND (V93NYK GE 941 AND V93NYK LE 949))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (V84SEI EQ 33 AND (V93NYK GE 931 AND V93NYK LE 949))  
CLASSPOUS=4.

IF (CLASSIND EQ 99) CLASSIND=CLASSPOU.

RECODE CLASSIND (6=5)(8,9,10=6)(99=SYSMIS).

VALUE LABELS CLASSIND 1 'I' 2 'II' 3 'IIIA' 4 'IIIB' 5 'IV' 6 'VI,VII'.

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# Appendix Three: Index Distributions

**Table A3.1: Index Distributions**

Index	Min	Max	Mean	Stand Dev	Cronb Alpha
Redistributive					
Sweden	0	6	3.71	1.79	.64
Australia	0	6	3.76	1.85	.62
Incentives					
Sweden	0	6	1.26	1.62	.64
Australia	0	6	0.73	1.36	.65
Macroeconomic					
Sweden	0	4	1.96	1.32	.60
Australia	0	4	1.74	1.32	.48
Government					
Sweden	0	12	8.52	2.70	.64
Australia	0	12	7.23	3.14	.70
Qualification					
Sweden	0	15	12.27	2.25	.72
Australia	0	15	13.70	1.77	.69
Ascription					
Sweden	0	12	2.50	2.14	.65
Australia	0	12	4.41	3.45	.84
Compensation					
Sweden	0	6	4.98	1.12	.66
Australia	0	6	5.31	1.04	.60
Wage difference					
Sweden	0.13	10.00	2.39	1.58	
Australia	0.20	28.00	3.54	1.55	

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