Islamic Activism: The Socio-Political Dynamics of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI)

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Islamic Activism: The Socio-Political Dynamics of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI)

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKKBB	Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith
DDI	Dewan Dakwah Islam or Islamic Preaching Council
FPI	Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front
FUI	Forum Umat Islam or the Forum of Islamic Society
GARIS	Gerakan Reformasi Islam or Islamic Reform Movement
Golkar	Golongan Karya or Functional Groups
HDI	Hizbud Dakwah Islam or the Party of Islamic Propagation
HT	Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Party of Liberation
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association
JAT	Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid or The Congregation of the Oneness of God
KISDI	Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World
KLI	Komando Laskar Islam or Islamic Force Command
KUII	Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia or the Congress of Indonesian Muslims

MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Warriors Council
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia or the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang or Crescent and Star Party
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party
PERSIS	Persatuan Islam or the Islamic Unity
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Development and Unity Party
TPM	Tim Pengacara Muslim or Team of Muslim Lawyers

ABSTRACT

Since the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed an escalation in the activism of Islamic revivalist movements whose goals revolve around the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law) such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), FPI (Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), and MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Council of Indonesian Holy Warriors). These movements have continuously voiced their pro-*sharia* agenda through a variety of collective actions such as mass protests, public gatherings, and media statements. With a view to enhancing co-ordination and communication among Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, these movements established an umbrella movement called FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Society) in 2005, which has also been actively engaged in social movement activities.

Unfortunately, unlike the other Islamic revivalist movements that emerged immediately after the fall of the Suharto regime mentioned above, there has been no scholarly research on FUI. This thesis, therefore, aims to answer the following primary research question: "How did FUI emerge and how does it mobilise organisational resources and frame its ideologies?" In an attempt to better account for this research question, the thesis employs the perspectives of social movements: political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing.

This thesis primarily argues that given differences in terms of ideologies and strategies on the part of Islamic movements and organisations in Indonesia, the

emergence of FUI was a result of a perceived need to solidify the pro-*sharia* agenda of these movements and organisations. As an umbrella movement, FUI heavily relies on its major member movements in order to actively engage in collective action. As a result, FUI's ideologies, organisational resources, and strategies are not immune to the influence of its major member movements. In the beginning of its activism (between 2005 and 2008), FUI largely relied on its organisational resources from HTI. However, when HTI severed ties with FUI in mid 2008, FUI has since shifted its reliance on organisation resources to FPI.

This thesis demonstrates that this shift is also characterised by the consolidation of FUI's ideologies that, unlike HTI that displays its trans-national political orientation through the re-establishment of the caliphate, emphasise the need to respect the basic philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia — *Pancasila* — in its efforts to implement *sharia.* This is done through, for instance, re-interpreting principles and values embodied in the *Pancasila* and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in such a way as to justify its pro-*sharia* agenda.

Chapter One

Introduction

Since the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed an escalation in the activism of Islamic revivalist movements whose goals revolve around the implementation of *sharia* and the re-establishment of the caliphate. Salim and Azra (2003: 1-2) argued that the face of political Islam in the aftermath of the Suharto regime has been characterised by the mounting expression of what they referred to as "more formalistic Islam", as evidenced by, among others, the growing demand of certain regions of Indonesia for the formal implementation of *sharia* and the emergence of Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), FPI (Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), and MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Council of Indonesian Holy Warriors). Prior to the regime's demise, some of them operated clandestinely to avoid the regime's repressive posture. Owing to a favourable political environment for activism after the regime's demise, these movements have continuously voiced their pro-*sharia* agenda through a variety of collective actions such as mass protests, public gatherings, media statements, petition drives, etc. They addressed a plethora of issues regarded as injustice ranging from economic issues (e.g. the rise of fuel prices) to pornography (e.g. the Miss World contest), with a view to exposing the inability of the government to cope with a wide range of problems and, at the same time, offering *sharia* as a panacea for these problems.

The term 'Islamic revivalist movements' in this regard refers to social movements that seek to revitalise the complete set of Islamic teachings and principles in the public sphere through engaging in collective challenges to authorities, elites, or other movements. Esposito and Voll (2001: 39) argue that 'Islamic revivalism' refers to the revitalisation of Islamic principles and teachings throughout the Muslim world, which is manifested in the growing prevalence of Islamic piety and in the rising adoption of Islamic culture and code of conduct among Muslims. For example, they consider the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood[1] and the Pakistan-based Jamaat-i-Islami as Islamic revivalist movements,[2] all of which seek to implement a *sharia* based system of law and government in their respective countries. Likewise, this *sharia* aspiration is, too, embodied in the aforementioned Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia and manifested in their relentless call for the complete implementation of *sharia* and, to some extent, the establishment of an Islamic state. However, it is worth mentioning that there are some other Islamic organisations that can also be categorised as revivalist that — unlike the aforementioned movements — do not engage in any collective challenges to authorities and elites through collective actions such as mass protests.

Some of these revivalist organisations are, for example, Jamaah Tabligh (Preaching Community) and BMTs (Islamic saving loan and cooperatives). While Jamaah Tabligh is an apolitical Islamic movement that is centred around preaching

[1] Muslim Brotherhood is widely regarded as the largest and most influential Islamic movement in the Arab world. It was established in 1928 by an Egyptian Islamic scholar, Hassan al-Banna. One of its underlying goals is to uphold *shariah* and implement it in the public sphere. For details, see for example, Husaini (1956) and Mitchell (1969).

[2] Jamaat-i-Islami was established in Lahore, Pakistan in 1941 by an Islamic scholar Abul Ala Maududi. It gained popularity and influence in the Indian sub continent and seeks to install an Islamic based government system in Pakistan. For details, see for example Nasr, (1994; 1996).

activities, calling upon Muslims to practice Islam so as to enhance their individual piety (Ali 2003), BMTs are microfinance institutions that provide financial services to the small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the poor, whose rules and regulations are as much as possible based on the principles of Islamic economics (Sakai 2008). It is vital at this juncture to delineate the underlying difference between Islamic revivalist organisations or institutions that engage in collective action such as those of HTI, FPI, and MMI and those that do not, such as Jamaah Tabligh and BMTs. Here, the concept of social movement is employed to delineate this difference. The majority of scholars underscore such essential elements that characterise social movements as the ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in the form of collective action such as mass demonstrations, public gatherings, petition drives, media statements, and so forth that typically employ extra-institutional means of influence (Gamson and Mayer 1996: 283; Tarrow 1998: 4; Tilly 2004: 7).

The ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents in the forms of collective action is what differentiates Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI and apolitical Islamic revivalist organisations or institutions such as Jamaah Tabligh as well as BMTs. This is also what differentiates such movements from an Islamic political party. One may categorise Indonesian Islamic parties such as PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party), which originated as a campus-based Islamic *Tarbiyah* (education) movement and gained popularity among Muslim students in the 1990s, as an Islamic revivalist movement. This is attributable to the fact that the actors and structures of political parties and social movements are mutually intertwined, such as for the Green Parties.

However, although political parties may consider themselves as part of a social movement under certain conditions, this mostly applies to parties originated by social movements. Furthermore, the majority of scholars agree that the main difference between social movements and political parties lies in the specific roles they play: while the political activism of the latter is mostly done within institutionalised politics such as the Parliament, the former are considered outsiders (Diani 1992: 14-15; Goldstone 2003: 3).

HTI, FPI, and MMI are three major Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia that emerged immediately after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 and have since actively engaged in various collective actions. HTI is well-known for its call for the re-establishment of the caliphate, which serves not only as its motto but also its solution to perceived multidimensional problems that have afflicted Indonesia since the Asian financial crisis in 1997. These problems began with the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah against the US dollar, which subsequently caused political and economic instability, a rise in the prices of commodities, massive unemployment, and prolonged inter-ethnic and sectarian conflicts in regions such as Moluccas and Poso, Central Sulawesi. MMI calls for the incorporation of *sharia* into Indonesia's positive laws, while FPI engages in collective actions that are basically the manifestation of its 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' principles, without having to go so far as to call for the establishment of any form of Islamic state in Indonesia. There are, of course, specific differences in the way in which these movements interpret and implement *sharia*, such as regarding whether or not the *syiah* or *shia* community in Indonesia are deviant, whether it is permissible to participate in general elections, and so forth. However, they all fundamentally concur with each other that

there is an urgent need to advocate the interests of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia and to revitalise Islamic teachings and principles not merely as issues that fall within the private sphere, but also within the public sphere.

Changes in the socio-political conditions of a country can create political opportunity for social movements, such as the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 that opened up political opportunities for HTI, FPI, and MMI to emerge. However, movements also create opportunity for other movements to emerge (Tarrow 1996: 60). As these Islamic revivalist movements interacted with each other to advance their pro-*sharia* agenda, they managed to establish an umbrella movement in 2005, which is called FUI (Forum Umat Islam or the Forum of Islamic Society), with a view to enhancing co-ordination and communication among Islamic revivalist movements or organisations in Indonesia. The leaders of these Islamic revivalist movements took the initiative to establish a forum with the primary goal of facilitating communication and exchanging information among a wide array of Islamic organisations. They managed to do this during and after the fourth congress of KUII (*Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia* or the Congress of Indonesian Muslims) held by MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* or the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) on 17–25 April 2005 in Jakarta.[3] However, like HTI, FPI, and MMI, FUI immediately transformed into another Islamic revivalist movement, actively engaging in social movement activities such as mass protests, public gatherings, media statements, and so forth. For instance, it regularly challenged Indonesian authorities and pressured them into

[3]For further information on previous KUII Congresses, see for example, Sitompul (2005).

accommodating their demands against an allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia[4] from 2005 to 2009 and the Miss World contest held in Bali, Indonesia in 2013.

A significant amount of scholarly work has been done on HTI (Salim 2005; Arifin 2005; Rahmat 2005; Fealy 2007; Muhtadi 2009; Ward 2009; Ahnaf 2009; Osman 2010a, 2010b), on FPI (Ng 2006; Wilson 2006, 2008; Jahroni 2008; Rosadi 2008; Fealy 2004: 114-115; Hefner 2005: 284-286), and on MMI (Bruinessen 2002; Fealy 2004). In contrast, notwithstanding its active role in social movement activities, there has been no scholarly research on FUI. This thesis therefore attempts to answer the following primary research question:

How did FUI emerge and how does it mobilise organisational resources and frame its ideologies?

This primary research question leads to the following two secondary research questions:

1. How does FUI accommodate the aspirations of its member movements?
2. How does it deal with differences of opinions among them?

1.1. The Significance of the Research

As the largest Muslim country in the world, where Islam and its adherents are considered by many to be moderate, Indonesia has witnessed an escalation in the

[4] Ahmadiyah Indonesia is a branch of the international Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, originally established by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian Village, Punjab, India in 1889. Mainstream Muslims repudiate its religious conviction that Mirza is a promised Messiah. For details, see for example Valentine (2008). For further discussion of Ahmadiyah Indonesia and the Monas Incident, see Purwanto (2008), International Crisis Group Report (2008), Crouch (2009, 2011) and Takuo (2010).

activism of Islamic revivalist movements since the fall of the Suharto's regime in 1998. These movements' goals revolve around the complete implementation of *sharia* and, to some extent, the re-establishment of the caliphate. The opening up of favourable political opportunities in post-Suharto Indonesia has guaranteed and facilitated a plethora of civil society organisations to emerge and express their aspirations through a variety of means, the most common of which are mass demonstrations, media statements, and public gatherings.

Through the above-mentioned type of social movement activities, Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia such as HTI, FPI, and MMI, benefit from the opening up of the political opportunities and can thus freely voice their *sharia* aspirations to the Indonesian public. However, the pro-*sharia* aspirations that these movements advocate often meet with strong resistance not only from secular organisations, but also from moderate Islamic organisations in Indonesia such as Nahdlatul Ulama[5] and Muhammadiyah,[6] which consider the agenda of these revivalist movements to be extreme, radical, and posing a threat to the Republic of Indonesia.[7] Moreover, there were several occasions in which the pro-*sharia* activism of these revivalist movements created violent clashes between the pro-*sharia* supporters and their opponents, which were mainly drawn from secular or moderate and liberal

[5] Nahdlatul Ulama, which literally means the Awakening of Muslim Scholars, is the largest moderate Islamic organisation in Indonesia. It was established in 1926. For details on Nahdlatul Ulama, see Fealy and Barton (1996) and Bush (2009).

[6] Muhammadiyah, which literally means the followers of the Prophet, is the second largest moderate Islamic organisation in Indonesia. It was established in 1912. For details on Muhammadiyah, see for example Peacock (1978) and Nakamura (1985).

[7] For resistance to the ideas of Islamic state and formalised *sharia* expressed by secular political parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), see *Rima News* (2012). For resistance voiced by moderate Islamic organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama, see Misrawi (2007); Muhyiddin (2008) and Wahid (2008).

Islamic organisations. As one example, FUI's relentless demands for the dissolution of Ahmadiyah Indonesia, which is an allegedly heretical and deviant Islamic organisation in Indonesia, ended up in a violent clash popularly known as the "Monas Incident" between pro-*sharia* supporters and Ahmadiyah Indonesia supporters under a coalition called AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith) in the vicinity of National Monument Tower (Monas) in Jakarta on the 1st of June 2008.

This tragedy shocked the Indonesian public and helped facilitate the issuance of a government joint ministerial decree in July 2008 ordering Ahmadiyah Indonesia to discontinue the dissemination of its alleged deviant teachings. While FUI was not satisfied with the decree that merely froze the activities of Ahmadiyah Indonesia, FUI's frequent mass protests against them, which culminated in the Monas Incident, helped pressure the government into partially accommodating FUI's aspirations. Another example is FUI's mass protests against the planned concert of the American pop diva Lady Gaga scheduled for June 2012 in Jakarta. Depicting the diva as 'immensely symbolic of pornography' and a 'Satan worshipper', FUI managed to pressure the authorities into not granting Lady Gaga a concert permit.

A study on FUI is important because, as mentioned earlier, while there have been many studies on Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia such as HTI, FPI, and MMI, there has been no scholarly study on FUI. In addition, unlike HTI, FPI, and MMI, FUI is not a single movement organisation. Rather, it is a coalition movement that consists of a number of Islamic revivalist movements. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of how FUI engages in a sustained series of collective actions and, at the same time, interacts with its member movements is needed so as to help us better

understand the current developments of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. The comprehensive understanding of how Islamic radicalism evolves in this world's most populous Muslim nation as well as the third largest democracy is vital in order for us to anticipate and formulate strategies on how to deal with potential negative impacts of the activism of these pro-*sharia* movements on the socio-political stability of Indonesia.

Some analysts have argued that political Islam in Indonesia is in decline (Fealy 2004: p. 117; Steele 2006; Eliraz 2007: p. 16). This is attributed, among other things, by the shifting political orientation of Indonesia's phenomenal Islamic party — PKS (the Prosperous Justice Party) — from endorsing a purist Islamic agenda such as the call for the implementation of *sharia* to a more moderate one that highlights the importance of building a clean government and combating corruption. However, while it is true that Islamic parties in Indonesia are gravitating towards the pragmatic centre, other actors of political Islam, as represented by Islamic revivalist movements such as FUI, remain committed to voicing their Islamic agenda that revolves around the complete implementation of *sharia*. In contrast to Islamic parties, these movements deliberately opt to serve as non-electoral movements: they do not contest seats in general elections. As a result, they do not need to alter their ideologies or to become moderate in order for them to maintain or boost the number of their voters. These movements have relentlessly engaged in a variety of non-electoral collective actions such as mass protests, public gatherings, media statements, petition drives, and so forth since the end of President Suharto's rule in 1998. Therefore, this study is important as it examines recent developments in Islamic revivalism in Indonesia, in

which FUI is one of the most active, in calling for the complete implementation of *sharia.* However, there has not been any scholarly study on this movement.

1.2. Research Scope

The objective of this thesis is to examine the socio-political dynamics of FUI. However, because FUI is a coalition movement that consists of a number of Islamic movements or organisations, this thesis will also analyse its member movements. Instead of covering all FUI member movements or organisations, this thesis only covers three FUI major member movements: HTI, FPI, and MMI. This is attributable to the fact that these movements are major Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia that actively engage in collective action. HTI is the founder of FUI and former FUI member movement; meanwhile, FPI is currently the largest FUI member movement in terms of the level of support based upon the quantity of followers, and MMI is a movement that is consistent for voicing the incorporation of *sharia* into Indonesian positive law. It is through a better understanding of these three FUI major member movements that we can appreciate the way in which FUI shapes its ideology and frames its rhetoric.

This thesis focuses on the activism of FUI from its emergence in 2005 to 2014. It will analyse a variety of FUI's collective actions during this period. The thesis also focuses on the two major aspects of FUI: 1) the way in which FUI emerges, mobilises its organisational resources, and frames its ideologies; and, 2) the way in which FUI interacts with and accommodates the aspirations of its three major member movements. These two aspects will be examined through the lens of social movement perspectives: political opportunity structures, resource mobilisation, and framing.

1.3. Research Methodology

1.3.1. *Research Design, Theoretical Framework, and Research Process*

This research falls under the general category of a qualitative study that stands in contrast to a quantitative study that is born out of a positivist paradigm, subscribing to a set of assumptions in which social phenomenon is measurable and quantifiable in reality. In this particular strand, objectivity takes precedent over subjectivity. In contrast to quantitative studies, a qualitative study adheres to an interpretive paradigm that views social phenomenon as a socially constructed reality and therefore adopts an inductive mode of inquiry rather than a deductive one and is theory generating rather than reliant on testing hypothesized theory (Merriam 1998; Creswell 2003). Case study is the closest type that represents the specific nature of this qualitative study. It is a type of study that intensively and holistically describes and analyses a single social unit that is contextually bounded. This research is accordingly regarded as particularistic in a sense that it focuses on a specific phenomenon. In this research, FUI is the object of the study.

The field research of this study was carried out between March 2013 and January 2014 in Indonesia. The field research was mainly located in Jakarta because the scope of FUI's activities is basically based in this capital city. However, the researcher also visited several other cities in the country such as Bogor, which is the home of some FUI leaders, and Yogyakarta, which is the headquarters of MMI. The participants of the research consisted of a number of leaders, senior members, and rank-and-file members of FUI as well as its major member movements: HTI, FPI, and

MMI. The role of these participants in this research is important because it is from them that the research gathered valuable primary data through interviews.

This research employs the perspectives of social movements: political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing in an attempt to examine the emergence, resources mobilisation, and framing strategies of FUI. This also serves as a tool of analysis in order to answer the research questions. The perspective of political opportunity structure is employed to explain societal and political factors that have contributed to the emergence of FUI. Most scholars agree that there are five factors or dimensions that are embodied in the perspective of the political opportunity structure, as follows: 1) the opening of access to power. This refers to the availability of opportunity for social movements to emerge and engage in various types of collective action within the political structure to which they are attached; 2) shifting alignments within the polity (McAdam 1996: 27; Tarrow 1996: 54; 1998: 76-80). This refers to the instability of political alignments, or electoral instability in a pluralist democracy system in which there is more than one centre of power; 3) emerging splits within elites. This refers to divisions among elites that help provide incentives to emerging movements; 4) the availability of influential allies. Influential allies help provide movements with incentives to take collective action, and; 5) the state's capacity or will to repress dissent. The degree of the state's capacity or will to repress dissent determines the opportunity of social movements to emerge and engage in collective action.

The perspective of mobilising structures is employed to analyse how FUI manages to mobilise organisational resources in order to sustain its social movement activities in Indonesia. The majority of social movement scholars have defined the

concept of mobilising structures as "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3; Tarrow 1998: 123). This concept is also referred to as a means of taking part in collective action, employing a variety of social networks such as family, neighbours, and friends. The perspective of mobilising structures principally underscores the necessity of societal support and the wide array of resources that must be mobilized, including but not limited to people, money, knowledge, frames, and skills. It also examines the linkages of social movements to other groups, the reliance of the movements on external support for success, and the tactics employed both by movements to advance their cause and by authorities to control or incorporate movements.

The perspective of framing is employed to examine how FUI expresses and articulates its ideologies to the Indonesian public through such means as rhetoric or symbols. In addition to the theoretical frameworks of the political opportunity structure and mobilising structures, social movements scholars have also examined the way in which individual participants of collective action portrayed themselves as an essential element of a social movement; how they appeal to the public and induce them not only to endorse their goals but also to join them and become adherents as well as constituents; and the way in which they articulate, express, and disseminate their frames. The term "framing" is employed to characterise this process of meaning construction. Frames represent "interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the 'world out there'". Such frames help movements to identify and define problems for action and at the

same time propose solutions to remedy the problems (McAdam 1996: 341; Wiktorowics 2004: 15).

The employment of the aforementioned theoretical framework constitutes the initial phase of this research by considering the fact that FUI, which is the object of this study, demonstrates many features that are also normally found in social movements in the West. Literature on this theoretical framework is reviewed in chapter two of this thesis. The second phase of the research process was data specification and collection. The types of data employed and how they were collected is presented in the next section. The third phase was data analysis. All data collected during the field research were organised, understood, and interpreted in a systematic way so as to help answer the research questions posed in this thesis.

1.3.2. *The Employment of Data Sources*

This research employs both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include the documents and periodicals such as bulletins, magazines, and tabloids of FUI and its major member movements: HTI, FPI, and MMI. These periodicals were available for the public at large, while some of the documents were not intended for the public. The majority of these movements have an official website on which the researcher can access valuable data or information on a variety of aspects of the movements such as press statements, thoughts, and events. In addition, interviews serve as another valuable primary data source. Fortunately, the researcher was able to gain access to some top leaders of these movements, which facilitated the collection of the primary data. In many occasions, useful data about these movements that were not available in their documents and periodicals could be gathered through interviews.

Further elaborations on the interview method employed in this research are discussed in the following section.

The researcher was able to gather most primary data regarding many aspects of these movements. However, unfortunately, there were some aspects of these movements whose primary data could not be collected, investigated, and verified. First, data about financial resources of these movements in general could not be gathered and verified. There were some reasons for this that will be discussed later, but the Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia are considered to be civil society organisations that are not obliged to submit financial reports to relevant Indonesian authorities serves as the primary reason for this. Second, some of these movements such as HTI and MMI have avoided mentioning the total number of their followers, which is most likely due to their desire to avoid any unwanted attention, particularly from the government. The others, such as FPI, albeit disclosing the number of its followers, have, in fact, difficulties in providing accurate estimate of the number of its followers due to the nature of the rule of FPI membership that is very loose and the poor capacity of its human resources to manage this data, hence the inability of the researcher to provide accurate data and analysis on the figures of these movements' members and followers.

The secondary data sources of this research mainly relied on the Indonesian media, particularly online media. This includes the online version of Indonesian news media such as *Kompas.com*, *Detik.com, etc.* Data sources from the media are also important to provide the researcher with a variety of these movements' public actions. Furthermore, they also helped the researcher to analyse how the media portrayed the images or activism of these movements. The other secondary data sources on Islamic

revivalist movements and the discourses of politics and Islam in Indonesia were available in the forms of books, journal articles, and conference papers. These data were valuable to complement and validate the primary data.

1.3.3. *Research Methods*

The following are several different methods employed to carry out this research:

Interviews served as a very important method to collect primary data in this research. Interviews were conducted in an unstructured style. This type of interview allowed questions based on an interviewee's responses and the interview to proceed in a friendly and non-threatening conversation. Interviews were conducted with a variety of people from FUI and its major member movements: HTI, FPI, and MMI; not only their leaders or senior members, but also rank-and-file members. This was done in order to complement and at the same time verify information received from various people within the same movement.

Participant Observation was employed to gain a deep understanding of various aspects of FUI along with its major member movements. This was done through actively participating in various FUI's activities and events such as public gatherings and mass demonstrations. By becoming a participant that closely observed its activities and events, the researcher was able to gain valuable information on the organisational culture, tradition, and decision-making process of FUI.

Document and Periodical Analysis was undertaken to review and evaluate a variety of documents and periodicals related to FUI and its major member movements. Some documents and periodicals that were analysed were for example, press

statements, magazines, tabloids, and bulletins. These type of sources were valuable not only in enabling the researcher to gain insights into various aspects of FUI, but also functioned as a means to complement and verify information received through interviews.

1.4. The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This introduces readers to the background of the emergence and dynamics of Islamic revivalist movements, particularly FUI, in Indonesia and presents primary and secondary research questions. It then discusses the significance of the research and the research methodology. It concludes with the structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2: Making Sense of Social Movements: Definitions and Characteristics

This chapter lays the foundation for the theoretical perspectives employed in this thesis. It discusses the definitions of what constitutes social movements and presents a widely- agreed definition of the term. The chapter then discusses the majority of views on the fact that the frontier between non-institutionalised politics such as social movements and institutionalised politics such as political parties has become increasingly blurred. It touches upon the posture of some Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia with regard to electoral participation in order to contribute to discussion on the aforementioned views. The chapter concludes with an overview

of trends in the studies of Islamic movements that have started to appreciate and employ the theories normally applied in research on Western social movements.

Chapter 3: The Changing Faces of Political Islam in Indonesia

This chapter discusses the notion of political Islam along with its manifestations that are specifically focused on the form of Islamic movements. It then examines the underlying features of such manifestations in the dynamic societal and political milieu of the country by focusing on the interaction, contestation and negotiation between different regimes, together with their policies, and non-state actors that represent political Islam, such as Islamic movements or organisations and Islamic political parties. In an attempt to map the current trends and gaps of Islamic activism in Indonesia, this chapter reviews literature on Islamic movements that emerged after the downfall of the Suharto regime.

Chapter 4: The Emergence and Mobilising Structures of FUI Major Member Movements

This chapter analyses the historical backgrounds and emergence of Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia that constitute FUI member movements. The chapter examines the way in which these movements exploit their human and organisational resources. It also discusses and compares various aspects of these movements' organisational structure and support-seeking strategies using the theoretical perspectives of mobilising structures.

Chapter 5: The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of FUI Major Member Movements

This chapter analyses the plurality of ideologies of FUI's member movements. It also examines how the ideologies of these movements are framed, that is, the way in which they articulate and accentuate their messages of protest that emanate from their ideologies as they are embroiled in a contestation of meaning in the socio-political milieu of contemporary Indonesia. It also clarifies the extent to which these ideologies and frames of protest vary from one movement to another.

Chapter 6: FUI's Emergence and Mobilising Structures

The chapter opens up with an analysis of the historical backgrounds of FUI. Employing the perspective of political opportunity structure, it accounts for a number of incentives that have contributed to the emergence of the movement against the backdrop of the burgeoning Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia. The chapter then examines the way in which FUI exploits its organisational resources in an effort to advance its pro-*sharia* agenda. It also explores the dynamic interaction among FUI's member movements so as to provide us with a better understanding of the patterns of both cooperation and conflict within contemporary Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia.

Chapter 7: FUI's Ideologies and Framing Strategies

This chapter examines both FUI's ideology and how it influences the way in which it develops its frames of protest. The chapter first analyses the ideological similarities and differences among FUI member movements. It then explains the social, political, and historical backgrounds that have contributed to such ideological

similarities and differences. Last, through the lens of framing perspectives such as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings developed by Benford and Snow (2000), the chapter also analyses FUI's framing strategies.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This concluding chapter reviews the emergence, resources mobilisation, and framing strategies of FUI and its major member movements: HTI, FPI, and MMI. The chapter answers the primary and secondary research questions posed in the Introduction chapter of this thesis and summarises the thesis' key findings. It also postulates on the prospects of the so-called pro-*sharia* movements such as FUI in Indonesia. It concludes with recommendations for future research on political Islam and Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia.

Chapter Two

Making Sense of Social Movements: Definitions and Characteristics

2.1. *Introduction*

As stated in the first chapter of this thesis, this study employs the theoretical perspectives of social movements as tools for analysis in an attempt to examine the emergence, mobilisation and framing strategies of FUI (Forum of Islamic Society) in the socio-political milieu of post-authoritarian Indonesia. Before we incorporate these perspectives into accounting for such strategies, it is vital at this juncture to provide an overview of theoretical discourses pertinent to the studies of social movements. We will first discuss the variety of definitions of what constitutes social movements and present commonly agreed elements that are embodied in the term. Social movements have been closely associated with non-institutionalised or informal collective action that utilise mass demonstrations in the streets as the most frequent repertoire of action to stage protests. However, the majority of views hold that the frontier between non-institutionalised and institutionalised politics, such as political parties, has become increasingly blurred and porous. It is for this reason that we will then discuss such views and touch upon the posture of some Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia with regard to electoral participation. Research in social movements in the West normally uses and develops a set of distinctive theories that

aim to better elucidate the movements' patterns, tactics, and dynamics. In contrast, studies of Islamic movements have largely ignored such a theoretical development and are fragmented into a diverse array of disciplines such as history, political science, sociology, and religious studies. Accordingly, we will conclude this chapter with an overview of trends in the studies of Islamic movements that have started to appreciate and employ the theories normally applied in research in Western social movements.

2.2. *Definitions of Social Movements*

The vast majority of studies in social movements are devoted to understanding a variety of collective actions that primarily occur in Western societies. They range from those commonly referred to as old social movements such as the workers' movement to new social movements such as the feminist, ecology, and anti-war movements, among others. While the advent of the former takes place in what many scholars have labelled as a social context of capital vis-à-vis labour heavily linked to orthodox Marxism that presupposes a strong working class, the latter is presumed to have had a social base dissimilar from that of the Marxist class model, which is too economistic. In other words, in providing a comprehensive analysis of new social movements, most social movement scholars have disregarded the classic deterministic element of capital-labour relations as the underlying basis of social movements since the post-industrial economy in 1960s. The hallmark of this new wave of collective action, in contrast with the workers' movement, is the fact that the working class has been rendered irrelevant to determine the social base, interests or ideology of the movement. It is also characterised by greater attention to social than economic

transformations (Buechler 1995: 453; Porta and Diani 1999: 11-13). Furthermore, Scott (1990: 16-17) specified three distinct features of new social movements. First, they place more emphasis on values and life-styles than on citizenship issues and political power. Second, they are situated within civil society. Finally, they strive to engender changes through imparting alternative values and life-styles.

Although there are differences in emphasis on the way in which scholars define what constitutes social movements, it is the type of post-industrial movements that have become their major interest. Complementing Scott's (1990) features of new social movements, other scholars have suggested some other descriptions of movements with a variety of viewpoints emanating from the typology of their network, structure, and strategies. For instance, the majority of scholars underscore such essential elements that characterise social movements as the ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in the forms of collective action such as mass demonstrations, public gatherings, petition drives, media statements, and so forth that typically employ extra-institutional means of influence (Gamson and Mayer 1996: 283; Tarrow 1998: 4; Tilly 2004: 7). Porta and Diani (1999: 13) argued that this type of definition, which highlights the magnitude of "sustainable collective challenges" as the sine qua non of every social movement, owes its development to those who have examined social movements chiefly as political processes. Similarly, Oberschall (1993: 2), albeit in a more general sense, held that social movements are massive collective efforts aimed at producing changes that affect the lives of many.

Other scholars pay more heed to the movements' aspect of organisation, networks, and rhetoric, suggesting that their success in advancing their goals is

contingent upon their ability to expand their networks, framing injustices and concomitantly exploiting them for the movements' sake. Social movements are thus networks of groups and organisations ready to stage mass protest for their cause and to interact with a diverse array of other actors in the public sphere through which they both forge alliances and confront opponents (Porta and Diani 1999: 16; Dieter 1996: 186). Becoming networks of groups with certain shared objectives to achieve, implies that, in order to succeed, there are a range of resources that social movements need to mobilise such as expanding networks, finding recruits and sources of financial support, and the like, to the maximum possible extent in such a way as to facilitate the attainment of these objectives. However, it is not sufficient to exclusively rely on their ability to attend to such a task of resource mobilisation. They also need to engage in what McCarthy, Smith, and Zald (1996: 291) referred to as "struggles over meaning" as they endeavour to shape public policy through framing social problems and injustices with a view to encouraging a wide array of audiences to affirm their cause and subsequently become involved in their series of collective action.

In sum, despite differences of weight on the way in which scholars define what constitutes new social movements, they all agree that these movements operate within the milieu of the post-industrial economy and that there are some features that are normally embodied in social movements, that is, the imperative existence of networks of groups with shared goals that constantly engage in collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents. In an attempt to study various aspects of social movements, scholars generally employ the following perspectives of social movements: political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing. Next, we will briefly discuss the main features of these three perspectives.

2.3. *Political Opportunity Structure*

Analysts employ a wide range of factors within the environment in which social movements operate that either encourage or discourage the movements to emerge and engage in collective action. Movements everywhere in the world do not operate in a vacuum. The ebb and flow of their activism is closely contingent on a number of dimensions and circumstances unique to a regime in an environment to which they belong. Tarrow (1996: 54) defined political opportunity structure as "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements". Tarrow's concept of political opportunity structure focuses not only on formal structures such as state institutions, but also conflict and alliance structures that provide the movements with incentives to mobilise internal resources in an effort to counter constraints external to the movements.

Analysts have attempted to specify various dimensions of political opportunity structure, but their concepts are, at best, more or less the same.[8] Tarrow (1998: 76-80) held that the dimensions consist of five elements as follows: 1) the opening of access to power. This refers to the availability of opportunity for social movements to emerge and engage in various types of collective action within the political structure to which they are attached; 2) shifting alignments within the polity — the instability of political alignments, which is tantamount to electoral instability in a pluralist

[8] For a table that describes the different dimensions of political opportunity structure among social movements scholars, see McAdam (1996: 27).

democracy system in which there is more than one centre of power; 3) emerging splits within elites — divisions among elites help provide incentives to emerging movements; 4) the availability of influential allies — influential allies help provide movements with incentives to take collective action, and; 5) the state's capacity or will to repress dissent — the degree of the state's capacity or will to repress dissent determines the opportunity of social movements to emerge and engage in collective action. Similarly, albeit minus Tarrow's third dimension: emerging splits within elites, McAdam (1996: 27) indicated four highly consensual dimensions of political opportunity structure: 1) the openness of the polity; 2) the instability of elite alignments; 3) the availability of important allies, and 4) the level of the state's repression.

Porta and Diani (1999: 195) argued that the various types of social movements' collective action such as mass protests, public gatherings, petition drives, media statements, and so forth, are highly political; the aforementioned consensual dimensions of the political opportunity structure are deeply entrenched in the political system of a country in which social movements operate. Thus, not only are the movements influenced by the political system, they also have the potential to affect it. As one example, it was not until the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 that Indonesia witnessed the euphoria of a plethora of social movements grasping the opportunity to come out into the open that would otherwise have been impossible. The movements simply lacked the opportunity to engage in any sort of collective action under an authoritarian state-controlled political atmosphere, particularly when their objectives posed perceived threats to the regime, which was characterised with its heavy reliance on the military to suppress dissent.

At that juncture, the first dimension of the political opportunity structure mentioned-above – the openness of the polity – did not exist and the fourth dimension – the level of the state's repression – was high. The second and third dimensions – the instability of elite alignments and the availability of influential elites – mattered little to the unfavourable Indonesia's socio-political climate at the time that had occasioned the impossibility of virtually all social movements to engage in protest activities. Although Porta and Diani (1999: 213) held that the lower the level of openness of the polity, the more vital the availability of institutional allies for securing access to power, this seems particularly pertinent to the majority of Western societies. Indonesia under the Suharto regime was in no way a country that fell under the category of a pluralist democracy in which there is normally more than one centre of power. The fact was that there was only one absolute centre of power, and even though the movements managed to forge alliances with certain disillusioned and disheartened influential elites, they could hardly engage in what Sydney Tarrow denoted "collective challenges" to the authorities.

While state institutions, from which the variable of access to power normally emanates, play an important role in the opening or closing of opportunities of social movements to emerge and immerse themselves in protest activities, movements also create opportunities. Their interaction with a large variety of institutions – both formal and informal – offers exemplars of the way in which movements engage in protest activities, which in turn produce opportunities for others as follows: 1) broadening the opportunities of the movements; 2) widening opportunities for others; 3) creating opportunities for opponents, and; 4) making opportunities for elites (Tarrow 1996: 60). For instance, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in 2005 MUI (Majelis Ulama

Indonesia or the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars), which is Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body, issued a *fatwa* (Islamic decrees) against Ahmadiyah Indonesia – an allegedly heretical and deviant Islamic organisation.[9] Such a *fatwa* was welcomed enthusiastically by virtually all Islamic revivalist movements in the country and consequently opened opportunities for them to stage massive and relentless mass protests against Ahmadiyah. However, these anti-Ahmadiyah movements also created opportunities for pro-Ahmadiyah movements to emerge. Amid mounting protests against Ahmadiyah, AKKBB formed and launched a pro-Ahmadiyah mass protest at the same time a network of Islamic revivalist groups staged an anti-Ahmadiyah protest in the National Monument, Jakarta in 1 June 2008.

Unfortunately, as the two opposing movements encountered each other, exchanges of provocative words became unavoidable and they ended up plunging themselves into a bloody clash that shocked the public and drew massive domestic and international attention.[10] This clash that is well-known as "the Monas Incident" subsequently created opportunities for state institutions to take action. Among others, the leader of FPI, Rizieq Shihab, was convicted of inducing his followers to attack AKKBB and was sentenced to one and half years in jail. Furthermore, the authorities, albeit unwittingly, had opened opportunities for an alliance reconfiguration of Islamic revivalist movements in the country. Knowing that such an incident had the potential

[9] As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ahmadiyah Indonesia is a branch of the international Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, originally established by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian Village, Punjab, India in 1889. Mainstream Muslims repudiate its religious conviction that Mirza is a promised Messiah. For details, see for example Valentine (2008). For a more detailed discussion of protest activities against Ahmadiyah Indonesia along with their implications, see Purwanto (2008), International Crisis Group Report (2008), Crouch (2009, 2011), and Takuo (2010).

[10] For details and implications of this incident, see for example Purwanto (2008) and Crouch (2009).

to damage its non-violent image it has carefully safeguarded since its emergence in 2001, HTI severed ties with FUI – a self-claimed umbrella forum of Islamic movements that largely owes its establishment to HTI. Since then, HTI, once lauded by other Islamic movements for its unconditional readiness to forge alliances with other Islamic movements, has now eschewed staging any kind of mass demonstration with its former allies, particularly FPI and FUI.

2.4. *Mobilising Structures*

While the dimension of the political opportunity structure is indispensable to the emergence and activism of social movements to engage in collective action, a favourable political opportunity for movements alone cannot translate their aspirations into sustained mass demonstrations in the streets and other related activities such as expanding networks, forging alliances, and confronting opponents without the ability to mobilise essential resources, however few and of whatever type, such as legitimacy, people, facilities and money (Tarrow 1998: 123). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996: 3) defined the concept of mobilising structures as "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action". In a more detailed manner, McCarthy (1996: 141) argued that the concept of mobilising structures is referred to as a means of taking part in collective action that employs a variety of social networks such as family, neighbours, and friends. McCarthy's definition of the concept mentioned above largely draws its inspiration from the previously well-known theoretical perspective of resource mobilisation, which McCarthy and Zald (1973: 1977) initially formulated. The underlying notion of the

resource mobilisation theory is that social movements serve as a driving force for social change chiefly through the social movements' organisations (SMOs) they spawn. To the more recent theoretical perspective of mobilising structures, the resource mobilisation equation of social movements with formal organisations is flawed on the grounds that grassroots settings such as work and neighborhood, in fact, play a critical role in facilitating and structuring collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 4; Porta and Diani 1999: 139).

In strengthening his arguments and demonstrating the flaw of equating social movements with formal organisations, Tarrow (1998: 123-124) distinguished three different aspects of movement organisation. First, movement organisation is defined as a "formal hierarchical organisation", which is the prevailing meaning of the term and defined by Zald and McCarthy (1987: 20) as "a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals". Second, it is defined as "the organisation of collective action at the point of contact with opponents". This type of organisation may include temporary assemblies of protesters, informal social networks, military-like cells, and so forth, which can be either managed by formal organisations, less formal organisations or coalitions of organisations, or by no one. In this sort of organisation, social networks at the grassroots level of society serve as its common sources of recruitment into social movements. The third type of organisation is referred to as "connective structures" that connect leaders and followers, centre and periphery, and different parts of a movement sector, which permits coordination and aggregation between movement organisations and allows movements to persist even when they lack any form of formal organisation. In reality,

Tarrow further argued that, more often than not, formal organisations poorly reflect the informal connective structures of a movement.

However, both the mobilising structures and the resource mobilisation theories principally underscore the necessity of societal support and the wide array of resources that must be mobilised, including but not limited to people, money, knowledge, frames, and skills. They also examine the linkages of social movements to other groups, the reliance of the movements on external support for success, and the tactics employed both by movements to advance their cause and by authorities to control or incorporate movements. These two theories owe their development more to the theories of political sociology and economics than to the social psychology of collective behavior, which posited that forms of social behaviour such as riots, unrest, and mass protests, are rooted in sufficient grievances and unrest in society.[11] McCarthy and Zald (1993: 40) coined the terms "adherents" and "constituents" to categorise people that provide social movements with resources. Adherents denote individuals and organisations that trust in the movements' principles and objectives, while constituents are those that provide the movements with resources. In order for the movements to succeed, not only do they need to convert non-adherents into adherents, they also have to encourage adherents to become constituents. To virtually all social movements that heavily depend on extra-parliamentary means to advance their goals, it is not uncommon that their existence largely owes to adherents and constituents. The movements will need adherents to stage any sort of protests mainly aimed at the

[11] For the detailed discussion of the theoretical perspective of collective behaviour, see Blumer (1951) and Turner and Killian (1957).

authorities, such as mass demonstrations in the streets, public gatherings, press statements, petition drives, etc. However, adherents alone are not enough. They also need financial resources from their constituents to ensure the continuity of their activities.

As one example, some of Islamic revivalist movements that Indonesia had, such as HTI, actually existed and operated clandestinely prior to the demise of the totalitarian Suharto regime in 1998. During their clandestine period, they managed to muster support from such informal networks as family, friends, and neighbours. Indeed, some of them, including HTI, recruited members and sympathisers through religious discussion circles they held in campuses. Upon the opening up of political opportunity that favoured them after the fall of the regime, they had already had essential resources at their disposal, that is, what McCarthy referred to as adherents and constituents mentioned above that were readily capable of helping the movements launch a sustained series of collective challenges to the Indonesian authorities, elites, and their opponents.

In addition to the capacity to muster support through the mobilisation of adherents and constituents, McCarthy and Zald (1987: 17-18) highlighted the significance of the so-called social movements 'entrepeneurs' that the movements should have to play a key role in stimulating protests and mobilising resources. Although virtually all Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia agree that the implementation of Islamic *sharia*, and to some extent, the establishment of an Islamic state, is of overriding importance, the features of their organisational structures are by no means the same as one another. Some movements, such as HTI, have exacting

organisational rules and a top-down hierarchical structure, but are not dependent upon certain charismatic figures that function as the minority entrepreneurs. This is not to say that there is no entrepreneur in HTI. Rather, all HTI members — regardless of whether they are leaders, senior or junior members — have had the responsibility to convert non-adherents into adherents. Others, such as FPI, have had less strict organisational rules than HTI. FPI is characterised by its strong reliance on its charismatic supreme leader, Rizieq Shihab, who plays an exceptionally important role in stimulating protests and mobilising resources. This is also the case for FUI. Upon the dismissal of Muhammad al-Khaththath from HTI in 2008, he focused on expanding the networks of FUI rather than his own new brand of movement called Hizbud Dakwah Islam or the Party of of Islamic Propagation (HDI), which in reality has considerable political platform similarities to HTI. Initially, Al-Khaththath expected that he would be able to induce a large number of HTI members to leave HTI and join HDI. However, the numbers of those that left HTI and joined HDI fell short of expectations; there were only a handful of them who voluntarily joined HDI — the approximate figure did not exceed 20 people. In both FUI and HDI, al-Khaththath, particularly since the Monas Incident in 2008, has become a central figure who serves as what has been coined above as the movement's entrepreneur whose primary tasks are to ensure the continuation of FUI's activism in the public sphere.

2.5. *Framing*

Social movements do not merely rely on favourable political opportunities and resources to mount protests. Indeed, to boost the political impacts of their action, movements need to develop frames through which the movements could not only

construct their core identity that marks them off from their opponents, but also transmit messages that will resonate across multiple layers of audiences and tap into the collective memory of the public. According to McAdam (1996: 341), attracting favourable media coverage and shaping public opinion are as crucial as mobilising resources, and whether or not such tasks succeed predominantly depends on the movements' ability to convey their various forms of what he referred to as "signifying work", as it is mostly reflected in the speeches, statements, and other ideological pronouncements of the movements' actors.

Since the 1980s, social movements' scholars have been paying attention to the ideational factors, culture, and meaning of movements. In addition to the theoretical frameworks of political opportunity structure and mobilising structures, they have also examined the way in which individual participants of collective action portrayed themselves as an essential element of a social movement; how they appeal to the public and induce them not only to endorse their goals but also to join them and become adherents as well as constituents; and the way in which they articulate, express, and disseminate their frames. The term "framing" is employed to characterise this process of meaning construction. Wiktorowics (2004: 15) held that frames represent "interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the 'world out there'". Such frames help movements to identify and define problems for action and at the same time propose solutions to remedy the problems (Zald 1996: 265).

Rooted theoretically in symbolic interactionism and contextual constructivism, Snow and his colleagues developed three core framing concepts to account for how

ideologies and symbols work in the service of social movements. First, movements seek to change socio-political conditions that are loaded with problems that need to be tackled. At this initial stage, movements constructed and developed what Benford and Snow called diagnostic framing that attends to the function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility. McAdam (1996: 110) referred to such a stage as "naming" grievances. Movements further connect these grievances with other grievances. Prognostic framing, the second core of the framing task, deals with the primary task of offering solutions to the problems, including planning a protest or attack along with tactics on how to execute the plan. The third framing, motivational framing, provides a rationale for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents. This task includes the formulation of an array of apt and powerful vocabularies that, when adopted and espoused by the adherents, will help sustain their participation in the various forms of the movements' protests (Benford and Snow 2000: 615-618).

The efficacy of the motivational framing is nevertheless contingent upon the ability of the movements' actors to construct the appropriate vocabularies mentioned above that have the capacity to resonate with potential participants. This sort of dimension is referred to as the framing resonance, and the frame that utilises identities, language, and cultural as well as religious symbols is typically more powerful in mobilising potential adherents and constituents. In order for the frame to have a high degree of resonance, it needs to be consistent and the articulators of this frame should also be credible. Moreover, collective action frames may differ from one movement to another depending on the extent to which they are relatively exclusive, rigid, and restricted or relatively inclusive and flexible in terms of the number of ideas

and topics they integrate and express. The relatively inclusive and flexible framing is thus referred to as "master frames", which include rights, injustice, environmental justice, culturally pluralist, and "return to democracy" frames, among others (Benford and Snow 2000).

Like social movements in the West driven by identity and cultural issues, Islamic movements all over in the world, too, are enmeshed in the struggles over meaning and values. The majority of Islamic movements have aspired to establish an Islamic state since the beginning of their history, as exemplified by such movements as the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928, Jamaat-e-Islami founded in Lahore in 1941, and Hizb ut-Tahrir founded in Jerusalem in 1953. They take on a variety of approaches to implementing such an aspiration: some advocate gradual and moderate steps, while others opt for rather confrontational and radical methods. However, despite this difference, their overall activities are gravitated towards mobilising and convincing people in the society in which they operate to endorse, internalise, and practice *sharia*, which is deemed as the one and only solution for a wide array of problems such as poverty, corruption, discrimination, and any other sorts of injustices. Unfortunately, in a modern nation-state in which secularism, which is antithetical to *sharia*,[12] has been a prevailing feature of its political system, their efforts to bring the *sharia* aspiration into play have invariably met with strong resistance from various state authorities. This is why they need to construct framing directed both at the state

[12] Islamic movements view *sharia* (Islamic laws) as a comprehensive set of values, principles, and regulations that govern all aspects of life including how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary world.

Sharia should therefore be adopted and practised by all Muslims, not only in their individual sphere, but also in the public sphere.

with a view to delegitimising it and at the bystander public with the aim of transforming them into adherents and constituents. Indeed, most of their struggles are carried out through society and cultural discourse rather than state institutions, and they maximise the utilisation of framing in such as way as to challenge dominant meaning produced by the state authorities and to craft networks of collective meaning to facilitate the implementation of their goals (Wiktorowics 2004: 16).

Islamic movements often blame the West along with their inherent values and practices for a variety of social and economic afflictions such as rising unemployment and commodities prices, soaring debt, the massive privatisation of national assets in the sector of oil and gas that is believed to have consequently led to the skyrocketing of petrol prices, the spread of pornography through their movies and media, and so forth. The ritual of blaming the West has inevitably become a salient trait of virtually all Islamic movements in the world stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, particularly those that seek to uproot the Western values and practices and to restore the increasingly deracinated *sharia*-based way of life that Muslims used to practice under the political model of the caliphate. Of course, such a ritual mostly takes place not in the West, but the blaming ritual is also directed at the national governments or authorities in which Islamic movements operate, which are heavily considered to be Western puppets. In fact, despite critiques of Huntington's (1996) "clash of civilization",[13] some Islamic movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir clearly attribute the

[13] See for example, Fox (2005).

aforementioned socio-economic ills to the inevitable and considerable differences between Islam and the Western civilisations.[14]

Such a blaming process falls under the category of diagnostic framing mentioned before, targeting the West, national authorities, and even other oppositional movements or organisations. Furthermore, similar to any social movements in the West, we can see the ubiquity of the utilisation of such master frames as social and economic injustice by Islamic revivalist movements in the Muslim world, and Indonesia is no exception. For instance, HTI represents the most organised and skilful Islamic revivalist movement that actively targets the authorities over a very broad spectrum of social, economic, political, and environmental problems arising in the country. Hardly any ill in Indonesia is missed from being diagnosed by HTI, and this is particularly understandable given the fact that the ultimate objective of this self-claimed international political party is to delegitimise the extant government in such a way as to facilitate the re-establishment of a transnational Islamic state — the caliphate — that is fully governed according to *sharia.* Mass demonstrations, like other Islamic movements everywhere, are the most common repertoire of HTI collective action, which concomitantly function as a prognostic framing or the next step after the diagnostic framing. Not only does this movement execute a plan to challenge the authorities for their incapability of coping with the perceived problems through mass protests, HTI also provides the public with the rationale behind the issues or problems it raises. As one example, a mass protest held by HTI against the government's decision to raise petrol prices was invariably accompanied with a set of reasons why

[14] See, for example, one of Hizb ut-Tahrir's books, Anonymous (2000).

such a policy was unjustifiable, striking a chord with the disenchanted populaces in the country.

HTI goes on to offer solutions, and it constantly offers *sharia* and the caliphate as an inextricable package of panacea for the problems it addresses. *Sharia* and the caliphate also function as the movement's catchphrase that is deeply associated with HTI and thus marks it off from other Islamic movements. While other Islamic revivalist movement in Indonesia such as MMI, JAT, and FPI also demand the application of *sharia*, HTI is the only movement that consistently calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate. Such a catchphrase is deliberately intended to serve as a motivational framing in a way that convinces the diverse audience of the compelling need for collective action to redress the multiplicity of ills and that sustains the commitment of its adherents.

2.6. *Social Movements and Electoral Participation*

Social movements' scholars have different opinions on the way in which they define what constitutes a social movement. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, to the proponents of the resource mobilisation theory, a social movement is viewed as a single formal organisation (McCarthy and Zald 1973: 1977). In contrast, later developments of social movements' theories have criticised the way a social movement is treated as a single formal organisation on the grounds that there are other settings such as the networks of friends, work, and neighbourhood that, indeed, play a more crucial role in facilitating and structuring collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 4; Tarrow 1998; Porta and Diani 1999: 139). Diani (1992:

13-15) made a helpful overview that will lead to a better understanding of differences between social movements and political organisations. According to him, social movements are often compared under the assumption that they all embody different styles of political organisation. He held that the primary difference between social movements and other political actors does not lie in the organisational characteristics or patterns of behaviour. However, as a matter of fact social movements are not considered to be organisations. Rather, as mentioned before, "they are networks of interaction between different actors that may either include formal organisations or not, depending on shifting circumstances". A social movement may be part of a formal organisation, but the two are not identical, as the latter reflects a more structured organisational feature. However, there are in fact many scholars in the field that use social movements to refer to both networks of interaction and specific organisations such as environmental organisations, citizens' rights groups, and religious sects (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1998), which has led to analytical confusion.

In essence, Dani's definition of social movements is similar to the advocates of the theoretical perspective of mobilising structures that emerged as a critique of resource mobilisation: they are networks of interaction among an array of actors and are thus not a single formal organisation. Such an overarching definition would consequently include bureaucratic interest groups or even political parties. However, Dani did not mean to suggest that his definition is such a broad theoretical category that includes several types of organisations such as interest and community groups as well as political parties. Rather, he suggested that under certain and specific conditions some political parties may feel that they are part of a movement and be recognised as such by other actors in the movement and by the general public, despite it being

largely restricted to political parties originated by social movements such as the Labour and the Green Parties. Althiugh, one may hold that political parties actually execute specific tasks at the level of interest participation and in this respect are different from social movements, Dani maintained that whether or not social movements decide to participate in elections mostly depends on several factors such as the availability of political opportunities, tactical and ideological considerations, and their connections with other actors in the movement. When movements decide to participate in elections, they play a different role in two different systems of action: the social movement and political party systems.

The recent development of arguments revolving around this very issue, however, favours the one that is in line with Dani's aforementioned view. For instance, Goldstone (2003: 2) argued that the frontier between institutionalised and non-institutionalised politics is at best blurred and porous, as "state institutions and political parties are interpenetrated by social movements, often developing out of movements, in response to movements, or in close association with movements". Likewise, Tarrow coined the term 'contentious politics' to denote "episodic and public collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects". He challenges any rigid boundary between institutionalised and non-institutionalised politics despite the fact that the boundary is hard to delineate precisely. Drawing the example of what the international media portrayed as 'an extra-institutional removal' of Philippine President Joseph Estrada in 2001, Tarrow held that street demonstrations could not have paved the way for Estrada's resignation had there been no extra-legal deals within the Filipino elite who actually engineered the entire crisis (Tarrow 2009: 435-439).

While it is held that a social movement is the networks of interaction and thus not a single organisation, as mentioned before, there are many influential scholars in the field that also employ the term social movement to refer to a single organisation. This is also the case for the studies of Islamic movements all over the Muslim world that refer to both the networks of interaction and formal organisations.[15] In Indonesia, although demands for the implementation of *sharia* have served as the primary goal of virtually all Islamic revivalist groups since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, each of these groups qualifies as a formal organisation with a set of distinct ideology and organisational attributes and at the same time constitutes networks of interaction. Diani is right when arguing that whether or not these Islamic movements decide to participate in elections is closely contingent upon a number of factors such as the availability of favourable political opportunities, ideology, and links with other actors of movements. For example, in Egypt, the long-suppressed Muslim Brotherhood finally found an incentive to transform into the Freedom and Justice Party (FJPP) and won elections after the departure of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. However, alas, the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood were again repressed under the Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi's interim government that overthrew the then ruling President Muhammad Mursi from the FJP in a coup in 2012. In contrast, despite considerable political favourable political opportunities, for a variety of considerations, all Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia have so far chosen to engage in non-institutionalised collective action since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998.

[15] Despite major agreements among social movements' scholars that a social movement is not a single formal organisation; the vast majority of literature on Islamic movements employ the term "movement" to denote both a social movement and a single organisation. Among other studies of Islamic movements, see for example Ali and Wenner (1982), Shadid (1988), Cornell (2005), Robinson (2004), Nurdin (2005), Osman (2010).

In other words, while the majority of them do not refrain from establishing communication and working together with state institutions and political parties in such areas as humanitarian activities, they do not contest elections. For instance, although Hizb ut-Tahrir was a self-claimed international political party seeking to re-establish the caliphate and contested elections in Jerusalem in its early history in Jordan in 1950s, it has deliberately positioned itself as a non-parliamentary movement and avoided electoral participation since these elections. Such a non-electoral posture applies to all Hizb ut-Tahrir branches all over the world, including its Indonesian branch of HTI. We will elaborate the reasons for this posture in detail later, but ideological considerations are the most prevailing factor in HTI's decision to avoid electoral participation. Similarly, FPI as one of the largest Islamic revivalist movements in the country once expressed its intention to contest elections, but it eventually decided to renounce this aspiration for a number of reasons to be discussed later and continue to work in the non-institutionalised path. In sum, the majority of social movements' scholars concur that the boundary between institutionalised organisations such as political parties and non-institutionalised ones such as social movements is porous as has been discussed above. The fact that social movements decide to contest elections does not necessarily mean that they strip themselves of their social movement status. Rather, as Diani argued above, they will engage in two systems of action at the same time: social movements and political party systems. Likewise, all Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia have so far decided to exclusively engage in non-parliamentary or non-institutionalised collective action. However, once they decide to contest elections in the future and transform into political parties, they could still play a role in the social movement system of action.

2.7. *Trends in Incorporating Social Movements' Theories into the Studies of Islamic Movements*

Social movements' theories have predominantly been employed to analyse a variety of new social movements in the West such as movements for civil rights that peaked in the 1960s, as well as environmental, feminist, anti-war, and anti-nuclear weapon movements. Despite considerable similarities in the way in which these movements and Islamic movements engage in collective action in terms of the utilisation of action repertoires and mobilisation as well as framing strategies, the enormous amount of literature on Islamic movements remains isolated from the theoretical perspectives of social movements. Indeed, they are typically descriptive analyses of ideology, structure, objectives, and histories of various Islamic movements, that disregard the theoretical developments of research in social movements. Wiktorowicz (2004: 3-4) considered the lack of a shared research agenda among the various disciplines of research in Islamic movements to be an additional barrier to theory building in the study of Islamic movement. For instance, historians expound the histories of either Islamic actors or movements; political scientists examine how Islam along with its manifestations impact the state and politics; sociologists analyse demographic roots of Islamic recruits, and; religious studies scholars are concerned with ideologies that motivate Islamic actors and shape the political platform of their movements.

Wiktorowicz further argued that while such disciplinary fragmentation has resulted in a better understanding of each particular element of Islamic movements,

it is unprepared for developing frameworks that elucidate how all these elements interact and influence the patterns of Islamic movements. In addition, he suggested that the incorporation of developments in social movements' research into the studies of Islamic activism could yield theoretical influence on a wide array of issues pertinent to Islamic activism. This view is in line with, among others, Sutton and Vertigans (2006) who found that the extent to which Islamic activism, which is manifested in the form of fundamentalist or terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, organises themselves bears a considerable resemblance to the large majority of Western and secular new social movements, and the assimilation of key new social movements elements into the analysis tools of general social movements' such as Islamic movements is therefore feasible. Wictorowicz's edited book (2004) on a social movement theory approach that he referred to as Islamic activism[16] was a highly appreciated endeavour to initiate the social movements' theoretical approaches. These have been most commonly applied to a plethora of Western social movements, and to explaining the patterns of various manifestations and patterns of Islamic activism. He brought a number of scholars that have been researching the various elements of Islamic activism ranging from HAMAS in Palestine (Robinson 2004) to the Bazaar movement in Iran (Smith 2004) to account for these elements utilising the theoretical perspectives of social movements. Although the samples of Islamic activism in the

[16] The term "Islamic activism" used in this book is meant to be as broad as possible, accommodating the variety of collective action that emerges under the name of Islam such as propagation movements, terrorist groups, political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts. See Wiktorowicz (2004: 2). For the other definition of the term, see Bayat (2005: 893-894). In his definition of Islamic activism, Bayat highlights the characteristic of extra-ordinary or extra usual practices that the activism should demonstrate, whether it is performed collectively or individually, institutionally or informally in order to bring about social change.

book are geographically limited to the Middle East and do not cover Southeast Asian Muslim countries, the book clearly offers new and valuable insights into how the studies of Islamic movements are approached and tied to the widely employed theoretical frameworks of social movements.

The book has served as a pioneering model for the following studies of Islamic movements that utilise the theoretical perspectives of social movements as a tool for analysis. While some studies present the combination of several social movements' perspectives, others focus on one particular perspective. For example, drawing on an example of an Islamic movement in Kyrgiztan, Karagiannis (2005) examined the transnational Islamic movement Hizb ut-Tahrir through the lens of a political opportunity structure to explain societal and political variables that helped facilitate the movement's emergence; resources mobilisation to analyse the variety of the movement's resources such as adherents, supporters, and money; and structural-functional theories to suggest that the movement's rise was due to economic and political strains in the country. Similarly, Robinson (2004: 112-142), Salim (2006), and Munabari (2010) utilised the common three perspectives of social movements — political opportunity structures, mobilising structures, and framing — to analyse HAMAS as a social movement and the Indonesian branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI) respectively. Other studies such as Clark (2004), Karagiannis (2009), Osman (2010), and Alimi (2014) examined a variety of Islamic activism in the Muslim world through the lens of one particular perspective. Clark analysed the networks of Islamic social institutions in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen; Karagiannis accounted for the framing strategy of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah; Nawab described the mobilisation strategy

of HTI, and; Alimi studied the patterns of action repertoire of a local Islamic movement in South Sulawesi, Indonesia.

2.8. *Summary*

We have discussed in this chapter the variety of definitions of social movements and suggested highly consensual features of them: social movements operate within the milieu of the post-industrial economy and consist of networks of groups with shared goals that constantly engage in collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents. The vast majority of literatures of social movements commonly employ the three theoretical perspectives of political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing to analyse the movements' emergence and mobilisation as well as framing strategies. We have also sketched arguments as to whether social movements differ from other political organisations such as political parties. The majority of the scholars, however, hold that the boundary between institutionalised or informal and non-institutionalised or formal organisations is at best porous and social movements can therefore play two different roles at the same time within both social movements and political party systems. We concluded the chapter by showing trends in the studies of Islamic movements where they have begun to incorporate the commonly utilised theoretical perspectives of social movements in the West over the last decade into explaining their various elements such as organisational patterns and strategies.

Chapter Three

The Changing Faces of Political Islam in Indonesia

3.1. *Introduction*

The collapse of the dictatorial regime of President Suharto in 1998 significantly altered the societal and political landscape of Indonesia, opening up political opportunity to express various sorts of political aspiration in ways that would have been previously inconceivable. Among others, the proliferation of ubiquitous manifestations of the seemingly inexorable march of political Islam serves as the hallmark of post-Suharto 'reformasi' order. However, in order to appreciate the extent to which these manifestations have shaped the shifting contours of the landscape, it is essential that we define what constitutes political Islam and concomitantly describe and analyse its dynamics and manifestations in the country before, during, and after the Suharto regime (1967-1998).

This chapter opens with a discussion on the notion of political Islam along with its manifestations that are specifically focused in the form of Islamic movements. It then examines the underlying features of such manifestations in the dynamic societal and political milieu of the country by focusing on the interaction, contestation and negotiation between different regimes together with their policies and non-state actors that represent political Islam such as Islamic movements or organisations and Islamic political parties. Lastly, in an attempt to map the current trends and gaps of Islamic

activism in Indonesia and to position my research within this field, this chapter reviews the literature on Islamic movements that have emerged since the downfall of the Suharto regime.

3.2. *Defining the Concept of Political Islam*

Many scholars in Islamic studies hold that the term 'political Islam', which is often used interchangeably with 'Islamism', principally refers to the instrumentalisation of Islam as much as a theological reference to a political ideology upon which politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary world. For instance, Roy (1994: 36; 2004: 58) and Boubeker and Roy (2012: 1) argue that there are such inherent elements as 'political action' and 'mobilisation' that are incorporated in this very term. This argument bears a considerable resemblance to that of Ayoob (2004; 2011: 2), who highlights the element of 'political objectives' that are pursued by Muslims, Islamic groups and organisations. Similarly, albeit in a more detailed fashion, Hefner (2012: 105-106) holds that Islamism is based upon three core beliefs: first, that "Islam is a total system (*al nizam al Islami*)," and a comprehensive transformation of state and society is therefore the quintessential requirement of this first principle; second, that this transformation must strictly adhere to Islamic *sharia*; and third, that "government legislation must be subject to some measure of authorisation" of Muslim scholars.

All of these arguments concur that, as far as this term is concerned, it is not Islam as a theological reference, which regulates such religious injunctions as daily prayers, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca and the likes, that matters. Rather, in an era in which the preponderance of Muslims are living in countries that are increasingly confronted with frustrating societal, economic and political predicaments, it is Islam

as a political ideology, which also provides its adherents with a set of rules and principles on how to attend to the affairs of their worldly life that belong to the public instead of private sphere, that has become a powerful driving force in remedying all these problems. Hassan (2002: 224) elaborated on two types of factors, domestic and global, that drive the tendency of many Muslims in the Muslim world to turn to Islam as the one and only solution. While the domestic factors primarily deal with the aforementioned predicaments, the global factors, "the hegemonic cultural patterns of the West", appear to have fomented widespread and enduring resistance in many parts of the Muslim world. Regardless of the actors of political Islam, i.e. Islamic political parties or Islamic social movement organisations, the 'political action', 'mobilisation' and 'political objectives' mentioned above are chiefly oriented towards the implementation of *sharia* and, to some extent, the establishment of the caliphate or Islamic state (Esposito and Voll 2001: 39).

As Hassan (2002: 224) pointed out above, it is the perception of Western cultural hegemony that appears to have served as the main culprit of the widespread and enduring resistance in increasingly disillusioned and disheartened Muslim populations, which once bore the signature of superior civilisation. Many believe that the emergence of the oldest Islamic movements in the modern era such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party) in pre-partition India and Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) in Jerusalem is an inevitable consequence of the perceived negative impacts of Western colonialism in the Muslim world in conjunction with the weakening and defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the 20th century — the representation of a uniting and powerful symbol of Islamic civilisation and political entity. Striving to address both the domestic and global factors that are

believed to have played a part in the decline of the Muslim world vis-à-vis the West, they extol the virtues of Islam and seek to make it the only solution (*Islam huwa al hall*) to these problems.

Muslim Brotherhood is the earliest and one of the largest Islamic movements in the world founded by a charismatic preacher Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. With a view to making *sharia* the sole basis for managing the affairs of state and society, this pan-Islamic movement immediately gained traction in most parts of the Arab world despite the fact it, more often than not, suffered prolonged repression and persecution from strident authoritarian Arab regimes.[17] In Jerusalem, a Muslim scholar, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, graduated from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, established an international Islamic movement called Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) in 1953. In spite of its conviction that the implementation of *sharia* is of paramount importance, unlike Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut-Tahrir underscores the significance of re-establishing the transnational caliphate, which came to an end when the Ottoman Empire was officially abolished on 3 March 1924, as a means to ensure the utter application of *sharia* in the affairs of state and society.[18] HT is banned in most of the Arab world and some other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey, and in countries where the movement is strictly proscribed, many of its members were incarcerated and even tortured for their harsh criticism and alleged coup plot against the regimes. However, the movement enjoys the freedom to operate

[17] For detailed accounts of Muslim Brotherhood, see for example Husaini (1956) and Mitchell (1969).

[18] For comprehensive works of Hizb al-Tahrir and its founder, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, see Farouki (1996), Cohen (1982), Commins (1991), and Osman (2012).

in some countries where the degree of political openness is considered high, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark and Indonesia.

In pre-partition India, a Muslim thinker, Abu Ala Maududi, founded Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Party) in Lahore in 1941 with the objective of establishing an Islamic state that is governed by *sharia.* Although Maududi lived in Pakistan and developed his movement there after the partition of India in 1947, his ideological contribution on the importance of establishing a truly Islamic state reverberated through the entire sub-Indian continent, as evidenced by the autonomous existence of Jamaat-e-Islami in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.[19] Of course, all these movements do not share exactly the same ideological features and methods of struggle to attain their religio-political goals. Some of them advocate a gradual approach to implementing *sharia* that should start from the smallest unit of society, that is, the family, and over time show their readiness to contest general elections once the political opportunity swings in their favour. Others believe that the re-establishment of the transnational caliphate takes precedence over such a gradual approach and eschew participation in electoral politics. Nevertheless, all of them agree that in an attempt to remedy increasingly intricate societal, economic and political conundrums confronting the Muslim world today, Islam as much a religion as a political ideology must be made the one and only solution, and it is through political action that such an ardent aspiration is pursued.

[19] For details of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic thoughts of Abu Ala Maududi, see for example Nasr (1994; 1996).

3.3. *The Face of Political Islam before Suharto's Era*

Islamic movements in Indonesia as much as social movement organisations everywhere in the world do not operate in a vacuum. The ebb and flow of their activism and the dynamics of their methods of struggle are closely contingent upon the degree of political openness and circumstances unique to a regime in an environment to which they are attached (McAdam 1996: 27; Tarrow 1996: 54, 1998: 4; Porta and Diani 1999: 207; Ayoob 2004: 1). Needless to say, in the pre-independence Indonesia under the Dutch colonial government[20] and throughout the short-lived Japanese colonial government (1942-1945), all of which were characterised by the high level of tendency towards suppression, the political opportunity of any mass-based organisation struggling for independence to engage in practical politics was strictly circumscribed, if not unavailable. Unlike manifestations of political Islam in the form of long-established Islamic movements that primarily seek to implement *sharia* and establish an Islamic state through political action in a number of Muslim countries mentioned above, at least from the pre-independence period to the period before the parliamentary democracy system in 1950-1959, Islamic manifestations in Indonesia were mostly channelled through apolitical means such as social and education.

[20] The Dutch colonial government had ruled over territories that have now become the Republic of Indonesia from the 17th century to 1942. At the height of its power, the Japanese Empire captured much of Asia and forced the Dutch to surrender unconditionally in 1942. Following the Japanese defeat in the World War II in 1945, Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence on 17 August 1945. However, it was not until 27 December 1949 that the independence was formally recognised by the international community. For the modern history of Indonesia, see for example, Ricklefs (1981) and Cribb and Brown (1995).

Among other Islamic movements at the time, Muhammadiyah (the followers of Prophet Muhammad) and Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of Muslim Scholars) deserve close attention, for since the very beginning of the 20th century they have been heralded as influential moderate Islamic movements in the country whose main activities are centred on social, religion and education. Muhammadiyah was founded by a reformist thinker, Ahmad Dahlan, in 1912 with the underlying aim of purifying Islamic practices particularly in Java Island, many of which were at the time believed to have syncretised with Hindu-Buddhist traditions, through establishing schools, clinics and hospitals. It promotes *ijtihad* — the interpretation of Islamic law through personal effort according to the Quran and Hadith (the narration of Prophet Muhammad) independent from any school of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), as opposed to *taqlid* — accepting traditional interpretations of Islamic law propounded by *ulama* (Muslim scholars) without necessarily examining the scriptural basis or reasoning of these interpretations.[21]

Opposing the modern and reformist posture of Muhammadiyah that particularly rejects pre-Islamic Javanese traditions, the charismatic head of an Islamic traditional school in East Java, Hasyim Asyari, founded Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, which also focused its activities on social, religious and education services.[22] During the pre-independence era, the way Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama accentuated their nationalistic fervour against the Dutch and Japanese colonial governments was channelled more into a cultural approach, that is, education rather than any sort of

[21] For details on Muhammadiyah, see for example Peacock (1978) and Nakamura (1985).

[22] For details on Nahdlatul Ulama, see for example Fealy and Barton (1996) and Bush (2009).

practical politics. However, there was a brief period of time following the formal recognition of Indonesia's independence when Nahdlatul Ulama gravitated toward practical politics. It contested the 1955 elections after severing ties from the biggest Islamic party at the time, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims Association),[23] and while it never transformed into a political party, Muhammadiyah constituted one of the major components of Masyumi.

Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama's focus on apolitical social and education activities is nevertheless a deliberate strategy that is not impervious to the suppressive nature of the pre-independence's political environment. Depending on political circumstances, such an apolitical strategy is not immutable: it might undergo revision as the movements make adjustments to its methods of struggle in the changing dynamics of the political environment to which they belong. Indeed, following the recognition of Indonesia's independence at the end of 1949 and adoption of the system of a parliamentary democracy in the period between 1950 and 1959, Indonesia witnessed a shift of methods of struggle on the part of mass-based Islamic organisations, during which Masyumi saw a favourable political opportunity to transform itself into a political party whose stated primary goal was to uphold the sovereignty of both the Republic of Indonesia and Islam.

[23] Masyumi was initially established by the Japanese colonial government in 1943 in an attempt to subdue Islamic movements, which consisted of four major Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyan, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan Islam (The Unity of Islam) and Persatuan Umat Islam (The Unity of Islamic Community). Following the Indonesian declaration of independence, it proclaimed itself as a political party in 1945, consolidating its statute and structure through the first Congress of Islamic Community held in Yogyakarta city on 7-8 November 1945. For details of Masyumi's statute, ideologies and programs, see Anonymous (1953). For the legacy of Masyumi in contemporary Indonesia, see Fealy and Platzdasch (2005).

In other words, the party sought to make Islam the guiding principles in the affairs of state and society, and as such, strove to incorporate *Piagam Jakarta*, which refers to the phrase of "with an obligation to follow Islamic *sharia* for its adherents", into the official philosophical foundation of the state of Indonesia, *Pancasila*.[24] Masyumi was nevertheless short-lived and its *Piagam Jakarta* aspiration was, alas, to no avail, as Sukarno — the first Indonesia's President (1945-1966) — banned the party in 1960 for its alleged involvement in the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) rebellions[25] and drove the nascent country into an authoritarian atmosphere under his new "guided democracy" policy.[26]

Apart from the PRRI, early Indonesia's post-colonial history also witnessed a bitter and protracted war waged by the Darul Islam rebellion against the Republic of Indonesia between 1949 and 1962. The rebellion was commanded by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo, one of the founders of Masyumi party as well as its representative for West Java. Even though Kartosoewirjo, like other leaders of the

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[24] *Pancasila* literally means five principles. These five principles are as follows: (1) belief in one God; (2) just and civilised humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; (5) social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

[25] PRRI was a rebel movement led by military leaders in Sumatera. It was declared in February 1958 and primarily due to inter-factional conflicts between leaders of the newly formed Indonesian Army, subsequently demanded the implementation of local autonomy in all over Indonesia. This movement was nevertheless short-lived, as the central government in Jakarta managed to regain control of the rebel areas shortly after its declaration. For details, see for example, Doeppers (1958) and Leirissa (1991).

[26] Due to a protracted political stalemate between political parties in the aftermath of the 1955 elections to formulate a new constitution and for political stability reasons, Sukarno dissolved the Parliament in July 1959 and called for the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution. For details, see for example, Lev (1966).

Masyumi party, yearned for the realisation of Islam as a basic ideology of the Republic of Indonesia, it was not until the Renville Agreement in 1948, which ceded West Java to the Ducth, that provided him with the impetus to resorting to the insurgency (Temby 2010: 4). Kartosoewirjo set up TII (Tentara Islam Indonesia or the Indonesian Islamic Army) based upon the paramilitary units of the Masyumi party, known as the *Hizbullah* (the party of God) and *Sabilillah* (in the cause of God). In early 1948, the TII consisted of about 4,000 men on which the Darul Islam rebellion primarily relied to launch guerrilla warfare against both the Dutch and the Indonesian armies. Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the establishment of NII (Negara Islam Indonesia or the Islamic State of Indonesia) on 7 August 1949 and made himself the head (*Imam*) of the NII (Soebardi 1983: 120).

The Darul Islam rebellion also prompted a number of other insurgencies, all of which pledged to carry out guerrilla warfare against the Indonesian army under the co-ordination of Kartosoewirjo, for instance, in Aceh led by Daud Deureuh and in South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar. The Darul Islam rebellion was finally defeated when it surrendered to the Indonesian army in the mountains of Geber, Garut, West Java in 1962. As a result, Kartosoewirjo, together with tens of his trusted men, were captured. This was followed by a mass surrender of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic army in other parts of West Java. The execution of Kartosoewirjo and his accomplices on 12 September 1962 marked the end of the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java (Seobardi 1983: 132). However, Kartosoewirjo's legacy and aspirations to the Islamic state of Indonesia never ceased. It is only natural that Kartosoewirjo's followers and sympathisers continued to extol him and his struggles. Yet, the aspiration for an Islamic state had struck a chord with not only Katosoewirjo's followers and sympathisers, but also

Masyumi's members and other Muslims at the time who were disenchanted by the dropping of the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam* Jakarta)[27] from the Indonesian Constitution 1945. Some of them thus opted to carry on the spirit and ideology that Kartosoewirjo had bequeathed. Under the repressive Suharto regime, albeit clandestinely, they attempted to find recruits and disseminate that belief that an Islamic state ought to be established in Indonesia. The evolution of the Kartosoewirjo's Darul Islam will be briefly discussed in the end of the next section.

3.4. *The Face of Political Islam during Suharto's Era*

The ascension of Suharto to power in 1967 signified the commencement of a new order that was typified by its contrast to the previous regime with regard to economic development policy: while the latter demonstrated its staunch anti-capitalist and anti-foreign investment posture, the former embarked upon a model favouring market-driven economic growth reinforced by massive foreign investment. However, this development agenda came at a price, for in an attempt to ensure the success of its development agenda, under the pretext of maintaining stability, the Suharto regime took a range of draconian measures primarily oriented towards emasculating political

[27] Jakarta Charter refers to the agreement among members of a committee of Indonesian Founding Fathers on the final draft of Indonesia's basic ideology in June 1945 after a long process of compromise. The contents of this draft were later declared to be the Indonesia's state ideology: *Pancasila.* However, the first article of this state ideology initially contained the following sentence: "with an obligation to follow *sharia* for its adherents", which was later the subject of objections by non-Muslims. This sentence was eventually deleted as a result of this objection and has been excluded from *Pancasila.* For discussions of this issue, see for example, Noer (1987); Ismail (1999); Romli (2006).

parties and political Islam, engineering elections and utilising the military's coercive force to maintain the status quo.

In 1975, under the slogan "for the good of political stability", the regime took a measure to emasculate and curtail political parties. The regime founded a state-backed party — Golkar (Golongan Karya or Functional Groups), while Islamic parties[28] were merged into a brand-new Islamic party PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) and other parties representing nationalist-secular and non-Islamic elements[29] were fused into PDI (Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party) (Karim 1983; Effendy 2003). This measure consequently locked out Nahdlatul Ulama's opportunity to further engage in practical politics and forced it to re-assume its initial role in the areas of social, religion and education. Nevertheless, although Nahdlatul Ulama as an institution was prevented from participating in electoral politics as a result of such a measure, it did not prevent Nahdlatul Ulama's members and other members of Islamic mass-based organisations including Muhammadiyah from becoming supporters and cadres of the PPP.

Owing to the unfailing support from the controlled state bureaucracies and armed forces, the emasculation of political parties was deliberately taken by the regime with a view to curbing unnecessary political tensions that — to the detriment of political freedom — would otherwise have posed a threat to the so-called "political

[28] Islamic parties that contested 1971 elections were PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Union Party), Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia or Indonesian Muslims Party), Nahdlatul Ulama and Perti (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah or Islamic Education Movement).

[29] Nationalist and non-Islamic parties contesting the 1971 elections were for example (Partai Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian National Party), Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia or Indonesian Christian Party) and Partai Katolik (Catholic Party).

stability" doctrine that was essential for the regime's development agenda. Worse still, in an effort to thwart the re-emergence and manifestation of various forms of political Islam following the Iranian Revolution, particularly the aspiration for an Islamic state, in 1985 the regime introduced a regulation that imposed the adoption of *Pancasila* as the one and only ideology of the overall political parties and mass organisations.[30] Consequently, PPP as the only Islamic party was compelled not only to change Islam as its basic ideology to *Pancasila*, but also to replace its religiously-powerful *Ka'bah*[31] symbol with a much less potent image, that is, a star. Such a tough policy sparked polarised responses from Islamic elements. Some promptly accepted the imposition, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, some felt a disinclination to the policy before finally agreing to comply, such as Muhammadiyah, while some others remained opposed to it, such as PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Students) (Ismail 1999).

Under a strictly controlled political environment such as this, the extent to which Islamic elements such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama were able to survive and translate their goals was closely linked to their ability to adapt in such an increasingly inauspicious political environment. It is against this backdrop that throughout the course of the Suharto regime, these two largest Islamic organisations revisited their methods of struggle, and instead of engaging in practical politics through either participating in electoral politics or formally establishing political affiliation to a certain political party as they did shortly after the recognition of

[30] The imposition of *Pancasila* as the one and only ideology for political parties and mass organisations was enforced through law number 3 year 1985 and law number 8 year 1985 respectively.

[31] *Ka'bah* is a cuboid building and the most sacred site that is located inside al-Haram Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia to which Muslims throughout the world direct their face during prayers.

Indonesia's independence, they chose to devote all their attention and resources to serving their nation in the areas of social and education. To date, these non-state organisations have established thousands of both modern and traditional schools,[32] universities, hospitals and orphanages that are scattered throughout the country. Many Indonesian observers strongly believe that, particularly through education, these organisations have played a valuable role in sowing the seeds of civil society, promoting and nurturing the moderate Islamic values of religious tolerance, inclusiveness and pluralism.

It is this sort of culture and tradition that has shaped the moderate and tolerant feature of Islam in Indonesia, which challenges the stereotypes of Islam as antagonistic to the principles of civil society and democracy embodied in a modern nation-state (Hefner 1997: 23; 2005: 296; Eliraz 2004: 90). Hefner (2000) suggested that Islam and democratisation are indeed compatible and coined the term "civil Islam" to denote the characteristics of Islam attached to the societal landscape of Indonesia that has long nurtured rich precedents for tolerance and civility, which is attributable to the profound commitment of civil organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama along with their leaders to promoting moderate and tolerant Islam through civic and educational activities. For the most part, the prevailing feature of the curriculum of the thousands of schools run by these two organisations is far from being considered radical by any means: it is designed and oriented toward

[32] Whereas schools established by Muhammadiyah are mostly considered modern in ways that, in addition to their modern Islamic curriculum, they follow the national curriculum set forth by the government called *Madrasa*, Nahdlatul Ulama runs traditional Islamic boarding schools called *Pesantren* that emphasise classical Islamic teachings. For discussion of Islamic schools in Indonesia, see for example Hefner Azra, Afrianty and Hefner (2007), Bruinessen (2008), and Hefner (2009).

instilling the Indonesian nationhood and equipping the young generation with the skills required for a variety of roles in the job market (Azra, Afrianty and Hefner 2007: 173). By moderate and tolerant Islam, I refer to the understanding and manifestation of Islamic teachings that, as opposed to radical or fundamentalist Islam, highlight mutual respect and tolerance among different ethnic, religious and racial groups in society. More importantly, this type of Islam is also characterised with its renunciation of the formalisation of *sharia* and the establishment of an Islamic state (Azra, Afrianty and Hefner 2007: 218).

It is nevertheless worth mentioning that during the end of the Suharto regime, all features that represent the moderate and tolerant Islam mentioned above endured surprisingly well and did not necessarily transform into a more radical form of Islam despite the regime's rapprochement with the Islamic elements from the late 1980s. Suharto set this rapprochement in motion through a number of measures such as the issuance of a law that guaranteed the implementation of religious education in the public schools in 1988, the granting of permission for the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) in 1990, which was often celebrated as one of the most remarkable events during this rapprochement period, the publication of a codification of Islamic family law in 1991 aimed at arbitrating disputes concerning such matters as marriage, divorce and inheritance, the abolition of the prohibition of the wearing of headscarf for female students in public schools in 1991, the introduction of an Islamic banking system in 1992 and the annulment of the government-supported lottery SDSB (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah or Social Donation with Prizes) in 1993. Moreover, it was also during this period that, for the first time, at the age of 69, Suharto and his

family made the pilgrimage to Mecca — an undeniably conspicuous posture intended to court the Islamic elements (Liddle 1996: 614; Effendy 2003: 195-196).

Some argued that such a harmonious rapprochement was attributable to the deteriorating relationship between Suharto and his military generals, particularly the Catholic Armed Forces Commander and the Minister of Defense and Security, Benny Murdani whose criticisms of Suharto's family business activities and suggestions of the need for presidential succession seemed to have irritated Suharto (Liddle 1996: 629; Honna 2003: 12-15). However, the dissonant relationship between Suharto and Murdani is not the only reason why the former abandoned his traditional client, that is, the military and turned to the Islamic elements. Hefner (1999: 50) held that Suharto was in fact cognisant of the mounting Islamic resurgence that had already been underway in the country. Undoubtedly, this provided the Islamic elements with considerable leeway to channel their religious and political interests through the government's growing support for Islam. However, despite such a leeway, both the regime and the Islamic elements seemed to have concurred that such political aspirations as the re-inclusion of *Piagam Jakarta* in *Pancasila*, the re-embracing of Islam as the primary ideology of political parties and mass organisations and the establishment of an Islamic state were ruled out. The mainstream Islamic agenda spearheaded by the Islamic elements at that time was consequently far from being regarded as a threat by the regime, for it was aimed more at bolstering Suharto's development agenda than at seeking to achieve objectives such as the realisation of *shariah* and the Islamic state (Liddle 1996: 615; Bruinessen 2002: 134-137).

The lengthy emasculation of any form of political Islam under the Suharto regime is believed by many to have forced Islamic movements and political parties to

surrender the very idea of *sharia* and the Islamic state, which they once pursued shortly after the recognition of Indonesia's independence. However, it would be naïve to argue that the highly restricted political opportunity was the only factor that had led Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama to abandon practical politics that they used to engage in, thus revisiting their methods of struggle and devoting their attention and resources to cultural, as opposed to political, aspects of Islam through social and education activities. Effendy (2003: 151-152) held that there had been a growing intellectual shift on the part of many Muslim thinkers and activists with regard to their stance on Islamic statehood or ideology since the late 1980s, exhibiting solid support for the regime's development agenda.

While it is widely agreed that the regime is emblematic of its repressive and coercive posture, in order to maintain power over the long run it also combined repression with toleration and coercion with co-optation (Aspinall 2005: 2). This is particularly evident in this rapprochement period during which the regime demonstrated a high-degree of toleration and co-optation towards the Islamic elements: Suharto tolerated societal organisations, including the Islamic ones, insofar as they upheld the regime's development agenda and acquiesced in its strict opposition to any manifestation of political Islam. Of course, most of the Islamic elements held strong convictions about Islam as the foremost driving force of the Islamic revival in the Muslim world, but they gradually began to renounce the very idea of *sharia* and the Islamic state, arguing that this sort of aspiration is, if anything, irrelevant to the realisation of Islamic values in the contemporary world.

The employment of co-optation, in addition to repression, was also applied to a post-Kartosoewirjo Darul Islam. As alluded to in the previous section, Darul Islam

was reborn in the 1970s, but unlike its predecessor, it did not act in open rebellion. Rather, it served as a clandestine organisation that enjoyed covert support from the Suharto regime's army intelligence. Indeed, the Suharto regime and Darul Islam had something in common: they were all anti-communist. The Darul Islam's anti-communist stance was evidenced through the sending of Kartosoewirjo's secret letters to President Sukarno in 1950 and 1951, which warned him of the potential Communist *coup d'état* (Soebardi 1983: 129). It was through the Suharto regime's intelligence agency — BAKIN (Badan Intelijen Negara or State Intelligence Agency) — that the reborn Darul Islam began to establish a close relationship with the regime. The co-optation of the reborn Darul Islam was deliberately engineered by the BAKIN to cultivate support for the anticipation of what was popularly known as the communist 'bogeyman' (Bahaya Laten PKI or the latent danger of communism) and, most importantly, for the victory of the first general election of Suharto's political party — Golkar (Golongan Karya or the Functional Groups) — in 1971 (Temby 2010: 6-8).

In the period between mid 1970s and 1980s, the reborn Darul Islam was closely associated with *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command) — an extremist group attributed to a series of bombing of night clubs, churches, and cinemas. The leaders of this terrorist group proved to be Darul Islam veterans, and yet, during their trials, they admitted that they maintained contacts with the Deputy Head of BAKIN at the time — Ali Moertopo. These terrorist incidents often occurred in years prior to elections and were believed to have been engineered by the BAKIN with a view to discrediting PPP, dissuading Muslims to vote for this remaining Islamic party (Bruinessen 2002: 128). Another critical juncture in the development of the reborn Darul Islam revolved around the role of two teachers of Al-Mukmin Islamic traditional school (*pesantren*) in Ngruki,

Central Java, by the name of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, who were recruited to Darul Islam by its veterans in 1976 (Temby 2010: 28). Both Sungkar and Baasyir were detained several times on charges of subversion such as boycotting the general election, refusing to honor the Indonesian flag at their *pesantren*, and attempting to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. They fled to Malaysia to avoid facing another jail punishment following their rejection of the imposition of *Pancasila* as the only ideology issued by the regime in 1985. While in Malaysia, they set up an Islamic group, namely JI (*Jemaah Islamiyah* or Islamic Community), whose objective was to establish a trans-regional Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Some of the most prominent programs of the JI in early 1990s were the dispatch of *mujahid* (warriors) in Afghanistan to help the Muslim Afghan warriors (*Mujahideen*) and Al-Qaida wage a holy war against Soviet Union and in Mindanao, the Philippines, to help MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) resistance movement fight against the government of the Philippines.

In essence, the highly repressive Suharto regime proved to be quite effective in crusing any opposition and subversion under the pretext of maintaining national stability. Nevertheless, as we will see in the next section, after the regime collapsed in 1998, the ensuing political freedom resulted in the flourishing of a plethora of mass organisations, which raise aspirations that used to be deemed highly subversive, such as the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of an Islamic state. The co-optation of the reborn Darul Islam by the state agency also proved to be successful in mustering support for the victory of the regime's political party — Golkar — in the general elections. Unfortunately, however, such co-optation failed to prevent the reborn Darul Islam from transforming itself into one of the most wanted Islamic

militant organisation in the world: JI.[33] Indeed, as an offshoot of the reborn Darul Islam, JI managed to mastermind a series of bombings in Indonesia, which will be touched upon in the next section.

3.5. *The Face of Political Islam after Suharto's Era*

The abrupt end of Suharto's rule on 21 May 1998 was followed by the breakdown of law and order and, at the same time, the rise of radical forms of political Islam, which lies in stark contrast to the moderate and tolerant Islam that previously prevailed in the country. After more than 30 years of being politically strangled by the authoritarian regime, Indonesians were overwhelmed with the euphoria of a 'reformasi' order, and as such channelled such euphoria in various political expressions. Salim and Azra (2003: 1-2) argued that the face of political Islam in the aftermath of the Surharto regime was characterised with the mounting expression of what they referred to as "more formalistic Islam", as evidenced by, among others, the growing demand of certain regions of Indonesia for the formal implementation of *sharia* and the emergence of radical Islamic revivalist movements such as FPI (Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Warriors Council) and FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Society). Of course, this is not to say that there are no differences in terms of these movements' ideology and methods of struggle. However, in spite of their specific differences, they all firmly

[33] JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) has been designated as one of the foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. Department of State since 23 October 2002. See the list of Foreign Terrorist Organisation released by the U.S. Department of State as at June 2016 at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

uphold the philosophy of the inseparability of Islam and politics and that it is not sufficient that the attainment of Islamic objectives is merely pursued through cultural approaches.

Unlike Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, these revivalist movements strive to enforce *sharia* — a highly taboo political aspiration throughout the course of Suharto's era, and collective action activities such as mass protests, public gatherings, petition drives, etc., serve as their primary means of attaining their religio-political ends. Many would agree that these sorts of Islamic movements largely owed their emergence to the sudden breakdown of law and order in a period in which the state had been rendered ineffective following Suharto's departure, which in turn opened up a political Pandora's box that not only triggered intense intra-civilian conflict, but also provided an incentive for any sort of movement, organisation and political party that would previously have found it impossible to exist (Effendy 2003: 200; Azra 2004: 147; Mietzner 2009).

Alas, the intense intra-civilian conflict was not the only repercussion of the post-Suharto order. The *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), which was an offshoot of the reborn Darul Islam with links to Al-Qaida as mentioned earlier in the previous section, also benefited from the relatively weak enforcement of law and order in the post-Suharto era. Indeed, the JI managed to engineer a series of bombings in Indonesia between 2002 and 2009 that claimed hundreds of casualties, such as the infamous Bali Bombing I in 2002, JW Marriott Bombing in 2003 in Jakarta, Bali Bombing II in 2005, and JW Marriott-Ritz Carlton Bombing in Jakarta in 2009. The perpetrators of these terrorist attacks such as Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron, and Azhari Husin were all JI cadres and

students of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir — the ideological gurus of the JI (*International Crisis Group* Report 2003).

According to a former JI leader who now works for the Indonesian government's deradicalisation program, Abdurrahman Ayyub, it is the extreme faction of the JI led by the commander of its military division, Zulkarnaen, who engineered all of these bombings in the country (Abdurrahman Ayyub [former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah Australia Branch], public seminar at Budi Luhur University, Jakarta, 1 June 2016). In addition, the sudden breakdown of law and order in the post-Suharto era also facilitated the emergence of a short-lived militia group called *Laskar Jihad* (Holly War Warriors) that waged sectarian wars against Christian militias in Ambon, Moluccas and Poso, Borneo between 1999 and 2004. It was the paramilitary wing of Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (The Sunni Communication Forum) founded in 1998, but it declared its self-dissolution in the end of 2002 after the conflicts subsided.[34] Both JI and *Laskar Jihad* are also considered revivalist organisations or entities in that they hold that Islam does not only regulate religious matters, but also worldy ones. As such, in essence, they share the aspect of "Islamic revivalism" with the samples of this study: FUI, HTI, FPI, and MMI, in that they all agree that Islamic law and rules — *sharia* — must serve as a comprehensive formal guidance not only in the private sphere, but also the public one.

Of course, it would not be difficult to differentiate between JI and Islamic revivalist movements such as FUI, HTI, FPI, and MMI mentioned above: while the former deliberately engaged in terrorist activities, the latter constitute social movements that

[34] For a thorough study of *Laskar Jihad*, see Hasan (2006).

constantly challenge their opponents through social movement activities. However, one would run the risk of over-generalising the term 'Islamic revivalism' in such a way as to refer to virtually all Islamic organisations, groups, parties, foundations or charities in so far as they can demonstrate their ardent Islamic aspirations. This is because, as we will discuss below, differences, particularly in terms of organisation, do exist among them to the extent that a consensus about the definition of the term urgently needs to be reached. Esposito and Voll (2001) argued that Islamic revivalism refers to the revitalisation of Islamic principles and teachings throughout the Muslim world, which is manifested in the growing prevalence of Islamic piety and in the rising adoption of Islamic culture and code of conduct among Muslims. For example, they referred to an Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood and a Pakistan-based Jamaat-i-Islami as Islamic revivalist movements. Likewise, the term "Islamic revivalist movement" defined above best describes the characteristics of the aforementioned Indonesian Islamic movements that emerged shortly after the downfall of the Suharto regime. Above all, they seek to redress all perceived pressing problems confronting Indonesia ranging from poverty, economic crisis, corruption and moral decadence amongst many more through collective action such as mass protests, public gatherings and petition drives that are chiefly oriented towards the implementation of *sharia* and, to some extent, the re-establishment of the caliphate. However, it is worth mentioning that there are some Islamic organisations that can be considered revivalist that — unlike the aforementioned movements — do not engage in any major form of collective action. Among others, some of these revivalist organisations are Jamaah Tabligh (Preaching Community) and BMTs (Baitul Maal wat Tamwil or Islamic saving loan and cooperatives). While Jamaah Tabligh is an apolitical Islamic movement that is centred

around preaching activities, calling upon Muslims to practise Islam so as to enhance their individual piety,[35] BMTs are microfinance institutions that provide financial services to small and medium-sized businesses as well as the poor. Their rules and regulations are as much as possible based on the principles of Islamic economics.[36]

It is vital at this juncture to delineate the underlying difference between Islamic revivalist organisations or institutions that engage in collective action such as those of HTI, FPI and MMI and those that do not such as Jamaah Tabligh and BMTs. The concept of social movement is accordingly employed to delineate such a difference. Diani (1992: 2) argued that social movements refer to informal networks or interactions between organisations or a group of individuals that engage in political or cultural conflicts on the strength of shared identities, while Tilly (2004: 7) highlighted three important elements that characterise social movements: (1) campaigns of collective claims, (2) forms of collective action such as mass demonstrations, mass gatherings, petition drives, media statements, etc., and (3) public representation of the cause's worthiness, unity, members, and commitments. Similar to Diani and Tilly, Tarrow (1998) held that social movement is a sustained series of collective challenges to authorities, elites, or other groups by people with shared objectives. HTI, FPI, MMI and FUI have all been undertaking sustained collective challenges to the Indonesian authority, elites and other groups through various forms of collective action such as those mentioned above. In contrast, although Jamaah Tabligh and BMTs fall within the category of Islamic revivalist organisations, as reflected in their vigorous attempts

[35] For details of Jamaah Tabligh, see for example Ali (2003), Aziz (2004), and Amrullah (2011).

[36] For details of BMT in Indonesia, see Sakai (2008).

to support and practise the Islamic principles and teachings, they do not engage in collective challenges to the Indonesian authority, elites or other groups.

By "Islamic revivalist movements", I refer to those seeking to revitalise and implement Islamic principles and teachings in the public sphere through engaging in persistent collective challenges to authorities, elites or other groups. According to this definition, one may categorise Islamic political parties such as the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),[37] which was born out of a campus-based Islamic *Tarbiyah* (education) movement and had gained popularity among Muslim students since the late 1980s, as an Islamic revivalist movement. Indeed, empirical research has demonstrated that the actors and structures of political parties and social movements are mutually entwined, such as with the Green Parties. However, despite the fact that under certain and specific conditions political parties may consider themselves as part of a movement, this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, which is strictly limited to parties originated by social movements. Furthermore, many would agree that the underlying difference between social movements and political parties lies in the level of specific functions they perform: while the latter engages in political activism inside of institutionalised politics such as the Parliament, the former is largely considered outsiders (Diani 1992: 14-15; Goldstone 2003: 3).

[37] For details of the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), see Mahmudi (2006), Hamayotsu (2011), Masaaki (2010) and Tomsa (2011).

3.6. *The Role of Islamic Revivalist Movements in Indonesia: Are They Significant?*

There are two opposing views concerning the extent to which these Islamic revivalist movements play a notable role in the societal and political landscape of post-Suharto Indonesia. The first view holds that their role and impact are insubstantial given that the number of their combined followers is far tinier than that of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama and that their very religo-political goals of implementing *sharia* utterly and transforming Indonesia into a full-fledged Islamic state are far from achievable. In addition, it is argued that the influence of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama as moderate Islamic movements on the dissemination of the values of moderate and tolerant Islam is so well-entrenched in Indonesia's society that it is very unlikely, if not impossible, that any sort of Islamic revivalist movements with such radical aspirations could have any notable role and impact in the society (Fealy 2004: 117; Eliraz 2004: 67, 2007: 16). Similarly, particularly with regard to the role of FPI, Mietzner (2009: 351) suggests that this anti-vice movement was weakening especially after its disbandment in 2002 and continued to falter after 2004. In contrast, the second view argues that although their very religio-political goals are far from realisation, their role and impact should not be overlooked. Hefner is the proponent of this view, and it seems obvious that he appreciates the fact that the size of the movements matters less than their ability to launch organised and sustained collective action. He puts it compellingly as follows:

> *A small but well-organized flank continues to demand state enforcement of a shari'a understood in authoritarian terms. Some among these groups, like the Party of Liberation (Hizb ut-Tahrir) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), have grown in recent years, building a network of militias,*

schools, and economic patronage. Statistically speaking, these groups still do not have a large mass following. However, as the history of Darul Islam demonstrates, movements do not need huge numbers of supporters to mount regular challenges to the political order. Even if their numbers remain small, these movements have dedication and organizational skill to guarantee themselves a role in Indonesian shari'a politics for some years to come (Hefner 2011: 308).

Recently, many Indonesian observers have contended that political Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia is in decline. This is particularly evidenced by the shifting political orientation of the country's most successful Islamic party in the 2009 elections, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This party went from endorsing a more purist Islamic agenda to that of a more moderate agenda (Steele 2006; Fealy 2004; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Masaaki 2010; Tomsa 2011; Tanuwidjaja 2010). However, while such contention might be true for Islamic political parties, this is hardly the case for the Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI and FUI. Despite a variety of challenges and constraints, they have relentlessly engaged in various forms of collective action from the very beginning of their existence. Of course, it is hard to envisage the viability of their ultimate goals — the comprehensive *sharia* and transnational Islamic state — in the current universal political milieu in which secularism, albeit not unchallenged, has become a common feature of the modern nation-state, and Indonesia is no exception. However, as Hefner puts it, these revivalist movements have organisational resources and skills at their disposal that enable them to raise their protest agenda whenever they deem it appropriate and to put pressure on the government to accommodate their demands. As one example,

these movements have launched incessant campaigns demanding the dissolution of Ahmadiyah Indonesia ever since MUI issued *fatwa* (Islamic decrees) labelling this organisation as deviant in 2005.

It was not until the Monas Incident in June 2008 that they gained momentum and managed to pressure the government into issuing a collective ministerial decree shortly after the incident, which ordered Ahmadiyah Indonesia to discontinue the dissemination of its alleged deviant teachings (*International Crisis Group* Report 2008; Crouch 2009; Takuo 2010). Additionally, anchored in the belief that eradicating vices such as pornography and obscenity is an inextricable part and parcel of the implementation of *sharia*, they staged a series of mass protests against the planned concert of the American pop diva Lady Gaga scheduled for June 2012 in Jakarta. Depicting the diva as "immensely symbolic of pornography" and a "Satan worshipper", they succeeded in pressuring authorities into not granting her a concert permit for security reasons (*Liputan 6* 2012; *Viva News* 2012; *CNN* 2012).

While it is worth underscoring the extent to which these revivalist movements posseses an ability to have a notable impact in the post-Suharto societal and political milieu, we should not overlook existing literature gaps on their current dynamics. As pointed out above, HTI, FPI and, to a lesser extent, MMI have received considerable scholarly attention, whereas FUI — notwithstanding its active and sustained role in social movement activities — has so far received no scholarly attention. As mentioned earlier, FUI serves as a forum aimed at enhancing coordination and sharing information among a plethora of Islamic movements and at actively playing the role of a social movement, challenging and pressuring Indonesian authorities to support its agenda through collective action. As a movement that consists of various Islamic

elements, FUI is consequently not immune to competing ideologies and discourses among its major members. HTI was the founding member of the forum before the former severed ties with the latter after the Monas Incident. In fact, the forum's secretary-general, al-Khathath, is HTI's former leader. FPI is another major member of the forum. Unlike HTI, FPI has hitherto remained active in the forum. While HTI and FPI concur with the fact that the implementation of *sharia* is of paramount importance, the extent to which it is accentuated and translated into a daily contentious struggle for power differs from one movement to another. Although the perceptions attached to these movements vary, they are socially constructed. For instance, HTI is regarded as a well-organised non-violent movement, whereas FPI is widely perceived as violent and less organised. It is therefore crucial to address the literature gaps by examining not only the historical and organisational backgrounds of the forum, but, more importantly, the contestation and negotiation of ideology and methods of struggle between members in the forum and between the forum and other movements as well as authorities so as to better account for the evolving dynamics of Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia. Research such as this falls within the field of what Eickelman and Piscatori (2004) referred to as "Muslim Politics", which involves an intricate pattern of cooperation and contest over the form, practice and interpretation of Islam and control of institutions between state and non-state actors.

3.7. *Summary*

In this chapter we have discussed the dynamics of Islamic manifestations in Indonesia before, during and after President Suharto's regime (1967-1998). The faces of Islamic manifestations in this country are anything but monolithic: they are closely linked to the level of political openness and circumstances unique to a regime in an environment to which they are attached. The two biggest Islamic movements in Indonesia that have existed since far before Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 — Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama — have played a significant role in shaping the moderate and tolerant face of Indonesia by the apolitical means of education, social and health services. However, they are by no means immune to changing political circumstances. Precedents attest to this.

As these movements found a political opportunity that swung in their favour, they opted to engage in practical politics, and contest general elections, such as during the short period of parliamentarian democracy in 1950s. In this era, albeit to no avail, they were among Islamic elements that sought to re-include *Piagam Jakarta* in the Indonesia's constitution, which capitalised on the obligation of Muslims to implement *sharia.* Conversely, when confronted with political circumstances that are against any forms of political Islam and that extensively restrained their direct participation from practical politics, such as during Suharto's 32-years of dictatorship, they acquiesced in such an unfortunate political situation and were compelled to abandon practical politics. Nevertheless, regardless of the changing posture with regard to electoral participation, it has become obvious that their contribution towards the crafting of the moderate and tolerant face of Islam in the country, particularly during the Suharto regime, has been indispensable.

We have also examined the emerging features of radical Islamic manifestations following the abrupt end of the Suharto regime in May 1998 that lie in a stark contrast to the previous moderate and tolerant face of Islam. A variety of what is commonly referred to as Islamic revivalist movements emerged as a result of the swinging of the political pendulum in favour of freedom of expression and democracy. Despite specific differences in terms of ideology and methods of struggle, they all uphold a firm belief that *sharia*, and to some extent, the caliphate are the panacea for a plethora of problems afflicting the country, and as such strive to implement them. HTI, FPI, MMI and FUI are among Islamic revivalist movements that actively engage in various forms of collective action such as mass protests, public gatherings, petition drives, etc. Nevertheless, while considerable scholarly attention has been paid to HTI, FPI and, to a lesser extent, MMI, there has been no scholarly attention paid to FUI despite its active role in public activism. It is against this backdrop that a comprehensive analysis on FUI is needed so as to better account for the evolving dynamics of Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Chapter Four

The Emergence and Mobilising Structures of FUI Major Member Movements

4.1. *Introduction*

Social movements are dependent upon the social-political environment to which they are attached. When they are situated in the political milieu that is not in favour of their cause, they are most likely forced to adjust their political strategy in such a way as to sustain their activism. Some of them opt to go underground so as to avoid the strict control of the authority, while others prefer to become inactive and wait until the political pendulum to swing in their favour. The post-Suharto period in Indonesia is characterised by the opening up of considerable political opportunity on the part of many Indonesians that used to live under an authoritarian regime. This era has witnessed the bourgeoning of the so-called Islamic revivalist movements whose goals revolve around the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of an Islamic state. These movements have benefited immensely from the demise of the Suharto regime and have taken the initiative to proclaim their public appearance.

Employing the theoretical perspective of political opportunity structure, this chapter analyses the historical backgrounds and emergence of these movements. However, the availability of favourable political opportunity alone is not sufficient for social movements to attain their objectives: they need to engage in relentless efforts

to mobilise a variety of resources that will facilitate the implementation of their goals. It is against this backdrop that this chapter also examines the way in which they exploit human and financial resources. Various aspects of these movement's organisational structure and support-seeking strategies will be discussed and compared using the theoretical perspective of mobilising structures to provide us with a better understanding of the current dynamics of pro-*sharia* movements in post-Suharto Indonesia.

4.2. *The Emergence of Post-Suharto's Islamic Revivalist Movements*

In chapter three we have indicated the manifestations of political Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia that are characterised with the mounting expression of what is often referred to as "more formalistic Islam", as evidenced by, among others, the growing demand of certain regions of Indonesia for the formal implementation of *sharia* and the emergence of radical Islamic revivalist movements (Salim and Azra 2003: 1-2). The demise of the Suharto regime in 1998 not only opened a Pandora's Box of troubles such as bloody sectarian conflicts in Maluku and Poso, it also opened up considerable political spaces in ways that would have been previously inconceivable (Effendy 2003: 200; Azra 2004: 147; Mietzner 2009). Throughout Suharto's tenure, the regime applied an array of measures to preserve the status quo in such a way as to prevent any political movement that attempted to challenge his power. In 1975, Suharto emasculated political parties, significantly reducing their numbers through forced mergers (Karim 1983; Effendy 2003: 150). In 1985 Suharto ordered that

Pancasila[38] be adopted as the only ideology of all political parties and mass organisations (Ismail 1999). In addition, in an effort to contain the political aspirations of Islamic elements in the country that began to grow following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the regime also issued a policy that prohibited the wearing of headscarves for female students in public schools in 1982 (Liddle 1996: 614; Effendy 2003: 150). Undoubtedly, such policies relegated Islamic elements along with their political aspirations to the fringes of the country's socio-political scene, preventing any sort of Islamic revivalist movements, particularly those with Islamic state and *sharia* aspirations, from operating publicly.

A wide array of Muslim activists in the country with an ardent aspiration to implement the comprehensive teachings of Islam in the society came out in the open as soon as the regime fell in 1998. Operating clandestinely, before 1998, these Muslim activists found universities to be their favourite venue for activities because not only are they relatively away from the monitoring of the state apparatus, they also provided these activists with an abundant of potential recruits consisting of young undergraduate students in search of identity and religious affiliations (Rahmat 2005). They remained clandestine despite Suharto's overtures for a rapprochement with Islamic elements in the late 1990s.

This rapprochement translated into several concrete measures such as the issuance of education law that guaranteed religious education in the public schools in

[38] *Pancasila* literally means five principles. It is the foundation of the state of Indonesia. These five principles are as follows: (1) belief in one God; (2) just and civilised humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; (5) social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

1988; the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) in 1990;[39] the codification of Islamic family law aimed at arbitrating disputes concerning such matters as marriage, divorce, and inheritance in 1991; and the annulment of SDSB (Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah or Social Donation with Prizes) in 1993, which was a kind of lottery with allegedly charitable purposes. Indeed, the majority of Islamic elements benefited from this rapprochement. However, both Suharto and the majority of Islamic elements seemed to have agreed that such political aspirations as the implementation of *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter),[40] the re-embracing of Islam as the primary ideology of political parties and mass organisations, and the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state, would be ruled out.

At this juncture, Islamic elements were given substantial leeway to play a decisive role in the public sphere insofar as they did not articulate such political issues. Thus, the mainstream Islamic ideas at that time were far from being regarded as a threat by the regime, and the main agendas of the majority of Islamic elements were oriented more to actively contribute to Suharto's development programs than to

[39] The establishment of ICMI is often celebrated as one of the most remarkable events during this rapprochement period. In its early development, ICMI ostensibly aimed not only to promote Islam, but also to develop science and technology as well as to improve the quality of human resources. However, it enjoyed considerable support from the government and often provided many Muslim intellectuals in the country with a quintessential stepping stone to higher political office. For a more detailed discussion of ICMI, see Hefner (1993).

[40] Jakarta Charter refers to the agreement among members of a committee of Indonesian Founding Fathers on the final draft of Indonesia's basic ideology in June 1945 after a long process of compromise. The contents of this draft were later declared to be the Indonesia's state ideology: *Pancasila.* However, the first article of this state ideology initially contained the following sentence: "with an obligation to follow *sharia* for its adherents", which was later the subject of objections by non-Muslims. This sentence was eventually deleted as a result of this objection and has been excluded from *Pancasila.* For discussions of this issue, see for example, Noer (1987); Ismail (1999); Romli (2006).

grapple with such sensitive issues as *sharia* and the Islamic state (Liddle 1996: 615; Bruinessen 2002: 134-137). These activists were well aware, however, of the very nature of this rapprochement, and it is therefore not surprising that during this period they, particularly those that already had a specific form of organisation such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), did not perceive any adequate political opportunity to publicly carry out their activities; hence their clandestine operation.

The social movement perspective of political opportunity structure holds that the ebb and flow of social movements are inextricably linked to the political environment to which they are attached. The level of openness or closure of the polity and the state's tendency towards repression are two major dimensions of this perspective (McAdam 1996: 27; Tarrow 1996: 54; 1998: 4; Porta and Diani 1999: 207). The repressive Suharto regime was considered the primary obstacle for Islamic revivalist movements to operate publicly. As the regime ended in 1998, the state's tendency towards repression significantly diminished and the level of openness gradually increased, thanks to the lofty aspirations of the people of Indonesia towards freedom and democracy. Fortunately, as the wave of democratisation reverberated throughout all layers of the Indonesian people, the succeeding regime could not help but accommodate such aspirations. It is against this backdrop that all sorts of political movements in the country, particularly the Islamic revivalist ones that had operated clandestinely in the previous regime, could finally see a favourable political opportunity to come out into the open.

Some of these activists already belonged to Islamic movements that had been operating clandestinely during the Suharto period such as HTI and Tarbiyah

Movement,[41] which, unlike HTI, opted to declare the establishment of an Islamic political party named PK (Partai Keadilan or Justice Party) on 20 July 1998 and later changed its name to PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Justice and Welfare Party) for the 2004 elections. Some other activists, who belonged to a variety of informal and relatively small Islamic study circles in their campuses or communities, decided to hold large public gatherings in an attempt to establish a pro-*sharia* Islamic movement such as MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Indonesian Holy Warriors Council). Unlike HTI and MMI, FPI (Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front) did not emerge from Muslim activists in universities, but was initiated by a number of influential religious leaders, some of whom are of Yemeni descent who claim to be the direct descendants of Prophet Muhammad. The following section will discuss and analyse the emergence and historical backgrounds of these Islamic revivalist movements along with their splinter movements that emerged later as a result of internal development or conflicts within the former.

[41] Tarbiyah Movement initially emerged from of Islamic study circles in secular universities such as Bandung Institute of Technology, the University of Indonesia, and Gadjah Mada University in 1980s. The Arabic term "tarbiyah" literally means increase or growth. This term is contextually used to refer to the religious training and development of Muslims. The central mission of the Tarbiyah Movement was to produce a new generation of Muslims in Indonesia that would practise and at the same time preach the pristine teachings of Islam. For details of this movement, see Machmudi (2008).

4.2.1. *The Emergence of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia)*

HTI has existed since the beginning of the 1980s. It was Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi who helped set up the movement's initial cells as early as 1982. Al-Baghdadi, a Lebanese who migrated to Australia at a young age, was invited by Mama Abdullah bin Nuh, an Indonesian Muslim scholar, to visit Nuh's Al-Ghazali Islamic boarding school located in the city of Bogor. It was during that time that Al-Baghdadi found an opportunity to recruit the movement's first generation members who were largely drawn from the Muslim students of IPB (Institut Pertanian Bogor or Bogor Agricultural Institute). From this university, HTI's cells developed and spread across many other universities in Java, and it was primarily through LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Campus Preaching Organisation) — campus-based Islamic circles that have existed in virtually all big universities in Java since 1980s — that HTI struggled to disseminate its ideas and find recruits (Muhammad Ismail Yusanti [HTI National Spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008).

HTI promptly came out in the open and drew public attention by launching its first international conference on the caliphate on 28 May 2000 at the Tennis Indoor Stadium in Jakarta. This conference, which was attended by hundreds of the movement's members and sympathisers, featured two overseas guest speakers: Ismail al-Wahwah (Hizbut Tahrir Australia) and Sharifuddin M. Zain (Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia). One of the local speakers from HTI was its former leader, Muhammad al-Khaththath. In addition to introducing the movement to the public, the conference aimed to convey the message that the caliphate was the only solution for dealing with multidimensional problems afflicting the entire Muslim population today. At this

conference, HTI stressed that the notion of nationalism has plunged Muslims all over the world into prolonged miseries, dividing the Muslim world into a multitude of nation-states that consequently serve as a major obstacle to calling for the unity of approximately 1.4 billion Muslims under one political entity (*Republika* 2000). This was HTI's first public appearance, however, it not only surprised the public, but also those who had been studying and loyally adhering to the movement's ideas. Indeed, many of its present members used to attend Islamic study circles that taught HTI's ideas, yet they were not aware the one organising these study circles had been HTI, thanks to the clandestine nature of the movement during Suharto's period during which it had jealousy safeguarded its identity (Abdullah [Local Spokesperson for HTI Central Java Chapter], personal communication, Semarang, 20 March 2008; Fealy 2007: 155).

HTI is an Indonesian branch of the international Hizbut Tahrir (HT) movement.[42] Equally important, HT exacts strict compliance with its ideology and administrative rules from its branches all over the world (Farouki 1996: 132-145). HT is a self-proclaimed international political party established in Al-Quds (Jerusalem) in 1953 by an Islamic scholar, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani (1905-1978). An-Nabhani, a Palestinian, went to Egypt in the early 1940s to study at Al-Azhar University. After graduation, he returned home and served as a religion teacher in Ibrahimiya High School. He condemned the Israeli occupation of his motherland and initially suggested how to liberate it, without mentioning the establishment of an Islamic state as a solution. Nevertheless, his later focus was not only limited to Palestine: in an attempt to restore the unity of Muslim states, an-Nabhani went so far as to advocate the

[42] To avoid confusion, the Indonesian branch of Hizbut Tahrir is referred to as "HTI", while "HT" is used to refer to the international Hizbut Tahrir movement.

reestablishment of the caliphate, which had been dissolved on 3 March 1924[43] soon after the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Ataturk was declared (Jansen 1979: 151; Commins 1991: 195).

4.2.2. *The Emergence of MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Council of Indonesian Fighters)*

Unlike HTI that has existed since the period of Suharto, MMI was established two years after the fall of the regime on 7 August 2000. The history of MMI began when a Forum of Islamic study circles in Yogyakarta called BKPM (Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Masjid or the Coordinating Body of Mosque Young Activists) felt a need to create a coalition that could serve as an umbrella organisation with the primary objective of enacting Islamic *sharia* in Indonesia. Before they held their first congress, which concurrently marked the movement's establishment, some activists in BKPM attempted to encourage a number of Islamic parties that emerged right after the fall of Suharto regime to unite to facilitate the utter implementation of *sharia* in the country. However, their attempt fell short of expectations, as the call for such a unity was unfeasible. Moreover, not all Islamic parties at that time concurred with these activists' concept of the formalisation of *sharia* in Indonesia: the majority of them held a view that such formalisation was not only unnecessary, but might also impair the concept of diversity that the Republic of Indonesia has embraced since the very beginning of its modern history guaranteed under its basic ideology — *Pancasila.*

[43] For the history of the last periof of the Ottoman Empire, see for example, Palmer (1992).

Having realised that the struggle for the implementation of *sharia* cannot be attained through Islamic parties, these activists decided to seek support from the networks of Islamic study circles in other cities in the country and encouraged them to join them in finding a solution for their ardent *sharia* aspirations. They eventually planned to have a public gathering that consisted of a variety of the country's Muslim scholars (Shobbarin Syakur [Secretary of MMI], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2013). Similar to HTI, according to these activists, the multi-dimensional problems that post-Suharto Indonesia had suffered such as the prolonged sectarian conflict in Maluku, the country's high debt, and corrupt leaders were among the culprits for the highly unstable social, political, and economic situation at that time (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 2001: xvii-xxviii). These problems often serve as the master frame of virtually all Islamic movements all over the Muslim world (Wiktorowics 2004).

Realising that these activists needed to draw public attention to this event with a view to getting its underlying message across, that is, the overarching implementation and formalisation of *sharia*, they managed to invite a number of influential Muslim scholars such as Deliar Noer,[44] Mochtar Naim,[45] Hidayat Nur

[44] Deliar Noer was a respected academician and politician in Indonesia. He obtained a PhD from Cornell University and had various positions in academia. He had strong aspirations to the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. He founded an Islamic political party called Partai Umat Islam (Party of Islamic Society) right after the fall of Suharto. However, this party failed to meet an electoral threshold determined by the Electoral Commission in 1999.

[45] Mochtar Naim is an Indonesian Anthropologist and has expertise on the culture of Minangkabau, West Sumatera.

Wahid,[46] Abu Bakar Baasyir,[47] and former HTI leader Muhammad Al-Khaththath, among others. All of these scholars, in principle, concurred with the implementation of *sharia* and viewed it as a vital solution for a better Indonesia.[48] Approximately 1,500 participants from various regions in the country participated in the congress held in Yogyakarta on 5 – 7 August 2000. They agreed to elect Baasyir as the leader (*amir*) of MMI and to make Yogyakarta the movement's headquarters.

4.2.3. *The Emergence of FPI*

Like HTI and MMI that benefited from the favourable political opportunity following the fall of the Suharto regime 1998, FPI was established several months after the regime's demise on 17 August 1998 in Jakarta. Their history began when a number of influential *ulama* (Muslim scholars) gathered at the *Al Umm* Boarding School to celebrate the Independence Day of Indonesia and at the same time discuss and find a solution to emerging multi-dimensional problems such as widespread sectarian clashes, violations of human rights, and massive social injustice, among others, as a result of the deteriorating capacity of the state to effectively attend to a wide range of problems in the country's transition to democracy. A large number of Muslims, particularly those who have *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and

[46] Hidayat Nur Wahid is a former President of PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahetera or Justice and Welfare Party) and currently one of its most senior cadres.

[47] Abu Bakar Baasyir is a strong advocate of *sharia* who had lived in exile in the era of Suharto. He strongly rejected the Suharto regime's measure of making *Pancasila* the only ideology for both political parties and mass organisations in the beginning of 1980s, fleeing to Malaysia to avoid persecution.

[48] For the opinions expressed by these Muslim scholars, see Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (2001: 215-263).

habaib[49] backgrounds such as Rizieq Shihab and Misbahul Anam, and some high-ranking military officials attended the meeting. The meeting agreed that in order for Muslims to play an active role in addressing such problems, a certain form of organisation was needed, hence the emergence of FPI (Ng 2006: 89-90; Jahroni 2008: 18). With the presence of some military officials at this event, coupled with the presence of military generals at FPI's first anniversary in the following year, speculation that the military was the primary actor that engineered the establishment of this movement abounded. In order to analyse this speculation, we should pay attention not only to the dynamics of power relations between Suharto and the military in 1980s and 1990s, but also to the ideology and principles of the movement.

First, during Suharto's authoritarian regime, it came as no surprise that the military played a significant role not only in matters related to defence, but also to social, political, and administrative affairs of the country.[50] Suharto largely owed his 32-year-period in power to well-sustained patron-client relations between himself and the military. The era at the beginning of the 1980s witnessed increasingly bitter relations between Suharto and Muslim elements. Not only did the regime issue a highly controversial law that required all mass organisations and political parties to adopt *Pancasila* as the one and only ideology, the military engaged in a number of violations

[49] In Indonesia, *habaib* is an Arabic plural term that is commonly used to denote those who claim to be the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. They are mostly of Hadrami descent. The singular term of *habaib* is *habib.*

[50] This role is commonly referred to as *Dwi Fungsi* (Dual Function). In Suharto's era, the military exercised two simultaneous roles; defence as well as social, political, and administrative roles. See one of the most comprehensive accounts that discuss the Indonesian military roles during Suharto's era; Crouch (2007).

of human rights, such as in the case of the so-called *Tanjung Priok* massacre.[51] The 1980s' were characterised by the nadir of relations between the regime and virtually all Muslim elements in the country. However, the pendulum swung in favour of the Muslim elements at the beginning of 1990s during which Suharto undermined the authority of his long-trusted Chief of Armed Forces, Benny Murdani, who was Catholic, and began to court Muslim scholars and intellectuals. This was followed by a number of measures, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, such as the establishment of ICMI — the state-sponsored Muslim think-tank organisation — and the introduction of a partial version of Islamic laws in the form of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, that principally aimed to appeal to the broad spectrum of Muslim elements.

This was Suharto's attempt at rapprochement, which paved the way for the emergence of what was referred to as "green military": Muslim military generals who sympathised and established close ties with a variety of influential Muslims along with their various organisations.[52] Such a tradition continued. In an increasingly unstable socio-political situation that engulfed Indonesia right after the fall of Suharto, the connections between "green military" generals and certain Islamic movements such as FPI, however close and whatever the political agenda that these generals had, came as no surprise. Second, a senior member of FPI who requested anonymity admitted that in the beginning of the movement's history, there were indeed some

[51] The Tanjung Priok massacre took place in the area of Tanjung Priok port, North Jakarta during which there was a bloody clash between the residents of Tanjung Priok and military personnel. Tens of people were dead and hundreds of civilians were injured and disappeared during this incident. It was triggered by the government's policy to force all mass organisations and political parties in Indonesia to adopt *Pancasila* as their one and only ideology.

[52] For a detailed account of the dynamics and contestation between factions in the Indonesian military from the end of Suharto's period to the beginning of post-Suharto era, see Honna (2005).

"green army" generals who provided the movement with financial support with the objective of eradicating non-Muslim *preman* or thugs in Jakarta. However, FPI maintains that it does not rule out receiving support from any party or individual that supports its underlying goals, which revolve around *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil).

4.3. *The Mobilising Structures of FUI Major Member Movements*

Indeed, the fall of the Suharto regime opened up political opportunities on the part of Islamic revivalist movements to come out in the open after the previous draconian political atmosphere forced them to operate clandestinely. However, the availability of political opportunity alone was not sufficient for these movements to engage in constant collective action such as mass protests, public gatherings, press statements, and other public activities. As Tarrow (1998: 123) argued, they also needed to mobilise essential resources, such as legitimacy, people, facilities, and money. In this sense, Islamic revivalist movements are in no way different from social movements in the West such as the civil rights movement in 1960s, the anti-nuclear movement, environmental movement, and feminist movement. All of them require collective vehicles, either formal or informal, through which they can mobilise people and engage in collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3). Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, like other movements in the world, rely upon a variety of social networks such as family, neighbours, and friends.

As mentioned earlier, the majority of the current Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, the Tarbiyah Movement, and MMI drew considerable mass support from

students who were active in campus-based Islamic circles. The social network of friends in universities had effectively facilitated the development of these movements (Rahmat 2005; Machmudi 2008). This is not to say that the social networks of family and neighbours did not contribute to their development. In fact, in some cities such as Yogyakarta, the emergence of HTI cells, unlike that in the city of Bogor, is largely owed to the networks of family and neighbours (Abdullah [Local Spokesperson for HTI Central Java Chapter], personal communication, Semarang, 20 March 2008; Tindiyo [Local Spokesperson for HTI Yogyakarta], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 24 March 2008). This is also the case for FPI in which the majority of its early supporters were not drawn from university students, but from a network of neighbours who regularly attended an Islamic study circle led by its charismatic founder, Rizieq Shihab. This study circle has been regularly held since the very beginning of FPI's history in a mosque that is only a few metres away from Riziq's house.

The omnipresence of the LDK (campus-based Islamic circles), which has existed since 1980s, has undeniably played an important role in facilitating the spread of Islamic teachings that view Islam and politics as two inseparable entities; that Islam does not only regulate matters that fall within the individual sphere, but also within the public sphere; and that Islam is a comprehensive religion whose teachings serve as the solution to all issues in life (*Islam huwa al hall*). This is the very view that has, in turn, provided a significant incentive to the emerging calls for the implementation of *sharia* and, to some extent, the establishment of an Islamic state in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Islamic revivalist movements also share considerable features with other social movements elsewhere in the world with regard to their financial resource. Donations

from the members and sympathisers of these movements remain their primary financial resource. The term "sympathisers" in this respect refers to individuals who are not necessarily members or the inside circle of the movements, but sympathise with the cause of the movements and are willing to provide them with financial support. Nevertheless, considering that the nature of these movements in Indonesia falls within the category of *Ormas* (Organisasi Masyarakat or civil society organisation), there is no obligation for them to make an annual financial report to the authority, and based on the author's fieldwork experience, any attempt to get access to verify or solicit a report of their financial activities would be fruitless for two reasons.

First, because they are classified as civil society organisations and are not obliged to make a financial report to the relevant authority, they see no need to record their financial resources and activities, hence the unavailability of the financial report. Second, they are reluctant to provide outsiders, including the author, with the details of their financial resources such as the names of influential sympathisers or people who have been donating their money to the movements and the quantity of their donations because they consider this matter to be private. Among these movements, HTI also receives regular financial support from its headquarters in the Middle East, despite the fact that official HTI leaders deny it.

According to Muhammad al-Khaththath, who was a former HTI leader, the provincial committee (*Al-Lajnah al-Wilayah*) members of HTI receive monthly salaries from the leadership committee (*Al-Lajnah al-Qiyadah*) in the Middle East, thanks to the fact that HTI is an international Islamic movement with branches scattered in a number of not only Muslim countries but also Western countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [a former leader of HTI and

Secretary-General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 20 November 2013). In addition to donations, the majority of these movements also raise money from the sale of their merchandise such as books, magazines, CDs, t-shirts, etc. This is, of course, not only intended to make additional organisational incomes, but also, and most importantly, to spread their ideas and galvanise support from the public.

The organisational structure and culture also affects the characteristics of, and to some extent the success or failure of, social movements everywhere in the world in attaining their goals. Some social movements rely heavily on the charisma of their supreme leader to sustain the activities of the movements, while some others undermine the importance of any particular leaders in order to ensure the movements' sustainability in the future once the supreme leader dies or is no longer able to lead the movement for a variety of reasons. In Indonesia, although all Islamic revivalist movements have branches scattered across the country, their organisational structure and culture exhibit varying degrees of solidity and methods of training for their cadres. For instance, with standardised and exacting organisational rules and principles, HTI is considered to be the most organised movement, while FPI has less organised organisational rules and principles than HTI.

In FPI, its supreme leader, Rizieq Shihab, plays a powerful role in all aspects of the movement, serving as the social movement's "entrepreneur", a term coined by McCarthy and Zald (1987: 17-18). "Entrepreneurs" are key individuals in social movements that play a major role in stimulating protests and mobilising resources. In contrast, HTI and MMI do not depend on any particular leaders the same way as FPI does, for their organisational culture is deliberately designed not to extol the merits,

however considerable, of their leaders with a view to ensuring the movements' sustainability in the future.

4.3.1. *The Mobilising Structures of HTI*

HT has a top-down hierarchical structure.[53] As a result, some analysts have portrayed the movement as totalitarian, resembling a Marxis-Leninist party (Cohen 2003: 3; Baran 2004: xi; Baran 2005: 1). However, Farouki (1996: 114) believed that maintaining the uniformity of the movement's political platform is the *raison d'être* of such a structure. The highest structure of the movement is called the leadership committee (*Al-Lajnah al-Qiyadah*), which is headed by the supreme leader called *amir.* This committee holds the authority to lead the movement and monitor its overall progress. An-Nabhani was the founder and the first *amir* of HT, and his leadership ended with his death on 20 June 1977. An-Nabhani was succeeded by Abdul Qadim Zallum, who had been there at the beginning and had worked closely with an-Nabhani to build up the movement. Soon after Zallum died, Ata Abu Rashta, former spokesperson for HT's Jordanian branch, assumed the leadership on 13 April 2003 and is the current *amir* (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2008a). The movement holds that such a succession model in which the *amir* has a lifetime tenure once appointed follows the one applied in the period of Rashidin Caliphs.[54]

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[53] For the diagram of the HT structure, see Farouki (1996: 116).

[54] The Rashidin Caliphs, which literally means the rightly guided caliphs (632-661 AD.), refers to a period of an Islamic leadership after the death of Prophet Muhammad. In total, there were four caliphs during this period: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, all of which were the Prophet's faithful companions. For the history of the Rashidin Caliphs and the early expansion of Islam, see for example, Muir (1963) and Madelung (1997).

Under the leadership committee is a provincial committee (*Al-lajnah al-Wilayah*) led by a man referred to as *mu'tamad.* The term *al-wilayah* (province) in this context, however, denotes a sphere of operation at the nation-state level (Farouki 1996). Accordingly, HT branches such as those in Indonesia, Malaysia, Britain, Australia, Sudan, Turkey, Palestine, Bangladesh, and so on, are referred to as HT provincial branches, and the provincial committee is normally located in the capital of each state. This committee consists of five to ten members who are responsible for anything related to the movement's affairs within the scope of a nation-state. These members are elected, and all HT members have the right to participate in a direct election of the committee in the province in which they dwell. As for the *mu'tamad*, he is nevertheless always directly appointed by the *amir* for reasons of maintaining firm control on the provincial committee members (Farouki 1996). The *mu'tamad* thus exercises considerable authority over the provincial committee members. This committee represents the leadership group in the nation-state in which it operates, and its position is so strategic that success or failure of the movement in this area relies heavily on its active role. It is compulsory for each HT provincial committee to directly report all of their activities to the leadership committee, which is mainly done through the internet. In addition, communication between HT provincial committees is considered unnecessary and in fact is not permitted (Rahmat 2005: 63). It is only natural that the horizontal communication between HT's provincial committees is prohibited given that it is a strictly top-down Islamic movement whose mode of communication and instruction is only done vertically with a view to ensuring the conformity of the movement's principles and organisational rules throughout its branches.

While the office location of each provincial committee is clear, the location of HT headquarters (the leadership committee) has been one of the most contentious issues to emerge in research on the movement. Many posit that London serves as its base (Cohen 2003: 1; Akbarzadeh 2004: 275; 2004: 698; Ayoob 2005: 83; Adamson 2005: 562; Karagiannis 2006a: 266), while Jordan is also claimed to be its headquarters (Baran 2004: ix). During its initial phase, HT headquarters, however, moved from one country to another. The initial headquarters from which an-Nabhani played a dominant role in day-to-day organisational activities was located in Jerusalem. As he moved to Damascus in 1953, the headquarters was relocated with him. Likewise, it was moved to Beirut in 1956 and 1959 when al-Nabhani resided there (Cohen 1982: 221; Farouki 1996: 115). These shifts should come as no surprise given that in many Middle East countries most HT branches had been illegal and under tight surveillance to the extent that the movement needed to cautiously locate its headquarters in a secure place (Jansen 1979: 151).

Despite disagreement over the headquarters' location, it is important to note that Farouki (1996: 115) had the impression that the leadership committee, which during al-Nabhani's life consisted of several men, was disbanded, and its functions were thus solely carried out by the *amir*. It is nevertheless unclear as to whether this leadership committee is currently restored. What is clear is that London is by no means the HT headquarters: it is merely a provincial branch (*Al-lajnah al-Wilayah*) of HT that has the same position as the other HT branches such as Hizbut Tahrir Australia, Hizbut Tahrir Yemen, Hizbut Tahrir Sudan, and so forth. This can be attributed to the fact

that in early 1996 Omar Bakri Muhammad,[55] erstwhile leader of HT Britain, stated that he had been forced by the leadership committee in the Middle East to quit the movement due to his alleged deviation from HT policy. He later founded an HT's splinter movement called Al-Muhajirun (Farouki 2000: 30-31). Bakri's statement thus obviously implies that the leadership committee is located in the Middle East. It is also evident that this committee holds the authority to dismiss any leader of its branches who violates the movement's policy, thus ensuring that its branches do not go astray.

As for Jordan, it is largely believed to be the traditional stronghold of HT and is often claimed to be the movement's headquarters. However, taking into account the fact that the *amir* exercises the most powerful authority over the movement and that, as argued by Farouki (1996: 115), the leadership committee previously comprising several men was disbanded; the question of the location of HT headquarters should no longer be significant. This is because in the so called Internet era, in which email communications are so ubiquitous, more and more people are working from home and the movement's *amir* can readily stay in touch with his trusted men in HT branches all around the world. Likewise, he could move from one country to another in the Middle East for certain organisational purposes, and with a laptop and Internet connection in his hands, monitoring the activities of the movement's branches and giving them necessary instructions can be done at ease.

Below the provincial committee is a local committee (*Al-lajnah al-Mahalliyah*) that consists of five people, including its head referred to as *naqib.* This local

[55] For the profile of Omar Bakri Muhammad and his early attempts to set up Hizbut Tahrir Britain, see Abedin (2004).

committee is established by the provincial committee in each urban centre and its offices are located in each capital of Indonesian provinces. HTI claims to have successfully established its local committees in virtually all the country's provinces. They are present in such regions as Java, which is considered the movement's stronghold; Bali; Sumatera, including Riau Islands and Batam; Sulawesi; Nusa Tenggara; Maluku; Kalimantan; and the very eastern part of the country, Papua.[56] The *naqib* is responsible for regularly sending reports on the movement's activities in his local area and for supervising study circles (*halaqah*), which constitutes the smallest unit of HTI's structure. This study circle is headed by *mushrif* and consists of five members or novices (*daaris*). The primary of task of the *mushrif* is to ensure the smooth knowledge transfer of HT's literature to the novices (Farouki 1996: 123-124).

HTI's first *mu'tamad* in post-Suharto era was Muhammad al-Khaththath (b. 1964). He graduated from Bogor Agriculture Institute majoring in Agricultural Science. While he studied in this institute, he was also studying Islamic subjects in a number of Islamic boarding schools such as Al-Ihya, Darut Tafsir, and Al-Ghifari. In 2005, in concert with other Muslim figures, he set up a coalition movement called FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Society). Despite the fact the he is one of the first generation of HTI, his career in the movement ended in August 2008, as he was expelled by the *amir* following the Monas Incident (discussed at length as in chapter six and seven) (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary-General of FUI], personal communication, 25 October 2008). Hafidz Abdurrahman replaced Al-Khaththath in 2004. He has a master's degree from the University of Malaya, Malaysia majoring in

[56] For the list of HTI chapters along with their contact persons, see *Al-Wa'ie* magazine. This list can be found on the cover page of the movement's monthly magazine.

Islamic studies and he has a Nahdlatul Ulama background (*Jawa Pos* 2006). The current HTI's *mu'tamad* is Rokhmat S. Labib.[57]

Based upon this organisational culture, unlike the other Islamic revivalist movements such as FPI, whose highest leader at the national level remains unchanged, HTI has been led by three different national-level leaders since it came out in the open. While the supreme leadership of the international HT movement who resides in the Middle East will only change once the supreme leader dies, the movement's provincial committee leaders in all of its national-level branches undergo rotation. This is deliberately aimed at preventing any of its provincial committee leaders from being overly admired by the movement's members and followers in this particular national-level area in such a way as to potentially open up an opportunity to secede from HT and establish a new movement, which is considered a potential threat for the unity and solidity of the movement as a strictly top-down international organisation. The other personality is Muhammad Ismail Yusanto (b. 1962), the movement's national spokesperson, whose position ensures greater media coverage than the other HTI personalities. Yusanto obtained his undergraduate degree in geology from Gadjah Mada University in 1988, and his master's degree in management from the Institute of Indonesian Entrepreneur Development, Jakarta, in 2000. Like Al-Khaththath, Yusanto studied Islamic subjects at a young age in several Islamic boarding schools such as Budi Mulia and Krapyak in Yogyakarta and Ulil Albab in Bogor

[57] Rokhmat S. Labib had a personal blog in which he shared his thoughts on HTI's ideologies. See http://rokhmatslabib.blogspot.com.au/

(Muhammad Ismail Yusanto [HTI National Spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008; Rahmat 2005: 125; Salim 2005: 76).

Both Al-Khaththath and Yusanto served as the committee members of MUI for the period 2005-2010. Yusanto held a position as a vice chairman of the Commission of Research whose main tasks were to carry out research concerning Islamic issues and to give research-based suggestions to the general committee for the purpose of issuing *fatwa* (religious decrees). Al-Khaththath, although he had no longer represented HTI since August 2008, served as vice secretary of the Preaching Commission with the goal of spreading *da'wah* (preaching) all around the country (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2005). The Commission of Research has a pivotal role, for according to MUI's procedure, any *fatwa* issued by the council must first be examined by this commission (*Antara* 2007). It was during Al-Khaththath and Yusanto's membership in MUI that this council issued a *fatwa* that labelled JAI (Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia or Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community) as a deviant Islamic organisation. The council strongly condemned JAI for adhering to the deviant belief that its founder and former supreme leader, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was a Prophet. However, it was not until 9 June 2008 that the government eventually accommodated the *fatwa* by issuing the so-called collective ministerial decree, ordering JAI to stop its overall activities, and any members who failed to comply with this decree would have sanctions imposed according to the relevant government laws and regulations (*Detik* 2008a).

Upon its first public appearance in May 2000, HTI had gained considerable confidence in holding various open discussion circles on Islamic issues not only in mosques, but also in such venues as seminar halls and campuses. In campuses, which

constitute one of the movement's major venues for finding new recruits, HTI had set up a campus-based group named Gema Pembebasan (Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan or the Students Movement of Liberation), which was launched on 28 February 2004 in the University of Indonesia.[58] Despite the fact that Gema Pembebasan was a campus-based political wing of HTI, the former avoided mentioning any association with the latter. Gema Pembebasan's written vision did not mention any words of the caliphate, let alone *sharia*: it simply stated that it sought to make Islam the mainstream ideology of student movements in the country.[59] Such a tactic is applied on the grounds that in some campuses, the presence of HTI had met with strong resistance from some student movements that condemned its ardent aspirations to the implementation of the caliphate and *sharia* (Tindiyo [Local Spokesperson for HTI Yogyakarta], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 24 March 2008). Gema Pembebasan was therefore needed to help HTI overcome such resistance. Among student movements in campuses, Gema Pembebasan accordingly became a relatively new movement, which inescapably competed with the already existing such movements as KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Students Action Front), HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Muslim Students Group), and PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Students Movement).

To augment its members and supporters, in addition to HTI members' personal networks, the movement relies on the aforementioned open discussion circles or

[58] For a detailed profile of Gema Pembebasan, see its website: http://www.gemapembebasan.or.id/.

[59] See Gema Pembebasan's website at http://www.gemapembebasan.or.id.

seminars. Through these events, participants who are curious about the movement along with its ideas are invited by the movement's members to participate in a small, albeit intensive, study circle, which consists of several novices. This study circle takes place in a private house and is led by the aforementioned *mushrif*. The main task of *mushrif* is to help novices to internalise HTI principles. This internalisation process necessitates students memorising the content of the movement's fundamental literature authored by an-Nabhani such as *Nizham ul-Islam* (The System of Islam), *Mafahim* (The Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir), and *Attakatul al-Hizbi* (Structuring of a Party). For novices to become members, it normally takes several years after they become well-versed in this literature. This was confirmed by a rank and file HTI member who in fact had needed around five years to move up from novice to member. There is, however, no specified length of time for this promotion, for it mostly depends on the novices' capacity to both internalise and implement the movement's basic principles, which is thoroughly assessed by their *mushrif* (Dendy [HTI Rank and File Member], personal communication, 23 October 2008; Arifin 2005: 155-165). For HTI, which emphasises the uniformity of its ideology, such a training culture is nevertheless necessary to ensure that its members are highly knowledgeable about the movement's principles.

HTI has been holding a variety of large public gatherings since it came out in the open in 2001 such as the regular events of the International Conference on the Caliphate held in Jakarta in 2008 and 2013 that were attended by tens of thousands of its members and sympathisers from various regions in Indonesia[60] along with a

[60] For HTI's Conference on the Caliphate in 2007, see for example (*Reuters* 2007). For its 2013 conference, see for example (*Republika* 2013).

series of conferences it held in 29 cities in Indonesia called *Konferensi Rajab* or the *Rajab*[61] Conference in 2011.[62] Slightly different from the main objective of holding Islamic studies circles in universities or mosques, which is aimed at attracting new recruits, such conferences are oriented to send a decisive signal to the public, the authorities, opponents or other Islamic movements or organisations, that HTI is active and growing. In addition, through such events the movement aims to continuously promote the significance of re-establishing the caliphate and implementing *sharia* in Indonesia, expecting that these salient messages will reverberate through multiple layers in society.

Certainly, HTI realises the effectiveness of the media's role in today's world. Accordingly, to massively facilitate the dissemination of its ideas, the movement regularly publishes in the media using bulletins, magazines, and tabloids. Even during the movement's clandestine period, it had regularly published a bulletin that had different names in different provinces. For example, despite the uniformity of its content, while the movement's former bulletin circulated in Central Java Province was named *Al-Misykah* (lantern), while that in Yogyakarta Province was called *Al-Miqyas* (scale) (Abdullah [Local Spokesperson for HTI Central Java Chapter], personal communication, Semarang, 20 March 2008). Such a strategy was undoubtedly aimed to ensure the movement's survival in an unfavourable political atmosphere under the repressive Suharto regime. The movement's present bulletin is called *Al-Islam*, issued

[61] *Rajab* is the seventh month of the Islamic calendar. HTI names this conference after *Rajab* during which the Ottoman Caliphate was dissolved in 1924, attempting to raise public awareness on how important this month is for all Muslims and to call for the re-establishment of this particular transnational political entity.

[62] See for example (*Era Muslim* 2011).

weekly and is mainly distributed to mosques during Friday prayers. *Al-Islam* was published not long after the movement's first public appearance in May 2000, thus rendering the already mentioned previous bulletin obsolete. While *Al-Islam* is primarily aimed at mosque attendees, *Al-Wa'ie*, the movement's magazine that literally means "awareness", is distributed monthly and is aimed at a broader target audience.

The movement's other media, which was launched in November 2008, is a biweekly tabloid, called *Media Umat.* Indeed, HTI manages a well-maintained Internet Radio and TV Channels, which is strikingly unusual among Islamic revivalist movements in the country.[63] The contents of these three media types primarily exhibit the movement's views on not only Islamic issues, but also various socio-political aspects of Indonesia. They are also used to convey the movement's criticism against such issues as the skyrocketing of fuel and commodity prices, the privatisation of national companies, the country's acute problems on corruption, and so forth. In addition to these printed media, HTI owns a well-maintained official website, thus enabling the public to become familiar with the movement's platform.[64]

HTI also enthusiastically attempts to establish relationships with many radio stations by seizing any opportunity to participate in their talk show programs on a regular basis. For example, HTI South Sumatra chapter is granted slots to deliver Islamic lectures in several radio stations such as Oz FM, Real FM, and Indralaya FM (Budiyanto [HTI Spokesperson for South Sumatera Chapter], personal

[63] See and listen to HTI's Internet Radio Channel at http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/radio-streaming/ and HTI's TV Channel at http://tv.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/

[64] See HTI's official website on http://Hizb ut-Tahrir.or.id/.

communication, Palembang, 7 March 2008). In Yogyakarta, the movement used to maintain an on-air program every Saturday evening called *Tanya Ustadz*, which literally means "asking questions to Muslim teachers", in a local favourite radio station called Unisi FM. The program aimed to invite radio listeners to ask any questions regarding Islamic issues to the interviewees who were comprised of some HTI members. In addition, these interviewees were given leeway by the radio station manager to decide the weekly topics to be discussed. Unfortunately, this program ended around 2005 because of a shift in the radio station's market. However, this was not the end of the story, for the movement subsequently achieved a new radio slot on Arma 11 radio station. Though the movement cannot deny that there are some radio listeners who are annoyed by its extreme stance against capitalism, secularism, democracy, nationalism, and other such ideas which the movement considers flawed, these sort of radio slots surely aid the movement in attracting as many people as possible to hear its ideas (Tindiyo [Local Spokesperson for HTI Yogyakarta], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 24 March 2008) .

Turmudi and Sihbudi (2005: 278) have suggested that HTI seemed to refrain from being an exclusive movement, given its readiness to cooperate with other movements. The movement attempted to form an alliance with other Islamic movements under a coalition called FUI (Forum Umat Islam or the Forum of Islamic Society), the details of which will be discussed at length in chapters six and seven. However, HTI's involvement in FUI lasted for only three years as the *amir* ordered the former to cut ties with the latter in around August 2008 and, at the same time, expelled Muhammad al-Khaththath from HTI, which was attributable to a Monas Incident that occurred on 1 June 2008 (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary-General of FUI],

personal communication, 25 October 2008). In this incident, KLI (Komando Laskar Islam or Islamic Force Command), which claimed to be an alliance of several Islamic forces (*laskars*), was involved in a violent attack on AKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or the Nationalist Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith) as it commemorated the birth of *Pancasila* in the vicinity of the National Monument, Jakarta (*Kompas Cyber Media* 2008a).

KLI claimed to have been provoked into an attack as AKBB protested against the developing demands for disbanding JAI, which was loudly expressed by FPI, MMI, HTI, and FUI (*Detik* 2008a). In the national media, KLI was closely associated with FPI due to the fact that virtually all attackers obviously exhibited their FPI symbols. However, KLI's commander, Munarman, insisted that it was his group that was fully responsible for the attack, not FPI (*Detik* 2008b). FPI leaders, such as Rizieq and Munarman, and members involved in the incident were soon arrested. Both Munarman and Shihab were convicted of inducing his followers to attack AKBB and were sentenced to one and half years in jail (*Kompas Cyber Media* 2008a, 2008b).

Indeed, every HTI member is strongly encouraged to exert influence on any environment in which they are present, aiming to both spread its very principles as widely as possible and, most importantly, to mobilise support for its causes. The HT *amir*'s fear that HTI's affiliation with FUI could hurt its non-violent image, as Al-Khaththath has suggested, is most likely attributable to the violent image of FPI, which is one of the major elements in FUI. The incarceration of the FPI leader, Rizieq Shihab, in connection with the Monas Incident, has inevitably added to FPI's long record of violence, which did imperil FUI, whose non-violent image has been projected by Al-Khaththath. This would in turn have a negative effect on HTI's image as a non-violent

movement because it was also a major element in FUI. Thus, cutting ties with FUI is the HTI's exit strategy from any association with FPI.

Upon Al-Khaththath's departure from HTI, he set up a new movement called HDI (Hizbud Dakwah Islam or Party of Islamic Preaching). There are, however, no significant ideological differences between HTI and HDI. Like HTI, HDI also calls for the implementation of *sharia* and the re-establishment of the caliphate. The only difference between the two is that while the former is guided by the international leadership in the Middle East, the latter is fully directed by Al-Khaththath in Indonesia. Senior members of HTI had thought that the departure of Al-Khaththath from HTI would affect the solidity of the movement's support base given Al-Khaththath's reputation as a former leader and the first generation of members in the movement (Muhammad Ismail Yusanto [HTI National Spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 4 November 2013). However, what they had thought did not materialise and there were only a handful of HTI members who sided with Al-Khaththath and joined HDI. Some of them were HTI members who were also dismissed by the movement's supreme leader in connection with the Monas Incident. This is most likely due to the organisational culture of HTI that exacts strict compliance with the regulations and decisions of the movement and that discourages blind obedience to any of its leaders. It is only natural that the dismissal of Al-Khaththath is perceived by the vast majority of HTI members as another decision of the movement, which is essentially the same as other movement's decisions, that needs to be understood and respected.

It is worth mentioning that HTI's involvement in FUI since 2005 turned out to be a source of disagreements among HTI executives. This is attributable to the fact that HTI found insoluble difficulties in controlling a divergence of perspectives among

FUI member movements regarding the agenda or issues of mass protests that they planed to raise along with their proposed solutions to the issues. An internal source of HTI lamented this fact since the beginning of HTI's involvement in FUI, but HTI restrained from severing ties with FUI until the Monas Incident in June 2008 with a view to preserving the unity of Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia. As mentioned earlier, every HTI member is strongly encouraged to serve as intellectual leaders in society, spreading HTI's ideology as far-reaching as possible and finding as many recruits as possible. In fact, HT branches all over the world are not allowed to establish a coalition with other movements unless it is HT that leads the coalition, which necessitates the movement revealing its identity and ideology whenever it engages in collective action through any protest through signs such as phamplets, banners and T-shirts. (Ismail Yusanto [HTI Spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 4 November 2013; Hizb ut-Tahrir 1999, 2001).

What had happened since the emergence of FUI was that the leadership role of HTI, which was expected by HT's organisational rules, did not materialise. In many of FUI's mass demonstrations, the HTI's mantra of the re-establishment of the caliphate appeared to have been eclipsedby the goal of the implementation of *sharia.* Moreover, the active participation of FUI in various forms collective action entailed a mention of its identity — FUI — as the organiser of the collective action, instead of HTI, in every of its protest signs and press releases. This in itself is a violation of HT's organisational rules mentioned above and is not common among other HT branches in the world: we can hardly find a HT branch that stages a mass demonstration in coalition with other movements except in Indonesia for a relatively short period of time between 2005 and 2008.

Al-Khaththath was certain that HTI always reported HTI's activities in FUI regularly to the HT's headqurters in the Middle East and that there had been no complaint from HT's supreme leader (*amir*) about this matter (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [former HTI leader], personal communication, Jakarta, 22 June 2013). However, one cannot deny that HTI's effort to lead other Islamic movements in FUI fell short of expectation, and it took about three years for HTI to convince itself that it was simply too hard to control other FUI member movements. This HTI's deviation from its organisational rules does not necessarily alter the general pattern of the traits of the international HT movement that strictly adopts a top-down hierarchical structure and exacts organisational rules on its branches and members. As an example, HT's non-electoral participation stance, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, remains adhered to by its branches.

Karagiannis (2006a; 2006b) argued that HT's financial resources, albeit solid, are a matter of speculation. Furthermore, Cohen (1982: 223) and Farouki (1996: 130-132) believed that the movement's financial resources were primarily derived from regular membership donations, and this was confirmed by HTI's spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto (Muhammad Ismail Yusanto [HTI's Spokesperson, personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008). However, whether every member in the movement pays the same amount of donation or it is dependent upon their amount of income is something that Yusanto avoided to disclose to the author. In addition to membership donations, an internal source of HTI who requested anonymity mentioned that the movement may receive financial support from those that are not affiliated with HT on condition that they must demonstrate that they espouse the causes and ideas of the movement. Moreover, this financial support must be unconditional and directly approved by HT's

supreme leader. HT referred to this type of donator as *mu'ayiid*, which literally means supporter. The other sources of HTI's income derives from the sale of its books, magazines, tabloids, and merchandises such as t-shirts, key holders, and so forth (Abdullah [Local Spokesperson for HTI Central Java Chapter], personal communication, Semarang, 20 March 2008; Tindiyo [Local Spokesperson for HTI Yogyakarta Chapter], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 24 March 2008).

As mentioned earlier in the beginning of this chapter, Al-Khaththath disclosed the fact that HTI leaders receive a monthly salary from the international HT movement in the Middle East (*Lajnah al-Qiyadah*), which suggests that in addition to the aforementioned financial resources, HTI also receives regular financial support from outside Indonesia (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary-General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 20 November 2013). Of course, this comes as no surprise given the fact that HTI is one of the branches of the international Hizb ut-Tahrir movement. However, the financial support from outside Indonesia, which HTI regularly receives, might not be the normal source of the other Islamic revivalist movements' financial support. Certainly, this is because, unlike HTI that is guided by an international leadership based in the Middle East, the other such movements as FPI and MMI are exclusively based in Indonesia and not guided by any international leadership.

In addition to financial resources, another organisational aspect of HTI that is not possible to investigate and verify is the total number of its followers. HTI has many branches spread across Indonesia in Sumatera, Java, Borneo, Bali, and Celebes islands, and, as mentioned earlier, the movement regularly held a series of large public gatherings in the cities of these islands called *Rajab* conference attended by tens of

thousands of its followers (*Tribun News* 2011; *Antara* 2011). However, when the author asked HTI's informants about this, they did not disclose it, and it is quite obvious that keeping this information a secret is part of HTI's policy. This is because HTI is the most organised Islamic revivalist movement in Indonesia, and for this reason, it is very unlikely that the movement does not have data on the total number of its members. While it is true that there has been no legal and administrative obstacle from Indonesian authorities that impedes HTI's activism in the country since its emergence in 2000, keeping such information a secret constitutes a deliberate strategy to avoid giving Indonesian authorities the impression that, as the only movement seeking to re-establish the transnational caliphate, HTI has enough followers to pose an existential threat to the Republic of Indonesia.

4.3.2. *Mobilising Structures of MMI*

According to the statute of MMI based upon the movement's first congress, the movement takes the organisational form of what it refers to as *tansiq* (alliance). That is, an alliance of *mujahid*, which literally means "Muslim fighters", based upon the spirit of *ukhuwah* (Islamic solidarity), *aqidah* (faith), and *manhaj* (methodology) with a view to serving as a movement that can guide *ummah* (people) in their struggle for the enactment of the laws of God on earth, irrespective of their tribe, nation, and state (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 2001: 141). The term "alliance", however, does not denote the common usage of the term that normally refers to an organisation or movement consisting of a number of member organisations. In reality, throughout the course of MMI, it has never become an alliance such as FUI that consists of a number

of movements or organisations. It remains a single Islamic movement along with a set of organisational rules and principles, and its members do not have any affiliations with other Islamic movements, let alone Islamic parties (Abu Jibril [Deputy Leader of MMI], personal communication, Tangerang, 9 April 2014).

MMI's structure is divided into two main committees: 1) the Consultative Assembly *(Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi)*, and; 2) the Executive Committee (*Lajnah Tanfidziyah*). The term *Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi* literally means the influential people who loosen and bind. It contextually refers to a group of influential and trustworthy people who provide *ummah* (the people) with sound judgements regarding all matters that not only fall within the individual sphere, but also that of public. This sort of structure existed during the period of the four *Rashidin* Caliphs (Rightly Guided Caliphs)[65] after the death of Prophet Muhammad and is often emulated by a variety of Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world. Congress is the most important regular event and the highest structure within the consultative assembly during which strategic decisions of the movement are formulated. Below the Congress is *amir* (leader), who leads the consultative assembly. The consultative assembly is responsible for the formulation of the movement's general policies, including programs, and consists of a number of senior and respected Muslim scholars in the country who endorse the implementation of *sharia*. It is worth mentioning that, unlike the members of the executive committee and the members of MMI in general, the

[65] The Rashidin Caliphs, which literally means the rightly guided caliphs (632-661 AD.), refers to a period of an Islamic leadership after the death of Prophet Muhammad. There were four caliphs during this period: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, all of whom were the Prohet's faithful companions. For the history of the Rashidin Caliphs and the early expansion of Islam, see for example, Muir (1963) and Madelung (1997).

members of the consultative assembly may be drawn from people that do not necessarily have an exclusive affiliation with MMI.

The consultative assembly has four departments: 1) Department of *Fatwa* (religious decree), which is responsible for the formulation of *fatwa*; 2) Department of Economy, which is intended to formulate economic programs of the movement based upon the principles of an Islamic economy; 3) Department of Ideology and Politics, which sets the movement's policies concerning political issues, and; 4) Department of Education and Culture, which determines the movement's education and culture policies. These four departments formulate the movement's grand strategies and are therefore not intended to spell out details on how these strategies are to be executed, for such a task falls under the authority of the executive committee. The division of authority between the consultative assembly and the executive committee is a typical organisational structure of virtually all Islamic movements in Indonesia. In fact, a large number of non-Islam based mass organisations and political parties in the country also adopt such division, although it may come in a variety of names. For instance, the consultative assembly of Nahdlatul Ulama, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or the Nation Awakening Party), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Development and Unity Party), PKS (Welfare and Justice Party), and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party) is called *Dewan Syuro* or *Majelis Syuro,* which literally means the consultative council. In Muhammadiyah, the term used to refer to this structure is called *Tanwir*, which literally means "enlightenment", which has exactly the same function as *Dewan Syuro* or *Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi.* This is also the case for Islam-based political organisations such as PD (Partai Demokrat or Democratic Party) that names its consultative assembly *Majelis Tinggi*, which literally means "High-Level Assembly".

This type of structure, albeit similar, has a few significant differences from that of HTI's provincial committee (*Al-lajnah al-Wilayah*) in that its committee members exercise the functions of both the consultative assembly (*Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi* or *Dewan Syuro*) and the executive committee (*Lajnah* Tanfidziyah). Furthermore, while HTI's provincial committee is the highest structure at the nation-state level; it is by no means, as explained before, the highest structure within the movement, for it is an international movement with its leadership in the Middle East.

Below MMI's Consultative Assembly is the Executive Committee, which is responsible for the execution of policies and programs formulated by the consultative assembly. It consists of eight departments as follows: (1) Department of *Sharia* Enforcement, which is crafted to play a major role in the socialisation of the importance of implementing *sharia* in the country; (2) Department of Inter-*Mujahidin* (Muslim fighters) Relations, which is responsible for maintaining co-ordination and communication among all *Mujahidin* in the country and abroad; (3) Department of Human Resources, which is aimed at formulating training programs for Muslim preachers and activists; (4) Department of Ideology and Politics, which is intended to produce future potential Muslim leaders and to design ideological and political strategies for the attainment of the movement's goals; (5) Department of Economy and Finance, which is focused upon the activities of empowering the economy of Muslims based upon the principles of an Islamic economy; (6) Department of Data and Information, which develops databases covering various information regarding the dynamics and challenges of efforts to implement *sharia* in Indonesia; (7) Department of Welfare, which aspires to gradually increase the wellbeing of Muslims, and; (8) Department of *Asykariah* (militia), which is a paramilitary wing of the

movement designed to provide the movement with a special task-force to help the implementation of *sharia* succeed and easily mobilise the movement's various events of collective action (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 2001: 175-176).

Regarding MMI's financial sources, like HTI and other Islamic movements, MMI relies on donations to finance its activities. According to the statute of the movement based upon its first congress, donations may come from both individuals and institutions. In addition to donations, membership dues and a variety of legal financial sources from the movement's commercial activities also become MMI's financial sources. Donations have always been the favourite financial source of any sort of social movement organisation, including Islamic movements. However, as discussed before, the extent to which the details of the donations such as, "who" (individuals or institutions) give the donations and "how much" money they give to the movement, are something that will remain a mystery to many outsiders.

Some of the movements such as HTI, as clarified by its former leader Muhammad al-Khaththath, receive financial support from overseas, and yet HTI's spokesperson Ismail Yusanto never acknowledged it to the author. Receiving donations and collecting membership among Islamic movements dues are not prohibited from the authority in Indonesia. However, disclosing the identity of the individuals or institutions that give the donations is something that these movements avoid for various reasons that have been mentioned before. While the details of their financial sources cannot be ascertained, it is possible to gauge the solidity of their financial resources and human resources. It is only natural that Islamic revivalist movements in the country attempt to transmit their messages to the public and appeal to potential recruits with a view to attaining their goals. The wide range of media used,

such as magazines, bulletins, tabloids, radio, and websites, are undeniably effective. However, the extent to which the capacity of these movements to publish, develop, and maintain a variety of media presence varies from one movement to another, and is contingent upon the capacity of the movement's human and financial resources.

MMI runs a website as a means to disseminate the movement's profile, press release, and thoughts to the public.[66] The movement used to publish a monthly magazine called *Risalah Mujahidin* (The messages of Muslim Fighters). It no longer publishes the magazine due to financial difficulties from a few years ago, but it regularly publishes a much more modest publication, namely, a four-page bulletin called *Sabiluna* (Our Path) (Abu Jibril [Deputy Leader of MMI], personal communication, Tangerang, 9 April 2014). In terms of the quantity and variety of the media, HTI definitely outdoes MMI, managing a wide range of regular publications, as mentioned before, such as a weekly bulletin (*Al-Islam*), a monthly magazine (*Al-Wa'ie*), a bi-weekly tabloid (*Media Umat*), and Internet Radio as well as TV Channels. This suggests that despite awareness on the importance of publishing a variety of media as a valuable means to achieve the *sharia* agenda on the part of Islamic revivalist movements, not all them have the sufficient resources, particularly the financial ones, to produce regular and well-maintained publications.

Unlike MMI, HTI has never halted each of these media on grounds of financial difficulties. Furthermore, despite the fact that MMI claims to have had approximately 30 branches that are scattered across regions in Indonesia, except for its congress held every five years, the movement rarely holds a large public gathering that is aimed

[66] See MMI's website at http://majelismujahidin.com/

at both consolidating its members and sympathisers all around the country and sending a message to the public, authority, and its opponents that it does exist and is growing. In contrast, as mentioned before, HTI has been holding a variety of large public gatherings since it came out in the open in 2001 such as the regular events of the International Conferences and the *Rajab* Conferences.

MMI's repertoire of collective action includes mass demonstrations, and the movement has engaged in this type of protest since its establishment. However, compared to HTI and FPI, MMI stages less frequent mass demonstrations. While HTI addresses virtually all trending political, economic, and moral issues that draw large public attention such as the rise of fuel prices, university tuition fees, corruption scandals among government officials, and the Miss World pageant held in Bali in 2013, among others, MMI rarely raises such political and economic issues. Over the last decade, the movement had devoted a great deal of its time and energy to protest against the alleged government's unjust trial and sentence of its former leader Abu Bakar Baasyir on a charge of immigration violation in 2003. The movement's protests against this issue were also aimed at the United States government, which is considered the main culprit behind this sentence: MMI strongly believed that it was the United States government that played a major part in pressuring the Indonesian government to send Baasyir to jail.

MMI's Secretary, Shobbarin Syakur, holds a view that the movement's focus of protest on this issue is one of the reasons why MMI rarely raised other protest issues through mass demonstrations. Moreover, mass protest is actually not the main repertoire of collective action of the movement, because MMI pays more attention to the other type of action, which is a public debate. This type of action requires MMI to

challenge any movements, organisations, or individuals, be they Muslims or non-Muslims, which hold or express deviant or misleading views on Islam which MMI aims to correct (Shobbarin Syakur [Secretary of MMI], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2013). However, MMI's relatively rare mass demonstrations are not only attributed to its preference of the type of collective action, but also to its lack of capacity to mobilise resources, particularly in terms of its human resources. One can easily notice that the number of participants joining mass demonstrations by MMI is less numerous that that of the other similar Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI and FPI.[67] The financial difficulties in continuously publishing its media, as mentioned above, along with the movement's relatively meagre capacity to mobilise people to stage mass demonstrations suggest that MMI has less capacity to mobilise both financial and human resources than the other major Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI.

In August 2008, before the third MMI's Congress was held, Baasyir resigned from the movement due to unresolved differences on the concept of Islamic leadership between him and other senior leaders of the movement, the details of which will be discussed in chapter five. His resignation brought at least two consequences on the organisational dynamics of MMI. First, considering the fact that Basasyir was a charismatic leader in MMI, his resignation significantly undermined the solidity of the movement. Second, there were a large number of MMI's members and symphatisers

[67] For example, a mass demonstration staged by MMI in front of the Office of the Attorney General demanding that death sentence on the convicts of the 2002 Bali Bombing be cancelled was attended by only a handful of people (approximately 30 people). See for example, *Viva News* (2008). In contrast, the majority of mass demonstrations staged by HTI and FPI mobilise much more people than that of MMI. See for example, *Voice of Islam* (2013b).

who supported his resignation, which in turn facilitated the emergence of a splinter movement called JAT (Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid or the Congregation of the Oneness of God). An internal source of MMI admitted that Baasyir's resignation had decreased the support base of the movement with a significant number of branches from the area of East Java diverting their support into joining the newly-established movement (Shobbarin Syakur [Secretary of MMI], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2013). Baasyir established JAT in September 2008 in Solo. Its members and sympathisers were largely drawn from the disenchanted MMI members and students of Al-Mukmin Boarding School, which he established in 1972 together with his colleague, Abdullah Sungkar, who also fled to Malaysia during the Suharto period (*Radar Solo* 2008). The fact is that MMI suffered from a reduced support base upon Baasyir's resignation and the establishment of JAT stands in contrast with that of HTI in which the dismissal of its former leader Al-Khaththath, who later established HDI, hardly affected HTI's support base. Again, this difference shows us that despite the shared ultimate objective of the two movements — the implementation of *sharia* — their capacity to mobilise resources differs from one another.

The networks of friends, families, and neighbours have acted as an effective means of providing Islamic revivalist movements with potential recruits, and MMI is no exception. Once a person becomes a member of the movement, he or she will persuade their family or friends to join the movement through participating in its regular Islamic studies circles. These study circles are usually held in mosques or in the houses of the movement's members, and the backgrounds of these members are as varied as those of the other Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI and FPI ranging from non-Islamic university students and teachers to entrepreneurs and

white-collar workers. Some of the members and sympathisers were raised in Muhammadiyah backgrounds and became teachers in Muhammadiyah schools. This suggests that affiliations with either Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama do not constitute an issue to becoming members of MMI so long as they concur with the movement's principles, particularly those related to commitment to the implementation of *sharia* in the country. A rank-and-file member of the movement, Tomi, told the author that his motivation for joining MMI was to actively engage in *da'wah* (preaching) activities (Tomi [Rank and File Member of MMI], personal communication, Tangerang, 27 September 2013). However, there are other members with various different and more specific reasons than those of Tomi such as a desire to learn about Islam more comprehensively and to live life in accordance with *sharia* (Fuadi 2009: 45-50).

MMI is a member organisation of FUI and is fairly active in participating in FUI's collective action. Given that FUI is a coalition that is based in Jakarta, it is MMI's Jakarta chapter that contributes to FUI's activities. Among the leaders of MMI, it is Abu Jibril, Deputy Leader of MMI, who often appears in various collective actions of FUI, particularly mass demonstrations. Jibril's participation in FUI is simply due to geographical proximity to the coalition's activities that primarily take place in Jakarta. He lives in the Greater Jakarta area, which allows him to easily interact with other leaders of Islamic revivalist movements and to engage in FUI's collective action, while other MMI's leaders such as Muhammad Thalib, the Supreme Leader, and Irfan S. Awwas, the Chairman of the Executive Committee live in Yogyakarta — MMI's headquarters. MMI's relationship with FUI, which is led by its Secretary-General, Al-Khaththath, is nevertheless characterised by a certain level of distrust and ambiguity.

The leaders of the movement's executive committee in Yogyakarta such as Awwas and Syakur denied MMI's affiliation with FUI considering the fact that the latter often acted unilaterally without consultation with the former (Irfan S. Awwas [MMI's Chairperson of the Executive Committee], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2013).

The relationship demonstrated a certain level of distrust, as there were occasions in which MMI complained about the mechanism in which FUI produced its decisions. For instance, Syakur lamented the fact that FUI unilaterally expressed its electoral support for the former pair of Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto in the 2009 Presidential election (Shobbarin Syakur [Secretary of MMI], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2013). Not only did MMI criticise such a one-sided decision, the movement also deplored the concept of electoral participation in a secular-democracy system, and it has hitherto taken a non-electoral participation stance, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Jibril was also aware of this unilateral action of FUI, but he refrained from severing ties with them for the sake of the solidarity and unity of pro-*sharia* Islamic movements in Indonesia (Abu Jibril [Deputy Leader of MMI], personal communication, Tangerang, 9 April 2014).

The relationship also demonstrated a certain level of ambiguity and inconsistency of views between the leaders of MMI on whether or not the movement is officially a member organisation of FUI. In addition to the aforementioned FUI unilateral electoral support, on one occasion the relationship between the two deteriorated as MMI's invitation sent to AL-Khaththath to organise a mass rally against an allegedly deviant *Shia* community in Jakarta fell on deaf ears, which is attributable

to different views on whether or not *Shia* is considered a deviant sect and on how to best deal with this community. It is true that as far as Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia are concerned, it is the spirit of the implementation of *sharia* that provides them with the basis for banding together. However, there are also an abundance of ideological differences among them, which sometimes leads to inter-movement strain and conflict. Unlike HTI that firmly decided to cut ties with FUI following the Monas Incident, MMI's posture on FUI is at best ambiguous. One the one hand, MMI is confronted with some policy disagreements over such issues as electoral participation and *Shia*, but on the other hand, the movement finds that refraining from being involved in FUI's activities does not constitute a good option for preserving the solidarity and unity among Islamic revivalist movements.

Like HTI, MMI avoided disclosing the figures of its followers, which is most likely due to its desire to avoid drawing attention to itself, particularly from the government. However, according to one of MMI's former member, upon the resignation of its charismatic leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir, in 2008, MMI suffered from the exodus of its members. They later joined Baasyir in order to establish a splinter movement called JAT (Nanang Ainur Rofiq [former MMI member and current chairman of JAT's Jakartca Chapter], personal communication, Jakarta, 23 August 2013). MMI also has branches in a number of provinces or districts in the country, although the number of these branches is not as many as HTI.[68] Furthermore, unlike HTI and FPI, MMI's head office is located in the city of Yogyakarta, not in the capital city of Jakarta, thanks to the historic city of Yogyakarta in which MMI was established. However, it is the MMI's

[68] For a list of MMI's branches in provinces and districts, see its website: http://www.majelismujahidin.com/lpwlpd-majelis-mujahidin/.

Jakarta chapter that is granted responsibility by its head office in Yogyakarta for communication and co-ordination purposes between MMI and other Islamic movements located in Jakarta, including FUI.

4.3.3. *Mobilising Structures of FPI*

FPI's support base is not drawn from university students. Unlike HTI and MMI, the history of FPI did not begin from the LDK campus-based Islamic study circles. The movement's pattern of recruitment is heavily influenced by the type of the socio-religious backgrounds of its founders and leaders. Virtually all the founders of FPI are *habaib* and *kyai*[69] whose followers are not based on campus. *Habaib* in Indonesia often hold gatherings in their local vicinity during which they give sermons, while *kyai* draw their support-base from students in their Islamic boarding schools. Both *habaib* and *kyai* occupy high social status and are respected particularly in religious communities in the country.[70] Therefore, the large number of FPI members and sympathisers are drawn from people who regularly attend the aforementioned Islamic study gatherings held by *habaib* and from students of Islamic boarding schools whose *kyai* are leaders or influential members in the movement.

Because *habaib* and *kyai* are the dominant leaders in FPI, in contrast to HTI, charismatic leadership is the type of leadership that prevails in FPI. Indeed, it is the

[69] *Kyai* is referred to as a prominent religious teacher who graduate from and often lead an Islamic boarding school.

[70] For discussion of the role of *kyai* in Indonesia, see Dhofier (1980). For discussion of the role of Hadrami community in Indonesia, including the *habaib*, see for example Mobini-Kesheh (1999).

charisma of its founder and supreme leader, Rizieq Shihab, that helps sustain the movement's activities. Shihab was born in Jakarta on 24 August 1965 and went to non-religious elementary and high schools. However, this did not prevent him from learning Islamic subjects as his parents provided him with a religious teacher to teach him Islamic subjects in his after-school time (Jaya Suprana Talk-Show 2014). Aspiring to pursue further education on Islamic studies in the Middle East, he entered a diploma program on the Arabic language in a Saudi government-funded higher education institution called LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or Institute of Islamic Study and Arabic) and continued his study further in the School of Law at King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Rizieq returned to Indonesia after graduating in 1990 and became an active preacher in his community in Jakarta. He soon enrolled in a post-graduate program in the International Islamic University Malaysia but decided to quit the program and to become a preacher once again, returning to Jakarta after spending a semester there (Jahroni 2008: 14). Graduating from a university in Saudi Arabia and having been descended from an Arab clan that has a direct blood relationship with Prophet Muhammad, Shihab came to prominence as an Islamic preacher and supreme leader of FPI with a relatively considerable number of followers. Certainly, Shihab's prominence functions as the FPI's most valuable source, not only for mustering support but also maintaining its solidity, ensuring the continuation of the movement's programs.

Rizieq also serves as what McCarthy and Zald (1987: 17-18) referred to as the movement's 'entrepreneur', playing a crucial role in an otherwise inactive movement, stimulating protest and mobilising resources. Indeed, an internal source of the

movement admitted that with a view to sustaining the movement's activities and programs in the future, instead of electing a new supreme leader, the rank of Rizieq in FPI has recently been elevated to what the movement calls *Imam Besar* or the Great Leader based on the unanimous decision of its third congress held in Jakarta in August 2013. The position of supreme leader he left was occupied by Muhsin al-Attas, one of the senior figures in the movement who is also from an Arab clan that has a direct blood relationship with Prophet Muhammad (Slamet Maarif [Deputy Secretary-General], personal communication, Cibubur, 20 November 2013).

The organisational structure of FPI has a lot in common with the majority of Islamic movements or organisations in the country in which there are basically two separate bodies of authorities: the Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Syuro*) and the Executive Committee (*Majelis Tanfidzi*). However, unlike MMI, after the elevation of the rank of Shihab to the Great Leader, the highest structure of FPI is nevertheless not the Consultative Assembly, but the Great Leader, and this structure consists of none but Shihab. The Consultative Assembly has the same standing as the Executive Committee, and it is led by a leader who is assisted by a secretary and five chairpersons in charge of five departments: Department of *Sharia*; Department of Honour; Department of Human Resources; Department of Advisory; Department of Supervisory. Meanwhile, FPI's Executive Committee consists of a leader; a secretary who is assisted with several vice secretaries; a trustee who is assisted by several vice trustees; and, some departments and autonomous bodies. The movement has more numerous departments than MMI ranging from Department of Religious Affairs and Foreign Affairs to Social Welfare and Women. The movement's autonomous bodies have had the same standing as the departments, but they are given more leeway to

govern themselves in terms of the formulation of programs and the chain of command. There are five autonomous bodies: Committee for Anti-Vice Monitoring; Committee for Preaching; Committee for Economic Empowerment, and; Committee for Legal Advocacy (Front Pembela Islam 2008), and an autonomous body of the paramilitary wing "Laskar Pembela Islam" or Islamic Defenders Militia that, like MMI, serves as a special task-force with the objective of facilitating the implementation of FPI's primary goal: "enjoining good and forbidding evil".

The other autonomous body in FPI that does not exist in the other Islamic revivalist movements, including HTI and MMI, is "Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia" or the Indonesian Red Crescent. It was deliberately set up in 2008 to respond to the increasing need of humanitarian assistance with a view to alleviating the impacts of natural disasters that have inflicted enormous suffering and damage across Indonesia over the last decade (Slamet Maarif [Deputy Secretary-General], personal communication, 29 May 2014). The movement has dispatched its Red Crescent to a variety of natural disasters-hit regions such as Yogyakarta during the volcano eruption in 2010 and North Sumatera during the Sinabung volcano eruptions in 2010 and 2013. Even before the Red Crescent was set up, the movement had dispatched its humanitarian mission to help the victims of devastating earthquakes in Aceh in 2004, Nias in 2005, and Padang in 2009. It also provided the victims of seasonal flooding in Jakarta with humanitarian assistance such as food and temporary camps through establishing emergency control posts (Muhammad Sahroji [a rank-and-file member of FPI], personal communication, Jakarta, 25 September 2013; *The New York Times* 2005; *Era Muslim* 2009; *Hidayatullah* 2014; *Detik* 2014).

As a religious-based movement, FPI's role in such post-disaster humanitarian assistance comes as no surprise, and the other Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI and MMI also engage in such an activity in an effort to appeal to the public and attract new potential recruits. However, unlike HTI and MMI, FPI deliberately creates divisions in its organisational structure that is specifically aimed at humanitarian assistance. Despite the fact that FPI's protest activities are more palpable in the eyes of the Indonesian public, the movement never rules out becoming active in humanitarian activities. This is because, as we can see in the variety of its organisational divisions or departments, FPI never limits the type of activities it engages in, which stands in contrast with HTI that firmly considers itself a political movement as opposed to a social or humanitarian movement. This stance requires HTI to exclusively focus its activities on politics in such a way as to raise the awareness of the public on the importance of embracing Islam as the one and only ideology and the best guide for life through the re-establishment of the caliphate. It is the ideology and principles of a movement that determines the features of its organisational structure, activities, and programs as well as the output of its support-seeking strategies.

The ideologies, principles, and framing of these Islamic revivalist movements will be further discussed in the next chapter, but as far as FPI is concerned, the movement's fundamental objective of 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' is basically meant to encompass a plethora of aspects, not only politics but also social. Unlike HTI, this objective does not require the FPI to go so far as to call for the establishment of an Islamic state, and it has never called for it since the beginning of its history. On the one hand, the movement actively engaged in mass protests against the

government whenever the movement found that there was an un-Islamic government measure it needed to address, particularly those related to a variety of social vices. However, surprisingly enough, on the other hand it does not rule out forging cooperation with the government in the area of social and development. As an example, FPI signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2012 for a social project called "Home Improvements" aiming to renovate the dwellings of the poor in some regions that are unfit for habitation (Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs 2012).

Although the other such movements as HTI and MMI also, to a certain extent, take part in post-disaster relief activities, they never established such cooperation with the government, and the post-disaster relief activities they engaged in were done independently in terms of motivation and human as well as financial resources. However, it is worth mentioning that, interestingly, the Indonesian media tended to cover the FPI's protest activities instead of its social and humanitarian ones.[71] Regardless of whether or not the journalists and editors of these media deliberately overlook FPI's role in social and humanitarian activities, Gamson and Meyer's (1996: 288) argument that the media rewards big news that emerges from the polemics and confrontations among social movements seems to hold true as far as this particular movement is concerned.

[71] The mainstream media in Indonesia such as *Kompas, Media Indonesia, Tempo,* and many others did not cover and report the FPI's humanitarian activities in helping the victims of seasonal flooding in Jakarta. Most of the reports and coverage of such activities were done by the uninfluential online media of Islamic preaching communities or Islamic revivalist movements such as *Suara Islam*, *Dakwatuna, Voice of Islam*, etc.

Similar to the other Islamic revivalist movements, FPI relies on donations from its members and sympathisers. However, in reality, more often than not, the movement's monthly membership dues cannot be collected, mainly due to the negligence of its members to pay the dues regularly (Novel Bamu'min [Secretary of FPI's Jakarta Chapter], personal communication, Jakarta, 1 June 2013). Furthermore, despite the presence of the movement's chapters in many regions in the country, FPI has been unable to provide its members with well-organised and regular training programs for its cadres, mainly attributable to the lack of organisational resources and awareness on the importance of such training programs. Consequently, since FPI came out in the open, there have been a number of incidents in which its members were involved in crime and violent clashes with either civilians, members of its opponent organisations, and the authorities. Indeed, the Indonesian Police Department announced that FPI was the most violent mass organisation in the country (*Tempo* 2012). Furthermore, Ng (2005) pointed out that some individuals in FPI's paramilitary wing (LPI) often took advantage of their membership with this wing to earn money by extorting the owners of places they considered un-Islamic, such as brothels, nightclubs, and casinos. While many would agree that there are a number of cases that confirm FPI members' involvement in crime and violent activities, Wilson (2008: 208) has pointed out that the top leaders of FPI are aware of such an alarming situation and have taken measures to redress it by either sanctioning or expelling those involved in violent activities and crime. This was confirmed by the leader and senior member of the movement (Muhsin Al-Attas [Leader of FPI], personal communication, Jakarta, 8 January 2014; Novel Bamu'min [Secretary of FPI's Jakarta Chapter], personal communication, Jakarta, 1 June 2013). However, despite the

movement leaders' commitment mentioned above, we can still see a series of violent incidents involving its members.[72]

There are at least three factors that contribute to the enduring cycle of violence on the part of FPI. First, despite the movement's claims that it occasionally holds open recruitment to seek qualified members based on Islamic criteria, it heavily relies on the personal networks of its members and sympathisers to muster support. Members of the FPI board are primarily drawn from *habaib* and *ulama*, while the rank-and-file members are normally drawn from a variety of nominal Muslims, that is, the average Muslims who are not really knowledgeable about the teachings of Islam. In fact, owing to the movement leaders' convictions that it is necessary to embrace unfortunate individuals to guide them to Islamic teachings, FPI is not disinclined to recruit thugs to serve as the backbone of its paramilitary wing (Ng 2005: 101-106). It is this paramilitary wing that acts as the primary source of the masses whenever the movement engages in collective action, and the members of this paramilitary wing, alas, often possess a mood of bellicosity and are thus easily provoked into clashes with their opponents or police officers.

Second, FPI's training methods and programs for its members, particularly the members of its paramilitary wing, are far from being effective in producing those who are fully aware of the significance of employing peaceful means. The movement has regular internal gatherings at every level of its structure, i.e. provincial and district levels, which are commonly referred to as *pengajian* or Islamic study circles (Novel Bamu'min [Secretary of FPI's Jakarta Chapter], personal communication, Jakarta, 1

[72] See for example, *Merdeka* (2013)

June 2013). However, the majority of these gatherings are intended to deliver sermons by the movement's senior members concerning Islamic subjects such as *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), *tauhid* (the concept of monotheism in Islam), *tarikh* (the history of Islam), and Quran and *hadits* (the narration of Prophet Muhammad).[73]

These gatherings are not aimed at providing the FPI's rank-and-file members with comprehensive knowledge and a guide of the movement's organisational and ideological-related matters such as its objectives and methods for achieving them, or its vision and mission, values, principles, and so forth. This sort of internal gathering stands in stark contrast with the unquestionably strict and well-organised HTI training methods and programs. As discussed before, the smallest unit of HTI's structure is called *halaqah* — a sort of Islamic study circle that consists of approximately five members or novices in which they learn regularly from a HTI senior member called *mushrif* about both Islamic subjects and HTI's organisational and ideological-related knowledge. The *mushrif* monitors the progress of all members or novices under his or her guidance, and they will not let their students elevate to the next level of lessons if they do not pass the criteria set by the movement.

Third, while it is believed that the FPI's ineffective training methods and programs have contributed to the involvement of its members and sympathisers in a number of violent incidents, the inability of the movement's leaders to ensure the employment of peaceful means in all of its mass protests is further evidence of not only the FPI's poor capacity to manage its human resources, but also its lack of commitment to renouncing violence. This is evidenced by the fact that on frequent

[73] See for example a collection of Rizieq Shihab's sermons, Shihab (2013b).

occasions, FPI senior members who were in charge of organising mass protests found difficulties in preventing their members from being provoked into getting involved in violent incidents, as confirmed by the movement's senior member as follows:

> *We had tried our best to ensure that we staged all of our mass protests peacefully. However, people need to understand that due to the large number of our protest participants coupled with unexpected circumstances arising in the street that played a part in losing their temper, sometimes there was not much we could do to prevent them from crossing the line. That was beyond our control* (Jafar Shodiq (Deputy Secretary-General of FPI), personal communication, Jakarta, 5 June 2013).

While mass demonstrations become the most common type of collective action employed by Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, each of them has their most preferred type of collective action other than the mass demonstrations. As mentioned before, although MMI has also engaged in mass demonstrations, it is nevertheless not its most preferred type of collective action: public debates are preferred. HTI used mass demonstrations as its primary repertoire of action in addition to regular national or regional-level public gatherings. But unlike FPI, neither HTI nor MMI had ever conducted the sweep of places that are considered un-Islamic. Certainly, sweeping the so-called un-Islamic places has been associated with FPI since the beginning of its history. As mentioned before, FPI's underlying objective constitutes 'enjoining good and forbidding evil', which also functions as the movement's motto.

The motto of 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' has two action implications. The 'Enjoining good' motto is implemented in a wide range of activities that are primarily aimed at realising good deeds that can bring benefits to others such as establishing the Indonesian Red Crescent with a view to helping mitigate the impacts of post-natural disasters in various regions in the country. Meanwhile, the 'forbidding evil' motto is aimed at eradicating vices in society. In the eyes of FPI, un-Islamic places such as brothels and discotheques are some obvious examples of such places. The purpose of FPI's sweeping activities is more oriented to encouraging the owners of such places to close their business particularly during the month of Ramadan, rather than recruiting potential members and spreading its ideology. Mass protest is the other commonly-employed type of FPI collective action, and the movement began to frequently use this particular type of collective action after it joined FUI in 2005.

Under the leadership of former HTI leader, Al-Khaththath, FUI staged mass demonstrations quite frequently, and it is worth noting that although FUI is a coalition consisting of a variety of Islamic revivalist movements, FPI is nevertheless the most active and the largest member organisation in FUI. Furthermore, FPI has never missed any of FUI's mass demonstrations that Al-Khaththath initiated, which explains why FPI began to frequently employ mass demonstrations as one of its preferred modes of action. While holding a variety of seminars or study circles in universities is one of the inextricable parts of HTI and MMI support-seeking strategies, rarely has FPI reached out to university students, thanks to the dissimilar historical backgrounds between HTI/MMI and FPI.

As discussed earlier, the first generation of leaders and members of the former were mostly university students, and it thus comes as no surprise that university

students constituted the majority of their early support basis. In contrast, FPI's support basis primarily consists of students of *kyai* in Islamic boarding schools and a variety of people who regularly attend the Islamic study circles held by *habaib*, which explains why the movement was at best not familiar with the strategies on how to reach out and appeal to the potential recruits of university students. With respect to publications, it has been pointed out earlier that HTI is undoubtedly the only Islamic revivalist movement that is fully aware of the importance of expanding its influence and ideology through a vast range of its unparalleled media and publications such as books, bulletins, magazines, newsletters, website, online radio and TV. Although having had fewer media and publications than HTI, MMI publishes bulletins and magazines in addition to the commonly employed other media such as books and websites as an effective means to disseminate its thoughts. In contrast, FPI does not have a regularly published bulletin and magazine, although it maintains a website and publishes books regarding its organisational features and thoughts. However, weekly and monthly Islamic bulletins and magazines have become the preferred effective media for Islamic movements that have emerged from universities.

These two media have been popular among campus-based Muslim activists since before the fall of Suharto, and these activists have had sufficient technical know-how on the production and management of this sort of media. Of course, this is not to say the leaders of FPI are not aware of the importance of diversifying its media and publications in order to find more recruits and muster more support. However, it is the aforementioned dissimilar backgrounds and characteristics of support-base between FPI and HTI as well as MMI that explains why some of them pay considerable attention to the importance of producing and maintaining a certain sort of media or

publications such as those of bulletins and magazines, while the other was simply not familiar with the technical know-how for the production and management of bulletins and magazines and thus relies on the other type of media such as websites.

Unlike HTI and MMI, FPI is not reluctant to mention the estimate of the number of its followers. FPI mentioned that the total number of its followers was about seven million people (*CNN Indonesia* 2014). However, as mentioned earlier, FPI is less organised than HTI in terms of the management of its organisation, which consequently cast doubt on the validity of this estimate. While it is true that, like HTI and MMI, FPI has many branches scattered across provinces, districts, and cities in Indonesia, an internal source of FPI acknowledged that the movement still had problems with the collection of data on its members (Novel Bamu'min [Secretary of FPI Jakarta Chapter], personal communication, Jakarta, 1 June 2013). These problems primarly revolved around the nature of the rule of the FPI's membership that is very loose coupled with the movement's poor capacity to manage its human resources, hence the difficulties in the collection of data on its members.

4.4. *Summary*

Through the lens of the social movement perspectives of political opportunity structure, and mobilising structures, this chapter has examined the emergence of FUI major member movements, and the manner in which they organise in order to advance their cause. All of the movements examined in this chapter— HTI, MMI, and HTI — came out into the open and gained political space following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. Among these three movements, only the HTI has actually

existed since the beginning of the 1980s, while MMI and FPI were established after the fall of Suharto. The fact that HTI is a branch of the international Hizbut Tahrir movement makes it the only internationally guided Islamic revivalist movement in the country, and as such has palpable different organisational characteristics than MMI and FPI.

While HTI has a strict and well-organised organisational structure and training programs, FPI, albeit possessing a large number of followers, has faced difficulties in providing its members with effective training programs, which consequently has led to the fact that, more often than not, its paramilitary wing engages in violent clashes with its opponents during mass protests. MMI basically shares a lot in common with HTI in terms of the way in which it has organised its training programs in that it pays close attention to the progress and development of its members through holding an intensive and small-scale *halaqah* (Islamic study circle), but it has poorer financial resources than HTI. This is worsened by an internal conflict within MMI that has engendered the establishment of a splinter movement and further reduced MMI's organisational solidity.

Further, this chapter has examined the pattern in which each of these movements executed its support-seeking strategies. While they all have an ardent aspiration towards *sharia*, the extent to which they execute their strategies to disseminate their ideologies and to garner support differs from one another. As a movement that initially began their activities in universities, HTI has the ability to reach out and appeal to university students. In contrast, being set up by *habaib* and *kyai*, the vast majority of FPI's support-base is drawn not from university students,

but from the students of Islamic boarding schools led by *kyai* and from a variety of people who regularly attend *habaib's* Islamic study circles.

This chapter has attempted to deepen our understanding of the similarities and differences of how FUI major member movements mobilise their organisational resources in an attempt to realise their pro-*sharia* aspirations. This knowledge enables us to better understand how and to what extent FUI relies on organisational resources from these major member movements. This is because FUI is a coalition movement whose activism relies immensely on its major member movements. Moreover, the findings of this chapter will later help us understand how FUI manages differences or positions itself among them in order to sustain its activism.

Chapter Five

The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of FUI Major Member Movements

5.1. *Introduction*

Social movements do not merely rely on their ability to mobilise support for a variety of mass protests they stage in public. They also need to develop their frames of protest by means of interpreting and assigning meaning to events and conditions, which are in turn transmitted to the public, resonate across multiple layers of audiences and tap into the collective memory of the public. This sort of process is often referred to as 'framing' and is extremely vital to every social movement in their attempt to appeal to the public and transform the bystander public into adherents. Nevertheless, in order to analyse the framing process of social movements, one cannot overlook the role of their ideologies. It is these ideologies that serve as the set of beliefs that, in turn, determine how these movements perceive and interpret the world and how they justify what is right and wrong through which discontent and issues are framed (Zald 1996: 262; Oberschall 1996: 94).

Virtually all Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia agree that Islam should not be regarded merely as a theological reference that attends to such religious injunctions as daily prayers, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca and the likes. They extol the virtues of Islam that functions both as a corpus of rules and an overarching way of life that also regulates political and public affairs; hence the relentless demands on the part of these movements for the implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law). However,

despite their common endeavour to make Islam the only solution (*Islam huwa al hall*) to a plethora of perceived problems in Indonesia, the extent to which they articulate their ideologies and translate them into various forms of collective action differs from one movement to another. For instance, despite their vehement support for the enactment of *sharia* in the country, HTI and FPI have a different view on whether an Islamic state should be established in Indonesia. While HTI consistently offers their version of an Islamic state — the caliphate — as a panacea to any social and economic ills confronting the country, FPI has never shown any predisposition towards the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. In order to investigate how HTI develops its frames of protest, we should understand its very concept of the caliphate around which the majority of its frames of protest are centred and developed. In addition, it is only through a sound understanding of the movement's concept of democracy that we can explain why HTI often denounces the current political system of the country as secular and therefore un-Islamic. Similarly, we cannot account for why despite FPI's preference for virulent and sometimes violent anti-vice campaigns, it does not rule out establishing cooperation with the Indonesian authorities to engage in social and humanitarian assistance without understanding its key concept of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil).

Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to analyse the plurality of ideologies of FUI member movements. It will also examine how the ideologies of these movements are framed, that is, the ways in which they articulate and accentuate their messages of protest that emanate from their ideologies as they are embroiled in a contestation of meaning in the socio-political milieu of contemporary Indonesia. This chapter employs three core framing concepts developed by Benford and Snow (2000)

that consist of diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Social movements seek to change socio-political conditions that are loaded with problems that need to be tackled. At this initial stage, movements have constructed and developed the diagnostic framing that attends to the function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility, which is also referred to as "naming grievances" (McAdam 1996: 110). Movements further connect these grievances with other grievances. Prognostic framing, the second core of the framing task, deals with the primary task of offering solutions to the problems, including planning a protest or attack along with tactics on how to execute the plan. The third framing, motivational framing, provides a rationale for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents. This task includes the formulation of an array of apt and powerful vocabularies that, when adopted and espoused by the adherents, will help sustain their participation in the various forms of the movements' protests (Benford and Snow 2000: 615-618).

In chapter four, we have discussed the emergence and mobilising of structures of the three major FUI member movements: HTI, MMI, and FPI. This chapter will first examine the basic ideologies of these three movements. Through the lens of framing, it will then analyse how these ideologies are articulated and translated into frames of protest. It will also clarify the extent to which these ideologies and frames of protest vary from one movement to another.

5.2. *The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of HTI*

5.2.1. *The Caliphate, Nation-State, and Nationalism*

The caliphate has occupied an extremely important ideological role in HTI. In addition to the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, it has served not only as the movement's ultimate objective, but also its recurring slogan that is present whenever it engages in collective action. HTI has consistently proposed the caliphate as the overarching solution to any social and economic ill it has ever addressed since coming out in the open in the beginning of the 2000s. The founder of the international Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, had written a book entitled *Nidham ul Islam* (The System of Islam) in which he laid the foundations of the caliphate along with its features and principles. Indeed, An-Nabhani provided his followers with the detailed statutes of the caliphate by means of formulating the draft constitution of the political entity he envisioned (An-Nabhani 2002: 115-164). The movement views the caliphate as a unified political entity whose system of law and government is utterly based upon *sharia*. It had existed from the period of the Rashidin Caliphs (632-661 AD)[74] to the Ottoman Caliphate before it was officially dissolved on 3 March 1924[75] soon after the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk was declared (Commins 1991: 195). As a result, there are some underlying differences that distinguish the caliphate from the modern political entity called the nation-state. In

[74] The Rashidin Caliphs literally means the rightly guided caliphs, and refers to a period of an Islamic leadership after the death of Prophet Muhammad. In total, there were four caliphs during this period: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, all of which were the Prohet's faithful companions. For the history of the Rashidin Caliphs and the early expansion of Islam, see for example, Muir (1963) and Madelung (1997).

[75] For the history of the last period of the Ottoman Empire, see for example, Palmer (1992).

order to delineate these differences, it is worth employing the definition of the nation-state developed by Benedict Anderson (1991).

The modern nation-state is characterised as "an imagined political community" that is both inherently limited and sovereign. It is limited because it has finite boundaries, beyond which lie other nation-states. Furthermore, it is sovereign because it is born out of the Age of the Enlightenment in Europe that has rendered the widely-regarded corrupt dynastic monarchies and divine sovereignty obsolete. The inevitable consequence of the primary feature of "limited boundaries" is the fact that, unlike the old political system of dynastic monarchy, there is no modern nation-state today that can claim its authority over any other nation-state. Moreover, the "sovereign" aspect that virtually all of today's modern nation-states enjoy is inherently secular in that it is not derived from any divinely ordained injunctions, and the role of both religion and religious institutions are radically diminished, inescapably being relegated to a mere individual sphere. These basic features of the nation-state certainly lie in stark contrast to the caliphate. The concept of boundaries in the caliphate is antithetical to the limited boundaries of the nation-state which can both enlarge due to annexation and shrink due to, for instance, land concessions as a result of suffering from a defeat in a war (Tindiyo [The Spokesperson of HTI Yogyakarta Chapter], personal communication, Yogyakarta, 4 December 2005). Furthermore, secularism is not recognised in the caliphate's system of law and government on grounds that Islam serves as the one and only overarching ideology, which is divinely ordained, that regulates all the affairs of life, both individual and public.

The Islamic creed ('aqeedah) constitutes the foundation of the state. Nothing is permitted to exist in the government's structure, accountability, or any other aspect connected with the government, that does not take the creed as its source. The creed is also the source of the state's constitution and sharia canons. Nothing connected to the constitutions or canons, is permitted to exist unless it emanates from the Islamic 'aqeedah (An-Nabhani 2002: 115).

The fact that the caliphate is diametrically opposed to the nation-state leads to the subsequent opposition on the part of HTI against some other notions or ideologies such as nationalism and democracy, which are deemed as alien to Islam. For instance, nationalism has been widely regarded as the by-product of the nation-state, and it is widely understood as a sense of loyalty or belonging to the nation-state. It is of vital importance and invariably in existence in so far as the nation-state model remains unaltered. It is only in the era of the nation-state that such ingredients as shared history of the past, myths, legends and the likes are reinvented and invoked through mass education and the media, thus promoting and at the same time nurturing the sense of deep attachments of the people to their nation-state (Smith 1999; 2004). In the eyes of HTI, the concept of the nation-state along with its by products such as nationalism is laden with problems. Not only is it alien to Islam, it is also the very source of disunity among Muslims in the world. It is due to the nation-state and nationalism that Muslims have scattered throughout various disparate political entities and that this fact has, in turn, become a major impediment to the political unity and

integration of approximately 1.6 billion Muslims around the globe into one political entity, that is, the caliphate.

HTI presents three reasons why nationalism must not be adopted as a bond that unites people. First, nationalism is tantamount to a tribal bond that is inappropriate to bind man with man in his quest for revival. Second, it is an emotional bond that arises from the survival instinct, thus resulting in the love of dominance. Third, it is an inhuman bond, for it causes conflicts among people over dominion (An-Nabhani 2002: 34). Furthermore, the movement holds a view that Muslims in Indonesia should realise how this perceived erroneous notion has played a part in the significant erosion of the unity of Muslims in all aspects of life, hence the tragic decline of their civilisation. Such a view was highlighted in the first HTI conference held in Jakarta on 28 May 2000, which also marked the movement's first official appearance before the Indonesian public (*Republika* 2000).

HTI's propensity for the re-establishment of the caliphate has met with severe criticism from many Muslim leaders in the country, particularly from Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah — the largest moderate Islamic mass organisations in Indonesia. In the eyes of these leaders, by espousing the concept of the caliphate, HTI harbours a transnational ideology that is tantamount to challenging Indonesia's form of government, which is a republic, as well as opposing *Pancasila* — the basic philosophy of Indonesia that guarantees its citizens the freedom of living harmoniously in a multi-cultural and multi-religious society (Misrawi 2007; Abdusshomad 2008; Wahid 2008). In responding to the fact that the dominant Islamic elements in the country oppose the discourse of the caliphate, which is due to its transnational nature that is antithetical to the country's form of government, HTI attempts to portray the caliphate

as the solution to the plethora of ills that have afflicted the country, particularly since the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Furthermore, the movement confidently argues that the re-establishment of the caliphate is, indeed, "for a better Indonesia" (Yusanto 2007; 2008). As a social movement, HTI's attempt to counter criticism against its caliphate discourse by presenting the caliphate as the most effective cure to these very ills is inextricably part of its strategies and struggles to engage in the production of meaning. As meaning is socially constructed, the public sphere becomes a highly contested arena in which political players, including social movements, shape their rhetoric to counter meaning produced by their opponents and at the same time to convince the bystander publics that it is their meaning that is worth endorsing (Snow and Benford 1988: 198; McAdam 1996: 338-339).

HTI's anti-nationalism stance constitutes the other reason why many leaders from the aforementioned moderate Islamic mass organisations in the country oppose the existence of HTI. Smith (2004: 5) held that one of the salient features of nationalism is a deep sense, albeit a social constructed one, of belonging or attachment that the people have towards their nation-state. Embracing the concept of the caliphate, which is, as discussed above, inherently transnational and antithetical to the nation-state, it is only natural that the movement is diametrically opposed to the very idea of nationalism. As mentioned earlier, the movement considers nationalism to be the primary cause of disunity among 1.6 billion Muslims scattered around the world today. However, the movement is fully aware of the fact that it functions as a social movement, assigning meaning and carrying out its perceived sacred mission to make the public believe in its cause and, in turn, fully endorse its ultimate goals of the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of the caliphate.

In an attempt to counter its opponents' criticism against its anti-nationalism posture, HTI has exploited rhetoric in such a way as to demonstrate that what the movement has been doing thus far is indeed the expression of its love of Indonesia. In other words, the way HTI exhibits its love of the country, which is tantamount to exhibiting its version of nationalism, is to provide the government with constructive criticism as reflected in a variety of issues it has addressed in its collective action. For instance, HTI takes a firm stance against the privatisation of Indonesia's national assets on the grounds that any sort of privatisation will only give away the country's economic resources. An example was the privatization of PLN, which HTI strongly rejected.

HTI argued that the privatisation of PLN would consequently increase electricity prices and thus exacerbate the financial burdens of people from low and middle income groups (*Al-Wa'ie* 2008a). At this juncture, the movement first diagnosed a problem in need of remedy, which is the privatisation of PLN and targeted the blame, which is the government. This is part and parcel of the movement's diagnostic framing. HTI further presented arguments on why the government's plan to privatise PLN was flawed: it would give away the country's economic resources and jeopardise the purchasing power of people from low and middle income groups. HTI also demanded that the government's privatisation plan be withdrawn, which is part of its immediate solution to the issue. The movement expressed this demand through mass rallies, one of its favourite action repertoires. This presentation of arguments and solutions along with means on how to express them, which is done through mass protest, is categorised as the movement's prognostic framing. Last, HTI provided motivational framing aimed at motivating the bystander public to join the movement and support its goals. *Sharia* and the caliphate have served as not only HTI's recurring motto that

resonate across the country in every one of its collective actions, but also the motivational framing.

According to HTI, the government's plan to privatise PLN was the quintessential example of the government's ignorance of the negative consequence of such a policy on the people once it was issued. HTI further argued that *sharia* also specifies guiding principles on how the state should take care of the economic affairs of the country for the benefit of the people. Therefore, every policy that the government issues should be derived from *sharia*, and in order to ensure the sustained implementation of *sharia* in every aspect of life, the caliphate is thus needed. It is the inextricable and repeated phrase of the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of the caliphate that have become the movement's constant vocabularies. These vocabularies not only become the overarching solution that HTI offers to tackle various problems confronting the country, but also the motivating catchphrase that encourages the bystander public, including the movement's opponents, to endorse and realise them. By addressing the PLN's privatisation issue, the movement sent a message to the public that it is concerned about the financial difficulties affecting the people from low and middle income groups. Undoubtedly, this message is aimed at justifying HTI's claim that its overall activities are indeed inherently nationalistic and oriented towards a better Indonesia. Nevertheless, the reality suggests otherwise. The movement's anti-privatisation posture is by no means attributed to its nationalistic attachment to Indonesia. Rather, it emanates from HTI's very principles that bitterly oppose taking advantage of any foreign capital and investment. This is clearly stated in article 160 of its draft constitution for the caliphate as follows:

The use of foreign capital and investment from within the State is forbidden. It is also prohibited to grant a franchise to foreigners (An-Nabhani 2002: 157).

Another example of how HTI exploits its rhetoric in such a way as to project its nationalistic image is when it warned the government against separatist movements in such regions as Papua and Maluku. In its weekly bulletin, HTI published an article entitled "Jangan Lepaskan Papua" ("Don't Detach Papua") that condemned a campaign for the disintegration of Papua from Indonesia launched by Papua's separatist movement called Kongres Rakyat Papua or Papuan People Congress from 29 May to 4 June 2000 (*Al-Islam* 2000). Likewise, HTI also denounced a separatist campaign launched by Front Kedaulatan Maluku or Maluku Sovereignty Front, which hoisted the flag of RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan or the Republic of South Moluccas) in Ambon on 25 April 2002 (*Al-Islam* 2002). Akin to the PLN privatisation issue, such exploiting of anti-separatism issues invokes the impression that HTI is far from being an anti-nationalism movement. However, the movement's anti-separatism stance is anything but the manifestation of its sense of nationalism. Rather, it is rooted in its beliefs that maintaining the integrity of Muslim lands is compulsory upon every Muslim, and any attempt that engenders the separation of the Muslim lands is strictly forbidden (*Al-Islam* 2001).

The following example will further demonstrate that the movement is essentially against the concept of nationalism by the most commonly-accepted definition of the term. There have been some incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia that have infuriated most Indonesians: (1) the torture of Nirmala Bonat, an

Indonesian migrant worker, committed by her Malaysian employer in May 2004 (*BBC News* 2004); (2) the brutal assault on Donal Kolopita, an Indonesian chief karate referee for the Asian Karate Championship held in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia in August 2007, committed by Malaysian Police officers (*Antara* 2007); and (3) the dispute over the ownership of a popular folk song "Rasa Sayange", which was used by Malaysia as the soundtrack for its "Truly Asia" tourism campaign.[76] While the majority of Indonesians were irritated with these incidents and some staged street protests against the Malaysian government, HTI avoided any involvement in the condemnation of Malaysia. Instead of protesting against the Malaysian government, the movement criticised the Indonesian government for failing to generate sufficient job opportunities for its people, hence the reason why there have been a considerable number of Indonesian unskilled workers working in Malaysia as maids. A HTI member from the South Sulawesi chapter, Zamroni Ahmad wrote an article in the mass media stating that, in addition to blaming the government for its inability to create enough job opportunities, argued that for the sake of the unity of Muslim lands, the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia should not be based upon nationalism, but on the Islamic creed (Ahmad 2004).

The caliphate has therefore functioned not only as HTI's panacea to all social and economic ills in the society that the movement consistently offers to the public, but also as its extremely important political dogma. While there are some other Islamic revivalist movements in the country that demand for the implementation of *sharia*

[76] Indonesians claim that this song is their folk song, and so do Malaysians. However, Malaysian Tourism Minister Tengku Adnan Tengku argued that this is a common folk song in *Kepulauan Nusantara* (Malay Archipelago) whose areas include Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam. See *Star Online* (2007).

such as MMI and FPI, it is only HTI that voices the establishment of the caliphate. As such, unlike MMI and FPI whose political campaigns do not extend beyond the scope of the republic of Indonesia, HTI goes so far as to call for the establishment of a transnational political entity — the caliphate — that is diametrically opposed to the very form of government of Indonesia. However, it is not merely the fact that a caliphate is different from the very concept of the republic that has sparked severe criticism against HTI. It is also due to the fact that the movement's firm belief in the significance of establishing the caliphate has challenged a number of ideologies or principles that are widely taken for granted in the era of the nation-state such as nationalism. Offering the caliphate as the ultimate solution to a multitude of problems confronting the country would be tantamount to challenging both the foundation of the state of Indonesia and at the same time the sense of nationalism that its people maintain.

In all examples of issues that HTI has addressed, discussed above, it is clear that the movement attempts to counter this criticism by assigning meanings that are opposed to that of its opponents, and these attempts are made to virtually all issues it has raised throughout its collective action. The movement covers a broad range of issues from social and politics to the economy and morals. Snow and Benford (2000) call such relatively inclusive and flexible framing "master frames", which include rights, injustice, environmental justice, culturally pluralist, and "return to democracy" frames, among others. In the eyes of HTI, this inclusive and flexible framing is primarily aimed at assigning meaning and exploiting rhetoric in such a way as to project an image of a movement whose *sharia* and caliphate causes are for a better Indonesia. Ahnaf (2009: 72) rightly points out that the HTI's social movement activities are also aimed

at delegitimising the state, because the establishment of the caliphate can only be achieved through the dissolution of the existing nation-state. Such delegitimation is done through consistently exposing the government's incapability of coping with a variety of problems.

5.2.2. *Democracy and Electoral Participation*

In addition to rejecting the concept of the nation-state and nationalism, HTI bitterly opposes the idea of Western democracy. The widely-accepted definition of modern democracy is "a system of government in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives". Such elements as 1) equal participation to all citizens to take an active part in politics; 2) sovereignty is vested in the hands of the people, which is often associated with the Latin phrase of *Vox Populi, Vox Dei* or the voice of the people is the voice of God; and 3) the guarantee of the practice of check and balances between executive and legislative institutions, among others, are generally considered the fundamental features of democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 114). However, among these elements, it is the second element that HTI strongly rejects. According to HTI, sovereignty lies not in the hands of the people, but in the hands of *sharia*: Islam has sufficiently provided its followers with a comprehensive set of rules and regulations that ought to serve as the overriding guiding principles to deal with a variety of problems in life. HTI views the practice of modern democracy as synonymous with that of secularism in which the decision-making process of virtually all public matters is largely based upon man-made rules through a majority of members in the Parliament. In other words, many products of

laws and regulations in the era of democracy are not based upon *sharia.* Rather, they are first and foremost derived exclusively from the thinking of human beings. Indeed, the movement wrote a book that is specifically aimed at attacking the very principles of democracy, which it considers to be "a system of disbelief".

> *Democracy is a ruling system set down by man in order to free themselves from the injustice of the rulers and their domination of the people in the name of religion. It is thus a system whose source is human beings and it has no connection to divine revelation or religion* (Zalloom 1995: 5).

While HTI denounces the secular aspect of democracy, the movement does not view the other elements of democracy mentioned above, such as the procedure of electing leaders or representatives through elections, as against its principles. Here, we will analyse HTI's real stance on electoral participation and why it has thus far avoided both transforming into a political party in spite of its self-proclaimed status as a political party[77] and casting votes in Indonesian elections. Despite some observers' argument that the international branch of HT deliberately opts to remain an extra-parliament movement (Mayer 2004: 22; Arifin 2005: 160; Karagiannis 2006: 266; Mandaville 2007: 111), the movement, in fact, once fielded candidates as independents in Jordan's elections for the Chamber of Deputies in 1954 and 1956. The second HT supreme leader, Abdul Qadim Zallum, albeit unsuccessfully, competed for a seat. In both elections, Almad Al-Daur, was the only HT's successful candidate

[77] The international branch of HT movement proclaims that it is a political party. See Hizb ut-Tahrir's official website, 'Hizb ut-Tahrir' (2014).

(Cohen 1982: 209-210; Farouki 1996: 6-7; Commins 1991: 196; Okar 20012: 558; Moaddel 2002: 541).

Due to the past fruitless experience of elections coupled with various Arab government heavy-handed measures against HT's members, the movement later deliberately changed its electoral participation posture and has since avoided participation. In the Jordanian political arena, this posture shift was evident as it boycotted the 1989 election, which was the first election held after the government abolished all political parties in 1957. The reason for this was that the movement saw no benefit in participation and refused to recognise the Jordanian constitution. Equally important, the primary reason why HT fielded candidates in the 1954 and 1956 elections despite its 1989 election boycott is that while an electoral law issued in 1986 stipulated that everyone who fields as a candidate must declare that they are not affiliated to a party whose platform is opposed to the constitution, such a phrase did not exist in the 1950s (Farouki 1996: 157; Okar 2001: 558).

In a striking contrast to HT's propensity for avoiding electoral participation, in HTI's international conference on the caliphate held in Jakarta on 12 August 2007, the movement's spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, stated that HTI did not rule out participation in future Indonesian general elections as a contestant on the grounds that HT had experience in fielding candidates for the Parliament in Jordan in elections in the 1950s (*Detik* 2007). HTI believes that according to Islamic rules, participation in general elections is allowed (*mubah*) (Muhammad Ismail Yusanto [HTI National Spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008). Yusanto mentioned that the general election is a method that is in accordance with the Islamic concept of *wakaalah* (representation). It consists of four elements: 1) *waakil*

(representatives); 2) *muwaakil* (people who are represented by *waakil*; 3) *'amal* (deeds or activities that will be executed by *waakil* on behalf of *muwaakil*); and 4) *'aqad* (pledges made by both *waakil* and *muwaakil*). Of these four elements, Yusanto stressed, *'amal* constitutes an extremely important aspect because if the deeds are good, the good representation follows. By contrast, if the deeds are bad, the representation is accordingly bad. Therefore, he highlighted, the general election itself cannot be classified as bad or good because it is only a method to elect representatives, and the main goal of these representatives is to make the Parliament a place for spreading *da'wah* (Islamic propagation), for scrutinising the executives, and most importantly, for implementing *sharia* completely.

Based upon this understanding, HTI holds that it may or may not join the general elections depending upon the country's socio-political circumstances. Furthermore, the movement has decided not to participate in general elections because it wants to avoid rivalry with Islamic political parties. By not being their rival, it believes it has rightly positioned itself as a partner of a broad range of Islamic elements so that it can comfortably propagate *da'wah* among them. When interviewed by the media, in line with Yusanto's views, a number of HTI members further stated that HTI would not dissuade its members from a non-participation stance at the general elections and would cast votes on condition that the contesting political parties demonstrate their unfaltering commitment to implement *sharia* (*Pikiran Rakyat* 2004; *Tribun Jabar* 2008).

According to the aforementioned HTI ostensible stance on electoral participation, the movement is trying to show that it is not against electoral participation. However, other facts suggest otherwise. It was, for instance, clearly

stated in HT's publication that the movement is not permitted to participate in the ruling system of government.

> *The Party [HT] also does not accept participation in the ruling system of government, because it is based on the ruling of Kufr [disbelief], and this is a matter that is forbidden for Muslims* (Hizb ut-Tahrir 1997: 31).

In contrast to the statements of HTI members mentioned above, in HTI's publication, its former leader, Farid Wajdi, argued that a decreasing voter turnout rate in local elections was attributed to the fact that people no longer trust the participating political parties that had failed to accommodate their aspirations. Moreover, despite Yusanto's statement that HTI refrains from being a rival for Islamic political parties in the country, it has continued to criticise parties such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or The Unity and Development Party) and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera of The Welfare and Justice Party). This is evidenced by the fact that Wajdi cited a poll conducted by a well-known polling institute, LSI (Lembaga Survei Indonesia or Indonesian Survey Institute) in October 2007, whose findings revealed that the platform of these Islamic parties had become increasingly secular and the public support for them had remained stagnant, if not waning (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2008c). Likewise, in another HTI publication, the movement asserted that political parties in post-Suharto general elections had fallen short of public expectations (*Al-Wa'ie* 2008b).

While casting votes on voting days is the right of every Muslim, Yusanto argued that Muslims must bear the consequences arising from exercising their right. In other

words, the only ideal political parties that Muslims should vote for are those that are committed to implementing *sharia* and the caliphate (Muhammad Ismail Yusanto [HTI National Spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008). This is undoubtedly the obvious manifestation of HTI's rhetorical attempts to subtly challenge the idea of secular and Western democracy along with its by-products such as general elections and concomitantly introduce, define, and promote its concept of *sharia* and the caliphate as the only self-proclaimed comprehensive system of government in the country. While it is not uncommon that post-Suharto Indonesia has witnessed the burgeoning of Islamic elements that demand the implementation of *sharia*, there is no movement that seeks to establish the caliphate but HTI. Accordingly, the "ideal political parties" that Yusanto referred to above actually do not exist in Indonesia on grounds that, as a matter of fact, there is not even a single political party in the country that espouses the idea of establishing the caliphate.

Another HTI senior member had also mentioned that if the political parties were given rights to radically change the Indonesian constitution to the extent that it would be totally in accordance with Islam, the movement would consider contesting seats in general elections (Abdullah [Local Spokesperson for HTI Central Java Chapter], personal communication, Semarang, 20 March 2008). However, a radical change in the country's constitution in favour of the implementation of *sharia* is as problematic as attempts to incorporate the Jakarta Charter[78] in Pancasila, which have always

[78] Jakarta Charter refers to the agreement among members of a committee of Indonesian Founding Fathers on the final draft of Indonesia's basic ideology in June 1945 after a long process of compromise. The contents of this draft were later declared to be the Indonesia's state ideology: *Pancasila.* However, the first article of this state ideology initially contained the following sentence: "with an obligation to follow *sharia* for its adherents", which was later the subject of objections by non-Muslims. This sentence was eventually deleted as a result of

ended in failure (Baswedan 2004; Romli 2008). Furthermore, Article 1 of the draft constitution of the caliphate stipulates that the Islamic creed be made the state foundation, and there is no constitution or canon permitted to exist unless it emanates from the Islamic creed (An-Nabhani 2002: 115). This Article 1 obviously contradicts the Indonesian constitution that positions Pancasila as both the state ideology and the supreme source of law. Thus, any attempt to make Islam the only state ideology would be tantamount to replacing Pancasila with Islam, which is at best unfeasible, if not impossible. After all, throughout Indonesian history, Pancasila has remained the state ideology, and aspirations to radically change it to Islam lie on the very fringe of public discourse. There remains widespread consensus and acceptance of Pancasila; this forms a serious barrier to such aspirations.

Considering that replacing Pancasila with Islam is at best unfeasible, there is no doubt that HTI's public statements to the effect that it would contest seats in the future general elections and that it provides its members with freedom to exercise their voting rights are simply rhetorical tactics. These tactics in all likelihood aim to deliberately prevent HTI from violating the country's electoral law. According to electoral law no. 10 year 2008 article 287, it is stated that any attempt to discourage people from exercising their right to vote is considered illegal and thus subject to punishment.

Zald (1996: 266) argued that dramaturgy and rhetoric are employed by social movement actors to engage in frames contestation with their opponents. Equally important, they are also employed to persuade their audiences and convince them

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this objection and has been excluded from *Pancasila.* For discussions of this issue, see for example, Noer (1987); Ismail (1999); Romli (2006).

that their causes are worth endorsing. As discussed above, it is clear that in attempts to assign, define, and interpret meaning, HTI is confronted with the fact that the notion of democracy has become the staple of the modern system of government in the nation-state era. While democracy has been increasingly associated with such elements as human rights, civil liberties, political pluralism, and equality before the law, among others, HTI exclusively views democracy as nothing more than a by-product of secularism. In the eyes of HTI, like secularism, democracy was born out of socio-political circumstances in Europe's Dark Ages whose populace were suppressed by corrupt priests and authoritarian dynastic rulers, hence the powerful and ubiquitous demands across the continent for the adoption of democracy in which people assumed a greater role in a political sphere. This is the very socio-political and historical background of the emergence of the notion of democracy that has concerned HTI more than any other aforementioned elements it has been currently associated with.

The movement argues that in democracy, elected representatives in the Parliament and government pass laws and regulations that are solely based upon the thinking of human beings and, more often than not, based upon the logic of the majority-rule decision-making process, not upon Islamic major sources of guidance such as the holy Quran and hadith.[79] However, when HTI frames the flaws of democracy, it is worth noting that it refrains from persuading the public to either boycott or take a non-participation stance on general elections. This is done despite the fact that the movement has clearly taken a non-participation stance on general elections since the international HT movement boycotted Jordan's 1989 elections.

[79] Hadith is the collection of traditions containing the sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad that, together with the Quran, constitutes the major source of guidance for Muslims in all aspects of life.

While it is true that persuading as many audiences as possible to support the ideas and principles of every social movement is of paramount importance, HTI is aware that such a mission is constrained by Indonesia's laws and regulations. The country's electoral law has made it clear that dissuading people from casting votes is illegal, and this is undoubtedly one of the regulations that has presented HTI with constraints on candidly expressing some of its real ideas and principles. After all, HTI's efforts to frame its causes need to be balanced against the movement's necessity of securing the political opportunity to be able to continue its activism within the country's public sphere.

5.3. *The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of FPI*

5.3.1. *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*

Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, which literally means enjoining good and forbidding evil, is the fundamental ideology of FPI on which its activism is based. Of course, when we adhere to this definition, virtually all Islamic movements in Indonesia would claim that their activities are generally intended to enjoin good and forbid evil. In fact, in the eyes of HTI, implementing *sharia* and establishing the caliphate, also falls under the category of such a definition. However, in this section, we will analyse how and the extent to which FPI defines and implements this ideology, which is not necessarily similar to the other Islamic revivalist movements. According to FPI, enjoining good and forbidding evil is an extricable part of Islamic injunctions, and this serves as the raison d'être of the establishment of FPI. Indeed, it is deemed as a sacred duty upon every Muslim with a view to maintaining law and order in society (Shihab 2013: 35-43).

Since FPI came out in the open in 1998, the movement has been highly associated with violence. Its activities are chiefly oriented to eradicate social evils from conducting sweeps of brothels, casinos, and stores selling liquor to combating pornography, despite the fact that it also engages in social and humanitarian activities such as helping the victims of natural disasters in a variety of regions in Indonesia. In 2012, the Indonesian Police Department announced that FPI was the most violent mass organisation in the country (*Tempo Interaktif* 2012b). This has, in turn, risen a big question on what kind of 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' the movement intends to develop given the widespread impression that it seems to have given more emphasis on the 'forbidding evil' activism than the 'enjoining good'. However, one of FPI's senior members denied that the movement only focuses on the 'forbidding activism'. He then explained a variety of FPI's social and humanitarian activities such as its involvement in post-disaster relief programs in the country (Jafar Shodiq [Deputy Secretary-General of FPI], personal communication, Jakarta, 5 June 2013).

William and Meyer's (1996: 288) held that the media rewards big news that emerges from polemic and confrontation among social movements. The violent image of FPI as a result of its frequent involvement in violence is shaped and projected by the media, and it is largely through the media that the such an image is transmitted to the public, hence the prevalent violent image of the movement in the country. Nevertheless, despite FPI's undeniable violent image, the movement is also engaged in social and humanitarian activities. William and Meyer's argument is sound as far as the Indonesia's media policy on FPI's reportage is concerned. In fact, there were only a handful of the media that covered a variety of FPI's social and humanitarian activities such as its involvement in helping the victims of seasonal flooding in Jakarta and

natural disasters in a number of regions, the majority of which were minor and privately-financed Islamic news media (*Era Muslim* 2009; *Hidayatullah* 2014). It is worth nothing, however, that FPI's interpretation and implementation of its underlying 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' philosophy does not correlate with the movement's infamous violent image. Rather, it has more to do with the movement's poor capability of disciplining its members than with its basic ideology, as we have discussed extensively in chapter four. Employing the framing perspective, this section will attempt to answer the fundamental question of how FPI frames issues it often raises in the public through a variety of collective action forms such as mass protest and sweeps, and whether the ways in which it frames these issues are similar to those of HTI.

While it is obvious that HTI invariably raises a very broad range of protest issues ranging from politics to the economy, FPI more often than not raises protest issues in the areas of morality. In the eyes of FPI, the category of evil includes, but is not limited to, pornography, prostitution, alcohol consumption, and gambling, and these have served as the movement's central and perennial issues since it came out in the open in 1998. These issues are considered to be social evils that must be forbidden, and authorities and certain groups or institutions pertinent to the issues are often targeted by the movement in its collective action. For instance, in 2006, the movement stormed into the newly launched Indonesian *Playboy* magazine office in Jakarta and forced it to shut down its operational activities (*Detik* 2006). Similarly, as an expression of protest against a Jakarta-based film production company's plan to bring in Miyabi, a Japanese porn star, to star in its movie, FPI burnt her poster (*Detik* 2010a). There are numerous other pornography-related issues in which FPI targeted artists who

showcased their sex appeal (*Detik* 2010b; *Detik* 2011; *Detik* 2012b). The pop diva Lady Gaga was no exception. Denouncing her as a 'moral destroyer', the movement staged a series of demonstrations at Police Headquarters in Jakarta, urging the authorities not to grant her a concert permit (*Republika* 2012; *ABC* 2012). As for alcohol consumption, prostitution and gambling, FPI regularly conducts sweeps of brothels and clandestine casinos as well as stores selling liquor (*Detik* 2009; *Metro TV News* 2011; *Tempo Interaktif* 2012a).

Unlike HTI that frames very broad protest issues with a view to deligitimising the government, FPI tends to exclusively develop its frames of protest around moral issues and does not go so far as to deligitimise the government and to establish an Islamic state. The diagnostic frame that FPI develops is aimed at diagnosing problems in need of remedy, and these problems more often than not revolve around the aforementioned moral issues. It is obvious that when the movement protested against the Indonesian *Playboy* magazine, the primary reason for such a protest is nothing but the perceived potential negative consequences of pornography that the magazine would bring about in society. The movement further targeted the source of the moral problem, which was the Indonesian *Playboy* magazine owner. The collective actions of both FPI and HTI have demonstrated the use of the first stage of the framing process, that is, the diagnostic framing, which is generally employed by every social movement in the world to diagnose problems in need of remedy and to name grievances. They all target the same sort of opponents that are also normally targeted by other social movements — authorities and groups or organisations whose principles are opposed to those of FPI and HTI. Nevertheless, the contrast between the two movements in the stage of diagnostic framing is that while HTI deliberately develops

a broad range of protest issues, the FPI, more often than not, engages in collective action as a response to what it perceives as *maksiat*, which literally means 'immoral behaviours', in society.

After diagnosing problems in need of remedy and targeting blame, social movements further offer solutions to the issues they address, and this stage of the framing process is referred to as the prognostic framing. Unlike HTI that consistently offered solutions to the problems it addresses in its collective action, there is not much that FPI can offer as solutions to a plethora of moral issues it has raised. In other words, while HTI offers solutions as well as rationalisation for any criticisms over the government's incapability of coping with various social and economic ills, FPI hardly offers solutions and rationalisations that are reflected in the signs or rhetoric of its collective action except that it demands that the 'immoral behaviours' be stopped. For instance, when FPI burnt posters of artistes it considered immoral and conducted raids on brothels and nightclubs, its members were merely focused on deploring the targets of blame it constructed. The movement did not present the public with any clear rationale for their action and solutions for the issues of vice it raised. It merely expressed its condemnation against such vice and demanded that it be eradicated. This lies in stark contrast with HTI that clearly and consistently presented and accentuated its predominant motto of the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of the caliphate as the all-encompassing solutions to a variety of problems it addressed.

The consistent dissemination of this motto helps construct the core identity of HTI, which in turn resonates across multiple layers of audiences and taps into the collective memory of the public. Consequently, in the eyes of the public, it is not

uncommon that HTI is viewed as a movement highly associated with the implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of the caliphate. In contrast, FPI only diagnoses problems in need of remedies, such as those of morals, and constructs targets of blame, such as artistes regarded as obscene. It has failed to convey clear and consistent core messages, be they suggested solutions or catchphrases such as those of HTI, which have the ability to reverberate through society. Of course, the 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' is a noble concept and constitutes the basic philosophy of FPI upon which its overall activism is based. However, the vast majority of the populace would not know that the movement has such a noble philosophy. Undoubtedly, this is attributed to the fact that in virtually all of the movement's collective action, it has hardly presented any catchphrases that reflect their signs or rhetoric of its mass protests that would function not only as solutions to the moral problems being addressed, but also as motivational framing aimed at shaping its core identity and motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents. The use of mottos, catchphrases, and rhetoric is referred to as motivational framing, and it also plays an important role in sustaining the participation of social movements' adherents in their various forms of collective action.

5.3.2. *Sharia*, Islamic *State*, *and Electoral Participation*

Unlike HTI that calls for the complete implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, FPI is not interested in the campaign for the formalisation of *sharia* in the country. The movement's leaders believe that 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' is tantamount to the implementation of *sharia*. One of the FPI's leaders argued that, in fact, Indonesia has implemented a number of laws that are in accordance with *sharia* such

as those concerning Islamic banking, Islamic marriage, and *zakat* (alms giving), among other things. Therefore, the movement believes that while the utter implementation of *sharia* in the country is essential, it should be implemented gradually. In other words, according to FPI, the complete formalisation of *sharia* in the country is not a priority. Furthermore, in contrast to HTI that views the establishment of the caliphate or Islamic state as crucial, in the eyes of FPI, Indonesia is already an Islamic state for the following reasons 1) the majority of Indonesians are Muslims; 2) Muslims are granted freedom to practise their religion; 3) there have been some parts of Islamic laws that are implemented by the government.

> *Indeed, the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia is not necessary on grounds that the country is already an Islamic state. It has implemented a number of laws that are in accordance with sharia such as those of Islamic banking, Islamic marriage, and zakat (alms giving). It is true that the full implementation of sharia has yet to be realised, but this is something that we need to achieve gradually* (Jafar Shodiq [Deputy Secretary-General of FPI], personal communication, Jakarta, 5 June 2013).

General elections have become the quintessential staple of any democratic country in the world, and Indonesia is no exception. It is therefore not uncommon that the Indonesian government has demonstrated its commitment, through a number of laws and regulations, to ensuring that its eligible citizens have the freedom to participate in them and that any attempt to prevent these citizens from casting votes in the days of elections be considered unlawful and thus deserving of punishment. It

has been pointed out earlier in this chapter that HTI has exploited its rhetoric in such a way as to convince the public and the government that it is not opposed to the concept of electoral participation and that it is not dissuading its members and supporters from casting votes in the days of elections. However, as we have discussed previously, the reality is that this trans-national movement is, in fact, diametrically opposed to the concept of electoral participation in the era of Western democracy: it considers general elections a product of Western democracy and is therefore forbidden in Islam.

In contrast to HTI, FPI considers supporting certain candidates that run for presidential or local government elections to be an effective way to facilitate the implementation of its 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' principles. However, this support is based upon the condition that these candidates must be willing to help implement and assist in the success of FPI's programs such as the eradication of social vices and the dissolution of the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia once they are elected. For instance, in Indonesia's 2009 Presidential Elections, FPI decided to support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto. Likewise, the movement also endorsed the pairs of candidates for governor elections in various regions in the country such as Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli in Jakarta's 2012 local election and Ahmad Heryawan and Deddy Mizwar in West Java's 2013 local election. Before formally deciding to endorse any candidates, the leaders of FPI would normally arrange a series of meetings with these candidates and ask them if they would be willing to support the movement's anti-social vice programs. Once these candidates concurred with the movement's proposal, FPI would subsequently issue instructions to all its adherents to fully support and to cast votes for these candidates on the day

of the election. In many occasions, the movement not only issued such instructions, but also mobilised its adherents to provide any required help and support for these candidates in order for them to win the elections (Novel Bamukmin [Secretary of FPI Jakarta Branch], personal communication, Jakarta, 1 June 2013; Muhsin Al-Attas [Leader of FPI], personal communication, Jakarta, 8 January 2014). Nevertheless, despite FPI's support for certain candidates that were willing to implement its programs, the movement sometimes opted not to support any candidate due to the fact that none of them would agree to support the movement's programs such as in the case of the FPI Depok Chapter in the 2009 Depok local election. In this local election, FPI held that none of the running candidates were willing to dissolve the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia (*Antara* 2009).

The FPI's willingness to support certain candidates that run for elections suggests that the movement views the practice of modern democracy as something that is not detrimental to the attainment of its Islamic cause in society. Unlike HTI that shuns general elections, in the eyes of FPI, the elections can indeed facilitate the implementation of its 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' philosophy in so far as the candidates are fully committed to this cause. This explains why gentlemen's agreements between FPI and these candidates are normally made prior to the movement's formal decision to fully endorse their candidature. Although not all candidates that FPI supported eventually won the elections, the movement's posture towards the practice of elections in post-Suharto Indonesia demonstrates that not all pro-*sharia* Islamic revivalist movements that emerged after the demise of the authoritarian Suharto regime bear the same characteristics of the trans-national HTI, which is totally opposed to the very foundation of the state of Indonesia. While it is

true that a large number of FPI's mass demonstrations are aimed at criticising the government, the movement has also engaged in cooperation with the government in the areas of social humanity, post-disaster relief, and social development. As one example, FPI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs in 2012 for a social project called "Home Improvements" aiming to renovate the dwellings of the poor in some regions that are unfit for habitation (Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs 2012).

FPI's willingness to engage in cooperation with the government is quite in contrast to the other mainstream Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia such as HTI and MMI. It is evident that, as has been discussed before, all HTI's statements saying that it is working for a better Indonesia is the manifestation of its rhetorical tactics with a view to delegitimising the government in such a way as to facilitate the re-establishment of the caliphate. This is not to say that HTI has never participated in social and humanitarian as well as post-disaster relief activities in the country. In fact, HTI has been involved in a number of such activities (*Republika* 2007). However, such activities were held independently as HTI received no financial support whatsoever from the government. Moreover, unlike FPI, there has never any cooperation in any area that has ever been made between HTI and the government.

FPI carries out two opposing tasks at the same time. The first task is aimed at challenging its opponents — more often than not the government, while the second task is oriented towards providing the people with social and humanitarian services. Indeed, the realisation of this second task is supported by the creation of special bodies in the structure of FPI such as the division Hilmi (Hilal Merah Indonesia or

Indonesian Red Crescent), which is specifically designed to provide the victims of natural disasters with required humanitarian assistance.

> *When we staged a mass protest against the government, it did not mean that we hated them. Rather, we attempted to correct their mistaken policies. We supported them when they issued sound policies. In fact, we had a MoU with them to renovate the dwellings of the poor. Besides, our activities do not only revolve around 'forbidding evil', we also provide the victims of natural disasters with help and assistance through our division of Hilmi* (Slamet Maarif [Deputy Secretary General of FPI], personal communication, 29 May 2014).

Woodward et al. (2014: 153) argue that FPI has what they refer to as a 'civil face', in addition to an 'uncivil face'. This 'civil face' presents the movement as the partner of authorities in efforts to control deviant movements such as Ahmadiyah Indonesia and to assist those in need such as the victims of natural disasters. No one can deny that these two opposing faces reflect the reality of FPI's activism in the public sphere. However, in the eyes of FPI, regardless of the categorisation of these 'faces', any form of collective action it engages in is the embodiment of its commitment to its guiding 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' principles. The acts of 'forbidding evil' that the movement has been engaging in so far are as meaningful as its 'enjoining good' acts on the grounds that both of them are considered part and parcel of the FPI's fundamental philosophy. Of course, what FPI considers to be good is not necessarily good in the eyes of the public. Likewise, when HTI considers the re-establishment of

the caliphate to be good and is worth endorsing, the majority of the public would consider it an absurd solution. Some of them would consider it a threat to the country and view HTI as a transnational movement that is devoid of nationalism.

Meaning contestation is indeed one of the primary tasks that any social movement in the world has to struggle with routinely in the socio-political milieu to which they are attached. Both FPI and HTI are embroiled in such contestation. Nevertheless, what mainly distinguishes FPI from HTI is the way they view the government or authorities. The widely agreed underlying feature that any social movements have is a sustained series of collective challenges to authorities, elites, and their opponents (Gamson and Mayer 1996: 283; Tarrow 1998: 4; Tilly 2004: 7). While HTI's overall activism is invariably oriented towards challenging authorities, elites, and its opponents, FPI does not always view the government or authorities as an opponent. As mentioned before, whether or not the movement challenges the government is dependent on the issues it raises, and even if the movement decided to stage mass protests against the government, it does not prevent the movement from engaging in cooperation with the government in the area of social welfare and post-disaster relief.

Against the aforementioned backdrop, there are at least three reasons why the government, represented by the Ministry of Social Affairs, was willing to propose and sign a MoU with the infamous FPI to renovate the dwellings of the poor. First, the fact that the movement does not go so far as to seek to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and that it has demonstrated its real action in providing assistance to the victims of natural disasters in a number of disaster-hit regions increases the likelihood of the government engaging with it. This likelihood is far higher than that with HTI

simply because HTI is a transnational movement, and whatever it does is aimed at delegitimising the government so as to facilitate the establishment of the transnational caliphate, which is diametrically opposed to the foundation of the state of Indonesia. Thus, engaging with FPI is a much more realistic option than with HTI. The government is aware that, unlike HTI, FPI's activism, albeit sometimes violent, is done without challenging the very foundation of the state of Indonesia.

Second, being aware of the fact that FPI also has 'enjoining good' programs, the government has attempted to co-opt FPI with the aim of not only taming the violent elements of the movement, but also helping to succeed its development agenda. In fact, former Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs, Gamawan Fauzi, encouraged all governors and mayors in the country to involve FPI in the implementation of their regional development agenda (*Kompas Cyber Media* 2013). The movement responded to these overtures positively and reiterated its readiness to work closely with the government in any area of cooperation that would bring benefits to the people of the country (*Kontan* 2013). Third, FPI is one of the largest Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia with numerous branches scattered across the country. Moreover, the vast majority of its adherents display a relatively high degree of respect and loyalty towards their leaders. This is one of the movement's valuable potentials with which it can mobilise and organise support for its various forms of activities and programs relatively easily. By engaging with FPI in its development agenda, such as the "home improvement" project, the government benefits from the readily available FPI's volunteers who are willing to execute such project tasks as renovating the dwellings of the poor and providing assistance to the victims of natural disasters, among others.

5.4. *The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of MMI*

5.4.1. *The Formalisation of Sharia in Indonesia*

The failure of the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesia's 1945 Constitution in the early independence of the country constitutes the rationale for the establishment of MMI. As discussed in the previous chapter, against this particular backdrop, the movement emerged in 2000 with the primary objective of implementing and formalising *sharia* in Indonesia, which serves as the panacea for a variety of problems and challenges that the country faces. Similar to HTI, MMI blamed the government for the various problems that post-Suharto Indonesia had suffered, such as the prolonged sectarian conflict in Maluku, the country's high debt, corrupt government officials, economic inequality, and so forth (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 2001: xvii-xxviii).

The wide range of issues that MMI had raised above is nevertheless not uncommon. In targeting blame, the majority of Islamic movements in Indonesia and the world would raise a broad range of relatively flexible and inclusive issues that revolve around injustice and inequality frames. These sorts of issues are powerful because they concern the majority of the populace in Indonesia. Raising these so-called pro-people issues, these movements, in turn, expect to gain some sort of support from the people for their very causes. Snow and Benford (2000) refer to such frames as "master frames". However, the relentless campaign for the full implementation of *sharia* is a common call for virtually all Islamic revivalist movements. In reality, the ways in which such a campaign is interpreted, articulated, and accentuated vary from one movement to another. In this section, we will examine

the specific characteristics of the MMI's pro-*sharia* ideology and analyse to what extent it varies from the pro-*sharia* ideology of HTI, which also occupies an extremely important position in its overall narratives in addition to the establishment of the caliphate.

The MMI's rationale for the need to formalise Islamic laws in Indonesia does not only lie on the movement's perception of the obligation of all Muslims to strictly adhere to a set of Islamic injunctions normally referred to as *sharia* . The movement also asserts that the call for the formalisation of *sharia* is in no way contradictory to the Indonesian 1945 Constitution. For instance, it claims that the people of Indonesia possess legal rights to implement *sharia* based upon: 1) *Dekrit Presiden* or the Decree of President issued on 5 July 1959 that acknowledged the legality of *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter)[80]; 2) The third paragraph of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution stating that "With the blessing of God the Almighty (Allah) and driven by the noble desire to live as a free nation, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence"; 3) Article 1 Chapter 29 of the 1945 Constitution which states that "The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God", and; 4) Article 2 Chapter 29 of the 1945 Constitution stating that "The state shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his/her religion and to worship in accordance with such religion and belief (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* 2013).

[80] Jakarta Charter refers to the agreement among members of a committee of Indonesian Founding Fathers on the final draft of Indonesia's basic ideology in June 1945 after a long process of compromise. The contents of this draft were later declared to be the Indonesia's state ideology: *Pancasila.* However, the first article of this state ideology initially contained the following sentence: "with an obligation to follow *sharia* for its adherents", which was later the subject of objections by non-Muslims. This sentence was eventually deleted as a result of this objection and has been excluded from *Pancasila.* For discussions of this issue, see for example, Noer (1987); Ismail (1999); Romli (2006).

If we [the government of Indonesia] really adhered to the Constitution 1945, then the Republic of Indonesia would actually be based upon religion [Islam]. This is because the phrase of 'The one and only God' is the concept of religion [Islam], not that of secularism, democracy or liberalism. ... Therefore, any laws and regulations must not contradict with the teachings of religion [Islam] (Awwas 2013).

The claims that the people of Indonesia possess legal rights to implement *sharia* mentioned above are certainly an MMI deliberate endeavour to formulate its own interpretation of the Indonesian Constitution with a view to contesting meaning and discourses in the public that are not in favour of its political goals. Nevertheless, the commonly accepted meaning of the aforementioned legal justifications is in no way intended to pave the way for the formalisation of *sharia* in the country. For instance, the phrase "The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God" in article one 1 chapter 29 of the Indonesian Constitution is, of course, by no means meant to recognise only one religion — Islam — in the country. The interpretation of "the one and only God", which is translated as "Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa" in the Indonesian language, normally serves as a general phrase that is often employed in legal documents in Indonesia to refer to the belief in a supreme being without reference to any particular God or religion (Morfit 1981: 840).

Furthermore, MMI argued that the first largest mass-based pre-independence social movement organisation in Indonesia, that is, SI (Sarekat Islam or the Association of Islam) was established in 1905 to implement the teachings of Islam and

played a major role in the pre-independence struggles against the Dutch colonial government.[81] For this reason, the movement attempted to convince the public that the aspiration to the implementation of *sharia* is not alien to the nation of Indonesia. It further argued that, in fact, the majority of the country's founding fathers, particularly those that belonged to SI and some other Islamic-based mass organisations or parties at the time such as Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or Council of Indonesian Muslim Association), had demonstrated their commitment to the implementation of Islamic norms and values in the country.[82]

MMI's rationale for the need to formalise *sharia* in Indonesia is primarily based upon the history of the perceived betrayal of the country's secular and non-Muslim leaders in the past who engineered the removal of the phrase of "with an obligation to follow *sharia* for its adherents" from the Jakarta Charter. Such a betrayal becomes one of the movement's master frames on which its protest rhetoric is based and at the same time functions as a diagnostic framing. As defined before, a diagnostic framing is an initial stage of framing that attends to the function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility. The movement blames the government for failing to realise the perceived sacred mandate of the country's founding fathers for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in *Pancasila.* Therefore, in the eyes of the movement, the re-inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in *Pancasila* is imperative and the formalisation

[81] Sarekat Islam, formerly known as Sarekat Dagang Islam, was initially established as a Javanese *batik* traders' cooperative in Indonesia. It later grew and became one the most influential of Indonesia's pre-independence social movement organisations. For details on Sarekat Islam, see Rambe (2008).

[82] Masyumi was established following the Indonesian declaration of independence on 7 November 1945. It later became the largest Islamic political party in Indonesia and consisted of a number of Islamic mass-based organisations, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah — the two largest Islamic organisations in the country. For details on Masyumi, see Noer (1987) and Artawijaya (2014).

of *sharia* is nothing but the embodiment of this very charter. The movement formulated the *sharia* version of the criminal code and presented it to the government and legislators in order to be adopted, but to no avail. This is part and parcel of MMI's prognostic framing aimed at offering practical solutions to its campaign for the formalisation of *sharia* in the country. However, unlike HTI that is adept at exploiting motivational vocabularies oriented towards transforming the bystander public into adherents such as "*Sharia* and the Caliphate for a better Indonesia", MMI lacks such a motivational framing in its collective action.

Without repeated vocabularies that the movement presents to the public as the embodiments of its cause, the image of a pro-*sharia* movement attached to MMI is less powerful than that of HTI. More often than not, when MMI engaged in collective action such as mass protest or public debate against its opponents, it failed to formulate an array of vocabularies that would help the public associate the movement with its major cause, that is, the formalisation of *sharia* in Indonesia. For instance, when MMI staged a mass protest at the headquarters of Indonesian Police against the detention of its former leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir, it demanded that Bassyir be released. The movement yelled such words as "Ustad Abu Harus Direhabilitasi" ("Baasyir has to be Rehabilitated"), "Ustad Abu Wajib Bebas" ("Baasyir Must be Released"), and "Hentikan Penzaliman Ulama" ("Stop the Criminalisation of Muslim Scholars"). While such words aptly reflected the primary goal of this particular protest, that is, the demand for the release of Baasyir, there was no attempt to connect this issue with the movement's more general and ultimate objective — the formalisation of *sharia* (*Detik* 2004). This is also the case when the movement held a mass demonstration in Jakarta against an allegedly deviant Shia community. MMI focused

on exposing the allegedly deviant aspects of the community, without going so far as to connect this issue with its larger agenda of the formalisation of *sharia* (*Voice of Islam* 2013a). This lies in contrast with the ways in which HTI frame its motivational vocabularies that invariably insert the underlying phrases of *sharia* and the caliphate for any sort of collective action it engages in and connects every issue it raises. It presents the proposition that all social and economic ills in Indonesia are due to the fact that *sharia* and the caliphate are not implemented in the country.

The other palpable difference between MMI and HTI is that the pro-*sharia* cause of the former is based upon the argument that the overall socio-political and historical backgrounds of pre-independence Indonesia such as the emergence of SI as the first pre-independence Islamic mass-based organisation and the formulation of the Jakarta Charter provide justification for the complete implementation of *sharia* in the contemporary setting of the country. In contrast, the HTI's pro-*sharia* campaign is hardly linked to such historical justifications. In other words, the nature of HTI's *sharia* cause is inextricably linked to and intended to support the re-establishment of the transnational caliphate. HTI views *sharia* and the re-establishment of the caliphate as inseparable, while the MMI's pro-*sharia* campaign is exclusively aimed at the Republic of Indonesia and is not oriented towards the establishment of a transnational Islamic state in the country. In sum, MMI seeks to construct narratives about the compatibility of *sharia* with the overall historical, legal, and political foundations of Indonesia, without accentuating the need to establish a transnational Islamic state. This is done in conjunction with its efforts to convince the public that such narratives are worth endorsing so as to muster support for the movement's pro-*sharia* agenda in the country.

5.4.2. *Democracy and Electoral Participation*

MMI rejects the concept of democracy and views it as against the teachings of Islam. Similar to HTI, this rejection is primarily based upon a belief that such a concept is alien to Islam and is not derived from *sharia.* According to MMI, democracy is categorised into two types. First, it is considered to be an ideology. As an ideology, the movement holds that democracy is diametrically opposed to Islam, referring to those that adopt this particular ideology as *mushrik*, which literally means people who devote worship to anyone or anything other than Allah the one and only God. Second, it is considered to be a method. As a method, MMI views democracy as something that is allowed or *mubah.* In the eyes of the movement, Muslims are allowed to adopt this method in order to elect leaders. However, Muslims must employ this method to advance the cause of Islam by electing leaders who have strong commitment to the formalisation of *sharia* in Indonesia. Although democracy as a method is regarded as *mubah*, the reality is that the movement warns the public that democracy is naturally against Islam.

> *It is only natural, as stated in the Holy Quran, that democracy despises Islam and Muslims. It has become the inherent characteristic of those that practise the notion of democracy that they will surely break their promises [to support the cause of Islam]* (*Arrahmah* 2013).

MMI's stance on electoral participation bears a considerable resemblance to that of HTI. The movement argues that general elections are the manifestation of

democracy as a method with a view to electing leaders. Accordingly, it considers the status of elections in Islamic law to be *mubah* (allowed), because there were a number of methods in the election of leaders in the era of the Rashidin Caliphs that employed such methods as consensus and voting. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier when we analysed HTI's stance on electoral participation, the fact that the status of elections in Islamic law is *mubah* does not necessarily prompt MMI to encourage its adherents to cast votes in general elections in the country. This is due to the fact that MMI, like HTI, takes into account a number of societal and political factors that play a part in the processes and outcomes of general elections within the contemporary socio-political settings of Indonesia. As pointed out above, when it comes to democracy, despite its *mubah* status, MMI chiefly views this notion with considerable distrust. Moreover, the movement complained to FUI — a coalition in which MMI is involved — as the latter publicly decided to support the candidacy of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto as President and Vice President for at Indonesia's 2009 Presidential elections. MMI argued that such a complaint was due to the fact that FUI had made this decision without prior consultation with MMI (Abu Jibril [Deputy Leader of MMI], personal communication, Tangerang, 9 April 2013). However, the underlying reason for such a complaint had more to do with MMI's considerable distrust with democracy along with its by-products such as general elections than to the lack of coordination or communication among FUI's member movements.

MMI issued a press release concerning its stance on electoral participation prior to the 2014 elections. This press release attested to the movement's anti-electoral posture. According to the release, there were two primary reasons why the movement opted to eschew electoral participation in Indonesia. First, it held the view that there

is no single political party in the country whose philosophy is genuinely based upon Islam and aimed at implementing *sharia.* Second, the participation of virtually all political parties in the country's general elections was aimed at strengthening the system of *shirk*, which contextually means that the system that is not utterly and genuinely based upon Islam. The movement argues that the system of *shirk* is tantamount to the system of secular democracy whose core belief recognise the separation of the state and religion (Islam). Based upon this rationale, MMI called upon every Muslim in the country to vote for a political party whose platform is not against *sharia* and to elect the candidates of President as well as the legislators of the country who demonstrate commitment to the formalisation of *sharia* in the country (*Arrahmah* 2014).

Similar to HTI, when MMI called upon Muslims to vote for a political party or the candidates of legislators that are committed to the formalisation of *sharia*, it was simply a rhetorical device. This is due to the fact that, as discussed earlier with regard to the HTI's stance of electoral participation, there is currently no political party nor legislator in Indonesia that espouses the formalisation of *sharia*. It is instead aimed at sending a clear message to the government that the movement does not dissuade its members from casting votes in general elections, which is prohibited according to the country's electoral law. Had MMI audaciously declared its anti-electoral participation stance and stated that it was preventing its members from casting votes in the days of the general elections, the movement could have seriously run the risk of violating the electoral law and endangering its future existence in the country's socio-political sphere.

5.5. *Summary*

Through the lens of framing, this chapter has analysed the ideologies of FUI's member movements: HTI, FPI, and MMI. It has also examined the way in which these movements articulate and accentuate their views and messages to the public, which emanate from their ideologies. While all of these movements agree that the implementation of *sharia* is vital to cure a plethora of social and economic ills in Indonesia, the extent to which it is achieved and reflected in their protest issues varies from one movement to another. This chapter demonstrated that all of these movements, like any other social movements in the world, employed similar flexible and inclusive framing, which is often referred to as master frames, in an effort to rebuke the authorities for a variety of perceived problems in need of remedies.

Social and economic injustice, corruption, and the skyrocketing of commodity prices, among others, are some of their favourite issues that they raise in the public. In addition to such issues, as Islamic revivalist movements, they also raise some issues that are not common to non-Islamic or secular social movements such as pornography and deviant Islamic sects. Nevertheless, this chapter showed that, the ideologies of these movements play a part in determining their specific and preferred protest issues and vocabularies. For instance, as a transnational Islamic revivalist movement, HTI's relentless campaign for the implementation of *sharia* is invariably voiced in conjunction with the movement's ultimate goal of the re-establishment of the caliphate. In contrast, MMI attempts to impart the narratives about the compatibility of *sharia* with the country's historical, legal, and political foundations, without accentuating the need to establish a transnational Islamic state. At this juncture, FPI's pro-*sharia* campaign is inherently different from HTI and MMI on the grounds that FPI views *sharia* as the

manifestation of its basic principles of 'enjoining good and forbidding evil'. In other words, FPI has raised protest issues that it considers to be the implementation of these principles such as combating pornography and conducting sweeps of brothers, casinos, and stores selling liquors, without seeing the need to go so far as to establish an Islamic state and to call for the immediate formalisation of *sharia.*

The way in which these movements developed their frames of protest was analysed according to the three framing perspectives: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing attends to the function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility, while prognostic framing deals with the primary task of offering solutions to the problems, including planning a protest or attack along with tactics on how to execute the plan. The last framing provides a rationale for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents. All FUI's member movements share the ability to diagnose problems that need to be addressed through their collective action. However, they have different capacity in developing their prognostic and motivational framing. HTI has shown its consistency in offering solutions to an array of problems it has diagnosed. It also invariably offers *sharia* and the caliphate not only as its recurring motto that resonates across the country in every of its collective action, but also its motivational framing. In contrast, although capable of diagnosing problems and offering either immediate or long-term solutions to the problems they addressed, MMI and FPI lack the apt and powerful vocabularies, such as those of HTI's *sharia* and the caliphate. These vocabularies, when adopted and espoused by the adherents, not only help sustain the participation of their adherents and the bystander public in the various forms of the movements'

collective action, but also project a positive image of the movements in the eyes of the public.

This conclusion offers insights into the variety of the ideologies and framing strategies of FUI's member movements. While it is true that all these movements seek to implement *sharia* in Indonesia, the ways they interpret, accentuate, express, and frame their ideologies vary from one to another. The next chapter will examine the history of FUI and how it mobilises its resources to muster support and advance its cause. As an alliance movement, FUI heavily relies on the resources and support of its member movements. The next chapter will also analyse how and to what extent its member movements provide FUI with these resources and support.

Chapter Six

FUI's Emergence and Mobilising Structures

6.1. *Introduction*

Islamic revivalist movements gained a favourable political opportunity to emerge in Indonesia following the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime. However, the availability of political opportunity for a social movement to emerge is not only dependent upon the nature of the polity to which the movement is attached: the polity that is often considered to be 'open' more often than not provides social movements with incentives to flourish. Social movements themselves create opportunities for other movements to emerge or to formulate collective action strategies to successfully counter their opponents (Gamson and Mayer 1996: 276; Tarrow 1998: 7). The post-Suharto Indonesia is characterised by a high level of political freedom that has benefited from a considerable number of social and political organisations in the country, ensuring their right to play an active role in the country's socio-political milieu. A number of Islamic revivalist movements that came out in the open in the early post-Suharto period such as HTI, FPI, and MMI had not only demonstrated their consistent presence and activism in public, but also created a political opportunity for the emergence of FUI. FUI was initially founded to serve as an informal umbrella body for a wide number of Islamic elements with a view to enhancing co-ordination and communication among its member movements so as to promote and consolidate the pro-*sharia* agenda in the country. However, this body has become a movement that

actively engages in social movement activities such as mass demonstrations, public gatherings, press statements, and so forth.

In the previous two chapters, we have analysed the member movements of FUI through the perspectives of political opportunity structures, mobilising structures, and framing. In this chapter, we will examine the emergence and mobilising structures of FUI. As mentioned above, although its member movements have their own collective action agenda, FUI itself has transformed into an Islamic movement that also actively engaged in collective action immediately after its establishment in 2005. Unfortunately, despite its ambition to enhance the unity of the plethora of Islamic elements in the country, FUI consists of a number of major member movements whose different characteristics and political platforms have rendered it susceptible to intra-organisational disputes. For instance, HTI was the founder of FUI, and yet the former deliberately opted to secede from the latter in 2008 for reasons to be discussed at length later.

This chapter will first analyse the history of FUI. Employing the perspective of political opportunity structure, it will account for a number of incentives that contributed to the emergence of the movement against the backdrop of the burgeoning of Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia. The chapter will then examine the ways in which FUI exploits its organisational resources in an effort to advance its pro-*sharia* agenda. Because FUI consists of a number of major Islamic revivalist movements, albeit upholding the principles of unity and harmony, conflicting interests among its member movements, particularly in terms of ideological orientations, are nevertheless inevitable. The vast majority of literature in contemporary Indonesian Islamic activism has examined a particular Islamic revivalist

movement, such as HTI and FPI (Jahroni 2008; Ward 2009; Muhtadi 2009; Osman 2010a, 2010b). In contrast, through the lens of mobilising structures, this chapter will explore the dynamic interaction among FUI's member movements so as to provide us with a better understanding of the patterns of both cooperation and conflict within contemporary Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia.

6.2. *The Emergence of FUI*

FUI was founded as a result of the fourth congress of KUII (*Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia* or the Congress of Indonesian Muslims) held by MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* or the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) on 17–25 April 2005 in Jakarta.[83] Hundreds of Indonesian Muslim people from a wide range of Islamic organisations, Islamic boarding schools and Islamic universities all took part in this congress. The congress had four primary objectives including: formulating strategies for advancing the culture of Muslims, seeking solutions to thwart moral degradation widely perceived as an unfortunate consequence of the spread and influence of pornography and illicit drugs, defining the concept of religious ethics and the unity of Muslims, and countering the negative stereotypes of Islam subsequent to the global campaign against terrorism launched by the United States (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008).

The congress concluded with the 'Jakarta Declaration', which crafted 14 recommendations for better solutions to a variety of challenges facing Indonesia; one of the foremost recommendations was an urgent call for the implementation of *sharia*

[83]For further information on previous KUII Congresses, see for example, Sitompul (2005).

(Panggabean 2005; *Detik* 2005). To this end, the congress authorised a number of *ulama* to establish a special committee responsible for ensuring the effective execution of these recommendations. In a follow-up meeting held in May 2005, this committee agreed to form a forum with the primary goal of facilitating communication and exchanging information among a wide array of Islamic organisations. Additionally, the forum was directed at providing individuals belonging to its member movements with training courses and workshops on Islamic subjects and at actively responding to contemporary local and global issues pertaining to Islam and the Muslim world. Mashadi from KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World) was elected to serve as the forum's leader, while Muhammad al-Khathath was chosen as the secretary-general. Al-Khathath is a former leader of HTI and one of its first-generation members.

The emergence of FUI in 2005 was mostly due to favourable political opportunities in Indonesia following the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 which facilitated the flourishing of a variety of mass organisations and political parties. However, Gamson and Mayer (1996: 276) and Tarrow (1998: 7) argued that it is not only the socio-political circumstances of a country that help create opportunities for the emergence of a social movement. Social movements themselves also create opportunities for other movements to emerge. Moreover, they can also create opportunities for other movements to devise collective action strategies in such forms as protest rhetoric and what social movement scholars often refer to as repertoire of contention. It refers to an array of protest-related tools and actions available to a movement in a given time frame such as rallies, vigils, sit-ins, petition drives, public meetings, solemn processions, boycotts, demonstrations, strikes,

pamphleteering, and so forth (Zald 1996; Porta and Diani 1999). Here, the activism of such Islamic revivalist movements as HTI, FPI, and MMI that emerged shortly after the fall of the Suharto regime played a role in the establishment of FUI. The emergence of a certain social movement is more often than not initiated by a social movement 'entrepreneur' that performs such tasks as providing the rationale of the establishment of the movement and encouraging other activists to endorse it (Porta and Diani 1999: 149; McCarthy and Zald 1993: 42). This is also the case for FUI whose emergence was initiated by HTI. HTI served as the movement 'entrepreneur' that played a vital role in the establishment of FUI despite the fact that it later opted to cut ties with FUI in 2008. The next section will discuss in detail the extent to which HTI provided FUI with considerable organisational resources so as to support the FUI's social movement activities.

6.3. *Organisations and Structures*

Portraying itself as a broad-based Islamic umbrella movement, FUI claimed that its members were drawn from virtually all Islamic movements and organisations as well as Islamic political parties in Indonesia. Among the movement's claimed members are FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), HDI (Hizbud Dakwah Islam or the Party of Islamic Preaching), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Holy Warriors Council), JAT (Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid or the Congregation of the Oneness of God), KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam or the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World), GARIS (Gerakan Reformasi Islam or Islamic Reform Movement), DDI (Dewan Dakwah Islam or Islamic Preaching Council), Al-Irsyad, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persis (Persatuan

Islam or the Islamic Unity), TPM (Tim Pengacara Muslim or Team of Muslim Lawyers), PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Development and Unity Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang or Crescent and Star Party), and some other organisations. However, this sweeping claim is unfounded, because in reality only a very few of them are active members of the forum. FPI and MMI are among the movement's active members. Among them, FPI is the largest movement in terms of the number of followers. It has invariably participated in every FUI demonstration, as evidenced by the frequent appearance of its supreme leader, Rizieq Shihab, in the movement's mass protests and by the conspicuous symbols and clothes of its members. HTI was one of the founding members of FUI and played a major role in its establishment. Indeed, HTI leaders such as Muhammad Al-Khaththath took the initiative to muster support from other Islamic movements for the FUI's establishment. Previous chapters have demonstrated that, in terms of the ability to exploit its organisational resources effectively, HTI is the most organised Islamic revivalist movement in Indonesia. Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated that HTI is a highly ideological movement in a sense that the ways in which the movement manages its organisational resources, including its members, are strictly driven by a set of uniform and exacting ideologies. These ideologies are primarily aimed at producing highly militant members that not only endeavour to attain the movement's primary objective — the re-establishment of the caliphate, but also to find as many recruits as possible. Turmudi and Sihbudi (2005: 278) rightly pointed out that HTI avoided being an exclusive movement, positioning itself as an inclusive movement that is eager to cooperate with other Islamic movements. Nevertheless, such eagerness is not simply driven by the normative behaviour of any movements or

organisations in the world that tend to band together for a common cause. Rather, it is intended more to exert an influence on other movements in such a way as to support and adopt HTI's ideologies, particularly those relating to the re-establishment of the caliphate.

The influences that HTI exerted on FUI were discernible from the ways in which FUI framed its protest issues, which will be discussed at great length in the next chapter. However, one of the major pronounced examples of such influence in the aspect of mobilising structures was the holding of workshops organised by HTI for the other member movements of FUI in order to facilitate the dissemination of HTI's ideologies such as the importance of implementing *sharia* and re-establishing the caliphate. For instance, HTI former leader, Hafidz Abdurrahman, became a guest speaker in one of FUI's workshops, delivering a presentation on the topic of Islamic *sharia* (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2008b). Another example was the fact that the distribution of an FUI's fortnightly tabloid called *Suara Islam* (the Voice of Islam) relied exclusively on the marketing network of HTI's print media. As a result, according to a senior member of FUI who used to be a member of HTI, before HTI seceded from FUI, the consumers of Islamic print media made the assumption that the FUI's *Suara Islam* belonged to one of HTI's print media. This is attributable to the fact that, in addition to the considerable similarities of content and editorial style between *Suara Islam* and HTI's print media such as *Al-Wa'ie*, the *Suara Islam* was sold by the same sellers of HTI's print media, the majority of which were HTI members and sympathisers (Shodiq Ramadhan [Secretary of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 2 April 2013).

The supreme leader of the international HT movement ordered HTI to cut ties with FUI in August 2008 and, at the same time, expelled Muhammad Al-Khaththath from HTI on account of the Monas Incident on 1 June 2008 in the vicinity of the National Monument, Jakarta. In this incident, KLI (Komando Laskar Islam or Islamic Force Command) was involved in a violent attack on AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan or the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith). KLI claimed to be an alliance of militia wings of Islamic revivalist movements that staged a mass protest against the government's decision to raise fuel prices, marching to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. The mass protest was organised by FUI whose participants were largely drawn from HTI and FPI. However, as the demonstration was taking place in front of the Presidential Palace, KLI split from the march and went to the National Monument as they learned that AKKBB was staging a mass protest there. AKKBB staged a mass demonstration in order to commemorate the birth of Pancasila and at the same time protested against the developing demands voiced by such Islamic revivalist movements as HTI, FPI, MMI, and FUI for disbanding an allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia. KLI claimed to have been provoked by AKKBB into this attack. In Indonesia's mainstream media, KLI was closely associated with FPI instead of FUI due to the fact that virtually all attackers wore FPI clothes and symbols (*Detik* 2008a; Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, 25 October 2008). As a result of this incident, the leader of KLI, Munarman, and the FPI leader, Rizieq Shihab, were soon arrested and convicted of inducing their followers to attack AKKBB. They were sentenced to one and half years in prison (*Kompas Cyber Media* 2008a).

It is worth mentioning that Munarman, who is a well-known legal activist, had an affiliation with HTI — he was an HTI novice (*daaris*). The term novice here refers to a person who is still in the process of studying HTI literature before he or she can become a member of HTI (Shodiq Ramadhan [Secretary of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 2 April 2013). However, HTI spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto, denied any affiliation by Munarman with HTI and said that he was instead the chairman of FPI's advocacy team (*Tempo Interaktif* 2008). Ismail's statement comes as no surprise given that, as the spokesperson of HTI, he is responsible for safeguarding the movement's non-violent image that he has been projecting since the movement's emergence in public despite undeniable Munarman's affiliation with HTI. Meanwhile, Al-Khaththath, believed that the reason behind the HTI supreme leader's order to sever ties with FUI was fear that the latter would impair the non-violent image of the former. However, Al-Khaththath disagreed with this decision and opted to side with FUI (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, 25 October 2008). The HT supreme leader's fear that HTI's affiliation with FUI could hurt the movement's non-violent image, as Al-Khaththath has suggested, is most likely attributable to the violent image of FPI, which is one of the main elements in FUI. The incarceration of FPI's leader, Rizieq Shihab, in connection with the Monas Incident, had undeniably added to FPI's long record of violence, which imperilled FUI, whose non-violent image had been projected by Al-Khaththath.

Thus, cutting ties with FUI was HTI's exit strategy from any association with FPI. This was confirmed by HTI's spokesperson, Ismail Yusanto. He asserted that HTI, in fact, planned to sever ties with FUI long before the Monas Incident, which is attributable to difficulties in settling ideological differences among FUI member

movements. Moreover, as discussed earlier in chapter, HTI is in fact not permitted to conceal its identity when engaging in collective action. In other words, HTI must show to the public that it always palpably uses its own name along with its symbols — Hizbut Tahrir — whenever it is involved in social movement activities (Ismail Yusanto [HTI spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 4 November 2013). According to this rule, HTI is actually not permitted to band together with other Islamic movements unless it becomes the leader of the coalition and must use its identity every time the movement engages in collective action. This is nevertheless the organisational rule that HTI could not implement in FUI, because every mass protest that FUI has engaged since its emergence uses the name of FUI, which is written on its protest signs and flyers, among others. This suggests that HTI's plan to exert influence on other Islamic movements through the establishment of FUI fell short of expectations. As HTI interacted and negotiated with other Islamic movements in FUI, it learned that it was too hard to uphold HTI's ideologies and concomitantly impart them to the other Islamic movements in FUI.

6.3.1. *HDI (Hizbud Dakwah Islam or the Party of Islamic Propagation)*

The HTI's withdrawal from FUI was also followed by the cutting of all HTI's organisational resources that the movement used to provide FUI. This included the sale and distribution network of FUI's fortnightly *Suara Islam.* A few months after his dismissal from HTI, Al-Khaththath founded a new Islamic revivalist movement called HDI (Hizbud Dakwah Islam or the Party of Islamic Propagation). Considering the fact that Al-Khaththath was a former HTI leader, some HTI members initially thought that there would be many HTI members that would leave HTI and join HDI (Ismail Yusanto [HTI spokesperson], personal communication, Jakarta, 4 November 2013). However, only a small number of HTI members left the movement and joined HDI: this number did not exceed 20 people. HDI shares considerable similarities with HTI in terms of its ideological platform, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. However, basically, while HTI is an international movement guided by a leadership in the Middle East, HDI is based in Indonesia and is primarily guided by Al-Khaththath as its leader (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, 25 October 2008).

It is worth mentioning that the FUI leader, Mashadi, who is a former senior member of PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or the Justice and Welfare Party), resigned from the position of an FUI leader not long after the Monas incident. He stated that the reason for his resignation was to give an opportunity to other more competent Muslim scholars to replace him (Mashadi [former leader of FUI], personal communication, 25 December 2013). Nevertheless, an internal source of FUI mentioned that Mashadi was deeply concerned about the grave repercussions of the

Monas incident, which might have impacted on the non-violent image of FUI, hence his resignation.

Upon HTI's withdrawal from FUI, the HDI played a major role in the day-to-day management of FUI and its fortnightly *Suara Islam.* The resignation of Mashadi as an FUI leader did not have any impact on the activities of FUI, because Al-Khaththath and a few other former HTI members actually controlled the direction and progress of FUI. They are the ones who determine protest issues to be raised and write headlines for the *Suara Islam.* Furthermore, they also lobby the active FUI member movements to agree with the protest issues they propose and to mobilise their members and sympathisers for various forms of collective action. They are what social movement scholars often refer to as social movement 'entrepreneurs', which play a major role in the progress and sustainability of the movement (Porta and Diani 1999: 149; McCarthy and Zald 1993: 42). Upon the resignation of Mashadi as an FUI leader, the position of an FUI leader has been vacant, and Al-Khaththath has not been keen to replace Mashadi as the leader. In the eyes of Al-Khaththath, the leader position in FUI is not as important as that in the other Islamic movements, because he views FUI as a coalition that consists of various Islamic movements. Therefore, in his view, the position of Secretary General, which he has been holding since FUI's establishment, is sufficient (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008). This explains why Mashadi's resignation from FUI did not have any negative impact on FUI, because the chief 'entrepreneur' of FUI has always been Al-Khaththath since it was founded in 2005.

Despite being the founder and leader of HDI, Al-Khaththath is not interested in increasing HDI membership. Since HTI's withdrawal from FUI, his main focus has been

on FUI (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008). There are two primary reasons that account for the Al-Khaththath's tendency to focus more on FUI than on HDI. First, HDI lacks the most vital element of organisational resources that every social movement should posses, that is, adherents. HDI has a very small number of active members, not exceeding 20 people. Al-Khaththath's assumption that there would be a large number of HTI members who would join his new movement fell short of expectations. Al-Khaththath is aware of the tiny size of his new movement, which meant that the movement is not confident in staging any mass protest by itself. However, in the realm of social movements, 'the logic of numbers', that is, the size of the overall dissidents that participate in the mass protest, matters. At the same time as political parties attempt to boost the number of electors that support them, it is not uncommon that social movements are also expected to mobilise as many demonstrators as possible in all their collective actions (Porta and Diani 1999: 174). Second, upon Al-Khaththath's dismissal from HTI, he aspired to call for a variety of Islamic elements, be they movements, organisations, or foundations, to band together for the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. To this end, he has not actively promoted and developed the HDI in order to tone down ideological differences among these elements. Rather, he has positioned the FUI as an umbrella movement and himself as a Muslim activist who is keen to embrace various elements in such a way as to unite them (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 22 June 2013).

6.3.2. *FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front)*

As discussed in the previous chapter, in addition to HTI, FPI is one of the largest Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia in terms of the size of the followers and chapters scattered across Indonesia. Since the emergence of FUI in 2005, FPI has always been a loyal member of the FUI, participating in virtually all of FUI's collective actions. Considering the fact that FUI alone is not a single social movement or organisation, the active role of its member movements in ensuring the continuity of its activism is of paramount importance. Before HTI severed ties with FUI, HTI provided the primary organisational resources for FUI. As mentioned before, HTI provided FUI not only with its members and sympathisers for a variety of activities such as mass demonstrations and the holding of training programs and workshops, it also provided FUI with its existing networks for the marketing of the FUI's fortnightly *Suara Islam.* However, upon the HTI's withdrawal from FUI, FUI has been relying on FPI for its organisational resources. Al-Khaththath managed to maintain a good relationship with an FPI's leader, Rizieq Shihab, particularly during Rizieq's incarceration following the Monas Incident in 2008. This relationship has continued since then, and these two leaders often meet with each other and discuss a range of contemporary issues pertinent to the FUI's collective action programs and strategies. While the withdrawal of HTI from FUI brought to an end some vital organisational resources the former used to provide the latter, it did not affect the continuity of FUI's activism.

As one of the largest Islamic revivalist movements, FPI has taken over HTI as the primary source of FUI's organisational resources. Although FPI lacks the capacity to provide its members with effective training programs, as discussed in chapter four,

it does not have any difficulty in mobilising its members and sympathisers to engage in mass protests. The majority of FPI leaders consist of *habaib*[84] and *kyai*[85] who enjoy a relatively prestigious social and religious status in Indonesian society, particularly among FPI members. Due to such a status, the level of compliance among FPI members is high, hence the easy and swift mobilisation for any collective action purposes. It is these FPI members that act as the largest participants in virtually all of FUI's collective actions, thanks to the good relationship that Al-Khaththath and Rizieq have fostered over the years, particularly since the Monas incident in 2008.

FUI's reliance on FPI after HTI's withdrawal is the only effective way to sustain FUI's activism within the Indonesian social and political milieu. The other FUI member movements such as MMI, albeit present in most of FUI's mass protests, do not have as many organisational resources as FPI. As mentioned before, Al-Khaththath's new Islamic movement — HDI — consists of only a handful of people. Although these people are the ones who play a major role in the day-to-day FUI activities, their number is far from being sufficient to engage in any sort of mass demonstration. However, 'the logic of number', that is, the number of overall dissidents that participate in mass demonstrations, in the activism of any social movements, including Islamic revivalist ones, matters. Al-Khaththath is fully aware of this, and his ability to maintain a good relationship with FPI leaders, particularly Rizieq, is undoubtedly the key to the continuity of FUI's activism.

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[84] In Indonesia, *habaib* is an Arabic plural term that is commonly used to denote those who claim to be the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. They are mostly of Hadrami descent. The singular term of *habaib* is *habib.*

[85] *Kyai* is referred to as a prominent religious teacher who graduates from and often leads an Islamic boarding school.

6.3.3. MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or the Indonesian Holy Warriors Council)*

In contrast to FPI that has the capacity to mobilise a considerable number of its followers to participate in FUI's mass demonstrations, MMI is more often than not represented by only a small number of its followers. There are at least two reasons that account for this fact. First, following the resignation of MMI's charismatic leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir, in 2008, MMI suffered from organisational conflict. As discussed in chapter four, this resulted in the emergence of a splinter movement called JAT (Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid or the Congregation of the Oneness of God). Accordingly, many MMI members who were loyal to Baasyir withdrew from MMI and joined JAT, which impacted on MMI's capacity to mobilise organisational resources (Nanang Ainur Rofiq [Chairman of JAT's Jakarta Chapter], personal communication, Jakarta, 23 August 2013). It is worth noting that the fact that the resignation of Baasyir from MMI in 2008 was followed by the resignation of a relatively large number of MMI members stands in a stark contrast to the removal of Al-Khaththath from HTI, which was only followed by a small number, up to 20, of HTI members leaving. As discussed in chapter four, this is attributable to the fact that while HTI deliberately shuns the leadership pattern that relies heavily on a certain leader, MMI had undeniably relied on Baasyir's seniority and charisma in order to muster support from its emergence in 2000 to Baasyir's resignation in 2008. Second, there are some ideological differences between MMI and Al-Khaththath such as the Islamic view of electoral participation and the perceived deviant sect of *shia* in Indonesia, which will be analysed in greater length in the next chapter. For instance, MMI condemned FUI's political initiative to support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in 2009, arguing that this unilateral decision disagreed with MMI's views regarding electoral

participation. However, despite such a disagreement, MMI refrained from withdrawing from FUI by reason of maintaining Islamic solidarity among Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia. Indeed, Abu Jibril as an MMI senior personality, more often than not, attended FUI's meetings to discuss a variety of issues to be raised in the public through collective action.

Although MMI has fewer organisational resources than FPI, it is among a few Islamic revivalist movements in the country today that has a well-established reputation as a pro-*sharia* movement, consistently calling for the complete implementation of *sharia* — a major objective that Al-Khaththath with his FUI also endeavours to achieve. Therefore, despite the fact that FPI's organisational resources alone are sufficient for FUI's needs to engage in a sustained series of collective actions, Al-Khaththath is fully aware that he also needs to engage as wide an array of pro-*sharia* movements as possible, including MMI. This is due to the fact that regardless of conflicting ideologies among FUI member movements that might create tension, FUI has been designed to serve as a coalition movement that consists of various Islamic elements since its emergence. It is inherently not intended to become a single movement organisation, and its core activities are essentially the same as any social movement in the world, mobilising as much support as possible for their causes. Social movements are normally confronted with a lack of the political and material resources required for regular access to political decision makers, which is why they are largely dependent upon what McCarthy, Smith, and Zald referred to as "outsider" resources and strategies (1996: 291). The term "outsider" here categorically refers to any Islamic elements that have ardent pro-*sharia* aspirations: in reality, practically all of them that are active in FUI have little access to the political decision makers. Accordingly, in the

eyes of FUI, engaging with a plethora of Islamic movements, particularly those that have the pro-*sharia* aspirations such as MMI, is not a choice, but a necessity.

6.4. *FUI's Scope of Activities*

Unlike common Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI that have branches in many parts of Indonesia, FUI is a coalition movement that does not have official branches. Through FUI, Al-Khaththath has deliberately opted to raise national issues, as opposed to local issues. Virtually all issues that FUI has ever raised since its emergence fall under the category of national issues. This means that the issues have a national impact, and often became the headlines of the country's news media such as the mass protests against the Miss World contest held in Bali in 2013 and the perceived deviant organisation of Ahmadiyah Indonesia. However, the forum also staged protests against the persecutions of Muslims in Myanmar and the publication of the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad in Denmark and France, which are naturally categorised as international issues. This implies that both national and international issues can be raised by the forum in so far as they have a huge impact on the country's national media. Of course, not all types of headlines of the newspapers would be heeded by FUI. As an Islamic coalition movement that endeavours to defend and promote the interests of Islam and its adherents, it is only natural that the forum normally raised issues that were deemed to be against Islamic teachings, the details of which will be discussed in the next chapter on the ideologies and framing of the FUI.

The fact that FUI does not have official branches and is only focused on issues that have a huge impact on the country's national news is attributable to at least two

factors. First, as mentioned before, Al-Khaththath's new Islamic movement — HDI — lacks organisational resources required to provide FUI with readily mobilised participants needed to engage in its mass protests. Second, raising issues that have a considerable impact on the public at a national scale is much more preferable than raising issues that are locally confined. This is simply because national issues are believed to have more potential to influence the decision makers in the national government than regional issues. Furthermore, virtually all protest issues raised by Islamic revivalist movements in the country are those of national or international issues that became the headlines of the country's national news media. For instance, when HTI staged a mass protest against the government's decision to raise fuel prices in 2008, this protest was not only staged in Jakarta, but also in other regions in the country (*Kompas Cyber Media* 2008c). After all, Indonesia has transformed into a democratic country since the demise of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, and it is only natural that in democratic societies, the mass media are referred to as "the purveyor of information and images" (McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996: 293). FUI and other Islamic revivalist movements in the country, like any social movements in the world, are fully aware of the need to compete for the attention of the national mass media. By raising issues that have a considerable impact on the public at large such as injustices, deprivations, and other issues that are regarded as against Islamic values and teachings, they mostly target the national government who have the authority to bring about policy changes at the national level.

Despite the absence of official branches, Al-Khaththath welcomes any Muslim activist or leader at the regional level to establish branches or chapters of FUI. However, there is no hierarchical connection between these branches and Al-

Khaththath's FUI in Jakarta. In other words, these branches are expected to be self-reliant and committed to defending and promoting the implementation of Islamic teachings and values in their regions. For instance, in 2009, a chapter of FUI in Bogor, West Java Province, was established. The leader was Iyus Khairunnas, a former chairman of the management board of a Bogor Grand Mosque. Iyus did not belong to any Islamic revivalist movement such as HTI, FPI or MMI, but desired to embrace a variety of Islamic movements and organisations in Bogor to band together for the causes of Islam (Iyus Khairunnas, [the Chairman of FUI Bogor], personal communication, Bogor, 6-7 July 2013). One of the major protest issues that FUI Bogor chapter raised was a conflict over a Christian church in the Bogor suburb of Yasmin. Although Indonesia's Supreme Court ruled that the Yasmin church had a valid building permit, the local government of Bogor insisted that the church's congregation in this suburb had falsified the permit (*Jakarta Post* 2014). While the nature of the relationship between the FUI Bogor chapter and Al-Khaththath's FUI was limited to communication and consultation, the two movements shared a basic similarity, that is, the eagerness to respond to an array of contemporary issues not only through Islamic discussion circles, but also mass protests.

Like many Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia that routinely hold Islamic discussion circles as a means to propagate *da'wah* (Islamic propagation) and to attract followers, FUI Bogor also had such a discussion circle that is held monthly in the Bogor Grand Mosque. Iyus became a regular speaker in this discussion circle, talking about the various topics of Islamic teachings. In addition, Al-Khaththath, too, became a regular speaker. Al-Khaththath's participation in this FUI Bogor discussion circle is attributable more to the fact that he lives in Bogor, which is only approximately 50

kilometres away from Jakarta, than to a manifestation of his control over and intervention in the activities of FUI Bogor.

After all, there was nothing much Al-Khaththath could do when the FUI Bogor discussion circle became inactive at the end of 2013, which was due to the change of the management board of Bogor Grand Mosque that happened to dislike the activities of FUI Bogor in this mosque. Al-Khaththath's inability to help resolve this issue was largely due to the fact that he deliberately focused his attention, time, and energy on the activities of FUI (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 20 November 2013). As mentioned earlier, due to the limited organisational resources of Al-Khaththath and other former HTI members that joined HDI, it comes as no surprise that Al-Khaththath has limitations in expanding his HDI, let alone FUI. Against this backdrop, the deliberate focus of the scope of FUI's activities on the national level, at the expense of establishing branches at the local level, nevertheless serves as Al-Khaththath's realistic yet strategic choice in his efforts to advance his pro-*sharia* goals through collective action.

6.5. *FUI's Support-Seeking Strategies*

6.5.1. *FUI's Media*

FUI inherits the culture of HTI, which views the media as an extremely vital tool to both disseminate the movement's ideologies and muster support. However, due to the lack of material resources, unlike HTI that maintains a variety of media such as a magazine, bulletin, tabloid, online radio and television, FUI only relies on its tabloid. The forum publishes a fortnightly tabloid called *Suara Islam* (the Voice of Islam), which also has a regularly updated online version.[86] Similar to other commercial tabloids, the tabloid has its own team of reporters, editors, and marketing. The reporters of the tabloid are tasked to interview a variety of people according to journalistic principles and to write articles based on these interviews. In other words, the contents of *Suara Islam* are not merely carbon copies from the articles of other mainstream media or the Internet sources. Exercising top authority over the tabloid's editorial policies, Al-Khathath serves as the general manager of the tabloid. This provides him with the leeway to control and direct the overall contents, including the headlines, of the tabloid. Demonstrating his role as an FUI 'entrepreneur', Al-Khaththath utilises the tabloid in such a way as to maintain the solidity of FUI member movements by providing them with spaces in *Suara Islam* to express their thoughts, programs, and activities at no cost (Shodiq Ramadhan [Secretary of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 2 April 2013). For example, FUI provides the FPI supreme leader, Rizieq Shihab, with a regular space in the tabloid in which he has ample opportunity to express his various thoughts on Islamic teachings.

[86] For the tabloid's website, see http://www.suara-islam.com

In fact, it is the FUI's tabloid, not the FPI's, that facilitates the dissemination of Rizieq's thoughts. This is simply because, as discussed in chapter four, unlike FUI, FPI does not have any well-maintained regular publication that functions as the primary printed media of the movement that facilitates the disseminations of its leaders' thoughts. Al-Khaththath is aware of this fact, and he even went further, encouraging Rizieq to write articles not only concerning worship, but also politics such as the relations between Islam and democracy, Islam and the state of Indonesia, and Islam and *Pancasila.* These topics are regarded by Al-Khaththath as having the greater potential of bringing about policy changes in favour of the implementation of *sharia.* FUI later compiled the collection of Rizieiq's articles in *Suara Islam* and published them in a book format. The compilation resulted in two books entitled "Wawasan Kebangsaan: Menuju NKRI Bersyariah" ("The National Awareness: Towards Indonesia with *Sharia*) and "Hancurkan Liberalisme: Tegakkan Syariat Islam" ("Eradicate Liberalism: Enforce Islamic *Sharia*") (Shihab 2011; 2012). FUI launched these books through various seminars and discussion circles with a primary view to disseminating its pro-*sharia* agenda and at the same time attracting followers who sympathise with it. It was during the period of these seminars and discussion circles between 2011 and 2013 that the forum launched its slogan: "Menuju NKRI Bersyariah" or "Towards Indonesia with *Sharia*". In contrast to HTI, which is anti-nationalism, FUI attempts to show to the public that it is a pro-*sharia* movement that is at the same time not anti-nationalism, the details of which will be discussed in the next chapter. It is the spirit of this slogan that is constantly manifested in the forum's programs and activities that are expected by Al-Khaththath to have the potential to mobilise as many organisational resources as possible.

6.5.2. *The Gatherings of the Readers of Suara Islam*

While the number of FUI's media is much lower than for HTI, serving as the FUI's entrepreneur, Al-Khaththath knows well how to maximise the potential of the forum's organisational resources despite their limitations. He set up a monthly discussion circle held in a mosque in Jakarta to facilitate the interaction between the readers of *Suara Islam* and the leaders of FUI member movements that is called "Temu Pembaca Suara Islam" or "The Gathering of The Readers of *Suara Islam*". Through this event, FUI raised a variety of issues that basically have political content and are principally aimed at criticising the government policies that are considered to be against Islamic teachings and principles. For example, the gathering raised an issue against the Miss World event held in Bali, Indonesia in 2013 entitled "Miss World Merusak Budaya Bangsa" (Miss World Ruins the Nation's Culture). On this topic, in addition to Al-Khaththath, FUI invited a speaker from FPI, Selon, and from the Indonesia's Human Rights Commission, Manager Nasution. It is worth mentioning that FUI did not refrain from inviting non-FUI speakers, which means that they are neither leaders nor members of FUI member movements in so far as these speakers agree with or support the FUI's goals upon which the gathering issues are based. Despite being a commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, Manager was the only commissioner that denounced the Miss World event on the grounds that it was against Indonesia's eastern culture (Manager Nasution [Indonesia's Human Rights Commissioner], public discussion at the FUI's Gathering of the Readers of *Suara Islam*, Jakarta, 31 August 2013).

By inviting speakers from both inside and outside FUI, the gathering of the readers of *Suara Islam* serves as FUI's invaluable means not only to maintain the solidity of its member movements. It also has the potential to effectively engage with other personalities from various backgrounds beyond the internal community of FUI such as the commissioner of Indonesia's Human Rights Commission. This is undoubtedly done with a view to endorsing FUI's ideas. Moreover, such a gathering provides the readers of the tabloid a valuable opportunity to regularly meet and interact with each other and to consult the leaders of FUI member movements for advice on Islamic issues. For example, the researcher had a chance to interview one of the gathering of regular attendants by the name of Sulaiman. He is a retired teacher and keen to join the gathering because of the fact that he agrees with and supports issues raised in the gathering. In addition, he also shares FUI's view on the importance of implementing *sharia* in Indonesia (Sulaiman [FUI's sympathiser], personal communication, Jakarta, 26 October 2013).

The gathering of the readers of *Suara Islam* is a perfect example of how Al-Khaththah through FUI plays an instrumental role as a movement 'entrepreneur', formulating ideas and converting them into consistent action with the objective of maintaining the solidity of the FUI's member movements and at the same time mustering as much support as possible. Social movements, however, need to demonstrate and ensure that they engage in collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in the forms of collective action in a sustained way (Tarrow 1998: 4; Tilly 2004: 7). To this end, social movements, including FUI, need to maintain the solidity of their supporters, be they leaders, members, and sympathisers. However, merely maintaining the solidity of the

movements' supporters is not enough. They also need to consistently attract support from beyond what currently exists, because social movements naturally lack material resources. Sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents should therefore be done in conjunction with sustainable support mobilisation. The lack of any form of sustainable support on the part of any social movement will automatically impinge on their ability to engage in the sustainable collective challenges. At this juncture, the gathering of the readers of *Suara Islam* fulfils FUI's particular need to both maintain the solidity of its member movements and at the same time muster further support.

6.5.3. *Pro-Sharia Presidential Candidates*

Through *Suara Islam* and its regular gathering, in 2013 Al-Khaththath proposed a number of Muslim leaders to be presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election, who would be expected to support the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. These candidates were, surprisingly, not only drawn from FUI member movements, but also from other non-FUI member movements or organisations. Some of the leaders from the FUI member movements were Rizieq Shihab (FPI), Abu Jibril (MMI), and Abu Jibril (JAT). The other candidates from outside FUI were, among others, Dien Syamsuddin (the leader of Muhammadiyah), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (the leader of Crescent Moon Party), Ma'ruf Amien (the leader of Indonesian *Ulama* Council), Hidayat Nur Wahid (the leader of Justice and Welfare Party), Ismail Yusanto (the Spokesperson of HTI), and Rhoma Irama (a famous Muslim personality and singer).[87] Similar to FUI's

[87] For a complete list of the FUI's proposed pro-*sharia* presidential candidates, see "FUI Keluarkan Daftar Capres *Syariah*" (*Suara Islam online*, 23 September 2013).

decision to support Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto as the pair of Presidential candidates in 2009, the forum believed that it did not have to ask for consent from its member movements about such proposed Muslim presidential candidates, nor from the aforementioned Muslim leaders whose names were proposed as presidential candidates. This is due to Al-Khaththath's strong belief that proposing presidential candidates from Muslim leaders is for the sake of *ummah* (Muslim people) in Indonesia and that there would be no FUI member movements that would disagree with it. Despite the absence of prior consent from these Muslim leaders, there had been no objection to FUI's campaign for the pro-*sharia* presidential candidates (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 20 November 2013).

In fact, FUI had conducted a series of opinion polls among the readers of *Suara Islam* from the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2014 with a view to displaying the ranking of the pro-*sharia* presidential candidates, which are based upon the votes of the readers of *Suara Islam* which were canvassed through mobile phone text messages. Furthermore, in an effort to amplify the effects this campaign, FUI set up a community of *Relawan Capres Syariah* (the Volunteers of Pro-*Sharia* Presidential Candidates) that consisted of the members of the FUI member movements as well as the readers of the FUI's tabloid who regularly attended the monthly gathering of the readers of *Suara Islam.* The forum also organised training and workshops that were aimed at equipping the volunteers with basic skills needed to appeal to their communities and encourage them to endorse the campaign. This community was chiefly aimed at socialising the FUI's pro-*sharia* presidential campaign and at the same time convincing the public on the importance of electing a pair of presidential

candidates who cared about and were willing to accommodate the perceived ardent aspirations of the Muslim people in Indonesia — the implementation of *sharia.* The volunteers were tasked to actively interact with their neighbours and local communities in such a way as to facilitate the dissemination and understanding of why it is important for Muslims to have their own leaders that are committed to the implementation of *sharia.* However, more often than not, the volunteers would be asked some basic questions by the people they approached such as what actually is a pro-*sharia* president and why is this concept different from the "normal" president. Being faced by such questions, the volunteers would automatically proceed to explain the concept of *sharia* in details, as explained by one volunteer:

> *I volunteer for the pro-sharia president campaign because I want to see that the comprehensive teachings of Islam be implemented in Indonesia. Participating in this campaign, I am happy to call for my families, friends, and neighbours to support and vote for one of FUI's proposed presidential candidates. ... Of course, there are some tough questions such as why bother electing a pro-sharia president in Indonesia, but I am ready to give them sound justification, thanks to FUI that has provided me with training on how to deal with such questions* (Sulaiman [a volunteer of the FUI's Pro-*sharia* president campaign], personal communication, Jakarta, 26 October 2013).

Despite the FUI's pro-*sharia* president campaign, Al-Khaththath was nevertheless aware of the fact that none of the presidential candidates he proposed

in his campaign would ever contest the country's 2014 elections. This is because any person that wishes to run for president in Indonesia has to be nominated by political parties. Furthermore, Indonesia's Constitutional Court does not permit independent presidential candidates, that is, any person that is not affiliated with or nominated by any political party. In fact, none of the FUI's pro-*sharia* presidential candidates was nominated by any political party: they were all nominated by Al-Khaththath through FUI with the primary aim of generating the awareness of the *umma* (Muslims) on the necessity of having a president who advocates the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia.

The campaign itself also served as a means to provide the public with the understanding of the concept of Islamic leadership. The concept basically requires that Islam be made as the one and only source of reference in order to cope with a plethora of issues in life, whether they fall within the public of private sphere. In order to meet this end, an Islamic leader is needed to ensure that it is the Islamic rules that are officially employed and enforced, not secular sources of law. In other words, the pro-*sharia* president campaign is simply one of FUI's programs that is particularly aimed at appealing to its audience consisting of the members and sympathisers of FUI member movements as well as the general readers of *Suara Islam* that are not affiliated with any FUI member movements. For instance, the FPI leader, Rizieq Shihab, was one of the favourite pro-*sharia* presidential candidates, as he is seen as a charismatic leader in the eyes of his followers.

Hundreds of FPI members and sympathisers who are scattered throughout the country would be more than happy to support their beloved leader to become the most voted FUI's pro-*sharia* presidential candidate, even though Rizieq personally had

no interest at all in becoming the president of Indonesia (Slamet Maarif [Deputy Secretary General of FPI], personal communication, Cibubur, 20 November 2013). As a result, it comes as no surprise that this FUI campaign had encouraged many of FPI members and sympathisers to find out the ranking of Rizieiq among the other pro-*sharia* presidential candidates through the FUI's *Suara Islam.* Similary, the members and sympathisers of MMI would also pay attention to the FUI's *Suara Islam* that had proposed one of its leaders, Abu Jibril, as one of the pro-*sharia* presidential candidates despite the fact that, as discussed in chapter five, MMI condemns the concept of secular democracy along with its products, including general elections. Encouraging as many people as possible, particularly the members and sympathisers of FUI member movements as well as the non-affiliated readers of *Suara Islam* to pay close attention to the FUI's tabloid and its message of the desirability of a state led by *sharia* were undoubtedly some of the primary goals of the campaign.

It is true that introducing alternative presidential candidates for the Muslim people in the country who had a commitment to the implementation of *sharia* as well as disseminating the concept of Islamic leadership served as the overriding objectives of this campaign, as were stated by Al-Khaththath (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 22 June 2013). However, the potential of this campaign for support mobilisation purposes far outweighed the purported objectives stated in the public. The campaign aimed to maintain support from the members and sympathisers of FUI member movements through encouraging them to take heed of *Suara Islam* through which not only could they see the ranking of their leaders in the pro-*sharia* presidential candidates opinion polls, but also learn about the ideas, programs, and activities of FUI. Furthermore,

mainly through the activities of the volunteers the pro-*sharia* presidential candidate campaign, the campaign also attracted the bystander public, which are particularly interested in looking for further information on the concept of *sharia*, to pay attention to the FUI's *Suara Islam* and to come to the monthly gathering of the readers of *Suara Islam.*

The FUI's pro-*sharia* presidential candidates' campaign attests to Al-Khaththath's capacity to play a role as what is referred to as a social movement 'entrepreneur' whose ideas and activities are instrumental to the sustainability of the movement's activism (Porta and Diani 1999: 149; McCarthy and Zald 1993: 42). As mentioned earlier, social movements, including FUI, are normally confronted with the lack of political and material resources required for regular access to political decision makers, which is why they are very dependent on what McCarthy, Smith, and Zald referred to as "outsider" resources and strategies (1996: 291). At this juncture, Al-Khaththath's idea to hold a pro-*sharia* presidential candidates' campaign is a clear example of how he attempted to address challenges such as the lack of resources, maintaining the support from the FUI member movements and, at the same time, encouraging the bystander public to become the adherents of FUI. These adherents will in turn become one of the valuable organisational resources of the forum in order to engage in various forms of collective action such as mass protests, public gatherings, and so forth. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, in the realm of social movements, 'the logic of numbers', which is the number of overall dissidents that participate in the mass protests, matters. At the same time as political parties attempt to increase the number of electors that support them, it is only natural that social

movements have a tendency to mobilise as many demonstrators as possible in every of their collective action (Porta and Diani 1999: 174).

6.6. *Financial Resources*

Similar to the other Islamic revivalist movements like HTI, FPI, and MMI, FUI heavily relies on its member movements and sympathisers for its financial resources. The term sympathisers in this respect refers to individuals who are not necessarily members of the movements, but sympathise with the cause of the movements and are willing to provide them with financial support. However, as discussed in chapter four, the primary sources of information on aspects of the financial resources of these sorts of movements, including FUI, depend exclusively upon the willingness of their members to disclose such information. However, this information was usually gathered without the author's ability to cross-check their financial report for at least two reasons. FUI is naturally categorised into *Ormas* (Organisasi Masyarakat or civil society organisation). Accordingly, it has no obligation to make and submit an annual financial report to the relevant authority. Second, they are reluctant to provide outsiders, including the author, with the details of their financial resources such as the names of influential sympathisers or people who have been donating their money to the movements and the quantity of their donations because they consider this matter to be private and taboo.

The financial resources that FUI receive are basically aimed at funding its various activities such as the production costs of its fortnightly tabloid (*Suara* Islam) and the activities of its mass demonstrations, among other things. For instance, FUI cannot solely rely on the amount of money generated from the sale of its tabloid to

cover its production costs, despite the fact that the tabloid also receives money, albeit insignificant, from the sale of its advertisement columns (Shodiq Ramadhan [Secretary of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 2 April 2013). In other words, the forum needs other sources of funding to meet these costs. For instance, an internal source told the author that a certain wealthy former HTI member who later joined HDI, which is one of FUI member movements, donated as much as 70 millions Rupiahs (approximately AUD 7,000) every month to fund the FUI's activities, including the publication of *Suara Islam* (Fauzi [a former HTI member and currently a member of HDI], personal communication, 24 September 2013). Furthermore, as the author made an interview appointment with the other internal source of FUI, the informant asked the author to wait for him in the secretariat of one of FUI's member organisations, while he met with the leader of this member organisation with the aim of asking for donations to fund one of FUI's activities (Syawal [a former HTI member and currently a member of HDI], personal communication, Jakarta, 1 October 2013).

The practice of asking for and giving donations, which serves as the backbone of the financial resources of virtually all Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, is nevertheless not uncommon. Indeed, it is possible that the donations are provided by those who are not necessarily affiliated the movements, yet the donors must personally agree with and support the cause of the movements. As discussed in chapter four, some Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI even set strict criteria for this kind of donors where they must endorse the principles and ideas of the movement, and ensure that their donations are unconditional. One might assume that there ought to be some sort of political or economic interests behind these donations. However, as far as Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia are concerned, according

to Al-Khaththath, the motivation behind such donations are primarily driven by their pursuit of the rewards of God, which in the eyes of these Muslim donors supersede any worldly motivations such as better economic or political advantages (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary-General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 26 November 2013). Even after Al-Khaththath and some of his followers were dismissed from HTI, the practice of the HTI's regular membership donations was applied in HDI in order to help fund the activities of FUI, despite the fact that HDI only consists of a few dozen members. It is these few HDI members that serve as the FUI's financial 'entrepreneurs', compelling themselves to pay the regular membership donations and concomitantly encouraging other members and leaders of FUI member movements to donate their money to FUI.

6.7. *Summary*

Employing the perspective of the political opportunity structure, this chapter has described the history of FUI through analysing incentives that have facilitated its emergence. The fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 played a significant part in providing a vast array of mass organisations in Indonesia with valuable political opportunities where previously, they were politically impotent. The immediate consequence of the regime's demise was the flourishing of Islamic movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI that called for the complete implementation of *sharia* in the country. However, FUI was not an immediate by-product of the post-Suharto era. In other words, unlike HTI, FPI, and MMI that emerged within one or two years following the regime demise, FUI was born in 2005, which is considered to be a latecomer in the euphoria of the immediate post-Suharto period. The chapter demonstrated that

the emergence of FUI is nevertheless not only dependent upon favourable political opportunity as a result of the regime's demise. It is also dependent upon the dynamic interactions among Islamic revivalist movements that have emerged earlier. This is because social movements also create opportunities for other movements to emerge, and it is these early Islamic revivalist movements that have played a part in providing FUI's subsequent birth.

Through the lens of mobilising structures, the chapter also examined ways in which FUI mobilises its organisational resources. Given the fact that FUI is a coalition movement consisting of Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, FUI's organisational resources are essentially characterised by their heavy reliance on its member movements. In the early years of FUI activism, it was HTI that provided FUI with considerable organisational resources. However, since HTI severed ties with HTI following the Monas incident in 2008, FPI has served as the FUI's major supporter from which FUI relies upon its organisational resources. Every social movement needs what is often referred to as 'entrepreneurs', that is, people who take the primary responsibility to ensure the sustainability of the movement's activism through encouraging the bystander public to transform into adherents and, most importantly, securing the material resources for the various movement's activities and programs. The chapter has also demonstrated that FUI has such 'entrepreneurs' from whom the forum relies upon. Indeed, it is these 'entrepreneurs' that have played an extremely important role in the sustainability of FUI's activism in the country since its establishment, despite tough challenges it has hitherto faced such as the end of HTI's support as it severed ties with FUI.

The chapter also showed that many of the ways in which FUI mobilises its organisational resources resembles those of HTI, which is reflected from the practice of regular membership donations among FUI's 'entrepreneurs' and from the forum's well-maintained fortnightly tabloid of *Suara Islam*, among other things. This is attributable to the fact that virtually all FUI's entrepreneurs are former HTI leaders and members, who later established a movement called HDI. Although they have a few different views from HTI on certain ideological matters such as the necessity of re-establishing the caliphate, HTI nevertheless imparted an immense influence on how FUI developed its support-seeking strategies. The chapter is aimed not only at contributing to the understanding of how and in what ways a coalition of Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia, such as FUI, manages to mobilise and concomitantly maintain support from its member movements, it also offers insights into the changing dynamics of the alliance patterns of Islamic revivalist movements in post-Suharto Indonesia.

This conclusion suggests that any internal conflict, which leads to the expulsion of any of its leaders, in a highly ideological and militant Islamic movement such as HTI, is likely to engender the emergence of another new highly ideological Islamic movement. More often than not, the features and patterns of the ways in which a new splinter movement mobilises support are highly similar to those of its parent movement, as in the case of HTI and HDI, which in reality plays the most curcial role in directing the FUI's activities and programs. This fact is demonstrated by the expulsion of a former leader of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), Omar Bakri Muhammad, as ordered by the HT's central leadership in 1996. Omar subsequently

established a new movement, called al-Muhajiroun,[88] whose role in public activism is as vigorous as that of its parent movement, the British branch of HT.[89]

[88] For further information on Al-Muhajiroun and Omar Bakri Muhammad, see Abedin (2004).

[89] See Farouki (1996: 30-31; 2000: 21-46).

Chapter Seven

FUI's Ideologies and Framing Strategies

7.1. *Introduction*

Like any Islamic revivalist movement that has emerged since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, FUI also develops its frames of protest by means of interpreting and assigning meaning to events and conditions. These frames of protest are in turn transmitted to the Indonesian public, resonating across multiple layers of audiences and tapping into their collective memory. While the ability of any social movement to mobilise organisational resources is vital to the continuity of its activism, it is at best meaningless if it is not done in tandem with the ability to appeal to the public and transform the bystander public into adherents. Furthermore, it is the ability of any social movement to develop its frames of protest that will shape the movement's identity and that marks itself off from other movements. However, it is the ideology of the movement that serves as the set of beliefs that determine how the movement perceives and interprets the world and how it justifies what is right and wrong through which discontent and issues are framed (Zald 1996: 262; Oberschall 1996: 94). Therefore, the analysis of how a movement develops its frames of protest cannot neglect the movement's ideology.

In chapter five we discussed the frames of protest and ideologies of FUI member movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI. It has been pointed out that despite the fact that all these movements concur with the significance of implementing *sharia*

in Indonesia, the extent to which it is interpreted, articulated, and implemented varies from one movement to another. This is attributable to the varying degrees of how each of these movements understands the concept of *sharia*, which is anchored in their respective ideologies and socio-religious platform. For instance, while HTI strongly believes that the implementation of *sharia* must be executed in conjunction with the re-establishment of an Islamic state (the caliphate), FPI disagrees with such a concept and argues that there is no need to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. The re-establishment of the caliphate, therefore, serves as HTI's religion and political convictions, which influences the ways in which it develops its frames of protest. The caliphate is considered to be HTI's principal motto, and at the same time, an overarching solution to perceived problems in the country, which is why the movement repetitively chants it through its rhetoric and protest signs at every of its mass protests. This suggests that the ways in which an Islamic revivalist movement develops its frames of protest are strongly influenced by its ideologies.

This chapter will examine both FUI's ideology and how it influences the way in which it develops its frames of protest. As discussed in the previous chapter, FUI is primarily directed by a number of former HTI leaders and members who, to a certain degree, retain some of HTI's ideology such as the firm belief on the importance of the re-establishment of the caliphate, in addition to the implementation of *sharia*. However, such ideologies have undergone some revision by of FUI's Secretary General, Muhammad al-Khaththath. For instance, although he believes that the re-establishment of the caliphate is essential, through FUI he prefers not to call for its re-establishment, and this is obviously reflected from FUI's rhetoric and protest signs. As such, this chapter will examine the ideological similarities and differences not only

between HTI and FUI, but also between FUI and the other two major member movements: FPI and MMI. It will also explain the social, political, and historical backgrounds that have contributed to such ideological similarities and differences.

Through the lens of such framing perspectives as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings developed by Benford and Snow (2000), this chapter will also analyse FUI's framing strategies. First, diagnostic framing will help us account for how FUI constructs and develops frames of protest that attend to the function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility, which is also referred to as "naming grievances" (Tarrow 1998: 110). Second, prognostic framing is employed to explain how FUI deals with the task of offering solutions to a wide range of problems it addresses, including planning a protest along with tactics on how to execute the plan. Third, motivational framing will help us understand how FUI provides a rationale for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents, and formulating an array of apt and powerful vocabularies that, when adopted and espoused by adherents, will help sustain their participation in the various forms of the movement's collective action.

7.2. The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of FUI

7.2.1. *The Caliphate, Nationalism, and the Nation-state*

As discussed in the previous chapter, HTI had an immense influence on how FUI develops its support-seeking strategies, which is attributed to some of the following factors: first, HTI is the primary founder of FUI, and it provided FUI with the majority of organisational resources that FUI needed before it severed ties with FUI in 2008; second, virtually all those who currently direct the progress and activities of FUI, who are often referred to as 'movement entrepreneurs' in the literature of social movements, are former HTI leaders and members. These 'movement entrepreneurs' inherited not only HTI's support-seeking strategies, but also its ideology, such as the significance of implementing *sharia* in Indonesia. However, its ideology has not been left intact. It has undergone revision by these FUI 'entrepreneurs'. In chapter five, we analysed the relationships between the notion of the caliphate, nationalism, and the nation-state. The features of the caliphate, such as the belief that Islam is the basis of its state ideology, that *sharia* is the one and only source of laws, and that its territorial boundaries are not limited, are inherently antithetical to those of the nation-state.

Unlike the caliphate, a nation-state today has fixed territorial boundaries, and beyond which lie other sovereign nation-states. Furthermore, virtually all nation-states are currently based upon secular laws, despite the fact that a small number of them apply partial Islamic laws similar to several other Islamic countries. Unfortunately, in the eyes of HTI, none of Islamic countries in the world today can be considered a true Islamic state (*Dar al Islam*), including Saudi Arabia. This is simply because, according

to HTI, none of them adopts and implements complete *sharia*, and are therefore categorised into non-Islamic states (*Dar al Kufr*).

HTI's campaign for the caliphate has met with severe resistance from many Islamic organisations in Indonesia, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhamamdiyah — the two biggest Islamic mass organisations in the country that have been widely applauded as moderate Islamic organisations. They have labelled HTI as harbouring an anti-nationalism cause — the caliphate — that poses a threat to the existence of the Republic of Indonesia. For instance, when HTI held an international conference on the caliphate on 12 August 2007 in Jakarta with an audacious slogan of "It is time for the caliphate to lead the world", some leaders from Islamic moderate organisations condemned the idea of re-establishing the caliphate in Indonesia. One of these leaders is Solahudin Wahid, a respected Nahdlatul Ulama leader. He firmly believes that *Pancasila*, as the basic ideology of the Republic of Indonesia, harmonises with the teachings of Islam, which is the very reason why the very idea of the caliphate in the country is inappropriate (Wahid 2008). Similarly, the other Muslim intellectual who has a Nahdlatul Ulama background, Zuhairi Misrawi, argues that the caliphate is not an ideal type of state, and there is indeed no instruction in Islam ordering its adherents to establish such a state (Misrawi 2007).

It is against the backdrop of such resistance that a number of former HTI leaders and members under the co-ordination of Muhammad Al-Khaththath attempted to revise the framing strategy concerning the caliphate they used to employ in HTI. Upon the dismissal of Al-Khaththath from HTI, he stated that the new splinter movement that he established in the end of 2008 — Hizbud Dakwah Islam (HDI) — would principally have more or less the same ideologies as HTI. However, he further

said that while HTI is directed by an international leadership in the Middle East, HDI is directed by him in Indonesia (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 12 March 2008). This suggests that despite Al-Khaththath's assertion that HDI shares many ideologies with HTI, he does not rule out revising HTI's ideologies so as to fit with the current dynamics of the socio-political milieu in which HDI, including FUI, operate. As discussed in the previous chapter, due to limited organisational resources, Al-Khaththath deliberately opted not to focus on growing HDI. Instead, he is more interested in developing FUI with a view to gaining opportunities to embrace as many Islamic elements as possible for the sake of the *sharia* campaign in Indonesia. Al-Khaththath nevertheless believes that re-establishing the caliphate is as necessary as implementing *sharia* (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 27 April 2013). However, he is confronted with the fact that, in FUI, there are other member movements, such as FPI, that do not concur with the idea of the caliphate. As described in chapter five, FPI has become the largest member movement in FUI after HTI severed ties with FUI in 2008, and FPI has since provided FUI with considerable organisational resources for the continuity of FUI's activism. As a result, the notion of the caliphate never appeared in the rhetoric of FUI throughout its collective action. Instead, Al-Khaththath formulated a slogan of "NKRI Bersyariah", which best represents the ideological belief of FUI. The term "NKRI" stands for "Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia", which literally means "The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia", while "Bersyariah" is best translated as "in accordance with *sharia*". Accordingly, "NKRI Bersyariah" can be best contextually translated as "The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that is in accordance with *sharia*".

The FUI's adoption of the term "NKRI" instead of the caliphate suggests that the movement is attempting to demonstrate to the Indonesian public that all of its activities and programs are oriented towards the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia. Of course, HTI would also present the same justification as FUI, that is, the caliphate is for the betterment of Indonesia. However, HTI cannot deny the fact that, despite such justification, the term 'the caliphate' is inherently problematic because it is defined as a transnational political entity whose ideology and rule of law are entirely based upon Islam. According to this definition, it is only natural that HTI, as mentioned before, is often labelled as an anti-nationalism movement. This is attributable to the fact that, notwithstanding HTI's relentless efforts to convince the public that the caliphate is for the sake of a better Indonesia, many would still view the concept of the caliphate and the Republic of Indonesia as completely incongruous. It is against this very backdrop that Muhammad Al-Khaththath and other former HTI members through FUI formulated the "NKRI Bersyariah" slogan that is chiefly aimed at sending a clear message to the public that it is far from being an anti-nationalism movement, and is working towards the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia through the implementation of *sharia.* According to a senior FUI executive:

> *In FUI, we do not use the slogan of the caliphate as a solution to various problems in Indonesia. Instead, we use "NKRI Bersyariah". We went through lengthy discussions to review the effectiveness of the caliphate slogan, and we eventually argued that we cannot effectively appeal to the Indonesian public if the solution of every sort of problem that we address through mass protests is the caliphate. For example, supposed we wanted to stage a mass*

protest against the government's decision to raise fuel prices. In HTI, we used to offer the caliphate as the solution for such an issue. However, we later thought that the public could be confused with such a solution because they might think that there is hardly any correlation between the rise of the fuel prices and the re-establishment of the caliphate. Instead of garnering public support for this issue, we are afraid that the slogan of the caliphate would discourage the public and, in turn, backfire on us (Shoidiq Ramadhan [Secretary of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 2 April 2013).

Opting to mute its caliphate aspiration, these FUI 'entrepreneurs' consequently attempted to construct its framing strategies in such a way as to justify its "NKRI Bersyariah" slogan. In other words, through this very slogan, FUI, endeavours to convince the public that its programs and activities are really oriented towards the betterment of Indonesia. To this end, FUI develops its rhetoric and discourses that will contest mainstream meaning in the public that is not in favour of its causes. Meaning contestation is one of the primary tasks that social movements in the world have to struggle with routinely in the socio-political milieu to which they are attached, and Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia are no exception. As meaning is socially constructed, the public sphere becomes a highly contested arena in which political players, including social movements, shape their rhetoric to counter meaning produced by their opponents and at the same time to convince the bystander public that it is their meaning that is worth endorsing (McAdam 1996: 338-339).

In chapter five, it has been demonstrated that HTI, MMI, and FPI, albeit with varying degrees of style, have all deliberately crafted their frames of protest, which are subsequently translated into their rhetoric, discourses, and protest signs, among other things. FUI has also made efforts to show the public that the primary cause it has been upholding since the beginning of its history, that is, the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, is not against *Pancasila*[90] as both the basic ideology and the supreme source of law of the Republic of Indonesia. The movement argues that the first article in *Pancasila*, which is "Belief in One God", serves as the raison d'être of the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. According to FUI, the term "Belief in One God" in this regard refers to nothing but the one and only God to which Muslims all over the world worship. Consequently, in the eyes of FUI, it is only natural that based upon this article, any product of laws and regulations in the country shall be in accordance with the God's commands and injunctions – *sharia.*

As such, the FUI interpretation is similar to that of MMI. As discussed in chapter five, MMI also claims that implementing *sharia* in the country is, in fact, supported by a number of Indonesia's basic legal instruments such as: 1) *Dekrit Presiden* or the Decree of President issued on 5 July 1959 that acknowledged the legality of *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter);[91] 2) The third paragraph of the Preamble of the 1945

[90] *Pancasila* literally means five principles. It is the foundation of the state of Indonesia. These five principles are as follows: (1) belief in one God; (2) just and civilised humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; (5) social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

[91]Jakarta Charter refers to the agreement among members of a committee of Indonesian Founding Fathers on the final draft of Indonesia's basic ideology in June 1945 after a long process of compromise. The contents of this draft were later declared to be the Indonesia's state ideology: *Pancasila.* However, the first article of this state ideology initially contained the following sentence: "with an obligation to follow *sharia* for its adherents", which was later the subject of objections by non-Muslims. This sentence was eventually deleted as a result of

Constitution stating that "With the blessing of God the Almighty (Allah)[92] and driven by the noble desire to live as a free nation, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence"; and 3) Article 1 Chapter 29 of the 1945 Constitution stating that "The state shall be based upon belief in the One and Only God (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* 2013).

The aforementioned similar interpretation of the basic ideology and the Constitution by FUI and MMI suggests that the leaders of these movements are well aware of the fact that meaning is socially constructed, and as 'entrepreneurs' of the movements, it is part of their duty to construct meaning of their own that suits their pro-*sharia* agenda. Of course, the correct and common interpretation of the first *Pancasila* article is different from that of FUI and MMI. The first *Pancasila* article, indeed, capitalises on the obligation of all Indonesian citizens to respect each other's religions and belief, without referring only to a specific religion. It guarantees the freedom of the practice of religions and belief among their adherents in the country (*Decree of the People Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. II/MPR/1978 about the Guidance of the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila*). However, such correct and common interpretation of this article is not taken for granted by these FUI 'entrepreneurs'. They re-define it and provide a set of arguments to justify their understanding and unilateral interpretation of the article. According to Syihab:

this objection and has been excluded from *Pancasila.* For discussions of this issue, see for example, Noer (1987); Ismail (1999); Romli (2006).

[92] According to Islam, "Allah" is the proper name of God.

> … *The first article of Pancasila has to be viewed as the most fundamental teaching of Islam, that is, the Tauhid (the oneness of Allah). … Therefore, this article serves as the basis for the implementation of the commands and laws of Allah as the one and only God* (Shihab 2012: 16).

Based upon the above argument, it is obvious that FUI deliberately attempts to formulate its own interpretation of the first article of *Pancasila* that deviates from the correct and common one. The deliberate interpretation of the words "Belief in One God" in *Pancasila* as "belief in the One and Only God (Allah)" in the eyes of FUI begets the inevitable consequences of the implementation of Allah's commands and laws — *sharia.* Accordingly, it is only natural that FUI further holds that any ideologies that do not emanate from the principles and teachings of "the One and Only God (Allah)" thus oppose the first article of *Pancasila.*

> *All ideologies that are not in accordance with the noble principles of 'the Oneness of God' such as atheism, communism, Marxism, secularism, and liberalism must be prohibited in Indonesia. Likewise, any deeds and behaviours that oppose such the noble principles as vice, murder, theft, rape, corruption, sorcery, gambling, and so forth must also be prohibited* (Shihab 2012: 17).

Through the lens of framing formulated by Benford and Snow (2000), FUI has attempted to attend to the social movement's function of targeting blame and attributing responsibility, which is referred to as diagnostic framing. This type of

framing also, as its name implies, requires that the movement diagnose or identify any problems in society that need to be addressed by, more often than not, the authority of the country. First, FUI wished to convince both the public and authority that the established understanding and interpretation of the first article of *Pancasila* is not correct and thus needs to be revised according to its version. Second, FUI offered solutions to the aforementioned problem along with rationalisations of why its solutions are worth endorsing. One of the solutions that the movement offered was the perceived correct re-interpretation of the first article of *Pancasila*, which should be understood as belief in the one and only God (Allah). Through such re-interpretation, FUI further argued that *sharia* is the law of God (Allah) and that its implementation in Indonesia is therefore the manifestation of this very article. This particular stage of the framing process is referred to as prognostic framing. This framing deals with the task of offering solutions along with their justifications to a wide range of problems social movement addresses. Third, through motivational framing, FUI has endeavoured to formulate vocabularies that are chiefly aimed at portraying itself as a pro-*sharia* movement that is, at the same time, committed to the betterment of Indonesia. In other words, the movement attempts to demonstrate that, unlike HTI whose sense of nationalism has been heavily questioned, its programs and activities are for the sake of Indonesia, not any other country. One of these vocabularies is the movement's "NKRI Bersyariah", which is also expected to serve as a powerful catchphrase in order to appeal to the bystander public and transform them into adherents.

7.2.2. *Democracy and Electoral Participation*

All former HTI leaders and members who become FUI 'entrepreneurs' believe that democracy is against Islamic teachings. This view is not different from that of HTI, which also views democracy as a system of *kufr* (disbelief). As discussed in chapter five, HTI considers the notion of democracy to be synonymous with that of secularism in that both of them negate the laws of God (*sharia*) as the overriding guidance of humankind in dealing with a plethora of problems in life. This is due to the fact that in democracy, sovereignty is vested in the hands of the people, which is often associated with the Latin phrase of *Vox Populi, Vox Dei* or the voice of the people is the voice of God. However, while HTI denounces the secular aspect of democracy, it does not view the other elements of democracy,[93] such as the procedure of electing leaders or representatives through elections, as against Islam. The key difference between HTI and FUI in this regard is not their understanding of democracy as a notion. They both agree that this particular notion is alien to Islam. Rather, they differ on their stance on electoral participation. While HTI deliberately avoids both becoming a political party that contests seats in the parliament and casting votes on election day, FUI does not refrain from supporting a certain political party or presidential candidate. In 2009, FUI officially supported the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto. According to FUI, one of the important reasons for this support is because of the candidate's commitment to endorsing FUI's agenda such as the dissolution of the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 27 April 2013).

[93] For details on the definition and elements of democracy, see for example, Schmitter and Karl (1991: 114).

Al-Khaththath held the view that, in HTI, there is no prohibition from participating in general elections. He mentioned that, indeed, when he was a leader (*mu'tamad*) of HTI in the beginning of the 2000s, he himself had even asked the former supreme leader of HT, Abdul Qadeem Zallum, whether or not HT was allowed to participate in general elections. The answer he received was that the general election in Islam is considered to be *mubah* (allowed). This is exactly the same answer regarding the Islamic legal status of electoral participation mentioned by HTI spokesperson, Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, in chapter five. Basically, the general election is only one method of electing a leader. In Islamic terms, this is known as *wakaalah*, which literally means representation. It consists of four elements: 1) *waakil* (representatives); 2) *muwaakil* (people who represent *waakil*; 3) *`amal* (deeds or activities that will be executed by *waakil* on behalf of *muwaakil*); and 4) *`aqad* (pledges made by both *waakil* and *muwaakil*). However, despite the fact that the Islamic legal status of general elections is *mubah* (allowed) and that HTI is allowed to participate in them, the reality is that HTI has always shunned them. Of course, as discussed in chapter five, HTI never showed its non-electoral participation stance to the public, thanks to Indonesia's electoral law no. 10 year 2008 article 28, stating that any attempt to discourage people from exercising their right to vote is considered illegal and thus subject to punishment.

Fealy (2007: 19) mentioned that there were some aspirations in HTI to transform the movement into a formal political party to contest Indonesia's 2009 general elections. Responding to this particular claim, Al-Khaththath stated that an option regarding the HTI's possibility of becoming a formal political party contesting seats in the country's general elections was, indeed, on the agenda before the

movement's big event of the International Conference on the Caliphate held in Jakarta in August 2007.[94] He further said that this conference was supposed to become an important event in which HTI would officially launch its transformation into a political party in the country. However, according to him, there were two main reasons why such a launch did not happen. First, HTI fell short of requirements set forth by the Indonesia's Electoral Commission regarding the minimum number of party branches that must exist in the country. Second, the majority of the members of the HTI provincial committee (*al-Lajnah al-Wilayah*)[95] disagreed with these aspirations (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 22 June 2013). This suggests that the main reason why HTI has thus far shunned electoral participation is due to a conscious choice of its leaders despite the fact that the Islamic legal status of electoral participation is *mubah* (allowed).

Being aware of the fact that participating in general elections is allowed, Al-Khaththath personally disagreed with the aforementioned choice of his former colleagues in HTI. It is against this backdrop that, through FUI, he supported the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election. Moreover, Al-Khaththath also ran as a candidate, albeit unsuccessfully, for the House of Representatives in the 2014 legislative election. His candidacy was officially endorsed by the Islamic Star and Crescent Party, which failed to pass the parliamentary threshold set forth by the Indonesia's Electoral Commission.

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[94] This event was widely covered in both the Indonesian and foreign media. See for example, *Reuters* (2007).

[95] As mentioned in chapter four, the term 'provincial committee' (*al-Lajnah al*-Wilayah) refers to a sphere of operation of the HT movement at a level of state, and the state in this regard refers to Indonesia in which HTI operates. Accordingly, this committee is the highest leadership structure within HTI.

The FUI's pro-electoral participation stance is undoubtedly influenced by Al-Khaththath's view on the lawfulness of actively participating in general elections, which is manifested in the casting of votes for certain candidates that have pledged to support FUI's pro-*sharia* agenda. This includes the possibility of running as candidates for political office, as epitomised by the above-mentioned Al-Khaththath's candidacy for the House of Representatives. However, while FPI supported the FUI's pro-electoral participation stance, MMI opposed it. As discussed in chapter five, FPI considers supporting certain candidates that run for presidential or gubernatorial elections to be an effective way to facilitate the implementation of its 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' principles. However, this support is based upon the condition that these candidates must be willing to help implement and succeed FPI's programs such as the eradication of social vices and the dissolution of the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia once they are elected. In contrast to FPI, MMI not only rejects the concept and practice of democracy, but also shuns electoral participation. MMI's view on democracy and electoral participation is very similar to HTI. Although the practice of democracy that is manifested in a method of electing leaders — the general election — is *mubah* (allowed), MMI firmly holds that, in reality, those that adopt and practice the notion of democracy will never agree to support the implementation of *sharia.*

MMI complained about FUI's decision to support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election, arguing that the decision had never undergone deliberation among all FUI member movements, particularly MMI. However, despite this complaint, MMI refrained from severing ties with FUI for the sake of maintaining unity among Islamic revivalist movements in the country (Abu

Jibril [Deputy Leader of MMI], personal communication, Tangerang, 9 April 2013). MMI's complaint against the FUI's support for the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election clearly implies that, although FUI was established to serve as an umbrella movement of a variety of Islamic movements in Indonesia, FUI is unable to accommodate every aspiration of its member movements. Ideological differences do exist among them, and the FUI's decision to participate in general elections through supporting certain candidates is undoubtedly influenced by Al-Khaththath's view on the lawfulness of participating in general elections. Fortunately, Al-Khaththath's pro-electoral stance is in agreement with the FPI's view on electoral participation. It has been suggested in the previous chapter that Al-Khathathath heavily relies on FPI to ensure the sustainability of FUI's activism for some very important reasons such as the fact that FPI is currently the largest FUI member movement in terms of its ability to mobilise support for a variety of FUI's collective actions.

Al-Khaththath realised that FUI's decision to support a presidential candidate might not satisfy all FUI member movements, particularly MMI, but he himself has a belief that electoral participation in Islam is allowed and that it has the potential to facilitate the implementation of *sharia* in the country. Therefore, it is only natural that through FUI, which is a movement whose activities, programs, and direction lies primarily in his hands, Al-Khaththath implements his pro-electoral participation aspiration. Of course, as mentioned above, this stance comes at a price: the possibility of some FUI member movements such as MMI being disenchanted by the FUI's decision to support a certain presidential candidate in the 2009 presidential election. However, in the eyes of Al-Khaththath, the price in this regard would be tolerable in

so far as he is able to maintain enduring support from FPI — the largest FUI member movement.

7.2.3. *Implementing Sharia in Indonesia: Which Sharia?*

Virtually all Islamic revivalist movements that emerged after the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 espoused the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. They all agree that *sharia* constitutes a panacea to a plethora of problems that have afflicted the country since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, the extent to which *sharia* is interpreted and implemented varies from one movement to another. *Sharia* basically means a set of perceived comprehensive rules and regulations in Islam that have to be adhered to by every Muslim, and these rules and regulations apply to matters that not only fall under the sphere of the individual, but also the public. As discussed in chapter five, the way HTI interprets the implementation of *sharia* goes so far as to call for the re-establishment of the caliphate. This is due to the fact that, in the eyes of HTI, the establishment of the caliphate is an integral part of *sharia*. In contrast, FPI does not consider the establishment of the caliphate or any form of Islamic state in Indonesia a necessity, because, according to FPI, Indonesia is already an Islamic state although there are many of its legal aspects that are still not in accordance with *sharia.* Another different interpretation of *sharia* is demonstrated by MMI in that it calls for the formalisation of *sharia* through the revision of all legal products, particularly a penal code, in such a way as to be in fully in accordance with *sharia*, without capitalising on the call for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.

FUI, as discussed earlier in this chapter, deliberately avoids calling for the establishment of any form of Islamic state in the country. Learning from a perceived fruitless campaign of the caliphate that the FUI 'entrepreneurs' used to chant in HTI, they formulated a motto of "NKRI Bersyariah" or "Indonesia with *sharia*", as an attempt to convince the public that the FUI's overall activities and programs are indeed oriented towards the betterment of Indonesia. However, *sharia* is a broad concept that encompasses detailed commands and injunctions of all aspects of life. It does not only regulate the form of a state, but also a wide range of issues that are basically aimed at exposing and critiquing the government's inability to cope with a plethora of political, social, economic, and religious injustices. The differences as to whether or not these movements participate in general elections discussed above are a result of their interpretation of *sharia.* While HTI and MMI shun electoral participation, FPI supports it. This suggests that although FUI was established to serve as an umbrella movement of various Islamic movements and was aimed at enhancing the unity, co-ordination, and communication among them, in reality, it is confronted with the fact that not all of its member movements have a uniform stance of the concept of *sharia* when it comes to certain delicate issues such as the ideal form of a state in Islam, electoral participation, and other issues that will be discussed later in the next section.

Considering the differences that FUI member movements have on some issues such as those mentioned above, an examination of some of the protest issues that FUI has raised in its collective action is necessary in order to account for how it interprets and applies its *sharia* concept. This is because, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the ways in which an Islamic revivalist movement understand and interpret its concept of *sharia* are nothing but the manifestations of

its ideologies and socio-religious platform. However, such understanding and interpretation of *sharia* can only be appreciated by the public through the range of protest issues that this movement has raised, how it responds to these issues, and what solutions it offers to remedy them. In the next section, we will discuss the FUI's manifestations of *sharia* by examining its protest issues. We will also analyse how it deals with differences that arise among its member movements regarding the preference of protest issues to be raised in its collective action.

7.2.4. *FUI's Protest Issues*

FUI was founded to accommodate the aspirations of a variety of Islamic movements and organisations in Indonesia. As a result, according to its secretary-general, Al-Khaththath, any protest issues that the FUI has thus far raised are always based upon prior deliberations among its member movements. In principle, FUI attempts to advocate the interests of Islam and its adherents in the country (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 27 April 2013). The forum's protest issues range from rejecting the rise of fuel prices to displaying the sense of Islamic solidarity towards its fellow Muslim Rohingyas that suffer from discrimination from the Myanmar government. Social movements everywhere in the world employ what is often referred to as "master frames", that is, relatively inclusive and flexible framing that covers such broad concepts as human rights, injustice, environmental justice, culturally pluralist and "return to democracy" frames, among others (Snow and Benford 2000). FUI, too, employs such master frames. However, considering that it is an Islamic revivalist movement, it is only natural that its master frames are deliberately based upon Islamic

teachings and principles. Accordingly, we will hardly see any Islamic revivalist movements that raise such concepts as human rights, democracy, and pluralism, which are often raised by secular or non-religious based social movements. Rather, Islamic revivalist movements, including FUI, will normally raise such jargons as "*sharia* for the betterment of Indonesia". This does not necessarily mean that the Islamic revivalist movements' manifestation of the concept of "injustice" that often becomes the quintessential master frame is always different from that of secular or religiously-based social movements.

Sometimes, such manifestation of the concept of "injustice" between these two types of movements overlaps when it is translated into their protest issues. For instance, when FUI staged a mass protest against the government's decision to raise fuel prices in 2012, it viewed such a policy as an injustice, which would also be deemed in the same way by the majority of secular or non-religious social movements. As far as FUI is concerned, the criteria of injustice in this regard are nevertheless determined by Islamic teachings and principles. At first glance, protesting against the rise of fuel prices has no direct relevance to the teachings of Islam. However, in the eyes of FUI, this policy is also considered an injustice and thus labelled as *maksiat*, which literally means wickedness. Thus, this policy is against Islamic teachings and principles because it is considered an unnecessary burden that has a considerable socio-economic impact on Indonesian households (*Detik* 2012a). Here, the FUI's understanding and manifestation of "injustice" is not only limited to Islamic worship such as regular prayers, alms giving, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca, and so forth. It is also manifested in matters other than worship, which often fall under the public sphere, such as public policies.

As for the FUI's protest issue of rejecting the rise of fuel prices, through diagnostic framing, which is the first step of framing, the forum attends to the social movement's function of identifying problems in society that need to be addressed by, more often than not, the authorities. The government's decision to raise fuel prices in this regard undoubtedly served as what FUI considered to be a problem and therein lies what is often referred to as injustice. However, diagnostic framing also requires that a social movement carries out an act of attributing responsibility or what is often referred to as "naming grievances" (McAdam 1996: 110). Here, after indentifying a problem in need of remedy, which was the rise of fuel prices, FUI then picked a target of blame — the government. In the second framing, which is prognostic framing, FUI planned an action to respond to this policy by staging a mass protest in Jakarta and concomitantly urged the government to withdraw this policy. The prognostic framing is employed by social movements to offer solutions to a variety of problems they address and to plan a set of collective action plans. Staging a mass protest constitutes a favourite form of collective action that FUI employed in this regard, and urging the government to withdraw its unpopular fuel prices rise serves as one of the solutions that the forum offered.

Last, motivational framing is normally employed by social movements to provide a rational for engaging in collective action, motivating the bystander public to transform into adherents, and formulating an array of apt and powerful vocabularies that will help sustain their participation in the various forms of the movement's collective action. Here, as reflected from the forum's statement and protest signs during the mass protest against the fuel prices rise, FUI called upon the public to endorse the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia as an effective solution not only to

the issue of the rise of fuel prices, but also to other social and economic problems in the country. "NKRI Bersyariah" or "Indonesia with *Sharia* for the betterment of Indonesia" is the forum's very slogan that, in this regard, serves as the aforementioned powerful vocabularies that are aimed at appealing to the bystander public and at the same time transforming them into adherents (*Okezone* 2012).

Another example of FUI's protest issue is a demand to cancel the Miss World contest held in Bali in September 2013. This issue might not be a problem in need of remedy as seen from the perspective of secular or non-religious based social movements, but as it constitutes a problem in the eyes of FUI, it held a series of mass rallies against it in Jakarta. This is what differentiates Islamic revivalist movements such as FUI from other type of movements, particularly ones that are secular or non-religious based. In an initial framing stage, which is diagnostic framing, the ideologies and socio-political platform of a social movement play a major role in the selection of protest issues. Here, Islamic teachings and principles obviously serve as the FUI's primary source of guidance on which the forum's decisions regarding the selection of protest issues are based.

To many Islamic revivalist movements, the chief reason for this protest is unambiguous: according to Islam, exposing women's bodies in public is *haram* (forbidden). However, the way FUI framed this protest issue went beyond merely saying that Miss World is *haram.* Rather, as reflected from the forum's protest signs, FUI portrayed this beauty pageant contest as contradictory to *Pancasila*, which is the very basic philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia (*Tempo Interaktif* 2013). This is certainly a deliberate attempt to amplify the magnitude of the protest issue of Miss World before the Indonesian public, convincing them that this is indeed a big issue

and therefore worth endorsing. As discussed earlier, FUI has made efforts to re-interpret and re-define *Pancasila* in such a way as to match its ideologies and goals, the primary of which is undoubtedly the complete implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. The forum argued that *Pancasila* is compatible with *sharia*, and any attempt to prevent its complete implementation in the country would automatically be deemed as against *Pancasila.* Because the Miss World contest is considered against *sharia*, it comes as no surprise that FUI argued that this contest is also against *Pancasila.* However, linking the protest issue of the Miss World contest with *Pancasila* was framed not only to bolster the impact of the protest, but also to demonstrate FUI's purported commitment to the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia — a pro-nationalism image that the forum has developed vigorously.

FUI has not only addressed national issues such as mentioned above, but also international ones in so far as these issues are deemed against Islamic teachings and principles. In the eyes of FUI, the Myanmar government's discrimination against Muslim Rohingyas is a gross violation of the rights of Muslims, because according to Islam, all Muslims in the world are considered one nation. This means that if there are Muslims in certain parts of the world, such as the Rohingyas or in Palestine, that suffer from any sort of discrimination, their fellow Muslims in the rest of the world have to show deep sympathy towards them and to feel obliged to offer them any kind of help that is possible. Here, the forum's target of blame was not only the government of Indonesia, but also that of Myanmar. FUI urged the government of Indonesia to provide the Rohingya refugees protection and the right to live in Indonesia. Equally important, the forum condemned the Myanmar government and urged them to stop what it considered to be a Rohingya massacre. In fact, some of FUI leaders managed

to meet with the Myanmar Ambassador for Indonesia to express this protest (*Voice of Islam* 2015).

When dealing with issues of discrimination against any Muslim population in the world, virtually all Islamic revivalist movements will agree that this particular issue should be part of their diagnostic framing. In other words, they feel that they should often raise such issues with the public. However, there is one primary difference between HTI and FUI in terms of the solution they offer in this regard. HTI urged the Indonesian government to dispatch the Indonesian military to countries where Muslims are discriminated against by their governments, such as in Myanmar and Palestine (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Website 2012). In contrast, FUI did not offer this solution. As mentioned above, the forum only urged the Indonesian government to offer the Rohingya refugees protection and the right to live in Indonesia, without demanding any dispatch of the Indonesian military to Myanmar to rescue the Rohingya community. This is attributable to FUI's deliberate strategy to offer a solution that is deemed as realistic.

While FUI agrees that all Muslims in the world are considered one nation (*ummah*), dispatching the Indonesian military to unilaterally rescue the Rohingya community and at the same time wage a war against the Myanmar government is impractical. This is exactly the same raison d'être as the FUI's deliberate option of avoiding any mention of the re-establishment of the caliphate as a solution in any of its collective action as it is an irrelevant solution to a wide range of protest issues the forum has thus far raised. FUI holds that any unrealistic solution it offers to the Indonesian public would potentially backfire on the image and protest agenda of the

forum (Shodiq Ramadhan [Secretary of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 2 April 2013).

The Indonesian public will find that many of FUI's protest issues that have been raised since HTI's withdrawal from FUI in mid 2008 are the same as those of HTI. HTI also raised such protest issues as the Rohingyas and the Miss World contest. This suggests that the diagnostic framing employed by these movements are similar, which comes as no surprise given the fact that those that direct the FUI leadership were former HTI's leaders and members. However, the protest issues of these movements are not always necessarily the same. There were occasions when HTI raised a protest issue that was not raised by FUI, and vice versa. As an example, HTI rejected a bill about mass organisations in Indonesia presented to the Indonesian House of Representatives in 2013 that called for stricter rules and regulations for every mass organisation in the country. Some of the objectives of this bill were to prevent any social unrest in society resulting from the activities of organisations or movements that are considered radical and to prevent them adopting an ideology other than *Pancasila.*

HTI criticised the bill and labelled it as the government's deliberate attempt to curb the freedom of expression on the part of civil society organisations in Indonesia. HTI labelled such an attempt as a serious setback for the progress of democracy in the country (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Website 2013). In contrast to HTI, FUI did not stage any mass protest against this bill. Al-Khaththath argued that the bill was basically meant to target movements that receive donations from outside Indonesia such as HTI and those whose ideology is not compatible with *Pancasila*, and, accordingly, FUI

found no reason to stage a mass protest against the bill (Muhammad Al-Khaththath [Secretary General of FUI], personal communication, Jakarta, 20 November 2013).

The other example was a series of FUI protests against the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahja Purnama, alias Ahok, calling for him to step down as a governor due to some of his statements and policies that are considered offensive to Muslims, such as his intent to disband FPI and his policy prohibiting the slaughtering of cows and sheep in schools during the Muslim holiday of the Feast of the Sacrifice (*Idul Adha*) (*Kompas* 2014). In contrast to FUI that considered this issue to be worth protesting, HTI did not view this issue as strategic enough to address because it was a local issue as opposed to a national one. As discussed in the previous chapters, because the chief aim of HTI is to overthrow the government and replace it with the caliphate, it is only natural that the national government of Indonesia should always serve as HTI's primary target of its collective action, not the local government. This explains why, unlike FUI, HTI did not stage any mass protest against the governor of Jakarta. While there is a mechanism of consultation among FUI member movements before the decision of protest issues can be raised, Al-Khaththath certainly has the power to make the final decision. Of course, all Islamic revivalist movements would agree that Islamic teachings and principles serve as the guidance for determining protest issues to be raised in public. However, there are occasions when the manifestation of these teachings and principles differ from one movement to another.

The fact that FUI and HTI sometimes raise different protest issues is attributable to their different interpretation of these teachings and principles. In other words, these differences are determined by particular ideologies and socio-religious platforms of the movements. However, as far as FUI is concerned, ideology and socio-

religious platform alone are not sufficient to account for differences of opinions among its member movements regarding a range of issues raised in the public. The nature of FUI's leadership, which heavily relies on Al-Khaththath as the de facto ultimate decision maker in the forum, also matters. Indeed, this is the most important factor in every one of FUI's decision-making processes. An obvious example of this was MMI's complaints about the FUI decision to officially support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election, which was considered by MMI to be a unilateral decision. Another example is a difference of opinion concerning an allegedly deviant *syiah* (or *shia*)[96] community in Indonesia. Unlike the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah community that is viewed by all Islamic revivalist movements in the country as deviant, not all of them regard *syiah* as deviant.

FPI holds that not all *syiah* Muslims are categorised as deviant. According to them, there are three categories of *syiah*. First, *syiah ghulat*: this category of *syiah* considers Ali bin Abi Thalib, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, a God and believes that the contents of the Holy Quran are no longer original. FPI considers this category to be extremely deviant. Second, *syiah rafidhoh*: this category of *syiah* does not go so far as to consider Ali a God, but publicly condemns the companions of Prophet Muhammad. FPI also views this category of *syiah* as deviant. Third, *syiah*

[96] *Syiah* or *shia* represents the second largest denomination of Islam. The term itself is a short form of *shi'atu 'Ali*, which means the followers of Ali bin Abi Thalib. Ali is Prophet Muhammad's companion, cousin, and son-in-law. *Syiah* considers Ali the divinely-appointed and most suitable direct successor to Prophet Muhammad upon his death. This denomination is based upon the Quran and the sayings (*hadith*) of Prophet Muhammad that are recorded only by Ali and his family as well as his descendants. In contrast to *sunni*, *syiah* do not recognise *hadith* that were derived from Prophet Muhammad's companions other than Ali. The 1979 Iranian Revolution with Ayatollah Khomeini being portrayed by many Muslims around the world as a symbol of resistance against the West facilitated the influence of Iran and *syiah* on many Muslim countries. It was not until the fall of Suharto in 1998 that *syiah* community in Indonesia began to gain the opportunity to come out into the open and spread. For more details on *syiah* in Indonesia, see Zulkifli (2013).

mu'tadilah: this category of *syiah* neither considers Ali a God nor condemns the companions of Prophet Muhammad. It considers Ali to be more prominent than other Prophet Muhammad's companions and narrates the sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*) as exclusively derived from Ali and his direct descendants. Unlike the first and second categories, FPI does not consider this third category to be deviant. While FPI calls upon Muslims to rectify those who adhere to the first and second categories of *syiah*, by force if necessary, it opts to employ a method of dialogue in order to deal with the third category. In the eyes of FPI, despite differences in terms of the sources of Islamic jurisprudence between *syiah* and *sunni*,[97] the *syiah* community in Indonesia falls under the third category, hence the use of a dialogue method instead of by force (Slamet Maarif (Deputy Secretary of FPI), personal communication, Cibubur, 20 November 2013; Mushin Al-Attas [Leader of FPI], personal communication, Jakarta, 8 January 2014).

The aforementioned FPI stance stands in contrast to that of MMI, which rejects such categorisation of *syiah* and views all *syiah* as deviant. In fact, it considers *syiah* the most dangerous and rebellious ideology and must therefore be confronted (*Hidayatullah* 2015). Based upon the belief that *syiah* is extremely deviant, MMI contacted FUI and proposed a plan to stage a mass protest against the *syiah* community's plan to celebrate their religious festival called *Idul Ghadir*[98] in Jakarta on

[97] *Sunn*i is the largest denomination of Islam. It constitutes approximately 90% of the world's Muslim population. The vast majority of Muslims in Indonesia are *sunni* Muslims. In contrast to *syiah*, *sunni* Muslims do not consider Ali the divinely-appointed and direct successor of Prophet Muhammad. In addition, as opposed to *syiah*, *sunni* recognised *hadith* that were derived not only from Ali, but also from other companions of the Prophet Muhammad.

[98] *Idul Ghadir* is a religious festival celebrated by *syiah* Muslims that is held annually on 18th of Dzulhijjah (the twelfth and final month in the Islamic calendar) with the aim of commemorating Prophet Muhammad's last

26th of October 2013. Alas, Al-Khaththath did not agree with this MMI's proposal on the grounds of the belief that, like FPI, a mass protest against the *syiah* community in Indonesia is not an appropriate method to employ because they are not considered deviant (Muhammad Al-Khaththath (Secretary-General of FUI), personal communication, Jakarta, 20 November 2013). As a result, MMI staged a mass protest against the *syiah* community alone without any support from FUI (*Suara Islam* 2013). This clearly suggests that despite FUI's claim that it serves as a coalition with a view to accommodating the aspirations of a wide range of Islamic elements in Indonesia and that there is a mechanism of consultation prior to the selection of any protest issue the forum has thus far raised to the public, the ultimate decision-making process in the forum is nevertheless determined by Al-Khaththath. Even though FUI is a coalition movement that consists of a number of Islamic revivalist movements and organisations, its leadership is solely directed by former HTI 'entrepreneurs' with Al-Khaththath being the de facto leader of these 'entrepreneurs' upon whom the overall direction and progress of FUI heavily depends.

sermon during which the *syiah* Muslims believe that Prophet Muhammad appointed Ali bin Abi Thalib as his direct successor. *Sunni* Muslims repudiate the *syiah*'s claim that Prophet Muhammad appointed Ali as his direct successor and accordingly do not recognise this particular festival.

7.3. *Summary*

This chapter analysed the manner in which FUI frames its protest issues and rhetoric in an effort to appeal to the Indonesian public and transform them into the forum's adherents. Social movements constantly struggle with meaning contestation with a view to countering discourses that are not in favour of their causes and at the same time interpreting as well as assigning meaning to these discourses. FUI is no exception. FUI is well aware that its pro-*sharia* aspirations have met with strong resistance from its opponents since the very beginning of its activism, be it authorities, organisations or other social movements that oppose the implementation of *sharia* in the country. It is against this backdrop that FUI has deliberately attempted to portray itself as an Islamic movement whose ideologies and goals are congruous with the basic ideology of the Republic of Indonesia — *Pancasila.* This is done, for instance, through contesting the widely-accepted definition of the first article of *Pancasila* — "Belief in one God". Unlike the correct interpretation of the article that capitalises on the obligation of all Indonesian citizens to respect each other's religions and belief, without referring only to a specific religion, FUI re-defined it as "Belief in one and only God (Allah)" based upon Islamic perspectives. This unilateral re-definition consequently serves as the FUI's raison d'être for its call for the complete implementation of Allah's commands and laws — *sharia*.

This chapter demonstrated that unlike HTI that is widely perceived to have harboured non-nationalist aspirations with its transnational caliphate agenda, FUI's framing strategy constitutes a conscious endeavour to appeal to the Indonesian public and that its pro-*sharia* agendas is not only compatible with *Pancasila*, but also oriented

towards the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia. While HTI also claims that re-establishing the caliphate is also for a better Indonesia, there have been many criticisms against this idea not only from secular organisations and movements, but also from Islamic ones. This is the very reason why FUI accordingly formulated a slogan of "NKRI Bersyariah" or "The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that is in accordance with *sharia*" after HTI severed ties with FUI in 2008, with a view to getting rid of any association from HTI and the controversial idea of re-establishing the caliphate in Indonesia. This slogan is frequently chanted in FUI's mass protests and functions as FUI's motivational framing, which is aimed at mustering support from the bystander public and transform them into adherents.

The chapter also showed that like other social movements in the world, FUI also employs inclusive and flexible framing, which are often referred to as "master frames" that cover a variety of issues that basically evolve around injustice and inequality. However, when translated into protest issues, the FUI's understanding and definition of injustice and inequality is derived from the teachings and principles of Islam — *sharia.* Therefore, it is only natural that, in addition to staging mass protest against socio-economic injustice, such as the government's decision to increase fuel prices, FUI also raised issues that addressed social vices such as the protest against the Miss World contest held in Bali, Indonesia in 2013, which was deemed an immoral event. All FUI member movements, too, adhere to *sharia* as the overriding guidance when making decisions concerning collective action strategies, including protest issues to be raised in the public. However, despite these movements' agreement on the necessity to adopt *sharia* as their underlying ideology, the extent to which it is interpreted and manifested into protest issues varies from one movement to another.

As one example, despite the fact that FUI inherited much of HTI's ideology and support-seeking strategies, protest issues that were raised by the former sometimes differed from those of the latter. HTI staged a mass protest against the bill of civil society organisations in 2013 that was deemed as threatening the future of mass organisations in the country including itself, whereas FUI did not find the need to raise this issue because it held that this bill would not affect the future of its activism.

Indeed, such differences also occur among FUI member movements. While FUI claims that it serves as a coalition of a wide range of Islamic movements and is aimed at accommodating the aspirations of its member movements, it is not able to satisfy all of its member movements' aspirations. Differences of opinion regarding the forum's decisions and the selection of protest issues in FUI are attributable to different understanding of Islamic perspectives on certain issues such as those regarding the Islamic legal status of electoral participation and the allegedly deviant *syiah* (or *shia*) community. This is clearly evidenced by the MMI's complaints about the FUI's unilateral decision to support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in 2009 and the forum's reluctance to accommodate the MMI's idea to stage a collective mass protest against the *syiah* community.

The chapter suggests that while differences of opinion concerning such issues in FUI are inevitable, the final decision-making process always lies at the discretion of the forum's secretary-general, Muhammad Al-Khaththath, upon whom the overall activities, programs, and progress of FUI relies. As a coalition movement consisting of a number of Islamic movements, the future of FUI in Indonesia's socio-political milieu, nevertheless rests with its ability to manage such ideological dissimilarities. HTI's withdrawal from FUI in 2008 was the first obvious example of how FUI was confronted

with dire internal problems that could not be resolved, with ideological differences between HTI and other FUI member movements playing a major part in this withdrawal. Similarly, MMI had expressed its complaints about some of FUI's decisions mentioned above, but refrained from cutting ties with it for the sake of maintaining unity among pro-*sharia* movements in the country. However, there is no guarantee that MMI's discontent can always be muted in the future. After all, FUI is a coalition movement, whose organisational resources are highly dependent upon its member movements. This means that its ability to manage the ideological differences of its member movements is vital to its continued existence in Indonesia.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1. *Introduction*

This thesis has examined the emergence and socio-political dynamics of an alliance of Islamic revivalist movements called FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Society) against the backdrop of post-Suharto Indonesia. The thesis opened with a review of the development of political Islam in Indonesia before, during, and after the authoritarian Suharto regime (1966-1998), in order to provide background information on the socio-political milieu of the country that has contributed to the emergence of a number of Islamic revivalist movements whose aspirations revolve around the complete implementation of *sharia* (Islamic law). Some of these Islamic revivalist movements serve as FUI's major member movements. The thesis then employed the various perspectives of social movement in order to better account for the research questions posed in this thesis.

The primary research question of this thesis is: how did FUI emerge and how does it mobilise organisational resources and frame its ideologies? This primary research question leads to the following two secondary research questions: how does FUI accommodate the aspirations of its major member movements and how does it deal with differences of opinions among them? To understand the background, the thesis described and analysed the organisation and ideologies of FUI's past and current major member movements: HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of

Indonesia), FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), and MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesia's Holy Warriors Council). An understanding of FUI's major member movements enables a better appreciation of FUI's mobilisation and framing strategies. Through the lens of such social movement perspectives as political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing, the thesis proceeded to examine the emergence and mobilisation as well as framing strategies of FUI. This chapter summarises the key findings and concludes with recommendations for future research on political Islam and Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia.

8.2. *The Changing Faces of Political Islam in Indonesia*

8.2.1. *Pre-Suharto Period*

In pre-independence Indonesia under the Dutch colonial government and throughout the short-lived Japanese colonial government (1942-1945), all of which were characterised with a high level of tendency towards suppression, the political opportunity of any mass-based organisation struggling for independence to engage in practical politics was strictly circumscribed, if not unavailable. From the pre-independence period to the period before the parliamentary democracy system in 1950-1959,[99] Islamic manifestations in Indonesia were mostly channelled through apolitical means such as social and education issues. Some of these organisations are

[99] The Dutch colonial government had ruled over territories that have now become the Republic of Indonesia from the 17th century to 1942. At the height of its power, the Japanese Empire captured much of Asia and forced the Dutch to surrender unconditionally in 1942. Following the Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945, Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence on 17 August 1945. However, it was not until 27 December 1949 that the independence was formally recognised by the international community. For the modern history of Indonesia, see for example Ricklefs (1981) and Cribb and Brown (1995).

Muhammadiyah (established in 1912)[100] and Nahdlatul Ulama (established in 1926)[101] that have served as two of the oldest Islamic mass-based organisations in the country whose programs and activities were focused upon social and education issues. There were nevertheless some aspirations on the part of Islamic mass-based organisations that attempted to incorporate Islamic *sharia* into *Pancasila*, the basic philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia. However, this attempt ended in failure. The end of this era witnessed harsh measures implemented by President Sukarno's regime (1945-1965) against pro-*sharia* Islamic organisations such as Masyumi,[102] which was allegedly involved in a number of separatist movements in the 1950s.

8.2.2. *Suharto Period*

The Suharto regime (1966-1998) took a range of draconian measures primarily oriented towards emasculating political parties and political Islam, engineering elections and utilising the military's coercive force to maintain the status quo in an attempt to maintain political stability for the sake of its development agenda (Karim 1983; Effendy 2003). These measures forced all Islamic organisations or movements in the country to surrender their political aspirations. However, at the end of the regime's period, Suharto took a number of measures designed to appeal to Muslims

[100] For details on Muhammadiyah, see for example Peacock (1978) and Nakamura (1985).

[101] For details on Nahdlatul Ulama, see for example Fealy and Barton (1996) and Bush (2009).

[102] Masyumi was initially established by the Japanese colonial government in 1943 in an attempt to subdue Islamic movements, which consisted of four major Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyan, Nahdlatul Ulama, Persatuan Islam (The Unity of Islam) and Persatuan Umat Islam (The Unity of Islamic Community). Following the Indonesian declaration of independence, it consolidated its statute and structure through the first Congress of Islamic Community held in Yogyakarta city on 7-8 November 1945. For details of Masyumi's statute, ideologies and programs, see Anonymous (1953). For the legacy of Masyumi in contemporary Indonesia, see Fealy and Platzdasch (2005).

in the country, which marked the beginning of a rapprochement between the regime and a variety of Islamic elements (Liddle 1996; Effendy 2003). Despite this rapprochement, the regime only accommodated Islamic elements' aspirations that were aimed at supporting its development agenda. Accordingly, any political aspirations that are derived from Islamic teachings such as the complete implementation of *sharia* and the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia remained muted.

8.2.3. *Post-Suharto Period*

The abrupt end of Suharto's rule on 21 May 1998 was followed by the breakdown of law and order and, at the same time, the rise of radical forms of political Islam, which lies in stark contrast to the moderate and tolerant Islam that previously prevailed in the country. After more than 30 years of being politically strangled by the authoritarian regime, Indonesians were overwhelmed with the euphoria of a 'reformasi' order, and as such channelled such euphoria into various political expressions. This period was characterised with the mounting expression of what has been referred to as "more formalistic Islam", as evidenced by, among others, the growing demand of certain regions of Indonesia for the formal implementation of *sharia* and the emergence of radical Islamic revivalist movements such as FPI (Fron Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or the Liberation Party of Indonesia), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia or Indonesian Warriors Council), and FUI (Forum Umat Islam or Forum of Islamic Society) (Salim and Azra 2003). These revivalist movements strive to enforce *sharia* — a highly taboo political aspiration throughout the course of Suharto's era — and collective action

activities such as mass protests, public gatherings, petition drives, etc., serve as their primary means of attaining their religio-political ends.

8.3. *Theoretical Perspectives*

8.3.1. *Definition of a Social Movement*

The vast majority of studies on social movements are devoted to understanding a variety of collective actions that primarily occur in Western societies. They range from those commonly referred to as old social movements such as workers' movement to new social movements such as feminist, ecology, and anti-war movements, among others. Despite differences in the way in which scholars define what constitutes new social movements, they all agree that these movements operate within the milieu of the post-industrial economy. The majority of scholars underscore such essential elements that characterise social movements as the ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in the forms of collective action such as mass demonstrations, public gatherings, petition drives, media statements, and so forth that typically employ extra-institutional means of influence (Gamson and Mayer 1996: 283; Tarrow 1998: 4; Tilly 2004: 7). Furthermore, in an attempt to study various aspects of social movements, scholars generally employ the following perspectives of social movements: political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing.

8.3.2. *Political Opportunity Structure*

Analysts employ a wide arrange of factors within the environment in which social movements operate that either encourage or discourage the movements to emerge and engage in collective action. Movements everywhere in the world do not operate in a vacuum. The ebb and flow of their activism is closely contingent on a number of dimensions and circumstances unique to a regime in an environment to which they belong. Analysts have attempted to specify various dimensions of the political opportunity structure, but their concepts are, at best, more or less the same as each other. Most scholars hold that there are five dimensions embodied in the perspective of political opportunity structure as follows: 1) the opening of access to power. This refers to the availability of opportunity for social movements to emerge and engage in various types of collective action within the political structure to which they are attached; 2) shifting alignments within the polity (McAdam 1996: 27; Tarrow 1996: 54; 1998: 76-80). This refers to the instability of political alignments, or electoral instability in a pluralist democracy system in which there is more than one centre of power; 3) emerging splits within elites. This refers to divisions among elites that help provide incentives to emerging movements; 4) the availability of influential allies. Influential allies help provide movements with incentives to take collective action, and; 5) the state's capacity or will to repress dissent. The degree of the state's capacity or will to repress dissent determines the opportunity of social movements to emerge and engage in collective action.

8.3.3. *Mobilising Structures*

The majority of social movement scholars define the concept of mobilising structures as collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and engage in collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3; Tarrow 1998: 123). This concept is also referred to as a means of taking part in collective action, employing a variety of social networks such as family, neighbours, and friends. The perspective of mobilising structures principally underscores the necessity of societal support and the wide array of resources that must be mobilised, including but not limited to people, money, knowledge, frames, and skills. It also examines the linkages of social movements to other groups, the reliance of the movements on external support for success, and tactics employed both by movements to advance their cause and by authorities to control or incorporate movements.

8.3.4. *Framing*

Since the 1980s, social movement scholars have been paying attention to the ideational factors, culture, and meaning of movements. In addition to the theoretical frameworks of political opportunity structure and mobilising structures, they have also examined the way in which individual participants of collective action portrayed themselves as an essential element of a social movement; how they appeal to the public and induce them not only to endorse their goals but also to join them and become adherents as well as constituents; and the way in which they articulate, express, and disseminate their frames. The term "framing" is employed to characterise this process of meaning construction. Frames represent "interpretive schemata that offer language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the

'world out there'". Such frames help movements to identify and define problems for action and at the same time propose solutions to remedy the problems (McAdam 1996: 341; Wiktorowics 2004: 15).

8.4. *FUI Major Member Movements: Emergence and Mobilising Structures*

8.4.1. *Emergence and Mobilising Structures of HTI*

HTI has existed since the beginning of the 1980s. It developed out of religious discussion circles among students at IPB (Institut Pertanian Bogor or Bogor Agricultural Institute). From this university, HTI's cells developed and spread across many other universities in Java, and it was primary through LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Campus Preaching Organisation) — campus-based Islamic circles that have existed in virtually all big universities in Java since the 1980s — that HTI struggled to disseminate its ideas and find recruits. HTI promptly came out in the open and drew public attention by launching its first international conference on the caliphate on 28 May 2000 at the Tennis Indoor Stadium in Jakarta (*Republika*, 2 June 2000). In addition to introducing the movement to the public, the conference aimed to convey the message that the caliphate was the only solution for dealing with multidimensional problems afflicting the entire Muslim population today.

HTI is an Indonesian branch of an international HT (Hizb ut-Tahrir) movement. HT has a top-down hierarchical structure. Some analysts have portrayed the movement as totalitarian, resembling a Marxis-Leninist party. Upon its first public appearance in May 2000, HTI gained considerable confidence in holding various open discussion circles on Islamic issues not only in mosques, but also in such venues as seminar halls and campuses. To augment its members and supporters, HTI

additionally relies on its members' personal networks and on open discussion circles and seminars it routinely holds. HTI's financial resources are primarily derived from regular membership donations. In addition to membership donations, the movement may receive financial support from those that are not affiliated with HT on condition that they must demonstrate that they espouse the causes and ideas of the movement. Moreover, this financial support must be unconditional and directly approved by HT's supreme leader.

8.4.2. *Emergence and Mobilising Structures of MMI*

Unlike HTI that has existed since the period of Suharto, MMI was established two years after the fall of the regime on 7 August 2000. The history of MMI began when a Forum of Islamic study circles in Yogyakarta called BKPM (Badan Koordinasi Pemuda Masjid or the Coordinating Body of Mosque Young Activists) felt a need to create a coalition that could serve as an umbrella organisation with the primary objective of enacting Islamic *sharia* in Indonesia. These young activists then managed to garner support from a variety of Islamic personalities and organisations to hold MMI's first congress held in Yogyakarta on 5 – 7 August 2000, from which the history of MMI began.

MMI's structure is divided into two main committees: 1) the Consultative Assembly *(Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi)*; and 2) the Executive Committee (*Lajnah Tanfidziyah*). The term *Ahlul Halli wal 'Aqdi* literally means the influential people who loosen and bind. It contextually refers to a group of influential and trustworthy people who provide *ummah* (the people) with sound judgements regarding all matters that not only fall within the individual sphere, but also that of the public. Regarding MMI's

financial sources, like HTI and other Islamic movements, MMI relies on donations to finance its activities. According to the statute of the movement based upon its first congress, donations may come from both individuals and institutions. In addition to donations, membership dues and a variety of legal financial sources from the movement's commercial activities also become MMI's financial sources (MMI 2001: xvii-xxviii).

8.4.3. *Emergence and Mobilising Structures of FPI*

Like HTI and MMI that benefited from the favourable political opportunity following the fall of the Suharto regime 1998, FPI was established several months after the regime's demise on 17 August 1998 in Jakarta. The history began when a number of influential *ulama* (Muslim scholars) gathered in *Al Umm* Boarding School to celebrate the Independence Day of Indonesia and at the same time to discuss and find a solution to emerging multi-dimensional problems in Indonesia. A large number of Muslims, particularly those who have *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and *habaib* backgrounds such as Rizieq Shihab and Misbahul Anam, and some high-ranking military officials attended the meeting. The meeting agreed that in order for Muslims to play an active role in addressing such problems, a certain form of organisation was needed, hence the emergence of FPI (Ng 2006: 89-90; Jahroni 2008: 18).

FPI's support base is not drawn from university students. Unlike HTI and MMI, the history of FPI did not begin from the LDK — campus-based Islamic study circles. The movement's pattern of recruitment is heavily influenced by the type of the socio-religious backgrounds of its founders and leaders. Virtually all the founders of FPI are *habaib* and *kyai* whose followers are not based on campus. The large number of FPI

members and sympathisers are drawn from people who regularly attend the aforementioned Islamic study gatherings held by *habaib* and from students of Islamic boarding schools whose *kyai* are leaders or influential members in the movement. Considering that *habaib* and *kyai* are the dominant type of leaders in FPI, unlike HTI that shuns the type of leadership that heavily relies on a certain leader, charismatic leadership nevertheless prevails in FPI. Similar to the other Islamic revivalist movements, FPI relies on donations from its members and sympathisers. However, in reality, more often than not, the movement's monthly membership dues cannot be collected for a variety of reasons.

8.5. *The Ideologies and Framing of FUI Major Member Movements*

8.5.1. *The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of HTI*

The caliphate has occupied an extremely important ideological role in HTI. In addition to the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, it has served not only as the movement's ultimate objective, but also its recurring slogan that is present whenever it engages in collective action. HTI has consistently proposed the implementation of *sharia* and the re-establishment of the caliphate as the overarching solutions to any social and economic ills it has ever addressed since the first time it came out in the open in the beginning of the 2000s. It views the caliphate as a unified political entity whose system of law and government is completely based upon *sharia*. As a result, there are underlying differences that distinguish the caliphate from the modern political entity called the nation-state. The fact that the caliphate is diametrically opposed to the nation-state leads to the subsequent oppositions on the part of HTI against some other notions or ideologies such as nationalism and democracy, which

are deemed as alien to Islam. Claiming that the re-establishment of the caliphate is for a better Indonesia, HTI addressed a variety of protest issues ranging from politics to the economy, which is basically aimed at de-legitimising the government of Indonesia in such a way as to facilitate the re-establishment of the caliphate.

8.5.2. *The Ideologies and Framing of FPI*

Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar, which literally means enjoining good and forbidding evil, is the fundamental ideology of FPI on which its activism is based. FPI deems this obligation as a sacred duty upon every Muslim with a view to maintaining law and order in society. It is obvious that HTI invariably raises a very broad range of protest issues ranging from politics to the economy, FPI more often than not raises protest issues in the areas of morality. In the eyes of FPI, the category of evil includes, but is not limited to, pornography, prostitution, alcohol consumption, and gambling, and these have served as the movement's central and perennial issues since it came out in the open in 1998. These issues are considered to be social evils that must be forbidden, and authorities and certain groups or institutions pertinent to the issues are often targeted by the movement in its collective actions. In contrast to HTI that invariably raise a very broad range of protest issues ranging from politics to the economy, FPI, more often than not, raise protest issues in the areas of morality. In the eyes of FPI, the category of evil includes, but is not limited to, pornography, prostitution, alcohol consumption, and gambling, and these have served as the movement's central and perennial issues since it came out in the open in 1998. These issues are considered to be social evils that must be forbidden, and authorities and

certain groups or institutions pertinent to the issues are often targeted by the movement in its collective action.

8.5.3. *The Ideologies and Framing Strategies of MMI*

The failure of the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in Indonesia's 1945 Constitution in the early independence of the country constitutes the rationale for the establishment of MMI. As discussed in the previous chapter, against this particular backdrop, the movement emerged in 2000 with the primary objective of implementing and formalising *sharia* in Indonesia, which serves as the panacea for a variety of problems and challenges that the country faces. Similar to HTI, MMI blamed the government for the various problems that post-Suharto Indonesia had suffered, such as the prolonged sectarian conflict in Maluku, the country's high debt, corrupt government officials, economic inequality, and so forth. MMI's rationale for the need to formalise Islamic laws in Indonesia does not only lie on the movement's perception of the obligation of all Muslims to strictly adhere to a set of Islamic injunctions normally referred to as *sharia.* The movement also asserts that the call for the formalisation of *sharia* is in no way contradictory to the Indonesian 1945 Constitution, which is an example of how it frames its ideology and how it convinces the Indonesian public that its causes are for the sake of Indonesia.

8.6. *The Emergence and Mobilising Structures of FUI*

8.6.1. *The Emergence of FUI*

FUI was founded as a result of the fourth congress of KUII (*Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia* or the Congress of Indonesian Muslims) held by MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* or the Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) on 17–25 April 2005 in Jakarta. Hundreds of Indonesian Muslim personages from a wide range of Islamic organisations, Islamic boarding schools and Islamic universities all took part in this congress. The congress had four primary objectives including: formulating strategies for advancing the culture of Muslims, seeking solutions to thwart moral degradation widely perceived as an unfortunate consequence of the spread and influence of pornography and illicit drugs, defining the concept of religious ethics and the unity of Muslims, and countering the negative stereotypes of Islam subsequent to the global campaign against terrorism launched by the United States following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001.

8.6.2. *Organisations and Structures*

Portraying itself as a broad-based Islamic umbrella movement, FUI claimed that its members were drawn from virtually all Islamic movements and organisations as well as Islamic political parties in Indonesia. However, the reality is that only a small number of them are active members of FUI. FPI and MMI are among the movement's active members. Among them, FPI is the largest movement in terms of the number of followers, while MMI is widely-known as a movement that is consistent in calling for the formalisation of *sharia* in Indonesia. HTI was one of the founding members of FUI and played a major role in its establishment. However, HTI cut ties with FUI in 2008.

Before HTI's withdrawal from FUI, HTI used to provide FUI with considerable organisational resources. HTI's withdrawal from FUI was also followed by the cutting of all HTI's organisational resources that the movement used to provide FUI. A few months after his dismissal from HTI, Al-Khaththath founded a new Islamic revivalist movement called HDI (Hizbud Dakwah Islam or the Party of Islamic Propagation). It is Al-Khaththath and some other former HTI members in HDI that play a major role in the day-to-day management of FUI.

8.6.3. *FUI's Scope of Activities*

Unlike common Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI that have branches in many parts of Indonesia, FUI is a coalition movement that does not have official branches. Through FUI, Al-Khaththath has deliberately opted to raise national issues, as opposed to local issues. Virtually all issues that FUI has ever raised since its emergence fall under the category of national issues. This means that the issues have had national impact, which often became the headlines of the country's news media. The fact that FUI does not have official branches and is only focused on issues that have a huge impact on the country's national news is attributable to at least two factors. First, as mentioned before, Al-Khaththath's new Islamic movement — HDI — lacks organisational resources required to provide FUI with readily mobilised participants needed to engage in mass protests. Second, raising issues that have a considerable impact on the public on a national scale is much more preferable than raising issues that are local in nature. This is because national issues are believed to have more potential to influence the decision-makers in the national government than regional issues.

8.6.4. *FUI's Support-Seeking Strategies*

FUI has inherited the culture of HTI, which views the media as an extremely vital tool to both disseminate the movement's ideologies and muster support. However, due to the lack of material resources, unlike HTI that maintains a variety of media such as a magazine, bulletin, tabloid, online radio and television, FUI only relies on its tabloid. The forum publishes a fortnightly tabloid called *Suara Islam* (the Voice of Islam), which also has a regularly updated online version. Similar to other commercial tabloids, the tabloid has its own team of reporters, editors, and marketing. FUI utilises the tabloid to express its ideologies, garnering support, and maintaining the solidity of its member movements by providing them with spaces in *Suara Islam* to express their thoughts, programs, and activities at no cost.

While the amount of FUI's media is much lower than that of HTI, FUI knows how to maximise the potential of its organisational resources despite limitations. FUI set up a monthly discussion circle held in a mosque in Jakarta to facilitate the interaction between the readers of *Suara Islam* and the leaders of FUI member movements that is called "Temu Pembaca Suara Islam" or "The Gathering of The Readers of *Suara Islam*". Through this event, FUI raise a variety of issues that basically have political content and that are principally aimed at criticising the government policies that are considered to be against Islamic teachings and principles.

Through *Suara Islam* and its regular gathering, in 2013 Al-Khaththath, FUI's secretary-general, proposed a number of Muslim leaders to be presidential candidates in the 2014 presidential election, who would be expected to support the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. These candidates were, surprisingly, not only

drawn from FUI member movements, but also from other non-FUI member movements or organisations. FUI called this campaign "pro-*sharia* Presidential Candidates". Furthermore, in an effort to amplify the effects this campaign, FUI set up a community of *Relawan Capres Syariah* (the Volunteers of Pro-*Sharia* Presidential Candidates) that consisted of the members of the FUI member movements as well as the readers of the FUI's tabloid who regularly attended the monthly gathering of the readers of *Suara Islam.* The forum also organised training and workshops that were aimed at equipping the volunteers with basic skills needed to appeal to their communities and encourage them to endorse the campaign.

8.6.5. *Financial Resources*

Similar to the other such Islamic revivalist movements as HTI, FPI and MMI, FUI heavily relies on its member movements and sympathisers for its financial resources. The term sympathizers, in this respect, refers to individuals who are not necessarily members of the movements, but sympathise with the cause of the movements and are willing to provide them with financial support. However, the primary sources of information on aspects of financial resources of this sort of movements, including FUI, depend exclusively upon the willingness of their members to disclose such information. The financial resources that FUI receive are basically aimed at funding its various activities such as the production costs of its fortnightly tabloid (*Suara* Islam) and the activities of its mass demonstrations, among other things.

8.7. *FUI's Ideologies and Framing*

8.7.1. *The Caliphate, Nationalism, and the Nation-state*

FUI leaders inherited much of HTI's ideology. This is because the majority of those that direct FUI's programs and activities are former members and leaders of HTI. However, its ideology has not been left intact, and it has undergone revision by FUI's leaders. HTI's campaign of the caliphate has met with severe resistance from many Islamic organisations in Indonesia, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhamamdiyah — the two biggest Islamic mass organisations in the country that have been widely applauded as moderate Islamic organisations. They have labelled HTI as harbouring an anti-nationalism cause — the caliphate — that poses a threat to the existence of the Republic of Indonesia. It is against the backdrop of such resistance that a number of former HTI leaders and members under the co-ordination of Muhammad Al-Khaththath, FUI's secretary-general, attempted to revise the framing strategy concerning the caliphate they used to employ in HTI. As a result, the notion of the caliphate never appeared in the rhetoric of FUI throughout its collective action. Instead, Al-Khaththath formulated a slogan of "NKRI Bersyariah", which best represents the ideological belief of FUI. The term "NKRI" stands for "Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia", which literally means "The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia", while "Bersyariah" is best translated as "in accordance with *sharia*".

8.7.2. *Democracy and Electoral Participation*

All former HTI leaders and members who become the FUI 'entrepreneurs' believe that democracy is against Islamic teachings. This view is not different from that of HTI, which also views democracy as a system of *kufr* (disbelief). However,

while HTI denounces the secular aspect of democracy, it does not view the other elements of democracy, such as the procedure of electing leaders or representatives through elections, as against Islam. The key difference between HTI and FUI in this regard is not their understanding of democracy as a notion. They both agree that this particular notion is alien to Islam. Rather, they differ on their stance on electoral participation. While HTI deliberately avoids both becoming a political party that contests seats in the parliament and casting votes on election day, FUI does not refrain from supporting a certain political party or presidential candidate. In 2009, FUI officially supported the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto. One of the important reasons for this support is because of the candidate's commitment to endorsing FUI's agenda such as the dissolution of the allegedly deviant Ahmadiyah Indonesia. The FUI's pro-electoral participation stance is undoubtedly influenced by Al-Khaththath's view on the lawfulness of actively participating in general elections, which is manifested in the casting of votes for certain candidates that have pledged to support FUI's pro-*sharia* agenda.

8.7.3. *FUI's Protest Issues*

In principle, FUI attempts to advocate the interests of Islam and its adherents in the country. FUI's protest issues range from rejecting the rise of fuel prices to displaying the sense of Islamic solidarity towards its fellow Muslim Rohingyas that have suffered from the Myanmar's government discrimination. Like other social movements, FUI also employs "master frames", which is relatively inclusive and flexible framing that covers broad injustice concepts. However, considering that FUI is an Islamic revivalist movement, it is only natural that its master frames are

deliberately based upon Islamic teachings and principles. Accordingly, we will hardly see FUI raise such concepts as human rights, democracy, and pluralism, which are often raised by secular or non-religious based social movements. Rather, FUI and other Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI will normally stick to jargon such as "*sharia* for the betterment of Indonesia".

Differences of opinions among FUI major member movements regarding issues to be raised in mass protests sometimes emerge. This is attributable to differences of ideology and socio-religious platforms among them. In addition, the nature of FUI's leadership which heavily relies on Al-Khaththath as the de facto ultimate decision maker in FUI also contributes to disagreement among its major member movements. MMI complained about FUI's unilateral decision to support the Presidential candidate pair of Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto in the 2009 presidential election and FUI's unwillingness to stage a mass protest against *syiah* community in Indonesia, which was considered deviant by MMI. Despite FUI's claim that it serves as a coalition with a view to accommodating the aspirations of a wide range of Islamic elements in Indonesia and that there is a mechanism of consultation prior to the selection of any protest issue the forum has thus far raised to the public, the ultimate decision-making process in the forum is nevertheless determined by its secretary-general, Al-Khaththath.

8.8. *Research Question Findings and Recommendations for Future Research*

This thesis posed the following primary research question: how did FUI emerge and how does it mobilise organisational resources and frame its ideologies? The thesis has demonstrated that FUI emerged against the backdrop of the demise of the

authoritarian Suharto's regime in 1998. However, FUI was not an immediate by-product of the post-Suharto Indonesia. Its history was preceded by the emergence of a number of Islamic revivalist movements such as HTI, FPI, and MMI whose goals revolve around the implementation of *sharia* and, to some extent, the establishment of an Islamic state. Changes in the socio-political conditions of a country can create political opportunity for social movements, but movements themselves also create opportunity for other movements to emerge. It was these Islamic revivalist movements that later played an important role in the establishment of FUI in 2005 with a view to serving as an umbrella movement of a wide range of Islamic movements and organisations in Indonesia.

The thesis showed that FUI heavily relies on its major member movements in order for it to actively engage in collective action within the socio-political milieu of Indonesia. Unlike HTI, FPI, and MMI, FUI is a coalition whose programs and activities are controlled by former HTI leaders and members. These people are referred to as FUI 'entrepreneurs' because they are the ones who take the responsibility to run FUI, finding support from other Islamic elements to provide the forum with sufficient organisational resources. After HTI's withdrawal from FUI, these leaders managed to establish a new movement called HDI whose ideology is similar to that of HTI. However, HDI lacks organisational resources. As a result, they heavily rely on FUI major member movements such as FPI and MMI. Organisational resources in this regard refer to a variety of resources that are needed by FUI to run its activities on a sustainable basis, but people and money serve as the most fundamental resources of the forum. FUI needs people or supporters in order to succeed in its mass protests, and the forum invariably receives this kind of support from FPI, which is currently the

largest FUI member movement with its estimated membership of seven million people. As for financial resources, although FUI issues a bi-weekly tabloid to sell to the Indonesian public, its activities still largely rely upon donations from its member movements.

Social movements constantly struggle with meaning contestation with a view to countering discourses that are not in favour of their causes and at the same time interpreting as well as assigning meaning to these discourses. FUI is no exception. FUI is well aware that its pro-*sharia* aspirations have met with strong resistance from its opponents since the very beginning of its activism, be it authorities, organisations or other social movements that oppose the implementation of *sharia* in the country. It is against this backdrop that FUI has deliberately attempted to portray itself as an Islamic movement whose ideologies and goals are congruous with the basic ideology of the Republic of Indonesia — *Pancasila.* This is done, for instance, through contesting the widely-accepted definition of the first article of *Pancasila* — "Belief in one God". Unlike the correct interpretation of the article that capitalises on the obligation of all Indonesian citizens to respect each other's religions and belief, without referring only to a specific religion, FUI re-defined it as "Belief in one and only God (Allah)" based upon Islamic perspectives. This unilateral re-definition consequently serves as the FUI's raison d'être for its call for the complete implementation of Allah's commands and laws — *sharia*. Basically, FUI attempted to make the Indonesian public believe that solutions it offered to address every protest issue it raised were for the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia.

The thesis also posed the following secondary research questions: how does FUI accommodate the aspirations of its major member movements and how does it

deal with differences of opinions among them? The thesis demonstrated that FUI regularly invites its major member movements to have discussions concerning protest issues to be raised in its collective actions along with strategies to execute these actions, which is in line with FUI's claim that it aspires to serve as an umbrella movement of a variety of Islamic movements and organisations in Indonesia and accommodate the pro-*sharia* aspirations of its member movements. However, in reality, while it is true that discussions are, more often than not, held prior to FUI's decision-making, it is not able to satisfy all of its member movements' aspirations.

Differences of opinions among FUI major member movements regarding its decisions and selection of protest issues exist. This is attributable to the different understanding of Islamic perspectives on certain issues such as those regarding the Islamic legal status of electoral participation and the allegedly deviant *syiah* (or *shia*) community. While differences of opinion concerning such issues in FUI are inevitable, the final decision-making process always lies at the discretion of the forum's secretary-general, Muhammad Al-Khaththath upon whom the overall activities, programs, and progress of FUI relies. In the end, when differences of opinions occur, it is Al-Khaththath who makes the final decisions in FUI.

The aforementioned type of FUI's leadership, which is heavily reliant on Al-Khaththath, is similar to that of FPI, which relies on Rizieq Shihab's charismatic leadership, and that of MMI when it was headed by Abu Bakar Baasyir from 2000 to 2008. While in the realm of social movements Al-Khaththath is referred to as an 'entrepreneur' for a significant role that he has been playing in FUI, the type of his leadership is also regarded as emblematic of charismatic authority defined by Max Weber as a type of leadership that derives from the charisma of the leader. The term

"charisma" here denotes a certain quality of an individual personality that is different from ordinary men and viewed as gifted with superhuman and exceptional powers or qualities (Weber 1968: 48). This charismatic authority stands in contrast with Weber's other types of authority: legal and traditional. While legal authority is based upon a system of rules that is applied administratively and judicially according to commonly-accepted principles, traditional authority is based upon a system in which leadership is legitimately and traditionally passed from one generation to another.[103]

Unlike legal authority, which is more predictable, and traditional authority, organisations that adhere to the charismatic leadership are considered by many as being unpredictable (Adair-Toteff 2005: 199). However, this does not necessarily mean that organisations demonstrating the features of charismatic authority are always prone to factionalism and splits. As Adair-Toteff observed:

> *Because of the personal, revolutionary and temporary qualities of the charismatic leader, Weber became increasingly aware of and concerned for the power of the contemporary political leader … the charismatic leader was by his or her very nature 'extraordinary' — hence the difficulties in foreseeing the duration and future consequences of charismatic domination/leadership* (Adair-Toteff 2005: 199).

The charismatic leadership of Rizieq Shihab, for instance, has been enduring from FPI's emergence in 1998 up to the present time. Instead of stimulating

[103] For more details on Max Weber's charisma and the other types of his authority, see for example, Weber (1968).

factionalism and splits, Rizieq's leadership and control over FPI has, in fact, strengthened the unity of this movement: there has been no splinter group or movement that emerges as a result of factional conflict in FPI. Likewise, since Al-Khaththath took up the position of the secretary-general of FUI in 2005, there has been no indication that the forum will falter or cease to exist anytime soon. While it is true that Abu Bakar Baasyir — an unequivocally charismatic leader among his followers — resigned from MMI and established a splinter movement called JAT in 2008 due to different perspectives of the concept of Islamic leadership among MMI executives, the potential for an Islamic movement to undergo factional conflict that leads to the emergence of a new splinter movement also happened to HTI, which obviously shuns any type of traditional or charismatic leadership. The Monas Incident in 2008 forced HTI to withdraw from FUI and subsequently led to the emergence of a splinter movement called HDI headed by Al-Khaththath. This attests to the Adair-Toteff's (2005) argument mentioned above regarding the unpredictability that characterises authority derived from personal charisma. In other words, contrary to the belief that the type of charismatic leadership is prone to factionalism and splits, the same type of leadership that is exercised in some Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia such as FUI and FPI has proven to be effective through their enduring activism. As a coalition movement consisting of a number of Islamic movements, the future of FUI rests with its ability to manage the ideological dissimilarities of its major member movements. HTI's withdrawal from FUI in 2008 was the first obvious example of how FUI was confronted with dire internal problems that could not be resolved, with ideological differences between HTI and other FUI major member movements playing a major part in this withdrawal. Similarly, MMI had expressed its complaints about

some of FUI's decisions mentioned above, but refrained from cutting ties with it for the sake of maintaining unity among pro-*sharia* movements in the country. However, there is no guarantee that MMI's discontent can always be muted in the future. After all, FUI is a coalition movement, whose organisational resources are highly dependent upon its major member movements. This means that its ability to manage the ideological differences of its major member movements is vital to its continued existence in Indonesia.

Despite challenges that FUI has faced since its emergence with regard to the ideological differences among its member movements and the fact that the forum is heavily reliant on its de-facto leader, Al-Khaththath, for its continued activism in the country, FUI indeed falls under the category of a social movement. It demonstrates the implementation of the most widely-agreed elements that are embodied in social movements, such as the ability to engage in sustainable collective challenges to authorities, elites, and opponents by people with shared objectives in the forms of collective action such as mass protests, public gathering, and media statements. It is true that FUI acts as an umbrella movement that manages the mobilisation of resources of other Islamic revivalist movements such as FPI and MMI. Equally important, it is also true that FUI is a coalition movement as opposed to a single social movement, which of course differs in terms of the nature of organisation from HTI, FPI, and MMI. However, with all organisational features that are embodied in FUI mentioned abvove, one cannot deny the fact that FUI has been making constant efforts to mobilise people with a shared fundamental objective, that is, the implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia, and to challenge the Indonesian government and its opponents through various forms of collection action, the most favoured being

mass protests. Taking into account all the efforts that FUI has made, the forum, however, qualifies as a social movement based upon the widely-agreed essential criteria against which social movements are defined by social movement scholars.

The aspirations for the complete implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia have been continuously voiced by FUI and its major member movements since the fall of the Suharto's regime in 1998. Indeed, HTI as an FUI former major member movement has been consistent in calling for the re-establishment for the transnational caliphate, which diametrically opposes the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia. However, post-Suharto Indonesia is also characterised with a high level of political openness that guarantees any associations, organisations, political parties, and social movements to express their aspirations through a variety of collective actions in so far as they do not do anything illegal. As a result, none of these Islamic revivalist movements have been banned or disbanded for its pro-*sharia* aspirations.

Of course, there have been many critiques from the majority of the Indonesian public against the idea of the complete implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. There have also been some demands that these pro-*sharia* movements be disbanded. One of such demands come from the largest Islamic mass organisation in the country that is well-known for its moderate posture — Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). While the estimates of its followers vary between 80 and 140 million people out of about 200 million Muslims in Indonesia, NU has played a massive role in shaping the moderate and tolerant face of Islam in the country. Together with Muhammadiyah — the second largest Islamic mass organisation — NU has made it clear that a debate concerning the compatibility of *Pancasila* as a basic philosophy of the state of Indonesia and Islam has long been over. In other words, in the eyes of NU and Muhammadiyah, *Pancasila*

is undoubtedly compatible with Islam, and any attempt to establish a legal system through the formalisation of *sharia* is thus unnecessary, if not unlawful. It is through educational institutions established by both of these organisations scattered throughout Indonesia that help facilitate the dissemination and internalisation of the moderate and tolerant values of Islam among millions of Muslims in the country. This sort of Islam is coined as 'civil Islam' by an American anthropologist Robert Hefner (2000) to suggest that the dominant stream of Islam in Indonesia is, indeed, compatible with democracy.

The features of the 'civil Islam' promoted by NU and Muhammadiyah, of course, stand in stark contrast to the pro-*sharia* mission advocated by FUI and its friends. No one can deny that FUI and the other pro-*sharia* movements are small, compared to NU and Muhammadiyah in terms of the number of their followers. However, albeit tiny, the incessant activism of these FUI and its friends within the socio-political milieu of the country in the forms of collective action has drawn prolonged public controversy and, to some extent, sparked sectarian-motivated hatred and conflict in society. Unfortunately, being currently the third largest democracy in the world, there has been, however, no adequate reason on the part of Indonesia's authorities to disband them. In other words, they are by no means terrorist organisations or separatist movements such as Jemaah Islamiyah or ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) that pose an existential threat to the existence of Indonesia. These pro-*sharia* movements are legal social movement organisations in Indonesia that all claim to work for the betterment of the Republic of Indonesia through collective action with a view to pressuring authorities into accommodating their aspirations. While it is true that there have been some occasions in which the collective actions of FUI major member

movements resulted in violence, the reality is that, this has never been sufficient justification for disbanding them. Unlike HTI, FUI does not go so far as to call for the establishment of an Islamic state: it merely calls for the complete implementation of *sharia* by means of collective action, ruling out any use of force.

Some observers such as Andrew Steele (2006) argue that political Islam in Indonesia is in decline. This is attributed to, among other things, the shifting political orientation of Indonesia's phenomenal Islamic party — PKS (the Prosperous Justice Party) — from endorsing a purist Islamic agenda, such as the call for the implementation of *sharia*, to a more moderate one that highlights the importance of building a clean government and combating corruption. When it comes to electoral politics, the tendency of Islamic parties to transform into what political scientists often refer to as "catch all" parties in an attempt to gain a broad segment of voters is nevertheless not only happening in Indonesia, but also in other Muslim countries such as the ruling Islamic-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) in Malaysia.

All these Islamic parties translate their Islamic aspirations into common yet appealing watchwords such as 'democratisation' and 'clean government', muting their *sharia* agenda. However, while it is true that Islamic parties in Indonesia are gravitating towards the pragmatic centre, other actors of political Islam as represented by Islamic revivalist movements such as FUI remain committed to voicing their Islamic agenda that revolves around the complete implementation of *sharia*. In contrast to Islamic parties, these movements deliberately opt to serve as non-electoral movements. In other words, they do not contest seats in general elections. As a result, they do not need to alter their ideologies or to become moderate in order for them to

maintain or boost the number of their voters. These movements have relentlessly engaged in a variety of non-electoral collective actions such as mass protests, public gatherings, media statements, petition drives, and so forth since the end of President Suharto's rule in 1998. While some of these movements underwent internal conflicts that led to the emergence of new splinter movements, their quest for the complete implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia will not falter. This is because they consider such a quest to be a sacred task that must be sustained, and the activists of these movements believe that immaterial rewards granted by God for relentlessly pursuing the *sharia* aspirations are more precious than the material ones.

The author recommends that future research is carried out to analyse the aspects of co-operation between FUI and the government. The majority of studies on Islamic revivalist movements or Islamic radicalism in many parts of the world, including Indonesia, have devoted much of their attention to the aspect of the clashes between these movements with their governments. Indonesia has suffered from the devastating impacts of natural disasters that have inflicted enormous suffering and damage across the country over the last decade. However, there has been little scholarly attention given to the role of Islamic revivalist movements in social or humanitarian issues. As one example, one of FUI's major member movements — FPI — has demonstrated its readiness to engage in such activities. In fact, FPI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs in 2012 for a social project called "Home Improvements" aiming to renovate the dwellings of the poor in some regions that are unfit for habitation (Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs 2012). As Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia are best known for their sustained series of collective challenges to authorities, this phenomenon is

worth researching in order to account for the rationale and implications behind their involvement in such social and humanitarian activities.

List of Interviews

Name of Movements/Organisations	**Name of Interviewees**	**Position**	**Date / Location**
FUI	1) Muhammad Al-Khaththath	Secretary General	1) 27 April 2013 / Jakarta 2) 22 June 2013 / Jakarta 3) 15 September 2013 / Jakarta 4) 20 November 2013 / Jakarta 5) 12 March 2008 / Jakarta 6) 25 October 2008 / Phone Interview
	2) Shodiq Ramadhan	Secretary	1) 2 April 2013 / Jakarta

			2) 23 December 2013 / Jakarta
	3) Iyus Khoirunnas	Chairman of FUI Bogor Chapter	6 and 7 July 2013 / Bogor
	4) Sulaiman	Volunteer	25 September 2013 / Jakarta
	5) Mashadi	Former Chairman	25 December 2013 / Phone Interview
HDI	1) Syawal	Member	1) 15 September 2013 / Jakarta 2) 1 October 2013 / Jakarta 3) 11 December 2013 / Jakarta
	2) Fauzi	Member	24 September 2013 / Bogor
FPI	1) Muhsin Al-Attas	Leader	8 January 2014 / Jakarta
	2) Jafar Shodiq	Deputy Secretary General	5 June 2013 / Jakarta

	3) Slamet Maarif	Chairman of Preaching Division / Deputy Secretary General	1) 2 July 2013 / Cibubur 2) 20 November 2013 / Cibubur 3) 29 May 2014 / Phone Interview
	4) Novel Bamu'min	Secretary of FPI's Jakarta Chapter	1 June 2013
HTI	1) Ismail Yusanto	National Spokesperson	1) 12 March 2008 2) 4 November 2013
	2) Tindiyo	Local Spokesperson of HTI's Yogyakarta Chapter	24 March 2008 / Yogyakarta
	3) Abdullah	Local Spokesperson of HTI's Central Java Chapter	20 March 2008 / Semarang
	4) Budiyanto	Local Spokesperson of HTI's South Sumatera Chapter	7 March 2008 / Palembang

MMI	1) Abu Jibril	Deputy Leader	9 April 2013 / Tangerang
	2) Irfan S. Awwas	Chairman	12 November 2013 / Yogyakarta
	3) Shobbarin Syakur	Secretary-General	12 November 2013 / Yogyakarta
JAT	Nanang	Chairman of JAT's Jakarta Chapter	23 August 2013 / Jakarta
Former Leader of Jemaah Islamiyah	Abdurrahman Ayyub	Former Leader of Mantiqi IV Jemaah Islamiyah	1 June 2016 / Jakarta

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