More than a Military Force: New Zealand's 1909 Decision to Form a Citizen-Soldier Army

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More than a Military Force: New Zealand's 1909 Decision to Form a Citizen-Soldier Army

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A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Thesis title and abstract

Thesis Title and Abstract | Declarations | Inclusion of Publications Statement | Corrected Thesis and Responses

Thesis Title

More than a Military Force: New Zealand's 1909 Decision to Form a Citizen Soldier Army

Thesis Abstract

The limited scholarship concerning New Zealand's military forces in the decades before the First World War has identified the strategic and imperial reasons for the militar y reforms of 1909. This thesis employs a 'new military history' or 'war and society' approach that recognises military and non-military reasons. While the post-1909 milit ary system sought to create a pool of trained men who would volunteer for service overseas, it also needed to address the public's expectation that training would mitiga te perceived societal shortcomings. Thus, New Zealand's citizen soldiers were more than a military force.

The decades around the turn of the twentieth century saw profound changes in social values, the economy, demographics, communications and attitudes in New Zealan d. Respect for military service, muscular Christianity and social Darwinism grew, as did concerns about urban youths. A new attitude to the empire and its defence devel oped. By the mid 1910s the public were increasingly insistent that broadly inclusive military training would remedy the decline in the behaviour, attitudes and physical co ndition of young males.

In 1907 the New Zealand government began to accept that its support for imperial defence needed to be more than vocal. Prime Minister Ward's 1909 decision to donat e a battleship to the Royal Navy was applauded by the public. His intimation that the volunteer system might be replaced with compulsory or universal military training m et with warm approval. For the first time in decades military and naval matters dominated public discourse. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed Ward that wh olesale military reforms in New Zealand were required. Thus, government acceptance that it needed to make a tangible contribution to imperial defence, an empire-mind ed public, advocacy of military training for social remediation reasons, and professional military opinion led to the Defence Act of 1909.

The operation of the new military system has been overlooked in the historiography. Sections of the public became upset that only half of those liable for training receive d it and that one-third of trainees were prosecuted in criminal courts for Defence Act offences while the vast majority of those who did not or refused to register did so wi th impunity. In 1914 it became clear that the territorial system would not provide the balanced force of trained volunteers as intended. Territorials were, however, relatively well-trained, five times more likely than non-territorials to volunteer for expeditionary service, and the staff and administrative systems that had been established proved effective.

New Zealand's post-1909 military system had two aims: social remediation and to deliver a trained expeditionary force. It was partially successful at both.

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Introduction

Between 1890 and 1909 a diverse range of social, political, economic, demographic, imperial and international developments led New Zealand to radically reform its military system. The limited previous scholarship on the pre-First World War military reforms in New Zealand has focused on the strategic and military matters. Consequently, rationales for the military reforms outside these spheres have been given insufficient attention or have been overlooked.

The British historian David Edgerton has argued that military matters have been neglected in general histories of Britain.[1] This thesis proposes the reverse: that general history needs to be included when considering military developments. The profound social, political, demographic and economic developments in New Zealand between 1890 and 1914 led to the period being described as 'the hinge of modern New Zealand history'.[2] The influence of these changes on the rationales for the military reforms are examined, and their effect on the reception of the scheme when in operation is revealed.

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[1] davidedgerton.org/blog/2018/7/25/putting-the-military-back-into-british-history, accessed 28 December 2020. Edgarton was referring to histories of Britain.

[2] James Belich, 'Myth, Race, and Identity in New Zealand', *The New Zealand Journal of History* 31:3 (1997): 10.

The military reforms in New Zealand were instituted by the Defence Act of 1909.[3] Previously a few hundred 'permanent force' (regular) personnel had manned the batteries at major harbours and had administered a volunteer, citizen-soldier force of semi-autonomous corps. The principal components of the 1909 reforms were to discontinue the volunteer system, which was widely acknowledged to no longer meet needs, and to replace it with a territorial army and compulsory military training, initially for 12- to 21-year-olds, later for 14- to 25-year-olds. Strictly speaking, the territorial army consisted of the fitter and more competent of the trainees over 18 years of age, some of whom received specialist training such as in artillery or engineering. It was, however, something of a virtual force: all its members were also compulsory trainees and the term *territorial* usually included any trainee over 18 years old, whether they were in the territorial army, the general training section (for the less fit) or one of the rifle clubs that operated in remote areas and small centres. The Act legislated that if New Zealand's security were threatened, the territorial army could be ordered to serve in any part of the dominion. Members of the territorial army could—there was confidence they would—also volunteer to serve overseas in defence of the empire.

Adopting a loosely chronologic framework, this thesis first examines the public's respect for untrained, amateur soldiers, and the nature of settler involvement in citizen-soldier formations during the New Zealand Wars (1845–81). The ineffectiveness of most volunteer corps and the strategic irrelevance of them all after a change in defence strategy in 1880 are then exposed, together with the reasons the Liberal government (1891–1912) refused to reform the volunteer

[3] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII 28.

system until 1909. Changes in social values before 1900 and after it are examined. Key lessons from, and public attitudes to, the South African War of 1899–1902 are analysed, and 1909 is identified as a watershed year for military reforms in New Zealand—and in most settler colonies. The passage of the Defence Act of 1909, the operation of the compulsory military training system, and the successes and weaknesses of it are then investigated.

It has been argued that most New Zealand military history has focused on narrating events in war rather than analysis.[4] The effect of the focus on war narrative and the lack of analysis has seen the significance of peacetime developments overlooked—despite their influence on wartime military performance and the extensive nature of some developments. With the possible exception of the New Zealand Wars, the pre-1914 military history of New Zealand is a neglected field of study.[5] Jeffrey Grey termed it 'sketchy'.[6] While the pre-1914 military history of New Zealand has been neglected, it has not been wholly ignored. A small number of published works have addressed the topic, though often only in part. In *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand 1840-1915* Ian McGibbon analysed New Zealand's naval and military forces in the 74 years between the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) and the First World War.[7] Well-researched and thoroughly considered, the work's focus on policy and strategy limited discussion of other factors that, this thesis argues, helped to shape the reforms of 1909.

Peter Cooke and John Crawford's *The Territorials: The History of the*

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[4] Deborah Montgomerie, 'Reconnaissance: Twentieth-Century New Zealand War History at Century's Turn', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 37:1 (2003): 62, 70, 71.
[5] The involvement of New Zealand troops in the South African War of 1899–1902 has also been poorly served.
[6] Jeffrey Grey, 'Military History and Historians', in Ian McGibbon, ed., *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History.* Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 321.
[7] Ian McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand 1840-1915*. n.p.: GP Books, 1991.

Territorial and Volunteer Forces of New Zealand and Steven Loveridge's *Call to Arms: New Zealand Society and Commitment to the Great War* both examine aspects of pre-1914 military history.[8] Cooke and Crawford's research for their history of 150 years of citizen-soldiering was clearly comprehensive. The opportunities for in-depth analysis were, however, compromised by the publishing genre: it was a general-market book that gave as much space to illustrations as to text. Loveridge's *Call to Arms* investigated the social-military nexus *during* the Great War rather than before it. Many of the phenomena Loveridge identified in wartime, however, also influenced the development of New Zealand's military forces before the war.

Turning to unpublished New Zealand scholarship, John Crawford's 1986 MA thesis on volunteer corps was a ground-breaking exposé of the strengths and shortcomings of the volunteer system.[9] Useful statistical information was gathered and analysed. Mark Stevens' 1977 analysis of the volunteers, militia, armed constabulary, permanent force and staff function gathered up a significant amount of information, largely from secondary and published-primary sources. Stevens' decision to structure his thesis on a force-by-force basis inhibited the appreciation of trends, but the tables of data he constructed are a valuable resource.[10] Ean Fraser's even earlier thesis on New Zealand military policy between the South African and Great wars identified the key incidents in the military reforms but made little attempt to explore the motivations for those reforms.[11]

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[8] Peter Cooke and John Crawford, *The Territorials: The History of the Territorial and Volunteer Forces of New Zealand*. Auckland: Random House, 2011; Steven Loveridge, *Calls to Arms: New Zealand Society and Commitment to the Great War*. Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2014.

[9] J. A. B. Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force 1885–1910', MA thesis, Canterbury University (NZ), 1986.

[10] Mark H. S. Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces and Defence Administration 1870–1900', MA thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977.

[11] Ean M. Fraser, 'New Zealand Military Policy: from the Boer War to the Great War, 1900–1914', MA thesis, n.d., no university named, Barrington Papers, Alexander Turnbull Library, 86-062-12/6.

There are sufficient similarities between Australia and New Zealand to make Australian historiography a useful resource for this thesis. Both New Zealand and the Australian colonies sent contingents to South Africa and introduced compulsory military training at almost the same time—and for similar reasons. Attitudes at imperial conferences and to perceived threats from foreign powers were, however, different.[12] The Australian works closest to the concerns of this thesis are Craig Wilcox's *For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854–1945,* John Mordike's *An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments 1880–1914,* and John Connor's *Anzac and Empire: George Foster Pearce and the Foundations of Australian Defence.*[13] Australian military history is only sometimes directly applicable to New Zealand but nearly always provides opportunities for comparison and contrast. The military history of the other former dominions (South Africa, Canada and Newfoundland) have, to a lesser extent, also been used.[14]

Because New Zealand frequently, and often consciously, emulated Britain, and because decision-making on military matters was influenced by British statesmen, military leaders and social developments, British history is often

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[12] F. L. W. Wood, *New Zealand in the World.* Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1940, p. 79, notes that the threat of foreign aggression saw Australia develop its own navy.

[13] John Mordike, *An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments 1880–1914.* North Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1992; Craig Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854–1945.* St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998; John Connor, *Anzac and Empire: George Foster Pearce and the Foundations of Australian Defence.* Port Melbourne, Vic: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[14] For example, Canadian historians such as: Douglas Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions and India, 1902–1945.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017; James Wood, *Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896–1921.* Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010; George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People,* Toronto: Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1974; Carman Miller, 'Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911' in B. D. Hunt and R. G. Haycock, eds, *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century.* Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1993; Katharine McGowan, '"A Finger in the Fire": Canadian Volunteer Soldiers and their Perceptions of Canada's Collective Identity through their Experience of the Boer War', *War and Society* 28:1 (May 2009): 79.

relevant to this research.[15] There is extensive literature on imperial matters in the period, on the reforms of the British Army, and on Colonial and Foreign Office policy.[16] A small but growing volume of work on New Zealand's relationships with the British government and its leaders is also available.[17]

General New Zealand history is dominated by Keith Sinclair, Michael King and James Belich. Outside involvement in wars, none of them credited military matters with much influence.[18] Social historians' analyses of gender, demographics, race, alcohol, immigration, urbanisation, class, and the role of the state help to identify civil attitudes and behaviours that affected decisions concerning the military.[19]

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[15] James Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000.* Auckland: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2001, pp. 27- 120; Stephen J. Clarke, 'Marching to their Own Drum: British Army Officers as Military Commandants in the Australian Colonies and New Zealand 1870-1901', PhD thesis UNSW@ADFA, 1999; Douglas E. Delaney, 'Army Apostles: Imperial Officers on Loan and the Standardization of the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies, 1904-1914', *War in History,* 23:2 (2016): 173; Christopher Pugsley, 'At the Empire's Call: New Zealand Expeditionary Force Planning, 1901- 1918', in John A. Moses and Christopher Pugsley. eds, *The German Empire and Britain's Pacific Dominions, 1871-191: Essays in the Role of Australia and New Zealand in World Politics in the Age of Imperialism.* Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2000, p. 225; M. F. Lloyd Prichard, ed., *The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield.* Glasgow: Collins, 1968; J. W. Davidson, 'New Zealand, 1820-1870: An Essay in Re-interpretation', *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand,* 5:20 (1953): 349-360; Bernard Attard, 'Making the Colonial State: Development, Debt, and Warfare in New Zealand, 1853-76', *Australian Economic History Review,* 52:2 (2012): 101-127; James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Bill Willmott, 'Introduction: Culture and National Identity', in David Novitz and Bill Willmott. eds, *Culture and Identity in New Zealand.* n.p.: GP Books, 1989.

[16] Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson, eds, *A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985; Ian F. W. Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers: The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945.* Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1991, 2011; E. A. Benians, J. R. M. Butler, P. N. S. Mansergh, E. A. Walker, eds, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol. III, *The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959; Donald C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1970-1914.* Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1965; Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society.* London: Longman Group Ltd, 1980.

[17] A good example being Tom Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick": Joseph Chamberlain and Richard Seddon', in Ian Cawood and Chris Upton, eds. *Joseph Chamberlain: International Statesman, National Leader, Local Icon.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 67–93.

[18] Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand.* Auckland: Penguin Books, 4th revised ed. 1991; Michael King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand.* Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003; James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century.* Auckland: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1996; James Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000.* Auckland: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2001.

[19] Examples include: Nadia Gush, 'With Culture Comes the Nation: Women, Cultural Citizenship and Late Nineteenth-Century New Zealand', *Cultural History,* 1:2 (2012): 205-225; Chris Brickell, 'Men

The perspective taken here is often called a 'new military history' or 'war and society' approach. It is distinguished from traditional military history by showing, Peter Paret argued, 'the interaction of war with society, technology, economics, politics and culture.'[20] To some extent, this thesis also addresses Roberto Rabel's 2001 complaint that 'fresh perspectives' were needed to broaden the vision of New Zealand military history, reflect societal and historiographical changes, and 'thereby create a "new" war history for the twenty-first century'.[21]

Extensive use has been made of archival sources. The AD (Defence) series at Archives New Zealand has proven valuable for information on the New Zealand Wars, the volunteer system and the New Zealand contingents in South Africa. James Allen's papers have helped to expose the workings of the military system in 1912–14. The *Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives* (AJHR) and the *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* (NZPD) have been made use of frequently. The *New Zealand Official Yearbooks* and census data have been mined for the statistical data that is analysed throughout this thesis. At the National Archives in Kew, London, War Office and Colonial Office files have been consulted to understand British perceptions of New Zealand's military performance and reforms, and the metropole's views on imperial defence. The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA) at Kings College London holds the papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Godley, the British officer who implemented New Zealand's military

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Alone, Men Entwined: Reconsidering Colonial Masculinity', *Journal of New Zealand Studies,* NZ13 (2012): 11-33; Katie Pickles, '"A Link in 'The Great Chain of Empire Friendship": The Victoria League in New Zealand', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 33:1 (2005): 29-50; R. L. Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists in New Zealand, 19109-1914', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 7:2 (1973): 128-147.

[20] Peter Paret, 'The New Military History', *Parameters* 21:3 (1991): 10.

[21] Roberto Rabel, 'War History as Public History: Past and Future', in Bronwyn Dalley and Jock Phillips, eds, *Going Public: The Changing Face of New Zealand History.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2001, pp. 67-9.

reforms in 1911–14 and commanded the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the First World War. The same archive also holds the manuscript of an unpublished autobiography by General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, one of Godley's key officers in New Zealand before the First World War. It is a richer source of information on the process of implementing the 1909 defence scheme than Godley's papers or his published autobiography.[22]

In order to understand public opinion in the period and the influences on it, use has been made of newspapers and periodicals, most from the National Library of New Zealand's online digitised collection, Papers Past.[23] Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century newspapers were powerful opinion-influencers. They carried syndicated New Zealand and international news, and provincial news. Editorials reflected and influenced public opinion, and letters-to-the-editor columns provided a means for citizens to express their views. Contemporary books were also valuable, especially regarding the First Taranaki War, New Zealand society around 1900, an officer's perspective on the volunteer system, and W. P. Reeve's 1898 history of New Zealand.[24]

As a consequence of the historiographical shortfall (the limited scholarship on pre-1914 New Zealand military affairs and its focus) important questions have remained unanswered. Why did New Zealand tolerate the inadequate and strategically irrelevant volunteer system for so long? Did attitudes towards military

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[22] General Sir Alexander Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier,* London: John Murray, 1939.
[23] paperspast.natlib.govt.nz
[24] H. B. Stoney, *Taranaki: A Tale of the War.* Auckland: W. C. Wilson, 1861; William Marjouram, *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy: The Taranaki War Diary of Sergeant William Marjouram, R.A.* Laurie Barber, Garry Clayton and John Tonkin-Covell eds. Auckland: Random Century, 1990; André Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand,* trans. E. V. Burns. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914; Lieutenant-Colonel H. Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering: The Army of Regulations.* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1910; William Pember Reeves, *The Long White Cloud: Ao Tea Roa.* Auckland: Golden Press Pty Ltd, 1898, 1973.

matters, and to participation in military forces, change between the settler days and the early twentieth century? If so, why and how? To what extent is it true that, as John Keegan observed, an army is 'an expression of the society from which it issues'?[25] For what reasons did the public insist upon the military training of youths in 1909, and what effect did their rationale(s) for it have on the scheme that resulted? Did New Zealand's involvement in the South African War and British requests for the settler colonies to contribute more to the defence of the empire influence the Defence Act of 1909? Why was 1909 the first time in 50 years that military matters became the dominant topic in social discourse in New Zealand?[26] In what ways were the administration and outcomes of the new military scheme successful or unsuccessful?

This thesis can be regarded as having four parts. The first part, chapters one, two and three, examine the period before 1900 and expose that a level of complacency about military affairs was usual in those years. Chapter four, which investigates New Zealand's involvement in the South African War of 1899–1902, constitutes the second part. It reveals that the South African War was something of an epiphany for the British Government and senior British military officers, but that few in New Zealand reacted in the same way; complacency continued in the colony. Part three (chapters five and six) examines the rationales, the motivations for the military reforms of 1909, while part four (chapters seven and eight) investigates the operation of the new military scheme, how it was perceived, and what it achieved and did not achieve.

In terms of chapter arrangement, this thesis commences with a study of pre-

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[25] John Keegan, *The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship.* London: Pimlico, 2nd ed. 2004, p. 3.
[26] Lieutenant-Colonel H. Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering: The Army of Regulations.* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1910, p. 166.

1890 New Zealand, the bulk of which is a case study of settler attitudes to and involvement in the First Taranaki War of 1860–61. The analysis of settler behaviour shows how military forces, and participation in them, were regarded in a period when New Zealand's cultural values were being established. The volunteer system is examined in chapter two to expose the reasons it performed so poorly in military terms, how it failed to meet strategic needs, and why it persisted long beyond the time it was needed. Chapter three examines developments in late nineteenth-century social values. In this period regard for military endeavours and military personnel improved. Additionally, changes in employment, the economy and where people lived in New Zealand led to a shift in values and new expectations about order, morality and obedience. How did these developments help to shape the military reforms of 1909?

Chapter four describes the nature of New Zealand involvement in the South African War of 1899–1902 and analyses the public's response to it. The chapter shows that the potential value of colonial troops was recognised in different ways by different parties, and that settler-colony attitudes to participation in imperial conflicts became evident.

Chapter five begins a two-chapter-long examination of the twentieth-century rationales for the Defence Act of 1909. First, the military, strategic and imperial reasons for military reforms are investigated. How did the concept of imperial defence influence British and settler-colony governments? Was New Zealand's reputation as the most loyal colony justified when considering military matters? What brought about the action and financial commitment that first appeared in 1907 and took stronger form in 1909? Chapter six surveys the effect on the Defence Act of 1909 of international events (especially those involving Germany), literature

and theatre, improved global communications, syndicated news bureaux, prosperity, larrikinism, muscular Christianity, youth movements, imperial lobby groups, social Darwinism, a change in perceptions of the volunteer system, and confidence that military training could remedy social ills.

The final two chapters examine the systems the Defence Act of 1909 introduced. Chapter seven investigates how the operation of compulsory military training was perceived by the public, politicians and those subject to training. Shortcomings in the disciplinary provisions of the Defence Act and the consequences of them are exposed. The creation of a territorial army and provision for an expeditionary force are the topics of chapter eight. Had the new training and system improved the standard of New Zealand's officers? Was the territorial army able to provide the integrated, trained expeditionary force it was designed to produce? The conclusion draws together the arguments and findings of this thesis to show what matters led to the decision to form a territorial army and institute military training in 1909.

Turning briefly to a few technical matters, a glossary of terms and abbreviations has been provided. Direct quotations preserve the spelling and capitalisation of the sources. References to the *New Zealand Official Yearbooks* do not contain page numbers because the online versions that were consulted give no page numbers. Instead, the name of the section from which the information was taken is provided. A few page ranges needed in the bibliography are absent because the Covid-19 lockdown in the last months of working on this thesis prevented checking print works in libraries.

The central question this thesis asks is: Why did New Zealand reform its military system in 1909?

Terms and Abbreviations Used

AJHR – Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives

AM – Auckland Museum

ANZ – Archives New Zealand

Friendly Maori – a non-combatant Maori during the New Zealand Wars who did not take up arms

KA – Kippenberger Archive, National Army Museum of New Zealand, Waiouru

Kupapa –those Maori actively fighting for the Crown during the New Zealand Wars

LHCMA – Liddell Hart Collection and Military Archive, Kings College London

Maori – the indigenous people of New Zealand; no belligerent status during the New Zealand Wars implied

MHR – Member of the House of Representatives (NZ)

Militia – In New Zealand, a compulsory service citizen-soldier force that could be called out in an emergency. In other settler colonies such as Canada, the equivalent of the New Zealand volunteers

MLC – Member of the Legislative Council (NZ)

NCO – Non-Commissioned Officer

New Zealander – a Maori or European of any nationality whose committed place of residence was New Zealand

NZMR – New Zealand Mounted Rifles, a South African War formation

NZPD – New Zealand Parliamentary Debates ('Hansard')

Outsettler – a European living on a property, usually a farm, in a location remote from a town or settlement

Pa – a Maori stockade or palisade with, sometimes, trenchworks, musket-ball-proof screens or artillery-proof bunkers

Rebel – an active belligerent and enemy of the Crown in the New Zealand Wars; all were Maori

TNA – The National Archives, Kew, London.

Volunteer – a member of a New Zealand volunteer corps.

Yearbook – unless otherwise specified, the *Official New Zealand Yearbook*.

CHAPTER ONE

Settler Attitudes to Military Service, 1840–1890

For most of New Zealand's first forty years as a colony (1840–1880) there were internal security scares and sometimes, in some areas, armed conflict. It might be expected that a martial tradition developed. In a sense, one did, but it was not especially martial and was evident in a minority of the population only. Even those settlers whose lives were at risk, and whose property was attacked, were frequently reluctant citizen soldiers. Volunteer corps attracted only a fraction of eligible men and compulsion was required to form citizen forces of the needed size. Maori participation in military activity virtually ceased with the end of the New Zealand Wars. Even during the wars, governments sought to limit defence expenditure, and those in areas not affected by the fighting resisted contributing men or money to the conflicts taking place elsewhere. The dominant attitudes to military participation that emerged during the New Zealand Wars were indifference and resentful acquiescence.

Examining the early years of new societies is important because it is when their ongoing mores are established. The organisational culture theorist Edgar Schein held that the beliefs and values of a 'macroculture' (nation), or indeed of any

group, are formed as a result of early experience.[1] He maintained that the founders of a social entity create its culture.[2] The political scientist Louis Hartz also recognised the importance of those who establish new societies. He argued that early colonists take with them a 'snapshot' of metropolitan values upon which they model the attitudes and beliefs of the colony. First-settler convictions become, he asserted, the ethos of the new land.[3] Both Hartz' and Schein's theories recognise the importance of early settlers and their experiences. Their findings explain why an appreciation of attitudes to military participation before the focus period (of 1890–1914) can reveal the roots of later conduct and values.

Before European settlement and for most of the nineteenth century, Maori lived in extended family or tribal groups, mainly in the North Island.[4] By the late eighteenth century Europeans had established seasonal sealing camps on the coast of the South Island. More soon followed.[5] These sealers and other Europeans had a disruptive influence on Maori.[6] The most damaging influence was the introduction of firearms. Most Europeans owned muskets and Maori quickly recognised their power.[7] In short order firearms became the preferred item of exchange.[8] In 1833, for example, the captain of HM store-ship *Buffalo* bought a load of timber from

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[1] Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership,* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985, 4th ed. 2010, p. 54.
[2] Ibid, p. 32.
[3] Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964, pp. 3–12.
[4] The 1861 census, although of a later date, estimated the Maori population of the North Island to be 53,056 and that of the South Island 2,280. Estimated Native Population of New Zealand, *Statistics of New Zealand*, 1861.
[5] A. H. Reed, *The Story of New Zealand,* Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1945 7th ed. 1955, p. 69.
[6] 'Not by the utmost stretch of charity could their crews be called civilizing agencies.' William Pember Reeves, *The Long White Cloud: Ao Tea Roa,* 1898, Auckland: Golden Press Pty Ltd, 1973, p. 105.
[7] Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* Auckland: Penguin Books, 4th revised ed. 1991, p. 41.
[8] Ian Wards, *The Shadow of the Land: A Study of British Policy and Racial Conflict in New Zealand 1832–1852,* Wellington: Historical Publication Branch, 1968, p. 3; Damien Fenton, 'Australians in the New Zealand Wars' in Craig Stockings and John Connor, eds, *Before the Anzac Dawn: A Military History of Australia to 1915,* Sydney: NewSouth, 2013, p. 119.

Maori. He paid for it with 20 double-barrelled guns, ten fowling pieces, 200 muskets, 5,000 ball cartridges and other arms.[9] That transaction was but one of hundreds of similar exchanges.

Armed Maori became a potent and disruptive force, not to Europeans initially, but other Maori. The first recorded Maori use of firearms against Maori was in 1807.[10] Three years later, the Musket Wars started.[11] Musket-armed Maori attacked Maori still reliant on spears and clubs. The fighting was brutal; the slaughter enormous. It is usually held that 20,000 Maori (one quarter of the estimated 80,000 population) were killed.[12] The principal historian of the Musket Wars, Ron Crosby, argued that the Maori population was larger, in the region of 100,000 to 150,000, and that between 50,000 and 60,000 people were killed—possibly as many as half the population.[13] The Musket Wars ended in the early 1840s with, significantly, the surviving Maori population owning firearms and experienced in armed conflict.[14] Some of those Maori would join rebel or Crown forces and fight again in the New Zealand Wars.

Armed Maori were not the first concern of the small number of Europeans who had settled in New Zealand in the early nineteenth century; order within their own communities was. Until the late 1840s, the principal European settlement and trading port was Kororareka (now Russell) in Northland. It was a lawless place,

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[9] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 10.
[10] Michael King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003, p. 132.
[11] Fenton, 'Australians in the New Zealand Wars', p. 119, determined that the Musket Wars commenced as early as 1810. James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict,* Auckland: Penguin Books, 1986, p. 20, gives a start date of 1818.
[12] James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century.* Auckland: Penguin Books, 1996, p. 157; Fenton, 'Australians in the New Zealand Wars', p. 119; A. H. Reed, *The Story of New Zealand*, Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1945 7th ed. 1955, pp. 101–2.
[13] R. D. Crosby, *The Musket Wars: A History of Inter*-Iwi *Conflict 1806–45,* Auckland: Reed Books, 1991, p. 17.
[14] Ibid, p. 14.

ridden with what a visitor described as 'vice of all kinds, drunkenness, licentiousness and other abominable crimes'.[15] Several attempts were made to control the settlement. In 1834 a group of settlers formed the Kororareka Association and tried to impose discipline.[16] It was quickly condemned as a vigilante organisation and had to disband.[17] Four years later the Vigilants were established. They sought to reduce lawlessness by punishing the unruly with fines, horse-whipping and tarring-and-feathering.[18] The Kororareka Association and the Vigilants were unofficial police bodies, not military forces. They were citizen initiatives taken at a time when there was no European authority in New Zealand. A British Resident, James Busby, had been appointed in 1833, but he had neither the legal authority to rule nor an armed force to back him up. Busby became known as the 'man-of-war without guns'.[19]

The maintenance of law and order in New Zealand changed in 1840 when Commander William Hobson, RN, arrived. Hobson's main tasks were to secure British sovereignty, keep order among the settlers, and to protect Maori.[20] Before accepting the position, Hobson insisted that he be given the means to impose law and order.[21] Initially, he was allowed just four troopers and a sergeant.[22] Once the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi had been signed (it made New Zealand a British colony) a

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[15] J. G. Clark, quoted in Stevan Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh: Sex and Drugs in Colonial New Zealand 1840-1915,* Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed Ltd, 1984, p. 77.
[16] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 19.
[17] Garry James Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance: The Shaping of New Zealand's Volunteer Force', PhD thesis, University of Waikato, 1990, p. 1.
[18] Reed, *The Story of New Zealand*, p. 111.
[19] W. P. Morrell and D. O. W. Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life,* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1957, p. 25, cite Maori as giving Busby his 'man-of-war-without-guns' name; Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 9, attributes the name to politician Thomas Trapp.
[20] J. W. Davidson, 'New Zealand, 1820–1870: An Essay in Re-interpretation', *Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand,* 5:20 (1953), 354–5
[21] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 24.
[22] Ibid, p. 34, p. 41.

detachment of troops was sent from Australia.[23] Hobson, who became Governor in 1840, banned citizen forces, which he regarded as threats to order, and took responsibility for internal security.[24] By April 1842 there were 100 imperial troops and approximately 2,000 settlers in New Zealand.[25] Hobson's decision to make the maintenance of order a Crown function was probably a relief to most settlers, who were intent on their survival.[26] Hobson not only prohibited settlers from forming citizen militia, he also asked nothing of them in terms of practical or financial support for military forces. The defence of the colony was, the settlers were told, not their responsibility.

Acceptance of a responsibility for their own security was, however, a tenet of the New Zealand Company, which established its first settlement at Port Nicholson (Wellington) just before the Treaty of Waitangi was signed. The company's founder, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, has been described as an enigma.[27] He worked as a diplomat, eloped and with and eventually married a rich ward in Chancery, was later gaoled for abducting a 15-year-old heiress, wrote on criminal and penal reform, and championed 'systematic colonisation'.[28] Wakefield believed that planned settlements of vetted immigrants could produce civilised, self-sustaining colonies.[29]

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[23] Ibid, p. 44. Initially New Zealand was a sub-colony of New South Wales; it became a crown colony in November 1840.
[24] Major G. J. Clayton, *The New Zealand Army: A History from the 1940s to the 1990s,* n.p.: Public Relations of New Zealand Army, 1990, p.10; Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 30.
[25] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 63; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 17.
[26] James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 554.
[27] Graeme L. Pretty, 'Wakefield, Edward Gibbon (1796–1862)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wakefield-edward-gibbon-2763/text3921, accessed 29 July 2021.
[28] Graeme L. Pretty, 'Wakefield, Edward Gibbon (1796–1862)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wakefield-edward-gibbon-2763/text3921, accessed 29 July 2021; Miles Fairburn, 'Wakefield, Edward Gibbon', *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/1w4/wakefield-edward-gibbon, accessed 29 July 2021.
[29] Katherine Smits, 'John Stuart Mill on the Antipodes: Settler Violence against Indigenous Peoples and the Legitimacy of Colonial Rule', *Australian Journal of Politics and History,* 54:1 (November 2008), 3; *The Collected Works of Edward Gibbon Wakefield,* M. F. Lloyd Prichard, ed., Glasgow: Collins, 1968,

Wakefield's first such venture was Adelaide in South Australia.[30] His later New Zealand Company founded five of New Zealand's six principal settler townships: Wellington, New Plymouth, Nelson, Christchurch and Dunedin.[31] For mostly financial reasons, Wakefield's aim of balanced colonisation was never fully realised.[32] The New Zealand Company did, however, select settlers who were of solid stock: merchants, small-time professionals, farmers, shopkeepers, clerks, domestic servants, and tradesmen. They were earnest and eager to better themselves materially.[33] They were also of the yeoman type; the land-owning commoners and craftsmen from whom citizen forces were often drawn.[34] It was paradoxical, therefore, that many of those who settled in New Zealand in its early years were the sort who, in Britain, would have been likely to participate in citizen-soldier forces but in New Zealand were debarred from doing so.

In the twenty years between 1840 and 1860 the European population in New Zealand increased approximately fiftyfold, from about 2,000 to around 100,000.[35] None of the early port-settlements was defended because no foreign threat was perceived and early relations with Maori were mostly harmonious.[36] In June 1843 the peaceable coexistence of Maori and settlers began to change when a dispute in

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p. 24; Douglas Pike, *Paradise of Dissent: South Australia 1829–1857,* Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1967, p. 75; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 61.

[30] Erik Olssen, 'Mr Wakefield and New Zealand as an Experiment in Post-Enlightenment Experimental Practice', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 31:2 (1997), 198; Pike, *Paradise of Dissent*, p. 5.

[31] Auckland, which was established by Governor Hobson, was the exception.

[32] W. H. Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand,* London: Faber and Faber, 1960, p. 59.

[33] Pike, *Paradise of Dissent*, p. 5, p. 51.

[34] Ian F. W. Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers: The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945.* Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1991, 2011, pp. 121–2.

[35] 99,021 people had been recorded in the census of 1861. It was estimated that a further 3,000 goldminers were resident but not included. Additionally, there were 7,294 imperial officers, troops and their wives and children in the colony. Population, *Statistics of New Zealand,* 1861.

[36] William Pember Reeves, *The Long White Cloud: Ao Tea Roa,* 1898, Auckland: Golden Press Pty Ltd, 1973, p. 161; Ian McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand 1840–1915*, n.p. [Wellington?]: GP Books, 1991, p. 2.; James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, Auckland: Penguin Books, 1986, p. 19.

the Wairau Valley, near Nelson, led to violence. The settlers responded by forming an armed force; it was immediately disbanded by the Governor.[37] The 'Wairau Affray', as it became known, was not the start of the New Zealand Wars. It and a few other small and brief incidents were, though, signs that some Maori were unhappy about European settlement.

In 1845, parts of Kororareka were attacked by disaffected Maori. Although citizen-soldier forces were prohibited, some Kororareka settlers tried to form a citizens' militia. The local magistrate banned it.[38] After a bungled defence, Kororareka was evacuated and subsequently looted and burned. The Governor, Captain Robert Fitzroy, RN, called for Auckland men to volunteer as 'special constables' to help restore the peace in Northland. When too few responded, Fitzroy reversed the policy regarding citizen involvement in military forces.[39] The Militia Ordinance of 1845 empowered the Governor to call for the compulsory training and military service of any male British resident between the ages of 18 and 60 years who was 'not an aboriginal native'.[40] Compulsion, Fitzroy learnt, was the only means of obtaining a citizen force of the required size.[41] Service in militia was not, therefore, evidence of settler willingness to participate in military forces; militia service was obligatory.

The attack on Kororareka signalled the beginning of 36 years of intermittent internal unrest in New Zealand. The New Zealand Wars of 1845–81 (previously

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[37] Mark H. S. Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces and Defence Administration 1870–1900', MA thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977, p. 1.
[38] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 103. Clayton, *The New Zealand Army*, p.11, refers to an unofficial militia which may have been another or the same citizen force.
[39] Peter Cooke, '"A Well Regulated Militia"—Compulsory Military Service 1845–72' in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *Tutu te Puehu: New Perspectives on the New Zealand Wars,* Wellington: Steele Roberts Aotearoa, 2018, p. 224.
[40] Militia Ordinance, 1845, 8 Vict. 1, c. 7.
[41] Cooke, '"A Well Regulated Militia"', p. 224

known as the Maori Wars or Land Wars) consisted mostly of skirmishes and brief battles. Engagements took place in different parts of the North Island, and were separated by periods of inactivity.[42] As James Hight remarked, the fighting was 'small in scale … and scarcely entitled to be classed in the category of "war".'[43] Fatalities were not especially numerous. Between 1845 and 1872, a period containing the major conflicts, 560 Europeans, 250 *kupapa* (Maori fighting for the Crown) and something over 2,000 rebels were killed.[44] It is the New Zealand Wars' place in race relations and in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi that gives them importance in New Zealand history.[45] The wars were also instrumental in the development of settler attitudes to military service.

It is vital to appreciate that the New Zealand Wars were not simply conflicts between Maori and Europeans. All the rebels were Maori, but by no means were all Maori rebels. Maori fought on and supported both sides. That said, the majority of Maori, like the majority of Europeans, took no part. As Sir Joseph Ward explained to the 1909 colonial conference, 'we have had a long war in days gone by but people in various parts of the country knew next door to nothing about it'.[46]

The New Zealand Wars have been divided into four phases: the Northern or Flagstaff War of 1845–46; the Taranaki Wars of 1860–61 and 1863; the Waikato

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[42] Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, p. 223; Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, pp. 103–4; Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand*, p. 82.
[43] J. Hight, 'The Maori Wars, 1843–1872' in J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton and E. A. Benians, eds, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol VII Part II, *New Zealand,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933, p. 121.
[44] James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period,* Vol. II: *The Hauhau Wars, 1864-72,* New York: AMS Press, 1922, 1969, p. 467.
[45] Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, p. 223; Belich, *Making Peoples*, p. 241 argued that the New Zealand Wars were consciously ignored by New Zealand historians. In another work Belich wrote that the involvement of 18,000 British troops and developments in Maori warfare made the wars a worthy topic for military historians. He also acknowledged that the wars' effect on race relations, their stature in New Zealand history and the light they throw on non-European responses to imperial expansion gave study of the wars further, broader importance. Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 15.
[46] Minutes of Proceedings, Imperial Conference 1909, p. 22, TNA CO 886/2/9

War of 1863–64; and the activities of and opposition to the (separate) rebel bands led by Te Kooti and Titokuwaru in 1864–81.[47] Some assert that peace was restored in 1872.[48] Tension continued throughout the 1870s, however, and Waikato rebels did not lay down their arms until 1881.[49]

Kororareka in the Northern War and New Plymouth in the First Taranaki War were the only major European settlements to be attacked. After the sacking of Kororareka, the dissident Hone Heke and his supporters moved to the north-eastern reaches of the Hokianga harbour where, with aid from other Maori, they constructed a number of *pa* (stockades with firing trenches and, in some, bunkers and musket ball-proof screens).[50] The *pa* were attacked and overrun by Crown forces. Less than a year after trouble surfaced, peace was restored in Northland.[51]

The attacks on the *pa* in Northland were prosecuted by 670 to 1,300 imperial troops,[52] four to five hundred *kupapa* (Maori fighting as Crown forces) and approximately 75 members of the newly established Auckland militia who had volunteered to serve outside their area.[53] Citizen soldiers could not be ordered to serve more than 40 kilometres (25 miles) from their homes—a restriction later acts retained and that limited the military resources available to the Crown. In the

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[47] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, contents page.
[48] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. II, p. 468.
[49] Ibid, pp. 473–74; Clayton, *The New Zealand Army*, p. 39.
[50] Colonel Despard, who commanded the Crown forces at Ruapekapeka (the last of the three *pa* battles), described the *pa* as possessing 'extraordinary strength'. Quoted in Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period,* Vol. I: *1845-64,* New York: AMS Press, 1922, 1969, p. 86. See also: Hight, 'The Maori Wars, 1843–1872', p. 128; Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 49.
[51] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. I, p. 87.
[52] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 201 gives 672; Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, pp. 58–9 gives 1,300.
[53] Ted Andrews, *'Kiwi Trooper': The Story of Queen Alexandra's Own*, Wanganui: Wanganui Chronicle, 1967, p. 2; Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 201 found that 57 citizen soldiers from Auckland were amongst the Crown forces at Ruapekapeka, the final of three *pa* attacked. The Militia Ordinance 1845, 8 Vict. 1, had been passed on 25 March 1845. It allowed the Governor to call up for training or active service British European males of 18 to 60 years; Peter Cooke, '"A Well Regulated Militia"', p. 225.

Northern War citizen soldiers served mainly as porters and guards but, as would happen repeatedly, they were deemed by the settlers to have played a central role in the fighting and to be superior to British regulars.[54]

The roots of the citizen force's reputation are difficult to trace. It appears that it arose less from the citizen soldiers' actions and more from the shortcomings, or perceived shortcomings, of the regular forces. Kororareka had been poorly defended with little coordination of navy personnel, police and citizens, and mistakes were made.[55] Commander Robertson's decision to evacuate the settlement was criticised at the time.[56] The initial response by imperial forces was poorly executed and beset with problems.[57] There was also considerable disagreement whether the *pa* at Ruapekapeka, the terminal engagement in the Northern War, was won in battle or merely gained when empty.[58] In all of these matters, the citizen soldiers were blameless; in a sense they won their reputation by default. It should also be noted that throughout the New World settlers often exaggerated the fighting worth of their men. Early citizen-soldier activity in Canada led to similar proficiency myths there.[59]

Between 1846 and 1860 there was, nominally, peace. Internal security nonetheless remained a concern. An economical solution was proposed by Edward

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[54] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 35; John Crawford. 'New Zealand' in Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire, 1837–1902,* London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, p. 123.
[55] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. I:, pp. 30–31.
[56] Peter Dennerly, 'The Navy in the Northern War: New Zealand 1845–46' in *Tutu Te Puehu: New Perspectives on the New Zealand Wars,* eds John Crawford and Ian McGibbon. Wellington: Stelle Roberts Aotearoa, 2018, p. 64.
[57] Ibid, p. 39.
[58] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 64.
[59] 'Militia Myth' in J. L. Granatstein and Dean F. Oliver, eds, *The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History,* Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 273. The Australian colonies had no citizen soldier forces until circa 1860. Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, revised ed. 1999, pp. 19–22.

Gibbon Wakefield.[60] He recommended that retired British military personnel be offered their usual pension plus passage to New Zealand, grants of land and assistance to establish themselves. In return, they would drill and train and be available for active duty. The Duke of Wellington disapproved. Pensioners, he held, were not fit for military service.[61] The British Government ignored Wellington's objection and between 1847 and 1852, some 695 men, accompanied by 1,887 wives and children, took up the offer. They were settled in four locations to the south of Auckland (Onehunga, Otahuhu, Panmure and Howick), between the town and the Maori hinterland to the south. The Royal New Zealand Fencibles, as the pensioners were known, were called out just once (in April 1851) and were disbanded in 1859.[62]

The fencible scheme restored the policy Hobson had initiated in 1840 (the Crown would provide and pay for troops, with nothing asked of citizens) and conflicted with Fitzroy's Militia Ordinance (which could call up citizens to fight). Fitzroy's creation of civilian responsibilities for the maintenance of order had been a response to the tension of the time and to the small number of men who had volunteered. The duties of citizens changed again in 1853 when representative government was established. With the privilege of (limited) democracy came a responsibility for internal security.[63] Reflecting the new state of affairs, the Militia

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[60] Wakefield migrated to New Zealand in in 1853 where he became a member of the General Assembly. Graeme L. Pretty, 'Wakefield, Edward Gibbon (1796–1862)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, adb.anu.edu.au/biography/wakefield-edward-gibbon-2763/text3921, accessed 29 July 2021.

[61] Wards, *The Shadow of the Land*, p. 372.

[62] Peter Cooke and John Crawford, *The Territorials: The History of the Territorial and Volunteer Forces of New Zealand*. Auckland: Random House, 2011, pp. 31–2.

[63] The first parliament was elected in 1853, after which citizen-soldier forces were funded by the general government. For a concise explanation of the representative government system and the extensions of the franchise in the nineteenth century see King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, pp. 200–01.

Act of 1858 legalised the formation of volunteer corps, units of men who enlisted by free will.[64] As initially conceived, volunteer corps provided military training and offered a defence resource to the state.[65]

By the mid-1850s, the 'peace' was being threatened by a disagreement between Maori in Taranaki. The European settlement in Taranaki, on the west coast of the central North Island, was established by Wakefield's New Zealand Company in 1841. By 1860 it had a European population of between 1,200 and 2,500.[66] New Plymouth, the seat of local government and main town, had a number of streets of wooden houses (many with an adjoining field or paddock), several hotels and shops, and at least one school (see Figure 1.1). Outsettlers had established farms and homesteads beyond the town. There was, however, no harbour. Ships anchored off the storm-prone beach at New Plymouth were loaded and unloaded by lighters. Despite the fertile soil and abundant rainfall, the province's prosperity was limited by three factors: the lack of a market; expensive and weather-dependent sea transport; and land for further settlement.[67] It was a difference of opinion between Maori over the sale of land that led to the First Taranaki War of 1860–61, the only

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[64] Militia Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. 8.

[65] Service in volunteer corps offered other attractions and opportunities which are described in the next chapter.

[66] The figures were drawn from several sources: Owen W. Bayly, 'The Bayly Lecture 1960', p. 4, AM MS 94/4; Table showing the estimated population of New Zealand in December 1860, www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1860-statistics-nz/1860-statistics-nz.html, accessed 2 May 2018; a contemporary account gives 2,850 as the total population including 1,751 male Maori, Rev. Thomas Gilbert, *New Zealand Settlers and Soldiers or The War in Taranaki, being Incidents in the Life of a Settler,* London: A. W. Bennett, 1861, p. 2; the population of the province was reported on page 2 of the *Taranaki Herald* on 19 September 1857 to be 2,513, of which 1,347 were males and 1,166 were females. It is unlikely the figures in the newspaper included Maori.

[67] Gilbert, *New Zealand Settlers and Soldiers*, p. 4; *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy: The Taranaki War Diary of Sergeant William Marjouram, R.A.,* Laurie Barber, Garry Clayton and John Tonkin-Covell, eds, Auckland: Random Century, 1990, p. 6; H. B. Stoney, *Taranaki: A Tale of the War,* Auckland: W. C. Wilson, 1861, p. 32.

war in which a major settlement was attacked and for which adequate records exist.[68]

The disputed land at Waitara, 15 kilometres northeast of New Plymouth (top right on the map, Figure 1.2).[69] The disagreement escalated into violence and by 1855 fatalities among Maori had resulted.[70] In the same year it was learnt that the Governor intended to call out the Taranaki Militia to restore the peace. The settlers objected.[71] They did not regard a dispute between Maori as a settler responsibility and argued that the disturbance should be dealt with by the imperial troops in the colony.[72] Taranaki's representative in the General Assembly (central government) lamented his constituents' 'leaden indifference'.[73]

Figure 1.1 – Devon Street (New Plymouth's main street) in 1858. W. J. Penn (ed), *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers: A Corps with a History,* New Plymouth: Thomas Avery, 1909.

[68] The sacking of Kororareka in 1845 is poorly documented. Apart from Kororareka and New Plymouth (Taranaki), no other settlements of significant size were attacked in the wars.
[69] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, pp. 84–5, p. 112.
[70] [Illegible first name] Turton to [Governor/Native Department?], 7 July 1855, ANZ AD31 7.
[71] B. J. Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand 1855–1870,* Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967, p. 5.
[72] Murray Moorhead, *First in Arms,* New Plymouth: Zenith Publishing, 2004, p. 17.
[73] C. W. Richmond to R. Pheney, 18 May 1856, in Guy H. Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, Wellington: R. E. Owen, Government Printer, 1960, p. 223.

Although Taranaki's settlers had refused to take responsibility for the maintenance of order in their province, their stance was not entirely unreasonable. If the imperial troops in the colony were not to be used, what was their purpose? Moreover, most settlers lived hard, labour-intensive lives. With no mechanical devices to assist them and little in the way of infrastructure available, few had the time or energy to take on military duties. In this, they were not unusual. Settler populations throughout the New World had low rates of military participation. Busy with their farms or businesses, settlers 'were not the natural Indian fighters of legend'.[74] When threatened, they tended to call on regular troops rather than take up arms themselves.[75]



Figure 1.2 – Portion of an 1862 map of Taranaki showing (L to R) Omata, New Plymouth, Bell Block and Waitara. It is likely that the pink-bordered area around New Plymouth shows the extent of the New Zealand Company's land purchase. Auckland Institute and Museum 832.2ac.

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[74] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 554.

[75] Ibid.

The province's newspaper, the *Taranaki Herald*, kept the settlers informed about the disputing Maori, the province's appeals to the Governor and government, and public opinion on the matter.[76] In April 1855 the Governor, Colonel Thomas Gore Browne, visited the province and shortly after agreed to send 300 troops.[78] When the promised troops failed to arrive, the *Taranaki Herald* reported that the 'utmost dissatisfaction is now being felt at the cold blooded [*sic*] indifference displayed by the Executive'.[79] The following month the newspaper charged the government with neglect:

> [N]o example can be found of the prosperity of an English settlement so wantonly trifled with, or the safety of a community of upwards of 2000 British subjects so utterly and daringly disregarded, as is presented in the present position of New Plymouth.[80]

The *Taranaki Herald* inflamed civil opinion before the fighting broke out, and criticised the government and imperial forces during the fighting.[81]

When troops arrived in Taranaki in August 1855 they were welcomed by the settlers.[82] The troops' presence may have eased settler anxiety but gave the Governor little comfort; he had no more men to send. The Governor, Colonel Thomas Gore Browne, also complained that while the settlers had been 'loud in their demand for troops and I may say for "*war*" with the natives[,] they have neglected to undertake their own share of the burthen and refuse to come out as Militia.'[83]

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[76] For example: 'To Her Most Gracious Majesty Victoria …', 1 *Taranaki Herald*, 4 March 1855, p. 2; 'The Native Feud at Taranaki', ibid, 23 May 1855, p. 2; editorial, ibid, 14 March 1855, p. 2; letter to the editor, ibid, 25 July, 1855, p. 3; 'Public Meeting', ibid, 1 August 1855, p. 3.
[78] Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 4 April 1855, p. 2; Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 18 April 1855, p. 2.
[79] Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 4 July 1855, p. 2.
[80] Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 1 August 1855, p. 2.
[81] See later, especially the *Herald's* other publication, the *Taranaki Punch.*
[82] Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 22 August 1855, p. 2.
[83] Governor Gore Browne to C. W. Richmond, 7 July 1857, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, p. 283. Italics in original.

A significant change in the land-sale disagreement took place in January 1858 when a group of Maori constructed 'a sort of Frontier Custom House' on a principal road, past which no person, Maori or European, was let without being searched.[84] Hitherto Maori had involved only Maori in their dispute. Concerned by the development, the provincial council petitioned the Governor for help.[85] There was little the Governor could do. There were sufficient troops to defend New Plymouth but not the whole province.[86]

Despite the presence of troops in New Plymouth, settler discontent with the government and military increased.[87] In February 1858, when the officer commanding imperial forces, Major Lloyd, commissioned men as militia officers, there was outrage at his choices. A well-attended public meeting insisted that that settlers should decide who was commissioned, and asked those who had received commissions from Lloyd to return them.[88] For his part, Lloyd would not reconsider the appointments and relations between the military and citizens soured.[89] A month later, Taranaki's 600 adult males were called to a parade where half were selected by ballot for militia training. Once more the settlers were unhappy. A correspondent to the *Taranaki Herald* complained that the ballot had resulted in older married men having to drill while younger single men, without commitments, had 'escaped'.[90] Discontent with Lloyd's appointments and with the ballot system may have

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[84] Letter to the editor, *Taranaki Herald,* 30 January 1858, p. 2.
[85] 'Memorial of the Superintendent and Provincial Council' to Governor, printed in *Taranaki Herald,* 30 January 1858, p. 2.
[86] H. A. Atkinson to C. W. Richmond, 8 February 1858, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers*, p. 346.
[87] Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 27 February 1858, p. 2.
[88] 'Appointment of Officers in the New Plymouth Militia', editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 27 February 1858, p. 3.
[89] Jane Maria Atkinson to Maria Richmond, 25 February 1858, and J. C. Richmond to C. W. Richmond, 28 February 1858, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol. I, pp. 356–59.
[90] Letter to editor, *Taranaki Herald,* 20 March 1858, p. 3.

contributed to the inefficiency of the Taranaki Militia. In May it was deemed unfit for active service and suitable for reserve or defensive roles only.[91]

In early 1859 and with tension in the province increasing, some Taranaki settlers took advantage of the provisions in the Militia Act of 1858 and formed the Taranaki Volunteer Rifles, one of the first volunteer corps in the colony. By March drills were being held and a corps band was being assembled.[92] (The band gives an indication of one tacitly understood purpose of volunteer corps: to impress or entertain fellow locals at public parades.)[93] Initially the Taranaki Volunteer Rifles had a strength of one hundred.

In February 1860, surveyors working on the disputed 240-hectare block at Waitara were attacked by Maori opposed to the sale.[94] As a result, martial law was declared, and the militia and volunteers were called out.[95] As would become the pattern during the fifty-year life of the volunteer system, when a threat emerged, volunteer numbers increased. Just two weeks after the commencement of hostilities, membership of the volunteer corps had jumped from 100 to 180.[96] Some of the volunteers wanted swift action taken to supress the rebel threat and were prepared to do it themselves.[97] The motives of most volunteers are, however, unknown.[98] The callout of the compulsory-service militia wound up depriving the province of essential services. Teachers, bakers, butchers and the like had to be

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[91] Lloyd's opinion reported by J. C. Richmond to C. W. Richmond, 10 May 1858, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, p. 396.
[92] W. J. Penn, ed., *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers: A Corps with a History,* New Plymouth: Thomas Avery, 1909, pp. 8–9.
[93] As the next chapter explains, bands were frequently established by volunteer corps.
[94] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 33.
[95] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 40.
[96] Penn, ed., *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers*, p. 12.
[97] For example, J. C. Richmond to C. W. Richmond, 9 February 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, pp. 515-17; H. A. Atkinson to C. W. Richmond, 10 February 1860, ibid, pp. 518–19.
[98] No source explaining the reasons volunteers joined corps was found or found to be referred to.

released to keep the town functioning.[99] (The Militia Act of 1865 acknowledged the need to maintain key civil functions and expanded the list of exempt occupations.)[100] By March fighting had begun.[101] The newly formed citizen forces did little to assuage the anxieties of the settlers. Requests for more imperial troops were made.[102]

A clear picture of civilian readiness to serve in military forces is evident in Taranaki in the early 1860s. Of the roughly 600 service-age men in the province, approximately 400 were compulsory-service militia and 200 were volunteers. Of the volunteers, half had joined during a time of tension, when the corps was formed. The other volunteers enlisted only when the conflict began. Put another way, two-thirds of citizen soldiers had to be compelled to participate, one-sixth volunteered only when fighting began, and one-sixth (circa 16.5 per cent) had been ready to serve when tensions were manifest.

As for the fighting in the First Taranaki War, the rebels usually held the initiative. The principal rebel tactics were raids on farms and people, ambush of supply columns, and what might be called acts of provocation.[103] The most dramatic form of provocation was the construction of *pa* (palisades or stockades).[104] *Pa* drew Crown forces to them, on ground of rebel choosing.[105] Operations against *pa* required the transport of men, artillery, stores and other equipment, often over

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[99] Charles Pasley to his father, 6 September 1860, AM MS 238; Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials,* p. 46.
[100] The Militia Act, 1865, 29 Vict. 52, s. VII. Occupations added to the exempt list included academics, sheriffs and constables, doctors, prison staff, postal staff, ferrymen, teachers, and employed seamen.
[101] Penn, ed., *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers*, p. 11.
[102] H. B. Stoney, *Taranaki: A Tale of War,* Auckland: W. C. Wilson, 1861, p. 44.
[103] Richard Taylor found that the rebels used two tactics ('strategic options'): *pa* to draw Crown forces to them; and guerrilla warfare. Richard Taylor, 'The Strategy of War: The Taranaki Wars and the Development of Maori and British Strategy', in Kelvin Day, ed., *Contested Ground Te whenua I Tohea: The Taranaki Wars 1860–1881,* Auckland: Huia Publishers, 2010, p. 58.
[104] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. I, pp. 41–2, p. 51.
[105] John Moremon, 'The Australian Colonial Press on the Wars in Taranaki and the Waikato', in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *Tutu te Puehu: New Perspectives on the New Zealand Wars,* Wellington: Steele Roberts Aotearoa, 2018, p. 456.

rough country or through dense bush. Supply columns were ambushed and plundered by rebels.[110] Just weeks into the fighting at Waitara, ambushes had made the 15-kilometre track between Waitara and New Plymouth so unsafe that bullock drivers and escorts refused to use it.[111] It is likely that the escorts were citizen soldiers.[112] The refusal to take on dangerous duty was, as later discussion will show, not untypical of Taranaki's citizen soldiers and their loose discipline. To overcome the risk of ambush and the recalcitrance of the escorts, steamers were brought in to convey men and supplies by sea.[113]

Crown tactics, it has been held, were largely reactive and were constrained by the skills and knowledge of imperial military personnel.[114] Often from stations in the Australian colonies or India, the regulars sent to the province were unfamiliar with their adversary and the country. To compound their difficulties, even basic intelligence sources such as maps did not exist. The limitations of imperial troops may not, however, have been as serious as was thought. A recent article found that the skills and experience of imperial forces were not as inappropriate as previously asserted, that tactics were adapted and lessons learned.[115] The untrained and inexperienced citizen soldiers, on the other hand, were of little help in military terms. One senior commander simply dismissed them as 'non-effective'.[116]

Initially, imperial forces under Colonel Charles Gold attempted frontal attacks on *pa*. Such attacks did little but cause Crown casualties. In August 1860,

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[110] An Officer [pseud.], *Suggestions in Reference to Military Operations in New Zealand*, London: Bult Brothers, 1860, pp. 4–5.
[111] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 42.
[112] Citizen soldiers were frequently given convoy-escort duties.
[113] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 53.
[114] Ian F. W. Beckett, 'The Victorian Army, Maori and the Conduct of Small Wars', in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *Tutu te Puehu: New Perspectives on the New Zealand Wars,* Wellington: Steele Roberts Aotearoa, 2018, pp. 471–72.
[115] Ibid, pp. 476–78, pp. 487–88.
[116] Major-General Pratt to Governor, 29 September 1860, ANZ AD100 1.

Major-General Thomas Pratt replaced Gold as commander. Pratt also attacked *pa*, but with saps—a siege tactic involving the digging of protected trenches to approach the objective in relative safety. Saps were effective but they were also slow.[117] Eager for quick results, the sap tactic, and Pratt himself, were derided by the impatient settlers and the press. A 'lazy *dilettante* style of playing at war' is how one newspaper described saps.[118] A *Taranaki Punch* cartoon depicted regular officers as the nursemaids of an infant sap (Figure 1.3). Pratt did consider other tactics. He contemplated a plan to deny the rebels sustenance by raiding their crops and livestock.[119] He also proposed the development of defended farming cooperatives. Nothing came of either idea.[120]

Figure 1.3 – A satirical cartoon reflecting settler attitudes to the slow (but ultimately effective) sap tactic implemented by Major-General Thomas Pratt. The cartoon shows soldiers as nursemaids of the 'infant' sap. The caption reads: 'NEW PLYMOUTH (*who is an awfully cheeky young scamp*).—Well, Old Woman, how is it now? HEAD NURSE (*very tartly*).—Progressing favourably.' *Taranaki Punch,* 13 March 1861.

[117] Major-General Pratt to Governor, 29 September 1860, ANZ AD100 1.
[118] *Southern Cross,* 25 January 1861, quoted in James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 109.
[119] Major-General Pratt to Governor, 25 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[120] Major-General Pratt to Governor and attachments, 14 November 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1; an advertisement for persons to register interest in forming cooperatively defended farms appeared on p. 1 of the *Taranaki Herald* on 3 November 1860.

Almost all commentators on the Taranaki Wars record that the civilian population was critical of the regular forces.[121] The contemporary criticisms principally related to the tactics commanders used and comparisons of regulars (disparaging) to local citizen soldiers (laudatory).[122] Decisions to avoid encounters with rebels especially aggrieved the settlers.[123] The settlers felt that non-engagement prolonged the conflict and emboldened the rebels to burn more houses and steal more livestock, and to do so with impunity.[124] At Huirangi (inland from Waitara) in September 1860, imperial troops walked into a trap. They quickly recognised their predicament and withdrew. The settlers' response was disgust. Fifteen hundred regulars had been routed, the settlers claimed, by just 41 rebels.[125] The highest-profile incident was when Taranaki's commander, Colonel Murray, withdrew imperial regulars, leaving a unit of citizen soldiers, who were short of ammunition and engaging a much larger rebel force, to their fate. The incident became something of a colonial scandal and soured civil-military relations.[126] Settlers' opinions about imperial troops were recounted in newspapers throughout New Zealand and in the Australian colonies.[127]

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[121] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 81, p. 101; An Officer [pseud.], Suggestions in Reference to Military Operations in New Zealand, p. 3; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 133; Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars*, Vol. I, pp. 180–1.
[122] In March and April 1860 a few 'sketches' and letters from citizen soldiers criticizing military commanders in Taranaki appeared or were reprinted in newspapers in Taranaki, Nelson and Auckland. A. S. Atkinson, 3 May 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol. I, , p. 389, p. 574.
[123] See for example A. S. Atkinson, journal entry 30 May 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol. I, , p. 590.
[124] Stoney, *Taranaki*, pp. 106–7.
[125] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 100.
[126] C. W. Richmond (MHR) to A. S. Atkinson, 3 April 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, p. 550.
[127] John Moremon, 'The Australian Colonial Press', p. 456.

Rebel raids on farms in the first year of the conflict resulted in 83 per cent of outsettlers' dwellings being destroyed.[128] Additionally, livestock were taken during the raids.[129] Outsettler families took refuge in New Plymouth where they caused overcrowding.[130] Authorities were concerned that one-half to three-quarters of the province's crops had been left unharvested on abandoned farms.[131] Food shortages and rebel threats diminished the already faltering morale in New Plymouth.[132] A *Taranaki Punch* cartoon (Figure 1.4) shows a rebel asking a sentry: 'Please when will it be convenient to begin burning the houses in the town, for we have nearly done the job outside.'



Figure 1.4 – Although published near the end of the First Taranaki War, the cartoon reflects long-standing settler anxiety about the possible fate of New Plymouth. *Taranaki Punch,* 27 February 1861.

[128] 175/212 homes were lost. Penn, ed., *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers*, p. 48.
[129] Ibid, p. 35.
[130] Jane Maria Atkinson to Margaret Taylor, 19 February 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, pp. 521–22; *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 38.
[131] J. Hursthouse to C. W. Richmond, 20 February 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, p. 524.
[132] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 37.

The flight of outsettlers into New Plymouth and the arrival of further imperial troops caused the town's population to increase nearly threefold.[133] With so many mouths to feed, so few farms operating and so much livestock stolen, food stocks quickly shrank. In early 1860 citizen soldiers were sent to harvest vegetables and collect forage from abandoned farms.[135] In August 1860, permission was sought to charter a steamer in Sydney to bring food to New Plymouth.[136] Rations had to be issued to some civilians and non-rebel Maori.[137] The huts that were constructed for refugees were quickly filled and displaced civilians were forced to shelter wherever they could.[138] Just two months after the start of the fighting, 300 to 400 people were on the sick list and dysentery was endemic.[139] Winter rain caused cesspits to overflow and exacerbated the spread of disease.[140] It has been asserted that the mortality rate in New Plymouth increased tenfold.[141] Civil order waned; children became foul-mouthed larrikins and adults resorted to 'drunkenness and other vice'.[142]

Military authorities saw the need to reduce the overcrowding, suffering, spread of disease, and the numbers needing rations. In July 1860 Colonel Gold issued a proclamation advising families with more than five children to ready themselves for evacuation to Port Cooper (Nelson). The proclamation assured the settlers that

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[133] Owen W. Bayly, 'The Bayly Lecture 1960', p. 6, AM MS 94/4; Charles Pasley to his father, 6 September 1860, AM MS 238.
[135] Penn, ed., *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers*, p. 26.
[136] Major-General Commanding to the Governor, 8 August 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[137] Robert Parris, Native Commissioner, to Brigade Major New Plymouth, 19 June 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[138] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 65.
[139] Ibid, p. 47, p. 50.
[140] Murray Moorhead, *First in Arms,* New Plymouth: Zenith Publishing, 2004, p. 203.
[141] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 100. Two things should not be forgotten. First, the population nearly tripled and the increase in the mortality rate in relation to the increased population may have been less than tenfold. Second, because few Europeans were killed in action in Taranaki, the increase in the mortality rate was, in the majority of cases, not a result of the fighting.
[142] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, pp. 51–3.

'Passages will be provided, and every attention shall be paid to their comforts.'[143] Gold's successor, Major-General Pratt, was not so diplomatic. His evacuation proclamation bluntly informed the settlers that they *must* leave. Some settlers complained that Pratt's tone was discourteous, dictatorial and had 'caused much bitterness against the authorities'.[144] Taranaki's élite were offended that military authorities had not consulted them first, and nine magistrates signed a petition stating that the methods being employed were offensive.[145]

Although virtually besieged, threatened with hunger, overcrowded, cold, damp, disease-ridden, and with civil order crumbling, many citizens stubbornly refused to leave. In September 1860, the Commanding Officer in New Plymouth reported that he was unable to remove further families without recourse to force, a method he thought 'undesirable' and 'repugnant'.[146] He asked that a member of the government be sent to persuade civilians to leave.[147] Pratt took heed of civilian objections to evacuation and searched for a solution. He won permission to grant early discharges to militiamen who would leave and take their families with them.[148] Additionally, the previously critical magistrates were asked to visit households and encourage women and children to leave.[149] Pratt's new methods met with some success: 250 women and children boarded a steamer for Nelson in early September.[150] Further steamers were less easy to fill and Pratt resorted to harsher tactics. He had soldiers round up children and put them aboard the evacuation

[143] Proclamation 27 July 1860, [Colonel] C. E. Gold, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[144] Stoney, *Taranaki: A Tale of the War*, pp. 70–71.
[145] Ibid, p. 71; J. M. Richardson et al to Major-General Pratt, 7 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[146] Headquarters, New Plymouth to Governor, 8 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1
[147] Headquarters, New Plymouth to Governor, 8 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[148] No author, 'Notice is hereby given that all families…' no date, ANZ AD100 Box 1
[149] Annon., 'Notice is hereby given that all families…' no date, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[150] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 66.

steamers. The mothers of the children inevitably chose to join their offspring.[151] Ultimately, however, the resisters won. Those who wanted to stay were allowed to remain, but at their own risk.[152] By October 1860 the number of women and children in New Plymouth had, it was asserted, grown to 910.[153]

In addition to resisting evacuation, Taranaki civilians were sometimes quick to claim compensation for damages. In July 1860 a farmer claimed £38/10/3 for damage to a fence.[154] Another sought £4 for a fence that had been removed.[155] John Jury applied for £50 compensation for the loss of his house.[156] Some of these claims were made to the military authorities, some to the civil administration.[157] Mr E. L. Humphries, the Deputy Superintendent for Taranaki, deemed the claims a military rather than a civil responsibility and simply forwarded them to Auckland (then the capital).[158]

It was more than compensation claims that strained civil-military relations in Taranaki. When military headquarters asked Humphries to encourage settlers to return inside the town's barricade at nightfall, Humphries' response was to recommend that instead of asking the settlers to move in, the defences should be extended outwards to include them.[159] By October 1860, Major-General Pratt had had enough. He wrote to the Governor complaining that the civil administration was

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[151] Moorhead, *First in Arms*, p. 225.
[152] *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy*, p. 71.
[153] Major-General Pratt to Governor, 23 October 1860, ANZ AD100 2. It should be remembered that statistics at this time were not always reliable.
[154] Northcroft and Kelly [?], 18 July 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2.
[155] [Illegible] to Governor, 28 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2.
[156] John Jury to OC Taranaki Militia, 29 August 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2.
[157] Major Herbert to Acting Superintendent Taranaki, 2 October 1860; Deputy Adjutant-General to Superintendent's Office Taranaki, 25 August 1860; and [illegible] to the Colonial Secretary, [no day] November 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2.
[158] Deputy Superintendent Taranaki to Colonial Secretary, [illegible day and date] 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2.
[159] Headquarters, New Plymouth to Governor, 27 October 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.

dodging its responsibilities and dumping them on him. He explained that he had been generous in providing military resources for public purposes, but the requests kept coming. In October, he explained, he had been asked to supply troops to shear 6,500 sheep.[160] While not all civil officials were uncooperative, there is little evidence of a united, civil and military prosecution of the war in Taranaki.[161]

One reason for the lack of unity between civil and military authorities (and between different military forces) was funding. The British Government provided and paid for the imperial troops in New Zealand—save a token £5 per soldier per annum contributed by the New Zealand Government.[162] The ultimate local commander of imperial forces was the Governor. The New Zealand Government funded and controlled the militia and the volunteers. Different funding sources produced different command chains, thus compromising unity of command. Moreover, Britain wanted the colony to bear the full cost of the imperial troops. Those costs were considerable. Pratt estimated that for the year ending 31 March 1861, the British Government would spend £213,378 plus the cost of transporting troops and stores to New Zealand.[163] Additionally, £59,311/14/1 was owed to the Commissary General for advances the New Zealand Government had received. The total was upwards of £273,000, or more than 60 per cent of the New Zealand Government's total 1860 revenue of £464,738/12/3.[164]

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[160] Pratt's response to the request for men, no date, forwarded to Governor 31 October 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.

[161] Major-General Pratt to Governor, 23 October 1860, ANZ AD100 2; and Colonel Gold to Governor, 19 June 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1 recognised the assistance of Robert Parris, the Taranaki-based Assistant Native Secretary.

[162] The £5 per imperial soldier per annum contribution was not settled until September 1860. It nonetheless had a start date of April 1858. Documents 1–4, AJHR A-2, 1861, pp. 3–5.

[163] Major-General Pratt to (a) Secretary of State for War and (b) Governor, both 24 November 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2.

[164] Major-General Pratt to Governor and attachments, 11 December 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 2; www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1860-statistics-nz/1860-statistics-nz.html, accessed 2 May 2018.

The New Zealand Government fielded as many as 600 citizen soldiers during the conflict in Taranaki.[165] They were equipped and paid for their service, though often poorly or incompletely in both regards.[166] Citizen soldiers constituted a minority of the frontline forces in Taranaki. Exact figures are hard to obtain but those that are available indicate that citizen soldiers seldom comprised more than one-quarter of field forces and often less.[167] Citizen soldiers were used for mainly garrison, sentry and escort duties.[168] Despite their limited involvement in offensive operations, and as had happened in the Northern War, citizen soldiers were regarded by civilians as better fighters than regulars.[169]

How did the good reputation of Taranaki's citizen soldiers come about? There are few reasons for believing that untrained farmers and storekeepers made better soldiers than trained regulars. The exception was that militiamen and volunteers were credited with local knowledge and bush skills. In at least some cases, that was a fair assessment.[170] Much as was the case in the Northern War, a good measure of the citizen soldiers' reputation resulted from civilian disappointment with the performance of regular forces.[171] The imperial troops were slow to arrive in Taranaki, they did not restore peace quickly and the sap tactic,

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[165] Charles Pasley to his father, 6 September 1860, AM MS 238, gives 584. Works cited earlier refer to 600 men on the militia roll.
[166] In June 1860, when the fighting at Puketakauere was taking place, 'much needed' clothing for the militia had not arrived from Auckland. 'The Maori War', *Wellington Independent,* 29 June 1860, p. 3.
[167] In April 1860, a force of 180 marines and seamen, 280 British regulars, 40 Royal Artillery and 20 Royal Engineers was augmented by 40 citizen soldiers (7 per cent of the force). In a 9 October operation involving 1,043 men there were 82 citizen soldiers (8 per cent). Penn, ed., *The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers*, p. 35; Later in April 1860 citizen soldiers constituted 50 of 210 troops (24 per cent). In January 1861, 300 regulars fought alongside 108 citizen soldiers (26 per cent). There were 40 Taranaki men and 140 regulars in an operation in January 1861 (22 per cent). Ibid, p. 45.
[168] Ibid, p. 28 and p. 46.
[169] JBelich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 84.
[170] For example, a letter to the editor of a newspaper advised on training methods so that 'the [imperial] military and [local] militia, &c. should act together in a wooded or broken country not known to the former'. Letters to the editor, *Wanganui Chronicle,* 28 June 1860, p. 2.
[171] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 92.

although effective, was disparaged by the settlers. More and more regulars were sent but had little effect on the rebels who continued to burn and raid farms, build *pa* (which then had to be attacked), interdict supply columns, and threaten New Plymouth. Failures by Crown forces upset and offended civilians. The reverse at Puketakauere, near Waiata, in June 1860 has been described as a 'disastrous' defeat with 'profound strategic and political' consequences.[172] For that defeat, the *Taranaki Herald* blamed imperial military tactics and also the Governor's soft policy regarding rebel Maori.[173] There was virtually no criticism of citizen soldiers at any time.

When militia and volunteers did fight, they were usually praised. A good example comes from the early weeks of the war when regulars and citizen soldiers responded to the tomahawking of three men and two youths at Waireka. Knowing the country, militia and volunteers took a 'direct cut' across sandhills and arrived before the regulars.[174] Confronted by rebels, the 'hitherto untried force' of citizen soldiers displayed 'gallant behaviour', delivered 'steady fire' (to the point that nearly all their ammunition was expended), and won plaudits from senior officers and the Governor.[175] Unfortunately, the regular forces did not come to the citizen soldiers' aid but returned to New Plymouth.[176] The Waireka incident provided support for three widely held attitudes: local citizen soldiers knew the country and could move through it more quickly than regulars; citizen soldiers were good fighters, ready to engage the rebels; and regular forces left citizen soldiers to their fate. Public condemnation of the conduct of imperial forces at Waireka 'deepened the [settlers']

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[172] Ibid.
[173] 'The Fight at Waitara', *Taranaki Herald,* 30 June 1860, p. 2; Editorial, ibid, 7 July 1860, p. 2; Ibid. Criticisms of Governor Gore Brown's policy appeared in other newspapers too, for example, 'The Maori War', *Wellington Independent,* 29 June 1860, p. 3.
[174] 'The Battle of Waireka', *Taranaki Herald,* 31 March 1860, p. 2.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.

dissatisfaction' with imperial commanders, worsened civil-military relations and the 'notion of the superiority of the settler-frontiersman to the incompetently led regular soldier gained ground rapidly'.[177]

One of the few to comment on volunteers and militiamen, and to do so with some authority, was Captain (later Major-General) Charles Pasley of the Royal Engineers. He described newspaper coverage of one battle as 'a most exaggerated estimate of the military qualities and efficiency of the settlers'.[178] Taranaki's citizen soldiers, he wrote, acknowledged that they lacked the skills of regulars and accepted that were it not for the imperial troops, New Plymouth would have been destroyed and its inhabitants slaughtered.[179] Even if Pasley's opinion is fully accepted, he was describing the opinions of some citizen soldiers (without identifying whether they were militia or volunteers) and was not recounting the views of civilian settlers.

Assessing the worth of citizen soldiers is difficult because much of the evidence is contradictory and often fails to distinguish between compulsory-service militiamen and volunteers. For example, in August 1860 a plan was developed to send citizen soldiers into the bush at night to interdict rebel raiding parties. Charles Pasley recounted that the men 'strongly objected to the arrangement. They said that they would of course go wherever they were <u>ordered</u>, but they would not go <u>voluntarily</u> in such hazardous service unless [regular] troops went with them.'[180] A contradictory account by Captain Harry Atkinson of the Taranaki Volunteer Rifles records that the volunteers were 'rather disgusted' when they were not released

[177] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. I, pp. 183–4; Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, pp. 84–5.
[178] Charles Pasley to his father, 6 September 1860, AM MS 238.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid. Original underscoring.

from normal duties to form night patrols to engage rebels.[181] Pasley did not explain whether the reluctant citizen soldiers were militia or volunteers. All that can be determined is that Atkinson's volunteers were prepared to take on hazardous duty. It is possible that the attitude of militiamen was different to that of volunteers.

Citizen soldiers sometimes displayed what regular officers regarded as insubordinate conduct. In August 1860 Pratt received what was virtually a petition from members of the Taranaki Mounted Volunteer Corps. They asserted that the 2s 6d per diem they received was insufficient to cover their costs and asked that it be increased. A petition from regular soldiers would not have been tolerated. Pratt had, anyway, a low opinion of Taranaki's citizen soldiers.[182] He associated them with the criticism of his command and complained to the Governor that, unlike British militia, Taranaki's citizen soldiers were not always available when needed and could refuse service outside their district.[183]

Citizen soldiers also exhibited a lower standard of military discipline than regulars. An imperial colonel was discountenanced when a significant number of militiamen failed to muster for an operation. A citizen officer advised the colonel to commence the march. The missing men would, he said, fall in as the column passed their houses. The men joined in as forecast.[184] In December 1860 militiamen were given advance notice that they would be required for active duty. They were reminded the day before they were due to report. On the day, however, 29 men failed to show (the source did not specify the strength of the force). When the

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[181] H. A. Atkinson to A. S. Atkinson, 31 August 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol. I, p. 630.
[182] Major-General Pratt to Governor, 10 August 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[183] Morgan S. Grace, *A Sketch of the New Zealand War,* London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1899, p. 85; Pratt to Governor, 10 January 1861, ANZ G16 1A.
[184] Grace, *A Sketch of the New Zealand War*, pp. 84–5.

absentees were rounded up, some claimed that they had been in back country and knew nothing of their orders. Others said that their parents had made them promise they would stop risking their lives.[185] There is, therefore, anecdotal evidence that after nearly ten months of fighting, some of Taranaki's citizen soldiers were reluctant participants. In the absence of evidence regarding how citizen soldiers regarded their involvement, the causes of, or reasons for, a disinclination to fight cannot be determined.

There were also examples of flagrant disobedience by citizen soldiers. On 27 September 1860 a court of enquiry heard that the militia's Captain W. C. King had refused an order from the Deputy Adjutant, Colonel Carey. Carey had ordered King to lead a fatigue party to a house in New Plymouth and persuade—if necessary, compel—the family there to take their places on an evacuation steamer. King refused to do as ordered and was arrested. He stated in court that threatening civilians with force was 'unmanly and degrading'.[186] The court had some sympathy for King but found the charges proven.[187] Having spent approximately three weeks under arrest, King was returned to duty.[188]

The incident with King took place six months into the conflict. By that time there were rumblings of discontent among volunteers and militia. The citizen soldiers wanted more autonomy, and better pay and conditions.[189] They had first been called out in early 1860 and would serve until August 1861. (They were called

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[185] Major Herbert, to Deputy Adjutant General, Waitara, 5 January 1861, ANZ G16 1A.
[186] 'Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry…', 26 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[187] 'Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry…', 26 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[188] King was most probably the Captain W. King who, with another militia officer, protested that timber, needed to fence in livestock from abandoned farms, was being cut from privately owned bushland and should stop. It transpired that King and his fellow officer/complainant were the owners of the bush. Major-General Pratt, 28 September 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
[189] Moorhead, *First in Arms,* p. 252.

out again, often for extended periods, four more times before 1870.)[190] Their compensation was two shillings and sixpence per day, half of what a labourer could earn and insufficient for men with large families. It was, though, some income for those who had lost their livelihoods.[191]

Not only was a citizen soldier's pay low, it was frequently late. Pay delays became a persistent issue for those serving in New Zealand forces in the nineteenth century. In October 1860, militiamen in Wanganui had gone unpaid since August.[192] In July 1861 pay for Taranaki citizen soldiers was a month overdue.[193] No improvement was evident later in the wars. An Ensign Walker claimed in September 1866 that he had five months' pay owing.[194] Although the citizen soldiers' compensation was small and irregularly paid, they were better remunerated than imperial troops. Morgan Grace recounted regular soldiers 'declaiming against the injustice which bound them to a service for a shilling a day, subject to stoppages [deductions], whilst a useless volunteer received half a crown a day [two-and-a-half times more] and full liberty to disobey orders if he liked.'[195]

The preceding examination of the behaviour of Taranaki civilians during the war of 1860-61 suggests that civilian cooperation with the military was frequently less than enthusiastic. Whether Taranaki's citizen soldiers served willingly or not cannot be determined exactly. While only one-third of service-age males (180 of the 584 on the Militia roll) joined the Taranaki Volunteer Rifles, willingness to serve may not have been the deciding factor. The social composition and membership

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190 Cooke, '"A Well Regulated Militia"', p. 231.
191 Ibid, p. 239–40.
192 Major Cooper to Colonial Secretary, 3 October 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 1.
193 Major Herbert to Colonial Secretary, 2 July 1860, ANZ AD100 Box 3.
194 Mick Richards, 'The Life and Times of a Military Settler of the 1st Waikato Regiment, 1863–1868', *The Volunteers,* 37:2 (2011), 99.
195 Grace, *A Sketch of the New Zealand War*, pp. 105–6.

dues of volunteer corps, which effectively excluded the poor and the working class, may explain why the other two-thirds of Taranaki men did not join. It also needs to be recognised that outsettlers often lived too far from New Plymouth, or were simply too busy, to attend volunteer parades. Taranaki's citizen soldiers displayed loose discipline: they were lackadaisical about orders and may have been disinclined to take on high-risk assignments. Despite receiving higher pay than regulars, citizen soldiers were vocal in their dissatisfaction with their remuneration and allowances. That is not to say that all Taranaki citizen soldiers served grudgingly or that some (Captain Harry Atkinson, for example) were not able soldiers.[196] The available evidence nonetheless establishes that a common, perhaps the dominant, attitude was of unenthusiastic acquiescence.

What accounts for the attitudes displayed by some citizen soldiers and civilians? Events before the fighting commenced provide a key. In the 1850s, when the dispute was between Maori only, settler requests for imperial troops were mostly rebuffed or met only in part, and only after months of pleading and lobbying. In the absence of a force capable of maintaining order, violence had escalated. Settlers had refused to form a militia in 1855 because there were imperial troops in the colony who could take on the task, and because they did not regard friction between Maori as their responsibility. The result of what the settlers saw as government inaction was that, by late 1860, rebels had destroyed nearly all outsettler homes, had the run of most of the province, and New Plymouth was threatened. Moreover, the arrival of further imperial troops had failed to improve the situation. Losses of livestock and produce had resulted in food shortages.

[196] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. I, p. 229; Belich, *The New Zealand Wars,* p. 86.

Overcrowding, disease and the near-constant risk of attack made life miserable. Civil-military cooperation was only sometimes evident, and civilians had taken to openly criticising the imperial commanders, their tactics and their troops. So ubiquitous was civilian discontent with imperial military forces that a publication, the *Taranaki Punch,* was produced to satirise the regulars serving in the province.[197]

The picture that emerges is not an attractive one. The settlers appear to have been irresponsible, unreasonable and ungrateful. There were, however, reasons for their behaviour. After much pleading, the troops that had eventually arrived had failed to resolve the conflict and restore the peace. As a refugee outsettler complained 'month after month goes by, and little is done save what gives fresh courage to the foe and less hope to us'.[198] When told that brighter days would surely come, the refugee responded 'can the most brilliant battle, after the whole country ['province'?] is devastated, restore to us our firesides, our cattle, or our farms[?]'.[199] In the settlers' eyes, the damage had been done. The troops that arrived were too few, too late and too ineffective.

Settler discontent also surfaced in claims for damages. Even before the fighting was over, the settlers mobilised support from General Assembly members regarding their losses. A result was a select committee inquiry into compensation for property losses. The committee found that a moral rather than a legal obligation existed for the government to recompense settlers. The committee's determination was based on four precepts: one, as citizens of the colony the settlers had the right to receive the protection of law; two, the conflict in Taranaki was not the result of actions by settlers, but 'of a course of policy sanctioned by the General Government';

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[197] Monthly issues of the *Taranaki Punch* were produced from mid-1860 to mid-1861.
[198] Mr Wellman, quoted in Stoney, *Taranaki*, p. 73.
[199] Mr Wellman, quoted in ibid, p. 73.

three, some homes were lost as a result of orders from military or provincial authorities to abandon homesteads and seek refuge in New Plymouth or as a consequence of men needing to leave homes undefended in order to serve in citizen-soldier forces; and four, because outsettlers were not always permitted by authorities to return to and protect their homes.[200] The second precept was an important one. It held the government responsible for the conflict in Taranaki, and it exonerated the settlers, thereby implicitly accepting that the settlers' 1855 objection to the callout of the militia had been proper, and that the maintenance of order was not the settlers' responsibility. The settlers' pre-1860 attitudes and actions were vindicated.

Civilian dissatisfaction with the conflict was different to the attitude displayed by Taranaki's citizen soldiers. The soldiers' attitude was the product of three matters: resentment over the dismissal of their appeals for intervention in the 1850s (which they shared with civilians); a lack of not only military training, but military acculturation; and that it was possible—and difficult, but often necessary—for a citizen soldier to do his military duty while simultaneously meeting both his family and occupational commitments.[201] As John Keegan observed, 'an army is an expression of the society from which it issues'.[202] Taranaki's citizen soldiers reflected the opinions and values of their community.

Unusually, the citizen soldiers of Taranaki remained a part of the civil society. When citizens take part in military conflicts, they normally leave their homes and

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[200] 'Report on the select Committee…', *Taranaki Herald,* 27 October 1860, p. 4.
[201] For citizen soldiers with businesses or other income, the 2/6 per diem—half the daily rate for a labourer and less than a large family needed—was meagre compensation. For refugee outsettlers who had lost their livelihoods, the pay was a form of welfare. Cooke, '"A Well Regulated Militia"', pp. 238–40.
[202] John Keegan, *The Mask of Command,* London: Pimlico, 2nd ed. 2004, p. 2.

jobs to train, live and work as soldiers, often among regular soldiers. In such cases, they enter a military world and adopt its ways and values. That did not happen in Taranaki. In Taranaki, citizen soldiers fought from their homes, or their temporary ones. 'Off duty' typically meant 'at home', or 'at work'; it did not mean in barracks or military encampments.[203] Militiamen and volunteers lived with their families and often continued, as best they could, their civilian occupations.[204] The citizen soldier Arthur Atkinson recorded in 1860 that his military duties gave him several days (and nights) free each week.[205] It was possible for citizen soldiers to meet all or some of their familial and occupational commitments while also meeting their military ones. If citizen soldiers ignored details and cut corners (such as not mustering for a parade but falling in as the column passed their houses), it is arguable whether it was a sign of poor discipline or of efficient time management.

The manner in which citizen soldiers participated meant that the Taranaki economy continued to function. As might be expected, trade declined during the fighting, in part because of lost harvests and livestock, in part the result of limitations on harvesting and exports that Colonel Gold imposed.[206] Advertising in the *Taranaki Herald* reduced from an average of approximately 2.4 pages per issue

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[203] Militiamen sent from New Plymouth to redoubts or stockades in the surrounding area were relieved by others regularly and had time off to 'attend to their own affairs'. Cooke, '"A Well Regulated Militia"', p. 236.

[204] In April 1860 militia and volunteers stood sentry on alternate nights. The effect, a settler recorded, was 'that quite half their days they [the citizen soldiers] are sleepy & good for nothing'. Jane Maria Atkinson to Maria Atkinson, 29 April 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol. I, p. 572.

[205] A. S. Atkinson, journal, 19–24 April 1860, in Schofield, ed, *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol I, p. 599. Atkinson's journal entries for early July 1860 record that on Thursday 5 July he was dismissed at 7am, on Friday he visited his farm and on Saturday attended a parade. He was on guard duty Sunday night to Monday morning, made no entry for Tuesday, and was part of an escort on Wednesday 11 July. Thursday's activities were unrecorded. There was a parade on Friday. Ibid, pp. 608–09. On 10 July 1860 Jane Maria Atkinson recorded in her journal that citizen soldiers stood guard from 4pm until 6:30 or 7am, ibid, p. 605.

[206] J. C. Richmond to C. W. Richmond, 12 May 1860, in ibid, p. 389, p. 580.

in 1856 and 1858 to 1.5 pages in 1860.[207] Those offering entertainment, indulgences and 'pleasure', however, enjoyed brisk business.[208] Servicing commissariat needs provided new income streams to others.[209] Thus, able to maintain aspects of their civilian lives (domestic and occupational), and having not received the usual immersion in military culture, it should be no surprise that Taranaki citizen soldiers were not especially soldierly.

The military demands on citizen soldiers' time also provide a reason for the reluctance of women and children to leave New Plymouth. Wives and children did not lose contact with their citizen-soldier husbands and fathers. Moreover, they worked on farms in daylight hours, but returned to the security of the town barricades at nightfall.[210] The maintenance of family life, and the need to maintain businesses, crops or livestock gave citizen soldiers and their families reasons to remain. For many, military service was obligation they did not want, did not see as their duty, were not trained to do, and had little time to do.

Fighting in the First Taranaki War wound down in 1861. The peace that followed was brief. The Second Taranaki War began in 1863, the same year as the Waikato War started. Unlike the Northern and Taranaki Wars, the conflict in the Waikato was to a large extent initiated by the Crown. Sir George Grey, who had returned to New Zealand for his second term as Governor, sought to crush the separatist King movement in the Waikato and, in the process, to confiscate land. The

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[207] *Taranaki Herald,* 6, 13, 20 and 27 September 1856; 4, 11, 18 and 25 September 1858; and 1, 8, 15, 22 and 29 September 1860. Most issues were of four pages.
[208] J. C. Richmond to Margaret Taylor, 9 December 1860, in Schofield, ed., *The Richmond–Atkinson Papers,* Vol. I, p. 666.
[209] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 106. Belich contended that in 1860–61 Taranaki 'ceased to exist as an economic entity.' While he acknowledged the economic importance of military spending and citizen soldier pay, he perhaps overlooked the continued but diminished advertising, the role of women, and that citizen soldiers frequently returned to their occupations when not on duty.
[210] Editorial, *Taranaki Herald,* 3 November 1860, p. 2, refers to women and children from farms who 'come within the lines at night'.

sale of confiscated land would, he hoped, recoup the cost of the fighting. Nothing like the cost of the war was realised from land sales.[211]

The invasion of the Waikato was prosecuted almost wholly by imperial regulars and *kupapa*. Citizen soldiers were unavailable because there were virtually no European settlements in the Waikato and the nearest militia, in Auckland, was over 40 kilometres away and beyond the service limit.[212] Some settlers did, however, volunteer to serve in the Waikato. In the main they were given garrison, orderly and escort duties.[213] Citizen soldiers in Auckland were from time to time called out when the town was *believed* to be threatened (it was never attacked). Displaying a similar lack of enthusiasm for military service, Auckland's citizen soldiers resented the disruption military service caused in their lives, made frequent requests for leave, or simply deserted.[214] Vincent O'Malley found that evading citizen-soldier duties 'became a feature of Auckland life.'[215]

Through what has been termed a 'campaign of misinformation', Governor Grey managed to have more and more imperial troops sent to New Zealand.[216] James Belich claimed that their numbers peaked at 14,000 during the Waikato War.[217] Ian Beckett has subsequently shown that about half that figure is a more realistic maximum.[218] The regulars who actually engaged rebels constituted a minority of the

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[211] The Waikato War cost millions of pounds while revenue from the sale of confiscated land yielded only £100,000. Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand*, p. 257.
[212] Cameron to Governor, 14 June 1861, ANZ G16 1A.
[213] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 26; Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 102.
[214] Ibid, p. 98.
[215] Vincent O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand: Waikato 1800-2000,* n.p.: Bridget William Books, n.d. [2016?], p. 221.
[216] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 123.
[217] Belich, *Making Peoples*, p. 236. Belich also claims that an '18,000-man British army' served in the Waikato, ibid, p. 241.
[218] Beckett, 'The Victorian Army, Maori and the Conduct of Small Wars', p. 477.

total force; most manned redoubts, constructed roads or had other duties.[219] As the rebel threat diminished in the late 1860s, so too did the willingness of the British government to provide and pay for troops in New Zealand. Closing down colonial garrisons also reflected a new British perception of the responsibilities of self-governing colonies.[220] Whitehall wanted the settler colonies that had been granted representative government to take responsibility for their local defence.[221]

Furthermore, as a result of a post-Crimean War royal commission and a desire to reduce defence costs, in the late 1860s and early 1870s the Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell, reformed the British army. Flogging and the purchase of commissions were abolished, a territorial system for citizen soldiers was introduced, the War Office was reorganised, and the maintenance of garrisons in self-governing colonies was discontinued.[222] In response to these 'Cardwell reforms', Premier Frederick Weld initiated the 'self-reliant policy'. Imperial regulars would be replaced by 'colonial' (New Zealand-funded) troops.[223] Money was a significant motivator. As early as 1863, New Zealand owed the British government four million pounds and had to borrow in London to settle the debt.[224] Retaining imperial troops involved costs the New Zealand government could not have met. Governor Grey, however, strove to retain imperial troops and, once more displaying

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[219] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 139, held that dealing with minor disturbances involved 75 to 80 per cent of the men. Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand*, p. 179, found that at least one-third of the force was required for logistics and convoy work.
[220] The 'settler colonies' were Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. They were where British emigrants had settled and had usually become the dominant population. Settler colonies were differentiated from crown colonies, where British citizens constituted a minority of the population but administered the colony and a larger indigenous population. Richard A. Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense': A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's defense organization, 1867-1919,* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967, p. 22.
[221] Ibid, p. 22.
[222] For a more detailed discussion of the Cardwell reforms see Edward M. Spiers, *The Late-Victorian Army, 1868–1902,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.
[223] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 62.
[224] Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand*, p. 181.

what has been described as 'only a nodding acquaintance with truth', informed the Colonial Office that the troops were critically needed.[225]

Although by the early 1870s there were no imperial troops in the colony to keep the peace, Weld's self-reliant policy was unpopular, especially in the South Island, which had seen almost no rebel activity. Responding to an invitation to take part in the fighting, one South Island volunteer captain insisted that there were plenty of North Island men not yet involved in the conflict, and that it was unreasonable to expect volunteers from elsewhere to do the fighting for them. The men in his corps agreed.[226] South Islanders generally resisted having to contribute to the cost of the wars in the north.[227] In the end, however, the richer and more populous South Island paid more towards the cost of the wars than did the North Island, where the fighting took place.[228]

Three main types of colonial field forces replaced imperial troops in New Zealand: permanent forces, armed constabulary and bush rangers. Settlers seldom showed interest in military service and few of the men in these forces were New Zealanders. Most were sojourners such as gold miners who were recruited in Otago or Victoria. It has been calculated that 2,450 (39 per cent) of the 6,336 colonial troops came from the Australian colonies.[229] The actual figure may have been higher. A report of June 1865 shows that two-thirds of recruits were from Australia.[230] The significant amount of recruiting that took place in the Australian

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[225] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 81.
[226] Lieutenant-Colonel H. Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering: The Army of Regulations,* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1910, p. 27. The incident took place in 1868, at time when some other Volunteer corps agreed to serve outside their areas.
[227] Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, p. 93.
[228] Alan D. Ward, 'The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 1:2 (1967), 150.
[229] Frank Glen, 'Australians in NZ Wars', *The Volunteers,* 24:1 (1998), 27.
[230] Military Settlers report to 30 June 1865, ANZ AD31 7.

colonies led the *Melbourne Punch* to assert that New Zealanders were not prepared to defend themselves.[231] Few recruits had previous military experience; seventy per cent of one intake had none.[232] One officer complained 'these men knew nothing of drill, or discipline; they were for the most part diggers [goldminers]'.[233] Recruits usually received 'a few days of elementary training' before being shipped to New Zealand where they received a few more.[234] Although the sojourner-soldiers released settlers from needing to take up arms themselves, they were not welcomed; the settlers called them 'scum'.[235]

The permanent force manned the guns at ports, managed stores or served as engineers. The armed constabulary was formed in October 1867 and was operational the following month. Most constables manned the stockades dotted around the North Island. More constables had military or police experience than in other forces.[236] Of the 205 men recruited by Captain William Stack in Melbourne in 1868, half had military experience.[237] Armed constables were also employed in operations against rebels and some units had Maori officers. Majors Ropata and Kemp (or Kepa) were respected and decorated officers under whom European constables served willingly.[238] By 1870, when rebel activity had waned, many constables languished in barracks or redoubts. Alcohol abuse became a serious

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[231] 'Wanted', *Melbourne Punch*, 10 December 1868, p. 187.
[232] Mick Richards, 'The Life and Times of a Military Settler of the 1st Waikato Regiment, 1863–1868', *The Volunteers,* 37:2 (2011): 92.
[233] 'Colonel William Bazire Messenger's Story', transcript of radio broadcast, KA, 1993.1182.
[234] Richards, 'Military Settler': 90.
[235] O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand*, p. 427.
[236] Jeff Hopkins-Weise, 'The Armed Constabulary of New Zealand: and the Australian Context', *The Volunteers,* 27:1 (2001): 5–7.
[237] Ibid: 12.
[238] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. II, p. 252, p. 298; Major-General Sir George S. Whitmore, *The Last Maori War in New Zealand Under the Self-Reliant Policy*, London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1902, pp. 124–5.

problem.[239] To keep the constables occupied and to keep them from drinking, they were put to work building roads, repairing bridges and maintaining telegraph lines. The armed constabulary was scaled down over a number of years. In 1886 the remaining constables were either laid off, made gunners at port batteries, or transferred to the newly established police force.[240]

The bush rangers, also known as 'forest rangers', were formed to fight in undeveloped country where they would employ irregular and guerrilla tactics. The rangers were popularly perceived as being highly effective.[241] The best known was Gustavus von Tempsky, a 'dashing hero' and an early exponent of self-promotion.[242] Darlings of the public, the rangers saw little action and frequently behaved like troublesome divas.[243] The constables and the rangers not only replaced imperial troops, they relieved volunteers and militia from the need to respond to (the increasingly rare and minor) incidents of rebel activity.[244] Although settlers had little time for the types of men who joined these forces, none complained that others had taken on the responsibility for keeping the peace.

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[239] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, pp. 238.
[240] H. W. Salmon, 'The Armed Constabulary in New Zealand: an edited transcript of an address given at the weekend workshop of the New Zealand Society of Genealogists, held at Hamilton in February 1976', pp. 2–6, AM MS 92/82.
[241] Thomas Gudgeon, *Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand,* London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1879, p. 9. Recent historians have confirmed that opinion, see O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand,* p. 221.
[242] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 219; Kynan Gentry, *History, Heritage, and Colonialism: Historical Consciousness, Britishness, and Cultural Identity in New Zealand, 1870–1940*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015, p. 106.
[243] Thomas Wayth Gudgeon, *The Defenders of New Zealand, being a Short Biography of Colonists who Distinguished themselves in Upholding Her Majesty's Supremacy in these Islands*, Auckland: H. Brett, 1887, p. 231; Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Strapp to his wife, 29 August 1865, quoted in Jeanie Graham, 'My Darling Emma', *The Volunteers*, 8:4 (1982): 17.
[244] Cowan claimed a battle in the Urewera in February 1872 was the final engagement. Later he gave 1872 as the end of open warfare but noted that incidents continued until '1875 at least'. He also recorded that Waikato Maori did not lay down their arms until July 1881. Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. II, p. 462, p. 468, pp. 473–4.

The final phase of the New Zealand Wars were the actions of and in response to the activities of Te Kooti and Titokuwaru from the late 1860s until the end of the wars. Te Kooti and Titokuwaru were the charismatic leaders of separate small bands of followers who moved about remote country and executed raids on farms and small settlements.[245] Volunteer corps sometimes assisted colonial troops in these actions. Volunteers developed a reputation for strict observance of their service contracts, ready, whatever the military situation, to pack their bags and depart the day their contracted term ended.[246] Once more, *kupapa* proved that they possessed better fighting abilities and bush skills than European citizen soldiers.[247] In James Cowan's opinion, it was *kupapa* who 'brought a lasting peace to the frontier.'[248]

Although the government was dependent on Maori and European citizen soldiers to assist its forces, they were not always properly treated. In 1864 Captain Hutton of the Royal Cavalry Volunteers in Auckland requested new clothing for his corps, whose uniforms had been worn ragged during active service. The response he received was a bureaucratic run-around.[249] Payroll administration was unreliable. At Christmas of 1863, some troops had been unpaid for three months.[250] Major-General George Whitmore, who commanded New Zealand's military forces, admitted that pay was frequently late and that its lateness contributed to the thieving that was prevalent in the forces.[251] These administrative shortcomings were probably the result of under-staffing. In 1866 military headquarters consisted

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[245] Ibid, p. 466.
[246] Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand*, p. 19.
[247] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, pp. 212–13.
[248] Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars,* Vol. II, p. 1.
[249] Captain H. Hutton to Quartermaster General, 20 January 1864, ANZ AD31 7; Lieutenant-Colonel Kearney [?] to Mr King, 21 January 1864, ANZ AD31 7; Minute dated 29 February 1864 (on copy of Hutton's letter of 20 January), ANZ AD31 7.
[250] *A Soldier's View of Empire: The Reminiscences of James Bodell, 1831-92*, Keith Sinclair, ed., London: The Bodley Head, 1982, p. 135.
[251] Whitmore, *The Last Maori War*, p. 116.

of an undersecretary, six clerks and a messenger. These eight were charged with administering over 2,000 men and eight steamers.[252] There was, furthermore, no military staff function, a deficiency that persisted until 1911 (see chapters 7 and 8).

From the end of the Waikato War in 1864, the government began reducing the size of its military forces.[253] By 1879 New Zealand's defence expenditure was the third-lowest in the Australasian colonies.[254] The cutbacks had unfortunate consequences for some men. Many of the colonial soldiers had been led to expect a long period of employment during which they could save the funds that would be needed to set themselves up when, on their release, they were given grants of land.[255] To add to their difficulties, the settlement of men on their land was slow. A report in 1865 records that of 2,923 men eligible for land, just 373 had been settled.[256] Frequently lacking the necessary funds and skills to succeed as farmer-settlers, many failed and simply walked away.[257] By 1880, only 10.4 per cent of soldiers' farms, and 28.2 per cent of the town plots some received, were still occupied by the former soldiers.[258]

The decline in rebel activity coincided with the emergence of a threat of a different nature: foreign aggression. There were two scares in the 1870s when it was believed that Russian warships would threaten New Zealand. The scares were not signs of a uniquely New Zealand paranoia. The scare of 1878 led the British

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[252] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 114.
[253] Jeffrey E. Hopkins-Weise, 'A History of the Colonial Defence Force (Cavalry): And the Australian Context', *The Volunteers,* 26:1 (2000): 17.
[254] W. C. B. Turnstall, 'Imperial Defence, 1870-1897' in E. A. Benians, J. R. M. Butler, P. N. S. Mansergh, E. A. Walker, eds, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol. III, *The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959, p. 233.
[255] Mick Richards, 'The Life and Times of a Military Settler': 99.
[256] Military Settlers report to 30 June 1865, ANZ AD31 7.
[257] O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand,* p. 449; Fenton, 'Australians in the New Zealand Wars', p. 144; Mick Richards, 'The Life and Times of a Military Settler': 100.
[258] O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand*, p. 465.

Government to form a Royal Commission chaired by Lord Carnarvon to investigate defences in the colonies.[259] These scares were also instrumental in the establishment of the Colonial Defence Committee.[260] By the early 1880s, external threat had replaced internal threat as the primary security concern.[261] It was a profound strategic change. New Zealand and other settler colonies realised that their security relied on Royal Navy protection and, in a worst-case scenario, military support from Britain. Britain and the settler colonies began to perceive a need to consult on defence matters.[262] The notion of imperial defence was born. Paradoxically, volunteer corps, whose *raison d'être* and operational limits were predicated on a now non-existent internal threat, continued to operate and to form as before.

Although legislation concerning settler participation in military forces changed during New Zealand's first 40 years as a colony, two things remained constant: the presence of imperial or colonial troops; and the New World settlers' disinterest in military service. Even when parts of the colony were threatened, or perceived to be threatened, settler willingness to take up arms was not widespread. Those outside the areas of conflict were often indifferent about what was happening elsewhere, two-thirds of Taranaki men had to be compelled to serve, and avoiding military duties became common in Auckland. Most Maori and Europeans took no active part in the New Zealand Wars. Settlers tended to ignore military instructions they did not agree with, and military and civil administrations did not always

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[259] John Mordike, *An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments 1880–1914*, North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992, pp. 7–8.
[260] Turnstall, Chapter VII, 'Imperial Defence, 1870-1897', p. 232, p. 235.
[261] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. vi.
[262] Craig Stockings, *Britannia's Shield: Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hutton and Late-Victorian Imperial Defence,* Melbourne: Cambridge University Pres, 2015, pp. 30–34; F. L. W. Wood, *New Zealand in the World,* Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1940, p. 73.

cooperate. Civilians were quick to criticise imperial forces and to praise their citizen-soldier forces—men who were usually untrained, often ill-disciplined, serving only reluctantly, and seldom involved in the fighting. The result was a contradiction between the reality of reluctant acceptance of duty, and a myth of martial proficiency. The volunteer force was not exactly an exception to this contradiction; it was a more complicated matter, as the next chapter explains.

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CHAPTER TWO

The Volunteer System, 1880–1909

This chapter is neither a history of volunteering, a condemnation of the volunteer system, a justification for it, nor an account of public and government perceptions of volunteers. Rather, it explores the question of whether the New Zealand volunteer system meet strategic and military needs, and analyses the 29 years it took between 1880 (the end of the New Zealand Wars) and the Defence Act of 1909 before governments, volunteers and the public recognised that volunteering was strategically inappropriate, militarily inadequate and in need of replacement.

As their name implies, volunteers were part-time citizen soldiers who served willingly—in this context, 'served' means to train and, if needed, fight. There were also non-military aspects of volunteering which will be described later. Volunteers were first allowed by the 1858 Militia Act.[1] Like militia (untrained, conscripted citizens who could be required to serve in an emergency), volunteers could be ordered to serve in their home district only. In 1860 volunteers were given the right to elect their own officers, an entitlement that many believed produced less-than-proficient officers.[2] Legislation concerning corps property (the buildings, funds,

[1] Militia Act, 1858, 21 Vict. 8, Sections XXIV, VII.
[2] Militia Act Amendment Act, 1860, 24 Vict. 34, Section XXIV.

uniforms and musical instruments volunteers collectively owned) was enacted in 1865.[3]

Between 1880 and 1910, there was an average annual strength of 10,000 volunteers, with per annum strengths ranging from approximately 4,000 to 17,000.[4] For the same years there were on average 158 separate corps, each having about 66 members.[5] As later discussion will show, not all members were active. Most corps were infantry units, often known as 'rifles'. Cavalry, mounted infantry, artillery, engineer and naval corps also existed (the last were attached to port defences). Additionally, a small number of cycle and 'bearer' (medical) units were formed, and many corps had bands. Cadet corps have not been included. Legislation contained provision for one other citizen-soldier force, a militia. Militia were (untrained) citizens conscripted to serve in times of crisis. Militia were sometimes called out during the New Zealand Wars. By the late 1860s, the need for conscripted citizen forces had disappeared and the militia was largely forgotten about.

Volunteer corps were first formed in the late 1850s, during a period of internal unrest and when isolated communities needed protection, or felt they did. By the 1870s the internal rebellion had shrunk to isolated pockets of discontent which were contained or challenged by permanent (regular) New Zealand Government forces.[6] Rebel activity ended absolutely in 1881. Around the same time, the risk of foreign aggression surfaced, Russia being regarded as the most likely

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[3] Volunteer Act, 1865, 29 Vict. 53, Section XXI.

[4] Based on five-yearly reports. Volunteer Force of New Zealand, AJHR H-10A, 1880; Report on New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-13, 1886; Defence and Police, *Statistics of New Zealand*, 1890; Defence Department, *Official Yearbook,* 1896; Defences Military and Naval, *Official Yearbook,* 1901; ibid, 1906; ibid, 1910. Also see Figure 2.4 later in this chapter.

[5] Ibid.

[6] The first permanent New Zealand forces were initiated by Premier Frederick Weld in 1864 as part of his 'self-reliant' policy. Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 62. The Armed Constabulary was established in 1867. Jeff Hopkins-Weise, 'The Armed Constabulary of New Zealand: and the Australian Context', *The Volunteers,* 27:1 (2001): 5.

antagonist.[7] The change in perceived threat, from internal to external, led to a change in defence strategy. Almost uniformly Britain's self-governing colonies committed to the protection of their principal ports from small-scale raids by one or two warships, with the Royal Navy expected to respond to any fleet-sized threat.[8]

The New Zealand iteration of this common defence strategy was the 1880 report by Colonel Peter Scratchley of the Royal Engineers.[9] His findings became the basis of New Zealand defence strategy for the next sixty years.[10] Based on the conclusions that Major-General Sir William Jervois had arrived at regarding the defence of the Australian colonies, Scratchley determined that so long as Britain retained command of the seas there was little chance of New Zealand being attacked by a foreign power's main fleet. Were Britain at war, however, the bulk of Royal Navy resources would be engaging the enemy, probably in the northern hemisphere. With the Royal Navy thus occupied, a wily adversary might send a ship or two to New Zealand to bombard a port, hold one to ransom, capture merchant vessels, or land a raiding party.[11] Scratchley determined that the armed defence of New Zealand's major ports was needed.[12] He advised that they be defended by 'batteries, armed with heavy rifled ordnance, together with submarine mines in the channels, and torpedo boats'.[13]

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[7] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 206; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 135.
[8] Brain P. Farrell, 'Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence', in Greg Kennedy, ed., *Imperial Defence: The Old World Order 1850–1956,* Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2008, p. 261.
[9] Colonel P. H. Scratchley, Defences of New Zealand: Report, AJHR A-4, 1880,
[10] J. T. Henderson, 'The Defence of New Zealand: A Theoretical Approach to the Study of the Formulation and Substance of New Zealand Defence Policy 1935–43', MA thesis, Canterbury University, 1971, p. 6.
[11] Colonel P. H. Scratchley, Defences of New Zealand: Report, AJHR A-4, 1880, p. 5.
[12] Ibid, p. 7.
[13] Ibid, p. 8.

Aware of the need to contain costs, Scratchley proposed that a small 'nucleus of permanently enrolled men' could, if reinforced by volunteer brigades, maintain and operate the guns, and defend the port batteries.[14] He also recommended 'the maintenance of local forces capable of operating in the field' to resist any landing by an enemy force.[15] Ideally, the field force would consist of Armed Constabulary but, understanding that expense was an issue, he ventured that a volunteer force of 500 men per port would suffice.[16]

Scratchley then examined the consequences of the new threat and new defence strategy for volunteer corps. Corps based at a distance from ports were of little use in protecting New Zealand from a raid. He was also concerned about the size and distribution of corps and noted that small scattered forces provided only 'weakness everywhere'.[17] Scratchley added that while an enquiry into volunteer corps was needed and that he had 'already drawn attention to the necessity for reducing the number of corps', it was 'in the interests of economy, discipline, and efficiency' that the volunteer force be rationalised and aligned with overall strategy.[18] Scratchley proposed a war establishment of 3,060 volunteers (all ranks) and a peacetime strength of 2,150.[19] At the time there were 8,458 volunteers.[20]

In 1880 Scratchley established that over 5,000 of New Zealand's 8,500 volunteers (roughly 60 per cent) were superfluous to strategic need. Even though much-desired expenditure reductions would be achieved by reducing the number of volunteers, no action was taken on volunteer numbers or strategically redundant

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[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid, p. 26.
[17] Ibid, p. 30.
[18] Ibid, p. 32.
[19] Ibid, p. 35.
[20] Volunteer Force of New Zealand, AJHR H-10A, 1880, p. 13.

corps. Some of Scratchley's other recommendations were, however, acted upon. Guns for ports were ordered and the construction of fortifications commenced. Work was slow and not all the ordnance was installed, in part because Sir William Jervois, who was appointed Governor in 1883, amended Scratchely's recommendations.[21]

In the early 1880s, the remaining members of the Armed Constabulary (one of the permanent forces New Zealand established to replace imperial regulars) transferred to the newly formed police force, were laid off, or were redeployed as battery personnel at major ports.[22] Volunteer naval brigades were formed to defend the port batteries and assist in their operation, as Scratchley had proposed. Although rural volunteer corps and corps based in towns distant from ports were not disbanded, volunteer numbers declined. By 1883, the strength had dropped to 4,242, almost half of the 1880 strength, but corps were still scattered throughout the colony. The Russian scare of 1885 saw volunteer numbers return to around the 8,000 mark; they remained there for the rest of the decade.

After 1880, the only volunteer corps that could be justified in terms of strategic need were the naval brigades and the corps located at or near ports. Not only were few attempts were made to re-structure volunteering to meet strategic requirements, volunteer corps based at ports received no special training in the new port-defence roles there were expected to take. Naval brigades (volunteers assisting permanent personnel in the operation and defence of port batteries) were the

[21] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, pp. 37–46.
[22] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 280; Clayton, *The New Zealand Army*, p. 44; Mark H. S. Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces and Defence Administration 1870-1900', MA thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977, p. 84.

exception; they were trained in gunnery. It would take until 1909 for New Zealand's citizen soldier forces to be aligned with strategic need.

Scratchley identified the inconsistency between the volunteer system and post-1880 defence needs. There were also other off-strategy elements of the system. Except for the naval brigades at ports, there is no record of the military administration or a government ever initiating a volunteer corps.[23] Volunteer corps were formed as a result of civilian 'demand'. Typically, a public meeting was held to determine interest. If sufficient support was demonstrated, the initial meeting or a subsequent one would decide the arm of the corps (infantry, cavalry, mounted rifles etc.), how it would be administered, what fees and dues members would pay, and the corps' uniform. The Governor or government would then be asked to recognise the corps. Official recognition entitled the corps to arms, equipment and, when offered, capitation payments.[24] Honorary memberships, often with an officer's rank attached to them, were bestowed on benefactors and prominent citizens.[25] Neither strategic nor defence needs determined where and when corps were formed. Corps established in the largely conflict-free South Island, for example, had no military justification.

A committee of corps members would be formed to manage the corps' finances and its property, often including a drill hall.[26] Thus, two administrative systems ran in parallel, the military chain of command and corps' management committees.[27] Fundraising balls, smoke concerts, sporting events, civil ceremonies

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[23] Defences of New Zealand, AJHR A-4, 1880, p. 26 et passim.
[24] Capitation payments were, as the name implies, paid per head, per efficient volunteer. A minimum number of volunteers per corps was often required for any corps members to earn capitation.
[25] Honorary members could wear the uniform of their volunteer corps until The Defence Amendment Act, 1900, 64 Vict. 69, c27 legislated that the permission of the Governor was required.
[26] Act for the Regulation of the Volunteer Force, 1865, 29 Vict. 53; The Volunteer Act, 1881, 45 Vict. 24.
[27] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 34; Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 50.

and fêtes consumed a portion, sometimes the larger portion, of members' time.[28] The amount of volunteers' time given to social and recreational activities is impossible to establish accurately. Voluntary military service was, it has frequently been remarked, as much a social as a military activity.[29] Virtually all corps ran sporting, social, fundraising and recreational events. Unfortunately, corps histories (when they were written) and the records corps maintained seldom describe non-military activities. Furthermore, no survey was run to determine why volunteers served. The consistent opinion of those who have studied citizen-soldier forces in New Zealand, other settler colonies and in Britain is that non-military activities and opportunities were a significant portion of the appeal of such forces, and sometimes their focus.[30] Some corps were little more than social or sports clubs.[31] Corps' management committees, independent finances, and the practice of electing officers challenged the military function of volunteer corps. For example, a volunteer's ability to fund corps activities and to stand rounds of drinks—not his military knowledge—was sometimes sufficient to be elected an officer.[32] There were, therefore, reasons for a corps to function more like a Rotary or rugby club than a military unit.

The drinking, sport teams, social activities, flamboyant uniforms, bands, opportunities for social advancement, smoke concerts and fêtes, combined with the

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[28] 'Smoke concerts' combined variety and music-hall performances, in which volunteers often performed, with drinking, conversation and perhaps a meal. Smoking was permitted.
[29] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 93; Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 53; Beckett, 'Introduction', p. 13.
[30] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', Chapter III; James Wood, 'Canada', in Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire, 1837–1902,* London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, pp. 86–87; Craig Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes: Citizen Soldiering in Australia 1854-1945,* St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998, pp. 32–40; Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers*, pp. 175–178.
[31] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 43.
[32] Ibid, p. 82.

cachet associated with public service, provided powerful non-military reasons for serving in volunteer corps. These motivations did not help make corps more efficient in military terms. The usual training commitment for volunteers was one evening parade a week.[33] Attendance at parades varied by corps and over time. Most training took place indoors and consisted of drill. In 1889 the Inspector of Volunteers described a typical weekly parade as too often being 'an inspection of buttons and pouches, followed by a march around the town.'[34] Parades were often repetitive and dull, the result of inadequate officers and the high turnover rate. Training was conducted by corps officers and NCOs, only some of whom had military experience. While permanent force instructors did visit corps, they did not do so frequently. Training schools for officers ran for fewer than ten of the fifty years the volunteer system operated and none was well patronised.[35] Around thirty per cent of corps members in any year were fresh recruits.[36] Their need for basic training meant that corps training seldom progressed past rudimentary levels. Serving both the social and military interests of their members, volunteer corps seldom became skilled fighting forces.

Apart from drill, target-shooting was a common volunteer activity. Some degree of proficiency with a rifle was necessary for a volunteer to be deemed efficient, that is, eligible for capitation payments. Overall musketry standards were not high but some corps formed squads of skilled marksmen who participated in

[33] The arrangements for rural corps were slightly different in order to accommodate the demands of seasonal work and the distances some volunteers had to travel to attend parades.
[34] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-16, 1889, p. 5.
[35] The officer training school Whitmore established in 1886 ran for 18 months, Babington's school ran for four years (1903–06), and the Council of Defence's for less than two (1908–9). In the 50-year life of the volunteer system, formal officer training was offered for approximately 7½ years.
[36] See below.

target-shooting competitions. Confidence in the military value of fixed-target shooting diminished over the life of the volunteer system.[37]

In most regions in most years an Easter training camp was run. Attendance was voluntary and only a portion, sometimes a mere fraction, of volunteers attended. The main training activity at annual camps was field exercises. Although a vital skill, fieldwork was often neglected in corps-based training and proficiency levels were low. Corps had little experience of or desire to work with other corps, and inter-corps rivalry over command appointments limited the effectiveness of the exercises, as did volunteer officers' lack of experience in commanding higher formations.[38] With attendance rates at annual training camps low, and few corps achieving more than rudimentary levels of proficiency, the actual *military worth* of the volunteer force was not high and there was no perception that individual corps were composite elements of a larger force.

Overall, there were four main deficiencies in the New Zealand volunteer system between 1880 and 1909: misalignment with strategic need; the absence of a regular force; corps insularity, independence and autonomy; and the military ineffectiveness of many corps. The implications of the 1880 change of defence strategy has largely been covered. With the exception of the naval brigades, most corps were unable to aid the defence of the four major ports and none was trained to do so.

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[37] The 1894 conference of senior officers charged with identifying means to improve the efficiency of volunteers found that the target shooting conducted by the New Zealand Rifle Association 'does not give any practical assistance to volunteering, and is subversive of discipline'. Volunteer Force of the Colony, AJHR H-24, p. 3; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 232-33.

[38] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 97.

New Zealand's volunteers also suffered from a structural anomaly, its second deficiency. The assumption on which New Zealand's (and most settler colonies') volunteer corps were formed was that when called out for active duty they would supplement regular forces or replace them in defined roles.[39] The structural oddity in New Zealand was the absence of regular forces. The last imperial troops were withdrawn from the colony by the early 1870s.[40] The armed constabulary and bush rangers replaced (to a degree) the imperial troops. In some actions against Te Kooti and Titokuwaru, however, portions of volunteer corps agreed to serve outside their district and assisted constables and rangers.[41] During the 1870s, therefore, a few volunteer corps did at times work with a regular force. Rangers and constables were, however, no match for imperial troops when it came to numerical strength, training, discipline or experience.[42] As the rebel threat diminished, so did the efficiency and order of New Zealand's permanent forces. Alcohol abuse was endemic in the armed constabulary.[43] After the disbandment of the armed constabulary in the early 1880s, no regular *field* force was maintained in New Zealand.[44] The volunteer naval brigades that supplemented the permanent forces at port batteries became the only

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[39] The public meeting on 6 August 1858 that led to the formation of the Auckland Volunteer Rifle Company determined that the company's principal duties would be to guard the regulars' barracks should the regulars be called away, and to assist the fire brigade when needed. Original Minutes Auckland Volunteer Rifle Company, AM MS 20; Peter Stanley, 'Heritage of Strangers: The Australian Army's British Legacy', *Australian Defence Force Journal,* 87 (March–April 1991): 24.

[40] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 144.

[41] For an account of the experiences of a volunteer officer during field operations, see Jeanie Graham, 'My Darling Emma', *The Volunteers,* 8:4 (1982): 16–27; Dalton, *War and Politics*, p. 19; Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand,* p. 92; Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Strapp, 12 November 1865, quoted in Graham, 'My Darling Emma': 24.

[42] Captain William Stack reported in late 1868 that 20 per cent of the men he had signed up had military experience. A further 36 per cent had police or volunteer experience. Jeff Hopkins-Weise, 'The Armed Constabulary of New Zealand: and the Australian Context', *The Volunteers,* 27:1 (2001): 12.

[43] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 79; H. W. Salmon, 'The Armed Constabulary in New Zealand: an edited transcript of an address given at the weekend workshop of the New Zealand Society of Genealogists, held at Hamilton in February 1976', pp. 2–6, AM MS 92/82.

[44] The last regular force, the Armed Constabulary, was disbanded in September 1886. For a concise history of the Armed Constabulary see Ian McGibbon, ed., *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History,* Auckland; Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 32–36.

citizen soldiers augmenting regulars. The majority of volunteer corps had no regular force to reinforce and received no training or equipment to compensate for the absence of regular troops. Moreover, no change was made to the volunteer system to accommodate the absence of regulars, despite the lack of regular forces being recognised. As the Under-Secretary of Defence, Colonel C. A. Humfrey, remarked in 1890, 'It is to be remembered that our Volunteer Force is with us practically the first line of defence, and not, as at Home, the fourth'.[45] New Zealand's volunteers were intended to augment regular forces, even after regular forces had been withdrawn or disbanded. They were one half of a double act with the other party absent.

The third problem with volunteer corps was their autonomy. Although successive governments to varying degrees subsidised, regulated, and equipped the volunteers, volunteer corps were formed by public will, owned their own property, were self-administered and essentially at odds with the top-down system of military command.[46] In essence, volunteers offered their services *with* strings attached. Most volunteer corps displayed an independence and what might be termed an insularity that diminished their military usefulness. Corps autonomy was at the heart of the volunteer system and the source of many of its problems.[47] Corps were not, and did not regard themselves as, components of a larger colonial force, and corps had little experience of fighting in larger formations. Indeed, they often resisted working with other corps.[48] In fairness, it should be recognised that transport within New Zealand in the nineteenth century was difficult and time-consuming.[49] Permanent-staff

[45] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-15, 1890, p. 3.
[46] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 101.
[47] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 46.
[48] See previous and later discussion in this chapter.
[49] See, for example, Beatrice Webb and Sidney Webb, *Visit to New Zealand in 1898: Beatrice Webb's Diary with Entries by Sidney Webb,* Wellington: Price Milburn & Co, 1959. The North Island's 'main trunk' railway line connecting Wellington and Auckland opened in only 1908.

instructors could not easily visit corps, and corps could seldom train with other corps. In a colony of isolated settlements and limited communication infrastructure, volunteer corps had to be self-sufficient.[50]

The combination of corps independence and poor communications resulted in a kind of insularity. Self-justifying, self-funded, self-managed and required to serve in their home district only, corps were self-centred and took pride in their individuality. Until 1900, when a standard uniform for volunteers was implemented, each corps' distinctive dress served to set it apart from other corps.[51] Corps saw themselves as unique, self-sustaining and responsible only to themselves. Reviewing the (by then terminated) volunteer system in 1912, Captain G. S. Richardson wrote that there had been 'practically no collective efficiency, and therefore our army … was not a success.'[52] The autonomous nature of New Zealand volunteer corps was consistent with citizen-soldier units in other settler colonies. In Canada, militia (volunteer) corps displayed a similar insularity and seldom saw themselves as components of a national force.[53]

Before turning to the military shortcomings of volunteering (the fourth and final inherent weakness of the volunteer system) two matters central to the effectiveness of the volunteer system need to be examined: defence expenditure and the numerical strength of the volunteer force. In 1880, New Zealand was

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[50] The notion of isolated individuals and isolated communities in the nineteenth century was challenged to some extent by Miles Fairburn who held that society at the time was *atomized* as much as it was isolated. See Miles Fairburn, 'Local Community or Atomized Society? The Social Structure of Nineteenth-Century New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 16:2 (1982): 11, 146, 150, 154, 172.

[51] Colonel C. T. Major, 'A History of the First Auckland Regiment, 1898–1927', *The Volunteers,* 25:3 (2000): 136. In addition to uniforms, Major also determined that independent administration, independent funds (some corps were considerably richer than others) and independent dealings with the district military office combined to increase corps insularity.

[52] Richardson, 'Some Thoughts on Obligatory Military Training in New Zealand':13.

[53] James A. Wood, 'The Sense of Duty: Canadian Ideas of the Citizen Soldier, 1896–1917', PhD thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2007, p. 40.

approximately one-quarter of the way through the 'Long Depression' that ran from the mid-1870s until the mid-1890s. The pre-1891 governments were loose and fluid alliances. They had an average term of just 16 months and were known collectively as the Continuous Ministry.[54] With their eyes firmly fixed on economic issues, without a political-party mechanism to ensure support beyond the short-term, and with no threat to the colony except the Russian scares of 1873 and 1885, defence was a low priority for spending, and sometimes an opportunity for cost-cutting. As Figure 2.1 shows, between 1880/81 and 1884/85, the defence budget was more than halved, from £237,090 to £101,899.[55] The end of the New Zealand Wars was in all probability the primary reason for the decrease. The Russian scare in 1885 saw expenditure jump to £302,434,[56] approximately 60 per cent of which was spent on the construction of and ordnance for port defences.[57] Constraints were then re-imposed. The nadir for Continuous Ministry defence spending was their last year in office (1890/91), when just £63,813 was spent.

[54] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, , pp. 233–4; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 42.
[55] Defence Expenditure from 1877 to 1897, AJHR H-19B, 1898.
[56] Defence Expenditure from 1877 to 1897, AJHR H-19B, 1898.
[57] Expenditure on the Establishment and Maintenance of Defences from 1884/85 to 1900/01, *Official Handbook*, 1901, gives slightly different information to those found elsewhere. The 1885/86 defence expenditure listed was £218,409 of which 58 per cent (£127,167) was spent on harbour defences. Of the £229,356 budget in 1886/87, £139,439 (60 per cent) was spent on harbour defences.



Figure 2.1 – Defence Expenditure 1879–1909 For 1879/80 to 1897/98, Defence Expenditure from 1877 to 1897, AJHR H-19B, 1898; for 1898/99 to 1909/10, *Official Yearbooks* 1899–1910.

With the Long Depression still running, the Liberal government (1891–1912) initially made only slight increases in the defence budget.[58] It was not until 1896/97 that defence expenditure exceeded £100,000.[59] Improvements in economic conditions after 1895, the persuasive powers of the then Commandant, Colonel Arthur Penton, and the effects of international incidents such as the Spanish-American War and the Fashoda Crisis (together with an internal dispute about dog taxes in Northland in 1889), led to slight increases in defence spending during the

[58] One of the first actions Richard Seddon, the Liberal Minister of Defence, took on assuming the portfolio was to terminate a number of officers in the Department of Defence and delegate decision-making authority. He justified the redundancies on the grounds of efficiency. The move also saved money. Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 344.
[59] Defence Expenditure from 1877 to 1897, AJHR H-19B, 1898.

late 1890s.[60] It was, however, the South African War of 1899–1902 that brought about the significantly higher expenditure after 1899.[61]

While examination of budget figures makes the relationship between perceived threat and expenditure plain, and while economic conditions largely paralleled the Liberal government's pattern of defence spending, raw figures tend to exaggerate the *relative* level of defence spending. Examination of defence expenditure per capita paints a different picture, as Figure 2.2 shows.



Figure 2.2 – Per capita defence expenditure 1880/81 to 1909/10. Population on left scale, per capita defence expenditure on the right scale. *Sources:* defence budgets for 1879/80 to 1897/98, defence expenditure from 1877 to 1897, AJHR H-19B, 1898; defence budgets for 1898/99 to 1909/10, *Official Yearbooks*, 1899–1910; population data from *Official Yearbook,* 1912. (**Per capita defence expenditure is decimal, not**

[60] Crawford, "The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 179.
[61] The level of spending would have been considerably higher were it not for public subscriptions, which met approximately one-quarter of New Zealand's costs. W. P. Morell and D. O. W Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life,* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1957, p. 271. The imperial government funding the fourth and subsequent contingents (see Chapter Four).

imperial. Thus, £0.20 is one-fifth of an imperial pound: four shillings or 48 pence, not 20 pence.)

Until the Russian scare of 1885, and again after it, post-1880 defence spending per capita trended downwards until the mid-1890s. In 1890/91 and in 1893/94 the colony spent just two shillings (24 pence) per head on defence. Comparison figures for 1898/99, calculated by the British government, were presented at the 1902 colonial conference (Figure 2.3). Those figures showed that the United Kingdom spent 169¾ pence per capita, Newfoundland spent 10 pence per capita, New South Wales and Queensland spent 32¾ and 32 respectively, Tasmania spent just 11½ pence, and New Zealand spent 33½ pence.[62]

Figure 2.3

Per capita military spending, 1898/99

Country/colony	Military expenditure per capita (pence)
United Kingdom	169¾
Canada	24
Newfoundland	10
New South Wales	32¾
Victoria	27
Queensland	32
South Australia	10¼
Western Australia	17¼
Tasmania	11½
New Zealand	33½

Figure 2.3 – Military (excluding naval) expenditure per capita for named British countries and colonies, 1898/99. Based on data in TNA CAB 18/10 30, p. 42. It should be noted that New Zealand's expenditure of £0.15 in Figure 2.2 is *decimal* and that, since 15 per cent of 240 pence (per pound) is 36 pence, it is close to the British figure of 33½ pence.

[62] TNA CAB 18/10 30, p. 42.

In 1905/06, when New Zealand's per capita defence expenditure was 43¼ pence (£0.18 *decimal*), Australia was spending in the region of 58 pence per citizen.[63]

While per capita expenditure increased after the mid-1890s, the 5s 9d per capita spent in 1900/01 (in response to the South African War and a doubling of volunteer numbers) was nonetheless significantly less than the 9s 9d per capita the cash-strapped Continuous Ministry spent during the Russian scare or indeed in either 1880/81 or 1881/82.[64]

Four phenomena are evident in defence spending between 1880 and 1910: the Liberal government was less inclined to spend on defence than the Continuous Ministry; recession constrained defence expenditure; security threats increased spending; and that security threats outweighed economic conditions in government decision-making. In the years between 1880 and 1909 there were two governments. The Continuous Ministry spent an average of 5s 9½d per capita per annum on defence and the Liberals an average of 3s 9½d—two-thirds of the Continuous Ministry's average.[65] Continuous Ministry spending on defence peaked in 1886/86 at approximately seven per cent of government revenue, despite the Long Depression.[66] The maximum the Liberals spent on defence was 3.53 per cent of

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[63] Australian defence expenditure for 1905/06 was £970,000 divided by a population of ca. four million is £0.24 *decimal* or 57.6 pence. Wray Vamplew, ed, *Australians Historical Statistics.* Sydney: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, 1987, p. 412, p. 26.

[64] The defence vote in 1885/6 (the Russian scare) represented 9s 9d per capita, it was 8s 9d per capita in 1880/81, and 9s per capita in 1881/82.

[65] In the 11 years of the period in which the Continuous Ministry was government (1880–91), defence spending per capita totalled £3.20 per capita, an average of £0.29 (5s 9½d) per capita per annum. In the 19 years between 1891/91 and 1909/10, the Liberals spent a total of £3.58 per capita, an average of £0.19 (3s 9½d) per capita per annum.

[66] 3s 9½d (45.5p) / 5s 9½d (69.5p) = 65.46 per cent. The was no *Official Handbook* for 1885, however, the handbook for 1890 gives taxation and customs revenue for the preceding decade and the total government revenue for 1889. An assumption has been made that the same ratio between customs plus taxation revenue and total government revenue applied in both 1885 and 1889. In 1889, customs and taxation revenue totalled £3,991,919 while total government revenue was £5,020,627, a ratio of 1:1.257. 1885's combined customs and taxation revenue was £3,444,708 which, when multiplied by 1.257, gives a total revenue of £4,332,401. £4,332,401 (total revenue) divided by £302,434 (defence expenditure) is 6.98%.

government revenue (1890/01).[67] Liberal expenditure on defence was not only half the proportion of government spending compared to Continuous Ministry, and much of it occurred in a period of unheralded prosperity.[68]

As was the case with the Continuous Ministry, the Liberals had spending objectives more pressing than defence. The first years of the Liberal government were also the last years of the Long Depression and restrictions such as limiting the amount of ammunition to be fired at training camps were understandable.[69] Even as the economy improved in the mid-1890s, and through the affluent years around the turn of the century, the Liberals continued to give priority to social welfare initiatives and development infrastructure.[70] Often apathetic about defence, most of the public approved.[71] The governments of other settler colonies behaved similarly, most refusing to entertain the levels of defence spending their British advisors recommended.[72] New Zealand's Premier from 1892 to 1906, Richard Seddon (he was frequently also the Minister of Defence), complained that he should not be expected to find often considerable amounts of money for every 'suggestion of every military officer who may, from time to time, occupy the position of Commander'.[73] Seddon's frustration was largely inevitable. The pace of military technology development frequently resulted in purchases becoming obsolete shortly after they

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[67] The *Official Handbook* for 1901 gives £6,514,049 as total government revenue for 1900; of this amount, £229.704 (3.53%) was spent on defence.
[68] Around the turn of the twentieth century, New Zealand's standard of living and per capita gross domestic product were amongst the highest in the world. Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 35.
[69] Peter Cooke, *Defending New Zealand: Ramparts on the Sea 1840–1950s,* Wellington: Defence of New Zealand Study Group, 2000, p. 159.
[70] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 427.
[71] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 150–1.
[72] Richard A. Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense': A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967, p. 232.
[73] Quoted in ibid, p. 226.

were made. The tone of Seddon's comment implies, however, that he attributed the inconsistency to advisors' whims.

The Liberal government could have reduced or rationalised defence expenditure considerably by adopting the many recommendations to disband strategically irrelevant corps.[74] Political consequences have been cited as the reason Seddon refused to do so.[75] Assertions that volunteers had political influence, although frequently made, are problematic. There are three components to the case for the political power of volunteers: that it was politically risky to upset volunteers; that volunteers, represented in the House by volunteer-MHRs, possessed political leverage; and that any reforms would upset volunteers.

It has been claimed that Seddon was concerned he would lose favour in his own electorate if he did away with strategically irrelevant corps, a reform that would have reduced costs, and possibly have closed down the six volunteer corps in his constituency.[76] The counter to this argument is that just five per cent of service-age males were active in volunteering, women constituted a considerable portion of voters (after enfranchisement in 1894), and only some volunteers were likely to be Liberal voters. The scale of any negative reaction would, consequentially, have been small.[77] Moreover, and as a number of commandants and inspectors reported, except in times of crises, the public was largely indifferent to defence matters. The 1890 report on New Zealand forces noted that the public did not 'look upon volunteering with any special favour'.[78] Seven years later Colonel Penton

[74] Scratchley's (AJHR A-4, 1880) and Fox's (AJHR H-9, 1893) reports are prominent examples.
[75] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p. 1; Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 99; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 166.
[76] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', pp. 363–64.
[77] See later in this chapter for volunteer participation rates.
[78] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-15, 1890, p. 3.

complained 'Very few people in the colony … look upon the defence question seriously'.[79] In 1903 Major-General Babington reported that defence did not 'occupy that position which its work and importance to the colony entitled it to', and in 1906 he advised 'I cannot think that the country would raise any serious objection to a more efficient and less expensive force replacing that now existing'.[80]

Furthermore, Seddon was little influenced by criticism of the government's poor treatment of volunteers. Newspapers complained about 'the discouragement, the snubbing, the cheese-paring' volunteers had to suffer,[81] but budgets did not go up and Seddon remained indifferent to volunteers' sensitivities. The claim that a voter backlash would result if defence costs were reduced and corps disbanded is contradicted by, first, discontent being limited to a small minority, second, a public consistently unconcerned about defence matters, and third, Seddon's disregard for press criticism of the manner in which he treated volunteers.

There are two elements to the contention that volunteers had political influence: the influence of volunteer officers and the alleged power of volunteer-MHRs. Volunteer officers were usually prosperous or prominent citizens.[82] Commanding officers had to be able to accept financial liability for corps funds, a responsibility only the well-to-do could take on.[83] In additional to financial standing, commandants and the government preferred volunteer officers to be gentlemen and

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[79] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1897, p. 1.
[80] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1903, p. 7; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p.1.
[81] *Truth,* 11 July 1895, quoted in Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering*, p. 87. It is likely that Slater made an error in identifying *Truth* as the source of the quotation. According to the National Library of New Zealand's Papers Past website, the *Sydney Truth* first appeared in 1896 (a year after the date Slater gave), and the *New Zealand Truth* did not commence publication until 1905. paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/nz-truth, accessed 10 February 2020.
[82] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 228; McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, pp. 103–04, p. 156; Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', pp. 152–53.
[83] The Volunteer Act, 1885, 29 Vict. 53, XXI and later legislation vested a corps' finances and property, and the liability for them, in the corps' commanding officer; McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 89.

to have social status.[84] (An unintended outcome of which was the perception by some ambitious men that a commission in a volunteer corps was a means to social advancement.)[85] Affluence and respectability do not, however, guarantee political sway. Had volunteer officers possessed the influence that has been asserted, their frustrations over obsolete arms, equipment shortages, late or inconsistent decision-making by the government, and the need for corps to sometimes fund training exercises themselves would surely have been remedied or made into public issues.[86] While it is likely that volunteer officers were well-connected and articulate, their mute acceptance of indifferent treatment suggests volunteer officers had little power to influence the government.

The influence of volunteer-MHRs is harder to gauge. Volunteer officers made up around 13 per cent of MHRs.[87] While Seddon was not always confident about support in the Liberal party or among its parliamentary partners, there is no evidence that he needed the support of the volunteer-MHRs spread through a number of political parties. The political power of British volunteer-members of parliament has been recognised, as has the political patronage of citizen soldiers in settler colonies.[88] The absence of evidence of a united volunteer-MHR faction in New Zealand suggests that New Zealand MHRs behaved like their counterparts in the Australian colonies and, contrary to the practice in Westminster, did not act as an

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[84] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 77, p. 79.
[85] Ted Andrews, *'Kiwi Trooper': The Story of Queen Alexandra's Own*, Wanganui: Wanganui Chronicle, 1967, p. 36.
[86] Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering,* p. 80, p. 92, pp. 133–34, p. 139; also see later in this chapter.
[87] Ten of 75 MHRs (13.3%) in 1894 were volunteers. Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 150–51.
[88] Beckett, 'Introduction', p. 13; Carman Miller, 'Sir Frederick William Borden and Military Reform, 1896-1911' in B. D. Hunt and R. G. Haycock, eds, *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century,* Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1993, p. 10; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 105.

organised lobby.[89] More importantly, like many other volunteer officers, volunteer-MHRs often supported recommendations to reform volunteering.[90] Conversely, Seddon, who was not a volunteer in New Zealand, consistently opposed reform initiatives.[91] As is examined later, volunteer-MHRs from both sides of the House approved Colonel Fox's reform recommendations in 1893 and voted for the Defence Act in 1909—a bill proposed by another volunteer-MHR, Sir Joseph Ward. Although usually keen to contain defence expenditure, no government availed itself of the considerable cost-savings that would result from adopting recommendations to rationalise volunteer numbers and align the force with strategic need. Seddon could have achieved the cost-savings a rationalisation of the volunteer force would have brought without compromising his political support in the House.

Although budgetary considerations often dominated the Liberals' attitude to defence spending, there were exceptions. A payment to encourage volunteers to attend daylight parades was approved in 1898 and, later, payments were introduced for those who took part in Easter training camps.[92] Colonial governments were notoriously parsimonious when it came to compensating citizen soldiers and payments were usually small. In 1907, when Canadian labourers received approximately two dollars per day, the Canadian government paid militia members who attended training camps a per diem of just 50 cents.[93] Capitation payments in

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[89] Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes*, p. 23.
[90] Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering*, p. 82, described Fox's reform recommendations as 'able and honest' and on p. 97 reported that when Fox attended a volunteer function in 1897 he was cheered enthusiastically.
[91] Seddon had briefly served in the militia while living in Victoria, Tom Brooking, *Richard Seddon: King of God's Own, the Life and Times of New Zealand's Longest-serving Prime Minister,* Auckland: Penguin Books, 2014, p. 32. Seddon was not a member of a New Zealand volunteer corps.
[92] Colonel C. T. Major, 'A History of the First Auckland Regiment, 1898–1927', *The Volunteers,* 25:3 (2000): 139.
[93] James Wood, 'Canada', in Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire, 1837–1902,* London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, p. 98. Wood added that militiamen who had passed musketry were compensated at a slightly higher rate.

New Zealand were seldom more than £2 per annum in the nineteenth century.[94] The other spending exception of the Liberals was public spectacles.[95] In 1897 a contingent was paid to participate in Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee celebrations in London.[96] Press reports of their experiences in London revived public interest in volunteering, but the contingent's involvement came at a price. The 1898 Easter training camp in Canterbury had to be cancelled because spending on the jubilee contingent had left insufficient funds in defence coffers to cover the cost of camps.[97] The 1901 visit by the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York saw the Liberals commit over £45,000—approximately one-quarter of the defence budget—to a military pageant in Hagley Park, Christchurch.[98]

While there is clear evidence that defence budgets directly affected volunteering (an increase in capitation payments tended to attract recruits while a decrease brought resignations),[99] volunteers frequently paid more for uniforms, annual subscriptions, event fees, and fines than they received in capitation payments.[100] Furthermore, volunteer corps usually owned their drill halls, ran their own fund-raising events, and received contributions to corps funds from patrons and well-off officers—practices that pleased Seddon.[101] Corps' assets and independent finances consequently provided a measure of insulation from the

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[94] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 60–62.
[95] John Crawford, 'New Zealand' in Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Citizen Soldiers and The British Empire, 1837–1902,* London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, p. 137.
[96] Twenty of the 54 in the contingent were Maori and were selected by the Native Affairs Department, not the Department of Defence. Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', pp. 399–400.
[97] Ibid, p. 398, pp. 408–09.
[98] Ibid, p. 434; Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 115, p. 120. Cooke and Crawford held that the pageant consumed one-fifth of the defence budget but the event occurred in the 1901/02 fiscal year when the defence vote was £191,205. The £46,000 cost they gave constitutes 24.05% of that year's defence budget.
[99] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 555.
[100] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 60–62.
[101] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 133.

vagaries of government funding. Volunteering was also more than a military activity. Government budgets would determine what rifles were issued and whether Easter camps were run or not, but had no effect on the concerts, sports matches, public ceremonies, fêtes, balls and other activities corps engaged in.[102]

For most of the years between 1880 and 1910 there was no internal or external threat. New Zealand governments echoed the attitude of their trans-Tasman neighbour: the lack of a threat meant the lack of a reason to spend on defence.[103] One historian cynically remarked of Queensland: if the volunteer system 'was unworkable. It was also cheap. That it was ineffective as well did not concern' the government.[104]

Turning to the numerical strength of the volunteer system, the restoration of internal security in 1881 removed much of the impetus to join or remain in volunteer corps, and numbers declined until 1885, the year of the Russian scare, when 35 new corps were formed and volunteer numbers jumped back to around 8,000 (see Figure 2.4, below).[105] Sudden spikes in volunteer numbers during security crises was the pattern in all the settler colonies. The Venezuela crisis of 1895, for example, caused a surge in militia numbers in Canada.[106] The growth in volunteer numbers that took place in New Zealand in 1898–99 (from 5,529 to 7,251, a 31 per cent increase), was also attributed to international tensions.[107] At the same time, however, limits on the formation of new corps in the 1890s (a seldom-imposed

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[102] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 17, p. 21, p. 25.
[103] Bob Nicholls, The Colonial Volunteers: The Defence Forces of the Australian Colonies 1836-1901, North Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1988, p. 175.
[104] D. H. Johnson, *Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces, 1860–1901.* St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1975, p. 201.
[105] Volunteer Force of New Zealand, AJHR H-4A 1885, p. 1.
[106] Wood, 'The Sense of Duty', p. 67.
[107] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1898, p. 1, p. 6; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1899, p. 1. Tension in Southern Africa was the primary cause.

restriction) moderated the growth of volunteer numbers. For instance, in 1897/98 fifty proposals for new corps were declined.[108] A policy reversal took place in 1899 when war broke out in South Africa. Restrictions on forming new corps were lifted and civilians again responded to a perceived threat by joining or forming volunteer corps. Between 1900 and 1901, defence expenditure rose and, as Figure 2.4 shows, volunteer numbers virtually doubled.



Sources: Volunteer Force of New Zealand reports, AJHR H-10A, 1880; H-23, 1881; H-22, 1882; K-17, 1883; H-3, 1884; H-4A, 1885; Reports on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-13, 1886; H-12, 1887; H-5, 1888; H-16, 1889; *Official Yearbooks*, 1891–1910.

Volunteer strength peaked in 1901 at 15,437. Although a decline then followed, there were still 12,089 volunteers in 1909, approximately fifty per cent more than the 8,000 of peak years in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

[108] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 106.

So far, this account of volunteer strengths from the end of the New Zealand Wars (1881) until the passage of the 1909 Defence Act has implied that participation levels were generally healthy and that, given the relationship between perceived threat and volunteer numbers, the 12,000 volunteers in 1909 suggest that some measure of security anxiety existed in the late 1900s. When, however, the number of service-age males is compared to the number of volunteers a quite different picture emerges. Between 1880 and 1909, the number of males between 21 and 65 years grew from 129,150 to 273,895, an increase of 112 per cent.[109] In the same period, volunteer numbers increased from 8,458 to 12,089, a growth of 43 per cent (see Figure 2.5).[110] The effect of the South African War excepted, not only did the post-1900 volunteer strength not keep pace with population growth it also failed to meet targets. The decline in volunteer numbers after the South African War resulted in volunteer strength falling below establishment.[111] The 18 corps inspected by the Inspector-General in 1907 were, on average, at 64.6 per cent of their establishment.[112] A small improvement was made the following year when the

[109] The 21–65 age range does not exactly match the service age range. The age range used is the nearest the *Official Yearbooks* provide to the service age range.
[110] It is recognized that population figures are essentially cumulative while volunteer numbers varied (and peaked at 15,437 in 1901).
[111] The number of volunteer corps multiplied by the minimum strength per corps to be eligible for capitation payments seems to have been used to determine establishment numbers. In 1908, for example, there were 249 corps, if each had an establishment of 60, the dominion establishment strength would be 14,940. The actual 1908 establishment was 15,118 (excluding bands and cadets). Establishment figures cannot have been based on strategic need because there was no strategic need for most corps. Given that, as later discussion shows, the percentage of service-age males required to meet some later establishment strengths was higher than could reasonably be achieved, it is unlikely that establishment numbers were a ratio of those eligible.
[112] 5,146 volunteers vs. an establishment for the 18 corps of 7,964. Inspector-General's report in Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, pp. 21–22.

national strength was 69.13 per cent of establishment.[113] In 1909 the statistic was 68.04 per cent.[114]



The number of service-age males (21 to 65 years) is given on the left scale, the number of volunteers on the right. *Sources*: *Official Yearbooks*, 1878–1909.

An even clearer picture of volunteering's declining appeal becomes apparent when annual percentage participation rates for service-aged males are examined. In 1880, 6.55 per cent of service-age males were volunteers. By 1909 only 4.41 per cent were, as Figure 2.6 shows. Between 1880 and 1909, participation by service-aged males declined by nearly one-third. The 1909 rate can also be assessed in light of the phenomenon that security anxiety increased volunteer numbers. Many New

[113] Extract from Report of the Inspector-General in Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1908, p. 11. Figures exclude bands and cadets.
[114] Extract from Report of the Inspector-General in Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1909, p. 11.

Zealanders were worried by the Russian scare in 1885, which resulted in a 5.40 per cent participation rate, and by events South Africa in 1901, that led to a 7.55 per cent participation rate. After 1901, volunteer participation rates entered a steady decline. The 1909 participation rate of 4.41 per cent, a figure slightly below the 4.81 per cent average for the years reviewed, establishes that no widespread concern about security existed at the time the 1909 Defence Act was passed. This finding will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6 because it raises questions about the reasons for the Act.



Sources: *Official Yearbooks*, 1878–1909.

The establishment for volunteers in 1908 was 15,118; in 1909 it was 14,829.[115] To meet the establishment in 1908, 5.68 per cent of service-age males would have had to be volunteers. For 1909, a 5.41 per cent participation rate would have been needed.[116] The only times in the previous thirty years that service-age participation rates had reached or exceeded 5.4 per cent were 1878–81 (the last years of the New Zealand Wars), 1885–86 (the Russian scare), and 1901–05 (the South African War and its aftermath). The establishment in 1908 was 118 per cent of the average participation rate for the years between 1878 and 1909; the 1909 establishment was 112 per cent of it.[117]

If the years of security concerns (1878–81, 1885–6 and 1901–5) are removed from the calculation, the average participation rate for *secure* years was 4.12 per cent. To meet the 1908 establishment, a participation rate of 5.68 percent was required, an expectation 38 per cent higher than the average participation rate for a secure year. The 1909 establishment necessitated a participation rate of 5.41 per cent, 31 per cent above the secure-year average. Filling all volunteer places would have required men to join at a rate approximately 15 per cent above the 30-year average, and about one-third greater than the average for years when no security threat was perceived. With no significant change in economic conditions to affect participation, the reason establishment strengths were not achieved in the late 1900s was simply that the establishment figures were unrealistic.[118]

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[115] Extract from Report of the Inspector-General in Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1908, p. 11; Extract from Report of the Inspector-General in Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1909, p. 11. Figures exclude bands and cadets.
[116] 1908 = 15,118 (establishment)/266,042 (males 21–65); 1909 = 14,829/273,895.
[117] 1908 = 5.68/4.81; 1909 = 5.41/4.81.
[118] The proliferation of corps during the South African War is partly to blame. Volunteer numbers declined after 1903, but the number of corps had increased during the war and corps were required to maintain at least a minimum membership figure. It is possible that the overall strength was calculated by multiplying the number of corps by the minimum membership requirement.

While establishment figures may have been optimistic, the number of those who participated in volunteering *over time* was considerably higher than annual strength numbers suggest. As has been mentioned, economic conditions, security anxieties, capitation rates, relocation for employment reasons, and repetition of basic drill led men to join or leave volunteers.[119] The result was that the average tenure of volunteers was 2¾ years in rural areas and 2½ years in urban centres.[120] In 1907 the Council of Defence calculated that up to 43,000 men may have passed through the volunteer system between 1898 and 1907.[121] The council's figure computes to an annual turnover rate of 29 per cent,[122] close to the 25 per cent per annum churn rate for volunteers in nineteenth-century Britain.[123] The 1907 volunteer strength of 13,080 represented 5.07 per cent of service-age males, while the 43,000 men who had some experience of volunteering in a ten-year window represented approximately 16.6 per cent of men of service age.[124]

These figures were reason for both satisfaction and concern. The number of men who had received some military training—the trained, or partially trained, military resource available to the state—was around three times greater than the number of men in the volunteer system in any given year. On the other hand, while the reasons men left corps varied, the turnover rate suggests a level of dissatisfaction with volunteering that cannot be ignored. Additionally, the aspects

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[119] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 51, p. 55; Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-5, 1888, p. 3; Attendance Register Thames Naval Brigade 1882, ANZ AD106 9.
[120] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 122–23. The figures are for 1907.
[121] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 20.
[122] The average number of volunteers per annum between 1898 and 1907 was 11,927. 29 per cent of that figure is 3,458. The sum of the average annual volunteer strength plus nine years of a 29 per cent churn rate is: 11,927 + (3,458 x 9) = 43,056.
[123] Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers*, p. 175.
[124] In 1907 there were 258,188 men of service age. If 43,000 of those had passed through the volunteer system, the volunteer-trained resource was 43,000/258,188, or 16.59 per cent. It is recognised that this calculation assumes men who had left a corps did not later join another.

of the volunteer system intended to retain members and to compensate them for their service (capitation payments, shooting contests, sports, and social events) were, potentially, insufficiently attractive.[125] There were two serious consequences of the 29 per cent annual churn rate: a low level of proficiency resulted from approximately one-third of corps being raw recruits each year; and the necessity to engage in basic training every year to address the needs of those recruits diminished the appeal of volunteering for experienced men and those interested in developing higher-level skills.[126]

Two other matters need to be discussed regarding participation: attendance and actual versus 'paper' enrolments. Even were the data available, it is beyond the scope of this work to determine overall attendance ratios for each corps in the 30-year period being examined. Based on a sample of fifty members of the Thames Naval Brigade who saw out the whole of 1882, 24 per cent attended a quarter or fewer of the 60 parades that year, 44 per cent attended between one-quarter and one-half of parades, 26 per cent attended half to three-quarters of parades, and just six per cent attended more than three-quarters of them.[127] It is, however, unwise to regard the Thames brigade's attendance as indicative of all volunteers. The Invercargill City Guards in 1883, for example, had significantly higher attendance rates.[128] There was, furthermore, a considerable variance in attendance rates within

[125] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 46 (Crawford is the source of the list of volunteer-retention activities, not the assertion that the activities were ineffective); in 1898 Colonel Penton encouraged the establishment of corps' sporting clubs to both address the popularity of sporting organisations that were competing for potential members' time and in an effort to retain fit members and maintain their fitness levels, Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 417.
[126] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 123.
[127] Attendance Register Thames Naval Brigade 1882, ANZ AD106 9.
[128] Invercargill City Guards Attendance Rolls 1883, ANZ AD106 15.

corps. One 15-man unit of the Thames Naval Brigade had a much higher attendance rate than the corps overall.[129]

Attendance at annual training camps was also inconsistent. Fifty-one of the 59-strong Dunedin Engineers, and just one of the 36-man Bruce Rifles, attended the Otago camp in 1891.[130] Other colonies experienced similar difficulties in getting citizen soldiers to attend or remain in training camps. An 1898 camp in New South Wales was attended by two-thirds of those *expected*, but almost none stayed whole time.[131] Attendance at the 1905 Easter camps in New Zealand was described as 'disappointing'.[132] The 1907 turnout was termed 'very poor', and in the same year the Council of Defence reported that attendance at Easter training 'has not for some years exceeded 25 per cent of the strength.'[133] Slightly more than 1,000 of New Zealand's 3,759 mounted rifle volunteers (circa 27 per cent) attended Easter camps in 1909.[134]

Not only was parade and camp attendance patchy, membership rolls were unreliable. The most likely cause for inflated membership rolls was the minimum strength levels corps were required to maintain to be eligible for capitation payments. The 1892 report on volunteers warned 'no reliance can be put on the actual strength shown on paper'.[135] In 1893 one-third of volunteers were deemed merely 'paper men',[136] and in 1909 it was estimated that about half of the 6,187

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[129] Attendance Register Thames Naval Brigade 1882, ANZ AD106 9.
[130] Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 125.
[131] Bill Gammage, 'The Crucible: The Establishment of the Anzac Tradition', in M. McKernan and M. Browne, eds, *Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace,* Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988, p. 149.
[132] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1905, p. 5.
[133] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 6.
[134] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 143.
[135] Report on New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-12, 1892, p. 2.
[136] Fox found that some corps comprised more than one-third paper men. Christchurch's Scottish Rifles consisted of 63 of all ranks on paper but only 21 in practice, Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 40.

infantry volunteers were inactive.[137] The compulsory provisions in the Defence Act of 1909 resolved the participation and attendance issues, and reduced the annual turnover rate. Attendance at parades and camps became mandatory, and just one-seventh of territorials were new each year. Training could progress beyond basic drill.[138]

Defence spending and volunteer strengths now analysed, the military shortcomings of volunteering (the fourth deficiency of the New Zealand system) will be explored. Annual reports identified a number of problems with volunteering. Most frequently criticised were the poor quality of officers (and the consequential effect on corps skill levels), equipment shortcomings, and port defences. Some less-frequently cited concerns (insufficient service and medical corps, poor staff functions, the poor physical condition of urban volunteers, and employer reluctance to release staff) will also be examined.

The quality of commissioned and non-commissioned officers was the single most frequently mentioned concern in reports on volunteers.[139] The competency of officers mattered because, as was realised in Australia, the efficiency of a citizen-soldier corps was dependent upon the quality of its officers.[140] In his 1893 report, Lieutenant-Colonel Fox found that in 91 per cent of cases, good officers made for good corps, and poor officers for poor corps.[141]

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[137] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 143.
[138] Men of 18 to 25 years were compelled to train, thus one-seventh (14.2%) of the territorial and general training section were new (18-year-olds) each year.
[139] Own count of annual defence/forces reports; McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 91, determined that poor leadership and inadequate equipment were the major weaknesses of the volunteer system.
[140] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 236.
[141] Fox delivered opinions on both the officers and the corps overall in 55 instances—the 55 exclude bands, cadets, corps where no comment was made on the commanding officer, when the commanding officer was absent, the CO's position was vacant, and Invercargill's G Battery (where the issues were too complex for a binary determination). For 50 of the 55 corps (91 per cent), the finding on the officer matched the finding on the corps, that is, the commanding officer and the corps both received positive reports or both received negative reports. Of that 50, 15 (30 per cent) were

The 1880 report on volunteers advised that most officers 'are not up to the standard for first commissions'.[142] Six years later, the Commandant, Major-General Sir George Whitmore, warned that volunteering's most serious shortcoming was its officers.[143] In response to his findings, Whitmore set up a school for officers. It lasted for 18 months and just four officers passed through it.[144] The Inspector of Volunteers in 1889, Lieutenant-Colonel Hume, reported that many officers were 'quite unfit to command'.[145] The following year he described volunteer officers as 'entirely deficient in … control and influence over those under their command' and found that the election of officers, which he and many others regarded as the key cause of officer inadequacy, was 'the greatest evil in our Volunteer system.'[146]

The best analysis of the volunteer system and its officers was the 1893 report of Major (local rank Lieutenant-Colonel) Francis Fox of the Royal Engineers. Fox arrived in New Zealand in May 1892 to take up the position of commandant. On arrival he explained that he first wished to make a thorough inspection of New Zealand's military forces.[147] The government gave him permission to do so.[148] Travel around the colony in the 1890s was slow but Fox's request for 'sufficient time' to inspect all forces had been accepted.[149] Seven months after his arrival, the government seemed to have lost patience. In December 1892 Fox received a

negative. In five instances (nine per cent of the 55 cases) the finding on the commanding officer was different to the finding on the corps. In all those five cases, the commanding officer received a favourable report while the corps did not. Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893.

[142] Volunteer Force of New Zealand, AJHR H-10A, 1880, p. 2.

[143] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-13, 1886, p. 3.

[144] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 91

[145] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-16, 1889, p. 4.

[146] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-15, 1890, p. 5. Hume was not the only person to identify the election of officers as a key contributor to the poor quality of officers, see later discussion.

[147] 'Our Commandant', *Wanganui Chronicle,* 9 May 1892, p. 2.

[148] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 1.

[149] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 1.

telegram instructing him to submit his report by the end of the following month, January 1893.[150]

Even before his report was published (on 30 June 1893), it was rumoured to be contentious.[151] Fox's report fell, one newspaper wrote, 'like a bombshell'.[152] In his general remarks on the volunteers, Fox found 'a very good spirit exists', despite some neglectful treatment.[153] He identified a lack of officer training as volunteering's principal shortcoming.[154] What differentiated Fox's report from other defence reports, and why it polarised opinion so sharply, were his frank observations on individual officers, who were identified by name.[155] Fox's 1893 report was the only report on volunteers that rated both individual officers and their corps, making it the most comprehensive and the most valuable.

Fox's findings were summarised in newspapers throughout the country.[156] Journalists frequently repeated any criticism Fox had made of local corps or officers, and provincial papers tended to react indignantly if the town's corps had been censured or recommended for disbandment.[157] The *Auckland Star* sought opinions on the report from parliamentarians and military officers. Most were positive. Fox's predecessor, Whitmore, described the report as 'fearless' and the product of

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[150] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 1. Fox's report is dated 14 February 1893.
[151] 'Our Defences', *Evening Post,* 30 June 1893, p. 2; 'Colonel Fox's Report', *Evening Star,* 30 June 1893, p. 1.
[152] 'Colonel Fox's Report', *Auckland Star,* 1 July 1893, p. 4.
[153] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 37.
[154] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 37.
[155] McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 94.
[156] For example, 'The Permanent and Volunteer Forces', *New Zealand Times,* 1 July 1893, p. 2; 'Our Defences', *New Zealand Herald,* 1 July 1893.
[157] 'Sensational Report on the Masterton Rifle Volunteers and School Cadets', *Wairarapa Daily Times,* 1 July 1893, p. 2; 'The Commandant on the Oamaru District', *Oamaru Mail,* 1 July 1893, p. 3; summaries of Fox's findings on each local corps in 'New Zealand Defence: Colonel Fox's Report', *Auckland Star,* 1 July 1893, p. 1; 'The Napier Volunteers: Their Disbandment Recommended', *Daily Telegraph,* 1 July 1893, p. 1.

someone who 'thoroughly understood his work'.[158] The Opposition leader and a former Minister of Defence, Captain W. R. Russell, 'entirely agreed with the report', and the MHR and volunteer officer, J. Joyce, termed it 'accurate … independent and impartial'.[159] All three disapproved, however, of the retention of officers' names in the published version.[160] A Liberal party member, Archibald Willis, the former captain of Wanganui's Albert Rifles, who had been described by Fox as 'not a good commanding officer', also agreed with Fox's findings.[161] He nonetheless felt he, personally, had been harshly treated.[162] Jackson Palmer, an independent MHR and a lieutenant in the Auckland Engineers, had been criticised in the report for his frequent absences.[163] Palmer's opinion was the only dissenting voice. He deemed Fox's work 'an unnecessary and gratuitous insult' and 'disappointing, weak, incorrect, careless, and expensive.'[164] Otago's *Evening Star* published eight anonymous opinions on Fox's report. All were positive. Three of the eight took exception to the publication of officers' names—for which they blamed the government, not Fox. Notable, none of the eight expected Fox's recommendations to be implemented.[165]

Some held that Fox's comments on volunteer officers were censorious. Most, as shown, thought them fair or accurate. The *Press* published an anonymous volunteer officer's analysis of Fox's findings. It argued that 196 of the 264 officers

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[158] 'Our Gallant Defenders', *Auckland Star,* 6 July 1893, p. 6.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid. It was generally understood that the decision to publish the report with officers' names intact had been Seddon's, not Fox's decision; Editorial, *Timaru Herald,* 4 July 1893, p. 1.
[161] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 13.
[162] 'Our Gallant Defenders', *Auckland Star,* 6 July 1893, p. 6. The article was reprinted in other newspapers, for example, the *Oamaru Mail* on 8 July 1893.
[163] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 17.
[164] 'Our Gallant Defenders', *Auckland Star,* 6 July 1893, p. 2.
[165] 'Colonel Fox's Report', *Evening Star,* 7 July 1893, p. 2. Commentators 1, 5 and 6 disapproved of the report's identification of individual officers.

Fox inspected (74 per cent) were rated positively and only 68 (26 per cent) negatively.[166] Fox, however, used many more terms and phrases than the five classifications the anonymous analyst used.[167] The unnamed officer's analysis was more interpretative than statistical and, because it was performed by a volunteer officer unwilling to put his name to his findings, the possibility of bias cannot be ruled out. By September the term 'Fox's martyrs' was commonly used to describe the officers and corps criticised in the report.[168]

Major Arthur Penton (local rank Colonel) succeeded Fox in 1896. Penton's first report stated that volunteer officers were not as competent as they needed to be.[169] The following year he criticised the inefficiency of both commissioned officers and NCOs. The latter were, Penton wrote, a 'great blot on the Volunteer Force'.[170] The South African War of 1899–1902 resulted in a dramatic increase in the. Number of volunteers (see above) but did nothing to improve officer competency. In 1901, Penton described volunteer training as 'wrong' and in need of 'complete change'.[171] He was disappointed that the government had not accepted his recommendation to abolish officer elections, which he regarded as a major contributor to the poor quality of officers. Penton also drew the government's attention to opinion of the

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[166] 'Correspondence: Colonel Fox's Report' (letter to the editor from 'Volunteer Officer'), *Press,* 10 July 1893, p. 6.
[167] 'Volunteer Officer' used just five performance classifications (very good, good, fair, indifferent, bad) while Fox used a range of terms and comments. On p. 9 of the Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, for example, Fox used: 'will be efficient', 'a smart young officer', and 'lately joined'; on p. 10 he used 'keen … [but] too inexperienced', 'intelligent, and anxious to learn', 'capable', 'not sufficiently keen', and 'not efficient'; and on, p. 11, 'likely to be a very efficient officer', 'have not had sufficient practice', 'will I judge be good officers, with practice', 'is resigning his command', and 'very promising' appeared. 'Volunteer Officer' did not explain how Fox's comments on officers were placed under the five headings he used.
[168] 'House of Representatives', *Press,* 29 September 1893, p. 5.
[169] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1897, p. 5, p. 7.
[170] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1898, p. 6.
[171] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1901, p. 3.

London *Times'* correspondent in South Africa who had reported that colonial troops were poorly served by their inadequately trained officers.[172]

Penton's replacement, Major-General (local rank) James Babington, also objected to the election of officers. In the hope of improving officer efficiency, Babington established a school of instruction. Some 375 officers and NCOs attended in its first year but were seldom able to cope and needed 'a considerable amount of … instruction of a very elementary nature'.[173] Most senior officers ignored the school.[174] The school closed in 1906 when its principal instructor returned to Britain.[175]

The commandant position was discontinued in 1906 when the Council of Defence took its place.[176] The council's 1907 report warned that volunteering was being given its last chance to become efficient.[177] The same report also found that officer training was volunteering's most critical need.[178] In 1908, in what was likely to have been an attempt to get around the government's continued refusal to end the election of officers (and thereby improve the quality of officers), the Council of Defence instituted two new boards. A promotion board would henceforward appoint senior officers, and a Board of Selection, to which 'gentlemen desirous of becoming officers may register and receive preliminary training', would train and approve potential junior officers *before* they were put up for election by corps.[179] The Council of Defence also established training courses for existing officers. The

[172] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1901, p. 3.
[173] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1903, p. 6.
[174] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1904, p. 4.
[175] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p. 11.
[176] The Council of Defence in 1907 comprised the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, an Adjutant and Quartermaster-General ('to arrive from England'), the Inspector-General, a Finance Member and a Secretary/Member. Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 1.
[177] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 1.
[178] Ibid, p. 24.
[179] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1908, pp. 1–2.

diversity of skill- and knowledge-levels among the officers who attended created 'almost insurmountable difficulties' for instructors.[180] Furthermore, only 57 of the dominion's 1,347 volunteer officers (4.2 per cent) enrolled.[181] The courses were abandoned in 1909 and in December the Defence Act ended the volunteer system.

Some officers were so concerned by their fellow officers' shortcomings that they took it upon themselves to try to improve the standard of officers. In what would become the last years of volunteering, the Auckland Garrison Officers' Club began publishing an instructional magazine, *Haversack*.[182] It was a lavish production with custom illustrations, photographs and articles on battles, artillery, fortifications and the like.[183] *Haversack* also championed compulsory military training because, as a contributor asserted in 1907, 'only a small portion of the [volunteer] force is in any degree efficient'.[184]

Across the period of 1880 to 1909 officer competency was a 29-year-old problem for which no remedy was effected, despite it being repeatedly reported as a critical shortcoming—usually *the* critical shortcoming—of the volunteer system. The question of why the election of officers remained in place when professional military opinion consistently urged that it be terminated needs to be answered. Although the election of officers was often identified as the major contributor to officer ineffectiveness, governments consistently refused to discontinue it. Between 1880 and the election of the Liberal government of 1891 there were seven

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[180] Ibid, p. 16.
[181] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1909, p. 3, p. 16.
[182] Publication and contribution details, *Haversack,* 30 January 1908: 22.
[183] *Haversack,* 30 January 1908, p. 9; ibid, 30 June 1908: 10.
[184] 'Universal Military Training', *Haversack,* 30 August 1907: 14–16; 'The Best, Least Irksome, and Least Costly Method of Securing the Male Able-bodied Youth of the Colony for Service in the Forces and for Expanding those Forces in Time of War', ibid, July 1907: 3.

administrations.[185] Each had pressing matters to deal with. The economy was in recession, immigration had slowed, public debt increased dramatically, wool prices fell, and unemployment rose.[186] It was, Keith Sinclair put it, 'misery'.[187] The works and armaments Scratchley recommended in 1880 were, nonetheless, carried out or purchased, but requests to reform the volunteer system were ignored or turned down, despite the cost-savings they promised.

The election of the Liberal government in 1891 did not change Wellington's attitude to the election of officers.[188] Seddon kept a tight grip on the reins of power, including the maintenance of political control of military forces, and refused to end the election of volunteer officers.[189] The reasons for Seddon's attitude are not hard to discern. As is elaborated in the next chapter, Seddon was a Fabian socialist who approved of democratic processes (such as elections) and held cooperative ventures (volunteer corps would qualify) in high regard.[190] Seddon admired amateurism. The lesson he chose to learn from the South African War, for example, was that untrained citizen soldiers from the colonies were highly effective.[191] Denying volunteer rank and file the right to elect their officers was anathema to Seddon's personal and political beliefs.

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[185] Hall (October 1879–April 1882), Whitaker (April 1883–September 1883), Atkinson's third administration (September 1883–August 1884), Stout (August 1884), Atkinson's fourth administration (August 1884–September 1884), the Stout-Vogel administration (September 1884–October 1887), and Atkinson's fifth administration (October 1887–January 1891).
[186] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 34; Reeves, *The Long White Cloud,* p. 243; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, pp. 233–4;
[187] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 172.
[188] The New Zealand Liberal party was left-of-centre.
[189] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 100.
[190] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 172; Tom Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick": Joseph Chamberlain and Richard Seddon', in Ian Cawood and Chris Upton, eds, *Joseph Chamberlain: International Statesman, National Leader, Local Icon,* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 68.
[191] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 155.

Seddon died in office in 1906 and was succeeded by his deputy, Sir Joseph Ward, who, unlike Seddon, was a volunteer officer. In addition to gaining the premiership, Ward became the Minister of Defence and President of the Council of Defence. It was, therefore, with Ward's approval that the Council of Defence chose to leave the volunteer system as it was while efforts were made to make it efficient.[192] While the council left officer elections in place, it implemented selection boards to mitigate the ills of officer elections and opened an officer training school, as mentioned above.[193] Should volunteering fail to meet the required standard, Ward and the Council would not tinker with officer appointments or training schemes, the whole system would, they advised, be replaced: 'Should the Volunteer Force not be maintained or brought up to an efficient state … the alternative is a system of universal or compulsory training'.[194]

After the poor quality of officers, the second-most-raised issue concerning the military effectiveness of volunteers was equipment. The main concerns were armaments (rifles and port guns), uniforms, kit, and ammunition. All of these had to be paid for and, as the above has shown, governments were often unable or disinclined to spend on defence. The result of spending restrictions was that rifles, artillery and kit became outdated and worn.[195] In 1886 Whitmore complained that the equipment on issue to volunteers was 25 to 35 years old, 'a legacy from the Imperial army … worn-out [and] useless'.[196] The following year he lamented that naval brigades had no boats.[197] The colony's total military-ambulance resource in

[192] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 1.
[193] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1908, pp. 1–2, p. 16.
[194] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 1.
[195] Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 50.
[196] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-13, 1886, p. 2.
[197] Cooke, *Defending New Zealand,* p. 155. In 1899 Colonel Penton complained that some volunteer naval garrison artillery could not get to their forts because 'we have no boats suitable for carrying a body of men', Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1899, p. 3.

1903 was four wagons.[198] In the early 1890s, New Zealand's military forces were described as consisting of one-and-a-half gunboats, 145 permanent artillery, 64 permanent militia, four torpedo boats, 5,821 volunteers armed with obsolete rifles, 2,000 school cadets, and several dozen bands. The best equipped, the commentator archly noted, were the bands.[199] Inadequate equipping of citizen soldiers was not restricted to New Zealand. Canadian artillery and militia equipment was often obsolete, and spending constraints were common. In 1894 Canadian military leaders had to decide between purchasing new guns or running summer training camps.[200]

The rapid rate of development in military technology contributed to equipment problems. The ordnance purchased on Scratchely's recommendation in the 1880s was outmoded ten years later.[201] A similar story applied to the rifles issued to volunteers. In his typically blunt way, Fox described the state of the colony's small arms as 'worn out … generally unserviceable, and in many cases unsafe'.[202] In the hope of saving money, governments sometimes overrode the purchase recommendations of their military advisors. In 1897, for example, the Liberals opted to buy cheaper, single-shot rifles rather than the more expensive magazine rifles that had been recommended. The decision produced no economy; four years later the single-shot rifles were replaced with magazine rifles.[203] Even

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[198] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 460.
[199] Artemidrus [pseud], *New Zealand in the Next Great War,* Nelson: Alfred G. Betts, 1894, p. 17.
[200] George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People,* Toronto: Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1974, p. 268.
[201] In 1893, Fox found a number of port guns to be unsafe or unserviceable, the submarine-mines 'valueless', and the torpedo service's equipment either obsolete or consisting of incompatible technologies. Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, pp. 3–4; The Military Forces and Defences of New Zealand, AJHR H-10, 1890, p. 3, stated that New Zealand's field artillery was obsolete and in need of replacement.
[202] Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces Part I, AJHR H-9 1893, p. 43.
[203] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 103; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1902, p. 4.

when the recommended equipment was purchased, ancillary items were sometimes overlooked. In 1898 Penton warned that new field artillery would be 'practically white elephants and useless' without horses to transport the guns.[204]

When each corps wore unique (and distinctive) uniforms of their own choosing, the cost of purchasing sometimes costly uniforms dissuaded those with limited means from joining corps,[205] and was but one of the many out-of-pocket expenses officers were expected to make and to which some objected.[206] Elaborate uniforms may have had a detrimental effect on willingness to engage in field training or active exercises,[207] and may also have inhibited inter-corps cooperation.[208] Despite those drawbacks, it took ten years of negotiation before all corps agreed to wear a standard uniform.[209] The change to a standard uniform transferred the responsibility for providing uniforms to the state, but not the cost of them, which remained with the volunteer. The state supply operation quickly failed; it neglected, for example, to supply overcoats.[210] Two years after it was brought to the government's attention, some overcoats (too few) were bought and made available.[211] The need for overcoats continued to be mentioned in Commandant's

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[204] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1898, p. 4.
[205] Don MacKay, *The Troopers' Tale: The History of the Otago Mounted Rifles,* n.p.: Turnbull Ross Publishing, 2012, p. 33; Guy C. Bliss, 'Volunteering in Canterbury 1860–1910', *The Volunteers,* 27:1 (2001): 56.
[206] Captain M. Bowron, Scheme for Efficient Volunteer Defence, AJHR H-54, 1891, p. 1. One of Bowron's recommendations was that the government supply and pay for a uniform that would be common to 'all corps of the same arms … [and] alike throughout the colony' (p. 3).
[207] Wood, 'The Sense of Duty', pp. 227–28, found that showy uniforms encouraged citizen soldiers to concentrate on ceremonial events at the expense of practical military exercises.
[208] Colonel C. T. Major, 'A History of the First Auckland Regiment, 1898–1927', *The Volunteers,* 25:3 (2000): 136, held that unique uniforms reinforced corps independence and diminished the success of attempts at combining corps into larger formations.
[209] A standard khaki uniform was approved in 1890, Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-24, 1891, p. 3. Initially volunteers resisted donning it, Fox reporting in 1893 'there is no uniformity', Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forcers, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 43. It was not until 1900 that the uniform was actually worn by all volunteers, McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, pp. 103–04.
[210] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1901, pp. 6–7.
[211] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1903, p. 5.

reports in 1904, 1905 and 1906.[212] In 1907 the Council of Defence reported that 2,000 coats had been purchased approximately four years earlier (when there were 15,244 volunteers) and offered for sale to corps at cost price. 'Only one-half,' the report stated, 'have been sold.'[213]

Uniforms were not a petty matter. They contributed to the frustrations volunteers felt and exposed the inadequacy of the administrative and supply systems supporting volunteers. Uniforms also offer an example of the effect an equipment deficiency could have. Inspectors and commandants repeatedly complained that infantry efficiency was handicapped by too much training in drill sheds and too little work in the field.[214] South of Auckland, winters are cold enough to require overcoats but no connection was apparently made between the reluctance to train outdoors and the uniform items issued.

The equipment issues and, importantly, the negative influence they had on the military efficiency, were remedied as a result of changes instituted after 1909. From a low of £165,142 in 1903/04 (3s 9½d per capita), defence expenditure rose to £568,123 in 1914/15 (9s 9½d per capita), a per capita rate that matched that during the 1885 Russian scare (see Figure 2.7 and, for comparison, Figure 2.2). It was not merely money that improved equipment provision. A significant expansion of the headquarters function, a general officer commanding who was able to justify equipment purchases, putting trained and experienced British officers in key staff

[212] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1904, p.4; ibid, 1905, p. 5; ibid, 1906, p. 11.
[213] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 12.
[214] Volunteer Force of New Zealand, AJHR H-10A, 1880, p.2; Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-15, 1890, p. 2; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1896, p. 1; ibid, 1897, p. 5; ibid, 1898, p. 5; ibid, 1899, p. 4; ibid, 1900, p. 3; ibid, 1901, p. 3; ibid, 1903, p. 4; ibid, 1905, p. 3; ibid, 1906, p. 8; ibid, 1907, p. 23; ibid, 1908, p. 14; ibid, 1909, p. 14. Too much indoors training remained an issue even in 1914, Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, p. 3.

roles, and cooperation from Ministers of Defence all contributed to improved equipment provision after 1909.[215]



Sources: *Official Yearbooks*, 1902–1910. (The **per capita expenditure shown is decimal, not imperial**. £0.20, for example, is 20 per cent, one-fifth, of a pound: 4 shillings or 48 pence, not 20p.)

The types of support services within the volunteer system were acknowledged to be inadequate but, like officer elections and strategically irrelevant corps, went unaddressed until 1910. Some other settler colonies took remedial action sooner. In the 1890s, Canada's Minister of Defence, Dr Frederick Borden, identified the need for new and better medical, transport, logistics and support functions for Canada's citizen soldiers and implemented them.[216] No New Zealand Minister of Defence displayed similar initiative, despite frequent remarks in defence

[215] See chapters 7 and 8 for fuller discussion.
[216] James Wood, 'Canada', in Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Citizen Soldiers and the British Empire, 1837–1902*, London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, p. 97.

reports that medical, service and transport functions were inadequate or non-existent.[217]

There was a similar disinclination by governments in the volunteer period to remedy the headquarters and staff shortcomings frequently raised in defence reports and exposed during the South African War.[218] In 1898 and 1899 Penton bemoaned the lack of military personnel in the Department of Defence.[219] His successor, Babington, also complained about the inadequacy of the headquarters function. In 1902 he submitted proposals to improve the defence administration. The following year he 'regretted' that none of them had been accepted.[220] Not letting the matter drop, in 1905 Babington justified the need for a better-trained and larger headquarters operation by remarking, 'without a staff the most transcendent genius cannot command troops successfully in the field, nor can they be trained in times of peace.'[221] His words had no effect.

Although the Liberal government refused to reform defence headquarters, four officers were permitted to go to Britain to train in staff duties.[222] Babington left the colony at the end of his five-year term having failed to win approval to remedy the 'very unsatisfactory' state of New Zealand's military administration.[223] Just as equipment shortcomings were not remedied until after the arrival of Colonel

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[217] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-16, 1889, p. 5; ibid, AJHR H-24, 1891, p. 3; Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, AJHR H-9, 1893, p. 43; Defences and Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1895, p. 13; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1896, p. 6; ibid, 1897, p. 7; ibid, 1900, p. 6; ibid, 1904, p. 3, p. 5; ibid, 1905, p. 5; ibid, 1906, pp. 8–9; ibid, 1907, p. 7; ibid, 1908, p. 6; ibid, 1909, p. 4.
[218] See chapter 4.
[219] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1898, p. 12; ibid, 1899, p. 6
[220] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1902, p. 1; ibid, 1903, p. 1.
[221] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1905, p 6.
[222] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 159.
[223] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p. 3.

Alexander Godley in late 1910, improvements in headquarters organisation had to wait until then too.[224]

The final two deficiencies of the volunteer system deserving examination were the willingness of employers to release volunteers from work commitments, and the physical condition of some of the men. In 1889 the Inspector of Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Hume, complained that employers 'raise objections to their assistants being connected with the [volunteer] Force.'[225] The following year, the Under-Secretary of Defence, Colonel C. A. Humfrey, reported that 'very few' volunteers found employers willing to grant them leave for military purposes.[226] To overcome employer resistance to giving volunteers leave, in 1891 Lieutenant-Colonel Hume recommended that the government proclaim volunteer holidays or half-holidays.[227] Six years later Colonel Penton also proposed that a military holiday would mean 'all the men can be got together' and would overcome the obstruction caused by those employers who 'do not give any facilities to the Volunteers in their employ for getting away to attend drill; and … do not in any way encourage the Volunteer movement.'[228] When reporting on attendance at Easter camps in 1898, Penton described employer reluctance to release workers as 'the great difficulty'.[229] (He later changed his mind and claimed that volunteers found other activities more appealing than field exercises.)[230]

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[224] See chapters 9 and 10.
[225] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-16, 1889, p. 7.
[226] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-15, 1890, p. 3.
[227] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-24, 1891, p. 2.
[228] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1897, p. 5.
[229] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1898, p. 9. In the same report Penton commented that the success of initiatives to increase the training of volunteers depended on employers releasing volunteers on their staff to attend the training, ibid, p. 6.
[230] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1900, p. 3.

In 1903 Babington too pointed the finger at employers and recommended that the Militia Act (compulsory service) be imposed for a week annually to ensure attendance at training.[231] In 1906 he proposed that Easter Saturday be made a 'statutory holiday for defence purposes',[232] a move presumably intended to free volunteers from work commitments between the holidays on Good Friday and Easter Monday. Poor turnouts for manoeuvres and Easter camps also concerned the Council of Defence who lamented: 'the majority of the Infantry never put in a solid day's work in the field during the whole course of their service.'[233] It was almost inevitable, therefore, that the 1909 Defence Act made attendance at camps and outdoor manoeuvres mandatory, and that the Act included provisions to punish territorials who absented themselves and employers who obstructed attendance.[234]

One of the reasons for the public's support of the Defence Act of 1909 was their concern to improve the physical condition of young urban males. In 1880 Scratchley had admired the 'physique and intelligence' of volunteers.[235] Ten years later, however, defence reports noted the difference between robust and fit rural volunteers and those in urban corps.[236] Babington raised concerns about the build and health of volunteers almost annually in the mid-1900s.[237] In 1909 the Inspector-General, Colonel R. H. Davies, remarked that rural volunteers, especially those used to the outdoors and rough conditions, made better soldiers than did many in urban

[231] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1903, p. 7.
[232] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p. 2.
[233] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1909, p. 6, p. 14.
[234] The Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII 28, Part VI set out compulsory, universal obligations. Part VII, 52 set a maximum fine of £10 for employers who prevented employees meeting their territorial-force obligations.
[235] Volunteer Force of New Zealand, AJHR H-10A, 1880, p. 2.
[236] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-15, 1890, p. 5; ibid, AJHR H-24, 1891, p. 3.
[237] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1904, p. 3; ibid, 1905, p. 3; ibid, 1906, p. 1, p. 8.

corps.[238] It was conjectured that unfit men were tolerated in volunteer corps simply to maintain a strength that would entitle the corps to continue to operate.[239]

To sum up. As Scratchley identified in 1880, there was no internal threat in New Zealand with the only risk—a very slight one—being a raid on a port.[240] Volunteer corps not in or adjacent to ports were, therefore, no longer needed. Such corps were not disbanded. The proportion of service-age men involved in volunteer corps trended downwards and average tenure was a little less than three years. For half the period examined, economic conditions limited the financial resources available to governments. Economic downturns constrained defence expenditure, but prosperity did not significantly increase it. Inspectors and commandants complained about the poor quality of officers, that volunteers avoided field training, and that many struggled with even rudimentary military skills. Although volunteers constituted nearly the entire New Zealand military force, despite the cost-savings expected to accrue from it, and regardless of how often commandants, inspectors and advisors recommended it, governments consistently refused to reform the volunteer system.

In Taranaki in 1860 the bulk of men waited until they were compelled by the Militia Act before taking up arms to defend their families, property and town. When New Zealand created its own military forces in the 1870s, the bulk of recruits were not settlers but sojourners, many of them recruited in the Australian colonies. New Zealanders were simply not interested in military service and most were apathetic about defence matters. The participation rate in volunteering declined from

[238] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1909, pp. 13–14.
[239] Report on the New Zealand Forces, AJHR H-12, 1892, pp. 2–3.
[240] Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton (Christchurch) or Port Chalmers (Dunedin).

approximately 6.5 per cent (1880) to 4.4 per cent (1909). Only a crisis could cause volunteer numbers to swell. Even then, the effect was temporary.

Those who joined volunteer corps did so for reasons unknown. Volunteering certainly offered military training. It also provided social, sporting, musical and recreational activities, even perhaps opportunities for social advancement. Only about one-quarter of volunteers attended training camps. Attendance at parades varied considerably, and some volunteers were only 'paper men'. The military capabilities of most volunteers were often little more than basic drill and rudimentary rifle skills.

Compulsion was required to get most men into military service in Taranaki in 1860. By 1909 compulsion was understood to be the only way to get young males into military training, and to actually participate in that training. The volunteer system was abandoned because too many volunteers were incompetent, because volunteering was unrelated to strategic needs, and because New Zealand society, and perceptions of military participation, were changing.

CHAPTER THREE

Social Change, 1881–1899

In the last decades of the nineteenth century New Zealand began a period of transformation. Indeed, the years around the turn of the twentieth century are often regarded as a turning point in New Zealand history.[1] At heart, it was a transition from a settler or pioneer society to a colonial one, and included demographic, economic and political changes, and a recasting of some core social values. The changes in civil society before 1900 not only shaped the response to the South African War, but also established the nature of further social change in the early twentieth century. That twentieth-century reshaping (the topic of chapter six) determined the purpose of the compulsory training scheme introduced in 1909, but was largely a continuation of the changes that began in the late nineteenth century.

That the society from which a military force is drawn shapes that society's military force has been long appreciated. Since at least the sixteenth century, military theorists have understood that civil society affects the will and capabilities of the citizen soldiers it can produce. In the early 1500s, Niccolò Machiavelli argued that the 'attachment and devotion' essential in a state's military force could be

[1] Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals*, p. 12; Belich, 'Myth, Race, and Identity in New Zealand': 10.

obtained only from its citizens.[2] How a state treated its citizens, together with the nature of citizens' skills and occupations, would he ventured determine the willingness of citizens to train and fight, and their effectiveness in battle.[3] Later military historians including Peter Paret, John Keegan and Michael Howard have also recognised the relationship between military forces and civil society.[4] One cannot, therefore, hope to understand New Zealand's citizen-soldier forces without understanding the society that produced them.

The last decades of the nineteenth century saw significant demographic changes in New Zealand. Between 1880 and 1910 the European population more than doubled, from 484,863 to 1,002,679.[5] Additionally, the gender imbalance was almost rectified.[6] In 1863 there were 1.8 males per female, in 1883 the ratio was 1.2 males per female, and in 1903 it was 1.1 males per female.[7] (The ratio of males to females in the Australian colonies was similar.)[8] The improvement in the gender

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[2] Niccolò Machiavelli, 'The Discourses on Livy', in [no ed., no trans.] *Nicolo Machiavelli: The Complete Collection,* n.p.: McAllister Editions, 2016, Chapter XLIII, p. 263; Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 51.

[3] Charles D. Tarlton, *Fortune's Circle: A Biographical Interpretation of Niccolo Machiavelli,* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, p. 107. Machiavelli maintained that peasants, who were used to hard physical labour and conditions out of doors, made better citizen soldiers than urban dwellers. Tradesmen, whose crafts often proved useful in battle, came second. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War,* trans. Henry Neville, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1674, 2006, Book I, p. 18, pp. 22–23.

[4] Peter Paret, 'The New Military History', *Parameters* 21:3, 1991: 10; John Keegan, *A History of Warfare,* London: Pimlico, 2nd ed. 2004, p. 12; Keegan, *The Mask of Command*, p. 3; Howard, 'The Use and Abuse of Military History', p. 196;.

[5] Population data for 1862–1911, *Official Yearbook* 1912.

[6] In the nineteenth century, the number of males in the population was always larger than the number of females. Jock Phillips, *A Man's Country? The Image of the Pakeha Male—A History,* Auckland: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 8. An extreme example was Otago in 1861 when, mostly because of the (male) gold miners who descended on the province during the gold rush, there were 3.525 males for every female. Population of Province in 1858 and 1861, *Statistics of New Zealand*, 1861.

[7] 1863: 105,978 males / 58,070 females = 1.825. 1883: 294,665 males / 246,212 females = 1.196. 1903: 439,674 males / 392,831 females = 1.119. Data all years: Population, *Official Yearbook,* 1912. Figures exclude Maori and Pacific Islanders.

[8] In 1889 the mainland Australian colonies had a population of 1,636,048 males and 1,373,702 females, a ratio of 1.19 males to every female. Population of Australasian colonies, (New Zealand) *Official Handbook,* 1889.

balance was brought about by births in New Zealand and government incentives to encourage unmarried British women to emigrate to the colony.[9]

The consequences of the earlier gender imbalance nonetheless lingered in the notable number of never-married men, and that New Zealanders married quite late.[10] In 1891 approximately 90 per cent of men between 21 and 25 years of age were unmarried, as were 62 per cent of 25- to 30-year-olds.[11] Rootless, young working-men drifted from one temporary position to another. Few had family in the colony and loneliness was endemic.[12] The men turned to gambling, alcohol and narcotics, all of which were then legal.[13] Between jobs the men became known for bingeing recklessly and sustaining a flourishing sex trade. In 1889 police estimated there were 800 full-time prostitutes in Auckland.[14] At the time, Auckland's population was just over 57,000.[15] While the annual marriage rate rose from 6.71 per thousand of population in 1880, to 7.67 in 1900 and 8.30 per thousand in 1910, only a slight improvement in the number of never-married males had taken place by 1911 when 40 per cent of adult males had still never married.[16] The presence of a large number of never-married men continued to be a characteristic of New Zealand society well into the twentieth century.[17]

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[9] King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, p. 230.
[10] So did Australians. In 1891, 43 per cent of males over 21 had never married. abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3105.0.65.0012006, accessed 21 August 2021.
[11] Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 10.
[12] Miles Fairburn, *The Ideal Society and its Enemies: The Foundations of Modern New Zealand Society 1850-1900*, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989, p. 144.
[13] Stevan Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh: Sex and Drugs in Colonial New Zealand 1840-1915*. Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed Ltd, 1984, pp. 249–50; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*. pp. 229–30.
[14] Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh*, p. 39.
[15] Population: Principal towns and suburbs, *Official Handbook*, 1889.
[16] Marriage rates, *Official Handbooks* 1889, 1890; Marriages, Number and rate, *Official Yearbook* 1911; Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 9.
[17] It took until 1956 for the number of never-married men to fall to (approximately) 20 per cent of adult males. Ibid.

The feckless and dissolute behaviour of unmarried and never-married men included high levels of violence and alcohol consumption.[18] Their debauched behaviour disgusted the politician and historian William Pember Reeves, who complained of their 'sickening orgies … in wayside public houses'.[19] The conduct of the 'crews' of unattached working men offended and even outraged a population that was becoming increasingly moralistic.[20] By the late nineteenth century, a growing number of people sought to reform the behaviour of males. James Belich contended that, beginning in the 1880s, 'a crusade for moral harmony tightened up New Zealand society like a giant spanner'.[21] As will be shown, participation in military activities came to be seen as a means to rectify undesirable behaviour.

One means of improving male behaviour was to limit, or forbid entirely, the sale of alcohol. Alcohol abuse was a major social issue in nineteenth-century New Zealand.[22] In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, approximately three-quarters of summary convictions were for drunkenness.[23] By the 1900s the share of alcohol-related convictions had dropped to about one-third.[24] Alcohol was a near-constant topic in public discourse, a debate in which women's voices were often

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[18] Patricia Grimshaw, 'Settler Anxieties, Indigenous People, and Women's Suffrage in the Colonies of Australia, New Zealand and Hawai'i, 1888 to 1902', *Pacific Historical Review,* 69:4 (November 2000): 558; Fairburn, *The Ideal Society and its Enemies*, p. 193, p. 206, p. 217, p. 223.
[19] Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, p. 244 and p. 278.
[20] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp. 176–7; Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 139.
[21] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 157.
[22] The first temperance organisation was formed in Kororareka in 1835. Further temperance organisations were started in 1843, 1871, 1872, and 1886. Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh,* pp. 178–80. Also see comparisons of types of pretty crime in chapter 7.
[23] 6,494 of 8,042 summary convictions in 1885 (73 per cent) were from drunkenness. Law and Crime, *Official Handbook,* 1889. 5,677 / 7,237 (78 per cent) in 1890. Law and Crime, *Official Handbook,* 1890. 4,493 / 6,061 (74 per cent) in 1894. Law and Crime, *Official Yearbook,* 1896.
[24] 8,774 of 24,765 summary convictions in 1903 (35 per cent) were for drunkenness. Law and Crime, *Official Yearbook,* 1905. 10,186 of 30,456 (33 per cent) in 1907. Law and Crime, *Official Yearbook,* 1909.

prominent.[25] By the 1890s the Women's Christian Temperance Union had become a political force.[26] A reason some New Zealanders supported the enfranchisement of women in 1893 was the belief that women would vote for prohibition.[27] Although colony-wide prohibition did not result, voters could decide if their electorate would be 'dry'.[28] The prominent role of women in the temperance debate led to women being regarded as forces of respectability and purity, and a moderating influence on men.[29] Many women wanted responsible and reliable husbands, a man who had a stable job in a town or who could take on one of the thousands of small farms the Liberal government created from large estates.[30] These small farms were often husband-and-wife concerns; the work wives did on them was critical to a farm's success.[31] In the late nineteenth century, New Zealand men were being told that they needed to change.

While women frowned upon drunken and debauched behaviour, service in volunteer corps was admired. The wives and mothers of volunteers supported volunteer corps by fund-raising, and presenting prizes or colours.[32] The volunteer officer, Henry Slater, recorded that 'a committee of ladies' held a fair and an auction to help pay off corps debts.[33] While there is no clear evidence that women saw a

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[25] Grimshaw, 'Settler Anxieties': 554. For a discussion of the role of women in this and later periods, see Sandra Coney, ed., *Standing in the Sunshine: A History of New Zealand Women Since They Won the Vote,* Auckland: Viking, 1993.
[26] Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, p. 12. The Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) included in its membership a number of women with (for the time) radical views, including anti-militaristic outlooks. After the military reforms of December 1909, the WCTU opposed cadet training, but not the military training of adult males. Coney, ed., *Standing in the Sunshine*, p. 308, p. 20.
[27] Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, p. 157.
[28] The Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act, 1893, 57 Vict. 34.
[29] Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh*, p. 131. Partial prohibition, in the form of alcohol-free or 'dry' areas (not the whole colony) took place. Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, p. 56; Geoffrey M. Troughton, 'Jesus and the Ideal of the Manly Man in New Zealand After World War One', *Journal of Religious History,* 30:1 (February 2006): 47.
[30] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 179.
[31] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 58.
[32] Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers*, p. 169.
[33] Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering*, p. 45.

need to reform the volunteer system or had opinions on which military training system was preferable, the discipline, exercise and values of well-officered corps mirrored the qualities many women sought in men. Participation in volunteer corps nonetheless declined.[34]

The proportion of the population living in urban centres increased in the nineteenth century. As early as 1874 more than half of European New Zealanders lived in towns. By 1900, two-thirds did.[35] Most immigrants were familiar with, and sought, an urban existence. Moreover, the permanent, full-time employment opportunities were emerging in towns, in the dairy factories and meat-processing works that were being built.[36] Between 1881 and 1891 the number of males employed in factories rose 62 per cent, and the number of females working in factories increased by 112 per cent. Most factories were small; the average in 1881–91 having 10.5 employees.[37] Secure town-based employment encouraged an abstemious and settled life, and helped to modify male behaviour.[38] Ironically, urbanisation also gave rise to concerns that town life made men weak and effeminate. In response to that anxiety, advertisements for pills, potions and devices to restore male virility became common in newspapers, and rugby came to be regarded as a means to safeguard masculinity.[39] It might be thought that volunteering, which offered exercise and discipline, would have benefited from the

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[34] See previous chapter.
[35] Caroline Daley, 'Taradale Meets the Ideal Society and its Enemies', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 25:2 (1991): 130.
[36] Morrell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life,* p. 127; Ben Schrader, *The Big Smoke: New Zealand Cities 1840-1920,* Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2016, p. 67.
[37] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 72.
[38] Jock Phillips, 'War and National Identity' in David Novitz and Bill Willmott, eds, *Culture and Identity in New Zealand,* n.p.: GP Books, 1989, p. 95.
[39] Ibid, pp. 98–100.

new advocacy of responsible, manly and ordered life but, as the previous chapter showed, overall participation in volunteer corps declined.

Although most European New Zealanders lived in towns, and more jobs had become permanent positions rather than temporary ones, New Zealanders continued to move frequently, as was common in other settler colonies.[40] It has been calculated that 57.5 per cent of people changed where they lived at least once in any ten-year period. The most mobile were single men under 30 years of age and unskilled labourers,[41] the type of men with the fitness and youth to make good citizen soldiers but who became increasingly indifferent to volunteering.[42]

One reason for the lack of interest in volunteering was an economic upturn. By about 1900 New Zealand was one of the most affluent societies in the world.[43] Keith Sinclair was sceptical about the accuracy of the assertions that New Zealand had the *highest* standard of living. He thought it more important that New Zealanders found such assertions believable.[44] The growth in wealth, whether real or perceived, was triggered by the voyage of a ship. In 1882, the *Dunedin* departed Port Chalmers for Britain. Its refrigerated holds contained frozen mutton and lamb carcasses together with a quantity of butter. The *Dunedin*'s voyage established that it was possible and economically viable to ship dairy products and frozen meat to Britain, and that there was a ready market for them there.[45] In the three years between 1887 and 1890, income from frozen meat exports more than doubled, from £455,870 to over £1 million. By 1910 the trade was bringing in £3,850,777. It was a

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[40] Catherine Coleborne, 'Regulating "Mobility" and Masculinity through Institutions in Colonial Victoria, 1870–1890s', *Law Text Culture,* 15 (2011), 45.
[41] Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, p. 128, p. 134, p. 136.
[42] See previous chapter for the decline in participation of service-age males in volunteering.
[43] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 191.
[44] Keith Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity*. Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1986, p.73.
[45] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 53, p. 57; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* p. 236.

similar story for dairy exports, which increased from £14,608 in 1881 to £207,687 in 1890, and £3,107,348 in 1910.[46] Although the amount of wool exported nearly doubled between 1880 and 1890,[48] the price plunged from 24d to 4d per pound (weight) and farmers suffered.[49] The advent of refrigerated shipping cushioned the blow for farmers. After 1882 sheep provided two income streams: wool and meat.[50]

In addition to farming, factories to process beasts or to make butter and cheese sprang up around the colony. The first dairy factory was established at Edendale in 1882, and a year later the first 'American principle' cheese factory was set up.[51] By 1901 there were 259 dairy factories.[52] These plants provided permanent full-time employment and created a need to improve transport infrastructure: roads so farmers could transport their stock, milk and cream to dairy factories, and rail lines to transport dairy products and frozen meat to ports.[53] The 1908 opening of the 'main trunk' railway line between Wellington and Auckland enabled the inland districts it passed through to participate, for the first time, in the export boom.[54] While the number of roads increased, the quality of them was often poor. Even in 1921 more than half of roads were of dirt and wide enough for only a horse-drawn cart.[55] In addition to employment in dairy factories and 'freezing works' (the name by which abattoirs are still known in New Zealand), transport providers, stock and

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[46] Exports of New Zealand produce, *Official Handbook*, 1890, Value of principal articles exported, *Official Yearbook*, 1911.
[48] Wool exports rose from 60 million pounds (weight) to 102 million pounds. Exports of New Zealand produce, *Official Handbook*, 1890.
[49] Reed, *The Story of New Zealand*, p. 265; Morrell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 150.
[50] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 236.
[51] Ibid, p. 237; Morrell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 165. 'American principle' cheese production was large-scale, factory-based manufacture rather than the traditional cottage-industry method. Such cheese factories were probably modelled on the production-line practices implemented by Jessie Williams in his Rome, New York, factory in the 1850s.
[52] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 60.
[53] Ibid, p. 56.
[54] Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 187.
[55] Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, pp. 176–77.

station agents, agricultural services firms, fertilizer companies, and farm-equipment providers all prospered as more intensive, scientific and resource-hungry farming methods were introduced.[56]

The previous chapter established that recessions, such as that experienced in Auckland in 1888, reduced interest in volunteering.[57] The export-led prosperity after 1895 did not, however, lead to an increase in volunteer numbers. In 1885 (during the Long Depression), five per cent of service-age males were volunteers, but in 1895 (when the prosperous years had commenced), only three per cent were.[58] As James Belich observed, participating in citizen-soldier forces was 'the last thing they [dominion citizens] wished to do during booms'.[59] The South African War caused participation rates to increase, but after the end of the conflict, and as the economic good times continued, volunteer strengths again declined.[60] By the late 1890s, the Liberal government found itself with an economy able to sustain increased defence expenditure but with fewer and fewer volunteers to spend it on. It is likely that, as the Commandant, Colonel Penton, complained in 1900, the colony's young men had 'other attractions which appeal to them more than soldiering does'.[61]

The buoyant economy and secure full-time employment brought changes to the way people lived. Towns usually had a horse-racing track, and dances and balls were regular events. The middle class entertained each other, public speakers

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[56] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 56. The arrival and rapid adoption of phosphate-based fertilisers in 1900 is an example of 'scientific' farming. Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 186.
[57] Report on the New Zealand Forces, *AJHR* H-5, 1888, p. 3. The same decline in interest in citizen soldiering was experienced in Australia. D. H. Johnson, *Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces 1860–1901,* St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1975, p. 167, p. 194.
[58] See previous chapter.
[59] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 554.
[60] See Fig. 2.4 (volunteer numbers 1890–99) and Fig 2.7 (percentage of service-aged males in volunteers, 1878–1909) in chapter 2.
[61] Defence Forces of New Zealand, *AJHR* H-19, 1900, p. 3.

toured, clubs of all sorts prospered, and theatrical productions, recitals and musical revues were performed.[62] There is some evidence that volunteers were 'joiners' and often involved in a number of organisations simultaneously. Eleven, unmarried, middle-class men in Masterton in the 1890s were found to usually belong to several of six groups: the volunteer corps, a philharmonic society, a church and three sports clubs.[63] Such men may have found other activities more appealing than the inspections and repetitive parades that volunteering too often offered.

Real wages improved after 1895 and more people had the means to pay for entertainment. The first cinema in New Zealand opened in 1896, two years after the Lumière brothers opened the world's first one.[64] Sport attracted a considerable number of young men and sport, especially rugby, was encouraged in schools. For many, however, *sport* involved no more than being a spectator. It has been calculated that *active* participation in sport in New Zealand in 1895 involved around only two per cent of those between 15 and 40 years of age.[65] A similar phenomenon was observed in Australia. One of the reasons Senator George Pearce promoted compulsory military training there was to ensure that young males stopped merely watching games and got some exercise.[66] It is likely that the number and appeal of activities and entertainments that the good times brought, combined with the disposable income to pay for them, diminished the relative appeal of volunteering. The competition, as it were, became stronger.

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[62] The list of activities and pastimes was drawn from notices in newspapers of the period.
[63] Chris Brickell, 'Men Alone, Men Entwined: Reconsidering Colonial Masculinity', *Journal of New Zealand Studies,* NZ13 (2012): 17.
[64] James Watson, *W. F. Massey New Zealand,* London: Haus Publishing, 2010 (Makers of the Modern World series), p. 19.
[65] Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, p. 180
[66] Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 22.

The prosperity around the turn of the twentieth century was in many cases facilitated by the numerous initiatives and reforms the Liberal government of 1891–1912 instituted. The election of the Liberal government was made possible by the electoral reforms of 1889. The reforms altered electoral boundaries, ended plural voting and abolished the land-ownership requirement. They also ended the administration of the country by what has been described as an 'oligarchy' of 'landowners and an upper middle class'.[68] The result was a system of 'one man, one vote' which, after the 1893 enfranchisement of women, became 'one adult, one vote'. After the short-lived governments of the Continuous Ministry, the new electoral system enabled the Liberals to introduce party politics and stable government to New Zealand.[69]

The Liberals were Fabian socialists, often influenced by utopian thinking.[70] Not that they ever articulated their ideology.[71] The Liberal's Fabianism was predicated on an interventionist state and recognition of the state's welfare obligations.[72] Cooperative ventures were much admired and the post office was regarded as a model state operation.[73] Support for the Liberals was strong among

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[68] Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, p. 273. Chapter 22 of Reeves' history of New Zealand is titled 'The End of the Oligarchy'.

[69] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* pp. 258–9. The Liberal government lasted for 21 years; the administrations of the previous Continuous Ministry averaged 16 months in power. Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 42.

[70] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* pp. 172–3; Fairburn, *The Ideal Society,* p. 27. Michael King maintained that Liberal MHRs, which is not the same thing as Liberal policies, 'were not, on the whole, socialists. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 259.

[71] Jock Phillips, 'Of Verandahs [*sic*] and Fish and Chips and Footie on Saturday Afternoon: Reflections on 100 Years of New Zealand Historiography', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 24:2 (1990): 122; Hon. W. P. Reeves, 'New Zealand Today' in Annon., ed., *The Empire and the Century: A Series of Essays on Imperial Problems and Possibilities by Various Writers,* London: John Murray, 1905, p. 466

[72] Francis Shor, 'The Ideological Matrix of Reform in Late-19th-Century America and New Zealand: Reading Bellamy's *Looking Backward'*, *Prospects,* 17 (1992): 39; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* p. 259.

[73] A. M. McBriar, *Fabian Socialism and English Politics 1884-1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 54; Willard Wolfe, *From Radicalism to Socialism: Men and Ideas in the Formation of Fabian Socialist Doctrines, 1881–1889*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975, p. 74.

workers and the poor but not limited to them alone. The middle class often voted Liberal.[74] New Zealand became (or perceived itself to be) a workers' paradise with a workers' government, or, to use a term Premier Richard Seddon was fond of, 'God's Own Country'.[75]

The Liberals were reformers.[76] They transformed social welfare, women's rights, industrial law, education and, importantly, land ownership. Healthcare, pensions and state-funded housing resulted in New Zealand being dubbed 'the social laboratory of the world'.[77] Women were enfranchised in 1893, the first time a nation-state did so. Industrial law and arbitration legislation improved working conditions, legitimised trade unions and reduced the number of strikes.[78] Universities were established and secondary education was made free.[79] Land ownership changed dramatically. Approximately 520,000 hectares (1.3 million acres) of large holdings were purchased, sometimes compulsorily, which, together with 1.2 million hectares (3 million acres) of Crown land and land purchased from Maori, was broken into small farms and sold to thousands of owner-farmers.[80] The prominent British Fabian Beatrice Webb visited New Zealand in 1898. She described the Liberals' reforms as 'rough and ready' and 'bold'.[82]

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[74] Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand*, p. 140; Willard Wolfe, *From Radicalism to Socialism*, p. 7.
[75] The application of 'God's Own Country' to New Zealand is not unique, the epithet has been associated with Tamil Nadu in India, Yorkshire in Britain and several other places.
[76] James Drummond, *The Life and work of Richard John Seddon Premier of New Zealand 1893–1906: With a History of the Liberal Party in New Zealand.* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, n.d. [1907], p. 135.
[77] Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, , p. 212.
[78] Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, pp. 314–323.
[79] Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 222; Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, pp. 176–7.
[80] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* pp. 269–70. Some 17,000 people lived and worked on the newly created small farms. Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 179.
[82] Beatrice Webb and Sidney Webb, *Visit to New Zealand in 1898: Beatrice Webb's Diary with Entries by Sidney Webb,* Wellington: Price Milburn & Co, 1959, p. 24.

In 1893, less than two years into the Liberals' first term, the Premier, John Ballance, died. Richard Seddon, who had held the Mines, Defence and Public Works portfolios, was made his replacement.[83] Richard John Seddon was born in Lancashire and initially emigrated to Victoria to work in the gold fields. In December 1866 he left Melbourne, where he had been an industrial worker and a corporal in the Williamstown Artillery Volunteers, for the goldfields on the West Coast of New Zealand's South Island. He married his Melbourne fiancée Louisa Spotswood in 1869, served on several local councils and boards, and in 1877 was elected mayor of Kumara, the town in which he and his family lived. Seddon was first elected to parliament in 1879.[84]

Charismatic, physically imposing and possessed of a loud (and apparently tireless) voice, Seddon has been described as a 'benevolent despot', a 'demagogue' and 'vulgar'.[86] Fond of publicity and given to making what Reeves termed 'habitual semi-regal progresses throughout his dominions', 'King Dick' told the crowds that turned out for his meetings what they wanted to hear or already thought.[87] They approved and were delighted to be able to regard their Premier as one of their own kind.[88] The Liberal cabinet held mostly yes-men.[89] They tolerated micromanagement by Seddon,[90] who kept the party together and subject to his

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[83] Brooking, *Richard Seddon,* p. 23, pp. 32–33; David Hamer, 'Seddon, Richard John', Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/2s11/seddon-richard-john, accessed 6 February 2018.
[84] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* p. 261; Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand,* p. 151–2; Drummond, *The Life and Work of Richard John Seddon,* p. 351; Hamer. 'Seddon, Richard John'.
[86] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 189; Stevan Eldred-Grigg, *A Southern Gentry: New Zealanders Who Inherited the Earth,* Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1980, p. 132; Webb and Webb, *Visit to New Zealand*, p. 31.
[87] Brooking, '"Playin' 'em like a Piana"': 57, 59; Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, p. 302.
[88] Brooking, '"Playin' 'em like a Piana"': 53 and 59; Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, p. 303; Drummond, *The Life and Work of Richard John Seddon,* p. 153.
[89] Oliver, *The Story of New Zealand*, p. 158.
[90] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 190.

will.[91] It is no exaggeration to say that Richard Seddon was the Liberal government, or that the Liberal government was Richard Seddon.[92]



Figure 3.1 – Richard John Seddon, ca. 1905. ATL 1/1-001917-G.

Western liberal thinking of the time, and Fabian thought especially, put considerable faith in the ability of amateur endeavour.[94] The form of amateurism Seddon particularly favoured was ad hoc, cooperative ventures of ordinary workers; the sort of mutual-benefit alliances miners established on goldfields.[95] Seddon had witnessed such cooperatives in Victoria and he had participated in them on the West Coast.[96] His fondness for such operations was so great that his habit of awarding

[91] Richard Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism,* London: Edward Arnold, 1905, p. 88.
[92] F. L. W. Wood, 'Why did New Zealand not join the Australian Commonwealth in 1990–1901?', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 2:2 (1968): 116.
[94] James Wood, 'Anglo-American Liberal Militarism and the Idea of the Citizen Soldier', *International Journal,* 62:2 (Spring 2007): 420.
[95] Morrell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 83.
[96] Richard Turner, 'The Apprenticeship of Richard Seddon', *Victorian Historical Journal,* 85:1 (June 2014): 111-12.

public-works contracts to cooperatives of labourers resulted in him being accused of 'Bellamyism'.[97]

The tenets of Seddon's political beliefs, his personal experience, and his conduct in politics suggest that, to Seddon, volunteer corps—because they were amateur, small-scale, cooperative citizen initiatives—were the most desirable means of providing defence forces. (Conversely, the free-market capitalist, Adam Smith, maintained that citizen-soldier forces were economically inefficient and contradicted the principal of self-interest.)[98]

Most of the public agreed with Seddon. Sport was an amateur pursuit in both Britain and New Zealand.[99] The New Zealand Rugby Football Union was formed in 1892 and steadfastly kept rugby an amateur sport for over a hundred years.[100] The amateur status insisted upon in sport meshed easily with the do-it-yourself practices of the colonists. As Reeves observed, the public 'find in practice that by collective action they can do many things which they wish to do.'[101] Until well into the twentieth century, small farmers and suburban home-owners engaged professional tradespeople only reluctantly, and preferred to turn their own hands to many jobs. The self-reliance and self-endeavour that had been required of the early settlers became New Zealand traits.[102] The same spirit was seen in cultural activities. Most choirs, orchestras and theatrical productions were amateur endeavours and provided the bulk of the entertainment in small communities.[103]

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[97] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 183. 'Bellamyism' refers to the political philosophy of the American utopian-socialist Edward Bellamy (1850–1898).
[98] Wood, 'Anglo-American Liberal Militarism': 412–13.
[99] W. J. Reader, *At Duty's Call: A Study in Obsolete Patriotism,* Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988, p. 96.
[100] Ron Palenski, *The Making of New Zealanders*, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2012, p. 10. The All Blacks did not turn professional until 1995.
[101] Reader, *At Duty's Call*, p. 96; Reeves, 'New Zealand Today', p. 466.
[102] Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 70, p. 86; Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, pp. 50–51.
[103] Brickell, 'Men Alone, Men Entwined': 16.

Seddon was personally and politically confident that the volunteer system was the most appropriate way to provide New Zealand's defence. He was, though, tight-fisted when it came to military expenditure—except for pageants.[104] Although parsimonious, he was reluctant to secure the cost savings expected to result from disbanding strategically worthless corps. He also distrusted military officers, British military officers in particular.[105]

All the settler colonies experienced some degree of tension between governments and their imperial military advisers and New Zealand was no different—except perhaps for its habit of requesting expert military opinion and then ignoring it.[106] The poor pay offered in colonial appointments was the greatest impediment to settler colonies obtaining capable, experienced and high-ranking British officers as commandants or advisers. British officers also worried that if they accepted positions in a colonial force, they would be overlooked for promotion and active-duty appointments.[107] The relationships between the Liberals and the officers appointed as commandants were seldom warm. The least happy was that between Seddon and Major Francis Fox (local rank Lieutenant-Colonel). Fox was the author of the 1893 report that, despite its honesty and thoroughness (or because of those qualities), caused a sensation.[108]

Seddon and Fox have to share the blame for what happened. Fox, it has been stated, was 'the most junior officer ever to be selected by the War Office for a

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[104] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 115.
[105] Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 96; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 149.
[106] Bob Nicholls, *The Colonial Volunteers: The Defence Forces of the Australian Colonies 1836-1901.* North Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1988, p. 136; Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 266.
[107] Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', pp. 67–8, pp. 84–5.
[108] See chapter 2.

military command in a self-governing colony.'[109] With no experience in dealing with government ministers, he made mistakes. Fox's request that parliament relinquish control of the military and hand it over to him showed that he had failed to recognise the political realities in New Zealand, the constitutional place of military forces, or had chosen to ignore them.[110] The last is quite possible. As Seddon's most-recent biographer remarked, Fox was 'arrogant and imperious'.[111] Furthermore, Fox's report appeared in a politically complex year. In 1893 Seddon was a new premier and his control of the party was not yet secure; the enfranchisement of women took place; the temperance movement was lobbying for prohibition; the effects of the Long Depression were still being felt; and there was a general election at the end of the year. Seddon had matters other than Fox to consider.

Seddon made no effort to make Fox's report palatable: he left Fox's comments on individual officers in the published version of the report. When commentators reacted indignantly, Seddon mutely looked on as Fox faced the criticism his comments had engendered.[112] (Most of the condemnation of Fox was for his frank criticisms. It was generally recognised that it was Seddon, not Fox, who had retained officers' names in the published report.)[113] There was no political disadvantage for Seddon in the public taking a dislike to a British officer accused of lambasting New Zealand volunteers. Seddon exploited the controversy to deny Fox the position of commandant, a role from which Fox might have challenged Seddon. Instead, Fox became a military adviser and the inspector of volunteers.[114]

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[109] Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 162.
[110] I. W. Ready, 'The Dispute Between Colonel F. J. Fox and R. J. Seddon, 1893–4', MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1963, p. 18; Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 165.
[111] Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 131.
[112] Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 165.
[113] See reactions to Fox's report in the previous chapter.
[114] McGibbon, ed., *The Oxford Companion*, p. 180.

The consternation Fox's report occasioned was unusual for a defence matter. Defence did not have a high priority for the Liberals. Ministerial control of defence (or any portfolio), which Fox had challenged, was a different matter. Ministers at the time were decidedly 'hands-on' executives, reluctant to delegate approval of even everyday details.[115] Defence had a low priority for the public too, in part because the few threats that were perceived were distant from New Zealand and short-lived, but also because defence expenditure constituted but a small portion of government spending.[116] In Britain, 38 per cent of the 1896 budget went to defence where defence matters held the public's attention.[117] In the same year, New Zealand's Liberal government spent a decidedly modest 1.5 per cent of its budget on defence and, consistent with the finding that significance in the budget paralleled importance in the public's mind, defence was not a topic in which New Zealanders showed much interest.[118]

Given the zeal with which the Liberals reformed so many significant aspects of New Zealand (industrial relations, social welfare, the franchise, education, land ownership, etc.), why a reform-minded government tolerated the expensive and ineffective volunteer system has to be asked. There are two answers. The short answer is: Richard Seddon. The longer answer is that the Fabian values Seddon and the Liberals espoused were not anti-military; they endorsed Mill's opinion that

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[115] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 113; Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, pp. 130-31. Gordon found that Seddon and the Liberals preferred to use 'political patronage' to determine suppliers. Although corrupt by modern standards, such practices were common at the time. Beatrice Webb accepted the level of Seddon's corruption because the premier's salary was insufficient to live on. Webb and Webb, *Visit to New Zealand*, p. 17. Keith Sinclair held that the Liberal's 'intolerable pettiness' was the worst feature of their administration, not the level of corruption. Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 190.
[116] The Russian scare of 1885 lasted approximately a year; both the Fashoda crisis and the Spanish-American War were quickly over. The South African War lasted three years.
[117] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 120.
[118] Total government expenditure was £4,509,981, of which the Defence Department received £68,552, or 1.520%. Revenue and expenditure, *Official Yearbook*, 1897.

defence was an obligation of the *people* and took it literally. If citizens were responsible for their defence, then citizen soldiers were the appropriate type of defence force. Defence was not a priority for the Liberals, who quite reasonably held that spending on social welfare, construction of infrastructure, the redistribution of land, and improving educational opportunities were more important. There was no conflict or threat that necessitated an overhaul of the volunteer system, and the public were sufficiently indifferent to defence matters that few positive electoral outcomes were anticipated should defence reforms be made. Any cost reductions that remodelling the volunteer system might generate were likely to be only trivial when defence amounted to less than two per cent of government spending. Seddon, the dominant political figure, felt no affection for imperial military officers and was sceptical of their opinions. These were, however, the very men who told Seddon that volunteering needed to be reformed. It is no coincidence that the Council of Defence's 'last chance' ultimatum to volunteering was issued after Seddon's death.

Between the end of the New Zealand Wars and 1899, defence matters seldom concerned the public or their governments. It is therefore ironic that, in the same period, military service came to be seen in a more positive light and the military's influence on civil society changed from being thought harmful to being beneficial. The change in civil attitudes to the military began in Britain—the source of most of New Zealand's institutions, opinions and people. In 1886, 41 per cent of New Zealand's population had been born in Britain or British possessions. Of the 52 per cent born in the colony, many (probably most) had been born to parents who had emigrated from Britain.[119] New Zealanders frequently boasted that the colony was

[119] 1886 census results, *Official Handbook*, 1889. A further 3 per cent were born in the Australian colonies.

98½ per cent British.[120] To nineteenth-century New Zealanders, Britain was 'Home'.[121] Most of the books in the colony, and most of the news reported in the press, came from Britain, reflected British concerns and conveyed a British perspective.[122] It has been argued that New Zealanders not only wanted to know what was happening in Britain, they sought to emulate it.[123] Visitors to the colony remarked on the British dress of the colonists,[124] the Britishness of its shops, streets and people,[125] even frozen meat exports were promoted as 'British New Zealand Lamb'.[126] It should be no surprise, therefore, that a change in perceptions of the military in Britain was replicated in New Zealand.

While the favourable way in which the military was regarded affected popular thinking, it had little *direct* effect on New Zealand volunteer corps. As the previous chapter exposed, volunteer strengths lagged behind the rate of population growth. On average, less than five per cent of service-age males were in volunteer corps. In the mid to late 1890s, and despite the new regard for military service, just under three per cent of service-age males served in volunteer corps; the lowest participation rate between 1878 and 1909.[127] Annual government expenditure on defence, despite the economic upturn, remained below three shillings per capita.[128] The New Zealand rate was about equal to that of New South Wales and Queensland,

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[120] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 189. Belich wrote that the half per cent was added to distinguish New Zealand from Australia, which claimed to be 98 per cent British.
[121] New Zealanders still referred to Britain as 'home' in the early twentieth century. André Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand,* trans. E. V. Burns, London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914, p. 358.
[122] Patrick Evans, *The Penguin History of New Zealand Literature.* Auckland: Penguin Books, 1990, p. 26; Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 460.
[123] Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 213.
[124] Ibid, p. 216–7.
[125] Webb and Webb, *Visit to New Zealand*, p. 1.
[126] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 368. While assertions that New Zealand-sourced meat was British may have been made to appeal to British consumers or overcome resistance to frozen and/or imported produce, Belich cited the practice as evidence of New Zealand claiming to be British.
[127] Figure 2.6 in chapter 2.
[128] Figure 2.2 in chapter 2.

and higher than the rates in Canada, Newfoundland and Tasmania.[129] The evidence suggests that while attitudes towards the military and military service changed in the late nineteenth century, active participation and government budgets did not—until the outbreak of war in South Africa, that is.

There were four main reasons for the improved regard for the military in the late nineteenth century: muscular Christianity; new imperialism; social Darwinism; and new attitudes to physical fitness and sport. The close relationship between the cross and the sword had waned with the end of the Crusades and the development of secular nation-states. Soldiers and sailors, especially the rank and file, had acquired a poor reputation. The Crimean War (1853–56) has been identified as the catalyst for the restoration of the military's public standing. There is also evidence that some Christian organisations revived their interest in the welfare of military personnel before Crimea.[130] Publishing too played a role. Catherine Marsh's *The Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars, 97th Regiment* first appeared in 1855. A biographical tribute to a proficient and devout army captain who was solicitous of his troops' wellbeing, it showed that soldiers were not necessarily unprincipled but could be moral.[131] *Hedley Vicars* became so popular a gift for boys that it sold 70,000 copies in its first year.[132] The work can be seen as both evidence that the public perception of the military was changing, and as a mechanism that facilitated the change. By the late nineteenth century, interest in and approval of the military were at considerably higher levels than in mid-century.[134]

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[129] Figure 2.3 in chapter 2.
[130] Olive Anderson, 'The Growth of Christian Militarism in Mid-Victorian Britain', *The English Historical Review*, 86:338 (January 1971): 46–7, 53.
[131] Henry Shafto Johnstone Vicars (1826–1855).
[132] Anderson, 'The Growth of Christian Militarism': 48–9.
[134] Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society.* London: Longman Group Ltd, 1980, p. 206.

As soldiers came to be seen as good or even godly, Christianity, especially in the Established (Anglican) Church, became more bellicose. While Donald Gordon's assertion that sermons became 'a perpetual shouting of the words "war" and "blood", "fire" and "battle"' probably overstated the change,[135] there is no denying that the nature of many new hymns reflected something of a recasting of the church in more martial terms. The titles of new hymns make the point: 'Fight the Good Fight', 'Soldiers of Christ Arise', 'Stand Up, Stand Up for Jesus' and the popular 'Onward, Christian Soldiers'.[136] The revival of the concept of the knight-soldier, the Christian-in-arms, was central to the redemption of the military's reputation.[137] The army also contributed to the revival. The War Office increased the number of padres and, for the first time, accepted Catholic priests and ministers from non-established churches as army padres.[138] The new popularity of things military was sometimes reflected in unexpected ways. The 'Christian Mission' that William Booth had founded in London in 1865, changed its name to the Salvation Army in 1878 and shortly after adopted military ranks and military-style uniforms for its members.[139]

While a higher regard for the military was evident in late-nineteenth-century New Zealand, the *pattern* New Zealand responses to crises had already been established. In Taranaki in 1860 and during the Russian scares, volunteer numbers rose. The public enthusiasm for the South African War of 1899–1902 and the increase in volunteer strengths were consistent with established behaviour. There is, however, evidence that the favourable regard for things military increased the

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[135] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 115.
[136] Reader, *At Duty's Call*, p. 24.
[137] Jacqueline Beets, 'Girls and Boys Come Out to Stay: Ideological Formations in New Zealand-set Children's Fiction 1862–1917', PhD thesis, Massey University, 2003, p. 281.
[138] Anderson, 'The Growth of Christian Militarism': 60–63.
[139] salvationarmy.org/ihq/our-story, accessed 8 February 2019.

appeal of enlisting to fight the Boers. In 1878 for example, when tension still persisted in parts of New Zealand, 6.5 per cent of service-age males were members of volunteer corps.[140] During the South African War, participation peaked at 7.5 per cent.[141] If, in order to recognise those fighting in South Africa, a further 1,800 is added to the peak number of 15,500 volunteers (thus including *all* the men in New Zealand military services during the war), the total rises to 17,300.[142] That figure equates to a peak participation rate of approximately 8.5 per cent.[143] A rate higher than at any previous time in New Zealand, including during the New Zealand Wars.[144]

Social changes and new ideologies had, it can therefore be argued, an influence on the scale of established behaviour. Increased involvement in military forces in times of tension was a usual response to crises before public attitudes to the military changed. After attitudes changed, the response to a crisis remained the same in nature, but the level of involvement was greater. On top of that, the extraordinary amount of money donated to fund two publicly subscribed corps for South Africa was unprecedented.[145]

The change in attitudes to the military also created a new role for military participation: the correction of undesirable behaviour. In combination with the

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[140] Figure 2.6 in chapter 2.
[141] Figures 2.5 and 2.6 in chapter 2.
[142] In the region of 5,500 men fought in New Zealand contingents. Most served for one year of the three-year war, an average of 1,833 per annum.
[143] The 17,300 in contingents or volunteer corps over 204,589 (the number of service-age males in 1909) = 8.46 per cent.
[144] While the majority of the 600 adult men in Taranaki in 1860 were engaged in the fighting as militia or volunteers, they constituted approximately 1.3 per cent of the total/colonial male population. (600/45,394). If half the males were of service age (as was the case—approximately—in 1880 and 1890). Taranaki's militia and volunteers represented a military participation rate of 2.6 of the colony's service-age males. Since Taranaki was the only province under threat at the time, few or no other militia were called out, and because volunteering was still in its early days, it is unlikely that more than five to seven per cent of service-age males were in military service in 1860.
[145] See chapter 4.

development of muscular Christianity, and the belief that 'games' (sport) developed character,[146] involvement in military activity was deemed to be a remedy for the social ill some were calling the 'boy problem'. The poor behaviour of urban male youths was a concern for many. As early as 1885 the Wesleyan church established a Helping Hand Mission in Auckland; its purpose was 'to benefit the "larrikin" classes.'[147] Newspapers frequently reported incidents of larrikinism or references to it. 'Larrikins' were responsible for damage to the life-saving equipment on an Auckland wharf; a boy who broke into his school and tore up test-cards was termed 'a young larrikin'; installing a lamp in Wanganui's Queen's Gardens was a pointless exercise because 'the larrikins would smash it.'[148] 'Some larrikin' disrupted a temperance meeting in Featherston, and when a witness in a trial would not swear on the Bible, 'the magistrate said he must be a larrikin or else he would.'[149] Larrikinism, some asserted, had become a 'colonial disgrace'.[150]

The press reports cited above not only provide confirmation that New Zealand had not escaped the boy problem (it existed in Australia too), but also suggest that, because petty crimes and unexplained damage were often blamed on larrikinism without proof, the extent of the boy problem may have been exaggerated. Statistical evidence suggests that larrikinism may not have been as prevalent as press reports implied. Between 1887 and 1891 offences against property (not limited to young offenders) varied between a low of 2.27 per thousand

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[146] Mark Girouard, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman,* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981, pp. 166–67, p. 170.
[147] 'The Wesleyan Jubilee', *Star,* 1 February 1890, p. 3. 'Larrikin' was, *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* found, originally an Australian term for 'a (usually juvenile) street rowdy'. Associated meanings include both poorly behaved and cheeky or irreverent.
[148] Editorial, *New Zealand Herald,* 25 February 1891, p. 4.; 'Law and Police', *New Zealand Herald,* 1 June 1893, p. 3; 'Borough Council', *Wanganui Herald,* 8 November 1899, p. 1.
[149] 'Featherstone Notes', *Wairarapa Daily Times,* 14 April 1894, p. 3; Editorial, *Western Star,* 24 June 1896, p. 2.
[150] 'Country News', *New Zealand Herald,* 13 September 1895, p. 6.

of population and a high of 2.49.[151] In the 1890s, when there was no abatement in the incidence of press reports of larrikinism, yet the offences-against-property rate dropped to 1.89 per thousand of population in 1894 and 1.96 in 1897.[152]

Exaggerated or not, press reports in the late nineteenth century suggest that the public was anxious about youth miscreance and *perceived* that there was a problem. In 1896 Seddon was sufficiently troubled by youth misconduct to propose that a curfew be imposed on the young. The idea failed to win support in the House.[153] The Boys' Brigade was founded in Glasgow in 1883, largely in response to concerns about the conduct of urban youth.[154] Three years later the first New Zealand branch was formed.[155] The Boys' Brigade provided the type of solution that letters to newspaper often recommended: 'the only argument of any avail … with the larrikin element, is *straight out muscular Christianity.*'[156] [Original italics.]

A secular alternative to muscular Christianity was military cadets. The first school cadet unit in New Zealand was established at Otago (boys') High School in 1864.[157] Provisions for school cadet corps were included in the 1877 Education Act, and by 1893 there were 2,153 cadets in 39 school corps.[158] Of the cadet corps that were comprehensively inspected in 1893, 72 per cent received favourable reports.[159] Australian cadet experience suggests that physical training rather than

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[151] Figures given are for 1889 (the high) and 1890 (the low). Law and Crime, *Official Yearbook*, 1893.
[152] Law and Crime, *Official Yearbook*, 1899.
[153] Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh*, p. 140.
[154] Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers*, p. 179; boys-brigade.org.uk/our-history, accessed 14 February 2019.
[155] bb.org.nz/about, accessed 14 February 2019.
[156] 'The Church Militant' (Letter to editor), *Waikato Argus,* 29 August 1899, p. 4.
[157] Stephen Carruthers, 'Duty to Serve? The Role of Secondary Schools in Preparing New Zealand Soldiers for Enlistment in the First World War', MA thesis, Massey University, 2015, p. 35.
[158] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 217.
[159] Eleven of the 39 corps were thoroughly inspected; eight (circa 72 per cent) of the 11 inspected were given positive reports. A further 11 corps failed to meet the standard for government assistance. Report on the New Zealand Permanent and Volunteer Forces, Part I, *AJHR* H-9, 1893, pp. 10–36, pp. 45–6.

military skills is likely to have been their focus.[160] Given experiences in Britain and Canada in the late nineteenth century, it is unlikely that New Zealand cadets attracted many larrikins to their ranks. Cadets in Britain appealed to the sons of upwardly mobile families.[161] Similarly, in Canada cadets were more popular with the middle classes than with the working (allegedly larrikin) classes.[162] Cadet corps (as chapter six shows), with their emphasis on discipline, masculine pursuits and fitness, helped military activities to be seen as advantageous because they were believed to encourage desired attitudes (chivalry, obedience, morality) and to provide a remedy for social ills (the poor physical fitness of urban youths, a decline in manliness, disorderly behaviour).

A more popular method of addressing the boy problem and social concerns was through playing team sports. Team sport had an indirect effect on military participation. Until the early nineteenth century, English public schools had sought to develop piety and scholarship in boys. Starting at Rugby School in the 1830s, educators began to concentrate on the development of character. They sought to build character through 'games' (team sports).[163] By the 1880s, games often dominated the culture of English public schools, to the point that in some schools a sound body became more important than a sound mind.[164] Teachers who emigrated from Britain to the settler colonies brought the new respect for games to schools in

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[160] Stockings, *The Torch and the Sword*, p. 42, p. 53, p. 55.
[161] Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers*, p. 179.
[162] Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, p. 122.
[163] Girouard, *The Return to Camelot*, pp. 164–65, p. 270. Girouard held that Matthew Arnold, who is often credited with the introduction of games/sports, was not as instrumental to the process as his deputy, Cotton, who later became headmaster of Marlborough School and introduced games there. Also see Reader, *At Duty's Call*, p. 97.
[164] Girouard, *The Return to Camelot*, p. 169; J. A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal*. London: Frank Cass, 1986, 1998, p. 23, pp. 35–6.

the colonies.[165] Sports such as rugby and cricket also reinforced the connections between Britain and the settler colonies. Erik Neilsen has argued that such imperial or British connections existed comfortably alongside notions of colonial identity.[166]

The idea that games would improve the physical condition of boys, revive military virtues and control youthful exuberance, was mostly welcomed in New Zealand where team sports—especially rugby—were credited with preserving manliness and restraining uncivilised behaviour.[167] In 1895 Wellington College's magazine, *The Wellingtonian,* claimed that rugby developed self-reliance, endurance, courage in difficulties, self-control, 'a check on morbid desires', and a good temper.[168] Rugby could help remedy the boy problem and was often compulsory in New Zealand schools.[169]

Those playing rugby or other team sports were inculcated with the imperialism and militarism that went hand-in-hand with muscular Christianity and the new respect for physical fitness.[170] The books schoolboys read in the late nineteenth century frequently promoted military duty and service to the empire.[171] Children's literature in the Victorian era was not primarily recreational, but a form of social conditioning.[172] The heroes in works for the young often trained for or fought in military forces. Military service was portrayed as noble and brave, and

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[165] J. A. Mangan, 'Noble Specimens of Manhood: Schoolboy Literature and the Creation of a Colonial Chivalric Code, in Jeffrey Richards, ed., *Imperialism and Juvenile Literature,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, p. 177.
[166] Erik Neilsen, *Sport and the British World, 1900–1930: Amateurism and National Identity in Australasia and Beyond*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 92–94.
[167] Jock Phillips, 'War and National Identity' in David Novitz and Bill Willmott, eds, *Culture and Identity in New Zealand,* n.p.: GP Books, 1989, pp. 87–88.
[168] Quoted in Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, p. 261.
[169] Reader, *At Duty's Call*, p. 97 remarked that the 'cult of games' was a euphemism for compulsory team sports.
[170] Girouard, *The Return to Camelot*, p. 176.
[171] Spiers, *The Army and Society*, p. 216.
[172] Jacqueline Beets, 'Girls and Boys Come Out to Stay: Ideological Formations in New Zealand-set Children's Fiction 1862–1917', PhD thesis, Massey University, 2003, p. 1.

sacrifice was credited with being holy.[173] G. A. Henty's books for boys sold over 25 million copies. He boasted that they 'taught British imperial history to untold numbers of boys and that the armed forces' officer ranks were filled with his readers.'[174] The New Zealand writer Alan Mulgan wrote that the British books he and others of his generation read when young made him think of England with reverence and as home.[175] The books for boys written in settler colonies differed colony to colony but virtually always promoted imperialism and manliness.[176] New Zealand-written juvenile fiction often encouraged young men to defend the empire by serving in the military.[177] The 1899 novel, *Anno Domini 2000: Or, Woman's Destiny*, was written by a former premier, Sir Julius Vogel, and described a future world in which a federation of Britain and its dominions acted as the global power.[178]

Works for the young containing flattering portrayals of the empire and military service were used in classrooms, loaned by libraries, given as presents, and awarded as prizes by clubs, schools and Sunday schools.[180] By these means the imperial and militarist values the works espoused were made accessible to even the impecunious.[181] Duty, war and the empire were also frequent themes in affordable comics and magazines published for boys. *The Boy's Own Paper* appeared in 1879. It

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[173] Ibid, p. 282.
[174] Quoted in ibid, p. 275.
[175] Cited in E. H. McCormick, *New Zealand Literature: A Survey,* London: Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 85.
[176] J. A. Mangan, 'Noble Specimens of Manhood: Schoolboy Literature and the Creation of a Colonial Chivalric Code', in Jeffrey Richards, ed., *Imperialism and Juvenile Literature,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, p. 191.
[177] Beets, 'Girls and Boys Com Out to Stay', p. 207.
[178] John C. Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence in the British World, 1870–1914,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 59.
[180] J. A. Mangan, '"The Grit of our Forefathers": Invented Traditions, Propaganda and Imperialism' in John M. MacKenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986, pp. 116–7.
[181] Reader, *At Duty's Call*, p. 29.

was followed by *Chums* in 1892, *The Captain* in 1899 and many others.[182] The influence that mass-market cheap magazines had on the development of beliefs and attitudes—before the advent of radio, television and the internet—was considerable. James Walvin argued that the jingoism and nationalism of early twentieth-century adults was acquired in their youth 'when thumbing through their books, comics, magazines and yarns.'[183]

The values found in juvenile literature and other publications reinforced the values implicitly conveyed in the subjects taught in schools, preached from pulpits, and encouraged through participation in team sports.[184] It has been contended that because New Zealand was deemed to lack a rich or long history, New Zealand schoolchildren received more instruction in British history than did their counterparts in Australia and Canada.[186] To a degree, young New Zealanders were developed into young Britons.

Schools were not overlooked by military and imperialist lobby groups. As has been remarked, after provisions were enacted in 1877, schools could operate cadet corps. The New Zealand branch of the Navy League was established in 1896, one year after the organisation's founding in Britain. The New Zealand Navy League sponsored essay-writing competitions and sent speakers around schools to promote the empire and military service. Navy League speakers in schools sometimes augmented their addresses with (what was for the time) state-of-the-art technology: lantern shows.[187] The boys at school in the 1890s were inculcated with

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[182] Ibid, p. 28.
[183] James Walvin quoted in Stephen Carruthers, 'Duty to Serve? The Role of Secondary Schools in Preparing New Zealand Soldiers for Enlistment in the First World War', MA thesis, Massey University, 2015, p. 29.
[184] Kynan Gentry, *History, Heritage, and Colonialism: Historical Consciousness, Britishness, and Cultural Identity in New Zealand, 1870–1940*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015, p. 3.
[186] Ibid, p. 15.
[187] Carruthers, 'Duty to Serve?', pp. 23–4.

militarism and imperialism; they would be of service age during the First World War.

When attention is turned to the adults of the time, few differences are revealed. Historians are almost unanimous in finding that in the last decades of the nineteenth century New Zealanders were more empire-minded, keener to maintain good relations with Britain, and more militaristic than before.[188] The blend of imperial loyalty, racism and militarism was described by Keith Sinclair as being:

> not a single, clear note but a chord. One sound, and not the loudest, tells of love of Empire and Motherland. There is an insistent undertone of British 'racialism'. But the dominant note is strident and unmistakable. It is usually called 'militarism'. The New Zealanders were ready to fight anyone and to prove to the world that they were as good as the best.[189]

Although there was consensus that loyalty, militarism and imperialism were widespread, there were differences of opinion regarding their cause. Belich credited British investment in New Zealand (which he termed 'recolonization') as being critical to the public's interest in imperial relations.[190] Others found that a 'sentimental attachment' to Britain, or the empire's capacity to be all things to all people, created the fond regard in which Britain was held.[191] Tours of Britain by New Zealand rugby teams contributed, it has been claimed, to the sentimental attachment.[192] Britain, it should not be forgotten, was New Zealand's dominant

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[188] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp. 79–80; Keith Sinclair, *Imperial Federation: A Study of New Zealand Policy and Opinion 1880–1914.* London: The Athlone Press, 1955, p. 8; Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 4; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 281.
[189] Sinclair, *Imperial Federation*, p. 22.
[190] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp. 30–31.
[191] Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life,* p. 214; Peter Burroughs, 'Imperial Defence and the Victorian Army', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 15:1 (1986): 72.
[192] Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, 2014, p. 36. Loveridge's opinion is somewhat different to the findings of Erik Nielsen, who found that assertions of both colonial/national identity and Britishness resulted from dominion sports team tours of Britain. Erik Neilsen, *Sport and the British World, 1900–1930: Amateurism and National Identity in Australasia and Beyond.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 92–94.

trading partner. It bought approximately 72 per cent of New Zealand exports in 1890, almost 74 per cent in 1895, and 70 per cent in 1900.[193] It has already been shown that in the 1880s and 1890s most of the population was either born in Britain or the offspring of people who had emigrated from Britain. Similar assertions have been made about Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee in 1897, in which a New Zealand contingent participated.[194] The royal family provided an emotional connection between colonial New Zealanders and Britain.[195]

Improvements in transport and communications, both within the colony and between the colony and the rest of the world, made it easier for New Zealanders to communicate with each other and to know of developments in Britain and the world faster that had previously been possible.[196] Moreover, New Zealanders adopted new communication technology rapidly. Only the United States equalled New Zealand's use of the postal system. On a per capita basis, New Zealanders sent twice as many telegrams as did Australians, and four times the number sent by Americans.[197]

The speed of communication links also improved. The Crimean War (1853–56) had been running for 96 days before news of it reached New Zealand. The 1885 Penjdeh incident was known of (via international telegraph) within hours.[198] The immediacy of telegraphed news heightened both the sense of intimacy with the rest of the world and the emotional force of the information conveyed.[199] Moreover,

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[193] The trade with the United Kingdom, *Official Handbook,* 1892; Exports from New Zealand, *Official Yearbook,* 1896; Trade with Different Countries or Colonies, *Official Yearbook,* 1901.
[194] Eldred-Grigg, *A Southern Gentry*, p. 136; Stevens, 'New Zealand Defence Forces', p. 17; Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 131.
[195] Ibid, p. 96.
[196] Reader, *At Duty's Call*, pp. 18–20.
[197] Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 63.
[198] Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 33. The Penjdeh incident was a conflict between Afghanistan and Russia that, because it was feared Russian intentions threatened India, led to Britain preparing a military response. The issue was settled peaceably.
[199] J. A. Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism,* London: Grant Richards, 1901, p. 11.

because of press agencies such as Reuters, newspapers in the settler colonies were offered British news and a British perspective on other news.[200] Faster communications with Britain were a welcome development for most colonists, who saw themselves as both New Zealanders and Britons.[201] Colonial Australians too were comfortable with what has been termed the 'essential duality of colonial identity'.[202] Considering themselves to possess (what would today be called) dual nationality, the security of the British Isles was as important to many New Zealanders as the security of the New Zealand islands.

More than news was communicated from Britain; reports of developments in technology, business, the arts and thought were also received. The New Zealand press responded positively to the 1883 publication of John Robert Seeley's *The Expansion of England,* largely because it argued for greater recognition of the value of colonies.[203] New Zealand offered to send troops in response to the Penjdeh Crisis of 1885,[204] and by 1890s Dilke's phrase 'Greater Britain' had entered general discourse.[205] The colonists, moreover, found nothing in the term 'Greater Britain' to offend them. They did not, for example, feel they had been relegated from the inner sanctum of *British* to a lower or peripheral status of *Greater British*. Economically, genetically, culturally and sentimentally, New Zealand was intimately attached to Britain.

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[200] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 460.
[201] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 51; Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 96.
[202] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 107.
[203] 'The English Beyond the Sea', *Timaru Herald,* 3 December 1883, p. 3; Editorial, *Auckland Star,* 28 December 1883, p. 2; 'The Expansion of England', *Southland Times*, 1 February 1884, p. 4; and 'Reviews', *New Zealand Herald,* 5 April 1884, p. 1 (supplement).
[204] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 29. The offer was declined. For an explanation of the Penjdeh Crisis see footnote on previous page.
[205] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 457. Searches of the digitised newspaper archive, Papers Past, suggest Belich's assertion is correct. The phrase 'greater Britain' was found 1,013 times in the 20 years between 1870 and 1889, and 2,539 times in the ten years between 1890 and 1899. Search conducted 11 February 2019.

For its part, Britain began to regard more highly the worth and military potential of the empire. The 'burden of empire' attitude to the colonies that had led Benjamin Disraeli's Conservative government to withdraw imperial troops from New Zealand and other colonies in the 1870s, was replaced by what has been called the 'new imperialism'. The Salisbury-Balfour government of 1895–1903 sought to form closer bonds with the colonies and to encourage cooperation across the empire. Its Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, initiated colonial conferences at which the leaders of the settler colonies meet with British politicians and imperial office-holders. The empire became more prominent and more popular in the British public's mind as cooperation within it was improved, and as the empire's military capabilities were recognised.[206]

There was also a distinct racial aspect to New Zealand's relationship with Britain that has direct bearing on attitudes to militarism in the colony. A central tenet of Wakefield's system of planned colonisation was the choice of appropriate settlers.[207] '[T]he population of New Zealand has been to all intents and purposes a selected one', Premier Julius Vogel told parliament in 1887.[208] The notion that New Zealand's immigrants had been hand-picked gave rise to the belief that New Zealand had gathered up Britons of especially good genetic stock.[209] In New Zealand, a greener and more pleasant land than the 'Jerusalem' left behind, with better food and healthier ways of life, that good British stock improved even further.[210] New Zealanders regarded themselves as not simply British, but 'Better Britons' who lived

[206] See chapter five.
[207] Edward Gibbon Wakefield established five of New Zealand's six main settlements. See chapter 1.
[208] Sir Julius Vogel, quoted in Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 80.
[209] Ibid, p. 12; Owen W. Bayly, 'The Bayly Lecture 1960', pp. 2–3, AM MS 94/4.
[210] Jock Phillips, 'Rugby, War and the Mythology of the New Zealand Male', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 18:2 (1984): 96; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 77 and p. 84.

in a 'Better Britain'.[211] New Zealanders were not alone in thinking of themselves in those terms. To different degrees, each settler colony maintained that its way of life, climate and society could improve British genetic stock.[212] The growing militarism in Britain was reproduced in New Zealand because it was the British thing to do, because New Zealanders were loyal, and because New Zealanders were ready to believe that, being Better Britons, they would make better soldiers than the citizens of old Britain.[213]

The idea that New Zealanders were Better Britons sat comfortably with the social Darwinism that spread throughout the Western world in the late nineteenth century.[214] In simple terms, social Darwinists interpreted (or misinterpreted) Charles Darwin's 'the survival of the fittest' and associated concepts such as the 'tree of evolution' to mean that since Europeans had the richest economies and the most successful civilisations, European races must be the most highly evolved. Social Darwinist thinking justified European hegemony over (in their eyes) less-evolved races in colonies and possessions, and may have encouraged the suppression of Maori culture in New Zealand.[215]

A desire to preserve the status of Anglo-Saxons as the premier race sometimes determined the racial composition of military forces. Non-white soldiers were, initially at least, not accepted for imperial service in the South African War. The reason was to avoid any suggestion that the British race was incapable of

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[211] Fairburn, *The Ideal Society*, p. 24; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp. 121–4; Gentry, *History, Heritage, and Colonialism*, pp. 107–8; Belich, 'Myth, Race, and Identity in New Zealand': 14; Phillips, 'Of Verandahs [*sic*] and Fish and Chips': 122.
[212] Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, pp. 21–22; Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 467.
[213] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, pp. 79–80.
[214] Charles Darwin visited New Zealand in 1835. He found it 'not a pleasant place', thought Maori lacked the charm and simplicity of Tahitians, and described the Europeans there as 'the very refuse of society'. Darwin quoted in Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 47.
[215] Erik Olssen, 'Mr Wakefield and New Zealand an Experiment in Post-Enlightenment Practice', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 31:2 (1997): 215.

maintaining the security of the empire.[216] Armed conflict was also seen as a Darwinian struggle for survival of the fittest;[217] weaker races would be vanquished by superior (white) races. Social Darwinism validated the importance of race and concepts of racial superiority, and provided a positive perspective on armed conflict. In the late nineteenth century the overwhelming majority of the New Zealand population was white, as Figure 3.2 shows.

Year	European	Maori	Chinese	Total
1886	573,940	41,909	4,542	620,391
	92.5%	*6.8%*	*0.7%*	
1891	622,214	41,953	4,444	668,611
	93.1%	*6.3%*	*0.7%*	
1896	699,649	39,854	3,711	743,214
	94.1%	*5.4%*	*0.5%*	

Figure 3.2 – Racial composition of the population, 1886–1896. 1886 census, *Official Handbook,* 1889; 1891 census *Official Handbook,* 1892; census of Maori and other data, *Official Yearbook*, 1896.[218]

Most of the Chinese in New Zealand had entered the colony as gold miners in the 1860s and virtually all were male.[219] In 1886 there were 4,527 Chinese men and just 15 Chinese women, a ratio of 302 males per female. In 1896 the ratio was 142 males per female, a significant improvement but still hugely imbalanced.[220]

[216] Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, p. 78. Also see the next chapter for the New Zealand response to the racial restriction on Maori volunteers for South Africa.
[217] Roger Chickering, 'War, Society, and Culture, 1850–1914: The Rise of Militarism' in Roger Chickering, Denis E Showalter and Hans J. van de Ven, eds, *The Cambridge History of War,* Vol IV, *War and the Modern World,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 130.
[218] The 1896 census for the first time identified those of mixed (Maori and other) race. The 2,259 persons of mixed race who were reported as living as or with Europeans have here been included in the European population, and the 3,503 of mixed race reported living as or with Maori are included in the Maori population.
[219] In December 1866 the mail steamer *Rangitoto* brought 88 passengers to the West Coast. Richard Seddon was one of them, and 40 (or 41) of the others were Chinese. Richard Turner, 'The Apprenticeship of Richard Seddon', *Victorian Historical Journal,* 85:1 (June 2014): 110.
[220] 1886 census results, *Official Handbook*, 1889. 4,527 males / 15 females = 301.8; *Official Yearbook*, 1896. 3,685 males / 26 females = 141.7. The gender imbalance was the combined result of Chinese women being forbidden to emigrate from China, Chinese men in New Zealand regarding themselves

Although less than one per cent of the colony's population, Chinese were often feared. Seddon was virulently Sino-phobic.[221] By 1896 further Chinese immigration was restricted by law.[222] Those laws were justified in social Darwinist terms. The preamble to the Asiatic Restriction Act of 1896 stated the act's intent was to 'prevent the Influx into New Zealand of Persons of Alien Race who are likely to be hurtful to the Public Welfare' and to 'safeguard the race-purity of the people'.[223] The Chinese in nineteenth-century New Zealand were regarded with suspicion by most of the European population.[224] They were subject to discrimination and vilification.[225] In researching this work no mention was found of Chinese involvement in military activities in New Zealand.

Maori constituted five per cent of the population in the late 1890s and played a disproportionately small part in the social and economic changes that took place. Maori who had fought in the New Zealand Wars had often earned the respect of imperial soldiers, but few Maori served as volunteers.[226] The creation of four Maori

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as sojourners rather than settlers, and because European and Maori women were unwilling to contemplate marrying Chinese men. Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh*, p. 12; King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* p. 368.

[221] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 228 quoted Seddon as saying: 'The chow element in New Zealand is like a cancer eating into the vitals of our moral being'. Seddon's verbal attacks Chinese were, his biographer stated, relentless and irrational. Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 76.

[222] The Chinese Immigration Act, 1881, [no law number or regnal data in published version] was to come into force when the number of Chinese in New Zealand reached 5,000. After that point, a maximum of one Chinese passenger per 10 tons of a ship's cargo would be imposed and a fee of £10 per Chinese landing in New Zealand was to be paid. The Chinese Immigrants Act Amendment Act, 1888, 52 Vict. 34, increased the ratio of Chinese to cargo to 1 per 100 tons. The Asiatic Restriction Act, 1896, 60 Vict. 64 (which excluded Indians and Jews from its provisions), lifted the freight ratio to 1 Asiatic per 200 tons, imposed a landing/poll-tax of £100 per Asiatic, and required payment of the poll-tax for any non-naturalised Asiatic who had left the colony and wished to return. The poll tax for Asiatic immigrants was not abolished until 1944. King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand,* p. 368. For European attitudes to Chinese see Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh,* p. 12.

[223] The Asiatic Restriction Act, 1896, 60 Vict. 64.

[224] Chinese were frequently held to be susceptible to 'unnatural vices' such as homosexuality. Eldred-Grigg, *Pleasures of the Flesh,* p. 47.

[225] Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 91; James Bennett, 'Maori as Honorary Members of the White Tribe', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 29:3 (2001): 43. Vilification of Chinese was often seen in cartoons, for example, The *Observer,* 6 August 1892, depicted a Chinese market gardener undercutting the prices of a European gardener.

[226] For example, James Bodell, *A Soldier's View of Empire,* p. 144.

seats in the House of Representatives recognised the contribution *kupapa* had made in the New Zealand Wars,[228] but when the fighting ended, Maori interest in military service also ended. There were, however, at least two Maori volunteer corps in the 1880s, and corps in Hawke's Bay and Canterbury are known to have had Maori sections.[229]

Different commandants had different attitudes to Maori volunteers. Colonel Penton was concerned about arming Maori and unenthusiastic about Maori corps. Major-General Babington hoped to increase Maori participation in volunteering but made little effort to do so.[230] European New Zealanders were, though, intensely proud of the twenty Maori in the 54-man contingent sent to Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee celebrations in London in 1897.[231]

In the 1880s and 1890s, most Maori lived in traditional, family-based groups in remote areas where they were isolated from much of the prosperity and the improvements in transport and communication infrastructure. By European standards, Maori housing was often poor, crowded or lacking in hygiene.[233] Although Maori were represented in parliament, played on sports teams and some graduated from universities, urban European New Zealanders seldom saw a Maori, and Maori were thought to be a dying race.[234] (The Maori population revived after 1900.)[235]

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[228] Belich, *The New Zealand Wars*, p. 309.
[229] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 528; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Forcs', p. 55.
[230] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 154; Crawford, 'The Role and Structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 54.
[231] Grace, *A Sketch of the New Zealand War*, p. 149; Christopher Pugsley, 'Images of Te Hokowhitu A Tu in the First World War' in Das Santanu, ed., *Race, Empire and First World War Writing,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 195.
[233] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 239–44.
[234] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 191.
[235] Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, p. 192.

The belief that Maori were heading towards extinction made the notion of racial decline an especially potent concept for nineteenth-century New Zealanders. Racial decline and the loss of species were vivid realities. They believed Maori were dying out, knew that the Moriori had all but gone, and that indigenous species such as the moa and huia were extinct or on the brink of it.[236] Furthermore, European New Zealanders had reasons to agree with social Darwinist doctrine concerning the superiority of races. They held themselves to be better Britons and guardians of the finest British stock, and none could escape the unambiguous evidence everywhere around them of the success their racial birthright was bringing. The wealth, the new factories, farms, houses, shops, schools, roads, railway lines, and telegraph connections, and the world-leading social-welfare initiatives combined to confirm that European New Zealanders were achieving the destiny of their highly evolved race and were truly making a Better Britain. If Maori were failing, the argument ran, it was because of their lower evolutionary state.

Social Darwinist attitudes about race fitted the experiences of European New Zealanders, justified the money and the progress that had been made, and explained why some shared in the benefits more than others. Despite recognising war as a means to cleanse the genetic pool and to prove the superiority of a race, racial theories and social Darwinism did not, as the previous chapter revealed, lead to increased participation in volunteering. As the next chapter shows, however, nineteenth-century beliefs about the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race

[236] Most of the few hundred remaining Moriori, an *iwi* (tribe) of Maori, had taken refuge on remote islands. The moa was an emu-like flightless bird that early Maori had hunted to extinction. The huia, a bird of flight whose feathers were prized by Maori, had become so rare that it was seldom if ever seen.

contributed to the public's enthusiasm for, and the initial optimism about, the war in South Africa.

The social changes and new ideologies of the late nineteenth century were the notes that combined to make the 'chord' Keith Sinclair described in a quotation earlier in this chapter.[237] The chord's several notes (empire, race, militarism) were in accord with, and reflected the mutually compatible nature of, many of the societal changes and new ideologies that emerged. The harmony that resulted was, it should be noted, serendipitous. The social changes and new convictions were not parts of a great plan, they did not share exactly the same aims or methods, and each found different degrees of favour in different parts of society for different reasons.

The new attitudes and beliefs that emerged in the late nineteenth century changed opinions about military service, race, physical fitness, Christianity, and sport, but had little immediate effect on patterns of behaviour. The proportion of service-age males in volunteer corps declined in the 1890s. In fact, the participation rate reached its nadir in this period. Annual government spending on defence did not exceed 3s per capita until the South African War. However—as had happened in Taranaki in 1860, during the Russian scares and in response to other tensions—crises and threats continued to stimulate action. In 1899, when Boer farmers in South Africa took up arms against the British, New Zealand was richer, more militaristic, more empire-minded, and more confident in itself than it had previously been. New Zealanders were ready to support the war, willing to donate money to the war, and eager to go and fight in it. New social values and beliefs had not changed the nature of responses to crises, but had increased the level of response.

[237] Sinclair, *Imperial Federation*, p. 22.

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CHAPTER FOUR

New Zealand's Involvement in the South African War of 1899–1902

The South African War of 1899–1902 influenced New Zealand's 1909 military reforms in sometimes convoluted or contradictory ways. For example, although in the wake of the conflict many maintained that untrained, colonial citizen soldiers were superior to British regulars, others concluded that better training of colonial soldiers was needed, that colonial officers lacked proficiency and that the administration of New Zealand's military forces was inadequate. There was little disagreement that New Zealand should take part in the war, though the reasons for that opinion were not uniform. The composition of New Zealand contingents changed over time but all experienced similar challenges in their formation, equipping, transport, administration, and military skills. The war led to an exponential growth in the number of men in volunteer corps, but to no other improvements. While the realisation of the implications of the South African War took longer to be understood by New Zealanders than they did by Britons, New Zealand eventually learnt lessons from the war. Seven years after the conflict ended, the colony acted on what it had learnt.

The Dutch first settled in the Cape of Good Hope in the seventeenth century. The Cape became a British possession in 1806, and in 1852 Britain recognised the Transvaal and the Orange Free State as independent republics. In 1877, however, British policy changed and the Transvaal was annexed. The Boers were unhappy about the change.[1] From December 1880 to March 1881 British forces clashed with Boers in the First Anglo-Boer War. Four matters dominate the British attitude to the Boer states in the late 1890s: the rich gold mines in the Transvaal; the Boers' treatment of *uitlanders* (immigrant, often British, workers who outnumbered the Boers); the imperialistic ambitions of politicians such as Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner; and a desire to avenge the humiliation of Majuba Hill (a prominent defeat in 1881). For the Boers, restoration of full independence and the protection of their livelihoods and culture mattered most.[2]

New Zealand newspapers had been reporting on developments in southern Africa and the Boer treatment of *uitlanders* since at least 1894.[3] They also reported the response of other settler colonies. In mid-1899 newspapers revealed that Canada had offered Britain 1,000 troops, and that 1,800 New South Wales citizen soldiers had volunteered to serve in South Africa.[4] There were also signs of a local willingness to fight: 'this time the Boers must submit to the stronger Power … or be compelled to submit at the point of a bayonet' the *Auckland Star* urged.[5] Rumours that the New Zealand government was preparing to send a contingent appeared in

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[1] Thomas Packenham, *The Boer War.* Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1979, 1997, p. xxi.
[2] Ibid, p. 13, pp. 25–35, pp. 50–53; Craig Stockings, *Letters from the Veldt: The Imperial Advance to Pretoria through the eyes of Edward Hutton and his Brigade of Colonials*. Newport, NSW: Big Sky Publishing, 2020, pp. 12–13. Chamberlain was the Secretary of State for the Colonies; Milner was the Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for Southern Africa.
[3] 'Disenfranchisement of Aliens', *Taranaki Herald,* 11 June 1894, p. 2; 'Town and Country', *Lyttelton Times,* 25 June 1894, p. 5; editorial, *New Zealand Herald,* 28 June 1894, p. 4.
[4] 'Notes and Comments', *New Zealand Herald*, 24 June 1899, p. 4; 'The Transvaal Tangle', *Taranaki Herald,* 26 June 1899, p. 2.; 'Local and General', *New Zealand Times,* 29 July 1899, p. 5.
[5] 'War Preparations in the Transvaal', *Auckland Star,* 16 August 1899, p. 4.

September.[6] Members of volunteer corps offered to fight in South Africa.[7] Having been kept informed about developments in southern Africa, encouraged by newspapers to take a stand, aware that several Australian colonies were contemplating sending troops, the public responded to government plans to raise a contingent with enthusiastic approval.[8] It has been contended that New Zealand was the most bellicose of the settler colonies.[9]

New Zealand and other settler colonies may have been ready to send troops, but in 1899 the War Office saw no need for them. It was confident that the British Army needed no assistance to defeat a few thousand Dutch farmers.[10] The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, regarded colonial participation in a quite different light. Like Charles Dilke and John Robert Seeley, Chamberlain saw the empire as an asset and sought closer relations with it, the settler colonies in particular .[11] He felt that if colonial governments offered troops for imperial service, it would demonstrate to other powers that all parts of the empire would spontaneously rise up if any part of the empire were threatened. Chamberlain therefore quietly prompted the settler colonies to offer troops. He was not seeking military assistance and was almost indifferent about the quality of the men.[12]

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[6] Editorial, *Otago Daily Times,* 2 September 1899, p. 4.
[7] 'The Transvaal Crisis: Offer of New Zealand Contingent', *New Zealand Herald,* 13 September 1899, p. 5; 'Volunteer and Defence Notes', *Auckland Star,* 21 September 1899, p. 3.
[8] Luke Trainor, 'Building Nations: Australia and New Zealand', in David Omissi and Andrew S Thompson, eds, *The Impact of the South African War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, p. 263; Keith Jeffrey, 'Kruger's Farmers, Strathcona's Horse, Sir George Clarke's camels and the Kaiser's battleships: the Impact of the South African War on Imperial Defence', in Donal Lowry, ed., *The South African War Reappraised.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 193; 'A Troop for the Transvaal', *Evening Post,* 27 September 1899.
[9] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 141; Eldred-Grigg, *A Southern Gentry,* p. 143.
[10] Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada.* Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 5th ed. 2007, p. 113.
[11] Chamberlain, imperial federation and imperial defence are examined in detail in the next chapter.
[12] Chamberlain to Minto, 22 February 1900, TNA WO 32/7929.

Chamberlain's aim in 1899 was to warn Britain's rivals of the loyalty and military might of the empire.[13]

A short time later, 'Black Week' in December 1899 dramatically changed the rationale for colonial participation: they were needed. A recent analysis by Douglas Delaney found that, if the troops recruited in Africa were included in the calculation, almost 23 per cent of imperial forces in South Africa came from the colonies. Those 101,276 men were, Delaney held, of real value.[14]

Turning back to the New Zealand experience, what is more surprising than the enthusiasm New Zealanders showed for a war with the Boer states, was the extent to which the strategic purpose of colonial contingents in 1899 was recognised. Chamberlain's objective were not made public, but newspapers reproduced it. The *New Zealand Herald* explained that although New Zealand's contingent would be small, it would serve 'as an object-lesson to the world that the "Sons of Empire" are ever willing to shed their blood "for England, home, and beauty".'[15] The opinion offered by Christchurch's *Press* could have been written by Chamberlain himself:

> Continental nations will naturally remark, 'If the Australasian colonies will spontaneously send over two thousand men to England's aid, out of mere sentiment, when there is no need for their assistance, what will they not do when England has to face one or more first-rate Powers, and is in real peril?' And this is a consideration which will make them think a little before they proceed to carry out any of their plans for pulling down Great Britain from her high estate.[16]

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[13] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 177.
[14] Douglas E. Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the dominions and India, 1902–1945.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 15. Delaney's contention that 23 per cent of the imperial force came from colonies and dominions is a departure from the 11 per cent given in earlier works such as Reader, *At Duty's Call*, p. 12, who gave the figure of 11 per cent. The difference springs largely from Delaney's inclusion of troops from southern Africa. The 48,862 troops from colonies outside Africa constituted approximately 11 per cent of the 448,435-strong imperial force.
[15] 'Auckland's Contingent: The Final Arrangements', *New Zealand Herald,* 9 October 1899, p. 5.
[16] 'The New Zealand Contingent', *Press,* 9 October 1899, p. 4.

While such observations echoed Chamberlain's thinking, there is no evidence that editors understood they were exposing the Colonial Secretary's rationale. It is likely that they coincidentally felt the same as Chamberlain.

New Zealand approved sending a contingent on 27 September 1899, two weeks before the war started.[17] The debate in the House of Representatives exposed the reasons New Zealand supported the war and the arguments of the few who opposed participation. Opening the debate, Premier Seddon promptly explained the reason was 'to prove our devotion to the Empire'.[18] Predictably, he then turned to costs and warned that a contingent would require 'a heavy expenditure'.[19] Other justifications he offered were that New Zealand was part of a great empire, the British in the Transvaal had been deprived of their rights, and that British actions and demands were 'moderate, manly and just'.[20] A force of 209 mounted infantry comprising nine officers, 28 NCOs, 168 privates, four drummers (and mounts for them all) was contemplated.[21] Seddon claimed he was 'voicing the mind and the feeling of the people of this colony when I say that they support this proposal', for which he sought unanimous approval.[22]

Seddon's statement that he was voicing the sentiments of the public should not be overlooked. It confirms the opinion (cited in the previous chapter) that Seddon tended more to say what people already felt and thought more than he stated his own convictions. Moreover, Seddon was hoping for the support of the

[17] Clayton, *The New Zealand Army*, p. 64.
[18] NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 75.
[19] Ibid, 75.
[20] Ibid, 76.
[21] Ibid, 75.
[22] NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 77.

House and, thus, the implication that joining the fight against the Boers was the public's wish warned those opposed or unsure that any other stance would not be well received by the electorate.

The Leader of the Opposition seconded the motion.[23] Six MHRs pointed out that Britain did not need military aid and had not asked for it.[24] Intentionally or not, such statements reinforced the notion that the purpose of the contingent was to demonstrate the unity of the empire and New Zealand's loyalty, not to bolster a beleaguered army. The Opposition's James Allen (who would become Minister of Defence in 1912) explicitly acknowledged the strategic role of sending a contingent: 'It is the united front that will prevent others from interfering with us. I take it that is the real sentiment underlying our action on this occasion.'[25] The Liberal minister, Robert McNab (who, in 1909, would tour New Zealand campaigning for compulsory military training), argued that offering a contingent was premature, that the fight was largely to avenge past grievances, and that it interfered in the internal affairs of a colony. He would oppose the motion.[26]

The statements made by MHRs often reflected the values and attitudes discussed in the previous chapter. William Massey (an Opposition MHR who would become Prime Minister in 1912) justified his support in imperialistic terms. 'When we see the Empire, of which we form a part, and which extends its protection to us, in trouble or in difficulty it is our duty to share the cost and bear a part of the responsibility.'[27] Walter Carncross expected that the benefits of a contingent would

[23] Ibid, 78.
[24] Hutchinson (Patea), Carson (Wanganui), Hutcheson (Wellington City), Taylor (Christchurch City), McNab (Mataura), and Allen (Bruce), NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 80–88.
[25] NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 86–87.
[26] Ibid, 87–88.
[27] Ibid, 89.

include the stimulation of a martial spirit in New Zealand youth and that on their return battle-experienced men would help improve volunteer corps.[28]

Seddon's motion did not achieve the unanimous support he sought; the result was 54 for and five against.[29] The voting of New Zealand MHRs was similar to their counterparts in Australian colonies. Victoria agreed to send a contingent by 64 votes to 14, New South Wales by 87 to 10 and South Australia by 18 to 10. Contingents were approved in Queensland and Western Australia without a division and without a record of votes in Tasmania.[30]

The public response to the decision to send a contingent was almost wholly positive.[31] The Defence Department was overwhelmed by applications to serve.[32] It is impossible to know with certainty why men volunteered. No survey of trooper motivations was conducted and, even had one been attempted, it would have lacked the sophisticated methodologies modern surveys can use to uncover real motives. It has been proposed that men came forward because military service was respectable, out of loyalty to the empire, in indignation at the Boer treatment of *uitlanders*, as a result of war-tolerant social-Darwinist thinking, or because fighting in South Africa promised to be an adventure.[33] An Australian recruit described his reasons as a mix of those motives:

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[28] Ibid, 90.
[29] Ibid, 96–7. The Legislative Council passed the contingent proposal 36 to one. 'Discussion in the Council', *Lyttelton Times,* 30 September 1899, p. 7.
[30] Guy Murfey, '"Fighting for the Unity of the Empire": Australian Support for the Second Anglo-South African War, 1899–1902'. MPhil thesis, UNSW Canberra, 2017, p. 23.
[31] 'The New Zealand Contingent', *Lyttelton Times,* 30 September 1899, p. 7.
[32] 'The New Zealand Contingent', *New Zealand Herald,* 10 October 1899, p. 5.
[33] King, *History of New Zealand*, p. 283; Murray Deaker, 'Seddon's Contribution to Imperial Relations 1897 to 1902'. MA thesis, University of Otago, 1968, p. 22; Simon Johnson, 'Sons of Empire: A Study of New Zealand Ideas and Public Opinion During the Boer War'. BA Hons thesis, Massey University, 1974, p. 23; John Crawford, 'The Impact of the War on the New Zealand Military Forces and Society', in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, the British Empire and the South African War 1899–1902.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003, pp. 209–11.

> Because the other chaps wer' joinin', and there was so much talk about it. Then, I s'pose, it's the right thing to do to stand up for y're own country, for, of course, England's our country as well as Australia. Then there's the change a feller gets, and the experience, and every feller natur'ly likes to be in a thing when its going'.[34]

What can be established is that newspaper editors—key influencers of public opinion—were keen to decide the troops' motivation. Occasional criticisms of troopers or cynical allegations about their motives brought swift admonition.[35] The press insisted that it was patriotism and loyalty to the empire that motivated the troops. The same was true across the Tasman where newspapers attributed enlistment numbers to the empire and colonial affection for it.[36]

The public's interest in the first contingent, and their desire to show their support for it, was tireless. When members of the first contingent attended the theatre, the street outside the venue was crowded with well-wishers, audience members wore badges and ribbons supporting the contingent, patriotic songs were sung and spontaneous cheering took place frequently.[37] Similar displays of emotion were recorded preceding the departure of Australian contingents.[38] Vast crowds gathered to farewell the New Zealand contingents, especially the earlier ones. With no television, radio or internet in 1899, and with photographs only rarely printed in newspapers, members of the public who wanted to witness a contingent's departure had to attend in person. Extra trains to and from Wellington (the port of departure)

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[34] Unnamed Victorian recruit quoted in Craig Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa, 1899–1902.* South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 23.
[35] See, for example, 'The New Zealand Contingent', *New Zealand Herald,* 10 October 1899, p. 5; 'New Zealand Patriotism', *New Zealand Times,* 20 October 1899, p. 4.
[36] Murfey, 'Fighting for the Unity of the Empire', p. 5.
[37] 'The Contingent at the Play', *Press,* 19 October 1899, p. 5.
[38] Murfey, 'Fighting for the Unity of the Empire', p.86.

were run for the first contingent's sailing.[39] It was estimated that over 6,000 people travelled to Wellington for the send-off.[40] One newspaper reported the crowd as between 40,000 and 50,000 people.[41] The estimate was an exaggeration. To achieve 50,000 spectators, every one of the 43,000 men, women and children then living in Wellington, all the 6,000 visitors plus a thousand others would have to have been on the streets. By comparison, approximately half of Sydney's population reportedly turned out to farewell the New South Wales contingent.[42] There is no doubt, though, that the crowds in Wellington were large and enthusiastic.

At the farewell on the wharves, Seddon described the 200-strong first contingent in a manner that made it seem more significant than its modest size, and made New Zealand's contingent seem important. He spoke of firsts. The Liberal government was the *first* Australasian government to sanction a contingent. The New Zealand contingent was the *first* to depart.[43] The *Auckland Star* agreed that the contingent was 'especially creditable to the colony' because it sailed before those from other colonies.[44] Other newspapers made similar observations.[45] Like newspapers in Australia and Britain, New Zealand newspapers were almost wholly supportive of the war.[46]

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[39] 'The New Zealand Contingent', *New Zealand Herald,* 20 October 1899, p. 5.
[40] 'The Influx of Visitors', *Evening Post,* 23 October 1899, p. 5.
[41] 'Arrangements Far from Perfect', *Auckland Star,* 23 October 1899, p. 2.
[42] Murfey, 'Fighting for the Unity of the Empire', p. 77.
[43] 'Speech by Premier', *Auckland Star,* 23 October 1899, p. 2. Other newspapers printed an almost identical version, via the United Press Association, for example, 'Another Account: The Farewell Speech', *Otago Daily Times,* 23 October 1899, p. 5.
[44] 'Speech by Premier', *Auckland Star,* 23 October 1899, p. 2.
[45] 'New Zealand's Contingent', *New Zealand Herald,* 23 October 1899, p. 4; 'Departure of the Contingent', *Press,* 23 October 1899, p. 5.
[46] Murfey, 'Fighting for the Unity of the Empire', pp. 57–59, p. 74.



Figure 4.1. New Zealand's contribution to the war in South Africa did not go unnoticed in Britain. The departure of the first contingent as depicted in the *Illustrated London News,* 9 December 1899. transpressnz. blogspot.com /2013/09/departure-from-wellington-to-boer-war.html

Figure 4.2. A photograph of the departure of the first contingent from Wellington, 21 October 1899. ATL PAColl-9349.

The Liberal party made as much domestic and imperial capital from the contingent and the South African War as it could The country would go to the polls in December and support for the Liberals had been waning.[47] Seddon decided that

[47] Sinclair, Imperial Federation, p. 33.

the war was a bandwagon onto which he should leap.[48] Unfortunately, Seddon overdid it. The Premier's Christmas card, which bore the image of a ship and portraits of two contingent officers (Figure 4.3), caused no offence. A Government Printing Office pamphlet, however, containing MHRs' speeches in the contingent debate, and who voted for and against, was regarded as going too far.[49] Seddon was also harsh on those who opposed participation. When an MHR and Wellington Harbour Board member voted against a harbour board motion to endorse sending a contingent, Seddon had him removed from the board. He also had the 'Hansard recorder' (parliamentary stenographer) James Grattan Grey sacked after an article Grey had written criticising colonial participation in South Africa was published in the *New York Times*.[50] Seddon's decision to connect himself with the contingent and the war proved to be a wise move. The Liberals were returned to government with an increased majority, and in January 1900 Seddon took the defence portfolio for himself.[51]

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[48] Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, p. 91; Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick"', p. 77; Brooking, *Richard Seddon,* p. 324; Christopher Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War.* Auckland: Reed Books, 2004, p. 40.
[49] 'Transvaal Contingent: Deplorable Party Tactics', *New Zealand Herald,* 24 October 1899, p. 5.
[50] Brooking, *Richard Seddon,* p. 331.
[51] Clayton, *The New Zealand Army*, p. 64, p. 67.

Figure 4.3. The Premier's 1899 Christmas card, sent out at election time, associated Seddon with the First Contingent. In addition to Seddon's photograph it bears photographs of Major Alfred Robin (Commanding Officer, First Contingent) and Captain Richard Davies. ATL 23053768.

Domestic political advantage was not Seddon's only reason for supporting involvement in the conflict. He was an imperialist, loyal to the empire and a vocal supporter of Joseph Chamberlain's initiatives concerning imperial unity.[52] Moreover, he believed that contributing troops would strengthen New Zealand's voice in imperial decision-making,[53] demonstrate that New Zealand did not need to federate with the Australian colonies (which he opposed),[54] and he expected to get something in return.[55] He did. After years of requesting that New Zealand or Britain should take possession of further territory in the Pacific, Whitehall allowed New Zealand to annex the Cook Islands. The approval was regarded as recognition of the

[52] Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, p. 108.
[53] Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense'*, p. 263. On this matter, see the next chapter.
[54] F. L. W. Wood, 'Why did New Zealand not join the Australian Commonwealth in 1990–1901?', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 2:2 (1968): 128; Miles Fairburn, 'New Zealand and Australasian Federation, 1883–1901', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 4:2 (1970): 156; Murray Deaker, 'Seddon's Contribution to Imperial Relations 1897 to 1902', MA thesis, University of Otago, 1968, p. 14; Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 320.
[55] Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, p. 368.

support the colony was giving in South Africa.[56] Seddon's stance on the conflict with the Boers was, therefore, a blend of his personal imperial loyalty and outright political savvy. Innately aware of public opinion (Belich referred to Seddon as 'that walking opinion poll'), Seddon linked his and the Liberal party's popularity to the popularity of the war.[57] There were only advantages to be gained.

In total, New Zealand filled about 6,500 combatant positions in South Africa. Because some served in more than one contingent, approximately 6,080 individuals filled those 6,500 roles.[58] The European male population of New Zealand in 1899 was 403,628.[59] Men aged from 23 to 40 could volunteer.[60] Based on age ratios in the 1896 census, there were approximately 121,000 men between 20 and 40 years of age.[61] The 6,000 who fought in South Africa therefore account for about five per cent of those eligible. By comparison, the Australian colonies provided a total of approximately 20,000 men, roughly 3.5 per cent of those eligible.[62]

Ten contingents were sent; each served for about a year. There were two hundred men in the first contingent, approximately 260 in each of the second and

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[56] Luke Trainor, 'Building Nations: Australia and New Zealand', in David Omissi and Andrew S Thompson, eds, *The Impact of the South African War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, p. 260; Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership,* p. 142; Murray Deaker, 'Seddon's Contribution to Imperial Relations 1897 to 1902', MA thesis, University of Otago, 1968, pp. 18–19. Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick"', p. 79, held that the Cook Islands was a token concession. He also noted that the larger island groups of Fiji and Tonga were not offered to New Zealand.
[57] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 228.
[58] Colin McGeorge, 'The Social and Geographical Composition of the New Zealand Contingents' in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, the British Empire and the South African War 1899–1902.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003, p. 102.
[59] Population 1862–1911, *Official Yearbook*, 1912. Europeans only, non-Europeans could not serve in South Africa.
[60] NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 75.
[61] Census data from 1896 determined that 17.49 per cent of non-Maori males were 20 to 30 years of age and 12.47 per cent were between 30 and 40 years of age, a total of 29.96 per cent. Proportions of different age-groups, *Official Yearbook*, 1890.
[62] The figure is approximate only. Using the New Zealand census ratio that 30 per cent of males were 20 to 40 years of age (making 600,000 from a male population of two million), the 20,000 who served were 3.5 per cent of eligible males. The 20,000 figure is from Murfey, 'Fighting for the Unity of the Empire', p. 5. Murphey's finding that 6 per cent of 20- to 30-year-olds served (p. 107) does not conflict with the 3.5 per cent figure for 20- to 40-year-olds calculated here.

third, and 526 in the fifth. These contingents all had a surgeon and veterinary surgeon but few other specialist officers or specialist NCOs save farriers, buglers and artillery.[63] Later contingents were larger. The eighth contingent, which sailed in February 1902, had 1,011 officers and men. It also contained a brigade-chaplain, a transport officer, a provost-sergeant, and pay personnel. The ninth and tenth contingents were also 1,000-strong formations.

It is difficult to trace precisely where, in what roles and in which incidents colonial soldiers fought in South Africa. In the preface to his history of New Zealand involvement, David Hall complained that, because contingents were often broken up and components served under different commands in different theatres, 'it is sometimes exceedingly teasing' to determine exactly who did what.[64] Sixty years later, Geoffrey Blainey explained in his foreword to Craig Wilcox's history of Australian participation that Wilcox had, for the same reasons, faced the same challenges.[65]

The first, second and third contingents had all arrived in South Africa by late March 1900. In May of that year they were merged into the New Zealand Mounted Rifles (NZMR) with Major Alfred Robin as Commanding Officer. The NZMR served in Major-General Edward Hutton's 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade. Hutton had been the General Officer Commanding in New South Wales and in Canada and knew colonial citizen soldiers. He recognised that colonial volunteers would be anxious about their treatment by imperial officers and that, because they were inexperienced and easily offended, the men would need the 'nicest and most tactful

[63] New Zealand Contingents: Nominal Rolls, AJHR H-6, 1900, pp. 1–15, pp. 25–34.
[64] D. O. W. Hall, *The New Zealanders in South Africa 1988–1902.* Uckfield, East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 1941, reprint n.d., p. xvi.
[65] Geoffrey Blainey, Foreword, in Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, no page number.

handling'.[66] Hutton had no doubts, though, about their 'inherent soldierly qualities … and their aptitude for military service.'[67] By August 1900 the 720-man strength of the NZMR had been halved. Most of those lost had transferred: 60 men joined the rail and telegraph, 90 were detached, and a hundred enlisted in the South African Police.[68] Only sometimes did the NZMR operate as a unit. It was frequently broken into squadrons and individual men were detached or served as scouts. Prominent engagements included Slingersfontein ('New Zealand Hill') in January 1900, the relief of Kimberley in February, Diamond Hill in June, and the capture of Pretoria in July.

The fourth contingent, commanded by Major Richard Davies (a captain in the first contingent), and the fifth contingent (Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart Newall) served with the Rhodesian Field Force. Squadrons from these contingents escorted convoys, captured Boer stock, cleared country to deny the Boers sustenance, and supervised prisoners of war.[69]

The sixth contingent, commanded by the permanent force's Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Banks, was deployed mostly in the Transvaal, often in units of forty to one hundred men. They fought at Pietersburg in March 1901, and elements were involved at Standerton and Paardeplaats, often in close cooperation Queensland men.[70] The sixth was the least disciplined contingent. A number of soldiers jumped ship when it stopped en route to South Africa.[71] A deputation of the contingent's

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[66] Hutton, 7 April 1900, in Craig Stockings, *Letters from the Veldt*, p. 101–02.
[67] Hutton, 7 April 1900, in Stockings, *Letters from the Veldt*, p. 102.
[68] Excluding officers, the first contingent was down to 80, the second had 110 left and the third 100. Hall, *South Africa*, p. 27.
[69] Ibid, pp. 40–45.
[70] Ibid, pp. 55–57.
[71] Commandant 6th contingent to Commandant NZ Forces, 15 February 1901, ANZ AD34 3.

sergeants, acting as if they were union delegates, raised other ranks' grievances with Colonel Banks in February 1901, and in June 1901 the contingent went on strike.[72]

The 61-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. Porter commanded the seventh contingent, which took part in Kitchener's 'new model' drives: 50-mile long lines of men, ten yards apart, to sweep Boers from the veldt. The seventh was the first New Zealand contingent to receive reinforcements in theatre (100 men arrived on 3 March 1902), and to have more fatalities from action and wounds than from disease.[73] (Overall, 133, or 58 per cent, of the 228 New Zealand men who died in South Africa, died from disease, usually typhoid and then called 'enteric fever'.)[74] The eighth and ninth contingents arrived just before the Vereeniging peace settlement and saw little action; the tenth saw none at all.

Field conditions for the New Zealanders, indeed for all colonial and British troops, were often harsh. Men were frequently at risk of ambush or snipers, nearly constantly on the move, and often engaged in skirmishes and chases. Days could be searing hot, the nights freezing. The imperial logistics system seldom coped. Ammunition and basic equipment such as cooking pots, fuel for fires and medical supplies were often in short supply or absent. Pay and mail were regularly late. Men and horses went without food.[75] In April 1900 General Hutton wrote that his mixed British and colonial force had 'been fighting and marching continually for the last three months, and are breech-less, boot-less, and shirt-less.'[76] Recognising that the supplies he could receive were insufficient to feed, mount, dress and equip his force,

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[72] Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience*, p. 46; Hall, *South Africa,*, p. 54; Christopher Pugsley, 'Australia, Canada and New Zealand and the War in South Africa, 1899–1902', *The Volunteers,* 25:2 (1999): 106.
[73] Hall, *South Africa,* p. 62, p. 67, p. 71.
[74] Ibid, p. 97.
[75] Entries for 20 and 21 December and 8 May 1900, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5.
[76] Hutton, 11 April 1900, in Stockings, *Letters from the Veldt*, p. 106.

Hutton focused on food as the first priority. Whenever he could, however, he sought out supplies to improve conditions for his men.[77]

Although New Zealand troops endured the same shortages and conditions as other forces, a number thought they were particularly hard done by.[78] Some of the grievances were justified. The imperial scale of rations was insufficient for most colonials, who were used to eating more and better food. Mounted troops—which all the New Zealanders were—were often sent well ahead of supply trains and had it harder than infantry or artillery who travelled with supply vehicles.[79] Only the later contingents had chaplains, transport officers, paymasters and the like.[80] A critical factor is that New Zealand soldiers could compare at first hand their in-field conditions with those of British forces who often had service corps support.[81]

Around the time that the first contingent was involved its first serious action (at Jasfontein Farm) in December 1899, British forces suffered a number of reverses. It was dubbed 'Black Week'. In New Zealand and throughout the empire it led not to despair, but to an increase in support for the war. Three themes emerged in the responses to Black Week: a resurgence of affection for the empire; a renewed commitment to defend it and the British race; and increased intolerance of those opposed to the war. News that the governments of New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria had offered further contingents was proof, the *Evening Post* argued, 'that the people of Greater Britain have the same doggedness' as Britons and any suggestion of giving in was 'unworthy of our race'.[82] (The use of Seely's 'Greater

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[77] Hutton, 11 April 1900, in Stockings, *Letters from the Veldt*, p. 108.
[78] See later discussion, especially the opinions of Major Jowsey.
[79] Hall, *South Africa.* pp. 79–80.
[80] See earlier.
[81] Blair Nicholson, 'Viewpoints on the Veldt: Attitudes and Opinions of New Zealand Soldiers during the South African War, 1899–1902', MA thesis, University of Waikato, 2011, pp. 71–4.
[82] 'Imperial Patriotism', *Evening Post,* 16 December 1899, p. 4.

Britain' reflects the extent to which New Zealanders were aware of the debate about the role of colonies in the empire.) The *Auckland Star* claimed 'the weight of public opinion throughout the country is greatly in favour' of a second contingent, and that those who thought the war unjustified were 'the enemies of their race and country.'[83] A second contingent was quickly formed and dispatched.[84]

Figure 4.4. The second contingent camp in Newtown Park, Wellington, in 1900. Note the spectators and the benches provided for them. Original image credited as ATL PA1-O-242-01. nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/newtown-park-camp

Black Week encouraged New Zealanders to make, and the press to publicise, donations to 'Patriotic' and 'More Men' funds.[85] Businesses and the public had given money and goods to the first contingent, but after Black Week donating took off.[86] In late December 1899 a public meeting in Dunedin raised £3,184 (approximately

[83] 'The Second New Zealand Contingent', *Auckland Star,* 20 December 1899, p. 4.
[84] The second contingent departed Wellington on 20 January 1900. The New Zealand Contingents: Nominal Rolls, AJHR H-6 1900, p. 5.
[85] 'The Patriotic Fund', *Press,* 20 December 1899, p. 7; 'The Relief Funds', *Evening Post,* 21 December 1899, p. 5.
[86] 'The Transvaal: The Needs of the Contingent', *New Zealand Times,* 12 October 1899, p. 7; 'Comforts Conveniences, and Farewells', *Evening Post,* 21 October 1899, p. 5.

$623,000 in 2020 values).[87] A few days later, Christchurch businessmen met and gave £1,591/15/- ($312,000).[88] Otago High School raised £23/8/6 ($4,600), mostly from the boys.[89] The Mayor of Wanganui cabled Seddon in early 1900 to say that 150 local men had volunteered, more were anticipated and that the public's 'great enthusiasm' meant it was 'simply raining money'.[90]

Even before the second contingent sailed there were calls for a third contingent. It too drew enthusiastic support.[91] The third (and fourth) contingents were funded entirely by donations.[92] According to David Hall, the New Zealand public gave £113,256 in support of the war.[93] If that figure is correct, it was a staggering amount of money, the equivalent of about $22 million in 2020 terms, and represented a donation by New Zealand's 800,000 men, women and children of around 3s 3d ($27) per head.[94] While it is not a direct comparison, up to 3 March 1900 the 1.3 million people of New South Wales raised £56,034 (approximately 5d per person).[95] South Australia was the only Australian colony where public donations covered all the costs of its bushmen contingent.[96]

Not only were the third and fourth contingents different in being funded by public subscription, they were different in composition. The first two contingents

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[87] 'The Patriotic Fund', *Otago Daily Times,* 30 December 1899, p. 10. The 2020 equivalent was calculated at rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/inflation-calculator.
[88] 'The Canterbury War Fund', *Press,* 28 December 1899, p. 2.
[89] Stephen Carruthers, 'Duty to Serve? The Role of Secondary Schools in Preparing New Zealand Soldiers for Enlistment in the First World War'. MA thesis, Massey University, 2015, p. 21.
[90] Mayor Wanganui to Seddon, 24 January [?] 1900, ANZ AD34 8.
[91] Chairman of Meeting in Hawera to Seddon, 11 January 1900; Fielding Town Clerk to Seddon, 6 January 1900, ANZ AD34 8.
[92] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 113. The third contingent departed on 17 February 1900, the fourth on 31 March 1900. New Zealand Contingents: Nominal Rolls, AJHR H-6 1900, p. 11 and p. 16.
[93] Hall, *South Africa*, p. 9.
[94] Hall gave no source for the figure he quoted. To this writer, it seems high. The 2020 equivalents were calculated at rbnz.govt.nz/ monetary-policy/inflation-calculator.
[95] Murfey, 'Fighting for the Unity of the Empire', p. 94.
[96] Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, p. 34.

were dominated by men drawn from volunteer corps.[97] The third and fourth were known as the 'rough riders' (a name taken from Theodore Roosevelt's force in Cuba during the Spanish-American War of 1898).[98] They were a version of the bushmen contingents Australian colonies formed and were composed of men from mostly rural areas with no volunteer experience but who were expected to be superior riders and shots.[99] The fifth and all later contingents were also mostly made up of inexperienced men and were funded by the British government.

The six thousand or so men sent from New Zealand were allegedly all Europeans. Maori were ineligible to serve because British authorities had decided that only Europeans would fight in South Africa.[100] John Mitcham identified a number of reasons why Britain wanted the conflict to be a white man's war: it was a show of Anglo-Saxon (not other races') loyalty to the empire; the British public and parliament were opposed to the use of non-white troops against white adversaries; any indication that Britain had to rely on non-white forces would imply that it was unable to defend itself; and a concern that indigenous fighters might be barbaric.[101] Additionally, allowing black Africans to witness non-white troops defeating white Boers could, some argued, inspire Africans to challenge white hegemony in South Africa.[102] The use of Indian sepoys, and the offers of indigenous

[97] Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 309; Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience,* pp. 52–3.
[98] Donal Lowry, '"The Boers were the Beginning of the End"?: The Wider Impact of the South African War', in Donal Lowry, ed., *The South African War Reappraised.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 213.
[99] Hall, *South Africa,* p. 35.
[100] The British and some southern African armies nonetheless employed Africans as servants, non-combatants and as soldiers: Nicholson, 'Viewpoints on the Veldt', p. 41.
[101] Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, pp. 78–79.
[102] Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, p. 24.

troops from the Malay States and several African colonies were, like Maori participation, declined.[103]

Maori representatives in parliament all supported participation in the war.[104] Seddon took up the Maori case with the Colonial Office but failed to have the race restriction lifted.[105] Maori had to be turned away. A prominent case was that of Ahere Hohepa (also known as Arthur Josephs).[106] In February 1900, Colonel Penton regretted having to reject Hohepa, whom he thought one of the ablest of those who had come forward.[107] Empathetic accounts of Hohepa's exclusion appeared in newspapers throughout the colony.[108] Despite British policy, a few Maori and part-Maori nonetheless served in South Africa.[109] Presumably they were of racially ambiguous appearance and/or had European names. The writer Arthur Conan Doyle reported seeing Maori faces in New Zealand contingents.[110]

Sending off contingents put considerable strain on already meagre military-administration resources. The Department of Defence was given just 24 days to form, prepare, equip and dispatch the first contingent and its horses.[111] The reason

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[103] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 115 explains that no formal or written ban has survived or is known to have existed. McGibbon determined that the prohibition on non-white troops was 'probably more in the nature of a tacit understanding'; Jeffrey, 'Kruger's Farmers, p. 188.
[104] NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 96–7; The Maori-seat MHRs were Hone Heke (Northern), Henare Kaihau (Western), Tame Parata (Southern), and Wi Pere (Eastern).
[105] Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 237.
[106] 'New Zealand Rough Riders: Napier', *New Zealand Herald,* 8 February 1900, p. 5.
[107] 'Hawke's Bay Rough Riders', *Hawke's Bay Herald,* 8 February 1900, p. 3.
[108] 'The Third Contingent: Position of the Maoris', *New Zealand Times,* 13 February 1900 p. 5. Other newspapers that ran Hohepa's story included: *Poverty Bay Herald*, 8 February 1900; *Evening Post,* 8 February 1900; *New Zealand Herald,* 13 February 1900; *Auckland Star,* 13 February 1900; *Wairarapa Daily Times,* 13 February 1900. It is possible that Hohepa/Joseph served in the third contingent. The contingent's nominal roll lists '816, Private Joseph, A.' with a home town of Napier that fits with press reports of Hohepa/Joseph training in Hawke's Bay. New Zealand Contingents: Nominal Rolls, AJHR H-6 1900, p. 14; 'Hawke's Bay Rough Riders', *Hawke's Bay Herald,* 8 February 1900, p. 3.
[109] Palenski, *The Making of New Zealanders*, pp. 41–42; Richard Stowers, *Rough Riders at War.* Hamilton: Richard Stowers, 2nd ed. 2002, p. 12.
[110] A New Zealander [pseud.], *New Zealanders and the Boer War or Soldiers from the Land of the Moa.* Christchurch: Gordon and Gotch, n.d. [1901?], p. 202.
[111] The House of Representatives approved sending the first contingent on 27 September 1899. NZPD, Vol. 110 (27 September – 23 October 1899), 96–7. The contingent sailed on 21 October. New Zealand Contingents: Nominal Rolls, AJHR H-6, 1900, p. 1.

for the hurried departure was Seddon's desire to be the first colony to have a contingent sail.[112] The process was made difficult by there being no stand-by forces at the ready, no experience in forming contingents, little in government stores, too few administration personnel, and difficulties sourcing horses.[113]

Insufficient quantities of arms and equipment were held in armouries and stores. The Wellington and Petone Naval Volunteers had to give up their carbines for the first contingent to use.[114] Uniforms were in short supply and, worse, there was no khaki drill in the colony with which to make more uniforms. Fortuitously, the South Canterbury Infantry Battalion (a volunteer corps) had received a stock of khaki cloth and the Wellington College Rifles (also volunteers) had imported some uniforms. The cloth and uniforms were used. Six Wellington clothing manufacturers rushed to produce uniforms for the contingent as the men gathered in camp. The contingent received its uniforms before departure, but the quality and fit were so poor that three tailors were sent with the troops to make alterations at sea.[115] There were also problems with the boots New Zealand bootmakers were asked to hurriedly manufacture.[116] After just two months' service the Commanding Officer of the first contingent, Major Robin, reported 'equipment, clothing and [b]oots are now in a bad state'.[117]

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[112] John Crawford, 'The Best Mounted Troops in Africa?' in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, the British Empire and the South African War 1899–1902.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003, p. 77.
[113] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 109.
[114] 'The New Zealand Contingent: Notes from the Camp', *New Zealand Herald,* 20 October 1899, p. 5.
[115] Stowers, *Rough Riders at War*, p. 10; 'New Zealand's Contingent for the Transvaal', *Evening Post,* 10 October 1899, p. 6. The problems with rushed uniforms persisted. A tailor was also required on the third contingent's ship. Under-Secretary of Defence to Mr John Mullet, 14 February 1900, ANZ AD34 9.
[116] Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Robin to Defence HQ, 22 December 1899, ANZ AD34 4.
[117] Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Robin to Defence HQ, 21 and 27 January 1900, ANZ AD 34 4.

There were similar problems finding saddles. The Wellington Mounted Rifle Volunteers were ordered to return the saddles they had recently been issued, and commercial saddlers were instructed to quickly manufacture more.[118] Even before the contingent sailed there were concerns about the quality of the rush-order saddles. Officers knew that the saddlers had been given little time but decided the saddles would do.[119] Within weeks of the contingent's arrival in South Africa, the saddles were shown to be unsuitable.[120]

Finding horses was as much of a problem as finding arms, uniforms and saddles. Rather than purchasing horses for those who could not provide a mount of their own, the government asked the public to donate horses.[121] Too few horses were given and the government found itself having to hurriedly buy fifty.[122] To complicate matters further, the horses volunteers brought with them and those that were donated frequently failed veterinary inspections.[123] The first contingent's pre-departure camp in Wellington initially had no shelter for horses. The horses suffered during a cold snap, one dying as a result.[124] The horse stalls on transport ships were often inadequate and did not improve over time. The equine accommodation on the sixth contingent's ship was so poor that it had to be reconstructed on passage.[125] The inadequacy of stocks of arms, munitions and equipment, the paucity of

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[118] 'The New Zealand Contingent: Arranging Details', *Otago Daily Times,* 3 October 1899, p.5.
[119] 'The New Zealand Contingent: Notes from the Camp, *New Zealand Herald,* 20 October 1899, p. 5.
[120] Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Robin to Defence HQ, 22 December 1899, ANZ AD 34 4
[121] 'The Auckland Contingent: An Appeal for Horses', *New Zealand Herald,* 2 October 1899, p. 5. Hall, *South Africa,* p. 7, held that preference for places in the first contingent was given to those who could provide their own horses and, ideally, pay for their own equipment.
[122] 'The New Zealand Contingent: Horses for the Troops', *New Zealand Herald,* 9 October 1899, p. 6.
[123] 'The New Zealand Contingent: Horses for the Contingent', *New Zealand Herald,* 10 October 1899, p. 5.
[124] Ibid.
[125] Sergeant-Major Sperman [?] to Commandant 6th Contingent, 19 January 1901, ANZ AD34 3.

administration staff and their inexperience were somehow overcome. They nonetheless exposed the inadequacies of New Zealand's military system.

In December 1899 the *Evening Post* reported 'The experience gained in the sending of the first contingent has enabled the Stores Department of the Defence Office to reduce preparations to a system, and the result will be a saving of much of the unnecessary bustle that was observed previously.'[126] The *Post* was being optimistic; dispatching contingents continued to be problematic. The uniforms and fabric that had been found were used up by January 1900 and the stock of greatcoats was running low.[127] Conditions aboard the third contingent's ship were hard on both men and horses.[128] (Seddon had organised the fitting out of that troopship so that 'a great saving can be effected.')[129] The Minister of Finance, Joseph Ward, and the Defence Department both insured fourth contingent's ship, the *Gymeric*. The duplication made both insurance policies invalid.[130] Conditions on the *Gymeric* were so palpably unhygienic that 67 of the first 90 men put aboard signed a written protest and left the ship for the wharf. The ship had to be fumigated and approved by medical officers before it eventually sailed.[131]

The habit of spending as little as possible on volunteers may have conditioned the way in which contingents were treated. For the troops heading to South Africa, government parsimony knew few bounds. The attempt to mount the

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[126] 'Our Second Contingent: Arrangements as to Stores', *Evening Post,* 23 December 1899, p. 5. To twenty-first-century ears the statement sounds like 'spin'. The *Post* did not provide a source for the copy.
[127] Penton to Seddon, 22 and 23 January 1900, ANZ AD34 8.
[128] Entry for 20 February 1900, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5. The accommodations and meal facilities for the men on the fifth contingent's troopship were also inadequate; the facilities for horses even worse. Report by Captain C. T. Major, 11 April 1900, ANZ AD34 3.
[129] Seddon to Under-Secretary Defence, 23 January 1900, ANZ AD34 8.
[130] Telegram Seddon to Ward, no date [March 1900?], ANZ AD34 9. The government cancelled one of the policies.
[131] Major Noel W. Taylor, 'The "Dandy Fourth" Petition', *The Volunteers,* 35:3 (2010): 157–163.

first contingent on donated horses did not meet with success and caused extra work for already-pressured staff. The fourth contingent was paid only half rates while in pre-departure camp.[132] They also had to find their own food and forage for their mounts.[133] Liquor for the voyage to South Africa, including a pint of beer per day for other ranks, had been donated to the first contingent and put aboard their ship. The government then sold the alcohol to the men.[134]

WORSE THAN THE BOERS.

Extract from a Trooper's Letter: "We had a fearful experience aboard the troopship between South Africa and New Zealand. The vermin were of a size indescribable; in fact we could not sleep, but simply had to entrench ourselves and meet them on the point of the bayonet directly a blanket was touched."

Figure 4.5. The conditions aboard troopships as depicted in the *Observer,* 23 August 1902.

The press seldom reported the myriad of challenges involved in the dispatch of the early contingents, but did note that New Zealand had been stripped of arms.

[132] Under-Secretary of Defence to Seddon and Seddon's reply, both 1 March 1990, ANZ AD34 9.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Stowers, *Rough Riders at War*, p. 10.

In December 1899 newspapers reported that the colony was low on munitions.[135] The *New Zealand Herald* worried that should New Zealand need to call out troops for its own defence there would be insufficient arms available.[136] The *Press* blamed Seddon, asserting that 'it is well known, [that he] has time after time ignored the recommendations of the Commandants'.[137] The *Auckland Star* then criticised the *Herald* for making the shortages public. '[T]he publication of such statements … would be unpatriotic if they were true' and could encourage an enemy to attack the undefended colony.[138] Seddon assured the *Star* that New Zealand had 'never been better off' for arms and ammunition, harbour defences were operating, and that 20,000 men could be mobilised if the colony were threatened.[139] There were fewer than 11,000 volunteers at the time.[140] Seddon was able to deflect the criticism about arms stocks, but saw in the criticism neither a need for reform of military practices or that the public would condone expenditure to increase arms holdings.

The need for improvements in the military administration did not, however, escape New Zealand's senior officers. The commandant, Colonel Penton, complained that he was sending troops to war despite having 'practically no military organisation, no trained staff, and … no freedom of action'.[141] Penton had, in fact, less freedom after the sailing of the first contingent. As Seddon had described during the parliamentary debate on sending a contingent, Penton, as commandant, would

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[135] 'The Colony's Defence Stores', *New Zealand Herald,* 27 December 1899, p. 5; 'New Zealand and the War, *Press,* 27 December 1899, p. 5.
[136] 'The Colony's Defence Stores', *New Zealand Herald,* 27 December 1899, p. 5.
[137] 'New Zealand and the War', *Press,* 27 December 1899, p. 5.
[138] 'New Zealand's Defences' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 29 December 1899, p. 4.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19 1900, p. 3. The 'fewer than 11,000' is based on Penton's August 1900 estimate of 11,444 volunteers if all corps were at full strength and recognizes that many of those in the first and second contingents had been members of volunteer corps.
[141] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19 1900, p. 1.

select the officers for the first contingent. Thereafter Seddon did.[142] Seddon's choices of officers have been criticised for failing to make best use of available personnel and the appointment of too many inadequate officers simply because of their political or personal connections.[143]

The most contentious and widely publicised appointment was the commanding officer of the third contingent. There were four candidates for command of the public-funded third contingent. Three received serious consideration: Colonel Francis Fox (the author of the controversial 1893 report on the volunteers who had settled in Canterbury); Major Thomas Jowsey (a hospital steward and volunteer officer from Timaru who had been a non-commissioned officer in the British army in India); and Colonel Joe Somerville (who had fought in the New Zealand Wars).[144] Penton and the fund organisers wanted Fox to command. While the fund organisers did not quite claim that, since it was their money, they would make the decision, they nonetheless informed Seddon that their 'wishes should be entitled to every consideration.'[145] Seddon did not see it in the same light and in short order the communications between the fund and Seddon were made available to newspapers. Since Seddon had nothing to gain from publishing the details of the quarrel, it is likely that the fund organisers gave the press their telegraphic exchanges with the Premier.[146]

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[142] John Crawford with Ellen Ellis, *To Fight for the Empire: An Illustrated History of New Zealand and the South African War, 1899–1902*. Auckland: Reed Books, 1999, p. 15.
[143] Crawford, 'The Best Mounted Troops in Africa?', p. 82.
[144] For further on Fox see chapter 2; Thomas Jowsey's New Zealand Defence Force Personnel Record, ANZ AABK 18805 W5515 0006375; Seddon to Penton, 6 February 1900, ANZ AD34 9.
[145] Penton to Seddon, 1 of 2, no date [Feb 1900?], ANZ AD34 9; 'Interesting Correspondence', *New Zealand Times,* 10 February 1900.
[146] 'Major Jowsey', *Press,* 31 January 1900, p.5; 'The Command of the Contingent' (letter), *Press,* 9 February 1900, p. 7; 'Interesting Correspondence', *New Zealand Times,* 10 February 1900, p. 7; 'New Zealand's Rough Riders', *Evening Post,* 12 February 1900, p. 5.

Seddon did not refuse outright to appoint Fox, with whom he had fallen out six years earlier, in 1893. Instead he announced restrictions and policies that effectively excluded Fox from consideration. He announced that Major Robin would be the senior New Zealand officer in South Africa, thus making it impossible for Fox, a colonel, to be Robin's subordinate.[147] Seddon favoured Colonel Sommerville, who was, he said, happy to temporarily 'forgo his present rank' and serve as a major.[148] That Fox too had offered to serve as a major was a consideration Seddon apparently ignored.[149] Seddon claimed that Fox was unsuitable because he was not a colonial. None of the candidates was. Jowsey was born in Yorkshire and it is unlikely that the 57-year-old Somerville, who was born in 1843, had been born in New Zealand.[150] On 6 February 1900, Seddon ended the argument. Unable to appoint the officer he preferred and determined to avoid one he disliked, Seddon selected Major Thomas Jowsey.[151]

The appointment was not without its problems. Jowsey was quickly disappointed in his officers—selections Seddon had made. At sea one officer was discovered to be an alcoholic.[152] Jowsey recorded that his officers lacked zeal and focused too much on their own comfort.[153] Moreover, after the creation of the NZMR in May 1900 he felt that Robin too often accepted the credit for others' work.[154] Robin helped to sour the relationship. He wrote to Penton that 'a good deal of

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[147] Seddon to Penton, 6 February 1900, ANZ AD 34 9
[148] Seddon to Penton, 6 February 1900, ANZ AD 34 9
[149] The Mayor of Christchurch to Seddon, quoted in 'Interesting Correspondence', *New Zealand Times,* 10 February 1900, p. 7.
[150] www.geni.com/people/Thomas-Jowsey/6000000006719936367, accessed 10 August 2020.
[151] Seddon to Penton, 2 of 2, 6 February 1900, ANZ AD 34 9.
[152] Entry for 21 February 1900, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5.
[153] Entry for 22 April, 'Report and Diary by Major Thomas Jowsey', 9 May [1900], ANZ AD34 2; Entry for 7 May, 'Report and Diary by Major Thomas Jowsey', 9 May [1900], ANZ AD34 2.
[154] Diary Entry 1 June 1900, Third Contingent Diary (Major Jowsey), ANZ AD34 5.

dissention exists among his [Jowsey's] command.'[155] (Other sources suggest that the other ranks of the third contingent respected and liked Jowsey.)[156] In mid-1900 it was discovered that Jowsey's majority predated Robin's, making Jowsey the senior officer.[157] Jowsey informed Robin who raised the matter with General Hutton, in whose command they were then serving. In the hope of avoiding a wrangle over seniority, Jowsey was offered an appointment with an attached artillery unit. When Jowsey accepted, Robin criticised him for deserting his men.[158] In mid-July Robin implied that Jowsey had taken unnecessary sick leave.[159] A fortnight later he wrote to Penton that Jowsey had absented himself.[160]

Figure 4.6. Major Thomas Jowsey, officer commanding the third



Figure 4.7. Major Alfred Robin, circa 1900, officer commanding the first

[155] Robin to Penton, 20 May 1900, ANZ AD34 29.
[156] The *New Zealand Herald* reported in September 1900 that the contingent welcomed Jowsey's return and, later, 'very much regretted his departure'. 'With Lord Roberts in the Transvaal', *New Zealand Herald,* 25 September 1900, p. 5. A trooper wrote in a letter that when Jowsey was recalled that the contingent was 'very cut up about it'. 'The War in South Africa: From Trooper Dickenson', *Lyttelton Times,* 26 September 1900, p. 5.
[157] 'The Boer War: The Invasion of the Transvaal', *Otago Daily Times,* 21 August 1900, p. 2. The means by which the dates of Jowsey's and Robins majorities came to light could not be determined.
[158] Robin to Penton, 20 May 1900, ANZ AD34 29.
[159] Robin to Penton, 18 July 1900, ANZ AD34 29.
[160] Robin to Penton, 31 July 1990, ANZ AD34 29. Robin wrote that that Jowsey's whereabouts had been unknown but that he had since been found and 'ordered' to rejoin.

contingent. *New Zealand Illustrated Magazine,* 1 March 1900.

contingent and, later, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. ATL MS-P 6694.

It was not until Jowsey returned to the third contingent in August 1900 that the New Zealand press picked up on the friction between the two officers.[161] Seddon confessed that there had been 'some unpleasantness'.[162] The *Free Lance* asserted that there would be 'some very dirty linen to be washed' when the contingents returned.[163] No linen was visible when Robin and Jowsey returned. 'There was never any misunderstanding … never a wrong word exchanged' Jowsey told the *Evening Post*.[164] Robin also denied any ill feeling, not only to the press but to Penton, to whom he wrote: 'no friction has existed, and we … have always been the best of friends'.[165]

On its own, the disharmony between Robin and Jowsey would be a side issue, but it exposed some long-established weaknesses in military administration in New Zealand. The poor quality of New Zealand's officers had been a perennial complaint in commandants' and inspectors' reports. No officer was trained in staff duties, there were too few staff personnel, and things slipped between the cracks. It was known before the third contingent sailed that Jowsey's majority predated Robin's but nothing was done.[166] Additionally, political influence reached further downwards in New Zealand than in other settler colonies.[167] While ministerial involvement in the

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[161] 'The Boer War: The Invasion of the Transvaal', *Otago Daily Times,* 21 August 1900, p. 2. The next day (22 August 1900) in 'Notes from the Front' the *Press* reprinted the story.
[162] 'The Command of the Contingents', *Lyttelton Times,* 23 August 1900, p. 5.
[163] 'All Sorts of People', *Free Lance,* 18 August 1900, p. 3.
[164] 'Interview with Colonel Jowsey', *Evening Post,* 23 May 1901, p. 5.
[165] Robin to Penton, 29 November 1900, ANZ AD34 29. Robin's about-face (from criticising Jowsey to claiming friendship with him) and Jowsey's denial of any animosity between him and Robin suggests the two made an agreement, or an instruction was issued, that a lid be put on reports of difficulties between the two officers. No evidence supporting either conjecture was uncovered.
[166] In informing Seddon that Colonel Fox was prepared to serve as a major, the Mayor of Christchurch explained that if Fox did so it would mean 'his relative position as regards seniority with Major Robin would be identical with that of Major Jowsey.' Quoted in 'Interesting Correspondence', *New Zealand Times,* 10 February 1900, p. 7.
[167] Canada too suffered the effects of political patronage in the appointment of officers. Desmond Morton, 'Canada's First Expeditionary Force: The Canadian Contingent in South Africa, 1899-1900',

appointment of a force commander was perhaps expected, it was unusual for politicians to be involved in the selection of majors, let alone of captains and lieutenants—appointments Seddon also made.[168] The examination requirements and promotion procedures implemented after 1909 ensured that political influence and seniority disputes would not happen again.

Although some officers in the New Zealand contingents were poor choices, most colonial officers in South Africa were untrained and few had recent operational experience.[169] They knew little, if anything, about administering a force in the field, and mastering imperial processes and paperwork took time.[170] As leaders and commanders they were often weak. Indeed, the Elgin Commission found that the performance of colonial contingents was compromised by their poor officers.[171] On the other hand, colonial officers developed officer skills quickly in the field.[172] Developing officer skills in theatre in wartime was not ideal; the post-1909 scheme introduced formal training and qualifying examinations for officers.

Colonial other ranks were popularly deemed to be good riders and shots, and to possess courage, hardiness and familiarity with the outdoors. Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen admired New Zealand and Australian soldiers for their 'cunning and shrewdness … initiative and intelligence', qualities he said he seldom found in

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in Marc Milner, ed., *Canadian Military History: Selected Readings*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1993, p. 27. Seddon went so far as to have his son, 'Dick Junior' appointed to a staff role. Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick"', p. 77.

[168] Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience,* p. 45. Katharine McGowan, '"A Finger in the Fire": Canadian Volunteer Soldiers and their Perceptions of Canada's Collective Identity through their Experience of the Boer War', *War and Society* 28:1 (May 2009): 64, found that political favours often determined the choice of Canadian officers; Crawford, 'The Best Mounted Troops in Africa?', p. 81.

[169] Crawford, 'The Impact of the War', p. 205; Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project*, p. 13, p. 16.

[170] Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Robin to Defence HQ, 22 December 1899, ANZ AD 34 4

[171] Gordon, *Imperial Defense*, p. 201.

[172] Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense'*, p. 281.

British soldiers.[173] It is easy to understand how such flattering remarks fell easily on the ears of colonial citizens, but they were also accepted by the British public. In 1900 the War Office received complaints from citizens that it was turning down offers of colonial troops, men everyday Britons deemed to be fitter, more aggressive and better suited than their own men to warfare on the veldt. They asked that more colonials be accepted.[174] The opinions of British civilians about colonial troops had little effect on the likelihood of military reforms proceeding in New Zealand, but the prevalence of the same opinions among the New Zealand public did. Such views confirmed that New Zealanders were Better Britons, New Zealand soldiers were better fighters, and they countered the arguments for training improvements, better officers and greater professionalism.

Despite their reputation, the men from New Zealand were not the pioneers and bushmen of popular perception.[175] Examination of the nominal rolls has shown that, overall, nearly 39 per cent were industrial workers, close to 33 per cent worked in agriculture or forestry, and that the third-most-common employment category (at 14.6 per cent) was commercial.[176] Over half the officers were from professional and commercial backgrounds, and nearly 41 per cent of the men (excluding non-commissioned officers) had been employed in industry.[177]

Although each settler colony thought the attributes of its men were unique, the praise of New Zealand, Australian and Canadian soldiers received was close to identical.[178] There is little difference between Sir Horace Smith-Dorien's statement

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[173] Lord Methuen to the Royal Commission into the war, quoted in Crawford, 'The Best Mounted Troops in South Africa?', p. 77.
[174] Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, pp. 83–85.
[175] Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 145.
[176] McGeorge, 'The Social and Geographical Composition', p. 106.
[177] Ibid.
[178] McGowan, 'A Finger in the Fire': 79.

about Canadian troops, 'there are no finer or more gallant troops in all the world',[179] and General Sir Ian Hamilton's remark 'I have never in my life met men I would rather soldier with', which he made about New Zealanders.[180] The two main reasons for comments varying so little from colony to colony were because colonial troops were alike in being untrained amateurs,[181] and because, for recruiting purposes and civilian morale reasons, senior British officers felt obliged to tell the public what they wanted to hear. The praise lavished on colonial contingents was, nonetheless, usually taken to be a considered professional assessment. 'The compliments paid by the War Office to our contingents … are evidently more than mere politeness' the Australian politician Alfred Deakin wrote in 1901.[182]

The quality of New Zealand other ranks is a complicated matter because attributes such as the initiative and intelligence Methuen admired were not always displayed in appropriate settings. New Zealand troops took little interest in what one termed 'red tape and drill book nonsense which is absolutely no use out here.'[183] When Major-General John French inspected the first contingent, he was satisfied with their riding skills, unimpressed by their drill and shocked at their language.[184] It has been contended that a culture of poor discipline developed in the contingents and that troops took pride in their insubordination.[185] Private William Raynes, for

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[179] Smith-Dorien quoted in George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People.* Toronto: Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1974, p. 286.
[180] General Sir Ian Hamilton, quoted in Hall, *South Africa*, p. 88.
[181] Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, pp. 285–6, quotes comments and compliments regarding Canadian soldiers that mirror comments about and compliments extended to New Zealand soldiers. New Zealand's Rough Riders were the equivalent of Australia's Bushmen formations, and criticised by British officers for their shared ill-discipline and lack of training. Clarke, 'Marching to Their Own Drum', p. 309. Pugsley, 'Australia, Canada and New Zealand': 104.
[182] Alfred Deakin, 'The Boer War', 20 February 1901, in J. A. La Nauze, ed., *Federated Australia: Selections from Letters to the Morning Post 1900–1910.* Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1968, p. 24.
[183] Quoted in Nicholson, 'Viewpoints on the Veldt', p. 84.
[184] Stowers, *Rough Riders at War*, p. 12.
[185] A New Zealander, *Land of the Moa,* p. 132; Nicholson, 'Viewpoints on the Veldt', p. 89.

example, was amused that British soldiers blindly followed regulations rather than using their own common sense.[186] Several observers noted, however, that while New Zealanders could be recalcitrant in camp, they were disciplined in battle.[187] It seems that little had changed since 1860 when Taranaki citizen soldiers did not bother to muster for a parade but joined the company as it passed their houses.

Disciplining New Zealand (or any colonial) troops required the sensitivity Hutton recognised. In September 1901 New Zealand soldiers who had gone into a nearby town to buy bread were reprimanded by a British officer for disobeying his order to stay out of the town. One trooper stepped forward, saluted and told the officer that New Zealanders preferred pleasing themselves and disliked 'a lot of bunkum at every turn'.[188] The man was given three days' imprisonment and a fine of 15 shillings.[189] When a British officer sentenced a New Zealand soldier to field punishment number 1 (he was lashed to a cart wheel), outraged New Zealand troops cut the straps. The punishment had to be abandoned on the grounds that it was unacceptable to New Zealanders.[190]

The New Zealand contingents had to put up with the same shortages and hardships as all other mounted infantry. A readiness to plunder and purloin, however, may have meant that New Zealand troops fared a little better than others.[191] It has been asserted that New Zealand troops have long been known as 'beggars, borrowers and thieves'.[192] On the other hand, conditions for the first

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[186] Ibid, p. 85.
[187] Ibid, p. 84.
[188] Henry George Gilbert, 23 September 1901, in Kingsley Field, ed., *Soldier Boy: A Young New Zealander Writes Home from the Boer War*. Auckland: New Holland, 2007, p. 64.
[189] Ibid.
[190] A New Zealander, *Land of the Moa,* p. 133.
[191] Hall, *South Africa,* p. 40–45.
[192] Glyn Harper, 'A New Zealand Way of War and a New Zealand Style of Command?', in Glyn Harper and Joel Hayward, eds, *Born to Lead?: Portraits of New Zealand Commanders.* Auckland: Exisle Publishing, 2003, p. 32.

contingents were made harder by the absence of support functions (service corps, paymasters and quartermasters). Troops often returned from engagements to find no tents up, no hot food, and no change of uniform.[193] Those who fought in South Africa are unlikely to have opposed reforms such as the creation of effective service corps that would have provided them with improved conditions.

Some, such as Jowsey, felt that colonial formations were hard done by. He resented that his field force was not issued with bread when those living in better conditions in nearby garrisons were. 'This is only another instance of the way those doing the work are treated' he complained. 'No one seems to take any interest in the oversea colonials who are always at the front'.[194] After three days of uncomfortable travel in an open railway wagon, Jowsey somewhat bitterly observed: 'I have reason to believe the Imperial officers are usually accommodated with a passenger carriage.'[195] New Zealand other ranks noted that British troops were better-equipped than they.[196] Apparently no connection was made between the conditions New Zealand troops had to put up with and military reforms. The better-supported British soldiers also recognised the difference and sometimes took pity on the colonials and gave them food or gifts.[197]

What New Zealand troops were seldom given was timely pay. Colonial troops were paid at higher rates than British troops—the difference being made up by colonial governments—but pay for the New Zealanders was often late.[198] Little had changed since the New Zealand Wars when the same tardiness was common.[199]

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[193] Pugsley, 'Australia, Canada and New Zealand': 106.
[194] Entry for 14 January 1901, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5.
[195] Entry for 2 March 1901, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5.
[196] Nicholson, 'Viewpoints on the Veldt', pp. 71–4.
[197] Henry George Gilbert, in *Soldier Boy*, p. 56.
[198] Entry for 17 January 1901, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5; Wilcox, *Australia's Boer War*, p. 304.
[199] See chapter one.

Little had changed because recommended reforms had been dismissed. In June 1900 Jowsey lamented 'I know the men are in want of money and I am very sorry that I cannot pay them what is due to them'.[200] As he often did, Robin took a sanguine tone when reporting to his superiors. 'Pay matters are, as you can imagine, somewhat mixed, and intricate,' he wrote to Penton, 'but [I] anticipate no difficulty in bringing it out right before leaving Africa.'[201] Robin's contingents were not due to depart for a further four months. Late pay continued to be a problem throughout the conflict. The commander of the fifth contingent, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart Newall, wrote to Seddon about his difficulties with imperial pay authorities.[202] On arriving in Africa in 1902, Richard Davies, who had been promoted to Brevet Colonel and officer commanding the 8th contingent, reported that the men had 'not been paid up to date'.[203]

Even when troops returned to New Zealand, pay was still sometimes owing. In December 1901 the *Auckland Star* reported that the MHR William Napier had informed the Minister of Defence (Seddon) that recently returned men were owed between £30 and £100 in pay but had been given only one pound and told they might have to wait six months for the balance. Napier asked for the men be paid £10 each immediately. Seddon authorised £5 payments.[204]

Better pay and better conditions were the main reasons men left contingents for other services in South Africa.[205] Service in the South African police was well paid, offered free rations and, at the end of their engagement men would be returned

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[200] Entry for 26 June 1900, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5.
[201] Robin to Penton, 31 July 1900, ANZ AD34 29.
[202] Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart Newall to Seddon, 16 June 1900, ANZ AD34 3. Newall was probably well-connected for he maintained a personal correspondence with the Premier.
[203] Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. C. Chaytor, 29 June 1902, ANZ AD34 3.
[204] 'Returned Troopers Without Funds', *Auckland Star,* 12 December 1901, p. 5.
[205] Stowers, *Rough Riders at War*, p. 14.

to their contingents or given passage back to New Zealand. 'Most of the officers', Jowsey wrote in June 1900, 'are applying for positions in the police force.'[206] Seddon was furious that troops had transferred to the police. He claimed that in doing so they breached the conditions of their service agreement.[207] Some regarded those who transferred out as unpatriotic.[208] It nonetheless continued and to such an extent that in September 1900 imperial authorities limited the portion of a unit that could transfer to the police to ten per cent of unit strength.[209] The increase in the size of New Zealand's headquarters function after 1909, and the introduction of staff college-qualified officers familiar with the necessary procedures, improved conditions for military personnel.

Leaving a contingent for another service was facilitated by the manner in which most formations were used in South Africa. Contingents were frequently broken up and mixed into other, often composite units, sometimes for lengthy periods of time. In such circumstances, loyalty to and affection for the initial contingent had a diminished chance of developing. Robin disliked the piecemeal use of New Zealand forces. He advised Penton that attempts had been made to keep the New Zealand forces together and that General Hutton had been supportive. The practice nonetheless continued. 'It is very disheartening,' Robin wrote, 'but cannot be helped.'[210] In August 1900 Robin shared with Penton his thoughts on lessons learnt. 'Next war, if New Zealand sends any men, it must be one Regiment, then drafts to keep them up … it is too much worry the present system, and the scattered

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[206] Entry for 21 June 1900, Diary of Major Thomas Jowsey, ANZ AD34 5.
[207] 'The Transvaal War', *Oamaru Mail,* 24 August 1900, p. 1.
[208] A New Zealander, *Land of the Moa,* p. 68.
[209] Deputy Adjutant General South Africa to Military Governor South Africa, 12 September 1900, ANZ AD34 7.
[210] Robin to Penton, 14 July 1900, ANZ AD34 29.

way the Imperial Authorities choose to work, or detach men.'[211] While the need for reforms relating to New Zealand-controlled matters became evident in South Africa, the need for some imperial-level reforms, such as keeping colonial units together rather than using them in a piecemeal fashion were also exposed.[212]

It was not until 1901 that the government voiced its objection to contingents being broken up.[213] In December of that year Seddon cabled the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne. He asked that the integrity of the eighth contingent be maintained and that it work with the sixth and seventh contingents. Doing so would, he claimed, bring two benefits: 'our forces would maintain their strength and field efficiency; and it would tend to encourage a large number of officers and men … to remain and volunteer for further service.'[214] Seddon explained that returned officers and men had assured him that if New Zealand formations served as one force they would be happier and better fighters. He then compromised his chance of gaining Lansdowne's support by attacking British loyalty:

> additional troops would not have been required had all statesmen and parties in the United Kingdom been guided by a love of country and patriotism … there can be little doubt that unguarded speeches, writings and actions have encouraged the Boers.[215]

New Zealand contingents, like virtually all colonial formations, continued to be broken up.

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[211] Report by Lieutentant-Colonel A. W. Robin, 10 August 1900, ANZ AD34 29.
[212] New Zealand was slow to recognise the need to insist on the integrity of its military formations when serving in imperial or coalition forces. The matter became an issue for the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Middle East in 1940. Ross Mackie, 'Freyberg's High-Command Relationships, 1939–1941', MPhil thesis, Massey University, 2014, chapter 1.
[213] Crawford with Ellis, *To Fight for the Empire*, p. 85.
[214] 'The Eighth Contingent', *Auckland Star,* 16 December 1901, p. 5. Because the text of the Premier's message was made available by the Associated Press, more than the *Auckland Star* carried it. A search at paperspast.natlib.govt.nz on 13 March 2019 found around 50 versions of the story between 14 and 28 December 1901 in the newspapers that have been digitised.
[215] Seddon's cable quoted in 'The Eighth Contingent', *Auckland Star,* 16 December 1901, p. 5.

Soldiers were not the only New Zealanders in South Africa. About a dozen nurses, all female, went to South Africa.[216] Although Seddon told a reporter that New Zealand nurses would be 'as good as the best medicine a wounded New Zealand trooper could receive', he showed no inclination to pay for them and next to no interest in their welfare.[217] Nurses had to fund themselves. In most cases, though, charities covered their costs and provided a stipend.[218] In September 1900, imperial army headquarters in Pretoria announced that they would pay the salaries of New Zealand nurses.[219] After the war, the New Zealand Government struck medals for the nurses and, after some persuasion, eventually paid a war gratuity.[220] Later governments may have provided pensions to at least some of the nurses.[221] The treatment of the nurses raises a further area where reform was needed: provision of an effective medical corps.

A further need for reform became evident back home in New Zealand. One direct and immediate effect of participation in the South African was the growth in the number of volunteers and, indeed, of volunteer corps. In one sense, the increase from fewer than 7,000 volunteers in 1899 to over 15,000 by 1901 (see Figure 2.3 in

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[216] Jeffrey, 'Kruger's Farmers, Strathcona's Horse', p. 189; Ellen Ellis, 'New Zealand Women and the War' in John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, eds, *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand, the British Empire and the South African War 1899–1902.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2003, p. 140.

[217] 'The Third Contingent: The Premier's Views', *New Zealand Times,* 29 January 1900, p. 7; Seddon to A. J. Andrews, 5 December 1901; Defence Office Wellington to Minister of Defence, 7 November 1901; Army Secretary to Miss J. Rattray, 29 May 1950, ANZ AD34 2; As the first contingent gathered in Wellington in October 1899, the Department of Defence received offers of service from nurses which were declined. One medical officer would sail with the contingent and return after the contingent's arrival in South Africa where the British army would provide medical services. 'No New Zealand Nurses or Doctors', *Evening Post,* 12 October 1899, p. 6; Governor to Seddon, 16 April 1900; Seddon to Governor, 9 May 1900, ANZ AD34 2.

[218] Army Secretary to Deputy Secretary War Pensions, 1 November 1955, ANZ AD34 2; Hall, *South Africa,* p. 84.

[219] Army HQ, Pretoria, to Nursing Sisters, 4 September 1900, ANZ AD34 2.

[220] Ellis, 'New Zealand Women and the War', p. 133.

[221] It is possible that Janet Williamson, who served as a nurse in South Africa, had her application for a pension accepted in 1934 when the Under-Secretary of Defence thought her entitled to one. 1934 letter attached to Army Secretary to J. Rattray, 29 May 1950, ANZ AD34 2.

chapter 2) approached the 18,000-man target the Joint Defence (Secret) Committee had recommended in 1900.[222] Other recommendations of the committee, however, such as equipment purchases, schools for officers, longer camps, increased capitation payments, better medical services, crisis-response plans, and a reorganisation of headquarters staff, were not acted on.[223]

It has been argued that Seddon allowed volunteer numbers to grow and new corps to form without restriction largely for the sake of popularity.[224] While volunteer service did increase in popularity, addressing the effectiveness of volunteers was also of popular interest. In 1899 the *New Zealand Herald* warned that volunteering was 'lamentably deficient and out of date … [and] in need of radical changes … [and] a thorough overhaul.'[225] Two years later, reforms were still being asked for, but any increase in defence spending was queried in parliament, and the colony was still reliant on inadequately trained and poorly equipped volunteers.[226]

Moreover, the increase in volunteer numbers had little effect on the composition of contingents. It has been established that the first two contingents, which contained a high proportion of men with volunteer experience, were better disciplined and generally better soldiers those in later contingents, where most men had no volunteer training.[227] As early as 1900 Robin reported that the 'few grumblers' were those without volunteer experience.[228] By early 1901 virtually all the volunteer corps members who had offered to serve in South Africa had been

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[222] Reports of the Joint Defence (Secret) Committee, n.d. 1900, ANZ Seddon 18.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Crawford, 'The New Zealand Volunteer Force', pp. 182–3; also see chapter two.
[225] 'The Defences of the Colony', *New Zealand Herald,* 27 December 1899, p. 4; 'Parliament: Another All-Night Sitting', *Daily Telegraph,* 16 October 1901, p. 5; 'Defence of the Colonies', *Auckland Star,* 11 October 1901, p. 3.
[226] 'Military Training', *Lyttelton Times,* 14 October 1901, p.4.
[227] Crawford, 'The Best Mounted Troops in Africa?', p. 93.
[228] Report of Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Robin, 14 July 1900, ANZ AD34 4.

accepted.[229] The well of trained men available to serve in South Africa was dry and, while the number of men in volunteer corps had more than doubled, few of the new volunteers offered to fight in South Africa. The compulsory military training provisions of the Defence Act of 1909 helped to ensure that New Zealand would be able to provide trained men in future conflicts. Indeed, two critical purposes of the post-1909 territorial army were to provide a pool of trained men who would volunteer for service overseas, and to train new men who could be used as reinforcements and to cover wastage.[230]

Just as the increase in volunteer numbers had no effect on the training levels of those who enlisted for South Africa (or the quality of training citizen soldiers received), the shortcomings the war exposed in the staff and administration functions of the New Zealand military forces led to no immediate reforms. On 20 July 1900, Seddon told the House of Representatives 'The equipping and sending of our contingents, and the lessons taught by the war in South Africa, must not be ignored.'[231] Ignoring them was, however, precisely what the Liberals did. A month later Colonel Penton complained that, despite repeated calls for improvements, New Zealand still had 'practically no military organisation, no trained staff' and that it was 'absolutely necessary that this should be rectified.'[232] In his 1901 report he described New Zealand's military administration as 'infinitely worse than anything I know of in any part of the Empire'.[233] The first post-war commandant's report, by Major-General James Babington in 1902, lamented that his proposals to reform the

[229] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1901, p. 2.
[230] Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Military Forces of New Zealand, War Office, August 1909, ANZ AD10 7, p. 3; also see chapter 8.
[231] Defences of the Colony, AJHR H-19A, 1900, p. 1.
[232] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1900, p. 1.
[233] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1901, p. 7.

military administration had not been approved.[234] Nor, as has already been shown, was any improvement in the conditions for horses, fitting out of transport ships, constraining political interference, or reducing government penny-pinching effected. Despite the statements Seddon made about learning lessons from South Africa, the Liberals' continued refusal to reform the military headquarters function shows that only lip service was being paid to the issue.

The levels of munition and equipment stores maintained in New Zealand were also criticised during the war. Even the usually diplomatic Robin was moved to remark before the departure of the first contingent that he hoped that volunteers would henceforward 'be kept in a greater state of preparedness' and that it would in future be 'easier to accoutre two thousand men than it had been to despatch the present [200-strong] Contingent.'[235] The shortage of uniforms, arms and equipment in New Zealand during the South African War was, it is true, exacerbated by the usual suppliers, in Britain, nearly exhausting their stocks equipping British forces.[236] The base problem, however, was the low level of stored inventory in the colony.

In Britain the government and public were disturbed by the time, men and money needed to suppress Boer citizen soldiers. Even before the war ended, Lord Elgin was appointed to head an inquiry into equipment provision and the conduct of the war. Two further investigations followed: in 1903 the Duke of Norfolk chaired a commission on militia and volunteers; and the following year Lord Esher's commission examined War Office reform.[237] Unlike New Zealand, in Britain the

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[234] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1902, p. 1.
[235] Robin's speech as reported in 'Views of Major Robin', *Press,* 19 October 1899, p. 5.
[236] David Steele, 'Salisbury and the Soldiers', in John Gooch, ed., *The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image.* London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 33.
[237] R. J. Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18.* Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1987, pp. 7–8.

public, politicians and military leaders quickly agreed that weaknesses existed and that remedies were needed.[238] While some of the exposures concerned industry, education and health, the military issues around which consensus developed were that national security should be above party politics, help from the dominions would be needed in a crisis, that the empire was threatened (Germany's programme of naval construction started in 1900), and that Britain's military administration needed overhauling.[239]

There was less concern about military reforms in the settler colonies than in Britain. In December 1901 Major-General Edward Hutton was appointed General Officer Commanding the newly created Commonwealth Military Forces of Australia (the Australian colonies had federated on 1 January 1901). Hutton's aim was not to address acknowledged shortcomings within the militia system but to create a unified citizen-soldier force for the defence of Australia that would be able, like the contingents sent to South Africa, to serve elsewhere. The difficulties Hutton first encountered were the lack of enabling legislation and a shortage of funds. Although his proposals were usually accepted, by the middle of 1903 Hutton's stubbornness and insensitivity began, not for the first time, to undermine his efforts.[240] Furthermore, like Babington in New Zealand, Hutton had to contend with the common perception—fostered by press stories of heroism and blandishments from British generals during the South African War—that untrained citizen soldiers were as good as or better than British regulars.[241]

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[238] W. J. McDermott, 'The Immediate Origins of the Committee of Imperial Defence: A Reappraisal', *Canadian Journal of History,* 7:3 (December 1972), 268.
[239] Geoffrey Searle, '"National Efficiency" and the "Lessons" of the War', in David Omissi and Andrew S Thompson, eds, *The Impact of the South African War*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 195–6.
[240] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 223.
[241] Ibid, p. 225.

In New Zealand, the government continued to ignore Babington's requests for staff reform or changes to the volunteer system. He was, however, permitted to establish a school of instruction for volunteer officers. It was not a success.[242] In 1903 Babington complained about political interference in the volunteer force and unhappily observed that while the military occupied first place in the public's mind during war, it was relegated to the last place in peacetime.[243] Two years later, Babington addressed the common colonial perception that untrained New Zealanders could outperform regular soldiers. Terming it a 'pernicious fallacy', he warned that someone who could merely shoot was unfit to face 'a trained and disciplined force'.[244] In his final report, Babington resigned himself to the fact that, although he had tried, his attempts to reform and improve New Zealand forces had achieved little: 'It does not appear to me that the colony takes the question of defence seriously, or gives it due attention'.[245]

The public's faith in amateur soldiers was shared by their Premier and mouthpiece. When arguing with fund organisers in early 1900 about the command of the third contingent, Seddon remarked that another von Tempsky was the type of officer he most wanted.[246] (Gustavus von Tempsky led untrained citizen-soldier bush rangers in the New Zealand Wars. His and the rangers' most significant achievement was the adulation they won from the public.)[247] In April 1902, Seddon and the MHR for Eastern Maori, Wi Pere, declared that 5,000 Maori troops, free of restrictive orders, would quickly sort out the Boers.[248] The Premier and Minister of

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[242] See chapter 2.
[243] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1903, pp. 1–7.
[244] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p. 6.
[245] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1906, p. 12.
[246] Seddon to Penton, 1 of 2, 6 February 1900, ANZ AD 34 9.
[247] See chapter 1.
[248] Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick"', p. 78.

Defence (Seddon) stubbornly insisted that colonial amateurs made the best soldiers. Views such as these, held by people as powerful as these, served to obstruct military reforms and to justify that obstruction.

The public's confidence that untrained colonial citizens were better soldiers than British regulars was bolstered by events in South Africa, and by the praise lavished on the men by British generals.[249] This phenomenon was evident in all the settler colonies.[250] The perception caused three key problems for military reformers. First, when reforms, better training and tighter discipline were proposed, the public saw no reason to fix something that they did not regard as broken and which, they had been told, worked well.[251]

Second, as in the Northland War of 1845–46, when settlers in New Zealand first asserted the superiority of untrained colonials over British regulars, the public's opinion of their soldiers was often based on partial, biased or inaccurate information. During the South African War flattering reports in newspapers that downplayed or overlooked failures and inadequacies,[252] and bullish personal letters from soldiers were regularly published in newspapers. Serving soldiers seldom believed such accounts of daring-do. 'By jingoes there's some awful lies told in letters … in the papers[;] they look ridiculous' one trooper commented.[253]

Third, and critically, the issue for military reformers was not the performance of colonial troops when skirmishing against small parties of other

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[249] Pugsley, 'Australia, Canada and New Zealand', p. 79.
[250] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 225.
[251] Bill Gammage, 'The Crucible: The Establishment of the Anzac Tradition', in M. McKernan and M. Browne, eds, *Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace.* Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1988, p. 154; Wood, 'The Sense of Duty', p. 32; Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience,* p. 49.
[252] Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society.* London: Longman Group Ltd, 1980, pp. 238–9. Spiers noted that conditions in concentration camps and inadequate services in military hospitals were brought to public attention by visitors rather than journalists.
[253] Nicholson, 'Viewpoints on the Veldt', p. 36.

citizen soldiers on the veldt. The issue was that Germany was emerging as a potential and bellicose rival. Untrained, poorly disciplined clerks and industrial workers who could perhaps fire a rifle would be no match for the well-trained armies of a major European power, equipped with the mechanised instruments of war the Industrial Revolution had made possible.

Both Babington and Hutton tried to get their governments to understand the role their military forces would be likely to play in a war with a major power. The Russo-Japanese War, Babington warned in 1904, should not be ignored. '[S]ooner or later, the existence of a force to defend Imperial interests in Australasia must be an imperative'.[254] In 1903 Hutton strove to amend the Australian Defence bill's provision that exempted citizen soldiers from compulsory service overseas. He was not successful.[255]

The absence of military reforms during and immediately after the South African War was in many ways understandable. The public knew little of the shortcomings that had been experienced, had been told that their citizen soldiers were exceptional warriors, and had failed to appreciate that the soldiers' performance against Boer farmers was no indication of how they would fare against ranks of trained and well-equipped European forces. In Britain, however, such issues were understood. Military reforms initiated there would filter out to the settler colonies.

The war in South Africa also alerted Britain to the military potential of the settler colonies.[256] New Zealand's involvement in the war led to its tacit acceptance

[254] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1904, p. 6.
[255] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, pp. 225–26.
[256] Stockings, 'The Weary Titan': 902.

that the colony would a take part in offshore conflicts in support of the empire.[257] Indeed, Seddon proposed the formation of an Imperial Reserve in mid-1900, while the war was still being fought.[258] South Africa strengthened interest in notions such as a 'pan-Britannic militia'.[259] To effect such a thing, however, the manner in which colonial troops were raised and trained, how they would serve with British forces, and communications between British military authorities and their colonial counterparts all needed to be improved and formalised.[260] The imperial conferences and the Committee for Imperial Defence (which was established in 1904) strove to gain commitments from the colonies regarding their contributions to imperial defence. The South African War not only provided reasons—clear to some, uncomprehended by others—to reform military forces, it also brought about a resurgence of interest in imperial defence.

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[257] King, *New Zealand*, p. 290.
[258] Seddon's proposal was made on 20 July 1900 and printed as Defences of the Colony, AJHR H-19A, 1900.
[259] Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes,* p. 45.
[260] Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project*, p. 14.

CHAPTER FIVE

Imperial Considerations: Words Become Deeds

In one sense it was ironic that imperial defence emerged, as a concept at least, in the 1860s and 1870s when William Gladstone's government was removing its garrisons from the colonies. In another sense, however, imperial defence was a logical consequence of that decision. If colonies were to be responsible for their internal security and for protecting themselves from small-scale raids—which is what was expected of them—there was no reason that the colonial forces created to meet those objectives should not be called upon were another part of the empire to be threatened.

This chapter examines how and why imperial defence came to motivate the New Zealand government (and those of other self-governing colonies) to contribute in tangible ways to imperial defence, including, in New Zealand's case, the role of imperial defence in the decision to implement compulsory training and develop a territorial army. While it would be a mistake to regard imperial defence as the only or the prime reason for New Zealand's 1909 military reforms, it was a significant reason for many, not least for politicians, imperial lobby groups and the better informed. Imperial defence considerations therefore deserve thorough examination.

At around the same time that Britain was recalling colonial garrisons, some began to challenge the Gladstonian view that the empire was a burden. One of the most prominent was the British politician Charles Dilke. He travelled extensively (including to New Zealand and Australia) and in 1868 published *Greater Britain: A record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries During 1866 and 1867.*[1] The work was immediately popular, not only in Britain but throughout the empire. A former Premier of New Zealand, Julius Vogel, became a champion of Greater Britain and argued that the settler colonies were components of a powerful British nation.[2] Imperial defence was, thus, the partner of a revised vision of Britain and the empire—of Greater Britain. A vision that included—potentially—imperial federation and an imperial *zollverein* (tax or customs union).[3]

In his 1880 report, Colonel Peter Scratchley had set out New Zealand's defence priorities.[4] The colony would defend itself from raids by one or two cruisers. Any larger threat would be met by the Royal Navy. In 1880, New Zealanders could take comfort from knowing that the Royal Navy was the largest in the world. By the mid-1900s, however, Britain's sea supremacy was being challenged by Germany, and imperial anxiety about European powers was rising.

The 'Cardwell reforms' of the 1860s and 1870s did more than end imperial garrisons in settler colonies, they modernised and enlarged the British army.[5] In 1878 the Colonial Defence Committee was established to report on port defences

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[1] His later publications included *The British Army* (1888), *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890) *Imperial Defence* (1892), and *The British Empire* (1899).
[2] Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 34.
[3] Ibid, p. 364, p. 13, p. 18.
[4] Colonel P. H. Scratchley, Defences of New Zealand: Report, AJHR A-4, 1880. See chapter 2.
[5] Viscount Edward Cardwell was Secretary of State for War from 1868 to 1874. For an account of the Cardwell reforms and other late nineteenth-century developments in the British army see Edward M. Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992.

throughout the empire.[6] The role of the committee expanded over time. It encouraged colonial governments to become defence-conscious, facilitated the communication of military opinion and knowledge, and sought to foster in the outposts of empire an imperial rather than a colonial view of defence.[7] In 1882 a royal commission into the defence of the empire forecast that in the future colonies would actively contribute to the defence of the empire.[8] Three years later, in 1885, New South Wales sent troops to support imperial forces in Sudan, the first instance of a colony providing direct military aid to the empire.[9] In 1890 the Colonial Defence Committee recognised that colonial contributions to the defence of the empire served two functions: the provision of troops; and proof to other nations of the strength and unity of the empire.[10] Additionally, the late-nineteenth century saw some landmark developments in military theory and strategic thinking: the first English translation of Clausewitz's *On War* in 1873; Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* in 1890; and Dilke's *Imperial Defence* in 1892.

The low levels of defence spending in the colonies was a sore point for late-Victorian and Edwardian British governments. Westminster felt that Britain bore too large a share of the financial burden of defending the empire. In 1858, before the withdrawal of imperial troops from the self-governing colonies, Britain's annual defence expenditure was £4 million. By comparison, the combined defence budgets of the settler colonies was less than ten per cent of that figure: £380,000.[11] Colonial

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[6] New Zealand, like many settler colonies, was slow in sending reports to and responding for information requests from the Colonial Defence Committee. Donald C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1970-1914,* Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1965, p. 107.
[7] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 101, p. 107.
[8] Summary of the Development of Imperial Defence, Defence Conference Confidential Papers, 1909, TNA CO 886/2, p. 33.
[9] Ibid, p. 34. It has also been contended that Canada's offer of troops to assist with the Indian Mutiny in 1857 was the first instance. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 101, p. 9.
[10] Ibid, p. 106.
[11] Ibid, p. 101, p. 10.

defence expenditure remained low when compared to British spending. In 1879 Britain spent 15s 7½d per capita on defence while New South Wales, the most defence-focused of the Australasian colonies, spent 2s 4d per head (14 per cent of the British figure). New Zealand spent 1s 9d per capita, and Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia spent less than 1s.[12] Britain's per capita defence expenditure in 1897 was approximately one pound (20s); in the same year New Zealand spent 2s 4d (11.5 per cent of Britain's rate).[13]

The self-governing colonies argued that they could not afford to pay for their strategic defence (a navy) and seldom saw it as their responsibility.[14] The settler colonies ensured their internal security, not their strategic security.[15] It should also be remembered that New Zealand had baulked at paying for imperial troops to assist with its internal security during the New Zealand Wars. They maintained that meeting the costs of development projects left them with little to spend on defence. Development costs were often the largest single component of government spending in the self-governing colonies. In 1897/88, public works constituted 16 per cent of the New Zealand government's direct expenditure. Public works were, however, often funded by loans and approximately 80 per cent of public debt had been raised to meet the cost of development projects.[16] In 1905/06, public works constituted one-third of government spending, and interest on loans a further 30

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[12] W. C. B. Turnstall, 'Imperial Defence, 1870–1897' in E. A. Benians, J. R. M. Butler, P. N. S. Mansergh, E. A. Walker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol. III, *The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919,* E. A. Benians, James Butler, C. E. Carrington, eds, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959, p. 233.

[13] 1897 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, p. 18; Revenue and Expenditure of the General Government, *Official Yearbook*, 1898.

[14] John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830–1970.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 25, p. 650; Turnstall, 'Imperial Defence', p. 586.

[15] Turnstall, 'Imperial Defence', p. 230.

[16] Approximatetly £35 million of New Zealand's £44.9 million of debt was attributed to development expenses. Finance, *Yearbook,* 1898.

per cent, the lion's share of which had funded public works.[17] Furthermore, there was no tangible threat to the security of most colonies or, for that matter, of Britain. Since threat would become the motivation by the late 1900s, the effect of the absence of a threat should not be underestimated.[18]

Turning to broader imperial relations, in 1883 the historian John Robert Seeley published *The Expansion of England,* over 80,000 copies of which were sold in its first two years.[19] Seeley argued that the empire shared a single identity and, as Dilke had intimated, that it could constitute a larger and stronger ('Greater') Britain. He also recommended that Britain's relations with the self-governing colonies should be more intimate than those with India and the crown colonies.[20] Seeley's views may have inspired the British government who, in 1887, hosted the first colonial conference. Representatives (usually not the political leaders) of a range of colonies attended.

A year after *The Expansion of England* appeared, the Imperial Federation League was established in Britain with branches in most settler colonies. The aim was the political federation of the empire. In one sense, the idea of imperial federation conflicted with colonial aspirations for independence.[21] On the other hand, closer imperial relations meshed with the sentimental, racial, economic, and cultural allegiances of those living in the settler colonies, many of whom were keen to see a closer relationship with the metropole.[22] Australia's Alfred Deakin and New Zealand's Richard Seddon and Joseph Ward were all imperialists, as were all the

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[17] Finance, *Yearbook,* 1906.
[18] Darwin, *The Empire Project*, p. 25, p. 650. Also see chapter 1.
[19] John Gross, 'Editor's Introduction' in J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England,* edited by John Gross, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1883, 1971, p. xii.
[20] Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 7.
[21] Ibid, p. 59, p. 68.
[22] Darwin, *The Empire Project*, p. 288.

leaders of the self-governing colonies.[23] Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1895 to 1903, was more than an imperialist, he was an advocate of imperial federation.[24]

Chamberlain hosted the 1897 imperial conference, the first to have colonial premiers attend. With attendance confined to the settler-colonies only, it was a grand affair.[25] By intention, it ran concurrently with Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee celebrations, for which great spectacles were staged and in which the premiers sometimes featured.[26] Seddon sent a well-paid contingent of 54 troops (20 of them Maori with no military experience), to participate.[27] Their and the Premier's involvement were well received in New Zealand.[28]

Chamberlain had chosen the Colonial Office over more prestigious appointments because only there could he achieve his ambition to change Britain's place in the world.[29] For Chamberlain, the federation of the Canadian colonies was

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[23] A. F. Madden, 'Changing Attitudes and widening Responsibilities, 1895-1914' in in E. A. Benians, J. R. M. Butler, P. N. S. Mansergh, E. A. Walker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol. III, *The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919,* E. A. Benians, James Butler, C. E. Carrington (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959, p. 400; Alfred Deakin was a politician, a prominent proponent of the federation of the Australian colonies, and a three-time Prime Minister of Australia (1903–04, 1905–08 and 1909–10).

[24] Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*, p. 56.

[25] J. E. Tyler, 'The Development of the Imperial Conference, 1887–1914' in E. A. Benians, J. R. M. Butler, P. N. S. Mansergh, E. A. Walker (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol. III, *The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919,* E. A. Benians, James Butler, C. E. Carrington (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959, p. 414; Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 132.

[26] Queen Victoria had emerged from mourning in 1887 and become the embodiment of Britain and the empire throughout the empire. Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 3; The Colonial Defence Committee was alive to the draw of the jubilee celebrations and encouraged Chamberlain to schedule the conference to coincide with the jubilee. Brain P. Farrell, 'Coalition of the Usually Willing: The Dominions and Imperial Defence', in Greg Kennedy (ed), *Imperial Defence: The Old World Order 1850–1956.* Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2008, p. 262.

[27] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', pp. 399–400, pp. 408–9. The pay and conditions afforded the contingent was consistent with Seddon's willingness to spend on defence displays. Seddon would do the same in 1902 when a 'coronation contingent' accompanied him to London for the 1902 conference and the coronation of Edward VII.

[28] It has been contended that in addition to public and press approval, the contingent s reinvigorated memberships of volunteer corps. McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 102.

[29] Denis Judd, *Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain.* London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977, p. 185.

a 'lamp lighting our path to the federation of the British Empire'.[30] Britain's 'splendid isolation' had become for him a cause of anxiety. Britain had no allies on the Continent, poor relations with most European states and, since the Venezuela Crisis of 1885, was less comfortable with the United States.[31] Britain had only its empire.

Figure 5.1 – Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1895–1903, n.d., ichef.bbci.co.uk/images/ic/1200x675/p044vf10.jpg

The Colonial Defence Committee drew up part of the agenda for the 1897 colonial conference, including proposals for the coordination of military forces throughout the empire, the establishment of military colleges in the settler colonies, and the legal issues around colonies sending troops abroad.[32] Such matters were much in line with Chamberlain's desire for closer cooperation between Britain and the colonies.[33] In his opening address he explained that closer imperial relations was the most important matter to be discussed.[34] Imperial defence was second.[35]

[30] Chamberlain, quoted in Robert V. Kubicek, *The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Conference.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969, p. 10.
[31] Judd, *Radical Joe*, p. 188.
[32] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 133.
[33] Farrell, 'Coalition of the Usually Willing', p. 264.
[34] 1897 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, p. 8.
[35] Ibid, p. 9.

Chamberlain then turned to the matter of cost. British tax-payers were unhappy that they footed almost the entire bill for defending the empire.[36] Britain's annual contribution to the defence of the empire was, he continued, about £35 million per annum, 'more than one-third of the total income of the country.'[37] After warning the premiers that 'nothing could be more suicidal' than for a colony to divorce itself from the 'protecting forces of the mother country', he told them he would be pleased to hear about 'any contribution … the Colonies would be willing to make'.[38]

Seddon refused to accept that New Zealand was not pulling its weight. In a sometimes confused response he mentioned a half-million-pound debt for harbour defences, interest payments of £20,000 per year, New Zealand's annual £21,000 contribution to the Australasian naval squadron, and 'defence costs' of £60,000.[39] The colony's total annual defence expenditure was, he claimed, £100,000 per year. 'I say what we have done in New Zealand for its defence … is as much as they are doing in the United Kingdom or in any other Dependencies … we are paying as much in the Colonies as they are doing in Britain for defence.'[40] 'Oh dear no,' Chamberlain replied, 'the navy alone costs us 10s a head'.[41] Figures produced by Chamberlain established that the annual cost of military and naval defences to the United

[36] Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense'*, p. 118.
[37] 1897 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, p. 9.
[38] Ibid, p. 10.
[39] Ibid, p. 18.
[40] Ibid, p. 18.
[41] Ibid, p. 18.

Kingdom was £40 million, approximately £1 per capita.[42] New Zealand's per capita defence expenditure for 1897–98 was 2s 4d, about one-ninth of British spending.[43]

When naval defence was discussed, Seddon complained about the types, power and size of the Royal Navy ships that operated in New Zealand waters.[44] Australian premiers raised concerns about the withdrawal from Australian waters of Australian Squadron ships in wartime,[45] and the Premier of Western Australia, Sir John Forrest, complained that the squadron seldom visited Fremantle.[46]

Seddon was politely reminded that the state of military forces in New Zealand was less than ideal and that a defence scheme for the colony had still not been submitted to the Colonial Defence Committee.[47] Seddon replied that nothing could be done to rectify either matter until (curiously) the port defences in Auckland had been completed.[48] Seddon was, however, prepared to pay a little more for naval protection—provided that the Admiralty stationed 'a better class of boat' in New Zealand waters.[49]

The premiers endorsed *in concept* empire-wide uniformity of munitions, arms and doctrine, but that was where they drew the line. The premier of New South Wales summed up the feelings of many of the premiers when he stated that while

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[42] Ibid, p. 18; £40,000,000 was quoted as the annual cost of military and naval expenditure, the population was described as 'less than 40,000,000.'

[43] 1897–98 defence expenditure was £83,004 for military and £2,525 for naval. (There was no reference to Seddon's £21,000 for the Australasian naval squadron.) £83,004 plus £2,525 gives a total defence expenditure of £85,529 which, divided by 729,056 (population), equates to a £0.12 (decimal) or 2s 4d annual expenditure per capita. Revenue and Expenditure of the General Government, *Yearbook*, 1898. Based on Seddon's figures, cited above (£100,000 paid by 700,000 people), the result is 2s 10d per head.

[44] 1897 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, pp. 34–35.

[45] Ibid, pp. 32–33.

[46] Ibid, p. 37.

[47] Ibid, p. 39.

[48] Report of a Conference between the Rt Hon Joseph Chamberlain, MP and the Premiers of the Self-Governing Colonies of the Empire, TNA WO 106/43, p. 73.

[49] 1897 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, p. 34.

taking on a share of the cost of the defending the empire was premature, he had no doubt that in an emergency his citizens would 'be ready to do anything, go anywhere', but in peacetime, he advised, 'Australians are very narrow in their contributions to anything.'[50] No one doubted that colonial citizens would volunteer in an emergency. Colonial leaders nonetheless made it plain that peacetime commitments regarding wartime contributions were unacceptable. The 1897 colonial conference therefore advanced the *notion* of imperial defence but made little practical progress on it.

It was the Boer states that precipitated the next development. Chamberlain's 1899 request that the settler colonies offer troops for service in South Africa was, as the previous chapter showed, not to solicit military aid (which was then regarded as unnecessary) but to signal to Britain's rivals that the whole empire would rise up to defend any threatened part. Chamberlain's motivation was, therefore, consistent with the 1890 opinion of the Colonial Defence Committee cited earlier.[51]

Seddon went along with participation in the South African war wholeheartedly—and won the support of the public and that year's general election for doing so. Apart from the political benefits, the troops cost him little. Public subscriptions funded the third and fourth contingents and the British government financed the larger, fifth through tenth contingents. The New Zealand government paid for approximately seven per cent of the troops the colony provided.[52] Seddon also leveraged New Zealand's involvement in South Africa to strengthen his claims for Pacific territories and to position New Zealand as Britain's most loyal colony.[53]

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[50] Ibid, p. 12.
[51] See earlier in this chapter; Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 106.
[52] There were about 450 men in the first two (New Zealand government-funded) contingents. Approximately 6,500 New Zealand troops served in South Africa. 450/6,500 = 14.4 or 7 per cent.
[53] Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, pp. 305–6, 320; also see previous chapter.

The next significant development in New Zealand's involvement in the defence of the empire took place on 20 July 1900 when Seddon made a statement to the House of Representatives on defence matters. The war in South Africa, he said, the possibility of an 'adjustment of affairs in China' (a reference to the Boxer Rebellion) and the 'outlook as a whole' made a number of defence initiatives 'prudent'.[54] More would be spent on a larger volunteer force, arms, artillery and rifle clubs. A cadet programme would be started and naval defences would be upgraded. His plans also included the formation of a 'reserve force equal to any emergency' and for service overseas.[55] Turning to how these initiatives were to be funded, Seddon said that since defence improvements would benefit both New Zealand and the empire, the British government should finance the scheme. The 'colonies' (he used the plural) would make interest payments at three per cent.[56]

Seddon's imperial reserve was based on a proposal made in May by the New South Wales Commandant, Major-General George French.[57] (At the Imperial Conference in 1902, Seddon acknowledged that French's scheme was 'similar' to his own.)[58] French had argued that 'the real way … to keep the flag flying all over the Empire is to form war reserves in the colonies.'[59] He proposed that the officers and men in the reserves be militia members or those who had fought in South Africa. They would be paid a 'retaining fee' of £8–12 per annum (by whom was not made

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[54] Defences of the Colony: Statement by the Rt Hon R. J. Seddon …, AJHR H-19A, 1900, p. 1.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Seddon was aware of French's almost identical proposal. Defences of the Colony: Statement by the Rt Hon R. J. Seddon …, AJHR H-19A, 1900, p. 3; Major-General French's Defence Scheme (Australia's Mounted Men), 8 May 1900, ANZ Seddon 18; Craig Stockings, '"The Weary Titan Staggers under the Too Vast Orb of its Fate". Post-Federation Australia and the Problem of Imperial Defence', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 44:6 (2016), 908; Christobel Gilmour, 'Seddon and the 1902 Colonial Conference', BA Hons thesis, University of Otago, 1970, p. 17.
[58] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, p. 86.
[59] Major-General French's Defence Scheme (Australia's Mounted Men), 8 May 1900, ANZ Seddon 18.

clear) but would receive Australian permanent force rates of pay, paid by the British government, when on imperial service.[60]

Onto French's scheme Seddon added four weeks' annual training in camp and that the British government was to provide the horses when the reserve was serving offshore, pay the annual capitation/retaining fees, and pay the reservists when in camp or on imperial service at rates not less than New Zealand's fifth contingent in South Africa was receiving (a rate higher than British troops received). Additionally, a limit on the places the force could serve was to be agreed upon by the New Zealand and British governments.[61] Seddon expected that 8,000 European and 2,000 Maori New Zealanders would volunteer. He estimated the annual cost of 10,000 New Zealand reservists at £100,000 per annum (£10 per head). When those 10,000 were combined with 40,000 similarly raised Australian reservists, however, Seddon said that the annual cost of a 50,000-strong force would be £1 million (£20 per head).[62]

Opposition MHRs had some doubts about Seddon's proposal. The leader of the Opposition complained that no provisions for training or for better organisation of the defence forces had been included—a telling comment that shows the weaknesses in citizen-soldier performance and the New Zealand staff function were known to at least some. He expected the imperial reserve to fail because men would not join it and parents would not allow their sons to be 'turned into ordinary Tommy Atkinses to fight all over the word.'[63] Despite Seddon's claim that his scheme could

[60] Ibid.
[61] Defences of the Colony: Statement by the Rt Hon R. J. Seddon …, AJHR H-19A, 1900, pp. 2–3.
[62] Ibid, p. 3.
[63] 'Views of Captain Russell', *Press,* 21 July 1900, p. 5.

be financed 'at very slight expense to the colonies',[64] Opposition members complained to the press that the costs were too high.[65]

There is no doubt that Seddon was an 'ardent' imperialist.[66] However heartfelt Seddon's imperialism was, imperial loyalty was a tactic he used to advantage New Zealand's in Whitehall. As Tom Brooking has shown, one way Seddon helped to secure access to British markets for New Zealand's wool, meat, cheese and butter was by proposing closer imperial relations and making demonstrations of imperial fealty.[67] In most instances, whenever New Zealand gave a concession or a gift, it expected something in return.[68] Moreover, Colonel Penton, the commandant, was not confident that men would enlist in the reserve in peacetime, and questions were raised about the legitimacy of a colonial parliament's determinations that involved extra-territorial matters.[69]

It is difficult to establish in quite what spirit, or for what purpose, the imperial reserve scheme was offered. The proposal had a number of troubling aspects. First, it was asking the New Zealand House of Representatives to consider a scheme that committed a third party (the British government), and quite unbeknownst to it, to pay nearly all the costs—as much as £1 million a year in Australasia alone. The financial outlay sought from Britain was hardly the 'slight expense' Seddon claimed it to be,[70] and was absolutely at odds with Chamberlain's complaint that Britain was already paying too much.

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[64] NZPD, Vol. 112 (19 July – 16 August) 1900, 78.
[65] 'Mr James Allen Interviewed', *Press,* 21 July 1900, p. 5; 'Mr Massey's Opinion', *Press,* 21 July 1900, p. 5.
[66] Brooking, *Richard Seddon,* p. 284.
[67] Ibid, pp. 285–86.
[68] Wood, *New Zealand in the World*, p. 76.
[69] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli,* p. 132.
[70] NZPD, Vol. 112 (19 July – 16 August) 1900, 78.

Second, Seddon's use of 'colonies' in the plural implied that he was not merely proposing a defence plan for New Zealand but for all the settler colonies. A multi-colony proposal was an appropriate topic for a colonial conference, not for a colonial parliament that had no authority outside its own shores. (Seddon would, in fact, submit his imperial reserve scheme to the 1902 colonial conference.)

Third, despite knowing that British military authorities had refused to accept Maori troops for South Africa on the grounds that imperial forces should be white, Seddon wanted one-fifth of the New Zealand reserve to be Maori.[71] In proposing that non-white soldiers be included he was risking objections from British authorities, the very people he expected to pay the costs.

Fourth, the two-fold difference in the cost of New Zealand versus Australasian reservists was unexplained and the absence of provisions for paying off the scheme's costs (Seddon mentioned only interest payments) combine to suggest that the financial aspects were not well-considered.

Overall, considering that the costs were high, the omissions and inconsistencies in the financial arrangements, that it required a compromise on the racial composition of imperial forces, and because it flew in the face of Britain's concern that the colonies should pay a larger share of imperial defence costs, it is hard to understand why Seddon thought his scheme would be attractive to Britain. The House, nevertheless, sent the proposal to its parliamentary Defence Committee.

[71] A War Office report of 1901 stated that the main burden of imperial defence 'must be borne by the white subjects of the King' and that colonial contingents of non-European men would not be considered. Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Altham (Assistant Quartermaster-General), The Organization of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service, 25 November 1901, Appendix, Colonial Conference 1902, Papers Relating … , TNA CAB 18/10, p. 47; Defences of the Colony: Statement by the Rt Hon R. J. Seddon …, AJHR H-19A, 1900, pp. 1–2.

On 16 August 1900 that committee, the Joint Defence (Secret) Committee, produced an interim report that endorsed Seddon's imperial reserve proposal.[72] The interim report contained, however, a caveat: its recommendations rested on the British government providing the necessary finance at acceptable rates. Should London decline to fund the scheme, the committee's spending priority was not an imperial reserve but the completion port fortifications.[73]

Seddon introduced the Joint Defence (Secret) Committee's interim report to the House late in the evening of Thursday 18 October, the penultimate sitting for the session. The few members present were tired and weary.[74] It is possible that Seddon scheduled the report at that time and day in the hope of limiting debate. He said the public were making 'references to Imperialism and militarism' and that it was better 'to act while the martial spirit is still rampant, and not wait until we get back to our normal condition.'[75] On paying for the reserve, Seddon said only 'we would call upon the Imperial authorities to bear some part of it', that it was but a 'small cost' to Britain, and that the British government would be 'very glad indeed to have reserve forces in the colonies'.[76]

The leader of the Opposition, Captain William Russell, had some reservations. He thought the initial intake too small and disliked the restrictions on where it could serve: 'The Imperial Reserve must be for the purpose of fighting Imperial battles anywhere in the Empire … [and] prepared to go where the Imperial

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[72] Joint Defence (Secret) Committee, Interim Report, 21 August 1900, p. 4; Schedule B, p. 8, ANZ Seddon 18. No final report is known of.
[73] Joint Defence (Secret) Committee, Interim Report, 21 August 1900, p. 6, ANZ Seddon 18.
[74] In the next day's sitting, the last for the session, the MHR for Masterton complained that he did not take part in the debate on the Defence Committee's report 'for the simple reason that the House was nearly empty—there was merely a bare quorum present—and members were jaded; and, in common with others, I was utterly unfit to do justice to the discussion of such an important matter.' NZPD, Vol. 115 (9–20 October) 1900, 507.
[75] NZPD, Vol. 115 (9–20 October) 1900, 447.
[76] Ibid, 449.

arms are wanted.'[77] Russell nonetheless approved the spirit of the proposal because it was patriotic and strengthened the empire.[78] He also recommended that until the British government confirmed whether and to what extend it would fund the reserve, the matter be put aside.[79] The debate ran into the early hours of Friday morning, when the House adopted the report.

Introducing the Defence Act Amendment Bill later the same day (Friday 19 October, the last sitting of the session), Seddon said the bill contained little 'of a debatable character, because it would merely enact the recommendations of the Joint Defence (Secret) Committee's report, which the House had adopted twelve hours earlier.[80] It was not the imperial reserve but other matters in the bill (the commandant's role, volunteer corps, port defences) that concerned most members. The Defence Act Amendment bill, and with it the imperial reserve scheme, was passed that day.[81]

Copies of the New Zealand Defence Act Amendment Act were sent to Britain. The initial responses were largely positive. While not entirely comfortable with the geographical limitations New Zealand could place on the use of the reserve, Chamberlain described the Act as a 'source of the greatest gratification'.[82] New Zealand's 'patriotic spirit' and 'practical foresight' were, he wrote, evident.[83] A likely reason for Chamberlain's opinion was an omission from the Act that had not then been noticed. There was no statement about who was to pay for the reserve.

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[77] Ibid, 452.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid, 453.
[80] Ibid, 500–01.
[81] Ibid, 517.
[82] Chamberlain to Governor of New Zealand, 6 September 1901, ANZ G2 12.
[83] Ibid.

For the 1902 colonial conference New Zealand submitted a notice of motion that each self-governing colony should establish an imperial reserve, and negotiate with the British government on where its reserve could serve and how the cost was to be shared between each colony and Britain.[84] Chamberlain referred the notice of motion to the Colonial Defence Committee.[85] The committee found the proposal 'identical' to the New Zealand Defence Act Amendment Act of 1900, which they had previously admired for being the first and 'an important step towards facilitating the conception and execution of comprehensive schemes of Imperial defence.'[86] The committee also had some reservations. Rather than endorsing New Zealand's proposal that each colony negotiate geographical limits on the use of its reserve, the committee preferred the reserves to be available for service anywhere, including Europe.[87] They also noticed what was to become the key issue: who would pay for the imperial reserves?

While the imperial reserve proposal provided for an agreement to be made between Britain and each colony on meeting the costs of the reserves, the Defence Act Amendment Act was, the Committee of Colonial Defence noted, 'silent on this point'.[88] They took the silence to mean that the British government was not required to meet any of the peacetime costs of a New Zealand reserve. New Zealand funding its imperial reserve also, the committee noted, 'avoided questions of divided responsibility and some other difficulties.'[89] Seddon, however, saw the responsibility for costs in a quite different light.

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[84] Appendix III, Colonial Conference 1902, Papers Relating … ,TNA CAB 18/10, p. 44.
[85] Ibid, p. 44; Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Altham (Assistant Quartermaster-General), The Organization of Colonial Troops for Imperial Service, 25 November 1901, Appendix, Colonial Conference 1902, Papers Relating … ,TNA CAB 18/10, pp. 47–52.
[86] Appendix III, Colonial Conference 1902, Papers Relating … ,TNA CAB 18/10, p. 44.
[87] Ibid, pp. 44–45.
[88] Ibid, p. 45.
[89] Ibid, p. 45.

The Defence Act Amendment Act of 1900 made, indeed, no mention of funding. (The only exception was a clause that required the British government to meet the costs of the reserve when on imperial service.[90] That was hardly a contentious matter given that Britain was paying for most of the colonial troops then serving in South Africa.) Seddon had told the House on 20 July 1900 that the peacetime costs of the defence initiatives would be shared between New Zealand and Britain.[91] New Zealand's Joint Defence (Secret) Committee's interim report recognised, however, that the *whole* endeavour depended on financial contributions from Britain.[92] Thus, two interpretations of the financial responsibility for an imperial reserve came to coexist. Seddon expected the British government to pay a share of the costs, perhaps the larger share. The Colonial Defence Committee thought the opposite, that New Zealand was offering to fund the entire cost of an imperial reserve.

The cost of imperial defence was, it should be remembered, a major issue for the British government. One of the first matters Chamberlain raised in his opening address to the 1902 colonial conference was that Britain was spending 29s 3d per capita per annum on defence while the settler colonies spent far less; 3s 4d in the case of New Zealand.[93] Once again Seddon argued that Chamberlain's figures were incorrect. '[O]ur expenditure per annum per head directly is about 5s,' he said.[94] (Based on figures in 1902's *Official Yearbook*, Seddon's statement was correct.[95]

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[90] Defence Act Amendment Act, 1900, 69 Vict 64, 12 (6.).
[91] NZPD, Vol. 112 (20 July–10 August) 1900, 76; ibid, Vol. 115 (9–20 October) 1900, 449.
[92] Joint Defence (Secret) Committee, Interim Report, 21 August 1900, ANZ Seddon 18, p. 4.
[93] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 57–58.
[94] Ibid, p. 64.
[95] The 1902 Yearbook gives defence expenditure as £160,178 (excluding the cost of the South African War) in the Defence section and £191,250 in the Finance section. A defence budget of £160,178 makes approximately 4s 2d per capita per annum. A £191,250 defence budget would make

New Zealand's 5s was, however, barely one-sixth of Britain's expenditure.) Seddon then cried poor. Development needs in the self-governing colonies reduced the funds available for defence. '[T]he people of the Mother Country' he continued 'profit very largely in that development, and it does not cost them anything whatever'.[96] Seddon did not explain how British tax-payers benefited from the construction of road bridges or rail lines in the colonies.

The New Zealand economy, he continued, was too small to bear a per capita defence expenditure equal to that of Britain's. Instead, a ten per cent 'preference' (reduction in tariff/import duty) could be allowed on imports from Britain.[97] Seddon claimed that the preference would benefit British manufacturers by £150,000 per annum (again, he did not explain how), and that it could take the place of increased defence spending by New Zealand. He claimed that £150,000 a year was equal to the interest on £5 million at 3 per cent: 'you might say that the colony of New Zealand by paying this would be paying the interest on five battleships that might cost a million each.'[98] Chamberlain responded that he did not understand.[99]

Other premiers, such as the Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Wilfred Laurier, agreed with Seddon's claim that development needs in colonies limited the funds available for defence.[100] Sounding a little vexed by the collective position that was forming, Chamberlain told the conference that were he speaking to a colonial population he would remind them that, but for Britain's protection, they would have to spend 'a vast deal more than you are spending to make an adequate, or any kind

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approximately 5s per capita per annum. Defences, Military and Naval; Revenue and Expenditure of the General Government, *Official Yearbook*, 1902.

[96] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, p. 64.

[97] Ibid, p. 65

[98] Ibid, p. 65

[99] Ibid, p. 65

[100] Ibid, p. 67.

of proportionate, preparation for your own defence.'[101] He trusted that, if so advised, colonial citizens would realise that they should contemplate imperial defence contributions in a generous spirit.[102] Chamberlain was clearly not prepared to add the cost of imperial reserves to Britain's already burdensome defence costs.

The Secretary of State for War, St John Brodrick, had different objectives. The War Office did not doubt that, in an emergency, colonial citizens would come forward to fight; the response to the conflict in South Africa had proven that. What concerned the War Office was how many men would be available, and that they should be trained in peacetime to confront not Boer farmers, but the well-trained forces of a major European power.[103] For Brodrick, therefore, imperial reserves offered solutions to the two issues that most concerned the War Office about colonial troops: firm numbers and a trained force. Seeking a means to make the idea appealing to the premiers, Brodrick suggested that that small-scale imperial reserves might be a more worthwhile investment for colonial governments than the larger volunteer and militia forces they maintained. The 100,000 citizen soldiers in the settler colonies were, he pointed out, poorly trained, inadequately equipped and consequently of little use. On the other hand, 20,000 trained and properly equipped imperial reservists would be a valuable asset to both the colonies and the empire.[104] Seddon, who normally argued that untrained citizen soldiers were the best soldiers (and had just toured South Africa saying so, loudly), opted to agree.[105]

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[101] Ibid, p. 76.
[102] Ibid, p. 76; Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, p. 148.
[103] McGibbon, *Path to Gallipoli,* p. 136.
[104] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 79–80. Also see Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 159.
[105] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, p. 86; Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 333.

Brodrick then went on to outline a solution that balanced financial support against availability. At a basic level, it was a 'he who pays the piper calls the tune' policy. If a colony wanted to approve each use of its imperial reserve, the colony should pay for its reserve. If, however, the British government had the right to call upon a colony's reserve in a crisis, the British government would meet some part of the reserve's costs. Brodrick was also prepared to discuss limitations on where an imperial reserve could serve.[106]

The War Office had, however, a further reservation about imperial reserve forces: the issue of control. Some senior officers worried how Britain could command and control a force in a colony.[107] Even before the 1902 colonial conference, Lord Roberts, General Nicholson and Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Altham were concerned that that colonial governments would be reluctant to hand control of their imperial reserves to Britain, especially without any say in strategy.[108]

Whitehall was not the only body wary of the imperial reserve scheme. Canada's Minister of Defence, Sir Frederick Borden, told the conference that the creation of a separate imperial reserve in Canada would offend the militia. He also argued that no special reserve was needed. Those who had volunteered to serve in South Africa had established that the colonies would 'assist the Mother Country in

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[106] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 79–81, pp. 95–95.
[107] Nicholas d'Ombrain, *War Machinery and High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain 1902-1914.* London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 228.
[108] In 1902 Roberts held the later-abolished post of Commander-in-Chief of the Forces. Nicholson was Director-General of Mobilisation and Military intelligence and, later, was Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Altham was Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General for intelligence. John Mordike, *An Army for a Nation: A History of Australian Military Developments 1880–1914.* North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992, p. 110; Stockings, 'The Weary Titan Staggers': 910.

the event of any emergency'.[109] The Prime of Australia, Sir Edmund Barton, agreed with Borden.[110] Canada and Australia did not lack of imperial loyalty, their reluctance to form imperial reserves arose from the convictions of their people and the powers of governments in self-governing colonies.[111] With the fighting ongoing in South Africa, Canadians and Australians (like New Zealanders) were being told that their untrained citizens made fine soldiers. The self-governing colonies all had legislation limiting the compulsory service of citizen-soldier forces to their own shores, were confident that men would volunteer in a crisis, and that agreements made in peacetime binding colonial governments to respond in certain ways in wartime were unacceptable.[112] Canada and Australia therefore chose not to form imperial reserves.

In the last days of the conference, Brodrick wrote that only three differences separated what he hoped for and what Seddon was seeking. Those differences were: how to equip an imperial reserve; the question of service on the Northwest Frontier of India; and the amount of annual capitation to be paid.[113] Brodrick was confident 'there will not be much difficulty in working out the details.'[114]

Seddon had accepted Brodrick's 'he who pays the piper' principle and offered a compromise solution. Once the places a reserve might serve are 'agreed upon, the financial difficulty is solved' he contended.[115] Seddon sought to limit the places a

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[109] Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 79–81, p. 82.
[110] Ibid, p. 83.
[111] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield,* p. 267.
[112] Ibid, p. 270; statements made by the premier of New South Wales, 1897 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/5, p. 12.
[113] Minute, Brodrick, 6 August 1902, Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, p. 170.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Seddon to Brodrick, 6 August 1902, Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 170–71.

New Zealand reserve could serve to South Africa, China and Canada.[116] He later added the western Pacific.[117] What these places have in common is that in none of them would reservists confront European forces, or not in any strength. Seddon and Brodrick both accepted that colonial troops were incapable of facing trained European forces.[118] The possibility that Seddon was seeking to limit service to 'soft' countries cannot be overlooked, nor can the possibility that the War Office had such little confidence in the fitness of colonial troops to engage European forces that felt they could not object.[119] The perceived threats to the empire were, however, European powers. An imperial reserve incapable of confronting the anticipated adversaries was of decidedly limited value. Seddon and Brodrick nonetheless continued their negotiations. In essence Seddon proposed that so long as Britain and New Zealand agreed on the repertoire the piper might be asked to play (the places a New Zealand reserve could serve), then Britain could call the tune—and pay the piper. Seddon argued that no colony would agree to its reserve being treated the same as reserves in the United Kingdom, which could be called to serve anywhere in the world. He also warned that men would not join the reserve without knowing where they might be sent.[120]

Five days later, on 11 August 1902, and after what he termed a 'development of an embarrassing nature' during the conference (presumably the refusals of

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[116] Memorandum by Mr St John Brodrick, 5 August 1902 (Appendix VI), ibid, p. 169.
[117] Seddon to Brodrick, 6 August 1902, ibid, p. 171.
[118] Christobel Gilmour, 'Seddon and the 1902 Colonial Conference', BA Hons thesis, University of Otago, 1970, p. 18; Richard Haldane, the Secretary of State for War from 1905 to 1912, was of a similar opinion. 'There was a considerable number of those [colonial] troops which no general would have had a right to pit against European troops without further training'. Quoted in Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, p. 147.
[119] 'There was a considerable number of those [colonial] troops which no general would have had a right to pit against European troops without further training.' Richard Haldane, quoted in Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, p. 147.
[120] Seddon to Brodrick, 6 August 1902, Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 170–71.

Canada and Australia to form imperial reserves), Seddon withdrew the imperial reserve motion.[121] Refusing to believe that all was lost, he wrote to Brodrick that withdrawal of the motion did not prevent them from coming to an agreement between themselves.[122] On 6 September, the eve of his departure from London, Seddon reminded Brodrick that he was still ready to establish a New Zealand imperial reserve, and that prompt action was needed because the interest in arms the South African War had generated would quickly wane.[123]

Seddon suffered no political adverse reaction in New Zealand from the failure of the imperial reserve proposal. New Zealanders had delighted in the press attention their premier received in London and warmly welcomed him home.[124] When newspapers mentioned (often only indirectly) the failure of the imperial reserve scheme, they usually praised Seddon's commitment and blamed others for the lack of success.[125] Four weeks after returning to New Zealand, the Liberals were once more returned to government.[126]

Six weeks after the end of the 1902 conference, the War Office asked the Colonial Office to forward to New Zealand a request for it to proceed with its imperial reserve.[127] Two acceptable forms for a New Zealand reserve were described. The first was a wholly or partly British-funded force that, in an emergency and subject to agreed restrictions on where it could be sent, would be

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[121] Ibid, pp. 170–71, p. 116.
[122] Seddon to Brodrick, 11 August 1902, TNA WO 32/8306
[123] Ibid.
[124] Murray Deaker, 'Seddon's Contribution to Imperial Relations 1897 to 1902', MA thesis, University of Otago, 1968, pp. 26–7; Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick"', p. 81; Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 341.
[125] 'The Return of the Premier' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 25 October 1902, p. 4; 'Reception to Mr Seddon' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 25 October 1902, p. 4; 'The Premier's Return', *Lyttelton Times,* 27 October 1902, p. 4.
[126] The general election of 25 November 1902.
[127] That was the normal channel for communications. The Colonial Office communicated with the colonies.

immediately available for imperial service. The alternative was for New Zealand to pay for an imperial reserve and, should a crisis arise, Britain could negotiate on where and on what terms the reserve might be used. Seddon and Brodrick both favoured the first option.[128] For Seddon, it was the cheaper one.[129] As Secretary of State for War, Brodrick also preferred it because he wanted to know what forces he could definitely call on in a crisis.

The Colonial Office was, however, more concerned about finances than military capabilities and insisted 'the Colonies should bear their due share in the defence of the Empire.'[130] In a letter to Brodrick the following May, Chamberlain explained that British tax-payers felt that 'the self-governing colonies who enjoy the benefits and advantages of the Empire should take a share in its defence.'[131] He was disappointed that the colonial premiers had shown a reluctance to share defence costs and that Canada and Australia had declined to form reserves. Chamberlain also confided that he had only limited confidence in the New Zealand offer because it depended so much upon Seddon and whether, 'if the influence of his strong personality were withdrawn from public life, opinion in New Zealand would be found to differ very largely from that in the sister colonies.'[132]

No reply was forthcoming from Brodrick, despite at least three reminders from the Colonial Office.[133] It was, nonetheless, the War Office that delivered the death blow to the imperial reserve idea. In January 1904, Hugh Arnold-Forster (who had replaced Brodrick as Secretary of State for War) wrote on a minute concerning

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[128] War Office to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 2 October 1902, 091/2247 I (1), 2 October 1902, TNA WO 32/8307.
[129] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 257.
[130] AQMG to DGMI, Register 091/2247, 1 December 1903, TNA WO 32/8307, p. 28.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.

a New Zealand imperial reserve 'I fear I cannot agree to this proposal.'[134] Reservists in New Zealand would, he noted, be subject to New Zealand law, and defaulters would have to be pursued through New Zealand courts. Moreover, a British government-funded imperial reserve in a colony posed the risk that were both the empire and the colony to be threatened simultaneously, the colony was unlikely to release its reserve for service elsewhere. 'If New Zealand really desires to assist the Empire in time of war,' Arnold-Foster continued, 'there is nothing to prevent the Colonial Government creating and maintaining a Reserve of its own.'[135]

On 9 February 1904, eighteen months after the 1902 colonial conference, the War Office informed the Colonial Office that it accepted the Colonial Office's position: if New Zealand wanted to raise an imperial reserve, it would need to do so at its own expense. A letter outlining the new terms was then sent to New Zealand.[136] Nothing more on the matter was heard from Seddon. Public interest in military matters had declined after the end of the South African War and, it has been argued, imperial reserves no longer earned the Premier political capital.[137]

The main reasons for the failure of the imperial reserve scheme were: the British public's concern over their rising defence costs; the refusals of Canada and Australia to form imperial reserves; the geographical limitations colonies could impose on the use of their reserves; and that the scheme was financially and in administrative terms an unattractive proposition for Britain.[138] Given the British

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[134] Minute 16, 1 January 1904, no file number, TNA WO 32/8307. The context of the rest of file (it was hand-addressed to 'C in C') suggests the minute was written by Arnold-Forster. Furthermore, on 19 Jan 1904, Field Marshal Lord Roberts agreed 'it is undesirable for England to pay for Reservists settled in New Zealand or any other self-governing Colony'. Minute 18, 19 January 1904, ibid.
[135] Minute 16, 1 January 1904, no file number, ibid.
[136] Untitled, undated 2-page minute on British government letterhead, ibid.
[137] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 135; Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience,* p. 53.
[138] Colonial Office to War Office, 2456/1903, 4 May 1903, TNA 32/8307; Colonial Office to Governor New Zealand, Secret, 27 August 1904, ibid; 1887 colonial conference, Extracts from Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence / Dominions No. 12 Confidential, Colonial Office, 1909, TNA

public's mood, taking on additional the costs of colonial reserves would entail expenses that were politically unacceptable.[139]

On Sunday 10 June 1906, Richard Seddon died of heart failure aboard the Federal-Houlder line's *Oswestry Grange* while returning to New Zealand after a visit to Australia.[140] His death sparked a string of eulogies that frequently lauded his commitment to the empire and his support for the South African War.[141] The *Sydney Morning Herald* described Seddon as a 'great citizen of the Empire and a foremost spokesman of Greater Britain'.[142] The London *Times* credited him with 'intense patriotism and enlightened Imperialism'.[143] Contemporaries made, and historians have continued to make, similar assertions. New Zealand has often been described as being the *most loyal* colony. Michael King thought so, and did Keith Jeffrey.[144] Donald Gordon termed New Zealand the 'most receptive' and 'most imperial-minded' colony.[145] André Siegfried, a contemporary observer, found it the most English colony and the most faithful to Britain.[146] Steven Loveridge noted that New Zealand was the most isolated colony and yet the most loyal.[147] Seddon's biographer,

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CO 886/2/5, p. 18; Proceedings of Colonial Conferences Relating to Defence, Colonial Office, 1909, CO 886/2/5, pp. 57–58. Historians too have agreed that the cost of defence was a major issue. See for example Richard A. Preston, *Canada and 'Imperial Defense': A study of the origins of the British Commonwealth's defense organization, 1867-1919.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967, p. 290, p. 296.

[139] Colonial Office to Governor New Zealand, Secret, 27 August 1904, TNA WO 32/8307.

[140] 'The Late Mr Seddon' and 'Death of Mr R. J. Seddon', *Evening News* (Sydney), 11 June 1906, p. 5 and p. 4; Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 405.

[141] 'Death of Mr Seddon', *Auckland Star,* 11 June 1906, p. 4; 'The Passing of a Strong Man', *Evening Post,* 11 June 1906, p. 6; 'A National Loss', *New Zealand Times,* 12 June 1906, p. 4; 'Death of Mr Seddon', *Otago Daily Times,* 12 June 1906, p. 6.

[142] 'The Late Richard Seddon', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 12 June 1906, p. 6

[143] The *Times* extract was quoted in 'Mr Seddon's Death', *Evening Post,* 13 June 1906, p. 7.

[144] 'New Zealand was one of the most loyal—if not *the* most loyal—of Britain's children.' [Original italics.] King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand*, p. 281; Keith Jeffrey, 'The Imperial Conference, the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment', in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *1911 Preliminary Moves: The 2011 Chief of the Army History Conference.* n.p.: Big Sky Publishing, 2011, p. 23.

[145] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 158.

[146] Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, p. 357.

[147] Steven Loveridge, 'The "Other" on the Other Side of the Ditch? The Conception of New Zealand's Disassociation from Australia', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 44:1 (2016): 82

Tom Brooking, thought New Zealand more loyal that the other settler colonies, and Keith Sinclair noted that New Zealand was the only colony consistently in favour of closer ties with Britain.[148]

All those statements accurately describe New Zealand's behaviour in general. They are not, however, always applicable to defence matters, especially before 1907. Seddon had been a vocal proponent of the empire. But when it came to action on defence, especially spending on defence, he had shown little enthusiasm. Seddon had refused to reform or properly equip the volunteers. He was happy to send troops to South Africa because, while doing so undeniably supported the empire, it also earned him political kudos and cost very little.[149] It is only fair to add that in the years Seddon was premier, there were few reasons for New Zealand to invest heavily in defence. The colony was not threatened, the supremacy of the Royal Navy was not then challenged, and men had volunteered to fight in South Africa. That said, Chamberlain was ready to have a New Zealand imperial reserve if—and only if—New Zealand paid for it. Brodrick was prepared to negotiate on where the reserve could serve, presumably because even if the reserve served away from the battleground, it could still free up imperial troops, and if New Zealand paid for a reserve, there would be none of the command issues Arnold-Forster raised. It is hard to avoid concluding that had Seddon been prepared to pay for an imperial reserve, he would likely have got one. One reserve, not the empire-wide adoption of the reserve scheme, which depended on other colonies agreeing, but one.

Seddon died when the deputy leader of the Liberal party, Sir Joseph Ward, was attending a postal conference in Rome. The acting Premier, Sir William Hall-

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[148] Brooking, '"King Joe" and "King Dick"', p. 74, p. 76; Sinclair, *Imperial Federation,* p. 11.
[149] The New Zealand government funded only 450 (the first two contingents) of the 6,500 troops sent to South Africa: approximately seven per cent.

Jones, served as Premier until Ward's return.[150] Joseph George Ward was born in Melbourne, Victoria, in 1856 to Irish-Catholic parents. His father died when Ward was four. Ward's mother, her children and her new husband moved to the southern New Zealand port town of Bluff when Ward was seven. In his early twenties Ward established a trading company. It grew into a considerable enterprise. He entered local politics at 25, married at 27 and was first elected to Parliament when 31. At the time of Seddon's death Ward was the Colonial Secretary and the minister for health, railways, post and telegraph, and industry and commerce. A volunteer officer, very wealthy, a quick and articulate speaker and a practising Catholic, he was also an advocate of imperial federation.[151]

Three months after being made Premier, Ward took over the defence portfolio.[152] In 1907 he attended the colonial conference in London.[153] There he met two of Britain's foremost military-political figures: the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Elgin (who had chaired the royal commission into the conduct of the South African War); and the Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane (who was reforming the British Army, often in response to the findings of Elgin's inquiry).

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[150] Despite the urgings of the Governor (Lord Plunket), Hall-Jones (who had been serving as acting Premier while both Seddon and Ward were out of the colony) refused to take up the premiership until after Seddon's funeral, which did not take place until 21 June. For the 11 days between Seddon's death and his funeral, New Zealand had no Premier. Ward, who had hurried home, was made Premier on 6 August 1906. Brooking, *Richard Seddon*, p. 406.

[151] Michael Bassett, 'Ward, Joseph George' in *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography,* teara.govt.nz/en /biographies/2w9/ward-joseph-george, accessed 12 June 2019.

[152] Ward became Minister of Defence on 23 November 1906, replacing Albert Pitt, who held the portfolio after Seddon's death.

[153] The conference ran from 15 April until 14 May. Allowing five weeks for the sea voyage each way, Ward was out of the colony from early March to late June.

Figure 5.2 – The meticulously attired Ward was an able politician but distanced from many by his wealth and religion. Photo taken circa 1900. nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/ joseph-ward.

By 1907 the international outlook was decidedly different to that of 1902. German naval construction occupied a prominent place in the public's concerns, and by as early as 1903 the War Office was worried that Britain had only 120,000 men at hand to respond to any moves by Germany's army of over three million.[154] Alongside these changes, a new British attitude to the colonies had emerged. Prior to entering politics, Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, had been a constitutional lawyer and was familiar with the legal issues associated with colonial involvement in imperial conflicts.[155] He was also cognisant of colonial sensibilities and, so long as overall imperial policy was respected, he accepted that 'the Dominions and India could remain autonomous' about the details.[156] Moreover,

[154] Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project*, p. 43.
[155] Ibid, p. 26.
[156] Richard Burdon Haldane, *An Autobiography.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929, p. 199.

since 1906 Haldane had been concerned that Germany might invade France and, with its growing naval fleet, would pose a threat to the security of the British Isles. In Haldane's opinion, Britain did not have a sufficiently large expeditionary force to oppose any such move by Germany.[157]

For his part, Ward was alive to Britain's central role in the New Zealand economy, which accounted for 80 per cent of export earnings and three-quarters of government debt.[158] A keen supporter of imperial federation, he proposed the formation of an imperial council (a parliament of sorts). Ward warned, however, that the independence of the self-governing colonies must not be comprised by it. When it came to defence matters, Ward initially took up the old tune: New Zealanders would willingly volunteer to defend Britain should it come under attack but would not accept a peacetime agreement binding them to do so.[159]

On 20 April, the fourth meeting-day of the 1907 conference, Haldane outlined the reforms he was implementing in the British army. He proposed that the colonies adopt a 'broad plan of military organisation for the Empire'.[160] Critically, he added: 'We know that you have all got your own difficulties and the idiosyncrasies of your own people to deal with. No rigid model is therefore of use. But a common purpose or a common end may be very potent in furthering military organisation.'[161] Haldane (Figure 5.3) went on to recommend that a general staff on the British model be created in each colony or dominion, and that dominion military forces should be able to defend their dominions and to serve overseas in aid of the empire.[162] He

[157] Ibid, p. 187.
[158] Exports: Rise in Value of Exports from New Zealand, *Official Yearbook*, 1908.
[159] Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907, London: HMSO, 1907, TNA CAB 18/13B, p. 30, p. 32.
[160] Ibid, p. 95.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid.

proposed officer exchanges and the empire-wide standardisation of army structures, arms, equipment and training.[163]

Figure 5.3 – Richard Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War 1905–1912. Photo: George Charles Beresford, 1903. www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw189852/Richard-Burdon-Haldane-Viscount-Haldane

In response, Ward changed tack. Instead of continuing to argue that peacetime commitments were unacceptable, he told the conference that he was confident the New Zealand parliament would endorse Haldane's proposals and act on them.[164] What Ward appears to have liked most was that Haldane's proposals did not seek to bind the self-governing colonies to a set of rigid requirements; the scheme could be adapted to meet the requirements of a colony, yet still maintain overall uniformity. 'I am quite prepared to support a resolution of that kind' he said.[165] Ward was not the only colonial representative to hold that opinion. Canada's

[163] Ibid, pp. 96–98.
[164] Ibid, p. 108.
[165] Ibid, p. 110.

Minister of Defence, Sir Frederick Borden, said he too was 'in very close sympathy' with Haldane's recommendations. The Prime Minister of Australia, Alfred Deakin, endorsed Borden's comments and stated that Australia had 'the warmest possible desire to cooperate' with the 'great projects you have clearly outlined today.'[166] The representatives of the South African colonies also approved Haldane's plans.[167]

The issues that motivated Haldane (his acceptance of colonial political sensibilities, tolerance of the colonial desire to avoid firm peacetime commitments, and his concerns about German aggression) won the support of colonial leaders. Unlike the stance taken at previous conferences, in 1907 there was agreement on four key imperial defence matters: the need for empire-wide uniformity of military procedures and equipment; that the self-governing colonies needed leeway in how each iterated the broad imperial scheme; that colonial populations would not accept peacetime commitments to support the empire in an emergency; and all were confident that in a crisis colonial citizens would eagerly volunteer to defend the empire.[168] It was consensus at last.

On the next conference day, however, when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth, ventured that the self-governing colonies should increase their contributions to naval defence, Ward's response echoed that of Seddon (and other colonial leaders) in 1902. Making use of the often-heard excuse, he said that New Zealand was a young country and that the state was burdened with expensive and inescapable development costs. Consequently New Zealand could not contemplate building or maintaining warships. Ward was, nonetheless, and subject to some

[166] Ibid, p. 107.
[167] Ibid, pp. 111–14.
[168] It has been argued that the operation of the British system of empire in the Edwardian period succeeded only when it was recognized that the self-governing colonies could not be ordered about. Darwin, *The Empire Project*, p. 301.

conditions, prepared to increase the colony's annual contribution to the Royal Navy.[169]

Ward acted on the promises he made in London in 1907. A few months after his return to New Zealand, he presented the Council of Defence's first report (which warned that volunteering was being given its last chance).[170] The council also revised the volunteer regulations (a frequently used mechanism to try to improve the system) and began paying volunteers to attend training camps.[171] As much as Ward had approved Haldane's imperial general staff and the offer of officer interchanges with and training in Britain, no officer was sent to staff college in 1908.[172] He did, however, increase New Zealand's annual contribution to the Royal Navy from £40,000 to £100,000.[173]

Two years after telling the colonial conference that New Zealand could not afford to pay for battleships, in early 1909 Ward made an unexpected and *ex cathedra* announcement that New Zealand would give the Royal Navy a dreadnought—two, if needed. The gift was far more than a gesture. A battleship would cost at least £1 million (approximately $170 million in 2020 terms but, given the costs of modern warships, a figure closer to $4 billion is more appropriate).[174] Ward's announcement was precipitated by the naval arms race between Britain and Germany and speeches in the House of Commons. Cabled news enabled the

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[169] Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907, London: HMSO, 1907, TNA CAB 18/13B, pp. 134–36.
[170] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 1.
[171] Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering*, p. 156.
[172] War Office to Col Office, 5 February 1908, Correspondence Relating to the Imperial Conference, CO 886/1 35-179, p. 16; No dominion sent an officer to staff college in 1908.
[173] Ibid, p. 176.
[174] In 2018 *Defence News* reported that Australia would spend A$35 billion on nine 'high-end anti-submarine frigates'; a per-hull cost of approximately $3.8 billion each. www.defensenews.com /naval/2018/06/29/australia-officially-announces-26b-frigate-contract-here-are-the-build-details/, accessed 24 September 2020.

dominions to keep abreast of German naval construction and Britain's responses to it.[175] Complaints in Britain that insufficient dreadnoughts were being built for the Royal Navy been reported in New Zealand as early as 1906,[176] and accounts of Germany's naval challenge were frequent.[177] In March 1909 New Zealanders learnt that in order to match German construction, Britain needed to build sixteen more battleships by 1911.[178]

The supremacy of British sea power was a fundamental strategic concern for New Zealand. The defence policy Colonel Scratchley had proposed for New Zealand in 1880 was still adhered to and was similar to that of most colonies and dominions. The outposts of empire would maintain their internal security and defend themselves from raids. Larger attacks would require the intervention of the Royal Navy. The German challenge to the Britain's naval supremacy therefore constituted two threats for New Zealanders: without a strong Royal Navy, New Zealand could be imperilled; and, because dominion citizens thought of themselves as New Zealanders, Australians or Canadians as well as British, they were concerned about the security of their other homeland, the British Isles.

Ward's was not the first or only voice in favour of donating a battleship. On 19 March, Sydney's *Daily Telegraph* had remarked that if the tension between Germany and Britain worsened, Australia and Canada, as the largest and wealthiest dominions, should offer to fund a dreadnought. '[W]hat a magnificent intimation that would be'.[179] The *Telegraph's* suggestion was widely reported in New Zealand,

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[175] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 232.
[176] For example, 'Another Dreadnought', *Auckland Star,* 18 July 1906, p. 5; 'Sixth Dreadnought', *Dominion,* 31 December 1907, p. 5.
[177] For example, 'German Navy: Construction of Battleships', *Otago Daily Times,* 14 August 1907, p. 5; 'Peace of the World: Rival Navies', *Evening Post,* 16 December 1907, p. 7; 'Supremacy of Air and Sea', *New Zealand Times,* 3 October 1908, p. 2.
[178] 'Britain's Rival', *New Zealand Herald,* 18 March 1909, p. 5.
[179] Editorial, *Daily Telegraph* [Sydney, NSW], 19 March 1909, p. 6.

as were similar recommendations made by other Australian newspapers.[180] Aware of the Australian public's support for donating a warship, and expecting New Zealanders to respond similarly, Ward seized the moment. For an advocate of imperial federation, supportive of Haldane's new approach, and vividly aware of New Zealand's economic reliance on Britain, paying for a dreadnought made sense. It was also likely to be politically advantageous.[181]

The offer was, however, made without consulting his party or parliament. While confident that politicians and the public would support him, Ward nonetheless felt the need to imply he had access to secret information that justified the gift. He also sent a letter to newspaper editors stressing the gravity of the naval crisis.[182] The editor of the widely distributed *Auckland Weekly News* accepted Ward's views. The gift of a dreadnought deserved, he wrote, 'the unanimous approval and unqualified endorsement of the Dominion' and that 'extraordinary circumstances' had required Ward to act without parliamentary approval.[183] Another article in the same issue took a different view and condemned Ward for failing to gain approval before acting.[184]

Parliament ratified Ward's offer, and the public and the press applauded it. Ward's gift, the *Dominion* wrote, 'surpassed the expectations of the most enthusiastic Imperialists' and proved to the world that New Zealanders were 'as

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[180] 'Our Threatened Naval Supremacy', *Manawatu Times,* 20 March 1909, p. 5; 'A Solid Empire: Help from Australia', *New Zealand Herald,* 22 March 1909, p. 5; 'Australian Enthusiasm', *Dominion,* 22 March 1909, p. 5; 'Gift of a Dreadnought', *Taranaki Herald,* 22 March 1909, p. 5; 'Australia's Attitude', *Press,* 22 March 1909, p. 7.

[181] It has been argued that part of reason the Fisher government in Australia fell was because it ignored the Australian public's belief that Australia should match New Zealand's offer and donate dreadnought. Craig Wilcox, 'Edwardian Transformation' in Craig Stockings and John Connor (eds), *Before the Anzac Dawn: A Military History of Australia to 1915.* Sydney: New South, 2013, p. 266.

[182] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, pp. 171–2.

[183] Editorial, *Auckland Weekly News,* 25 March 1909, pp. 34–5.

[184] 'New Zealand's Offer', *Auckland Weekly News,* 25 March 1909, p. 28.

ready as ever to take their full share of the burdens of the Empire in time of threatened trouble'.[185] The writer was nonetheless disconcerted by the million-pound price tag.[186] The *Weekly News* reported that the gift had been welcomed by local councils, the Primate of New Zealand, the Dunedin stock exchange, the Navy League, the Farmers Union, even a meeting of ladies in the Waikato town of Cambridge.[187] Some discontent about paying for the warship and that Ward had acted without parliament's authorisation nonetheless lingered. Newspapers often dismissed it as the rumblings of an 'insignificant minority' of 'Socialists and Little Englanders'.[188] Most New Zealanders were pleased by their Prime Minister's commitment to imperial defence.

A week after Ward's announcement, Canada signalled its intention to develop a navy of its own. On 15 April, Australia also offered to establish a navy and, on 4 June, Australia's new Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, added the gift of a battleship to the Royal Navy.[189] At the end of the month, the British government invited the self-governing colonies to send representatives to an imperial conference on the defence of the empire.[190]

In April 1909, two months before his departure for that conference, Ward announced the government's intention to reform the organisation and administration of its military forces. The Council of Defence was to be abolished and the commandant role restored. Separate northern and southern commands would be established, the cadet system would be taken out of the hands of the Department

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[185] Editorial, 'The Navy and New Zealand', *Dominion,* 23 March 1900, p. 4.
[186] Editorial, 'The Navy and New Zealand', *Dominion,* 23 March 1900, p. 4.
[187] *Auckland Weekly News,* 1 April 1909, p. 26.
[188] Editorial, *Press,* 14 April 1909, p. 6; 'The Dreadnought Meeting', *Press,* 15 April 1909, p. 6.
[189] Australia's interest in developing a navy of its own was in part the result of public concerns about Australia's security and the threat of invasion by an Asian power that Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 had stirred up. See next chapter.
[190] Imperial Conference on Defence: Admiralty Memorandum, 20 July 1909, CAB 37/100 98, p. 1.

of Education and made a military responsibility, more rifle clubs were to be formed, and more rifle ranges constructed.[191]

A month later, Ward tempered his stance. In a speech on 1 May in Invercargill, he said that while the volunteer system had improved, and although he would like to see every man capable of bearing arms 'under some system of compulsion as regards military training', he could not 'shut [his] eyes to the difficulties' associated with doing so.[192] Unlike Ward's April speech, his Invercargill address was regarded as containing only half-measures, and was criticised for not recognising the public mood. The *New Zealand Herald* called them 'meaningless utterances' promising only 'petty improvements in our notoriously hopeless volunteer system'.[193] The newspaper maintained there was no popular support for compulsory *service* but plenty of support for 'universal training', for those under 21 especially.[194] The *Evening Post* accused Ward of lacking boldness, and echoed the *Herald's* opinions that 'compulsory military training, as distinct from compulsory service, has gained commendation throughout the country', and that Ward did not understand the public mood.[195]

Ward then headed to London where the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, opened the imperial conference on defence by raising the same concerns, and using the same approach, as Chamberlain had more a decade earlier. He complained that Britain was paying 28s 1d per capita for naval and military defence while the dominions were, on average, paying less than a quarter of that: 6s ½d.[196]

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[191] 'The Defence Forces: The New Scheme', *Dominion,* 6 April 1909, p. 7.
[192] 'The Prime Minister's Speech', *Dominion,* 3 May 1909, p. 8.
[193] 'Prime Minister's Speech' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 3 May 1909, p. 4.
[194] Ibid.
[195] 'Defence Matters', *Evening Post,* 3 May 1909, p. 6.
[196] Minutes of Proceedings, Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire, 1909, Imperial Conference Secretariat, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/8, p. 4.

(New Zealand's per capita expenditure on defence for 1908–09 was 5s 3d; for 1909–10 it was 6s 1d.)[197] None of these figures included the costs of the battleships several dominions had given Britain, or the cost of the navies Australia and Canada had proposed to develop. Asquith was, however, pleased that the dominions had shown they were willing to:

> become parties to a co-ordinated system of Imperial Defence in which all who share the benefit should, each in their respective degrees and according to their local circumstances and requirements, contribute, or share, also in the burden.[198]

Ward was the first dominion representative to speak. Rather than argue, as Seddon had done, that New Zealand was paying its share, and instead of repeating his (Ward's) 1907 excuses about more-pressing development needs, Ward admitted that New Zealand was 'not doing as much as it ought to do' and offered 'to give considerably more'.[199] His reason was 'the outcome of recent developments' (presumably German naval and military expansion).[200] A similar resolve was shown by the other dominion representatives at the conference.[201]

Not only would the dominions furnish personnel and matériel for the defence of the empire, they were, signally, prepared to meet the costs themselves. For New Zealand, the commitments made in 1909 demonstrated its resolve to continue on the course first taken in 1907. Before then, and before the German threat had

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[197] Based on Expenditure on Defence, *Official Yearbook*, 1914.
[198] Minutes of Proceedings, Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire, 1909, Imperial Conference Secretariat, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/8, p. 5.
[199] Ibid, p. 7.
[200] Ibid. Coverage of German shipbuilding in the New Zealand press has already been described. Articles on German military developments such as 'The Next War: Immense German Army', *Press,* 20 July 1908, p. 7; 'Zeppelin's War Airship', *Evening Post,* 7 August 1908, p. 2; 'German War Talk', *Auckland Star,* 7 January 1909, p. 5; and 'Armed Automobiles', *Press,* 27 March 1909, p. 9, kept New Zealanders informed.
[201] Minutes of Proceedings, Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire, 1909, Imperial Conference Secretariat, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/8, pp. 7–10.

appeared, Seddon had resisted spending on defence and had denied that New Zealand was not paying a fair share. In 1907 Ward had responded differently. Although he offered only moderate increases in financial support, he had instituted changes in the volunteer system and had foreshadowed more of them. Moreover, he had given Britain an expensive warship. International developments had so motivated him by 1909 that Ward was ready to spend more on defence and to make the bold reforms the public and press wanted.[202]

On the second day of the conference, Ward repeated an offer he had made in 1907, to exchange a 550-strong contingent with the Indian army. The difference in 1909 was that he was prepared to meet all the costs, including those of the Indian army troops. Ward also asked what number of troops New Zealand needed to raise. Before his question was answered, he proposed a peacetime establishment of 100,000.[203] A force of 100,000 volunteers was an unrealistic objective; it would be eight times larger than the 1908/09 volunteer strength of 12,057.[204] An establishment of that size would also require an unprecedented level of participation from New Zealand's 266,042 men of service age.[205] The highest participation rate for volunteering had been during the South African War when 7.55 per cent of eligible males had (briefly) joined up.[206] A force of 100,000 would require the active involvement of 37.6 per cent of eligible males.

There were also hints about other military developments made at the 1909 conference. The New Zealand officer representing the dominion in the sub-

[202] See the next chapter for further discussion of the nature and effect of international developments.
[203] Minutes of Proceedings, Imperial Conference on the Subject of the Defence of the Empire, 1909, Imperial Conference Secretariat, 1909, TNA CO 886/2/8, pp. 22–23.
[204] Defences, Military and Naval, *Official Yearbook*, 1909. The volunteer strength excludes cadets and rifle club members.
[205] Ages of the People, *Official Yearbook*, 1909.
[206] See chapter two.

conference on military defence, Colonel Richard Davies, implied that some form of compulsory training was being contemplated. Responding to remarks made by Australia's Colonel Bridges on 'compulsory service' there, Davies said 'That question will come in with us about universal training … I am confident myself that it will be adopted very shortly in New Zealand'.[207] It is more than likely, therefore, that by early 1909, before the conference on imperial defence, Ward had been considering the replacement of volunteering with some form of compelled military training—the type of replacement for volunteering that the Council of Defence had foreshadowed in 1907. Indeed, forming a 100,000-strong military force in New Zealand in peacetime would require some form of compulsion.

During the conference period Ward had meetings with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Nicholson. Nicholson thought the small-scale changes to the volunteer system that Ward described to him (probably the cosmetic changes he had announced in Invercargill in May) would be insufficient.[208] On Wednesday 4 August, Colonel Davies told the military sub-conference that he had spoken with Ward and had been 'authorised' to say that Ward 'agrees with a specially enlisted, specially ear-marked force to be set aside for an expeditionary force'.[209] This was, however, exactly the kind of separate, imperial-service force Ward had refused to countenance in 1907 and for which Seddon had failed to get support in 1902. Ward nonetheless asked Nicholson to develop a military scheme

[207] Minutes of Proceedings of Sub-Conference on Military Defence, Wed 4 August 1909, TNA CAB 18/12B, p. 4.
[208] John Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war": New Zealand Military Policy on the Eve of the First World War' in Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *1911 Preliminary Moves: The 2011 Chief of the Army History Conference.* n.p.: Big Sky Publishing, 2011, p. 109.
[209] Minutes of Proceedings of Sub-Conference on Military Defence, Wed 4 August 1909, TNA CAB 18/12B, p. 3.

for New Zealand to this end.[210] Nicholson did so; it became the basis of the 1909 Defence Act.

Ward's statements in London were well-received in New Zealand. Weeks before he was due home, New Zealand newspapers reported on meetings to determine the form of reception the Prime Minister should receive (see Figure 5.4).[211] Ward sailed back to New Zealand aboard HMS *Challenger.* He arrived on 30 September to something of a hero's return.[212] The editors of the major dailies lined up behind him: 'the arrangement made by Sir Joseph Ward … is, on the whole, very satisfactory' and 'we are profoundly of the opinion that the policy of the Prime Minister is [sound]'.[213] Later that year the Defence Act was passed and New Zealand introduced compulsory military training and a territorial force.[214]



Figure 5.4 – An impression of how Ward might be welcomed home. The dredge in the lower left of the image bears the name 'Dredgenought'. *Haere Mai* is Maori for welcome. 'A suggestion for an appropriate naval welcome

[210] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 109.
[211] 'The Prime Minister', *New Zealand Herald,* 16 September 1909, p. 6; 'The Premier's Home-coming', *Auckland Star,* 23 September 1909, p. 6.
[212] 'Home Again', *Auckland Star,* 30 September 1909, p. 5.
[213] Editorial, *Press,* 1 October 1909, p. 6; 'A Local Navy' (editorial), *New Zealand Times,* 4 October 1909, p. 4.
[214] See chapter 7.

at Auckland on the occasion of the Prime Minister's return', *New Zealand Herald,* 25 September 1909, p. 17.

Papers laid before the 1911 imperial conference showed that New Zealand was acting on its imperial defence obligations, as were the other dominions. In addition to the work Major-General Alexander Godley (the commandant appointed in late 1910) had commenced on compulsory military training and the territorial force (see chapter seven), a local branch of the imperial general staff had been established.[215] Officer examinations, inspections of military forces and access to staff colleges were all progressing.[216] There were 15 imperial officers on loan to the dominion, three New Zealand officers were receiving training in Britain, two imperial officers were in New Zealand on interchange, and eight New Zealand officers were on interchange in Britain.[217] The 1911 conference also learnt that two New Zealand officers had passed staff college.[218]

Across the Tasman Sea, the Australian government had honoured its 1909 commitment to create a local navy, the cost of which was considerable: a capital expenditure of £3.7 million and an on-going annual outlay of £750,000.[219] In 1909, just weeks before New Zealand passed similar legislation, Australia introduced compulsory military training and formed a territorial army. In Canada conversely, Prime Minister Laurier's plans to create a Canadian navy contributed to his party's defeat in the 1911 elections.[220] Compulsory cadet training for Canadian youths was

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[215] Papers Laid Before the Imperial Conference: Naval and Military Defence, HMSO, July 1911, TNA CAB 18/13B, p. 6
[216] Ibid, pp. 8–14.
[217] Ibid, p. 17.
[218] Ibid, p. 18.
[219] Jeffrey Grey, *A Military History of Australia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, revised ed. 1999, p. 72.
[220] Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership*, p. 248.

implemented, but compulsory military training for adults was stymied by the new Minister of Militia and Defence, the South African War veteran and long-serving militia ('volunteer') officer, Colonel Sam Hughes.[221]

The clearest proof of New Zealand's acceptance of its imperial defence obligations was the passage of the Defence Act in 1909 (see chapter seven) and a marked increase in defence spending. Total defence spending (military and naval) in 1902/03 was £298,207, a figure inflated to some degree by expenditure related to the South African War. £300,695 was spent in 1909/10 and, in 1910/11, with compulsory training and the territorials being established, it jumped to £812,398. The pre-war defence expenditure peak was £1,257,498 in 1912/13 (see Figure 5.5).



Figure 5.5 –Increased spending on naval forces constituted a significant portion of the total increase. Expenditure figures given exclude the *direct* costs of the contingents sent to South Africa in 1899–1902 and exclude the construction of harbour defences. *Official Yearbook*, 1905, 1914.

[221] Wood, *Militia Myths*, p. 174.

In the same period, the population of New Zealand increased from 729,056 to 1,084,662. Figure 5.6 shows per capita defence spending (spending is shown as a decimal measure; £0.25 equals one-quarter of a pound, or five shillings). The low was in 1897/98 when 2s 4d per head was spent on defence. In 1909/10 defence amounted to 6s 1d per capita and in 1912/13, the peak year for pre-war defence spending, it was 23s 10d.



Figure 5.6 –The population figures for financial years (April–March) are by calendar year, i.e., the population used for 1897–98 is for calendar 1897. Financial data is per financial year (April–March). Expenditure is decimal (£0.50 is 10s or 120d, not 50p). *Yearbook*, 1905, 1914.

The pattern of per capita defence spending in New Zealand was similar to that of Australia and Canada, as Figure 5.7 shows. After 1909 Canada, Australia and New Zealand all significantly increased defence expenditure.



Figure 5.7 –Per capita defence expenditure in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 1901/02–1913/14. **Note***:* it is the *pattern* of spending that is being compared, not the amount spent. Canadian expenditure, for example, is in Canadian dollars, not pounds, and it is unclear from the *Official Australian Yearbooks* whether the Australian figures included all defence expenditure or military spending only. NZ data sources as per Figure 5.6. Australian sources: *A Statistical Account of the Colonies of Australasia, 1902–02,* p. 743; ibid, *1903–04*, p. 543; *Official Australian Yearbook,* 1910, p. 111, p. 117, p. 1049, p. 1054; ibid, 1916, p. 91, pp. 991–92. Canadian data from *Canada Yearbook,* 1910, p. 280; ibid, 1915, p. 64, p. 537, p. 583; ibid, 1921, p. 97.[222]

The jump in New Zealand defence expenditure that took place after 1909 was principally the result of three new expenses: the commencement of the territorial and compulsory military training programmes; meeting the crewmember wages and a portion of the operating cost of HMS *New Zealand* (the battleship New Zealand had given Britain); and paying down the loan New Zealand had secured to buy it.[223]

Throughout his term in office, and in the absence of a serious threat to the empire such as Germany became, Richard Seddon consistently refused to make any

[222] Note too that the fiscal years in the three dominions were not the same. Canadian data is per calendar year, the Australian financial year runs from 1 July to June 30, and the New Zealand financial year is 1 April to 31 March.
[223] Expenditure on Defence, *Official Yearbook*, 1914.

practical or financial commitment to imperial defence. His inaction was in part the result of parsimony and in part the lack of a compelling need. By comparison, Ward appears more attuned to imperial defence. He recognised the shortcomings of the volunteer system and the benefits of imperial defence and was prepared to act—even to spend.[224] The international situation and the public mood during Ward's premiership were, however, markedly different to those during Seddon's. Ward had reasons to act, Seddon did not.

The watershed for New Zealand and the other dominions was a gentle one that spanned the imperial conferences of 1907, 1909 and 1911. A change in British expectations helped, but the critical motivating factor was the threat from Germany. That threat prompted Ward to donate a battleship to Britain and, in order to meet imperial defence obligations, to implement compulsory military training and form a territorial army.

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[224] Defence expenditure in 1906–07 was £209,180. In 1911–12 (his last budget) it was £1,210, 849. Expenditure on Defence, *Official Yearbook*, 1914.

CHAPTER SIX

Social Change and Other Pressures, 1900–1909

The preceding examination of the role of New Zealand's closer relations with Britain and the development of imperial defence described one set of important justifications for New Zealand's military reforms in 1909. That chapter also touched on the apprehension German military and naval expansion caused, related how lobbyists and newspaper editors pressed the government for universal or compulsory military training, and that serious financial commitments to defence such as warships and an expanded citizen-soldier force had transitioned from being controversial and unwelcome, to being popular and politically advantageous. It is the growth of support for universal or compulsory military training in the 1900s, and the different rationales for it, to which this chapter now turns.

The rise in German naval and military power, together with suspicions of that country's intentions, came at a time when New Zealand society was changing. Affluent and conservative farmers and a prosperous urban middle class were gaining political strength. Perceptions that the morals, physical condition and discipline of urban youth had declined, went hand in hand with the belief that military training would ameliorate these trends. The advocacy of the empire and

heroism in books, classrooms and youth movements increased support for the empire, and helped to make martial skills and chivalrous behaviour admired ideals. British and Australian arguments regarding military training stimulated debate in New Zealand. There was, too, apprehension about the survival of the British race and, importantly, little effective opposition to these social trends and new ideals.

The new social imperatives combined to create a public determination that military training was needed. The press, patriotic leagues, educationalists, farmers, business organisations, clergy, local councils, public authorities, and private citizens all asked the government to act. As has already been shown, Prime Minister Ward was slow to respond. The Defence Bill was not introduced to the House until November 1909. Once there, it was quickly approved.

Why did New Zealanders worry about Germany? The British empire's attitude to Germany changed at the turn of the twentieth century. In the late nineteenth century Germany was usually admired. It was associated with high culture, intellectualism and romantic landscapes.[1] After Britain and Ireland, Germany was the third-most-common source of immigrants to New Zealand—a distant third, it should be noted.[2] Some New Zealanders preferred German immigrants over Irish Catholics.[3] After 1900, Germany's pro-Boer stance, and the passage of the Second German Naval Law (which doubled the size of its navy), British and colonial attitudes to Germany became increasingly circumspect.[4]

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[1] Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism and Ambivalence, 1860–1914.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 107.
[2] In the late nineteenth century 74 per cent of immigrants were from Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) and 19 per cent from Ireland. Immigrants from Germany were third (no percentage figure given). King, *History of New Zealand*, p. 175.
[3] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 224.
[4] Scully, *British Images of Germany*, p. 109.

Most misgivings arose from German naval and military developments. The growth in the size of Germany's navy distressed Britain especially, but it, France and Russia were also concerned about the growth in the size of the German army. Designed to be a cadre force, the German army's rank and file could be quickly expanded by calling up reservists who had passed through two or three years of military service.[5] Between 1871 and 1914, the number of experienced men the German army could mobilise grew roughly eightfold, to nearly four million. The 1912 strength of Germany's standing army was 640,000.[6]

German warship construction, which had been justified by the new *Weltpolitik* (world policy) strategy, significantly increased German naval power. The Reichstag committed to the construction of 45 large battleships by 1920.[7] Supported by the million-member German Navy League and industrialists such as Krupp, Germany commenced a shipbuilding programme to challenge British maritime supremacy.[8] It was the growth of Germany's naval rather than military power that concerned New Zealand. The overall defence strategy Colonel Scratchley had developed in 1880 had not changed. New Zealand, like most British colonies and dominions, was to defend itself from small-scale attacks which, New Zealand being an island state, would necessarily be seaborne. Any large move against New Zealand would need to be met by the Royal Navy. A navy that rivalled Britain's consequently diminished New Zealand's security. In addition to the disquiet German naval expansion generated throughout the British empire, British perceptions of

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[5] The period of compulsory military service varied at times but was usually two or three years.
[6] E. D. Brose, *Kaiser's Army: The Politics of Military Technology in Germany During the Machine Age, 1870–1918.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 177.
[7] Stig Föster, 'The Armed Forces and Military Planning' in Roger Chickering (ed.), *Imperial Germany: An Historiographical Companion.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996, pp. 474–76.
[8] Matthew S. Seligmann, *Spies in Uniform: British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of the First World War.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 169, p. 185, p. 190, p. 192; Stig Föster, 'The Armed Forces and Military Planning', p. 477.

international incidents, such as the Moroccan crises and Austra-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, increased doubts about Germany's intentions.

The growth in German power, and news of the various international crises, was communicated to New Zealand from mostly British sources. By 1906/07, *every* British service attaché in Germany regarded Germany as a threat.[9] The material gathered by these military attachés was circulated around Whitehall departments, not just the service offices. These reports were taken seriously and influenced policy.[10] For example, when it was learnt in 1908 that Germany was surreptitiously building battleships ahead of schedule, an 'acceleration scare' shook Whitehall.[11] Confidential information about Germany was sometimes disclosed to the press, usually by the Admiralty, which was keen for the public to appreciate the need for further warship construction.[12]

In addition to factual information about Germany, fiction and drama helped to shape perceptions. As Richard Scully observed, one cannot appreciate pre-1914 attitudes to Germany without considering literature.[13] Erskine Childers' 1903 novel, *The Riddle of the Sands* (in which a British yachtsman and a vacationing Foreign Office clerk uncover a German plot to tow barge-loads of invasion troops across the North Sea to Britain), was a popular and critical success. *The Riddle of the Sands* was sold in New Zealand and was followed by a string of other invasion novels, a genre

[9] Seligmann, *Spies in Uniform*, p. 159.
[10] Ibid, p. 227, p. 231, p. 244, p. 249.
[11] Ibid, p. 195, pp. 199–200.
[12] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, 'Sir John Fisher and the *Dreadnought:* The Sources of Naval Mythology'. *Journal of Military History,* 59 (October 1995): 624, 630; Seligmann, *Spies in Uniform*, p. 8, p. 223.
[13] Scully, *British Images of Germany*, p. 85.

that remained popular until the eve of war.[14] Guy Du Maurier's 1909 play, *An Englishman's Home* (where athletic and aristocratic 'Nearlanders' [Germans] invade the home of an indolent and indulged English family), became an instant hit. The West End success of *An Englishman's Home* was widely reported in the dominion,[15] and the play's first local production opened on 10 September 1909.[16] For the New Zealand public, factual sources and creative works between 1900 and 1914 combined to construct an image of Germany that was bellicose, menacing, and (that most 'un-English' of things) underhanded.

By the time the 1909 Defence Bill was being debated in the House, New Zealanders knew of German naval expansion, that Britain was concerned by international incidents and Germany's likely intentions, and many had read or seen fictional representations of the threat Germany constituted. It could be argued that security anxieties were behind the public support for universal or compulsory military training. There is, however, a counter argument. In chapter 2 it was shown that participation in volunteer corps consistently increased in times of crisis. In 1880, the last year of the New Zealand Wars, 6.55 per cent of service-age males were volunteers. The 1885 Russian Scare saw 5.4 per cent join volunteer corps, and the South African War caused participation to rise to 7.55 per cent. The average participation rate for service-age males in 1878–1909 was 4.81 per cent. Despite the

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[14] *The Riddle of the Sands* was on sale in New Zealand in September 1903, possibly in a local reprint by Whitcombe and Tombs. 'New Books and Publications', *Press,* 26 September 1903, p. 5; Scully, *British Images of Germany*, p. 125.

[15] 'Anonymous Play: "An Englishman's Home", England's Unpreparedness', *Evening Post,* 2 February 1909, p. 7, was the first. It reported that the play, which opened on 1 February, was sold out until the end of March. The most interesting of the many reports of the play was 'Theatrical Success: "An Englishman's Home" is Not in Berlin' a Press Association report that a German production of the play had been 'hissed off the stage' in Berlin. The article also stated that a production of *An Englishman's Home* had opened in Sydney, where it 'evoked tremendous interest, crowds waiting at the doors for seven hours.' The short notice concluded by remarking that a 'feature of the audiences is the marked attendance of persons who do not usually attend theatres.' *New Zealand Times,* 13 April 1909, p. 5.

[16] 'Entertainments: The Julian Knight Season', *New Zealand Herald,* 1 September 1909, p. 5.

concerns about Germany in 1909, the participation rate was just 4.41 percent; slightly below the average for the previous 30 years, and lower than the rate for years with security crises (approximately 5.5 to 7.5 per cent).[17]

The sub-average participation rate in volunteering in 1908 and 1909 suggests that anxiety about German military and naval developments was not as keenly sensed in New Zealand as in Britain. It therefore follows that, while concern about Germany in all likelihood contributed to the support for military reforms, security concerns *alone* do not explain the level of approval the Defence Act of 1909 received. It is therefore necessary to explore other reasons for the institution of compulsory military training, reasons that have been little appreciated in the historiography but are examined here.

Before turning to those other reasons, two matters need clarification: the ill-definition of the form of military training proposed; and the compatibility of different rationales for military reforms. At the time there was little consensus on precisely what form military training would or should take. As the following examination shows, 'compulsory military training' (mandatory participation) was frequently used as a synonym for 'universal military training' (in which all participated). Military *training* (skills development) and military *service* (a period of enlistment) were also sometimes confused.[18] Others championed the Swiss system: a compulsory, universal-service, citizen militia. The phrase 'universal/compulsory military training' will therefore be used here to describe all such proposals.

In addition to imprecise terminology, different benefits were pointed up by different commentators. Some people wanted military reforms to improve the

[17] See chapter 2 for sources.
[18] See the previous chapter where newspaper editors felt obliged to differentiate between the public's desire for compulsory military training and its resistance to compulsory military service.

defence of New Zealand, to serve the empire's needs, or to address perceived shortcomings in physical fitness, morality or discipline. Social Darwinists and eugenicists saw war as a means to strengthen the genetic fabric of the race. These different reasons were comfortable allies and did not conflict with each other. In many ways, they broadened the support for military reforms. There is nothing unusual in this, but it needs to be appreciated.[19] A small minority opposed military training, usually because compulsion was to be used, they objected to government regulation, or opposed militarism. The dissenters were seldom given an opportunity to voice their opinions, and were usually shouted down when they were.

The push for military training took place at a time when New Zealand society was changing. One of the most significant post-1900 social developments was the rise of conservative-leaning small farmers and an urban middle class. Before the 1890s, many farms were large estates, the workers on them mere employees. The Liberals opened up new land and purchased large properties in whole or part. They divided the vast land resources they acquired into small holdings, and provided loans to help owner-operators (often husband-and-wife teams) to buy and establish farms.[20] The Liberals did this as refrigerated shipping services expanded, and British markets sought more wool, mutton, butter and cheese. Primary production was the engine of economic growth. In 1895, the export of primary products (excluding extraction) earned £5,629,381 and constituted 67 per cent of export revenue.[21] Ten years later, income from the export of primary products had doubled

[19] An everyday example might be three flatmates agreeing to have a salad for dinner. One wants a salad because they are dieting, another thinks salad is an economical meal, and the third has had a big lunch and wants only something light. While each has different reasons for wanting salad, individual motives cause no disagreement. Rather, there is only consensus.
[20] Between 1892 and 1912 the Liberals purchased over half a million hectares from established estates and over a million hectares of Maori land. King, *History of New Zealand,* pp. 269–70.
[21] 'Declared values of the chief articles exported', *Official Yearbook*, 1896

to £11,431,601 and was 78 per cent of export earnings.[22] The export of farm produce made New Zealand rich. In the 1900s it reportedly had the highest standard of living in world.[23]

Establishing people on their own farms had unintended consequences. As farming came to dominate the economy, the political influence of farmers grew. Farmers were 20 per cent of the population and one-third of members of parliament.[24] Moreover, the farmers who had been set up on the land by the Liberals tended to move to the right politically.[25] The 1907 appearance of the *Dominion* newspaper, which was established by businessmen and wealthy land-holders to communicate conservative opinion in Wellington and the lower North Island, reflected the growth of centre-right attitudes.[26] The change of government in 1912—from the Fabian socialism of the Liberals to the centre-right Reform party—was largely due to the influence of farmers and the urban middle class.[27]

Although farm output increased, urbanisation continued. Auckland doubled in size between 1891 and 1911 (from 51,287 to 102,676), and most new job opportunities were as clerical, retail, transport or factory employees in city- or town-based commercial enterprises or in government agencies.[28] In 1881, nine per cent of workers were employed in industry; in 1911, 31 per cent were.[29] White-collar employment also increased.[30] Although urban professionals and office workers were prominent in volunteer corps and in the contingents sent to South

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[22] 'Value of Principal Articles Exported', *Official Yearbook*, 1906.
[23] Eldred-Grigg, *The Great Wrong War,* p. 14.
[24] Reeves, 'New Zealand Today', p. 468.
[25] R. M. Burdon, *The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand 1918-39.* Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1965, p. 3; Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 150.
[26] paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/dominion, accessed 11 July 2019.
[27] Morell and Hall, *A History of New Zealand Life*, p. 194.
[28] Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, pp. 142–43.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 155.

Africa, a perception that urban males were weedy and limp aesthetes—and unfit for military service—nonetheless emerged.[31]

Concerns about the declining masculinity, physical condition and morals of young urban males lent support to widespread military training, which was seen as the remedy. The social benefits were deemed to justify the costs. Across the empire, societies feared that young men were being feminised by town life. Schools, sports teams, youth groups and literature sought to develop manliness in boys.[32] A well-patronised tour by the bodybuilder Eugen Sandow in 1902 helped to make the outward signs of fitness fashionable.[33] It has been argued that muscularity was especially valued in the settler colonies.[34] The All Blacks' victorious 1905–06 tour of Britain was used to extol traditional masculinity.[35] Welcoming the team home, Seddon said the All Blacks represented the 'manhood and virility of the colony'.[36]

Masculinity did not just make for proficiency on the football field, but on the battlefield too.[37] Rugby was regarded as a 'soldier-making game'.[38] The MHR and President of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union, Dr Alfred Newman, claimed that rugby players were adept with a bayonet because their sport training taught them quickness and to stab the enemy first, much as Figure 6.1 illustrates.[39] The

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[31] Schrader, *The Big Smoke,* p. 377.
[32] Martin Crotty, *Making the Australian Male: Middle-Class Masculinity 1870–1920.* Carlton South, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 2001, p. 11.
[33] Schrader, *The Big Smoke*, p. 382.
[34] Mangan, *The Games ethic and Imperialism*, p. 21.
[35] Phillips, 'Rugby, War and the Mythology': 97.
[36] Seddon, quoted in ibid: 90.
[37] Lynn Charles McConnell, 'W. N. "Bill" Carson: Double All Black, Military Cross Recipient', *The International Journal of the History of Sport,* 31:18 (2014): 2406.
[38] Thomas R. Ellison, quoted in Jock Phillips, 'Rugby, War and the Mythology': 95.
[39] Dr Alfred Newman, quoted in Steven Loveridge, '"Soldiers and Shirkers" Modernity and New Zealand Masculinity During the Great War', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 47:1 (2013): 59.

press sometimes likened the All Blacks' success to the achievements of New Zealand troops in South Africa.[40]



Figure 6.1 – Rugby was seen as developing soldierly skills. Original in *The Carival Book,* reprinted in Loveridge, *Call to Arms,* p. 124.

New Zealand schools emulated the practices and values of English public schools, where sport, the development of character and becoming a gentleman were sometimes more highly regarded than academic success.[41] By 1900, playing rugby was compulsory (for boys) in most New Zealand secondary schools.[42] New Zealand's mania for rugby was not unique. In Canada, for example, ice hockey assumed much the same role.[43] Nor were girls denied the benefits of sport.[44]

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[40] Jock Phillips, 'Rugby, War and the Mythology': 92.
[41] Helen Alison Dollery, '"Making Happy, Healthy, Helpful Citizens": The New Zealand Scouting and Guiding Movements as Promulgators of Active Citizenship, 1908–1980', PhD thesis, Massey University, 2012, p. 33; Girouard, *The Return to Camelot*, p. 166. Also see chapter three.
[42] Geoffrey T. Vincent and Toby Harfield, 'Repression and Reform: Responses Within New Zealand Rugby to the Arrival of the "Northern Game", 1907–8', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 31:2 (1997): 236.
[43] Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism*, pp. 162–3.
[44] The headmistress of Auckland's Diocesan High School for Girls (a private, Church of England school) said of the physical education programme: 'the good had been moral as well as physical'. Quoted in Dollery, '"Making Happy, Healthy, Helpful Citizens"', p. 79.

It was boys, though, who were more exposed to the moral benefits of physical activity. Popular boys' magazines and books promulgated a late-Victorian code of chivalry and muscular Christianity.[45] Schools instilled the values of patriotism, duty, responsibility and sacrifice.[46] The Education Act of 1877 had made provision for military drill in schools. School cadet corps were operating, albeit in smaller numbers, well before the 1909 Defence Act made them compulsory.[47] Jock Phillips found: 'On the parade ground, on the sports field, in the classroom New Zealand boys were taught to be good soldiers and sportsmen, but more than that they were taught to be chivalric gentlemen.'[48] Chivalrous gentlemen needed to be fit, moral, loyal and obedient. Mechanisms to encourage those virtues were unavoidable for most British and settler-colony boys in the 1900s.

The resurgence of moral values in New Zealand after 1900 has been termed the 'great tightening'.[49] Alcoholism, larrikinism, socialism and sexuality were condemned. Some measures now seem absurd, for example, legislation compelling farmers to put mating livestock into fields away from the view of roads.[50] In the 1911 general election, prohibition received 56 per cent of the vote, close to the 60 per cent required for New Zealand to go dry.[51] The Sabbath was strictly enforced.[52] While Methodists and Baptists tended to be advocates of temperance, the largest denomination, the Church of England, was more concerned with the promotion of

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[45] Girouard, *The Return to Camelot*, p. 266.
[46] Jeanine Graham, 'Young New Zealanders and the Great War: Exploring the Impact and Legacy of the First World War, 1914–2014', *Paedagogica Historica,* 44:4 (August 2008): 431.
[47] Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment with Compulsory Military Training', p. 31.
[48] Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 155.
[49] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 187.
[50] Ibid, pp. 157–8, p. 160.
[51] Benoit Dostie and Ruth Depré, 'Serial Referendums on Alcohol Prohibition: A New Zealand Invention', *Social Science History,* 40 (Fall 2016): 497, 492.
[52] André Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand,* translated by E. V. Burns. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914, p. 47, p. 322.

muscular Christianity: '[T]he Lord Jesus Christ is not only the Prince of Peace' a prominent British Anglican priest sermonised. 'He is the Prince of War too.'[53]

The inculcation of youths with virtues and morals was frequently an object of magazines and books. Juvenile literature was often chosen by adults and therefore reflected prevailing social values.[54] Even in Australia, which had a larger local publishing industry than New Zealand, British books still dominated.[55] A number of developments appeared in turn-of-the-century juvenile literature: a masculine perspective came to dominate; Christian values were supplanted by national or imperial ones; and physical and military matters displaced spiritual and intellectual concerns.[56]

The Department of Education's *School Journal* was a highly influential New Zealand publication. Launched in 1907, it contained stories, poetry and articles written or adapted for young learners. Analysis has found that about 30 per cent of its content was imperialistic, patriotic or concerned military matters.[57] Royalty, historical battles, British heroes and 'subordination of the individual to the needs of the state and the Empire' frequently featured.[58] Free to public schools and offered at a low price to private schools, the *School Journal* was used on average for half an hour a day in classrooms throughout the dominion.[59]

Commercial and government publications helped spread the word about discipline and duty to the empire, as did youth groups for boys. Youth groups also

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[53] From a sermon by Charles Kingsley quoted in Hobson, *The Psychology of Jingoism*, p. 51.
[54] Crotty, *Making the Australian Male*, p. 96.
[55] Ibid, pp. 96–7.
[56] Ibid, p. 169.
[57] E. P. Malone, 'The New Zealand School Journal and The Imperial Ideology', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 7:1 (1973): 12–14.
[58] Ibid, 14.
[59] Ibid, 13.

championed the values of the growing middle-class.[60] Of all the youth movements in New Zealand, the Boy Scouts was the most popular. Its success was so swift and extensive that Frank Baden-Powell, the son of the movement's founder, visited the dominion in 1909 to ascertain why.[61] It has been asserted that scouting's appeal in New Zealand was its military associations, values, and advocacy of fitness (see Figure 6.2).[62]



Figure 6.2 – Boy Scouts engaging in military-style activities published at the time of the debate on the 1909 Defence Bill. *Auckland Weekly News,* 16 December 1909, p. 18.

The introduction of compulsory cadet training in 1909 created a competitor for the Boy Scouts. Scout leaders discussed with the government the possibility that scouting could be regarded as fulfillment of cadet obligations. Scout organisers in

[60] Crotty, *Making the Australian Male*, pp. 168–70.
[61] *Auckland Weekly News*, 11 March 1909, p. 27.
[62] Dollery, '"Making Happy, Healthy, Helpful Citizens"', p. 71.

Australia made similar overtures.[63] Provision was made in the Defence Act of 1909 for scout troops to become junior cadets, but in May 1911 the government decided that all male youths over 14, even scouts, must register for compulsory military training. As a result, 8,000 of the dominion's 15,000 scouts left the movement.[64] Other youth organisations also suffered membership declines after compulsory training was introduced.[65]

The advocacy of youth participation in military and quasi-military activities in the 1900s was based on a desire to encourage fitness, unity and a sense of duty as much as to improve security.[66] These justifications mirrored those of Australia's champion of compulsory military training, Senator George Pearce. Pearce saw military training as a form of social control, able to teach responsibility, develop good citizens, and improve physical fitness.[67]

Advocacy of the social and moral benefits of military training sometimes came from unexpected sources. Methodists were among the least militaristic of the Christian denominations. One Methodist missionary, however, told a reporter that he supported cadet camps because of the knowledge and discipline attendees gained.[68] The commander of the Northland Battalion, who might have been expected to have spoken of the military skills acquired at camps, recommended military training for its 'moral, social, religious, [and] physical effects'.[69]

The merits of military training were actively promoted after 1900 by empire-minded lobbying organisations. The National League, Round Table, Navy League,

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[63] Crotty, *Making the Australian Male,* pp. 207–9, p. 217.
[64] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw VII 28, c. vi.39; Dollery, '"Making Happy, Healthy, Helpful Citizens"', pp. 95–6.
[65] Crotty, *Making the Australian Male*, p. 197.
[66] Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 150.
[67] Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 22.
[68] 'Cadet Camps', *Auckland Weekly News,* 25 February 1909, p. 20.
[69] Ibid.

and Victoria League all operated in New Zealand. The largest was the New Zealand Branch of the National Service League (later the National League of New Zealand) which was established in August 1906. Many of the League's leaders were prominent figures in politics, business, the professions, education, religion or the military.[70] It quickly gained the support of newspaper editors, initially promoted the Swiss system of compulsory-service citizen militias, and published the magazine *Defence* (see Figure 6.3).[71] Issues of *Defence* frequently featured reports of volunteer events, articles on universal service, interviews with cadets, and rationalisations for military training such as the threat from Asia.[72]

League membership in New Zealand was reported to be 6,600 in early 1908.[73] In 1914, the National Service League in Britain, drawing on a population roughly 40 times larger, had grown to a peak membership of 270,000, almost exactly the same level of per capita support as the National League of New Zealand enjoyed in 1908.[74]

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[70] Thomas W. Tanner, *Compulsory Citizen Soldiers.* n.p. [Australia]: Alternative Publishing Co-Operative Ltd, 1980, p. 73; Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment', p. 44.
[71] Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment', pp. 36–38.
[72] *Defence*, 28 October 1907, p. 8 (Universal Service); 23 November 1907 and 21 December 1907, p. 3, pp. 8–9 (Swiss System); 21 December 1907, p. 3 (Cadets). p. 8 ('Get a Gun in a Hurry').
[73] 'For Our Country' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 22 April 1908, p. 4; 'National Service' (editorial), *Dominion,* 22 April 1908, p. 6.
[74] Matthew Hendley, '"Help us to Secure a Strong, Healthy, Prosperous and Peaceful Britain": The Social Arguments of the Campaign for Compulsory Military Service in Britain, 1899–1914', *Canadian Journal of History,* XXX (August 1995): 268–9; Adams and Poirer, *The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain*, 1987, p. 17. Britain's 1914 League membership of 270,000 from 40 million population = 0.67 per cent. The New Zealand League's 6,600 from one million population = 0.66 per cent.



DEFENCE

OFFICIAL ORGAN NATIONAL LEAGUE OF NEW ZEALAND

Vol. I.—No. 10. OCTOBER 28, 1907. One Penny.

A LESSON FROM A LAD.

SUGGESTION WORTHY OF STATESMEN'S NOTICE.

Rangiora, August 23rd, 1907.

To the Hon. Secretaries,
National League of New Zealand.

Dear Sirs,

"Defence" has some very good articles and hints in its columns, and I believe no person could read it without being roused to do something for his or her country's safety and need.

As I am only a mere lad, I cannot do a great deal to further your movement, and, besides, I am from home nine months in the year, being apprenticed to the carpentering; but I shall try to spread your organ abroad, and am sending half-a-crown to assist, if possible, your funds.

One thing that myself I feel the need of, is a cadet force or a military training school of some description to take youth after leaving school. I left the High School when fourteen, and cannot join the Volunteer Force until eighteen, for I am now sixteen and have nowhere to go for military exercise. I think that if this want were supplied there would be a much stronger volunteer force in existence as a result; because after leaving school young fellows find another vent for their energies and somewhere else to spend their leisure time.

Hoping for every success to the national effort,

I am, yours sincerely,

ARNOLD SHARP.

Figure 6.3 – The front cover of issue 1:10 (October 1907) of The National League's *Defence* magazine. The 'lesson' is from an apprentice carpenter complaining that, at 16 years of age, he was ineligible for school cadets, too young for a volunteer corps and had 'nowhere to go for military exercise.' Six months' later, the Auckland Education Board picked up on the military training gap and unanimously agreed to warn the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Education that the absence of military training for those between school cadets and volunteer corps needed to be addressed.[75]

To an even greater degree than the National League, the Round Table also focused on the élite. The Round Table was an empire-wide, pro-military, pro-imperial federation lobby group. Its core strategy was not to attract a large membership, but to manipulate public opinion from behind the scenes.[76] The enlistment of the powerful and influential was central to its mode of operation.

[75] 'Local and General News', *New Zealand Herald,* 14 November 1907, p. 4.
[76] John Kendle, 'The Round Table Movement: Lionel Curtis and the Formation of the New Zealand Groups in 1910', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 1:1 (1967): 47.

Realising that closer imperial relations depended on support from the dominions, in 1910 the Round Table's founder, the British academic and imperialist Lionel Curtis, visited the dominions to recruit members and establish cells. Curtis spent eleven weeks in New Zealand and set up Round Table chapters in the major cities and several provincial centres.[77] He met key Liberal and Reform politicians, senior New Zealand military officers, academics, and business leaders. Those who could influence the press were especially sought out.[78] Like the National League, the Round Table produced a magazine, *Round Table.* It was published in London and distributed throughout the empire. In 1911 the magazine ran a series of articles on New Zealand.[79] Because the Round Table campaigned behind closed doors, the extent of its influence is virtually impossible to gauge. It has, however, been described as 'extremely powerful'.[80]

The New Zealand branch of the Navy League was established in 1896 and adopted, conversely, a very public profile.[81] Like its parent organisation, the British Navy League, which promoted the navy, distributed literature, held public meetings and lectures, and sponsored 'educational propaganda in schools', the New Zealand branch did much the same.[82] More than other lobbying organisations, it promoted its views to the youth of the dominion. Naval officers (often retired) spoke to school assemblies and at public meetings. The Navy League supported school cadet corps by providing prizes for competitions, endorsed universal military training and,

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[77] Ibid, 36–38, 41
[78] Ibid, 42–43.
[79] The first was 'New Zealand', *Round Table,* 2:5 (1911), 166–180.
[80] Kendle, 'The Round Table Movement', 33.
[81] See chapter 3.
[82] 'The British Navy League', *Evening Post,* 23 September 1902, p. 5.

unsurprisingly, applauded Ward's 1909 decision to give the Royal Navy a battleship.[83]

The first New Zealand branch of the Victoria League was established in 1905.[84] Primarily a women's organisation (men were permitted to join), it promoted closer ties with Britain.[85] To some degree it was a reaction to other women's organisation, such as the Women's Christian Temperance Union, which tended to be pacifist in nature.[86] Although also led by members of the élite, the Victoria League's officers included élite Maori women such as the wives of Maori MHRs.[87] Before the First World War it was best known for locating and tending to the graves of New Zealand Wars' soldiers. The Victoria League expanded its operations during the First World War when it took to providing welfare services and goods to soldiers.[88]

Thus New Zealand had four imperialist, pro-military lobbying organisations actively campaigning in the 1900s. Their modes of operation differed. The Navy League promoted naval and military matters to youth; the National League of New Zealand solicited members, funded speaking tours, produced a national magazine and lobbied politicians. Round Table officers acted as *éminences grises*, and the Victoria League engaged in patriotic endeavours. Critically, the leagues all shared the same aim: loyalty to and defence of the empire.

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[83] See chapter three; 'Navy League Competition', *Otago Daily Times,* 23 January 1909, p. 6; 'Universal Military Service', *Dominion,* 15 January 1909, p. 9; 'The Navy League: Offer Heartily Endorsed', *New Zealand Herald,* 23 March 1909, p. 5; 'Patriotic Telegrams', *New Zealand Times,* 23 March 1909, p. 6; The Navy League Approves', *Dominion,* 23 March 1909, p. 6; 'Professor Haslam', *Press,* 23 March 1909, p. 7.
[84] Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 174.
[85] Katie Pickles, '"A Link the 'The Great Chain of Empire Friendship": The Victoria League in New Zealand', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 33:1 (2005): 30.
[86] Phillips, 'War and National Identity', p. 104.
[87] Pickles, 'The Victoria League in New Zealand', 35.
[88] Gentry, *History, Heritage, and Colonialism*, p. 101; Pickles, 'The Victoria League in New Zealand', 34–37.

Support for the empire in the Edwardian period was often related to race. As defined at the time, *race* was both ethnicity- and nationality-based; newspapers spoke, for example, of the 'German race'.[89] The British empire contained people of almost every ethnic group, but British investment was concentrated on the European citizens of the empire. White Australians, for example, received 77 times more British investment per capita than did the non-whites of India.[90] Imperial defence developed at the same time as did notions about the Anglo-Saxon race and its genetic heritage.[91] Francis Galton's ground-breaking investigation into the inheritance of intelligence, *Hereditary Genius,* appeared in 1869. By 1911 there was a chair of eugenics at University College London.[92] The South African War had shown Britain that white soldiers from the settler colonies could become a valuable resource—especially if properly trained and versed in British army doctrine. In the settler colonies, the South African War confirmed already-conceived notions about the superiority of the racial stock in the white outposts of empire over that remaining in the metropole.[93]

Ideas about racial superiority fell on fertile ground in New Zealand, not only because New Zealanders thought they were Better Britons, but because of Dr Truby King. In New Zealand today, King is remembered largely for his views on child care. In the early twentieth century, however, the appeal of his convictions included race issues, the need for discipline, healthy living, and social order. In 1900 King and his wife, Isabella, adopted a baby. Seven years later, King was holding public meetings

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[89] For example: 'If England Were Invaded', *Evening Post,* 2 June 1909, p. 11; 'Germany's Warlike Party', *Oamaru Mail,* 17 August 1905, p. 1; 'Home and Foreign: Rise of Germany', *Press,* 26 September 1907, p. 7; 'German Affairs', *Dominion,* 5 May 1909, p. 7.
[90] Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 5, p. 115.
[91] Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, p. 40, p. 55.
[92] Fergusson, *Empire,* p. 264.
[93] Mitcham, *Race and Imperial Defence*, p. 40, p. 82; Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 467.

to promote what they had learned.[94] Early audiences were so taken by his 'scientific' method of child-rearing that an organisation, the Society for the Promotion of the Health of Women and Children (the Plunket Society after 1914), was formed to promote them.[95] By the late 1900s King was fast becoming one of the most influential men in New Zealand.[96]



Figure 6.4 – A 1942 edition of Truby King's, *Feeding and Care of Baby*. A best-seller, the book advocated the health and discipline of youth as fundamental to the welfare of the race.

Fresh air, good food, exercise, routine, and discipline were at the heart of King's child-care methodology. Babies were to be fed by the clock, and to defecate

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[94] Barbara Brookes, 'King, Frederic Truby', *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, 1993, 2011. teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/2k8/king-frederic-truby, accessed 26 June 2019.
[95] 'A Health Society', *New Zealand Herald,* 15 May 1907, p. 7; 'Health of Women and Children', *Otago Daily Times,* 15 May 1907, p. 3; Lynne Giddings, edited by Elizabeth Cox, 'Royal New Zealand Plunket Society, 1907–', nzhistory.govt.nz/women-together/royal-new-zealand-plunket-society, accessed 26 June 2019; Erik Olssen, 'Truby King and the Plunket Society: An Analysis of a Prescriptive Ideology', *New Zealand Journal of History,* 15:1 (1981), 11. The *Plunket* in the name reflected the endorsement of the Governor's wife, Lady Victoria Plunket, who remained a patron of the society after returning to Britain at the end of her husband's term of office in New Zealand.
[96] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 163.

on demand.[97] By 1909 King was arguing that if mothercraft were neglected, the British empire would decline to second-class-power status.[98] His claims, Eric Olssen found, 'touched the fears and phobias' of the many who worried about the future of the British race.[99] King proposed a method of child-rearing that promised to correct the perceived decline in order, fitness, masculinity and discipline. While King's methods might be able to reduce the level of social ills in upcoming generations, military training remained the popular panacea for the existing generation of youths.[100]

Conscription and military training were prominent topics throughout the empire by the mid-1900s. New Zealand newspapers described Australian military training developments.[101] The Australian justifications for compulsory military training sometimes referenced a threat from Asia.[102] Both the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Colonial Defence Committee had dismissed any likelihood of an Asian power invading Australia.[103] While Senator George Pearce was concerned about the physical fitness and the discipline of youth, he also warned: 'in the East there are people alien to us in race, religion and ideals … Our White Australia legislation is so much waste paper unless we have rifles behind it, and are prepared

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[97] Ibid, p. 159.
[98] King, cited in Erik Olssen, 'Truby King and the Plunket Society', 4.
[99] Ibid, 6.
[100] For example, 'Defence of New Zealand', *Lyttelton Times,* 5 May 1906, p. 6; 'Universal Training' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 13 July 1906, p. 4; 'Military Training', *Auckland Star,* 18 July 1906, p. 3; 'Universal Training by Compulsory Service', *Auckland Star,* 19 September 1906, p. 3; Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 149.
[101] 'Empire Defence: What Australia Proposes', *Evening Post,* 14 December 1907, p. 7; 'Compulsory Service Adopted in Australia', *Auckland Star,* 14 December, 1907, p. 5; 'Australian Defence', *Oamaru Mail,* 14 December 1907, p. 1; 'Scheme of Defence', *Taranaki Herald,* 14 December 1907, p. 5; 'A Defence Scheme for Australia', *New Zealand Times,* 16 December 1907, p. 5; 'Universal Service: Federal Defence Scheme', *Dominion,* 16 December 1907, p. 7; 'Defence Matters' (editorial), *Press,* 16 December 1907, p. 6; 'Every Man a Soldier', *New Zealand Herald,* 18 December 1907, p. 8.
[102] Tanner, *Compulsory Citizen Soldiers*, p. 71; Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes*, p. 60; Neville Meaney, 'The Problem of "Greater Britain"', p. 61.
[103] Neville Meany, *The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14: A History of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-23,* Volume I., Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976, p. 138.

to back it up by force if necessary.'[104] It has been argued that Pearce and other proponents of compulsory military training exploited the Australian public's fear of Asian powers to gain support for their military training schemes.[105] Similar concerns about the threat from Asia were also voiced in New Zealand, but far less frequently.[106]

Pearce also articulated a justification for a compulsory element to military training that was often repeated in New Zealand. In 1907 he told the Australian Senate:

> we compel our youths to go to school … because we recognise that it is essential in the interests of the body politic that every citizen of the country should be possessed of a certain degree of education … it is equally essential that they should be taught the duties and responsibilities of … the defence of their country. [107]

Many New Zealand politicians thought similarly. Speaking to a Legislative Council motion on universal military training in November 1907, John Callan, argued that if school education was compulsory because it benefited both the child and society, 'why should not the youth of the Dominion be … fitted to defend their country?'[108] In June 1909 the MHR John Thomson told the House that physical and military training were 'essential for the proper education' of children.[109] Opposition leader, William Massey, recommended copying Switzerland, where, he said, military training was a part of their 'national education'.[110]

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[104] Pearce, quoted in John Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 13
[105] Jauncey, *The story of Conscription*, p. 122–23.
[106] Examples of concern about Asian powers include: 'Gift Battleships: Putting Your Money into Bags with Holes in the Bottom' (letter to editor), *Dominion,* 27 March 1909, p. 14; and opposition to the formation of an expeditionary force intended for the European theatre when the threat was, it was ventured, Japan, 'Our Military System', *New Zealand Truth,* 8 February 1913, p. 4.
[107] Pearce, quoted in Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, pp. 22–23.
[108] NZPD, Vol. 142 (21 October – 25 November), 1907, 797.
[109] NZPD, Vol. 147 (10 June – 16 June) 1909, 170.
[110] NZPD, Vol. 148 (10 November – 29 December) 1909, 1020.

The defence initiatives announced by the Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, in late 1907 were almost universally applauded by newspaper editors and public figures in New Zealand.[111] 'It is impossible to read of this bold and statesmanlike scheme without wondering what New Zealand will do in the matter' the *Dominion* noted.[112] The Mayor of Auckland and the President of the National League both endorsed the Australian plans.[113]

The British conscription controversy of the late 1900s was also well-reported in New Zealand.[114] The key figures in the debate were Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, who had led imperial forces in the South African War and championed compulsory military service (conscription), and General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had also fought in South Africa, was the Inspector-General of Oversea Forces and a proponent of non-compulsory military training (voluntary-service territorial forces). In 1910, Hamilton, together with the Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, published *Compulsory Service,* an attack on Roberts' conscription proposals. Roberts responded with *Fallacies and Facts: An Answer to 'Compulsory Service'*.[115] Accounts of the compulsory versus voluntary training debate in Britain were reported in New Zealand, as were the launchings in 1906 of HMS *Dreadnought* (the first of the Royal Navy's new class of large battleships) and *U-1* (Germany's first submarine).

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[111] 'The Federal Defence Scheme', *New Zealand Times*, 24 December 1907, p. 4; 'Compulsory Service: Mr Deakin's Proposals', *New Zealand Herald,* 28 December 1907, p. 6; 'Australian Defence' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 16 December 1907, p. 4; 'Australian Defence' (editorial), *Evening Post,* 16 December 1907, p. 6; 'The Defence of Australasia', *Auckland Star,* 17 December 1907, p. 4.
[112] 'Colonial Defence', *Dominion,* 17 December 1907, p. 4.
[113] 'Every Man a Soldier', *New Zealand Herald,* 18 December 1907, p. 8.
[114] For example: 'Germany and England', *Evening Post,* 23 February 1910, p. 16; 'Defensive Training' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 4 July 1910, p. 4; 'The Armament Question' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 1 September 1910, p. 4; 'Compulsory Training' (editorial), *Dominion,* 7 February 1911, p. 4; 'Mr Laurenson at Woolston' (letter to ed.), *Lyttelton Times,* 14 June 1911, p. 2; 'Anglo-Colonial Notes: Lord Kitchener Against Conscription', *Otago Daily Times,* 9 December 1911, p. 15.
[115] Adams and Poirier, *The Conscription Controversy*, pp. 44–45.

As the 1900s progressed, the pressure for compulsory/universal military training increased. While race-supremacy and concerns about discipline, fitness and masculinity continued to have effect, the public increasingly regarded the volunteer system as inadequate.[116] Some, however, thought the flaws of volunteering were insufficiently appreciated. In 1906, the *New Zealand Herald* wrote: 'We do not think the colony quite understand the astounding inefficiency of its defences as at present organised or the cost of bringing them up to an efficient standard.'[117] Several months later, New Zealanders were made aware that the Council of Defence had given volunteering its last chance. Crucially, they also learnt that in the council's opinion, universal and compulsory military training was the only alternative.[118]

In October 1907 the MLC Robert Loughnan moved that all able-bodied males be trained in military or naval drill. Echoing the arguments of Australia's Senator Pearce, he held that the defence of one's country was an obligation of citizenship. Loughnan also said that the volunteer system had 'entirely broken down'.[119] Dr William Collins, rather highjacked the debate by proposing, in a long-winded deliberation, that military training records be used to gather health statistics.[120] Loughnan's motion was defeated four to 21, not because it was unwelcomed, but because few MLCs thought the proposal workable.[121]

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[116] 'Military Training' (editorial), *Otago daily Times,* 29 June 1907, p. 8; 'Dominion Defences: The Volunteer System', *Auckland Star,* 10 October 1907, p. 3.
[117] 'The Council of Defence', *New Zealand Herald,* 19 December 1906, p. 6.
[118] 'New Zealand Defence: First Report of Council', *New Zealand Herald,* 10 August 1907, p. 6; 'Defence of New Zealand', *Oamaru Mail,* 10 August 1907, p. 4; 'Voluntary Defence', *Auckland Star,* 10 August 1907, p. 7; 'New Zealand Defence Forces', *Otago Daily Times,* 10 August 1907, p. 5; 'New Zealand Defence Forces', *Press,* 10 August 1907, p. 10; 'Defence: Policy of the Council', *Lyttelton Times,* 10 August 1907, p. 11.
[119] 'Legislative Council: Defence of the Dominion', *Dominion,* 9 October 1907, p. 6.
[120] NZPD, Vol. 142 (21 October – 25 November 1907), 797–801.
[121] Ibid, 796–804.

Robert Loughnan was not the only person concerned about the volunteer system and the quality of the force. In a largely laudatory report on the Easter volunteer manoeuvres in April 1908, a journalist felt obliged to note that only one-third of volunteers had bothered to attend. Was it fair, he asked, that 'the willing horse should be worked in this manner for the benefit of the idler'?[122] He then raised an issue that would have considerable bearing on how the operation of compulsory military training was received. He noted that the volunteer system lacked 'equality of sacrifice'.[123] As the next chapter will elaborate, *universal* military training was perceived as being equitable because all were to be treated the same; compelling only some to engage in military training was not. The *Auckland Weekly News* published an illustration (Figure 6.6) making just this point.

In April 1908, the *Auckland Star* felt confident to state that 'the case for universal training has been effectively made out.'[124] Criticism of the volunteer system also continued. In June 1908, the commanding officer of a volunteer training camp told a reporter that volunteering would not become efficient until 'universal' training replaced it.[125] Also in June, the powerful Farmers' Union conference passed a motion in support of 'compulsory military service'.[126] (These citations are good examples of the use of *universal* and *compulsory* with no exact meaning being evident, and also of the confusion between military *training* and military *service*.)

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[122] 'Rational Defence', *New Zealand Times,* 21 April 1908, p. 4.
[123] Ibid.
[124] 'For Our Country', *Auckland Star,* 22 April 1908, p. 4.
[125] 'Second Regiment Mounted Rifles: Volunteer and Service Jottings', *New Zealand Herald,* 24 June 1908, p. 4.
[126] 'Defence: Compulsory Training', *Dominion,* 6 June 1908, p. 5.

Figure 6.6 – A fundamental of *universal* military training was that every young male would do his fair share. Avoiding training would be impossible. The caption read: 'CITIZEN SOLDIER: Now then, mate, why don't you join us? LOAFER: Not me, I like my liberty. This is a free country. CITIZEN SOLDIER: Well, it won't be a free country much longer if everyone goes on like you.' 'Working and Shirking', *Auckland Weekly News*, 10 June 1909, Supplement p. 14. (*Punch* was acknowledged as the origin.)

The publication of the defence report in August 1908 (which recommended the retention of volunteering) was seized upon to advance the need for extensive military reforms and for New Zealand to take defence more seriously.[127] The *Evening Post* described the report as 'an interesting essay on the results to be obtained from flogging a moribund horse.'[128] The *New Zealand Herald* declared that the report would not satisfy loyal citizens, and complained that the Council of

[127] 'Compulsory Training' (editorial), *Waikato Times,* 4 September 1908, p. 2; 'The Defence Report' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 28 August 1908, p. 4.
[128] 'The Volunteer System' (editorial), *Evening Post,* 27 August 1908, p. 6.

Defence's 1907 ultimatum to volunteers had been wasted. The newspaper proposed that compulsory military training be adopted.[129]

By late 1908, few New Zealanders had reason to believe that volunteering was meeting needs. Newspaper editors were unhappy with the decision to keep the volunteer system,[130] and tweaking volunteering via regulatory changes had proven ineffective. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Slater's account of being a volunteer officer, *Fifty Years of Volunteering,* was subtitled *The Army of Regulations*.[131] In it he recorded that there had been three reviews of regulations in 1904–05, a reorganisation of the Department of Defence in 1905, and that the tenth set of regulations was issued in January 1906—and amended a month later. New regulations were published in 1907, when 28 regulations were revoked, 83 amended and 40 new ones added.[132] In 1908, over 150 regulations were amended, 38 were revoked and 39 new ones added.[133] These fidgety changes produced no substantial improvement.[134]

1908 was an election year and Ward's first as Prime Minister. Despite the growth in support for military training, Ward chose not to make it an election issue. Ward and the Liberals were returned to government in the November election. They won a further five per cent of the popular vote, but secured eight fewer seats in the

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[129] 'The Defence Report' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 28 August 1908, p. 4.
[130] 'The Heretungas', *Dominion,* 30 January 1908, p. 5; 'Volunteer Unrest: Inquiry Called For', *Dominion,* 21 February 1908, p. 7; 'Volunteer Unrest', *Dominion,* 22 February 1908, p. 4; 'New Zealand News: An Otago Volunteer Trouble', *Dominion,* 13 July 1908, p. 8.
[131] Lieutenant-Colonel H. Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering: The Army of Regulations.* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1910.
[132] Ibid, p. 156.
[133] Ibid, p. 162.
[134] Ibid, p. 156.

House.[135] The election results had, the *Dominion* claimed, greatly increased the number of MHRs in favour of compulsory military training.[136]

As more people accepted that volunteering had had its day, and that a universal or compulsory system was the logical replacement,[137] pressure to implement such a scheme increased even further. In January 1909, the Legislative Council heard that, after inspecting territorial forces in Britain and meeting with Haldane and senior British officers, the MLC George Smith was confident that universal/compulsory military training was likely to be needed in the United Kingdom.[138] James Allen, the shadow minister of defence and a volunteer officer, told a public meeting in April that the volunteer system was 'on the wrong lines and a great waste of money.'[139] Universal training was, he said, the solution.[140] Like many critics of volunteering, Allen separated the volunteer *system* (which he said had failed) from the *volunteers* (whose patriotism and sacrifices he respected).[141]

Ward, however, was still unconvinced about universal/compulsory military training. It should also be noted that, in early 1909 and despite several attempts, Australia had not introduced compulsory training, that compulsory military training remained unpopular in Britain,[142] and that Canada was still debating the matter. The arguments for introducing universal/compulsory military training in Canada were much the same as those in Australia and New Zealand.[143]

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[135] A possible reason for the loss of some seats was that the 1908 election was the first to employ a two-round system. Under the system, if the most popular candidate for a seat had not won more than half the votes cast, the two top-polling candidates went into a second ballot to determine the winner. The two-round method was discontinued in 1913.
[136] 'Compulsory Military Training' (editorial), *Dominion,* 9 January 1909, p. 4.
[137] Crawford, 'The New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 222.
[138] 'The King's Army: Haldane's Territorials', *Dominion,* 27 January 1909, p. 8.
[139] 'Universal Training: Mr James Allen, MP', *Oamaru Mail,* 29 April 1909, p. 1.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Crawford, 'The New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 221.
[142] Beckett, *Britain's Part-time Soldiers*, p. 219.
[143] Wood, 'The Sense of Duty, p. 343.

International events were used to rationalise defence initiatives. The battleship race between Britain and Germany had precipitated Ward's gift of a dreadnought in March. The gift made it plain that the government was prepared to make a financially significant commitment to imperial naval defence, but what did it signal to those seeking military reform? In response to the dreadnought offer, the former Opposition leader, Sir William Russell, argued that Germany could man its warships and maintain its army only because it ran a system of compulsory service. 'Can we?' he asked.[144] Russell said that the time for compulsory military training had come.[145]

The *New Zealand Times* thought similarly and maintained that, if asked, whether 'every able-bodied citizen should go through a course of military training', the public would agree overwhelmingly.[146] The *Manawatu Daily Times* noted that the battleship gift did not replace the need for universal training.[147] Many other newspapers made similar remarks.[148] The *Auckland Star* interviewed Ward about compulsory military training. He told them 'the present is not the time'.[149] The *New Zealand Herald* was stunned by Ward's doubts about universal/compulsory military training: 'we cannot but express our amazement that … Sir Joseph Ward should still hesitate to adopt it'.[150] The *Auckland Weekly News* found Ward's desire to retain the volunteer system unsatisfactory. '[T]here is no process or method saving "compulsion" alone which can effect the purpose sought … No payment or reward …

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[144] 'Sir William Russell's Views', *Star,* 23 March 1909, p. 3. The "we" Russell used was as likely to have been the empire as New Zealand.
[145] Ibid.
[146] 'New Zealand's Battleship' (editorial), *New Zealand Times,* 23 March 1909, p. 4.
[147] 'The Naval Crisis' (editorial), *Manawatu Daily Times,* 23 March 1909, p. 4.
[148] 'The 'Dreadnought' Gift' (editorial), *Evening Post,* 23 March 1909, p. 6; 'Sir Joseph Ward's Offer of a Battleship' (editorial), *Press,* 23 March 1909, p. 6; 'New Zealand to the Rescue' (editorial), *Fielding Star,* 23 March 1909, p. 2.
[149] 'The People's Attitude', *Auckland Star,* 24 March 1909, p. 5;
[150] 'The Defence Question' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 24 March 1909, p. 6.

can muster the entire youth of the community in the defence force excepting the statutory obligation to serve.'[151]

It was not just newspaper editors who argued that the dreadnought gift was no substitute for universal/compulsory military training. Numerous writers of letters to newspaper editors made the same case.[152] While slow to issue a statement, the National Defence League applauded the gift of a battleship—and urged Ward to implement universal military training. The league's request was widely reported.[153]

Local councils, business organisations and public bodies also insisted that universal/compulsory military training was needed. The Auckland City Council determined that it was 'absolutely necessary' that universal military training be instituted.[154] One thousand copies of a pamphlet on universal training were purchased and distributed by the Hamilton Borough Council.[155] Both the Dunedin and Christchurch councils gave their support to universal military training.[156] The national conference of the business lobby group, the Chamber of Commerce, unanimously resolved that 'compulsory military training is the fairest, most efficient, and most economical means of defence.'[157] The President of the Otago Employers' Association was reported as saying that, provided the interruptions to business were not severe, employers would cooperate with universal service.[158]

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[151] *Auckland Weekly News,* 1 April 1909, p. 35.
[152] 'National Defence' *Press,* 24 March 1909, p. 7; 'The National Defence League', *Nelson Evening Mail,* 24 March 1909, p. 1; 'Universal Military Training', *Wanganui Herald,* 30 March 1909, p. 5; Raymond Tune's letter in 'Gift Battleships', *Dominion,* 27 March 1909, p. 14.
[153] For example, 'National Defence League's Approval', *Wanganui Herald,* 27 March 1909, p. 5; 'Universal Military Training', *New Zealand Times,* 30 March 1909, p. 5; 'National Defence', *Southland Times,* 20 March 1909, p. 5; 'Universal Training', *New Zealand Herald,* 31 March 1909, p. 6.
[154] 'Universal Training: Within the Dominion', *New Zealand Times,* 2 April 1908, p. 6.
[155] 'Hamilton Borough Council', *New Zealand Herald,* 26 April 1909, p. 6.
[156] 'City Council', *Otago Daily Times,* 21 October 1909, p. 4; 'City Council', *Press,* 19 October 1909, p. 8; 'Town and Country', *Lyttelton Times,* 18 June 1909, p. 6.
[157] 'Universal Training Favoured by Commercial Conference', *Auckland Star,* 15 April 1909, p. 5.
[158] 'The Dearth of Defenders', *Otago Daily Times,* 6 April 1909, p. 3.

Even the Department of Defence was reported to be in favour of compulsory military training.[159] At the Trades and Labour Council conference, however, a motion to support compulsory military training was defeated.[160]

Ward also faced criticism over the way the dreadnought gift had been made. The issue was not the gift itself, but that Ward had committed New Zealand to it without consulting parliament.[161] His unilateral action was not out of character. Like Seddon, he kept power to himself, Cabinet met infrequently, committees seldom operated, and he overwhelmed himself with work.[162] The Liberal party were used to leaders making decisions themselves.[163] Ward told the House that he made the offer to support Britain, the empire and New Zealand, and that the gift had been approved by the press, the public, and civic bodies.[164] Having wrung what political advantage they could from Ward's impetuosity, the House unanimously approved the gift.[165]

Around the time of Ward's announcement of the dreadnought gift, New Zealand newspapers reported that some British employers were requiring their staff to serve in the (voluntary) territorial forces there. 'E. H.' wrote to the *Dominion* in protest. Demanding that employees join territorial units was, he insisted, an 'iniquitous system of compulsion'; most workers had 'nothing worth fighting for' and would be better off siding with the invaders.[166] The editors appended a

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[159] 'Universal Training: Is It Conscription', *New Zealand Times,* 1 May 1909, p. 7.
[160] Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment', p. 100.
[161] NZPD, Vol. 147 (10 June – 16 June) 1909, 155.
[162] Michael Bassett, *Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993, p. 173.
[163] Ibid, p. 174.
[164] NZPD, Vol. 147 (10 June – 16 June) 1909, 154.
[165] Ibid, 200.
[166] 'The Economic System and National Defence', *Dominion,* 13 March 1909, p. 10.

comment beneath the letter asserting that it was an example of the 'extravagance of the ideas and language of a section of the Socialist party.'[167]

At the risk of exaggerating one letter's significance, E. H. articulated the attitudes of some, and the *Dominion*'s comment on the letter was an example of the way those opposed to universal/compulsory military training were frequently disparaged by opinion-shapers.[168] A similar response to opponents of military training occurred during a public meeting in Auckland in April. The meeting advocated the introduction of universal/compulsory military training. When an audience member (described as a socialist by a reporter) spoke against the proposition, he was shouted down by the crowd.[169]

By April 1909, battleships and military training were *the* topics of public discourse. The *Auckland Weekly News* reported:

> These are times in which everybody is talking Dreadnoughts and military training … You hear of them on tramcars and on trains and on excursion boats and at dairy factories and theatres and school picnics, wherever people gather together. Men talk of them and women and even children.[170]

A similar observation was made by the Christchurch-based volunteer officer, Colonel Henry Slater:

> During the winter months of 1909 greater interest was taken in Defence matters than at any other previous period during the existence of the Volunteer system in New Zealand. By articles, letters in the papers, and interviews, the subject was constantly before the public, the general opinion being that some form of compulsory service would be necessary before we could obtain an efficient Defence force.[171]

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[167] Ibid.
[168] The same issue ran letters supporting the British employers and devoted the whole of page 6 to the results of rifle shooting contests, including photographs of some competitors.
[169] 'Universal Training', *Auckland Weekly News,* 22 April 1909, p. 21.
[170] 'It Isn't Only the Guns', *Auckland Weekly News,* 15 April 1909, p. 16.
[171] Slater, *Fifty Years of Volunteering*, p. 166.

The public's preoccupation with defence was both out of character (commandants' and defence reports had frequently complained that the public were indifferent to defence matters) and significant, because it implied an unprecedented level of interest in military and naval affairs. Slater's and the *Weekly News*'s accounts of the dominion's mood show that by the second quarter of 1909, most New Zealanders were convinced of, almost animated about, the need for military training. They were not asking their Prime Minister to lead the way, they were begging him to catch up.

Furthermore—this cannot be stressed enough—while the security of the empire, a need to defend New Zealand and the threat from Germany were clearly motivations, the public were also deeply concerned about the future of the race, that volunteering had failed, and about the morality, masculinity, discipline, loyalty, and fitness of young males. As Australia's Senator Pearce and New Zealand politicians had frequently said, universal/compulsory military training was not only important to defence, it was, like universal and compulsory education, beneficial to the recipients and advantageous to society generally.

In May 1909, Ward began testing the political waters. In a speech in Invercargill, he acknowledged 'all are anxious to see our internal defence put upon a more practical footing' and that there had been calls for (as he termed them) 'universal military service' and 'conscription'.[172] Ward confessed that giving every male citizen military training appealed to him personally, but he was unable to 'shut [his] eyes to the difficulties that surrounded such a proposition.'[173] He warned that the cost of compensating large numbers of men for income lost while receiving

[172] 'Important Policy Speech' (record of Ward's address), *New Zealand Times,* 3 May 1909, p. 5.
[173] Ibid.

military training would be overwhelming. Instead, the government would make gradual improvements to the current system.[174]

Such half measures satisfied no one. The Prime Minister's confidence in the volunteer system was deemed unjustified. 'On the question of defence Sir Joseph had much to say, but he has added nothing of importance', the *Dominion* complained.[175] The *Otago Daily Times* advised that, contrary to some statistics Ward had cited in his speech, the reality of the current defence system was 'a paper army that could not be made to materialise at the present time.'[176] Nor was the newspaper satisfied with Ward's intention to simply tinker with volunteering:

> The advocates of universal service and compulsory training have many forcible arguments at their disposal, and the whole subject of defence is one upon which the Government should realise the necessity by this time of showing a bold front.[177]

The *Evening Post* compared Ward's Invercargill speech to one he had given a month earlier. They noted how, in just weeks, Ward had turned from being 'impressed with the need for an improved defence' to being 'impressed with the difficulties … Sir Joseph, who gauged the temper of the country rather correctly a month ago, may be making a mistake in his present assessment of the national sentiment.'[178]

One of the Liberal Cabinet members who lost his seat in the 1908 elections was Robert McNab. A historian and volunteer officer, McNab had served several terms as Minister or Acting Minister of Defence. After Ward's announcement of the battleship gift, McNab decided that defence matters should not be left there.

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[174] Ibid.
[175] 'An Anxious Manifesto', *Dominion,* 3 May 1909, p. 6.
[176] 'The Defence System' (editorial), *Otago Daily Times,* 15 May 1909, p. 9.
[177] 'The Defence System' (editorial), *Otago Daily Times,* 15 May 1909, p. 9.
[178] 'Defence Matters', *Evening Post,* 3 May 1909, p. 6.

Confident that volunteers approved of compulsory training, and that compulsory training was the 'proper corollary to the Dreadnought offer', he set off on a 25-centre speaking tour.[179] In May, McNab told a reporter that it was a term as Acting Minister of Defence that had convinced him that the volunteer system needed to go. McNab explained that he was advocating universal training, not conscription. He also recommended holding a referendum on the issue.[180]

The *New Zealand Herald* described McNab's speaking tour as 'an unbroken series of approving meetings … [that] has everywhere carried his hearers with him'.[181] When McNab was questioned on the impression he had formed of public opinion, he replied that 60 per cent of New Zealanders favoured universal military training. He also remarked: 'I know of no public question during the term of my political career that has commanded such unanimous support from the press'.[182] When the Defence Bill was later debated in the House, the influence of McNab's speaking tour was recognised by newspaper editors and parliamentarians.[183] The MHR Alexander Malcom thanked McNab for 'educating the people of this country as to the necessity for such a Bill as this', and even Ward acknowledged McNab's influence on public opinion.[184]

In early and mid-1909, Ward still lacked confidence that the public would approve military training. In contrast, the leader of the Opposition, William Massey, was sure they would. On 16 June Massey told the House 'the volunteer system has

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[179] 'Citizen Soldiers: Compulsory Training Advocated', *Evening Post,* 21 April 1909, p. 3; 'The Dominion and Defence', *Lyttelton Times,* 21 April 1909, p. 6; Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment with Compulsory Military Training', p. 43.
[180] 'The Defence Question', *Auckland Weekly News,* 13 May 1909, p. 21.
[181] 'Uproarious Meeting in Wellington', *Auckland Weekly News,* 20 May 1909, p. 22; 'Universal Training' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 18 June 1909, p. 4.
[182] 'National Defence', *Auckland Star,* 23 June 1909, p. 3.
[183] Editorial, *Ashburton Guardian,* 15 November 1909, p. 2.
[184] NZPD, Vol. 148 (10 November – 29 December) 1909, 1015, 1029.

failed—failed miserably and completely', and should be replaced by universal training.[185] The defence outlook, he warned, was perilous; 'almost every country in the world is preparing for war.'[186] Ward responded that the government planned to introduce reforms. He said that two solutions had been prepared and that, rather than rushing into the matter on the last day of the session, military training should be deferred until it could be given thorough debate.[187]

The *New Zealand Herald* expected that, when the House returned, and given the 'intense feeling that really exists throughout the Dominion', Massey's motion would be successful.[188] Trying to patch the holes in the volunteer system was pointless, the newspaper continued, and trusting to fate and the Royal Navy was not sufficient. Defence preparations had to be made in peacetime, and only universal training would provide the dominion with the desired level of security.[189] What Massey told the House and what the *Herald* echoed were three of the most commonly heard, defence-related justifications for military reforms: a threat existed and needed to be prepared for; the volunteer system was irreparably broken; and universal/compulsory military training was the only workable solution.

When Parliament resumed in October 1909, the press and public were impatient. The *New Zealand Herald* criticised the government for taking too much time over minor matters, while important issues such as defence remained undebated. '[U]niversal training is so inevitable', the newspaper stated, 'that it is

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[185] NZPD, Vol. 147 (10 June – 16 June) 1909, 307.
[186] Ibid.
[187] NZPD, Vol. 147 (10 June – 16 June) 1909, 307, 309. Ward's initial proposal in response to Massey's universal training recommendation was, curiously, that the recommendation be given temporary, non-binding acceptance. Ward continued to employ strange debating tactics; for example, he voted against his own motion to adjourn the debate. Ibid, 309; 'Flouting Parliament', *Dominion,* 18 June 1909, p. 8.
[188] 'Universal Training' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 18 June 1909, p. 4.
[189] Ibid.

now merely a question of its prompt acceptance or its grudging delay.'[190] Frustration with Ward's inaction was exacerbated by articles that exposed (and sometimes exaggerated) the threat to security.[191] In October the National League began soliciting signatures for a petition asking the government to implement compulsory military training. The petition maintained that there was public 'alarm' at the lack of trained defenders and at the military developments taking place in Europe and Asia.[192]

In November, Ward announced that military training camps of 12,000 to 15,000 acres would be established in each of the two main islands to provide venues for practical military training. The camps would be part of other military changes the government would announce shortly.[193] The Commanding Officer of Auckland district, Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, said he believed that the Prime Minister had at last accepted the need for universal training. 'It has been a mystery to me', he confessed, 'why he has not adopted it sooner. But he has left it until people showed that they wanted it.'[194] Patterson also had an opinion on why military training was a popular initiative. He argued that the public's desire for universal/compulsory military training lay in it offering 'physical and moral advantages' and protection against invasion.[195]

Although a few maintained that compulsory military training impinged on civil liberties, the use of government regulation to force young males train was perhaps more acceptable in New Zealand than in other countries. The French

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[190] 'The Work of the Session' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 25 October 1909, p. 4
[191] For example, 'O. Come All Ye Germans!', *New Zealand Herald,* 26 June 1909, p. 13.
[192] 'Universal Training: A Petition to Parliament', *New Zealand Herald,* 11 October 1909, p. 5.
[193] 'Internal Defence Proposals', *Otago Daily Times,* 13 November 1909, p. 8.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid.

academic and political observer, André Siegfried, visited New Zealand around this time and noted the way that government intervention was commonly approved.[196] The population had, he wrote, a 'perfect mania for appealing to the state.'[197] He ascribed the phenomenon to the industrial laws and women's suffrage legislation that had made New Zealand famous, in its own eyes at least.[198] The New Zealand Government provided the lion's share of education and health services, and the dominion's railways, telegraph system and new telephone service were all state monopolies. As early as 1890 the government was the largest landowner, landlord and employer.[199] Although a minority opposed state interference in young men's lives, the majority of New Zealanders were, Siegfried opined, comfortable with governmental direction.[200]

In July and August of 1909, Ward was in London to attend the Imperial Conference on the Defence of the Empire. His presence there afforded him the opportunity to discuss with senior British politicians and military officers his plans to make limited military reforms—presumably those announced in Invercargill in May and poorly received by the public and press. Ward met with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Nicholson. The result was that Ward asked Nicholson to prepare a new military scheme for New Zealand. The matter that precipitated Ward's request was not whether New Zealand should have voluntary, compulsory or universal military training, but what military system was necessary for New Zealand to meet its imperial defence obligations.[201] The public pressure to

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[196] Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, pp. 54–5.
[197] Ibid, p. 52.
[198] Ibid, p. 61.
[199] Reeves, *The Long White Cloud*, pp. 282–3.
[200] Siegfried, *Democracy in New Zealand*, p. 55
[201] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 185.

implement universal/compulsory military training may have placed societal benefits ahead of military and strategic ones, but what tipped the scales for Ward was the defence of the empire.

That Ward's motive arose from meeting imperial defence obligations rather than anything else confirms an argument this thesis has consistently advanced: the reasons individuals (or organisations) favoured universal or compulsory military training varied, but did not conflict with each other. Ward's imperial defence motivation satisfied those concerned to improve the physical condition of youth, to replace a dysfunctional volunteer system, or to improve discipline in society. Moreover, through either good sense or good fortune, Ward did not say what had stimulated him to act. Those motivated by other reasons were therefore able to feel that their rationales had been validated—as the responses from politicians, newspaper editors and lobbyists showed (see below).

General Nicholson recommended that coast defence garrisons, a mobile defence force and an expeditionary force be established along with a reserve, which would cover battle wastage in war. Supply, signals and ambulance corps were included. A territorial army was to be the heart of the scheme.[202] He estimated that New Zealand had 160,000 males of military age, from whom a 30,000-strong territorial force could be formed. Nicholson expected that, in the event of a war, 10,000 of those 30,000 would volunteer for service overseas in an expeditionary force.[203] The training of the men would, Nicholson warned, be critical. He identified four training matters that would determine the success of the scheme: the quality and number of instructors; schools for senior and staff officers; facilities for practical

[202] War Office, 'Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Military Forces of New Zealand', August 1909, ANZ AD10 7, pp. 6–8.
[203] Ibid, p. 9.

training; and the allocation of sufficient time to training.[204] His proposals formed the basis of the Defence Bill that Ward introduced in November.

In presenting the Defence Bill, Ward told the House that compulsory *physical* training for youths of 12 to 18 years, and compulsory *military* training for those between 18 and 21 years were proposed. The purpose of the training was to provide trained personnel who might volunteer for a 20,000-strong expeditionary force,[205] a larger force than the 10,000 Nicholson had proposed. He expected that most MHRs would support the Bill, as would the majority of the public.[206] Ward's recognition of the public mood was a signal departure from his previous stances. In March he had argued that instituting compulsory military training would be precipitate.[207] In May he had claimed that large-scale universal/compulsory military training would be unworkable.[208] Not once did he acknowledge that the public wanted military reforms. But in late November, he was not only proposing the introduction of compulsory military training, he was claiming that the public supported the idea. The National Defence League certainly approved.[209] The *New Zealand Herald* found it 'gratifying to know that the Government has at last decided in favour of universal defensive training'.[210] The *Dominion* endorsed the scheme with, albeit, two reservations: that uniforms should have been included, and how attendance at training camps would affect employers.[211] The physical and moral benefits of compulsory training were acknowledged by many newspapers.[212]

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[204] Ibid, p. 51.
[205] 'Compulsory Training', *Auckland Weekly News,* 18 November 1909, p. 20.
[206] 'Compulsory Training', *Wairarapa Age,* 17 November 1909, p. 4; 'Compulsory Training', *Akaroa Mail and Banks Peninsula Advertiser,* 16 November 1909, p. 2.
[207] 'The People's Attitude', *Auckland Star,* 24 March 1909, p. 5;
[208] 'Important Policy Speech' (record of Ward's address), *New Zealand Times,* 3 May 1909, p. 5.
[209] 'Compulsory Training', *Taranaki Herald,* 15 November 1909, p. 4.
[210] 'Universal Training', *New Zealand Herald,* 11 November 1909, p. 4.
[211] 'Compulsory Service', *Dominion*, 11 November 1909, p. 6.
[212] For example, 'Compulsory Training', *Patea Mail,* 19 November 1909, p. 2.

Ward was quick to explain that conscription (compulsory military service) was not being proposed. Defence costs would, he said, increase by 58 per cent, from £202,000 to £352,000. (The amount actually required was three times that.) The Prime Minister then explained that to have all 160,000 eligible males involved in military training would cost over a million pounds. '[W]e cannot look at any expenditure approaching this figure' he warned.[213] Financial constraints meant only some young males could be trained.

Ward was proposing compulsory military training, but not *universal* compulsory military training. It was a distinction few appreciated, then or in the following years. The MLC John Barr so misunderstood the situation that he told the Legislative Council that the Bill was fair because 'all sections of the community have to do the same drill'.[214] Moreover, as the next chapter explains, partial participation in compulsory military training led to the defiance of orders to train on the grounds of 'If he doesn't have to do it, why should I?'

A territorial force would, Ward explained, be created to replace volunteer corps. British army methods and organisation would be implemented, and time spent at compulsory training would be paid at 'fair' rates. Approximately 38,000 12- to 18-year-olds and about 31,000 18- to 21-year-olds would be involved. Including the men over 21 years of age, who could serve voluntarily in territorial units, the total likely adult participation was, Ward estimated, between 40,000 to 50,000.[215] Again, the difference between the number Ward quoted as being eligible versus the number who would actually be involved was not questioned.

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[213] NZPD, Vol. 148 (10 November – 29 December) 1909, 1000–01.
[214] Ibid, 1425–26.
[215] Ibid, 1004–05.

Turning to those who might oppose military training, Ward said that religious and conscientious objectors would be exempted from learning to fight, but would 'have to undergo physical drill and do non-combatant work.'[216] (The grounds for objecting to training in the Defence Act were limited to religious belief only.) Those who evaded training could be fined or face other penalties. Special provisions for Boy Scouts and naval corps were included. The Prime Minister assured the House that the scheme would not create European-style militarism or encourage jingoism, neither of which, he said, the dominion would tolerate.[217]

James Allen responded for the Opposition. He not only supported the Bill but recommended that training not stop at 21 years, but extend until men were 30.[218] Few MHRs spoke against the Bill;[219] most approved it, but for sometimes quite different reasons. George Thompson supported the Bill for its moral rather than military benefits, and because it would reduce larrikinism [220] Alexander Malcom spoke of the aggressiveness of Germany and deemed it necessary to ban alcohol from camps if the support of women were to be secured.[221] William Massey supported the Bill in principle, but wished it had a closer resemblance to the Swiss system.[222] A similar range of mostly positive statements were heard when the Bill was debated in the Legislative Council.[223]

The Defence Act of 1909 established eight forms of service: 1, a permanent force (full-time, professional personnel, usually with instructor, port defence,

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[216] Ibid, 1004–05.
[217] Ibid, 1006–07.
[218] Ibid, 1007–11.
[219] Two who did were Alexander Hogg, NZPD, Vol. 148 (10 November – 29 December) 1909, 1011–1013 and David McLaren, ibid, 1024–26;
[220] NZPD, Vol. 148 (10 November – 29 December) 1909, 1013–15.
[221] Ibid, 1015–17.
[222] Ibid, 1020.
[223] Ibid, 1412, 1414, 1417, 1419–20.

administration, or staff responsibilities); 2, junior cadets (compulsory physical training for 12–14 year-olds, repealed in 1912); 3, senior cadets (compulsory physical and military training for 14–18 year-olds); 4, a general training section (compulsory military training for 18–21 year-olds, amended in 1910 to 25 years); 5, a territorial force (of 18–21 year-olds, amended in 1910 to 25 year-olds, more strenuously trained than those in t general training, liable for service in New Zealand only, but hopefully willing to volunteer for overseas service in an expeditionary force); 6, a reserve (21–30 year-olds, 25–30 year-olds after 1910); 7, defence rifle clubs (initially to cover areas where cadets or general training were not viable, repealed in 1912); and 8, a militia (a long-standing provision to conscript 17–55 year-olds in event of war).[224]

The Act also established fines of up to £10 for employers who prevented staff from attending training, and a £20 fine for anyone bringing alcohol into a camp. There were severe penalties (fines of up to £50, the loss of voting rights, and exclusion from government employment) for failing to register for or being absent from training. Officers would be appointed, not elected, and the Council of Defence would stay—it was, however, disbanded and in 1910 a commandant was appointed.[225]

The Defence Bill had a swift and easy journey through the House and the Legislative Council.[226] It was popularly approved in parliament, and by the press and the public.[227] The Defence Act of 1909 was in a sense all things to all people: it addressed the widespread acceptance that the volunteer system was no longer fit

[224] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw VII 28.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Clayton, *The New Zealand Army*, p. 78.
[227] John Crawford, '"Should we 'be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 106.

for purpose;[228] honoured the agreements made at the 1909 conference on imperial defence;[229] and offered a means of remedying the social and moral issues that worried many.[230] It has been argued that anxiety about the welfare of youth was in fact critical to the Bill's widespread endorsement.[231] Although the training provisions of the Act were often regarded as the main achievement at the time, it has since been argued that the creation of the recruiting, administrative and instructional functions was of greater value.[232]

Newspapers applauded the Defence Act. It was, the *Evening Post* said, the 'greatest achievement of the [parliamentary] session'.[233] The *Manawatu Daily Times, West Coast Times, Auckland Star, Dominion, Evening Post* and the *Press* wrote much the same [234] The *New Zealand Herald* claimed 'nine persons out of ten in the Dominion are in favour of … universal training'.[235] It should be noted that *Herald*'s use of 'universal training' was either because it thought it a synonym for *compulsory training*, or because it too failed to recognise that training would extend to only a portion of those eligible. Although Ward was congratulated for introducing compulsory military training, it was seldom regarded as his initiative.[236] In March of 1909, Ward's gift of a dreadnought was seen as bold, right and welcome. The reaction to the Defence Act in December was different. The legislation had come only

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[228] Ibid, p. 107.
[229] Crawford, 'The New Zealand Volunteer Force', p. 239.
[230] Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 154.
[231] Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment', p. 57.
[232] Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience*, pp. 57–8.
[233] 'The Work of the Session' (editorial), *Evening Post,* 24 December 1909, p. 6.
[234] 'Fuss and Fustian' (editorial), *Manawatu Daily Times,* 28 December 1909, p. 4; 'The Parliamentary Session' (editorial), *West Coast Times,* 29 December 1909; 'The Close of the Session' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 30 December 1909, p. 4; 'Notes of the Day', *Dominion,* 30 December 1909, p. 4; 'Looking Backward: 1909', *Evening Post,* 30 December 1909, p. 3; 'The Work of the Session' (editorial), *Press,* 30 December 1909, p. 6.
[235] 'Universal Training' (editorial), *New Zealand Herald,* 15 November 1909, p. 4.
[236] 'The Work of the Session' (editorial), *Evening Post,* 24 December 1909, p. 6.

after the public, press and lobbyists were nearly exhausted with pleading and prodding Ward to act. Consequently, it would have been hard for the public, newspaper editors, politicians, business groups, and patriotic leagues to feel that the Defence Act was anything other than their achievement, not Ward's.

Though few knew it at the time, in some respects the Defence Act of 1909 was incomplete and ill-considered. Training was not universal and partial participation in training would cause problems. There were no provisions for conscientious objection, the cost would be far greater than Ward had predicted and, as the next chapter explains, the disciplinary mechanisms the Act permitted were ill-conceived. When used, they led to a public backlash.

In summary, New Zealand had changed significantly in the fifty years leading up to 1909 and the passage of the Defence Act. In Taranaki in 1860–61, when the threat to survival was manifestly real and close, most settlers did only the minimum required from them by the Militia Act. By the 1890s, volunteer corps were often social or recreational clubs as much as (or more than) they were military units, and per capita participation in volunteering was declining. Commandants complained that New Zealanders were apathetic about defence matters. Starting in about 1907, and certainly by 1909, imperial considerations, new attitudes in British politicians and military leaders, and international developments provided sound military and strategic reasons to overhaul New Zealand's military system, and to do so without delay.

The below-average rate of involvement in volunteering, however, contradicts the view that the threat to the empire was the main reason the public wanted military reforms. The clear pattern established in the thirty-year period since the end of the New Zealand Wars was that security anxieties caused an

increase in volunteer numbers. Volunteer numbers in 1909 were low. From where, then, did the public pressure to reform volunteering and institute universal or compulsory training come?

Universal/compulsory military training was popular with the public because they often saw it as a means to address social phenomena that concerned them: the poor physical condition of male urban youths, a decline in youth morality, and a general lack of discipline. Participation in military training would, it was often held, also reinforce the virtues of muscular Christianity, patriotism, chivalry, and loyalty to the empire. Moreover, if every young male were compelled to participate, military training would satisfy New Zealand conventions about fairness and equitability, and would ensure that those who were unlikely to involve themselves voluntarily (but who probably needed it the most), would share in the benefits. The clergy, newspapers, patriotic leagues, scout masters, educationalists, Chambers of Commerce, the Farmers' Union, local councils, and public bodies all publicly supported universal/compulsory military training for its fairness and the social good it would do. The only people who objected to universal/compulsory military training were, newspapers told their readers, extremists.

Thus two main rationales for the defence reforms of 1909 existed. Ward, the imperial lobby groups and some individuals held defence of New Zealand and the empire to be the critical element. Low volunteer participation rates and the prominence of the social benefits of military in public discourse show that many others perceived no heightened security threat but saw the remediation of social ills as the key benefit. As it happened, the Defence Act of 1909 satisfied them all—until it came into operation, that is.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

'Unfair and un-British': The Administration of Compulsory Military Training, 1911–14

On 3 September 1913, the opposition MHR George Russell told the House that compulsory military training had failed. His justifications were that only some young men were required to train, and that too many trainees were being prosecuted in courts. In just two years of operation, compulsory military training in New Zealand had created a measure of discontent. That discontent and the causes for it are the subjects of this chapter

Russell believed that compulsory military training was supposed to include all of those liable for training. He argued that the 'absolute universality which was emphatically given to the country as the principal feature of the system when it was brought in' had not, he asserted, been realised.[1] Russell was far from alone in not understanding that compulsory military training in New Zealand was never intended to be universal. When introducing the Defence Bill in December 1909, the then Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, had made the scale of the scheme plain. He explained that there were neither the funds nor a military need to have every

[1] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 305.

eligible male take part in military training.[2] Ward's statement was widely overlooked. Russell and others continued to expect that military training would include all liable males, and were not satisfied with partial participation. Forcing only some to train was contrary to two widely held values: fair play and equality of sacrifice. There was, however, little that could be done. The budget was limited and by 1913 the numbers in compulsory military training were close to establishment.[3]

Russell had two issues with Defence Act prosecutions. First, he disapproved of the number of trainees being prosecuted under the Defence Act. He told the House: 'you see the same young men week after week brought before the Courts and prosecuted. By that method you are causing dissatisfaction with the system'.[4] The solution, he ventured, was 'not prosecutions, but more attractions, more inducements.'[5] There was a reason so many trainees were brought before the courts. Hamstrung by the provisions in and omissions from the Defence Act, the only mechanism officers could use to instil discipline was to bring cases in civil courts. There is no evidence that addressing the shortcomings in the Act was contemplated by either a minister of defence or senior officers. The result of having only the courts to enforce discipline was that by the end of 1913, over 10,000 trainees had been prosecuted.[6] The vast majority of charges (93.6 per cent of them) were brought for minor infractions such as missing or obstructing a parade.[7] Those convicted usually received fines. Some parents and members of the public were, like Russell, unhappy

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[2] NZPD, Vol. 148 (10 November – 29 December) 1909, 1000–01. Also see chapter six.
[3] In 1912, the cadet and territorial forces were 89 per cent of establishment, they were at 84 per cent in 1913, and reached 98 per cent in 1914. Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 7; ibid, 1913, p. 12; ibid, 1914, p. 13.
[4] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 305.
[5] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 305.
[6] See Figure 7.4, below.
[7] 93.6 per cent of those prosecuted were charged with missing or obstructing a parade. Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37.

that boys and young men were being sentenced in courts—and getting criminal records—for what were usually trivial incidents of misbehaviour. Officers had, however, no other course available to them.

Second, Russell was offended that thousands of young males were unregistered, unaccounted for, and unprosecuted. As Russell correctly appreciated, the vast majority of Defence Act prosecutions were of youths (cadets) and young men (territorials) who had accepted the obligation to train and were taking part in training.[8] Nearly 20 per cent of those required to register did not register: some 15,000 to 18,000, depending on the year, between 1911–14.[9] Most of those who did not register, in both New Zealand and Australia, failed to do so through negligence or ignorance of the law. Only a minority refused to take part in compulsory military training.[10] Just 136 young New Zealand males, 1.5 per cent of Defence Act cases, were prosecuted for failing to register.[11] Many trainees and some members of the public resented the fact that those who submitted to training were prosecuted, while those who refused to honour their legal obligations escaped retribution. Russell described it as 'absolutely unfair and un-British'.[12]

It is likely that Russell had been inspired to speak, at least in part, by a recent, incident of open defiance of the Defence Act by some young miners from the West Coast who were sent into detention on Ripa Island (examined later in this chapter). Their much-publicised flouting of the Defence Act, and the failure of mechanisms to punish them, embarrassed the government and saw labour organisations, pacifists,

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[8] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37.
[9] See Figure 7.3, below.
[10] Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 38; John Barrett, *Falling In: Australians and 'Boy Conscription' 1911–1915*. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1979, p. 3, p. 3, p. 129, p. 132; Ryan Bodman, '"The Military Strike is Now On!" A History of the Passive Resisters Union, 1912–14', *Labour History*, 107 (November 2014), 4.
[11] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37.
[12] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 305.

anti-militarists and socialists rally to the miners' support.[13] Meanwhile, supporters of compulsory military training became frustrated that the obdurately disobedient were defying the law with impunity, and were setting a bad example for others.[14]

The root cause of the growth in discontent with compulsory military training was, what might be called, its operational shortcomings. The Department of Defence had neither the resources nor any easy means of identifying those who had not registered. The Liberal and Reform governments failed to remedy the disciplinary provisions of the Defence Act, were inconsistent in their policies regarding prosecutions, and did not explain to the public why only some of those liable for training were required to undergo training. Additionally, a want of sensitivity was shown by both the government and military officers in their dealings with cadets and territorials.

It is important to stress that while aspects of compulsory military training were regarded with disfavour by an increasing number of people, such people remained the minority. The vast majority of New Zealanders (and Australians) approved of compulsory military training and of things military in general.[15] The commandant, Major-General (local rank) Alexander Godley, also thought a 'large majority' regarded compulsory military training favourably.[16] As one historian noted, 2,500 people may have cheered the Ripa Island resisters, but 130,000 turned out to welcome the battle-cruiser HMS *New Zealand*.[17]

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[13] 'Unity Congress', *Evening Post,* 4 July 1913, p. 8; 'Big Deputation', *Evening Post,* 5 July 1913, p. 9; Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 6, 9, 13.
[14] 'Serious Position', *Evening Post,* 23 July 1913, p. 3.
[15] Barrett, *Falling In*, p. 3.
[16] Major-General A. J. Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army', *The Army Review,* October 1913, 321.
[17] Belich, *Paradise Reforged*, p. 81.

Before examining the operation of compulsory military training, it is necessary to quickly describe the aims and structure of the training system. There were civil and military objectives for compulsory military training. The civil (or social) objective was to improve the morality, discipline and physical condition of young men. The military aim was to create a disciplined, patriotic and efficient military force, its members ready to defend New Zealand, either within the dominion (which could be required of them) or outside it (by volunteering for expeditionary service).

In December 1910, Major-General Godley arrived in New Zealand with several British officers. Together with New Zealand permanent force officers, and further British officers and NCOs who came later, they began registering youths and young men, and setting up compulsory military training. Four military districts were established (Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, Otago), each subdivided into areas. District and area commanders, adjutants, and training staff were appointed. Youths and men trained in companies based in cities, towns and rural centres. Persons living in places distant from training centres were exempted, as were those in isolated parts of the country.[18]

Of the eight forms of training described in the previous chapter, three were the most important to this chapter: senior cadets (14- to18-year-olds), who received physical and some military training, and the two adult formations (18- to, ultimately, 25-year-olds), which consisted of a general training section (for the less fit) and a territorial force. (The term *territorial* was frequently used to cover both adult

[18] The largest exempted areas were sparsely populated: the central plateau of the North Island, Fiordland and the southern half of the West Coast, the Nelson Lakes and Karamea Bight, and the mostly Maori populated East Cape (Maori were exempt from compulsory training). McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 204 (map).

formations.) The territorial force was the most important in military terms because, in addition to infantry, it contained the specialist and technical sections such as mounted units, engineers and artillery. The scheme had been designed so that, when all its elements from various parts ('territories') of the dominion were combined, something resembling a balanced military force would result.[19] Active training commenced in mid-1911. The number of training units and the number receiving training increased over time, as did the provision of uniforms, rifles, artillery and other matériel.[20]

The comments Russell made in the House in September 1913 articulated what many felt about the manner in which compulsory military training should be conducted. Fairness, equality of sacrifice, encouragement, tolerance, and fewer prosecutions were desired. While such attributes may seem reasonable, they were not widely evident in the culture of the pre-1910 New Zealand Military Forces, the culture that the territorial scheme inherited. Insensitivity to public opinion and disregard for civil notions of fairness were fairly common in the Department of Defence's before compulsory military training commenced.

A good example of Department of Defence culture is found in what became known as the 'Knyvett Case'. On 21 December 1909, while the House of Representatives was debating the Defence Bill, a military court of inquiry opened in Auckland. The court was to determine whether Captain Frank Knyvett of the Auckland Garrison Artillery (a volunteer corps) was guilty of four counts of

[19] The basis of the scheme was the plan General Nicholson wrote at Ward's request in 1909 (see chapter 5) and Kitchener's emendations to it in 1910 (see later in this chapter).
[20] Appendix D, AJHR H-19, 1911, pp. 20–23, describes the staged enlistment of trainees; Godley was unable to run large-scale training camps in 1911 because uniforms and equipment were unavailable. General Sir Alexander Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier,* London: John Murray, 1939, p. 144.

prejudicing good order and military discipline.[21] Knyvett, two officers and sixty men had travelled to Wellington for firing exercises they had arranged with the Petone Naval Artillery (also volunteers).[22] They met their fares and expenses themselves.[23] While the Auckland gunners were en route, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Alfred Robin, learnt of the arrangement and informed the commanding officer of the Petone Navals (also a volunteer artillery corps) that the Aucklanders would not be coming.[24] The training and accommodation arrangements were cancelled. Knyvett and his men arrived in the capital on Saturday 30 October to find they had nowhere to stay and that the planned training exercises were no longer possible. The *Dominion* broke the story of the confusion.[25] Other newspapers picked it up.[26]

Furious at what he saw as the interference of Colonel Robin and the resultant waste of time and money, Knyvett vented his anger in a letter to the Minister of Defence. The letter's statements about Robin led to Knyvett being charged with breaching section 54 of the Defence Act.[27] The decision to charge Knyvett was both legitimate and harsh. Knyvett's letter was insubordinate and imprudent, but he was an able and conscientious officer. He had been awarded the Distinguished Conduct

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[21] Charge sheets, 17 December 1909, The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, pp. 7–8.
[22] Barry Mostyn Williams et al, *Knyvett Pioneers,* Matamata, NZ: Tainui Press, 2013, p. 143.
[23] Knyvett to Minister of Defence, 10 November 1909, The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, pp. 1–2.
[24] 'Auckland Gunners: Visit to Fort Kelburne', *Dominion,* 2 November 1909, p. 5.
[25] 'A Huge Surprise', *Dominion,* 1 November 1909, p. 7.
[26] 'Big Gun Shooting', *Auckland Star,* 1 November 1909, p. 5; 'Someone has Blundered', *Wanganui Herald,* 1 November 1909, p. 5; 'A Surprise Party', *Evening Post,* 1 November 1909, p. 3; 'A Volunteer Trip', *New Zealand Herald,* 2 November 1909, p. 6; 'Auckland Gunners', *New Zealand Times,* 2 November 1909, p. 5; 'A Trip for Nothing', *Oamaru Mail,* 2 November 1909, p. 4; 'A Volunteer Muddle', *Press,* 2 November 1909, p. 8.
[27] Adjutant-General to Commanding Officer, Auckland volunteers, 29 November 1909, The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, p. 3; Defence Act, 1908, 8 Edw VII, 41, Section 54 (1) concerns insubordination, disobedience, neglect of duty and any of the offences in section 52, which includes subversion of discipline and insolence towards a superior officer.

Medal in South Africa, and the Auckland Garrison Artillery was second only to the Petone Navals in gunnery.[28]

The conduct of the court of inquiry was irregular. The president stated that a New Zealand court of inquiry was more like a British court martial than an inquiry. Court-martial procedures would apply—except that Knyvett was denied both the legal counsel and 'friend' (advisor) that courts martial allowed. The charge was then changed from breaches of the Defence Act to breaches of Regulation 180.[29] (Knyvett's eventual dismissal from the force was, nonetheless, made under section 54 of the Defence Act.)[30] Knyvett protested about the change of charges, the ambiguous status of the court, and being denied access to advice. He also claimed that his letter to the Minister of Defence was privileged.[31] The court dismissed his objections.

Knyvett quickly found himself in a predicament over witnesses. He needed to demonstrate the truth of his assertion he had made in his letter to the minister: that officers throughout the North Island had contacted him with concerns about Colonel Robin. The court accepted that the Auckland officers called as witnesses confirmed Knyvett's statement. The evidence of Auckland officers, however, did not prove that officers from *throughout* the island had raised concerns about Colonel Robin. The court nonetheless refused to allow witnesses from more than 200 miles away, thus denying Knyvett the means to prove the truth of his statement, while still requiring him to do so.[32]

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[28] Williams et al, *Knyvett Pioneers,* pp. 141–43.
[29] Verbatim Report of the Proceedings… , The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, pp. 29–30.
[30] Adjutant-General to Minister of Defence, 29 December 1909, The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, p. 15; Governor to Minister of Defence, 31 December 1909, ibid.
[31] Verbatim Report of the Proceedings… , The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, pp. 31–33.
[32] Verbatim Report of the Proceedings… , The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, p. 39, pp. 43–44, p. 40.

The court's verdict was released on 7 January 1910. Knyvett had been found guilty and was dismissed from the volunteers.[33] The response of the Garrison Artillery, and many Aucklanders, was angry indignation. A Knyvett Defence Committee was formed and public meetings were held.[34] The rights and wrongs of the case are not the issue here; what mattered was that it became a serious public-relations embarrassment for the Department of Defence. Not all newspapers thought Knyvett's treatment unfair, the *New Zealand Times* wrote 'Captain Knyvett's indiscretion made his removal inevitable',[35] but most took Knyvett's side and newspapers throughout the dominion kicked up a storm of protest.

The *New Zealand Truth* (a scandal-sheet that was popular, powerful and nationally distributed) described the court of inquiry as a 'Comic Opera Court'.[36] The *Auckland Star* told its readers that Knyvett had been exonerated over the trip to Wellington, described the anomalies in the status of the court, and noted inconsistences between statements the court made and its verdict.[37] 'Captain Knyvett is precisely the sort of enthusiast we want', the *Manawatu Daily Times* wrote.[38] All 173 members of the Garrison Artillery were reported to have resigned over Knyvett's dismissal.[39] It was further claimed that volunteer corps throughout the country might go on strike in support of Knyvett.[40]

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[33] Adjutant-General to Minister of Defence, 29 December 1909, The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, November 1910, p. 15; Minister of Defence to Governor 31 December 1909 and Governor's reply, 1 January 1910 (No. 38), ibid.
[34] Williams et al, *Knyvett Pioneers,* p. 144.
[35] 'An Indiscreet Officer', *New Zealand Times,* 8 January 1910, p. 4.
[36] 'The Knyvett Case: Auckland Agitated', *New Zealand Truth,* 15 January 1910, p. 4. Belich described the *New Zealand Truth* as 'the nearest thing New Zealand had to a national newspaper' and the place to find evidence of working-class attitudes. Belich, *Paradise Reforged,* p. 179.
[37] 'Captain Knyvett's Case', *Auckland Star,* 7 January 1910, p. 5. The article was syndicated and appeared, in sometimes slightly altered form, in other newspapers, for example: 'Found Guilty: The Knyvett Case', *Dominion,* 8 January 1910, p. 5; 'The Knyvett Case: Military Discipline', *Evening Post,* 8 January 1910, p. 9.
[38] Editorial, *Manawatu Daily Times,* 8 January 1910, p. 4.
[39] 'Knyvett's Bulldogs: Whole Company Resign', *New Zealand Herald,* 8 January 1910, p. 6.
[40] 'Topics of the Day', *Evening Post,* 10 January 1910, p. 6.

The damage the Knyvett case caused was a widespread perception that the military administration had been unfair. It did not matter that Knyvett had been insubordinate and reckless. Guilty or not, many felt there had been something unjust about his trial, and it was at that they took offence. There are two linked reasons for the public finding Knyvett's treatment unsettling. First, they were civilians and unaware of the standard of conduct expected of military officers. Second, Knyvett's treatment challenged widely held notions of equality and fair play. In the eyes of many, Knyvett had done nothing wrong. Jack was as good as his master, and quite entitled to criticise his master should he so wish.

At defence headquarters, senior officers failed to recognise that the treatment of citizen officers (or citizen soldiers) had to be fair and, more importantly, be seen to be fair. No officer questioned whether an untrained volunteer officer such as Knyvett should be expected to possess the same discretion and forbearance as a trained, regular officer. Rather than displaying tolerance or flexibility, the defence administration closed ranks and shielded one another.[41] The manner in which the Department of Defence treated Knyvett in 1909–10 closely mirrored the manner in which it treated the thousands of youths and young men who missed or disrupted a parade in 1911–14. The public were offended by the unfair (as they saw it) way Knyvett was tried and dismissed, and offended at the way thousands of trainees were brought before the courts.

[41] An example of the shielding by senior officers was Robin's memorandum to Ward in January 1910. In it he claimed that the Council of Defence had been lenient regarding the Auckland gunners' 'unsanctioned' travel to Wellington. Robin denied speaking to the *Dominion* newspaper, which had first reported the matter, and concluded his general remarks in the same unctuous tone as he had employed when raising concerns about Jowsey's performance in South Africa (see chapter 4). Robin to Minister of Defence, 18 January 1910, No. 40, The Knyvett Case, AJHR H-19B, 1910, p. 16.

Despite the fault lines the Knyvett case had exposed, it was sidelined in the public's consciousness a month later when Field-Marshal Viscount Kitchener toured New Zealand. Kitchener arrived in Bluff on 17 February 1910 where he was met by dignitaries and his New Zealand-resident sister, Mrs Millie Parker.[42]

Figure 7.1 – Lord Kitchener and his sister, Mrs Parker, in Dunedin. *Auckland Weekly News*, 3 March 1910, Supplement p. 16.

Kitchener was in New Zealand to inspect the military forces and had just finished doing the same in Australia. With most elements of the dominion's forces in limbo between the end of the volunteer system and the start of compulsory military training, there was little for Kitchener to inspect. He decided not to write a separate report on New Zealand, but offered his report on the Australian military forces.[43] Kitchener's belief that his Australian report would fit New Zealand also

[42] George H. Cassar, *Kitchener: Architect of Victory.* London, William, Kimber, 1977, pp. 160–1.
[43] Clayton, 'Defence not Defiance', p. 509.

reflected his desire to have compatible, mutually supporting military systems in the two dominions.[44]

Apart from the way Kitchener's visit promoted pride and interest in things military, there were four main outcomes.[45] First, some changes to the training and territorial army plans were made, including the extension of participation until 25 (rather than 21) years of age.[46] Second, Kitchener stressed that New Zealand's officers needed more comprehensive training.[47] To achieve this, more instructional personnel were required and the general staff needed to be increased to least one hundred.[48] Third, Kitchener gained an understanding of New Zealand's military capabilities, its officers and men, the dominion's leaders, and the character of the people. He left better informed than most in the War Office about the kind of officers New Zealand should recruit to achieve its military ambitions. The then Colonel Alexander Godley attended what he termed a 'long and most interesting' meeting with Kitchener before taking up his appointment in New Zealand.[49]

The fourth and most important outcome was that Kitchener informed Prime Minister Ward of the purpose of the training:

> At the risk of repetition I wish to again emphasise the importance of placing the ideal of your defence on as high a standard of efficiency as possible in order that the men serving, as well as the public, may have a just pride in the fighting value of the force.[50]

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[44] Kitchener to Ward, 2 March 1910, ANZ AD10 7; McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 189.
[45] James Wood, *Chiefs of the Australian Army: Higher Command in the Australian Military Forces, 1901–1914.* Loftus, NSW: Australian Military History Publications, 2006, p. 143. Kitchener's presence also had a positive effect on public attitudes in Australia. Stockings, *Making and Breaking*, p. 89.
[46] This and several other changes were included in the Defence Amendment Act, 1910, 1 Geo V, 21.
[47] Trevor Royle, *The Kitchener Enigma.* London: Michael Joseph, 1985, p. 231.
[48] Kitchener to Ward, 2 March 1910, ANZ AD10 7.
[49] Gen Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 138.
[50] Kitchener to Ward, 2 March 1910, ANZ AD10 7

Not only did the citizen soldiers need to be competent, they and the public needed to recognise and admire the soldiers' abilities. In essence, Kitchener was warning that esprit de corps and public support were key requirements for success.

Most senior officers recognised the merits of Kitchener's priorities. The Director of Staff Duties and Military Training, Colonel Edward Heard (a British officer Godley had appointed), was one of those who sought to realise Kitchener's imperatives. In his 1911 Memorandum on Training, Heard explained that compulsory military training was intended to produce an efficient, organised and trained force.[51] Just as importantly, self-sacrifice and patriotism had to be instilled. The inculcation of these virtues would, he advised, 'depend on the manner in which it is done.'[52] Discipline required tact and courtesy. Officers needed to take an interest in 'the welfare and comfort of their men'.[53] The efficiency and pride Kitchener saw as vital in citizen-soldier forces were the very attributes Heard wanted officers to develop in trainees.

There were, however, some impediments to achieving those objectives. Defence headquarters was under-resourced. In 1909 it had 56 staff: three colonels; nine lieutenant-colonels; two majors; 13 captains; six lieutenants; and 23 NCOs, clerks, secretaries and others.[54] Only one, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Chaytor, the Director of Military Training and Education in 1909, had passed staff college.[55] Those 56 personnel administered, equipped and oversaw the training of 270

[51] Appendix G (Memorandum on Training), Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H19, 1911, p. 28.
[52] Appendix G (Memorandum on Training), Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H19, 1911, p. 28, p. 30.
[53] Appendix G (Memorandum on Training), Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H19, 1911, p. 31.
[54] Department of Defence, *Official Yearbook*, 1910. Ranks given include those holding temporary ranks.
[55] Department of Defence, *Official Yearbook*, 1910.

permanent officers and men and 12,089 volunteers, a ratio of one staff member for every 220 personnel.

By 1912, when there were over 36,000 in compulsory military training, 500 in the permanent force, and far more matériel and equipment to source, distribute and maintain, there were just 66 in the staff corps, a ratio of one staff member for every 553 personnel.[56] Even had the staff corps been at Kitchener's recommended 100, the ratio would have been 1:365, well above that of 1909. From the beginning of compulsory military training, the staff function was under-resourced and, consequently, overworked.

The Director of Military Operations, Lieutenant-Colonel John Burnett-Stuart (a British officer Godley had brought to New Zealand), was one of the most overworked staff officers. He was also well-qualified for the role. A graduate of Sandhurst, Burnett-Stuart had served in India and South Africa, passed staff college in 1902, and worked for a period at the War Office.[57] As Director of Military Operations, he was responsible for establishing the administrative framework for compulsory military training. He later wrote of his task:

> I could not help thinking that New Zealand embarked rather light-heartedly on this Defence Scheme of theirs without quite realising what a complicated business it was. Nothing had been done to prepare for it before we arrived. But when they did get down to it, everyone from the Government downwards did all they could to see it through, and to help us.[58]

Burnett-Stuart worked long hours to set up the training system and make it work. For a period he also, simultaneously, served as the commanding officer of the

[56] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 2.
[57] Memoirs, Burnett-Stuart 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, LHCMA, p. 5, p. 31, p. 45, p. 46.
[58] Ibid, p. 62. Godley thought much the same. New Zealand had, he wrote, 'very little idea of how it [compulsory military training] was to be put into practice.' Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 142.

Canterbury district. In 1912 he suffered a nervous breakdown and was sent back to Britain.[59] With key officers strained to the point of breakdown, and an under-establishment staff corps trying to administer tens of thousands of personnel in a new military scheme, it should be no surprise that some matters were overlooked or unresolved, or that actions lacked finesse.

Furthermore (as the next chapter elaborates), most of the area and training-unit officers had been officers in volunteer corps. Some weeding out was done and training courses were run to improve the quality of the officers, but given that the poor quality of officers was repeatedly identified as the principal defect of the volunteer system, the standard of the officers dealing with trainees was not impressive.[60] It should also be recognised that the transition from the volunteer to the compulsory training system was slow and confused. The change took over a year. Some volunteer corps continued to operate, often as transitional units or because corps owned property.[61] The Council of Defence was on the way out in 1910 but no commandant (its replacement) arrived until December. To make matters worse, the chief of the general staff role had been discontinued.[62]

By early 1911, Godley's team of officers were in place and working. Their first task was the registration of those liable for training. In March 1911, Burnett-Stuart published a four-page set of instructions regarding registration. It was a thorough piece of work that divided the process into stages, listed actions for headquarters, district and area commands, and gave clear deadlines.[63] Further memoranda on

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[59] Memoirs, Burnett-Stuart 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, LHCMA, pp. 64–66, p. 68.
[60] Also see chapter 2 on the shortcomings of many volunteer officers.
[61] Corps property included drill halls and military and recreational equipment. Additionally, outstanding mortgages and loans for halls or other purposes prevented some corps from disbanding. Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H19, 1911, p. 5, p. 16.
[62] [Absences from] Department of Defence, *Official Yearbook*, 1911.
[63] Circular Memorandum 18/11, 22 March 1911, ANZ AD9 11.

procedures accompanied supplies of forms, or addressed particular aspects such as medical examinations.[64]

Despite Burnett-Stuart's best efforts, identifying all of those liable for training and getting them registered was never done completely. Registration began in early 1911. Junior cadets (12 to 14 years of age) were still being run, and the age at which compulsory military training ceased had been increased, as per Kitchener's recommendation, to 25 years.[65] Some 22,016 young men (18 and over) and 30,164 youths had registered by August 1911, a total of 52,180.[66] The total liable for compulsory military training that year (including the 12 and 13 year-olds in junior cadets) was 86,767.[67] The 52,180 who registered were, therefore, just 60 per cent of those who should have registered. The defence administration recognised the shortfall and extended the registration deadline.[68]

It appears that the Department of Defence had an inaccurate understanding of the number required to register. The defence report for 1912 stated that census figures showed that '27,080 between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one' were expected to register, and that 28,600 had registered.[69] Data from the 1911 census shows that, by May 1912, as many as 40,901 over 18- to 22-year-olds (territorials) should have registered (see Figure 7.2 and footnotes).[70]

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[64] Circular Memoranda 23/11 (A.G.) of 30 March 1911; and 33 of 18 May 1911, ANZ AD9 11.
[65] The maximum age limit of 25 years of age applied only to those who turned 21 after 2 November 1910. Those who were 21 to 24 years-old on 2November 1910 did not have to register or train, but those who turned 21 after that date were required to remain in training until they were 25. Section 6 (c.), Defence Amendment Act, 1910, 1 Geo. V., 21.
[66] Nature of Service, Chapter 36, Section XI, *Official Yearbook,* 1911.
[67] The total includes the 1911 'total liable for CMT' category in Figure 7.2 plus the 12 and 13 year-olds, who would have needed to register for junior cadets.
[68] Circular Memorandum 41/11, no date, ANZ AD9 11; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1911, p. 23.
[69] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 7. The census figures referred to in the defence report were almost certainly from the 1911 census, which was the source for Figure 7.2.
[70] The defence report gave the number of those over 18 years who had registered up to 31 May 1912, that is all of 1911 and 5/12ths of 1912. Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 7. Consequently, the range of 31,992 (the 1911 figure) to 40,901 (the 1912 figure) is given here.

Figure 7.2 –European males liable for CMT, 1911–14[71]					
Age	1911	1912	1913	1914	
11 y.o.	9,338				
12 y.o.	9,213	9,338			
13 y.o.	8,878	9,213	9,338		
14 y.o.	9,124	8,878	9,213	9,338	
15 y.o.	8,727	9,124	8,878	9,213	*Senior*
16 y.o.	9,924	8,727	9,124	8,878	*Cadets*
17 y.o.	8,909	9,924	8,727	9,124	
18 y.o.	9,021	8,909	9,924	8,727	
19 y.o	9,129	9,021	8,909	9,924	
20 y.o.	8,829	9,129	9,021	8,909	
21 y.o	5,013[72]	8,829	9,129	9,021	*Territorials*
22 y.o.		5,013	8,829	9,129	
23 y.o.			5,013	8,829	
24 y.o.				5,013	
Senior Cadets	36,684	36,653	35,942	36,553	
Territorials	31,992	40,901	50,825	59,552	
Total liable	68,676	77,554	86,767	96,105	

Source: Ages of males excluding Chinese, Maori and Polynesians, chapter 55, 1911 Census, www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1911-census /1911-results-census.html#d50e237808, accessed 7 December 2020.

That a sizeable number of those liable for training had neither registered nor been prosecuted for failing to register worried many in 1911 and later. The *Evening Post* reported in 1913:

> there is good reason to believe that not more than 60 per cent at most of the youths liable for service have been traced by the defence authorities. The resisters are not nearly as numerous as the noise they make suggests, but behind them is a large mass of apathy and concealment.[73]

[71] Only 'British subjects', excluding Maori (who were exempted from compulsory training), were required to register. The above data therefore excludes Maori, Chinese and Pacific Island males.
[72] Those who turned 21 after 2 November 1910, had to remain in CMT until their 25th birthday. The defence report was written in May of 1911, six months after 2 November 1910. Consequently, half of the 10,026 males who were 21 in 1911 (5,013) have been included.
[73] 'Serious Position: Defence Scheme in Christchurch', *Evening Post,* 12 July 1913, p. 3.

The newspaper went on to argue, much as George Russell would a little later, that compelling some to undergo training while ignoring the unregistered created a sense of unfair treatment among those who met their obligations.[74] In September 1913 the House debated participation in compulsory military training.[75] Responding to comments on the number of unregistered who had not been prosecuted, the Minister of Defence, James Allen, confessed: 'we cannot get at them … there are a great number we do not know of, and what we are doing is to try and get at them.'[76] Between 1911 and 1914, when an average of approximately 16,500 did not register for training, just 136 (0.8 per cent of the unregistered) were prosecuted for not registering.[77]

The difficulties the Department of Defence faced in discovering the identities and whereabouts of unregistered individuals was, certainly, one reason for the small number of unregistered who were prosecuted. Another reason was that senior cadet and territorial forces were close to their establishment figures. In 1910, the establishment for territorials was 20,000 for all ranks.[78] It was raised to 30,000 in 1911.[79] There were 28,600 territorials in 1912 (89 per cent of establishment), 25,289 in 1913 (84 per cent), and 29,413 in 1914 (98 per cent), making an average of 91 per cent of establishment.[80] Confident that close to sufficient numbers were

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[74] 'Serious Position: Defence Scheme in Christchurch', *Evening Post,* 12 July 1913, p. 3.
[75] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 310. In addition to the (as even Allen admitted) difficult-to-comprehend figures, the terms used were ambiguous. When MHR George Whitty exposed that the number for those 'registered' was the same as the number for those 'eligible to be registered' Allen evaded the matter. Ibid, 312.
[76] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 311.
[77] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37. The numbers who did not register are from Figure 7.3. *Note:* The data in Appendix J of the defence report are of questionable accuracy. The total number of Defence Act prosecutions recorded (8,783) is significantly different to the 16,657 provided (from court records) in the *Official Yearbooks*.
[78] Defence of the Dominion of New Zealand, AJHR H-19A, 1910, p. 3.
[79] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1911, p. 3.
[80] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 7; ibid, 1913, p. 12; ibid, 1914, p. 13. Figures in the sources sometimes identified general training section members separately, some did not.

registering to meet targets, and aware that the budget limited the number of participants, there was little reason for the Department of Defence to hunt out the unregistered, get them to register, and then, with training places filled, leave them alone.[81] In addition to the above reasons, those who registered underwent a medical inspection and an assessment of character that resulted in either being deemed suitable or being given an exemption.[82] The main reason for registered males not receiving training was that they were awaiting posting to a training unit; it accounted for nearly half of the registered who were not actively training.[83].

The net result of the difficulty in identifying the unregistered, achieving close to establishment numbers, screening, exemptions, and posting delays was that, on average in 1912–14, only 53 per cent of those liable for training were trained, and an average of 65 per cent of registered males received training (see Figure 7.3).

Australia had a lower level of active participation for those who had registered for training (averaging of 58 per cent), as Figure 7.4 shows. For some of Australia's registered males, the participation rate may have been even lower. Of the 38,806 18-year-olds who registered for the Citizen Force in 1913 (the equivalent of New Zealand's territorials), 17,041 (44 per cent) received training.[84]

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[81] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 4; R. L. Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists in New Zealand, 1909–1914. *New Zealand Journal of History,* 7:2 (1973): 140.
[82] The grounds for exemption included temporarily or permanently physically unfit, habitual criminality, a few specific types of employment, residing in exempted areas, or living beyond a defined distance from a training centre.
[83] For 1912–13, approximately 9,000 were awaiting posting and approximately 9,985 were exempted for other reasons. Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1913, p. 12.
[84] *Official Yearbook,* Australia, p. 944.

Figure 7.3 – Those of senior cadet and territorial ages liable, registered for, or actively training in New Zealand, 1912–14

	1912	*1913*	*1914*
Liable for CMT	77,554	86,767	96,105
Registered	62,778	69,700	78,335
Liable but not registered	14,776	17,067	17,770
Active in CMT	36,869	49,526	51,561
% of liable who registered	81%	80%	82%
% of liable in active CMT	48%	57%	54%
% of registered training	59%	71%	66%

Sources: The liable figures are from Figure 7.2 (above); the numbers registered are from AJHR H-19, 1912, 1913, 1914; the number active in training is from Nature of Service, *Official Yearbook*s, 1912, 1913, 1914.

The response of the Liberal and Reform governments to the number of unregistered males, and to the prosecution of trainees, varied over time. In 1911, in the hope of making it clear that failing to register would not be tolerated, the then Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General, Colonel Robin, instructed area officers to select for prosecution one or two of those who had not registered. Unregistered persons who had openly refused to register were preferred. Poorly substantiated cases and those with any risk of religious objection being claimed were to be excluded. This limited set of cases was intended 'to make an example of any males liable who have failed to register'.[85] Prosecutions were to be conducted by the police, were to take place as quickly as possible.[86]

[85] Robin for Godley to Minister of Defence, 15 June 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[86] Robin for Godley to Minister of Defence, 15 June 1911, ANZ AD1 732. *Official Yearbook* figures show that 28 prosecutions for Defence Act offences were brought in 1911 and that 12 convictions resulted (see Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.4 – Active training of registered males in Australia, 1912–14			
	1912	1913	1914
Registered	184,000	221,000	252,000
Number training	110,000	131,000	142,000
% of registered training	60%	59%	56%

Source: Barrett, *Falling In*, p. 212.

Problems surfaced almost immediately. Although the Crown Law Office had confirmed that police would prosecute Defence Act offences, police in some areas were reluctant to do so.[87] On 17 July, for example, the Director of Military Operations, Burnett-Stuart, had to ask the Department of Justice to inform Hawke's Bay police that they must prosecute those who had not registered for military training.[88]

The flurry of prosecutions around the middle of 1911 ended shortly after it began, probably for the political reasons discussed below. The consequences of the suspending prosecutions were quickly evident. In October, the Commanding Officer in Canterbury wrote to defence headquarters complaining that 'a large proportion' of orders to attend training were being ignored because 'the issuing officer has no machinery behind him to enforce compliance'.[89] He worried that 'passive neglect of all orders is already common' and blamed that neglect on 'the cessation of proceedings against those who have not registered'.[90]

The suspension of prosecutions increased the recalcitrance of some trainees. The Commanding Officer for Wellington district, Colonel Chaytor, also reported that prosecutions for failure to comply with the Defence Act were needed. The men in

[87] Crown Law Office to NZ Defence Forces, 12 July 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[88] Director of Military Operations to Justice Department, 17 July 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[89] CO Canterbury Military District to Defence Headquarters, 20 October 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[90] CO Canterbury Military District to Defence Headquarters, 20 October 1911, ANZ AD1 732.

his district had, he wrote, no confidence that action would be taken against those who did not register, or against trainees who failed to attend parades. Demanding training from only a portion of those who had registered was causing discontent. Echoing the same 'equality of sacrifice' argument that politicians, newspaper editors and members of the public had frequently voiced, Chaytor explained that his men were 'prepared to serve if every fit man is compelled to serve by law, but not otherwise'.[91] Similar opinions were expressed by military officers in Australia.[92]

In November 1911, Robin sent the commanding officers of the four military districts a letter of a 'semi-private character' asking them to 'quietly and without attracting too much attention' prepare lists of those who had not registered.[93] Robin also requested that reluctant trainees 'be tenderly handled for a time to give them a chance to play the game properly.'[94] The district commanders were warned to be 'very patient, on <u>no account are resisters to be made Martyrs of, or have any notice taken of them</u>, they will all be overtaken and dealt with in due course.'[95] [Underscore in original.] The reason for the gentle approach was, at least in part, because 1911 was an election year. Prime Minister Ward suspended Defence Act prosecutions until after the election.[96]

The growing appeal of William Massey's Reform party had put the Liberals' 20-year hold on power at risk. From the opposite political direction, a rise in unemployment and industrial discontent favoured the growing (but still small) Labour party and threatened to split working-class support for the Liberals.[97]

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[91] CO Wellington district to NZ military headquarters, 16 November 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[92] Barrett, *Falling In*, pp. 129–30.
[93] Colonel Robin to District COs, 16 November 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid. Capitalisation as in original.
[96] Godley to Ward, 16 December 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[97] Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals*, pp. 327–334.

Compulsory military training was endorsed by both major parties and was not an election issue, but Ward could not risk upsetting any trainee, or his family, with a Defence Act prosecution. After the elections, Godley wrote to Ward: 'in accordance with your promise that immediately after the Elections there should be no delay in carrying out the provisions of the Defence Act' he would have 'notices sent out to all defaulters'.[98]

In December, Wellington district's Colonel Chaytor, reported that trainees were being actively encouraged to ignore orders to attend parades. He did not know who were coaxing the men to absent themselves, but reported that 'in some cases monetary compensation has been promised to those who may be imprisoned in consequence of such refusal.'[99] Chaytor's report of trainees being urged to miss parades was not the first. Six months earlier, Robin had asked that the Solicitor-General prepare processes and forms that would enable action to be taken against persons inciting others to breach the Defence Act.[100] In his letter, Chaytor asked if an example could be made of such men.[101] Robin advised that inciting others to refuse registration or training was an offence under section 52 of the Defence Act and that the police should be notified.[102] Section 52, Chaytor replied, covered only employers who kept employees from training.[103] Chaytor was right, employers were the only people who could be prosecuted under the Defence Act for preventing trainees from training. There were, however, provisions in the Criminal Code to do so.[104] Robin and the Department of Defence apparently did not know of them.

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[98] Godley to Ward, 16 December 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[99] CO Wellington district to NZ military headquarters, 13 December 1911, ANZ AD1 732
[100] Robin for Godley to Minister of Defence, 12 June 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[101] CO Wellington district to NZ military headquarters, 13 December 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[102] Robin to Chaytor, 18 December 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[103] CO Wellington district to NZ military headquarters, 20 December 1911, ANZ AD1 732.
[104] Section 52, Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII, 28, uses the phrase 'in his employ'; Section 73 (d) of the Criminal Code Act, 1893, 57 Vict. 56, made it an offence to counsel or procure a person to commit an

In Australia there was no restriction on who could be prosecuted for preventing trainees from training. Section 75 of the Defence Act of 1903 (the Australian Defence Acts of 1909 and 1910 were amendments to the 1903 Act) made it an offence for *any person* to counsel another not to enlist, or to encourage or aid an enlisted person to not perform a duty.[105] Section 81 made it an offence for *any person* to obstruct naval or military service.[106] [Italics added in both instances.]

On 27 November, probably in preparation for a post-election restoration of prosecutions, Robin sent the district commanders a memorandum outlining a new, harsher approach. Unregistered males were to be informed they had four days to register. The names of those who did not then register were to be handed to the police for prosecution.[107] Robin gave, however, no advice on how district commanders could discover the identities of those who had not registered. The need for the military authorities to know the identity of those who should register was never met. Although there is no evidence explaining why so few unregistered males went unprosecuted, being unable to establish who they were is likely to have been a significant reason.

The Liberals did not fare well in the elections of December 1911. They won only 33 seats (down from 50) while Massey's Reform party secured 37. Support from some Labour and independent members made it possible for the Liberals to continue to govern. To get that support, however, Ward had to resign as Prime

offence. Section 74 of the same made a person who encouraged a third party to commit a crime guilty of that same crime.

[105] The [Australian] Defence Act, No. 20,1903.

[106] The [Australian] Defence Act, No. 20, 1903.

[107] Colonel Robin to District OCs, 27 November 1911, ANZ AD1 732.

Minister and from Cabinet.[108] Thomas Mackenzie became Prime Minister and Arthur Myers was given the defence portfolio.

The prosecution of defaulters resumed in early 1912, with the focus on territorials (18 years of age and over).[109] The number of cases brought rose dramatically, from 28 in 1911 to 3,187 in 1912. Yet again, the vast majority of those prosecuted were trainees, not the unregistered. One important reason for the increase in Defence Act prosecutions was, as James Allen would recognise in September 1913, that prosecution in a civil court was the only mechanism officers had to enforce discipline.[110]

Many of the officers running training units were unhappy about the administrative burden bringing charges placed upon them.[111] Captain C. L. Hawkins of Auckland, for example, complained to district headquarters that the police required him to produce a birth certificate and proof that the offender had resided in New Zealand for six months. To do so, he wrote, 'entails a considerable amount of work, and the Birth Certificates cost 2/6 each.'[112] Apparently unfamiliar with the basics of law, he also lamented that the Defence Act 'throws the onus of Proof on the Prosecutor, and not the Defendant.'[113]

There was no need for officers to pay for birth certificates. Arrangements were in place for the Registrar-General to supply at no cost proof-of-age documents

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[108] Hamer, *The New Zealand Liberals*, pp. 344–48.
[109] Godley to district COs, 3 January 1912, ANZ AD1 732. The Department of Defence frequently referred to those in the 18 to 21-plus age range as 'territorials' when only some were territorials and some were members of the general training section.
[110] Allen to Minister of Justice, 11 September 1913, ANZ AD1 732.
[111] No copy of the charge sheet/form officers completed was uncovered. It nonetheless appears that the information required from officers about offenders was: offender's name, age, the offence, place, date and time of offence, and (the only possibly difficult item) proof that the offender had resided in New Zealand for at least six months.
[112] Captain C. L. Hawkins to District HQ Auckland, 15 February 1912, ANZ AD1 732.
[113] Ibid. Capitalisation as in original.

to military officers.[114] Captain's Hawkins' complaint about the burden of proof was, surprisingly, endorsed by Auckland's Commanding Officer and by Robin, the Adjutant-General, who forwarded Hawkins' letter, along with the Auckland commander's covering note, to the Solicitor-General.[115] The Crown Solicitor confirmed that the prosecution needed to prove a case.[116] To be fair, the junior officers were handicapped by not being trained officers, and Robin, although Adjutant-General, was not a lawyer, not a trained officer, and had no in-department legal counsel. At the same time, such incidents illustrate the confusion and the lack of training that beset the administration of compulsory military training.

Inattention to detail by military officers, and ignorance of legal procedures, complicated prosecutions. Frequently officers forwarded to police only a portion of the required information, for example, omitting the date and place of an alleged offence.[117] Of the 16,657 Defence Act prosecutions in 1912–14, 10,897 (65.4 per cent) led to convictions. By comparison, of the 138,612 cases heard by magistrates in the same years, 114,144 (82.3 per cent) resulted in convictions.[118] In Australia in 1913, 92 per cent of Defence Act prosecutions resulted in convictions.[119]

Even cases that offered the Department of Defence an opportunity to make an example of flagrant defiance of the Act were sometimes poorly handled. The 1912 prosecution of Harold Wise was one of them. Wise had been handing out pamphlets

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[114] Registrar-General to Minister of Defence, 26 March 1912, ANZ AD1 732. There is some evidence that proof of age documentation was not freely supplied by all registrars of births. On 16 February Lieutenant-Colonel Burnett Stuart wrote to defence headquarters to complain that the Christchurch registrar had received no instructions regarding supplying no-cost proofs of age. ANZ AD1 732.
[115] CO Auckland district to defence headquarters, 16 February 1912, including Hawkins' letter of 15 February and a handwritten minute by Robin of 19 February 1912, ANZ AD1 732.
[116] Crown Law Office to NZ Defence Forces, 22 February 1912, ANZ AD1 732.
[117] CO Wellington district to HQ NZ Military Forces, 18 March 1912; Adjutant-General to Inspector of Police Wellington, 21 March 1912; Inspector of Police Wellington to Adjutant-General, 21 March 1912, ANZ AD1 732.
[118] See Figure 7.7, below.
[119] Barrett, *Falling In*, p. 214.

encouraging young men not to register for compulsory military training. He had also not registered himself. For a defence administration keen to show that failing to register would have consequences, it was an ideal case.[120] In court, Wise pointed out that no proof that he was of liable age had been produced. The trial was adjourned to allow the prosecution to obtain the proof. When the trial resumed, no proof of age had been found, and the magistrate was forced to dismiss the case.[121]

Inconsistent judgements by magistrates was also of concern. In April 1912, for example, a magistrate dismissed the charges against two men who had failed to attend a training camp on the grounds that it was not a civil matter.[122] The imposition of inappropriate sentences by some magistrates' courts so worried Auckland's Colonel Reed that he recommended to Godley that Defence Act cases should be heard by stipendiary (qualified, professional) magistrates only. Justices of the Peace (citizens, usually untrained in law) were, he wrote, unreliable judges and sometimes 'faddists'.[123]

The imposition of gaol sentences disturbed the public (in New Zealand and Australia) because they disliked youths and young men associating with criminals.[124] There were very few offences in New Zealand's Defence Act for which an offender could be imprisoned.[125] Almost all prison sentences arising from Defence Act convictions were for failing to pay the fine that had initially been

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[120] Section 73 (d) of the criminal code made it an offence to counsel or procure a person to commit an offence. Criminal Code Act, 1893, 57 Vict. 56.
[121] 'Not Afraid of Gaol', *New Zealand Times,* 8 February 1912, p. 1.
[122] Adjutant Wellington Division to HQ Wellington, 3 April 1912, ANZ AD1 732.
[123] Defence HQ Auckland to Godley, 27 January 1912.
[124] Paul Baker, *King and Country Call: New Zealanders, Conscription and the Great War.* Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1988, p. 12; Milburn, 'New Zealand's First Experiment', p. 67; Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 4; Barrett, *Falling In*, p. 175.
[125] Sentences of gaol terms could be imposed for stealing military property, wearing military uniform without entitlement, disclosing official information to a foreign state, and for a few other offences. Sections 56, 60, and 61, Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII, 28.

imposed.[126] In such cases, the imprisonment was not the sentence for breaching the Defence Act but, essentially, for contempt of court—a point of law the government, defence authorities, the press, and the public failed to appreciate.

The public were also upset at the number of court proceedings being brought against trainees for relatively minor matters, such as missing or disrupting a parade. Paradoxically, those who attended parades and were obedient expressed their annoyance that unprosecuted absentees and disrupters were getting away with it, and began skipping parades themselves.[127] The administration was damned if they did prosecute, and damned if they did not.

A particularly uncomfortable incident that illustrated the readiness to prosecute trainees and ignore those who refused to register, took place in July 1913. Boys travelling to parades in a West Coast mining town were 'terrorised' into absenting themselves by other, unregistered youths who opposed compulsory military training.[128] People were outraged that the cadets who were pressured into missing parades, were prosecuted for being absent, but no charges were brought against the youths who had bullied the boys and had refused to register for training.[129]

There were 16,657 prosecutions for Defence Act offences in 1911–14. In relation to those actively receiving training, approximately one-third of trainees

[126] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 8.
[127] Opponents of compulsory military training claimed that as few as ten to fifteen per cent of trainees were attending parades. Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists': 141.
[128] Allen to Godley, 7 July 1913, ANZ Allen18.
[129] Ibid.

were prosecuted.[130] The 10,897 convictions that resulted equate to the conviction of approximately one-in-five trainees (see Figure 7.5).[131]

Figure 7.5 – Prosecutions and Convictions / Active in training

	Active in training	Def Act Prosecutions	Share CMT Prosecuted	Def Act Convictions	Share CMT Convicted
1911	36,473	28	0.1%	12	0.03%
1912	36,869	3,187	8.6%	1,924	5.2%
1913	49,526	7,030	14.2%	4,819	9.7%
1914	51,561	6,440	12.5%	4,154	8.1%
Total		16,657	32%[132]	10,897	21%[133]

Sources: Participant data from Nature of service, *Official Yearbook*, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914. Prosecution and conviction data from Summary Convictions, *Official Yearbook*, 1915.

The prosecution rate in New Zealand was higher than that in Australia. It has been stated that in 1910 to 1912 about two per cent of those registered were prosecuted.[134] That figure is considerably higher than in New Zealand in 1912, by when compulsory military training was running throughout the dominion. A quite different rate for Australia was, however, calculated by the Quakers and Australian Freedom League members, John Fletcher and John Mills. They found that Australia

[130] The 32 per cent represents the highest annual number receiving training (51,561 in 1914) over the number of prosecutions in 1911–14 (16,657).
[131] The years 1912–14 have been used because CMT was only beginning to operate in 1911 and there was an embargo on Defence Act prosecutions in the latter part of the year. Because the maximum age of those liable for CMT increased one year per annum (see Figure 7.2), no person receiving training in 1911 reached the maximum age by 1914, which means that the 51,561 in training in 1914 was also the total number to receive training before the First World War. Figures are approximate because they reflect prosecutions and convictions, not individuals prosecuted or convicted. Some individuals were prosecuted or convicted more than once.
[132] The 32 per cent represents the highest annual number receiving training (51,561 in 1914) over the number of prosecutions in 1911–14 (16,657).
[133] To achieve the 21 per cent result, the total number of convictions 1911–14 was divided by the highest annual number receiving training (51,561 in 1914).
[134] Francis Thomas Hurley, 'Compulsory Military Training and the Conscription Referendum in Victoria, 1911–1916'. MA thesis, University of Melbourne, 1972, p. 46 (footnote) found less than two per cent were prosecuted; Barrett, *Falling In*, p. 213 claimed two per cent.

brought nearly 28,000 Defence Act prosecutions against 123,000 active military trainees,[135] a rate of 22.8 per cent. Their figure is roughly two-thirds of New Zealand's prosecution rate of 32 per cent.

When it comes to the nature of prosecutions in New Zealand and Australia there is close similarity. In New Zealand, 93.6 per cent of Defence Act prosecutions were for missing or obstructing a parade.[136] In Australia in 1913, 95 per cent were.[137] Additionally, one per cent of prosecutions in Australia in 1913 were for failing to register. While that figure is about the same as New Zealand's 1.5 per cent[138], it should be noted that Australian military officers were able to register any unregistered person who was liable for training while New Zealand officers could not.[139] In both New Zealand and Australia, most Defence Act prosecutions were for relatively minor offences committed by those participating in compulsory military training. Very few prosecutions brought against those who did not register.

Defence Act prosecutions in New Zealand in 1911–14 were sufficiently numerous to constitute 12 per cent of the cases heard by magistrates. In the peak prosecution year of 1913, 15 per cent of magistrates' court hearings were Defence Act proceedings and Defence Act convictions in 1911–14 constituted 9.5 per cent of all summary convictions (see Figure 7.6). Defence Act offences were the second-most common summary offence in New Zealand in 1911–14 (alcohol-related

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[135] John Percy Fletcher and John Francis Hills, *Conscription Under Camouflage: An Account of Compulsory Military Training in Australasia Down to the Outbreak of the Great War.* Adelaide: Cooperative Printing and Publishing Company, 1919, p. 120.
[136] AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37.
[137] That 95 per cent was made up of 55 per cent for 'evading personal service', 32 per cent for absence from drills, and eight per cent for 'indiscipline'. John Barrett, *Falling In: Australians and 'Boy Conscription' 1911–1915*. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1979, p. 214.
[138] See earlier in chapter.
[139] Barrett, *Falling In*, p. 214.

offences were a clear first). By comparison, offences against property (burglary, theft, housebreaking, etc.) were seven per cent of summary convictions.[140]

Figure 7.6 – Defence Act Prosecutions / Summary Convictions, 1912–14

	Cases before magistrates	Defence Act prosecutions	Def. share all cases	Summary convictions	Defence Act convictions	Def. share of convictions
1911	38,095	28	0.1%	32,039	12	<0.1%
1912	42,394	3,187	7.5%	34,986	1,924	5.5%
1913	46,847	7,030	15.0%	38,748	4,819	12.4%
1914	49,371	6,440	13.0%	40,410	4,154	10.3%
1912–14	138,612	16,657	12.0%	114,144	10,897	9.5%

Sources: Charges Before Magistrates, *Official Yearbook,* 1915; Summary Convictions, *Official Yearbook,* 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915.

The Defence Act convictions were for new offences and so numerous that they affected overall crime statistics. They were responsible for nearly two-thirds of the increase in summary convictions in New Zealand between 1911 and 1912, and approximately three-quarters of the increase between 1912 and 1913 (see Figure 7.7). So significant was the change that the editors of the *Official Yearbook*s in 1913, 1914 and 1915 felt obliged to explain that the major reason for the increase in the number of summary convictions was new Defence Act offences.[141] The editors of Australia's 1914 *Official Yearbook* offered a similar explanation for the rise in the number of convictions in New South Wales.[142]

Defence Act convictions significantly increased the number boys and young men with criminal records. Some 21 per cent (10,897) of the 51,561 receiving military training also received convictions for Defence Act offences. By comparison,

[140] Summary Convictions, *Official Yearbook,* 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915.
[141] Summary Convictions, *Official Yearbook,* 1915.
[142] *Official Yearbook*, Australia, 1914, p. 798.

the portion of the overall population convicted of a summary offence in 1914 was 3.7 per cent.[143] Defence Act convictions resulted in 11.3 per cent of 14- to 24-year-olds to rise to, three times the rate for the whole population. Trainees were nearly six times more likely to be prosecuted than were citizens overall.[144]

Figure 7.7 – Defence Share of Increase in Summary Convictions, 1911–14

	Defence convictions	Increase in No. defence convictions	Total summary convictions	Increase in number of summary convictions	Defence share of increase in convictions
1910	0		31980		
1911	12	12	32039	59	20.34%
1912	1924	1912	34986	2947	64.88%
1913	4819	2895	38784	3798	76.22%
1914	4154	-665	40410	1626	(n/a)[145]

Source: Summary Convictions, *Official Yearbook,* 1915.

On 10 July 1912, a number of independent MHRs changed from supporting the Liberals to supporting the Reform party. As a result, William Massey's Reform party became the government.[146] James Allen was made Minister of Defence.[147] Allen was born in South Australia in 1855. After the death of his mother (when Allen was three), he, his father and siblings migrated to Dunedin. At six, Allen was sent to Britain to be educated. He attended Clifton College (school) and St John's College,

[143] Summary Convictions, *Official Yearbook,* 1915.
[144] In 1914, 96,105 males were aged 14 to 25 (see Figure 7.2). By 1914, 10,897 of them (Figure 7.5) had been convicted of a Defence Act offence. 10,897/96,105 = 11.3 per cent or three times the rate for the general population. In 1911–14 there were 51,561 trainees and 10,897 convictions. 10,897/51,561 = 21 per cent, 5.7 times the 3.7 conviction rate of citizens in general.
[145] The defence share of the increase in summary convictions was calculated as the increase in the number of defence convictions over the increase in the number of summary convictions. No share of the defence contribution to the increase in convictions in 1914 was calculable because there were fewer Defence Act convictions in 1914 than in 1913.
[146] NZPD, Vol. 158 (27 June – 14 August) 1912, 393.
[147] NZPD, Vol. 158 (27 June – 14 August) 1912, iv.

Cambridge.[148] Allen then returned to New Zealand where, in 1887, he married and entered parliament—by ousting the then premier, Robert Stout, from his seat. Allen inherited a real estate portfolio from his father and was independently wealthy.[149] He was intelligent, a devout Anglican, a sportsman, and a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Otago Garrison Artillery volunteers (see Figure 7.8).[150]

Figure 7.8 –James Allen, the Minister of Defence 1912–20, photographed during the First World War. teara.govt.nz/en/photograph/31/james-allen

Recognising that the public disliked seeing youths and young men imprisoned with criminals, Allen promptly made some changes. The Defence Amendment Act of 1912 replaced imprisonment in civil gaols with military detention and, to avoid the detention of those who refused to pay fines for Defence

[148] Ian McGibbon, 'Allen, James', Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3a12/allen-james, accessed 3 August 2019.
[149] Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists': 138; Lois Claire Voller, 'Colonel the Honourable Sir James Allen: Statesman'. MA thesis, University of Otago, 1943, p. 2, pp. 7–9.
[150] Voller, 'Sir James Allen', pp. 7–9.

Act offences, attachment (garnishee) orders would be issued to get fines paid.[151] There were the usual hiccoughs that provide further evidence of the overburdened staff function and the need for a trained legal officer in Defence headquarters. Warrants for military detention had not been developed,[152] forms for filing attachment orders were unavailable,[153] and some employers failed to make the ordered deductions.[154] The glaring omission from the 1912 Amendment Act was its failure to introduce disciplinary mechanisms that could replace pressing charges in civil courts. Prosecutions not only continued; they peaked in 1913 when 7,000 were prosecuted for, and nearly 5,000 were convicted of, Defence Act offences.

Which government department was responsible for bringing charges under the Defence Act continued to be the subject of dispute. Correspondence passed between the Department of Defence and Department of Justice, each asserting that the other should prosecute.[155] Godley consistently took exception to military officers bringing actions in civil courts. He thought that doing so would harm the public's perception of compulsory military training and the military generally, and maintained that prosecutions under the Defence Act were a police matter.[156] In February 1913 James Allen was attending meetings in London. The acting Minister

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[151] Section 11, Defence Amendment Act, 1912, 3 Geo V, 20. An attachment or garnishee order requires an employer to deduct a sum from an employee's wages or salary and pay it to a nominated third party.

[152] Sections 2–10, Defence Amendment Act, 1912, 3 Geo V, 20; 'Defender' [telegraphic address] Greymouth to Defence Department Wellington, 1 March 1913; NZ Defence Forces to Allen, 4 March 1913, ANZ AD1 724.

[153] For example, Magistrates' Court Nelson to Defence Department, 19 December 1912, ANZ AD1 724; NZ Military Forces to Under-Secretary for Justice, 24 December 1912, ibid; and Magistrates' Court Christchurch to NZ Defence HQ, 3 March 1913, ibid.

[154] Magistrates' Office Blenheim to Justice Department Wellington, 2 October 1913, ANZ AD1 724.

[155] Solicitor-General's Office to NZ Military Forces, 19 December 1913, ANZ AD1 724.; Major-General Commanding NZ Military Forces to Minister of Defence, [no day] January 1914, ibid; Department of Justice to GOC NZ, 20 May 1914, ibid.

[156] Major-General Commanding NZ Military Forces to Minister of Defence, [no day] January 1914, ANZ AD1 724.

of Defence, Robert Heaton Rhodes, advised the Minister of Justice that defence personnel should not, and were not required to, take an active role in prosecutions:

> Much of the opposition of [*sic*] the Defence Act would seem to be due to the impression that civil rights are being invaded by 'Military Law', and it is for this reason that it seems most desirable that the Military Authorities should in future be entirely disassociated from the administration of the Act.[157]

The following month, however, the superintendent of police in Christchurch wrote to the Adjutant-General asking that defence personnel, rather than police, 'lay informations' and conduct Defence Act prosecutions.[158] The superintendent's request was probably the result of a report from a Christchurch sub-inspector who had told the superintendent that Defence Act cases were a 'waste of time' for police and that in Auckland and Wellington they were prosecuted by military officers.[159] It seems unlikely that military officers were prosecuting Defence Act cases in Wellington, right under Godley's nose.

Christchurch, it should be noted, was where organised opposition to compulsory military training was most active.[160] The Canterbury district brought a disproportionately high number of Defence Act prosecutions.[161] Canterbury held one-quarter of the male population but was responsible for nearly 40 per cent of Defence Act prosecutions.[162] In April 1913 alone, Canterbury's military officers sent

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[157] Acting Minister of Defence to Minister of Justice, [no day] February 1913, ANZ AD1 732.
[158] Superintendent Kiely to Adjutant-General, Police 11/454[554?], 25 March 1913, ANZ AD1 732.
[159] Report of Sub-Inspector MacKinnon re Defence Prosecutions, 21 March 1913, ANZ AD1 732.
[160] Godley wrote of his 1911 speaking tour that in Christchurch that opponents of compulsory military training were especially noticeable. Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army': 319. General Sir Ian Hamilton noted the same. Hamilton to Lord Stamfordham, 30 April 1914, LHCMA Hamilton 5/1/18. In Australia, Adelaide was the centre of opposition to compulsory military training. Tanner, *Compulsory Citizen Soldiers*, p. 213.
[161] Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists': 129.
[162] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37. It has been noted previously that this data source is sometimes unreliable. It is, however, the only source uncovered that provides prosecutions by military district. Males in Marlborough, Nelson, Westland and Canterbury provinces

over 250 cases to the police.[163] Allen was critical of the martinet-like behaviour of the officers in Canterbury. He complained to Godley that responding to minor infringements with criminal charges showed a 'want of tact'.[164] 'Pinpricks are not good,' he continued, 'in fact they are damaging to the scheme.'[165]

Two months after Rhodes' letter to the Minister of Justice, the Adjutant-General offered something of a compromise. He informed police that military officers would *assist* police with proceedings, but would not *conduct* prosecutions. It was, he explained, 'undesirable that Military Officers should appear to usurp the role of the police' and (echoing Rhodes' comment) 'lend colour to the view held in some quarters that the Defence Act is "Military Law" overriding civil rights.'[166] Despite such efforts, in early 1914 the Cabinet accepted that the only way to obtain police cooperation in Defence Act matters was with money. Police were offered a ten-shilling bonus per conviction.[167]

Despite the replacement of gaol terms with military detention, and the introduction of attachment orders to get fines paid, public concern about prosecutions did not diminish and the number of prosecutions continued to grow. The peak year was 1913, which saw 7,030 prosecutions made and 4,819 convictions secured.[168] (The war led to fewer prosecutions. It can, however, be extrapolated that 1914 was on track to produce more prosecutions and convictions than 1913.)[169] In

(which constituted the Canterbury military district) over dominion male population. Provincial Districts, *Official Yearbook,* 1914.

[163] Canterbury HQ to NZ Military Forces HQ, 1 April 1913, ANZ AD1 732.

[164] Allen to Godley, 25 September 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.

[165] Allen to Godley, 25 September 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.

[166] Adjutant-General to Commissioner of Police, 5 April 1913, ANZ AD1 732.

[167] Defence HQ to Solicitor-General, 12 January 1914, ANZ AD1 732.

[168] See Figure 7.6.

[169] There were 6,440 prosecutions and 4,154 convictions in the first seven months of 1914. Assuming a constant number of prosecutions per month, had the war not started, the likely number of prosecutions for 1914 would have been 11,040 with 7,123 convictions, increases over the 1913 figures of 63 per cent and 48 per cent respectively.

mid-1913 and still worried about detentions and attachment orders, Allen announced that a parliamentary committee would be formed to examine the administration of the Defence Act and, specifically, punishments.[170]

Defence Act prosecutions exposed some difficulties with and inconsistencies in defence legislation. In April 1912, for example, the Crown Law Office warned that the requirement for other ranks to attend a minimum number of parades per year meant that 'so long as the man attends a sufficient number in the year he can please himself as to which of the total number he attends.'[171] Just weeks later the Solicitor-General wrote advising much the same, and to warn of three other ambiguities in the Act.[172] Technically, the parade-attendance matter was resolved with Section 55 of the Defence Amendment Act of November 1912.[173] News of the change was not, however, communicated to all trainees. In July 1913, Allen was told that thirteen youths had been convicted for missing their first parade of the year, the boys believing they could make up later for the missed parade. [174]

There were also discontent about some prosecutions in rural areas. The MLC John Anstey cited a number of instances: a man who had to forego £14/10 in wages (a considerable sum) to attend camps and training; a man fined £6 for non-attendance after giving notice that he was working outside his home district (£6 was two to four weeks' income for a farm labourer); and that no drill had been run during slow farming periods but camps were scheduled at harvest times.[175]

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[170] Allen to Godley, 3 July 1913, ANZ Allen18.
[171] Crown Law Office to New Zealand Defence Forces, 12 April 1912, ANZ AD1 732.
[172] Solicitor-General to New Zealand Defence Forces, 28 May 1912, ANZ AD1 732. The ambiguities related to the start and end dates for the year, transfers and postings, and training requirements when transferred.
[173] Defence Amendment Act, 1912, 3 Geo. V, 20. Section 55 made being absent from *any* camp, parade or drill a failure to render personal service as required.
[174] Allen to Godley, 22 July 1913, ANZ Allen18.
[175] Notes on Interview with Hon. J. A. Anstey MLC, author unknown [Allen?], 8 July 1913, ANZ Allen 18. Prices and Wages, *Official Yearbook*, 1914.

Some prosecutions were considered draconian. In August, a government MHR complained to Allen that twenty senior cadets of 'exceptionally good character' were being prosecuted for non-attendance.[176] The boys' parents supported military training but resented not being told of their sons' failures to attend. The MHR worried that if parents continued to be left uninformed, compulsory military training would 'become more and more unpopular among those who today are supporters of the scheme.'[177] Apparently unmoved, Allen replied that prosecuting absences from parades was usual practice and known to cadets, and that alerting parents to sons' absences would further burden an 'already hard-worked Permanent Staff'.[178] The next day, however, a memorandum was sent to all district headquarters requesting that, when possible, parents should be advised if their sons missed parades.[179]

The detention of a number of fine-defaulting young men on Lyttelton harbour's Ripa Island in 1913 made Defence Act punishments a cause célèbre, and gave a fillip to organisations opposed to compulsory military training. In broad terms there were four, often overlapping, categories of organised opposition to compulsory military training. Pacifists opposed armed conflict and held that military training would increase the chance of war. Anti-militarists objected to the spread of what they saw as militarism. Some unionists worried that the territorial force would be used against workers, and others held that compulsion to train compromised civil liberties. The main organisations founded to oppose compulsory military training were the Anti-Militarist League, the National Peace Council and the

[176] George Sykes to Minister of Defence, 6 August 1913, ANZ AD1 732.
[177] George Sykes to Minister of Defence, 6 August 1913, ANZ AD1 732.
[178] Allen to Sykes, 11 August 1913, AN ZAD1 732.
[179] Adjutant-General to district HQs, 12 August 1913, ANZ AD1 732.

Passive Resisters' Union.[180] All were formed in Christchurch. The Passive Resisters' Union was unique in being established by, and having its membership restricted to, those liable for training.[181] The organisations opposed to compulsory military training were supported to various degrees by the Federation of Labour, the Socialist party, the Society of Friends (Quakers), and the Women's Christian Temperance Union.[182]

In mid-1913, thirteen young, West Coast coal miners, who were also passive resisters, were fined for not registering. They not only refused to pay their fines but came up with an ingenious way of avoiding payment through attachment orders. They went on strike so that there would be no pay packets from which to garnish payment of their fines. Not wanting to be arrested, they hid in bushland. When five of their number went into town to support their Labour member, they were recognised by police and arrested.[183] Sentenced to military detention for not paying their fines, they were taken to Lyttelton (the port for Christchurch and the Canterbury province) and handed over to the permanent artillery who manned the battery on Lyttelton's Ripa Island and were to be their gaolers.[184]

With little regard for the reactions of citizens and often radical waterside workers—and in the port for the centre of opposition movements in New Zealand—the rifle-carrying gunners fixed bayonets and marched the resisters, under guard, through the town and along the wharves to the boat that would take them to the island (see Figure 7.9).[185] Eight other passive resisters were brought to the island

[180] Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarist': 129–30.
[181] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 6, 9.
[182] Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists': 131–4.
[183] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 12–13.
[184] Weitzel, 'Pacifists and Anti-militarists': 144.
[185] Ibid.

around the same time, including experienced agitators from Christchurch.[186] When the resisters were ordered to drill, clean guns or carry coal, they refused.[187] In consequence, their rations were reduced. In response to that, ten of them went on a hunger strike.[188]

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Vol. 4, No. 121. (Registered for Transmission by Post as a Newspaper.) FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1913. PRICE—ONE PENNY. (6s. 6d. per annum within the Dominion; 8s. 6d. per annum outside N.Z.)

NEW VOICES SPEAK
By EDWIN MARKHAM.
Resolved to lay the rafter and the beam
Of Justice—the imperishable dream;
This is the voice of Time against the hours;
This is the witness of the cosmic powers;
This is the Music of the Ages—this
The song whose first notes shook the abyss.
All that we glory in was once a dream;
The World Will arches onward gleam by gleam.
New voices speak, dead paths begin to stir,
Man is emerging from the sepulchre.
—Selected

News and Views

OFF TO RIPA ISLAND

Figure 7.9 – The Federation of Labour's newspaper supported the Ripa Island detainees. *Maoriland Worker,* 11 July 1913, p. 1 (upper front cover).

The Commanding Officer on Ripa Island, Lieutenant Donald MacDonald, later complained that he had no means of punishing detainees and no power to force them to obey his orders. Like the officers training cadets and territorials, his only recourse was to prosecute intransigent detainees in a civil court.[189] On 2 July,

[186] Two resisters, Worrall and Williams, are mentioned in the inquiry proceedings as responsible for stirring up the others. Joint Defence Legislation Committee, AJHR I-7A, 1913, pp. 30–31.
[187] Joint Defence Legislation Committee, AJHR I-7A, 1913, pp. 5–6.
[188] Joint Defence Legislation Committee, AJHR I-7A, 1913, p. 26.
[189] Ibid, p. 27. The regulations under which the detainees were charged were the Defence Amendment Act of 1912. Section 8 (2) stated that refusing to submit to orders while under military

MacDonald had a magistrate brought to the island. The detainees were convicted of breaching the detention regulations and sentenced to a further week's detention.[190] These events were taking place on an island occupied solely by military personnel and would not have reached the public ear were it not for three things: the detainees were able to write and post letters; they were allowed visitors; and (for reasons unknown) Lieutenant MacDonald invited reporters to the magistrate's hearing on the island.[191]

Newspapers had earlier reported the resisters' actions and their detention.[192] On 2 July news of the detainees' hunger strike broke; fuller accounts soon followed.[193] The detention of passive resisters on Ripa Island was taken up by groups opposed to compulsory military training, and by socialist and labour organisations. In short order the resisters became a challenge to and an embarrassment for the government. The Federation of Labour's *Maoriland Worker* presented the resisters' detention as government persecution of the working class,[194] and began publishing a weekly 'Roll of Honour' containing the names of those who had been detained for Defence Act offences.[195] Reports claimed that detainees' mothers had been barred from visiting their sons, solitary confinement had been imposed, the food was inadequate, and that insufficient blankets were provided.[196] (Other, contradictory accounts—see Figure 7.10—indicated that the

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detention was 'an offence punishable on summary conviction before a Magistrate'. There were no other references to enforcing obedience in the Act.

[190] Joint Defence Legislation Committee, AJHR I-7A, 1913, (unnumbered/second page).

[191] Ibid, p. 27, p. 1.

[192] 'Defence Act Telegrams', *Greymouth Evening Star,* 17 June 1913, p. 6; 'At Ripa Island', *Lyttelton Times,* 21 June 1913, p. 3.

[193] 'Hunger-Strike by Military Offenders', *Evening Post,* 2 July 1913, p. 8; 'Military Detention', *Press,* 3 July 1913, p. 2; 'The Passive Resisters', *Lyttelton Times,* 3 July 1913, p. 9.

[194] 'Military Despotism', *Maoriland Worker,* 20 June 1913, p. 6.

[195] Jauncey, *The story of Conscription in Australia*, p. 93.

[196] 'Military Detention', *Lyttelton Times,* 23 June 1913, p. 5.

conditions were not harsh.)[197] Within days some newspapers were referring to the detainees as 'martyrs'.[198] Questions were asked in the House and reported in newspapers.[199]



Figure 7.10 – The satirical weekly *Free Lance*'s recognised the detainees' methods and intentions—and depicted the conditions of their detention as relatively comfortable. The caption read: 'The Chief Martyr (after finishing his dramatic appeal to the Unity Congress in Wellington): There you are, chaps. Ain't it fetching? What odds on us as the 'Eroes and Martyrs of New Zealand?' *Free Lance,* 12 July 1913, p. 1 (cover).

When a letter from three of the hunger-striking detainees was read to the Unity Congress in Wellington (a Labour party and trade union meeting), delegates were so outraged that the meeting was suspended to allow those present to march

[197] Ibid, p. 9.
[198] The first instance found was 'Anti-Militarists', *Grey River Argus,* 3 July 1913, p. 5.
[199] 'Military Offenders', *New Zealand Herald,* 4 July 1913, p. 8; 'In the House', *Dominion,* 5 July 1913, p. 5.

to parliament and demand the detainees' release. Representatives of the march were received by Massey and Allen.[200] The Unity Congress's demands were discussed by the Cabinet the next day, a Saturday. A seven-point letter in response was issued over Massey's and Allen's signatures. It assured the congress that the detainees were being and would be treated justly and humanely.[201] The congress dismissed the letter as 'altogether unsatisfactory'.[202] For the *Dominion,* however, the letter was a 'cause for disappointment' as it was 'attempting to conciliate the irreconcilables'.[203] The Cabinet had, it transpired, been precipitate. An investigation into the events on Ripa Island was quick to find that most of the detainees' complaints were groundless. The *Press* reported that the investigation 'blows into fragments the amazing structure of falsehoods erected by enemies of the Defence Act.'[204] Other newspapers reacted similarly.[205]

Australia too had its share of high-profile Defence Act prosecutions. Victor Yeo of Broken Hill, for example, was prosecuted so many times for not paying fines for refusing to train that the prosecuting officer eventually declined to appear because of the negative publicity the trials generated.[206] The prominent Australian socialist Henry ('Harry') Holland refused to let his son register for military training and was fined.[207] Holland did not pay the fine, instead he migrated to New Zealand where he was appointed editor of the Federation of Labour's *Maoriland Worker*.

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[200] 'Unity Congress', *Evening Post,* 4 July 1913, p. 8; 'Big Deputation', *Evening Post,* 5 July 1913, p. 9.
[201] The Cabinet assured the congress that: sufficient food and clothing would be provided; non-military work would, if possible, be found for the detainees; solitary confinement would be restricted to punishment purposes; medical personnel would visit more frequently; and the matters raised by the congress's representatives would be investigated. The letter was published in 'Ripa Island "Martyrs"', *Dominion,* 7 July 1913, p. 5.
[202] 'Ripa Island "Martyrs"', *Dominion,* 7 July 1913, p. 5.
[203] 'Ministers and the Defence Act', *Dominion,* 8 July 1913, p. 4.
[204] 'Disloyalist Mendacity', *Press,* 9 July 1913, p. 8.
[205] 'Boys at Ripa Island: Allegations Unfounded', *New Zealand Herald,* 9 July 1913, p. 10.
[206] Barrett, *Falling In,* p. 178.
[207] Fletcher and Hills, *Conscription Under Camouflage*, p. 57.

Imprisoned for sedition in 1913, he later became the parliamentary leader of the Labour party.[208]

Despite the Ripa Island inquiry's findings, the detainee John McTaggart claimed victory. He wrote in *Maoriland Worker* that the hunger strike and refusal to work had improved detention conditions. The resisters' actions were, he asserted, proof of the efficacy of striking.[209] For Allen and the government, the Ripa Island detainees had exposed to the public some serious shortcomings in the military detention regulations and, worse, the publicity generated meant every person inclined to refuse compulsory military training now knew how to act if detained. As the *Evening Post* reported:

> the situation at Ripa Island is simply defeating the ends of the Defence Department … the lads have successfully defied authority. They have refused to obey orders to drill or to work … and they have announced all their successes to their friends outside … Ripa Island, in fact, is in danger of becoming simply a centre of anti-militarist propaganda, where young men are taught that they can defy the law.[210]

In late August Allen admitted: 'The law at present with regard to detention is I think unworkable and I expect I shall have to alter it this year'.[211] A fortnight later he lamented that resisters had become 'too much of a burden for the Defence Department and I am hoping to get rid of it somehow.'[212] Ryan Bodman claimed that after the Ripa Island incident compulsory military training began 'descending into disarray' and that the Defence Act became a 'toothless tiger'.[213] Neither was the case.

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[208] Patrick O'Farrell. 'Holland, Henry Edmund', Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3h32/holland-henry-edmund, accessed 12 November 2020.
[209] 'Massey's Victims' (letter from McTaggart), *Maoriland Worker,* 18 July 1913, p. 4.
[210] 'Serious Position', *Evening Post,* 23 July 1913, p. 3.
[211] Allen to Godley, 12 September 1913, ANZ Allen 1 1.
[212] Allen to Godley, 25 September 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.
[213] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 19, 20.

General Hamilton's report on New Zealand forces in May 1914 found no disarray,[214] and prosecutions for Defence Act offences continued.[215]

Although the Ripa Island resisters were objecting to compulsory military training, their resistance was also a manifestation of the politics of the time. A major strike in the Bay of Plenty mining town of Waihi in 1912 had resulted in violent clashes between police and strikers, and the death of one striker. The incidents in Waihi occurred before the Reform party took government, but Massey was keen to confront the 'Red Feds' (Federation of Labour) and class war threatened.[216] The Passive Resisters' Union had been formed by working-class apprentices in the Christchurch railway workshops.[217] The first branches of the union were established in mining centres, where militant unionism was common.[218] The Federation of Labour, the Socialist party and Labour's Unity Congress opposed compulsory military training and supported the passive resisters.[219] A measure of the opposition to military training in 1912–14 was, therefore, inspired by political considerations.

Industrial discontent boiled over in October 1913 when a waterfront dispute turned into a general strike.[220] Large protests, property damage and violence took place in most major cities. Massey and the Minister of Justice, Alexander Herdman, wanted to break the unions and asserted that the police could not cope alone. The Farmers' Union (despite its name, a farm-owners' association) was asked to provide

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[214] Hamilton, the Inspector-General of Oversea Forces, inspected New Zealand forces in early 1914.
[215] As Figure 7.7 shows.
[216] King, *New Zealand*, pp. 306–7; Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand,* p. 209.
[217] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!"': 6.
[218] Ibid.
[219] The secretary of the Waihi branch of the Socialist party boasted to the Department of Defence that at two public meetings of 500 to 600 people each, the motion 'That this meeting of citizens protest against compulsory military training in any shape or form' had been carried almost unanimously. Secretary Socialist Party Waihi to Defence Department, 30 May 1911, ANZ AD1 638.
[220] King, *New Zealand,* pp. 311–13.

special constables. Massey wanted to call out the permanent artillery as well.[221] Largely because of the good sense and negotiating powers of the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Edward Heard (who was acting commandant while Godley was in Britain), the Department of Defence managed to disguise much of its involvement.[222] When Heard received the request to use the gunners, he baulked at it. With Allen's agreement and support, he negotiated a compromise. Alive to the damage that would result to the reputation of the Department of Defence if military personnel were seen to be used against striking workers, Heard discreetly asked mounted territorial officers in rural areas to volunteer *as ordinary citizens* to be special constables.[223] Farmers and civil servants constituted, however, the bulk of the special constabulary's other ranks.[224]

As much as Allen and Heard sought to limit military involvement, the police had no means of accommodating, equipping or feeding the 'specials', as the special constables were called, so the military had to help.[225] The specials upset many regular police by being undisciplined, drinking too much, and overly violent with strikers (who called them 'Massey's Cossacks'). In order to improve discipline, territorial and permanent force officers were given command positions in the special constabulary.[226] The involvement of territorial and permanent force officers

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[221] Richard S. Hill, *The History of Policing in New Zealand,* Vol. III, *The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: The Modernisation of Policing in New Zealand, 1886–1917*. n.p. [New Zealand]: Dunmore Press, 1995, p. 276, pp. 305–6.
[222] Godley wrote that the involvement of the military in the special constabulary was 'camouflaged'; Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 151.
[223] John Cawford, 'Overt and Covert Involvement in the 1890 Maritime Strike and 1913 Waterfront Strike in New Zealand'. *Labour History,* 60 (May 1991): 73.
[224] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 179
[225] Hill, *The Iron Hand*, p. 308.
[226] Ibid, p. 307, p. 311; 'Witnesses Accounts: Charging and Shooting', *New Zealand Times*, 4 November 1913, p. 7; 'Drunken Specials Let Loose', *Maoriland Worker*, 5 November 1913, p. 9; 'Mass Meeting Yesterday', *Dominion*, 3 November 1913, p. 8.

was reported in newspapers,[227] and questions regarding military involvement were asked in the House. The government's responses were not always entirely truthful. In the House, the Minister of Justice denied that territorial officers commanded special constables in Wellington,[228] and Allen claimed that Colonel Heard had 'never mixed himself up in any way whatever with this strike business.'[229] By such means the Department of Defence escaped vilification by organised labour and the Left. Most New Zealanders, whether waterside workers or Reform party supporters, associated the specials with farmers, not with the military (see Figure 7.11).[230]

As might be expected, the declaration of war in 1914 brought changes in the operation of compulsory military training. On 12 August district commands were advised that, 'except in bad cases', Defence Act prosecutions 'may be withdrawn at your discretion.'[231] Moreover, several of the organisations opposed to compulsory military training, including the Passive Resisters' Union, ceased functioning.[232]

Contrary to the expectations of many, compulsory military training in New Zealand was not all-inclusive; just half of those liable for training received training and it has been impossible to establish how those who were trained were selected. The public, the press and politicians were uncomfortable knowing that some were

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[227] 'General Strike Notes', *Dominion,* 31 October 1913, p. 8; 'State Buildings Guarded', *Press,* 1 November 1913, p. 12; 'State Buildings Guarded', *New Zealand Herald,* 1 November 1913, p. 8; 'Parade in Hamilton', *Auckland Star,* 4 November 1913, p. 6; 'Waterside Workers Strike: Volunteers from the Waikato', *Otago Daily Times,* 4 November 1914, p. 4;

[228] Hill, *The Iron Hand*, p. 321. It is possible, though most unlikely, that no territorial officer held a command position in Wellington. It is also possible that Herdman (the Minister of Justice) specified command in only Wellington as a means of disguising the involvement of territorial officers in special constabulary command positions elsewhere.

[229] NZPD, Vol. 166 (20 October – 14 November) 1913, 860.

[230] Cawford, 'Overt and Covert': 81; 'Farmers Organising', *New Zealand Herald,* 3 November 1913, p. 9; 'Country Cousins', *Auckland Star,* 4 November 1913, p. 6; 'The Scab Union', *Maoriland Worker,* 12 November 1913, p. 6; 'Farmers in Camp', *Auckland Star,* 18 November 1913.

[231] Colonel Chaytor to all districts, 12 August 1914, ANZ AD1 732.

[232] Bodman, 'The Military Strike is Now On!': 20. For an examination of the range of reactions to the declaration of war, see Graham Hucker, '"The Great Wave of Enthusiasm": New Zealand Reactions to the First World War in August 1914—A Reassessment'. *New Zealand Journal of History,* 43:1 (2009): 59–75.

doing their duty while others were not. Kitchener had stressed that enthusiasm amongst trainees, and public pride in the force, needed to be generated if the scheme were to succeed. Some senior officers strove to meet those objectives but the lack of

Figure 7.11 – The cover illustration from *Free Lance* reflected the opinion that most special constables were farmers. In this case, farmer support was regarded positively. The caption read: 'New Zealand (to the farmer): Mob rule threatens my towns. On you I rely in this emergency. Take this baton and uphold law and order.' *Free Lance,* 8 November 1913, p. 1.

empathy in New Zealand's military culture won out. By 1912, compulsory military training was reliant on prosecutions to maintain attendance and discipline. One-third of trainees were prosecuted, and 20 per cent of trainees received a criminal conviction. The number of youths and young men with criminal records was nearly six times than for the general population. Many New Zealanders were unhappy that so many trainees received criminal records for petty matters, and were upset that those who failed to register were almost never prosecuted. Members of the Passive Resisters' Union blatantly refused to cooperate. The notoriety they achieved won

them the support of those opposed to compulsory military training, and of organised labour and the Left. The resisters embarrassed the government and exposed the administrative shortcomings of the defence administration and its disregard for public sensibilities.

Overall, the operation of compulsory military training in New Zealand was often inconsistent, clumsy or insensitive. It may have achieved many of its social aims (improving the morality, physical fitness and obedience of young males) but, with only half of those liable actually participating in training, the success was partial at best. Never so large as to threaten the viability of the scheme, the minority who were dissatisfied with or opposed to compulsory military training grew, often as a result of the manner in which compulsory military training operated. The success or failure of compulsory military training cannot, however, be determined without examining its military aims and achievements; that is the topic of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Making a Citizen Army, 1911–14

Had the purpose of the territorial army and compulsory training scheme been only to improve the morality, physical fitness and obedience of youths, a simpler training programme could have been run. Such training would have provided trainees with some military skills, would have addressed the concerns many had about youths, and at a considerably lower cost than was required for the territorial army. It was the military and strategic objectives of the scheme that justified the territorial army. The territorial army had a twofold purpose: to defend the New Zealand islands (which was unlikely to be needed); and to provide a body of trained men, not inexperienced amateurs, who would volunteer to serve abroad in support of the empire (which, by 1909, seemed a possibility). The territorial army was the most strategically significant element of the Defence Act of 1909. How and why the force was formed, its 1914 inspection, and the response of trainees when war was declared are examined in this chapter.

Like businesses and governments, military organisations need leaders. As early as 1909, Prime Minister Ward confessed that the Council of Defence had proven 'unwieldly and unsatisfactory' and that a British commandant was once

again being considered.[1] The Defence Act of December that year hedged on the matter. The Act gave the Governor the power to appoint a commandant but also 'established' a Council of Defence—which had been in operation since 1907.[2] Field-Marshal Kitchener's formal recommendations in March 1910 made no reference to a commandant.[3] Kitchener nonetheless encouraged Ward to replace the council with a commanding officer.[4] With the Council of Defence ineffective and no commandant appointed, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Alfred Robin, relieved himself 'of a large amount of detail work' in order to 'devote more time to … the reorganisation of the Forces'.[5] The government meanwhile set about finding a suitable British officer to serve as commandant.

The reasons for once more seeking a British rather than a New Zealand officer as commandant were professional competence and experience. Moreover, in 1910 the likelihood of war was increasing, and there was no officer in New Zealand capable of taking the commandant role. Of those holding a colonelcy (the highest rank) in New Zealand forces in 1910, Robin had received no formal officer training and had not attended staff college, Colonel Richard Davies was training in Britain, and the Adjutant-General, the British officer Colonel Harry Tuson, had come to the end of his term and was returning home.[6] New Zealand had to look elsewhere.

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[1] Ward, 'Proceedings of the Imperial Conference on Naval and Military Defence …' 19 August 1909, TNA CO 886/2/367, pp. 78–79.
[2] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII 28, c. 5 (b), 12 (1.).
[3] Defence of the Dominion of New Zealand, AJHR H-19A, 1910.
[4] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli,* p. 192; Terry Kinloch, *Godley: The Man Behind the Myth,* n.p. [NZ]: Exisle Publishing, n.d. [2018?], p. 69.
[5] Chief of the General Staff to Minister of Defence, 15 March 1910, ANZ AD1 585.
[6] McGibbon (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History,* p. 452; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1910, p. 1. The list of colonels excludes (temporary) Colonel James Purdy, the Director-General of Medical Services, because he was likely to have been a doctor rather than a soldier. The one New Zealand officer in 1910 who had passed staff college was Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Chaytor. Department of Defence, *Official Yearbook,* 1910.

The government's first choice was Major-General Sir Percy Lake, who was coming to the end of his extended term as Chief of the General Staff in Canada. The War Office explained to the New Zealand government that Lake's services were required in India. Furthermore, he had been earning £1,500 a year in Canada and could expect to earn 'considerably more' in India, while New Zealand was offering only £1,000 a year.[7] There was, the War Office continued, 'little likelihood' of any major-general accepting a £1,000-a-year appointment, but a suitable colonel could probably be found.[8] On 6 September 1910 Ward announced that Colonel A. J. Godley (who would take the local rank of major-general) had been appointed commandant for a term of five years. With a commandant found, Ward also advised that the two-year-old Council of Defence was no longer needed and was abolished.[9]

Alexander John Godley was born in Kent, England, in 1867. His father was a captain in the British Army and his uncle, John Godley, had been one of the founders of the Wakefield settlement in Canterbury. Godley attended RMC Sandhurst in 1885 and the following year joined the Royal Dublin Fusiliers; later transferring to the more prestigious Irish Guards.[10] How Godley, whose family had no money to help him, managed to get by on just his salary in an expensive guards regiment remains, his biographer admitted, an unanswered question.[11] Godley saw active service in Mashonaland. In 1898 he married Louisa Fowler and entered Camberley staff college but left before completing his course to fight in the South African War.[12]

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[7] War Office to High Commissioner NZ, 11 June 1910, ANZ G2 Box 18.
[8] Ibid. For an examination of the issues relating to British commandants in Australia and New Zealand in a slightly earlier period, see Stephen J. Clark, 'Marching to Their Own Drum'.
[9] *NZPD,* Vol. 151 (6 September 1910), p. 299.
[10] Ray Grover, 'Godley, Alexander John', Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 1996, teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3g12/godley-alexander-john, accessed 6 September 2019.
[11] Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 23.
[12] Grover, 'Godley, Alexander John'. Godley's wife, Louisa, had no private income; Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 38.

Godley had been a member of Field-Marshal Garnet Wolseley's 'magic circle' of favoured officers. After Wolseley's removal as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in 1900, his successor, Field-Marshal Frederick Roberts, bestowed on Godley no similar support. Having not been made a major-general within the required five-year period, in 1910 Colonel Godley was put on half pay. If not promoted within two years, he would be forced to retire. Godley secured temporary appointments commanding territorial brigades but his future remained uncertain. In July 1910 the Army Council came to his rescue when they recommended him to New Zealand as the new commandant.[13]

Godley subsequently claimed that the position was a 'most tempting one'.[14] Financially, it made sense for him to accept. With no private income, the £1,000 per annum New Zealand was offering was a significant increase on his £700 colonel's salary.[15] Godley nonetheless negotiated a further £200 as a housing allowance.[16] The terms Godley won were justified, Ward told the House, because the commandant replaced four officers who had been paid £525 each, and because the cost of living was higher in New Zealand than in Britain.[17] In career terms, however, Godley had some reservations about the appointment. He worried that far away in New Zealand he would be forgotten about. Senior officers with whom Godley had served in South Africa, including Generals Sir John French, Sir Ian Hamilton and Sir Henry Rawlinson, helped to convince him otherwise.[18] Before leaving Britain, Godley met with Kitchener, who explained to him New Zealand's military training scheme.

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[13] Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 40, p. 42, pp. 65–66, p. 70.
[14] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier,* p. 137.
[15] Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 70.
[16] Godley's salary as a colonel was £700. Ibid, pp. 71–72.
[17] *NZPD,* Vol. 151 (6 September 1910), p. 299; Christopher Pugsley, *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story,* Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984, p. 13;
[18] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, pp. 137–38.

Godley travelled to New Zealand via Canada, the United States and Australia. In each country he met with senior officers and inspected local military training.[19]

Figure 8.1 – Major-General Sir Alexander Godley during the First World War. ATL 23243397.

In professional terms, Godley was a suitable appointment. He had fought alongside colonial forces in South Africa, had passed staff college, had held instructional appointments, and had some experience commanding British territorials.[20] He was, however, also aloof, something of a martinet, slow to praise, anxious about his social standing, and 'viewed sport as a distraction'—traits unlikely to go over well in rugby-obsessed, purportedly classless New Zealand.[21]

[19] Ibid, pp. 138–41.
[20] For his studies at Camberley and service in South Africa Godley was awarded the right to use 'p.s.c.' (passed staff college). Kinloch, *Godley,* pp. 61–68.
[21] Douglas E. Delaney, 'Army Apostles: Imperial Officers on Loan and the Standardization of the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies, 1904–1914', *War in History,* 23:3 (2016), 187; Pugsley, *Gallipoli,* p. 13; Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier,* is riddled with name-dropping and accounts of occasions when he was treated as a dignitary; Colin Richardson, 'General Sir Alexander John Godley: The Last Imperial Commander', in Glyn Harper and Joel Hayward (eds), *Born to Lead?*

Accompanied by his wife, Louisa, Godley met up in Sydney with several of the British officers who would assume key roles on his staff.[22] They sailed together to New Zealand where they were welcomed, one officer noted, 'ceremoniously, rather than hospitably'.[23]

On taking up his appointment, Godley had four main objectives: the security of New Zealand; establishing the compulsory military training system; creating a citizen-soldier army; and improving the morality, fitness and obedience of the trainees. Regarding the first objective, in 1910 New Zealand was secure. The threat rebel Maori had once posed had dissipated decades earlier, and as the Committee of Imperial Defence would shortly note, with over 5,000 miles separating the dominion from the nearest naval base of any potentially belligerent power, the chance of an attack by capital ships was 'not a contingency … [to] reasonably be expected', and while a small tip-and-run raid by light cruisers was possible, it was also unlikely.[24] In 1913 the War Office downgraded even further the chance of a seaborne attack.[25] Additionally, there was considerably less public anxiety in New Zealand than in Australia about invasion by an Asian power.[26] Most of the 325 members of New Zealand's permanent force manned and maintained the batteries at the major

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Portraits of New Zealand Commanders, Auckland: Exisle Publishing Ltd, 2003, p. 48; McConnell, 'W. N. "Bill" Carson': 2406.

[22] Heard, Burnett-Stuart and Captain Spencer-Smith. Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier,* p. 141.

[23] Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, LHCMA 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, p. 60.

[24] Committee of Imperial Defence Secret Document 77-C, 'New Zealand: Scale of Attack under Existing Conditions', May 1911, TNA CAB 38/17/26.

[25] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 234.

[26] Unlike Australia, no fiction describing an invasion of New Zealand by an Asian power was written and the New Zealand League did not use a threat from Asia as frequently or prominently as its Australian counterpart ('Get a Gun …' in the league's *Defence* magazine of 28 October 1907 is a rare instance of an exception to the above). For the effect on Australian defence policy of fears of invasion by an Asian power see Neville Meaney, 'The Problem of "Greater Britain"', p. 234.

ports.[27] When it came to the defence of the New Zealand islands, therefore, Godley had little to do or change.

The second objective, establishing compulsory military training, was more of a challenge. Compulsory military training served three purposes: it delivered basic military training to youths and young men; the territorial army provided a force that could be ordered to defend New Zealand and could volunteer to serve overseas; and training was expected to address the social issues the scheme was presumed to remedy. Godley recognised that there was 'a great deal of spade-work to be done' and held that the Defence Act had been passed 'with very little idea of how it was to be put into practice.'[28] He delegated the establishment of the compulsory military training system to his Director of Military Operations, Lieutenant-Colonel John Burnett-Stuart.[29] Burnett-Stuart described his task as a 'formidable proposition' that in due course contributed to him having a break-down and being sent home to Britain.[30] In April 1911, four months after Burnett-Stuart began working on the scheme, a document was distributed that described the functions of the cadet, territorial and reserve sections, the training requirements of each, and the registration procedures.[31] Registration began and just six months after the arrival of Godley and his senior subordinates the first territorial units were operating.[32]

Forming a territorial army, the third objective, was Godley's most important duty.[33] Given Godley's interviews with senior British officers and the professional

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[27] 'Proposals for so organising the military forces of the Empire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event of war', TNA CO/886/2/368–409.
[28] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 142.
[29] Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, LHCMA 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, p. 62.
[30] Ibid, p. 61, p. 66.
[31] Godley to Director of Military Training, 10 May 1911; Lieutenant-Colonel Burnett Stewart to provincial and national officers of the Farmers' Union, 29 May 1911, ANZ AD1 634.
[32] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 116.
[33] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli,* p. 238; Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 118.

contacts he maintained, it is almost certain that Godley understood that the imperial purpose of the territorial army was to provide trained men who would volunteer to fight overseas in defence of the empire.[34] General Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff who provided the framework for the 1909 Defence Act, had made it clear that the army to be established would have three purposes: 'Home Defence'; 'Expeditionary Action'; and the 'Replacement of Wastage in War.'[35] Expeditionary service would be voluntary, a mode of enlistment that worried no one. As premiers and prime ministers had repeatedly stated, there was no doubt that men would come forward when needed. While there is no evidence that Godley read Nicholson's plan, it is extremely unlikely that he did not. Even if Godley were unaware of the territorial/expeditionary force priority, Prime Minister Ward was, and had agreed to form a voluntary-service expeditionary force at the imperial conference in 1909.[36] Kitchener had also made it clear to Ward in 1910 that: 'A thoroughly trained and efficiently equipped force should be the supreme object of your efforts'.[37] It is worth noting at this point that while the importance and strategic purpose of the territorial army and an expeditionary force was understood by those in responsible positions, it was not explained to the general public.[38] Public ignorance of the voluntary nature of an expeditionary force would, as later events showed, cause some problems.

Military support from the dominions had always been a fundamental tenet of the imperial defence concept. The difference by 1909 was that the dominions had

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[34] Godley was a prodigious letter-writer and, to use a modern term, networker. See Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier* and his correspondence held at the Liddle Hart Collection and Military Archive at Kings College, London, for example, the files Godley 3/1–292.
[35] Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Military Forces of New Zealand, War Office, August 1909, ANZ AD10 7, p. 3. Nicholson reiterated these aims in more detail later in the report. Ibid, p. 6.
[36] Minutes of Proceedings of Sub-Conference on Military Defence, Wed 4 August 1909, TNA CAB 18/12B, p. 3.
[37] Kitchener to Ward, 2 March 1910, ANZ, AD 10 7, p. 3.
[38] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, pp. 175–6.

recognised the need for training, and for empire-wide standardisation of equipment and procedures. The sub-committee on defence at the 1909 imperial conference noted that the dominions had made progress in local defence and in liaison with the Imperial General Staff, but 'little or no progress has been made … for rendering assistance to other parts of the Empire in an emergency.'[39] Dominions were, though, standardising on British equipment and practices. Like the citizen soldiers in Australia and Canada, New Zealand territorials could not be ordered overseas. They were, however, free to volunteer for expeditionary service.[40] Godley was confident that in the event of war New Zealanders would willingly offer to serve overseas in an expeditionary force.[41]

The compulsory military training system also had social remediation aims, the fourth objective. These Godley and his staff understood and embodied in the scheme. The 1911 'Conditions of Service and Training' explained that the purpose of military training was:

> not only to provide an adequate and economical Force for the Defence of the country … but also to train the youth of the Dominion in those habits of alertness of mind and body, of discipline and of patriotism which are the qualities of the good citizen as much as of the good soldier.[42]

These aims were reiterated in 1912 when those responsible for cadet units were told that cadet training was intended:

> a) To improve the character of the New Zealand youth and to train him to habits of discipline and respect for authority;
> b) To build up his physique;

[39] 'Proposals for so organising the military forces of the Empire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event of war', TNA CO/886/2/368–409, p. 46.
[40] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII 28, c. 26.
[41] Godley to Allen, 2 August 1912, ANZ AD 10 7.
[42] 'The Conditions of Service and Training of the New Zealand Territorial Force', General Staff, Wellington, 20 April 1911, ANZ AD1 634.

c) To prepare him to take his place in the ranks of the Territorial Force.[43]

Shortly after his arrival in New Zealand, Godley realised that he needed to identify and recruit officers, meet civic leaders, and generally win over the public. He ordered that a training camp for potential officers be held, and embarked on a speaking tour. The idea for these initiatives may have come from earlier imperial officers. In Australia in 1902 Major-General Hutton decided to identify suitable officers and develop his command structure before he contemplated any other actions.[44] The idea for a speaking tour may have been the knowledge that, on his appointment as General Officer Commanding in Canada (also in 1902), General Lord Dundonald had embarked on a speaking tour.[45]

In early 1911, a ten-week-long 'special camp of instruction' for existing and potential officers and NCOs was held at Tauherenikau, near Featherston, north of Wellington.[46] The camp was established and run by the Director of Staff Duties and Military Training, Colonel Edward Heard, one of the British officers who had arrived with Godley in December 1910.[47] Instruction was not the camp's only objective. By its conclusion, 41 new officers and 42 new NCOs had been identified and appointed to the permanent force or staff corps.[48]

Throughout the operation of compulsory military training, Godley selected officers strictly on merit.[49] A merit-based selection policy was mandated in the Defence Act of 1909, which had done away with the election of officers, and was one

[43] Richardson, 'Some Thoughts on Obligatory Military Training': 16.
[44] Stockings, *Britannia's Shield*, p. 217 and pp. 220–1.
[45] Wood, 'The Sense of Duty', p. 169.
[46] Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 76.
[47] Delaney, 'Army Apostles': 187.
[48] Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army', p. 1.
[49] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 114.

of the matters Kitchener had stressed in his 1910 report.[50] A similar merit-based method of commissioning officers was adopted in Australia.[51] It is likely that Godley was comfortable with the idea of promotion on merit. His father never rose above the rank of captain (at a salary of £365) and had no private income. Godley had gained entry to Sandhurst by the only means available to him: he won a 'gentleman cadet' scholarship.[52] In many ways, therefore, he was a self-made man. Merit-based promotion also sat comfortably with New Zealand notions about equality of opportunity and what has been described as 'the bourgeoise ethic of hard work.'[53]

Godley began his speaking tour while the camp at Tauherenikau was still running. He inspected military establishments and explained to civic leaders, employers and the public how the new military training scheme would operate. He sometimes found himself mollifying objectors and gave numerous press interviews.[54] Young New Zealand males, he told a reporter, were the 'most excellent material' and he could 'see no reason why we should not in a very short time have a territorial force which will be an example to all others.'[55] Burnett-Stuart thought Godley's tour a success: 'no one could have done it better. He looked the part, spoke well … was dignified … and he was popular'.[56] Godley's own impression was that 'the people as a whole were thoroughly in sympathy with the scheme, and that the large majority of those liable for training were ready and willing to fulfil the obligation of

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[50] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII 28, c. 24. Kitchener recommended that energy, ability and exam results should determine promotion rather than 'merely waiting for vacancies in their separate branches'. Defence of the Dominion of New Zealand, AJHR H-19A, 1910, p. 7.
[51] Craig Wilcox, 'Edwardian Transformation' in Craig Stockings and John Connor (eds), *Before the Anzac Dawn: A Military History of Australia to 1915,* Sydney: NewSouth, 2013, p. 268.
[52] Kinloch, *Godley,* pp. 14–16.
[53] Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 16, p. 49.
[54] Memoirs, Chap 6, LHCMA Burnett-Stuart 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, p. 63.
[55] 'The New Commandant', *Auckland Weekly News,* 19 January 1911, p. 19.
[56] Memoirs, Chap 6, LHCMA Burnett-Stuart 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, p. 63.

personal service for their country.'[57] As the previous chapter showed, the actual response of young New Zealanders to their military-training obligation was sometimes less enthusiastic than Godley forecast.

With so much to create and initiate in the first year of compulsory military training, and with Easter (the traditional time for camps) having passed before training commenced, no large training camps were run in 1911. It had also become evident that the general staff in New Zealand lacked training and experience.[58] Burnett-Stuart recalled that while good officers had been recruited in New Zealand and worked hard, additional trained and experienced officers and NCOs were needed.[59] Godley responded to the skill shortage in two ways: he arranged for more British officers to be brought out, and he increased the number of New Zealand officers receiving training in Britain. In 1912 for example, 15 New Zealand officers were training in Britain or India, and 15 British officers were serving in New Zealand.[60] Permanent force officers were sent to staff college at Quetta, India, or Camberley, England.[61] In 1911 one New Zealand officer had passed staff college; by 1914 three had.[62] Australia and Canada also made use of British training institutions.[63] As Kitchener had recommended, arrangements were made for New Zealand officer cadets to attend the newly established military college at Duntroon

[57] Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army': 321.
[58] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 195.
[59] Memoirs, Chap 6, LHCMA Burnett-Stuart 6/1-12 Memoirs Chapters, p. 62.
[60] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, pp. 2–3.
[61] Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army': 324.
[62] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 114.
[63] John Connor, 'Australian Military Education, 1901–18', in Douglas Delaney et al (eds), *Military Education and the British Empire, 1815–1949*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018, p. 79; Andrew L. Brown, 'Cutting its Coat According to the Cloth: The Canadian Militia and Staff Training before the Great War', *War and Society,* 34:4 (2015): 264.

in Australia.[64] Ten of the 41 cadets in Duntroon's first (1911) intake were from New Zealand. Six were sent in 1912, three in 1913, and nine in 1914.[65]

Sending cadets and officers overseas for training was necessary because New Zealand lacked suitably qualified instructors and had too few officers to make training institutions viable.[66] Some problems were encountered, however, by officers training in other countries. In 1913 New Zealand officers at Camberley complained that their £25 allowance did not cover the £32 mess subscription and other fees, let alone books, a typewriter and the required bicycle.[67] In the same year, the three New Zealand officers hoping to qualify for staff college all failed. Godley explained that the New Zealanders lacked the required proficiency in languages and general education subjects but had passed the military subjects.[68] In addition to sending personnel overseas for training, exchanges with British officers were made, Godley established the New Zealand branch of the Imperial General Staff in Wellington, and sent Colonel Robin to London to serve as New Zealand's representative to the Imperial General Staff.[69] Robin's role was advisory and to facilitate efficient two-way communications.

By 1914, New Zealand had 18 British officers on loan, Canada had 38 and Australia 19.[70] Australia also had six officers on exchange, six Royal Army Service Corps instructors, and 53 British NCOs from India.[71] New Zealand had the highest

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[64] Defence of the Dominion of New Zealand, AJHR H-19A, 1910, p. 7.
[65] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 197.
[66] See chapter 2 for examination of previous, in-country military training initiatives that failed.
[67] Notes of Interview, J. A. [James Allen], 17 March 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.
[68] Godley to Allen, 24 August 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.
[69] Delaney, 'Army Apostles': 174–6; Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 115.
[70] Delaney, 'Army Apostles': 177.
[71] Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 29.

proportion of British officers who had passed staff college.[72] British officers with staff skills were needed in New Zealand because, in comparison to Canada or Australia, few New Zealand officers had passed staff college. Making use of British officers was supported by the Liberal and Reform governments, and by the War Office. The sensationalist *New Zealand Truth,* however, had claimed that 'Majah-Gineral' Godley's employment policy was 'No Colonials Need Apply' and that taking on more 'Imperial swashbucklers' would result in New Zealand officers being passed over.[73] Six months later, *Truth* complained that when Godley's appointment was announced, one British staff officer had been mentioned. That one officer had, *Truth* asserted, 'merged into a quite respectable total of be-titled haw-haw individuals who strut about in resplendent plumes'.[74]

Most newspapers took a different view. The *Press* explained that it was at present 'absolutely necessary to import a few British officers, but eventually the Citizen Army will be staffed by well-trained New Zealanders'.[75] The *New Zealand Times* stated that British officers and NCOs were popular, 'keen and capable'.[76] In December the following year, when Allen remarked that the achievement of 'New Zealand and imperial ideals' had relied on visiting officers, his audience responded with enthusiastic agreement.[77]

On 16 February 1914, however, the usually pro-military *New Zealand Herald* published an article critical of British officers. While accepting that officers with specialist or technical skills were needed and had worked well, it contended that

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[72] In Canada, 10/38 (26 per cent) of loaned officers had passed staff college, in Australia 4/19 (21 per cent) had, and in New Zealand 7/18 (39%) had. Delaney, 'Army Apostles': 178.
[73] 'The Territorials', *New Zealand Truth,* 18 February 1911, p. 7.
[74] 'Military Matters', *New Zealand Truth,* 22 July 1911, p. 4.
[75] 'Military Training', *Press,* 22 July 1911, p. 6.
[76] 'The Question of Defence' (editorial), *New Zealand Times,* 13 December 1912, p. 3.
[77] 'Banquet to Honour James Allen', *New Zealand Times,* 12 December 1912, p. 7.

general officers were usually 'unsatisfactory', renown for red tape, and indifferent to New Zealand conditions and attitudes.[78] Godley challenged the newspaper's assertions and dismissed the allegations of insensitivity to New Zealand mores. The reaction of the officers was, he reported, 'a very genuine feeling of indignation' and he worried that 'silly old ideas about Imperial officers' had been revived in public discourse.[79] The Governor, Lord Liverpool, also complained about the article. He described it as 'most insulting and totally untrue', and was concerned that it had been cabled to Britain where it could offend veterans or upset the King.[80] Condemnations of the article had, Liverpool noted, been published in other newspapers. The Governor was confident that those denunciations reflected the opinion of '99 per cent of all New Zealanders.'[81]

In addition to the occasional criticism of their ways, British officers also found New Zealand prices higher and conditions less attractive than those at home. By 1913 several of them were discontent. In Godley's absence, the acting General Officer Commanding, Colonel Heard, drafted for British officers contemplating duty in the dominion an honest but unflattering description of what to expect in New Zealand. It noted that leave was limited to one month per year, no servant would be allowed to accompany the officer nor allowance for one paid, the cost of living was higher than in Britain, and the annual £30 horse allowance would not cover the cost of keeping a horse. James Allen, the Minister of Defence, was not pleased and asked Godley to deal with the matter.[82]

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[78] 'Imported Officers', *New Zealand Herald,* 16 February 1914, p. 6.
[79] Godley to Allen, 17 February 1914, ANZ Allen1 1; Godley to Allen, 18 February 1914, ibid.
[80] Governor to Allen, 26 February 1914, ANZ Allen1 1.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Allen to Godley, 15 August 1913, ANZ Allen1 1. Allen quoted Heard's document in his letter.

One of the most important years for New Zealand's citizen army was 1912, when four significant developments took place: training included battalion-level camps; there were new Ministers of Defence; Godley won approval to plan an expeditionary force; and talks established a new level of military cooperation with Australia. Training in 1911 had focused on individual corps and basic skills. While training in 1912 was also at a fairly elementary level, 55 week-long training camps were run throughout the dominion and attended by a total of 17,831 territorials.[83] The camps were compulsory and 82.5 per cent of trainees attended, a distinct improvement over the last years of the volunteer system when less than 25 per cent attended camps.[84] Although there were some shortages of equipment and uniforms, trainees at the camps were reported to be enthusiastic and interested.[85]

Throughout 1912 steps were taken to improve the training of and equipment provided to territorials. Eight thousand rifles were purchased, local manufacture of uniforms was arranged, new artillery pieces were received, tactical exercises were held for territorial officers, and a staff tour was run for senior officers. Additionally, the appointment of 29 quartermaster sergeants and 73 sergeant instructors improved the training and administrative support available to territorial officers.[86] In January the first edition of *The New Zealand Military Journal* was published. Produced by the dominion section of the Imperial General Staff in Wellington, issues appeared quarterly and were distributed free-of-charge to officers. Copies could also be purchased for one shilling.[87] The first issue included articles on training

[83] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 1; Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 117–8.
[84] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 4; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1907, p. 6.
[85] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 144.
[86] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 8, p. 10, p. 6, p. 3, p. 2.
[87] *The New Zealand Military Journal,* 1:1 January 1912; Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1912, p. 6.

territorial officers, 'obligatory' military training, communications, finance, mounted rifles, and discipline.[88]

Two vital competencies were addressed simultaneously in 1912: the skills of trainees and of those training the cadets and territorials. Circulars were issued on how to make training both effective and engaging. In a move to motivate boys and stimulate their interest in military matters, territorials were to be encouraged to attend cadet drills: 'every effort should be made to arouse the interest of the boys even at the expense of regular progressive training', Otago district headquarters advised.[89] 'Wearisome repetition … [was] to be avoided', unit pride engendered, and 'manly games and healthy sport' encouraged.[90] Other military districts distributed nearly identical advice.[91] The headquarters of the Wellington Mounted Rifles Brigade recommended that permanent force instructors be used to train new territorials, leaving territorial officers to work with experienced personnel. The maintenance of interest would be helped, the circular advised, if different skills were taught annually. For 1912, Wellington district would focus on reconnaissance and protection.[92]

The poor quality of officers had been the most criticised aspect of the previous volunteer system.[93] Annual confidential report forms for officers had existed for some time. When completed, the forms provided little more than a sentence-long comment on an officer and some basic statistical information.[94] Those with potential were, nonetheless, often identified. In 1912, for example, the

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[88] *The New Zealand Military Journal,* 1:1 January 1912, table of contents.
[89] Cadet Training, District headquarters, Otago, 29 May 1912, ANZ AD19 20.
[90] Ibid.
[91] For example, Cadet Training, GSO Canterbury Military District, 12 August 1912, ANZ AD19 20.
[92] Brigade Major, Wellington Mounted Brigade Rifles, 30 October 1912, ANZ AD19 20.
[93] See chapter 2.
[94] Annual Confidential Report form, ANZ AD37 21.

keenness and competency of Second-Lieutenant Bernard Freyberg of the 6th Hauraki Regiment were recognised.[95] (Freyberg would win the Victoria Cross and rise to brigadier in the British army in the First World War, and command the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the second.)[96] Godley read the confidential reports on officers and noted on them actions to be taken. He displayed little tolerance of poor performance. An officer who had attended only evening parades was, Godley wrote, to 'attend properly or go'.[97] On another he ordered that an inadequate officer be asked to resign.[98]

In addition to the developments in military training in 1912, there were two changes of Minister of Defence. On Ward's resignation from Cabinet positions in early 1912, the Liberal party's Arthur Myers became Minister of Defence. Then, in July and after 21 years of Liberal government, the Reform party gained control of parliament and the volunteer officer, Colonel James Allen, took up the defence portfolio.[99] Godley was not pleased about Allen's appointment. He had hoped to again have a minister who possessed 'the great merit of being entirely ignorant of military affairs'.[100] He was concerned that Allen thought 'he knows as much about soldiering as anyone whose profession it is.'[101] Allen, who would be Minister of Defence until 1920, had a professional but not a warm relationship with Godley.[102] Indeed, while most recognised Godley's commitment, competence and training abilities, few were fond of him. Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger remarked

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[95] Annual Confidential Report, 6th (Hauraki) Regiment, 25 February 1912, ANZ AD37 12.
[96] For further information on Freyberg as a territorial officer in New Zealand and later see: Paul Freyberg, *Bernard Freyberg, VC: Soldier of Two Nations.* London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991.
[97] Annual Confidential Report, No. 4 Company NZ Garrison Artillery, 12 April 1912, ANZ AD37 12.
[98] Ibid.
[99] For a description of Allen, see the previous chapter.
[100] Godley to Kilbracken (a cousin), quoted in Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 83. Ward had, nonetheless, been a territorial officer.
[101] Extract from Report of Defence Minister to Prime Minister, n.d. [1913], ANZ AD 10 7.
[102] See chapter 7; McGibbon (ed), *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, pp. 15–16.

at the time of Godley's death: 'There does not seem to be any photograph showing him smiling'.[103] Despite the formal nature of his relationship with Allen, Godley was comparatively well-served by Allen. He enjoyed a generally higher level of political support than did British officers commanding in other dominions, and Allen was more inclined to accept advice and cooperate than defence ministers elsewhere.[104]

In August 1912, Godley sought Allen's permission to initiate a key imperial and strategic development: to begin working on expeditionary force planning.[105] No separate formation or organisation was to be created, rather any expeditionary force would consist of territorials who volunteered to serve overseas.[106] Such a capability was not a departure from existing policy but a fulfilment of it. As already noted, General Nicholson's 1909 proposals for the armed forces of New Zealand had included an expeditionary force.[107] Additionally, the War Office expected New Zealand to provide one. In January 1912, General Sir John French (who was soon to be appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff) wrote to Godley that, in the event of war with Germany, New Zealand forces could expect to be serve overseas, either to attack German colonies, reinforce the British Expeditionary Force, or to go to Egypt.[108] Godley assured Allen that preparing an expeditionary force committed the New Zealand government to nothing. The preparations would, however, aid War Office planning by giving it an intimation of the likely size and nature of the resource

[103] Kippenberger, quoted in Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 229.
[104] Delaney, 'Army Apostles': 185.
[105] Godley to Allen, 2 August 1912, ANZ AD 10 7.
[106] In 1913 Allen reminded the House that an expeditionary force would be formed from territorials who had volunteered to serve overseas. NZPD, Vol. 163 (24 July – 20 August), 1913, 250.
[107] (Secret) Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Military Forces of New Zealand, August 1909, ANZ AD 10 7. Also see chapter 5.
[108] French to Godley, 1 January 1912, TNA WO 106/59.

available in New Zealand if war broke out. Informing British authorities of what it could expect was, he insisted, 'of the utmost importance'.[109]

Allen received the request just weeks after becoming the minister and did not reply. Two months later Godley again sought permission to begin expeditionary force planning.[110] He paraphrased for Allen the content in French's letter of nine months' earlier. Because a modern war would be expensive it would probably be short. What happened in its early stages would shape the outcome. Pre-hostility planning was therefore essential. Germany was identified as the 'probable opponent'.[111] Godley duly described the places to which New Zealand troops might be sent, and recommended that 'Dominion Troops should be given the opportunity of fighting with the British Expeditionary Force in the main theatre of operations.'[112] He concluded by repeating that it was vital that the New Zealand and British governments develop a 'definite understanding' on available military resources.[113] In late 1912 Allen authorised Godley to plan an expeditionary force.[114] Australia was at a similar stage in its expeditionary force planning. In September 1912, the Chief of the Australian General Staff, Brigadier-General José (Joseph) Gordon, sought permission to begin planning an Australian expeditionary force.[115]

Overseas service in defence of the empire was not a new concept for either New Zealand or Australia. New South Wales had sent a force to the Sudan in 1895, New Zealand, Canada and the Australian colonies had sent contingents to South

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[109] Godley to Allen, 2 August 1912, ANZ AD 10 7, p. 2.
[110] Godley to Allen, 9 October 1912, ANZ AD 10 7; also see Defence: Proposed Organisation for an Expeditionary Force, ANZ AD 10 7, p. 2, which refers to Godley's August and October letters and makes no reference to any correspondence from Allen to Godley on the matter.
[111] Godley to Allen, 9 October 1912, ANZ AD10 7.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 240.
[115] Chief of the General Staff (Australia) to 'Secretary', 27 September 1912, ANZ AD10 7.

Africa. In 1901 Richard Seddon had offered an imperial reserve but, no other colony was interested in the idea and, by refusing to pay for it or to relinquish control of its use, nothing came of the proposal.[116] The differences in 1912 were peacetime planning for imperial service, indicating the scale and nature of the military force that should be available and, significantly, acceptance of the financial consequences. Developments in Europe and the increased chance of war undoubtedly helped to stimulate action and commitment.

New Zealand's willingness to take on new financial obligations in 1912 was remarkable because the defence budget had increased dramatically and Allen was looking for ways to trim costs. Between 1910/11 and 1911/12, military (non-naval) spending nearly doubled—from £214,205 to £413,451. Pre-war military spending peaked the following year at £529,396 (see Figure 8.2).[117]



Figure 8.2 – Military (excluding naval) expenditure 1904/05 to 1913/14. Source: Statement of Amounts Expended by the New Zealand Government, ANZ AD1 834.

[116] See chapter 5.
[117] Statement of Amounts Expended by the New Zealand Government, ANZ AD1 843.

Although he had approved the defence budget, Allen, who was also Minister of Finance, displayed the parsimony ever-evident when New Zealand governments were dealing with defence matters. In July 1912 he informed Godley that parliament might question defence costs. Seeking savings, Allen queried travel allowances, the New Zealand officers training in Britain, Colonel Robin's role in London, the number of staff officers in New Zealand, whether some personnel could be retired, even the costs of hiring motor cars.[118] Godley denied that there had been any extravagance and pointed out that Australia spent far more per serviceman than did New Zealand. He defended the personnel in Britain and the compensation they received, reminded Allen that the New Zealand staff numbers were under establishment, and advised that it was not possible to reduce the defence budget without compromising efficiency.[119] Godley also offered a ray of hope. The delivery of some guns and equipment might be delayed until the new financial year. Should that happen, the allocations for the delayed matériel would not be drawn upon in the current fiscal year.[120]

Military relations between New Zealand and Australia also improved in 1912. In 1910 Lord Kitchener had encouraged New Zealand to work on defence matters in collaboration with Australia.[121] Kitchener's hopes came closer to realisation in the last months of 1912 when Godley visited Australia to inspect military training and Australian forces. It quickly emerged that the strategic concerns of the two countries deserved thorough discussion.[122] The Prime Minister of Australia, Andrew Fisher, asked William Massey, the Prime Minister of New

[118] Allen to Godley, 23 July 1912, ANZ AD 10 7.
[119] Godley to Allen, 25 July 1912, ibid.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Kitchener to Ward, 2 March 1910, ibid.
[122] Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 36.

Zealand, to authorise Godley to discuss mutual assistance and cooperation with the Chief of the Australian General Staff, Brigadier-General Gordon.[123] Massey promptly agreed.[124] In a meeting on 18 November, Gordon and Godley identified three common, overall strategic principles: the maintenance of imperial supremacy at sea; dominion/domestic defence; and (the vaguely worded) 'mutual cooperation so as to ensure success at the decisive point.'[125] On the last, the war then breaking out in the Balkans was cited as evidence of the need for thorough preparation in peacetime, and the advantage to be gained from taking the initiative early in a conflict—an echo of the opinions General French had shared with Godley in January.[126] The statutory limitations on where Australian and New Zealand troops could be ordered to serve were deemed a 'not insurmountable obstacle' because men would readily volunteer for imperial service and because 'no nation has ever allowed [such restrictions] … to influence its military action to its disadvantage.'[127]

Gordon and Godley developed a proposal for a joint expeditionary force of approximately 10,000 Australians and 6,500 New Zealanders. Whether this joint force was in addition to the expeditionary force Godley has started planning or a substitute for it was not stated. They hoped that the New Zealand government would commit to a definite number so that detailed planning could commence.[128] In addition to discussing an Australia-New Zealand force, Godley and Gordon divided the Pacific into areas of interest. Australia took responsibility for territory west of 170° West (the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the German possessions of New

[123] Prime Minister Australia to Prime Minister New Zealand, 24 October 1912, ANZ AD 10 7.
[124] Prime Minister New Zealand to Prime Minister Australia, 31 October 1912, ibid.
[125] (Secret) Notes for Conference 18:11:1912, ANZ AD 10 7, p. 1.
[126] (Secret) Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Military Forces of New Zealand, August 1909, ANZ AD 10 7; French to Godley, 1 January 1912, TNA WO 106/59.
[127] (Secret) Notes for Conference 18:11:1912, ANZ AD 10 7, p. 3.
[128] Ibid, pp. 3–4.

Guinea and New Britain) and New Zealand assumed responsibility for territory east of 170° West (Fiji, Tonga, and the German colony in Samoa).[129]

Back in New Zealand in December, Godley prepared notes on his meetings so that Allen, who was due to have talks in Australia en route to meetings in Britain, could discuss the Gordon-Godley recommendations with his Australian counterpart, Senator George Pearce.[130] Allen was pleased with the outcome of Godley's discussions on matters such as officer-cadet training.[131] He was not, however, impressed with the proposal for an Australia-New Zealand expeditionary force. He considered the 6,000 troops New Zealand was expected to provide as smaller than the dominion was capable of producing, and worried that a two-dominion force would restrict New Zealand's autonomy and 'compromise [its] national identity'.[132] In his meetings with Pearce, Allen was sufficiently impressed with the Australian senator to ask his advice on military and naval matters.[133] It may have been Allen's confidence in Pearce that led to his change of heart. He agreed to the development of an 18,000-strong Australia-New Zealand force to be used in the (unlikely) event of either country being attacked.[134] The concept of the force was later endorsed by the War Office.[135] Allen then continued his voyage to Britain.

The main purpose of Allen's 1913 visit to London was not military matters but secure a loan and to advance his ambition that New Zealand should develop a naval capability of its own.[136] He had what have been described as 'difficult' and 'somewhat acrimonious' meetings with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston

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[129] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, pp. 208–9.
[130] Godley to Allen, 10 December 1912, ANZ AD10 7.
[131] Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience,* pp. 60–61.
[132] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 121.
[133] Connor, *Anzac and Empire*, p. 50, p. 36.
[134] Meaney, 'The Problem of "Greater Britain"', p. 86.
[135] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 241.
[136] Ibid, p. 217.

Churchill.[137] It was not until the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, intervened that Allen was able to get agreement that, like Australia, New Zealand should have its own navy. To that end, the use of a training ship, HMS *Philomel,* was arranged.[138] Allen also had discussions concerning the interchange of officers, the performance of New Zealand officers in Britain, representation on the Imperial Defence Council, and military expenses and travel allowances.[139]

Alive to the need to equip New Zealand forces, Allen negotiated the purchase of a total of 30,000 rifles. New British-made small arms were in high demand in 1913 but he managed to secure 5,000 new Lee Enfield rifles at £1/12/6 each and 10,000 used but refurbished ones at £1/-/9¼ each. Needing more, he negotiated the purchase of several thousand un-reconditioned, second-hand rifles from Britain, but when Canada offered to sell him 15,000 Lee Enfields (including bayonets and scabbards) in similar condition for one dollar each, Allen jumped at it. Ever keen to cut costs, he estimated that he saved between 5,000 and 6,000 pounds.[140] Purchase prices aside, Allen had provided New Zealand with a single model of rifle that was also the British standard. The uniformity of small arms simplified training, maintenance and parts management, and ensured consistency in imperial actions.

Allen's achievements in Britain in 1913 were, however, overshowed by a press relations débâcle. It exposed the New Zealand public's continuing attitude to compelling men to fight overseas, and their attitude to formalised peacetime commitments regarding war. In a speech in Britain, Allen referred to the

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[137] Ibid, p. 221–22

[138] Ibid, p. 221–22; Ian McGibbon, 'Allen, James', teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/3a12/allen-james, accessed 10 March 2017.

[139] Allen to Godley, 5 June 1913, ANZ Allen 1 11; Notes of Interview with Generals H. H. Wilson …, 3 April 1913; Representation on Imperial Defence Council, 11 April 1913, ANZ Allen 1 4; Allen to Godley, 3 June 1913, ANZ Allen 1 11.

[140] [Allen?], Supply of Lee Enfield Rifles, no date but attached to 3 June communication from Allen to Godley, ANZ Allen 1 11; Allen to Colonel Heard, 28 August 1913, ANZ Allen18.

expeditionary force. He told the British press that New Zealand hoped to provide a force of 8,000 men for service in any part of the Empire.[141] As was mentioned earlier, the expeditionary force capability in the Defence Act of 1909 had seldom been promoted to the public who knew little about it. There was, therefore, an element of surprise on the public's part. The major upset, however, was caused by cabled reports of Allen's speech omitting the key fact that the force would be a volunteer one.[142] The *Auckland Star* assured readers: 'What he no doubt means is that a volunteer force of that number can always be relied on in this Dominion'.[143] The *New Zealand Times,* however, insisted:

> the men of our islands will go to war voluntarily, and not as a force compelled under a scheme put upon them in this surprise fashion … Not as conscriptionists will the free men of this country permit themselves to be shipped away at the whim of Mr Allen or Mr Massey.[144]

The next day, still maintaining that Allen was contemplating a conscript force, the *New Zealand Times* claimed that Allen's comments had:

> excited alarm and strong disapproval throughout the country … the man hood of New Zealand, no matter how loyal, will not be content to be compulsorily pressed into foreign service at the dictations of … [politicians] seeking limelight and distinction in the old country.[145]

A unique perspective on the matter was taken by the *Wairarapa Age* which contended that money was behind it all. Allen was in London to secure a loan and had emulated Ward's tactic from 1909, when a battleship was offered to Britain at the time a loan was being requested. Allen, the *Wairarapa Age* continued, had

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[141] 'Imperial Defence' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 1 February 1913, p. 4.
[142] Newspaper editors understood that the cabled text was an edited version of what Allen's speech contained. 'Defence Matters' (editorial), *Southland Times,* 6 February 1913, p. 4.
[143] 'Imperial Defence' (editorial), *Auckland Star,* 1 February 1913, p. 4.
[144] 'That Expeditionary Force', *New Zealand Times,* 4 February 1913, p. 6.
[145] 'The Expeditionary Force', *New Zealand Times,* 5 February 1913, p. 6.

merely replaced a warship with the promise of an expeditionary force. Furthermore, and again copying Ward, he had done so without parliamentary approval.[146]

Unfortunately, Massey's remark that there was no provision in the Defence Act of 1909 to send a force overseas confused rather than clarified the issue.[147] Either Massey thought that *send* was synonymous with *order,* or he was unaware of Section 26 of the Act, which freed members of the territorial force to volunteer to serve outside New Zealand.[148] The Acting Minister of Defence, R. Heaton Rhodes said it was 'obvious' that Allen was referring to a voluntary force.[149] Other government ministers gave similar assurances.[150] Godley stated that no territorial could be ordered to serve overseas, and 'no one would leave New Zealand except as a volunteer.'[151]

Ministerial and military assurances had only limited effect; the controversy continued. The New Zealand Labour party telegraphed the leader of the British Labour party, Kier Hardie, to repudiate Allen's offer.[152] On 8 February the *New Zealand Truth* weighed in. They opposed an expeditionary force on the grounds that New Zealand forces were needed at home to protect the dominion from (Australia's

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[146] 'An Expeditionary Force', *Wairarapa Age,* 3 February 1913, p. 4.
[147] 'The Expeditionary Force' (editorial), *Evening Post,* 7 February 1913, p. 6.
[148] Defence Act, 1909, 9 Edw. VII 28, S 26.
[149] 'The Expeditionary Force', *Taranaki Daily News,* 8 February 1913, p. 3.
[150] 'Unity of the Empire', *Auckland Star,* 3 February 1913, p. 5; editorial, *New Zealand Herald,* 3 February 1913, p. 6; 'The Minister of Defence in London', *Otago Daily Times,* 3 February 1913, p. 5; 'Imperial Defence', *Auckland Star,* 4 February 1913, p. 4; 'Mr Allen's Offer', *Wairarapa Age*, 7 February 1913, p. 5.
[151] 'The Expeditionary Force', *Lyttelton Times,* 5 February 1913, p. 11; 'New Zealand and Defence', *Waikato Argus,* 7 February 1913, p. 2.
[152] 'General Cables', *Stratford Evening Post,* 6 February 1913, p. 5; 'New Zealand's Overseas Forces', *Dominion,* 6 February 1913, p. 7; 'Imperial Defence', *Evening Star,* 6 February 1913, p. 6; 'The Expeditionary Force', *New Zealand Times,* 6 February 1913, p. 7. It should be remembered that the New Zealand Labour Party at the time was small and was not the principal opposition party. It held just four seats.

bogeyman) Japan.[153] Opponents of compulsory military training also objected to an expeditionary force.[154] Ten days after the story broke, Massey cabled Allen (who was still in London) for an explanation. He requested that all correspondence on the matter be marked *confidential,* 'to protect us in case the House of Assembly orders correspondence to be laid on [the] table.'[155] Allen replied that, as had always been intended, the expeditionary force would be made up of volunteers. He defended the preparations that had been made by noting that they were recommended by the 1909 Imperial Conference, would allow the War Office to plan the defence of the Empire, and that the scheme had been thoroughly discussed with senior British officers.[156]

Knowing that he had described the 8,000-strong expeditionary force as a volunteer one and apparently believing that it was the disclosure of the force's strategic purpose that had upset some of the public, Allen wrote to Godley:

> I did not think it wise to keep the fact that we are arranging the necessary organisation a secret. I think the people ought to understand what is being done, and I am quite sure that when they do understand it they will back it up, and I hope the time may come when they will be prepared to volunteer even before we require them, so that we may give them some training together.[157]

The controversy over Allen's partially quoted statement revealed New Zealand attitudes to conscription and to peacetime commitments to participate in war. The majority of New Zealanders had supported the Defence Act's use of

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[153] 'Our Military System', *New Zealand Truth,* 8 February 1913, p. 4. The reference to Japan is most likely to have been caused by *New Zealand Truth*'s close links with 'Truth'-titled newspapers in Australia, all (in New Zealand and Australia) owned by the Australian John Norton.
[154] 'Auckland Women's Peace Committee', *Auckland Star,* 11 February 1913, p. 6.
[155] Maisey [Massey] to Allen, 10 February 1913; and Prime Minister to Minister of Finance [Allen], 14 February 1913 [date of receipt London], ANZ Allen1 4.
[156] 'Extract from Report of Defence Minister to Prime Minister', 5 June 1913, ANZ AD10 7.
[157] Allen to Godley, 20 March 1913, ANZ WA252 1.

compulsion when it came to military training and, as was the case in Australia and Canada, the defence of the New Zealand islands. The objections of those opposed to compulsory military training were not always related to compulsion; some were based on pacifist or anti-militarist views.[158] Those who objected to compelling men to fight overseas did not necessarily have an issue with the Defence Act's powers to compel citizens to train or to order them to defend the dominion. No one doubted that in a crisis New Zealanders would volunteer to defend the empire, and no one doubted that sending volunteers, not conscripts, to overseas conflicts was the appropriate response.

The other aspect of Allen's statement that animated some was that Allen appeared to have made a peacetime commitment to send troops in the event of war. Parliament did not resume until late June in 1913. On 3 July Allen was accused of doing what Sir Joseph Ward had done with the dreadnought offer: he had committed New Zealand to an action (in Allen's case, the provision of troops in the event of war) without parliament's approval.[159] Allen maintained that the dreadnought offer had been 'a very different proposition' and said that the *discussions* he had in Britain were sanctioned by Cabinet.[160] Two weeks later Allen was asked 'what legislative authority' had been used to commit the dominion to 'defend other parts of the Empire'.[161] Allen reminded the House of Section 26 of the Defence Act, that expeditionary force service was voluntary, and that preparing for such an eventuality was sensible.[162] The matter was raised again on 30 July. The leader of the

[158] See previous chapter.
[159] NZPD, Vol. 162 (26 June – July 23), 1913, 107.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid, 741.
[162] Ibid, 741–42.

Opposition asked Allen what authority he had to offer Britain an expeditionary force. 'I have made no offer', Allen replied.[163]

Two clear and generally held attitudes appear in the responses to Allen's incompletely reported speech. First, while few objected to compelling men to defend New Zealand's shores, and no new opposition surfaced regarding the legal obligation on young men to train, New Zealanders were not comfortable with conscripting men to serve overseas. Second, while no doubts were raised about the willingness of New Zealanders to fight in defence of the empire, peacetime commitments regarding the force New Zealand would provide were unacceptable.

As Allen overcame the issues reporting of his speech had generated, he found himself facing his second major challenge in 1913. This time it was a financial one. Growth in expenditure had increased at a rate higher than growth in government revenue, as Figure 8.3 shows.

	Total Revenue (£)	Rev Growth	Expenditure (£)	Expnd Growth
1910/11	10,297,273		9,343,106	
1911/12	11,061,161	7%	10,340,368	11%
1912/13	11,734,271	6%	11,032,038	7%
1913/14	12,229,661	4%	11,825,864	7%

Figure 8.3 – Growth in New Zealand Government revenue and expenditure, 1909/10–1913/14. Revenue and Expenditure, *Official Yearbook,* 1914.

Hoping to balance the books by reducing expenditure, Allen was challenged by being told that more needed to be spent on defence. Godley advised him that war with a European power would make supplies from Britain nearly impossible to obtain and estimated that a £500,000 stockpile of matériel was required.[164] Expenditure of a

[163] NZPD, Vol. 163 (24 July – 20 August), 1913, 250.
[164] Godley to Allen, 11 July 1913, ANZ AD10 11.

further half million pounds was out of the question; it would have doubled military costs and put the government into the red.[165] In June Allen warned Godley that the defence estimates had been reduced.[166] The defence budget was further reduced in August, when government expenditure was forecast to exceed revenue.[167]

Allen's solution to the provision of equipment was to compromise. He did not think it necessary to 'equip the Territorial forces as a whole … on the scale provided for the British Army.'[168] Items such as carts and horses could, he argued, be sourced from 'the people of the country on mobilization'.[169] Only 'urgent and necessary requirements' were approved.[170] In a supply debate in July 1913, Allen nonetheless argued that expenditure on the expeditionary force was necessary and prudent by referring to the scramble to dispatch the first contingent to the South African War. 'If we had made better preparation [then],' he told the House, 'and had sent the men away fully equipped and prepared, certainly we should have saved some lives and have done even more credit to New Zealand than we did.'[171] Non-naval defence expenditure in 1913/14 was slightly lower than in 1912/13.[172] Containing costs proved difficult. By late 1913 the territorial force budget had been overspent by £28,000 and more than three months remained until the end of the financial year.[173]

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[165] Military (non-naval) expenditure in 1913/14 was £519,333. ANZ AD1 843. Total government expenditure in 1913/14 was £11,825,864, a further £500,000 would have taken expenditure to £12,325,864, some £96,203 more than the government's income of £12,229,661. Revenue and Expenditure, *Official Yearbook,* 1914.
[166] Allen to Godley, 27 June 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Godley to Allen (and notes thereon), 11 July 1913, ANZ AD10 11.
[169] Godley to Allen (and notes thereon), 11 July 1913, ANZ AD10 11
[170] Ibid; Acting Commandant to Quartermaster General, no date; and Quartermaster General's reply to Acting Commandant, 17 July 1913, ANZ AD 10 11
[171] NZPD, Vol. 163 (24 July – 20 August), 1913, 250.
[172] Military (excluding naval) expenditure fell from £529,396 in 1912/13 to £519,333 in 1913/14. ANZ AD1 843.
[173] Allen to Godley, 19 December 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.

Forced to reduce costs, Godley would not compromise on training standards and kept a close eye on training programmes. Officers were required to submit (what were effectively) lesson plans. Godley reviewed them personally. His comments show a clear appreciation of both military expectations and what might be termed educational considerations. A syllabus of cadet training was deemed 'too vague and general'.[174] Seeking to cultivate the spirit and pride that Kitchener had held to be vital, he disliked finding 'wearisome reiteration of the same exercises' and complained that instructors lacked the 'imagination to interest the boys.'[175] Other training plans for territorials were criticised for omitting certain topics, for lack of detail, or for providing insufficient field work.[176] Godley got to the point of wondering whether the Director of Military Training should prepare a syllabus for all drills and parades 'and make them [the instructors] stick to it.'[177]

Against what he called 'a good deal of opposition' from his staff who thought him overly optimistic, Godley insisted that the training camps in 1913 be brigade camps.[178] With the dispatch of an expeditionary force increasingly likely, he maintained that exercises at that level could not be deferred.[179] '[I]f they ever had to fight,' he noted in his autobiography, 'it would be in higher formations, of which they had never had previous experience.'[180] The camps were a success in training terms and in terms of attendance, with 84 per cent of territorials present.[181]

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[174] Minute-Sheet from Chief of the General Staff to Godley, 5 March 1913; and Godley's comments on it dated 12 March 1913, ANZ AD19 20.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 146.
[179] The warship-construction race with Germany continued and the Second Balkan War started in 1913.
[180] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 147.
[181] Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army': 322.

In latter half of 1913 Godley made a visit to Britain to catch up on recent developments.[182] On the way there he visited military training institutions in the United States, and had meetings with the Canadian general staff. In Britain he observed exercises, met government ministers, held discussions with senior military officers, and was given an audience with the King.[183] The Secretary of State for War, John Seely, asked Godley to write a report on the New Zealand forces.[184] The result was a frank reckoning in which he expressed his confidence in the proficiency and quality of the men in mounted, engineer and artillery corps. His concern was the infantry, which tended to fill up with those unsuitable for specialist units, the unfit, the poorly educated, and the recalcitrant. Godley doubted whether New Zealand infantrymen would tolerate the conditions of war or have the perseverance to fight well. He also warned Seely that New Zealand citizen soldiers were a volatile lot, explaining by way of example that 'a slight and temporary shortage of rations [had] almost produced a mutiny.'[185] Godley's return voyage took him via Egypt, where Kitchener urged him to take over as General Officer Commanding in Australia, and then to Australia, where he met with Brigadier-General Gordon and Senator Millen, the new Australian Minister of Defence. Having been informed of the incidents on Ripa Island, one of the matters he discussed with them was enforcement of the compulsory aspects of military training schemes.[186]

In early 1914, not long after his return from Britain, Godley had the commanding officers of territorial units brought to Wellington. There they were

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[182] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 147.
[183] Godley to Allen, 31 December 1913, ANZ AD1 880.
[184] John Edward Bernard Seely, later Lord Mottistone, Secretary of State for War 1912–14, not to be confused with John Robert Seeley, the author of *The Expansion of England* (1883).
[185] Godley to Secretary of State for War, 19 August 1913, ANZ Allen18.
[186] Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 150; Godley to Allen, 31 December 1913, ANZ AD1 880. The Ripa Island incident (see previous chapter) had blown up while Godley was away. Allen kept Godley informed of developments in letters. Allen to Godley, 11 July 1913 and 18 July 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.

made privy to some of the war plans he and his staff were developing.[187] 1914 was also the year that the Inspector-General of Oversea Forces, General Sir Ian Hamilton, was to inspect New Zealand's troops. Knowledge Godley had obtained in Britain helped him shape the training in camps in 1914, which Hamilton would attend. In order to lift skill levels, Godley also increased the number of permanent staff supporting territorial officers. By 1914 there were 56 area sergeants-major and 48 sergeant instructors supporting territorial officers.[188] Despite these improvements, Godley was aware that, as in volunteer days, much unit-level training continued to lack variety and too often consisted of repetitive drill in drill halls.[189] The additional training staff nonetheless made it possible for camps to take on more sophisticated challenges. Training camps in 1914 offered, for the first time in New Zealand, division-level exercises. They were reputedly the largest military manoeuvres run in New Zealand until the 1950s.[190]

While territorial officers and NCOs had, Godley reported, 'shown a marked improvement', the competence of territorial officers varied considerably.[191] Many territorial officers had been officers in the volunteer force. While the weakest of them had been culled in 1911, some under-performing citizen officers remained, and the growth from 12,000 volunteers in 1909 to over 50,000 cadets and territorials by 1914 had increased the need for officers. Even as late as 1914, the presence of former volunteer officers in the territorial force produced manifestations of the volunteers' defiant independence. In February, for example,

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[187] [Steadman?], 'Life Story of Thomas Herbert Steadman', p. 35, AM MS 97/23.
[188] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials,* p. 163.
[189] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, p. 3.
[190] Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 42.
[191] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, p. 4; Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 178.

Godley attended a church parade in Auckland. Two officers were dressed in blue (volunteer) uniforms, out of perversity, Godley thought, because they had not been given free khaki uniforms to replace their old ones.[192]

Nor had much changed in the class of person who became a citizen officer. The 1909 Defence Act had scrapped officer elections and replaced them with promotion from the ranks and exam-based advancement. Godley insisted on egalitarian principles: 'rich and poor, high and low, with no distinctions of class or occupation … all are treated alike', he stated.[193] The majority of territorial officers like the majority of volunteer officers, nonetheless continued to come from the upper levels of society.[194] Territorial officers needed an education and free time. As was almost inevitable, the professional class became the territorial-officer class. Australia had a similar experience. There, the 21 per cent of the employed population with professional or management careers provided 80 per cent of citizen officers.[195] Despite the advantages of their education and career experience, in 1914, as in the days of the volunteers, there was still 'much room for improvement' in officer standards.[196] For this shortcoming, Godley blamed budget constraints, which had, he reported, 'precluded the holding of courses'.[197]

An example of the problems poor officers could cause took place at the Wellington district training camp at Takapau, Hawke's Bay, in May 1914. A number of men were kept in camp beyond the stated period, possibly for longer than they were legally obliged to attend. Concerned that they would not be paid for the extra

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[192] Godley to Allen, 14 February 1914, ANZ Allen1 1.
[193] Godley, 'The Making of the New Zealand Citizen Army': 327.
[194] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, pp. 164–5.
[195] William Westerman, 'The Middle-class at War: The intersection of military, cultural and social histories of the AIF in the First World War' in Tristan Moss and Tom Richardson (eds), *New Directions in War and History,* n.p.: Big Sky Publishing, 2016, p. 33, p. 36.
[196] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, p. 4
[197] Ibid.

time, a group of several hundred other ranks protested. Their numbers were swelled by on-lookers, and the mood was provoked by some agitators who tried to incite the men to violence.[198] The subsequent Court of Inquiry found that officers at the camp should have quelled the disturbance before it attracted a crowd.[199] The court criticised the officers for keeping the men in camp beyond the stated term and without their agreement, and for not making it plain whether or not the men would be paid. The men, the court found, had 'assumed that they were being trifled with.'[200]

The court further noted that some territorials attended the camp reluctantly, some were known troublemakers, and others had been prosecuted for Defence Act offences. 'These men have come to the camp', the court decided, 'with the intention of raising a disturbance whenever an opportunity occurred'.[201] The incident at Takapau exposed a number of concerns: malcontents existed in territorial units, and that even after three years of training, some territorial officers still lacked the necessary command skills, interest in and authority over their men. Both Godley and General Hamilton raised concerns about officer competence in their reports.[202]

Disturbances like those at the Takapau camp mattered more in 1914 because the camps were a central part of General Sir Ian Hamilton's inspection tour.[203] Hamilton had served in both South African wars, was an observer of the Russo-Japanese War and in 1913 was made General Officer Commanding-in-Chief for the Mediterranean.[204] He was also the author of *Compulsory Service,* a 1910 work

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[198] Colonel E. W. Chaytor to HQ NZ Military Forces, 25 May 1914, ANZ AD10 1.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Notes of evidence taken at Court of Inquiry at Takapau, 8 May 1914, ANZ AD10 1.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Defence Forces of New Zealand [Godley report], AJHR H-19, 1914, p. 4; Military Forces of New Zealand [Hamilton report], AJHR H-19A, 1914, p. 21.
[203] Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 89.
[204] McGibbon (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p. 213. In 1915 Hamilton would command the Gallipoli campaign.

(discussed in the previous chapter) which argued against compulsory military training and proposed instead voluntary participation.[205]

Allen had been on tenterhooks about Hamilton's inspection and was worried that any criticisms 'would be very injurious to the scheme.'[206] His concerns may have been based on communications from Colonel Robin, the New Zealand representative to the Imperial General Staff in London. In 1913 Robin had advised that Hamilton was 'very much opposed to compulsory service or training … [and] goes out of his way to condemn it.'[207] At almost the same time, however, Allen received contrary advice from Godley. It happened that in 1913 Godley and Hamilton had been on the same ship from Canada to Britain. Onboard discussions between the men revealed that their differences were few.[208] That understanding probably came as a relief to Godley, who knew that the government had been concerned that an opponent of compulsory military training was about to give an official opinion on New Zealand's compulsory training scheme.[209] Hamilton, Godley wrote to Allen, 'thoroughly realises that the success of the citizen army must depend on the encouragement it gets' and that Hamilton had requested meetings with a range of citizens, not just soldiers.[210]

Hamilton had a different view about meeting dignitaries and making speeches. In a letter to Richard Haldane, he wrote that Allen had asked him to make speeches: 'he [Allen] says that thus, and thus only, can one get at the New Zealand voter—win his sympathy—and defeat the disarmament and pacifist crew, who here

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[205] General Sir Ian Hamilton, *Compulsory Service: A study of the Question in the Light of Experience.* London: John Murray, 1910, pp. 143–47.
[206] Allen to Godley, 12 September 1913, ANZ Allen1 1.
[207] Robin to Allen, 4 July 1913, ANZ Allen13.
[208] Godley to Allen, December 1913, ANZ AD1 880; Godley, *Life of an Irish Soldier*, p. 152.
[209] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 124.
[210] Godley to Allen, 28 July 1913, ANZ Allen18.

are fairly powerful and lively.'[211] Furthermore, Hamilton's staff officer had warned Godley that Hamilton had been fatigued by the 'everlasting speech-making' required of him in his pre-New Zealand inspection tour in Australia, and in letters to his wife Hamilton complained about having to give speeches.[212]

Hamilton's opposition to compulsory military training was known in New Zealand. When Hamilton was still inspecting Australian forces, Godley forwarded him a postcard that had been sent to Allen. The postcard (Figure 8.4) quoted Hamilton's opposition to compulsory military service. It was, Godley said, an example of the 'many leaflets now being circulated by our anti-militarists'.[213] Throughout his inspection tour, Hamilton kept his views on compulsory military training to himself. He received numerous letters from individuals and organisations, many of them critical of compulsory military training, and replied to most of them by politely but unambiguously endorsing compulsory military training in the dominions.[214]


Dominion Series No. 4

15

General Sir Ian Hamilton

Supports **A Volunteer System** as against

Compulsory Military Training.

He writes—"Are we to imagine young men whose elders, safe from service themselves, have passed a law compelling them to serve willy-nilly—are we to imagine them animated by the same moral force as young men who have joined the colours from sheer love of them? If so, then all I can say is . . . . the ideal which has guided British theory and practice for centuries must be wrong and doubly wrong!"

Extract from "Compulsory Service" page 122, by General Sir Ian Hamilton, 1911.

YATES & SULLIVANT, CHRISTCHURCH.

[211] Hamilton to Lord Haldane, 24 May 1914, LHCMA, Hamilton 5/1/11.
[212] Ellison to Godley, 6 March 1914, LHCMA 5/1/69. For example, Hamilton's letters to his wife, 1 May 1914, 21 May 1914 and 25 May 1914, LHCMA, Hamilton 5/1/71–77.
[213] Godley to Ellison, 19 March 1914, LHCMA Hamilton 5/1/69.
[214] See correspondence in LHCMA Hamilton 5/1/80–87

Figure 8.4 – A postcard, believed to have been distributed by an organisation opposed to compulsory military training, forwarded to General Sir Ian Hamilton's staff officer. LHCMA 5/1/69.

In his report on the New Zealand forces, Hamilton stated that he had inspected 36,674 personnel or 70 per cent of the military forces. He described them as well-equipped and well-armed and 'second to none' in terms of 'human material'.[215] The force, however, suffered from a 'want of field-work and of an ingrained habit of discipline'.[216] The poor field skills were, he thought, almost inescapable with citizen soldiers, and discipline would improve as the period under training extended and as territorial officers took more responsibility for training their men.[217] The territorials were 'not perfect, or anywhere near prefect', in some respects they were 'backward', but three years of training had produced 'singularly rapid' improvements.[218]

Although tasked with reporting on the military state of the New Zealand forces, Hamilton also admired the societal benefits of compulsory military training. In terms of the moral and physical effects of compulsory military training on young males, Hamilton was satisfied that the scheme was successful and popular.[219] In private correspondence, he was enthusiastic about the non-military outcomes. In a letter to Lord Stamfordham, for example, he wrote:

> It is difficult to estimate the amount of good this boy training is doing out here—bringing lads from the back-blocks into the towns, and making them guests of kind and refined people for two or three days on end, and, at the

[215] Military Forces of New Zealand: Report by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, 4 June 1914, AJHR H-19a 1914, p. 1, p. 27.
[216] Military Forces of New Zealand: Report by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, 4 June 1914, AJHR H-19a 1914, p. 27.
[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid, p. 8.
[219] Ibid.

> same time, smartening them up morally and physically to an extent which has to be seen to be believed.[220]

One matter that did worry Hamilton was that around one-quarter of potential trainees lived in rural areas where no convenient or cost-effective means of training them had yet been found.[221]

As had been frequently noted in reports during the volunteer era and in Godley's own reports, the skills of territorial officers were (again) found wanting. Hamilton recorded that officers often failed to take their men into their confidence and that, despite the enthusiasm of their subordinates, seldom knew their men's names or occupations. 'Nothing I have written, or shall write, in this report is, I am convinced, so important' Hamilton warned.[222] The perennial problem of indifferent citizen officers was, despite the culling and the training and the best efforts of Godley and his team, still the greatest single weakness in New Zealand's military forces.

Hamilton's inspection tour quite naturally involved some expense, about which Allen was by turns either cheese-paring or open-handed. He complained about the number of officers and orderlies accompanying Hamilton, and termed the 22 hotel rooms and five sitting rooms requested in one provincial centre 'extremely excessive'.[223] Conversely, Allen made cars and the government launch available, should Hamilton wish to go sight-seeing in Rotorua.[224] At first Hamilton disliked his duties in New Zealand. Only a few days into his tour he wrote: 'I may fairly say I am

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[220] Hamilton to Lord Stamfordham (private secretary to the King), 13 May 1914, LHCMA Hamilton 5/1/18.
[221] 'Military Forces of New Zealand: Report by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces', 4 June 1914, AJHR H-19a 1914, p. 18.
[222] Ibid, p. 21.
[223] Allen to Godley, 22 April 1914, ANZ Allen1 1.
[224] Allen to Godley, 8 May 1914, ANZ Allen1 1. Rotorua has geothermal attractions and a lake.

already up to the neck in it'.[225] He later changed his tune: the tour had gone 'very rosily' and towns and cities had competed with each other 'in being as nice to me as they possibly could.'[226]

Godley was delighted with Hamilton's report. He described it as 'most gratifying' and told Allen that Hamilton's remarks concerning readiness for war were 'a great feather in the cap of New Zealand'.[227] So pleased was he that Godley wanted the report printed in pamphlet form. He even made recommendations about the colour of the cover and the paper size.[228] The government too was pleased with the report and arranged for Godley to be knighted.[229]

Hamilton's report needs to be read, however, in the light of an agreement he made with Allen. On 12 September 1913 (just months after the incidents on Ripa Island), Allen informed Hamilton that the military system in New Zealand was in a precarious state and that any 'adverse criticisms' in his report could endanger the success of military training.[230] In his reply, Hamilton recognised Allen as his employer, agreed to provide him with drafts of the report. He assured Allen that 'should he consider certain subjects too delicate for my handling, they may be altogether omitted'.[231] Hamilton had made a similar arrangement regarding his Australian report, and had allowed the Canadian Minister of Defence to review the draft of his report there.[232] Hamilton defended the practice by maintaining that it

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[225] Hamilton to Lord Stamfordham (private secretary to the King), 30 April 1914, LHCMA Hamilton 5/1/16–16.
[226] Hamilton to Lord Haldane, 24 May 1914, LHCMA, Hamilton 5/1/18.
[227] Godley to Allen, 4 June 1914, ANZ AD10 11.
[228] Godley to Allen, 4 June 1914, ANZ AD10 11.
[229] Kinloch, *Godley,* p. 91.
[230] Allen to Hamilton, 12 September 1913, cited in Hamilton to R. H. Brade (Assistant Secretary, War Office), 19 November 1913, LHCMA, Hamilton 5/1/73.
[231] Ibid.
[232] Ibid.

adhered to agreements established at the 1911 Imperial Conference.[233] In remarks to the press, however, Hamilton asserted that his report was frank: 'I have tried to live up to their [New Zealand government's(?)] repeated exhortation to me to speak the truth and shame the devil; only I tried to do it nicely.'[234] Hamilton left New Zealand on 4 June 1914. Two months later war was declared.

Naval and military authorities across the empire had been preparing for war for some time. From at least 1910 dominion governments had received instructions regarding preparations for and procedures in the event of war.[235] In late July 1914 the Senior Naval Officer in New Zealand, Captain H. J. T. Marshall, ordered ships coaled, and on 30 July New Zealand's four military districts were instructed to prepare for mobilisation and given instructions for the processing of volunteers. In the first days of August the inspection of vessels arriving at New Zealand ports commenced, censorship was introduced and port batteries were manned night and day.[236]

The government made it plain that, unlike the South African War, this time there would be no community-raised units such as 'Rough Rider' contingents, and no political involvement in officer appointments.[237] The territorial system would provide the volunteers for any expeditionary force, which Major-General Sir Alexander Godley would command. Territorials—or anyone—willing to fight could volunteer. Prime Minister Massey expected between 7,000 and 8,000 to volunteer. Within a week, 14,000 had offered their services.[238]

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[233] Ibid.
[234] 'New Zealand: An Earthly Paradise', *Nelson Evening Mail,* 5 June 1914, p. 5. The article's content had been provided by United Press Association and appeared in numerous other newspapers.
[235] Colonial Office to Governor NZ, 30 June 1910, ANZ G2 Box 18.
[236] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 245; Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 126.
[237] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 127.
[238] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 193.

The territorial system General Nicholson had drafted for New Zealand in 1909, and which Godley and his officers had implemented, was designed so that each district would supply a roughly equal number of trained volunteers whose specialisations (infantry, artillery, mounted rifles etc.) would combine into a balanced national expeditionary force.[239] It quickly became clear that not even the first echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force could be raised on that basis.[240] There were four main problems: rural areas found it difficult to fill their quotas; urban districts had more volunteers than required; the majority of those who volunteered were not in fact territorials; and a significant proportion of territorials were either under enlistment age (20 years) or failed to pass the medical examination.[241]

The nature of employment in country districts (owner-farmers, the self-employed, share-milkers) meant that many rural men could not easily leave their jobs, and those whose occupations provided them with accommodation would make their wives and families homeless if they left. Domestic obligations were, indeed, a significant consideration for many potential volunteers. Of the men in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force of 1914, 94 per cent were single.[242] They were also predominantly New Zealand-born and Protestant.[243] Regarding their military training, of the 8,400 men in the expeditionary force in October 1914, 6,925 (82 per cent) had received prior military training. Of those, 3,602 had been territorials and were over 20 years of age (see Figure 8.5).[244] The remaining 3,323 men with training

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[239] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 110.
[240] Fred Waite, *The New Zealanders at Gallipoli,* Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd, 1919, electronic version: nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly, Chapter 1 (no page numbers available).
[241] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 251; Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 53; Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 128.
[242] Loveridge, *Calls to Arms*, p. 176.
[243] 74 per cent were New Zealand-born and 86 per cent were protestant. Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 55.
[244] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 196.

had, presumably, been in volunteer corps. Godley's hope of an all-territorial expeditionary force was not realised.[245] Just 43 per cent of the first echelon came from territorial units. It was, however, a different story for officers, 85 per cent of whom (285 of 338) were territorials.[246]



Figure 8.5 – Untrained, territorial-trained and those otherwise trained in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, October 1914. Based on Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 196.

One positive outcome was that territorials were more inclined to volunteer than non-territorials. In 1914, there were 568,161 males in New Zealand.[247] Based on age breakdowns in the 1911 census, 183,698 of them were of enlistment age.[248] Of those, approximately 25,900 were territorials, 3,602 of whom (ca. 14 per cent of

[245] Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 53.
[246] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 128.
[247] *Official Yearbook,* 1915, Population of the Dominion.
[248] 53,180 males (9.36 per cent of the 568,161 males) were 20 to 25 years of age, 58,521 (10.3 per cent) were 25 to 30 years of age, and 52,839 (9.3 per cent) were 30 to 35 years of age. Additionally, 8.43 per cent of males (47,896) were aged 15 to 20. If two-fifths of these (19,158), reflecting the 18 and 19 year-olds in the five-year grouping, are added to those aged 20 to 35, the total number of men of enlistment age was 183,698. *Official Yearbook,* 1915, Ages of the People.

territorials) entered the first echelon.[249] The other 4,800 in the first echelon came from the 157,798 non-territorials, a three per cent participation rate.[250]

The mobilisation of the expeditionary force in 1914 was a dramatic improvement on the improvisation and haste that had taken place during the South African War. The speedy formation and dispatch of a 1,374-strong contingent to capture German Samoa was evidence of the soundness of the preparations Godley had made.[251] Allen was proud that the small force could be formed and sent in just 11 days.[252] The rapid dispatch meant, however, that no military intelligence regarding Samoa was secured.[253] Nor was tropical kit, and woollen uniforms quickly proved unsuitable.[254] Mobilisation in 1914 was not perfect, but it was a distinct improvement on 1899, and New Zealand was the only dominion to mobilise according to its pre-war plan.[255] The most troublesome mobilisation, in Canada, was marked by confusion, conflicting plans and a scramble for matériel.[256] New Zealand's problems and equipment shortages were relatively few and minor.[257]

In the 1950s Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, who served in New Zealand forces in both world wars, deemed the expeditionary force of 1914 a better

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[249] Godley's report, Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, gives 25,684, Hamilton's report, Military Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19A, 1914, gives 25,902.
[250] The 183,698 males aged 18 to 35, less the 25,900 in territorials = 157,798.
[251] Crawford, 'Should we "be drawn into a maelstrom of war"', p. 126.
[252] Colonel Sir James Allen, 'New Zealand in the World War', in J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton and E. A. Benians (eds), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* Vol VII Part II, *New Zealand,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 225.
[253] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 249.
[254] Cooke and Crawford, *The Territorials*, p. 191.
[255] Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience*, p. 63.
[256] George F. G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People,* Toronto: Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1974, p. 310; Wood, 'The Sense of Duty', p. 352.
[257] Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 58; Antje Kampf, 'Controlling Male Sexuality: Combating Venereal Disease in the New Zealand Military during Two World Wars', *Journal of the History of Sexuality,* 17:2 (May 2008), 238; William G. Malone, *No Better Death: The Great War Diaries and Letters of William G. Malone,* edited by John Crawford with Peter Cooke, Auckland: Reed Books, 2005, p. 52.

fighting force than the first echelon of 1940.[258] The question was, were they ready to face the large, well-equipped, conscript armies of European powers? The Australian Military Board determined that had the products of Australia's similar military training system been pitted against an 'efficient enemy' without further training, disaster would have resulted.[259] The Australian Imperial Force, produced from a system almost identical to New Zealand's territorial training regime, also needed months of training.[260] Australian and New Zealand forces were thus first sent to Egypt for further training.[261] As with virtually all armies, and like the Australian Imperial Force, it was experience in war that made the New Zealand Expeditionary Force effective.[262]

One aspect of the expeditionary force that Allen and Godley got correct from the start was reinforcements and replacements. General Nicholson had established the need for replenishment in 1909 and had given wastage estimates in an appendix to his territorial scheme.[263] Adhering to Nicholson's advice (and Field Service Regulations), reinforcements to cover early wastage were sent with the first echelon.[264] To help ensure sufficient replenishments thereafter, Colonel Robin was brought back from London and given the task of restoring the territorial force to its full strength, thereby ensuring a supply of trained replacements.[265] Additionally, the

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[258] Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, 'The New Zealand Army', *Royal United Services Institution Journal,* 102:605 (1957): 70.
[259] Jean Bou, 'Ambition and Adversity: Developing an Australian Military Force, 1901–1914' in *1911 Preliminary Moves*, p. 177, p. 181.
[260] Wilcox, *For Hearths and Homes*, p. 79.
[261] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 255.
[262] Bou, 'Ambition and Adversity', p. 183; Christopher Pugsley, 'At the Empire's Call: New Zealand Expeditionary Force Planning, 1901–1918' in Moses, John A. and Christopher Pugsley (eds), *The German Empire and Britain's Pacific Dominions, 1871–1919,* Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2000, p. 221; Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience,* p. 221, p. 304.
[263] Appendix F, Memorandum on Wastage in War, (Secret) 'Scheme for the Reorganisation of the Military Forces of New Zealand', War Office: 1909, ANZ AD 10 7, pp. 48–50.
[264] Allen to QMG, 20 August 1914, ANZ AD10 8; Godley to Allen, 25 August 19194, ANZ AD10 8.
[265] McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 256.

upper age limit for enlistment was increased from 35 to 40 years.[266] Allen kept replenishment in mind throughout the war, and agreed to the expansion of New Zealand forces only when confident that replacement requirements could be met. Australian and Canadian forces grew without the same restraint and encountered problems maintaining strengths.[267] New Zealand was the only dominion to maintain its expeditionary force at full strength throughout the First World War.[268]

In conclusion, between 1911 and 1914, Godley and his team of British officers introduced to New Zealand unprecedented levels of efficiency and discipline. A stepped approach was taken. Godley first vetted and identified key officers and explained his plans to civic leaders and the public. The training of cadets and territorials was also structured: they were given simple drill and exercises in their own units at first and, as time progressed, more sophisticated skills were developed in larger formations. Officers were reminded of the importance of maintaining trainees' interest and developing unit pride. New Zealand officers and potential New Zealand officers were sent overseas for training. From late 1912, planning for the strategic heart of the compulsory military training scheme commenced: an expeditionary force made up of volunteers from the territorial force. Governments were prepared to invest in the scheme and defence budgets swelled until economic conditions forced some constraints. Similarly, while better training and more support personnel for territorial officers improved overall officer standards, the poor quality of officers remained the most serious shortcoming.

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[266] Memorandum for Communication to the Press, Defence Headquarters, 11 September 1914, ANZ AD10 8.
[267] Pugsley, *The ANZAC Experience*, p. 66.
[268] Pugsley, 'At the Empire's Call', p. 238. New Zealand instituted conscription in 1916. That too aided the maintenance of the expeditionary force.

The core objectives of the compulsory military training scheme (teaching military skills, improving the morality, physical fitness and obedience of young males, and forming a trained territorial force ready to volunteer for overseas service in defence of the empire) were all achieved, somewhat patchily in certain cases, but achieved overall. Over 50,000 youths and young men were being trained. The scheme was held to have improved the behaviour, morals and physical condition of trainees. In 1914 rank-and-file territorials were nearly five times more likely to volunteer for the expeditionary force than non-territorials, and 85 per cent expeditionary force officers in the same year came from territorial units. In just three and a half years, Godley had built a small, trained and relatively balanced citizen army, the first such force New Zealand had ever had.

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CONCLUSION

More than a Military Force

Two of the most telling documents concerning the purpose of New Zealand's compulsory military training scheme and territorial army were 'Conditions of Service and Training', that informed territorial officers that developing 'the qualities of the good citizen' were as important as developing good soldiers, and a *New Zealand Military Journal* article, that explained to citizen officers that the purpose of cadet training was to inculcate 'discipline[,] … respect for authority' and physical fitness, as well as to prepare boys for territorial army service.[1] Pre-1914 compulsory military training in New Zealand had two objectives: to improve the physical condition, morality and obedience of youths; and to address the concern that Germany was a threat to the security of Britain and, by extension, to New Zealand. These two sets of reasons combined to provide compelling reasons for the Defence Act of 1909.

Although the Defence Act was passed in 1909, the justifications for it had been developing for some decades. From the time New Zealand became a British

[1] 'The Conditions of Service and Training of the New Zealand Territorial Force', General Staff, Wellington, 20 April 1911, ANZ AD1 634; Captain G. S. Richardson, 'Some Thoughts on Obligatory Military Training in New Zealand', *New Zealand Military Journal,* 1:1 (January 1912): 16; both quoted in the previous chapter.

colony it experienced profound demographic changes. Not only did the European population increase dramatically, the gender imbalance was virtually normalised, people took to living in towns, and the nature of employment changed. Lonely pioneer farmers and crews of rootless and reckless young male labourers gave way to settled family life and permanent full-time employment. At the same time, and often a result of developments in Britain, there were changes in social values. Alcohol consumption, immorality and larrikinism became less and less acceptable. Aided by improvements in communications (railways, steam ships, the telegraph) new imperialism, muscular Christianity and a respect for military service became tenets of late-Victorian and Edwardian thinking throughout the empire. A significant number of New Zealanders were nonetheless concerned that the youth of the dominion, especially young urban males, failed to accept these values. They saw military training as a remedy and accepted that, to have any effect on correcting youth behaviour and thinking, it would need to be compulsory. Thus, instituting compulsory military won the approval of many not because military instruction was involved, but because it promised a cure for worrisome social ills.

There were also strategic and military justifications for the Defence Act. In many ways the Royal Navy was the guarantor of security for the British empire. By 1909 it was clear to every (white) citizen of the empire that the Royal Navy was being challenged by Germany. Moreover, the likelihood of armed conflict in Europe had been increasing for years. Seven years after the end of the South African War, it appeared that another, larger war was imminent. The threat Germany posed had facilitated empire-wide consensus on three critical matters. First, and as had long been the case, no one doubted that dominion citizens would volunteer to fight if the empire were in danger. The South African War had proven that. Second, the

insistence by dominion prime ministers that their citizens would not tolerate peacetime commitments to the size of their dominions' wartime support had finally been accepted by the War Office and the British Government. Third, dominion leaders recognised that their citizen soldiers and officers needed to be better trained, and that British military doctrine, arms and methods should be used in dominion forces in order to aid integration (of volunteers from those forces) into imperial formations in wartime. These matters provided dominion governments with sound reasons to reform their military training programmes and their military forces.

The widespread approval the New Zealand Defence Act of 1909 received might imply that the military schemes it introduced would be warmly received. In early 1910, just a few months after the passage of the Act, Lord Kitchener made a tour of inspection. With volunteer corps disbanding, training not yet started and the territorial army yet to be formed, there was little for him to inspect. His visit nonetheless drew crowds of well-wishers and gave military matters a fillip. Major-General Godley did not arrive in New Zealand until late 1910. His speaking tour in early 1911 went over well, but by mid-1911 only 60 per cent of those liable for cadet or territorial training had registered.[2] Between 1912 and 1914 approximately 20 per cent of those liable for training did not register.[3] To add insult to injury, those who failed to register were almost never identified.[4] Little more than half of those liable to receive training took part in training.[5] The general public might have endorsed compulsory military training for youths, but one-fifth of youths were

[2] Nature of Service, Chapter 36, Section XI, *Official Yearbook,* 1911.
[3] See Figure 7.3 in chapter 7.
[4] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 311.
[5] See Figure 7.3 in chapter 7.

insufficiently interest to register and nearly a half were not required to take part. A number of citizens worried that the system was unfair.

The issue that most threatened the success of the compulsory military training system was the Defence Act's only means of disciplining trainees: prosecution in civil courts. Between 1911 and 1914, 16,657 cases were brought resulting in 10,897 convictions, the equivalent of 21 per cent of those receiving training.[6] In 1913, 15 per cent of cases heard in Magistrate's Courts were Defence Act cases and constituted over three-quarters of that year's increase in summary convictions.[7] The number of trainees who received criminal records for minor lapses such as missing or disrupting a parade upset many, including the MHR George Russell. Russell was just as distressed that those participating in training were being brought before the courts for minor incidents of misbehaviour while those who neglected or refused to register escaped prosecution.[8] Indeed, of the 16,657 Defence Act prosecutions, just 136, or 1.5 per cent, were for failing to register.[9] 1913 was also the year that an incidence of open defiance of the Defence Act gained attention. A number of Passive Resisters (members of a group of those liable for but opposed to compulsory military training) staged a protest and hunger strike while in military detention on Ripa Island. Their actions garnered them support from pacifists, anti-militarists, socialists, Quakers, trade unions and the Labour party. The Passive Resisters' actions embarrassed the government but, contrary to some assertions in the historiography, did no damage to the compulsory military training system.[10]

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[6] Figure 7.5 in chapter 7.
[7] Figures 7.6 and 7.7 in chapter 7.
[8] NZPD, Vol. 164 (21 August to 18 September), 1913, 305.
[9] Defence Forces of New Zealand, AJHR H-19, 1914, Appendix J, p. 37.
[10] See chapter 7.

In the main, the compulsory training system and the territorial army made good progress. The 1914 inspection report by the Inspector-General of Oversea Forces, General Sir Ian Hamilton, was largely positive. While the quality of territorial officers was a concern, there had been significant improvement overall.[11] The imperial defence purpose of the Defence Act had also received attention. In late 1912 the Minister of Defence, James Allen, approved the commencement of planning for an expeditionary force. Any expeditionary force would be made up of volunteers, ideally the trained men in the territorial army. The public knew little about the expeditionary force capability and in 1913 were disconcerted when press reports of a speech Allen made in London omitted mention of the force's voluntary nature. New Zealanders were distressed by the implication that territorials would be conscripted to serve overseas. A fundamental premise of General Nicholson's plan for New Zealand and the Defence Act's provisions was that the trained men in the territorial army could volunteer for expeditionary service. Their training would provide a skilled force of, hopefully, balanced composition (sufficient infantry, mounted rifles, artillery, engineers) that was ready for integration into an imperial formation. In August 1914 that did not happen.

As had been predicted, New Zealanders volunteered in large numbers. Most of them, however, were not territorials. Just 43 per cent of the men in the first echelon were territorials. While that proportion was less than had been hoped for, territorials were almost five times more likely to volunteer than non-territorials. It was a different story regarding officers. Territorial officers constituted 85 per cent of the first echelon's officer corps. The administrative systems Godley and his

[11] Military Forces of New Zealand: Report by the Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, 4 June 1914, AJHR H-19a 1914, p. 21, p. 27.

officers had put in place worked well. A 1,374-strong contingent sailed for Samoa 11 days after war was declared, New Zealand's mobilisation ran to plan and worked, and from the start provisions for replenishments to cover wastage were always kept in mind.

If at least some of the military objectives of the Defence Act's reforms were met, what of the social remedy the training was expected to effect? It is difficult to answer that question because no one recorded the outcomes. Cadet training, which had been offered in some schools since the late 1870s, had for some time been praised for its beneficial effects on boys.[12] Halting or reversing declines in youth conduct and values was acknowledged as a key reason the public supported compulsory military training.[13] When trainees misbehaved, the public were not upset by their mischief; they were aggrieved that trainees were prosecuted in criminal courts. That members of the public objected to only some youths receiving training while others did not reflected their belief in equality of sacrifice. Their desire for more, or all, youths to be trained also indicated that they were satisfied that compulsory military training was meeting its objectives. In 1914, General Sir Ian Hamilton, a prominent opponent of compulsory military training, was impressed by the moral and physical improvements compulsory military training produced.[14] While there is only limited evidence that trainees' physical fitness, obedience or morals improved as a result of compulsory military training, there is also none to the contrary. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that any progress that was made was, at minimum, sufficient to avoid complaint.

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[12] For example, 'Cadet Camps', *Auckland Weekly News,* 25 February 1909, p. 20.
[13] 'Internal Defence Proposals', *Otago Daily Times,* 13 November 1909, p. 8.
[14] Hamilton to Lord Stamfordham (private secretary to the King), 13 May 1914, LHCMA Hamilton 5/1/18.

Several matters raised in this work would benefit from further research. This thesis has exposed the extent to which compulsory military trainees were prosecuted in civil courts. Further work on those prosecutions and reactions to them would contribute to our understanding of pre-First World War compulsory military training. For what specific breaches were the cases brought, and did these vary over time? What accounted for the high prosecution rate in Canterbury? Why did fewer Defence Act cases result in convictions when compared to other summary offences? How did magistrates and justices of the peace respond to charges and evidence, and what types of sentences did they impose? The way that trainees, their parents, friends and employers responded to trainees being prosecuted needs examination, as does the effects the prosecution of trainees had on public attitudes towards compulsory military training.

More information on the operation of the volunteer system would be valuable. Was a typical parade, as commonly reported, an inspection of buttons and rifles followed by a march around the town, or were training and field exercises undertaken? Did attendance at regular parades differ from attendance at sporting and social events? What proportion of volunteer corps were merely drinking or social clubs? It may also be possible to explain why so few volunteers attended camps and—something of a long shot—to discover the motivations of those who joined corps. Research of this type could help to explain the disparities between corps, and within corps over time. We would move closer to an intimate understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the volunteer system.

The role of women in the decision to implement compulsory military training has been only touched on in this thesis. Nineteenth-century New Zealand saw profound changes in the number and influence of women. Incentives to encourage

young women to emigrate to New Zealand and births in the colony resulted in something close to a gender balance in the colony. Women were prominent in, and often leaders of, moral, temperance and pacifist movements and were enfranchised in 1893. The influence of those movements is evident in the public pressure for and against compulsory military training.

New Zealand history generally, and New Zealand military history especially, would benefit from more biographical research. A number of the people mentioned in this thesis deserve biographies. Colonel Sir James Allen would benefit from a biography.[15] A volunteer officer, the Opposition spokesman on defence in the 1900s, Minister of Defence (and several other departments) from 1912 to 1920, he was the High Commissioner in London and New Zealand's representative at the League of Nations from 1920 to 1926. Allen had to handle the Ripa Island incident, negotiated with Britain about New Zealand's first navy ships, approved Godley's 1912 request to begin planning an expeditionary force, and oversaw New Zealand's involvement in the First World War.

Similarly, Major-General Sir Alfred Robin was one of the colony's best volunteer officers, commanded the first contingent to South Africa and also the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. Robin was later Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand liaison officer to the Imperial General Staff, and Commandant of New Zealand-based troops in the First World War. Although he influenced politicians, military policy, and the culture of the New Zealand Military Forces, he remains a shadowy figure whose importance is likely to have been underestimated.

[15] An unpublished MA thesis presented to the University of Otago in 1943 is available.

A group biography of the British officers on Godley's staff in 1910–14 would also be beneficial. Officers such as Heard and Burnett-Stuart were responsible for the practical establishment of the compulsory military training system and the territorial force. Similarly, further biographical research on New Zealand officers would increase our understanding of New Zealand's pre-1914 military forces. Major Thomas Jowsey, commander of the third contingent in South Africa and who apparently fell out with Robin, would make an ideal case study of (what the limited scholarship suggests was) an 'ordinary' officer. Jowsey's contemporary, Major-General Richard Davies, was a captain in the first contingent, and commander of the fourth and eighth contingents. He served as Inspector-General of the Defence Forces until being sent for training in Britain. There he so impressed his superiors that he was given command of a British infantry brigade. Davies commanded British Army divisions in the First World War and suicided in 1918. He was one of New Zealand's first, perhaps the first, trained, regular officer to reach high rank.

The findings in this thesis have challenged some elements of the historiography. The conduct of Taranaki citizen soldiers in 1860–61 reflected their resentment that steps to calm the dispute between Maori had not been taken earlier. Some citizen soldiers were capable and courageous, many made indifferent soldiers and did only the minimum required of them by law. With virtually all citizen soldiers striving to maintain their family life and civilian occupations, few could do more than the minimum, and normal military discipline was impossible to impose. They were neither the natural soldiers of myth nor, in most cases, enthusiastic fighters.

By 1880, when internal security had been achieved and foreign aggression became the concern, there was no longer a strategic justification for 60 per cent of volunteer corps. Governments and the public seldom took any interest in volunteers

or defence and virtually nothing was done, despite repeated pleas for reforms. The contention that volunteers had political sway has been shown to be unlikely because, if able to influence governments, defence budgets would have been larger, reforms initiated, officer standards improved, and volunteers better treated.

The 1909 defence reforms recognised the social objectives of the scheme: creating loyal, fit, moral and disciplined citizens. Moreover, the Long Depression had been replaced with prosperity, and the Liberal party was losing ground to the more conservative Reform party. If British general history cannot, as Edgerton maintained, be understood without including military matters, New Zealand's military history, especially around the pivotal turn of the twentieth century, cannot be properly understood without recognition of the social, political and economic matters that affected decision-making on military matters.[16]

A raft of social, demographic and value changes took place in New Zealand, and in much of the Western world, around the turn of the twentieth century. Morality, discipline, respect for military service, the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race, new imperialism, and muscular Christianity (to name a few) became social imperatives. Coupled with the enfranchisement of women, a buoyant economy, improvements in communication, new forms of employment, urbanisation and, critically, threats to the security of the empire, two justifications for compulsory military training and a better military force emerged in New Zealand. Military training could inculcate in youths the new values, and New Zealanders came to understand that its defence included the defence of the empire. There was the money to fund the cost of such initiatives, and by 1909 New Zealanders no longer

[16] For more on Edgerton's views regarding military and general history see the introduction.

dismissed defence matters as irrelevant but talked of them often and requested action on them from their government.

The South African War of 1899–1902 was not the agent of change in New Zealand that it was in Britain. While it exposed to senior New Zealand officers and some ministers that military reforms were needed, no action was taken. Participation in South Africa did, however, demonstrate the extent of the financial contribution New Zealanders were ready to make to send men to fight for the empire. What tipped the scales for New Zealand and the other dominions was the rise of a threat from Germany. A more serious commitment to imperial defence began to be made by dominion leaders in 1907 and stepped up in 1909.

The passing of the Defence Act of 1909 was warmly received by the public. It was less welcomed by the youths who were to receive compulsory military training. As findings here have shown, 20 per cent of those liable to register did not do so. It offended many that those youths were neither identified nor prosecuted. Little more than half of those who registered actually received training. Because a significant number of people expected the training to be universal (including all youths) as well as compulsory, it was often thought unfair that only some had to train. What upset more, however, was that trainees, some as young as 14, were prosecuted in criminal courts, usually for minor lapses in behaviour or attendance. While open defiance of the Defence Act has been examined (and its influence often exaggerated) in the historiography, the prosecution of trainees has been overlooked—despite the fact that by 1914 one-fifth of those in training had a criminal record for breaching the Defence Act.

The territorial army the Defence Act of 1909 made possible was intended to provide a force that could be ordered to defend any part of New Zealand. It was also

expected that its members would volunteer to serve overseas in defence of the empire. Additionally, it was hoped that members would volunteer in a relatively even way so that infantry, mounted, artillery and engineering functions would be suitably represented in the voluntary expeditionary force. Despite the closely monitored and structured training, the equipment that had been purchased, the field exercises that had been run, and the inculcation of loyalty, service and discipline, the result was disappointing so far as men went. Just 43 per cent of the first echelon's other ranks were territorials. By contrast, territorial officers made up nearly all its officer corps.

The main aim of this thesis was not to assess the success or failures of compulsory military training and the territorial army, but to expose why they were instituted. The public's confidence that compulsory military training would help remediate perceived social shortcomings was one reason. The need for a better military force, one that could defend New Zealand and form a voluntary force to defend the empire was the other. The territorial army (and the training that supported it) was always more than a military force.

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