Analyzing oppositions in the concept of visuality between aesthetics and visual culture in art and education using John R. Searle's realist account of consciousness

Author:
Francini, Althea

Publication Date:
2009

DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26190/unsworks/20393

Analyzing Oppositions in the Concept of Visuality Between Aesthetics and Visual Culture in Art and Education Using John R. Searle's Realist Account of Consciousness

Althea Francini

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the College of Fine Arts

University of New South Wales, Sydney

2009

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

Signed ……

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

‘I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).
I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.'

Signed …….....
Date …….....

AUTHENTICITY STATEMENT

‘I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format.’

Signed …….....
Date …….....

Abstract

In art and education, theorists dispute the concept of visuality, or how meaning occurs from what we see. This study examines two opposed and acrimoniously entrenched theoretical perspectives adopted internationally: visual culture and aesthetics. In visual culture, visual experience, including perception is mediated by background cultural discourses. On this approach, subjectivity is explained as conventional, the role of the senses in making meaning is strongly diminished or rejected and from this, accounting for visuality precludes indeterminate and intuitive aspects. Differently, aesthetic perspectives approach visual meaning as obtaining through direct perceptual and felt aspects of aesthetic experience. Here, subjectivity remains discrete from language and the role of cultural discourse in making meaning diminishes or is excluded. Each description is important to the explanation of visuality in art and education, but problematic.

To start, the study outlines the central explanatory commitments of both visual culture and aesthetics. The study identifies problems in each with their explanations of subjectivity or self. Both positions maintain from earlier explanations of cognition that separate theoretically and practically the senses, cognitive processes, and context. The study looks at approaches to mind and representation in accounts of visuality and provides some background from the cognitive sciences to understand the problem further. Contemporary explanation from science and philosophy is revising the separation. However, some approaches from science are reductive of mind and both aesthetics and visual culture theorists are understandably reluctant to adopt scientistic or behaviourist approaches for the explanation of visual arts practices.

The aim of the study is to provide a non-reductive realist account of visuality in visual arts and education. To accomplish this aim, the study employs philosopher John R. Searle's explanation of consciousness because it explores subjectivity as qualitative, unified, and intrinsically social in experience. By doing this, the study addresses a gap in the theoretical understanding of the two dominant approaches to visuality. The key to relations between subjectivity and the world in reasoning is the capacity for mental representation. From this capacity and the rational agency of a self, practical reasoning is central to the creation, understanding, and appreciation of art and imagery. This account of consciousness, its aspects, and how it works includes description of the Background, as capacities enabling the uptake and structuring of sociocultural influence in mind. Crucially, the study shows how the capacity for reasoned action can be represented without dualism or reduction to the explanatory constraints of behavioural or physical sciences, an important commitment in the arts and education.

In this explanation, the study identifies epistemic constraints on the representation of mental states, including unconscious states, in accounting for practices as reasoned activities. Centrally, the study looks at how, from the capacities of consciousness and the self's freedom of will, visuality is unified as qualitative, cognitive, and social. In exploring Searle's explanation of consciousness, some account of current work on cognition extends discussion of a reconciliation of visuality on these terms.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents *cont.*

Table of Contents *cont.*

Table of Contents *cont.*

Table of Contents *cont.*

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the result of many people's interest and effort. My first debt of thanks is to Dr. now Emeritus Professor, Neil C. M. Brown, who supervised the work. Professor Brown's commitment to research, arts education, and his students is exceptional. His thoughtful engagement, insight, humour, and kind mentorship have been essential to this project in every respect.

I thank these people for their generosity in the practice of scholarly community: Professors Paul Duncum, Alison Gopnik, and Martin Jay do not know me personally, but each one contributed to this thesis, sending me hard to find papers and references or answering questions. Professors Max Coltheart and Jerrold Levinson were also kindly helpful.

Many people at the College of Fine Arts were essential to the project. Dr. Kerry Thomas's extensive knowledge of education provided critical support in the exchange of ideas. I also deeply value her sense of care for the well-being of colleagues and students. I am particularly indebted to the people at the Clement Semmler Library. Their support, as individuals and collectively, represents for me the highest level of professional conduct. I thank those in the School of Art History and Art Education, especially Dr. Gay McDonald for her patience and courtesy. As well, my students in visual arts, design, and education deserve mention for their enthusiasm and interest in research, and thanks, for teaching me so much.

I am extremely fortunate to have had a number of outstanding teachers, throughout my life. I am aware that they transformed my life and the lives of others with their commitment, persisting enthusiasm and patience for the requirements of transmitting knowledge, as well as deep knowledge of their field. In my experience, each one has had a capacity to nurture the best in their students. This effort, I feel, is a critical contribution to the well-being of the world.

My family has been essential in these years. I dedicate this work to each of them: my mother Clarice, my daughter Lucy, and my niece Jade Estel-Watters, from their love, made this work possible. My sister-in-law, Linda Geddes Bradbury brings light to my work, and life. And I am deeply grateful to Graham Burdett for his care and commitment. I am privileged to have dear friends and thank them all for their support, wonderful conversations, and good natured tolerance of my extended absences.

And finally but not least, I am grateful to Sammy, her humour, and her sociability of spirit. Now, she is part of this work.

Note

The study adopts *OED* spelling, but I maintain the variations of authors referenced. All emphasis and parentheses in quotes are consistent with the original unless otherwise specified. In-quote citations are fully referenced in most cases.

Chapter 1
Introduction to the Study

1. Introduction and Aims

In the visual arts and education there is strong disagreement between advocates of aesthetics and visual culture over the explanation of visuality. Visuality concerns how meaning is made from visual experience. The debate is entrenched and acrimonious. On one side, theories of aesthetics focus on the role of aesthetic pleasure, explaining visuality as the intuitive experience of self, separate from language. On the other, theories of visual culture focus on the role of culture, explaining visuality as discursive, or defined by language. The hypothesis of the study is that non-reductive realist account of consciousness can revise the terms of the argument, reconciling the polarized views. To address the hypothesis, I make an account of philosopher John R. Searle's explanation of the unity of consciousness as an appropriate and relevant means for reconsidering this opposition.

The aim of the study is to non-reductively unite the extension of visuality in art and educational explanation by realist account. In order to do this, the study requires three further objectives. The first objective is to understand the two different accounts of visuality in visual arts and education. Aesthetics and visual culture provide two opposing explanations of art and imagery tied to different practices, having different objects. To meet the objective, the study provides accounts of visuality from visual culture and from aesthetics. In visual culture, visuality is mediated. Meaning derives from social discourses in the experience of imagery, broadly defined. In aesthetics, the intuitively felt experience of visuality enables meaning and derives from aesthetic experience of, most particularly, art.

Each explanation provides some understanding of visual experience and how we make meaning. But both accounts divide experience. Aesthetics maintains a separation between the subject and the agency of culture and language. Visual culture holds instead that cultural discourses determine subjectivity and is reductive or eliminative of

an agent self. Both explanations reject a necessary aspect of conscious experience and so they are in some sense dualistic. The dualism in arts explanation reflects the difficulty in epistemology of reconciling the relation between qualitative or felt states and the agency of culture or the world in subjective experience. Traditionally, there is a distinction between the mental and the material world, as describing incommensurably different phenomena. This distinction sustains in arts and education, typically motivated by concern that realism as the model of explanation exemplified in the physical sciences is eliminative or reductive of mind.

So, the second objective is to provide an alternative as correction to the dualism, without reduction of mind, or the mental aspect of experience. To address this goal, the study sets out realist philosopher John Searle's account of consciousness to counter the divided views. Searle explains mind and the existence of mental states as emergent from and consistent with physical, including biological and social reality. Mental states are real and the capacity of mind to represent the world is one aspect of a unified state of consciousness. In this way, Searle's explanation is not reductive of consciousness.

The third objective is to consider how Searle's account of consciousness fits visuality in the arts and education. To meet this, the study discusses Searle's explanation in relation to the current approaches to visuality. From this discussion, a minimal set of realist non-reductive constraints unites the extension of visuality, reconciling the current division between aesthetic and visual culture accounts.

1. 1. Background to the Study

Visuality is a concept referring broadly to how meaning is taken up or made by people through visual experience (Foster, 1988). So, visuality refers to both perceptual and cognitive experience. But use of the term is fluid. Longstanding philosophical concern in aesthetics to approach visuality from perceptual processes, as the physiology of vision, is discounted in contemporary argument. In discourse on art and imagery, the term has come to distinguish the operations of vision by marking out social or cultural dimensions of practices in contrast to biological or perceptual operations of sight

(Foster, 1988). Visuality is now more commonly explained as the discursive "articulation of what is seen by a subject embedded in history, and its social and political conditions" (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3).

Approaches to visuality in philosophical aesthetics maintain a commitment to visual processes causing aesthetic experience and typically focus on the explanation of artistic artefacts. Rejecting this approach, visual culture defines visuality in the activity of cultural discourses evidenced in representation generally, as imagery. Not yet clearly defined, the concept of visuality is now employed to cover different disciplinary and academic concerns (Elkins, 2003, pp. 4-5; see also Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. vii). There are "substantial intellectual issues at stake" in the conflict between aesthetic, as subjective, and social theories of art (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 8). The emergence of visual cultural theory and its criticism of the "visual character of art" means that "intellectual orthodoxy in the UK and USA is now firmly focused on the social explication of works of art above all else" (p. 8).

However problematic, theorists suggest "many of the most creative debates and research programmes in contemporary critical theory, postmodern philosophy, aesthetic theory, deconstruction and cultural studies converge and intersect upon the field of 'visuality'" (Heywood and Sandywell, 1999, p. ix). These discourses identify visuality as "one of the central, if contested, terrains of modern critical thought" (p. ix). Previously in visual arts education and in the arts generally, challenges to the assumptions underlying visuality characteristically polarize the concept's scope and focus. So for example, earlier debates relocated the concept variously between mind and body (Bell, 1977; Collingwood, 1958; Stolnitz, 1977); individual and society (Hughes, 1991; Krauss, 1986); and psychology and neurophysiology (Arnheim, 1974a, 1974b; Gardner, 1983; Gombrich, 1961; Wollheim, 1991). That is, typically, each change marks visuality in terms of opposing agendas.

1. 1. 1. *The Opposition Between Aesthetic and Cultural Experience in Visuality*

Visual arts education reflects a concentration of this debate between social and aesthetic theories, as theorists argue over practical approaches, or practices of visuality, in

teaching and learning. Advocates of aesthetic explanation claim aesthetic experience is the basis for knowledge in understanding of art objects. Alternately, visual culture advocates claim aesthetics oriented education is ethically and practically redundant as class-based and irrelevant. Outcomes to the debate are significant for the field. The two positions are grounded in different assumptions and involve different kinds of practices and objects of concern (Francini, 2001). Aesthetic explanation is exemplified in the curriculum of discipline based art education, although philosophical aesthetics precedes this curriculum structure (Efland, 1990; Gombrich, 1961; Osborne (Ed.), 2000; Wilson, 1997). More recent, cultural or social explanation in art education is exemplified in the curriculum of visual culture and represents a 'textual' approach to imagery (Brown, 1989a; Duncum, 2001; Freedman, 2000a; Tavin, Kushins, and Elniski, 2007).

Competition between aesthetic and social focus is, in significant part, symptomatic of conflicts in the philosophical and psychological assumptions driving the term[1]. The debate polarizes distinctions between the mental on one hand and the material or physical and social conditions on the other (Searle, 1994a). The study summarizes this dualism as an opposition, between self, or subjectivity, and the world. The opposition between aesthetics and visual culture constrains the identity and practices of art and education.

1. 1. 2. *Aesthetic Explanation of Visuality*

Aesthetic explanation provides a conceptual framework for subjectivity and the self in visual arts and education. Focus on the subjective in aesthetics accounts, for the experience and understanding of artistic works, significantly contributes to the construction of artistic identity (Brown, 1989b). This mode of explanation relates to qualitative forms of knowledge from "*the self as an instrument*," providing a framework of reference for the "sensibility and perceptivity" of subjectivity (Eisner, 1998, p. 33). Historically, the aesthetic mode connotes both the "subjective contribution of a form of sensibility to a representation" and the expression of an ""intention of relating a

[1] The political dimensions of the debate as tacit argument for resources, while noted, is not the focus of this study; see Limits of the Study.

representation not to the cognitive faculty but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure""[2] (Guyer, 1997, p. 63).

Aesthetic explanation seeks to extend knowledge of the intrinsically qualitative or felt mode of experience. In aesthetics, meaning occurs from the immediate, or felt, and reflected experience of perceptual (and especially visual) phenomena as a particular kind of pleasure, most typically obtaining in relation with artworks. Aesthetic knowledge concerns both a particular form of experience and exemplary artefacts having artistic rather than, or superseding, practical value. From this concern for aesthetic experience as felt, there is strong interest in mental states, in contrast to behaviour. Study of behaviour in aesthetics is characteristically deflected to the study of artistic practices and the artefacts arising from those practices. And from exploring the role of mental states in the production of works, there is also strong interest in aesthetics towards artistic motivations.

Meaning is enhanced rather than diminished through qualitative experience of the world (Eisner, 1998, p. 35). The detachment, and neutral forms of description employed in scientific or analytic modes of enquiry and explanation are perceived as mechanical or masking the personal (pp. 35-36). Instead, in aesthetics there is emphasis on interpretive methods. And, on the dominant paradigm of depiction, as pictorial representation, philosophical investigation of the aesthetic characteristically focuses on the idea of "pictorial, non-linguistic, thought and its expression and understanding" (Harrison, 1991, p. 215). Concern with expression in aesthetic enquiry also provides knowledge as empathy; the expressed experience of the other is recognized (Eisner, 1998, p. 37). Under these terms, artistic power occurs through personal expression and the beholder accesses aesthetic experience of this expression as a felt or intuited response.

1. 1. 3. *The Limits of Opposing Subjective Experience and Rationality*

From these commitments, aesthetic focus in visual arts education provides important access to and explanation of subjective modes in experience, but also demonstrates

[2] Paul Guyer is citing Kant's *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*; and on the role of pleasure; and see for example, Elliot Eisner on the "delight, the creative thinking and aesthetic experience" of art education (1994, p. 189).

limits. In part deriving from broader problems in epistemology, priority of subjectivity as felt experience in aesthetics has become entrenched as an opposition between emotion, or feeling, and reasoning (Best, 1992, p. 3). The felt or qualitative experience of mental states is explained under these terms as private and inaccessible (Searle, 1994a, pp. 19-20). Reasoning or rationality instead belongs to the public or social sphere and representation in language (Brown, 1989a, p. 30; Harré, 1983, p. 119). The immediate perceptual nature of aesthetic experience is accounted for as non-conceptual and from this, non-cognitive in character (Best, 1992, pp. 1-15). This commitment is more recently revising. But typically the aesthetic still defines an *alternative* domain of experience to the 'real world' or public rationality[3].

So, historically defined as non-conceptual in character, there is a distinction between aesthetic experience and language. The dissociation between the felt quality of mental events as private and inscrutable on one hand, and conceptualization of objective experience as communicable on the other, situates the beholder, including the artist, in a kind of 'otherworld' environment of practice[4]. In aesthetics, visuality is identified with pictorial representation. Opposing the pictorial and linguistic reduces the scope of experiencing art and further, isolates artistic identity from the world. Visuality, here, is "non-discursive" (Ross, 2005, p. 65). Subjectivity as a realm of mental activity dissociated from language plays a significant role in characterizing artistic activity. Art remains identified as an affective domain in contrast to cognitive or psychomotor domains in taxonomies of knowledge (Bloom, 1956; Efland, 1997, p. 5). The aesthetic on this account relies on unmediated and subjective apprehension of an original experience. In its exclusive or exaggerated form, the romantic view of aesthetic experience situates artistic practices in the realm of personal intuition, "'untainted' by cognition, understanding or rationality" (Best, 1992, p. 3).

Explanation of aesthetic experience as a private intuited condition maintains aesthetic practices in art and education as subjective, in contrast to defining real knowledge[5] (pp.

---

[3] On distinctions between private thought and public rationality, see Harré (1983, p. 119).

[4] On distinctions between subjectivity and "the real world," see Searle (1994a, p. 19).

[5] On difficulties with the objectivity of assessment in the arts, David Best argues "arts educators are often their own worst enemies (in arguing against objective criteria), in that they tend readily to accept and

29-33). And from this distinction aesthetics is isolated in curriculum, as it is in epistemology. Demonstrating the legitimacy of its claims to knowledge is difficult. There is a perceived distinction between artistic activity and epistemic objectivity (Best, 1992, p. 32; Efland, 1997, p. 5). Art educators promote the extension of knowledge in visual arts by arguing for alternatives to the constraints of rational or discursive modes of explanation (Ross, 2005). There is questioning of existing models for the publication of research in practices of visual arts and design; the problem derives from sustaining accountable explanation that is not reductive of artistic concerns (see Biggs, 2002). As well, from longstanding commitment to the subjective expressive account of aesthetic practices in art and education, aesthetics is vulnerable to criticism of an ascribed elitism and irrelevance (Duncum, 1999a, p. 46).

1. 1. 4. *Visual Cultural Explanation of Visuality*

Visuality, or "visual matters" in aesthetics, art history, and visual studies is "fraught" with "many competing voices" (Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. vii). In this environment, contemporary art theory increasingly associates visuality with the study of images and culture. In visual cultural discourse, the term 'image' refers to "any likeness, figure, motif, or form that appears in some medium or other" (Mitchell, 2005, p. xiii). Usage of the term 'visuality' now commonly extends to the taking up of meaning as a semiotic process of 'visual' relations to language and culture evidenced in the form of images (Alpers et al, 1996). In contrast to the art disciplinary "model of history," visual culture more typically organizes on what is described as "the model of anthropology" (p. 25).

Visual cultural theorists employ different methods and identify different objects of study (Rampley, 2005a). There is support for a "more active interplay between literary theory and art history" (Melville, 1991, p. 74). Interest lies in a "new social/political/communicational order that employs mass spectacle and technologies of visual and auditory simulation in radically new ways" (Mitchell, 1995b, p. 207). Characteristically, visual culture expresses lack of interest in "older cultures," the formal concerns of aesthetics, and "canonical" artworks (Elkins, 2003, p. 17). Most

---

proclaim the subjectivist doctrine – probably because they see no alternative" (1992, p. 29, parentheses added).

notably and controversially, visual cultural interests mark the breakdown of traditional boundaries between “verbal” and “visual” disciplines (Mitchell, 1995b, p. 207). Typically, advocates look for revision of art historical methods to semiological approaches in the investigation of artworks and other artefacts (Bryson, 1991, p. 61). Concern with the nature of “representation and mediation” disposes the emerging field of visual cultural studies to investigate “production of political power through the use of media” (Mitchell, 1994, p. 3).

In art education, advocacy of visual culture seeks critical revision of aesthetic concerns and approaches (Freedman, 2000a, 2000b). Visual culture focuses instead, most typically, on the material and commodity nature of cultural artefacts (Duncum, 1997, p. 75). In contrast to aesthetic concern with artistic artefacts, “frameworks of media and cultural studies” are employed to “consider the various ways in which visual culture relates to broad social processes” (2001a, p. 108). Social or cultural concerns allow engagement with “multiple layers of meaning” through semiotic approaches (Duncum, 1991, p. 32; quote from Freedman, 2000b, p. 10). Advocates argue this form of cultural enquiry allows art education to approach mass and new media “with the appropriate conceptual tools” (Duncum, 1997, p. 71). Characteristically, these instruments consist in “critical social theory” (Freedman, 2000a, p. 319).

1. 1. 5. *The Limits of Revising Art to a Semiotics of Visual Culture*

As with aesthetics, there are constraints on the philosophical and psychological assumptions of visual culture. Theories of visuality directly affect both the content and methods of art and education (Efland, 1990, 1997). Study of new media and forms, the reconsideration of methods, and reflection on assumptions provide further means for teaching and learning about art and imagery (Elkins, 2003, p. 36-37; Freedman, 2000a; Brent Wilson, 2003). And semiological accounts, paradigmatically since Nelson Goodman’s work, extend the interpretive possibilities in accounting for art (see Goodman, 1968). But identifying art and education with semiotic approaches ties explanation to the conventions of social practices. Critics argue commitment to a “socially constructed” account of seeing based on rejection of perceptual aspects of

visual processes means visuality “remains in need of a sensory foundation” (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 6).

Other criticism argues against the literary methods of visual culture, saying that the “study of literature and the study of the visual arts” cannot be understood as “symmetrical activities” (Melville, 1991, p. 74). There is concern that the “reading of images as if they were texts” can risk “concluding that they are nothing but texts with no remainders that make them specifically visual” (Jay, 1999, p. 16). Other critics argue more strongly that sociological approaches, as social theories of art, are reductive. The critical project of “combining theory with emancipating struggle” is itself seen as a form of violence (Heywood, 1997, pp. 56-57).

Visual culture at present constitutes an emergent approach to the explanation of art and imagery. But from its criticism, there is strong rejection of longstanding practices of aesthetics based enquiry in the visual arts and secondary and tertiary education (Tavin, 2005, p. 114; 2007). Advocates oppose contemporary art and educational practices in revolutionary terms. The basis of argument for “paradigmatic change in art education” means the discourse of advocacy for visual culture maintains emphasis on “radical critique” (2005, p. 114). Polarization of the discourse occurs through means of “ideological debate” (see p. 114).

Argument of this kind challenges preceding field-dependent engagements through politicization as “dichotomies”[6] (p. 114). Institutional practices such as visual arts, including design, and education function within a context of prior and ongoing theoretical and practical concerns (Boyd, 1976, 1988). These concerns are understood because of a background of knowledge specific to disciplinary, or conceptual structures (Bauerlein, 2004, p. 5; Searle, 1995a, 2001). Opposition to existing practices in visual culture seeks the revision of art and education to an undetermined interdisciplinary basis.

[6] On field dependent criteria of knowledge see Toulmin (1982).

There are claims this kind of extension is unqualifiable[7]. Related to this concern, criticism argues the indeterminability of claims made from such an eclectic and unresolved theoretical basis (Bauerlein, 2004). There is also argument against the "different knowledge, strategies, and skills" distinguishing visual cultural studies' objectives from those intentions underlying artistic objectives concerning works of art (Silvers, 2004, p. 21). Further challenging is visual culture's committed heterogeneity to disciplinary frameworks (see Culler, 1982). Visual culture functions as an "expanded field of inquiry whose boundaries are anything but clear" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 233).

Semiotic analysis provides a "protean engine of meaning" (Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. xi). And, there are variations in the functions, limits, and objectives of semiotic analysis (see Bal (Ed.), 2004; Eco, 1986, 1990). But within semiotic description, properties of artistic works "assimilate… to writing and language" (Elkins, 1998, p. 18). And without alternative frameworks of meaning-making, semiotics renders visual artefacts pictorial "opportunities" for cultural narratives (p. xii). The irrationality, opacity, and unruliness of "marks, lines, traces, edges, outlines, surfaces and fields" reduce to "orderly systems of signs" (pp. xii-xiii). When this occurs, "semiotics (and linguistic models in general) may appear more as simplifications than as adequate models" (p. xiii).

Criticism of the sufficiency of visual culture analysis occurs first, towards the semiotic detachment of "defining features of objects and performances in the arts" from their "specialized material and technical characteristics" and the rationality of cognitive-based theories that deny "non-rational investments" in performances (quote from Brown, 2003, p. 286; see also Elkins, 1998, p. 18; Janks, 2002). Second, there is "dissonance" between art history, aesthetics, and visual studies, occurring in text functioning "as the general precondition for all notions of language, meaning, and presence" (Mitchell, 2002, pp. 232-235).

The representation of subjectivity and agency in visual cultural studies, like aesthetics, is problematic and provides the focus to this study. Characteristically, in visual culture,

[7] See W. J. T. Mitchell on "visuality" as the object of visual studies; Mitchell says, "it is a capacious topic indeed, one that may be impossible to delimit in a systematic way" (citing Foster, 1988; Mitchell, 2002, p. 233).

identity is fragmented and agency reduces to either ideological opposition or is eliminated by cultural determinism. There is also debate over "post-structuralist thinkers who would insist that there is no way out of the web of representation – not even our own – so that our access to the real is effectively occluded" (Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. xiv). On this strong relativism, the world exists only from a point of view, and so as language. The concept of identity is determined in visual cultural accounts by the mediation of meaning within the "complex intertextuality of images"[8] (quote from Duncum, 1997, p. 74). The "antirealist" basis of semiotics (Bal and Bryson, 1991, p. 174) disposes it to a rejection of sensory aspects of works as entailing formalist or psychological accounts of perception (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3).

Scholars of aesthetics also argue their effort to account for art objectively. Historically, these theorists say, the "intrinsically reflective structure of the aesthetic response" has provided philosophy and art history with objective criteria to account for the development of understanding (Gero, 2006, pp. 4-5). From this commitment, critics express reluctance to the "move to absorb art history into semiology" on the basis that this revision instead "may pull the field away from a developed sense of objectivity that is one of its central strengths" (Melville, 1991, p. 75).

In contrast, advocates say semiotic analysis in visual culture is an important methodological means for cross-disciplinary enquiry. The study gives attention this concern. But revision of art and educational practices from focus on artistic production and appreciation to critical cultural analysis shifts emphasis from the pictorial as aesthetic to the linguistic as critical analysis (Francini, 2001). The characteristic claim in visual culture that all representation is linguistic or languagelike[9], is problematic. In current research, argument "that all languages of the brain ultimately must be translated into a common underlying language" is rejected (Galaburda, Kosslyn, and Christen,

---

[8] See Paul Duncum, on the "absence of a unified self, and instead… fragmented identities and a de-centered self;" Duncum says, "we need to view students as free-floating agents who create meaning out of the bits and pieces of stories, images and objects that envelop them" (1997, pp. 73-74).

[9] On semiotics and the "heritage of the linguistic turn" from cognitivism, including "the language of thought and computational theories of mind" see Daddesio (quote from p.92), drawing on Jerry Fodor (1975). It should be noted that the influence of a language of thought as a concept, on semiotics, makes reference to Fodor's work, but the philosopher Jerry Fodor is a realist and not a relativist.

2002, p. 9; see also Kosslyn, 2002). On that account, there is the question of a distinction between the practical and theoretical basis of the visual arts and literary-based studies as language practices (Brown, 2006; Francini, 2001).

1. 1. 6. ***Visuality in the Context of a Realist View of Consciousness as a Unified State***

In accounting for the creation, production, and understanding of artefacts including artworks, the role of mental states in practices is critical. In the visual arts and education, interest in this knowledge concerns the development of artistic and interpretive capability from naïve to practiced states. As the practical activity of knowledge acquisition, the development of artistic expertise requires unity between the physiological, psychological, and social aspects of experience. Isolation or reification of any of these agencies does not properly characterize how learning occurs; rather, there is integration (Tononi, Edelman, and Sporns, 1998, p. 474). The coherent integration of information occurs from interactive elements of the brain (Friston, 2004, p. 973; Rueda, Posner, and Rothbart, 2005, p. 576). And this interaction enables adaptation (Tononi et al, 1998, p. 474).

Accounting the causal role of thinking in the activity of practices is a longstanding difficulty in epistemology. But isolating and opposing aspects of consciousness does not represent the required coherence of a 'self' in practice, or articulates it poorly in dichotomized terms. Currently, scientific methods are revising in the study of consciousness (Chalmers, 2004, p. 1117). And investigating the role of mental states in reasoned actions increasingly propels science research[10] (Frackowiak, Friston et al (Eds.), 2004); Gazzaniga (Ed.), 2004; Squire, Bloom et al (Eds.), 2003). In philosophy, Searle's realist account describes biological, psychological, and social phenomena as a causal network in consciousness (Searle, 2000a, 2001). Background capacities enable consciousness as self or 'I' to adapt (1995a). In consciousness, the dominance of any single categorical distinction as a division between self and world is misleading. Rather,

[10] Investigations into mind also draw on research in the arts for understanding of felt states and thinking. See for example, Bloom (1996), citing the work of Jerrold Levinson; Carruthers (2006b), on the work of Marcia Muelder Eaton; Susan Feagin and Levinson. But Levinson, for example, argues Paul Bloom's attributions and Peter Carruthers argues strong modularity of mind, which this study rejects.

there are “intricate linkages between private mind, public behavior and brain function” (Damasio, 2000, pp. 14-15).

From John Searle’s account, mental states are real phenomena. Consciousness is irreducibly qualitatively subjective, and unified in experience (1998a, p. 204; 2002a, p. 41). As neurophysiological processes, the brain system both causes and realizes conscious states (2002b, p. 61). Thinking and feeling, “go on at the same time in the same field of consciousness” (1999, p. 74). The world exists independently of our knowledge of it and our access to the world is available perceptually for instance, through touch and vision (pp. 10-29). As a realist, Searle rejects dualism (2002a). And having the capacity to represent the world in mind, people can also share social, including institutional and conventional facts as an aspect of their background of consciousness (p. 153).

In philosophy of mind, ‘intentionality’ describes the mind’s ability to represent objects and states of affairs in the world (1995a, pp. 6-7). Searle’s account of intentionality (as representational states) in consciousness addresses the opposed distinctions between subjective and objective ‘knowing’ in epistemology. Consciousness as a unity, in these terms, typically organizes the diversity of phenomena meaningfully in experience. Because Searle holds the ontological reality of mental states, his explanation of consciousness provides non-reductive explanatory means for accounts of practices. And from Searle, the rational agency of the self or ‘I’ in reasoned activity, having freedom of will is not reducible to rules in social practices (2001). Searle’s account in this way provides alternative philosophical explanation to relativist account of the self in practices.

1. 2. Significance of the Study

Evidence of the need for this enquiry lies in the unhappy and dichotomized relations between aesthetic and cultural theories in the literature of art theory and education (Eisner, 1994; Elkins (Ed.), 2006; Holly and Moxey, 2002; van Eck and Winters, 2005). Advocates of aesthetic and cultural views most typically each seek priority of a

particular aspect of visuality and from this, the practical commitments vary significantly in art and education. On one side, argument for the theoretical base of the field strongly concerns aesthetic value (Eisner, 1994, p. 189). In practices of aesthetics, there is emphasis on the study and production of artworks (2002, 2005). On the other, visual culture theorists claim the explanation of art from cultural, or social agency (Freedman, 2000a, p. 320). In practices of visual culture, there is emphasis on the critical study and production of material culture (Duncum, 2003).

Each side of the debate, as a species of argument between formalism and relativism, seems to exclude the principles or values of the other (Crozier and Greenhalgh, 1992). But, "it is a false opposition" (p. 84). Arthur Efland proposes a middle position in this binary through inclusion of both aesthetic and cultural values in the discursive practices of the field (Efland, 2004). This proposal is important, but cannot account for the inherent dualism sustaining the oppositions in each account. In recent years, the discourse of visual culture has largely marginalized aesthetics. And from this criticism, there is foreseeable risk in art and education of the reduction or loss of aesthetics, both of its practices and as an epistemic framework for perceptual or subjective, as felt, experience. This study seeks in part to rectify this marginalization, without further opposing the accounts.

The debate in art education is also tied to the frustrations of accounting the arts as educationally valid (see Davis, 2008; NACCCE, 1999; Urmacher and Matthews (Eds.), 2005). Felt experience in the making of meaning counts as an aspect of knowledge in the arts. But there is a common perception that reductive positivist or behaviourist mechanisms drive education's institutional constraints (Eisner, 1992b; Shulman, 2005). In scientific modes of account, the internalization of all experience renders explanation of aesthetic events "objectively false but subjectively true" (Barone, 1992, p. 33).

In this dichotomy, the discourse of artistic practices frequently "collapses inward into the internal imaginative realm of human meaning" (p. 33). Alternately, to address this problem in the representation of artistic knowledge, there is increasing attention to linguistic forms of account (Duncum, 1993). But there is concern that emphasis on

discursive methods is a reduction to literal kinds of knowing[11], for example, as critical literacy. The solutions proposed simply rehearse the present dichotomy, reinforcing either opposition or identity between visual arts and language.

Underlying the argument is polarized concern for values advocated. Eisner says that "recognizing and accepting the inevitable transaction between self and world seems… more realistic and more useful" (1992a, p. 15). However, there appears little way forward in explaining the relation at present. The significance of the study lies in the provision, from Searle's account, to reconsider this 'inevitable' but epistemologically difficult transaction. Searle makes epistemic and ontological distinctions in the explanation of mental states, providing a framework for their account as real phenomena. And from background capacities and intentionality we can represent the world in mind. Searle develops "a first person account of intentionality, real, intrinsic intentionality, using the resources of logical analysis" (2004a, p. 322).

There is evidence that the appeal of strong relativism typifying visual culture discourse to now is questioned as an approach to accounting the relation between self and world; equally, there is concern for the alternative as explanatory reduction, in the modes of scientific accounting (Jay, 2002; Mitchell, 2002). In the arts, there is criticism of the sciences' approach to knowledge, although increasingly in education there is interest in explanation from the cognitive sciences. In art education discrimination among the various approaches is difficult. For example, some accounts in cognitive science are strongly reductive of mental states, others are not. So, the study provides some explanation of current debates in cognitive sciences on issues directly taken up in theories of visuality in the visual arts and education. In this way, the study enables some understanding of approaches in the sciences that are reductive of mind or otherwise.

Understanding these different views is seen as critical to pursuing viable explanation of visuality in arts and education. For this reason, a non-reductive account of

[11] On the first problem, see Ross, on Eisner's "influential" development of the "arts as a paradigm for non-discursive knowledge" (2005, p. 65); on the second, see Tanner, on limits of traditional schooling and gearing to "facts and skills in an error-oriented curriculum" through "worksheets and workbooks" (2005, p. 40).

consciousness is timely and apt. The explanation of consciousness in the sciences and philosophy concerns the association between biology (now studied in the sciences as neural activity), and volition[12] (Koch, 2004a, p. 1107). So, investigation of consciousness includes concern with the relation between subjective experience, mental representation of the world (as intentionality) and goal-directed action. Disciplined practices require this account since their activities involve the "expression of organized mental activity" (Vernant, 2006, p. 13). As an aspect of human consciousness, freedom of will is crucial to understanding this activity (Searle, 2001). Both current explanations of visuality account a lack of autonomy in the representing mind. There is cultural determinism in visual culture's constraints on agency and biological determinism as an innate disposition in aesthetics. So, account of consciousness is relevant and appropriate; "consciousness and the problem of free will reside at the nexus of the mind-body problem" (Koch, 2004a, p. 1107).

1. 3. Design and Methods of the Study

The framework of philosophical realism is fundamental to the design of this study. The aim of the study is to reconcile current approaches, providing an alternative means for explaining visuality that is non-reductive. The outcome of the study is designed to be minimally prescriptive but enable accountability for the explanation of visuality as realist commitment. The dualism driving the debate between aesthetics and visual culture requires address. Realist account of consciousness provides the base to maintain the practical integrity of both aesthetic and visual cultural forms of account as a reconciliation between mind and world. The fear of philosophical and scientific reduction to accounts in the arts drives anxiety towards realism. But the study is designed to demonstrate that realist explanation of visuality can be both accountable and non-reductive. Searle's work is particularly appropriate to the problem and from his account, rejection of realism in the arts is unwarranted[13].

---

[12] Meanings of 'volition' relevant to this study include "1. An act of willing or resolving; a decision or choice made after due consideration or deliberation. 2. The action of consciously willing or resolving; exercise of the will" (Little et al (Eds.), 1975, p. 2488).

[13] Realism is crucial to the design of the study as an alternative approach to current epistemic mechanisms in explanation in the arts. Knowledge revises "even where premises and inferences occur" from epistemically reliable regulation (Boyd, 1988, pp. 191-192). This regulation includes social,

The study provides conceptual analysis of the two dominant approaches to visuality in contemporary visual arts and education. Debate between aesthetic and cultural explanation is chosen as the most appropriate focus to test the assumptions guiding current theories of visuality. In this debate, differences between the theories articulate in the context of ongoing argument; so opposition identifies and emphasizes distinctions in the literature. These marked oppositions underlie the significance of selecting and working with this focus, since advocates maintain argument for priority of one explanation over the other, in some cases to exclusion of the alternate account. Outcomes to the debate thus significantly affect practices in art, design, and education.

Broadly, there is variation between aesthetics and visual culture concerning their preferred objects of study. But specifically, their argument bases in different approaches to accounting perceptual and cognitive activity in the experience of imagery. Both forms of account are emergent from longstanding epistemological tradition that strongly distinguishes perceptual, as felt, states from cognitive states. The distinction is characteristically rehearsed in art and education as opposing feeling as intuitive, and language as rational. This tradition has led, in aesthetic accounts, to a perceptual as intuitive commitment in explanation. And, in addressing cognitive activity in visual experience, visual culture accounts typically maintain commitment to strongly socially mediated accounts of perception. Each form of account is problematic, reflecting oppositions that are now widely discounted in the cognitive sciences. By designing the investigation around the framework of consciousness, the study enables revision in art and education from superseded epistemic distinctions concerning how we make meaning.

---

technical, and psychological "mechanisms" that test, accept, or reject new theories (pp. 191-192). A background of "relevantly, approximately true" theoretical traditions enables principles of inference or rationality to function (pp. 191-192). Under these terms, methodologies of practices include such legitimate "'tacit' factors" as "'physical intuition(s)'" (pp. 191-192, parentheses added). And realism is appropriate to the explanation of arts disciplinary practices. One "intended consequence" of professional training involves the development of a ""feel" for the issues and the actual physicals materials which the (discipline) studies" (p. 193, parentheses added). As well as the development of knowledge of "explicit theory," intuitions of biological, psychological, and physical kinds function as an "important" part of the epistemic reliability of practices (p. 193). The close relation in a discipline between relevant background theory and the experimental conditions of practices allows judgments to "reflect a deeper understanding" than is evident in the field's "explicit theory" (p. 193).

The study triangulates its analysis of aesthetics and visual culture with philosophical explanation (see Cohen, Manion, and Morrison, 2000, pp. 112-115). As well, there is some situation of Searle's account with current research in the cognitive sciences to extend explanation and further discussion. In taking this overall form, the study provides first, understanding of the 'territory' covered by different meanings of visuality and second, tests the accounts in the context of contemporary explanation of consciousness. As part of this work, the study reviews assumptions guiding the explanation of visuality.

1. 3. 1. *Methodological Framework of the Study*

The study emerges from and extends on prior case study of visual culture in art education (Francini, 2001). This current study uses conceptual analysis as appropriate to the study of visuality in the arts and education (Soltis, 1978). Conceptual analysis involves asking prior questions and making distinctions[14]; it is helpful for "theorizing, practicing or problem solving" (Soltis, 1978, p. 97) in the following ways.

The concept of visuality is indistinct but problematic at present because its terms are argued. And these terms implicitly and explicitly structure arts and educational practices. So in this sense, to analyze the concept of visuality is only possible indirectly through account of its practices, described by relevant scholars. The study asks, 'What are the basic meanings of visuality?' and looks for exemplar uses of the concept in context (Soltis, 1978). By doing this, the study organizes the typical variations through differentiating or distinguishing types of explanation of visuality, as aesthetics and visual culture. Defining the terms of difference, in aesthetics, the concept of self is present in the agency of subjective or felt states in the construction of meaning. And the practical activity of self is identifiable in the perceptual processes of the beholder in aesthetic experience of artworks. In visual culture, the concept of world is present in the

[14] Conceptual analysis refers to the "attempt to describe certain features of the relationship between utterances of the term under analysis, and the beliefs, ideas and perceptions of those who do the uttering" (Neander, 1991, p. 170). Conceptual analysis here broadly involves trying to "describe the criteria of application that the members of the linguistic community generally have (implicitly or explicitly) in mind when they use the term" (p. 170); or simply, it is "an attempt to describe what people think they are referring to" (p. 172). Conceptual analysis is not employed here as theoretical definition (which "is (roughly) an attempt to describe the things referred to") (p. 172).

agency of socially constructed meaning. And the practical activity of world is identifiable in the socialized identity of a subject, as the cultural discourses mediating visual experience of imagery.

These distinctions provide an effective means for understanding the different explanatory approaches to visuality. Analysis of this kind enables comparison between the terms constituting each case, but leads to a further question: 'Are there two kinds of visual experience in reality?' Each account distinguishes an aspect of experience underlying visuality, roughly defined as self or world. In this way both are reliant on the notion of someone experiencing something. But since the views are partial and opposed, they each exclude real account of how that occurs. As the explanation of how we make meaning, I believe that consciousness underlies the possibility of either kind or species of account. That is, consciousness is the ground from which experiencing something is made possible. So, the prior condition for accounting how we make meaning requires understanding what consciousness is and how it works. To test the sufficiency of aesthetic and cultural explanations of visuality, the study compares the accounts with the more general conditions of consciousness. This method provides a way of first analyzing and testing and second, revising current accounts of visuality that underlie practices in the visual arts and education.

1. 4. Limits of the Study

The accounts of aesthetics and visual culture are based on relevance to the current advocacy of either aspect and each is synopsized, employing recognized theorists. The mass of literature relative to both aesthetic and cultural theories requires the study to form a minimum structure of necessary and ongoing concerns. Some brief historical background furthers explanation of concepts and continuing debates affecting the explanation of visuality. With both aesthetics and visual culture there is emphasis in the study on the considerations of subjectivity since it clarifies problems with current accounts. Means for the explanation of consciousness limits to John Searle's

philosophical realist explanation. But the limitation to Searle's work on consciousness is, in my view, a valid approach[15].

The study employs Searle's work to consider a realist approach to accounting visuality. From this means, there is coherence across a wide range of explanatory interests. The study does not defend Searle's work, but there are contrasts to his views that require explanation in order to understand the relevance of certain points. For example, the irreducibility of the first-person features of mental states is crucial to this study. So, Searle's work is set out with some account of alternate perspectives to further explanation. Also, I do not criticize Searle's specific theses and offer only general contrast with other approaches, for instance functionalism. There are many, and strongly argued, views in the explanation of mind[16]. The study also draws on a small but representative sample of work in the cognitive sciences on cognition, reasoning, felt experience, and practical or goal-directed action.

More generally, the study outlines the debate between visual culture and aesthetics but excludes advocacy of either account. There is some criticism of intrinsic difficulties with both explanations, to provide structure. But the value of both forms of account is explicitly expressed and I hope, represented. Nor does the study pursue detailed explanation of the methods of each. Rather the investigation outlines the broad form and reasoning behind their concerns and approaches. Further, from its focus on the preceding conditions of visuality, the study also does not advance a systematic model of

---

[15] Searle's work on representation is taken up in philosophy of both visual and literary arts; see Lamarque and Olsen (Eds.), (2004); Searle (1980, 1994b). But his wider project may be less familiar to readers in art and education. John R. Searle's work is taken up in philosophy of mind, language, and social explanation; pragmatics of communication, literary theory, and philosophy of linguists in semiotics; communication and cognition; psychology; the science and neurophilosophy of consciousness; and study of intentionality and institutional facts. In philosophy, he is considered to be at the forefront of the study of mind and consciousness.

[16] As with any significant philosopher, Searle has many critics. For various criticism, discussion, and support of Searle's specific theses, for philosophy of mind etc., see for example, Grewendorf and Meggle (Eds.), (2002); Kim (1995); Koepsell and Moss (2003); Preston and Bishop (Eds.), (2002); Smith (Ed.), (2003); pragmatics of communication etc., see Eco (1986); Fish (1980); Habermas (1998); communication etc., see Burkhardt (Ed.), (1990); psychology, see Fotion (2000); consciousness, see Bennett and Hacker (2003); Koch (2004a, 2004b); intentionality, see Lepore and Van Gulick (Eds.), (1993); Tsohatzidis (Ed.), (2007). For helpful description of various problems and approaches in the explanation of consciousness, including discussion of Searle's criticism of cognitivism and the objections of his critics, see Flanagan (2001).

arts and educational practice, or curriculum. Instead, it analyzes and provides revision to the most problematic suppositions driving current practices of aesthetics and visual culture.

1. 5. Outline of the Study

The following Chapters 2 through 5 of the study concern the accounts of visuality in art and education. These chapters set out a relevant structure of concerns in aesthetics and visual culture. In Chapter 2 the study looks at the disciplinary identity of visual culture and argument against philosophical aesthetics. Visual culture is variously defined by its advocates as an emerging approach, a field or sub-field, and a cross- or ex- disciplinary practice. In this emergent identity there is to now strong criticism of aesthetic explanation of visuality. Following an account of the argument, Chapter 3 of the study looks at visual culture's most characteristic means for study of culture as semiotic and the explanation of representation, perception, and subjectivity. In semiotic accounts, all representation, including perception, is mediated and discursive or language-based.

Chapter 4 sets out an account of aesthetics, which supports the visual arts within a non-discursive paradigm of knowing. Aesthetics is a longstanding philosophical enterprise and some account of its history is helpful in recognizing commitments. The study looks at aesthetic explanation of understanding, interpretation, and judgment of artistic works, and the representation of subjectivity in aesthetics. From its background, aesthetics characteristically identifies artistic capacities as innate or dispositional.

Chapter 5 looks at explanations of representation in visuality. Two paradigms or models are briefly described: the pictorial as perceptual or causal, and symbolic. To understand further differences in the explanation of visuality, the study sets out some background from cognitive science influencing accounts of representation in the arts. This chapter identifies the emergence and continuing influence of early cognitive concepts on the understanding of art. Increasing epistemological concern with the role of language (from the 'linguistic turn') in representation provided for all mental representation to be characterized as linguistically organized. But there is debate that such characterization does not provide for the particularly visual nature of understanding art.

Chapters 6 through 9 of the study concern the realist view of consciousness put forward by John R. Searle. Chapter 6 sets out Searle's rejection of relativism and his explanation of ontological and epistemological distinctions between the subjective and objective in accounting phenomena. Chapter 7 sets out Searle's explanation of consciousness as a qualitative, subjective unity, including its further aspects or features and brief description of Searle's account of the self or 'I' in rational action. Crucially, this rational 'I,' having freedom of will enables account of practical or reasoned action without reduction to mechanistic causal constraints.

Chapter 8 outlines Searle's account of intentionality, or the capacity for representation of the world in consciousness, including the capacity for collective intentionality. These capacities are critical to understanding visuality as they enable the relation between self and world. Chapter 9 concerns Searle's account of the network and background of intentionality. Background capacities permeate and enable the network of intentional states, providing the key to understanding how visuality works in consciousness.

Chapters 10 and 11 set out the results of the study, discussing the role of consciousness as a unity in reconsidering opposed accounts of visuality. These chapters compare the analysis of visual culture and aesthetic theories in art and education with Searle's account of consciousness. Chapter 10 identifies how Searle's realist explanation of consciousness fits the concept of visuality, maintaining the integrity of aesthetics' and visual culture's objects. Discussion situates study of aesthetics and visual culture in art, education, and the broader cultural environment. And Chapter 11, finally, finds that realist account of an irreducible 'I,' having a background of capacities and freedom of will enables a revised, reconciled approach to visuality in the visual arts and education.

Chapter 2

Visual Culture's Disciplinary Identity and Argument with Aesthetics

2. Introduction

The concept of visuality, in its most general sense, refers to how we make meaning from what we see. Different approaches to visuality provide a conceptual arena for substantial argument in visual arts discourse. In aesthetics, art history and more recently, visual culture studies, "visual matters" are "fraught" with "many competing voices" (Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. vii). The concept of visuality is so contested that in art and education, there is support for the study of visual culture as a paradigmatic revision to practices (Duncum, 2001; Freedman, 2003). Visual culture theorists criticize the disciplinary foundation of philosophical aesthetics and its engagement with the study of art (Holly and Moxey, 2002; van Eck and Winters, 2005). Advocates claim the relevance and appropriateness of their proposed changes to the study of visual arts. The engagement is "part of the attempt to theorize our way through postmodern cultural experiences," which in relation to academic interest "arises from the societal turn towards the cultural and the simultaneous turn of the cultural towards the visual that is at the heart of cultural postmodernism" (Duncum, 1999a, p. 46).

The aim of this chapter and the next is to characterize the concept of visuality within the discourse of visual culture studies. In visual culture, the concept constitutes within an emerging framework of enquiry (as practices) that, for the most part, explicitly seek to distinguish visual culture from aesthetics. So, to properly accomplish its aim, this chapter first provides account of visual culture's epistemological commitments and institutional presence. Advocates for the study of visual culture claim various motivations, methods, and objectives underlying their views on visuality. On some accounts, visual culture studies supplements arts disciplinary scholarship, providing focus on sociocultural aspects of the history and explanation of art. On others, the function of visual culture is to radically constrain the 'dogma' of art disciplinary commitments. And on others, engagement with new media and technologies, and the exploration of their effects, motivates accounts. In some cases, the scholarship reflects a

spectrum of these variations within the individual accounts and the study provides relevant reference to this. Second, this chapter further outlines the basis for distinction between visual culture and disciplinary aesthetics from visual culture's argument against philosophical aesthetics.

Following this account, Chapter 3 outlines visual culture's commitment to the discursive construction of visual experience, most generally as semiotic explanation or the theory of signs. Importantly, characteristically visual culture theorists reject aesthetic explanation of representation as perceptual or sensory accounts of art. From the study's concern with consciousness, the reasons for this rejection are important. Perceptual accounts, theorists say, leave no room for the explanation of culture as discourse in the constitution of subjectivity. Relevant to its conclusions, the study looks at accounts differing from this view.

These two chapters on visuality in visual culture attempt to represent the most characteristic variations and consistencies in the views of exemplar scholars, including background and theoretical influences on those views. In doing this, the chapter provides three outcomes appropriate to the thesis. First, the work represents, in synopsis, the concept of visuality in visual culture studies from exemplar theorists. Second, advocacy of visual culture typically positions against philosophical aesthetics. So, outline of this argument provides comparison with the conception of visuality in aesthetics, following these chapters. Third, following the wider structure of the study, there is outline of visual culture studies' explanation of subjectivity in consciousness.

2. 1. Background to Visual Culture in Visual Arts and Education

Concern with the cultural mediation of visual experience emerged in the 1970s and 1980s from scholars "with backgrounds in literary studies, sociology, art criticism or psychoanalysis" (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3). These critics of traditional art historical analytic approaches argued against the "foundation of visuality in science" defining visual aspects of painting in "terms of optics, mathematics or the physiology and psychology of perception" (p. 3). Such identifications are part of history's and

contemporary culture's "scopic regimes," having their "own rhetoric and representations" (Foster, 1988, p. ix). By naturalizing vision in the way such regimes work, differences are closed in discourse, "to make of its many social visualities one essential vision, or to order them in a natural hierarchy of sight" (p. ix).

From the late 1980s, "debates in analytic philosophy and phenomenology" and "focus on the impact of recent post-structuralist thinking on traditional art historical analysis" motivate "an assortment of academic departments"[1] and "a variety of educational institutions, from technical schools to graduate programs" to further reflect on the values of the traditional art canon (Bryson, Holly, and Moxey, 1994, pp. xiii-xv). Art history as it was practiced was problematic; "other humanities (had) not suffered as much as the history of art from institutional inertia" (p. xv, parentheses added). In 1988, the 'visual turn' (or later, from W. J. T. Mitchell, the 'pictorial turn') was articulated in *Vision and Visuality*[2] (Foster (Ed.), 1988; Mitchell, 2008).

Broadly, from these decades, "two distinct approaches" developed "on issues of representation" in art disciplinary scholarship (Bryson, Holly, and Moxey, 1991, p. 1). As perceptualist accounts, the first approach "seeks, in Aristotelian fashion, to define an essence of art" (p. 1). And, "by reference to perceptual and/or phenomenological assumptions putatively shared by all human beings, this approach is designed to be independent of issues of historical variation"[3] (p. 1). From such accounts, "artistic truth is often construed as trans-historical" (p. 1).

The second approach, semiotic, rejects this view. Instead, advocates claim "that representation is always a matter of convention, not of essence" (p. 1). This approach "refuses to ground representation either in perception or in the phenomenological

---

[1] The quotes are drawn from Bryson, Holly, and Moxey (Eds.), (1994) as exemplar of organized institutional activity preceding the emergence of visual culture. From the late 1980s, on this account, academics met to "chart, discuss, and argue" the "impact of contemporary theory on the discipline of art history;" these scholars "came together from an assortment of academic departments (art history, studio arts, philosophy, history, film studies, classics, theatre, anthropology, psychology, and literary studies)" (p. xiii).

[2] Publication of *Vision and Visuality* proceeded from the Dia Art Foundation (New York) 1988 conference; see Martin Jay on this conference as "the moment" of the "visual turn" (2002, pp. 267-268).

[3] Perceptual, or causal accounts of representation are taken up further in Chapter 5: Mind and Representation in Accounts of Visuality.

experience of the world" (p. 1). As semiotic, "the work of art is wholly defined by its historical conditions of origin and reception" (p. 1). Semiotic theorists "would insist that the confrontation between work and spectator necessitates an act of interpretation;" in this confrontation, there is recognition of "the historical gulf separating the horizon of the work from that of the spectator" and that interpretation "also demands acknowledgment of social difference" (p. 1). To address those concerns, theorists are "convinced that considering images in light of new theoretical perspectives provides new answers to old questions about art" (Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 53). The new perspectives derive from 'postmodern' or poststructuralist theories. Visual culture, broadly, bases in this second form of account.

Visual cultural theorists, consistent with the wider cultural influences of the late 20th Century, identify "one major change in the visual arts, and therefore in art education;" that is, "a shift in foundational concepts toward the postmodern" (Freedman, 1998, p. 9). The concept of the postmodern is strongly contested[4] (Slattery, 2006); it's claims vary in often contradictory ways (Lyotard, 1984, p. 73). But from the described shift and array of theoretical perspectives characterized under the term, visual arts curriculum in education should "be reconceptualized from a postmodern perspective as well" (Freedman, 1998, p. 9).

Further, postmodern art is not self-explanatory. Rather the "information" is intentionally represented in ways that require interpretation by the audience from "personal and cultural" associations[5] (p. 9). The art, here, "is often self-contradictory, intellectually

---

[4] But, broadly, in discussion of curriculum development, Patrick Slattery defines the postmodern, among other things, as a "philosophical movement that seeks to expose the internal contradictions of metanarratives by deconstructing modern notions of truth, language, knowledge and power;" a "radical eclecticism (*not* compromise or consensus) and double-voiced discourse that accepts and criticizes at the same time because the past and the future are both honoured and subverted, embraced and limited, constructed and deconstructed;" and a "post-structural movement toward de-centering where there is an absence of anything at the center or any overriding embedded truth at the core" (2006, pp. 15-16).

[5] Kerry Freedman avoids using the term 'semiotic' in this paper. Rejecting the concept of visual literacy, "which has generally meant the semiotic reading of signs and symbols" Freedman says, "the concept of visual literacy is an attempt to force images to fit illegitimately into a structuralist analysis of literary texts" (see Brown, 1989a; quote from Freedman, 1998, p. 14). Instead, she says, she is referring "to the processes of creation, interpretation, and critique of art in relation to multiple meanings and their fluid existence outside of school" (Freedman, 1998, p. 14). I am taking Freedman's comments, loosely, in this instance to indicate a distinction between structural and poststructural semiotics. The distinction is taken up later in the chapter.

multi-layered, and references previous forms of art" (p. 9). And "from a postmodern perspective, even concepts previously considered fairly stable are in flux" (p. 9). Truth, on this account, shifts "from an epistemological to an ontological issue; it becomes less about what we know than who we are"[6] (p. 9). Consciousness of identity is central to this reconceptualization. But it is identity explicitly tied to the rejection of a "unity of experience"[7] (Lyotard, 1984, p. 72).

Argument for "paradigmatic change in art education" means frequently the discourse of visual culture maintains emphasis on "radical critique" in the form of "ideological debate" (quotes from Tavin, 2005, p. 114). This form of advocacy acts exclusively, opposing contemporary art educational practices in revolutionary terms, rejecting prior disciplinary-based practice[8] (see for example, Duncum, 1997, p. 71; Tavin, 2005, p. 114; 2007). Argument here seeks to challenge first, art education's field-dependent engagement with works of art[9] (Corbett, 2005, p. 19); and second, epistemological

---

[6] In this postmodern condition or context, "time loses its neat linearity, space appears to expand and contract, and boundaries of various sorts are blurred" (Freedman, 1998, p. 9).

[7] In rejecting the "uncompleted project of modernity," Jean-François Lyotard says "what (Jürgen) Habermas requires from the arts and the experiences they provide is, in short, to bridge the gap between cognitive, ethical, and political discourses, thus opening the way to a unity of experience" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 72, parentheses added). But, Lyotard's "question is to determine what sort of unity Habermas has in mind;" "is the aim of the project of modernity the constitution of sociocultural unity within which all the elements of daily life and of thought take their places as in an organic whole?" (p. 72). Or, rather, "does the passage that has to be charted between heterogeneous language games – those of cognition, of ethics, of politics – belong to a different order from that?;" and "if so, would it be capable of effecting a real synthesis between them" (pp. 72-73). Hypotheses of unity, (whether deriving from Hegel or Kant) "must be submitted" Lyotard says, "to that severe reexamination which post-modernity imposes on the thought of the Enlightenment, on the idea of a unitary end of history and of a subject" (p. 73).

[8] On the incommensurability of theoretical terms in the revision of knowledge, see Kuhn (1996); see also Sankey (1993, p. 760). (For further on incommensurability, see following on theoretical background). As well, early models of Marxism have been rejected. But Stuart Hall's view of modern culture as "relentlessly material in its practices and modes of production" for example, supports Marx's anticipation that capital "would become ever more rapacious, ever more pervasive" (Duncum, 1999b, pp. 302-303; citing Hall, 1996).

[9] See David Corbett on Victor Burgin's "argument for visual culture and its corollary, the death of art history;" Burgin saw the "systematic attention to 'art' objects, like the concept of 'art' itself, as a transitory moment in culture, now due to be superseded, in what seemed to him writing in the mid-1980s to be clearly 'postmodernity,' by the expanded field of visual culture" (Corbett, 2005, p. 19). The "*end* of art theory *now* is identical with the objectives of theories of representation in general: a critical understanding of the modes and means of symbolic articulation of our *critical* forms of sociality and subjectivity" (Burgin, 1986, p. 204; cited in Corbett, 2005, p. 19).

commitment to the study of aesthetics, through politicization as "dichotomies"[10] (quote from Tavin, 2005, p. 114). In visual culture accounts, there is committed heterogeneity to disciplinary frameworks (see Culler, 1982).

2. 1. 1. *Theoretical Background*

Epistemic commitments in visual culture typically identify with poststructuralist theory[11] (see Freedman, 1997, 2000a). Substantially shaping this discourse is the "post-Nietzschean tradition in European philosophy" and the "pragmatic tradition in American philosophy"[12] (Rorty, 1999, p. xvi). The "image of art" deriving from this theoretical background constitutes on a "particular style of philosophy" which "has always had deeply political ambitions" (Heywood, 1997, p. 7). On these accounts, all discourse is situated, from a point of view and so proceeds as "needs and interests" (Rorty, 1999, p. xxvii). The notion of truth is a linguistic construct; that is, there is no "language-independent" reality[13] (p. xxvii). The term 'relativism,' although problematic, roughly characterizes this rejection (pp. xvi-xviii).

Richard Rorty says, the term relativist "is applied" to those "who agree with Nietzsche that "Truth" is the will to be master of the multiplicity of sensation;" it is also applied "to those who agree with Thomas Kuhn that science should not be thought of as moving towards an accurate representation of the way the world is in itself"[14] (p. xvi). The European or continental philosophical tradition typically puts "forward a distinctive, new, post-Nietzschean 'method;'" "thus in early Heidegger and early Sartre we find talk

---

[10] There is advocacy of visual culture as "a conversation about the struggles of the living and the harmful powers of the dead" which may "work deconstructively as radical critique to question critical limits of dichotomies, obstructing totalities, and dialectics"" (Miller, 2004, p. 4; cited in Tavin, 2005, p. 114).

[11] Reductively, "these can be divided into two broad strategies: historicizations of the subject, exemplified by the work of Michel Foucault; and challenges to the linguistic essentialism implicit in some structuralist accounts, exemplified by the work of Jacques Derrida" (Calhoun (Ed.), (2004).

[12] I cite Richard Rorty (as exemplar) for his references to significant theoretical sources of poststructural discourse, particularly in relation to the 'linguistic turn;' for further discussion and defence of relativism, see Rorty (1999). For explanation of neo-pragmatist commitment in art education, see for example, Freedman (2003).

[13] So, "we need to stop thinking of words as representations and to start thinking of them as nodes in the causal network which binds the organism together with its environment" (Rorty, 1999, p. xxiii).

[14] In the early 1960s, both Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend separately published work on incommensurability. Kuhn's "initial discussion suggested that proponents of incommensurable theories are unable to communicate, and that there is no recourse to neutral experience or objective standards to adjudicate between theories" (Sankey, 1993, p. 760). For description of Kuhn's revision of his initial thesis, see Sankey (1993).

of ‘phenomenological ontology,’ in late Heidegger of something mysterious and wonderful called ‘Thinking,’ in Gadamer of ‘hermeneutics,’ in Foucault of the ‘archaeology of knowledge’ and of genealogy’” (p. xx). Derrida’s ‘grammatology,’ Rorty says, is “evanescent whimsy, rather than a serious attempt to proclaim the discovery of a new philosophical method or strategy” (pp. xx-xxi). Christopher Norris says “the texts of Jacques Derrida defy classification according to any of the clear-cut boundaries that define modern academic discourse” (2002, p. 18). But Derrida’s work is exemplar in the literature of visual culture as defining deconstruction.

The influences of literary and social theory on the development of visual culture over the last thirty years is significant. In the 1980s, Jonathan Culler notes the emergence of new modes of interpretation in which “works of literary theory are closely and vitally related to other writings within a domain as yet unnamed but often called “theory” for short” (1982, p. 8). Neither literary theory specifically, nor philosophy “in the current sense of the term,” such theory derives from the works of, among others already referenced, “Saussure, Marx, Freud, Erving Goffman, and Jacques Lacan, as well as Hegel”[15] (p. 8). Culler says, “it might be called “textual theory,” if *text* is understood as “whatever is articulated by language”” (p. 8). The “kind of writing” that developed “is neither the evaluation of the relative merits of literary productions, nor intellectual history, nor moral philosophy, nor epistemology, nor social prophecy, but all of these mingled together in a new genre”[16] (cited p. 8; from Rorty, 1976, pp. 763-764).

The “new genre” Culler says, “is certainly heterogeneous;” “the practitioners of particular disciplines complain that works claimed by the genre are studied outside the proper disciplinary matrix” (p. 9; see also Knight, 2005, p. 785). That is, “students of theory read Freud without enquiring whether later psychological research may have disputed his formulations; they read Derrida without having mastered the philosophical tradition;” and “they read Marx without studying alternative descriptions of political

[15] And with these influences are the “other distinctive activities and discourses” concerned; Gadamer’s work for example ties to “a particular strand of German philosophy, Goffman to empirical sociological research, Lacan to the practice of psychoanalysis” (Culler, 1982, p. 9).
[16] For further on identification of authors influential in visual culture but not referenced in this study, see Rampley (2005c).

and economic situations" (p. 9). And so, "these works exceed the disciplinary framework within which they would normally be evaluated and which would help to identify their solid contributions to knowledge" (p. 9). In effect, these works "function not as demonstrations within the parameters of a discipline" but rather, "as re-descriptions that challenge disciplinary boundaries" (p. 9).

Michel de Certeau says, "a particular problem arises when, instead of being a discourse on other discourses, as is usually the case, theory has to advance over an area where there are no longer any discourses" (1988, p. 61). So, "Foucault and Bourdieu situate their enterprise on this edge by articulating a discourse on non-discursive practices" (p. 61). An "individual science can avoid" the "direct confrontation" in explanation between discourse and practice as "experimentation" (p. 61). But "theoretical questioning, on the contrary, *does not forget*, cannot forget" there is always "also their common relation with what they have taken care to exclude from their field in order to constitute it" (p. 61).

Theoretically, visual culture draws on linguistics, structuralism, semiology (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3); reader-response theory (Tompkins (Ed.), 1980); and cognitive theory (Brown, 2003a, p. 286). These frameworks provide for visual culture's methods to function relative to "the explicit medium of language" (p. 286). Argument for semiotic analysis bases in cognitive approaches to understanding the "semantic properties of performances, that is, on what artworks mean and how their meaning is framed" within "symbolic domains" (p. 286). And "to perceive the arts as a symbolic domain is to abstract their meaning" (p. 286). Keith Moxey says, "based on a Derridean philosophy of language, one that insists that language is the home of metaphysics, visual studies focuses first and foremost on the frame within which meaning is produced" (2001, p. 114).

2. 2. Perspectivalism, Strong Relativism, Anti-Realism

In visual culture, the distinction between ontology, as mode of existence, and epistemology, as systematic knowledge is typically avoided[17]. But, on these accounts, there is no relevantly real world independent of theoretical terms. Typically, visual culture theorists lay claim (tacitly or explicitly) to anti-realism, variously defined in terms of perspectivalism, radical constructivism, or social constructionism (or reconstructionism)[18]. Radical constructivism "is a way of thinking about knowledge and the act of knowing" (von Glasersfeld, 1996, p. 15). That is, on this view, "actions, concepts, and conceptual operations are viable if they fit the purposive or descriptive contexts in which we use them" (p. 14).

On this account, theorists reject the supposition or epistemological pursuit of an external or objective reality tied to, underlying, or causing direct knowledge of the world. Such pursuit characterizes 'positivistic' agendas typically implemented from scientistic (as derivative or emulative of scientific) methodological structures[19] (Bal and Bryson, 1991,

---

[17] That is, "constructivist and sociocultural accounts of learning each rest on ontological assumptions, but these often go unnoticed;" "this is due in part to their relatively unarticulated character and in part to a lingering anxiety, traceable to the logical positivists, that discussion of ontology is merely "metaphysical," untestable, and therefore unscientific or even meaningless" (Packer and Goicoechea, 2000, pp. 227-228).

[18] See for example, Bal and Bryson (1991); Dikovitskaya (2005); Duncum (2000); Freedman (2000a); Mitchell (2002); Sturken and Cartwright (2001).

[19] One important characteristic of poststructural discourse proceeds from the rejection of "finding something stable which will serve as criterion for judging the transitory products of our transitory needs and interests" (Rorty, 1999, p. xvi); that is, a disposition in poststructural accounts to non-distinction between modes of discourse. This collapse of distinction can then approach all knowledge as practical interest. Rorty for example, rejects any "dramatically different" way of thinking between philosophy, physics, and politics. Such distinction is "methodolatory" (p. xxi). So, Rorty says, "for pragmatists there is no sharp distinction between natural science and social science, nor between social science and politics, nor between politics, philosophy and literature;" that is, "all areas of culture are part of the same endeavour to make life better" (p. xxv). And "there is no deep split between theory and practice, because on a pragmatist view all so-called 'theory' which is not wordplay is always already practice" (p. xxv). To properly understand all claims on strong relativist, or perspectivalist accounts *as* the situated nature of all discourse: from the rejection of notions of objectivity, "much postmodern writing in philosophy, cultural studies, and women's studies deliberately compromises the clarity of the distinction between fiction, art, and criticism" (Connor, 1997, p. 431, emphasis deleted). And, "one of the important characteristics of the postmodern condition is the rise of a generalized self-consciousness in social life" (p. 431). So, "it may seem fitting that one of the most striking evidences of the condition is the emergence of "the postmodern" as a style or sensibility within critical writing itself" (p. 431). From such a development, "certain forms of writing *about* postmodernism, whether in philosophy, social theory, cultural studies, or literary criticism, come to perform and even consciously to promote the values or qualities that are its object;" and "the ambiguity of the phrase "postmodern theory," which does not allow the sense of "theory *of* the postmodern" and "theory *as* the postmodern" to be easily distinguished, is therefore appropriate as well as

p. 174, 2003; Mitchell, 2005, pp. 157-158; Moxey, 2001, p. 73). So, "there may well be a hidden residue of the natural in the cultural" but "a radical cultural relativism insists it can never be accessed except through its particular cultural mediations;" the attempt "to get rid of it entirely" is evident in the "current claim that it is culture 'all the way down'" (Jay, 2002, p. 272).

Discussion of the 'real' is identified with historical disposition to claim an overriding viewpoint. W. J. T. Mitchell describes first, objectivity "understood as the somewhat detached, skeptical attitude associated with scientific research" and second, "objectivism" as "the conviction that we do posses, or will in due course, a complete and total account of objects, an exhaustive, eternally comprehensive description of the "given"" (2005, p. 157). Both objectivity and objectivism, Mitchell says, are ideological "protoimperialist formations" (p. 157). But "objectivity is an essential component of that open, curious, and unresolved frame of mind that makes the encounter with novel, alien realities possible and desirable" (p. 157). On Mitchell's account "objectivism," by contrast, "is the ideological parody of objectivity, and tends toward self-assurance and certainty about the sovereign subject's grip on the real" (p. 157).

Concern for the subsumption of difference and its annihilatory consequences motivates the relativism in most accounts. Relativism, Mitchell says, "only makes sense to someone who understands that there are radically different forms of subjectivity in the world;" "this understanding can only come to someone who knows that there are other cultures, other societies and polities, and other kinds of objects in the world"[20] (p. 158). So, "for cultural relativists, whatever is left of 'the real' is located not in something we designate as nature, but rather in that diacritical term called culture or, more precisely, in the plurality of different cultures that resist universalization" (Jay, 2002, pp. 271-272). And "one familiar consequence of this conclusion is the rise of an identity politics

---

confusing" (p. 431, selective emphasis deleted). What is valued, on these accounts, is the construction of "an enabling fiction" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 245).

[20] In the same way that "discourse analysis approaches language as a code of arbitrary signs that are substitutes for the world rather than the route through which we gain access to it," visual culture studies "first and foremost is interested in how images are cultural practices, the significance of which betrays the values of those who create, manipulate, and consume them (Moxey, 2001, p. 114).

that trusts only concrete subject positions rather than any alleged omniscient 'view from nowhere'" (p. 272).

There is recent questioning of the requirement for visual culture to base in strong relativism: "now that the tide of cultural studies is beginning to recede a bit and the limits of cultural radicalism are becoming increasingly apparent," Martin Jay says, "relativism no longer seems as inevitable an implication of the abandonment of transcendental naturalism" (p. 276). In this shift, relativism "cognitive or normative, may not be overcome, but the assumption that cultural difference is its source cannot be plausibly sustained" (p. 276). But an element of anxiety remains for Jay towards the "hostile takeover of the humanities by the natural sciences" as "consilience" (p. 276; 1999).

2. 3. Representation and Anti-Representationalism

In the interpretation of artworks and imagery, typically, the model for explanation in visual culture is semiotic, or the theory of signs; this breaks "allegiance to an account of artistic creation that is based on the concept of resemblance or mimesis"[21] (Bryson et al, 1994, p. xviii). In contrast to the "mimetic tradition" of philosophical aesthetics and the investigation of pictorial representation, the meanings of works as representation here lie not in their duplication of "some referent to the real world," but rather in "the way in which they exhibit the cultural values of the historical moment to which the artist belonged" (p. xviii). The "basic tenet of semiotics, the theory of sign and sign-use, is antirealist" (Bal and Bryson, 1991, p. 174). The work itself "actively" engages in "organizing and structuring the social and cultural environment in which it was located"

[21] The "primary source of the new insistence on the discursive, textual, or institutional constitution of images, which makes any appeal to their natural, universal, or transcendental status seem naïve" lies, (Martin Jay thinks "it fair to argue") "in the exponential explosion of what might be called the technical and cultural mediation of experience" (2002, p. 270). The recent and "rapid development" of computer graphics and imaging technologies, Jonathon Crary says, "is part of a sweeping reconfiguration of relations between an observing subject and modes of representation that effectively nullifies most of the culturally established meanings of the terms *observer* and *representation*" (1992, p. 1). Such an "outcome" follows "from the scientific discoveries of the 19th Century that showed vision was physiologically dependent rather than a matter of the laws of refraction and reflection operating on a passive and neutral eye" (Jay, 2002, p. 270, drawing on Crary's work); but see also Margaret Atherton arguing against "Crary's claim that the early nineteenth century witnessed a rupture in the way the observer was conceived" (1997, p. 158).

(Bryson et al, 1994, p. xviii). Mieke Bal says, “the idea of the ‘real’ thing suppresses the constructed nature of ‘reality’” (2003, p. 8).

So, direct representation of world to the senses is typically rejected in visual culture. And “in the constructivist way of thinking, the concept of viability in the domain of experience, takes the place of the traditional philosopher’s concept of Truth, that was to indicate a ‘correct’ representation of reality” (von Glasersfeld, 1996, p. 14). For “believers in representation, the radical change of the concept of knowledge and its relation to reality, is a tremendous shock;” “they immediately assume that giving up the representational view is tantamount to denying reality, which would be a foolish thing to do” (p. 14).

But this is a limited caveat. The idea of an external and language independent world as immediately causing states of mind, including visual perception, is rejected. In criticism of perceptual experiments: “what the eye sees – light, color, and shape – was usually taken for granted as a physical given, and the research focused on the sensory mechanisms that could convey a presumed reality to the brain” (p. 10). The “aim of the experiments was always to discover how the eye manages to see what is there, as though to perceive were simply to *receive* something that exists ready-made;” the radical constructivist is “amazed at the general lack of epistemological considerations”[22] (p. 10).

And, “crucial” to understanding the rejection of visual perception as representational is the notion of practices (May, 1995, p. 49). The “term “practice” may be defined as a social pattern of behaviors directed toward a socially recognized goal” (p. 49). So, “pragmatists insist on nonocular, nonrepresentational ways of describing sensory

[22] The motivation to anti-representationalism consistently, if not invariably, concerns an ethics of representation; Todd May says “the principle of antirepresentationalism is as follows:” “People ought not, other things being equal, to engage in practices whose effect, among others, is the representation or commendation of certain intentional lives as either intrinsically superior or intrinsically inferior to others (1995, p. 48). Dorothea Olkowski for example employs the work of Gilles Deleuze for “linking the analysis of existing conditions to the critique of the structure of representation to produce the ruin of representation, the ruin of hierarchically ordered time and space” (Olkowski, 1999, p. 2). And “with this ruin underway – with static structures of time and space, of life and thought, disassembled – a philosophy of change becomes possible” (p. 2). This “is a philosophy that is more abstract than the static structures that undergird representation” (p. 2).

perception, thought and language, because they would like to break down the distinction between knowing things and using them;" and "starting from Bacon's claim that knowledge is power, they proceed to the claim that power is all there is to knowledge"[23] (Rorty, 1999, p. 50).

2. 4. Epistemology in Visual Culture

Visual culture studies defines all knowledge as social construction (Mitchell, 2002, p. 237). And, "this overcoming of what has been called the "natural attitude" has been crucial to the elaboration of visual studies as an arena for political and ethical critique"[24] (p. 237). In characterizing this form of account, knowledge cannot demonstrate proof of reality as objective or true because explanation is always from a perspective entailing particular and vested interests (Jay, 2002). In terms of practice, the identification and explanation of those interests from a critical perspective can constrain or subvert the naturalization of dominant discourses as institutionalized economic or political power. The interests of vested power are masked, or invisible, until recovered through critical thought or deconstruction[25]. Such identification typically provides the locus of concern and basic motivation, in some instances explicitly, as an ethics of representation[26], for study of visual culture. To this degree, visual culture studies remains, on the whole,

---

[23] That is, "that a claim to know X is a claim to be able to do something with or to X, to put X into a relation with something else" (Rorty, 1999, p. 50). But "to make this claim plausible," Rorty says, "they have to attack the notion that knowing X is a matter of being related to something *intrinsic* to X, whereas using X is a matter of standing in an *extrinsic*, accidental, relation to X" (p. 50).

[24] But, Mitchell continues, "if it becomes unexamined dogma, it threatens to become a fallacy just as disabling as the "naturalistic" fallacy it sought to overturn" (2002, p. 237).

[25] Fine arts "are socially marginalized" (Duncum, 1999b, p. 298). But the viewing of television is significant in its ubiquity; its "effects are profound" and similar to the effects of ideology and hegemony, which are successful due to their invisibility (pp. 297-299). Ideology "operates behind our backs" while hegemony is effective "because it grounds itself in… common sense assumptions, in the realm of the natural" (p. 299). From this naturalization of dominant discourse, "the world students live in is shaped through their interpretation of 'pictures'" (Pearson, 1995, p. 10). So, "a core education in pictures" should consist in examining these interpretations" of the mass produced cultural artefacts of visual culture "and relating this examination to the producer's intentions" (p. 10). And, "the task (in these instances) is to counter the social engineering effected through pictures;" that is, "to socially re-engineer the views of students to enable them to critically engage with the various meanings given to particular image products by different groups" by "most importantly," resisting "the propagandist intentions of the people employing them" (p. 10, parentheses added).

[26] Compare Diarmuid Costello and Dominic Willsdon, for example on the ethics *of* aesthetics (2008) with Ian Heywood, who identifies a relation between ethics and art as practices but rejects convergence (1999).

consistent with the explanatory modeling of culture studies (see Knight, 2005). But the specifically 'visual' aspects of cultural artefacts provides focus on discourses constituting the visual field of operations, as 'visuality'[27].

The central concern for visuality as it is conceived in visual culture, is a defined "difference within the visual – between the mechanism of sight and its historical techniques, between the datum of vision and its discursive determinations" (Foster, 1988, p. ix). This "discursive elucidation or articulation of what is seen by a subject" is "embedded in its history, and its social and political conditions" (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. xv). From this distinction, critical (as ethical) study of visuality as text or discourse, materially represented in the form of imagery is, arguably, the object of visual culture studies[28]. In visual culture discourse, the term 'image' refers to "any likeness, figure, motif, or form that appears in some medium or other"[29] (Mitchell, 2005, p. xiii).

This indefinite extension of artefactual kind under the term 'image' is controversial, since it precludes any boundary on enquiry constrained by the form or kind of artefact. Distinctions in artefactual kind assimilate, typically but not always, in that the methods of visual culture claim investigation of any phenomena as textual analysis. Looking is an act of 'reading' the text (as interpretation in contrast to perception). So, on these accounts all events, objects, and phenomena are text of different modes (Bal, 1996a, 2003; Bryson, 1983). From this rejection of delimitation on interest, visual culture characteristically remains 'outside' mainstream epistemic frameworks. Most commonly its advocates are institutionally identified among various disciplines, visual culture providing an interdisciplinary research focus[30].

---

[27] Reference to 'visual aspects' is a very rough, but common description. Mitchell more carefully says, "there are no such things as "visual media," typically exemplified by film, photography, video, television, and the Internet" (2002, p. 239). The "fallacy of the "visual media" is repeated by (advocates and detractors) as if it denoted something real" (p. 239, parentheses added).

[28] Argument over the "object" of visual cultural studies is taken up further, following.

[29] The centrality of the image in visual culture is criticized for its "disembodiment of the cultural object" (Carol Armstrong, in Alpers et al, 1996, p. 27). Responding to such criticism, Mitchell says, "visual culture is not limited to the study of images or media;" rather, investigation "extends to everyday practices of seeing and showing, especially those we take to be immediate or unmediated" (2002, p. 343).

[30] See contributors in, for example: Bryson, Holly, and Moxey (Eds.), (1994); Heywood and Sandywell (Eds.), (1999); Holly and Moxey (Eds.), (2002); van Eck and Winters (Eds.), (2005).

But, the concept of a study of visual culture is most typically enabled by relation with the visual arts and other arts disciplines engaging the study of artefacts broadly defined as visual. The relation is, as Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey put it at the beginning of this chapter, fraught. With few exceptions to now, "a staple feature of the literature presenting visual culture" is "a series of negations of traditional art history" as well as "sociology, anthropology, and so on" (Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 29).

Emergence in varying accounts of a new field, a new project, or interdisciplinary approach, proceeding from this critique ranges between employing the terms visual culture, visual culture studies, and more recently visual studies (Elkins, 2003; Mirzoeff, 2002a, 2002b; Moxey, 2001). Some mark a distinction between visual studies as the "field of study" and visual culture as the "object or target of study" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 232).

2. 4. 1. *Institutional Location*

Margaret Dikovitskaya's study on visual culture represents scholarly interest across three academic "clusters" of theorists: "the first see visual studies as an appropriate expansion of art history;" second, there are those who view "the new focus as independent of art history and more appropriately studied with technologies of vision related to the digital and virtual era;" and the third grouping "considers visual studies a field that threatens and self-consciously challenges the traditional discipline of art history" (2005, p. 3).

James Elkins says a number of published texts on visual culture "do not so much define a new field as they define their difference from existing fields, especially art history" (2003, p. 17). And, "taken together" these publications "imply three distinct directions of visual culture:" first, "toward contemporary transnational media;" second, "toward the philosophic interrogation of vision and visuality;" and third, "toward a social critique of current image-making practices"[31] (p. 17).

[31] Elkins cites the publications as definitive of the first direction, Mirzoeff (Ed.), (2002); the second, Heywood and Sandywell (Eds.), (1999); and third, Sturken and Cartwright (2001).

Elkins notes at university institutions, visual culture studies courses are included in "a wide range of existing departments" such as "Art History, English, Women's Studies, Comparative Literature, Art Education, Sociology, Philosophy, Visual Communication, and Television, Film and Media Studies" (p. 8). The first departments to initiate courses of this kind, on Elkins' account, are Film Studies; but he observes that the "new field can also find a home in the departments of Art History, Literature, or Philosophy" (p. 8). In some cases, Elkins says, "innovative visual culture courses have entirely replaced the old art appreciation classes" (p. 126). And the "best of those courses treat visuality at a high level" that is, they prepare "students to think about vision more reflectively than they had before, by introducing the psychoanalytic, phenomenological, and political dimensions of seeing" (p. 126).

The "interest of visual culture seems," to Mitchell, "to reside precisely at the transitional points in the educational process;" that is, "at the introductory level (what we used to call "art appreciation"), at the passageway from undergraduate to graduate education, and at the frontiers of advanced research" (2002, p. 244). Visual studies, Mitchell says, "belongs, then, in the freshman year in college, in the introduction to graduate studies in the humanities or arts and sciences, and in the graduate workshop or seminar" (p. 245). Other advocates argue strongly for the revision of art education to a visual culture orientation at secondary and elementary level (Duncum, 2001; Freedman, 2003; Keifer-Boyd, Amburgy, and Knight, 2003). But there is ongoing debate over the institutional identity of visual culture studies.

2. 4. 2. *Visual Cultural Identity*

The identity of visual culture, including its research objects as institutional activity, is not fixed. Nicholas Mirzoeff says that he previously "argued that visual culture is concerned with visual events in which the user seeks information, meaning or pleasure in an interface with visual technology" (2002a, p. 5). But, he says, "this formulation bears re-examination, given the rapid pace of change" (pp. 5-6). The term visual culture, "rather than visual studies or other such formulations," is "the right phrase for the discursive formation" that the 2nd Edition of *The Visual Culture Reader* "seeks to represent" (p. 6). And "by retaining the term culture in the foreground, critics and

practitioners alike are reminded of the political stakes inherent in what we do;" "for otherwise it can and has been argued there is no particular need for visual culture as an academic subfield"[32] (p. 6).

Dikovitskaya considers visual culture "a new field for the study of the cultural construction of the visual in arts, media, and everyday life" (2005, p. 1). Elkins says visual culture has already been "adopted as a recognized field"[33] (2003, p. 5). Bal on the other hand rejects the concept of visual culture as a field; "to call 'visual culture' a field is to treat it like religion"[34] (2003, p. 5). On the question of whether visual culture is a discipline, Bal says; the "first obvious answer is 'no,' because its object cannot be studied within the paradigms of any discipline presently in place" (p. 5). Visual culture, on Bal's account, "badly needs to draw on several other disciplines: well established ones like anthropology, psychology and sociology, or ones that are themselves relatively new, like film and media studies" (pp. 5-6). But, "a second answer to the question of whether visual culture is a discipline has to be 'yes;'" "unlike some disciplines (e.g. French) and like others (e.g. comparative literature and art history)," visual cultural analysis "lays claim to a specific object and raises specific questions about that object"[35] (p. 6).

---

[32] Mirzoeff says, "visual culture has come into a certain prominence now because many artists, critics and scholars have felt that the new urgency of the visual cannot be fully considered in the established visual disciplines" (2002a, p. 6). And, "one way of connecting these different disciplinary dilemmas – whether in art history, film studies or cultural studies – is to emphasize the continuingly dynamic force of feminism (taken in the broad sense to incorporate gender and sexuality studies)" (p. 6).

[33] In contrast to the institutional spread of cultural studies in for example, the U. K., America, Australia, Canada, and India, Elkins says, visual culture "is slightly but measurably different, even aside from its emphasis on the visual;" it "is pre-eminently an American movement and it is younger than cultural studies by several decades" (2003, p. 2). Deborah Knight says cultural studies, "which began as a small, oppositional, multidisciplinary and distinctively British intervention in the critical study of classes and cultures" quickly emerged as a popular movement in "English-language academia, especially in the United States" (2005, p. 787).

[34] That is, "religion is the field, theology its dogmatic intellectual circumscription, and 'religious studies,' the academic discipline" (Bal, 2003, p. 5). And "to confuse those terms is to be sucked into the very thing you need to examine, whereby it becomes impossible to examine your own presuppositions;" "you cannot pull yourself out of that marsh by your own hair" (p. 5).

[35] Bal says, "although visual culture studies is grounded in the specificity of its object domain, lack of clarity on what that object domain is remains its primary pain point" (2003, p. 6). And "it is this lack that may well determine the life span of the endeavour;" "rather than declaring visual culture studies either a discipline or a non-discipline," Bal says, "I prefer to leave the question open and provisionally refer to it as a movement" (p. 6). The "term or would-be concept, of *visual culture* is highly problematic;" that is, it is "predicated" on "a kind of visual essentialism that either proclaims the visual 'difference' – read 'purity' – of images, or expresses a desire to stake out the turf of visuality against other media or semiotic

Bal says, "here and there, programs of study that carry the name 'visual culture' are emerging," but, (to Bal's knowledge), "no departments" (p. 6). In a number of tertiary institutions worldwide, these visual cultural studies programs have been initiated although, as indicated, the disciplinary location varies (see Dikovitskaya, 2005; Elkins, 2003, p. 8). Visual culture studies (as an umbrella term) and its methods emerges from a "network of disciplines including literary criticism, media studies, and semiotics" (Duncum, 1990a, p. 208); from previously, "sociology, art criticism or psychoanalysis" (Van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3); and centrally, culture studies (Duncum, 2001; Hall, 1997; Knight, 2005; Mirzoeff, 2002a).

Distinction between visual culture and culture studies is however iterated (see for example, Bal, 2003; Elkins, 2003; Mitchell, 1995a). Elkins says, "in general terms, it would be fair to say that visual culture is less Marxist, further from the kind of analysis that might be aimed at social action, more haunted by art history," as well as "more in debt to Roland Barthes and Walter Benjamin than the original cultural studies"[36] (2003, p. 2). In contrast to the art disciplinary "model of history" visual culture, it has been suggested, organizes "on the model of anthropology"[37] (Alpers et al, 1996, p. 25). Mitchell says, the term visual culture "suggests something more like an anthropological concept of vision as artefactual, conventional, and artificial – just like languages, in fact, which we call "natural languages"" in the same moment "we admit that they are

---

systems" (p. 6). Such "turf-policing is visual culture's legacy, its roots in the paranoid corners of the art history to which it claims, in most of its guises, to offer a (polemical) alternative" (p. 6).

[36] Knight characterizes the move away from Marxism from the late 1980s, towards focus on consumption and the construction of identities as the "third phase of cultural studies" (2005, pp. 783-784). There is sufficient variation from Elkin's characterization in visual culture accounts to not generalize from his view; but this distinction from culture studies is important. On Elkins' further account of visual studies, there are a number of concerns taken up that lead me to distinguish between visual studies and visual culture studies. These distinctions are discussed later in the chapter.

[37] This study employs the terms visual culture and visual culture studies interchangeably. Both terms are commonly used to describe the study of what is named as visual culture, although there is debate over the distinction (Bal, 2003; Mitchell, 2002). Like Mirzoeff, Mitchell also prefers the term visual culture "because it is less neutral" than visual studies (see Mitchell, 2002, p. 232). That is, "it commits one at the outset to a set of hypotheses that need to be tested" for instance, "that vision is (as we say) a "cultural construction," that it is learned and cultivated, not simply given by nature…" and "(finally) that it is deeply involved with human societies, with the ethics and politics, aesthetics, and epistemology of seeing and being seen" (p. 232). But the term visual studies is now commonly in use; see for example, Elkins (2003) and Moxey (2001); from the previous note, I will discuss some distinctions between visual studies and visual culture studies I believe are relevant, so avoid the use of 'visual studies' here except in cited references.

constructed on the borderlines between nature and culture" (in Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 244).

On Elkins account, visual culture is "closer to sociology in the European sense – that is, unquantified and culturally oriented sociology" (2003, pp. 3-4). Visual culture methods of analysis brought to the investigation of art objects challenge traditional aesthetic commitments to "forensic skills of connoisseurship" and issues of authenticity (Mitchell, 2002, p. 234). Instead, visual culture theorists characteristically apply "insights from general linguistics, structuralism, semiology or neo-Marxism" (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3). This approach provides what is arguably a "generalized "iconological" interpretive expertise" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 234).

Such a methodological base is not unproblematic for art disciplinary scholarship (Alpers et al, 1996; Mitchell, 1995b; Moxey, 2001). Mitchell's critical comments, for instance, bear on the "de-skilling" of "a whole generation of scholars" as a result of the "larger forces in academic politics;" he is "mindful" these forces have "in some cases exploited interdisciplinary efforts like cultural studies in order to downsize and eliminate traditional departments and disciplines"[38] (2002, p. 234). Mitchell captures the inchoate or developing identity of visual culture (or "visual studies"), as a "proto-discipline" (2008, p. 180). But, he says that he does "not yet know" whether visual culture "will be a field, a department, a subdiscipline, or a discipline, or a passing moment of interdisciplinary turbulence"[39] (2003, p. 250).

2. 4. 3. *Disciplinary Identity and Objects of Knowledge*

In relation to visual culture, variance in their interests and objectives see different disciplines both supplement and frequently contradict "some of the most fundamental

[38] See also Mitchell on the close tie of disciplinarity to "professions, turf wars, discipleship, and a genealogy of often competing practices" (2003, p. 251).

[39] But, Mitchell adds, "disciplinary coherence" across all fields "retreats before us," he notes, the "closer we come" to them (2003, p. 251). That is, "disciplinarity is a relative thing;" in his experience, "it rarely depends on the establishment of a universally agree-upon 'object,' whether defined or created" (p. 251). The point that institutional power is not dependent on categorical agreement is important to the emergence of visual culture. The "oddity" of disciplinary activity is that its "thriving is independent of how well defined at the outset are the basic categories in those disciplines" (Freeman, 2001, p. 23).

intellectual principles" of one another[40] (Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. vii). Visual culture broadly includes studies in traditional, new and mass media (Holly and Moxey (Eds.), 2002). There is also interest in a "new social/political/communicational order that employs mass spectacle and technologies of visual and auditory simulation in radically new ways" (Mitchell, 1995b, p. 207). Elkins says "visual studies" can be understood as "a set of concerns united by a lack of interest in several subjects – older cultures, formalism, and canonical works of art"[41] (2003, p. 17).

Absence of a single unified disciplinary base means significant debate marks both the objects and methods of enquiry (p. 5). Mitchell and Elkins characterize visual culture studies as "interdisciplinary" or "hybrid" (Mitchell, 1995b, p. 207; Elkins, 2003, p. viii). This hybridity or interdisciplinarity is central to debate over visual cultural studies as an identity, as well as its pursuits. Some theorists question the notion of visual culture as "an academic and cultural discipline or approach" on grounds that historically, the "collapse of object and discipline" into one identity generates "methodological dogmatism or indifference" [42] (Bal, 2003, p. 6). There is, on Mitchell's account, "some kind of excess, density, and plenitude in visual culture that escapes formalization"[43] (in Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 239).

On Mitchell's account (in contrast to Bal's), visual culture stands "at the threshold of definition;" "it is already many things" (2003, p. 250). Visual culture, he says, constitutes on "studies in:" "popular culture and media; sub- or non-artistic visual representations; scientific and technical imaging; commercial media" (p. 250). Mitchell also cites "social practices of seeing and spectatorship; optical dimensions of unconscious and conscious mental life (memory, fantasy, imagination); what Gombrich

---

[40] As art history, aesthetics, and visual culture studies, or visual studies, in Holly and Moxey (Eds.) (2002).

[41] But see, for example, Michael Ann Holly in contrast to Elkins; "the majority of these (contemporary visual culture studies) analysts regard objects produced before the 20th Century as over and done for, and in this benighted habit refuse to acknowledge that the past, even that of centuries ago, can 'answer back'" (Holly, 2003, p. 240, parentheses added).

[42] Bal says, the "attempt to define rather than create the object of visual culture studies has yet another drawback;" "since the object domain itself is limitless, the attempt to define what the objects have in common can only invoke banality" (2003, p. 12).

[43] Mitchell rejects "formalizing" visual culture "within the straightjacket of linguistics" (in Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 239).

called ‘the beholder’s share’ in image formation” (p. 250). There is interest in “boundaries;” “between vision and language, vision and audition, vision and the invisible; between the seen and overlooked;” and finally, “between visual representation generally and the specific field of the visual arts” (p. 250).

Across all these views however, visual cultural interests typically mark a breakdown of traditional boundaries between “verbal” and “visual” disciplines (Mitchell, 1995b, p. 207). There is support for a “more active interplay between literary theory and art history” (Melville, 1991, p. 74). In the mid-1990s, and still commonly, the “polemical claim” that the interaction between image and text, or language is “constitutive of representation as such” typifies visual culture discourse (Mitchell, 1994, p. 5; cited in Moxey, 2001, p. 112).

On one side, from this interest, visual cultural theorists most characteristically seek revision of art historical methods to semiological, as sign systems, approaches in the investigation of artworks (Bryson, 1991, p. 61; Duncum, 1991, p. 32). Semiotic or semiological approaches themselves vary, employing different philosophical and ideological objects and methods (Eco, 1986). But on the other side, some theorists challenge such identity between imagery and language. More recently, Mitchell qualifies his notion of representation: “language is based on a system (syntax, grammar, phonology) that can be scientifically described; pictures and visual experience may not have a grammar in this sense” (in Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 239). If pictures consist in “a language, it is one that has so far eluded the net of linguistics” (p. 239).

Ian Heywood and Barry Sandywell say: “we have to speak in the plural of ‘hermeneutics of vision’ when defining the field of visual culture today,” that is, “interest in the phenomenological, semiotic and hermeneutic investigation of the textures of visual experience,” as the concept of visuality absorbs “the impact of a wide range of semiotic theories of representation drawing upon largely continental social and philosophical thought” (1999, p. ix). Some theorists represent study of visual culture including characteristically art historical methodological frameworks: Mitchell, for example, describes his work “explaining what pictures are, how they mean, what they

do, while reviving an ancient interdisciplinary enterprise called iconology" as the "general study of images across the media," as well as "opening a new initiative called visual culture" as the "study of human visual experience and expression" (2005, p. 6).

For some theorists the disciplinary basis of visuality in art history, as aesthetic concern with artistic artefacts, is revised to sociocultural analysis or rejected altogether. Instead, "frameworks of media and cultural studies" are employed to "consider the various ways in which visual culture relates to broad social processes" (quote from Duncum, 2001, p. 108; see also Freedman, 2000b). The "recent work from sociology and social theory has been at the forefront of this revaluation of visual metaphors and ideas" (Heywood and Sandywell, 1999, p. ix). Social or cultural analysis enables engagement with different meanings (Freedman, 2000b). Advocates claim this form of investigation allows visual arts and education to approach mass and new media "with the appropriate conceptual tools" (Duncum, 1997, p. 71). And from social reconstructionist, as postmodernist advocacy, these instruments consist in "critical social theory"[44] (Freedman, 2000a, p. 319).

In art institutional contexts, emphasis and interests vary significantly (Elkins, 2003, p. 7; Holly and Moxey, 2002; Moxey, 2001). But across this variance, visual culture theorists typically consider the pervasive or ubiquitous nature of cultural representation in visual images transforms "the nature of political discourse, social interaction and cultural identity" (Freedman, 2000a, p. 315). And, these theorists argue, the discursive mediation of the visual, as dominant discourses, is problematic. Art education practices require a shift towards understanding the "contemporary realities" of mass media (p. 315). Understanding, on this view, can be accomplished by questioning the beliefs and values underlying cultural identity (Duncum, 1999b, pp. 307-308; Keifer-Boyd, 2003, pp. 315-317).

[44] The "understanding (of) visual culture is not synonymous with social perspectives of art education," but "they are related" (Freedman, 2000a, p. 323, parentheses added). Freedman identifies those concerned with the social reconstructionist perspective "as agents for social change" (p. 323). The "climate" of "postmodernism" on this account, "includes a skepticism about modernist conceptions of sociopolitical, economic, and scientific progress" (1997a, p. 21).

2. 4. 4. *The Problem With Knowledge as Discipline Based in Visual Culture*

For "postmodern aestheticians," the "process of evaluating modern philosophy" is "an imperative"[45] (Freedman, 2000b, p. 5). Importantly, disciplinary boundaries constrain knowledge; "particularly from the work of Kant, different forms of knowledge and experience became thought of as separate from one another" (p. 5). From this distinction, "metaphysical thinking was considered distinct from scientific method and aesthetic experience was conceptualized as separate from ethical judgment" (p. 5). This "effort to isolate and define distinctive attributes was to enable different modes of knowledge to be efficiently understood" (p. 5).

In contemporary education however, "postmodern art makes imperative a connectedness that undermines knowledge as traditionally taught in school, involving interactions between people, cultures, forms of representation, and professional disciplines" (1998, p. 9). The "elevation of text" and from this, the value distinction, even opposition, between "art making and textual study" is "an arbitrary construction of knowledge" (p. 10). There is a separation between the visual arts as "visual technologies" in contrast to the location of "media studies" typically represented in curriculum within "the domain of English education"[46] (p. 10).

The criticism of disciplinary constraints is consistent with Bal's concern for disciplinary objects as 'dogma;' on Freedman's view, disciplinary, as specific epistemic forms of engagement, curtails knowledge of the object. The "essential qualities of images have been hidden in curriculum through the representation of aesthetics in school as formal and objective or expressive and subjective"[47] (p. 10). The separation of fields in education is inappropriate for explaining and understanding contemporary art;

---

[45] Freedman references Hilda Heine, Paul Crowther, Peter McCormick, Richard Shusterman.

[46] In the U. S., Freedman says, this traditional distinction in the curriculum "has resulted in turf-building of various sorts" (1998, p. 10). The conceptual identity of art, in contrast to text-based curricula, "depends on images of beauty and other aesthetic qualities;" these qualities "promote perceptual pleasure to inform, seduce, convince, and so on" (p. 10). And "in part because they are pleasurable" or "sensuous," these qualities "have been diminished in importance in school" (p. 10).

[47] The essential qualities, in Freedman's account, are not recovered through aesthetic methods; rather, to "uncover what is hidden, curriculum must be made transparent through its deconstruction" (1998, p. 10). And when attention shifts from "developing curriculum" to "understanding curriculum," Freedman says, "we see new subject area connections and the cutting edge of knowledge today is revealed on the borders of disciplines" (p. 11).

"modernist conceptions of aesthetics are not helpful in looking at postmodern imagery" in that "they simply do not provide access to most postmodern art"[48] (p. 10).

There are "educational implications" deriving "from a new relationship between students and the art they encounter;" "this relationship is complex and involves disputes, including a range of (epistemological) boundary disputes"[49] (p. 13, parentheses added). In better university courses, Elkins says, visual culture studies aim at "a generalizable set of approaches to images that can serve students in a wide range of disciplines;" for this reason, "they concentrate on the social construction of vision, the relation between seeing and saying, the lack of natural images," as well as "the necessity of interpretation, and the involvement of the viewer in what is seen" (2003, p. 127). Typically, these introductory tertiary courses as yet only prepare students in "art history or studio art" (p. 127). But, Elkins says, "the challenge is to imagine an introductory course" that prepares students for majors "in visual anthropology, physics, cognitive science, or engineering" (p. 127). Such a course of action "will require a discussion about specific visual competencies and particular sets of visual knowledge" (p. 127).

2. 4. 5. *Inter-, Multi-, Trans-,* or *Post-Disciplinarity?*

Elkins' claim for visual culture's lack of interest in older cultures, formalism and canonical artworks does substantially typify visual culture discourse, but does not indicate scholarship engaging the 'art canon' as visual culture[50]. The contrast points to a broader problem in the changing and still fluid terms of visuality, demonstrated in the relation between theory and method on one hand, and institutional identity on the other.

---

[48] The tendency is to simplify; art is represented "as a less-than-complex" subject in curriculum in order to teach to behavioral objectives," or to "make assessment more "scientific"" (Freedman, 1998, p. 10). But, viewing art in education as "merely therapeutic or a problem of design" is compromised; rather, to understand art "as a form of social production," for example, as "seductive, gendered," etc., "represents the complexity of the visual arts" (p. 10).

[49] The "issue of aesthetics in education" exemplifies "the problem" (Freedman, 1998, p. 13). The "notion of aesthetics prevalent in curriculum typically establishes a boundary conflict: form versus meaning" (p. 13). That is, "since Kant, aestheticians and other members of the art community have explained aesthetics as being inherently separate from meaning" (pp. 13-14). But "from a postmodern perspective, the aesthetic is inherently attached to meaning;" for instance, colour "is used to elicit a sociocultural response" (p. 14).

[50] See for example, Bal (2002); Bryson (2002); Pollock (2002); Kemp (2006).

Griselda Pollock for example says, it is primarily the "fluency with which I can work in a transdisciplinary way between the compelling and contradictory claims of different modes of thought and practice that I treasure as the enabling quality of the radical dissidence from a disciplining discipline"[51] (2003, p. 254).

Elkins describes interdisciplinarity as a "leading" concept in visual culture studies (2003, p. viii). But in contemporary academia, knowledge still functions within an economy of disciplinary structures (Mitchell, 2003). The term 'multidisciplinary' has gained academic currency and the literature of visual culture reflects this usage. Bal however describes approaches to the study of the object of visual culture within a "conglomerate" of disciplines, contra multidisciplinarity; she says, "within this conglomerate each discipline contributes limited, indispensable and productive methodological elements, which together offer a coherent model for analysis, not a list of overlapping questions" (2003, p. 7; drawing from Hooper-Greenhill, 2000). This view identifies visual culture not as a field of knowledge or even a specific discipline on current models, but rather an amended, still specialized approach to the study of visually defined artefacts[52]. Bal proposes an inter- or trans-disciplinary use of "concepts" that "travel" (2002). The issue of maintenance, development, or loss of specialized skills in the context of interdisciplinary approaches is a crucially interesting problem concerning visuality in contemporary educational environments.

Visual culture, Mirzoeff says, is an "increasingly important meeting place for critics, historians and practitioners in all visual media who are impatient with the tired nostrums of their "home' discipline or medium" (2002a, p. 6). The "emergence of multi-media has created an apparent state of emergency" in (U. S.) universities, "at the level of criticism, pedagogy and institutional practice" (p. 6). Behind all of the activity in response to this development, "lurks the fear of an emergent contradiction: digital culture promotes a form of empowered amateurism – make your own movie, cut your

[51] Broadly, Pollock's institutional identity and research interests "articulate the interface between aesthetics, ethics and politics" (2008).
[52] In the previously cited Heywood and Sandywell, for example, contributors derive from departments of Philosophy, Fine Art, Sociology, and Visual Arts from various U. S. and U. K. universities and colleges (1999).

own CD, publish your own website" – that, Mirzoeff says, "cuts across professionalization and specialization, the twin justifications of the liberal arts university" (p. 6).

So, visual culture "is not a traditional discipline, then, because before very long there may not be anything like the current array of disciplines" (p. 6). Instead, "it is one among a number of critically engaged means to work out what doing post-disciplinary practice might be like and, further, to try and ensure that it is not simply a form of pre-job training" (p. 6). The "constituent element of visual culture's practice is the visual event;" the "event is the effect of a network in which subjects operate and which in turn conditions their freedom of action"[53] (p. 6).

2. 5. Background to Visual Cultural Analysis v. Aesthetics

In visual culture discourse, broadly, theorists have commonly claimed philosophical aesthetics is elitist and alienating. This 'anti-aesthetic' is undergoing "rethinking" from some theorists, as an "ethics of aesthetics" makes its way into discourse[54] (Costello and Willsdon, 2008, p. 7). But criticism of aesthetics' longstanding philosophical commitments and its central disciplinary object of art continues (see Duncum, 2008; Tavin, 2007). Rejection of philosophical aesthetics from scholars advocating engagement with popular culture emerges in art education from the early 1980s[55] (see Duncum, 1982a; Popkewitz and Freedman, 1984). The opposition is consistent with criticism of the aesthetic from emerging scholarship in art history and cultural studies at that time (see van Eck and Winters, 2005). As well as its intrinsic elitism and

[53] From Foucault, Mirzoeff says, "'the problem is to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another'" (Foucault, 2000, p. 116; cited in Mirzoeff, 2002a, p. 6).

[54] But, such close identity between ethics and art is problematic; see Heywood (1999).

[55] Drawing on the cultural studies work of Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, among others, argument for study of mass produced culture in art education emerges as debate between 'high culture' and 'popular' culture (Duncum, 1987). The high culture position seeks to "attack popular culture from an outsider's position and treat ordinary people in a dismissive way" (p. 8). In critical discourse, prescription of exemplary aesthetic works is indicated as contrary to "cultural democracy" (p. 8).

universalization of Eurocentric rationalist values, the history of aesthetics sets sensory and conceptual activity in opposition[56] (Eagleton, 1990).

Experience of art on aesthetic accounts is felt, tied to immediate perceptual activity, distinct from cognition (p. 13). The overriding agency of culture in the experience and understanding of art and imagery is excluded from aesthetic explanation (Bryson, 1991). Further, the influence of aesthetic accounts is pervasive. The "ways in which aesthetic experience is conceptualized and represented in curriculum, whether overt or hidden, are at the foundation of art education" (Freedman, 2000b, p. 1; see also 2003, pp. 23-24). And, "it is time to seriously question the influence of this aesthetic tradition on curriculum"[57]; "a reconsideration of notions of aesthetics for art education is needed" (2000b, pp. 1-2).

Over time, the role of the aesthetic in experience demonstrates a persistent object of concern in visual cultural accounts. As interest in the aesthetic re-emerges, a reconsideration becomes apparent in visual cultural discourse from the late 1990s, shifting towards an 'everyday aesthetic' construct[58] (see Duncum, 1999a; Light and

---

[56] The "distinction which the term 'aesthetic' initially enforces in the mid-eighteenth century is not one between 'art' and 'life', but between the material and the immaterial: between things and thoughts, sensations and ideas, that which is bound up with our creaturely life as opposed to that which conducts some shadowy existence in the recesses of the mind" (Eagleton, 1990, p. 13); on the universalization of value, see (pp. 21-22).

[57] Identification of "aesthetics with formalism or expressionism" disregards how "art and aesthetic experience has changed through the dynamics and saturation of image making and image viewing in postmodern culture" (Freedman, 2000b, p. 1). And, "this contemporary view is fundamentally based on a sociocultural conception of aesthetic experience and an aesthetic of meaning constructed from various forms of visual culture" (p. 1).

[58] Following on the renewed interest in the aesthetic, the literature of visual culture claims "everyday" 'aesthetic' sites as artefacts of study; revision to the preferred artefacts of investigation should include "theme parks, shopping malls and television" (Duncum, 1999b, pp. 295-296). The case for "incorporating everyday cultural sites into art education" is "twofold:" first, the "sheer volume and familiarity" of everyday sites are "far more significant in forming and informing one's identity and view of the world beyond personal experience" (p. 296). Second, increasingly "there exists a powerful synergy of technological, economic, and social dynamics driving the proliferation of everyday aesthetic experiences" (p. 296). These influences will deliver a cultural revolution "that sidelines, even further than today, the role of the fine arts" in student experience (p. 296). From their ubiquity, everyday sites vary significantly from the identification of artworks within the elite, and elitist, institutionalized context of an artworld. From this distinction between the two kinds of 'visual' artefact, education should democratically focus on the more typical aspects of the student's world (Freedman, 2000a). Fine art is uncharacteristic of obtaining aesthetic experience "outside of the world sanctioned by art institutions" (Duncum, 1999b, p. 295). That is, aesthetic experience of fine art is uncommon for the "great majority of children," except through "relatively unusual and isolated events like a gallery visit" (pp. 295-297). Further, the aesthetics

Smith (Eds.), 2005). The rejection of 'modernist' philosophical aesthetics remains however (see Duncum, 2008; Tavin, 2005). Aesthetic values, like other concepts of truth and value, may relate to issues of power more than to any objective standard (Freedman, 1997, p. 25). The underlying argument remains consistent: in contrast to "aesthetic appreciation," semiotic and sociological discourse advances "social values and meanings" (Duncum, 1987, p. 7; see also Tavin, 2007).

The case that study "of the everyday" is "more important" than the study of fine arts "relies on a post-structural semiotic view of culture;" that is, "to view aesthetic sites in such terms is to read them, first, as markers of meaning irrespective of social privilege" and second, "in the context of people's lives" (1999b, p. 297). So, "a post-structural semiotic approach means trying to grasp aesthetic sites in terms of the purposes to which they are put in the multiple contexts in which they are experienced" (p. 297). And approached this way, in contrast to aesthetic significance of particular or unique artefacts, "the very special importance of the visual arts lies precisely in their ubiquity" (p. 297).

2. 5. 1. *The Problem with Philosophical Aesthetics*

From the early 1980s, roughly, three ethical criticisms of the aesthetic emerges in art education: first, socially, the "main objection to aesthetic theory" is "not philosophic, but ideological," on the grounds that "the specialization of certain artefacts as art on aesthetic grounds" is "rooted in class division"[59] (1982a, p. 57; 1990b). Second, cognitively, the aesthetic orientation is "self-enclosed, self-sufficient, unrelated to considerations of utility;" the aesthetic position is "something set apart from normal social experience" (1982c, p. 72). Third, later attaching to the previous argument, one further criticism substantially shapes the problem: technologically, experience of the

---

of fine art "stresses the cultivation of distance;" instead "everyday aesthetics emphasizes involvement" (p. 296).

[59] Study of aesthetics is the "continued application" of a "class-based theory, allowing one class the presumption of a sense of superiority over other classes" (Duncum, 1982a, p. 57). The relationship of "formal study of aesthetic experience" is characteristic of the "aim of becoming a connoisseur" (1982b, pp. 67-68). Art educators who cultivated an aesthetic orientation "may be led to assume that those who do not approach cultural artefacts in this way" are "even somehow deficient as human beings" who "possess inferior" judgment (1982c, p. 76). The "discourse of aesthetics" consists in "loaded categories, ideological baggage, and troubling taxonomies" (Tavin, 2007, p. 43).

aesthetic has “changed through the dynamics of image-making and image viewing in postmodern culture” (Freedman, 2001, p. 34; cited in Tavin, 2005, p. 113).

Visual culture theorists say, from its development, aesthetic theory attributed intrinsic and objective values to art objects. The ‘creative genius’ from the aesthetic tradition was one who ordered these universalized elements through personal style (Popkewitz and Freedman, 1984, p. 276). On such terms, personal artistic idiosyncrasy was valued as a marker of that individual style (p. 275). Aesthetic quality was separated and isolated from “other philosophical problems of knowledge, from the modes of production in which art was produced” and “from other humanly made objects”[60] (p. 276). Also “a disinterested or detached attitude was established, distinct from common-sense perceptions and awareness” (p. 276). Aesthetics opposes consideration of the “ways in which most people in our society make meaning” through its “claim to universal significance” (Duncum, 1982c, p. 75). The “epistemological foundations” of aesthetics in art education “erases the politics and history of aesthetic standards” (Tavin, 2005, p. 113). And present practices characterize art as “a specialized, imaginative activity” (Duncum, 1982c, p. 76).

In art education, Freedman says, “curriculum has often focused on form and technical skill, as opposed to content” (Freedman, 2000a, p. 316). But “students make art not merely for its formal, technical, or even private value, but to communicate about social issues in social ways” (p. 323). Historically, aesthetic experience “is a mere sensory coupling with elements and principles of design;” in this way it is unrelated to meaning and interpretation (p. 317). Curriculum, on this view, is entrenched in an outdated analytic aesthetics from which the notion of aesthetic experience is drawn (p. 317). In contrast to the art of modernist aesthetics, postmodern artists frequently “reject formalistic uses of the elements and principles of design in favour of symbolic uses that suggest multiple and extended social meanings” (p. 317). In relation to some postmodern works, formalism does not allow students access to the work (p. 318).

[60] And the “professional aspects of aesthetic codes” reinforce the separation of artists and their production from other social contexts (Popkewitz and Freedman, 1984, p. 278).

2. 5. 2. *Revision of the Aesthetic*

By the late 1990s, a "new aesthetic emphasis" emerges within the context of "instantaneous communications, of a sudden and exponential proliferation of images, and an economy increasingly reliant…upon the production of ever more imagery" (Duncum, 1999a, p. 45). In contrast to "interest in the auric, isolated object," an "aesthetics of the everyday" is now the object of "social prominence and academic attention" (p. 45). Aesthetics has "acquired a wholly unprecedented social significance, driven by…technological developments, economic imperatives and new social formations," which will "greatly accelerate over the next few decades" (p. 46).

Visual culture theorists claim understandings of the term aesthetics has shifted (Duncum, 1999a; Freedman, 2001); as metacriticism, the philosophy of aesthetics refers to the "appreciation of beauty" or "the visually vital," both of which retain to the "specifically visual, rather than social or political dimensions" (Duncum, 1999a, p. 46). This tradition focuses "exclusively on only certain privileged forms of the visual," which are those of "high art and other experiences… considered to be spiritually elevating"[61] (p. 46). In contrast, the "aesthetic of the everyday" relates to the traditional meaning of the Greek "*aesthesis* to mean "the conditions of sensuous perception" and to "visual effect and appearance" (p. 47; citing Williams, 1983, p. 31).

The previous "single, richly coded image" and "singular scrutinizing gaze" encouraged contemplation (pp. 47-48; citing McRobbie, 1994, p. 13). But the lingering of aesthetic engagement does not capture contemporary experience. Instead, the contemporary reference relates to the "sense of intoxication, sensory overload, disorientation and the

[61] Such an approach to the aesthetic functions within a tradition where "art and the aesthetic are often so closely associated that they mutually define one another;" "reference points beyond social use and social valuation" (Duncum, 1999a, p. 46). From that tradition, art and the aesthetic constitute "elements of a continuing divided modern consciousness between the individual and society, and humanity and technology" (p. 46). The concept of "the creative imagination" is embedded within this aesthetic as a response to the reductiveness and commodification of material objects (p. 47). In art discourse, Duncum says, art objects are separated from the production of other commodities; this defended autonomy from the "social, economic and political interests" driving the production of other objects enables "art and aesthetic appreciation…a false separation from material conditions" (p. 47). But such a theoretical separation was "never more than a deception;" it enabled distinctions between ""art and non-art"… "culture" from "mass culture"" (p. 47; citing Williams, 1997, p. 154). The creation of "calm reflective sites" corresponds to the "division of labour in production," normalizing a value of art as "special… separate from everyday life" (p. 47).

intensities" of "theme parks, shopping malls and television" (pp. 47-48). This contemporary view replaces the singular engagement between gaze and object with "a multiplicity of fragmented, and frequently interrupted 'looks'" (p. 48; citing McRobbie). Visual interest revises to be embedded in contexts of "production and commercial interest" (p. 48).

The aesthetics of the everyday can be understood as an "inversion or switching about of Kantian aesthetics"[62] (p. 48). The different theoretical orientations, as idealist, formalist, and empathy or expression, were "informed by" the notions of aesthetic disinterestedness, as well as interestedness[63] (p. 48). Idealism and formalism both locate in notions of disinterestedness (p. 48). Requiring the "cultivation of cool detachment, Kant's "concern for ideas and form" stresses disinterest (p. 49). But the "concern for feeling and desire emphasized interestedness" (p. 49). This tradition of empathy, or expression, is "grounded in feeling, presupposes goodwill, and strives for mutual understanding" (p. 49). Artworks, on this basis, are "not just for the eyes, but the "whole well-tuned personality"" (p. 49; citing Mundt, 1959, p. 293).

---

[62] From Kant, the notion of aesthetic judgment concerns a "soaring imagination and a vital spirit" that is "disciplined by sound critical judgment, a broad understanding, and discriminating taste" (Duncum, 1999a, p. 49). Kant's notion of the sublime relates to nature; but the condition of the everyday aesthetic is experienced in the "human-made environment of flashing lights, discordant sounds, and continual, hurried and abrupt movement" (p. 49). For critics, the 'everyday aesthetic' represents excess rather than the exceeding of Kant's sublime and results in succumbing to an experience where there is "neither a sense of separation… nor any actual autonomy" (p. 50). This perceived lack of autonomy is problematic. There are critics who, in observing the absence of "distance or disinterestedness" claim "that the consequence of an everyday aesthetic view is "disinterest… apathy" (p. 49). Such response could, Duncum says, be a reaction by those not schooled in the media saturation of the contemporary generation, who are conditioned to the mimetic quality of the image; that is, they may feel "it merely represents or comments on something real;" that is, "they do not acknowledge that it is something real in itself" (p. 50).

[63] Theoretical developments from the 19th Century German aesthetic tradition, from Kant's *Critique of Judgment* consist, Duncum says, principally of three kinds. First the Idealists "were interested in the knowledge base or ideas of art;" in the 20th Century, this kind is most famously represented in the iconological approach of Panofsky (1999a, p. 48). The approach "interpreted meaning in terms of a layering of historical references" and meaning here resides in the various "levels of symbolism that accrue over time where the present always refers, in part, to the past" (p. 48). Second; the "Pure Visibility theorists who were succeeded in the 20th Century by the Formalists" such as Bell and Fry (p. 48). This approach emphasizes the "pleasures of pure form unrelated to ideas or feelings" (p. 48). Third, the "Empathy theorists;" exploring "the value of sympathetically entering into the emotional or feeling content of art" (p. 48). Meaning here resides in the "fulfilment of desire" (p. 48). In the 20th Century, the empathy approach was developed by "Expression theorists" such as Collingwood, "who stressed the exploration by artists of the human heart and soul" (p. 48).

A “postmodern aesthetics of the everyday” Paul Duncum says, is emergent from this theoretical framework; it “involves participation, sensuousness, and desire” (p. 49). The “aesthetics of the everyday is also the heir to the Idealists’ and Iconographers’ interest in meaning coded in signs;” but, in contrast to “an iconographic interest in meaning accrued over time, the aesthetics of the everyday is ahistorical” (p. 49). That is, “meaning is said to entirely refer to the immediate present” (p. 49). Iconographic meaning consists “mostly in relationships between past and present;” however, “many contemporary signs are said to float without reference to the present, let alone the past”[64] (p. 49).

There are relational “continuities” existing amongst “high art aesthetics and everyday aesthetics” (p. 51). The continuity means that the contrast between them “is not then as pronounced as some postmodern theorists would have us believe” (p. 51). And “indeed, everyday aesthetics is not unlike Kant’s notion of the sublime” (p. 51). As with “high art sites,” Duncum says, “different sites of the everyday suggest different degrees of distance and control” as well as a “range of experiences”[65] (p. 51).

2. 6. Conclusion

By the end of the 20th Century, the emergence of what is more recently known as the “creative class” impacts on visual culture theory[66] (see Florida, 2007). From this

[64] Typifying description of the separation from past meanings, Jean Baudrillard says, “it is a new generation of signs and objects which comes with the industrial revolution” that is, “signs without the tradition of caste, ones that will never have known any binding restrictions” (1983, p. 96). The “problem of their uniqueness, or their origin, is no longer a matter of concern; their origin is technique, and the only sense they possess is in the dimension of the industrial simulacrum” (p. 96).

[65] The “notion of an “everyday aesthetic” is controversial; it faces “some problems of definition” which “potentially threaten the viability of the everyday aesthetics project to extend the scope of philosophical aesthetics” (Petts, 2008, p. 116). On the problems of trivialization and incoherence from extension of included terms to ‘everyday’ sites and experiences, see for example, Petts (2008).

[66] There is “a new class, variously called the service class (Lash, 1994), the new petit bourgeoisie (Bourdieu, 1989), or the new cultural intermediaries (Featherstone, 1991), who are open as no class before to a playful exploration of social signifiers” (quote from Duncum, 1999a, p. 52). The individuals of this class are located across many professional areas, including teaching; they “invest… in Bourdieu’s terms, in educational and social capital” (p. 52). And they are “highly receptive to symbolic exchange through consumer goods, services, and images which many of them are responsible for producing” (p. 53). Here, consumption is a “playful but acceptable signifier of identity” (p. 53). The children of this class extend this semiotic engagement, “learning to view non-mediated reality in semiotic terms; indeed…they view ‘real life’ as if it were mediated” (p. 53). The experience of computers for this generation means

context, the role of symbolic value is significant in understanding the ‘aesthetics of the everyday;’ “material objects are also signs, and we relate to the world of things in both instrumental and symbolic ways (Duncum, 1999a, p. 52). Consumption of both material goods and the “mediated experience” of such things as tourism provide both location and identity in the world, such that “we live in a “semiotic society” or a “culture society”” (p. 52; citing Lash, 1994, p. 277). The following chapter takes up visual culture’s commitment to representation as social and from this, the discursive construction of the subject, in semiotic accounts.

“they are able to view real life in terms of signs” in which the “primary, non-mediated world is read as a multimedia text” (pp. 53-54). Concern with the processes of capital remains. There is advocacy for “what Marx called the investigation of the material conditions of cultural production” since “the embrace of aesthetic sites is as fetishistic as high art aesthetics tended to be” (p. 54). To “revel in the…pleasures” of everyday aesthetic sites from an “insider’s perspective” enables art educators to “fashion a sense of ourselves” (p. 54).

Chapter 3

Explanation and Subjectivity in Visual Culture's Concept of Visuality

3. Introduction

Visual culture emerges in the 1990s. But the influence of semiotic theories on the explanation of art as pictorial representation is longstanding. Primary among those influences since the 1960s, *Languages of Art* by philosopher Nelson Goodman (1968) impacts on the study of art and the psychology of representation in visual arts and art education. Goodman's concern with art as a symbol system of representation develops in the context wider interest, particularly from mid-20th Century, in the structures of language[1]. To understand the explanation of visuality as an approach to representation, in visual culture, the study traces some wider historical background concerning Goodman's influences.

3. 1. Art, Imagery, Semiotic Analysis

The "linguistic turn of the sixties seemed to herald a new focus on language in both the humanities and social sciences that might break through the disciplinary boundaries separating philosophy, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, and literary criticism" (Lee, 1997, p. 1). The influence of "Piaget, Chomsky, and Lévi-Strauss" provided an "image in which structuralist conceptions of culture and psychology would combine with generative accounts of linguistic structure to create an interlinked model of the "deep structures" of human consciousness" (p. 1). And "in the early days of structuralist

[1] The focus on Goodman's work (and lesser reference, following, to Roman Jakobson) as exemplar of structuralist semiotic theories is relevant as well as having further purpose; it concerns broader interest in this study towards the nature and ongoing influence from cognitive science on theories of representation in the arts. Goodman's work remains influential and the focus is, I believe, necessary to account of cognition in visuality (see Gardner, 2000; Hyman, 2006). But from the constraints of this larger framework, I apologize for the lack of reference to other theorists, among others, C. S. Peirce and Ernst Cassirer. There are important others: "it can be said that the semiotic perspective has long been present in art history: the work of Reigl and Panofsky can be shown to be congenial to the basic tenets of Peirce and Saussure, and key texts of Meyer Shapiro deal directly with issues in visual semiotics" (Bal and Bryson, 1991, p. 174).

linguistics there was a constant interplay among linguists, philosophers, and literary critics"[2] p. 1).

The intellectual direction from this period significantly forms, from "the late 1950s," in the development of cognitive science (Bruner, 1990, p. 2). This development, as prototypically inter-, trans-, or multi- disciplinary was radical, preceded the emergence and claims of contemporary visual culture by some half century. The "cognitive revolution as originally conceived virtually required that psychology join forces with anthropology and linguistics, philosophy and history, even with the discipline of law" (p. 3). In that period, for example (at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard), "among the Center's Fellows could be numbered almost as many philosophers, anthropologists, and linguists as there were proper psychologists – among them such exponents of the new constructivism as Nelson Goodman"[3] (p. 3). Goodman, like others in the early years of cognitive science, was interested in the "construction of meaning" (see Bruner, 1990); in the explanation of art, his approach has been absorbed into art theory including aesthetics, broadly defined. Goodman's work substantially defines symbol theories of representation, providing an early, structuralist, framework for visual culture's rejection of causal or perceptual accounts of depiction.

The "symbol theory" of representation presupposes visual experience as systematically mediated; Nelson Goodman is its "most prominent champion" (McIver Lopes, 1998, p. 141). Dominic McIver Lopes says, "pictures, (Goodman) argues, *do not depict* because we first see scenes and objects in them;" rather, "what we see in pictures is determined by our beliefs, imaginings, or knowledge about what they represent"[4] (p. 141, emphasis

---

[2] But, partly from the "divergence" of interests among these groups, "enthusiasm" for the project receded (Lee, 1997, p. 1). For further discussion of reasons for the shift, see Lee (1997).

[3] As well as Goodman's presence as a Fellow, "it is no surprise and certainly not an accident," Jerome Bruner says, "that in those early years the advisory board of the Center" included "a philosopher, W. V. Quine, and intellectual historian, H. Stuart Hughes, and a linguist, Roman Jakobson" (1990, p. 3). Regarding "the law," Bruner reports "that several distinguished members of the faculty" attended colloquia, including "Paul Freund" who "admitted he came because we at the Center, it seemed to him, were interested in how rules (like rules of grammar, rather than scientific laws) affected human action and that, after all, is what jurisprudence is about" (p. 3).

[4] But technically, "none of Goodman's observations about the logic of pictures entails antiperceptualism" (McIver Lopes, 1998, p. 141). That is, "assuming a sufficiently fluid conception of vision, there is no reason why the mechanisms of pictorial denotation and predication and the organization of pictures into

and parentheses added). On Goodman's account, "analysis of pictures can be usefully modeled on an analysis of linguistic expressions and other symbols with which they share certain logical properties" (p. 141).

Goodman's work provides a "semantic theory of depiction" (p. 141). Here, "pictorial representation involves denotation and predication in a symbol system;" so, "just as a word or sentence in a language refers to an object or state of affairs, a picture belongs to a pictorial system in which it refers to objects and scenes" (p. 141). And, "just as some words or phrases in a language function as predicates, pictures in a pictorial symbol system represent what they denote as having properties" (p. 141). For example, "the *Mona Lisa* portrays a woman as smiling enigmatically because it belongs to a system in which it denotes a certain person and predicates of her the property "is enigmatic"" (p. 141).

McIver Lopes says, "denotation and predication always take place in the context of a system whose function is to lay down what any given design denotes or predicates;" "the systematicity of pictures accommodates their diversity" (p. 141). So, "pictures belong to diverse styles or systems" and "these styles have an internal coherence because pictorial competence is system-relative" (p. 141). That is, "an ability to interpret some pictures in a style or system entails an ability to interpret readily and correctly other pictures in the same system" (p. 141). But this "picture-reading skill" within one style or system does "not necessarily (imply) an ability to interpret readily and correctly pictures in other styles or systems" (p. 141, parentheses added).

3. 1. 1. *Poststructuralist Semiotics*

Goodman's work currently maintains extensive influence on the semiotic explanation of art (McIver Lopes, 1998; Hyman, 2006). But, in the last decades, and more decisively for visual culture, "semiotics has been engaged with a range of problems very different from those it began with" (Bal and Bryson, 1991, p. 174). The contemporary encounter between semiotics and art history involves "new and distinct areas of debate" emerging

---

systems might not turn out to depend on facts about vision;" "despite this, Goodman insists that pictorial representation is arbitrary" (141).

from literary and gender discourse (p. 174). These new areas consist in the "polysemy of meaning; the problematics of authorship, context, and reception; the implications of the study of narrative for the study of images; the issue of sexual difference in relation to verbal and visual signs;" and further, "the claims to truth in interpretation"[5] (p. 174).

Bal and Norman Bryson say that "in its "structuralist" era semiotics frequently operated on the assumption that the meanings of signs were determined by sets of internal oppositions and differences mapped out within a static system"[6] (p. 177). The "crucial move" in this form of analysis "was to invoke and isolate the synchronic system, putting its diachronic aspects to one side;" "what was sought, in a word, was structure" (p. 177). But the "critique launched against this theoretical immobility of sign systems pointed out that a fundamental component of sign-systems had been deleted from the structuralist approach," that is, "the system's aspects of ongoing semiosis, of dynamism" (p. 177).

The shift "to thinking of semiosis as unfolding in time is indeed one of the points at which structuralist semiotics gave way to post-structuralism" (p. 177). And "Derrida, in particular, insisted" that meaning could not be fixed; "rather meaning arose exactly from the movement from one sign or signifier to the next, in a *perpetuum mobile*" from "where there could be found neither a starting point for semiosis, nor a concluding moment in which semiosis terminated and the meanings of signs fully "arrived"" (p. 177).

Some visual culture theorists claim the effects of linguistics based semiological approaches are limited; "in this case it is people like Lyotard, (Gilles) Deleuze and (Michel) Foucault who have invented concepts more suited for dealing with the

[5] Bal and Bryson provide further on the rejection of "positivistic" models of art history and the "theoretical skepticism of semiotics" (1991, p. 174).

[6] And "in order to discover the meanings of the words in a particular language, for example, the interpreter turned to the global set of rules (the *langue*) simultaneously governing the language as a whole;" these were "outside and away from actual utterances (*parole*)" (Bal and Bryson, 1991, p. 177).

relationship between visuality and expression"[7] (David Rodowick in Dikovitskaya, 2005, p. 261, parentheses added).

3. 2. Explanation in Visual Culture

In visual culture, explanations characteristically base in deconstruction in its broadest sense, better described as approach than method[8]. On deconstruction, Paul de Man "(maintains) that one could approach the problems of ideology and by extension the problems of politics on the basis of critical-linguistic analysis, which had to be done in its own terms, in the medium of language" (McQuillan, 2001, p. 82, parentheses added; citing de Man, 1986, p. 121). And deconstruction "begins" with the "gesture of turning reason against itself" in order to "bring out its tacit dependence on another, repressed or unrecognized, level of meaning"[9] (Norris, 2002, p. 63).

Deconstruction "is avowedly 'post-structuralist' in its refusal to accept the idea of structure as in any sense given or objectively 'there' in a text" (p. 3). And, "above all, it questions the assumption… that structures of meaning correspond to some deep-laid mental 'set' or pattern of response which determines the limits of intelligibility" (p. 3). Contrary to the "search for invariant structures or formal universals," deconstruction "starts out by rigorously *suspending* (the) assumed correspondence between mind, meaning and the concept of method which claims to unite them" (p. 3, parentheses added). The "abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained; and the aim is not

[7] But it is Derrida who "radically deconstructed the linguistic base of semiology" (Rodowick in Dikovitskaya, 2005). For further on the application of Deleuze's work in film theory, see Rodowick (1997).

[8] The term 'deconstruction,' from Derrida is now applied to the approaches of various theorists (Norris, 2002; Taylor, 1986). Derrida "has always insisted that deconstruction, if ever there is such a thing, is not a systematic theory, a project" nor can it be formalized as a "method of analysis" (Patton, 2006, p. 5). But in visual culture, deconstruction is now often broadly taken to reference the critical analysis of a text in terms of inherent "multiple, contradictory meanings" (quote from Freedman, 2003, p. 101; see also Rampley, 2005b, p. 136).

[9] I employ Christopher Norris's 3rd Edition work on deconstruction as a widely used text acknowledged by, among others, Umberto Eco and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; but also note that Norris argues against relativism; see Norris (1997).

to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (*creativeness*)"[10] (Deleuze, 2002, p. vii).

Deleuze says, "in so-called rationalist philosophies, the abstract is given the task of explaining, and it is the abstract that is realized in the concrete" (p. vii). So, "one starts with abstractions such as the One, the Whole, the Subject, and one looks for the process by which they are embodied in a world which they make conform to their requirements (this process can be knowledge, virtue, history…)" (p. vii). And this rationalist approach maintains, "even if it means undergoing a terrible crisis each time that one sees rational unity or totality turning into their opposites, or the subject generating monstrosities" (p. vii). But Deleuze's (empiricist and pluralist) approach, he says, "starts with a completely different evaluation: analysing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-existent concepts can be extracted from them;" "states of things are neither unities not totalities, but *multiplicities*"[11] (p. vii).

3. 2. 1. *Method in Visual Culture*

Semiology, "originally a theory of the generation of meaning in language, has come to play a crucial role in informing the analysis of visual culture;" but it "is only *one* method for exploring (visual culture's) rhetorical dimension"[12] (Rampley, 2005b, p. 133, parentheses added). Other theoretical approaches (as broadly semiotic) in visual culture explanation draw on communication theory and discourse analysis (Duncum, 2007, p. 286; see also Rampley, 2005b, p. 135); "sociological and anthropological methods" and "other sociocultural critique methods" (Freedman, 2003, p. 154); "psychoanalysis, feminism, postcolonial criticism" (Bal, 1996, p. 7). Gillian Rose includes compositional interpretation and content analysis among those mentioned

---

[10] This quoted section, Deleuze says, derives from "the two characteristics by which (A. N.) Whitehead defined empiricism" (2002, p. vii, parentheses added). Deleuze says his approach is an "equivalence between empiricism and pluralism" (p. vii).

[11] Deleuze follows this: "it is not just that there are several states of things (each one of which there would be yet another);" nor, he says, "that each state of things is itself multiple (which would simply be to indicate its resistance to unification)" (2002, p. vii). So, "the essential thing, from the point of view of empiricism, is the noun *multiplicity*, which designates a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one another;" "every 'thing' is made up in this way" (p. vii).

[12] The "idea of visual rhetoric is currently associated most commonly with the semiological investigations of writers such as Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco and Norman Bryson" (Rampley, 2005b, p. 133).

above, as methodologies for "the production of empirically grounded responses to particular visual materials" (2001, p. 2).

But in visual culture, all these approaches and methods attend, in their various ways, to the notion of multiple kinds of 'meaning' obtaining in experience of imagery[13]. In poststructural concern with situatedness, as the representation of a point of view, there is commitment to "self-reflection" in approaches and rejection of "methodological dogmatism or indifference" (Bal, 2003, p. 6).

3. 2. 2. *The Construction of Meaning*

In contrast to aesthetic concern with unique or particular properties, features, or qualities of artworks and the immediate felt experience of such objects, semiotic study of visual culture requires inference from the audience to construct meaning from the object or phenomena[14]. Properties of particular art works are attributed "through the language of critical ascription" (Brown, 2003a, p. 286). From this attribution, works of art do not form a distinct class of objects. Rather, under cognitive terms (from previously) the metaphor of "visual literacy" applies to understanding cultural meanings of all media artefacts[15] (p. 286). Media is a generalized term here; "painting,

---

[13] And in secondary education advocates of visual culture argue that art theory should focus on issues of representation more generally and "art should actually promote or suggest many interpretations" (Freedman, 1997, p. 26).

[14] On the interpretation of works, "postmodernist works are "anti-form"" (from the "name of a movement whose leader was Joseph Beuys"); these works "repudiate the integration of visual forms, which defines aesthetic quality" (Macquet, 1990, p. 55). Instead of objects, "postmodern productions are happenings (chance events improvised, spontaneous, without scenario), installations (impermanent assemblages set up in a gallery for a temporary exhibition), concepts (ideas expressed by texts, maps pencils, and other trivial objects" as well as "earthworks (that may result in transforming a site or may consist of digging a hole, then filling it up, as Claes Oldenburg did, or burying a metal cube, as Sol LeWitt did), and other processes" (p. 55). So, "these processes are visual in the sense that they are visible, but they are not intended to have a visual quality that could trigger an aesthetic perception" (p. 55). Rather, "their makers and conceptors make an effort to avoid any visual appeal – and succeed well," since "these productions are directed to the intellect, not to the eyes;" "they may have a strong symbolic impact" (p. 55). For discussion of these 'anti-aesthetic' works, as exhibited works of art, see (p. 55).

[15] The literacy metaphor is significantly problematic. Visual culture theorists commonly refer to the 'reading' of all artefacts as 'text;' see for example, Bal, (1990). On this form of account, distinction between written works, and imagery, depicted as 'visual text' is ambiguous; see for example Howells (2003). But, some visual culture theorists have responded to criticisms of reductionism; one fallacy or myth, Mitchell says, is that "visual culture implies that the difference between a literary text and a painting is a non-problem;" that is, "words and images dissolve into undifferentiated "representation"" (2002, p. 236). Mitchell replies to this characterization: "there are no visual media;" "all media are mixed media, with varying ratios of senses and sign types" (p. 237). Elkins says, "the first thing that needs to be said about visual literacy is that it can't possibly mean anything;" "if it did mean something, then we

printmaking, photography, film, television/video, computer digital imaging," and so on, as imagery, fall within the class of "imaging technologies" (see Myers, Hammett, and McKillop, 1998; quote from Sturken and Cartwright, 2001, p. 11). Traditional art disciplinary concern with the intentionality or mental process of the artist, or "maker," and the work transfers to concern with "the beholder and consumer"[16] (Brown, 2002, p. 46).

As the study of signs within symbol systems, semiotic analysis provides for objects to 'stand in for,' as exemplar of, another thing. On this view, "an artwork has meaning if it can be connected with something else – other artworks, ideas, and events – what in general can be called context"[17] (Parsons, 2002, p. 30). And "because meaning consists in connections," it can be explicated, articulated for others" (p. 30). So, "connections can be indicated in words and they likely can be discussed, argued about, and organized deliberately;" "when they are discussed, they are discursively mediated rather than immediately grasped"[18] (p. 30). Michael Parsons says, "meaning in this sense is often contrasted with the aesthetic, which is perceived rather than being put into words, is directly grasped rather than discursively connected" (p. 31).

---

would be able to read images, to parse them like writing, to read them aloud, to decode them and translate them" (2003, p. 128). Elkins hopes "that we all hope that images are not language, and pictures are not writing" (p. 128). Instead, "it is necessary to think much more specifically and consider exactly which interpretive skills and what kinds of images can serve as a useful common ground for an education in images" (p. 128).

[16] So for example, from this revision, concern with a generalized term of 'global capital' as "designer capitalism" locates theoretical interest in the beholder, as consumer (quote from jagodzinski, 2008). On jan jagodzinski's characterization of global capital, "everything becomes the *same* so as to become *different* through exchange value" (p. 148).

[17] To understand art requires understanding the influence of context, because "without context, a painting is just paint on canvas;" "with context it is a work of art" (Freedman, 2000a, p. 318). Examples of context are "cultures, countries, communities, institutions, including schools themselves, and the sociopolitical conditions under which art is made, seen and studied (p. 318). As well, "contexts include theories and models, such as models of aesthetics, childhood and curriculum that shape our views about art and teaching;" (p. 318). The work is not only "surface form and content, it is about the people who created it, viewed it, showed it, bought it, studied it, and criticized it" (p. 318). But the term 'context' itself is problematic unless understood as text; "it cannot be assumed that "context" has the status of a given or of a simple or natural ground upon which to base interpretation" (Bal and Bryson, 1991, p. 177). The "idea of "context" posited as platform or foundation, invites us to step back from the uncertainties of text" (p. 177). But, Bal and Bryson say, "once that step is taken, it is by no means clear why it may not be taken again; that is, "context" implies from its first moment a potential regression "without brakes"" (p. 177).

[18] That is, "they can be taught and learned in a way that looks very much like the way history, for example, is taught and learned" (Parsons, 2002, p. 30).

In this way, responses to works in visual cultural accounts approach interpretation "as the construction of meanings rather than as the perception of qualities" (p. 30). The "interpretation of visual works of art" here, proceeds "in much the same way theorists have treated literary and other kinds of texts, appealing variously to hermeneutic, reader-response, reception, and intertextualist theories" (p. 30). And "such theories accord a much more constructive role to the viewer and his or her cultural context;" that is, meaning "is constructed by the interaction of the viewer with the work" or other entity under description (p. 30). So, "to see is a process of observing and recognizing the world around us" (Sturken and Cartwright, 2001, p. 10). Instead, "to look is to actively make meaning of that world;" "looking is an activity that involves a greater sense of purpose and direction" that is, it is "an act of choice" (p. 10). And "through looking we negotiate social relationships and meanings" (p. 10). In this way, "looking is a *practice* much like speaking, writing, or signing"[19] (p. 10). That is, 'looking' is a learned act of representing. And so culture, on this form of account, determines the representation.

3. 3. The Language of Representation in Visual Culture

For advocates of visual culture, accounts of representation from philosophical aesthetics, as perceptual or sensory based, significantly constrain understanding how vision and visuality function. Sensory accounts, theorists say, do not provide explanatory means for discourse on the cultural construction of the visual field in the experience of art or imagery[20] (Bryson, 1991). Instead, symbol system accounts do, these theorists say, provide such means.

In visual culture, "semiology approaches painting as a system of signs," or symbols (p. 61). From previously; on Goodman's view, the "aesthetic realm" is explained as a "symbol system" and from this, "all its features are syntactic or semantic ones, rather than causal features such as the effect of the work on the observer" (Margalit, 1998, p.

[19] As a practice, "looking involves learning to interpret and, like other practices, looking involves relationships of power" (Sturken and Cartwright, 2001, p. 10).

[20] For exemplar account on the discursive mediation of visual experience and more systematic treatment of argument for semiotic contra perceptualist accounts of visuality, see Bryson (1991).

321). (And from cognitive science from the 1950s, the thesis that all mental representational content is propositional or languagelike places emphasis on the rules or structures of language, as information processing)[21]. All systems of representation under the terms 'semiotic systems,' like language, share a conventional or rule structured identity[22]. The following outline account of representation exemplifies visual culture's approach to the explanation of all objects under a shared languagelike identity between semiotic systems.

Representation "refers to the use of language and images to create meaning about the world around us" (Sturken and Cartwright, 2001, p. 12). That is, "we use words to understand, describe, and define the world as we see it, and we also use images to do this;" "this process takes place through systems of representation (as symbol systems), such as language and visual media, that have rules and conventions about how they are organized" (p. 12). So, "a language like English has a set of rules about how to express and interpret meaning, and so, for instance, do the systems of representation of painting, photography, cinema, or television"[23] (p. 12).

Historically, Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright say, "debates about representation have considered whether these systems of representation reflect the world as it is," in

---

[21] This much argued and still strongly debated thesis (from the cognitive sciences in the form of symbol-processing accounts of mental representation), is relevantly exemplified in "debate over the nature of mental images;" on one side of the debate (Stephen Kosslyn's) depictive accounts of mental representation claim mental images "are *spatially displayed* or are *depictive*;" (Pylyshyn, 2002, p. 157, in argument with Kosslyn). On the other there is, or has been, (Zenon Pylyshyn's) "position that language-like symbolic representations underlie all forms of thought" (Kosslyn, Ganis, and Thompson, 2003, p. 110, in argument with Pylyshyn). The "debate follows at least two paths, theories promoting symbolic representations and computational approaches – that is, Pylyshyn's approach – and theories more grounded in physiology – that is, Kosslyn's approach" (Toth, 2002, p. 212). For account of the "heritage of the linguistic turn as it manifests itself in the tendency of cognitive scientists to conceive cognition as a "language of thought"" and its relation to semiotics, see Daddesio (1995, p. 55-57). For further explanation of the views and expansion of the concerns, see this study, Chapter 5.

[22] Martin Jay says "the claim that images can be understood as natural or analogical signs with universal capacities to communicate" is typically dismissed in visual cultural accounts; Mitchell, for example (Jay says) "insists that images be situated firmly in the world of convention rather than nature" (2002, p. 269). All looking is cognitively organized under these terms (Bryson, 1991). And to "consider an image cognitively, to engage in discourse about it… is to textualize it" (Jay, 2002, p. 270; citing Kirby, 1996, p. 36).

[23] On creativity as the "elaboration of new combinations of the sign" see Bryson (1991, p. 70).

such a way "that they mirror it back to us as a form of *mimesis* or imitation"[24] (p. 12). Or, on a visual cultural as "*social constructionist*" account, "whether in fact we construct the world and its meaning through the systems of representation we deploy" (p. 12).

3. 3. 1. *Perception*

Visual culture theorists account for the perception of pictures or images as intrinsically mediated by cognitive processes, in the form of values, beliefs, ideologies, assumptions, etc. On this view, "we only make meaning of the material world through specific cultural contexts;" this "takes place in part through the language systems (be they writing, speech, or images) that we use" (pp. 12-13). Hence, "the material world can only be "seen" by us, through these systems of representation" (p. 13). That is, "the world is not simply reflected back to us through systems of representation," rather "we actually construct the meaning of the material world through these systems" (p. 13).

This view on strong cognitive (in the form of cultural schemas) intervention in, as the mediating construction of, perceptual experience derives from (in its more technical form) theories of the "theory-ladenness of vision" (Estany, 2001). Exemplar of an extreme form of the view, Paul Feyerabend was to "assert that observations (observation terms) are not merely theory-*laden*" but rather *fully theoretical*; that is, "observation statements have no 'observational core'"[25] (1981, p. x). The thesis had a galvanizing effect for poststructuralist criticism of scientific and philosophical methods. Feyerabend claims the "thesis can also be read as a historical thesis concerning the use of theoretical terms by scientists;" "in this case it asserts that scientists often use theories to restructure abstract matters *as well as* phenomena, and that no part of the phenomena is exempt from the possibility of being restructured in this way" (p. x).

---

[24] In the Western intellectual tradition, distinction is made "between words as conventional signs and images as their natural counterparts" (Jay, 2002, p. 269). From Plato, "there were two ways of representing a man, either by saying his name or by drawing his portrait;" "whereas words were taken to be arbitrary signifiers without any necessary relation to what they signified, images were understood to be tied by natural forces to what they resembled, iconic analogues of their objects" (p. 269). And, Jay says, "mimesis of the real was assumed to be better served by vision than by any other sense" (p. 269).

[25] The "theory-ladenness of vision" is further explained in Chapter 5.

Deriving (strongly disputed) grounds from Feyerabend's controversial theses[26], on visual culture accounts, we make sense of what we see or arrive at meaning from signs operating within systems of conventional symbols, not from any universal as general perceptual cause; "semiology approaches painting as a system of signs" and "what this term in the first instance displaces is the term *perception*"[27] (Bryson, 1991, p. 61).

Bryson rejects any necessary correspondence between the "two mental fields of artist and spectator" (p. 64-65). To explain: the aesthetic framework typifying the basis for Bryson's anti-perceptualist claims is an account of art in which "the core, or central, or minimal artistic enterprise consists in a person's bringing into being an object or event with the idea of offering it, to others or himself, for aesthetic apprehension" (Beardsley, 1975, p. 5). And on looking "at a particularly life-like representation, I, the viewer, re-experience at one remove the original vision, retinal or imaginary, of its creator, the artist"[28] (Bryson, 1991, p. 64). But, as an interpreted event, Bryson in contrast claims complete autonomy of the artwork and its reception from the intentionality (mental

---

[26] Bal and Bryson (as exemplars of visual culture's tacit identification with Feyerabend's claim) say "epistemology and the philosophy of science have developed sophisticated views of knowledge and truth in which there is little if any room for unambiguous "facts," causality, and proof, and in which interpretation has an acknowledged central position" (1991, p. 174).

[27] Dominant in art historical approaches to picture perception, 'perceptualist accounts,' exemplified in Ernst Gombrich's "approach to art by way of a psychology of perception," are strongly rejected in semiotic accounts (Bryson, 1991, p. 61). In contrast to the explanation of art from perceptualist theories, in the latter part of the 20th Century a "New Art History" scholarship (from which visual culture derives) "rejected the formalist and psychological approach to perception which attempts to remain within the visual domain" (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3). Advocates of semiotic accounts of images claim perceptualist accounts prevent investigation "from fully examining the ways in which the work is related to all the other institutions and practices that constitute social life" (Bryson et al, 1994, p. xviii).The problem is that "if we stand back a little and begin to ask questions of the Perceptualist account we will find that, crucially, it leaves no room for the question of the relationship between image and power" (Bryson, 1991, p. 63). The "intervention" of power may be of a positive or negative kind "but either way the place of power is on the outside of this inward perceptual activity of painting and viewing" (pp. 63-64).

[28] Also note contra Bryson's view, Richard Wollheim's rejection of what he calls "the Contagion theory," which "holds that, in each and every case, for the spectator to grasp what the artist meant, there must be re-created in his mind when he looks at the painting precisely the mental condition out of which the artist painted it" (1991a, p. 103). But, a "general account of pictorial meaning" Wollheim says, "locates pictorial meaning in a triad of factors: the mental state of the artist, the way this causes him to paint, and the experience that a suitable informed and sensitive spectator can be expected to have on looking at the artist's picture" (p. 103). Such a "psychological account," opposes "those schools of contemporary thinking which propose to explain pictorial meaning in terms like rule, convention, symbol system, or which in effect assimilate pictorial meaning to something very different," that is, "linguistic meaning;" those schools include for example "structuralism, iconography, hermeneutics, and semiotics" (p. 103).

representational states) of the artist, or the "subjectivity" of the author[29] (quote from Hermerén, 1975, p. 57).

On Bryson's account, interpretation of the work proceeds even at the level of perception; "my ability to recognize an image neither involves, *nor makes necessary inference towards*, the isolated perceptual field of the image's creator;" "it is, rather, an ability which presupposes competence within social, that is, socially constructed, codes of recognition"[30] (1991, p. 65). So, "when people look at representational painting and recognize what they see," Bryson says, "their recognition does not unfold in the solitary recesses of the sensorium but through their activation of codes of recognition that are learnt by interaction with others, in the acquisition of human culture" (p. 65). Reference to aesthetic value limits understanding of "image-making" to "secret and private events, perceptions and sensations occurring in invisible recesses of the painter's and viewer's mind"[31] (p. 65). But, "painting," like "mathematics and reading" are registered in semiotic terms as "activities of the sign" (p. 65).

Concern with the nature of "representation and mediation" contra perceptual accounts of visual function provides an explanatory base for visual culture studies to investigate "production of political power through the use of media"[32] (Mitchell, 1994, p. 3). A perceptual account "omits or brackets the social formation" (Bryson, 1991, p. 63). The "perceived allegiance" of art historical investigation is to a "theory of immanent aesthetic value" (Bryson et al, 1994, p. xviii). It is this commitment that ties art to "a psychology of perception" or "perceptualist account" of visuality (Bryson, 1991, pp. 62-

---

[29] Bryson's discussion broadly incorporates argument from the "intentionalist fallacy" (see Beardsley and Wimsatt, 1976).

[30] And, Bryson says, "the crucial difference between the term 'perception' and the term 'recognition' is that the latter is *social*;" "it takes one person to experience a sensation, it takes (at least) two to recognize a sign" (1991, p. 65).

[31] And "what Perceptualism leads to is a picture of art in isolation from the rest of society's concerns, since essentially the artist is alone, watching the world as an ocular spectacle" but, Bryson says, "never reacting to the world's meanings, basking in and recording his perceptions" and "apparently doing so in some extraterritorial zone, of the social map" (1991, p. 66). If instead "we consider painting an art of the sign, which is to say an art of discourse, then painting is coextensive with the flow of signs through both itself and the rest of the social formation" (p. 66).

[32] As the study of the behaviour of power, visual cultural explanation in art and education characteristically favours "symbolic uses that suggest multiple and extended social meanings" (Freedman, 2000a, p. 317).

63). But in the discourse of visual culture, rejection of sensory or perceptual explanation is increasingly problematic (van Eck and Winters, 2005; Heywood and Sandywell, 1999; Jay, 2002).

Mitchell recently says, “it may be time to rein in our notions of the political stakes in a critique of visual culture, and to scale down the rhetoric of the “power of images;”” they may not have the power attributed to them (2005, p. 33). Instead, Mitchell advocates shifting the object of study “from power to desire,” in order to “refine and complicate our estimate of (imagery’s) power and the way it works” (p. 33, parentheses added). Such an advocated shift is, in part, notable. Mitchell’s focus remains on power, accounted in this instance in terms of desire. But the notion of desire draws visual culture’s interests towards psychological and perceptual accounts. Desire is psychological; its motivations or causes are often experienced as sensory, perceptual, corporeal.

3. 3. 2. *Revising the Problem of Perception in Visual Culture*

The explanation of sensory and perceptual experience won’t leave the room, so to speak. And, it remains a difficult presence in visual culture. Mitchell asks “to what extent is vision *unlike* language, working (as Roland Barthes observed of photography) like a “message without a code”?” (Barthes, 2000; cited in Mitchell, 2002, p. 237). And “in what ways does it *transcend* specific or local forms of “social construction” to function like universal language that is relatively free of textual or interpretive elements?” (Mitchell, 2002, p. 237). The senses, as corporeality “remind us” Jay says, “powerfully of our roots in the animal world;” “sight, no matter how seemingly disincarnated it might appear in certain scopic regimes, never loses its links with the flesh in which it is embedded” (2002, p. 276). Even when vision has “seemed in danger of being subsumed entirely under visuality, this stubborn residue of what culture thought it had left behind was never entirely overcome” (p. 276).

Jay’s concern is reflected in a number of visual culture accounts that are attempting to come to terms with perceptual or embodied subjectivity (see for example, Heywood, 1999). But visual culture’s frustration with the sensory focus in aesthetics largely

remains (Tavin, 2007). Perceptual accounts refer to a "psychobiological condition" that "is only part of aesthetic experience"[33] (Freedman, 2000b, p. 2). The sensory perceptual commitment in aesthetics is longstanding, resulting in a focus on "the qualities of form" (p. 2). From this engagement, the "most important influence" on the "aesthetic tradition" has been "the pervasiveness of formalism, which to some extent, logically followed from Kant's critique" (p. 2). And "formalist aesthetics" consists in "the notion of pure form removed from sociopolitical content and context," so excluding "direct social or moral agency" (Tavin, 2007, p. 42).

But claiming identity between aesthetics and formalism as a general term is problematic; formalist approaches vary and are debated in aesthetics (Wollheim, 2001). And some visual culture theorists are less exclusive of perceptual causes. In addressing a "hermeneutical aesthetics" of visual culture Nicholas Davey also says, "formalist aesthetics reflects its empiricist heritage by supposing a differentiation between, first, the having of sensations and perceptions and, second, the attribution of meaning and value to those sensations" (1999, p. 12). The "phenomenological tradition in which hermeneutics resides insists, however, that such a demarcation between perception and conception is nothing other than a *falsification* of experience" (p. 12). Drawing on Kant, (but in contrast to the previous criticism), a hermeneutic aesthetics Davey says, requires the concept of "cognitive and perceptual transfer;" this allows the animation of "inanimate matter with concepts and ideas" and "allows us to *feel* their presence as if they had been applied directly to us and us alone" (p. 13).

From commitment to the discursive construction of subjectivity as visuality, the particular approach of visual culture to the representation of subjective experience maintains as the politics of identity. The following section looks at why.

[33] The "importance of form" cannot be denied; "it is the seductiveness of form that makes art so powerful" (Freedman, 2000b, p. 2). But "the problem" lies in the "application of the theory in curriculum as it were the only, or first, way to analyze imagery" (p. 3). Formalism is "a pseudo-scientific conception of aesthetics" focusing on "the analysis of physical and perceptual characteristics of art objects" and reducing form to "elements (such as line, shape, and color) and principles (such as rhythm, balance, and unity) of design" (p. 2).

3. 4. Subjectivity/Subjectivities

The concept of identity in visual culture reflects the poststructural's "movement toward decentering" in which, Slattery says, "there is an absence of anything at the center or of any overriding embedded truth at the core, thus necessitating a concentration on the margins and a shift in emphasis to the borders" (2006, p. 18). This emphasis brings awareness of opposition between centre and margin. The concept of unity is problematic, functioning as a sign, or evidence of concealment; semiotic analysis provides means for the disruption of unity masking, for example, "problematic and gendered" discourse"[34] (Bal, 1990, p. 512). From the apparent seamlessness or uninteruptedness of dominant narratives, power remains unseen or invisible, constructing the identity of the subject, until countered by deconstruction of such identity as text or narrative (p. 512).

The notion of a singular identity has dispersed to an awareness of "multiple identities which are often contradictory;" visual culture theorists "talk of an absence of a unified self and, instead, of fragmented identities and a de-centered self" (Duncum, 1997, p. 73). Recognition of marginalization had reached the point where "so many interests are now acknowledged as marginalized that marginalized "others" now take up the position of the dominant, if fragmented center"[35] (p. 73). Importantly, negotiating identity occurs within the saturating context of mass media. Students "should be viewed as constructing meaning within the complex intertextuality of images" (p. 74). So, "we need to view students as free floating agents who create meaning out of the bits and pieces of stories, images and objects that envelop them"[36] (p. 74).

The "humanist conception of human subjectivity" has been "subject to devastating criticism;" its notion of a unified experience of identity is historically situated (Moxey,

---

[34] See for example, Bal on the "sense of unity" that "passes unnoticed because it is not contradicted clearly by other signs that help us process the work as a whole" (1990, p. 512).

[35] The point of consistency lies in common exposure to the effects of capital (as consumption); all of the "focus on the "other"" Duncum says, "almost invariably fails to address the fact that no matter what minority or combination of minorities a person may belong to, he or she engages as part of everyday, ordinary experience with popular mass culture" (1997, p. 73).

[36] And "what is needed is a remapping of the areas between school and home, between traditional curriculum offerings and students' own knowledge of the world (Duncum, 1997, p. 74).

2001, p. 81). From anthropology and literary criticism[37], Keith Moxey says, there is suggestion that "the conception of the human subject as stable and unchanging, a self-conscious entity capable of knowing the world and itself, is a dimension of the Eurocentrism that characterized Western culture during the colonial period of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (p. 81). And "psychoanalysis, for example, has tended to emphasize the contingency of human consciousness" (p. 81). For instance, "according to Jacques Lacan, subjectivity is split by the acquisition of language" (p. 81). This split functions between "that which represents the desires and drives of a pre-conscious condition (the unconscious) and that which represents the codes and conventions that govern social life (the symbolic)" (p. 81).

So, the notion of a unified self, on this form of account, constrains awareness; "all texts position the reader/viewer as an object of text meaning – as a member of an audience with particular social relationships with other members and with other audiences" (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 63). Attention is given to how "texts represent meanings about the self and others, or meanings on the basis of a particular kind of self," as "critical literacy"[38] (p. 63). The "reader/viewer becomes transformed from the object of a single text meaning to a subject who, by bringing to bear on one text the potentials of many other connected texts, has multiple possibilities for future being and action" (p. 63). And, theorists claim advantage in the transformation, as redescription of identity between artist and beholder. Using the textual notion of 'reading' works (from Stanley

[37] On Moxey's references, see Fabian (1983); Said (1979, 1993).

[38] The concept of 'critical literacy' and its alternative 'visual literacy' (as a kind of critical literacy in imagery as text) is controversial in art education (Brown, 1989a). Visual culture advocacy of semiotic analysis of imagery supports instrumental value of studying art, from its argued points of consistency with language. So, "we grasp reality through language; it saturates and is saturated by all social activity" (Duncum, 1999b, p. 297). And "by using a semiotic view of culture where the focus is the ordinary everyday aesthetic experiences of people, such sites can be seen as important as language" (p. 297). In these accounts, knowledge of media qualifies in terms of 'visual' forms of literacy; competency defines as "critical literacy" that is, "the intentional subversion of meanings in order to critique the underlying ideologies and relations of power that support particular interpretations of a text" (Myers, et al, 1998, p. 63). Use of *text* here broadly refers to "all forms of representing meaning such as images, music, and video, as well as words" (p. 63). Such knowledge preserves instrumental value in two ways; first, as ideological or political and second, proceeding from the political, as means for an elevation of the visual arts' status in curriculum to that of language-based subjects (see Duncum, 1991, 1993). Characterizing student learning outcomes in various terms of literacy provides consistency with competency defined educational outcomes, see for example, Myers et al on "critical literacy" (1998). Literacy claims are popular but tend to be reductive. As instrumental claims for 'visual' forms of education, they also risk contrasting with argument for visual culture as critical engagement ensuring that study does not reduce to "pre-job training" (see Mirzoeff, 2002b, p. 6).

Fish), the audience become "artists in that they remake the work in the act of understanding" (Freedman, 1997, p. 25).

3. 5. Conclusion

In visual culture accounts, from the 1990s, clear distinction between the "sensory" and "semiotic" becomes "obsolete" (Mitchell, 1994, p. 6). The distinction is "now being replaced by a notion of humanistic or liberal education as centrally concerned with the whole field of representations and representational activity" (p. 6). Visual culture seeks account of cultural discourses that, theorists say, determine the meanings made of visual experience of imagery. The term 'imagery' extends to artefacts or phenomena of any kind. The claim for this extension is significant as theorists depict visual culture practices as epistemologically poststructural. Artefacts (as any represented phenomena) in this case serve as discursively constituted objects for the critical recovery of interests vested, rather than defining a specific disciplinary focus.

Visual culture as cross-disciplinary or extra-disciplinary practice provides an account or explanation of visual experience as cultural mediation. And, theories of immediate perceptual causes of visual experience, characteristic of aesthetic accounts, are typically rejected in visual culture. This rejection is necessary, visual culture theorists say. Aesthetic accounts exclude the overriding role of culture in the constitution of subjectivity that visual culture, as a framework of enquiry, seeks to explain. But there is evidence that, on some accounts, the rejection of direct perception is not a requirement or necessary condition of this framework of visuality.

More recently on Mitchell's account, perceptual and optical interests are not excluded in visual culture studies; "the essence of the visual must begin with the eye and its operations, with the history and theory of optics and the act of visual perception in all the organisms that possess the appropriate organ"[39] (2003, p. 251). Historicist emphasis on the discursive construction of those accounts may underlie part of Mitchell's advocacy. But Elkins, likewise, includes the neurology and neurobiology of vision as

[39] Visuality "cannot be adequately described as a sensory faculty or perceptual power, but must be theorized as a *drive* that mobilizes the organism around pain and pleasure, aversion and desire" (Mitchell, 2003, p. 251).

having "special importance for visual studies" programs[40] (2003, p. 88). On some approaches to visual culture, there is evidence of concern with, and revision of, the rejection of perceptual accounts in visual culture theory (see for example, Heywood, 1999).

Mitchell also says, "the study of visual culture has to resist the constructivist reflex and reopen the question of culture's boundaries with visual *nature*," that is, "vision considered as a physiological process, a "drive," a sensory, phenomenological dimension shared with animals"[41] (1995b, p. 543). And in ascribing a causal role to biology, Mitchell asks, "to what extent is vision *not* a learned activity, but a genetically determined capacity;" that is, as "a programmed set of automatisms that has to be activated at the right time, but that are not learned in anything like the way that human languages are learned"[42] (2002, pp. 237-238). On one hand Mitchell's account opens visual culture explanation to perceptual accounts. But on the other, the form of the explanation he represents is determinative and, in the cognitive sciences and developmental psychology, much debated.

Some theorists express interest in accounts of visual perception from the sciences under the description 'visual studies.' The distinction and increasing use of the term 'visual studies' indicates the emergence of further variations in explanatory commitments. Disciplinary populations will self-select visual culture's academic survival strategies and so, I think, affect the fluidity and range of these commitments. James Elkins' reference to the importance of accounts from biological sciences, for example, advocates the inclusion of studies in sensory or perceptual aspects of experience as part

---

[40] Elkins says, David Marr (1983); Semir Zeki (1999); and Francis Crick (1994) are commonly cited by "people in the humanities who are interested in the science of vision" (2003, p. 88). Marr's computational approach is a symbol-processing account of vision; see this study, Chapter 5. For discussion of problems concerning these citations as outdated (Marr) and the difficulties of 'popular' accounts of science (Crick and Zeki), see Elkins (2003, pp. 88-89). For support and critical review of Crick's work, see Searle, Chapter 2: 'Francis Crick, the Binding Problem, and the Hypothesis of Forty Hertz' (1998b, pp. 21-35).

[41] Because "it is hard to imagine how there could be an "optical unconscious" without this level of automatism, a kind of prosthetic agency in the organ, the medium, or the image" (Mitchell, 1995b, pp. 543-544).

[42] Concern for representational (visual and linguistic) capacities as innately programmed is consistent with modular symbol-processing accounts of mind. Those accounts are taken up further in Chapter 5, this study.

of the developing identity of visual studies programs. Such accounts, he says, provide further possibility for study of the biology of socialization. These references suggest that research from the biological and cognitive sciences are of intrinsic, rather than strictly historicist, interest to explanation in visual culture[43]. The remarks are timely and further discussed in the results of the study.

So I distinguish the description of 'visual studies,' perhaps problematically for visual culture theorists, as partly different from explicitly strong ideological agendas represented under 'visual culture' or 'visual culture studies.' But such a move opens accounts to more complex explanations and models of visual experience, requiring testing on scientific and other grounds. For instance, Mitchell's expressed interest in the biology of visuality simply amends the predetermining controls on subjectivity from cultural to biological mechanisms. And, there are significant difficulties in the biological and cognitive sciences and philosophy with such deterministic causal accounts[44].

Regard for the biology of visuality raises interesting concerns for present ontological and epistemic commitments in visual culture or visual studies. Martin Jay questions the explanatory requirement for radical cultural relativism in visual culture (2002). But he also expresses concern with 'consilience' as an attempt at universalization of different discourses from "evolutionary biology and cognitive science," in the misguided belief they can "explain everything" (p. 276; see also 1999). Jay appropriately claims there is a difference between forms of accounts. But, on the role of theories, it is unlikely, in my view, that rejection of explanation from the sciences, or their limitation to references of support for relativist claims can plausibly sustain the development of visual culture.

---

[43] Visual culture, Mitchell says, "in its more interesting moments, is *not* just the "visual front" of cultural studies;" it is "too interested in the question of what vision is, too "aesthetic" in its fascination with the senses, perception, and imagination" (1995b, p. 542). On Mitchell's account, "the rhetoric of iconoclasm that cultural studies inherits from Marxism, its reliance on linguistic and discursive models, produces a kind of friction with studies in visual culture;" these studies instead "tend to be grounded in a fascination with visual images, and thus to be patient with and attentive to the full range of visual experience from humble vernacular images to everyday visual practices" (p. 542).

[44] The way Mitchell frames the question of the role of biology is important; he is (implicitly) referring to predetermining innate or inborn, modular biological capacities posited by, for example, Noam Chomsky. The issue is taken up in Chapter 5: Mind and Representation in Accounts of Visuality, and further in Searle's account of unconscious rule-following in Chapter 8: *The Capacity for Representation in Consciousness*.

Nor, I feel, with certain reservations I express later in the study, is this rejection or limitation necessary.

Jay's concerns for reductionism are widely shared and deeply relevant to research and education in the arts. There is anxiety for the distinct role of the humanities and social sciences suffering in comparisons with the cultural prevalence of modeling from the biological and physical sciences. From this chapter, there appear to be three options of response: first the rejection and (the 21st Century forms of) demonization of scientific models common in the humanities; second, the ad hoc and limited introduction of material from the sciences in visual culture coursework as token or ideologically instrumental engagement; and third, capitulation to modeling of mind from the sciences. I do not think any of these options can work well for explanation. Nor do I believe that they contribute to research and education in visual arts practices. But, in order to explain why, I think the study's account of aesthetics as a framework of visuality and John Searle's work on consciousness is helpful.

Before that however, I will identify some problems in the representation of subjectivity in visual culture, as I do later concerning aesthetics. Discourses (as power) account for the character of visual experience, on this form of account. From visual culture's radical constructivism, the world (as discourse/power) constitutes mind and from this, notions of subjectivity. This subjectivity is conventional, having only mediated grasp of the world. There is no immediate perceptual access to any language-independent reality. Rather, because all experience is strongly mediated, reality only exists as the linguistically organized construction of meaning. And in that constitution of subjectivity, accounting it as multiple and apparently irreconcilable identities replaces prior widespread commitment to the transcendental self as a unity of experience.

But in replacing the transcendental account, the consequences following on the rejection of unity are, in my view, deeply troubling. The literature of visual culture, characteristically, represents subjective experience as incommensurably discontinuous with both others and its own past, or split between the unconscious or preconscious, as drives, and the rules as language. On these forms of account, I think proceeding from

the lack of unity, there is no subjective autonomy. The notion of self, on such accounts is determined and reducible to fragments, as different discourses.

The reasons for supporting this view have been set out. Such a model provides, theorists claim, ethical engagement with radical difference. But it is the hypothesis of this study that there may be a better way to account for subjectivity, without obscuring or eliminating difference. Further, without reduction to the constraints of explanation in the physical sciences, the study proposes this alternative way of representing subjectivity is not opposed, but rather can be informed by considered, non-reductive explanation from philosophy and the sciences. In doing this, I do not think that visual culture studies need lose any of its relevance to the explanation of culture as background. But the ethical concerns can stand independently of relativism and commitment to subjectivity as determined.

Chapter 4
The Concept of Visuality in Aesthetic Concepts

4. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to characterize the conceptual framework of visuality from aesthetics in visual arts and education. A particular objective of the study underlies the general aim however, articulating the form of the chapter. Philosophical aesthetics since the 18th Century enables an epistemic location for investigation of the role of subjectivity in consciousness. But over the same period, the emergent rationalism of the Western intellectual tradition problematizes the subject. The concern with subjective experience as knowledge isolates aesthetics from mainstream philosophical enquiry. Further, aesthetic experience as a disciplinary focus has been consistently and largely successfully marginalized in art and education in recent years from visual culture's criticism. This isolation significantly impacts on the explanatory basis of visuality.

In contemporary education, aesthetics continues to be represented in visual arts curriculum (Board of Studies, 1999). From this presence, there remains a pedagogical framework for the explicit representation of subjective experience as a means for knowledge of the world. However, since the later part of the 20th Century, increasing emphasis on social constraints in the production of identity and specific criticism of aesthetic concepts eclipses, and in some cases seeks to exclude, study of traditional concepts of aesthetics in education. The preceding chapter identifies the objections from visual culture. But from these arguments, there is opportunity to look again at visuality from the point of view of aesthetic meaning, attending to the role of subjectivity represented in the discourse of philosophical aesthetics.

So, the objective of this section of the study is to provide description of aesthetics and its current explanation in the literature, particularly as it relates to consciousness. To achieve this, the study identifies and outlines aesthetics related concerns employing exemplar authors in art theory, philosophical aesthetics, and education. In some cases,

the study provides brief historical background informing the development of the aesthetic tradition to explain its sometimes tacit commitments.

The notion of 'aesthetic' identifies a particular form of response in the beholder as aesthetic experience and from this, those features, properties or qualities of phenomena called aesthetic including those in nature, which may give rise to aesthetic experience. So, the present chapter on aesthetics concerns the notion of aesthetic experience as a particular form of experience in consciousness. The first part of the chapter provides focus on the explanation of aesthetic objects including concerns such as interpretation, judgment, and so on in the context of art. Study of aesthetics to now is identified with art by general account[1]; accomplished works of art, aestheticians say, are "the principal loci of aesthetic qualities" (Levi and Smith, 1991, p. 191). Following, the second part of this chapter concerns the subjectivity of the beholder or spectator, including the artist[2]. Philosophical aesthetics, since the 18th Century, has provided a role for subjectivity but there are problems in explanation when the role identifies with 'artistic disposition.'

4. 1. Background to Aesthetics

Since the 18th Century, aesthetics principally refers to a branch of philosophy, although aesthetics and its familiar terms are commonly referenced in everyday language. Views on what precisely constitutes the role of the aesthetic differ[3]. However, typically in

---

[1] Aesthetics "is the branch of philosophy that has art for its subject matter" (Parsons and Blocker, 1993, p. 6). Or alternately, the "philosophy of art is part of general aesthetics" (Seel, 2005, p. xii). Michael Kelly in the Preface to *Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* for example, suggests that asking "contemporary aestheticians what they do" is likely to meet the response "the philosophical analysis of the beliefs, concepts, and theories implicit in the creation, experience, interpretation, or critique of art" (1998, p. xi). Items that count as aesthetic however, do not necessarily limit to art objects (see Sibley, 2006e; Strawson, 2004).

[2] In aesthetics, "it should be remembered that not only do 'artist' and 'spectator' refer to roles, rather than people" but also, Malcolm Budd says, "that the role of the artist, properly understood, requires the artist, in the creation of her work, to adopt or bear in mind the role of the spectator" (2004a, p. 266). This "multiplicity of roles is a requirement" for the artist; "inside each artist is a spectator upon whom the artist, the artist as agent, is dependent" (Wollheim, 1991a, p. 101).

[3] Like the concept of visuality, defining 'aesthetic' can be considered problematic in terms of limiting its scope; Katya Mandoki for example, says use of the term has included "an experience, the quality of an object, a feeling of pleasure, classicism in art, a judgment of taste, the capacity of perception, a value, an attitude, the theory of art, the doctrine of beauty," as well as "a state of the spirit, contemplative receptivity, an emotion, an intention, a way of life, the faculty of sensibility, a branch of philosophy, a type of subjectivity, the merit of certain forms" and an "act of expression" (2007, p. 3). Mandoki's

accounts the aesthetic, first, "plays a definitive role" in distinguishing "encounters (that) are marked by aesthetic experiences, aesthetic judgments, aesthetic perceptions, and so forth" (Carroll, 1986, p. 57, parentheses added). Characteristic of aesthetic experiences is a kind of pleasure different to other kinds, associated with or emergent from the aesthetic "attitude" as a particular voluntary form of attention given by people to objects (Fenner, 1998, p. 150). Further, although the terms vary, such an attitude or particular kind of attention can be educated or trained to discriminate among and evaluate features or qualities of objects (Eisner, 2002, p. 75; Sibley, 2006d, p. 89; Wollheim, 1980, p. 205). From this, second, "notions of the aesthetic are also mobilized in theories of the nature of art objects" that is, artworks as artefacts "designed to bring about aesthetic experiences and aesthetic perceptions, or to engage aesthetic faculties et cetera" (Carroll, 1986, p. 57). So most generally, the notion of the aesthetic is applied to particular kinds of experiences as well as properties, features and qualities of objects depending on the beholder's concerns[4].

Historically, philosophical aesthetics first concerns the "existence and apprehension of beauty in art and nature" (Samuels, 2006, p. 134). From this commitment, discourse on aesthetics occurs across visual, literary, and performing arts, for example music, drama, and dance. Extending on this presence, study of aesthetics "is also a part of other disciplines" – such as law and sociology – "that reflect equally, if differently, about art in its natural and cultural contexts" (Kelly, 1998, p. ix). Aesthetics constitutes a central line of philosophy and for centuries art has been regarded as one of the significant concerns "of human creativity and activity" (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 2). Some theorists view aesthetic experience as the only, or primary legitimate response to any work of art (see for example Seel, 2005; Smith, 1999). Others find this view "unduly restrictive,"

---

description is helpful in characterizing the diversity of conceptual content under the umbrella term, but she is citing different approaches and objects marked as aesthetic occurring over a period of millennia, and the same can be said, I think, of the concepts 'art,' and 'science;' see for example discussion of consistency and inconsistency of conceptual content of 'art' over time (Levinson, 1979, 1989, 1993); on 'philosophy of science,' for example, as a concept, see Marc Lange on teachers and students grappling "with the task of capturing, in logically precise terms, the spirit behind logical positivism" in order to "to enable that spirit to withstand their own increasingly sophisticated critiques of various earlier formulations of core positivist ideas;" the "philosophy of science" however "is plainly recognizable in the ancient world, in the Scientific Revolution, and in the nineteenth century" (2007, p. 3).

[4] On the range of aesthetic concerns, see for example Carroll (1986); Steenberg (1992); and more generally, Kieran and McIver Lopes (Eds.) (2007); Lamarque and Olsen (Eds.) (2004); Levinson (Ed.) (2005).

claiming “albeit an important one” aesthetic experiences “constitute only one family of responses” to artworks (Carroll, 2002, p. 167).

Contemporary theories of aesthetics can be traced to 18th Century philosophical developments. In the 20th Century, phenomenological speculation prioritizes the “human subject’s” relation to aesthetic concerns (Samuels, 2006, p. 134). The emergence of conceptual art in the 20th Century diminishes the prestige of the aesthetic as the unique mode of access to knowledge of art (Seel, 2005, p. xi). But even greater impact occurs from the 1970s when poststructural and psychoanalytic discourses radically critique “the metaphysics of presence” and aesthetics loses “its basis as a philosophy of experience” (Samuels, 2006, p. 134). Further, cultural studies theorists in this period argue “aesthetic reflection” seems to “distract from the consideration of art’s embeddedness in the social world” (p. 134).

From cultural upheavals at the end of the 20th Century however, a philosophical “renewal of interest in aesthetics” emerges “as a way of thinking through what was perceived as a period of political and artistic crisis” (p. 134). There is also “renewed interest in aesthetics” beyond “the precincts of academic departments of philosophy”[5] (Carroll, 2000, p. 191). As well, “discontent has been growing among aesthetic theorists about the status of the discipline within philosophy as a whole;” such discontent is “manifest in calls for the greater incorporation of art and aesthetic theory into mainstream philosophy” (Forsey, 2003, p. 581).

4. 1. 1. *Ontology and Epistemology in Aesthetics*

Ontological commitments in theories of art and the aesthetic vary and do include realism (see for example Levinson, 1994). From the variation, generalization is inappropriate. But frequently, and typically from the history of aesthetics, commitments base in variations of idealism, as constructivism or phenomenalist idealism. From the Kantian tradition, “space, time, causality, and object are forms the human mind brings to its experience of the world” (Packer and Goicoechea, 2000, p. 228). So, “our

[5] Noël Carroll says the evidence of “renewed interest” outside academia is seen in a number of “centers for research in humanities” in the United States, for example, recently featuring aesthetics “for semester-long or year-long cycles of lectures and discussions” (2000, p. 191).

experience of the world as objective and certain – spatial and temporal, with objects interacting causally – is constituted through the application of these cognitive structures to basic sensory impressions" (p. 228). On this view, "all reality consists in conscious states" (Searle, 1995a, p. 183).

In epistemology, aesthetic experience remains difficult to formulate in terms of its "distinctiveness and essence" (quote from Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 310; see also Manns, 1998). Interest in "inner states and the way they manifest themselves" in aesthetic judgment is problematic because these phenomena are not visible (Wollheim, 1991b, p. 37). But this constraint leads to argument that "from Baumgarten and Kant to Valéry and Adorno, aesthetics has been guided by reflections on "what is indeterminable in things"" (Seel, 2005, p. xiii).

On one hand, attending to the abstraction of aesthetic concepts, such as qualities, is necessary to explanation in aesthetics. But on the other, explanatory identification with 'indeterminable' objects of study is difficult. In epistemology, the vagueness of "inner concepts" is debated in efforts to characterize a 'language of thought' (quote from Sorensen, 1991, p. 393). In aesthetics however, interest lies in felt experience having a certain qualitative, in contrast to specifically conceptual as propositional, aspect. From this, in teaching and learning, the subjectivity of aesthetic experiences as mental states is challenging[6]. This concern limits the explicit presence of aesthetic theory in educational curriculum and underlies controversy with aesthetics. However, the sensuous particularity of the phenomenological, as subjective experience in aesthetics, aestheticians claim, "represents a genuine way for human beings to encounter the world" (Seel, 2005, p. xi).

4. 1. 2. *The Role of Subjectivity in Aesthetic Experience*

From the beginning of the 18th Century, theories of taste focus "theoretical considerations on the perceptions and reactions of subjects," philosophically providing

[6] On argument over the problem of vagueness or intangibility of aesthetic concepts, see for example, Levinson and Matravers (2005); Matravers and Levinson (2005); Wollheim (1991b).

"steps in the direction of subjectivity"[7] (Dickie and Sclafani, 1977, p. 567). In the 19th Century, "the faculty of perception assumes a central role" in theories of aesthetic attitude (p. 567). From then on, aesthetic theories concern the psychology of response in contrast to earlier focus on beauty as an objective property or quality of objects. The modern philosophy of the aesthetic in this way centrally concerns perception, subjectivity, and psychological responses to phenomena, particularly art.

But also after the 18th Century, "the way that the primacy of "experience" developed in philosophical discourse" gradually but eventually isolated aesthetics "from the mainstream of epistemology and ontology" (Townsend, 1987, p. 287). These concerns, the content of aesthetics as the psychology and subjectivity of response as well as the problem of isolation from mainstream epistemology, exist as part of the discourse of contemporary aesthetics in the arts and education (Brown, 1990).

Theories of aesthetics vary in their ontological commitments but they share a "parallel evolution" with art in Western tradition (Lind, 1992, p. 117). Richard Wollheim says, the "core of aesthetics is the study of art: of art in general, and of the general aspects of works of art in particular" (1991, p. 37). Aesthetic experience provides direct means for apprehending the complex nature of art objects. Theorization here substantially concerns the subject as beholder in the context of a psychological response, or "mental attitude" to beauty and art (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 310).

The "intrinsically reflective structure" (Gero, 2006, p. 4) of an aesthetic judgment does not function through formal modes of reasoning but rather "as one whose determining

[7] The valuing of a particular capacity for aesthetic experience in the apprehension of beauty exists in discourse from Presocratic times. Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz traces "initiation" of the history of the concept of aesthetic experience as a kind of attitude to a text from Pythagoras, which holds as exemplary the function of the spectator (1980, p. 310). Pythagoras' text is cited from Diogenes Laertius' Latin translation and runs, ""Life is like an athletic contest; some turn up as wrestlers, others as vendors, but the best appear as spectators"" (cited, p. 310). A little later, although from Pythagoras, Plato determines beauty as an idea or ideal form preceding objects in the visible world. So, idealism in aesthetics occurs early in the Western intellectual tradition. The archaic etymology of the word *aisthēsis* ties most closely to perception (Summers, 1998). But from Plato and Aristotle, *aisthēsis* "became the agent of a higher principle, the soul, conceived as distinct from sense and essentially rational, specifically in being homologous with the reasons and causes of the larger world" (p. 428). In forming new meanings, "some *aisthēsis* provided reflective access to the nature of the soul itself" and in this, "the congruence between soul and sense, experienced as a kind of pleasure, constituted a judgment" (p. 428).

ground cannot be other than subjective" (cited in Crowther, 2002, p. 52; Kant, 2001, p. 89, §5). That is, reflecting on immediate felt experience, as a qualitative or subjective response, to particular objects generates aesthetic knowledge (Eisner, 2002). The uniqueness or individuality of felt meaning obtaining from this experiential mode is popularly understood. But the substantive role of subjective experience in aesthetic judgments makes the establishment of aesthetic claims epistemologically problematic as non-verifiable[8] (Toulmin, 2003).

4. 1. 3. *Aesthetics in Art Education*

So, broadly, the concept of aesthetics is both problematized and widely regarded as importantly relevant in culture. Reflecting this variation, the concept and role of aesthetics in art and education are widely argued, accruing both strong criticism and equally strong support. As a current epistemological and curricular framework in visual arts education, aesthetics is subject to ongoing revision (Board of Studies, 1999; Brown, 2005a; Eisner, 2002, p. 45). Theorists of aesthetics argue the concept of aesthetic experience as the defining value in art education[9]. Advocates characteristically "take the principal objective of art education to be the development of a disposition to appreciate excellence in art for the sake of the worthwhile experience such appreciation is capable of bringing about" (Smith, 1995, p. 57).

But the sufficiency of the intrinsic value of aesthetic experience as a "basic justification" for the development of aesthetic judgment is not without criticism (Parsons, 2002, p. 25). From the previous chapter, the literature of visual culture rejects modernist philosophical aesthetics in secondary and tertiary visual arts education (see for example Duncum, 2007; Tavin, 2007; Tavin et al, 2007). In particular, visual culture theorists criticize formalist concerns in aesthetics as "agendas" ignoring the cultural contexts of production (Tavin et al, 2007, p. 14).

---

[8] See Stephen Toulmin, for example, on the difficulty of establishing pre-eminent claims in aesthetics (2003, p. 19).

[9] On advocacy of aesthetics in art education, see Michael Parsons, (2002); as advocacy, see for example, Ralph Smith (1995, 1999).

4. 1. 4. *Classifying Aesthetic Concepts*

Common to theories of aesthetic experience is an attitude defined in the enjoyment of beauty, requiring detachment from the practical utility of the aesthetic object as a way to apprehend the particularity of the object (Fenner, 1998). Historically, this variation from any practical or utility value of the object is related to the "disinterested" attention of the aesthetic attitude (Kneller, 1998, p. 59). Strongly rejected as historically situated by culture theorists, the concept of disinterest continues both as an object of argument and a framework, tacitly or explicitly, for the concept of aesthetic experience (see Duncum, 2007; Freedman, 2000b).

Aesthetic theories vary in ontological or metaphysical commitments. Theorization of aesthetic experience explores a certain kind of perceptual and psychological response or responses, to aesthetic qualities of objects[10]. This response particularly concerns that of felt pleasure in the beholder, including the artist or designer[11]. In this way accounting a subject's aesthetic experience, epistemically, traditionally discriminates between senses and cognition. However aesthetic experience as a mode typically concerns a close relation between sensory as perceptual and felt experience, on one hand, and reflection as cognitive responses to these phenomena, on the other (Sibley, 2006b). Characteristically, the objects of perception are of interest in their "*sensuous constitution*" (Seel, 2005, p. 45). The "attentiveness to the appearing of a sense object" in this mode "lets something be in its repleteness" (p. 47, emphasis omitted).

The way in which concepts are understood is revising[12]. But until recently these ontological categorizations provide a classificatory, or "definitional" structure to

---

[10] Such discourse includes argument over the existence or otherwise of first, aesthetic experience, as a particular form or kind of experience, and second, aesthetic properties or qualities of objects, see for example discussion, in the affirmative on the second concern, Levinson and Matravers (2005); in the negative on the second, Matravers and Levinson (2005).

[11] And on the "question of whether or not aesthetic properties are response dependent" see Levinson and Matravers (2005).

[12] In its long history some background to the categorization of concepts, in defining the aesthetic, is relevant. In the Western intellectual tradition, early philosophical speculation on the nature of phenomena and experience characteristically identifies between "two simple logical types" (Lloyd, 1992, p. 7). In the first, "objects are classified or explained by being related to one or other of a pair of opposite principles," as (in G. E. R. Lloyd's terms) "polarity;" in the second, identification and explanation occurs "by being likened or assimilated to something else," as "analogy" (pp. 7-8). So, in this classification of experiential objects, variation between strict inclusion and strict exclusion results in "pairs of opposites of quite

concepts or ideas, since Aristotle[13] (Murphy, 2004, p. 11). The term 'aesthetics' derives from such early distinction, resulting in dichotomy, between cognitive processes of rationality and the immediacy of sensory impressions and felt states. That is, the most significant distinction concerning aesthetics was made between possible kinds of knowing as the mental and the sensual, which were "constantly set against one another" (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 3).

While problematic, this structuring effect in the logic of Western thought provides the base for a philosophical enterprise and place for aesthetics within academic and general discourse. For the identity of aesthetics, broadly but importantly, the most persistent general categories of functions in the Western canon derive from Aristotle as "*theory, action, creativity*" (p. 2). Forming the basis of Kant's three critiques and aligning aesthetics with creativity, more recently these distinctions are commonly reduced to the bipartite concepts of theory and practice[14] (p. 2).

4. 1. 5. *The Explanation of Art in Aesthetics*

Theories of the aesthetic function in a "contested space," most commonly occupying territory within the "disciplines of philosophy and art history"[15] (Gero, 2006, p. 3).

---

different sorts (which) appear to be treated as mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives in whatever sense or in whatever relation they are used" (p. 8, parentheses added). Or, "when two cases are known to be similar in certain respects, it necessarily follows that what holds true for one holds true also for the other" (p. 8). This alternation tends to "ignore lesser degrees of similarity and difference in stressing the complete correspondences, or the absolute oppositions, between things" (p. 8). Lloyd suggests caution; this characterization of thought into oppositions in early Greek philosophy, whilst valid, is only sustainable as "broad generalization" (p. 15). But the binary approach characterizes historically the structuring of concepts in philosophy. Later, Aristotle formulates distinctions between types of opposites that admit, or exclude intermediates, and classifications are made that enable comparisons between contradictory and mediate conditions (p. 162). For fuller discussion of Aristotle's Laws or Principles of the Excluded Middle, and Contradiction, see (pp. 161-171). Including certain features or properties and excluding others in the Western tradition in this way meant a view of concepts as "logical entities that could be clearly defined" (Murphy, 2004, p. 14).

[13] Revision from this view to prototype and exemplar theories of concepts is ongoing since the 1970s, but the influence of a definitional or classical view across all areas of epistemology continues. Influencing education, the classical view of concepts for example exerted "extraordinary influence in developmental psychology" in the 20th Century, through the work of Piaget (Murphy, 2004, p. 15). For revisions to Piaget's theories from theorists mentioned in this study, see for example, Bloom (2004); and Karmiloff-Smith (1996).

[14] In the 19th Century, enquiry into the three frameworks developed as philosophies of logic, ethics and aesthetics (Tatarkiewicz, 1980).

[15] Less generically, discourse in aesthetics significantly occurs "among the history of art, the philosophy of art history, the theory of culture, and philosophical aesthetics" (Horowitz, 1998, p. 316). These fields "often stand apart from, or are even hostile to, one another" (p. 316). For example, perspectives on "the

Theorists within these research communities describe the aesthetic as a "multiply defended zone of discourses" (p. 3). These discourses nevertheless systematically refer to either, or both, certain kinds of conscious experiences and features of objects typically but not always artworks, as causal of those experiences. At the broadest level, two types of description of the aesthetic generate "maneuvers and countermaneuvers" within art discourse (p. 3). Advocates of the "subjectivist position" claim that judgments of an aesthetic kind "are autonomous" that is, "aesthetic encounters with artworks involve immediate, non-inferential sensory responses" (p. 3). In this relation to the work, "sustained contemplation alone" enables refinement of the aesthetic experience, without "appeal to such extraphenomenal factors as facts about art theory, art practice, or art history" (p. 3).

Advocates of the alternate view claim that "theory and practice are logically implicated in aesthetic judgment," since they are both "logically implicated in the artwork itself" (p. 3). This second view, theorists argue, provides a basis for claims of truth and falsity in aesthetic judgments, "or at least talk of "better" and "worse"" (p. 4). So, the difference between the two positions concerns whether "aesthetic encounters with artworks" are "logically independent of their theoretical properties or necessarily constrained by them" (p. 4).

4. 2. Aesthetics and Knowing

Aesthetic values are characteristically explored in modes of explanation "appropriate for works of art," and so categorically falling within explanation in the arts[16] (Kemal

---

dominant aesthetic foundations underlying art historical investigations" were considered at the Clark Conference in 2001, at the Clark Art Institute, (Williamstown, MA.) under three domains; Art History, Aesthetics and Visual Studies, which from previously in the study, are each seen to both supplement and frequently contradict "some of the most fundamental intellectual principles of the others" (Holly and Moxey, 2002, p. vii).

[16] But note Salim Kemal's and Ivan Gaskell's comments on the 'arts' can be extended to aesthetic concerns in musical and other performance arts as well as visual and literary arts. For characteristic argument in aesthetics on what items count or are linked to the aesthetic (by means of providing a particular form of experience or appraisal) in explanations from 'the aesthetic point of view,' see for example, Frank Sibley (2006d); and Peter Strawson (2004). Briefly, while "it would be very precious for anyone to say (he or she) found predication or disjunction aesthetically admirable," Strawson says, "I have heard a logician say that he found quantification aesthetically admirable" (2004, p. 238, parentheses added). For Strawson, "there is point in trying to clarify the notion of aesthetic appraisal *via* the notion of

and Gaskell, 2006, pp. 1-2). In knowing about works, there are "at least three different types of knowledge claims about the arts," being "distinguished by their objects" (Novitz, 1998, p. 120). Each type of claim has "been the object of scholarly discussion within aesthetics" (p. 120). The first, on David Novitz's account, "concerns what we know (or believe) *about the work* and whatever imaginary worlds it posits;" the second concerns "what we know (or believe) to be an *appropriate emotional response* to the work;" and the third, Novitz says, concerns "what art enables us to know or understand *about the actual world* in which we live"[17] (p. 120). The third type of claim, Novitz says, "obviously challenges a good deal of mainstream epistemology" because "much of the art that we regard as instructive, insightful, or informative is also fictional" (p. 120). Knowledge of works of art proceeds from the attribution of a mode of existence to them as objects or entities, that is, their ontological status. So, do they form a distinct class, as a special kind of object?

In aesthetics, interpretive strategies of different kinds as disciplinary methods provide a basis for explanations and the results are typically referred to as appreciation and/or criticism of art objects (Kemal and Gaskell (Eds.), 2006; Roskill, 2006). The "salience" of explanatory interests "points in two directions, one internal to a work and the other external, though not necessarily as an irresolvable bifurcation" (Kemal and Gaskell, 2006, p. 1). The bifurcation between engagement with internal features such as the "expression, content and form" of works of art and their historical contexts immediately and importantly concerns art objects as a "specific class of objects," a difficulty "vividly felt throughout the history of the discipline of history of art" (Corbett, 2005, pp. 19-20).

---

work of art , even though things other than works of art may be objects of aesthetic appraisal" (p. 239). Partly in contrast, Sibley says lack of generality and a non-conceptual character are "typically present in aesthetic assessment as such *whatever* is being judged aesthetically;" that is, "they do not result from the concept of a work of art" but rather "would remain in aesthetic judgment and assessment even if we did not have, as we might conceivably might not, either any art-works or even the concept 'work of art'" (2006d, p. 90). So, Sibley says, "to assess something as a work of art, but not from the aesthetic point of view may be, as Strawson says, self-contradictory;" however, "to assess something aesthetically but not as a work of art (as indeed Strawson certainly allows) is not" (p. 90).

[17] The first type of claim, Novitz says, "concerns validity and objectivity of criticism" that is, "can interpretations and evaluations be true and be known to be true," or, "is their truth always relative to a certain culture or period within a culture?" (1998, p. 120). The second type of claim "concerns belief that works of art can properly be understood only if we have appropriate emotional responses to them" and from this, the problem "is to know which emotional responses are appropriate, which inappropriate to a particular work" (p. 120).

David Corbett says the problem of the distinction of art objects is intrinsic to the discipline (2005). Corbett notes Michael Podro's argument that tension in the explanatory relation between art object and context is "the consequence of 'the nature of art itself … both context-bound and yet irreducible to its contextual conditions'" (p. 19). Podro's original comments define the tension between aesthetic and cultural explanation; he says "either the context-bound quality or the irreducibility of art may be elevated at the expense of the other;" so, "if a writer diminishes the sense of context in his concern for the irreducibility or autonomy of art he moves toward formalism" (1982, p. xx). But, if the historian "diminishes the sense of irreducibility in order to keep a firm hand on extra-artistic facts," that writer "risks treating art as if it were the trace or symptom of those other facts"[18] (p. xx).

4. 2. 1. *Art as an Unconventional Convention*

The "very practice of discerning interest, of giving significance or value" to qualities in or of works of art "depends on constitutive conventions that make it meaningful to put marks on canvas or to give words a non-pragmatic order" (Kemal and Gaskell, 2006, p. 2). That is, in the interpretation and explanation of artworks, their constitutive practices are characteristically implicated in and are part of the aesthetic content and value of the work[19] (see for example Podro, 2006). But, "artist and critic attend to works only mediately" (Kemal and Gaskell, 2006, p. 2). Dependent on "stories told about works that locate the importance of visual and literary interests," arts practices (as production, critical and historical analysis, interpretation, and appreciation of works of art) "are social in the further sense that the discernment, location, and construction of interesting

[18] Podro's comments are also cited in Corbett (2005, p. 19)

[19] On the relevance of the constitutive role of such conventions in the explanation of artworks, Podro for example says "painting has a density which is obscured if we isolate the recognition of the subject from the sense of the medium" (2006, p. 43). When "we see the subject matter – the things that lie in the world outside the painting and upon which the painting draws – as dissolved, reconstituted, and recombined," he says, "it seems natural to say that we see the subject formulated in the medium" (p. 43). Since Ernst Gombrich's "focus on the psychology of recognition and its application to depiction," interpretation brings a "new level of explicitness" to "the question of how the recognition of the subject is related to the material surface of the painting and to the ordering of the painting" (pp. 43-44). Podro's essay proceeds to "three arguments which might lead us to *dissociate* the sense of medium from the sense of subject matter," all of which draw on insightful representation of the (in his following words) "coexistence, even ironic coexistence, between qualities of medium and subject" (pp. 44-46, emphasis added). See also Roger Scruton on the meaningfulness of the representational medium: it "could not be said that the painting is being treated as a surrogate for its subject: it is *itself* the object of interest and irreplaceable by the thing depicted" (2004, pp. 363-364).

objects has value within a social scheme" (p. 2). And, as practices, there are constraints on these schemes. To fully understand "how evidence and ideas are put to work within a practice involves disclosing the ways in which meanings, values and intentions are ascribed to them by its institutions" (Brown, 2001, p. 83). The notion of institutional constraints on the concept of art is significant. In philosophical aesthetics, focus on definitions of art and the agency of an 'artworld' emerges in the second half of the 20th Century[20].

The character of any aesthetic explanation of art proceeds from "definitional questions" which are "are inextricably meshed with ontological, interpretive, and evaluative issues" [21] (Davies, 1991, p. ix). Morris Weitz famously argues (originally in 1956), that "the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties," unless we "choose to close the concept" (2004, p. 16). Rather, he says, the "primary task of aesthetics is not to seek a theory but to elucidate the concept of art;" that is, the task "is to describe the conditions under which we employ the concept correctly" (p. 16).

In contrast to Weitz, Jerrold Levinson says any of the inclusions that count in a concept of art may be "dramatically different" to the same kinds of items, activities, reasons and paradigms present at any other given period (1993, p. 412). So, a "minimal thread of continuity" means that the "social, political and economic structures that surround the making of art at different times" may vary to the point that any of the particular conditions in which art functions may be "arguably absent or only minimally present in some circumstances in which art-making seems to occur nevertheless"[22] (p. 412).

---

[20] From this period, for exemplar description of causal relations between 'artworld' and art objects, see Arthur Danto (1964, 1974); on institutional explanations of art, see George Dickie (1977, 1984).

[21] There is "considerable debate over the nature of interpretation itself" and theorists vary in their ontological commitments (quote from Stecker, 1994, p. 193). Methodological frameworks within disciplinary protocols provide varying constraints based in different motivations, values and objectives, on the explanation of artistic works and practices (Roskill, 2006, p. 98). See for example Mark Roskill, on characterization of explanatory modes and their purposes commonly employed in art historical/critical study (2006).

[22] Levinson's influential art concept account now extends beyond the field of art and aesthetics. Psychologist Paul Bloom in his work on learning, development and concept change employs Levinson's intentional-historical theory of art as the framework for his paper on artefact concepts (see Bloom, 1996). (But see Levinson (2006, pp. 30-35) on disagreement with Bloom on this matter). For broad characterization of currently relevant approaches to definitions of art (distinguishing between

4. 2. 2. *Art and the Particular*

Attention to and experience of the particular most typically distinguishes the forms of enquiry and the basis for claims in the arts[23] (Eisner, 1998, p. 38). Contrasting with "general claims about reality and truth," the arts and arts education characteristically employ qualitative enquiry to attend to the idiosyncrasy of "images and stories," including non-instrumental values, engaged in artistic artefacts[24] (Brown, 2001, p. 86). From engagement with the particular however, there is the "tendency to search for universal meanings in the common, the ordinary, the shard dimensions of experience" (Feldman, 1987, p. 19).

In this way, there may be significant distinctions in argument "between "use value" and "artistic value"" of works (Roskill, 2006, p. 97). There is, for example, "little use for the second movement of Braham's *Symphony Number 4* other than in the playing, appreciating, and understanding of it" (Brown, 2001, p. 86). And from this value, direct experience of the artwork is commonly nominated to partly, but critically, constitute proper knowledge of the work in explanation; that is, "we cannot know the content of the work of art without experiencing the work, because the experience is used to represent the content of the work and is part of the content"[25] (Lehrer, 2007, p. 1). So, "when we know what the work of art is like, we know its content in a special way, by

---

"functional," "procedural," and "historical/intentional" accounts), see Davies (1991); for fuller explanation and argument of current theories of identification and definition of art, see for example Lamarque and Olsen (Eds.) (2004); Levinson (Ed.) (2005).

[23] Typically, David Feldman says, "we might guess that the bulk of artistic activity is idiosyncratic;" the "quality of aspiring to uniqueness in the arts" is "perhaps their single most distinctive feature" (1987, p. 20). Feldman's comments are particularly relevant now to the eclecticism of artistic activity in new media (see Manovich, 2001a, 2001b). The "more esoteric the medium, the more idiosyncratic the domain is likely to be in its expression" and, Feldman says, artists "may vary in how idiosyncratically they approach the demands of a domain" (for example, the "poet/musician" John Cage), but the "premium," which is "placed on creativity in all art forms" means "it is reasonable to expect in the arts frequent incursions into the realm of the unique" (p. 20).

[24] In accommodating aesthetic knowledge, the arts "fit within the distinctive category of qualitative as opposed to quantitative knowing" (Brown, 2001, p. 86); see also Eisner (1998, 2002).

[25] However, Levinson says on this matter, while "first-hand experience of aesthetically notable objects such as artworks is the main point of our involvement with them," this "should not lead us to think that *only* through such experience can we learn anything about how they are aesthetically" (2005, pp. 213-214).

incorporating the experience of the work of art into a state of understanding and knowledge" ("in the mentality of the viewer")[26] (p. 1).

Where discussion relates to genre as a sort, style, or category of artefact, the particular also can serve as exemplar, in which case the instance may support a "general conclusion" (Gelley, 1998, p. 155). But "in this sense, exemplarity involves not so much (an entity) to be studied analytically as a hermeneutical practice, a practice that is integral to many kinds of discourse" – "ethical, juridical, political" for example (p. 155, parentheses added). Conventionally identified with "matters of opinion or taste" however, aesthetic claims about artistic artefacts and practices are still taken to differ significantly from claims in the previous three enterprises[27] (Toulmin, 2003, p. 19). The problem of claims in aesthetics is taken up in the following sections.

4. 2. 3. *Aesthetic Interpretation*

From the last chapter, visual culture theorists criticize the formalism of analytic aesthetic explanation. Such criticism largely under-represents contemporary explanation in philosophical aesthetics. The "key aesthetic debates have tended to be between those who are broadly identifiable as those who are formalists and those who propose various types of relativism" (Crozier and Greenhalgh, 1992, p. 83). But there is also criticism of formalism from theorists in philosophical aesthetics, such as Richard Wollheim (Batkin, 1998, p. 217). He, and other critics, "take the formalist to maintain that what we appreciate or judge when we appreciate or judge a work of art aesthetically (that is, *as* a work of art) are just its formal attributes;" that is, "roughly, the composition or

[26] Here, the subjectivity of viewer, on Keith Lehrer's view, is crucial to proper knowledge of the work. The "representation of the content incorporates the experience, including the phenomenology of the work of art, into the representational understanding of its content" (2007, p. 1). Lehrer's account leads to exemplarization of the particular and so is similar (and explicitly indebted) to Nelson Goodman's insistence on "the symbolic character of the arts;" but there is a notable difference, Lehrer insists (p. 12). He says, the "representation of what the work of art is like" in this way "uses the experience of the work of art as an exemplar to stand for a class of experiences of which it is a member" (p. 1). But Goodman "connects the exemplarized particular with other particulars by reference to a predicate" (pp. 11-12). Lehrer's account instead contends that the "kind of representation effected by exemplarization distinguishes it from linguistic representation by allowing us to use a sensory particular to represent a class of particulars" Lehrer says, "in a way that is not constrained by linguistic representation and may indeed transcend it" (p. 12). For further on Goodman's account, see previous chapter, and Chapter 5. Of interest here in Lehrer's claims is his reference to an inclusion of sensory experience (on Lehrer's account, as a mechanism for comparison of particulars) for aesthetic knowledge of artworks.

[27] See also Toulmin et al for modes of argument in the arts (1984, pp. 349-367).

organization of the work as opposed to its representational content," applying to (generally) "works from all periods of history, of all types" (p. 217). Such a thesis "explicit or implicit holds that the only or the essential element of aesthetic value in a work of art is its form"[28] (p. 217). But, in contrast to claims that aesthetic explanations limit to formalism, in encountering the representational content of art interpretive approaches are taken up in philosophical aesthetics.

Aesthetic interpretations provide means for addressing questions concerning art and other objects. More generally, interpretation is itself "not a distinct concept" and the idea "resists strict or algorithmic rules about correct application" (Krausz, 1993, p. 66; 1998, p. 520). Hilary Putnam says "not only is interpretation a highly informal activity, guided by few, if any, settled rules or methods, but it is one that involves much more than linear propositional reasoning" (Krausz, 1993, p. 66; citing Putnam, 1992, p. 129). Rather, the activity of interpretation "involves our imagination, our feelings – in short, our full sensibility"[29] (p. 66).

Commonly employed, hermeneutic or interpretive approaches in the visual and other arts, as humanities, encompass the psychological features of aesthetic experience by distinguishing between explanation and understanding. Understanding "as a method characteristic of the humanities" functions here as "a form of *empathy*… or re-creation in the mind of the scholar of the mental atmosphere, the thoughts and feelings and motivations of the objects of (his or her) study" (von Wright, 2004, p. 6, parentheses added). Eisner, for example, says that empathy invoked through the "presence of voice" and expressive language in qualitative explanation is "important in furthering human understanding" (1998, pp. 36-37). Interpretive methods emphasize "contrast between those sciences" aiming "at generalizations about reproducible and predictable phenomena" and those which "want to grasp the individual and unique features of their objects" (von Wright, 2004, p. 5).

[28] For account of the rejection of formalism, particularly that of Clive Bell and Roger Fry, from Arnold Isenberg and Wollheim, see Batkin (1998).
[29] Again cited from Putnam (1992, p. 129).

From previously, different approaches are employed in the investigation of art objects depending on the aims and values of the interpretation (Roskill, 2006). Each approach may require distinct strategies and only the guiding assumptions are outlined here[30]. Some theorists, such as Monroe Beardsley, argue for a "singular right interpretation" of the object (Krausz, 1998, p. 521). Others such as Joseph Margolis suggest that for cultural entities "more than one interpretation of a pertinent object is characteristically admissible" (p. 521). And these "nonconverging interpretations can be legitimately" defended"[31] (1993, p. 63).

One significant variation between interpretive approaches concerns assumption of the dependence or independence of the interpreted object from the interpretation (Barnes, 1988, p. 86; Krausz, 1998, p. 521). One view holds that "there is no art object independent of interpretation as such," that is, the interpretation "constitutes" the object (Krausz, 1998, pp. 522-523). This "imputationalist" view argues that "art objects are altered by the histories of their interpretations" although the position does not require an absence of constraints on interpretation (p. 522). Constraints are provided in these cases "within the context of pertinent interpretive practices" (p. 522). These practices are "fostered and shared by interpretive communities"[32] (Barnes, 1988, p. 87).

In contrast, the "anti-imputationalist" argues that "art objects are fully constituted independently of interpretation as such" that is, "they cannot be constituted by interpretation"[33] (Krausz, 1998, p. 522). Krausz says on this view, "whichever interpretations are admissible must be constrained by something other than interpretation itself" (p. 522). Further, constraints on interpretation occur since "it must be possible for an interpretation to be wrong or inadmissible" (p. 522). This argument provides for defeasibility (Barnes, 1988, pp. 110-120). A defeasible "property, relation

[30] Systematic explanation of the views briefly touched on in this study are found in Barnes (1988); and Krausz (1993, 1998).
[31] On "multiple admissible interpretations" Michael Krausz says, "multiplism does not commit one to the view that ideally admissible interpretations are equally preferable" (1997, p. 415).
[32] For criticism of this view, see for example, Stecker (1994). For defence of this view (and explanation of his relativist ontology), see for example, Eisner (1989).
[33] If "an interpretation fully constitutes its art object, there would be a population explosion of art objects;" as a consequence, "no two interpretations could compete" ("arts objects would multiply by the number of interpretations offered") (Krausz, 1998, p. 522).

or judgment" of interpretation can be defeated or substantially revised "by further considerations" such as "later facts or evidence"[34] (Finnis, 2005, p. 194). Anti-imputationalists argue that because art objects are "autonomous" of their interpretations, "it must be possible to identify and reidentify art objects on different occasions" (Krausz, 1998, p. 522).

4. 2. 4. *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Judgment*

Whereas interpretation follows closely on the notion of understanding, emphasis in aesthetic judgment lies in concepts underlying evaluation (Sibley, 2006d, p. 88). In actual cases of aesthetic judgment the two are closely identified and can be difficult to distinguish. Theories of aesthetic judgment developed, broadly, in terms of the capacity to discriminate (in relation to beauty and taste) (2006a, p. 1). The activity of discrimination in this sense immediately incorporates sense or perceptual content[35]; aesthetics "deals with a kind of perception" (2006c, p. 34). From this, aesthetic judgment includes and significantly concerns the perception of features and, roughly, how those features function or come together as a whole in the object or phenomena.

But, perception is not reducible to sensation; rather "the faculty of sense-perception is that faculty by means of which we are able to characterize or identify things as a result of the use of our senses"[36] (Hamlyn, 1959, p. 6). In "critical and evaluative discourse"

---

[34] For discussion of defeasibility of reasons in aesthetic evaluation, including distinction between generalists (as "subscribers to the idea that general reasons and criteria can be offered and utilized in aesthetic evaluation") and particularists (as "those who hold that aesthetic judgments are not and cannot be supported or justified by general reasons or criteria") see for example, Bender (1995, p. 380). John Bender says "reasoning in aesthetics is defeasible and non-monotonic in nature" (p. 379). To explain briefly: "everyday reasoning is mostly non-monotonic because it involves risk" that is, "we jump to conclusions from deductively insufficient premises" (Fuhrmann, 1998, paragraph 2). And, "we know when it is worthwhile or even necessary (for example, in medical diagnosis) to take the risk" (para. 2). Yet, André Fuhrmann says, "we are also aware that such inference is 'defeasible' – that new information may undermine old conclusions" (para. 2). Defeasible inferences have "traditionally captured the attention of philosophers" for example, "theories of induction, Peirce's theory of abduction, inference to the best explanation, and so on" (para. 2). For further on abduction and the consequences of its role in reasoning see Ch. 5, Section 3.3. n.56, this study.

[35] But see Frank Sibley, for example, on not making "*perceptual proof*" identical with giving reasons in explanation (2006c, pp. 39-41). For further on the specific debate about perceptual content in critical reasoning in the epistemology of aesthetics (and preserving "the rational status of critical discourse" but not as deductive reasoning from general principles or claims), see for example, Hopkins (2007, p. 138).

[36] Judgments here significantly derive from felt experience as exploration; exploring the qualities of form, including felt responses, extends on "perceptual activities," which are insufficient in themselves to understand artworks (Eisner, 2002, p. 76). Levinson makes a distinction in the interpretation of artefacts,

about works of art, there is an important distinction in the "exercise of taste" between "personal preference or liking" and discrimination as "an ability to notice or see or tell that things have certain qualities"[37] (2006a, p. 2-3).

So, characteristically in aesthetics, direct experience of works is regarded as necessary, or significantly relevant, to aesthetic judgments because "people have to *see* the grace or unity of a work, *hear* the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, *notice* the gaudiness of colour scheme," or "*feel* the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone"[38] (2006c, p. 34). To "learn from others," even "on good authority, that the music is serene, the play moving, or the picture unbalanced is of little aesthetic value" that is, "the crucial thing is to see, hear, or feel" (p. 34). Supposing "that one can make aesthetic judgments without aesthetic perception, say, by following rules of some kind, is to misunderstand aesthetic judgment" (p. 34).

The requirement for direct experience of works has a long history in Western philosophical thought. In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle compares "judgments about art to ethical judgments," but in the case of art "finding the mean by reasoning is difficult because the judgment must be made to the particular" so, "the judgment rests

---

events or objects, between "'What *does* it mean?' and 'What *could* it mean?'" labelling the first "the determinative mode of interpretation" and the second, "the *exploratory* mode of interpretation" (2006, p. 275).

[37] In practice, aesthetic expressions about works typically refer to relationships between the features of a work or its qualities, resulting in terms such as *vivid*, *integrated*, or "*sets up a tension*, *conveys a sense of*, or *holds it together*" (Sibley, 2006a, p. 1). Qualities that provide valid grounds in critical evaluation of aesthetic experiences for example, in Beardsley's terms, tend "to classify under the three general categories of reasons, *unity*, *intensity*, and *complexity*" (Brown, 2003b, p. 104, emphasis added). So for example, the "qualities may belong to simple elements of the work, such as particular lines or colors, or to regions, where the elements interact and give rise to qualities of much greater complexity" (Parsons, 2002, p. 26). Under these descriptive terms such "phenomenally objective" qualities (since they are "experienced as belonging to the object itself"), "may be more or less intense, more or less complex, and (at the level of the work as a whole) more or less unified" (p. 26). But see Sibley sympathetically contra Beardsley's "three primary or basic positive criteria" (as intensity, complexity, unity) of critical reasons that, Sibley says, "can never in any circumstances count otherwise than in a positive direction" (2006e, p. 105). Sibley instead claims distinction "between overall judgments of things… where the relevant criteria are *independent* of each other, and overall judgments of those many things, including art-works, where the relevant criteria are *interacting*" (2006e, p. 107). Although "we can set out criteria of merit, these are not independent; they can interact within the whole in various ways" (p. 107).

[38] How this experience obtains may vary; someone "may be struck by these qualities at once, or they may come to perceive them only after repeated viewings, hearings, or readings, or with the help of critics" (Sibley, 2006c, p. 34). See also Levinson for discussion and qualification on the necessity of direct experience in aesthetic judgments (2005, pp. 213-214).

with perception (*aisthēsis*)"[39] (Summers, 1998, p. 429). Aristotle gives "great importance to *aisthēsis* in the exercise of the central virtue of prudence (*phronēsis*)," and "prudence depends on experience and on the right judgment of the particular matter at hand, a judgment expressly opposed to general, mathematical judgments" (p. 429). So, in the case of art "principles applied without respect to the particular case will be imprudent and unjust, and we have the capacity" as *aisthēsis* "to make judgments about particular cases"[40] (p. 429).

Later, Kant refers to the common grounds of judgments in the case of the aesthetic as "a claim to subjective universality"[41] (2001, p. 97, §6). In aesthetic judgments "we suppose that our pleasure is by rights communicable to or valid for everyone; we assume that everyone must experience this" (Deleuze, 1984, p. 48). In other words, "what the phrase 'this rose is beautiful' (or ugly) actually does is not ascribe objective beauty (or ugliness) to the rose; rather, it imputes to the other the same feeling of pleasure (or pain) that one feels in oneself"[42] (de Duve, 2008, p. 140-141).

So, "a Kantian commitment to the democracy of aesthetic pleasure" occurs (Wollheim, 1991b, p. 38-39). The commitment means that "no matter how precisely the judgment (is) interpreted" it is seen to "not presuppose," but rather renounce "any assistance from, special knowledge"[43] (p. 39, parentheses added). Aesthetic perception for Kant is

---

[39] Distinction between judgments of an aesthetic character and judgments of other kinds also occurs early in the Western intellectual tradition. Plato and Aristotle follow Pythagoras in their view that the human soul has the capacity to resonate with harmony. In the Platonic tradition the "consonance between *aisthēsis* and mind is beauty" and with Aristotle the ("five special") senses "express judgments in pleasure and displeasure, always preferring the mean" or balance (Summers, 1998, pp. 428-429).

[40] The role of *aisthēsis* or perception in *phronēsis* (as practical reason) remains a significant reference in philosophical aesthetics for the exploration of critical reasoning, see for example Hopkins (2007, p. 139).

[41] From Kant, disinterest in aesthetic judgments requires freedom from "any inclination" in the subject, which then provides access to the same grounds for judgment a person could "presuppose in everyone else" (2001, p. 97, §6). These common grounds in Kant's terms mean aesthetic judgment "has the similarity with logical judgment that its validity for everyone can be presupposed," except that "universality" here "cannot originate from concepts" (p. 97, §6). Instead the validity of the judgment of taste lies first in its abstraction from all self interest, and second in its combination with a different form of universality, or common grounds of judgment to that which "pertains to objects" (p. 97, §6).

[42] So, "to say that Ms A and Mr B" (who disagree over the beauty/ugliness of the rose) "are both right is to say that this call on the other's capacity for agreeing by dint of feeling is legitimate;" "this is what Kant understood better than anyone before or anyone since" (de Duve, 2008, p. 141).

[43] In discussion of Goodman's *Languages of Art*, Wollheim is referring, in criticism, to the history of analytic aesthetics.

available is to any person who, “first, possesses the appropriate sensuous and cognitive faculties and second, is willing to be attentive to the full sensuous presence of an object, while foregoing cognitive or practical results” (Seel, 2005, p. 4). Discourse on the role of perception in aesthetic judgments remains central to concern about claims in art critical discourse (Hopkins, 2007).

4. 2. 5. *Aesthetic Judgments*

Aesthetic judgments pertain to and require the senses or aesthesis for discriminating. But, “while it is reasonable to connect perception with judging… it is incorrect to identify it with judging” (Hamlyn, 1959, p. 6). Levinson proposes that “the distinctive mark of aesthetic satisfaction in art is that it is satisfaction deriving from attention that focuses, above all, on the relation of content to form and form to content in the given work of art” (2006, p. 4). In this way, aesthetic understanding extends further than the immediate or felt experience of works. In judgments, the representational content and the form of the work are taken to be interdependent. So, identification and the understanding of formal qualities in works plays a central role in determining the meaning and value of works; that is, a judgment of parts and the activity of their reciprocal relations in constituting the whole, in what is seen (or in the case of music or spoken poetry for instance, heard)[44] (Eisner, 2002, pp. 75-77). Eisner nominates the attention to relationships “among the “parts” that constitute a whole” a “fundamental concern” for practices in the arts[45] (p. 75).

So, aesthetic judgments characteristically involve “perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of aesthetic discrimination or appreciation” as the “exercise of taste” (Sibley, 2006a, p. 1). But in teaching and learning about aesthetic judgments, “the explanatory power” of

---

[44] See also Wollheim, on the aesthetics of the literary arts concerning the difference between “understanding the words or sentences out of which the poem (for instance) is constituted” and the work’s “artistic meaning” (1991b, p. 40).

[45] Jacques Maquet says, “in everyday language ‘form’ is opposed to ‘substance’ – as when we say “the substance of this talk is excellent, but the form is poor”” (1990, p. 50). And “because of that, the word ‘form’ may evoke something superficial, not as important as the ‘substance’ or ‘content’ with which form is associated” (p. 50). In this way, “form may be trivialized as if it were a matter of orthography and correct grammar” (p. 50). But, “this is not so for modern painters;” “for them form is not the superficial aspect of painting” rather, “it is the whole of it” (p. 50). That is, “visual forms are to painting what sounds are to music;” “without sounds, no music; without forms, no painting” (p. 50). For these reasons, “visual forms are the substance of painting” (p. 50).

aesthetic description is problematic (Brown, 1989b). There is "the suspicion that what can be said about the aesthetic character of objects, in particular art objects, will in many instances turn out to be self-evident and relatively trivial"[46] (p. 212). And, "for this reason art teachers, trying to verbalize aesthetic quality, often find themselves diverted into indirect kinds of description"[47] (p. 212). The "amplification of a felt quality" in an artwork, and its "refinement into the recognition" of a correspondent concept or term is "deeply involved in the precision with which it is translated into an identifying description"[48] (p. 217). So, "the interesting interaction of 'concept,' 'recognition,' and 'experience' (the acute feeling itself) in aesthetic comprehension represents the praxiology of aesthetic description" (p. 217). The precision or otherwise of language in aesthetic explanations must negotiate "how aesthetic properties are able to be real assertions"[49] (p. 217).

4. 3. Problems in the Explanation of Aesthetic Experience

In philosophical aesthetics at present, interpretive strategies provide epistemically acceptable explanations of art objects. But the history and residue of separation of aesthetics from mainstream epistemology remains problematic either tacitly or more

---

[46] Michael Baxandall (as art historian and critic) worries "at his own nerve in verbalizing at other people about objects they can already see" (1979, pp. 454-455). The problem concerns the specifically visual character of the visual arts. The difficulty with "matching language with the visual interest of works of art" is taken up in the following chapter (quote from p. 455).

[47] On this difficulty, it is a "fact that it is very difficult to say a great deal about a painting, except by talking about its relationships to something else, whether to other paintings, other arts, contemporary social movements, contemporary beliefs, or contemporary ideas;" and "that is why, in a gallery, we are so often tempted to fall back on the "that reminds me" school of criticism" (partially cited in Baxandall, 1979, p. 455; Passmore, 1972, p. 579).

[48] But, more generally aesthetic terms are part of everyday life, and can be used without particularly knowing they are providing aesthetic judgments (Sibley, 2006a). Use of these terms ranges from everyday vernacular such as *elegant* and *ugly*, to *coherent, sombre* or *melancholic*, which might be more commonly employed by "professional critics and specialists" (p. 2); see also Geertz on distinctions in vernacular and specialist language (1997). Such terms constitute on either or both descriptive and evaluative components (Levinson, 1994, p. 352); on evaluative/descriptive distinctions, see also Sibley (2006e); and Strawson (2004). Aesthetic terms are "based on and report, albeit obliquely, certain looks/feels/appearances that emerge out of lower order perceptual properties" (Levinson, 1994, p. 351). Some terms, such as *beautiful* have "no current non-aesthetic use" (Sibley, 2006a, p. 2). Other terms have "entered the language of art description and criticism" (p. 2). Identification of, for example, *balanced* or *dynamic* states of affairs function by "some kind of metaphorical transference" but are so familiar in art discourse they are now little more than "quasi-metaphorical" (p. 2). In other cases the use of "contrasts, comparisons and reminiscences" allows full extension of aesthetic concepts into similes and metaphors to obtain meaning (p. 18).

[49] See also Levinson and Matravers (2005); Matravers and Levinson (2005).

explicitly in education. These problems proceed from two significant values in aesthetics.

The first value is conceptual indeterminacy or limited determinacy in the apprehension and development of what are called since Kant, 'aesthetic ideas.' Emergent from the first, the second value is the insufficiency of rules, as predictability, to determine the creation and interpretation, as understanding, of art. Taking these values together, the aesthetic mode of enquiry is distinguished from analytical enquiry and the value of a reduction on logical constraints remains. From aesthetic experiences of artistic works the learner "(discovers) that in one of its major guises the world appears as a world of qualities; they begin to appreciate the sheer qualitative immediacy of life" (Levi and Smith, 1991, p. 197, parentheses added). And aesthetic pleasure, as a felt state in response to a particular work of art, functions heuristically[50]. That is, advocates characteristically argue that one gains valuable knowledge or understanding of some kind as a consequence of the experienced pleasure[51] (Eisner, 1992c, 1993, 2005). So, in aesthetics, rules aren't sufficient to capture the epistemic territory. Eisner for example, says that "the arts teach children that most exquisite of capacities, the ability to make judgments in the absence of rules" (2005, para. 5).

But, the constraint on rules in aesthetics makes the arts' educational function complex. In educational contexts, there are significant difficulties attending Eisner's claim about the arts. The role of language and explanation in aesthetics is problematic. Eisner says language is inadequate as "a vehicle" for actual aesthetic, as phenomenal experience of qualities such as, for example, "the color blue" (2002, p. 165). As well, teaching and learning practical arts, including the content of aesthetic knowledge, as 'creative' capacities is not straightforward in terms of academic knowledge.

---

[50] That is, as a method enabling the subject to discover or learn something for themselves. Concerning visuality, the claim has a long history; David Summers, on "sight as heuretic," draws on Plato's *Timaeus* (47a-c): "not only does the clearest knowledge of the natural world proceed from the sense of sight, but, over and above this, the sustaining principles of order and harmony are also most evident through it" (1987, p. 32).

[51] Typically, advocates of aesthetics in education say the discovery by students of the qualitative immediacy of aesthetic experience in the understanding and appreciation of artworks proceeds to increasingly "sophisticated experiences" but "mature perception" of the works unfolds "only against a background of information about art" (Levi and Smith, 1991, p. 197).

Institutionally, the experiential demands and predictive constraints on learning in the arts suffer comparison with teaching content amenable to, or identified with ruled explanations, for example mathematics. Knowing in such subjects can be, as epistemology, measurably tested (Arts Education, 1995, p. 117). This problem is evident in argument against those measurement standards figuring what Eisner critically refers to as "end state" educational goals for students in arts education[52] (1998, p. 101). In his argument, Eisner is referring to, and claiming epistemological value, as a form of knowledge, for the 'what it feels like' or qualitative aspect of, in this instance aesthetic, experience; that is, the role of subjectivity explained in education. To attend to the concerns Eisner and others identify, the remaining work of this chapter is to further characterize the role of subjectivity in the aesthetic modeling of visuality.

4. 3. 1. *Dominant Narratives of Aesthetic Experience*

The concept of the aesthetic in the modern sense in part develops first, from the Cartesian rationalism and "emerging empiricism" of the later part of the 17th and 18th Centuries in England (Townsend, 1987, p. 287). Earlier belief in tradition, opinion, and revelation gives way to interest in the nature of experience and the "testing" of judgments in philosophical and critical enquiry (pp. 287-288). A "systematization *through* logic" develops from this time (Coyne and Snodgrass, 1995, p. 35). Cartesian rationalism emphasizes "pure reason" (pp. 34-41). Empiricism "maintains that our primary source of knowledge is sense experience, or observation" (p. 41).

In this emergent empiricism, Locke separates "ideas in the mind from qualities in the object" (Townsend, 1987, p. 288). Locke's writing concerns the mental representation of non-mental entities or "external sensible objects" (Locke in Cohen, 1984, p. 73). For

[52] There is "no formula for creativity" (Mitchell, Inouye, and Blumenthal (Eds.) 2003, p. 2). Educators of visual (and other) arts say strategies for the production and understanding of art can be taught, but are not effectively educated from conventions alone (Arts Education, 1995; Eisner, 1998, 2002). Advocates of "aesthetic awareness" in education argue that "the ability to demonstrate aesthetic judgment" is a "matter of more than just 'technical accuracy'" (Arts Education, 1995, p. 138). For this reason, institutional assessment of 'creative' arts, including practical arts, through measurement in schooling attracts criticism from educational stakeholders; see for example, Matthews and Urmacher (2005, p. 220). Critics of regulative curriculum models that focus on "'behaviour as evidence of learning"' argue such outcomes-based models attempt to "blueprint" teaching and administrative (as assessment) concerns as "rigid" structures, unable to accommodate "creative and unpredictable" elements of arts learning (Arts Education, 1995, pp. 117-118).

Locke, “all visual sensations are subjective” (Hamm, 1937, p. 499). So, primary qualities such as weight and shape exist in objects, while secondary qualities such as colour and taste are “mere powers” in those objects “to produce ideas by means of the primary qualities of insensible particles”[53] (Bolton, 1976, p. 309). Locke’s work introduces “a consistently psychological point of view” typical of the Enlightenment, which sees replacement of the previous “analysis of being with the analysis of mind” (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 319).

Second, against the rationalist enterprise German idealism provides another systemization of thought, as romanticism (Coyne and Snodgrass, 1995, p. 41). Theorists such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel “built their theories upon the primacy of the *subject* as opposed to the *object*” (p. 41). In contrast to “arguments appealing to “pure logic” and “objective truth”” the influence of romanticism is characterized by a “dependence on imagination, intuition, emotion, feeling, and the primacy of the individual” (p. 41). In the romantic tradition, artistic and design practices function as “a product of the individual, who must be given free reign to exercise creativity” (p. 41).

Although “the relationship between romanticism and rationalism often is ambiguous” concepts of artist and designer in the romantic paradigm are narratives of the “hero” (p. 42). Artists and designers here are “visionaries” who “must ward off the influences of mediocrity”[54] (p. 42). The ethos of romanticism in aesthetics draws on earlier views in which it takes a “special capacity of the soul to perceive an ideal beauty,” thus denoting

---

[53] In contemporary philosophical aesthetics, properties or qualities of objects are often discussed as “non-aesthetic” properties in comparison with “aesthetic properties” (Steenberg, 1992, p. 342). So for example, colour is generally considered to be a non-aesthetic quality (in the sense of an object of judgment) (Sibley, 2006c). But from colour as a non-aesthetic quality there proceeds for example, “a colour’s ‘warmth,’ ‘gaiety,’ and ‘beauty,’ or from volume and form, a shape’s ‘gracefulness,’ ‘clumsiness,’ ‘ugliness,’ and from sound, a sound sequence’s ‘darkness,’ ‘sadness,’ ‘beauty,’” which are all “designated aesthetic properties” (Steenberg, 1992, p. 342). On “aesthetic properties, or at least many aesthetic properties” as “higher-order ways of appearing,” see Levinson and Matravers (2005). Also, “concerning the ontological status of the two kinds of properties;” some theorists assert “that non-aesthetic as well as aesthetic properties are intrinsic to objects” (Steenberg, 1992, p. 342). In argument, “philosophers state various views concerning the relationship between the two kinds of properties” and further, “there are contradictory views” concerning whether “statements asserting non-aesthetic and/or aesthetic properties of objects and sound sequences can be proved true or false” (p. 342). On this argument, see for example Hyman (2006); Levinson and Matravers (2005); Matravers and Levinson (2005).

[54] For current prevalence of romantic stereotypic representation of artists as “mad, bad and sad,” but “rugged individualists powered by pure genius” see Bidisha (2007).

"a capacity of mind" as prerequisite for "aesthetic emotions" (quote from Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 315). Both "rationalism and romanticism" are "commonly defined in terms of their opposition to one another," each having "their own dominant metaphors" (Coyne and Snodgrass, 1995, p. 42). Rationalist metaphors are of "systems, mechanisms, order, and the *object*;" romantic metaphors are of "individuality, flow, spirit, and the *subject*" (p. 42).

4. 3. 2. *Sensation, Feeling, and Aesthetic Experience*

The relation between aesthetics and art, in both their various forms, has held for over two millennia[55]. But assimilating Baumgarten's term aesthetics into philosophical discourse in the 19th Century "labelled hitherto nameless mental states, experiences and emotional responses to art and beauty" (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 311). From this, the study and explanation of perception becomes intrinsic to the relation between art and the aesthetic (Kemp, 1990, pp. 250-257). For example Hegel in the 19th Century defines aesthetics "simply as a "philosophy of art"" (Seel, 2005, p. 5). He also says, "more precisely" aesthetics means "the science of sensation or feeling"[56] (Carroll, 2004, p. 423, n.14; quote from Hegel, 1979, p. 1).

But, from previously, philosophical investigation of felt states in response to art and nature as, primarily, a concern for beauty is difficult epistemologically. The problem concerns three interconnected commitments in aesthetics that are not tractable (as reliably establishing true knowledge) to traditional epistemological procedures; first, the role of pleasure and emotion in aesthetic experience and the agency of that pleasure in establishing aesthetic judgments (see Nehamas, 1998); second, from its disinterest, the distinction of aesthetic value from other values (Kant, 2001, p. 95, §5; Novitz, 1990);

---

[55] On adaptation of the concept of art, see Levinson (1993).

[56] There is ongoing debate over whether "aesthetic properties necessarily depend on properties perceived by the five senses," (Carroll, 2004, p. 413). The argument is significant across a number of problems in aesthetics. In the explanation of artworks for example, Carroll says, "many conceptual works do not require being perceived in order to be understood and processed appropriately; indeed, this may even be an essential feature of the design of the particular work in question" (p. 413). From this, "some aesthetic theorists of art" for instance Beardsley (Carroll says), "deny that conceptual works of this type are art" (p. 413). For further on the argument, see Carroll (2004); and Shelley (2003). The argument bases on whether, or to what degree, or in what kind, cognitive content counts in experience as aesthetic; see Carroll's same paper for example, on disagreement over humour in certain works counting as "an aesthetic attribute" (2004, p. 418, n.10). As well, for contrast with Hegel's view of a 'science' of feeling, see Seel (2005, p. 2).

third, from their conceptual indeterminacy, the absence of rule-governed or 'mechanical' procedures in the application of aesthetic concepts (Novitz, 1990; Sibley, 2006a).

4. 3. 3. *Pleasure and Emotion in Aesthetic Experience*

Aesthetic judgments incorporate a particular kind of pleasure, distinct from other kinds, as a basis for the judgment. Pleasure, here, "is fundamental to aesthetics" as a "specific style of philosophical meditation on the nature of art and beauty," (Herwitz, 1998, p. 1). Specifically conceptualized as non-desiring (as disinterested), aesthetic pleasure is "self-justifying" and "highly sublimated and even "contemplative" in character" (p. 1; see also Stolnitz, 1977). Characteristic of this mode of attention is time spent in reflection, or "aesthetic lingering" (Seel, 2005, p. 47).

While the concept of aesthetic pleasure emerges explicitly into philosophy from the late 18th Century, many ontological commitments in aesthetics precede this description. Aristotle makes distinction "between the special (or external) senses and the central, or common sense (*aisthetikon koinon* or *sensus communis*)" (Caton, 1973, p. 78). While each of the senses perceive qualities separately, they are experienced together through this *common sense* and it appears that we perceive things as a whole[57] (p. 79). For Aristotle, the "ability for discriminating objects" through this inner sense provides "the human capacity for making basic perceptual judgments and thus makes coherent sense experience possible" (Kneller, 1998, p. 60). Further, the training of sensory awareness is critical to the development of aesthetic judgment (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 313). But acuity is not the goal of educating the senses, since animals have more capability in this way than people (p. 314). Rather, the senses play importantly different roles. Aristotle distinguishes between characteristic kinds of pleasure involving sensory experience, critically opposing pleasure from the senses of vision and hearing with the pleasure obtaining from the senses of taste and smell[58].

---

[57] It is worth noting that Tatarkiewicz says Aristotle provides the first "complete and mature form" of opinion on the aesthetic experience of the spectator in the "much less read" *Eudemean Ethics*, rather than the better-known and more commonly credited *Poetics* (1980, p. 314).

[58] The form of perception and observation marked out in the spectator's role requires that one looks "attentively" and sees "accurately" (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 313). To grasp or fully understand the experience requires the "concentration of a sense" or "senses," specifically to enable judgment (p. 313).

The distinction is important in the conceptual development of aesthetic experience. Aristotle excludes taste and smell from what we now call the aesthetic response because they anticipate or associate the sensations felt with eating and drinking that is, appetite. These associations from taste and smell are "biologically conditioned" and unlike visual and auditory sensations, where the pleasure derives from a "delight in themselves" (p. 314). This early differentiation from instinctive sensual desires and appetites sustains, although critiqued, into contemporary aesthetics, affecting the particular ethical character of aesthetic theory[59]. First, aesthetic distinction from the appetites of the body as biological, and thus animal, traditionally provides a gap for freedom from judgments constrained by instrumental purposes[60]. Second, characterization of aesthetic pleasure

---

Knowing beauty occurs via the senses and in particular, the sense of vision. Visual experience, or seeing had a "privileged status" for the early Greeks, occupying an "unparalleled position in the range of human capabilities" (Vernant, 1995, p. 12). Jean-Pierre Vernant sets out the relation between seeing and knowing for the Greeks as one where *idein*, "to see," and *eidenai*, "to know," are two verbal forms of the same term" (p. 12).

[59] Lessing, among others in the 18th Century, maintains the distinction in this value or direction of the senses (Rée, 2000). For Lessing, Jonathon Rée says, the "peculiarity of eyesight" is "its ability to detect several spatially separate realities in a single moment or *Augenblick*;" other senses (the "lower" or "dark senses" in Lessing's terms), confine "to a procession of qualities which file past our consciousness one by one" (p. 59). Philosophical investigation of varied sense functions in consciousness continues. In his philosophical analysis of the senses, Hans Jonas argues visual function discriminates and coordinates (the person's) experience simultaneously in and across space and time in ways that other sensory inputs cannot match. He characterizes the sense of sight by exploring its difference to the temporally conditioned senses of hearing and touch (1966, p. 40). The "pointlike experience" of these latter senses make them in Jonas's view, senses of becoming (p. 144). Jonas identifies the "now" of the visual field within the context of a *dimension* of the immediate and extended present, which can hold the passing contents within the "flux of event" (p. 144). He says, "indeed only the simultaneity of sight, with its extended "present" of enduring objects, allows for the *distinction* between change and the unchanging and therefore between becoming and being" (pp. 144-145, emphasis added). For further on Hans Jonas's account, see Jay (1994). Visual capacity for characterizing distinctions and unity in the observational field has become an object of contemporary research. In visual perception, the most intense neuronal excitation is caused at the onset of the stimulus edge or boundary (Macknik, Martinez-Conde, and Haglund, 2000). We are in effect, biologically disposed as evolutionary advantage to perceiving distinctions as a means of identifying, situating, and predicting movement and behaviour in space.

[60] Kant distinguishes judgment of the beautiful through comparison with two other kinds of judgment (2001, p. 94, §5). First, determining what is *agreeable* as a form of judgment is motivated by personal preferences and dislikes. Based in stimulus response and the conditioning of inclination or desire, the agreeable is "also valid for non-rational animals" (p. 95, §5). The second comparison is with judgments of the *good* that are also related to desire. Satisfaction in the good is based in the rationality of those objects that are "esteemed, approved" and hence "objective" values (pp. 94-97, §5, and §6). Judging the good in these terms is a rational (as "theoretical" and intellectual) activity, which Kant ties to a complete distinction from animal nature (p. 95, §5). In contrast, judgment of beauty "is valid only for human beings, i.e., animal but also rational beings" (p. 95, §5). This particular kind of satisfaction as "favour" is the only judgment of the three kinds to form on freedom because it is independent, in Kant's view, of both the senses and reason. Objects of "inclination" and those "imposed" by "law of reason" constrain the possibility of a "free satisfaction", since "all interest presupposes a need or produces one" (p. 95, §5).

remains predominantly, though not altogether now, sourced in visual and auditory experience.

Further, Aristotle explicitly cites the inclusion of emotion or felt experience in this regard as pleasurable, nominating "an intense pleasure" derived from assuming the viewer's attitude (p. 314). This emotional response is particularly human, in Aristotle's view, and can be so intense that detachment from it is rendered difficult (p. 314). The unique emotional intensity of the aesthetic response later reifies as a primary value in the European romantic tradition from the 19th Century (Rosenblum, 1994). Felt pleasure and emotional response remain significant values in advocacy of aesthetics (Eisner, 1991, p. 4). Frequently argument identifies a conflict between the propositional constraints of reasoning as linguistic and the depictive character of the arts as emotional or feeling in "describing, interpreting and appraising the world"[61] (quote from Eisner, 1998, p. 2). On this view, language is typically inadequate to explain the sensory immediacy, intensity, and flow of felt states (Lehrer, 2007, p. 2).

4. 3. 4. *Cognition and Sense in Aesthetic Experience*

Commitment to exploration of a distinction between sensory or perceptual experience and cognition contributed substantially to the development and value of the study of subjectivity and its close tie to visuality in philosophical aesthetics. For this reason, the following section provides some brief history of the reasoning behind emergence of the value. Baumgarten in the 18th Century connects sensitive cognition (*cognitio sensitiva* from sensations) to what was previously theorized as the study of beauty, terming the relation *cognitio aesthetica* (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 311). Baumgarten distinguishes a different category of experience from "the category of intellectual discourse, with its network of clear and distinct abstract ideas" (Gero, 2006, p. 4). Instead, he describes an intermediate form of "sensitive discourse, with its suggestive flood of densely packed imagery and ideas" (p. 4).

Through Baumgarten, aesthetics as a branch of epistemology becomes "concerned not solely with the beautiful objects of nature or art but, much more generally with a special

[61] See also Susanne Langer (1974) as an influential text on this characterization.

faculty of perception" (Seel, 2005, p. 2). Identifying *cognitio aesthetica* as a mode of knowing, Baumgarten's notion of the aesthetic functions "in contrast to clear and distinct conceptual knowledge" (p. 2; see also Kemp, 1990, p. 250). The distinction between the two modes however does not oppose *cognitio sensitiva* to "*clarity*" but to the "*distinctness* of conceptual-propositional knowledge" (p. 2; cf. Kemp, 1990, p. 250). To know "something aesthetically possesses a conciseness completely different from knowing it scientifically," although in Baumgarten's notion the two modes "maintain a relation of complementarity" (p. 2).

For Baumgarten, Martin Seel says, "aesthetic knowledge is specialized in perceiving complex phenomena – not in order to analyze them in their composition but to make them present in their intuitive density" (p. 2). In this way, "something is not determined *as something*;" rather the "goal of this knowledge" is "consideration of the particular" (p. 2). The "real accomplishment of *cognitio sensitiva*" is "to know the particular in its particularity," which Seel says, "is something no science will be able to achieve" (p. 2). Baumgarten's complex terms have since abbreviated to aesthetics but contemporary use typically sustains, or explicitly argues, the categorical distinction of aesthetic knowing from propositional knowing (see Hopkins, 2007; Seel, 2005).

Critical to the "underlying commitments" developing the modern concept of aesthetic experience is the early 18th Century work of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury[62] (see Shaftesbury, 1964; quote from Townsend, 1987, p. 287). Shaftesbury distinguishes between an immediate, unmediated perception of felt pleasure in something and the "reflected joy or pleasure" that may ensue as a result of "notice of this (original) pleasure" (cited in Stolnitz, 1977, p. 611, parentheses added). The reflected pleasure functions in Shaftesbury's terms as a "second-order awareness" of the immediate perceptual experience (as the ""original satisfaction"") and this secondary experience can be motivated by an "interested regard" in contrast to the disinterested experience (cited, pp. 611-612). Shaftesbury in this way "opposes disinterestedness to

[62] Tutored by Locke, Shaftesbury dominates 18th Century British aesthetics as "one of the most widely-read authors of his time" (Stolnitz, 1977, p. 612). In Shaftesbury's work "response to the arts is never independent of morality" (Townsend, 1998, p. 445). His work also profoundly influences European, especially German thinkers of the 18th Century, including among others Lessing, Schiller, and Kant.

the desire to posses or use the object" (p. 611). Rather, with disinterest Shaftesbury identifies a virtuous contemplation, denoting ""the state of barely seeing and admiring"" (cited, p. 611).

Shaftesbury's notion of disinterest rejects extrinsic motivations driving self-interested actions[63]. Instead, disinterest functions through regard for the *intrinsic* qualities of something, the "excellence of the object" for its own sake[64] (cited, p. 609). Shaftesbury describes the "virtuous" person as a "spectator, devoted to "the very survey and contemplation" of beauty in manners and morals" (p. 611). Neo-Platonic, Shaftesbury's disinterest as common sense, or *sensus communis* echoes the Greek idealism; the "original" or unmediated and valued perception, "can be no other than what results from the love of truth, proportion, order and symmetry in the things without"[65] (cited, p. 611). Shaftesbury identifies disinterest as a mode of attention where the practical significance of the object is "supplanted altogether by the perceptual" (p. 611).

The distinction of a particular, unmotivated apprehension of objects with reference to the intrinsic value of the encounter remains characteristic of the concept of aesthetic

---

[63] A subject of debate "very much in the air" at the time of Shaftesbury, the concept of interest in an ethical sense (in that period) "designates the state of well-being or the genuine and long-range good" of either or both individual and society (Stolnitz, 1977, pp. 608-609). Radically, Shaftesbury instead "uses the term interest to refer, not to the good, but to the *desire or motive* to achieve the good", in a *private* rather than *common* sense of good (p. 609, emphasis added). Virtue is itself ""no other than the love of order and beauty," and Shaftesbury's notion of disinterested perception includes the "enjoyment of mathematics" for example, where "in such experience" the ""admiration, joy, or love turns wholly upon what is exterior and foreign to ourselves"" (cited, p. 611).

[64] In Shaftesbury's use of the term the "connotation of egoism" makes the concept of interest interchangeable with the notion of self-interest (Stolnitz, 1977, p. 609). The motives then designated by interested actions function in "regard for the well-being of the agent" rather than the "good and interest" of the "species and community" (cited, p. 609). But importantly, Shaftesbury does not deploy the term disinterest to refer to "benevolent or altruistic actions" in the sense that he is not "seeking to promote social well-being" by his use of the term (p. 609). Benevolent interest and the actions that proceed from these motivations may also be vested, in this case by regard for reward. Rather, Jerome Stolnitz says, Shaftesbury "wishes above all to insist… that hope of reward or fear of punishment is "fatal to virtue" and to piety as well" (p. 609). Concern "with what is intrinsic" in contrast to "concern for some desired consequence" means, unusually, on Shaftesbury's view "ethics is not a question of consequences" but rather perception or attitude (p. 610).

[65] Shaftesbury's notion is hardly the first in philosophy to distinguish between a contemplative, non-purposeful pleasure, and purposeful pleasure. Medieval writer, John Scotus Erigena, distinguishes between the contemplative delight of the aesthetic attitude and the practical nature of desire, or the "craving for possession" (Tatarkiewicz, 1980, p. 316). Leon Battista Alberti suggests in the 15th Century that for the soul to apprehend beauty "a passive submission to it is more important than an active idea controlling the experience" (p. 317).

experience. The idea Stolnitz says, has "transformed habits of seeing and judging," providing later support for regarding the aesthetic object as ""autonomous" and "self-contained""[66] (p. 607). But from the separation of aesthetic value from regard for use, or instrumental value, "traditional aesthetics" is seen as "an unworldly discipline" (Novitz, 1990, p. 9). The "artistic and economic integrity" such a view requires, demands contribution to a "a debate about a singularly elusive value: a value untainted by personal or political interests, by desires, needs, whims or fancies"[67] (p. 9). Novitz says, "if the tradition is correct, aesthetic value has very little to with what we actually want or prefer" rather it is a "pure value"[68] (p. 9).

4. 3. 5. *Conceptual Indeterminacy and Imagination in Aesthetic Ideas*

Baumgarten's new term provides an identity. But in argument over the aesthetic since the late 18th Century, "the field of combat has been Kantian" (Gero, 2006, p. 4). Kant "introduced or developed most of the critical terms in play in modernist art analysis" (p. 4). Following Baumgarten, Kant sets out the aesthetic "as the sensible component of knowledge" (Guyer, 1997, p. 63). In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant rejects determinate concepts and rule-governed constraints in the content or representation of aesthetic ideas in works of art (2001, pp. 192-195, §49). For Kant, "there can be no mechanical or determinate rules for individual judgments of taste" (Guyer, 2001, p. xxi).

Contemporary discourse still explores Kant's claims, contrasting "rule-following, on the one hand, and rule-breaking or rule-making, on the other" in the "creative development" of artworks (Pateman, 1991, p. 34). But, Paul Guyer says, "it must be kept in mind that in Kant's usage "aesthetic" is not synonymous with artistic," rather it "connotes only the subjective pleasure we take in objects" (1997, p. 178). Aesthetic ideas in Kant's terms "are intuitions for which no adequate concept can be found, but that make us

---

[66] Stolnitz says the concept of "disinterestedness" was the motivation for the British first envisioning in aesthetics the "possibility of a philosophical discipline, embracing the study of all arts, one which would be moreover, autonomous, because its subject matter is not explicable by any of the other disciplines" (1977, p. 608). While "we cannot understand aesthetic theory" without understanding disinterest, he says, the concept is strongly criticized in Marxist theory (p. 607).

[67] But for debate on identification of "valuing of an experience for its own sake with disinterestedness," see for example Carroll (2001, p. 81); Stecker (2001).

[68] On description of argument over aesthetic value as *sui generis* or unique, that is, "irreducible to other kinds of value" see Novitz (1990, p. 10).

reflect and search for one" (2001, p. 193, §49). The extension of possible meanings in the representation of aesthetic ideas gives "imagination cause to spread itself over a multitude of related representations, which let one think more than one can express in a concept determined by words" (p. 193, §49).

These representations (like Wittgenstein's "family resemblances") "do not follow rules but create ones;" they "make us recall or create other representations, one after another, whole chains of images and concepts, so that one is linked to the next, but without an overall rule that would determine the next step or link" (Wenzel, 2005, p. 102). Kant marks the aesthetic idea as a "representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., *concept* to be adequate to it, which consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible" (2001, p. 192, §49). For Kant the "infinite richness of material" of the aesthetic idea "escapes any attempt of expression in a conceptual and exhaustive way" (Wenzel, 2005, p. 101).

Kant sees the aesthetic idea as "the counterpart (pendant) of an *idea of reason*" (2001, p. 192, §49). Reason "conversely" is a concept, which cannot be sufficiently apprehended within the framework of imagination since "no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate" (p. 192, §49). On this account, conceptual indeterminacy functions necessarily in aesthetic experiences to motivate or drive understanding and requires distinction from the capacity to logically limit explanation. Nevertheless the relation between aesthetic ideas and reason, for Kant, is explicit (see p. 192, §49). Kant's account constrains theoretical (or in Kant's terms *pure*) reason on one hand and the extension or overflow of imagination in aesthetic experience on the other.

Kant's distinction and relation between aesthetic meaning, reasoning, and language reduces to a division over time, placing the concept of aesthetic experience and understanding as one outside rational discourse (Cooper, 1992). Early 20th Century theories of aesthetics represent the apotheosis of the split. Benedetto Croce for example claims that knowing occurs in "two forms" (1970, p. 93). Knowledge, Croce says, "is either *intuitive* knowledge or *logical* knowledge; knowledge through the *imagination* or

knowledge obtained through the *intellect*; knowledge of the *individual* or knowledge of the *universal*" (p. 93).

4. 4. Artist and Practice

The subjectivity of the spectator or beholder, as a role, is of primary concern in understanding visuality from the aesthetic point of view, the activity of the artist also requiring the role of the beholder. Art and education, as well, concerns the creation of works of art and from these interests, there is concern for understanding and explaining artistic motives or reasoning in the production or creation of art. Accounting for the subjectivity of the artist as the creator of artworks is difficult and remains problematic in explanation.

4. 4. 1. *Genius As Originality*

Following Shaftesbury, Kant's extension to the concept of artistic genius becomes the romantic basis for commitment to a naturalization of the motivations of artists[69]. Kant makes a distinction between the production of art as works of genius and judgments of art. So, "for the judging of beautiful objects, as such, *taste* is required; but for beautiful art itself, i.e., for *producing* such objects, *genius* is required" (2001, p. 189, §48). Taste constitutes on a "faculty for judging," and is "not a productive faculty" (p. 191, §48). The characteristics typically representing the artistic as a creative facility, on Kant's account, derive from an innate disposition that is different in kind to others.

The "natural gift" of genius, from Kant, "gives the rule to art," functioning as an innate mental aptitude or "inborn predisposition of the mind (*ingenium*)" (p. 186, §46). Further, since "talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given" is distinct from aptitude as a "predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule," it follows that "*originality* must be its primary characteristic" (p. 186, §46). To distinguish the products of genius from "original nonsense," the work should be "*exemplary*" and "while not themselves the result of

[69] As well as the contribution of disinterest, Shaftesbury also counts as "a chief source of the doctrine of "genius"" (Stolnitz, 1961, p. 98).

imitation," they must serve that purpose for others as a "standard or a rule for judging" (pp. 186-187, §46).

Genius, on Kant's account, is "entirely opposed to the *spirit of imitation*" (p. 187, §47). The activity of genius is neither systematic nor amenable to control, so the artist (as the author of beautiful art) first, cannot gain access to how the ideas come about (the "genius himself does not know himself how the ideas for it come to him"); second, "does not have it in his power to think up such things at will or according to plan" and as a result, third; "cannot communicate to others precepts," as rules, that would "put them in a position to produce similar products" (p. 187, §46). Neither can one learn or acquire the necessary inspiration, "however exhaustive all the rules for art" or "excellent the models for it may be" (p. 187, §47).

But an artwork of genius is not "a mere product of chance" (p. 188, §47). There is "no beautiful art" that does not constitute from "something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rules, and thus something *academically correct*" because, Kant says, "something in it must be thought of as an end, otherwise one cannot ascribe its product to any art at all" (p. 188, §47). In scientific works, the communicability of method means the "greatest discoverer differs only in degree from the most hard working imitator and apprentice;" but "someone who is gifted by nature" to produce beautiful art "differs in kind" from those who follow[70] (p. 190, §48).

4. 4. 2. *Genius in Kind*

From the second half of the 18th Century, "critics turned to empirical psychology initially for evidence of universal mental traits that could account for such things as similar responses to aesthetic causes in all ages" (Malek, 1980, p. 48). However, "this

[70] But also from the second half of the 18th Century, "an increasing preoccupation with scientific method" in "thought in general and in criticism in particular also indirectly stimulated interest in theories of genius by fostering curiosity about differences and analogies between scientific and artistic minds" (Malek, 1980, p. 49). In essays on genius from this period, James Malek says, "genius was defined in many different ways by different critics, but however variously it was defined, one of the most basic questions in these essays was whether genius was innate or acquired" (p. 50). Influential essays from Sharpe and Helvetius, Malek says, "contain (that) century's most comprehensive, compelling and influential argument favoring acquired genius" but, "their stance was rapidly overshadowed by the majority view that genius is innate" (p. 51, parentheses added).

interest in mental operations soon extended to questions relating to the powers required for unusual achievement in the various arts and sciences" (p. 48). Concern for the 'original' mind, as a type, becomes predominant; "in treatises on genius, one of the qualities most frequently discussed was originality" as a "trait common to achievements in all disciplines and whose sources could be sought in direct investigations of the mind" (p. 49).

So, from the 18th Century, genius as a concept "is intimately connected with creativity and originality"[71] (Murray, 1989, p. 2). The characteristics attributed to genius in art (innateness, inexplicability, creativity as originality) distribute over time to an assumption of the broader peculiarity of an artistic personality or persona, separate in kind, as the innovator. Discourse on genius permeates the romantic view of artistic giftedness (Kemp, 1989, p. 32). And the concept of genius becomes intrinsic to modern aesthetics (Stolnitz, 1961, p. 98).

The value of these terms, and particularly the notion of creativity in relation to the aesthetic, remains in contemporary discourse in advocacy for the arts in education (Brown, 2001). In discourse, "there is much generic talk about creativity" (Arnheim, 2001, p. 24). Problematically, "everybody seems to know what it is, although opinions vary as to how broadly it is distributed" (p. 24). While "some believe that creativity is a rare gift, others find some of it in everybody" (p. 24). But, "what exactly creativity is," Rudolph Arnheim says, "is by no means clear" (p. 21).

Kant's distinction of innate artistic genius is in *kind*, in contrast to the apparent procedurally constrained *degree* of demonstrable giftedness in the exceptional scientist. But persistent and significant difficulties attend this influential, and in various forms, ongoing characterization. First, as innate or inborn, disposition to artistic giftedness is not amenable to tuition. The "'natural ability'" of genius, as benchmark or significant

[71] And "by the end of the 18th Century the genius, and in particular the artistic genius, comes to be thought of as the highest human type, replacing such earlier ideal types as the hero, the saint, the *uomo universale* and so on" (Murray, 1989, p. 2).

creativity and originality, "is a quality which cannot be acquired by learning, nor is it a quality which everyone possesses"[72] (Murray, 1989, p. 3).

Second, the term becomes "used in the sense of an inexplicable quality" (p. 3). As an 'inexplicable quality' the notion of innate genius is more typically rehearsed today as (in this case, artistic) creativity of mind. The source of the contemporary view as a particular and peculiar kind of inborn capacity sustains in, roughly, three stereotypic explanatory forms. The forms are related and variously represent an identifiably 'artistic' mind as psychologically creative in contemporary descriptions, either tacitly or explicitly.

4. 4. 3. *The Artistic Mind as Beyond Analysis*

The first form rehearses views of artistic genius basing in an "unfettered natural ability," which is "essentially beyond the reach of analysis," partaking "of something divine""[73] (quote from Malek, 1980, p. 51, citing Edward Young). In this ahistorical disposition "an "original author is born of himself"" (p. 51, citing Edward Young's 1759 *Conjectures on Original Composition*). And on this view, since the romantics, "learning may simply be an "impediment" to genius" (quote from p. 51). From the attribution, artistic activity is reified as an "ineffable" charisma, signified in the "quasi-magical potency of the (artist's) signature" (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 81, parentheses added).

But, on this mystification of practice, analysis appears transgressive (1996, p. 185). The problem, it should be noted, does not limit to accounts of artistic practices as creative. Pierre Bourdieu represents the difficulties: the "fields of literature, art and philosophy" he says, "pose formidable obstacles, both objective and subjective, to scientific objectification" (p. 184). And, "in this case more than any other, conduct of research

[72] The "need felt by some (18th Century) critics to explain the undeniable success of works that violated widely accepted artistic practices or were produced by "uneducated" artists also contributed to the popularity of inquiries into the nature of genius" (Malek, 1980, p. 49, parentheses added).
[73] On the innateness of genius from early Latin and Greek etymological associations of the term with spirit, of various qualities, see Lewis (1936); Murray (1989); and particularly, Onians (1973).

and the presentation of its results have run the risk of letting themselves be imprisoned within the alternatives of an enchanted cult or a disabused denigration"[74] (p. 184).

4. 4. 4. *The Artistic Mind as Special*

The second explanatory form characteristically rehearses a distinction between artistic and other forms of intentional, in the sense of mental representational, activity. This distinction of psychological mode looks to the division of artistic, from other kinds of, mental capacities. This form of explanation, in contrast to the first, is analytical. But it develops, in my view, from the application of a 'natural ability' status to artistic capacity and so, in that sense, is emergent from the first explanatory stereotype. In contemporary discourse, the form of this argument bases in a view of mind, or brain, as strongly modular or innately domain-specific[75]. Critical of general intelligence measurements, this path attracts advocacy from educators claiming special value for artistic activity as dispositionally-based or biased, in curriculum; there is requirement to address giftedness. But from current research, there is criticism of innate domain-specific ability as strongly modular or discrete, on two grounds: first, for lack of sustainable evidence as proof of distinction[76] (Sternberg, 1994, p. 281). And second, strong modularity cannot explain reasoning (Searle, 2001).

4. 4. 5. *The Artistic Mind as Pathology*

The third form, basing in the "idea that certain individuals possess inexplicable creative powers," precedes the 18th Century in "literature and thought" (quotes from Murray, 1989, p. 4). From Plato, a "belief in the irrationality" of the creative "process" becomes associated with the later concept "of genius" (p. 4). The "pathology of genius," on this

---

[74] Both alternatives "being present, under diverse guises, inside each of the fields" (1996, pp. 184-185). The "rupture that must be affected in order to ground a rigorous science of cultural works is hence more than and different from a simple methodological overturning" Bourdieu says; rather "it implies a veritable *conversion* of the most common manner of thinking and living the intellectual life, a sort of *épochè* of the *belief* commonly granted to cultural things and to the legitimate ways of approaching them" (p. 185).

[75] Howard Gardner is exemplar of this view in art education and educational psychology; see (1983, 2003a, 2003b).

[76] The case of modularity and domain-specificity, or otherwise, of mind is taken up in more detail in the following chapter, but on debate in education see Gardner (1998); and Klein (1997); for recent advocacy of innate modularity thesis in developmental psychology see for example, Scholl and Leslie (2001); for explanation and argument against strong modularity, see for example, Karmiloff-Smith (1996). On the role of modular or domain-specific intelligence in intelligence measurement, see Gardner, (2003a).

account, achieves “a level of insight denied the normal person;” but it is “insight achieved at the cost of inner torment and, not infrequently, the languishing of the artist’s physical constitution” (Kemp, 1989, p. 32). Characteristically, on this form of account, mental states concerned with artistic activity are “connate with mystery and doubt” (Bone, 1989, p. 117). In this sense description of artistic irrationality, although a longstanding view, proceeds as a variation on the first, as the mystification of motive to practice.

Particularly since the 20th Century the irrationality of the artistically creative mind, as a presumption or presupposition, provides the conceptual basis in analysis. Substantially, I think, the ascription derives from traditional epistemic polarity between the rational, and non-rational as irrational. In itself, study of nonrational causes in attributions of motive is, I believe, a good thing epistemologically and an effective means of subverting the polarization. But an overriding attribution of motive in artistic personality, as innately irrational psychological trait, is problematic. Strong reinforcement of this identification occurs, since Freud, in the view that artistic imagination as creativity can be understood as the outcome or realization of unconsciously and neurotically sourced motives[77] (see for example Ehrenzweig, 1993). Alternately, but basing in the same claim to neurotic dispositional variation from the general population, the peculiarity of artistic disposition as genius or creative endowment “does not denote the presence of an attribute or identity, but the *absence* of attribute and identity” (Bone, 1989, p. 117).

From the empiricist’s perspective on “genius and creativity” there is criticism of the general imprecision or lack of clarity in terms for analysis (Eysenck, 1995, p. 4). But, precisely, (on Hans Eysenck’s account) creativity can be “postulated to co-exist, and can be causally related to psychopathological personality traits often found, to a

[77] On this view, characteristically, the artist is outsider, or privileged insider: art “is a dream” Anton Ehrenzweig says, “dreamt by the artist which we, the wide awake spectators, can never see in its true structure” (1993, p. 79). The “work of art remains the unknowable *ding an sich*” (as thing in itself) (p. 79). In argument for toleration of psychological uncertainty during periods of artistic innovation, Ehrenzweig says, “any creative thinker who ventures into new territory risks chaos and fragmentation” (of their psychological states); on his account “an initial state of fragmentation and the not inconsiderable (paranoid-schizoid) anxieties attendant on it must be tolerated” (p. 147).

debilitating effect, in functional psychotics" (p. 8). Eysenck's account is strongly criticized[78] (see Csikszentmihalyi, 1993). But the "correlation between creativity and mental illness is a persistent theme in psychiatry" (Blakemore, 2008, p. 22).

The difficulty with such accounts lies in the consequences of possible misrepresentation, drawing in part from the historical identity between the concepts of 'artistic' and 'creative.' Generalization of neurosis or pathology to artistic (as creative) motivation, as a common attribution of psychological distinction of personality, is strongly questionable. But accounting for motive, as reasons why we do things, is complex. On one hand, psychoanalysis has a "depth" that has "eluded both academic psychology and behaviorism," strongly accentuating "human personality and unconscious motivation;" on the other, it says "little about rational thought processes or conscious problem-solving" (Gardner, 1984, p. 3).

4. 4. 6. *Subjectivity in Artistic Identity*

Three significant commitments in philosophical aesthetics identified in this chapter converged over time. They each maintain as popular constraints on causal explanation of the artist's subjective experience. First, the distinction of felt pleasure as an epistemological object of aesthetics; second, the distinction of aesthetic judgment from practical and other kinds of judgment; third, and proceeding from the previous two, the intuitive, unpredictable, and dispositional account of the artist as an identity. And on the basis of art explained as personal expression, theses causes are realized in, or commonly held to drive, artistic practice.

The artist's subjectivity on these accounts is either phenomenal, separate in its particularity as a reified ontology and from this inexplicable, or alternately

[78] On Eysenck's dispositional account, "geniuses and creative persons generally are thus postulated to have high scores on the personality dimension of psychoticism;" that is, he says, "a temperamental dispositional trait rendering a person more likely to succumb to a functional psychosis, given sufficient stress, and showing cognitive features similar to those of psychotic patients" (1995, p. 8). In criticism of the attribution, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi says Eysenck "has only a passing interest in creativity;" "what he cares about is psychoticism and whatever does and does not correlate with it" (1993, p. 188). So, "because some measures of divergent thinking that are usually taken to measure originality do correlate with psychoticism, to that extent he has become interested in creativity" (p. 188). But "this amount of intellectual commitment to a complex topic" Csikszentmihalyi says, "does not seem enough to carry one beyond the most superficial levels of understanding" (p. 188).

behaviourally explained. In behavioural accounts, the artist is characteristically explained as real, but irrational. And on these forms of description, artistic motivation is variously measurable in scales of a dispositional or innate pathology. From these accounts, the artistic, as a particular ‘creative’ psychology, is an accident of and driven by nature.

From its identity with the concept of creativity, the attribution of artistic personality on these forms of description limits explanation of artistic practice as causal of innovation, or creativity. That is, constraints of neurotic or pathological dispositional accounts, at best, limit understanding of the role and scope of acquired knowledge, institutional influence, and practical experience in effecting innovation. The innate or dispositional view accounting for artistic motivation in practice appears to represent an anomaly in the broader explanation of identity in practices as such. That is, there appear to be fewer accounts of endemic innate neurosis in causal accounting of other practices.

All three forms of dispositional accounts – as mysterious, special, or neurotic, reify the form of mental content and motivations as particular to art practice. The condition linking all three stereotypes lies in making artistic motive peculiar, as anomalous, in the maintenance and advancement of contemporary culture; partly valued as different, but unintegrated. Such accounts seek explanation of an ‘original’ psychological resource in the artist but default to limited conceptual mechanisms in explanation of psychological states as causal of practices. By rejecting such strategies, accounts falls outside the explanatory range of contemporary epistemology. Or, by falling within it, explanation risks accounting the artist and their practice to reinforcement of the stereotypic presuppositions.

Accounts of artistic peculiarity are not only sourced in the particulars of the history of aesthetics. There is a deeper constraint. Although interest in the mental states of artists (and other ‘creative’ identities) persists, epistemological limitation on the explanation of mental states in general ties knowledge of artistic motivation to behavioural accounts and self-reports. Regard for the validity of self-reports, as sufficient, in explanation

diminished in the 20th Century[79]. And there is general dislike of behaviourism in the arts as valid means to account for the role of mental states in the production of artistic works.

Attending on the constraints of these approaches, accounts of artistic motivation increasingly identify their explanation with the role of the unconscious. From this interest in the unconscious, and requiring method, analysis has largely employed psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious. Some constraints on the adequacy of these frameworks have been indicated. But investigation of the role of mental states, including unconscious states, as reasons for actions is importantly relevant to the study of arts as practices.

4. 5. Conclusion

This chapter, as the second part of the study, concerns the concept of visuality in philosophical aesthetics. Previously, in visual culture, the relation of viewer to image identifies, broadly, as the reading of text. Emphasis in these accounts places on the critical analysis of discourses. In contrast, the visuality of aesthetics concerns the experiential relation between (substantially) artwork, artist, and the role of the beholder. But subjectivity as a felt or qualitative relation to a particular object proves difficult to encounter epistemologically, although phenomenological accounts provide mechanisms. From idealism in various forms such accounts, like those of visual culture, risk the reduction of world to mind. The tax on disciplinary aesthetics is current isolation from mainstream epistemology.

The difficulties of the arts in education and epistemology do not diminish, but rather identify, their capacity for representing the world in ways that are of interest. So, for the place of aesthetics in curriculum, apparent lack of fit tests the epistemic constraints on what counts as valued knowledge. Eisner says that the arts play a role in the transformation of consciousness; the senses “are our first avenues to consciousness”

[79] In analytic aesthetics, concern with the mental states of artists as explanatory of their works also came strongly under attack from the ‘intentional fallacy,’ taken up briefly in the preceding chapter; see Beardsley and Wimsatt (1976).

(2002, pp. 1-2). And from this beginning with sensory experience, “work in the arts contributes to the development of complex and subtle forms of thinking;” for example, “flexibility” and a “tolerance for ambiguity” provide opportunities for “complex cognitive modes of thought” (p. 35). Interest in the “cognitive consequences of engagement in the arts” emerges in the 20th Century (p. 35). But the approach is still in the process of securing a strong identity in the “aims of art education”[80] (p. 35).

Exemplar scholars working in art history, psychology, art education and philosophy, such as Rudolph Arnheim and Nelson Goodman, counter the disposition to exclude the role of cognition in the arts (p. 35-36). But theoretical commitments in cognitive science from its inception as a research project suggest the absorption of theory from cognitive sciences to the visual arts in education is complex. And, in the study of perception and cognition there are strong differences in the explanation of representation. In part proceeding from these differences, the two opposed conceptions of visuality, as aesthetics and visual culture, emerged in visual arts and education.

To explore these concerns, the fifth chapter of the study begins by looking at the problem of ambiguity in the perception of art. Longstanding belief in the ‘deceptions’ of artistic representation affect the ethical standing of artistic accomplishment. From this starting point, the chapter proceeds to further study the difference between theories of pictorial depiction and semiotic explanation in their approaches to visuality. The ‘linguistic turn’ of the 20th Century impacts on theories of visuality and some of the debates from cognitive science are considered.

[80] The lack of theoretical foothold, Eisner says, lies in the long history of perception of the arts as an affective mode of experience “rather than cognitive” (2002, p. 35).

Chapter 5

Mind And Representation in Accounts of Visuality

5. Introduction

So far, the study sets out the different accounts of visuality in art and education, as visual culture and aesthetics. Because of their strongly different views about what is valued in teaching and learning, there is debate. Some of the debate, from the previous accounts, concerns the artefacts of interest. Aesthetics provides focus on the study of exemplary artworks. Visual culture looks to the study of imagery, as any kind of representation. Some of the debate concerns the different approaches to the study of objects of interest. Broadly, visual culture focuses on the critical investigation of power in culture. Aesthetics enquires into the role of the senses and aesthetic experience in the appreciation of art.

But the debate forms on how we make meaning from what we see. In visual culture, background discourses constitute meaning. In aesthetics, meaning constitutes from particular kinds of felt experiences. So, how we experience meaning lies at the heart of argument over visuality. In both accounts, there is ongoing interest in the explanation of mental representation, more recently from the cognitive sciences. The engagement extends on earlier work in art and education theory. Cognitive studies, from the middle of the 20th Century hypothesize new models of how mind, with its representational capacities, works. And, the 'linguistic turn' of this period significantly affects epistemology generally. In part from these developments, in the 1980s, argument emerges over visuality in the arts, prefiguring the differences between aesthetic and visual cultural frameworks in art education.

The locus of argument, in this case, concerns the perception and understanding of pictures. In the cognitive sciences, early explanatory commitments as a particular focus on language, coincide with interest from the arts concerning the making of meaning in the perception of art. Work from Nelson Goodman (1968) and Rudolph Arnheim (1974a), as exemplary of these concerns, proceeds to impact on the explanation of

visuality in visual arts and education. The main aim of this section of the study is to outline key points underlying the debate that emerged concerning representation.

To introduce the issues, the chapter sketches an initial concern with the representational ambiguity of visual art as pictures. The study proceeds from this to outline the two major explanatory paradigms of representation, as depictive and symbolic. Broadly, on the first, perceptual theorists look to the particularly visual character of pictorial representation, seeking to address whether there is a kind of pictorial or visual, as non-linguistic, thinking. As the dominant explanatory framework in aesthetics, obtaining meaning or understanding depiction here is typically characterized as 'applied' seeing.

The second form of account (drawing on earlier explanation from the study on visual culture) looks to the explanation of art as a symbol system and its mode of existence as social convention. Perception on this form of account is not direct, rather it is strongly mediated by theory, as social discourses. Art, as a symbol system on these accounts, is characterized as a language. And from this, obtaining meaning or understanding is identified with competency in 'reading' images. Following explanation of these views, the study looks at debates over mental representation from cognitive science to further understand the influence of this field's early disciplinary commitments in characterizing visuality in art and education.

5. 0. 1. *Background to Representation*

Art, from Plato, concerns the "activity of representation" (1987, Book 10, §1). That is, art represents the world to mind. Understanding the activity of representation in this way concerns knowledge of both how the mind represents the world in experience and with looking at art, how mind perceives artistic representations of the world, as pictures.

With the visual arts, the problem is how we perceive and recognize pictures, as pictures. Pictures "are so familiar, so easy to grasp and work with, that the idea that there even could be in principle any *deep* problem about understanding them" can seem absurd (Harrison, 1997, p. 11). But "their easy nature seduces us into theoretical complacency" (p. 11). Artistic representation is not simple. It appears to be, but the perceptual and

cognitive facility involved in understanding pictures make the explanation of art as representation complex.

In its longstanding role, art, as "mimesis" or imitation, deals with the appearances of the world[1] (Plato, 1987, Book 10, §1-2). Concerns with representation have traditionally formed the basis of a ongoing research interest within "optically-minded theory and practice in art" towards the biological and psychological sciences[2] (Kemp, 1990, p. 1). So, from "Alberti to Gombrich and Arnheim," engagement with the "visual aspect of painting" locates visuality in aesthetics within "the scientific terms of optics, mathematics or the physiology and psychology of perception" (van Eck and Winters, 2005, p. 3). Particularly, from the 18th Century philosophy and science systematically investigate the mental representation of phenomena (Kemp, 1990, p. 250). The capacity for representing the world in mind, or mental representation, refers to perceptual and cognitive activities by which the mind forms images and concepts.

From mid 20th Century, research from the emergent interdisciplinary cognitive studies, as science, distributes to interested fields (Bruner, 1990, p. 3). Since its inception, the enterprise "occupies itself as never before since Kant with the philosophy of mind and of language"[3] (p. 3). From this interdisciplinary work, there is a "move to conceptualize

---

[1] Some "difficulties appeared" in translation of the Greek concept of *mimesis* into Latin and Italian "from the very beginning;" acceptance of the term in the sense of *imitation* prevailed as "sufficiently vague" to encompass Aristotle's and his later medieval commentators' "understanding of poetry" (Tatarkiewicz, 2005, p. 176). But "there was an awareness that "imitation" did not simply denote the reproduction of things" (p. 176). See also however, Richard Bernheimer; on his account, the "oldest and most widespread" view of artistic representation held that imitation in art should "imitate in a literal and relentless fashion, allowing no space for a contribution by the artist, and confining the work of art to the role of an indistinguishable duplicate of its model" (1961, p. 7).

[2] In the sciences, systematic investigation of visual processes developed as "an optical tradition of considerable vigor" from early Greek philosophical enquiry and has "flourished continuously" in research enterprises ever since (Lindberg, 1981, p. ix). David Lindberg says "three broad traditions appear to contain the great bulk" of the early Greek enterprise; "a medical tradition, concerned primarily with (optical) anatomy and physiology," for "treatment of eye disease;" "a physical or philosophical tradition, devoted to questions of epistemology, psychology, and physical causation;" and finally, "a mathematical tradition, directed principally toward a geometrical explanation of the perception of space" (p. 1, parentheses added). Research and explanation of visuality in the arts draws on each of these traditions: see for example Arnheim (1974a, 1974b); Becker (1993); Brown (2001a); Gombrich (1982); Hopkins (2007); Kemp (1990); Lamarque (2006); Wollheim (1980, 1991a).

[3] Cognitive psychologist, Jerome Bruner describes the "profound revolution" of cognitive science in the 1950s: its primary aim he says "was to discover and describe formally the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what meaning-making processes were implicated;" its goal was not in reforming behaviourism but in replacing it (1990,

mental experience as an exclusively linguistic process" (Esrock, 1998, p. 463). And from its beginnings, the research from cognitive studies significantly impacts on the explanation of representation in aesthetics; paradigmatically from this period, Nelson Goodman's work "focuses attention on the syntactic and semantic features of pictures" (Schwartz, 2001, p. 707).

In art education, the various explanations of mental representation are purposeful, typically seeking to establish or support value claims for the "techniques" and "traditions" of arts in curriculum[4] (Brown, 2001). In the last decades, "different ways of valuing the arts emphasize different aspects of their knowledge structure by highlighting either their cognitive uniqueness or their generalizability"[5] (p. 86). In recent years theorists more frequently seek a concept of those cognitive abilities the arts may distinctively provide for (Efland, 2002, p. 157).

5. 1. Pictures and Psychology

Historically, the "plausible rendering of nature" as a mimetic activity "saw the evolution of art mainly as a technical progress" (Gombrich, 1982, p. 11). But "as a very complex and indeed very elusive affair," the "imitation of visual reality" Ernst Gombrich says, "demands a psychological explanation"[6] (p. 12). Addressing the "puzzle" of how "gifted painters" can accomplish successful naturalistic works explores the "relation

---

pp. 2-3). The emergent science "focused on the symbolic activities that human beings employed in constructing and in making sense not only of the world, but of themselves" and a further "aim was to prompt psychology to join forces with its sister interpretive disciplines in the humanities and social sciences" (p. 2).

[4] In visual arts education, debate over mental representation significantly impacts in discourse on the marginalized role of art in education (Brown, 2001). Broadly in advocacy, "there are three contemporary arguments supporting claims for the importance of education in the arts;" claims of "inherent value," claims of "instrumental value," and claims of "unified knowledge," in which "the properties of individual member arts are unified under a number of over-arching dispositional concepts" (p. 85). The "two most important of these distinguishing concepts in unified knowledge claims are the "creative" and the "aesthetic"" (p. 85). The "deepest inroads into (the arts') marginalization has been made by reconception of their cognitive structure" (p. 88, parentheses added). But for these value claims to sustain over time, a more complex engagement with the role of cognition is required in art education. Arthur Efland says, "if every domain is cognitive, then being classified as cognitive no longer confers status" (2002, p. 157).

[5] See also Efland (2002, p. 11).

[6] The history of interest in the psychology of art is longstanding; see Kemp, (1990). Aristotle "discusses in his *Poetics* why 'imitation' should give (people) pleasure," attributing such pleasure to our "inborn love of learning" (Gombrich, 1982, p. 12, parentheses added). So, "as we look we learn and infer what each is;" "the pleasure, in other words is one of recognition" (p. 12).

between visual perception and pictorial representation" (p. 12). Additionally, the purposes of works of art do not limit to skilful reproduction as representation. There is expressive content extending on, or "transcending," the strictly representational aspects of works (Efland, 2002, p. 5).

Artworks "are not about concrete objects so much as about what can be thought or felt and must be apprehended inwardly" that is, "they express aspects of experience, states of mind, meanings, emotions, subjective things" (Parsons, 1989, p. 70). This might be "obvious to us, though we may be unclear exactly what kind of things these (states of mind, etc.) are" (Parsons, 1989, p. 70, parentheses added). The density of meanings available to the beholder in the experience of artworks contrasts with the transparency and precision of constraints on knowing in other subjects.

5. 1. 1. *The Problem of Meaning*

The "thickest, densest, and most notationally inflexible subjects are the arts," whereas "the thinnest subjects of all are mathematics and written language" (Brown, 2001, p. 86). That is, "because the rational syntax and tautological semantics is so transparent," mathematical knowledge is "based on a universally applicable system of notation" (p. 86). Their semantic thinness means "mathematics and written knowledge can be used by other fields without imposing separate meanings on their specialized concepts and ideas" (p. 86).

In contrast, "the "notational systems of the arts have more dedicated uses;" "the arts trade in singular outcomes and original solutions that, while valuable in themselves, are not so easily bent into use by other fields" (p. 86). And, "while the arts rehearse significant personal and cultural values," Neil Brown says, "these values are satisfied in idiosyncratic ways through images and stories, rather than general claims about reality and truth"[7] (p. 86). So, "the arts benefit less from the precise forms of explanation that notational languages provide" (p. 86).

[7] But, on the particular visual character of the "fictional truths" of pictorial representation in comparison with representation in language such as novels see, for example, Walton (1987).

5. 1. 2. *The Problem of Artistic Knowledge*

The precision or disambiguity of explanation in notational languages differs from "the kind of knowledge (in this case, visual) arts represent" (p. 87, parentheses added). For example in the previous chapter, from Kant, there is contrast between the transparent explanatory logic of the representations, as explanations, from science and the variation from this logical mode in the representations of art. Accomplished artworks are ambiguous Brown says, often concealing the means of their production (2004). Effacing "all trace of its production" artistic depiction can in this way effect a "plunge into unreality" (Hobson, 1982, p. 3). That is, in the experience of art, its medium can be forgotten. And from this, artistic virtuosity is identified as causal of disrupting clear boundaries between the representation and its objects[8] (pp. 3-4). There can be mistrust and criticism of art's ambiguity in representation, its "illusion," as something opposed to truth[9] (pp. 3-4). But artistic "virtuosity" is "born out of the poetic intuition that the world will not reveal itself voluntarily" (Brown, 2004, p. 31).

The accomplished production of artistic artefacts conceals the practical and theoretical knowledge engaged (Brown, 2004; Hobson, 1982). That is, accomplishment, as excellence or virtuosity in the production of artistic works, is not transparent (Brown, 2004). The invisibility (and inscrutability) of the artist's mental operations and, in their actions, skilful negotiation of the particular are constraints on the explanation of artistic

---

[8] The argument has been significant historically; the resemblance between "pictures and sculptures" and "what they represent" led to "fear with similarity-based representation" of a "substitutive error," in which the representation "ceases to be a representation" and "comes to be seen" as the entity or phenomena depicted, risked for example, with icons of faith (Sakamoto, 1998, p. 144). Constraints on the reproduction of certain images from this fear typically limit to the visual arts; linguistic representations are not "considered prone to the same kind of representational or substitutive errors because they do not purport to resemble the objects they stand for" (p. 144).

[9] There is a long pedigree of argument or distrust in art for its lies "that resemble reality" (Brown, 2004, p. 21). The purpose of mimesis as imitation, on the "oldest and most widespread" view, was held to be "the deception of the unwary, who are induced to take the artefact for the natural object from which it has been copied" (Bernheimer, 1961, p. 7). And artists "have never been forgiven for corrupting the innocence of perception" with their skilful illusions (Brown, 2004, p. 31). Concerns for the affective power of art direct towards this visual 'trickery,' as the deception of the senses; see Gombrich on artistic accomplishment of the "tricks" of pictorial representation (1982, p. 12). From their representational ambiguities, artworks can inspire "strong feelings" (quote from Bloom, 2004, p. 66). On the experience of felt, including emotional, responses to both representational and nonrepresentational works, see Elkins (2001). In aesthetics, the "assumption" that judgments about artworks "are grounded on experiences located in the affective side of our nature" is older than Kant (Osborne, 1979, p. 135).

artefacts and their causes. The work of the artist, in the traditional structures of Western epistemology, challenges ethics[10].

5. 1. 3. *Artistic Virtuosity and Representation*

In artworks, pictorial devices of artistic representation can provide "highly ambiguous" visual cues in ways that are "hard to disentangle" (Gombrich, 1982, p. 39). On illusion in works of art, Gombrich says, "we prefer suggestion to representation, we have adjusted our expectations to enjoy the very act of guessing, of projecting"[11] (1961, p. 385). Interest in and valuing of ambiguous pictorial qualities extends from concern with their representational to their expressive features (p. 359). In their ambiguity, works of art provoke engagement with subtlety, imagination and the interpretation of meaning, for example, from metaphor (Eisner, 2002, p. 35; Efland, 2002, p. 152; Empson, 1961). But from the conceptual beginnings of art, the technical or "crafty virtuosity" of artists and designers effects perceptual and ethical "paradoxes which beset the conventional production of knowledge" (Brown, 2004, p. 31). There is mistrust in this ambiguity because art functions "in that area of flow… between the merely subjective and the intersubjective" (Hobson, 1982, p. 19).

There is a further problem attending on this mistrust, concerning arts in education. Ambiguity is valued and is part of arts discourse. But in (developmentally) earlier

---

[10] On the diminished ethical value of practical knowledge in contrast to theoretical (from its history as pure reason) knowledge from early distinctions in Greek culture, and its ongoing cost to education in practices, see Brown (2004). Since the early Greeks, "the accomplished artists and craftsmen are considered to be poor models of virtue" (p. 20). But the problem of ethics in the case of art does not limit to argument against the technical and conceptual power of the artist. From Plato, there is no true or real knowledge for the artist in the representation of objects of phenomenal experience. Depicting "mere phenomenal appearance" as "colour and form" does not provide "direct experience" of objects in the world (Plato, 1987, Book 10, §1). Plato marks an increasing distance from their "grasp of truth" ordered by "use, manufacture, and representation;" the "artist who makes a likeness of a thing knows nothing about the reality but only about the appearances" (Book 10, §1). From this lack of direct experience, the painter is unable to "know whether or not his pictures are good or right" (Book 10, §1). These constraints on artistic virtuosity, as practice, make it "inconsistent with the contemplation of ideal truth" (Brown, 2004, p. 20). The "technical efficiency" of artistic and craft practices in illusion still carries the early "epistemological ambiguity inherent in the representation of knowledge" (p. 19).

[11] And design fields make use of this interest; "while not a virtue in itself" the concept of ambiguity is seen as a strategic "resource for design" (Gaver, Beaver, and Benford, 2003, p. 233). Ambiguity of various types can be helpful for example by interrupting over-determined interpretation "in terms of an established discourse" so in this way, ambiguity is "useful in spurring people to approach a particular system with an open mind" and in the context of technological genres, for example, "to question the assumptions they have" (p. 238).

educational environments, as the introduction and staged representation of epistemology, ambiguous and complex phenomena are challenging to encounter and, from this, not easy for teaching and learning. The arts "have a tendency to misrepresent their level of complexity, making them seem simpler and more regular than they are," Arthur Efland says; "when instruction misrepresents the level of ambiguity that may be characteristic of a work of art, its possible meanings are lost to the learner"[12] (2002, p. 11).

The historical disposition to criticism of art for its representational ambiguities is problematic. Marian Hobson marks the "expulsion of illusion" in such critique as failure to account for "the dialectic between representation and form, between imaginative tissue and awareness of production" (1982, pp. 4-5). In its elements, Hobson's dialectic nominates, I propose, relationships between representation and depiction on one hand, and interpretive capacities and recognition in the experience of art, on the other[13]. The locus of argument over visuality in aesthetics derives from strongly different accounts of these concerns.

5. 2. Representation and Depiction

Kendall Walton says, "one way to "represent" something is to make a picture of it" (1987, p. 277). And pictorial representation is identified with depiction[14] (Budd, 2004; Walton, 2004). So, depiction is "one species of representation" (Walton, 2004, p. 349). Another species, or mode, of representation "is to describe it or refer to it in words" (1987, p. 277). Each of these modes has "unique constraints and unique possibilities"

---

[12] The problem has, I think, something to do with time spent with domains of knowledge. Related to the cognitively demanding character of the arts, on the need for "time in the school timetable" for learning in the arts, see Arts Education (1995, p. 86).

[13] I employ these familiar, as related, concepts to explain Hobson's dialectical composition. Use of the term *depiction* in these contexts assumes or argues "that there is a specially pictorial form of representation," and "its use is increasingly standard in philosophical discussion (of visual arts, music and literature) of this topic" (Hopkins, 1995, p. 425, parentheses added). The term *recognition* draws from, among others', Gombrich's reference to recognition (1982, p. 12). Recognition, Gombrich says "is clearly an act of remembering," but he makes a distinction; "it must not be confused with that other aspect of memory; our power of recall" (p. 12).

[14] Pictures, Malcolm Budd says, "are a distinct kind of representation" and "it is definitive of a picture that it represents" its object "by depicting it" (2004, p. 383). Depiction, on Walton's account "comprises, roughly, representation by the "perceptual" arts" for example, "representational painting and sculpture" (2004, p. 357).

(Eisner, 1998, p. 46). In aesthetics, there is philosophical interest in "what might count as *pictorial* thought?" (Harrison, 1997, p. 4).

To clarify: there is "a very great deal of writing and thinking about pictorial art," which "gives the curious impression of avoiding the pictorial itself in exchange for an attention to what non-pictorial topics are 'about'" (p. 7). That is, "what narratives they illustrate, what values we may suppose the artist who painted them had with respect to what the paintings depict" (p. 7). And, "such discussion is really concerned with the literary envelope of the pictorial"[15] (p. 7). But, "the specific interest of the visual arts is visual" (Baxandall, 1979, p. 455). Here, although "the form of our language may be informative – "there is a flow of movement from the left towards the centre" – its action is likely to be a sort of verbal pointing" (p. 455). So, "what distinguishes it from manual pointing is mainly that along with direction ("left to centre") goes a category of visual interest ("flow of movement")" (p. 455).

The "question for pictures generally and thus for pictorial art" Harrison says, is "whether thought might be exercised in, and communicated by, pictures as such, not as they may rely on non-pictorial assumptions, but in their own right" (1997, p. 4).

There is a difficulty however; "philosophy is a predominantly a linguistically centred discipline" and there is an assumption "that questions about communication and of the quality of thought that may be communicated must be questions about language, since language is alone the proper domain of meaning" (p. 4). So, "if there were such a thing as specifically pictorial communication, either pictures would turn out to be a kind of language (which seems implausible)"[16] or, Harrison says, "pictorial communication

---

[15] Andrew Harrison says, while "of great importance," it is often "as if there were merely a running admission that 'of course,' these are rather excellently made pictures" (1997, p. 7). So, "a respect for skill – admittedly of a very high order – becomes all that is left of a respect for the pictorial" (p. 7). This result "will be inevitable if purely pictorial thought is either non-existent or radically elusive to any possible theory of communication" (p. 7).

[16] It "is often suggested" that "art is a language and it is just in virtue of this fact that art and literature are unified" (Passmore, 1972, p. 578). The "word "language" is very broadly used" and "if one is prepared to speak of a "language" whenever there is a method of conveying something – a feeling, a piece of information, a promise, a threat – then painting can serve as a language" for example, conveying "an impression of distance by a gradation of colours" (p. 578). But, John Passmore says, "it is not a language in the sense of which English is a language, with a vocabulary and a grammar;" there is no "lexicography

would not be concerned with the conveyance of 'thought' in any genuine sense of the word" (p. 4). That is, "if pictures communicate, that they do will turn out to be not a 'cognitive,' but a 'causal' matter" (p. 4).

To obliquely illustrate the notion of causal here: Baxandall says, "one of the art historian's specific faculties is to find words to indicate the character of shapes, colours, and organizations of them;" but "these words are not so much descriptive as demonstrative" (1979, p. 455). That is, "if my purpose is not to describe but rather to indicate (a) to someone who has seen it (b) such kinds of visual interest as I am finding in it just now," then "my blunt words" for example, ""long," "thin," "shiny," "green,"" etc., "are sharpened for me because what I have done is to instigate, or offer to instigate, a guided act of inspection of the particular object by the hearer, and he knows really that was my intention" (p. 456).

So, "neither of us expects him to think, if he does elect to follow my prompting, "Oh, not red then": rather he will elaborate and refine my category "green" for himself" (p. 456). Baxandall says, "of course the matter is more complicated than this" (p. 456). But, "the immediate point" is the "use of language invites the receiver to supply a degree of precision to broad categories by a reciprocal reference between the word and the available object;" the use of language is ostensive, or demonstrative[17] (p. 456).

---

or a grammar of form" (p. 578). There is "no such thing;" "there could, of course, be a dictionary of iconographic symbols," but "form has neither a vocabulary nor a grammar" (p. 578). So, to describe something as a "*grammar of film*" for instance is wrong: "what counts as "grammar" is nothing more than a set of conventional habits or precepts:" Passmore says, "grammar is, of course, itself such a set but it is more than that – it determines what is syntactically meaningful and what is meaningless, as the so-called grammar of the film does not" (p. 578). What the expression actually refers to is "the established conventions" of the medium (p. 579). The "gross over-extension of the concepts of "language" and "grammar" is one of the principal sources of the intellectual confusions characteristic of our age" (p. 579).

[17] But "direct descriptive terms can cover very little of the interest;" "it is not vacuous to point to Michelangelo's *Moses* as "square" – but the fit between sense and reference is now becoming very loose," and the listener "must supply a great deal" of "interpretive tact" (Baxandall, 1979, p. 456). Baxandall's essay (elegantly) continues on the obliqueness of art-critical language, to frame "three rough divisions or moods" of reference (p. 457). The work has been revised and republished in Baxandall (1999).

5. 2. 1. *The Pictorial and Symbolic Models of Representation*

Discussion of analogy, similarity, and distinction between pictures and language as modes of communication is not new in art discourse[18]. For example, the "painting's own momentum in representing its subject, its control over aspects of the world which it abstracts and combines – and which it transforms through its own procedures," Podro says, "has been the recurrent theme of critical commentary from Alberti and Vasari to the present" (1987, p. 3). And "among the several ways Alberti conceived this transformation was on analogy with the co-ordination of parts within the structure of a sentence"[19] (p. 3).

From previously in the study of visual culture, since mid-20th Century there is discourse of a kind of identity between pictures and language. And, broadly, from the "claim that thought relies on *propositional representations*" there is argument that all mental representation, including imagery, can be characterized as either linguistic or languagelike (quote from Galaburda et al, 2002, p. 3). The claim has been influential in semiotic theories (see for example, Daddesio, 1995, pp. 55-57); so it is an important argument in discussion of visuality. The point is much debated across many disciplines.

---

[18] The "distinction between natural signs and conventional signs stems originally from Plato's *Cratylus*;" "but the classic exposition of it appears in Augustine's treatise *On Christian Doctrine* (Hyman, 2006, p. 161). On Plato's distinction between *mimesis*, as "representation," and *diegysis*, as "simple narrative," see Danto (1982, p. 1). Some of Arthur Danto's discussion is helpful here: he describes Socrates' (from Plato's *Republic*, 394) "three classes of poetic representation:" first, "mimesis" as "tragedy and comedy;" second, work "in which the poet speaks in his own person" for example lyric poetry; third, works employing "both methods" (p. 1). So, "Homer will at times describe what a man is doing," for instance, "pleading to have his daughter returned to him; and sometimes he will give us the very words the father uses in pleading for his daughter's return" and in this case, "an elocutionist, like Ion the Rhapsode" will move from the "narrative voice" (as diegysis) "to mimesis" (as imitation) "speaking now in the father's voice, and in such a way, presumably, as to stir vicarious paternal feelings in the breasts of his auditors" (pp. 1-2).

[19] Podro's comments bear on the role of practical reasoning in artistic actions; he describes the mental activity engaged in the "expression of practical thought with materials" (from Harrison, 1978, p. 184; cited in Podro, 1987, p. 3). In Vasari's commentaries, "the sense of *disegno*, the mind's grasp of things" is "realized in the fluent delineation of them" (Podro, 1987, p. 3). In Raphael's drawing of *Madonna and Child with Book*, for example, the particular rhythm and complexity of form, foreshortening, and articulation are all connected; accomplished in the work "without loss of its own graphic impulse" (p. 3). This "sustained impulse" Podro says, "implies that all these details have been held in mind and the drawing has subsumed them within its own continuous movement" (p. 3). But the "thought in drawing and painting may not always be manifested by fluency," rather, "it may involve an accumulation of adjustments, self-monitoring, self-revising" (p. 3). So, understanding "how the maker of the picture made his picture becomes a way of seeing how he attended" (Harrison, 1978, p. 184; cited in Podro, 1987, p. 3). The "communicative effect of such devices" Harrison says, "can be to relate the observer's attention in different ways to the evidences of the physical act of painting and what is shown to have been seen, or may be supposed as having been seen" (1978, p. 184).

In part as a result of this debate, in contemporary discourse there are two "seemingly conflicting paradigms" informing the "conception and study of picture perception"[20] (Schwartz, 2001, p. 707).

In brief, the "dominant paradigm" typically "claims that seeing a pictorial representation of an object is, with qualifications, like seeing the object itself" (p. 707). On this account, pictorial representation is best characterized "when, as in trompe l'oeil paintings, viewers can not tell the picture, the stand *in* or substitute, from the real thing"[21] (p. 707). That is, "the picture, being a geometrically sanctioned projection of its object, resembles it, or otherwise serves as a mimetic surrogate, "*re*-presenting" what it depicts" (in-text quotation from Danto, 1982; Schwartz, 2001, p. 707). This paradigm is "one especially favoured by vision theorists" (Schwartz, 2001, p. 707). The "differences among vision theorists' accounts of picture perception largely reflect differences in their approaches to non-pictorial vision" (p. 707). Accounts of this kind, criticized in visual culture, are characteristically referred to as perceptual accounts.

Alternatively, and from the previous study of semiotics in the account of visual culture, the "symbolic model" focuses "attention on the syntactic and semantic features of pictures;" "on this account, pictures are importantly allied with other forms of representation, including languages, maps, and music notation" (p. 707). The following sections of the study outline, in broad terms, the central commitments of each paradigm concerning distinctions or otherwise between words and pictures as representations.

---

[20] There are many "philosophical theories of representation;" but "the centrality of representation within the pictorial arts means that any answer that is not supported by a theory, moreover a theory that meshes at once with a general account of perception and with broad cultural practices," Wollheim says, "will not do" (1998, p. 217). Wollheim's claim to a required relation (in theorizing representation) between perception and cultural practices is relevant: the concept of a 'language of thought' from cognitive science is taken up in the development of semiotic theories; see for example, Daddesio (1995, p. 55-56). In description and criticism of Fodor's theory, Daddesio says, the "innate linguistic faculty (of LOT) takes the same form as the languages we speak;" "to understand cognition we simply have to study language and to explain how we are able to learn language, it suffices to invoke the "language of thought" (p. 56, parentheses added).

[21] More carefully, because the point is important, Schwartz's statement of qualifications on the claim matters; on his perceptual (as causal) account, Harrison says, the claim "that pictures function by presenting us with illusions of what they depict would seem on the face of it to be incompatible with the theory of easy pictures" (1997, p. 18). That is, "to directly recognize both that something *is* a picture and what it is a picture *of* is incompatible with mistaking the picture for something else, namely, what it depicts" (p. 18).

5. 2. 2. *Perceptual Theories of Depiction*

Since "we *look* at words as well as pictures" and "representations of both kinds are for the eyes," Walton asks, "How is pictorial representation more *visual* than verbal representation?" (1987, p. 277). He notes "it is often said that pictorial representation is somehow "natural," whereas verbal representation is merely conventional" (p. 277). The "traditional accounts of this naturalness speak of resemblances between pictures and what they picture"[22] (p. 277). That is, "a picture of a dog looks like a dog" ("it is said"), whereas "the word "dog" means dog only because there happens to be a rule or agreement or convention, in the English language, to that effect" (p. 277).

The "popular, common sense 'theory' of pictures" is "that they are *easy*" (Harrison, 1997, p. 11). But the "easy nature of the majority of pictures – that we can construe them apparently just by looking – is the central puzzle about the pictorial" (p. 11). Harrison says, "it is not that easy pictures are easy to make" (p. 11). That is, "most hand-made pictures require a skill beyond most of us," although "most of us can make a sketch that will work well at a pinch" (p. 11). But, "they are easy to *recognize*, both *as pictures* and in terms of *what they depict*" (p. 11). So, "we understand what pictures represent almost without effort," and "little or no learning is needed to interpret" them (McIver Lopes, 1998, p. 139). Dominic McIver Lopes says "this is a fact about our *competence* with pictures" (p. 139). In this way, "all pictures inform us about things by *causing* us to have visual experiences "as of" those things" (p. 139, emphasis added). And "this fact about the *phenomenology* of pictures also sets them apart from other representational media such as language" (p. 139).

Harrison points to "three underlying assumptions here:" first "is our normal ability to recognize pictures, to easily see what they are pictures of, far outstrips our normal capacity to make them;" second, "our ability to recognize pictures seems to be closely tied to" and is "perhaps even an aspect of," he says, "our ability to recognize whatever it may be that they depict" (1997, pp. 11-12, emphasis deleted). And "in both of these ways pictures, regarded as ways of communication seem (certainly for adults) to

[22] The rejection of representation basing in resemblance (as a family of theories) is the key criticism from Nelson Goodman on perceptual theories of representation; I set out an outline of the theories but do not attend to the debate directly.

contrast dramatically with our capacities with sentences" (p. 12). That is, "in general the sentences we can understand are of the same kind and complexity as the sentences we can produce for the understanding of others" (p. 12). But it is "not so for pictures: our inability to make a Titian-type, or a Vermeer-type picture has little or no connection with our capacities to recognize it"[23] (p. 12).

So deriving from these, "the third assumption" is "that pictures *achieve their function* not via some process of understanding or interpretation on the beholder's part but *causally*" (p. 12). Suppose, Harrison says, "that to respond properly to a picture required that we had to acquire rules not only for recognition, but for their production;" "this does seem to be so for sentences, and indeed it seems to be central to the idea of understanding" (p. 12). In this way, "pictures of trees belong with trees rather than with sentences about trees" (p. 12). So, "to recognize the former is to recognize the latter," as a "form of imaginative experience;" "what we 'see in'[24] the marked surface is, when we get it right, how the picture-maker came to 'see' the subject of his picture" (pp. 12-13).

5. 2. 3. *The Emergence of Argument Against Perceptual or Causal Accounts of Depiction*

Perceptual accounts identify as the dominant paradigm in theories of picture perception (Schwartz, 2001). But, the primary alternative explanation emerged in symbolic accounts of picture perception, advocated "most forcefully by Nelson Goodman" (p. 707). From previously, understanding of how mind makes meaning was shifting from

[23] On this form of causal account "picture perception is a matter of vision, whereas comprehending languages and other symbol systems depends on cognition" (Schwartz, 2001, p. 708). See Schwartz (2001) for difficulties with the "distinction between the visual and cognitive" from this view and comparison with the "symbolic model" of picture perception (p. 708).

[24] The work of Richard Wollheim is exemplary of (roughly) this model of account. Wollheim says that one of the "fundamental capacities that the artist relies upon the spectator to have and to use" is "*seeing-in*" (1991a, p. 104). Seeing-in, as it is now called, "is a distinct kind of perception" that is "triggered by the presence within the field of vision of a differentiated surface" ("not all differentiated surfaces will have this effect") (p. 105). But, "when the surface is right, then an experience with a certain phenomenology will occur, and it is this phenomenology that is distinctive about seeing-in" (p. 105). This "distinctive phenomenological feature" Wollheim calls "'two-foldedness,' because when seeing-in occurs, two things happen" (p. 105). These two things "are distinguishable but also inseparable;" that is, "they are two aspects of a single experience, they are not two experiences" (p. 105). Wollheim's "two-foldedness" consists in: "I am visual aware of the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else" (p. 105). So, "I look" for instance "at a stained wall," and "at one and the same time I am visually aware of the wall, and I recognize a naked boy in front of a darker ground;" "in virtue of this experience I can be said to see the boy in the wall" (p. 105).

the development of cognitive science in the second half of the 20th Century (Bruner, 1990). Theories of cognition in this period were an influence on, and influenced by, the 'linguistic turn' (Daddesio, 1995, p. 55-56). As well, from the 1960s, Rudolph Arnheim challenges the distinction between thinking and perception, saying "no thought processes seem to exist that cannot be found to operate, at least in principle, in perception;" that is, "visual perception is visual thinking" (1974a, 1974b; cited in Eisner, 2002, p. 36).

Goodman, from the same period maintains and explicitly extends language to perceptual processes. Criticizing the aesthetic attitude as "passive contemplation" he says, "we have to read the painting as well as the poem," understanding "that aesthetic experience is dynamic rather than static"[25] (cited in Eisner, 2002, p. 37; Goodman, 1972). The aesthetic attitude on Goodman's view, is "restless, searching, testing;" "less attitude than action" (cited in Eisner, 2002, p. 37). Goodman's, Arnheim's and others' views on the understanding of art as a cognitive, and from this, (on Goodman's account) languagelike activity, help reshape the study of art in visual arts and education (see for example, Brown, 1989a, p.29).

From the 1950s on, theorists such as Arnheim (1974a), Goodman (1976), and Susanne Langer (1974) provide "universalist psycholinguistic models of thinking" (Brown, 2001, p. 88). On Goodman's analysis, no "special rules" exist "pertaining to artistic symbol systems or to symbol systems used artistically," that is, "no symbol system is inherently artistic or nonartistic" (Gardner, 1990, p. 9). Rather, psycholinguistic theories attempt to describe artistic or aesthetic knowing on the basis of values. Goodman "rejects the attempt to distinguish science and art by characterising science as literal, cognitive, and emotionally neutral, while considering art as metaphoric, expressive, and

[25] Arnheim also emphasizes the activity of cognition in perception; he examines the distinction in visual experience, between "passive reception and active perceiving" ("contained even in elementary visual experience") (1974a, p. 14). The "world casts its reflection on the mind, and this reflection serves as raw material to be scrutinized, sifted, reorganized, and stored" (p. 14). That is, the "given world is only the scene on which the most characteristic aspect of perception takes place," but "through that world roams the glance, directed by attention, focusing the narrow of sharpest vision now on this, now on that spot" and so on; "this eminently active performance is what is truly meant by visual perception" (p. 14). From this activity, Arnheim "(sees) no way of withholding the name of "thinking" from what goes on in perception" (p. 14).

lacking in cognitive value" (Margalit, 1998, p. 320). Rather, Goodman "claims that works of art, like science, present views of the world that can provide right insights, information, and knowledge" (p. 320). This repositioning of art is important. The "universalist credo of visual literacy" for instance, is characteristic of the educational focus on "the instrumentalist proposition that the arts serve cognition" in psycholinguistic models (Brown, 2001, p. 88).

In arts education, the significant impact of cognitive theories emerges when the arts reposition "alongside other disciplines as a symbolic system of thought" (p. 88). Exemplar of the model, Goodman, as a constructivist, holds that "there is no ready-made world independent of language" to which "different versions of the world" can "be compared" (Margalit, 1998, p. 319).

5. 2. 4. *Symbolic Theories of Pictorial Representation*

The "aesthetic realm" on Goodman's (and others') cognitive account is a "symbol system" and from this, "all its features are syntactic or semantic ones, rather than causal features such as the effect of the work on the observer" (p. 321). Characteristically, this "family of theories" is called "semiotic" (Wollheim, 1998, p. 218). Semiotic accounts "have in common that they ground representation in a system of rules or conventions that link the pictorial surface, or parts of it, with things in the world" (p. 218).

On perceptual or causal accounts of picture perception, "causation and resemblance are generally held to be natural relations, which exist independently of human custom or convention" (Hyman, 2006, p. 162). Here, pictures are "classified as natural signs by philosophers who accept the resemblance theory or the illusion theory, in some form" (p. 162). This is because "the resemblance theory claims that a picture depicts the object it resembles;" "the illusion theory claims that a picture depicts the objects whose effect on the senses resembles the effect it has itself" (p. 162). But "when twentieth-century philosophers defend the claim that pictures are conventional signs" (in symbol theories), "they mean that semantic conventions, rather than resemblances or illusions explain how pictures represent" (p. 162).

Semiotic accounts, like perceptual accounts, vary. But "the most vociferous" Wollheim says, "model the rules of representation upon the rules of language"[26] (p. 218). In semiotic accounts, "the grasp of representational meaning is fundamentally an interpretive, not a perceptual activity"[27] (p. 218). In art educational discourse at least, criticism from advocates of semiotic approaches (characteristic of visual culture studies) more recently eclipses discussion of perceptual and psychological accounts of depiction.

5. 3. Background to Cognitive Accounts of Mental Representation in the Arts

Goodman's account of art emerges in the context of the post-war development of a new "perspective" in psychology and other disciplines, as cognitive studies, later distributing as a variety of cognitive sciences[28] (see Bruner, 1990, p. 3; quote from Hunt, 1989, p. 603). Goodman was among the early researchers in these studies and was an exponent "of the new constructivism" (Bruner, 1990, p. 3). From the inception of the "enterprise," the role of language is central (p. 3). In the 1960s, cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner, for example, claims the notion of a "stage-like change from thinking and representing in terms of images ("iconically") to thinking and representing more discursively ("symbolically")" (Keil, 1989, p. 17).

Bruner's, Goodman's, and others' concerns with language in this period were part of a broader trend in epistemology generally. The "emergence of modern mathematical logic" had "a profound effect on epistemology in general" and "some philosophers began to apply insights of logic to the philosophy of mind" (Churchland, 1989a, p. 252).

---

[26] Although descriptions vary, the rules of language play a paradigmatic role in these accounts. More moderately, Robert Schwartz says, for example, "the symbolic paradigm does stress that pictures, as representations, function *like* languages," but "it does not claim they *are* linguistic symbols" (2001, p. 707).

[27] Refer Chapter 2, on visual culture to provide further on interpretation in semiotic accounts of representation.

[28] Cognitive science "is an attempt to unify views of thought developed by studies in psychology, linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, computer science, and the neurosciences" (Hunt, 1989, p. 603). From the 1970s the "close relation" between research laboratories ("with some overlap of faculty and students") in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cognitive psychology became institutionalized "under the banner of 'cognitive science'" (Simon, 1979, p. 366). More recently, the MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences classifies the cognitive sciences (as domains) into philosophy, psychology, neurosciences, computational intelligence, linguistics and language, and culture, cognition, and evolution (Wilson and Keil (Eds.) (2001).

These philosophers "began to think that representations might usefully be modeled on sentences, and the relations between them could be characterized in terms of logic" (p. 252). So, "oversimplifying, one could then think of the mind as essentially a kind of logic machine that operates on sentences" (p. 252). From this approach, there is a persistent theoretical relation between mental representation defined as languagelike and the computational modeling of mind[29].

Definitive of cognitive psychology from the beginning is the "modeling of human cognition as information processing"[30] (Simon, 1979, p. 364). From this modeling, the "symbol processing approach views an intelligent agent as an information processor which receives input from the environment, processes the information, that is, manipulates symbols, and produces some output;" "therefore it has been called the *information processing approach*" (Pfeifer, 1996, p. 253). On the symbol processing

---

[29] See Churchland (1989a, p. 252). Thomas Daddesio (1995) also reflects on the trend: There is "a second carryover from the linguistic turn, the wide-spread attempt to impose the structure of formal logic on thought, meaning, language, and rationality" (p. 55). The "clearest and most controversial formulation of the thesis of the essential propositionality of cognition is to be found in Jerry Fodor's "language of thought"" (Daddesio, 1995, p. 56; see Fodor, 1975). Daddesio says, "Fodor takes a typically cognitivist stance in countenancing a system of representations for the mediation of perception, language, and reasoning;" "his next move is to argue that "the language of thought may be very like a natural language. It may be that the resources of the inner code are rather directly represented in the resources of the codes we use for communication"" (cited p.56; from Fodor 1975, p. 156). Fodor, on Daddesio's view, "does not truly depart from the linguistic turn but instead pushes its premises to their ultimate consequences" (p. 56). Jerry Fodor says, the "defining project" of the early work of cognitive science was "to examine a theory, largely owing to Turing, that cognitive mental processes are operations defined on syntactically structured mental representations that are much like sentences" (2001, p. 4). The "proposal was to use the hypothesis that mental representations are languagelike to explain certain pervasive and characteristic properties of cognitive states and processes" ("for example, that the former (states) are productive and systematic, and that the latter (processes) are, by and large, truth preserving") (p. 4, in-text parentheses added). "Roughly," Fodor says, "the systematicity and productivity of thought were supposed to trace back to the compositionality of mental representations, which in turn depends on their syntactic constituent structure" (p. 4). And "the tendency of mental processes to preserve truth was to be explained by the hypothesis that they are computations, where by stipulation a computation is a causal process that is syntactically driven" (p. 4). But, on rejecting Fodor's attribution re Turing, see Wilks, (2003, p. 322). On criticism of the "claim that thought relies on *propositional representations*," as the sole mode of mental representation or 'language of thought,' see Galaburda et al (2002).

[30] On cognitive psychology's computational modeling or simulation of psychological processes as "information processing psychology," Herbert Simon says, "the simulation models of the 1950s were offspring of the marriage between ideas that had emerged from symbolic logic and cybernetics, on the one side, and Würzburg and Gestalt psychology, on the other" (1979, p. 364). So, "from logic and cybernetics was inherited the idea that information transformation and transmission can be described in terms of the behavior of formally described symbol manipulating systems;" "from Würzburg and Gestalt psychology were inherited the ideas that long-term memory is an organization of directed associations" and "that problem solving is a process of selective goal-oriented search" (pp. 364-365). But, "it was 10 years or more" before computer simulation models "had much impact on the mainstream of experimental psychology" (p. 365).

view, “thinking and intelligence (are seen) as akin to a computer performing formal operations on symbols” (Bredo, 1994, p. 23, parentheses added). By the 1980s, in the cognitive sciences “the concept of representation has become almost inextricably bound to the concept of symbol systems” and “this conflation of concepts is nowhere more prevalent than in descriptions of “internal representations”” (Kosslyn and Hatfield, 1984, p. 1019).

The “symbol-processing view” assumes the world is represented by the knower “in symbols formed and manipulated by the mind” (Efland, 2002, p. 53). That is, in symbol-processing accounts, “mind is generally conceived to be inside the head” and “symbols in the head then model objects in the external world” (Bredo, 1994, p. 24). But, from the 1990s in art education, symbol processing accounts from cognitive sciences are criticized as “less congenial to the arts” for their “tendencies to *de-emphasize both context and affect*”[31] (Efland, 2002, p. 57). First, illustrating the decontextualization, Noam Chomsky’s theory of an innate ‘language acquisition device,’ for instance, is “destined to unfold *regardless* of specific cultural stimuli and environmental interaction” (Davis and Gardner, 1992, p. 97; cited in Efland, 2002, p. 57). The second problem concerns affect. On the role of feeling or felt states in making meaning, there is criticism of a “dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective”

[31] In traditional definitions offered, the “subject matter” of cognitive psychology “approximates to the psychological study of cognition” as knowing and, drawing on the philosophical meaning of cognition in its widest sense, extends to include “‘sensation, perception, conception, etc., as distinguished from feeling and volition’” (Garnham, 1995, p. 167, citing *OED*). In “the period from about 1956 to 1972” a “few explorations had been made of the links between cognition and emotion and motivation, psychopathology and social behaviour, but most information processing research (as cognitive psychology) during this period was limited to cognitive processes” (Simon, 1979, p. 366, parentheses added). In the mid-1980s, Howard Gardner cites a significant “feature of cognitive science” as “the deliberate decision to de-emphasize certain factors” including “the affective factors or emotions, the contribution of historical and cultural factors and the role of the background context in which particular actions or thoughts occur” (1987, p. 6). By the mid-1990s, the emergence of interests in practical reason and the biological basis of emotions meant feeling and volition increasingly became objects of interest in cognitive research; see Garnham (1995, p. 168); and, for example, Frith et al (1991). See also Bredo in that decade, on interest in “situated cognition” arising “in reaction to the to the currently dominant computational, or symbol-processing, view” in “both psychology and education” (1994, p. 23). The emergence and increasingly wider use of brain imaging technologies now assist revision of the traditional distinction; see for example Breiter and Gasic (2004); Damasio (2000); Mathews, Yiend, and Lawrence (2004); Rueda, Posner, and Rothbart (2005). The distinction, as separation between feeling (and emotion) and cognition, while eroding in work from neuro or brain imaging studies, still impacts in education and for that reason is taken up further in the following chapters on Searle’s work and in discussion of results.

from the view of mind as a "symbol processing system," characterizing mental processes in computational terms (Efland, 2002, p. 57).

In art and education, the nominated difficulties are relevant; the presuppositions model the explanation of mind, providing the framework for visuality. So, the aim of the following part of the study is to briefly account the basis of Efland's concerns since they are concepts under strong debate; first, innateness; second, domain specificity (cf. modularity); third, the computational model of mind. From computational modeling of mind, there is some consideration given to the theory-ladenness versus neutrality of perception and the current state of argument on whether all representation is languagelike. In discourse on cognition, all these concerns interrelate as a way of explaining mental representation[32]. The intention in the following sections is to provide a framework for some of the problems such concepts present for our understanding of consciousness. The chapter concludes by introducing John Searle's work, briefly outlining his criticism of the view that "the brain is a digital computer;" Searle calls such a view "cognitivism" (1994a, p. 202).

5. 3. 1. *Innate or Inborn Rules and the Metaphor of Mental Operations as Computations*

Expanding on concerns in art education from Efland and others with the de-emphases on both context and affect in symbol-processing accounts: first, there is debate over whether knowledge emerges as a consequence of innate mechanisms (from the European rationalist tradition), or from the acquisition of experience (from the British empiricist tradition). On the prior, nativists hold that there are innate cognitive structures explaining the acquisition of for example, in Chomsky's case, language. On this view, "the grammar of any human language is a highly systematic, abstract structure and that there are certain basic structural features shared by the grammars of all human languages, collectively called *universal grammar*" (Garfield, 1995, p. 367). From this, the argument goes, "all known grammatical rules of all the world's languages, including the fragmentary languages of young children must be stated as

[32] The "symbol-processing approach to cognition can be conceived of as an evolving family of related approaches rather than a logically defined class" (Schwartz, 2001, p. 25).

rules governing hierarchical sentence structures" (p. 368). These innate "specifiable" rules however, remain intrinsically inaccessible to consciousness (Gardner, 1984, p. 4).

Two of Chomsky's principal arguments in support of his theory of innate or inborn linguistic rules frame Efland's concerns; first, "the poverty of stimulus" argument and second, "the argument from the modularity of linguistic processing"[33] (quote from Garfield, 1995, p. 367). On poverty of stimulus, "the grammar is innately specified, and is merely 'triggered' by relevant environmental cues"[34] (p. 369). On the argument of modularity (as mandatory dedicated and encapsulated cognitive subsystems) innatists, or nativists characteristically claim "the modularity of language processing is a powerful argument for the innateness of the language faculty" (p. 370).

Second in Efland's criticisms, "since computers also process symbols" computation on this view is seen to serve "as an apt metaphor for the mind and its operations"[35] (2002, p. 53). To explain: Bruner says that "very early on" in the emergence of cognitive science, the "emphasis began shifting from "meaning" to "information," from the *construction* of meaning to the *processing* of information" (1990, p. 4). The "key factor in the shift was the introduction of computation as the ruling metaphor and of computability as a necessary criterion of a good theoretical model" (p. 4; see also Kosslyn and Hatfield, 1984). Quite quickly "computing became the model of the mind" [36] (p. 6). But, the information computing metaphor as the model for mind is

---

[33] Strongly contested, the "stimulus argument has been of enormous influence in innateness debates" (Garfield, 1995, p. 369).

[34] Chomsky's argument for this conclusion is not included here, but for explanation accessible to non-specialists, see Garfield (1995). For current discussion of this view, and problems with it, in the context of ongoing research that problematizes, and may counter, Chomsky's theory of a Language Acquisition Device (LAD), see Colapinto (2007). Professor John Searle's work is responsible for drawing my attention to this article.

[35] The metaphor of mind as computer is ubiquitous, but Earl Hunt says attributing the computational metaphor to the computational view of mind is problematic "as there is no claim that an electronic computer is a physical model for thought or the brain" (1989, p. 604, n.1). Metaphors aside for the moment, from Fodor's work, argument for modularity (as innate biological mechanisms) identifies with computational models of mind; see Fodor (1983). With qualifications, Fodor says, "the computational theory of mind is captive to the massive modularity thesis;" Fodor himself does not support the hypothesis of massive modularity (2001, p. 24). The concept is taken up further in the following section.

[36] The motivation for the modeling was apparent to cognitive researchers: "we understand how computers work, and in the hope of bringing similar understanding to human psychology, psychological processes such as perception, concept formation, problem solving, and imagery have been modeled as computations in an internal symbol system" (Kosslyn and Hatfield, 1984, p. 1019). But, Stephen Kosslyn

inappropriate, Bruner says, because "information is indifferent with respect to meaning" (p. 4). Computing "as a model of the mind" cannot for example "cope with vagueness, with polysemy, with metaphoric or connotative connections" (pp. 5-6). And, Efland says, "unlike learners, computers don't have purposes" (2002, p. 57). But identification of brain processes and, with them, mental states as computationally explained popularly structures the modeling of mind in cognitive science[37].

From "the development of information-processing theories of mental phenomena, couched in the terms of the theory of computation" the object of research is articulated in terms of "the parts or processes of which the mind is composed" (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006, p. 628). And "central to (such) computational approaches… has been *modularity*" that is, "the notion that mental phenomena arise from the operation of multiple distinct processes rather than a single undifferentiated one" (p. 628, parentheses added). This lineage of symbol, as information processing account of mind remains influential in art education. From symbol-systems research, "different symbolic domains" have been "posited as distinctive "frames of mind"" in Howard Gardner's work (Davis and Gardner, 1992, pp. 102-103). Gardner originally expounds his theory of multiple intelligences in 1983, from "work in neurobiology" suggesting "the presence of areas in the brain that correspond, at least roughly, to certain forms of cognition"[38] (cited in Efland, 2002, p. 62, emphasis deleted; Gardner, 1983, p. 59).

---

and Gary Hatfield say, "this source of appeal is also a cause for skepticism" (p. 1019). The "fact that it is convenient to view psychological processes by analogy to computers may have seduced us away from other, perhaps more valid, conceptions" (p. 1019). Debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences over the computer metaphor, or view in its stronger application of mind/computer identity, has significant epistemic outcomes (see Searle chapters). Methodological approaches and commitments vary. For example Kosslyn and Hatfield in the paper cited here retain "a commitment to representations and computations," which "is not based on the idea that information must be stored and manipulated in symbol systems" (p. 1020).

[37] See, for example Pinker (1999).

[38] The issue of context in Gardner's work is however, present. Gardner's theory of various "relatively autonomous intelligences," contra *g* or "general intelligence," acknowledges context influence (quote only, 2003b, p. 4; see also 2003a). On the relevance of social environment to learning about art for example, Gardner says "an individual's level of understanding of the arts emerges slowly as a result of his interactions in the artistic realm and his more general understandings of physical and social life" (1990, p. 17). So, "if one wants to enhance an individual's understanding the most likely route is to involve her deeply over a significant period of time with the symbolic realm in question," and "to encourage her to interact regularly with individuals who are somewhat (rather than greatly) more sophisticated than she is," as well as giving "her ample opportunity to reflect on her own emerging understanding of the domain" (p. 17). But, see also Gardner (1987, p. 6), on earlier explanation of constraints on theoretical commitments to context in cognitive psychology.

While Eisner's view is also "essentially a symbol-processing view," with Eisner, Efland says, "the mind is biologically rooted in the senses" and "the mind begins with the senses as inputting devices" (2002, p. 62). Instead, "Gardner's ideas about the various intelligences are linked to regions in the brain rather than to the eye or ear" and his "idea of the mind is akin to the central processing unit of the computer" (p. 62). Gardner, Efland says, "tends to portray *each* intelligence as an autonomous system in its own right" (p. 63). But what does this mean?

5. 3. 2. *Modularity and Domain Specificity*

Succeeding the "universalist psycholinguistic models" of mental representation, proposals of "structural differences, rather than similarities, between domains of knowledge" emerge in art education, "distinguishing features of artistic thinking" from "thinking in other fields" (Brown, 2001, p. 88). Domain-specific knowledge in some of its strongest expressions attends on the view that part or all the cognitive system consists in, from previously, independent or autonomous brain processes or 'modules,' as innate structures[39]. But, "there are several independent notions conflated in the use of the term 'module'" (Pylyshyn, 1999, p. 364, n.1). The "classic examples of modules are supposed to be the specialized representations and rules of the visual or syntactic systems"[40] (Gopnik, 1996, p. 170). Fodor, for example "takes it as demonstrated that

[39] There is "widespread assumption in the cognitive sciences that there is an intrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domain-specificity" (Khalidi, 2001, p. 191). But there are different views; for example, Rochel Gelman warns against conflating "notions of domain-specificity and innateness" saying, "nothing in the offered definition of a domain requires that a domain-specific knowledge structure be built on an innate foundation" (2000, p. 855); see also Khalidi (2001), on argument against the assumed connection. The argument hinges on what constitutes a domain and whether ontologically, it constitutes on modular architecturally and heritably determined brain states; see for example Churchland (2002, p. 326). Gelman says, "only some of the many domains people acquire result from the facilitatory effects of innate skeletal structures;" "core domains constitute a small universal class of knowledge structures" whereas "noncore domains are an extremely large class" (2000, p. 855). Most typically however, modularity defines in terms of innate structures. see for example Carruthers (2006a); Patricia Churchland (2002, p. 326); Fodor (1983); Karmiloff-Smith (1996).

[40] For exemplar explanation of modularity, see Fodor, (1983); on innate syntactic systems, see Chomsky (1980). The usage of 'module' "proprietary to Noam Chomsky" refers to "a body of innate knowledge" (or, by preference, a body of "innately cognized" propositional contents") (Fodor, 2001, p. 57). Fodor says "modules in this sense are noncommittal with respect to just about all issues about the architecture of mental processes" (p. 57). The "putative connection" between Chomsky's and Fodor's modeling, "is that bodies of innate knowledge are typically processed by encapsulated cognitive mechanisms;" and, Fodor says, "vice versa, that encapsulated cognitive mechanisms are typically dedicated to the processing of innate databases" for example, "the integration of innate information with sensory inputs early in the course of perceptual analysis" (p. 57).

modules for spoken language and visual perception are innately specified"[41] (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 4). Argument for linguistic modularity claims that "the processes that subserve the acquisition, understanding and production of language are quite distinct and independent of those that subserve general cognition and learning"[42] (Garfield, 1995, p. 370). On this view, "language learning and language processing mechanisms and the knowledge they embody are domain specific" (p. 370).

Unlike Bruner and Piaget "who argue for domain-general development"[43], Fodor instead is widely taken to hold "that the mind is made up of genetically specified, independently functioning, special-purpose "modules" or input systems"[44] (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 2). In 1983 Fodor introduces the concept of modularity, listing features that "might be typical of modular systems;" these include "domain specificity, encapsulation, mandatory operation (automaticity), inaccessibility to consciousness, speed, shallow outputs, fixed neural localization, and characteristic breakdown patterns" (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006, p. 629).

---

[41] In 1983, Fodor "launched" the debate on modularity, proposing "a particular account of mental structure in which information-processing modules of a very special specific kind – reflex-like, hardwired devices that process narrow types of information in highly stereotyped ways – played a central role" (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006, p. 628); see Fodor (1983).

[42] Although currently unsupported most generally, the notion of modularity is influential and ongoing, for various reasons, in symbol-systems models of mental representation taken up, particularly from Gardner's work, in art education. Because of the study's interest in rational action and so practical reason, the concept of the mind as modular is later taken up in discussion. The thesis of modularity is "highly contentious in contemporary cognitive science" (Garfield, 1995, p. 370). Further, "there is little consensus" on the issue (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006, p. 628); for example, Patricia Churchland emphasizes the "interdependence of genes and epigenetic factors, prenatally and postnatally," saying that "considerable evidence runs against the idea that brain evolution consists in the selection of anatomically localized functional subsystems (modules) that are *separately heritable* and gradually optimized over generations" (2002, p. 326). There is the view that "from a neuroscience perspective, 'modularity' is an obsolete concept, resembling the 'centers' concept that was discarded by scientists doing brain research several decades ago" (cited in Churchland, 2002, p. 413-414; quote from Panksepp and Panksepp, 2001, p. 3). Fodor says that he is fan of modularity (2001, p. 65); but "the massive modularity thesis pretty clearly *isn't* true" (p. 23). For current defence of massively modular models of mind, see Carruthers (2006a); Pinker (1999); Sperber (2002); on reconciling Fodor's nativism with Piaget's constructivism, see Karmiloff-Smith (1996). Some of Fodor's argument against massive modularity and its computational modeling of whole of mind is taken up further in the main body of text, following.

[43] In contrast to informationally encapsulated constraints hard-wired in the human brain architecture, for domain-generalists such as Piagetians, "development involves the construction of domain-general changes in representational structures operating over all aspects of the cognitive system in a similar way" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 7).

[44] Fodor rejects this characterization of his view as massive modularity (2001). I include Karmiloff-Smith's account of Fodor's view as exemplar explanation and criticism of modularity.

From this account, “each functionally distinct module has its own dedicated processes and proprietary inputs” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 2). The informational encapsulation of modules in Fodor’s account makes them “cognitively impenetrable,” or “insensitive to central cognitive goals” (p. 2). That is, “a significant part of vision” for example (as early perceptual processes on Zenon Pylyshyn’s and Fodor’s accounts), is impervious to “the influence of beliefs, expectations, values and so on” [45] (Pylyshyn, 1999, p. 343).

With cognitive impenetrability, “according to modularity theories, representations of the world are not constructed from evidence in the course of development” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 169). Rather, “innate structures create mandatory representations of input” (p. 169). On this view, “representations that are the outcome of modules, unlike those that are the result of more central knowledge and belief processes, cannot be overturned by new patterns of evidence;” that is, “the encapsulation of modules means they are indefeasible” [46] (pp. 169-170). The modules involved are “deemed to be hard-wired (not assembled from more primitive processes)” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 2). And the “internal structure of the module cannot be reorganized as a result of input from other systems, though of course outputs from the module can be used by other systems” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 170).

Innatist theories such as Fodor’s, Annette Karmiloff-Smith says, result in “dismissing the relevance of a developmental perspective on cognitive science” (1996, p. 5). From critics such as Karmiloff-Smith, innatist theses are strongly challenged, although “irrespective of whether they agree with Fodor’s strict modularity thesis, many psychologists now consider development to be domain specific” (p. 6). But, “much depends,” Karmiloff-Smith says, “on what one understands by “domain”” (p. 6). It “is important not to confuse “domain” with “module”” (p. 6). That is, “from the point of

[45] On modularity and cognitive impenetrability: Pylyshyn says “because there are several independent notions conflated in the general usage of the term “module,”” he eschews “the use of this term to designate cognitively impenetrable systems” (1999, p. 2). Fodor says, “it’s informational encapsulation, however achieved, that’s at the heart of modularity” (2001, p. 63).

[46] Alison Gopnik says, “in Chomsky’s theory of syntax acquisition, the initial innate structures mean that only a very limited set of possible grammars will be developed;” “they constrain the final form of the grammar in the strong sense that grammars that violate them will never be learned by human beings” (1996, p. 170). For some contrasting discussion of this view see Colapinto (2007); on defeasibility, see this study, Chapter 4. Section 3.2. n.34

view of the child's mind," for example, "a domain is the set of representations sustaining a specific area of knowledge: language number, physics, and so forth"[47] (p. 6). Instead, "a module is an information-processing unit that encapsulates that knowledge and the computations on it" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 6). Fodor himself makes a distinction between "modularity theories according to which domain specificity is a primarily a property of *information*" and modularity theories that "generally take domain specificity to be a property of *processes*"[48] (2001, p. 59). So, "considering development domain specific does not necessarily imply modularity" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 6).

The "storing and processing of information may be domain specific without being encapsulated, hard-wired, or mandatory" (p. 6). Various revisions, including Karmiloff-Smith's, soften the initial modularity thesis[49]. The rejections of encapsulation, some argue, "rob the notion of any epistemological interest"[50] (see Fodor, 2001, p. 60; quote from Gopnik, 1996, p. 182). In "cognitive neuroscience" Gopnik says, the term module "means little more than 'functional unit'" (1996, p. 182).

5. 3. 3. *Modularity and the Reasoning Mind*

So, "in the weakest sense, a module can be something like: a dissociable functional component" and taken "in this weak way, the thesis of massive mental modularity would claim that the mind consists entirely of distinct components, each of which has some specific job to do in the functioning of the whole" (Carruthers, 2006a, p. 3-4). As

---

[47] On this "*phase* model of development rather than a *stage* model," Karmiloff-Smith employs "the term 'domain' to cover language, physics, mathematics, and so forth," distinguishing ""microdomains" as "subsets within particular domains" for example, "gravity within the domain of physics and pronoun acquisition within the domain of language" (1996, p. 6). And, on Karmiloff-Smith's reference to "the point of view of the child's mind," in contrast to Fodor's nativist modeling: in the 1990s, Bredo says for example, "recent interest in situated cognition has arisen in reaction to the currently dominant computational, or symbol-processing, view" (1994, p. 23). Critics of computational modeling suggest it would be better to conceive "of cognition as it is involved in the practical doings" of ordinary people, "rather than in the formal operations of computers" (p. 23).

[48] For Fodor, the "problem" is "to avoid the trivialization of domain specificity claims" (2001, pp. 59-60). Fodor says the notion of domain specificity *qua* the modularity thesis he is concerned with, "applies to the way information and process interact" (pp. 60-61).

[49] In developmental psychology see for example, Baron-Cohen (1996); Karmiloff-Smith (1996).

[50] For advocacy of "a broader notion of modularity than the one Fodor advanced" as "a modularity concept based on the notion of *functional specialization*, rather than Fodorian criteria such as automaticity and encapsulation," see Barrett and Kurzban (2006, pp. 628-629).

well, “it would predict that the properties of many of these components could vary independently of the properties of the others;” this would be, Peter Carruthers says, “consistent with the hypothesis of ‘special intelligences’[51] (pp. 3-4; citing Gardner, 1983). But such a view of mind as largely or entirely functionally modular is problematic.

To summarize broadly the claim for mind as a computer: “the mind is a system of organs of computation” in which “the brain processes information and thinking is a kind of computation” (Pinker, 1999, p. 21). On this account “the mind is organized “into modules or mental organs, each with a specialized design that makes it an expert in one area of interaction with the world” and the “module’s basic logic is specified by our genetic program” (p. 21). Psychology, on this view, is “reverse-engineering” by which “one figures out what the machine was designed to do” from analysis of its functional components (p. 21).

This strongly modular view of mind is not one that is widely held, but it remains influential. In the cognitive sciences generally, the thesis of the “modularity of perceptual input systems has gradually been dismissed over the past 20 years;” and “the place where modularity enthusiasts have gone is to higher level cognition (such as lie detection modules, theory of mind modules, and mathematics modules)” and so on (Spivey, 2008, p. 138). Contrary to Fodor’s “view that only “peripheral” systems such as vision are modular,” these “other researchers, especially evolutionary psychologists” propose that ““central” processes, such as those underlying reasoning, judgment and decision making” are modular[52] (Barrett and Kurzban, 2006, p. 628). This is “precisely the place where Fodor claimed modules could not be found” (Spivey, 2008, p. 138).

---

[51] That such a view could be “either interesting or controversial” would, Carruthers says, “depend on whether the thesis in question were just that the mind consists entirely (or almost entirely) of modular components” or alternately “that the mind consist *of a great many* modular components” (2006a, p. 4). A “thesis of massive (in the sense of multiple) modularity is a controversial one, even when the term ‘module’ is taken in its weakest sense” (p. 4). Carruthers defends a version of MM of mind. Although qualifying Fodor’s conception of modules, he maintains a view of mind as “neurally realized” and “significantly innate” modular processes as independent (“to some degree”) through encapsulation in both the “narrow-scope or wide-scope sense” (p. 18).

[52] Barrett and Kurzban cite for example, Cosmides (1994); Pinker (1999).

Fodor rejects generalizing the role of modular subsystems to explanation of the whole of mind; "taken literally," the "idea that most or all of cognition is modular" Fodor says, "verges on incoherence;" and "taken liberally, it lacks empirical plausibility," (2001, p. 56). Consideration of "arguments *against* such models" particularly derives "from the holistic and creative character of much of human thinking" (Carruthers, 2006a, p. 18). And Fodor for example, (Carruthers says), "has consistently maintained that there is nothing modular about central cognitive processes of believing and reason"[53] (2006a, p. 19, n.3; see Fodor, 2001).

Fodor says, "by definition, the more encapsulated the informational resources to which a computational mechanism has access, the less the character of its operations is sensitive to global properties of belief systems"[54] (2001, p. 63). That is, "modules have access only to information from stages of processing at lower levels, not to information from top-down process" (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996, p. 2). So, "what a mind knows or believes cannot affect the workings of a module"[55] (p. 2). The problems of explaining mental operations, in this case, "are about how deeply, in the course of cognitive processing, a mind should examine its background of epistemic commitments"[56] (Fodor, 2001, pp. 63-64).

---

[53] Fodor's account, Carruthers says, "was explicitly designed to apply to modular input and output systems like colour perception or face recognition" rather than claims about reasoning (2006a, p. 19, n.3).

[54] In computational terms, "the system is "encapsulated" with respect to information that is *not* in its database;" "its operations are defined with less than full generality or its informational exchanges with other processing mechanisms are constrained" (Fodor, 2001, p. 63).

[55] From her developmental perspective, Karmiloff-Smith says, "it is implausible that development will turn out to be entirely domain-specific *or* domain general" (1996, p. 9). The "*more complex the picture we build of the innate capacities of the infant mind, the more important it becomes for us to explain the flexibility of subsequent cognitive development*" (p. 9). So, although there is need to "invoke some built-in constraints," in Karmiloff-Smith's view, "development clearly involves a more dynamic process of interaction between mind and environment than the strict nativist stance presupposes" (p. 9).

[56] Fodor borrows the term 'background' from John Searle (in Fodor, 2001, p. 110, n.6; see also p. 38). The problem, on Fodor's account, concerns the constraints or limits on Computational Theory of Mind (CTM); "it holds little promise of illuminating *global* cognitive approaches" (Hershfield, 2005, p. 183). Fodor directs his concern to the requirement (in explanations of mind) of accounting for the role of abduction; (from C. S. Peirce), broadly, as inference to the best explanation, or the capacity in mind for "formulating new hypotheses and deciding which of them to take seriously" (Hookway, 2005, p. 1). Abduction "constitutes a large portion of a person's mental life" (Hershfield, 2005, p. 184). The "inference pattern" of abduction "addresses a wide range of issues concerning the 'logic of discovery' and the economics of research" (Hookway, 2005, p. 1). The "classical architectures" in CTM explanation "know of no reliable way to recognize such properties" of mind, "short of exhaustive searches of the background of epistemic commitments;" Fodor thinks "*that's* why our robots don't work" (2001, p. 38).

Cognitive scientists, Michael Spivey says, "can lament the fact that perception and cognition are not modular – and therefore require far more complex measures, models, and analyses than previously used – but (they) cannot ignore it" (2008, p. 138, parentheses added). So, "a new theoretical apparatus for studying the mind is indeed required after all;" that is, one that can explain "complex integration of information from varied sources"[57] (Spivey, 2008, p. 138).

5. 3. 4. *The Theory-Laden Observation v. Neutrality of Observation Debate*

The theory of informational encapsulation and its epistemological (and ontological) consequences to the explanation of mind are also part of a broader controversy relevant to this study. The argument is fought across various lines of enquiry and has held for decades[58] (Estany, 2001, p. 205). In this debate, theories of visual perception are critical (p. 208). There is agreement in "psychological and optical theories" that "human visual perception enables humans to gather a certain range of information from their environment" (Paller, 1988, p. 135). But influentially in 1969, in philosophy of science, Norwood Hanson says "seeing is what I shall call a "theory-laden" operation;" that is, "we usually "see" through spectacles made of our past experience, our knowledge, and tinted and mottled by our special languages and notations" (cited in Estany, 2001, p. 205; Hanson, 1969). Hanson (Anna Estany says), "assumes a continuity of perception with cognition" (2001, p. 205).

From this account, Hanson's thesis "has been used by many philosophers (for example P. Feyerabend and various social constructivists) to defend their relativistic theses, even though Hanson never reached such radical conclusions" (p. 205). In contrast, but also in philosophy of science, Carl Hempel "formulates an "empiricist criterion of meaning"

---

[57] I include Spivey's remarks for their relevance to the discussion of modularity and ongoing research into the explanation of mind. But I should note that the commitments of this study vary from his approach to consciousness, discussed later in his book. Spivey defines consciousness, as I understand him, as self-consciousness and addresses its study to behavioural properties; see Spivey, Chapter 12, "Dynamical (Self-) Consciousness" (2008, pp. 307-333). On Searle's definition of consciousness see this study, Ch. 6, Section 1.7, *Clarification of the Term Consciousness*, including n.20; for description of problems with behavioural accounts of consciousness see also Ch. 6, Section 2.3, *The Problem of Ontological Reduction and the Irreducibility of Consciousness*, including notes 29-32.

[58] Some argue the stakes are high in the debate: the "neutrality *vs.* theory-ladenness of observation" question "is an important debate because the objectivity of science" Estany says, "appears to be at stake" (2001, pp. 203-205). The problem is taken up in the chapters of the study on Searle's work.

and draws the conclusion that science is objective, based on the possibility of the theory of neutrality of observation"[59] (Estany, 2001, p. 205; in text quote citing Hempel, 1970).

The "problem of observation leads us to the reliability of our sensory apparatus and this, in turn, leads us to perception and its neurological basis" (p. 207, parentheses added). On one view, "our cognitive activity occurs through processes called "bottom-up; the other view argues for a "top-down" account" (p. 207). On the "bottom-up" account, roughly, "the perceptual recognition of something implies that certain information flowing from external stimuli comes into contact with some neurons" whereas "the "top-down" account of cognitive activity presents a different picture" (p. 208). On this approach, "the beliefs of the higher or more fundamental level influence how perceptual units are interpreted by the lower levels" (p. 208).

Estany says, "there is empirical evidence to show that humans use both types of processes in perception because each have characteristic advantages and disadvantages" (p. 208). On "the "bottom-up" point of view," for example, "recognition is based on the detection of features, where a feature is an attribute characteristic of an object that can be detected in many situations and thus functions as an invariable signal" (p. 207). Here (on this form of account), "pattern recognition involves the flow of information from

[59] The "counterpart" of this debate in philosophy of mind takes form in the "opposing theories of perception proposed by Jerry Fodor and Paul Churchland" (Estany, 2001, pp. 205-206). Both Fodor and Churchland provide computational accounts but their views, and ontological commitments, differ. Fodor's work engages David Marr's exemplar computational account of visual perception as modular; see Marr (1983); Churchland however (in criticism of Marr's modeling) says, "certain psychological features of vision seem to be difficult to account for within computer vision models" (1989a, pp. 471-472). On one side, Fodor's thesis of cognitive impenetrability, that is, "perceptual processes are isolated" ("they send inputs to higher levels of cognitive processes but are impenetrable to them") has the consequence that "all humans share the same perceptual experience" (Estany, 2001, p. 206). Fodor says, "there is a class of beliefs that are typically fixed by sensory/perceptual processes, and that the fixation of beliefs in this class is," in a sense, "importantly theory neutral;" so, "given the same two stimulations, two organisms with the same sensory/perceptual psychology will quite generally observe the same things, and hence arrive at the same observational beliefs, *however much their theoretical commitments may differ*" (cited in Estany, 2001, p. 206; Fodor, 1984, pp. 24-25). Fodor's constraint on cognitive input to visual perceptual processes, it should be noted, does proceed to "some pretty comprehensive refinement" of this claim; see (1984, p. 25). Churchland, on the other side, takes the view that "the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver" (1988, p. 167). Contra Fodor, Churchland argues for "the theoretical character of all observation judgments" (1988, p. 167). For Churchland, "it would seem that all perceptual processing is inescapably laden with the legacy of general knowledge shaped by past experience" (1989b, p. 267; cited in Estany, 2001, p. 206). Estany says, "Churchland's argument that observation is theory-laden, thus parallels and lends support to the views of Kuhn and Feyerabend, amongst others" (2001, p. 207).

small perceptual units to bigger units" and so is "operative in the recognition of words from letters" etc.[60] (p. 207). And "thanks to top-down processes we can recognize patterns with incomplete or degraded information" (p. 208). Top-down processes Estany says, "makes perception faster, but they can induce us to make mistakes in a perception by relying too heavily on previous knowledge" (p. 208). The "polarity between bottom-up and top-down approach is also found in current debates about how best to understand vision"[61] (p. 208).

5. 3. 5. *Non Computational Modeling of Perception*

The debates over vision as computational or otherwise are central to accounting visuality. And attributing the role of the senses as discrete, or alternately, situated in an irreducibly complex and fully embodied state is crucial to the arguments (but cf. Paller, 1988, p. 136, and following n.62, below). Computational explanation provides one model of visual processes.

Computational theories hold the view that "visual perception is the result of information processing and computation from primitive neurophysical units" (Paller, 1988, p. 136). On this account, "visual perception can be explained" as "requiring rule governed inference processes" [62] (Paller, 1988, p. 136). But, "the problem with these "traditional

---

[60] Experiments show "that the model of recognition through distinctive features works;" "some organisms at the bottom of the phylogenetic hierarchy recognize objects through simple, invariable features" and "other organisms higher up in the phylogenetic hierarchy recognize objects defined by many characteristics" (Estany, 2001, pp. 207-208).

[61] Churchland says, ""top-down strategies" are "characteristic of philosophy, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence research" whereas, "bottom-up strategies" are "characteristic of the neurosciences" (1989a, p. 3). But, he says, both research approaches "should not be pursued in icy isolation from one another" (p. 3).

[62] On "traditional optically-based views" (or "micro-processing accounts") of visual perception, one "assumption" is that "a complete explanation of visual perception requires causal description at the level of physical micro-processes" (Paller, 1988, p. 136). (Paller says, "these might be called micro-process accounts of perception since the transmission devices and the receptors are described using micro-physical and cellular theory" (p. 136). This assumption is not requisite to computational theories of visual perception (p. 136). Pylyshyn, for example, "replaces the micro-physical condition with a looser condition") (p. 136; see Pylyshyn, 1984, p. 166). But also, Paller says, "a second and different claim is that perception requires inference of varying sorts;" for example, "micro-process accounts require that a pattern of light stimulations be inferred from a sufficient number of individual photoreceptor firings" (p. 136). In theories of visual perception, broadly, there "are two general sorts of inference that perception might require" (p. 136). Paller says, "the first type of inference is from primitive input to complex perceptual output;" "the other type is from is from perceptual content to the organism's environment" (p. 136); for further explanation of inference types see (pp. 138-139). Computational accounts, such as that from Fodor and Pylyshyn, argue "that inferential processes are required in order to explain perception"

theories" is "that they describe perception as the result of operations on the discrete deliverance of the senses" (p. 137). On this modeling, "observers take it for granted that one sees the environment with one's eyes;" here, "the eyes are the organs of vision just as the ears are the organs of hearing, the nose the organ of smelling, the mouth is the organ of tasting, and the skin is the organ of touching" (Gibson, 1986, p. 205). So, the "eye is considered to be an instrument of the mind, or an organ of the brain" (p. 205). But, from this supposition, the "textbooks and handbooks assume that vision is simplest when the eye is held still, as a camera has to be, so that a picture is formed that can be transmitted to the brain" (p. 1). And in this way, "vision is studied by first requiring the subject to fixate a point and then exposing momentarily a stimulus or a pattern of stimuli around the fixation point" (p. 1). James Gibson calls "this *snapshot vision*"[63] (p. 1).

The "generally accepted theory of the eye… asserts that it forms *an image of an object* on the back of the eye" and (broadly from Kepler's theories), that there is "point-to-

---

(p. 136). The "inference process claim is different from the micro-process assumption;" but micro-process and computational accounts both "require that the organism infer properties of its environment from properties of the patterns of light stimulations" (p. 136). But, the inferential claim is itself "controversial," and is the subject of criticism of computational accounts; James J. Gibson, Paller says, "argues that neither sort of inference is involved in perception" (p. 136). Paller says, "both Gibson and Fodor and Pylyshyn agree" that some properties of visual perception can be characterized "as a process which does not require inference" (p. 136). That is, there is agreement that "some properties are directly pick-up or transduced; and they agree that direct pick-up or transduction is characterized as a process which does not require inference" (Paller, 1988, p. 136). (Transducers "are technically defined as mechanisms which convert information from one physical form to another" but "specifying what is allowed to count as a transducer for the purposes of cognitive theory is a nontrivial problem") (Fodor, 1981, p. 157). And "if there is genuine macro-physical explanation of perception, then transduced properties may be physically complex" (Paller, 1988, p. 136). Paller says, "as the complexity of transduced properties increases and the greater the range of physically complex properties which can be transduced, the less inference and computation which will be required on the part of the physical mechanisms" (p. 136). Therefore, "in order to provide some alternative to the view that visual perception is the result of information processing and computation from primitive neurophysical units as computational theories suppose," Paller says, "it must be shown both that visual perception can be explained in some way other than as requiring rule governed inference processes and that the transduction of physically complex properties is possible and not redundant" (that is, that the "ecologically describable macro-processes" can causally "reduce to some micro-physical and neurological processes which provide the actual explanation of the observation") (p. 136). I treat Gibson's theory of visual perception too briefly, with apologies, by only introducing the broadest, but hopefully two central features of his (direct perception) account in the context of this section of the study: the whole of state character of visual perception, and the rejection of perceptual mediation from preconceptions. For all detail, see Gibson (1986); for argument against Gibson's view from computational explanation, see Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981).

[63] When "the exposure period is made longer, the eye will scan the pattern to which it is exposed, fixating the parts in succession" (unless "prohibited from doing so"); Gibson calls this "*aperture vision*" because "it is a little like looking at the environment through a knothole in a fence" (1986, p. 1).

point correspondence between an object and its image" (pp. 58-59). Such an approach "lends itself to mathematical analysis;" "it can be abstracted to the concepts of projective geometry and can be applied to the design of cameras and projectors, that is, to the making of pictures with light, photography" (pp. 59-60). And "it works beautifully" for "images that fall on screens or surfaces and that are intended to be looked at"[64] (p. 60). But, Gibson says, "we can think of vision as a perceptual system, the brain being simply part of the system" (p. 60). On this account, "the eye is also part of the system, since retinal inputs lead to ocular adjustments and then to altered retinal inputs, and so on;" that is, the "process is circular, not a one way transmission" (p. 60).

Gibson says, "the truth is that each eye is positioned in a head that is in turn positioned on a trunk that is positioned on legs that maintain the posture of the trunk, head, and eyes relative to the surface of support" (p. 205). That is, "vision is a whole perceptual system, not a channel of sense" (p. 205). And, "one sees the environment not with the eyes but the eyes-in-the-head-on-the-body-resting-on-the-ground" (p. 205). The "perceptual capacities of the organism do not lie in discrete anatomical parts of the body," but rather "lie in systems with nested functions"[65] (p. 205).

Gibson targets (Paller says), "the somewhat extreme claim that inputs are primitive neuron firings;" "the activity of the physiological neuron firings would have to be two-fold" that is, "first, the neuron firings must be processed into an integrated or coherent product and then the product must be interpreted" (1988, p. 137). But, "the problem with computational models is that unless we are to understand such models

---

[64] Gibson says, "this success makes it tempting to believe that the image on the retina falls on a kind of screen and is itself something intended to be looked at, that is, a picture" (1986, p. 60). But, this "leads to one of the most seductive fallacies in the history of psychology – that the retinal image is something to be seen" (p. 60). Gibson calls this "the "little man in the brain" theory of the retinal image," which "conceives the eye as a camera at the end of a nerve cable that transmits the image to the brain" (p. 60). So, "then there has to be a little man, a homunculus, seated in the brain who looks at this physiological image," leading to infinite regress (p. 60). And "even the more sophisticated theory that the retinal image is transmitted as signals in the fibres of the optic nerve has the lurking implication of a little man in the brain;" "for these signals must be in code and therefore have to be decoded; signals are messages, and messages have to be interpreted" (p. 61). Such theories, Gibson says, "carry the implication of a mind that is separate from a body" (p. 61); see also Paller (1988, pp. 137-138).

[65] Bonnie Paller says "J. J. Gibson's ecological optics is arguably the leader in promising non-inferential, non-micro-physical views" (1988, p. 136). For current work on perception drawing on Gibson's theories, see for example, Noë (2004).

metaphorically, there must be some one or more computational mechanisms which are both physical and have the ability to interpret the product of integrated neuron firings according to some set of rules;" that is, "some knowledgeable something must perform the computational tasks" (pp. 137-138). And "barring non-natural intervention, the difficulty would be to explain how the organism could learn or otherwise acquire reliable inference rules in the first place"[66] (p. 138).

Gibson rejects the argument that perception "cannot be direct and must be mediated by preconceptions" (1986, p. 168). Assertions that "perception is mediated by assumptions, preconceptions, expectations, mental images, or any of a dozen other hypothetical mediators" have been tested (p. 168). But the test results generalize "from peephole observation to ordinary observation" and from this, Gibson says, rest on perceptual anomalies (detected but emergent from the test conditions) that cease "when an observer uses two eyes and certainly when one looks from various points of view"[67] (p. 168).

5. 3. 6. *Concepts in Visual Experience*

Deriving from Feyerabend's extension of theory-ladenness theories to claim complete theoretical organization (as relativizing) of visual experience, semiotic theorists reject direct perceptual, or causal accounts in the understanding of pictures. In visual cultural explanation, all perception is an act of interpretation. Visual experience is constructed by, and so relative to, the mediation of theory or pre-existing concepts. As conceptual, all mental representation is linguistic, or languagelike on this account[68].

---

[66] The "possibilities are not limitless – either the computational mechanism along with its rules are born into the organism (innate) or there is some physiological apparatus which acquires the rules and hence the ability to render the acquired computations and interpretations" (Paller, 1988, p. 137). For further on the circularity of computational arguments on this point, see (pp. 137-138).

[67] For details of such experiments and Gibson's specific criticisms, see Gibson (1986, pp. 166-169).

[68] On the "nature of the processes that mediate signs:" Daddesio for example says, "at the biological level, a symbol, for instance, would correspond to a complex interplay of neuronal firings and biochemical reactions" and "at the psychological level, the same symbol would correspond to mental representations of the sign, its objects and interpretants while at the sociocultural level, it would involve a conventional relation between the aforementioned representations" (Daddesio, 1995, p. 20). See also Chapter 3, *Representation in Visual Culture* and *Perception*.

Mental representation as languagelike is strongly argued and undergoing significant revision. The view of all representation reducing to a common or single language of thought as propositional is now widely considered problematic (Galaburda et al, 2002, p. 3). There is, for instance, argument in the cognitive sciences for "multiple possible "languages of thought;" these "different languages" or modes of representation "play different roles in life of the mind" (p. 1). And in philosophy of science, Edouard Machery says, "the question 'Is cognition linguistic?' divides recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups;" "sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim" (2005, p. 469).

Roughly, sententialists are further divided between those who claim "non natural" (as Mentalese) and "natural" language as inner speech (p. 470). In contrast, the "*non-linguistic conception of cognition* is really a mixed bag" of "different conceptions of cognition" that are "only unified by their rejection of the sententialist orthodoxy" (p. 470). But importantly, the particular rules of linguistic representation, or "verbal language" have "no obvious parallel in other modalities" (Galaburda et al, 2002, p. 10). And the differences between symbolic and nonsymbolic representations mean, simply, there is "more than one way to think" (p. 1).

The question of whether all "experience is conceptual" remains "controversial" (Noë, 2004, pp. 181-182). There is "little doubt," Alva Noë says, "that *some* perceptual content is conceptual" (p. 181). So, "only someone in possession of appropriate conceptual skills could have a perceptual experience with that content" (p. 181). That is, "it couldn't look to you as if the ballerina tripped if you didn't know what a ballerina is, or what tripping is" and so on (p. 181). And, "the fact that there are different standards for concept possession doesn't alter the fact that some perceptual content is framed precisely in terms of what perceivers know about their worlds" (p. 182).

But, more recently, "a growing number of philosophers have been inclined to answer (the) question negatively; some content is *non*conceptual" (p. 182, parentheses added). Perceptual experiments on animals have demonstrated that "experience can genuinely present the world as being that way for the animal even though the animal has no

cognitive apparatus for appreciating how the experience presents the world as being"[69] (p. 182). Noë says "the possibility that our relation to the world, through thought, and our relation to it through experience, differ not in kind, but in degree" (p. 207).

5. 3. 7 *The Psychological Reality of Making Meaning*

Consistent with much 20th Century enquiry the suggested object of visual culture, as the obtaining of meaning, derives broadly from discourses, including those from philosophy of science and cognitive sciences, as epistemology is influenced by 'the linguistic turn.' Support persists for the relativization or complete theoretical organization of visual experience. As well as the linguistic mediation of perception, in visual culture, semiotic accounts typically maintain a linguistic or textual identity between all modes of representation, as imagery. And across aesthetics and visual culture commitments, longstanding interest from philosophers and psychologists in art and education evidences the direct influence of cognitive science[70].

The modeling of mind from the cognitive sciences is increasingly influential in explanations. On transfer to other disciplines some aspects of the modeling are, from this account, not without problems. The metaphor of mind as computer has explanatory limits in teaching and learning; it is reductive. The appeal of the metaphor lies I think in the suggested systematicity of mental operations (see Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith, 2003). But reductiveness is only helpful when it is explicit. So, in educational environments any claim for mind as a system must account for, at least, how it is reductive[71]. That is, claims should be set in the context of the "*psychological reality* of the computational ascriptions" (Searle, 2002a, p. 126).

---

[69] Underlying the "idea that there is nonconceptual perceptual content is the concern that to suppose that all perceptual content *is* conceptual is to *overintellectualize* perceptual experience" (Noë, 2004, p. 182); for further on argument, see Chapter 6: Thought in Experience (pp. 181-208). Drawing from J.J. Gibson's work on the embodied state of perception, see Noë on "a kind of *sensorimotor* understanding" that is, "the sense of the presence" of objects (p. 207).

[70] The influence of the linguistic construction of mind has been ongoing: Daddesio says, "the first phase of cognitivism constituted a reaction against behaviorism, however, the break with the linguistic turn is more apparent than genuine" (Daddesio, 1995, p. 55). For direct interest in cognitive explanation in arts and education, see for example Brown (1989a, 2001a); Efland (2002); Eisner (2002); Parsons (1989).

[71] In accounting for the values of reduction for example, in developmental psychology there is interest in connectionist computational models of mind in contrast to symbol-processing rule-based models. From the relevance of connectionist modeling to educational philosophy and psychology, briefly: on Michael Thomas's and Karmiloff-Smith's account, connectionist models "are loosely based on principles of

A key attribute of this psychological reality is, in my view, the embodied role of sensory aspects of visuality. From this chapter, there are some problems in explaining the role of the senses in visuality from the cognitive sciences. One of the significant difficulties attending on information-processing models is their tendency to disembody and from this, make discrete the senses and their activities or processes. (But the problem has been general to epistemology. The reification of the senses is also problematic in aesthetics, as causal accounts). Such explanation does not lend itself to properly understanding visuality. That is, explanation will isolate aspects of visuality that, in people, require integration in order to function. Explaining visuality is, I believe, better approached by understanding this integration as consciousness.

The view of mind as an information processing system or rule governed machine does remain current in explanation from cognitive sciences. By way of introduction to the account of consciousness in this study, philosopher John R. Searle's work argues against such modeling[72]. From this debate, Searle provides criticisms of the

---

neural information processing" and "seek to strike a balance between importing basic concepts from neuroscience" into accounting behaviour, "while formulating those explanations using the conceptual terminology of cognitive and developmental psychology" (2003, p. 136). The "computational modeling of cognitive processes" provides advantages, most notably "theory clarification" (p. 133). In accounting for "individual differences, cognitive development, and atypical development" computer models are applied "against a background of pre-existing verbal theories speculating on what cognitive mechanisms might underlie variations" in each of these domains (p. 133). To illustrate: "in the domain of intelligence research, one may refer to a more clever cognitive system as being *faster*" but "an implemented model of that system must specify what *speed* really means;" and "in the domain of developmental research, one may refer to a more developed cognitive system as containing *more complexity*, but an implemented model must specify what *complexity* really means;" and so on (p. 133). Connectionist network modeling contrasts with "symbolic, rule-based computational models;" the latter "rarely offer developmental accounts for how relevant knowledge can be acquired" (p. 137). (See discussion of innatist or nativist accounts, previously). Differently, "connectionist networks have been widely used to model phenomena in cognitive development because they are essentially learning systems" (p. 137). But like "rule-based models," Thomas and Karmiloff-Smith say, connectionist models "remain limited in at least two respects;" first, so far, "they have only been applied to specific cognitive domains such as language acquisition or categorization" and "therefore, they cannot currently address issues concerning the development of *domain-general* processing capacities" (p. 140). Second, "connectionist networks do not readily represent relational or syntactic information," so "they cannot be used to evaluate claims" that "cognitive development can be explained as an increase in the ability to represent higher orders of relational complexity" (p. 140). Importantly however, computational modeling generates new "parameters as potential explanations of each type of cognitive variability" and "because it is inevitable that connectionist models will become more complex over time, it is likely new candidate parameters will emerge" (p. 146).

[72] And the context of argument is interesting. The modeling of mental processes as computational in cognitive science has its "clearest expression" in research into artificial intelligence or AI (see for example Brooks, 1991; quote from Clark, 1995, p. 410; Hunt, 1989). Searle's work is influential in argument over classical or strong AI (for discussion and criticisms of Searle's account, see Preston and

Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and Representational Theory of Mind (RTM)[73] (Heil, 2004). For educators, the debate is generally relevant, since it highlights the role of interpretation in reasoning. More specifically, for theories of visuality, the debate concerns the role of mental contents in making meaning, and so its outcomes are significant. Daddesio, for example, notes the longstanding rejection of the concept of mental contents in semiotic approaches (1995).

RTM "depicts minds as semantic engines, devices that operate on purely formal and syntactic principles, but in a way that mirrors semantics;" and "this means, roughly, that although mental operations are indifferent to the significance of the symbols on which they operate" (that is, they are uninterpreted), "these operations are indistinguishable from those that might be performed by someone who understood the symbols" (p. 111). On mind/computational identity "for proponents of the Language of Thought, this is *all there is* to understanding" (p. 111).

But John Heil says, on Searle's account, "it is not" (p. 111). Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment "makes it clear that there is much more to minds than this;" "a device – a robot perhaps – whose 'brain' realized a semantic engine and thereby satisfied the requirements (of RTM) would no doubt fool us: we should *think* it intelligent, regard it as having a mind" (p. 113, parentheses added). But "we would be wrong," because "at best the device would be simulating intelligence and understanding, in the way a computing machine might produce a simulated weather pattern or an instance of molecular bonding" (p. 113). Searle says, "syntax is not the same as, nor is it by itself sufficient for, semantics" (1994a, p. 200).

Bishop (Eds.), (2002), for example). But, on recognizing the role of AI research: "although many of the claims of the proponents of Artificial Intelligence have been excessive, ill-advised claims of "machines that think" should not lead us to overlook the genuine contribution of this field to the understanding of cognition" (Daddesio, 1995, p. 55).

[73] It is here that further brief discussion of the 'language of thought' is appropriate. Jerry Fodor's work is defining of RTM (a variety of functionalism), which "requires the postulation of a system of symbols that function as 'mental representations'" (see Fodor, 2001; quote from Heil, 2004, p. 107). These symbols (making up "what Fodor calls a 'Language of Thought'") are "a biologically fixed code analogous to the 'machine code' hard-wired into an ordinary computing machine" (Heil, 2004, p. 107). So, "your forming a belief that the window is open is a matter of a sentence in the Language of Thought corresponding to the English sentence 'The window is open,' acquiring an appropriate functional role" or "a matter of this sentence's slipping into your belief box" (p. 107).

Briefly, “because programs are defined purely formally or syntactically, and because minds have an intrinsic mental content,” Searle says, “it follows immediately that the program by itself cannot constitute the mind;” “the formal syntax of the of the program does not by itself guarantee the presence of mental contents” [74] (1994a, p. 200).

From this study of the cognitive sciences’ approaches to the explanation of mind, art theory and education should encounter the explanatory frameworks of cognitive sciences with interest, but reflectively. The following chapters, among the other aims of the study, seek philosophical explanation through Searle’s work, of how that can be done.

5. 4. Conclusion

As a brief summary preceding Searle’s explanation of consciousness: in visual culture, meaning constitutes from cultural discourses. Visual culture is characteristically committed to the semiotic explanation of visual experience. Interest in all symbolic modes of representation as language, or the semiotics of discourse, provides visual culture, its theorists claim, with the epistemic grounds or basis for interdisciplinarity. As a mode of language, imagery, or the visual representation of any phenomena, maintains equivalence across all media. Effort here seeks new explanatory forms to revise traditional epistemic or disciplinary constraints and investigate, particularly the ethics of, emergent cultural phenomena.

From these commitments, the role of language is central to visual culture as the cultural determinant of meaning. Perception here is always already mediated by language in the experience of imagery. The ‘world,’ on this form of account, constructs subjectivity and ‘self’ is culturally determined. The unity of a self is discounted; rather ‘I’ exists as fragments of different discourses. And, in teaching and learning, cultural agency eclipses the role of mental states. Typically, visual culture especially rejects those states pertaining to immediate sensory or perceptual causes in making meaning. Some theorists incorporate a phenomenological aspect of visuality by including those perceptual causes as genetically rule determined drives.

[74] For further, see also (1990b, p. 21); (1984a).

Differently, in aesthetics, meaning constitutes importantly on the role of the senses and felt experience. Disciplinary aesthetics has a longstanding epistemological commitment to accounting for the causal role of qualitative states in knowledge, particularly of art. But in emphasizing the causal role of these mental states, the agency of cultural context diminishes in the establishment of meaning. Teaching and learning here looks to nurturing an innate or dispositional capacity to intuit knowledge of art, from the agency of the 'self.'

On this form of account, language is problematic in that it does not convey the immediacy and intensity of felt states in (predominantly) visual experience. Characteristically, in this intensity of perceptual experience, subjectivity is dominated by non-cognitive causes, as emotion or feeling. And in perceiving something as a 'work of art' this way, we are especially able to apprehend and understand meaning through empathy as shared experience.

Visuality, from these two forms of explanation, rests on a division of agency between the world, or self. The following chapters on consciousness from Searle provide the basis for a different approach.

Chapter 6
Background to the Study of Consciousness

6. Introduction

So far, this study has provided two accounts of visuality, from visual culture and aesthetics. From their explanatory commitments, the accounts diverge in their objects of interest. But, most strongly, they disagree over representation. Each claim different relations between the physical and mental as causes of visuality. Traditionally, these relations are represented as body and mind. Visuality, as perceptual and cognitive, is both biological and mental and explanation must account for both.

John Searle says the old philosophical dichotomy between mind and body, or between physical and mental entities produces beliefs or sets of conflicting beliefs, which "we believe we really cannot give up" (2007, p. 38). Opposing the "physical" and the "mental" as "mutually exclusive classes" in effect stands in the way of resolving the difficulty[1] (1999, p. 69). The beliefs are often tacit in the formulation of knowledge, since they are based in presuppositions and "systematic" ambiguities (1995a, p. 150). Philosophical dichotomies lead to "default positions," reinforced in the way researchers model the problem (1999, p. 69). Searle says the "problem is not with our access to the facts," rather the difficulty lies in the "set of categories we have inherited for dealing with the facts" (p. 69). The "way out" of these unhelpful dichotomies he says, "is to make a *conceptual* revision" (p. 69).

The following four chapters look to Searle's account of consciousness, providing a different approach to the problem of visuality, as how we make meaning from what we see. Searle is a realist. So, to start, this chapter introduces some distinctions he makes concerning philosophical realism and the study of consciousness. These distinctions ensure a non-reductive account of visuality. Realists take as true the world exists and

[1] The problem concerns consciousness: "on the one hand, dualists treat consciousness as a metaphysically distinct, nonphysical problem" (Searle, 1999, p. 68). And "on the other hand, materialists deny its existence as a real and irreducible phenomenon," maintaining "that there really is no such thing as consciousness over and above "material" or "physical" processes described in third-person terms" (p. 68).

that we can have objective knowledge of this world. And on this basis, Searle rejects relativism and its variants including perspectivalism. Perspectivalism he says, confuses epistemic features of descriptions with the ontological features of phenomena. And to understand how consciousness is both real and irreducibly subjective, Searle says, requires understanding distinctions between its ontology, causal capacities, and epistemology.

Searle's account addresses "Why consciousness?" for this study: there is a "special feature" of the human brain as a "biological system" which "makes it differ remarkably from other biological organs" (1994a, p. 227). The human brain has the "capacity to produce and sustain all the enormous variety of our consciousness life" (p. 227). In particular, "the processes that we think of as especially mental," including "perception, learning, inference, decision making, problem solving, the emotions" and so on, are all "in one way or another crucially related to consciousness" (p. 227). Throughout the account of Searle's work the study reintroduces concerns from the previous chapters as they become relevant.

There is one request. Parts of these chapters concern explanation in the sciences as well as philosophy. This may seem to the reader, at times, distant from explanation in the arts. But in these instances, the work is addressing longstanding epistemological constraints, confusions, and errors in accounts of consciousness and its states. It is the sum of these constraints etc. that have marginalized study of the role of mind in the practical arts. It becomes clear that Searle's work provides a means to revise this epistemological exclusion without explanatory reduction of the arts to identity with science. So, I ask for the reader's patience.

6. 0. 1. *Introduction to Realism*

Realists take as true that the world is real, and exists prior to human representations. That is, the world exists apart from what may be thought or believed or said about it. So, representation of reality can occur "in the form of beliefs, experiences, statements,

and theories" but "the foundational principle"[2] of realism is there is "a real world that exists entirely independently of thought"[3] (1993a, p. 60). Description and explanation under these terms presupposes that language "at least on occasion, conforms to that reality" (p. 58). Searle marks these "basic tenets" as "essential to any successful culture" (pp. 58-60). Truth in realism "admits of degrees" that is, a statement might be "only *roughly* true" for example, that a planet is *roughly x* miles from the sun (1995a, p. 200).

From the early 17th Century, development in the "Western Rationalistic Tradition"[4] provides significant extension on the earlier philosophical view of a logically accessible relation between reality and explanation through theorizing, by "matching theoretical constructs against an independently existing reality through systematic experimentation" (1993a, p. 58). Criticism and testing of beliefs occur in this way, under "the most rigorous standards of rationality, evidence, and truth" (pp. 57-58). Describing real events or phenomena, theorizing can include explanation of unobservable entities (Boyd, 1988, p. 188). Socially constructed entities such as "money, property, marriage, and governments" are also aspects of reality (Searle, 1993a, p. 60). Because references to phenomena are independent of the phenomena themselves, claims can be true or false, and knowledge can be revised (Boyd, 1988, p. 182). Backgrounds of "*relevantly, approximately true*"[5] theoretical traditions, which are also "partly tacit" enable epistemically "reliable *regulation* of belief rather than belief *production*" (pp. 190-193). Regulation of this kind includes social, technical and psychological "mechanisms" for criticizing, testing, accepting, or modifying new theories (p. 192). These mechanisms provide for theorizing in practices.

---

[2] Employment of the term *foundational* here should not be construed as relating to foundationalist grounds for legitimation, where "certain foundational beliefs…have an epistemically privileged position" (Boyd, 1988, p. 191).

[3] Some realists hold that the properties of observable and "unobservable" entities "are largely theory-independent" (Boyd, 1988, p. 188).

[4] Searle describes this intellectual tradition as "a very particular conception of truth, reason, reality, rationality, logic, knowledge, evidence, and proof" (1993a, p. 57).

[5] The method for revision of knowledge here is a "paradigm-dependent paradigm-modification strategy" because the "methodological principles at any given time will themselves depend upon the theoretical picture provided by the currently accepted theories" (Boyd, 1988); see also Searle (1969, p. 50).

Under these terms, methodologies of practices can include such legitimate "'tacit' factors" as "'physical intuition(s)'" (pp. 191-192, parentheses added). That is, one "intended consequence" of professional training involves the development of a ""feel" for the issues and the actual physicals materials which the (discipline) studies" (p. 193, parentheses added). As well as the development of knowledge of "explicit theory," intuitions of biological, psychological, and physical kinds function as an "important" part of the epistemic reliability of practices (p. 193). The close relation in a discipline between explicit relevant background theory and the experimental conditions of practices means judgments can "reflect a deeper understanding than that currently captured in explicit theory" (p. 193).

6. 0. 2. *Realism and Truth*

In philosophy, realism contrasts with *instrumentalism* "and its variants," which holds the reality researchers study "is largely constituted by the theories they adopt" (p. 182). As well realism contrasts with *relativism*, which holds that "there are no universal truths about the world" (Pojman, 1999, p. 790). *Cognitive relativist* belief holds, "the world has no intrinsic characteristics, there are just different ways of interpreting it" (p. 790). The *ethical relativist* position assumes that "moral principles are largely a reflection of social constructs or conventions" (Boyd, 1988, p. 182).

There are important distinctions relevant to this study concerning realist ontology as it contrasts with variants of *idealism*[6] including relativism. From previously, aesthetics characteristically maintains some form of idealist commitment. And, relativism primarily forms the ontological or presuppositional basis for postmodern theorizing.

[6] Searle has abandoned use of the term "idealism" (2004a, p. 317). But very broadly, philosophical idealism "presupposes a distinction between appearance and reality, drawn in an other than common-sense way," maintaining "in general that what is real is in some way confined to or at least related to the contents of our own minds," (Hamlyn, 2005, p. 414). The stronger sense of (transcendental) idealism seeks to "in effect construe reality in terms of the contents of an individual mind" (p. 414). Most importantly, the various "forms of idealism" commonly hold the view "that there can be no access to reality apart from what the mind provides us with and further that the mind can provide and reveal to us only its own contents" (p. 415).

Searle's realist concerns with relativism are apparent in the following two arguments or views he addresses[7].

First, relevant to this study, one form of relativism Searle describes is "perspectivalism" (2004a, p. 317). Often tacit, this view tends to treat "the perspective from which something is regarded… – as somehow part of its *ontology*" (p. 317, emphasis added). Perspectivalism argues that "we never have unmediated access to reality," rather reality itself is "always mediated by our perspectives" (Searle in Feser and Postrel, 2000, pp. 44-45). Searle rejects this view and marks out perspectivalism, or "perspectivism"[8] (1999, p. 18) in this respect as problematic because it excludes cognitive access to an independently existing world. The claim that "all knowledge is possessed by human beings who operate in a certain context and from a certain perspective" is, Searle says, trivially true (in Feser and Postrel, 2000, p. 45).

The "recognition of this limitation," that is, the acknowledgment that "accuracy and objectivity are difficult to attain because of the fact that all representation is *from a point of view* and *under some aspects and not others*" is "one of the central *epistemic* principles" of the Western Rationalistic Tradition in its present form (1993a, p. 58, latter emphasis added). To argue that "knowing reality directly as it is in itself requires that it be known *from no point of view*" is "an unjustified assumption to make" (1999, p. 21, emphasis added). Rather, the table I "directly see" in front of me, for instance, is seen "from a point of view" and "I know it from a perspective" (p. 21). So far as the perspectivalist claim of an aspectual shape to knowing, there is no exclusion of our "direct perceptual access to the real world" (p. 21).

Perspectivalism in this sense "is not inconsistent with either realism or the doctrine of epistemic objectivity" (p. 21). However, perspectivalist argument Searle says, goes on to claim that "without a prior vocabulary which it describes or brings to a situation, there would be no facts whatsoever" (p. 21; citing Fay, 1996, p. 72). That is, the

---

[7] Searle offers further consideration of challenges to realism than the two arguments outlined here; see (1995a, pp. 149-197; 1999, pp. 1-37).

[8] Searle identifies the "thread" of perspectivism running through the varieties of idealism in ""deconstruction," "ethnomethodology," "pragmatism," and "social constructionism"" (1999, p. 18).

argument supposes facts "have no independent existence" (p. 22). But to suggest "you can't really know things about the real world or about things as they are in themselves" is, Searle says, "bad argument" (in Feser and Postrel, 2000, p. 45; see also 1999, p. 22). Simply, it does not follow from the fact that someone "must have a vocabulary in order to state the facts, or a language in order to identify and describe the facts" that the facts described or identified "have no independent existence" (1999, p. 22). Rather, "facts are conditions that make statements true, but they are not identical with their linguistic descriptions" [9] (p. 22).

A second argument of relativism that Searle rejects is the "argument from conceptual relativity" (p. 22). The argument goes, that since concepts are made by people, "there is nothing inevitable about the concepts we have for describing reality" (p. 22). The relativity of concepts, the (relativist) argument follows, shows that "external realism is false because we have no access to external reality except through our concepts" (p. 22). This argument against realism then assumes "different conceptual structures give different descriptions of reality" and that "these descriptions are inconsistent with each other" (pp. 22-23). For example "relative to one "conceptual scheme," on being asked for the number of objects in this room, "I may count the various items of furniture" (p. 23). But "relative to another conceptual scheme" someone might not make a distinction between each of the "elements of a set of furniture" and instead treat "the furniture set as one entity" (p. 23). In the first conceptual scheme, there are several objects and in the second, there is one. A conceptual relativist will argue "there is no fact of the matter except relative to a conceptual scheme," and thus further "there is no real world except relative to a conceptual scheme" (p. 23).

But in reality, the world itself is not made inconsistent or relative by the argument. Rather Searle says, the "real world doesn't care about which system of counting we use" (p. 23). Each account "gives us an alternative and true description of the one world, using a different system of counting" (p. 23). There only appears to be a problem

[9] The argument presented here takes the form of a "use-mention fallacy," which "consists in confusing features of a word when it is mentioned with features of the thing referred to by the word when it is used;" that is, the argument supposes "that the linguistic and conceptual nature of the *identification* of a fact requires that the *fact identified* be itself linguistic in nature" (1999, p. 22).

because of the "apparent inconsistency in saying there is only one object and yet there are (several) objects" (p. 23, parentheses added). Both claims "are consistent" as soon as the "nature of the claims is understood" and further, "both are true" (p. 23). The answers, "and there are many examples" of these kinds of things "in daily life," are "true depending on which system of measurement we are using" (p. 23). In this regard "any attempt" to investigate the way things are in the world inevitably "presupposes that there is a way that things are, independently of our claims" (p. 31). Realism is "the framework that is necessary for it to be even possible to hold opinions or theories," otherwise the "very terms" of debate itself "are unintelligible"[10] (p. 32).

6. 1. Ontology, Objectivity, and Subjectivity

Searle makes some important distinctions between ontology and epistemology. The consequences of these distinctions provide the basis for explanation of consciousness and subjectivity. First, generally, in philosophy *ontology* is the name given to the "study of the most general structures displayed by objects" (van Inwagen, 2001, p. 1). Superseding the term metaphysics, ontology now serves as "an appropriate name for the science of being as such" (p. 1). In contrast, *epistemology* is the name given to the "nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope, and general basis" (Hamlyn, 2005, p. 260). Searle says with "any phenomenon, but for biological phenomena especially, we need to know" first, "What is its mode of existence? (ontology);" second, "What does it do? (causation)," and third, "How do we find out about it? (epistemology)" (1991, p. 47).

6. 1. 1. *The World As It Is and Knowing About the World*

To repeat, the most basic assumption of realism, described here as "external realism" (1995a, p. 150) is there is a real world, or universe that exists "totally independent" of representations, such as beliefs or statements about that world (1993a, p. 60). Because there is a reality to which we can refer, we can make statements about it that can be true or false. Searle defends the correspondence view of truth that is, "that truth is a matter

[10] Realism is "not a hypothesis, belief, or philosophical thesis" as such; rather it is part of the "enabling conditions" of consciousness (as the background) and "commitment to realism is exhibited" Searle says, not as a belief I hold that the real world exists, but "by the fact that I live the way I do," that is, "my commitment to the existence of the real world is manifested whenever I do pretty much anything" (1983, pp. 158-159).

of correspondence to facts" (1995a, p. 199). This view assumes that "in general our statements when true correspond to facts" about the world[11] (p. 149).

6. 1. 2. *Basic Facts*

Searle says that culturally, we make "a great deal of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity" (2006a, p. 15). But there is a difficulty when employing the terms that generates confusion. The distinction between the objective and subjective "is systematically ambiguous between an epistemic sense and an ontological sense" (p. 15).

There are many aspects of the world that are "described by our representations" but which, "exist completely independently of those or any other possible representations" about them, such as the actual movement of a planet in its elliptical orbit (1993a, p. 61). These kinds of things, including unobservable or "'theoretical'" entities such as "atoms and electromagnetic fields" exist and will continue to exist whether they are detected or measured or not (Boyd, 1988, p. 188). The world or universe in this sense consists "*entirely* of mindless, meaningless brute physical particles," and is "determined in accordance with causal laws" (Searle, 2004a, p. 318).

To "provide a picture of the world," the model for arriving at "systematic knowledge" of what Searle calls the "basic facts" is the natural sciences (2007, p. 4). This model bases in "simple empirical observations recording sense experiences" (1969, p. 50). The "shared feature" of the concepts organizing this knowledge "are essentially physical, or, in its dualistic version, either physical or mental" (p. 50).

Epistemologically, knowledge of these objects or entities is accepted, tested, or revised on the basis of the "objectivity, certainty and universality" of the facts (2007, p. 27). The knowledge is objective because the truth of claims does "not depend on the feelings or attitudes of the participants in the discussion" (p. 27). Objectivity "in the epistemic sense" means that propositions are "ascertainable by any competent observer" (2005, p. 161). Certainty in this regard means that "the evidence is now so great that it is

[11] Searle sets out more fully the status of *facts* and the correspondence theory of truth, in his chapter, "Truth and Correspondence" (1995a, pp. 199-226).

irrational to doubt" these kinds of fact (2007, p. 27). Universality means those facts are "as true in Vladivostok or Pretoria as they are in Berkeley or London" (p. 27).

6. 1. 3. *Distinctions Between the Ontological Sense and Epistemic Sense of Objectivity and Subjectivity*

Epistemically *objective* judgments relate to "*how the world is in fact*" (1995a, p. 6). For example, ""Matisse lived in Nice during the year 1917;"" Searle says, "we contrast" such "completely objective judgments" with epistemically subjective judgments (1994a, p. 94). Epistemically *subjective* judgments "depend on certain attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and the hearers of the judgment," for example, ""Van Gogh is a better artist than Matisse"" (p. 94). While these judgments can be made and argued[12], such kinds of judgments are *subjective*. Epistemically subjective judgments contrast with "objectively true judgments," in which there is correspondence with "objective facts" (1995a, p. 8). Searle notes "it should be obvious" from the examples he uses that the "contrast between epistemic objectivity and epistemic subjectivity is a matter of degree" (p. 8).

As well as a distinction between objectivity and subjectivity in the *epistemic* sense, there is another objective-subjective distinction, in the *ontological* sense. The most basic "conception of reality," described by atomic and evolutionary biology theories in the natural sciences provides knowledge of natural kinds of entities and their systemic relations, for example "mountains," "molecules" and "babies" (p. 6). In the *ontological* sense the distinction between *subjective* and *objective* "(ascribes) modes of existence" (p. 8, parentheses added). Mountains in this sense are ontologically objective because "their mode of existence is independent of any perceiver or mental state" (p. 8). Some of these systems are biological and further, some of these biological entities have evolved particular structures such as nervous systems "capable of causing and sustaining consciousness" (p. 6).

[12] One aspect of the correspondence or relation of language to reality Searle notes (in another context), is that "People can say, "You've said something true or false, or relevant, or irrelevant, or intelligent or stupid" – and that's a remarkable fact" (in Feser and Postrel, 2000, p. 46).

Consciousness is a “biological and therefore physical” as well as “mental feature” of human and some animal nervous systems (p. 6), functioning as “an inner qualitative, subjective state typically present in humans and the higher mammals” (1998a, p. 1936). The experience of these states, for instance feeling pains, is *ontologically subjective* because “their mode of existence depends on being felt by subjects” (1995a, p. 8). Searle says “the statement “I now have a pain in my lower back” is completely objective” since it “is made true by the existence of an actual fact” (1994a, p. 94). The statement refers to a pain that is “*not* dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers” (p. 94, emphasis added). But “the phenomenon itself, the actual pain itself, has a *subjective mode of existence*” (p. 94, emphasis added).

To summarize: it is possible to make different kinds of epistemic or knowledge claims, for example “*epistemically subjective* statements” can be about objects or entities that are “*ontologically objective*” (1995a, p. 8, emphasis added). The statement ““Mt. Everest is more beautiful than Mt. Whitney”” involves a subjective judgment about “ontologically objective entities”(pp. 8-9). We can also report an “epistemically objective fact” such as, ““I now have a pain in my lower back;”” but the phenomenon reported, in this case pain, has an *ontologically* “*subjective* mode of existence” (p. 9, emphasis added). In this way we can make epistemically objective statements about ontologically subjective entities.

6. 1. 4. *The Ontology of Subjectivity*

Discussing “consciousness as subjective,” in the sense of subjectivity Searle refers to here, is “an ontological category” and not “an epistemic mode” (1994a, p. 94). To recover the ground briefly, Searle says judgments are often spoken of “as being “subjective” when we mean that their truth or falsity cannot be settled “objectively”” (p. 94). We contrast “such subjective judgments with completely objective judgments,” because with objective judgments “we can ascertain what sorts of facts in the world make them true or false independent of anybody’s attitudes or feelings about them” (p. 94). When we say ““I now have a pain in my lower back”” the statement is objective; the fact of the pain is independent of any observer’s “stance, attitudes, or opinions” (p. 94).

But the "phenomenon itself, the actual pain itself, has a subjective mode of existence" and "what is true of pains is true of conscious states generally" (p. 94). That is, for it to be a conscious experience, "it must be *somebody's*" conscious experience (p. 94). To take the example of pain, there is a "much stronger sense in which the pain must be "*somebody's* pain" than "the sense in which a leg must be somebody's leg" (p. 94). We can see for instance that "leg transplants are possible; in that sense, pain transplants are not" (p. 94).

So, felt states are real. They have a mode of existence that is subjective. But how can these states be put into description as part of our natural life and relevant to understanding the way the world works? Searle considers the history of epistemology to clarify some problems with accounting for consciousness to now.

6. 1. 5. *Traditional Epistemic Modeling and the Subjectivity of Conscious States*

The first-person ontology of consciousness makes the study of consciousness different to the study of other phenomena. Searle looks at how the models we have for arriving at knowledge of the world create problems in the study of consciousness. Subjectivity is a "special feature" of consciousness and its "states and processes" that is "not possessed by other natural phenomena" (p. 93). The subjectivity of conscious states means the study of consciousness itself is "recalcitrant to the conventional methods of biological and psychological research, and most puzzling to philosophical analysis" (p. 94). Since the 17th Century consciousness has been "excluded" epistemically from "the natural world" in the belief it was not part of that world (p. 93). This may have been Searle says, "a useful heuristic device" at the time but it has led to "disastrous effects" (pp. 93-95). The "exclusion was based on a falsehood," which "has prevented us from arriving at an understanding of consciousness" (p. 93).

There has been a "persistent failure to recognise and come to terms with the fact that *the ontology of the mental is an irreducibly first-person ontology*" (p. 95, emphasis added). The real "world described by physics and chemistry and biology," is a world that "contains an ineliminably subjective element" (p. 95). Consciousness is a "natural biological phenomenon;" but there are "very deep reasons" historically Searle says,

"why we find it difficult" to accept that the material world contains an irreducibly subjective "element" (pp. 93-95). Searle says because of the first-person nature of subjectivity, the "special relation" I have "to my conscious states" is "not like my relation to other people's conscious states" and also "they in turn have a relation to their conscious states, which is not like my relation to their conscious states"[13] (p. 95). As well, subjectivity has the "consequence that all of my conscious forms of intentionality[14] that give me information about the world independent of myself are always from a special point of view" (p. 95). That is, the "world itself has no point of view" however, "my access to the world through my conscious states" is "always from my point of view" (p. 95).

How can we know consciousness as both a real part of the physical universe *and* subjective, when we "think of the world as consisting of particles" and all the features of this natural world including biological systems made up of those particles? (p. 96). To form a "picture" of the world in this way, we imagine it with our "inner eye" in terms of "gross visible features" that are "completely objective" (p. 96). We understand these objective features "in consequence," as being "equally accessible to all competent observers" (p. 96). Whenever "we are asked to form a world *view* or a world *picture*" in the manner of observations, "we form these on the model of vision" (p. 96). But this creates a problem with "something that is irreducibly subjective" (p. 96). When we try to "visualize the world" we are unable to "*see consciousness*"[15] (p. 96, emphasis added).

The "very subjectivity of consciousness" in these terms "makes it invisible in the crucial way" (p. 96). The difficulty is that "if I try to observe the consciousness of another," then "what I observe is not his subjectivity but simply his conscious behavior, his structure and the causal relations between structure and behavior" (p. 97). I may further "observe the casual relations between both structure and behavior" and "the environment that impinges on him and on which he in turn impinges" (p. 97). I cannot

[13] This is not an argument for "privileged access" (1994a, p. 95, n.5).

[14] Briefly, the term intentionality here refers to the "property of many mental states and events" to represent "objects and states of affairs in the world" (Searle, 1983, p. 1).

[15] Searle says that "*if we try to draw a picture of someone else's consciousness, we just end up drawing the other person* (perhaps with a balloon coming out of their head)" and "*if we try to draw our own consciousness, we end up drawing whatever it is that we are conscious of*" (1994a, p. 96).

“observe someone else’s consciousness as such” (p. 97). But “what about my own inner goings-on? Can I not observe those?” (p. 97).

Again, it is “the very fact of subjectivity, which we were trying to observe,” that “makes such an observation impossible” (p. 97). What of the common view of introspection that is, the capacity “we have to *spect intro*” or look inside ourselves? (p. 144). Searle says, “our idea of an objectively observable reality presupposes the notion of observation that is itself ineliminably subjective” (p. 98). There is “no way for us to picture subjectivity as part of our world view because, so to speak, the subjectivity in question is the picturing” (p. 98). This point is important for understanding description of first-person states, so it is worth further account.

6. 1. 6. *Understanding the Subjectivity of Consciousness*

Searle addresses “several standard mistakes about the nature of consciousness” (1999, p. 69). The mistakes of *introspection* from above, and *privileged access* are among those that are “commonly made” (p. 69). The visual models that work for the observation of other events cannot provide for knowledge of our own subjective states. We cannot assume we have a “special capacity” for “introspecting” our conscious states (1994a, pp. 143-144); it is a “mistake” in the “philosophical tradition” (1999, p. 72).

Commonsense or ordinary usage of the word *introspection* suggests that people often introspect their own conscious states for example, examining their feelings closely in relation to an important decision that must be made. The problem with this everyday use Searle says, is that philosophers take the metaphor of introspection “literally” (1994a, p. 144). The metaphor is modelled on visual capacity (p. 144). But the “model of vision requires a distinction between the act of perceiving and the object perceived” (1999, p. 72). In the case of “conscious subjectivity” there can be no “distinction between the observation and the thing observed, between the perception and the object perceived” (1994a, p. 97). The “introspection” of one’s own conscious state “is itself that conscious state” (p. 97).

There is another philosophical term suggesting we have special kind of access to our mental states. The "metaphor of *privileged access*" is "even more confused" than the "commonsense metaphor of introspection" in that it "substitutes a "visual metaphor" with a "spatial metaphor" (p. 98, emphasis added). On the spatial model, consciousness is "like a private room into which only we are allowed to enter" (p. 98). But Searle says, "there has to be something to which I have privileged access;" that is, ""I would have to be different from the space I enter" (p. 98). Like the visual metaphor of introspection, the "metaphor of a private inner space breaks down" because "I cannot make the necessary distinctions between the three elements of myself, the act of entering, and the space in which I am supposed to enter" (p. 98).

Instead, one mental state can be directed "at another," that is, "we can think about our thoughts and feelings" (p. 144). Further "we can have feelings about our thoughts and feelings;" but there is no "special faculty of introspection" (p. 144). The "solution" here is not trying "to develop a special mode of picturing, a kind of super-introspection" but instead, "to stop picturing altogether at this point" and "just acknowledge" that "conscious mental phenomena" are "irreducibly subjective" (p. 99). The "idea of (ontologically) subjective representations of reality" means that the "ontology of observation – as opposed to its epistemology – is precisely the ontology of subjectivity" (p. 99).

The "traditional Cartesian conception of the mind" holds that "first-person reports of mental states are somehow *incorrigible*" (pp. 144-145, emphasis added). That is, they have the "property of not being open to correction" (Abraham, 2005, p. 425). The thesis of incorrigibility holds that "we can't be mistaken about the contents of our own minds" (Searle, 1994a, p. 145). But, Searle says that "it is a mistake to suppose that our knowledge of our own conscious states is certain and incorrigible" (1999, p. 72). The problem might come about because we confuse "the subjective ontology of the mental with epistemic certainty" (1994a, p. 145). But "from the fact of subjective ontology" Searle says, "it does not follow that one cannot be mistaken about one's mental states" (p. 145). While there is "an asymmetry" between "the way I have access to my conscious states and the way that you have access to my conscious states," the

asymmetry "does not imply that I cannot be mistaken about my conscious states"[16] (1999, p. 70). Searle says that "there are several different dimensions" in which mistakes about "our own conscious states" can be made[17] (p. 70).

6. 1. 7. *Clarification of the Term 'Consciousness'*

Searle proposes a "common-sense definition" of consciousness[18] as "those states of *sentience* or *awareness* that typically begin when we wake from a dreamless sleep and continue through the day until we fall asleep again, die, go into a coma or otherwise

---

[16] For an extended analysis of the asymmetry, or difference between "the way I stand to my mental states, and therefore the way I stand to reports of my mental states" and "the way that other people stand to my mental states" based on the appearance/reality distinction, see Searle (1994a, pp. 145-149).

[17] The mistakes are relevant to accounting for mental states. First, we "can be wrong about our own conscious states" in that "we simply deceive ourselves" (1999, p. 70). One "very common form" of self-deception occurs when the "agent has a motive or reason for not admitting" to themselves that they are "in a certain mental state" (1994a, p. 147). This "self-deception" can occur "because it is too painful to confront" some "feelings and attitudes" and "we (sincerely) refuse to admit" them, "even to ourselves" (1999, p. 70, parentheses adapted from 1994a, p. 148). The resistance or refusal in acknowledging some of our own mental states, "requires unconscious mental processes," for example "you can consciously and sincerely claim that you intend to give up smoking" but unconsciously know that you "have no such intention" (1999, p. 71). The "second source of errors about our own conscious states," which is "related to self-deception" is "misinterpretation"(p. 71). For example "in a moment of great emotion" a person may quite "sincerely think" they "are in love" (p. 71). Later the person realises "that at the time (they) simply misinterpreted (their own) feelings" (1994a, p. 148, parentheses added). Searle says that "crucial to this sort of case is the operation of the Network and the Background" of the person experiencing the realization (p. 148). Here, it is a question of "locating a piece in a puzzle relative to a whole lot of other pieces" (p. 148). A third very "common source of error" is "related to" misinterpretation (1999, p. 71). There are "many mental states," which are "conceptually tied to our behaviour under certain descriptions" (p. 71). I might say for example that, "I have a firm and unconditional intention to do something" such as "write a book," or "stop smoking" (p. 71). But subsequently, I have not exhibited any "disposition to do the thing" (p. 71). My behaviour provides us with reasonable doubt "that I made a correct attribution of an intention to myself" (p. 71). That is, my "subsequent behaviour proves (I was) wrong" to think I had "really made up (my) mind" (p. 71, parentheses added). Searle says "there are many important mental concepts, such as intending, deciding or performing actions," which "in fact straddle the categories of the conscious states and behaviour" (p. 71). The intentional performance of "writing a book" for instance, "unlike the mere thought" of it, "has all sorts of physical aspects" in that "I actually have to do something" and "move (my body) in certain ways if I am to be writing a book" (p. 71, parentheses added). Searle says "it is a mistake to suppose that there is a clean separation between the verbal categories that apply to consciousness and those that apply to subsequent behaviour" (p. 71). The "fourth form of mistake" that Searle describes "about our own conscious states," concerns "inattention" (p. 72). That is, "in the sheer chaotic busyness of life" (1994a, p. 148) we "simply don't pay enough attention to the ways in which our consciousness is proceeding" (1999, p. 72). Such "inattention" to our own conscious states can occur for example when we think that, "we are firmly committed to a certain political stance" (p. 72). However over time we realize that without having noticed it, "our political preferences have changed" (p. 72). Such a case concerns "a whole Network of intentionality," where the Network shifts "without (our) being aware of it" (1994a, p. 148, parentheses added).

[18] The work of such a definition "is to identify the target of scientific investigation" in contrast to analytic definitions, which "typically come at the *end*" of the investigation (Searle, 1998a, p. 1936, parentheses added).

become 'unconscious'"[19] (1998a, p. 1936). He attends to some of the "consequences" of this definition (p. 1936). Consciousness in terms of the given definition "should not be confused with attention," because consciousness can be present without attention to a particular object, for example, the feeling of my feet on the floor (p. 1936). Also, consciousness also should not be "confused with self-consciousness" (p. 1936). Self-consciousness "is a very special form of consciousness, perhaps peculiar to humans and the higher mammals" and refers to states "in which the subject is aware of himself or herself"[20](p. 1936). There are forms of consciousness, for example the feeling of pain, which "do not necessarily involve the consciousness of the self as a self" (p. 1936).

6. 2. Mental States and Causal Explanation

The physical sciences' generation of a picture of the world as one "consisting of brute facts," that is the physical facticity of phenomena or events is "taken to form the model for all knowledge" (1969, p. 50). Description and explanation of this kind refers "to an entity that is out there and that is assumed to exist independently of a conscious observer" (Edelman, 2001, p. 11). This model means physical (such as chemical), systems or events for example, can be explained because the *behaviours* of these kinds of things can be observed or theorized. These behaviours are constrained by necessity, or "causal laws" (Searle, 2004a, p. 318). That is, we can or should be able to cite the "causally sufficient conditions" that determine the behaviour of the event (2007, p. 39). In this way "we think explanations of natural phenomena should be completely deterministic," for example why an earthquake "*had* to occur" (pp. 38-39).

But the advantage of prediction this model supports (Edelman, 2001, p. 11) constrains knowledge of some objects of explanation since there are other kinds of natural events that do not fit this description. For example, "biological systems, unlike physical systems, do not have rigid laws" (Crick and Koch, 2004, p. 1133). The differences in

[19] Also, broadly given in Edelman and Tononi (2001, p. 3); Koch (2004a, p. 1107).

[20] To explain more fully, Searle says that self-consciousness is "an extremely sophisticated form of sensibility" where "in any conscious state we can shift our attention" from the object, "to the state itself" (1994a, p. 143). Searle provides an example of this kind of attention, referring to the method of impressionist painters; the artists "shifted their attention from the object to the actual visual experience they had when they looked at the object" (1994a, p. 143).

understanding and explaining these kinds of systems require distinction from analyses typical of more predictable kinds of phenomena. To return to the model of the physical sciences briefly: in principle water, for instance, can be described both in "ordinary language" as colourless and tasteless and scientifically "in terms of atoms and the laws of quantum mechanics" (Edelman, 2001, p. 11). But when *consciousness*, or *mental states or events* are investigated "we encounter an asymmetry" because "no amount of description will ever be able to account fully for a subjective experience, no matter how accurate that description may be" (p. 11).

So, in contrast to examples of water or the movement of tectonic plates, for such things as mental phenomena it is "impossible to have deterministic explanations" (Searle, 2007, p. 39). There is predictability in what causes the processes of events such as an earthquake. But the physical sciences' model of explanation cannot provide the same certainty (as "causally sufficient conditions") in accounting for the "experience of acting "freely" or "voluntarily"" for example (p. 39). There is a difficulty in these cases of explaining the *mental* in relation to the *physical* because in the Cartesian tradition, there is a supposition that these represent "two kinds of substances or properties in the world" (1994a, p. 13). There is "no logical connection, no necessary connection between inner, subjective, qualitative mental states and external, publicly observable behavior"[21] (2002a, p. 16). Searle says, "in actual fact, conscious states characteristically cause behavior;" but the "behavior that they cause has to be distinguished from the states themselves" (p. 16).

6. 2. 1. *Consciousness as an Object of Knowledge*

In spite of being unobservable to others and thus challenging for scientific research, consciousness is "the central mental notion" in accounts of the mind (1994a, p. 84). The "uncertainties faced by both philosophers and scientists when dealing with consciousness" has meant previously, "science has always tried to eliminate the subjective from its description of the world" (Edelman, 2001, p. 10, emphasis deleted). The challenges faced in accounting for consciousness mean that while the "subjective

[21] Explanation of "the physical nature of a mental phenomenon" in the empirical view is traditionally problematic (Nagel, 1974, p. 436); see also Edelman and Tononi (2001, pp. 10-11).

character of experience" is the "most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena," it is "very poorly understood" (Nagel, 1974, p. 436). Consciousness may vary in form between humans and (in Thomas Nagel's now famous example) bats, but "the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism" (p. 436). In this way, while philosophy and the sciences mark out areas of "special competence" (Searle, 1998a, p. 1935), in the case of consciousness there is agreement that the subjective or qualitative nature of experience is a key concern. For Searle, the role of philosophy in the investigation "is in part an attempt to reach the point where we can have systematic knowledge"[22] (p. 1936). In the neurosciences, accounts of consciousness at present seek to integrate "into a scientific framework" two "key classes of data," that is, "*third-person*" data or "data about behaviour and brain processes" and "*first-person*" data or the qualitative nature of subjectivity[23] (Chalmers, 2004, p. 1111).

6. 2. 2. *Consciousness as Both Biological and Mental*

Conscious states occur as a result of biological processes; "neurophysiological processes" in the brain" cause mental phenomena, which are "themselves features of the brain"[24] (Searle, 1994a, p. 1). How the neurophysiology of the brain can cause the range of mental events occurring as consciousness is a significant object of concern for both philosophy and the neurosciences (see for example Frackowiak et al (Eds.), 2004; Gazzaniga (Ed.), 2004). Philosophy and the psychological and cognitive sciences[25] seek

---

[22] Searle's reference to this effort reflects the metaphor of philosophy's "traditional role as midwife to the sciences" (quote from Burge, 1992, p. 19).

[23] It is appropriate to note that of the scientists referred to here, Searle says Francis Crick and Gerald Edelman among others "think" as Searle does, "that brain processes… cause consciousness;" but differently, Searle says, David Chalmers and others "think that brains are just one type of computational or information-processing device that can sustain consciousness" (1998b, p. 56). For exchanges between Searle and various researchers concerning consciousness, see Searle (1998b). See also Chalmers recently on the expectation of science to explain the first-person data of consciousness "in a non-reductive form" (2004, p. 1113). The frameworks in which first- and third-person data are investigated "is controversial" and subject to ongoing discussion (p. 1113). The ontological irreducibility of the subjective nature of mental events provides the basis for Searle's explanation of consciousness; see Searle (1998b).

[24] Searle distinguishes this description from other philosophical views of mind, as "biological naturalism" (1994a, p. 1). The term "biological naturalism" for Searle "emphasizes the biological character of mental states, and avoids both materialism and dualism" (2004b, p. 113). For defence of this view, see "What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind" (1994a, p. 1-26); or for summary of theses, see (2004b, pp. 113-115).

[25] The relation between these fields is recognized. Searle says that from the "beginnings of the discipline" he has "been a practicing "cognitive scientist"" (1994a, p. 197). The "advent of cognitive science and the

to address the "causal relations between "mental" phenomena and "physical" phenomena" and in Searle's account, "in a way that avoids epiphenomenalism" [26] (1994a, p. 1-2). Differences exist in arguments over the best means for addressing the "problem of consciousness" (1998a, p. 1938). But for Searle, investigating consciousness seeks to address "the problem of accounting for the existence of our ontologically subjective states of awareness" (p. 1938).

Like "solidity, liquidity, and transparency" consciousness is an example of "causally emergent system features" [27] (1994a, p. 111). That is, some features of systems can be "deduced or figured out or calculated" from the way the features are "composed and arranged," for example the "shape, weight, and velocity" of a stone (p. 111). But "other system features cannot be figured out just from the composition of the elements and environmental relations" (p. 111). In these cases, the features "have to be explained in terms of the *causal interactions* among the elements"(p. 111, emphasis added). Consciousness can be understood in this way as "an emergent feature of certain systems of neurons in the same way that solidity and liquidity are emergent features of systems of molecules"[28] (p. 112). Further in relation to causal explanation, commitment to the "old Cartesian categories of the mental and the physical" (2007, p. 48) meant dualists sought to characterize mental phenomena as "not part of the ordinary physical world" but as "something over and above it" (2004b, p. 127). But, Searle says that "we are not talking about two independent things, consciousness and neuronal processes;" rather the

---

development of neurobiology" enabled significant "cooperative endeavors between philosophers and scientists" (2004a, p. 319). Cognitive science as such "was invented in large part by philosophers and philosophically minded psychologists" who tired of behaviourism (p. 319).

[26] Epiphenomenalism is a "species of dualism" (Horn, 2005, pp. 258-259), holding that mental events are caused by physical events, but are not themselves a cause of physical events. Some realist explanations are seen to lead to epiphenomenalist commitments, for example Donald Davidson's *anomalous monism* (p. 258). For Searle the significance of avoiding epiphenomenalism in accounting for conscious states, as I understand it, concerns recognition of the causal efficacy of mental states in conscious actions, as "macro-level" features or the "macrophenomena" of a complex system although they are "grounded in the micro-level neurobiological features" or "microstructures" of brain processes (1998a, pp. 1938-1939).

[27] Searle marks out the term "'emergent property'" as "so confused in the literature" that it doesn't provide a "very clear notion," so his inclusion of the term is "careful" (1998a, p. 1940) and functions in what he hopes is an "unmysterious sense" (1997, p. 103).

[28] Searle says it is important to understand that "the model of different levels of layers of description of a system" cannot be explained in terms of a "part-whole relation" (1995b, p. 217). For instance "solidity and liquidity are features of physical systems at a higher level than that of molecules" (p. 217). However "solidity and liquidity are not parts of the molecules nor are they parts of the system composed of molecules;" they are just "higher level *features* of systems that are not *parts* of the system" (p. 217).

conversation is “about the same system at different levels” (p. 128). However, establishing causal relations is challenging.

Different levels of causal identification are “real” but there is a “*causal reality constraint*” on the explanations (1997, p. 104). That is, “we have to cite real features of the real world which function causally” (p. 104). To be a “real level” Searle says that a “putative causal level has to be appropriately related to the more fundamental levels,” for instance by “being a causally emergent property of those levels” (p. 104). Physical systems such as the brain “have different levels of description” (p. 103). A “causal explanation” of cognitive function, for example, “can range from conscious processes of decision making, at the top level, to the molecular structure of neurotransmitters, at the bottom” (p. 103). Higher levels “typically,” will be “causally emergent properties of the behaviour and organization of the elements of the brain at the lower levels” (p. 103). But the “causal powers of consciousness and the causal powers of its neuronal base are exactly the same” (2004b, p. 127).

6. 2. 3. *The Problem of Ontological Reduction and the Irreducibility of Consciousness*

Searle rejects ontological reduction of subjective states. That is, Searle says consciousness is irreducibly subjective. Irreducibility in this sense means the existence of the first-person aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced to, or made identical with, any “third-person objective features” for example, neurobiology (2005, p. 161).

This point is crucial to the study on two counts. First, the experience of consciousness as irreducibly first-person provides the basis for representation of subjectivity as first-person states. To now, confusion over this point has marginalized study of first-person as subjective states from mainstream epistemology. And accounting those states proceeds without the constraint of explanatory reduction of those states to behaviour; this point is taken up further in the following section. Second, from the previous account of debates in cognitive science (in Chapter 5), the disposition to represent the mind as a symbol processing system lends itself to the reduction or elimination of non-systematic features of mind, particularly the qualitative, felt aspect of mental states.

But, from Searle's account, the essential feature of consciousness consists in its first-person aspect . Explanation from the cognitive sciences, I suggest in the last chapter, should be treated reflectively in art and education. But addressing the problem at base concerns discrimination among accounts from the sciences when they are applied in these different contexts. The issue is not simple, because the presuppositions informing the accounts are commonly tacit. In properly accounting the role of mind in practices it is crucial, I think, to distinguish between reductive and non-reductive accounts. And, the reasons for this caution concern the following.

The view that mental states "are not something in addition to physical phenomena; rather they can be reduced to, and are forms of, physical states" is the basis Searle says, for a materialist view of mind [29]. By extension, this includes the more recent functionalist view[30]. Both forms of explanation are widely taken up. But, Searle says

[29] Materialism rejects the belief in two properties or substances entailed in dualism, deriving instead from a monist that is, single property or substance view of the world. Monism occurs as "mentalist monism" or "materialist monism" (Searle, 2004b, p. 48). Mentalist monism underpins *idealism*, or the belief that "everything is ultimately mental," and materialist monism is the basis of *materialism*, which holds the view that "everything is ultimately physical or material" (1998b, p. 135). Very roughly, these are the distinctions played out in the ontologies typically underpinning philosophical aesthetics (as mentalist) and visual culture (as materialist). As a realist, Searle rejects idealism but also argues against materialism on the basis that the view reduces the existence of mental states such as "beliefs, desires, pains etc." to physical states and in this way eliminates the existence of mental phenomena (p. 136). Perhaps the best example of a materialist view affecting the philosophy and psychology of education in the 20th Century can be seen in the case of *behaviourism*, where mental states are considered "just patterns of behavior and dispositions to behavior," that is, "bodily movements which have no accompanying mental component" (p. 137). The clinical psychologist B. F. Skinner was a significant proponent of behaviourism (see Skinner, 1953); his views have been valued in educational research even in the latter part of the 20th Century (see for example Skinner, 1982). Skinner and other behaviourists "attacked the notion of consciousness" (Fotion, 2000, p. 150). Forms of materialism provide the current succession to behaviourist views (see following note).

[30] In contemporary philosophy of mind, a more recent variation on materialism and behaviourism is *functionalism*, which is the view that "mental states are functional states and functional states are physical states; but they are functional states in virtue of their causal relations" (Searle, 1998b, p. 141). Functionalism "provides a highly schematic conception of the mind" (Heil, 2004, p. 106). Functionalism holds there are only standard causal relations that is, there are "no intrinsic features" of mental states (Snowdon, 2005, p. 324; see also Searle, 2004b, p. 63) and is "the most widely held theory of the relation between mind and body among philosophers today" (Searle, 1998b, p. 139). On the functionalist view of mind, the notion of *mental activity* "can be thought of as brain activity described at the functional level of analysis and implies that we can study how the brain functions independently of studying the physical structure of the brain" (Kosslyn and Hatfield, 1984, p. 1026). The idea behind this, "was to show that there is no essential connection between psychological properties and physical properties" (for the "in principle" reason that psychological states "might occur in quite different physical or physiological substrata") (p. 1027).

that each of these views is reductionist[31]. And their various forms hold significantly problematic outcomes[32].

6. 2. 4. *Causal Reduction cf. Ontological Reduction of Consciousness*

Searle's view of consciousness "is a form of causal reduction" as he has "defined the problem;" that is, "mental features are caused by neurological features" (1994a, p. 115). In scientific definitions where there is causal reduction however, this can "tend to lead to ontological reductions"[33] (p. 115). For example the colour *red* is ontologically redefined or reduced in some theories to "photon emissions," where "it follows trivially that the color red *is nothing but* photon emissions of 600 nanometers" (p. 115, emphasis added). The purpose of the account in such a case is "toward greater generality, objectivity, and redefinition in terms underlying causation" (p. 116).

In contrast, attempting the same reduction ontologically with consciousness arrives at an "apparently shocking asymmetry" (p. 116). Mental phenomena do not reduce to physical phenomena; they "continue to have mental properties" that is, *the qualitative and subjective features of the mental remain* (2004b, p. 58). Consciousness "is causally reducible to brain processes;" but even a "perfect science of the brain would not lead to an ontological reduction of consciousness" in the same way the sciences theoretically

---

[31] Materialist accounts and their variations are "usually taken" either to deny the existence of the "irreducible and ineliminable character of consciousness and intentionality" as "*eliminativism*," or if they exist, "they are really something else" as third-person phenomena, brain or functional or computational states, as "*reductionism*" (Searle, 2007, p. 20, emphasis added).

[32] Searle says "the functionalist is emphatically not saying that a belief is an irreducible mental state which *in addition* has these causal relations, but rather that being a belief *consists* entirely in having these causal relations" (1998b, p. 140). The functionalist commitment in this way eliminates "any mental component" in explanation of causal relations (p. 140). Functional accounts of mind in psychology and artificial intelligence research, from previously, view "the mind in the body as something like a computer in a robot" (Harman, 1990, p. 31). Kosslyn and Hatfield say "this approach to understanding the relationship between mind and body has sometimes led experimental psychologists to believe there is little point in studying how the brain works" (1984, p. 1027); but, the assumption (of equivalence of implementation systems) on which the functionalist/ computationalist model bases, Kosslyn and Hatfield say "is unfortunate" (p. 1027). Searle's original argument against computationalism (1980a) that is, the view that ""mental states are computational states" of the brain, or "strong AI" (1994a, p. 21) initiated and continues to generate substantial discourse on the issue; refer Selected Bibliography on the "Chinese Room" debate in Preston and Bishop (Eds.), (2002). Searle says there is a " reluctance to accept the consequences of ontological subjectivity" in philosophy, psychology and the cognitive sciences, where confusion exists between the ontological, causal and epistemic status of questions in the investigation of mental states (1991, pp. 46-47).

[33] For more systematic treatment of the various kinds of reductionism in philosophy of science, see Searle (1994a, p. 112-116).

reduce such things as "heat, solidity, colour, or sound" to their physics (1994a, p. 116). When a theory reduces the ontology of colour to photon emissions for example, theorists are eliminating the appearances of the colour as a real feature of the thing, retaining only the physical features of the object[34] (pp. 120-123). But it is the "subjective appearances" of mental states (p. 119) that are the phenomena here "that interest us the most" (p. 121). This is because "consciousness consists in the appearances themselves"[35] (p. 122).

6. 2. 5. *Irreducibility of Subjective or First-Person Features of Consciousness*

The problem of irreducibility here involves "a point about what real features exist in the world and not, except derivatively, about how we know about those features" (p. 117). To illustrate the distinction, in the case of pain, the statement ""I am now in pain"" refers to "the fact that you are having certain unpleasant conscious sensations" as well as "experiencing these sensations from your subjective, first-person point of view" (p. 117). The sensations in this case "are constitutive of your present pain" (p. 117). And it is also true that "underlying neurophysiological processes" are causing the pain (p. 117).

But there is a distinction between the neurophysiology of the event, pain, and the qualitative felt first-person experience of the sensations. The "objective, third-person patterns of neuron firings" cannot reduce to "the subjective, first-person sensation of pain" (p. 117). We are not able to say, "the pain is really "nothing but" the patterns of neuron firings" (p. 117). Should we try "such an ontological reduction" Searle says,

---

[34] For background and rationale for the appearance/reality distinction in reductionism, see Searle (1994a, pp. 118-124).

[35] In rejecting the appearances of a phenomenon in the empirical tradition, there is an attempt to get at the "underlying physical reality" that is, "in part" to distinguish "between "objective physical reality" on the one hand and mere "subjective appearance" on the other" (Searle, 1994a, p. 122). Generally, the "pattern of our reductions" Searle says, "rests on rejecting the subjective epistemic basis for the presence of a property as part of the ultimate constituent of that property" (p. 122). For instance, "we find out about heat or light by seeing or feeling" (p. 122). Definition of the phenomenon then occurs "in a way that is independent of the epistemology" (p. 122). But from previously, the "epistemic bases," here *are* the appearances, as the qualitative, subjective nature of consciousness (p. 122). Searle says the irreducibility of consciousness does not have any "deep metaphysical consequences for the unity of our overall scientific world view," rather it is a "trivial consequence of the pragmatics of our definitional practices" (p. 122). The problem "merely shows" that consciousness "by definition, is excluded from a certain pattern of reduction" (p. 122).

“the essential features of the pain would be left out” (p. 117). The “first-person character of the pain” cannot be conveyed through “description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts” (p. 117). The “first-person features” of the pain “are different from the third-person features” (p. 117).

6. 2. 6. *Epistemology and Explanation of the Irreducibility of Subjectivity*

While it is an argument about ontology, Searle says there are “obvious epistemic consequences” to the fact of the irreducibility of a “subjective, first-person point of view” (p. 118). In the case of the “essential features” of subjectivity, “my knowledge that I am in pain has a different sort of basis to my knowledge that you are in pain” (pp. 117-118). In the case of consciousness, argument for causal reduction of mental features to neurobiological features admits neurobiological cause of mental states. But *causal* reduction here does not commit to a corresponding *ontological* reduction of the subjective features of experience in the way of ontological reduction of colour to photon emissions. The “*subjective, qualitative, first-person, experiential phenomena*” of consciousness means that the experience of something *appears or feels to the person involved, in a certain way or like something* (2004b, p. 96, emphasis added).

The existence or ontology of “subjective “mental” experiences” is held to be non-reducible by Searle “*according to standard patterns of reduction*” on the grounds that ontological reduction usually concerns elimination of “the mere “subjective” appearance” of phenomena from “the “objective physical reality”” (1994a, p. 122-124). But “in the case of consciousness” Searle says, “*the appearance is the reality*;” that is, the subjective appearance of reality is in this case the aspect of reality to be understood (pp. 121-122). The existence of mental states can neither be “explained away as some kind of illusion,” nor “eliminated by some sort of redefinition” (1984b, p. 10).

6. 3. Conclusion

Searle makes crucial distinctions for the study of mind, or consciousness. The existence of consciousness is an objective fact about the world. There is a requirement on investigation involving mind to remember consciousness is irreducibly subjective.

Searle rejects materialist views that eliminate the special feature of mental states, that is, their intrinsically subjective or first-person qualitative mode of existence. Consciousness is causally reducible to neurological features. But it cannot be in the same way ontologically reducible to those features. This distinction from other physical and even nonconscious biological entities makes the study of consciousness different to study of those other phenomena, posing particular problems in explanation. But it is possible to make epistemically objective claims about ontologically subjective states. Mind, as mental states having content, for instance a visual perception, belief, or desire, is real.

The rejection of reductionism or eliminativism has consequences for the concept of visuality in art and education. From the previous chapters, in philosophical aesthetics there is longstanding commitment to the investigation of subjective experience as direct, qualitative states of mind. But from the requirement to eliminate appearances from explanation of reality this object of study, as consciousness, has been marginalized in epistemology for some time. And visual culture as a materialist framework seeks in many cases further marginalization of aesthetics, particularly in education. So, the study of aesthetics in this way demonstrates persistence, sustaining its disciplinary commitments over time, despite difficulties. Theorists of aesthetics claim the immediate experience, as subjective appearances, of phenomena is significantly constitutive of visuality. And, from this chapter, it is possible to see aesthetics asserts a valid claim to its presence in epistemology. The qualitative aspect of experience, as crucially causal in understanding the appearances of things is necessary, aestheticians say, to accounting for visuality.

The description of epistemic and ontological distinctions concerning consciousness, so far, is essential to the study of subjective states as real events in a non-reductive approach to visuality. But, these states do not exist as detached phenomena. Rather, subjectivity is one aspect among a unity of aspects constituting consciousness. The following chapter proceeds with further detail of Searle’s account of consciousness.

Chapter 7

Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Self

7. Introduction

The major objective of this study is to unify the explanation of visuality, providing realist alternative to current accounts as the basis for understanding, without reduction or elimination of mind, or the mental aspect of experience. To achieve this aim, the previous chapter broadly identifies the ontology and provides epistemic distinctions required for study and account of consciousness. Extending this basis, the present chapter provides detail of the ontology of consciousness as realist framework for accounting visuality. The chapter first sets out Searle's explanation of the essential structural features of consciousness. His work describes the uniqueness of conscious phenomena. Critical to the study as part of this framework, there is one defining inclusion: the role of self in consciousness. One essential aspect of human consciousness is the sense of self. And from brief description of this, the chapter proceeds to Searle's explanation of the irreducibility of self in rational action.

The study includes this aspect of Searle's account because visuality, as the making of meaning, concerns practices[1] and so is not conceptually separate from people doing things, and wanting to do things, for reasons. But there is a problem defining who or what is acting on the basis of those reasons. Typically, in aesthetics the self is explained as intuitive, dispositional, and separate from world. In visual culture the self is explained as a socially constructed entity, its identity having multiple fragmented and incommensurable modes of existence. In this way each approach claims a divided self, as the intuiter or recipient of meaning. Notably from these divisions, in both forms of explanation, there is absence of self having agency. Roughly, both explain self as determined, either by nature or culture. This study of Searle's work varies from these descriptions. In the following, human consciousness is more than a sum of its particular features. For an agent to voluntarily act on a reason, there must be a self. The

[1] As visuality these are broadly referred to as practices of looking and making meaning; in the context of visual arts and education, practices also concern for example, teaching and learning the study, appreciation, and creation of art and 'visual' media, as imagery.

irreducibility of a unified self having rationality and from this, freedom of will provides the study's basis for testing and revising understanding of visuality.

In a few concerns, the following account is brief, as some of the features of consciousness and their aspects are set out more fully in other contexts of the investigation. For example, the account includes introduction to the capacity for representation in consciousness that is, intentionality, and this is taken up further in the following chapter.

7. 0. 1 *Consciousness*

Consciousness is a biological phenomenon. But it differs from "other biological phenomena" and further, "other phenomena in the natural world" (Searle, 2000a, p. 560). Arguing against both substance and property dualism[2], Searle says the question of such an account does not derive from a Cartesian opposition between two kinds of substance or "*res cogitans* to *res extensa*;" nor does it lead toward description of a phenomenological "third kind of being"[3] (2004a, p. 318-319). The problem as Searle states it poses "no opposition between minds and nature, because mind is part of nature" (p. 319). Investigating "the question "How does the human reality relate to the more fundamental reality?"" is really "no more Cartesian than the question "How does chemistry relate to the more fundamental atomic physics?""[4] (p. 319). From this, Searle says further questions of how "human being can, by their subjective thought processes"

---

[2] Substance dualism holds that ""mind" and "body" name two kinds of substances" (Searle, 1998b, p. 136). Property dualism is "the view that there are two metaphysically distinct kinds of properties in the world, mental and physical" (p. 168). But see also Searle on adapting the traditional terms of property dualism under particular constraints, specifically the consequence that "intrinsic mental properties are just one kind of higher level physical property among many others" (1984b, p. 6).

[3] As well as rejecting a distinct kind of phenomenological being separate from the basic physics of the world, Searle argues against a "three world view" espoused by some philosophers, referring to a view that there are "*three* distinct worlds" comprised of the physical, the mental and "the world of cultural products such as poetry and scientific theories" (2007, p. 21). Searle strongly states the view that "we live in exactly one world, not two or three or any other larger number" (p. 22). Searle says, "there is no escaping the fact that we all live in ("are located and causally situated in") one space-time continuum" (2004a, p. 329, parentheses adapted from p. 329).

[4] But the question of accounting for "conceptions of ourselves as a certain sort of human being" in an awareness that the "universe that we know consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force" is the "one overriding question in contemporary philosophy" (Searle, 2004a, pp. 317-318). In the sciences now, the problem of consciousness is investigated in biological terms, more specifically in the form of neurobiological accounts; see Crick and Koch (2004); Edelman (2006); Edelman and Tononi (2001); Koch (2004a, 2004b); Searle (1994a, 1995b, 1998).

produce “an objective social reality” constitute series of “important questions of philosophy” (p. 318).

The “fact that the consciousness of others is ‘unobservable’” should not constrain investigation since “electrons, black holes and the ‘Big Bang’ are not observable by anybody;” but Searle notes, “that does not prevent their scientific investigation” (1998a, p. 1936). Consistent with this philosophical direction, researchers in various sciences now ask, “*What if subjectivity itself is its subject*?” (Edelman and Tononi, 2001, p. 10).

7. 1. A General Account of the Essential Structural Feature of Consciousness

To start, Searle says, the “essence of consciousness” is the “combined feature of qualitative, unified subjectivity” (2000a, p. 563). That is, the first characteristic feature of consciousness has three aspects consisting in its “qualitativeness, subjectivity, and unity” (p. 560). These three aspects are “logically interrelated,” in that “the first implies the second, and the second implies the third” (p. 560). Searle considers it “best to treat them together, as different aspects of the same feature” (p. 560).

7. 1. 1. *Qualitativeness*

Searle marks out the *qualitativeness* of consciousness as different from other phenomena in the natural world. This aspect refers to the “certain qualitative feel” that every conscious state has (p. 560). Qualitativeness means there is “something that it feels like” or something “it is like,” for “every conscious experience” (p. 560). The experience of hearing a dog bark or tasting wine is “very different from” touching a piece of wood; and these experiences “have a different qualitative character” to smelling the perfume of a rose or listening, for instance, to a particular musical performance (p. 560).

Traditionally in philosophy the qualitative aspects of experience are characterized as “qualia” (*s.* quale). But Searle is “reluctant” to separate “the problem of consciousness

and the problem of qualia”[5] (pp. 560-561). In this sense, the term ‘qualia’ for Searle, “is just a plural name for conscious states” (p. 561) and “consciousness” and the “notion of qualia” are “completely coextensive” (2004b, p. 134). The qualitative character of consciousness does not limit to “perceptual experiences,” rather “even conscious thinking has a qualitative feel to it” (2000a, p. 561). There is a certain feeling to thinking, “two plus two equals four” that is different for example to thinking the same thought in an unfamiliar language, or even ““two plus two equals one hundred eighty-seven”” [6] (p. 561).

7. 1. 2. *Subjectivity*

Conscious states are also “essentially *subjective*” (p. 561). S*ubjectivity* follows from *qualitativeness*; that is, “properly understood, qualitativeness implies subjectivity” (p. 561). Only experienced by “some animal or human subject” the qualitativeness of conscious states means, “there must be some subject that experiences the event” (p. 561). Even when two people listen to the same performance of music, for instance, the “qualitative experience can exist only as experienced by some subject or subjects” (p. 561). The “different token experiences” may be “qualitatively identical”, exemplifying the “same type” of experience; but, “nonetheless each token experience can exist only if the subject of that experience has it” (p. 561).

The intrinsic subjectivity of conscious states is what Searle refers to as “a first-person ontology,” or “mode of existence,” because the states only exist “when they are experienced by some human or animal agent” that is, “by some “I” that has the experience” (p. 561). This “I” of consciousness also demonstrates in the following example: Searle says, “I can reasonably wonder what it feels like to be a dolphin and swim around all day” because “I assume dolphins have conscious experiences” (1994a,

---

[5] Elsewhere, Searle says that separating qualia from consciousness seems to him “profoundly mistaken;” “*the problem of consciousness is identical with the problem of qualia, because conscious states are qualitative states right down to the ground*” (1998a, p. 1938).

[6] To elaborate on Searle’s distinction briefly; in philosophy, qualia are commonly “thought of as non-intentional, i.e., non-representational features of the states that have them” (Shoemaker, 1999, p. 762). And some functionalists distinguish intentional states such as beliefs and desires as having “no *quale*, no special conscious qualities,” thereby treating the states “as if they were completely independent of consciousness” (Searle, 1991, p. 49). But Searle characterizes “even conscious thinking as having “a qualitative feel to it” (2002a, p. 40). The point is taken up further in the study’s *Discussion of Results*.

p. 132). But when that is compared with wondering "what it feels like to be a shingle nailed in a roof year in and year out," the same sense of "I" does not follow because "there isn't anything at all that it feels like to be a shingle," that is, "shingles are not conscious" (p. 132).

7. 1. 3. *Unity*

The third characteristic aspect of consciousness is its *unity*. The *unified form* of consciousness is "absolutely critical" to its understanding (1999, p. 74). The diversity of an agent's conscious experiences "at any given point" all "come as part of one unified conscious field" (2000a, p. 561); in their "nonpathological" form, conscious states "come to us as part of a unified sequence" (1994a, p. 129). *Unity* follows from *subjectivity* and *qualitativeness* "because there is no way you could have subjectivity and qualitativeness except with that particular form of unity"[7] (2000a, p. 562). This experience of unity "exists in at least two dimensions" (1994a, p. 130).

Searle refers first to "horizontal" unity, which functions as the "organization of conscious experiences through short stretches of time" (p. 130). Also known as "iconic memory"[8] (Coltheart, 1980, p. 57) this "remembered present"[9] (Edelman, 1989; cited in Searle, 1994a, p. 130) is an "essential" aspect of the unity of consciousness (Searle, 1994a, p. 130). For example, when speaking or thinking a sentence, "even a long one" there is an "awareness of the beginning" of what was said or thought, that continues "even when that part is no longer being thought or spoken" (p. 130).

---

[7] A conscious state, Searle says, "is by definition unified" (2000a, p. 562).

[8] Max Coltheart says what is "usually referred to as iconic memory" occurs within a few milliseconds or "tens of milliseconds," where "the visual display is initially represented in a high-capacity, rapidly decaying, specifically visual form of memory" (1983, p. 285). The actual duration of this "pre-categorical sensory memory" (p. 283) is "shorter than the latency of written or spoken responses" (p. 286). Coltheart says whereas iconic memory is pre-categorical, for an "item to be reported" as a written or spoken response "it must be represented in a post-categorical form" (p. 286). This "second memory component" (or post-categorical form) to which items "must first be transferred" in order to be reported, is described as 'durable storage'" (p. 286). Very roughly, Michael Eysenck and Mark Keane define "iconic store" as "a sensory store in which visual information is held very briefly" (2005, p. 559).

[9] The "remembered present" of "primary consciousness" refers to the "interaction of the memory system with current perceptions," which "occurs over periods of fractions of a second in a kind of bootstrapping" (Edelman and Tononi, 2001, p. 107-109). These connections "between memory systems and systems for perceptual categorization" in fact "take place within periods ranging from hundreds of milliseconds to seconds" (p. 108). In this time strong interaction between the requisite neuronal groups (in the thalamocortical system) enable emergence of the "ability to construct a scene" (pp. 108-109).

Second, the dimension of "vertical unity" refers to "the simultaneous awareness of all the diverse features of any conscious state" (p. 130). The sense of the chair against my back and the feeling of my arms on the table, the green of the trees I see outside the windows, the taste of coffee and the sound of the dog barking in the distance all occur "as part of a single unified conscious field" (2000a, p. 562; see also 2004b, pp. 136-138). This vertical unity or "unified conscious field" (2004c, p. 80) is described as "the transcendental unity of apperception" by Kant (see Kant, 1999, pp. 230-234, A103; cited in Searle, 1994a, p. 130); it is investigated as one "binding problem" in the neurosciences[10] (Crick and Koch, 2004, p. 1139). Like Kant, Searle also emphasizes the *unity* of consciousness as "immensely important" (2004b, p. 136).

7. 1. 4. *Aspects of Consciousness as a Unified Field*

Discussing the "totality" of consciousness as "made up of the various bits within it," in the way we commonly think of elements composing a whole, "may be inappropriate where consciousness is concerned" (1999, p. 80). As well, regarding consciousness as "various elements" making up "your present conscious field," Searle says, leads to "a number of serious problems," most notably the "binding problem" (p. 80). In the case of vision for instance, how do the specialized elements of the visual system bind all the "disparate inputs" into a "unified visual experience of an object such as the table in front of me?"[11] (p. 80). Rather than treating the unity of consciousness as "a matter of combining elements," Searle proposes "a different approach;" consciousness, "consists in a conscious field" where the "flux of our conscious experiences" occur as "variations and modifications in the structure of the field"[12] (pp. 81-82).

---

[10] The "perceptual unity" or "binding" function in consciousness "can be of several types" (Crick and Koch, 1990, p. 269). But broadly, theories of "binding" attempt to "capture a mechanism capable of making the necessarily fragmented activity of our brain cohere in time and space" (Damasio, 2000, p. 335).

[11] Searle suggests an approach to thinking about the unified state hypothesis in more detail; see (1999, pp. 81-83).

[12] Searle identifies "two general approaches to the problem of consciousness:" the first bases on "our conscious field (consisting) of a series of building blocks, which are the individual conscious experiences" (2000b, pp. 4-5, parentheses added). Research in this approach (broadly) tries "to find the neuronal correlate of consciousness (NCC) for individual sensory experiences, and then generalize from them to an account of consciousness generally" (p. 5). The second, which is Searle's preference for research (2000a, p. 573), is the "unified field approach" (2000b, p. 5). This approach instead bases on the consciousness as a unified state, where the "individual perceptual inputs (are not understood) as *creating* consciousness, but as *modifying* a pre-existing consciousness" (p. 5, parentheses added). Searle looks to

In terms of visuality as how we make meaning, the qualitative, subjective unity of consciousness is critical to understanding experience as (typically) coherent. The distinction, from previously, between epistemology and ontology is important here; in epistemology, study of the world as 'bits' or parts is common. But differently, in the ontology of (nonpathological) conscious states, experiences are intrinsically and irreducibly felt, from a point of view, and unified.

7. 2. Introduction to Intentionality in Consciousness

Intentionality is the capacity of consciousness to represent objects and states of affairs in the world. Study of intentionality is critical to this study. From the accounts of representation from visual culture and aesthetics, disagreement over how mental representation functions locates the crucial point of difference in their approaches[13]. Chapter 8, following, sets out further investigation of Searle's explanation of *intentionality*, and so this section functions only as an introduction.

7. 2. 1. *The Feature of Intentionality*

The "feature of consciousness that is most essential for our survival in the world," Searle says, "is that consciousness gives us access to the world other than our own conscious states" (p. 76). In this way, consciousness "is essentially tied to *intentionality*" (p. 76), although *intentionality* is "not the same as consciousness" (1983, p. 2). Philosophically, *intentionality* is the "property of mental states" that is "directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world" (2000a, p. 564). Words like "intending"[14] or "imagining" in the ordinary sense of their meanings for example, refer

---

avoiding both "the building block metaphor" as a "part-whole metaphor" (2000a, p. 574) and the "proscenium metaphor," (risked in the unified field approach) in which we "think of our experiences as like actors that move on the stage of consciousness" (2000b, p. 6). Instead, Searle "wants to take the idea of the unity of consciousness seriously, and to think of changes in consciousness as modifications of a pre-existing unified field" (p. 6). Rather than seeking discrete correlates, he suggests "we should try to find the differences between the conscious brain and the unconscious brain" (p. 5). There are a number of "lines of contemporary research" (2000a, p. 575). For approaches basing first, on NCC discovery see, for example, Koch (2004b); and second, on a unified field approach see, for example, Llinas et al (1998).

[13] See Chapter 5.

[14] The relationship between "intention" in the sense, for example, of intending to do something and *intentionality* in the sense of "directedness" is simply a feature of English vocabulary; Searle notes that the same words in German for instance are dissimilar, so there is "no problem" with a conflation of the terms in that language (1999, p. 86).

to intentional states in the philosophical sense, since there is something this intending or imagining is *about.* But this "feature of directedness or aboutness" (1983, p. 1) means *intentionality* here also extends to include "beliefs, hopes, intentions, fears, desires, and perceptions" (2000a, p. 564). If someone has a belief or a fear, it is a belief or fear *about something*; a "normal visual experience" means someone "is actually seeing something" (p. 564). Philosophically, the term *intentionality* is used to describe, "any mental phenomena at all that have referential content" (p. 564).

7. 2. 2. *The Aspectual Shape of Intentionality*

The claim that everything in experience occurs from a point of view provides the basis for relativist claims that things only exist from a point of view. But instead, Searle makes a distinction between objects and their representation in consciousness. He says that unlike the objects of experience, "conscious experiences" are "always perspectival" (1994a, p. 131). Experiences "are always from a point of view," whereas "objects themselves have no point of view" (p. 131). When we see something, for instance, we see the object "from a point of view," which means we see it "under certain aspects and not others" (p. 131). This is an obvious feature of visual experiences. But it is also true for "other sensory experiences as well" (p. 131). Following on this, "every belief and every desire, and indeed every intentional phenomenon, has an aspectual shape" (p. 157). Searle says that, "all representations represent their objects, or other conditions of satisfaction, under aspects" (p. 131).

7. 2. 3. *Distinguishing Intentionality in Consciousness*

Conscious states, "typically have" intentionality (2000a, p. 564). But Searle says that "not all conscious states are intentional," just as "not all intentionality is conscious" (p. 564; see also 2004b, p. 138). In the first case, someone may have a generalized sense of anxiety, for example, where "one is not anxious about anything in particular but just has a feeling of anxiousness" (2004b, p. 139). In the second case, "it is still true" when I am asleep for instance, that I continue to hold a large number of beliefs that "are not then and there present to my consciousness" (p. 139).

Also, Searle distinguishes "between the state and what the state is directed at or about or of"[15] (1983, p. 2). While there are a large number of exceptions to the relation between consciousness and intentionality, there is a "very important and serious overlap" (2004b, p. 138). The "conceptual connection" or overlap "between consciousness and intentionality" is necessary to a "complete theory of intentionality" (1994a, p. 132). Searle says that "only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious"[16] (p. 132).

7. 3. Introduction to Further Structural Features of Consciousness

So far in this account, conscious experience is intrinsically subjective. It is felt, from a point of view and unified. And intentionality is that capacity to represent the world in consciousness. Intentional states are always from a point of view. But there is more that is relevant to accounting for conscious states and from this point, distinctions between conscious and unconscious states begin to play an important role. Following on the significant feature of consciousness as qualitative, subjective, unified, and having the capacity for intentionality, Searle identifies certain other "structural features" of consciousness (p. 128) in the following way.

7. 3. 1. *Centre and Periphery*

In consciousness, there is a *distinction between the centre and periphery of attention*. This feature means, under ordinary circumstances, "at any given time" within their conscious field the person can alter their "attention at will from one aspect to another" (2000a, p. 564). For example, at present I may not be giving attention to the feel of my reading glasses on my face or the sound of rain against the window; but "I can shift my attention" to such things at any time (p. 565). The immediate focus of attention can alter, for instance, from concentrating on the next words I write, to an awareness of

[15] Although, Searle says, "this does not exclude the possibility of self-referential forms" of intentionality (1983, p. 2); see Chapter 8, *Intentional Causation* and *Causal Self-Referentiality*.

[16] This statement is a "strong claim" by Searle, which has significant consequences "for the study of mind" (1994a, p. 132). For fuller argument, see Searle (1991); also (1994a, pp. 151-173); see also following chapter.

people moving about. These changes can occur in me without moving from my seat, or "indeed without even moving my eyes" (2004b, p. 140). The redirection of attention and distinction between features "in the conscious field we are paying attention to, and those we are not paying attention to" is a significant object of neurobiological research (p. 140). Searle says that "typically the brain plays small tricks to cover for certain deficits," for example, not seeing blind spots, although they are present in the line of vision (pp. 140-141).

An important difference should be noted between consciousness, attention, and the "unconscious" (1994a, p. 138). Commonly we refer to some features of "our conscious life" in terms of "being unconscious," for example, "I am unconscious of the feeling of the shirt against my skin" (p. 138). Here, the meaning of the term 'unconscious' more appropriately relates to whether or not something is an immediate object of attention. But it is a "mistake" to think of the distinction between the centre and periphery of attention in the same sense we mean the "conscious/unconscious distinction" for example, "I am unconscious of the growth of my toenails" (p. 138).

7. 3. 2. *Mood*

All human conscious states exist "in some sort of *mood* or other" (2000a, p. 565). Even when "it is not a mood that has a specific name" (2004b, p. 139), there is "always a certain flavor to one's conscious states, always an answer to the question "How are you feeling?"" when asked (2000a, p. 565). Searle describes this feature as "a certain tone to one's conscious experiences" (2004b, p. 139). *Mood* "by itself, never constitutes the whole content of a conscious state" (1994a, p. 140). There may be no strong sense of elation or depression, but when "dramatic changes" occur, for example when receiving good or bad news, a change in mood can be observed (2004b, p. 139). Searle marks a distinction between mood and emotion. They are "not the same" because emotions are intentional, that is, they "always have some intentional content, whereas mood need not have an intentional content" (p. 140). Moods however do "predispose us to emotions" (p. 140).

7. 3. 3. *Pleasure/Unpleasure*

Historically, the concept of pleasure is central to explanation of aesthetic experience; it is also tacitly problematic in art education[17]. But Searle says, there is "some degree of *pleasure or unpleasure*" in "any conscious state" (p. 141). In "considering the whole of a conscious state" sufficient to "have the unity and coherence" Searle is "trying to describe" (1994a, p. 141), there is a dimension of pleasure, including unpleasure (2004b, p. 141). Experiences can be "pleasant, painful, unpleasant, neutral" (2000a, p. 565) as well as exasperating, amusing, annoying, boring, enchanting, nauseating, and so on (1994a, p. 141).

There are "many subdimensions" to this feature; Searle uses the examples of boredom during sexual pleasure and pleasure during the experience of pain as "eccentric," but possible (p. 141). These examples also imply the dimension of pleasure/unpleasure, or pleasant/unpleasant, can be "colored by intentionality" (p. 129). An example here is pain, which may be experienced simply "as painful" (p. 129). However, "where there is belief that the pain is "being inflicted unjustly" it is experienced as less pleasant than when the pain is experienced for instance as "part of a necessary medical treatment" (p. 129). Like mood, it is important to avoid mistaking "intermediate and therefore nameless positions on the scale" as not being "on the scale at all" (p. 141).

7. 3. 4. *Gestalt Structure*

Another feature Searle includes is the *Gestalt* or *figure-ground structure* of conscious experience (p. 132). The gestalt structuring of perception is familiar as a longstanding object of perceptual studies in the visual arts (see for example Arnheim, 1974a; Wollheim, 1991a). Searle's account re-identifies its significance. In vision for example, rather than seeing things as a "disorganized mess" that is, "undifferentiated blurs and fragments" (2004b, p. 143), the brain organizes perceptions into "coherent conscious perceptual forms" (2000a, p. 565). This coherence occurs even though "only fragments of those objects are reflecting photons at the retina" (2004b, p. 143). These forms are further structured or integrated into "coherent wholes" (p. 144). Ordinarily, "on the

[17] From previously, see Freedman on the role of perceptual pleasure in aesthetic experiences contributing to the diminished importance of studying those states in education (1998, p. 10).

basis of very limited stimuli" a person can "recognize a face, or a car" since consciousness organizes perceptions into "objects and features of objects" (2000a, p. 565). This figure-ground aspect also means the focus of attention "will be against a background that is not the centre of attention" (1994a, p. 133).

The "larger the scope of attention," the nearer the "limits of consciousness" approach the "boundary conditions" that function as a further feature (see following) (p. 133). I am able to "make a distinction" between the objects of my attention and "the ground on which they are perceived" (2004b, p. 144). For example, I can see the book against the background of the table, which is further perceived against the background of the floor and room, and again the extension of the background occurs until I approach the peripheral "limits of my visual field" (1994a, p. 133). The consequence of this organization is that "all (normal) seeing is *seeing as*, all (normal) perceiving is *perceiving as*" (p. 133). The brain is also able to "take a constant stimulus" and shift so that the perception can be seen "first as one perception, now as another" for instance, the well known ""duck-rabbit"" drawing (2004b, p. 143). Normally, consciousness itself "is *consciousness of something as such and such*" (1994a, p. 133).

There are "two aspects at least" to this Gestalt structure (2004b, p. 144). First, the brain has a "capacity to organize perceptions into coherent wholes;" second, the brain also has the capacity to "discriminate figures from backgrounds" (p. 144). Searle says the "figure-ground structure of perception and consciousness" is a "special, though pervasive case of the more general feature of structuredness" in "conscious experiences" (1994a, p. 133).

7. 3. 5. *The Aspect of Familiarity*

The aspect of familiarity Searle accounts for introduces, in part, some resolution to the problem of mediated perception claimed in visual culture, as semiotic theories. The motivation for mediation, these theories argue, forms from epistemic problems in accounting for conceptual content in perceptual experience. For example, in visual culture, these concepts are held to account for the social constraints on, or conditioning of, visual experience. The problem derives from epistemological tradition that strongly

separates mental states having conceptual content, as cognitive on one hand, and perceptual, as felt or qualitative states on the other. The solution to the dilemma in symbol system accounts is to claim perceptual mediation, as an interpreting act in mind. The difficulty with this explanation lies in its inherent infinite regress, that is, who is the mediating, or interpreting entity.

Searle's explanation varies from accounts of indirect perception, as mediation. Rather, the experience we have of something, *as something*, functions as the aspect of familiarity. Searle describes the structural features of consciousness including "temporality, sociality, unity, intentionality, subjectivity, and structuredness" (p. 133). Following from these, it appears to him that the *aspect of familiarity* in "ordinary or nonpathological" conscious states is "the most pervasive feature" of "conscious awareness" (p. 133).

The term *aspect of familiarity* is preferable to "the more colloquial "feeling of familiarity"" because the "phenomenon (described) is not a separate feeling" (p. 135, parentheses added). For instance, when looking at "my shoes" there will not be a separate "visual experience of the shoes and a feeling of familiarity" (p. 135). Instead "I *see* the shoes at once *as* the shoes and *as* mine" (p. 135). The aspect of familiarity "makes possible much of the organization and order" of "conscious experiences" (p. 135). Referring to studies that show "perception is a function of expectation," Searle says the "corollary of this claim" is "the organization of perception is only possible given a set of categories that identify entities within the familiar" (p. 136).

The "prior possession of an apparatus" that is "sufficient to generate" the aspectual shape of intentional states and (non-pathologically) "structured or organized" forms of consciousness, "guarantees" that experience of these features of conscious states occurs as "more or less" familiar (p. 133). Searle says we "experience things on a continuum, on a spectrum, that goes from the most familiar to the most strange" (1999, p. 79). In "varying degrees" the "sense of familiarity" pervades our conscious experiences (p. 79). So, even when I "am in what is to me an extremely strange environment" (p. 79) and

see buildings and people for example “I have never seen before,” it is still familiar *as* a building or *as* a person (2000a, p. 565).

Disruption of this aspect is difficult. When surrealist painters for example, “try to break this sense of the familiarity and ordinariness of our experiences” by depicting an unfamiliar landscape and contents, the “light (still comes) from a source” (1994a, p. 134, parentheses added); objects are still identifiable as a “drooping” watch, or “three-headed” dog (2000a, p. 565). The difficulty with breaking this sense of familiarity “follows from the facts of intentionality” which is, “that all mental representation is under an aspect” (1999, p. 79). To “describe the structure of the intentionality involved” here is “tricky” (1994a, p. 136).

In order for someone “to be conscious of something,” a person has to be “conscious of it as something;” that is, “all consciousness *of* is consciousness *as*” (p. 136). But, Searle says, excluding pathological and like conditions, “perceiving as, and other forms of consciousness as, require (pre-existing) categories” (p. 136, parentheses added). That is, consciousness itself “involves categorization” using categories that “have to exist prior to the experience” (p. 136). To see something for example “as a duck or a rabbit,” someone has to have already be familiar with or mastered “the categories “duck” or “rabbit” prior to the perception” (p. 136). This familiarity or “mastery of a set of categories” constrain and “enable us, in varying degrees” to structure and assimilate “our experiences, however novel, to the familiar” (p. 136). So, Searle says the features of “structuredness, perception as, the aspectual shape of all intentionality, categories, and the aspect of familiarity” all “hang together” (p. 136, emphasis deleted).

7. 3. 6. *Situatedness or Boundary Conditions*

Related “but not identical” to the way there is a distinction between the centre and periphery of our attention in conscious states, Searle says, “conscious states typically come with a *sense of their own situatedness*” (1999, p. 78). This sense of “location in space and time” (p. 78), as well as the “socio-biological location of (one’s) present conscious states,” is pervasive in conscious experiences (1994a, p. 139, parentheses

added). Searle also refers to this as the "*boundary conditions* of consciousness" (1999, p. 78).

There is always a "sense of what one might call the background situation in which one experiences the conscious field" (2004b, p. 141). There may not be immediate awareness of this "sense of one's situation" (p. 141); for example the location I am in may not be "an intentional object of (my) consciousness" (1999, p. 78, parentheses added). But "normally" a person is "in some sense cognizant" of the time of day and the year, the location and the country the person is in, and whether they have just had lunch or dinner, with a "range of features" that are taken for granted within the "conscious field" of the person experiencing their situation (2004b, p. 141). Most commonly, the awareness of an intrinsic "sense of situatedness" occurs "when it is lost or disrupted" (p. 141). Searle refers to the "characteristic" experiences of suddenly wondering what day of the week it is now, or which semester it is "as one gets older," or for example, the sudden "sense of bewilderment" that can occur on waking in strange location (p. 142).

7. 3. 7. *Active and Passive Consciousness*

From previously, to account for cognition in the experience of art, models of perception from Arnheim and Goodman characterize all perception as active. But in Searle's account, there are important distinctions to be made. Reflecting on one's own conscious experiences Searle says, suggests there is an "obvious distinction between the experience of voluntary intentional activity" and the "experience of passive perception," although the distinction may not be sharply marked (p. 142). Searle says there is a "voluntaristic element of perception," just as there are "passive components of voluntary action" (p. 142).

The distinction can be observed "in the case of perception;" for example, seeing the trees in front of me, or the feeling of the shirt on my arms, in which there is a sense that "this is happening to me" (p. 142). In contrast if I act, for instance, walking to another

room, there is a sense "I am doing this" that is, "I am making this happen"[18] (p. 142). Searle says that "any account of mind has to confront this experience" because "the experience of voluntary action more than anything else" provides us with "the conviction of our own free will"[19] (p. 142).

7. 3. 8. *Overflow*

Searle refers to the way "conscious states in general refer beyond their immediate content" as *overflow* (1994a, p. 137). The "immediate (mental) content tends to spill over" or *overflow*, connecting "with other thoughts that in a sense were part of the content but in a sense were not" (p. 137, parentheses added). These "other thoughts flow" in a stream of associations (1999, p. 79). For example, I look at the vase of flowers in front of me and my thoughts on it "have an indefinite extendability" (1994a, p. 137). That is, I "see them in the context of my previous experience" (1999, p. 79). I do not see them as just flowers, rather they are flowers of a certain kind, colour, and perfume, like others but different in some ways, with memories and associations leading to other thoughts that continue indefinitely. Conscious experiences in this way "typically refer beyond themselves" (p. 79). Experiences are not "isolated" rather they "always (spin) out to further experiences beyond," referring to "things unseen" (p. 79, parentheses added).

7. 3. 9. *The Sense of Self*

More recently Searle includes the *sense of self* in discussion of the features of consciousness. The "whole discussion of self" has a "sordid history in philosophy" and "the problem of the self" as such "poses such hard problems" that he is "reluctant to even raise the issue" (2004b, p. 144). But, Searle goes on to say that typically in consciousness there is an experience of self; that is, "I have a certain sense of who I am, a sense of myself as a self" (p. 144).

---

[18] Searle notes the experiments by neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (see Penfield, 1975, p. 76): on causing the limbs of his patients to move through stimulation of the motor cortex, subjects of the stimulation "invariably" responded, ""I didn't do that, you did it"" (cited in Searle, 2004b, p. 142).

[19] See Searle on further description of the "striking and dramatic difference between the qualitative character of perceptual experiences and the qualitative character of voluntary actions" (2000b, p. 6).

The “logical structure of explanation of human behaviour where the agent voluntarily acts on a reason” Searle says, “requires us to postulate an irreducible self” (2001, p. 276). Added to this, “the self so construed requires a unified field of consciousness” (p. 276). Although “the self is not identical with the field,” its “operations, whereby it makes decisions on the basis of reasons and acts to carry out those decisions,” do require “a unified field containing both cognitive elements such as perceptions and memories as well as volitional elements such as deliberations and actions” (p. 276). To understand this, “try to imagine the mind as a Humean bundle of unconnected perceptions;” Searle says, “there is no way that the self can operate in the bundle” since “to operate in making decisions you would have to have a different self for each different element in the bundle” (p. 276). On Searle’s account there is, irreducibly, a self as ‘someone’ who makes choices and acts on the basis of reasons.

In art and education, accounting for the role of self in rational action is crucial to understanding visuality as practices. That is, there is an ‘I’ making meaning in experience. The point is, I think, mismanaged in both current accounts of visuality. In aesthetic accounts, the ‘I’ is reified and distinct from language, reducing explanation to nonrational as intuitive dispositional accounts. In visual culture, fragmented discourses serve the role of ‘I.’ Neither form of explanation effectively allows the role of self as a unified state having rationality and from this, freedom of will and so, agency. To start, Searle’s discussion of the irreducibility of self and the problem of a Humean ‘bundle’ or no-self is taken up in the following section in relation to practical reason.

7. 4. Consciousness, the Self, and Voluntary Action

The “constraints of rationality” are “a matter of the way in which we coordinate our intentionality” that is, the “way in which we coordinate the relations between our beliefs, desires hopes, fears, and perceptions, and other intentional phenomena” (p. 23). And the coordination of intentional phenomena “presupposes the existence of (a) gap” (p. 23, parentheses added). The “traditional name” for this gap is ““the freedom of the will”” (p. 13). Searle explains: if “I have a choice and I consider various reasons for choosing among the alternatives available to me,” I “can only engage in this activity if I

assume that my set of beliefs and desires by itself is not causally sufficient to determine my action"[20] (p. 13). The "operation of rationality presupposes that there is a gap between the set of intentional states on the basis of which I make my decision and the actual making of the decision"[21] (p. 13).

In accounting "for the phenomena of the gap," Searle says, "we have to presuppose" both "a non-Humean, irreducible notion of the self" and "certain special relations between the self and time" insofar as "practical reason is concerned" (p. 62). "Two equivalent definitions" of the gap can be given, "one forward-looking, one backward" (p. 62). In the forward sense, Searle defines the gap as "that feature of our conscious decision making and acting where we sense alternative future decisions and actions as causally open to us" (p. 62). In the backward-looking sense, the gap is "that feature of conscious decision making and acting whereby the reasons preceding the decisions and the actions are not experienced by the agent as setting causally sufficient conditions for the decisions and actions" (p. 62). Searle says, "as far as conscious experiences are concerned" the gap he describes manifests in three ways (p. 62). First, the gap "occurs when the beliefs, desires, and other reasons[22] are not experienced as causally sufficient conditions for a decision (the formation of a prior intention)" (p. 62). That is, "when one is making rational decisions there is a gap between the deliberative process and the decision itself, where the decision consists in the formation of a prior intention" (p. 62).

Second, the gap occurs "when the prior intention does not set a causally sufficient condition for an intentional action" (p. 62). So, "once one has made up one's mind to do

---

[20] The "sense of "cause"" Searle refers to here, is "the ordinary" or Aristotelian ""efficient cause" sense"" of the word, "as in: the explosion caused the building to collapse, or the earthquake caused the destruction of the freeway" (2001, p. 12).

[21] To understand the point, Searle says, "you need only consider cases" in which "the belief and the desire are really causally sufficient" that is, "cases where there is no gap" (2001, p. 13). For example, the case "where the drug addict has an overpowering urge to take heroin, and he believes that this is heroin; so compulsively he takes it" (p. 13). In this case "the belief and the desire are sufficient to determine the action, because the addict cannot help himself" (p. 13). But "such cases seem to be outside the scope of rationality altogether;" they are not "the model of rationality" (p. 13). Searle says, people whose behaviour "is determined by sufficient causal conditions are removed from the scope of rational assessment" (p. 24).

[22] The "other reasons" Searle cites here base in "the combination of institutional reality" and "the imposition of meaning," together enabling "individual human beings to create certain forms of desire-independent reasons for action" (2001, p. 57).

something, that is, one has formed a prior intention" Searle says, "there is a gap between the prior intention and the actual initiation of the action in the onset of an intention-in-action" (p. 62). Third, there is also a gap "when the initiation of an intentional project does not set sufficient conditions for its continuation or completion" (p. 62). That is, "whenever one is in the course of some extended pattern of activity" for instance, "such as I am in now writing this book," a gap exists "between the causes in the form of the prior intention to perform the action and the intention in action on one hand, and the actual carrying out of the complex activity to its completion, on the other" (p. 63). In "extended actions," Searle says, "you still have to keep trying; you have to keep going on your own" (p. 63).

These three gaps, between deliberation and decision, between prior intention and initiation of action, and between the intention-in-action and completion of a complex activity, can all be "seen as different aspects of the same feature of consciousness" (p. 63). That is, the "feature whereby our conscious experiences of acting" are "not experienced as having psychologically sufficient causal conditions that make them happen" (p. 63). The "exercise of the will, the conscious feeling of effort" are both "names for the same thing" (p. 63).

7. 4. 1. *The Gap and the Irreducibility of Self*[23]

So, the "definition of a free (voluntary, rational, conscious) action is that it does not have causally sufficient psychological antecedents" that is, "in the case of voluntary action, the psychological causes do not necessitate the effect" (pp. 73-74). But, "how does the action come about if nothing fills the gap?" (p. 74). That is, "how do we get over the gap from my reasons in the form of psychological causes to the actual performance of the action?" (p. 79). Searle says, "*the intelligibility of our operation in the gap requires an irreducible notion of the self*," in that "we cannot make sense of the gap, of reasoning, of human action and of rationality generally, without an irreducible, that is, non-Humean, notion of the self"[24] (pp. 74-75).

---

[23] Searle provides extensive argument for this thesis, which is addressed but not detailed here; see (2001, pp. 79-96).

[24] The "self according to Hume, is just a bundle of experiences and nothing more" (Searle, 2001, p. 77). Searle suggests "Hume's point" in the argument is that "nothing could count as the experience of the self,

In order to correctly interpret the thesis: "The action does have an adequate psychological explanation even if it lacks causally sufficient antecedent psychological conditions;" "I *performed* the action for a reason;" "I did it for a reason, even though the reason does not fix an antecedently sufficient cause," the "first step" is "*to see that for its understanding we require a very special notion of agency*" (pp. 80-83). A "Humean bundle, even if unified and embodied, is not enough[25];" "you have to have an animal agent" (p. 83). So, "something is an agent in this sense if and only if it is a conscious entity that has the capacity to initiate and carry out actions under the presupposition of freedom" (p. 83). While that rightly "sounds trivial," such a notion of agency "is not innocuous, because it implies a bundle is not enough for agency" (p. 83). Searle says, "an agent in this sense requires more than being a bundle or being a part of the bundle" because "the intention-in-action is not just an event that occurs by itself"[26] (p. 83). Rather, "it can occur only if an agent is actually doing something, or at least trying to do something" that is, "*agency requires an entity that can consciously try to do something*" (p. 83).

The "next step" is to understand that, "because the agent has to be able to make decisions and perform actions on the basis of reasons," Searle says, "the same entity that acts as agent must be capable of perception, belief, desire, memory[27], and

---

for any experience I had would just be another experience" (p. 77). On Hume's account "not only is there no experience of the self, but there could not be one, because nothing could logically satisfy the constraints placed on the metaphysical notion of the self" (p. 77).

[25] Hume's account of self as a "bundle of experiences," needs revision Searle says, to counter Kant's objection that "all of my experiences at any given point in time come to me as part of a unified conscious field" (2001, p. 77). On this (as Kant's) "revised Humean conception of the self," Searle additionally claims "that the body is essential to my having the sequence of conscious experiences;" that is, "even if I am a brain in a vat, there still has to be a physical brain" and "to have experiences of the world" requires of that physical brain "some kind of causal interaction with the world" (p. 78). But, consisting of "conscious feelings, including memories and a sense of "me-ness" (and "no doubt" also including "a lot of false beliefs"), Searle says, "in summary, the "self"" on this account, remains "entirely reducible to simpler elements," which "are caused by and are realized in a continuously existing physical system, my embodied brain" (p. 79). That is, "even updated to include a physical body with all of its dispositions," Hume's account "of me as a sequence of impressions and ideas," Searle says, "does not capture the essential requirement for rational agency, namely selfhood" (p. 93).

[26] Searle says, "on the Humean conception the bundle is just a sequence of natural phenomena, part of the sequence of efficient causes and effects in the world" (2001, p. 83).

[27] Searle says, "the continuity of my memory experiences is an essential part of my sense of myself as a continuing self" (2004b, p. 290). Historically, the "continuous sequence of conscious states bound together ("from the first-person point of view") by my capacity at any given point to remember conscious

reasoning" (p. 83). The "notion of agency was introduced to account for *volition*" (p. 83). Volition refers to those mental events involved with choosing, deciding, and the initiation of action. But, in this traditional "jargon," Searle says, "the same entity that has volition must also have *conation* and *cognition*"[28] (pp. 83-84). As a volitive, including cognitive and conative entity, the "agent must in short be a self" (p. 84).

7. 4. 2. *Self, Reasons, and Actions*

Searle says, "just as agency has to be added" to the Humean notion of the self as bundle, "to account for how embodied bundles engage in free actions," we find that "selfhood" must "be added to agency" in order "to account for how agents can act rationally" (p. 84). So, "*the reason we can rationally accept explanations that do not cite sufficient conditions in these cases is that we understand that the explanations are about rational selves in their capacity as agents*" (p. 84). Searle provides an example to illustrate, suggesting "the following three sentences look similar in surface syntax," but reveal "important differences" in their "underlying semantics" when "we understand them given our Background presuppositions" (p. 84).

First, ""I raised my arm because I wanted to vote for the motion;"" second, ""I got a stomachache because I wanted to vote for the motion;"" and third, ""The building collapsed because the earthquake damaged the foundation"" (p. 84). The first "is perfectly acceptable as an explanation even though it does not cite sufficient reasons," Searle says, "because we understand it against the Background presupposition of the existence of rational selves, acting on reasons, under the presupposition of freedom" (p.

---

experiences occurring in the past" seems "to many philosophers, most famously Locke," the "essential element of personal identity" (p. 287, parentheses adapted).

[28] There are "two modes" whereby "consciousness gives us access to the world other than our own conscious states" (Searle, 1999, p. 76). These are "the cognitive mode, where we represent how things are" and "the volitive or conative mode, in which we represent how we want them to be, or how we are trying to make them become" (p. 76). Cognitive processes under this distinction broadly refer to such things as experience, perception and memory. Volition traditionally concerns mental processes of willing or resolving; conation, in this sense including *affects* and *emotions*, refers to basic motivations, and the initiation of action, so embodying motivations for actions "ordered toward certain results" (Pascual-Leone, 1990, p. 259). The two families of terms Searle sets out here are distinctions (including argument over the distinction) occurring commonly in philosophical and educational research discourse, see for example Ackerman (2003); Corno (1993); Helm (2007); Pellegrino, Baxter, and Glaser (1999); Snow (1989). In aesthetic education, see Eaton and Moore (2002).

84). We can contrast the first sentence with the second, and "given our Background presuppositions" the second "is interpreted like" the third (p. 84). That is, the second, "works as an explanation because, in context, it gives causally sufficient conditions, and rationality and freedom are not in the picture at all" since "getting a stomachache is not a case of acting on a reason" (p. 84).

To "accept explanations" of the first form, we need to understand how the "question, "Why did you do it?" asks for a totally different sort of answer to the question, "Why did it happen?"" (pp. 84-85). Searle says we "always look at phenomena such as rational behavior and its explanation from the first-person point of view, because they have a first-person ontology;" that is, "they only exist from the first-person point of view" (p. 85).

Understood "from that point of view," Searle says, "there is no question that it is both the case that the reasons were not causally determining, and yet the explanation is perfectly adequate as it stands" (p. 85). The sentence ""I raised my arm because I wanted to vote for the motion"" adequately explains "both why I did what I did, and why I did that rather than an alternative that was causally open to me" because "it cites the reason that I, as a rational self, made effective by acting on it" and answers "the question "Why did you do it?" without implying "It is causally impossible that anything else could have happened"" (p. 85). There is no "requirement on such an answer that the answer give determining causal conditions" (p. 85). That is, "*the causal gap does not imply an explanatory gap*" (p. 85). The "question, "Why did you do that?"" Searle says, "does *not* ask: what causes were sufficient to determine your action?" (p. 85, emphasis added). Rather "it asks: what reason(s) did you as a rational self, act on?" and the "answer explains" by "*showing how a rational self operated in the gap*" (p. 85).

Searle says that we should not suppose the "language games of explanations in classical mechanics" are necessary to the explanation of "actions by giving reasons"[29] (pp. 85-86). Rather, "the language game of explaining actions" has a "different logical form

[29] That is, "in a Wittgensteinian tone of voice one wants to say" (Searle says): "this is how the language game of explaining actions is played, and don't suppose it must be played according to the rules of the language game of explanations in classical mechanics" (2001, p. 86).

from ordinary causal statements" (p. 86). Searle says, the "requirement that I state the reasons I acted on requires a reference to a self" and such "reference to a self is ineliminable" (p. 87). The "truth conditions of sentences in the form "*X* performed act *A* for reason *R*" require not just the existence of events, psychological states, and causal relations between them" Searle says, "they require a self (which is something more than an agent) that makes a reason effective by acting on it"[30] (pp. 86-87).

7. 4. 3. *The Self and Responsibility*

To briefly repeat, there is "an experiential gap and a self that operates in that gap" (p. 89). The "self operates in that gap on the basis of reasons" (p. 89). And, "in order that something be a reason that can function in deliberation and action, it must be a reason for an agent" (p. 89). To state the point "precisely:" "there are lots of reasons for doing things that no one knows about"[31] but, "such a reason cannot have a role in deliberation" (p. 89). Searle says, "in deliberation a reason must be in the possession of an agent in order to function as a reason"[32] (p. 89). Further, he says, "since reasons can be cognitive – beliefs and perceptions for example – the self must involve more than agency, more than just volition" (p. 89). That is, "one and the same entity must be capable of operating with cognitive reasons as well as deciding and acting on the basis of those reasons" (p. 89).

To "take the next step" in the argument so far[33] "we assume the existence of an irreducible conscious self acting on the basis of reasons under the constraints of rationality and on the presupposition of freedom" (p. 89). So, we are now able to "make sense of *responsibility* and all of its attendant notions," Searle says: "*Because the self operates in the gap on the basis of reasons to make decisions and perform actions, it is*

---

[30] Searle notes the claim by some philosophers "that in voluntary actions we *create* our selves" is "a totally different notion of the self" from the one he is "now expounding" (2001, p. 87). Searle says "they must mean we create our character and personality;" but the "point" he makes here is, "not that action creates a self, but that the action *presupposes* a self" (p. 87).

[31] For instance, ""people had a reason to eat whole wheat bread – it prevents beri-beri – without knowing that they had such a reason" (Searle, 2001, p. 89).

[32] Searle notes that "this is an additional feature of the self, as well as being an argument for the existence of the self" (2001, p. 89).

[33] This section of the study outlines, but does not provide the whole procedure of argument for the "existence of an irreducible, Non-Humean self" (Searle, 2001, p. 79). I omit much detail of Searle's argument, with apologies.

the locus of responsibility" (p. 89). That is, "in order that we can assign responsibility, there must be an entity capable of assuming, exercising, and accepting responsibility" (p. 90).

To explain the notion, Searle introduces the concept of time, suggesting we can make sense of responsibility "only if we can now assign responsibility for actions that occurred in the past" (p. 90). In this way, "I am held responsible now for things I did in the distant past;" however, "that only makes sense if there is some entity that is both the agent of the action in the past and me now" (p. 90). Searle says, "that entity" is what he has been "calling "the self"" (p. 90).

We should note the distinction between perceptions and actions here, in that "perceptions affect me but I am not accountable for them in the way I am accountable for my actions" (p. 90). So, "only of a self, in the sense explained can we say that he or she is responsible, guilty, to blame, to get credit, is deserving of reward or punishment;" and "these attributions are different from "is good looking," "is in pain," or "sees the oncoming car"" (p. 90). While "the former set require an irreducible notion of the self for their intelligibility," the "latter do not" (p. 90).

The mode of conscious reasoning of the 'I' or self is continuous with past and present. Searle's account here raises a number of points critical to the concept of visuality. First, from previously, the constitution of subjectivity in visual culture attributes agency to background discourses. The attribution requires temporal continuity of a self, since there must be some one, or else thing, at the affect of discourse (to effect identity). But typically on accounting the self as discourse, there is discontinuity with past. Second, visual culture accounts typically also represent subjective experience constituting as many distinct or fragmented elements (as identities) maintaining incommensurability; unity is rejected[34]. Claim that this enables representation of difference avoids the

[34] See Chapter 3, *Subjectivity/Subjectivities*. The problem in accounting for inter- and intra- individual variation in the concept of identity/identities is interesting, but not addressed I think by rejecting the preceding condition of unified self and its constraint of rationality, or the capacity for reason. There are alternative means in research for explanations of (nonpathological) experiences of difference. For instance, on decision making, Robyn LeBoeuf and Eldar Shafir describe how "preferences fluctuate along

necessary criteria, that the self is irreducible and its unity is requisite to any concept of rationality (and so, irrationality). For any explanation of making meaning, accounting someone having the capacity for reason is a necessary condition. And the self, having the capacity for rational or reasoned action, has freedom of will[35]. The determinism of visual culture accounts fails to negotiate this capacity as an aspect of visuality.

And last, the representation of subjective experience in aesthetic accounts tends towards intuition, characterizing the self as separate from language and thus reasoning or deliberation. Such accounts reify the autonomy of self (as intuitive) from interaction with the world. But they do not provide for the rational agency of a unified self in deliberate action. So, on this view, there is lack of accounting the agency of memory in time, particularly including the role of language, in the development of a sense of self.

7. 4. 4. *The Self Reasoning in Time*

We can now see "that rationality in action is always a matter of an agent consciously reasoning in time, under the presupposition of freedom, about what to do now or in the future" (p. 90). Searle says, "in the case of theoretical reason, it is a matter of what to accept, conclude or believe" and "in the case of practical reason, it is a matter of what actions to perform" (p. 90). And, there is "a sense in which all reasoning is practical, because it all issues in doing something" (p. 90). That is, in "theoretical reason, the doing is typically a matter of *accepting* a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence;" so "theoretical reason is, thus, a special case of practical reason" (p. 90).

The "difference between theoretical and practical reason" Searle says, lies "in the direction of fit[36] of the conclusion:" there is "mind-to-world" direction of fit "in the case of drawing a conclusion from evidence or premises," and "world-to-mind" direction of fit, "in the case of forming a decision and hence an intention on the basis of

---

with momentarily salient identities" (so for example, as "mother" in one circumstance, and "CEO" in another) (2003, p. 257); see further, LeBoeuf and Shafir on *Identities* (2003, pp. 257-258).

[35] Just as difference does not require rejection of the unity of consciousness, I think addressing the constraints on decision-making, as conditioning of some kind, does not require rejection of the capacity for freely willed action.

[36] See following chapter.

considerations" (p. 91). This difference "has important further consequences" in that "practical reasoning is not just something that occurs in time;" it is "about time in the sense that it is reasoning now by a self about what that self is going to do now or in the future" (p. 91). With the notion of time introduced, "we see that the self is required both as a locus of responsibility for past actions, and as a subject of planning about present and future actions" (p. 91). In planning "for the future, the subject of the planning is the same self that is going to perform the act in the future" (p. 91).

In summary, first, "the existence of voluntary, intentional actions requires a conscious agent who acts" but logically, there can be agency "and not yet a self" (p. 91). So, second, "in order to be a self the entity that acts as an agent must also be capable of conscious reasoning about its actions" (p. 92). That is, the entity must be "capable of perception, memory, belief, desire, thought, inference, and cognition generally;" the "agent must be a self" (p. 92). Crucially, third, the "special logical feature of rational action explanations" is that "construed as causal explanations, they do not work" (p. 92). The "causes are typically not sufficient to explain the action;" and yet, Searle says, "they are perfectly adequate as they stand" (p. 92). For their "intelligibility" we do not think of them "as citing causes that determine an event" (p. 92). Rather, we cite "the reasons that a conscious rational agent acted on;" and "agency plus the apparatus of rationality equals selfhood" (p. 92).

Fourth, with the "self as the agent of action" we can account for such "puzzling notions" as responsibility, "with (all) its attendant notions" (p. 92, parentheses added). Fifth, "the existence of the self accounts for the relation of agency to time" in the sense that "one and the same self must be responsible for the actions that it performed in the past, and it must be capable of planning about the future" (p. 92). Searle says that "all reasoning is in time, and practical reasoning (in the sense he has tried to explain here), is about time" (p. 92, parentheses added).

7. 4. 5. *The Self, Consciousness, and Experience*

Searle asks "what is the relationship between the self" he describes ("a purely formally characterizable entity defined by a specific list of features"), "and our actual conscious

experiences?" (pp. 92-93). The "key" he says, "lies in examining the structure of our own consciousness since the first condition on the self is that it should be capable of consciousness" (p. 93). On the account Searle presents, "the self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced" (p. 93). That is, there are no "substantive features" [37] (2004b, p. 297).

So, "it is characteristic of my conscious experience that I engage in deliberation and action, I have perceptions, I use my memories in deliberation, I make decisions, I carry (or "fail to carry") out my decisions;" and, Searle says, "I feel satisfied or unsatisfied, guilty or innocent, depending on the net results of all of these activities"[38] (2001, p. 93, parentheses adapted). Although "the self is not the name of an experience nor is it the name of an object of experience," there is "nonetheless," a "sequence of formal features of our experiences that are constitutive of ourselves as selves" (pp. 93-94).

Searle counters two common objections. First, he asks, "how can we be sure" that we are "not reifying something in order to have an object for the "I" to refer to when we say "I decided to vote for Clinton"?"[39] (p. 94). The answer here is "no;" because the "grammatical requirement is the same even in cases where I am not doing anything" (p. 94). For instance, "consider "I see the rose"" – "as far as the phenomenology is concerned, you can describe the phenomenological facts by saying "This sequence of experiences now includes one of a rose"" (p. 94). However, "you do not capture the active feature of the decision by saying this sequence of experiences now includes a

[37] Searle draws an analogy: "in order to understand my visual perceptions, I have to understand them *from a point of view*, but the point of view itself is not something that I see or otherwise perceive" (2004b, p. 297). For example, when "I look at a table, I have a visual experience and there is a table that is the object of the experience" (2001, p. 93). The "point of view has no substantive features other than this one formal constraint, namely it has to be the point from which my experiences take place," a "formal requirement necessary to render intelligible the character of my experiences" (2004b, p. 297). Searle says, "similarly, the notion of self" he postulates "is a purely formal notion, but it is more complex" (p. 297). There is no correspondent "self-experience and no object experienced as the self;" rather, ""self" is simply the name for that entity which experiences its own activities as more than an inert bundle" (2001, p. 93).

[38] The "line" Searle says he is "following here" is "in a sense a fine line between Hume's skepticism and the naïve pretheoretical view that each of us is aware of himself or herself as a self" (2001, p. 93).

[39] That is, as a "grammatical illusion foisted on us by the subject-predicate structure of the sentences" (Searle, 2001, p. 94).

decision," Searle says, "for the decision was something I made, an action on my part, and the experience of the rose was received passively"[40] (p. 94).

Second, Searle asks, "are we not postulating a homunculus who lives in the gap and makes our decisions for us?"[41] (p. 94). Again, the answer here is "no," because, Searle says: "we live in the gaps and make the decisions" (p. 94). The "postulation of a self does not require that we have any experiences of the self" (p. 94). But, Searle says, "the experience of free actions requires a self even though the self is neither an experience nor an object experienced" (p. 95). Lichtenberg's "it thinks" (in critique of Descartes' *cogito*) "was wrong," Searle says; "if thinking is an active voluntary process, there must be a self who thinks" (p. 95).

7. 5. Intentionality and Rationality[42]

From Chapter 5, some accounts of mind propose modules underlying reasoning, judgment and decision making. Employing such accounts, there is argument for the value of arts deriving from an innate dispositional capacity to reason and act in particular ways (as modular). But Searle rejects such distinction from other reasoned action. There is a "quite specific (intellectual) tradition of discussing rationality and practical reason" that "goes back to Aristotle's claims that deliberation is always about means, never about ends" (p. 5, parentheses added). While the "tradition is by no means unified," characteristically "it represents human rationality as a more complex version of ape rationality" (p. 5). And from this tradition, the "possession of rationality is our defining trait as human beings" that is, "the human being is a rational animal" (p. 8). Rationality in this view functions as "a separate cognitive faculty" (p. 8, emphasis deleted).

---

[40] Searle says "it is a formal requirement on rational action that there must be a self who acts, in way that that it is not a formal requirement on perception that there be an agent or a self who perceives" (2001, p. 93).

[41] And "does this not lead us to an infinite regress?" (Searle, 2001, p. 94).

[42] Rejection of a separate faculty of reason is one of a number of criticisms Searle makes of traditional views of rationality in his explanation of practical reason, or rationality in action; for full outline of argument see (2001, pp. 1-32).

Searle considers this notion of a specific "cognitive faculty" of rationality problematic[43] (pp. 7-8). Most recently the "fashionable term for faculty is "module,"" by which it is (generally) meant that "humans have various special cognitive capacities, one for vision, one for language, etc., and rationality is one of these special faculties, perhaps even the most distinctive of our human capacities" (p. 9). But, "*there is no separate faculty of rationality*" (p. 22). There "cannot be a separate faculty of rationality distinct from such capacities as those for language, thought, perception, and the various forms of intentionality" Searle says, "because rational constraints are already built into, they are internal to, the structure of intentionality in general and language in particular" (p. 22).

That is, "once you have intentional states," that is, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc., and "especially" language, "then you already have the constraints of rationality" (p. 22). To "have a beast that has the capacity for forming beliefs on the basis of its perceptions, and has the capacity for forming desires in addition to beliefs, and also has the capacity to express all this in a language" is to find "it already has the constraints of rationality built into those structures" (p. 22). Searle clarifies the point: "there is no way you can make a statement without committing yourself regarding such questions as "Is it true or false?" "Is it consistent, or inconsistent with other things I have said?"" (pp. 22-23). So, Searle says, "the constraints of rationality are not an extra faculty in addition to intentionality and language;" "once you have intentionality and language, you already have phenomena that internally and constitutively possess the constraints of rationality" (p. 23).

7. 6. Conclusion

The structural features of consciousness are, in many of their aspects, familiar in visual arts and education. The qualitative, subjective aspect of aesthetic experience is the object of philosophical aesthetics. This chapter identifies the significance of aesthetics' disciplinary object. Inclusion of the subjective experience of appearances is central the explanation of visuality. Searle's explanation contrasts with the separation in

[43] Searle notes (from Alan Code) that "this standard attribution may be a misunderstanding of Aristotle's actual views" (2001, p. 5).

epistemology of qualia from investigation of consciousness. The other structural features of consciousness provide further means for the study and explanation of conscious states. For example, the biological, embodied situatedness or boundary conditions, as temporal and spatial locatedness is an essential feature of conscious experience. But more recently, this is commonly underrepresented in accounting visuality.

The ‘sensorial’ continuity between thought and feeling provides a move away from the constitution of subjective processes in visuality as overdetermined or strictly conventionalized by social discourses. To start, on Searle’s account of the cognitive nature of perception, social discourses *are* agent in intentional states including perception, as the aspect of familiarity. For example, to see something as money or art requires familiarity with the concept categories of money or art. But on semiotic argument, there is rejection of perceptual accounts as explanatory of the artist’s and beholder’s mental states. And there is rejection of any commonality between the mental states of artist and audience. These joint exclusions describe aesthetic experience as consisting in solitary and incommunicable recesses of the sensorium; that is, the “isolated perceptual field of the image’s creator” (see Bryson, 1991, p. 65).

These exclusions are, I think, unsustainable. In challenging the distinction between perception and cognition, the argued isolation of the perceptual, as sensory experience, presupposes both separation and opposition between the social and the sensory (roughly as culture and biology). Both visual culture and aesthetics define a conflict in this way. From visual culture, cognitive including perceptual activity is over-determined, predicated on existing practice. In its turn, also characteristically separating the sensory as felt pleasure, from the cognitive, aesthetics is reductive or exclusive of cognition in perceptual activity. In contrast, from Searle’s account, biology and culture are co-constitutive of a reasoning self. Through intentionality, as representational (including perceptual) states, subjectivity functions as a qualitative interaction between self and world.

The self having freedom of will is a critical aspect of Searle's account of the irreducibility of self in reasoning and voluntarily actions. This provides another step away from determinist accounts of visuality. For any explanation of human behaviour, Searle distinguishes gaps, as causally insufficient conditions to determine the action, between thinking and acting. But these causal gaps, in the case of a rational self acting on the basis of reasons, do not entail an explanatory gap by way of the constraints attached to causally determined mechanical behaviours.

There is no predictable relation between thinking and acting comparable to the causal constraint on explanation in the physical sciences. This variation substantially constitutes the reason for distinction between science as objective and arts as subjective arenas of explanation. From devaluing of the latter in epistemology, the distinction is regarded as a key problem in arts and education. Further, in the inter-disciplinary approach of visual culture studies and the cross-disciplinary relevance of both visual culture and aesthetics, negotiating the distinction between explanation in the sciences and explanation in the arts is critical. If the price of representing the value of arts practices demands transferring deterministic constraints to explanation in the arts there is, rightly, anxiety about equating mind with mechanics. But, from Searle's account, there is no requirement for equivalence. The two forms of explanation are logically different without exclusion.

In this chapter particularly, it is the unity of these aspects and the irreducibility of the self, as an 'I' in consciousness, that I want to focus on. The study notes some problems affecting the viability of some aspects of explanation in visual culture, insofar as they are semiotic, accounts. Strong relativism and accounts of perception as mediated are epistemologically problematic (in that they are unsustainable ontologically), in my view. Also, the reification of self in aesthetic accounts is reductive of the reasoning agency of self in deliberate action, as context. But Searle's account of the qualitative, subjective unity of conscious experience provides substantial support for continuity of the disciplinary object of philosophical aesthetics, as the exploration and explanation of qualitative states (in experience, creation, and appreciation of art, and visual media, as imagery). As a postscript on the concern with felt states, Searle makes a valuable

distinction between the mode of felt states having mood and emotions; they are often conflated in explaining the arts.

To summarize problems in the accounts of visuality in this context: conscious experience *as* a unified and irreducible self is typically divided in both visual culture and aesthetics. In aesthetics, the notion of self constitutes as a perpetual inborn intuition, non-discursive and so separated from language (see for example, Urmacher and Matthews (Eds.), (2005). The self in visual culture deconstructs as fragmented or incommensurable normative discourses. Each approach is relevant to visuality in particular ways. There is value in explaining the role of qualitative aspects of consciousness and there is value in explaining the role of social agency in subjectivity. But the loss of ontological unity of self in both explanations ensures understanding practices is problematic.

On this point, Searle's account of the self's capacity for rational action, including his rejection of strong modular accounts of reasoning, establishes a general basis for a more coherent approach to the explanation of visuality. But the relation between self or 'I' and world requires further explanation. And so far, on that relation, the study introduces intentionality as the capacity for representation in consciousness. Searle's account in this study extends further, to understand intentional states, both conscious and unconscious and their role in relating the self to the world.

Chapter 8
The Capacity for Representation in Consciousness

8. Introduction

In the debate between visual culture and aesthetics, visual culture typically characterizes visuality as culture 'all the way down.' On this form of account, there is little explanatory inclusion of the autonomy or the independent mind of, in this case, the beholder (all my comments include the artist and also refer to student or novice). In contrast, aesthetics characteristically identifies visuality with the phenomenological, as the felt, intuited experience of subjectivity. Here, the 'disposition' of the beholder maintains distinction as 'original' subjective resources; subjectivity is separate from language and sociocultural influence. So, in this sense, aesthetic accounts also limit explanation of the autonomy of the self as a rational agent. Very roughly, the debate maintains theoretical conflict between subjective experience as 'all language' or 'no language.'

In either form of visual explanation, there is an exclusion of some kind in the explanatory relation between self and world in the consciousness of the beholder. Both accounts instantiate the notion of consciousness, as self, divided from world. From Searle this is, in part, because our inherited language makes authentic revision difficult. Dualism is, he says, out of fashion but won't go away. But, also from Searle's account, there is a feature of human consciousness that enables explanation of the relation between self and world. Searle says that the mind is not "a self-enclosed arena of subjectivity" (1999, p. 85). Rather, the "primary evolutionary role of the mind is to relate us in certain ways to the environment, and especially to other people" (p. 85).

Each person's "subjective states" such as "beliefs and desires, intentions and perceptions, as well as loves and hates, fears and hopes" relate the person "to the rest of the world" (p. 85). The "general name" for the relation between one's (or "my")

subjective states and the world Searle says, is "intentionality"[1] (p. 85). Broadly, intentionality is that "property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states and affairs in the world" (1983, p. 1). Insofar "as far as coping with the world is concerned, the most important feature of consciousness is that it is essentially connected to intentionality" (1999, p. 83).

Before I move on, several previously explored concerns can be briefly restated. In accounting for mental states, psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious remain an important methodological inclusion in theories of visuality, so there is longstanding interest in the unconscious. More recently, there is regard for a biology of visuality, including interest in biological account of the unconscious. In visual culture there is expressed interest in the unconscious as drives and predetermined genetic programs, for instance with language and visual processes. In aesthetics, there is interest in modular programmed capacities that some theorists hope may explain giftedness in art. The study outlines such concerns in the chapters on visual culture and aesthetics. Following this, in Chapter 5, there is some brief explanation of innate, unconsciously rule-determined, modular accounts of reasoning from cognitive science. And, in the previous chapter, study of practical reasoning from Searle rejects strong modularity accounts of reasoning in rational action.

At their base, I think these interests in visual culture and aesthetics derive from concern with, but unfortunately maintain, dualism. The broad motive attending the interest in biological accounts is relevant in this case, because it indicates the source of confusion. Widespread contemporary regard for science's explanatory reduction of phenomena to physics epistemically requires the arts to make some account of states of mind consistent with matter. But innate modular programming cannot account for a conscious irreducible self. Rather such explanations rely on a mediating nonconscious entity of some kind.

[1] Written over decades, Searle's work on intentionality sometimes employs capitalization to distinguish the philosophical or technical use of the term for representation or *aboutness*. In this study all quoted references are consistent with Searle's variations.

In visual arts and education, accounts or strategies from the sciences as means for the explanation of visuality are not an easy inclusion. In the arts, there is longstanding well-founded antipathy towards scientific reduction of states of mind in behaviourist accounts. They are not regarded as sympathetic to the interests of arts and education, as teaching and learning. So, I will restate the most important motivation for this study, since it is crucial to the following account of intentionality as a biological phenomenon: Searle's realism is not reductive. The important point of the study is that as a realist, Searle explains subjective experience and from this, intentionality, as ontologically real states of consciousness.

The aim of this chapter is to understand how the relation between self and world, as intentionality, works. To do this properly, and attend further to the concerns I just raised, there is explanation of the structure of intentional states, including requirements on the epistemology of unconscious phenomena. There are, in Searle's account, limits on what counts as a mental state when it is unconscious. Following this, a further class of intentionality the study looks at is collective intentionality, or shared intentional states. Addressing the social aspect of consciousness requires some study of this capacity. But Searle's explanation of intentionality is extensive. So, there is a caveat on this chapter of the study; it is brief in relation to Searle's body of work on these matters and there is much in his account that is not included. To achieve its aim, the study outlines Searle's explanation and from the necessary brevity, some footnotes provide further detail in the study[2].

8. 0. 1. *The Biological Basis of Intrinsic Intentional States and Mental Phenomena*

Intentionality refers to those mental states that "are in some sense directed at objects and states of affairs in the world" (Searle, 1979a, p. 74); that is, the particular mental states or events which consist in "their (in a special sense of these words) being *directed at*, being *about*, being *of*, or *representing* certain other entities and states of affairs"

[2] Although a relatively early work of Searle's, his most complete account of the structure of intentionality can be found in *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (1983).

(1984b, p. 3). Consistently, Searle rejects dualism in the role intentionality plays in consciousness[3].

Not all mental states are intentional. For example experience of a pain or ache or tickle may be conscious, but those things "are not in that sense directed at anything" in the "way that our beliefs, fears, etc. must in some sense be about something" (1979a, p. 74). As well, not all intentional states "are even conscious states" (p. 74). Someone may hold for instance "many beliefs" that are not in that moment present to their conscious mind, and that they may in fact "never have thought about" (p. 74). Intentional states "are real intrinsic features" of some biological systems "in the same way that mitosis, meiosis (as forms of cell division), and the secretion of bile" are also "real intrinsic features of certain biological organisms" (1984b, p. 5, parentheses added). Equally, and importantly relevant to this study, it is a "biological fact that certain mental states function causally in the interactions between the organism and the rest of nature," as well as "in the production of the behavior of the organism" (p. 10).

8. 0. 2. *Biology, Aboutness, and Actions*

Previously, in the study, some theorists depict the role of biology in visuality as unconscious and predetermining drives[4]. In part, I believe, such depiction proceeds from longstanding epistemic difficulties in accounting for a biology of mental states. There is a question of how brain states, which are a physiological aspect of the natural world can have the "remarkable properties" of intentionality (1999, p. 91). That is, how can a biological capacity in an organism be *about* something else? How can brain states, which each consist in "such things as configurations of neurons and synaptic connections, activated by neurotransmitters" actually "*stand for* anything?" (p. 90). Searle proposes approaching the problem in a simpler and less mysterious way. He provides an "entering wedge" (p. 96) in terms of "biological capacities that are

[3] Searle looks to how "matters of mind, language, and society, can all be shown to be part of the natural world" and as such "continuous with planets, atoms, and digestion" (1999, p. 89). In a world consisting "entirely of physical particles" Searle says, it "is a biological fact that certain sorts of organisms have certain sorts of mental states" (1984b, p. 10). Just as "breathing, digesting and sleeping" are "part of a person's biological life," so too "intentional mental phenomena are part of our natural biological life history" (p. 5).

[4] See *Conclusion*, Chapter 3; from Mitchell (2002).

primitive," such as "hunger, thirst, the sex drive, perception and intentional action" (2004b, p. 164).

By "looking for causal mechanisms in the brain" we can at least know "the *form* of the answer" (1999, p. 96). Thirst for example is "an intentional phenomenon" that is caused by neurobiological processes where, "to be thirsty is to have a desire to drink" (2004b, p. 164). It is "just a fact of biology" that hunger and thirst can cause organisms to seek out and consume food and water[5] (1984b, p. 10). When the "natural biological" causes of intentionality in the case of thirst and hunger are understood, it is not too difficult "to extend the same sort of explanation to the sensory modalities, such as vision and touch"[6] (1999, p. 96). Searle says that, "once we reach the actual visual experience, we have the intrinsic intentionality we have been looking for"[7] (p. 96). The question of "how it can be a case of seeming to see something" requires we understand that "the seeming to see is not *added on* to the visual experience" in the same way "that the referential relation to a particular" woman is "added on" to the words *Mary Jane*[8] (p. 98). Rather the experience itself "just is an experience of seeming to see something" (p. 98). Searle says that "visual phenomena, like beliefs and desires, are characteristically identified and described in terms of their Intentional content" (1983, p. 43). Just as "there is no way to give a complete description of my belief without saying what it is a

[5] Searle describes a sequence of biochemical processes that lead to an increase in the rate of neuron firings in parts of the hypothalamus, which in turn "causes the animal to feel a conscious desire to drink" (1999, p. 95). He also provides additional consideration (through examples of pathologies) of the role the hypothalamus plays in causing the intentional phenomena of thirst (p. 95). Searle cautions that "hypothalamic events by themselves are unlikely to be sufficient for any conscious states, and also that his account is standard, and will most certainly be revised in time (p. 96).

[6] Searle also acknowledges we "do not know the (final) answer to the question" of how "brain processes cause visual experiences" (1999, p. 96, parentheses added).

[7] That is, "in order to see something one has to have a visual experience, and the visual experience is the vehicle of intentionality" (Searle, 2002a, p. 78).

[8] The point counters explanation of visual experience as mediated, that is: "visual experience is not the object of visual perception, and the features which specify the Intentional content are not in general literally features of the experience" (Searle, 1983, p. 44). For instance, "it is a category mistake to suppose that when I see a yellow station wagon the visual experience itself is also yellow and in the shape of a station wagon" (p. 43). So, "just as when I believe that it is raining I do not literally have a wet belief" it is likewise "when I see something yellow I do not literally have a yellow visual experience" that is, "one might as well say that my visual experience is six cylindered or that it gets twenty-two miles to the gallon as say it is yellow or in the shape of a station wagon" (p. 43). The "greater immediacy to visual experiences" tempts people to mistakenly "suppose that the predicates which specify the conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience are literally true of the experience itself" (p. 43).

belief *that*," likewise "there is no way to describe my visual experience without saying what it is an experience *of*" (p. 43).

At an "equally biological," although "much more sophisticated" level, "the fact of causal relations involving intentional mental states is pretty obvious"[9] (1984b, p. 11). A person's musical preferences for example "may play a causal role" in their purchase of tickets and attendance at a concert, just as the desire to move from one place to another "may play a causal role" in a person catching a train or riding a bus (p. 11). Searle says "beliefs, desires and sophisticated forms of thought processes" may be "more complex and more removed from the immediate stimulation of the brain by the impact of the environment" than such things as "perceptions" or feeling hungry and thirsty (2004b, p. 164). But, they are still "caused by brain processes and realized in the brain system" (p. 164).

8. 1. Intentionality as Representation

Concern for the "way in which mental acts can be 'involved with' or 'connected to' their objects" is a "classical dilemma" in the explanation of intentionality (Birchall, 1981, p. 147). The problem "is based on the assumption that for a mental act to have an object, the mental act must be in some way *related to that object*" (p. 147). Philosophically, there is a query of how "mere bits of matter inside the skull could "refer to" or be about something in the world beyond themselves or could through their interactions create such a reference?"[10] (Searle, 2004b, p. 159). Further, there is a question of how is it possible for someone to think about non-existent objects; for example, I can "make up a story" about Santa Claus when Santa Claus in fact "does not even exist" (p. 160). But the form of such questions imposes a relation on the thoughts "like standing next to or hitting or sitting on top of" their objects (like Mercury, Caesar and the Rubicon, and Santa Claus) and iterates "the wrong model of relations on the sentences that describe our intentional contents" (p. 165).

---

[9] However "the logical structure of the causal relations involved" here, as well as the "consequent implications that those causal relations have for the logical structure of the explanation of human behavior" is Searle says, "a great deal less obvious" (1984b, p. 11).

[10] How is it possible for such "ethereal and abstract" things as thought processes to reach to or be in contact with something else, for instance thinking of the planet Mercury, something far away in space or, "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" which is so far away in time? (Searle, 2004b, pp. 160-163).

Searle says we cannot touch something "that does not exist," just as we "cannot sit on something" millions of miles away (p. 165). Instead, "referring to or thinking about something" is not the same as or similar to reaching or touching, "it is rather a form of *representation*" (p. 165). A belief in this way is "intrinsically a representation" (1983, p. 22). Representing something "does not require that the thing represented actually exist" or even "that it exist in some immediate proximity to the representation of it" (2004b, p. 165).

Intentionality, Searle says, is "defined in terms of representation" (1994a, p. 189). There is however, "probably no more abused a term in the history of philosophy than "representation,"" and Searle clarifies his use of the term (1983, p. 11). When Searle says "that a belief is a representation," for instance, he is "most emphatically not saying that a belief is a kind of picture"[11] (p. 12). Rather, "to say that a belief" in this case is "a representation is simply to say," first, "that it has a propositional content and a psychological mode;" second, "that its propositional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects;" and third, "that its psychological mode determines a direction of fit of its propositional contents" (p. 12).

8. 1. 1. *Outline of the Structure of Intentionality*

The "formal structure of the intentionality" Searle describes "is no trivial matter" rather it is "the structure of our conscious life" (2004b, p. 174}. Understanding "a social situation we are in," or "(making) up our minds to engage in some course of action" as well as when "we perceive the heavens on a starry night" and those "recollections of our childhood" while doing something, are all "manifestations of the formal structure" of intentionality (p. 174, parentheses added). Searle says "in order to understand our lives, we have to understand the structure of intentionality" (p. 174).

Searle says "for any intentional state – belief, desire, hope, fear, visual perception, or intention to perform an action," the "content" of that intentional state needs to be

[11] Searle places other constraints on his account of representation. He "(does not endorse) the *Tractatus* account of meaning," nor "(does he say) that a belief re-presents something that has been presented before," nor "(is he saying) that a belief has a meaning," nor "(is he saying) that (a belief) is a kind of thing from which one reads off its conditions of satisfaction by scrutinizing it" (1983, p. 12, parentheses added).

distinguished from "the type of state that it is" (1999, p. 99; see also 2004b, p. 166). That is, "every Intentional state consists of an *Intentional content* in a *psychological mode*" (1983, p. 12). For example, "I can believe that it will rain, hope that it will rain, fear that it will rain, or desire that it will rain" (2004b, p. 166). The propositional "content, that it will rain" is the same in all of these cases, but "that *content* relates to the world in different psychological *modes*; belief, fear, hope, desire, etc."[12] (p. 166, emphasis added). But "not all intentional states have an entire proposition as their content"[13] (p. 167). For instance, one can "just admire Eisenhower or love Marilyn" and in these cases "the intentional state just refers to an object" (p. 167).

We should "notice" Searle says, "intentional representations are always under certain aspects and not others (p. 167). For instance, "I might intentionally represent an object as the Evening Star and not as the Morning Star even though one and the same object is both" (p. 167). The "aspect" of the state, in this case, ""celestial body that shines near the horizon in the evening," is not the same aspect as "celestial body that shines near the horizon in the morning"" (p. 167). Searle says, "*intentional states always have aspectual shapes*"[14] (p. 167).

The "different types of intentional states" Searle says, "relate propositional content to the real world with, so to speak, different obligations of fitting" or direction of fit (1999, p. 100). For example, the state of belief "is supposed to represent how things are in the world," whereas a desire represents "how we would like them to be" (2004b, p. 168). Searle says "the belief is, so to speak *responsible for fitting the world*" that is, it has a ""*mind-to-world direction* of fit"" or "*responsibility* for fit" (p. 168). As a mental state, the belief is "responsible for fitting an independently existing reality" (p. 168). Alternately, "in the case of desire it is, so to speak, the *responsibility of the world to fit*

---

[12] Searle says "the distinction between content and mode carries over to perceptions and intentional actions;" "you can see that it is raining, just as you can believe that it is raining" or "you can intend to go to the movies, just as you can wish that you were going to the movies" (1999, p. 99).

[13] Cf. with Chapter 5, *Concepts in Visual Experience*.

[14] Failing to account for the aspectual shape of intentional states leads to significant difficulties in explaining intentional phenomena and Searle says "some materialist theories are unable to do so" (2004b, p. 167). Functionalist accounts (see Chapter 6: *The Problem of Ontological Reduction and the Irreducibility of Consciousness*) for example are "unable to distinguish between the desire for water and the desire for H_2O" because "the causal relations on which functionalism relies to analyze intentionality do not have the aspectual shapes characteristic of genuine intentionality" (p. 167).

the content of the desire," so the "mental state" in this case has "the "*world-to-mind direction* of fit"" or "*responsibility* for fit"[15] (p. 168).

Where the content of an intentional state "is a whole proposition and where there is direction of fit" Searle says, "the Intentional content determines the *conditions of satisfaction*" (1983, p. 12). The "key to understanding intentionality is conditions of satisfaction" (2004b, p. 169). When "we say, for example that a statement is true or false, that an order is obeyed or disobeyed, that a promise is kept or broken" we "apply a notion of satisfaction" or "conditions of success" on the statement (1983, p. 10). Searle says "this notion of satisfaction clearly applies to Intentional states as well" (p. 10). That is, "an intentional state is satisfied if the world is the way it is represented by the intentional state as being" (1999, p. 103).

Searle says, "to understand what a belief is, you have to know under what conditions it is true;" "in the case of a desire, under what conditions it is satisfied" and "in the case of an intention, under what conditions is it carried out, and so on with other intentional states" (2004a, p. 321). For instance, "my belief will be satisfied if and only if things are as I believe them to be," or "my desires will be satisfied if and only if they are fulfilled" and "my intentions will be satisfied if and only if they are carried out" (1983, p. 10). The "intentional state" in each of these cases, "is satisfied or not depending on whether there is indeed a match between propositional content and the reality presented" (1999, p. 103).

The "most common expressions for appraising success in achieving mind-to-world direction of fit are "true" and "false"" that is, "beliefs and convictions can be said to be true or false" (2004b, p. 168). But, "desires and intentions are not true or false the way beliefs are;" that is, "their aim is not to match an independently existing reality, but rather to get reality to match the content of the Intentional state" (p. 168). Since they are

[15] And some cases "have the "*null* direction of fit;"" that is, "they "presuppose" a fitting relation rather than assert or try to bring it about" (Searle, 2004b, p. 169). For example, "if I am sorry that I stepped on your foot, or I am glad that the sun is shining, I take it for granted that I stepped on your foot and that the sun is shining" (p. 169). These states aim neither to "match reality" (mind to world) nor "to get reality to match them" (world to mind) (p. 169).

"determined by the content," conditions of satisfaction "must obtain if the state is to be satisfied," and "for this reason the *specification* of the content is already a *specification* of the conditions of satisfaction" (1983, p. 13). That is, "every Intentional state with a direction of fit is (already) a representation of its conditions of satisfaction" (p. 13, parentheses added).

Semiotic approaches typically insist that perception is strongly mediated by its cognitive content. On Searle's account, perception is cognitive. But there is no mediation, rather perception is immediate. There is, Searle says, a relevant difference between forms of intentionality that causes confusion. For the study, Searle's account makes an important distinction explicit in the following point.

Intentionality is that capacity for representation or *aboutness*; "an Intentional state *has* a representative content, but it is *not about* or *directed at* its representative content;" there is no necessity for an "intermediate" entity (p. 17 emphasis added). To explain: the *derived* intentionality of pictures and sentences provides for a "distinction between the entity and its representative content" (p. 22). But Searle says that "it is at least misleading, if not simply a mistake, to say that a belief, for example, is a two-term relation between a believer and a proposition" (p. 18). That is, there is "no second order" intentional state about a "first order" state of belief or desire"[16] (p. 22).

Unlike the distinction between the entity and its representative content in the case of derived intentionality, we can't make the same distinction "for beliefs and desires *qua* beliefs and desires because the representative content of the belief or desire isn't in that way separable from the belief or desire" (p. 22). Rather, "the belief is identical with the proposition construed as believed" (p. 19). That is, "the consciousness of the conditions of satisfaction *is part of* the conscious belief or desire, since the Intentional content *is internal* to the states in question" (p. 22, emphasis added).

So "if I have a belief that it is raining, the content of my belief is: that it is raining" (p. 13). The "conditions of satisfaction are (in this case): that it is raining – and not, for

[16] Because "if it were, we would indeed get infinite regress" (Searle, 1983, p. 22).

example, that the ground is wet or that water is falling out of the sky" (p. 13, parentheses added). Searle says, "since all representation," whether intrinsic (as "mind") or derived (as "language, pictures" etc.) "is *always* under certain aspects and not others, the conditions of satisfaction are represented under certain aspects"[17] (p. 13).Those intentional states which do not have entire propositional content are in part constituted by other intentional states having entire propositional content with conditions of satisfaction.

8. 1. 2. *Intentional Causation*

In the previous chapter's account of rational action, the explanatory relation between intentionality and causation of behaviour does not require determination in the way of classical mechanics; but the role of reasons in the attribution of causation is critical. How does such a relation work? Searle says, not only does mind intrinsically represent objects and states of affairs in the world, as well, "our minds are in constant causal contact with the world" (1999, p. 104). For instance, "when we see things, the objects we see cause our visual experiences of them" (p. 104). Or "when we remember events in our past, those past events cause our present memories" and "when we intend to move our bodies, those intentions cause the bodily movements" (pp. 104-105). In each of these cases "we find both a causal and an intentional component" (p. 105).

The "essential feature of intentional causation is that the intentional state itself functions causally in the production of its own conditions of satisfaction or its conditions of satisfaction function causally in its production" (1984b, p. 11). In the "one case the representation, as a representation, produces what it represents;" and "in the other case the object or state of affairs represented functions causally in the production of its representation" (p. 11). To take the first case, for example: "if I now have a strong desire to drink a cup of coffee and I act on the desire so as to satisfy it," Searle says, "then the desire whose content is (that I drink a cup of coffee) causes the very state of affairs, that I drink a cup of coffee" (p. 11). In this "simple" case, the desire "represents the very state of affairs that it causes" (p. 11). The "cause is a representation of that which it causes" so, "the specification of the cause, as cause, is indirectly already a

[17] For further explanation of these features of intentionality, see Searle (1983, pp. 1-37).

specification of the effect" (p. 11). The desire here "both causes and represents its conditions of satisfaction" (1999, p. 105).

8. 1. 3. *Causal Self-Referentiality*

In the second case, Searle says "sometimes it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional state itself that it is only satisfied if it functions causally" (p. 105). For instance "if I intend to raise my arm, then the intention requires more to be satisfied than just that I raise my arm" (p. 105). Here "it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of my intention to raise my arm that that very intention should cause the raising of my arm" (p. 105). In this way, "intentions are causally self-referential"[18] (p. 105). This "causal self-referentiality" Searle says "is present not only in the "volitive" states, such as intentions, but also in the "cognitive" states of perception and memory" (p. 105).

For instance, "if I really see that tree, then it must not only be the case that I have a visual experience whose conditions of satisfaction are that there is a tree there," but also "the fact that there is a tree there must cause the very visual experience that has those conditions of satisfaction" (p. 105). In the case of memory, "if I remember" running a foot race at a school function, "then it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of the memory not only that I really did" run such a foot race, but "the event of my running the race must cause the memory that has those conditions of satisfaction" (pp. 105-106). The "most biologically basic intentional phenomena, including perceptual experiences, intentions to do something, and memories" are "all causally self-referential" (2004b, p. 170). The role of causal self-referentiality in volitional activity, as well as perception and memory (as cognitive activity) is always present in the representation of practices.

[18] Searle notes "in this respect intentions differ from desires" because "a desire can be satisfied even if it does not cause the conditions of its satisfaction," but "an intention can be satisfied only if it causes the rest of its own conditions of satisfaction" (1984b, pp. 11-12). To take an example, "if I want to be rich and I become rich" Searle says, "my desire will be satisfied even if that desire played no causal role in my becoming rich" (p. 12). However, "if I intend to earn a million dollars and I wind up with a million dollars quite by accident" in a way in which the intention "played no causal role consciously or unconsciously in my getting it" then, Searle says, "although the state of affairs represented by my intention came about," we find that "the intention itself was not satisfied" in that "the intention was never carried out" (p. 12).

That is, in explanation, tacitly or explicitly, it accounts for the directions of fit and causation between mind and world[19].

8. 2. Intentionality and the Unconscious

From the introduction to this chapter and earlier parts of the study, there is significant interest in attributing a causal role to unconscious states in the explanation of visuality. In art theory and education there is longstanding engagement with psychoanalytic accounts and, more recently, the role of the unconscious as biological phenomena is evident. In Searle's work, such interest is because the unconscious "is part of an explanatory need" that "has come to figure hugely in our explanation of human behavior" [20] (pp. 249-250). Attributing "unconscious mental states" such as beliefs and desires to some behaviour enables us to give reasons for the person's actions by way of "unconscious motivations" (p. 250).

As well as its contribution to a non-reductive ontology of intentionality as mental states, Searle's account clarifies many points of possible confusion in engaging with current accounts of unconscious phenomena. This clarification is relevant. There is interest expressed from visual culture theorists in the role of unconscious as genetically rule-governed or determined mechanisms, for example. Such interests are particularly vulnerable, in my view, to confusions over certain points Searle's explanation attends to. Further, accounting for the unconscious is a necessary preliminary to understanding

[19] For "cognitive states with causal self-referentiality, such as perception and memory" Searle says, "we have mind-to-world direction of fit and world-to-mind direction of causation," since "my mental state of memory or perception "fits" the world only if the world causes the state that has the fit" (1999, p. 106). In the case of "visual perception" for instance, "if I see the cat is on the mat, I see how things really are" (thus achieving "mind-to-world direction of fit") "only if the cat's being on the mat causes me to see the situation that way" (having a "world-to-mind direction of causation") (2004b, p. 171). In the case of "volitive states, such as intentions, the directions are reversed" (1999, p. 106). There is world-to-mind direction of fit, and mind-to-world direction of causation. For example "I succeed in intentionally reaching the book on the top shelf (and thus achieve world-to-mind direction of fit)" in this case "only if my trying, my intention-in-action, causes my success (mind-to-world direction of causation)" (2004b, p. 171). This is because "my intention to raise my arm "fits" the world only if the state itself causes the event in the world that it fits, that is, only if the intention itself causes the event of raising my arm" (1999, p. 106). Searle provides a helpful schema of the "resulting formal relations" involved here, using "the old fashioned terminology of cognition and volition to name the two families;" see Searle (2004b, pp. 171-172). See also n.24 following, for further on significance in explanation.

[20] For systematic account of the unconscious and intentionality see particularly Searle (1994a, 1994b).

Searle's explanation of the role of the background and network of intentional states, in the following chapter.

To properly account for the role of unconscious states, there are explanatory challenges. And because "we have become so used to talking about the unconscious" Searle says, we have in fact "forgotten just how puzzling the notion of the unconscious really is"[21] (p. 238). There are difficulties in philosophy understanding states that are "mental and at the same time totally unconscious;" that is, how can unconscious states "function causally as mental states while they are unconscious?" (p. 238). As well, in cognitive and other sciences there is a problem with unconscious states in how we "distinguish between the mental and the non-mental" (1994b, p. 847). There are constraints on what constitutes a *mental* state that first need to be understood in order to account for unconscious mental states.

8. 2. 1. *Metaphorical or As-If Attribution of Unconscious Mental States*

First, not all states in an agent's experience are mental states and "not even every state of the brain which functions essentially in the *production* of mental phenomena is itself a mental phenomenon" (1991, p. 49). Searle notes the "distinction between *intrinsic* intentionality and *as-if* intentionality" (1994a, p. 156). As-if statements such as "the

[21] To start, there is a question of what it is "about a brain process" that "makes it a mental process?" (Searle, 1994b, p. 848). An answer to the question is "relatively easy," Searle says when "the process is *conscious*" for instance, "if I am consciously trying to run a mile in six minutes" (p. 848, emphasis added). This is because "my conscious intentionality," which is "paradigmatically mental" is "playing a causal role in the production of my behavior" (p. 848). But "how could we subtract the consciousness from a mental state and still have a *mental* state left over?" that is, in "naïve, pre-theoretical" terms, how could we have a "conscious mental state minus the consciousness?" (1991, pp. 47-48). The "notion" of the unconscious "is far from clear" (1994a, p. 151). But, Searle says, it does seem "clear that there are unconscious mental states and these play a causal role" in our behaviour (1994b, p. 848). He suggests that remembering "distinctions between ontology, causation, and epistemology" can be helpful to understanding unconscious mental states insofar as their "mode of existence," what they *do*, and how we "find out about" them (1991, p. 47). If, for example "we were examining the heart", the answers to these distinctions consists in "the heart is a large piece of muscle located in the chest cavity (ontology); the heart functions to pump blood throughout the body (causation)," and we can "find out about the body indirectly through such methods as using stethoscopes, cardiograms and taking pulse, and directly opening up the chest cavity and looking at the heart (epistemology)" (p. 47). There are "series of confusions between these three questions" for instance, behaviourism "confuses the epistemology of the mental with the ontology" insofar as suggesting "we find out about mental states by observing behavior, so mental states just consist in behavior and dispositions to behavior" (p. 47). Alternately, "functionalism consists in confusing the causation with the ontology" in the view that "mental states have causal relations" ("to input stimuli, other mental states, and output behavior"), so "mental states just consist in having these causal relations" (p. 47).

plants in my garden are hungry for nutrients" for instance, fall into cases of "metaphorical attributions," *as-if* the plants have intentionality[22] (1999, pp. 92-93).

But, to describe an intentional state as *intrinsic* is "just to say that the states and events really exist in the minds/brains of agents" (1984b, p. 4). That is, there is "nothing metaphorical or *as-if* about these attributions," since "attributions of the unconscious lose their explanatory power if we do not take them literally" (1994a, p. 156). To "say of someone who is asleep that he believes" for example, the Eiffel Tower is in Paris or "to say of someone who is awake that he has an unconscious but repressed hatred of his father," is "speaking quite literally" (p. 156). Searle says, "*only intrinsic intentionality is genuinely mental*" and "*unconscious intentional states are intrinsic*" (p. 156).

So, "relative to some purpose or another anything can be treated *as-if* it were mental" (1991, p. 52). And the "problem of distinguishing the mental from the non-mental becomes more acute when we get inside the human body" (1994b, p. 848). There are, Searle says, "a lot of systems inside the body that do complicated and apparently "intelligent" information processing, but which have no mental life at all"[23] (p. 848). For example, axonal myelination or nerve sheathings of the central nervous system "couldn't themselves be conscious states" (1994a, p. 154). Although we may assume that "myelination functions essentially in the *production* of (our) mental states," the actual phenomena of myelination are "nonconscious" and such things are "not in the mental line of business at all"[24] (p. 154, emphasis and parentheses added).

---

[22] Searle says that "no doubt there are marginal cases" of the distinction (1994a, p. 81). For instance, "about grasshoppers and fleas… we may not be quite sure what to say;" just as there is "no doubt, even in some human cases we might be puzzled as to whether we should take the ascription of intentionality literally or metaphorically" (pp. 81-82).

[23] Searle cites a case where the writers refer the stomach as an "intelligent organ" capable Searle says, of "performing all sorts of mental operations;" journal article cited in (1994a, p. 81); quote from (1994b, p. 848).

[24] Noting the distinction between mental events and processes, and biological structures that "are important" for various kinds of mental phenomena, but which have "no mental reality" to their behaviour is significant (Searle, 2004b, p. 242). Attributing mental states in explaining the behaviour of non-mental biological phenomena confuses the particular "logical properties" of "mentalistic explanations," with "other sorts of explanations" (1994b, p. 847). Mentalistic explanations "in general", are "about phenomena that are content-guided" that is, the "semantic or intentional content" attributed in the explanation "plays a causal role in the production of the behavior;" the behaviour is "trying to realize the conditions of satisfaction of that intentional state" (p. 847): see also previously, *Causal Self-Referentiality*. For instance, "if I explain the behavior" of a swimmer by saying that the swimmer "is

8. 2. 2. *The Aspectual Shape of Unconscious Mental Phenomena*

So unlike such nonconscious states and processes, first, "my belief (when I am not thinking about it) that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" "is matter of *intrinsic* intentionality, and not a matter of what anybody else chooses to say about me or how I behave or what sort of stance someone might adopt toward me"[25] (1991, p. 50, emphasis added). Second, the "belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris *represents its conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects and not others*" (p. 51, emphasis added. That is, the belief has "a certain *aspectual shape*," which is "part of its identity, part of what makes it the state that it is" (p. 51). For instance the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris is "distinct" in its point of view "from the belief that 'the tallest iron structure built in France before 1900 is located in the French capitol'" (p. 51). The "link, then, between intentionality and consciousness lies in the notion of an aspectual shape" (p. 52). Searle says, "any theory of the unconscious must be able to account for" the "fact that intentional states represent their conditions of satisfaction only under certain aspects and those aspects must matter to the agent" (p. 50). The aspectual feature "must exist from his/ her point of view" (p. 53).

These "two features" that is, the "fact that an unconscious intentional state must be *intrinsically* mental" as well as "the fact that it must have a certain *aspectual* shape" Searle says, both "have important consequences for our conception of the unconscious"

---

trying to" swim a hundred metres in two minutes, "then the actual intentional state present in the agent and specified in the explanation," *trying to swim a hundred metres in two minutes*, "plays a causal role in the production of the behavior;" that is, the behaviour "is precisely one of trying to realize the conditions of satisfaction of that intentional state" (p. 847). In contrast, "if I say that a body falls a certain distance in a certain time because it is an instance of the law $S=1/2\ gt^2$" (of gravity), then, "I give an explanation of the behavior of a falling body by stating a law which has a certain semantic or intentional content;" but, Searle says, "the content, $S=1/2\ gt^2$, plays no causal role whatever," that is, "it simply describes and explains, it does not cause" (p. 847). And "this is a familiar distinction;" "a special case of the distinction is the familiar one between *rule-described* and *rule-governed* or *rule-guided* behavior" (p. 847). Searle says, "in particular, mentalistic explanations that appeal to rules are about phenomena that are *rule-guided*, not merely *rule-described*" (p. 847, emphasis added). There is no way to "make this sort of distinction (between rule-guided on one hand, and rule-described or rule-governed phenomena on the other) just by looking at external behavior," since "there are lots of systems that behave exactly *as-if* they were following rules" (p. 848, parentheses added).

[25] Since to be an intrinsic state (and not a derived or *as-if* form of intentionality), the experience must be from someone's point of view or more technically, have an aspectual shape, the "aspectual feature" of intrinsic intentional states "*cannot* be exhaustively or completely characterized solely in terms of third-person, behavioral, or even neuro-physiological predicates" (Searle, 1994a, p. 158, selective emphasis from original). There "will always be" Searle says, "an inferential gulf between the behavioral *epistemic grounds* for the presence of the aspect and the *ontology* of the aspect itself (p. 158).

(p. 51, emphasis added). The consequence is that "we understand the notion of an unconscious mental state only as a possible content of consciousness" (p. 51). That is, albeit unconscious and "perhaps impossible to bring to consciousness for various reasons"[26], the state must be "*the sort of thing* that could be or could have been conscious" (p. 51; see also 1999, p. 86).

In order for unconscious phenomena to be "genuinely mental," the states "must preserve their aspectual shape even when unconscious" (p. 57). But "the only sense" in which the preservation of an aspectual shape is notionally possible when unconscious "is that they are the possible contents of consciousness" (p. 57). Briefly, he says "*the ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the conscious*" (1994a, p. 172). But this ontology has consequences for commonly held views of unconscious mental phenomena.

8. 2. 3. *Explanation of the Unconscious from Distinctions Between Unconscious States*

Searle says, "we can provide a legitimate sense to the notion of the unconscious, provided we describe it in terms of the causal capacities of the brain to cause consciousness" (2004b, p. 248). There are "neurobiological structures capable of causing" both "conscious states" and "behavior appropriate to those mental states" (p. 248). These structures cover first, "preconscious" states and second, those commonly known as "repressed conscious cases" (p. 248).

8. 2. 4. *The Preconscious*

First, the *preconscious*, Searle says is an "unproblematic type" of "unconscious mental state" (p. 240). As "an obvious sort of case," it "can be truly said of me, even when I am sound asleep that I believe that George Washington was the first president of the United States" (p. 239). Searle asks "what fact about me makes it true that I have this belief even when I am unconscious?" (p. 239). Further "we can even say of a person who is

[26] Certainly, "a person may be unconscious" such as when they are asleep, or "in a coma" and so on; and "many mental states are never brought to consciousness" (Searle, 1994a, p. 153). Also "no doubt," many mental states "could not be brought to consciousness" for various reasons, for instance "they may be too painful and hence too deeply repressed for us to think of them" (p. 154).

wide awake, and who happens to be thinking about something else entirely that he believes George Washington the first president of the United States (p. 239). Again, "what fact corresponds to these claims?" (p. 239). The "fact that corresponds to the claims" Searle says, in "both cases," is "that there is in him a structure that is capable of producing the state in a conscious form"[27] (p. 239). To say, in this case, "the man has an unconscious belief that George Washington was the first president of the United States" is simply to identify "a structure in him" by "virtue of the conscious state that (the structure) is capable of causing"[28] (p. 240, parentheses added).

Searle identifies "a second type of unconscious state," which is "more problematic" (p. 242). Often, "an agent has mental states that function causally in her behavior," where that person "is totally unaware of the functioning of the mental state and may even sincerely deny it" (p. 240). Searle says "some of these cases are of the sort Freud described as repression," but in a more general way "we can characterize these, again using the Freudian vocabulary, as the dynamic unconscious" (p. 240). Here, the "agent clearly acts out of a motive of which he is unaware and would presumable deny if he were challenged" (p. 241).

These "types of cases" Searle refers to ("following Freud"), as "cases of repressed unconscious mental states" (p. 241). Searle says, "the way to understand the repressed cases" is "on the model of the first, the preconscious," (p. 242). The causal capacity of

---

[27] Searle employs an analogy to "help make (the) point clear" (1999, p. 87, parentheses added). Even when "I turn my computer off" and "all of the words and images on the screen disappear," those words and images (in the absence of mistake) "do not cease to exist," instead they remain, stored "in the form of magnetic traces" (p. 87). Although the form of the words and pictures cannot be detected, "the fact that they are still words and pictures" constitutes on the "fact that the magnetic traces can be converted into words and pictures when the machine is turned on" (p. 87). This fact remains true even when the conversion cannot occur "because the CPU is broken or some such" (p. 87). This analogy, Searle notes, differs from the metaphor (commonly applied to computers) of the "filing cabinet," where the words and pictures "retain exactly their original form" (p. 87). Rather, Searle says, his analogy allows for how "such mental states" may "have a totally different, nonconscious form," but as "neurobiological states and processes describable in purely neurobiological terms," they "are still unconscious *mental* states, capable of acting causally in ways similar to conscious mental states" (p. 87).

[28] Searle says "this sort of attribution is very common" for instance "we say of a substance in a bottle that it is a cleanser or a bleach" unproblematically, "without identifying the chemical structure any further" (2004b, p. 240). We are simply identifying it "by what it does, not by what structure enables it to do it" (p. 240). To say in our case "the man has an unconscious belief that George Washington was the first president of the United States" is likewise "identifying a structure in him" by "virtue of the conscious state that (the structure) is capable of causing" (p. 240, parentheses added).

the neurobiological structure to realize motives in behaviour remains consistent, even when "the agent may have extra reasons for not wanting to admit the motivation to himself" (p. 245, parentheses added). This assimilation is consistent with "what we already know about the brain and how it works, as well as what we know about our conscious mental life" (p. 246).

8. 2. 5. *Accounting for Nonconscious States and Processes*

From previous distinction, there are also nonconscious "neurobiological structures capable of causing behavior that is *as if* it were intentionally motivated;" but "there is no psychological reality" in those cases where "the sort of motivation could not be a conscious intentional content" (p. 248). For instance, in the cognitive sciences, "it is commonly said that a child learns a language by "unconsciously" applying many computational rules of universal grammar;" and in another example, "that the child is able to perceive visually by performing "unconscious" computational operations over the input that comes into the child's retina" (p. 241). In "both of these kinds of cases" that is, "both in the acquisition of language and the forming of perceptions" the agent or person "not only cannot bring the (computational rule) to consciousness in fact, but could not bring it to consciousness even in principle" (p. 241, parentheses added). Searle calls these cases that are both unconscious and inaccessible to consciousness in principle, the "deep unconscious"[29] (p. 241).

But, on Searle's account, "there is no such thing as a deep unconscious mental state" (p. 246). Lacking "the aspectual shape of the intentional state," the "deep unconscious cases" are missing "the essential feature of intentionalistic phenomena"[30] (p. 247). The aspectual shape is what "enables (the intentional state) to function in mental causation

[29] For fuller argument by Searle on "deep unconscious" states and processes, specifically on Chomsky's attribution of "deep unconscious rules" in relation to a Language Acquisition Device (LAD) see, "Some Consequences: Universal Grammar, Association Patterns, and Connectionism" (in Searle, 1994a, pp. 240-247). Searle says the "view that states are mental and yet not the sort of state that could function consciously is incoherent" because "it cannot answer the question: What fact about these brain processes makes them *mental*, makes them have the features of intentional mental states?" (1999, p. 88).

[30] These states may "function critically in controlling our mental lives" but "are not cases of mental phenomena at all" (Searle, 2004b, p. 242). For instance, one reason "I do not die" even when "I am unconscious or in a sound sleep" is that the "medulla will still control my breathing" (p. 242). But "I am not unconsciously following the rule "Keep breathing" (p. 242). Just as the "stomach functions in a nonmental fashion when I am digesting food," there is "no mental reality to the events in the medulla" (p. 242). While neurobiological, these states are both nonconscious and non-mental.

and therefore to justify the mentalistic forms of causal explanations" (p. 247, parentheses added). Searle suggests that we "assimilate" the deep unconscious, to "the nonconscious" (p. 247). So, "there are *non*conscious neurobiological processes that we can describe *as if* they were intentional"[31] (p. 246). There are also "neurobiological processes capable of producing states in a conscious form" (p. 246).

But, "to the extent that the mental state is not even the kind of thing that could become the content of a conscious state, it is not a genuine mental state" (p. 246). Why? Because "we understand an unconscious mental state only as a state that, though not conscious then and there, is capable of becoming conscious;" and, Searle says, "when we attribute such a state to an agent, we are describing a brain mechanism, not in terms of its neural biological properties, but in terms of its capacity to cause conscious states and behavior"[32] (p. 246).

In conclusion, "an unconscious mental state, when unconscious, consists in a capacity of the brain to produce that state in a conscious form and to produce behavior appropriate to that state" (pp. 248-249). But, Searle notes, "this result has an unexpected consequence" for his "analysis of intentionality" (p. 249). In his work, Searle distinguishes between "the network of intentional states and the background of capacities that enable these states to function" (p. 249). So, "what are the elements of the network when they are unconscious?" (p. 249).

On the "dispositional analysis" provided here, the "status of my belief that George Washington was the first president when I am sound asleep" Searle says, "consists of a brain capacity" (p. 249). The "background also consists of such capacities" (p. 249). From this, "it turns out that the network of intentionality, when unconscious, is a subclass of background capacities; it is the special capacity to produce certain forms of

[31] Searle says, in these deep unconscious cases there are only "neurobiological features" and neurobiology "as such has no aspectual shape" (2004b, p. 247). To repeat, deep unconscious states are a case of phenomena "that behave as if they had intentionality" (p. 247).

[32] Searle calls this view "the Connection Principle" since "it claims that our notion of the unconscious is logically connected to the notion of consciousness" (2004b, p. 246); see also (1994a, p. 155).

conscious thoughts and behavior" (p. 249). The following chapter takes up Searle's account of the network and background of intentional states further.

8. 3. Further Distinctions in Intentional Phenomena

For further understanding the role of consciousness in the explanation of visuality, this section continues to study intentional phenomena. In this case, however, there is focus on the role of an irreducibly collective or *we*-intentionality. Searle's work on this matter is written as a crucial element in his explanation of social reality. But Searle's account of collective intentionality is importantly relevant to explanation of the general role of sociocultural constraints on visuality and further explains how we see, and explain, something *as* something.

Like the previous explanation of the unconscious, the following explanation is essential to the account of intentionality as both biological and mental. As well, what follows forms a necessary preliminary to understanding constitutive aspects of the background and network of intentional states as a relation between self and world, in the next chapter. The social or *we*- aspect of intentionality forms a critical aspect of the results of this study. In accounting for social reality, Searle says, the interaction between self and world includes an irreducible relation between ourselves and others as a capacity for collective activity. In this sense, Searle's explanation contrasts with strong relativist claims of incommensurable difference in the ontology of subjectivity.

8. 3. 1. *Intentionality in the World*

As part of their evolution, humans have "a mental reality, a world of consciousness, intentionality, and other mental phenomena" (1995a, p. xi). The capacity for representation or intentionality, from previously, enables survival in the world. As an extension of the individual's capacity in consciousness to represent the world, the question emerges: "How does one organism relate to the consciousness and intentionality of other organisms?" (in Feser and Postrel, 2000, p. 48). Searle says, "human beings, by their individual and collective efforts, create the part of the world that contains linguistic, social and institutional reality" (2004a, p. 333). That is, the

capacity for collective intentionality enables the production of social structures based in "human agreement" (1995a, p. 1). In this collective effort, "human societies are immensely complex and immensely various" (2006a, p. 15). But, "it is not necessary to postulate any special metaphysical realms in order to account for communication and shared intentionality"[33] (Searle, 1983, p. 198). The "possibility of shared intentional contents does not require a heavy metaphysical apparatus any more than the possibility of shared walks"[34] (p. 198).

Searle thinks "the capacity for collective behavior is biologically innate, and the forms for collective intentionality cannot be eliminated or reduced to something else" (1995a, p. 37). As well, "collective intentional" behaviour is "by no means confined to human beings but rather seems to be a biologically primitive form of animal life"[35] (1990a, p. 402). Human collective behaviour "typically involves language but does not invariably require language or even conventional ways of behaving" (p. 402). So, for example, "I see a man pushing a car in the street in an effort to get it started; and I simply start pushing with him" (p. 402). While "no words are exchanged and there is no convention according to which I push his car," it "is a case of collective behavior" that is, "in such a case *I* am pushing only as part of *our* pushing" (p. 402). We "take social reality for granted," learning as children to "see our surroundings in terms of their socially defined functions," and "without reflecting on (their) special features" (1995a, p. 4, parentheses added). Searle says, "in most cases it is harder to see objects as just natural phenomena, stripped of their functional roles" (p. 4). "Indeed," it is "only by force of abstraction" we can see "moving cars, dollar bills, and full bathtubs" as "masses of metal in linear

---

[33] Searle says the "metaphysical complexity" of "ordinary social relations" is "truly staggering" (1995a, p. 3). But, the problem of a special metaphysical realm occurs in positing an irreducibly collective intentionality via "some sort of collective mental entity, some overarching Hegelian World Spirit, some "we" that floats around mysteriously above us individuals and of which we as individuals are just expressions" (1999, p. 118).

[34] If for example, "you think about the Evening Star under the mode of presentation "Evening Star," and I think about the same planet under the same mode of presentation," Searle says, "the sense in which we have an abstract entity in common is the utterly trivial sense in which if I go for a walk" (around the Sydney Harbour for example), "and you go for exactly the same walk, we share an abstract entity, the same walk, in common" (1983, p. 198).

[35] The "simplest form of social facts involves simple forms of collective behaviour" (Searle, 1995a, p. 37). So, we recognize "cooperative behaviour" Searle says, when we "consider two birds building a nest together, or puppies playing on a lawn, or groups of primates foraging for food, or even a man going for a walk with his dog" (1990a, p. 402).

trajectories, cellulose fibres with green and grey stains, or enamel-covered iron concavities containing water" (p. 5).

But this "invisibility of the structure of social reality" generates "a problem for the analyst" (p. 5). That is, "we cannot just describe how it seems to us from an internal "phenomenological" point of view," Searle says, "because money, property, marriages, lawyers, and bathtubs do not seem to have a complex structure"[36]; such things "just are what they are, or so it seems" (p. 5). Neither "can we describe them from the external behaviorist point of view;" in this case "because the description of the overt behavior of people dealing with money, property, etc., misses the underlying structures that makes the behavior possible"[37] (p. 5). So, Searle seeks to explain "how there can be an epistemically objective social reality that is partly constituted by an ontologically subjective set of attitudes," or, how "there can be an objective reality that is what it is only because we think it is what it is"[38] (1999, p. 113). A crucial element in his account of social facts is, "collective intentionality"[39] (p. 116).

---

[36] And, Searle says, "what goes for" money, property and marriage "goes for universities" and "journal interviews and language in general, and cocktail parties and tenure and a whole lot of other things that are socially constructed – they're socially created" (in Feser and Postrel, 2000, p. 47).

[37] Nor, Searle says, "can we describe those structures as sets of unconscious computational rules, as is done by contemporary cognitive science and linguistics:" from previously, "it is incoherent to postulate an unconscious following of rules that is inaccessible in principle to consciousness" (1995a, p. 5). And, "computation" is anyway, "one of those observer-relative, functional phenomena we are seeking to explain" (p. 5).

[38] One "puzzling" feature that follows "from this combination of the subjective and the objective" is the "causal efficacy" of social entities (Searle, 1999, pp. 113-114). Searle looks to how it is that "money, governments, universities, private property, marriages, and so on" function "causally in our lives," in a "world consisting entirely of physical and chemical elements" (pp. 114-115). Other "puzzling features" Searle seeks to address is the circularity, at risk of infinite regress, of accounting for social entities ("its being money requires that it be believed that it is money") and the "role of performative utterances in the creation of institutional facts" ("language is not used merely to *describe* the facts but, in an odd way, is partly *constitutive* of the facts") (pp. 114-115).

[39] I say the following by way of apology and explanation of my perhaps too rough adaptation of Searle's account of social reality to the needs of the study. Searle's account of social reality is largely concerned with the "subclass of social facts" he calls "institutional facts, facts involving human institutions" (1995a, p. 26). What counts as an institution is of interest in the social sciences and Searle marks out "those cases where the facts in question are on the margin of being institutional" as "more interesting" to him (2006a, p. 28). But Searle is "not attempting to describe" he says, "massive forms of human practices" that for example "go with what we call 'science' or 'religion' or 'education;'" although within those practices "there are indeed institutions" (p. 28). Institutional practices such as "money, property, government and marriage" entail "collectively recognized" deontic obligations (rights and responsibilities) (p. 28). Searle makes a distinction between social facts and objects like "the role of tools such as hammers where there is no deontology involved" for example, and the role of tools such as money, which only makes sense given a deontology" (2004a, p. 324). This distinction is crucial. From its constraints, there are problems of generalizing from specifically institutional facts to social practices such as art. The risk lies in confusing

8. 3. 2. *Collective Intentionality*

Collective intentionality "is the intentionality that is shared by different people" (2006a, p. 16). Searle says, "just as there can be shared intentions to do things, so there can be shared beliefs and shared desires" (p. 16); "many species of animals, our own especially" have "in addition to singular intentionality," the capacity for "collective intentionality" (1995a, p. 23). This capacity means "not only that they engage in cooperative behavior, but that they share intentional states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions" (p. 23).

From previously, the phenomenological and behavioural points of view are each inadequate to account for social reality (p. 5). Rather the "correct stance, the correct methodology for describing the *structure* of social reality" starts with using "a first-person intentionalistic vocabulary" in order to "lay bare certain elementary features of social ontology"[40] (p. 5). So, as well as intentional states "of the form "I intend" or "I believe" or "I hope" etc., there are those intentional states which take the form ""we intend," "we believe," "we hope" and so on" (1999, p. 118). And, "of course, if I have a "we intention," I must also have an "I intention"" because, Searle says, "if I am intentionally doing something as part of our doing something, then I must intend to do my part" that is, "I must intend that I do something that is part of our doing something" (p. 118). Collective intentionality "or we-intentionality"" Searle believes, is "an irreducible class of intentionality"[41] (p. 118).

---

the activities of art, under 'institutional' accounts (as 'artworld'), with ruled obligations; on identifying background practices with rules (see following chapter, *Theoretical Analysis of the Background*, Section 2.3. including n.5). So, I exclude Searle's work on constitutive rules (a species of regulative rules) as part of his account of social reality, since we can only talk of "institutional facts" in the context of those rules (see 1995a, pp. 79-126; 1999, pp. 122-124). This study focuses on the phenomena in consciousness of an irreducible, collective intentionality consistent with intentionality as both mental and biological, and philosophical account of intentionality relevant to visuality (in this case, seeing-*as*). For this reason I seek account of the capacities of intentionality underlying social practices in their broadest description and make a conceptual distinction, following Searle, from practices entailing deontic obligations; on the distinction, see for example, Searle (2006a p. 28). From this constraint, the study broadly limits description of Searle's account of social reality to the element he calls collective intentionality and further on, from their relevance to visuality, assignments of function and derived intentionality.

[40] Searle also restates the epistemic and ontological distinctions between subjective and objective judgments previously set out in Chapter 6; see also (1995a, pp. 5-9).

[41] There is philosophical argument over the reduction of collective intentionality to individual intentionality; but Searle takes collective intentionality "as a primitive" or irreducible, saying "there is nothing to prevent us from having in our individual heads intentionality of the form, for example, "we

"Essential to our very existence," collective intentionality "in real life" is both "common" and "practical" (p. 120). To "see collective intentionality in action" we can "look at any football game, political rally, concert performance, college classroom," or "conversation" (p. 120). That is, "whenever you have people cooperating" or "sharing their thoughts, feelings, and so on" Searle says, "you have collective intentionality" (p. 120). There is "a crucial difference between the intentionality of collective cooperative behavior and that of individual behavior;" for instance, "contrast an orchestra performing a symphony with the individual members of the orchestra playing their parts in isolation"[42] (p. 120).

Collective intentionality is "the foundation of all social activities" (p. 120). Most forms of "human conflict" even require cooperation, for example, "a prize fight, a football game, a legal trial, or even two philosophers engaged in an argument" (p. 120). So, there is no requisite collective intentionality when "one man comes up behind another in a dark alley and hits him on the head" (p. 120). But "a level of cooperation is required" for "a prize fight, a wrestling match, a duel, or even an exchange of insults at a cocktail party;" that is, "in order to be fighting at one level we have to be cooperating in having a fight at another level"[43] (p. 120). Searle defines "a *social fact* as any fact involving two or more agents who have collective intentionality" (p. 121). So, "for example, the fact that two people are going for a walk together is a social fact" (1995a, p. 26).

Searle's following point is important for the notion of a self relating to others in any collective, goal-directed action. Collective intentionality he says, "presupposes a Background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative agency" i.e., "it presupposes a sense of others as more than mere conscious agents, indeed as actual or potential members of a cooperative activity" (1990a, p. 414). To "ever have or act on

---

believe," "we intend," and so on" (1999, p. 119-120). Searle provides systematic defence of his claims of collective intentionality, which are not included here; see (1990a).

[42] This "crucial" distinction between cooperative collective behaviour and individual behaviour holds, Searle says here "even if by chance the individual members were all rehearsing their parts in a way that happened to be synchronized, so that it sounds like the symphony" (1999, p. 120).

[43] Searle says, "it is worth noticing in passing that most forms of competitive and aggressive behavior are forms of higher-level cooperation" (1990a, p. 413). This framework of a "higher-order intention to cooperate" provides the distinction "between a prizefight and a case of one man simply assaulting another man in a dark alley" (p. 414).

collective intentions" Searle says, "what you must suppose is that the others are agents like yourself, that they have a similar awareness of you as an agent like themselves," and further, "that these awarenesses coalesce into a sense of *us* as possible or actual collective agents"[44] (p. 414). Just as Searle accounts for an irreducible 'I' who can act on the basis of reasons, here, it takes an irreducible 'we' intention to enable social acts.

This "Background sense of others as possible agents" of cooperative behaviour means "when I go out my door into the street to help push the stranger's car, part of the Background is that each of us regards the other as an agent and as a candidate to form part of a collective agent" (pp. 414-415). In this sense, such cooperative presuppositions "are not in the normal case "beliefs"" (p. 414). Rather, "just as my stance toward the objects around me and the ground underneath me is that of their being solid, without my needing or having a special belief that they are solid" so, Searle says, "my stance toward others with whom I am engaged in collective behavior is that of their being conscious agents in a cooperative activity, without my needing or having a special belief to that effect" (p. 414).

Accounting for the relation between self and others in the activities of social practices is critical to the explanatory power of approaches to visuality. From Searle's account, to explain practices by reification of subjectivity as incommensurably different or separated from others in the world is incoherent. Collective intentionality "cannot be reduced to individual intentionality" (1995a, p. 24). The "crucial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something together" (pp. 24-25). And "the individual intentionality that each person has," for example in my playing "*my* part" as a violinist, "in *our* performance of the symphony," is "derived *from* the collective intentionality" that we share (pp. 23-25). Current strong interest in this social aspect of consciousness from the cognitive sciences is taken up further in the study, in the discussion of results.

[44] Searle says, "not all social groups are engaged in goal-directed behavior all the time" but "nonetheless, they have the type of communal awareness that is the general precondition of collective intentionality" (1990a, p. 414).

8. 3. 3. *Distinction Between Intrinsic and Derived Intentionality*

From previously, there are different modes or forms of intentionality. The "intentionality that humans and animals have *intrinsically*" is distinct from "the sort of *derived* intentionality of words and sentences, pictures, diagrams, and graphs" (1999, p. 92, emphases added). There are "many conscious states," which are "intrinsically intentional"[45] (2004b, p. 138). The claim made in the statement ""I am very hungry now"" attributes "intrinsic intentionality to me;" that is, "if I have the state that is attributed to me, I have it regardless of what anyone else thinks about it" (1999, p. 93).

In contrast, another statement, ""In French, "J'ai grand faim en ce moment" means I am very hungry right now"" also literally attributes intentionality" (p. 93). However, in this case "the intentionality of the French sentence is not intrinsic," instead "it is derived from the intrinsic intentionality of French speakers" (p. 93). Searle says, "that very sentence" may "have been used by the French to mean something else;" alternately, "it might have meant nothing at all" (p. 93). So, "in that sense its meaning is not intrinsic to the sentence but is derived from agents who have intrinsic intentionality" (p. 93).

The "distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality is a special case" of the distinction between "*observer-independent*" and "*observer-dependent*" features of the world[46] (pp. 93-94). This "much more fundamental distinction" (p. 93) concerns the difference between "those features of the world that exist independently of our attitudes and intentionality generally," and features of the world "that exist only relative to our intentionality" (p. 116). To explain artefacts of any kind in realist terms, the distinction is critical.

---

[45] For example, from previously – "my present visual perception" Searle says "could not be the visual experience it is if it did not seem to me that I was seeing chairs and tables in my immediate vicinity" (2004b, p. 138). Intrinsic intentionality is ontologically subjective; that is, it is "not a matter of what anybody else chooses to say about me," nor "how I behave or what sort of stance someone might adopt toward me" (1991, p. 50).

[46] The phenomena of "intrinsic intentionality" are "observer-independent," that is, "I have my state of hunger regardless of what any observer thinks" (1999, p. 94). But "derived intentionality" exists "only in relation to observers, users, and so on" and is "observer-dependent" (p. 94).

8. 3. 4. *Distinguishing Observer-Independent and Observer-Relative Features of the World*

Searle says, "mountains and molecules exist independently of our representations of them" that is, they are "*intrinsic* to nature" (1995a, p. 9). Their existence is prior to any representation of them and is independent of "our attitudes and activities" (1999, p. 116). But, there are "further features" we need to distinguish from such *intrinsic* or *observer-independent* features of the world, that is, those existing "*relative* to the *intentionality of observers, users, etc.*" (1995a, p. 9). The existence of such features "(depends) on us," that is, "the exercise of our intentionality" (1999, pp. 116-117, parentheses added).

Frequently objects "will have both sorts of features," some of them "observer-independent, some *observer-relative*" (2002a, p. 115, emphasis added). For example, Searle says, the "object in front of me" has "a certain mass and a certain chemical composition" (1995a, p. 9). This object is made in large part of wood, "the cells of which are composed of cellulose fibres" as well as some metal "which is itself composed of metal alloy molecules" (p. 9). These are "observer – (or intentionality) independent" features (2002a, p. 115).

But, Searle says that "it is also true to say of the very same object that it is a screwdriver" (1995a, p. 10). To describe this object "as a screwdriver," is to "(specify) a feature of the object that is observer or user relative" (p. 10, parentheses added). So, "it is a screwdriver only because people use it as (or made it for the purpose of, or regard it as) a screwdriver" (p. 10). Whereas things such as "force, mass, and gravitational attraction are observer-independent," such things as "money, property, marriage, government and correct English pronunciation as well as knives, bathtubs and motor cars are observer-relative" (2002a, p. 115). That is, they "only exist relative to human observers" (p. 115).

Nevertheless, "you can't use just anything as a knife or a chair or a nice day for a picnic" (p. 115). The knife, which has "a certain (observer-independent) mass" is "a knife relative to the fact that human agents have designed it, sold it, used it, and so

forth, as a knife" (p. 115, parentheses added). So "'observer-relative' does not mean arbitrary or unreal;" the "fact that something is a knife or a chair or a nice day for a picnic is observer-relative but it is not arbitrary" (p. 115). It is not "just my opinion or evaluation" that something "is a screwdriver" (1995a, p. 10). Rather it is, Searle says, "a matter of objectively ascertainable fact that is a screwdriver" (p. 10). While "the existence of observer-relative features of the world does not add any new material objects to reality" it still "can add epistemically objective *features* to reality where the features in question exist relative to observers and users"[47] (p. 10).

8. 3. 5. *Ontological Subjectivity and Epistemic Objectivity of Observer-Relative Features*

To explain further, 'wherever there is an observer-relative feature, such as being a knife or being money" there has to be "some agents who use or treat the entity in question as a knife or as money" (2002a, p. 115). It is, Searle says, "an intrinsic fact about me that I treat this object as a knife, even though the fact that this object is a knife only exists relative to me and other observers" (p. 115). Insofar as observer-relative features "exist only relative to the intentionality of agents" they are "*ontologically subjective*" (1995a, p. 10, emphasis added); that is, as mental states such features have a first-person mode of existence. While the "money and knives are observer-relative" Searle emphasizes, "the fact that observers treat certain objects as money or knives is not observer-relative, it is observer-independent" (2002a, p. 115).

Importantly, this point "is why social science explanations can satisfy the causal reality constraint" Searle says, "even though the features appealed to are observer-relative features" (p. 115). Although "pounds, dollars and interest rates are all observer-relative," it is a "perfectly legitimate *causal* explanation," for example, "if I say 'The rise in American interest rates caused a rise in the exchange value of the dollar against the pound'" (pp. 115-116). The "causal mechanisms work" (in this instance) through "the attitudes of investors, bankers, moneychangers, speculators, and so forth;" that is,

[47] Searle says that it is "characteristic of the natural sciences" to "deal with observer-independent features – such as force, mass, the chemical bond" and so on, whereas the social sciences characteristically "deal with observer-relative features, such as money, property, marriage and government" (2002a, p. 115). While "some parts of psychology deal with observer-relative features," the "core of cognitive science" for instance "deals with observer-independent features such as perception and memory" (p. 115).

the "explanation of the observer-relative phenomena makes implicit reference to human agents"[48] (p. 116).

Searle says it is "not always immediately obvious whether a feature is intrinsic or observer relative," using colour as his example (1995a, p. 11). The way to account for the distinction is by understanding that "intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of all mental states, *except for mental states themselves*, which are also intrinsic features of reality" (p. 12, emphasis added).

8. 3. 6. *Further Ontological and Epistemic Distinction Between Intrinsic and Observer-Relative Features*

In his account, Searle wants the difference between observer-independent and observer-relative features "to seem quite obvious," since "social reality in general can be understood only in light of the distinction;" so he offers the following comparisons (p. 12). In each of the following statements, the "first states an intrinsic fact about an object," whereas the "second states an observer-relative fact about the very same object" (p. 12).

> "1a. intrinsic: That object is a stone
> 1b. observer relative: That object is a paperweight
> 2a. intrinsic: "The moon causes tides
> 2b. observer relative: The moon is beautiful tonight
> 3a. intrinsic: Earthquakes often occur where tectonic plates meet
> 3b. observer relative: Earthquakes are bad for real estate values"
> (1995a, p. 12).

Searle says that "observer-relative features are always created by the intrinsic mental phenomena of the users, observers etc., of the objects in question" (p. 12). As with "all mental phenomena," we find that "those mental phenomena" are "ontologically subjective," and that "observer-relative features inherit that ontological subjectivity" (pp. 12-13).

[48] The "rise in pressure of a gas" for example, "is observer-independent," whereas "the rise in the value of the dollar is observer-dependent;" "but the explanation in both cases can be a causal explanation" (Searle, 2002a, p. 116). The "difference comes out in the fact that the explanation of the observer-relative phenomena makes implicit reference to human agents" (p. 116).

But importantly, “this ontological subjectivity” of mental states “does not prevent claims about observer-relative features from being *epistemically objective*,” for instance in the statements 1b (paperweight) and 3b (real estate value) above; also note in 2b, the statement is “epistemically… subjective” (p. 13, emphasis added). These points in Searle’s explanation “illustrate the ways in which all three distinctions cut across” ontological and epistemic distinctions; that is, the difference “between the intrinsic and the observer-relative,” “between ontological objectivity and subjectivity,” and “between epistemic objectivity and subjectivity” (p. 13). Searle says that the “logical consequence of the account of the distinction” he gives, is “that for any observer-relative feature F, *seeming to be F* is logically prior to *being F*, because – appropriately understood – seeming to be F is a necessary condition of being F” (p. 13).

8. 4. Assignment or Imposition of Function

Searle’s work here further clarifies the ‘way we see things.’ The following distinctions between causal and functional attributions and agentive and non-agentive functions are relevant to the explanatory practices of visuality, for reasons Searle’s account sets out.

There is a “feature of intentionality” Searle calls the ““assignment (or imposition) of function”” (pp. 13-14). He characterizes this feature as a necessary element of “theoretical apparatus” for an ontology of social reality (p. 13). Searle notes the capacity “humans and some others animals have to impose functions on objects” (p. 14). For instance, the imposition of a function can be made to “naturally occurring objects” such as a body of water assigned the purpose of mooring boats or the tree an animal employs to escape a predator (p. 14). That is, the “agents exploit the natural features of the object to achieve their purposes” (1999, p. 121). There are also “those objects created especially to perform the assigned functions,” for instance a chair or table or fountain pen (1995a, p. 14).

Searle says that “functions are never intrinsic to the physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from outside by conscious observers” (p. 14). For instance “it is intrinsic to nature that the heart pumps blood, and causes it to course through the body” just as “it is

also an intrinsic fact of nature that the movement of blood is related to a whole lot of other causal processes having to do with the survival of the organism" (p. 14). In this, causal relations between the heart, the blood and survival are all intrinsic to the organism and observer-independent facts (p. 14). The "heart pumps blood" (p. 14). But to say "in addition" that ""the *function*" of the heart is to pump blood"" situates "these facts relative to a system of values that we hold" (pp. 14-15). That is, we assign "a teleology to those causal processes"[49] (p. 15). Searle says, whereas "causation is observer-independent," the "attribution of function to causal relations situates the causal relations within a presupposed teleology" (1999, p. 122). That is, the function is assigned relative to a given "set of values"[50] (1995a, p. 15).

Importantly, the assignment of function appropriately enables "a whole vocabulary of success and failure," whereas "simple brute facts of nature" do not admit attributions beyond their "causal facts" (p. 15). We cannot for instance "speak of better and worse stones" (p. 15). But when we assign "a function to the stone" such as "a weapon or a paperweight or an *objet d'art trouvé*" then "we can assess its adequacy under these functional descriptions" (p. 15). In this way, attribution of a function is "normative" (p. 18). So "roughly speaking, functions are causes that serve a purpose" (2006a, p. 17). Assigning a purpose or teleology to causes for example allows us to "speak of "malfunction," "heart disease," and better and worse hearts" (1995a, p. 15). Searle says

[49] Causality "is traditionally contrasted with teleology" (von Wright, 2004, p. 83). *Causal* explanations "normally point to the past" in the sense: ""this happened, *because* that had occurred,"" assuming a "nomic" or lawlike (in contrast to contingent) connection "exists between the cause-factor and the effect-factor" (p. 83). In contrast, "teleological explanations point to the future" (""this happened, *in order* that that should occur"") and assume a "more complex, so to say oblique" nomic connection (p. 83). Philosophically, "the most distinctive feature of biology" is "its characteristic use of *functional* or teleological *explanations*" (Papineau, 2005, p. 97). Teleological explanations try to account for biological traits "by appeal to their contribution to optimal states, or the normal functioning, or the attainment of goals, of wholes or systems they belong to" (Bogen, 2005, p. 911). In biological accounts typically, justification "involves two components: analysis of the function of the item to be explained and an aetiological (causal) account" (p. 911, parentheses added). The "functional analysis" component is teleological, extending on a purely causal account insofar as it "seeks to determine what contribution the item to be explained makes to some main activity, to the proper functioning, or to the well-being or preservation, of the organism, object, or system it belongs to" (p. 911).

[50] Searle says "we do indeed "discover" functions in nature" but "only within a set of prior *assignments* of value (including purposes, teleology and other functions)" (1995a, p. 15). For instance "we take it for granted that life and survival are values" (p. 15). So "part of what the vocabulary of "functions" adds to the vocabulary of "causes" is a set of values" (p. 15).

"functions are never intrinsic; they are assigned relative to the interests of users and observers" (p. 19).

A "perhaps decisive clue" to the observer relativity of functions, Searle says, "is that "functional attributions, unlike causal attributions, are intensional-with-an-s"[51] (p. 18). The "substitution of coreferential terms in function context fails to guarantee preservation of truth value" (pp. 18-19). Searle says, "thus "the function of A is to X" together with "X-ing is identical with Y-ing" do not imply "The function of A is to Y" (p. 19). For example, the function of computer graphics (A) is to make images (X) and

[51] Intentionality-with-a-t "is that property of the mind by which it is directed at objects and states of affairs in the world" (Searle, 1995a, p. 18). Instead, "Intensionality-with-an-s" is "that property of sentences and other sorts of representations ("statements, and other linguistic entities"), by which they fail certain tests for extensionality" (denotation, consisting in those things signified by the word) (2001, p. 59, in-text parentheses adapted from p. 23). Such tests are commonly "substitutability of identicals and existential generalization" (1983, p. 23). Leibniz's Law for example consists in "the substitutability of coreferring expressions without loss or change of truth value" (2001, p. 59). That is, "if two expressions refer to the same object they can be substituted for each other in a sentence without changing the truth value of the sentence" (1995a, p. 18). Those "sentences that fail this test are said to be *intensional* with respect to substitutability" (p. 18). For instance, "the statement "Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta" fails the substitutability test" in this case "because together with the statement "Jocasta is identical with his mother" it does not permit the inference: "Oedipus wants to marry his mother" (2001, p. 59). So, "the statement is intensional with respect to substitutability" (such statements "are sometimes called *referentially opaque*") (p. 59). On the test of existential generalization, "the statement "Oedipus is looking for the lost city of Atlantis" does not permit the existential inference "There exists a lost city of Atlantis,"" because "Oedipus may be looking even if the thing he is looking for does not exist" (p. 59). Searle says "*reports* of Intentional-with-a-t states are characteristically intensional-with-an-s reports" (1983, p. 24, emphasis added). However, "it does not follow from this, nor is it in general the case, that Intentional-with-a-t states are themselves intensional-with-an-s" (p. 24). For example, "the sentence "John believes that King Arthur slew Sir Lancelot" is used to make a statement about an Intentional state, namely John's belief" (p. 23). And, Searle says, "since an Intentional state is a representation," then the statement is "not so much a *representation* of a representation, as a *presentation* of a representation, since in reporting his belief I present its content without committing myself to its truth conditions" (p. 23, emphasis added). The truth of the report "requires only that John has a belief and that the words following "believes" in the sentence accurately reflect the representative content of his belief" (p. 23). That is, Searle says, "since the statement is a representation (or "presentation") of a representation, its truth conditions do not, in general, include the truth conditions of the representation being represented" (p. 23, parentheses added). The "report that John believes that King Arthur killed Sir Lancelot is indeed an intensional-with-an-s report, but John's belief itself is not intensional" rather, "it is completely extensional" (p. 24). There is however, "nothing to prevent there being Intentional-with-a-t states that are also representations of representations" for example, "my belief that John believes that King Arthur slew Sir Lancelot is an intensional-with-an-s mental state because it is an Intentional state which is a representation of John's belief" (p. 25). Thus, Searle says, its conditions of satisfaction "depend on features of the representation being represented and not on the things represented by the original representation" (pp. 25-26). So, "to repeat," John's "belief is extensional; my belief about his belief is intensional" (p. 26). Searle says it is a "mistake" to assume "that all Intentional entities such as propositions and mental states are somehow intensional-with-an-s" (p. 24). This mistake "derives from confusing properties of reports with properties of the things reported" (p. 24). Searle says, the mistake "is apparently endemic to the methods of linguistic philosophy" that is "the confusion of features (or "properties") of reports with features of the things reported" (p. 24, parentheses adapted).

image making consists in the distribution of pixels on a cathode screen (Y); but it is not the case that the function of computer graphics is (by substitution) 'to distribute pixels on a cathode screen'[52].

In summary, Searle calls "attention to certain central conditions" of functional attribution (p. 19). First, "whenever the function of X is to Y, X and Y are parts of a *system* where the system is in part defined by *purposes, goals, and values generally*" (p. 19). Searle says, "this is why there are functions of policemen and professors but no functions of humans as such" (p. 19). Second, "whenever the function of X is to Y, then X is *supposed to* cause or otherwise result in Y" (p. 19). Such a "normative component in functions cannot be reduced to causation alone," because the functional attribution can exist ("X can have the function of Y-ing" that is) "even in cases where X fails to bring about Y all or even most of the time" (p. 19). The "function of safety valves" for example "is to prevent explosions," even when "safety valves are so badly made that they in fact fail to prevent explosions that is, they *malfunction*" (p. 19).

8. 4. 1. *Distinction Between Agentive and Non-Agentive Functions*

Searle makes another distinction in the assignment or imposition of function, "between *agentive* and *nonagentive* functions" (p. 20). There are immediate "*uses* to which we put objects," that is, "functions that we do not discover, and that do not occur naturally" (p. 20). So, to say, ""This stone is a paperweight," "This object is a screwdriver," or "This is a chair"" or, for example to mark out "practical, gastronomic, aesthetic, educational" etc., interests, assigns purposes "relative to the practical interests of conscious agents" (p. 20). Searle says that "not all these interests are "practical" in any ordinary sense, because such functions are also assigned when we say "That is an ugly painting"" (p. 20).

Searle calls these ""agentive functions,"" because "all these are instances of uses to which agents intentionally put objects" (p. 20). He says, "some objects" assigned an agentive function "are naturally occurring" for example, "a stone that we use as a paperweight" and "some are artefacts made specifically to perform these functions, such

[52] To my knowledge, this example was designed by Neil C. M. Brown.

as chairs, screwdrivers, and oil paintings" (p. 20). Also, "an object manufactured to perform one agentive function can be used to perform another," as reported" for instance by ""This hammer is my paperweight"" (p. 20). Searle says, "as in the case of the heart, the function is not intrinsic to the object in addition to its casual relations;" however, "in contrast to the ascription of function to the heart, in these cases the ascription of the function ascribes the *use to which we intentionally put* these objects" (p. 20).

Searle says, "we can discover" functions "occurring in nature independently of the practical intentions and activities of human agents" and he calls these ""nonagentive functions"" (p. 20). Such functions are assigned not for practical purposes but rather, "are assigned to naturally occurring objects and processes as part of the theoretical account of the phenomena in question" (p. 20). So for example, when "we say "The heart functions to pump blood," we are providing "an account of how organisms live and survive" ("relative to a teleology that values survival and reproduction") (p. 20). But, Searle says, "there is no sharp dividing line" between agentive and nonagentive functions, and "sometimes an agentive function can replace a nonagentive function, as when, for example we make an "artificial heart"" (p. 20). Whereas "nonagentive functions continue to chug functionally along without any effort on our part," it is most commonly "the case that agentive functions require continuous intentionality on the part of users for their maintenance" (p. 21).

In this way, "bathtubs, coins, and screwdrivers require continued use on our part in order to function as bathtubs, coins, and screwdrivers" while, "hearts and livers continue to function as hearts and livers even when no one is paying attention" (p. 21). Further, Searle says, the "person actually using some object for an agentive function may not be the agent who actually imposed the function on the object;" they "may even be unaware that the object has that function" (p. 21). So for example, the "function of the drive shaft is to transmit power from the transmission to the axles" but "most car drivers are probably unaware" that "is its agentive function" (p. 21).

8. 4. 2. *Assigning Intentionality as Further Distinction Among Agentive Functions*

Searle identifies "one more distinction" within "agentive functions" (p. 21). There is a "special class" in which "the agentive function assigned to an object is that of standing for or representing something else" (p. 21). Thus, Searle says, "when I draw a diagram" of a football play, I let certain circles stand for the quarterback, the runningback, the offence linemen and so on" (p. 21). Here, the "agentive function assigned to the marks on the paper is that of representing or standing for; but because "representing" and "standing for" are just other names for intentionality," Searle says, "in this case we have intentionally imposed intentionality on objects and states of affairs that are not intrinsically intentional" (p. 21). The "names in English for the result of this type of imposition of function" are ""meaning" or "symbolism"" (p. 21). The "marks on the paper now stand for or represent objects and states of affairs independent of themselves;" so, "marks on the paper now have a meaning in a way that a screwdriver, for example, does not have meaning" (p. 21).

Searle says, "in the use of language we impose a specific function, namely, that of representing onto marks and sounds" (p. 21). The "capacity to impose functions on natural phenomena" is "remarkable" but, Searle says, "equally remarkable is the fact that functions may be imposed quite unconsciously, and the functions once imposed are often – so to speak – invisible"[53] (pp. 21-22).

[53] Money, for example "may simply have evolved without anyone ever thinking "We are now imposing a new function on these objects,"" (Searle, 1995a, p. 22). But, "for all cases of agentive function, someone must be capable of understanding what the thing is for," otherwise "the function could never be assigned;" "at least some of the participants in the system of exchange must understand consciously or unconsciously, that money is to buy things with, screwdrivers are for driving screws, and so forth" (p. 22). And, "once money has evolved, people may use money to buy and sell without thinking about the logical structure of imposed function" (p. 22). Should "we assign a function that is totally apart from human intentions, it would have to fall in the category of nonagentive functions" (p. 22). Supposing for example, "someone says that the intended agentive function of money is to serve as a medium of exchange and a store of value but money also serves the hidden, unintended function of maintaining the system of power relationships in society" (p. 22). The "first claim is about the intentionality of agentive function" while "the second claim is about nonagentive function;" that is, "like the claim that the heart functions to pump blood" it "would be true if and only if there is a set of unintended causal relations and these serve some teleology, even if it is a teleology that is not shared by the speaker" (p. 22). The point, as a distinction between agentive and nonagentive functions, is relevant to attributions of intentionality in accounting for relations of power in visual culture (in the agency of imagery).

To summarize, there are "*nonagentive functions*," which "in general" are "naturally occurring" for example, "the function of the heart is to pump blood;" there are "*agentive functions*" for instance "the function of a screwdriver is to install and remove screws;" and "within agentive functions" there is "a special subclass, where the *function assigned is that of intentionality*," so "for example, the function of the *sentence* "Snow is white" is to represent, truly or falsely, the state of affairs that snow is white" (p. 23, emphases added).

8. 5. *Conclusion*

To understand how the relation between 'I' and world works, as the self's capacity for representation, the aim of studying Searle's work in this chapter is to provide realist account of the structure and role of intentionality in consciousness. The motivation for doing this concerns the fragmentation of consciousness current in accounts of visuality in education. In the explanation of subjective states, phenomenological method Searle says, can risk the first-person "point of view" as such, becoming "part of what is described;" that is, the "stance becomes part of the ontology"[54] (2004a, p. 330). In collapsing this distinction between the self (as 'I') and the world, such explanations disallow constraints on the real network of relations.

Alternately, behavioural accounts characteristically reduce or eliminate first-person components in explanation and do not capture "what it consciously feels like" to do something (quote only 2004a, p. 321). And the "notion of a bodily movement by itself is inadequate for any analysis of mental states" (2002a, p. 205). To effectively address explanation of mental events consistent with neurophysiological causation, this study of intentionality explains intentional phenomena as both biological and mental, with

[54] Searle says "because of their failure to recognize the basic facts, some phenomenologists seem to be unable to give a *de re* reading of reference to objects" (2004a, p. 330, limited emphasis from original retained). Broadly, *de re* "beliefs and other sorts of propositional attitudes" are "relations between agents and objects, they cannot be individuated solely in terms of their mental contents (*de dicto*)" (1983, p. 198). That is, (on Tyler Burge's account of *de re*), "there are contextual, nonconceptual elements which are crucial to the identity of the belief" (p. 211). Reference to "brute phenomena is *de re*, it has wide scope occurrence" (2004a, p. 331). But in the case of "existential phenomenologists," their "reference to the basic facts is not wide scope, it is not *de re*" (p. 333). Rather "it is always inside one of the phenomenological operators;" that is, "nothing ever has an absolute existence, not even planets or hydrogen atoms" (p. 333). So, such reference "does not seem to involve a distinction between me and the world" (2004a, p. 327). For further on *de re*, *de dicto* distinctions see (1979b, 157-161).

description of causal relations between the embodied self and world. Such an approach, I believe, provides for a non-reductive explanation of practices constituting visuality, as the making of meaning.

The further outcome of this chapter is that Searle's account provides a way of navigating the problem of including, or representing, mental states in the explanation of practices. That is, Searle's account of conscious, unconscious, and collective intentional phenomena attends to intentional causation in the "explanation of human behavior" (1999, p. 106). Intentional causation, Searle says, is "absolutely crucial" to working with the (causal and epistemic) constraints on intentionalistic, or mentalistic explanation in the human sciences (p. 106). For this reason, much content in the footnotes of this chapter has attended on the detail and forms of argument behind these constraints.

The constraints are critical to representing arts practices. From the previous chapter, intentional causal explanations, unlike Humean cause-and-effect explanations, "are not deterministic in form" (p. 106). But in the Western intellectual research tradition, the causal role of mental states in explanation is epistemically challenging. Those accounts in the arts and education that do not reject the problem (by claiming some form of phenomenological idealism), are inclined towards behaviourism and determinism as a compromise with the constraint of rationality. In Chapter 4, for example, I express concern with the explanatory habits that have formed around representing the role of mental states in artistic activity.

There is the reductionist (or eliminative) explanation of mental states from behaviourism or alternately, biological unconscious rule-following, accounting mind as an innately modular. There is also widespread attribution of neurosis to artistic disposition. The employment of these forms of explanation reduces in significant part, I think, to the epistemological challenges of representing the role of a rational mind in non rule-governed practices. And by citing the rationality of mind in those practices the study does not exclude the role of nonrational motivations as features of practices. I am simply trying to attend on the problem of subsuming all nonrational psychological phenomena under the irrational; this is a category mistake. Searle's approach is

consistent between the biological and mental, between conscious and unconscious phenomena, and between self and world, non-reductively. This approach provides a different framework for explaining visuality.

There is one further concern with Searle's account of consciousness to complete this study of his work. That is, there is a "relationship between consciousness and intentionality on the one hand, and the capacities, abilities, and the general know-how that enable our mental states to function on the other" (1994a, p. 175). Searle calls these "capacities, etc., collectively, "the Background"" (p. 175). Background capacities structure consciousness, enabling intentional states to function, or work. The explanatory framework of these capacities is, in my view, the crucial means for understanding the social character of mind.

Chapter 9
The Network and Background of Intentionality

9. Introduction

From Searle's account of consciousness to now: the enabling condition of any discourse is that there is a real world or universe; this fact allows us to distinguish between the world and representations, such as beliefs or statements, about it. As part of that physical reality, some biological forms have consciousness, that is, mental features of brain states. In human and some other animal forms having consciousness, typically or non-pathologically, conscious states are qualitative or felt from a first-person point of view and unified in experience. From this irreducible first-person mode, study of consciousness differs from study of other phenomena.

A further feature of consciousness, as intentionality, is the capacity to represent states and affairs in the world. As humans, we can not only mentally represent how things are but also how we would like them to be. To rationally act on these representations requires an ineliminable self or 'I' who can choose to act on the basis of reasons. But there is a causal gap between reasoning and acting. This causal indeterminacy or capacity for choosing among alternatives (as conscious effort) is known as freedom of will. The causal gap does not imply an explanatory gap; the voluntary actions of a reasoning self impose logically different explanatory constraints on accounts to those of (classical) mechanical causal relations in epistemology.

As well as conscious intentional states there are unconscious states having an aspectual shape, or point of view. These unconscious mental states exist as a capacity of the brain to produce that state in a conscious form and to produce behaviour appropriate to that state. A further biologically innate form of intentionality is an irreducibly *we*- or collective intentionality; this capacity enables human beings to collectively create and sustain a social reality in which we see (and act on) aspects of our surroundings *as* their socially defined functions or purposes.

As mental phenomena intrinsic to their users, observers, makers, etc., these observer-relative features of objects are ontologically subjective. But, this ontological subjectivity does not prevent claims about social entities, having observer-relative features, from being epistemically objective. The fact that observers treat certain objects as artworks or interest rates is not observer-relative, rather, it is observer-independent. In this way, the causal reality constraint on claims in social science explanations is satisfied by their implicit reference to human agents. It is legitimate in explanation of social phenomena to make reference to the attitudes of participants as causally constitutive in the events.

Some functions of objects are independent of human effort and can be discovered. As well, there are functions assigned by agents requiring continuous intentionality on the part of users for their maintenance. But functions of objects, practical or otherwise, are always assigned relative to the values of observers, users and so on; and from this, those functions can be evaluated. There is a further class of agentive functions in which the assigned purpose of certain objects and states of affairs is that of standing for or representing something else, as symbols or meaning; but the intentionality they carry, as meaning, is observer-relative rather than intrinsic.

Implicit in this account and consistent with his explanation of consciousness so far, Searle says that intentional states "do not function in an independent or atomistic fashion" (1983, p. 141). Rather, there are capacities of consciousness that enable a network of intentionality. Understanding how those states and capacities work is critical to further understanding the constitutive relation between mind and world. So, the aim of this chapter, within the constraints and object of the study, is to provide the last but key means from Searle's account for understanding how visuality works as a unity in consciousness. To achieve the aim, this chapter studies Searle's explanation of the network and background of intentional states[1]. In this sense, the chapter follows on the previous explanation of consciousness and intentionality, including study of the

[1] As with the term 'intentionality,' Searle's employment of capitalization for naming the network and background varies. The study maintains the quoted variations; but following a pattern in many of Searle's later works, does not employ the distinction outside quotes.

distinction between unconscious and nonconscious states and collective intentionality, for reasons that will become clear.

The background accounts for, among other things, the disposition to practices and habits constituting subjective experience. Significant to this explanation is the role of memory. But further, the network and background of the self or 'I' are crucial for understanding how meaning obtains in consciousness and so, the account here forms a necessary part of the strategy of this study to provide non-reductive realist explanation of visuality. For this reason, the chapter proceeds from the network of intentionality and background, as enabling capacities, to Searle's explanation of how the background works in practice. To start, the following sections look to the pre-conditions of intentionality.

9. 1. The Precondition of Intentionality

Searle says, "each Intentional state has its content and determines its conditions of satisfaction only in relation to numerous other Intentional states" (p. 141). A "man who forms the intention to run for the Presidency of the United States" would for instance, "normally believe for example, that the United States is a republic, that it has periodic elections" and "that in these elections the candidates of two major parties vie for the Presidency," etc. (p. 141). And, "he would normally desire that he receive the nomination of his party, that people work for his candidacy, that voters cast votes for him, and so on" (p. 141).

These beliefs and desires may not be "essential to the man's intention," nor is the existence of any of them "entailed by the statement that the man has the intention to run for the presidency of the United States," (p. 141). But, "without some such Network of Intentional states the man could not have formed what we would call "the intention to run for the Presidency of the United States"" (p. 141). That is, the intention "can only have the conditions of satisfaction it does, and thus can only be the intention that it is, because it is located in a Network of other beliefs and desires" (p. 141). Further, "in any real life situation, the beliefs and desires are only part of a larger complex of still other

psychological states" including "subsidiary intentions as well as hopes and fears, anxieties and anticipations, feelings of frustration and satisfaction" and so on (p. 141). This "entire holistic network" abbreviates to "simply, the "Network"" (p. 141).

Searle believes "that anyone who tries seriously to follow out the threads in the Network will eventually reach a bedrock of mental capacities that do not themselves consist in Intentional states (representations)" but which, "nonetheless form the preconditions for the functioning of Intentional states" (p. 143). This "precondition or set of preconditions" of intentionality is "the Background" (p. 143).

9. 1. 1. *The Network of Intentional States*

To explain further: "it is in general impossible for intentional states to determine conditions of satisfaction in isolation" (1994a, p. 176). In order to "have one belief or desire, I have to have a whole Network of other beliefs or desires" (p. 176). So, for example, if I now want to visit an exhibition at a local art gallery, "I have to have a large number of other beliefs and desires, such as the beliefs that there are (art galleries) in the vicinity," that art galleries are "the sort of establishment" where exhibitions are held, artworks "are the sort of thing" that can be made and exhibited to an audience, at certain times in these particular settings, "and so – more or less – indefinitely on" (p. 176, parentheses added).

From this network of states however, we can see that "the content of the intentionality is not, so to speak, self-interpreting" that is, "it is still subject to an indefinite range of different applications" (p. 176). Insofar as "the actual intentional content of my desire is concerned," in this case to visit an art gallery exhibition to view works of art, "it is possible to have that very content and still apply it in an indefinite number of different and inconsistent ways" (p. 176). So, "what exactly constitutes" an artwork, "what constitutes" viewing an exhibition, "what constitutes" an art gallery? (p. 176).

Artworks, exhibitions and art galleries are all "subject to different interpretations" and Searle says, "these interpretations are not fixed by the content of the intentional state by itself" (p. 176). So, the "whole Network" of all these intentional states "stands in need

of a Background, because the elements of the Network are not self-interpreting or self-applying" (p. 176). The "same intentional state can determine different conditions of satisfaction, given different Background capacities;" and Searle says, "an intentional state will determine no conditions of satisfaction unless it is applied relative to an appropriate Background" (p. 176). The following section looks to Searle's explanation of background capacities and the background's role in intentionality.

9. 1. 2. *The Network as Part of the Background*

Searle modified his earlier "conception of the Background," in an important way, later clarifying some relevant distinctions between the network and the background (p. 186). Searle's "earlier view" of the background was of the "mind as containing an inventory of mental states," where at any given moment some of these (states) are conscious and some unconscious" (p. 186, parentheses added). This prior view was mistaken; but "both language and culture" has tended "to force this picture on us" (p. 187).

To "think of memory as a storehouse of propositions and images, as a kind of big library or filing cabinet of representations" is a "real mistake" (p. 187). Instead, "we should think of memory" as "a *mechanism* for generating current performance, including conscious thoughts and actions, based on past experience" (p. 187). To say for instance "even when Jones is asleep" that "he believes Bush is president and that he knows the rules of French grammar," indicates "we think lying in there in his brain, sleeping too, are his belief that Bush is president and his knowledge of French" (p. 187).

In contrast to this storehouse or filing cabinet view, "what goes on in the brain, other than consciousness" is "an occurrent reality that is neurophysiological rather than psychological" (p. 188). From the previous chapter, "when we speak of unconscious states, we are speaking of the capacities of the brain to generate consciousness" (p. 188). Further, "some capacities of the brain do not generate consciousness," they "rather function to fix the application of the conscious states" enabling "me to walk, run, write, speak, etc." (p. 188). But when we describe someone "as having an unconscious belief, we are describing an occurrent neurophysiology in terms of its dispositional capacity to cause conscious thoughts and behavior" (p. 188).

In this way, we can say that "to have a conscious thought, one has to have the capacity to generate a lot of other conscious thoughts" and "these conscious thoughts all require further capacities for their application" (p. 190). And, "within that set of capacities there will be some that one has acquired in the form of consciously learned rules, facts, etc." (p. 190). Searle illustrates the distinction: "I was taught the rules of baseball, the rule that in the U.S. we drive on the right side of the road, and the fact that George Washington was the first president" (p. 190). However, he says, "I was not taught any rules for walking, nor was I taught that objects are solid;" "the original intuition that there is a distinction between Network and Background derives from this fact" (p. 190). So, "some of one's capacities enable one to formulate and apply rules, principles, beliefs, etc., in one's conscious performances" (p. 190). But these capacities still require "Background capacities for their application"[2] (p. 190). The "Network is that part of the Background that we describe in terms of its capacity to cause conscious intentionality" (p. 188).

From the accounts of visuality earlier in the study: typically, in visual culture, subjectivity constitutes discursively, as incommensurable or irreconcilable cultural discourses of identity. In aesthetics, subjectivity proceeds as pretheoretical (intuition) that sustains distinct from language. So, subjectivity in either account constitutes on separation between self and others in the world. And from both, there is intra-individual as well as inter-individual incommensurability. In accounting for subjective experience neither form of explanation is consistent with how consciousness works. And in practices of visuality the explanations as they stand are reductive.

[2] Searle's conceptual distinction between the network and background includes the "need to distinguish" first, the "center of our conscious attention from the periphery, boundary conditions, and situatedness of our conscious experiences;" this is "in some sense, a foreground-background distinction" (1994a, p. 189). Second, the need for distinguishing "within mental phenomena the representational from the nonrepresentational," in this way providing for the role of the "nonrepresentational in the functioning of intentionality" (p. 189). Third, the distinction between "capacities" and "their manifestation" in the sense of "which capacities should be thought of as Background capacities?" (p. 189). Fourth, Searle distinguishes between "what we are actually concerned with from what we are taking for granted," for instance consciously placing a book on the table compared to an assumption of the solidity of objects (p. 189). Searle says "these distinctions cut across each other" (p. 189). The "actual content" of "all conscious intentionality" ("all thought, perception, understanding, etc."), can only determine its conditions of satisfaction "relative to a set of capacities that are not and could not be part of that very conscious state" (p. 189).

But, in explanation how can we allow for strong differences between people individually and collectively, and include commensurability between variations? Searle's account differs to both current forms of explanation. All the following points of clarification are required for understanding the network and background capacities, but the fourth point provides a critical link in accounting for dispositional variations and consistencies between individuals and groups. So, some repetition in the preliminary content for the sake of coherence is relevant.

Searle clarifies a distinction between network and background capacities in the following ways: first, he says, "intentional states do not function autonomously" that is, "they do not determine their conditions of satisfaction independently" (p. 190). Second, "each intentional state requires for its functioning a set of Background capacities;" the "conditions of satisfaction" for each state "are determined only relative to these capacities" (p. 190). Third, "among these capacities will be some that are capable of generating other conscious states," and "to these others" the first and second conditions apply (p. 190). Fourth, the "same *type* of intentional content can determine different conditions of satisfaction when it is manifest in different conscious tokens, relative to different Background capacities" and, Searle says, "relative to some Backgrounds it determines none at all" (p. 191).

9. 2. Understanding the Background

The following explanation reconciles the roles in consciousness, as a relation, between pre-representational capacities and intentional states having propositional content; from this, it is critical to understanding visuality. I include some detail here because the account does not support argument for incommensurable difference as grounds for relativizing the world to different points of view. Instead, the following sections provide realist explanatory means for cultural influence in constituting the background.

The background is "the precondition of Intentionality"(1983, p. 157). That is, background capacities "form the necessary preconditions for the functioning of intentional contents" but they "are not and could not be construed as further intentional

contents" (1995a, p. 132). Rather, the Background "provides a set of enabling conditions that make it possible for particular forms of Intentionality to function" (1983, p. 157). As Searle uses the term, there is "nothing whatever that is "transcendental" or "metaphysical" about the Background" (p. 154). Searle says "in a crucial sense" what he calls the background "consists of mental phenomena" and "is not a set of things nor a set of mysterious relations between ourselves and things" (p. 154). The background "is simply a set of skills, stances, preintentional assumptions and presuppositions, practices, and habits" (p. 154).

Searle places a caution on this description: "there is a real difficulty in finding ordinary language to describe the Background" (p. 156). To speak "of "assumptions" and "presuppositions"" is, in a literal sense, wrong (p. 156). Such terms "imply the apparatus of representation with its propositional contents, logical relations, truth values, directions of fit, etc." (p. 156). So Searle generally prefaces ""assumption" and "presumption" with the apparently oxymoronic "preintentional,"" since "the sense of "assumption" and "presupposition" in question is not representational"[3] (p. 156). Searle prefers the expressions ""capacities" and "practices"" in discussion of the Background since, he says, "these can succeed or fail, but only in their exercise; and they can succeed or fail without their being themselves representations" (p. 156).

[3] The "main function of the mind is, in our special sense of that word, to represent" and "we have a rich vocabulary" of "memory and intention, belief and desire, perception and action" for description of such representations (Searle, 1983, p. 156). Searle says "we are most at home with a first-order vocabulary" for intentional states, for example we *believe* that it will rain, *wish* we could sleep in, and are *sorry* that they had to go (p. 156). But, "language is not well designed to talk about itself" and "the mind is not well designed to reflect on itself" (p. 157). The vocabulary we have available "when we do reflect on the Background" is that of "first order mental states," and the "temptation is to represent its elements on the model of other mental phenomena, to think that our representations are of representations" (p. 157). On going to arrange some flowers, I am surprised when I lift a large vase by its "near weightlessness" (p. 157). "Inspection reveals" that the glass is very fine: "we would naturally say" I *believed* that the vase was quite substantial, "and I *expected* it to be heavy" (p. 157). But, Searle says, "that is wrong" (p. 157). In contrast to "the sense in which I really do believe without ever having explicitly thought about it" that the price of postage stamps will increase and "I really do expect" a wave of hot days this summer, "I had no such expectations" about the vase; "I simply acted" (p. 157). Our "ordinary usage" means we "treat elements of the Background as if they were representations;" however, "it does not follow from that, nor is it the case that, when these elements are functioning they function as representations" (p. 157). Searle says "the price we pay for deliberately going against ordinary language is metaphor, oxymoron, and outright neologism" (p. 157).

Other philosophers have recognized "the sort of phenomena" Searle calls "Background" (1994a, p. 177). In philosophy, Hume first (Searle believes) recognized "the centrality of the Background in explaining human cognition" (1995a, p. 132). Wittgenstein's later work "is in large part about the Background" (see Wittgenstein, 1969); and "Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*" (see Bourdieu, 1990) closely relates, in Searle's view, to his own "notion of the Background" (1994a, p. 177). Nietzsche, Searle says, is "one of those most aware of its contingency," that is, "the Background does not have to be the way it is;" "there are no proofs to the effect that the Background we have is one we must have of necessity" (p. 177). But on this and other concerns, there are common "ways of misunderstanding" the Background that Searle seeks to "eliminate," since they can lead to mistakes (p. 191). The following sections address these misunderstandings.

9. 2. 1. *The Contingency of the Background*

The hypothesis of the Background "does not show that meaning and intentionality are unstable or indeterminate," or "that we can never make ourselves understood, that communication is impossible or threatened" (p. 191). Rather, the thesis of the Background "merely shows that all of these function against a contingently existing set of Background capacities and practices" (p. 191). But some researchers find this aspect of the background a difficult constraint because it seems to them that "meaning, intentionality, rationality" and so on, "are somehow threatened if their application depends on contingently existing biological and cultural facts about human beings" (p. 191). Rejecting this attitude, Searle instead views the background as "an excellent territory for theorizing" (p. 191).

Searle says it is "important to point out" that the Background is a "feature of our *representations* of reality, and not a feature of the *reality* represented"[4] (pp. 191-192). The "mistake" lies in thinking that "somehow or other reality itself becomes relative to

[4] And that "*there exists a way that things are that is independent of our representations of how things are*" is, Searle says, "not a 'thesis' that one can argue for or against; rather it is a Background presupposition of the intelligibility of large sections of discourse, whether in our form of life or in the most exotic" (2006b, p. 112). So, "consider such utterances as 'hydrogen atoms have one electron', 'it rained yesterday', or 'the sun has nine planets;" "for every one of these utterances, and indeed for an infinite number of other such utterances, in our form of life or others," Searle says, "External Realism is a Background presupposition" (p. 112). External realism "is *not* something that can be 'proved' or 'disproved', because all such proofs and disproofs presuppose it" (p. 112).

the Background, and that consequently some sort of relativism or idealism must follow" (p. 192). Although "our system of representation requires a nonrepresentational set of capacities in order to function," Searle says, "the reality which that system is used to represent is not itself dependent on those capacities, or indeed on anything else" (p. 192).

Briefly, "the Background does not threaten our conviction of external realism, or the correspondence theory of truth," nor "the possibility of clear communication, or the possibility of logic" (p. 192). But "it does cast all of these phenomena in a different light, because they cannot provide transcendental justifications of our discourse" (p. 192). "Rather", Searle says, "our acceptance of them is a Background supposition of discourse" (p. 192).

9. 2. 2. *Perception and Interpretation*

There is "one misunderstanding of the Background," which is "particularly important in theories of textual interpretation" that is, the "mistaken supposition that all understandings must involve some act of interpretation" (p. 192). Searle says, "whenever one understands something, one understands in a certain way and not in other ways" (p. 192). As well, "alternative interpretations are always possible" (p. 192). But from these two facts, "it simply does not follow that in all discourse one is engaged in constant "acts of interpretation"" (p. 192). It is true that "one's immediate, normal, instantaneous understanding of utterances is always possible only relative to a Background" (p. 192). But from this "it does not follow that there is some separate logical step, some separate *act* of interpretation involved in normal understanding" (p. 192).

The mistake here is similar to one made in "those theories of cognition" claiming "that we must have made an inference if, when we look at one side of a tree, we know that the tree has a back side" (p. 192). Searle says, "on the contrary, what we do is simply see a tree as a real tree," although "one could of course, given a different Background, interpret one's perception differently" for instance, "see it as a two-dimensional stage prop tree" (p. 192). But again, it does *not* follow "from the fact that alternative

interpretations are open to one," first, "that ordinary perceptions always involve an act of interpreting," nor second, "that some inferential step is made, as an actual temporal mental process, whereby one infers unperceived data from perceived data" (p. 193).

9. 2. 3. *Theoretical Analysis of the Background*

The Background "is emphatically not a system of rules" (p. 193). The point is critically important to research in understanding the background and accounting for practices generally. For this study it is relevant; first, because of the conflation in semiotic discourse between the ruled representations of language and the mistake of subjectivity *as* discursively constituting on or as those rules. And second, in art education there is interest in accounts of mind as innate, predetermining, rule-governed modular capacities. In a behaviourist orientation there is also, I think, risk of accounting for arts practices as rule determined.

To regard rules as "essential to the sorts of phenomena" Searle discusses here, is a "weakness" of some theories[5] (p. 193). Rather, "it is important to see that rules only have application relative to the Background capacities" (p. 193). Rules "are not self-interpreting," and so "require a Background to function; they are not themselves explanatory or constitutive of the Background" (p. 193). From "these considerations" it can "sometimes (seem) as if the Background cannot be represented or made fully explicit" (p. 193, parentheses added). But, "we have a model of explicitness for the representation of mental states" consisting in "providing sentences that have the same intentional content as the states represented" (p. 193). For instance, "I can make the belief that water is wet fully explicit by saying it is the belief that water is wet" (p. 193). The "difficulty" here is that "the model is simply inapplicable to the Background," because "the Background does not in that way have any intentional content," so "we cannot represent it as if it consisted of a set of intentional contents" (p. 193).

[5] Theorization of the Background in terms of a system of rules is a "weakness" of Foucault's (1972) "notion of a discursive formation" and Bourdieu's (1977) "earlier discussion of practice," because "both thought that rules were essential" (Searle, 1994a, p. 193). But, noted previously, Searle comments that "Pierre Bourdieu's important work on the "habitus" is about the same sort of phenomena" that Searle calls the Background (1995a, p. 132). Elsewhere, it should also be noted, Searle expresses his respect for Foucault's "caliber" as a "thinker" (in Feser and Postrel, 2000, p. 45).

However “this does not mean that we cannot describe the Background, or that its functioning is unanalyzable, or anything of the sort” (p. 193). Searle says “*of course* the Background can be represented” (p. 193). The expression “the Background” *is* a representation, and “the Background can be made “fully explicit” by using the same expression – or by writing a book about the Background;” “it is precisely the beginnings of an analysis of the Background that (he is) attempting to provide” (p. 193, parentheses added).

9. 3. The Background as Know-How

In summary so far: Searle distinguishes between the Network of intentional states with representational content and the Background as “a set of non-representational mental capacities that enable all representing to take place” (1983, p. 143). That is, “intentional phenomena such as meanings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, desires, and experiences only function within a set of Background capacities that are not themselves intentional” (1994a, p. 175).

As another way of stating this Searle says, is that “all representation, whether in language, thought, or experience, only succeeds in representing given a set of non-representational capacities” (p. 175). For instance “beliefs, desires or rules only determine their conditions of satisfactions” (that is, the “truth conditions for beliefs, fulfilment conditions for desires” and so on), “given a set of capacities that do not themselves consist in intentional phenomena” (1995a, p. 129). So, “in order that I can now have the Intentional states that I do I must have certain kinds of know-how,” which means “I must know how things are and I must know how to do things” (1983, p. 143). But “the kinds of “know-how” in question are not, in these cases, forms of “knowing that”” (p. 143).

To illustrate the point, we should consider “what is necessary, what must be the case, in order that I now form the intention to go to the refrigerator and get a bottle of cold beer to drink” (p. 143). Searle says, all the “biological and cultural resources that I must bring to bear on this task, even to form the intention to perform the task, are (considered

in a certain light) truly staggering" (p. 143). However, "without these resources I could not form the intention at all" in the sense of "standing, walking, opening and closing doors, manipulating bottles, glass, refrigerators, opening, pouring, drinking" (p. 143). The "activation of these capacities would normally involve presentations and representations," for instance, "I have to see the door in order to open the door, but the ability to recognize the door and the ability to open the door are not themselves further representations" (p. 143). And "it is such nonrepresentational capacities that constitute the Background" (p. 143).

9. 3. 1. *Distinction Between Deep Background and Local Background*

To enable a "minimal geography of the Background," Searle says, we need "at least the following:" to distinguish what we might call the "deep Background"" capacities, "from what we might call the "local Background" or "local cultural practices"" (p. 144). Searle describes the first, the "deep Background," as including "at least all of those Background capacities that are common to all normal human beings in virtue of their biological makeup;" that is, "capacities such as walking, eating, grasping, perceiving, recognizing" as well as "the pre-intentional stance that takes account of the solidity of things, and the independent existence of objects and other people" (p. 144). The second, ""local Background" or "local cultural practices,"" Searle says, "would include such things as opening doors, drinking beer from bottles, and the pre-intentional stance that we take toward such things as cars, refrigerators, money and cocktails parties" (p. 144).

The "differences in local Backgrounds make translation from one language to another difficult," but the "commonality of deep Background makes it possible at all" (1994a, p. 194). For example "if you read the description of a dinner party at the home of the Geurmantes in Proust" there is the likelihood that "differences in local cultural practices" mean "some features of the description" are "puzzling" (p. 194). However, "there are certain things you can take for granted" for instance, that "the participants did not eat by stuffing the food in their ears" (p. 194). That, "is a matter of deep Background" (p. 194).

9. 3. 2. *Knowing How Things Are and Knowing How to Do Things*

There is another distinction "within both the deep and the local Background" that is, "we need to distinguish those aspects which have to do with "how things are" from those aspects that have to do with "how to do things"" (1983, p. 144). But, Searle says, "it is important to emphasize that there is no sharp dividing line between "how things are for me" and "how I do things"" (p. 144). For instance, it is "part of my preintentional stance toward to the world that I recognize degrees of the hardness of things as part of "how things are"' and at the same time, "that I have numerous physical skills as part of "how to do things"" (p. 144).

However, "I cannot activate my preintentional skill" (of for example, "peeling oranges") "independently of my preintentional stance towards the hardness of things" (p. 144). That is, I can "intend to peel an orange, but I cannot in that way intend to peel a rock or a car," Searle says, but "not because I have an unconscious belief" that ""you can peel an orange but you cannot peel a rock or a car"" (p. 144). Rather, it is "because the preintentional stance I take toward oranges (how things are) allows for a completely different range of possibilities (how to do things) from that which I take toward rocks or cars" (p. 144).

Searle says, "roughly speaking," the distinction he makes "between knowing how to do things and knowing how things are" looks to capturing "our traditional distinction between the practical and the theoretical" (1994a, p. 194). But "*the Background itself is neither practical nor theoretical*" rather, "both practical and theoretical reason are dependent on the Background" (p. 194, emphasis added). The distinction between "knowing how to do" and "knowing how things are" is needed (p. 194). But "it is obvious" that the "two are closely related;" for example, "I cannot" Searle says, ""know how" to chop wood without taking for granted that axes made of butter will not work and axes made of water are not axes at all" (p. 194).

9. 3. 3. *Operation of the Background*

Understanding consciousness in reasoned action as the embodied and unified states of a self or 'I,' having both mental and physical features, is critical to the explanation of

practices. And to understand this properly in the context of this study, Searle's account sets out how the background and network of intentional states works. From Chapter 7, in explanation of the relation between practical and theoretical reason Searle says that all reasoning is in some sense, practical. The following sections takes this further.

There are "certain laws of operation of the Background" (p. 195). First, "in general, *there is no action without perception, no perception without action*" (p. 195). Second, "*intentionality occurs in a coordinated flow of action and perception and the Background is the condition of possibility of the forms taken by the flow*" (p. 195). Thinking "of any normal slice of your waking life" for example, "you are eating a meal, taking a walk in the park, writing a letter" or "driving to work;" "in each case the condition of possibility of the performance is an underlying Background competence" (p. 195). The "apparatus" of "Background abilities" makes possible "the existence of the intentional content," that is, "the intentionality involved in (or "what counts as") "driving to work" for example" (p. 195, parentheses adapted).

Third, Searle says, "*intentionality tends to rise to the level of the Background ability*" (p. 195). For example: the "beginning skier may require an intention to put the weight on the downhill ski," whereas an "intermediate skier has the skill that enables him to have the intention "turn left,"" and "a really expert skier may simply have the intention "ski this slope"" (p. 195). To take a "ski race" for instance, "the coaches will try to create a level of intentionality that is essential to winning the race;" however, "that presupposes a huge underpinning of Background abilities" (p. 195). In such a case "the coach may instruct the skier "Stay close to the gates in the flush, take the red gate before the steep on the inside"" etc. (p. 195). And, "similarly, when I am speaking English, I do not have the intention to match singular nouns with singular verbs or plural nouns with plural verbs" rather, "I just talk" (p. 195).

Fourth, "all voluntary subsidiary actions performed within the scope of a higher-level intentional action are nonetheless intentional" (p. 195). Or, more simply, "though intentionality rises to the level of Background ability, *it reaches all the way down to the bottom of the ability*" (p. 195). So for instance, although "I do not require a separate

intention to move my arms and legs when I ski or to move my mouth when I talk" Searle says, "nonetheless, all of these movements are done intentionally" (p. 196).

In the case of perception, "I do not normally see at the level of coloured patches" rather, "I see a Chevrolet station wagon with a rusting front fender" or, I see a painting by Vermeer of a man bent over a table, holding a pair of dividers, daylight streams through the window onto the side of his face, his clothes and instruments; behind him is a cupboard[6] (p. 196). But, Searle says, "notice in these cases" although "the intentionality of my perception rises to the level of my Background ability (my ability to recognize Chevrolet station wagons, Vermeers, etc.), nonetheless the lower-level components are also part of the intentional content;" that is, "I do indeed see the blue of the station wagon" and the brown of the cupboard (p. 196).

Fifth, "*the Background is only manifest when there is intentional content*" (p. 196). While "the Background is not itself intentional" Searle says, "any manifestation of the Background, whether in action, perception, etc., must itself come into play whenever there is some intentionality, conscious or unconscious" (p. 196). When we refer to the Background "we do not "name a sequence of events that can simply occur" (p. 196). Rather it is that "the Background consists of mental capacities, dispositions, stances, ways of behaving, know-how, savoir-faire, etc.," and all of these "can only be manifest when there are some intentional phenomena," for example "an intentional action, a perception, a thought" and so on (p. 196).

9. 3. 4. *Physical Skills*

From earlier in the study, mental states are higher order features of brain or neuro-physiological states; in the biology of human consciousness, mental states are inseparable from body states. So, for example, if I experience a state of pain, there is a state of feeling pain in my body. As a more complex example: as a child, I could see how writing looked and wanted to write. To start, there was embodied (as both physical/mental) effort, to properly hold and move the pencil and so on, to fit the

[6] Searle's example draws instead from, I think, Vermeer's 'Woman in Blue Reading a Letter.'

practice. Co-ordinating my intentions and actions was difficult. That changed over time. But what happened?

The acquisition of skill in practices is particularly relevant for the study as well as coherent explanation of intentionality, so the following explanation is set out in some detail. Returning to "what it is like to learn to ski" is helpful here, since "skiing is one of those skills which is learned with the aid of explicit representations" (1983, p. 150). The "beginning skier" for example "is given a set of verbal instructions as to what he is supposed to do" such as ""lean forward," "bend the ankles," "keep the weight on the downhill ski," etc." (p. 150). Searle says "each of these is an explicit representation" (p. 150). And "to the extent that the skier is seriously trying to learn, each (representation) will function causally as part of the Intentional content determining the behavior;" that is, "the skier tries to keep the weight on the downhill ski by way of obeying the instructions to keep the weight on the downhill ski" (p. 150, parentheses added).

This example is "a perfectly standard case of Intentional causation: the instructions have world-to-word direction of fit and word-to-world direction of causation" (p. 150). However, "after a while the skier gets better" and "no longer needs to remind himself of the instructions" Searle says; "he just goes out and skis" (p. 150). On the "traditional cognitivist view, the instructions have become internalized and now function unconsciously but still as representations" (p. 150; citing Polyani, 1958).

Some authors consider it "essential" that the "intentional contents" of the instructions, once they are internalized should "function unconsciously but still as representations" because "if one thinks about them or tries to bring them into consciousness, they get in the way, and one is no longer able to ski as well" (p. 150). This is, Searle says, "rather like the proverbial centipede who thinks about which leg he is supposed to move next and becomes paralyzed" (p. 150). On this analogy, "the skier will become paralyzed, or at any rate impeded, if he tries to remember the instructor's rules; he is better off letting them function unconsciously" (p. 150).

Searle finds this view “of what happens when the skier gets better implausible” and proposes “an alternative hypothesis” (p. 150). That is, “as the skier gets better he does not internalize the rules better, but rather the rules become progressively irrelevant” (p. 150). The rules of how to ski “do not become ‘wired in’ as unconscious Intentional contents;” instead, “the repeated experiences create physical capacities, presumably realized as neural pathways, that make the rules simply irrelevant” (p. 150). Searle says, ““Practice makes perfect” not because practice results in a perfect memorization of the rules but because repeated practice enables the body to take over and the rules to recede into the Background” (p. 150).

9. 3. 5. *Rules and the Acquisition of Expertise*

The “repeated practice and training in a variety of situations eventually makes the causal functioning of representation unnecessary in the exercise of the skill” (p. 151). The skilled skier “does not follow the rules better;” rather it is the case that “he skis in a different way altogether” (p. 151). The “advanced” skier’s “movements are flowing and harmonious” (p. 151). In contrast “the beginning skier, consciously or unconsciously concentrating on the rules, makes movements which are jerky, abrupt and inept” (p. 151). The skier who has become expert “is flexible and responds differently to different conditions of terrain and snow” (p. 151). But the inexperienced or novice skier “is inflexible, and when different and unusual situations” occur, “he tends simply to fall down” (p. 151).

Differently, a “downhill racer on the course moves very rapidly” at over 100 kms an hour, “over a terrain that is rough and uneven;” his body making “thousands of very rapid adjustments to variations in the terrain” (p. 151). To account for this as “making a very rapid series of unconscious calculations applying unconscious rules” is less plausible than suggesting “rather that the racer’s body is so trained that these variations in the terrain are dealt with automatically” (p. 151). On Searle’s account, “the body takes over and the skier’s Intentionality is concentrated on winning the race,” (p. 151). He does not deny though, “that there are forms of Intentionality involved in the exercise of skills,” nor does he deny “that some of this Intentionality is unconscious” (p. 151). In those cases where “we do in fact act according to,” or following, a rule “as in the rules

of speech acts, we just act on the rule, we don't need any further rules for interpreting the rules" (p. 153). Searle says, "there are indeed representations, some of which function causally in the production of our behavior" (p. 153). However, "eventually in the sequence of representations we reach a bedrock of capacities;" "as Wittgenstein suggests, we just act" (p. 153).

The Network of intentional states "shades off into a Background of capacities" that include "various skills, abilities, preintentional assumptions and presuppositions, stances and nonrepresentational attitudes" (p. 151). In this way, "the Background is not on the *periphery* of Intentionality but *permeates* the entire Network of Intentional states; since without the Background the states could not function, they could not determine the conditions of satisfaction" (p. 151). Searle says, "without the Background there could be no perception, action, memory" that is, "there could be no such Intentional states" (pp. 151-152).

9. 4. Obtaining Meaning and the Background

In their practices, meaning in representation is central to both aesthetics and visual culture approaches. And, from Searle's explanation, we can only represent or obtain meaning because of the pre-representational capacities of the background. These capacities underlying the network of intentional states typically enable us, for example, to easily understand sentences. But meaning, on Searle's account, is always radically underdetermined. Context and relevance are critical. The points of context and relevance in establishing and generating meaning make Searle's explanation particularly apposite to practices of visuality. To start, though, the following sections continue Searle's account of the role of the background as know-how in establishing literal and metaphorical meanings in sentences.

9. 4. 1. *The Background and Understanding Literal Meaning*

To understand the "literal meaning of sentences," whether the "simplest" sentence such as ""The cat is on the mat"" or the "most complex sentences of the physical sciences" requires, Searle says, "a preintentional Background" (p. 145). That is, any sentence "can

only determine its truth conditions or other conditions of satisfaction against a Background of capacities, dispositions, know-how" and so on, that "are not themselves part of the semantic content" or "literal meaning" of that sentence (1983, p. 145; 1995a, p. 130). Should we "alter the preintentional Background," Searle says, "the same sentence with the same literal meaning will determine different truth conditions" or "different conditions of satisfaction, even though there is no change in the literal meaning of the sentence" (1983, p. 145).

The requirement of a preintentional Background for making meaning can be understood in obvious examples, such as "in sentences containing simple English verbs like "cut," "open," or "grow"" (1995a, p. 130). We can "think," for instance, of "the word "cut"" occurring in "sentences such as "Sally cut the cake" or "Bill cut the grass" or "The tailor cut the cloth,"" and "the verb "grow" in sentences such as "The American economy is growing" or "my son is growing" or "the grass is growing"" (p. 130). And, "in a normal literal utterance of each of these sentences, each verb has a constant meaning" – "there is no lexical ambiguity or metaphorical usage involved" (p. 130). "In each case" however, "the same verb will determine different truth conditions or conditions of satisfaction generally, because what counts as cutting or growing will vary with the context" (p. 130).

So, you know that "the sentence "Cut the grass!"" is "to be interpreted differently from "Cut the cake!"" (p. 131). If for instance, "somebody tells me to cut the cake and I run over it with a lawnmower" or alternately, "they tell me to cut the grass and I rush and stab it with a knife" Searle says, "there is a very ordinary sense in which I did not do what I was told to do" (p. 131). There is "nothing in the literal meaning of those sentences (to block) those wrong interpretations;" but, "in each case we understand the verb differently, even though its literal meaning is constant, because in each case our interpretation depends on our Background abilities" (p. 131, parentheses added).

To take the sentence ""She gave him her key and he opened the door;"" there is general agreement "that there is a certain underdetermination of what is (literally) said" (p. 131, parentheses added). Searle instead says that "there is a *radical* underdetermination of

what is said by the literal meaning of the sentence" (p. 131). There is "nothing in the literal meaning of the sentence" that blocks the interpretations: "He opened the door with her key by bashing the door down with the key; the key weighed two hundred pounds and was in the shape of an axe," or alternately, "He swallowed both the door and the key and he inserted the key in the lock by the peristaltic contraction of his gut" (p. 131).

Any attempt to "fix the correct understanding" of the sentence requires us "to spell out the Background as part of the semantic content" and there is no place to stop, because "each semantic content we produce will require yet more Background for its comprehension" (1983, p. 148). The "fact" is, "you have a certain sort of knowledge about how the world works" and "you have a certain set of abilities for coping with the world" (1995a, p. 131). That is "the only thing that blocks those ("ridiculous but still literal") interpretations" (p. 131, parentheses adapted). Semantic content is not grasped "in isolation" or even "with a set of presupposed beliefs," rather it "only functions against a Background of cultural and biological know-how" (1983, p. 148). Searle says, "those abilities are not and could not be included as part of the literal meaning of the sentence" (1995a, p. 131).

The "thesis of the Background" extends from "semantic contents to intentional contents generally" (p. 132). That is, "any intentional state only functions" Searle says, "against a set of Background abilities, dispositions, and capacities that are not part of the intentional content and could not be included as part of the intentional content" (p. 132). Searle says it is these Background capacities or "know-how which enables us to understand literal meanings" (1983, p. 148).

9. 4. 2. *The Background and Understanding Metaphors*

There are ""discoverable principles" in the interpretation of metaphor, but they are "by no means algorithmic;" that is, "such rules do not function in a mechanical fashion" (pp. 148-149). So, "when a speaker says metaphorically that *X* is *Y* he means *X* is like *Y* in respect to certain features *F*;" however, "there is no algorithm for discovering when an utterance is intended metaphorically" and there is "no algorithm for calculating the

values of *F*, even after the speaker has figured out that the utterance is intended metaphorically" (p. 149).

Further, "there are many metaphors whose interpretation do not rely on any perception of literal similarity between the extension of the *Y* term and the referent of the *X* term" (p. 149). So for instance, "we speak of a "sweet (*Y*) person (*X*)," a "sour (*Y*) disposition (*X*)," and "we also speak of a "warm (*Y*) welcome (*X*)," and "a cool (*Y*) reception (*X*)"" (p. 149, parentheses adapted). But in "neither" of these cases (of taste and temperature metaphors) "are there any literal similarities between the extension of the *Y* term and the referent of the *X* term which are sufficient to account for the metaphorical utterance meaning" (p. 149). That is, "the metaphorical utterance meaning" of the expression *a warm reception* for example, "is not based on any literal similarity" between warm things "and the character of the reception so described" (p. 149).

While "certain metaphors" do function on "principles of similarity," the "point" of the preceding examples is to demonstrate "that there are also certain metaphors" and "indeed whole classes of metaphors, that function without any underlying principles of similarity" (p. 149). Rather than the "application of any underlying 'rules' or 'principles,'" Searle says, "it just seems to be a fact about our mental capacities" that we can "interpret certain sorts of metaphor" through "the sheer ability to make certain associations" (p. 149). The best way he knows "to describe these abilities" is "to say that they are non-representational mental capacities" (p. 149). The "nonalgorithmic character of the rules and the fact that some of the associations are not determined by rules at all" both "suggest that there are nonrepresentational capacities involved" (p. 149). Even if "a complete and algorithmic sets of rules for metaphor" could be demonstrated Searle says, "such rules would (still) require a Background for their application" (p. 149, parentheses added).

Searle says we are "effortlessly" able to attach metaphorical interpretations to make meaning in conversation, because "we always interpret a sentence against a background of practices and within a network of beliefs and assumptions which are not themselves part of the semantic content of the sentence" (2002a, p. 199).

9. 4. 3. *Human Practices, Relevance, and Communication*

So, background "practices" enable us to interpret different sentences differently; and from this, "we know what it is to cut grass; we know what it is to cut cake; and we know that each is quite different from cutting a cloth" (p. 198). That is, "those are human practices" and "are just ways we have of behaving" (p. 198). The "knowledge we have about such matters is either knowledge from the network" of our intentional states "or is so fundamental that it is not quite right to construe it as propositional "knowing that…" at all" (p. 198). But, "there are many syntactically acceptable English sentences containing the word "cut" that we can't interpret at all" (p. 199). For example, "suppose I say to you "Go cut the mountain!" or "Sally cut the coffee" (p. 199). In the effortless sense in which we interpret "cut the cake" or "cut the cloth," Searle says, "I don't know how to interpret these other examples" (p. 199).

In these cases, "I can *invent* an interpretation for each of these, but when I do that, what I do is invent a background practice that fixes an interpretation" (p. 199). In the first case, this "doesn't take much imagination;" we could suppose that "we run a big freeway building crew and we are making interstate highways" and 'we have two ways of dealing with mountains; we either level them or we cut right through them" (p. 199). So, we can imagine, "if I say to my foreman "Go cut that mountain," he just cuts a freeway right through it" (p. 199). In the second case, Searle says, "many of my students immediately attach a metaphorical interpretation to "cut the coffee," interpreting "it as meaning: dilute the coffee in some way" (p. 199). And "we could invent other interpretations" (p. 199).

In conversation "we assume that the speaker's utterance makes sense, but in order to make sense of it we have to fit it into the background" (p. 199). For example, "notice that in the case of "The president cut the salaries," we immediately give it a metaphorical interpretation;" but, "with a little ingenuity and an idiosyncratic president," Searle says, "we could in such a case imagine a literal interpretation of "cut"" (p. 199). We could "suppose the salaries are always in the form of wads of dollar bills and an eccentric president insists on cutting the end off of each person's salary before handing it over" (p. 199). While "this would be an odd case," we can still

“imagine a literal interpretation of “cut”” here (p. 199). In such a case “the metaphorical interpretation fits the background easily; the literal interpretation requires generating a new background” practice (p. 199).

Searle says, “one of the ways in which the background is crucial for understanding conversation is in the role that the background plays in determining conversational relevance” (p. 199). Relevance is “in general relative to the purpose of the conversation” (p. 199). But “the purpose itself and what constitutes relevance relative to that purpose, will depend on the shared backgrounds of the participants” (p. 199). So, “what the participants in the conversation take as relevant, what counts as relevant, will always be relative to the cognitive apparatus they bring to bear on the conversation,” that is, “it will always be relative to their network and background”[7] (p. 199).

We may think that “communication takes place because of prior collateral information which speaker, hearer, and observer possess” (p. 202). That “is true as far as it goes,” but “prior collateral information is no more self-interpreting” than the “original semantic contents” of the conversation (p. 202). Rather, “the original utterances and the prior collateral information only function” Searle says again, “against a background of capacities, stances, attitudes, presuppositions, ways of behaving, modes of sensibility, and so on, that are not themselves representational” (p. 202).

So, “all meaning and understanding goes on against a background which is not itself meant or understood, but which forms the boundary conditions on meaning and understanding, whether in conversations or isolated utterances” (p. 202).

9. 5. Background Functions as Summary

The following sections bring to a close this study of Searle’s explanation of consciousness. From the critical role of the background in the explanation of visuality

[7] On conversation, Searle notes how “the richness” of a “shared background enables a very minimal explicit semantic content to be informative and even satisfying” to its participants and the “frustrating and unsatisfying” outcomes of conversations that can occur “between people of radically different backgrounds,” in which participants “can speak at great length and achieve only mutual incomprehension” (2002a, p. 202).

the following account looks to how the Background works, providing practical summary and clarification of the role of the Background in consciousness.

Searle defines the "concept of the Background" as "the set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable intentional states to function" (1995a, p. 129). He says "by *capacities*" he means "abilities, dispositions, tendencies, and *causal structures generally*" (p. 129). In discussion of the Background "we are talking about a certain category of neurophysiological causation," although "we are forced to describe them at a much higher level"[8] (p. 129). The concept of "*enabling* is meant, then, to be a causal notion," since "we are not talking about the logical conditions of possibility" but rather "about neurophysiological structures that function causally in the production of certain sorts of intentional phenomena" (p. 130).

From previous explanation, Searle holds that "all intentional states are either actually or potentially conscious;" so he confines "his discussion (here) to conscious forms of intentionality" (p. 130, parentheses added). The following sections set out Background "*function*," which Searle explains "under the general heading of the varieties of enabling" (p. 130). That is, there "is a variety of different types of functioning of the Background," and Searle lists "several types," addressing how the Background functions in "consciousness generally" (pp. 132-133).

9. 5. 1. *Linguistic Interpretation*

First, Searle says "*the Background enables linguistic interpretation to take place*" (p. 132). From previously, "the meaning of any sentence radically underdetermines its truth conditions" (p. 132). This is because, "the literal meaning of the sentence only fixes a set of truth conditions given certain Background capacities" (p. 132). The "word "cut" does keep a common meaning" in the earlier examples, but we do not interpret sentences "at the level of bare semantic content; interpretation rises to the level of our

[8] This is "because we do not know how these structures function" at the "neurophysiological level," but "there is nothing disreputable about that" (Searle, 1995a, p. 129). "When I say" for instance, "that I am able to speak English, I am talking about a causal capacity of my brain;" but, Searle says, "there is no objection to identifying that capacity as, e.g. "the ability to speak English" without knowing the details of its neurophysiological realization" (p. 130).

Background abilities" (p. 132). So, "we interpret these sentences" Searle says "immediately and effortlessly" in "a stereotypical appropriate way" (p. 132).

9. 5. 2. *Perceptual 'Interpretation'*

Second, "*the Background enables perceptual interpretation to take place*" (p. 132). From prior explanation, "given certain Background skills, we are able to see things as certain sorts of things" that is, "we bring the ability to apply certain categories" (p. 133). Take Wittgenstein's example of the duck/ rabbit drawing (refer Wittgenstein, 1958, 194*e*); Searle says "we are able to see the figure as either a duck or a rabbit because we bring to bear on the raw perceptual stimulus a set of Background skills," and this is so "for perception in general" (1995a, p. 133). The "perceiver assimilates the perceived object to some more or less familiar category," meaning that in normal cases of perception "I see this as a chair, this as a table, that as a glass" and so on (p. 133). These "two pervasive functions, namely, the role of the Background in facilitating linguistic ("semantic") interpretation" and its "role in facilitating perceptual interpretation" extend "to consciousness generally" (p.133, parentheses adapted). But Searle places a caveat on use of the word 'interpretation.'

Importantly, in describing these features, Searle is "reluctant to use the word "interpretation" because it suggests something that is definitely false;" that is, "use of this word suggests that there is an act of interpreting whenever we understand something or perceive something" (p. 134). Searle rejects this notion; rather, he says "we normally just see an object or understand a sentence, without any *act* of interpreting" (p. 134). As Wittgenstein does, we "might want to reserve the word "interpretation" for cases where we actually perform a conscious and deliberate act of interpreting" for instance, "where we substitute one expression for another"[9] (p. 134). So, "with that caveat," Searle says that "the understanding of utterances and the experiencing of ordinary conscious states require Background capacities" (p. 134).

[9] That is, "it is a very special intellectual performance to produce an act of interpretation" (Searle, 1995a, p. 134).

9. 5. 3. *Structuring Consciousness*

Searle says, we find the third feature of the role of the Background "by extending the first two features" (p. 133). So, *third*, "*the Background structures consciousness*" (p. 133). In "all non-nonpathological forms of consciousness our conscious experiences come to us with what we might call an aspect of familiarity" (p. 133). Searle says, "because all intentionality is aspectual, all conscious intentionality is aspectual" (p. 133). So, "even if I am in a strange locale" where the architecture and the "dress of the people look different from the way they look" in London or Beijing for instance, those things and circumstances still appear familiar to me as "houses," "clothing," "people," "earth," "sky" etc. (p. 133). From previously in the study, the "possibility of perceiving, that is, the possibility of experiencing under aspects requires a familiarity with the set of categories under which one experiences those aspects" (p. 133). The "ability to apply those categories is a Background ability" (p. 133).

9. 5. 4. *Narrative or Dramatic Categories*

Fourth, "*temporally extended sequences of experiences come to us with a narrative or dramatic shape*" (p. 134). That is, "*they come to us under what for want of a better word"* Searle calls, *"dramatic categories*" (p. 134). Not only do "our particular experiences occur to us as aspectual," there is as well "a narrative shape to sequences of experiences" (p. 134). The examples considered so far show the Background has "an episodic application," but it also has "a dynamic application over a series of successive events" (p. 134).

Searle says this "manifestation of the Background" is what he calls "the dramatic categories that extend over sequences of events and structure those sequences into narrative shapes" (p. 135). This shaping is obvious in instances "where the perceptual and linguistic categories extend to long sequences of events" (pp. 134-135). So, I "perceive things as houses, cars, and people," and "I also possess certain scenarios of expectation that enable me to cope with the people and objects in my environment" (p. 135). These "scenarios of expectation" Searle says, "include a set of categories for how houses, cars, and people interact" for example, "how things proceed when I walk into a restaurant, or what happens in a supermarket" (p. 135).

Extending to a larger scale, people have "series of expectations about bigger categories in their life," in the way of "the category of falling in love, or getting married and raising a family, or going to a university and getting a degree" (p. 135). What "people get from television, movies, and reading" for instance, is "in part, a set of beliefs and desires;" the point here being that "beliefs and desires only fix conditions of satisfaction against a Background of capacities that are not themselves beliefs or desires" (p. 135).

9. 5. 5. *Motivational Dispositions*

The *fifth* Background function Searle describes is that, "*each of us has a set of motivational dispositions, and these will condition the structure of our experiences*" (p. 135). The person who is "obsessed by Oriental rugs, sports cars, and fine wines" for example, "will experience the streets of Paris or New York in a different way from the person who is obsessed by cloud formations and Arizona cactus;" that is, "there are lots of opportunities for the collector of fine wines and Oriental rugs, not so much for Arizona cactus" (p. 135). The "collectors of Oriental rugs" will "have conscious beliefs and desires about Oriental rugs;" for example, Searle says, "I believe that Kazaks cost a lot more than Hamadans" and "I would like to own a Chi Chi" (p. 135). In this way "these and other beliefs and desires help to structure my experiences" (p. 135). The point is "in addition to such specific beliefs and desires, what gives sense to those beliefs and desires is a set of motivational dispositions" (p. 136).

9. 5. 6. *Readiness*

Sixth, "*the Background facilitates certain kinds of readiness*" (p. 136). Searle says, "at any given point, I am ready for certain things and not other things" (p. 136). For example, "in large cities I am ready for street noises," "for the sound of cars, and the sights of lots of other people, stores and traffic" (p. 136). And, "when I am on the ski slope, I am ready for other skiers coming by as potential projectiles" (p. 136). However, "when I am giving a lecture I am not at all ready for a skier to come skiing through the lecture hall" (p. 136). That is, "I would be absolutely astounded if a skier suddenly came through, or if an elephant simply walked into the room;" but "I am completely ready for the sorts of noises and responses that one normally hears in lecture halls" (p. 136).

So, “when I am skiing, I am ready for other skiers as potential sources of danger, as people trying to push in front of me in the lift line” and “as old skiing friends I encounter on the ski slope” (p. 136). And in the context of “a seminar, I am ready for people to raise their hand and accuse me of infinite regress arguments;” however “I do not have the reverse readiness” (p. 136). That is, “if, in the deep snow at the top of Red Dog Ridge, I encountered a bunch of people” sitting at study desks, “raising their hands and saying such things to me as “There is an infinite regress in one of your arguments,” I would be astounded by that” (p. 136). Searle says, “such things could happen, but they are definitely not the sort of thing that the Background makes me ready for” (p. 136). Comedy often bases “on just such incongruities” (p. 136).

9. 5. 7. *Behaviour*

Seventh, “*the Background disposes me to certain sorts of behavior*” (p. 136). Searle says, “I am disposed to laugh at certain kinds of jokes and not others” and “I am disposed to speak at a certain level of loudness and not at another,” just as “I am disposed to stand at a certain distance from people when I talk to them and not at certain other distances” (p. 137). Searle calls “all of these, manifestations of the Background” (p. 137).

So, Searle provides seven ways in which “Background abilities manifest themselves in actual occurrent forms of intentionality” (p. 137). He does not “suppose that these are all the ways that the Background is manifested” but is “reasonably confident” they fit the theory of the Background he states (p. 137).

9. 6. Conclusion

From Searle’s explanation, in daily life the self, as ‘I,’ functions as a whole or unified state in consciousness. And, in experience, we participate in social reality, characteristically taking for granted this is how the world is. Mostly, Searle says, we are not interpreting, rather we just see things *as* something, including in many cases the social functions or purposes of the phenomena in question. And, we take this aspect of the perception of social reality for granted. So it is, in a sense, invisible to us. All of these practices, the study shows, are realized aspects of our background capacities.

From an embodied basis of preintentional or pre-representational capacities a network of intentional states enables us to think, feel, and act. And we can communicate with others, the background enabling the exchange of relevant and appropriate meaning.

This final chapter on Searle's explanation of consciousness addresses some answers to the debate between (roughly) causal and mediated accounts of perception. Understanding the way the background works is crucial to addressing this debate. Substantially, I think the problems with existing accounts derive from limiting these rich, complex, and nonlinear capacities in consciousness to binaries of events or phenomena. The question of whether there is or is not cognitive content and how far such content may be theory-laden misdirects, in my view, the central concerns of both aesthetics and visual culture.

The network of states, from Searle's account, is the precondition of any intentional state; and background capacities enable mental representation. Previously in the study, from Fodor, it is background capacities and their global requirements on cognitive function that confound the computational or strongly modular account of mind[10]. How deeply into cognitive processing the activity of the background of epistemic commitments commences, is from Searle's account, at the level of perception. But this opens up, rather than closes, the most interesting questions for visuality. The direction it attends on is the "social character of the mind" (quote from Searle, 1994a, p. 248).

Central to visual culture there is interest in the social practices constituting visuality. From Searle's explanation, this concern does not require rejection of an agent self having direct, felt perception of the world. Rather, background capacities enable account of the role of practices in the constitution of conscious experience. And importantly, the motivation for study of sociocultural agency in practices of representation functions as an ethical value independently of visual culture's claims of mediated perceptual processes. Enabling a unified explanation of visuality, inclusion of the network and background philosophically sustains the study of such agency without

[10] See Chapter 5: on *Modularity and the Reasoning Mind*, including n.56, on Fodor's and others' concern for abduction in reasoning, as inference to the best explanation.

rejection of the perceptual and sensory interests in the epistemology of aesthetics. From Searle's explanation, there is no sharp distinction in the aspects of states. So, in aesthetics there is interest towards the felt or qualitative aspect of mental states, as appearances. But from Searle's work I do not think this concern requires rejection of further mental content. Rather, the qualitative aspects, as mode and content of states, function as a unity.

I will register a concern that Searle's account defines and that he now explicitly suggests. Searle recently says it is his view that, "there is an aesthetic dimension to all conscious experiences" (2007, p. 14). Searle has not, so far, elaborated on the remark to my knowledge. But, in all mental representation, including conscious thought, there is an immediate felt, qualitative aspect. Agent in all experience is the role of pleasure/unpleasure and as I understand Searle's hypothesis, this dimension functions as an intrinsic aspect of the unified state of consciousness. The relation, as a unity in experience between the dimension of pleasure and felt aspects of states I think is interesting. Although I am pursuing this very roughly and altogether briefly, from Searle's account, I also think it follows there is an aesthetic aspect to all conscious experience. I return to this concern in the following chapter's discussion of results.

In conclusion to this part of the study, Searle's account of consciousness explains a self, having ontologically real first-person conscious states. And importantly for this study, such subjective states cannot be reduced or eliminated in explanation. Typically, the self or agent as an ineliminable 'I,' has perception, belief, desire, memory, language, etc., and so, the capacity for reasoning. And from this basis, cognitive and volitive, including conative capacities enable the self to choose, decide, and intend actions that occur in a real world. As that self there is a rational agent who, acting on the basis of reasons, has responsibility for those actions.

From this explanation, the arts and social sciences can provide real, non-deterministic causal account of the role of mind in the actions of this conscious self. In accounting for the self in the activities of practices, Searle's work explains the non rule-determined capacity for adaptation to the constraints of context in understanding and making

meaning. I this take up further in the final chapter of the study, employing the capacity for making metaphor as a useful explanatory device.

Chapter 10
Discussion of Results

10. Introduction

From Searle's explanation of the irreducible qualitative unity of consciousness, the agency and free will of a rational self, intentionality, including the network and background capacities of intentional states, as well as brief account of their role in learning and negotiating practices, the framework for the main aim of the study is met. That is, the aim of the study is to unite the extension of visuality in visual arts and education explanation. But, there is a constraint on this primary goal. That is, the study's alternative to the debated terms of visuality should be non-reductive.

In order to complete the aim, broadly, this study describes a set of conclusions. In this discussion, I distinguish three major results, each consisting in a number of outcomes. To explain the presentation of these briefly: so far, for the purposes of representing the debated terms of visuality clearly, this study of aesthetics and visual culture articulates a separation in their objects of concern consistent with the variations in their practices. To start, the discussion continues this distinction. The first and second major results provide some account of aesthetics and visual culture in light of this study of Searle's explanation of consciousness. In doing this, discussion sustains the central epistemological objects of both accounts of visuality in the debate. I roughly define those objects and their value in the following way: the results of this study maintain the validity and importance of aesthetic experience of artistic works and other phenomena, and understanding of the ethical constraints on social practices in experience of imagery, as real and valued knowledge in visual arts and education.

The third result of the study completes appropriate, that is, non-reductive account of the extension of visuality from the role of consciousness as a unity, for explanation in visual arts and education. The hypothesis of the study is that non-reductive realist account reconciles the debate between visual culture and aesthetics. And, from this study of John Searle's work, the two opposed explanations of visuality can provide

philosophically accountable consistency *between* their objects. This consistency or integration is evident, from Searle's realist account, in the unified state of operations in consciousness of a reasoning agent or irreducible self as 'I.' My interest is in this reconciliation because, I think, it provides an epistemologically interesting term or set of terms for approaching the study and explanation of visuality as practices. Accounting for this reconciliation, as an interpretation of results, provides the final major result, as the closing chapter of the study. But to start, the following sections of this chapter draw on the study of Searle's work to comment on the current explanatory frameworks of visuality as epistemological strategies in the visual arts and education.

10. 1. The First Result of the Study

Maintaining the central epistemological object of aesthetics as the explanation of aesthetic experience of artistic works, the first result of the study accounts for the qualitative states of aesthetic experience and its objects as real phenomena. In this first major result, three further outcomes proceed in relation to the study of aesthetics.

First, the study, from Searle's account, demonstrates that the first-person ontology of mental states cannot be eliminated and cannot be accounted for by third-person explanations of behaviour. Those explanations are reductive of the first-person character of, in this case aesthetic, experience. In contrast to such reductions, this study provides philosophical grounds for the ontological subjectivity of aesthetic experience in epistemology.

Second, Searle's account, from the previous outcome, provides a philosophically defended explanatory framework that extends the study of these states as necessary aspects of the unified state of consciousness; there is however, a constraint on explanation. That is, aesthetic experiences as qualitative states in consciousness have their own aspectual characteristics but are not separate from other mental states in experience. They are enabled by the network of intentionality and background capacities.

So, third, from Searle's account, having these capacities and being capable of conscious reasoning, the self or 'I' can voluntarily act on the basis of reasons as free will. Having the capacity for practical reason, and so free will, the subjective or first-person states of a self in consciousness are neither separate from, nor determined by practices. In this way, the self is both free to act and enabled in those actions by intentionality as the representational interaction between self and world. This third outcome largely provides the framework for revision to the concept of visuality as a reconciliation between oppositions, or the third major result of the study.

The set of these three outcomes constitute the first major result of the study. But, as the explanation of particular kinds of experience, the appropriateness of aesthetics in the epistemology of art and from this, education, warrants further scrutiny. In doing this, the study draws further on the account of consciousness from Searle.

10. 1. 1. *Discussion of Aesthetics in the Concept of Visuality*

The philosophical framework of aesthetics in art history, theory, and education is longstanding, with strongly defined practices of visuality providing explanation of aesthetic experience in relation to aesthetic objects, especially art. As well as aesthetic experience, these depictive objects are importantly relevant to the study and explanation of aesthetic experience. From its explanatory commitments, there is strong interest in the understanding of immediate felt states directed towards the features of, most typically, exemplary artworks but also other phenomena, including nature.

In recent years these concerns have been to a large degree marginalized in the discourse of art education from criticism by advocates of visual culture. Two criticisms from visual culture are pertinent to aesthetic study of artistic artefacts. First there is criticism of a narrow focus, on two counts. Second, proceeding from the claimed narrowness of the aesthetic object (as a kind of experience of, most typically, particular artefacts), there is criticism towards an absence of reflection on the ethical contexts of culture in aesthetic discourse. I will address the criticisms of narrow focus shortly, but attend to the problem of ethics in aesthetics later in the discussion. A third criticism from visual culture educators is that philosophical aesthetics is irrelevant to the typical student's

world from its representation of exemplary art as elite and distinct from the conditions of broader cultural production. On this argument, the criticism of aesthetic concerns is, in my view, unwarranted.

10. 1. 2. *The Relevance of Aesthetics in Contemporary Education*

There is argument for the rejection of disciplinary focus on aesthetic study of art objects in education. Critics claim this focus is an elite and elitist activity saying, for instance, experience of exemplary art and its supporting institutions is not representative of most student's experience[1]. But the relevance of aesthetic interest in artworks in the context of art museums, galleries, and other arenas proceeds from longstanding widespread cultural commitment to the activities and experience of art. Art institutional activities of some kind typically inform educational experience either directly or indirectly.

Field trips to gallery and museum sites, for example, are significant in the educational value of institutional experiences for young children, due in part to their differentiated sense of occasion and interactive participation in civic values[2] (Falk and Dieking, 1997; Kwak, Dhavan, and Holbert, 2004). And attending on the concern for student interest in exemplary artworks in criticism of art institutional focus, the pleasurable aspects of art play an important role in the experience of it. Although education and entertainment are not dependent upon each other, neither are they polarized (Falk and Dieking, 1997, p. 15). John Falk and Lynn Dieking report that learning outcomes for visitors of art museums were as important for those who sought educational benefits from their museum experience as for those who sought entertainment[3] (1997).

Still attending on the role of aesthetics in education from widespread cultural value: since the 1990s cultural, scientific, and technological developments mean aesthetic concepts are significant to a number of emergent or newly identified forums.

---

[1] The following criticisms of aesthetics in education are drawn from Chapter 2, particularly *Background to Visual Cultural Analysis v. Aesthetics*, *The Problem with Philosophical Aesthetics*, and *Revision of the Aesthetic*.

[2] The "social capital" developed through "engagement with public life" from museum and art gallery visits serves "the health of democratic societies" (Kwak et al, 2004, p. 643).

[3] Falk and Dierking investigated the importance of school field trips to museums as they were reported in the memories of elementary school children, secondary school children and adults. All the groups were able to recall educationally significant details (1997).

Concurrent with the renewal of aesthetic concerns in political, cultural, and artistic interests in the 21st Century, identification of aesthetic issues in advancing technology and industry significantly motivates research. Specifically, aesthetics is a branch of philosophy. But aesthetic concepts are broadly taken up and relevant to a number of traditional and developing fields as well as everyday life. Cultural and social goals of consumption, broadly speaking, motivate considerable research in the aesthetics of visuality, as felt experience, across these areas.

A brief sample of widespread demand for aesthetic knowledge can be found in first, the global requirements in the production of artistic and designed objects and their associated imagery (Throsby, 2006, pp. 38-42); second, the integration of sciences, technologies, and aesthetic production (Eger, 2004; Mitchell, Inouye, and Blumenthal (Eds.), 2003); and third, the emergence of global "creative capital" dependent on aesthetics-based skills and the politics of economic and social development (Florida, 2007). The economic value of aesthetic concerns in cultural production is significant, for example, the Japanese digital animation industry export value ($23 billion, 2002) (Cameron, 2006) and the aesthetic concerns of website production (Miller, 2001).

Further, aesthetic organization of sense experience provides a significant relational framework across disciplines (Emmer, 2005). Research communities in some cases strongly identify with aesthetics. For instance, "as an area of design concerned with cognition and perception," the emergence of the field of artificial intelligence "can be understood as the latest manifestation of certain views of aesthetics that have their roots in older philosophical, scientific, and artistic projects" (Sack, 1998, p. 123). And the development of situated aesthetics research is leading to the emergence of new disciplinary entities, evident for example in the case of environmental aesthetics (Carlson, 2000, 2005; Fisher, 2005).

In education, broadly, study of the aesthetic provides awareness of and responsiveness to the unique properties, or individuality of felt experience (see Guyer, 2005; Heid, 2005). And from Searle's account, in its felt experience as the unity of a first-person point of view or 'I,' having temporal continuity, the aesthetic also captures the need for

a narrative of 'self' in the student's world (see also Brown, 1989b, p. 223; Bruner, 1990). This constitutive capacity in (or of) the sense of the self is important. In art for instance, aesthetic description as a narrative transaction enables "the beholder to immerse themselves in both virtual and real time modalities" (Brown, 2003a, p. 312). That is, the embodied and continuous narrative of the 'I' is significantly constitutive in the aesthetic play of imagination in digital and other immersive environments (Murray, 1998).

The interpretive power of aesthetic explanation means even very young students as audiences can make "concrete observations about an artwork" (see Brown, 2005a; quote from Goldberg, 2005, p. 25). From this capacity, students participate in the "awareness and appreciation" of nature and one's environment (Schirrmacher, 2002, p. 168). This embodied, and so, participative experience of the self or 'I' as a felt relation and interaction with the environment is importantly relevant in education (Brown, 2005a). On the application of its concepts and practices in the rapid developments or shifts in technological innovations, the aesthetic also informs new modes of making meaning in art and design. Negotiating virtual environments and interactive activity for instance is "now part of the array of aesthetic decisions of any artist" (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 75).

In summary, there is widespread commitment to aesthetic value in culture and the aesthetic is particularly appropriate to the participatory narrative of self in the education of students. The relevance of aesthetic knowledge to these concerns provides, in my view, grounds to reject criticism of aesthetics as extraneous to the student's and beholder's typical life experience. Rather, study of aesthetics has an important role in education and epistemology.

10. 1. 3. *Art in Education*

Contemporary transitions in technology, among other grounds, are utilized to claim that aesthetic interest in art objects is too narrow, and so, an irrelevant or diminished value in art education[4]. Critics claim the narrowness functions in two ways. First, focus on aesthetic experience does not explain culture sufficiently broadly and second, aesthetic

[4] See Chapter 2, particularly n.58.

focus on artworks as their object is exclusive. On the first, it is true that aesthetics, as a form of experience, is not explanatory of culture broadly speaking. As one disciplinary activity among other relevant aspects of art, education, and learning broadly, there is no requirement that it should be. But, claiming aesthetic interest in art is narrow is an interesting criticism. Briefly, the concept of art and with it, artwork extends to widespread interest across different arenas, including but not reducing to technology, described above. There is however a significant consideration in the problem of characterizing artistic concern with artworks as a narrow concern.

The activities of art are purposeful. But their outcomes are often unconstrained by what we commonly attribute to the ends of purposes. In the activity of representing, "representations are *plastic*; that is, they are easy to vary" (Gooding, 2006, p. 691). This activity of "variation is often exploratory, playful, and opportunistic" and "is an important source of new insights and possibilities" (p. 691). These "variations arise both from mental operations by individuals and during communicative exchanges between individuals and groups" (p. 691). It is the exploratory, playful character of attention and contextual opportunism that non-trivially help define the conceptual relation between the aesthetic, as pleasure, and creativity.

Use of the "umbrella concepts" of "creativity," and "the aesthetic" now "attaches an implicitly high level of value" (Brown, 2001, p. 93). And the broader cultural value attaching to these concepts determines in part the relevance of art in education. Roughly, and mostly with a number of problems attending on its definitions, educators call the modes of activity attending on art and design 'creative,' partly to refine a distinction as 'innovative' between the production and reproduction of knowledge (Brown, 2005b).

David Gooding says "there is no case for assimilating all cognition to the material, technical, and cultural aspects of systems;" the "sociological assimilation of all knowledge to social relations and cultural traditions makes it difficult to explain how

the larger distributed system can deal with change or produce innovations"[5] (2006, p. 696). From these considerations, I believe the role of art in education may always be a difficult fit, particularly when we define educational value of a subject area in terms of a reductive strategic logic. But art maintains a valuable presence in education in large part because, for now, its knowledge is not typically defined by such reduction. The play in art, and the role of pleasure in that play, do not contradict its disciplined activity. Rather, they are importantly constitutive of the experimental and experiential conditions of the field.

So, the role of the aesthetic and its concern with art is culturally relevant in generic terms. But the aspect of conscious experience that starts as aesthetic intuition only develops as a sophisticated capacity for discrimination and judgment in the context of teaching and learning. Aesthetic concern with artistic objects refers, from the study's account of aesthetics, to particular practices of knowledge, including production, understanding, and appreciation of artistic works. On study of exemplary works: these are valued as contributions of a certain kind to knowledge. Commonly now, the extension of artistic merit to artefacts applies to a broad and emerging range of phenomena, as art. The attribution of artistic merit serves in argument for an artefact's presence in curriculum. This identification provides accountable basis in epistemology. And from its wide application, there is no necessary exclusion of ethical and other concerns under the umbrella term 'artistic'[6]. But the criteria of artistic merit provides an important threshold in accounting for art's disciplinary activity[7]. There is risk that an aesthetics of the 'everyday,' as unrestricted extension to any social phenomena to address the claimed narrow focus on art can be used to trivialize the actual constraints on this form of enquiry[8].

---

[5] Gooding is referring to the wider distribution of cognition as "being embodied and networked and so (involving) physical and social processes 'outside' the brain and body" (2006, p. 696, parentheses added).

[6] On various inclusions, including ethical concerns in definitions of art, see for example, Barnes (1998); Davies (1991).

[7] It is on this point that I think the 'middle ground' between aesthetic and cultural concerns Arthur Efland (2004) appeals for, is attended to (see Chapter 1, *Significance of the Study*). That is, the concept of art does not necessarily exclude other concerns, including the ethical. And the attribution of artistic merit provides a qualification for extended but not unrestricted inclusion of different phenomena.

[8] From the study's interest in the possibility that there is an aesthetic dimension to all conscious experience, I do not think there is any problem in the application of aesthetics to objects other than fine art. On what counts as art in contemporary art education, the class of objects falling under the category of

In this way, the criticism of narrowness describes a different problem motivating the debate between visual culture and aesthetics. The problem concerns the value or worth of art-related practices in education. Aesthetic experience and art as expression broadly participate in the early development of student knowledge. But aesthetics and art also have a specific epistemological role in education as increasingly particular practices in scholastic development. And the disciplinary focus of aesthetics, I suggest, contributes significantly to knowledge.

Epistemological engagement with a particular kind of experience as aesthetic and the development of discrimination as aesthetic knowledge strongly constitutes in experience of artworks. An artwork can be understood as a particular way of approaching, exploring, representing, and communicating experience of the world[9]. I do not think aesthetic experience solely constitutes on art objects. But concerning artistic activity and works of art, I think explanation of this knowledge best develops when art maintains as a specific class of objects. In this classification, there is no necessary rejection of art historical and critical interest in context. But sharing identity with imagery of any kind lends itself more readily to reduction of the arts' creative concerns. The reduction occurs in art identity deriving from general membership in an unlimited class of objects. Here, the primary epistemological concern lies in sociological or historicist interest. I pursue this further in discussion of depiction, following.

---

art does not typically reduce to what it is claimed in criticism as the 'art canon;' on wide inclusion in curriculum under the definition of art since the early 1980s see for example, NACCCE (1999, p. 49). See Brent Wilson on the art educator's role as "that of negotiator among conventional art, emerging art, and student-initiated content that may include virtually anything from the entire realm of visual culture" (2003, p. 227). There are, in my view, some problems with an indefinite extension of terms in an "aesthetics of the everyday;" but for thoughtful overview on extension to a broad range of objects in the notion, basing in criticism of the 'art canon' restriction, see Sartwell (2005). As wide, but not unrestricted inclusion of everyday art objects, Crispin Sartwell includes "fine and popular arts;" "art and craft;" and "art and spirituality" (p. 764). Deriving from, among others, the pragmatism of John Dewey, Sartwell identifies the everyday aesthetic experience as one that "stands out in the mind as a complete unit, that is pervaded by a unifying quality" (p. 766). The defining characteristics of this experience, from Sartwell's description, are unity, coherence, and intensity (p. 766); (cf. Monroe Beardsley's criteria of unity, intensity, complexity; see Chapter 4, *The Role of Perception in Aesthetic Judgment*, n.37).

[9] Annette Barnes says, "in the representing done by artworks, many more features of the representation matter than matter, say, in the representing done by diagrams in a science textbook;" the "slightest difference in a representation in art makes a difference while it does not typically make a such a difference in non-art areas" (1998, p. 512).

To understand the value of art and with it, aesthetics in education, there is further need to address the specialization of knowledge. To do this, I briefly return to the disciplinary object of aesthetics as aesthetic experience in relation to Searle's explanation of consciousness.

In the arts there is already discussion of consciousness generally. From the earlier example, there is research on the narrative transactions of self in aesthetics (see for example Brown, 2003a). In considering the present role of aesthetics in the explanation of visuality, Searle's account does provide further means in language appropriate, I think, to the pursuit of a rigorous practice or set of practices. From the history of those practices, much of that language already exists. For example, in this study's account of aesthetics, recognition of aesthetic meaning conventionally involves, in part, associating felt states with the properties of objects, in order to make meaning or understand art. This enables some, although by no means complete, account of the experience to render in language. In negotiating the poverty of language to the experience of felt states the trade-off, so to speak, is that in description and explanation, qualities of felt states stand in for an equivalent, relevant, or appropriate extension of terms. This is explicit as metaphor; one thing stands for another to extend understanding, make meaning, or develop a concept (Ortony, 1993; Sibley 2006a).

The problem of language in aesthetics is challenging for epistemology, but valuable. The difficulty of putting words to felt states motivates the search for appropriate extensions of meaning in explanation. And in this sense study of aesthetics and art is, among other things, both embodied and a metacognitive activity (noting they are not practically distinct). That is, such study consciously attends on in this metacognitive activity in reasoning, from the experience and knowledge of the qualitativeness of states. There is appropriation of qualities as features from the extension terms to the reference terms so, for instance, making sense of one colour as cool and another as warm. I will take this up further, later. What is important here is that Searle's account of consciousness as qualitative is appropriately relevant to an existing set of explanatory practices.

Historically, the role of pleasure in the experience of art and nature significantly constitutes the object of aesthetics. But this concern, from conventional separation of the intuition of pleasure from rationality has tended to isolate the role of the aesthetic in study of mind. Further, there is tendency to reduce or exclude first, the range and second, specificity of aesthetic practices. In visual culture's criticism, this is evident where there is reduction of philosophical aesthetics to formalism in the first, and deregulation as an everyday aesthetic to a general kind of experience of any phenomena in the second. In the criticism of aesthetics' practices, there is also commonly rejection of the longstanding role of disinterest in aesthetic experience. Felt pleasure no longer identifies with autonomy from practical interest and survives in discourse as other motivations, typically as drives[10].

These reductions led to the account of aesthetics in this study, including explanation of the concept and origin of disinterest as an ethical concern, in order to counter what I feel is an important but diminished value in epistemology and education. The concept of disinterest can be understood as a mode of detachment from practical interests. But equally, and interestingly, it echoes W. J. T. Mitchell's description of objectivity as an open, curious, unresolved frame of mind[11]. The strong rejection of any non-practical account of pleasure in visual arts and education discourse requires, I suggest, rethinking. And, in reconciling the aesthetic with the cognitive, I would extend Mitchell's account of objectivity as an open frame of mind to include the availability of the senses, as a rough description, to the experience. I take the role of the senses in cognition up further, in the following chapter.

By drawing on Searle's account, study of aesthetic experience as a disciplinary activity provides means in epistemology for the exploration of felt and qualitative experience as intuitive or immediate aspects of all mental states, without rejection of perception as a cognitive activity. From study of his current framework of consciousness, Searle's account can extend the particular role of the aesthetic consistent with its disciplinary object. The dimension of pleasure/unpleasure in consciousness plays an important role

[10] See for instance, Chapter 3: *Perception* and *Conclusion*.
[11] See Chapter 2, *Perspectivalism, Strong Relativism, and Anti-Realism*; and see Mitchell (2005, p. 157).

in aesthetic experience of art objects. That is, in aesthetics, reflection on the conscious dimensions of pleasure is employed to discriminate within and among aesthetic phenomena, particularly including art.

10. 1. 4. *Study of Depiction*

Returning to the criticism from visual culture that aesthetic attention given to artworks, in contrast to imagery of any kind, is too narrow a focus in art education. Student education proceeds from naïve to practiced states, requiring the introduction of general on to specialized knowledge. As this learning proceeds, the explanation of artistic objects requires knowledge of artistic values as importantly relevant to the work's meaning. Knowledge of these values significantly develops from understanding depiction[12]. Without knowledge of depiction, there is loss of understanding the relation between artistic values and meaning in artworks. I will give some reasons why I think so.

Philosophical aesthetics' concern with pictorial representation and from this, depiction[13] contrasts with the generalized notion of representation from semiotic accounts in visual culture. Depiction and representation are related; depiction is a species of representation. This point is important to understanding the difference between values in aesthetics and visual culture as practices. That is, it is semiotic interest in representation generally that opens visual culture to its theoretical and practical variations from aesthetics[14]. Likewise, it is the concern with depiction specifically that gives aesthetics much of its identity.

Characteristically, in semiotic discourse and from this visual culture, artworks do not form a particular class of objects. Rather, their identity is subsumed within the broader category of representation and a 'levelling' of features occurs. Artworks are relevant as 'imagery of any kind.' The interest in semiotics lies in a representation's syntactic and

---

[12] The following discussion draws on Chapter 4, *Aesthetics and Knowing*, *Explanation of Art in Aesthetics*, and *Art as un Unconventional Convention* as well as Chapter 5, generally.
[13] See particularly Chapter 5, *Representation and Depiction*.
[14] But as noted, the influence of semiotic account of representation in theories of aesthetics, from Goodman's and many others' work, precedes the emergence of visual culture.

semantic, or languagelike properties. In contrast, accounts in aesthetics look particularly to the immediate and reflective apprehension of artistic qualities in the medium and the form of the representation. So the stakes involved, so to speak, in the matter of depiction and representation concern not only the way we see, but what we see and study, in education at least.

Depiction is central to the explanation of artistic forms, providing means to account values represented in the work particularly including, but not limiting to, artistic. Apprehension from a developed knowledge of the medium and formal qualities of works are constitutive aspects of aesthetic experience. Aestheticians claim that pictorial and other artistic forms of depiction hold rich representational, as depictive content. Aesthetic exploration of this content and its means accesses particular kinds of experience of properties, features, or qualities strongly present in artworks. But these are typically passed over when the object is not understood as art and characteristically missing in visual experience of general representations (see Barnes, 1998, p. 512 and n.9 previously).

In arts and education, practices of aesthetics develop the capacity for identifying, discriminating among, and making judgments about depictive qualities in works and the works as depictive of some thing. In doing this, first, the intentional, including perceptual and felt states of the beholder, are consciously attended to and given voice (or brought to attention) as aesthetic experience. Following on this, the novice beholder, including artist, learns to give close attention to the work of material or physical properties in arranging and constituting a work's meaning or meanings[15]. In this experience, the material appearances as the sensuous or sense-derived 'feel' of works and their arrangement are considered to be communicative in some way. So, the beholder gains a 'sense' of the work or phenomena under description.

I need also add this play of materiality (in the eye or other sensory experience of the beholder) does not typically define but importantly contributes to meanings in works. For this reason, in aesthetics pictorial and depictive interest characteristically attends on

[15] I include in this description reference to properties, features, or qualities of virtual works.

the presence of the work, since it 'carries' meaning particular to the representational form. But the significance of the work in this case is not simply extended by its formal means, although this is possible in description and explanation. Rather the qualities as formal properties of the work are intrinsic to significant experience of the work.

10. 1. 5. *Discrimination, Interpretation, Judgment*

The capacity for discrimination develops in the education of aesthetic judgment as the apprehension and further (as the metacognitive part), understanding or appreciation of the role of these particular 'aesthetic,' as perceptual, and other features in constituting meaning. It is here that Searle's account is crucially relevant. We see things 'as' something and there is no mediating interpreting entity. Instead, perception is direct *and* informed by background capacities, both local and deep. Understanding and interpreting art as the 'expression of practical thought with materials'[16] is thus both an active and passive encounter, not one or the other.

So, in the reflexive relation between visual or perceptual experience of properties, features, or qualities in the work (and their unity or intensity for instance) on one side, and reflection on the meaning of the whole on the other, learning in aesthetics concerns the development of a cognitive, including perceptual, capacity for discrimination and appreciation[17]. Further, in this conscious reflexivity between perception and thought in aesthetics, there is a metacognitive aspect of aesthetic knowledge in epistemology. I take this up in the next chapter. From this discussion, largely attending on the second outcome in the maintenance of the aesthetic object, aesthetic knowledge develops, becoming a constitutive and in my view relevant part of background capacities in consciousness. And the role of pleasure in aesthetic experience requires some brief address.

From the account of aesthetics in this study and my inclusion of Searle's comment on the possibility of an aesthetic dimension of consciousness at the close of last chapter I

[16] From Harrison (1978, p. 184); in this study, see Chapter 5, n.19.

[17] It is also on this point that aesthetic judgments can be made regarding objects other than artworks, for instance concerning an aesthetic dimension in the experience of mathematics; see Chapter 4, *Aesthetics and Knowing*, including n. 16.

think the inclusion of pleasure/unpleasure as a dimension of conscious experiences begins to situate the aesthetic further. That is, the dimension of pleasure in the felt experience of all states constitutes an intrinsic aspect of conscious experience, whether it is given to attention or not. The experience of this aspect may refer or relate (and this is a hesitant claim and more an expression of interest), to an intrinsic discriminatory capacity functioning in consciousness[18]. I do claim, more easily, that aesthetics as a philosophical object provides some specific account of this aspect of pleasure in consciousness.

This first result draws on the study's account of aesthetics as well as consideration of the role of aesthetics in culture as a whole, and Searle's account of consciousness. From these together, I think the relevance and appropriateness of aesthetics in epistemology constitutes most effectively on the constraints of its particular practices. And from what I have said, I think my comments are inclusively relevant to the application of aesthetics in different environments or contexts, where there is interest in the kinds of experiences we have concerning aesthetic relations between form and content in the constitution of meaning.

In attending to the criticism of a narrow engagement with artworks, my discussion explicitly concerns depiction in artworks as a particular kind of artefact or object. So, I have only referred to aesthetic appreciation of nature. But in its practices, aesthetics conventionally includes this interest, including aesthetic concern with relations between natural and artefactual kinds (see Brown, 2005a). These relations, from advances in technology, will place aesthetics, along with ethics, as central in cultural discourse, in my view.

---

[18] Much of my hesitancy here concerns what is implied in the claim; that is, that such an aesthetic capacity as intrinsic to consciousness would be an irreducible aspect of our background capacities. This would be consistent in identifying the role of pleasure/unpleasure with the biological, as survival responses of attraction and avoidance on one hand and Searle's account of the 'colouring' agency of intentionality on this dimension of consciousness on the other, as roughly the distinction, I think, between deep and local background capacities respectively. See also, Chapter 4, n.60, on Kant's description of aesthetic judgment as being a uniquely human activity, as both animal and rational, and so being particular to the exercise of free will. Arguing against the notion of the aesthetic generally, culture theories have tended to claim there is nothing in the concept of aesthetic experience that is universal, or common to everyone; rather, it is considered a theoretical construct having more to do 18th Century European theories of taste. I do however disagree with this historicism.

From consideration of these issues, the study rejects the argument that aesthetics provides too narrow epistemological focus. Rather, I think, the constraints of aesthetics' practices are intrinsically valuable and indirectly instrumentally valuable. But this needs to be stated carefully. The character of artistic activity is both experimental and inherently worthwhile as productive of art. The role of aesthetics in this unique form of activity, in both its experimental aspect and purposiveness, also serves the increasing specialization of knowledge without excluding, but instead contributing to wider application in the production of new knowledge. Searle's account of consciousness, I claim as the first major result of the study, maintains the integrity of aesthetics as an epistemological object that is an importantly relevant presence in education.

10. 2. The Second Result of the Study

Maintaining the epistemological object of visual culture, the second result of the study provides explanation of the agency of culture and language in first-person experience. As with the first, this second result consists in three outcomes, proceeding in this case in relation to study of visual culture.

First, the study, from Searle's account demonstrates that the first-person character of mental states cannot be eliminated, but importantly here cannot be accounted for as a self-contained phenomenology separate in experience from the material world. Such accounts are reductive of the constitutive role of context or environment, including language, in subjective experience. Searle's explanation, in contrast to such reductions, provides philosophical support for the constitutive agency of culture in the ontology of conscious experience. So, from its account, the study provides consistency with visual culture's explanatory object.

Second, Searle's account provides a philosophically defended explanatory framework that extends the explanation of cultural agency in an epistemology of visuality. The first-person ontology of mental states cannot be accounted for by exclusion of social interaction. Rather, the network of intentionality and background capacities, including the capacity for collective intentionality, provide the necessary enabling conditions in

consciousness for the rational agency of a self or 'I' to make meaning. In subjective experience, culture and identity in this way are not separate. But, having the rational agency of an irreducible self, neither are cultural practices determinative, that is, eliminative of freedom of will.

So, the third outcome here substantially shares the final outcome from aesthetics, but with slightly different focus. From Searle's account, in consciousness the background as enabling conditions of conscious felt states constitutes an irreducible and real aspect of the operations of a self or 'I.' As this self or 'I,' we can voluntarily act on the basis of reasons. That is, from the capacity for practical reason, including background capacities, and having free will, cultural agency in consciousness does not causally determine the reasoned actions of the self or 'I.' Rather, the self is both free to act and enabled in operations by her or his representational interaction with the world, including shared meaning. And again, this third outcome largely provides the framework for reconciliation between existing oppositions in the concept of visuality, as the third major result of the study.

The set of these three outcomes, like the first major result, constitute the second major result of the study. And, attending on the explanation of visuality as cultural agency in constituting meaning, the appropriateness of visual culture in epistemology and from this, education, requires further address. In doing this, the study draws further on the account of consciousness from Searle.

10. 2. 1. *Discussion of Visual Culture in the Concept of Visuality*

The presence of visual culture in the visual arts and education, unlike philosophical aesthetics, is not explicitly longstanding. At present varying, still emergent, and even conflicting interests are still shaping that explanatory presence (Keifer-Boyd, Amburgy, and Knight, 2003, p. 44). This seems consistent with the conduct of any new epistemological entity. But importantly, visual culture typically does not have strong concern for independently specific practices relating visuality to a particular constraint of artefact or object kind. Instead, in its developing commitments there is strong interest in the exploration and understanding of the motivations constituting imagery, as an

ethics, or concern for the practical interests invested in representation generally (Costello and Willsdon, 2008).

In accounts from visual culture, representations or discourses proceed normatively, conventionalizing the production of meaning as interpretation (Keifer-Boyd, 2003, p. 315). So, expression of interest in representation here can be broadly taken to refer to any representation of discourses, as imagery, as well as the constraints of discourses, as power, in acts of interpretation or mental representation. The concern, broadly, lies in recuperating their relations. In visual culture, all representation, including that in mind as mental representation, is semiotically mediated, requiring an act of interpretation. And so, on this form of account representation of any kind, including perceptual experience, is a discursive act iterating conventions. I return to this later. But in this sense, drawing on Searle's account, the object of visual culture, is the activity of constraints, as culture or discourse, on seeing-*as*.

The presence of visual culture in epistemology is recent and disciplinary sources in art history and theory substantially anchor visual culture in academia. From the articulated rather than (typically) functionally separated aspect of visual culture's identity, criticism of aesthetics in visual culture in part defines the difficult relations between them as forms of enquiry. Emerging from art history and theory, visual culture adapts a specifically visual framework for explanation of the agency of discourse, as constitutive of first-person experience. Historical identification of aesthetics with the concept of disinterest in visual experience in a sense situates visual culture as an epistemological mirror, for the study of interests.

Ironically, deriving from the rejection of the concept of aesthetic disinterest, in visual culture there is criticism towards an absence of reflection on ethics in aesthetic discourse[19]. Motivating or practical interests constitute experience, these critics say, and so are always present but not self-evident to the beholder, in the appearances of the

[19] See Chapter 4, *Cognition and Sense in Aesthetic Experience*, on Shaftesbury's contribution to an ethics of seeing in the concept of aesthetic disinterest, as a form of impartiality; and Chapter 2, *The Problem with Philosophical Aesthetics* and *Revision of the Aesthetic* on visual culture criticism of disinterest in aesthetics.

works or imagery. The irony lies in the discursive eclipse of the ethical concerns driving the emergence of the concept of disinterest and its role in defining aesthetic experience[20].

So, prior and continuing art historical interest in aesthetics, as accounting the intrinsic qualities of art and imagery and contexts of appreciation extends, in some cases, but most frequently alternates in visual culture, to broader critical study of practices of representation. In doing this, visual culture attends on disclosing or recovering the unspoken or invisible mechanisms of exclusion in discourse. For this reason, explanatory concern in visual culture relates any object of experience to imagery, most typically understood loosely as text.

10. 2. 2. *The Relevance of Visual Culture in Contemporary Education*

Knowledge of art and the aesthetic develops in the context of cultural values that are learned (Bourdieu, 1993; Nochlin, 1999). In this way, experience of the arts is a cognitively informed, rather than a passively receptive activity (Falk, 1998). The representation of knowledge in educational contexts is particularly subject to enquiry into the values represented (Keifer-Boyd, 2003). In this attention, the practical role of social criticism is significant in effecting change. Visual culture's activity in secondary and tertiary education is consistent with wider social reflection on the agency of institutional practices (Keifer-Boyd, 2003, pp. 315-316). In the following section, as brief example consistent with the first result, I take the educational role of art institutions generally to highlight the social context of values and their transmission.

Concern for the role of aesthetic representation in the education of broader cultural values has led to significant revision of art museum practices and their place in the construction of knowledge (Hooper-Greenhill, 1999; 2000, p. 12). Institutionally, this revision proceeds from criticism of the "treatment of non-Western art and material culture" (Burkhart, 2006; quote from Jones, 1993, p. 201), and ideologies underlying cultural representations (Berlo et al, 1995; Ward, 1995). Analyses found for example, institutional discrimination in the representation of art on the basis of gender, race, and

[20] See Chapter 4, *Cognition and Sense in Aesthetic Experience*.

class[21]. The ongoing revision of discriminatory practices has reshaped the role of museums and galleries in art and education broadly (Hooper-Greenhill, 1999, 2000; Williams, 1996).

In the education of visuality, this cultural redefinition, including that of aesthetic judgment is an ongoing necessity in the programs of art museums and galleries (Williams, 1996). These institutions not only reflect the "mission of exposing the public to works of art in the hopes of developing and refining the aesthetic vision of individuals" (Stone, 1992). As well, they provide learning and interaction through the social association with civic life (Kwak et al, 2004). But importantly, the representation and interpretation of visual cultural objects in art and educational environments should include awareness of the meanings, locations, and stories or narratives underlying the cultural object's presence (Hooper-Greenhill, 2000). This provision for meaningful context as local narratives of cultural practices gives voice to the humanly particular as person or community, attending to what is not explicit in the form of the representation as artefact or imagery (MacDougall, 1997).

The presence of visual culture in education provides various approaches for, typically, enquiry into the contexts of, as constraints on, practices of representation. The historical conditions of the origin and reception of works demands, as Norman Bryson says, the acknowledgment of social difference[22]. In this way, visual culture epistemologically and so, educationally, challenges the cognitive neutrality of making meaning as visuality; it is in visual processes that we see things as we do. The effort in visual culture attends on opening the agency of cultural constraints in visual organization to ethical reflection (Keifer-Boyd, 2003, p. 317). From Searle's account, the aspect of familiarity structures conscious experience so we see something *as*- something and meanings are always already present in much of our social reality, as the purposefulness of objects. In the reproduction of social meanings, the automaticity of the goals and values we apply and attend on derives from the activity of relations of power.

---

[21] See for example: on gender, Kanatani and Prahbu (1996); Keifer-Boyd (2003); Nochlin (1999); Ward (1995); on race, see Boime (1990); Harris (2006); Pinder (Ed.), (2002); and on class, see Bourdieu (1989, 1993); Jones (1993, p. 203).

[22] See Chapter 2, *Background to Visual Culture in Visual Arts and Education*.

But argument in visual culture for the inclusion of accounts from biological sciences concerning the sensory or perceptual aspects of experience is also importantly relevant. Elkins says these provide further possibility for study of the biology of socialization[23]. In a practical way the inclusion, from this study, would strongly develop the identity of visual studies' educational and research programs. So, the interest is significant for the scope of visual studies. In Searle's discussion on the proper study of mind, as consciousness, the final guideline he includes "is that we need to rediscover the social character of the mind" (1994a, p. 248). The issue is taken up further in the third major result of this study.

10. 2. 3. *The Study of Imagery in Education*

Broadly, the epistemological presence of visual culture proceeds from a strong cultural shift in the way we understand and explain representation generally (see Crary, 1992; Jay, 1994). Conventionally, explanation of visual representation in the arts was most closely linked to the artistic production of artworks in studies of art history, criticism, and appreciation. But this has changed; in the 21st Century, the economic and creative (as innovation) convergence of arts, sciences, and technology is dramatic. For this reason, the role of the arts as a sphere of cultural production is also transforming. For example, common interests in innovation are consistent with increasing focus on the development and utilization of modeling technology that is, technology concerned with the visual and aesthetic representation of ideas (Emmer, 2005; Kemp, 2000, 2006). Global emphasis on visual technologies is expected to continue. There is strong economic motivation. There is for instance expectation of dramatic increase, in the billions of dollars, of global income from interactive games (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006).

The range of philosophical and ethical issues proceeding from these events constitute a substantial aspect of discourse across all the forums cited. The visual arts and design are consistently responsive to advances in technology (Keifer-Boyd, 1996; Kemp, 1990; Smith, 1995). And there is demand for creative reasoning and artistic content in the production of new technology (Druckery, 1996). Artistic and design intentions now

[23] See Chapter 3, *Conclusion*.

concern such intersections as art and biological and medical research, evident for example, in the "visionary" Ars Electronica Conferences (Stephen Wilson, 2003, p. 55). These intersections provide a forum for artists, scientists, and researchers to examine "the implosive tendencies that digital technologies impose on the world, bringing cultures on top of each other and flouting boundaries: national, material, technological and psychological" (Ars Electronica, 2005). Provision for the explanation of these concerns as artefacts and practices, including account of interests effecting social outcomes, in epistemology is critical. Visual culture discourse provides an explicit explanatory bridge across the range of these issues (Keifer-Boyd, 1996). Because the forms of its explanations enable consideration of intersecting and at times inconsistent values, visual culture's approaches to visuality are importantly relevant (pp. 37-38).

Like the broader social flux they describe, those approaches are still emergent (pp. 37-38). In part because of visual culture's pre- or proto- disciplinary quality in the analysis of social activity, the study's account from Searle extends to collective intentionality and explanation of the imposition of functions on objects of visual experience. The capacity for collective intentionality and Searle's description of the purposefulness of visual activity in applying social constraints on meaning are, I believe, relevant and can extend the explanatory framework of visual culture's discourse on these concerns[24].

The motivations for epistemology and from this art, and education broadly, to productively encounter the cultural shift in practices of representation are strong (p. 38). But it is increasingly apparent that disciplinary interests in isolation are insufficient to effect real innovation (Mitchell et al (Eds.), 2003). James Elkins' and others' descriptions of interdisciplinarity as central to visual culture's identity are apposite[25]. The production and reproduction of specialized knowledge is tested in the requirement to meaningfully apply knowledge across different contexts (Mitchell et al (Eds.), 2003).

---

[24] See Chapter 8, particularly *Further Distinctions in Intentional Phenomena* and its following account, including *Assignment and Imposition of Function*, *Distinction Between Agentive and Non-Agentive Functions* and *Assigning Intentionality as Further Distinction Among Agentive Functions*, including n.53.
[25] See Chapter 2, *Inter-*, *Multi-*, *Trans-*, or *Post-Disciplinarity*.

There is strong motivation for cross-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary application of knowledge. Diverse concerns in aesthetics, technology, visualization, and visual representation for instance, share interest in the relation between "mathematical and artistic points of view" (Emmer, 2005, p. xiii; see also Kemp, 2006). But the relation is not restricted to practical implementation of aesthetic solutions in technological innovation (Keifer-Boyd, 1996). Researchers say "on the theoretical level for example, visual information and its processing present a profound challenge to computer science and mathematics" (Nesetril, 2005, p. 39). And "this challenge revolves back to the aesthetics and perception of art itself" (p. 39).

The "processing of visual data is characterized by its vast complexity"[26] (p. 39). Increasingly, account of this complexity does not always sit comfortably within the explanatory conventions of any specific field. Alternately and equally interestingly, there is concern for exploring representations simultaneously within different disciplinary contexts. For instance, Martin Kemp, in his articles on art and science for the journal *Nature*, describes a series of "enigmatic" representations that "exploit a resonant series of visual and verbal associations" (2000, p. 146). The artworks' "ambiguities" appear "the very antithesis" of accounting science (p. 147). But, Kemp says, "we have seen repeatedly that science involves acts of creative looking at images that hover on the edge of illegibility" (p. 147). The artist "exploits conditions of visual and psychological indeterminacy" (p. 147). Likewise, the "modern astrophysicist is determined to master the uncertainty… even when indeterminacy itself is at the centre of the system" (p. 147).

From visual culture, in education and epistemology there are constraints on interpreting and integrating the many kinds of relevant meaning available in visuality, on two counts. First, it is insufficient to represent this innovation simplistically. Knowledge of artefacts requires understanding their local and broader motivational contexts as

[26] To illustrate the point, the density of information contained in computer generated imagery far surpasses that in the representation of textual information; "it is virtually impossible to run out of computer memory with a text, no matter how long" but "with digitized images it is easy to run out of memory" (Nesetril, 2005, p. 39).

practices[27]. On this problem, Searle's explanation of the role of background capacities and how they work in consciousness is helpful. Account of the role of local and deep background enables philosophically appropriate means for the explanation of practices, including their role in perception in visual culture[28]. Much of the intentional phenomena of meanings, understandings, interpretations and so on proceed from background capacities in consciousness as 'know-how'[29].

And second, advocates of visual culture in education say current epistemological mechanisms don't provide the best educational strategies for how the brain or mind in fact works, in relation to practices[30]. For explanation of visuality, the problem is both relevant and important. I take it up in the following discussion of interdisciplinarity as a central concern in visual culture[31].

10. 2. 4. *Cross-disciplinarity, Interdisciplinary, and Hybridity*

Developments in technology "have transformed working practices and modes of communication" (Harris, 1999, p. 3). This "cultural convergence of art, science and technology" situates art and design practices in a "time of cross-disciplinary ferment, collaboration, and intellectual confrontation" (Lovink, 2002, pp. x-xi). As well, artists are "cultural producers;" and many claim they "can create the strongest art by being critically aware of the social construction of meaning" (Stephen Wilson, 2003, p. 89). There is substantial rhetoric in relation to extra-, cross-, or post- disciplinarity. But in this, there are strongly relevant concerns for the production and reproduction of knowledge that put pressure on educational environments to adapt[32] (Mitchell et al, (Eds.), 2003).

---

[27] See Kemp, on interpreting imagery and the problem of "context" and the audience's "resulting expectations" (2000, quote from p. 146).

[28] See Chapter 9, particularly *Distinction Between Deep Background and Local Background*.

[29] See Chapter 9, particularly *The Background as Know-How*.

[30] See Chapter 2, particularly *The Problem With Knowledge as Discipline Based in Visual Culture*.

[31] The discussion draws on Chapter 2, *The Problem With Knowledge as Discipline Based in Visual Culture* and *Inter-*, *Multi-*, *Trans-*, or *Post-Disciplinarity*.

[32] The *Beyond Productivity: Information Technology, Innovation, and Creativity Report* from the U. S. National Research Council Committee of the National Academies (Mitchell et al, (Eds.), 2003), states that the relation between information technologies and creative practices (ITCP) "depends on opportunities for learning across multiple disciplines" (p. 4). Cross-disciplinary activities and support "is not easy;" the way in which colleges and universities "focus mainly on established disciplines" means

In discussion of visual culture as 'visual studies' in Chapter 3, I distinguish between varied interests in the identification of visual culture as the explanation of ideologies and what is described as visual studies' more general approach to the study of representation. The following study illustrates the relevance of this more general approach to cross-disciplinarity briefly, in description of an expert and novice working together on the interpretation of brain imagery: "brain images do not function as self-explanatory representations that simply support scientific reasoning and practices" (Alač and Hutchins, 2004, p. 632). That is, "despite the fact that MRI measurements are made visible, a great deal of interpretive work is required to render the visible images meaningful" (p. 632). The authors of the study employ "a variety of semiotic resources" to "analyze how representations of *messy* experimental data become organized, meaningful phenomena" in the interpretive processes of the actors[33] (p. 632).

The nature of visuality as equally inclusive of aesthetic and semiotic or social concerns is increasingly brought to bear on practices of education in different fields. The broader inclusion is necessary to multidisciplinary engagement for understanding the complexity of representation in contemporary practices (MacEachren, 2004, p. 1). Multimedia works, for instance, challenge boundaries between prior description of 'visual' and 'non-visual' learning, where "the combination of text, video and navigable space" can be used "to create "microworlds"" (Murray, 1998, p. 6). Contemporary relations between information technologies and creative practices "may constitute an important domain of research" that is intrinsically both "exploratory" and "transdisciplinary" (Mitchell et al, (Eds.), 2003, p. 9). Availability to "new points of view and new problems" is "ever-present in the arts and design" (p. 9). I briefly look at this interest in adaptation in relation to the development of information technologies (IT). In doing this, the discussion recovers some concerns for cross-disciplinary explanation of representation in epistemology and education.

---

that "cross-disciplinary programs that do exist vary widely in their institutional support, effectiveness, and quality" (p. 4). As with any professionals, there is need in the ITCP environment to be "deeply conversant" with the capacities and limits of IT; but this knowledge requires more than "training," since it also "demands an ability to understand tools and media critically, both culturally and historically" (p. 4).

[33] Importantly, in studying the interpretive processes of the actors, the researchers reject locating "all cognitive processes inside the head of individual actors;" rather they study "gesture as a feature" of cognitive activity, or "action as cognition" (Alač and Hutchins, 2004, pp. 656-657).

The historical and contemporary disposition in the arts for adaptation to emergent technologies lends itself to art and design "perspectives on tools and applications" for the "needs of other kinds of IT users" (p. 9). This is seen for example, in the "design and implementation of sensor systems, distributed control systems and actuators, generative processes and virtual reality" as well as networks such as the Internet (p. 9). Artistic and design interests provide new opportunities for interactivity, including "exploring human-machine interaction" (p. 9). Conversely, computer sciences research challenges artists and designers to reconsider their "established assumptions and practices" (p. 10). The "flexibility" of artistic and design purposes "parallels the plasticity of the computer itself" (p. 9). Some of the "joint outcomes" of the increasing interdisciplinarity may be evidenced in such areas as "augmented reality, tangible computing, lifelike computer animation… and user-centred evaluation of computer systems" (p. 10).

But this interdisciplinary work cannot be reductive of the constraints on particular fields or knowledge (p. 10). In order to generate significantly "interesting new questions" of the relation between IT and creative practices (ITCP) it is important to deeply understand both IT *and* the arts and design (p. 10). The explanation of visuality concerns how we make meaning from what we see. The role for accounts of visuality is developing from the increasing requirement for multiple modes of explanation of representation, including its ethical constraints, in different arenas that require or invite collaboration. Arts oriented researchers extend beyond "more narrowly focused technological" contexts into the less obvious "cultural, social, ethical, and methodological questions" (p. 10). The advent of digital media and its computational and network requirements is "fundamentally different" from earlier technologies, requiring theorists to "strive to create new models of commentary that consider more than consumption or spectatorship" (Lunenfield, 1999, p. xix). An "intimate understanding of how these media are created and work" begins to "get at the constraints of practice particular to these new media"[34] (p. xix).

[34] Forms such as painting and architecture possess "stability;" but digital media and their environments have more "mercurial qualities" which we can conceptualize rather as "somehow evanescent, like theatrical performances or dance recitals (Lunenfield, 1999, p. xx).

In support of revising approaches to his field, Alan MacEachren says multidisciplinary engagement is necessary for understanding the complexity of visual representation[35] (2004, p. 1). The representational aspects of maps, for example, mean there are "important links between cartography and a variety of cognate fields" (p. 1). Linked cognate fields MacEachren nominates are "art, cognitive science, sociology, cognitive and environmental psychology, semiotics, and even the history and philosophy of science" (p. 1). MacEachren says "it makes more sense to consider complimentary *artistic and scientific approaches* to studying and improving maps, both of which can be applied to any given cartographic problem" (p. 9).

I distinguish linked approaches, such as MacEachren engages, from notional integration. The latter concept raises issues of loss of field specificity. There are problems with reduction in integration; resource pressures in academic institutions, for instance, can exploit interdisciplinary activity[36]. The concept of multi-disciplinarity requires specialization and includes concern with bridging concepts in communication between modes of explanation[37] (Mitchell et al (Eds.), 2003, p. 5). The difficulty in epistemology of linking specialized approaches is significant, but so are the requirements for such approaches (MacEachren, 2004; Mitchell et al (Eds.), 2003).

10. 2. 5. *Approaching New Forms of Meaning*

The definitional fluidity of visual culture's object stems, I think, in part from the requirement on scholarship to deal constructively with the challenges discussed. That is, the variation in visual culture's identified interests is consistent, in my view, with concern for the emerging range of interpretive issues in an epistemology of representation. From this study, visual culture is an 'approach,' most typically taken up within the further context, and in the best accounts, particular constraints of an object[38]. So, there is effort to apply values to what may be ephemeral or emergent phenomena under description. This form of practice revises from more typical disciplinary

[35] In 2004, Professor of Geography and Director of the GeoVISTA Center at Pennsylvania State University.
[36] See Chapter 2, *Visual Cultural Identity*.
[37] As exemplar of this approach, see Kemp (2006).
[38] On the extension of the term 'object' including explanation of the intentionality brought to bear on artefacts, see Michael Baxandall (1985), particularly Chapter 1.

enterprise in which there are more consistent constraints on the study of particular sustaining phenomena.

Such an approach as a new form of practice produces, it seems, both an advantage and a problem. Account of all phenomena *as* semiotic in the most characteristic approach of visual culture, for instance, enables continuity of explanatory means across study of different entities. But the approach also risks a reductiveness towards what Mitchell refers to as the excess, plenitude, or density of imagery[39]. Elkins also identifies the risk of reducing the irrationality, opacity, and unruliness of art to sign systems; in doing this, "semiotics (and linguistic models in general) may appear more as simplifications than as adequate models" (1998, pp. xii-xiii).

But also in visual culture there is argument against assimilating new practices to prior means of explanation[40]. I take this to suggest, "new commentaries need justification less than they require the kind of logic and style we demand of serious discourse on anything else" (Lunenfield, 1999, p. xiv). The argument is revealing. At its best, this discourse seeks to "sacrifice neither rigor nor sense" (p. xiv-xv). And importantly, at the same time, understanding new or digital media for instance, is to counterintuitively "embrace ambivalence" (p. xiv) and the "contradiction of thought" (p. xviii). From the introductory sections to Chapter 5, I don't think this approach to accounting artistic production, in encountering ambiguity, is in any way new (see Empson, 1961). But the forms of the objects and globalization of the activities of their production and distribution are. Without conflating the "digital with the dialectic," this dialectical or dialogical approach grounds "the insights of theory in the constraints of practice" (Lunenfield, 1999, pp. xv-xix).

Searle's account of background capacities in consciousness is non-reductively consistent with visual culture's explanation of visuality as the practices by which we make meaning from culture. I make a further claim that I mean to be non-reductive: in its effort to recover the implied in the ostensive, visual culture provides an

[39] See Chapter 2, *Disciplinary Identity and Objects of Knowledge*.
[40] See Chapter 2, generally and *Theoretical Background* in particular.

epistemologically interesting relation, rather than conflict, with aesthetics in the study of artefacts (see for example, Kemp, 2006). The remaining part of discussion, as the final chapter of this study concerns exploring that relation.

10. 3. Conclusion

From earlier, practices in aesthetics include interest in depiction. In discussion of depiction in this chapter, the development of discrimination in aesthetic judgment provides relevant means for knowledge applying to artistic artefacts and more generally, but importantly, to other phenomena. And, in the development of aesthetic judgment, there is particular concern for perceptual responses to the properties, features, or qualities of objects and their arrangement in constituting aesthetic and further meaning. The knowledge of interest to visual culture concerns, broadly speaking, the recovery of constraints on such representations in the cognitive content of perception, for ethical review.

In significant ways the two approaches, as lines of enquiry, vary and the study's structure attempts to convey their individual integrity. But taken together, and non-reductively of each approach to practice, the scope of aesthetics' and visual culture's variations in the explanation of art and imagery can be immensely productive in understanding visuality. From this focus, and drawing on Searle's account of perception as direct and cognitive, I think there is a significant relation to be found between aesthetics and visual culture that reconciles their current opposition. In this reconciliation, I characterize their objects of interest converging broadly as the 'sense' of meaning.

Chapter 11
Discussion of the Third Outcome of the Study

11. Introduction

The third outcome of the study is an appropriate unification of oppositions in the extension of visuality in visual arts and education explanation, from Searle's account of consciousness as qualitative unified subjectivity. From this study of his work, the opposed explanations of visuality can find philosophically accountable consistency *between* their objects. The explanatory power of visuality as a concept, I believe, lies in reconciling the explanations of subjectivity in aesthetics and visual culture discourse, while maintaining the uniqueness of their epistemological interests.

The fact of consistency or integration between the opposing accounts is evident, from Searle's account, in the unity of operations in consciousness of a reasoning agent or self, as 'I.' This irreducible 'I,' as the unified state of an embodied agent having the capacity for voluntary rational action in their interactions with the world, provides the framework for discussion of the third outcome of the study. This integration opens a different approach to the study and explanation of visuality. Accounting for this reconciliation, as the study's further interpretation of results, provides the final outcome of the study. Preliminary to this discussion, the following sections outline the study's concerns with current accounts.

11. 0. 1. *Current Approaches to Understanding Visuality*

The hypothesis of the study is that there can be reconciliation of oppositions in accounts of visuality. The motivation for this hypothesis concerns the explanatory limits, defined as bifurcations of different kinds between self and world, on visual culture's and aesthetics' accounts of subjectivity. In both visual culture and aesthetics, the explanation of subjectivity most representatively derives from relativism of some kind, as for instance, social (re)constructionism, strong perspectivism, or constructivism. In these forms of relativist commitment, there is no immediate access to the world

independent of language and proceeding from this, the world exists relative to a point view.

Roughly, from these accounts, two concerns dominate the motivations for these commitments. First, strongly in visual culture accounts, there is ethical concern to enable explanatory frameworks for the representation of difference as identity. And, opposing this value, vested relations of power subsume actual differences in the normative agency of 'objective' discourses, such as those from science. There is scepticism in visual culture, and postmodernist discourse generally, for the concealment or non-disclosure of interests, as power, in axiomatic truth claims. Second, in arts and education, there is concern with the derailment of subjectivity as a diminished value in epistemology, particularly deriving from the influence of behaviourism in the 20th Century. The significant role of mental states as qualitative, first-person experience in the making, understanding, and appreciation of art is an enduring but rather tested commitment in arts education (Eisner, 1996). The literal price of this commitment is represented in accounts from educators on the economic value attached to education in the sciences compared with education in the arts (2002, pp. 27-28).

But, the means by which both visual culture and aesthetics proceed with their concern, as explanation, provides a particular problem in education that I think intensifies the value distinction between the arts as subjective and sciences as objective[1]. From strong relativism, the epistemological arena of visual arts education most typically commits to explanation based in rejection of immediate causal relations between the world and self, as perceptual access to real phenomena. The rejection of realism, among its many effects, divides mind in education between scientific approaches to the world, on one side, and artistic and cultural approaches, on the other[2]. This epistemological schism in arts and the education of students is I think, deeply problematic. The "dichotomies

[1] From the U. K. ('Robinson') Report: *All Our Futures*: there is a "tendency" for debate in education "to be expressed as a series of exclusive alternatives, even dichotomies: for example as a choice between the arts or sciences" and "between academic standards or creativity" (NACCCE, 1999, p. 9).

[2] On the affective/intellectual division that does "not do justice either to the children or to the society" see Eisner (1996, pp. 23-24); on sciences/arts division in education, see NACCCE (1999, pp. 82-83); and on problems with the conceptual rejection of objectivity from the humanities in research universities, see Searle (1993a).

between arts and sciences have deeply affected our systems of education and helped forge popular stereotypes of artists and scientists" as excluding identities (NACCCE, p. 83). There are reasons for the problem but it needs to be addressed another way. To explain why, I turn to some distinctions Searle's account attends to.

11. 0. 2. *Realism and Relativism in Epistemology*

To begin, considering the motivations for the rejection of realism is important. In the accounts of aesthetics and visual culture there is genuine concern for explanatory reductions in epistemology. By general account, modeling on the sciences can make explanation in the arts as an approach to knowledge difficult, without being helpful. Particularly, the interest in laws covering behaviour as generalizations in the natural sciences does not fit with explaining the idiosyncrasy of cultural practice[3]. On Mitchell's and Martin Jay's accounts for example, the constraints seem like a demand for a 'view from nowhere'[4]. In contrast to sciences, the arts are essentially concerned with representing, in some form, the particularity of intentional activity as a perspective on the world. So, both accounts of visuality in this study hold strong concern for realism as a behaviourist positivism or strict methodological empiricism[5].

But, from Searle's account, arguing that knowing reality directly requires that it be known from no point of view is an unjustified assumption. Rather, it is an important

---

[3] See Baxandall on the ongoing debate between nomological (as causal terms covered by general laws) and teleological (as the actor's purposefulness) explanatory modes of human actions in the arts (1985, p. 12).

[4] See Chapter 2, *Perspectivalism, Strong Relativism, Anti-Realism*. Defining the expression, in *The View From Nowhere*, Thomas Nagel says both subjectivity and objectivity "are necessary" to explanation (1989, p. 5). Objectivity "is both underrated and overrated, sometimes by the same persons;" that is, "it is underrated by those who don't regard it as a method of understanding the world as it is in itself," and "it is overrated by those who believe it can provide a complete view of the world on its own, replacing the subjective views from which it has developed" (p. 5). Nagel says "these errors are connected" in that "they both stem from an insufficiently robust sense of reality and of its independence of any particular form of human understanding" (p. 5).

[5] The argument over differences in accounts from the natural sciences and arts and social sciences is longstanding but not always clear over what is debated; and "we should be very suspicious of the terms" in which the debate "is traditionally posed," (Searle, 2002a, p. 131). Contrary to common assumption, Searle says, "explanations in the natural sciences do not universally employ the covering law form" (p. 131). For example explanations of brain function (in the texts he has read), "are indeed causal, but they do not appeal to covering laws" (p. 131). For Searle's description of "some of the *actual* differences" between the explanatory modes, see (2002a, pp. 132-140).

constraint on epistemology that all representation is from a point of view[6]. The point is crucial to understanding that the representation of different points of view, or the particular aspectual shape of knowledge, maintains in realist explanation. Realism is not reductive to a 'view from nowhere' (Nagel, 1989). From Searle's account, states of consciousness are ontologically subjective; they are real, having a mode of existence that enables understanding of them, as those subjective states[7]. The first-person character of conscious states is not however, accessible to behavioural explanation in the same way as other natural phenomena[8].

Searle's work describes epistemic means for exploration and explanation of those states as real phenomena and the causal role of intentionality in reasoned behaviour without reduction[9]. The appearances of things are meaningful. Study and account of those states of appearances in conscious experience is the disciplinary focus of aesthetics in particular and visual culture generally, as part of visuality. In science research, conventionally the negotiation with objectivity as an approach to knowledge is the attempted elimination of appearances in explaining behaviour. But study of consciousness in the sciences now seeks to address this constraint to enable exploration of the appearances of mental states. The change is interesting and, in this instance, can be helpful to arts explanation.

So, explanation in the sciences is negotiating this shift in approach. The arts, however, still tend towards the presupposition of incommensurable ontological differences between the physical and mental[10]. From the traditional rejection of appearances as real

---

[6] See Chapter 6, *Realism and Truth*.

[7] As epistemically objective or subjective depending on the representation; see Chapter 6, *Distinctions Between the Ontological Sense and Epistemic Sense of Objectivity and Subjectivity*.

[8] See Chapter 6, *Traditional Epistemic Modeling and the Subjectivity of Conscious States*.

[9] See Chapter 8, The Capacity for Representation in Consciousness, particularly n.24, concerning mentalistic explanation.

[10] On Searle's account of the debate between positivism and interpretivism; he says, the "positivist tradition" argues that since "the physical world is the only world," those "models of explanation that are appropriate to physics and chemistry" are appropriate "to the rest of science;" otherwise the validity of explanation is itself undermined (2002a, p. 131). Alternately, "in the interpretivist tradition" Searle says there is "often the implied claim" that "some special mental (human, social) facts have a different sort of ontology from the ontology of physics and chemistry" (p. 131). Although rarely made explicit in argument, Searle regards the "basic metaphysical dispute between materialism and dualism" as "one of the underlying motivations for the persistence" of debate between the two traditions (p. 131). Searle says

phenomena and different objects of interest, there is relevant epistemological contrast between the explanatory modes of sciences and the arts. But there is no necessary sense in which realism diminishes explanation in the arts. Rather, from Searle, consciousness is both biological, as neurophysiological and irreducibly mental as the first-person qualitative aspect of experience. On these terms, Searle's realist account provides the necessary safeguard for nonreduction in the explanation of art and culture.

The safeguard is necessary. Accounting for human practices requires some understanding of the role of subjective states in reasoned action (Harrison, 1978). It is here the anxiety towards any reductive description of consciousness in the arts concerns a deeper problem in epistemology generally: confusing the limits of language with the boundaries of rationality in consciousness. The Western intellectual tradition has a history of dichotomy between feeling and reason, or rationality. Broadly, extra-linguistic aspects of representation fall outside description of the rational and so, reductively, outside rational constraints as nonrational. The difficult middle ground in epistemology between the actual role of felt states in practices and accounting for reasoned behaviour has proven deeply problematic for explanation of the arts and their representation in education and research[11]; there is the perception of a polarization between the two (Eisner, 1992a, 1992c).

There remains some investment in this dichotomy in the arts. Some rationality (traditionally) attributes to the role of the beholder in the development of judgment. But in visual arts and education, there is still widespread rejection of the constraint of rationality as extraneous to the explanation of their practices of production (Best, 1992). This often tacit rejection reinforces the concept of artistic activity as deriving from an intuitive disposition. The ongoing cost of polarization between feeling and reason is

---

that in the "crudest and most polemical forms" of the debate "the interpretivists see the empiricists as crass philistines" and "empiricists see interpretivists as muddle-headed sentimentalists" (p. 131).

[11] Eisner says, "unfortunately, cognition is often narrowly conceived" and "perhaps nowhere does this problem stand out more clearly than when cognition is contrasted with affect" (1996, p. 20). The "cognitive and affective are all too often regarded as distinct and independent states of the human organism" (p. 20). And "if such distinctions were simply theoretical conveniences, they might not cause as much practical mischief," but "the mischief stems from the fact that the distinctions are reified and practically applied" (p. 20).There is the additional value reduction of the practical activity of art in the longstanding denigration of practical reason cf. theoretical reason in education; see Chapter 5, *Artistic Virtuosity and Representation*; for further, see Brown (2004).

high for the arts in epistemology, however (see Urmacher and Matthews (Eds.), 2005). Attending to the role of feeling in explanation, as artistic motivation's intuitive aspect, is necessary. But in centralizing this aspect, to the exclusion of the role of practical reasoning, explanations largely proceed from a presupposition of irrationality or variation from norms of general intelligence in some form[12]. Attributions tend to either mystify the relation or, from the 20th Century, address it within the constraints of psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious. The study has described some difficulties that can occur with both frameworks of explanation[13].

In arts and education, the problem as it stands offers no genuine way out. Argument for art as an intuitive and nonrational activity is contrary to sustaining a meaningful role in education (see Best, 1992). But, conforming description of art to ruled procedures is a poor compromise (Eisner, 2002). This study makes the point that it is also wrong; in the activities of making, understanding, and appreciating art and imagery, these practices and their attending background states cannot (or should not) be systematized or explained as rule described or governed (see Chapter 9, *Theoretical Analysis of the Background* as well as Chapter 8, n.39.). In the third alternative to emerge, there is argument for adapting art explanation to the constraints of institutional preference for language in education (see Duncum, 1993). While the point of addressing both visual and linguistic aspects of art more coherently in education is importantly relevant, this manoeuvre risks reducing artistic to linguistic practices, most typically articulated as literacy issues[14].

11. 0. 3. *The Explanation of Practices*

The problem for the arts lies in the revision of language needed to meet the fact and nature of consciousness. In this, the problem is the same for the sciences. From Searle's

---

[12] See Chapter 4, particularly *The Artistic Mind as Beyond Analysis*, *The Artistic Mind as Special*, and *The Artistic Mind as Pathology*.

[13] See Chapter 4, *Subjectivity in Artistic Identity*.

[14] The comments here reference the necessity (in my view) of committing to a more coherent approach to verbal and visual aspects of art in teaching and learning, with brief discussion further on. But the problem requires the scope of a separate enquiry; this study attends on the preceding conditions for such an account. See James Elkins for helpful discussion, including criticism, of "visual literacy" (2003, pp. 125-195). I suggest that any description of learning about art under the terms 'literacy' will arrive at reduction. See also Chapters 4 and 5 (particularly *Representation and Depiction* and following sections) of this study on distinctions between artistic forms and language.

account, consciousness is irreducibly biological and mental and its causal relations cannot be accounted for in terms of classical mechanics. So, I don't think the revision is easy – it challenges our explanations, and conceptions, of how and why people do things. The tendency for mechanistic explanation of all events is deeply entrenched in epistemology for a reason. In accounting for mind as both biological *and* mental, the proliferation of causally relevant phenomena in explanation is difficult to encounter. Explaining the mental is not amenable to values of theoretical parsimony.

But, language develops and revises in context. Implicit throughout this study, explanation in the arts, including the visual arts, provides significant epistemic resources in accounting for the first-person qualitative aspects of mental states. Also, current research in the sciences attempts to address traditional epistemological limitations on study of mind. The distinction between feeling and reason is no longer typically reduced to a dichotomy. The study of conscious phenomena as subjectivity is increasingly important in research (Chalmers, 2004; Edelman and Tononi, 2001; Koch, 2004a; Searle, 1998a). But so far, the "methods for gathering first-person data are quite primitive compared with (the sciences') methods of gathering third-person data" (Chalmers, 2004, p. 1117, parentheses added).

In art and education, from this study, approaches to visuality constitute visual arts practices. As thinking about and making art and imagery, the reasoning involved is practical or goal-directed, even where the values applied may be non-instrumental. The explanation of goal-directed reasoning in action increasingly propels research in cognitive science. With the caveat of ontological irreducibility of consciousness as both biological and mental, I think this enquiry is relevant to the study's final outcome[15]. So, the third result approaches the revision of visuality from Searle's explanation in the context of three related concerns with practical reason: first, the development of identity as relations between the self or 'I' and knowledge; second, the integration of knowledge as how we make meaning; and third, the adaptation of knowledge in practice.

[15] In this study I have attended quite extensively to concerns with research from cognitive science that is reductive of mental states. The following material derives from work in a variety of cognitive sciences, for example psychology and neuro studies; and as is the case throughout the study, the researchers may hold different views of mind to Searle. So, the constraint is worth repeating, as a caveat.

Organizing the discussion in this way, the three concerns indicate a set of constraints on the opposed accounts from visual culture and aesthetics and so provide the framework for revision of visuality from Searle's account.

11. 1. The Embodied Unity of 'I' and the Self's Practical Interest in Knowledge

From Searle, in choosing, deciding, initiating, and sustaining action on the basis of reasons, there must be a self having cognitive and volitive, including conative, capacities[16]. Having these, conscious experience is unified in a first-person perspective and human consciousness operates as a self or 'I.' In attempting to explain this irreducible self in scientific terms, neuroscientists describe human brains as "extraordinary integrative devices" (Tononi et al, 1998, p. 474).

The necessarily subjective feeling of consciousness involves "the sense that a given stimulus is being perceived in a personal perspective; the sense that the stimulus is 'owned' by the organism involved in the perceiving;" and, Antonio Damasio says, "last but not least, the sense that the organism can act on the stimulus (or fail to do so), that is, the sense of 'agency'"[17] (1998, p. 1880). An essential part of that sense of self as a continuity, Searle says, is memory[18]. Through memory, including a continuous updating representation of the states and structure of the body, the gradual development of a sense of self "places mental contents in an individual perspective" conferring ownership and providing a sense they can be acted on (p. 1880).

The unity of consciousness required in order for this self or 'I' to initiate reasoned actions provides the first constraint on the revision to visuality from current aesthetic and visual culture accounts. There is discourse in visual culture of the absence of unity, as a de-centred self, or fragmented and multiple identities[19]. The study finds this is, at best, descriptive means for accounting the sense of self. But this device cannot account

---

[16] See Chapter 7, *The Gap and the Irreducibility of Self*, including n.28.

[17] This does not mean that the sense of self or subjectivity that is characteristic of consciousness is necessarily generated simply by the interaction of a behaving organism with its environment; that is, "there can be a substance of mind without the trait of consciousness" (Damasio, 1998, p. 1880).

[18] See Chapter 7, *The Gap and the Irreducibility of Self*, particularly n.27.

[19] See Chapter 3, *Subjectivity/Subjectivities.*

for the integrative requirements on the operations of human consciousness, as the self. The study also provides some description of theories of strong modularity of mind because of their influence in visual arts education, particularly in explanations of artistic disposition[20]. This study also finds, from Searle and other accounts, those views cannot explain the required informational integration in our capacity for rationality[21]. In non-pathological cases or typically, coherent integration of information occurs between functionally specialized groupings of neurons and highly interactive elements of the brain; and this interaction is necessary "to guide adaptive behavior" (Tononi et al, 1998, p. 474).

This interaction and integration is requisite for adapting behaviour to the practical requirements of the 'I' in context. For instance, "people make countless decisions every day, ranging from ones that are barely noticed and soon forgotten" to "others that are highly consequential" (LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2005, p. 243). To act on those decisions, choices proceed from *perception* to *interpretation* of the constraints, as possible "moves" based "on the best available assessment" of the situation (Ericsson, 2003, p. 106). The recalling of other choices, or memory of prior "moves" is a constituting aspect of this activity (p. 106).

From Searle, the organization of the 'I' or self as a unified field of consciousness is critical. Damasio says the "integrated and unified scene that characterizes the conscious mind will require massive local and global signalling of populations of neurons across multiple brain regions;" that is, the required neural activity involved occurs in "separate but interconnected brain regions" (Damasio, 2000, p. 335). One example of the complex associative networks guiding this capacity in brain function concerns interactivity between cognition and emotion. Neurophysiologists describe extensive interaction between brain structures specialized for emotion and those systems linked to cognition and awareness (Phelps, 2004).

---

[20] Chapter 4, *The Artistic Mind as Special*.

[21] See Chapter 5, *Modularity and the Reasoning Mind*; and from Searle's account, Chapter 7, *Intentionality and Rationality*.

Traditionally in cognitive science, the role of emotion in cognition has not been thought significant (p. 1013). In part, this can be attributed to the specialized neural systems supporting each function (p. 1013). However, researchers now conclude that, "separation between emotion and cognition seems artificial when one is trying to understand everyday human function in a social environment" (p. 1013). The self as a unified 'I' has cognition and volition, and so includes both perception and memory, and the capacity for affect and emotion in operations. And, in relation to learning, the interpretation of events is critical. There is evidence that both symbolic means (language) and cognitive strategies modulate emotional reactions "in a range of circumstances," including for example, fears generated through imagination (pp. 1008-1013). Imagination here can be usefully understood in the sense of mental acts that attempt to bridge the relation between the world as an agent believes it to be (as cognitive) and the world as the agent desires it to be (as volitive)[22] (Currie, 1995).

In Searle's explanation of the operations of the self, having freedom of will, there are causal relations between the reasons we have for actions and the voluntary actions we take. And there are also, necessarily, causal gaps between our reasons for doing things and the actions that follow[23]. So, in deliberating, we choose among possible courses of action as conscious effort and can act on the basis of reasons[24]. An area of research in the neurosciences concerning reasoned action investigates relations between behaviour, cognition, and physiological structures in the central nervous system of the human body. For example, ideomotor models of action are of interest in understanding the nature of practices and processes of learning. They are concerned with such characteristics of experience as the mental representation of action, willed action, and implementing correct action (Grafton and Ivry, 2004, p. 444).

Ideomotor models of these relations provide understanding of actions arising from internal or mental operations (p. 441). On ideomotor models, the formalization of a goal

---

[22] See Searle on the pattern of formal relations (of conditions of satisfaction) of intentional states under the familiar distinctions of cognition and volition (2004b, p. 170); in this study, see Chapter 8, *Intentionality as Representation* and its following sections, particularly n.19.
[23] See Chapter 7, *Consciousness, the Self, and Voluntary Action*.
[24] See also Chapter 7, *Consciousness, the Self, and Voluntary Action*.

causally participates in determining the action. That is, in goal-directed or practical reasoning we want do things because we have reasons for doing those things and this intention provides motivation to work out how to accomplish the goal[25]. So, working backwards, the means to achieve or implement the goal is mentally constructed after determining the desired goal. A recent "outgrowth" in ideomotor theories is simulation theory[26] (p. 444). Here, "action and cognition overlap" because the mental states that represent actions *simulate* processes associated with executing that action (p. 444). Knowledge of actions occurs through reference to manifested actions, or actions that are observed.

11. 1. 1. *The Self and Others in Action*

As the activities of mind, goal states are difficult to investigate. But functional imaging (*f*MRI) studies relating to mental imagery have demonstrated an "overlap in activation patterns for real, observed and imagined movements" (p. 444). Consistent with simulation theory, a class of neurons, "mirror neurons" has been discovered in monkeys and the existence of an equivalent system demonstrated in humans (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Related to purpose or intention, these neurons activate when specific goal-related action is observed. There is evidence that "every time we are looking at someone performing an action, the same motor circuits that are recruited when we ourselves perform that action are concurrently activated" (p. 495). Imagining, in this context, functions to put oneself 'in the shoes' of another. This whole of state relation between actor and observer-actor indicates mirror neurons "could provide the basis for the abstract representation of goals" (Frith and Frith, 1999, p. 1694).

---

[25] But see also Chapter 7, *Consciousness, the Self, and Voluntary Action* on the gaps between the intentional states and choosing to act: as forward-looking and backward-looking; between the deliberation and the decision, or formation of prior intention; the gap between the prior intention and initiation of action; and the gap between the intention in action and the completion of a complex activity.

[26] Simulation theory (ST) consists in a family of theories of mind that are debated, having divergent accounts among proponents and those who reject ST; simulation theory "is said to contrast with theory-theory" (TT) that is, "the belief that we understand people's psychological states by appealing to a psychological theory" (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, p. 50). Broadly, Norman Freeman says, "TT is intellectualist in that emphasis is put on the child's own theory of mind" (as a "theory through which children are held to filter psychological evidence"); ST alternately "is grounded in a consideration of pre-reflective practical intelligence plus a competence at imagining what can be seen or done in situations" (1995, p. 68). ST "is in the early stages of consolidation" (p. 68).

From Searle's work, the capacity for collective, or *we*- intentionality is irreducible and presupposes a background sense of others having a similar awareness that you are an agent having self like them. There is strong interest in the cognitive sciences on this issue. Vittorio Gallese says "the capacity to code the 'like me' analogy between self and others constitutes a basic prerequisite and a starting point for social cognition"[27] (2003, p. 517). The explanation of mental representation integrating with sensorimotor and other biological states so far requires an irreducible relation in self to others having like states. The studies on mirror neurons suggest simulative brain states from the learner's perceptual activity, maintaining through visual relation with an experienced performer, as like other, provide a means for engaging and developing particular knowledge of the world. The research, consistent with Searle's account to my knowledge, indicates that the intentionality involved critically integrates with the intentionality of like others as a sociobiological aspect of consciousness.

So, to summarize the first constraints on revising the concept of visuality: in order to act deliberately on the basis of reasons, there is the critical requirement for a self or 'I' in the operations of a human consciousness; this unified state of self occurs as massive global brain activity between specialized and integrative neuron populations; the integration enables and guides adaptive behaviour. Memory as continuity is crucial to the role of self in operation. This capacity for, and integration of perception, memory, affect, and emotion in consciousness enable action, cognition, and volition to overlap and typically (in nonpathological states), the self has freedom of will. In the experience of events, there is a bridging between beliefs, desires, and other mental states of the self in relations with the world; and there is a gap between reasoning and actions, as causally insufficient conditions to determine choices. But people also do things because

[27] The capacity for the self or subjectivity of an agent to relate to a like other "is one of the most controversial topics within the ongoing debate in the cognitive sciences;" but is progressively gaining "the center of the stage" (Gallese, 2003, p. 517). This is because, Gallese says, "more and more scholars are experiencing a growing sense of discomfort with respect to the heuristic value of accounts of human cognition exclusively focusing on a solipsistic, monadic dimension" (p. 517). So "interpersonal relations are the focus of many different disciplines such as neuroscience, cognitive and developmental psychology, philosophy of mind, and psychiatry;" "*imitation*, *empathy*, and *mind-reading* denote, among others, different levels and modes of interaction by means of which individuals establish meaningful bonds with others" (p. 517). I am drawing from the work of Gallese, Chris Frith, and Uta Frith on these issues, as a relevantly representative sample of studies in neurophysiological or embodied states of social cognition in self, in relation to Searle's account of collective intentionality.

they have reasons for doing them. Crucially, there is a basic or irreducible capacity in consciousness to represent in self a direct felt relation with other like selves. From this capacity, an 'I' shares in embodied ways the sense of 'what it feels like' to be a self.

This discussion of practices identifies the first set of constraints on a different approach to visuality from Searle's account. Revising here, from current representations of subjectivity in visual culture and aesthetics, concerns the self and the unity of its operations including relations between self and others in the world. The fragmentation of identity in poststructural discourse plays an epistemological role in articulating various kinds of conflict. But it poorly explains the actual mode of visuality, including the self's or learner's operations, as 'I.' And the account contrasts with aesthetics' longstanding characterization of self as separate in kind from the world. From this first set of constraints, mind as self or 'I' is a unity of conscious states and further, unified with the world. From this unity, feeling and reason are not separate and we have the background capacity to share the 'what it is like' with others.

11. 2. The Integration of Knowledge as How We Make Meaning

The second set of constraints on the revision to visuality from Searle's account also concern the explanation of practices. In this case, the discussion looks at how we make meaning in the practical operations of a conscious self. Searle says that mentalistic explanations are about semantic, or intentional content guided phenomena. That is, the behaviour is trying to realize the conditions of satisfaction of that state[28]. So, it is important to remember that what is under description has different explanatory requirements to those of rule-described or rule-governed phenomena. This study has noted there are accounts in the cognitive sciences that explain some mental phenomena under these second set of terms; but, these do not explain the rationality of human action constrained by a clear notion of what constitutes a mental event.

[28] See Chapter 8, *Intentionality as Representation* and its following sections; and *Causal Self-Referentiality* and *Metaphorical or As-If Attribution of Unconscious Mental States*, particularly n.24.

To understand Searle's account in the context of revising the concept of visuality in art and education, the following discussion looks at 'what it is like' to make meaning, as an aspect of practical reason. To do this, from the study of aesthetics, use of metaphor is a way to negotiate uncertainty in representation. To look at making metaphor as a capacity in reasoning provides some understanding of thinking, or in a larger sense, intentionality, when meaning is not transparent; that is, as a bridging strategy between uncertainty and gaining or establishing 'knowing.' Making metaphor, as a reasoning process, from Searle's and the following account, is not rule-determined[29]. There is no algorithm or formula for interpreting metaphors. But making, interpreting, and understanding metaphor is also not arbitrary. In this way, metaphor provides a (somewhat metaphorical) middle ground in accounting visuality.

There are frameworks of appropriateness and relevance in the application of metaphor in experience that require and draw on background capacities. And, there is a necessary bridging relation in reasoning between the particularity or idiosyncrasy of background capacities for representation and working with shared meaning. The intentional, or representational, capacity for making metaphor particularly exemplifies our capacity for reasoning as a whole of state activity in consciousness. The following sections provide the second set of constraints on the revision to visuality from Searle's work. The discussion draws on Searle's explanation of the network and background capacities and the role cognitive sciences attribute to relations between embodied states, language, and background knowledge in representing the world.

11. 2. 1. *The Role of Background Knowledge in Understanding*

From Searle's account, the background of consciousness provides the underlying set of capacities from or within which intentional states function. And any intentional state functions within a network of relations to other intentional states as simply, the network. We use and understand metaphor, for example, because of this network and background

[29] For this point and the following discussion see Chapter 9, particularly *The Background and Understanding of Metaphor*.

of intentionality[30]. The interrelation of "knowledge or belief or opinion or presupposition" is critical to the context-dependence of interpreted meaning (Searle, 2002a, p. 196).

So, the background enables people to interpret things or make meaning, in particular ways relative to particular contexts. The "cognitive apparatus" of the network and background provides for the adaptation of meaning to make sense of situations, as well as knowing when something does not make sense (p. 199). And in practices, the causal capacities of the background in reasoning enable the agent to adapt to constraints. The background in this sense provides means for acquiring and understanding new knowledge.

11. 2. 2. *Making Meaning*

In art theory, one of the significant and problematic objects of interest since Kant concerns the complexity of a non rule-determined extension of meaning in aesthetic experience[31]. As well as Searle's account, contemporary research in psychology on concept acquisition (Lakoff, 1993; Murphy, 2004), cognitive development and executive functioning (Schneider, Schumann-Hengsteler, and Sodian (Eds.), 2005), reasoning and metacognition (Brown, 1987), problem-solving (Davidson and Sternberg (Eds.), 2003), and embodied aspects of learning (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) support the argument that aesthetic experience, as visuality, cannot reduce to rules. But nor does it reduce to cognitively empty states (although I do not think that all cognition is linguistic). Rather visuality is embodied and cognitive[32].

---

[30] See Chapter 9, *Obtaining Meaning and the Background, The Background and Understanding Literal Meaning, The Background and Understanding Metaphors, Human Practices, Relevance, and Communication*, and *Linguistic Interpretation*.

[31] See Chapter 4 generally; and on the problem of rules in aesthetics specifically see *Problems in the Explanation of Aesthetic Experience*.

[32] Elliot Eisner has claimed the sensory/cognitive aspect of visuality for decades: "one's experience of the world is basically qualitative" (1996, p. 33). And on the qualitative aspect of thinking, he says, "one might legitimately ask, are all concepts at base qualitative?" (p. 34). People "communicate with an automaticity that does not take time for concrete exemplification," however, "this bypassing of the qualities to which the term refers should not be taken to mean that, because the term is a so-called abstraction (all terms are abstract), it is not rooted in sensory material" (p. 34). So, "supposing someone did not understand the meaning of the term *infinity* and wanted you to help him grasp its meaning" (p. 34). Then, "the task you would probably undertake would be to illustrate the meaning of the concept through material that was visual or visualizable" (p. 34). That is, "we attempt to make verbal labels

The capacity to identify and interpret relations between concepts to extend meaning through metaphor is central to aesthetic concepts and underlies the notion of aesthetic judgment. From previous discussion, aesthetic understanding frequently constitutes from metaphor[33]. Metaphor is critical to working with meaning in the arts and visual culture[34]. And importantly, metaphor provides a way of thinking about thinking.

To know what might be meant in a metaphor involves cognitive access to one concept in terms of another concept. And, the role of metaphor is increasingly understood as significant in reasoning[35] (Ortony, 1993; Giora, 2007). Metaphors "map the propositional structure of one domain onto the propositional structure of another domain"[36] (Lakoff, 1993, p. 231). They can also function in the form of images as visual metaphor (p. 211). In the case of mapping attributes in an image metaphor, the "proliferation of detail in the images" structures this form of metaphorical association as "highly specific" cases (p. 230). Again, the role of memory in interpretation is crucial. Both verbal (or textual) and visual kinds of metaphor need interpretation by "recalling contexts and suggesting connections" (Parsons, 2002, p. 32). Interpreting metaphors

---

meaningful by providing the label with a content that someone can experience directly or can imagine, an image that makes the construction of meaning possible" (p. 34). The discussion following in the main body of results supports this view. On the qualitative aspect of all conscious states, including thinking, see also Searle's account in Chapter 7, *Qualitativeness*.

[33] See Chapter 4, *Aesthetic Judgments*, particularly n.48.

[34] See for example, Abrams, on metaphor, and cognitive function of metaphor, in poetry (2005, p. 165); and Empson (1961); on metaphor in visual arts, see Sibley (2006a); in art education, see Parsons (2002, p. 32).

[35] The inclusion of metaphor as part of the discussion of results is consistent with strong interest from the cognitive sciences in this particular aspect of mental activity and some of the research is described. My interest mainly lies in the role of metaphor in reasoning as a 'whole state' activity in consciousness. On this, there is also research in the brain sciences; for example, on visual field experiments for right hemisphere sensitivity to novel metaphoric relations, see Mashal and Faust (2008); on some background and synopsis of current work on left brain/right brain activity in making and interpreting metaphors, see Giora (2007).

[36] I am cautious employing George Lakoff's description of mapping, since it can imply the possibility of an algorithmic correspondence, but he explicitly rejects this. So, I do it because his use of the term is fairly loose. Note that Lakoff disagrees with Searle on distinctions between literal and metaphorical meaning and metaphor's use in daily language; see Lakoff (1993) contra Searle (1993b). On Lakoff's account, conventional metaphors (for example, "love is a journey") function as a kind of "mapping" (1993, p. 210). This "fixed part of our conceptual system" means "new and imaginative uses of the mapping can be understood instantly," since the conventional metaphor provides "ontological correspondences and other knowledge" of the relevant concept (p. 210). But, Lakoff says, rather than functioning algorithmically or according to a strict pattern of logic, the mapping of metaphors allows for "an open-ended class of potential correspondences across inference patterns" (p. 210). Novel "source domains" or "target domains" mean patterns of mapping are not static (pp. 210-211). This extension means that new metaphors can be applied to existing conceptual structures and vice versa.

bases in the capacity to "infer, or "pick up"" the "contrast between what is *said* and what is *meant*" (Winner and Gardner, 1993, p. 426). This interpretive capacity in intentionality is significant because, from Searle's account, there is no requisite literal similarity between the referent and extension terms. So, there is a question of how we can 'pick up' the distinction.

Metaphor functions as a kind of figurative language which previously was separated from literal language meanings (Lakoff, 1993, p. 204). Literal meanings in language are easier to deal with because they are symmetric with concepts that can be defined as true or false (Searle, 1978). Metaphor is more complex because its meanings are not literal, although the entailments may be[37] (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). In cognitive research, conventional separation between literal and metaphorical language is revising to an understanding that metaphors structure "our everyday conceptual system, including most abstract concepts" and underlie "much of everyday language" (Lakoff, 1993, p. 204). And, this "enormous metaphor system" now refers to a " "cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system" in contrast to metaphor's prior or "classical" definition as "novel or poetic linguistic expression" (pp. 202-204).

This scaffolding of conceptual meaning through conventional metaphor helps explain the making of novel metaphors, so describing a capacity for establishing or generating new knowledge. In one of the ways this synthesis demonstrates, metaphor is not restricted to simple organization of meaning but can be "valid in several ways," or something can depict "several different metaphors at once" (Empson, 1961, p. 49). Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue for the careful study and understanding of the function of metaphorical reasoning in the acquisition of concepts (1999, p. 73). Metaphorical forms of knowing, "may play a significant role in structuring one's experience" (p. 72).

So, metaphors are not separate or extraneous to understanding the object of thought. Rather, Lakoff and Johnson say, people's "most important abstract concepts, from love

[37] The extension of meaning in the metaphor may entail propositions that "can be literally true or false" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 72). The observation is important, reflecting Searle's account of the requirement that any intentional state can only function as part of a network of states, 'shading off' into background capacities; see Chapter 9.

to causation to morality, are conceptualized via multiple complex metaphors" (p. 73). In other words, without metaphors "concepts are skeletal and bereft of nearly all conceptual and inferential structure" (p. 73).

11. 2. 3. *Background Concepts and Thinking About Thinking*

The making and understanding of metaphors bases in the capacity to conceptualize or mentally represent *relations* between different kinds of things. Study of metacognition, which involves "knowing about what you know"(Shinamura, 2000, p. 142) as higher forms of reasoning, supports the "deliberate "seeking after meanings and relationships""[38] in order to reason well[39] (Brown, 1987, p. 67). Knowledge of metacognitive concepts themselves is still emerging[40] (Kuhn et al, 1995). Metacognitive concepts "may appear mysterious" because they inform more complex patterns of reasoning; but they are "central to learning and development" (Brown, 1987, p. 65).

Research into how metaphors function in understanding is further developing knowledge of how concepts form (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, pp. 60-73) and of how learning itself occurs (Petrie and Oshlag, 1993). Earlier "studies of concepts" and how they function in reasoning "used materials that are as divorced as possible from outside knowledge" (Murphy, 2004, p. 141). More recently, it is understood that "a major issue" in the way concepts function is "the way in which concept acquisition and use are influenced by background knowledge"[41] (Murphy, 2004, p. 356).

Ellen Winner and Howard Gardner provide support for this view, saying that "full comprehension of nonliteral utterances requires not only interpretation but also *metalinguistic awareness*" (1993, p. 426), that is, conscious understanding of interrelations between language, thought, and cultural and social factors (Carroll, 1964; Lee, 1997). Metaphor requires judgment because the person "must learn where

---

[38] Recognizing what something is in terms of relations is critical to understanding how the world functions in general. For example, in physics what is called "a particle's properties" is "really nothing more than shorthand for the way it interacts with everything around it" (Castelvecchi and Jamieson, 2006, p. 29).

[39] Citing John Dewey on the induction of reflective strategies and "learning to think" (Brown, 1987, p. 67).

[40] See Deanna Kuhn et al, for survey of developmental literature on metacognition (1995).

[41] See also Keil (1989); Murphy and Medin (1985).

metaphor is useful to thought, where it is crucial to thought, and where it is misleading," since "conceptual metaphor can be all three" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p. 73). This requirement, as the capacity for discrimination, means the person must apply knowledge of other concepts and their use to the context in which any concept functions (Murphy, 1985).

Lakoff and Johnson refer to this semantic (meaning) discrimination or suitability of interpretation to the selection of metaphoric meaning as "aptness" (1999, p. 73). The ability to determine the aptness of a particular metaphorical concept "requires an embodied realism," that is, "a realistic body-based understanding of our environment" (p. 73). And, the "conceptual web" of this association indicates the "bi-directional influence" between embodied perceptual processes and interconnected concepts in determining meaning (Goldstone and Rogosky, 2002, pp. 295-299).

Other research indicates the *multi-modality* of conceptual mechanisms including the function of action, in concept formation. The "conceptual system shares mechanisms with perception and action;" in this way "it is non-modular" (Barsalou, 2003, p. 513). That is, concept formation is not specific to an isolated information processing function of one kind. Rather, "a given simulation for a concept is situated, preparing an agent for situated action with a particular instance, in a particular setting" (p. 513). Critically, the bodily relation to language and context also requires understanding the social environment as part of the "social nature of perception" in representation[42] (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006, p. 99). This is the metalinguistic awareness Winner and Gardner describe. They say that for full comprehension of such things as metaphor and irony, "it is only at this level do nonliteral utterances *feel* different (and hence function differently) from literal ones" (1993, p. 426).

To understand and successfully work with metaphors requires the network of intentionality and background capacities including language, to enable an embodied or

[42] See also Lee (1997).

felt discrimination of meaning[43]. The difference to other mental representational states in this case (of metaphor) lies in the metacognitive function, as awareness of, the relations. These findings further address, from the previous chapter, the critical relevance of the metacognitive aspect of aesthetic knowledge in epistemology.

In summary of these constraints on this revision to visuality from Searle's account: in consciousness, a network of intentional states requiring background capacities enables the self or 'I' to represent the world. From this network and background typically we make meaning of experiential phenomena. The causal capacities of the background enable us to adapt through acquiring, testing, and understanding new knowledge. In this adaptation, we make sense of experience by situating meaning in context, relating novel experience to relevant prior meaning[44]. And to do this effectively requires an embodied capacity for judgment or discrimination that realistically integrates percepts, concepts, and actions in situations. This is the capacity to know what is meaningfully apt in context.

So, the second set of constraints on this revision to visuality concerns the capacity of self to reason, making meaning in context in order to act effectively. This constraint, like the first, contrasts with current accounts of visuality. Broadly, visuality concerns making meaning of what we see. In visual culture, this process derives from cultural discourses that determine how we make meaning. But in this way, meaning reduces to convention and so is, in some sense, protocolic or rule-determined. And in aesthetics, meaning derives from the sensory, or perceptual, as felt states. In this sense, meaning reduces to intuition as pre-theoretical. So, respectively, there is tendency on one side to conventionalize visuality as shared meaning, and tendency to make meaning arbitrary to the particular on the other side. From Searle's work and this discussion, neither form of explanation accounts for how meanings are made in consciousness. Meanings are always radically underdetermined. But from our backgrounds, they are not arbitrary[45].

---

[43] Searle's account of the qualitativeness of all conscious experience, including conscious thinking is critical to this point; see Chapter 7, *Qualitativeness*, particularly n.6.

[44] See Chapter 9, *Human Practices, Relevance, and Communication*.

[45] See Chapter 9, *The Background and Understanding Literal Meaning*, *The Background and Understanding Metaphors*, and *Human Practices, Relevance, and Communication*.

11. 3. The Adaptation of Knowledge in Practice

The third and final set of constraints on the revision to visuality again concerns the explanation of practices. From the concern with freedom of will in making meaning I distinguish it from the prior two constraints. In doing so, I identify this section as crucial to completing this account of consciousness. But why is freedom of will so critically relevant to accounting visuality? I think because without it, there can be no theoretical and practical distinction between the human mind and any information implementation system or program. We could not account for our capacities, and their range, to make meaning[46]. That is, all conscious activity including cognition, would be always already determined or rule-governed, and this is not the case. And further, also crucially, freedom of will is the locus of responsibility[47].

In the following discussion, I consider how the meanings we make in experience are not rule determined. The uniqueness of consciousness is that it is not mechanistic. The point is critical to extend understanding of mind, and crucially relevant to education. Christof Koch says "although consciousness is fully compatible with the laws of physics, it is not easy to predict its properties" from the neuronal interactions of brain states[48] (Koch, 2004a, p. 1108). Neuronal activity is a "highly nonlinear phenomenon" (p. 1108). So, how do these nonlinear phenomena, as events in the brain, result in the reasoned activity of consciousness? There is no final answer, but there is increasing interest in the capacity for negotiating complexity in consciousness. Koch says, the "abilities of groups of neurons to learn from interactions with the environment and from their own internal activities are routinely underestimated (p. 1108).

---

[46] I use the term 'make meaning' broadly, as applying the constraints of rationality in the self's conscious experience, so including for instance the establishing, testing, validation and discrimination among differences and so on, of choosing meaning in context. These activities are not always in the conscious field of attention, but they are occurring continuously, as part of background capacities. As a case of literal meaning, where there is variation among reference terms, we discriminate among the different meanings, from Searle's examples in Chapter 9, between cutting the cake, or cutting the grass and in nonliteral cases such as metaphor, we can generate a novel appropriate extension of meaning suited to context.

[47] See Chapter 7, *The Self and Responsibility*.

[48] Koch says "understanding the material basis of consciousness is unlikely to require any exotic new physics but rather a much deeper appreciation of how highly interconnected networks of a large number of heterogeneous neurons work" (2004a, p. 1108).

The capacity to "exercise control over its functions, states and inner processes" is "an important key to how the self is put together" (cited in Rueda et al, 2005, p. 573; Vohs and Baumeister, 2004, p. 1). Among other things, this capacity is fundamental to an individual in learning, or the development of knowledge. In education, there is need to recognize "the mutual dependence of freedom and control at the heart of the creative process" (NACCCE, 1999, p. 43). That is, "it is possible to have a limited creative impact in some fields with little knowledge of them," but "sustained creative achievement involves (gaining) knowledge of the field in question and skills in the media concerned" (p. 42, parentheses added). As evidence of our ability to deal with complexity in learning, negotiating between freedom and constraints, as conscious effort, in consciousness is an interesting aspect of visuality. To understand this further, I will recover some territory and then return briefly to metaphors.

So far, in the results from Searle's account, the discussion emphasizes the requirement of first, a self or 'I" in the operations of human consciousness and second, the requirement in consciousness for background capacities. These capacities enable the embodied self to incorporate novel experience with the familiar in the operations of practical (and so including theoretical) reasoning[49] on one hand, and integrate experience of other like selves, including collectively, on the other. But these capacities in consciousness presuppose, from Searle's account, a reasoning agent whose actions are not causally determined, or rule governed. Rather, we have the capacity to be rule guided.

Since we are social, and having collective intentionality, we can be influenced in our actions by social practices or conventions, as reasons for doing things. Regulation in many cases guides behaviour. But the actions of rational agents having language are not determined by the rules of practices. Background capacities enable us to relevantly acquire skills, that is, we learn. And the repetition of deliberate action "enables the body to take over and the rules to recede" into our background[50]. The capacity for perception

[49] On the distinction of theoretical reason as a special case of practical reason, see Chapter 7, *The Self Reasoning in Time*.
[50] See Chapter 9, *Physical Skills*, and *Rules and the Acquisition of Expertise*; citation from Searle (1983, p. 150).

and cognition, and from this, interpretation and judgment in experience enables willed action. And critically, the self or 'I,' having the capacity to reason, with all that entails, has freedom of will. So, the final constraint on this study's revision of visuality from Searle's account concerns the integration in consciousness of our capacity for convention guided behaviour and our freedom in choosing among alternative possibilities of acting.

From Searle's explanation, the aspect of familiarity or seeing-*as* enables much of the organization and ordering of conscious states. This organization is only possible from pre-existing categories. So we see something, for example, as a dog/ as a schnauzer/ as a miniature schnauzer/ as Sammy, and so on. James Hampton and Helen Moss say, "conceptual representation is arguably the most important cognitive function in humans" and is "centrally involved in memory, speech, planning, decision-making, actions, inductive inferences and much more besides" (2003, p. 506). Conceptualization is integral to the acquisition of new knowledge. But from this, the question emerges of "how *is* it possible to learn something radically new?" (Petrie and Oshlag, 1993, p. 582). From Searle's account, there is radical underdetermination of meaning in language[51]. This is one key to our capacity to rationally adapt to the constraints of context.

The acquisition of knowledge cannot be understood in terms where the new is either constrained to schemas "we already possess" or something "arbitrary and subjective" (p. 584). And metaphor, for instance, is hypothesized as "one of the central ways of leaping the epistemological chasm between old knowledge and radically new knowledge" (p. 583). Metaphor "can provide a *rational* bridge from the known to the radically unknown, from a given context of understanding to a changed context of understanding" (p. 584). The "central educational concern" with the possibility of developing significantly new knowledge places metaphor in a "crucial epistemic role" of rendering the acquisition of new concepts "intelligible" (p. 584). Like "analogies, models and exemplars," metaphor also functions as a "central" figurative device in

[51] See Chapter 9, *The Background and Understanding Literal Meaning* and *Rules and the Acquisition of Expertise*.

acquiring new understanding[52] (p. 584). And finally, metaphors "invite the use of a familiar rule-governed device" in dealing with the learning situation "in ways that require the bending or even breaking of the familiar rules" (p. 584).

So, how do we manoeuvre between acquiring new concepts, including rules, applying and forgetting them as they become part of our background know-how, and adapting our practices to make meaning in the beliefs, desires, etc., of the self or 'I' in the social context? From Searle's account, both effortlessly and effortfully[53]. We learn to do things, not by consciously following the rules better, rather we do things in a different way altogether as we become skilled. Background capacities enable us to respond meaningfully. But there is also conscious effort, that is, free will in the deliberate or rational actions of the self, as well as responsibility[54].

The "ability to control one's behavior plays an important role in the development of personality and the socialization of the child" (Rueda et al, 2005, p. 573). This "self-regulation has been related to emotionality, delay of gratification, compliance, moral development, social competence, empathy, adjustment, and cognitive and academic performance" (pp. 573-574). Additionally, "self-regulation is thought to be the key mediator between genetic predispositions, early experience, and adult functioning;" "effortful control allows individuals to regulate their behavior in relation to current and future needs" (p. 574).

In summary of this final constraint on the revision to visuality, there is emphasis on the capacity in consciousness for practical reason and how this capacity is an aspect of the unified self or 'I' making choices, both effortlessly, and as conscious effort. And, our rationality in action is not mechanically causally determined by convention. The concept of consciously bending or breaking the rules in practices implies both familiarity with, and the capacity for applying constraints to, conventions. Our ability to

---

[52] See also previously, this chapter, n.32, regarding Eisner's description on the requirement of qualitative or felt aspects of concepts in exemplification to establish meaning in learning processes.
[53] On effortlessness see Chapter 9, *The Background and Understanding Metaphor*, and on the conscious feeling of effort as the exercise of the will, see Chapter 7, *Consciousness, the Self, and Voluntary Action*.
[54] See Chapter 7, *The Self and Responsibility*.

deal with complexity is increasingly relevant to accounting visuality and mind generally. And understanding the negotiation between freedom and self-regulation in consciousness provides I think, an important step of address.

This final constraint again contrasts with the accounts of visuality set out in the study. Visual culture is eliminative or reductive of freedom of will from theorizing an overdeterminative function of cultural discourse in subjectivity. And in aesthetics there is autonomy, but the self here is held separate from language, committing to exclusion of rules[55]; it is a negative autonomy. Both accounts, in this sense, do not provide explanatory means for real agency.

There is some slippage in the concepts I am juggling here, since freedom of will is the crucial, and yet most complex, aspect of consciousness to account for. But in this discussion I am trying, awkwardly, to re-situate visuality in a middle ground, the self having freedom in rational or deliberate action to choose, to organize and interpret, and generate novel meaning, from background capacities including learned practices. I have further emphasized the self's capacity to regulate its actions in this learning as an aspect of freedom of will.

11. 4. The Unity Between Self and World in Visuality from John R. Searle's Account of Consciousness

From this discussion I include three broad kinds of constraints on visuality in art education: there is a self, that is social, having freedom of will. However, it is what is not explicitly included as a constraint that enables this revision as a unification of the extension of visuality. Realism provides the terms under which discourse occurs. The revision, as consciousness having immediate access to the world, epistemologically grounds the explanation of visuality within an ontology of real events.

[55] On one hand in aesthetic accounts, there is rejection of rules in thinking; on the other, artistic dispositional accounts, as strong modular accounts of mind, do derive from rule accounted processes.

The epistemic investments in relativism to now, I believe, occurred for good reasons constrained by the structure of our knowledge in language. But the continued employment of relativism in explaining visuality, from this account, is not requisite to the valid maintenance of the role of mental states in explanation. The distinction Searle provides between the epistemology and ontology of consciousness enables the progressive revision in language to our understanding of mind as both biological and mental. And this distinction enables realist account of visuality in the arts, without reduction of their particularity. The following revision to visuality attends on consciousness as part of, and enabling relations with, real events.

Essentially, there are three constraints this study provides for the revision to visuality. These consist in: first, the qualitative subjective unity of an irreducible and ineliminable self or 'I' in human consciousness having immediate perceptual and cognitive access to the world; second, the requirement, in the operations of that self, for the network of relations between intentional states and their enabling background capacities; and finally, further, the freedom of will of that self. Each of these constraints is necessary to properly accounting visuality[56]. On those conditions or constraints in explanation, the oppositions between aesthetics and visual culture over visuality, as how we make meaning, are reconciled. In the conscious and unconscious operations of a self or 'I,' including the irreducible capacity for collective or social practices in culture as 'we,' visuality is unified.

This revision to visuality contrasts with current accounts. I have set out these contrasts in the relevant contexts throughout the study and in discussion, but to briefly recount them: the study contrasts with both current explanations in providing realist account of visuality. In its explanation of background capacities, this revision contrasts with aesthetic accounts limiting explanation of aesthetic experience to the intuition of felt states as wholly dispositional or separate from the influence of culture. And, in its explanation of mental representation as immediate and causally related to experience of the world and the reasoning agency of an irreducible self having freedom of will, the

[56] And together, I think the constraints are sufficient to revise the problems in prior explanations.

revision contrasts with visual culture accounts claiming all representation is an act of interpretation and subjectivity conventionally determined by discourses.

The direct effect of the revision on these accounts addresses problems in the current explanation of subjective experience in visuality. There are a number of inclusions in the study addressing difficulties in, or simply explanatory requirements on, accounts of visuality specifically and the arts generally. For example, in the explanation of conscious and unconscious mental states and their distinction from nonconscious biological processes, as well as explanation of background capacities, the study makes further provision from Searle's work for account of motivations in practical reason.

From this provision, I think Searle's account opens an explanatory alternative to strong innate dispositional accounts of artistic motivation with their attending problems. There is opportunity I think, from the explanation, to clear the confusion between the nonrational and the irrational. That is, explanation can move on from tendency to confuse all unconscious motivation with irrational phenomena or alternately, biological determinism. There is also account from Searle of acquiring knowledge in practices and description of how the background works. This provision attends on difficulties in the arts with the current binary opposition between rules and artistic practices in teaching and learning.

The study's interest in applying Searle's account to the problem of visuality in art, theory, and education lies in non-reductively removing existing constraints on the concept. There are, to now, divisions in the explanation of subjectivity. Those divisions do not and cannot account for the way visuality works in consciousness. Rather consciousness as qualitative, subjective unity opens a different concept of visuality. And this discussion of revision has identified an interpretive framework for how that might look.

The small error of each approach in the debate over visuality, as aesthetics and visual culture, sustains in overriding the other as exclusive, in my view. So, to counter this, drawing on Searle and further research from the cognitive sciences in this discussion of

results, there is emphasis on the embodied aspect of reasoning, as the 'making sense' of experience[57]. I contrast 'making sense' in this way to 'making meaning,' which I think tends to disembody the actual activity involved. This emphasis on embodied reasoning as making sense is inclusive in accounting for visuality as both sensory and cognitive. There is still, I believe, risk that the term 'cognitive' is understood as propositional and linguistic, and so from habit excluding felt and emotional aspects of consciousness.

To address this risk, the study includes Searle's account of cognition and volition, including conation. But there is a history in epistemology generally and explanation in the arts particularly, of representing felt states, including emotions, to reify the solitary concerns of the beholder. And so, as well as Searle's account of collective intentionality, in the preceding interpretive framework of practices, revision to the concept of visuality consists in more than focus on visual, as an isolated sense, perception. From the discussion of empathy and mirror neurons, the shift demonstrates how visual experience is a whole embodied state in representing the world and others in consciousness.

The making sense in experience as a whole of consciousness state that includes like others, as 'we,' refines this shift in visuality. From philosophy and contemporary research into cognition, the move provides an incremental but required adjustment to our understanding of the way mind works. The shift also defines the means for reconciliation between aesthetics and visual culture. Inclusion of the social as an aspect of embodied cognition negotiates the distinction, at least in consciousness, as a relation between the sensory and so private aspect of 'meaning,' and the public condition of 'sense'[58]. On this point, the 'sensorium' and the social reconcile in cognition.

There is one difficulty here: a latent separation in the term 'reconcile' I think addresses exclusions in visual culture and aesthetics, so technically the term is useful. But the

[57] The concern for 'making sense' is not new in art education, although explanation of the concept varies; c.f. for example, Brown (1989a, p. 29-30).
[58] On discussion of the sensory requirement on making meaning or sense of something, see Eisner (1996, pp. 20-38); on discussion of the public or social constraints on securing a 'sense' of meaning see Brown, 1989a, p. 30).

sensory and social are unified aspects in human consciousness. They are not divided in experience. The point of reconciliation between the sensory and social, as a unity, enables a rethinking of visuality. At the same time, it is essential to sustaining the particularity of aesthetics' concern with the role of the senses in making meaning and visual culture's concern with the sociality of meaning. The values in maintaining these commitments remain, I believe, independent of the current theoretical and practical exclusions in accounting visuality.

11. 5. Conclusion to the Study

There are a number of reasons why there is debate between scholars of aesthetics and visual culture over visuality. The study attends on the conceptual and practical division. From this account, the reach of a concept discloses in practices. The debate is largely driven, I believe, by residual tensions formed in the environment of earlier explanations of cognition. These accounts theoretically and practically separated the senses, thinking, and context in the explanation of mind. And yet consciousness requires a coherent synchrony, or unity, between all these to make meaning, or sense, of something.

The debate over visuality, from earlier discussion, is also evidence of pressure in contemporary epistemology to reconsider how we explain practices. The presence and impact of technology on the production of art and culture are now revising the role of specialized knowledge and the interpretation and integration of that knowledge across different fields of enquiry. Reconsidering the sensory and social aspects of cognitive function from perspectives of unity is a crucial contribution, in my view, to addressing this concern.

These events in turn impact on the discrete boundaries of disciplinary structures and raise questions for visual educational curriculum. The problem of how curriculum adapts remains topical. In 1999, the widely read U. K. NACCCE report into creativity and education states "the essence of creativity is in making new connections;" but "these possibilities can be frustrated by rigid divisions in subject teaching which current pressures tend to encourage" (p. 82). Yet, "outside schools, some of the most dynamic

developments are the result of the interaction of disciplines" (p. 82). Ten years on, educational structures do not evidence substantial change.

The effect of "the relationships between the arts, sciences and technology" will change education (p. 82). And practices of visuality are a key concern in this shift. Any explicit revision to the current division between disciplines can be negotiated in tertiary environments on this basis, in my view. From the expressed interest in explanations from the sciences by some theorists, I suggest visual studies, in its broader sense, as prototypical of possible frameworks for this development. In secondary education, there is even I think, some scope to encounter the possibility of 'visual education' as a model or mode of learning across disciplinary structures. But I do not underestimate the difficulties this would entail.

At the end of Chapter 3 of this study I raise three possible, but in my view equally unsustainable, options for the arts on the role of science in the explanation of visuality. First I suggest that the arts can continue to reject or demonize accounts of science as positivist. Second, that accounts of visuality might include material from the sciences in an ad hoc manner. And third, that accounts may capitulate to the sciences' models, for instance as contemporary forms of behaviourism. There are problems with all of these responses, as explanatory mechanisms, that risk diminishing real values in accounts of the arts. Addressing the first option, the sciences' move towards an explanation of consciousness is, in many contemporary instances, genuinely committed to advancing the role of mental states in explanation rather than accounting them epiphenomena. I think those accounts can be helpful in explaining visuality and the discussion of results in this chapter attempt one relevant case of inclusion. So, I do not think there is any intrinsic problem with drawing on explanation in the sciences in the arts and education.

But this raises the problem of discrimination among accounts and I seek to address that difficulty with Searle's work, centrally including his explanation and rejection of reduction of mental phenomena in explanation. By doing this, I hope to attend on the second risk in drawing on accounts from science in an unreflective way. The reference to discrimination among accounts of mind circumvents, I hope, an attraction to ad hoc

tactics over engaged responsiveness. And in advocating responsiveness the third risk, of capitulation, is neutralized. Searle's account provides philosophical means for arts explanation, in this case on visuality. This study of his work provides substantial ground for both visual culture and aesthetics to revise their dualism without diminishing their commitments.

All of the problems mentioned in not addressing the current basis of these commitments, I suggest, are unnecessary; the central explanatory interests of each approach are not threatened from realism. From this account, knowledge constitutes in the study of both aesthetics and visual culture, as practices of visuality. Both approaches to practices in visual arts and education are uniquely valid. But to proceed further than debate based in rejection of either view, there is need for coordinating those practices in art, theory, and education[59].

This coordination occurs in my view, in moving toward a reflexive rather than repeated relation between the forms of account. Practically and theoretically there is considerable and interesting scope to address visuality on these terms. This study, for instance, explains the capacity of consciousness to understand and adapt particular knowledge across different practices and make meaning, or sense, of experience in context[60]. Here, the reflexivity of relations I suggest concerns a greater theoretical or explanatory unity between the sensory, cognitive, and social aspects of visuality, deriving from their embodied and practical unity. The traditional bifurcations don't explain how visuality works. Arriving at meaning in the explanation and understanding of art and imagery is complex and to properly explore this will be crucial to the epistemology of visuality in art and education.

In conclusion, socially, there are artistic and ethical requirements on the productive and difficult enterprise of encountering and anticipating change. The debate over these

[59] On the requirement for coordinating practices in education see National Research Council (2000, p. 152).

[60] For further example, see Martin Kemp on a reconciliation of the particular longstanding debate on perspective between symbolic and perceptual accounts in art history/theory, that "(rescues) important elements of both theories" (1987, quote from p. 256, parentheses added). Kemp continues with this approach; see (2006, p. 14).

requirements in art and education is part of that enterprise, and so is important. To accomplish real engagement, “it is important” recognizing “that when art ‘resists’ analysis, concepts, reflective articulation it does so for its own purposes” (Heywood, 1997, p. 7). The relation, even where it is a tension, between art and ethics is one of culture’s most enduring and rewarding engagements. A reduction to identity between the two undermines the potential of both; it risks becoming what Peter Smith calls “a new Puritanism” (2003, p. 26). In visual arts and education the role of visuality, from the study’s revision, sustains the transgressive and open-ended activities of art without undermining the role of ethical reflection and action.

Bibliography of Listed References

Abraham, W. E. (2005). Incorrigibility. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 425). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abrams, M. H., & Harpham, G. G. (2005). *A Glossary of Literary Terms* (8th ed.). Boston: Thomson Wadsworth.

Ackerman, P. L. (2003). Cognitive Ability and Non-Ability Trait Determinants of Expertise. *Educational Researcher, 32*(8), 15-20.

Adler, D. (2004). Painterly Politics: Wölfflin, Formalism and German Academic Culture, 1885-1915. *Art History, 27*(3), 431-456.

Alač, M., & Hutchins, E. (2004). I See What You Are Saying: Action As Cognition in fMRI Brain Mapping Practice. *Journal of Cognition and Culture, 4*(3-4), 629-661.

Alpers, S., & et al. (1996). Visual Culture Questionnaire. *October, 77*, 25-70.

Arnheim, R. (1974a). *Visual Thinking.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Arnheim, R. (1974b). *Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Arnheim, R. (2001). What It Means To Be Creative. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 41*(1), 25-25.

Ars Electronica. (2005). Festival for Art, Technology and Society. Retrieved 23 August, 2008, from http://www.aec.at/en/festival2005/index.asp

Arts Education. (1995). *Arts Education Report by the Senate Environment, Recreation, Communications and the Arts Reference Committee* (Australian Senate Report No. ISBN 0 6 42229 236). Canberra: Australian Government.

Atherton, M. (1997). How to Write the History of Vision: Understanding the Relationship between Berkeley and Descartes. In D. M. Levin (Ed.), *Sites of Vision: The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy* (pp. 139-165). Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press.

Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2006). Evening News Report: 14 May 8.30pm.

Bal, M. (1990). De-Disciplining the Eye. *Critical Inquiry, 16*(3), 506-531.

Bal, M. (1996). Reading Art? In G. Pollock (Ed.), *Generations and Geographies in the Visual Arts: Feminist Reading* (pp. 25-41). London: Routledge.

Bal, M. (2002). *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Bal, M. (2003). Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture. *Journal of Visual Culture, 2*(1), 5-32.

Bal, M. (Ed.). (2004). *Narrative Theory : Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge.

Bal, M., Bois, Y.-A., Lavin, I., Pollock, G., & Wood, C. S. (1996). Art History and Its Theories. *The Art Bulletin, 78*(1), 6-25.

Bal, M., & Bryson, N. (1991). Semiotics and Art History. *Art Bulletin, 73*(2), 174-208.

Barnes, A. (1988). *On Interpretation: A Critical Analysis.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Barnes, A. (1998). Definition of Art. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 1, pp. 511-513). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baron-Cohen, S., & Swettenham, J. (1996). The relationship between SAM and ToMM: two hypotheses. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), *Theories of Theories of Mind* (pp. 158-168). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barone, T. E. (1992). On the Demise of Subjectivity in Educational Inquiry. *Critical Inquiry, 22*(1), 25-28.
Barrett, H. C., & Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity In Cognition: Framing the Debate. *Psychological Review, 113*(3), 628-647.
Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Situated Simulation in the Human Conceptual System. *Language and Cognitive Processes, 18*(5/6), 513-562.
Barthes, R. (2000). *Camera Lucida*. U. K: Vintage.
Batkin, N. (1998). Formalism in Analytic Aesthetics. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 217-221). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baudrillard, J. (1983). *Simulations* (P. Foss, P. Patton & P. Beitchman, Trans.). Los Angeles: Semiotext[e].
Bauerlein, M. (2004). The Burdens of Visual Cultural Studies. *Arts Education Policy Review, 106*(1), 5-12.
Baxandall, M. (1979). The Language of Art History. *New Literary History, 10*(3), 453-465.
Baxandall, M. (1985). *Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Baxandall, M. (1999). The Language of Art Criticism. In S. Kemal & I. Gaskell (Eds.), *The Language of Art History* (Digital Print ed., pp. 67-75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beardsley, M. (1975). Semiotic Aesthetics and Aesthetic Education. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 9*(3), 5-26.
Beardsley, M., & Wimsatt, W. K. (1976). The Intentional Fallacy. In D. Newton-de Molina (Ed.), *On Literary Intention* (pp. 1-13). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Becker, A. L. (1993). On Arnheim on Language. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 27*(4, special issue: Essays in Honour of Rudolf Arnheim), 115-128.
Bell, C. (1977). Art as Significant Form: The Aesthetic Hypothesis. In G. Dickie & R. J. Sclafani (Eds.), *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (pp. 36-48). New York: St. Martin's Press.
Bender, J. W. (1995). General But Defeasible Reasons in Aesthetic Evaluation: The Particularist/Generalist Dispute. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53*(4), 379-392.
Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Berlo, J. C., Phillips, R. B., Duncan, C., Preziosi, D., Rice, D., & Rorimer, A. (1995). The Problematics of Collecting and Display: Part 1. *The Art Bulletin, 77*(1), 6-23.
Bernheimer, R. (1961). *The Nature of Representation: A Phenomenological Inquiry* (1994 UMI POD: Ann Arbor ed.). New York: New York University Press.
Best, D. (1992). *The Rationality of Feeling: Understanding the Arts in Education.* London, Washington: The Falmer Press.
Bidisha. (2007, Tuesday, November 13). From Trash to Treasure - The Myth of Artistic Genius. *Sydney Morning Herald,* p. 13.
Biggs, M. A. R. (2002). Editorial: The Concept of Knowledge in Art and Design [Electronic Version]. *Working Papers in Art and Design*, 2. Retrieved 06 09 08 from http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/papers/wpades/vol2/intro02.html.

Birchall, B. C. (1981). The Intentional Project. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42*(2), 147-159.
Blakemore, C. (2008, Thursday, March 6). Fine Line Between Genius and Madness. *Sydney Morning Herald,* p. 22.
Bloom, B. J., Englehart, M. D., Furst, M. D., Hill, E. J., & Krathwol, D. R. (1956). *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals*. New York: Longmans Green.
Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, History, and Artifact Concepts. *Cognition, 60*, 1-29.
Bloom, P. (2004). *Descartes' Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human*. London: William Heinemann.
Board of Studies. (1999). *Stage 6 Visual Arts Syllabus: Preliminary and HSC Courses* Retrieved 11 September 2008. from http://www.boardofstudies.nsw.edu.au.
Bogen, J. (2005). Teleological Explanation. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 911). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boime, A. (1990). *Art of Exclusion: Representing Blacks in the Nineteenth Century*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Bolton, M. B. (1976). The Origins of Locke's Doctrine of Primary and Secondary Qualities. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 26*(105), 305-316.
Bone, D. (1989). The Emptiness of Genius: Romanticism. In P. Murray (Ed.), *Genius: The History of an Idea* (pp. 113-127). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1989). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice* (R. Nice, Trans.). Stanford: CA: Stanford University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1993). *The Field of Cultural Production*: Columbia University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1996). *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (S. Emanuel, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bourriaud, N. (2002). *Relational Aesthetics* (S. Pleasance, F. Woods & M. Copeland, Trans.): les presses du réel.
Boyd, R. N. (1976). Approximate Truth and Natural Necessity. *Journal Of Philosophy, 73*(18), 633-635.
Boyd, R. N. (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (Ed.), *Essays on Moral Realism* (pp. 181-128). New York: Cornell University Press.
Bredo, E. (1994). Reconstructing Educational Psychology: Situated Cognition and Deweyian Pragmatism. *Educational Psychologist, 29*(1), 23-35.
Breiter, H. C., & Gasic, G. P. (2004). A General Circuitry Processing Reward/Aversion Information and Its Implications for Neuropsychiatric Illness In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences III*.
Brooks, R. A. (1991). Intelligence Without Representation. *Artificial Intelligence, 47,* 139-159.
Brown, A. (1987). Metacognition, Executive Control, Self-Regulation, and Other More Mysterious Mechanisms. In F. E. Weinert & R. H. Kluwe (Eds.), *Metacognition, Motivation, and Understanding* (pp. 65-116). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Brown, N. C. M. (1989a). The Myth of Visual Literacy. *Australian Art Education, 13*(2), 28-32.

Brown, N. C. M. (1989b). Aesthetic Description and Realism in Art Education. *Studies in Art Education, 30*(4), 212-224.
Brown, N. C. M. (1990). *Distinguishing Artistic from Vernacular Performances in the Visual Arts: A Classroom Perspective.* Paper presented at the Occasional Seminar in Art Education: Understanding Art as the Basis for Primary Art Teaching, University of South Wales College of Fine Arts
Brown, N. C. M. (2001). The Meaning of Transfer in the Practices of Arts Education. *Studies in Art Education, 43*(1), 83-102.
Brown, N. C. M. (2003a). Are we entering a post-critical age in visual arts education? . *Studies in Art Education, 44*(3), 285-289.
Brown, N. C. M. (2003b). *Beardsley's Revised Aesthetic Theory as a Model for Visual Aesthetic Educational Theory.* Ann Arbor: MI: UMI.
Brown, N. C. M. (2004). The Paradox of Virtuosity in The Practical Arts. *Educational Philosophy and Theory, 36*(1), 19-34.
Brown, N. C. M. (2005a). *The Frames and Relational Aesthetics.* Paper presented at the Eleventh Occasional Seminar in Art Education: Learning and Teaching New Media Practice and the Frames in Visual Arts and Photography, College of Fine Arts, UNSW.
Brown, N. C. M. (2005b). *Paradox and imputation in the explanation of practical innovation in design.* Paper presented at the Speculation and Innovation Conference Proceedings, Kelvin Grove, Queensland University of Technology.
Brown, N. C. M. (2006). Psychology of Perception, Neurophysiology, Pathology and Visual Education: unpublished manuscript: University of New South Wales: Sydney.
Brown, N. C. M., & Weate, A. (2002). A Decade of Curriculum Reform in Australian Art Education. *Australian Art Education, 25*(1), 41-50.
Bruner, J. (1990). *Acts of Meaning* (pbk ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bryson, N. (1983). *Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze* London: Macmillan.
Bryson, N. (1991). Semiology and Visual Interpretation. In N. Bryson, M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation* (pp. 61-73). Cambridge: Polity.
Bryson, N. (2002). Dialectics of Seeing. In M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies* (pp. 215-230). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Bryson, N., Holly, M. A., & Moxey, K. (1991). Introduction. In N. Bryson, M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation*. Cambridge: Polity.
Bryson, N., Holly, M. A., & Moxey, K. (1994). Preface and Introduction. In N. Bryson, M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Visual Culture: Images and Interpretations* (pp. xiii-xxix). Hanover: NH: Wesleyan University Press.
Bryson, N., Holly, M. A., & Moxey, K. (Eds.). (1994). *Visual Culture: Images and Interpretations.* Hanover: NH: Wesleyan University Press.
Budd, M. (2004a). Artistic Value. In P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art - The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology* (pp. 262-273). Oxford: Blackwell.
Budd, M. (2004b). How Pictures Look. In P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art - The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology* (pp. 383-395). Oxford: Blackwell.

Burge, T. (1992). Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990. *The Philosophical Review, 101*(1: Philosophy in Review: Essays on Contemporary Philosophy), 3-51.

Burgin, V. (1986). *The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Burkhardt, A. (Ed.). (1990). *Speech Acts, Meaning and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle*. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Burkhart, A. (2006). Object Lessons: Thinking About Material Culture. *Art Education, 59*(2), 33-39.

Calhoun, C. (Ed.). (2004). *Oxford Dictionary of Social Sciences: Poststructuralism*. Oxford: Oxford Online Reference.

Cameron, D. (2006, March 25). Battle Lines Are Drawn. *Sydney Morning Herald*, p. 37.

Carlson, A. (2000). *Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art, and Architecture*. London: Routledge.

Carlson, A. (2005). Environmental Aesthetics. In B. Gaut & D. M. McIver Lopes (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics* (2nd ed., pp. 541-556). Oxford: Blackwell.

Carroll, J. B. (Ed.). (1964). *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Carroll, N. (1986). Art and Interaction. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 45*(1), 57-68.

Carroll, N. (2000). Art and the Domain of the Aesthetic. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 40*(2), 191-208.

Carroll, N. (2001). Enjoyment, Indifference, and Aesthetic Experience: Comments For Robert Stecker. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 41*(1), 81-83.

Carroll, N. (2002). Aesthetic Experience Revisited. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 42*(2), 145-168.

Carroll, N. (2004). Non-Perceptual Aesthetic Properties: Comments for James Shelley. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 44*(4), 413-423.

Carruthers, P. (2006a). The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind. In R. J. Stainton (Ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science* (pp. 3-21). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Carruthers, P. (2006b). Why Pretend? In S. Nichols (Ed.), *The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction* (pp. 90-109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Castelvecchi, D., & Jamieson, V. (2006, 12 August). Curiouser and Curiouser: String theory's main rival has earned the right to be taken seriously. *New Scientist,* 5, 29-31.

Caton, H. (1973). *The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes.* New Haven and London,: Yale University Press.

Chalmers, D. (2004). How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness? . In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences III* (pp. 1111-1119). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor. *Philosophy of Science, 55*(2), 167-187.

Churchland, P. M. (1989a). *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain* (pbk ed.). Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press.

Churchland, P. M. (1989b). *A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science*. Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press.
Churchland, P. S. (2002). *Brainwise: Studies in Neurophilosophy*. Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1995). Language of Thought (2). In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 408-412). Oxford: Blackwell.
Cohen, E. D. (1984). Reason and Experience in Locke's Epistemology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45*(1), 71-85.
Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2000). *Research Methods in Education* (5th ed.). London: RoutledgeFalmer.
Colapinto, J. (2007, April 16). The Interpreter: Has a remote Amazonian tribe upended our understanding of language? *The New Yorker*, 8-37.
Collingwood, R. G. (1958). *Principles of Art*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coltheart, M. (1980). The Persistences of Vision. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 290*(1038: The Psychology of Vision,), 57-69.
Coltheart, M. (1983). Iconic Memory. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 302*(1110: Functional Aspects of Human Memory), 283-293.
Connor, S. (1997). Postmodernism. In M. Payne (Ed.), *A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory* (pbk ed., pp. 428-432). Oxford: Blackwell.
Cooper, D. E. (1992). Editor's Introduction. In D. E. Cooper (Ed.), *A Companion to Aesthetics*. Oxford, UK,: Blackwell.
Corbett, D. P. (2005). Visual Culture and the History of Art. In C. van Eck & E. Winters (Eds.), *Dealing with the Visual* (pp. 17-36). Aldershot, Hampshire: England: Ashgate.
Corno, L. (1993). The Best-Laid Plans: Modern Conceptions of Volition and Educational Research. *Educational Researcher, 22*(2), 14-22.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1994). Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of functional organization. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), *Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture* (pp. 85-116). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Costello, D., & Willsdon, D. (2008). Introduction. In D. Costello & D. Willsdon (Eds.), *The Life and Death of Images* (pp. 7-36). Ithaca: NY: Cornell University Press.
Coyne, R., & Snodgrass, A. (1995). Problem Setting Within Prevalent Metaphors of Design. *Design Issues, 11*(2), 31-61.
Crary, J. (1992). *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (pbk ed.). Cambridge: MA: The MIT Press.
Crick, F. C. (1994). *The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul.* New York: Scribner.
Crick, F. C., & Koch, C. (1990). Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness. *Seminars in the Neurosciences, 2*, 263-275.
Crick, F. C., & Koch, C. (2004). A Framework for Consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences III* (pp. 1133-1143). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Croce, B. (1970). Art as Intuition. In M. Weitz (Ed.), *Problems in Aesthetics* (2nd ed., pp. 93-107). New York: Macmillan.
Crowther, P. (2002). *The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art* (Reprinted ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Crozier, W. R., & Greenhalgh, P. (1992). Beyond Relativism and Formalism: The Empathy Principle. *Leonardo, 25*(1), 83-87.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). Does Overinclusiveness Equal Creativity. *Psychological Inquiry, 4*(3), 188-189.
Culler, J. (1982). *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Currie, G. (1995). Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science. In M. Davies & T. Stone (Eds.), *Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications* (pp. 151-169). Oxford: Blackwell.
Currie, G., & Ravenscroft, I. (1997). Mental Simulation and Motor Imagery. *Philosophy of Science, 64*(1), 161-180.
Daddesio, T. C. (1995). *On Minds and Symbols: The Relevance of Cognitive Science for Semiotics*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Damasio, A. R. (1998). Investigating the Biology of Consciousness. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 353*(1377: The Conscious Brain: Normal and Abnormal), 1879-1882.
Damasio, A. R. (2000). *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness*. London: Vintage, Random House.
Danto, A. (1964). The Artworld. *Journal Of Philosophy, 61*(19), 571-584.
Danto, A. (1982). Depiction and Description. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43*, 1-18.
Davey, N. (1999). The Hermeneutics of Seeing. In I. Heywood & B. Sandywell (Eds.), *Interpreting Visual Culture: Explorations in the Hermeneutics of the Visual* (pp. 3-29). London: Routledge.
Davidson, J. E., & Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.). (2003). *The Psychology of Problem Solving*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davies, S. (1991). *Definitions of Art*. Ithaca: New York: Cornell University Press.
Davis, D. (2008). *First We See: The National Review of Visual Education*. Canberra: The Australian Government: Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations.
Davis, J., & Gardner, H. (1992). The cognitive revolution: Consequences for the understanding and education of the child as artist. In B. Reimer & R. A. Smith (Eds.), *The arts, education, and aesthetic knowing: Ninety-first yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (pp. 92-123, Part II). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
de Certeau, M. (1988). *The Practice of Everyday Life* (S. Rendall, Trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
de Duve, T. (2008). Do Artists Speak on Behalf of All of Us? In D. Costello & D. Willsdon (Eds.), *The Life and Death of Images* (pp. 140-156). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
de Man, P. (1986). *Resistance to Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, G. (1984). *Kant's Critical Philosophy* (H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Deleuze, G., & Parnet, C. (2002). *Dialogues II* (H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, Trans.). London: Continuum.
Dickie, G. (1977). Defining Art. In G. Dickie & R. J. Sclafani (Eds.), *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (pp. 500-515). New York: St. Martin's Press.
Dickie, G. (1984). *The Art Circle: A Theory of Art*. New York: Haven Publications.

Dickie, G., & Sclafani, R. J. (1977). Traditional Theories of the Aesthetic and Contemporary Discussions of These Theories. In G. Dickie & R. J. Sclafani (Eds.), *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (pp. 566-568). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Dikovitskaya, M. (2005). *Visual Culture: The Study of the Visual after the Cultural Turn*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Druckery, T. (1996). *Electronic Culture: Technology and Visual Representation*. New York: Aperture.

Duncum, P. (1982a). A Reply to Donald Richardson. *Journal of the Institute of Art Education, 6*(3), 57-59.

Duncum, P. (1982b). Aesthetics: A Fundamental Experience, A Reply to June Parrott. *Journal of the Institute of Art Education, 6*(3), 67-68.

Duncum, P. (1982c). Towards Locating Children's Spontaneous Drawings During Middle Childhood within Art Education. *Journal of the Institute of Art Education, 6*(1), 69-86.

Duncum, P. (1987). What, Even Dallas? Popular Culture Within the Art Curriculum. *Studies in Art Education, 29*(1), 6-16.

Duncum, P. (1990a). Clearing the Decks for Dominant Culture: Some First Principles for a Contemporary Art Education. *Studies in Art Education, 31*(4), 207-215.

Duncum, P. (1990b). Responding to the High Culture Critique of Popular Culture. *Australian Art Education, 14*(1), 12-24.

Duncum, P. (1991). Articulating a Cultural Literacy Curriculum. *Australian Art Education, 15*(2), 30-36.

Duncum, P. (1993). Beyond the Fine Art Ghetto: Why the Visual Arts Are Important in Education. In *Studies in Education and the Arts No. 2 (monograph)*. Victoria: Arts Ed Press, Deaking University.

Duncum, P. (1997). Art Education for New Times. *Studies in Art Education, 38*(2), 69-79.

Duncum, P. (1999a). Theorizing an Art Education of Everyday Aesthetics. *Canadian Review of Art Education, 26*(1), 44-56.

Duncum, P. (1999b). A Case for an Art Education of Everyday Aesthetic Experiences. *Studies in Art Education, 40*(4), 295-311.

Duncum, P. (2000). How Art Education Can Contribute to the Globalization of Culture. *Journal of Art and Design Education (JADE), 19*(2), 170-180.

Duncum, P. (2001). Visual Culture: Developments, Definitions, and Directions for Art Education. *Studies in Art Education, 42*(2), 101-112.

Duncum, P. (2003). The Theories and Practices of Visual Culture in Art Education. *Arts Education Policy Review, 105*(2), 19-25.

Duncum, P. (2007). Aesthetics, Popular Visual Culture, and Designer Capitalism. *Journal of Art and Design Education, 26*(3), 285-295.

Duncum, P. (2008). Holding Aesthetics and Ideology in Tension. *Studies in Art Education, 49*(2), 122-135.

Eagleton, T. (1990). *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Eaton, M. M., & Moore, R. (2002). Aesthetic Experience: Its Revival and Its Relevance to Aesthetic Education. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 36*(2), 9-23.

Eco, U. (1986). *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Eco, U. (1990). *The Limits of Interpretation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Edelman, G. M. (1989). *The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness*. New York: Basic Books.
Edelman, G. M. (2006). *Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Edelman, G. M., & Tononi, G. (2001). *Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination*. London: Penguin.
Efland, A. D. (1990). *A History of Art Education: Intellectual and Social Currents in Teaching the Visual Arts*. New York: Teachers College Press.
Efland, A. D. (1997). *A History of Cognition in Art Education. 1996 Keynote Address* Paper presented at the Seventh Occasional Seminar in Art Education: Continuity and Change in N.S.W. Art Education: The Reinvention of Practices and Content, College of Fine Arts, UNSW.
Efland, A. D. (2002). *Art and Cognition: Integrating the Visual Arts in Curriculum*. New York: Teachers College.
Efland, A. D. (2004). The Entwined Nature of the Aesthetic: A Discourse on Visual Culture. *Studies in Art Education, 45*(3), 234-251.
Eger, J. M. (2004). Nurturing a Creative Community: The Role of Art and Culture in Commerce and Community. *Cosmos*, 1-4.
Ehrenzweig, A. (1993). *The Hidden Order of Art: A Study in the Psychology of Artistic Imagination* (pbk ed.). London: Weidenfeld.
Eisner, E. W. (1989). Slippery Moves and Blind Alleys: My Travels with Absolutism and Relativism in Curriculum Theory. *Curriculum Inquiry, 19*(1), 59-65.
Eisner, E. W. (1992a). Objectivity in Educational Research. *Curriculum Inquiry, 22*(1), 9-15.
Eisner, E. W. (1992b). Are all Causal Claims Positivistic? A Reply to Francis Schrag. *Educational Researcher, 21*(5), 8-9.
Eisner, E. W. (1992c). Introduction to Special Section on Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Relativism. *Curriculum Inquiry, 22*(1), 5-7.
Eisner, E. W. (1993). Forms of Understanding and the Future of Educational Research. *Educational Researcher, 22*(7), 5-11.
Eisner, E. W. (1994). Revisionism in Art Education: Some Comments on the Preceding Articles. *Studies in Art Education, 35*(3), 188-191.
Eisner, E. W. (1996). *Cognition and Curriculum Reconsidered* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
Eisner, E. W. (1998). *The Enlightened Eye: Qualitative Inquiry and the Enhancement of Educational Practice* (pbk ed.). New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Eisner, E. W. (2002). *Arts and the Creation of Mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Eisner, E. W. (2005). Three Rs Are essential, But Don't Forget the A - the Arts. *The Kennedy Center, ArtsEdge: Reprinted by permission from the Stanford University School of Education Alumni Email Newsletter.*
Elkins, J. (1998). *On Pictures and Words That Fail Them*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elkins, J. (2001). *Pictures and Tears: A History of People Who Have Cried in Front of Paintings.* New York: Routledge.
Elkins, J. (2003). *Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction*. New York, London: Routledge.
Elkins, J. (Ed.). (2006). *Art History Versus Aesthetics* (Vol. 1). New York, London,: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

Emmer, M. (2005). Editor's Introduction. In M. Emmer (Ed.), *The Visual Mind II*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Empson, W. (1961). *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. London: Penguin, Chatto and Windus.
Ericsson, K. A. (2003). The Search for General Abilities and Basic Capacities: Theoretical Implications from the Modifiability of Mechanisms Mediating Expert Performance. In R. J. Sternberg & E. L. Grigorenko (Eds.), *The Psychology of Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise* (pp. 93-125). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Esrock, E. (1998). Visual Imagery in Reading. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 462-466). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Estany, A. (2001). The Thesis of Theory-Laden Observation in the Light of Cognitive Psychology. *Philosophy of Science, 68*(2), 203-217.
Eysenck, H. J. (1995). *Genius: The Natural History of Creativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eysenck, M. W., & Keane, M. T. (2005). *Cognitive Psychology: A Student's Handbook* (5th ed.). Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press.
Fabian, J. (1983). *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Falk, J. H. (1998). A Framework for Diversifying Museum Audiences. *Museum News, 77*(5), 36-74.
Falk, J. H., & Dieking, L. D. (1997). School field trips: Assessing their long-term impact. *Curator, 40*(3), 211-218.
Fay, B. (1996). *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Featherstone, M. (1991). *Consumer Culture and Post Modernism*. London Sage.
Feldman, D. H. (1987). Developmental Psychology and Art Education. *Art Education, 36*(2: Art and the Mind), 19-21.
Fenner, D. (1998). Aesthetic Attitude. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 1, pp. 150-153). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feser, E., & Postrel, S. R. (2000). Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle [Electronic Version]. *Reason*, 31, 42-50 from http://www.reason.com/news/show/27599.html.
Feyerabend, P. (1981). *Realism, Rationalism & Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Finnis, J. (2005). Defeasible. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 194). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fish, S. (1980). *Is There A Text In This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Fisher, J. A. (2005). Environmental Aesthetics. In J. Levinson (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 667-678). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Flanagan, O. (2001). *The Science of the Mind* (Reprint, 2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Florida, R. (2007). *The Flight of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition for Talent*. New York: HarperCollins.
Fodor, J. (1975). *The Language of Thought* (Ist ed.). New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
Fodor, J. (1983). *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Fodor, J. (1984). Observation Reconsidered. *Philosophy of Science, 51*(1), 23-43.

Fodor, J. (2001). *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). How Direct is Visual Perception?: Some Reflections on Gibson's 'Ecological Approach'. *Cognition, 9*, 139-196.
Forsey, J. (2003). The Disenfranchisement of Philosophical Aesthetics. *Journal of the History of Ideas, 64*(4), 581-597.
Foster, H. (1988). Preface. In H. Foster (Ed.), *Vision and Visuality* (pp. ix-xiv). Washington: Bay Press.
Fotion, N. (2000). *John Searle*. Twickenham: Acumen.
Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). New York: Harper and Row.
Foucault, M. (2000). *Power* (R. Hurley & et al, Trans.). New York: New Press.
Frackowiak, R. S. J., Friston, K. J., Frith, C. D., et al (Eds.). (2004). *Human Brain Function* (2nd ed.). Amsterdam: Elsevier Academic Press.
Francini, A. (2001). *A Historical Account of the Emergence of Visual Culture in Visual Arts Education: A Case Study of Political Discourse in the Field* Unpublished Honours Thesis, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
Freedman, K. (1997). Postmodernism and Art Education. *Australian Art Education, 20*(1-2), 21-26.
Freedman, K. (1998). Blurring Textual Boundaries. In A. Weate (Ed.), *Occasional Seminar in Art Education, 8: The Forces Underlying Art Educational Developments* (pp. 9-18). Sydney: School of Art Education, College of Fine Arts, University of New South Wales.
Freedman, K. (2000a). Social Perspectives on Art Education in the U.S.: Teaching Visual Culture in a Democracy. *Studies in Art Education, 41*(4), 314-329.
Freedman, K. (2000b). *Neo-Pragmatist Views on Making Meaning: Contemporary Aesthetics in Curriculum.* Paper presented at the 40th NAEA Congress, Los Angeles, USA.
Freedman, K. (2001). How Do We Understand Art: Aesthetics and the problem of meaning in the curriculum. In P. Duncum & T. Bracey (Eds.), *On Knowing Art and Visual Culture* (pp. 34-46). Christchurch: New Zealand: Canterbury University Press.
Freedman, K. (2003). *Teaching Visual Culture: Curriculum, Aesthetics, and the Social Life of Art*. New York: Teachers College Press.
Freeman, N. (1995). Theories of the Mind in Collision. In M. Davies & T. Stone (Eds.), *Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications* (pp. 68-86). Oxford: Blackwell.
Freeman, N. H. (2001). *What is Currently Known About the Mental Work of Children in Making Art?* . Paper presented at the 10th Occasional Seminar in Art Education: Reassessing the Foundations of Art in Education, UNSW.
Friston, K. (2004). Functional Integration in the Brain. In R. S. J. Frackowiak, et al (Ed.), *Human Brain Function* (2nd ed.). London: Elsevier Academic Press.
Frith, C., Friston, K., Liddle, P., & Frackowiak, R. (1991). Willed Action and the Prefrontal Cortex in Man: A Study with PET. *Proceedings: Biological Sciences, 244*(1311), 241-246.
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (1999). Interacting Minds – A Biological Basis. *Science, 286*(5445), 1692-1695.

Fuhrmann, A. (1998). Non-monotonic logic. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Retrieved March 31, 2008, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Y079
Galaburda, A. M., Kosslyn, S. M., & Christen, Y. (2002). Introduction. In A. M. Galaburda, S. M. Kosslyn & Y. Christen (Eds.), *The Languages of the Brain* (pp. 1-14). Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press.
Gallese, V. (2003). The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 358*(1431), 517-528.
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2*(12), 493-501.
Gardner, H. (1983). *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences*. New York: Basic Books.
Gardner, H. (1984). *Art, Mind and Brain*. New York: Basic Books.
Gardner, H. (1987). *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (pbk ed.). New York: Basic Books.
Gardner, H. (1990). *Art Education and Human Development: Occasional Paper 3*. Los Angeles: Getty Publications.
Gardner, H. (1998). A Reply to Perry D. Klein's "Multiplying the Problems of Intelligence by Eight". *Canadian Journal of Education, 23*(1), 96-102.
Gardner, H. (2000). Project Zero: Nelson Goodman's Legacy in Arts Education. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58*(3), 245-249.
Gardner, H. (2003a). Three Distinct Meanings of Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, J. Lautrey & T. Lubart, I (Eds.), *Models of Intelligence: International Perspectives* (pp. 43-54). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Gardner, H. (2003b). Multiple Intelligences After Twenty Years. *Paper presented to the American Educational Research Association*.
Garfield, J. L. (1995). Innateness. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 367-374). Oxford: Blackwell.
Garnham, A. (1995). Cognitive Psychology. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 167-176). Oxford: Blackwell.
Gaver, W. W., Beaver, J., & Benford, S. (2003). Ambiguity as a Resource for Design. *Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems Archive: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference, 5*(1), 233-240.
Gazzaniga, M. S. (Ed.). (2004). *The Cognitive Neurosciences III*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Geertz, C. (1997). From the Native's Point of View. In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and the Emotions* (Current reprint ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gelley, A. (1998). Rhetoric: Exemplarity. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 4, pp. 155-159). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gelman, R. (2000). Domain Specificity and Variability in Cognitive Development. *Child Development, 71*(4), 854-856.
Gero, R. (2006). The Border of the Aesthetic. In J. Elkins (Ed.), *Art History Versus Aesthetics* (Vol. 1, pp. 3-18). New York, London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
Gibson, J. J. (1986). *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Giora, R. (2007). Editorial: Is Metaphor Special? *Brain and Language, 100*, 111-114.

Goldberg, B. (2005). Art of the Narrative: Interpreting Visual Stories *Art Education, 58*(2), 25-32.
Goldstone, R. L., & Rogosky, B. J. (2002). Using Relations Within Conceptual Systems to Translate Across Conceptual Systems. *Cognition, 84*, 295-320.
Gombrich, E. H. (1961). *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gombrich, E. H. (1982). *The Image and the Eye: Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gooding, D. C. (2006). Visual Cognition: Where Cognition and Culture Meet. *Philosophy of Science, 73*(5), 668-698.
Goodman, N. (1968). *Languages of Art*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Goodman, N. (1972). Art and Inquiry. In *Problems and Projects* (pp. 307-321). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Gopnik, A. (1996). Theories and modules; creation myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), *Theories of Theories of Mind* (pp. 169-183). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grafton, S. T., & Ivry, R. B. (2004). The Representation of Action. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences III* (pp. 441-451). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Grewendorf, G., & Meggle, G. (Eds.). (2002). *Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality: Discussions with John R. Searle*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Guyer, P. (1997). *Kant and the Claims of Taste*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2001). Editor's Introduction (P. Guyer & E. Matthews, Trans.). In P. Guyer (Ed.), *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (pp. xiii-lii). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, P. (2005). *Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Habermas, J. (1998). *On the Pragmatics of Communication*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hall, S. (1996). The Meaning of New Times. In D. Morley & K.-H. Chen (Eds.), *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*. London: Routledge.
Hall, S. (1997). The Work of Representation. In S. Hall (Ed.), *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (pp. 13-74). London: Sage.
Hamlyn, D. W. (1959). Aristotle's Account of Aethesis in the De Anima. *The Classical Quarterly, 9*(1), 6-16.
Hamlyn, D. W. (2005). Idealism (Philosophical). In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 414-415). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hamm, V. M. (1937). Addison and the Pleasures of the Imagination. *Modern Language Notes, 52*(7), 498-500.
Hampton, J. A., & Moss, H. E. (2003). Concepts and Meaning: Introduction to the Special Issue on Conceptual Representation. *Language and Cognitive Processes, 18*(5/6), 506-512.
Hanson, N. (1969). *Perception and Discovery: An Introduction to Scientific Inquiry*. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper.
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. *Philosophical Perspectives, 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind*, 31-51.

Harré, R. (1983). *Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harris, C. (Ed.). (1999). *Art and Innovation: The Xerox PARC Artist-in-Residence Program*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Harris, C. (1999). Editor's Introduction. In C. Harris (Ed.), *Art and Innovation: The Xerox PARC Artist-in-Residence Program*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Harris, M. D. (2006). *Colored Pictures: Race and Visual Representation* (pbk ed.). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Harrison, A. (1978). *Making and Thinking: A Study in Intelligent Activities*. Plymouth: The Harvester Press.
Harrison, A. (1991). A minimal syntax for the pictorial: The pictorial and the linguistic - analogies and disanalogies. In K. S & I. Gaskell (Eds.), *The Language of Art History* (pp. 213-239). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harrison, A. (1997). *Philosophy and the Arts: Seeing and Believing*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1979). *Hegel's Introduction to Aesthetics* (T. M. Knox, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heid, K. (2005). Aesthetic Development: A Cognitive Experience. *Art Education, 58*(5), 48-53.
Heil, J. (2004). *Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Helm, B. W. (2007). *Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hempel, C. (1970). *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*. New York: The Free Press.
Hermerén, G. (1975). Intention and Interpretation in Literary Criticism. *New Literary History, 7*(1), 57-82.
Hershfield, J. (2005). Is There Life After the Death of the Computational Theory of Mind. *Minds and Machines, 15*(2), 183-194.
Herwitz, D. (1998). Pleasure. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 4, pp. 1-6). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heywood, I. (1997). *Social Theories of Art: A Critique*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press.
Heywood, I. (1999). 'Ever More Specific;' Practices and perceptions in art and ethics. In I. Heywood & B. Sandywell (Eds.), *Interpreting Visual Culture: Explorations in the Hermeneutics of the Visual* (pp. 198-217). London: Routledge.
Heywood, I., & Sandywell, B. (Eds.). (1999). *Interpreting Visual Culture: Explorations in the Hermeneutics of the Visual*. London: Routledge.
Heywood, I., & Sandywell, B. (1999). Introduction: explorations in the hermeneutics of vision. In I. Heywood & B. Sandywell (Eds.), *Interpreting Visual Culture: Explorations in the Hermeneutics of the Visual* (pp. ix-xviii). London: Routledge.
Hobson, M. (1982). *The Object of Art: The Theory of Illusion in Eighteenth Century France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Holly, M. A. (2003). Now and Then. *Journal of Visual Culture, 2*(2), 238-242.
Holly, M. A., & Moxey, K. (2002). Editors' Introduction. In M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies* (pp. vii-xvii). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Holly, M. A., & Moxey, K. (Eds.). (2002). *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hookway, C. J. (2005). Abduction. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hooper-Greenhill, E. (1999). *The Educational Role of the Museum* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Hooper-Greenhill, E. (2000). *Museums and the Interpretation of Visual Culture*. London: Routledge.
Hopkins, R. (1995). Explaining Depiction. *The Philosophical Review, 104*(3), 425-455.
Hopkins, R. (2007). Critical Reasoning and Critical Perception. In M. Kieran & D. M. McIver Lopes (Eds.), *Knowing Art* (pp. 137-153). Dordrecht: The Netherlands: Springer.
Horn, J. (2005). Epiphenomenalism. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 258-259). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horowitz, G. (1998). Ernst Hans Josef Gombrich. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 315-319). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Howells, R. (2003). *Visual Culture* (pbk ed.). Cambridge, U. K: Polity Press.
Hughes, R. (1991). *The Shock of the New*. New York: Knopf.
Hunt, E. (1989). Cognitive Science: Definition, Status, and Questions. *Annual Review of Psychology, 40*, 603-629.
Hyman, J. (2006). *The Objective Eye: Color, Form, and Reality in the Theory of Art*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
jagodzinski, j. (2008). Postmetaphysical Vision: Art Education's Challenge In an Age of Globalized Aesthetics (A Mondofesto). *Studies in Art Education, 49*(2), 147-160.
Janks, H. (2002). Critical Literacy: Beyond Reason. *The Australian Educational Researcher, 29*(1), 7-277.
Jay, M. (1994). *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (pbk ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jay, M. (1999). The Menace of Consilience; Keeping the Disciplines Unreconciled: unpublished manuscript (pp. 1-19): University of California: Berkeley.
Jay, M. (2002). Cultural Relativism and the Visual Turn. *Journal of Visual Culture, 1*(3), 267-278.
Jonas, H. (1966). *The Phenomenon of Life: Towards a Philosophical Biology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, A. L. (1993). Exploding Canons: The Anthropology of Museums. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 22*, 201-220.
Kanatani, K., & Prabhu, V. (1996). Instructional Resources: Artists Comment on Museum Practices. *Art Education, 49*(2), 25-32.
Kant, I. (1999). *Critique of Pure Reason* (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (2001). *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (P. Guyer & E. Matthews, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1996). *Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science* (pbk ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Keifer-Boyd, K. (1996). Interfacing Hypermedia and the Internet with Critical Inquiry in the Arts: Preservice Training. *Art Education, 49*(6, Art Education Reform and New Technologies), 33-41.

Keifer-Boyd, K. (2003). A Pedagogy to Expose and Critique Gendered Cultural Stereotypes Embedded in Art Interpretations *Studies in Art Education, 44*(4), 315-334.
Keifer-Boyd, K., Amburgy, P. M., & Knight, W. B. (2003). Three Approaches to Teaching Visual Culture in K-12 School Contexts. *Art Education, 56*(2), 44-51.
Keil, F. C. (1989). *Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kelly, M. (1998). Preface. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 1, pp. ix-xvii). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kemal, S., & Gaskell, I. (2006). Interests, Values, and Explanations. In S. Kemal & I. Gaskell (Eds.), *Explanation and Value in the Arts* (Digital Print ed., pp. 1-42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kemal, S., & Gaskell, I. (Eds.). (2006). *Explanation and Value in the Arts* (digital print ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kemp, M. (1987). Perspective and Meaning: Illusion, Allusion and Collusion. In A. Harrison (Ed.), *Philosophy and the Visual Arts: Seeing and Abstracting* (pp. 255-276). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Kemp, M. (1989). The 'Super-artist' as Genius: The Sixteenth Century View. In P. Murray (Ed.), *Genius: The History of an Idea* (pp. 32-53). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Kemp, M. (1990). *The Science of Art: Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.
Kemp, M. (2000). *Visualizations: the Nature Book of Art and Science*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kemp, M. (2006). *Seen | Unseen: Art, Science, and Intuition from Leonardo to the Hubble Telescope* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Khalidi, M. A. (2001). Innateness and Domain Specificity. *Philosophical Studies, 105*, 191-210.
Kieran, M., & McIver Lopes, D. M. (Eds.). (2007). *Knowing Art: Essays in Aesthetics and Epistemology* (Vol. 107). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
Kim, J.-W. (1995). Mental Causation in Searle's "Biological Naturalism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55*(1), 189-194.
Kirby, J. T. (1996). Classical Greek Origins of Western Aesthetic Theory. In B. Allert (Ed.), *Languages of Visuality: Crossings Between Science, Art, Politics, and Literature* (pp. 29-45). Detroit: Kritik.
Klein, P. D. (1997). Multiplying the Problems of Intelligence by Eight: A Critique of Gardner's Theory. *Canadian Journal of Education, 22*(4), 377-394.
Kneller, J. (1998). Disinterestedness. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 59-64). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knight, D. (2005). Aesthetics and Cultural Studies. In J. Levinson (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 783-795). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2006). The Social Nature of Perception and Action. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15*(3), 99-104.
Koch, C. (2004a). Introduction to Section X, Consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences III* (pp. 1107-1109). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Koch, C. (2004b). *The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach*. Englewood, Colorado: Roberts and Company Publishers.
Koepsell, D., & Moss, L. S. (Eds.). (2003). *John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kosslyn, S. M. (2002). Einstein's Mental Images: The Role of Visual, Spatial, and Motoric Representations In A. M. Galaburda, S. M. Kosslyn & Y. Christen (Eds.), *The Languages of the Brain*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kosslyn, S. M., Ganis, G., & Thompson, W. L. (2003). Mental Imagery: against the nihilistic hypothesis. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7*(3), 109-111.
Kosslyn, S. M., & Hatfield, G. (1984). Representation Without Symbol Systems. *Social Research, 51*(4), 1019-1045.
Krauss, R. (1986). *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Krausz, M. (1993). *Rightness and Reasons: Interpretation in Cultural Practices*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Krausz, M. (1997). Rightness and Reasons: A Reply to Stecker. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55*(4), 415-418.
Krausz, M. (1998). Interpretation in Art. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 520-523). New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, D., et al. (1995). Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 60*(4: Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition).
Kuhn, T. (1996). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (3rd ed.). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kwak, N., Dhavan, V. S., & Holbert, R. L. (2004). Connecting, Trusting, and Participating: The Direct and Interactive Effects of Social Associations *Political Research Quarterly, 57*(4), 643-652.
Lakoff, G. (1993). Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd ed., pp. 202-251). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*. New York: Basic Books.
Lamarque, P. (2006). Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries. In M. Kieran (Ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lamarque, P., & Olsen, S. H. (Eds.). (2004). *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art - The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lange, M. (2007). Our Logical Empiricist Heritage: Introduction. In M. Lange (Ed.), *Philosophy of Science: An Anthology* (pp. 3-9). Oxford: Blackwell.
Langer, S. (1974). *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lash, S., & Urry, J. (1994). *Economies of Signs and Space*. London: Sage.
LeBoeuf, R. A., & Shafir, E. B. (2005). Decision Making. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning* (pp. 243-265). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lee, B. (1997). *Talking Heads: Language, Metalanguage, and the Semiotics of Subjectivity* Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Lehrer, K. (2007). Knowing Content in the Visual Arts. In M. Kieran & D. McIver Lopes (Eds.), *Knowing Art: Essays in Aesthetics and Epistemology* (pp. 1-18). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
Lepore, E., & Van Gulick, R. (Eds.). (1993). *John Searle and His Critics* (pbk ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Levi, A. W., & Smith, R. A. (1991). *Art Education : A Critical Necessity*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Levinson, J. (1979). Defining Art Historically. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 19*, 232-250.
Levinson, J. (1989). Refining Art Historically. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 47*(1), 21-33.
Levinson, J. (1993). Extending Art Historically. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism: Philosophy and the Histories of the Arts, 51*(3), 411-423.
Levinson, J. (1994). Being Realistic About Aesthetic Properties. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52*(3), 351-354.
Levinson, J. (2006). *Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levinson, J. (Ed.). (2005). *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* (pbk ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levinson, J., & Matravers, D. (2005). Aesthetic Properties: II Jerrold Levinson. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 79*(1), 211-227.
Lewis, C. S. (1936). Genius and Genius. *The Review of English Studies, 12*(46), 189-194.
Light, A., & Smith, J. M. (Eds.). (2005). *The Aesthetics of Everyday Life*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lind, R. (1992). The Aesthetic Essence of Art. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 50*(2), 117-129.
Lindberg, D. C. (1981). *Theories of Vision From Al-Kindi to Kepler* (pbk ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Little, W., Fowler, H. W., Coulson, J., Onions, C. T., & Friedrichsen, G. W. S. (Eds.). (1975). *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles* (3rd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Llinas, R., Ribary, U., Contreras, D., & Pedroarena, C. (1998). The Neuronal Basis for Consciousness. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 353*(1377, The Conscious Brain: Normal and Abnormal), 1841-1849.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1992). *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (reprint from 1966 ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Lovink, G. (2002). *Uncanny Networks*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Lunenfield, P. (1999). Editor's Introduction. In P. Lunenfield (Ed.), *The Digital Dialectic: New Essays on New Media*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
MacDougall, D. (1997). The Visual in Anthropology. In M. Banks & H. Morphy (Eds.), *Rethinking Visual Anthropology* (pp. 276-294). New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
MacEachren, A. M. (2004). *How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design*. New York: The Guilford Press.

Machery, E. (2005). You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and the Language of Thought. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56*(3), 469-485.
Macknik, S. L., Martinez-Conde, S., & Haglund, M. M. (2000). The Role of Spatiotemporal Edges in Visibility and Visual Masking. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97*(13), 7556-7560.
Malek, J. (1980). Isaac D'Israeli, William Godwin, and the 18th Century Controversy Over Innate and Acquired Genius. *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature, 34*(1), 47-64.
Mandoki, K. (2007). *Everyday Aesthetics: Prosaics, the Play of Culture and Social Identities.* Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.
Manns, J. W. (1998). *Aesthetics.* New York: M. E. Sharpe,.
Manovich, L. (2001a). *The Language of New Media*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Manovich, L. (2001b). Post media aesthetics. In *dis_Locations* (pp. 10-20): ZKM Center for Art and Media, Karlsruhe/The Centre for Interactive Cinema Research, College of Fine Arts, University of New South Wales,.
Maquet, J. (1990). Perennial Modernity: Forms as Aesthetic and Symbolic. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 24*(4), 47-58.
Margalit, A. (1998). Nelson Goodman: Survey of Thought. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 319-322). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marr, D. (1983). *Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information* (pbk ed.). Oxford: W. H. Freeman
Mashal, N., & Faust, M. (2008). Right hemisphere sensitivity to novel metaphoric relations: Application of the signal detection theory. *Brain and Language, 104,* 103-112.
Mathews, A., Yiend, J., & Lawrence, A. D. (2004). Individual Differences in the Modulation of Fear-Related Brain Activation by Attentional Control *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16*(10), 1683-1694.
Matravers, D., & Levinson, J. (2005). Aesthetic Properties: I Derek Matravers. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 79*(1), 191-210.
Matthews, J., & Urmacher, P. B. (2005). An Interview With Maxine Greene. In P. B. Urmacher & J. Matthews (Eds.), *Intricate Palette: Working the Ideas of Elliot Eisner* (pp. 219-229). New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.
May, T. (1995). *The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism.* University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
McIver Lopes, D. (1998). Depiction. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 4, pp. 139-142). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McQuillan, M. (2001). *Paul de Man.* London: Routledge.
McRobbie, A. (1994). *Postmodernism and Popular Culture*. London: Routledge.
Melville, S. (1991). Reflections on Bryson. In N. Bryson, M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation* (pp. 74-78). Cambridge: Polity.
Miller, D. (2001). The Fame of Trinnis: Websites as Traps. In C. Pinney & N. Thomas (Eds.), *Beyond Aesthetics: Art and the Technologies of Enchantment* (pp. 137-155). Oxford: Berg.

Miller, N. (2004). Hauntology and History in Jacques Derrida's Spectres of Marx. Retrieved September 1, 2008, from www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/taller/miller_100304.pdf
Mirzoeff, N. (Ed.). (2002). *The Visual Culture Reader* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Mirzoeff, N. (2002a). The Subject of Visual Culture. In N. Mirzoeff (Ed.), *The Visual Culture Reader* (2nd ed., pp. 3-23). London: Routledge.
Mirzoeff, N. (2002b). Ghostwriting: Working Out Visual Culture. In M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies* (pp. 189-202). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mitchell, W. J., Inouye, A. S., & Blumenthal, M. S. (Eds.). (2003). *Beyond Productivity: Information Technology, Innovation, and Creativity, from the National Research Council Committee of the National Academies.* Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1994). *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1995a). Interdisciplinarity and Visual Culture. *The Art Bulletin, 77*(4), 540-544.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (1995b). What is Visual Culture? In I. Lavin (Ed.), *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside. A Centennial Commemoration of Irwin Panofsky (1892-1968)* (pp. 207-217). Princeton, N. J: Institute for Advanced Study.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2002). Showing Seeing: A Critique of Visual Culture. In M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies* (pp. 231-268). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2003). The Obscure Object of Visual Culture: Response to Mieke Bal's 'Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture'. *Journal of Visual Culture, 2*(2), 249-252.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2005). *What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images.* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Mitchell, W. J. T. (2008). Cloning Terror: The War of Images 2001-4. In D. Costello & D. Willsdon (Eds.), *The Life and Death of Images* (pp. 180-207). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Moxey, K. (2001). *The Practice of Persuasion: Paradox and Power in Art History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Mundt, E. K. (1959). Three Aspects of German Aesthetic Theory. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 18*(3), 287-312.
Murphy, G. L. (2004). *The Big Book of Concepts*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Murphy, G. L., & Medin, D. L. (1985). The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence. *Psychological Review, 92*, 289-316.
Murray, J. H. (1998). *Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Murray, P. (1989). Introduction. In P. Murray (Ed.), *Genius: The History of an Idea* (pp. 1-8). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Myers, J., Hammett, R., & McKillop, A. M. (1998). Opportunities for Critical Literacy and Pedagogy in Student-Authored Hypermedia. In D. Reinking, M. C. McKenna, L. D. Labbo & R. D. Kieffer (Eds.), *Handbook of Literacy and Technology: Transformations in a Post-Typographic World* (pp. 63-78). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

NACCCE. (1999). *All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education.* UK: National Advisory Committee in Creative and Cultural Education.
Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? . *The Philosophical Review, 83*(4), 435-450.
Nagel, T. (1989). *The View From Nowhere* (pbk ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
National Research Council. (2000). *How People Learn: Brain, Mind, Experience, and School: from the Committee on Developments in the Science of Learning and the Committee on Learning Research and Educational Practice*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Neander, K. (1991). Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense. *Philosophy of Science, 58*(2), 168-184.
Nehamas, A. (1998). Richard Shusterman on Pleasure and Aesthetic Experience. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56*(1), 49-51.
Nesetril, J. (2005). Aesthetics for Computers, or How to Measure Harmony. In M. Emmer (Ed.), *The Visual Mind II*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Nochlin, L. (1999). *Representing Women*. London: Thames and Hudson.
Noë, A. (2004). *Action in Perception*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Norris, C. (1997). *Against Relativism: Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Norris, C. (2002). *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice* (3rd ed.). London, New York: Routledge.
Novitz, D. (1990). The Integrity of Aesthetics. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 48*(1), 9-20.
Novitz, D. (1998). Epistemology and Aesthetics. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 2, pp. 120-122). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Olkowski, D. (1999). *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Onians, R. B. (1973). *Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate* (2nd Edition ed.). New York: Arno Press.
Ortony, A. (Ed.). (1993). *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ortony, A. (1993). Metaphor, Language, and Thought. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd ed., pp. 1-16). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Osborne, H. (1979). Some Theories of Aesthetic Judgment. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 38*(2), 135-144.
Osborne, P. (Ed.). (2000). *From an Aesthetic Point of View: Philosophy, Art and the Senses*. London: Serpent's Tail.
Packer, M. J., & Goicoechea, J. (2000). Sociocultural and Constructivist Theories of Learning: Ontology, Not Just Epistemology. *Educational Psychologist, 35*(4), 227-241.
Paller, B. T. (1988). A Defense of a Non-Computational, Interactive Model of Visual Observation. *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy Of Science Association, 1*, 135-142.
Panksepp, J., & Panksepp, J. B. (2001). A synopsis of "The seven sins of evolutionary psychology". *Evolution and Cognition, 7*, 56-80.
Papineau, D. (2005). Biology, Philosophical Problems of. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 97-98). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parsons, M. (1989). *How We Understand Art: A Cognitive Development Account of Aesthetic Experience* (pbk ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parsons, M. (2002). Aesthetic Experience and the Construction of Meanings. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 36*(2), 24-27.
Parsons, M. J., & Blocker, H. G. (1993). *Aesthetics and Education: Disciplines in Art Education* (pbk ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Pascual-Leone, J. (1990). Intension, Intention, and Early Precursors of Will: Constructive Epistemological Remarks on Lewis's Research Paradigm. *Psychological Inquiry, 1*(3), 258-260.
Passmore, J. (1972). History of Art and History of Literature: A Commentary. *New Literary History, 3*(3: Literary and Art History), 575-587.
Pateman, T. (1991). *Key Concepts: A Guide to Aesthetics, Criticism and the Arts in Education*. London: The Falmer Press.
Patton, P., & Smith, T. (2006). Editors' Introduction. In P. Patton & T. Smith (Eds.), *Jacques Derrida: Deconstruction Engaged; The Sydney Seminars*. Sydney: Power Publications.
Pearson, P. (1995). Looking for Culture: Implications of Two Forms of Social Theory for Art Educational Theory and Practice. *Australian Art Education 18*(3), 6-18.
Pellegrino, J. W., Baxter, G. P., & Glaser, R. (1999). Addressing the "Two Disciplines" Problem: Linking Theories of Cognition and Learning with Assessment and Instructional Practice. *Review of Research in Education, 24*, 307-353.
Penfield, W. (1975). *The Mystery of the Mind: A Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Petrie, H. G., & Oshlag, R. S. (1993). Metaphor and Learning. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd ed., pp. 579-609). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Petts, J. (2008). Book Review: The Aesthetics of Everyday Life. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 42*(1), 116-121.
Pfeifer, R. (1996). Symbols, Patterns and Behavior: Beyond the Information-Processing Metaphor. In A. Kent & J. G. Williams (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Microcomputers: Volume 17 - Strategies in the Microprocess Industry to TCP/IP Internetworking: Concepts: Architecture: Protocols, and Tools* (pp. 253-275). New York: Marcel Dekker.
Phelps, E. A. (2004). The Human Amygdala and Awareness: Interactions Between Emotion and Cognition. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences III* (pp. 1005-1015). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Pinder, K. N. (Ed.). (2002). *Race-ing Art History: Critical Readings in Race and Art History*. London: Routledge.
Pinker, S. (1999). *How the Mind Works* (pbk ed.). London: Penguin.
Plato. (1987). *The Republic* (D. Lee, Trans. 2nd ed.). London: Penguin.
Podro, M. (1982). *The Critical Historians of Art*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Podro, M. (1987). Depiction and the Golden Calf. In A. Harrison (Ed.), *Philosophy and the Visual Arts: Seeing and Abstracting* (pp. 3-21). Dordrecht: D. Reidel/Kluwer Academic.
Podro, M. (2006). Fiction and Reality in Painting. In S. Kemal & I. Gaskell (Eds.), *Explanation and Value in the Arts* (Digital Print Transfer ed., pp. 43-54). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pojman, L. P. (1999). Relativism. In R. Audi (Ed.), *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 790). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pollock, G. (2002). The Aesthetics of Difference. In M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Art History, Aesthetics, Visual Studies* (pp. 147-174). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pollock, G. (2003). Responses to Mieke Bal's 'Visual Essentialism and the Object of Visual Culture': Visual Culture and its Discontents: Joining in the Debate. *Journal of Visual Culture, 2*(2), 253-260.
Pollock, G. (2008). Griselda Pollock: Research Interests [Electronic Version]. Retrieved 7th June, 2008 from http://www.leeds.ac.uk/fine_art/people/staff/gp/research.html.
Polyani, M. (1958). *Personal Knowledge: Toward a Post-Critical Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Popkewitz, T., & Freedman, K. (1984). Culture, Art and Consciousness: On Social Transformation and the Production of Myths in Science and Curriculum. *Contemporary Education Review, 3*(1), 269-280.
Preston, J., & Bishop, M. (Eds.). (2002). *Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence*. Oxford: Oxford University and Clarendon Press
Putnam, H. (1992). *Realism with a Human Face*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). *Computation and Cognition*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1999). Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22*(3), 341-365.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (2002). Mental Imagery: In search of a theory. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22*, 157-238.
Rampley, M. (2005a). Visual Culture and the Meanings of Culture. In M. Rampley (Ed.), *Exploring Visual Culture: Definitions, Concepts, Contexts* (pp. 5-17). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Rampley, M. (2005b). Visual Rhetoric. In M. Rampley (Ed.), *Exploring Visual Culture: Definitions, Concepts, Contexts* (pp. 133-148). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Rampley, M. (2005c). Introduction. In M. Rampley (Ed.), *Exploring Visual Culture: Definitions, Concepts, Contexts* (pp. 1-4). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Rée, J. (2000). The Aesthetic Theory of the Arts. In P. Osborne (Ed.), *From an Aesthetic Point of View: Philosophy, Art and the Senses* (pp. 57-70). London: Serpent's Tail.
Rodowick, D. N. (1997). *Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine*. Durham: Duke University Press.
Rorty, R. (1976). Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture. *Georgia Review, 30*, 757-771.
Rorty, R. (1999). *Philosophy and Social Hope*. London: Penguin.
Rose, G. (2001). *Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials*. London: Sage.
Rosenblum, R. (1994). *Modern Painting and the Northern Romantic Tradition: Friedrich to Rothko* (pbk reprint ed.). London: Thames and Hudson.

Roskill, M. (2006). What makes the visual arts so different, so appealing? In S. Kemal & I. Gaskell (Eds.), *Explanation and Value in the Arts* (Digital Print ed., pp. 94-108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, J. (2005). The Importance of Being Artist: Reflections on Elliot Eisner. In P. B. Urmacher & J. Matthews (Eds.), *Intricate Palette: Working the Ideas of Elliot Eisner* (pp. 65-73). New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Rueda, M. R., Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (2005). The Development of Executive Attention: Contributions to the Emergence of Self-Regulation. *Developmental Neuropsychology, 28*(2), 573-594.
Sack, W. (1998). Artificial Intelligence. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 1, pp. 123-130). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Said, E. (1979). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
Said, E. (1993). *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Knopf.
Sakamoto, G. (1998). Resemblance. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 4, pp. 142-148). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Samuels, M. (2006). Aesthetic Theories. In L. D. Kritzman (Ed.), *The Columbia History of Twentieth Century French Thought* (pp. 134-136). New York: Columbia University Press.
Sankey, H. (1993). Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability. *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44*(4), 759-774.
Sartwell, C. (2005). The Aesthetics of the Everyday. In J. Levinson (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 761-770). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schirrmacher, R. (2002). *Art and Creative Development for Young Children*. Albany: New York: Delmar Publications.
Schneider, W., Schumann-Hengsteler, R., & Sodian, B. (Eds.). (2005). *Young Children's Cognitive Development: Interrelationships Among Executive Functioning, Working Memory, Verbal Ability and Theory of Mind.* New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Scholl, B. J., & Leslie, A. M. (2001). Mind, Modules, and Meta-Analysis. *Child Development, 72*(3), 696-701.
Schwartz, R. (2001). Vision and Cognition in Picture Perception. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62*(3), 707-719.
Scruton, R. (2004). Photography and Representation. In P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art* (pp. 359-374). Oxford: Blackwell.
Searle, J. R. (1969). *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1978). Literal Meaning. *Erkenntnis, 13*, 207-224.
Searle, J. R. (1979a). What Is an Intentional State? *Mind, 88*(349), 74-92.
Searle, J. R. (1979b). *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1980a). Minds, Brains, and Programs. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3*, 417-424.
Searle, J. R. (1980b). "Las Meninas" and the Paradoxes of Pictorial Representation. *Critical Inquiry, 6*(3), 477-488.
Searle, J. R. (1983). *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1984a). *Minds, Brains, Science*. London: Penguin.

Searle, J. R. (1984b). Intentionality and Its Place in Nature. *Synthese, 61*(1), 3-16.
Searle, J. R. (1990a). Collective Intentions and Actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan & M. Pollack, E (Eds.), *Intentions in Communication* (pp. 401-415). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Searle, J. R. (1990b). Is the Brain a Digital Computer? *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 64*(3), 21-37.
Searle, J. R. (1991). Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality. *Philosophical Issues, 1*(Consciousness), 45-66.
Searle, J. R. (1993a). Rationality and Realism, What is at Stake? *Daedalus, 122*(4), 55-83.
Searle, J. R. (1993b). Metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (2nd ed., pp. 83-111). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1994a). *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Paperback ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Searle, J. R. (1994b). The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and Lepore. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54*(4), 847-855.
Searle, J. R. (1994c). Literary Theory and Its Discontents. *New Literary History, 25*(3), 637-667.
Searle, J. R. (1995a). *The Construction of Social Reality*. London: Penguin.
Searle, J. R. (1995b). Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55*(1), 217-232.
Searle, J. R. (1997). The Explanation of Cognition. In J. Preston (Ed.), *Thought and Language* (pp. 103-126). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1998a). How to Study Consciousness Scientifically. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 353*(1377), 1935-1942.
Searle, J. R. (1998b). *The Mystery of Consciousness*. London: Granta Books.
Searle, J. R. (1999). *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*. London: Phoenix Books.
Searle, J. R. (2000a). Consciousness. *Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23*, 557-578.
Searle, J. R. (2000b). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain. *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7*(10), 3-22.
Searle, J. R. (2001). *Rationality in Action.* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Searle, J. R. (2002a). *Consciousness and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. R. (2002b). Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. In G. Grewendorf & G. Meggle (Eds.), *Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality: Discussions with John R. Searle* (pp. 3-16). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Searle, J. R. (2004a). *The Phenomenological Illusion.* Paper presented at the Experience and Analysis Erfahrung und Analyse: August 8-14, 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel.
Searle, J. R. (2004b). *Mind: A Brief Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. R. (2004c). Comments on Noë and Thompson, 'Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness?' *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11*(1), 80-82.
Searle, J. R. (2005). Consciousness, Its Irreducibility. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 161). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. R. (2006a). Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles. *Anthropological Theory, 6*(1), 12-29.

Searle, J. R. (2006b). Reality and relativism: Shweder on a which? hunt. *Anthropological Theory, 6*(1), 112-121.
Searle, J. R. (2007). *Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Seel, M. (2005). *Aesthetics of Appearing* (Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Shaftesbury, A. A. C. (1964). *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill.
Shelley, J. (2003). The Problem of Non-Perceptual Art. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 43*(4), 363-378.
Shinamura, A. P. (2000). What is Metacognition? The Brain Knows. *The American Journal of Psychology, 113*(1), 142-146.
Shoemaker, S. (1999). Qualia. In R. Audi (Ed.), *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 762). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shulman, L. S. (2005). Forward. In P. B. Urmacher & J. Matthews (Eds.), *Intricate Palette: Working the Ideas of Elliot Eisner*. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Sibley, F. (2006a). Aesthetic Concepts. In J. Benson, B. Redfern & J. R. Cox (Eds.), *Frank Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics; Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics* (pbk ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sibley, F. (2006b). Aesthetics and the Look of Things. In J. Benson, B. Redfern & J. R. Cox (Eds.), *Frank Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics; Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 24-32). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sibley, F. (2006c). Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic. In J. Benson, B. Redfern & J. R. Cox (Eds.), *Frank Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics; Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 33-51). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sibley, F. (2006d). Colours. In J. Benson, B. Redfern & J. R. Cox (Eds.), *Frank Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics; Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 54-70). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sibley, F. (2006e). Particularity, Art, and Evaluation. In J. Benson, B. Redfern & J. R. Cox (Eds.), *Frank Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics; Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 88-103). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sibley, F. (2006f). General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics. In J. Benson, B. Redfern & J. R. Cox (Eds.), *Frank Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics; Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics* (pbk ed., pp. 104-118). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silvers, A. (2004). Pedagogy and Polemics: Are Art Educators Qualified to Teach Visual Culture? *Art Education Policy Review, 106*(1: Art Education and Visual Culture Studies), 19-23.
Simon, H. A. (1979). Information Processing Models of Cognition. *Annual Review of Psychology, 30*, 363-396.
Skinner, B. F. (1953). *Science and Human Behavior*. New York: Macmillan.
Skinner, B. F. (1982). A Science of Behaviour. In E. Bredo & W. Feinberg (Eds.), *Knowledge and Values in Social and Educational Research*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Slattery, P. (2006). *Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Smith, B. (Ed.). (2003). *John Searle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, P. J. (2003). Responding to Paul Duncum. *Arts Education Policy Review, 105*(2), 25-26.
Smith, R. A. (1995). *Excellence II: The Continuing Quest in Art Education.* Reston, VA: The National Art Education Association.
Smith, R. A. (1999). Justifying Aesthetic Education: Getting It Right. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 33*(4, Special Issue: Musings: Essays in Honour of Bennett Reimer,), 17-28.
Smith, T. (1993). *Making the Modern: Industry Art and Design in America*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Snow, R. E. (1989). Toward Assessment of Cognitive and Conative Structures in Learning. *Educational Researcher, 18*(9), 8-14.
Snowdon, P. (2005). Functionalism. In T. Honderich (Ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* (2nd ed., pp. 324-325). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soltis, J. F. (1978). *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts* (2nd ed.). MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
Sorensen, R. A. (1991). Vagueness within the Language of Thought. *Philosophical Quarterly, 41*(165), 389-413.
Sperber, D. (2002). In Defense of Massive Modularity. In E. Dupoux (Ed.), *Language, Brain and Cognitive Development: Essays in Honour of Jacques Mehler* (pp. 47-57). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Spivey, M. (2008). *The Continuity of Mind.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Squire, L. R., Bloom, F. E., McConnell, S. K., Roberts, J. L., Spitzer, N. C., & Zigmond, M. J. (Eds.). (2003). *Fundamental Neuroscience* (2nd ed.). London: Academic Press/Elsevier Science.
Stecker, R. (1994). Art Interpretation. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 52*(2), 193-206.
Stecker, R. (2001). Only Jerome: A Reply to Noël Carroll. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 41*(1), 76-80.
Steenberg, E. (1992). Verbalizing the Aesthetic Experience. *British Journal of Aesthetics, 32*(4), 342-346.
Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Thinking and Problem Solving* (pp. 263-288). London: Elsevier Academic Press.
Stolnitz, J. (1977). On the Origins of “Aesthetic Disinterestedness”. In George Dickie & Richard J. Sclafani (Eds.), *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (pp. 607-625). New York: St. Martin's Press.
Stone, D. L. (1992). A Descriptive Study of the Art Museum Relative to Schools. *Visual Art Research, 18*(2), 51-61.
Strawson, P. F. (2004). Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art. In P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art* (pp. 237-242). Oxford: Blackwell.
Sturken, M., & Cartwright, L. (2001). *Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Summers, D. (1987). *The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Summers, D. (1998). History of Aisthēsis. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 3, pp. 428-432). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tanner, D. (2005). The Mind's Eye. In P. B. Urmacher & J. Matthews (Eds.), *Intricate Palette: Working the Ideas of Elliot Eisner* (pp. 33-52). New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Tatarkiewicz, W. (1980). *A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics* (C. Kasparek, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff and Kluwer Academic.

Tatarkiewicz, W. (2005). *History of Aesthetics: Volume 3, Modern Aesthetics* (New ed.). London: Continuum.

Tavin, K. (2005). Hauntological Shifts: Fear and Loathing of Popular (Visual) Culture. *Studies in Art Education, 46*(2), 101-117.

Tavin, K. (2007). Eyes Wide Shut: The Use and Uselessness of the Discourse of Aesthetics in Art Education. *Art Education, 60*(2), 40-45.

Tavin, K., Kushins, J., & Elniski, J. (2007). Shaking the Foundations of Postsecondary Art(tist) Education in Visual Culture. *Art Education, 60*(5), 13-19.

Taylor, M. (Ed.). (1986). *Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Thomas, M., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2003). Connectionist Models of Development, Developmental Disorders, and Individual Differences. In R. J. Sternberg, J. Lautrey & T. Lubart, I (Eds.), *Models of Intelligence: International Perspectives* (pp. 133-150). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Throsby, D. (2006). *Does Australia Need a Cultural Policy*. Strawberry Hills: Currency House.

Tompkins, J. P. (Ed.). (1980). *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tononi, G., Edelman, G. M., & Sporns, O. (1998). Complexity and Coherency: Integrating Information in the Brain. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2*(12), 474-484.

Toth, J. A. (2002). When is enough enough? The integration of competing scientific agendas: Commentary on Pylyshyn's 'Mental Imagery: In search of a theory. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22*, 212-213.

Toulmin, S. (1982). The Construal of Reality: Criticism in modern and postmodern science. In W. J. T. Mitchell (Ed.), *The Politics of Interpretation* (pp. 99-118). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Toulmin, S. (2003). *The Uses of Argument* (updated ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1984). *An Introduction to Reasoning* (2nd ed.). New York: Macmillan Publishing.

Townsend, D. (1987). From Shaftesbury to Kant: The Development of the Concept of Aesthetic Experience. *Journal of the History of Ideas, 48*(2), 287-305.

Townsend, D. (1998). Anthony Ashley Cooper. In M. Kelly (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Vol. 1, pp. 445-448). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.). (2007). *Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Urmacher, P. B., & Matthews, J. (Eds.). (2005). *Intricate Palette: Working the Ideas of Elliot Eisner*. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.

van Eck, C., & Winters, E. (2005). Acknowledgements and Introduction. In C. van Eck & E. Winters (Eds.), *Dealing with the Visual: Art History, Aesthetics and Visual Culture* (pp. xv-13). Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.

van Eck, C., & Winters, E. (Eds.). (2005). *Dealing with the Visual: Art History, Aesthetics and Visual Culture*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.
van Inwagen, P. (2001). *Ontology, Identity, and Modality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vernant, J.-P. (1995). Introduction (C. Lambert & T. L. Fagan, Trans.). In J.-P. Vernant (Ed.), *The Greeks* (pp. 1-21). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Vernant, J.-P. (2006). *Myth and Thought Among the Greeks* (J. Lloyd & J. Fort, Trans.). New York: Zone Books.
Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2004). *Handbook of self-regulation: Research, theory, and applications*. New York: Guilford.
von Glasersfeld, E. (1996). *Radical Constructivism*. London: Routledge.
von Wright, G. H. (2004). *Explanation and Understanding* (pbk ed.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Walton, K. L. (1987). Looking at Pictures and Looking at Things. In A. Harrison (Ed.), *Philosophy and the Visual Arts: Seeing and Abstracting* (pp. 277-300). Dordrecht: D. Reidel/Kluwer Academic.
Walton, K. L. (2004). Are Representations Symbols? In P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition* (pp. 349-358). Oxford: Blackwell.
Ward, F. (1995). The Haunted Museum: Institutional Critique and Publicity. *October, 73*, 71-89.
Weitz, M. (2004). The Role of Theory in Aesthetics. In P. Lamarque & S. H. Olsen (Eds.), *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art - The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology* (pp. 12-18). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wenzel, C. H. (2005). *An Introduction to Kant's Aesthetics: Core Concepts and Problems*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Williams, B. L. (1996). An Examination of Art Museum Practices Since 1984. *Studies in Art Education, 38*(1), 34-49.
Williams, R. (1983). *Culture*. London: Fontana.
Williams, R. (1997). *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, B. (1974). One View of the Past and Future of Research in Aesthetic Education. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 8*(3), 59-67.
Wilson, B. (1997). *The Quiet Evolution: Changing the Face of Arts Education*. Los Angeles, CA: Getty Center for Education in the Arts.
Wilson, Brent (2003). Of Diagrams and Rhizomes: Visual Culture, Contemporary Art, and the Impossibility of Mapping the Content of Art Education. *Studies in Art Education, 44*(3), 214-229.
Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. C. (Eds.). (2001). *The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences* (new ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Wilson, Stephen (2003). *Information Arts : Intersections of Art, Science, and Technology* (Reprint ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Winner, E., & Gardner, H. (1993). Metaphor and Irony: Two Levels of Understanding. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (pp. 425-443). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). *Philosophical Investigations* (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans. 2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *On Certainty*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wollheim, R. (1980). *Art and Its Objects* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wollheim, R. (1991a). What the Spectator Sees. In N. Bryson, M. A. Holly & K. Moxey (Eds.), *Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation* (pp. 101-150). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Wollheim, R. (1991b). The Core of Aesthetics. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 25*(1, Special Issue: More Ways of Worldmaking), 37-45.
Wollheim, R. (1998). On Pictorial Representation. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56*(3), 217-226.
Wollheim, R. (2001). On Formalism and Pictorial Organization. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 59*(2), 127-137.
Zeki, S. (1999). *Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.