Religion and Social Capital:
Civil Society Organisations in Disaster Recovery
in Indonesia

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A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences
UNSW Canberra

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This thesis examines the roles of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and their social capital formation in post-disaster Indonesia. In the context of recovery following a catastrophic event, this subject has been studied by scholars such as Aldrich (2011, 2012), James and Paton (2015) and Rivera and Nickels (2014) but their research focussed on examining the role of internal civil society in the disaster recovery. I define internal groups as associations that emerge within the disaster affected communities. This study will fill the gap by studying external civil society: that of organisations from outside of the affected localities. The main research questions are the followings. To what extent external civil society groups (i.e. CSOs/Faith Based Organisations or FBOs), along with other disaster management agencies, can contribute to providing economic recovery aid in post-disaster Indonesia? In what way are external CSOs groups able to create positive social capital or produce adverse results from social capital formation in the affected society? The main arguments in this research are twofold. First, the roles of CSOs in post-disaster Indonesia are increasing particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami but their involvement in the phase of recovery needs to be more extensive. CSOs involvement in the recovery phase is the least compared to other phases of disaster management cycle. This fact is paralysed with little attention from scholars to study the recovery phase. Second, while scholars like Candland (2001), Lockhart (2005) and Smidt (2003) maintain that CSOs particularly with religious background (FBOs) are capable to generate social capital using religious and cultural means, their ability in building good social capital is largely depends on numerous factors. As social capital is a "double-edged sword" (Aldrich and Crock, 2007: 379), the findings of this study demonstrate that external FBOs can harm the society through their recovery aid and social capital formation. Consequently, affected-communities will experience slower process of recovery and resilience. This study employs qualitative approaches, using the 2013 earthquake in Aceh and the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption in East Java as case studies.
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Abstracts

This thesis examines the roles of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and their social capital formation in post-disaster Indonesia. In the context of disaster recovery, this subject has been studied by scholars e.g. Aldrich (2011, 2012), James and Paton (2015) and Rivera and Nickels (2014) but their research focused on examining the role of internal civil society, that of associations that emerge within the disaster-affected communities. This study will fill the gap by studying external civil society: organisations from outside of the affected localities. The main research questions are the followings. To what extent external civil society groups along with other disaster management agencies, can contribute to providing economic recovery aid in post-disaster Indonesia? In what way are external CSOs groups able to create positive social capital or produce adverse results from social capital formation in the affected society? The main arguments in this thesis are twofold. First, the roles of CSOs in post-disaster Indonesia are increasing particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami but their involvement in the phase of recovery needs to be more extensive. CSOs involvement in the recovery phase is the least compared to other phases of disaster management cycle. This fact is analysed with little attention from scholars to study the recovery phase. Second, while scholars like Candland (2001), Lockhart (2005) and Smidt (2003) maintain that CSOs particularly with religious background (Faith Based Organisations, FBOs) are capable to generate social capital using religious means, their ability in building good social capital largely depends on numerous factors. As social capital is a “double-edged sword” (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379), I argue that external FBOs, through their recovery aid, can harm the society. Consequently, affected-communities will experience slower recovery and resilience. External civil society disaster relief organisations need to be careful with their approach of delivering recovery assistance and this consideration is not comprehensively reflected in disaster management policy in Indonesia e.g. Disaster Management Law 24/2007. This study employs qualitative approaches, mainly semi-structured interviews and participant observation, using the 2013 earthquake in Central Aceh and the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption in East Java as case studies.
Acknowledgments

Alhamdulillah (Praise to Allah), I thank You for giving me strength and courage to finish this thesis. This thesis would not have been possible without the support given by many people and institutions. My first debt of gratitude is to the University of New South Wales (UNSW) for providing me with a three and a half years’ UNSW Scholarship to undertake this PhD project. I am especially grateful to my supervisor Dr Minako Sakai for her endless support and invaluable guidance from my arrival in Canberra until the final phase of the writing process. I have benefitted a lot from her critical comments and positive suggestions. It is my privilege to have accomplished this thesis under her persistent supervision. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Dr Nicolaas Warouw as my co-supervisor who has been helpful with his constructive feedback and good-humoured discussion.

The School of Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS) at UNSW Canberra has been very supportive and has provided resources to help me complete my study. I wish to thank the HASS management and administration staff, especially Prof David Lovell, Prof Shirley Scott, Dr Ned Dobos, Margaret McGee, Bernadette McDermott, Marilyn Anderson-Smith and Shirley Ramsay for their excellent support. I also greatly appreciate Dr Sally Burt’s professional editorial and proofreading services, in accordance with the UNSW Guidelines. My friends and colleagues have been steadfast supporters. At HASS I am indebted to Najib Kailani, Falik Isbah, Peter Job, Ajie Saksono, Birawa Anoraga, Haoyue Zu, Ross Mackie and Zaw Linn for their company and cheerfulness. Outside the office, I have received significant social support from countless Indonesian friends who have helped me survive and stay sane. My
colleagues at the International Centre for Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies (ICAIOS) especially my former supervisor Dr Saiful Mahdi and Nurul Fajar (research assistant) also deserve my sincere gratitude.

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I extend my deepest gratitude to all those who assisted me during my fieldwork. I am indebted foremost to Dr Eko Teguh and Surya Rahman (HFI) who helped me to connect with potential interviewees. My sincere thanks to all those I interviewed; CSOs, government personnel, and villagers for sharing their ideas and knowledge. My special appreciation goes to Asep Beny (DMC-DD), Jodi Iswanto (PSI-DD), and Saiful (KTN-DD). I am humbled by the warm welcome I received from the people in Jaluk village in Central Aceh of Aceh Province, and Pandansari village in Malang of East Java Province. My heartfelt thanks to Mulyadi’s family and Pak Parno’s family for their hospitality during my stay in Jaluk and Pandansari respectively.

Last, but most importantly, I am exceptionally grateful to my family and my wife’s family. I am especially grateful to my parents (Nurdin Manyak and Asma Rasyid) for their unconditional love, motivation and inspiration; and to my brothers (Muammar and Zahrul Fuadi) and my sisters (Nurmala Hayati and Nasri Diana) for their support and prayer. I dedicate this thesis to my beloved wife, Syarmila Hayati, and my joyful and lovely son, Nibras, both of whom have enriched my life in Canberra. Thank you for understanding the hectic life of a PhD student.
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Note on Spelling and Transliteration

I follow the standard and common usage of Indonesian terms such as *adat* and *qurban* for generic meaning with italic format. However, when the words are used for Indonesian organisations, specific names or abbreviations, I will not use italic such as “Dompet Dhuafa”, “Bukit Barisan” and “Renaksi”.

Note on Currency Conversion

Throughout this study, the exchange rates of one Australian Dollar to Indonesian Rupiah have fluctuated at around 10,000 Rupiah. For consistency and simplicity purposes, I apply a standard conversion rate of one Australian dollar to 10,000 Rupiah. The Australian Dollar henceforth abbreviated as AUD and the Indonesian Rupiah as IDR.
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APU</td>
<td>Al-Azhar Peduli Ummat (Al-Azhar Caring the Islamic Community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNPB</td>
<td>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster Management Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPBD</td>
<td>Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Regional Disaster Management Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDRM</td>
<td>Community Based Disaster Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>Comprehensive Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Yayasan Dompet Dhuafa (Wallet for the Poor Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMC-DD</td>
<td>Disaster Management Centre of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>Disaster Resource Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (The Aceh Free Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFI</td>
<td>Humanitarian Forum Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMI</td>
<td>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDR</td>
<td>International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTN-DD</td>
<td>Kampoeng Ternak Nusantara - Dompet Dhuafa (Archipelago Livestock Village of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation). A special unit under the Dompet Dhuafa Foundation to implement livestock development program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPBI NU</td>
<td>Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim Nahdlatul Ulama (Disaster Management and Climate Change Foundation of Nahdlatul Ulama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDMC</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Islamic Clerics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKU</td>
<td>Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum (Assistance for the Relief of Public Suffering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planas PRB</td>
<td>Platform Nasional Pengurangan Resiko Bencana (National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI-DD</td>
<td>Pertanian Sehat Indonesia – Dompet Dhuafa (Health Agriculture Indonesia of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation). Autonomous unit under the Dompet Dhuafa Foundation working in agriculture sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renaksi</td>
<td>Rencana Aksi (Action Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RZ</td>
<td>Rumah Zakat (Alms House)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOVIA</td>
<td>School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (School for the training of Native Physicians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>The United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>Wahana Visi Indonesia (World Vision Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>nominal Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>local customary law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alang-tulung</td>
<td>helping each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Quran</td>
<td>the holy book for Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aqiqah</td>
<td>welcoming new baby born (Islamic celebration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asas tunggal</td>
<td>sole ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bang</td>
<td>older brother, called for one whose age is older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokasi Terpimpin</td>
<td>Guided Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrasi Pancasila</td>
<td>Pancasila Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desa tertinggal</td>
<td>underdeveloped village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dusun</td>
<td>hamlet/ sub-village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gampong</td>
<td>village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gotong royong</td>
<td>mutual help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hijrah</td>
<td>migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idul Adha</td>
<td>the day of sacrifice (Islamic celebration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idul Fitri</td>
<td>the day marks the end of fasting month Ramadhan (Islamic celebration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infak</td>
<td>donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepala Desa</td>
<td>head of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khitanan</td>
<td>celebration of boys’ circumcision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keuchik</td>
<td>head of village (Gayonese/Acehese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kyai</td>
<td>Islamic clerics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lebaran</td>
<td>Indonesian calling for <em>Idul Fitri</em> and <em>Idul Adha</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mas</td>
<td>Javanese calling for man or boys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
masjid  
prayer house

menomang  
Gayonese tradition of mutual help for rice planting

menuling  
Gayonese tradition of mutual help for paddy mowing

meugang  
Gayo and Acehnese tradition to welcome the fasting month of Ramadhan and celebrate Islamic festivals

mubelah  
Gayonese tradition of mutual help for digging soil

mujik  
Gayonese tradition of mutual help for threshing rice

mulamut  
Gayonese tradition of mutual help for grass cleaning

munatal  
Gayonese tradition of mutual help for clearing embankment

mushalla  
prayer house (smaller than mosque)

musyawarah  
meeting for consensus building

nrimo  
acceptance, to accept

Orde Baru  
New Order (Suharto era)

Orde Lama  
Old Order (Sukarno era)

paguyuban  
association, mostly informal as support networks

Pancasila  
Five Principles (of Indonesian Constitution)

Panitia Sembilan  
nine working committee members working for drafting Indonesian constitution

pengajian akbar  
large-scale of religious gathering

pesantren  
Islamic boarding school

pesantren kilat  
short-term Islamic boarding program

priyayi  
Javanese aristocrats

qurban  
sacrifice of cattle

Reformasi  
Reform period (Post-Suharto era)

santri  
pious Muslim

sedekah  
charity

tengkulak  
local collector
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>toke</td>
<td>big trader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turun tanah</td>
<td>celebration of baby touching the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ummah</td>
<td>Islamic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wakaf</td>
<td>endowment</td>
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<tr>
<td>zakat</td>
<td>obligatory almsgiving</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction

I. Background

This study examines the roles of Civil Society Organisations (henceforth abbreviated as CSOs) and their social capital formation in post-disaster Indonesia. It includes an analysis of external CSOs, which I refer to as CSOs from outside the disaster-affected area. Social capital is important for disaster recovery and resilience as shown by recent studies in the field of disaster recovery. Scholars (Aldrich, 2012; Rivera and Nickels, 2014) argue that communities with high levels of social capital will be able to recover faster and show greater resilience in the aftermath of natural disasters than those that have a low stock of social capital. Thus, I will test this hypothesis by analysing the role of external CSOs in this thesis. I will examine whether they are able to generate social capital in disasters-affected societies or weaken it.

1 I adopt the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) to define some key terms such as disaster, recovery, resilience and vulnerability. The definitions by the UNISDR are widely accepted by scholars or practitioners. Disaster is defined as "a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts.". For this study, I limit the exploration of disasters to those occurring naturally, which excludes man-made and technological disasters. Recovery is "the restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk." Resilience means "the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management." Finally, the word vulnerability means "the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards." See https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology (accessed 11 January 2016). Some other terms such as civil society and social capital will be discussed in Chapter Two.
Natural disasters are global concerns. The Asia Pacific region is particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), between 2005 and 2015, forty percent of natural disasters across the globe occurred in the Asia Pacific region. The following are some of catastrophes that occurred in the region during that time: the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake (2004), the earthquake in Java, Indonesia (2006), Sumatra, Indonesia (2009), Samoa (2009), Haiti (2010), Japan (2011), China (2014) and Nepal (2015), the flood in Sri Lanka (2011), Nepal (2012), Indonesia (2013) and India (2014), cyclone Nargis in Burma (2008), typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013), typhoon Rammasun in China and Vietnam (2014), and volcanic eruptions in Indonesia in (2010, 2014, 2015) and the Philippines in (2013). The region is home to eighty percent of individuals affected by natural disasters globally. The impact was massive, with half million lives lost and 1.4 billion individuals affected.2

This study focuses particularly on Indonesia, which is geographically a part of the Asia Pacific. The reason why Indonesia has been chosen for this case study is the higher degree of vulnerability compared to some other countries. The high exposure of Indonesia to disasters is due to its demographic and geological location within “the Ring of Fire”. The Ring of Fire refers to the plate tectonics around the Pacific Ocean, which stretches from South America (East) down to New Zealand (West), as illustrated in Map 1.1. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions, most of which are frequent occurrences in Indonesia, are triggered by the plate tectonics (Rinard Hinga, 2015: xvii).

What is more, Indonesia is located at “the hottest spot on the Ring of Fire“ (Saul, 2014). In other words, the country is among the most seismically active zones in the world and home to 142 volcanoes. The earthquake and tsunami in Aceh (2004) and Mentawai (2010), the earthquake in Nias (2005), Yogyakarta (2006), West Java and West Sumatra (both in 2009), Bener Meriah and Central Aceh (2013), the eruptions of Merapi (in 2006 and 2010) and the latest Mount Kelud and Sinabung explosions (in 2014 and 2015 respectively) are among the Ring of Fire’s more recent natural disasters. Indonesia also faces other natural disasters such as floods, landslides, droughts and forest fire. I am personally from Banda Aceh and I have witnessed the terrific impact of disasters especially the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that destroyed my hometown.

In response to the natural disasters mentioned above, scholars, policy-makers and emergency managers turned their efforts towards finding ways of coping with disasters and exploring possibilities to decrease vulnerability and to increase resilience in the region. This study especially attempts to examine how CSOs can play a complementary role to the government in helping the affected communities recover faster, strengthen their resilience and reduce their vulnerability.

CSOs, along with military and government institution, the media and local community groups are among the key actors in post-disaster relief (Sakai et al., 2014). Of these agencies, the government is the one that holds the main responsibility in disaster management. In the Indonesian context, the obligation of the government has been mandated in the Disaster Management Law No 24 Year 2007.³

II. Research Objectives and Questions

The objectives of this research are twofold. The first is to examine the extent to which external agencies, particularly CSOs, are able to play a role in providing recovery assistance, with a specific focus on economic development, in post-disaster Indonesia. The second objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which CSOs, especially those with religious underpinnings, are able to strengthen social capital while delivering recovery aid to an affected society. Strengthening social capital will assist the survivors of disasters to recover faster. Prominent scholars in the field (Aldrich, 2012; Buckland and Rahman, 1999; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011; James and Paton, 2015, 2016b; Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004) regard social capital as one of

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³ Details on this will be elaborated on separately in Chapter Six.
the crucial driving forces behind the speedy or, vice versa, the slow process of recovery in communities following disasters. In other words, social capital can be a “double-edged sword” (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379) or “Janus-faced” (Szreter, 2002: 575) because it can have a positive impact, but it can also have a negative impact. (Portes, 2014; Portes and Landolt, 1996).

Based on the objectives outlined above, I will address the following research questions in this study:

1. To what extent do external civil society groups, along with other disaster management agencies, contribute to providing disaster (economic) recovery aid in the aftermath of disasters in Indonesia?

2. How do CSOs interact with other agencies such as government or other organisations in the post-disaster setting? In what ways do collaborative works i.e. partnerships and coordination or, alternatively, competitions and tensions between CSOs and these agencies develop?

3. In what ways are external CSOs able to create positive social capital or produce adverse results from social capital formation in the affected society?

4. How will the findings of this study contribute to the existing theoretical discussion and policy relevance?

III. Main Arguments

There are two main arguments in this thesis. The first is that the role of CSOs in post-disaster Indonesia is significant and this was particularly evident after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, but they need to be involved more in the recovery phase. While all the
phases of the disaster cycle (namely emergency response, recovery, preparation and mitigation) are equally important, CSOs are least involved in the recovery phase. This fact has received little attention from scholars in the study of the recovery phase, particularly in the Indonesian context.

The second argument is that while some scholars like Candland (2001), Lockhart (2005) and Smidt (2003) maintain that CSOs, particularly with religious foundations (Faith-Based Organisations, henceforth abbreviated as FBOs), are capable of generating social capital using religious means, their ability to build good social capital largely depends on a variety of factors including the socio-cultural and political context. In other words, I argue that as social capital is a “double-edged sword” (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379) these external CSOs can harm the society through their recovery aid and social capital formation, which leads to a slower process of recovery.

IV. Justifications of Research

The significance of this study lies in its contribution to the following theoretical and practical debates. Firstly, this study seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature by studying external CSOs (the name I give to civil society groups that come from outside the localities of the affected disasters). There has been a growing research on the nexus between civil society and social capital formation in disaster context (e.g. Aldrich, 2011, 2012; James and Paton, 2015, 2016b; Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b; Rivera and Nickels, 2014). These studies have focused predominantly on the civil society groups that have emerged within disaster-affected societies. I name this group internal CSOs
as opposed to external CSOs. The role of external civil society groups remains understudied and this analysis seeks to remedy that.

Secondly, the growing literature on disaster in Indonesia largely focuses on large-scale disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Clarke et al., 2010; Daly et al., 2012; Jauhola, 2013; Samuels, 2013, 2016) or the 2010 eruption of Mount Merapi in Yogyakarta (Birowo, 2010; Gaillard and Texier, 2010; Sulistiyanto, 2014). Given the vulnerability of Indonesia to natural hazards as demonstrated earlier in this paper, small to medium-scale natural disasters have not been widely studied by academics. I attempt to fill this gap by taking two medium-scale natural disasters that frequently occur, namely earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. I argue that studying the most frequent disasters will help contribute to the widening of the existing literature on natural disasters in Indonesia and help policy-makers to reduce the impact of these occurrences. The focus of this study is the earthquake in the Gayo highlands of Aceh in 2013 (hereafter shortened as the Gayo earthquake) and the volcanic eruption of Mount Kelud in East Java in 2014 (hereafter referred to as the Mt. Kelud eruption).

Thirdly, this study proposes to address a gap in the existing literature by studying the nexus of religion (religious groups), development and disaster. Scholars (Thornton et al., 2012: 790) contend that “the importance of faith-based groups, as influential civil society organisations, is widely acknowledged and they are viewed by some as key players in disaster relief and broader development programmes, particularly in regions where the government provides little or no assistance.” This means that religious groups, which are part of CSOs, as I shall discuss in Chapter Two, play crucial roles in disaster and development activities. However, there is little empirical research that investigates the roles of CSOs particularly FBOs in disaster recovery in Indonesian context. Scholars who study the interconnection between
religion, development and disaster in Indonesia mainly focus on how religious communities interpret disasters and ways of coping with such extreme tragedies (Fanany and Fanany, 2014; Rahiem et al., 2017; Samuels, 2016). Consequently, I argue that this study will not only contribute to the disaster scholarship but also to development studies and religious studies. What is more, as I examine the Indonesian society from different perspectives, this study proposes comprehensive approaches, ranging from historical, theological, political, sociological and political.

Fourthly, as this research connects the emerging concept of social capital with CSOs, which have opportunities to grow and play a crucial role in the aftermath of disasters in Indonesia, this study will contribute to scholarly debates on how to make best use of aid for community recovery.

Finally, this research proposes a methodological innovation in disaster research by empirically comparing societies affected by different types of disasters. Some researchers tend to look comparatively at different communities affected by one type of disaster (Häberli, 2012; Mukherji, 2014; Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006). This study intends to extend the approach of (Aldrich, 2012) who looked at several disasters across different locations. However, given the available resources, this study is limited to a subnational analysis focusing on a specific country (Indonesia) and this will be explained in the methodology section. The comparative study is important not only to widen possibilities for generalisation but also to document as many lessons as possible about “build[ing] back better” for the future of Indonesia. In short, the findings of this study are important for both academic and policy discussions, as it aims to enhance resilience and reduce the vulnerability of the affected societies.
V. Research Methodology and Scope: Comparative Case Studies in Diverse Indonesian Societies

This research project has used primarily field research with a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is inductive in nature. As this research is aimed at providing more in-depth narratives from empirical findings, I argue that qualitative research is the best approach to answer the research questions of this study. Scholars studying disasters commonly use three research methods namely field research, survey research and documentary or historical research (Stallings, 2007). Field research involves qualitative case studies where an individual or a group of researchers visits a disaster site. The techniques used in this method are field notes, participant and non-participant observation, formal and informal discussion or interviews and the collection of documents. The second method, survey research, uses quantitative approaches such as questionnaires. Hence, this method contrasts with field research methods. The third method, documentary research, is also known as desk study or bibliographical research, and it involves collecting documents related to disasters. They can be divided into “contemporaneous” materials, documents produced soon after the disaster, and also more historical or archival documents. Among these three categories, fieldwork research is the most appropriate for this study due to it being a “prototypical method” for disaster research (Stallings 2007, p. 56).

The overall character of this study is exploratory. As this study focuses on social aspects (i.e. social capital) of post-disaster communities, the main method used in this study is ethnographic fieldwork. Ethnographic fieldwork is the most appropriate for this study because it is aimed at “discovering and investigating social and cultural patterns and meaning in communities, institutions and other social settings” (Schensul et al., 1999: 1).
During the fieldwork, I have used mainly in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants as well as participant observations. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. I also employed desk study which involved the collation and review of the existing literature, documents, reports and media. Triangulation (using more than one method and source of data collection) is expected to “enhance [the] credibility and trustworthiness of the data and findings, permits for that desirable thick, rich context to develop, and facilitates emergent questions and problems” (Phillips, 1997: 188). As this research focuses on social aspect of disaster recovery, the ethnographic study is deemed best due to its characteristics of sociocultural description (Stewart, 1998: 7).

Furthermore, in relation to fieldwork sites, this study used a multi-sited ethnography (comparative approach) aimed at understanding the bigger picture (Falzon, 2009: 14). As this study is also intended to provide policy recommendations, a comparative approach is needed for policy-makers to increase their understanding and policy options (Øyen, 1990: 2–3; Peacock, 1997: 129). Much of the early literature on post-disaster societies tends to focus on one disaster site or a single disaster. According to Aldrich (2012: ix), conclusions drawn from a single disaster could lead to “pitfalls” and that findings from several disasters could give a better and more comprehensive picture of disaster management (2012: ix).

Today, comparative research is increasing. Some scholars have conducted comparative research in many ways. For instance, scholars investigate comparative communities from a single event of disaster such as the case of 2004 Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (Kennedy et al., 2008). Other scholars research one type of disaster in some countries across different times such as the work of Özerdem and Jacoby (2006) on the earthquakes in India, Japan and Turkey in 2001, 1995 and 1999.
respectively. There have also been comparative studies across disasters and communities such as James and Paton (2015) who investigated the case of Taiwan following the 1999 Chi Chi earthquake and 2009 Typhoon Morakot and Myanmar in the aftermath of 2008 Cyclone Nargis. In summary, these scholarly works indicate that comparative studies are an emerging and important trend. Another example is Aldrich (2012) who studied four post-disaster communities, namely Tokyo (1923 earthquake), Kobe (1995 earthquake), Tamil Nadu (2004 Indian Ocean tsunami), and New Orleans (2005 Hurricane Katrina).

In comparative studies, the focus is on similarities and differences in specific issues (Ragin and Amoroso, 2010). Indonesia is a culturally diverse country which consists of more than 300 ethnic communities with different regional languages. Despite their differences, the Indonesian population shares vulnerability to natural disasters.

Map 1.2: Sites for case studies (Aceh and East Java). Modified by author using Google Maps

Therefore, this study proposes comparative research to understand the complexity of post-disaster communities with diverse cultural backgrounds. I have chosen to conduct multi-site ethnographic fieldwork that focuses on the 2013 Gayo earthquake and the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption (Map 1.2). For the former event, I
conducted fieldwork in the Central Aceh District of Aceh and for the latter research was done in Malang District of East Java.

I have two reasons for selecting these sites. Firstly, these sites were affected by the most destructive disasters in Indonesia in recent times. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia experiences several types of disaster. Among them, earthquakes (and tsunamis) as well as volcanic eruptions are the most deadly and damaging types of disaster. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, hydrological disasters such as floods, landslides and strong winds occur more frequently than other disasters. Despite being less frequent, geological disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions cause greater losses.

The second reason for selecting the Gayo and Mt. Kelud sites is that despite their specific localised social, cultural and political landscape, they are “linked together in a coordinated structure” (Ekström, 2006: 502) as post-disaster regions. In other words, I argue that the people in these areas have something in common, as they
are disaster-affected agricultural communities, but their socio-cultural contexts are very different. I have argued above that the result of social capital formation by external CSOs can be influenced by the socio-cultural and political context. The Mt. Kelud eruption on 13 February, 2014, caused seven deaths and displaced more than 200,000 people. The most severely damaged areas, in chronological order, are the three districts in East Java namely Kediri, Malang and Blitar (IFRC, 2014). The estimated economic loss was predicted to be more than IDR 1.2 trillion (AUD 112 million) including damage to the agriculture sector. In the Gayo highlands of Aceh Province, an earthquake measuring 6.2 on the Richter scale struck the Central Aceh and Bener Meriah districts on 2 July, 2013. As a result, 42 people died, 558 people were injured, and more than 50,000 people were displaced. The estimated financial loss is about IDR 1.4 trillion (AUD 140 million), again, including the cost to the agriculture sector. This is similar to the Mt. Kelud-affected societies mentioned above (BNPB, 2013).

In terms of socio-cultural background, there are differences between both affected areas, which will be further discussed separately in the chapters addressing each of the case studies. The fact that Gayo is a post-conflict area makes it different to Mt. Kelud societies and the majority of the Indonesian population. Therefore, I assume that the Gayo community had a low stock of social capital and will, therefore, experience a slower recovery process. The existing literature suggests that violent conflict will affect social capital of the affected community and it will also create “exclusion, inequality and indignity”, thus, will cause “societal cleavage” (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 13). As a part of Aceh Province, the Gayo region was affected by a long, violent conflict (1976-2005) between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the separatist movement called Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Free Movement, GAM). As a result, societal cleavages between those who sympathised with the GAM and
those who supported the GoI can be found within single villages (Barron et al., 2005). In 2005, the peace agreement between the opposing parties took place, meaning the region has gradually recovered (Susanti, 2008)

Moreover, as victims of the conflict, the survivors of the 2004 Aceh tsunami need more time to recover. The available literature suggests that the recovery of Aceh after the tsunami has been slower than other regions affected by the same disaster. For instance, after two years of recovery efforts, the reconstruction of post-tsunami Thailand was considered “by most people as reasonably successful” (Nidhiprabha, 2007: 38) while at the same time, “it is still too early to declare success” in post-tsunami Aceh recovery (Fan, 2006: 4). A study in Fiji also demonstrates that the impact of human-made disaster, such as political instability, lasts for decades, longer than the impact of natural disasters (Chand, 2014). In summary, Aceh and Malang Districts share similarities as disaster-affected and agricultural societies, their socio-cultural and political backgrounds as well as their speed of recovery as a community can be different. Therefore, it is presumably this diversity that will provide a broader understanding of Indonesian societies’ disaster recovery.

The six months of fieldwork began in April and was completed in September 2015. I spent two and half months in Jakarta, one month in East Java and another month in Central Aceh to conduct research. In Jakarta, I contacted individuals and relevant organisations working for government institutions and CSOs in disaster management in Indonesia.

Based on findings from the interviews in Jakarta, I then went to Mt. Kelud in East Java where I studied one Islamic charitable CSO namely the Archipelago Livestock Village of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (KTN-DD) that provided economic recovery aid to livestock farmers in Pandansari village of Malang District. I then
visited Jaluk village in Central Aceh District to study Health Agriculture Indonesia of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (PSI-DD) that delivered economic recovery assistance to coffee farmers. The details of these organisations will be described in the relevant chapters. In total, I interviewed 44 individuals. They included CSO representatives and facilitators, governmental disaster agency officials, village leaders and recovery program beneficiaries.  

I would like to note that all of my fieldwork sites were new social environments to me. I am originally from Indonesia and live in Banda Aceh but I had never visited the Gayo highlands, which are about five hours’ drive away. I have also never been to East Java. I was only familiar with Jakarta because I had visited that city many times, although only for short visits lasting no more than a week. However, my background as a humanitarian aid worker assisting with Aceh’s post-tsunami relief in 2006-2008 has trained me to adapt to living in rural or remote areas. Some of my colleagues also helped me with access to some key individuals and organisations for data collection in the field.

Finally, it is worth noting that the design and ethics application for this research has met the requirements of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research based on the meeting of UNSW, Canberra’s Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel on 25 February, 2015. On 3 March, 2015, I received the letter confirming that the Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research) had approved my application (reference number A-15-9). During my fieldwork, I provided information about my research to all of the interviewees and I gave them Participant Information Statements and Consent Forms. The form was written in English and Indonesian. All of the

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4 For details, see Appendix: List of Interviewees.
participants in this research agreed to be interviewed in two ways. Firstly, they gave their written permission by signing the consent form. Secondly, they provided verbal authorisation, and this was particularly the case in rural areas where villagers were not familiar with the information provided on the consent form.

VI. Structure of Thesis

This thesis is structured in seven chapters. Chapter One is the Introduction which presents the overall background of this research. This chapter highlights my research objectives and justification, questions and main arguments. This chapter also includes the scope and methodology of research.

Chapter Two presents the theoretical framework for my research. I will present a theoretical debate of the basic concepts and nexus between civil society, disaster recovery and social capital. I further elaborate scholarly discussion on the importance of social capital for community recovery and resilience. This chapter also discusses roles of external civil society groups including FBOs and their social capital formation in disaster recovery.

Chapter Three discusses the ability of Indonesian CSOs in utilising social capital for various agenda depends on socio-political contexts. It begins with the historical development of CSOs in Indonesia, examined in chronological order. This chapter also examines the involvement of FBOs in disaster relief. It explores how FBOs have been active and dominant in different phases of disaster management in Indonesia, particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Chapter Four highlights the case study of positive outcomes from social capital formation by external CSOs delivering economic recovery assistance in Jaluk village,
Central Aceh, after 2013 Gayo earthquake. This chapter starts with a description of the socio-economic situation in the Gayo highlands and the impact of the catastrophe. After that, I will introduce a case of an external CSO namely Pertanian Sehat Indonesia – Dompet Dhuafa (Health Agriculture Indonesia of Wallet for the Poor Foundation, PSI-DD). PSI-DD is an Islamic charitable organisation that originally based in Indonesia. This chapter demonstrates the ability of Islamic FBO to develop new or strengthen existing social capital among the affected villagers who are also Islamic. With recovery programs derived from Islamic teaching, the PSI-DD has helped the affected people in Aceh to “relate, bond, bridge and link”. As a result, I argue that the Gayo community experienced faster recovery than the Javanese in Mt. Kelud region.

In Chapter Five, I provide the case study of negative consequences from external aid and social capital development by another external CSO after the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruptions. With a similar approach to that taken in Chapter Four, I will begin with an explanation of the socio-economic landscape and the impact of the eruption on the society. Then I will introduce Kampoeng Ternak Nusantara - Dompet Dhuafa (Archipelago Livestock Village of Wallet for the Poor Foundation, KTN-DD) that delivered economic recovery assistance to Pandansari village, Malang. In contrast to the previous chapter, Chapter Five demonstrates that FBOs, even when they share the religion of their beneficiaries, do not have an advantage in delivering recovery aid. Rather, these FBOs also potentially produce negative externalities from social capital such as polarisation of society and aid exclusion.

Chapter Six presents an analysis of other actors that involved in the case study areas. I examine especially the effectiveness of recovery efforts by Indonesian government agencies (BNPB/National Disaster Management Agency and BPBD/Regional Disaster Management Agency), which hold primary responsibility for
disaster recovery in Indonesia as prescribed by the Disaster Management Law 24/2007. This chapter demonstrates that the Indonesian government has limited capacity in delivering recovery programs and other agencies particularly CSOs have been showing their ability to fill the gap left by those limitations.

Finally, Chapter Seven is the Conclusion, which summarises answers to my research questions, suggests directions for further research and proposed policy recommendations relevant for providing better disaster recovery programs in Indonesia and countries in a similar context.
Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework: The Nexus between Civil Society, Faith-Based Organisations and Social Capital in Disaster Recovery

I. Introduction

This chapter presents the overall theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter attempts to engage with theoretical discussions on key terms that arose in the Introduction chapter, namely civil society, Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), development, economic recovery, and social capital. All of these key terms are broad and complex, but are interconnected.

This chapter starts by conceptualising civil society. Civil society is a wide concept. However, despite differences of academics’ views on the concept of civil society, scholars arguably agree on the importance of civil society groups, along with the government and the market. Following that section, I will discuss academic discourses on development and disaster, their interconnectedness and the importance of CSOs in these fields. Unlike the emergency relief phase, which is short-term, the recovery period is mid to long-term in orientation. Therefore, this study employs a multidisciplinary approach that integrates both disaster and development studies together.

CSOs are well regarded as capable of generating social capital. I argue that social capital is important to speed up disaster recovery and to enhance resilience in post-disaster communities. In the following section, I discuss the concept of social capital and its general categorisation as bonding, bridging or linking. While the available studies tend to focus on the roles of internal CSOs in social capital formation, this
study proposes to fill a gap in the existing literature by studying external civil society. The contribution of this study is crucial as it examines the way in which CSOs are able to produce positive consequences, but also negative outcomes during the process of social capital formation.

II. Defining Civil Society

As noted above, the term civil society is broad and complex, so it is important to provide a brief theoretical discussion about civil society. The term civil society is contested in theory and reality. It can be interpreted in different ways and can be used by different people in different places to mean different things (Edwards, 2009).

Historically, the term civil society derived from the Latin *societas civilis*. It has been a part of Western political philosophy since 1400 (van Rooy, 1998: 7). The word first introduced by Cicero – a Roman Latin writer - and since then the meaning of civil society has evolved (Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001). To make the term civil society easier to understand, van Rooy (1998: 7–8) subsequently divided theories of civil society into “classic” and “today’s literature”. The prominent classical theorists are Ferguson (1782), Gramsci (1989), Hegel (2008), Locke (1963), Smith (1801) and Tocqueville (2004). Among the leading contemporary theorists are Cohen and Arato (1999), Gellner (1994), Keane (1998), Seligman (2014), and Shils (1997). While the classical theory of civil society dates back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the modern theory of civil society has been developed during the emergence of civil society from the 1990s onwards.5

5 Given the difficulty to find the original publications for most of classical theorist, I use their modern reprints or translations in reference list. The original works of respective authors are as follow; Ferguson (1767), Gramsci (1948), Hegel (1821), Locke (1689), Smith (1776) and Tocqueville (1835).
The classical definitions of civil society are mainly based in the political context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Western society. As modernisation took place during that period, social life can be seen as being divided into society and the state. (Civil) society can be seen in different forms of associational life, as suggested by Tocqueville (2004). In his writing on “Democracy in America”, Tocqueville illustrates how civil society had worked in the USA in his often-quoted passage:

“Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society.” (Tocqueville, 2004: 596).

Tocqueville introduced the notion of civil society in the nineteenth century. In his passage above, Tocqueville noted the existence of religious groups and social welfare activities in America during his visit in 1831. Interestingly, Tocqueville’s passage above is still relevant now. Today religious groups still play important roles within civil society. Tocqueville’s writings on civil society are also consistent with the findings of this study that demonstrate that religious groups have played vital roles in providing social welfare assistance to communities in the aftermath of disasters.
The contemporary theorists of civil society mentioned above perceive civil society as part of global phenomenon. For instance, Keane (1998) argues that globalisation has made civil society more institutionalised and globalised. We have witnessed a number of local, national and global civil society institutions established since the beginning of the twentieth century.

Both classical and modern scholars mentioned earlier do not have an agreed definition of civil society. There is some agreement among them, I believe, and it is twofold. Firstly, civil society is recognised as an important actor in many areas i.e. development, disaster relief, politics and democratisation. Secondly, civil society is a sphere beyond the control of the state and the market. Civil society has also been referred to as the “third sector” implying it is an element on par with with the government and private sector.6

Many organisations belong to civil society. Some examples of the organisations can be found in the definition set by Centre for Civil Society of the London School of Economics and Political Science which states:

“Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group.” (Centre for Civil Society, 2006).7

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7 I have selected the definition used by the Centre for Civil Society because the institution has been doing extensive research on civil society. Its definition has been used by many agencies, including the UN.
In the Indonesian context, the institutionalisation of civil society groups took place in the pre-colonial period (1908) but has flourished significantly since 1998 following the fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto. The way in which CSOs operate depends on specific social, cultural and political contexts so noting these timeframes is important.  

Groups that belong to civil society have several names. They can be Civil Society Organisations (CSO), Non-Profit Organisations (NPO), Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO), Voluntary Development Organisations (VDO), Non-Government Organisations (NGO). PVOs and VDOs are terms used in the USA and Africa respectively (Shaw and Izumi, 2014: 4). NGO is also a term that is widely used because it was introduced by the United Nations in 1945 (Ummah p. 29). Currently, the term CSO is used by the UN and other development agencies such as the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom. In the World Bank and DFID’s definition, CSOs are Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), trade unions, professional groups, indigenous people movements and foundations (Clarke, 2007; The World Bank, 2003). This means that CSOs is a broader term that includes NGOs, FBOs and other civil society groups. As the use of CSO is currently much more popular, and for consistency, in this thesis I will use the term CSOs to refer to civil society groups in general.

It is also worth noting that in the contemporary literature, scholars have attempted to define characteristics of civil society. Some characteristics of civil society groups are that they have “values and norms”, “space for action” (independence from

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8 More about history and development of Indonesian civil society will be explored in Chapter Three.
the state and market), a specific historical development, they are “anti-hegemony” and are an “antidote to the state” (van Rooy, 1998: 12–27). Civil society is also voluntary, active, independent, has a framework of civility, tolerance and self-regulated (Lovell, 2014: 29). Any values that contradict these characteristics will exclude groups from civil society. This is the case, for instance, for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, an infamous organisation that promotes violence and radical ideology. According to Keane (1998), such groups cannot be a part of civil society, rather they represent uncivil society.

The findings of this thesis demonstrate that among the many types of CSOs mentioned above, FBOs are the predominant actors in Indonesian disaster recovery. Therefore, it is important to briefly discuss the concept of FBOs. According to Berger (2003: 16), several million CSOs exist in the world today and “an increasingly visible number of organisations are defining themselves in religious terms—referring to themselves as “religious,” “spiritual,” or “faith-based” NGOs”. These organisations operate at every level of the community, be it local, national, regional or international. They are equally important as other organisations. FBOs work closely with the community at the grass-roots level and are often able to act as a substitute for the government in solving problems that occur in society (van Rooy, 1998).

FBOs are important in Indonesia. In fact, as Azra (2007: 288) pointed out, Indonesian FBOs have “a long and rich history”. They emerged in the colonial period before Indonesia was an independent state. Since then, some of these FBOs have provided social welfare assistance to Indonesian society and continue to do so. The Indonesian FBOs have played significant roles at the grass-roots level and are able to complement the government in providing social welfare assistance (Sakai, 2012). The
extent to which they can contribute in disaster recovery will be presented in the case study chapters.\footnote{More details about Indonesian FBOs will be discussed in Chapter Three.}

For the purpose of this thesis, I use Berger’s definition (2003: 16) of FBOs, that they are “formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions and which operates on a non-profit, independent, voluntary basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the public good at the national or international level”. Assessing a number of FBOs at the United Nations (UN) systems, Berger (2003: 32–33) states that FBOs generally produce five services or outputs namely education (formal and non-formal), relief (such as “food distribution, shelter, water, sanitation, and medical care”), social service (such as “peace building and community development” activities, salvation (proselytisation and/or conversion), and mobilisation of opinion (for policy influence or change). The beneficiaries of these services vary from member to external target groups.

It is also worth noting that the emergence of a discourse about FBOs within the literature on civil society was in response to secularisation theory. It can be traced back to the nineteenth century where social theorists like Comte, Durkheim, Weber and Marx, to name a few, maintained that following modernisation and industrial society, religion will gradually decline and be less significant in the public sphere (see e.g. Bruce, 2001, 2011). However, as time passes, the world has witnessed a religious revival. As a result, we can see the involvement of religious groups in many aspects of society, including development and disaster recovery. CSOs’ involvement in disaster recovery and development agenda will be discussed in the next section.
III. Disaster Recovery, Development and CSOs

I have already stated that CSOs are a fundamental part of society, in addition to the state and the market. Before proceeding into the involvement of CSOs in development and disaster recovery, it is important to provide a definition of development and disaster recovery and discuss the interconnectedness between these terms. Similar to civil society, development is a broad concept. There is no consensus on a definition. In simple terms, development is “a process of change, growth, progress or evolution” (Midgley, 2014: 4). On the other hand, disaster recovery, which was referred to in Chapter One, is defined by the UNISDR as “the restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk”.

The above definitions share one thing in common; both development and disaster recovery are processes designed to make things better. The UNISDR’s definition above also highlights two things. Firstly, recovery is multi-dimensional, i.e. economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental. Secondly, it is important to align the disaster recovery practice with sustainable development. Sustainable development refers to “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

10 For theoretical discussion on the concepts of development see e.g. Lewis and Kanji (2009).
In Chapter One, I defined disasters from the perspective of disaster studies and the UNISDR. From the perspective of development studies, disasters can be seen as “any severe disruption to human survival and security that overwhelms people’s capacity to cope” (Collins, 2009: 4). I am aware that disasters are categorised by the theory into either natural, technological or social disasters. In a simple comparison, a natural disaster is related to hazards caused by extreme natural events, technological disasters are triggered by technological hazards and social disasters are caused by social and political phenomena (Albala-Bertrand, 2010; Phillips, 2009). The concentration of this study is limited to natural disasters. While I agree that human factors may contribute to natural disaster (O’Keefe et al., 1976), the term natural disaster here refers to geo-physical and hydro-meteorological events.

I contend that disasters and development are two terms that are interconnected. Any casualties or damage resulting from disasters may interrupt established development planning and goals (Kapucu and Liou, 2014). Being underdeveloped or lacking development may also lead to increasing hazard and vulnerability in facing disasters. On the other hand, good development systems facilitate better disaster relief practices. Improved disaster relief efforts will eventually boost development processes (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011; Chand, 2014; Pinkowski, 2008). For that reason, disasters can also be “catalysts” (James and Paton, 2015: 227), and “vehicles” (Shaw, 2014: 412) for development opportunities.

We can also observe the nexus between disaster and development in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of 2030 Agenda. With seventeen development goals to achieve by 2030, disaster risk reduction and resilience has been prioritised as a cross-cutting goal. For instance, goal number 1 of the SDGs is to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere”, one of its targets is “by 2030, build the resilience
of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters”.  

Agreeing with this interconnectedness, as highlighted above, this study will enrich the existing knowledge by investigating the extent to which CSOs and other actors (i.e., government) contribute to disaster recovery in the affected societies, which further results in sustainable development.

As I have discussed the interrelationship between development and disaster recovery, let us engage with scholarly discussions on the involvement of CSOs generally and FBOs specifically in this nexus. CSOs are one important agency in disaster relief. In their study, Sakai et al. (2014) maintain that four agencies contribute significantly to the post-disaster relief setting. They are military and government institutions, CSOs, the media, and local community groups. Existing studies have explored the roles of each agency, such as the government (Jalali, 2002; Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006; Rubin and Barbee, 1985), military (Gaydos and Luz, 1994; Kelly, 1996; Moroney, Jennifer D. P. et al., 2013), CSOs (Chandra and Acosta, 2009; Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006), media (Miles and Morse, 2007; Perez-Lugo, 2004), and community groups (Patterson et al., 2010; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985). A recent and perhaps one of the most comprehensive studies can be found in Sakai et al. (2014) as well as James and Paton (2016b) that systematically explore the role of various agencies in responses to disasters, particularly those in the Asia Pacific region.

However, while the four agencies listed above are vital to post-disaster relief, recent studies have pointed out that the role of CSOs is seen as “adjunct to the

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government” (Lovell, 2014: 30), a “neglected factor” (Aldrich, 2008: 85), or that they “get listed last” (Gupta and Sharma, 2006: 78). Studies have shown that the government’s capacity in disaster relief is insufficient and this gap is filled by international parties and CSOs (Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006; Sakai et al., 2014). For instance, in countries like Turkey, Japan and India, the government is “unprepared, uncoordinated, inadequate and ineffective”, thus, allowing CSOs to operate and support the government (Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006: 99). As evidence for this argument, in Chapter Six I explore the role of government in implementing recovery programs in two affected areas.

Furthermore, the current studies have addressed the role of CSOs in some countries (Dias et al., 2013; Izumi and Shaw, 2012; Jalali, 2002; Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006; Sakai et al., 2014). Those studies have analysed the involvement of CSOs in all phases of disaster relief in countries such as Turkey, India, Japan and other countries within the Asia Pacific region. This literature emphasises the significant roles of CSOs in post-disaster studies to which this research will contribute. In Indonesia, CSOs also play significant roles either through collaborative works (i.e. partnerships) with other institutions or by working alone to fill the gap, as I show in other chapters of this thesis.14

CSOs are also crucial actors within the development field. While the concept of civil society has long been studied, it is since the 1970s that CSOs have been playing a larger role in socio-economic development, particularly in developed economies. Before 1970, CSOs limited their service delivery to emergency humanitarian

14 See Chapter Three for a background of CSOs and their involvement in phases of disaster management in Indonesia, and Chapter Four and Five on case studies of how CSOs are able to fill the gap through their recovery assistance.
assistance, and provided it on a short-term basis. After 1970, CSOs have successfully become “the new sweethearts” in the development world due to their influence on policy and political engagement, as well as their ability to provide alternative development aimed at meeting the needs of the poor (Banks and Hulme, 2012: 5). In another words, CSOs worldwide generally started to focus on local level, empowerment and bottom up perspectives (Lewis and Kanji, 2009).

Moreover, the role of CSOs in development is not only limited to the local or national scope but they have also expanded into the international sphere. According to Clark (1991, quoted in Hall and Midgley, 2004: 15–16) CSOs have six functions namely, providing “relief and welfare”, producing “technical innovation”, serving as “public service contractors”, becoming “popular development” organisations, working at “grass root” level, and focusing on establishing “advocacy and networks”. Examples of CSOs that provide each of these functions are Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Aga Khan Foundation, CARE, Oxfam, Grameen Bank and the anti-globalisation movement. However, I argue that this categorisation should not be exclusive, as one CSO may perform more than one function. For instance, the CRS, CARE and Oxfam have also been involved in emergency relief in numerous areas affected by major disasters. All of those CSOs mentioned above are actually international CSOs. In this study, however, my focus is on nationally based CSOs with some overlapping functions including providing disaster relief and welfare as well as working at grassroots level.

Having discussed the roles of CSOs in general, the focus will now narrow to FBOs. FBOs have a long tradition, rooted in their religious teachings, of helping people in need. The world’s religions; Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, to name a few, appeared centuries ago. Since then, the adherents of these
religions have been providing humanitarian and development assistance to those in need. When disaster strikes, community-based religious organisations are among the first to respond and provide emergency assistance (Wisner, 2010). However, scholarly focus on the roles of FBOs in disaster situations is relatively recent. Academics have studied the FBOs’ contribution in communities affected by disasters, such as 2005’s hurricane Katrina (Airriess et al., 2008; Pant et al., 2008), in 2008 Cyclone Nargis Myanmar (Jaquet and Walton, 2013), and in Japan following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (Sakai and Inaba, 2014).

Consistent with evidence from other countries, in the context of Indonesia, FBOs are at the forefront of disaster relief efforts. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Three, FBOs are, in fact, the dominant category of CSOs that participate in Indonesian post-disaster relief. Sakai (2012) argues that the capacity of Indonesian FBOs is stronger than their secular CSOs due to the former’s ability to generate funding from their followers and their contribution in providing social services for the poor (Sakai, 2012). In contrast, secular CSOs are dependent on international donors (Antlöv et al., 2010). This donor-dependency means that secular CSOs focus not only on disaster relief, but also on other agenda such as human rights advocacy, anti-corruption regimes and good governance in order to attract popular support and money. Similar to Sakai (2012), Latief (2012) also maintains that the roles of CSOs, particularly Islamic FBOs in Indonesia, are growing due to their crucial provision of disaster aid to affected communities.

In recent years, there is also a growing trend of populations seeking aid from Islamic FBOs in disaster relief situations. A number of scholars have studied the role of several Islamic organisations in the aftermath of major disasters, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2006 Jogjakarta earthquake (Latief, 2012; Nurdin, 2015;
Ratcliffe, 2007; Sakai and Fauzia, 2014). Latief’s work on Islamic activism in Indonesia is probably best at describing how Islamic CSOs have played roles in developmental activities, including disaster relief. Taking examples from three disasters in Indonesia, namely the earthquakes in Aceh, Nias and Yogyakarta in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively, Latief (2012) demonstrates how numerous Islamic organisations contributed to the disaster response. However, he argues that Islamic CSOs, like any other developmental NGOs, are short-term oriented (Latief, 2012: 323). This is contrary to the findings of this research that show CSOs tend to provide long term projects. The contradictory views between Latief and this study have come about because Latief investigated the emergency relief phase, while I focus more on the long-term recovery period.

Similar to the discussion on the role of religion in disaster studies above, religion has also been neglected in the literature of development studies (Clarke, 2011; Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Clarke and Tittensor, 2014; Clarke and Ware, 2015). As mentioned above, secularisation theory argues that since the Enlightenment and modernisation of Western countries, development has become secularised and this has led to the decline of the role of religions and limits religious influence in the public sphere. Religion, regardless of its importance and universality, has been marginalised in mainstream development (Rakodi, 2012). However, since the 1980s, particularly after the Iranian revolution and the end of the Cold War, religions have experienced a revival globally.

According to Clarke and Jennings (2008: 19–24), the following six factors contribute to the revival of religion. Firstly, the emergence of a fundamentalist Christian movement following Ronald Reagan’s presidency in 1980 shaped American policy. Secondly, the crucial role of FBOs in developed and developing countries was
recognised. Thirdly, the Iranian revolution in 1979 contributed to the appearance of political Islam, particularly in the Middle East region. Fourthly, the end of communism and the Cold War in 1989 triggered identity construction and this included identification with religion. Fifthly, the development of a transnational civil society promoted faith-based activism. Finally, large-scale migration to some developed countries which led to the construction of specific or multiple identities, including religious identity. These factors are true particularly if we are examining transnational or global FBOs. In my opinion, it is also important to consider the local and the national contexts that influence to the involvement of FBOs in development and disaster relief efforts. I shall demonstrate this in the next chapter.

As religion and religious groups have been seen as one of the important factors in pursuing development agenda, the following are examples of recent efforts on integrating religious groups into development practice and research. In 1998, the President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord George Carey, initiated the World Faiths’ Development Dialogue (WFDD). The aim was to bridge “the worlds of faith and secular development”.¹⁵ In other words, the purpose was to facilitate connections between religious and secular development organisations. The second example is the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighbourhood Partnerships established by President George Bush in 2001. It served as a bridge that connected “the federal government and non-profit organizations, both secular and faith-based, to better serve Americans in need”.¹⁶ Other examples can be found in the case of the Department for International

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¹⁵ [https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/wfdd/about](https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/wfdd/about) (accessed 4 February 2016).

¹⁶ The office is still active during Obama’s leadership. See [https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ofbnp) (accessed 1 May 2017).
Development in the UK. In 2005, the agency provided a five-year research program on Religion and Development. The objective of the program was to explore “the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction.\(^\text{17}\)

Another important case of integrating religion into development programs is the United Nations (UN). FBOs have been involved in the UN since the early 1990s (Knox, 2002). The main impetus was the end of the Cold War, as religious resurgence and concern over global public policy was increasing. At that time, the UN organised a series of conferences examining human rights (1992, in Australia), the environment (1992, Brazil), population (1994, Egypt), human development (1995, Denmark), women and gender (1995, China), and social development (2000, Switzerland) (Haynes, 2013: 4). Previously marginalised, FBOs are currently important actors in policy debates and policy formulation in the UN (Haynes, 2014). Given their importance, some UN agencies have developed guidelines for engaging with FBOs (UNAIDS, 2009; UNDP, 2014; UNFPA, 2009; UNHCR, 2014). Finally, the most recent example is the establishment of the International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD) in February 2016 following the Partners for Change – Religions and the 2030 Agenda conference in Berlin. The objective of PaRD is to work collaboratively toward achieving the SDGs’ 2030 Agenda. The membership of PaRD is made up of UN agencies, the World Bank and governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agencies for International Development (USAID), the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), partnering

with a number of FBOs e.g. the ACT Alliance (coalition of churches), (Christian) World Vision, Islamic Relief, the Baha’i International Community, Buddhist Global Relief and the WFDD mentioned above. All of these examples are attempts to involve religion (and FBOs) in development practice and research (Clarke, 2007; Clarke, 2011; Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Clarke and Tittensor, 2014).

I highlight the predominant studies on FBOs and development in the Western world focus largely on Christian organisations. This is due to the fact that Christian FBOs not only outnumber those from other religions but because the Christian spirit that has been revived in the twentieth century (Benthall, 2007a; Clark, 2004). Clarke and Tittensor (2014) argue that the works of Islamic FBOs are invisible and not part of the mainstream development sector. Research on Islamic FBOs is still scarce. When they are studied the major focus on Islamic FBOs are on large transnational organisations, such as Islamic Relief, Muslim Aid and the Islamic Red Crescent (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003; Petersen, 2015). Additionally, studies on Islamic FBOs focus more on the Middle East region, thus, ignoring the periphery of the Muslim World (Clark, 2004). Hence, this study seeks to fill that gap by providing insight into the Indonesian Muslim context.

IV. Social Capital Formation by Internal and External Civil Society: Benefit or Downside?

Given the vital involvement of CSOs in disaster recovery mentioned in the previous section, it is important to examine their role in social capital formation. The available literature on CSOs and their impact in humanitarian aid, including disaster relief,
illustrates that the focus on social capital is relatively new. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the trend of research was to investigate physical capital. In the 1990s, the paradigm has shifted to concentrate more on human capital (education). Recently, the trend has shifted to focus more on building social resource or capital that enables communities to recover from disasters (Aldrich, 2012; cf. Noy, 2013). So the focus of research has evolved from over time. My focus on social capital seeks to contribute on the current scholarly debate about sustaining recovery and building resilience in communities affected by natural disasters. The development of social capital, unlike physical or human capital that seems to be more tangible and measurable, can be challenging for disaster management agencies, including CSOs. The task of restoring social capital is far harder than restoring physical capital (Ostrom, 2009: 22). It is challenging for CSOs to persuade donors of the importance to rebuild or strengthen social capital (Gannon, 2013).

Furthermore, social capital is an elusive concept and has various meanings. In this context, social capital is defined as "features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1995: 67). Definitions of types or elements of social capital are also varied but generally can be divided into three, that of “bonding” (developing trust, social norms, participation and networks within the same community), “bridging” (developing networks with other communities), and “linking” (creating social ties between the community and external groups such as the government and CSOs) (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Other types of social capital are such as relational, cognitive and structural (James and Paton, 2015: 209).

Social capital is a key aspect for resilience and recovery. As defined earlier in Chapter One, resilience is the ability “to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to,
transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management”. Both resilience and recovery are important for the community to get back to their pre-disaster or better condition in the aftermath of catastrophes. Scholars (Aldrich, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013; Buckland and Rahman, 1999; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; James and Paton, 2016b; Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; Sakai et al., 2014; Shaw and Goda, 2004) emphasise the importance of social capital as one of the important driving forces of the pace of the recovery and resilience in communities affected by disasters. Communities with high level of social capital will experience rapid recovery and enhanced resilience. In contrast, societies with low level of social capital will limit their capacity for resilience and recovery.

Example of high level of social capital can be found in the following studies. For instance, in their study of the Kobe (1995) and Gujarat (2001) earthquakes, Nakagawa and Shaw (2004) demonstrate that although there were socio, economic and cultural differences, both communities were able to recover faster due to their “bonding” (trust, social norms, participation and networks), “bridging” (multidisciplinary networks), and “linking” (formal collaboration between government and communities) social capital. In their research of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Gupta and Sharma (2006) found that social capital called joint family (extended family system) played an important role in providing assistance to children orphaned by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, Indonesia, the virtue of gampong (village) was part of the social capital that helped the Lambung villagers

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develop a land consolidation process and then the overall recovery of the village (Mahdi, 2012). Example of low level of social capital can be found for instance in Aldrich’s (2012) work. In his study on communities affected by the 1995 Kobe earthquake, Aldrich (2012: 79) found that one neighbourhood with low social capital “was left with few of its original residents and little community resilience or collective memory”.

While scholars have highlighted the importance of social capital, it also can bring harm to the community. To borrow Aldrich’s term, social capital is a “double-edged sword” (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379). In other words, social capital can have positive as well as negative consequences. The negative impact of social capital, according to (Portes, 1998: 15), can be found in the “exclusion of outsiders, excessive claim[s] of group members, restrictions on individual freedoms and downward levelling norms”. A brief example is provided by the case of Tamil Nadu, India, where excluded community members (mostly vulnerable and minority groups) had to find alternative assistance to support them in the aftermath of 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Aldrich, 2011). Under such circumstances, this study seeks to explore whether the dual impact of social capital also exists within the Indonesian post-disaster environment.

Available studies also demonstrate the linkage between civil society, disaster recovery and social capital. The following scholarly works (Aldrich, 2012; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011; James and Paton, 2015; Shaw and Goda, 2004) examine this interconnection by examining the bonding social capital and the roles of local civil society. This is the case, for example, in Kobe (1995) and Tokyo (1923) of Japan where civic movements or voluntary organisations emerged from within the communities and they were able to work together to rebuild the city following the earthquake (Aldrich,
Similarly, without outside intervention, the St. Bernard community was able to utilise their “collective narrative” of social capital to recover, and embrace “a self-reliant strategy in which they relied on their own efforts and informal support from their family and their neighbours” after the 2005 Hurricane Katrina (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011: 280).

Some studies (Aldrich, 2011, 2012; Rivera and Nickels, 2014) have been conducted focusing on the aspect of “bridging” social capital in disaster recovery. For instance, in their study on the Versailles neighbourhood of New Orleans East in the wake of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, Rivera and Nickels (2014) found the community-based FBO, Mary Queen of Vietnam (MQVN) Catholic Church, provided a number of relief services to its community. The MQVN was not only able to fill the gaps left by government limitations but it was also able to strengthen the social capital in the community. In his studies of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Tamil Nadu of India, (Aldrich, 2011, 2012) presents the case of *uur panchayats* (a local caste) that serves as an intermediary between external groups (CSOs or the state) and the community. Unlike the case of Hurricane Katrina, Aldrich (2011; 2012) found that social capital can also produce negative outputs because the local organisation excluded non-member community and marginalised groups from aid distribution. Aldrich’s book entitled *Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery* (2012) is perhaps the most comprehensive scholarly work on the relationship between civil society, social capital and disaster recovery.

However, the literature presented above has two limitations. First, Aldrich (2012) focused on “mega-disasters”, the term he used for major disasters. He compared the cases of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. Methodologically, comparative
research, and particularly cross-national research, as Aldrich did, is important. However, the challenge is to translate a variety of attitudinal and value orientations equivalently across national, culture and ethnic boundaries (Peacock, 1997: 127). Aldrich did not comprehensively cover these aspects in his studies, as he did not link the cultural differences and similarities in locations of his case studies. My research offers to fill that gap by studying small-scale disasters and extending the focus to the cultural aspects of communities affected by the Gayo earthquake and Mt. Kelud eruption. I argue that while large-scale disasters are more complex than medium or small-scale ones, the latter are more frequent than the former. Studying small-scale disasters will contribute to a more comprehensive academic understanding and provide more useful policy recommendations to achieve better results in disaster recovery.

The second limitation is that Aldrich and other scholars mentioned above are more focused on civil society groups that have emerged from within the community following the disasters. External civil society groups have not been the focus of much research. Theoretically, as mentioned earlier, CSOs not only emerge from within the community but also from outside the affected community. To make the distinction between the two, I label them internal CSOs and external CSOs. While these studies attempt to show that communities with higher levels of social capital and strong internal civil society groups are able to recover without outside intervention, I argue that it is important to examine how external civil society groups contribute to either strengthening or weakening existing social capital. In Indonesia, external CSOs are relatively weak and fragmented.20

20 Will be discussed further in Chapter Three.
The studies above also demonstrate that what remains to be seen is how external CSOs are able to contribute either positively or adversely in social capital formation within an affected society. Among the limited available literature, some case studies do exist. In a study on the impact of Hurricane Mitch (1998) in Nicaragua, Häberli (2012) demonstrates that when the decision-making process is dominated by a specific group, it has resulted in either inclusion or exclusion of aid access to others. Survivors with established contact with local leaders and external groups, such as national or international CSOs, received more support to “bounce back” to their normal life following the disaster. In contrast, vulnerable and marginalised victims, such as women and elderly people, tend to be excluded from the aid beneficiary list. Another negative outcome from such imbalanced distribution of aid from disaster recovery programs is that it has resulted in the enforcement of the existing community division between Catholic and Evangelical communities. In Tamil Nadu, India, Aldrich (2011; 2013) argues that the extensive aid from external agencies damaged the existing social capital. For instance, the influx of financial aid for orphans has encouraged more early marriage and this causes a ‘second tsunami’ of problems to deal with. Drawing on this empirical evidence from other countries, I propose to investigate a similar context using Indonesian societies in the aftermath of disasters, particularly the Gayo earthquake in Central Aceh and the Mt. Kelud volcanic eruption in East Java (see Chapters Five and Six).

In post-disaster Indonesia, similar findings resulted from the study of Yogyakarta. In their research on shelter projects following the earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006, MacRae and Hodgkin (2011) found that while the external actors (a group of international donors) were relatively successful in completing the shelter project, there were a number of shortcomings. One of them was the lack of local
knowledge and cultural sensitivity. Similar to some studies mentioned above, the case provided by MacRae and Hodgkin (2011) was on large-scale disasters and their scope of research was limited as it was based on a housing project. Smaller-scale but frequent disasters are still under-studied. Thus, my research on economic recovery in Gayo and Mt. Kelud will contribute to widening the growing literature on disaster recovery in Indonesia.

V. **FBOs, Faith-Based Aid and Social Capital Formation**

FBOs and secular CSOs have been engaged in development and disaster relief. In Indonesia, FBOs dominate civil society groups that provide social welfare in both sectors (Sakai, 2012). While government agencies have been implementing numerous development and disaster relief programs, their capacity is limited. FBOs, therefore, are able to complement government efforts. The domination of CSOs by FBOs raises the question about similarities between FBOs and secular organisations. Let us discuss scholarly works on comparing the two types of CSOs that may help to explain the domination of FBOs in particular fields.

Scholars attempt to distinguish between religious CSOs and their secular counterparts (Berger, 2003; Clarke, 2007; Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Ebaugh et al., 2003; Jeavons, 1998; Lockhart, 2005; Sider and Unruh, 2004; Unruh and Sider, 2005). Jeavons (1998) is probably the most cited scholar on the difference between these types of organisations. Jeavons (1997) offers seven dimensions to define an organisation as “religious,” namely (1) self-identity, (2) participant selection (staff, volunteers, funders, and clients), (3) sources of material resources, (4) goals, products,

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21 Secular CSOs refer to groups that do not contain any religiosity in their identity or programs. See the following paragraph.
and services, (5) information processing and decision-making (6) development, distribution, and use of power, and (7) inter-organisational relationships. Each of these aspects is measured from not religious (secular) to fully religious.

Another example is Berger (2003). In her study of the United Nations-affiliated organisations, Berger identifies some differences between religious and secular CSOs. While the two types of CSOs “operate within the same legal and political frameworks of secular civil society”, the religious CSOs differ because of their religious motives, moral duty and divine incentive. Religious CSOs also have stronger and more stable “social capital” (social networks) than the secular CSOs, and in some cases, than governments (Berger, 2003: 19–20). For instance, international Christian humanitarian organisations are able to operate smoothly through churches in local communities in African states. Likewise, the international Islamic relief agencies work with Islamic grass-roots groups in Islamic countries (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003 p.92).

Another important work is Sider and Unruh’s (2004) on categorisation of CSOs based on their religiousness. They make six typologies to determine religiosity of particular organisation. The first type is “faith-permeated”. This category refers to the most religious organisations where faith is evident in all levels of the organisation and religious affiliation is a requirement of participation. The second type is labelled, “faith-centered” where religious messages and activities are explicit but religious identification is optional for participation. Thirdly, “Faith-affiliated” groups have only limited faith elements but some religious influences remain. The fourth type is those with a “faith-background” that act in a secular way but have historical ties to a specific faith. The fifth type: “faith-secular partnership” includes collaborations between secular and religious entities. Finally, the last category is completely secular (Sider and Unruh, 2004: 119–120).
It is worth noting that unlike the case in most Western countries where FBOs receive financial support from the government for their social welfare and humanitarian programs, the main sources of funding for Indonesian FBOs are their adherents or supporters (Sakai, 2012). In relation to Islamic FBOs, their financial resources originate from the Islamic tradition called *zakat, infak, sedekah, and wakaf*. In Indonesia, these terms are commonly abbreviated ZISWAF (Fauzia, 2013).

Scholars have also examined how social capital can be generated by FBOs and particularly through their faith-based programs. For example, in their study of two Christian NGOs in the UK, Bunn and Wood (2012: 646) found that by offering faith-based services, “strategic production and deployment of social capital” of individuals or group members can be achieved. In the context of Islamic FBOs, Harrigan and El-Said (2009: 9) argue that FBOs represent “the most important form of social and human capital in Muslim societies”. As evidence, Candland (2001) demonstrates that the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Islamic Clerics, NU), has been able to generate social capital through its social welfare programs and this has occurred for decades.

While the evidence outlined above demonstrates that FBOs that share the same religion with their beneficiaries have the potential to generate positive social capital, they can also produce the downside of social capital. One illustration is the study of James and Paton (2015) on disaster recovery after the 2009 Cyclone Morakot in Taiwan. They argue that FBOs (together with secular organisations) can also

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22 The ZISWAF in general is forms of charity either voluntary or obligatory. *Zakat* is almsgiving (obligatory); *infak* is donations (can be voluntary or obligatory depends on the context); *sedekah* is charity (voluntary). Each righteousness in Islam is considered *sedekah*; *wakaf* is endowment (voluntary). See also Newby (2004).
potentially harm the existing social capital in the community. This happens when external CSOs do not have adequate knowledge of local conditions or some cultural awareness. As a result, “numerous conflicts, mis-communication, frustration and dissatisfaction with the quality of the reconstruction efforts” occurred in relocation and housing projects undertaken by external CSOs (James and Paton, 2015: 218).

In view of the local and cultural contexts above, we need to examine whether FBOs, especially Islamic FBOs have any advantages when working with Muslims. Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim population in the world.23 Does cultural proximity help social capital formation and the smooth delivery of aid? This is important because scholars such as (Benthall, 2007b, 2012, 2016; Cordier, 2009; Palmer, 2011) have argued that Islamic FBOs do not always have an advantage when working with Muslim beneficiaries (ummah or Islamic community).24 This study thus interrogates the argument that external FBOs, specifically Islamic ones, have an advantage when working with or among Islamic communities. Related to the arguments about social capital formation in Indonesian disaster recovery contexts, this study seeks to examine whether FBOs, particularly Islamic ones, as external groups, are also potentially harmful to the existing social capital when they operate within Muslim communities. My argument is that Islamic FBOs, like any other disaster agencies, can also potentially weaken the existing social capital in the society. This will happen if they neglect the local context. Details on this argument will be presented in the examination of the Mt. Kelud case study.


24 “Muslims, regardless of differences, regard themselves as one ummah”, see Newby (2004: 207).
VI. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the intersection of the concepts of civil society, development, recovery and social capital and demonstrated the importance of investigating these terms in the context of existing research. Social capital theory has emerged as a focus of scholars and my research aims to enrich the existing literature.

This chapter has emphasised that the use of social capital is important for speeding up community recovery and resilience in the aftermath of disasters. The scholarly discussions in this chapter demonstrate that civil society groups, particularly internal ones, are making good use of social capital in communities affected by natural disasters. However, I point out that the role of external CSOs in building social capital and whether they have an advantage or disadvantage in assisting the disaster-affected society remains to be investigated. This is the gap I seek to address.

Finally, as highlighted above, I argue that social contexts and political situations do affect the way CSOs operate. This brings us to the discussion in the next chapter, about recent developments of Indonesian CSOs, their different trajectories in response to specific socio-political factors, and their roles in disaster management in recent times.
Chapter Three

CSOs in Indonesian Disaster Management: Background and Contemporary Development

I. Introduction

This chapter discusses the development of Indonesian CSOs and their roles in the disaster management sector. In this chapter I argue that the way Indonesian CSOs operate and set their agenda has been largely influenced by their socio-cultural and political contexts. I also contend that although Indonesian CSOs have been providing disaster relief assistance since the colonial period, it was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that triggered CSOs (and other agencies including the government) to include disaster management as a major agenda item. Since 2004, we have witnessed new policies and the development of organisations related to disaster management practices in Indonesia.

Following the arguments above, I will answer the following specific questions of this chapter.

1. How did civil society groups emerge in Indonesia and to what extent do they contribute to disaster relief?
2. To what extent has social capital been used by CSOs in Indonesia?
3. In what way are CSOs able to play a part in different phases of disaster management in contemporary Indonesia?

Answering these questions is important because of Indonesia’s interest to minimise the impact of natural disasters. As stated earlier in Chapter One, Indonesia
is one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries, home to 142 volcanoes and exposure to different types of natural disasters.\(^{25}\)

I divided this chapter into two main sections. The first part of this chapter discusses the development of CSOs in Indonesia over time. I propose to base this discussion on general periods of different political leadership in Indonesia, namely the colonial period, the state building (Sukarno) period, Suharto’s rule, and the post-Suharto or contemporary period (before 2004). In the second part of the chapter, I present the active or increased involvement of Indonesian CSOs in the disaster relief sector, particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The findings of this study, as I shall elaborate later, show that in Indonesia, FBOs, unlike secular groups, are predominantly active in this field. However, I argue that the contributions of CSOs to disaster recovery will be more effective if they act collaboratively i.e. through networks and partnerships with other disaster management agencies, rather than working alone. Finally, I conclude this chapter with a summary and discussion about policy relevance. It is worth noting that for the purpose of this study, the range of CSOs discussed in this chapter is limited to organisations involved in the development sector and social welfare in Indonesia.

II. Historic Development of CSOs in Indonesia

I argue that to understand the current phenomenon of CSOs in today’s Indonesia, we need to be aware of their past. In this section, I will analyse the emergence of CSOs in Indonesia from the colonial period to contemporary times. Civil society groups

appeared in Indonesia in the 20th century and religious groups in particular have played unique roles in each phase of Indonesian development. Indonesian FBOs have evolved and the focus of their agenda has shifted over time to react to their changing contexts, be they political, social or cultural.26

Literature on CSOs in Indonesia mainly highlights the relationship between religion (mainly Islam) and politics but the topics tend to be very broad from the first arrival of Islam to contemporary political Islam (Azra, 2006b; Effendy, 2003; Fealy and White, 2008; Hefner, 1993, 2000; Porter, 2002). Some other scholars study only selected organisations and therefore, their focus is very narrow (Abdullah, 2001; Bush, 2009; Falaakkh, 2001). Focus on the evolution of Indonesian CSOs across time and specifically their efforts towards disaster relief have not been widely studied, but it is the focus of this study.27

A. Colonial Period (1908 – 1945): The Beginning of Indonesian CSOs

Scholars contend that the earliest appearance of civil society in Indonesia can be traced to the Dutch colonial period (Antlöv et al., 2006; Chirzin, 2000; Gross, 2007). The concept of civil society was introduced into Western society in the seventeenth century, as mentioned in Chapter Two, but it was only in the twentieth century that this notion appeared in Indonesia. In the early twentieth century, the Dutch introduced Ethical Policy to improve the conditions of the Indies. The policy was regarded as a

26 In Indonesian context, the term civil society has been translated into different names such as masyarakat kewargan/warga, masyarakat sipil, or masyarakat madani. The debates about these names have been discussed elsewhere, see for example Azra (2006a: 38–48) and Beittinger-Lee (2009: 26–28).

27 Latief’s work (2012) is exceptional but his focus was on solely on the roles of Islamic CSOs and during emergency relief phase.
shift from exploitation to emancipation because “it was the “moral duty” of The Netherlands to combat the causes of perpetual poverty in colonial Indonesia and improve the welfare of the people there” (Ooi, 2004: 490). The Ethical Policy, to some extent, has provided access for Indonesians to higher levels of education and better leadership positions at the local level. As a result, civil society groups emerged during that time (Gross, 2007: 22–23).28

In the colonial period, the focus of civil society groups was on building nationalism and identity formation (i.e. cultural, religious, and political) (Beittinger-Lee, 2009). Disaster relief was not their major focus. During this period, civil society groups had been able to use the available stock of social capital in the form of religious and cultural identity to achieve their objectives. Social capital in this context can be defined as “norms and values promoting cooperation frequently originates in phenomena like religion, shared historical experience, and other deeply embedded cultural traditions that can be shaped only with great difficulty” (Fukuyama, 2002: 32). To borrow Wuthnow’s (2002) term, this type of social capital is called identity-bridging social capital. In Indonesia, it was cultural (i.e. kinship and ethnicity) and religious identity that had created mutual trust which leads to collective action between civil society groups. This identity also impacts “on the ways people think about themselves and their definitions of “us” and “them.”” (Wuthnow, 2002: 670).

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28 No exact date when Indonesia was exists but historians contend it can be traced back to the arrival of Europeans in Indonesia in the 16th century (Drakeley (2005); Ricklefs (2008)). Indonesia was first colonised by the Portuguese, then the Dutch (17th to 20th century), and partially British (19th century), and eventually Japan (1942-1945). Dutch imperialism lasted for three centuries, longer than any other imperial rule. As a result, the Dutch had more influence on Indonesian history, including on the emergence of Indonesian civil society.
It is fair to say that people with different backgrounds can be bound together because they share an identity. In this context, the identity is either based on ethnicity or religion. An example of the former is the Budi Utomo and the latter is Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Union, SDI) and Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI). These movements were the first institutionalised civil society groups that emerged and they triggered the development of other associations.

The Budi Utomo was established on the 20th of May, 1908 by Javanese aristocrats (priyayi). Its founders, Dr. Sutomo and Dr. Sudiro had roots in the lower class of priyayi and were students at Batavia Medical School (STOVIA). One driving factor that led to the creation of this movement was the frustration of the lower class priyayi with the Dutch and the higher class of priyayi who possessed greater political and economic power (Gross, 2007: 23).

It is little wonder that the initial membership of Budi Utomo consisted mainly of the lower class priyayi whose ancestry was traced to the Kingdom of Islam-Mataram (Nagazumi, 1972; Tsuchiya, 1975). However, because the ultimate goal of Budi Utomo was to build nationalism and strengthen Javanese identity with the particular aim of improving agriculture and education in Java, the movement was eventually able to gain a wider support. In its first year, this movement had 10,000 Javanese members (Clancy, 1992: 28; Nasution, 2016: 382). Despite being Javanese-centric, the Budi Utomo was considered the first nationalist movement in Indonesia. Its establishment date, 20 May, is still celebrated in Indonesia as the day of national awakening (kebangkitan national).

The Budi Utomo inspired the birth of other organisations to fight for nationalism. To borrow Drakeley’s (2005: 56) words, the Budi Utomo served as “a vital transitional organization in which many Indonesian nationalists and reformers
developed their ideas”. Some examples of subsequent movements inspired by Budi Utomo are the Indisje Partij (Indies Party) and Taman Siswa (Garden of Pupils). The former was established in 1912 by Douwes Dekker, along with Cipto Mangunkusumo and Ki Hajar Dewantara. The organisation promoted radical nationalism and independence which led to the Indies Party being banned by the Dutch in the following year. The Taman Siswa was developed in 1924 by Ki Hajar Dewantara and focused solely on promoting nationalism through education (Clancy, 1992).

A social or political civil society group that represented a specific Islamic identity was the SDI, initiated in 1911. This movement began in Central Java as a cooperative for Muslim businessmen to counter the Chinese hegemony in batik (Javanese traditional textile) trades (Clancy, 1992: 166; Nasution, 2016: 382). A year later, the SDI transformed to SI. Led by Tjokroaminoto, the SI had a broader agenda and focused not only on trade but also education, economic, politics and conveying Islamic messages.

Using Islam for religious appeal, the SI mobilised its members to strengthen not only their religious identity but also their nationalism. Islam is synonymous with nationhood and indigenous identity. To be a Muslim means being opposed to “economic dominance, racial superiority, and political control imposed by the colonial regime” (Liow, 2016: 179). What is more, to be a Muslim also means opposing Christianity. Although Christianity had appeared in the archipelago during pre-colonial times, it was during the Portuguese and the Dutch colonisation period that a

29 Scholars have different opinions on the founder of SDI. Some of them for example Ali (2016), Latif (2008) and Vickers (2013) argue that it was Tirta Adhi Suryo while some others such as Effendy (2003), Hilmy (2010) and Ricklefs (2008) believe that it was Haji Samanhudi who established the organisation.
significant proportion of Indonesians were converted to Christianity. Particularly during Dutch colonialism, Christians were given privileged access to jobs and education. Muslims could not access these privileges, unless they converted to Christianity, an option that was rejected (Liow, 2016).

As a result of its Islamic-cum-nationalism campaign, the SI attracted people from both rural and urban areas, in Java and from other islands. In 1919, it was estimated that SI had two million members, with almost one hundred branches across the archipelago (Egger, 2008; cf. Williams, 2015: 70). Given this fact, the SI was considered the first mass-supported organisation in Indonesia.

The emergence of SI with its religious and national identity was in line with the development of other Islamic groups. In the same year, 1912, a modernist Islamic organisation called Muhammadiyah was established by Ahmad Dahlan. The Persatuan Islam (The Islamic Unity, Persis) emerged and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Islamic Clerics, NU) were created in 1923 and 1926 respectively. During the colonial period, these religious organisations contributed significantly to shaping the national identity.

Moreover, the SI had also stimulated the creation of non-religious groups which appeared at the same time as the Islamic groups. For instance, both the Asuransi Jiwa Bersama Bumi Putera (Insurance Cooperative Peasants) and the left-wing of Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) appeared in 1912 and 1920 respectively. In 1927, the Perkumpulan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Association) was established and restructured into the Partai Nasional

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30 These Christian communities were located outside Java particularly in the eastern part of Indonesia and the North Sumatra. For more on Christianity in Indonesia see Aritonang and Steenbrink (2008).
Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI) in the following year. Some notable leaders from these groups were Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta who later played pivotal roles in Indonesian independence and state-building (Beittinger-Lee, 2009: 36).31

It is worth noting the agenda of the latter organisations focused solely on nationalist discourse and nation building and did not contain any religious intent. From the 1930s, both religious and nationalist groups started to rally around the idea of independence. While the former believed that the future of Indonesia should be established within the framework of Islam, the latter argued that the state should be separated from religion (Effendy, 2003). The unfinished debates about relations between Islam and state continued not only throughout the process of state formation, as I shall describe in the following section, but also continue in Indonesia today.

Despite their differences, the development of both religious and nationalist civil society groups during colonial times demonstrates that before Indonesia become an independent state, these organisations “asserted the presence of civil society” (Chirzin, 2000: 23). In this period, these organisations played a unique role in building nationalism and in the development of independence. An example of building nationalism can be found in West Sumatra, where Muhammadiyah clerics helped the local traders in fighting the Dutch-supported adat (local customary law). In East and Central Java, the fight against colonialism was supported by traditionalist NU kyai (clerics) who had been based in pesantren (boarding schools) (Bush, 2009; Pringle, 2010).

31 The SI leadership was split and led to the development of nationalist and communist party.
In this period, some religious groups, particularly the Islamic organisations, had used religious social capital to mobilise resources in response to social issues. It began with SI and other organisations followed. Their social engagement with the community can be seen in a wide range of welfare provisions i.e. education and economic development. One possible explanation for provision of social welfare by Islamic groups derived from Islamic teaching. Theologically, Muslims are encouraged to help their fellow Muslims or other believers. In terms of funding, which is another important factor for organisational sustainability, Islamic organisations can generate different types of religious alms namely *zakat*, *infak*, *sedekah* and *wakaf* (mentioned in Chapter Two).\(^{32}\) The ability to raise funds also probably explains why some Islamic organisations are able to persist. As opposed to the SI, which became involved in politics and finally dissolved due to internal conflict between Islamic and communist values (Egger, 2008), Muhammadiyah, NU and Persis continue to be important organisations in Indonesia today. The first two are the largest Islamic organisations still in existence. Other religious organisations, particularly Christian organisations were more specialised in providing orphanages and hospitals at that time.

Now let us examine the involvement of CSOs in disaster relief in this era. It is argued that it was Islamic groups that were at the frontline of disaster relief at that time. Two of the above-mentioned Islamic organisations, the SI and the Muhammadiyah, were major players in this period. The SI, for instance, established the Relief Committee of Sarekat Islam Trenggalek in East Java. The Relief Committee collected funds to help other victims of fire in Kwitang of Betawi, Jakarta in 1918 and helped victims of famine in East Java in the following year. The SI also became

\(^{32}\) The definition for these terms has been explained in the Chapter Two. For the history and theological interpretation on Islamic philanthropy in Indonesian context see Fauzia (2013).
involved in advocacy for disaster prevention policies. In 1918, the SI demanded the government and private sector reduce the cost of food and distribute cheap food (Fauzia, 2013: 144–145). Another organisation, Muhammadiyah for example, also had a special division, named Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum (Assistance for the Relief of Public Suffering, PKU), working on relief. The PKU was established as a response to the Mount Kelud eruption in 1919 and since then has provided various relief programs to the people (Fauzia, 2013: 147–157).

However, during that time, the work of these organisations was limited and localised. They were predominantly based in Java and helped only people in that area. My assumption is based on scarce documentation and the limited available literature on this topic (cf. Fauzia, 2013; Noer, 1978).

B. State Building Period (1945 – 1966): CSOs’ Focus on Nationalism and Identity Formation

The period of 1945-1966 was similar to the previous era where disaster relief was not the main focus of civil society groups. What differentiates it from the earlier period is that while CSOs in the colonial era had focused on building nationalism and identity formation, their concentration in this period was more on the state formation process. Religion was also used as social capital for mobilising resources but Sukarno saw that as a threat. What is more, the competition among CSOs had become more intense.

The contest between Indonesian CSOs can be seen in two phases. First, there was competition between the Islamist and secular CSO activists. This was expressed

33 On 15 August 1945, the Japanese Empire surrendered to end World War II. This also marked the end of Japanese occupation in Indonesia. Two days afterwards, Sukarno and Hatta declared the country’s independence and were selected as President and Vice President respectively.
during the drafting of the national constitution which was ratified on 22 June, 1945. Nine working committee members were selected to compose the constitutional preamble, known as the Jakarta Charter. The Islamists were Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso and H. Agus Salim of SI and Wahid Hasyim of NU, while the rest, led by Sukarno, were nationalists. The different views of the nationalist and Islamist groups were discussed earlier. Controversy arose when the latter group added seven words (“*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya”/obligation for Muslims to practice Islamic law) after the phrase Believe in God. Those seven words were removed due to heated debates between Islamists nationalists and non-Muslim leaders (Bush, 2009; Elson, 2009; Pringle, 2010). It can be seen that despite sharing a goal of creating Indonesian independence, the Islamic and secular activists also had their own agenda.  

The second area of contestation among CSOs involved three factions; namely Islamists, nationalists, and the Communists. This competition developed in the 1950s when Indonesia started its process of democratisation. In fact, this situation provided opportunities for the Islamic CSOs established during colonial era to transform into political parties. The NU, Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Party of Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations, Masyumi), and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party, PSSI, changed from SI), to name a few, participated in the first national election in 1955. Theoretically, CSOs cannot be political parties, some of them may transform into political parties to pursue their agenda and compete against the ruling regime (van Rooy, 1998). The Islamic parties named above came second, third and fifth place in the election respectively, after the nationalist PNI and

34 The idea of forming an Islamic state is still subject to debate and fought by some Islamist groups in today’s Indonesia. See for instance Azra and Salim (2003) and Azra (2004).
communist PKI that came second and fourth. As mentioned earlier, it can be seen that the “us” (Wuthnow, 2002) diffused into three opposing factions.

By using religious social capital, these Islamic parties attempted to gain votes from Muslim constituents. In the 1950s’ election mentioned above, the three Islamic parties combined attracted over 48% of the total number of votes which indicated their ability to attract support from their religious followers. These votes were used to promote the Islamic state ideology which was initially contested in the Jakarta Charter. The number fell short, however, because a two-thirds majority was needed to have the proposal accepted (Hilmy, 2010; Pringle, 2010).

Sukarno’s leadership was further challenged by numerous secessionist factions from the communist and Islamists groups. Among the most remarkable occurrences were the uprisings movements by communists from Madiun in East Java and the Islamists from Darul Islam (Islamic Abode) by Kartosuwiryo in West Java, both in 1948. Then in 1957, the Piagam Perjuangan Semesta (Universal Struggle Charter, Permesta) emerged in Sulawesi, established by Lt. Colonel Sumual. One year later, the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, PRRI) led by Lt. Colonel Ahmad Husein was established in West Sumatra. The last three groups appeared in protest to the Central Government in Jakarta which was Java-centric and neglected development outside Java (Clancy, 1992; Pringle, 2010).

Given the political volatility of the Islamist and Communists, in 1959, Sukarno introduced the notion of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy). The concept was

35 The Darul Islam movement had spread to other parts in Indonesia i.e. South Sulawesi and Aceh in 1952 and 1953 respectively.
that any political decisions were to be decided by Sukarno himself. This policy particularly affected Islamic civil society in the sense that Sukarno wanted to decrease religious influence in the political sphere. Pringle (2010: 65) called this a period of “Islamic marginalization”. In other words, it is fair to say that in this period, Islam, as a mobilising force, was perceived by Sukarno as a threat.

In the same year, Sukarno dismissed the Masyumi party and arrested their leaders due to their involvement in the Permesta and PRRI mentioned above. Masyumi’s supporters largely came from non-Javanese backgrounds which indicated that the party and their leaders were involved in the rebellion movements (Clancy, 1992: 152–153). The dismissal of Masyumi left NU as the only Islamic political party in the parliament. Unlike Masyumi, NU was willing to adopt and cooperate with Sukarno’s policy because the latter viewed Sukarno’s concept as compatible with Islam (Bush, 2009).

In contrast to fading Islam, the communist PKI had become stronger. Some new organisations were established under the patronage of the PKI. Those were, for instance, Barisan Tani Indonesia (Peasant Front of Indonesia, BTI), Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth) and Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women’s Movement, Gerwani). Those organisations operated at the village level and were successful in mobilizing support from the grass roots. However, due to their nature as left-wing organisations affiliated with the PKI, they were banned by the New Order regime (Hadiwinata, 2003).

What about CSOs contribution in disaster relief in this period? I have highlighted that civil society groups had put their tremendous efforts into the state building process, which is understandable because Indonesia was a young and fragile state at that time. It is hard to find any evidence of the involvement of CSOs,
particularly those that transformed into political parties, in responding to any disaster. Similar to the previous period, documentation on the roles of CSOs in disaster relief in this era seems to be limited as well. The little available literature suggests that some CSOs, which were apolitical, were involved in disaster relief. Taking the Mount Agung eruption in Bali in 1963 as an example, religious groups like Muhammadiyah (Nurfatoni, 2017) and World Vision Indonesia (WVI)\textsuperscript{36} helped the victims of the eruption. The Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI, Indonesian Red Cross), which was established in September 1945, (Fauzia, 2013: 177) was presumably involved in disaster relief, but no historical records are available. Overall, the role of CSOs in this era was insignificant.

C. Suharto / New Order Period (1967 – 1998): Civil Society, Development and Democratisation\textsuperscript{37}

Similar to the previous two periods, CSOs during the Suharto era did not put disaster relief on their agenda. As I have argued earlier, specific socio-cultural and political contexts have been driving factors for CSOs setting their agenda. In Suharto’s era, CSOs concentrated more on development and democratisation issues. The Suharto period was marked by several policies that limited the functioning of civil society, particularly the Islamic elements. Before the contemporary Islamic revival in Indonesia in 1990s, secular and Christian CSOs dominated the sphere of civil society.

\textsuperscript{36} The WVI is a Christian organisation established in 1960s in Indonesia. It focused on child welfare in its first inception and currently provides a variety of social supports including disaster relief. \url{http://www.wvi.org/indonesia/about-us-0} (accessed 17 May 2016).

\textsuperscript{37} Suharto’s period is also known as \textit{Orde Baru} (New Order). This name differentiates between him and the old leadership, which Suharto called the latter as \textit{Orde Lama} or Old Order. See \url{http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/languagesofsecurity/2011/05/27/indonesian-order/} (accessed 17 May 2016).
Suharto became the second Indonesian President in 1967 and his regime remained in power until 1998.

Similar to Sukarto, Suharto’s rule was also authoritarian in nature. More specifically, Suharto restricted the operation of CSOs (particularly Islamic ones) that were against him and his government. According to Aspinall (2005: 22–23), Suharto ruled Indonesia with three main characteristics. Firstly, by extending and strengthening the role of the military in Indonesian politics with *dwifungsi* (dual function) policy. The policy allowed the Indonesian army to play double roles, in defence and security as well as in politics, such as becoming bureaucrats and politicians. Secondly, his rule was characterised by a restructure of the political system and civil society. During the Suharto era, only three parties were allowed to participate in the election, namely Golongan Karya (Functional Group, Golkar), the nationalist Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party, PDI), and the Islamic Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP). Suharto used the Golkar as a political vehicle, and thus it played a dominant role in Indonesian politics during his rule. The third characteristic was the reconstructing of the ideological justification for Suharto’s authoritarianism. For instance, Suharto believed that the concept of Demokrasi Pancasila (*Pancasila Democracy*), was different from Western democracy and Islam and was compatible with *Pancasila*. It is arguable that Suharto’s policy was similar to, and probably worse than, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.

Having learnt from political turbulence during Sukarno’s era, Suharto thought that his politisation of Indonesian principles (*Pancasila*) could control any voice of opposition or prevent the revival of Islam and communism. Unlike during Sukarno’s era where the competition between the three sides (secularist/nationalist, Islamist and Communist) was visible, Suharto attempted to diminish the roles of the latter two. He
implemented several measures (Hadiwinata, 2003). Firstly, he forbade the villagers from becoming involved in any political activities, including joining national political parties operating in the village. Instead, village organisations, such as Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Resilience Council, LKMD), Karang Taruna (Youth Group), and Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Education, PKK), were given financial support towards their operations. In addition, Suharto also established several national groups, including Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian National Youth Committee, KNPI), Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Farmer's Association, HKTI), and Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Indonesian Prosperous Labour Union, SBSI). With a significant number of state-sponsored groups, non-state civil society groups were expected to decline. Secondly, Suharto launched a variety of development programs, addressing education, health care and rural development. In 1969, for example, Suharto introduced Bimbingan Masyarakat (Community Guidance, Bimas) as part of an effort to modernise the agricultural sector. The specific objective was to achieve swasembada pangan (self-sufficiency) in the agricultural sector and minimise the country’s dependency on foreign support, i.e. needing importing food from other countries. Another popular program was Bantuan Desa (Village Assistance, Bandes). Each village received a grant to be used for its development. Through development programs, Suharto wanted to decrease the influence of CSOs because he considered these organisations to be a threat to his regime. The third effort made by Suharto was to pass a Law on Organisasi Kemasyarakatan (Social Organisations, Ormas) which was passed in the 1980s. The law regulated CSOs so they were controlled by the government. Thus, the autonomous nature of CSOs had been weakened. He also introduced the asas tunggal (sole ideology) policy. This meant that any CSOs
including FBOs could not operate unless they pursued the state ideology *Pancasila* as their organisational ideology.

Despite political oppression from Suharto, the Indonesian CSOs attempted to operate. In the late 1960s’ onwards, former students, journalists and intellectuals including from the FBO activists challenged Suharto’s leadership. They protested, particularly against the government’s economic and political initiatives that could lead to mismanagement and corruption.

The 1970s were marked by the growth of civil society in Indonesia especially because of the availability of funding from foreign organisations (Aspinall, 2005). Among the many CSOs that emerged, three prominent Indonesian CSOs were established during that time, namely Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Foundation, LBH), Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan Penerapan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Social Economic Research Education and Information, LP3ES), and Bina Desa (Village Development) in 1969, 1971, in 1975 respectively. These organisations emerged as what Aspinall (2005: 90) called a “populist shift” where civil society actors started to change their position from “acceptance” to “challenge the elitism” of development and modernisation programs organised by Suharto.

In addition to available funding from foreign donors, CSOs were also able to operate because of their ability to adapt to the current regime (Eldridge, 1990). Because of the restrictions created by the Ormas Law mentioned above, many CSOs called themselves Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Community Self-Reliant Institution, LSM). During that period, the term NGO was widespread globally and using non-government could indicate opposition to the government. The term *swadaya* was more acceptable, as Suharto also used this term in his development program mentioned above.
Following the government restrictions on CSOs and the approaches they used during the Suharto era, CSOs can be categorised into three types (Eldridge, 1990: 511–528). This classification seems to be relevant in the context of authoritarian regimes where CSOs have different ways in dealing with dictatorship. Firstly, there are “high-level partnership: grassroots development” CSOs. These organisations had strong partnerships with the government and focused more on community development programs. Some examples were the Christian CSOs Bina Swadaya (Self-Reliant Development Foundation)\(^{38}\) and the Yayasan Indonesia Sejahtera (Indonesian Welfare Foundation, YIS)\(^{39}\). The second category focused on “high-level politics: grass-roots mobilisation”, contrasted with the first category’s mission. CSOs in this category did not want to cooperate with the government in the development sector. Rather, they concentrated on policy advocacy for specific sectors and mobilisation of the people. The LP3ES, the LBH, and the Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Environment forum, WALHI), to name a few, were among CSOs included in this classification.\(^{40}\) The LP3ES, as a research institute, was known for its advocacy through its publication. Its journal, Prisma, was an outlet for intellectuals and former students to express their critical ideas about the government (Ganie-Rochman and Achwan, 2005). The LBH focused on providing legal aid for marginalised people in both rural and urban areas. Finally, the WALHI emphasised its work on issues related

\(^{38}\) The Bina Swadaya established in 1967 (http://binaswadaya.org/bs3/history, accessed 22 March 2016). The organisation continues to operate today but their influence in development had been decreasing.

\(^{39}\) The YIS founded in 1974. It had roots in the Christian Health Foundation or widely known as YAKKUM Eldridge (1990: 517). Similar to Bina Swadaya, YIS also still functions with a different name, Yayasan Insan Sembada, but it currently does not involve itself much in the development sector. Its website is http://www.yis.or.id (accessed 22 March 2016).

\(^{40}\) WALHI emerged in 1980. It still persists today and serves as one of the main actor in environmental concerns. Its website is http://www.walhi.or.id (accessed 22 March 2016).
to their environmental impact, such as government policy on forestry and transmigration. The last category, “empowerment at the grassroots”, refers to local-based organisations that operate on a small-scale. The examples of this type of organisations include Kelompok Studi Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Study Group, KSBH). This group operated in Yogyakarta and its main objective was to increase awareness of particular rights and to play a mediatory role between the people and the authorities.

During this period, and particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, Christian CSOs especially, have been providing social welfare assistance to poor Indonesians. In addition to the two Christian CSOs mentioned above (Bina Swadaya and YIS), some other organisations, such as Gereja Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Church, GKI) and Yayasan Kristen untuk Kesehatan Umum (YAKKUM Foundation for Public Health), also emerged as important actors in the development sector. These organisations had worked on community development and in the health sector i.e. providing hospitals for the poor (Hadiwinata, 2003; Sakai, 2012). The contribution of these organisations to responding to social issues emphasises the pivotal role of FBOs in disaster management in Indonesia.

In the early 1990s, the rapid economic development and globalisation caused a revival of Islam in Indonesia, which Suharto did not predict (Pringle, 2010). This lead to a growing Muslim middle class and an increasing number of intellectuals, as well as the emergence of various Islamic organisations. One of the most remarkable

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41 GKI was officially founded 1988 (http://www.gki.or.id, accessed 24 May 2016). Yakkum has been established in Indonesia since 1950 (http://www.yakkum.or.id/tentang-kami/14-profilsingkat, accessed 24 May 2016). In 2001, it established its own unit called Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU) which focused on handling humanitarian issues including disasters (http://www.yeu.or.id/about-us.html, accessed 24 May 2016).
moments was the establishment of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association, ICMI) in 1990 (Azra, 2006a; Hefner, 1993, 2000). That year is cited as the beginning of the Islamic renewal in Indonesia. The development of ICMI eventually also resulted in the emergence of Dompet Dhuafa (DD) Foundation, which will be introduced in Chapter Four. It is also important to mention that rapid economic development in the Suharto era also brought negative consequences, such as a widening gap between the rich and the poor particularly in urban areas (Sakai, 2012). The DD Foundation initially emerged in response to this problem.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that from the illustration above we can see CSOs in the Suharto era were primarily used for campaigning, encouraging community mobilisation and advocacy. I argue that the focus on disaster relief was limited. Similar to previous periods, studies on CSOs involved in disaster relief were scarce. Let us examine one case, the earthquake and tsunami in Flores, East Nusa Tenggara that took place in 1992. This disaster was considered one of the major disasters in Indonesian history. It claimed more than 2,000 lives, in addition to causing severe damage to building and coastal areas (Tsuji et al., 1995). Apparently, no CSOs were involved in providing disaster relief in Flores. As foreign donors have been existed in Indonesia since 1970s, some of them contributed in some ways. For instance, American USAID helped by providing emergency shelter needs (Michaels and Luther, n.d.). The Australian government sent a plane containing tarpaulins, water containers and medical supplies (Yates and Bergin, 2011: 25). However, foreign assistance was channelled through the government did not always get through to the affected society due to corruption by state officials (Forshee, 2006: 21).
The absence of active local CSOs in Flores disaster can be explained by the
dominance of the government which perhaps limited the space for CSOs to fill the gap.
It can also be explained by the fact that helping disaster victims was not a priority area
at that time (as stated earlier, their focus was more on development and advocacy). A
third explanation is the lack of CSOs resources. Flores is located in the eastern part of
Indonesia and it took time to access the area. In short, this period highlights the limited
involvement of CSOs in providing disaster relief in Indonesia.

CSOs

This period has seen the flourishing of Indonesian CSOs following the fall of the
authoritarian regime. Some organisations from previous periods, such as
Muhammadiyah and NU, continue to operate due to their ability to generate funding,
by using religious social capital as a basis for resource mobilisation including financial
funding. In addition, many new CSOs have also been established. However, I point
out that CSOs started to focus on disaster relief only after the 2004 Boxing Day
earthquake and tsunami.

In 1998, Suharto had to step down after three decades of dictatorship. A year
earlier, the 1997 economic crisis had hit Southeast Asian countries. It started with the
collapse of the Thai Baht, and the Indonesian currency (Rupiah) was also affected.
Consequently, the Indonesian economy was ruined. At the same time, the streets were
full of student protests demanding freedom and reform and there were also anti-
Chinese riots. The communal conflict in Maluku and an insurgency movement in Aceh

Reformasi literally means reforms. The term refers to Post-Suharto era
arose. Given the political and economic instability, on 21 May, 1998 Suharto finally announced his resignation (Crouch, 2010). Following the fall of Suharto, reforms have been gradually made in almost every aspect of the Indonesian government. As an example, the governance system was decentralised (this will be further explained in Chapter Six). Reforms in the law, military, the electoral system also took place, to name a few (Crouch, 2010; Erb et al., 2013; Forrester, 1999; Schwarz and Paris, 1999).

In short, the post-Suharto era provided space for Indonesia to become a newly-democratic country. Civil society started to flourish and the quantity of CSOs increased significantly. While there was no official database to calculate the exact number of CSOs in Indonesia, some figures can be traced. According to the National and Political Unity Office, a unit within the Indonesian Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were 3,225 organisations registered in 1995. The amount doubled to 8,720 and then increased sharply to 13,400 in 1998 and 2000 respectively (Koran Jakarta, 2013). In 2013, 139,957 CSOs were registered by different governmental institutions, 108 of them are international CSOs registered under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Government officials believe that the numbers of CSOs could actually be higher, as some CSOs may not register themselves with government agencies (JPNN, 2013). Nonetheless, these figures illustrate the tremendous development of CSOs in Indonesia over this time.

It is worth noting that despite the significant number of CSOs in the post-Suharto era, their sustainability was challenged by a substantial reduction in foreign donor funding (Aspinall, 2010; Mietzner, 2012; Sakai, 2012). This was in contrast with the previous era where some CSOs received foreign assistance, as mentioned earlier. There are three reasons for this situation. Firstly, since 2004, Indonesia has been considered a politically stable country. Secondly, since 2006, the status of the
Indonesian economy has grown and Indonesia has become a lower-middle income country. Thirdly, in 2009, the “Jakarta Commitment” was issued by the Indonesian Government in agreement with 26 multilateral and bilateral agencies to channel their financial support directly to the government. As a result, many CSOs experienced financial constraints, particularly secular CSOs (Sakai, 2012). Therefore, I contend that secular CSOs are less active than religious ones. FBOs are able to generate donors from their adherents and use a variety of religious instruments such as their places of worship (mosque, church) and religious alms giving (e.g. zakat) to attract donations. Therefore, I contend that secular CSOs are less active than religious ones. FBOs are able to generate donors from their adherents and use a variety of religious instruments such as their places of worship (mosque, church) and religious alms giving (e.g. zakat) to attract donations.43 In the next section, I will demonstrate how it is mainly FBOs involved in disaster relief.

III. Disaster Management in contemporary Indonesia: Roles of Indonesian CSOs

In this section, I shall discuss the roles of CSOs in disaster management in Post-Suharto era, particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This section particularly attempts to answer research question number three stated above: in what ways are CSOs able to play a part in different phases of disaster management in contemporary Indonesia? The findings of this study demonstrate that in the disaster relief sector, FBOs are the dominant contributors in this field. This is due to their ability to generate resources, as stated above. Another important finding from this study is that what we have witnessed in this era is a new phenomenon where CSOs work collaboratively either with their counterparts or with other agencies. In the previous eras, each CSO tended to work in isolation. During the colonial and Sukarno periods, as outlined above,

43 See for example Fauzia (2013) on the practice of Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia since colonial times and Azra (2006a) on the emergence of Islamic civil society in post-Suharto era.
we have observed competition between religious and secular CSOs to pursue their own specific objectives.

I have argued that CSOs need to work collaboratively with other institutions in order to increase the effectiveness of disaster management practices. Collaborative disaster governance, which involves networks and partnership, is one important aspect in managing complex emergencies (Kapucu et al., 2009; Kapucu et al., 2010; Kapucu and Garayev, 2011; Tierney, 2012). It serves as "a function of increasing societal complexity" which involves collective actions of many various institutions, be it formal or informal (Mitchell, 2006). In the global Disaster Risk Reduction framework of Hyogo and Sendai, partnership is also considered to be crucial (UNISDR, 2005, 2015). According to the Sendai Framework “partnerships play an additional important role by harnessing the full potential of countries and supporting their national capacities in disaster risk management and in improving the social, health and economic well-being of individuals, communities and countries.” (UNISDR, 2015: 25).

Collaborative works will occur if all stakeholders have mutual trust and understanding. This section demonstrates the contributions of the networks of major CSOs, particularly the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI), in expanding their networks in different forms of partnerships in disaster management practice in Indonesia. The findings of this study reveal that these collaborative works took place across all phases of disaster management (emergency response, preparedness and mitigation) except recovery.

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44 In Chapter Six, the findings of this study suggests that each organisation tends to work individually which affect their effectiveness in delivering disaster aid.
A. Natural Disasters in Indonesia: A Background

Before discussing the roles of CSOs in phases of disaster in Indonesia, I present an introduction to natural disasters in Indonesia and recent policies and practices in response to these catastrophic events. I highlighted in Chapter One that Indonesia is one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries due to its geological location in a very insecure region called the ring of fire. The country faces several types of natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunami, volcanic eruptions, floods, landslides, droughts and forest fires. Those disasters not only cause physical damage but they also destroy the social and economic life of affected populations.

Indonesian vulnerability and exposure to natural disasters as well as their development are not new. It can be traced back centuries such as the eruption of Mt. Krakatau or Krakatoa in 1883 that affected Indonesia and beyond. The explosion killed more than 36,000 people and devastated hundreds of coastal areas (Simkin et al., 1984; Strachey, 1888).

Despite these historical examples, scholars only started to focus extensively on disasters in Indonesia after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. As Olsen et al. (2003: 110) argue, the attention given to natural disasters has mainly been a result of media coverage, political interest and stakeholder commitment. The 2004 tsunami served as a catalyst in many ways. It contributed to ending the conflict in Aceh, which was one of the affected areas, as Gaillard et al. (2008) illustrate in their study. It also helped to improve the disaster management practice in Indonesia in a broader context, as I shall demonstrate shortly. After the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, Indonesia experienced subsequent major disasters; the earthquakes in Nias (2005), Yogyakarta (2006), West

Java (2009) and West Sumatra (2009), the tsunami in Mentawai in 2010, the eruptions of Merapi in 2006 and 2010, and the latest Mt. Kelud and Sinabung eruptions in early 2014, to name a few. All of these disasters gained fairly extensive media coverage and political attention.

In response to disasters in those areas, there was a rapid flow of aid from various parties including governments, individuals and organisations. In the case of the Aceh and Nias tsunamis, for instance, the humanitarian aid that followed was considered the largest disaster relief funding provided to the developing world. Numerous rehabilitation and reconstruction projects, such as in housing, health, education, and livelihood were initiated; all were aimed at rebuilding lives of victims of the disasters. A similar reaction has been seen in response to other affected areas in Indonesia with smaller-scale projects depending on the causalities and losses.

In post-disaster Aceh, Clarke et al. (Clarke et al., 2010) demonstrate that rehabilitation and reconstruction are complex and challenging. A number of organisations (government, religious, secular, international donors) were involved in disaster relief in Aceh, and several issues arose such as the limited capacity of aid workers to perform their tasks, a lack of coordination between the relief actors, the low level of project participation, and the different perceptions of ‘reconstruction’ between different groups and the community.

Lessons were learnt from the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in Aceh and several devastating disasters that have occurred since. In 2007 the Indonesian government enacted Law No 24 on Disaster Management. The Law addresses many important issues related to disaster reduction and post-disaster relief. For instance, it describes

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46 The Mt. Sinabung is still active up to now and last erupted in May 2016.
the responsibilities of government at all levels, national, provincial and local in preventing and responding to disasters (The President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007). Since 2008, the Indonesian government has a mandated agency responsible for disaster management, namely the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster Management Agency, BNPB). It is a permanent agency designed to replace the previous institution which was called National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, Bakornas PB). A more detailed analysis of this institution will be presented in Chapter Six.

Development should be inclusive and civil society is considered a crucial element. This element, which was categorised as community by the Disaster Management Law, needs to be involved in post-disaster relief under the coordination of the BNPB. Therefore, CSOs, and particularly religious ones, provide an alternative to government agencies as the key actors in disaster relief. CSOs have been recognised as important agencies in disaster relief in the Indonesian context, particularly after the 2004 tsunami. Their importance was further stated in the global Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) frameworks of Hyogo and Sendai (UNISDR, 2005, 2015). The following sections highlight the significant contribution of CSOs in phases of disaster management.

B. Roles of CSOs in Disaster: Phase of Emergency Relief

I have argued that the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a catalyst for a greater community focus on disaster relief. The tremendous amount of financial support given by the wider community (local, national and international) to development agencies, including CSOs helped increase their organisational capacity in disaster management practice. The capacity of CSOs has been expanding with further involvement in three
major disasters, namely the Padang, West Sumatra earthquake in 2009, the Yogyakarta earthquake of 2006 and the Mt. Merapi eruption in 2010.

In my interviews with representatives of CSOs, many explained that they had learnt a lot from their experience in disaster recovery in Aceh and Nias. One representative from NU stated:

“At that time our awareness national-wide had evolved. Our consciousness in Indonesia, that if no tsunami in Aceh we will not understand that disaster management is something that needs to be properly run. [It is] not like firefighters [one time problem solving]. It was [the tsunami in] Aceh that woke us up that disaster management has to be systematic, integrated and comprehensive. That why finally the embryo of CBDRM NU started.” (Muhammad Ali Yusuf, Head of LPBI NU, Interview, 17 April 2015)

In addition to a few CSOs that have been active in disaster relief, such as the WVI and YAKKUM, new CSOs focusing in humanitarian and disaster relief have been created. For instance, in 2006, the Christian organisation Karina (Caritas) was established. Since 2004 units specialising in disaster management have been established by some CSOs. In 2007, the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre (MDMC) was founded. The DD also established its own unit, the Disaster Management Centre of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (DMC-DD) in 2010. In the same year, the NU also initiated a Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM-

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section, and eventually transformed into Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim Nahdlatul Ulama (Disaster Management and Climate Change Foundation NU, LPBI NU) (Sakai and Fauzia, 2014). Other Islamist groups, such as the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (the Indonesian chapter of Liberation Party, HTI) and Front Pembela Islam (Front of Islam Defender, FPI), also joined the work of providing emergency response to natural disasters (Latief, 2012; Nurdin, 2015). This phenomenon indicates the growing role of CSOs, and particularly the FBOs, in disaster relief.

Interestingly, unlike FBOs, the visibility of the other CSOs in the context of disaster relief is relatively minor. In contrast to FBOs, some secular CSOs mentioned earlier, such as the Bina Desa, Bina Swadaya, LBH, WALHI, LP3ES and many more, still focus on their existing special interests without extending their work to disaster relief. The reason, as mentioned earlier, could be that the lack of available resources probably hinders their involvement in disaster relief.

To support my analysis above, I present the findings from my study that suggest that the actors in disaster relief during the emergency response phase were predominantly religious CSOs. In the case of the Gayo earthquake in 2013, for instance, forty institutions participated in a coordination meeting (UNOCHA Indonesia, 2013). Out of the forty, ten of them were faith-based CSOs and four of them were members of the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI) namely the DD, Karina, MDMC and YEU. Others presents were representatives of the government, the UN, Red Cross, international CSOs and media. There were four
secular CSOs and only Pusaka Indonesia that provided significant contribution.50 According to a document from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Indonesia (2013), Pusaka “distributed 700 tarpaulins and 700 sarong in Bah, Serempah and Kute Gelime Villages of Aceh Tengah, distributed rice, sugar, cooking oil, fish and kurma to 130 families in Buteh Village, and provided psychosocial kits in We Nangka, Dedingin, and Tapak Manggo Villages of Kuta Panang”. Other secular CSOs, namely Lumbung Yusuf Indonesia, only carried out an assessment.51

In contrast, all religious CSOs participated actively and extensively in disaster affected areas in Gayo. They provided significant assistance. The DMC-DD for instance, conducted Search and Rescue activity, health services, provided latrines, public kitchens, and temporarily rehabilitated mosques. Its assistance centred on the area of Ketol and Kute Panang. Working with UNICEF, it performed Sekolah Ceria (Happy School) activities in Blang Mancung, Ketol. It also trained building workers to assess damaged houses and build earthquake-safe buildings in Jaluk Village (UNOCHA Indonesia, 2013). This comparison highlights the difference in resource availability between the two types CSOs.

As stated above, another important development is the new collaborative work through networks and partnerships between different organisations. The findings from this study show that the one of the forms of collaboration that emerged involved FBOs. FBOs tend to be sectarian and work exclusively. However, the recent phenomenon

50 Pusaka Indonesia was established in 2000 in Medan, North Sumatra. It focuses on children’s issues. See http://pusakaindonesia.or.id/sejarah (accessed 31 May 2016).

51 Lumbung Yusuf Indonesia is an organisation established in 1998 that focuses on humanitarian issues including disaster relief. See http://lumbungyusuf.org (accessed 31 May 2016).
shows a new shift in Indonesian disaster relief, as FBOs are willing to cooperate with those that have different religious and cultural backgrounds (Latief, 2012; Sakai and Fauzia, 2014).

In other countries, collaboration between FBOs and their peers or other secular agencies has become commonplace. One example is in Haiti, following the earthquake in 2010. Coles et al. in their study (2012: 69) found that four types of collaborative works occurred, namely “NGO/FBO relationships with other NGO/FBO, NGO/FBO relationships with local agencies, local agency relationships with NGO/FBO, and other agency partnership”. These collaborations imply that inter-religious and religious-secular partnerships can develop. However, as their study was quantitative in nature, no details of the narrative about the practice of these partnerships are available. In the Indonesian context, one example of collaboration is the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI), a consortium of interfaith networks established in 2008. Some scholars (Latief, 2012; Sakai, 2012; Sakai and Fauzia, 2014; Sakai and Isbah, 2014) have highlighted the importance of HFI as the new interreligious forum. However, details on how HFI operates on the ground, particularly in disaster relief, have not been extensively analysed.

Historically, the HFI was considered as a national chapter of the Humanitarian Forum International (hereafter referred to as International HFI) which is based in London. Established in 2004, the Forum was founded to bridge a gap between Islamic organisations and the “West”, particularly following the 9/11 attacks that put the former under scrutiny. In addition to Indonesia, other chapters are found in Kuwait, Sudan and Yemen (Interview with Surya Rahman Muhammad, Executive Director of HFI, Jakarta, 15 April 2015). HFI was founded by six FBOs namely MDMC, Yayasan Tanggul Bencana Indonesia (Indonesian Disaster Prevention Foundation, YTBI),


YAKKUM Emergency Unit (YEU), Dompet Dhuafa Foundation, Caritas Indonesia (Karina) and WVI, plus one secular CSO namely Perkumpulan Peningkatan Keberdayaan Masyarakat (Community Empowerment Development Association, PPKM). The aim of HFI is to “build an mutual understanding between Humanitarian actors especially NGOs, across differences background, ethnic race, tribe, religion and countries, to campaign norms and humanitarian standard principles throughout dialogs, and developing partnership in any level they were stayed on”.52 The HFI aimed to be inclusive, tolerant and at reducing sectarianism.

Since its inception in 2008, HFI has demonstrated significant development. In terms of its membership, in addition to its seven founding members mentioned above, other FBOs gradually joined the HFI. First, Pos Keadilan Peduli Ummat (Justice Post for Ummah, PKPU) and Church World Service (CWS) Indonesia joined the consortium in 2010 and 2011 respectively. In the following year, Habibat for Humanity was added as a new member. Later in 2013, two organisations namely the DRR Unit of the Union of Churches in Indonesia (Unit PRB PGI) and the Rebana Indonesia Foundation (Baptist church network) joined the HFI. In 2014, Rumah Zakat (Alms House, RZ) started HFI’s membership. Finally, LPBI NU and Baznas Tanggap Bencana (National Zakat Agency for Disaster Response, BTB) have also become new HFI members in 2016. In total, the HFI now consists of fifteen members. All of them are FBOs except the PPKM. There are seven Islamic CSOs, seven Christian CSOs and one secular CSO.

It is important to note that the scope of work of Indonesian HFI is slightly different to that of the international one. As mandated at a global level, the focus of

HFI is on conflict resolution. The organisation was involved in the response to both international and national conflicts. Internationally, the HFI was involved in Myanmar and Palestine and nationally in Lampung and Madura. However, unlike the international HFI, the Indonesian HFI is actively involved in every part of disaster relief in Indonesia.

In regards to ways of operating, the Indonesian HFI secretariat is as a hub. This means that the secretariat team at HFI serves as the coordinating unit for its members. When a disaster strikes and some HFI members come to the affected area for emergency response, the HFI staff will gather information from its members and share it with other members. In short, it provides mapping and guidance to the aid so that overlapping can be avoided. Surya explained how the HFI and its members operate:

“[HFI] is a gathering hub for CSOs. It is up to them to decide the type of assistance. We usually provide guidance so the aid is not overlapping and become field of competition such as what happened in Aceh. We are coordinating so we can work together. The first thing we do is mapping who work where so the potential of overlapping can be avoided. When they have extra assistance but limited human resource they can share such as in the East Java where DD has a lot of rice stock which then was forwarded to the MDMC. In Jogja [Yogyakarta], all assistance from the WVI were handed to MDMC because it was the latter’s area. In terms accountability it will not hide the fact that the aid was from the former” (Interview with Surya Rahman Muhammad, Executive Director of HFI, Jakarta, 15 April 2015).

The case of HFI illustrates how social capital works among its members. As social capital leads to collective action, the benefit is that it avoids conflicts of interest among different groups and encourages collaborative work among HFI members. In
terms of funding, the HFI initially received financial support for two years from its headquarters in London. As the capacity of HFI members was relatively stronger than that of the other three chapters, the funding from London was reduced in 2010 and fully ended in 2012. Currently funding comes from regular incentives of the HFI members. Additionally, the HFI also conducted its own activities to get additional financial resources.

Interestingly, in addition to inter-religious partnerships, such as in the case of HFI, the collaboration between secular and religious CSOs also took place. This collaboration came in the form of a public-private partnership called the Disaster Resource Partnership (DRP). The DRP was considered to be “a new model for coordinated private sector partnership in response to natural disasters” (World Economic Forum, n.d). In fact, this approach has emerged since late 1999 as an alternative to existing policy-making teams that were dominated by government, politicians, disaster response practitioners and academics. The public sector engagement was initially encouraged in the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015 document but it was in 2009 at the World Economic Forum when representatives of leading companies in the Engineering & Construction (E&C) sectors discussed their contribution to natural disaster relief. As a result, a global DRP was established.

The main concept of DRP came basically from the involvement of E&C practitioners following the Gujarat Earthquake in 2001. At that time, the Engineering & Construction Disaster Resource Network (DRN) was established in India. In addition to India, another DRP was eventually established in Mexico and Indonesia (World Economic Forum, 2010). In the Indonesian context, the DRP was announced
in June 2011 by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the President of Indonesia at that time, at the East Asia Summit (The World Economic Forum) in Jakarta (Rembeth, 2015).

In terms of membership, the DRP Indonesia consists of ten E&C companies partnered with government, civil society and the UN. The ten E&C companies are PT. Amec Berca Indonesia, PT. PP (Persero) Tbk., PT. Wijaya Karya (Persero), Tbk., PT. Waskita Karya, PT. Total Bangun Persada, Tbk., PT. Jaya Konstruksi Manggala Pratama, Tbk., PT. Tatamulia Nusantara Indah, PT. Balfour Beatty Sakti Indonesia, Davy Sukamta & Partners and PT. Yodya Karya (Persero). They are considered notable companies the E&C sector in Indonesia. The Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, the Ministry of Health and the BNPB represent the government side. The HFI and the UN represent the civil society and international development agencies respectively.

It is worth noting that DRP Indonesia’s activities are still limited as its involvement is primarily on earthquake engineering (reconstruction). I contend that the networks of HFI (through its members) have contributed significantly in the development of DRP in disaster relief practice. For example, the HFI members have helped DRP in fundraising. They conducted fundraising for the 2013 Gayo earthquake appeal in Pondok Indah Mall, one of the largest shopping centres in Jakarta, Indonesia. In the field, in collaboration between the DD and MDMC, the DRP Indonesia organised training for construction labourers on building earthquake-resistant structures (Victor Rembeth, Program Manager of DRP Indonesia, Interview, 24 April 2015).

Today in Indonesia’s disaster management sector, the HFI members are arguably the main actors. They play an active role in every phase of disaster management, the organisation is a member of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) initiated by the UNOCHA Indonesia. At a regional level, it is a part of Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN). The HFI has also been involved in the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (Planas PRB) which will be explained in the next section.

C. Roles of CSOs in Disaster: Phase of Prevention and Mitigation

FBOs also play a significant role in the phase of disaster prevention and mitigation in Indonesia. In fact, almost all FBOs in Indonesia have a risk reduction element in their activities. One example is the LPBI NU, which belongs to the largest Islamic group, the NU. Since 2006, the organisation has conducted Community-based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) programs across Indonesia. It was been supported by several donors including Australia and the UN. Additionally, as the NU has a national-wide network of Islamic education (pesantren) and religious leaders (kyai), the organisation used its networks to raise awareness on DRR issues. The LPBI NU also published some materials, such as Community-based Disaster Risk Management from the Islamic Perspective, Building Community Resilience in Disaster Management and Islamic Solution to Climate Changes and its impact.54 All of these publications were aimed at shifting the paradigm of religious fatalism among its adherents (Muhammad Ali Yusuf, Head of LPBI NU, Interview, Jakarta, 17 April 2015).

Likewise, the MDMC that belongs to the second largest Islamic organisation, the Muhammadiyah, has also launched a similar DRR program. The organisation works at Muhammadiyah-affiliated elementary schools and youth organisations. It was expected that both entities could be “agent[s] of development in building the safety culture among their communities” (Mulyasari and Shaw, 2012).

The phase of disaster prevention and mitigation is widely known as risk reduction. The HFA 2005-2015 highlights that this aspect is the main responsibility of the government but also should be supported by other sectors. As a disaster affects communities directly, CSOs can be “potential catalysts for triggering the DRR activities” (Mulyasari and Shaw, 2012). This is not only because CSOs have relatively better access to the grass root level but also due to their strong impact within the society. This is particularly the case for FBOs because of their charismatic leaders and influence.

Identical to the phase of emergency response illustrated above, some new collaborative works also occurred in this disaster prevention and mitigation phase. Inter-religious partnerships can be observed in the case of HFI. It has a collaborative program in Grogol village, Jakarta called Kampung HFI (Village of HFI). The village was chosen because it was considered to be a good example of diversity and tolerance. The villagers who live in Grogol are heterogonous as they are from different ethnic groups and there are Muslims and Christians in the village (Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, 2016).

55 The HFA much more focused on preparedness and mitigation efforts. Since 2015 with the Sendai Framework, disaster recovery activities have been included more comprehensively into DRR aspect.
The involvement of HFI members in Grogol was based on their specific specialisation. For instance, the Habitat for Humanity helped in construction, the WVI and MDMC in child program, and DD in economic development. By working on each expertise, the Grogol project is expected to be sustainable. One example of the activities undertaken by the Kampug HFI was an emergency drill on 16 January, 2016 in which 138 village representatives participated. According to Surya of HFI:

“We are working together...(using) mosque and church approach. This is not a project so it is not limited. [It is] like an assisted village (desa binaan)” (Surya Rahman Muhammad, Executive Director of HFI, 2015, Interview, 15 April).

Another form of partnership is inter-organisational as in the case of Platform Nasional Pengurangan Resiko Bencana (National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, Planas PRB). According to the Planas PRB website, its members are government institutions and ministries, CSOs, the Indonesian Red Cross, private sectors, universities and media.56 In general, the Planas PRB is a multi-stakeholder coordination forum that focuses on disaster risk reduction in Indonesia. The forum was established in 2009 as a mandate of the World Disaster Conference and HFA in 2005. According to the HFA, the mandate was to “support the creation and strengthening of national integrated disaster risk reduction mechanisms, such as multi sectoral national platforms, with designated responsibilities at the national through to the local level to facilitate coordination across sectors.” (UNISDR, 2005).

Similar to the emergency relief phase, I also contend that HFI members have actively participated in these collaborative works. Using their extensive networks, HFI has played a significant role in Planas PRB activities. For instance, on 11 December 2014 a Planas PRB’s national gathering was held in the office of the LPBI NU. Along with CSOs activists, the Planas PRB advocates for the amendment of the Disaster Management Law 24/2007. This effort has been supported by CSOs, including all of the HFI members. Likewise, the Planas PRB also supported several HFI activities. For example, on 10-11 March 2016, the members of HFI met in the LPBI NU office to develop “joint protocol for humanitarian agencies”. Aimed at providing a mechanism for building better coordination and filling the gap in emergency responses, this protocol will become a reference for the HFI members (Rizqa, 2016).

Furthermore, while the Planas PRB has national scope, the platform was supposed to be at the regional and local level. As of 2013, there were already sixteen and seventeen platforms in the provincial and local (district/municipality) areas respectively. These platforms focus primarily on advocacy and policy implementation. Additionally, thirteen thematic platforms were established based on specific needs. The Higher Education Forum for DRR (Forum Perguruan Tinggi untuk PRB) and the Teacher Forum for DRR (Forum Guru PRB Kabupaten Simeulue) are some examples of thematic platforms. The Jangkar Kelud, a community based initiative that was established in 2008 following the Mt. Kelud eruption in 2007, is an example of a thematic platform.\footnote{The name of Jangkar Kelud has the philosophy that the community can live in harmony with the nature.}
D. Roles of CSOs in Disaster: Phase of Recovery

While all phases of disaster management are equally important, the findings from the fieldwork suggest that not all CSOs are able to extend their support from the emergency to recovery phase. The main reason is the lack of financial resources. Drawing from this study on the post-Gayo and Mt. Kelud disasters, the findings demonstrated that only a few CSOs are involved in the recovery phase, which I will discuss further in Chapter Six. Therefore, it is fair to say that the role of CSOs in disaster recovery is still under-researched.

Additionally, future collaboration or formation of partnerships between agencies during disaster recovery is recommended. It is not only because “the more the merrier”, but also if all recovery assistance can be integrated and coordinated, the greater impact for the affected society can be seen. To my knowledge, the Indonesian government does not have any policy yet on collaborative works for disaster recovery. Indonesia can learn from other countries that have framework for collaborative disaster governance for disaster recovery. For instance, Australia has developed National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NOAG) to emphasise the collective responsibility for building resilience. In NOAG, roles of each stakeholder (government, community, CSOs, business) are clearly defined. Likewise, the USA has the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF). It may take time but we need to consider the importance of collaborative work. By that then we can probably sure that the resilience is strengthened.

58 For NOAG document see Council of Australian Governments (2011).
IV. Conclusion

This chapter analysed the emergence of civil society groups in Indonesia and especially their contribution to disaster management in that country. From an historical perspective, CSOs have existed in Indonesia since before the state’s independence in 1945. Since then, CSOs have evolved and emerged based on specific socio-economic and political contexts. Disaster relief has become major work for CSOs. In Indonesia, this was so only after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This extreme event has contributed to the improvement of disaster management policies and practice in Indonesia, including the increased organisational capacity of CSOs.

This chapter has answered three specific research questions stated in the beginning. I argue that CSOs particularly HFI members, are among the important actors that have played major roles in all phases of the disaster management cycle. CSOs have been able to expand their networks through their active involvement in several forms of collaborative works mentioned above. These collaboration are relatively good but limited, and their collaboration did not take place or endure in the recovery phase. In the next two chapters (Four and Five), I will present the case study of the roles of CSOs in the disaster recovery phase of the 2013 Gayo and 2014 Mt. Kelud eruptions. These two chapters are important to understanding the involvement of CSOs in the recovery phase, and I will especially analyse the extent to which they have played a critical role in helping affected communities to recover faster through social capital formation.
Chapter Four

Social Capital that Relates, Bridges, Bonds and Links: The Case Study of Economic Recovery after the 2013 Gayo Earthquake

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter (Chapter Three) I discussed the general background of CSOs in Indonesia and their involvement in all phases of disaster management. Overall, CSOs have been playing a role in the practice of disaster management in Indonesia since the colonial period. Following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, their significant contribution has been more widely recognised. As a type of CSO, FBOs have predominantly represented civil society groups. However, of the four phases of disaster management, the recovery period is where CSOs have contributed the least. In this chapter, I provide a case study of economic disaster recovery assistance provided by CSOs in communities in the aftermath of the 2013 Gayo earthquake. The findings of this study suggest that among many CSOs that involved in the earlier phases of emergency relief in Gayo, only one CSO remains in the field, namely Pertanian Sehat Indonesia – Dompet Dhuafa (Health Agriculture Indonesia of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation, PSI-DD).

This chapter attempts to answer the following general research question, introduced in Chapter One: in what ways are external CSOs able to create positive social capital or possibly weaken the social capital in the affected society? In this chapter, I examine the role of PSI-DD in social capital formation while delivering economic recovery assistance in Jaluk village of the Central Aceh District, following the Gayo earthquake in 2013. The aim of this chapter is to highlight an example of one
FBO that was able to strengthen social capital and produce positive consequences from their social capital formation. As a result, I argue that the inhabitants of Jaluk village recovered faster than other villages in the surrounding region.

This chapter will begin with a description of the background on the case study location. This includes a brief description on the Gayo highlands, disaster impact and an introduction to the Jaluk village as a fieldwork site. Then I will introduce the Dompet Dhuafa Foundation and its special unit, the PSI-DD. The latter had provided economic recovery assistance in Jaluk village.

After that I will discuss the findings from the fieldwork where PSI-DD (which is based in Bogor, West Java), as an external CSO, had provided an economic recovery program that strengthened the existing social capital and generated new social capital in Jaluk village. Using the framework of the cultural contexts of social capital (James and Paton, 2015) and the importance of a village facilitator (Lockhart, 2005) I contend that the PSI-DD has been capable of generating stocks of social capital derived from the indigenous Gayonese cultural and religious traditions in the society. By developing four types of social capital, namely relational, bonding, bridging and linking, as discussed in Chapter Two. I argue that an external CSO, i.e. PSI-DD, has helped the Jaluk villagers to experience faster recovery and stronger resilience. This recovery, I argue, is multi-dimensional, not only economic but also social and cultural recovery.

II. Background on the Case Study Area

A. The Gayo Highlands: An Introduction

Let me introduce the setting of my fieldwork site. Geographically, the Gayo highlands is situated within the Bukit Barisan (Mountains Range) which stretches from the south
to the north of Sumatra island. The Gayo highlands are divided into four plateaus: the Lake Tawar district, the Isak river valley, Gayo Lues and Serbojadi (Bowen, 1984). Using current territorial administration, the following districts of Central Aceh, Bener Meriah, Gayo Lues, and East Aceh (especially Serbojadi Subdistrict) are the Gayo highlands. The majority of the population are Islamic, as Aceh Province is made up predominantly of Muslims.60

The term Gayo refers to an ethnic group who predominantly dwell in the region as well as referring to the language spoken in the area (Bowen, 1984; Wiradnyana and Setiawan, 2011). It was believed that the Gayo people (Gayonese) have a strong connection with the ethnic Karo Batak of North Sumatra who were brought by the Dutch and then assimilated with the locals. Other ethnic groups that populate the Gayo highlands are Javanese, Acehnese, and Chinese (Schröter, 2010).

The total population of the Central Aceh District is 200,412 people or 50,314 households (BPS Central Aceh Regency, 2017). The majority of these people make a living out of agriculture (i.e. rice, vegetable, fruits and coffee) and livestock (Bowen, 1984; BPS Central Aceh Regency, 2017). The highlands are located in the range of 800 to 12,000 meters above sea level, which makes the region famous for Arabica coffee cultivation.

Coffee was first planted in this area in the colonial period. Since then, Gayo coffee has become a very popular product. Currently, Gayo coffee is exported to Western markets such as the US, Canada, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands (Antara News, 2014). However, like any other coffee brand trading in other parts of

60 For more on the history and dynamics of Gayo see for example, Bowen (1984, 1988, 1993), Hugronje (1996).
Indonesia, the export market has been dominated by large multinational companies. Farmers are in an asymmetric supply chain (Neilson, 2008, 2014). This situation has been worsening because of a lack of access to capacity building that could expand their knowledge of agriculture and provide higher levels of education. Most of the coffee farmers (such as those in Jaluk village, my fieldwork site) have low levels of education (secondary education). Understanding this socio-economic condition gives us an understanding of the background of PSI-DD that provided economic recovery assistance through coffee farmers’ empowerment. One of the visible impacts of PSI-DD’s involvement with the coffee farmers in Jaluk was that they have expanded their networks with government agencies, institutions and markets. This particular aspect will be discussed further in the section on linking social capital.

![Image of coffee farm in Jaluk, Gayo highlands](image.jpg)

Figure 4.1. One of Arabica coffee farms in Jaluk, Gayo highlands. Image by author.

**B. Gayo Highlands as a Conflict-Affected Area**

It is important to mention that the Gayo population has been suffering from a long civil conflict. Violent conflict within a state will harm its social capital. It will weaken mutual trust and demolish collective norms and values in the society which eventually
leads to community polarisation. This is the case in conflict-affected areas where one side tends to be suspicious of others and it is difficult to trust other people. Thus, the level of social capital in Gayo is relatively low. Colletta and Cullen (2000: 3–4) have observed this in their studies on post-conflict societies in Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia. They say:

“Violent conflict within a state weakens its social fabric. It divides the population by undermining interpersonal and communal trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good, and increasing the likelihood of communal strife. This damage to a nation's social capital the norms, values, and social relations that bond communities together, as well as the bridges between communal groups (civil society) and the state impedes the ability of either communal groups or the state to recover after hostilities cease. Even if other forms of capital are replenished, economic and social development will be hindered unless social capital stocks are restored.” (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 3–4).

Between 1979 and 2005, armed conflicts occurred in Aceh when Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, GAM) wanted independence from Indonesia. These conflicts affected the whole of Aceh, including the Gayo highlands. The conflict in the Gayo region was more complicated than in many other parts of Aceh. Unlike in Aceh where the civil war was between the Acehnese fighters and the Indonesian army, the conflict in Gayo has created tension between the local population (mainly Acehnese and Gayonese) and the Javanese who are more recent migrants. The Javanese wanted
to be a part of Indonesia, in opposition to the mission of GAM. They became members of Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of Homeland, PETA), an organisation established by the Indonesian military to counter the influence of GAM in the Gayo highlands.\(^{61}\)

The tension between the Javanese and the rest was a result of a pre-existing conflict. The transmigration program initiated during the New Order period has provided many benefits for the Javanese.\(^{62}\) They received land, housing and money which eventually caused jealousy from local inhabitants that had been settled in the area longer (Schröter, 2010). In short, the prolonged conflict has damaged the economy, human, physical and social capital.

Even though the conflict was ended through a peace agreement signed in Helsinki in 2005 and ten years have passed since then, the Aceh Province in general and the Gayo Highlands in particular, has still not fully recovered. During my fieldwork research, I still heard narratives of negative memories and about trauma resulting from the conflict. Many of the villagers talked about their lost family members, burnt houses, abandoned coffee farms, and forced-migration to other safer villages. Therefore, I argue that the stock of social capital in the Gayo highlands was relatively low. External CSOs need to be more sensitive and aware while delivering their assistance, including when this community is struck by disaster which makes their life even worse.

\(^{61}\) For detailed discussion on the Aceh civil conflict see Aspinall (2009); Drexler (2008); Reid (2006).

\(^{62}\) Historically, the transmigration program, or resettlement of Javanese to other parts of Indonesia started first by the Dutch in 1905. It became more widespread under Suharto era. While transmigration brings benefits to some extent, scholars demonstrated that it has huge negative impacts for the society and environment. For more see e.g. Fearnside (1997) and Hardjono (1988).
C. The 2013 Gayo Earthquake and its Impact

Like any other part of Indonesia, the Gayo highlands are generally exposed to natural disasters. The region is geologically situated on the Sumatra Fault Zone that makes the region vulnerable to hazards like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and landslides (Rusydy, 2013). On Tuesday 2 July, 2013 at 14.37 Indonesian Western Time, a 6.2 magnitude earthquake occurred in Aceh Province of Sumatra Island in the western part of Indonesia. The epicentre was situated at the border of the Ketol Subdistrict of Central Aceh District and Timang Gajah Subdistrict of Bener Meriah District.

The earthquake resulted in 34 deaths, 92 people suffered major injuries, 352 people received minor injuries and a total of 48,563 people were displaced in Central Aceh alone. In the neighbouring district of Bener Meriah, the earthquake caused eight deaths, 52 people had major injuries and 62 individuals suffered minor injuries and 4,776 people were displaced as a result of the earthquake. In terms of infrastructure, about 20,400 buildings including houses, community facilities, health centres and schools were reportedly damaged (BNPB, 2013).

Based on damage and loss assessments conducted by the Indonesian government, the impact of the earthquake was massive and it caused a total financial loss of IDR 1,419 trillion (AUD 142 million). The proportion of damage was as follows: housing (47.87%), social (26.85%), public infrastructure (16.18%), cross-sector (5.34%) and productive economy (3.77%) (BNPB, 2013: iii–iv).63

63 The Indonesian disaster management agency (BNPB) developed five criteria of losses in the damage assessment framework. These criterias are housing (human resettlement), infrastructure (e.g. transportation, water and sanitation, energy and agricultural infrastructure), social (e.g. health, education, religion), economy (e.g. agriculture, small and medium industry, market and tourism), and cross sectoral (e.g. government, environment, and security). See BNPB (2013, 2014).
D. Fieldwork Site: Jaluk village of Ketol Subdistrict, Central Aceh

I mentioned in the Methodology section of Chapter One that I chose the fieldwork sites based on the type and timing of the disasters. This led me to select the 2013 Gayo earthquake and 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption in East Java. For the case of Gayo, I found that only one CSO (PSI-DD) was implementing its economic recovery program in Jaluk village. With this finding, in August 2015, I went to Jaluk village for my ethnographic fieldwork and I stayed there for two weeks.

Map 4.1: Location of Jaluk village (starred). The bordered area is Central Aceh District. Modified by author using Google Maps

Jaluk village is located within the Ketol Subdistrict, Central Aceh District (Map 4.1.). Ketol was one of the most heavily affected regions due to its proximity to the earthquake’s epicentre.64 Jaluk village was settled in 1940. At that time, there were only three houses and it was under the administration of the neighbouring village,

64 The epicentre of the earthquake was at Timang Gajah Subdistrict of Bener Meriah District, a neighbouring region to Ketol.
Wihni Durin. Currently, Jaluk village is one of 25 villages situated in Ketol Subdistrict, Central Aceh. Situated around 30 kilometres from Takengon, the capital city of Central Aceh District, Jaluk village is quite isolated. The road infrastructure is poor, and many spots are vulnerable to rockslides.

Jaluk village is inhabited by 195 households, it consists of 386 men and 371 women, all of them are Muslims. Most of the population is Gayonese with a small percentage of Javanese and Acehnese. All of the villagers are Muslims. As with the majority of Gayonese, the majority of villagers in Jaluk work in coffee production either as farmers or as farm workers. Only half the population of Jaluk village has completed secondary education. The village covers 50,472 hectares, half of that area is made up of coffee farms. Jaluk is divided into two dusun (hamlets/sub-villages) called Dusun Atas (the upper hamlet) and Dusuh Bawah (the lower hamlet) (Tim Penyusun RPMJK, 2010).

In relation to natural disasters, some elders in the village have experienced three earthquakes including those in 1966, the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and the recent 2013 earthquake. The last earthquake destroyed the village mosque and community houses. In total, there were 26 houses severely damaged, 40 houses with medium damage and 38 houses sustained minor damage.

In response to the most recent earthquake, the Aceh Governor, Zaini Abdullah, announced that the two weeks period from 3 to 16 July, 2013 was an emergency response phase. After that, the short-term recovery period lasted for 25 days (17 to 10 August, 2013) (Gunawan, 2013). On 30 August 2013, the Action Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in the Central Aceh and Bener Meriah Districts Year 2013-2014 was signed by Syamsul Maarif as the Head of BNPB. The Action Plan highlights the government’s plan for recovery programs within the affected areas.
However, the budgetary process in Indonesia is complex. Two of the major complexities are; firstly, the annual fiscal period starts in January and goes through to December. If a new budget allocation is needed in the middle of fiscal year, its realisation can be postponed to the following year. Secondly, Indonesia adopted a decentralised approach after the fall of Suharto, as stated earlier in Chapter Three. The process of budgeting takes a long time, involves wide public participation and a multi-level consultancy process (the local, regional to national) aimed at achieving mutual agreement. It took months for a budget proposal to gain approval at the national level. As a result, there was a delay in the implementation of the recovery program provided by the government. A more detailed discussion on the roles of government will be presented in Chapter Six.

During the emergency response, there was relatively good coordination between government and other actors. In my interviews with many CSOs’ representatives (e.g. DD Foundation, Muhammadiyah and Indonesian Red Cross), they admitted that the coordination was good. It was probably due to lessons the government learnt from the experience of Aceh after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The coordination was also well-documented. A document from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Indonesia shows that there was a coordination meeting to allocate tasks that was initiated by the BNPB and UNOCHA on 15 July, 2013. The meeting was attended by 84 people representing forty (local, national, and international) organisations or institutions (UNOCHA Indonesia, 2013).
III. Introduction to Case-Studied FBO

A. Dompet Dhuafa Foundation

PSI-DD is part of the Dompet Dhuafa (DD) Foundation. Before presenting PSI-DD, let me briefly introduce the DD. The DD was established in April 1993, three months after the established Republika, which has grown to become the largest Islamic daily in Indonesia. To promote this newly establishment agency, its Editor-in-chief, Parni Hadi, organised an event in Yogyakarta. When the promotional event finished, Parni Hadi and his colleagues were invited to have lunch together with preachers from Corps Dakwah Pedesaan (Rural Propagation Corps). During the conversation, Parni was surprised to realise that these preachers only received IDR 6,000 (AUD 0.6) as their monthly incentive. The amount was very low in comparison to the cost of living. Parni promised that he would do something in response to this issue. From that moment, Parni Hadi and his colleague started gathering alms from the readers of Republika. In 1994, the DD Foundation was officially established.

The DD Foundation is arguably the largest philanthropic organisation in Indonesia, in terms of resources. In 2015, the organisation was able to gather donations equivalent to more than AUD 20 million. It has 200 employees and 10,000 volunteers dispersed in more than fifty alms collection counters in Jakarta alone. It has 12 offices across Indonesia and five overseas chapters. 13 million beneficiaries have been

65 CDP is a local CSO based in Yogyakarta with a focus on Islamic preaching and community empowerment, similar to what DD has been doing. See http://cdpjogja.blogspot.com.au/p/tentang-cdp.html (accessed 21 July 2016).
66 For a full history for the birth of DD see https://www.dompetdhuafa.org/about (accessed 21 July 2016).
reached by DD through its 522 programs. In 2016, the DD received the Ramon Magsaysay Award, the most prestigious award in Asia, which is equivalent to the Nobel Peace Prize (Associated Press, 2016).

Since its establishment, the organisation has been innovative in providing social welfare to poor people. In general, the DD’s social welfare programs are divided into four areas; education (e.g. scholarships and free education), health (free health services), social development (e.g. disaster management, volunteers’ recruitment and support for labours), and economic empowerment (e.g. small business start-up, agriculture and livestock). My focus in this study is the economic empowerment area. Special units based on their expertise run the economic programs. For example, BMT Centre (Baitul Maal wat Tamwil/Islamic saving and loan cooperative) implemented an Islamic microfinance program, Kampoeng Ternak Nusantara (Archipelago Livestock Village, KTN-DD) focuses on helping livestock farmers (which will be discussed further in Chapter Five), and Pertanian Sehat Indonesia (Indonesian Healthy Agriculture, PSI-DD) works on helping farmers.

It is important to mention that the way DD involved in disaster management is quite different from other CSOs involved in disaster management. Organisations like LPBI NU and MDMC, for instance, are special units established within the NU and Muhammadiyah respectively to implement activities in all phases of disaster management. Other organisations, like the WVI and Karina, also work in four disaster phases. For DD, the phases of emergency, mitigation and preparedness are the

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69 For some scholarly works on DD see, for example Latief (2012), Sakai (2012), and Sakai and Fauzia (2014). None of these studies examines the role of DD in disaster recovery. The last two studies above discuss DD’s role in the emergency phase of disaster relief.
responsibility of DMC-DD. Sometimes DMC-DD asks other units, such as the DD health unit, to provide emergency assistance related to health services. Economic recovery is the responsibility of units under the economic empowerment division mentioned above. The results of livelihood assessments conducted by the DMC-DD during the emergency phase determine who will take responsibility for a recovery program. In disaster-affected communities where livestock breeders are affected, the KTN-DD will take responsibility for providing the recovery program, such as the case of Mt. Kelud in Chapter Five. If the survivors of disasters are farmers like the Gayonese, its responsibility is given to the PSI-DD.

B. Health Agriculture Indonesia of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (PSI-DD)

The participation of PSI-DD, especially in disaster recovery in Indonesia, is relatively new and small. The organisation has provided economic recovery to victims of the 2010 Merapi eruption and the 2013 Gayo earthquake. The development of PSI-DD can be traced back to 1999. Six years after the establishment of Dompet Dhuafa, in June 1999, the Laboratorium Biologi (Biology Laboratory) was established in Bogor. It was expected that the organisation would be able to contribute to the development of the agricultural sector in special and unique way. It is worth noting that while agriculture was a central focus of development during the Suharto era, the majority of

70 The DMC-DD is based at Tangerang, close to its headquarters. Its address is Jl. Pahlawan No.34 Rempoa Ciputat Tangerang Selatan (http://dmcdd.net/kontak, accessed 18 July 2016).

71 DD provides social services including economic empowerment in disaster and non-disaster areas. Disasters are only one focus of DD. For some community empowerment programs in economic sector see https://www.masyarakatmandiri.co.id/pemberdayaan-3/ (accessed 21 July 2016).

farmers lived under the poverty line. In addition, the agricultural sector was dominated by state-owned company called PT Perkebunan Nusantara (National Farming Company, PTPN) and large-scale private plantation corporations. Thus, the aim of the Laboratorium Biologi was to research and develop agricultural inventions to help disadvantaged farmers in Indonesia. The first product produced was a virus to control plant pests named Vir-X and Vir-L. Within three years, the Biology Laboratory introduced several environmentally-friendly agricultural products such as organic fertiliser and vegetable based pesticides.

In 2002, the Biology Laboratory became Usaha Pertanian Sehat (Healthy Agriculture Enterprise, UPS) with an extended focus on marketing products originated from the research. Then in 2003, in addition to UPS, which under the management of Jejaring Aset Reform (Reform Asset Network of DD), the Lembaga Pertanian Sehat (Healthy Agriculture Institution, LPS) was established and managed by Jejaring Aset Sosial DD (Social Asset Network of DD). In 2004, both divisions were merged into LPS with an extensive range of activities including research, marketing organic agricultural products, and empowering farmers.

Finally, in early 2012, the LPS developed into an independent network of DD with the establishment of PSI-DD as Perseroan Terbatas (Limited Corporate, PT). This was considered crucial because the PSI-DD had to become more professional. Despite its different names and managerial responsibilities, the focus of the organisation was still the same, supporting marginalised farmers. Furthermore, the PSI-DD developed its motto PETANI KUAT (literally means solid farmer), abbreviated from Profesional, Empati, Transparan, Akuntabel, Networking, Independen, Kerjasama, Unggul, Amanah dan Tangguh (Professional, Empathy, Transparent, Accountable,
Networking, Independent, Teamwork, Excellence, Reliability, and Strong). For PSI-DD, the economic empowerment of the agricultural sector not only targets farmers as objects but also as subjects of the program. In other words, the program provided by the PSI-DD directly involves the farmers in a variety of the services it delivered.

There are five PSI-DD programs. These are seed banks, independent clusters, village barn, economic recovery, and healthy farmer empowerment. These programs can run simultaneously or separately based on the context of society. The PSI-DD programs can also be categorised into on-farm (related to farming and harvesting) and off-farm (capacity building and marketing). In the context of Jaluk village, the PSI-DD implemented economic recovery and healthy farmer empowerment that consists of four core activities:

1. Building human resource (farmer) capacity
2. Introducing organic and environmental-friendly agriculture techniques
3. Developing and strengthening institutional farmers
4. Supporting farmers with financial capital

Through these four activities, it is expected that the farmers will have increased income and strengthened social interactions among farmers and with other stakeholders. To implement this empowerment program, the PSI-DD employs a clustering approach. Each cluster has specific agricultural products. At present, the organisation has twelve clusters, namely Banyuasin (South Sumatra), Bogor, Cianjur, Subang (West Java), Serang, Lebak (Banten), Brebes, Blora, Tegal (Central Java), Kulon Progo (Yogyakarta), Bantaeng (South Sulawesi) and Jaluk (Aceh).

In Chapter Two (Section V) I explained the characteristics of FBOs that differentiate them from other types of (secular) CSOs. Understanding this differentiation helps explain why FBOs like DD Foundation emerge and grow rapidly in Indonesia. Using Sider and Unruh’s (2004) categorisation of FBOs, which classifies them into six categories: faith-permeated, faith-centered, faith-affiliated, faith-background, faith-secular partnership, secular, I argue that most programs of DD can be categorised as “faith-background”. The “faith-background”, as Sider and Unruh (2004: 120) maintain, describes the situation where an FBO performs secular activities but they are historically tied to a specific religious teaching. We can label programs like education, health, economic and social development as being secular in nature, in the sense that they do not contain any religious message. However, in fact DD’s programs are based on the specific teachings of Islam. This brings us back to our theoretical discussion on the nature of FBOs.

The PSI-DD’s agriculture program, for instance, is a “faith-background” program based on the following reason. According to PSI, historically, farming was practiced by the Islamic prophet Muhammad when he and his companions migrated from the city of Mecca to Madinah due to pressure from the locals who rejected Islam in 622 C.E. The migration, called *hijrah*, was a most remarkable event in Islamic history and is considered to have established the Islamic calendar.\(^74\) The migrants, called *Muhajirun*, were financially weak were accepted by the local Muslims called *Anshar* (literally means helpers). The Prophet Muhammad declared brotherhood between *Muhajirun* and *Anshar* because the latter shared their food, house and land. The *Anshar* were farmers and they helped their *Muhajirun* brothers either by having

\(^74\) For more on *hijrah* see Newby (2004: 81).
them as partners in farming or giving half of their land to them. As the migration’s aim was to achieve a better life, the Islamic civilisation was seen to have begun in the Madinah city. After constructing a mosque, the Prophet developed Islamic civilisation through knowledge, war strategies and people’s welfare that started from the food they consumed. When the prophet saw much empty space in the city of Madinah, he suggested to his companions that they should start planting dates.

Furthermore, the PSI-DD agriculture program was theologically based on the hadith (saying) of the Prophet: “If the Hour (Day of Resurrection) starts to happen and in the hand of one of you is a palm shoot or seedling; then if he’s able to plant it before the Hour happens, and then let him plant it”. PSI-DD also argues that farming is also a form of gratitude (syukur) to the Creator and a way gather good fortune (rezeki) which also derives from Islamic teaching. This particular aspect was quoted from the Chapter of Abasa verses 27-32 of Al-Quran (The holy book for Muslims): “Then We caused to grow therein grain. And grapes and green fodder. And the olive and the date palm. And thick gardens. And fruits and grasses. For your benefit and for your cattle”.

The story above can be found in the website of PSI-DD. If we want to examine it further, the story demonstrates the efforts towards social capital formation between the muhajirun and anshar. I argue that PSI-DD (and DD-Foundation in general) is integrating this aspect of social capital formation into their program. It is a part of religious teaching.

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75 This story can be found on PSI-DD’s website: https://pertaniansehat.com/read/2013/08/16/ketika-rasul-dan-sahabat-bertani.html (accessed 25 July 2016).
IV. Findings from the Ground: Social Capital that Relates, Bonds, Bridges and Links

In this chapter, I will discuss the ability of PSI-DD, as an external CSO, to develop social capital either by using existing forms of social capital or by generating new ones. In Chapter Two I noted that social capital is a broad concept. Some types of social capital are bonding, bridging, linking, relational, cognitive and structural (James and Paton, 2015: 209). In the context of Gayo, I argue that PSI-DD has been able to strengthen the existing bonding social capital, and further developed new relational, bridging and linking social capital. In the context of Gayonese society, the findings of this study demonstrate that the cultural context of social capital can be observed in the forms of kinship networks, cultural religious traditions, religious places (mosque). These forms are considered as bonding social capital. The role of the facilitator appointed by PSI-DD, who lived in the village, was to be a liaison between the external organisation and the villagers. This facilitator has been playing a pivotal role in producing relational, bridging and linking social capital, as I will show in the next section.

I concur with the views of James and Paton (2015: 209) who argue that social capital is a Western construct and that we need to explore “theoretical equivalence in culturally diverse contexts and providing a cross-cultural evidence base to support the more widespread application of the concepts of social capital and resilience”. In other words, both scholars believe that social capital formation depends on the cultural context of a specific region.
A. Building Relational Social Capital

I contend that PSI-DD as an external CSO had made some efforts to gain the trust of the Jaluk villagers. The process of building social relationships between PSI-DD and Jaluk villagers can be seen as the formation of relational social capital. It is defined as “trust and trustworthiness characteristic of social relationships between community members and between community members and civic agencies” (James and Paton, 2015: 209).

The findings of this study suggest that the process of building relational social capital took place in many ways. During the emergency period, DMC-DD helped villagers to trust the PSI-DD through the former’s emergency relief programs. DMC-DD was among the first to arrive in Gayo following the disaster. It arrived at Jaluk village on the second day after the disaster. Mulyadi, a young person originally from Jaluk self-initiated a post (posko) in the village. Based on his experience studying in Banda Aceh, he learnt about organisational management and fundraising. He told the head of the village that a posko is important for information dissemination, at least if the local government visits the village. Mulyadi took pictures of all the houses in the village and assessed the damage and injuries by himself. He thought that if the government and other organisations came to Jaluk village, he would be ready with the basic information. Many people came and provided emergency response in Jaluk village but it was DMC-DD that came first. At that time, the organisation’s representative was Mr Hendra, the Head of Free Health Service (Layanan Kesehatan Cuma-Cuma, LKC), one of DD’s units in health sector. Hendra was based in Banda  

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76 Media reveals that the response from the government was slow. Many victims did not receive emergency support after few days of disaster. See Lintas Gayo (2013).
77 Mulyadi graduated from Syiah Kuala University, the largest and most prominent university in Aceh.
Aceh, which emphasises its nature as an external entity. After receiving data from Mulyadi, Mr Hendra asked if he could stay in the village and provide emergency services. When DD wanted to build a temporary health clinic, Mulyadi told the DD representatives that they were welcome to stay in his uncle house that was slightly damaged but considered safe. Mulyadi’s uncle, Cek Gia, moved to Takengon to run his coffee trading business so his house in Jaluk was unoccupied. Since then, the house has hosted DD’s secretariat.

In Jaluk village, the emergency response activities were provided by DMC-DD. Some of the activities carried out were Search and Rescue (SAR), health service provision, trauma healing services, sanitation services, public kitchens, building a temporary mosque, and training on how to build earthquake-safe buildings. During my fieldwork, I received positive feedback on the emergency relief programs run by the DMC-DD.78

The second effort of building relational social capital was made directly by the PSI-DD representative through direct social interaction. While running the emergency response activities, DMC-DD conducted a feasibility study for a recovery project in Ketol Subdistrict. A year after that, Mulyadi was contacted by one DMC-DD staff to inform that PSI-DD planned to provide economic recovery assistance in Jaluk village. Mulyadi was further told that the PSI-DD team would come to visit Jaluk in November 2014 to socialise and launch this program (Interview with Mulyadi, Jaluk, 11 August 2015).

78 The DD Foundation in general has a long history of working experience in Aceh. During the prolonged conflict, in August 1999 and January 2000 DD Foundation managed thousands of refugees across Aceh. The DD Foundation was also involved in Aceh following the Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake in December 2004, see for example Saabah et al. (2006).
In November 2014, the PSI-DD representatives, Casdimin, Adi Nurhidayat and newly recruited village facilitator, Nopen, came to Jaluk village. Mulyadi, in coordination with other village leaders, gathered the villagers in the mosque. The meeting was conducted in the evening and attended by most villagers. The PSI-DD representatives explained to the villagers that the organisation would run an economic recovery project in Jaluk for two years, focusing on empowering coffee farmers. They said that all villagers except civil servants and relatively rich people (large coffee traders) were eligible to be involved in the program. The project was to provide economic recovery assistance to a group of 100 coffee farmers. The group was further divided into ten clusters, with one leader for each cluster. Each farmer would be given IDR 2,800,000 (AUD 280), at a total cost of 280 million (AUD 28,000). A management group (led by Nopen and Mulyadi) was established to control the money and use it for income generation, which meant it would be mainly spent on coffee trading during harvest seasons.

It is worth noting that the process of building trust at that stage was not fully successful. PSI-DD has gained the support of many villagers, mainly Mulyadi and the village leaders, but not all villagers were supportive. Some challenges faced by the PSI-DD representative (Nopen) and Mulyadi indicate the low level of social trust. Firstly, there was a rumour that the economic program would only be given to the group leaders. The second challenge was the nature of aid that was given in the aftermath of the disaster in Gayo, which focused on cash transfers from the state

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79 Nopen is his nickname, his real name is Novrizal. It is common in Indonesia to call someone with nickname or a shorter name.
government. This program was considered complete once a specific amount of money was disbursed to the beneficiaries. The DD economic recovery program, which was planned to last for 2 years, was a relatively new experience for the villagers. Mulyadi and Nopen were approached by some villagers to distribute the allocated IDR 280 million in cash. Some of them promised to give a small percentage of the money to Nopen and Mulyadi if they were willing to compromise. This offer, however, was rejected by both Nopen and Mulyadi.

As the level of trust from the villagers was low in the initial stages of PSI-DD’s economic recovery program, this evidence suggests that building social capital is not a quick process. PSI-DD was aware of this and the institution attempted to develop other types of social capital formation.

**B. Program Facilitator as a Bridge for Social Capital Formation**

In his research on the process of social capital formation in educational programs, Lockhart (2005, pp. 51-53) demonstrates the ability of an FBO’s staff members or volunteers to create social ties with the program recipients. The process of social capital formation normally occurs either through formal consultation or informal discussions during the breaks in classes. The positive attitude of the FBO’s representatives further developed social capital as a result of the program’s implementation.

In my research, I observed a similar supportive attitude from Nopen, the village facilitator hired by PSI-DD to live in the village for two years. Given the low level of

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80 The government provided periodic cash transfer assistance to victims of a disaster (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six).
trust from the community members at the initial stages, I argue that Nopen's role contributed significantly in strengthening all types of social capital in the village. How was Nopen able to successfully gain the villagers trust and their support for his programs which eventually contributed to strengthening relational social capital between the villagers and PSI-DD? My analysis shows it was due to his ability in developing bridging social capital. It can be defined as a relationship that “connects members of the group or network to extra-local networks, crossing ethnic, racial, and religious cleavages” (Aldrich, 2012: 32). This definition fits this context, as Nopen was an outsider who wanted to be connected with the Jaluk villagers.

In Sumatran society, outsiders can build strong social emotional ties even when they are not genealogically related (Sakai, 2017a, 2017b). In her research on the Gumay society of South Sumatra, Sakai (2017b: 55) shows that when a Gumay person lived outside their village, they were able to make familial relationships with people who were not relatives. This family is important for providing a social society while a Gumay individual lives in an unfamiliar environment. In Gayo society, I argue that this is also the case. While the family ties or kinships between Gayo people is still strong, as I will discuss in the next section, the outsiders who come and live in the village are also thought of seperti saudara (as family).

Nopen is an Acehnese who comes from North Aceh, which is about five hours drive away from his hometown to Jaluk. He has a strong Islamic educational background as he graduated from pesantren and the local Islamic State Institute. He joined PSI-DD after completing his assignment as a village facilitator in West Java for an organisation called Indonesia Bangun Desa (Indonesia Develops Village, IBD). From November 2014 onwards, Nopen stayed in Jaluk village and lived in a house which was previously home to the DD secretariat. Knowing none of the villagers when
he first arrived in Jaluk, Nopen had attempted to generate bridging social capital with
the villagers. He tried to build his social relations with the villagers in many ways.
Firstly, he was able to use the *masjid* (mosque) as a venue for bridging social capital.
He went regularly to the village mosque for collective *maghrib* (sunset) prayer and
Friday sermons.

The mosque is a sacred place for Muslims. Historically, the mosque has been
used not only for praying but it has also been used as a learning centre (Azra, 2006b).
In their study on the 2005 Pakistan earthquake recovery process, Cheema et al. (2014:
2221) argue that the mosque was not only a place for prayer but also a place for social
interaction, negotiation and communication. In Aceh’s context, this was also the case.
In other words, mosques can be used for social capital formation where people meet
regularly and exchange information. Nopen has used the mosque as a venue for his
bridging social capital formation. There he took an opportunity to meet and greet the
villagers. He also used the mosque to disseminate information. As the mosque has a
loudspeaker that can reach the whole village, he used it to make announcements related
to recovery program activities (e.g. to extend invitations for meetings or work).

Nopen also made the effort to befriend Mulyadi and mingle with his extended
family, the most influential family in the village. Both Nopen and Mulyadi are around
the same age (20s year old, Nopen is slightly older) and as a result, they easily built a
brotherly relationship (Figure 4.2). Mulyadi had assisted Nopen to settle in and get to
know the locals. I record Mulyadi’s impression about Nopen as follows:

“Actually, there are positive things [from PSI-DD’s program].
I am fortunate to have this program. Bang Nopen is a friend to
think [a company for discussion]. In the past, there was Pak Keuchik (head of village) [who was my close friend]. Now he is the village secretary [and busy].” (Interview with Mulyadi, Jaluk, 11 August 2015).

As a result, Nopen was gradually able to build very good social ties not only with group members but also with the whole village. When I came to the village for research, it was almost one year into his assignment. Nopen knew all the villagers in Jaluk and some people in the neighbouring villages.

The description above illustrates Nopen’s efforts in developing bridging social capital in informal situation. The formal process operated through the conduct of PSI-DD’s programs. Within a year, Nopen had initiated several activities as a part of the

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81 Bang literally means older brother, called for one whose age is older in a relationship.
PSI-DD economic recovery program. Firstly, by recruiting more beneficiaries. At the first meeting between PSI-DD and the community members on 2 November 2014, only eleven people were recruited to be involved in the program. Ten people were selected as team leaders and Mulyadi was appointed as the head of the groups. When Nopen started living in the village, he worked with these eleven people to recruit other group members. It took about a month to reach the targeted 100 farmers. The group was later named Musara Pakat, which literally in Gayonese means “together through consensus”.

Secondly, capacity building occurred through training. Nopen organised two training courses to expand the farmers’ knowledge. The first training session was facilitated by a local expert on coffee cultivation. The second training session was provided by PSI-DD staff who came from Bogor. This training was on pest control. However, as the PSI-DD staff forgot to bring the training material for practice, training was non-practical.

Thirdly, capacity was enhanced by building a rumah kompos (compost house). As follow up to the first training session, Nopen invited the group members to construct a compost house. The house is used to process coffee fruit peels into compost. Prior to the training, the longstanding practice in the village was to sow coffee fruit peels directly into farming land. However, this was not effective because the peels were in the form of unfinished compost. From my observations during the fieldwork, the compost house is regularly used and its produce shared among group members.

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82 Some details will be discussed in the section d below on linking social capital formation.
Fourthly, capacity building took the form of piloting through demonstration plot (dem-plot). In each cluster across Indonesia, PSI-DD uses dem-plot to introduce healthy cultivation that will lead to sustainable agriculture. In Jaluk village, Nopen approached Yusuf (Mulyadi’s grandfather) to allow his land to be used for dem-plot piloting. Both of them undertook the responsibility of keeping the dem-plot up to the standards required for coffee farming. It is expected that once the dem-plot demonstrates it leads to better coffee production, it will be replicated across other farms particularly those belonging to the group members.

Through the activities described above, I have observed that Nopen was well-respected by community members. In short, I argue that Nopen has successfully developed a new stock of bridging social capital and strengthened relational social capital.

C. Bonding Social Capital: Kinship and Cultural-Religious Practice

During my fieldwork, I have observed that Nopen, on behalf of PSI-DD, has also contributed to strengthening the existing bonding social capital. Bonding social capital is defined as “relations between family members, close friends, and neighbours” (Woolcock, 2002: 23). This definition suggests that bonding social capital occurs within social relationships of homogenous groups. In the context of Gayo, bonding social capital comes in the form of kinship networks and cultural-religious practices namely meugang, alang tulung and musyawarah, which will be

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83 Nopen has been featured in the Putra Daerah (literally means local son, can be interpreted as local hero) website. The website features local heroes across Indonesia and their achievements or contributions to the community. See http://putradaerah.com/2016/03/06/novrizal-zainal-pendiri-ksu-musara-pakat/ (accessed 7 December 2016).
explained shortly. While these stocks of social capital existed in the Gayo community long before the arrival of external CSOs like PSI-DD, I argued that the organisation has been able to strengthen and integrate them into PSI-DD’s economic recovery activities.

The first example of bonding social capital is through kinship. Scholars maintain that family or kinship ties is a very important form of social capital (Fukuyama, 1995, 2002; James and Paton, 2015; Nee and Sanders, 2010). Kinship arguably still plays an important role in Gayo as well as in other part of Sumatra, such as in Batak, North Sumatra (Bruner, 1959; Kipp, 1986; Vergouwen, 1964), Gumay of South Sumatra (Sakai, 2006, 2017a, 2017b) and Minangkabau in West Sumatra (Blackwood, 1997, 2000). Relationships based on kinship can provide specific advantages to their members because of their nature as “collectivistic cultures” (James and Paton, 2015: 209). In Gayonese society, kinship is perceived in both uxorilocal and virilocal relations. The latter is considered stronger than the former (Bowen, 1984; Schröter, 2010). This is also the case of Jaluk village where kinship ties are still important. Although the kinship seems to be not as strong as in times gone by, the majority of people living in Jaluk village are one big family, as they share the same descent.

The PSI-DD strengthened the bonding social capital of the village by including the villagers in the Musara Pakat group mentioned earlier. According to Mulyadi, most members of the Musara Pakat group come from his extended family. They are his grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins or outsiders married to his relatives who eventually settled in the village. In practice, this is proven to be easier for group member recruitment. Mulyadi confessed that some of his family members initially did not believe him when he approached them and they would not join the group
(Interview with Mulyadi, Jaluk, 11 August 2015). However, within a few months and when they witnessed some success from the programs run by the PSI-DD, in addition to the bridging social capital established by Nopen, these family members finally put their trust in Mulyadi and Nopen.

The second example of bonding social capital can be seen through *meugang*. As Fukuyama (2002) has argued, one source of social capital is cultural and religious tradition. The Gayo inhabitants had been converted to Islam in the seventeenth century. Before that, they embraced animism. They practiced local rituals and believed in local spirits. Since Islam came to the region, the Gayonese have adapted their local customs (*adat*) to be compatible and consistent with Islamic teachings. This *adat* is still practiced in the Gayo society (Bowen, 1984, 1993).84

One of the *adat* practices is *meugang*, a tradition not only practiced in Gayo, but in the whole of Aceh Province. *Meugang* is observed to welcome the fasting month of Ramadhan and to celebrate the Islamic festivals such as *Idul Fitri* and *Idul Adha*.85 *Meugang* is when family members gather and consume meat together. Historically, it is believed to have been practised since the Acehnese Sultanate in 14th century. At that time, the Sultan (king) distributed meat, clothes and rice to the poor, disabled and widows (Hasjmy (1983: 151)).86

Nowadays, the *meugang* tradition is still very strong. It is now not the ruler’s (government’s) responsibility but rather it is the obligation of every individual. It has

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84 In general, *adat* is a part of Indonesian culture and still practiced by many ethnic groups in the country.
85 *Idul Fitri* is the holy day marks the end of fasting month Ramadhan. *Idul Adha* is the holy day of sacrifice. Muslims worldwide celebrate both festivals.
86 See also Ulung (2015).
become a matter of pride and honour. A poor family head has to save or borrow some money to prepare at least a kilogram of meat. A father or a husband will feel ashamed if they cannot provide the *meugang* meat for their family members (Hakim, 2015). During the humanitarian efforts after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2005, the *meugang* meat was donated as part of the assistance provided by some organisations.\(^{87}\)

In April 2015, the Musara Pakat group members were able to gather profits from coffee trading, amounting to around IDR 12 million (equivalent to about 1,200AUD). As the month of Ramadhan was approaching and the Idul Fitri celebration was in June and July 2015, the PSI-DD facilitator, Nopen, and Mulyadi proposed to the members of Musara Pakat that they use this money for *meugang*.

It is worth noting that the villagers are mostly poor people and they have difficulties in financial management. During the harvest season, one can get money from coffee processing. This can be either from picking coffee berries, drying, sorting, trading, or from working in the coffee processing fabrics. Once one has received money from such activity, either he or she will spend it on their basic needs or they will use it to repay debts. If there is a little money left, it will be usually be spent on minor luxuries. Many traders from outside the village come to offer their merchandise, such as furniture, curtains, rugs, and so on. As a result, many villagers faced difficulty when it came to preparing for *meugang* as their money had run out. According to Mulyadi:

"The *meugang* tradition is very strong but it is individual responsibility. Having money or not, one has to buy [the meat]. In *meugang* for Ramadhan, usually here [people] tend to consume chicken. In *meugang* for *lebaran* (*Idul Fitri* or *Idul

\(^{87}\) See for example Canadian Red Cross (2005).
Adha), it is obligatory to consume either water buffalo or cow. It was like that since a long time.” (Interview with Mulyadi, Jaluk, 11 August 2015).

Considering the strong cultural and religious element of meugang and the difficult financial situation faced by the Musara Pakat group members, they finally agreed that the profit gained from the harvest should be used for buying meugang meat. It was decided through a meeting (musyawarah). Eventually, from the profit earned by the Musara Pakat group, each member received one kilogram of water buffalo for meugang. In other words, 100 households were assisted by the meugang meat distribution. When I interviewed several family members, all of them mentioned meugang as being the immediate benefit that they gained from participating in the PSI-DD program. This also means that meugang serves as “social glue” for enhancing social capital between Musara Pakat group participants. From this point, I argue that PSI-DD’s economic recovery programs have helped its beneficiaries to recover their livelihoods, social and cultural recovery.

Finally, another example of bonding social capital was found through alang-tulung and musyawarah. In Gayo tradition, alang-tulung means helping each other (literally in Indonesian tolong menolong). The alang-tulung is usually conducted on a voluntary basis and is practised when a person is sick, struck by a calamity, is weak or is poor. There is a Gayonese saying “alang tulung beret berbantu” which equates to the Indonesian saying “berat sama dipikul ringan sama dijinjing” (heavy loads we carry together by our shoulders and light weight we carry together by hands). In other words, both heavy and light loads should be borne together.

In Gayonese society, this alang-tulung is widely practiced, for instance, in wet-agriculture with soil tillage (mubelah), embankment clearing (munatal), grass cleaning
(mulamut), rice planting (menomang), paddy mowing (menuling), and rice threshing (mujik). Furthermore, the alang-tulung is also performed to provide public needs such as repairing roads and constructing village infrastructure (Basri, 1982: 27–28).

The process of alang-tulung starts by meeting together (musyawarah). During my fieldwork, I found that the Musara Pakat group members still voluntarily exercise this musyawarah and alang-tulung. The former is usually conducted in the evening after the sunset prayer. Due to the difficulty of gathering all members for a meeting, usually Heads of Musara Pakat clusters came to represent their members. For the Musara Pakat group, the musyawarah is a regular activity.

Figure 4.3: The musyawarah practice by members of Musara Pakat group. Image by author.

According to Mulyadi, the musyawarah is conducted at least once a month. In some cases, it can be every fortnight. During the harvest season, the informal meetings can occur every evening. Mulyadi used to sit with the young members of the group. The purpose is not only to discuss the daily progress of the coffee harvest but also to
guard the coffee beans due to the growing threat of thefts (Interview with Mulyadi, Jaluk, 11 August 2015).

I had a chance to participate in one of their meetings, conducted on 11 August 2015 at the PSI-DD secretariat (Figure 4.3). The *musyawarah* was attended by representatives of each cluster, Mulyadi as leader of Musara Pakat and the PSI-DD facilitator Nopen. The meeting ran for about one and half hour and its purpose was to discuss future activities by the group members, such as preparation for the harvest season in November 2015. One topic of the discussion was about the plan from PSI-DD to provide livestock assistance to the farmers, so they could gain more profit. The discussion led to an agreement to inform PSI-DD that instead of providing cows, goat was better as the latter does not require as many resources such as financial capital, land, breeding time and food (grass). Breeding cows also means that the income generation process would take longer. There was a greater potential market for goats as there are many local celebrations that require goat such as *aqiqah* (welcoming a new born baby), *turun tanah* (a baby touching the ground celebration), *khitanan* (male circumcision) and *qurban* (sacrifice of cattle). 88

At the *musyawarah* mentioned above, the participants also discussed how to select a person to be responsible for taking care of the goats and technical issues related to the goats’ shelter construction. For the former, they finally gained a consensus to select one of the poorest people within the group so that he or she would have additional income. The profit from goat breeding will be shared evenly between the caretaker and the group. For the latter, the meeting participants agreed to build the

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88 *Aqiqah* is customary sacrifice of animal to celebrate the welcoming of a newborn child. For more see Newby (2004: 31). *Qurban* is practiced during *Idul Adha*, the holy day which marks the conclusion of the pilgrimage to Mecca. For more about this practice, see Newby (2004: 65).
shelter by *alang-tulung*. They also gained agreement that although they saved some money to buy materials, such as wood, for the shelter, they preferred to get it from local resources. One participant suggested they use bamboo for the shelter fence as it was available everywhere in the village, thus, there was no need to spend the money. They further agreed to cut the bamboo trees together which they eventually did on Friday 14 August, 2015.

The *alang-tulung* in the village is usually performed on Friday because people have more free time as they prepare themselves for Friday sermon. According to Mulyadi about *alang-tulung* and *musyawarah*: “the success of the program is not seen from the result but from our togetherness” (Interview, Jaluk, 11 August 2015). In summary, the existing bonding social capital has been strengthened with the help of Nopen, the PSI-DD’s village facilitator.

**D. Linking with Outside Village: New Jaluk’s Social Capital**

Another important finding from this study is the ability of PSI-DD to generate linking social capital. This term refers to “networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society” (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004: 655). In other words, linking social capital is the ability to socially interact with outsiders that have specific power. In this case, the PSI-DD has helped the Jaluk farmers to expand their network by connecting them to government institutions and markets.

In the case of government institutions, Nopen attempted to introduce the Musara Pakat group to some government officials both at the local and provincial levels. One example was a training session initiated by Nopen on 22 December 2014.
He invited Mr Khalid from Balai Pengkajian Teknologi Pertanian (Aceh Provincial Assessment Institute for Agricultural Technology, BPTP) to facilitate the training. The training was entitled “Appropriate Agricultural Technology for Healthy Coffee Cultivation and Arabica Coffee Waste Management”. Mr Khalid is a prominent expert in coffee cultivation in the region. The training focused on increasing the awareness of having Standard Operating Procedures in coffee cultivation, such as regular rejuvenation pruning, organic fertilisation, and picking the red colour coffee berries. The participants learnt how to make fertiliser from coffee fruit peels. Although having been coffee farmers for decades, some theoretical and practical information provided by Mr Khalid was quite new for the Jaluk farmers. For years, coffee farmers in Jaluk picked the red-colour coffee berries but they also picked the green ones, and this would eventually harm the coffee plant.

In relation to connecting them to the market, Nopen helped the Jaluk farmers expand their networks. This happened in many ways, firstly, by expanding the local network. Before the PSI-DD intervention, the farmers used to sell their coffee to local toke (big trader) or tengkulak (local collector) who used to lend them some money. Consequently, their coffee is sold at prices lower than the market value and the difference was considered ‘interest’. According to the principles of PSI-DD which derived from Islamic teaching, the interest was considered to be *riba* (trading with interest), thus, forbidden and not Islamic. Therefore, the Musara Pakat group bought coffee from local farmers in Jaluk and its neighbouring villages and sold it to Takengon at a higher price. Mulyadi’s uncle, Cek Bahagia, who lives in Takengon, is a focal point for coffee trading in that place. Nopen and Mulyadi also went to Takengon regularly to test possibilities of networking with other traders.
The PSI-DD which is based in Bogor, Java, also helped to expand the network of the Jaluk farmers. The coffee produced by Jaluk farmers has been promoted and sold at some events in Jakarta, such as at Indonesia Philanthropy Festival (IPFest) in 2016 (Aziz, 2016). PSI-DD further shared the profit gained from the sales there to the Musara Pakat group. At the international level, DD tried to introduce Indonesian coffee through “Aroma of Heaven: Biji Kopi Indonesia (Indonesian Coffee Bean)”, a documentary movie screening in Philadelphia, USA. Among the coffee promoted was that from Gayo and Temanggung, where PSI-DD has been implementing their farmer’s empowerment program.

Finally, PSI-DD helped the Musara Pakat develop a marketing strategy. In the past, the farmers used to sell the green beans, without processing them any further into roasted beans. In late November, 2015, PSI-DD granted a roasting machine to the Musara Pakat group. Having this roaster enabled the farmers to roast the green beans and they then packed them into more attractive packaging. These packaged roasted beans are retailed at various shops in Central Aceh. I argue that by doing this the farmers’ coffee will have an added-value which will increase their income.

V. Conclusion

This chapter attempted to answer the research questions outlined in the Introduction. This chapter demonstrates the ability of PSI-DD as external CSO to develop new and strengthen existing social capital in Jaluk village. It is fair to say that the PSI-DD has been able to generate new social capital in the form of relational, bridging and linking capital. The organisation has also strengthened the existing bonding social capital, derived from the indigenous Gayonese kinship and social traditions, in Jaluk village. The limitation of PSI-DD in developing relational social capital suggests that social
capital formation takes time. In this case, it took about two years before achieving a tangible result.

Did rapid recovery and resilience take place in Jaluk village? During my stay in Jaluk village, I observed that the community was changing. They started to gain confidence in their livelihood following the catastrophe that affected every aspect of their lives. I found that PSI-DD and particularly its facilitator, Nopen, has been contributing significantly in supporting the farmers to return to their pre-disaster condition. In fact, I believe that their conditions now seem to be far better, particularly with the increased income they receive through the Musara Pakat group. However, further research needs to be done to confirm this belief.

I argue that the findings of this chapter contribute in enriching the existing literature by providing successful empirical evidence of social capital formation by an external CSO. Social capital is a process that brings mutual benefit (Putnam, 1995: 67). In this context, the advantage for PSI-DD was that its program ran well. For Jaluk villagers, the benefit was a positive result of their rapid community recovery and resilience. This case study can provide lessons for other external agencies if they want to come and help the community. The question is whether we can see the same evidence in the case of other societies and in other disaster areas in other parts of Indonesia. Let us examine this in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

External CSOs, Positive and Negative Externalities of Social Capital: The Case Study of Economic Recovery after the 2014 Mt. Kelud Eruption

I. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to answer the following research question as outlined in Chapter One. In what ways are external CSOs able to create positive social capital or weaken the social capital in an affected society? This chapter differs from Chapter Four because here I especially attempt to answer the second part of the question, in what ways do CSOs potentially produce negative externalities of social capital? I have demonstrated in Chapter Four the ability of an external CSO, PSI-DD, to form social capital in the Gayo community. In contrast to the findings from Chapter Four, in this chapter I argue that external CSOs may also weaken the social capital of a community in the wake of a disaster and this can impede the speed of a community’s recovery and weaken its resilience.

In this chapter I use the framework of the downsides of social capital (Aldrich, 2011, 2012; Portes and Landolt, 1996) to explain the findings related to negative externalities (Fukuyama, 2002) resulting from social capital formation by external CSOs. Social capital is not always a good thing. It can lead to adverse results, to some extent. Thus, social capital is regarded as a “double-edged sword” (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379) or “Janus-faced” (Szreter, 2002: 575). External CSOs need to be

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89 Fukuyama (2002) names positive and negative externalities to refer benefits and downsides of social capital respectively.
aware of this if they expect to bring about rapid recovery in a community they seek to assist.

This chapter starts with the introduction of my case study site. I will briefly introduce the East Java community, particularly the Pandansari village, Ngantang in Malang District and the impact of the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruptions in the region. Next, I briefly discuss another special unit of Dompet Dhuafa, namely Kampoeng Ternak Nusantara (Archipelago Livestock Village of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation, KTN-DD), which provided an economic recovery program to the Pandansari village.

I will then analyse the social capital formation and its consequences, either positive or negative, caused by the KTN-DD, as external agency, when delivering aid. I examine whether KTN-DD has been successful in building the relational, bonding, bridging and linking social capital such as in the case of PSI-DD in Gayo in Chapter Four. I argue that while there are similarities between the PSI-DD and KTN-DD in the sense that both generated positive social capital, the negative consequences were more visible in the latter case.

The last part of this chapter discusses two concepts, cultural proximity and the Javanese indigenous value called nrimo (in the Javanese language, it means to accept or acceptance). Cultural proximity refers to whether religious agencies have special advantages when working with their co-religionists. Nrimo is a Javanese concept, which arguably has become an important competency to cope with hard situations like disasters. Discussing both notions is important because both influence the degree to which a disaster affected community can speed up its recovery and enhance their resilience. I conclude by analysing why there was sharp contrast in the results of social capital formation attempts made in Jaluk and Pandansari and to what extent we can avoid the poorer outcomes in the future. As cultural proximity does not always work,
another important thing is to understand the “cultural contexts” (James and Paton, 2015). Knowing this potentiality will help prevent the harmful effects of social capital formation in disaster-affected communities elsewhere or in the future.

II. Background of the Case Study Area:

A. Mt. Kelud of East Java: A Brief Outlook

Located in the eastern part of the most populous island in Indonesia, the East Java Province has more than 39 million inhabitants (BPS Jawa Timur, 2017).\(^{90}\) Similar to other parts of Indonesia, East Java is vulnerable to natural disasters. The region is home to 13 volcanoes, most of which are still active.\(^{91}\) Our focus here, though, is on Mt. Kelud.\(^{92}\)

Map 5.1: Map of Mt. Kelud surrounded by three districts. Modified by author using Google Maps.

\(^{90}\) The exact figure is 39,075,152 according to the BPS Jawa Timur (2017: 40). Compare to Aceh Province which only has 5,096,248 (BPS Aceh (2017: 39).


\(^{92}\) The Mt. Kelud is also spelled Kelut, but Kelud is the more common spelling nowadays.
Mt. Kelud is situated on the border between the Blitar, Malang and Kediri districts of East Java (Map 5.1). The Pandansari, which I shall describe shortly, is located in Malang District. Pandansari is among the villages near to Mt. Kelud. Kelud is one of the most active volcanoes in Indonesia. It has erupted more than 30 times within the past six centuries. In 1586, the 1,731-metre Mt. Kelud claimed more than 10,000 lives. In 1919, an eruption resulted in more than 5,000 casualties (Thouret et al., 1998: 462). These massive losses indicate the terrible outcome from Mt. Kelud eruptions to communities who live in the surrounding area. In recent years, as Indonesians are more aware about disaster prevention and mitigation measures, the number of fatalities can be minimised. However, the community still cannot avoid other impacts caused by eruptions.

This study focuses on the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption. On 2 February 2014, the Indonesian Volcanology and Geology Disaster Mitigation Centre (BVMG) upgraded the status of the Kelud volcano from Normal (level I) to Aware (level II). On 10 February at 16:00, the status was increased to Alert (level III). Finally, on 13 February, 2014 at 21:15, the BVMG updated the status from Alert to the highest level (Danger, level IV of the highest). Two hours after that status update, the first eruption began at 22.55 and was followed by a series of further eruptions (BNPB, 2014).

The eruptions (thus more than one) caused only a small number of casualties. Four people died and over 200,000 inhabitants of 35 villages who live within the 10-kilometer radius of Mt. Kelud had to be evacuated. In total, 56,089 displaced people were temporarily housed at 89 evacuation centres across Blitar, Malang and Kediri districts. The volcanic ash from Mt. Kelud travelled more than 250 kilometres, across four provinces, namely East Java, Yogyakarta, Central Java, and West Java. The ash had caused damage to houses across these area and forced the closure of seven major
airports on the Java islands. The most heavily affected regions were Malang and Kediri districts. (BNPB, 2014).

In terms of financial losses, it was estimated to have cost around IDR 1,153,671,237,100 (AUD 115 million). Almost half of the total loss and damage was a result of damage to the economy, particularly in the agricultural sector. Kediri district was the worst affected area, followed by Malang District and Blitar was the least affected by the eruption (BNPB, 2014).

In response to the disaster, the East Java Governor, at that time Mr Soekarwo, declared an emergency situation within the East Java Province for a month, and this lasted until 14 March, 2014. During this emergency period, aid was mobilised by numerous agencies including the government, CSOs, the community, and the private sector. The emergency aid was given in the form of temporary camps and housing renovations, particularly to fix roofs damaged by the fall of ash. The government aimed to complete the renovation of all damaged houses, about 12,304 homes, within a month (Ainun, 2014). During my fieldwork, however, I found that the house repair work took a few months.

When the emergency period was completed and the East Java Governor declared the shift to the recovery period, the main focus was on restoring livelihoods and rebuilding infrastructure. However, the government assistance for the recovery was slow in coming due to numerous factors and the gap that was left was filled by CSOs.\(^{93}\)

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\(^{93}\) Further details on recovery by the government will be analysed in Chapter Six.
B. Fieldwork Site: Pandansari Village

Pandansari village is where I conducted my fieldwork in May 2015 for two weeks. The village situated in Ngantang subdistrict of Malang District. The village covers 1,103,425 hectares half of which is considered productive land. The village is divided into seven hamlets, namely the Bales, Plumbang, Klangon, Munjung, Sambirejo, Sedawun and Wonorejo (Sa'diyah, 2015: 87–88).

Pandansari consists of 1,505 households (2,427 males and 2,503 females), the majority of which are Javanese and Muslim. Most villagers in Pandansari only graduated from primary education (mostly elementary schools) and they work in the agricultural and livestock sectors (Sa'diyah, 2015: 89–91). The agricultural products they produce include durian, rice, and horticultural products such as tomato, chili, cauliflower, and red onion. The livestock raised are mainly cows and sheep. In short, Pandansari shares similar socio-economic characteristics with Jaluk of Gayo (as discussed in Chapter Four) in terms low levels of education and having low-income
earning population. From the perspective of assistance eligibility, we can say that most Pandansari villagers are in need. The village’s situation explains why KTN-DD selected this village among others to offer assistance.

Pandansari is located within seven kilometres of Mt. Kelud. In the eruption in 2014, the volcanic ash heavily damaged all houses and village assets such as schools, community buildings and water pipes. The mudflow and cold lava following from the eruption worsened the situation by destroying roads, bridges and agricultural infrastructure such as farming lands, paddy fields, irrigation canals and water dams. Access to Pandansari was restricted and all of the villagers had to be evacuated. Immediately after the eruption, Pandansari was named *desa mati* (dead village) (Romadoni, 2014).

What is worse, the villagers had to leave their livestock. As a result, the cows consumed grass that contained volcanic ash, which eventually made the cows sick and led to the death of the sheep. The villagers found they had to sell their cows at a very low price or slaughter them. This situation was one of the reasons KTN-DD provided livestock breed as part of its assistance to some villagers.

The Pandansari village is classified as a *desa tertinggal* (underdeveloped village). Located near to the provincial road that connects the Malang and Blitar districts, Pandansari ironically has a very limited transportation access. It takes around 30 minutes to access the centre of the subdistrict (at the distance 12 kilometres), two hours to reach the capital of Malang District which is 49 kilometres away and four

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94 Underdeveloped refers to region that need extra assistance from the government. The Indonesian government has a designated ministry that tasked to boost development in underdeveloped regions namely Ministry of Villages, Underdeveloped Regions and Transmigration (Kementerian Desa, Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal, dan Transmigrasi).
hours to travel the 120 kilometres to Surabaya, the capital city of East Java Province (D.C et al., 2015).

C. The Case-Studied FBO: Archipelago Livestock Village (KTN-DD)

I mentioned in Chapter Four (Section III) that the Dompet Dhuafa Foundation has some autonomous divisions that focus on economic development, including the KTN-DD. Similar to PSI-DD in Chapter Four, KTN-DD programs are also “faith-background”.\(^95\) The philosophy of KTN-DD is rooted in the concept of *qurban* (sacrifice of cattle). The *qurban* meat is distributed to the poor and the needy. In 1994, DD launched a program called Tebar 999 Hewan Kurban (Spread 999 *Qurban* Animals) aimed at allocating the animals to poor areas in Indonesia. Since 2000 the DD has shifted its approach from distribution to empowerment. Instead of giving the *qurban* animals to the poor during *Idul Adha*, DD donated the animals months earlier. The purpose of this was so that the needy could breed the animals, sell them during *Idul Adha*, and eventually earn an income. As the program expanded, in 2005 the DD Foundation established a special unit tasked to administer the livestock development program. This unit was called Kampoeng Ternak Nusantara or KTN-DD, which is the subject of the study in this chapter.

In general, the way KTN-DD works is similar to PSI-DD in many ways. Firstly, the objective of this empowerment program was to increase the income of the poor and assist them to achieve recovery and resilience. In the context of the livestock development program, KTN-DD will help the farmers to be empowered individually.

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\(^{95}\) For the definition of “faith-background” (Sider and Unruh (2004), refer to earlier discussions in Chapter Two and Four.
or collectively. Individually, the breeders will be taught different aspects of raising livestock, such as nursery and healthiness, feeding management, reproduction technology and livestock waste management. Collectively, the KTN-DD focused particularly on building collective awareness and teamwork for between the breeders and worked on building their capacity in institutional management. Secondly, KTN-DD and PSI-DD are similar in the sense that the involvement of both organisations in disaster affected communities is relatively new. Similar to PSI-DD, the KTN-DD has been working in poor communities across Indonesia. Until 2014, the KTN-DD has empowered 5,195 livestock farmers across 14 (out of total 34) provinces in Indonesia (DMC-DD, 2014). In the context of post-disaster recovery, the KTN-DD has been involved with communities affected by the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption in Yogyakarta and the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption, which is the subject of this study.\(^96\)

Unlike in Gayo where DMC-DD and PSI-DD programs had been aimed at covering the entire population of Jaluk, KTN-DD only helped one (out of seven) hamlet in Pandansari, namely Klangon. The reason of this difference is the large size of Pandansari’s population. Klangon is populated by 159 households and consists of 223 males and 224 females, making the total 447 individuals (Jannah, 2015). As we observe, the population of Klangon hamlet is almost equivalent to Jaluk village’s population (195 households, 757 individuals). This situation indicates the widely accepted opinion that although CSOs are able to fill the gap left by the government, they are limited in terms of resources.

The selection of Klangon, as opposed to other hamlets, was based on the assessment conducted by KTN-DD during the earlier phase of emergency response. Klangon is considered among the neediest and had better potential to grow if assisted, compared to other hamlets (Interview with Saiful, KTN-DD staff, Jakarta, 9 June 2015). The economic recovery programs provided in Klangon included focusing on integration of the agriculture and livestock sectors. For the former, KTN-DD (supported by PSI-DD) provided the aid recipient with agricultural products. For the latter, KTN-DD provided the beneficiaries with a cow and sheep breeding program. The total budget allocated for this program was IDR 500,745,903 (AUD 50,000). KTN-DD selected 60 households to participate in this economic recovery program (KTN-DD, 2016). The percentage is relatively small compared to Klangon’s or Pandansari’s total population which again shows the limitations of KTN-DD. KTN-DD admitted their limitations, saying:

“We do have limited resources…. We are possible to distribute [fund] to all areas because we want a program that has impact. Hopefully the program in Klangon will be replicated in its surrounding areas. We hope that happen…..We are not superbody, we are not a part of the government that has to do everything” (Interview with Saiful, Jakarta, 9 June 2015)

From the statement above, KTN-DD’s focus was clear. The organisation focuses on small communities rather than big ones. In small communities, the economic recovery program is much more manageable and effective and so the impact is visible to donors.

In short, despite some differences between KTN-DD and PSI-DD, the approach of the former is arguably not different from the latter’s, as discussed in 97 Agricultural assistance was minor, thus, not the focus on this chapter.
Chapter Four. Thus, I expect that the impact from this livestock development program would be similar to that in Pandansari. The farmers in Klangon (if not the whole village) will hopefully join their colleagues in Gayo who experienced rapid recovery and resilience. However, the results from social capital formation and recovery aid distribution in Klangon were quite different, and this will be discussed shortly.

III. Empirical Findings from the Ground: Benefits and Downsides of Social Capital

Scholars share the same opinion, that social capital is an important aspect for disaster recovery and resilience (Aldrich, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013; Buckland and Rahman, 1999; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2011; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; James and Paton, 2015; Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; Norris et al., 2008). Disaster affected communities with strong social capital will recover and build their resilience faster than those who have low levels of social capital. The evidence for this argument has been proven elsewhere, including in Chapter Two and Four of this thesis.

However, few studies available to investigate whether social capital formation leads to negative consequences in the context of disaster recovery. As I mentioned earlier in the Introduction of this chapter, social capital is a double-edged sword (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379) or is “Janus-faced” (Szreter, 2002: 575). Social capital not only has benefits but also “downsides” (Portes and Landolt, 1996). A group with strong social capital can provide benefits for its members on the one hand, but may also be harmful to those beyond the group on the other. In that case, Fukuyama (2002: 30) has warned that social capital formation can be attained “at the expense of outsiders”.

Some examples of the negative externalities of social capital and external agencies have been presented in studies of India (2004 Indian Ocean tsunami), Nicaragua (1998 Hurricane Mitch) and Taiwan (1999 Chi Chi earthquake and 2009 Typhoon Morakot). For India, Aldrich (2011; 2012) found in his research that strong social capital of a specific group has led to the exclusion of other group members especially marginalised people i.e. women, the elderly, Dalits (the lowest caste) and other religious minority groups (Muslims and non-Christians). In Nicaragua, external aid was controlled by certain groups that excluded disadvantaged community members and enforced the community divide between Catholics and Evangelicals in the community (Häberli, 2012). Likewise, the top-down recovery approach taken by government and external agencies in Taiwan has neglected minority groups i.e. Hakka and Christian victims (James and Paton, 2015).

It is essential to analyse the extent to which these findings may reflect the situation in Indonesia. The findings of this study prove that such instances are evident in the case of the Mt. Kelud affected communities. While KTN-DD and PSI-DD (in Jaluk) are from the same entity and run “faith-background” programs with a similar approach, the degree to which they successfully generated social capital differs. I have demonstrated in Chapter Four that in the case of Gayo. PSI-DD had successfully generated four forms of social capital in Jaluk village. In the context of Mt. Kelud, KTN-DD was only partially able to develop bonding and linking social capital, while relational and bridging social capital were missing altogether. What is more, social capital formation led to negative externalities. These externalities harmed the Pandansari villagers, thus, affecting their recovery and resilience.
A. Building Relational Social Capital

As discussed in Chapter Four, relational social capital refers to the “trust and trustworthiness characteristic of social relationships between community members and between community members and civic agencies” (James and Paton, 2015: 209). Therefore, I examine the efforts of KTN-DD in building relationships with the Pandansari villagers. I argue that the process of generating relational social capital in Pandansari was less successful than in Jaluk. In the latter village, the process of building relational social capital initially generated low levels of social capital. The village facilitator (Nopen) helped increase levels of trust through his efforts in strengthening other types of social capital. In the case of Pandansari, this was partially absent. Different types of disaster (earthquake versus eruption) made the struggles for social capital formation in Pandansari harder. As distinctive from Jaluk village where DMC-DD contributed to the development of relational social capital by providing emergency relief directly to the villagers, the organisation could not do much in Pandansari. This was because disaster emergency assistance was concentrated in the temporary shelters located outside the village.

As opposed to earthquakes, which cannot be predicted, volcanic eruptions can be anticipated and advanced warnings may be given. Villagers conducted several drills before the eruption (Interview with villager Mr Parno, Pandansari, 13 May 2015). People or organisations willing to help the victims of the disaster were better prepared to help the victims.98 During the emergency response period, DD was among the first organisations to arrive. According to Asep Beny, the Head of DMC-DD, as the

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98 Three days after the government upgraded the status from normal to Aware (level II) on 2 February, 2014, the Indonesian Red Cross volunteers "were placed on standby and spent time conducting refresher training for evacuation, IDP management and relief support" (IFRC 2014: 3).
organisation has its branch office in Surabaya, the capital city of East Java, it did not take long for its DD volunteers to reach the affected area. They arrived only a few hours after the eruption and were ready for disaster response activities. The first thing they did was open temporary shelters to manage IDPs in all three affected districts. In Malang, the camp was located at the community hall of Ngoto village in Pujon Subdistrict, the neighbouring subdistrict of Ngantang. (Interview, Jakarta 8 June 2015).

Concerning relational social capital formation, DMC-DD was not able to build relational networks with Pandansari villagers at that time. This was because the temporary shelter in Pujon was allocated to all affected people in the surrounding region. Two days after the eruption, the Pujon shelter was at capacity housing 25,000 IDPs (Rochmanuddin, 2014). DMC-DD, along with others, provided assistance to all individuals regardless of which village they came from. The organisation contributed by providing food and non-food items, health services and psychosocial support for the IDPs (DMC-DD, 2014). Most Pandansari villagers stayed in Pujon but some of them asked to move because the shelter was over-crowded (Interview with villager Mr Parno, Pandansari, 13 May 2015). Given the complexity of this situation, relational social capital between DMC-DD and Pandansari villagers was missing during this time.

A month after the eruptions, DMC-DD started its early recovery activity. The organisation worked on rehabilitation activities i.e. cleaning and repairing some

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99 Compared to the case of Jaluk in Chapter Four where DMC-DD started to operate in the village immediately after the earthquake.

100 In Chapter Four, I stated that DMC-DD was responsible for providing physical recovery if deemed necessary.
houses, reconstructing primary schools and mushalla (prayer houses, smaller than mosque) in Pandansari village. It can be seen that the organisation tried to use sacred places for social capital formation, as was the case in Jaluk village, to gain trust in the organisation. Also similar to Jaluk, the KTN-DD hired a village facilitator to serve as a liaison between the organisation and villagers. KTN-DD’s program was designed to last for only one year (compared to two years of KTN-DD in Jaluk) so the village facilitator was expected to stay in Pandansari for that period. Let us analyse his role in the following section.

**B. Bridging Social Capital: Facilitator’s Externalities**

In Chapter Four I highlighted the supportive attitude of Nopen as village facilitator in Jaluk. Overall, Nopen was able to develop trust from community members. In Pandansari, I argue that the facilitator has been able to develop good social relationships with KTN-DD beneficiaries but not with others, particularly the village leaders.

The case of Yasir, the KTN-DD’s village facilitator in Pandansari, tells a different story. Let me briefly introduce Yasir. He was born in 1982. He comes from Bojonegoro but he has been living in Landungsari village, in the Dau Subdistrict of Malang District. Yasir had some experience in the delivery of social welfare and community empowerment programs. From 2009 to 2014, he was a subdistrict facilitator in Ngantang for the World Bank’s nationwide initiative for poverty reduction called the National Program for Community Empowerment (Program

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101 Bojonegoro is a region in East Java, located around 150 kilometres from Malang District.
Nasional Pemberdayaan Mandiri, PNPM). Yasir was relatively well known because of his extensive Islamic knowledge. He was often involved in a variety of Islamic activities including preaching and delivering Friday speeches in the region (interview with Yasir, Pandansari, 15 May 2015).

I contend that in addition to Yasir’s experience in community empowerment activities, his commitment to Islamic devotional matters was seen as a positive and was one of the reasons that KTN-DD chose him as a village facilitator. Yasir’s first social interaction with KTN-DD was in July 2014. It was the holy month of Ramadan when Muslims fast and organise several religious activities. Yasir participated in two events conducted by DMC-DD in Pandansari. Firstly, he served as teacher to give lessons to children in a short-term Islamic boarding program (*Pesantren Kilat*). Secondly, he attended a large-scale religious gathering (*Pengajian Akbar*). It was after this that he volunteered for DD. At the same time, KTN-DD was looking for village facilitator. The organisation could not find a suitable candidate. A month after that, Yasir was on their radar as a potential applicant. The KTN-DD asked him to submit an application and Yasir was invited to the headquarters of KTN-DD in Parung, Bogor for a job interview. He was eventually offered the job. In October 2014, he was officially hired as the village facilitator by the KTN-DD (interview with Yasir, Pandansari, 15 May 2015)

As a village facilitator, Yasir was supposed to live in Pandansari so he would be able to effectively oversee the day-to-day running of KTN-DD’s economic recovery program. However, unlike Nopen, Yasir did not stay in the village. Yasir was married and had three children. As he was settled with his family, Yasir asked for an exception to stay in Ladungsari instead. He visited Klangon when he was needed. The travel
between the villages took about one and half hours by road. In anticipation of his absence, Yahman served as a back-up facilitator for the project.

I contend that bridging social capital was missing because of this absence. To emphasise what I have discussed in Chapter Four, bridging social capital is crucial as it “connects members of the group or network to extralocal networks, crossing ethnic, racial, and religious cleavages” (Aldrich, 2012: 32). Nopen’s experience in Jaluk has demonstrated that by living in the village and having frequent social interaction, he was able to gain trust not only in him but in PSI-DD.

During my fieldwork, I found some negative externalities due to Yasir’s situation as an external individual staying outside the village. Firstly, Yasir was initially unaware of the local dynamics in Pandansari, especially in Klangon. Prior to the launch of KTN-DD’s post-disaster economic recovery program, there was a local election to choose the head of the hamlet in Klangon. At that time, the community was polarised in support of their potential leaders. There were two contestants; Junari and Suwaji, the former eventually won. Yasir was not aware of this polarisation. The first time he needed to distribute the recovery aid (livestock), Junari and his supporters were excluded from the distribution.

Secondly, living outside the village delayed Yasir’s finding of a local cadre. I have discussed in Chapter Four that social relationships and networks are important. In the case of Jaluk, a local cadre can be seen in the profile of Mulyadi who befriended Nopen quite quickly. For Yasir, his unfamiliarity with Pandansari costed him months

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102 Yasir drives a motorcycle.

103 Yahman was known to DMC-DD and KTN-DD staff because his house was used as a temporary home for the secretariat during early recovery period.
in finding a local cadre, half a year into the economic recovery program. Recruitment of a local cadre is important for sustainability once the economic recovery program is completed. I argue that late recruitment of a local cadre will contribute to delayed recovery and resilience building.

Thirdly, Yasir’s absence from the village limited his ability to establish good rapport with the local leadership, particularly Sitin, Pandansari’s head of village (Kepala Desa). Local practice was that every organisation that came to help the villagers had to report to village authorities. During the emergency response, due to the massive influx of aid, Sitin admitted that she could not identify all of them. When the emergency period finished and KTN-DD had run its economic recovery program, Sitin was concerned because the organisation representative only met her once to ask for approval. After that, as the village leader, she received no updates about the program. Klangon’s head of the hamlet used to report to her that Yasir did not inform them of any of the activities KTN-DD conducted.

In short, Yasir had poor communication skills which affected his ability to generate bridging social capital. This concern is expressed in Sitin’s statement below:

“[The facilitator, Yasir] was not appropriate. It has been repeatedly…..The facilitator, I used to warn him. He used to conduct activities there [in Klangon] without the awareness of the village authority. It was so often. If a guest [of KTN-DD] came from Jakarta, or somewhere else, I just got the complaint from the head of hamlet. He told me “Madam, in my place [Klangon], there are some activities, but I was not informed”. Like that. I used to warn [Yasir]“ (Interview with Sitin, Pandansari, 17 May 2015).
C. Bonding Social Capital: Positive and Negative Externalities

Bonding social capital happens between individuals that share similar characteristics, as discussed in Chapter Four. Unlike in Jaluk, I observe that bonding social capital formation has been somewhat successfully developed but negative externalities also occurred. Fukuyama (2002: 30) argues that “societies with many tightly bonded groups or networks may be fragmented and rife with conflicts and hostility when viewed as a whole.” In Pandansari, positive externalities can be seen in the form of strong in-group social capital due to having a close-knit neighbourhood, regular interactions and gotong royong (mutual help). The downsides of this social capital formation are that it leads to exclusion, jealousy, conflict, and community polarisation.

Demographically, the majority of Klangon villagers are Javanese Muslims. Unlike in Gayo where kinship still plays a major role in bonding social capital formation, I found that the neighbourhood, regardless of its background, was more important. The neighbourhood, or so called kampong, has been deeply rooted in the Javanese society (Guinness, 1999, 2009).

The KTN-DD economic recovery program only targeted 60 out of 145 total households in Klangon hamlet. Similar to PSI-DD, KTN-DD also divided their beneficiaries into clusters or smaller groups. In this case, 60 people were divided into six groups which meant each group consisted of 10 people. At the beginning, the initial target was to recruit 30 household leaders as aid beneficiaries. The recruitment process was problematic. Yahman, who served as a back-up facilitator, was assigned to select

104 Officially, the level of village administration in Java can be divided into village, dusun (hamlet), Rukun Warga (RW/upper level neighbourhood) and Rukun Tetangga (RT/lower level neighborhood). The RW is the smallest unit, consists of 30 to 50 households. See Sutiyo and Maharjan (2017). In Gayo, the lowest structure is hamlet.
30 beneficiaries, as Yasir was new to the village. Many people whom Yahman chose were those who lived in the same neighbourhood as him. These 30 members included Suwaji and his supporters who lost the hamlet leadership election. Thus, we can say that the selection of aid recipients was also based on a connected political group. The bias in the selection led to jealousy. Junari, who contested the election with Suwaji asked to join. Yasir and Yahman approved his request. Junari further invited his loyalists to come on-board to fill the remaining slot of 30 members.

Another problem that occurred during the initial phase of the program was the aid delay. According to Yasir, the initial project design was that every group would receive 12 sheep each and two cows to breed, making a total of 72 sheep and six cows in all. Due to a budget allocation delay from KTN-DD, Yasir only received sheep but not cows. He distributed the sheep to Suwaji’s groups. The cows, which came later, were given to Junari’s groups (interview with Yasir, Pandansari, 15 May 2015). I argue that the delay in receiving the money not only led to unequal aid distribution but it also enhanced the rivalry between the sheep groups and the cow recipients.

Eventually, Yasir was made aware of this situation. He attempted to strengthen the bonds between the two polarised groups with the following activities. Firstly, he held regular group meetings. Yasir asked the group to meet on a weekly basis. The purpose was to discuss the progress of their livestock and share their learning. Accumulated social interaction can form social capital (Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000). The second thing Yasir did was increase cultural awareness on the importance of being a cohesive group. Similar to PSI-DD in Jaluk, KTN-DD also expected that the group could bond strongly. For that purpose, Yasir promoted the term *paguyuban* (association).
Historically and culturally, paguyuban has been practised by Indonesian communities, especially in Java. Yasir explained to the group members that it was important to work collectively as one paguyuban. The group members would be stronger if they supported each other. After several approaches to the polarised sheep and cow breeders, all of the six groups finally agreed to be gathered under one paguyuban, which was eventually called Kelud Barokah (Blessed Kelud).

Another effort made by Yasir was using gotong royong as a form of social capital. The gotong royong is widely practiced across Indonesia. Scholars (Bowen, 1986; Cohen, 1974) argue that in the past gotong royong was used as a form of political oppression, especially during the Suharto era. However, I argue that this is no longer the case as gotong royong is widely practiced in Indonesia and it can be beneficial for the community.

In the context of KTN-DD economic recovery programs, the gotong royong can be observed in the livestock husbandry practice. Each group had drawn up a roster to feed the cattle and clean the shed (Figure 5.2). Not all members were able to keep the schedule because some members were lazy. It was agreed that if that happened, the norms, as one stock of social capital (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2008; Putnam, 1995; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), would apply. Yasir and the group leader warned the lazy group members.

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105 Some community groups have been using paguyuban to refer their associational affiliation. For works on some paguyubans in Java see for example Daniels (2016), Kartasasmita (2013) and Sairin (1992).

106 In Chapter Four, I mentioned alang-tulung which can be defined as a form of gotong royong.
Yasir’s efforts in the latter stages of the project were partially effective in strengthening bonding social capital of paguyuban members. I argue that while in-group social capital has been strengthened, which was positive, people external to the group experienced negative externalities. Fukuyama (2002: 30) argues that “societies with many tightly bonded groups or networks may be fragmented and rife with conflicts and hostility when viewed as a whole.” In addition to conflict, strong in-group social capital may lead an outsider to be “excluded from the networks and mutual support linking insiders” (Portes and Landolt, 1996: 2). Additionally, as in-group solidarity is strong, social cohesion with those external to the group will be impeded (van Deth and Zmerli, 2009).

Referring to the scholarly argument above, I found negative externalities from solid bonding social capital and external aid by KTN-DD. We can observe these externalities in some forms. Firstly, there was the exclusion of marginalised people
who were at the periphery of power. We have seen above that only members of either
the Junari or Suwaji groups benefitted from KTN-DD’s economic recovery assistance.
Thus, we can see that the situation is slightly comparable to cases in India and
Nicaragua as illustrated earlier in this chapter.

The second externality was jealousy and complaints. This concern was
expressed by Sitin, the Pandansari village head. People complained to her about the
imbalanced aid distribution. The first group who complained were Klangon villagers
who were excluded from participation in the KTN-DD economic recovery program.
She was told that the aid was exclusively for particular individuals, based on specific
social and political relations, as highlighted above. One example given as evidence
was that one big family who lived in the same house could have two representatives.
The second group was those who lived in other hamlets in Pandansari. Many of them
were envious and expected that they would also be eligible for DD assistance. Sitin
had asked KTN-DD representatives to distribute the assistance as equally as possible.
She argued that it was not only Klangon affected by the disaster but the whole village.
If the budget was limited, there should be a plan to rotate the assistance to other hamlets
(Interview with Sitin, Pandansari, 17 May 2015).

I asked one of DD Foundation’s staff whose responsibility was to monitor the
KTN-DD program in Pandansari about these externalities. He admitted that in some
cases the organisation could not fully implement the program as planned, specifically
in post-disaster societies. He said:

“Indeed not all of [our programs] were successful. Sometimes
we had these problems [community jealousy and polarisation].
That was our risk, the programs’ risk, the risk that we had to
face. In the field, it was really depends on facilitator that
should be clever to handle the conflict or to try not to make it
worse. In disasters usually the victims are many which is different with regular [normal situation]. In normal situation they [community members] can work by themselves. If we help some of them the rest will not be jealous. But in disaster the case is different because they [all] are in need and we only help some.” (Interview with Satria, Jakarta, 9 June 2015)

To sum up, KTN-DD through its facilitator Yasir has attempted to strengthen bonding social capital through neighbourhood and cultural roots. The result was “double-edged”, the term I borrow from Aldrich and Crook (2007: 379). On the one hand, aid recipients (Paguyuban members) internally became more solidly connected after having become quite polarised due to political tension. On the other hand, the rest of the villagers (non-Paguyuban members) experienced negative consequences in the form of aid exclusion, jealousy and grievance.

**D. The Linking Social Capital:**

The development process of linking social capital in Pandansari was different with the case of Jaluk discussed in Chapter Four. In Jaluk, linking social capital was generated because of the contributions of both the individual (Nopen) and the organisation (PSI-DD). It can be seen through Nopen’s effort to link the villagers with government agencies and PSI-DD helped in marketing and promotional assistance. In Pandansari, I was able to find very little evidence of his efforts in linking social capital due to his limited role as a village facilitator. It was KTN-DD at Bogor that contributed to the development of linking social capital through *qurban* and *aqiqah* program.107

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107 Definitions of these terms have been discussed in Chapter Four.
The *qurban* and *aqiqah* is a national-wide program run by KTN-DD. The organisation sells the cattle to Islamic communities across Indonesia for their *qurban* and *aqiqah* rituals. In this case, KTN-DD will buy cattle from livestock farmers, including the Pandansari villagers, at a good price. Therefore, the result is increased income for the farmers. In some cases, KTN-DD also encourages its beneficiaries to donate to their surroundings. According to a KTN-DD report (2016), the Paguyuban Kelud Barokah experienced a significant growth of assets. From its beginning with 72 sheep, its has raised that number to 170. The six cows, have become nine. From this increase, the Kelud Barokah members donated some cattle to the community.

From that point, we can tell that linking social capital has been produced through the production of social, religious and cultural values. As an external faith-based CSO, KTN-DD has successfully formed new linking social capital. However, we notice that the result of linking social capital formation in Pandansari occurred only after the completion of the program. This case is different from Jaluk where we observed that this type of social capital was produced since the middle of the economic recovery program cycle. The explanation for this discrepancy is, arguably, the incomplete functions of the village facilitator in Pandansari. Based on this difference, I argue that the path of community recovery in Pandansari is slower than in Jaluk.

IV. Further Analysis


Based on the discussions above, I argue that we need to investigate whether external FBOs, especially the Islamic ones, have advantages while working with beneficiaries with the same religious beliefs. In other words, does cultural proximity alone assist
with social capital formation and make aid delivery more effective? Do Islamic FBOs like PSI-DD and KTN-DD have privileges when operating in Jaluk and Pandansari?

Jonathan Benthall is among the leading theorists who study cultural proximity in the context of the Islamic world. The basic idea of cultural proximity is that if Christian organisations are able to work effectively in areas that are predominantly Christian, there is also a possibility that Islamic organisations can do the same with Muslim communities (Benthall, 2007b: 7). It is clear to Benthall, and I agree, that cultural is a “euphemism for religious” (Benthall, 2012: 66). Thus, the concept of cultural proximity was developed through an argument that Islamic FBOs can have an advantage when working with Muslim beneficiaries as a whole ummah.

Scholars (Benthall, 2007b, 2012, 2016; Cordier, 2009; Palmer, 2011) have analysed the extent to which cultural proximity helps FBOs in delivering assistance to their co-religionists. For instance, Benthall investigates the roles of two transnational Islamic organisations, namely Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid in Aceh following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. He argues that both Islamic FBOs were able to apply cultural proximity to work effectively in Islamic Aceh. Beneficiaries were happy with both organisations, particularly because their staff and leaders had good manners and socialised with them, especially through religious activities such as praying or fasting (Benthall, 2012: 76). Overall, Benthall argues that cultural proximity can be beneficial but Islamic FBOs cannot “rely on its cultural proximity to such populations as an excuse for neglecting all the other factors that make for successful aid delivery, that would be a mistake.” (Benthall, 2016: 55).

Concurring with Benthall, Cordier (2009) also contends that the extent to which Islamic FBOs are successful when operating in Muslim areas is relative and depends on numerous factors such as the role of religion in the community, the local practice
of philanthropy and the existence of other networks. Likewise, in her study on the roles of Islamic Relief in providing assistance to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Palmer (2011) demonstrates that external CSOs including Islamic ones from Western countries, tend to neglect local values. This happens because of differences in social class and the difference in the perception of external staff and aid recipients.

The studies above concentrate on transnational Islamic FBOs as external agencies. My contribution to the literature is made through the attention I give to national Islamic FBOs and in the disaster recovery phase. The findings of this study related to cultural proximity partially confirm that Islamic FBOs have advantages when working with their Muslims. This happens when external Islamic agencies, as with both PSI-DD and KTN, utilise religion and culture as stock social capital effectively. Some examples that I have demonstrated are through using the masjid, mushalla, meugang, qurban, and aqiqah.

However, as argued above, other factors also matter. Both Jaluk and Pandansari inhabitants are Muslims but they do not hold radical Islamic views. In Jaluk, with a Gayonese ethnic as majority, their religious life has been influenced by adat and animism ( Bowen, 1984, 1993). Likewise, the Pandansari villagers do not follow orthodox Islam. In his study on Islamic religiosity in Java, Geertz (1971; 1986) sorts the Javanese Muslims into three categories santri (pious Muslim), abangan (nominal Muslim) and priyayi (aristocrats). In my view, the Pandansari villagers are abangan.

The existence of PSI-DD and KTN-DD does not guarantee both organisations have privileges within these communities if they neglect local values and dynamics. Some

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108 Cordier investigates the roles of Islamic Relief and Muslim Hands in Central Asia, Iraq and Pakistan.

109 See also Azra (2006b) and Hefner (1987).
examples have been provided above, such as the criticisms from the Pandansari leader to the village facilitator and his lack of awareness of the existing political divisions within the community.

I argue that to complement the cultural proximity, CSOs, particularly the religious ones like KTN-DD and others, need to familiarise themselves with and understand the “cultural contexts” of specific communities struck by natural disasters (Chamlee-Wright, 2010; James and Paton, 2015). In their study on disaster recovery in a Buddhist society in Myanmar (2008’s Cyclone Nargis) and Taiwan (the 1999 Chi Chi earthquake and 2009’s Typhoon Morakot), James and Paton (2015) emphasise the need to accommodate the local contexts of each locality.

B. The Power of Nrimo

How do the Pandansari people recover when social capital, which was expected to help the recovery process, provides adverse results? Local communities often utilise indigenous values embedded in their daily life. (Campbell JR, 1990; Ellemor, 2011). Practising indigenous beliefs will help disaster survivors to reinforce “their persistence in dealing with complex, evolving problems during recovery” (James and Paton, 2015: 219). In their study on disaster recovery after the 1999 Chi Chi earthquake in Taiwan, James and Paton (2015) demonstrate the embedded he Hakka spirit in Taiwan was beneficial in helping the Hakka people to strengthen their bonding social capital.

In the context of Pandansari, the indigenous practice is nrimo which translates as “to accept” or “acceptance”. Some Indonesian scholars (Irawanto et al., 2011; Napitupulu, 1968) contend that nrimo is a distinctive Javanes culture. I argue that its uniqueness is a matter of semantics. The practice of nrimo can be found elsewhere.
*Nrimo*, to some extent, shares the connotation of *sabar* (patient) where Muslims have to accept it when something bad happens to them. Likewise, James and Paton (2015: 222–223) mentioned the practice of “acceptance” in Taiwanese and Hakka society.

Nevertheless, *nrimo* is arguably one important indigenous tool for Javanese society to use to cope with disasters. It helps the community to recover and get back to their normal life. This is evident in communities affected by the 2006 earthquake (Zaumseil et al., 2014) and 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption (both in Yogyakarta). In the case of the Mt. Kelud eruption I found a similar experience where community members accepted the situation. On many occasions during my interaction with Pandansari villagers, I heard “*nrimo*” repeatedly spoken. The most common response to the disaster that I got was “*mo gimana lagi mas? Yo wes nrimo*” (so what else is there to do *Mas*? That is it [just] accept).¹¹⁰

We found some paradoxes in the community where they had practised *nrimo* but they were jealous or complained about unequal distribution of aid. My explanation is that *nrimo* is utilised, where a community cannot find any other alternative. Nonetheless, I argue that the concept of *nrimo* could be helpful to assist a disaster affected community, particularly those who are affected by negative externalities of social capital. *Nrimo* is unique to Javanese society. It is a Javanese’s “community competence” (James and Paton, 2016a: 8) or community (collective) efficacy (Norris et al., 2008; Paton et al., 2008) which requires building resilience and recovery. Further research might be needed to make *nrimo* more measurable.

¹¹⁰ *Mas* is Javanese calling for men or boys.
V. Conclusion

This chapter has answered the research question: in what ways are external CSOs able to create positive social capital or possibly weaken the social capital in the affected society? External CSOs are able to produce positive impacts from social capital formation but they also create negative effects. This may affect community recovery and resilience. That is obvious in Pandansari village through the economic recovery program delivered by KTN-DD.

KTN-DD has been partially effective in building bonding and linking social capital, but there was a missed opportunity in relational and bridging social capital. Several factors were behind this failure but it was mainly due to the inadequate role of the village facilitator. Furthermore, as social capital has been developed, negative externalities occurred in the form of aid exclusion and grievances.

KTN-DD and PSI-DD come from the same division of economic recovery of the DD Foundation. But why were the results of social capital development contradictory? I argue that the contexts were different. Firstly, the type of disaster was different. After the earthquake, DMC-DD came directly to the village and helped with building social capital through their emergency relief. In the case of the Mt. Kelud eruption where people needed to leave their villages, efforts towards social capital development were made harder because the shelter was utilised by diverse communities. Secondly, the functioning of the village facilitator impacted the social capital development. Both KTN-DD and PSI-DD have a similar practice of placing a dedicated person to live-in and link to the community. This did not happen in Pandansari, as Yasir remained living outside the village and visited it infrequently. Thirdly, the local settings were different. Jaluk is a comparably small village with a total of 195 households. Jaluk is fragile as it is a post-conflict area but their existing
bonding social capital is high due to strong kinship. Helping half of the village population was probably acceptable. In contrast, Pandansari has 1,505 households. Assistance to 60 families covered only four per cent of the total population. The village was not affected by armed conflict, but the community was polarised by political interests. Inattention to local context could harm the society.

The findings from Pandansari highlighted that the Islamic KTN-DD could not rely solely on cultural proximity when delivering aid to Muslims beneficiaries. The organisation needs to understand localities and perform well to avoid negative externalities. Fortunately, the Javanese have *nrimo* embedded in their daily practice which possibly could assist them to recover and increase their resilience as quickly as the Gayonese in Jaluk. Another equally important factor is understanding “cultural contexts” (James and Paton, 2015) where each locality has specific characteristics. Combining cultural proximity with cultural contexts is largely beneficial for Islamic CSOs if they want their economic recovery programs and efforts towards social capital formation to succeed.
Chapter Six

The Government and Gap Fillers in Indonesian Disaster Recovery: Lessons Learnt from the Field

I. Introduction

Two recent chapters (Four and Five) have highlighted the contribution of CSOs, that of PSI-DD and KTN-DD, in delivering economic recovery assistance to the communities affected by the 2013 Gayo earthquake and the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption respectively. Both chapters have answered number one and partially answered number three of the main research questions stated in Chapter One. This chapter will attempt to complete the answer to question number three: to what extent do external civil society groups, along with other disaster management agencies, contribute to providing disaster (economic) recovery aid in the aftermath of disasters in Indonesia? To do that, I have set the following specific questions. If civil society groups like PSI-DD and KTN-DD have played their roles, what are the contributions of other agencies? To what extent are government efforts in disaster recovery effective?

I propose three main arguments in this chapter. Firstly, despite government claims that its disaster management agencies have a long involvement in disaster in and in managing complex emergencies in the country, I argue that their work, especially recovery efforts in my research areas, has not been completely successful. Secondly, all agencies, both government and non-government have played different roles in disaster recovery. While the Indonesian government has the main responsibility in disaster management, their capacity is limited. I argue that this gap is the area which should be filled by other actors, mainly CSOs. Thirdly, it is important for each agency to work collaboratively in the recovery period. As I will demonstrate
later, the findings of this study demonstrate that each agency, including the government, tends to work on its own which arguably has less impact than if they worked collaboratively. In Chapter Three I argued that partnership or collaboration has been seen recently to give greater benefits to Indonesian societies than can be provided by organisations working on their own. This partnership was missing in the recovery phase. In this chapter I emphasise again the importance of collaborative works in governing disaster recovery, which ultimate leads to positive effects such as rapid community recovery and increasing resilience.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, I argue that the practice of disaster management by government agencies, and especially in the recovery period, has been influenced by the global and local contexts. I will briefly examine or analyse the relevant global frameworks for disaster management. Responding to this, the Indonesian government has conducted some key actions to adopt global frameworks such as through implementing better legal and institutional policies. I argue that two key policies resulting from this are the legalisation of the Disaster Management Law Number 24 Year 2007 and the establishment of the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). I will analyse these policies to provide a background for contextualising the empirical findings of my case studies.

The next section provides evidence of the government’s role in disaster recovery in Gayo and Mt. Kelud. The findings from the fieldwork demonstrate that recovery efforts by the government in Gayo were relatively better coordinated than in the case of Mt. Kelud. However, the implementation of recovery activities by government agencies both in Gayo and Mt. Kelud has been delayed. I argue that this delay consequently contributed to the slow community recovery and resilience.
process. In other words, a gap opened up when the government was not able to achieve what it was supposed to. Finally, the last section discusses efforts by non-state actors (other than PSI-DD and KTN-DD discussed earlier in Chapter Four and Five) to act as gap fillers to cover government limitations in Gayo and Mt. Kelud.

II. Disaster Management Framework in Global Perspectives

Natural disasters across the world can hamper development, thus, there have been attempts by the global community to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities in the most affected regions. These efforts can be traced back to the late 1980s when the term “sustainable development” was first coined in development studies (Wisner et al., 2003). On 22 December, 1989, countries issued a resolution through the United Nations (No. A/RES/44/236), calling for international action to reduce risk and vulnerability, particularly in developing countries.\(^\text{111}\) It was triggered by the fact that natural disasters in the previous two decades across the globe had caused the loss of three million lives, affected 800 million people, and caused economic losses amounting to more than $23 billion.\(^\text{112}\)

The 1989 solution had two results. Firstly, the International Framework of Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction stated that actions were required at the national and international level to minimise the impact of natural disasters. Secondly, the establishment of the International Decade for Natural Disaster


Reduction (IDNDR) in January 1990 raised awareness of disaster-related issues.\textsuperscript{113} Not long after that, the first World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (WCNDR) was held in Yokohama in May 1994. The result was a consensus entitled the “Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation”.\textsuperscript{114}

After a decade, the second conference was conducted in Hyogo, Japan in January 2005. The name of the conference was slightly changed from WCNDR to the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR) which indicates a paradigm shift that increased the focus on reducing the risk of disasters. Representatives from 168 countries (state and non-state institutions) participated in the WCDRR. The result of the conference was a 10-year master plan for disaster risk reduction entitled “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters” (HFA). As an internationally agreed framework, the ultimate outcome of HFA was to significantly reduce “disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries” (UNISDR 2007, p. 3). There are five actions that should be taken as a matter of priority; 1) ensuring disaster risk reduction is a priority at the national and local level; 2) identification of disaster risks and improving early warning systems; 3) Building a safety and resilience culture through knowledge, innovation and education; 4) Reducing the risks; and 5) strengthening preparedness for an effective response (UNISDR 2007, pp. 5-6). To achieve all of these expected goals, the government holds

\textsuperscript{113} The IDNDR then changed to become the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) in 2000. The UNISDR is an intra-agency unit under the auspices of the UN and is still operating now, focusing on disaster risk reduction issues. See more at https://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/history (accessed 7 November 2016).

\textsuperscript{114} https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/8241 (accessed 9 November 2016).
the primary responsibility and other parties, such as the CSOs, have been promoted in the HFA as “vital stakeholders” to work together with the government (UNISDR 2007, p. 13).

In 2015, as HFA’s term ended, the third WCDRR was held in Sendai. The international community agreed on a new framework called the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. It has four priorities for action that include “understanding disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk, investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience, and, enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction” (UNISDR, 2015: 14).

All of the global frameworks described above, although different in terms of timeframe, share one thing in common, the notion that disasters have to be managed properly. The shared goal is to reduce the negative consequences caused by disasters. Additionally, as these frameworks are built on consensus among countries, although they are not binding, it is important for each country to adopt them. In the following section, I will examine the ways in which Indonesia adopted these global frameworks and what efforts have been made towards them, particularly in the context of the recovery of Gayo and Mt. Kelud.

III. Localising the Global Frameworks into the Indonesian Context

I argue that the Indonesian government has partially adopted the international frameworks into its local context. Concurrently, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami has become a catalyst that triggered the creation of new policies in disaster management practices in Indonesia. I propose to discuss two key policies mentioned above, that of
the development of the Disaster Management Law and National Disaster Management Agency in 2007 and 2008 respectively.

A. The Disaster Management Law 24/2007

The Disaster Management Law, passed in 2007, is a considerable achievement for Indonesia. It is not only as a national tool that reflects the global framework of HFA, but also a policy developed as a response to the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami. Hening (2014) contends that it was CSOs that initially proposed the Disaster Management Law, and it was discussed with members of Indonesian parliaments and the Minister of Social Affairs in March 2005. The Disaster Management Law took almost three years to be enacted by the Indonesian Parliament. The legislative process was long because of extensive procedures in drafting and because of the different perceptions on disaster management of the government and the Parliament’s members. Nonetheless, after its enactment, the Disaster Management Law has been functioning and represents a fundamental change in disaster management practices in Indonesia.

The Disaster Management Law mainly consists of eight aspects (Hening, 2014: 50–51). Firstly, a paradigm shift has occurred in three elements, including the response to risk management, local government now has more decentralised power, and there is shared responsibility between the government and wider community. Secondly, the need for good political will and policy improvement at all levels is recognised. Thirdly,

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115 In Chapter Three, I have argued that the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a catalyst for better disaster management practices in Indonesia.

116 The draft of the Law was completed in December 2005, and officially legalised in April 2007.
there has been a process of institutionalisation of new agencies for disaster management, which will be elaborated shortly. Fourthly, the implementation of disaster management activities is now based on the disaster management cycle. Fifth, rights as well as obligations of citizens are recognised. Sixth, the role of the private sector and international communities is recognised. Seventh, mechanisms for relief management which include coordination, community participation, accountability and transparency have been developed. Finally, a system has been developed to monitor all activities of disaster management. These elements are generally derived from the HFA’s mandates (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Disaster management cycle and its breakdown activities according to Disaster Management Law 24/2007. The figure developed by author.
I point out that there are two significant flaws in the Disaster Management Law and these are outlined below. During my fieldwork, I found that CSO activists had documented a List of Problems with the Disaster Management Law (Paripurno and Andaruni, 2012). They have been advocating for the Law’s amendment. For the purpose of this study, I present two flaws.

Firstly, in terms of responsibility in disaster management, the Disaster Management Law openly declared that the government has the main responsibility for disaster management. Article 5 of Chapter III of the Disaster Management Law on Responsibility and Authority clearly states that “government and regional governments shall bear responsibility for disaster management” (The President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007: 6). This responsibility is shared with the community, the private sector and international organisations. However, there is no clear description of how that responsibility should be shared or how that sharing should take place in each phase of disaster management. Additionally, the Disaster Management Law did not explicitly mention the role of CSOs, including religious and adat organisations. In response to this flaw, CSO activists have proposed that religious and adat groups should be included in the Disaster Management Law. During my fieldwork, I attended a consultation meeting between representatives of CSOs and members of the Indonesian Parliament at which representatives of CSOs encouraged the government to be more inclusive in their policies towards disaster management.117

The second flaw in the Disaster Management Law was the definition of the disaster management cycle which goes against the most common international framework. The Disaster Management Law divides the disaster cycle into three stages;

117 The meeting held on 15 April 2015 at the Indonesian Parliament building, Jakarta.
pre-disaster, emergency and post-disaster, as illustrated in the Figure 6.1. This is quite different to the commonly accepted four phase disaster management cycle, that of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

For decades, there have been attempts by both scholars and practitioners to define phases of disasters (Neal, 1997; Phillips et al., 2011). The earliest attempt was conducted by Carr (1932, in Neal 1997) who divided disasters into four phases, the preliminary, dislocation and disorganisation, readjustment and reorganisation, and confusion-delay phase. Carr’s effort was followed by many scholars like Powell (1954, in Neal 1997) who defined eight phases of the disaster cycle; pre-disaster, warning, threat, impact, inventory, rescue, remedy, and recovery. Next, Stoddard (1968, in Neal 1997) categorised disasters into seven stages; pre-emergency, emergency (warning, threat and evacuation, dislocation relocation), and post-emergency (short-term and long-term rehabilitation).

Adopting aspects from the attempts above, efforts by scholars and practitioners to define the disaster management cycle continue. In 1979, the National Governor’s Association (NGA) of the USA produced a report entitled “Comprehensive Emergency Management” (CEM) which has been used by many international organisations or other countries in their disaster management and is widely used now. The CEM describes four phases of disasters; mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The first phase, mitigation, includes efforts conducted to “eliminate or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster” (National Governors’ Association, 1979: 12). This includes activities to minimise impacts and vulnerabilities to a disaster, such as building to safety codes, zoning and other attempts to make the people more resilient in the event of a disaster. The second phase, preparedness, includes activities aimed at building a community’s readiness to face a catastrophic event. Some
examples for this phase are providing emergency training, practising disaster drills and creating warning systems. The third phase, response, refers to the actions taken immediately following a disaster, such as “search and rescue, emergency shelter, medical care, mass feeding” (National Governors’ Association, 1979: 13). Finally, recovery, refers to the stage where recovery “activities continue until all systems return to normal or better” (National Governors’ Association, 1979: 13). This recovery phase is divided into the short-term and long-term. While the former lasts for six months to one year, the long-term can mean years or decades after the disaster.\textsuperscript{118} These four disaster management phases do not happen in order or as a linear process but are “multidimensional”, not “mutually exclusive” (Neal, 1997: 250) and “often overlap and the length of each phase greatly depends on the severity of the disaster” (Shaw and Izumi, 2014: 328).

The CEM is arguably the most commonly used and accepted disaster management cycle by scholars and practitioners. I attempt to compare the differences between the NGA and the Disaster Management Law’s framework in reference to the disaster management cycle. Pre-disaster refers to mitigation and preparedness, the emergency phase refers to the response, and post-disaster means recovery. In relation to the recovery phase, we can see that the government bears responsibilities in managing both rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. These activities are gigantic and need vast resources. The findings below demonstrate that the government cannot undertake all of these tasks effectively.

\textsuperscript{118} \url{http://RestoreYourEconomy.org} (accessed 27 November 2015).
B. National and Regional Disaster Management Agency

Similar to the Disaster Management Law, the development of both national and regional government disaster management agencies (BNPB and BPBD) have been driven by global and local influences. The functions of BNPB and BPBD were to adopt the HFA global blueprint. The local agencies were created as a response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the mandate of the Disaster Management Law. In their research on organisational and institutional changes in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, Birkmann et al. (2010) argue that it was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that triggered the development of new disaster management agencies in both countries. In the Disaster Management Law (Chapter IV on Institution), it was stated that, as the Indonesian government bears the main responsibility for disaster management in Indonesia, they shall establish national and local institutions in the field of disaster management (The President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007).

The BNPB was initiated in 2008 based on Presidential Decree No 8. It is a non-departmental government institution that is directly responsible to the President of Indonesia (equal to ministry level). While the BNPB operates at the national level, the BPBD operates at the regional level, both provincial and district. The provincial BPBD reports to the Governor and the district BPBD reports to the Regent or Mayor. The relationship between BNPB and BPBD is reflected through coordination between them, not reporting to each other. Despite their difference, the three levels of government agencies share some important tasks, as outlined in the Disaster Management Law summarised in the Figure 6.1 earlier. As government

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119 Based on this reporting responsibility, this chapter uses national, provincial and district government as synonymous to BNPB, provincial BPBD and district BPBD respectively.
representatives, the BNPBs and BPBDs are assisted by the military and supporting ministries such as Ministry of Social Welfare and Ministry of National Development Planning.

On its website, BNPB states that its roots can be traced back to colonial times.\textsuperscript{120} I argue that despite the government’s claim about the long involvement of government agencies in disaster management practice, the findings from my case study areas show that the government’s recovery projects were not effective. Before going into the case studies, let me present a summary of the policies and the evolution of disaster management practices in Indonesia. I have divided them based on political periods, similar to Chapter Three\textsuperscript{121}.

Firstly, during the Sukarno period, as a newly established country, some policies were made but they largely addressed the disaster response phase. The disaster management agency was located in Jakarta. On 20 August, 1945, the Indonesian government set up an organisation called Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (Agency to Support War Victims and Family, BPKKP). This organisation aimed at helping the victims and their families of the war for independence against Dutch and Japanese occupation. Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Force, BKR) was eventually established as a part of BPKKP to serve as guardians of the community. In the long run, the BKR has been transformed into the current Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Defence Forces, TNI). Furthermore, in response to the 1960 cyclone and flood in Maluku and the 1961 landslides in some places in Sumatra, Java and Nusa Tenggara, Sukarno issued Presidential Decree number 54 on the

\textsuperscript{120} https://www.bnpb.go.id/home/sejarah (accessed 13 November 2016).

\textsuperscript{121} See \url{http://www.bnpb.go.id/profil} (accessed 13 November 2016), also Djalante and Thomalla (2012), Hening (2014) and Lassa (2013).
establishment of Panitia Penampungan Bencana Alam (Committee for Sheltering from Natural Disasters, PPBA). According to the decree, the committee was led by the President and served as a permanent coordinating body across the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Works and Energy, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health. It can be seen that the disaster management focus was shifted from man-made disasters to natural disasters.

On 14 December, 1966, another Presidential Decree, number 256, was issued on the wind up of the PPBA and the establishment of a new institution called Badan Pertimbangan Penanggulangan Bencana Alam Pusat (Central Advisory Board for Natural Disaster Management, BP2BAP). While the BP2BAP has similar functions to the PPBA in managing emergency relief, the difference between the two could be seen in their leadership. Due to the political turmoil of that period, it was the Minister of Social Welfare who led the BP2BAP.

The Suharto period was similar to the Sukarno period in the sense that regulations were issued in response to specific events. The difference was that the focus had been extended to recovery and preparedness to adopt the Yokohama framework. Disaster governance was centralised but Suharto established local institutions to help the national government. In 1967, the BP2BAP was replaced by Tim Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Alam (National Coordination Team for Natural Disasters Management, TKNPBA) based on Presidium Cabinet Decree 14/U/KEP/I/1967. Then on 18 June 1979, Suharto issued decree No 28 on the establishment of Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana Alam (National Coordinating Body for Natural Disasters Management, Bakornas PBA). Led by a Coordinating Minister of Peoples’ Welfare, the scope of disaster management
was expanded to cover not only the emergency phases but also the recovery period. Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksanaan Penanggulangan Bencana Alam (Coordinating Unit for Implementing Natural Disaster Management, Satkorlak PBA) was established at the provincial level. In 1990, another Presidential Decree (number 43) was released. The decree further extended the scope of disaster management to cover mitigation, emergency relief and rehabilitation and reconstruction. The focus was not only on natural disasters but also man-made disasters. The change was most likely driven by the Yokohama framework outlined above.

Similar the discussion in Chapter Three, the remarkable progress in disaster management was after 2004, in the post-Suharto period. The beginning of this period was marked by several conflicts in Aceh, Poso and Maluku that led to a massive number of refugees. In response to that issue, Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Coordination Agency for Disaster Management, Bakornas PB) was established. In 2001, Presidential Decrees numbered 03 and 111 were issued to restructure the Bakornas PB into Bakornas PBP (National Coordinating Board for Disaster and Refugee Management/Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungs). After 2004, the paradigm of government intervention has shifted to more towards disaster prevention and management. Presidential Decree number 83/2005 was issued to restructure the Bakornas PBP to become the Bakornas PB. The difference between the 2005 Bakornas PB and the one created in 1999 was that the former was given day-to-day management responsibilities while the latter was responsive to the occasional need. This period was also marked by the shift in global attention towards improving lives of people through the Disaster Risk Reduction approach and the HFA 2005-2015. In 2008, the BNPB was established and then eventually its regional branches of BPBD were also created.
My analysis of the evolvement of Indonesian disaster management agencies highlights two basic differences between BNPB and the agencies it replaced. Firstly, BNPB has branches reaching down to the district level. As of 2015, all 34 provinces in Indonesia have BPBD representation and about 468 have BPBD out of a total 514 districts/cities across the country (Saepuddin, 2015). Secondly, BNPB has more functions involving not only the implementation of disaster management but also the formulation of policies. According to its website, the general functions of BNPB are the development of disaster management policies, handling refugees, and coordination of the implementation of comprehensive disaster management activities as planned.

From the historical timeline above, the transformation of designated government institutions for disaster management was supposed to produce better results in disaster management practice.

I began this section by arguing that the functions of the national BNPB and the regional BPBD were mandated by the global HFA. Their main responsibility is stated in the Disaster Management Law. The question to investigate is how successful the functioning of these government agencies has been. Let us examine their recovery efforts in the case of Gayo and Mt. Kelud in the following section.

IV. Governing Gayo and Kelud: Findings on BNPB and BPBD

In this section, I analyse the role of BNPB and BPBD in managing recovery activities after the Gayo earthquake and Mt. Kelud eruption to examine whether their functions have been effective. Studies on the governance of disaster recovery by Indonesian

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122 Unfortunately no available data on updated number of BPBD in 2017.
government agencies mainly took place before the Disaster Management Law and the establishment of BNPB and BPBD. This is the case, for instance, for studies on the 2004 Aceh tsunami (Clarke et al., 2010; Jayasuriya and McCawley, 2010; Shaw et al., 2006) and the 2006 Jogjakarta earthquake (Joakim and Wismer, 2015; Kusumasari and Alam, 2012a). Studies on the role of government in the recovery phases of disasters that occurred after 2008 are scarce. One of the few scholars that focuses on this issue is Sulistiyanto (2014). In his research on the role of both the local and central government in responding to the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruptions in Yogyakarta, Sulistiyanto (2014) demonstrates that there was poor disaster governance by both the local and national government. Some issues raised were, for instance, the lack of coordination and management between the provincial and district government agencies, data inaccuracy, reduced payments for the survivors and political tension between the local leader of Yogyakarta (Sultan Hamengkubuwono X) and the Indonesian President (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at that time).

Years after the Merapi eruptions in 2010, have government agencies learnt from the recovery in Yogyakarta and from other disaster-affected areas? The findings of this study suggest that it depends on the context. Both the BNPB and BPBD in Gayo performed better that in Mt. Kelud. However, it does mean that the governance of disaster recovery in Gayo was completely positive. I separate the analysis into three aspects: recovery planning, organisational strength and coordination, and the implementation of recovery.

A. Recovery Planning

I measure the extent to which government agencies have been successful in recovery planning in Indonesia through the process of developing a planning document called
the Renaksi (Rencana Aksi/Action Plan). As I will explain shortly, the Renaksi is an instrumental policy document that influences the results of recovery. In Gayo, the development of Renaksi brought a positive outcome. The evidence was the enactment of the “Action Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction After the Earthquake Disaster for District of Central Aceh and Bener Meriah Year 2013-2014”. It was signed and endorsed by the Head of BNPB (Peraturan Kepala BNPB) and numbered 01/2013. The date of endorsement was 30 August, 2013 which means the regulation was issued exactly one month after the earthquake. In contrast to the Mt. Kelud case in which the Renaksi had still not been agreed to or signed in 2015, one year after the eruption. What explains this difference? I contend that it was due to complexities of budgeting process and politicisation of the disaster.

Let me firstly discuss the process of Renaksi development. The Disaster Management Law (article 35 and 36) specifies that every region, either province or district/municipality, has a responsibility to prepare a plan for all phases of disaster management (The President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2007). In the pre-disaster phase, the plan focuses on building preparedness and mitigation. The plan includes a mechanism and guidelines for disaster preparedness and mitigation, including preparation of a contingency plan. In the phase of disaster, the government has to develop an Operational Plan for managing emergency activities. This includes an allocation of a budget for emergency calls Dana Siap Pakai (Ready to Use Budget, DSP). Lastly, in the recovery phase, a Renaksi is needed.

The development of a Renaksi is based on two assessments conducted by the BNPB and BPBD jointly called the Damages and Losses Assessment and Human Recovery Needs Assessment. These assessments focus on the following five elements: housing and settlement, infrastructure, economy, social, and cross-cutting sectors
(governance, security and banking). In the context of both the 2013 Gayo earthquake and the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption, the UNDP Indonesia provided technical assistance to the government in conducting assessments and developing Renaksi. Results from the assessments were further developed into detailed resources, i.e. recovery activities, timeline and financial (budget). All levels of government agencies (national, provincial and district) had to agree and share responsibility for these aspects.

In the Gayo earthquake, the agreements between the three levels of government were reached, which led to the enactment of the Gayo Renaksi mentioned above. The district BPBD was responsible for implementing recovery activities. The provincial and national agencies took part in monitoring and evaluation. In relation to a timeline, the three levels of agencies agreed that the recovery should start immediately and run until December 2014. In relation to budgeting, the allocations were also clear. The total approved budget for the recovery was IDR 862,929,000,000 (AUD 86 Million). There was no financial responsibility attached to the district government, rather it was shared between the provincial and national government. The latter covered most of the recovery cost.

The shared budget was in the housing reconstruction activities. The government has three classifications of the damage level of affected houses: heavy, medium and light. The national government allocated the budget for reconstruction of heavy-damaged homes at IDR 40 million (AUD 4,000), medium-damaged at IDR 20 million (AUD 2,000) and light-damaged homes at IDR 10 million (AUD 1,000). However, the estimated cost for heavy and medium damaged houses was higher than the allocated fund, estimated to be IDR 60 million (AUD 6,000) and IDR 25 million (AUD 2,500) respectively. As the BNPB had only IDR 40 million for the heavily-damaged houses, the Aceh government was willing to fill the gap by financing the
remaining IDR 20 million. Likewise, in addition to the BNPB’s IDR 20 million allocated to medium-damaged houses, the Aceh government provided an extra IDR 5 million (AUD 500). In summary, there were clearly defined responsibilities divided among the district, provincial and government agencies.\(^\text{124}\)

The Mt. Kelud case was similar to that in Gayo’s context, except for the process of reaching the agreement on a budget for recovery fund.\(^\text{125}\) The estimated funds needed for the recovery were IDR 436,555,947,399 (AUD 43 million). In July 2015, the draft of the Mt. Kelud Renaksi was endorsed at the district level. At the provincial level, the process of budgeting was stuck. The reason was political. When Mt. Kelud erupted a year ago, the Governor of East Java told the media that he would allocate IDR 1 trillion (AUD 100 million) to the recovery (Ali, 2014). The national government heard this news. They considered IDR 1 trillion to be enough to fund the recovery activities, so they waited to make sure the Governor kept his promise.\(^\text{126}\) In the end, the IDR 1 trillion in funds was a false political promise and the required money was actually not available.

The tension between both the provincial and national governments can be seen in the following contradicting statements. The East Java BPBD perceived that they have fulfilled their responsibility and used their available budget. According to the Head Executive of East Java BPBD:

\(^{124}\) For details of the funding responsibilities see BNPB (2013: 82).

\(^{125}\) In relation to the specific funding for disaster recovery in Indonesia, the money comes mainly from the state budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara, APBN) and the local budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah, APBD), and in some cases, grants from donor agencies. The district government holds the primary responsibility to ensure a budget is available. If the district fund is insufficient, the district will ask for support from the provincial government. If both the provincial and district government need more financial support, they can request it from the BNPB.

\(^{126}\) The total damage was AUD 115,000 as stated in Chapter One.
“We are confident that we have done at best. There is no at other province that when a disaster occurred it was declared directly as provincial disaster [main responsibility of district level]. We did not beg [from other] but directly spent our money. Then they [BNPB/national government] talked about the Renaksi. I mean for those at Central [national government] level try to coordinate well first so the accumulated [budget] can be found. We filled the gap by giving [IDR] 60 billion. So, the Central should coordinate well. Not only us who were required but the Central could decide. Was the Renaksi required? We had already proposed [the fund]. (Interview with Sudarmawan, Surabaya, 5 June 2015)

When I presented Sudarmawan’s opinion to a BNPB representative, the latter argued that it was responsibility of the East Java BPBD. The national BNPB will help only if the district and provincial governments are unable to deliver recovery assistance. The BNPB’s Social Economy Director for Rehabilitation and Recovery Division says:

“Actually [the required fund] was not big and based on the law the most responsible agency was at the district level. If the district was not capable then the province, then the Central. From the analysis, it was not proper to be in Central [government’s responsibility]. We are the Central ready to help……. But the Renaksi cannot go alone. It has to be proposed to the Central because in the law there is no formulation that the money will automatically come. Still has to be based on proposal [formal request] from the local. Try to see the laws. [The proposal] was not exist (Interview with Siswanto, Jakarta 11 June 2015).

In response to the tension above, the UNDP that was involved in the development of the Renaksi attempted act as a mediator between the central and
provincial governments. On 25 March 2015, the UNDP facilitated a meeting between the BPBD and BNPB. It was revealed that the promised IDR 1 trillion did not exist (Interview with Rinto, UNDP, Yogyakarta, 25 May 2015). When my fieldwork was completed in September 2015 (which is more than a year after the Mt. Kelud eruption), the process of negotiation was still ongoing. The complexities mentioned above, particularly relating to the budgeting process, have led to different results in the Gayo and Mt. Kelud areas.

**B. Decentralisation Effect: Organisational Strength and Coordination**

The previous chapter noted that following the collapse of the New Order era in 1998, there were dramatic changes in the post-Suharto era. Booth (2005) argues that the post-Suharto period was marked by the decentralisation of power and governance was shared with local leadership. Evidence of this can be found in Law Number 22 on Local Governance passed in 1999. In contrast to the Suharto period when all resources and power were centralised, Law 22/1999 details the new decentralised Indonesia. In short, there was more autonomous power at both the provincial and district/municipality levels.\(^{127}\)

By autonomous power I mean that each district had to develop its own capacities. In relation to disaster management agencies, each local BPBD, particularly at the district level, should have adequate capacity (Table 6.1.). In this regard, the level of institutional capacity of BPBD was categorised as being either Level A or B as regulated by the Instruction of Minister of Internal Affairs 46/2008. Level A indicates a strong institutional capacity of local agency while Level B refers to a relatively

\(^{127}\) For more on decentralisation see for example Aspinall and Fealy (2003); Hill (2014).
weaker BPBD. The BPBD in Central Aceh and Bener Meriah were established in 2010 and graded as level A BPBDs. The BPBD of Malang and Blitar were found, in 2011 and 2012 respectively, also to be level A BPBDs.

In contrast, the BPBD in Kediri was classified as level B. The reason for this was the lack of political will and its limited resources. The development of the BPBD at district level was the responsibility of the Regent. In Kediri, there was no initiative from the Regent to support the BPBD. As a result, the BPBD Kediri had weaknesses in planning and implementing disaster management activities, including recovery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of Capacities</th>
<th>Blitar BPBD</th>
<th>Malang BPBD</th>
<th>Kediri BPBD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPBD Level</td>
<td>A level</td>
<td>A level</td>
<td>B Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local legal framework</td>
<td>Local law for DRR enacted</td>
<td>Local law for DRR enacted</td>
<td>No local law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning document</td>
<td>Developed DRR plan</td>
<td>Developed DRR plan</td>
<td>No plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgeting</td>
<td>Allocated budget</td>
<td>Allocated budget</td>
<td>Allocated budget only after 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking strength</td>
<td>Medium extensive with emergency actors</td>
<td>Medium extensive with emergency and DRR actors</td>
<td>Limited network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and support for disaster management</td>
<td>Infrastructure and personnel equipped</td>
<td>Infrastructure and personnel equipped</td>
<td>Limited. Infrastructure and personnel not equipped</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Comparison between three BPBDs in the Mt. Kelud case. Source UNDP & FAO (2016), modified by author.
One negative result of the limitations of BPBD Kediri was its limited coordination with other BPBDs. As Kelud affected three districts, the Kediri BPBD has to coordinate with the Malang and Blitar BPBDs. However, the coordination between these three agencies was difficult (Wasono, 2015).

In contrast to Mt. Kelud, the findings in Gayo showed that the coordination between government agencies in the Central Aceh and Bener Meriah districts was efficient because they were at the same level (A). They were also able to develop good coordination with provincial and national agencies. The Aceh government and the Central Aceh government developed a father-son relationship. This indicates the strong family relationship as discussed in Chapter Four. While the district government could sometimes bypass the provincial level by communicating directly with the national government, it can be understood as a consequence of decentralisation. According to the Head of Rehabilitation of Reconstruction of Aceh BPBD:

“[Coordination] is maintained, a must, still as father and son. Not an obligatory but now we have autonomy so they can go directly to the Central. For example, if they need more budget they can go there because we do not have budget here. So they can ask [the Central] immediately. Sometimes we were informed but sometimes not because of the autonomy. They considered themselves to be stand-alone but actually if the autonomy the province is still the parent….The most important thing is that the people are supported”. (Interview with Teuku Bustamam, Banda Aceh, 16 September 2015)

The good coordination between Central Aceh BPBD and BNPB is expressed below:

“[Coordination with the BNPB] was good. Whatever we say it was about the budget [availability]. They [BNPB] tried hard. In
addition to the housing, they also support the infrastructure. There are some roads that were reconstructed particular in Ketol [Subdistrict of Central Aceh] we had five roads been paved by the Central.” (Interview with Zulkifli, Secretary of BPBD Central Aceh, Takengon, 27 August 2015).

From the situation outlined above, we clearly see that the unequal level of BPBDs had caused a lack of coordination. As this is evident in the Mt. Kelud case, I argue that this weakness has contributed to the delay of recovery and resilience building.

C. Recovery Implementation

The implementation of economic disaster management by government agencies in the aftermath of the Gayo earthquake and the Mt. Kelud eruption was short-term and delayed. Unlike other organisations that focus mainly on economic recovery, which I shall discuss shortly, recovery efforts by the government mainly focus on physical and economic recovery. After the Gayo earthquake, the physical recovery involved the reconstruction of damaged houses and public infrastructure. After the Mt. Kelud eruption, the physical recovery assistance involved renovating damaged roofs and public buildings.

In terms of economic recovery, the government implemented a cash-for-work program for the earthquake victims. Households with heavy and medium-damaged houses received IDR 50,000 (AUD 5) for two months and this was reduced to one month for those whose houses were only slightly damaged. The cash-for-work programs have been implemented in many emergency areas. Overall, it brings

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128 For some scholarly works on cash-for-works see e.g. Doocy et al. (2006), Farrington and Slater (2006), and Harvey (2007).
benefits, but the impact is short-term. Therefore, I argue that economic recovery programs by the government should not be considered an aspect of sustainable development. In the case of Mt. Kelud, I found little evidence of the economic recovery assistance. This was due to the lack of budget available in the Renaksi, as discussed above.

In terms of a timeline for the implementation of both Renaksi, I found that government agencies in both Gayo and Mt. Kelud delayed the implementation of recovery. According to Gayo’s Renaksi, the housing construction should have started by September 2013 and been completed by December of the same year. In reality, it was only completed two years afterward. During my fieldwork in Gayo in 2015, I found that some houses were still under construction. The housing recovery project was finally targeted to be completed by the end of 2015. In relation to the recovery of other sectors, it was planned that it would be conducted between January and December 2014 (BNPB 2013). Yet, the progress was also delayed for a year. The impact was massive, with many communities temporarily living in tents or temporary shelters for a long time.

In the context of Mt. Kelud, it was more difficult to trace the progress of reconstruction due to the bottlenecks explained above. According to the Renaksi, the housing reconstruction projects should have been initiated by July 2014 and finished in December of the same year. Reconstruction in other sectors was planned from August 2014 until the end of 2015. Interestingly, in the timeline outlined in the Renaksi (BNPB, 2014: 197), there was an additional column filled with "pasca tahun 2015 (after year 2015) which means that there was a possibility that the recovery programs would continue into the following year but it was not mentioned exactly when it should be completed. Until the writing this chapter, there was no data available on the progress
of the recovery by the government in targeted areas. Similar or worse to the Gayonese society, the communities in East Java had to wait longer for the government to help them in recovery. In summary, the delay of implementation by the government has harmed community recovery and resilience in both Gayo and Mt. Kelud.

To sum up, the findings presented above demonstrate that the roles of government agencies in disaster recovery varied. The whole process of recovery depended on the local capacity of each BPBD and the socio-political contexts. This limitation by government is further complemented by other actors, which will be discussed in the next section.

V. Gap Fillers: Other Recovery Providers in Gayo and Mt. Kelud

Scholars studying disasters in other parts of the world argued that generally the government has limitations in managing relief activities. CSOs are mainly gap fillers that attempt to compliment the government efforts (Dias et al., 2013; Izumi and Shaw, 2012; Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006; Sakai et al., 2014). Those scholarly works provide examples from countries like India, Japan, Turkey and others in the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, Sakai and Fauzia (2014) argue that in the disaster relief setting, three types of non-state actors that are active namely local secular groups, local FBOs and international FBOs. However, contrary to Sakai and Fauzia (2014), in my research areas I found that the non-state actors were international secular organisations and local (national) FBOs. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that CSOs were gap fillers.

In Gayo, my findings show that in addition to the government, two agencies were involved in disaster recovery, namely Save the Children (STC) and the case
In the context of disaster recovery in Gayo, the STC implemented a program called Livelihoods and Improved Nutrition for Kids (LINK2) in the Bener Meriah District. The program was aimed to “improve the food security of small-scale coffee producing households”. The program provided livelihoods and nutritional assistance to the poor coffee grower families. However, the LINK2 program was not technically a recovery initiative. In fact, it was referred to as LINK2 because it was a continuation of the same project (LINK) that the STC had launched in the Gayo highlands. The LINK program was carried out from 2010 to 2012 and was then extended to 2015 as LINK2. These programs were funded by the Keurig Green Mountain. The company has been importing coffee to the region since the 2000s, so it is arguably fair to say that the funding could considered to be a part of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) fund.

In the areas affected by the Mt. Kelud eruption, five agencies participated in the recovery programs. They were the UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Rumah Zakat (Alms House, RZ), Al-Azhar Peduli Ummat (Al-Azhar Caring the Islamic Community, APU), and the case studied...
KTN-DD. Firstly, let us analyse the involvement of the UNDP and FAO. In Mt. Kelud, because both organisations are under the auspices of the UN, they ran an integrated project named “Support to Mount Kelud Post-Eruption Recovery”. According to their report (UNDP & FAO, 2016), the project was designed to have four outputs. Firstly, it focused on “strengthening capacities of national and local authorities to coordinate post disaster early recovery and recovery measures”. Secondly, it aimed at “strengthening capacities of national and local authorities to plan and implement post-disaster recovery measures”. Thirdly, it worked on “restoring livelihoods and developing economic opportunities of the affected population”. Fourthly, it focused on “ensuring risk-reduction principles are incorporated in recovery measures”. The responsibilities for achieving these outputs were shared equally between the UNDP and FAO. The UNDP was required to focus on the first two objectives, while the FAO focused on the others.

The UNDP started helping the Indonesian government in May 2014, two months after the eruptions. The organisation provided a variety of technical assistance in planning, implementing and monitoring disaster management activities by the government. Some examples of support provided by the UNDP were the development of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) in the form of input into the damage assessments mentioned above, contributions to drafting the Renaksi, facilitating the budgeting process of the Renaksi, mainstreaming DRR into recovery activities, and

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133 The UNDP in Indonesia was established in 1954 through the UN Technical Assistance Board. In 1960, the UNDP signed an agreement with the Indonesian government to provide development assistance (http://www.id.undp.org/content/indonesia/en/home/countryinfo.html, accessed 25 November 2016). Its counterpart, the FAO has been operating in Indonesia since 1979 and since then it has focused on food and agricultural development in the country (http://www.fao.org/indonesia/about-us0/en/, accessed 25 November 2016). The appearance of the UN agencies in Indonesia in 1970s is one example on the influx of funds from foreign donors in 1970s discussed in Chapter Three.
providing support for the post-disaster coordination system (Interview with Rinto, UNDP, Yogyakarta 15 May 2015).

The FAO program started a year later. The organisations worked on economic development in agriculture and the livestock sector. Some of the activities provided were in coordination with the BPPDs, especially in those related to livelihood policies, such as banana cultivation, livestock support and training for farmers. This program lasted until August 2016.

Other organisations involved in Mt. Kelud’s recovery were Alms House (RZ) and Al-Azhar Caring the Islamic Community (APU). In general, as both organisations are Islamic CSOs, the way RZ and APU operated was similar to PSI-DD and KTN-DD. RZ operated in Wates Subdistrict and delivered economic recovery assistance for livestock farmers similar to that provided by KTN-DD. APU worked in Puncu village of the Kediri district and provided recovery assistance to horticulture farmers similar to that provided by PSI-DD. Nonetheless, all of these Islamic CSOs have played their unique roles in disaster recovery. Further research may be needed to provide more insights on the recovery efforts made by all agencies.

134 The Rumah Zakat is an Islamic charity organisation similar to DD. It was established in 1998 by Abu Syauqi and some of his colleagues who attended Majlis Taklim Ummul Quro (Ummul Quro Islamic teaching group). Its establishment in 1998 shows that the organisation emerged in response to the economic crisis that hit the country that year. At that time, its name was Dompet Sosial Ummul Quro (Ummul Quro Social Wallet) the name clearly refers to the religious group that the founders attended. To be more general and acceptable to the public, the named was changed to Rumah Zakat in 2003 (https://www.rumahzakat.org/tentang-kami/sejarah, accessed 30 November 2016). Al-Azhar Caring the Islamic Community (APU) is an Islamic philanthropy organisation similar to DD and RZ. APU was a special unit working in disaster relief and social development as part of the Al-Azhar Foundation, one of the well-known educational institutions in Indonesia. APU was founded in 2004 which indicates that APU is a relatively new player in Indonesia, compared to other Islamic charities like DD, RZ and many others. For more on APU see its website http://alazharpeduli.com/profil (accessed 30 November 2016).
VI. Conclusion

This chapter has emphasised that disaster recovery is a complex process. This study shows that the government had inadequate capacity in managing disaster recovery in the areas affected by the Gayo earthquake and the Mt. Kelud eruption. While the recovery assistance by the government in Gayo was provided in a more efficient way than in Mt. Kelud particularly in terms of planning and coordination, I argue that the implementation of recovery in general was ineffective. Both national and regional disaster management agencies (BNPB and BPBD) in Gayo and Mt. Kelud struggled to deliver timely recovery efforts. I argue that the government agencies did not really learn from previous disasters such as the case of the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruption mentioned above.

Chapter Three argued that while collaborative works or partnerships are important, they were missing in the recovery phase in my case studies. The contribution of government and other actors in disaster recovery in Gayo and Mt. Kelud indicates that each organisation tends to work alone. The HFA has described the importance of collaborative works or partnerships to reduce disaster risk (UNISDR, 2005: 1). This means that partnership is crucial. Future collaborative works in disaster recovery involving state and non-state actors would be helpful to overcoming the challenges discussed above.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

I. Concluding Remarks

This study has examined the roles of external CSOs in providing economic recovery assistance in Indonesia in post-disaster settings. Indonesia is a country that is one of the most vulnerable to disasters, with a high degree of risks compared to some other countries. In this thesis, I have provided analyses on the degree to which external CSOs, specifically the religious ones, are able (or are not able) to strengthen the existing or social capital or develop new social capital in communities affected by natural disasters. Social capital is crucial to accelerate community recovery and enhance resilience. These analyses were guided by four following research questions:

1. To what extent do external civil society groups, along with other disaster management agencies, contribute to providing disaster (economic) recovery aid in the aftermath of disasters in Indonesia?

2. How do CSOs interact with other agencies, such as government or other organisations, in the post-disaster setting? In what ways do collaborative works i.e. partnerships and coordination, or alternatively, competition and tension, between CSOs and these agencies develop?

3. In what ways are external CSOs able to create positive social capital or produce adverse results from social capital formation in the affected society?

4. How will the findings of this study contribute to the existing theoretical discussion and policy relevance?
I summarise the findings as follows:

Firstly, the abilities of Indonesian CSOs, particularly FBOs, in social capital formation can be traced back to the colonial period, as discussed in Chapter Three. 1908 marked as the beginning of CSOs’ institutionalisation in Indonesia. Since then, CSOs have been able to generate social capital to achieve their agenda based on socio-economic and political contexts. In terms of disaster relief, CSOs, particularly FBOs, have been involved in helping people affected by disasters for decades. Their contribution has been growing significantly since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In today’s Indonesia, CSOs involved in disaster relief are mostly FBOs and this is because they have greater access to resources than secular CSOs.

Secondly, the scholarly arguments discussed in Chapter Two maintain that CSOs are capable of social capital formation which leads to communities recovering more rapidly and having greater resilience after disasters strike. However, as social capital is a “double-edged sword” (Aldrich and Crook, 2007: 379) or is “Janus-faced” (Szreter, 2002: 575), it can have benefits and create downsides at the same time. From the case study in Jaluk village in Gayo (Chapter Four), PSI-DD demonstrated that external agency was able to strengthen the existing social capital (bonding) and to form new social capital (relational, bridging and linking). It was capable of generating stocks of social capital derived from religious values and indigenous Gayonese characteristics. In contrast, KTN-DD in Mt. Kelud (Chapter Five) partially strengthened bonding and linking social capital but missed opportunities to create relational and bridging social capital. This resulted in negative externalities, which led to the slower process of community recovery and resilience in Pandansari, compared to Jaluk.
Thirdly, each community has its own embedded resources that can be useful in the post-disaster context. These resources are, in fact, the stock of social capital that brings benefits in many ways. The first benefit was to help strengthen bonding social capital. In Chapter Four, we observed the importance of kinship, meugang and alang-tulung for social capital formation in Jaluk village. In Chapter Five, we examined the paguyuban and gotong royong as being tools for social capital development in Pandansari village. The second benefit was to support the community in dealing with problematic situations, such as when external agencies failed to deliver aid effectively and efficiently. I have analysed the concept of nrimo that assisted the Pandansari villagers when they received unequal aid distribution from the KTN-DD (Chapter Five). In short, these resources, called “community competence” (James and Paton, 2016a: 8) or community (collective) efficacy (Norris et al., 2008; Paton et al., 2008), have contributed positively to community recovery and resilience.

Fourthly, the case studies presented in Chapter Four and Five display examples of CSOs’ works to fill the gap left when the government failed to implement comprehensive recovery assistance to the affected society. The Indonesian government has declared it has the main responsibility for disaster management, as stated in the Disaster Management Law 24/2007. Responding to this responsibility, the government had developed a recovery plan, as analysed Chapter Six. However, constraints such as tension between the regional and national government, a lack of coordination, weak institutional capacity and resource limitations have hindered the government’s ability to assist effectively and efficiently in disaster recovery. The government’s failure to implement disaster recovery activities as scheduled has delayed the process of community recovery and resilience. Following the creation of this gap, CSOs like (KTN-DD, PSI-DD, APU and RZ) and international organisations
(FAO, UNDP and STC) have complemented the government in delivering recovery assistance. The findings underline that disaster recovery is a collective responsibility and should not be left to the government alone.

Finally, I propose policy implications from the findings of this study. One recommendation is that as external CSOs continue to operate in disaster management activities in Indonesia, they must understand that external aid and social capital formation can lead to negative side effects. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Five, this can be the result of a lack of knowledge of local conditions as well as underperforming staff. External CSOs need to rethink their approach when working with the community.

Therefore, investment in some of the following aspects would also be useful to minimise the unintended negative results. Firstly, staff need to be trained in how to develop professional relationships i.e. building rapport and developing communication strategies. This may have avoided the complaints made by Pandansari’s village head about the poor communication of the village facilitator. Secondly, organisations should map the social and cultural setting they find themselves in. Assessments conducted in the post-disaster context usually focus on damage and economic losses. Mapping the social and cultural setting of each village would provide insights into the political and cultural situation prior to the program’s intervention. If KTN-DD or other CSOs had done this and shared the findings with its staff members, aid could have been provided more inclusively and tensions in the community could have been avoided. Thirdly, organisations need to have effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. As external agencies, regular monitoring and evaluation has to be performed in an effective way. In Chapter Five, I highlighted the awareness of KTN-DD staff whose job was to monitor the program in Mt. Kelud. In relation to the conflict
that occurred and the underperforming village facilitator, their evaluations were silent apart from acknowledging that these situations were normal in post-disaster situations.

Another recommendation derived from these findings is that CSOs can pioneer collaborative works in the disaster recovery phase with their existing social capital. The findings from this study show that CSOs’ networks have contributed to the development of collaborative works, which are new in disaster management practice in Indonesia (Chapter Three). CSOs have contributed to recent collaborative works such as in the form of inter-faith collaboration (HFI) and religious-secular inter-organisational partnerships (DRP and Planas PRB). These collaborations are effective because their programs have brought benefits to the society. These collaborative works have occurred in the phases of emergency, mitigation and preparation. What has been missing is collaborative work in the recovery phase. Using existing social networks, CSOs can initiate the formation of collaborative work in governing disaster recovery activities. It is possible to achieve that by expanding the role of the HFI to involve members collectively in disaster recovery. Collaborative disaster governance, especially in the recovery phase, is probably a new for Indonesia but it has been successfully regulated and practised by many disaster-prone countries, as discussed in Chapter Three. This is imperative to speeding up robust community recovery and resilience.

II. Contributions to the Existing Literature

This study has contributed to the existing literature in the following ways. The existing literature (Aldrich, 2008, 2011, 2012; James and Paton, 2016b; Kusumasari and Alam, 2012b; Rivera and Nickels, 2014; Shaw and Goda, 2004) has shown on the importance of civil society groups in disaster recovery. These groups facilitate social capital
formation that eventually contributes to community recovery and resilience. These groups, that I have labelled internal CSOs, emerge within the community or become part of community life. Therefore, internal CSOs build long-standing social interaction with the locals and develop greater understanding on their indigenous values. This thesis has complemented the studies above by examining the role of external CSOs, which originally operate outside the community, in delivering external aid and developing social capital in the affected society. As part of their nature of being outside the society, the task of external CSOs in building social capital is arguably harder than the internal CSOs. The findings of this study, especially those presented in Chapter Five, have confirmed that claim. However, it is not always the case, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, these external CSOs can also be as successful as internal ones.

Additionally, evidence from this study strikes a chord with other research on cultural proximity. Scholars (Benthall, 2007b, 2012, 2016; Cordier, 2009; Palmer, 2011) have analysed the degree to which cultural proximity assists external CSOs, particularly FBOs, when working with beneficiaries who are co-religionists. For Islamic FBOs, the cultural proximity is established when they work with Islamic society. This thesis tested whether they have special advantages when working together with Muslim beneficiaries as one ummah. The scholars listed above have focussed on transnational Islamic CSOs. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by studying national Islamic CSOs, which indisputably have greater advantages while operating within the country whose population mostly have similar cultural and religious characteristics.

The findings of this study have shown that FBOs’ work, through their “faith-background” economic recovery programs, was effective by commendably optimising
spiritual and traditional values such as utilising sacred places (*masjid* and *mushalla*), *meugang*, *qurban*, and *aqiqah* embedded in daily life. However, evidence presented in Chapter Five has demonstrated that cultural proximity did not help the FBO when local contexts were neglected. Alternatively, this study proposes that FBOs can perform better by incorporating the cultural proximity with unique cultural contexts (Chamlee-Wright, 2010; James and Paton, 2015). By that, I mean that the expected community recovery and resilience is likely to be achieved.

There is a massive literature on civil society in Indonesia but it mostly concentrates on politics and democratisation (Antlöv et al., 2006; Antlöv et al., 2010; Azra, 2004, 2006a, 2007; Beittinger-Lee, 2009; Budiman, 1990; Hadiwinata, 2003; Hefner, 2000; Mietzner, 2012; Salim and Azra, 2003). Studies examining CSOs in disaster management in Indonesia are much scarcer. There have been a few exceptional works (Latief, 2012; Mulyasari and Shaw, 2012; Sakai and Fauzia, 2014). This study has enriched the study of CSOs by examining their roles in the disaster recovery phase and exploring the nexus between their recovery assistance and social capital formation.

Finally, this study offers an interdisciplinary approach by looking at the nexus of religion, development and disaster. Scholars (Sakai et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2012) argue that FBOs are widely regarded as important actors within the disaster and development sectors, as highlighted in Chapter One. However, studies on FBOs in disaster recovery tend to focus on religious interpretation and coping mechanisms in the aftermath of disasters (Fanany and Fanany, 2014; Rahiem et al., 2017; Samuels, 2016). Therefore, it is fair to say that this study will contribute to the academic discussion within the interdisciplinary study of disaster, development and religious studies.
III. Suggestions for Future Research Directions

This study has limitations. During six months of fieldwork, I note that the limited timeframe and resources may have limited the scope of the data collected for this research. Therefore, suggestions for the future research as follows.

Firstly, as recovery takes a long time to achieve sustainable development, it is important to revisit the case-study areas to investigate whether community recovery and resilience can be achieved in the longer term. I have also mentioned indigenous practices within the communities i.e. *nrimo* in Chapter Five which was helpful for coping with difficult situations, including disaster relief. A follow up research in Gayo and Mt. Kelud to examine the long-term impact of recovery aid and to explore other distinctive indigenous values that assist to cope with disasters is likely to be useful to confirm or supplement the findings of this study.

Secondly, during the fieldwork I used qualitative methods, mainly participant observation and conducting semi-structured interviews. Further research using a quantitative approach to examine others factor not covered in this thesis, such as surveys about the community's satisfaction with the recovery efforts and statistical analysis on economic recovery, may compliment this study.

Finally, this study, though comparative and extensive across cultural and geographical difference, cannot be definitive. Its limitation lies in its focus on only two disaster events, two communities, and two organisations, out of many. Given the complexity of disaster relief and the fact that Indonesia is a large country exposed to numerous natural hazards, more empirical case studies on other agencies and other communities would assist in providing more comprehensive findings and policy recommendations.
# Appendix: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Organization/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achmad Saifuddin</td>
<td>Kediri Disaster Management Agency (BPBD Kediri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adit</td>
<td>Al-Azhar Caring the Islamic Community (APU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrianus Suyadi</td>
<td>Caritas (Karina) Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Anakotta</td>
<td>World Vision Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardanti Sutarto</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asep Beny</td>
<td>Disaster Management Centre of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (DMC-DD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benny</td>
<td>Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (economic development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bik Sur</td>
<td>Jaluk villager (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cek Erni</td>
<td>Jaluk villager (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cek Sudibjo</td>
<td>Jaluk villager (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cek Yudhi</td>
<td>Jaluk village secretary (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eko Teguh Paripurno</td>
<td>Indonesian Society for Disaster Management (MPBI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elwin</td>
<td>Alms House (RZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fajar</td>
<td>Jaluk villager (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamadi</td>
<td>Pandansari villager (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jodi Iswanto</td>
<td>Health Agriculture Indonesia of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (PSI-DD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadim</td>
<td>Pandansari villager (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kek Mul</td>
<td>Jaluk villager (male)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardi</td>
<td>Pandansari villager (male)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Muhammad Ali Yusuf: Disaster Management and Climate Change Foundation of Nahdlatul Ulama (LPBI NU)

Muhammad Jawad: Justice Post for Ummah (PKPU)

Mulyadi: Jaluk villager (male)

Novrizal (Nopen): Jaluk village facilitator (PSI-DD)

Parno: Pandansari villager (male)

Putra: Jaluk villager (male)

Rachmat Irwansyah: UN Resident Coordinator Office Indonesia

Rinto Andriono: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Indonesia

Saiful: Archipelago Livestock Village of Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (KTN-DD)

Samidah: Jaluk villager (female)

Satria: Dompet Dhuafa Foundation (economic development)

Sigit Iko Sugondo: Al-Azhar Caring the Islamic Community (APU)

Siswanto Budi Prasodjo: National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB)

Sitin: Pandansari head of village (female)

Sudarmawan: East Java Disaster Management Agency (East Java BPBD)

Supiyadi: Pandansari villager (male)

Surya Rahman Muhammad: Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI)

Teuku Bustaman: Aceh BPBD

Tia Kurniawan: Indonesian Red Cross

Titi Moektijasih: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Indonesia
Trinirmala Ningrum  : National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (Planas PRB)

Victor Rembeth  : Disaster Resource Partnership (DRP)

Yahmadi  : Pandansari villager (male)

Yahman  : Pandansari villager (male)

Yasir  : Pandansari village facilitator (KTN-DD)

Zulkifli  : Central Aceh BPBD
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