Border Heterotopias

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BORDER HETEROTOPIAS

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The central argument is that, understood as a heterotopia, the border does not have a static structure; it is not a natural or a fixed entity with a stable identity. On the border all these lines co-exist, working in a continuum, and in their entanglements they alter one another. These three types of lines constantly mutate depending on the discursive and corporeal practices constituting them. It is the ever-shifting, contradictory and uncertain movements of these lines that transform a border into a heterotopia. Heterotopia is in constant transformation. The colonising structures and dominant moral codes of molar lines may temporarily capture this space, while molecular lines may destabilise the operation of established power structures offering the first signals of positive transformations, and thus alternative political imaginations. In this sense, the border does not exhibit a final structure, it is always at the state of uncertainty; it is always on the threshold. Nothing is stable on this space. The border *moves* in every direction in response to and in anticipation of the different lines that enable its construction, preservation, disruption and transformation. As such, the border never settles, it re-begins each time with the ever-shifting entangled movement of its multiple lines. This is where the positive force of border heterotopias lies. Their constant movement is their *potential* to activate a new form of ethics that is cultivated by the politics of becoming-other.

ABSTRACT

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This thesis tracks the moving lines of border heterotopias through a method of 'border nomadology'. It adopts this method to examine the composition, movement and transformation of two border heterotopias: walls in Israel/Palestine; and islands in Australia. An in-depth analysis of these two specific cases suggests that: (1) walls (Israel/ Palestine) and islands (Australia) have played an active role in the practices of occupation and colonisation (2) border heterotopias are not simply the performances of the state and its networks, but they are constructed by and constitutive of multiple actors including those who are considered as the subjects of violent bordering practices (3) the politics of death and oppression may seem to be the only defining features of these violent borders, but their cramped spaces are transgressed in every direction especially when their lines of flight are activated through the affirmative politics of becoming. This analysis shows that an unexpected movement of any kind might arise in the cramped space of the border. Therefore, we cannot conceptualise the border in dualistic terms as either a capturing oppressive apparatus of the sovereign or a space of 'escapes', but a fluid meshwork space. This is the main contribution of this thesis to the contemporary critical scholarship on borders.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AAtW	Anarchists Against the Wall
ACBPS	Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
ACRI	Association for Civil Rights in Israel
ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ANGAU	Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit
AoM	Autonomy of Migration
CAPS	Claims Assistance Provider Scheme
CBC	Cross Border Collective
DDR	*Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (East Germany)
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIBP	Department of Immigration and Border Protection
EU	European Union
GIS	Geographic Information System
GPS	Global Positioning System
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDC	Immigration Detention Centre
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
ISM	International Solidarity Movement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
NSW	New South Wales
NT	Northern Territory

OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
OSB	Operation Sovereign Borders
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RPC	Regional Processing Centres
RSD	Refugee Status Determination
TBT	Transborder Immigrant Tool
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
WA	Western Australia
WZO	World Zionist Organisation

TABLE OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

A STUDY OF BORDERS AS HETEROTOPIAS

1. Preamble

Seventeen July 2011: I am crossing Qalandiya checkpoint, the main and busiest crossing-point between the northern West Bank and Jerusalem. I go through a series of cage-like passages of metal bars and turnstiles before I show my passport to a disinterested young Israel Defence Forces (IDF) soldier behind bullet-proof glass. This is not the first time I have crossed this checkpoint. I have already learnt that the timing is unpredictable – it may take hours or a few minutes. I may be trapped within the remotely operated turnstiles and have to wait helplessly for the buzzing sound; I have already learnt that soldiers can close any line at any moment. I might witness a man or a child forced to remove his shoes or belt. I have already learnt that this so-called 'terminal' is not ordered in the way of airport terminals, which are governed by precise rules. This 'terminal' is a space of uncertainty, anxiety and oppression.

On this particular day, I watch as a Palestinian woman is separated from her three children to cross the narrow turnstile. I ask myself: how do Palestinians endure these practices every day? Is it possible to resist this oppressive, individualising and suffocating apparatus? On the following day I sought a response to these questions from a member of the Alrowwad Center of Culture and Arts located in Aida refugee camp, Bethlehem:

> Being there is an act of resistance. [Israel] forces [us] into exile. We are in a constant resistance. Marrying, falling in love, going to work, going to school, crossing the checkpoint, jumping from checkpoints; these are constant acts of resistance …. What they consider illegal is legal for me.[1]

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[1] Alrowwad Center of Culture and Arts, Interview with the author, Bethlehem, 18 July 2011.

On the way back to the Bethlehem checkpoint after the interview, I am walking next to the Separation Wall (hereafter referred to as the Wall). Under the shadow of watchtowers, I see two children cheerfully drawing a birthday cake on the Wall for their father's birthday. I look at their mothers, who own a souvenir shop next to the Wall, one of whom smiles at me: 'the Wall is now their playground', she says.

That day my conversations with Palestinians led me to question a specific form of political criticism that I had accepted, and which exposes and deconstructs only the horrors of the Wall. Although this form of criticism unsettles the rationality of Israel's matrix of control and foregrounds its historical violence, it is nonetheless restricted to depictions of the Wall as an encapsulating apparatus of Israel's colonising power. This critical view leaves no room to see the Wall's alternative spaces, its cracks – whether large or small – or to imagine the possibility of alternative forms of politics. In seeking to challenge the Wall, I had attributed overwhelming power to it, thereby perceiving the Palestinian as helpless, one who was fully trapped and silenced by this apparatus. As I walked through the checkpoint I realised that my way of thinking had paradoxically reinforced the very border that I wanted to undermine.

That day my encounters with Palestinians reminded me of William Connolly's approach to this problem by means of 'positive ontopolitical interpretation', which merges deconstructive forms of critique with reconstructive methods.[2] This form of interpretation explores and fosters the possibilities for alternative being, while disturbing the settled:

> To practice this mode of interpretation, you project ontopolitical presumptions explicitly into detailed interpretations of actuality, acknowledging that your implicit projections surely exceed your explicit formulation of them and that your formulations exceed your capacity to demonstrate the truth. You challenge closure in the matrix by affirming the contestable character of your own projections, by offering readings of contemporary life that compete with alternative accounts, and by moving back and forth between these two levels.[3]

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[2] William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralisation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) 36.
[3] Ibid. 36.

Immersed in self-reflexive thoughts, I sought a new form of political criticism that reveals different movements and moments of contestation – a form that disturbs the Wall's seemingly concrete structure without idealising these movements and by recognising their limitations. I asked myself: how and what forms of alternative politics emerge in this colonised space? How can we address the emergence of new subjectivities that may – or may not – traverse existing regimes of control? What forms of critique can expose the existence of alternative politics without downplaying the violence of established border politics and their destructive and colonising power? What kind of a critical language can reveal the multiple possibilities of borders? As I walked through the Bethlehem checkpoint that day, I asked myself how to perceive borders not only as spaces of death and suffering – of mobilised horror – but as spaces of becoming that are full of transformations, uncertainties, ambiguities, contradictions, and paradoxes?

A few years later, in 2015, I read the news of the new fence Hungary had erected on its border with Serbia and the government's perception of the refugee crisis. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán referred to the arrival of refugees as a 'poison' and a 'threat to European civilisation'.[4] According to him, a fence had to be built to confine this threat. During the same period, the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott echoed Orbán in recommending that European countries adopt Australia's strict border regime in response to their border 'crisis': 'the only way to stop people trying to gain entry is firmly and unambiguously to deny it'.[5] However, I also read news about citizen solidarity on the Greek Islands of Lesvos in response to refugee arrivals: how the islanders provided support to refugees at a time when states portrayed them as poison who intruded the integrity of their borders. I read news on refugees who dismantled Hungary's fence and continued to walk and cross the borders. As I read the news, I recalled Doreen Massey's words:

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[4] Ian Traynor, 'Migration Crisis: Hungary PM Says Europe in Grip of Madness', *The Guardian,* 3 September 2015.

[5] Tony Abbott, 'Tony Abbott Says Europe Should Learn from Australia How to Halt Refugees', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 28 October 2015.

I want to imagine space as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity; space as the sphere in which distinct narratives co-exist; space as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of more than one voice … I want to imagine space as disrupted and as a source of disruption. That is, even though it is constituted out of relations, spatiality/space is not totally coherent.[6]

I asked myself once again how to conceptualise the border as a 'sphere of the possibility of the existence of multiplicity', 'as a sphere in which distinct narratives co-exist'? How can we engage with a form of critique that goes beyond perceiving borders either as spaces of oppression or spaces of resistance, and spaces that generate the power of death over the power of life? What form of critique can expose the existence of alternative spaces of borders without overlooking the pervasive operation of contemporary discourse on security, identity, and the state that seeks to refuse and erase others' narratives? What form of language can transverse the hierarchical distinction between inside and outside to unsettle the established primacy of the inside? How are borders performed? What new subjectivities, spaces, narratives, connections, alliances, conflicts and transformations do they constitute and foster? These puzzling questions stand at the heart of this study.

2. Borders as heterotopias

In answering these core questions, this study suggests the need to conceptualise borders as heterotopias. Heterotopia, in the words of Edward Soja, is a 'third space' – an other space – that is both material and metaphorical, and real and imagined.[7] This other space is a socially, politically and culturally constructed lived space that is simultaneously 'oppressive and liberating, passionate and routine, knowable and unknowable …. a space of radical openness, a site of resistance and a struggle'.[8] For Michel Foucault, heterotopia is a space 'capable

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[6] Doreen Massey, 'Spaces of Politics', in Doreen Massey and Philip Sarre John Allen (eds.), *Human Geogrography Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 279-80.
[7] Edward W. Soja, 'Thirdspace: Expanding the Scope of the Geographical Imagination', in Doreen Massey, John Allen and Philip Sarre (eds.), *Human Geography Today* (Malden: Polity Press, 1999), 276.
[8] Ibid. 276.

of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible'.[9]

Drawing on a Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology of becoming and Tim Ingold's notion of lines, this study offers an alternative reading of heterotopia as a meshwork space. This alternative reading is not a whole departure from the existing conceptualisations of heterotopia – it is clearly inspired by them – but it offers a conceptual extension of them in several ways. It does so by sketching a reading of the concept defined as a fluid meshwork space constituted by and constitutive of entanglements and ever-shifting transformative movements of three lines: molar lines, molecular lines, and lines of flight. Molar lines are colonising lines. They seek to organise, capture and discipline living beings and their environments. These lines establish binaries such as self/other, inside/outside and familiar/strange. Molecular lines and lines of flight are the movements, moments, forces and fluxes that traverse, disrupt, resist and problematise the order of things – established structures that appear as normal and natural. Molecular lines are always already present in this space. They open up the foreclosure of the disciplinary, organising and colonising movements of molar lines. On the border, all these lines co-exist, working in a continuum, and in their entanglements they alter one another. These three types of lines constantly mutate depending on the discursive and corporeal practices constituting them. The ever-shifting, contradictory and uncertain movements of these lines transform the border into something else, into an other space – a heterotopia. As the movement of lines never ceases, heterotopia is in constant transformation. The established power politics of molar lines may temporarily capture this space, while the molecular lines may mutate the operation of molar lines offering the first signals of positive transformations, and thus alternative political imaginations. In this sense, heterotopia does not exhibit a final structure. It is always at the state of uncertainty; it remains always on the threshold.

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[9] Michel Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', *Diacritics,* 16/1 (1986), 25. While heterotopia used in this study is a spatial concept, it has to be noted that it is also medical terminology. It refers to a group of cells or tissues occurring in unusual places in the body. They constitute 'an anomaly… disorder … malposition … abnormality or anomalous position of an organ'. Although typically benign, in most cases they are removed surgically as they can undergo malign transformation. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, (Philadelphia: Saunders, 2001).

As heterotopias, borders are political multiplicities of a different kind: they are micro and macro, molar and molecular, centred and non-centred, repressive and productive. Everything in the space of the border – humans, animals, eco-systems, objects, architecture – has a capacity to affect this space and to be affected by it. In their encounters with one another, they open border heterotopias to variations defined by an unstable dynamic of which an unexpected movement of any kind might arise. This study argues that borders as heterotopias are always in the process of becoming. The concept of heterotopia provides a shifting image of the border that does not belong to a static plan. Heterotopia is always in motion, it never settles. The boundaries of the border shift. The boundaries of the inside are transgressed by the outside. The border *moves* in every direction in response to and in anticipation of the different lines that enable its construction, preservation, disruption and transformation. Everything mutates when the lines of the border interweave, entangle and alter function and form. In short, borders *move*.

This constant state of movement and transformation requires new ways of conceptualising and mapping borders. This study suggests one such alternative method, namely 'border nomadology'. In line with the understanding borders as heterotopias, this method maps the constitution and entanglement of multiple lines of borders. It aims to draw a border cartography that emphasises the interplay between these lines without prioritising the movement of one line over another. By pursuing this method, this study tracks the composition, movement and transformation of border heterotopias: the process of their becoming. The core premise of border nomadology is then the replacement of the stable world of being with an unstable world of becoming, thus facilitating a form of 'positive ontopolitical interpretation' as Connolly suggests.

The adaptation of border nomadology in the study of borders has important implications for critical border studies. Most notably, it adds complexity to its core theoretical premises, which understand borders as complex discursive and material creations that affect the social and political field. This reading suggests that borders are not natural or innocent constructions, but historically contingent performances. They are foremost the effects of the modern geopolitical imagination, which performs state sovereignty

as the permanent principle of political life.[10] This state-centric imagination assumes that political life can only be possible within precise bordered spaces. It perceives the inside of state space as constitutive of order, unity and security, and the outside as a sphere of insecurity, uncertainty and anarchy. It is this imagination, which represents borders as constitutive of the boundaries of citizenship and belonging – of social, cultural and political harmony. It is this imagination, which constructs the otherness as threatening, regressive and strange, and seeks to erase all alternative narratives of the border.

While this study draws upon this theoretical background, it also aims to unsettle the overly pessimistic tenor of contemporary critical scholarship on borders. It takes issue with its 'Agambenian' tone, which understands borders predominantly as spaces of abjection, spaces of normalised exception, or as non-places that accommodate nothing but bare life fully captured by the decisionist power of the sovereign. This form of critique typically defines border politics within the narrow confines of state performances and its networks. Its theoretical premises lead to a totalised notion of the sovereign possessing an all-encompassing power in establishing and sustaining the border. I argue that this critical narrative starts and ends with the 'power of death', which captures the movement of 'undesirables' – those attributed a single identity: a faceless, voiceless and helpless figure trapped within the oppressive space of the border. In such a lexicon the border is a technology of death, a machine of entrapment, an encapsulating apparatus of sovereignty and modernity in which we are destined to be imprisoned.

Border nomadology, in contrast, endorses the complexity of contemporary life: the messiness, ambiguity, and unruliness of borders, and the unexpected molecular movements and moments of contestation and resistance that may lead to positive transformations. These movements may guide an emergence of alternative politics and unconventional ways of imagining the space of the state. However, they may also be captured by the already established forms of border politics. In short, the central argument of this study is simple:

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10 John Agnew, 'The Territorial Trap: Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory', *Review of International Political Economy,* 1/1 (1994), 53-80, Rob B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Newcastle: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

borders are spaces of different kinds of multiplicities. They are spaces of becoming which *move* on the lines of capture *and* rupture. Borders – at least the ones I discuss throughout this thesis – are thereby heterotopias.

3. Border nomadology as an exemplary method

The concept of heterotopia is at the heart of the empirical inquiry pursued in this study. Therefore, it is important to clarify from the outset how this concept functions, how it relates to the empirical component of the study, and how its empirical examples speak back to the concept of heterotopia. As noted earlier, border nomadology is a method of mapping border heterotopias. However, this method does not function by 'applying' a pre-established concept to empirical examples, and this is not the process undertaken in this study. As Brian Massumi argues, in the application model one seeks to fit empirical interpretations to the pre-established boundaries of the concept.[11] In this model one starts with abstractions and then looks for the real-life illustrations to falsify or confirm the fixed conceptual frameworks and theoretical assumptions upon which those abstractions are built upon.[12] In the words of Massumi:

> If you apply a concept … it is the material you apply it to that undergoes change, much more markedly than do the concepts. The change is imposed upon the material by the concept's systematicity and constitutes a becoming homologous of the material to the system.[13]

The application model therefore silences certain interpretations of 'actuality', and creates a false dichotomy between theory and practice. By assigning concepts fixed definitions, this model hinders the potential of concepts to generate new possibilities and new political imaginations, hence to create a new world.

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[11] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the virtual: movements, affect, sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press) 17-20.
[12] Nicholas Gane, 'Concepts and the New Empricism', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12/1 (2009), 83-97.
[13] Massumi, *Parables for the virtual: movements, affect, sensation*, 17.

Massumi argues that one way to avoid the application model is to adopt the use of what he refers to as the 'exemplary method'. An example has a performative force in that it helps us to invent or reinvent concepts. As Massumi puts it, an example in this context is 'neither general (as is a system of concepts) nor particular (as is the material to which a system is applied). It is "singular"'.[14] That is to mean, each example activates certain details, and each detail has the potential to challenge the pre-established models. This does not mean that the researcher needs to detach herself from the theoretical foundations of concepts. Although such foundations still need to be taken into account, the exemplary method looks beyond these foundations, operating by 'extracting [theoretical concepts] from their usual connections to other concepts in their home systems and confronting them with the example or a detail from it'.[15] In analysis that proceeds by examples, 'the concept will start to deviate under the force [of the example]. Let it. Then reconnect it to other concepts, drawn from other systems, until a whole new system of connections starts to form'.[16]

Border nomadology is thus a method that proceeds by means of examples and their performative forces. In this method the concept of heterotopia is an experimental tool-box that is used to understand complexities of different border sites, and to reveal an alternative understanding of the border. With this method, this study departs from existing works in border studies, which tend to take a concept with a pre-established definition provided by Foucault and apply it to particular examples.[17] In these studies, heterotopia appears as a frozen concept with a fixed identity whose only purpose is to enforce a specific interpretation of particular border sites. Border nomadology, in contrast, seeks the messiness of the concept that is not entirely comfortable with its existing interpretative systems. As Soja suggests, the concept of heterotopia is inherently open to radical interpretation.[18] A concept whose analytical aim is to disrupt totalising

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[14] Ibid. 17
[15] Ibid. 18.
[16] Ibid. 19.
[17] See for example, Mark Salter, 'Governmentalites of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession', *International Political Sociology,* 1 (2007), 49-66, Joseph Pugliese, 'Crisis Heterotopias and Border Zones of the Dead', *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies,* 23/5 (2009), 663-79, Michele Budz, 'A Heterotopian Analysis of Maritime Refugee Incidents', *International Political Sociology,* 3 (2009), 18-35.
[18] Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers), 1996.

structures of borders therefore should not be confined by its own pre-established boundaries. In this sense, border nomadology pursues a concept that continuously becomes other than itself.[19] That is to mean, it activates the details of each example to alter its pre-established definition – as understood by Foucault – and to expand the function and meaning of the concept. As an exemplary method, border nomadology connects heterotopia with other concepts – such as becoming, machines, lines, non-community, excess – and facilitates the concept to acquire a new meaning understood in terms of a fluid meshwork space. This method does not reinvent heterotopia, but rather aims to establish 'a new system of connections' between the concept of heterotopia and the concept of the border. In this regard, it is important to understand the concept of heterotopia as a process that works outside of the application of pre-determined strict conceptual frameworks to case studies. It is a concept that walks together *with* the multiple lines of border sites: a concept that changes function and form with an example's idiosyncrasies; that is able to *move* with the examples it traces. In short, it is important to understand the concept of heterotopia as an experimental tool-box used to foster new border narratives that challenge and exceed the modern geopolitical imagination and its methods of dealing with the question of the border.

4. The Separation Wall, and the Manus Island and Nauru Refugee Detention Centres

For its examples, this study explores two types of border sites: walls and islands. Over the past decade, these two types of border have become the focal point of attention in public and policy debates over nationalism, anti-terrorism, and anti-

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[19] This notion of the 'concept' is inspired by Deleuze and Guattari. They understand the 'concept' as having a becoming that continuously changes function and meaning. Deleuzian constructivism begins with the idea that every creation is on a plane of construction that gives it an autonomous existence. Concepts are not exceptions. Deleuze and Guattari understands philosophy as an art of invention or reinvention of concepts. A concept is not a representation of the external world; it is rather an experimental tool-box that is used to create new possibilities. Therefore, concepts need to be creative, inventive and not representative. For Deleuze and Guattari, a concept is a multiplicity, an assemblage, a mobile bridge that is reborn in its relations with other concepts, problems and events. Concept creation is thus an open-ended process. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is philosophy,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press) 15-41.

migration. States increasingly use islands and walls as part of their border enforcement practices. These borders are used for political aims, in particular to exclude, deter, isolate and/or detain those whose irregular movement are perceived as threats to the fictive unity of the state. What we are witnessing today is an emerging era of walled borders and 'island detentions' targeting certain population groups who have been increasingly excluded from the global mobility regime and exposed to diverse forms of violence.

In order to ensure considered interpretation and analysis of each example, this thesis takes two iconic instances of contemporary walls and detention sites established on islands: Israel's Separation Wall in the West Bank, and Australia's refugee regional processing centres (RPCs) on Manus Island and Nauru.

The Wall is now perhaps one of the most well-known and controversial aspects of Israel's 49-year occupation of the West Bank. Its construction began in 2002 at the height of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Over the last fourteen years the Wall and its associated regimes of control have incrementally developed; it has shifted and taken numerous shapes, in each incarnation seizing more land from Palestinians. The Wall has diverse effects throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. However, one widespread impact is that it undermines every aspect of the lives of West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian citizens of Israel. With its current route, the Wall separates families and hinders access to their land. It significantly impedes Palestinians' right of movement, limits their access to health, education, and other services in East Jerusalem, destroy livelihoods, and curtails agricultural practices, forcing Palestinian farmers either to cease cultivation entirely or shift their mode of production.[20]

Much has been documented on these humanitarian effects and the illegality of the Wall.[21] In 2004, International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, advised that Israel as an occupying force breached its obligations under applicable humanitarian law and various human rights instruments including the

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[20] The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office', (Jerusalem: OCHA, July 2014), viewed 13 September 2014, <http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_10_years_barrier_report_english.pdf>.
[21] Ibid., B'Tselem, 'Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank', (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2012).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[22] It held that construction of the Wall, along with previous associated measures, impeded exercise by the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination, thereby constituting a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right. The Court did not confront the existence of the Wall, but challenged its associated regimes and its route. In its decision, it highlighted the deviation of the route of the Wall from the Green Line and concluded that the 'construction of the Wall and its associated regime created a "fait accompli" on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, it would be tantamount to *de facto* annexation'.[23]

The function of Manus Island and Nauru as places hosting RPCs began during the same period, when Australia established refugee detention camps on these islands in 2001 following the Tampa crisis and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Republic of Nauru.[24] This policy came to be known as the Pacific Solution I (2001–2007). It created Australia's offshore borders and sought to deter asylum seekers to reach Australia by boat. Immediately after the establishment of detention centres, Australia began to transfer asylum seekers to these islands for refugee processing. The Manus Island and Nauru RPCs were officially closed in 2007 and re-opened in 2012 as a response to the increase in the number of maritime arrivals. Since August 2012, any person arriving in Australia by sea without a valid visa has been subject to offshore processing in Nauru or PNG, even if they applied for asylum immediately upon arrival in Australia.

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[22] International Court of Justice (ICJ), 'Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem', GA RES ES–10/15, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/RES/ ES–10/15 (2004).

[23] Ibid. 184, par. 121.

[24] Manus Island is part of Manus Province in northern Papua New Guinea (PNG). The Regional Processing Centre (RPC) on Manus Island is located within the Lombrum naval base on the small adjacent island of Los Negros, connected by bridge to Manus Island. Nauru is the world's smallest island nation in the world, stretching to a mere twenty-one square kilometres. It is just below the equator, approximately 3000 kilometres north-east of Cairns on Australia's east coast.

The Nauru and Manus Island RPCs are repeatedly referred to as Australia's 'Guantanamo Bay'.[25] Since 2013, several international and national agencies have addressed serious human rights violations that have been occurring at these detention centres.[26] These include indefinite and mandatory detention of asylum seekers, inefficient and arbitrary assessment of refugee claims, and ill-treatment of asylum seekers detained in these camps.[27] As is now widely documented, the inhumane and harsh conditions of the camps contribute to serious mental health issues among asylum seekers. The operation of Australia's current offshore processing regime established on these two islands raises important issues regarding its compliance with international human rights obligations. The United Nations (UN), for instance, reports that Australia is likely to have breached the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol since it penalises asylum seekers based on their mode of arrival in Australia, and sends them back to the countries where their life or freedom would be threatened. In doing so, Australia fails to provide asylum seekers with a fair and an efficient refugee status determination system.[28]

Furthermore, various international and national human rights organisations note the detention of children, the harsh conditions, and the frequent unrest and violence inside RPCs all amount to breaches of several human rights conventions including: the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[29] Recent allegations against the operation of the Manus Island and Nauru

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25 David Isaacs, 'Nauru and Manus Island are Australia's Guantanamo Bay', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 February 2016, John Keane, 'When concentration camps and democracy clash', *ABC News*, 28 April 2014.

26 Amnesty International Australia, 'This Is Breaking People: Human Rights Violations at Australia's Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea', (Sydney: NSW Amnesty International Australia, 2013), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'UNHCR Monitoring Visit to the Republic of Nauru, 7 to 9 October 2013', (Lyons: UNHCR, 2013c), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'UNHCR Monitoring Visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea 11 to 13 June 2013', (Lyons: UNHCR, 2013b).

27 Ibid.

28 UNHCR, 'UNHCR monitoring visit to the Republic of Nauru, 7 to 9 October 2013', UNHCR, 'UNHCR monitoring visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea 11 to 13 June 2013'.

29 Amnesty International Australia, 'This Is Breaking People: Human Rights Violations at Australia's Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea'. Australia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1980, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990. It signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention against

RPCs also raise troubling questions about the secrecy that surrounds Australia's management of these centres. In fact, in a recent report on the Nauru RPC, Amnesty International claims that these camps are deliberately designed to inflict harm and suffering in order to deter refugees from seeking asylum in Australia.[30]

What The Wall and Manus Island and Nauru RPCs also share is that they represent the shifting lines of territorial borders: neither of them are physically located on the border understood in conventional terms as a legal demarcation between two sovereign entities. The Wall is a non-border in motion. Its location frequently changes according to political interests, discourses and practices that create, sustain and govern its operation.[31] Similarly, Australia's RPCs are continuously shifting borders established in the territory of third countries, referred to as 'off-shored borders'. These constructions maintain a border function solely for particular groups of people; Palestinians in the Israeli case and, in the Australian case, asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat. In these cases, mobile borders do not limit the operation of the respective states; rather, both states actively seek to intervene, occupy and colonise the space they create. These borders are thus fluid, mobile and violent; they only directly impact the bodies of those they seek to police, control and exclude, and they present an alternative to the conventional notions of the border understood within the confines of the territorial state.

So why do I choose these 'cramped spaces' as examples in this study? Cramped spaces are 'spaces of abjection' in which 'displaced, and dispossessed people are condemned to the status of strangers, outsiders, aliens, and [enemies]', and are held in detention, forced into deportation, and stripped of their rights.[32] Indeed, even a disinterested observer of Israel's Separation Wall and Australia's Manus Island and Nauru RPCs would realise the extent of

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Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 2009, but not yet ratified.
[30] Amnesty International, 'Island of Despair: Australia's "Processing" of Refugees on Nauru'.
[31] As of 2014, it is approximately 710-km long, of which eighty-five per cent runs inside the West Bank. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office'.
[32] Engin F. Isin and Kim Rygiel, 'Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps', in Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristina Masters (eds.), *The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 181.

suffering, cruelty, and state-imposed violence produced within these cramped spaces. In many ways, these are extreme cases in the sense that Australia is frequently cited as one of the countries that endorse the most punitive and exceptional asylum seeker regimes in the world, with indefinite and mandatory detention, and Israel's Wall is considered one of the significant barriers to the peace in Israel and Palestine.

It is therefore not surprising that the academic literature regards these sites as spaces of abjection. Much of the debate on Australia's current and past operations of offshore detention camps is centred either on the legality of these spaces and the extra-territorial application of international human rights conventions or on Australia's 'sovereign exceptionalism'.[33] The central argument here is that these camps constitute material manifestation of Australia's sovereign exceptionalism, which reduces asylum seekers to bare life: the camp detainee is deprived of his/her rights and stripped of any social or political status. He/she remains the object of sovereign intervention, but only through his/her exclusion.[34]

Similarly, Israel's Wall is understood as one of the latest material configuration of Israel's exceptionalism and its colonial project in Palestine.[35] The Wall constitutes one of the elements of Israel's matrix of control.[36] The space created by the Wall perpetuates and normalises Israel's historical project of 'spatio-cide' – a colonial project that aims to facilitate emigration of the Palestinian population by transforming the space upon which Palestinians live.[37]

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[33] Mary Crock and Kate Bones, 'Australian Exceptionalism: Temporary Protection and the Right of Refugees', *Melbourne Journal of International Law,* 15/2 (2015), 522-49.
[34] Suvendrini Perera, 'What Is a Camp?', *Borderlands e-journal,* 1/1 (2002b).
[35] See for example Daniela Manscbach, 'Normalizing Violence:From Military Checkpoints to 'Terminals' in the Occupied Territories ', *Journal of Power,* 2/2 (2009), 255-73, Joanna C Long, 'Border Anxiety in Palestine-Israel', *Antipode,* 38/1 (2006), 107-27, Nigel Parsons and Mark B. Salter, 'Israeli Biopolitics: Closure, Territorialisation and Governmentality in the Occupied Palestinian Territories', *Geopolitics,* 13/4 (2008), 701-23, Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, 'The Monster's Tail', in Michael Sorkin (ed.), *Against the Wall : Israel's Barrier to Peace* (New York New Press, 2005), 2-27, Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, 'The Order of Violence', in Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (eds.), *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 99-140, Sari Hanafi, 'Spacio-Cide and Bio-Politics : The Israeli Colonial Conflict from 1947 to the Wall ', in Michael Sorkin (ed.), *Against the Wall : Israel's Barrier to Peace* (New York: New Press, 2005), 158-73, Derek Gregory, 'Palestine under Siege', *Antipode,* 36/4 (2004), 601-06.
[36] Jeff Harper, 'Beyond Road Maps and Walls', *The Link*, 37 (1), 2004, 6-7.
[37] Hanafi, 'Spacio-Cide and Bio-Politics : The Israeli Colonial Conflict from 1947 to the Wall ',158-78.

The Wall as a border-in-motion, argue Derek Gregory, Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, produces a pervasive form of violence and reduces Palestinians to bare life. Gregory writes that the Palestinian is *homines sacri*: a figure whose life or death bears no consequence for the Israeli state.[38] In this space, the occupied body is 'constantly exposed to all sorts of dangers, forsaken and abandoned'.[39] The governing rule of the Wall is not to discipline, annihilate or assimilate the occupied Palestinian. With its ever-shifting regime of closures, permits and separations, the Wall is one of 'architectonic-geostrategic machines' of Israeli power that rules the occupied Palestinian as a 'temporary human being' who is governed by the Israeli state only by its exclusion.[40]

It is difficult to resist these arguments, because what produces and maintains the power of the Wall, and the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs is indeed what Azoulay and Ophir refer to as 'the economy of violence' – the pervasive interplay between spectacular violence (outburst of physical violence) and suspended violence that replaces the material harm with intimidation and deterrence.[41] In these places, violence penetrates the body, the consciousness, and the space of the non-citizen subject not necessarily through the means of overt violence. There might be no physical evidence of an eruption of violence, yet the traces of destruction, pain and suffering are distinct.[42] What describes the economy of violence that governs these places is suspended violence, its constructive dimension rendering the state's use of violent force invisible. It grows deeply within every organ of the ruling power, and is circulated and normalised in functioning of its organs. Azoulay and Ophir argue that suspended violence allows the ruling power to operate without law, discipline or ideology, and to proceed without war or catastrophe.[43]

This does not mean that suspended violence eradicates the use of spectacular violence. On the contrary, what makes suspended violence powerful

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[38] Gregory, 'Palestine under Siege', 604.
[39] Azoulay and Ophir, 'The Monster's Tail', 6.
[40] Ibid.11.
[41] Ibid. 3-12. See also Ariellay Azoulay and Adi Ophir, *One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine*, trans. Tal Haran (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012) 133-39.
[42] Ariellay Azoulay and Adi Ophir, *One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine*, 133- 39.
[43] Ibid.133-139.

and pervasive is its ever-present potential to be transformed into a violent force at any time and in any location: spectacular violence seems like disappeared, but in fact it is immanent and imminent.[44] The economy of violence that governs these three spaces thus is not only visible traces of human rights violations and death, but the blurred distinction between the two forms of violence. In these spaces violence multiplies itself in the sense that both suspected and spectacular violence coexist and work mutually within a continuum. In all three spaces (the Wall, and Manus Island and Nauru RPCs) the non-citizen is ruled as a 'temporary human being' through the means of the economy of violence.[45] As Azoulay and Ophir writes: without having any protection of any legal system, their life is 'invaded by mechanisms of power which make it at one and the same time an object of knowledge and an addressee of violence'.[46]

These cases are thus 'difficult cases' in the sense William Connolly understands them. Difficult cases arise

> … when people suffer from injuries imposed by institutionalised identities, principles, and cultural understandings, when those who suffer are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening, contagious or dangerous to the self-assurance of these identities, and when the sufferers honor sources of ethics inconsonant or disturbing to these constituencies. And this suffering, too, invades the flesh. It engenders fatigue; it makes people perish; it drives them over the edge.[47]

Difficult cases emerge in the most cramped spaces. Blockages, limits, and boundaries seem to capture the movement, voice, and life of all living beings in these spaces. The operation of the ruling power and its heterogeneous networks appear to be the defining force for the ways in which a cramped space is intended to operate and govern its subjects. Yet, as Nicholas Thoburn writes following Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, politics emerge exactly within these spaces.[48] The impossibility of writing, speaking, moving, and living becomes the driving force for those who are constructed as strangers, outsiders, aliens, enemies or

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[44] Azoulay and Ophir, *One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine*, 134.

[45] Azoulay and Ophir, 'The Monster's Tail', 11.

[46] Ibid. 18.

[47] William E. Connolly, 'Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming', *Culture,Medicine and Psychiatry,* 20 (1996), 255.

[48] Nicholas Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2003).

helpless unrepresented victims. Cramped spaces leak from everywhere and are transgressed from all directions. This is precisely why Connolly argues that it is imperative to identify 'difficult cases' in our critical analyses not to represent the unrepresented, but to honour the 'ethos of critical engagement': a language that challenges and exceeds established norms and moral codes.[49] This language offers an alternative reading of contemporary life that acknowledges the affirmative force of difference and becoming. Its diagnosis of the present begins with deconstructing the colonising lines of borders and the constitutive forces of a given 'economy of violence'. But it then proceeds with a reconstructive process – a language that seeks the ways in which the politics of disruption, transgression and contestation compete with the colonising lines of the border. This is why this study focuses on these difficult cases: to identify the language that honours the 'affirmative force of difference and becoming'; that does not assign a fixed identity and a single status to the recipients of violence and those who establish alliances with them; and that recognises their power in unsettling the closed boundaries of the inside. This is a language that transverses the hierarchical distinction between inside and outside and acknowledges the productive and transformational forces of the outside. That language is the main contribution of this study to the critical scholarship on borders.

5. Remarks on fieldwork and interviews

The empirical investigation of this study relies on a wide range of sources including academic literature in the fields of International Relations, border studies, political geography, and history; news sources; reports by governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental international organisations; and parliamentary inquiries and public hearings. It is also informed by a series of interviews conducted in Israel, Palestine and Australia (Appendix I).

I undertook fieldwork in Israel and Palestine in June and July 2011, the purpose of which was to improve my understanding of the prevailing discourses and practices that shape the operation of the Wall. To this end, I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with various organisations and individuals

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[49] Connolly, 'Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming', 255.

(Appendix I). In line with Irving Seidman's approach to in-depth interviewing, the purpose of these interviews was to better understand 'lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience'.[50] With this aim, interviews were conducted mainly in the format of an open-ended conversation with each interviewee. These conversations enabled the interviewees to express their thoughts, feelings, experiences, and stories relatively freely.

My conceptual framework is also informed by my daily personal observations and experiences acquired at several checkpoints (mainly Qalandiya and Bethlehem), my casual talks with Israeli women from Machsom Watch, and with many Palestinians who at the time did not hold permits.[51] One of the limitations of this fieldwork was my inability to speak Arabic and Hebrew, and my lack of access to an interpreter. Therefore, I was able to conduct interviews only with those who could speak English.

However, undertaking similar fieldwork was impossible in the case of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs due to severe travel restrictions imposed by the Australian government. For these sites, I therefore used parliamentary inquiries on the allegations relating to the conditions and circumstance of these RPCs, submissions to these inquires, and the public hearings.[52] Additionally, I conducted interviews with the key Australian refugee advocacy and activist groups that had managed to establish contacts with asylum seekers in these camps (via email or phone) and which are actively involved in activist or humanitarian work in Australia (Appendix I). The purpose of these interviews was to understand the discourse surrounding refugee activism in Australia and to gather information about asylum seekers' resistance movements and daily life experiences in these camps.

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[50] Irving Seidman, *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences* (New York: Teacher College Press), 9.
[51] Machsom Watch is a group of Israeli women who observe and document the events and the conduct of Israeli soldiers and private security agencies at checkpoints in the West Bank.
[52] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 2014), Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 'Select Committee on the Recent Allegations Relating to the Conditions and Circumstance at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru', (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 2015).

6. Significance of the study

The significance of this study is two-fold: one is theoretical, and the other is empirical. First, the alternative reading of heterotopia suggested in this study aims to further conceptual debates in the literature. While the concept of heterotopia has been used widely as an analytical tool in studies examining public places, gated communities, and online sites, it is underdeveloped in border studies. By using the concept as an experimental tool-box to explore two disparate border sites, my aim is to add to recent studies that have adopted the concept, and, more importantly, to extend the conceptual boundaries of heterotopia.

As such, the alternative reading of heterotopia seeks to address the rigid theoretical compartmentalisation plaguing critical border studies. As I will discuss in the following chapter, the contemporary field is divided into three theoretical perspectives: biopolitical borders, thanatopolitical borders, and agency approaches. Each perspective is governed and overly captured by the specific theoretical background it uses, and therefore presents a particular narrative of the border: it either privileges a pessimistic reading of the border as governed by the all-encompassing networks of sovereign power, or it privileges 'escapes' to falsify this pessimistic reading. As Nick Vaughan Williams argues, such theoretical compartmentalisation of the field of border studies leads to a rigid duality in its reading.[53]

Against this backdrop, this study aims to problematise the pessimism of the field that conceptualises the border as a dystopian space of exception, a site of oppression, or as a space of abjection that leaves no room for the agency of the figure of the minor. By exploring differing movements of resistance and contestation, this study suggests to disturb the narrative that attributes final power to the sovereign in sustaining the border. In doing so, it contributes to studies that move beyond 'Agambenian' frameworks in their emphasis on the ways in which contemporary repressive bordering practices are disrupted by acts of resistance. Nonetheless, using heterotopia as an experimental tool and keeping

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[53] Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 2015) 123.

its definitional boundaries open allows this study to avoid prioritising one particular border narrative over another. This study recognises contestability in each reading and is based on the argument that borders are frequently open to unexpected transformation of any kind, as there is no guarantee that acts of contestation lead us to positive change. Furthermore, by understanding resistances as a process of becoming-other, becoming-stranger and/or becoming-minor, this study seeks to present an alternative reading of contemporary acts of contestation. By exploring the border as heterotopia – a space of fluid meshwork, uncertainties, and ambiguities – this study addresses and goes beyond the dualistic boundaries of contemporary critical scholarship. In doing so, it offers a new way of looking at the concept of the border.

Second, the originality of this study lies in its aim to bring two distinct border sites – walls and islands – together in the context of two states, Australia and Israel. In doing so, it explores how walls and islands exhibit similar and distinctive functions in the constitution of borders. Furthermore, to date there has been no detailed study of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs engaging with the irreducibly complex aspect of their constitution. By looking at acts of resistance and contestation in these two RPCs and exploring alternative forms of activism in Australia, the study contributes to critical analysis of the topic.

Finally, this study explores the operation of two mobile borders in two divergent contexts – occupation and conflict in the Israeli case and, in the Australian case irregular migration. An analysis of these diverse cases seeks to contribute to contemporary debates over the ongoing transformation of borders in critical border studies. As I discuss in detail in the following chapter, these debates suggest that the border is no longer simply located on the territorial edges of the state, but in multiple locations – on the recognised border, in third countries, the high-seas, and inside the territory of the state. An historical analysis of mobile operation of Israel and Australia's borders, however, suggests that the contemporary mobility of borders should not be overstated. The contemporary condition is not as contemporary as it first appears; they are rather built upon the colonising practices of the past.

7. Thesis outline

As laid out in this introduction, the central argument of study is that borders as heterotopias do not have a static structure that can be understood in terms of a certain form of a unity. They are fluid meshwork spaces performed by the constant movement and the entanglement of three lines: molar and molecular lines and lines of flight. This argument is established in three sections.

The first section begins with mapping the main debates and theoretical frameworks in contemporary critical border studies. Chapter One discusses the significance and limitations of the scholarship and questions the extent to which the field is critical of its own interventions. Chapter Two establishes the central theoretical framework of this thesis and proposes a heterotopic reading of the concept of heterotopia. The chapter unpacks different elements of heterotopia by examining at how its three lines are constituted and what they constitute. After deconstructing different elements of heterotopia, the chapter correlates its diverse elements and argues that heterotopia is not a network space or a space of resistance, but rather a fluid meshwork space whose boundaries remain open for transformations of any kind.

After detailing the conceptual framework of the study, I commence navigating border heterotopias in reference to walls. The first intermezzo provides a critique of the present state of walled borders by uncovering their historical conditions. It does so by tracing some of the distinct historical periods in which walls, barbed wire, and fences activated turning points in the construction of borders. This brief genealogical inquiry explores distinct periods in which walls functioned as sacred lines, sedentary lines, disciplinary lines, colonising lines, lines of capitalism, and lines of disruption and contestation. This intermezzo concludes with brief discussion of the present era and explores how contemporary border walls continue to function as disciplinary colonising lines while simultaneously activating movements and moments of disruption and contestation.

The study explores its first case study – walls in Palestine – in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. Chapter Three traces the movement of walls and fences in Palestine. It shows how they constituted turning points in the corporeal and

discursive construction of borders and facilitated the colonisation of Palestine. By exploring four space-events – the *Kibbutz*; the Tower and Stockade Settlements; the Fortification of the Frontier movement; and transit camps – Chapter Three demonstrates that walls and fences were crucial machines of Zionism's colonial practices, which had begun to establish itself in Palestine by the nineteenth century. They have constituted a central place in the imagination and the production of Israel and Palestine. This inquiry shows the historical relevance and powerful operation of molar lines of borders in the context of Palestine. Furthermore, it unsettles the dominant discourse that identifies the Separation Wall with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and perceives it as an 'abnormal tissue' in the imagination of 'Israel proper'. In these terms, the chapter demonstrates that the contemporary wall in the West Bank is more than a product of 1967; instead, it is a historically recurring apparatus that facilitates colonisation of Palestine, its land, knowledge and people.

Chapter Four explores molar lines, cracks, and ruptures of the Wall. In order to account for the complex operation of the Wall, the chapter commences with discussion of its colonising network, which is established and sustained by the Israeli State. While the chapter begins with an emphasis on the Israeli state, its foremost aim is to shift attention from state-centric analysis to the discussion of molecular movements that create, sustain or disturb the existence of the Wall. This is undertaken by examining three movements: the pro-wall movement which imagines the Wall as a 'life-fence'; the 'alter-wall' discourse which is constrained within the Green Line paradigm; and the 'anti-wall' movement in Palestine, which is born out of the Wall's spatial excess activating a process of becoming-other. In exploring these movements, the chapter demonstrates how the Wall constitutes a place of distinct and competing narratives and practices, a heterotopia.

The final part of the study follows the structure of the previous section. It commences with an intermezzo. In this second instance, it addresses theme of repeating islands. It traces historical connections between the island and the border by exploring the ways in which the island has occupied a prominent place in the construction of dichotomies such as inside/outside, land/sea, chaos/order, self/other, and security/threat. In this brief genealogical inquiry, I consider the

discursive and cartographic imaginations of islands in Western thought, including the occupation of islands and their role in colonial 'disease assemblage'. This intermezzo concludes with discussion of the present era and explores how islands operate as heterotopic spaces in the context of contemporary border assemblages.

Chapter Five moves on to discuss the second case study, analysing how islands occupied a prominent role in the colonisation of Australia and the constitution of its ever-shifting ocean borders since British settlement. It traces historical practices that colonised, emptied, and re-assembled islands as sites of incarceration, Aboriginal reserves, medical institutions, and internment camps. Mapping these practices demonstrates that since its inception, colonial Australia's islands have persistently been used as solutions to particular perceptions of crisis. Chapter Six continues to explore the role of islands in the constitution of Australia's borders and examines how Manus Island and Nauru are reassembled as a perceived solution to a new crisis: asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat. I argue that the Australian offshore border on Manus Island and Nauru is a cramped space constituted by tangled movements of capture and becoming-other. By examining two processes of becoming – becoming-noisy and becoming-asylum seekers – and analysing alternative forms of pro-refugee activism in Australia, the chapter demonstrates the affirmative potential of molecular ruptures that constitute border heterotopias.

The thesis concludes by addressing ethico-political implications of the notion of 'affirmative hope' suggesting that it may open up a space for an alternative border politics cultivated by the ethos of critical responsiveness.

CHAPTER 1

BOUNDARIES OF CRITICAL BORDER STUDIES

The collapse of the Berlin Wall, discourses on globalisation, the war on terror, and the widespread employment of new technologies of border control have renewed the debate on the concept of the border. Over the past few decades the field has undergone profound transformation, moving away from what John Agnew calls the 'territorial trap': a positivist epistemology that perceives states as fixed units of sovereign space and containers of societies, and borders as defensive apparatuses separating the uncertainty of the outside from the security of the inside.[1] As Henk van Houtum observes, where in the early 1960s border studies predominantly focused on study of the demarcation of boundaries as taken-for-granted entities of the modern state system, now the attention has moved to the concept of the border, more complexly understood 'as a site at and through which socio-spatial differences are communicated'.[2] With its prevailingly critical voice, the contemporary scholarship no longer reads borders

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[1] Agnew, 'The Territorial Trap: Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory', 53-80.

[2] Henk Van Houtum, 'The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries', *Geopolitics,* 10/4 (2005), 672.

as natural, pre-given lines between territorial units. Rather, it perceives borders as performative spaces and interrogates the ways in which they are materially and discursively constituted. With its post-positivist methodology, critical border studies problematises the foundation of modern statehood by focusing on how borders operate as effects of the modern geopolitical and biopolitical imaginary, and how such imaginaries perpetuate established power politics.

This chapter maps the major debates and theoretical frameworks in contemporary critical border studies. I argue that the revival of interest in the concept of the border, the richness of post-structuralist foundations of the field, and burgeoning dialogue among the disciplines of International Relations (IR), political geography, criminology, anthropology, and sociology provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to ask a self-reflexive question: how critical are we? What are the limits of the new concepts and theories of the critical scholarship? Are we, more specifically, sufficiently critical to address the contemporary violent state of borders? I argue that since the field has already established the limitations of traditional approaches to borders and retreated from the tenets of positivist epistemology, it is timely for critical border studies to focus on self-critique – on the limitations and self-defeating movements of its own critical interventions as a means of expanding the boundaries of scholarship and fostering new political imaginations.

This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I outline the development of border studies and progressive shifts to post-positivist epistemology. Then I discuss the contemporary conceptualisations of borders as biopolitical and thanatopolitical spaces. Finally, I provide a critique of these two approaches and lay the foundations of alternative border thinking: heterotopia.

1. The development of border studies: towards performativity of the border

The origins of border studies can be identified in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Early works focused on the mapping, typologies, and classifications of state borders. According to Julian V. Minghi and Vladamir Kolossov, during the first half of the twentieth century border studies was mostly

about studying differences between natural and man-made boundaries, the evolution of border areas, and borders' morphology by reference to the balance of power between neighbouring states.[3] Writing in 1932, Whittemore Boggs, for example, perceived treaties, laws, agreements and maps as constitutive of borders. For Boggs, the primary functions of borders were to foster or prevent inter-state conflicts.[4] In this perspective, borders were self-evident necessities of the state system – mapped lines essential to the separation of territorial units.

Early in the Cold War era the overweening perception of international geopolitical structure in terms of threat and counter-threat between communist and liberal democratic states gave rise to Anglo-American division of the world map into regions of stability and instability; a consequence of this was that functionalist approaches began to dominate border studies by the 1950s.[5] The central aim of functionalism was to replace the bio/geo-determinism of previous generations with a 'rational, scientifically reliable, and realistic' conceptualisation of the border.[6] In 1950 Richard Hartshorne urged caution regarding Ratzel's Darwinian perception of the state as an 'organism'. He referred to it as pseudo-scientific thinking dominated by political geography. According to Hartshorne, political geography had to consider the genesis, structure, and function of a 'state-area' defined as an 'organised unit of land and people, organised by man according to a particular idea or purpose'.[7] In the works of Ladis Kristof, Victor Prescott, and Julian Minghi, the border appeared as a self-evident apparatus that delimited the boundaries of state administration and legal jurisdiction. Minghi defined the border as territorial limit of the state representing a homogeneous unity.[8] Similarly, Kristof conceptualised borders as

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[3] Julian V. Minghi, 'Boundary Studies in Political Geography', in Roger E. Kasperson and Julian Minghi (eds.), *The Structure of Political Geography* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 140-60, Vladamir Kolossov, 'Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches', *Geopolitics,* 10/4 (2005), 606-32.
[4] S. Whittemore Boggs, 'Boundary Functions and the Principles of Boundary Making', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 22 (1932), 48-49.
[5] Peter Taylor, *Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality* (Harlow: Longman & Scientific Technical, 1993), 150-53.
[6] Richard Hartshorne, 'The Functional Approach in Political Geography', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 2/2 (1950), 129.
[7] Ibid.128.
[8] Minghi, 'Boundary Studies in Political Geography', 160.

spatial expressions of legal orders.9 Writing in 1969, he outlined the differences between frontiers and state boundaries, and argued that outer-oriented frontiers represented rebelliousness and lawlessness, whereas inner-oriented boundaries marked the limits of internal political powers manifesting orderly and rationally centred socio-political forces.10 In his pivotal work, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries,* John R.V. Prescott perceived state borders as concrete markers of sovereignty that underwent continuous change through conflict, military expansionism, territorial conquest, and geographical fluctuation.11

The positivist tradition understood the state as a unit designed for the containment of power, and perceived the border as a line separating the inside from external threats. It will be wrong to see such descriptions of the border as innocent representations. As a political practice, knowledge creates its own power by circulating certain representations within a given social, cultural and political field, and thereby making these representations to appear as evident realities. The positivist tradition created its own politics of truth by normalising the interior of state territory as representative of spatial unity fostering order and control and a homogeneous national identity. In doing so, the post-positivist approaches contributed to an essentialised view of the border perceived as an idealised constitutive and regulatory element of the modern state system – as a 'hard-shell fortification' and a 'wall of defensibility' representing the impermeability of the corporeal and normative being of the state.12 The history of violence invested and perpetuated through this geopolitical imagination and its forced imposition to the vast tracts of colonised non- European territories were not placed under critical scrutiny, but accepted as historical 'facts'. As a result, the power/knowledge of Turner's frontier thesis – in which frontiers were meeting points between civilisation and savages – constructed its own map of

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9 Ladis Kristof, 'The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries', in Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi (eds.), *The Structure of Political Geography* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 126-31.
10 Ibid.126-31.
11 John R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Allan and Unwin, 1987).
12 John H. Herz, 'Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', *World Politics,* 9/4 (1957), 473-93, John H. Herz, 'The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State', *Polity,* 1/1 (1968), 11-34.

the world, which was starkly divided by territorial borders accepted as essential politico-normative figures of the established geopolitical practices.[13]

Since then the epistemological, political and normative orientation of border studies has undergone profound transformation. The shift to post-positivist methodology has enabled border studies to develop a predominantly critical voice in its conceptualisation of the border. Contemporary scholarship no longer perceives borders as natural fixtures on geopolitical maps, but rather as culturally, socially and historically situated discursive and material constructions. Borders are performative spaces constitutive of social and political subjectivities. The central questions that occupies critical scholarship thus are: how is the border constituted; how does it circulate and re-produce certain social and political realities; and how do such realities enable new forms of spatial organisation, subjectivity, and mobility. In this sense, the border is no longer understood as a noun, but first and foremost as a verb in the sense of bordering, ordering, and othering – a political practice that produces binary categories such as inside and outside, familiar and strange, friend and enemy.[14] As David Newman and Anssi Paasi argue,

> State boundaries are … social, political and discursive constructs, not just static naturalised categories located between states. Boundaries and their meanings are historically contingent and they are part of the production and institutionalisation of territories and territoriality …. they also have deep symbolic, cultural, historical and religious, often contested, meanings for social communities. Even if they are always more or less arbitrary lines between territorial entities, they may have deep symbolic, cultural, historical and religious, often contested meanings for social communities. They manifest themselves in numerous social, political and cultural practices.[15]

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[13] Frederick J. Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History', in Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi (eds.), *The Structure of Political Geography* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 132-39.

[14] Houtum and Naerssen, 'Bordering, Ordering and Othering', (, Yosef Lapid, 'Introduction: Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New Direction', in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (eds.), *Identities, Borders, Orders Rethinking International Relations Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 1-28.

[15] David Newman and Anssi Paasi, 'Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography', *Progress in Human Geography,* 22/2 (1998), 187-88.

In many ways two developments – the spatial turn in social sciences and the rise of critical geopolitics – have played a significant role in changing paradigms and shifting epistemologies in border studies. The spatial turn of the 1980s and 1990s sought to liberate space from its accepted Cartesian coordinates. The central premise of the spatial turn is that space is not a passive and empty background waiting to be occupied and appropriated by humans. Rather, it is produced through the enactment of political, social, and cultural practices, norms and codes.[16] The production of space cannot be divorced from these practices and the ways in which they are enacted in a particular time and context. What we have learnt from Henri Lefevbre, Michel de Certeau, Ed Soja and Dooren Massey and many others is that the social and the political are spatially constructed, and spatiality is a social, political and a cultural construct. Hence, space is always political and politics is always spatial. Space is not a static enclosure with clear inside/outside boundaries enveloping objects and subjects. It is not frozen in time; it does not have an 'essence':

> Space is becoming the principal stake of goal-directed actions and struggles. It has of course always been the reservoir of resources, and the medium in which strategies are applied, but it has now become something more than the theatre, the disinterested stage or setting, of action. Space … can no longer be looked upon as an 'essence', as an object distinct from the point of view of (or as compared with) 'subjects', as answering to a logic of its own. Nor can it be treated as a result or resultant, as an empirically verifiable effect of a past, a history or a society. Is space indeed a medium? A milieu? An intermediary? It is doubtless all of these, but its role is less and less neutral, more and more active, both as instrument and as goal, as means and as end.[17]

Such premises of the spatial turn have had a significant influence in our understanding of borders, in particular our conceptualisation of modern and Western territoriality and the ways in which it has been always imagined and produced certain forms of knowledge and boundaries – through violent dichotomies of modern life. In particular, Lefebvre's conceptualisation of space

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[16] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989), Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005), Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[17] Lefebvre, *The Production of Space,* 410-11.

has inspired influential works in the discipline. Examples include: John Agnew's problematisation of 'territorial trap'; RBJ Walker's interrogation of inside–outside dichotomies, evident in the violent connection between the territorial partition of space and the rise of the modern state; and Annsi Passi's observations of the complex relationship between territory, nation, and state, and the ways in which boundaries were performed through historically contingent social and political relations.[18] All these works encourage us to problematise the modern foundations of traditional border thinking and to move towards interpretative methodologies that explore the politically and socially constructed nature of borders and the violent colonial practices that continues to give rise to these constructions.

Certainly, critical geopolitics, in particular the influential works of Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, has made significant contributions to the incorporation of the spatial turn in international relations, political geography, and politics, and to the formation of a solid conversation among these disciplines.[19] Ó Tuathail and Dalby have pursued a research agenda that calls into question the essentialised concepts of the state system and explored how modern and Western cartographic imaginations of the state enabled some political possibilities while excluding, silencing and colonising others:

> To construct critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit our attention to a study of the geography of politics within pregiven, taken-for-granted, common-sense spaces, but investigate the politics of the geographical specification of politics. That is, to practice critical geopolitics.[20]

The central premise of critical geopolitics is that in the modern cartographic imagination, states are perceived as organic entities, which possess a moral right

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[18] Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995), Anssi Paasi, 'Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border', *Regional studies,* 33/7 (1999), 669-80.

[19] As Robert Jackson argues, the overarching state-centrism of International Relations (IR) did not allow the discipline to make the concept of the border a subject of inquiry. By building a bridge between political geography and IR, the earlier works in critical geopolitics made a significant contribution to IR by disrupting its silence on the concept of the border. Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant Human Conduct in a World of State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 316.

[20] Simon Dalby, 'Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference, and Dissent', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 9/3 (1991), 274.

to occupy and colonise the space of 'others', and it is this moral right that justifies the dispossession of indigenous people from their own lands. Modern dichotomies of inside/outside and self/other reproduce metaphysical conceptions of borders and ideological structures of space and time. These practices, Ó Tuathail and Dalby argue, demonstrate the constitutive relationship between knowledge and power and how this relationship in Western political and spatial imagination forces a firm 'conceptual, moral and/or aesthetic understanding of self and other, security and danger, proximity and distance, and indifference and responsibility'.[21] Such static ontology entails 'the transposition of the historically unique territorial structure of the modern interstate system into a generalised [timeless] model of sociospatial organisation' that enables state-defined amnesia in relation to the historically contingent nature of territorialisation as a 'national' space.[22]

In short, critical border thinking interrogates and resists this political amnesia – a forceful forgetting that privileges the colonial and Western cartographic eye which continues to empower global colonisation by inserting its own borders into the territories of others, and by dominating our political, social and cultural imaginations. Moving away from such Western accounts of borders and territoriality, the central premise of critical border thinking is thereby to call into question:

> the violence (frontiers) of imperial/territorial epistemology and the rhetoric of modernity (and globalisation) of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the Other and, therefore, continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as eradication of the difference.[23]

2. 'Lines in the sand': the proliferation of biopolitical borders

[21] Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, 'Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics', in Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics* (New York: Routledge, 1998) 4.
[22] Neil Brenner, 'Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies', *Theory and Society,* 28 (1999), 48.
[23] Walter D. Mignolo and Madina V. Tlostanova, 'Theorizing from the Borders: Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge', *European Journal of Social Theory,* 9/2 (2006), 206.

Over the last decade, critical scholarship has further challenged the 'territorial epistemology' by focusing on the changing nature and location of borders. The central premise of this scholarship is that the traditional image of the border is becoming increasingly irrelevant in the context of their contemporary operation. Borders are no longer located on the geographical outer edge of the state, functioning merely as margins or outer territorial edges.24 Rather, they are undergoing radical transformations – disintegrating, fragmenting, often migrating away from their original delimiting spaces. Today, what we are witnessing is the proliferation and 'vacillation of borders' that traverse the 'quantitative relation between border and territory' through the creation of multiple border sites.25

The transformation of the border takes place as a solution to the increased irregular movement of people, which is predominantly constructed and presented as a security threat. Vaughan-Williams argues that in official discourses migration is framed in ambiguous ways.26 While legally sanctioned movement is regarded as an opportunity for the receiving countries, movement without state approval is represented as disruptions to the social and political cohesion of developed countries. Representation of unsanctioned interstate movement as a problem corresponds to the contemporary moral panic surrounding the securitisation practices that construct undocumented foreigners as illegals, deviants, unruly bodies, terrorists, and criminals. Matthew Sparke defines this hypocrisy as the 'neoliberal nexus of securitised nationalism and free market transnationalism' that governs the operation of contemporary borders.27 This nexus preserves the traditional nationalist imagining of the homeland, and in so doing it rationalises disciplinary methods of interstate migration governance and their liberal economic rationality.28

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24 Etienne Balibar, 'The Borders of Europe', in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds.), *Cosmopolitics, Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 216-29. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
25 Balibar, 'The Borders of Europe', 220.
26 Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond,* 20.
27 Matthew B. Sparke, 'A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizenship on the Border', *Political Geography,* 25/2 (2006), 151-80.
28 Ibid.153.

Such nationalist imagining of the homeland therefore promotes practices, which seek to manage and regulate the movement through surveillance and risk management technologies. It is these diverse and dispersed practices which create a new border topology now referred to as a 'biopolitical border':[29] a mobile, flexible border that operates primarily as a 'line in the sand'.[30] The biopolitical border is diffused across multiple sites constantly shifting in accordance with changing political interests, discourses, and the deployment of new security apparatuses. It is a 'borderwork' that is non-detectable, non-material, and multiple.[31] The biopolitical border is not geographically linear line – it is a fragmentation of the border into multiple zones. It is 'everywhere' – it is real, but not localisable. As Etienne Balibar famously writes, the new border is 'multiplied in its localisation and function', and 'thinned out and doubled' in that it is 'no longer at the shore of politics'.[32]

This alternative reading of the border takes Foucault's understanding of biopolitics as its main source of reference. For Foucault, biopolitics is the merging of life with politics. It takes life as its main object: 'its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its changes, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings'[33] – it is the threshold of modernity that takes the life of the species as its own political invention.[34] Its emergence in the late eighteenth century transformed the traditional sovereign right to 'take life or

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[29] William Walters is one of the first scholars to employ the concept of the biopolitical border. William Walters, 'Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 20 (2002), 561-80.

[30] Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the 'Lines in the Sand Agenda'", *Geopolitics,* 17 (2012), 727-33, Noel Parker and N. Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Postscript: Ongoing Research, Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies', ibid.14 (2009), 582-87. Examples of this scholarship include Louise Amoore, 'On the Line: Writing the Geography of the Virtual Border', *Political Geography,* 30 (2011), 63-64, Basaran, *Security, Law and Borders: At the Limits of Liberties*, Corey Johnson et al., 'Interventions on Rethinking 'the Border' in Border Studies', *Political Geography,* 30/2 (2011), 61-69, Chris Rumford, 'Global Borders: An Introduction to the Special Issue', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 28 (2010), 951-56, Chris Rumford, 'Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders', *Geopolitics,* 17/4 (2012), 887-902, William Walters, 'Border/Control', *European Journal of Social Theory,* 9/2 (2006c), 187-203, Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber (eds.), *Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006).

[31] Chris Rumford, 'Introduction: Theorizing Borders', *European Journal of Social Theory,* 9/2 (2006), 155-69.

[32] Balibar, 'The Borders of Europe', 220.

[33] Michel Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, trans. Graham Bruchell (New York: Picador, 2007b) 254.

[34] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990) 143.

let live'. During this period, two forms of power emerged. The first was disciplinary: the 'anatomo-politics of the body'.[35] Discipline invents techniques that enable the spatial distribution of bodies, their surveillance, separation, and visibility. The second form of power was bio-power. This new technology regards the population – its birth rates, death, production, illness – as a political problem that needs to be managed and regulated. It is not applied to individual bodies, but to 'man-as-living-being'.[36] Therefore, for Foucault, biopolitics does not seek to discipline 'man-as-living-being', but to regulate and manage it. As such, it is a specific form of power to 'make live and to let die'.[37] In Foucault's words, biopolitics is 'the calculated management of life' that seeks to foster life.[38] It introduces a set of new techniques such as statistical assessments and interventions aimed at the level of population. It connects political and economic practices, and it intervenes in the problems it created at the first stage – birth rate, longevity, public health, housing, migration, and so on.[39] Biopolitics integrates the techniques of discipline, utilises them, modifies them, and improves them. Similarly, it does not substitute the old sovereign right, but penetrates into it. In short, biopolitics is the merging of 'the body-organism-discipline-institutions series with the 'population-biological process-regulatory mechanisms-State' series.[40]

Adopting this Foucauldian paradigm of biopolitics, critical border studies investigates how the new topology of the border intervenes into and regulates the population it seeks to manage. The diverse application of the new border apparatuses and the improvement of traditional mechanisms enable the formation of a new reality that transforms the border into a political technology whose object is population management. In this context, the border operates as a connector – a complex network – that brings together diverse elements of the social and political field in novel ways. It includes demographics, statistics, surveillance techniques, as well as new actors such as private companies, the

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[35] Ibid. 139. See also Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 1977b).
[36] Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976* (New York: Picador, 2003) 242.
[37] Ibid. 241.
[38] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction*, 140.
[39] Ibid. 140.
[40] Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*, 250.

civil-military complex, humanitarian agencies, and so on. With such functioning, the biopolitical border takes the form of 'techno-bio-logical ordering' practice.41

William Walters, for example, argues that with the Schengen process, the borders of the European Union (EU) are transformed into ever-shifting scientific and managerial apparatuses in the governance of mobilities.42 The removal of internal borders enables the external borders of Europe to operate as a complex network whose central objective is to manage the 'problem' of crime and illegal migration. The biopolitical border seeks to achieve this objective by relying on new and pre-existing technologies such as the electronic virtual territory of databanks, and employment and social security records.43 Consequently, the EU border is now best understood as a political technology that produces power/knowledge of movement, and of health and wealth, which in effect enables the production of population as a knowable and governable entity. Similarly, in her discussion of the United States' US-Visit program, Louise Amoore argues

> the management of the border cannot be understood simply as a matter of the geopolitical policing and disciplining of the movement of bodies across mapped space. Rather it is more appropriated as a matter of biopolitics, as a mobile regulatory site through which people's everyday lives can be made amenable to intervention and management.44

The biopolitical border is thus extends its scope beyond control of entry and exit points to management of life at the local, national, regional and global levels. The operation of this new border topology sustains itself by generating new disciplinary-biopolitical strategies and by improving and modifying already existing traditional methods of border control.

As a complex network, the biopolitical border functions at multiple locations: within the territory of the state, on the physical location of the border,

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41 Michael Dillon, 'Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)Order', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 32/3 (2003), 531-58. Dillon defines the new political realm as 'techno-bio-logical ordering of life' that creates 'bodies' comprised of informational exchange mechanisms.
42 Walters, 'Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border', 561-80.
43 Ibid. 574, 573.
44 Louise Amoore, 'Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror', *Political Geography,* 25 (2006), 337.

within the territory of other countries and at sea. Within state territory, border control operates through internal controls that are based on 'crime making' – the criminalisation of undocumented persons. It excludes undocumented immigrants from welfare support, the labour market, and public education; and operates through tracing, expelling and detaining those without valid documents.[45] On the physical location of the border, this network intensifies traditional methods such the construction of physical barriers, and increased use of military technology, personnel and hardware including drones.[46]

The operation of the biopolitical border in third countries and at sea perhaps constitutes the most observable defining feature of this new border topology. In recent years much has been written on what is now referred to as 'externalisation of the border'. These studies explore how states increasingly outsource border control management to international and regional agencies such as FRONTEX and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and how they use third country territories to detain asylum seekers or to process their refugee claims.[47] Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo refer to such extraterritorial bordering practices as 'policing at a distance': practices of control by specific arrangements, procedures and technologies that seek to intervene and manage

[45] Arjen Leerkes, Godfried Engbersen, and Joanne Van Der Leun, 'Crime Control: Irregular Immigrants and the Influence of Internal Border Control', *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 58/1 (2012), 15-38, Leanne Weber, *Policing Non-Citizens* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), Leanne Weber, 'Border as Method: Tracing the Internal Border', viewed 19 January 2016, <http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/tracing-the-internal-border>.

[46] Reece Jones and Corey Johnson, 'Border Militarisation and the Re-Articulation of Sovereignty', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers,* 41/2 (2016), 187-200, Joseph Nevins, *Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Allien" and the Making of the US-Mexico Boundary* (New York: Routledge, 2002), Timothy J. Dunn, *The Militarisation of the US-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home* (Austin: The University of Texas, 1996), Peter Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

[47] Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, 'Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe', *Government and Opposition,* 43/2 (2008), 249-60, Andrew W. Neal, 'Securitisation and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of Frontex', *JCMS,* 47/2 (2009), 333-56, Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Borderwork Beyond inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror', *Space and Polity,* 12/1 (2008), 63-79, Simon Reid-Henry, 'An Incorporating Geopolitics: Frontex and the Geopolitical Rationalities of the European Border', *Geopolitics,* 18/1 (2013), 198-224, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 'The Externalisation of European Migration Control and the Reach of International Refugee Law', *European Journal of Migration and Law,* (2013), 273-98, Luiza Bialasiewicz, 'Off-Shoring and Outsourcing the Border of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean', *Geopolitics,* 17/4 (2012), 843-66, Amy Nethery, Brynna Raferty-Brown, and Savitri Taylor, 'Exporting Detention: Australia-Funded Immigration Detention in Indonesia', *Journal of Refugee Studies,* 26/1 (2013), 88-109.

the movement of people before individuals enter a given territory.[48] The increasing trend of 'off-shoring' borders evinces states' intentions to halt and/or detain 'risky subjects' before they reach a main point of entry. Such practices blur spatial and political distinctions between state borders and security practices, which are now located wherever border control functions are performed. In accounting for this aspect, Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering define contemporary borders as 'complex performances of state power staged at multiple locations through technologies of detection, selection, deterrence, expulsion and pre-emption directed towards targeted groups'.[49] Similarly, Mark Salter writes that these risk-management methods seek to make borders 'smarter' and thus 'more secure by displacing the site of decision or policing out from the actual territorial line'. [50]

In its operation at multiple locations, the biopolitical border as a network becomes an object of technical expertise and intervention within programs and schemes of international, national and regional authorities as well as private agencies.[51] What sustains the continuous reproduction and operation of this network is the integration of technological innovations in bordering practices.[52] This does not mean that traditional mobility management methods such as physical barriers or strict passport controls and visa regimes have been replaced.[53] Rather, they too have become more technologically advanced. As Ayse Ceyhan writes, 'the global mobility regime is now more focused on high technology like biometrics as a security enabler'.[54] According to Dennis Broeder

[48] Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo, 'Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies', in Didier Bigo and Elspheth Guild (eds.), *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 203-27.
[49] Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering, *Globalisation and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier* (Hampshire, Palgrave: Palgrave, 2011) 12.
[50] Mark Salter, 'Passports, Mobility, and Security: How Smart Can the Border Be?', *International Studies Perspective* 5/1 (2004), 71-91.
[51] Rutvica Adrijasevic and Willam Walters, 'The International Organization for Migration and the International Government of Borders', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 28/6 (2010), 977-99.
[52] Earlier examples of this scholarship include Elia Zureik and Willan Publishing Mark B. Salter , Devon, 2005 (eds.), *Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity* (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2005), Charlotte Epstein, 'Embodying Risk: Using Biometrics to Protect the Borders ', in Louise Amoore and Marieke De Goede (eds.), *Risk and the War on Terror* (London: Routledge, 2008), 178-93.
[53] For the history of the passport see John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[54] Ayse Ceyhan, 'Technologization of Security: Management of Uncertainty and Risk in the Age of Biometrics', *Surveillance and Society,* 5/2 (2008), 102.

and James Hampshire, biometric borders constitute 'preemptive mobility governance', which function by means of the digitisation of people – that is, rendering potential immigrants, passengers, undocumented and documented travellers alike as manipulable data.[55] This form of control is based on risk-based governance and it transforms the border into a 'post-panopticon',[56] an 'electronic panopticon',[57] and a 'firewall'[58] in which surveillance operates in non-carceral forms that make passengers visible to the panoptic observer. Seen in these terms, the biopolitical border turns the mobile body into a site of observation, calculation and risk assessment.[59] Such technological operation of the border blurs the distinction between virtual and actual, as the border is now designed to be mobile in time and space, moving simultaneously in every direction together with the moving subjects it seeks to control.[60] In a Foucauldian way this operation of the biopolitical border does not seek to hinder mobility: rather, it aims to facilitate it through the separation of risky bodies from those bodies approved by the state.

Such transformation of the border and its complex operation attract a diversity of attributions such as 'diagram',[61] 'mobility assemblage',[62] and 'banoption'.[63] Inspired by Gilles Deleuze, Salter defines the contemporary mobility regime as performative of the new border in terms of complex 'systems that mix technology, politics, and actors within diverse configurations in that they do not follow given scales or topographies'.[64] Similarly, Walters perceives

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[55] Dennis Broeder and James Hampshire, 'Dreaming of Seamless Borders: ICTs and the Pre-Emptive Governance of Mobility in Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 39 (2013), 1-18.

[56] Roy Boyne, 'Post-Panopticism', *Economy and Society,* 29/2 (2000), 285-307.

[57] David Lyon, 'An Electronic Panopticon? A Sociological Critique of Surveillance Theory', *The Sociological Review,* 41/4 (1993), 653-78.

[58] William Walters, 'Rethinking Borders Beyond the State', *Comparative European Politics,* 4/2-3 (2006a), 141-59.

[59] Peter Adey, 'Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, and the Preemptirve Securitization of Mobile Body', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 27 (2009), 274-95.

[60] Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 'Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the 'Lines in the Sand Agenda'', 730.

[61] Walters, 'Border/Control', 187-203.

[62] Mark Salter, 'To Make Move and Let Stop: Mobility and the Assemblage of Circulation', *Mobilities,* (2013), 1-13.

[63] Didier Bigo, 'Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices of Control of Banopticon', in Rajaram P. Kumar and Carl Grundy-War (eds.), *Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics of Territory's Edge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2007), 16.

[64] Salter, 'To Make Move and Let Stop: Mobility and the Assemblage of Circulation', 1-13, ibid.7-10.

the border as a diagram: concrete practices, schemes and spaces that form new spatialities and subjectivities. Drawing on Jean Luc Nancy and Foucault, Didier Bigo reads the contemporary border as 'banopticon' to emphasise the illiberal disciplinary strategies dispersed through every aspect of life in liberal regimes:

> [The banopticon] allows us to analyse the collection of heterogeneous bodies of discourses (on threats, immigration, enemy within, immigrant fifth column, radical Muslims versus good Muslims, exclusion versus integration, etc.), of institutions (public agencies, governments, international organizations, NGOs, etc.), of architectural structures (detention centres, waiting zones and Schengen traffic lanes in airports, integrated video camera networks in some cities, electronic networks outfitted with security and video-surveillance capacities), of laws (on terrorism, organized crime, immigration, clandestine labour, asylum seekers, or to accelerate justice procedures and to restrict the defendants' rights), and of administrative measures (regulation of the 'sans papiers', negotiated agreements between government agencies vis-à-vis policies of deportation/repatriation, 'common' aeroplanes specially hired for deportation with costs shared by different national polices, etc.).[65]

The diffused operation of the border as a performative space reinforces the established binary categories such as illegal/legal, regular/irregular, voluntary/involuntary and documented/undocumented persons.[66] The effect of such binary categories, as Bryan Turner rightly argues, is the creation of a smooth mobility regime for trusted bodies and an 'immobility regime' for undesirable migrants, refugees, and other aliens.[67] These parallel regimes signal the emergence of a new form of global 'enclave society' in which the 'undesirables' increasingly become subjects of different modes of sequestration,

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[65] Didier Bigo, 'Globalised (in)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon', in Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds.), *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 32.
[66] Saskia Sassen, 'Beyond Sovereignty: Immigration Policy Making Today', *Social Justice,* 23/2 (1996), 9-20, Amoore, 'Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror', 336-51, J. Benjamin Muller, 'Travelers, Borders, Dangers: Locating the Political at the Biometric Border', in Mark Salter (ed.), *Politics of the Airport* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 127-43.
[67] Bryan Turner, 'The Enclave Society: Towards a Sociology of Immobility', *European Journal of social theory,* 10/2 (2007), 287-303.

exclusion and imprisonment.[68] In short, such shifts transform the contemporary border into what Bigo refers to as a 'Möbius ribbon':[69]

> the delimitation of inside and outside are subjective, or, more explicitly, intersubjective… The Möbius ribbon destabilizes the idea of an objective border between inside and outside, friend and foe, law and exception (the liberal view of the border of a cylinder). Within the strip, zones of indetermination appear; zones of conflagration (of violence and of meanings) emerge, and they are not no-man's land: on the contrary, they are populated by individuals excluded from both the inside and the outside, from both friendship and enmity, from both law and exception.[70]

Critical scholarship on the biopolitical border – its externalisation or dislocation – contributes to the field in a number of ways. First, following the footsteps of early works on critical geopolitics, this scholarship challenges the inside and outside. It unsettles, in the words of Salter, the theory of / that had shaped the conceptualisation of borders for too long.[71] By removing '/' – the separating line between inside and outside, critical scholarship helps us to perceive the border as a continuum. As I will elaborate in detail in the following chapters, my conceptualisation of the border builds on this notion of border: an ever-shifting and productive relationship between the inside and outside. In particular, my analysis of the Separation Wall and Australia's refugee detention centres in Manus Island and Nauru, which do not locate on the border understood in traditional sense, contributes to this notion of blurred boundaries. Second, by exploring the diverse practices of private agents, non-governmental organisations and humanitarian actors, the scholarship on the biopolitical border emphasises the power of multiple actors in performing and sustaining the border.[72]

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[68] Ibid. 287-303.
[69] Didier Bigo, 'The Mobius Ribbon of International and External Security(Ies)', in D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid M. Albert (ed.), *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 91-115.
[70] Bigo, 'Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices of Control of Banopticon', 16.
[71] Mark B. Salter, 'Theory of the /: The Suture and Critical Border Studies', *Geopolitics,* 17/4 (2012), 734-55.
[72] The 'humanitarian border' is still an under-theorised area. Significant exceptions include Nick Vaughan-Williams and Adrian Little, 'Stopping Boats, Saving Lives, Securing Subjects: Humanitarian Borders in Europe and Australia', *European Journal of International Relations,* (2016), 1-24, Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond,*

Despite its significant contributions to the field, critical scholarship on biopolitical borders has a number of limitations, which this thesis aims to address. First, current scholarship predominantly focuses on the contemporary era, and exaggerates the shifts and transformations occurring in the last two decades. As I will elaborate in my discussion of Israel and Palestine and Australia, the biopolical apparatus of the border is nothing new. In fact, it played a significant role in the long history of colonisation. As I will demonstrate throughout this thesis, the paradox of modern politics is that the secure inside has always been sought to be sustained through blurring the boundary between inside and outside. Therefore, the crucial question is not how the new border topology creates inside and outside indistinctions, but how such indistinctions repeat their historical paradoxes in different forms.

Second, the contemporary scholarship on biopolitical borders unreflexively adopts network thinking. It certainly demonstrates the complex operation of the contemporary border. However, it reinforces rigid conceptions of that network perceived as a whole. In this reading, the border, as a complex network, loosely connects multiple agents and apparatuses, yet all of these diverse elements are locked within that network and serve to maintain its stability, supporting top-down state-centric bordering practices. The border described by these readings might not have boundaries, but the neat network they narrate does. Relations among different agents and apparatuses proceed from one point to another, and as a result they appear as dispersed points within the boundaries of that network. The literature on the biopolitical border explores how the border operates beneath state practices in terms of micropolitics of the border. Nevertheless, the network it depicts reinforces the very border it seeks to challenge. Even studies drawing on Deleuze provides us with an extraordinarily conservative reading, failing to account for the vital concept of 'becoming' in Deleuzian thought. In doing so, they offer a limited reading of the micropolitics and heterogeneity of the border. I do not suggest discarding micropolitics and heterogeneity of the border, nor do I propose to abolish

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William Walters, 'Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border', in Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke (eds.), *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 138-64.

analyses of networks. On the contrary, I argue that we need to expand the boundaries of these concepts, and we continue to explore networks while recognising that the border is not only constituted by the power of such networks. That is to say, complex networks constitute only one 'line' of the border.

Consequently, the contemporary scholarship takes Balibar's famous quote 'borders are everywhere' as one of its points of reference. Yet it fails to take into account the 'ambivalence of the border' that Balibar in fact emphasises. In his search for the performativity of the European border, he argues that borders can only be characterised by their intrinsic ambivalence. It is this ambivalence that opens the border into multiple forms of politics that challenge its oppressive structure.[73] The critical scholarship on biopolitical borders reads as the border network as life-capturing political technology. Contestations of its life-capturing power are almost wholly absent in this scholarship. This issue becomes even more problematic in studies that take Giorgio Agamben's reading of biopolitics as their major point of reference.

3. The return of the sovereign: the thanatopolitical metamorphosis of the border

In his attempt to complete Foucault's project on biopolitics, Agamben reintroduces thanapolitics and sovereign power into the realm of biopolitics. Whereas for Foucault biopolitics signifies an epochal shift from 'take life or let live' to the merging of natural life (*zoe*) and politically qualified life (*bios*), for Agamben the political realm has always been biopolitical.[74] He argues that biopolitics did not begin to emerge during the second half of the eighteenth century as Foucault observes. Rather, it was embedded in the constitution of sovereign power from the very beginning. Contrary to Foucault, Agamben insists that biopolitics is as old as sovereignty because it constitutes the very foundation of sovereign power, which operates through making what he refers to as 'indistinctions' between two forms of life. Agamben explains the link

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[73] Etienne Balibar, ' At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation?', *European Journal of Social Theory,* 13/3 (2010), 315-22.
[74] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

between *zoe* and *bios* through his concept of 'inclusive exclusion'. *Zoe,* he argues, has never been outside the realm of bios, nor is *zoe* synonymous with it; rather, it forms a 'hybrid form of life' that is included by its exclusion.[75] Agamben refers to this 'hybrid form of life' as 'bare life'.

Bare life should not be confused with *zoe*. It is rather a 'zone of indistinction' that forms sovereign power. Sovereign power first excludes bare life and then captures it within the political realm in the virtue of its very exclusion. For Agamben, bare life is the life of the figure of *homo sacer*, which may be killed but not sacrificed. Its life is included in politics in the form of its exclusion:

> ... what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of *zoe* in the polis – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, *bios* and *zoe*, right and fact, enter into a zone of indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested.[76]

The sovereign is thus the one who decides the temporal and spatial operation of the state of exception, which blurs dichotomous boundaries between exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, *bios* and *zoe*, and right and fact. It is the normalisation of the state of exception that has become the dominant paradigm of contemporary politics.

For Agamben, biopolitics and thanatopolitics are not two opposite realms. In fact, a decision on life (biopolitics) is always a decision on death (thanatopolitics). That is to say, the line between biopolitics and thanapolitics is not a stable boundary separating two realms. Rather, biopolitics and thanatopolitics remain in a zone of indistinction.[77] Agamben elaborates this zone through his discussion of the camp. The camp is a space of exception, whose

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[75] Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond*, 48.
[76] Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 9.
[77] Ibid.122

constitutive violence is the production of bare life. The camp is a specific spatial arrangement in which the state of exception is normalised.78 The juridico-political structure of the camp is not simply the production of the state of exception, but the preservation of a stable exception, which appears both as the constitutive element of the camp and the condition of its continuing existence. Agamben argues that in this zone the boundaries between exception and rule, legal and illegal, and fact and law are blurred. The creation of such 'indistinction' is the very condition of the sovereign and the political life it inscribes, and hence the camp is never completely outside, but is included by its very exclusion from political life. In this zone, where 'the very concepts of subjective rights and juridical protection no longer make any sense', what constrains the sovereign is not the law, but the perceived dangers to public security.79

The camp is the material symbol of the generalised creation of bare life whose production and condition are normalised in contemporary politics: a biopolitical apparatus that inscribes life within juridical order only through producing very strict boundaries between political life and bare life. The camp, he writes, 'is the absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realised in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation'.80 The inhabitant of the camp, who is deprived of rights and stripped of all political status, is reduced to bare life: a naked corporeality. He/she is still the object of sovereign intervention, but only through his/her exclusion. The juridical procedures and deployments of power abolish the rights of the camp inhabitants and, consequently, crimes committed against them do not constitute crime. In short, the camp performs the sovereign act of abandonment, which turns it into a no-place and transforms its inhabitants into non-people stripped of juridical protection.

Over the last decade Agamben's reading of biopolitics in *Homo Sacer* and *State of Exception* have become textbooks for those studies exploring contemporary border crises, particularly in their focus on sovereign violence, human rights abuses, and death on the border.81 Agamben's understanding of

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78 Ibid.166-80.
79 Ibid.171.
80 Ibid.171.
81 Some notable examples are Mark Salter, 'The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics', *Alternatives,* 31/2 (2006),

biopolitics has influenced many works discussing limits of liberal practices, the war on terror, the politics of humanitarianism, detention camps, migration, and refugees.[82] His concepts of bare life, the state of exception, and the camp are inspirational sources for critical discussion concerning the sites of border violence – airports,[83] immigration detention camps,[84] migration zones,[85] and patrolled borderlands.[86]

This paradigm has introduced a new debate on the contemporary operation of biopolitical borders. Salter, for example, regards the biopolitical border as 'a space of permanent exception'.[87] He argues that the contemporary operation of the border illustrates the reach of sovereign power to ban and to

167-89, Reece Jones, 'Agents of Exception: Border Security and the Marginalization of Muslims in India', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 27/5 (2009), 879-97, Sonja Buckel and Jens Wissel, 'State Project Europe: The Transformation of the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life', *International Political Sociology,* 4 (2010), 33-49, Mark Salter, 'When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Borders, Sovereignty, and Citizenship', *Citizenship Studies,* 12/4 (2008), 365-80, Nikos Papastergiadis, 'The Invasion Complex: The Abject Other and Space of Violence', *Geografiska Annaler,* 88/4 (2006a), 429-42, Guillermina Seri, 'On the "Triple Frontier" and the "Borderization" of Argentina: A Tale of Zones', in Jenny Edkins, Veronique Pin-Fat, and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 79-100, Jon Stratton, 'Zombie Trouble: Zombie Texts, Bare Life and Displaced People', *European Journal of Cultural Studies,* 14/3 (2011), 265-81, Heidrun Friese, 'Border Economies: Lampedusa and the Nascent Migration Industry', *Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures,* 6/2 (2012), 66-84, Lara Palombo, 'Mutations of the Australian Camp', *Continuum,* 23/5 (2009a), 613-27, Hosna J. Shewly, 'Abandoned Spaces and Bare Life in the Enclaves of the India-Bangladesh Border', *Political Geography,* 32/1 (2013), 23-31.

[82] Derek Gregory, 'The Black Flag: Guantánamo Bay and the Space of Exception', *Geografiska Annaler,* 88/4 (2006a), 405-27, Claudia Aradau, 'Law Transformed: Guantanamo and the 'Other' Exception', *Third World Quartely,* 28/3 (2007), 489-501, Jenny Edkins, 'Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,* 25/1 (2000), 3-25, Bulent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, 'Zones of Indistinction: Security, Terror and Bare Life in Territories', in Anselm Franke (ed.), *Territories, Islands, Camps and Other States of Utopia* (Berlin: KW-Institute for Contemporary Art, 2003), 42-51, Shampa Biswas and Sheila Nair (eds.), *International Relations and States of Exception: Margins, Peripheries, and Excluded Bodies* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[83] David Lyon, 'Filtering Flows, Friends, and Foes: Global Surveillance', in Mark B. Salter (ed.), *Politics at the Airport* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 29-50.

[84] Bulent Diken, 'From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City', *Citizenship Studies,* 8/1 (2004), 83-106, Kumar Prem Rajaram and Carl Grundy-War, 'The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand', *International Migration,* 42/1 (2004), 33-63, Willem Schinkel, ''Illegal Aliens' and the State, Or: Bare Bodies Vs the Zombie', *International Sociology,* 24/6 (2009), 779-806.

[85] Savitri Taylor, 'Sovereign Power at the Border', *Public Law Review* 16/1 (2005b), 55-77.

[86] Jones, 'Agents of Exception: Border Security and the Marginalization of Muslims in India', 879-897

Susan Bibler Countin, 'Illegality, Borderlands, and the Space of Nonexistence', in Richard Warren Perry and Bill Maurer (eds.), *Globalization under Construction: Governmentality, Law and Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 171-202.

[87] Salter, 'The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics', 169-70.

exclude in the context of its moving objects and subjects.[88] The act of crossing a border is a performative event of sovereign power, as it is the sovereign who decides the political status of those mobile individuals. In this context, it is the sovereign who determines the spatial and temporal displacement of the border; this sovereign act is both an effect and a constitutive force of biopolitics. Charlotte Epstein's analysis of biometric borders echoes this line of argument. Epstein delineates how the border functions as a biopolitical practice that produces bare life, blurring the boundaries between inside and outside, exclusion and inclusion, *bios* and *zoe*.[89]

Similarly, Vaughan-Williams observes that the contemporary biopolitical border operates as an 'undecidable zone of anomie excluded from the normal juridical-political space of the state, but nevertheless an integral part of that space'.[90] He explains that what we are witnessing today is a 'generalised biopolitical border'. New border sites – such as detention camps in Guantanamo, immigration detention facilities in southern Australia, and various so-called CIA 'black sites' in Eastern Europe – are zones of indistinction operating simultaneously as inside and outside.[91] In these practices normal order and rule of law are de facto suspended. These sites are constituted by exceptional practices that produce bare life through the blurring of *zoe* and *bios*. In these terms, the disintegration of the border away from the border not only signals the blurred spatial boundaries between inside and outside, it also refers to the sovereign decision in producing the state of exception and the distinction between the politically qualified life of the citizen and bare life. The inhabitants of these exceptional places are denied their individual rights and not qualified as political subjects. Nevertheless, they are included in the political realm by their exclusion, because it is their very exclusion that is the constitutive element of sovereign power. Following Carsten Laustsen and Bülent Diken, Vaughan-Williams further maintains that these exceptional sites are no longer exceptional. Rather, they have become the rule for normalised practices in global politics. The generalised biopolitical border is thus a 'global archipelago of zones of

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[88] Salter, 'When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Borders, Sovereignty, and Citizenship', 365-80.

[89] Epstein, 'Embodying Risk: Using Biometrics to Protect the Borders ', 186.

[90] Vaughan-Williams, *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power*, 112.

[91] Ibid. 114.

indistinction in which sovereign power produces the bare life it needs to sustain itself".[92]

Such generalised biopolitical operation of the border is perhaps most visible in the context of the deportation and detention of 'illegal' immigrants. Nicholas De Genova, for example, suggests that the criminalisation of movement and deportation of undocumented immigrants is now one of the routine conventions of statecraft. These normalised conventions create a global abject class of 'deportable aliens', who are included in the political realm only through their exclusion from individual rights.[93] Similarly, detention of the 'illegal' migrant is a concrete manifestation of sovereign power in creating bare life. Seizing on Agamben's thesis, Prem Kumar Rajaram, Carl Grundy-Warr, and Suvendrini Perera, for example, argue that the detention camps are the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.[94] Construction of these camps is legitimated through the circulation of historical anxieties over perceived threats to the political community. The asylum seekers in these camps are isolated and excluded from national consensus and are stripped of any political and social rights. They are subjected to normalised practices of policing and the use of state violence, which in turn reduces them to a biological corporeality trapped within his/her bare speechlessness:

> Refugees are marked out by their precise lack of rights. Their a- or extra-territorial form of existence seems to consign them to an abject condition of speechlessness which leaves them with little or no remit to challenge often ill-intentioned depictions (as well as occasional brutality or violence).[95]

Therefore, in detention camps, Diken and Schinkel write, the refugee is stripped of his/her rights and identity, and becomes a 'zombie'.[96] The refugee detention

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[92] Ibid.116

[93] Nicholas De Genova, 'The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement', in Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (eds.), *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freefom of Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 33-65.

[94] Rajaram and Grundy-War, 'The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand', 33-63, Perera, 'What Is a Camp?'.

[95] Rajaram and Grundy-War, 'The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand', 37.

[96] Diken, 'From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City', 83-106, Schinkel, ''Illegal Aliens' and the State, Or: Bare Bodies vs. the Zombie', 779-806.

camp is a non-place 'where human and inhuman enters into a zone of biopolitical indistinction and the detainees can be subjected to all sorts of physical and symbolic violence without legal consequences'.[97] In this non-place there is no separation line between biopolitics and thanatopolitics.

As borders now increasingly become non-places, they pervasively produce living deaths not only in camps, but also in borderlands, at points of border crossings, and within the territory of the state. Roxanne Doty, for example, observes the normalisation of death on the US - Mexico border, arguing that sovereign practices first transform the undocumented Mexican into an illegal body, and then reduces its existence into bare life.[98] The construction of walls, the increased militarisation of the border, and the criminalisation of movement change the desert into a death trap for immigrants. Such practices leave them vulnerable not only to state violence, but also the violence of ordinary citizens who act as border patrol agents.[99] Consequently, the contemporary border is now best described as

> … a space of forced invisibility, exclusion, subjugation, and repression that materializes around [the undocumented] wherever they go in the form of real effects ranging from hunger to unemployment (or more typically, severe exploitation) to violence to death.[100]

In short, the contemporary criminalisation of movement, and hardening and militarisation of the border signal the expansion of sovereign power, which erases distinctions between norm and exception, legality and illegality, fiction and real, inside and outside, and death and life.[101] In the words of van Houtum, the contemporary 'apartheid politics' of borders is loaded with the rhetoric of selective access, burden and security threat, provoking the dehumanisation of

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[97] Diken, 'From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City', 88.

[98] Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Crossroads of Death', in Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristina Masters (eds.), *The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3-24, Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Bare Life: Border-Crossing Deaths and Spaces of Moral Alibi', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 29/4 (2011), 599-612.

[99] Shahram Khosravi, *'Illegal Traveller'': An Auto-Ethnography of Border* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010) 3.

[100] Nicholas P. De Genova, 'Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Antropology,* 31 (2002), 427.

[101] Reece Jones, *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (London: Verso, 2016), Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (New York: Zone Books, 2010).

those who are now deemed wastable and deportable lives.102 In this context, what is most alarming is no longer the suspension of the normal legal order and the generalised reproduction of a state of exception, Doty argues, but the suspension of morality, which turns borders into places of generalised 'moral alibi'.103

4. The acts of 'abject subjects': a critique of Agamben and beyond

Much has been written on the limitations of Agamben's reading of biopolitics. It has been criticised as 'messianic politics'104 and as a form of 'political nihilism' that leaves no room for struggle and resistance.105 In his critique, William Connolly points out that Agamben's decisionist and exceptionalist accounts of politics not only imprisons it within the limits of sovereign power, it also constitutes a narrow, tight and timeless understanding of the sovereign that exerts final authority and all-encompassing power.106 Emphasising Agamben's silence on micropolitics and the complex functioning of sovereignty, Connolly argues that the elements of sovereignty are not 'concreted in the single will of a people, a king, or a dictator': rather, they are a loose assemblage of techniques that operate 'below the threshold of political visibility'.107 The central issue in contemporary politics is not so much about the merging of sovereignty and biopolitics, but politics that is driven by the 'fictive unity' of the modern nation state.108 For Connolly, positive transformation does not necessarily require the abandonment of politics altogether, as Agamben suggests, but it does require latitude in this fictive unity in order to enable critical ethos in the cultures of deep pluralism in which sovereignty is practiced.109

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102 Henk Van Houtum, 'Human Blacklisting: The Global Apartheid of the EU's External Border Regime', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 28/6 (2010), 957-76.
103 Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Bare Life: Border-Crossing Deaths and Spaces of Moral Alibi', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 29/4 (2011), 599-612.
104 Catherine Mills, 'Agamben's Messianic Politics: Biopolitics, Abandonment and Happy Life', *Contretemps,* 5 (2004), 42-62.
105 Ernesto Laclau, 'Bare Life or Social Indeterminancy? ', in Matthew Calarco and Steven Decaroli (eds.), *Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life* (California: Stanford University Press, 2007), 11-22.
106 Connolly, 'The Complexities of Sovereignty', 23-42.
107 William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 20.1.
108 William E. Connolly, *Pluralism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005)134- 45.
109 Ibid.

Similarly, Rosi Braiddotti rightly criticises Agamben's inheritance of Heideggerian ontology, arguing that such ontology imprisons politics within the tragic aspect of modernity, concomitant with its alienating and destructive power of technology.[110] The presentation of bare life as a 'disposable matter' in the hands of despotic power captured by the state system signifies the negative limits of modernity and 'the abyss of totalitarianism'. In Agamben's politics, death always wins out. Braiddotti, however, argues that such a pessimistic account of regimes of sovereign-bio-power not only breeds the condition of human passivity, but it also leaves no room for discussion of the complexity of life and the generative powers of *zoe*. Jacques Rancière draws our attention to the 'ontological trap' in Agamben's overly pessimistic and deterministic understanding of politics based on a strong polarity between bare life and the state of exception, which amounts to ontological destiny.[111] In regards to the space of the camp, for instance, Agamben assumes a strict border between the executioner and the victim, and between *bio* and *zoe*. Therefore, indeed any struggle to enact rights is from the outset caught within the 'biopolitical trap'. As Rancière points out, Agamben's reading of biopolitics equates politics with power: 'a power that it increasingly takes as an overwhelming historico-ontological destiny from which only a God is likely to save us'.[112] We can only traverse this ontological trap by resetting the question of the subject of politics and the border separating bare life and political life – by re-conceiving politics not as a field of power, but as a challenge to dominant order by those excluded from the polity.[113]

My aim here is not to recap the literature on the merits of Agamben's account of sovereignty and biopolitics, nor to defend him with references to his other works.[114] The purpose is to focus on the limitations of existing scholarship whose accounts of the border overwhelmingly rely on Agamben's two major

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[110] Rosi Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 39-42.
[111] Jacques Rancière, 'Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?', *The South Atlantic Quarterly,* 103/2/3 (2004), 297-310.
[112] Ibid. 302.
[113] Jacques Rancière, 'Ten Thesis of Politics', *Theory & Event,* 5/3 (2001).
[114] For the affirmative and positive dimension of Agamben's philosophy in reference to his concepts of profanation and coming community see Sergei Prozorov, 'Why Giorgio Agamben Is an Optimist? ', *Philosophy Social Criticism,* 36/9 (2011), 1053-73, Jessica Whyte, *Catastrophe and Redemption: The Political Thought of Giorgio Agamben* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2013).

writings on the state of exception and *homo sacer* (and hence very narrow reading of Agamben) and has inherited the 'ontological trap' present in these works. In its extensive use of concepts like bare life, the camp, and the state of exception as analytical tool-boxes, the 'Agambenian turn' in critical debates retains the merits of research into the biopolitical border discussed earlier. In its constant references to these concepts, it also presents contemporary borders as spaces of abjection, spaces of normalised exception, or non-places which accommodate nothing but bare life captured by the decisionist power of sovereign. In these interventions, the border once again appears as a completed achievement of modernity devoid of ambiguity or contestation. The border is a calculated and disciplined space which achieves to control all living and non-living beings. In such a lexicon, the border is simply the technology of death, an encapsulating apparatus of sovereignty and modernity in which we are all imprisoned. The Agambenian lexicon narrates the border as a deserted island: lifeless space abandoned to the mercy of sovereign indistinctions. The only thing that moves in this space are the shifting lines of sovereign indistinctions. Consequently, what we are left with is a dead-end narrative in which biopolitics turns into thanatopolitics: death captures the border and quietly awaits the sovereign moment of distinctions between bare life and other lives. The 'undesirable' subject of the border who is included by his/her exclusion is given a single identity: a faceless, voiceless and helpless figure trapped within the abject space of the border. As Walters writes, this is a narrative in which 'sovereign power has the last laugh'.[115]

In perpetuating the post-structuralist habit of presenting a pessimistic vision of politics, this critical scholarship unfortunately operates within a self-defeating paradox. While it seeks to challenge state-centric, top-down, dominant bordering practices, by envisaging the border as a sovereign apparatus of entrapment, and all living beings as eternally ensnared within this apparatus, it turns the critique into a futile effort without the imagining possibility of positive transformation. With its emphasis on the negative aspects of border politics, such critical debates 'refuse to pursue the trail of affirmative possibility very far, out

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[115] William Walters, 'Acts of Demostration: Mapping the Territory of (Non-)Citizenship', in Engin Isin and Greg M. Neilson (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (London: Zed Books, 2008b) 188.

of a desire to minimise its implication in ontological assumptions', and hence, it refuses an encounter with the question of how, and under what conditions, alternative politics emerge.[116] Consequently, in its reductive reading, this 'Agambenian' scholarship fails to envisage the border as a space of becoming. Rather, it is captured by a motionless image of the border devoid of other possibilities: possibilities that expose the impossibility of an all-capturing sovereign; and possibilities that reveal the existence of multiple forms of politics, some of which have the ability to transcend the given categories of established moral structures of our contemporary life.

Certainly, I am not the first to address the limitations of the 'Agambenian turn' in critical border studies. Major recent perspectives – the Autonomy of Migration (AoM),[117] and the agency of the 'abject subject', and migrant activism – provide powerful alternatives to the works that privilege sovereign power.[118] According to the AoM perspective, the social and political field is foremost constituted by 'escapes'.[119] Escape subverts existing power configurations by enabling a transformation in the biopolitical control of life. AoM privileges movements of 'subversion, refusal, desertion, sabotage' – 'escape routes' – by focusing on the creative, connective and transformative potential of these routes. Dimitris Papadopoulos and colleagues argue that moments and movements of escape are not subsequent to the practices of control, but occur first: 'People's efforts to escape can force the reorganisation of control itself; regimes of control must respond to the new situations created by escape'.[120] According to AoM,

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[116] Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralisation*, 36.

[117] Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

[118] Influential works in this field are Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (London: Zed Books, 2008), Anne McNevin, *Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the Political* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), William Walters, 'No Border: Games with(out) Frontiers', *Social Justice,* 33/1 (2006b), 21-39, Jenny Burman, 'Absence, "Removal" and Everyday Life in the Diasporic City: Antidetention/Antideportation Activism in Montreal', *Space and Culture,* 9 (2006), 279-93, Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, 'The Clown at the Gates of the Camp: Sovereignty, Resistance and the Figure of the Fool', *Security Dialogue,* 44/2 (2013), 93-110, Vicki Squire and Jonathan Darling, 'The "Minor" Politics of Rightful Presence: Justice and Relationality in *City of Sanctuary*', *International Political Sociology,* 7 (2013), 59-74, Maurice Stierl, "No One Is Illegal!' Resistance and the Politics of Discomfort', *Globalizations,* 9/3 (2012), 425-38, Raffaela Puggioni, 'Border Politics, Rights to Life and Acts of Dissensus: Voices from the Lampedusa Borderland', *Third World Quarterly,* 36/6 (2015b), 1145-59.

[119] Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century.*

[120] Ibid. xv.

politics does not arise simply through sovereign power and its generative apparatuses of biopolitics, but through the acts of 'imperceptible' subjects who remain unrepresented within dominant regimes and outside of the existing power structures, and betray the established forms of representational politics. Imperceptible politics, they argue, empowers 'possibilities for breaking the closure' of the existing order of things, offering new forms of life beyond the representational politics that to capture all aspects of everyday life.[121]

On a different spectrum, critics similarly urge caution regarding scholarly emphasis on 'the rights of passage' being determined only by the sovereign, instead offering a shift to the 'rites of passage' that mark and facilitates possibilities for change.[122] Engin Isin, Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel's foundational works on transgressive citizenship politics, abject spaces, acts of citizenship, citizens without frontiers, and abject cosmopolitanism are significant examples of this approach.[123] These works seek to expose alternative politics that exceed the power of sovereign-bio-governmental control and established categories – citizen, refugee, asylum seeker, and documented migrant – through which politics are framed. In privileging the political agency of the 'abject subject', this scholarship explores the ways in which the abject figure refuses to remain the subject of bare life and claims political agency through various acts of resistance, making a demand that important facets of macropolitics refuses to recognise.

The central premise of this scholarship is the shift in analysis from bare life to the figure of abject described as 'fully formed subjects who are capable of autonomy, self-representation and claim-making'.[124] In its critique of

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[121] Ibid. xv.

[122] Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, 'Border Theatre: On the Arts of Security and Resistance', *Cultural Geographies,* 17/3 (2010), 302.

[123] Isin and Nielsen (eds.), *Acts of Citizenship*, Isin Engin, *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), Isin and Rygiel, 'Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps', Peter Nyers, 'Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement', in Nicholas De Genova and Nathalie Peutz (eds.), *Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010b), 413-41, Engin Isin, *Citizens without Frontiers* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), Kim Rygiel, 'Bordering Solidarities: Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement and Camps at Calais', *Citizenship Studies,* 15/1 (2011), 1-19, Kim Rygiel, 'Dying to Live: Migrant Deaths and Citizenship Politics Along European Borders', *Citizenship Studies,* 20/5 (2016), 545-60.

[124] Peter Nyers, 'No One Is Illegal between City and Nation', *Studies in Social Justice,* 4/2 (2010a), 132.

exclusionary politics of the state, the agency approach aims to reveal the ways in which contemporary bordering practices are disrupted or traversed by resistance, struggle, and different forms of contestation. These acts of contestation and resistance have the power to transform what Isin and Rygiel call 'abject spaces', such as camps.[125] The camp, they argue, is a not simply a space of confinement but 'a site where life struggles against any sovereign reduction to bare life'.[126] These spaces are characterised by struggles of a figure of abject who is capable of making political claims.

Isin's notion of 'acts of citizenship' – transformative, innovative and spontaneous acts of non-citizens – unsettles conventional understanding of the ways in which people become political. Isin argues that becoming political does not require citizenship. Instead, becoming political can be activated through those moments and movements which disturb the given categories of contemporary politics – such as citizenship – and reveal their arbitrary constructions.[127] He maintains that becoming political occurs through 'polyvalent, multiple, minor and tactical' acts of the 'unnamed figure' who is not recognised in legal codes, but is still able to effect the agency of politics through these acts of contestation.[128] These acts perform new paths to follow, offering new maps and creating new connections and imaginations that are not imprisoned within territorial and legal codes of the state system.

Peter Nyer's notion of 'abject cosmopolitanism' echoes this argument. He contends that exclusionary measures of contemporary bordering practices – asylum seekers, undocumented workers, 'illegal' migrants, etc. – create an'abject diaspora'.[129] He maintains that border politics is the disrupted

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[125] Isin and Rygiel, 'Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps', 181-203.

[126] For a similar line of argument, see Raffaela Puggioni, 'Resisting Sovereign Power: Camps in-between Exception and Dissent', in Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik (eds.), *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency* (London: Routledge, 2006), 68-83, Richard Bailey, 'Up against the Wall:Bare Life and Resistance in Australian Immigration Detention', *Law and Critique,* 20/2 (2009b), 113-32, Rutvica Andrijasevic, 'From Exception to Excess: Detention and Deportations across the Mediterranean Space', in Nicholas De Genova (ed.), *Deportation Regime: Soveignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 148-63, Raffaela Puggioni, 'Against Camps' Violence: Some Voices on Italian Holding Centres', *Political Studies,* (2013), 1-16, Nando Sigona, 'Campzenship: Reimagining the Camp as a Social and Political Space', *Citizenship Studies,* 19/1 (2015), 1-15.

[127] Engin, *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship*, 275.

[128] Ibid. 282.

[129] Nyers, 'Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement', 413.

movement of the prevailing order, operating through acts of contestation triggered by the 'abject migrant' who asserts him/herself as an active political agent. The political campaigns by and in support of the 'abject diaspora' constitute sites of abject cosmopolitanism. Abject cosmopolitanism challenges the traditional terms defining the boundaries of political community and identity, and raises questions about who belongs, who can express themselves politically, who speaks, and who can be political.[130] The notion of abject cosmopolitanism challenges nationalist discourses that give rise to exclusionary bordering practices; it also disturbs contemporary practices of liberal humanitarianism, which depict the 'abject diaspora' as speechless, apolitical, and invisible victims of state practices. The notion of abject cosmopolitanism does not speak for the so-called 'speechless victims'; rather, it takes the acts of the 'speaking subject' as its starting point: 'the task of politics ... [is] something other than representing the unrepresented. Something much more ambitious, difficult, and radical is at work here. The task becomes theorising the political in relation to the unrepresentable'.[131]

In summary, recent scholarship on the active agency of the abject investigates acts of 'traversing frontiers': acts that migrate through and beyond established identities, roles, statuses and, ultimately, political subjectivities.[132] Escaping and recasting sovereign power, abject subjects are makers and shapers of the new frontiers of political being, moving beyond the territorial limits which define the conventional understanding of political agents as holders of rights and freedoms.[133] Political actions practised by those without legal and political status 'are implicated in new kinds of subjectivities that undermine citizenship as a clear-cut status'.[134] In doing so, these acts, moments and movements offer the potential to remove blockages against the emergence of new political imaginaries that go beyond the territorial state and the all-encompassing power of the sovereign. As Walters observes, the analytical emphasis on such 'acts serves to draw our attention to moments of interruption, instances when

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[130] Ibid. 439.
[131] Nyers, 'No One Is Illegal between City and Nation', 131.
[132] Isin, *Citizens without Frontiers*.
[133] McNevin, *Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the Political*, Anne McNevin, 'Becoming Political: Irregular Migrant Activism through Community Theatre', *Local-Global: Identity, Security, Community,* 8 (2010), 142-56.
[134] McNevin, *Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and New Frontiers of the Political*, 5.

something, however small and seemingly marginal, is changed, possibly for the first time'.[135] As it will be seen in the rest of this study, I will follow some paths of this scholarship, albeit in different ways.

In this chapter I have outlined the major theoretical debates concerning critical border studies and discussed their limitations. Yet a problem remains. It should be clear from this brief outline that the field is divided into three theoretical perspectives: one is the particular reading of the border through Foucault's conceptualisation of biopolitics, the other is drawn from a narrow reading of Agamben's two major works on *homo sacer* and the state of exception, and the last is what I call the 'agency approach'. Each approach privileges one of two particular narratives: capture or escape; and practices of oppression or acts of resistance. Therefore, the conclusion of each narrative is pre-defined and overly structured by the particular theoretical framework adopted to analyse a certain empirical case. To put it differently, our way of thinking about borders is governed and captured by the particular theoretical background we use. As a result, the conclusion of each narrative is in many ways predetermined. Such rigid disciplinary compartmentalisation of the field leads to a certain duality: we either privilege an overly pessimistic reading of the concept of the border captured by the networks of sovereign power, or we choose an alternative narrative that seeks to falsify this pessimistic reading. We need to ask how to go beyond such dualism in order to make the theory more sensitive to – and inclusive of – multiple and sometimes contradictory realities of the empirical cases we analyse.

This issue has been also raised by Vaughan-Williams, Anne McNevin, and Vicki Squire.[136] Vaughan-Williams argues that such compartmentalisation of the field reinforces an intellectual and practical impasse that is often presented as a rigid interpretive 'choice' privileging one narrative over another.[137] Similarly, Squire and McNevin maintain that the current debates over borders are divided into two rigid interpretative camps: one focuses on the practices of

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135 Walters, 'Acts of Demostration: Mapping the Territory of (Non-)Citizenship', 192.
136 Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond*, 8-9, Vicki Squire, 'Acts of Desertion: Abandonment and Renouncement at the Sonoran Borderzone', *Antipode,* 47/2 (2016), 500-16, Anne McNevin, 'Ambivalence and Citizenship: Theorising the Political Claims of Irregular Migrants', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* 41/2 (2013), 182-200.
137 Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis*, 123.

control and therefore silences marginalised groups and individuals, and the other gives voice to these groups. McNevin argues that such disciplinary divisions lead to a reductionist approach that conceals the ambiguities and ambivalences of the contemporary operations of power, and movements of resistance and contestation.[138]

Indeed, borders – at least the ones I discuss throughout this thesis – are more complex and messier than can be conceived by this duality. Therefore, following McNevin, Vaughan-Williams, and Squire, I would suggest an alternative thinking of the concept of the border that would act as a bridge between these camps. I argue that we need to loosen the theoretical boundaries to grasp the ways in which borders operate as spaces enabling many possibilities, ambiguities, shifts and continuities. We need to think and write *with* the border, *with* its uncertainties and messiness. That is, to *trace and walk on* its multiple lines – wherever they are drawn – and with all living and non-living beings that create those lines.

In order to read the border as a space that enables the emergence of distinct possibilities, I would suggest that critical border studies requires an alternative concept that transcends from the boundaries of disciplinary division – that would reflect the messiness and complexities of the border, and that would move beyond the limits of 'negative' and 'positive' interpretative frameworks. For these purposes, I suggest an emphasis on the concept of heterotopia as an analytical entry point that would prevent privileging one narrative over another. In the next chapter, I will discuss how concept of heterotopia can address the issues I outlined in this chapter. I will elaborate on how this concept enables nuanced engagement with the 'many politics' of borders, and how it acts as a map that offers multiple entry points to questions concerning the concept of the border. I will suggest that concept of heterotopia will enable us to speak about the border as a fluid meshwork of space, as a space in continuous transformation – a space that *moves*.

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[138] McNevin, 'Ambivalence and Citizenship', 182-200.

CHAPTER 2

BORDER NOMADOLOGY: MAPPING HETEROTOPIAS

Comprehensive understanding of spatiality was at the centre of most of Foucault's writings, argues Ed Soja and Stuart Elden.1 Indeed, Foucault was a thinker of not only power/knowledge, but of power-knowledge-space. He considered that the diverse formations of space, its continuities and breaks, can only be understood through genealogical interventions that reveal the possibility of the emergence of different modalities of power. Foucault's writings are a series of genealogical inquiries about how the inter-performative relationships between power, knowledge and space operate within a social and political field, how these relationships produce different forms of subjectivities, and how power/knowledge intervenes into the space that it aims to form and manage.

In *The Order of Things*, for example, Foucault discusses the spatialisation of knowledge: how certain discursive classifications of objects have played a crucial role in the constitution of knowledge as science. *The Birth of the Clinic* is not only a book about historical shifts in the perception of disease that occurred in the late eighteenth century. It also exposes the ways in which the marriage of modern clinical medicine and pathological anatomy spatialised illness. Similarly, in *History of Madness* Foucault traces the performative relationship between spatial patterns of exclusion and the transformation of madness into an object of scientific observation and experimentation. He shows us the emergence of modern medical space, which by the eighteenth century had enabled the replacement of old with new social and spatial boundaries. *Discipline and Punish* is a series of spatial analyses. Foucault explains in detail how disciplinary power structures space in terms of the hierarchical and functional distribution of elements. Disciplinary power produces shift in boundaries by over-coding space, transforming it, and by ultimately creating new enclosures in which power can be exercised on the body and the soul of the individual.

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1 Edward W. Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History* (London: Continuum, 2001) 93-150.

In his later works on security and governmentalisation of the state, Foucault once again focuses on the problem of space. In presenting shifts from sovereignty to governmentality, he argues:

> First of all, the state of justice, born in the feudal type of territorial regime … second, the administrative state, born in territoriality of national boundaries in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding to society of regulation and discipline; and finally a governmental state, essentially defined no longer in terms of its territoriality, of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of its population with its volume and density, and indeed also with the territory over which it is distributed, although this figures here only one among its component elements.[2]

In *Security, Territory and Population*, the operation of space shifts again: it opens its closed boundaries to the outside, and is regarded by Foucault as 'a series of possible events', as mobile 'series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework'.[3] Unlike sovereignty, which over-codes territory, and discipline, which operates within enclosures on the individual as a 'body capable of performances', security takes population as its object and plans a milieu in terms of indefinite series of mobile elements and of circulation.[4] Security is perceived as creating and operating in a networked space. In short, Foucault's works present the genealogy of the reproduction of space and territory, and the effects of such reproductions within the whole social and political field.

In his all genealogical inquiries, Foucault firmly rejects the structuralist model of thought that perceives space as dead, fixed, homogeneous and immobile.[5] Space, for him, is foremost a political practice that connects heterogeneous elements in the social and political field. In his emphasis on the transformations of space, he underlines the shifts from segmented, enclosed, immobile and frozen space to mobile spaces, and shows the performative functions of such shifts. However, as Nigel Thrift argues, there is a blind spot in his understanding of space.[6] That blind spot is Foucault's conceptualisation of space in terms of certain orders, which fundamentally

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[2] Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Colin Gordon and Peter Miller Graham Burchell (ed.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 104.
[3] Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, 20.
[4] Ibid. 20- 22.
[5] Michel Foucault, 'Space, Knowledge, and Power', in Paul Rainbow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 239-56.
[6] Nigel Thrift, 'Overcome by Space: Reworking Foucault', in Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (eds.), *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007), 55.

constrains his capacity to grasp the aliveness of space. Indeed, in his writings space is a political technology that is caught by multiple principles of order(ings) largely devoid of contestations and ambiguities. In his discussion of the Panopticon, for example, inmates are muted. Disciplinary power seems to capture all elements of the production of space. One wants to see the face of the leper and to hear his/her voice in the constitution of exile-exclusion.

Certainly, Foucault never presents us with the Agambenian type of pessimism or its politics of defeatism. He writes: 'no matter how terrifying a given system may be there always remain possibilities of resistance, disobedience and oppositional grouping'.[7] In force of flight, he insists that spaces of captivity can be reserved and escapes can be activated.[8] But such escapes are activated within the network of power exercised on the subject itself and, consequently, his understanding of power becomes a decisive force in the construction of space. Foucault, however, may have been aware of this blind spot in his writings on space and his silence on its ambiguous character, as his later project on 'heterotopia' attempts to grasp the aliveness of space, its shifting movements and moments. Heterotopia is Foucault's 'other space', his unfinished project, in which he seeks to liberate space from its particular orderings, and to open its boundaries to transformations, ambiguities, contestations, and confrontations.

This chapter outlines the conceptual and methodological framework of this thesis. Asking what heterotopia is and how it operates assists in determining whether – and in what ways – it is relevant to our conceptualisation of the border. How could the concept be used to address theoretical problems in critical border studies? And how can we read this concept heterotopically in order to address these problems? In seeking to answer these questions, I first discuss Foucault's reading of heterotopia as 'other space'. Then, drawing on Deleuzian ontology, I propose an alternative reading of heterotopia as a fluid meshwork space constituted by the entanglement of molar and molecular lines and lines of flight. Finally, I discuss how 'border nomadology' offers an alternative map in tracing borders and their complex operation.

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[7] Foucault, 'Space, Knowledge, and Power', 245.
[8] Michel Foucault, 'The Force of Flight', in Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (eds.), *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007a), 169-82.

1. Foucault's other space

In 'Of Other Spaces', Foucault opens his search for heterotopias – 'other places', 'other sites' – with his brief critique of structuralism: its excessively certain way of dealing with history and time.[9] He argues that in its effort to establish stable configurations constituted by an ensemble of juxtaposed relations, structuralism freezes space in deference to time and history. In this effort, space emerges as homogeneous and empty: a kind of 'void, inside of which we could place individuals and things'.[10] This critique follows Foucault's brief discussion of the history of space in which he aims to set space against time and against history.[11] The space of the Middle Ages, he explains, was dominated by a hierarchised ensemble of sites, which was later replaced with an 'infinitely open space' by the seventeenth century and by Galileo. Consequently, our contemporary epoch describes for us another form of localisation of space: an emplacement defined by the relations of proximity between points and elements.[12] Inspired by Gaston Bachelard, Foucault seeks to highlight the non-representable and heterogeneous character of space that could only be thought of in terms of shifting relations, disruptions, breaks, openings and closings. Space is positive, productive and generative of forces, he insists. Most importantly, Foucault draws our attention to 'space-time': their co-existence and their simultaneous transformations.[13] His brief argument on such qualities of space sets the remaining tone of his essay and the complex picture of heterotopia that he wants to sketch.

In 'Of Other Spaces', heterotopias manifest themselves in different ways. First, for Foucault heterotopias are not utopias. Utopias are imaginations presenting 'society in perfect forms' or in reversals of those forms, but they are fundamentally unreal spaces: in utopias, emplacements have no real places.[14] By contrast, heterotopias for Foucault are real spaces. It is possible to designate the locations of specific heterotopias and categories of heterotopias in reality, such as a ship, a honeymoon suite, a museum, a cemetery, a prison. However, in his concise statement

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[9] As Edward Casey argues in 'Of Other Spaces' Foucault uses 'spaces', 'places', and 'sites' almost interchangeably and does not distinguish between these terms. Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) 30.
[10] Michel Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', *Diacritics,* 16/1 (1986), 22-27.
[11] Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*, 156.
[12] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 23.
[13] I borrowed the phrase 'space-time' from Doreen Massey.
[14] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 24.

that 'heterotopias are not utopias' Foucault does not depict the two spaces as binary terms. Heterotopias are actual spaces, but they are different from other spaces. They always embrace elements of utopias within themselves, and hence there is always a continuum between utopias and heterotopias. Heterotopias are specific combinations of both real places and utopias. This is not to say that heterotopias resemble utopias, nor does it mean that heterotopias are crude representations of utopias. Rather, heterotopias are in-between spaces: they are a 'kind of mixed, intermediate experience', a 'mirror' where the boundary between virtual and actual blurs.[15] Foucault writes that a mirror:

> makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there.[16]

In this vein, Foucault's many examples of heterotopia include utopian elements. A prison as a heterotopia, for example, inherits elements of the Panopticon as a utopia, but it never functions as an ideal Panopticon – the real prison fails our utopian imaginations. Or consider Foucault's discussion of the ship, which operates as a continuum between utopia and heterotopia: a space in-between. By the sixteenth century, European ships had begun to operate as passages from island utopias to real islands, to the New World colonies.[17] The ship as a heterotopia functioned to create a new space 'that [was] other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours [was] still messy, ill constructed and jumbled'.[18] The ship, as a floating space, constituted a passage to the 'new world' by transgressing the old boundaries between land and sea. It enabled to the emergence of the new 'Nomos of the Earth' by disturbing the certainty of the 'old world', while at the same time connecting the old nomos with the new one. The ship was a boundary-crossing experience: a space between real and utopian spaces.

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[15] Ibid. 24.
[16] Ibid. 24.
[17] I will discuss 'island utopias' in detail in the second intermezzo.
[18] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 27.

Second, heterotopias are relational – they are independent from other places, but remain connected to all other places. Foucault emphasizes not only how different heterotopias are connected with one another, but also how heterotopias are linked to other places, and to the institutions and norms that dominate the social and political field. Heterotopias are 'formed in the founding of every society' and are performed by these norms and institutions.[19] Foucault conceptualises heterotopias as points of a network, which are constituted by heterogeneous and dispersed elements within a given social and political field. A cemetery, for example, is contiguous with the city and the village, but also with the church, medical science, and the changing schemes of urban planning. The cemetery as a heterotopia constitutes a point that joins other points in the network of norms and practices that regulate the sites associated with the dead body. Shifts in these norms and practices, Foucault argues, change the nature and the boundaries of heterotopias. He elaborates in great detail how the relocation of the cemetery to the outside of city boundaries was the outcome of the individualisation of death and the association of death with illness in the nineteenth century.[20] Such shifts in norms and institutions not only cause changes in the boundaries of heterotopias. They may also transform places into heterotopias. During these shifts some heterotopias may also alter their forms, such as the transformation of 'crisis heterotopias' into heterotopias of deviation.[21] Consequently, heterotopias are never stable. They constantly shift in correlation with the ever-changing boundaries of power/knowledge.

Foucault's conceptualisation of heterotopias is remarkably similar to his understanding of disciplinary spaces, and thus makes it one of Foucault's 'familiar' spaces, rather than his 'other space'. However, Foucault advances his argument using other features of heterotopias. He elaborates on how heterotopias operate as 'counter-sites' that simultaneously contest and traverse these norms and practices. Heterotopias activate escapes or transgressions, or are constituted by these

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[19] Ibid. 24.

[20] Ibid. 25.

[21] 'Crisis heterotopias' are privileged or forbidden places, which accommodate those deemed as living in a state of crisis such as menstruating women, pregnant women, and lepers. Foucault argues that crisis heterotopias are replaced with 'heterotopias of deviation': places for 'individuals whose behaviour is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm'. Examples of 'heterotopias of deviation' include psychiatric hospitals, prisons, and retirement homes. Ibid. 24-25.

practices.22 Heterotopias may 'suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect'.23

The interpretation of heterotopias as 'counter-sites' constitutes an important aspect of the debate over the meaning and function of this 'other space'. Since the concept was not developed fully by Foucault and left with many inconsistencies, it has been interpreted in many different ways. It has been read as a 'third space',24 a 'space of alternate ordering',25 as 'counter-political or anti-political space',26 'hybrid space',27 as 'marginal sites of modernity, constantly threatening to disrupt its closures and certainties',28 and as social spaces of possibility where 'something different' arises.29 The concept has also been criticized as being 'structuralist',30 'banal',31 and essentially 'flawed'.32 However, as Peter Johnson argues, among all these criticisms and interpretations, there is a persistent association of the concept with spaces of resistance, with counter-sites, or with spaces of emancipation.33

Framing heterotopia as spaces of resistance or 'counter-sites' certainly provides us with a richness of opportunities in discussion of the concept, especially in debates over the functioning of border in the form of camps, as understood in the

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22 Foucault (1977) does not perceive transgression in negative terms, as opposite to the limit. Rather, he understands it 'as a flash of lightning in the night' (35). Transgression, for Foucault, is not a victory over limits: it is an affirmation of 'limited being'. Jon Simons argues that Foucault's notion of transgression demonstrates that no limits are absolute. Rather, they are inherently unstable, without firm and secure grounds. Michel Foucault, 'A Preface to Transgression', in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977a), 29-52, Jon Simons, *Foucault and the Political* (London: Routledge, 1995) 68-105.

23 Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 24.

24 Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*.

25 Kevin Hetherington, *The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering* (London: Routledge, 1997).

26 Etienne Balibar, 'Europe as Borderland', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 27 (2009), 192.

27 Sarah Whatmore, *Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces* (London: SAGE, 2002).

28 Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994) 151. See also Rob Shields, *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1991).

29 For detailed discussion of Lefebvre's reading of heterotopias in *The Urban Revolution* see David Harvey, *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution* (London: Verso, 2012).

30 Arun Saldanha, 'Heterotopia and Structuralism', *Environment and Planning A,* 40 (2008), 2080-96. James D. Faubion, 'Heterotopia: An Ecology', in Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter (eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (London: Routledge, 2008), 31-40.

31 David Harvey, 'Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils', *Public Culture,* 12/2 (2000), 529-64.

32 Benjamin Genocchio, 'Discourse, Discontinuity, Difference: The Question of 'Other' Spaces', in Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (ed.), *Postmodern Cities and Spaces* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 35-46.

33 Peter Johnson, 'Unravelling Foucault's 'Different Spaces'', *History of the Human Sciences,* 19/4 (2006), 81.

Agambenian sense. In these interpretations, heterotopia is perceived as a space that is the antithesis of the camp – a counterstrategy to the proliferation of all-encompassing power of the sovereign and the conditions of bare life it produces.[34] However, reading heterotopia as a counterstrategy confines it within firm definitional boundaries. Johnson rightly argues that understanding heterotopias as spaces of resistance does not disturb certain binaries that the concept itself aims to unsettle.[35] Similarly, Kevin Hetherington insists that reading heterotopias in the image of counter-hegemonic space perpetuates the simple polarisation between center and margin, order and resistance, perpetuating a static view of space that excludes its multiple, unfixed, contested or uncertain operations.[36] For Hetherington, 'in these spaces ordering and disordering go together, as do centres and margins, in ways that are tangled, uncertain and topologically complex'.[37] Indeed, what makes heterotopia an 'other space' is the power of these spaces in 'juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are incompatible themselves'.[38] If we shift our attention from other principles of the concept prescribed by Foucault to this feature, we will be able to read heterotopia as a fluid space replete with uncertainty, ambiguity, movement and affirmative difference – elements that accommodate several incompatible sites that are not only entangled with one another, but which also exhibit the potential to transform each other. Heterotopia is ultimately a space 'with a multitude of localities containing things so different that it is impossible to find a common logic for them, a space in which everything is somehow out of place'.[39]

Despite inconsistencies of the concept as presented by Foucault, heterotopia has been used as an analytical tool in studies examining places such as museums, libraries, shopping malls, exclusive locations like gated communities, and virtual spaces, including on-line sites.[40] However, the concept is little used in border studies,

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[34] See for example Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter, 'Heterotopia in a Postcivil Society', in Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter (eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 3-10.

[35] Johnson, 'Unravelling Foucault's 'Different Spaces'', 82.

[36] Hetherington, *The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering*.

[37] Ibid.17.

[38] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 25.

[39] Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, 151.

[40] See for example Beth Lord, 'Philosophy and the Museum: An Introduction to the Special Issue', *Museum Management and Curatorship,* 21/2 (2006), 79-87, Loretta Lees, 'Ageographia, Heterotopia, and Vancouver's New Public Library', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 15/3 (1997), 321-47, Shields, *Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity*,

receiving limited attention only recently.41 Mark Salter, for instance, examines how international airports operate as heterotopias in the form of multiple governmentalities.42 He focuses on the interplay between 'the airport of deregulation' administered by neoliberal governmentality, and 'the airport of intensive regulation' enabled by risk management and policing. Joseph Pugliese uses 'crises heterotopias' as an analytical tool to compare two detention islands: Lampedusa and Christmas Island. He demonstrates how these islands as crises heterotopias accommodate contradictory differences functioning both as holiday destinations and as camps understood in the Agambenian sense.43 Similarly, in her analysis of the Tampa and SIEVX 2001, Michele Budz examines how asylum seeker's boats constitute a space of discipline and resistance.44 While these studies encourage us to use the concept of heterotopia in our analyses of different sites of borders, they make a limited contribution to the concept itself, and do not extend the boundaries of heterotopia.

My aim is to contribute to these studies by sketching an alternative reading of heterotopia as 'a space of becoming' that is made up of multiple sites, relations, practices, and processes that are connected to each other. This alternative reading is not a complete departure from Foucault's reading of heterotopia – it is both criticism and complement. As Soja argues, what makes heterotopia an interesting concept is its radical openness to interpretation.45 Heterotopia is a disruption of 'totalizing

Kathleen Kern, 'Heterotopia of the Theme Park Street', in Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter (eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Post-Civil Society* (London: Routledge, 2008), 105-16, Derek Hook and Michele Vrdoljal, 'Gated Communities,Heterotopia and a "Rights" of Privilege a 'Heterotopology' of the South African Security-Park', *Geoforum,* 33 (2002), 195-219, Setha Low, 'The Gated Community as Heterotopia', in Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter (eds.), *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (London: Routledge, 2008), 153-64, Teresa Davis, 'Third Spaces or Heterotopias? Recreating and Negotiating Migrant Identity Using Online Spaces', *Sociology,* 44/4 (2010), 661-77, Katrien Jacobs, 'Pornography in Small Places and Other Spaces', *Cultural Studies,* 18 (2004), 67-83.
41 See for example Mark Salter, 'Governmentalites of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession', *International Political Sociology,* 1 (2007), 49-66, Joseph Pugliese, 'Crisis Heterotopias and Border Zones of the Dead', *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies,* 23/5 (2009), 663-79, Michele Budz, 'A Heterotopian Analysis of Maritime Refugee Incidents', *International Political Sociology,* 3 (2009), 18-35, Freerk Boedeltje, 'The Other Spaces of Europe: Seeing European Geopolitics through the Disturbing Eye of Foucault's *Heterotopias*', *Geopolitics,* 17 (2012), 1-24, Ugur Yildiz, 'Precarity of the Territorialised State: Immigrants Re-Drawing and Re-Mapping the Borders', *Journal of Borderland Studies,* (2016), 1-16, Scott Tate, 'Tinkering with Space: Heterotopic Walls and the Privileged Imaginary of the 'New Belfast'', in Max O. Stephenson and Laura Zanotti (eds.), *Building Walls and Dissolving Borders* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 69-98.
42 Salter, 'Governmentalites of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession', 49-66.
43 Pugliese, 'Crisis Heterotopias and Border Zones of the Dead', 663-79.
44 Budz, 'A Heterotopian Analysis of Maritime Refugee Incidents', 18-35.
45 Soja, *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*, 145-63.

closures and all [seemingly] permanent constructions', including our own interpretations of established concepts.[46] Heterotopia is, therefore,

> a critical 'other than' choice that speaks and critiques through its otherness. That is to say, it does not derive simply from an additive combination of its binary antecedents but rather from a disordering, deconstructive, and tentative reconstitution of their presumed totalization, producing an open alternative that is both similar and strikingly different.[47]

I take Soja's emphasis on the openness of the concept as a point of departure in my alternative reading of heterotopia as a 'space of meshwork' in which multiple 'life-lines' entangle one another and transform each other. My intention is not to provide a completely new interpretation of heterotopia, but to extend its conceptual boundaries. I do so by providing a heterotopic reading of the concept.

I argue that a study of the border *problematique* cannot proceed without opening the boundaries of concepts that we use to trace that *problematique*: it cannot proceed without disturbing their established classifications and orderings, without capturing movements of those concepts, without establishing new relations with the new and already existing concepts, without assigning them new functions and new purposes, new lives, and without tracing their potentials to create worlds-to-come. For the border *problematique* I engage with in this work, I open the boundaries of the old concept of heterotopia as presented by Foucault, allowing it to engage with multiple concepts such as fluid space, smooth and striated spaces, assemblages, multiplicities, machines, excess and becoming. In its relation with these concepts, the old Foucauldian concept of heterotopia is ultimately transformed into an 'other concept', an 'other space' whereby some of its old elements remain the same and some of them change their functions and meanings. In seeking the 'other space' of the concept of heterotopia my ultimate intention is to present a heterotopic reading. This reading seeks new connections with different concepts – to create an 'other concept' within, and contiguous with, the old one. This attempt relies on the fluidity, the uncertainty, and the ambiguity inherent in the meaning of heterotopia: it makes the concept move in different and sometimes competing directions, and it maps its

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[46] Ibid.61.
[47] Ibid.61.

becoming. What I seek is to enter into the space that Foucault already opened for us almost fifty years ago.

2. Heterotopia as an entanglement of 'life-lines': A Deleuzian ontology

In the opening pages of *Lines,* Tim Ingold asks: 'What do walking, weaving, observing, singing, storytelling, drawing and writing have in common? The answer is that they all proceed along lines of one kind or another'.[48] In his anthropological study Ingold seeks to unsettle the Western understanding of the passage of history, space and time as a straight line.[49] He reveals how different forms of lines operate in various contexts and practices: in language, music notation, cartographic maps and kinship charts, and in walking, weaving, sailing, painting, and many other human activities. According to Ingold, lines are ontologically constitutive of life: lines bring things to life. He writes that 'nothing can hold on unless it puts out a line, and unless that line can tangle with others'.[50] That is to say, life perceived as flows and fluxes is formed by the entanglement of different forms of lines. For Ingold, there are first two main types of lines: threads and traces. Threads create the surface by moving rhizomatically, whereas traces are 'enduring mark[s] left in or on a solid surface by a continuous movement'.[51] There is, however, also another kind of line: 'the cut, the crack and the crease'.[52] These lines are formed by ruptures on the surface, and they traverse other lines. Ingold urges us that there is nothing stable about the movement of these lines. In their constant movement they transform each other as they proceed. They fold, unfold, and alter one another.

Ingold's work is a bold attempt to open the enclosed boundaries of lines. That is to say, he redefines the conventional apprehension of lines as formed by points joined together in a continuum, which are then connected closely to create a smooth surface. There are certainly lines that function as point-to-point connectors. The lines of state, occupation and colonialism are of this type. Modernity, Ingold argues, generally proceeds along these lines, which function according to a genealogical

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[48] Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007) 1.
[49] Ibid. 2.
[50] Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines* (London: Routledge, 2015) 1.
[51] Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 43.
[52] Ibid. 44-47.

model reflecting a tree-like structure. However, there are always movements, ruptures on the surface disturbing the smooth movement of lines of occupation and separation.

However, Ingold's notion of lines, or more precisely, the movement of lines, cannot be defined only within the terms of diversity. Ingold discusses the function of different lines, arguing that in addition to their diversity, it is their entanglement that establishes the 'meshwork' that enables the opening of lines. A meshwork comprises interwoven trails left by people, animals and objects caught in multiple entanglements. As Jan Loovers writes, place is conceived by Ingold as a complex knot of lines of movement.[53] These knots are formed by a multitude of lines. Living beings, he writes, are not 'externally bounded entities made up of linear lines' competing for a limited space; rather, they are 'bundles of interwoven lines of growth and movement, together constituting a meshwork in fluid space'.[54] This meshwork does not have beginnings, ends or closed boundaries. Ingold's notion of meshwork unsettles the totality and closure that is formed by point-to-point connectors. A meshwork is in a constant flux that opens itself up to possibilities of change. It is this meshwork that constitutes heterotopia, which is no longer this or that space, but an other space.

A close reader of Ingold's works would acknowledge the strong correlations between his reading of lines and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's understanding of politics. Like Ingold, for Deleuze and Guattari the entanglement of different forms of lines is constitutive of social and political relations between human and non-human worlds. In his dialogues with Claire Parnett in 'Many Politics', Deleuze is straightforward: 'Whether we are individuals or groups, we are made up of lines and these lines are very varied in nature'.[55] There are lines which organise and capture territorial units like state borders. These lines function as forces of control, and they over-code the social and political field. But there are also other, more chaotic lines. These lines break, undermine, traverse or abolish the lines of ordering and organisation. For Deleuze and Guattari, lines are not defined by their forms or their inherent features, but only through their ever-shifting movements and relationships

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[53] Jan Peter Laurens Loovers, 'Walking Threads, Threading Walk: Weaving and Entangling Deleuze and Ingold with Threads', *The Unfamiliar,* 5/1 (2015), 111.
[54] Tim Ingold, 'Bindings against Boundaries: Entanglements of Life in an Open World', *Environment and Planning A,* 40/8 (2008), 1796.
[55] Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbare Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 124.

with one another. Each line has its own abstract machine, its own diagram – a 'spatio-temporal multiplicity'.56

Like Ingold, Deleuze and Guattari assert that nothing is stable on a single line. Everything mutates when lines interweave, entangle, and change forms. These lines co-exist, and they also transform each other. The line of separation may be transformed into a line of transversal linkages that create affirmative difference.57 It is thus a becoming of lines in which affirmative politics is born: a politics that does not imprison itself within the events of horror and pain of biopolitics – a politics that activates new experimentations, offering new social and political territories and relations. That is to say, the only feature that defines lines is their becoming: their ever-shifting movements and entanglements that create new possibilities, actions, and affects. The movements of lines, as Veronique Bergen writes, 'disable, negate, impoverish or exacerbate, affirm, enrich life'.58 We do not know, therefore, in advance which form or function they will take:

> It is not that these lines are pre-existent; they are traced out, they are formed, immanent to each other, mixed up in each other, at the same time as the assemblage of desire is formed, with its machines tangled up and its planes intersecting. We don't know in advance which one will function as a line of gradient, or in what form it will be barred.59

Deleuze, Guattari and Parnet suggest a model involving three lines. First are molar lines – segmental lines, break lines, lines of occupation. Then there are crack lines – molecular lines, middle lines; and last are lines of flight, comprising rupture lines and nomadic lines. They argue that there is nothing more complex than the movement of these three lines, which they call 'life-lines'. Bearing this in mind, I can now revisit the question as to how each of these life-lines function: what forces they activate; how they entangle with one another; and how they relate to the state, power, space, heterotopias, and borders.

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56 Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986) 30.
57 Leonie Ansems De Vries, 'Politics on the Line', in Brad Evans and Julian Reid (eds.), *Deleuze and Fascism: Security: War: Aesthetics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 126-47.
58 Veronique Bergen, 'Politics as the Orientation of Every Assemblage', *New Formations,* 68 (2009), 35.
59 Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 133.

Molar Lines

As with all lines, molar lines have their own machines, rhythms and movements. These lines are what Ingold calls point-to-point connectors. The abstract machines of molar lines first capture discursive or non-discursive floating points. Then these machines assign each point a function and connect them, one to another, to form a unity: space with defined borders. Molar lines are sedentary lines that create structured and organised homogeneous spaces formed by diverse points. These lines connect points to form a boundary in which life, Ingold writes, is contained within 'enclosed communities, each confined to one spot, [within] vertically integrated assemblies'.60 Molar lines connect diverse elements to forming striated space; they also divide and cut the occupied surface into territorial blocks, restrict movement, or facilitate it in an orderly fashion.61 Definition of molar lines is secured by means of binary, linear, or circular block-segments.62 Each block-segment fosters a point with new functions. Molar lines thus belong to what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a 'punctual system'. In this system, points are coordinates, codes and functions. The punctual system

> (1) …comprise[s] two base lines, horizontal and vertical, they serve as coordinates for assigning points. (2) The horizontal lines can be superposed vertically and the vertical line can be moved horizontally, in such a way that new points are produced or reproduced …. (3) From one point to another, a line can (or cannot) be drawn, but if it can it takes the form of a localizable connection.63

If molar lines are made up of innumerable dispersed points that belong to the same series, it means each point caught up on the line changes the boundaries of the block-segments without affecting their unity. Following chapters include various cases of such functioning of molar lines, but a few snapshots would help to clarify the abstract discussion here. Consider the pre-state function of the Jewish settlements in Palestine as an example. These settlements (Point A) were dispersed throughout

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60 Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 2-3.
61 Ibid. 81.
62 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 208-13.
63 Ibid. 295.

Palestine and were assigned specific defensive and offensive functions against Palestinians. They colonised the territory, and were also connected to one another to form the future borders of Israel as a line. Similarly, the contemporary wall in the West Bank (Point A) is connected to other apparatuses of the occupation and colonisation, such as checkpoints (Point B), a permit regime (Point C), the Israeli police and the army (Point D). While each point has its unique function, it belongs to a series comprising other points: together they form a network of control whose boundaries continuously shift with the change in each point. A further example is the externalisation of contemporary border controls in Australia. This system links its territorial borders (Point A) to embassies (Point B), airports (Point C) detention centres (Point D) and third-country islands (Point E), as well as mobile apparatuses of control including visas and biometric cards (Point F). While all of these distant elements move Australia's national limits offshore and seemingly create multiple dispersed borders, these distant points form a closed network, a continuum, an assembly that aims to preserve the security of the border. Whatever the movements of these points are, as Deleuze and Guattari write, molar lines over-code the territory that they correspond to and generate dichotomies such as inside/outside, us/them, domestic/foreign, land/sea, and order/chaos. The perseverance of molar lines depends on the effects of binary machines, which give rise to the birth of these lines. [64]

Molar lines create, organise, capture and separate territorial units: they are lines of discipline. We all desire the security of the refuge that these lines offer to us. We love to dwell within its seemingly concrete fastness and to regard its boundaries as untroubled limits in our encounters with others whom we prefer to see as threats to our being. Although we are not incarcerated by the movement of these lines, molar lines produce, define and discipline our bodies and our behaviours. They thereby imply power or, to put in Foucauldian terms, the 'micro-physics of power': power that is immersed within a social field and is productive of the reality that makes us act, speak and live in certain ways.

While power, for Foucault, is made operational on bodies and on territories, it also produces and transforms them and connects them with one another. Power comes from everywhere, writes Foucault famously. It is never stable: it moves in

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[64] In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari call these abstract machines as abstract machine of overcoding as they define a rigid segmentarity and (re)produces segments. Ibid. 223.

every direction, forming a network of relations diffused in a social space. The micro-physics of power, he argues in *Discipline and Punish*, presupposes that power is not a property, but a strategy whose effects he attributes to 'dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess'.[65]

Foucault's new 'topology' of power, as Deleuze calls it, shows us that power does not hold a structure or an 'essence', and cannot be localised within state apparatuses or institutions, although it is partially dependent on them.[66] Power does not have a centre: it is a multiplicity that cannot be identified within a unified structure. For Deleuze, therefore, it was Foucault who found a reorientation in our understanding of power that is not connected with the 'hollow abstractions' of the state, of the law, or of ideology.[67] Power is not pyramidal: it is developed by means of contiguity.[68] He writes in his accounts of Foucault, '[t]he thing called power is characterised by immanence of field without transcendent unification, continuity of line without global centralisation, and contiguity of parts without distinct totalisation: it is a social space'.[69] Consequently, the question is less what power is, and more how it functions, what effects it produces within the whole social field, how it creates 'a regime of truth' that enables, motivates or blocks new practices and statements. Furthermore it is a question as to how it activates a 'diagram' of each society, its abstract machine – its map, its social and political cartography – which 'does not function to represent, … but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality'.[70]

On the molar line power creates segments, over-codes them and ensures passage from one segment into another. Each device of power, Deleuze and Parnet

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[65] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 26.

[66] Deleuze, *Foucault*, 38.

[67] Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*,129.

[68] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan and Réda Bensmaïa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 56.

[69] Deleuze, *Foucault*. 24.

[70] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 142. In 'On Several Regimes of Signs', Deleuze and Guattari define the abstract machine as diagrammatic: it 'operates by *matter*, not by substance, by *function* not by form'. The abstract machine is unstable and fluid. It is 'pure Matter-Function – a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute' (141). In *Foucault*, Deleuze uses the terms 'diagram' and 'abstract machine' interchangeably. As Paul Patton writes Deleuze and Guattari perceive abstract machines as 'virtual multiplicities' vital to the operation of assemblages in which they are actualised or expressed. They operate like a software program, turning the 'assemblage of computer hard-ware into a certain kind of a technical machine'. Paul Patton, *Deleuze and the Political* (New York: Routledge, 2000) 44-45.

write, is a 'code-territory complex'.[71] Molar lines imply different modalities of power that create ever-shifting fluid segments with different kinds of boundaries, and these boundaries generate different forms of behaviour, corresponding to different kinds of social and political formations. The abstract machine of molar lines is thus constitutive of a new reality. It simultaneously deterritorialises and reterritorialises land and environment. It invents a new space, disturbs previous footprints on the territory, and imposes new borders, new practices and new institutions. Seen in these terms, molar lines go beyond discipline to the process of colonisation.

If the molar line implies power that is not centred on any apparatus or institution, what relation does the state have with it? The analysis of molar lines does not start or end with the state. This is how my conceptualisation of border heterotopias differs from Agambenian readings of power that is totalised in a theory of sovereign power, and the way it enhances biopolitical life. However, this does not mean that the state is irrelevant to the analysis of life-lines. On the contrary, the state uses the molar line, captures it and spreads it to the whole social and political field. On the molar line, Deleuze and Parnet explain:

> [the abstract machine of over-coding] organizes the dominant utterances and the established order of a society, the dominant languages and knowledge, conformist actions and feelings, the segments which prevail over the others. The abstract machine of overcoding ensures the homogenization of different segments, their convertibility, their translatability, it regulates the passages from one side to the other, and the prevailing force under which this takes place. It does not depend on the State, but its effectiveness depends on the State as the assemblage which realizes it in a social field.[72]

To clarify the argument here, let us again consider a particular example of walls in the context of Israel and Palestine. As I will elaborate in Chapter Four, the contemporary wall in the West Bank emerged as a collective movement within Jewish-Israeli society in early 2001. But the Israeli state captured all diverse movements of the past and the present, applying them and connecting these dispersed heterogeneous elements to foster a wall with the function of capturing Palestinian land and people. The state has transformed the Wall into a multiplicious entity, a network, by connecting it to statistical machines, demographic machines, territorial

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[71] Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 129.
[72] Ibid. 129.

machines, legal machines and security machines that were already operating in Israel and Palestine. The state has interconnected these machines to create a perfect mechanism of control. This does not mean that the Wall comprises a uniform system: it has its own ever-shifting heterogeneous elements working independently of the state, but its effectiveness depends on the state and its institutions. The Wall, therefore, is not independent from political sovereignty, nor from the type of power it exercises over both Palestinian and Israeli populations.

This example is reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari's comments regarding the state as a phenomonenon of intraconsistency. The state, they argue, resonates with diverse points of order, whether they are geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, or technological particularities.[73] It connects diverse points to create a network. The state, they write, 'operates by stratification … it forms a vertical, hierachized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in their relations with other elements, which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations'.[74] The operation of stratification necessarily involves deterritorialisation, but its form is relative as it quickly moves towards fixity, central organisation, ordering, disciplining and capturing space and time. The state machine uses a system of over-coding, which constitutes the essence of the state. The state, therefore, does not only exercise power over the segments it creates, but it also imposes its own rigid segmentarity.[75]

How is such functioning of the state related to molar lines of contemporary borders? As Paul Patton writes, for Deleuze and Guattari the primary function of the state is to capture: the state functions to capture 'flows of all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital'.[76] In most basic terms, this function of the state operates in the form of political sovereignty. However, as Patton elaborates, the underlying rationale of the state is the establishment of a unified interiority, since 'sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of interiorizing, of appropriating locally'.[77] This means that the state needs institutions of borders and citizenship, and the constitution of a milieu of interiority.

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[73] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 433.
[74] Ibid. 433.
[75] Ibid. 210.
[76] Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, 99.
[77] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 360.

The state needs to over-code the border in order to transform it into a milieu of interiority. It does so by capturing floating elements, which include, for example, everyday practices of border dwellers. As many anthropological and ethnographic studies on borders indicate, these practices include cross-border irregular movement, agricultural production, labour cooperation, marriages, smuggling, amongst others.[78] Such irregular activities form 'imperceptible subjectivities' that are defined by their potentialities, and which escape fixed forms of regulation and control.[79] The state seeks to capture the movement of these deviant bodies. It does so not necessarily by repressing or immobilising them, but by absorbing them, encapsulating them as a means of establishing a milieu of interiority. At the level of individuals, the state seeks to capture these deviant bodies by domesticating, adjusting and disciplining them.[80] Geographically, it establishes security apparatuses such as checkpoints, visa regimes, and so on. It seeks to capture the territory at a basic level by establishing such security apparatuses. As I mentioned in the example of the Wall, however, the state also links these security apparatuses to law, welfare, economics, health, science, and education, as well as discourses of generalised societal fear of strangers, outsiders and other perceived threats. The movement of molar lines requires the state for its continuity and effectiveness. On the same topology, however, there are other lines and movements that operate simultaneously with the movement of the molar line of the border.

Molecular lines (cracks) and Lines of Flight (rupture lines)

Molecular lines are movements, forces and fluxes that disrupt the order of things – binaries, structures and organisations. While molar lines establish connections between points in an orderly fashion, molecular lines proceed by fluxes escaping from these connections. Such escape, however, should not be understood as an addition of another segment on molar structures; nor should it be perceived as a movement

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[78] See Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State* (Oxford: Berg, 1999). Pablo Vila (ed.), *Ethnography at the Border* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2003), Gloria Anzaldua, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books 1987), Oscar J. Martinez, *Border People: Life and Society in the US-Mexico Borderlands* (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1994).
[79] Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century.*
[80] Ibid. 8.

forming an opposition along the molar line. Rather, molecular lines draw another path, a third intermediate path: they 'make fluxes of deterritorialisation shoot between segments, fluxes which no longer belong to one or to the other, but which constitute an asymmetrical becoming of the two'.[81] That is to mean, as a middle line, a molecular line constitutes a third that derives from elsewhere and unsettles disciplinary and capturing movements. This line is drawn by micropolitical flows and fluxes that shake binary and homogenised practices of molar organisation.

As an example of the movement of the molecular line, Deleuze and Parnet discuss how the Cold War world order was first segmented between the West and the East. This form of segmentarity was drawn by an abstract machine of over-coding as the hegemonic ordering of world politics.[82] Nonetheless, the West-East line was not all-encompassing; added to which, minute cracks had occurred on the North-South line, destabilisations from the South. As Deleuze and Parnet write, rather than being great ruptures, destabilisations triggered by the movement of the molecular line are cracks 'which bring everything into play and divert the plane of organisation'.[83] In a social field there is always someone who comes from the 'South': 'A Corsican here, elsewhere a Palestinian, a plane hijacker, a tribal upsurge, a feminist movement, a Green ecologist, a Russian dissident'.[84] The social and political field of the border thus cannot be understood without tracing its paths on the 'South'.

The molecular line is perhaps the most interesting line, because it is a line of ambiguity. It marks a limit beyond which everything changes its nature. Politics on this line is full of ambiguity, because it is not easy to recognise whether 'cracks' move beyond the familiar power politics represented by the dominant orders in a society, unsettling the fundamental ontological codes of modern politics – politics that are always linked to the sovereign and its foundational right to monopolise borders. Politics on the molecular line are ambiguous – owing to its intermediary status this line is always ready to translocate to one side or the other. We do not know in advance which turn it will take: it may transform itself into a line of flight. However, deterritorialisations on this line may also lead to reterritorialisations that cause blockages and reversions into the molar line. The molecular line 'continually

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[81] Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 131.
[82] Ibid.131.
[83] Ibid.131.
[84] Ibid.131.

dismantles the concretions of rigid segmentarity', while everything it dismantles may be reassembled on a different level: 'micro-Oedipuses, microformations of power, microfascisms'.[85] This is the danger of the molecular line of which Deleuze and Guattari warn us: the line may appear to be a line of flight, especially when it is drawn by the movement of relative deterritorialisations. Therefore, they urge caution regarding liberation and human rights movements, and all other practices of contestation and destabilisation, and suggest avoiding swift conclusions that such movements will necessarily establish affirmative movements occur on lines of flight.

What defines lines of flight is transformation and difference, which constitute central elements of Deleuzian ethics and politics. These creative transformations occupy a significant place in Deleuze and Guattari's thinking – each such change occurs on a given line of flight, that is, the movement of absolute deterritorialisation by 'which 'one' leaves the territory' through a process of becoming.[86] On the line of flight, everything changes and transforms into something different than what it was before:

> On this line something carries us away, across our segments, but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown, not foreseeable, not pre-existent. This line is simple, abstract and yet is the most complex of all, the most tortuous.[87]

Similar to molecular lines, lines of flight break up the segments of molar lines, but they do not substitute these segments with other lines. Like molecular lines, lines of flight open up, cross and disturb the problematic foreclosure of the disciplinary, organising and colonising movements of molar lines. Regardless of this, the

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[85] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 205.
[86] Ibid. 508. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the differences between relative and absolute deterritorialisation. Relative deterritorialisation occurs when deterritorialised elements are immediately reterritorialised by the molar dimension of individual and collective life blocking the movement of lines of flight. By contrast, absolute deterritorialisation refers to a qualitatively different type of movement along the lines of flight. As Paul Patton elaborates, absolute deterritorialisation is 'the state in which there are only qualitative multiplicities, the state of unformed matter on the plane of consistency'. Absolute deterritorialisation exists within relative deterritorialisation. As I will explain below, it has two poles as well. It may turn into lines of abolition and destruction depending upon the nature of the assemblages through which these movements are expressed'. Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, 107.
[87] Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*,125.

movement of lines of flight is drawn by the abstract machine of mutation. This machine

> operates by decoding and deterritorialisation … steers the quantum flows, assures the connection-creation of flows, and emits new quanta. It itself is in a state of flight, and erects war machines on its lines. If it constitutes another pole, it is because molar or rigid segments always seal, plug, block the lines of flight, whereas this machine is always making them flow, 'between' the rigid segments and in another, submolecular, direction.[88]

Lines of flight are not defined by points: they are not lines that are drawn from one point to another, they instead run in-between points in a different direction that renders them indiscernible.[89] They free themselves from the punctual system of molar lines. Lines of flight do not proceed like vertical and horizontal lines, but instead draw a diagonal matrix.

Defined as 'transformational multiplicities', lines of flight affect assemblages in which they operate, enabling them to function in different ways. They are full of potentialities and driven by energetic flows of movement and tension. That is why Deleuze and Guattari believe that the social field and the constant change entrenched in it are constituted by these lines. As Deleuze writes famously, a society is not defined by contradictions: 'a social field does not contradict itself, but first and foremost, it leaks out on all sides'.[90] The line of flight 'is there from the beginning, even if it awaits its hour and waits for the other to explode'.[91] For this reason Deleuze and Guattari insist that every politics is simultaneously micropolitics and macropolitics. Every society, every group and every individual has its own lines of flight, although some can never find them, and some others have lost them.

Becoming

Politics on lines of flight associate closely with many Deleuzian and Guattarian concepts such as war machines, bodies without organs, transversality, schizoanalysis,

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[88] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 223.
[89] Ibid. 297.
[90] Gilles Deleuze, 'Desire and Pleasure', in David Lapoujade (ed.), *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006b), 127.
[91] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* 205.

rhizomes, and becoming. While it is well beyond the focus of this chapter to explain each of these concepts, one of these – becoming – carries particular importance for the overarching argument of this thesis and for the following discussion. Lines of flight are the lines of metamorphosis in which we can trace acts of becoming. Cliff Stagoll explains that Deleuze in his earlier works uses the term 'becoming' to describe the 'continual production of difference that is immanent within the constitution of events', whether they are material or discursive.92

As a characteristic of the production of any event, becoming, refer to transition from one state into another.93 Becoming does not envelop a given event. Objects of becoming are not static. Becoming has no beginning or end, departure or arrival. Rather, it is a continuous process that moves through an event. What lies at the core of Deleuzian thinking is a view of the world in which things and states are perceived as products of becoming – bodies and things that are always in motion. Such a view undoubtedly undercuts modes of thought that privilege origin, essence and stability. In Deleuzian thinking, therefore, everything *moves* with the acts of becoming, through continual formations and transformations, which in turn produce effects on the material and discursive construction of the world.

In *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Kafka,* Deleuze and Guattari define the process of becoming as bodily transformations, and they unpack how bodies undergo change when they collide and encounter with one another. Becoming refers to a relational process that corresponds to the affective power of bodily capacities for transformations when they act upon other bodies, or when they are acted on by other bodies.94 Deleuze and Guattari call such transformational capacities of bodies 'affections', 'additive processes, forces, powers, expression of change – the mix of affects that produce a modification or transformation in the affected [and the affecting] body'.95 Affect is the production of a continuum of intensities. For Deleuze and Guattari, affect is the force behind all forms of social and political formations. Brian Massumi, in his introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus*, explains that affect is

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92 Cliff Stagoll, 'Becoming', in Adrian Parr (ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 26.
93 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 237.
94 Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, 78.
95 Felicity J. Colman, 'Affect', in Adrian Parr (ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 11-12.

> … a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential
> state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in
> that body's capacity to act. *L'affection* (Spinoza's *affectio)* is each such state
> considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting,
> body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to include "mental" or
> ideal bodies).[96]

If affect corresponds to the transformational powers and forces of affected and
affecting bodies in their collisions, becoming is the power of affect.

Becoming is a relational process. We need to understand this process as 'a
block of co-existence'. What Deleuze and Guattari mean by 'a block of co-existence'
includes encounters between bodies and the capacities of distinct bodies for
engagement, and, more significantly, a process of 'double deterritorialisation'
whereby bodies collide with each other. Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly maintain
that becoming is not an imitation, not a reproduction or a representation; it is not a
process of mimicry in which body A resembles body B, and B resembles C through
their contract of alliance. As Massumi explains, the process of becoming is not an
imitation: imitation operates within the boundaries of molar lines. Imitation
conceives 'the body as a structured whole with determinate parts in stable interaction
with one another'.[97] Becoming, in contrast, functions as a borderline – moving away
from the boundaries of molarity, it 'unfolds potentials enveloped in a singular
individual at a crossroad of mutation'.[98] In their double deterritorialisation, bodies are
caught up in and capture one another: they all decompose and compose one another.
Rather than a dual process, becoming is 'a single bloc of becoming' in which bodies
reinvent each other:

> Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialisation of one term and
> the reterritorialisation of the other; the two becomings interlink and form
> relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialisation ever
> further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two
> heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome …
> [99]

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[96] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, xvi.
[97] Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari* (Cambridge: MIT, 1992) 96.
[98] Ibid. 96.
[99] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 10.

What the process of becoming shows is the affirmative powers of bodies to become different. The concept of becoming presents the potential of bodies to become other during their encounters with one another. This mode of thought moves away from a view which perceives the body – understood in its broadest terms – as an envelope with stable boundaries and a fixed identity. Rather, as Simone Bignall argues, this mode of thought encourages us to understand the body as a collection of relations: as 'an assemblage of components bound into a coherent form' with an ever-shifting consistency.[100] The coherent form is only temporary, because as the body enters into new relations with other bodies, its components constantly change, which in turn transforms the assemblage in which they join.

Becoming certainly is not only becoming-other, but also becoming-minoritarian. Deleuze and Guattari overcome understanding of the minority or the majority in quantitative terms, seeking to know how and where one positions him/herself vis-à-vis a particular set of established identities, relations, languages and norms.[101] The minority figure is foremost an agent of the process of deterritorialisation. This figure is identified by characteristics such as its exclusions – or in Agambenian terms its 'inclusive exclusions' – and should be seen as inheriting no fixed qualities of identity, all the while reconstituting self in terms of shifts in position and becoming. Deleuze and Guattari thereby replace minority with becoming-minoritarian, referring to the potential of encountered bodies to dislodge themselves from the dominant codes that govern the social and political fields – this changes their modes of being by becoming different than what they were before.

Becoming-minoritarian implies two simultaneous movements: 'one by which a term (the subject) is withdrawn from the majority, and another by which a term (the medium or agent) rises up from the minority'.[102] Hence, like all other forms of becoming, becoming-minoritarian – minor politics – should be regarded as a collective process: as a constellation of alliances between bodies. In such a dual process, becoming-minoritarian involves a question of how one becomes a stranger to one's self, to his/her identity, language, and established relations in his/her encounters with others. This process calls established relations and power

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[100] Simone Bignall, *Postcolonial Agency: Critique and Constructivism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 179.
[101] Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*, 22.
[102] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 291.

mechanisms into question and creates a counterforce against these mechanisms as defined by the majority. More significantly, becoming as a dual relational process also affects the internal composition of subjects, which further changes relations and connections among them.

In their encounters with others, bodies constantly become different. Becoming-minoritarian is a continuous rupture with no end state. Like all forms of becoming, becoming-minoritarian is an incomplete state, a constant encounter across differences:

> Becoming works on a time sequence that is neither linear nor sequential because processes of becoming are not predicated upon a stable, centralized Self who supervises their unfolding. These processes rather rest on a nonunitary, multilayered, dynamic subject attached to multiple communities. [Becoming-minoritarian] … is an affect that flows, like writing: it is a composition, a location that needs to be constructed together with, that is to say, in the encounter with others. They push the subject to his/her limits, in a constant encounter with external, different others.[103]

Becoming-minoritarian is a collective and ever-shifting molecular process: it is the opposite of macropolitics; it is active micropolitics, the path-in-motion of which erases and transforms the former boundaries between the self and the other.

Molecular lines, lines of flight and process of becoming bring a number of questions to the debate on border politics, in particular on the movements of contestation and resistance to the molar lines of the border. We ask how bodies encounter one another on the borderline, how such encounters trigger different forms of becoming, what boundaries between the self and the other remain the same, and what others are transformed into something else. Mapping moments of becoming-other ultimately encourages us to ask how the figure of minor contests different forms of biopolitical violence and how such contestations change the border and the identities that give rise to that violence. How, for instance, do Jewish/Israelis and Palestinians in their collaborative struggles against the Wall activate the moments of becoming-other? What aspects of their identities remain unchallenged when their bodies collide on the border? Do such collisions challenge the unequal power relations between them? What transformations – whether small or large – occur, and

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[103] Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 35.

what aspects of the Wall change or remain unchallenged during such encounters? We can ask similar questions in our discussion of asylum seekers who cross the borders of Australia: how does the act of crossing and the incarceration of the asylum seeker on isolated islands transform not only the asylum seeker him/herself, but the many others who form alliances with them or who choose to remain outside of these alliances? And what old boundaries remain intact during these transformations? As Bignall argues, becoming is not a complete process, because one's identity is affected in many different ways in his/her encounters with others. Some aspects of their identities remain the same; some others are transformed into something else:

> Sometimes certain elemental parts will enter into new relations with the encountered body, which alters their capacity to remain in the previous relations defining existing bodily configuration, thus transforming the internal composition of the body and changing its expression of consistency as a mode of being. However, other aspects of bodily configuration will remain untouched and unchanged by the encounter with the other. While one's identity constantly shifts and transforms according to social context and particular constitutive relations, such becomings are only ever partial and incomplete, since one is never affected all at once in one's entirety.[104]

In summary, the lines of becoming do not assign a stable identity to the minority figure. This figure could be instantiated as a refugee, a Palestinian, a child, or a woman. Moments of becoming-other do not exclude structural inequalities that may govern relations, in particular between minority and majority groups. It does not gloss over the extent to which such inequalities may create silences or may preserve the violence that create these inequalities in the first place. But at the same time it recognises an affirmative power of such encounters in opening up a space for change. Such a mode of thought ultimately encourages us to distance ourselves from perceiving these minor figures in their 'abject statuses'; in their powerless, helpless and silenced positioning. It forces us to see these figures not only as capable of speaking and acting, but most importantly as capable of change and of changing others. This mode of thought also prevents us from taking movements of contestation and resistance for granted. It enables us to recognise their limitations or their unexpected turns, which may lead to unified identities that are subsumed within familiar power politics, or that are used by the territorialising attempts of the sovereign. However, this is the premise of lines of flight or lines of becoming. It is a

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[104] Bignall, *Postcolonial Agency: Critique and Constructivism*, 174.

powerful premise that on the borderline there is a constant encounter of difference, which we cannot possibly grasp within the dead-end thanatopolitical narratives of biopolitics. We can apprehend this difference through an engagement with the liveliness, dynamism, ambiguity, unruliness and messiness of heterotopias – their productive force; their production of ever-shifting movement and difference; their affirmative politics.

Border heterotopias as fluid meshwork spaces

Space is a process of becoming. It is a dynamic process. Space is always produced through life-lines, and hence, it is in persistent variation. As a process of becoming, it is always on the *move*: it is defined by movement and difference. We do not experience space solely in terms of a structured whole in which we occupy and dwell. Instead, we also experience it in terms of movements and relations of speed and slowness that evoke powers to affect and to be affected.[105] As discussed above, when we see relations in their becoming, they lose their stable qualities. Rather, we perceive them as potentialities: as power to traverse and transform structures, and as transformational potentials of being affected and of affecting other bodies in their collisions with one another. Seen from the same perspective, space is performative of and performed by these collisions of bodies. The collision of bodies here refers to encounters among humans and non-humans, including objects. It, however, never totally envelops these encounters. Rather, it moves through them, cuts them, unites them, or traverses them, causing specific transformations of the space itself. It is this process of the becoming of space that helps us to perceive it as always in a state of emergence, variation and unexpected change.

As a process of becoming, space changes form depending on the life-line that constitutes it. In the last chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss two forms of space: striated and smooth.[106] Striated space (striated organisation, sedentary space) is performed by molar lines, and is effectuated and used by state apparatuses. As explained above, this form of space is constituted by

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[105] Tamsin Lorraine, 'Ahab and Becoming-Whale: The Nomadic Subject in Smooth Space', in Ian Buchanan and Greg Lambert (eds.), *Deleuze and Space* (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 2005), 159-75, Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, 301-308.
[106] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 474-500.

fixed points, whose connections seek to foster a structured whole. Striated space is a space of organisation and selective order that is constituted around modality. Deleuze and Guattari define this form of space as metric or measured space 'which intertwines fixed and variable elements, produces an order and succession of distinct forms, and organises horizontal … lines and vertical … planes.[107] Striated space is immersed within limits: the movement in this space is from one point to another, which involves some assigned breaks and intervals.

In contrast, smooth space (nomad space, rhizomatic space) is not defined by points, but by molecular lines and lines of flight. Hence, smooth space is molecular: it has no centre and no end-state. Unlike striated space defined as dimensional, smooth space is directional: it is formed by trajectories. This does not mean that there are no trajectories in striated space. The difference is that in striated space trajectories are subordinated to points, whereas in smooth space points are subordinated by trajectories. In smooth space the movement does not occur between one point and another and does not draw a line connecting those points. As Edward Casey elaborates, in smooth space one does not move in accordance with directions or geometrically determined vectors, but in accordance with a set of relations, such as bodily connections with wind, sand, sea: upon an ocean 'or in the windswept desert, one *listens* to direction, *feels* it, as much as one sees it'.[108] In this space, he writes, 'the points of origin and destination … are invisible, and the path one takes/makes is immediately erased by shifting sands or sea or wind'.[109] Produced through means of becoming, smooth space is defined by its vastness. This certainly does mean that smooth space has no borders. Its borders move in every direction in accordance with the nature of the journey itself: the orientations of this journey and its molecular lines define the ever-shifting qualities of this space.[110] Such movement ultimately gives this space a heterogeneous character constituting repeated, irregular variation: it dissolves within the diversity of the journey and the potentiality of its lines. That is why smooth space is a space of disorganisation and unpredictability. Deleuze and Guattari perceive this space is formed by its outside.

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[107] Ibid. 478.
[108] Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, 304 [Emphasis in original].
[109] Ibid. 306.
[110] The journey here does not refer to a movement from one point to another. I use it in the broadest terms including everyday life on borders and different forms of resistances and contestations.

Smooth space and striated space correspond to two different kinds of multiplicities: 'metric and nonmetric, extensive and qualitative, centered and acentered, arborescent and rhizomatic; numerical and flat, dimensional and directional, of masses and of packs, of magnitude and of distance, of breaks and of frequency'.[111] In presenting such contrasting multiplicities, however, Deleuze and Guattari maintain non-dualistic difference, avoiding dichotomies and boundaries between contrasting concepts. They look for the connections between them, as concepts too are always in a state of becoming. Deleuzian concepts are always open-ended. As Elizabeth Grosz writes, in a Deleuzian lexicon 'pairs are always a mixture of both, specific integrations of chaos and order, each more or less chaotic and ordered'.[112] Their discussion of smooth and striated space is not an exception. What most attracts Deleuze and Guattari is how two forms of space communicate with and transform each other, and how their lines cut one another.

In summary, two forms of space co-exist. Smooth space can always be transformed by molar organisation and traverse striated space. Similarly, striated space is open to the forces of deterritorialisation: its lines of separation can be traversed, mutating itself into smooth space. Striated space can be used for purposes other than those it is created to perform. A border wall can be re-used in ways that abolish or neutralise its initial separation or colonising function. It can be transformed into a surface for graffiti that makes biopolitical violence visible. A border wall can be re-used as a gathering place to resist occupation and colonisation. Similarly, an island-prison can be transformed into a space for activating decolonisation movements. Such 'counter-uses' of striated spaces may deactivate their initial disciplinary, oppressive or colonising purposes, or they may simply create smooth spaces within striated spaces. This does not mean that, as Deleuze and Guattari insist, smooth spaces are necessarily liberatory, nor does it mean the forces of deterritorialisation are always ready to be activated. Counter-uses of striated spaces may be captured and re-implemented by the state, increasing the effectiveness of these spaces. Nonetheless, lines of flight retain the potential to create new spaces, and they remain always immanent in the social and political field.

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[111] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 484.
[112] Elizabeth Grosz, 'Deleuze, Theory, and Space', *Log,* 1 (2003), 83.

Having discussed smooth and striated spaces, let me return to the question that I raised at the beginning of this chapter: what is heterotopia? Heterotopia, in this Deleuzian perspective, is the 'doubling space' in which smooth and striated spaces co-exist and their lines entangle and transform one another. Heterotopia, as Foucault writes, 'is capable of juxtaposing in a single real space several spaces'.[113] 'Several incompatible spaces', however, should not be understood as stable parts of space perceived as a whole. These sites are fluid. They constantly mutate depending on the movement of lines that constitute them. With each movement of a given line space transforms into something else, into an 'other space'. This other space is heterotopia. Undefined by static qualities, it is heterotopia's ever-shifting lines and their power to be affected and affect one another that cause unexpected variations. Read within this framework, heterotopia is not a network or 'hybrid space', but a 'meshwork' space which constantly moves with the movement and entanglement of lines.[114]

Ingold carefully differentiates meshwork space from networks. A network, he argues, is defined by connections between well-established points, directions and standard axes of X-Y-Z. A network is drawn by molar lines.[115] However, a meshwork is constituted by trajectories of different kinds: the lines of meshwork proceed through the 'interwoven trails rather than a network of intersection routes'.[116] In his critique of the spatial theory presented by the actor-network theory, Ingold argues that network thinking seeks the connections between points; in privileging networks, this mode of analysis emphases not things, organisms or persons, but relations

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[113] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 25.

[114] Sarah Whatmore defines heterotopia as a hybrid space: a relational space 'spun between people and animals, plants and soils, documents and devices in heterogeneous social networks which are performed in and through multiple places and fluid ecologies'. My interpretation of heterotopias modifies Whatmore's emphasis on networks. Whatmore, *Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces*, 14.

[115] It is precisely for this reason that the term 'assemblage' I use throughout this thesis should not be read as 'complex networks', or within the perspective of actor-network theory. Understanding the term 'assemblage' as a network presupposes a whole formed by the complex relationships between its constitutive parts. The assemblage is indeed complex and relational, not because it connects heterogeneous elements, but because it is a multiplicity: 'an increase in dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 8). Throughout this thesis I use Ian Buchanan's definition of the assemblage: 'a living arrangement' … which always benefits someone or something outside of the assemblage itself along the same line … it is purposeful, not simply a happenstance collocation of people, materials and actions, but the deliberative realisation of a distinctive plan (abstract machine) … it is a multiplicity, which means its components are both known and integral to its existence, not unknown and undecided'. I use the term 'networks' to examine the complex arrangements and constitution of molar lines. Ian Buchanan, 'Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents', *Deleuze Studies,* 9/3 (2015), 385.

[116] Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History*, 81.

between them. While this mode of thought maps connectivities, it nonetheless understates the question of how each connected entity plays an active role in the formation of the other, and how each connected entity is in constant movement, enabling its own transformation.[117] According to 'meshwork thinking', entities do not operate as fixed points: there are no well-defined objects, structures or identities. This way of thinking acknowledges structures – eg., pre-established identities – that seek to sustain familiar power politics, but it never ceases in seeking to locate their instabilities and mutations. The lines of meshwork, Ignold concludes, are not lines of points, but lines of flow: they 'flow, mix, and mutate as they pass through the medium, sometimes congealing into more or less ephemeral forms that can nevertheless dissolve or re-reform without breach of continuity' (Figure 1).[118]

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Figure 1:Meshwork of entangled lines (above); network space (below)
Source: Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History, 82.

Ingold's description of meshwork aligns with the alternative topology developed by Annemarie Mol and John Law: fluid space.[119] Like Ingold, Mol and Law argue that different relations that constitute network space are a matter of diversity. These relations are defined by their diversity and constituted by standard coordinates that more or less depend on each other. In contrast, fluid space does not limit itself by these coordinates; instead it extends possibilities beyond Euclidian restrictions. Mol and Law define fluid space as 'topological multiplicities'.[120] Whereas network space maintains identities of the entities that form it, fluid space is not imprisoned within strict boundaries in which entities and their identities can be sharply separated from one another. They are always subject to change. Fluid space has boundaries, but these boundaries are open to the outside blurring the rigid separation of inside and outside. In this space, there is no obligatory point of passage, no standard or single point to be crossed or defended.[121] In a Deleuzian lexicon, fluid

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[117] Ingold, 'Bindings against Boundaries: Entanglements of Life in an Open World', 1786-1810.
[118] Ibid. 1806.
[119] Annemarie Mol and John Law, 'Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology', *Social Studies of Science,* 24/4 (1994), 641-71.
[120] Ibid. 641-71.
[121] Mol and Law, 'Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology', 661.

space is a mixture in which different lines entangle one another. In fluid space 'nothing completely coincides, and everything intermingles or crosses over', changing function and nature.[122] Therefore fluid space travels everywhere: it *moves*. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Mol and Law insist that fluid space retains other spatialities coexisting with network spaces. Fluid space is a world of mobile mixtures: a heterotopia.

My aim here is not to assign uniform qualities for all heterotopias. As Foucault argues, there is no absolute, universal formula that could describe heterotopias.[123] In some heterotopias molar lines function more powerfully than other lines. In some of them, lines of flight wait for a propitious moment, and may never be activated. In some others, forces of deterritorialisation never disappear. They are never tamed by molar organisations and they keep subordinating lines of separation. On borders – at least the ones I discuss throughout this thesis – molar lines appear to capture everything. The border is a space in which we perhaps discover our deepest anxieties and fears, where we encounter the stranger in the most ambivalent of ways, where we question ourselves and our relations with others, and where we feel love and hate most powerfully. At first sight molar lines of the border capture and discipline bodies and souls; they operate more forcefully than other lines. Molar lines seem to preserve their biopolitical violence in order to sustain the processes of separation and exclusion that gave rise to their birth. Regardless of this, border heterotopias are meshwork spaces. Like all heterotopias, border heterotopias involve 'a vast array of affective and transformative processes in which social and spatial orders and disorders are constantly reworked'.[124]

In summary, border heterotopias have four main constitutive features:

1. *Border heterotopias are other spaces:* They are spaces in which molar and molecular lines and lines of flight co-exist, and in their entanglements they transform each other. The movements and entanglements transform the space into something different than what it was before. As the movement of lines never ceases, this other space is in constant transformation. Therefore, border heterotopias do not have final structures. They *move*.

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[122] Quoted in Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, 304.
[123] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 24.
[124] Keith Woodward and John Paul Jones, 'On the Border with Deleuze and Guattari', in Henk Van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch, and Wolfgang Zierhofer (eds.), *B/Ordering Space* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005), 239.

2. Border heterotopias are performative: They are produced and productive. They are not natural or fixed entities with stable identities. They are produced by molar and molecular lines and lines of flight. They change function and form depending on their subjects, and produce new objects and subjects, new territories, new conflicts, new connections, new expressions and new behaviours. They are immersed within the dynamic movements of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. They are spaces of double becoming.

2. Border heterotopias are heterogeneous spaces: Border heterotopias are not network or hybrid spaces, although networks are one of their constitutive elements. They are political multiplicities of different kinds – arborescent and rhizomatic, micro and macro, metric and nonmetric, centred and acentred, molar and molecular. Understood as multiplicities, border heterotopias are fluid meshwork spaces whose elements evade presupposition of a priori fixed points, order, identity or structure. These elements are de/composed by their connections, entanglements and ever-shifting movements. Everything – humans, animals, eco-systems, objects, architecture – has an agentic capacity; subjects and objects possess the power to affect and to be affected. It is their encounters that open border heterotopias to variations defined by an unstable dynamic of which an unexpected movement of any kind might arise.

4. Border heterotopias do not have firm boundaries: They do not have rigid boundaries defined by fixed divisions between inside and outside. The inside space and the outside space are not two juxtaposed spaces divided by boundary lines. We cannot talk about inside/outside, but only connections between them. There is no '/' between inside and outside. Rather, there is *and*, which establishes a connection and a topological continuity between difference. An inside space is always co-present with an outside space: 'it is constituted by the folding of the outside'.[125] That is to mean, the outside is not a rigid boundary line or a limit. It refuses to dictate interiority, and offers unlimited flexibility that is defined by a 'fluid connectivity' between inside *and* outside.[126]

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[125] Deleuze, *Foucault*, 98.
[126] Bernand Cache, *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories*, trans. Anne Boyman (Writing Architecture; Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995).

3. Border nomadology: a map

This chapter has outlined the conceptual framework of border heterotopias. Its framework is not a self-contained theory or a structural model, but rather a map of nomadic/heterotopic inquiry, which I refer to as 'border nomadology'. This map draws a cartography of lines in which we track the composition, movement and transformation of border heterotopias: the process of their becoming. An emphasis on becoming means perceiving border heterotopias in a constant flux, open to uncertain movements. It means tracking their messiness, fuzziness, shifts and continuities. The lines of this map are therefore not linear, but diagonal, allowing a cartography that seeks 'multiple entryways' to these other spaces.[127]

A map that creates multiple entryways to these other spaces principally follows nomadic/heterotopic inquiry: a methodology that seeks, in the words of Rosi Braidotti, 'affirmative differences or creative repetitions, which means *retelling, reconfiguring, and revisiting a concept, phenomenon, event, or location from different angles'*.[128] As Braidotti writes, this form of inquiry is more than quantitative multiplication of interpretations – it is a 'qualitative leap of perspective that can generate a hybrid mixture of interpretation of the phenomenon in question'.[129] Such nomadic inquiry endorses a critique that acknowledges the indeterminate and continuously shifting forms of seemingly fixed and settled structures – it respects the complexities, uncertainties and changes of the worlds in which we are living. The methodology I sketch here therefore begins with and remains in nomadic thought.

Nomadic thought replaces 'being' with 'becoming'. It is, Deleuze writes, not something that 'plots a point, fixes an order'.[130] On the contrary, the movement of this thought ceases any relation to the One or the Many in order to unsettle the stable image of the world and its dominant representations, which force us to perceive the world within a certain form of unity. Unlike tree-like logic, Deleuze and Guattari argue, nomadic thought does not stem from one root and will not proceed by means of tracking the lines of that root. Like the nomad, who occupies a space in order to

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[127] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 12.
[128] Griet Roets and Rosi Braidotti, 'Nomadology and Subjectivity: Deleuze, Guattari and Critical Disability Studies', in Dan Goodley and Bill Hughes (eds.), *Disability and Social Theory: New Development and Directions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 168 [Emphasis in original].
[129] Ibid. 168.
[130] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 7.

evade the codes of striated space, nomadic thought resists re/codifications, and it seeks to displace proper names and the order of things that shape our thinking.[131] A mode of inquiry that is based on nomadic thought avoids the pitfalls of establishing binaries, and the order of interiority:

> Rather than analysing the world into discrete components and reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging. The modus operandi of nomad thought is affirmation, even when its apparent objective is negative.[132]

Nomadic thought is thus equivalent to Foucault's 'thought from the outside', or 'thought of the outside'. Like Deleuze and Guattari, for Foucault the outside offers uncertainty, but this uncertainty is productive and affirmative. It unsettles the unity of the inside. Thought from the outside escapes the mode of being, the dynasty of representation, and it traverses the unity of the inside with historically instituted codes and structures.[133] Foucault's 'thought from outside' is the heterotopic inquiry/thought that he sketches in the preface of *The Order of Things*, where he first used the concept of heterotopia as critique:

> Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things … to 'hold together … heterotopias … desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.[134]

From Foucault's understanding it is apparent that the map of border heterotopias is ultimately a heterotopic inquiry.

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[131] Gilles Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought', in David Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), 142-49.
[132] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, xiii.
[133] See Michel Foucault, *Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside*, trans. Brian Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 1987).
[134] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: The Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge, 2001) xix. Foucault introduces the term when he discusses Borges' Chinese Encyclopaedia. Borges uncanny classification creates a heterotopia and in so doing he disrupts familiar systems of ordering.

One might still ask why this map, but not another one? This map seeks to unsettle two frameworks that dominate our perceptions of borders. The first framework comprises the dominant state-centric representations of the world that perceive borders as the foundational, legitimate and final stage of the sovereign act. The second is founded on critical readings of the border that challenge such hegemonic representations of the world, but which results in a fixed framework centred on the thanatopolitics of borders and on the theory of the sovereign. As discussed in the previous chapter, the excessively Agambenian and thanatopolitical reading of borders in critical border studies provides an important critique of the state. It nevertheless imprisons itself within an overly structured framework of the tragic aspects of the border: its cruelty and violence. In those readings the violence, death, and cruelty of the border become its never-changing identities and the bare life it produces. This form of critique presents the border as a technology of death, a machine of entrapment and a capturing apparatus of modernity. Consequently, it draws a picture of the sovereign that captures everything. This negative reading of the border starts and ends with analysis and critique of molar lines of the border. It therefore promulgates a pessimistic vision of power. The map I present here begins with the rejection of this zero-sum, dead-end vision of the border. With its emphasis on becoming and with its affirmative tone, it traces lines of flight, and in doing so it perceives a border open to transformative movements and moments. Ultimately it rejects the bare life of the figure of the minor, insisting on the affective and affected power of that figure. This map opens the border to its outside and to the productive and affirmative power of the outside: it disturbs the unity of inside in order to perform a new inside that is as much external to itself.

Such affirmation continues to acknowledge – and refuses to neglect – the colonising power of the border, its biopolitical violence, and the role of the sovereign in perpetuating this violence. This inquiry recognises power structures played at the border, and at the same time acknowledges the mutative character of these structures. An inquiry that fails to engage with the violence of the border downplays the suffering endured by the figure of the minor, and the lived stories and memories in the patterns of border politics. Furthermore, concealing the violence and the colonising power of the border propagates a static understanding of the border typified by a framework that is restrained by an artificial celebration of escape. As

Deleuze and Guattari warn us, all lines are open to unexpected transformations in that there is no guarantee that lines of flight or escape lead us to positive change.[135] Lines of flight can transform into a line of abolition, of destruction of others and of itself, causing and being caused by blockages. The map I sketch here therefore does not present a happy picture. On the contrary. This map navigates various spaces, past and present, in order to understand how borders colonise territories and people – how they cause multiple forms of dispossession; how they perpetuate the violence that has legitimated their formation.

Border nomadology does not prioritise one life-line over another. It announces a cartography of the interplay between these lines. By simultaneously depicting the micropolitics and macropolitics of border heterotopias, this map disturbs cartographies that attribute final authority to the sovereign in establishing borders. The cartography of border nomadology is itself an evolving border that is continuously re/created through the interplay of different forces of micropolitics and macropolitics. A map that tracks the entanglement of lines addresses the problem in critical border studies I raised in the first chapter: a problem that forces us to choose capture or escape, oppression or resistance, smooth spaces or striated spaces, power of death or power of life. The map of border heterotopias escapes from such binaries and such rigid compartments: it recognises contestability in each reading, and does not prioritise one reading over another. It endorses the diversity of life and its affective force.

The best way to read this map is as an 'in-between'. Ingold's discussion of the difference between and in-between is relevant here.[136] Between, he argues, connects given points: it moves between two points and therefore articulates a divided and ordered world: it 'articulates a divided world that is already carved at the joints. It is … a double-headed arrow that points at once to this or that'.[137] Between is a bridge on which we always end up arriving at one point, a conclusion. In contrast, in-between, is 'a movement of generation and dissolution in a world of becoming'.[138] Whereas between has two terminals to choose from, in-between is 'the realm of the

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135 Deleuze, 'Desire and Pleasure',127.
136 Ingold, *The Life of Lines*, 147.
137 Ibid. 147.
138 Ibid. 147.

life of [multiple] lines'.[139] In-between never stops producing unexpected movements and transformations.

Finally, this map provides a genealogical inquiry that sheds light on the shifts and continuities of the movement of lines on border heterotopias. In doing so, it addresses the problem raised by Liam O'Down in regards to contemporary border studies, which understates the historical manifestation of present-day borders while maintaining their significance.[140] O'Down argues that such 'epochal thinking' fails to recognise 'the past in the present', and exaggerates the novelty of contemporary shifts in borders. In providing a genealogical inquiry, this map seeks to show how the border heterotopias discussed throughout this thesis change form depending on the forces that appropriate them. Further, it aims to understand the conditions of the present without limiting positive possibilities and potentialities of the present. In its genealogical reading, this map demonstrates how borders repeat and how in their every movement their repetition is non-identical – they produce difference: a new life, a new beginning.

In short, border nomadology is the map of border heterotopias. It presents multiple entryways to the life of borders. This map is drawn from – and on – the author's own experiences, own encounters with others, her own becoming, and it will be re-drawn by readers in their own encounters with the text. In many ways, and like all maps, this map creates its own politics of truth. As Deleuze and Guattari write, 'the map is open and connectable to constant modifications. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation'.[141] The only promise of this map is to raise new questions about the cramped spaces of borders, and to open possibilities for positive change by tracking the dynamic, productive and affirmative lines of border heterotopias, which I now begin to navigate.

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[139] Ibid. 147.
[140] Liam O'Dowd, 'From a 'Borderless World' to a 'World of Borders': 'Bringing History Back In'', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 28/6 (2010), 1032.
[141] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 12.

INTERMEZZO

REPEATING WALLS

2015 may be remembered as the year of border walls. In August 2015, the Hungarian defence forces completed the construction of a four-metre high barrier on Hungary's border with Serbia. This occurred in only a few months after the Hungarian government declared a state of emergency as a response to the growing number of refugees. A few months later, in October, the construction of another barrier on Hungary's border with Croatia was completed. In the second half of 2015, the Turkish military began building a concrete wall on its border with Syria, in Hatay. This was followed by the Bulgarian fence project on the border with Turkey. When Bulgaria announced the completion date of the fence on its border with Greece, the *Daily Mail* announced: 'New "Iron Curtain" comes twenty-five years after rusty fences stopped people escaping Communism over border'.[1]

Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there has been a dramatic increase in the construction of border walls. Over the past few years, their widespread use as border control apparatuses has attracted a new scholarly interest on their physical and symbolic functions. Much of the debate is centred on how contemporary border walls function as 'image crafters' of the state that define the boundaries of who belong to the given society and who does not.[2] Reece Jones, for example, argues that walls can be best understood as one of the illustrations of sovereign practice attempting 'to create a homogenised and orderly population inside a bounded territory'.[3] Wendy Brown similarly suggests that contemporary wall politics (re)performs the sovereign power of states in an age of 'waning sovereignty'.[4] Walls operate as theatrical stages and seek to reaffirm states' role as a container of a society. For others, contemporary border walls draw new boundaries between the rich and the poor intensifying global

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[1] Thomas Burrows, 'Return of the Iron Curtain', *Daily Mail,* 26 March 2016.
[2] Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide*, Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*.
[3] Reece Jones, *Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India and Israel* (London: Zed Books, 2012) 3.
[4] Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*.

inequality and criminalisation of the movement of the 'unwanted'.5 In this sense, walls symbolise 'the emergence of a privileged few who actually live the promise of globalisation and defend its privileges through teichopolitics [wall politics]'.6

This intermezzo seeks to contribute to this slowly emerging literature on border walls. The ambition of this intermezzo is to deepen the debate on contemporary border walls by tracing some distinct historical periods in which walls constituted new spaces, relations, connections and conflicts. It seeks to shed light on their shifts and continuities. With only a few exceptions, the contemporary critical literature on border walls overly focuses on the present-day borders, and therefore, it overlooks how walls 'repeat' and move in every direction with the different forces that activate them.7 I argue that being the oldest physical structures to have shaped the organisation of space, and relations, norms, institutions, walls have acted as one of the most important active agents in the de/constitution of borders. They have appeared and reappeared in varying forms and contents. The inquiry I present here is therefore about what I describe as 'repeating walls'.8

'Repeating walls' means tracing the multiple lines of walls and their entanglement. In this chapter, I ask how, throughout their history, walls have given birth to new territories, connections and collisions, how they have performed different forms of boundaries, and what disruptions and transformations they have enabled. It has to be noted that 'repeating walls' is not a form of replication, repeating the same phenomenon again and again. Rather, repetition means to begin again and to affirm the power of the new in order to allow the production of new experiences, affects and expressions.9 As Gilles Deleuze argues, a 'thing' is formed by forces imminent in them. Force is never single: it is always plural and fluid in that 'the same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force which appropriates it'.10 When read in such terms, 'repeating walls' means tracing how walls have changed

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5 Turner, 'The Enclave Society: Towards a Sociology of Immobility', 287-303.
6 Stephane Rosiere and Reece Jones, 'Teichopolitics: Re-Considering Globalisation through the Role of Walls and Fences', *Geopolitics,* 17 (2012a), 217-34.
7 An exception is Polly Pallister-Wilkins, 'Bridging the Divide: Middle Eastern Walls and Fences and the Spatial Governance of Problem Populations', *Geopolitics*, 20/2 (2015), 1-22.
8 The notion of 'repeating walls' that I use in this intermezzo and in the following chapter is inspired by Antonio Benitez-Rojo's notion of 'repeating islands', which is discussed in the second intermezzo. Antonio Benítez-Rojo, *The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992).
9 Adrian Parr, 'Repetition', in Adrian Parr (ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 225-27.
10 Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: continuum, 2002) 3.

function and form depending on the forces and movements that have appropriated them and how as active agents walls have performed new discursive and material realities. 'Repeating wall' thereby signifies that despite their motionless and static appearance, walls *move*. In each movement, multiple lines of walls – molar and molecular lines and lines of flight – enter into new relations with different assemblages, and they create new functions producing new connections and relations among territories, institutions, norms, individuals, groups, and places.

The aim of this intermezzo then is to show that walls are not passive agents on the landscape. Despite their appearances as a rigid boundary lines, walls are made up of multiple lines, and therefore, they create border heterotopias; meshwork spaces produced by entanglement of lines; spaces that always *move*; spaces that are always in the process of becoming. Walls do not simply separate inside and outside, they also connect them creating a continuum. The boundaries they seek to establish are inherently porous because, 'divisions shift or move as outside forces cause internal variations or as internal variations create new connections'.11

This intermezzo thus concerns the heterotopic functioning of walls. It travels across different times and geographies to trace their molar and molecular lines, and lines of flight. In this intermezzo, I show how throughout the history walls have functioned as sacred lines, sedentary lines, disciplinary lines, colonising lines, lines of capitalism, and lines of disruptions and contestations. I further discuss how in the contemporary era border walls continue to function as disciplinary colonising lines while simultaneously activating movements and moments of disruption that expose the potentiality of alternative forms of border politics.

1. Beginnings

'In the beginning was the fence', writes Carl Schmitt.12 In *The Nomos of Earth*, Schmitt describes walls, fences and enclosures as being constitutive of various spatial, social, political and legal orders, and as the material effects of those orders. He is occupied by the questions of what enclosures do and what they enable. In his reading, walls, fences, and enclosures are not nouns, but verbs. They form different

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11 Cache, *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories*, ix.
12 Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*, trans. George L.Ulmen (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2003) 74.

types of connections between the earth and people.13 In Deleuzian terms, Schmitt perceives walls, fences and other forms of enclosures as one of the major forces of the reterritorialisation of the earth: 'fence, enclosure, and border are deeply interwoven in the world formed by men, determining its concepts'.14 Wall, in Schmittian conception then, is *nomos* that organises 'the concrete existence of human communities in their occupancy of the earth and orientation on it'.15 Walls capture space, transform it, and present 'concrete unity' as the ultimate and ideal form of political, social, and religious order, and in doing so they shape the foundational principles of shifting order.

Schmitt further shows us how the emergence of walls and enclosures characterise the shifting orientation in the people's connection with territory. The birth of walls marks a transition from nomadism to settled communities.16 Walls and other forms of enclosures are the foundational moments of dwelling: constructive and constituted movements of sedentary space. What makes the new organisation of space different from nomadic space is its fixed boundaries and fixed households. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Schmitt defines the nomad as occupying a fluid smooth space without enclosures.17 Similar to Michel Foucault, Schmitt further maintains that the

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13 Detailed consideration of Carl Schmitt's understanding of space is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it is important to mention that in *The Nomos of the Earth* and *Land and Sea*, Schmitt depicts not the absolute territorialisation of the earth, but rather an indeterminacy of the shifting spatial order. He conceptualises space is an active constitutive and constructive force. Similarly, *nomos* is not a stable concept for Schmitt; it has shifting meanings and functions. His reading of *nomos*, as Rory Rowan argues, presents the tension between order and disorder in the construction of space. On the one hand, Schmitt inscribes indeterminacy in the foundations of spatial order. Therefore, in his writing *nomos* appears almost as an aporetic concept. On the other hand, in order to solve the 'problem' of that 'indeterminancy', Rowan suggests, he persistently seeks to find a stable ground for *nomos* in the 'form of an authentic legitimacy' that could be detached from its normative and positivist meaning. For detailed discussion of Schmitt's understanding of space see Rory Rowan, 'A New Nomos of Post-Nomos? Multipolarity, Space, and Constituent Power', in Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 143-62, Claudio Minca and Rory Rowan, *On Schmitt and Space* (London: Routledge, 2015), Stephen Legg (ed.), *Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), Claudio Minca and Nick Vaughan-Williams, 'Carl Schmitt and the Concept of the Border', *Geopolitics,* 17/4 (2012), 756-72.
14 Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*, 74.
15 Mitchell Dean, 'A Political Mythology of World Order: Carl Schmitt's *Nomos*', *Theory, Culture and Society,* 23/5 (2006), 7.
16 Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*, 341.
17 There are parallels between Schmitt's reading of the nomad and Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of smooth space. Certainly, Schmitt does not share Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the open-ended dynamism of the earth, which is always fertile to the unenclosed 'nomad-nomos'. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari's *nomos* is primarily defined through the movement of deterritorialisations, there are no lines of flight in Schmitt's *nomos*. Deleuze and Guattari and Schmitt, however, all understand territory as a 'force-field', and believe that the earth is continuously reterritorialised. For detailed comparison of Schmitt and Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of

power of the nomad, like that of the shepherd, is defined by the multiplicity of movement.[18] The nomad's territory constantly shifts and denies unity: it is marked by the expandable limits of the nomad's own movement. The territory marked by the wall, however, is a departure from that order, Schmitt argues. Walls and fences are not only constitutive of the organisation of space in a sedentary fashion. With their bordering function, walls are also machines that sustain the continuity of this new connection between the earth and the people:

> … soil that is cleared and worked by human hands manifests firm lines, whereby definite divisions become apparent. Through the demarcation of fields, pastures, and forests, these lines are engraved and embedded …. In these lines, the standards and rule of human cultivation of the earth becomes discernible …. [Then] the solid ground of the earth is delineated by fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses and other constructs. Then, the orders and orientations of human social life become apparent.[19]

Indeed, since the first stone fortifications in Jericho, walls have been appropriated to form new spatial orders that have been linked to a multitude of political, legal and social orders. The question is then: how do walls function to constitute and break these orders? What kind of striated space have they created? What forms of boundaries have they imposed? And, how have walls affected the ever-changing relationship between the earth and the people?

In the early Greek cities, wall building constituted a customary and sacred practice.[20] Walls were dedicated to Gods: they were perceived as sacred. Rather than forming original components of the Hellenic cityscape, Horst De La Croix notes, they were built after cities had become well-developed.[21] While walls did not initially create these cities, they did enable a new relationship between the city and the citizen.

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territory see Gavin Rae, 'Violence, Territorialization, and Signification: The Political from Carl Schmitt and Gilles Deleuze', *Theoria and Praxis,* 1/1 (2013), 1-17.

[18] For Schmitt, the nomad, like the shepherd, practises 'a power of care'. Foucault makes a very similar argument in *Security, Territory and Population*, in his discussion of pastoral power and its difference from the Greek God. He writes that 'the shepherd is someone who feeds … looks after'. In Foucault's writing pastoral power is 'a power of care', and this power is exercised through a multiplicity of movement rather than on a unity of territory. Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, 123-30.

[19] Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*, 42.

[20] Horst De La Croix, *Military Consideration in City Planning: Fortifications* (New York: George Braziller, 1972) 12-13. De La Croix also notes the discovery of the multiple-layer of stone walls in Catalhoyuk in Anatolia, which date to 5650 BC.

[21] Ibid. 21.

With their function of protecting the city from outsiders, walls united their inhabitants through investing in the notion of a 'citizen' who resides within the borders of the city. In ancient Greece, walls became recognised as a symbol of a free and autonomous society of citizens, perceived as architectural manifestations of progress and civilisation. They came to be regarded as constituting the boundary between civilisation and primitiveness, and as connections between the corporeal and spiritual worlds.[22]

In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt explores this boundary function of walls and argues that they comprised the foundational elements of the city. In the absence of an enclosure, a grouping of households could not be defined as a political community. Enclosures functioned to divide the public and private realms.[23] The city-state was in fact the enclosure of a number of houses living together, Arendt explains:

> The law of the city-state was neither the content of political action … nor was it a catalogue of prohibitions …. It was quite literally a wall, without which there might have been an agglomeration of houses, a town (*asty*), but not a city, a political community. This wall-like law was sacred, but only the inclosure was political. Without it a public realm could no more exist than a piece of property without a fence to hedge it in; the one harbored and inclosed political life as the other sheltered and protected the biological life process of the family.[24]

According to Arendt walls were constitutive of the boundary between the spheres of the public and the private, the *polis* and the family household.

While walls had a separation function, the boundaries they established should not be understood as fixed outer lines of the city or definite limits imposed on a defined space. The ancient Greek city, for example, argues Stuart Elden, cannot simply be equated with the modern conception of the nation-state, which typically maintains clearly demarcated boundaries.[25] Similarly, Elden argues, we cannot understand the walls built by Romans throughout Europe by means of the framework of the modern territoriality.[26] As CR Whittaker observes in *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, despite the strong sense of organised social and political space, it was

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22 Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988) 189-90.
23 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958). 61-65.
24 Ibid. 63-64.
25 Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013) 21-53.
26 Ibid. 21-53.

impossible to find evidence of a frontier that functioned as a fixed line in Roman culture.[27] Rather than fixed, definitive lines, the frontiers of the Roman Empire comprised overlapping mobile zones. The Romans did not see fortifications as absolute limits to their expansion.[28] Whittaker argues that although stereotypical representations tend to depict Roman walls as dividing lines between the Romans and the barbarians, the boundaries of the Empire were much more imprecise.[29] In the context of the Roman walls, the purpose was not to separate one land from another or to set a fixed border. Instead, walls were constructed to control and manage movement. As Elden writes, 'what was on the other side was not the possession of another sovereign entity that was recognized as an equal, but merely separated what was Rome and what was not yet Rome'.[30] In this sense, as I will discuss in Chapter Four, the mobile operation of Israel's contemporary Separation Wall in the West Bank officially declared as a 'security barrier', but not as a 'border wall' presents strong parallels to such functioning of Roman walls.

One of the most well-known walls of the Empire, Hadrian's Wall, presents an interesting example relevant to this point. Although Hadrian's Wall was located on the northern limit of the Empire, it never marked the outer *fines* of Roman territory.[31] While its political and mythological representations have enabled sharp demarcation between the English and the Scottish since the eleventh century, Hadrian's Wall did not perform a corporeal linear border. Instead, it established a discursive border between what was perceived as Roman/English 'civilisation' and Pictish/Scottish 'barbarism.[32] From the English perspective Hadrian's Wall was a 'natural' frontier as it separated 'civilisation' from 'barbarism'. Such representations invested a genealogical claim that the differentiation of the English nation from the Scots was 'natural'. Many images of the Wall from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries similarly depicted England as a settled land, with Scotland and much of Wales as

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[27] C.R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994) 12.

[28] Ibid., Elden, *The Birth of Territory*, 53-96.

[29] Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*, 8. Whittaker argues that the Romans had two kinds of boundaries: the boundary of assigned lands and the boundary beyond. They also understood territory as a zone of increasing uncertainty stretching from the centre to the periphery. This zone was perceived in terms of power. For detailed discussion on the complex nature of the Roman frontiers see ibid.,10–30

[30] Elden, *The Birth of Territory*, 92.

[31] Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*, 82-84.

[32] Richard Hingley, *Hadrian's Wall: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

wild lands, reinforcing a vision of barbarism beyond the Wall and rendering it as a symbol of 'civilisation'.[33] In re-performing the Roman past of Britain, these representations of the Wall played a role in the later development of British nationalism and the celebration of British contributions to 'civilisation' through colonisation.[34] Such performative roles of the Wall never fully disappeared, and have been continuously reactivated.[35]

During the Middle Ages, walls were again invested with new purposes presenting shifts from their earlier functions and they became one of the most important symbols of the city. A period comprising the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, regarded as 'wall building' centuries. During this period, in England alone the number of walled towns doubled.[36] Similar to past centuries, in the Middle Ages the power of walls exceeded their boundary functions and they were linked to other social, economic and religious elements within the social and political field. During this period, walls primarily enforced a strict vertical reterritorialisation of the earth as a divinely ordered hierarchic ensemble of places: 'sacred places and profane places, protected places and open places, and urban places and rural places'.[37] In particular from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries walls were assigned to perform new social and religious functions. The moral topography of medieval Christian conceptions of the cosmos was reinforced with the construction of walls. The material landscape of the city was perceived in the same way that Eden was imagined, surrounded by walls.[38] Keith Lilley writes that for the medieval Christian mind, a hierarchically ordered cosmopolis was a moral map.[39] The cosmopolis was divided between the centre and the periphery, both spatially and socially. The centre, 'the

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such representations were used by prominent English writers to promote the English nationalism.

[35] Similar constructions of Hadrian's Wall as 'Britain's frontier wall' continued in debates over the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. See for example 'Scottish Independence Will Cause Mass Immigration, Theresa May Claims', March 2012, Hugo Gye, 'Who Needs a Referendum? Separation of Scotland from England Begins as Craftmen Rebuild Hadrian's Wall a Year Ahead of Crucial Poll', *Daily Mail,* 24 September 2013.

[36] James D. Tracy, 'To Wall or Not to Wall: Evidence from Medieval Germany', in James D. Tracy (ed.), *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 71-87.

[37] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 1.

[38] In continuation of this tradition, from the ninth to thirteenth centuries the heavenly and earthly city of Jerusalem was depicted as circumscribed by walls. Keith Lilley, 'Mapping Cosmopolis: Moral Topographies of the Medieval City', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 22 (2004), 688.

[39] Ibid. 681-98.

citadel', was set in the most elevated location. The outer parts of the city were allocated to those further down the social hierarchy. The lowest sections of the society – such as lepers and prostitutes – remained beyond the city walls.[40] Walls, in other words, facilitated the city built in the form of many hierarchical levels.

In Middle Ages walls further enabled the birth of new classes and a new relationship between the city and its residents. In Europe, walled cities came to symbolise 'islands of peace'.[41] Citizens of the medieval walled city enjoyed protection, with its walls representing freedom. The city was turned into a place where people could enjoy the protection of citizenship. In the Middle Ages, the countryside was not seen as a beautiful or orderly landscape. Similar to the differentiation of the natural and barbaric from the cultural and the civilised, it was the function of walls to encircle the 'orderliness' of the city and separate it from the 'chaos' of the countryside. It was this protective function of walls that facilitated the city's development as protector of the market. As a result, walls enabled the new class – merchants – to become permanent members of the city.[42] Amongst other roles, city gates were used for the purposes of taxation, conjoining the functions of the control of movement and the financial upkeep of the city-state at the point at which representatives of the city-state and its citizens cross paths. Walls further represented a healthy community via their quarantining role in the control of disease. The city gates were closed whenever plague or other diseases occurred. However, once again, walls did not create strict borders between the civic interior and the unregulated exterior. Rather, they were the apparatuses of control that governed flows in and out

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[40] Ibid. 698.

[41] It is important to emphasise that walls had crucial religo-social functions for early and late medieval urban Arab-Muslim culture. It was believed that walls separated the secular from the sacred, and Muslim from non-Muslim. Walls, therefore, were ascribed religious meaning. For detailed discussion of the role of walls in Muslim culture during medieval times, see Jonathan M. Bloom, 'Walled Cities in Islamic North Aftica and Egypt with Particular Reference to the Fatimids (909-1171)', in James D. Tracy (ed.), *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 219-46, Simon O'Meara, *Space and Muslim Urban Life: At the Limits of the Labyrinth of Fez* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007). For functions of walls and other barriers in the context of tropical Africa in the pre-colonial era see Graham Connah, 'Contained Communities in Tropical Africa', in James D. Tracy (ed.), *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 19-45.

[42] Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformation, and Its Prospects* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961) 248-53. Anthony Giddens contests a Weberian claim that the medieval city was a self-sufficient city within its walls. For Giddens, such Weberian approach overly generalises differences between cities across Europe. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California, 1985) 35-41.

the city: with gates inserted in them, walls allowed intervals of movement and acted as passages between the city and the countryside.[43]

By the fifteenth century, walls moved once again. The defensive functions of city walls altered radically with the introduction of gunpowder and cannon during the fifteenth century.[44] However, as Schmitt tells us, throughout the sixteenth century, boundaries continued to be determined by mythical separations such as those separating 'a cosmos from a chaos' and 'enclosure from wildernesses'.[45] Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries city walls in Europe continued to function as symbols of the civic and independent status of urban citizens.[46] During the Renaissance, the fortress also persisted as the material representation of the sovereign authority of the prince. As Simon Pepper states, for the Renaissance princes, the fortress was 'a personal symbol of princely authority and territorial dominion and by extension, a badge of his rule over a state'.[47]

Despite the change in their military function, walls continued to define the hierarchical lines of the city, albeit in new ways. The writings of the Renaissance architect and philosopher Alberti shed light on the roles of walls in constructing the modern cityscape. While *On the Art of The Building in Ten Books* was a treatise on architecture, it also emphasised the political and social function of modern architecture.[48] In a Foucaldian way, one may argue that Alberti's treatise was an early example of the ways in which architectural ideas and practices perform and discipline the modern urban space. Writing in the late fifteenth century, Alberti perceived cities without walls in a very Aristotelian way: as 'defencelessly naked'.[49] Most importantly, walls, according to Alberti, were disciplinary apparatuses of modern urban planning. He saw the spatial design of inner city walls as a tool with which to

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[43] For the brief discussion of divergent functions of city gates, see Julian Gardner, 'An Introduction to the Iconography of the Medieval Italian City Gate', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers,* 41 (1987), 199-213.
[44] Renaissance town walls were low and earth-sheltered. Although the architecture of Western European walls changed during this period, the Ottomans continued to build medieval-style fortresses with high masonry walls and circular towers. See Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk* (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2009) 33.
[45] Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*.52.
[46] Simon Pepper, 'Siege Law, Siege Ritual, and the Symbolism of City Walls in Renaissance Europe', in James D. Tracy (ed.), *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 583.
[47] Ibid. 587.
[48] For the legacy of Alberti's ideas on walling the city, see Gordana Fontana-Giusti, 'Walling and the City: The Effects of Walls and Walling within the City Space', *The Journal of Architecture,* 16/3 (2011), 309-45.
[49] Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, 100.

perform a new societal order. He suggested that the circular design of inner walls could protect 'the core population' by dividing the city into two separate districts of wealthy and poor citizens. He recommended use of inner walls to channel and control population movement, in particular during revolts and public disturbances.[50] Alberti's legacy has survived. His ideal of inner city walls as disciplinary urban apparatuses shaped the spatial and the political order of the modern city in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Alberti's idealisation of inner city walls has in fact never disappeared. Walls within cities have been reactivated in different forms with the change in the post 9/11 urban setting. As 'walled urbanism' has become one of the dominant features of metropolitan cities, physical barriers have been remobilised against perceived threats.[51] But perhaps Alberti's inner city walls have been reassembled most powerfully in the context of contemporary gated communities and other architectural and urban planning schemes inspired by the concept of 'defensible space' that force inside and outside dichotomy by separating familiar from alien, private from public, and orderly space from chaos perceived as chaotic.[52]

2. 'Progress-as-enclosure': the colonising lines of the fence

By the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, city walls began to disappear. With the Industrial Revolution and new capitalist modes of relations, the growth of trade between the town and the countryside rendered the enclosure of towns obstructive rather than useful. As Foucault explains, 'what was at issue in the eighteenth century was the question of spatial, juridical, administrative and economic opening of the town: resituating the town in a space of circulation'.[53] This rationale, which opened up the town's borders, however, enclosed the countryside by

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[50] Ibid.118.

[51] For detailed discussion on how the urban landscape has been transformed into a fortified landscape, see Jon Coaffee, *Terrorism, Risk and the City: The Making of a Contemporary Urban Landscape* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), Jon Coaffee, Paul O'hare, and Marian Hawkesworth, 'The Visibility of (in)Security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences against Terrorism', *Security Dialogue,* 40/4-5 (2009), 489-511.

[52] In the late 1960s and 1970s, defensive architecture was intensively used in American cities. In the late 1960s urban planners began seeking ways in which urban design could be changed to reduce criminal behaviour. In the 1970s Oscar Newman proposed a concept of 'defensible space'. He sought to develop neighbourhoods with limited public access. Contemporary gated communities in metropolitan cities reflect these basic principles. Oscar Newman, 'Defensible Space: A New Physical Planning Tool for Urban Revitalization', *Journal of the American Planning Association,* 61/2 (1995b), 149-65.

[53] Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, 13.

converting its common lands into a multitude of privately owned parcels. These new privately owned lands were clearly separated from one another with boundary stones, walls, fences, and hedges. Walls and fences, however, were not simply the symbols of the privatisation of land. They became the lines of capture that enabled the transformation of land into a form of 'machinery whose principle … would be … a geometry of divisible [and composable] segments'.[54] In other words, walls and fences did not act as passive things on the land waiting to be appropriated for a coming order; rather, they became agents of the new forms of land appropriations and the simultaneous deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of labour power.

The British Enclosure Acts (1604–1914) provide a paradigmatic example of how walls and fences continuously perform novel forms of political, social and spatial connections and interruptions. Since the fourteenth century in England, fences or other boundary markers signified ownership. The enclosure movement was a continuation of this tradition. However, by the seventeenth century, the system that had been previously based on local agreements was replaced with a 'statutory instrument' – the Parliamentary Enclosure Acts.[55] It was believed that enclosure could help to modernise farming techniques, and could thereby improve the productivity of land. However, the new system, with its heterogeneous elements, developed destructive effects within the whole social field. First, Eugene Holland argues, the Enclosure Acts enabled simultaneous operation of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of land and labour-power. Peasants, who were freed from common land – dispossessed – by the Enclosure Act, were banished from their primary means of production. However, their labour power was at the same time captured by other means of production.[56] The enclosure movement's effect of dispossession deprived

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[54] Deleuze, *Foucault*, 40.

[55] Michael Turner observes that enclosures occupied the British landscape for centuries before the Parliamentary Acts. Before the eighteenth century, enclosure was conducted by means of local agreements. However, after 1750, private enclosure was replaced by 'the statutory instrument'. The first Parliamentary enclosure was in 1604. It however became common only by the mid-eighteenth century. In other words, while Parliamentary enclosure was not the only form of enclosure, by the 1750s it had become the most dominant and pervasive form. Turner argues that this transformation occurred due to the increase in the number of interested parties which demanded a system to govern the entirety of the complex process. Turner also notes that the Parliamentary enclosures did not have the same impact in all regions of England. For example, they were negligible in the Welsh borders, and in south-east and south-west England. Michael Turner, *Enclosures in Britain 1750-1830* (London: Macmillian Press, 1984) 16-17. Michael Turner, 'Parliamentary Enclosures: Gains and Costs', in Anne Digby and Charles Feinstein (eds.), *New Directions in Economic and Social History* (London: Macmillian, 1989), 22-34.

[56] Eugene W. Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London: Routledge, 1999) 20-21.

the landless of access to open spaces previously used for fuel gathering, animal grazing, and agriculture.[57]

Second, enclosures enabled recoding of land by facilitating the transformation of land into a subject of registration. The registration of land created new actors closely connected to each other: commissioners, administers, surveyors, clerks, bankers, and land owners. The enclosures also produced different classes: the small farmers, who gradually lost their land; the cottagers; and the landless commoners. Finally, the enclosure movement destroyed the entire social fabric of village life. It normalised new territorial structures by abolishing the open field system whose regulation was previously based more on regional customs. In doing so, the enclosure movement erased regional differences in the mode of social organisation and the management of agriculture.[58] It has to be noted, however, that commoners were not passive victims of the enclosure movement. In particular, in the second half of the eighteenth century their resistance to the privatisation of the commons was strong enough to disrupt and delay enclosures.[59]

Despite the persistent resistance of commoners, the enclosure movement succeeded in de/reterritorialisation of the whole social, economic and political field, investing it with new subjectivities. The enclosure movement took its power from its free-floating politics, which spread throughout the social fabric. It shaped micro-perceptions through discursive constructions that deemed the commons and people living on them as useless, unproductive, and dangerous. This discourse was created and circulated through novels, pro-enclosure pamphlets, and husbandry manuals. Written in 1653, pro-enclosure pamphleteer Adam Moore, for example, in his short husbandry manual *Bread for the Poor and the Advancement of the English Nation* contended that the common lands were 'nurseries of Thieves and Horse-Stealers'.

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[57] Turner, 'Parliamentary Enclosures: Gains and Costs', 22-34.

[58] Alvaro Sevilla-Buitrago, 'Territory and the Governmantalisation of Social Reproduction: Parliamentary Enclosure and Spatial Rationalities in the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism', *Journal of Historical Geography,* 38/209-219 (2012). Alvara Sevilla-Buitrago writes that the open field system was also a form of territorialisation. Regulation of the open field system, however, was based on customary practices. For example, twice a year local landholders and villagers gathered to decide how to use communal land, drafting a field order, which was later celebrated with communal festivities.

[59] Turner, *Enclosures in Britain 1750-1830*, 11. For details of the commoners' resistance see J.M. Neeson, *Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700-1820* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Roger B. Manning, *Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

For Moore, enclosing the land would work as 'a remedy for beggary'.[60] Such discursive construction enabled commoners to be regarded as wild, irrational and disorderly throughout the seventeenth century.

Furthermore, by the eighteenth century, the enclosure of land was linked to the British national interest. Robert Marzec observes that from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, English novels made frequent reference to enclosure and to the 'disorderly' nature of common lands.[61] These constructions invested the idea of controlling the movement of nomadic desire. With the increasing prevalence and pervasiveness of these constructions, enclosures not only enabled the transformation of land and labour, but they also became the constitutive elements of domesticity in the Christian modern nuclear family and its mode of dwelling.[62] Consequently, enclosures captured the entirety of social and economic production, and came to be perceived as an indispensable step towards the utopian catchcries of modernity, progress, and civilisation.

The mechanisms that linked enclosure with aspirations of progress, modernity, and civilisation not only empowered internal colonisation, but also de/re territorialisation of first North America, then South Africa, and finally Australia. In the nineteenth century, walls, fences and barbed wire were reassembled as colonial machines. Colonisation imposed its own molar lines: disciplinary and biopolitical lines. Enclosures as colonial machines operating in imperial assemblages functioned to connect centre and periphery, to appropriate resources and to absorb the energy of appropriated colonies. Enclosures facilitated the destruction of indigenous rhythms by transforming relations between native populations and their links with their lands. The mechanisms of enclosed private property were transported to the colonised territories in order to transform them into homogenised spaces where a set of artificial arrangements, calculations and stratifications could take place.

In the context of North America, for example, Stuart Banner argues that the settlements in some colonies proceeded on the principle of fencing the inhabitable

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[60] Quoted in Nicholas Blomley, 'Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Rights and the Work of Hedges', *Rural History,* 18 (2007), 10.

[61] Robert P. Marzec, 'Enclosures, Colonisation, and the Robinson Crusoe Syndrome: A Genealogy of Land in a Global Context', *boundary 2, 29/2* (2002), 129-56. A good example is Dafoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. In his anxiety of living on an unenclosed and uncultivated island, Crusoe names his dwelling 'Wall'.

[62] Ibid. 129-56.

areas or those areas perceived as 'empty'.63 In his seminal work, *The Great Plains*, Walter Prescott Webb similarly describes how the invention of barbed wire in the nineteenth century made the occupation of the Great Plains possible.64 He writes that 'it was barbed wire and not the railroads or the homestead law that made it possible for farmers to resume, or at least accelerate their march across the prairies and onto the Plains'.65 Barbed wire captured all social, economic and environmental fields by causing fundamental changes in local traditions.66 Barbed wire introduced new modes of animal mobility, and as a result enabled a new form of human–animal interaction and contributed to a new mode of ecological dis/ordering. Webb's historical analysis shows that barbed wire in the context of the American West contributed to 'the disappearance of open, free range and converted the range country into the big-pasture country'.67 By making stock farming the dominant form of land appropriation, barbed wire determined the means of colonisation. It operated as an element of the larger ontology of 'progress-as-enclosure' that informed the Western colonisation of the spatial, political, social, and economic fields in its subjugated lands.

This ontology of 'progress-as-enclosure' dwells most influentially in the works of John Locke, who from the beginning developed a thesis that juxtaposes 'commons' with 'property'. As Roberto Esposito argues, for Locke 'the right of property is the consequence as well as the factual precondition for the permanence in life', which enables life and property to entangle with one another, making one both 'the content and the container of the other'.68 At the core of Locke's argument is the

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63 Stuart Banner, *How Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontiers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) 32.

64 For detailed discussion see Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains* (Waltham: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1959) 288-318.

65 Ibid. 317.

66 The first war to make use of barbed wire was the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa. According to Reviel Netz, it established new forms of control over colonial space. While the British used barbed wire to protect their railroads, they also needed to protect the barbed wire, leading to the construction of garrisons called 'blockhouses'. Railroad land was parcelled into fenced cells, with the addition of blockhouses making spatial control feasible. Eventually, the 'blockhouse system' spread beyond the railroad and became a larger space-control mechanism. Prior to British domination in South Africa, barbed wire had already transformed the land by facilitating intensive modes of agriculture. Reviel Netz, *Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2004) 60-69.

67 Webb, *The Great Plains*, 312.

68 Roberto Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004) 64. Roberto Esposito discusses Locke in the context of the immunisation paradigm. I will discuss the immunisation paradigm and its connection with the notion of the 'common' in Chapter Five.

perception of the commons as a potential risk to progress. In Chapter Five, 'Of Property', *Two Treatises of Government*, Locke describes commoners as 'backward' and he regards enclosure as a divine remedy for the 'state of nature'. He continues:

> God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the great conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.[69]

For Locke, therefore, enclosure was the major apparatus in preventing the risk of the commons, and in increasing the productivity and the value of land.

Enclosure, in Locke's thinking, was also an essential element in the 'civilisation mission' carried out in the 'New World'. In 'Of Property', Locke juxtaposes the 'enclosed land' of England with the 'uncultivated land' of America. According to Locke, what made England a 'civilised country' were the cultivation of land, enclosure, and property rights. America, on the other hand, could be defined as an 'uncultivated waste', which was 'left to nature, without any improvement'.[70] His discussion of Indians and America contains a number of references that associate 'common' with 'poverty', 'waste', and 'wildness'. 'Of Property' presents a textbook example of the colonial mind, which actively constructed indigenous populations not as owners of the land, but as 'wild commoners', each individual of which '[knew] no enclosure and [was] still a tenant in common'.[71] The outcome of Locke's argument was the application of two different types of enclosure in the recognition of property rights in colonial settings. For Locke, as Alan Greer writes, although enclosures at home and in America might have equally desirable ends, they could not be achieved

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[69] John Locke, *Two Treaties of Government* (London: Everyman, 1924) 131.
[70] Ibid. 133.
[71] Ibid.128. English colonists carried an intellectual heritage that allowed them to recognise the Indians as property owners, with a system reminiscent of the English pre-enclosure property system. This made them more inclined to recognise the Indians' land rights (Banner 2005). Although there were negotiated treaties between Indians and colonists, David Chang (2011) argues, the massive land transfers conducted pursuant to the Dawes Act 1887 cannot be considered as voluntary. The agreement resulted in further loss of land with separated areas reserved for tribal land and an overt intension to segregate Indians. Locke was an administrator of the American colonies, and he knew that the Indians were farmers. Banner argues that Locke preferred not to include this information in *Two Treaties of Government*. See Banner, *How Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontiers*. David A Chang, 'Enclosures of Land and Sovereignty: The Allotment of American Indian Lands', *Radical History Review,* 109 (2011), 108-19.

through the implementation of the same property rights. In England, enclosure required the ostensible consent of the commoners. However, in America enclosure required no one's permission as the common land was considered by Locke as in a state of nature – as 'wasted land'. [72]

It has to be acknowledged that colonisation was a process of continuous struggle between settlers and indigenous populations: movements against enclosure operated as active acts of disturbance in colonised territories. The ideas which informed the anti-enclosure movement in England were transported to the colonised territories.[73] Experiences of dispossession at home encouraged the early English colonists both in North America and in Australia to support the universal right of the commons. In the North American context, the early settlers practiced a combination of private property and a collective management.[74] The nineteenth century 'fence-cutter wars' involved resistance to the absolute reterritorialisation of open land. These movements were initiated by cattle pastoralists who opposed fencing in Texas, New Mexico, and 'wherever men began to fence and make private what hitherto had been free land and grass'.[75] These wars were remarkably widespread and amounted to comprehensive social upheaval. The anti-enclosure movement in Australia was even more powerful than its North American counterpart. As a result of resistance to land appropriation of the state, millions of acres of crown land had to be officially classified as commons in Australia.[76]

However, these movements were molecular lines carried dangers rapidly turning themselves into sedentary state lines: they were appropriated in the colonisation of the New World and utilised by state apparatuses. The anti-enclosure movements were rapidly turned into molar lines with their exclusion of the indigenous populations from the universal right of the commons. This exclusion of the indigenous population created two different forms of commons: colonial and

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[72] Allan Greer, 'Commons and Enclosure in the Colonisation of North America', *The American Historical Review* 117/2 (2012), 368. As Greer writes, Locke's differentiations of commons in England and in America established the central aspects of his ideas on colonial property formation. For Locke, commons in England was instituted in law. Pre-colonial America, however, knew no law, and therefore its lands constituted commons open to all.
[73] For this line of argument see ibid. 365-386. Banner, *How Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontiers.*
[74] Greer, 'Commons and Enclosure in the Colonisation of North America', 365-86.
[75] Webb, *The Great Plains*, 313.
[76] Ben Maddison, 'Radical Commons Discourse and the Challenges of Colonialism', *Radical History Review,* 108 (2010), 38.

indigenous.[77] Initial colonisation was therefore made possible through the creation of two different forms of commons and the brutal transformation of the indigenous commons into the colonial.[78] Allan Greer explains that it was not before the nineteenth century that fences, registry offices and other developments associated with private property stabilised the new political and economic order of the enclosed property regime, from which indigenous populations were largely excluded.[79] In short, the story of enclosure as 'progress-as-enclosure' and the birth of the barbed wire tells us that fences operated as an active force in the formation of a new spatial order. This new spatial order did not originate solely from a sovereign decision, but derived from a more complex interplay among micro practices. Walls, fences, and barbed wire as constitutive elements of this new spatial order empowered these practices by creating new connections and interruptions in the flow of imperial assemblages.

3. 'Deframing': The Berlin Wall as an example

In his groundbreaking book *Earth Moves*, architect Bernard Cache redefines architecture as an art of the frame and encourages us to rethink the relationship between interior and exterior. In *Earth Moves,* Cache's ambition is to create a dynamic conception of architecture: a shifting and fluid form of architecture, which does not belong to a static geography or a complete plan, but is always open to variation with new things are added or new relations are made'.[80] Put differently, in order to disturb traditional architectural practices that seek to stabilise seperations between inside and outside, Cache commits to an unconventional notion of architecture defined in terms of mobile space, unstable territory, and shifting boundaries. He, therefore, defines architecture as an art of the frame. For Cache, frame carries three functions: it seperates, connects, and arranges. Frame separates

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[77] For discussion of colonial and indigenous commons in the context of North America see Greer, 'Commons and Enclosure in the Colonisation of North America', 365-86.
[78] While settlers in North America recognised indigenous property rights, in Australia the process of colonisation was organised around the concept of *terra nullius*, which stripped the indigenous populations of any entitlement to land.
[79] Greer, 'Commons and Enclosure in the Colonisation of North America', 365-86.
[80] Cache, *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories*, viii.

by means of the element wall, but at the same time it re-establishes connections and flows.

Cache's notion of the frame functions as a fold expressing a flexible continuity and connectivity between inside and outside. As a fold, Paul Harris argues, frame does not work from the inside (a pre-existing whole) to the outside (a rigid boundary); rather, it operates from exterior to interior.[81] The exterior boundary does not dictate interiority, but offers unlimited flexibility that is defined by a fluid connectivity. What Cache does, in other words, is to open architecture to its outside, 'where what is internal to the frame discovers a relation to what is external to it in such a way as to open it up to the outside'.[82] Deleuze and Guattari calls this relationship between inside and outside and the productive force of the outside as deframing. For them, the system of framing 'needs a vast of plane of composition that carries out a kind of deframing following lines of flight that pass through the territory only in order to open it onto the universe, … and that now dissolve the [established/sedentary] identity of the place as vectors folding the abstract line of relief'.[83] Framing always carries a potential to activate movements of disturbances, because there is always a possibility of change immanent to any territory. Such movements that open inside to outside transform enclosed spaces delimited by walls into experimental and creative minor spaces that betray their primarily disciplinary functions.

The Berlin Wall is perhaps one of the most well-known paradigmatic examples of deframing, and therefore it deserves a special attention. The Wall certainly operated as a separation line between the East and the West. The separation function of this frame was 'overcoded by an abstract machine [of Cold War geopolitics] as the sketch of a World Order'.[84] However, what made the Wall unique was that it was at the same time – to use a Deleuzian metaphor – the 'south line' of the Cold War that destabilised its abstract machines and diverted its plane of organisation. It was a space of which destabilisations, deframing, took place. Take the example of late 1980s, when in East Berlin locations close to the Wall became

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[81] Paul A. Harris, 'To See with the Mind and Think through the Eye: Deleuze, Folding Architecture, and Simon Rodia's Watts Towers', in Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert (eds.), *Deleuze and Space* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 40.
[82] Cache, *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories*, xi. Deframing is also what Elizabeth Grosz calls 'spatial excess'. I discuss spatial excess in Chapter Four in the context of the Separation Wall.
[83] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy*, 187.
[84] Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues II*, 131.

sites for grassroots protest.85 These sites offered new possibilities that began to unsettle the geopolitical territories and binary divisions of the Cold War. Carolyn Loeb and Andreas Lueascher argue that the 'open ended and exploratory bricolages of living, community and performing spaces' created by the East Berlin youth and artists created 'the sense of new possibilities waiting to be realised in a reunified city'.86 Similarly, in the West, districts close to the Wall such as Kreuzberg emerged as a site for countercultural experimentation and political contestation.87

Furthermore, as it is well-known, the Berlin Wall was the canvas of the movements of the 1960s: graffiti on the Wall served as 'a bulletin board as well as an experimental studio art with political overtones'.88 With the graffiti altering its surface, the Wall was transformed into a communication apparatus and became an active agent in enabling widespread protest actions. Wall graffiti performed 'a deframing power that open[ed] it onto a plane of … an infinite field of forces'.89 In the late 1980s, with the increased interest of international artists, the Wall became an exhibition site. The exhibition 'Overcoming the Wall by painting the Wall' in 1988 typifies the role of experimental practices in 'proclaiming the slogans of every struggle in Europe'90: an event which reminds us Deleuze and Guattari's famous words, 'the painter's action never stays within the frame; it leaves the frame and does not begin with it'.91

Perhaps, most interestingly, the Wall generated various incompatible sites at one site. Take the example of the Turkish immigrant Osman Kalın's famous garden house, adjacent to the Wall, which emerged and continues to survive as a heterotopia. Kalın immigrated to Germany in 1980 and began to cultivate a small dumping site on the border in Kreuzberg. This small borderland belonged to the German Democratic

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85 For resistance movements in the late 1980s and the destruction of the Berlin Wall see William I. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945-2002* (New York: Anchor Books, 2004). 347-366; Roland Bleiker, *Nonviolent Struggle and the Revolution in East German* (Cambridge: The Albert Einstein Institution, 1993).

86 Carolyn Loeb and Andreas Luescher, 'Cultural Memory after the Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Case of Checkpoint Charlie', in Laura Zannotti and Max O. Stephenson (eds.), *Building Walls and Dissolving Borders: The Challenges of Alterity, Community and Securitizing Space* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 180.

87 Ibid.180.

88 Brian Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997) 26

89 Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy*, 188.

90 Frederick Baker, 'The Berlin Wall', in Paul Ganster and David E. Lorey (eds.), *Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World* (Wilmington: SR Books, 2005), 34.

91 Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy*, 188.

Republic (East Germany: *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* – DDR), but it was located on the Western side of the Wall. Since the land belonged to the DDR, the Western German authorities determined they were legally unable to expel Kalin from his land. Kalın transformed this small piece of land into a fertile vegetable garden in the middle of the destructive geopolitical space of the Wall. He surrounded his garden with a wire fence, claiming ownership of the land. In the words of Kalın's son 'Without the Wall [the garden] might never have happened. He never dreamt of having a garden like this when he came to Germany'.[92] After the collapse of the Wall, the area surrounding Kalın's garden was built over with high-density residential blocks. Kalın refused to leave his house and commenced proceedings to obtain legal ownership of the property.

In the words of Louise Osborn, Kalin is 'Germany's first guerrilla gardener'.[93] Indeed, during the Cold War, Kalın's garden contested the limits of its immediate surroundings – destructive geopolitical separation. In the post-Cold War era, multimillion-dollar buildings and Kalın's Turkish-style squat *(gecekondu)* exist in the same place.[94] What Kalin created was a 'defiant garden' that promoted life against the destructive moments of the Berlin Wall. He also created a form of 'minor' architecture, a Turkish squatter *(gecekondu),* that continues to disrupt conventional disciplinary/organising lines of urban planning (Figure 2). 'Kalın's garden on the Wall' was one of the many examples that demonstrates how the Wall activated many movements that opened the Wall itself to its outside, to the forces of lines of flight. In short, as Cache shows us walls *move*: they are formed by multiple lines, which do not remain within their imposed borders. Walls create shifting territories, discourses, and practices some of which carry the potential to disturb molar lines of the modern organisation of space and its binary dispositions which tirelessly seek to capture all living beings and their environment. Such heterotopic functioning of walls continues today in the context of new border walls.

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[92] Dave Graham, 'Garden Blooms in Shade of Berlin Wall', *Reuters,* 20 August 2009.
[93] Louise Osborn, 'Germany's First Guerrilla Gardener', *The Guardian,* 19 August 2013.
[94] In Turkish, *Gecekondu* means a house constructed quickly, usually over a night, without proper permissions.

The figure is removed due to copyright restrictions

Figure 2: Osman Kalin's house in Kreuzberger: A 'minor' architecture

Source: Sascha Lehnartz, 'Der Kreuzberger Guerrilla-Garten, [The Kreuzberg Guerilla Garden] ', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 March 2007.

4. Re-assembling walls, creating new heterotopias

In 2009, on the twentieth anniversary of the fall of Berlin Wall, world leaders gathered around the Brandenburg Gate and gave a series of speeches on the tyranny of the Wall which, in their own words, 'imprisoned half a city, half a country, half a continent and half the world for nearly a third of a century'.[95] What was largely unnoticed during those celebrations was that there were already twenty-eight border walls erected in different regions of the world (Figure 3). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of border walls and fences has been increased significantly. In the last twenty years, their numbers have more than tripled. This trend has been most significant between 2005 and 2015, when the total number of border walls increased from around twenty to seventy. In 2012, roughly thirteen per cent of the world's borders were marked with a form of a wall or a fence.[96]

The figure is removed due to copyright restrictions

Figure 3: The increase in the number of walls (1945-2015)

Source: Elisabeth Vallet, Zoe Barry and Josselyn Guillarmou, *More Border Walls in a Borderless World 1945-2015*, UQAM, Unpublished data, 2015.

As mentioned earlier, such unexpected increase in the construction of walls and fences along border lines has generated a new debate in border studies which predominantly frame this phenomenon as a sovereign practice of capture and control occurring in the post-sovereign era. I, however, argue that rather than functioning

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[95] Editorial, 'Gordon Brown Joins World Leaders to Mark Fall of Berlin Wall', *The Guardian,* 9 November 2009.
[96] Stephane Rosiere and Reece Jones, 'Teichopolitics: Re-Considering Globalisation through the Role of Walls and Fences', *Geopolitics,* 17/1 (2012b), 223.

solely as the apparatuses of the sovereign and as apparatuses of capture, these border walls perform border heterotopias as entanglement of multiple lines constituting a fluid meshwork space. Despite their static façade, these border walls are active in that they create new spaces, new practices and new encounters between human and non-human worlds. They function as lines of control, and they over-code the social and political field. Furthermore, in many cases they are built upon the legacy of colonialism and they perpetuate the footprints of the past displacements, and in doing so, they connect the past with the present. However, while they foster practices of disciplinary-biopolitical-sovereign control, they at the same time trigger movements and moments that break, undermine, or traverse the lines of ordering and organisation. Seen in these terms, many contemporary border walls function as 'South' lines, 'cracks', that disturb power/knowledge of securitised nationalism, racism and colonialisation.

First, in many cases, the contemporary border walls and fences present a colonial continuity in the construction of borders, which sustains the past colonial practices of biopolitical-governmental control and dispossession of indigenous populations. In such context, present-day border walls comprise the current layers of the corporeal and discursive demarcation lines of the past. The border wall(s) separating the United States (US) and Mexico is one of the many examples of the perseverance of past separations, annexations, and displacements. Although construction of the present-day US–Mexico border wall(s) began in the 1990s, it can best be described as the periphery of a 166 year-old militarised colonial zone. The contemporary wall is the top layer of the 'deep archaeology' of internal colonisation and dispossession of Mexicans and Native Americans.[97] These repeating walls were set in motion when the United States (US) annexed half of Mexican territory with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) and absorbed 100,000 Mexicans and 200,000 Native Americans.[98] Following the Treaty, border monuments were erected to

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[97] I borrowed the term 'deep archaeology' from Michael Dear. Dear uses this term to describe the vertical stacking of the border monument 122A. See Michael Dear, 'Bajalta California', *Boom: The Journal of California,* 4/1 (2014), 95.

[98] Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the war between Mexico and the United States (US). For discussion of the creation of the US-Mexico border and development of US border enforcement since 1848 see Nevins, *Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Allien" and the Making of the US-Mexico Boundary*, Dunn, *The Militarisation of the US-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home*.

designate a boundary line.99 In 1901, in the California-Baja region, the first federal fence was built in order to restrict the movement of cattle, and to reinforce property divisions and land grants.100 In 1936, the Civilian Conservation Corp began building a fence in the San Diego area to prevent unauthorized migration from Mexico. Most significantly, between 1978 and 1980, the Carter Administration erected a three-metre high chain-link fence referred to as the 'Carter Curtain', and expanded previous fences in El Paso, Chula Vista (San Diego), Yuma, and Tucson. This was followed by construction of the San Diego Primary Border Fence (1990), the San Diego Sandia Fence (1996), and the Texas - Mexico Wall (2008).101 These different layers have all enabled the dispossession of Mexicans and Native Americans. The contemporary wall continues to capture and colonise indigenous communities, their collective identity and autonomy through confiscating and blocking access to their traditional lands, while at the same time activates indigenous movements against land grabs and the militarisation of borderlands.102

The Ceuta and Melilla fences echo a similar colonial legacy. Spain seized Melilla and Ceuta during the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries at the end of the *Reconquista* and subsequent Spanish expansion into the Maghreb territories.103 These two enclaves operated as military garrisons of Spain's colonial penetration into the continent. Although these colonies were the zones of interaction between two different cultures and religions, from the Spanish perspective they constituted imagined borders between 'civilisation' and 'savagery'.104 Many critics today argue

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99 The Treaty required both sides to establish a commissioner and a surveyor to 'designate the Boundary Line with due precision upon authoritative maps, and to establish upon the ground landmarks which shall show the limits of both Republics'. This was initially done with border monuments. In 1894, a total of 258 border monuments were erected to territorialise the border. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the United States of America and the Republic of Mexico, *Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo*, February 2, 1848, US-Mexico, 9 Stat. 922, Article V. Dear, 'Bajalta California', 86-97.
100 Rachel St John, 'Divided Ranges: Trans-Border Ranches and the Creation of National Space Along the Western Mexico-US Border', in Benjamin Johnson and Andrew R. Graybill (eds.), *Bringing National Borders in North America: Transnational and Comparative Histories* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 116-40.
101 In 2011, the Obama administration cancelled expansion of the high-tech Southern border fence project.
102 Margo Garcia Tamez, '"Our Way of Life Is Our Resistance': Indigenous Women and Anti-Imperialist Challenges to Militarization Along the US-Mexico Border', *Works and Days,* 29 (2011), 281-317.
103 Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla has been contested by Morocco since its independence in 1956.
104 See Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, 'Border Acrobatics between the European Union and Africa: The Management of Sealed-Off Permeability on the Borders of Ceuta and Melilla', in Emmanuel Brunet-

that such orientalist perceptions continue to shape Spain's contemporary immigration and citizenship policies, not only towards the Moroccan Muslims living on the other side of the fence, but also towards the Muslim populations living in these two border towns.[105] Indeed, the circulation of orientalist constructions re-activated powerfully when Spain joined the European Union (EU) in 1986, and Ceuta and Melilla became the only Euro–African territories.[106] Accordingly, Spain revoke the orientalist discourses of the past and began representing its border with Morocco as the frontier between EU and Africa, and hence a border between 'order' and 'chaos'. Since the 1991 Schengen Agreement, Moroccan citizens are not allowed to cross the Spanish border without a visa. The only exception is for citizens from the Moroccan provinces of Tetouan and Nado. The 'Schengenisation' of the border has also created boundaries between European Union (EU) Muslims and Moroccans. Today, Ceuta and Melilla have ethnically divided suburbs between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim and Moroccan communities in these towns are largely marginalised economically, socially and politically. Furthermore, the 2004 terrorist attacks in Spain intensified racialised attacks against the Muslim population. The Muslim suburbs are now increasingly represented as 'breeding grounds for jihadist recruitment'.[107] The construction of the fence emerged and continues to sustain its existence as a result of such orientalist discourses and banal politics of securitisation of Muslims.[108]

Second, as these instances demonstrate, the molar lines of contemporary border walls and fences proceed by means in which the state captures the border region, internalises and regulates its flows and connections by targeting and securitising certain population groups. Constructions of walls in these regions do not seek to stop entry entirely, but to organise, regulate and channel the movement in the desired direction. In order to do so, state utilise other actors. Walls constructed on these borderlands enable the formations a number of new network spaces. They

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Jailly (ed.), *Borderlands: Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe* (Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, 2007), 75-93.

[105] See for example ibid. 75-93.

[106] See Carmen Gonzalez Enriques, 'Ceuta and Melilla: Clouds over the African Spanish Towns. Muslim Minorities, Spaniards' Fears and Morocco-Spain Mutual Dependence', *The Journal of North African Studies,* 12/2 (2007), 119-234.

[107] Sooren Kern, *Radical Islam Spreading in Spain*, Gate Stone Institute, 3 July 2012, accessed 17 March 2013, < https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3140/radical-islam-spain>.

[108] Construction of the first fence began in 1993 and the second in 1995. In 2005, the Spanish government built a third adjacent fence.

facilitate creation of new fixed paths, partitions and disciplinary codes operating both at the level of individual and population as a whole. Like a corner joint of a frame, they connect diverse actors, practices, discourses, sites, and apparatuses on these borderlands. Border enforcement agencies, construction companies, contractors, border crossers, local residents, anti-wall activists, pro-wall groups, private security companies, research centres, scientists, border security experts, film makers and artists, humanitarian and charity groups, international organisations and people smugglers all entangle amidst one another on these borderlands, turning them into crowded heterogeneous spaces. In order to foster their function of control, they are supported by advanced technological apparatuses, which transform these borderlands into 'technological zones'.[109] These walled borders code the space with surveillance systems, lightings, thermal and infrared cameras, checkpoints, and turnstiles. All these apparatuses are not only connected to existing legal, political and social practices, they also release effects on the social and political fields creating new legal and political rules, and procedures.

Take the example of the so-called 'terminals' along Israel's Separation Wall in places such as Bethlehem, Jalameh/Mqeibleh, Qalandiya, and Qalqiliya. With watch towers, surveillance cameras, turnstiles, intercoms, smart card readers and fingerprint scanners, and with private security agents these terminals channel movement by generating new disciplinary codes that aim to control not only Palestinian movements, but every aspect of their lives.[110] As I elaborate later in Chapter Four, all these apparatuses are connected to statistical, demographic, economic, legal, and security organs of the Zionist body that seeks to control Palestinian land and people. Similarly, in the contexts of the Ceuta and Melilla fences, the specific technological design of the fence as 'three-dimensional' creates legal loopholes, which enable the Spanish government to foster its power of control.[111]

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[109] Barry Andrew, 'Technological Zones', *European Journal of Social Theory,* 9/2 (2006), 239-53.
[110] Hagar Kotef and Merav Amir, 'Between Imaginary Lines: Violence and Its Justifications at the Military Checkpoint in Occupied Palestine', *Theory, Culture and Society,* 28 (2011), 55-80.
[111] According to the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the heavily patrolled triple fence and excessive use of force by the Spanish Civil Guards are the major causes of deaths and injuries. Immigrants are often caught in barbed wire or shot by the Spanish Civil Guards. See Amnesty International, 'Spain and Morocco: Failure to Protect the Rights of Migrants', (Spain: Amnesty International, 2006), viewed 12 June 2014,
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR41/009/2006/en/725e1555-d3e6-11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/eur410092006en.pdf>, Human Rights Watch, 'Abused and Expelled: Ill-Treatment of Sub-Saharan Africa Migrants in Morocco', (Human Rights Watch, 2014), viewed 12 June 2014, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/morocco0214_ForUpload_0.pdf>.

According to the Spanish government, areas between fences constitute the border, and hence are not considered Spanish territory. The lack of legal clarity gives the government power to deport those stuck in between fences. As a result of such practices, immigrants prefer to use new migration routes and take dangerous sea voyages to reach the Spanish Canary Islands. These new routes enable people smugglers to become more powerful agents of borders.[112] Similar processes are also be observed at the US–Mexico border wall. The wall uses high-technology infrastructure that integrates securitisation discourses of undocumented Mexicans within a wide range of customs and immigration laws – this is done so under what is referred to as the Secure Border Initiative (SBI).[113] The complex infrastructure of the border wall deter and impede cross-border movement, and as a result it redirects many undocumented immigrants into dangerous inland routes through the desert.[114]

Third, it is important to see these walls in 'more-than-human' terms. Walls as the entanglement of different lines are constitutive of new forms of relationship between human and non-human worlds, forcing new animal movements and causing substantial damage to the natural ecosystem. The US-Mexico wall, for example, unsettles the traditional cross-border migration routes of animals, disrupting the cross border connectivity of wildlife and ecosystems. Studies have already reported that the construction of the fence has placed particular animal species at risk of extinction.[115] The design of the US-Mexico wall in some areas also obstructs the natural flow of water, causing extensive flooding and damage to resources and

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[112] Amnesty International, 'Spain and Morocco: Failure to Protect the Rights of Migrants'.
[113] Secure Border Initiative (SBI) was launched in 2005. Two components of the Secure Border Initiative were SBINet and SBI Tactical Infrastructure. SBInet was responsible for the development, installation and integration of technological solutions to improve the deterrence and detection function of the border. The SBI Tactical Infrastructure program develops and installs physical components such as fences, roads, lights and vegetation control. SBINet was cancelled in 2011.
[114] Edward Helmore, "Death Map' of Desert Aims to Save Lives of Desperate Mexican Migrants', *The Guardian,* 1 June 2013.
[115] Aaron D. Flesch et al., 'Potential Effects of the United States-Mexico Border Fence on Wildlife', *Conversation Biology,* 24/1 (2010), 171-81. The 2005 *Real ID Act* waives laws that interfere with the construction of physical barriers along the border. In 2008, Homeland Security suspended legislation including laws protecting the environment, endangered species, migratory birds, and Native American graves and religious sites. Environmental groups have undertaken lawsuits and public hearings. See The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 'DHS Exercises Waiver Authority to Expedite Advancements in Border Security', (Washington: DC: DHS, 2008), viewed 12 June 2014, <http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/humanrights/borderwall/law/waivers-DHS-PR-Regarding-Exercise-of-Waiver-Authority.pdf>. For detailed discussion of this legislation see Jenny Neeley, 'Over the Line: Homeland Security's Unconstitutional Authority to Waive All Legal Requirements for the Purpose of Building Border Infrastructure', *The Arizona Journal of Environmental Law and Policy,* 1/2 (2011), 140-67.

infrastructure on neighbouring land.[116] Ironically, flooding caused by the wall also threatens its own foundational stability.

The fence on the border between Botswana and Zimbabwe, which I call 'biosecurity border fence', is perhaps a unique example of the ways in which a fence functions 'more-than-human' terms by immobilising trans-boundary wildlife and radically alters the ecosystem of a border region. Although the fence is largely seen as a response to the growing number of irregular movement of undocumented persons, one of the major functions of the fence is to prevent interaction between cattle herds in Botswana and Zimbabwe, and thereby avert the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. The fence is a product of the long history of veterinary fencing in Botswana and neighbouring countries.[117] In Botswana, fences were introduced by the colonial administration, and were seen as a means of reforming the 'backwardness' of seasonal migratory pastoralism. Since early colonial times, veterinary fences have been erected to control livestock diseases and boundary disputes between local tribes.[118] From the 1870s onwards, the rapidly expanding South African mining industry has created a market for cheap meat. Since then, livestock development policy in Botswana has prioritised the concerns of international markets over rural livelihood and environment.[119] With the increase of controls throughout 1950s and 1960s, Botswana was divided into a series of quarantine zones demarcated by veterinary cordon fences. The first was constructed on the Zimbabwe border.[120] Daniel McGahey argues that much of the 1950s fencing was justified on the grounds that it would 'facilitate the task of the [colonial] administration of better management

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[116] Brady Mccombs, 'Rain Washes Awat 40 Feet of US-Mexico Border Fence', *Arizona Daily Star*, 10 August 2011.

[117] See Daniel J McGahey, *Maintaining Opportunism and Mobility in Drylands: The Impact of Veterinary Cordon Fences in Botswana*, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. For a compilation of studies on the impact of fencing in the southern Africa see Ken Ferguson and John Hanks (eds.), *Fencing Impacts: A Review of the Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts of Game and Veterinary Fencing in Africa with Particular Refernce to the Great Limpopo and Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Areas* (Pretoria:Mammal Research Institute, 2010).

[118] Veterinary fence is a large-scale fencing strategy. One of the most famous examples of such fencing is the rabbit-proof fence in Australia.

[119] Daniel J. Mcgahey, 'The Impact of Veterinary Cordon Fences on Livelihoods and Natural Resource Use in Botswana', in Ken Ferguson and John Hanks (eds.), *Fencing Impacts: A Review of the Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts of Game and Veterinary Fencing in Africa with Particular Refernce to the Great Limpopo and Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Areas* (Pretoria: Mammal Research Institute, 2010), 44-48.

[120] Daniel J Mcgahey, 'Maintaining Opportunism and Mobility in Drylands: The Impact of Veterinary Cordon Fences in Botswana', (University of Oxford, 2008) 32. The fence along the international boundary between Botswana and Namibia was also constructed in the early 1960s and disrupted the wild life movement between two countries.

of pasture, preservation of herbage and conservation of soil'.121 After independence fences remained intact. In particular, with the introduction of the EU trade subsidies veterinary fences have proliferated in order to comply with the strict requirements of the EU and the World Organisation of Animal Health.122 As a result, Botswana has become divided by a web of veterinary fences in order to protect export-directed livestock from health security threats.123

The border fences in Botswana have a destructive impact on the wildlife population, obstructing animals' access to water, obliterating natural habitat, and partitioning the landscape into sterile, isolated regions.124 Fencing in this context of generates a neo-colonial form of economic exploitation at the expense of the ecosystem. Many international conservation organisations and lobbying groups have already presented that ecosystems are interconnected and do not correspond with political boundaries divided by fences.125 For example, Elephants Without Borders, a non-profit research organisation, tracks the movements of elephants and observes significant changes in elephant-human relationships in the region resulting from border fencing. Animals also contribute to border performances by engaging in 'guerrilla warfare' to preserve their migratory patterns.126 What these examples illustrates is that contemporary fences impose new modes of dis/ordering and as a result they create new forms of relations between people, animals and geographical

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121 Ibid. 35.

122 In 2013, the European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General listed the electric fence on the border with Zimbabwe as a positive development in Botswana's control of foot-and-mouth disease. The European Commission Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, 'Final Report of an Audit Carried out in Botswana from 04 to 11 March 2013', (Brussels: DG SANCO, July 2013), viewed 09 July 2014, < ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/act_getPDF.cfm?PDF_ID=10380>.

123 Mcgahey, 'The Impact of Veterinary Cordon Fences on Livelihoods and Natural Resource Use in Botswana', 44-48.

124 Ibid. 44-48. Karen Ross, 'The Advocacy Role of NGOs in Promoting Dialogue as a Means of Resolving Conflicts Resulting from Veterinary Cordon Fencing in Botswana', in Ken Ferguson and John Hanks (eds.), *Fencing Impatcs: A Review of the Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts of Game and Veterinary Fencing in Africa with Particular Reference to the Great Limpopo and Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Areas* (Pretoria: Mammal Research Institute, 2010), 40-43, Michelle E. Gadd, 'Barriers, the Beef Industry and Unnatural Selection: A Review of Impacts of Veterinary Fencing on Mammals in Southern Africa', in Michael J. Somers and Matthew W Hayward (eds.), *Fencing for Conservation: Restriction of Evolutionary Potential or a Riposte to Threatening Processes?* (New York: Springer, 2012), 153-86.

125 Ross, 'The Advocacy Role of NGOs in Promoting Dialogue as a Means of Resolving Conflicts Resulting from Veterinary Cordon Fencing in Botswana', 40-43. Since the 1990s, international conservation organisations and lobbying groups have embraced the concept of Transfrontier Conservation Areas.

126 Ken Ferguson and John Hanks, 'Executive Summary' Ken Ferguson and John Hanks (eds.), *Fencing Impatcs: A Review of the Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts of Game and Veterinary Fencing in Africa with Particular Reference to the Great Limpopo and Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Areas* (Pretoria: Mammal Research Institute, 2010), 12-17.

regions. Borders do not only affect humans. Similar to their progenitors, contemporary border walls and fences re-perform border spaces in 'more-than-human' ways. In doing so, they reconstitute complex webs of relations with non-human and human agents: they simultaneously separate and connect people, animals, plants, and land, and create what Sarah Whatmore calls 'fluid ecologies.[127]

Finally, in their constant movement, border walls and fences activate lines of contestation disturbing the many facets of disciplinary-bio-governmental border practices. There are now countless examples that show us how walls facilitate the formation of minor spaces within these striated spaces. Tijuana's tent cities are one of the examples of such minor spaces. They are constructed by the immigrants themselves, and are supported by activists to shelter the homeless deportees. They at the same time put pressure on the Mexican government to provide shelters and other forms of aid to the returned immigrants.[128] Similarly, stopover camps on Moroccan hills form minor spaces of the border walls. Thousands of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa stay on these hills before they try to cross the border. They travel for months through the deserts of Algeria before they reach these camps. As Heather Johnson argues, such transit sites disturb the Agambenian understanding of the camp as defined by the sovereign power.[129] Indeed, these camps as minor spaces are defined and challenged by the movements of immigrants themselves. Their movement creates irregularity that confronts the institutional regimes of regular mobility.[130] These camps accommodate such irregularity by enabling new connections, sociabilities and common lines of flight.[131] They create spaces in which immigrants can claim their rights to life by traversing sovereign and disciplinary lines of the border.

I do not intend to celebrate or idealise such camps. Certainly they are the sites of impoverishment, struggle, and suffering. However, I argue that the existence of such transit camps on walled borders demonstrates that immigrants' border

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[127] Whatmore, *Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces*, 14.

[128] There are similar camps in Tijuana, Mexico. Unlike the camps in Morocco, which are constructed by the immigrants themselves, the camp cities in Tijuana are supported by activists to shelter the homeless deportees. They also put pressure on the Mexican government to provide shelters and other forms of aid to the returned immigrants. Michelle Garcia, 'Tijuana's Tent City Shelters Deported Immigrants', *AlJazeera,* 28 November 2013.

[129] Heather Johnson, 'The Other Side of the Fence: Reconceptualizing the 'Camp' and Migration Zones at the Borders of Spain', *International Political Sociology,* 7 (2013), 75-91.

[130] Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century*.

[131] Aysen Ustubici, 'Political Activism between Journey and Settlement: Irregular Migrant Mobilisation in Morroco', *Geopolitics,* 21/2 (2016), 303-24.

trajectories are not determined movements between two points of departure and arrival: the border is not a linear line, but a lived experience – it is a journey. These camps challenge the dominant stories representing the immigrant as the one who that arrives to a point 'illegally'. Rather, the story of their journeys becomes visible through these camps. As Cetta Mainwaring and Noelle Brigden explain, the journey 'is not simply a space in between arrival and departure, a temporary movement of mobility between normal static existences, but a social process that shapes migrants and societies'.[132] The journey performs the becoming of the immigrant. These journeys leave physical, emotional and physiological traces on its survivors, as Mainwaring and Brigden suggest.[133] What becomes visible in these minor spaces is the becoming of irregular immigrants, and it is those becomings which disturb the sedentary lines of the state. However, these journeys cannot be simply described as 'escape routes'.[134] We need to acknowledge that through these journeys, immigrants ultimately seek to be recognised as citizens of countries of arrival and to be incorporated into the state system which created these journeys in the first stage. Therefore, as Anne McNevin might have put it, the political acts generated by these journeys '*both* resist *and* reinscribe the power relations associated with contemporary hierarchies of mobility'.[135] That is why it is impossible to neatly separate the politics of molar and molecular lines and lines of flight. On these borders, these lines entangle one another so closely that they all have the potential to unexpectedly transform one another.

Furthermore, the construction of these walls and fences activates collaborative, creative and inventive struggles against the thanatopolitics of these borderlands. They generate new encounters between immigrants and citizens and form new minor spaces that call for postcolonial and cosmopolitan forms of living. The US-Mexico border provides many examples of autonomous activist sites that call for transborder justice. Friendship Park is one of such sites which functions as a heterotopic space: it is simultaneously a militarised security zone, borderland, a

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[132] Cetta Mainwaring and Noelle Bridgen, 'Beyond the Border: Clandestine Migration Journeys', *Geopolitics*, 21/2 (2016), 247.

[133] Ibid. 247.

[134] Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephson, and Vassilis Tsianos, *Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).

[135] Anne McNevin, 'Ambivalence and Citizenship: Theorising the Political Claims of Irregular Migrants', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 41/2 (2013), 183.

touristic heritage site, a garden, a bi-national gathering place, and an activist scape.[136] Since its inauguration by Patricia Nixon in August 1971, Friendship Park has been used as a gathering place by people on both sides of the border. Those who are unable to cross the border exchange kisses, tamales, and news through small gaps in the tattered chain-link fence.[137] While the fence in this park separates people, it simultaneously connects them by functioning as a communicative embodied apparatus. As an activist space, the park provides a platform for bi-national protests such as friendship vigils, weekly Sunday meals, communion services, language exchanges, and international art and kite-flying festivals.

Construction of a fence on Friendship Park has also activated a coalition of organisations working to save the park. Jim Holsin obverses that with the construction of a triple fence border in the park, 'a simple act of fellowship gradually developed into a strategic coalition aimed at challenging the militarisation of the border'.[138] The Bi-national Friendship Garden of Native Plants emerged as part of this movement. The garden aims to 'create a space where people can make friends through the border wall and to promote the native flora' of the region.[139] The garden contests the environmental impacts of the fence and creates connections 'between people and with the earth in the shadow of the wall'. [140] The bi-national garden is not two separate gardens located on each side of the border, but rather it is a single heterotopic space that belongs to people of both Tijuana and San Diego. The garden does not recognise the border: in its rhizomatic movement it cuts across the border and connects its inside with the outside.

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[136] Friendship Park includes three areas: Monument 258, the beach below Monument 258, and the Bi-national Friendship Garden of Native Plants. The monument 258 is one of the first monuments built after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. It is located at the centre of Friendship Park along the border of San Diego-Tijuana. In the early 1990s, the US government began to build a new barrier atop the monument. In 2009 the park was closed for the construction of a triple fence on the border. See Friends of Friendship Park, 'Friendship Park: Inside Border Field State Park', viewed 18 August 2014, <http://www.friendshippark.org/>.

[137] Since the construction of the triple fence in 2008, the public access to the park has been severely restricted. The park now can only be visited on Saturdays and Sundays. The US border patrol agents no longer permit human contact through the fence. Archibold C. Randal, 'US-Mexico Border Fence Will Split Friendship Park', *The New York Times,* October 22, 2008.

[138] For the history of activism in Friendship Park see Jill M. Holslin, 'Saving Friendship Park: A History of the San Diego Coalition Friends of Frienship Park', in Justin Akers Chacon and Enrique Davalos (eds.), *Wounded Border/Frontera Herida: Readings on the Tijuana/San Diego Border Region and Beyond* (San Diego: San Dieg City Works Press, 2011), 143-56.

[139] Friends of Friendship, 'Binational Friendship Garden of Native Plants', viewed 18 August 2015, <http://www.friendshippark.org/#!garden--jardin/c1s6x>.

[140] Ibid.

As a final note, these walled borders generate processes by which technology can be used for alternative, activist objectives. Technology in this context facilitates creation of what I call 'alter-border apparatuses' or what Vicki Squire refers to as '(post)humanitarian artifacts'.[141] The *Border Witness Project*, launched in June 2014 by the No Borders Morocco network, offers a clear illustration of how alternative technology use can challenge the thanatopolitics of borders. By recording and documenting human rights abuses taking place on the border, the *Border Witness Project* seeks to make immigrants' journeys visible. With this aim, No Borders Morocco provides audio-visual recorders, SD cards, USB sticks, mobile phones, laptops, and hard drives to immigrants. With these tools immigrants can record and share their journeys, and they make themselves visible to the general public.[142]

The US-Mexico border offers numerous examples of 'alter-border apparatuses'. In particular, many humanitarian activist groups including Humane Borders and Water Stations.Org use technological tools such as the Geographic Information System (GIS), the Global Positioning System (GPS), and mobile phones to prevent immigrant deaths in the desert. Recently, Humane Borders initiated a project known as *The Arizona Open GIS Initiative for Deceased Immigrants*. This initiative generates a geographic-information-based tool that provides spatial data on immigrant deaths. The goal of this project is to increase awareness about migrant deaths and to lessen the suffering of families by providing them with information regarding their deceased relatives and friends.[143] Data generated by this initiative are used by another project, *Warning Posters*.[144] This mapping project employs GIS software to plot the exact locations of water stations, estimated walking times, and other salient details of the Arizona border region on high-resolution maps. Posters are widely distributed in churches, shelters, shops, and other locations on the southern side of the border, and warn immigrants about the dangers they may face during their journeys in the desert. These 'counter-maps' assist immigrants on their attempts to

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[141] Vicki Squire, 'Desert 'Trash': Posthumanism, Border Struggles, and Humanitarian Politics', *Political Geography,* 39 (2014), 11-21.
[142] For more details No Borders Morocco, 'No Borders Morocco', viewed 12 August 2015, <https://beatingborders.wordpress.com/category/english/>.
[143] Humane Borders, '*The Arizona Open GIS Initiative for Deceased Immigrants*', viewed 1 July 2014, <http://www.humaneborders.info/>.
[144] Humane Borders, 'Warning Posters', viewed 1 July 2014, <http://www.humaneborders.org/warning-posters/>.

traverse the border, and in doing so, they disturb the disciplinary maps of border enforcement agencies.

Similarly, another project, *Transborder Immigrant Tool*, initiated by the Electronic Disturbance Theatre, utilises mobile phone technology to generate a 'queer code'.[145] Like *Warning Posters*, *Transborder Immigrant Tool* seeks to guide immigrants to safe water stations, while at the same time providing poetic audio (Figure 4). By combining GPS with what they call a 'global poetic system', this initiative renders an inspiring form of virtual activism. Inspired by Donna Harraway's notion of cyborg technology, Ricardo Dominguez, the founder of the Electronic Disturbance Theatre, seeks to call into question the ways in which immigrants are always presented in less-than human terms. Such activist-artistic ways of using technology calls for investment in trans-border justice for immigrants.[146] This project exemplifies the utilitarian intermingling of material and human agency, whose practices perform a border disturbance. Technology in this context seeks to create potential spaces and this is the power of border heterotopias to create new earths to come. Such 'alter-border apparatuses' undoubtedly challenge Agambenian understanding of technology as being solely a capturing tool that produces docile forms of bodies.[147] The activist and artistic ways of using technology on these walled borders describes the creation of multiple realities, one of which invests ethical responsibility towards those who are deemed to be invisible victims of walled borders. Technology in this context is an alternative active agent in the constitution of the border. It releases forces of lines of flight by opening up potentials for new forms of life unrestrained by the disciplinary lines of walled borders.

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[145] The Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT) established in 1997. It is a small group of cyber activists and artists who develop practice and theory of Electronic Civil Disobedience. Its members work at the intersection of radical politics, performance art, and computer software design. They also produce a civil disobedience device called *Flood net*, a URL-based software used to block opponents' websites. This device is inspired by earlier tactics of trespass and blockade. The Electronic Disturbance Theatre, 'The Electronic Disturbance Theatre', viewed 10 August 2014, <http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ecd.html>.

[146] Leila Nadir, 'Poetry, Immigration and the FBI: The Transborder Immigrant Tool', *Hyperallergic,* (23 July 2012).

[147] Giorgio Agamben, *What Is an Apparatus and Other Essays?* trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Standford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

Figure 4: Transborder Immigrant Tool, Electronic Disturbance Theatre

Source: Museum of Arte Útil, viewed 10 November 2014, <http://museumarteutil.net/projects/transborder-immigrant-tool/>.

5. Conclusion

In this intermezzo, I have traced some of the distinct historical periods in which walls, barbed wire, and fences activated turning points in the construction of borders. My aim has been to shown that walls are not straight lines on the landscape proceeding from one point to another. They cannot be described simply within the terms of network borders or 'escape routes'. Rather, they perform border heterotopias: a complex fluid meshwork space constituted by the entanglements of multiple lines formed by both humans and non-humans. On these borders, diverse politics of three lines is intertwined in that they all have the potential to transform one another. It is precisely for this reason why the lines of walls do not have neat boundaries. Transformation is immanent on these borderlands; molar lines may unexpectedly turn into lines of flight and vice versa. As I have demonstrated throughout this intermezzo, borders inscribed by walls, fences and barbed wire pertain disciplinary-biopolitical-governmental codes and practices. They seek to control and manage populations in the desired directions. Yet, at the same time, lines of flight are always already present on these borderlands. These borderlands cannot be simply defined as disciplinary-biopolitical network spaces, because they are simultaneously minor spaces. They carry the potential to draw practice and thought into a milieu of contestation, of deframing, of alternative politics that macropolitics of state fails to recognise. My intention is not to gloss over the suffering endured by people crossing or dwelling on walled borders, neither to forget deaths at border crossings. Nonetheless, walls and fences perform spaces of becoming; they *move* in different and competing directions depending on the forces that activate their lines. I suggest that walls and fences as border heterotopias always accommodate unexpected instability that disturbs the established order of things. It is these movements that offer potential to produce new experiences, new affects, and ultimately new lives beyond the violent practices of the border. To place border walls and the traditional coercive and violent security practices of the sovereign under scrutiny therefore requires us to perceive these movements and their becoming. This form of scrutiny not only renders these violent

practices visible, it also facilitates the further production of new minor spaces within the violent sites of the border. The next two chapters will proceed within the trajectory of this argument and consider how walls and fences create heterotopic borders in the context of Israel and Palestine.

CHAPTER 3

WALLS OF PALESTINE: JEWISH/ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN BECOMING

In the course of the Arab Revolt that occurred between 1936 and 1939, British officials arranged for the construction of a wall on the northern border of Palestine. Known as Tegart's Wall, its purpose was to 'prevent bands fleeing from justice, smuggling arms, or entering for terrorism and agitation across the frontiers between Palestine and Syria, Transjordan, and the Lebanon'.[1] Tegart's Wall could not survive long; shortly after its construction it was torn down by border dwellers and border crossers in 1939. Yet, seventy-three years after its disappearance, the wall has reappeared in a different shape. In January 2012, the Israeli government completed construction of the Metulla Wall, situated along the Blue Line, with the intention of protecting houses from sniper fire from across the border; the wall constitutes the most recent episode of 'repeating walls' on Israel's borders.[2]

Walls and fences have been one of the features of the Palestinian landscape since the late nineteenth century. They have appeared repeatedly in diverse forms, functioning in different ways. This chapter concerns these repeating walls. This genealogical inquiry explores how walls in Palestine were re-arranged as a function of a particular problem and how they enabled a series of possible realities. In its search for the performative roles of walls and fences, this chapter seeks to understand how walls transformed Palestine and Israel, and how they have connected the past with the future. In answering this central question, this chapter seeks to show that

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[1] Jerusalem Correspondent, 'Tegart's Wall', *The Times,* 28 May 1938.

[2] The Blue Line is the demarcation line between Israel and Lebanon set by the United Nation (UN) on 16 June 2000 after the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from Lebanon. The Blue Line is generally consistent with the Anglo-French 1923 boundary line agreement. The Lebanese government claims that at some locations the Metulla Wall violates Lebanese territory demarcated by the Blue Line. However, according to the UN records, Metulla Wall often runs parallel to the withdrawal line of 2000. United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)*, S/2000/590 (16 June 2000), United Nations General Assembly, *Identical Letters dated 23 July 2014 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council*, General Assembly 68th Session, Agenda item 35, The Situation in the Middle East, A/68/957-S/2014/548 (30 July 2014).

walls and fences have been recurring apparatuses on the Palestinian landscape enabling the creation of new territories, boundaries, connections and, most importantly, new conflicts.

The overarching argument of this chapter is that walls and fences constituted one of the machines of Zionism's colonial assemblage, which had begun to establish itself in Palestine by the nineteenth century. Laurence Silberstein writes that Zionism was an abstract machine that produced new connections in order to make it possible for Jews to come together as a national and colonial assemblage.3 The act of building walls and fences or their deliberate exclusion from the planning of Jewish settlements played an active role in this assemblage. Facilitating simultaneous deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of the Palestinian land and people, the act of building walls and fences enabled colonisation of Palestine and fostered the corporeal and discursive production of a new Jewish life in Palestine, which later informed the ways in which Israeliness was performed and mapped. In such terms, building walls and fences was a performative practice, the end of which has been the radical transformation of space. Walls and fences as colonising machines sought to capture and appropriate the territory within assemblages of people, places, institutions, narratives, norms and actions. It was the part of a larger project of act of building, which as Eyal Chowers argues, played a central role in Zionist project in its aspiration of merging the self and the material world in Palestine.4

In considering the role of walls and fences in colonisation of Palestine, this chapter begins with discussion of Ottoman projects that set precedent. I then explore four significant events that occupy a significant place in Jewish-Israeli history: the *Kibbutz*; Tower and Stockade Settlements; the Fortification of the Frontier movement; and finally, transit camps. I refer to these four types of material and social establishment as 'space-events'. As discussed earlier, space is both performed and performative. It is never stable, in that space is always open to unexpected moments and movements; realised and potential forms of becoming. Space in such terms can be conceived in relation to the events that perform it. Events constitute turning-points

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3 Laurence J. Silberstein, 'Becoming Israeli/Israeli Becomings', in Ian Buchanan (ed.), *Deleuze and the Contemporary World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 147.
4 Eyal Chowers, *The Political Philosophy of Zionism: Trading Jewish Words for a Hebraic Land* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 115–151. For Chower, the act of building resembles Hiedegger's notion of dwelling, whereby homelessness is the main problem of modernity, with the need to combat this problem through the shared project of building as dwelling.

in the material construction of things.[5] By creatively and constructively running through bodies and states of affairs, events transform and alter relations between corporeal and discursive worlds. In this sense, events are connections, constructions, and experimentation, as they affect territories, bodies, languages, norms, and institutions, 'which they cut and bruise'.[6] Most importantly, events do not have clear beginnings and ends: they always become. I argue that the four 'space-events' discussed in this chapter contributed to Jewish/Israeli and Palestinian becoming – the continuous deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of Palestine and Israel.

1. Towards the colonisation and modernisation of Palestine

Walls and fences were not common features of the Palestinian landscape before the nineteenth century. The only patterns of physical separation were occasional stone walls used to separate farmland and discourage nomads from entering into agricultural areas.[7] The walls of Jerusalem's Old City were perhaps the most significant boundary markers, securing the city from nomadic Bedouin attacks.[8] Until the late nineteenth century, gates were used to control movement in and out the city.[9] Only a small number of people lived outside the walls of the Old City, and this included a limited number of Arab families.[10] Similar to the separative function of medieval walls in Europe, the lowest sections of society, such as lepers, were ostracised beyond the city walls. By the nineteenth century, however, these medieval

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[5] Iain Mackenzie, What Is a Political Event? ', Theory & Event, 11/3 (2008), 1-18.

[6] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: The Athlone Press, 1990) 10.

[7] Fred Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum, 'Agricultural Land-Management Methods and Implements in Ancient Erez Israel', in Fred Skolnik and Michael Berenbaum (eds.), *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Farmington Hills: Thomson Gate 2007), 474-76.

[8] Dror Ze'evi, *An Ottoman Century: The District of Jerusalem* (New York: State University of New York, 1996) 19. Yusuf Natsheh, 'The Architecture of Ottoman Jerusalem', in Sylvia Auld and Robert Hillenbrand (eds.), *Ottoman Jerusalem : The Living City, 1517-1917* (London: Altajir World of Islam Trust, 2000), 601-602.

[9] Muslim visitors were required to undergo identification processes. Non-Muslim travellers were required to pay fees. See Rochelle Davis, 'Ottoman Jerusalem: The Growth of the City Outside the Walls', in Salim Tamari (ed.), *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighbourhoods and Their Fate in the War* (Jerusalem: The Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), 19, Ze'evi, *An Ottoman Century: The District of Jerusalem*, 19.

[10] Ruth Kark and Shimon Landman, 'The Establishment of Muslim Neighbourhoods in Jerusalem Outside the Old City During the Late Ottoman Period', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly,* (1980-1981), 115-19, Davis, 'Ottoman Jerusalem: The Growth of the City Outside the Walls'.

functions gradually disappeared. In particular, walls of Jerusalem gradually lost their functions of separating the Old City from the countryside.[11]

The changing functions of the city walls encouraged new forms of enclosure. The *Tanzimat* reforms (1839–1876) that were introduced to modernise the Ottoman Empire further enabled the introduction of more enclosures and boundary markers on the landscape.[12] One of the most significant developments was the Land Code (1858), which was designed to increase state tax revenues and improve land productivity. The Land Code was the Ottoman counterpart of the British Enclosure Acts discussed in the previous intermezzo; it was a colonising machine that introduced new forms of land appropriation and enabled de/reterritorialisation land and labour power. Similar to the British Enclosure Acts, the Ottoman Land Code created new political, economic and spatial connections and interruptions, and consequently, it produced effects in the social, economic, and political field. For the first time in Ottoman history, individual land titles were created for uncultivated land by regulating and formalising acquisition, tenure and transfer of state land.[13] As a result, Ottoman land was transformed into a disciplinary object that required charting, surveying and registering. Fences were part of this reform movement, and they facilitated decoding and recoding of the land. Ruth Kark suggests that the privatisation of land allowed the development of modern agricultural infrastructure in Palestine such as reservoirs, canals, and fences.[14] Although fencing did not become as common as it was in the context of the British Enclosure Movement, Ottoman land reform effectively

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[11] Nicholas E. Roberts, 'Dividing Jerusalem: British Urban Planning in the Holy City', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 42/4 (2013), 12. Until the nineteenth century, Jerusalem was mostly about the Old City with only few Arab families living outside its walls. The *Tanzimat* reforms (1839–1876) encouraged people to settle outside the city walls. For detailed discussion on the life outside city walls during the Ottoman Empire see Kark and Landman, 'The Establishment of Muslim Neighbourhoods in Jerusalem Outside the Old City During the Late Ottoman Period', 113-35.
[12] The Ottoman Empire governed Palestine from the sixteenth century until 1918. Throughout this period, it did not constitute a distinct administrative unit. *Tanzimat* is considered as the first substantial reform period of the Ottoman Empire. The *Tanzimat* reforms were top-down imperial Westernisation projects initiated by the ruling bureaucratic class. The reforms were intended to foster the ideal of Ottoman citizenship, to abolish traditional tax farming, and to eliminate provincial powerholders. The reforms sought to centralise the power structure of the state, secularise its legal functions, and to establish equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. See Sina Aksin, *Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to the Present* (New York: New York University Press, 2007) 20-30.
[13] Gudrun Kramer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*, trans. Graham Harman and Gudrun Kramer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 81-92.
[14] Ruth Kark, 'Consequences of the Ottoman Land Law: Agrarian and Privatization Processes in Palestine, 1858–1918', in David Kushner (ed.), *The Application of the Tanzimat Reforms in Various Regions of the Ottoman Empire* (in press).

bestowed official recognition on enclosed wasteland and encouraged further enclosure.[15]

The most visible effect of Ottoman land reform was the introduction of new land owners and the dispossession of the previous cultivators. First, along with other *Tanzimat* reforms, the Land Code created specific legal and economic preconditions for the purchase of private land on the open market, which eventually increased Zionist settlement in Palestine.[16] Second, land ownership began shifting to the families of urban *effendis* (absentee landlords) as many peasants and Bedouins were reluctant to register their land due to fear of high taxation. The changes in state recognition of land ownership also caused the rise of the urban elite known as the Notables, which led to a power shift from the countryside to the cities. As a result, similar to the consequences of the British Enclosure Acts, countryside residents became increasingly dependent on urban patrons.[17]

The Ottoman land reform mostly affected the Bedouin tribes and their land rights. Until the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire issued laws and regulations to protect the mobility of nomadic tribes and their livelihoods. Fences were often used to secure their lifestyle and movement, with the Ottoman requirement that farmers mark boundaries of their land with fences or stones if it was located on a Bedouin route.[18] In the course of *Tanzimat*, however, the sedentarisation of Bedouins became a state policy. Ottoman reformists and Western observers saw the Bedouin tribes as untamed, wild and backward, perceiving them as a threat to the modern state structure and an obstacle to productive land use and agricultural development.[19]

The fear of Bedouins became central concern during the British Mandate period. The British continued sedentarisation of these tribes and used fencing as a means of what was referred to as zoning.[20] The British Mandate authorities controlled

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[15] Atilla Aytekin, 'Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire', *Middle Eastern Studies,* 45/6 (2009), 935-51. Traditional patterns of life did not change rapidly, persisting until well into the twentieth century despite the efforts of modernisation. Kramer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel.* 91-92.

[16] Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 23-24.

[17] Kramer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*, 92-95.

[18] Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Washington, D.C.: The University of Washington Press, 2009) 29.

[19] Ibid.10.

[20] This technology was later employed as a new apparatus by the State of Israel to frame the boundaries of citizenship in the context of the enclosure zone *Siyag* (fence). Following the 1948

nomadic movement by fencing off Bedouin pastures and prohibiting Bedouins from entering enclosed areas.[21] Consequently, the Bedouin nomads, very much like the Indians of North America, were increasingly forced to relinquish their way of life as cultivators and herdsmen.[22] They further became the subject of Zionist colonial discourse. By the late nineteenth century, as Ghazi Falah notes, Zionists in Palestine saw Bedouin pastoral nomadism as a 'wasteful system of nomadic grazing' and as 'an obstacle on the Zionist path to the purchase of soil in Palestine' since the Bedouins' claim on the land was as strong as that of non-Bedouin indigenous Arabs.[23] In this way the Bedouin also became subjects of the Judaisation of the land in Palestine.[24]

The act of building walls and fences emerged as one of the most powerful elements of the Judaisation of Palestinian land. By the late nineteenth century Judaisation had become an entrenched part of early Jewish society in Palestine, with the first Zionist Aliyah established in 1882.[25] Judaisation was a colonising assemblage: a deliberate arrangement of living and a distinctive plan that sought to re-arrange and re-create people, materials and actions, and the relations between them. By connecting the discursive and material practices of nationalism, modernity, and architecture with a series of machines such as the military, bureaucracy, the state, the nation, and family, Judaisation sought to de/reterritorialise all social, economic, spatial and political fields in Palestine. It played a central role in Zionism, which has seen Israel-Palestine as an exclusive territory belonging only to Jewish people since

War, approximately eighty to eighty-five percent of Negev Arabs either fled or were expelled. The remaining 11,000 were transferred by the state to this enclosure zone in the northeast of Be'er-Sheva. This area remained under military administration until 1966. The Bedouin Arabs' freedom of movement was severely restricted outside this area. Oren Yiftachel, 'Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State: Land Policies and Indigenous Resistance', in Duanne Champagne and Ismael Abu-Saad (eds.), *Indigenous People between Autonomy and Globalization,* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 31.

21 Ghazi Falah, *The Role of the British Administration in the Sedenterization of the Bedouin Tribes in Northern Palestine, 1918-1948* (Durham: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1983).

22 Ibid., Ghazi Falah, 'Pre-State Jewish Colonisation in Northern Palestine and Its Impact on Local Bedouin Sedentarization, 1914-1948', *Journal of Historical Geogprahy,* 17/3 (1991), 293.

23 Falah, 'Pre-State Jewish Colonisation in Northern Palestine and Its Impact on Local Bedouin Sedentarization, 1914-1948', 293.

24 For further discussion see Yiftachel, 'Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State: Land Policies and Indigenous Resistance', 21-24, Ismael Abu-Saad, 'Spatial Transformation and Indigenous Resistance: The Urbanisation of the Palestinian Bedouin in Southern Israel', *American Behavioral Scientist* 51/12 (2008), 1713-54.

25 Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2006).

its beginnings.26 From the outset, Judaisation as a colonial assemblage has simultaneously de/reterritorialised Palestine by depopulating the land, forming new forms of territorial relations, creating Jewish enclaves, appropriating and populating the land with these enclaves and, finally, by connecting all these transformed elements into an integrated societal model. As Marcelo Svirsky writes:

> [Judaisation] deterritorialises places and sites, draining people and energy from the soil. Then Judaisation invests with human subjects and artefacts: housing, sexual production, forests, routes and roads, *replacing* that which had been drained.27

In short, as a colonising assemblage, Judaisation functioned to capture 'both the earth or geographical surface and the people or their productive activity: it required land as opposed to territory, labour as opposed to free activity'.28 The early Zionist movement in Palestine understood the 'conquest of the land' alongside the 'conquest of labour' as essential elements of this assemblage.29 The 'conquest of the land' did not only refer to the acquisition of ownership – it also required appropriation and transformation of the land in order to create a new form of Jewish life in Palestine. The question is thus how walls and fences functioned in this colonial project? What new connections and interruptions did they activate? What new forms of life did they create in Palestine?

2. Walls of Jewish/Israeli becomings

a. The birth of the Kibbutz: territory without walls

The etymology of the term *kibbutz* owes as much to the collective agency of civil society as it does to the contemporary institution comprising cooperative settlements. The word 'kibbutz' is the congealed status of the verb 'le-kabetz', meaning 'to gather,

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26 Ibid. The first Zionist colony in Palestine was Petah Tikva near Jaffa. It was established as a colonial settlement in 1878.
27 Marcelo Svirsky, *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012) 57-58 [Emphasis in original].
28 Patton, *Deleuze and the Political*, 122.
29 Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*.

collect, assemble'. The attempts to erect communal settlements started in 1909 during the Second Aliyah, and at the beginning they were called 'kvutza' (group).30 These communal settlements, noted by Gershon Shafir, was 'half way solution between the communal orientation and the strong individualist tendency that characterised so many of the immigrants before the First World War'.31 By the Third Aliyah that started to take place by 1919, however, small and closed *kvutzot* were seen as lacking potential to generate a movement and full cooperation in all spheres of life. As a result, in 1919, for the first time, *kvutza* was replaced by the inclusive kibbutz, and the first large kibbutz was established at Ein Harod in 1922. While there was no radical shift between *kvutza* and *kibbutz*, what characterised the later was the 'equalization of living and working conditions'.32 In the *kibbutz*, Shafir argues, 'solidarity derived not from personal bonds but from the common project' and it was this change which furnished communal settlements with an ideological armor, 'viewing it as the Eretz Israeli path to socialism'.33 To put it differently, the cooperativism of *kvutza* was reinterpreted as 'ideologically ground collectivism' and socialism became a central tenet shared by the members of *kibbutz*.34

Envisioned as an exclusively Jewish cooperative and a collective settlement, the communal experiment was the materialisation of the ideals of Zionism and socialism. In fact, the *kibbutz* were acts of creating new forms of connections and conflicts between the land and Jewish people, Jewish settlements and their surroundings, and ultimately between Jewish settlers and native Palestinians. The *kibbutz* formed and conducted simultaneous flows of de/reterritorialisation of the Palestinian land and labour power. It first sought to remove previous life prints from the landscape, and then to create a new Jewish life in Palestine. In its search for the conquest of labour and the conquest of land, this experiment composed its own fixed and fluid practices, territories and functions. It generated and imposed new

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30 The first *kvutza* was Degania founded in 1910. Some regards Degania as the first *kibbutz*. Degania occupies a special place in Israeli imagination in particular because Aaron David Gordon who worked and lived in Degania. Gordon was the chief theorist of Jewish nationalism in Palestine, whose ideas of the relationship between labour and nation inspired Zionist labour movement. According to Henry Near and Daniel Gavron, the first *kibbutz* was born during the Third Aliya. See Henry Near, *The Kibbutz Movement: A History Origins and Growth, 1909-1939 Volume 1* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1992), 15-41, Daniel Gavron, *The Kibbutz: Awakening from Utopia* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000).
31 Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*, 183.
32 Ibid. 183.
33 Ibid. 183.
34 Ibid. 184.

institutional, behavioural, social and economic codes. It aspired to gather all floating Jewish elements in Palestine within a unified whole. What sustained the operation of this colonising machine was its intimate connection to other Zionist machines intended to capture and re-create Palestine.

The *kibbutz* was a bottom-up experiment initiated by its members, who persistently tried to seize control over the planning, structure and organisation of settlements.[35] This settlement experience played an important role in shaping society and institutions not only prior to establishment of the Israeli state, but also during its development.   Shafir argues that the *kibbutz* was 'the decisive organisational innovation', which provided the infrastructure of effective Jewish colonisation, and 'set the core parameters of the Israeli nation and the future state'.[36] At the heart of this colonisation project was ethno-national control over land and labour. Unlike earlier models of the First Aliyah, which relied on Arab labour and settlement plantation, the *kibbutz* sought to monopolise land, settlement, and labour.[37] Svirsky argues that the invention of the *kibbutz* ended the plantation-type settlement and transformed the logic of Jewish settlement into one of ethnic colonisation.[38] This colonising machine was maintained through a very strong notion of Arab exclusion and segregation.[39] Its exclusionist and separatist structure refused a shared life with

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[35] The World Zionist Organization (WZO) retained sole authority to purchase the land, and was responsible for the establishment of settlements, their planning and social organisation. See Galia Bar Or, 'The Initial Phases: A Test Case ', in Galia Bar Or (ed.), *Kibbutz: Architecture without Precendents* (Tel Aviv: Top-Print, 2010), 34-39.

[36] Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*, 146.

[37] Besides economic and political/cultural reasons for 'conquest of labour', the exclusion of Arab labour from the construction or agricultural projects was justified by the notion that such involvement would endanger the transformation of the material world into an exclusively Jewish one. Eyal Chowers, *The Political Philosophy of Zionism: Trading Jewish Words for a Hebraic Land*, 135.

[38] Svirsky, *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine*, 53.

[39] These settlements varied considerably in terms of lifestyle and ideology. For example, Kibbutz Artzi of Hashomer Hatza'ir supported bi-nationalism, facilitated direct contact with the Palestinian Arabs, promoted joint political parties and a common education centre. Unlike many other kibbutzim it did not advocate the expansion of its boundaries. Hashomer Hatza'ir originated as a Zionist youth movement in 1913 in Austria-Hungary. Its members moved to Palestine in the 1920s and founded their own *kibbutzim*. From 1929 until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Hashomer Hatza'ir advocated bi-nationalism and had political partners such as Ihud – a small circle of intellectuals such as Martin Buber, Judah Magnes, and Haim Kalvarisky. However, its members were not completely against the conquest of labour, seeing bi-nationalism not as an end itself, but both a means of realising Zionism and an expression of its own internationalist and socialist values (Beinin, 1990: 28). See Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times* (Haifa: Shikmona, 1970), Near, *The Kibbutz Movement: A History Origins and Growth, 1909-1939 Volume 1*, Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), Joel Beinin, *Was the Red Flag Flying There?Marxist Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Egypt and Israel, 1948-1965* (Berkeley:

Palestinians, and sought an exclusively Jewish life in Palestine. In fact, the *kibbutz* constituted the most homogeneous body of Israeli society: it was mainly composed of Eastern European Jews, and excluded those from the Middle East and North America.[40]

This sterile, exclusively Jewish life was formed and reinforced through spatial disciplinary myths such as the creation of 'something from nothing', 'making the desert bloom' and 'land redemption'. Both Chower and Svirsky argue that while *terra nullius* was central to European colonialism, it was absent in the colonial discourse of Zionism; rather, dispossession and appropriation of the land was justified through ethno-national arguments reinforced by such spatial mythologising.[41] These myths starkly juxtaposed Arab village and Jewish settlement. The performative force of these myths was the construction of the Arab village as congested and lacking in sanitation, and the Jewish settlement as secure, boasting clean facilities and efficient farming techniques. The *kibbutz* in this narrative was associated with progress, civilisation and order, ultimately functioning as justification for occupation of the land. Architect Arieh Sharon's heroic depiction of the *kibbutz* exemplifies such constructions:

> The hard, almost barren soil resulting from centuries of neglect and erosion, the swamps, malaria and shortage of water, were a spur to energy, initiative and perseverance on the part of the enthusiastic youth, and encouraged the creation of the *kibbutz* communities.[42]

The occupied land in Palestine was not perceived as empty, but as mistreated and neglected, the transformation of which would enable the birth of a new form of Jewish

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University of California Press, 1990), Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times*

[40] Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*, 184.

[41] Svirsky, *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine*, 47, Chowers, *The Political Philosophy of Zionism: Trading Jewish Words for a Hebraic Land*, 115-51.

[42] Arieh Sharon, 'Collective Settlements in Israel', *The Town Planning Review,* 25/4 (1955), 261. Arieh Sharon immigrated to Palestine in 1920. Sharon was the head of Government Planning Department after the establishment of the State of Israel and the leader of the first master plan in 1950.

life. The occupied space of the *kibbutz* was therefore perceived as 'the stage, the collective arena of interaction …. It … [was] the space of life itself'.[43]

What made the *kibbutz* a distinctive settlement model was its spatial layout and architectural design. As Deleuze writes, a machine, is 'an assembly of organs and functions that makes something visible and conspicuous'.[44] Indeed, as a colonising machine, from the outset, the *kibbutz* sought to make its 'assembly' – its practice of ideological tenets and its regulation – visible, and to establish a collective life based on this form. This form was instantiated in the architecture of *kibbutz* settlements, based on flexible boundaries and the omission of walls and fences in their initial spatial layout. Such deliberate exclusion of enclosures in the early *kibbutz* design redefined the notion of border in Jewish imaginary; it opened the inside to the outside, constructing continuity between the two, and it established porous boundaries between public and private and urban and rural.[45]

First, the interior design of individual settlements sought to produce collective and connective Jewish bodies, space and time. As a collective experiment that aspired to capture all aspects of the new Jewish life in Palestine, the architectonics of the *kibbutz* not only included planners and architects, but also doctors, teachers and residents. The absence of walls between residential units constituted a central element in establishing a new cooperative socialist life. Such design sought to discipline Jewish migrants through generating new collective work, family and education patterns. Gardens and buildings were planned in accordance with this 'common life' principle.[46] In the words of Richard Kaufman, chief architect of The World Zionist Organisation (WZO):

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[43] Zvi Efrat, 'The Discreet Charm of the Kibbutz', in Galia Bar Or (ed.), *Kibbutz: Architecture without Precedents* (Tel-Aviv: Top-Print, 2010), 123.

[44] Deleuze, *Foucault*, 58.

[45] As will be explained below, this borderless design would gradually change by the mid-1930s with Tower and Stockade settlements. There were differences in the spatial design of the *kibbutzim*, which did not use a unified spatial layout. Here I discuss the most common spatial structure.

[46] The *kibbutz*'s spatial design and architecture was historically dynamic and constantly changing. The initial extreme of the communal ideal was later transformed into the desire for privacy and the construction of separate residential units. See Michael Chyutin and Bracha Chyutin, *Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007) 76.

The desire to create a new society calls for a distinctive architectural expression. Collectivism is the most significant principle of *kibbutz* life, and it must be articulated in *kibbutz* architecture.[47]

The interior design of the *kibbutz* also comprised a unified collective space without fences. The invention of this new form of architectural design overturned territorial demarcation: in its physical manifestation of collectivist ideology it repudiated the linearity in the concept of the border. Architect Zvi Efrat elaborates the invention of the unique architectural style of the *kibbutz*:

Contrary to any known rural, suburban, or urban typology, the type 'kibbutz' did not evolve from an initial point of division into lots; instead, it invented a new indivisible architecture that in principle breaks away from the entire history of territorial demarcation and fencing known to us. This invention facilitates thinking that is textural rather than linear, diffuse rather than contoured, patterned rather than object-oriented, that aims to create a space without borders between the private and the public, and without fences between neighbors. This is a distinctive architecture because it eliminates the common affinity between the house and the plot, between figure and ground; consequently it makes possible the implementation of the kibbutz ideology, which seeks to separate some of the domestic functions, to make them collective, and thus reduce domesticity to a necessary minimum. The private and the public domains are thus de-polarized, and rearrange themselves in a continuum, in a way unknown anywhere else.[48]

Second, designers envisioned the external boundary of the *kibbutz* to function as a space in motion. It was intended that the flexible boundaries of the *kibbutz* would equip it with the ever-present capacity to expand itself. This flexible model was a shift from the earlier *kibbutzim* design, which was reliant on fixed border walls set in the form of a typical German rectangular courtyard.[49] Michael Chyutin and Bracha Chyuyin argue that the organisation of *kibbutzim* was similar to the military forts in the American Wild West.[50] The wall surrounding the settlement marked its

47 Richard Kauffmann, 'Twenty Years of Planning Agricultural Settlements', in *Twenty Years of Construction* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv: Association of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors, 1940), quoted in Yuval Yasky, 'Neither City, nor Village- a Kibbutz', in Galia Bar Or (ed.), *Kibbutz: Architecture without Precedents* (Tel-Aviv: Top-Print, 2010), 91-114. Richard Kauffman was invited to Palestine in 1920. He designed the *moshav* Nahalal in 1921 and the first *kibbutz*, Ein Harod.
48 Zvi Efrat, 'The Discreet Charm of the Kibbutz', in Galia Bar Or (ed.), *Kibbutz: Architecture without Precedents* (Tel-Aviv: Top-Print, 2010), 123.
49 Sharon, 'Collective Settlements in Israel', 265.
50 Chyutin and Chyutin, *Architecture and Utopia: The Israeli Experiment*, 90.

boundaries and served defensive purposes. However, this model was later seen as restrictive for further expansion. Consequently, *kibbutz* members sought ways in which future expansion could be included in the settlement's original plan, so that supplementary building would appear as natural development rather than as patches or mechanical additions.[51] This ideal of expansionism being inherent in the original social and architectural organism required flexible boundaries that opened the inside towards the outside, and called for the abolishment of walls surrounding the settlements. As Samuel Bickels, both an architect and the *kibbutz* member maintains:

> The physical planning of the *kibbutz* has to be dynamic and flexible by its very nature. The *kibbutz* is a large settlement that keeps growing and changing. Just as the *kibbutz* develops from its original nucleus, so too must its planning be nuclear and developing.[52]

Judaisation of the land was aided by this spatial, wall-less layout. While as a form of spatial organisation it did not erase the notions of inside and outside, it nonetheless redefined the relationship between them by enabling continuity between the two. This continuity encouraged the *kibbutz* space to become a flexible and continuously expanding network. The outside was seen and turned into a 'free space always opening to a future [in which] nothing ends'.[53] As a colonising machine, the *kibbutz* redefined the border not as a 'fixed limit but [as] a moving matter' that was always waiting to be emptied, occupied and transformed.[54] The kibbutz was certainly not the only settlement type that enabled the colonisation of Palestine. Other settlement types with different spatial and communal configurations, such as *moshavim*, also played a significant role in the colonising process. What made the *kibbutz* significant, however, was its pivotal role in this process that set the ideological parameters of the future Israeli state.

It has to be noted that expansionism of such settlements occurred together with the increase in extra-legal Jewish migration.[55] During the 1930s a huge number

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[51] Or, 'The Initial Phases: A Test Case ', 38.
[52] Quoted in ibid. 41.
[53] Deleuze, *Foucault*, 74.
[54] Ibid. 96-97.
[55] While in 1919 there were estimated 65.300 Jews living in Palestine, this number increased to 400.000 in 1936. Ronen Shamir, *The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early Mandate Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) x.

of Palestinian peasant families were evicted from their lands as a direct result of British colonial law.[56] However, as Deleuze and Guattari insist, the forces of deterritorialisation are always immanent in any territory. The outside both empowers and resists the movements of territorialisation and deterritorialisation.[57] Indeed, the expansionist ideals of these settlements and the rapidly growing Jewish territorialisation of Palestine activated forces of the Great Revolt (1936–1939). The first organised calls for Palestinian armed resistance took place in the early 1930s following the rise of the Qassamite movement and the formation of small armed bands in the preceding decade. The 1931 Palestinian Conference in Nablus demanded for the first time establishment of a defence organisation and armed struggle.[58] Non-violent forms of resistance also intensified during these years in the forms of strikes, petitions, demonstrations, boycotting of non-Palestinian imports, and social and political non-cooperation with the British authorities.[59] In the course of these events, the Great Revolt not only called for restrictions on Jewish immigration and the regulation of land transfer, but also the end of the British Mandate (1921–1948) and granting of Palestinian independence.[60] The Tower and Stockade settlements emerged in this context as an alternative means of achieving colonisation of the land and constitution of a border.

b. Tower & Stockade (*Homa Umigdal*)

The Tower and Stockade settlements were a response to the Great Revolt. Emerging in a context of continuous Jewish conflict with the indigenous Palestinians, these

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[56] As Ronen Shamir explains, British colonial law was not a passive actor in territorialisation of Palestine. With its advanced web of administrative apparatuses and governmental departments, and a fully developed legal system, British colonial law played a constitutive role not only in Zionist immigration, settlement and land acquisition, but also in Jewish nationalism and its state building project. For detail discussion see ibid. 11-12.

[57] Elizabeth Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001) 64.

[58] Mary Elizabeth King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance* (New York: Nation Books, 2007) 40.

[59] The Palestinian resistance first launched in 1886 after the Ottoman Land Reform discussed above. The first non-violent action was against the Zionist colony of Petah Tikva. It followed by decades of active petitions, riots, demonstrations, boycotts, tax revolts and other forms of civil disobedience both during the Ottoman period and the British Mandate. During the British Mandate these acts increased dramatically. See Mazin B. Qumsiyeh, *Popular Resistance in Palestine : A History of Hope and Empowerment* (London Pluto Press, 2011) 36-76, King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 23-58.

[60] King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 48-58.

147

settlements incorporated walls into their architectural design primarily for reasons of defence (Figure 5). The spatial style of Tower & Stockade was a walled courtyard in which everything around the settlement would be visible to the settlers' omnipresent gaze.[61] These settlements were established in the context of emerging militarism. The Jewish paramilitary organisation Haganah was established in 1920, and the British relied on the organisation during the Great Revolt for unsanctioned actions. By the late 1930s and the 1940s, militant civilian and volunteer activist groups proliferated. The Fosh Fighters, for example, was formed in 1937 and characterised by its communal, emotional, and spontaneous actions, and by its refusal of the authority of Haganah.[62] Uri Ben-Eliezer explains that it was the events of the late 1930s which stimulated constructed Israeli militarism, which continues to shape the Israeli society today.[63]

As a settlement model, Tower and Stockade was reflective of this new form of militarism. It was a movement initiated and executed by civilian volunteers. These settlements were built in the course of a night. In Henry Near's narration of the construction of these settlements, 'idealistic and self-sacrificing' non-settlers delivered by convoy built fortifications at daybreak, surrounded by a prefabricated double-wall filled with gravel, and a central tower with a searchlight to observe and control the surrounding area.[64] The idea of self-defence grounded in the erection of walls and towers was constructed and sustained through biblical references and heroic mythology. Such narratives performed these settlements as foundational fortifications in another episode of the 'conquest of land'. In the words of a *Kibbutz Me'uhad* member:

> [Tower and Stockade settlements were] built on the wall and they that bear burdens … every one with one of his hands wrought in the work, and with the other hand held a weapon …. This image of man which informs our way of life, our self-education, the education of our children … is bound up with the conquest of the soil, of land, and sea – the image of a Jew who knows how to use his strength against violence, to harness his strength in self-defence. We

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[61] Different from *kvutzot* 'Tower and Stockade' settlements were *kibbutzim* or *movhal* settlements.
[62] Fosh Fighters adopted a first-strike approach, ideologically locating themselves between Irgun terror and Haganah's passive defence. See
Uri Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of the Israeli Militarism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998) 23-24.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Near, *The Kibbutz Movement: A History Origins and Growth, 1909-1939 Volume 1*, 323, 315-325.

must develop our inner forces and initiative not only for colonisation … but in order to turn ourselves into defenders.[65]

These heroic constructions hold a mythical place in the Israeli national imagination.[66] The narratives of Tower and Stockade perform the Jewish body as heroic, hard-working, and devoted. The narratives of walls and tower tell a story of how few Jews fought against the hostile and unexpected attacks of many Arabs. These narratives operate as cinematographic images of an impervious safe house protecting settlers by walls and tower against intrusions of the unwelcomed other. These images are cinematographic, in the sense that they remain always in motion: they have been carried into the settlement plans in the 1970s in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and into the present-day justification of the Separation Wall.

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Figure 5: Tower and Stockade Settlement (1938)

As is clear from the security emphasis of their name, the ideological effect of Tower and Stockade settlements was one of seizing surrounding territory from its present inhabitants. Despite their inherent narrative of self-defence, Sharon Rotbard argues, Tower and Stockade settlements were deliberately intended to be offensive in their occupation of Palestinian land, constituting a shift in the Zionist settlement policy and the role of the Jewish farmer in sustaining settlements at the expense of its

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[65] Quoted in ibid. 311. Kibbutz Me'uhad, Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad (The United Kibbutz Movement) founded in 1927 at a conference in Petah Tikvah as a national organisation of *kibbutzim*. During the British mandate, the movement played an important role in the construction of the Tower and Stockade settlements, the organisation of immigration and the struggle for independence. Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad had an expansionist ideology. According to Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad, the location of *kibbutzim* had to be determined by the 'pioneering needs'. Therefore, the first Jewish settlements on the Golan Heights was founded by Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad in order to perform its overarching expansionist and ideology. This ideology envisioned that 'the natural borders of *Erez* Israel are those of the historic homeland of the Jewish people, and this is the area for *aliyah*, settlements, and the realisation of the Zionist program'. Quoted in Jewish Virtual Library, 'Kibbutz Movement', viewed 06 August 2015,
<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0012_0_11103.html>.
[66] See Tamar Katriel and Aliza Shenhar, 'Tower and Stockade: Dialogic Narration in Israeli Settlement Ethos', *Quarterly Journal of Speech,* 76/4 (1990), 359-80.

existing occupants.[67] The Jewish farmer became a fighter, whose role was to conquer increasing acreage. In the mid-1930s 'the ideal of the farmer on his land was overlaid with politically based orientation entailing military strategy and conquest'.[68] They occupied land through establishing 'facts on the ground'. That is why it is not surprising that a massive settlement project commenced after the 1937 Peel Commission partition plan. As a result of the plan, between 1936 and 1947, 118 settlements were built.[69] All using the Tower and Stockade model, these settlements enabled the control of land purchased by the Jewish National Fund, but which had not yet been settled. Such settlements sought to operate as clear signifiers within the territory in which they were built, claiming ownership of the land and the capacity to defend it. As a result, they transformed the Palestinian landscape into a 'battle field, a scene of conflict, and a frontier'.[70]

The Tower and Stockade settlements did indeed created 'facts on the ground' by functioning as an offensive flexible fortification, oxymoronic as a line of enclosures in that they were always open to the outside and the prospect of incorporating further territory.[71] These settlements did not introduce a new type of settlement; they were continuation of earlier model. In fact, they were combination of *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* enabled by the efforts of non-settlers, and did not present a communal life different than other settlements. However, the central ideology of this flexible offensive of enclosures, Rotbard argues, was to create a Jewish continuum that would define the future borders of the state. This continuum took the shape of the letter N traced along the Jordan Valley in the north, to the Jezreel Valley and through the central coastal plain. The function of these settlements was to fill in points on the N-line.[72] Put differently, the N line was defined by points – Jewish enclaves assembled together to compose a line. Each point was assigned a certain

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[67] Sharon Rotbard calls these settlements as 'the settlement offensive'. Sharon Rotbard, 'Wall and Tower', in Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets (eds.), *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism* (Basel: Die Deutsche Bibliothek, 2006), 102-12.

[68] Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of the Israeli Militarism,* 23.

[69] Misha Louvish, 'Stockade and Watchtower', in Fred Skolnik (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Judaica* (19; Farmington Hills: Keter Publishing, 2007), 230. The first 'Tower and Stockade' settlement was Tel Amal built in Jezreel Valley in 1936.

[70] Rotbard, 'Wall and Tower', 109.

[71] As I discuss in the next chapter, the mobile nature of the Separation Wall has strong parallels with this elastic nature of the Tower and Stockade settlements. The concreteness of the Separation Wall creates the illusion of a fixed linear border. However, the constant modifications in its route show that the Wall is not an absolute limit to Israeli expansion into the West Bank.

[72] Rotbard, 'Wall and Tower', 109.

task of appropriating and protecting surrounding territory. Each point utilised walls and towers as the apparatus of colonisation. The erection of walls and towers prevented the British authorities from removing these settlements: once the wall and tower were erected each point transformed into a 'fact on the ground'.

The molar lines of the future state were formed between these points – the walls of each settlement connected one to another to create the N-line. As Eyal Weizman argues, colonisation was made possible not through the movement of linear lines, but by means of founding and joining these strategic points.[73] For the first time, walls and towers in Palestine became the part of a network in the 'punctual system' with flexible lines colonising the territory.[74] The event of Tower and Stockade re-invented walls as colonising machines in the 'matrix of strong points' spread throughout Palestinian territory.[75] The construction of this form of settlement eventually ceased. However, as colonising machines settlements reappeared in alternative forms and the walls of the Tower and Stockade settlements were never turned into a distant memory; instead been repeatedly and consistently reawakened and merged with new assemblages of Jewish/Israeli colonisation.

c. The walls of 'frontier nationalism'

'Frontier nationalism' occurred during the nation-building decade of the 1950s. The period following the establishment of the State of Israel can be characterised by a series of projects that disenfranchised indigenous occupants and colonised Palestinian territory. The borders of the new state – in particular Western Negev, opposite the Gaza Strip, and the boundary with Egypt – were sites that depended on the implementation of such projects. During this period the border was transformed into national territory – partially through armistice agreements, but more importantly through the appropriation of non-state spaces. The border was territorialised through hierarchical and functional distribution of settlements and new immigrants, mostly Mizrahim. The territorialisation of the border, however, was not confined by the

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[73] Eyal Weizman, 'The Geometry of Occupation', *Borders* (Center of Contemporary Culture of Barcelona, 2004, 1st March).
[74] As I discussed in Chapter Two, punctual system made up of points forms molar lines. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* 295-296.
[75] Weizman, 'The Geometry of Occupation'.

practices of the state. It was at the same time activated and sustained by individuals and groups. Very much like Tower and Stockade settlements, the territorialisation of Israel's borders was a mass movement. Referred to by Adriana Kemp as 'frontier nationalism', this mass movement operated by means of the construction of walls and fences as one of its primary apparatuses.

In order to grasp how frontier nationalism functioned and utilised walls and fences, one first needs to perceive the border of the new state not as an empty space waiting to be appropriated, but as a lived space performed by the everyday cross-border movements of Palestinians. The 1949 agreements divided many villages and turned the borders of Israel into a violent geography. As a result of these armistice agreements, 760,000 Palestinians were dispossessed, became illegal in their own land, made refugees or were forced to settle in areas adjacent to Israel's new borders. This mass displacement, however, did not completely halt cross-border movement. Benny Morris observes that between 1948 and 1956 thousands of Palestinians crossed the border into Israel from Jordan's West Bank, the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, and from the Sinai Peninsula, Lebanon and Syria.[76] Many Palestinians continued to cross the border for cultivation, grazing, reclaiming possessions and crops, visiting relatives, resettlement in Israel, and in some cases for theft and robbery.[77]

Although cross-border movement was predominantly motivated by economic and social reasons, the Israeli state depicted the infiltration of Palestinians as a security threat to the new collective Jewish body. According to this adamant narrative, border transgression was not an act of legitimate right to return or an act of reclaiming abandoned land, but rather it was a threat to the settlement activity, property and life of the new nation. Most importantly, cross-border movement was perceived as a threat to the demographic balance of the new state. Consequently, cross-border movement was framed as politically motivated – as a terrorist action against the new state and its Jewish-Israeli population. In the words of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, this threat was an unconditional call to war:

> Every additional Arab in the country increases the danger … one thing is clear – there will be a guerrilla war in our minds and we must accept that fact that this situation will almost always exist. This may lead to war …. It is

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[76] Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 28.
[77] Ibid. 34-68.

impossible to expel them by moralizing … rather, they must be expelled at the point of a gun.[78]

As Michel Foucault argues, the construction of security fabricates, organises and 'plans a milieu in terms of possible elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework'.[79] Indeed, in the context of Israel, the border of the new state was prearranged as a milieu that would render itself as a field of intervention. First, discharged soldiers, new immigrants, youth, teachers, veteran city dwellers, and *kibbutz* members were all called on to defend the border of the new nation and to establish new settlements.[80] Settlers on border towns underwent basic training in the use of firearms. The government established a new border police unit to defend the borders.[81] Second, and most importantly, the government reactivated the pre-state 'punctual system' that I discussed above. Between mid-1948 and mid-1953, 350 new settlements were established mostly on border areas.[82] The settlements were perceived as 'border walls', which could function to prevent infiltration and to invalidate the Palestinian right of return, and in so doing could occupy the border region.[83] These settlements were distributed throughout the country according to the population dispersal plan.[84] Functioning as

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[78] Quoted in Ze'ev Drory, *Israel's Reprisal Policy 1953-1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation* (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 78.

[79] Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, 20.

[80] Adriana Kemp, 'From Politics of Location to Politics of Signification: The Construction of Political Territory in Israel's First Years', *Journal of Area Studies,* 6/12 (1998), 89.

[81] Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War.* 119-121. Other responses of the army included expulsion of border communities and launching military operations on both sides of the armistice line, which did not operate as an external limit to Israel's military operations. Ibid. 124-131.

[82] Ibid. 121. These border settlements were part of discriminatory policies towards new Mizrahim immigrants, discussed below. Mizrahim were not always passive participants of territorialisation of the border. For example, between 1951 and 1956, 2000 families refused to settle on the land (Svirsky, 2014: 78). During the same period, many Mizrahim organised local strikes to protest poverty and high rates of unemployment in these settlements, and to contest disciplinary practices of the Jewish Agency, which interfered in every aspect of their daily lives, including education of their children (Chetrit, 2010: 61-62). Kemp considers these practices as 'acts of disengagement'. However, such protests should not be considered as refusal of Judaisation of the border. These acts directed against the racialised discriminatory policies of the state, and not against the Zionist project of Judaisation of the land. Marcelo Svirsky, *After Israel: Towards Cultural Transformation* (London: Zed Books, 2014a), Sami Shalom Chetrit, *Intra-Jewish Conflict in Israel: White Jews, Black Jews* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010).

[83] Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War*, 122.

[84] Aharon Kellerman, *Society and Settlement: Jewish Land of Israel in the Twentieth Century* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993) 201. For example, Arieh Sharon designed the first national plan (1951), dividing the country into 24 planning regions. The primary goal was to disperse the population away from the Mediterranean seaboard into the country's less-populated

border walls, houses in these settlements were built in a concentrated fashion in order to form a chain.[85] As a result of the cultivation of land in border areas and the construction of fences around settlements, the border *kibbutznik* became performers of the border: they determined where it began and ended. In the words of one border settler, 'To the extent that we retreat, they [i.e. the infiltrators] will push forward in our direction. And if we advance, they perforce will retreat'.[86]

Enclosures became the apparatuses of such acts of territorialisation.[87] First, the *kibbutz* movement lobbied for fences with barbed wire to be constructed around border settlements. Second, in 1955, this call led to a nationwide grassroots volunteer movement named 'Fortification of the Frontier'.[88] This movement was first initiated at the local level by the Jerusalem Workers' Council, which organised volunteers to support efforts for fortification. This local initiative became an organised campaign – 'From the City to the Village' – in the auspices of the Histadrut, the General Federation of Labour, founded in 1920. This campaign called union members to work on frontier settlements. Workers' committees, national unions, and the Teachers' Federation were called upon to organise and coordinate volunteers to work on border fortifications. The Teachers' Federation in particular regarded this campaign as an educational opportunity for students to experience the *kibbutz* lifestyle and the landscape of their purported religious homeland.[89] Finally, the state combined these volunteer movements in the campaign 'Operation Wall'. The government called upon urban youth to contribute their labour. With material and technical support provided by the IDF, hundreds of volunteers built walls and fences around border settlements. In short, the border that was already performed as an administrative and military line was transformed into 'a place for forging national images and representations, an

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regions by directing the movement of new immigrants. Arieh Sharon, *Kibbutz+Bauhaus: An Arhictect's Way in a New Land* (Stuttgart: Kramer Verlag, 1976) 78.

[85] Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War*, 123.

[86] Quoted in ibid.123.

[87] The UN first proposed the construction of a fence. In order to reduce tensions, General Edson Burns, commander of the UN Emergency Force, suggested a fence be constructed along the demarcation line between Israel and Egypt in the area of the Gaza Strip in 1954. In 1957, he approved Israel's proposed plan to unilaterally build a 35-mile fence along the line. This was the first proposed fence in the history of the state. Jerusalem Correspondent, 'Israel May Fence Gaza Border', *The Times,* 04 April 1957.

[88] Moshe Naor, 'The Israeli Vounterring Movement Preceding the 1956 War', *The Israel Affairs,* 16/3 (2010), 434-54.

[89] Ibid.449.

intrinsic aspect of the national socialisation', and a place for reviving the 'pioneering spirit' of Labour Zionism.[90]

The collective act of building enclosures along the new borders of Israel had profound effects beyond its physical territorialisation of the landscape. This collective act blurred distinctions between home and battle-front, citizen and soldier, civilian and combatant, offensive and defensive, legal and extra-legal, and peace and war. The act of building walls and fences became a spectacle of the new Israeli subjectivity and its new mode of being. Erecting walls and fences, as Kemp would argue, 'promoted an image of the new Israeli who was called on to demonstrate unbounded loyalty to guarding boundaries' of the new state.[91] In such terms, the collective and volunteer practices of wall building were the manifestation of the production of a 'nation-in-arms'.[92] Creation of the 'nation-in-arms' required a specific form of militarism in Jewish Israeli society, which took its power from its ability to function below the visibility of legislation and the institutions of state. As Svirsky maintains, this form of militarism constructs itself not necessarily through legislation, but through everyday practices including social and cultural roles established within the Jewish Israeli society.[93] Throughout the 1950s, this form of militarism operated at the new borders of Israel. And the collective act of building walls and fences in this period as apparatuses of the nation-building project performed and facilitated this form of normalised militarism – a form that continues to blur boundaries between civil and military sectors in Israel today.

d. Transit camps: 'gates' to becoming an Israeli

During the period of mass migration to Israel (1948–1957), immigration processing or transit camps were established. These camps were the initial destination for new immigrants, where they registered their personal details, registered for the army, went through medical screening, and temporarily remained until housing arrangements were finalised. The camps were constructed and maintained by the Absorption

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[90] Kemp, 'From Politics of Location to Politics of Signification: The Construction of Political Territory in Israel's First Years', 92-93.
[91] Ibid. 92.
[92] Uri Ben-Eliezer, *The Making of the Israeli Militarism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998) 193-222.
[93] Svirsky, *After Israel: Towards Cultural Transformation*.

155

Department of the Jewish Agency. Although the conditions in these camps were extremely impoverished, they were regarded as the gates to becoming an ideal Israeli.

Opened in 1949, Shaar Haaliya (The Gate of Immigration) was the largest and most significant camp in the history of immigration processing camps in Israel. It had previously been used by the British as a military encampment.[94] The Jewish Agency established it as a processing centre where new immigrants would be registered as Israelis militarily, socially, medically, and symbolically. Although the camp was designed to be a very short-term first destination, with an increasing number of arrivals it rapidly transformed into long-term accommodation. The camp functioned to separate the diasporic Jews from citizens and non-immigrants, and to discipline the new immigrants politically, medically, and culturally in order to integrate them into Israeli society. Nadav Davidovitch and colleagues argue that the camp represented a 'physical manifestation of Israel's melting pot policy'.[95] According to a journalist of the time, the camp was an 'immense assembly line' in the production of the new population.[96] This assembly line aimed to transform the immigrant body from a diaspora Jew into a disease-free Israeli citizen. In explaining this governmental apparatus, the authors of a report published by the Jewish Agency in 1952 wrote:

> The idea for a processing camp came in answer to two problems that the Absorption Department was considering in those days: how to turn the new immigrant into a citizen of Israel in only a few days, and how to protect the Yishuv from diseases that were likely to befall it as a result of this wave of immigration.[97]

Shaar Haaliya was isolated geographically and socially. It was a quarantine: a contained environment that ensured before being released into Israeli society, immigrants would undergo medical examination.[98] In order to complete the process smoothly, and to prevent people entering and exiting the camp at will, it was enclosed by a barbed-wire fence and under police guard. In 1951 the barbed-wire fence was

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[94] Tom Segev, *1943: The First Israelis* (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 118.
[95] Nadav Davidovitch, Rhona Seidelman, and Shifra Shvarts, 'Contested Bodies: Medicine, Public Health, and the Mass Immigration to Israel', in Sandy Sufian and Mark Levine (eds.), *Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel-Palestine* (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 33.
[96] Segev, *1943: The First Israelis*, 119.
[97] Quoted in Rhona Seidelman, 'Conflicts of Quarantine: The Case of Jewish Immigrants to the Jewish State', *American Journal of Public Health,* 102/2 (2012), 248.
[98] Davidovitch, Seidelman, and Shvarts, 'Contested Bodies: Medicine, Public Health, and the Mass Immigration to Israel', 33.

replaced with a wall. The camp's wall was justified on the basis of fear of disease and in order to protect the *yishuv* from epidemics.

As with other processing camps, Shaar Haaliya was informed by Zionist public health discourse and its racial and ethnocentric practices, which created Israel's multiple 'others'.[99] These transit camps were the manifestation of 'Israeli orientalism' and the ways in which it played on Mizrahim bodies.[100] By 1951 the majority of the Shaar Haaliya inhabitants were Mizrahim. These camps are best understood in the context of demographic change in the ethnic composition of the Jewish-Israeli population that mass migration caused. While before 1948 ninety per cent of Jewish immigrants were of European origin, after 1949 half of the immigrant population was comprised of Yemenite, Iraqi, and North African Jews.[101] As a result of this change the proportion of Mizrahim among Israeli Jews increased from twelve per cent in 1948 to thirty-three per cent in 1951.[102] During the first decade of the state of Israel these processing camps operated as disciplinary-governmental machines of the Israeli citizenship assemblage. This assemblage regarded the ideal Israeli citizen as white, healthy, European, and Jewish, and accordingly performed Mizrahim as the 'second other', who needed to be disciplined and transformed.

This assemblage certainly took its power from its discursive constructions that performed new immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East as backward and underdeveloped. Such constructions mimicked typical orientalist fears of race and colour. From the perspective of the dominant Ashkenazi establishment, the 'oriental Jews' could threaten the quality of the population, impair the economy, spread

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[99] Ibid. 126.

[100] Mizrahim is a contested term. It is argued that the term Mizrahim imposes homogeneity among different ethnic groups existed under this label. Therefore, for example, Yehouda Shenhav uses the term 'Arab Jews'. Ehud Ein Gil and Moshe Machover, however, criticise labelling Mizrahim as Arab Jews because, Iranian, Kurdish, Turkish, and South Indian Jews are not Arabs. These debates demonstrate that Mizrahim is a socially constructed term, the meaning of which changes according to the context and the individual. Here I use Mizrahim to refer to the non-Ashkenazim Eastern Jews. Ehud Ein-Gil and Moshe Machover, 'Zionism and Oriental Jews: A Dialectic of Exploitation and Co-Optation', *Race and Class,* 50/3 (2008), 62-76, Yehouda Shenhav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). For detailed discussion on the contested nature of the debate over the meaning of Mizrahim see Harvey E Goldberg and Chen Bram, 'Sephardi/Mizrahi/Arab-Jews: Reflections on Critical Sociology and the Study of Middle Eastern Jewries within the Context of Israeli Society', *Studies in Contemporary Jewry,* 22 (2007), 227-56.

[101] Yinon Cohen, 'From Haven to Heaven: Changing Patterns of Immigration to Israel', in Daniel Levy and Yfaat Weiss (eds.), *Challenging Ethnic Citizenship : German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration* (New York: Berghahn, 2002) 37-40.

[102] Ibid. 37-40.

disease, irrevocably alter *yishuv* culture, and increase crime rates. The 'oriental Jews' were seen as 'unhealthy bodies'.[103] Such constructions performed these new immigrants of African and the Middle East as threats to the European purity and homogeneity of the new state envisioned as modern, secular and Western. An article published in *Haaretz* in 1949 shows us that it was not only Palestinians whose were perceived as a threat to the new state, but also Jews from North Africa:

> The primitiveness of these [North African] people is unsurpassable. They have almost no education at all, and what is worse is their inability to comprehend anything intellectual. As a rule, they are only slightly more advanced than the Arabs, Negroes and Berbers in their countries. It is certainly an even lower level than that of the former Palestinian Arabs. Unlike the Yemenites, they lack roots in Judaism. On the other hand, they are entirely dominated by savage and primitive instincts.[104]

Unlike Palestinians, however, Mizrahim constituted the essential constituent of the new Israel. As Yehouda Shenhav argues, Israeli orientalism exposes the simultaneous operation of Zionism as a colonial and a national project. Zionism presents an ambiguous relation towards its 'Jews of the East', who have been placed in a hybrid and in-between status:

> On the one hand, they were perceived in the Zionist discourse as an integral element of the national community and as the expression of its primordial foundations. On the other hand, they were subjected to a colonial epistemology, and within this epistemology, they were orientalised and racialized.[105]

Hence, rather than excluding Mizrahim, the Zionist project aimed to include this 'ambiguous non-Ashkenazi other' by transforming it into a liberal European subject stripped of its oriental past. Inclusion of the Eastern Jews into the mainstream Ashkenazi establishment through the practices of modernisation and secularisation became central to Judaisation of the new state. Mizrahim was a necessary organ in the new Israeli body which performed the creation of a healthy and strong Israeli population as a political, scientific, and biological problem. The desire to incorporate

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[103] Seidelman, 'Conflicts of Quarantine: The Case of Jewish Immigrants to the Jewish State', 243-52.
[104] For the full text of the article see Segev, *1943: The First Israelis*, 159-61.
[105] Shenhav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity*, 192.
See also Ella Shohat, 'The Invention of the Mizrahim', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 29/1 (1999), 5-20.

Mizrahim into the new Israeli subjectivity transformed the body of Mizrahim into a site of biopolitical inscription, and hence called for two complex sets of mechanisms that worked at the levels of the individual body and the Israeli population as a whole: 'the body-organism-discipline-institutions mechanism' and 'the population-biological-regulatory mechanisms'.[106] Considered in this Foucauldian manner, transit camps constituted one of the material manifestations of these mechanisms of the new state.[107]

It would be, however, wrong to perceive these transit camps simply within the terms of their disciplinary-governmental functions. These camps were heterotopic spaces with its entanglement of life-lines. Mizrahim immigrants persistently traversed the disciplinary-sedentary lines of these camps. The Walls of Shaar Haaliya, for example, did not prevent movement in and out of the camp: it rather populated by immigrants and their relatives, contractors, factory-owners, cheap labourers, money-changers, black marketers, thieves and prostitutes – that quickly expanded and deepened commercial and social relations with local communities. The camp space as a lived space was performed by everyday activities of defiance and opposition to its disciplinary and regulatory practices.[108] There were frequent occurrences of protests since the first days of the camp.[109] More importantly, walls of the camp played a role in making the camp space neither Israeli nor diasporic, but instead a heterotopic place in which past and present co-exist. In their discussion of 'minor' Mizrahim literature, Piera Rosetto and Hannah Hever reveal the extent to which these camps acted as a spatial continuum between immigrants' birth places and Israel, becoming 'minor spaces'.[110] Mizrahim frequently continue to live with their ethnic traditions, and in doing so, they create minor spaces within the cramped spaces of camps and they defied the imposed dichotomy between Jewish and Arab space. Hever argues that such spaces did not 'require an exilic-Ashkenazi otherness, nor … [did] it need Arabness as an Oriental otherness. It … [did] not have to erase and suppress

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[106] Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*, 250.

[107] Other manifestations of these mechanisms included land distribution, and education, such as development of a separate curriculum for Mizrahim and establishment of boarding schools for Mizrahim children. Chetrit, *Intra-Jewish Conflict in Israel: White Jews, Black Jews*, 43-62.

[108] See Segev, *1943: The First Israelis*, 118-30.

[109] For detailed accounts of camp protests see Chetrit, *Intra-Jewish Conflict in Israel: White Jews, Black Jews*, 58-62.

[110] Piera Rosetto, 'Space of Transit, Place of Memory: Ma'abarah and Literary Landscapes of Arab Jews', *Quest: Issues in Contemporary Jewish History,* 4 (2012), Hannah Hever, 'We Have Not Arrived from the Sea: A Mizrahi Literary Geography', *Social Identities,* 10/1 (2004), 31-51.

the "there" in order to characterise and define the "here"".[111] Rather, camps as 'minor spaces' created hybrid bodies.

Neither utopian nor dystopian, these camp sites enabled the 'invention of missing people' – the performance of Mizrahi as a hybrid political, cultural and social body within the new Israeli collective. Development of both Shaar Haaliya *ma'abarot* – temporary camps that functioned from 1951 onwards – did not alter the preponderance of Mizrahim as the major new immigrant group. While *ma'abarot* settlements were not surrounded by fences, they were too isolated and poverty-stricken. Both Shaar Haaliya and *ma'abarot* as cramped spaces gave rise to Mizrahim minor politics. These spaces contributed to the formation of new Mizrahim subjectivities that refused their cultural and economic oppression and orientalist categorisations. The first organised riots, Wadi A-Salib riots (1959), the tent movement of the 1970s, and the proliferation of groups such as the Black Panthers (1971), the religiously conservative Shas (1984), and the recent emergence of the Mizrahim Democratic Coalition have all posed challenges to the Eurocentric scripts of the Jewish-Israeli self that have underpinned the Zionist project since its beginnings. Despite vast ideological differences, all these protest groups have not only demanded social and economic equality, but they have also rejected the orientalist scripts of Zionism that aimed to erase all differences.[112] And they have all

[111] Hever, 'We Have Not Arrived from the Sea: A Mizrahi Literary Geography', 50.

[112] Detailed discussion of Mizrahim politics is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, relevant to this discussion is that Mizrahim politics encapsulates political agendas across the political spectrum. Other than the Mizrahim Democratic Coalition, the significance of the groups listed above was the discriminatory practices of the state. Even those on the left, e.g., the Blank Panthers, did not question Zionism nor aim to include the Palestinian struggle fully in their discourse. I therefore want to distinguish the Mizrahim Democratic Coalition from earlier groups like the Blank Panthers. The Mizrahim Democratic Coalition was founded in 1996 by a group of intellectuals and thinkers such as Yehouda Shenhav, who rejects the Zionist project. While their fields of activity, in particular the Land and Housing campaign, do not engage with the Palestinian question, the Coalition aims to 'bring about a meaningful change among the Israeli society and implement values of democracy, human rights, social justice, equality and multi cultures' inclusive of Palestinians. Since the 1970s the extreme anti-Palestinian ideology of Zionist parties has found strong support among the Mizrahi electorate. During the 1977 elections, Mizrahim enabled the victory of Menachem Begin, the founder of Likud. Tamar Hermann observes that the overly Western orientation of peace movements in Israel, which is usually represented by upper middle-class and secular Ashkenazis, created an unbridgeable gap between the peace movement and the Mizrahi sector. Mizrahim feel represented in the traditional-orthodox camp and its hawkish policies towards the Palestinians. Mizrahim also tend to support settlements in the West Bank due to cheap housing (Hermann, 2009: 48-51). Similarly, Smadar Lavie (2014) argues that the main reason for the Mizrahim support of right-wing political parties is the role of the Zionist left in the intra-Jewish racial formations in Israel. Tamar S. Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Smadar Lavie, *Wrapped in the Flag of Israel: Mizrahi Single Mothers and Bureaucratic Torture* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014). For more information of Mizrahim Democratic Coalition see Hakeshet Hademocratit Hamizrahit, viewed 28 October 2014,

created disparate Israeli subjectivities that continue to perform new paths of Israeli becoming.

3. The post-1967 era

These four space-events are not an exclusive list of transformations activated by walls and fences in Palestine: the landscape of Palestine has been continuously riven by the construction of walls and fences. After the 1967 war, Israel initiated a chain of fortifications on different fronts of the occupied territories. The Bar-Lev Line, for example, was built along the east coast of the Suez Canal after Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula. With this chain Israel sought to establish a defensive line along the outermost edge of the territories and, to connect dispersed points in order to create a complete territorial unit.[113] During the same period a different front – the border with Lebanon – also became a new object of concern for Israeli officials due to Palestinian *fedayeen* incursions from South Lebanon. When the Lebanese civil war began in 1976 the 'Good Fence' was established and remained active until 2000.[114] With the 1982 War with Lebanon, Israel built electrified fences, anti-personal minefields, and patrol roads along the border.[115]

Walls and fences continued to shape Israel and Palestine during the 1990s with the shift to separation discourse that developed with the *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements* (13 September 1993) signed with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the *Gaza–Jericho Agreement* (4 May 1994), and the *Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (28 September 1995).[116] In accordance with Article 23 of the *Gaza–Jericho Agreement*,

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<http://www.ha-keshet.org.il/english/english_index.html>. For detailed discussion of Mizrahim Democratic Coalition see Tilde Rosmer, 'Israel's Middle Eastern Jewish Intellectuals: Identity and Discourse', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* 41/1 (2014), 62-78.

[113] Eyal Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verson, 2007).57.

[114] As part of its 'Good fence' policy, the Israeli government established a number of gates along the heavily guarded fence in order to allow South Lebanon residents to access medical care and employment in Israel.

[115] Due to topographical difficulties the fence did not follow the precise 1923/1949 borderline. The IDF created a new military line called the 'Purple line'. David Eshel, 'The Israel-Lebanon Enigma', *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin,* (2001), 80.

[116] These agreements led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and the withdrawal of the Israeli military forces from eighty per cent of the Gaza Strip in 1994.The Oslo II Accords designed three types of territories in the West Bank; Area A is under the Palestinian civil and security control; Area B falls under Palestinian civil control but Israeli security control; and Area C is under full Israeli civil and security control. According to Neve Gordon, the Oslo period caused a shift from the 'colonisation principle' to the 'separation and partition' principle, which was

a sixty-kilometre fence was erected.[117] In addition, the notion of constructing a separation barrier along the West Bank developed soon after violent terrorist attacks in Tel-Aviv in October 1994 and Beit Lid in January 1995. The Rabin government, formed in July 1992, regarded the prospect of enclosing the West Bank as 'an intermingling of tens of thousands of Israelis and Arabs without a clear line of demarcation'.[118] Consequently, the government proposed absolute separation between Israelis and Palestinians in the territories not merely intermittently 'when there [was] a closure … but rather as a world view'.[119] In April 1995, Moshe Shahal, the Minister of Police, offered a 'separation sphere' that would allow Palestinians to enter into Israel only with permits through eight new checkpoints.[120] At the checkpoints movement would be monitored by police patrols and electronic surveillance devices, and bordered by an electronic fence. Separation fence proposals largely disappeared during Shimon Peres's government (1995–1996) and his successor, Benjamin Netanyahu's tenure as prime minister (1996–1999).

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accelerated after the Al-Aqsa Intifada and evident in construction of the Separation Wall. In those terms, separation has never meant Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. Rather it functioned to maintain a direct and indirect control over the resources of the territories. I agree with Gordon that the separation principle dominated the 1990s, but I do not agree that it differs markedly from the colonisation principle. The genealogy of the contemporary colonisation practices presented in this chapter suggests that both principles sustain each other at both macro and micro levels. Gordon, *Israel's Occupation*, 197-222.

[117] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994*, viewed 12 November 2009, MFA, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Agreem ent%20on%20Gaza%20Strip%20and%20Jericho%20Area>. This fence was dismantled by Palestinians during the Al-Aqsa Intifada and was rebuilt in a more sophisticated fashion in 2001 by the Israeli government.

[118] The first enclosure was introduced in 1991 during the Gulf War. This became institutionalised in 1993 through the permit regime and permanent checkpoints on the Green Line. In March 1993, the entire municipality of East Jerusalem became no-entry Israeli territory requiring a permit to enter. Amira Hass argues that the 'closure' policy was first introduced temporarily as a military-bureaucratic pre-emptive security measure. However, since 1993, the policy has become a political goal used as a disciplinary tool to control every aspect of Palestinian social, economic and political life. See Amira Hass, 'Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 31/2, 2002, 5-20 Sara Roy, *Failing Peace, Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), Avram Bornstein, 'Military Occupation as Carceral Society, Prisons, Checkpoints and Walls in the Israeli-Palestinian Struggle', *Social Analysis,* 52/2 (2008), 106-30.

[119] Yitzhak Rabin, 'Remarks by Prime Minister Rabin on Israel Television, 23 January 1995', in *Historical Documents,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, viewed 10 June 2012, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%20 1947/1995-1996/Remarks%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Rabin%20on%20Israel%20Television>.

[120] Israeli Government, 'Cabinet Communiqué on the closure of the areas, 29 January 1995**',** in *Historical Documents,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, viewed 10 June 2012, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%20 1947/1995-1996/Cabinet%20Communique%20on%20the%20closure%20of%20the%20areas>.

The notion of constructing a fence was revived during Ehud Barak's government in 1999. Following the footsteps of Rabin, Barak saw physical separation as a basic need for Israel's political, security and moral interests in its war against terror. He perceived physical separation as a demographic necessity for preservation of the Jewishness of the state.[121] In his view, separation did not mean 'absolute detachment' from the OPT, but a 'broad economic cooperation, sharing of know-how and raw materials, and some Palestinians working in Israel'.[122] Barak proposed construction of a fence in September 1999 as part of his 'security separation plan'.[123] After the Camp David Summit in 2000, Barak's Deputy Defence Minister Ephraim Sneh proposed a 'double fence': one on the Green Line and the other inside the West Bank.[124] The construction of the Separation Wall, however, was launched in 2002 by the Sharon government as a response to the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

The Separation Wall project was followed by construction of a fence on the Egypt border in 2010 after the number of undocumented immigrants from Egypt increased dramatically. The Israeli government passed legislation in an attempt to halt the movement.[125] Construction of the barrier commenced in November 2010 and was completed in 2013. Finally, in 2012 Israel began construction of the Metula Wall

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[121] Knesset, *Ehud Barak's Plan for a Better Israel*, The Election Platform for the 15th Knesset, viewed 10 June 2012, <http://knesset. gov.il/elections/eindex.html>.

[122] Ehud Barak, 'Remarks by Prime Minister Barak to the Israel Policy Forum, New York, 20 November 1999', in *Historical Documents,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel (1999-2001), viewed 10 June 2012, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1999-2001/51%20Remarks%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20Israel%20P>.

[123] Before the Camp David Summit in July 2000, Barak stated that a fence between Palestinians and Israelis would contribute to the independent Palestinian 'identity, development and free choice'. He suggested that a fence could offer the means for Palestinians to 'control their own economy, value their own currency, and determine their own markets'. For Barak, a fence could help Israel to control the Palestinian movement from the West Bank, and could thereby institutionalise the management of movement that was currently conducted on a de-facto basis under the closure policy since 1993. Ehud Barak, 'Statement by Prime Minister Barak regarding the Camp David Summit, 10 July 2000', in, *Historical Documents,* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, viewed 10 June 2012, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1999-2001/141%20%20Statement%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20regarding%20t>.

[124] According to the proposal, the first fence was intended to be constructed on the Green Line working as a security fence and the second inside the West Bank functioning as a political fence, which would set the basis of future border negotiations. The exact route was not published. The construction was initiated in areas such as Tulkarem and Qalqilya in the North. Construction was halted with the change in government. Shaul Arieli, Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, 23 June 2011.

[125] Resolution No. 1506, 14 March 2010, *Constructing a barrier on Israel's Western border*; Gilad Natan, 'National Programme to Meet the Problem of Infiltrators and Asylum Seekers Entering Israel across the Egyptian Border', (Jerusalem: The Knesset, Research and Information Center, 2011).

on the Lebanon armistice line.[126] With this surfeit of walls and fences, perhaps Israel is now one of the world's most-walled countries.

4. Conclusion

Marcelo Svirsky argues that walls constitute the 'final silhouette' of the Jewish/Israeli collective body.[127] In this chapter, however, I have suggested that rather than giving 'a final silhouette' to an already performed collective body, the act of building walls in Palestine has enabled, defined, and redefined the Jewish/Israeli becoming. I have shown how walls and fences have constituted a central place in the imagination and the production of Israel and Palestine and how they enabled the colonisation of Palestinian land. By exploring the role walls and fences played in the geohistory of Palestine – its deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation – I have argued that walls and fences were not static boundary markers: they continuously moved, and in each movement they created turning points in the construction of new borders.

The significance of the genealogy presented here is twofold. First, I have sought to demonstrate that the construction of walls and fences in Palestine was more than top-down state practice. Macropolitics and micropolitics operated in conjunction in transformations of Palestine. What sustained and continues to sustain the perseverance of walls and fences in the Palestinian landscape are the socio-political actions operating beneath and apart from state practices. Second, by applying a genealogical approach my aim has been to challenge arguments that the Separation Wall is the product of Israel's occupation of the West Bank. In exploring repeating walls in Palestine, I have sought to establish the foundational argument for the next chapter: the present day wall cannot be understood without appreciating the long history of the colonisation of Palestine. Therefore, we should not see the Separation Wall as the product of 1967; rather, we need to consider it as an organ of the Zionist body that began to evolve in the late nineteenth-century. In these terms, I argue that the contemporary wall in the West Bank is not as contemporary as it at first appears; instead, it is the continuity of the forces of de/reterritorialisation in Palestine. With

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[126] Construction commenced in 2001, when Israel began erecting a new electrified fence along the border after its withdrawal from the self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon. This fence was dismantled by protestors during the May 2011 commemoration of Nakba Day.

[127] Svirsky, *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine*, 58.

this preparatory argument I will explore in the next chapter the heterotopic functioning of the Wall: how it works and what it performs in Israel and Palestine today, and how it activates new movements and moments of Palestinian and Israeli becoming.

CHAPTER 4

HETEROTOPIA ON THE NON-BORDER: THE SEPERATION WALL

The years 2001 and 2002 witnessed a number of tragic events in Israel and Palestine. On the first of June 2001, twenty-one people were killed in a suicide bombing outside the Dolphinarium discotheque in Tel Aviv. It was a day of national trauma. The Dolphinarium tragedy occurred at the height of the Second Intifada (hereafter referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada), reviving proposals for unilateral separation. Immediately after the attacks, *Knesset* Labour Member Haim Ramon proposed construction of a border wall.[1] In August 2001, four *Knesset* members of divergent political persuasion began working collaboratively to mobilise a public movement for unilateral separation from Palestinian Authority (PA)-controlled areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[2] One month after the Dolphinarium tragedy, Larry Derfner wrote in Jerusalem Post:

> Many Israelis today are dreaming of walls – hundreds kilometres of walls, with electrified fence, sensors, guard dogs, mines and alert border guards – to separate them from the one million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and two million in the West Bank. The plan is called 'unilateral separation'.[3]

In July 2001, the Defence Cabinet accepted the Steering Committee's recommendations on the construction of a barrier in purportedly high risk areas.[4] By the end of that year, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared his war on terror. In March 2002, Israel launched its largest military operation in the West Bank since 1967,

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[1] The proposal was rejected by Defence Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and other ministers. They all argued that the fence would not stop terror – it would instead simply be perceived by the public as a political border of the future state of Palestine. Ben-Eliezer proposed a 'security zone'. Gil Hoffman, 'Former Generals in Labor Oppose Ramon Separation Plan', *Jerusalem Post,* 12 June 2001, Gil Hoffman, 'Peres: Settlements Already Frozen', *Jerusalem Post,* 26 June 2001.
[2] Hannah Kim, 'Ramon: Unilateral Separation Movement to Be Set up in Sept', *Haaretz,* 17 Agusut 2001.
[3] Larry Derfner, 'The Separation Option', *Jerusalem Post,* 10 August 2001.
[4] Ibid.

Operation Defensive Shield, which transformed many West Bank towns and villages into war zones. Same year in April, the Defence Cabinet decided to begin the construction of a wall stretching from the Salem checkpoint in the north to Kfar Qassam in the south, and also at two sections around Jerusalem. Finally, in 2002 Sharon announced his endorsement of the construction of a wall:

> I cannot stand the pressure of public opinion desperate for the *Golden Calf* of a fence and a wall, I'm in effect giving up the principles of my policies, and granting Arafat, in direct response to the intolerable, unceasing terror he uses against me – and without any political agreement – an immeasurable strategic achievement. And I'm doing it even though deep in my heart I know that a separation wall cannot solve the terrorism problem, just as the Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal did not prevent the casualties during the war of attrition, nor ultimately prevent the Yom Kippur War.[5]

The construction of the Wall began in the same year.

It has been over a decade since construction began. This project was launched as part of three-pronged scheme including war against terror, security separation, and final-status agreements to be held at some time in the future – a scheme that has never been completed.[6] The construction of the Wall has never been finalised. It shifted and took different shapes with different political and security interests. Some parts were dismantled and other sections were rebuilt. The Wall has never turned into a 'political border' understood as a delimiting line between two sovereign entities. In fact, since its first days, the Israeli government has repeatedly emphasised the 'non-border' aspect of the Wall. From the Israeli perspective, the Wall operates as a security apparatus, but not as a line marking a national political border or limiting the movement of the Israeli state and the expansion of Jewish settlements into the West Bank. For Israelis the Wall is a non-border that functions as a border only for Palestinians.

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[5] Israel Harely, 'Sharon Grants Victory to Arafat', *Haaretz,* 13 June 2002.
[6] In May 2002, the government released two schemes. The first scheme was about 'unilateral security separation' and creating physical barriers. This plan foresaw to leave the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and all of the settlements in place. The 'security fence' was part of this scheme. The second scheme was 'unilateral political separation'. This plan proposed to block Palestinians entry into Israel and to evacuate some settlements on the western side of the fence. The Israeli government continuously emphasises the strategic rationale behind the Wall with aim to maintain that it would not be perceived by the Israeli public as a political border.

This chapter discusses the politics of the multiple lines of the Wall and argues that the entanglement of Wall's molar and molecular lines and lines of flight create a heterotopia. This analysis is inspired by Eyal Weizman's Deleuzian description of the Wall as a rhizome. In his ground-breaking works, Weizman engages with movement of the Wall and presents how the Wall operates as an elastic frontier with multiple and non-hierarchical entry and exit points.[7] Most importantly, Weizman maintains that the Wall as an apparatus of the Israeli occupation constitutes 'heterogeneous assemblages of interconnected systems of fortification and architectural constructions that are operated by a multiplicity of institutions'.[8] I do agree with Weizman's description of the Wall. As I will discuss in the first section of this chapter, the colonising lines of the Wall, which function as a complex network, do not separate, but instead connect and reproduces regimes of the Israeli state within a heterogeneous Zionist assemblage. However, I take his analysis one step further to reveal the smooth space of the Wall that Weizman largely fails to take into account. In this chapter I discuss Wall's middle lines and lines of flight, and consider the extent to which Wall's excess challenges hierarchical relations and organisations that have been historically functioned to imprison and colonise social and national bodies and territories in Israel and Palestine. In my discussion of both macropolitics and micropolitics of the Wall, I argue that the Wall forms a heterotopic space. In this space everything changes with the simultaneous movement of multiple lines. While lines of contestation and disturbances activate potential movements for positive transformations, forces of established molar formations continue to operate through the partition and colonisation of space.

In revealing Wall's multiple lines my inspiration is thus the possibility of change immanent to any territory. Drawing on this notion, I begin with the argument that the Wall is not a fixed or an end project. Walls are not static constructions: they change functions depending on the lines along which they operate. In so arguing, my aim in this chapter is to narrate the Wall in a manner that does not limit itself to analysis of the Israeli regime of control and its 'abject reterritorialisation' – a regime that transforms Palestinian existence into bare life. My search for the multiple lines of the Wall thus commences with discussion of Wall's colonising function. This first

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[7] Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*, 161-84. Eyal Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence for Arendt to Gaza* (London: Verso, 2011) 65-98.

[8] Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence for Arendt to Gaza*, 80.

section presents how the Wall aims to capture the Palestinian movement. I continue with interrogation of Wall's immunising function and its operation beneath the state. The purpose here is to shift attention from state-centric analysis to the discussion of molecular movements that create and sustain the existence of the Wall. This is followed by discussion of other lines of the Wall: the creative, mobile, experimental movements against the Wall which call for a new life in Israel and Palestine.

1. Colonising lines of the Wall

It is a warm, July day. I am visiting Al Quds University in Abu Dis, East Jerusalem – perhaps the only university in the world cut in two by a giant, snake-shaped wall. Its shadow imparts a sense of entrapment and enclosure. I ask myself whether such a strange place has an exit. A couple of Palestinian students are approaching me. I hesitantly ask them how they feel about the Wall and how it affects their everyday lives. It is the everydayness of the Wall I want to understand: what does it mean living with a wall? Students tell me how they feel suffocated. Those who do not have Jerusalem identity cards shout: 'we cannot go anywhere; we cannot move'. After this discussion I am due to meet with an academic who has been working at the university for many years. Without my asking him any questions, he tells me directly: 'we cannot separate the social from the political or vice versa …. This wall affects every aspect of life. It destroys life'. When he talks of his personal experiences of checkpoints, road closures, and permits, he persistently repeats the word 'uncertainty'. He explains that he cannot estimate the time when he could arrive home or work, because there could be roadblocks. He contests one of the names of the Wall, 'security fence': 'I don't know what security means. This is a game. You are not free. [Because] you are not sure of anything'. I later realise that he had been explaining to me the politics of mundanity in the imposition of the Wall on everyday life: the story of its uncertainty and how uncertainty forces itself into the everyday.

The Wall and the systematic production of its uncertainty seek to capture and shape every day of every Palestinian: how they get up in the morning, how they have their breakfast, how they drive, how they get married and with whom, how they visit their friends and relatives, how they get sick and when, how they reach the hospital, how they eat and what they eat, how they breathe, and how they die. The Wall's

power repeats itself every day in a different form: in the form of permits, roadblocks, checkpoints, and in other minor walls and fences that are dispersed everywhere in the West Bank. And the Wall's movement does not only control – it also initiates different forms of subjectivities. The Wall forms new spaces, new movements, new legal statuses, new borders and conflicts.

The Wall is thus more than an enclosure entrapping Palestinians within a defined space. It is a colonising network itself. It creates new connections, codes, and discontinuities within a flow and with other flows. The Wall creates its own fixed and fluid elements, statements, and functions. It creates and conducts simultaneous flows of relative deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The Wall first empties Palestinian land in order to occupy it. It then captures that land, its people and resources, and imposes its own behavioural, legal, and institutional codes. These codes are made up of ever-shifting heterogeneous elements. They do not form a uniform system – they are 'disparate rationalities, mechanisms of power, whose heterogeneity reinforces the overall effectiveness and perseverance'.[9] The effect of this production is to:

> [narrow] the land and [disable] the possibility of forming a political [Palestinian] community. What thus emerges is a mode of controlling the space and the population inhabiting it by controlling the temporality and continuity of the movement within it.[10]

However, this movement should not be understood as bodies relocating from one point to another. It should be conceived in terms of the movement of continuously shrinking Palestinian territory now divided into unconnected segments; the movement of the mental and corporeal space of Israel 'proper'; and the movement of Israeli and Palestinian social, cultural, and political institutions and their constantly changing relations and connections with each other.[11]

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[9] Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi, 'Introduction', in Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (eds.), *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion : Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 22.

[10] Hagar Kotef, *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governance of Mobility* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015) 21.

[11] The notion of Israel 'proper' refers to the borders of the State of Israel according to the 1949 Armistice lines – the Green Line. Throughout the text I use quotation marks to highlight that the notion of 'proper' is based on national amnesia that forgets the violent past of the Green Line.

Furthermore, the Wall creates new machines and is connected to other machines:

> every machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is concerned, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it. This is the law of the production of production.[12]

The Wall is thus a network of a network that forms and connects machines as points of a network: it is an entity that multiplies itself. It is connected to statistical machines, demography, territorial, and legal and security machines. It connects and improves already established institutional and strategic control mechanisms including checkpoints, permit regimes, bypass roads, and road blocks. And finally all of these diverse heterogeneous elements are connected to the Zionist machine.

The colonising lines of the Wall comprise movements of new forms of territorial inclusion and exclusion by constantly altering its route. During the first years of its construction, the Wall annexed sixteen Palestinian villages in the West Bank.[13] As of July 2014, however, it incorporates sixty-five out of 150 Jewish settlements into Israel 'proper'. Approximately eighty-five per cent of the Wall runs inside the West Bank, annexing approximately 30,261 dunams of land, of which eighty-eight per cent belongs to the West Bank Palestinians (Figure 6).[14] The fence

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'Proper' is the signifier of political discourse that accepts pre-1967 borders of Israel as acceptable and as separate from the territories.

[12] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia* trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press, 1983) 36.

[13] On 14 August 2002, the Defence Cabinet approved the final route for the first stage of the construction. This stage included ninety-six kilometres between Salem and Elqana and another twenty kilometres in the Jerusalem Envelope. In early December 2002, the Cabinet approved the route for the second stage, which stretches east from Salem along the Green Line and then south from Al-Mutilla to Tayasir. In July 2003, work on the first stage was completed in most areas. The High Court of Justice, HaMoked: Center for the Defence of the Individual v. The Government of Israel et. al., Petition for Order Nisi and Interlocutory Order, HCJ 9961/03, Jerusalem, 6 November 2003, viewed 02 February 2015, < http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/3820_eng.pdf>.

[14] As of July 2014, concrete sections constitute roughly fifteen per cent of the constructed length of the barrier. B'Tselem, 'Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank', (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2012), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), '10 Years since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office', (Jerusalem: OCHA, 2014).
viewed 13 September 2014,
<http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_10_years_barrier_report_english.pdf>, Shaul Arieli, Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, 23 June 2011.

is a multi-layered system comprising three sets of fences, patrol roads, and an adjacent smoothed strip of sand. According to Shaul Arieli and Israel Kimhi, the fence section of the Wall is more problematic than the concrete section as it requires annexation of more land in the West Bank.[15] Arieli explains that this system requires approximately fifty to sixty kilometres in width, whereas the concrete wall is just eight metres wide.[16] With its current route and design, the Wall entraps around 11,000 Palestinians living in thirty-two communities between the Wall and the Green Line, making them dependent on permits or special arrangements to continue living in their homes.[17]

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Figure 6: Map of the Wall (2014)

Source: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office', (Jerusalem: OCHA, July 2014).

In East Jerusalem, the Wall introduces a creative form of territoriality: it creates simultaneous territorial inclusion and exclusion (Figure 7).[18] On the one hand, the Wall surrounds and incorporates some of the Jewish settlements into the Israeli side.[19] In doing so, the Wall draws 164 square kilometres of the West Bank territory into metropolitan Jerusalem.[20] On the other hand, the Wall excludes some Palestinian populated areas perceived as 'problematic'. These areas include Kafr' Aqab, the Shu'afat refugee camp, Ras Khamis, Ras Shahada, and Dahyat A-Salam. The Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli police refuse to deliver basic services to these

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[15] Israel Kimhi, Interview with the author, The Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, Jerusalem, 14 June 2011, Shaul Arieli, Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, 23 June 2011.

[16] Arieli, Interview with the author.

[17] OCHA, '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office'.

[18] The route for the 'Jerusalem envelope' was approved by the Israeli government on 10 July 2005. For details see Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF), 'Cabinet Communique', (Jerusalem: MOF, 2005), viewed 08 June 2012, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2005/pages/cabinet%20communique%2010-jul-2005.aspx>.

[19] These settlements are Givat Ze'ev area in the northwest, Maaleh Adumim in the east, and Gush Etziyon bloc in the southwest.

[20] Before 1967, the six and a half square kilometres constituting East Jerusalem was under Jordanian rule. Israel annexed 64 and a half square kilometres, most of which belonged to twenty-eight villages in the West Bank. Such encroachments have captured over 210 square kilometres to Jerusalem. Ir Amim, 'The Separation Barrier', (Jerusalem: Ir Amim, 2012), viewed 01 March 2015, < http://www.ir-amim.org.il/en/issue/separation-barrier>.

areas. Although these areas are spatially excluded from East Jerusalem, the Israeli government continues to regulate them and to control population movement via checkpoints and permits.[21]

With this simultaneous territorial exclusion and inclusion, the East Jerusalem Wall operates demographically, that seeks to maintain a Jewish majority in Jerusalem.[22] Seen in these terms, the Wall functions as part of what Hamoked calls 'quiet deportation policy': a set of continuously changing legal arrangements which revoke the permanent residency status of East Jerusalem Palestinians in arbitrary ways, and reduce the number of Palestinian residents legally residing in East Jerusalem.[23] Such connections of the Wall with 'demographic machines' are reminiscent of the first spatial boundaries of the city drawn by the British, 'who were the first to discover the connection between the drawing of boundaries and the political conflict over Jerusalem: the placement of border lines determines the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs'.[24] Ironically, however, the demographic route of the Wall leaves 1,400 West Bank residents on the Jerusalem side.[25] These residents do not hold Jerusalem identity cards: they are made illegal in their own homes, and without permits are denied access to work in East Jerusalem.

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[21] As of May 2015, more than one quarter of East Jerusalem residents are separated from the city due to the Wall. The Wall also cuts the spatial, social and economic continuum between East Jerusalem and adjacent West Bank towns and villages such as A-Ram, Abu Dis, Bir Naballa, Beit Sahur, Qalandiya, Beit Hanina and Sawachra A-Sharkiya. The East Jerusalem residents reside on the other side of the Wall are required to go through checkpoints in order to enter other parts of the city. Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), 'East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and Figures', (Jerusalem: ACRI, 2015), viewed 23 May 2015, <http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EJ-Facts-and-Figures-2015.pdf>, Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), 'Situation Report: The State of Human Rights in Israel and OPT 2013', (Jerusalem: ACRI, 2013), viewed 23 May 2015, <http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/SituationReportEng2013.pdf>.
[22] See for example Merav Amir, 'On the Border of Indeterminancy: The Seperation Wall in East Jerusalem', *Geopolitics,* 16/4 (2011), 768-92.
[23] The Palestinians of East Jerusalem have 'permanent' residency rights in Israel. They can live and work in Israel, vote in local elections, and have social benefits rights. However, they cannot vote in national elections or obtain an Israeli passport. Residency can be revoked if a person fails to live in Jerusalem for more than seven consecutive years; and in cases of treason, espionage and terrorism. Between 1967 and 2014, Israel revoked the residency permits of 14,416 East Jerusalem Palestinians. Since construction of the Wall, permit revocations for those living in areas left outside the city have accelerated due to the fact that their links with the city have increasingly been cut. Hamoked, 'Israel Continues Its Queit Deportation Policy', (Jerusalem: Hamoked, 2015).
viewed 12 May 2015, < http://www.hamoked.org/Document.aspx?dID=Updates1483>.
[24] Meron Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, trans. Maxine Kaufman Nunn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 55. For detailed discussion of the history of the Jerusalem's present-day zones, see Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 166-196, C.R. Ashbee, *Jerusalem 1918-1920: Being Records of the Pro-Jerusalem Council During the Period of the British Military Administration* (London: John Murray, 1921).
[25] OCHA, '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion'.

Figure 7: The Wall in Jerusalem (2014)

Source: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office', (Jerusalem: OCHA, July 2014).

Yet the new form of this constantly changing territoriality of East Jerusalem foster 'vertical resistance', in particular in the areas of Shu'afat refugee camp and Kafr' Aqab. Palestinians living in these areas take the advantage of the absence of the enforcement of planning laws, which are applied to other Palestinian neighbourhoods located on the Israeli side of the Wall. Consequently, residents of these areas now construct taller buildings than are legitimate under Israeli sanction. This illegality is the direct consequence of restrictive and discriminatory planning policies. Such constructions, Igal Chaney and Gillad Rosen argue, empower local communities by giving them an opportunity to structure their own abandoned neighbourhoods and by challenging discriminatory Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem.[26] In this instance, the state of exception that provokes these inequitable discriminatory planning regulations creates its own paradox, and it fails to capture and discipline the bodies that it intends to control.

Furthermore, while the Wall aims to exclude as many Palestinians as possible, it has caused unintended consequences and counter-movements. After construction began, approximately 40,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites who had previously lived in the West Bank moved back into Jerusalem, fearing they might lose their residency status.[27] Rather than excluding Palestinians, the East Jerusalem Wall caused the highest volume of Palestinian immigration into Jerusalem in the history of Israel.[28]

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[26] See Francesco Chiodell, 'Planning Illegality: The Roots of Unauthorised Housing in Arab East Jerusalem', *Cities,* 29/2 (2012), 99-106, Igal Charney and Gillad Rosen, 'Splintering Skylines in a Fractured City: High-Rise Geographies in Jerusalem', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 32 (2014), 1088-101.

[27] Bennett Zimmerman et al., 'Jerusalem 2050 and Beyond', (Jerusalem: The American-Israel Demographic Research Group, 2007).

[28] Israel Kimhi, 'The Operational Regime of the Security Fence around Jerusalem: Potential Implications for This City,' in Israel Kimhi (ed.), *The Security Fence around Jerusalem: Implications for the City and Its Residents* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2006).

This trend, Israel Kimhi comments, was followed by an increased number of Palestinians moving into Jewish neighbourhoods, resulting in several hundred Jewish and Palestinian families living together within the same suburbs.[29]

The Wall also creates a new space of its own: the seam zone. In October 2003, the IDF declared the area between the Wall and the Green Line a 'closed military zone'. The aim, according to the Israeli Government, was 'to prevent terror attacks … [issuing] from the area of Judea and Samaria into the State of Israel' and to minimise friction between the Palestinian and Israeli populations.[30] Since then, the Israeli state has been capturing and reorganising this space through a number of legal, military, and other spatial arrangements. These arrangements include introduction of a permit regime specific to the seam zone, creation of a new brigade to supervise construction of the Wall, and the establishment of new checkpoints, tunnels, humanitarian gates, and 'fabric of life' roads. IDF refers to this zone as a 'geographic security space', which, in its defensive terminology, 'does not mark a national border or any border'.[31] Indeed, the Israeli state controls both sides of the line, and therefore the seam zone does not function as a border separating two entities. More accurately, the seam zone is neither inside nor outside; rather, it is simultaneously located within and without. In this 'no-border' zone, the Israeli state organises and manages space, time, speed, and movement. The seam zone of the Wall creates disconnected seam enclaves, which unsettle every aspect of Palestinian life.[32] The Israeli state not only controls the surface, but also the substance of this terrain by connecting some of these enclaves via 'fabric of life' tunnels.[33] In the operation of all these practices, the Israeli state fosters institutional and strategic uncertainty.

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[29] Israel Kimhi, Interview with the author, The Jerusalem Institute for Israeli Studies, Jerusalem, 14 June 2011.

[30] Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), 'Order Concerning Security Directives (Judea and Samaria): Declaration Concerning the Closure of Area Number S/2/03 (Seam Area)', (Jerusalem: IDF, 2 October 2003). Also see B'Tselem, 'Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank'.

[31] B'Tselem, 'Arrested Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank'.

[32] The seam enclaves differ from internal enclaves created by the Wall. While there is no precise data on the number of Palestinians living in the seam zone, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that if the Wall is completed as planned, 25,000 more West Bank Palestinians will reside in the seam zone. OCHA, '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion'.

[33] In 2006, villages south and southeast of Qalqilyah, for example, were connected to the city via 'a fabric of life' road with an underpass beneath the Wall connecting to Route 55. This road was the first example of a 'fabric of life' road built along the route of the Wall. B'Tselem, 'Arrested

Most importantly, the seam zone creates an arbitrary permit regime, which is governed by structural and institutional uncertainty. This zone requires all Palestinians older than sixteen years of age to obtain a permit from the Israeli Civil Administration to be eligible to reside in or enter the area.[34] With its constantly changing collection of orders and protocols, this complex web of administrative and legal network separates different population groups, regulating how they live and how they move from one point to another. The seam zone is a Palestinian exclusion zone: it is only Palestinians who need permits. International tourists and Israelis including Jewish settlers do not require a permit in order to enter the zone. The permit regime not only seeks to direct movement in the desired direction, it also organises the time. Permits are time-restricted: each permit is granted for a limited period. Permits can only be made for certain dates and certain hours of the day. All permits are temporary, including the permit classed as a 'permanent resident certificate'.[35] Finally, the permit regime of the seam zone operates within a 'humanitarian machine' of the occupation. It channels all movement through different types of barrier gates, including 'fabric of life' gates. Palestinian farmers are obliged to apply for 'prior coordination' or obtain special permits to access their lands and water resources through a designated gate at an allocated opening time.[36] Such 'humanitarian' gates help Israel to generate a discourse of 'enlightened occupation', seeking to normalise its power of occupation and colonisation. In short, the permit regime of the Wall's seam zone works on three levels: on the terrain, on the individual occupied Palestinian body, and on the Palestinian population as a whole.

Development: The Long Term Impact of Israel's Separation Barrier in the West Bank', Weizman, *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation*, 173-182.

[34] The Civil Administration is not 'civil': it is the military body in charge of administering civilian matters such as permits in the OPT. The seam zone permit regime should not be confused with the permits required to enter Israel. For details see Hamoked, 'The Permit Regime: Human Rights Violations in West Bank Areas Known as the Seam Zone", (Jerusalem: Hamoked, 2013), viewed 13 December 2013, <http://www.hamoked.org/files/2013/1157660_eng.pdf>.

[35] As of March 2013, there were 13 different types of 'seam zone' permits – each requires its own special requirements and eligibility criteria. The 'permanent resident' certificate allows individuals to live in their own homes located within the seam zone for two years from the time of approval. In each application, the applicant must prove that his/her centre-of-life is in the area. Hamoked, 'The Permit Regime: Human Rights Violations in West Bank Areas Known as the Seam Zone'.

[36] As of September 2015, there are 85 gates along the Wall. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), 'Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report', (Jerusalem: OCHA, September 2015), viewed 30 September 2015, <https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_10_02_english.pdf>.

The seam zone seeks to control and regulate the details of the everyday lives of Palestinians, who are required to reside in and visit this zone. This ever-shifting space never aims to produce self-governing liberal subjects nor a viable life for West Bank Palestinians.[37] The restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities, deliberately structured within the uncertainty governing administrative rules, curtail the economic, political and social development of Palestinian life.[38] Any request for a permit can be refused for 'security reasons', or on the grounds that the applicant has 'no connection with the land, or … [does not] have enough land'.[39] Any granted permit can be revoked at any time by the Civil Administration for undeclared 'security reasons'. Barrier gates can be closed at any time without prior notice or warning. More importantly, the Israeli authorities view the function of granting permits as an exception and a privilege provided to Palestinians. In doing so, as Hagar Katef argues, the basic right to freedom of movement becomes a normalised exception.[40] It is this institutional uncertainty that maintains the effectiveness of the colonising lines of the Wall.[41] According to one member of Machsom Watch, the Israeli state activates unpredictability and uncertainty as a strategic operational norm to 'make people unsure of their situation'.[42] As uncertainty becomes the governing rule of this 'non-border' zone, the very meaning of security can change at any time and anywhere, ultimately undermining every aspect of Palestinian life.

Finally, the Wall multiplies itself in order to protect its very existence. It creates elastic 'special security zones' within the West Bank on Palestinian land. These zones were first created in 2002 by the IDF. They were initiated after Yesha Council's pressure on the army to protect the settlements left on the east side of the Wall.[43] The Council insisted that the Wall, once finished, would turn the settlements

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[37] Umut Ozguc, 'Beyond Panopticon: The Separation Wall and Paradoxical Nature of Israeli Security Imagination', *Australian Political Science Association Conference 2010, Connected Globe: Conflicting Worlds* (University of Melbourne, 27-29 September 2010).

[38] See OCHA, '10 Years Since the International Court of Justice Advisory Office'.

[39] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA), Interview with the author, OCHA, Jerusalem, 12 July 2011.

[40] Kotef, *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governance of Mobility*.

[41] Yehouda Shenhav and Yael Berda, 'The Colonial Foundations of the State of Exception: Juxtaposing the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories with Colonial Bureaucratic History', in Adi Ophir, Michal Givoni, and Sari Hanafi (eds.), *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (New York: Zone Books, 2009), 337-74.

[42] Machsom Watch, Interview with the author, Jerusalem, 3 July 2011.

[43] The Yesha Council is the supreme regional authority for Jewish settlers in the West Bank. It was created in the early 1980s as a public body and became a leading colonising project, replacing Gush Emunim. Historically, the Yesha Council opposes to the border because of its desire to expand the Jewish settlement project in the territories.

located on the eastern side into targets of 'the energy of terror'.[44] In order to justify construction of the Wall, the Yesha Council requested a special zone in which all Palestinian traffic would be regarded as suspicious.[45]

A special security zone is an outer cordon running parallel with the pre-existing fences that surround a given settlement, creating a secondary outer ring around the settlement (Figure 8). In most cases, such a secondary fence includes electronic components, patrol roads, and cameras. The security zone does not operate as a rigid boundary. Although in most cases the maximum width of the outer ring is four hundred metres, there are no restrictions on the area that it might occupy.[46] In some instances, this elastic boundary is maintained by the settlers themselves.[47] According to the army, the purpose of these zones is to 'ensure that the first contact with the terrorist occurs as far as possible from settlers' homes'.[48] Similar to the seam zone, 'special security zones' are 'closed military zones' in which special rules of engagement apply. Although the land between secondary fences and the old fence of the settlement or the houses of settlement is allocated as an 'empty warning zone', settlers are allowed to enter this area. Not surprisingly, Palestinians require access permits and proof of land ownership, and they need to coordinate their time of entry with the Civil Administration in order to be eligible to cultivate that land. Once again, the Wall juxtaposes the lives of two populations against one another and devastates Palestinian life with zero-sum reckoning that this colonial practice will sustain the continuity of Jewish life.

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[44] Nadav Shragai, 'IDF Proposes Creating 400-Meter 'Special Security Zone' around Every Settlement', *Haaretz,* 3 October 2003.

[45] Nadav Shragai, 12 June 2002. , 'Settlers Lobbying for Fence around Area a, Not Green Line', *Jerusalem Post,* 12 June 2002, Amos Harel, Anshel Pfeffer, and Haaretz Correspondents, 'Analysis: The Fence around Itamar Did Not Stop Terrorist', *Haaretz,* 21 June 2002.

[46] There are some cases of which the secondary fence is placed well beyond the four hundred meters. For example, the Ariel settlements reach a distance up to one kilometre from the closest houses of the settlements. Hamoked, 'The Permit Regime: Human Rights Violations in West Bank Areas Known as the Seam Zone'.

[47] The initial plan was to create close land rings around 41 settlements as a complement to the erection of the Wall. To implement the plan, the Special Security Area Administration was established in August 2004. In 2007, 45 settlements were included in the plan. See B'Tselem, 'Access Denied: Israeli Measures to Deny Palestinians Access to Land around Settlements', (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2008), viewed 14 December 2014, <www.btselem.org/download/200809_access_denied_eng.pdf>.

[48] Amos Harel, ' IDF Creating Buffer Zones around West Bank Settlements', *Haaretz,* 26 December 2006.

Figure 8: Special Security Zones

Source: B'Tselem, 'Access Denied: Israeli Measures to Deny Palestinians Access to Land around Settlements, (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2008).

2. A 'Life-fence': the Wall as a form of immunisation

The question then becomes: how does the Wall sustain its continuous colonising movement this powerfully? While the above analysis reveals how colonising lines of the Wall operate at different levels by connecting the Wall to other heterogeneous elements in the form of a network, it does not fully explain the means by which the Wall maintains its power. In order to understand the power of its colonising lines, we also need to look beneath the operation of the Israeli state – those molecular formations that construct a perverse rationality for the Wall. Using Marcelo Svirsky's epidemiological analogy, I argue that what sustains the Wall to function as a powerful colonising network is its 'immunisation' function: it is a Zionist machine that protects the exclusivity of Jewish life from the contagion of a collective Jewish and Palestinian community – from decolonised forms of shared life in Israel and Palestine. As Svirsky explains, Zionist immunity has been operating as a constructive element of the modern plane of Israel and Palestine since 1882.[49] As discussed in the previous chapter, between the period of 1882 and 1968, walls and fences were appropriated as performative apparatuses of this immunity. I do not intend to argue that the Separation Wall mimics earlier enclosures: it has its unique characteristics. What repeats is the movement of Zionist immunity, which re-activated itself in the form of 'victimisation Zionism' after the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in the early 2000s.

Writing during the first days of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Doron Rosenblum describes the consensus emerging within Jewish-Israeli society in Israel. This consensus took shape around the rhetoric of 'returning to ourselves', of returning 'to the wellsprings of Zionism, to the old, rock-solid "basic verities": immigration, settlement, redemption of the land, consolidation of our hold and expansion of our

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[49] Svirsky, *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine*, 43-70.

border'.[50] This consensus rested exclusively on a narrative of victimisation, which constructs and normalises the feeling of being a victim to constant threat and utilises each ensuing event – interpreted as tragedy – as a legitimising force in implementing ethno-national goals.[51] Such goals appear in the form of building settlements in the West Bank, rationalising extra-judicial executions, and building enclosures The continuity of victimisation Zionism depends on its own paradox: it historically prisons the Jewish-Israeli collective in a constant state of insecurity, and it is that state of insecurity secures the very being of that collective. The construction of threat as existential reproduces the exclusivity and the boundaries of the Jewish-Israeli collective. As Gad Yair's recent research shows, existential anxiety and persistent fear of annihilation operate as a major trait of the Israeli national character and stimulate a 'narrative of victimhood'. Such narrative, he argues, is invoked by reference to Biblical mythology, historical events, and contemporary political developments.[52]

In its paradoxical form, victimisation Zionism adopts a paradigm of self-protective immunity. *Immunitas*, according to Roberto Esposito, is an attempt to immunise the social body from the dangers of communal interaction, functioning through the use of what it opposes.[53] Immunity presents itself in the form of a reaction intended to elude a particular situation of risk. The immunity function of victimisation Zionism safeguards the exclusiveness of Jewish life from the risks that derive from its own collective configuration: from a collective life with Palestinians in Israel. In this sense, victimisation Zionism is a reactionary force: the vast number of victims

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[50] Doron Rosenblum, 'The New Zionism', *Haaretz,* 17 July 2001.

[51] Ibid. It has to be further noted that during the first years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada there were joint Palestinian and Israeli demonstrations. These demonstrations aimed to challenge victimisation narratives and to promote compassion for the other side's narratives. In spring 2001, for example, the Centre for Rapprochement organised a great number of demonstrations, which contributed to formation of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM). In 2001, the Sulha Peace Project, an Israeli-Palestinian grassroots movement, was founded. It organised a one-day gathering promoting 'cooperation, shared responsibility, and hope' and interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. Gush Shalom, an Israeli peace group, sponsored meetings to discuss Israel's war crimes in the OPT. In 2002, the group Courage to Refuse was founded, publishing the *Combatants' Letter* declaring refusal to continue fighting beyond the pre-1967 borders. Courage to Refuse, 'The Combatants Letter', 2002, viewed 10 September 2014, < http://www.seruv.org.il/english/combatants_letter.asp>, Sulha Peace Project, 'What is Sulha? ', viewed 10 September 2014, < http://sulha.com/>.

[52] Gad Yair, 'Israeli Existential Anxiety: Cultural Trauma and the Constitution of National Character', *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture,* 20/4-5 (2015), 346-62.

[53] Roberto Esposito, *Immunitas : The Protection and Negations of Life* trans. Zakiya Hanafi (Malden: Polity Press, 2011) 7.

that produce this force, as Rosenblum notes, constitutes at the same time an opportunity for an endless number of reactions and additional pretexts. The immunisation paradigm envisions 'happy and healthy life' without the existence of Palestinians, but that 'happy and healthy life' is only possible by making the threat of living with Palestinians always immediately alive. Victimisation Zionism, in other words, does not eliminate the conflict; rather, it incorporates conflict into the Jewish body in order to immunise it from the perceived threat of living with Palestinians.

Emergence of the Wall as part of this immunisation paradigm in Israel first occurred in the form of minor fences and enclosures. During the early years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the reactive operation of 'victimisation Zionism' occurred at local levels. In 2002, for example, after the attacks at Café Moment in Jerusalem, restaurants, stores, private homes, and some settlements began building private fences.[54] This was followed by foment among settlers along the Green Line, who mobilised and circulated the victimisation narrative, recalling the volunteerism and the heroism of the *kibbutz* movement. In May 2002, Green Line communities under the banner of the Green Line Forum, started raising funds abroad for the construction of a wall in order to separate West Bank Palestinians from Israelis. In December the same year, the settlements of Gilboa Regional Council initiated the construction of a twelve-kilometre fence between Moshav Ram-On and villages in the Jenin area.[55] The council planned recruiting thousands of volunteers from Israel's youth movements, and hosted high school students to help with construction of the fence. In addition to community emergency response teams, a new 'nation-in-arms' project, *Mivtzar,* was launched in eight settlements. This pilot project recruited newly discharged soldiers as a 'first response team' required to spend a certain number of hours per week in a settlement and to respond to infiltrations as required.[56] In many ways all these diverse practices echoed 'frontier nationalism' that I discussed in the last chapter.

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[54] Lauren Gelfond, 'Please Fence Us', *Jerusalem Post,* 03 May 2002. During the same period, the residents of Negev town of Nitzana also demanded a fence on the border with Egypt. Tsahar Rotem, 'Nitzana Residents Demand Electric Fence on Border with Egypt', *Haaretz,* 13 January 2003.

[55] David Rudge, 'Green Line Communities Raising Funds Abroad for Security Fence ', *Jerusalem Post,* 12 May 2002, David Ratner, 'Gilboa Towns Build Separation Fence', *Haaretz,* 17 December 2002.

[56] Matthew Gutman, 'Lack of Funds Delays Settlement Security Fence Construction', *Jerusalem Post,* 31 December 2002, Margot Dudkevitch, 'IDF Ready for Increase in Terror If US Attacks Iraq', *Jerusalem Post*, 26 December 2002.

In particular, during the first years of its construction, the Wall was perceived as a barrier against any contact with West Bank Palestinians and this contact was typified as 'violent' intrusion that posed a risk to corrupt and subvert Israel. This perception was circulated in media reports, academic writings, and in High Court decisions concerning the route of the Wall. The judgement of the High Court on Beit Sourik and Alfei Menashe, for example, opens with the depiction of a 'Palestinian … campaign of terror against Israel and Israelis',57 assigning 'pain' as justification for the construction of the Wall.58 The same form of rationale that blames the enemy and the 'pain' inflicted on Israeli society constituted the dominant feature of the media in its support for construction of the Wall.59 For instance, in 2003 Moshe Arens writes in *Haaretz* that 'it is the Palestinians themselves to blame for the construction of the fence …. If the fence will help to keep the Palestinians out of Israel in the years to come, so much the better'.60 According to Yossi Alpher, during the first years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada the attitude of 'no-contact' with Palestinians dominated the perception of the general public in its support for construction of the Wall. In expressing the general atmosphere among Israelis, Alpher says: '[Israelis] have nothing to do with [Palestinians]. Put up the fence and forget [Palestinians]. They can go to hell. They can have their state; they can do whatever they want as long as they leave as alone'.61

The Wall's immunisation function is most vigorously promoted by two pro-fence groups: Fence for Life and the Movement for Unilateral Disengagement. These

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57 The High Court of Justice, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, HCJ2056//04, Jerusalem, 2 May 2004, viewed 09 January 2011, <http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf >.
58 The High Court of Justice, Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ7957/04, Jerusalem, 15 September 2005, viewed 06 June 2014, < http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/570/079/A14/04079570.A14.pdf>.
59 Daniel Dor, *Intifada Hits the Headlines: How the Israeli Press Misreported the Outbreak of the Second Palestinian Uprising* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). See also Gadi Wolfsfeld, Paul Frosh, and Maurice T. Awabdy, 'Covering Death in Conflicts: Coverage of the Second Intifada on Israeli and Palestinian Television', *Journal of Peace Research,* 45/3 (2008), 401-17. My review of articles published in *Jerusalem Post* and *Haaretz* about the Wall between 2000 and 2004 suggests that both newspapers supported the construction of the Wall. *Jerusalem Post* framed the Wall as a security apparatus. Many editorial pieces supported a wall for security purposes. *Haaretz* encouraged the political separation on the Green Line.
60 Moshe Arens, 'Sitting on the Fence', *Haaretz,* 5 August 2003.
61 Yossi Alpher, Interview with the author, Tel Aviv, 23 June 2011. According to the Peace Index, conducted by the Israel Democratic Institute, there was huge support for the Wall in 2002 (52 per cent). In July 2003, the Wall was perceived as a fundamental security apparatus directed against terrorism emanating from the West Bank. In October 2003, public support increased to 83 per cent. See, 'The Peace Index', viewed 10 September 2014, <http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/guttman-center-for-surveys/the-peace-index/>.

two groups organised public events, including rallies and seminars, and submitted a petition to the Israel High Court to pressure the government to complete the Wall.[62] According to a prominent member of Fence for Life, the major function of the Wall is to defend the healthy Jewish-Israeli body from the intrusion of West Bank Palestinians:

> I said all the time it is very dangerous to put it on the Green Line. Why is it very dangerous? Because if you put security fence on the Green Line, this means giving up all territories without negotiations …. The real thing [is that] Palestinians cannot really accept us. It is not a possibility …. It is not a real possibility to make a real peace with Palestinians. The only peace you can [make] with them is to hold the land and to be strong. And if they feel you are strong … they postpone their programs to deal with you …. There is one difference between Jews and Muslims. Muslims are very assertive. If they want something they can kill you if they want to. But Jews are very delicate. They believe in spirit …. If they come to power here, Jews would have no choice. I don't know if they kill or evacuate. But it would be like Holocaust for [Israelis] …. Security fence would stop this inflow.[63]

Fence for Life maintains that the purpose of the Wall is not merely to prevent suicide attacks: it has the more profound objective of impeding the 'process of realising the right of return'.[64] According to the group, Palestinian refugees and the eternal ties between the Palestinians of the West Bank and Israel constitute an existential threat to Jewish-Israeli citizens. The Wall eliminates all demographic dangers by excluding as many Palestinians as possible and cutting ties between the West Bank Palestinians and the Palestinian citizens of Israel; in doing so, it protects Israel from an 'imminent Holocaust':

> The Palestinians say 'well we want peace with you'. Just one small demand …. We want all refugees from '48' and their children would come back to their place. That's all. Four million people would come here. Of course we are doomed. When the other side asked you to do that it is very obvious that they are trying to kill you. No question about it.[65]

Such articulations about the 'life-protection' function of the Wall remind us of Esposito's remarks on the constitutive relationship between community and

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[62] Fence for Life, Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, 11 July 2011.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.

immunity. For Esposito, immunity is the exact opposite of community: it is the rejection of *communitas*.66 Esposito associates *communitas* with its etymological derivation *munus,* which concerns public obligation and forms the basis of *municipality* and *immunity*. He argues that *communitas* requires gift-giving that demands exchange in return. *Communitas,* therefore, endorses a debt and an encounter. Immunity is the rejection of that exchange:

> Immunity connotes the means by which the individual [or social body] is defended from the 'expropriate effects' of the community, protecting the one who carries it from the risk of contact with those who do not … As a result, the borders separating what is one's own from the communal are reinstituted …67

Immunity presupposes community, but also negates it by rejecting anything in common.68 It reconstitutes community by protecting the social and the individual body from a presupposed 'excess of communal gift giving',69 thereby excluding 'life-in-common'.70 Esposito maintains that immunity protests or restores one's already established borders that were threatened by the public commonality. Structured in this way, the immunity paradigm is an attempt to immunise the social body from the dangers of a communal *munus* – it is a call to re-establish borders.

Such call to re-establish a border is clear in the words of one of Israel's prominent academics, Dan Schueftan, on separation and the immunisation function of the Wall. Schueftan unreservedly advocates the separation of Jewish Israelis from all Palestinians, including Palestinians of Israel in order to keep Jewish Israelis immune from the 'disease' of the Middle East, which he perceives as the most corrupt and the most backward region of the world.71 For Schueftan, open borders are 'essentially suicidal' as they prompt the 'creeping return' of Palestinians to Israel: a

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66 Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*.
67 Ibid. xi.
68 Ibid. 51.
69 Ibid. xi.
70 Esposito, *Immunitas : The Protection and Negations of Life,* 9.
71 Gershon Baskin and Sharon Rosenberg, 'The New Walls and Fences: Consequences for Israel and Palestine', *Working Paper* (Brussel: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2003).

return that would increase non-Zionist elements of the state.[72] The demographic metamorphosis of the Wall is therefore not coincidental – it is a form of immunisation against any exchange with Palestinians and a 'life-in-common'. The Wall is presumed to defend the Jewish body from the intrusion of non-Zionist elements into Israel – seen as the consequence of any exchange with Palestinians. As Svirksy argues, since its inception, Zionism at its core has been the rejection of exchange, proximity, familiarity, and the adoption of 'not having anything in common' as a mode of hostile engagement with Palestinians.[73] The disastrous effect of immunisation is that, as Esposito reminds us, when the protection reaches a certain limit, as in the case of the Wall, it 'forces life into a sort of prison' and it forces a life understood without any real sense of collectivity. Hence, the Wall destroys not only the life of Palestinians, it also imprisons the Jewish-Israeli body by closing itself to difference, to the outside, and to diverse forms of subjectivity. It does not only harm the other, but also the self.

Yet Esposito also encourages us to ask: is it possible to imagine a life as multiplicities of difference that opens itself to other lives?[74] 'Can life be preserved in some other form than that of its negative protection'?[75] Is it then possible to conceive of the Wall beyond the paradigm of immunisation? Does the Wall's negative form of protection of the individual and the social body necessarily either negate life or enhance it through a negative form of protection of the individual and the social body? Can it be opened to other lives, to the outside, and to affirmative difference? What is the excess of the Wall that produces its other life-lines? These are the questions I will be seeking answers to in the next three sections.

2. The Middle line? The '67' paradigm and 'Alter-Wall' discourse

As I described in Chapter Two, middle lines are threshold lines laden with uncertainties and ambiguities. Movements on these lines may lead to absolute de-territorialisation or transform into forces of reterritorialisation causing blockages in

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[72] Dan Schueftan, 'The Separation Option: An Alternative to the Peace Process?', *Policy Analysis,* (2000). Similar views are also presented by Arnon Soffer. See Evgania Bystrov and Arnon Soffer, 'Israel: Demography and Density 2007-2020', (Haifa: University of Haifa, 2008).
[73] Svirsky, *Arab-Jewish Activism in Israel-Palestine*, 60.
[74] Esposito, *Immunitas : The Protection and Negations of Life*
[75] Ibid.16.

the social and political field and operating within the familiar obstructive sphere of power politics. I suggest that contemporary alter-wall discourse is the middle line of the Wall – a line that merges with the established molar formations and therefore is transformed into a form of reterritorialisation.

The deviation of the route of the Wall from the Green Line constitutes the major point of reference in this discourse. By demanding a change in the Wall's route and by aiming to alter the permit regime and checkpoints according to humanitarian principles, alter-wall discourse seeks to achieve what Eyal Weizman calls 'the best of all possible walls'.[76] The alter-wall discourse is certainly a 'crack' in what seeks to portray itself as escape from the lines of occupation. It calls the Israeli occupation and its associated regimes into question. However, it operates within the familiar discourses that advocate an 'imaginary legal' border, the Green Line, as an uncontested border.[77] In this discourse, the Green Line becomes the focal point of delineating the legitimate borders of Israel, the spatial limits of Israeli control, and a threshold on how to define the meaning of Jewish-Israeli security and morality.

It is no exaggeration to argue that alter-wall discourse is one of the most dominant discourses concerning the Wall. It is, for instance, constructed and

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[76] Weizman, *The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence for Arendt to Gaza*, 65-80.
[77] 'Imaginary legal' border here indicates the contested nature of the Green Line's border status. The Israel government maintains that the Green Line does not constitute Israel's eastern borders. It was established after the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948/1949 in the Armistice Agreement with the Kingdom of Jordan. The Armistice Line of 1949 did not create a border to which one could attribute the entitlement of sovereignty. During the Six Day War (1967), Israel expelled the Trans-Jordanian forces from the West Bank and took the territory between the Green Line and the Jordan River under its control. In its written statement to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Israeli government argues that the Green Line has never been accepted as a legitimate border, neither through the Security Council resolution 242 (1967), Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (1993) nor through the Road Map (2003). Despite its short duration, as David Newman argues, the Green Line has become a strong indicator of territorial demarcation between Israel and Palestine in the mental images of Israelis and the international community. Andreas Muller, *A Wall on the Green Line* (Jerusalem: The Alternative Information Center, 2004). David Newman, *Boundaries Influx: The 'Green Line' Boundary between Israel and the West Bank- Past, Present and Future* (Durham: University of Durham, 1995a), Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF), 'Request for an Advisory Opinion from the 10th Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on "the Legal Consequences Arising from the Construction of the Wall Being Built by Israel', (Jerusalem: MOF, 30 January 2004), United National General Assembly, 'Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine', A/RES/181 (II) (29 November 1947).

maintained in Israel's High Court decisions.[78] It is circulated with the reports written by international organisations, and through activities of some Israeli human rights groups and the position taken by the Palestinian Authority (PA).[79] The history of this discourse can be traced to 2004, when the Jewish town Mevaseret Zion and its Palestinian neighbour Beit Sourik began a joint ad-hoc campaign against the planned route of the Wall. In their petition to the High Court, residents of Mevaseret Zion claimed that the fence had to be adjacent to the Green Line in order to allow residents of Beit Sourik to work on their lands, and that the undersized gates planned for the Wall would violate Palestinians' dignity.[80] The planned route, petitioners insisted, would not fulfil the requirements of proportionality – the balance between the security needs of Israel and the infringement of the Palestinians' human rights. The campaign was the first against the route of the Wall followed by many. In the Beit Sourik case, the petitioners had no objections to the existence of the Wall. However, plaintiffs maintained that the Wall violated international humanitarian law by deviating from the Green Line.[81] The High Court similarly took the Green Line as the foundation for its decision. Ironically, however, it concluded that the Wall would become illegal only if it was built on the Green Line. In that case the Wall would function as a unilateral declaration of a political border, and hence would violate the principle of temporariness of the occupation.[82] Despite the differences, in the

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[78] As of 2015, the *Battir* Case remains as an exception to the legal construction of 'alter-wall' discourse. The landscape of Battir is recognised by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) as a world heritage site. Construction of the barrier was challenged by Friends of the Earth Middle East and by villagers. In *Battir* Case, unlike other disputes, petitioners did not seek to change the Wall's route and resisted the construction of a barrier on the Green Line. The petition against the Wall in Battir did not seek to change the route of the Wall along the least harmful path, but instead claimed the 'impossibility' of the Wall. In 2015 the High Court refused the IDF's submission to maintain its route for the barrier through Battir, arguing that the section of the barrier was not a security priority. The Court also ordered the state to notify the village in advance if it plans to begin the construction. In doing so, the Court created a legal space for the Israeli government making it eligible to build a barrier in the future. See Forensic Architecture, 'The Wall in Battir: Landscape and Heritage Against the Logic of Separation', viewed 12 June 2015, <http://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/wall-battir/>.

[79] In 2004, Fatah Leader and Palestinian Authority (PA) minister Kadoura Fares maintained that the PA would accept a wall on the Green Line. Ghassan Khatib, a Palestinian politician and the director of the Government Media Centre, confirms this position. Matthew Gutman, 'Modified Fence Excluded Settlements', *Jerusalem Post,* 09 February 2004, Ghassan Khatib, Interview with the author, Ramallah, 05 July 2011.

[80] The High Court of Justice, *Beit Sourik Village Council v The Government of Israel*.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid. See Yuval Feinstein, 'Activists Squeezed between the 'Apartheid Wall' and the 'Separation Fence'', in Elisabeth Marteu (ed.), *Civil Organisations and Protest Movements in Israel: Mobilisation around the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009), 107-25, Michael Lynk, 'Down by Law: The High Court of Israel: International Law, and the Separation Wall', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 35/1 (2005), 6-24, Aeyal M. Gross, 'Human Proportions: Are

positions of both the petitioners and the High Court, the Green Line operated as a threshold to establish the legitimacy of the Wall.

According to many groups, individuals and organisations the main problem is the route of the Wall, rather than its existence. Many international organisations including the United Nations (UN), and some Israeli human rights organisations share a similar view. Adopting the general international position towards the Wall, the UN Barrier Monitoring Unit, for example, advocates a border on the Green Line and suggests that it is deviation of the Wall from the Green Line that constitutes the main problem.[83] Similarly, many Israeli human rights organisations locate the Green Line at the centre of the debate and their activities. For instance, in its petition against the Wall surrounding Alfei Menashe enclave, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) offered an alternative route for the fence. In its petition it asked the court to dismantle some constructed segments of the Wall and move these to a place coinciding with the Green Line.[84] A similar position is shared by the Israeli human rights organisation B 'Tselem: 'If you want to build a security measure, you should do it on the Green Line. On the border …. Not taking more lands in the West Bank, because this suits all the settlements on the West Bank'.[85]

A 'Green Line Wall' is also supported and promoted by various Israeli liberal advocacy and activist groups. The position taken by Peace Now, a prominent activist

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Human Rights the Emperor's New Clothes of the International Law of Occupation? ', *The European Journal of International Law,* 18/1 (2007), 1-35, Aeyal M. Gross, 'The Construction of a Wall between the Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and Limits of Humanitarian Law and the Structure of Occupation', *Leiden Journal of International Law,* 19 (2006), 393-440, Yishai Blank, 'Legalizing the Barrier: The Legality and Materiality of the Israel/Palestine Separation Barrier', *Texas International law journal,* 46 (2011), 309-43.

[83]The UN Barrier Monitoring Unit, Interview with the author, Jerusalem, 17 July 2011. The General Assembly Resolution against the Wall similarly emphasises the illegality of the Wall due to its planned route in the OPT. It specifies that its deviation from the Green Line causes 'the confiscation of land, disruption of the livelihood of protected persons and the *de facto* annexation of land'. The European Union (EU) and some international non-state actors such as Amnesty International also take a similar position. The United Nations General Assembly, 'Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory', General Assembly Tenth Emergency Special Session, Agenda Item 5, A/RES/ES-10/13 (27 October 2003), Dimitris Bouris, *The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories : State-Building without a State* (New York Routledge, 2014) 86. For a more detailed survey of the position taken by various international organizations see Muller, *A Wall on the Green Line*, 29-30.

[84] The petition was submitted in 2004 by Attorney Michael Sfard on behalf of ACRI and six residents from two of the enclave villages, Ras A-Tira and Wadi A-Rasha. For the first time, the High Court ordered dismantling of a constructed section of the Wall. The Court based its decision on the ICJ's Advisory Opinion. Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), 'Second Principled Court Ruling on Separation Barrier', (Jerusalem: ACRI, 20 September 2005). viewed 01 March 2015, < http://www.acri.org.il/en/2005/09/20/second-principled-court-ruling-on-separation-barrier/>.

[85] B'Tselem, Interview with the author, Jerusalem, 10 July 2011.

group established in 1978 as part of the Israeli Peace Movement, is a good example. According to its chairman, the Wall could help in the realisation of a two-state solution to the conflict as long as it is properly situated:

> Those who want to completely dismantle the fence seek to create the reality of a single, bi-national state: either non-Jewish or non-democratic. The fence must be moved to the future border based on the 1967 lines and the land taken away from Palestinians from its construction must be returned to them.[86]

To summarise, the contemporary normative view is that the Israeli state as sovereign has the right to protect its borders against perceived threats, but that the state's practices of 'immunisation' should consider Palestinians' concerns and rights, and operate within the rules of established international humanitarian law.

This view is shared by Meir Margalit, human and civil rights activist, one of the founders of the Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions and Meretz City Councilman. For Margalit, the Wall's deviation from the Green Line constitutes one of the major barriers against any solution to the present conflict:

> The Wall. Especially the route of the Wall. The fiercest problem. It is annexing the Palestinian land. My problem is not the Wall; my problem is the route of the Wall. The second problem is the management of the border: checkpoints. But at this stage of the conflict, I think that the Wall on the Green Line can be a solution, but just at this stage of the conflict. Because my utopia is that one day there will be no borders between Israel and Palestine.[87]

As Yishai Blank argues, for the liberal left in Israel the Wall is as an opportunity to draw a decisive border between Israel and Palestine.[88] Marglit, indeed, believes that the Wall has one positive impact: it imposes the existence of a border in the Israeli consciousness and the recognition of the West Bank as a separate entity. He calls this impact a 'collateral effect' unintended by the Israeli state.[89] According to Marglit, if coexistence is utopian deferral to an unknown future, what is needed is a 'clear', 'just' and 'legitimate' border on the Green Line. At this stage of deferral, the Wall on the

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[86] Dimi Reider, 'Rightists Say Bring Down the Wall, Leftists Say Let's Keep It'', *+972,* 11 April 2013, viewed 12 February 2015, < http://972mag.com/rightists-support-demolishing-the-wall-while-leftists-want-to-keep-it/69024/>.

[87] Meir Margalit, Interview with the author, Jerusalem, 21 June 2011.

[88] Blank, 'Legalizing the Barrier: The Legality and Materiality of the Israel/Palestine Separation Barrier', 339.

[89] Margalit, Interview with the author.

Green Line would provide the 'just' order which Israelis have sought since 1967. In the 'alter-wall' discourse, coexistence waits for Godot to arrive. In short, as a resident of Mevaseret Zion summarises, the central dynamic of alter-wall discourse is 'not about getting rid of the fence, it is about having a different fence'.[90]

The problematic aspect of 'alter-wall' discourse is twofold. First, it is largely perceived that Israel has a right to protect itself from its security threats. Such statist language sustains the power of the sovereign over a 'legitimate' border. Second, the liberal language of alter-wall discourse requires caution. This language ostensibly promotes the legal rights of Palestinians and aims to end the occupation. However, this begins with the assumption that the Wall and its associated systems are products of Israel's occupation of the West Bank only, and it is the occupation that initiated Israeli violence against Palestinians. As Adi Ophir and Ariella Azoulay would argue, such a position assumes that the occupation is temporary and 'the Territories' is a separate entity external to 'Israel proper' and the 'democratic' system that governs it.[91] In doing so, alter-wall discourse fails to recognise how the Wall functions as a perpetuated effect of violence of the long history of the colonisation of Palestine commencing in the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of Israel, discussed in the previous chapter. What is enormously problematic is that alter-wall discourse perpetuates the political discourse in Israel that considers the pre-1967 borders as 'proper', 'normal' and 'just', and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (the 'War of Independence') as moral self-defence. In other words, alter-wall discourse simultaneously conceals and promotes the foundational violence produced through the establishment of the 'imaginary legal' border – the Green Line.

The discursive construction of this discourse requires the most caution because it substantiates its position through political amnesia that forgets the systematic violence pursued against Palestinians before the occupation and within the legitimate borders of pre-1967 Israel. One should remember that the violence of the Green Line is a constitutive violence, the pervasiveness of which could only be maintained through forgetting: forced forgetting that performs pre-1967 Israel as unproblematic. One needs to forget the violent history of this imaginary border in order to construct it as a legitimate border. As Yehouda Shenhav reminds us, the

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[90] Tovah Lazaroff, 'Court Delays Fences Construction near Mevaseret Modi'in', *Jerusalem Post,* 18 March 2004.

[91] Azoulay and Ophir, *One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine*.

Green Line was sketched by politicians, diplomats, cartographers and geographers. The Palestinians at the time were not recognised as a national group and were not involved in the decision-making process of armistice agreements.[92] The Green Line language of alter-wall discourse makes *al-Nakbah* invisible, and as a result it contributes to the hegemonic Zionist narrative of the 1948 War that erases the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians before, during and after the war.[93] Alter-wall discourse destroys the memory of 'the project of Judaisation of the state through various practices of 'de-Palestinianisation' before 1967.[94] Furthermore, alter-wall discourse forgets how during the 1950s extreme institutions of the military control targeted not Jewish Israelis, but only Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Alter-wall discourse imprisons the problematic of the Wall within the narrow limits of occupation discourse. In doing so, it fails to see the Wall as the continuing effect of all violent practices occurring before the occupation. Behind the guise of its humanitarian language, this discourse erodes the long colonial history and the continuing effects of pre-1967 borders, preserving the foundational violence that hegemonic Zionist narratives aim to render invisible. The violent formations of this discourse benefit from the joy of the lightness of forgetting. As William Connolly writes:

> The appearance of a pure general will … requires the concealment of impurities. Such a strategy succeeds if violence in the founding is treated by the hegemonic political identity to have no continuing effects. Acting as if, for instance … the systematic violence against the indigenous inhabitants in the founding of the United States carried no continuing effects into the present. The paradox of sovereignty dissolves into the politics of forgetting.[95]

The consequence of alter-wall discourse is re-construction of what Shenhav calls the '1967 paradigm': forgetting the arbitrary and violent past of the Green Line and recasting it as the signifier of 'legitimate' and 'enlightened' Israel. It is a

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[92] Yehouda Shenhav, *Beyond the Two-State Solution: A Jewish Political Essay* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) 4.

[93] Based on the Palestinian sources, Ilan Pappe discusses the extent of atrocities committed before and after the war. He notes that the Jewish forces forcibly expelled almost a quarter of a million Palestinians before the 1948 War. Ilan Pappe, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: OneWorld, 2006).

[94] Adriana Kemp, ''Dangerous Populations': State Territoriality and the Constitution of National Minorities', in Joel S. Migdal (ed.), *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 75.

[95] Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralisation*, 138.

paradigm that constructs the two decades from independence to the Six Day War as heroic, glorious nation-building years. It is a paradigm that believes Israel was corrupted in 1967, and thereby it yearns for pre-1967 Israel in order to re-inject 'justness' into the Israeli imaginary. And it is a paradigm that is constrained by the international limits of the so-called 'peace process'.[96] As part of this paradigm alter-wall discourse regards the Wall, in its current route as somatic tissue rendered abnormal by having grown in the wrong location, damaging the healthy Israeli-Jewish body. This is a violent forgetting of the refugees of 1948, demolished Palestinian villages, forcefully separated Palestinian families, erased Arabic names of villages and towns: the long history of the Palestinian dispossession. In short, while it first seems like a 'crack', as a middle line of the Wall, alter-wall discourse falls quickly back into the forces of molar lines in Israel and Palestine, and it reconstructs and preserves the familiar power politics.

3. Becoming a minor space: spatial excess of the Wall

a. The Wall's lines of flight: possibility of a new life?

In March 2003 in the Palestinian village of Masha, bulldozers began uprooting olive trees and destroying farms to construct a segment of the Wall. Palestinian villagers promptly mobilised five-hundred people and organised a demonstration in order to stop the construction. Together with the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) and Israeli activists, they erected tents on the planned route of the Wall. The tents remained at three separate locations for four months. During the life of Masha camp the Israeli activist group, Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW) was formed. The camp failed in its attempt to halt construction of the Wall. However, it succeeded in triggering a movement against the Wall in the West Bank: a creative, collaborative, experimental, and mobile movement that activates the Wall's spatial excess.[97]

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[96] Shenhav, *Beyond the Two-State Solution: A Jewish Political Essay*.
[97] The Mas-ha Camp campaign was followed by demonstrations in the West Bank village of Budrus later in the same year and quickly spread to other villages affected by construction of the Wall. The first phrase of the movement lasted until 2005. This first phrase was inspired by the model implemented in Budrus. It was mainly direct actions seeking to prevent bulldozers from uprooting trees and to halt the construction of the Wall. The second phase began with Bil'in demonstrations in 2005. Since then, creative demonstrations have been taking place every Friday in Bil'in.

In her discussion of 'architecture from the outside', Elizabeth Grosz explains 'spatial excess' as an inherent excess contained within any space or any site.[98] Excess is an extra or parallel dimension that activates flows and forces of deterritorialisation. These flows offer a potential to challenge, undermine and traverse the sedentary function of architecture. Spatial excess reveals the inherent instability of the authoritarian function of architecture and offers a radically 'antifunctional' alternative. Excess, Grosz writes, is construction of a movement, a force, a flow, a smooth space that traverses the boundary it aims to undermine.[99] These boundaries are the established order of things entrapped within a striated cramped space. Spatial excess constitutes movements waiting to be released from the molar systems of those colonising lines; it activates process of becoming-other.

The movement activated by the Wall's excess can be broadly defined by its five features: it is local, non-institutionalised, mobile, collaborative, and non-violent. First, the anti-wall movement is non-hierarchical in form. It is a web of individuals, organisations, and groups loosely connected to one another, and comprising part of a larger movement of popular non-violent resistance in the West Bank.[100] According to Roi Wagner, an Israeli activist, because of its non-hierarchical form the anti-wall movement provides grassroots alternatives to the institutional activities of Palestinian political parties, and in doing so it offers a substitute to the top-down agenda of the Palestinian elite and Israeli human rights organisations.[101] This movement brings together local Palestinian committees, groups like Stop the Wall, and alternative media such as Palestine News Network, Alternative Information Center, Activestills and the Electronic Intifada. By reporting on issues that are often overlooked in the mainstream Israeli and international media, alternative media draws attention to the

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[98] Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*.

[99] Ibid.153.

[100] The anti-wall movement needs to be seen as an element of general popular resistance. It is not my intention to argue that the anti-wall movement is completely distinct movement. For detailed discussion on popular non-violent resistance see Maia Carter Hallward and Julie Norman (eds.), *Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada* (New York: Palgrave, 2011), Julie M. Norman, *The Second Palestinian Intifada: Civil Resistance* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), Mazin B. Qumsiyah, *Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment* (London: Pluto Press, 2011), Linah Alsaafin, 'How obsession with 'non-violence' harms the Palestinian cause', *The Electronic Intifada*, 10 July 2012, viewed 04 May 2013, < https://electronicintifada.net/content/how-obsession-nonviolence-harms-palestinian-cause/11482>.

[101] Roy Wagner, 'Navigating privilege, solidarity and belonging: A chapter from the new book 'Anarchists Against the Wall'', *+972*, 7 December 2013, viewed 10 December 2013, < http://972mag.com/navigating-privilege-solidarity-and-belonging-a-chapter-from-the-new-book-anarchists-against-the-wall/83186/>.

movement. Non-governmental Palestinian organisations deliver training and education campaigns about non-violent demonstrations.[102] This non-institutionalised movement also gathers Palestinian, Israeli and international activists, artists, film and documentary-makers, students, sportswomen and men, musicians, and so on.

Second, the anti-wall movement can be defined by its non-violent and innovative character. It is organised in the form of demonstrations, marches, non-cooperation, conferences, sport events, and artistic and creative works including documentaries, movies and all other forms of art. At its core, this movement has an experimental and mobile nature in that it offers multiple entry points to the movement without narrowly defining what its boundaries should look like. In the words of one local council member of Al-Walaja, the movement against the Wall does not have firm boundaries – it is open to all forms of political creativity and to everyone who wants to become part of it:

> [This] is one form of resistance, a frame that can include anybody and everybody, and does not require a special skill or a special affiliation …. Anybody can be part of this resistance. It also has to be non-violent; well, it doesn't have to be, but this is the nature of the kind of popular resistance that it's non-violent. It is many things: an activity, a demonstration, a celebration, it can be a contest. It's a place for creativity on the one hand, and a place for all those who want to resist the military occupation.[103]

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[102] See Norman, *The Second Palestinian Intifada: Civil Resistance*, 47-60. Popular committees established during the First intifada were transformed into non-government organisations (NGOs) during the Oslo period. As a result, these popular committees lost their grassroots power once they became professional centres funded by foreign agencies. This shift enabled the PA to exert control over these organisations. According to Palestinian NGO network, these Palestinian NGOs mainly develop projects to accommodate donors' political agenda – a trend referred to as NGOisation. International funding encourages the Palestinian NGOs to develop short-term projects, which frequently fail to address local issues, requiring longer term commitments. Sophie Richter-Devroe argues that most NGOs in the West Bank hardly contribute to the popular resistance due to fear of losing their international funding. The NGOisation of grassroots initiatives can also be observed in Israel. Palestinian NGO Network, Interview with the author, Palestinian NGO Network, Ramallah, 5 July 2011, Rema Hammani, 'NGOs: The Professionalisation of Politics', *Race & Class*, 37/2 (1995), 51-63, Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*, Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabari, 'The New Palestinian Globalized Elite', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 24/13-31 (2004), Sophie Richter-Devroe, ''Here, It's Not About Conflict Resolution - We Can Only Resist': Palestinian Women's Activism in Conflict Resolution and Non-Violent Resistance', in Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt (eds.), *Women and War in the Middle East : Transnational Perspectives* (New York : Zed Books: Zed Books, 2009), 158-92.
[103] Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 'Women and the Struggle against the Wall in the West Bank', *Stop The Wall*, January 2011, viewed 1 August 2013, <https://www.stopthewall.org/>.

Third, the anti-wall movement has a local character. Village-based protests are organised through popular committees. These ad-hoc committees are not formal; they welcome local volunteers, such as village elders, religious leaders, youths, unions, students, activists, and in some cases local political leaders from different political factions.[104] Each village mobilises its own strategy. They organise demonstrations, implement legal and media training, facilitate cooperation with the Israeli activists and ISM and, finally, they monitor and report different aspects of the Israeli occupation and the IDF's disproportionate use of force during demonstrations. In some cases, local committees also pursue legal action in the Israeli High Court against the route of the Wall. However, unlike the alter-wall discourse, these local committees do not consider legal action as the defining feature of the movement. Instead, they perceive legal action as a form of protest that problematises the apparatuses of occupation and colonisation. Basel Mansour, the representative for the Popular Committee of Bil'in in 2007, explains,

> We went to this occupational court not out of faith in it, but to prove that these courts are nothing but tools of the occupation. They are like a soldier that shoots you in the head and kills you, and then wraps your head in a white cloth, to be portrayed as a first aid worker. In its decision, this court proved to be cowardly and a cause of injustice; we turn your attention to the fact that our campaign was against the existence of the wall in principle, and not only opposition to its route …. And we will crush all of the machinations of the occupation, until we reach the ocean that knows no border.[105]

The non-institutional, pluralistic character of these local strategies means they are not uniform; since the Wall does not have the same impact throughout the West Bank, each village develops its own local actions.[106] Abdallah Abu Rahmah, the coordinator of Bil'in committee, explains that some villages were more active participants of the movement than others due to the differences in economic links with Israel. One of the main reasons, for example, why Bil'in is active in the struggle against the Wall is its labour structure. According to Abu Rahmah since the villagers

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[104] The committees are loosely connected to the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, which was formed in 2009 by the Palestinian activists from all over the West Bank. It aims to facilitate coordination among villages. Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, 'About the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, viewed 10 May 2015, <http://popularstruggle.org/content/about>.

[105] Basel Mansour, 'A Victory for the Joint, Popular Struggle', *The Electronic Intifada*, 19 September 2007, viewed 09 September 2011, < https://electronicintifada.net/content/victory-joint-popular-struggle/7148>.

[106] Abdallah Abu Rahmah, Interview with the author, Ramallah, 19 July 2011.

in Bil'in do not work in Israel regularly, they do not need permits, and therefore they can be active participants of the movement, whereas residents of other villages fear losing their work permits if they attend or organise demonstrations.[107]

Finally, according to Palestinians, the primary inspiration for the anti-wall movement is the First Intifada (1987–1993).[108] The First Intifada and the accompanying ethos of non-violence constitute one of the major narrative traits of the struggle. As Abu Rahmah observes, 'we took the experience from the others like Gandhi and Mandela and the First Intifada and Mubarak Awad. And we add something from our experience' in order to create a new experience, a new struggle and a new movement.[109] Similarly, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee explains that popular committees

> … present a unique form of community based organising and resistance in the tradition of the first Palestinian Intifada. These diverse, non-partisan committees lead community resistance to Israeli occupation in various forms, such as marches, strikes, demonstrations, direct actions and legal campaigns, as well as supporting boycotts, divestment and sanctions.[110]

As expressed in the Popular Coordination Committee's motto, the ethos of the anti-wall movement is 'Nonviolence. Creativity. Joint Struggle'.[111]

The question remains: if the anti-wall movement is an excess of the Wall, what does this excess enable? Can it activate a possibility of a new life? Grosz argues

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[107] Ibid.

[108] Abdallah Abu Rahmah, Online communication with the author, 9 February 2015. Popular committees were initially formed during the First Intifada to meet the everyday needs of Palestinians during curfews. Their initial responsibilities were to supply basic foodstuffs, clandestine storage, food distribution, and community protection. These committees gradually became cornerstones of mobilisation in local struggles. According to Glenn Robinson, while popular committees during the First Intifada initially increased the cohesion of Palestinian society, they were later dominated by factional activists and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). As a result, they lost their broad social base. Gleen E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State the Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997) 94.

[109] Abu Rahmah, Online communication with the author. For details of Mubarak Awad's definition of resistance see Mubarak Awad, 'Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories', *Journal of Palestine Studies,*, 13/4 (1984), 22-36. For detailed discussion on the mobile and experimental character of the First Intifada see King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, Todd May, 'Deleuze and the Tale of Two Intifadas', in Anna Hickey-Moody and Peta Malins (eds.), *Deleuzian Encounters: Studies in Contemporary Social Issues* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 212-22.

[110] Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, 'About the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee'.

[111] Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, 'Under Repression: Policy Paper on Israeli Violations of the Civil and Political Rights of Members of the Popular Struggle Movement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory', (Ramallah: Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, September 2010).

that spatial excess fosters movement for the construction of a 'non-community': a community of those who do not belong to a community harvested by negative passions; a community that is not a 'social island within a sea of the same'; that is not an application of pre-existing principles of encounter with the other; that does not fence off itself with the paradigm of immunisation, but opens itself into affirmative difference, to becomings.[112] Grosz points out that non-community performs new connections and new alignments, where the power of the established order and norms of things are challenged. Non-community is the movement that produces unexpected intensities, peculiar sites of difference, and an affective transformation that problematises and confronts established subjectivities. It generates new terrains of action to perform new subjectivities that are not born out of otherness or sameness, but out of difference, and out of one's metamorphosis of becoming-a-stranger-to-oneself – becoming-other.

Grosz's non-community is analogous to Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of 'the outside', 'the exteriority', 'deterritorialisation' and 'lines of flight', which all challenge forces that resist change. In a Deleuzian lexicon, non-community is the movement that seeks to overturn fixed and binary relations that contain and imprison the social and national body, while at the same time exposing the same body to new and unpredictable relations, organisations, and territories. Non-community is also analogous to Esposito's 'common immunity' 'affirmative immunity', in that it does not fence life with negative protection. It is the return to difference, to the outside, rather than to sameness or to otherness, which rejects the encounter with the other as a perceived threat. The crucial condition of non-community is its 'outsideness' to the system that it exceeds.[113] Therefore, non-community is, Grosz writes, the encounter with the outside. It confronts the colonial and occupying system from the outside and remains in the outside. Consequently, non-community always remains as a movement of becoming-other.

Non-community constitutes the forces of what Svirsky calls 'Resistance A'. Resistance A is not reactionary: it is not a reaction to power arrangements.[114] Rather, it is born out of an excess of flows and forces that escape from colonial and occupying

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[112] Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Marcelo Svirsky, 'Resistance Is a Structure Not an Event', *Settler Colonial Studies,* (Forthcoming).

powers. Resistance A is produced external to the operation of systems. Unlike 'Resistance B', which is a 'display of resistance compelling majoritarian forces to adjust – such as the alter-wall movement –, or 'Resistance C', which is a 'display of resistance that becomes actualised and remains within the space of interiority of state power', Resistance A does not face power directly to generate a counter force.[115] Rather, it challenges power by speaking and acting external to its common institutions and established normative boundaries. Resistance A aims to produce an effect on the internal compositions of the individualities of subjects, which in turn alters common and collective relations and connections among them.[116] Resistance A, as the force of non-community, performs these relations and connections only by remaining as the outside in order to transform the inside, and in order to activate moments and terrains of deterritorialisation. How then does the anti-wall movement infect the Wall with its outside? Does this movement stimulate a non-community? Is it a display of Resistance A? How does the anti-wall movement change the encounter with the other and with one's internal connection to oneself?

First, as a joint struggle the anti-wall movement stimulates new connections between Israelis and Palestinians. One of the founders of the Masha camp, Raad Amer explains that the movement has improved Palestinian access to Israeli support, international and local media, enabling relations between Palestinians and Israelis hitherto not thought possible in particular during the peak of Al-Aqsa Intifada. Over the years opposition to the inclusion of Jewish Israelis in the movement has lessened.[117] Amer describes the joint movement as 'a great story of success, based on mutual respect and understanding of the needs of each side'.[118] The active and persistent presence of AAtW in demonstrations has been one of the driving forces

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[115] Ibid.

[116] Marcelo Svirsky, 'On the Study of Collaborative Struggles in Settler Societies', *Settler Colonial Studies,* 4/4 (2014b), 434-49.

[117] Haggai Matar, 'The Wall, 10 years on/ Part 6: What has the struggle achieved? ', *+972*, 9 May 2012, viewed on 14 March 2014, <http://972mag.com/the-wall-10-years-on-part-6-what-has-the-struggle-against-the-wall-achieved/45148/>. The inclusion of Jewish Israelis into the movement is still regarded as 'walking on a thin line' for many Palestinians. According to Stop the Wall, Palestinians were not still at ease with the inclusion of Israeli human rights organisations in the movement. The general perception among Palestinians is that the Israeli human rights organisations predominantly work to 'enlighten the occupation'. Due to the failure of past 'coexistence' projects that I discuss below, Palestinians remain suspicious of the involvement of Israelis. Anarchist Against the Wall (AAtW) is one of the few exceptions because of its very strong anti-Zionist, anti-occupation, and anti-colonisation position. Stop the Wall, Interview with the author, Ramallah, 05 July 2011.

[118] Ibid.

behind this change. Although joint demonstrations remain small, with the number of participants rarely reaching over five hundred, the foundation of AAtW was a blueprint for struggle against the Wall.[119] Their presence during demonstrations enables positive forces of interaction. As Uri Gordon from AAtW argues, the joint struggle has become an experiment in face-to-face encounters between Israelis and Palestinians where they can challenge their stereotypes of each other.[120] It is through this process of joint action that new subjectivities and new ways of life may emerge. Indeed, Abu Rahmah from the village Bil'in tells that Israelis coming to demonstrations have successfully altered the villagers' perception of Israelis as being 'bad people'.[121] Collaborative demonstrations, he adds, have not only changed the villagers' perceptions of Israeli activists, but also the villagers' attitudes towards them: 'now we are more welcoming. We know that they are coming for us, [Israelis] are not "bad"'.[122]

Consequently, opposition to the inclusion of Jewish Israelis in the movement has become increasingly marginalised over the years mostly because the movement is shaped through a minor composition and it does not impose or ask to adjust a majoritarian framework, as alter-wall discourse seeks to do. One of the most important features of the struggle against the Wall is that, as an Israeli activist from AAtW, Jonathan Pollak explains, it is 'a Palestinian movement undermining Israeli occupation in a very basic, insurrectionary way … it is a Palestinian thing'.[123] Demonstrations are organised by Palestinians. Israelis are invited to these demonstrations. The joint struggle against the Wall refuses the voice and the power of the majority in determining the limits of resistance or transformations. In this sense, it presents a shift from co-existence to what Svirsky calls 'co-resistance': 'the collaborative alliance of Israelis and Palestinians struggling to bring Zionist

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[119] Polly Pallister-Wilkins, 'Radical Ground: Israeli and Palestinian Activists and Joint Protest against the Wall', *Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest,* 8/4 (2009), 393-407. AAtW is not the only Israeli group joining the demonstrations in the West Bank. Many other Israeli groups, such as Ta'ayush, and in some cases Gush Shalom and Rabbis for Human Rights are also present in demonstrations. With it 'anarchist-organized, non-hierarchical and directly democratic' nature, AAtW presents a different political position from these groups. AAtW is the main group, which shapes the central premises of the joint struggle discussed in this section.
[120] Uri Gordon, 'Against the Wall: Anarchist Mobilization in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', *Peace and Change,* 35/3 (2010), 420.
[121] Abu Rahmah, Interview with the author.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Rebecca Vilkomerson, 'An Interview with Israeli Activist', *The Nation*, 10 March 2011, viewed 1 July 2013, <http://www.thenation.com/article/interview-israeli-activist-jonathan-pollak/>.

settlerism to an end. Co-resistance is about the way we struggle'.[124] The words of Muhammad Khatib, one of the Bil'in popular committee activists, capture the minor composition of this struggle and the necessity of a collaborative alliance:

> Israeli supporters were always our partners …. It's true that it is our struggle, but they are partners in every way. It is important that more Israelis come so that we can show that they too oppose the occupation, that they affect public opinion in Israel, especially now that the Israeli public is moving toward the radical right. They must demonstrate their opposition to segregation.[125]

With these features, the anti-wall movement diverges fundamentally from earlier Peace Movement models and coexistence projects. As Gordon and Svirsky argue, co-existence projects, such as Seeds for Peace summer camps and youth dialogue camps, assume equality between the occupier and the occupied at the time of an ongoing conflict, and therefore hide the privileged status of Israelis joining these projects.[126] The Israeli Peace Movement does not hide this inequality, instead it reinforces that inequality by imposing a distinctively orientalist framework on the nature of peace and how it should be secured. In the discourse of the Israeli Peace Movement, Palestinians become silent child-like victims of the occupation and Israelis are seen as colonial liberators.[127] These models construct Palestinians as victims who are silenced, oppressed, or waiting to be emancipated within the system defined and imposed upon it by the majority.

Unlike these 'co-existence' models, 'co-resistance' against the Wall seeks to form a new relationship, a community in the form of a 'non-community' linking Israeli and Palestinian activists. Their collaboration does not mask the unequal relationship that is established by their identities and recognises the power imbalances between Israelis and Palestinians. Noa Shaindlinger, an Israeli activist expresses:

> We do not wish to be treated as 'equals' or to lead the struggle. On the contrary: we do not make demands, and we are not attempting to lead or be

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[124] Svirsky, 'On the Study of Collaborative Struggles in Settler Societies', 440.

[125] Quoted in Haggai Matar, 'A consciousness free of occupation: Bil'in marks 10 years of popular struggle', +972, 26 February 2015, viewed 27 February 2015, <http://972mag.com/a-consciouness-free-of-occupation-bilin-marks-10-years-of-popular-struggle/103266/>.

[126] Gordon, 'Against the Wall: Anarchist Mobilization in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', (, Svirsky, 'On the Study of Collaborative Struggles in Settler Societies', 440.

[127] For an overview of the Israeli Peace Movement see Hermann, *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*. As Hermann argues, the Israeli peace movement, which is largely represented by the Ashkenazi Jewish-Israelis, does not challenge the militarism embedded in Israeli society. The peace movement is largely built upon the legacy of Zionist narrative and the Israeli national ethos.

decision-makers in this process. At most, we see ourselves as allies, junior partners in a joint struggle. 'Joint' does not mean equal partnership, but it does indicate our deepest commitment to and solidarity with the ongoing Palestinian struggle for liberation from the shackles of colonialism and apartheid. The fight to end racial oppressions must entail a joint struggle that brings together people of different ethnicities and creeds, including those who enjoy colonial privileges, to demand an end to a racist regime.[128]

This movement constitutes the non-community of those Palestinians and Israelis not only seeking escape from the occupying and colonising forces of Zionism, the established norms of militarisation, and racism in their societies, but also seeking to overturn these structures to foster a new form of post-colonial community.

Second, the anti-wall movement releases an effect on the internal composition of existing subjectivities. This effect encourages participants to challenge and to traverse established identities from the outside: it welcomes becoming-a-stranger-to-oneself, becoming-other. Joint demonstrations do not hide the Israeli activists' identities as occupiers, normalise those identities or turn the Israeli activists into 'native Palestinians'. The Israeli activists recognise their Jewish-Israeli identity.[129] However, such recognition does not mean that the joint struggle relies on already present identities. The Israeli activists do not seek to challenge existing identities by masking or disassociating themselves from that identity. Rather, through problematising their Jewish-Israeli identity and the problematic role it plays in coexistence projects of the Israeli Peace movements and in existing political solutions, the Israeli activists acknowledge the impossibility of a coherent identity, and in doing so, they offer a passage to the difference. The joint struggle as 'sparkle of the outside', seeks to traverse established identities and their presumed unities. Roy Wagner, an activist contributing to the West Bank demonstrations, for example, does not leave his Jewish-Israeli-middle class-Ashkenazi identity behind. Instead, he confronts and deconstructs it in order to become a stranger to himself, to become

[128] Noa Shaindlinger, 'Thoughts on a joint but unequal Palestinian Israeli struggle', *+972*, 24 June 2012, viewed 12 February 2014, < http://972mag.com/thoughts-on-a-joint-yet-unequal-palestinian-israeli-liberation-struggle/49242/>.
[129] Linah Alsaafin argues that there is no such a thing as 'joint' struggle mainly because the Israeli anarchists do not even identify themselves as Israelis. However, I argue that close consideration of the opinions of AAtW suggests that activists identify themselves as Israelis, but use this identification to challenge Zionist left discourse. AAtW explicitly defines itself as an 'Israeli group supporting popular resistance to the Israeli separation wall'. See Anarchists Against the Wall, viewed 24 December 2014, <http://www.awalls.org/>, Alsaafin, 'How obsession with 'non-violence' harms Palestinian violence'.

other. Wagner perceives his privileged life as a Jewish-Israeli living in Tel-Aviv as one of the causes of Palestinians' problems and ongoing conflict:

> I, an occupier, a participant in the violence that enables much of their nationalism and chauvinism, can't cast judgement. Criticizing from my position won't do any good, it will only reassert my position as the whiter man who knows better and pretends to speak from a higher moral ground. My place, then, is to express solidarity with their struggles on their terms, especially (but not only) where these struggles challenge nationalism and chauvinism, building the scaffolding for our common future struggles for a better life together beyond occupation …. I felt [Jewish Israeli compatriots'] nationalist and conservative agenda was something I must reject …. I act in solidarity with people whose plight has to do with my privilege. Since I am part of their problem, it's pointless for me to patronize them over how their communities go wrong; my role is to work in solidarity when they fight to make things better. With those who share my privileges though not my politics, with those whose wrongs are so densely interlinked with mine, I feel that I don't have enough of a common language to talk about what's wrong.[130]

The anti-wall movement has a further effect within Palestinian society. Abu Rahmah elaborates how struggle against the Wall transforms Bil'in. He argues that as a common enemy that inflicts suffering on all of the villagers it unites them:

> We call each other whatever happens now, not just for political matters, but for everything. We support each other more closely now. We are more organised. Our life is more organised …. There is solidarity in every aspect of our lives now.[131]

Perhaps most importantly, the anti-wall movement encourages deconstructing established territories of gender roles in Palestine. This is evident in the increasing role of Palestinian youth and women in the movement. Women actively participate in demonstrations in Budrus, Nabi Saleh, and Al-Walaja. They perform several roles in the struggle including joining demonstrations, documenting, and delivering first aid to injured demonstrators.[132] Women's participation in the struggle is not as strong

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[130] Noam Sheizaf, 'Anarchists: The most important activists on the Jewish Israeli left', *+972*, 8 July 2012, viewed 25 August 2014, < http://972mag.com/anarchists-the-most-important-activists-on-the-jewish-israeli-left/50269/>.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 'Women and the Struggle against the Wall in the West Bank'.

and persistent as it was during the First Intifada: throughout the West Bank it is mostly ad-hoc. Their involvement in the struggle depends on the size of the community, dominant cultural roles, and educational and economic factors.[133] For example, while women have played a very active role in Budrus, their presence is very limited in Bil'in. Despite limitations, there are considerable efforts to strengthen women's voices. In 2003 a network called Women against the Wall was founded. Its aim is to establish a women's branch for each male-dominated popular committee in order to strengthen women's voices in decision-making processes.[134] The participation of Palestinian women makes the struggle a genuinely mobile one that not only challenges the Israeli occupation and colonisation, but also disrupts patriarchal territorialisation of women as mothers and carers. Ayed Morrar, from Budrus, expresses:

> We discovered that Palestinian women do not prefer to stay in the kitchen and prepare food for the men coming back from the demonstrations. They want to be the heroes as well, to participate and to take a leading role in our national struggle for freedom.[135]

Sophie Richter-Devroe observes that Women against the Wall not only mobilises women for struggle against the Wall, but also activates the struggle against gender hierarchies in the organisational structures of popular resistance and popular committees.[136]

Finally, the non-community of the anti-wall movement releases its energies through seeking to invest new ways of life in Israel-Palestine. It does not imprison itself within the familiar narratives of the two-state solution. As Caroline Mass Dibiasi observes, the establishment of a Palestinian state is no longer a dominant point of reference.[137] Rather, the emphasis is on human rights wherever they are violated and suppressed. After the victory of Bil'in in the Israel High Court regarding

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[133] Ibid.
[134] Sophie Richter-Devroe, 'Defending Their Land, Protecting Their Men', *International Feminist Journal of Politics,* 14/2 (2012), 181-201.
[135] Quoted in Jody McIntyre, 'Interview: Budrus "built a model of civil resistance"', *The Electronic Intifada*, 4 November 2010, viewed 12 October 2013, < https://electronicintifada.net/content/interview-budrus-built-model-civil-resistance/9774>.
[136] Richter-Devroe, 'Defending Their Land, Protecting Their Men', 181-201.
[137] Caroline Mall Dibiasi, 'Changing Trends in Palestinian Political Activism: The Second Intifada, the Wall Protests, and the Human Rights Turn', *Geopolitics,* 20/3 (2015), 1-27.

the Wall's route, Abu Rahmah explained that their aim was not only to 'stop the wall'; that its scope was much broader:

> I think it is difficult to stop our non-violent resistance now. We will continue it towards any human rights violations in any parts of the world. South Africa, Egypt. Now the movement is not just for Palestinians (yes it is our priority now), but for people.[138]

Similar remarks are also made by the AAtW activists: 'This is not a national liberation struggle it is a human rights struggle. Well, it is a national liberation struggle, but first of all it's a human rights struggle for freedom and equality'.[139]

With its autonomous language, the anti-wall movement is not shaped by existing political solutions: it does not aim to reproduce a collective subject that will call upon already present boundaries of Israel-Palestine. Rather, with its experimental nature, the non-community of the movement offers open-ended fluid transformations. While the greater goal of the struggle is to end the occupation, its premises extend beyond it: it challenges nationalism and racism in all forms and it envisions a 'postcolonial society for Israelis and Palestinians'.[140] As Wagner states, AAtW aims to end 'Zionist colonialism [, which] was justified within Israel up until 1967'.[141] The early booklets of AAtW similarly suggest that the Israeli activists do not limit their actions with the question of occupation, rather they problematise the 1948 war, the military rule imposed on Palestinian citizens of Israel between 1948 and 1966, and the ongoing racism and discrimination occurring within the borders of Israel 'proper'.[142] In this sense, the joint struggle against the Wall bridges both sides of the Green Line by fundamentally unsettling the idea of Israel 'proper'. The Israeli

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[138] Abu Rahmah, Interview with the author. For example, most recently, Palestinians showed solidarity with the residents of Baltimore and issued a declaration of support for those struggling against racial injustices.
[139] Raz, 'Accidental Interview of an Anarchists', *We Are All Anarchists Against the Wall*, 14 October 2004, viewed 16 January 2012, <http://www.fdca.it/fdcaen/press/pamphlets/waaaatw.htm>.
[140] Shaindlinger, 'Thoughts on a joint but unequal Palestinian Israeli struggle'.
[141] Wagner, 'Navigating privilege, solidarity and belonging: A chapter from the new book 'Anarchists Against the Wall''.
[142] Anarchists Against the Wall, *Opposing the Bulldozers, the Army and the Occupation Through Direct Action and A Joint Popular Struggle*, AAtW, viewed 25 March 2012, <http://www.awalls.org/>, Anarchists Against the Wall, *We Are All Anarchists Against the Wall*, AAtW, 14 October 2004, viewed 16 January 2012, <http://www.fdca.it/fdcaen/press/pamphlets/waaaatw.htm>.

activists raise the issue that the regime within Israel 'proper' cannot be separated from the regime of occupation – that they mutually reinforce each other. The movement bridges 'two sides of the Green Line' by organising protests within the borders of 'Israel proper' to raise public awareness of things 'that are being done in [Israelis'] name just 20 kilometres away from Tel Aviv'.[143] These actions have included changing the names of Tel Aviv streets into the names of streets in occupied Hebron, posting stickers denouncing 'price tag' actions by settlers against Palestinians, and returning US-manufactured tear gas canisters used by the Israeli army at West Bank demonstrations to US ambassadors.

To conclude, as the creative, mobile and rhizomatic movement of a non-community, the anti-wall movement aims to offer new ways of life through calling into question the established modes of being in every aspect of life in order to inscribe a different form of space in Israel and Palestine. Noam Sheizaf perfectly summarises the central dynamic of this non-community:

> It would not be an exaggeration to say my acquaintance with [Palestinians] fundamentally altered my political perception. One aspect of that activism is to think politically about all our life choices – what we eat, who we exploit through our work and how we oppress others. The other side is to engage in continuous determined political action.[144]

b. Creative excess

In 2005 the villagers of Bil'in 'occupied' the settlers' side of the Wall with a shipping container. Their aim was to challenge the occupying force by 'mimicking' its own practices of occupation.[145] The Israeli army removed the container several times, but the villagers continued reinstalling it, arguing that the container was no more illegal than the settler outposts. They insisted that if settlers constructed outposts without permits, Palestinians too should have had the right to do the same.[146] Gradually, this

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[143] Ibid.
[144] Sheizaf, 'Anarchists: The most important activists on the Jewish Israeli left'.
[145] Abu Rahmah, Online communication with the author.
[146] This creative strategy was later used as a legal strategy. The Israeli High Court gave temporary permission to the villagers to use their container (Overmeyer, 2014). The first successful recovery of land by direct protest action of a West Bank village occurred in 1986. The action was initiated by Awad in the village of Tqu when an elder approached to him to see Awad's ideas of non-violence in practice (King, 2007: 147-149). Laura Overmeyer, 'Interview with Abdallah Abu Rahmah', *Qantara*, 21 November 2014, viewed 10 September 2014, <https://en.qantara.de/content/interview-with-

container has been turned into a 'mobile home' as the villagers call it. It is now a meeting point where demonstrations against the Wall are organised. The 'mobile home' is one of the many examples of the ways in which the anti-wall movement reappropriates the space of the Wall in order to offer new ways of using the same space beyond its occupational function. As Grozs's description of spatial excess further encourages us to ask: can the Wall itself operate as something other than how it is supposed to operate; how is the Wall's striated space cut by its smooth space?

Since the first days of its construction, the Wall has activated many artistic forms of action. As part of the anti-wall movement, graffiti, photography, performance art, movies and documentaries, and participatory media projects have reconfigured the Wall's occupational functions and turned it into an experimental, collaborative and creative space. The creative excess of the Wall brings Palestinian, Israeli and international artists together. Participatory media projects, Julie Norman observes, create a space for community engagement and enhance dialogue between youth and adults.[147] Similarly, collaborative art projects, such as those of Artists without Walls, traverse the surveillance and boundary functions of the Wall.[148] Furthermore, graffiti, posters, commercial advertisements, and murals turn the Wall into a platform for global communication.[149] As Craig Larkin writes, graffiti with its non-organised and experimental nature functions as a medium for communication in a climate of extreme control. Graffiti on the Wall operates as an arena for

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abdallah-abu-rahma-creative-resistance-to-barbed-wire-and-walls>, King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*.

[147] Julie M. Norman, 'Creative Activism: Youth Media in Palestine', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication,* 2 (2009), 251-74.

[148] Artists without Walls is a group of international, Israeli and Palestinian artists. In April 2004, in Abu Dis, with the aim of rendering the Wall virtually transparent and penetrable, they placed cameras on both sides of the Wall. Each camera was directed at the view looking out from each side of the Wall and was connected to a projector located on the other side of the Wall. The aim was to project the recorded footage on opposite sides of the Wall simultaneously in real time, thereby creating 'a virtual window in the Wall via closed-circuit video'. Eyal Danon and Galit Eilat (eds.), *Liminal Spaces 2006-2009* (Tel Aviv: The Center for Digital Art, 2009).

[149] The Wall graffiti is one of the most discussed aspects of the Wall due to its visibility for researchers visiting Palestine, in particular Bethlehem. In such terms, researchers investigating, writing and publishing about the Wall graffiti should not be seen as passive observers. Rather, they should be seen as active performers of the 'spatial excess' of the Wall. See David Hanauer, 'The Discursive Construction of the Separation Wall at Abu Dis', *Journal of Language and Politics,* 10/3 (2011), 301-21, Rebecca Gould, 'The Materiality of Resistance: Israel's Apartheid Wall in an Age of Globalization ', *Social Text,* 32/1 (2014), 1-21, Ronen Eidelman, 'The Separation Wall in Palestine: Artists Love to Hate It', *Thamyris/Intersecting,* 21 (2010), 95-114, Simon Faulkner, 'The Most Photographed Wall in the World', *Photographies,* 5/2 (2012), 223-42, Craig Larkin, 'Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board: Graffiti,Murals, and the Art of Sumud', *Arab Studies Journal,* 22/1 (2014), 134-69, Steven Olberg, *Political Graffiti on the West Bank Wall in Israel/Palestine*, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Saint Thomas, 2011.

'counterpublics' in which multiple and contradictory international voices can engage with the local populace.150 Through the practice of art, the Wall becomes a site in which creative politics materialise. As one of the artists of Artists without Walls writes, the practice of art is a form of imaginative politics: it is the material outcome of the imagination of the viewer and the imaginative exchange between the viewer and the artists.151 Similar to the operation of the border-wall art in the context of the US-Mexico border, the Wall art:

> … portrays marginalized points of view, critiques dominant messages, and not only posits alternate possibilities, but creates them …. Performative border art also defies the limit of the wall, rehearsing transgressions that allow imagination to transcend the wall's brute technologized and material limit.152

The creative excess also defines the Friday demonstrations of Bil'in. As is now widely documented, the creative protest actions of Bil'in take many forms: playing football over the fence in 2010 during the World Cup; holding mirrors and using the sunlight to project the words, 'no wall', onto the soldiers; leading bicycle tours along the route of the Wall; wearing Avatar costumes; locking activists in cages attached to the ground where bulldozers operate; initiating kite contests; replanting trees after the Israeli army uproots them; creating a garden using tear gas canisters as pots. According to Abu Rahmah, creativity is seen as a path to success, because interesting demonstrations attract international attention and solidarity.153 But most importantly, these protest actions also aim to use the creativity of the Palestinian youth and to encourage them to express themselves in creative ways.154

Beyond the strategic use of creativity, Friday demonstrations in Bil'in transform the walled space of Bil'in into a theatrical stage. They function to blur boundaries between the performer and the audience, metaphor and real, humour and drama, and outside and inside. In doing so, they expose political contradictions and challenge normalised representations. Everyone, including the Israeli soldiers and

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150 Larkin, 'Jerusalem's Separation Wall and Global Message Board: Graffiti,Murals, and the Art of Sumud', 134-168.
151 Danon and Eilat (eds.), *Liminal Spaces 2006-2009*, 22.
152 Edward Casey and Mary Watkins, *Up against the Wall: Re-Imagining the US-Mexico Border* (Austin: University of Texas, 2014) 208.
153 Abu Rahmah, Online communication with the author.
154 Ibid.

media representatives, become active participants of these demonstrations. The extensive use of force by the Israeli army unintentionally turns the soldiers into one of the performers. The extensive use of force against non-violent forms of protest challenges normalised and dominant representations of Palestinians as violent in international and Israeli mainstream media. As Ranie Jawad writes, in these demonstrations 'one's presence … becomes politicised. There is no outside from which to 'objectively' observe the confrontation that ritually takes place'.[155] These demonstrations challenge the territorialising function of the Wall by releasing the Wall's creative excess.

It is not my intention to idealise the anti-wall movement. The struggle against the Wall has been criticised for not achieving tangible results and not putting sufficient pressure on ending the Israeli occupation or removing the Wall. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of popular committees through Bil'in international conferences, which attract more international participants than local Palestinians, and possibility of NGOisation of the Popular Coordination Committee can indeed pose a danger to centralise the movement.[156] Perhaps more important is the issue of whether the anti-wall movement, as the Wall's excess, has created a new life in Israel and Palestine? The answer is no. At the time of writing, Prime Minister Netanyahu is recommending completion of the Wall around Israel 'to protect it from wild beasts'; the conflict between settlers and Palestinians has intensified; the Palestinian citizens of Israel are becoming increasingly marginalised; freedom of speech is getting more restricted through a series of legal regulations in Israel 'proper'; and Palestinians continue to suffer every day at checkpoints and in their own homes.[157]

However, I suggest that a possibility of a new life is born out of the excess of the Wall – a possibility of a 'movement from one form of existence into another'.[158] Grosz reminds us that performing alternative forms of space through the movement of non-community may generate 'the possibility of exchange between and across

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[155] Rania Jawad, 'Staging Resistance in Bil'in: The Performance of Violence in a Palestinian Village', *TDR: The Drama Review,* 55/4 (2011), 136.
[156] The Popular Committee seeks to facilitate conversation among villages without dominating or institutionalising the movement. It stresses independence and uniqueness of local committees. Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, 'About the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee'.
[157] Peter Beaumont, 'Netanyahu Plans Fence around Israel to Protest It from 'Wild Beasts',' *The Guardian,* 10 February 2016
[158] Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*, 9.

difference', and as a result, 'space, or spaces, may become a mode of accommodation and inhabitation rather than commonness that communities divide and share'.[159] The Wall's excess activates this possibility through the movement of non-community. The anti-wall movement acts as a reminder that the established order of things in Israel and Palestine is no longer working. That order always has an excess, and it is that excess which problematises the ongoing conflict, its history and its present.

My intention in this chapter has been to reveal how the Wall constitute heterotopia: a fluid meshwork space formed by the entanglements of multiple life-lines. I have shown how the Wall moves backwards and forwards with the different forces that constitute it. Furthermore, in my discussion of the lines of flight, I have sought to argue that the movement of this line does not have an end state, it is always experimental in itself. I argue that the Wall's excess is a force without fixed boundaries and without ready-made outcomes. The excess, as many would argue, may fall back into the forces of reterritorialisation. The anti-wall movement as an excess nonetheless may also lead to deterritorialisation in Israel and Palestine, leading towards a genuinely postcolonial society. As Deleuze and Guattari observe, it may appear as if nothing happens in the present, and yet 'everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment'.[160] The transformative potential of 'spatial excess' is thus its resistance to the present: it is the creation of a new life in Israel and Palestine that is not yet achieved, that has not yet unfolded.

[159] Ibid.157.
[160] Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?,* 158.

INTERMEZZO

REPEATING ISLANDS

Islands are now one of the sites where contemporary 'crisis' of sovereign borders are generated and perpetuated. In recent years, in particular the islands of the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea have become main points of arrival along 'escape routes'. In 2016 alone, approximately 164.000 refugees arrived in the Greek Islands, and 200.000 in Sicily including Lampedusa.[1] During their deadly journeys, approximately 3600 refugees drowned or were reported as missing.[2] In order to contain this movement, states now increasingly seek new ways to utilise islands as stockades safeguarding the mainland from the spread of this so-called 'crisis'. They blur the distinction between humanitarian and security practices or block the humanitarian work, and use islands as sites of exclusion, detention and deportation. In the contemporary context of the border, as Alison Mountz writes, islands have become sites where the sovereign and biopolitical practices empower each other with an aim to secure the fixed and exclusive boundaries of a given state, nation and territory.[3]

This intermezzo seeks the historical conditions that enabled the construction of contemporary state of islands as sites of 'secure' borders, and as spaces of exclusion and detention. It argues that the land and sea boundary that islands generate in our imaginations is not as natural as it first seems. The dominant representation of the island as a space starkly separated from the sea, and as a space of isolation and insularity has come to seem natural as an effect of certain political, social and cultural molar structures that has shaped the possibility of the contemporary violent borders. That is, the land and sea boundary of the island is not given; it is not a product of its natural geographical features. As Epeli Hau'Ofa powerfully argues, for many

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[1] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response', viewed 10 November 2016, < http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Alison Mountz, 'The Enforcement Archipelago: Detention, Haunting and Asylum on Islands', *Political Geography,* 30 (2011), 119.

indigenous cultures in the Pacific, for example, the coast does not constitute a boundary between land and sea.[4] Rather, it functions as a passage; a space of connections between people, animals and nature. The imagined boundary of the island is therefore a historically constructed and contingent political practice. It is the product of particular historical events in Western knowledge, its institutional structures, narratives and moral codes which established and perpetuated certain molar formations. It was these events which facilitated the configuration of the island as a border site. These events performed the border as a representative of the inside and the outside, and the self and the other, and they eventually made the island a porotype of the modern nation state, and a site of exclusion and detention where the very being of that state could be secured and perpetuated. These performances and their colonial geopolitical mode of rationality that were created under the heading of security and economic progress further transformed islands into spaces of 'emptiness', 'wilderness' and 'isolation' waiting to be occupied, modernised and tamed. These representations not only empowered Western colonisation, but also enabled the repetition of binary border thinking embedded in Western modernity in the massive tracts of non-Western territories.

This intermezzo is then about 'repeating islands': how these events have re/de-assembled the island in particular forms and connected it to the machines of certain molar and molecular structures that govern and disturb these formations.[5] Here 'repetition', to note once again, does not refer to a condition of reiterating the same thing over and over again. Instead, repetition is 'connected to the power of difference in terms of a productive process that produces variation in and through every repetition'.[6] Every repetition entails a difference in that the 'repeating island' moves in a different direction and takes a different form each time that form (re)appears. By entering into new relations with the machines of different assemblages, the 'repeating island' creates new functions and produces new connections and collisions among institutions, bodies and discourses. In each repetition, the 'repeating island' forms new relations, territories, affects, cracks and ruptures. Drawing on such understanding of 'repeating island', I argue that the island is not a static space, but a heterotopic one composed of fluid forms, statements and

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[4] Epeli Hau'ofa, 'Our Seas of Islands', *The Contemporary Pacific*, 6/1 (1994), 147-161.
[5] Benítez-Rojo, *The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective*.
[6] Parr, 'Repetition', 225.

functions: a fluid meshwork space that is constituted by and constitutive of multiple lines. The repeating island and its imposed border *move* with the different forces which foster their constitution, preservation, disruption and transformation.

This intermezzo begins with unfolding the performative functions of Western island utopia that enabled the production of island borders. This discussion follows by navigating colonial islands and the ways in which they were used as biopolitical machines of the Western 'disease assemblage'. The final section returns to discussion of contemporary border enforcement practices on islands. By focusing in particular on Europe's new border assemblages, the section seeks to explore simultaneous operation of the multiple 'life-lines' of islands. It explores how security practices and different forms of resistance and contestation interweave with one another on islands and how these practices transform islands into heterotopias.

1. Discursive and cartographic imaginations: island utopias

In *Islands of the Mind*, John Gills argues that since Plato islands have played an indispensable role in the development of Western thought. He writes that 'western culture not only thinks about islands, but thinks *with* them'.[7] Indeed, islands were born as discursive spaces in Western imagination long before they functioned as colonial spaces, leper colonies, or carceral sites. They were first imagined and narrated before they became the agents of Western geopolitical practices. Islands operated as one of the most powerful tropes in early Greek utopian literature. During the Middle Ages, islands were depicted as 'New Jerusalems'.[8] Since the Early Modern period, utopia has invariably been located on islands or island-like landscapes. The isolated island and the shipwrecked and adventurous heroic sailor taming the deserted island were common elements in modern utopian literature. As Simone Pinet argues, the narrated island – the discursive island – was therefore was both the space of possibility and historically produced space.[9] The discursive island was not a brute representation of the external world. Rather, it worked as one of the performatives of the material world divided into concrete units by borders. The

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[7] John Gillis, *Islands of the Mind: How the Human Imagination Created the Atlantic World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004) 1 [Emphasis in original].
[8] Ibid. 83-100.
[9] Simone Pinet, *Archipelagoes: Insular Fictions from Chivalric Romance to the Novel* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).

performative function of the discursive island exhibited its own flows and breaks, and created its own connections to other political, social and territorial constructions.

The sea and the island comprised the major elements in the early environment of Greek topophilia.[10] The ancient Greek mind imagined the world as an island.[11] The sea and the island appeared frequently in the Homeric epics. Islands were regarded as both ideal spaces and threatening forces.[12] The function of discursive island in performing binary thinking that idealises limits, enclosures, insularity and boundaries, however, mainly developed during the early Middle Ages. In particular, from the fourteenth century onwards, the discursive island constituted a space that accommodated a new relation between the virtual and the actual, classical and modern space, and between geography, history and politics.[13] In the medieval imaginary, the island began to occupy a divine space. The insular tradition was one of the first narratives of the Middle Ages, conceiving the world as a closed and spatially finite, hierarchically organised cosmos involving – and devolving – circles of hell and heaven.[14] Reflecting this imaginary, islands were represented as encircled spaces. This particular depiction of the island was the constitutive element of the moral topography of the era. The governing mind of medievalism represented the material landscape of the city in the same way in which Eden was imagined as having circular boundaries surrounded by walls.[15] Similarly, the island utopias of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries resembled the ancient and medieval Eden, although they also departed in some ways. Early utopias were divine sites, whereas modern utopias were man-made places: products of civilisation.[16] However, both idealised the notions of insularity and the security of self-contained worlds.

The discursive island appeared most powerfully in utopian literature of the European Renaissance. The utopian tradition brought together European exposure to the Americas, the critique of European societies, and the desire to create better social and political orders. In the utopian tradition the island played two performative

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[10] Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974) 120.

[11] Pinet, *Archipelagoes: Insular Fictions from Chivalric Romance to the Novel*, 33.

[12] Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values*, 120.

[13] Pinet, *Archipelagoes: Insular Fictions from Chivalric Romance to the Novel*.

[14] John R. Gillis, 'Taking History Offshore: Atlantic Islands in European Minds, 1400-1800', in Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith (eds.), *Islands in History and Representation* (London: Routledge, 2003), 21.

[15] Lilley, 'Mapping Cosmopolis: Moral Topographies of the Medieval City', 688.

[16] Gillis, 'Taking History Offshore: Atlantic Islands in European Minds, 1400-1800', 21.

functions. First, it was narrated as a self-contained space emerged as the most ideal form of spatial ordering, and therefore became the prerequisite to modern state formation. The Renaissance's island utopia was defined by its independence from the rest of the world. This independence was derived from the dichotomy of land and sea, and of island and continent. As a result, the modern island utopia reinforced the idea that a better society could only be achieved within an orderly and controlled space marked by borders. This discursive island created the perfect model for a potential modern political community defined by strict inside/outside boundaries and by autonomous self-sufficient units secured against the intervention of others by means of enclosure. The bounded space became a promise for a better life. In these terms, one may argue that island utopia was the emerging territory of the modern state. Second, the discursive island promised alternative lives and new possibilities in the newly created world, and in doing so it became the crucial element in Western colonial practices. The discursive field of island connected words with writers, philosophers, colonists and voyagers, with ships and seas, with navigation apparatuses, and with colonised continents, islands and indigenous populations – it operated as an abstract machine of Western colonial assemblage.

Thomas More's *Utopia* is a paradigmatic example of this tradition: idealising borders; creating a distinct separation of inside from outside, land from sea, and citizen from stranger.[17] It is therefore not surprising that More's text – written barely a quarter-century after Columbus's journey to the Caribbean – described an island utopia located in the 'New World'. It was also not coincidental that the concepts of limit and enclosure were the main tropes of the story, which was written at a time when the modern conception of the state was emerging in Europe and the enclosure movement was occurring in England. As Peter Nyers argues, far from being a utopian tract with no relevance to modern international politics, More's text emphasises

> how the enclosure that provides the condition of possibility for the anarchic international realm is precisely that enclosure which allows for the ideally ordered public space. [*Utopia*] relies upon the exclusionary logic of spatial enclosures, it also involves a sustained violence to the Other.[18]

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[17]Thomas More, *Utopia* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949).
[18] Peter Nyers, 'The Politics of Enclosure in Thomas More's *Utopia*', *Journal of Political Science,* 6 (2000), 1-20.

Nyers argues that More's *Utopia* places a great deal of emphasis on ensuring a secure, stable and an ordered inside protected from the dangers and the historical contingencies of the outside.[19] Indeed, More's *Utopia* venerates the enclosed and self-sufficient space through the idealised depiction of the fortified insular island, its interior cohesion and boundary practices drawn between strangers and its citizens. The insular geography of the island allowed More to draw very strict separations between the inside and the outside. The interior of More's island was defined by its orderliness, self-sufficiency, and sense of unity. The homogeneity of the inside was exemplified by the similarity of the fifty-four cities comprising the utopian state. These cities had limited but utilitarian relations with the outside, which was regarded as unpredictable, anarchic and threatening.

Carl Schmitt writes that even though More's *Utopia* was not a book of international law or politics, it nonetheless revealed the 'possibility of an enormous destruction of all orientations based on the old *nomos* of the Earth'.[20] In this way it can be said to have held the capacity to function as a catalyst for wide-reaching social and ontological change. Schmitt argues that since the book propounded discursive possibilities that could be implemented, *Utopia* was eutopia – a catalyst for the betterment of one's existing world. Indeed, *Utopia* was yet-to-come metamorphosis of the Earth: a new *nomos* of the Earth that came to be defined by autonomous homogeneous state units, freedom of seas, and colonisation. The discursive island of *Utopia,* in other words, constituted emerging linear territorial lines of the Earth.

Similarly, a century later Francis Bacon's discursive island, Bensalem, was defined by the same logic of insularity and the inside/outside dichotomy.[21] The island of Bensalem was again an idealised model of the modern political order. The spatial limits of the island were defined by its 'natural' borders. Its political governance was sustained by laws implemented by a single authority. The social organisation of the island was designed to preserve an internal unity and cohesion; and modern scientific rationality functioned as the island's main governing mechanism. Furthermore, Bacon's *New Atlantis* placed great emphasis on the state's relationship with the figure of the stranger, whose unauthorised irregular movement presented a threat for the

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[19] Ibid. 16.
[20] Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*, 178.
[21] Francis Bacon, 'New Atlantis 1627', in Richard Foster Jones (ed.), *Essays, Advancement of Learning, New Atlantis, and Other Pieces* (New York: The Oddssey Press, 1937), 449-91.

idealised social and political order. The spatial, social and political order of Bensalem enabled the state to interdict with foreign ships, and prohibited entrance of the stranger without a licence. Strangers could remain on the island only for sixteen days. During their stay, they were detained in the 'Strangers House'. Such practices of detention were seen as a form of political necessity.[22] One certainly does not need to be a careful reader of *New Atlantis* to see how present-day administrative detention of asylum seekers in Australia and elsewhere echoes the Bensalemites' existential fear of the figure of the stranger and the outside.

From at least the seventeenth century, Robert Shannan Peckham argues, the island in the discursive field began to develop as 'a site of double identity'.[23] On the one hand, the discursive island came to be a place of incarceration and control. On the other hand, it became a place of struggle for freedom and of authenticity, where one can return to himself/herself. Writing between 1776 and 1778 in *The Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, Jean Jacques Rousseau, for example, celebrated the island as an isolated and self-contained place where one can return to his authentic being.[24] For Rousseau, the island was a site for discovery – a place for happiness without the distraction of unpleasant objects and memories of the old world. He saw the ocean as a border between himself and the island, and as a bridge between the real and the imagined.[25] Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* similarly dealt with the theme of taming the unknown by enclosing it.

By the seventeenth century, these discursive islands gained another function. It began to operate as one of the abstract machines of the new spatial organisation of the nation state in Europe. The island utopia performed the possibility of re-organisation of political space that would suit the ambitions of specific political

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[22] The law-maker of the island, King Salomana, acknowledges that the incarceration of strangers without their will is an act against humanity. Therefore, he makes provisions to release strangers who are distressed. Such provisions, he believes, make Bensalem different from China, whose very strict border control practices are considered as 'ignorant, fearful, foolish'. Ibid. 467.

[23] Robert Shannan Peckham, 'The Uncertain State of Islands: National Identity and the Discourse of Islands in Nineteenth-Century Britain and Greece', *Journal of Historical Geogprahy,* 29/4 (2003), 502.

[24] Ibid. 499-515.

[25] Ibid. 510. John Locke depicts the island in a more dystopian way. In *Second Treatise of Civil Government* (1689), he makes a quick reference to Garcilasso de la Vega's story on Peru and the relationship between two men in a desert island. Not surprisingly, Locke describes the island as a place in a state of nature. His depiction of the island as being in a state of nature reflects his views on North America that I discussed earlier in the first intermezzo.

projects such as nationalism and colonialism.26 European island literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided a powerful language to nation building projects that foresaw a contented, sustainable political community as inherently enclosed and sovereign. It was, therefore, not coincidental that numerous 'Robinsonnades' were produced throughout Europe in the course of the nineteenth century.27 Furthermore, as Peckham observes, the framed perspective of the world that was performed by island utopias legitimated the imposition of taxonomic categories upon the world.28 The legacy of this vision of the island as insular and enclosed played an important part in nineteenth-century evolutionary science, which, again, was developed on islands.

The colonial function of the discursive island, imagined as a passive and an empty space, became evident during the same period. Between 1788 and 1910 in England alone over 500 desert-island stories were published.29 Elizabeth DeLoughrey argues that the widespread publication of the island-utopia narrative explains the great extent to which the inscription of the island trope in fiction upheld the logic of imperialism.30 The discursive island functioned as the abstract machine of colonial expansion and the appropriation of island-spaces as *terra nullius.* Australia is the paradigmatic example of this: as a settler colony, it was born as a fictional utopian concept – *Terra Australis Incognita* – which as an idea derived from the classical concept of the antipodes. The search for *Terra Australis Incognita* was a fixture of early exploration literature, mostly French.31 As Simon Ryan suggests, this imaginative construction of *Terra Australis*, an antipodean continent, was not simply

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26 Frank Lestringant, 'Utopia and the Reformation', in Roland Schaer, Gregory Claeys, and Lyman Tower Sargent (eds.), *Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 161-79.
27 Peckham, 'The Uncertain State of Islands: National Identity and the Discourse of Islands in Nineteenth-Century Britain and Greece', 502.
28 Ibid. 502.
29 Elizabeth M. Deloughrey, *Routes and Roots: Navigating Caribbean and Pacific Island Literatures* (Honolulu: The University of Hawai'i Press, 2007) 12-13.
30 Ibid. 13.
31 Lyman Tower Sargent, 'Australia as Dystopia and Eutopia', *ARENA Journal,* 31 (2008), 109-25, John Dunmore, *Utopias and Imaginary Voyages to Australia* (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1988). Alfred Hiatt notes that in the sixteenth-century maps *Terra Australis* was represented not only with an extensive coastline, but also with exotic interiors deriving from South America and Asia. In this regard *Terra Australis* was a manifestation of the age of exploration. From the early 1600s onwards, *Terra Australis* slowly ceded to European recognition of earlier French and Dutch explorations of the region, and eventually to James Cook's two mapped voyages between 1768 and 1775. Alfred Hiatt, 'Terra Australis and the Idea of the Antipodes', in Alfred Hiatt et al. (eds.), *European Perceptions of Terra Australis* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 9-44, Simon Ryan, *The Cartographic Eye: How Explorers Saw Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

the result of an aesthetic or pseudo-scientific desire for symmetry. This imagination functioned as an abstract map for early European responses to Australia. It was the antipodean tradition of *Terra Australis* that enabled the European construction of Australia's Indigenous population as strange and perverse: it was therefore the antipodean tradition that wrote the first scripts of sustained violence against the Aboriginal people.[32] The legacy of this tradition in constructing the other as strange and awkward has never disappeared; it still continues today in present-day Australia.[33]

The role of the discursive island in constituting the modern inside/outside dichotomy can also be observed the ways in which the 'cartographic island' operated both in imagination and in practice. Like the discursive island, the cartographic island contributed to the creation of new geographies in the form of bounded unities. Pinet's research on cartographic representations of islands shows us how during the Middle Ages the map functioned to contain the fear of the unknown sea.[34] The medieval culture was terrified by the sea, an unknown and an uncontrollable void. The sea was the limit: the coastline traced by the map designated a boundary for the space it conscribed. Cartographic mapping of islands played an important role in containing that fear.[35] Portolan charts produced during this era carefully depicted coastlines, harbours, bays, coastal and riverside towns.[36] As the primary concern was that of ascertaining the safest, most lucrative trade routes, these charts were not concerned with interior geography, but with the accuracy of land/sea boundaries; islands were depicted oversized, boldly and uniformly coloured, as if they were homogeneous spaces.[37] Such maps created empty frames in which – and from which – later imperial riches would be drawn.

Cartographic production of islands functioned as another abstract machines of the modern territorialisation of the Earth. The cartographic construction of island spaces in portolan cartography influenced modern mapping, which essentialised and totalised space according to the strict dichotomy of interior and exterior space, negatively emphasising the vacant, colonisable space of continental and island

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[32] Ryan, *The Cartographic Eye: How Explorers Saw Australia*.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Pinet, *Archipelagoes: Insular Fictions from Chivalric Romance to the Novel*.
[35] Ibid.31-33.
[36] Ibid. 33.
[37] Philip E. Steinberg, ' Insularity, Sovereinty and Statehood: The Representation of Islands on Portolan Charts and the Construction of the Territorial State', *Journal of compilation,* (2005), 262.

interiors.[38] By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, cartographers sought to depict territorial states as unique entities with precise borders separating the land from the sea.[39] By the nineteenth century as boundaries became more concrete in the way we understand them today, maps of the world concentrated on the borders of island and eventually of nation state. Philip Steinberg observes:

> [the] drawing of lines, which began with the drawing of coastlines around islands and migrated to the coastlines of the mainland, eventually led to the further drawing of lines that facilitated and characterized the internal territorial organisation projects of the era of development.[40]

In short, by establishing passages between the real and the imagined world, and the past and the future, discursive and cartographic islands performed an idealised image of the modernity constituted through a hierarchical order between inside and outside. Borders they inscribed gradually became the permanent normalised fixtures of modern political life. The discursive and the cartographic island contributed to the formation of new territories in the form of nation state with distinct borders separating the security of inside from threatening, unknown outside.

2. Colonising Islands, creating new borders

'Every important change in the image of Earth is inseparable from a political transformation, and so from a new repartition of the planet, a new territorial appropriation.… [a new] spatial order', writes Carl Schmitt in *Land and Sea*.[41] A 'spatial revolution' occurred with the age of discovery, when the 'originally terrestrial world' was altered, and a particular relationship between the spatial order of enclosable land and the spatial order of unbound sea was born.[42] As discussed in the first Intermezzo, for Schmitt space is a force-field – a cultural and social apperception and reconstruction of the world. Every *nomos* does originate from a new spatial order that creates new appropriations and new distributions of the Earth. European

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[38] Ibid. 253-62.
[39] Ibid. 262.
[40] Ibid. 253-62.
[41] Carl Schmitt, *Land and Sea*, trans. Simona Draghici (Washington D.C: Plutarch Press, 1997) 38.
[42] Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum*, 49.

exposure to the Americas, the circumnavigation, and further developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries activated a new perception of space, he argues. This new perception of space was hitherto unseen. It was not merely the discovery of new continents and oceans: it was a 'deep mutation' of old customs, beliefs, and laws, lands and seas:

> New spaces were opened that seemed endless to the Europeans who swarmed out to those distant expanses and treated the non-European and non-Christian peoples and countries which they discovered as abandoned property, devolving to the first occupier arriving from Europe. [43]

Spatial revolution was more than simply setting foot on previously unknown land. It was simultaneous deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation of islands. As Benítez-Rojo writes in a Deleuzian tone, this revolution began with 'Columbus's machine', which evolved into 'the Grandest machine of the Earth' through inventing and connecting new machines – naval machines, military machines, bureaucratic machines, commercial machines, political machines, legal machines and religious machines; each having its own master codes.[44] The new spatial turn took an archipelagic form of multiple connections and conjunctions. The discovery of the New World was not a discovery: rather, it was an act of connecting two worlds. This act did not conceive the sea as a boundary or a barrier, but a passage between the new and the old world – a passage for endless European expansion.

Islands constituted the major sites of this spatial revolution. Indeed, no territory had been systematically colonised as much as islands, the human and non-human resources of which were made extractable, calculable, orderable and governable. Islands were first occupied by the Europeans and then emptied, to be reassembled with new desires. They were made sites of cultural, scientific, and political experimentation. They were occupied by generations of European voyagers, cartographers, botanists, ethnographers, traders, slavers, scientists, armies, missionaries, and colonial officials. Islands first became forward bases for fishing and fur trading.[45] Then, they were transformed into sugar plantations sites. European

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[43] Schmitt, *Land and Sea*, 38.

[44] Benítez-Rojo, *The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective*, 6-8.

[45] Gillis, *Islands of the Mind: How the Human Imagination Created the Atlantic World*, 87.

experimentation in plantations, enslavement, and deforestation began in the Mediterranean islands.[46] With the age of discovery these experiments were repeated in islands of the Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Pacific oceans. As valuable sites for plantation production, slave labour, extraction of raw materials and military outposts, the economic and geostrategic importance of islands grew along with the rise of commercial capitalism and nationalism. By the end of the eighteenth century, 'every Atlantic island had been found, explored, and exploited to the fullest extent possible. At this point, the insular imagination moved on to the Pacific, where a whole new … [political] geography was in the process of formation'.[47]

Consequently, colonisation of islands turned islands into homogenised spaces where a set of artificial arrangements, calculations and stratifications took place. Colonisation imposed its own disciplinary and biopolitical lines. The European conceptions of space and its inside/outside dichotomy were imposed on the colonised islands. Such imposition established new movements with their own rhythms and forcefully transformed relations between native populations and their own land and sea. As Epeli Hau'ofa argues in the context of the Pacific, the colonisation of islands meant drawing artificial lines across the sea, which resulted in confining Ocean peoples to tiny spaces. Such practices territorialised the sea by transforming the Pacific from a 'sea of islands' into 'islands in the sea':

> Nineteenth century imperialism erected boundaries that led to the contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless world into the Pacific islands states and territories that we know today. People were confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. [48]

Such colonial practices and the historical inequalities between colonial powers and indigenous populations were never disappeared, but became the conditions of the present reappropriation of islands as carceral sites and as sites for border enforcement. Take the example of Guantanamo Bay, which has been a strategic colonial site since the first Spanish invasion in the fifteenth century. Amy Kaplan argues that one cannot understand the contemporary operation of

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[46] Ibid. 87.
[47] Gillis, 'Taking History Offshore: Atlantic Islands in European Minds, 1400-1800', 20
[48] Epeli Hau'ofa, 'Our Sea of Islands', *The Contemporary Pacific,* 6/1 (1994), 155.

Guantanamo Bay as a prison camp without looking at the history of the imperial and colonial relations between the United States (US), Cuba and Haiti. The contemporary prison does not operate independently from its historical operation as a pseudo-colonial outpost.[49] Although Guantanamo Bay was never formally an American colony, it operated as 'a site of uneven colonial exchanges between Cubans and Americans, as Cubans entered the naval base as labourers'.[50] In the twentieth century, Kaplan notes, Guantanamo Bay was transformed from a military outpost into a detention camp used to incarcerate undocumented immigrants from Haiti and Cuba, and later to detain and torture foreign combatants regarded as significant in terms of anti-US terrorist or military information. The contemporary operation of Guantanamo Bay therefore reflects the continuing salience of the 'colonial architecture of power'.[51]

Similarly, in the nineteenth century the Sicilian island of Lampedusa went through a long process of de/re-territorialisation as an Italian penal colony. Italy's contemporary repressive border-control policies against African refugees mimic the nineteenth century governmental practices of crime, law and order that were drawn profoundly along racial lines. These practices performed Africans as 'primitive, backward and barbaric'.[52] The modern performances of imagining the Italian nation-state as white, European and Northern have enabled the use of Lampedusa as a laboratory in which to implement racialised laws. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Italy was the first Mediterranean country to introduce sea patrolling in 1997 in order to control and prevent the human flow of migrants escaping Albania.[53] Similarly, as I will discuss in the following chapters, Australia's current use of Manus Island and Nauru as border enforcement sites is not coincidental; it is a recurring practice whose roots should be sought in colonisation of these islands. In short, the contemporary use of islands as border enforcement sites is not independent from the history of colonialism. Rather, it is the continuation of violent practices that performed islands as political spaces waiting to be occupied, emptied and appropriated for the social, political and cultural scripts of the Western imagination.

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[49] Amy Kaplan, 'Where Is Guantanamo?', *American Quartely,* 57/3 (2005), 831-58.
[50] Ibid. 838.
[51] Derek Gregory, 'The Black Flag: Guantanamo Bay and the Space of Exception', *Human Geography,* 88/4 (2006b), 405-27.
[52] Pugliese, 'Crisis Heterotopias and Border Zones of the Dead', 663-79.
[53] Raffaela Puggioni, 'Border Politics, Right to Life and Acts of Dissensus: Voices from Lampedusa Borderland', *Third World Quartely,* 36/6 (2015a), 1147.

3. Islands as machines of 'disease assemblage'

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a new function of the island began to emerge: a site of science and a site of isolation and quarantine that operated within the flows of Western colonial networks. On the one hand, the natural isolation of islands made them convenient laboratories for evolutionary theories exploring new life forms and the complex relationship between humans and nature. On the other hand, the same language of isolation enabled islands to function as biopolitical apparatuses of 'disease assemblage' of colonial practices.54 As Foucault observes, in the late eighteenth century two forms of power emerged. The first was disciplinary: the 'anatomo-politics of the body'.55 The second one was bio-power. Bio-power regarded the population – its birth rates, death, production, and illness – as a political problem that needed to be managed and regulated. As I discussed earlier in Chapter One, for Foucault biopolitics is 'the calculated management of life' that seeks to foster life.56 Biopolitics takes the biological life 'both as its object and its objective': 'its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its changes, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings'.57 It does not abandon the techniques of discipline. It rather integrates them, utilises them, and improves them. Biopolitics is therefore merging of 'the body-organism-discipline-institutions series with the 'population-biological process-regulatory mechanisms-State' series.58 It reassembles every kind of apparatuses and institutions in novel ways that it enables new forms of lives and spatial designs. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century the increasing use of islands as stations of quarantine and sites of isolation was exemplar of this transformation.59 In the colonial context, with the healthy body was started to be associated with the whiteness, islands became biopolitical sites of

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54 I borrowed the term 'disease assemblage' from Beth Greenhough. By 'disease assemblage', however, I refer to the simultaneous functioning of bureaucratic regimes, legal regulations, medical knowledge, and spatial constructions as part of colonial practices as well as acts of resistance. Beth Greenhough, 'Assembling an Island Laboratory', *Area,* 43/2 (2011), 134-38.

55 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction*. 139. See also Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*.

56 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction*, 140.

57 Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, 254.

58 Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*, 250.

59 Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith, 'Editor's Introduction', in Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith (eds.), *Islands in History and Representation* (London: Routledge, 2003), 3-4.

racial experiments. In this sense, islands played a role in the construction of the concept of 'disease' as a political actor in Western biopolitical imagination.

The use of islands in the management of leprosy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries constitutes a significant example on this point. As Rod Edmond and Alison Bashford write leprosy was a boundary disease.[60] Europeans associated leprosy with customs and habits of indigenous people, who were branded as unclean and dangerous for the white population.[61] Consequently, the management of leprosy became constitutive of the borders between the white and indigenous body, the healthy and the unhealthy body; between disease and treatment, and contaminated and uncontaminated space. In the colonial context, the management of leprosy intertwined 'with spatial governance of indigenous people throughout the British Empire, and with colonial laws as well as local rule[s] regulating movement, contact and institutionalisation'.[62] The isolated nature of islands made them ideal sites for the deportation, isolation, and exclusion of leprosy sufferers, and transformed islands into leper colonies which progressively created its own practices of power/knowledge. Epidemiologists, colonial medical officers, bacteriologists, police, and patients were all connected one another on the space of leper island giving birth to expert knowledge and experiments on leprosy, and panoptic forms of architectural styles.[63]

It is however wrong to see these islands simply as spaces of exclusion and isolation. The island as a leper colony was never only an abject site, but a heterotopic space in which capturing disciplinary-biopolitical practices were transgressed by the

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[60] Rod Edmond, *Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Alison Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism,Nationalism and Public Health* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003).

[61] Detailed discussion of the management of leprosy is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to say here that leprosy disappeared in Europe in the sixteenth century (except in Norway), but it was rediscovered in the nineteenth century in colonised locations. Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism,Nationalism and Public Health*.

[62] Ibid. 81.

[63] See ibid., Edmond, *Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History*, 81-114. Kalaupapa Island in Haiwaii (1866–1969), Culion Island in the Phillippines (1906–1980), Quail Island in New Zealand (1906–1925), Robben Island in South Africa (1845–1931), D'Arcy Island in Canada (1891–1924), and Nauru were the most well-known islands used for leprosy management. For detailed discussion of these islands and their role in the colonial context see R.D.K. Herman, 'Out of Sight, out of Mind, out of Power: Leprosy, Race and Colonization in Hawai'i', *Journal of Historical Geography,* 27/3 (2003), 319-17, Renisa Mawani, ''The Island of the Unclean': Race, Colonialism and 'Chinese Leprosy' in British Columbia, 1891 - 1924', *Law Social Justice and Global Development Journal,* 1 (2003), 1-29, Warmick Anderson, 'Leprosy and Citizenship', *positions,* 6/3 (1998), 707-30.

different processes of becoming. The management of leprosy transformed these islands into new heterogeneous places occupied with the movements not only of colonial officials, scientists, and medical doctors, but also of journalists, travellers, novelists, and social activists. Edmond describes that unlike those who wished to be protected from the sight and danger of the leper, traveller-writers who were critical of imperial power transgressed the boundaries placed around the leper.[64] In their encounters with lepers these journalists, travellers and writers sought to remove the barriers between the colonised leper and the Western visitor. In fact, in exceptional cases the bodies of visitors underwent stigmata-like metamorphoses beginning to present the conditions of leprosy sufferers.[65] Such metamorphosis of the body presents us with an example of how living with others releases a potential to transform the identity and the material form of the body, and activates the process of becoming-other. This is reminiscent of Deleuze's writing on Tournier's *Robinson Crusoe*, where he argues that the island is not always a border site, but a place where we question life without others, and our encounters with others.[66]

Most importantly, in some instances, leprosy colonies were transformed into spaces of resistance, where the discourses on decolonisation were activated. Take the example of remote Kalaupapa Island in Hawaii. As Douglas Herman explains, native Hawaiians were not passive bodies waiting to be disciplined.[67] Instead, locals formed a number of political organisations and initiated armed struggles against the segregation policies and leprosy related disciplinary practices of the late nineteenth century.[68] Hawaiians saw the exclusion of leprosy patients as a form of overt colonialism, thereby they sought to politicise the management of leprosy. Perhaps most significantly, Robben Island, which was once a leper colony and functioned as a high-security prison until 1991, was turned into a space of resistance by its political prisoners in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.[69] Lessons learnt on the island were implemented outside Robben to negotiate the conditions of the new

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[64] Edmond, *Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History*, 220-44.

[65] Ibid. 220.

[66] Gilles Deleuze, 'Michel Tournier and World without Others', *Economy and Society,* 13/1 (2006a), 52-71.

[67] Herman, 'Out of Sight, out of Mind, out of Power: Leprosy, Race and Colonization in Hawai'i', 331-32.

[68] Ibid. 331-332.

[69] Fran Lisa Buntman, *Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid* (Cambridge: The George Washington University, 2003).

democratic state. In this sense, the island itself created new movements and new connections, leading to a new African geo-body.

These brief examples unsettle the perception that presents islands solely as sites of entrapment and discipline. Islands are not simply spaces of abjection that foster the functioning of disciplinary-biopolitical practices and discourses of modernity. What the narratives of leper colonies tell us is that islands as heterotopias are spaces in which lines of capture and flight intertwine with one another like a meshwork. Heterotopias are spaces of becoming. Therefore, they always act as constant reminders of the possibility of change immanent in any territory. This is once again a reminder of Deleuze's words on islands: The island is an affirmation of the world in process, '[n]ot even a puzzle, whose pieces when fitted together would constitute a whole, but rather a wall of loose, uncemented stones, where every element has a value in itself, but also in relations to others, isolated and floating relations'.[70] The island is thus both an isolated and a floating space. Its borders are not static, they *move*. The island as a heterotopia is constantly de/re-assembled to form new functions, to create new relations, to discipline new bodies, and to activate new forms of transgressions and contestations. The question thus now I return to is: how do islands function in such ways in Europe's contemporary border assemblages? What new forms of relations, connections and contestations do they foster?

4. Re-assembling islands as sites of border enforcement: the contemporary era

Islands constitute one key element in the contemporary discourses on the securitisation of migration and the ways in which sovereign powers use geography in creative ways for specific political aims, in particular to isolate and exclude those who are publicly portrayed as national security threats.[71] In particular, the popular domestic fear of those arriving by sea is now increasingly harnessed by state authorities, which in effect, facilitates the use of islands as main sites of border security practices.

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[70] Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998) 86.
[71] Mountz, 'The Enforcement Archipelago: Detention, Haunting and Asylum on Islands,' (, Mountz, 'In/Visibility and the Securitisation of Migration', 118-28.

The construction of irregular movement by sea as a security threat echoes the chaotic depiction of the sea constructed during the Middle Ages discussed earlier. The sea once again is perceived as a transgressive and an unpredictable space full of uncontrollable unknowns. As William Walters writes, the old idea of the high seas as constituting a space of unpredictability, violence, and lawlessness beyond the territorial power of the state is being recalled in the contemporary re-construction of land/sea borders of Australia, Europe and elsewhere.[72] As Foucault writes, security fabricates, organises and 'plans a milieu in terms of possible [and uncertain] elements, of series that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework'.[73] The securitisation of irregular movements of those arriving by sea thus enables the inscription of highly regularised and strategised disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms and transform islands into sites of transit, detention, processing, and/or deportation. In all these forms, islands act like stockades – pre-emptive frontiers and external perimeters that protect the mainland from the 'incursion' of the unwanted mobility of those 'undesirables'. In all these forms, islands of the new border assemblages are re-configured to capture uncontrolled movement, to regulate it in the desired direction in order to make the external threat emanating from sea navigable, controllable, and thus governable.

Functioning as stockades, islands perform a new border regime away from the mainland, and it is this new border regime that re-organises islands as extra-legal geographies. In particular, the use of third country islands for refugee processing and detention purposes empowers states to offshore their borders, and provide a room for them to avoid their international human rights obligations by transferring their responsibilities to third countries. As I will discuss in the last chapter, this is particularly a case in Australia's border network on Manus Island and Nauru. The controversial use of islands as refugee detention camps invokes troubling questions over states' deliberate violation of refugees' legal rights in particular in the context of limited access to asylum proceedings and arbitrary detention. As Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz argue, practices of 'externalisation of asylum' transform islands into extra-legal geographies of exclusion that lead to 'neo-*refoulement* – the legal 'return of asylum seekers and other migrants to third countries

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[72] William Walters, 'Bordering the Sea: Shipping Industries and the Policing of Stowaways', *Borderlands e-journal,* 7 (2008a), 5.

[73] Foucault, *Security,Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France 1977-1978*, 113.

or regions of origin before they reach the sovereign territory in which they could make a refugee claim'.[74]

In the context of the European Union (EU), the practices of *neo-refoulement* have been developed over the years through a series of bureaucratic and technological innovations. As a result of these innovations, islands have been transformed into the first lines of defence in EU's border management. With the eradication of internal borders among Schengen states in 1995, the focus shifted from nationally controlled mechanisms to integrated border management and cooperation in the control of EU's external borders.[75] Between 1999 and 2005, EU policy emphasis was on harmonising legal frameworks in respect to the external border controls and asylum policies of individual states. From 2005 onwards, the emphasis has shifted to extend and police the EU border perimeter.[76] Therefore, over the past decade the southern maritime borders of Europe have been increasingly presented as risky backdoor entrances that must be policed. As a result, islands as Europe's external borders have become main sites of intervention with the blurring boundaries between practices of security, terrorism, humanitarianism, and migration/asylum in policy debates.

Such transformations have contributed to proliferation of actors operating simultaneously on the islands of first lines of defence. Specialised border agencies, in particular, play a significant role in turning these islands into sites of international intervention and governance.[77] These diverse agencies employ their technical expertise transforming these islands into managerial spaces.[78] International Organisation for Migration (IOM), for example, manages and operates the offshore processing facilities. Currently, IOM monitors arrivals in Lampedusa and the Aegean

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[74] Hyndman and Mountz, 'Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe', 249-60.

[75] For detailed discussion, see Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond.*

[76] Ibid. 16. The establishment of FRONTEX in 2005 contributed to the externalisation of the EU border perimeter and its institutionalisation. FRONTEX was created to 'facilitate solidarity between member states in the field of external border management', in particular in the areas of control and surveillance of borders and the return of third-country nationals illegally present in the member states. See, Neal, 'Securitisation and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of Frontex', 333-56, Sarah Leonard, 'EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: Frontex and Securitisation through Practices', *European Security,* 19/2 (2010), 231-54, Vaughan-Williams, 'Borderwork Beyond inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror', 63-79.

[77] Adrijasevic and Walters, 'The International Organization for Migration and the International Government of Borders', 977-99, William Walters, 'Reflections on Migration and Governmentality', *movements,* 1/1 (2015), 1-25.

[78] Adrijasevic and Walters, 'The International Organization of Migration and the International Government of Borders', 977-99.

Islands, and it provides trainings, counselling, and return assistance. Similarly, the management of detention and processing centres are also increasingly outsourced by governments to international corporations and private security firms. As Adrijasevic and Walters put, the operations of these private companies transform the frontier islands into sites of 'commodified service[s] to be marketed within a global economy'.79 Furthermore, as it is well-known, there is now a proliferation of international humanitarian agencies working on these islands. These different actors do not simply run either in the same or competing directions. Rather, they function in more entangled ways: they first perform the islands' border regime as a 'problem of management' and then territorialise a given island environment as a 'crowded, heterogeneous, and mostly disputed field of [technical and scientific] expertise and intervention' of international governance.80

The entangled operation of different actors is most observable in the context of contemporary 'hotspot' regime created in Lampedusa (Italy), Malta, Linosa (Italy), Pantelleria (Italy), the Canary Islands (Spain), and recently a number of Greek islands, most notably Lesvos.81 As of April 2016, eleven hotspots have been created on Lampedusa, Lesvos, Chios, Leros, Kos, and Samos. In its current usage the term 'hotspot' is a metaphor in practice. In 2015, the EU Commission proposed a new 'hotspot' scheme as part of the immediate action plan to assist 'frontline' member states. The proposed objective of this scheme is to meet the humanitarian challenges caused by the current refugee movement at the EU's external borders.82 The scheme aims to provide individual states and EU agencies such as FRONTEX, European

79 Ibid. 979.
80 Ibid. 979.
81 Alison Mountz and Nancy Hiemstra, 'Spatial Strategies for Rebordering Human Migration at Sea', in Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan (eds.), *A Companion to Border Studies* (Sussex: Blackwell, 2012), 455-72. For detailed discussion see Andrijasevic, 'From Exception to Excess: Detention and Deportations across the Mediterranean Space', Human Rights Watch, *Spain: The Other Face of the Canary Islands: Rights Violations against Migrants and Asylum Seekers* (Human Rights Watch, 2002), Paolo Cuttita, "Borderizing' the Island: Setting and Narratives of the Lampedusa 'Border Play", *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies,* 13/2 (2014), 196-219.
82 European Commission, 'The hotspot approach to managing exceptional migratory flows ', viewed 12 February 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf>. 2015 saw a record number of migrants arriving in the EU. FRONTEX reports that 1.83 million irregular border crossings were detected at the EU's external borders. According to Eurostat, 1.29 million asylum applications were lodged in the EU in 2015. The highest number of arrivals in the EU was recorded on the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios and Samos. The hotspot approach aims to manage these pressures on the first country of entry. Anita Orav, 'Hotspots and Emergency Relocation: State of Play', (European Parliament, March 2016), viewed 12 February 2016, < http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)579070>.

Asylum Support Office, and Europol with an integrated platform to manage irregular movement. The operational support concentrates on registration, identification, fingerprinting, and debriefing of asylum seekers, as well as policy practices that return migrants either to their country of origin or to third countries.

The hotspot approach has contributed to re-assemblage of these islands in the form of 'pre-emptive humanitarian frontiers' in Europe's contemporary border 'crisis'.[83] The new regime institutionalises these islands as sites of coercive intervention of European agencies. Red Cross observes that these interventions invite disciplinary methods. These methods include compulsory and forced fingerprinting; administrative detention without judicial oversight; limited or no access to the United Nations Refugee Agency and other organisations; deprivation of protection safeguards and information; and a considerable likelihood of collective deportation.[84] As a result of these practices employed by diverse actors, the distinctions between forced and voluntary migration are lost, and many refugees find themselves qualified as voluntary migrants. Furthermore, the hotspot approach instils its own humanitarian scripts with a biopolitical emphasis on saving lives at sea.[85] In doing so, it reactivates a particular representation of refugees as innocent victims of human smuggling. The hotspot regime transforms these islands into humanitarian passages that function to discipline and save refugee bodies by channelling them in a determined direction. In most cases it does so by supporting strategies which deter refugees from taking voyages by sea. Consequently, under the disciplinary/biopolitical functioning of these 'hotspot' islands, the distinction between security and humanitarianism evaporates at the border, and these two areas now operate in a continuum reinforcing each other.

The re-assemblage of islands in the form of stockades and pre-emptive humanitarian frontiers also contributes to the militarised borders with increased surveillance of land, sea, and air. Lampedusa is a good example. Since the island has become the EU's external frontier, it has been utilised as a site of militarised border enforcement. The island is now marked by detention centres, police and military

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[83] Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, 'The EU Hotspot Approach at Lampedusa', *Open Democracy,* (2016), viewed 26 February 2016, < https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/glenda-garelli-martina-tazzioli/eu-hotspot-approach-at-lampedusa>.

[84] Red Cross, *Europe in Crisis: Facilitating Access to Protection, (Discarding) Offshore Processing and Mapping Alternatives for the Way Forward* (London: Red Cross, 2015) 11-14.

[85] For Foucauldian reading of humanitarian borders see Walters, 'Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border'.

installations such as video surveillance apparatuses, 'anti-migrant' radars, helicopters, as well as paramilitary sea operations conducted by the Italian state authorities and EU agencies such as FRONTEX. The re-appropriation of the former military base, Loran as a reception centre surrounded by barbed wire typifies the deliberate conflation of militarism with humanitarianism. Such militarised practices not only affect islanders' everyday lives in negative ways, they also damage their relations with asylum seekers by making detained asylum seekers invisible to the public eye.[86]

Transformation of islands into border enforcement sites at the same time turns these spaces into 'crisis heterotopias' presenting seemingly contradictory places in one place. As Foucault explains, crisis heterotopias constitute rites of passage where society places individuals who have deviated from the norm.[87] Like all heterotopias, these sites accommodate contradictory discourses, practices and places. Crisis heterotopias makes violent contradictions inherent in these spaces more perceptible. In the context of Lampedusa, for example, Joseph Pugliese illustrates how the island function simultaneously as space of detention and a space of entertainment with it holiday resorts.[88] Similarly, the Greek island of Lesvos accommodates such contradictions in one place with a 'wave of migrants, sharing beaches with wealthy holidaymakers'.[89] Jörg Bruggemann's recent series of photographs titled *Tourists v. Refugees* from the Greek Island of Kos capture such contradictions of these heterotopias (Figure 9).[90] In each case, the holidaymakers are not passive consumers of island spaces; rather, they become active political actors in the form of spectators who contribute to the heterotopic functioning of these sites. In short, all these diverge actors – islanders, asylum seekers, humanitarian workers, media, state agencies, and specialised border organisations – are connected to one another on the molar lines of these 'crisis heterotopias'.

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[86] Heidrun Friese, 'Border Economies: Lampedusa and the Nascent Migration Industry', *Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures,* 6/2 (2012), 66-84.
[87] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 27.
[88] Pugliese, 'Crisis Heterotopias and Border Zones of the Dead', 663-79.
[89] Patrick Kingsley, 'Greek Island Refugee Crisis: Local People and Tourists Rally Round Migrants', *The Guardian,* 9 July 2015.
[90] Jörg Bruggemann, 'Tourists V Refugees ', 2015, viewed 20 March 2016, <http://www.joergbrueggemann.com/tourists-vs-refugees/>.

Figure 9: Lesvos as a crisis heterotopia

Source: Jörg Bruggemann, 'Tourists V Refugees ', 2015, viewed on 12 October 2015, <http://www.joergbrueggemann.com/tourists-vs-refugees/>.

Yet, these islands are now also becoming notable sites of protest and contestation that disturb molar formations of Europe's new border assemblages. The Greek island of Lesvos is a case in point here. The island is now defined by its activist citizens 'who struggle against injustices in creative, autonomous, and inventive ways'.91 Their acts seek to traverse authoritative scripts of the border imposed by state and all other border agencies. Islanders work closely with the solidarity network and offer all forms of support to refugees including taking care of the sick and injured. The self-managed and all-volunteer open refugee camp *Village of All Together* is one of the sites that transgresses the bureaucratic border regime established on the island. The *Village of All Together* presents creative and autonomous forms of hospitality. It is not a legal entity, but a site established in 2012 by a network of citizens, collectives, and groups in Lesvos.92 The Village is an independent camp surviving without the support of any state organisations or the EU funds. Although bringing refugees from the beach to the camp is now considered as human smuggling by state officials, as of March 2016 the Village has managed to host 6000 refugees.93 In the words of the network, the Village defends the right of the refugees to fair treatment, and simultaneously it promotes open borders and the creation of open hospitality centres.94 By creating an alternative other space in Lesvos, the *Village of All Together* seeks to challenge sovereign practices that inscribe punitive border regimes.

Similar forms of creative and autonomous acts are also evident in Lampedusa. The Lampedusa Process illustrates this point. The Process was initiated in January 2014 to bring together many international European and North African activist movements, networks, organisations, and individuals.95 The process produced a draft

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91 Isin, *Citizens without Frontiers*.
92 Lesvos Solidarity, 'Open Solidarity Refugee Camp', viewed 21 March 2016, < http://lesvossolidarity.org/index.php/en/home/about-us>.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 European Alternatives, *'The Charter of Lampedusa and the Quest for Alternative Citizenship and Migration Policies',* 3 February 2014, viewed 15 April 2014, <http://www.euroalter.com/%C2%93the-charter-of-lampedusa%C2%94-and-the-quest-for-

Charter of Lampedusa. The aim of this process was to rewrite 'the history of the Mediterranean space and beyond' and to transform Lampedusa from a 'frontier-island' into a 'common space'. The Process linked the Italian island of Lampedusa to broader calls for radical transformations of border practices. It called for an 'alter-border' movement: freedom of movement for everyone without any distinction on the basis of country of birth and social, legal or economic status. With cosmopolitan language, the *Charter of Lampedusa* took the 'whole planet as its sphere of application', not only the Italian or European borders.[96] In doing so, the Lampedusa Process called for a new understanding of citizenship that was based on 'the planet Earth as a shared space'. It aimed to transform, as Engin Isin would put it, the very modes of being political by transcending territorial and legal understanding of citizenship.[97] It did not purport a territorial objective and did not seek to recode Lampedusa according to binary divisions of citizen and non-citizen, and in doing so, one may argue that the Process contributed to the heterogeneous lines of the island of Lampedusa in radical and creative ways.

Finally, such acts of contestation and disturbance are supported by activist ways of using technology by creating what I have earlier referred to as 'alter-border apparatuses'. *Watch the Med* provides a perfect example on point. It produces maps that trace deaths and violations of asylum seekers' rights at the maritime borders of the EU. With its online mapping system, *Watch the Med* monitors migrant deaths, missing people, distress calls, and sea interceptions. According to its creators, *Watch the Med* is part of an existing transnational underground railroad that supports unauthorised mobility and acts of escape.[98]

Another project, the *Alarm Phone,* launched in 2014, similarly provides an emergency hotline that monitors missing people and assists refugees in distress at sea. The project utilises Global Positioning System (GPS), Google Maps, and messaging applications such as *Whatsapp* to receive SOS calls from asylum seekers' mobile phones and it prompts responsible authorities to conduct rescue operations. In doing so, the *Alarm Phone* project aims to prevent states' push-back practices at sea.

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alternative-citizenship-and-migration-policies>. For discussion of local protests see Puggioni, 'Border Politics, Right to Life and Acts of Dissensus: Voices from Lampedusa Borderland', 1145-59.
[96] Ibid. 1145-59.
[97] Engin Isin, *Citizens without frontiers*.
[98] Watch The Med, 'Reports', viewed 22 March 2016, <http://www.watchthemed.net/index.php/main>.

By creating such 'alter-border apparatuses', this activist project seeks to invest new possibilities for life: a life that transcends the disciplinary/thanatopolical practices of the sovereign and its networks established on the frontier islands of Europe's new border assemblages. Such use of technology challenges the way we understand modern appratuses primarily as capturing, disciplinary ones producing docile bodies. In the words of Maurice Stierl, an active member of *Watch the Med*, *Alarm Phone* is a political project aiming to create a 'mobile commons'. '*Alarm Phone* politics', is an embodiment of international counter-citizenship that supports uncompromised freedom of movement for all.[99] In this sense, the *Alarm Phone* project is the Mediterranean equivalent of the *Transborder Immigrant Tool (TBT)* discussed earlier in the context of the US-Mexico border. Like TBT, *Alarm Phone* seeks to establish public discourse on open borders, and in doing so create border disturbances. Such activist ways of using technology seeks to re-configure these islands beyond their enforced land and sea boundaries by creating new connections between citizens and non-citizens of borders. All these acts of contestation and disturbance transform islands into heterotopias, and they show us the possibility of an alternative border that is not captured by the politics of death.

5. Conclusion

In *Desert Islands,* Deleuze discusses two forms of islands: oceanic and continental.[100] Oceanic islands are 'originary, essential islands'. Continental islands, by contrast, are 'accidental, derived islands'. In the thought of Deleuze, the oceanic island is the smooth space, whereas the continental island is striated, one that is born by annexation and occupation. In describing two different forms of islands, Deleuze seeks to show the doubling space of the island: the co-existence of smooth and striated spaces. It is the entanglement of molar and molecular lines and lines of flight that re-creates the island. These lines are constitutive of these spaces and they never cease to move, they continuously encounter one another transforming each other. What Deleuze presents in *Desert Island* is in fact a dynamic picture of the island as a

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[99] Maurice Stierl, 'Activist Border Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea', *Citizenship Studies,* (Forthcoming 2016).
[100] Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953-1974* trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004) 9.

space of recreation; a space on the plane of becoming. The island is a space of migrations, movements and forces of multiple life-lines that are entangled with one another: '[t]he island constantly changes, unfolding, and refolding on a line of flight in all directions across the surface of the globe'.101 The island is a heterotopia. It does not have a fixed reference: it always re-begins. The island, in short, is a *world-in-becoming*. It repeats, and in each repetition it creates something new.

In this intermezzo, I have sketched a brief history of 'repeating island': a recreation that de-assembles and re-assembles, and disconnects and reconnects materials, people and actions. I have sought to show the historical connection between the island and the border and the continuing significance of that connection in the contemporary discourses of security. By tracing some historical periods, I have shown that with each different force that gives rise to its re-creation, the repeating island achieves new functions and produces new relations, connections, conflicts, transgressions and contestations. In this inquiry, I have sought to establish that islands are not static spaces simply defined by dichotomies of land/sea, self/other and inside/outside. Those dichotomies are not natural, but historically contingent political practices that have enabled the production of bounded spaces. However, there are always forces that disturb the movement of molar formations. The island politics is not solely constituted by molar lines, but the movement of multiple lines. Therefore, the island refuses to hold a final structure defined by strict boundaries of land and sea. There is always a movement that either challenges or reinforces that boundary. Based on this argument, in the next chapter, I will move on to the analysis of repeating islands of Australia: the constant movement of Australian islands and the role of these movements in the colonisation of Australia as an island-continent girt by sea.

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101 Stewart Williams, 'Virtually Impossible: Deleuze and Derrida on the Political Problem of Islands (and Island Studies) ', *Island Studies,* 7/2 (2012), 219.

CHAPTER 5

ISLANDS OF AUSTRALIAN BECOMING

On 13 August 2012, the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers delivered its recommendations to the Australian Government on how best to respond to the increased numbers of irregular maritime arrivals.[1] The Panel suggested balancing Australia's national interests and integrity of borders with the humanitarian needs of asylum seekers. As part of its deterrence approach, the Panel advised to re-open the Australian-funded detention and regional processing centres on Manus Island and Nauru. Two weeks after the Expert Panel report, the Australian military arrived in Nauru to inspect the detention site before transferring the first group of asylum seekers held in Darwin.[2] The second episode of the Pacific Solution began with the announcement of the reopening of Manus Island and Nauru detention and processing sites. On 21 November 2012, the first charter flight transferred nineteen asylum seekers from Christmas Island to Manus Island.[3]

This chapter traces the historical condition of Australia's border network established on these two islands. It argues that the contemporary operation of Australia's offshored borders on Manus Island and Nauru is one of the recurring apparatuses of the historical molar formations that have sought to protect the island-continent of Australia from the perceived dangers of living with the others constructed as 'backward', 'uncivilised' or 'security threat'. The chapter explores this argument by interrogating how, since British settlement, a particular island imagery has occupied a prominent place in the constitution of Australia's exclusive borders.[4] It looks at the ways in which islands have been appropriated as stockades protecting the mainland from perceived threats, and thus been regarded, in the words of Prime

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[1] Angus Houston, Paris Aristotle, and Michael L'estrange, 'Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers', (Canberra: Australian Government, 2012).

[2] Dylan Welch, 'Nauru Awaits First Pacific Solution Intake', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 29 August 2012.

[3] Ben Packham, 'First Asylum-Seekers Sent to Manus Island', *The Australian,* 22 November 2012.

[4] In this chapter I provide both Indigenous and English names of islands to call attention to the almost-forgotten Indigenous names of these islands and the history of their colonisation.

Minister Billy Hughes, 'encompass[ing] Australia like fortresses … [hence] as necessary to Australia as water to a city'. By investigating how islands have been utilised as a solution to a perceived problem, how they have performed a series of possible realities, and how they have acted as both constitutive and disruptive of Australia's borders, the chapter seeks to understand the means by which islands define Australian becoming.

The chapter is then about 'repeating islands' of Australia. It examines how Australian islands have been utilised as colonising machines, military machines, machines of capitalism and machines of resistance since the first days of Captain Cook's assertion of sovereignty over the whole eastern coast of New Holland and the declaration of Australia as *terra nullius*. The discussion begins with Australia's constitution of first 'island-borders'. The first two sections show how Australia was perceived as an island itself girt by sea and how such perception enabled the continent to be invaded and colonised. Then, the chapter explores the ways in which islands surrounding the mainland were re-assembled as sites of reserves, leprosy colonies, and internment camps. Borders of these islands, however, were not static. They were simultaneously 'isolated and floating', and not simply apparatuses of repression, colonisation and oppression. The movement of lines of flight were immanent in the colonised cramped space of islands. These movements connected islands with the borders of mainland Australia and the totality of molar structures which sought to construct the Australian self as Anglo and white. And it was the entanglement of these movements which transformed islands into heterotopias. Within this framework, the chapter moves on to examining the ways in which islands were transformed into minor spaces and played a significant role in Indigenous resistance against settler colonialism. The chapter concludes with the history of Manus Island and Nauru; how they were functioned as military and mining machines in Australia's colonial network.

1. 'Geopolitical' beginnings of Australia's island-borders

In her influential work, *Australia and the Insular Imagination*, Suvendrini Perera argues that the roots of Australia's contemporary border anxiety – the constant fear of invasion by asylum seekers coming by sea – should be sought in the violent

constitution of Australia as an island-continent.5 According to Perera such constitution has had a significant role in imprisoning the Australian self in its own constitutive paradox. On the one hand, the Western image of the island defined by its insularity, internal unity, and by its precise land and sea boundary has enabled Australia to perceive the coast as a walled border against the invasion of its multiple others. The 'islandness' of Australia has performed this geopolitical space as a 'whole and self-contained geography, and a monadic landmass' surrounded and protected by encircling oceans.6 On the other hand, the same ocean and isolation have been imagined as an 'open road to the enemy', which has confined the Australian collective in a persistent state of insecurity. Ironically, it has been that state of insecurity which has sought to secure the enforced unity of that collective by excluding threatening others.7 Therefore, in order to understand the present condition, as Perera suggests, one first needs to trace the constitution of Australia's island-borders – how they were drawn first by the British and then Australia, how these borders performed the Australian self, and how they generated and perpetuated Australia's invasion anxiety.

Imagining Australia as an island-continent, as 'shifting coastlines', wrote its first scripts by creating Australia as an empty frame – a 'blank space' – to be filled by the dreams of British sovereignty, ownership and government.8 It performed Australia as *terra nullius*, a 'geography of emptiness and lack'. The creation of Australia as an island-continent materialised new borders, movements, and markings with their own rhythms by seeking to replace all Indigenous footprints with the British ones. As Perera puts it, imagining Australia as an island-continent was the violent foundational act that created *Terra Australis* – a geopolitical space first imagined and invented as an island-continent, and then invaded, emptied, and colonised. Initially, it was mapping and exploration of the coastline that facilitated colonisation and enabled emerging linear borders of Australia. Surveying and mapping of the coastline by generations of navigators, surveyors and explorers

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5 Suvendrini Perera, *Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats and Bodies* (New York Palgrave Macmillian 2009).
6 Ibid. 18.
7 Anthony Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8 Perera, *Australia and the Insular Imagination: Beaches, Borders, Boats and Bodies*, 1.

allowed the identification of suitable sites for further settlement.9 First, individual seaborn implants were born as fixed points. In most cases specific surveys preceded settlements, which gradually created a linear border along the coastline.10 Then, those dispersed points were all connected to the greater political, social and economic network of British imperial power.

In these terms, Matthew Flinders' voyages between 1801 and 1803 were one of the major events in the construction of this 'empty frame'. Flinders mapped the entire northern coast. As Nonie Sharp explains, his voyages did not simply contribute to the charting of the unknown. Those voyages generated a new cartographic possibility, and created a new geopolitical space by converting its spatial heterogeneity into sameness. His charts established a single and discrete land unit, and drew a fixed boundary line between the land and the sea.11 Flinders used 'fixed points on the hill and cape', and then linked these points in the form of a linear border line. It was that line which contributed to the creation of Australia in the form of an 'empty frame' waiting to be filled with colonial practices. Flinders' maps and charters operated as abstract machines prefiguring the entire social, economic and political field. They were the codes productive of specific arrangements by which the Australian colonial practices operated and created new borders. The aim of this abstract machine was to make the island-border visible, and thus colonisable and governable. However, as Sharp explains, this cartographic machine induced its own violence: 'Far from making the sea more visible, the detailed mapping of the entire north coast of Australia closed off from the imagination the idea of the sea as a living landscape shaping the lives of peoples who lived by it'.12 It made indigenous forms of living invisible, and thereby produced and preserved the emptiness of the whole continent, and of islands and seas surrounding it.

With the federation of colonies in 1901, the independent maps of Australia were born, creating Australia's first independent island-borders. These borders were elastic in that they shifted continuously with the ever-shifting subjects of Australia's

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9 Frank Broeze, *Island Nation: A History of Australians and the Sea* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998) 119.
10 Ibid. 125. Examples included the foundation of the port-capital of a new colony, such as Fremantle-Perth and Adelaide.
11 Nonie Sharp, *Saltwater People: The Waves of Memory* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002) 182- 200.
12 Ibid. 186.

invasion anxieties.13 Reflecting these anxieties, in 1902, for example, the director of Australia's first Naval Forces, Captain Creswell, envisioned the sea surrounding Australia as a void and as the frontier of the new nation.14 In a report submitted to the Minister of State for Defence, he wrote:

> The sea screens the enemy. We have no eyes – no intelligence of his movements. He may attack any of the populous centres of capital ports … the sea frontier places the defence under still greater disadvantages. The sea is not a mountain range, but an easy road, open to the enemy, which he can pass along at pleasure, but which is denied to us.15

The first constitutive element of this sea frontier was the *Immigration Restriction Act* (1901), which set the foundations of the White Australia policy.16 It followed by the *Quarantine Act 1908*.17 As a newspaper article from the period put it, the *Quarantine Act* was the effect of the new nation's anxieties over the 'maritime invasion … by infectious disease'.18 In many ways, Australia's quarantine policy was a political technology that first produced the health of the population as a political problem, and then dealt with this problem through a set of new regulations and sites, which eventually drew this new nation's racial boundaries.19 This political technology played a significant role in performing whiteness of independent Australia. This again was sustained through certain imagination of Australia as an island. As an island isolated by sea, Australia was perceived to be a natural quarantine zone immune from the disease of racial miscegenation regarded as proliferating from

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13 This is not to suggest that the boundaries of colonies were static. Since its beginnings as a penal colony, Australia has had elastic oceanic frontiers. This was first evident in the boundaries of the colony of New South Wales (NSW). Its first boundaries were extended to include all the islands in the Pacific Ocean within the latitudes 43º39' and 10º37' south, with the eastern limits of the Governor's jurisdiction left unspecified. J.M.R. Young, 'Australia's Pacific Frontier', *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand,* 12/47 (1966), 373-88.

14 Sydney Morning Herald ,'Australian Naval Defence: Captain Creswell's Views', 26 June 1902.

15 W.R. Creswell, 'Report Submitted by the Naval Director to the Honourable the Minister of State for Defence', in Nicholas A. Lambert (ed.), *Australia's Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime Strategy and the Australia Statino 1880-1909* (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1905), 119.

16 The *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* was abolished in 1975 with the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975*.

17 The *Quarantine Act 1908* created the Federal Quarantine Service within the Department of Trade and Customs in 1909. Quarantine was the only public health power granted to the new Commonwealth Government. For details see Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism,Nationalism and Public Health*, 115-130, Michael W. White, *Australian Offshore Law* (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2009) 240-250.

18 Editorial, 'Our Quarantine Policy', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 19 June 1901.

19 Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism,Nationalism and Public Health*, 115-130.

Asia.[20] As a consequence of such constructions, the healthy social body came to be defined by its whiteness.

Quarantine is the definitive example of the negative immunity paradigm discussed earlier in the context of Israel's Separation Wall. The disciplinary-biopolitical lines of quarantine comprised rejection of the encounter with the threatening other. Those lines were constructed by and constitutive of ultimate rejection of the 'life-in-common'. In fact, it was this rejection performed white Australian self, whose discursive and physical boundaries needed to be kept immune from the disease of the 'Asian other'. Quarantine captured and over-coded the life of the new nation by producing its own discourses, practices, regulations, and hence its new island borders. One of these new regulations was the quarantine line: a peripheral three nautical mile sea boundary enclosing the entire continent. Ruth Balint argues that the quarantine line was both a political and a 'symbolic act imagined as a very fine-meshed net encircling the whole country', and thereby defending the island-border.[21] Later *Navigation Act 1921* created a further net and sought to seal the Australian coast against foreign vessels carrying passengers and goods between Australian ports. In this context, islands such as Thursday Island (Waiben), Bruny Island (Lunawanna Allonah) and Torrens Island began to emerge major sites in the first line of defence protecting the 'purity' of the mainland.

By the end of the First World War, the island-borders of Australia took a new shape with its new invasion anxiety accentuated by war-time enemies, Russia and Germany. In order to contain such anxiety, Australia had undertaken several efforts to annex islands in the Pacific in order to expand and defend its sea frontier. In this context, islands once again perceived as stockades in the protection of island-fortress from its war-time enemies. The desire to appropriate islands as stockades – as military and commercial outposts – opened a new era in the history of Australia's colonisation

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[20] This perception is still evident in government discourse. An Australian government website, for instance, defines Australia as a natural quarantine zone:

> As an island, Australia is a natural quarantine zone. This means we are able to keep out many of the pests and diseases, such as rabies and papaya fly, that ravage other parts of the world. It also means we have some of the most unique animals and plants the world. Many of our islands feature animals and wildlife that are unique to the islands due to their isolation from threats'.

Australian Government, Australian Islands, 1 February 2011, viewed on 14 January 2016, <http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/austn-islands>.
[21] Ruth Balint, *Troubled Waters: Borders, Boundaries, and Possession in the Timor Sea* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2005) 33.

of the Pacific. As Anthony Burke writes, with the end of the Great War a new Australian subjectivity gained ontological depth with war-inspired nationalism.[22] This form of nationalism invested its own political and cultural myths of the Australian subject and its claims of unity against perceived threats of communism and deepening economic and industrial crises. The extension of Australia's elastic island-borders to include Pacific islands consequently became an important strategic tool in promoting post-war nationalism and a political symbol of Australia's internationally recognised independent status.

Finally, the Second World War invested new anxieties and facilitated shifts in Australia's island imagery. With the Japanese invasion of Darwin and the incursion of Japanese submarines into Sydney Harbor in 1942, ocean once again became a source for concern. In 1944 the Minister for Shipping echoed Creswell:

> … before that war, Australians thought that the Commonwealth was secure from attack because of its geographic isolation, but the war had proved conclusively that great oceans were not effective protection against attack. The insularity of Australia was now gone forever.[23]

As Elizabeth McMahon observes, after the Second World War 'the vastness of the continent was radically diminished by the perception of and on Australia as a conquerable territory – an island besieged'.[24] In short, the island imagery of Australia performed the whole continent in the form of a 'quarantine zone' whose defence was based on creating strong sovereign borders against the invasion of threatening others. Such imagery, as Perera suggests, have never lost its significance. In fact, today it powerfully continues to act as a justification for Australia's exceptional policy practices against asylum seekers arriving by boat and their imprisonment on isolated islands, whose roots should also be sought in the birth of Australia as a British prison isolated by sea.

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[22] Anthony Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety,* 51-62.

[23] Quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 'Perils Seen in Insularity: Warning by Mr Beasley', 25 July 1944.

[24] Elizabeth Mcmahon, ' Australia, the Island Continent: How Contradictory Geography Shapes the National Imaginary', *Space and Culture,* 13/2 (2010), 183.

2. A penal colony machine girt by sea: the birth of Australian exceptionalism

Australian exceptionalism began as a specific form of machine: a penal colony. This machine was a 'criminal waste-disposal system': a system of enforced transportation of the criminal, the marginalised and dispossessed.[25] Later this 'criminal waste-disposal system' created its own machines that were closely connected each other: naval, political, military, statistical, medical, legal, missionary machines, and eventually settler colonial 'conquest, domination, displacement-replacement machine'.[26] On a new continent these machines were connected to each other to form a governable system, while remaining connected to British imperial power.

According to the British government of the period, the islandness of Australia and in particular its distance from England, made it ideal for an establishment of a prison colony.[27] Proposals for establishing a penal settlement in New South Wales (NSW) emerged at a time when a penal colony was perceived as a solution to the increased crime rates in Britain. The increased crime rate was largely caused by industrialisation, dispossession as a result of the enclosure movement, and consequent urban migration. Nevertheless, it was wholly attributed to a 'criminal class', perceived as a social threat and a contaminant of British society. Such moral and political codes first created 'transportable crimes' through a set of discursive and non-discursive practices, such as laws and statistics.[28] As a result, the 'transportable' convict body became the register of a healthy British body politic.

In 1779 a House of Commons committee was established to inquire into the state of domestic gaols and the question of transportation. The Committee set a plan for 'effectually disposing of convicts' and 'rendering their transportation reciprocally beneficial both to themselves and to the State, by the establishment of a colony in

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[25] Robert Hughes, *The Fatal Shore, a History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia, 1787-1868* (London: Guild Publishing London, 1987) 161.

[26] Marcelo Svirsky, 'Resistance is a structure not an event', *Settler Colonial Studies* (2016), 2.

[27] Geoffrey Blainey and Frank Broeze argue that there were also strong strategic imperatives for the establishment of a settlement in NSW. In its rivalry with France, England needed a new port in order to strengthen its commercial empire in the East. Blainey argues that Botany Bay was vital for British interests in its competition with France over India and the Far Eastern trade routes. See Geoffrey Blainey, *The Tyranny of Distance : How Distance Shaped Australia's History* (Melbourne Sun Books, 1983) 21-26, Broeze, *Island Nation: A History of Australians and the Sea*, 29-36.

[28] See Hughes, *The Fatal Shore, a History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia, 1787-1868*. 19-42.

NSW'.29 The proposal specifically suggested that the 'remoteness' of NSW, 'from whence it is hardly possible for persons to return without permission', could provide 'a remedy for the evils likely to result from the late alarming and numerous increase of felons'.30 Similarly, in their reports to the Committee both Joseph Banks, a botanist in Cook's *Endeavour*, and James Matra, a sailor, diplomat and midshipman on the same voyage, recommended NSW as a proper place for the reception of criminals. Cook and Matra emphasised the strategic importance of NSW and the fertility of its land 'for the production of valuable commodity', and also its isolation, which would make escape difficult.31 As Hughes writes, '[T]ransportation sought to remove, once and for all, the source of contamination from the otherwise decent bosom of the lower classes, and ship it "beyond the seas" to a place from which it could not easily return'.32

Australia's beginnings as a penal colony island can be read as an Agambenian translation of Kafka's *Penal Colony*, in which the boundaries between norm and exception, law and nature, and violence and law were blurred, and where the matrix of the sovereign machine was directly excised on abandoned convicts. Unlike many other colonies, Australia was not born as a utopia, but as a dystopia, where 'man coerced, exiled, deracinated, in chains' with no hope for return.33 The writings of Samuel Sidney and Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century shed light on how the 'islandness' and the 'insularity' of Australia were both constitutive and constructive of such exceptionalism. Sidney saw Australia as a grand British achievement, which was 'advanced from the condition of a mere gaol or sink'. Unlike Sidney, Bentham was a strong opponent of penal settlement in NSW. Both, however, saw the island-isolation of Australia and its distance from England as the main drive for the creation

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29 The Heads of a Plan, *Historical Records of New Zealand Vol.1*, ed. Robert Mcnab (Wellington, 1908) 47.
30 Ibid. 53.
31Sydney Morning Herald, 'Sir Joseph Banks', 21 January 1905, James Matra, 'Letter', in Robert Mcnab (ed.), *Historical Records of New Zeland Vol. 1* (Wellington, 1908), 42.
32 Hughes, *The Fatal Shore, a History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia, 1787-1868*. 168. Hughes notes that during the 1830s in England, Australia was perceived as a 'terrible' place. As a result, the British government began using transportation to Australia as a deterrence campaign to reduce crime. Interestingly, in 1999, the Australian Department of Immigration, in its first deterrence campaign for asylum seekers entitled *Pay a People Smuggler and You Will Pay the Price*, used the same strategy. Warning asylum seekers about the dangers of coming to Australia by boat, the campaign depicted Australia as 'a terrible place to go' with dangers such as crocodiles and deserts. Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 'Pay a People Smuggler and You'll Pay the Price', (Canberra: Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) 1999) 1-4.
33 Hughes, *The Fatal Shore, a History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia, 1787-1868*, 1.

of a space of exception located beyond the law, while remaining connected to imperial law. Sidney argued that 'tyranny became chronic through the whole body corporate of the colony' as the civil law was suspended and replaced with the 'law of the lash'.[34] He underlined the ways in which sovereign power acting outside the law was normalised. For Sidney, it was the banality of violence that defined the penal colony:

> The distance from England, the few means of communication, the indifference of the English public to the fate of the inhabitants of a penal or any other colony, rendered the governor, so far as the control of law extended, actually irresponsible. As there was no law, so there was no publicity and no public opinion to restrain the exercise of the despotism, which was the only possible government in such a penal settlement.[35]

Similarly, for Bentham insularity and distance from the motherland constituted the defining features of the penal colony in NSW. *Panopticon Versus New South Wales* was his manifesto outlining contradictions between the governing principles of the penal colony and of the Panopticon.[36] The Panopticon was Bentham's utilitarian surveillance machine. It was designed to deter abnormal behaviour and to discipline individual bodies. For Bentham it aimed to prevent further crime through reformation and incapacitation. The Panopticon's central principle was to 'see without being seen'. Bentham argued that, unlike the Panopticon, the penal colony in NSW did not aim to discipline individual bodies: rather, it sought only to exclude them from the British polity. Convicts, the 'expelled emigrants' as he called them, were the 'lepers' of British society. These pariahs 'who were to be sent out of it belong neither to the list of souls to be saved, nor to the list of moral beings'. According to Bentham, what drove the establishment of a settlement in the first instance was the desire to render convicts invisible and to make their return impossible once released: 'Let a man once get there, we shall never be troubled with him anymore'.[37] One can easily see the same rationale behind Australia's

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[34] Samuel Sidney, *The Three Colonies of Australia: New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia: Their Pastures, Copper Mines, and Gold Fields,* (London: Ingram, Cooke and Co., 1853), 27.
[35] Ibid. 27.
[36] Jeremy Bentham, 'Panopticon Versus New South Wales: Or, the Panopticon Penitentiary System, and the Penal Colonisation System Compared. In a Letter Addressed to the Right Honourable Lord Pelham', in John Bowring (ed.), *The Works of Jeremy Bentham* (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), 173-248.
[37] Ibid. 186.

contemporary policy of transferring asylum seekers to Manus Island and Nauru and detaining them there indefinitely.

As a final note, it should be noted that both Sidney's and Bentham's descriptions of tyranny totally disregarded violence directed towards dispossession and destruction of the Indigenous population. For Bentham the Aborigines were less than human – 'a set of brutes in human shape'. What we do not read in the writings of Sidney and Bentham, and in many other nationalistic commemorations of Australia's convict past is the extent to which transportation was also intended as a means of colonisation; its effect, as Hughes explains, was the creation of 'the unrelenting, go-getting, land-grabbing, cash-and-gold obsessed materialism of free Australian colonists, acting in a vast geographical space'.[38] The operation of penal colony machine was repeatedly evoked in other islands – in Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), Norfolk Island, Sarah Island (Langerrareroune) and Maria Island. These islands were occupied, emptied and reterritorialised as prison-islands. Tasmania became the major penal colony in Australia. Norfolk Island was first settled in 1788, and was later transformed into a prison for convicts who committed particularly serious offences.[39] The 'criminal waste-disposal system' stopped functioning by 1868; however, its performative rationale never disappeared. Rather, it was re-activated repeatedly in different forms against foreign and Indigenous populations enabling islands to function as major sites of exile and detention.

3. Islands of detention and exile

Islands played a central role in the colonisation of Australia and in the conduct of oppressive policies against Australia's Indigenous population. From the early decades of the nineteenth century until the 1960s, islands were appropriated as reserves and Aboriginal prisons. The use of islands as reserves began by the late 1830 at a time when there was a growing humanitarian belief in Britain for the protection of Indigenous people and their recognition as British subjects.[40] The 'Aboriginal

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[38] Hughes, *The Fatal Shore, a History of the Transportation of Convicts to Australia, 1787-1868*, 588.

[39] Transportation to NSW ended in 1840 and to Van Diemen's Land in 1853. The last convict was arrived in 1868.

[40] See Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, 'Trajectories of Protection: Protectorates of Aborigines in Early 19th Century Australia and Aotearoa New Zeland', *New Zeland Geographer,* 64 (2008), 208.

problem' created new networks of territories, and institutional and non-institutional mechanisms and practices. Aboriginal protectorates were established first in South Australia and then at the Port Philip District of NSW.[41] Alan Lester and Fae Dussary write that these protectorates were complex imperial spaces created through a multiplicity of trajectories within the colonial assemblage.[42] It was not only the sovereign, but many other actors such as humanitarian activists, missionaries, scientists, and journalists who sustained the operation of protectorates and reserves.[43] This complex 'humanitarian' network was a deliberative plan and was not necessarily institutional and systematic. This network, however, not only failed to protect the interests of Aborigines, it at the same time generated the apparatus of their continuing dispossession.[44] Reserves were never seen as compensation provided for lost land due to pastoral expansion, rather, they became places to exclude, discipline and imprison the Aborigines and to advance the territorialisation of their land by the settlers.[45] As a result of discriminatory legislation introduced in all colonies, Aborigines lost their basic rights: freedom of movement; of labour; custody of their children; and control over personal property.[46]

Islands constituted one of the central elements of this network. They were used to create and maintain colonial exclusiveness and control over all living beings and their environment. Functioning as reserves, islands were connected to other social, political and economic elements that produced new colonial social, political, economic and spatial practices. From the early nineteenth century until the 1960s island-reserves captured and organised Aboriginal bodies, their space and time. These reserves composed new forms of Australian being: new boundaries, new movements,

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[41] Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights: A Documentary History* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 7.

[42] Lester and Dussart, 'Trajectories of Protection: Protectorates of Aborigines in Early 19th Century Australia and Aotearoa New Zeland', 205-208.

[43] Ibid. 208.

[44] The British notion of protection failed due to opposition by pastoralists upon whom the colonial economy rested. The colonial governments deliberately declined to recognise Aborigines as British subjects. These governments also sanctioned the involvement of paramilitary forces in punitive expeditions in Queensland, Western Australia (WA) and the Northern Territory (NT) throughout the rest of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth century. Attwood and Markus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights: A Documentary History*, 7, Raynold Evans, Kay Saunders, and Kathryn Cronin, *Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland* (Sydney: Australia and New Zeland Book Company, 1975).

[45] Henry Reynolds, *Dispossession: Black Australians and White Invaders* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin 1989) 83.

[46] The growing racial belief that Aborigines were a 'dying race' enabled Victoria (1869), Queensland (1897), WA (1905), NSW (1909), and South Australia (1911) to introduce racist legislations.

new relations, and new legal statuses. Parallel to the operation of all other reserves upon the mainland, island-reserves functioned as spaces of 'institutionalised racialism' producing their own institutions, spaces, procedures, laws, calculations, rules, and tactics.[47] In doing so, island-reserves preserved and reinforced the institutions and tactics of white Australia not only within islands themselves, but also in Australia as a whole.

Island-reserves as central elements in colonial network were functioned as experimental sites in which Aborigines were forcibly evicted from their homelands and transported to. Bruny Island (Lunawanna Allonah) was one of these first 'experimental' sites allocated to the slow demise of Tasmania's remaining Aboriginal population. In 1830, the removal of natives to a settlement on Flinders Island was proposed to 'see if they could be redeemed and reclaimed for Christianity'.[48] In 1897, on the initiative of Archibald Meston seventy-three Indigenous Australians were initially brought from Maryborough to Fraser Island (K'gari). An article from the period observed that Meston's 'Fraser Island experiment' aimed to reform natives, return them to 'their cleanly and healthy habits', and 'put them under proper discipline'.[49] The ostensible paternalistic goal was that of enabling Indigenous peoples to exercise 'guardianship' over themselves. This indicates that in their initial stages island-reserves were perceived as a liberal experiment that would produce self-governing and self-disciplining subjects.

In Queensland, in particular, the use of islands as reserves became widespread after the *Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act (1897)*.[50] Those island-reserves were depicted as 'paradise' for Aborigines secured from the violence of the settlers. In the imagination of white humanitarians, these island-reserves enacted a form of liberal utopia – sanctuary for Aborigines 'isolated from pernicious influences which … serve to degrade them'.[51] In 1929, for example, a

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[47] Evans, Saunders, and Cronin, *Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland*, 351.

[48] Lester and Dussart, 'Trajectories of Protection: Protectorates of Aborigines in Early 19th Century Australia and Aotearoa New Zeland', 209.

[49] The Telegraph, 'Fraser Island Blacks', 17 May 1897.

[50] Before the *Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act (1897)*, a small number of reserves were gazetted use by Aboriginal people. However, with passage of the 1897 Act, all Aboriginal reserves became subject to its provisions. For the list of reserves see Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 'Mission and Reserve Records', viewed on 18 September 2015, <http://aiatsis.gov.au/research/finding-your-family/research-resources-family-history/mission-and-reserve-records>.

[51] Sunday Times, 'Island Reserve for Aborigines', 9 June 1912.

Sydney Morning Herald article portrayed Palm Island (Bwgcolman) as an 'Abo's Paradise'; a 'home more than a penitentiary', with 'crystal clear coral seas, glistening waters of deepest blue, tall mountains thickly cloaked with towering trees'.[52]

In reality, island-reserves were spaces of lifetime exiles for Aboriginal people. As Humphrey McQueen writes, they were designed with 'a desire to put the Aborigines out of sight and out of mind'.[53] On these islands the movements of Aborigines were severely restricted. In some reserves such as Palm Island (Bwgcolman), segregation of the Indigenous population was similar to apartheid and their accommodation was, in practice, imprisonment.[54] Similar to Australia's present-day asylum seeker detention camps, the operation of these reserves remained hidden from the public. Their transformation into reserves also facilitated colonisation of these islands. In the context of Palm Island (Bwgcolman), for example, the Manberra people, the traditional owners of Palm Island (Bwgcolman), were forcibly deported from the island in order to 'empty' the space before the creation of the penal reserve.[55] Throughout the 1920s, Murris and Torres Strait Islanders were shipped to the island to provide pastoralists with cheap labour. On Palm Island (Bwgcolman), as in many other island-reserves, Aborigines were not passive victims. In 1957, for the first time an organised collective resistance was formed to protest appalling working conditions, lack of wages, and a regime of autocratic control.[56] Consequently, the cramped space of Palm Island (Bwgcolman) became a minor space in the overall struggle for Aboriginal rights.

The 'Aboriginal problem' further called for the use of islands for leprosy patients. While leprosy islands did not accommodate only the Aboriginal patients, it was the Aboriginal patients who endured oppressive racist practices.[57] The island

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[52] F.C.B., 'Palm Island', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 29 June 1929.

[53] Quoted in Evans, Saunders, and Cronin, *Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland*, 347.

[54] Joanne Watson, *Palm Island: Through a Long Lens* (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2010).

[55] See ibid. In 2004, 36 year-old Mulrunji died in police custody. The riot erupted a week after his death. The local station was destroyed by fire and the courthouse was damaged. In the course of events, the white community temporarily left the island and a state of emergency was declared without consulting the local council. According to Deirdre Tedmanson, Mulrunji's death demonstrates the persistence of colonial violence on the island. See Chris Cunneen, 'Riot, Resistance and Moral Panic: Demonising the Colonial Other', (University of New South Wales Law Series 2008), Deirde Tedmanson, 'Isle of Exception: Sovereign Power and Palm Island', *Critical Perspective on International Business,* 4/2 (2008), 142-65.

[56] For detailed discussion of Palm Island Strike see Watson, *Palm Island: Through a Long Lens*, 102-120.

[57] For example, Peel Island and Channel Island were multi-racial institutions. However, white patients were separated from the Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders, South Sea Islanders and

leprosarium was not an Australian invention. However, peculiar to Australia and its leprosy policy was empowered strictly regulated and explicitly racialised practices of isolation at a time when in most countries compulsory isolation of leprosy patients had been largely abandoned.[58] By the early twentieth century, in Queensland and across northern Australia leprosy islands became a common part in the reserve system and in practices that forcibly removed Aboriginal people from their communities.[59] This system involved doctors, scientists, hospitals, and the police force in conducting raids on Aboriginal communities, in particular in the Northern Territory (NT). Suzanne Saunders argues that the isolation of leprosy patients provided another justification for the restriction of Aboriginal movement and control over their lives.[60] In NT, Mud Island (Bung-umba) (1889) and Channel Island (1931) were established as isolation settlements. In Queensland, in 1935 there was a strong campaign for establishment of a non-white only leper colony.[61] The leprosy island was realised once again as a 'solution to the Aboriginal problem' whereby mobility of the indigenous population was perceived as unpredictable, unproductive, and deviant.[62] However, unlike earlier ideas concerning reserves, they were never imagined as

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Chinese patients. The Aboriginal patients were kept in total isolation, while white patients could receive visitors. Geoffrey Genever, 'Queensland's Black Leper Colony', *Queensland Review,* 15/2 (2008), 59-68.

[58] Bashford, *Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism,Nationalism and Public Health*, 81-114, Suzanna Saunders, *A Suitable Island Site: Leprosy in the Northern Territory and the Channel Island Leprosarium* (Darwin: Historical Society of the Northern Territory, 1989).

[59] Leprosy was always stigmatised as a disease of 'coloured' and 'inferior' races. In the late nineteenth century, leprosy was perceived as a 'Chinese disease'. It was believed that the disease was introduced by indentured Chinese labourers in the 1850s. Chinese patients were typically deported, particularly after 1901 with the introduction of national immigration restrictions. By the early twentieth century leprosy had spread to the Aboriginal population in the northern and western states. As a result, Aborigines became the major target of intervention. In 1941 the Leper Line was created by the Western Australian government to prevent Aboriginal people from travelling south of the twentieth parallel. The line was enacted as part of the *Western Australian Native Administration Act*, which became the *Native Welfare Act* in 1954. The Act criminalised Aboriginal people crossing the line without the permission of the Commissioner of Native Affairs. See Anne Scrimgeour, 'Leprosy, Labour and the 'Low Wage Line'', *History of Australia,* 9/3 (2012b), 107-31, Anne Scrimgeour, 'Battlin for Their Rights: Aboriginal Activism and the Leper Line', *Aboriginal History,* 36 (2012a), 56-79.

[60] Saunders, *A Suitable Island Site: Leprosy in the Northern Territory and the Channel Island Leprosarium*.

[61] Genever, 'Queensland's Black Leper Colony', 59-68.

[62] Sarah Prout and Richard Howitt, 'Frontier Imaginings and Subversive Indigenuos Spatialities', *Journal of Rural Studies,* 25/4 (2009), 396-403. Prout and Howitt argue that the experiences of Indigenous Australians were similar to the Bedouins' encounter with the State of Israel. As discussed in Chapter Three, Bedouin movement was seen as a threat by the Ottomans, the British and by Israel. Physical barriers were used to control their movements. Similar to Bedouins' experiences, Aboriginal people were confined to specific areas where they were deprived of their traditional lifestyles.

constituting racial liberal experiments that sought to discipline and include Aborigines.

In each movement, the lines of repeating islands took a different form. They were reappropriated as a function of another perceived political problem. Some of these island reserves and leprosy islands were later transformed into military machines during the First and Second World Wars, becoming sites of fortification and military operations.[63] Most importantly, three British nuclear testing programs were carried out in the Monte Bello Islands in Western Australia during the 1950s; these tests affected generations of Indigenous Australians. Furthermore, during both world wars islands were used as sites for internment camps. These camps functioned to define the whiteness of Australia as resolutely British. During both world wars, first Germans, then Italians and Japanese were declared as enemy aliens and interned. Rottnest Island (Wadjemup), Torrens Island, Bruny Island (Lunawanna Allonah), and Garden Island became the major internment sites.[64] In particular, these islands were the sites where the anti-German campaign was played out.[65] These internment camps drew the boundaries between home front and battle front, friend and enemy, and citizen and alien. They functioned to re-qualify the definition of Australian whiteness as being Anglo-Saxon and boundaries of Australian citizenship.[66]

Yet, these islands were never static spaces defined only by one movement: the movement of the colonial power. They were constituted by the movement of multiple life-lines. These cramped spaces always held a number of incompatible

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[63] For example, Thursday Island (Waiben) was a place of fortification, which was later transformed into a quarantine station. The island later became a centre for military operations in the Torres Strait during the First World War, securing Australia's northernmost border. Some other islands, such as Stradbroke Island (Minjerribah), included coastal gun battery emplacements during the late 1930s.

[64] During the First and Second World Wars, resident nationals of countries at war with Australia were classed as 'enemy aliens'. The policy originally included people who immigrated to Australia. In 1915, however, it expanded to include naturalised British subjects who were born in enemy countries as well as people of enemy descent, determined patriarchially. National Archives of Australia, 'Wartime internment camps in Australia', viewed 12 October 2015, <http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/snapshots/internment-camps/introduction.aspx>, Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia 1914-1920* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989).

[65] For detailed discussion of anti-German campaign see Gerhard Fischer, 'Fighting the War at Home: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens in Australia During the First World War', in Panikos Panayi (ed.), *Minorities in Wartime* (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 263-86.

[66] William Morris Hughes (Prime Minister of Australia, 1915-1923), expressed the importance of the Britishness of Australian whiteness in 1919 as follows: 'We are more British than the people of Great Britain, we hold firmly to the great principle of White Australia, because we know what we know'. For discussion of the Britishness of Australia see, for example, Neville Meaney, 'Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 31 (2003), 121-35.

places all in the same place. In these terms, perhaps, Rottnest Island (Wadjemup) constitutes a perfect example of a heterotopia. The island has simultaneously accommodated a number of several spaces all within the one place: an Aboriginal prison, a boys reformatory, a penal station, an internment camp, a tourist complex, an Indigenous memorial and activist sites have all coexisted in one place. The story of the island's reterritorialisation began in 1841 when an Aboriginal prison was established as a site for a liberal experiment in the colonial humanitarian network discussed earlier.67 Wadjemup was a space of oppression. Between 1883 and 1931, 3,670 Aboriginal men served out sentences and 365 were buried on the island.68 Furthermore, Wadjemup operated as a colonising, disciplinary machine connected to Western Australia's (WA) frontier wars. The island played an extensive role in the repression of Noongar resistance and in emptying their land for further settlement. As Neville Green and colleagues reveal, the colonisation of WA was performed through the establishment of a carceral network encompassing the colony.69 Aborigines within the colony were systematically removed from their lands as a result of arbitrary trials.

During the same period, Wadjemup was also developed as a popular holiday destination. The island initially became a site for recreation in 1859 when the Governor expressed an interest in holidaying on the island. In 1911, the cells of the established Quod prison were transformed into a hotel. Today, the Quod is a sacred place for Indigenous Australians, remembering and memorialising cultural genocide and Aboriginal resistance on this site. However, Quod continues to function as one of the most expansive hotels on the island. Tania Ferrier's art work, the *Quod Project*, provides a strong critique of this contemporary heterotopic functioning of

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67 Neville Green and Susan Moon, *Far from Home: Aboriginal Prisoners of Rottnest Island 1838-1931* (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1997) 14. Reflecting the general humanitarian policies of the time, the island was chosen for the site of an open-plan prison, wherein the prisoners could develop farming and building skills isolated from the mainland. The aim was to establish a self-sufficient institution. In 1849, the prison was closed. In 1855, it was re-opened. For detailed history of Rottnest Island see ibid., Glen Stasiuk, *Wadjemup: Rottnest Island as Black Prison and White Playground*, Unpublished PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2015.
68 Ibid. Transportation of Aboriginal prisoners ceased in 1903; however, prisoners continued their sentences on the island until the late 1920s. In 1904, it became an annex of Fremantle prison.
69 In the south west of the colony, prisons were established in Guildford (1841), Albany (1850), York (1852), and Bunbury and Busselton (1879). As colonists in the 1870s began settling in the areas north and east of Perth, they built prisons in Roebourne (1881), Derby (1887), Wyndham (1888) and Carnarvon (1890). In doing so they constructed 'a colony-wide network of incarceration that ran from Wyndham in the far north, east to Coolgardie and Kalgoorlie, down to the bottom tip at Albany and far west to the central prison on Rottnest Island'. Ibid., Stasiuk, *Wadjemup: Rottnest Island as Black Prison and White Playground.*

Wadjemup.[70] It depicts how consumerism and tourism perpetuate injustices and displacement through a certain amnesia that refuses to acknowledge the island's past violence. Sally Morgan's art work, *Greetings from Rottnest* (1988), similarly problematises the contemporary functioning of the island as a space of tourism which conceals indigenous narratives and footprints, and hence, carries the violence of the past into the present (Figure 10). In Morgan's words, her art-activism 'gives a voice and an identity to the people who were buried on the island and who didn't receive the burial mortuary ceremony they would have on their own country'.

The figure is removed due to copyright restrictions

Figure 10: Rottnest Island as a heterotopia. *Greetings from Rottnest*, Sally Morgan
Source: Bronwyn Watson, 'Rottnest Island's dark past', *The Australian*, 15 December 2012.

Since the late 1980s, Wadjemup has also functioned as a minor space. In the last two decades local Noongar leaders and custodians and activists from all over the state have activated a collaborative struggle between white and Indigenous Australians for the recognition of genocide, past sufferings and indigenous rights on the island. The year 1994 was a turning point. Several demands were made to the State Government that people of the Noongar community should be recognised as custodians of the island, and the Quod area should be set aside as a camping place for the Aboriginal use only. This ceremony was a significant event. For the first time in its history a senior member of the government affirmed Wadjemup's past function as the site of the greatest number of Aboriginal deaths in custody in WA. What Wadjemup's heterotopic story indicates is that the repeating island is not recurring movement of colonising, oppressive and disciplinary lines. Every repetition forms new relations and territories that activate 'cracks and ruptures'. Therefore, the repeating islands of Australia are not simply a repetition of abject reterritorialisations. Wadjemup reminds us once again of the potential of change that is immanent to any

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[70]Tania Ferrier, 'Quod Project, Room 2: Quod Double', viewed 24 September 2015, <http://www.taniaferrier.com.au/quodproject/quoddouble.html>, Bronwyn Watson, 'Rottnest Island's Dark Past', *The Australian,* 15 December 2012.

territory. The following section considers how islands release such potential in Australian becoming.

4. Islands as minor spaces

Henry Reynold writes that since the arrival of the First Fleet 'the Aboriginal response to invasion was much more positive, creative and complex than generations of white Australians have believed'.[71] Islands have always occupied an important place in this response and in the movement of lines of flight. Flinders Island, for example, was the first site at which organised Aboriginal political activism occurred.[72] In the late 1830s the Aborigines at Wybalenna – the settlement site on the island – started active resistance against their oppression first in the form of a petition to the Queen. This movement was led by Walter George Arthur – the first Aboriginal activist and a crucial figure in linking the 'primary resistance' of the frontier with larger political movements such as the anti-slavery crusade.[73]

Further acts of resistance were reactivated on the Torres Strait Islands on 14 January 1936 when, with two exceptions, all Islanders living in thirteen communities refused to work the pearling luggers owned by the Islanders, but controlled by the Protector.[74] The 1936 Maritime Strike was a significant point in the history of the Aboriginal Rights movement. The nine-month strike directly involved seventy per cent of the Islander workforce and was supported by the Communist Party of Australia on the mainland.[75] It was the first organised political challenge to state

[71] Henry Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006) 199.
[72] Attwood and Markus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights: A Documentary History*, 30-31, 37-41.
[73] Henry Reynolds, 'Walter George Arthur', *Island,* 49 (1991), 36-39.
[74] See Nonie Sharp, 'Culture Clash in the Torres Strait Islands: The Maritime Strike of 1936', *Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland,* 11/3 (1981), 107-26, Sharp, *Saltwater People: The Waves of Memory*, 203-214. The 1920s were a turning-point in the movement. Reynold notes that although there were important instances of political action in the nineteenth century in the form of petitions and writing letters to politicians, the 1920s and 1930s saw activist groups emerging with sufficient continuity and organisation to exert influence on mainstream Australian politics. Aboriginal political organisations were founded during this period. The focus of the movement was to resist the removal of children, the retention of reserve lands, and demands for equal rights, including citizenship rights. Henry Reynolds, 'Action and Anxiety: The Long History of Settler Protest About the Nature of Australian Colonisation', *Settler Colonial Studies,* 4/4 (2014), 334-39, Attwood and Markus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights: A Documentary History*.
[75] The Communist Party was established in the early 1920s and presented a radical voice in the collaborative struggle for Indigenous rights. Bob Boughton, 'The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People's Rights 1920-1970', in

authority. Sharp explains that while the initial demands of the Islanders were an increase in wages and independence in operating their pearling boats, the strike more expansively constituted the entire colonial system.[76] On 23 August 1937, for the first time, all island councillors gathered at Masig (Yorke Island) and made demands to the Queensland Government. The strike achieved tangible results including enactment of the *Torres Strait Islander Act (1939),* which increased Islanders' authority in their own affairs.[77] The strike not only united all Torres Strait Islanders in their political struggle, it also resulted in legal recognition of their identity distinct from the mainland Aboriginal peoples. Murray Island (Mer/Murijingalong) leaders pressed for control over the islands' funds and for equality within Australian society.[78] Owing to its radical successes in wresting civil and tangible rights from the state, the 1936 strike was a pivotal disruption that began to displace the previously undiminished hegemony of Australian colonisation. It was an event yet-to-come in the sense that 'home rule had become a specific demand among the Murray Islanders, half a century before Mabo' – the 1992 High Court decision that rejected the doctrine of *terra nullius* in Australia.[79]

Ian Buchanan writes that *terra nullius* was 'the content of the form' – 'a particular shape the state of exception took in the establishment of Australia as a sovereign'.[80] In 1982, Kokiki Mabo and other Murray Islanders campaigned to break that particular shape and the legal and moral form it imposed. In its hallmark decision, the High Court concluded that:

> … the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the island of Mer except for that parcel of land leased to the Trustees of the Australian Board of Missions and those parcels of land (if any) which have been validly appropriated for use of

Ray Markey (ed.), *Labour and Community: Historical Essays* (Wollongong: University of Wollongong, 2001), 263-94.

[76] Sharp, 'Culture Clash in the Torres Strait Islands: The Maritime Strike of 1936', 107-26.

[77] The initial outcome of the strike should not be exaggerated. Sharp points out that the 1939 Act preserved 'indirect rule' by the government over the islanders' boats. Segregation continued, and it was not until 1962 (Federal) and 1964 (State) that the islanders were permitted to vote in either state or federal elections. Ibid. 122.

[78] Ibid. 120.

[79] Quoted in Boughton, 'The Communist Party of Australia's Involvement in the Struggle for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People's Rights 1920-1970' 39.

[80] Ian Buchanan, 'Symptomatology and Racial Politics in Australia', *Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia,* 4/1 (2012), 120.

administrative purposes the use of which is inconsistent with the continued enjoyment of the rights and privileges of Meriam people under native title.[81]

The decision established that the island has never been deserted nor isolated. Although the case was limited to Mer Island, its principles were applicable to Australia as a whole.

Since 1992, much has been argued on the paradoxical effect of the Mabo decision in representing colonial attempts to accommodate post-colonial realities. It has been argued that by re-legitimating European law, which colonised Aboriginal people in the first instance, the decision required Aboriginal people to recognise the law that colonised them. In doing so, the Mabo decision neither abolished the asymmetry between the common law and indigenous law nor offered a positive recognition of difference.[82] While the court demolished the concept of *terra nullius* in respect of property, it preserved it in regard to sovereignty.[83] In other words, it did not question the illegality of annexation. Notwithstanding its limitations, the 1992 Mabo decision commenced a new 'Native Title era' in Australia.[84] The 1992 Mabo decision was not an event of decolonisation. The Murray islanders, however, succeeded in breaking the silence over the banality of 'the state of exception' and the particular form of space it created. Perhaps, most importantly, as Paul Patton argues powerfully, the 1992 Mabo decision recalled the event of colonisation in order to rewrite it in a radically different form.[85] It was a recollection of the indigenous 'footprints' that had been forgotten and concealed beneath the surface of Australian politics. The 1992 decision was a moment of Australian becoming. The decision, Patton writes, 'involved a return to earlier events of colonisation, collapsing elements of the colonial past into the present and making these parts of the ongoing elaboration

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[81] Nonie Sharp, *No ordinary judgement: Mabo, the Murray Islanders land case* (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1996), 178.

[82] See for example Stewart Motha, 'Mabo: Encountering the Epistemic Limit of the Recognition of 'Difference'', *Griffith Law Journal,* 7/1 (1998), 79-96.

[83] Henry Reynolds, *Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, State and Nation* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996) 3.

[84] The 1992 Mabo decision was followed by the creation of the *Native Title Act 1993* and the National Native Title Tribunal in 1993. In 2011, the registered determinations of native title covered fifteen percent of the landmass of Australia. As of 26 January 2016, 350 native title determinations were made by a court or other recognised body. National Native Title Tribunal, *Statistics*, viewed 26 January 2016, < http://www.nntt.gov.au/Pages/Statistics.aspx>.

[85] Paul Patton, 'The Event of Colonisation', in Ian Buchanan and Adrian Parr (ed.), *Deleuze and the Contemporary World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 122.

of the future', which had the potential to reveal radically diverse encounters between Indigenous and non-indigenous Australians.[86]

Since the 1992 decision, islands have continued to play an important role in offering new entries on the map of Australia and challenging its linear island-borders. Following Mabo, in 1994 the Croker Island native title application was lodged by Mandilarri-Ildugij, Mangalara, Murran, Gadura-Minaga and Ngaynjaharr peoples. The claimants sought recognition of their rights to exclusive possession, ownership, occupation, use and enjoyment of the sea, the seabed and its resources. It was the first native title claim over an area of sea and seabeds surrounding islands.[87] Although the court recognised only non-exclusive native title rights to the sea property, the Croker Island Seas Case demonstrated that Indigenous peoples held a different concept of the sea - land boundary to that of Europeans. The case did not completely overturn Australia's national amnesia, which fails to recall that colonisation was not the territorialisation of the land only, but also of the sea, imagined as 'empty' and 'free.'[88] However, the Croker Island case reminded us that the space of the sea was not an empty space: rather, it is filled with indigenous 'sacred sites and dreaming paths'.[89] Croker Island retold an alternative narrative that the dichotomous European imagination of land and sea was not the initial and exclusive account of Australian cartography.

In short, Australian islands are fluid, mobile spaces. New political, social and economic constellations are always immanent in these spaces. As the ongoing struggles over the preservation of island resources and the protection of ecosystems, such as those in Fraser Island (K'gari) and Stradbroke Island (Minjerribah), or as the recent Nyoongar Tent Embassy on Matagarup (Heirisson Island) reminds us, islands are spaces of political experimentation and struggle. Islands can always be activated

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[86] Ibid. 122.

[87] Croker Island is part of the largest groups of islands located 200 kilometres north-east of Darwin. In 1998, the High Court in its decision concluded that native title exists over the two-thousand square kilometres of sea and the sea-bed adjoining Croker Island. It found that the claimants did have Native Title rights to the ear, but these rights are not exclusive or commercial. In other words, they had the right to their traditional use of the sea, but this would not prevent others from fishing or carrying out other commercial activities.

[88] Siiri Wilson argues that by failing to recognise exclusive rights, the High Court decision perpetuated dispossessions and weakened the promise of the Mabo decision and the mandate of the Native Title Tribunal. Siiri Aileen Wilson, 'Entitled as against None: How the Wrongly Decided Croker Island Case Perpetuates Aboriginal Dispossession', *Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal,* 18/1 (2009), 249-80.

[89] Sharp, *Saltwater People: The Waves of Memory.*

as minor spaces, where claims for alternative sovereignty can be made, possibilities of a new political community can be awakened, the enforced boundary between land and water transgressed, and the imaginary unity of Australian being disturbed.

5. The colonial history of Manus Island and Nauru

a. Manus Island: a military machine

Australia's territorialisation of Manus Island began with its first military and then administrative role in New Guinea as a League of Nations mandate.[90] Australia's administration of New Guinea until its independence in 1975 was typical of colonial extra-nationalist practice, exhibiting strong paternalistic tones. The words of Australian politician Thomas Henley perhaps best depict this colonial mindset: 'we have a new world in the making.… Here, awaiting the energy and enterprise of civilised man, lie vast tracts of virgin country possessing untold sources of mineral and other wealth and illimitable opportunities for development'.[91] Indeed, for Australia, New Guinea was an uncivilised world waiting to be captured and transformed. Although Manus Island did not become a place of particular interest for Australia until the Second World War, the colonisation of the island was part of this mission.

The systematic colonisation of the island began immediately after the annexation of New Guinea by Germany in 1884 and took economic, political, technological and social forms.[92] While the Germans did little more than exert missionary and otherwise a tokenistic administrative presence over the area, the Australians took a more disciplinary-biopolitical-governmental approach.

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[90] Manus Island is the largest island of the Admiralty Islands, an archipelago group of eighteen islands in the Bismarck Archipelago. Lorengau is the capital of Manus Province. Other large islands in the province are Ramutso and Los Negros, connected to Manus Island by bridge. During the Paris Conference Australia failed to annex German colonies, but it succeeded in obtaining a Class C Mandate of German New Guinea and Nauru along with New Zealand and Britain. Mandate C gave Australia almost the same control over New Guinea as annexation.

[91] Thomas Henley, *New Guinea and Australia's Pacific Islands Mandate* (Sydney: John Sands, 1927) 12.

[92] Manus Island was first sighted by Spanish explorer, De Saavedra in 1528. For 98 years after the first encounter, there was no record of Europeans on the island. Until 1875 there were only short visits by Europeans. Between 1885 and 1899 New Guinea was under the control of the New Guinea Company, which hoped to profit from local labour on copra, cocoa and tobacco plantations. In 1899 the New Guinea Company administration was replaced by direct control of the German government.

Immediately after taking control of the entire area in the 1920s, the Australian administration initiated a structure of administration and control by imposing health programs, regular censuses and patrols, and adjudication of disputes on the island.[93] The major impact of the colonisation of Manus was the transformation of all social production systems. By ending customary warfare between villages, colonisation altered all practices of kinship and exchange. In their ethnographic discussions of Manus province, James Carrier and colleagues indicate the positive commercial and ceremonial functions of pre-colonial inter-village warfare and boundaries. The colonial capture of Manus resulted in the abolishment of local warfare and the imposition of 'colonial peace' and labour recruiting, which destroyed the local production system.[94] Elimination of the indigenous systems of locality and kinship relocated economic resources out of the region and out of the control of villages, eventually making Manus dependent on external support. Otto writes that rather than ending violence, colonisation replaced local antagonisms with its own more destructive colonial technology and machinery of warfare.[95] Colonisation of Manus supplanted indigenous social and economic systems with a new colonial arrangement sustained by its disciplinary administrative and military centres. Such colonial practices captured the local territories of Manus in order to create pacified homogeneous lands and labour, and then transformed them into a single Australian-dependent unit.

During the Second World War Manus Island was transformed into a military machine. It was first invaded by the Imperial Japanese forces in 1942. Then, in 1944, the United States (US) forces landed on the island and turned Lombrum Point into one of the world's largest naval bases.[96] The Australian New Guinea Administrative

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[93] James G. Carrier and Achsah H. Carrier, 'A Manus Centenary: Production, Kinship, and Exchange in the Admiralty Islands', *American Ethnologist,* 12/3 (1985), 511, G.W.L. Townsend, *District Officer: From Untamed New Guinea to Lake Success, 1921-1946* (Sydney: Pacific Publications, 1968).

[94] Ton Otto, 'Warfare and Exchange in a Melanesian Society before Colonial Pacification: The Case of Manus, Papua New Guinea', in Ton Otto, Henrik Thrane, and Helle Vandkilde (eds.), *Warfare and Society: Archaeological and Social Anthropological Perspectives* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 187-99, Carrier and Carrier, 'A Manus Centenary: Production, Kinship, and Exchange in the Admiralty Islands', 511.

[95] Otto, 'Warfare and Exchange in a Melanesian Society before Colonial Pacification: The Case of Manus, Papua New Guinea', 188.

[96] Capture of the Admiralty Islands was the latest steps in the Allied campaign, which closed the Bismark-Solomons area from Axis supply and reinforcement. The purpose of the naval base was to support operations on the north coast of New Guinea. See United States War Department, *The Admiralties: Operation of the 1st Cavalry Division* (Washington D.C.: Historical Division War Department, 1945).

Unit supported operation of the base. The site went through a series of transformations over the decades before becoming a detention and processing centre for asylum seekers in 2001. During the war Manus Island was built over with aerodromes, roads, wharves, offices, hospitals, camps, shops and houses built for thousands of American seamen, technicians and dockyard workers.[97] For a short period of time the island was a busy industrial seaport with a huge flow of capital. Villages were transformed into army camps without consultation with the islanders, who were forced to be the part of the war in the Pacific. In her authoritative work on Manus, Margaret Mead celebrates such transformation and the occupation of the island by modern war technologies. Seeing the war as impetus for this transformation, she writes, 'Americans knocked down mountains, smoothed islands for airstrips, tore up miles of bush – all with their marvellous engines'.[98] In Mean's orientalist depiction, such technological developments enabled by the West, in particular by the Americans, fortunately, 'mobilised their imagination' and delivered to them 'a total civilised way of life'. Mead applauds capture of the island – its people and land – by modern technology. She strongly believes that the 'liberal' colonisation did not work against the islanders' will and brought modernisation by '[passing] on a developed tradition' to Manus Island.

It was during the late 1940s that Manus became a point in Australia's border protection network. In 1946 the Australian Civil Administration established itself on the island to protect Australia against the attacks of an unnamed enemy.[99] Flaming Australia's invasion anxiety, an article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* underlined the strategic importance of Manus Island for frontier protection:

> It is too easily forgotten, although the last war should have driven it home, that the strategic frontier of the Commonwealth is not its northern coast, but

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[97] Sydney Morning Herald, 'Future of Manus', 18 February 1946.

[98] Margaret Mead, *New Lives for Old: Cultural Transformation - Manus 1928-1953* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1956) 168.

[99] In 1947, the US withdrew its forces and dismantled the base after failed negotiations with Australia over its joint use. Sydney Morning Herald, 'Defence of the Pacific', 24 April 1946, John Dedman, 'Encounter over Manus', *Australian Outlook,* 20/2 (1966), 135-53, Australian Department of Defence, 'The Strategic Importance of a Base at Manus', (Canberra: Australian Department of Defence, 1953), Roger Bell, 'Australian-American Discord: Negotiations for Post-War Bases and Security Arrangements in the Pacific 1944-1946', *Australian Outlook,,* 27/1 (1973), 12-33.

the chain of island outposts which screen it. These islands can be either bastions of defence or jumping-off points for an invasion of the mainland.[100]

Similarly, in 1951, the Defence Committee stressed the importance of re-establishment of an advanced naval and air base on the island to protect the northern border against a possible 'communist' attack:

> In the event of the Allies being forced to withdraw from the mainland of Asia, the general line of defence in the Anzam region would extend through the Admiralty Islands, New Guinea, and the coastal waters of North and North West Australia and Cocos Islands.[101]

Following withdrawal of the US forces in 1950, Australia began to reconstruct the base with the labour of Japanese war criminals.[102] This was the first time Manus became a site for a detention camp, where Japanese were held for the final series of war crimes trials.[103]

The transformation of Manus Island into a military machine in the form of a military base and a military camp for war trials destroyed the remaining structures of indigenous production.[104] Consequently all these transformations made the island increasingly dependent on the support of its colonisers whose impact continues in the present day. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the contemporary use of Manus as a detention centre in Australia's border protection network reproduces similar

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[100] Sydney Morning Herald, 'Raiders in Our Island Waters', 4 August 1951.

[101] Australian Department of Australian Department of Defence, 'The Strategic Importance of a Base at Manus'. By the mid-1950s Manus had lost its strategic importance. According to a 1953 Defence Committee Report the low probability of global war had changed the importance of the base in the defence of Australia. It concluded that it would establish an advanced base only if Malaya would fall to the communists.

[102] On April 1950 the base at Manus Island was commissioned HMAS Tarangau. In 1971, the base retained two functions: to provide fuelling and communications facilities for the Royal Australian Navy and to train the PNG Division of the RAN for the PNG coastal force and its facilities. Royal Australian Navy News, 'Hmas Tarangau', 1971.

[103] The war crimes trial program was conducted between 1945 and 1951 in eight different locations: Morotai, Wemak, Labouan, Ambon, Rabaul, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Manus Island. See Michael Carrel, *Australia's prosecution of Japanese war criminals: stimuli and constraints*, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2005, Caroline Pappas, *Law and Politics: Australia's War Crime Trials in the Pacific, 1943-1961*, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of New South Wales, 1998.

[104] Carrier and Carrier, 'A Manus Centenary: Production, Kinship, and Exchange in the Admiralty Islands', 505-22.

colonial practices and destructs the island by disturbing its local economy, social cohesion and customary land rights, and eco-system.

b. Nauru Island: an extracted 'wasteland'

Since the introduction of the Pacific Solution and the openings of refugee detention centres in Nauru, Australia has been heavily criticised for reviving its past colonial exploitation of this island. It has long been argued that very much like Manus Island, the contemporary use of asylum seeker detention centres in Nauru has its roots in Australia's long history of colonial past. Indeed, Nauru was colonised by Australia and transformed into 'wastelands' long before it was reassembled in the form of Australia's border enforcement sites. Its colonisation and the extraction of their natural resources enacted its particular transformation into a phosphate mine. And since the early days of Australian colonisation, therefore, like Manus Island, Nauru has existed somewhere between inside and outside of Australia.

Nauru was first sighted by Europeans in 1798. It did not, however, become a colony until the late nineteenth century, when phosphate was discovered on the island.[105] Extraction commenced in 1907, the way cleared by a conjunction of legal stepping-stones. First, in 1907, phosphate was declared to be excluded from landowners' control and became a free mineral.[106] Then, in 1919, the *Nauru Island Agreement (1919)* between the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and New Zealand provided conditions by which mandatory powers could gain access to the cheapest possible phosphate.[107] As a violent text, the *Nauru Island Agreement* sustained

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[105] Nauru is the remotest island in the Pacific. With the Anglo-German Declaration of 1886 it was given under German influence, becoming a German colony within the Protectorate of the Marshall Islands in 1888. Administration of the island was given to the Jaluit Company. Jaluit played a major role in financing the administration of Nauru, which in return was provided economic privileges. Phosphate – used for agricultural fertiliser – was discovered in 1899 by Albert Ellis. In 1900, the Pacific Island Company – later the Pacific Phosphate Company – purchased a 90-year lease from Jaluit.

[106] During the German rule, the miner was liable to restore the surface. The miner was also liable to compensate the landowner if restoration was impossible. In this regard the German period showed greater solicitude for the interests of the Nauruans. International Court of Justice, *Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru V. Australia): Memorial of the Republic of Nauru* (The Hague, 1990) 7-8.

[107] Under the 1919 Agreement, the first administrator was to be appointed for a term of five years by the Australian government. His was required to 'make ordinances for the peace, order and good government of the Island'. His role also included provisions of education for children on the island, and establishment of police force and courts. Expenses of these services had to be met by the sale of

de/reterritorialisation of Nauru until the *Nauru Act 1965*. The Agreement established the office of British Phosphate Commissioner, who operated the phosphate business on behalf of the three partner governments, generously provided with all powers necessary to determine and implement the conditions under which the deposits would be worked and sold. The 1919 Agreement was followed by the lands ordinances.[108] *The Land Ordinance 1921* divided the island into phosphate-bearing lands and non-phosphate-bearing lands. Seventy-five percent of Nauru was declared as phosphate-bearing. In 1927, a new land ordinance extended the powers of the Commissioner to include rights to lease any phosphate bearing land, to mine phosphate to any depth desired, and to use or export such phosphate.

The legal system enforced on Nauru was an abstract machine, a diagram: a 'map of function' of Australia's new mining assemblage. As an abstract machine, this legal regime forced the construction new territories and boundaries on the island, and imposed new relationships and collisions. First, it systematically destroyed the Nauruan flora and vegetation of its plateau.[109] In 1965, when plans for resettlement of the Nauruans to an island in Australia were abandoned, seventy-five per cent of the land was already mined. Second, before mining operations started, the Nauruans held a strong attachment to their lands and maintained a developed tenure system. Almost the whole island was owned by the islanders themselves. The colonial legal system imposed on the island not only disregarded the indigenous conception of land ownership, it also abolished all indigenous boundaries on the island. The Nauruans were not given any voice in regard to the legal arrangements that dispossessed them of their own lands. As expressed by the Nauruans, the legal regime transformed their relations with trees, birds, palms, pandanus, fish, the sea and the coast as well as the relations of non-human beings with the earth. Finally, the island devolved into an industrialised space, and became totally dependent on imports.

An island, however, manifests constantly changing heterogeneous elements introduced by new abstract machines. It never achieves a final structure as lines of flight are always immanent in their constant entanglement with colonising lines. The

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the phosphate. The United Kingdom (UK) and Australia were allotted forty-two per cent of output, and New Zealand sixteen per cent.
[108] For discussion of the lands ordinances see ICJ, *Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru V. Australia: Memorial of the Republic of Nauru*, 33-39.
[109] See ICJ, *Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru V. Australia: Memorial of the Republic of Nauru*, 81-97.

colonised space of Nauru started to become a space of contestation after the transition to trusteeship in 1947.[110] Several acts of contestation recalled and challenged the earlier events of colonisation. These acts included petitions submitted by the islanders to the UN demanding more representation in control of their islands; Nauruans' rejection of settlement in Australia and their application to the International Court of Justice for Australia's violation of trusteeship obligations and its failure to rehabilitate the land from which phosphate was extracted.[111] The refusal of the Nauruans to resettle in Australia, their insistence on retaining their distinct identity as Nauruans, and the establishment of the Nauru Phosphate Corporate before independence in 1968 were the moments that challenged earlier events of colonisation of the island.

6. Conclusion

John Mateer argues that 'Australia is not an island – it is an archipelago'.[112] Seeing Australia as an archipelago is to acknowledge the function of each island in performing Australia's becoming. Indeed, in this chapter, I have explored how islands have performed the imagination and the production of Australia. The purpose of this inquiry has been two-fold. First, I have sought to demonstrate that Australia's present day refugee detention centres in Manus Island and Nauru cannot be understood without appreciating the long history of the colonisation of Australia and these islands. Therefore, we need to consider contemporary detention centres as machines

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[110] The mandate operated from 1920 and 1947. From 1947 to 1968 Nauru was administered under a trusteeship agreement of the UN. In 1942, Japanese invaded the island. In the same year, the majority of Nauruans were deported to the island of Truk in Micronesia, where they were used as forced labour. The islanders were repatriated to Nauru on 31 January 1946. During the war, approximately one-third of the total Nauruan population died. ICJ, *Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru V. Australia: Memorial of the Republic of Nauru*, 40.

[111] The resettlement talks began in 1962 after it was widely reported that phosphate deposits would be depleted by the 2000s. Due to the high costs, the proposal on the rehabilitation of the land was rejected by the Australian Administration and the British Phosphate Commissioner. Rather, the Australian government preferred the resettlement option Fraser Island and Curtis Island were proposed as resettlement sites. The Nauruans rejected the Australian proposal of individual, gradual and piecemeal settlement on the grounds that they could not preserve their identity. During the 1964 Nauru talks, the Nauruans insisted on not becoming Australians with citizenship entitlements. They rather they sought to sustain autonomy on the island they were offered to resettle. Gil Marvel and Brian Opeskin, 'The Resettlement of Nauruans in Australia', *The Journal of Pacific History,* 46/3 (2011), 337-56.

[112] John Mateer, 'Australia Is Not an Island', *Meanjin,* 65/1 (2006), 89-93.

of Australia's ocean borders that began to evolve in the eighteenth-century. Second, in exploring the repeating islands of Australia, I have demonstrated their heterotopic functioning, and argued that islands are not static spaces. They are the entanglement of multiple life-lines. With these preparatory arguments, in the next chapter, I will explore how two islands – Manus Island and Nauru – are reassembled as a solution to Australia's new border crisis: asylum seekers coming to Australia by boats.

CHAPTER 6

HETEROTOPIAS ON THE OCEAN BORDER: THE REFUGEE DETENTION CENTRES IN MANUS ISLAND AND NAURU

In June 2013, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) launched a new reform programme: *Blueprint for Reform 2013-2018*.[1] This five-year road map asserts the strategic importance of Australian borders for national security and economic prosperity. Most notably, it calls for a redefinition of the concept of the border. It suggests that the border is not as a physical barrier separating nation-states, but a 'complex continuum'. The border, the programme maintains, is not 'a line on the map'; rather it is a 'continuum that stretches onshore and offshore including the overseas, maritime, physical border and domestic dimension of the border'.[2] Under the *Blueprint for Reform,* the ACBPS commits to work together with the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), promising to manage each dimension of this continuum to 'protect safety, security and commercial interests of Australia'.[3] This new notion of 'complex border continuum' turns Australia's ocean borders into a flexible line; an elastic fortification whose purpose is to control 'who and what has the right to enter or exit, and under what conditions'.[4] The 'complex border continuum' redefines Australian borders as a matrix of strong points spread both onshore and offshore. It assigns each point a

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[1] Australian Customs and Border Protection, 'Blueprint for Reform 2013-2018', (Canberra: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, June 2013).

[2] Ibid. 8. Australia's first national security strategy (2013) was the first government attempt that proposed this notion of the border. This strategy perceived 'border integrity' as a major security interest. It constructed irregular maritime migration as one of the main challenges to Australia's borders. Australian Government, 'Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security', (Canberra: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013).

[3] The ACBPS was Australia's primary border control agency. In July 2015, the Service was abolished and its functions were integrated into the DIBP and ABF. The ABF is currently the primary Australian federal agency responsible for protecting Australian borders and managing the movement of people and goods. This new front-line operational agency unites all operational border investigation, compliance, and detention facilities and enforcement functions. The DIBP provides immigration policies and corporate support for the ABF. Australian Border Force, viewed 12 November 2015, <https://www.border.gov.au/australian-border-force-abf>.

[4] Australian Customs and Border Protection, 'Blueprint for Reform 2013-2018', 8.

certain task and a purpose, and then connects each point with one another to form a shifting border network.

This chapter is about one of the offshore points on this border continuum: refugee detention and processing centres on Manus Island and Nauru. As I elaborated in the previous chapter, since British settlement, islands have occupied a prominent role in the colonisation and transformation of Australian borders. Islands have been persistently used as solutions for particular perceptions of crisis. They have had a constitutive place in the production and preservation of multiple others who have been historically perceived as threats to Australian identity, unity and national security. This chapter extends the analysis to discuss how, in the post-Tampa period, and in particular, since the reintroduction of the Pacific Solution in 2012, islands have been re-assembled as a solution to another crisis: the asylum seekers coming by boats without authorisation. In this particular context, this chapter aims to answer how the Manus Island and Nauru Regional Processing Centres (RPCs) have been re-invented as one of the points in Australia's new 'complex border continuum'. More specifically, the chapter examines how these places function in Australia's border network; what new territories, and behavioural, legal and institutional codes they generate; and what forms of contestation they activate.

In responding to these questions, I draw on the argument that I established in the last two chapters. I argue that islands are heterotopic spaces. They do not have static borders, but moving ones. As heterotopias, they are (re)produced through the constant movement of multiple life-lines. The movement of these lead the emergence of different forms of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. The continuous and unexpected movements of these lines are tangled with one another, affecting each other on the heterotopic space of the island. The island as a space of becoming produces and reproduces, and connects and disconnects institutions, bodies, and territories.

By writing within this framework, this chapter seeks to add complexity to the theoretical picture of the refugee detention camps in Manus Island and Nauru. It does so by suggesting moving away from the contemporary debates which are centred on the discourse of human rights and the dystopian image of the camps. [5] These debates

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[5] Michelle Foster and Jason Pobjoy, 'A Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia's 'Excised' Territory', *International Journal of Refugee Law,* 23/4

tend to focus on human rights violations, illegality/legality of these camps, and the extraterritorial application of Australia's obligations arising from international human rights instruments, mainly the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is one of the general arguments that Australia's punitive border regime that seeks to prevent asylum seekers arriving in Australia has the hallmarks of border panic, which is mobilised by the historical anxieties of 'losing control of sovereign borders'.[6] Australia's border regime therefore reveals the tension between the notions of national security and human rights protections.[7] The camp in these debates appear as a spatial-ontological apparatus of the Australian state which operates through excluding asylum seekers from the normal juridio-political protections of national and international law and thus exposing them to the overt means of violence. The asylum seeker detained in these camps deemed as unworthy of state protection and rendered by the Australian sovereign as abject subject 'who is consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it'.[8] In these camps, the asylum seeker is not simply set outside the law, but abandoned by it, and consequently, he/she becomes a constitutive figure of Australia's sovereign power through his/her exclusion from the juridical and political sphere. In this context, quoting Giorgio Agamben, Suvendrini Perera writes, the camp is a space of exception 'in which the normal order is *de facto* suspended and in which whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law, but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign' there.[9]

My aim in this chapter is not abandon discussions about the Australian state and its construction of a violent border in Manus Island and Nauru. One certainly cannot proceed without understanding the ways in which the Australian state creates new borders and establishes new practices, institutions and networks. However, I suggest that an analysis of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs as tangled lines of capture and resistance provides a more nuanced picture of these camps. Such analysis

(2011), 583-631, Crock and Bones, 'Australian Exceptionalism: Temporary Protection and the Right of Refugees', 522-49.

[6] Greg Martin, 'Stop the Boats! Moral Panic in Australia over Asylum Seekers', *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies,* 29/3 (2015), 304-22, Christine Evans, 'Asylum Seekers and 'Border Panic' in Australia', *Peace Review,* 15/2 (2003), 163-70.

[7] Nikos Papastergiadis, 'The Invasion Complex: The Abject Other and Spaces of Violence', *Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography,* 88/4 (2006b), 429-42.

[8] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), quoted in Vaughan-Williams, *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond,* 50.

[9] Suvendrini Perera, 'What Is a Camp? ', *Borderlands e-journal,* 1/1 (2002a), viewed 19 October 2010, < http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no1_2002/perera_camp.html>.

brings new questions into the contemporary debate: how do the act of crossing and the incarceration of the asylum seeker activate moments of becoming-other, what happens when the asylum seeker and the agents of the Australian state collide on these isolated islands, what forms of alliances are formed, what transformations occur as result of these alliances?

The chapter begins with the discussion of the colonising lines of Australia's border network. The first part discusses how the Australian state re-assembles islands to form a new border regime. It explores the performative effects of the border network created on Manus Island and Nauru and elaborates how this network creates new legal, behavioural and institutional codes. It seeks to expose the violence and seemingly all-encompassing operation of the molar lines. In the second part, I explore the different processes of becoming in the cramped spaces of Manus Island and Nauru RPCs. In the final section, I demonstrate how the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs incite the new forms of refugee activism in Australia. I conclude this chapter by outlining the transformational potential of these acts.

1. Australia's Border network

a. Reassembling islands and shifting borders

On 27 August 2001, the Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, approached Christmas Island with 433 asylum seekers rescued from an Indonesian boat, the *Palapa* – the 137th boat that had travelled from Indonesia to Australia in that twelve-month period.[10] Soon after the Australian authorities spotted the Tampa, the captain of the ship, Arne Rinnan, was directed not to enter Australian territory. However, with the deteriorating conditions of the asylum seekers on the ship, on 29 August, the Tampa entered Australian waters. Shortly after, the ship was boarded by the Australian

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[10] For the events occurred during the Tampa crisis see Australian Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 'A Certain Maritime Incident', (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, *Dark Victory* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003), Peter Mares, 'Reassessing Tampa', in Dean Lusher and Nick Haslam (eds.), *Seeking Asylum in Australia: Yearning to Breathe Free* (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007), 52-63, Michael Grewcock, *Border Crimes: Australia's War on Illicit Migrants* (Sydney: The Institute of Criminology Press, 2009), Susan Kneebone, 'Controlling Migration by Sea: The Australian Case', in Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas (eds.), *Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 2010), 341-68.

Special Air Service. The Australian government declared the asylum seekers in MV Tampa as national security threats, and decided not to allow them landing in Australia. The government then proceeded with a series of regional arrangements with New Zealand, Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG). On 1 September 2001, the Prime Minister, John Howard, announced that the government had reached an agreement with New Zealand and Nauru for the processing of the people rescued by the Tampa. Furthermore, on 2 September, the government announced that it had reached an agreement with PNG to transfer asylum seekers through Port Moresby on the Australian troopship HMAS Manoora.[11] A day later, the rescued asylum seekers were transferred to a navy boat and taken to Nauru together with another group of asylum seekers, who had previously arrived on Ashmore Island. Later that month, the Senate passed six bills relating to border protection.[12] Just a few weeks after the legislative changes, on 19 October, an Indonesian boat that was en-route from Indonesia to Christmas Island carrying 421 people sank in the Indian Ocean, inside Australia's intensively patrolled border-protection and surveillance zone. 353 asylum seekers lost their lives in that incident.[13]

The Tampa event started a new era in Australia's border regime. It introduced new methods of control that continue to shape Australia's militarised maritime borders, whose effectiveness since then has relied on the perceived threats emanating from the sea. The event-effect of the Tampa was the expansion of the sphere of Australia's maritime policing operations and a shrinking of the rights of those arriving Australia by sea without visas. The delegitimisation of the right of seeking asylum and the representation of asylum seekers as threats to national integrity and security during the Tampa incident echoed powerfully Australia's historical anxieties; the fear of those outsiders imagined as threatening to the unity of white Australia and its perennial obsession of controlling ocean-borders.[14] The Tampa recalled past events of exclusionist and oppressive practices of the Australian state in

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[11] Australia Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 'A Certain Maritime Incident'.
[12] These bills were Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act No.127 2001, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone Provisions) Act No.128 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act No.134 2001, Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) No.129 2001; Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) No.206 2001; and Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act No.126 2001.
[13] For detailed discussion of this incident known as 'SIEV X affair' see Tony Kevin, *A Certain Maritime Incident: The Sinking of SIEV X* (Melbourne: Scibe Publications, 2004).
[14] Grewcock, *Border Crimes: Australia's War on Illicit Migrants*, Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia's Invasion Anxiety*.

order to connect them with Australia's future borders. It reinvoked Australia's past which regarded the ocean as a transgressive space beyond sovereign control – as 'an open road to the enemy' as Captain Creswell put it in 1902.[15] By enabling the introduction of new mechanisms of control over land and sea, the Tampa event created new subjectivities, new mobilities, new territories, and new connections between new and already-existing regimes of border protection.

One of these new territorial spaces was the island. Without doubt, the use of islands as border sites was not a new practice. As discussed earlier, since the beginnings of British settlement, islands have played an integral role in the production of Australia's territorial, social and political imaginary. They facilitated the colonisation of Australia and the conduct of oppressive policies against indigenous populations, enemy aliens, Asians and those who were perceived as threats against the fictive unity of the Australian self. Therefore, the event-effect of Tampa was not the invention of islands, but a reinvention of them as machines of Australia's new border regime. This reinvention, however, was not a simple repetition of the past. The Tampa plunged islands into new and already existing behavioural, legal and institutional codes of borders, including the mandatory detention of those arriving in Australia without visas.[16] With the event of Tampa, islands became new sites of Australia's border network. This was done by two simultaneous practices: the inclusion of the third country islands in Australia's border regime and the exclusion of Australia's islands from its migration zone. This double movement re-created islands as spaces of 'excision' and 'exile'.[17] Since their inception, these two practices have been operating in a continuum sustaining the effectiveness of one another.

Exclusion of Islands: The excision regime

In 2001, Australia created a new category of Australian territory; 'excised offshore places'. First, with the *Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act*

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[15] Sydney Morning Herald, 'Australian Naval Defence: Captain Creswell's Views', 26 June 1902.
[16] The mandatory detention of non-citizens without valid visas was first introduced by the Keating (Labor) government in 1992 through the enactment of the Migration Amendment Act 1992. At the time, the policy of mandatory detention was a temporary and an exceptional measure to manage the Indochinese boat arrivals. However, in 1994, this policy was extended to include all 'unlawful non-citizens'.
[17] Foster and Pobjoy, 'A Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia's 'Excised' Territory', 583-631.

2001 (Cth) a small number of islands – Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and Cocos (Keeling Island) – as well as offshore resource and other installations were defined as excised offshore places.[18] The amending legislation, however, allowed further excision of any external territory and any island that formed part of a state or a territory. With this provision, the excision regime was expanded gradually over the years. In 2005, with the *Migration Amendment Regulations (No. 6) 2005 (Cth)* approximately 4890 islands were deemed excised offshore places.[19] The final expansion of the excision regime took place in 2013, when the whole island-continent of Australia became an excised offshore place.[20]

The excision regime forms Australia's 'seam zone': an ever-shifting security space constituted by island-enclaves. These enclaves are connected together to form an extra border for a certain group of people to protect the border of the mainland (Figure 11). In other words, the excision regime creates a double border – a stockade around the mainland. The excision act and the following amendments do not excise islands from the migration zone. Rather, the excision regime creates a new category of person; an 'offshore entry person' (a person who enters the migration zone via an 'excised offshore place').[21] The significance of the excision is that any person who

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[18] The rationale of the excision policy was to reduce incentives for people in taking dangerous journeys to Australia, to prevent people smugglers from targeting islands closer to the mainland particularly in the Torres Strait, and to deter people to use offshore entry places as a means of achieving migration outcomes. Nathan Hancock, 'Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (No.2)', (Canberra: Department of the Parliament Library, 2002-2003).

[19] Foster and Pobjoy, 'A Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia's 'Excised' Territory', 583-631.The *Migration Amendment Regulation (No.6) 2005 (Cth)* prescribed the following islands as excised offshore places: The Coral Sea Islands Territory, all islands that (a) form part of Queensland and are north of latitude 21° south; (b) form part of Western Australia and are north of latitude 23° south; (c) form part of the Northern Territory and are north of latitude 16° south.

[20] The excision of the entire mainland was suggested by the Expert Panel on Asylum seekers in 2012. The Panel recommended some amendments in the *Migration Act 1958* to ensure that 'arrival anywhere on Australia by irregular maritime means' would not provide 'individuals with a different lawful status than those who arrive[d] in an excised offshore place'. The Panel argued that such legislative change would ensure all 'irregular maritime arrivals' to be processed outside Australia, regardless of where they first entered the country. As a result, the *Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013* came into effect on 20 May 2013 as part of the government's 'no-advantage policy'. Houston, Aristotle, and L'estrange, 'Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers'. For detailed analysis of parliamentary discussions see Anthea Vogl, 'Over the Borderline: A Critical Inquiry into the Geography of Territorial Excision and the Securitisation of the Australian Border', *UNSW Law Journal,* 38/1 (2015), 114-45.

[21] Hancock, 'Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (No.2)'. 'Migration zone' is 'the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian resource installations and Australian sea installations'. It includes 'land that is part of a State or Territory at mean low water; and sea within the limits of both a State or a Territory and a port; and piers, or similar structures, any part of which is connected to such land or to ground under such sea; but does

arrives on an excised island after the excision time without a valid visa becomes an unlawful non-citizen because of her/his act of entry, and is consequently prohibited from applying for a protection visa in Australia. As a result, the offshore entry person becomes an unlawful non-citizen and a transitory body, which can be forcibly removed to offshore processing centres. This seam zone operates as an offshore-entry-person exclusion zone. Therefore, what become excised are not so much the islands, but the bodies of the offshore entry persons. Similar to the seam zone in the West Bank, this bubble-like exclusion zone invents new methods of control, and ever-shifting legal instruments, and it is continuously expanded to immunise the mainland from the 'contagion' of those who were constructed as threatening bodies. In doing so, this seam zone introduces a new form of territoriality that aligns with the movement of these 'threatening bodies'. With this new border regime, the excised islands become *non-Australia* for offshore entry persons.

With the transformation of the whole mainland into an excised offshore place, the entire island-continent of Australia has transformed into a new space: a *non-Australia* for offshore entry persons arriving without documentation. Currently, although asylum seekers actually arrive *in* Australia, they are not considered as arriving in Australia. With this transformation, the whole island-continent of Australia becomes an impasse or an impassable threshold that constantly defers the act of arrival. This legal construction of a new border can be seen as a sovereign act of eternal deferral, which perpetually defers the juridical moment of arrival. That is to mean, the regime of excision prevents asylum seekers from applying for protection visa or from seeking options to settle in Australia.

Such legal construction of the border has at least two perverse effects. First, although the rationale is to 'stop the boats' by intimidating and deterring asylum seekers from arriving Australia without documentation, this seemingly impassable threshold has never achieved preventing asylum seekers from crossing that threshold. Second, the excision regime is conveyed with a humanitarian language of 'saving lives on sea' by deterring asylum seekers from taking dangerous maritime voyages.

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not include sea within the limits of a State or Territory'. The *Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measure) Act 2013* replaced the definition of 'offshore entry person' in section 5(1) of the Migration Act with 'unauthorised maritime arrivals'. An unauthorised maritime arrival is 'a person who enters Australia by sea at an excised offshore place, or any other place, and becomes an unlawful non-citizen as a result'.

Yet, it creates its own visible form of violence that has gradually deepened over the years. Between 2001 and June 2012 only, 964 asylum seekers lost their lives at sea while trying to reach Australia's borders.[22] Certainly, these figures cannot capture the horror of those voyages. However, they expose how the imagined security of the totalising and exclusionist Australian self that historically seeks to immunise itself from strangers is sustained through the insecurity of those strangers, through subscribing to their death on the sea and keeping those deaths at a distance away from Australia. Consequently, the legal construction of *non-Australia* shows us that the immunised Australian self constructs and preserves itself by negating the life of the other, and, hence it always fails the humanity of which it is ostensibly constituted.

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Figure 11: Australia's Seam Zone - Maritime Boundaries and the Excisions (2005)

Source: Moria Coombs, Excising Australia: Are we really shrinking? Research Note, 31 August 2005, no.5, Parliament of Australia, Information and Research Service, Canberra, 2005.

Inclusion of Islands: The exile regime

The exile regime operates through two mutually supportive state apparatuses: one is the use of third-country islands as refugee detention and processing places, and the other is the use of Australia's excised island – Christmas Island – as a transit place. Transfers of 'offshore entry persons' to third countries for processing was first introduced during the Tampa crisis after the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Republic of Nauru – the policy came to be known as the Pacific Solution 1 (2001-2007).[23] The RPCs on Manus Island and Nauru were established in the same year. The overall rationale of the Pacific Solution 1 was to deny asylum seekers' access to Australia's legal protection system, which

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[22] Houston, Aristotle, and L'estrange, 'Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers', 75.

[23] For detailed discussion of the Pacific Solution 1 see Savitri Taylor, 'The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare: The Difference between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing', *Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal,* 6/1 (2005a), 1-43, Susan Metcalfe, *The Pacific Solution* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2010), Kneebone, 'Controlling Migration by Sea: The Australian Case', 341-68.

included the right to an independent merits review and the right of juridical review.[24] During the first phase of the Pacific Solution, the whole regime of the offshore processing on Manus Island and Nauru established a system not only prevented asylum seekers from seeking protection in Australia, but also extended Australia's border regime to include these islands. Unlike current practices, however, policies developed under the Pacific Solution 1 provided that those found to be refugees could ultimately be settled in Australia or in a third country. During this first phase, a total of 1637 asylum seekers were detained in both islands with sixty-one per cent resettled in Australia and the remainder was resettled in countries such as New Zealand, Sweden, Canada and the United States.[25]

This exile regime has constantly changed, and with each change, Australia's borders have shifted. The first phase of the Pacific Solution was formally ended in 2008 with the Labor government policy 'New Directions in Detention'. This new approach to border protection was centred on two pillars: one was to close down the RPCs on Manus Island and Nauru and to abolish temporary visas, and the second was to keep the architecture of the excision regime at place.[26] As a result, the Nauru and Manus Island RPCs were closed and the last twenty-one detainees on Nauru were brought back to Australia in February 2008.[27]

However, Australia's shifting borders began taking a new shape with the increase in the number of boats arriving in 2012.[28] Soon after the drowning of ninety-two asylum seekers in the northeast of Christmas Island in June 2012, the Australian

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[24] Kneebone, 'Controlling Migration by Sea: The Australian Case', 362.

[25] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 2014).

[26] Chris Evans, 'New Directions in Detention: Restoring Integrity to Australian Immigration System', (Canberra: ANU Centre for International and Public Law, 29 July 2008). In the 'New Direction in Detention', the Rudd (Labor) government set seven key immigration values. The most significant component of this new policy was the use of mandatory detention as a last resort. The government decided to use the policy of mandatory detention only for two purposes: to facilitate the initial health, identity and security assessment of unauthorised arrivals, and to detain unlawful non-citizens who would present unacceptable risks to the community, and would repeatedly refuse to comply with their visa conditions.

[27] The last detainee on Manus Island left in 2004. Jennifer Pagonis, 'UNHCR Welcomes Close of Australia's Pacific Solution', (UNHCR, 8 February 2008), viewed 10 November 2015, < http://www.unhcr.org/47ac3f9c14.html>.

[28] The number of boats increased from 69 in 2011 to 278 in 2012. Janet Philips, 'Boat Arrivals and Boat 'Turnbacks' in Australia since 1976: A Quick Guide to Statistics', (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2016), viewed 08 August 2016, <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/Quick_Guides/BoatTurnbacks>.

government commissioned a panel to investigate and provide policy options on the asylum seekers arriving by boats. The Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers recommended re-launching the offshore processing arrangements and re-opening of RPCs on Nauru and Manus Island.29 The underlying tone of the Panel was to create strong disincentives for irregular maritime arrivals by establishing a clear 'no advantage principle'. This principle was represented in terms of a fair and reasonable humanitarian program. 'No advantage principle' dictated that those asylum seekers arriving irregularly by boats would not gain any benefit by 'choosing not to seek protection through established mechanisms'.30 A humanitarian rhetoric of 'saving lives' was the central aspect of this principle. According to the Panel, the 'no advantage principle' might prevent asylum seekers from risking their lives on dangerous maritime voyages and discourage them to do business with people smugglers. The effect of this principle was two-fold. On the one hand, it promoted the myth of the orderly queue, which asylum seekers must join. On the other, it constructed two juxtaposed images of a typical asylum seeker. One was the 'ideal' asylum seeker, a figure waiting patiently and silently to be processed through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in some transit country such as Malaysia or Indonesia.31 The other was the 'deviant' asylum seeker. The Report implicitly constructed asylum seekers coming by boat as unruly bodies who refused to act in accordance with established mechanisms. As a result, Manus Island and Nauru were portrayed as circuit breakers for the movement of those 'deviant' asylum seekers. These islands once again became places of exile, disciplinary mechanisms, for those asylum seekers who had incentives to act against the 'ideal' figure of the asylum seeker.

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29 Houston, Aristotle, and L'estrange, 'Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers'. The Panel made 22 recommendations. These recommendations included an increase in Australia's humanitarian program to 20.000 places per annum; the removal of family reunion concessions for those who arrived through irregular maritime voyages; and the *2011 Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer and Resettlement (Malaysia Agreement)*. In May 2011, the Australian government reached a transfer arrangement with the Malaysian government for eight-hundred asylum seekers who had arrived in Australia by boat. In return, Australia agreed to resettle 4000 refugees from Malaysia over four years. However, the Australian High Court overruled the proposed plan in August 2011 following Malaysia's refusal to sign the Refugee Convention.
30 Ibid. 8.
31 For detailed analysis of the Expert Panel Report on Asylum Seekers and 'no advantage principle' see Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber, 'New Deterrence Scripts in Australia's Rejuvenated Offshore Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers', *Law and Social Inquiry,* 39/4 (2014), 1006-26.

The Australian government endorsed the recommendations of the Panel, and the second phase of the Pacific Solution formally began shifting Australia's borders once again. In August 2012, Australia signed MoUs with PNG and Republic of Nauru relating to the transfer, assessment and settlement of asylum seekers.[32] Transfers of asylum seekers to Nauru began on 14 September 2012 and to Manus Island on 21 November 2012. The turning point, however, took place on 19 July 2013, when the government announced the introduction of the Regional Resettlement Arrangement with PNG.[33] Under the new Resettlement Arrangement, all asylum seekers detained on Manus Island would be transferred to Australia to have their refugee claims processed. All new irregular maritime arrivals, however, would be deported back to PNG and Nauru. With this new arrangement, asylum seekers lost their rights to be settled in Australia. Instead, they could resettle in PNG or another country, including Nauru.[34] As Madeline Gleeson argues, for the first time in Australian history, the new Resettlement Arrangement closed the entire country completely and indefinitely to asylum seekers arriving irregularly by sea.[35]

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[32] In September 2012, both PNG and the Republic of Nauru were declared designated countries for regional processing. The Australian government framed its decision within the terms of 'national interest'. Chris Bowen, the former Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, stated that even if the designation of Nauru and PNG was inconsistent with Australia's international obligations, it was in the national interest to designate Nauru and PNG as regional processing countries. Bowen stated that such an arrangement would retain the confidence of the Australian people in a fair and orderly refugee and humanitarian program. According to Bowen, this arrangement would 'discourage irregular and dangerous maritime voyages and thereby could reduce the risk of the loss of life at sea'. Chris Bowen, 'Statement of Reasons for Thinking That Is in the National Interest to Designate Nauru to Be a Regional Processing Country', (Canberra, 10 September 2012), viewed 10 November 2015,
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/1906349/upload_binary/1906349.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/1906349%22, Chris Bowen, Statement of reasons for thinking that is in the national interest to designate Papua New Guinea to be a regional processing country, Media Release, 9 October 2012,
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id=%22library%2Flcatalog%2F00589621%22>.
[33] In August 2013, Australia and PNG signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which superseded the previous one. Commonwealth of Australia and Republic of Papua New Guinea, *Regional Resettlement Arrangement Between Australia and Papua New Guinea*, 19 July 2013. Commonwealth of Australia and Republic of Nauru, *Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and The Government of Australia, relation to the transfer to, and Assessment and Settlement in, Papua New Guinea of Certain Persons, and Related Issues*, 6 August 2013.
[34] Nauruan authorities later denied the claim that refugees could be permanently resettled in Nauru. Amnesty International Australia, 'This Is Breaking People: Human Rights Violations at Australia's Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea', 16.
[35] Madeline Gleeson, *Offshore: Behind the Wire on Manus and Nauru* (Sydney: New South, 2016), 103. The introduction of Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) on 18 September 2013 took this agreement as its central principle. Australia also ceased to consider the resettlement of anyone who registered with the UNHCR in Indonesia on or after 1 July 2014.

The second element of this exile regime is sustained by the use of another island − Christmas Island − as a place hosting the transitory bodies of asylum seekers. The Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (IRPC) on Christmas Island was first established in 2001, soon after the island was turned into an excised island.36 The introduction of the second phase of the Pacific Solution has transformed the centre into a transit place for those asylum seekers who wait for their transfers to Manus Island and Nauru. Currently, Christmas Island functions as an enforced passage between Australia and Manus Island or Nauru. Since early September 2013, the offshore entry persons have been intercepted in Australian territorial waters, their boats have been escorted or towed to the Christmas Island IRPC, and they have been detained at the IRPC before they are transferred to Manus Island or Nauru. 37

The Christmas Island IRPC merges itself with the exile regime not only through acting as an enforced passage, but also through producing invisible form of violence. This form of violence manifests itself through the creation of strategic uncertainty, which is used as another form of deterrence strategy in Australia's punitive border regime. Similar to the operation of the Israeli power in the West Bank, the Australian state sustains its power through creating anxieties with ambiguous rules and regulations and seeks to use this ambiguity as a form of deterrence for future asylum seekers planning to come to Australia by boats.

The strategic uncertainty and its invisible violence manifest themselves in two ways. First, under the current policy, upon their arrivals to Christmas Island, asylum seekers go through initial health and age assessment and brief interviews on their

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36 The Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (IRPC) is Australia's first purpose-built high security immigration detention centre for non-citizens and for all persons who come within the scope of the *2001 Migration Amendment (Excision from migration zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act*. Christmas Island, along with Cocos (Keeling) Island, is the common place of arrival for asylum seekers coming by boats. As of March 2016, 183 men are detained at IRPC (DIBP, 2016). IRPC is used to detain asylum seekers, and all other non-citizens arrived Australia without valid visas or violated their visa conditions. A detention centre was opened on Cocos (Keeling) Island in 2001. However, it was closed in 2002. In 2012, the number of arrivals to Cocos (Keeling) Island increased and the quarantine facilities on the island were upgraded to accommodate asylum seekers temporarily before their transfers to Christmas Island or Darwin. Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), ' Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary', (Canberra: DIBP, 31 March 2016), viewed 12 June 2016, <http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/immigration-detention-statistics-31-mar-2016.pdf>.
37 Depending on their place of arrivals, asylum seekers can also be transferred to Darwin. However, currently, Christmas Island is the main transit place. Amnesty International Amnesty International Australia, 'This Is Breaking People: Human Rights Violations at Australia's Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea', 84.

asylum claims. According to Amnesty International, these assessments are conducted in arbitrary ways. In order to accelerate the transfer of asylum seekers to PNG or Nauru, the initial health and age assessments are made within a short time frame, and therefore, these assessments are heavily relied on observations of physical appearance.[38] Second, upon their arrival to Christmas Island the asylum seekers are informed that they are in an offshore place. They are told about the policy under which they will be transferred to PNG or Nauru. Nonetheless, Amnesty International observes, they are not provided with an exact timeframe of their transfers and the conditions under which they will be transferred. Transfers can take place within forty-eight hours after their arrival or months.[39] They can occur in the middle of the night without a notice.[40] In such circumstances, the asylum seekers are expected to wait patiently and silently for their unknown future. When uncertainty becomes the generalised governing rule, its invisible violence deepens its power by capturing and shaping the detained body of the asylum seeker. This form of violence does not aim to internalise the asylum seeker by including him/her in the Australian legal system, it only seeks to capture him/her temporarily with an aim to turn him/her into a docile transitory body, who is always ready to be 'voluntarily' removed into another space of uncertainty: Manus Island or Nauru.[41]

b. Creating a network with 'ambiguous sovereigns'

With its new offshore processing and resettlement regime, Australia establishes a border network: it connects, coordinates and manages multiple actors in order to sustain the operation of the RPCs on Manus Island and Nauru. This network is composed of a series of heterogeneous elements that are connected one another. Australia not only creates these elements, it also maintains their smooth operation.[42]

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[38] Ibid. 30-32.

[39] Amnesty International Amnesty International Australia, 'This Is Breaking People: Human Rights Violations at Australia's Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea', 30-32.

[40] Ibid. 30-32.

[41] Amnesty International reports that the asylum seekers are forced to sign statements indicating that they are undertaking the journey to PNG voluntarily. Ibid. 32.

[42] Unless specially cited, all information provided in this section is compiled from Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal

Construction companies, contractors, sub-contractors, Australian and local government officials, islanders, asylum seekers, refugees and transportation vehicles all entangle in this network.

This border network operates in complex ways, which requires further explanation. First, under the current arrangements with the Republic of Nauru and PNG, the Australian government is fully responsible for the transfers of asylum seekers from Australia to Manus Island or Nauru.[43] Second, Australia employs private companies for construction projects making these companies as one of the crucial points in the network. These companies further use chartered ships, passenger transport planes and cargo transporters to deliver construction materials to these respective islands. Third, local administrators, who are appointed by the PNG and Nauruan government, manage the RPCs. However, there is also a coordinator, who is appointed by the DIBP. Fourth, the DIBP further contracts with service providers. Depending on the terms and the conditions of their arrangements with the DIBP, private security companies might subcontract local firms.[44] The Australian government also provides a number of officials to assist with the management and daily operation of these centres. In short, the Australian government establishes a link between all different actors, manages their operations, and it bears all the costs of the operation of this network. As summarised by Daniel Webb,

> . . . Australia designed the arrangements, Australia built and funds the detention centre, Australia contracts service providers to provide services at the centre and Australia is involved in the processing of claims within the centre. So not only is Australia a link in the causal chain, Australia built the chain and underwrites the chain and is involved very closely in every link of that chain.[45]

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and Constitutional Affairs, ' Select Committee on the Recent Allegations Relating to the Conditions and Circumstance at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru', (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 2015).

[43] Between the inception of OSB on 18 September 2013 and 31 March 2016, Australia transferred 770 asylum seekers to Manus Island and 1355 to Nauru. As of 31 March 2016, there are 468 asylum seekers detained in Nauru and 905 in Manus Island. Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 'Monthly Operational Update ', (March 2016), viewed 18 May 2016, < http://newsroom.border.gov.au/channels/operational-updates/releases/monthly-operational-update-march-2>.

[44] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', 27.

[45] Quoted in ibid.,135.

What sustains seemingly smooth operation of this network is the formation of ambiguous sovereigns; multiple agents who act as the ruling powers in the operation of RPCs (including the refugee claim assessment process) without any responsibility and accountability. The creation of ambiguous sovereigns is a deliberate act initiated by Australia. By utilising ambiguities in rules and regulations applied to these agents, Australia seeks to create legal loopholes, and in doing so, it aims to maintain the continuity of the network. Under the current arrangements with Australia, the governments of Nauru and PNG own and operate the RPCs. They are responsible for security and welfare of asylum seekers detained in these centres.[46] According to the Australian government, it is the sovereign right and responsibility of PNG and Nauru to manage the RPCs under their national laws. Furthermore, under the current arrangements, the governments of Nauru and PNG are responsible for assessing asylum claims and facilitating resettlement for those asylum seekers who are in the need for protection. The Australian government understands its role in this network as limited to the transfer of asylum seekers, funding the RPCs, and providing support services and advice.[47]

The ambiguity over who manages and controls the RPCs, and in fact, the whole network intensifies in the context of the link established between the DIBP and the service providers. Australia arranges and coordinates the entire contract-administration process. The DIBP manages the operation of service providers, who are responsible for the welfare and security of asylum seekers and the daily operation of these centres. In their operations, service providers are bound by the terms and conditions of their contracts with the DIBP. These conditions require them to report to Canberra. While their contracts require them to engage with all stakeholders, including PNG and Nauruan officials, there is no legally binding relationship with these governments. To put it directly, service providers operate on the territory and under the national laws of a third country, but their operations are shaped, managed

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[46] The Republic of Nauru acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention on 28 June 2011. The Nauru Refugees Convention Act 2012 establishes a national legal framework for Refugee Status Determination (RSD) under Nauruan law; an independent merit review tribunal; access to judicial review; and the requirement for natural justice and confidentiality in relation to refugee claims. PNG acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee on 17 July 1986 with several reservations.

[47] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 'Select committee on the recent allegations relating to the conditions and circumstance at the regional processing centre in Nauru'.

and controlled by the DIBP. Consequently, as expressed by many service providers to the Senate Inquiry on the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs, it is the DIBP, which governs the RPCs.

The ambiguity over the responsibilities and roles of different actors involved in this border network is exacerbated in the context of the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process conducted in PNG and Nauru. According to the UNHCR, there is confusion over responsibilities of each agent involved in this process. The Australian immigration officers who conduct the interviews even though Australia repeatedly tells it is a PNG/Nauruan process.[48] Furthermore, Australia not only manages interviews, but it also contracts independent Australian firms to conduct Claims Assistance Provider Scheme (CAPS) interviews for the RSD process.[49] These firms provide the results of the initial interviews to the DIBP, who then delivers them to PNG and Nauru. Despite being included in the RSD process, these firms are, however, migration agents under the Australian law, and do not have any standing within the PNG or Nauruan legal system.

The creation of such ambiguity has two immediate effects. First, despite being the main architect of the entire border regime, Australia's long-standing view is that persons in PNG and Nauru are outside Australia's territory, and therefore, the Australian government does not exercise control of these centres. According to this view, once asylum seekers are transferred from Australia to PNG or Nauru, the RSD process is solely the responsibility of these governments, and the Australian involvement in this process is merely supportive in nature. Such view prevents Australia from assuming direct responsibility over the allegations on the RSD or visible form of violence occurred in these camps against asylum seekers.

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[48] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'UNHCR Monitoring Visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea 11 to 13 June 2013', United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'UNHCR Monitoring Visit to the Republic of Nauru 7 to 9 October 2013', (Lyons: UNHCR, 2013a).

[49] Claims Assistance Provider Scheme (CAPS) is the initial process at the RPCs. During this process, the asylum seekers give statements about their claims. Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February'. Public Hearing (Canberra, 12 June 2014), viewed 1 October 2015, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/4358a115-9810-412e-bc86-572f5d4fa680/toc_pdf/Legal%20and%20Constitutional%20Affairs%20References%20Committee_2014_06_12_2587_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/commsen/4358a115-9810-412e-bc86-572f5d4fa680/0000%22>.

Second, the creation of ambiguous sovereigns turns the RPCs on Manus Island and Nauru into ambiguous spaces whose legal and functional boundaries are not clearly determined. In the context of the Manus Island RPC, Steven Kilburn, a former G4S safety and security officer, expresses this ambiguity as follows:

> The difficulty was that no one really knows what that place is. What is it? Is it a jail? Is it a detention centre? Is it a processing centre? Do people have freedom there or not? During our training – the abysmal training that we got when we first arrived on the island – no one seemed to know. They have not done anything wrong. They are not criminals. You have to treat them with respect. Good. Fine. They are not in detention. Well, how come I chain up the gate, they have to come and ask me, and I choose whether they go in or out? How come they cannot walk from there to there without being put in a bus and checked off? Are they in detention or are they not? Is this a prison or is it not? Are they free to walk around or are they not? No, they are not. But the difficulty is that I do not think we have really worked out what it is yet. I do not think they have worked out what it is … No-one knows, and there is all this back and forth between who is responsible for simple stuff.[50]

The creation of such ambiguous spaces governed by ambiguous sovereigns further makes the asylum seeker the direct addressee of the violence of these camps. Many human rights organisations have already documented that ambiguities over the roles and the responsibilities of service providers, and the PNG, Nauruan and Australian governments, create a punitive and an arbitrary regime of detention.[51] The asylum seekers are not fully informed about their legal status or the whole RSD process per se. There have been long delays in the processing of refugee claims. The asylum seekers are not provided timetables for RSD hearings and decisions. Nor do they know how long they might remain in detention, or where they would resettle if they are found refugees. The UNHCR further expresses concerns about the return-orientated environment in these camps.[52] It observes that rather than promoting safe,

[50] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', Public Hearing, (Canberra, 11 June 2014), viewed 15 October 2015, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/9cc102b3-17b6-42d8-b898-fcb8733894d4/toc_pdf/Legal%20and%20Constitutional%20Affairs%20References%20Committee_2014_06_11_2581_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/commsen/9cc102b3-17b6-42d8-b898-fcb8733894d4/0000%22>.
[51] UNHCR, 'UNHCR Monitoring Visit to the Republic of Nauru 7 to 9 October 2013', UNHCR, 'UNHCR Visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea 23 to 25 October 2013', Australia Amnestry International, 'This is breaking people: human rights violations at australia's asylum seeker processing centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea'.
[52] UNHCR, 'UNHCR Monitoring Visit to the Republic of Nauru 7 to 9 October 2013', UNHCR, 'UNHCR Visit to Manus Island, Papua New Guinea 23 to 25 October 2013'

fair and humane conditions, and identifying and protecting refugees in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, service providers promotes non-voluntary return of asylum seekers to their country of origins. The UNHCR reports that pressure exerted by persons in authority to return, coupled with harsh detention conditions and uncertainty and protracted detention, raise troubling questions over the 'voluntariness' of the asylum seekers' return.[53] Under this arbitrary regime, complaints about the conditions of the RPCs and service providers are not fully investigated and they are often left in limbo.[54] In short, the operation of this network and the creation of ambiguous sovereigns leave asylum seekers in a complete state of uncertainty and make them more prone to the violence of Australia's border regime. Similar to Israel's operation in the West Bank, Australia creates a system that is governed by structural and institutional ambiguities, and creates everyday uncertainty in the lives of asylum seekers, who are once again expected to wait patiently and silently in these camps.

As a final remark, it is important to note that the operation of this network not only seeks to capture asylum seekers; it also generates its own colonising lines that transform Manus Island and Nauru once again into 'wastelands'. The continuous movement of fly-in and fly-out service providers, Australian government officials, and cargo ships and planes now occupy these islands. Such transformation of Manus Island and Nauru repeats their colonial past; their simultaneous deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation as machines of Australia's mining and military assemblages. The lines of Australia's new border network once again colonise land and people, and disturb local economies, social cohesion and environmental sustainability. The lines of this network generates its own violence whose addressee is not only the detained asylum seeker, but also local islanders and the natural environment.

In the context of Nauru, the detention centre is the second largest employer after the Nauruan government.[55] The Australian investments on Nauru usually benefit

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Australia Amnestry International, 'This is breaking people: human rights violations at australia's asylum seeker processing centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea'.

[55] Australia is Nauru's most significant donor. It contributed approximately fifteen per cent of domestic revenue in 2014–15. In the 2014-15 financial year, Australia's total official development assistance to Nauru was $27.1 million. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Nauru Aid Program Performance Report 2014-2015', (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 30 October 2015), viewed 16 May 2016, <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/nauru-appr-2014-15.pdf .

powerful families who own shares in the land of the detention centres. These investments fail to create a long-term sustainable economic model.56 Furthermore, jobs generated by the operation of the RPC increase Nauru's dependency on Australian aid. In fact, this dependency sustains the operation of the border network created on the island. The Refugee Action Coalition (Sydney) explains:

> Nauru is tiny … It is massively distorted. Detention centre on this island is a massive distortion of the Nauruan society and its economy … before the establishment of the detention centre, jobs available for locals were limited. Now if they find a job, it will be at the detention centre. They are made part of the business. The asylum seeker sees Nauruans with their Transfield and Wilson shirts.57 Now the whole population of Nauru is part of the apparatus that represses asylum seekers. [Nauru] had a very long history of underdevelopment. This is a very dependent society. And divided on the basis of families. … the [privileged] families are getting their cut from the Australian government or from phosphate. [Their] existence depends on these connections.58

Similarly, in the context of Manus Island, Australia's border network disturbs the local economy, social cohesion and customary land rights. The Australian government claims that the RPC and related construction activities, including development assistance have increased the number of jobs in the Manus economy.59 This economic boost, however, is short-term and dependent on the Australian aid and investments.60 Furthermore, Diana Glazebrook observes that detaining asylum

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56 Michael Walsh, 'Powerful Nauru Families Benefiting from Australian-Funded Refugee Processing Centre', *ABC News,* 29 March 2016.

57 Transfield and Wilson are the major service providers in the RPC.

58 Refugee Action Coalition (Sydney), Interview with the author, Sydney, 10 November 2015.

59 For example, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reports that the RPC and related construction activities have resulted in a seventy per cent increase in the number of formal jobs in the Manus economy. As at 31 August 2015, approximately 836 PNG citizens are employed to provide services at RPC at Lombrum. Around 627 of these PNG citizens are from Manus province. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Regional Processing Centre on Manus: Economic and Aid Update Fact Sheet 4- Existing Manus Province Aid Package as at 7 September 2015', (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015), viewed 18 June 2016, <http://png.embassy.gov.au/files/pmsb/Manus%20Factsheet%20as%20at%20September%202015_Final.pdf>.

60 In the context of Manus Province, under the Partnership for Development to Manus Province, Australia provides an assistance package (approximately $15 million over 2012-16) to Manus in addition to Australia's existing support to PNG. A report by Murray Edwards and Adam Smith International, for example, notes the temporary nature of jobs created in relation to the construction and operation of RPC on Manus Island. Ibid., Ravi Tomar, Parliamentary Library, 30 April 2015, 'Increased Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Manus Province', (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 30 April 2015), Murray Edwards and Adam Smith International, 'The Manus Economy', (8 September 2014), viewed 16 November 2015, < http://png.embassy.gov.au/files/pmsb/Manus%20Economy%20Report_8%20September.pdf>.

seekers on Manus, where most landholding is customary, violates indigenous land rights and fuels resentments among local islanders against asylum seekers.[61] Indeed, local members of the parliament and customary landowner groups protest against the management of the detention centre. They demand compensation for the use of the airport, the dumpsite, and for the waste management of Australian ships and sewage disposal.[62] Some traditional landowners perceive Australia's border regime on the island as a 'boomerang system' in which the Australian government contracts with Australian companies, and the profit made by the operation of the RPC bounces back to Australia, rather than benefiting locals.[63] Islanders also protest that they are not given equal opportunities in tender processes. They raise concerns about wage discrepancies between local and Australian employees working for service providers.[64] Because of increased number of local protests, the PNG government has begun to impose extensive policing in Manus Province to silence and suppress the growing dissent against the Australian operations on the island.

Australia's border network on Manus further disturbs the ecological balance of the province. During the initial stages of the project, in its risk assessment report, an independent agency employed by the Australian government documented that the construction of RPC could trigger loss of flora, and contamination of the soil and ground waters.[65] Indeed, the island now faces negative environmental impact generated by the construction and operation of the RPC. The increased number of ships carrying asylum seekers, service providers and construction materials adversely alter marine environment, which in turn affects islanders' traditional fishing activities.[66] Furthermore, islanders repeatedly raise concerns about the long-term impact of garbage generated black fly infestation, which damages the sago palms,

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[61] The PNG constitution recognises customary land ownership. Approximately ninety-seven per cent of the land in PNG is under customary ownership. Diana Glazebrook, 'Papua New Guinea's Refugee Track Record and Its Obligations under the 2013 Regional Resettlement Arrangement with Australia: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia ', (Canberra: ANU, 2014), 9.
[62] In September 2013, traditional landowners, for example, started a 'quiet guerrilla war' and blocked access to dumps and gravel pits to stop the construction of the RPC., 'PNG Landowners Threaten to Shut Off Water to Asylum Seeker Centre', *The Guardian,* 2 September 2013.
[63] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February', 13.
[64] Helen Davidson, 'Manus Island Residents Air Grievances About Hosting Australian Detention Centre', *The Guardian,* 22 January 2016.
[65] Liz Hurst and Jennie Hellyer, '30% Concept Design Report- Preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment', (Melbourne: Sinclair Knight Merz, October 2013).
[66] Ibid.

and affects the source of islanders' stable food.[67] In expressing the environmental impact of the RPC, a former G4S safety and security officer, states that Australia's operation turns the island into a wasteland:

> People told me about the environmental damage that the site is doing. Everything is disposable – every knife, fork, cup. We go through thousands and thousands of disposable plates, knives, forks and bottles of water every day. There are no facilities on Manus Island for recycling. There is no proper transfer station. It all gets taken away and dumped in the bush … The locals are resentful of the fact that we are destroying their island basically and just turning it into a tip.[68]

In summary, Australia's border network on Manus Island and Nauru operates as a colonising machine: it seeks to capture and transform the terrain, the ocean, the islanders and the asylum seekers. However, the camps in Manus Island and Nauru contain an inherent excess: an excess that activates processes of becoming, and turns these spaces into heterotopias.

2. Cracks and Leaks: lines of contestation

a. Becoming-noisy and becoming-asylum seeker

Politics begins with the experience of the oppressed, subaltern, and minority people who are captured and suppressed in cramped spaces, argue Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.[69] As cramped spaces, the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs are 'blocked

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[67] Glazebrook, 'Papua New Guinea's Refugee Track Record and Its Obligations under the 2013 Regional Resettlement Arrangement with Australia: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia ' , 9.

[68] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February'. Public Hearing, (Canberra, 11 June 2014), viewed 10 November 2015, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/9cc102b3-17b6-42d8-b898-fcb8733894d4/toc_pdf/Legal%20and%20Constitutional%20Affairs%20References%20Committee_2014_06_11_2581_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees/commsen/9cc102b3-17b6-42d8-b898-fcb8733894d4/0001%22>.G4S is the former security contractor employed by the Australian government.

[69] Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*.

passages' that cut lines of mobility.[70] The lack of mobility is not simply the inability to move from one point to another. Instead, it is a form of impossibility: impossibility to act, to write, to speak, to move and perhaps to survive. Every movement in a cramped space is marked by a boundary, and every boundary aims to capture movements, ideas, events and expressions. In such spaces, molar lines appear to be encapsulating. They appear to capture and define all living beings and their environment. Yet, this 'impossibility of action is matched with the impossibility of passivity' and that requires a process of 'tracing a path between impossibilities' – as in Samuel Beckett's formulation 'I can't go on, I'll go on'.[71] The impossibility of action that is inherent in such spaces acts as a driving force that draws thought and practice into a milieu of contestation and disturbance.[72] The impossibility of action opens cramped spaces into their many politics.

Cramped spaces induce an excess. As I discussed earlier in the discussion of the Separation Wall, excess exposes the inherent instability and the potential failure of cramped spaces. Molar lines never fully capture this space. Cramped spaces leak out everywhere. Excess is the leak. It is an extra dimension that opens up the possibility of politics of becoming; different ordering of the social and political field activated by the movements on escape lines. The politics of becoming enables molecular changes on the molar lines:

> It opens up closed forms of existence, e.g., the subject, the animal, the human, etc. to the potentiality of becoming something else; of transforming their existence again and again, and of reinventing themselves as a new form of existence. Being in this mode of becoming is a way of escaping.[73]

How does the idea of becoming then play out in the cramped spaces of Manus Island and Nauru? What kind of cracks does it enable? What forms of contestations emerge in the process of becoming? In seeking to answer to these questions, I will elaborate on two different but entangled processes of becoming: becoming-noisy and becoming-asylum seeker.

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[70] Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*.
[71] Thoburn, *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*, 19.
[72] Ibid.19.
[73] Andreja Zevnik, *Lacan, Deleuze and World Politics : Rethinking the Ontology of the Political Subject* (London: Routledge, 2016) 77.

Becoming-noisy

In February 2014, the asylum seekers at the Manus RPC began protesting their indefinite detention. Within a couple of weeks, the protesters grew in number, and their protests became an everyday occurrence at the RPC. The asylum seekers raised their voice: 'We're being treated like idiots; they think we're idiots. You know, we are not, we're educated people, we have access to the Internet, we know what's going on and they're lying to us, and they're treating us like idiots'.[74] On 15 February, the asylum seekers demanded a substantive response to their questions regarding their RSD process. They stated that they would put their protests on hold only if the DIBP would provide them with solid answers.[75] More than two hundred asylum seekers engaged in this protest action. The protest actions escalated later into violent clashes between the asylum seekers and the local islanders resulting with the death of one asylum seeker, Reza Berati, and many injuries. The news quickly spread to the Australian media and made the harsh conditions and circumstance of the Manus RPC visible to the Australian public. Within a few days, thousands of Australians gathered at rallies across the country to protest against the secrecy surrounding around the operation of the Manus camp and the government's treatment of asylum seekers. Demonstrating a powerful solidarity with the asylum seekers at the Manus RPC, all rallies were conducted under a single slogan 'Not in our name! Shut down Manus and Nauru'. As expressed by one Australian protestor, the central message circulated during these rallies was explicit:

> I think, we Australians have been shocked to see somebody who came here
> for our protection, as Reza did as an asylum seeker, to instead meet a very

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[74] Quoted in G4S Australia, 'Submission by G4S Australia Pty Ltd. For the Senate Committee inquiry into the events of 16 to 18 February 2014 at the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre', Submission 18, 14 May 2014, viewed 1 November 2015, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Manus_Island/Submissions>.

[75] Amnesty International, 'Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee', Inquiry into the incident at the Manus Island detention centre from 16 February to 18 February', Submission 22, 9 May 2014, viewed 12 September 2015, < http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Manus_Island/Submissions>, G4S Australia, 'Submission by G4S Australia Pty Ltd. For the Senate Committee inquiry into the events of 16 to 18 February 2014 at the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre'.

brutal death, and we're very concerned with the way that all asylum seekers in our care are being treated.[76]

The February incident at the Manus RPC was certainly not an isolated event. In fact, since their reopening in 2012, both the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs have witnessed several protest actions such as hunger strikes, self-harm, and riots. For example, soon after their transfers to the Nauru RPC in 2012, a number of asylum seekers stitched their lips and three detainees escaped from the centre as part of their everyday protests. In 2015, seven hundred asylum seekers at the Manus RPC declared a two-week long hunger strike. This hunger strike was one of the largest protests that had occurred in the island's history.[77] Same year, refugees, who were released from the camp but forced to live in Nauru, launched a campaign of non-cooperation with the Nauruan and Australian governments to demand their freedom from the island. In that instance, refugees quit their jobs and withdrew their children from schools to protest the living conditions in Nauru and to resist the Australian government's plans to resettle them in Cambodia.[78] More recently, in 2016, the asylum seekers at the Nauru RPC launched a protest action against detention, and that action lasted for two hundred days. All these protests made these camps visible to the Australian public eye and turned them into a subject of contestation in policy debates.

Through all these protest actions, the asylum seekers exposed and problematised the violence of the Australian border network. They transformed themselves into noisy detainees. Noise, argues Greg Hainge, is a performance that has a disruptive effect on the established order of things.[79] Through generating new relations, connections or communication forms, noise may create a new reality and activate a process of becoming. Noise resists both politically and materially in a way that it 'reconfigures matter in expression, conduction and conjugation'.[80] We should not understand noise as the opposite of silence; silence too may function as a noise. However, in its all forms, noise resists the order that imposes fixed identities and

[76] 'Candlelight Vigils Held for Slain Asylum Seeker Reza Berati Who Died on Manus Island', *ABC News*, 24 February 2014.
[77] Stephanie Peatling, 'Manus Island Protest Escalates, up to 700 Detainees on Hunger Strike', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 18 January 2015.
[78] Liam Fox and Sam Bolitho, 'Hundreds of Nauru Refugees Protest against 'Slave-Like' Living Conditions', *ABC News,* 24 March 2015.
[79] Greg Hainge, *Noise Matters: Towards an Ontology of Noise* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).
[80] Ibid. 23.

positioning. Noise is a performative process, an affect that offers the potential to challenge the enforced and capturing unity of power structures by shifting their established configurations. Hence, it signals the possibility of the emergence of new identities, relations and connections. With such disruptive force, noise is thus noisy.

Becoming-noisy of the asylum seekers at the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs is foremost a process in which asylum seekers refuse to accept their state-imposed status of illegality. They resist being criminalised and punished based on their mode of arrival to Australia. They resist Australia's act of eternal deferral, and they persistently make a claim for legitimacy. Their actions have powerful potential not only because they facilitate breaking out the rules of the camps. Becoming-noisy has a powerful potential because it interrupts the state-imposed identity of the detained asylum seeker: a figure who is expected to follow the rules and regulations of the camp and to wait patiently and silently for his/her refugee assessment process. It is a resistance against being defined as a docile body captured temporarily.

Becoming-noisy has a powerful potential because it not only disturbs the state-imposed identity of the asylum seeker, but also challenges the ways in which the contemporary refugee advocacy in Australia constructs their identity in a particular way. The current advocacy is centred on pain and suffering of the asylum seeker and it persistently circulates a childlike image of him/her. It paints an image of an asylum seeker without an agency, as helpless and silenced waiting for his/her refugee assessment. In this context, the images of a child trapped behind the fences or a woman on pamphlets for advocacy rallies are not coincidental; they serve to construct and preserve this particular image. Images of female, pregnant, or a child body appear to represent and reinforce the innocence of the asylum seeker. As expressed by the Refugee Council of Australia:

> in the case of children, the general public view is that children are innocent. What the successive governments have done is to create a suspicion about the motives of people coming to Australia seeking asylum. But in the case of children no one can say these children try to [manipulate] the migration system in Australia.[81]

These images are used to increase empathy of the Australian public, who might otherwise be captured by the government's representation of the asylum seeker as a

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[81] Refugee Council of Australia, Interview with the author, Sydney, 10 November 2015.

security threat.82 Nevertheless, the images of women and children correspond best to the figure of the abject, who 'suffer from a form of purity that demands them to be speechless victims, invisible, and apolitical'.83 The repetition of the powerlessness and the silence of the asylum seeker in contemporary advocacy debates recall Liisa Malkki's comments on how a certain vision of helplessness is linked to the constitution of the refugee as a 'mute body': 'helpless victims need protection, need someone to speak for them'.84 Malkki argues that these representational practices reduce the refugee simply to a biological corporeality trapped within his/her bare speechlessness.85

The process of becoming-noisy thus foremost interrupts these representations. Rather than waiting for a permission to act and for someone else to speak for them, the asylum seekers at the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs make independent noise and act outside and against the scope of all these representations. By becoming noisy, the asylum seekers reject the identity that is imposed on them by either the Australian state or advocacy groups. Becoming-noisy is then a process of breaking out of the representational practices that ascribe asylum seekers a fixed identity and no political agency.

Several specific acts of asylum seekers at Manus Island and Nauru manifest how noise acts against these representations, while simultaneously interrupting the operation of the molar lines of the Australian border network. Although these camps seek to control and discipline asylum seekers, they do not hinder the formation of alliances and informal organisations. While their actions are under constant surveillance, the asylum seekers are still able to exert political power to influence their environment. According to the Refugee Action Coalition (Sydney), what is largely missing in public debates is asylum seekers' active involvement in the formation of political organisations.86 The formation of informal committees empowers them in their contacts with service providers when they make demands for their daily requirements.87 These committees further facilitate the organisation of

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82 Ibid.
83 Nyers, 'Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-Deportation Movement', 419.
84 Liisa H. Malkki, 'Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization', *Cultural Anthropology,* 11/3 (1996), 388.
85 Ibid. 390.
86 Refugee Action Coalition (Sydney), Interview with the author.
87 Ibid

collective political actions. Certain ethnic groups, in particular Iranian asylum seekers, who were characteristically active in political protests and organised struggles back in their own countries, bring their political traditions to these committees and play a role in organising collective protest actions.[88] These informal committees also enhance solidarity and alliances among asylum seekers of different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds.[89] Becoming is not an individual process. It always involves others since it emerges out of encounters and alliances with others. According to the Refugee Action Coalition

> in times of protests, there is a high level organisation within and between different ethnic groups. When the hunger strike started Somalis sit with Iranians, [Iranians] sit with Tamils, [Tamils] sit with Afghans [and discuss] "what are we doing".[90]

Similarly, Mark Isaacs, a former Salvation Army employee at the Nauru RPC, observes that asylum seekers act as a collective

> within …[the] Iranian group were a multitude of different religions, ethnicities and social groups. They were Kurds and Arabs, homosexuals, Muslims, atheists and Christians. They were proud men who refused to accept their situation in Nauru. Their actions were subversive. They were utilising the limited power they possessed, trying to uphold some semblance of autonomy.[91]

In some instances, such formation of alliances enables asylum seekers to take the temporary control of RPCs. The protest actions at the Manus Island RPC in February 2014 constitute a case in point here. Although their protests were suppressed by the administration, the asylum seekers continued to exert control over the operation of the camp by hindering the entrance of the PNG staff into the facility. Kilburn, the former G4S employee, describes the events as follows:

> The transferees decided they were going to do it themselves because they did not want the PNG staff. They said: 'If any PNG staff come in here there will

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[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid
[91] Mark Isaacs, *The Undesirables: Inside Nauru* (Melbourne: Hardie Grant, 2014) 47.

be violence. We don't want them in here'. We [G4S staff] did not go into the compound either … So we were passing food over the fence. [The transferees] went and set up their own canteen. They cleaned it up afterwards. They were demonstrating: 'We can do this ourselves. We don't need the PNG guys in here'. And that continued for a long time. They were getting packaged meals delivered, serving themselves and running it themselves'.[92]

These incidents suggest that by acting outside the established norms, the asylum seeker establishes a different relation to the self and seeks to reorder not only the rules of the camp, but also how his/her identity is represented by dominant discourses. By becoming noisy, the asylum seekers transform themselves from being 'silent childlike victims' or 'docile bodies' to 'noisy detainees' who speak for themselves, demand, act, resist, and seek to conduct the everyday life in the camp.

Asylum seekers' noise is arguably most visible through hunger strikes and suicide attempts. During these silent protest actions, the body of the asylum seeker becomes a site for political struggle. Lucy Fiske and Richard Bailey observe that during their hunger strikes at the refugee detention centres in Australia, detainees seek to establish sovereign of the self against the authority of the sovereign state.[93] By launching a collective hunger strike or attempting suicide, the asylum seekers at the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs similarly exert a temporary control over their own bodies and disturb the sovereign right to determine how their bodies are supposed to act and function. As expressed by an asylum seeker who was on a hunger strike for sixteen days at the Manus RPC, 'We're not looking for a better life, just a normal life. I have given myself until Christmas. If I'm not released or the conditions have not changed, I will take my own life'.[94] Another asylum seeker spoke similarly:

I am sure if I continue to stay here, I will take my own life … I am under intense pressure. Between the pressure they create here for you and the pressures where I come from, it is very intense. I tried to cut my veins just to take my own life. I don't want to talk anymore. If you want to help me as a

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[92] Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, 'Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 February'. Public Hearing (Canberra, 11 June 2014).

[93] Richard Bailey, 'Up against the Wall: Bare Life and Resistance in Australian Immigration Detention', *Law and Critique,* 20/2 (2009a), 113-32, Lucy Fiske, *Human Rights, Refugee Protest and Immigration Detention* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2016), 113-46.

[94] Quoted in Amnesty International, 'This is breaking people: human rights violations at Australia's asylum seeker processing centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea ', 56.

human being, talk to International Organisation of Migration. Get my ticket. Get me out of here as soon as you can.[95]

These comments suggest that by taking control over the boundary between their life and death, the asylum seekers transform their bodies into a site for political negotiations with service providers and the governments of PNG/Nauru and Australia. In the words of one asylum seeker:

> We start hunger strikes because we want our freedom … We want to complain in a peaceful way. They [referring to service providers] don't care about us until the hunger strike started. After that they listen to us. [and they started to ask] *What do you want? What's your problem? Why did you start hunger strike? ...* After three days you just can't move anymore. It is very hard. But they don't care about us until one important part of your body stops, and then they care. You see many guys here do suicide or hurt themselves. They do this because they don't' want to harm the others. They just harm themselves. They want to show their feelings. [96]

As Fiske notes, these actions are clearly communicative acts; they are used when all other forms of communication have failed to provoke a response.[97] People use their bodies to speak to the oppressor, connecting them in a dialogue through their gaze.[98] Indeed, as above comments suggest, hunger strikes facilitated a dialogue between asylum seekers and service providers in the context of the Nauru RPC.

The communicative potential of hunger strikes and suicide attempts increases with asylum seekers' transfers to Australia for medical treatment. Due to the limited health facilities on Manus Island and Nauru, there are now many incidents in which asylum seekers are transferred to Australian hospitals. With these medical transfers, the asylum seeker manages to cross the border and forces the state to preserve the life that it excluded in the first place. These transfers make the conditions of Manus Island and Nauru more visible to the Australian public eye, which in return, encourages the public to put more pressure on the Australian government not to deport asylum seekers back to Manus Island or Nauru.

My aim here is not to show the effectiveness of the protest actions in reaching tangible outcomes, but to reveal the ways in which these actions fundamentally

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[95] Ibid. 56.
[96] Quoted in Isaacs, *The Undesirables: Inside Nauru*, 139 [Emphasis in original].
[97] Fiske, *Human Rights, Refugee Protest and Immigration Detention*, 140.
[98] Ibid. 140.

problematise existing social and political norms and expose their intrinsic cracks. Specifically, in the context of hunger strikes and suicide attempts, by exerting violence over the body and bringing it to the edge of death, the asylum seeker displays the inherent failure of the established norms of the sovereign state – that is its biopolitical inscriptions.[99] As Foucault notes, the care of the body is the major governing norm of the modern sovereign.[100] The central function of biopolitics is to protect life, flourish it, improve it and prolong its duration. Foucault argues that in the context of sovereign and its power over life, 'formidable power of death presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exert a positive influence on life, that endeavours to administer, optimise and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations'.[101]

The asylum seekers' display of harm over their bodies is therefore at the same time a display of the state's failure in governing and regulating these spaces according to the established norms of biopolitics. The asylum seekers in this context do not oppose the biopolitical inscription of the system. Rather, they seek to be included in the system that excluded them in the first place: their goal is *not* death, but to become refugees and settle in Australia. Through these protest actions, they do not seek to replace the established system with another one, or to transform it entirely. These actions are not total acts of resistance against the biopolitical foundation of the sovereign. Yet, by exposing violence that is inherent in the system that fails to uphold its internal logic, they problematise the inner functioning of the sovereign; the effectiveness of existing biopolitical apparatuses of the government in the protection of life. In doing so, these actions touch the ethical and moral standards of society and its perception of life. That is why, one may speculate that such actions distress the Australian public and increase the movements of solidarity with asylum seekers.

In short, becoming-noisy shows that the body of the asylum seeker is not a passive object of sovereign practices. The camp does not take the politics out of them, nor does it produce bare life. The asylum seeker is not the one who inherits a fixed

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[99] Detailed discussion of different theoretical debates over asylum seekers' hunger strikes is beyond the scope of this chapter. For an overview of different perspectives on hunger strikes in different contexts see Deirdre Conlon, 'Hungering for Freedom: Asylum Seekers' Hunger Strikes - Rethinking Resistance as Counter-Conduct', in Dominique Moran, Nick Gill, and Deirdre Conlon (eds.), *Carceral Spaces: Mobility and Agency in Imprisonment and Migrant Detention* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 133-48.

[100] Zevnik, *Lacan, Deleuze and world politics: rethinking ontology of the political subject*, 94.

[101] Foucault, *The History of Sexuality 1: An Introduction*, 137.

stable identity, but the one who constantly changes through his/her encounters with the others. The process of becoming-noisy activates the moments and movements of contestation. This contestation exposes cracks in the molecular lines that are laden with uncertainty: they may turn into lines of flight or be captured by molar lines of the state. Yet, their transformational potential is that they expose the fundamental failure of the dominant representations and the functioning of the system. By contesting the oppressed quality of the existing forms of politics, becoming-noisy offers a potential to affect the politics.

Becoming-asylum seeker

Becoming-noisy has further effects on the employees of Manus Island and Nauru RPCs. It is a collective and an affective process that empowers others to dislodge themselves from the dominant codes that govern the social and political fields. As discussed in Chapter Two, becoming is a relational process. It is the affective power of bodies for transformation when they encounter one another. Becoming is a 'block of co-existence' that corresponds to potential of bodies to become other during their encounters with one another and their potential to increase their powers through forming alliances. In this process one acts

> outside the scope of the assigned identity, or in opposition to the established order or to the dominant reasoning informing political … decisions. [It is] a different relation to 'the self', and hence a requestioning of what that 'self' was supposed to stand for, a realisation as to who others think they are, and the consequences of such realisation.[102]

Becoming-asylum seeker refers to the transformation of some employees working at the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs because of their everyday encounters with the asylum seekers.[103] The employees of service providers witness hunger strikes, riots and self-harm incidents.[104] They are required to prevent asylum seekers

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[102] Zevnik, *Lacan, Deleuze and world politics: rethinking ontology of the political subject*, 78.
[103] Andreja Zevnik observes the same process at Guantanamo. She calls this process 'becoming-detainee'. Zevnik, *Lacan, Deleuze and world politics: rethinking ontology of the political subject*, 85-88.
[104] Charlotte Wilson, 'Select Committee on the Recent Allegations relating to Conditions and Circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru', Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs

from harming themselves and to intervene to the incidents. During these encounters, some employees confront their role in Australia's border network and question their positioning in that network through the eyes of the asylum seeker. Becoming- asylum seeker is becoming-minoritarian: 'one by which a term (the subject) is withdrawn from the majority, and another which a term (the medium or agent) rises up from the minority'.[105] It involves a question of how one becomes a stranger to one's self, to his/her identity, language and established relations in his/her encounters with the minor. This process does not only call established power mechanisms into question. It also produces effects on the internal composition of subjects, which further changes relations and connections among them. That is to say, becoming-asylum seeker is a process in which the employee of the camp becomes a foreigner to the policies that he/she is supposed to implement, and to the border that he/she is supposed to protect. Such transformations force the employees to establish new relations and connections with the asylum seekers, with their employers and with the Australian government.

The experience of Mark Isaacs, a former Salvation Army employee who worked at the Nauru RPCs, is an example in this case. In his book, *The Undesirables,* Isaacs describes the violence of the camp in detail and tells how the camp functions as a state of exception that strips asylum seekers of their rights.[106] Isaacs presents his narrative through detailed description of his everyday life in Nauru, and his daily encounters with the asylum seekers. The memoirs of Isaacs are more than the story of the violence in the camp; they are Isaacs's slow transformation due to his daily encounters with the asylum seekers. After spending time with the asylum seekers in the camp, and exchanging ideas, food and jokes, Isaacs problematises his position on the molar lines of Australia's border network. He writes about the events that led him to question his role in Nauru:

> The initial excitement and enthusiasm of working in Nauru was thrust aside
> by the riot and all that was left was a camp with grave issues. For many of the
> Salvo staff, work in Nauru was a continual challenge. We were caught
> between two major driving forces: assisting the men, and working under a
> government contract. We spent ten hours a day working and talking with the

Committee, *Select Committee on the recent allegations relating to conditions and circumstances at the regional processing centre in Nauru*, Submission 79, viewed 12 November 2015, < <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Regional_processing_Nauru/Regional_processing_Nauru/Submissions>.
[105] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* 291.
[106] Isaacs, *The Undesirables: Inside Nauru*.

men, hearing their stories, handling their complaints about unjust treatment and unjust incarceration …

Our role was to care for the men, yet they were on the opposing side? We were expected to show allegiance to the Australian government and the organisation that worked on Nauru, ergo helping the men was a form of treason? The riot was a perfect example of this. We were expected to condemn the men for their actions, yet we understood their frustrations, we sympathised with them and their situation. Wasn't that our job, after all?[107]

As it can be read in this short excerpt, his encounters with the asylum seekers, and in fact, their noise encouraged Isaacs to question his situated identity as an employee who was required to implement government policies at the Nauru RPC. Thus, in many ways *The Undesirables* is a book that demonstrates how the process of becoming-asylum seeker occurs in the cramped space of the Nauru RPC.

The experience of Jon Nichols, a former security guard at Nauru RPCs employed by Wilson Security, provides another example. In his testimony to the Senate Inquiry on the allegations relating to the conditions and circumstance at the Nauru RPC, Nichols explains:

A lot of the staff [members]over there are ex-military – whether it be the New Zealand Defence Force or the Australian Defence Force – and a lot of them still harbour the hatred towards whom they perceive to be the enemy, which are the people that they are supposed to be providing care for.[108]

In questioning the situation, Nichols questions his identity as a security guard and as an Australian. He tells to the Committee that he felt 'frustrated, disillusioned with the company and annoyed at [himself] as an Australian and being part of a company that was subjecting people to this'.[109] His everyday encounters with the asylum seekers in

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[107] Ibid. 59.
[108] Wilson Security is a subcontractor of Transfield Services. It has provided security services in Nauru since late 2012 and on Manus Island since February 2014. Australian Parliamentary Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 'Select Committee on the Recent Allegations Relating to the Conditions and Circumstance at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru', Public Hearing (Canberra, 20 August 2015, viewed 1 November 2015, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/cb24090f-e333-448e-90b0-95a3b6164956/toc_pdf/Regional%20Processing%20Centre%20in%20Nauru_2015_08_20_3718_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf>.
[109] Ibid.

Nauru encourage him to change his position from a security guard to a 'noisy whistle-blower':

> Seeing people slash themselves with razor blades, cutting people down and performing CPR on them because they have hung themselves after a conversation with a lawyer – all of those sorts of things are what is triggered me to be in the position I am now.[110]

As these two examples demonstrate becoming-asylum seeker is the process of becoming-minoritarian: a process by which one starts to question their own self, becomes a stranger to the dominant codes that govern the camps, changes his/her mode of being by becoming different than what he/she was before. The employee seeks to disturb those codes by becoming-noisy like the asylum seekers. In 2015, for example, some of the former and current employees of service providers made their experiences available to the public despite the Australian government's attempt to criminalise 'disclosure of information'.[111] In their open letter regarding the *Border Force Act 2015*, they confronted government policies:

> We have advocated, and will continue to advocate, for the health of those for whom we have a duty of care, despite the threats of imprisonment, because standing by and watching sub-standard and harmful care, child abuse and gross violations of human rights is not ethnically justifiable.[112]

The transformational potential of becoming-asylum seeker manifests itself in the way it exposes, problematises and interrupts the state-imposed border and inner functioning of the system at the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs. By facilitating

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[110] Quoted in Nicole Hasham, 'Detention Centre Workers Suffering Their on Trauma in Dealing with Asylum Seekers', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 26 February 2016.

[111] According to the Secrecy Clause, Part Six, of the *Border Force Act 2015*, 'an entrusted person commits an offence if he or she makes a record of or discloses, protected information unless the making of the record or disclosure is authorised by law'. Article 48, however, requires that an entrusted person may disclose protected information if: (a) the entrusted person reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat to the life or health of an individual; and (b) the disclosure is for the purposes of preventing or lessening that threat. Parliament of Australia, *Australian Border Force Act 2015*.

[112] John-Paul Sanggaran et al., 'Open Letter on the Border Force Act: 'We Challenge the Department to Prosecute'', *The Guardian,* 1 July 2015.

solidarity with the asylum seekers and entering into new alliances with them, becoming-asylum seeker enhances the noise of asylum seekers.

In conclusion, all these different processes of becoming transform the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs into heterotopias: a fluid meshwork spaces formed by the entanglements of life-lines. These camps are not static. In these spaces, all the movements of oppression and resistance are entangled with one another in a way that they constantly transform each other. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, nothing is stable on a single line. Everything mutates when lines interweave, entangle, and change forms. Different lines of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs co-exist, and have the potential to change one another. These camps are formed by the political multiplicities of different kinds, not simply by the logic of inclusive exclusion that structures the sovereign power. The borders of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs move in every direction with the different forces that enable their construction, preservation, and disruption. The process of becoming is not an end state; it does not abolish the molar lines. Yet, they reveal the inherent instability of those lines. These processes expose how at the space of the camp the striated and smooth spaces coexist and how these two forms of spaces operate in a continuum. The borders of these cramped spaces cannot be contained; they leak out everywhere. Hence, the final question is how the process of becoming transcends the borders of the camps and isolated islands and create new movements of contestations in Australia.

b. 'Citizens without frontiers': connected lives, connected islands

The process of becoming at the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs have an affective power; they incite new political connections and contestations by rejuvenating pro-refugee movements in Australia. Contemporary refugee advocacy/activism takes different forms. It involves, for example, submissions to Senate Inquiries and Parliamentary Bills, the documentation of the conditions at the RPCs, letter writing campaigns, advocacy on individual legal cases, joint statements, and protest rallies. There are also significant examples of civil disobedience. In early 2016, for example, some Australian medical practitioners refused to discharge asylum seekers facing

deportation back to Nauru.[113] In March 2016, 115 church groups launched a sanctuary movement to prevent the asylum seekers from being returned to Nauru.[114] The participant churches initiated sanctuary training on how to resist attempts by the border police if they tried to remove the asylum seekers forcibly. Certainly, contemporary pro-refugee movement in Australia exposes different discourses on borders and disseminates different messages.[115] My aim here is not to discuss the details of this heterogeneous movement. What I want to elaborate here is a specific form of activism; what Engin Isın refers to as 'acts of citizens without frontiers'.[116]

Isın argues that the acts of citizens without frontiers are the acts of those who seek to traverse borders by unsettling given categories of contemporary politics – such as citizenship – and by revealing the arbitrary constructions of these categories.[117] For Isın, the word 'traverse' embodies multiple meanings. First, it denotes acts such as opposition and disturbance: 'something that crosses, thwarts or obstructs; or something that can form opposition, an obstacle or an impediment; things that constitute a trouble, vexation, a mishap, misfortune, adversity can all be called traverses'.[118] In this meaning, to traverse is to disturb the established order of things on the movement of molar lines. However, acts of traversal do not only create disturbances. To traverse is also to follow new paths, and to create new maps and connections. These acts seek to produce new political subjectivities by removing blockages against the emergence of new imaginaries. The acts of traversing frontiers are creative, experimental and innovative. They activate new forms of actions that are not born out of the otherness or the sameness, but out of the difference. Seen in these terms, acts of traversing frontiers are not only 'acts of crossing against but also leaving remains or traces and building bridges'. [119]

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[113] Nicole Hasham, 'Hospital Refuses to Discharge Asylum Seeker Toddler to Prevent Return to Nauru', *Sydney Morning Herald,* 13 February 2016.

[114] Nicole Hasham, 'Nuns, Church Groups Start Training for Australian Border Force Raids', *Sydney Morning Herald* 12 March 2016 , Melissa Davey, 'The Whole Nation Is on Board: Inside the Sanctuary Movement to Protect Asylum Seekers', *The Guardian,* 13 March 2016.

[115] For historical discussion of refugee advocacy and activism in Australia see Danielle Every, *The Politics of Representations: A discursive analysis of refugee advocacy in the Australian Parliament*, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Adelaide, 2006, Diana Gosden*, 'I had to do something. I couldn't do nothing!': Citizen Action in Support of Asylum Seekers in Australia 2001-2006*, Unpublished PhD thesis, The University of New South Wales, 2012, Claudia Tazreiter, 'Local to Global Activism: The Movement to Protect the Rights of Refugees and Asylum Seekers', *Social Movement Studies,* 9/2 (2010), 201-14.

[116] Isin, *Citizens without Frontiers*.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid. 3.

[119] Ibid. 3

In the context of contemporary refugee activism in Australia, one group, *Cross Border Collective* (CBC) presents a unique example of acts of traversing frontiers. CBC was formed by a small number of activists in 2010 as an anti-deportation movement.[120] Over the years, it has gradually expanded the scope of its activities. The group began visiting Villawood Immigration Detention Centre (IDC) in Sydney and organising conferences, workshops and forums together with the Australian artists and academics. In 2011, a small number of activists occupied the Immigration Minister's office to show solidarity with the asylum seekers, who, at the same time, launched a roof top protest at the Villawood IDC.[121] In 2015, CBC initiated a simultaneous hunger strike in Australia when seven hundred asylum seekers at the Manus RPC declared a two-week long hunger strike.

CBC is a small and loose network of Australian activists, which does not have any clear membership structure or a program. The activists define the group as a creative, and an experimental and autonomous project. Its founding principle is a call for 'no borders'. Since its beginnings, the central aim of CBC has been to 'create a space where opposition to Australia's border protection regime can be again transformed into a movement; around which anger, hope, solidarity and resistance can be channelled into strategies for dismantling the border'.[122] The network advocates open borders and rejects the state-imposed distinctions between economic migrant/refugee, legal/illegal passage, and permanence/temporality.[123]

CBC seeks to offer new border imaginations that are not imprisoned within the territorial and legal codes of the state system. It does not only speak about injustices produced by Australia's border network. The group neither solely demands an end to mandatory detention and offshore detention regime, nor calls on the Australian government to increase its humanitarian intake. In fact, CBC criticises dominant forms of refugee advocacy in Australia and argues that these attempts only seek to make borders 'more humane' without challenging their biopolitical foundations. For CBC, the challenge to the Australia border network begins with the problematisation of the very foundation of the border and the ways in which it creates different categories of people. In its campaign for free movement and equal rights for

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[120] Anonymous, Cross Border Collective, Interview with the author, Sydney, 10 November 2015.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Rattus, 'Breakout: For the Free Movement of People Conference, Redfern Community Centre, December 10-12', *Mutiny,* December 2010.
[123] Ibid.

all, CBC contests the state imposed boundary between being citizen and non-citizen. In doing so, the group rejects the conventional foundations of political identity that is always linked to the notion of citizenship. To put it differently, CBC problematises the foundational boundaries of modern politics that are always bounded to the sovereign right that determines who is entitled to rights and freedoms. Through such contestations, CBC calls for a shift from an advocacy for rights and citizenship to a less compromising emancipatory politics. In the words of one activist:

> That's not what human rights are about. Human rights or international law in general is premised on borders. It doesn't try to challenge capitalist social relations, or existing political structures. Like you say, it is liberal humanitarianism. A little bit liberal humanitarianism is great, people in detention will be happy to be released on the basis of liberal humanitarianism but of course we need to go beyond that and talk about real emancipatory politics.[124]

With its emphasis on 'emancipatory politics', CBC aims to offer an alternative to the humanitarian advocacy that dominates the debates over the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs. In fact, CBC takes a critical stance towards the representational practices of humanitarian advocacy and the figure of the silenced-abject refugee. In its own words, the group confronts 'liberal-humanist depiction of powerless and desperate peoples who have no agency and need to be saved'.[125] Rather than speaking *for* the asylum seekers, this network seeks to act *with* them and act *like* them.

The hunger strike they initiated in 2015 is a brief example of this position. This hunger strike pursued to establish connections with the asylum seekers at the Manus Island RPC. According to one activist, this particular form of action sought to stress the asylum seekers' political resistance:

> I was there at a rally, again … Another rally. I felt like 'oh god. All I have done for this issue is to be at rallies. I felt kind of distressed and frustrated, upset about what is happening for people in detention. One of the things Cross Border tried not to do is to replicate [pro-refugee marches and rallies]. We looked for other ways. Different things … I guess we wanted to draw attention

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[124] Anonymous, Cross Border Collective, Interview with the author.
[125] Rattus, 'Breakout: For the Free Movement of People Conference, Redfern Community Centre, December 10-12'.

specifically to the fact that was … the biggest hunger strike in recent history in Manus … We wanted to draw attention to detainees, what they were doing, the situation they were in … they were taking a significant political action … Another [aim] was to show [our] support to them. And another was to give other Australians, other people an opportunity to show solidarity with [the asylum seekers in Manus] and to give people in detention to see other people supportive of what they were doing.[126]

I argue that by launching a simultaneous hunger strike with the asylum seekers at the Manus Island RPC, CBC activated a process of becoming-asylum seeker that I discussed earlier. It established a bodily solidarity with them. Rather than speaking about the pain and suffering of the asylum seeker, they replicated and felt the same pain on their own bodies. The simultaneous hunger strike sought to create bodily connections between the activists in Australia and the asylum seekers in Manus Island, and hence, it created a parallel heterotopic space in Australia that connected bodies and islands separated by borders.

Furthermore, CBC disturbs the Australian border network by raising broader questions about Aboriginal rights, everyday racism and structural inequalities within Australia. According to the group, the exclusionary nature of the border regime could not be traversed without challenging Australia's colonised history and the way in which this history continues to shape the present:

The national border is part of the system that criminalises some border crossers and not others - by restricting the legal options for entering and remaining in Australia, and making some people 'illegal'. The political justification for the Australian border and its enforcement via immigration detention is deeply racialised. The process of criminalisation used in border control share many features with processes of criminalisation more generally. The prison industrial complex (PIC) functions to control those on the margins of Australian [society]: Indigenous people, the poor, the young, non-heteronormative people of colour, the unruly and the dangerous. Throughout Australia's colonised history, racialized communities have been disproportionately targeted for incarceration.[127]

With an attempt to shake the hegemonic readings of Australia's colonial past and present, CBC links the border question with the Aboriginal sovereignty. According to the group, the contemporary violence of borders was born with the

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126 Anonymous, Cross Border Collective, Interview with the author.
127 Gem Romuld, 'Prison', *We Don't Cross Borders; Borders Cross Us*, Cross Border Collective, viewed 12 August 2015, <http://www.crossbordersydney.org/>.

event of colonisation which constituted Australia's first violent borders against indigenous people by imposing restrictions on their movements and rights. CBC exposes the violence inherent in the foundational moment of the Australian sovereignty and questions the legitimacy of that moment: James Cook's declaration of sovereignty on Possession Island in 1770. Through its artistic intervention, the twelve poster series 'We Don't Cross Borders: Borders Cross Us', CBC asks:

> … who has the right to determine who should be allowed to come within Australia? The simply answer is that the Australian government has the legal and institutional power to control Australian borders. The full answer is that the Australian government present day power rests on the violent invasion, dispossession and colonisation of indigenous Australia. Sovereignty over Australia was never ceded by indigenous Australians and the legitimacy of white Australian sovereignty remains contested.[128]

In its contestations of Australian sovereign rights, the network actively participates in the Aboriginal Passport Ceremonies.[129] During these ceremonies, Aboriginal passports are presented to several asylum seekers. These ceremonies promote the idea of First Nation sovereignty and recalls the past events of invasion and colonisation that created the border. In the words of Thorpe:

> It's obvious what a passport does, it gives you right to enter other peoples' land and territory. It's an entry via our customary law. It is how any other passport would work. What it does is to give recognition to the Original People of this land, and give non-aboriginal people a way of recognising that.[130]

The Original Nation passport is an assertion that Aboriginal sovereignty was never ceded. The act of issuing these passports problematises the legitimacy of the Australian sovereign right to decide who is entitled to cross the borders of the state. The act of issuing Aboriginal passports is an act of traversing frontiers: it disturbs the foundations of the Australian sovereignty and offers new maps and territories for alternative sovereignties.

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[128] Cross Border Collective, *We Don't Cross Borders: Borders Cross Us*, 2012, viewed 12 August 2015, <http://www.crossbordersydney.org/>.
[129] The Aboriginal passport was first introduced in 1988 by the Tasmanian activist Michael Mansell. It was first issued to an Aboriginal delegation who travelled to Libya.
[130] Robbie Thorpe, 'Cross Border Collective Interview', *We Don't Cross Borders: Borders Cross Us*, 29 March 2012, viewed 12 August 2015, < http://www.crossbordersydney.org/ >.

Finally, CBC raises questions about the economy of the border and the ways in which Australian citizens contribute to its violent constitution. In 2013, for example, the group launched a project, Cross Border Operation Matters (xBorder Ops) to incite a debate on the contribution of the Australian and international business to Australia's border network.[131] This project persistently updates the list of corporations that are involved in the operations of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs. It calls the Australian public to protest these corporations in their daily lives. Together with the Divest from Detention Network, Cross Border Operation Matters activates the boycott and divestment campaign with an aim to break the 'supply-chain' that preserves Australia's border regime in Manus Island and Nauru.[132] As part of their campaign, activists regularly protest the service providers that profit from the detention business. They block Wilson Security car parks in Brisbane and Melbourne, and disrupt Transfield's annual conferences.[133] The boycott and divestment campaign seeks to change the ways in which we perceive Australia's contemporary border regime. The central message of this campaign is explicit: our everyday choices contribute to the violence of these camps. Through the ways we speak, act, and invest, we sustain the border regime. Our everyday decisions affect both the lives of asylum seekers and the local islanders. Thus, we are all part of the Australian border assemblage. Our lives are not marked by borders; we are all tangled with one another on the lines of Australia's borders.

These forms of contestation have been criticised by some pro-refugee groups because they fail to deliver an achievable plan and to mobilise public support for more humane borders.[134] Perhaps, what is more important here is the question of whether these contestations have changed Australian government's policies towards asylum seekers in Manus Island and Nauru. The answer is no. In early 2016, the Australian government indicated that it would not accept any asylum seekers from Manus Island; even the PNG Supreme Court found that the detention was

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[131] XBorder, Cross Border Operational Matters, viewed 12 March 2016,
<https://xborderoperationalmatters.wordpress.com/>, also see Angela Mitropoulos and Matthew Kiem, 'Cross-border Operations', *The New Inquiry*, 18 November 2015, viewed 12 February 2016, <http://thenewinquiry.com/features/cross-border-operations/>.
[132] Divest From Detention: Campaigns taking action to end the camps, viewed 23 May 2016, <http://divestfromdetention.com/>.
[133] Tony Moore, 'Brisbane Protest Questions Wilson Role in Manus, Nauru Detention Centre Security ', *Brisbane Times,* 6 November 2015, Paul Farrell, 'Protestors Disrupt Transfield Meeting over Manus and Nauru Contract', *The Guardian,* 28 October 2015.
[134] Refugee Action Committee (Canberra) Interview with the author, Canberra, 21 October 2015.

unconstitutional.135 At the time of writing, the government is recommending a new legislation to prevent all asylum seekers from Manus Island and Nauru from obtaining any visa including tourist or business visas.136 All these different acts of contestation, therefore, might not yet reached tangible transformations in Australia's offshore border network. However, they all reveal the inherent instability of this network. They expose that the established order of things has no long-term sustainability, because it leaks out everywhere and because it will continue to induce an excess.

These acts of contestation resist the established borders between inside and outside, us and them, domestic and foreign, citizen and non-citizen, and land and sea. By dismantling the unity of the inside, and creating connections with the asylum seekers excluded from the Australian borders, these acts open the inside space to its outside. In doing so, they reject the operation of the outside as a rigid boundary line or a limit, and they create a 'fluid connectivity' between inside and outside.137 These acts disturb the unity of inside in order to perform a new inside that is as much external to itself. Hence, I argue that the transformative potential of these acts rests not on whether they deliver tangible outcomes, but on their resistance to the present, and their acknowledgement of the very possibility of change that begins with the outside and remains on the outside.

In this chapter, I have shown how the Australian border established in Manus Island and Nauru are constituted by the entanglement of multiple lines. I have demonstrated that the molar lines of this network generate new violent territories, and institutional and legal codes. Yet, as I have argued, these lines are not static. They are always open to multiple forms of contestation. These camps are heterotopias. They are spaces of multiple and contradictory possibilities, and therefore, their borders are never stable. They always induce a spatial excess. The borders of the Manus Island and Nauru RPCs move backwards and forward with the different forces of capture and resistance. These camps do not have one entry point; they do not have firm boundaries that can only be drawn by the sovereign. The borders of these camps are always open to the productive forces of the outside; to the movements of various

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135 Amy Macquire, 'High Court Asked to Declare Manus Detention Illegal as 859 Detainees Seek Their Day in Court', *The Conversation,* 5 May 2016.
136 Dan Conifer, 'Manus Island, Nauru Refugees to Be Banned from Entering Australia, Malcolm Turnbull Says', *ABC News,* 30 October 2016.
137 Cache, *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories.*

contestation. This is the potential of heterotopias: they are always in a state of emergence, variation and unexpected change. Positive change might not yet have been achieved. It may appear as if nothing happens in the present, and yet – to repeat once again – 'everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment'.[138]

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[138] Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* 158.

CONCLUSION

'AFFIRMATIVE HOPE' AS A METHOD

The border is one of the most pressing ethical and political questions of our time. Over the last two decades, 60.000 people have been recorded as either missing or dead along migration routes.[1] In 2016 alone, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported approximately 4000 refugee deaths in the Mediterranean and 6000 worldwide.[2] In the wake of this human tragedy, states have engaged in an orchestrated effort in propagating a narrative of securitisation and framing the contemporary condition as 'crisis' of sovereign borders. This so-called 'border crisis' has been generated and perpetuated by building walls and fences along borders, detaining asylum seekers on isolated islands, implementing push-back policies, restricting or criminalising humanitarian work, and by destructing irregular transit camps along refugees' 'escape routes'. More depressingly, such efforts have found a strong resonance in dominant public discourses, which now increasingly portray the refugee movement as a threat to the social, cultural and political harmony of the refugee-receiving countries. These developments are the only a few glimpses of the increasingly violent state of contemporary borders. They suggest that the politics of death seems to be the defining force of the border in our contemporary era. It seems almost impossible to imagine and enact an imminent possibility of positive transformation. It seems there is no hope for an alternative border politics that is rooted in an ethics of responsibility and care for those 'undesirables' who are displaced, silenced, abused and killed.

The driving motivation of this study has been to *resist* such a demoralising condition of the present and to seek for alternative ways of approaching border politics. This resistance is underpinned by a conviction that the claustrophobic instantiation of the self as harvested by geo-biopolitical practices, its narcissistic

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[1] International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Missing Migrants Project*, viewed 15 October 2016, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>.
[2] Ibid.

celebration of patriotic nationalism, and its economy of violence are not our final destination. As William Connolly writes, 'nothing is fundamental': there is no single moral order, design of being, model of rationality, or overriding logic that marks human experience and fixes possibilities.[3] In an ambition to resist the present, my driving force therefore has been a belief in the existence of *multiple possibilities*, on the 'fundamental mobility of things': a mobility that generates the very possibility of alternative practices being able to compete with the dominant forms of politics.[4] This is a belief in the power of collective experiments that work towards the creation of alternative forms of collective life by energising new relationships between the self and the other, and between inside and outside. This belief entails that the creation of alternative sustainable futures may not seem to be imminent. But it is immanent within a given social and political field, because the lines of flight are always already present in every field, although they seem to be overly marginalised in our contemporary era.

Rosi Braidotti calls this belief 'affirmative hope'.[5] For her, one way to resist the present is the 'construction of social horizons of hope' that places desire for transformation or becoming-other at the centre of alternative thinking about politics.[6] Affirmative hope is not a kind of hope that works against life, which tends to narrow the capacities of the self by seeking security and prosperity with a desire for sameness. When hope works against life, it operates within the established political, cultural and social constraints, rather than suggesting an emancipation from negative passions that empower those constraints. This form of hope negates the power of life itself, because its negative passions do establish double enclosures around the self, thereby they not only harm the other, but also limit the capacity of the self to 'growing in and through' the other. In contrast, affirmative hope is an ethico-political practice that aims '"active counter-actualisation of the current state of affairs" . . . through the project of transforming negative into positive relations, encounters and passions'.[7] Affirmative hope is based on ethics of affirmation, which entails a strong belief that our negative passions and hopes that dominate our contemporary era can be

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[3] Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralisation,* 1-2.
[4] Ibid. 39.
[5] Rosi Braidotti*, Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti*.
[6] Ibid. 267.
[7] Ibid. 31.

transformed. It assumes that, 'every event contains within it the potential for being overcome and overtaken – its negative charge can be transposed'.[8]

Affirmative hope drives from a notion that identity is not fixed, but is relational and collective: it is produced during and by our encounters with the others. What is positive about affirmative hope is the belief in deterritorialising agency, equipping it with the capacity to modify one's identity and to change others – a capacity to become the other. As I have discussed throughout this study, becoming-other entails a process in which one becomes a stranger to one's identity and to the established relations with the other and with the outside. This process does not simply involve calling power relations into question. The process of becoming-other is a process of becoming-minor. It involves self-realisation of how one's own negative passions and abusive actions, or simply silence and ignorance in times of horror produce harmful effects on the life of others. This realisation calls for a withdrawal from one's fixed position from the majority to establish a different relation to the self. This is a process of active micropolitics, the path-in-motion which erases and transforms some of the established enclosures around the self and between the self and the other. Affirmative hope is harvested by a belief in the very possibility of this process. It is, as Braidotti writes: 'a qualitative lead that carves out active trajectories of becoming and thus can respond to anxieties and uncertainties in a productive manner and negotiate transitions to sustainable futures'.[9]

In order to remove the blockages that constrain the process of becoming-other, affirmative hope resists the present by operating within two registers: one is to resist the economy of violence that governs our contemporary life, and the other is to resist the pessimism that dominates our critical interventions. As I have argued throughout this study, the pessimism that shapes critical scholarly interventions has several limitations. This is not to say that these interventions do not present powerful critique of the present condition. They certainly do, especially by tracing and revealing the ways in which the geo-biopolitical imaginations establish the border as an indispensable organising principle of modern political life. In doing so, such critical interventions disturb the contingent and constructed nature of the established modes of politics, identity, and rationality. However, in such lexicon, the border

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[8] Ibid. 288.
[9] Ibid. 297.

becomes the monologue of the sovereign and its constitutive performances of creating distinctions between bare live and other lives. Such pessimism limits our imagination within a destructive ontology of being, and paradoxically constrains the possibilities of the emergence of a new being. Affirmative hope does not require us to abandon entirely this form of critique. As this study has also presented, a certain dose of such intervention is required to unpack the powerful operation of contemporary violent politics of borders as well as to avoid a naive optimism and arriving at quick conclusions. But, as Connolly rightly suggests, these interventions need to be complemented with the strategy of attachment: a strategy in which one seeks for the traces of alternative politics that offers affirmative interpretations and positive ideals with a desire to flourish an ethics based on the ethos of critical responsiveness – the politics of becoming-other.[10]

With an ambition to resist the present with affirmative hope and its required strategies, I have suggested to imagine the border not as a space of oppression or a space of escape, but as a heterotopia – a fluid meshwork space. The central argument I have put forward in this study is that the border does not have a static structure; it is not a natural or a fixed entity with a stable identity. This suggests that the border is not simply an apparatus of the sovereign. Instead, it is performed by multiple actors including those who are the recipient of colonising practices and by those who form alliances with them. On the border, everything – humans, animals, laws, institutions, objects, buildings, knowledge – entangle with one another. It is these entanglements that perform the heterotopic space of the border. The border never totally envelops these collisions. Rather, it moves through them, cuts them, unites them, or traverses them, causing a constant transformation in its own space. The border therefore cannot be defined as a space of either repression or emancipation. What is *fundamental* about the border is its constant mobility: its uncertain movement, which is constituted by and constitutive of ever-shifting movements of molar lines, molecular lines and lines of flight. The movement of these lines do not cease. In their entanglements with one another they transform themselves and each other. It is these constant movement of lines that create the border as a space of multiple possibilities – a heterotopia.

A few concluding remarks on molar lines, and those molecular lines that are driven by negative passions and captured by the macropolitics of the state. These are

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[10] Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralisation,* 36-40.

the lines of fixed being, identity and striated spaces. They are the lines of colonisation, discipline, exclusion and dispossession. The primary function of molar formations is to striate the space they engender and to make their subjects controllable and governable. As I have discussed in the context of the history of fences and barbed wire, the modern ontology based on 'progress-as-enclosure' has established the moral codes of these formations. This ontology underpinned by a hierarchical relationship between the self and the other, the inside and the outside, and the domestic and the foreign, which is perceived as necessities of 'civilisation', 'progress' and 'modernity'. As I have demonstrated throughout this study, molar formations are not simply the products of the state. Both macro and micro practices are entwined with one another on these lines. Yet, the effectiveness of these lines depends on the state. The state unites all heterogeneous elements in a given social and political field and turns the border into a network space. This form of network border operates within the territory of the state, in the territory of third countries, at high seas, and on the geographical outer edge of the territory. In this sense, molar lines are point-to-point connectors. I have also urged caution regarding molecular lines. Politics on these lines is full of ambiguity, because it is not always easy to recognise whether and when the acts of contestation move beyond the familiar power structures and unsettle the established ontological codes of modern politics. These acts may turn into negative passions or they may lead to positive transformations.

The in-depth analysis of the colonisation of Palestine in Chapter Three offers an example of such powerful operation of molar formations. This analysis suggested that the physical enclosures were not static constructions on the Palestinian landscape. Enclosures facilitated the practices of occupation and colonisation. These enclosures were empowered by a desire to create a sterile exclusive Jewish life in Palestine. This desire was promoted and sustained by various temporal and spatial myths that represented indigenous forms of living as backward and threatening, while portraying the new Jewish settlements as the manifestations of civilisation and progress. It was this form of desire that produced its own self-justifying immunity paradigm: a paradigm that constructed the Palestinian other as an existential threat to the collective Jewish/Israeli body.

The immunity paradigm has refused and suppressed a shared life in Palestine and has envisioned a 'happy and healthy' Jewish/Israeli self without the existence of

the Palestinian other. It does so by keeping the threat of living with Palestinians always alive and immediate. This paradigm has been materialised through 'repeating walls' which eventually created a double enclosure: it has excluded the threatening Palestinian other, while at the same time isolating and imprisoning the Jewish-Israeli self in a constant state of insecurity. It is paradoxically such state of insecurity that has sought to secure the wholeness of the very being of that collective, and hence, has limited the capacity of the Jewish/Israeli self to relate to the colonised/occupied Palestinian other. I have therefore argued that the Separation Wall cannot be understood simply as a product of Israel's occupation of the West Bank. Rather, the Wall is one of the recurring apparatuses of this dominant paradigm which emerged as a constructive element of the plane of Israel and Palestine in the late nineteenth century. I have suggested that the molar elements of the Wall sustain the historical formations of that colonising network by seeking to guard the Jewish/Israeli self from the possibility of decolonised forms of shared life in Israel and Palestine. The 'repeating walls' in Palestine present us with an example of how negative passions are fuelled and sustained by micro practices beneath the state, and how they are captured by the state and spread to every organ of the social and political field. They show how negative passions function as black holes: they not only harm the other, but the self as well.

These similar molar formations have had a performative role in the constructing and maintaining Australia's constantly shifting ocean borders. The Australian example has exposed the powerful operation of the colonising and exclusive lines of the border, albeit in the context of islands imagined as natural enclosures. Since British settlement, those formations have performed the Australian collective body as white and Anglo, and sought to secure that collective by pervasively constructing and sustaining the threat of living with the other. Very much like 'repeating walls' in Palestine, islands have been utilised as stockades to produce and guard those molar formations. The use of islands as sites of incarceration, Aboriginal reserves, leper colonies and internment camps have presented us with examples of how those molar formations have created their own double enclosure: they have excluded and colonised the other, while simultaneously imprisoning the Australian self in a constant state of border anxiety awaiting to be invaded by those internal and external others. The Australian border network built on Manus Island

and Nauru is one of the recurring apparatuses of these historical molar formations that pervasively seek to protect the island-continent of Australia from the threat of living with the others.

Yet, the border *moves*. Nothing is stable on the border of these cramped spaces. The border never settles; it re-begins each time with the ever-shifting movement of its multiple lines. This mobility is not negative, but productive of things, new realities. It is important not to perceive this mobility only as recurring circulation of molar formations and their negative hope, but also as a creation of difference; creation of something new. This is the positive force of border heterotopias. Their constant movement is their *potential* to activate a new form of ethics that is cultivated by the politics of becoming-other.

Such politics of becoming-other has been activated in the contexts of the Separation Wall, and the Manus Island and Nauru Refugee Processing Centres (RPC). In fact, these cases are paradigmatic examples showing the positive potential of this mobility. As I have presented in Chapter Four, in the context of the Separation Wall, the anti-wall movement initiated by the West Bank Palestinians offers a radical alternative to two prevailing forms of politics in Israel and Palestine: one is colonising politics noted above, and the other is the politics of 'alter-wall' discourse that normalises the pre-1967 borders as 'proper' and 'just', thereby forcing a collective amnesia on the arbitrary and violent past of the Green Line. I have argued that with its mobile, local, creative, non-institutional, and collaborative features, this movement neither seeks to adjust the established norms and institutions in accordance with the dominant humanitarian discourses nor presents Palestinians as victims who are waiting to be emancipated within the system defined and imposed upon by the occupier. The anti-wall struggle is a form of what Marcelo Svirsky calls 'co-resistance'. It is a collaborative alliance between Israelis and Palestinians which fosters a possibility of what Elizabeth Grosz refers to as a 'non-community': a community that neither fences off itself with the paradigm of negative immunity nor forces the other to become the same.[11] It is a community that opens itself into affirmative differences by seeking to create new connections and new relations between Palestinians and Israelis. The anti-wall movement is not simply a resistance against the location of the Wall. It is not only a reactionary force against the Israeli

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[11] Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*.

occupation. Rather, it entails a resistance to the past and present practices of colonisation and the dominant form of life they have generated in Palestine over a century. The collaborative nature of the anti-wall movement fosters new encounters between Israelis and Palestinians that exceed some aspects of their established identities. This is particularly the case for Israeli activists, who as a result of their destabilising encounters with Palestinians, problematise their Jewish/Israeli identity and begin to become a stranger to themselves and to become other.

The struggle of the anti-wall movement exhibits the very possibility to disturb the established modes of being in order to inscribe a different form of space in Israel and Palestine. This form of space is the non-community of those Palestinians and Israelis who not only seek an escape from the occupying and colonising forces, and from the established norms of militarism and racism. It is the non-community of those Palestinians and Israelis, who also acknowledge their vital reliance on each other, thereby seeking to overturn these totalising structures to foster a new form of shared life. I have stressed that a form of struggle that nurtures 'non-community' is the resistance of those who choose to remain on the outside. And this is the excess of the Wall that turns it into a heterotopia, an other space.

It is possible to observe similar dynamics in the case of Manus Island and Nauru RPCs. In my discussion of the processes of becoming at these camps in Chapter Six, I have presented the inherent instability of the molar formations of Australia's border network and the productive force of 'noise'. By becoming noisy the asylum seekers in these camps expose that their lives are not bare lives; they rather have a political agency. As I have argued, the process of becoming-noisy disturbs two forms of fixed identity: one is the state-imposed identity that forces the asylum seeker to be silent and docile; the other one is his/her representation in dominant humanitarian discourses as a child-like and helpless figure lacking a political agency. I have stressed that becoming-noisy is not an individual process, but a relational one. Becoming-noisy, in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is 'a block of co-existence' that reveals the affective power of bodies, their capacity to change and to change others when they collide with each other, and their potential to increase power through forming alliances. As a collective process, becoming-noisy thus has an accumulative effect on the employees of the camps and on creating new connections with the mainland Australia.

Becoming-asylum seeker is one of the manifestations of the collective transformational impact of becoming-noisy. In their encounters with the asylum seekers, some employees of these camps question their positions in Australia's border network and become strangers to the dominant codes that govern this network. As a result of this process, the employee of the camps seeks to change his/her mode of being by becoming different than what he/she was before. Furthermore, the politics of becoming transcends the borders performed in the Manus Island and Nauru and triggers alternative forms of refugee activism in Australia. As I discussed in Chapter Six, Cross Border Collective (CBC) is one such example. This group create connections with the asylum seekers excluded from the imposed borders of Australia and problematise Australia's colonial past and present. In doing so, its activist practices expose the violence of totalising unity of the inside. All these acts connect Australia with Manus Island and Nauru RPCs, and they all transform these camps into heterotopias.

Some may suggest that such interpretation of these acts of contestation and disturbance forces a naïve idealism and false hope, especially in the absence of any evidence for concrete changes in dominant policy practices and social codes. I however suggest that the significance of these acts does not rest on whether they lead to immediate social, cultural and political transformations. Rather, their significance rests on their power to encourage us to perceive the border 'as the sphere of the possibility of the existence of more than one voice'.[12] The acts of contestation and disturbance give us a scope for critical human agency, affirming its capacity to reconfigure border assemblages in positive directions. They expose the very possibility that prevailing configurations of borders can be confronted and transformed. They open up the possibility of a new border imagination that exceeds some aspects of the territorial and biopolitical codes of the state system. These acts are paradigmatic examples of how affirmative hope can be channeled into activism and into active forms of engagement with the other. In short, my diagnosis of the present condition is that alternative imaginations, affirmative hopes, are alive and active. However, these imaginations and alternative narratives are overly marginalised in the contemporary context of border politics, which makes us believe that there is no room to create thriving lines of flight.

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[12] Doreen Massey, 'Spaces of Politics', 279.

Thus, the question is: how can we thrive lines of flight?

I have suggested that cultivating the politics of becoming-other offers one promising alternative to the contemporary violent politics of borders. This is because becoming-other, as Connolly suggests, is the movement of 'alter-identities' that 'imperils the stability of being through which dominant constituencies are coded and comforted'.[13] The politics of becoming-other does not ground on the identity of the self that is constructed through the negation of the other. Rather, it begins with the politics of self-disturbance: to become a stranger to the self and to thrive connections with the other. It is a call for collective transformation. It renders the outside as a productive source for such transformation. In this process, both the self and the other transform themselves in order to become different than what they were before. Some of the elements of their identities remain intact, but some mutate. Therefore, the politics of becoming-other does not confine itself to the realm of law, the established institutions, and the asymmetrical and invisible forms of power structures. Its core openness to others and to the outside is the potential of the politics of becoming-other. To attend to this form of politics does not mean to suggest a world without borders. It, rather, advocates perceiving the border as a sphere of new connections, and thresholds, not as a limit to our encounters with the others. To put it differently, the politics of becoming-other calls for the re-construction of borders that is founded on an ethics that cultivates an 'ethos of critical responsiveness': an ethics that is empowered by the affirmation of difference, the affirmation of the life of the other, and the affirmation of the generative vitality of interconnection between people and their interdependence on each other. This is a form of ethics that functions with increasing each other's capacities, rather than diminishing or constraining them in the name of negative and self-affirming imaginations and desires.

In order to establish such an alternative form of the border, first, I believe that it is important to empower those collective and activist movements which seek to create smooth spaces within the striated space of the border by struggling against molar formations. If such an ethos is to be acknowledged and flourished, however, these movements should be open to permanent mobility. That is to mean, acts of contestation and disturbance need to be placed under constant critical scrutiny. As

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[13] Connolly, 'Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming', 263.

Deleuze and Guattari warn us, all lines are open to unexpected transformations in that there is no guarantee that lines of flight lead us to positive change. These movements may open blockages on one element of the border, while simultaneously creating new ones on others. They are susceptible to becoming molar formations inducing suffering on others. Therefore, we also need to be critical towards these movements in order to render them open to the pluralisation of voices and prevent them from the risk of becoming self-defeating. Second, a radically alternative border politics entails all of us to render ourselves open and attentive to become-other, to become strangers to ourselves. As Braidotti writes 'we are all in this together': we are all part of the contemporary border assemblages. That is to mean, the way we speak, act, consume, think, write, imagine and live effect certain re/configurations of contemporary borders. Therefore, perhaps, in times of desperation, suffering and terror like ours all we need is affirmative hope as a method of living – hope that activates 'dreaming forward' with the ethos of critical responsiveness.

As such, our scholarly interventions constitute important elements of the contemporary border assemblages. I see Foucault's notion of power-knowledge-space as an inspirational source in the sense that the way we think and write about borders can produce an affirmative power in constructing social networks of affirmative hope and its ethos. It is not sufficient to resist the contemporary racism and militarisation of the border by exposing their persistent rationalities. Creation of alternative futures also requires imagining and showing their very possibilities. Therefore, affirmative interpretations are needed. Such interpretations can further contribute to fostering affirmative hope as a method of writing, and it is this method that 'aims at *creating* new ways of thinking, perceiving and sensing Life's infinite possibilities and potentialities'.[14]

In this regard, I conclude this study by proposing two possible areas for further research. The first area is what I refer to as 'alter-border' apparatuses. In the first and second intermezzos, I have presented a few examples on the ways in which technological tools are utilised by migrants, refugees and activists in a way to confront the politics of death on the border. I have briefly noted how tools such as the Geographic Information System (GIS), the Global Positioning System (GPS), and mobile phones are used by migrants and refugees on their migration routes. Two

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[14] Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013) 107 [emphasis added].

recent projects, *Alarm Phone* and *Transborder Immigrant Tool (TBT)* have exemplified the ways in which activist movements facilitate such technologies in their struggle against contemporary border regimes. A further scholarly interest is needed in this area for two purposes. One is to go beyond a Heideggerian-Agambenian interpretation of modern technology as being a capturing tool that only produces docile forms of bodies, and the second reason is to develop a dialogue with these activist movements.

The second possible area of research is the impact of the new and emerging border security apparatuses on border ecosystems. I have provided some examples of the ways in which these apparatuses disturb natural ecological balance of border areas. I have briefly discussed how the US-Mexico wall unsettles the cross-border migration routes of animals and places particular species at risk of extinction. Furthermore, the discussion of Botswana and Zimbabwe 'biosecurity fence' has showed the ways in which fences can immobilise transboundary wild-life, radically altering the ecosystem of the border region. Similarly, the Manus RPC destructs the maritime environment of the province and triggers loss of flora. Comprehensive research on how exactly new border security technologies damage natural ecosystems is needed to conceptualise the border 'more-than-human' terms. Conceptualising the border as connected ecologies is crucial to understand the 'nature as having an agency, who "speaks"'.[15] A detailed research on the impact of emerging border security apparatuses can contribute to a new form of border politics that 'refuses to silence the speech of nature' and that encourages an 'active communication with the non-human element' of the border.[16] Such form of communication is needed to create new imaginations that 'nurture worlds for both humans and species co-living in biosphere'.[17] Alternative imaginations that breed our affirmative hopes therefore should not only accommodate humans, but be extended to non-human species. Because, on the border we – all human and non-human beings – are inextricably connected to one another and our lives are all dependent on each other.

[15] John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 150.

[16] Ibid. 140-161.

[17] Anthony Burke et al., 'Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 44(3) 2016, 500.

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APPENDIX 1

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- PAASI, Jerusalem, 18 June 2011.
- Matchsom Watch, Jerusalem, 20 June 2011.
- Meir Marglit, 21 June 2011.
- Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Jerusalem, 22 June 2011.
- Yossi Alpher, Tel- Aviv, 23 June 2011.
- Shaul Arieli, Tel-Aviv, 23 June 2011.
- Ghassan Khatib, Ramallah, 05 July 2011.
- Al-Haq, Ramallah, 05 July 2011.
- Palestinian NGO network, Ramallah, 05 July 2011.
- Stop the Wall, Ramallah, 05 July 2011.
- B'Tselem, Jerusalem, 10 July 2011.
- Fence for Life, Tel-Aviv, 11 July 2011.
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- Alrowwad, Bethlehem, 18 July 2011.
- Holy Land Trust, Bethlehem, 18 July 2011,

Australia

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- Walking Borders, phone interview, 28 October 2015.
- Refugee Action Collective (Victoria), Phone interview, 3 November 2015.
- Refugee Action Coalition (Sydney), Sydney, 10 November 2015.
- Refugee Council of Australia, Sydney, 10 November 2015
- Cross Border Collective, Sydney, 10 November 2015.