The discursive construction of the concept of creativity in Australian education policy and practice

The Discursive Construction of the Concept of Creativity in Australian Education Policy and Practice

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Abstract

Multiple and conflicting truths are simultaneously being told about creativity in Australian and global contexts: creativity is related to improvisational free-play and also to academic rigour, both about self-expression and about very specific economic outcomes, situated in collaborative contexts but also in the exploitation of others. This thesis takes a Foucauldian genealogical approach to relate the construction of truth and knowledge about creativity in Australia to the conditions of possibility that inhere in education policy and practice. Three sites are foregrounded to conduct this analysis. The first is a range of policy documents, four specific to the Australian context and one global, where I use Foucault's concept of *homo economicus* to analyse how neoliberal conditions establish a competition and productivity-oriented version of creativity. I indicate how there is a silence about alternative accounts of self-expression and of the indeterminacy of creative outcomes in these policies. Secondly, I focus on the school institution and analyse interviews conducted with seven teachers in an Australian high-school music department (two interviews with each teacher). I draw on Foucault's idea of disciplinary power to argue that the conditions of normalisation and surveillance in the school institution construct creativity as a quantifiable entity. However, this subjugates discourses of ambiguity and unconventionality. Finally, the third point of analysis is one individual's subjectivity. Using Foucault's concepts of ethical self-formation, *parrhesia* and counter-conduct, I analyse practices undertaken by a teaching deputy principal in the construction of his subjectivity, and consider how these practices co-opt and counter neoliberalised and disciplined inflections of creativity. The account of the power/knowledge relationship presented here adds to the literature on creativity in the Australian context, for example, to respond to the question of whether or not creativity can be taught and assessed. Additionally, the thesis addresses a need for more research that brings Foucault's perspectives and concepts into dialogue with empirical data in pursuing contemporary education questions. Finally, guided by a broader and more capacious interpretation of policy, this thesis contributes to the field of policy studies by identifying nuanced patterns of co-option, countering and enactment between policy texts and teachers' practices in a specific school context.

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Signed   …………………………………………….................

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Abstract

Multiple and conflicting truths are simultaneously being told about creativity in Australian and global contexts: creativity is related to improvisational free-play and also to academic rigour, both about self-expression and about very specific economic outcomes, situated in collaborative contexts but also in the exploitation of others. This thesis takes a Foucauldian genealogical approach to relate the construction of truth and knowledge about creativity in Australia to the conditions of possibility that inhere in education policy and practice. Three sites are foregrounded to conduct this analysis. The first is a range of policy documents, four specific to the Australian context and one global, where I use Foucault's concept of *homo economicus* to analyse how neoliberal conditions establish a competition and productivity-oriented version of creativity. I indicate how there is a silence about alternative accounts of self-expression and of the indeterminacy of creative outcomes in these policies. Secondly, I focus on the school institution and analyse interviews conducted with seven teachers in an Australian high-school music department (two interviews with each teacher). I draw on Foucault's idea of disciplinary power to argue that the conditions of normalisation and surveillance in the school institution construct creativity as a quantifiable entity. However, such conditions undermine discourses of ambiguity and unconventionality. Finally, the third point of analysis is one individual's subjectivity. Using Foucault's concepts of ethical self-formation, *parrhesia* and counter-conduct, I analyse practices undertaken by a teaching deputy-principal in the construction of his subjectivity, and consider how these practices co-opt and counter neoliberalised and disciplined inflections of creativity. The account of the power/knowledge relationship presented here adds to the literature on creativity in the Australian context, for example, to respond to the question of whether

or not creativity can be taught and assessed. Additionally, the thesis addresses a need for more research that brings Foucault's perspectives and concepts into dialogue with empirical data in pursuing contemporary education questions. Finally, guided by a broader and more capacious interpretation of policy, this thesis contributes to the field of policy studies by identifying nuanced patterns of co-option, countering and enactment between policy texts and teachers' practices in a specific school context.

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Chapter One: Introduction

It is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. (Foucault, 1977, p. 28)

This thesis is an analysis of how knowledge of creativity is discursively constructed in Australian education discourse at three different levels: in policy, in the school institution and by an individual. In it, I argue that policy and practice establish a range of conditions of possibility that demarcate *how* meaning can be made of creativity. Such conditions include the prioritisation of employment and the economy in education policy and the prioritisation of comparison and surveillance in institutional practice, all of which are pivotal in understanding creativity in Australian education. Such conditions normalise certain truths about creativity: it manifests in design and problem-solving, it is necessary for economic prosperity, and it can be planned for in advance. The same discursive conditions throughout the documents and institutional practices are not compatible with other conceptualisation of creativity. The effect of this incompatibility is that *other* versions of creativity – for example, versions that prioritise collaboration, spontaneity or self-fulfilment and those that consider creativity as self-revelation are kept "outside of the truth" of Australian education. The thesis draws out

the active negotiation work of an individual teacher to construct creativity through his practices. In an individual's construction of creativity (how it is defined, the practices of "creative teaching", the desired behaviours of creative students etc.), normalising effects of policy and schooling practices are negotiated. This thesis therefore highlights tensions between the "realities" about creativity established in policy and practice, and meaning that is made of the concept by the individual.

Understanding the discursive construction of creativity is important in light of the place of the concept in the Australian context and the abundance of debate and discussion on *what* creativity *is* and what it can *do*. A survey of recently published government policy documents on education reflects the preoccupation with creativity in the national context. The generic capability, "critical and creative thinking" is a construct in the new Australian curriculum appearing in all curriculum documents from Foundation to Year Twelve across all subject areas. Recent government publications include *Creative Industries, a Strategy for 21st Century Australia* (Australian Government, 2011), *Creative Australia, National Culture Policy* (Australian Government, 2013) and *Nurturing Creativity* (NQSPLD, 2012), all of which reveal concerns with understanding creativity and demonstrate a plethora of aspirations held for it. The first two of these documents emphasise that creativity is desirable and that maximisations of individuals' creative potential in channels such as design industry will reap personal and economic benefits. The latter advocates for creativity to be nurtured in early childhood contexts.

Another indicator of the high importance of creativity in Australia is the place afforded to it in national media such as in the educational supplements of newspapers. Appendix One presents eight media articles published over the previous three years,

which shows how multiple truths are simultaneously being told about creativity. It is about free play and rigor. It is about self-expression and freedom but also associated with very specific economic outcomes and goals. Creativity involves collaboration but also exploiting other players in a competitive economy. The inherent message here in the articles and broader policy context is that creativity is important and that its role in Australian education needs to be understood and realised.

This thesis is underpinned by Foucault's concepts of discourse (Foucault, 1970, 1972, 1978) and power/knowledge (Foucault, 1977, 1994b) where power is a series of relations and effects, and knowledge comprises not just ideas and facts but the conditions of possibility that allow for certain statements to be enunciated - what creative students do, what creative teachers do, how to recognise creativity etc. Although widely used in education, Foucault's work has rarely been invoked in understanding creativity. The methodology guiding the thesis is a Foucauldian genealogical approach, appropriate due to its concern with questioning how power relations have constructed the present. Like Foucault's genealogies, the thesis avoids a singular perspective on the meaning of constructed objects and is concerned with knowledge that may be ignored or omitted.

Each analysis chapter represents a point on a discourse nexus or on a "diagram of power" (Ball, 1994, p. 22) - policy in Chapter Five, the school institution in Chapter Six and the individual in Chapter Seven. Policy or teacher-interview data, along with particular concepts from Foucault's work are brought together within each of the analysis chapters. The first site of analysis, Chapter Five, is education policy where I read the creativity discourses therein through a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility (Foucault, 2004). This grid facilitates engagement with how the prevalent notion of

neoliberalism impacts on the concept of creativity. Using Foucault's writings, I argue that a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility (also discussed in Chapter Three) applied over education policy brings into focus how concerns with employability, productivity and other economic appropriations of education legitimate only particular versions of the concept. Economic appropriations support design process or risk-taking conceptualisations of creativity and simultaneously limits others (e.g. creativity as self-fulfilment).

Secondly, focusing on the school institution in Chapter Six, and analysing teacher interview data, I address how creativity discourses are constructed by the effects of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977). Although a theme has been established in literature that disciplinary power works to construct subjects and objects, its bearing on creativity has been under-researched. I demonstrate how the normalising and surveillance effects of disciplinary power, which reify the use of time in schools and promote comparative assessments, legitimate a version of creativity wherein it can unfold in linear time and can be assessed by the teacher. At the same time, however, I demonstrate how these conditions create tensions for alternative versions that prioritise risk taking, improvisation and incubation time.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, I turn my attention to an individual teacher, again drawing on interview transcripts, and consider how creativity discourses occupy a place in practices of ethical self-formation (Foucault, 1985, 2001a, 2001b). Foucault's writings on this concept provide an "architecture" within which an individual's negotiation and construction of creativity can be understood. Through engagement with this teacher's *telos,* modes of subjection, practices of counter-conduct and *parrhesia* (all of which are elements of this architecture of ethical self-formation), I show how some

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versions of creativity that are normalised by the effects of policy and practice feature in his construction of the concept. By feature, I mean that some of the legitimated "inside the true" discourses of policy and schooling are accepted and supported (e.g. explicit teaching and assessment of normalised skills), while the teacher counters other discourses such as the prescription of fixed-time periods in making meaning of creativity. When policy, practice and the individual are brought together as a nexus of creativity discourses, the discursive construction of creativity in Australian education is linked to a host of competing agenda and claims for legitimacy where consensus on its meaning is never fixed.

The Paradox of Creativity

This thesis addresses a paradox in contemporary education both in Australia and beyond where multiple truths are told about the concept of creativity while it is simultaneously elusive of any fixed meaning. One the one hand, creativity appears as something that is known and recognised. For example, schooling practices need to drastically change to facilitate it (Robinson, 2002, 2011); creativity is under threat from forces of globalisation (Grierson, 2009), performativity (Burnard & White, 2008; Chappell, 2008; Jeffrey & Troman, 2009, 2013; Simmons & Thompson, 2008; Troman, Jeffrey, & Raggl, 2007; Turner-Bisset, 2007) and neoliberal prerogatives in education (Adams, 2013; Mansfield, 2009). Furthermore, the future economy is dependent on its embedment and prioritisation in education (Florida, 2002; MCEETYA, 2008; Seltzer & Bentley, 1999). Invocations abound for creative learning and creative teaching, for creative partnerships and for all things creative in education (Cropley, 1999; Dunbar-Hall, 2002; Jeffrey, 2006a, 2006b; Jeffrey & Craft, 2004; Jeffrey & Troman, 2013).

Multiple truths about creativity are also articulated in the Australian context where it is simultaneously associated with a range of views on what creativity *is* and a range of views on what creativity *can achieve*. Broadly, a survey of newspaper articles in Appendix One highlights that creativity is concerned with revelation of the self (Grierson, 2011), with economic imperatives (Florida, 2002; Seltzer & Bentley, 1999), and with social cohesion (Adams, 2013; Jones & Thomson, 2008). The term creativity is invoked to meet multiple agendas (Australian Government, 2013; Gibson, 2005; Neelands & Choe, 2010), symptomatic of a situation wherein "contradictory objectives are improbably yoked together" (Jones & Thomson, 2008, p. 724).

Contrary to these ideas of creativity as a "known entity", it is positioned in other literature as rhetoric (Banaji, Burn, & Buckingham, 2010; Munday, 2014; Neelands & Choe, 2010), doctrine (Schlesinger, 2007; Thornham, 2014), and as a discourse (Gibson, 2005; Readman, 2010; Weate, 1996). Denying creativity of any essential nature, these accounts draw attention to the way in which creativity is modelled by political and cultural contexts (Neelands & Choe, 2010; Nelson, 2010). In the work of these writers, there is no taken for grantedness about creativity *per se,* rather it can be considered as an effect of conglomerates of frames of reference. These writers are concerned with the broader frames of reference and contextual factors that culminate to give shape and form to creativity. Gibson exemplifies this point in discussing how Romantic and instrumentalist versions of creativity are constructed by differing points of emphasis and prioritisations of government:

Where creativity is portrayed as something owned by individuals, we have

seen how a veil of self-expression descends and covers ambiguity and

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ideology, namely, the political reality of individualism, of what individuals actually are and of how teachers can intervene in pupils' learning. And, when creativity is used to extol the values underlying the government's economic project, it is delivered in an unequivocal way that forecloses on debate about its instrumentality. The use of the word creative to veil and sustain these ambiguities is at least contentious (Gibson, 2005, p. 163).

The premise of researchers such as Gibson (2005) is that "creativity" is a signifier used in vastly different ways according to differing agendas of individuals, and that each unit of meaning affixed to creativity or juxtaposing of the word with another (the "creative economy", the "creative process" or "creative outcomes") represents a constellation of choices specific to a context. The writers referenced above show how discourses from education and economics are melded with creativity research to construct purpose-specific models of creativity according to changing priorities of government (Callaghan, 2012; Jones & Thomson, 2008; Mansfield, 2009).

In beginning with the perspective that there is no singular inherent truth about creativity in education, this thesis is situated in the latter body of work. Rather than arguing for what creativity is or is not – a generic skill, necessary for economic growth etc. – my concern in this thesis is to draw on the work of Foucault to understand *how* such truths can be told. The focus in this thesis is on the conditions that facilitate select versions of creativity and omit others. While I am not interested in any real truth about creativity or in arguing that one version is superior to another, I am concerned about the real effects on teachers and students where schools support and legitimate some versions of creativity while omitting others. The patterns by which versions of creativity are legitimated and omitted *do* matter since certain types of work are being valued in

schools, different message are being given to teachers on the quality of their work, particular student behaviours are being endorsed and others demoted, all of which are effects of the assumptions on creativity constructed in policy and practice. This thesis responds to the paradox outlined above through its relating of possible truths about creativity to the conditions of possibility that inhere in policy and practice.

Personal Encounters with Creativity and the Sense of a Problem

The notion of creativity is one that has always perplexed me from my time as a student and as a primary teacher in Ireland to my undertaking of postgraduate study in Australia. In my early days of primary school, those so-called creative tasks (fictional writing, improvisation in music or drama lessons) more often than not really frustrated me. I could never conjure up anything like the stories or the sounds that television and Disney movies presented, or express myself in the ways to which I aspired. I decided I wasn't a creative person. When I started teaching, I often found myself using phrases that I had heard myself: "It doesn't matter about X or Y; this is about your creativity". I observed how some children relished these kinds of statements, while others found them unnerving or contrary to the parameters within which they wanted to work. I wondered if my lessons really addressed the imperative to exhibit creativity, if they facilitated children's "creative learning experiences", or if my teaching could be considered creative. In researching for my MEd thesis on accountability and evaluation in Irish education, a rhetoric of the diminishment of opportunities for creativity in a growing performativity culture was a recurrent theme in teacher discussions.

In 2011, I took a break from teaching and studied for an MA in Computer Music, a one-year full-time course in sound engineering, electroacoustic composition and computer programing. The following year, with no substantial changes to the course structure, "computer music" was changed to "creative music technologies". Again, this raised a range of questions for me. Did this new title apply to all of the course elements? Who decided that this course should have the root "creat/" in the title? What were the parallels between the work I completed on the course and the work that children in my care did in expressing their creativity? After completing the course, would my skillset be in any way comparable to that of people who had completed creative writing courses?

Recently I read *Creativity, Inc.* by Ed Catmull (Catmull, 2014) founder of the computer animation film studio *Pixar* and president of *Walt Disney Animation Studios* (my interest in reading this being that the movies of my childhood represented the pinnacle of creative endeavour for me). This book revealed so much insight into the process of making those movies – the frustrating mock-ups, the candour required in dealing with early ideas, the requirements of balancing the views of multiple stakeholders in each project, and the excruciating deadlines and risks involved. If these movies were to represent "creativity", then creativity involved considerable persistence and resilience *more than* "light bulb moments" of inspiration. This intersection between my personal and professional experiences, and various challenges to ideas I had constructed on creativity, informed my topic selection of creativity when the opportunity arose to undertake PhD study in Australia. For all the above reasons, I was drawn to engage further with the notion of creativity. How is this concept so elusive yet highly prioritised in education? How did Australian education policy position and

understand the concept? Did Australian teachers encounter similar challenges to those of Irish teachers in balancing their views on creativity with education reform technologies?

The following questions reflect a myriad of directions I saw my study taking based on how my personal and professional experiences to date mingled with my engagement with creativity. How is creativity appropriated in schools for cultural industries? Was it thwarted by dominant discourses of performativity or neoliberal marketisation? Was creativity immune or otherwise "other" to these influences of performativity and marketisation? In thinking about all of these questions, I found myself trying to clarify an "operational construct" of creativity. As the case with so much other research in the area, I would work with a unity of knowledge such as "creativity is a process" or "it is a product of an individual's imagination." These unities of *what* creativity is could then be potentially incorporated into any claims that schools were guilty of grave disservice to creativity or that they are the sites wherein it is embraced and maximised.

Research on creativity in which I immersed myself failed to offer an account that I could apply to all my experiences and to how I had encountered the word. Many literature reviews opened with the difficulty in articulating the meaning of the word and I found myself in agreement with those that claimed the overuse of "creativity" had stripped away any useful meaning. Any attempt to define for myself or to justify any single unity of knowledge on creativity became a frustrating pursuit. I was never satisfied with any feasible "robust" demarcation between creativity and frequently researched education narratives such as performativity or neoliberalism. This thing called creativity could emanate from an individual (Kant, 1952) or from social

interactions (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Sawyer, 2012). It could manifest in a finished product (Brown, 2013; Glickman, 1978) or in a process (Lubart, 2001; Wallas, 1973). It was positioned as antithetical to market metrics (Adams, 2013; Mansfield, 2009), but yet could exist under signs of the market (Bröckling, 2013). So every starting point for any research into its place in contemporary education involved attempts to suture together an object to use in the research, an object that I found to be unravelling as quickly as it was put together.

On researching the area of creativity and its intersection with education and schooling, I very quickly came across a TED talk by Sir Ken Robinson (Robinson, 2002) in which he posed the question "do schools kill creativity"? This talk has been viewed forty million times on the TED website alone, and is widely cited on education fora. The core of his argument was that schools were designed to impart knowledge that would serve the industrial labour market of a bygone era, and consequentially only particular subjects and learning experiences were valued. Furthermore, he argued that schools themselves are industrialised - in looking to serve the factories, they became the factories. My reading about performativity and neoliberalism signalled many points of correlation where research would support Robinson's argument. In the same year, another high-profile speaker, Richard Florida (Florida, 2002), asserted that "creativity is the new economy". He strongly argued for education to prepare students for creative and cultural industries and aligned the individual's prospects for future success with creativity defining contemporary education.

Could it be that at the same time, schools might be killing creativity and unleashing its boundless potential? As a teacher and as a student, I didn't think the invocations to be creative and the work in which teachers were engaged was "killing

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creativity". Also, as my thoughts above will attest to, deliberations on the word creativity that I had encountered weren't industry or economy focused. Two of the major discourses of creativity in contemporary education articulated truths about it, yet these truths did not directly correspond with my engagement with the concept in both personal and professional contexts.

The combined assertions from Sir Ken Robinson and Richard Florida encouraged me to think in a different way about creativity. The notion of a new economy or a school as a factory presented defined contexts within which definitions and aspirations for creativity could be articulated. Those notions of the economy and factory implied a range of placeholders and anchorage points within and around which only particular notions of creativity could converge. The more I pursued with the idea of context and its legitimation of truths, I began to realise that the notion of creativity was better thought of as a constellation of knowledge legitimated in particular contexts. For example, it *is* a process that is vital for future economic success in instrumentalist economy-oriented policy (Gibson, 2005; Neelands & Choe, 2010) or it *is* related to free play and the imagination when associated with discourses of child development (Lindqvist, 2003; Russ, Robins, & Christiano, 1999; Smolucha, 1992; Vygotsky, 1967/2004). My interest switched to how knowledge, normative positions and singular truths about creativity made their way into education policy and schools. My growing understanding of the work of Michel Foucault signalled many avenues through which I could pursue this interest.

Why Foucault?

Even though my initial intention was to use the work of many thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard, Ludvig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida to inform this thesis, I later decided to centralise the work of Michel Foucault. The more I read of Foucault's work, the more I sensed that sustained engagement with his writings would offer an epistemological, methodological and theoretical "togetherness" to address the initial problem guiding this thesis. I was inspired by Foucault's engaging style of writing and by the range of themes his work extended to. There was something of an organic relationship between my own sense that particular notions of creativity could be inside or outside of the truth, and Foucault's work on discourse, power and knowledge. Gradually, I began to think of my project in terms of Foucault's epistemology and methodology, and to explore how the tools he used could "give form" to my initial sense of the problem. I was motivated by the challenge implied in calling my work a Foucauldian-inspired analysis and in ensuring that my approaches and modes of analysis were congruent with this. This was a challenging task characterised by an ethic of questioning and by the avoidance of linearity, with few certainties or "tried-and-tested" structures to lean on along the way.

Michel Foucault's writings about power and knowledge (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1994b, 1994c) encouraged me to think about how truths about creativity were constructed in particular contexts while other discourses of creativity remain outside of the truth. Rather than ending the discussion at the elusiveness of creativity, I could bring Foucault's work to bear on this elusiveness and ask questions like: What power effects makes particular discourses "true" in some contexts? How is this particular knowledge

configuration brought inside the true? What alternative knowledge is operating behind these truths?

Importantly for me, Foucault's work offered a space to develop as a researcher at all points along this research journey and reminded me that there is no fixed point to this development. From the early stages of the project right through to completion, I found immense encouragement and motivation to pursue with the work in the freedom of making this thesis my own, and in not having to account for or legitimate my work against a previously laid-out model. Foucault's writings assured me that the doubts and the uncertainties that arise when writing a document like a PhD thesis are not hallmarks of ineptitude or ignorance. On the contrary, it is these doubts and uncertainties that make the work interesting. As he said:

I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? What is true for writing and for love relationships is true also for life. The game is worthwhile insofar as we don't know where it will end. (Foucault, 1988, p. 9)

The work of Michel Foucault has been used to a limited extent to engage with the contingency of creativity in education. For example, Readman (2010) used Foucauldian writings on ideology, rhetoric and discourse to analyse the discursive construction of creativity in education policy in the UK context. Jeffrey and Troman (2009) invoked Foucault's work to analyse how teachers manage performativity and creativity related

policies. Mølholm (2014) considered the subjectification of the creative individual using Foucault's concept of the *dispotif*. However, in light of the growing recognition of how Foucault can shed new light on education questions in fields from leadership to arts education (Gillies, 2013; Lindgren & Ericsson, 2010; Niesche, 2011; Peters & Besley, 2007; Thomson, Hall, & Jones, 2013; Weate, 1996), and in light of the otherwise frequent featuring of Foucault's work in Australian education research (as identified in Chapter Three), it is surprising how little creativity-related work draws on Foucault's writings in this country. This thesis addresses this gap.

The following concepts from Foucault's work are drawn upon throughout this thesis: discursive practices (Foucault, 1972, 2003), discourse (Foucault, 1972, 1985), power/knowledge (Foucault 1977, 1994c), genealogy (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1985), disciplinary power (1977), ethics (Foucault, 1978, 1994b, 2001b), counter-conduct (Foucault, 2009) and *parrhesia* (Foucault, 2001a, 2001b). The most immediate observation that can be made on reading this list is that the thesis is not confined to any one particular method or modality of power.

The concept of genealogy (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1985) with its inherent focus on how conditions of possibility account for configurations of knowledge presented a range of opportunities to analyse how creativity discourses are positioned within present relations of power. My engagement with how Foucault argued for the arbitrariness of dominant notions of criminality or sexuality in contemporary society motivated me to bring his work into the discourse field of creativity.

The power/knowledge neologism (Foucault, 1972, 1977) is at the core of this thesis on the relative positioning of creativity discourses by specific conditions of

possibility. Although not one and the same thing, power and knowledge are inextricably linked. In Foucault's conceptualisation, power produces knowledge and a function of knowledge is power. Using Foucault's idea of power/knowledge, I thought of discourses of creativity as knowledge constructs, and of the discursive conditions as particular power effects. The challenge here in understanding Foucault's power/knowledge was to continually reassess my prior understandings of power. I departed from notions of power as the possession of individuals and from accounts of power's immutable attributes. I began to understand the potential of Foucault's work to position creativity as a constellation of discourses that could gain or lose currency on account of the broader imperatives of the contexts within which they were articulated. All of the specific analytical concepts used throughout this thesis are contextualised in Chapter Three.

Why Policy and Practice?

The analysis undertaken in this thesis could have been focused at many different levels. For example, the positioning of discourses on creativity could extend to education policy discourse analysis, case studies of classrooms, teacher staff rooms, education administration sites, or to life history approaches. For Foucault, discourse works at multiple levels and is not located in any particular document or institution, or only accessible by virtue of one methodological approach. After a range of considerations, given below, I decided the entry point for me into creativity discourses would be a range of policy documents and teacher interviews.

Inspired by the work of scholars like Stephen Ball (Ball, 1990, 1994, 1997, 2013), I saw that this analysis of the conditions of possibility could be informed by critical

engagement with the constructedness of policy. The selection of policy as a point of access into discourses of creativity was also influenced by the proliferation in the Australian context over recent years of policy "firsts". In 2013, an Australia-wide curriculum was published for the first time. The contemporariness of the curriculum is evident in how elements are still being implemented in stages at the time of writing, and, at least in the NSW context, in how elements of the curriculum are being resisted (Clarke & Pittaway, 2014; Davies, 2015). Since the curriculum extends to all subject areas and school sectors, I chose three policies from the corpus of the curriculum documents on which to base the analysis. The *Australian Curriculum: The Arts Foundation to Year 10* (ACARA, 2013a) document was selected since multiple instances of the root "creat/" (create, creativity, creative etc.) are included therein. In addition, this curriculum was the most appropriate one to use for analysing patterns of co-option between policy and practice since the sample of teachers interviewed were music educators.

The other national curriculum documents analysed were *Critical and Creative Thinking* (ACARA, 2013b), and *Shape of the Australian Curriculum* (ACARA, 2012). The *Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (AITSL, 2011) were produced by the first federal level regulatory authority for standards of the teaching profession. Therefore, the discourses of creativity throughout this document are highly significant. The Culture Policy, *Creative Australia* (Australian Government, 2013)*,* articulates the agenda of the government at the time of publication for developing the cultural sector of the economy. Taken as a nexus of contemporary education discourses, the analysis of creativity in these policies is timely and very much rooted in the present context. I also complement this analysis with one further national document, *The Melbourne*

Declaration of Goals for Young Australians (MCEETYA, 2008) and one global document *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving Volume V* (OECD, 2014) since the intersection between these and the aforementioned documents have important ramifications for creativity discourses.

It is important to acknowledge here that the policy site to be analysed can be considered relatively synchronic, while the work of Foucault's genealogies is frequently premised on a more diachronic approach. The thesis includes diachronic analysis since I point out how the documents analysed here are informed by predecessor documents. Since this thesis is not called a genealogy or a replication of Foucault's work, and is strongly informed by the ideas of power/knowledge and omitted knowledge that are central to Foucault's genealogies, the term "genealogical approach" is used in this thesis. Since the ideas of Foucault's genealogies inform the analysis, rather than primarily a diachronic frame of reference, the choice of policies here is compatible with a "genealogical approach". Chapter Four of this thesis further discusses the rationale for including these documents while Chapter Five, the first of the analysis chapters, includes more contextual information for each one.

As a teacher, I wanted to talk to other colleagues and to analyse how schooling practices inform the construction of creativity discourse. Every day, teachers engage with multiple and conflicting creativity discourses (Banaji et al., 2010; Gibson, 2005; Neelands & Choe, 2010; Schlesinger, 2007). They are encouraged to be creative in planning and teaching lessons. One colleague asks another if a particular idea is creative. They encounter ideas in curriculum such as "creative thinking", "creative expression", and "creative potential". Parents and other stakeholders tell them that creativity is valued and will pay dividends in the workforce later on.

After deciding to interview teachers, I then had to decide the school-level and subject area I would target. For example, I could have conducted this study with university academics, with teachers at the pre-school level, with teachers of mathematics or with teachers in independent schools. Although I never explicitly sought representativeness or generalisability as understood by conventional social science research, the decision to focus this project on a selective public high school music department meant that I was situating my focus at a midpoint between early to tertiary education and between the public/private divide. It also meant that I could focus on the area of the high school curriculum of which I had more experience than others, and so could engage in more discussion to understand teacher practices. After consideration of various methods of enquiry, two lengthy qualitative interviews with all of the participating teachers surfaced as the most appropriate method for me. They afforded me the potential to engage in conversation about teacher practices and to seek elaborations on the points that teachers made. Furthermore, I could ask the teachers to relate their practices to their personal beliefs on creativity and to their own experiences as a student. Therefore, interviews in consort with a policy analysis presented the greatest potential for this project. Chapter Four, on the methodological design of the research, presents further contextualisation information on the teachers and on the school in which they work.

An important element of this study is the relationship between policy and teacher practices. To understand this relationship, I turned to the work of Stephen Ball and his colleagues. This project is not primarily interested with how particular policy discourses "translate" into real life school contexts. Rather, it works with a more capacious view of policy as a process which is "as diversely and repeatedly contested

and/or subject to different 'interpretations' as it is enacted (rather than implemented) in original and creative ways within institutions" (Ball, Maguire, & Braun, 2012, p. 20). There is not a linear relationship between policy and practice. The conceptualisation here is that both policy writing and practice exist on a discourse nexus, and that analysis at both levels is necessary to understand the intricacies of relations by which a phenomenon like creativity is brought "inside the true".

Aims and Questions

The aim of this thesis is *to understand how Australian education policy, institutions and individuals discursively construct the concept of creativity.* Arising from this aim, the thesis draws on the work of Foucault to address the following questions:

- How are discourses of creativity constructed in educational policy?
- How do practices of a school institution sustain particular discourses of creativity?
- What discourses of creativity are ignored or omitted in policy and practice?
- How does an individual accept or resist normalised assumptions about creativity constructed in policy and practice?

Thesis Chapter Outline

Chapter Two of this thesis concerns itself with the concept of creativity and surveys research in the field. A fundamental argument of this thesis is that creativity is a constellation of discursive effects in specific contexts, and that therefore, there is no universal or generically understood "creativity". Multiple accounts of the creative object, the creative student, the teacher supporting/developing creativity or teaching creatively, the appropriate environment for creativity, the aspirations held for it, preclude a generic, universal construct. Chapter Two supports this argument on the lack of consensus on creativity by highlighting multiple "versions" of creativity and by highlighting fragmentation and tensions between the versions. These versions and inherent tensions are structured around five themes: (1) creativity and the individual, (2) creativity and the social context, (3) creativity as unknown and unwanted, (4) creativity and appropriations in education and economic contexts and (5) creativity and multiplicities. The chapter points out how knowledge emerging throughout each of these versions can be related to discursive conditions. Furthermore, it considers the "incisions" that an analysis of discursive conditions would make in the creativity knowledge constructed - for example, the questions that could be posed and the taken-for-granted assumptions that could be challenged. In the subsequent discussion throughout the analysis chapters, the extent to which *possible* accounts of creativity (knowledge about objects, people, aspirations for creativity etc.) feature in policy and practice are related to the discursive conditions therein.

Chapter Three introduces Foucault's work and argues for the potential afforded by his writings to understand how conditions of possibility construct the concept of

creativity. It situates this thesis by outlining where Foucault's work has already been widely used in education research. This chapter works through the central themes of discourse, power/knowledge, genealogy, *homo economicus*, ethics, counter-conduct and *parrhesia.* It highlights the contexts within which Foucault drew on the themes, where they emerge in the work of other researchers, and their bearing on this thesis.

Chapter Four outlines details of the research design. In the chapter, I discuss the power/knowledge epistemology guiding the research and outline how a genealogical approach informs the thesis. Following this, ethical considerations and methods of gathering data are outlined. This chapter also includes a discussion on the concept of neoliberalism, a concept that emerges in the work of Foucault, in critiques of reform in Australian education, and in research on the "fate" of creativity in education contexts. I outline the ways in which this thesis understands the notion of neoliberalism and how this understanding informs the design of the research. The chapter ends by highlighting the position of the researcher and the significance of this positioning.

Chapter Five is the first of the formal analysis chapters and presents an analysis of five policy documents including *Australian Curriculum: The Arts Foundation to Year 10* (ACARA, 2013a), *Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (AITSL, 2011), *The Melbourne Declaration of Goals for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008), *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving Volume V* (OECD, 2014) and *Creative Australia* (Australian Government, 2013). Throughout the chapter, I argue that creativity is constructed in policy by neoliberal ideals by mapping the concept on a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility. I show how notions of creativity affixed to competition, productivity, industry, measurement and environmental instability emerge throughout the documents and how they are legitimated therein. Throughout this

analysis, I indicate how these conditions sustain or ignore discourse from the multitude of potential truths of creativity.

Chapter Six is the first of the two analysis chapters dealing with data from the interviews. In this chapter, I argue that the effects of disciplinary power in the school institution to normalise behaviours, to appropriate time and to compare individuals establish discursive nets within which creativity is constructed. I outline how notions such as the "good teacher", advance planning and comparative assessments construct creativity. These sustain a measurable, uniformly applicable construct of creativity, while there is a silence about discourses of ambiguity and unconventionality.

Chapter Seven is the second chapter that works with interview data. Here the focus changes to one individual, a teaching deputy-principal named David.[1] This chapter highlights how David constructs the concept of creativity by pursuing his *telos* and enacting practices of ethical self-formation. In doing so, he accepts particular normalised conceptualisations of creativity (discussed in Chapter Five and Six) while resisting others.

Chapter Eight is the final chapter in the thesis. This chapter summarises the thesis and draws together conclusion points from the analysis chapters on how conditions of possibility discursively constructs the concept of creativity in Australian education policy and practice. This chapter also outlines the contributions made by this thesis under three headings: Australian perspectives on creativity, policy studies, and the use of Foucault's work in education research. This chapter concludes by identifying

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1 Pseudonyms are used throughout for all participants

limitations of the study and with final thoughts on how my thinking on creativity has been informed by undertaking this work.

Relevance and Significance

The recent publication of several government documents and the incorporation of the "critical and creative thinking" capability across the national curriculum indicate the importance of the concept of creativity for Australian education. This thesis adds to the literature on creativity in Australian education by offering a timely and site-specific account of how creativity discourses are being constructed, and of how they come to manifest in policy to practice. This thesis avoids "global" or "radical" positions (Dean, 1999, pp. 34 – 35). Its problematisation of governmental practices, and incorporation of policy and practice perspectives will "eschew any position that claims that all the activity of governing is bad or good, necessary or unnecessary" (Dean, 1999, p. 34). The thesis avoids the trajectory of conclusions and recommendations that often appear in creativity research in the field of education. My interest in not in prescribing the environment most appropriate for the development of creativity, or in determining the characteristics of creative students. Instead, I seek to understand the conditions of possibility that facilitates such prescription and appropriation.

This thesis holds significance for both policy development and practice. For policy development, it highlights the aspirations for creativity and the characteristics of "creative students" that are being ignored by the prioritised creativity truths. In Chapter Five, for example, I show how the pervasive incitements towards competitive behaviours undermine a relational or reflective version of creativity. For practice, I draw attention to barriers to teachers' and students' engagement in activities associated with

some versions of creativity. Such barriers or forces include normalised assumptions on what good teachers do and the centrality of examination and assessment in schools. For advocates of marginalised accounts of creativity, such as social justice or democracy-oriented accounts, this thesis outlines specific practices and policy constructs wherein they are omitted. It can therefore contribute to arguments on change required in the pursuit of alternative versions of creativity.

As well as the contributions made by this thesis to perspectives on creativity, it presents an account of how discourses in published policy are interpreted in practice. Through its focus on three points of a policy/practice discourse nexus, the thesis adds to the literature on policy studies by highlighting subtle patterns of engagement and enactment between these points. It outlines the significance of context and individual's processes of meaning-making in how discourses are appropriated in schools.

The final point on the significance of this thesis is that it provides an example of how Foucault's work can inform education research on contemporary problems. Foucault's work is often used in Australian education research testifying to a consensus on how his work can shed new light on contemporary education questions. However, it is rarely associated with the concept of creativity. This thesis brings together insight afforded by the work of a philosopher of great interest in the Australian context with a topic of widely documented national importance.

Chapter Two: The Concept of Creativity

Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.

(Foucault, 1984, p. 88)

This chapter engages with creativity research in education to highlight how the concept resists final and universally legitimated construction. The premise of this thesis is that there is no universal creativity, rather that it is discursively constructed and produced. This chapter emphasises how there is no universally accepted creativity by presenting different versions of creativity that emerge in education and by drawing attention to the tensions that exist between them. I pre-empt the analytical work to follow in this thesis by outlining where a focus on the discursive production of knowledge about creativity could help understand *how* these versions of creativity feature in educational literature. I establish a context for the analytical work by presenting some of the discursive conditions that legitimate discourses of creativity, by posing questions that an analysis of discursive conditions would extend to, and by providing examples from the analysis to follow in Chapters Five to Seven of where particular versions of creativity are related to discursive conditions in Australian policy and practice.

Using the notion of "versions of creativity", this chapter introduces a plethora of research strands into creativity and outlines the assumptions made and the truths claimed to sustain these versions. Such assumptions and truths claimed extend to what creative students and teachers do, the aspirations held for creativity and the ontological

nature of creativity. Using bodies of international and Australian literature, this chapter maps many of those *possible* discourses of creativity that I will later argue are inside the true, and those that are not, at three sites of Australian education. It is therefore a contextualisation and scene-setting chapter in which I highlight key knowledge configurations in creativity research, particularly where it intersects with education. The chapter cannot exhaustively review all literature relating to creativity or claim to represent a review of "the field". Creativity in education is not a discreet field of knowledge; it is situated in a nexus of disciplinary perspectives and competing visions such as psychology and sociology, or "progressive education" and "conservative education". What this chapter does is outline key features and "points of interest" on a "creativity in education map", engaging with the literatures and theorists whose works bring creativity and education together.

In the first section of the chapter, I will outline definitions that are applied to creativity and systems by which creativity discourses and research are frequently classified. Following from this, I then draw upon a diverse body of literature to construct a series of versions of creativity around five themes. Within each theme, I chart prominent discourses of creativity knowledge, and indicate incompatibilities and points of tension between the various accounts of creativity.

Definitions and Categories

Creativity research represents a very broad field of enquiry, provoking interest and debate from a multitude of interested parties across a diverse range of contexts. Testament to this is the proliferation of annual literature reviews (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004) and research handbooks on the topic (Sternberg, 2011;

Thomas & Chan, 2013), some of which are titled "creativity" or "creativity research" literature reviews (for example, Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004), and others referencing the relationships between creativity and other topics, such as neuroscience (Sawyer, 2011), imagination (Tsai, 2012), intelligence and personality (Batey & Furnham, 2006), technology (Loveless, 2002), organisational psychology (Zhou & Shalley, 2008), and music (Running 2008).

Understanding creativity is an on-going concern in the field of education. Some points of enquiry in this field include the way in which the concept is constructed in curriculum and policy, the educational value of the concept, and the "harnessing" of creativity for schools and other educational institutions. Some overviews of research on creativity and education that address these points of enquiry include those by Banaji, Burn & Buckingham (2010), Craft (2001a) and Cremin, Craft & Clack (2012). Examples of special issues of educational journals focusing on creativity include *Cambridge Journal of Education* (2006, 36/3), *Education 3-13* (2007, 35/2), *British Educational Research Journal* (2008, 34/5), and *London Review of Education* (2012, 10/2).

One reason cited for the lack of consensus and fragmentation in creativity research is the differing definition of creativity across multiple fields (Chan, 2013; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Holm-Hadulla, 2013; Runco, 2004; Sawyer 2006; Sternberg, 2011; Thomas & Chan, 2013). Struggles to define creativity reflect a belief that it *is* something with its own essential nature, rather that reflective of the premise guiding this thesis that creativity is a constructed phenomenon contingent upon the power relations at play. As an example of a definitional difficulty, the association of "usefulness" with creativity prevalent in widely accepted definitions (e.g. in

psychological and sociological research) is difficult to operationalise in cognitive neuroscience research on the concept (Sawyer, 2011). Another point of fragmentation in the research is the tension between individual (cognitive, psychological, neurobiological) starting points for understanding creativity and sociological constructs of the concept (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Defining and understanding creativity is made further complex by evolution in research paradigms, for example positivist to constructivist (Chan, 2013) where the nature of methodologies and epistemological underpinnings on claims to truth are eternally evolving. Importantly for this thesis, Chan (2013) notes the dearth of research on creativity informed by a critical paradigm. Through its questioning of the assumptions and the power effects behind the construction of creativity in policy and practice, this thesis aligns itself with more critical approaches to understanding the concept (Gibson, 2005; Neelands & Choe, 2010; Readman, 2010, 2011).

In terms of defining creativity, the terms "originality" and "usefulness" feature strongly in research across multiple disciplines and contexts (Amabile, 1996; Craft, 2000; Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Das, Dewhurst & Gray, 2011; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; Thomas & Chan, 2013). Other related words such as novel, fresh and valuable all similarly echo a "new-and-useful definition of creativity" first introduced by Barron (1955). For example, creativity as "the capacity to do or become something fresh and valuable with respect to others as well as to ourselves" (Pope, 2005, p. 16) brings the notion of originality and novelty to products and processes (what one can do) as well as to what one can become. Creativity is a capacity in Pope's (2005) definition, while in Parkhurst's (1999) definition, it is an ability or quality: "The ability or quality displayed when solving

hitherto unsolved problems, when developing novel solutions to problems others have solved differently, or when developing original and novel (at least to the originator) products" (Parkhurst, 1999, p. 18). This slipperiness of language in terms like "capacity", "ability" or "quality", and in open-ended constructions such as "to do", "to become" or to "solve unsolved problems" indicates the difficulty of settling on a "working" construct of creativity. Such language is sufficiently vague that multiple contradictory claims to creativity can be made within the same definitional parameters. As an illustration, such definitions incorporate a capacity to solve the problem of balancing company accounts, and to an individual becoming a more self-fulfilled person. Rather than arguing for the company accounts or self-fulfilment versions of creativity, or for a myriad of other possibilities, my interest in this thesis is in how such definitions are constructed.

The relationship between the self and others in understanding creativity is introduced in the two above-mentioned definitions. While there may be consensus that the two qualities of novelty and originality are central in understanding creativity, there is a question of who recognises and deems the creative outcome to be original or useful. In research informed by a sociological perspective (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Sawyer, 2012; Stein, 1953; Thomas, 2007), both of these qualities can only be recognised by other individuals. Problematising definitions of creativity around originator's ability or capacity as in the definitions above, Sawyer (2012, p. 214), drawing on Amabile's (1982) work argues that "if creativity can't be defined without appropriateness, and appropriateness can be defined only by people working in a domain, then the definition of creativity is fundamentally and unavoidable social".

Rhodes's (1961) four-fold framing device of person, process, product and press, is frequently drawn upon to categorise creativity research (for example, Craft, 2012; Lassig, 2013; Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Person-focused research addresses a range of individual characteristics and dispositions and claims that these contribute to creative outcomes. Examples of such contributions include Sternberg's "resources for creativity" (Sternberg & Lubart, 1992) or the individual's level of motivation (Rubenson & Runco, 1992, 1995). The second of the four orientations is premised on processes such as problem-solving (Guilford, 1967; Lassig, 2013; Webster, 1990) or movement through a "model of creativity" (Wallas, 1973). One example of a highly prevalent process-account of creativity in the field of education is Guilford's four stages of creative problem-solving (to be discussed later). Discourses that locate creativity in a creative product are concerned with "outcomes" or with a "face" that can be put before an audience or observed as a finished entity. Analysis of creativity as product begins with the painting, composition or scientific invention over which judgement is made on its originality and novelty (Dunbar-Hall, 2002; Humphreys, 2006). Finally, "press" in Rhodes four-fold conceptualisation refers to the environment for creativity and so can also be considered as "place". Enquiry into the way in which creative individuals appropriate and manage time, or the architecture of work/study spaces thought to be conducive to creativity exemplify this perspective in creativity research.

A historical investigation of creativity research suggests three broad focal categories from early enquiries into creativity to the present: a focus on genius, psychological study and sociological perspectives (Chan 2013; Craft, 2001a; Runco, 2004). These are not rigidly fixed categories but offer a useful way to chart developments and trajectories in creativity research. The first of these categories is the

focus on genius up to the 1920s. Here creativity was attributed to divine inspiration and self-authoring. In the review below, I indicate ways in which inspiration and genius have historically manifested in education research and also ways in which the legacy of such concepts can be seen today. The second category is the empirical and psychological investigation of creativity through to the 1980s. This more systematic study was instigated by a move toward empirical investigation of creativity within the discipline of psychology. A speech by J.P Guilford to the *American Psychological Association* in 1950, which advocated for the scientific study of creativity, was instrumental in this empirical turn in creativity research (Runco, 2004; Runco & Jaeger, 2012). In the field of psychology, Guilford has been deemed the "father of modern creativity research" (Sternberg, & Grigorenko, 2001, p. 309). Following Guilford, cognitive researchers into creativity began to explore processes such as divergent thinking or fluidity and flexibility in the generation of ideas.

Correlative with this more systematic focus on creativity, a prerogative of creativity research was to understand what aspects of a child's development are related to adults' creative endeavours whether in the realms of science, technology or art. Furthermore, the organisational perspective of creativity facilitated by empirical methods explored the environment thought to be most conducive for creativity and looked at the extent to which factors like level of support (Madjar, Oldham, & Pratt, 2002) and positive affect (George & Zhou, 2002, 2007) influenced creativity in the workplace (Zhou & Shalley, 2008) or the home setting (Runco, 2004).

A sociologically-oriented wave of creativity research emerged in the 1980s. This social perspective located creativity in the judgement of peers (Amabile, 1996; Amabile & Pillemer, 2012; Brown, 2013; Glickman, 1978) or in the exchanges of collaborators

(Sawyer, 1992; Thomas, 2009). Sociological research into creativity drew on cultural psychology (Connery, John-Steiner & Marjanovic-Shane, 2010; Vygotsky, 1967/2004), sociocultural theory (John-Steiner, 1997; Vygotsky, 1967/2004) and on Bourdiean theories of field and habitus (Thomas, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). A final point on a historical continuum of creativity research is that neurobiological research into creativity, focusing on the neocortex and higher-level mental functions, represents a current point on a trajectory of early to contemporary enquiry into the concept. Although neurobiological research into creativity is still in its infancy (Holm-Hadulla, 2013; Sawyer, 2012), and does not feature strongly in this thesis due to its limited featuring in educational research, it is important to acknowledge the growth of this research field; the case of neurobiological research illustrates an important insight into power/knowledge and creativity. Our understanding of creativity is in flux from the early focus on genius, through to psychological measurement, through to cognitive neuroscience. The ever-evolving power effects of modes of investigation and frames of reference (religious, scientific, evidence-based) continually construct the concept. The discursive conditions of scientific enquiry and technological advancement will shape how we speak of and understand creativity, perhaps in ways that will later render present-day constructions obsolete.

While many accounts of creativity locate it firmly within a psychological or sociological tradition, interdisciplinary accounts that transcend across a number of disciplinary perspectives are also found in the literature (Barker, 2013; Essl, 2013; Hemlin, Allwood & Martin, 2004; Holm-Hadulla, 2013). For example, Sternberg and Lubart's (1992) resources for creativity include cognitive elements (e.g. intelligence) and social/organisational (e.g. environment). Additionally, Sternberg and Lubart (1991,

1992, 1995) in their "investment theory of creativity" incorporate other resources such as knowledge (of the field), cognitive styles (seeing things in new ways), personality (tolerance for ambiguity, willingness to take risks), motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic), and environment. Componential or confluence theorists of creativity such as Amabile (1983, 1996) incorporate domain skills, creativity skills, and task motivation, and the interplay between individual and social perspectives. A final example of an interdisciplinary approach to understanding creativity is Csikszentmihalyi's (1999) work, which considers the relationship between the individual, domain and field in creative outcomes.

This overview of creativity research has briefly introduced definitions, historical developments and research categorisation systems. In the mapping analogy used earlier, where this chapter represents a mapping of key features of creativity discourse in education, this overview establishes the scale and the identification reference keys for the points of interest to be discussed below.

Versions of Creativity in Education

The discussion of multiple versions of creativity below is structured around five themes: "creativity and the individual", "creativity and the social context", "creativity as unknown and unwanted", "creativity and appropriations in education and economic contexts" and "creativity and multiplicities". These themes were chosen for the capaciousness they afford to engage with diverse perspectives on the topic of creativity. Consistent with the Foucauldian approach throughout this work, they do not represent normalised or pre-existent categories of creativity truth.

I chose the term *version*, "an account or description from a particular point of view especially as contrasted with another account" (Merriam-Webster, 2016), due to it connotations with variation on some initial point of reference. Economic policymakers may "release" a different version of creativity than that released by early childhood educators. For example, a government economic policy version may espouse product-oriented or genius self-authored accounts of creativity, while advocates of child free-play may promote process-oriented accounts and perspectives from developmental psychology. Each version draws from *partial* and *possible* knowledge of what creativity could mean to claim its own authority and legitimacy.

To present an account of creativity versions, I draw on existing classificatory work (Banaji et al., 2010; Gibson, 2005; Readman, 2010). Banaji at al.'s (2010) "rhetorics of creativity" is particularly informative both in terms of the identification of various creativity truths across a plethora of research perspectives but also the invoking of rhetoric to describe these[2]. As mentioned earlier, this selection is not exhaustive since such coverage of a fragmented research field would not be possible. However, the account below offers a broadly representative mapping of knowledge production about creativity.

Following Readman (2010), a final important point in terms of constructing a list of versions of creativity, is that in doing so one is "actively involved in producing and developing particular categories by arguing implicitly and explicitly that they represent particular ways of thinking about creativity" (Readman, 2010, p. 35). To reaffirm the Foucauldian underpinnings of this thesis, in this chapter I am not concerned with the

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[2] Munday (2014) wrote that the term "discourses" could have been used rather than "rhetorics".

"rightness" or "wrongness" of any particular version, rather with surveying the field of knowledge production on creativity in education to demonstrate the impossibility of fixed meaning. My argument is that there is no fixed meaning and that therefore to understand creativity one needs to abandon the quest for universality of creativity *per se* and analyse the discursive production in sites such as policy and practice. This chapter contributes to this argument on the need to abandon creativity as a fixed entity by highlighting how the versions of creativity appear tension-riddled and incompatible when brought together on one map.

Creativity and the individual.

In this section, I review research that prioritises and centres the individual in accounts of creativity. I consider how the individual's development, the individual's temperament, personal characteristics and dispositions are all invoked in education discourses on creativity.

The relationship between play and creativity.

The value of play is emphasised in many accounts of creativity. Vygotsky (1967/2004) believed that an individual's creative development was intimately related to their early experiences of childhood play, and that creative thought processes in the young child develop to give realisation to adult creativity in scientific, technological and artistic endeavour. The trajectory from early childhood play to adult creativity is thus established:

- Imagination is internalisation of children's play

- Imagination is a higher mental function of a consciously directed thought process

- Creative thinking involves the collaboration of imagination and thinking in concepts which occurs first in adolescence but matures in adulthood

- Both artistic and scientific creativity requires the collaboration of imagination and thinking in concepts.

(Smolucha & Smolucha, 1986, p. 478-479)

In this trajectory, the imagination is developed through the medium of play, and imagination is an inherent component of creativity. Drawing on Vygotskian theory, creative play is linked in research to a range of capacities such as the development of improvisational abilities in jazz performance (Sawyer, 1992, 2003, 2006) and the development of divergent thinking processes (Russ & Wallace, 2013). Many studies have established a link between the cognitive and affective processes afforded by play and creative outcomes (Carruthers, 2002; Danksy & Silverman, 1973; Howard-Jones, Taylor & Sutton, 2002; Moore & Russ, 2008; Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 2006; Russ & Schafer, 2006; Saracho, 1992). Carruthers (2002, p. 225) argues that "essentially the same cognitive resources are shared by adult creative thinking and problem-solving on the one hand, and by childhood pretend play, on the other - namely, capacities to generate and to reason".

In light of the Vygotskian links between early childhood play and its place in later adult creativity, researchers such as Carruthers (2002) and colleague Russ (2003) argue that rejection and undervaluing of child play in the interests of instrumentalist

outcomes to mimic adult thought processes (e.g. solving abstract problems over a short period of time) may severely inhibit and diminish opportunities for creative development. Play-oriented accounts of creativity establish that all children can be creative and that there is an organic relationship between early childhood and adult creativity. Another important feature of the play-focused version of creativity is the long time span involved in the progression and maturation of creativity. As this review will continue to demonstrate, not all accounts of creativity prioritise early childhood experiences in the development of "mature forms" of creativity, or facilitate lengthy periods in the germination of childhood experiences to adult forms of creativity.

The child's experience and imagination.

The child's experience of the natural world around them, and of their encounters with others, is also a vital component of creativity for Vygotsky (Ayman-Nolley, 1999; Lindqvist, 2003; Smolucha, 1992; Smolucha & Smolucha, 1986; Tsai, 2012; Vygotsky, 1967/2004) and for John Dewey (Dewey, 1938; Goldblatt, 2006). Far from considering "everyday" experiences and encounters as inconsequential occurrences, for Vygotsky the development of the creative imagination is experientially founded and informed by the depth and richness of a child's experience. In other words, creative outcomes are contingent upon material by which they are furnished; one cannot be considered creative unless they have had rich and multiple experiences of their world. Creativity in accounts of how it is derived from childhood experience is not extracted from the context in which it is to manifest but directly contingent upon it.

Linked to his wider education philosophy on children acting on impulse and eternally curious of the world around them, Dewey foregrounded the concept of

creativity enquiry, an experience that involves "provision of and a control over qualities that are intimately associated with the mastery of both the method of inquiry and the subject matter children had to learn" (Dewey, 1902, p. 100). Here, in Dewey's child-led, participatory and organic conceptualisation, creative enquiry *itself* is an experience or a mode of learning. Creativity is not something that can be passively observed in a product nor an ability latent in individuals but signifies the processes in which children engage to make sense of the world around them.

For Dewey and Vygotsky, affect and emotion are an inherent aspect of real-life experience however this experience is socially/historically/culturally constructed (Dewey, 1902; Vygotsky, 1967/2004). Vygotsky's writings about the "emotional reality of the imagination" (Vygotsky, 1967/2004, p. 14; see also Christianson, 1992) draw attention to how emotion cannot be separated from cognition in the development of creativity. An individual's lived experience, *pershevanie* (Connery, John-Steiner & Marjanovic-Shane, 2010), is, for Vygotsky, a component of creative processes and outcomes. This emphasis on emotion is in opposition to later-discussed accounts of creativity that exclusively foreground cognitive or measurable constructs.

Fulfilling and revealing the self.

Associations are made in literature between creativity and self-revelation/self-fulfilment. Such accounts of creativity revolve around the self and look "inwards" to the individual. Grierson (2011, p. 348) argues for the impossibility of exteriorising and "showing" creativity to others in the form of producing creative outputs. Drawing on Heidegger, she invokes creativity as the "seeking of a state of becoming in time, rather than arriving at the finite or prefigured place of Being" (Grierson, 2011, p. 344).

Moreover, "if the processes of time and being can be activated as a process of revealing in the moments or events of creativity, in pedagogical events, encounters and enterprises, then creativity might restore a reconnection of self and world" (Grierson, 2011, p. 348). Creativity is established here as a kind of quest of self-discovery and self-understanding. Furthermore, since it is a "seeking", Grierson (2011) articulates an active conceptualisation of creativity as self-discovery, which eludes a terminal destination. Such a notion of creativity is far removed from ideas of maximising one's creative potential in creative industry or deploying a pre-established range of thinking skills, both of which are prioritised in other accounts of the concept. Also, the interiorised notions of creativity create many tensions in educational sites such as the difficulty of marshalling the concept into predetermined descriptors like assessment criteria. Grierson's work resonates with a distinction between predominately "Western" and "Eastern" creativity identified by Lubart:

> Eastern conception of creativity seems less focused on innovative products. Instead, creativity involves a state of personal fulfilment, a connection to a primordial realm, or the expression of an inner essence or ultimate reality. (Lubart, 1999, p. 340)

The diminution of focus on product made *by* or *for* the individual gives way to creativity as a connection to the self. These ideas of self-fulfilment and self-revelation are often established as a value base for creativity in education. For example, a NACCE report in the UK context claims that it is the core value of "the right to fulfilment and self-realisation" (NACCE, 1999, p. 53) that is "at issue in our arguing for a more systematic and sustained approach to creative and cultural education" (NACCE, 1999,

p. 54). Sir Ken Robinson, chairman of the committee that produced the above report, articulates a version of creativity as self-fulfilment in his belief that each child is endowed with natural talents and abilities, that each child's creative self is inextricably linked to such talents, and that overly-narrow school and education systems (in terms of emphasising only particular subjects and outlets for the creative self) prevents this fulfilment. As he says, "we're all born with tremendous creative confidence and abilities. Young children are full of great ideas and possibilities" (Robinson, 2009).

Guy Claxton's (2006) "inward attention" and embodiment approaches to creativity are also underscored by a sense of inward focus. Developing on a notion of "soft creativity", the "more mundane, patient, real-world kind of creativity that is the stock-in-trade of the designer, the novelist or the gardener" (Claxton, 2006, p. 353), he aligns creativity with a physical sensation in the individual's body. His account of the creative process includes incubation time and feelings of unease while dealing with potential solutions:

> Once such a hazy sense is located, you then - slowly and patiently again -
> see if you can find a short form of words, or perhaps an image, that captures
> the essence of the felt sense. Once a candidate phrase or image presents
> itself, you always refer back to the felt sense itself, asking yourself "Is that
> right?" Either there will be a physical reaction that signals "Not quite" or
> "Not really", or there will be a feeling of satisfaction - "Yes, that's it" - that
> surfaces as a small feeling of ease or release. Then the felt sense changes,
> and you can repeat the cycle of unfolding your own meaning to yourself.
> (Claxton, 2006, p. 354)

To be creative here is to arrive at an "all-is-well" balance between the self and the exterior world. The subtext to this metaphysical accounts of creativity is that finding a primordial balance between self and world is possible and that there is a human nature ordinarily out of reach beneath the surface to be "tapped into". Such a belief is closer to thinkers like Chomsky (Davidson, 1997) on a universal human language of truth, than to Foucault[3] who would argue that human nature and an exterior world/individual harmonious balance are language and knowledge configurations. Creativity is nonetheless positioned here as an inherently human pursuit that constructs individuals as seekers of truth journeying to understand self and the world. These discourses contrast with those that suggest creativity can be empirically analysed in constructs like problem-solving.

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[3] My use of Foucault's work throughout this thesis is not to support or conversely argue against constructions of creativity in literature. While I use Foucault's work to problematise particular constructions of creativity premised upon universals of "human nature", "public good" etc. and as a language to engage with the concepts brought inside/left outside the truth of creativity, my interest is not in arguing via Foucault that any accounts of creativity are in any way flawed. Championing one account over another is to take a normative position, a position resisted throughout this thesis.

The individual and problem-solving.

Guilford conceived of creativity as a component of intelligence and subsumed it within his Structure of Intellect Model (Guilford, 1967). Within this model, divergent thinking is "one of the intellectual factors that constituted the structure of intellect" (Batey & Furnham, 2006, p. 367). Divergent thinking, a concept that pervades in psychology literature is deeply wedded to creativity (Guilford, 1967; Runco, 2004; Russ & Schafer, 2006; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2001; Sternberg & Lubart, 1992; Torrance, 1974). The focus on the measurement of divergent thinking aligns with a conceptualisation of creativity as problem-solving. Guilford (1967, p. 312) argued that "there is something creative about all genuine problem-solving, and creative production is typically carried out as a means to the end of solving some problem". For Guilford (1967), problem-solving incorporates the following aspects: sensitivity to problems, fluency (ideational, associational and expressional) and flexibility (spontaneous and adaptive).

It is useful to think of the psychological branch of enquiry that derives from Guilford's work in terms of personality and cognition (Craft, 2001a). Studies on personality focus on traits of individuals such as their level of intrinsic motivation (Lassig, 2013; McLellan & Nicholl, 2013) or their tolerance for ambiguity (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995; Merrotsy, 2013). As a sub-theme under psychological approaches to creativity, enquiry into cognition is facilitated by psychometric testing (Craft, 2001a). Psychometric testing of creativity includes the wide used of Torrance's Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974, 1981) wherein creativity is conceived of as a constellation of abilities. These assessments measure fluency (the number of ideas or

solutions given), originality (the uniqueness of the ideas given), and flexibility (the variety or diversity of the ideas) (Runco, 2004).

In the interest of discursive conditions, and considering the plethora of psychological investigations into creativity that arose from Guilford's work (as discussed above), it is important to note the Cold War context in which Guilford conducted his work. This specific context is rarely acknowledged in contemporary associations made between creativity and problem-solving (e.g. throughout the OECD document to be analysed in Chapter Five). Vernon (1970), attributing Guilford's work to its specific historical context, readdresses how creativity as problem-solving was especially pertinent at the time of Guilford's writing:

> The most urgent reason is that we are in a mortal struggle for the survival of our way of life in the world. The military aspect of this struggle, with its race to develop new weapons and new strategies, has called for a stepped-up rate of invention. Having reached a state of stalemate with respect to military preparedness, we encounter challenges on all intellectual fronts, scientific and cultural as well as economic and political. (Vernon 1970, p. 167)

The point here is that the prerogative of stepping up the rate of invention required by the Cold War for military purposes provided discursive nets for creativity as problem-solving. In the current time, different discursive conditions legitimate discourses of creativity as problem-solving, namely the demands of the labour market and competition among nation states (as discussed in Chapter Five).

As well as the separation of these conditions of possibility from the advancement of creativity as problem-solving, much contemporary literature that legitimates Guilford's work on problem-solving as a kind of theory of creativity does not engage with criticisms raised about Guilford's work. These criticisms relate to the methodology, his insistence on creativity as a function of intelligence, the test environment and the elision of the social context in his investigations (Batey & Furnham, 2006, p. 367). Although Guilford's work on creativity is pivotal to many contemporary psychological conceptualisations of creativity, these historical conditions and criticisms reveal that there are always alternatives and questions over what is reified as creativity discourse.

The individual's resources.

A range of individuals' "resources" such as intelligence is also associated with creativity in literature. Batey and Furnham (2006, p. 357) cite early research by Galton in 1869 (see Galton, 1962) on heredity differences and argue that the "grounding of the investigation of creativity in the camp of individual ability differences (i.e. creativity as a component of ability or intelligence) more than a hundred years ago led to the construct being considered a predominately intellectual trait of individual difference".

In Sternberg and Lubart's (1992) conceptualisation, such dispositions as intelligence are considered "resources for creativity". Other resources include knowledge, thinking styles (see also Zhu & Zhang, 2011), personality (tolerance of ambiguity, willingness to overcome obstacles, willingness to grow, willingness to take sensible risks (see also Steers, 2009), belief in oneself, motivation and environment. Similar traits and characteristics of creative individuals are discussed in research by

Dacey & Lennon (2000), Getzels & Csiksentmihalyi (1976), and Simonton (1984). In explaining creativity with reference to an individual's resources, the implication here is that creativity is comprised of different components and elements. The blending of these components results in greater or lesser levels of creativity; one can be more or less creative than another depending on the "make-up" of these resources. This is different from an account of creativity that relates to *every* individual accessing a primordial realm. The notion of being able to compartmentalise, isolate and assess different components of creativity is seductive to empirical traditions such as psychology. In a version of creativity that prioritises resources, the creative individual is one who exhibits and demonstrates "creative components" such as tolerance of ambiguity and high levels of motivation. Demonstrable manifestations of creativity, however, are premised on a different view of the creative individual to that of the "inward-looking" and "journeying" individual discussed earlier.

I now move to versions of creativity that look beyond the individual to its manifestation in social contexts.

Creativity and the social context.

As previously noted, research into creativity in the 1980s and 1990s was heavily influenced by social perspectives (Amabile, 1983; Craft, 2001a). This heralded a situational focus over the dispositional. Moving beyond accounts of the creative genius and empirical studies, creativity began to be investigated as the outcome of exchanges between individuals (Amabile, 1983; Brown, 2013; Chappell, 2008; Jeffrey & Craft, 2001; Rhyammar & Brolin, 1999; Sawyer, 2012; Thomas, 2009, 2010a, 2010b).

A sociocultural model of creativity.

A sociocultural model of creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Sawyer, 2012) seeks to explain the concept with reference to the individual *and* sociocultural factors such as the field and the domain (e.g. Feldman, Csikszentmilialyi, & Gardner, 1994; Sawyer, 2012), the habitus (Thomas, 2007) or gatekeepers and intermediaries (Stein, 1974). Guided by a sociocultural model, work is deemed creative or otherwise with reference to a complex web of interactions between individual, domain and field, and to the values and expectations of a field. Examples of such fields include music and visual art, here conceptualised as distinct social spaces wherein actors vie for power (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; English, 2012; Thomson, 2010). Terms such as "gatekeepers" (Sawyer, 2012, p. 215) describe the role that the field plays in selecting and facilitating work deemed to be appropriate. In a domain such as music composition, gatekeepers include commissioning bodies and critics. In the visual arts, gatekeepers are curators and gallery owners. Each domain, for example the domain of western classical music, is the entirety of the values, expectation, norms, traditions and conventions that have been accumulated over time. While Sawyer (2012) writes of gatekeepers as intermediaries, he also makes the point that audience judgement plays a final role in the attribution of creativity to products through its arbitration of the gatekeeper's decision. In a market-style economy of creative judgements, the economic or credibility fate of commissioning body as gatekeepers is often dependent on the whims of audiences as consumers.

If such an account of creativity is foregrounded as the chief perspective by which the concept is explained, one's individuality in creative endeavour becomes secondary to pre-existent values and convention. Lurking behind these accounts of gatekeepers and

established values is a sense of custodianship by significant individuals/groups over what is recognised as creative. The "realm of living common culture… full of expressions, signs and symbols through which individuals and groups seek creatively to establish their presence, identity and meaning" (Willis, 1990, p. 1) is sidelined by a prioritisation of the pre-established conventions and sensibilities.

There is great potential for "colonisation of creativity" by individuals with greater influence and resources, a colonisation that is at odds with notions of creativity as residing in the individual's own configuration of resources, and distinctly different to a creativity attributed to *all* individuals' self-fulfilment. Locating creativity in the individual's self-revelation and in the individual's resources such as intelligence is not directly compatible with locating the concept in pre-established conventions and the tastes or preferences of significant gate-keepers and audiences. This tension between the dispositional and the situational is an example of conflicting conditions of possibility for creativity. As I progress through the analysis in this thesis, I outline how particular discourses such as creative potential or expression legitimate the dispositional, while others such as evaluative judgement support situational notions of creativity.

Social reasoning and creativity.

Another sociological view of creativity is that it manifests in the micro-moments of interaction between students and teachers. In her investigations in Visual Arts teaching, Kerry Thomas (2007, p. 8) argues for creativity as a "culturally situated apprenticeship in practical and social reasoning", an apprenticeship which is "highly inferential…(and) reliant on tactful exchanges" (Thomas, 2010b, p. 137; see also Thomas, 2008). Drawing on Bourdiean theory of habitus, symbolic capital and

misrecognition, she locates creativity in the transactions of symbolic capital (e.g. jokes, interjections) between student and teacher within the art education classroom (habitus). Creativity here is the product of an "embodied, although overlooked, history that accrues in its value through reiterative compromises between teachers and students in the genesis of possibilities and in the resolution of artworks" (Thomas, 2010a, p. 36). Such an account of creativity argues that it is a situational and context-bound concept. The term "overlooked" above highlights that the symbolic capital is paradoxically downplayed - for example, in student claims to creative work, teachers' words and promptings are not officially recorded in journals or students' accounts. Thomas therefore locates creativity outside of the psychological resources that students bring to their work and outside of pre-determined models and processes that lead to creative outcomes. Since creativity isn't authored by particularly gifted individuals or the prerogative of only certain individuals whose resources are perfectly blended together in this account, it suggests more democratic grounds on which to engage with the topic.

An issue that arises from disavowing creativity from psychological conceptualisations or from ideas of creativity intimately connected to each individual's unique being and self-fulfilment, is that some students have greater access to cultural capital than others (see Jeffrey, 2006a). Various forms of interaction and value systems assumed in schools and education systems have been shown in research to exclude some students, and in so doing to reproduces inequalities (see Apple, 1996; Connell, 2012; Lingard, Creagh & Vass, 2012). In associating creativity solely with interactions between students and teachers, there is a risk of attributing creativity only to those students who are in a better position to access the cultural capital of schooling. Based on the sociological conceptualisation of creativity presented thus far, creativity is a

relational phenomenon that emerges in collaborative contexts, while creative individuals are those who are sufficiently equipped to negotiate such contexts.

Social justice, democracy and creativity.

A foundational premise of some sociological versions of creativity is that it signifies an inherent capacity in all children, and as such is a basis for democratic education (Banaji et al., 2010; Dewey, 1985; Willis, 1990). Initiatives that seek to develop creativity while simultaneously negating exclusionary practices in how schools are structured are critiqued in the literature. For example, Hall and Thomson (2007) critique *Creative Partnerships* in the UK context for the way in which systemic requirements such as the National Curriculum are not changed by this initiative in the pursuit of creativity. Rather, they argue that the emphasis is placed on how the children themselves need to change. In arguing that this impasse can only be remedied by greater engagement with material contexts wherein creativity manifests, Hall and Thomson write that an account of creativity going beyond a "flabby rhetoric of inclusion" (Hall & Thomson, 2007, p. 327) needs to be offered. This lends to the argument from Dimitriadis, Cole and Costello (2009) that programmes focused on the development of creativity (such as *Creative Partnerships* in UK and those by the *National Endowment for the Arts* in US) cannot somehow hover above and apart from the material context in which schools and children are situated (Dimitriadis, Cole, & Costello, 2009). These authors, in their focus on sites of implementation of arts programmes against the backdrop of educational and social disadvantage, appeal for an understanding in which discourses around the arts (associated with creativity) and education are rooted in the particular "emergent and shifting social, political and economic landscape" (Dimitriadis et al., 2009, p. 364) of the contexts within which they are articulated. In other words,

these authors express the futility of advocating for the unleashing and development of student creativity as if it were a context-free entity that bore no relationship to constraining and challenging circumstances such as lack of access to resources. Other circumstances that impinge on democratic discourses of creativity, discussed throughout Chapter Six and Seven of this thesis, include the centrality of assessment and comparison technologies.

The work of John Dewey re-enters this discussion on democratic versions of creativity (Adams, 2013; Carr & Hartnett, 2010; Dewey, 1985). To link creativity to democratic education, I take the notion of democracy, not as a utopian constitutional end point but as a practice of negotiation and struggle to win political rights (Mouffe, 2005). Against the backdrop of competition-oriented globalisation and economisation, Adams (2013, p. 248) draws on Dewey (1985) to makes the strong claim that "creative practices are marginalised or assimilated because they can stand for what remains of the transformative democratic potential for education". As a kind of antidote to economic appropriations of education, and to forge a connection to democracy-oriented conceptualisations of education and creativity, Adams (2013) advocates for the notion of relational creative practices. Citing an example of the artwork *Oslo: Palestinian Embassy*, Adams (2013) outlines how the work is "only ever the sum of its relations with the people who are experiencing it at any one moment… not simply in these spaces, they are of them as well" (Adams, 2013, p. 245). He argues that the "creativity value" of this work is not in the judgements that can be made but in the immediate engagement of onlookers with it. For Adams (2013, p. 254), the "messy, untidy and slightly anarchic" nature of relational creative practice counters marketisation or regularisation of education in the contemporary context, and aligns with the progressive

and democratic ideas of Dewey's project. To be creativity in such democratic contexts as described by Adams (2013) above is to engage with and to relate to others. Unlike individualistic notions of creativity, the concept is not invoked in terms of how it can be deployed and put to use to maximise outputs or productivity.

Both individual and social versions of creativity emerge in the next section on creativity as an unknown phenomenon.

Creativity as unknown and unwanted

In the discussion of creativity as an unknown and unwanted phenomenon, I consider discourses where it is positioned as that which resists quantification or distillation into constructs like resources or meta-processes. An interesting segway into this discussion is Csikszentmihalyi's comment that the works of Vincent van Gogh now widely celebrated as creative remained for some time "just the hallucinatory original works of a sociopathic recluse" (Csikszentmihalyi 1999, p.321).[4] Such intermingling of creativity with hallucinations and reclusion, or with mental illness (Ludwig, 1995; Kaufman, 2001) are distinct from the positive assumptions of imagination, play, psychological resources and relational contexts discussed so far. As this section identifies, creativity as something unknown and unfathomable relates both to historical conceptualisations of the concept and to contemporary concerns in educational contexts.

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[4] Sawyer argues that the idea of the field lagging behind the extraordinary potential of individuals such as van Gogh, as expressed by Csikszentmihalyi above, includes "large portions of Romantic myth" albeit a vague refutation offered that "van Gogh's paintings were selling quite well soon after his untimely death" (Sawyer, 2012, p. 217).

Divine inspiration and the creative genius.

Early accounts of creativity were interchangeable with the concepts of genius and divine inspiration (Albert & Runco, 1999; Batey & Furnham, 2006; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). The idea of divine inspiration can be traced as far back as the writings of Plato. His account of creativity as a phenomenon that "comes through" individuals rather than one that the individual instigates is exemplified by Homer who "knew nothing of real charioteering but rather reported whatever his muse inspired him to report" (Stokes, 2008, p. 105). This Platonic notion of divine inspiration also emerges in the writings of Nietzsche. In describing his creative process, a great sense of the power of this invasion is articulated where he says "Zarathustra himself as a type, came to me - perhaps I should say rather - invaded me… everything occurs quite without volition, as if in an eruption of freedom, independence, power and divinity" (Nietzsche, 1952, pp. 209 - 210). A phenomenon that "comes through" or invades individuals cannot be rationally explained as in the example of creativity as a constellation of resources, and also resists quantification or measurement as in the example of creativity as problem solving or alignment with conventions. Nietzsche's move from "came to me" to "invade me" is stronger that Plato's notion of an inspirational muse. In his account, creativity is forceful, all-encompassing, pervasive and uncontrollable.

The uncontrollable nature of creativity also echoes with Immanuel Kant's writing (1952) on genius:

Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the

same to others in such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products …Nature prescribes the rule through genius not to science but to art, and this also only in so far as it is to be fine art. (Kant, 1952, p. 168)

The association made between creativity discourses and the concept of genius establishes the ontological basis for creativity at the level of the exceptionally talented subject. The nature of this talent is such that it cannot be produced or developed. Instead, "since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art" (Kant, 1952, p. 136). The individual's talent cannot be tempered to adhere to rules already in existence. Rather, as illustrated with the example of fine art below, the work of a Kantian genius establishes rules by which later works can be informed. Kant said:

> The concept of fine art, however, does not permit of the judgement upon the beauty of its product being derived from any rule that has a concept for its determining ground, and that depends, consequently, on a concept of the way in which the product is possible. Consequently, fine art cannot of its own self excogitate the rule according to which it is to effectuate its product. But since, for all that, a product can never be called art unless there is a preceding rule, it follows that nature in the individual (and by virtue of the harmony of his faculties) must give the rule to art, i.e., fine art is only possible as a product of genius. (Kant, 1952, p. 168)

While notions of "genius" as "innate mental aptitude" are unlikely to find explicit expression in contemporary creativity discourse (for example, in the selection of newspapers articles in Appendix One), the concept of genius occupies a place in creativity discourses to the present (Banaji et al., 2010; Batey & Furnham, 2006). For instance, popular discourses that talk of "unleashing inner creativity" or "tapping into creative potential" suggest creativity as something ordinarily "out of reach" rather than something that can be directly targeted in notions of "teaching creative problem-solving skills". The legacy of a genius discourse seems rather unfortunate for Batey and Furnham (2006), both of which are researchers in the field of psychology, who consider enduring notions of genius to signify a "legacy overshadowing some attitudes towards creativity research today" (Batey & Furnham, 2006, p. 356). Their questioning of the "legacy overshadowing" the "attitudes" towards creativity as beyond scientific understanding implies a belief that scientific understanding can supersede genius accounts, or that scientific understanding can dispel the shadows cast by notions of genius. The importance given to measurable constructs and variables in documents like the AITSL standards (AITSL, 2011) as discussed in Chapter Five, correspond with scientific discourses of creativity rather than with vague and elusive notions of genius and talent.

In education sites like schools and universities, one effect of a genius discourse of creativity is that space is elided for the role of the teacher (Gibson, 2005). The creative muse "visits" or "invades" students and a teacher is powerless to influence this phenomenon. The notion of a teacher equipping students with creativity skills or planning lessons that facilitates student creativity is incompatible with a genius discourse of creativity. As I discuss in subsequent sections, other versions of creativity

do appropriate creativity as something that can be marshalled into a school timetable and *do* construct teachers as directly involved in promoting and developing student creativity.

Remaining with the broad theme of creativity as unknown and unwanted, the next section looks at questions that exist on the benefits of appropriating creativity in educational contexts.

Disliked and unwanted creativity

Although the subtext to appeals for creativity in popular media and academic literature is such that creativity is inherently good and desirable, other accounts deviate from this theme. The deviation from the rhetoric of "goodness" works on a conceptual level to construct a version of creativity as a feature of schooling that is sometimes unwanted.

Research has indicated that some teachers dislike many traits associated with creativity. For example, Westby and Dawson (1995) write about how traits such as impulsivity, risk-taking, independence and determination were unfavourably looked upon by teachers in some contexts. Such traits stand in opposition to other learner characteristics preferred by teachers such as conformity and unquestioned acceptance of authority (Ng & Smith 2004; Steers, 2013).

The patterns by which teachers dislike or support/legitimate behaviours can be understood as conditions of possibility for the creativity of children in schools. As an illustration, the construct of "student unconventionality" associated with creativity is bound up with the conditions of possibility in classrooms. If teachers with greater authority and autonomy than the students are not receptive to unconventionality, then

students' opportunities for unconventional approaches to their work may be greatly diminished. Drawing on the research cited earlier on symbolic exchanges (Thomas, 2007, 2008), teachers are in a position to place higher and lower values on behaviours in general and on behaviours associated with creativity (Fryer, 1996). If teachers' "non-receptivity" is stronger to the extent of dislike, one can see how the unconventional student, and unconventional work practices are at a disadvantage in this classroom.

An issue with the line of research on teachers' likeability of traits and work-approaches associated with creativity is that it is premised upon a "prototype" of a creative student. The construction of this prototype however is highly contingent on the research paradigm informing the work - a creative student from a sociological perspective is not one and the same as another from a psychological perspective. It is no more a universal truism that "creative students relate well to peers" than "creative students take risks". Constructing a prototype to encompass all the versions and discourses of creativity that exists would seem practically impossible and wrought with contradictions. Therefore, a picture of whether the teacher "likes" such creative students is problematic and always partial.

Another tension in this line of enquiry is the paradox of teachers disliking behaviours associated with creativity along with a simultaneous preference for more student creativity in their classrooms, for example 96% of teachers valuing creativity *per se* in Feldhusen and Treffinger's (1975) research. These tensions testify to the lack of consensus on what creativity is. One the one hand, on a conceptual level the abstract idea of creativity is considered desirable. On the other, it's manifestation in "real" and everyday student behaviours may be unwanted and discouraged. In Chapter Six of this thesis, I point out a disjuncture between aspirations for more student creativity, yet

paradoxical practices of limiting unconventional students' behaviours associated with it. I relate this limiting to the discursive conditions of the effects of disciplinary power to normalise student behaviours in schools.

Malevolent creativity.

Another version of creativity that deviates from predominately positive conceptualisations of the concept is creativity as a potential source of damage and destruction. The writers discussed below call halt to the assumption that creativity is unquestionably beneficial to humankind. A suspicious and heightened awareness of the limits of creativity is associated with deliberation on the ethical limits creativity (Craft, 2003a, 2005, 2006; Chappell, 2008; Chappell & Craft, 2011; Claxton et al., 2008). Questions such as the following reflect ethical considerations on the question of creativity in education: Why do education systems wish for students to be creative? If creativity is attributed to destructive acts, should its development be a priority for schools? Is there a distinction between creativity "put to use" in productive ways on the one hand and destructive ways on the other? One way of responding to such questions is to consider different forms of creativity rather than one overall "good" and desired form.

A distinction between desired creativity and that thought to be destructive can be considered as one between benevolent and malevolent creativity (Cropley, Kaufman & Cropley, 2013). While benevolent is associated with the production of literary, scientific and musical canons, the impact of malevolent creativity on humanity is far from positive. As Steers says:

Sadly the innovative and imaginative outcomes of human creativity are just

as likely to be malignant as beneficent. While creativity may be directed to

sustainable development, preventing disease, famine and poverty, it may

equally be directed at designing weapons of mass destruction, plotting

crimes against humanity, exploiting the vulnerable or encouraging the

profligate use of scarce natural resources for commercial gain… "Creative

accounting" may be a root cause of the current economic recession. (Steers,

2009, p. 129)

The notion of "just as likely" appears pessimistic and provocative here. If it is true

that the development of weapons of mass destruction and the abuse of natural resources

are as likely an outcome of creativity as sustainable development, then this likelihood is

completely negated in policy. The calls to "find it, promote it (creativity)" in the UK

context (QCA, 2004, online) or encouragement of children to "reach their creative and

expressive potential" in Australia (ACARA, 2013a, p. 3) signifies that malevolent uses

of creativity are not considered a likely threat.

To deal with the vast discrepancy between advocating for the development and

fostering of creativity in schools, and acknowledging that recent onslaughts on

humanity could be termed creativity, the notions of "wise" and "humanising" have

begun to appear in discussion of fostering creativity in education. For Anna Craft

(2006), a discourse of wisdom facilitates engagement with the moral and ethical limits

of creativity:

The fostering of creativity with wisdom may be integrally related to the

nurturing of moral development and there is therefore potential for teachers

to highlight the ethical and moral issues that arise from creativity. At the least this may mean recognizing that, during the twentieth century in particular, creativity was resourced, developed and applied in what might be seen as undesirable and unethical ways. (Craft, 2006, p. 346)

This comment does not distinguish between a "good" and "bad" creativity, instead implying that the phenomenon called creativity became channelled into negative outlets over the last century. It is not clear what (if any) desirable and ethical ways creativity was resourced, developed and applied over the same period or if such positive ends have a greater claim on the term creativity. Further developing on the notion of wisdom to encourage deliberation on the ends of creativity, Claxton, Craft and Gardner (2008) advocate for "wise humanising creativity", a creativity that is "grounded in a reciprocal relationship between the collaborative generation of new ideas and identities, fuelled by dialogues between the participants and the world outside" (Claxton, Craft, & Gardner 2008, p. 9).

It is noteworthy that the emphasis here on reciprocal relations and collaboration aligns tightly with the sociological notions of creativity discussed earlier rather than with the individual-oriented accounts. In one sense, wise creativity as an antidote to malevolent creativity is at the expense of locating creativity at the level of the individual. However, this implies that there is a "greater good" in the creativity emerging in collaborative contexts that in individual pursuit. It also implies that there is a universal "wisdom" that all will apply in their deliberations on creativity. Like "human nature" or "good teaching", wisdom is not a universally accepted value base. It is difficult to establish if there is a distinction for Claxton, Craft and Gardner (2008) between benevolent and malevolent creativity, or if, for them, there is a singular

creativity about which a collaborative dialogue determines how it should be put to use. These distinctions are important because so much creativity discourse is predicated on other terminology in education with positive connotations. While few would disagree with the importance of engagement with moral dimensions of human actions or collaborative dialogue, writings from the authors above do not target why "creativity" remains unquestionably positive in education policy such as that analysed in this thesis. They don't mount a critique to the imperative to find and promote creativity. Despite their invocations that dialogue is facilitated on the appropriate "end uses" of creativity, they implicitly accept that creativity is something that *can* and *should* be developed. In this thesis, I analyse the conditions of possibility within which discourses of creativity emerge, and point out where the immediate prerogative to develop creativity on account of its abundant personal and societal benefits forecloses engagement with creativity as unwanted or unwelcome.

In contrast to creativity as unknown and unwanted, the versions of creativity highlighted below begin from the premise that it should be appropriated in education and economic contexts.

Creativity and appropriations in education and economic contexts.

The unfathomability, suspicion or mistrust associated with creativity as discussed in the previous section are all negated in versions of creativity that posit it can be appropriated in education and economic contexts. In discourses of creative teaching, assessment for creativity and preparedness for creative industries, creativity can be planned for in advance and given a mandate. In an "international policy text" (Jeffrey & Troman, 2009, p. 2) premised on the fundamental necessity of creativity in education to ameliorate the economy, the underlying premise is that creativity is known and inherently desirable. The discussion below will highlight rationales for knowing creativity in schools, and argue that through "common sense" assumptions made between the concept and other language of schooling (assessment, teaching, preparation for later life), creativity becomes part of the schooling vernacular.

Rationales for knowing creativity.

Although the realisation of Keith Sawyer's (2012) aspiration of developing a science of creativity is considered ambitious by some researchers (e.g. Chan, 2013) due to the diversity of research paradigms, it is indicative of many similar calls in research to develop a "joined-up" research programme synthesising approaches to understand the concept (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Holm-Hadulla, 2013). In regard to the question of "why" we need a science of creativity or a reference point for the concept across all disciplines, Sawyer (2012) makes the following points:

- Explaining creativity can help us identify and realise every person's unique creative talent

- Explaining creativity can help our leaders respond better to the challenges facing modern society

- Explaining creativity can help us all to become better problem solvers

- Explaining creativity helps us to realise the importance of positive, peak experience to mental health

- Explaining creativity helps educators to teach more efficiently.

  (Sawyer, 2012, pp. 4 - 5)

The most immediate observation from this listing is that creativity will make us "better" people - leaders will better respond, student will be better at problem-solving and teaching will be improved. Since explaining and understanding creativity leads to gains at all three of these levels, it establishes an unquestionable need to give creativity a central place in educational institutions. The "betterment discourse" means that every individual's unique talent (as referenced in the first of Sawyer's points above) needs to be channelled into the activities of future leaders, teachers and problem-solvers. Explaining creativity is firmly attached here to maximising abilities - a theme I argue underscores discourses of creativity throughout the Australian policy context (see analysis in Chapter Five).

Another observation is that the points on the need to explain creativity oscillate between those that benefit the individual (explaining their talents, developing positive mental health) and those that have systemic benefit (ameliorating schooling systems and the problems faced by society). The same creativity captures everything from an

individual's mental health and talents to how that individual will lead and teach effectively. Since creativity is presented as a macro-level "theory of everything", the imperative of arriving at consensus on how it is defined and measured would seem unquestionable. The deeper question of why creativity is associated with mental health or to leadership in the first place are negated in the construction of the rationale above; it *just does*. The analysis of the discursive conditions in policy and practice throughout this thesis aims to avoid taken-for-granted associations made between creativity and other constructs.

Teaching philosophies and creativity.

Another "macro-level" notion of creativity is the claim that the teaching methods emanating from the writings of particular educational theorists and philosophers have great potential to facilitate creativity. Creativity is "known" in that the learning principles espoused by these particular theorists are deemed to be facilitative of student creativity. Creativity is implicitly defined as adherence to such principles.

One example here is the aforementioned work of John Dewey whose ideas of the curiosity, natural impulse of children, and of balancing the curriculum with children's interests (all of which he associated with creativity) have informed the development of pedagogy and curriculum (Cremin, Craft & Clack, 2012). The focus on children's impulses as a foundation for learning relates to the individual-centric notion of the child's own experience. While creativity is not explicitly defined in Dewey's work or in the curricula that draw on his work, where creativity is juxtaposed with Dewey, it is defined as relating to children's impulses and experiences by association.

Dantus (1999) and Cane (1999) foreground an emphasis on self-revelation that underpins Montessori teaching in claiming that Montessori methods can develop children's creativity. Taken further therefore, where Montessori methods are used in educational settings alongside assurances that student creativity is being developed and facilitated, creativity is implicitly defined as self-revelation. This implicit definition buys into an individual-centric account. The teaching philosophy of Reggio Emilia has also been applauded for the development of creativity through its focus on:

- Involving children in higher-level thinking skills (analysis, synthesis, evaluation)

- Encouraging the expression of ideas and messages through a wide variety of expressive and symbolic media

- Encouraging the integration of subject areas through topics holding meaning and relevance to the children's lives

- Offering adequate time for the in-depth exploration of specific topics which may arise from spontaneous interest. (Craft, 2001a, p. 17)

As with the previous example of Dewey's work, since Montessori or Emilia didn't explicitly define creativity or articulate how creativity *is* self-revelation, the claims that reliance on their approaches develops student creativity is underlined by a host of assumptions on creativity as an individual enterprise, or as something that is inherent in every child. If the use of these educators' methods are recommended to develop creativity in early childhood settings, it is difficult to see the point at which the "outcomes" of such learning become merged with the utilitarian benefits of these children later teaching or leading in more efficient ways. Since education policy is

frequently an assortment of different education philosophies including those of early childhood educators, and national priorities such as the need to remain competitive, multiple conflicting discourses of creativity are drawn together.

Recognising and describing student creativity.

Many research exemplars that advocate for greater realisation and opportunity for creativity in education are premised on a list of characteristics of students considered to be "creative" (Chan & Chan, 1999; Cropley, 1999; Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Steers, 2009). A recurrent theme in the construction of such a list is that it is then possible to point out what aspects of schooling negatively impinge on creativity or the aspects that are beneficial to its development. A typical example from the literature of a description of student creativity is provided by John Steers who, in providing descriptors of behaviours associated with student creativity, also comments on how contemporary school climates prevent some behaviours being promoted in classrooms:

- tolerance for ambiguity - how often are teachers required to make everything clear- cut, define precise learning outcomes, eliminating all uncertainty?
- flexibility and openness to alternative approaches - how is it that school managers and inspectors place such high value on adherence to schemes of work and detailed, sometimes minute by minute, lesson plans?
- playfulness with ideas, materials or processes - how often do teachers insist pupils stop "messing around"?
- an ability to concentrate and persist, to keep on teasing and worrying away at a problem rather than seeking premature resolution - how often

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is there insistence that student assignments must be handed in on time to meet teachers' arbitrary deadlines?

- a willingness to explore unlikely connections and apparently disassociated ideas - how often are pupils told "get back on task - stop wasting time"?

- the self-awareness and courage to pursue their ideas in the face of considerable opposition - how often is this interpreted as stubbornness or insubordination?

- confidence, the self-belief to take intellectual and intuitive risks (perhaps in essence creative thinking is simply "risky thinking"). So why do teachers often advise that it is best to play safe, stick to established routines, and not to take too many chances? (Steers, 2009, p. 130)

The questioning of "how often" teachers' ask or do something, immediately following an identification of something that students deemed to be "creative" do or demonstrate paints a negative portrayal of how schools currently "cater" for creative students and their work preferences. It is interesting that in the construction of such a list, the author engages with commonly-cited constructs as if they were unanimously accepted. As a case in point, the notion of "tolerance for ambiguity", a descriptor that is frequently applied to student creativity (Furnham & Marks, 2013; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995; Merrotsy, 2013) comes at the top of the list here. Also uncritical of the notion of "tolerance of ambiguity" is the ACARA curriculum in the Australian context, which recommends that activities to foster critical and creative thinking should challenge students to tolerate ambiguity (ACARA, 2013b). Problematising the concept, Furnham and Marks (2013) outline how it is frequently interchangeable with "tolerance

of uncertainty" (TU). Tolerance for ambiguity is the individual's reaction to an ambiguous situation in the present (for example, how stressed they become), while tolerance of uncertainty is frequently associated with how the individual deals with the uncertainty of the future (Furnham & Marks, 2013). In Steers (2009) work, it is not clear what the ambiguity is that students tolerate, whether in the confines of a particular lesson or in a longer-term notion of how student learning will be drawn upon to deal with future problems. The teacher is implicated differently in both understandings yet where a generic idea of ambiguity is included, the specific activities of the student and how the teacher might facilitate these are not clear.

The imperative to avoid "top-down" evaluation and extrinsic motivation in the pursuit of creativity frequently appears in accounts of educational environments that are most conducive to its development (Jeffrey & Woods, 1998; Woods & Jeffrey, 1996; Woods et al. 1997). The damaging effects of heavily prescribed environments for creativity are articulated in Nicholl and McLellan's (2008, p. 596) research where they identified how highly regulated work environments "with an emphasis on craft and the acquisition of practical craft-based skills… (allowed) very little opportunity to be creative". These findings echo with advice from literature reaching back fifty years such as "encourage practice-learning without the threat of evaluation" (Myers & Torrance, 1961) and "downplay the evaluation of children's work" (Hennessey & Amabile 1987).

The teacher is complicit in undermining creativity and one who is powerless to change the order of events at school in many accounts of the appropriate environment for creativity (as in the example from Steers, 2009 above). They "insist" and "advise" and are also the same individuals who are required to tightly plan lessons and to act on the whims of school managers and inspectors. It is not immediately apparent whether it

is inspection and evaluation regimes or teachers themselves that are being targeted in the critique of schooling environments that damage creativity. The question of what teachers can do to make classroom environments more creativity-friendly is conflated with systemic constraints within which teachers themselves are also implicated. In Chapter Six of this thesis, I analyse how practices of a school institution construct creativity and how they facilitate or omit particular discourses of what teachers "should do" or "should be" to facilitate creativity or to teach creatively. For example, rather than accept a generic or universally applicable construct such as how the establishment of success criteria helps to comprise a creativity-friendly environment, this thesis emphasises how the notion of criteria is linked to measurement-oriented frames of reference. While these frames are conducive to some versions of creativity, they are not compatible with others.

Teaching for creativity/ teaching creatively.

A distinction frequently made in literature is one between teaching for creativity and teaching creatively (Munday, 2014; NACCE 1999; Starko, 2005). The former of these locates creativity with the student where the teacher does not need to identify as a creative person or demonstrates that there is creativity in his/her approaches. The latter, "teaching creatively", places the onus for creativity on the teacher. I interpret these attempts at distinctions as symptomatic of a move towards a science of creativity in education. "Teaching creatively" presents the adverbial form whereas "creative teaching" is an adjectival form. At the root of this distinction lies the question of whether creativity is something "we are" or something that "we do". Both elements of this distinction feature in the Australian context as demonstrated in the analysis to follow. For example, creativity is related to something that "we are" where the policy

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context speaks of Australians as a creative nation, or of children that possess creative potential. Creativity as something "we do" arises in the same context in discourses that relate creativity to design and to problem-solving. Eschewing a normative position on either "to be" or "to do" forms of creativity, this thesis outlines how both are constructed in policy and practice.

The rhetoric of some accounts of teaching creatively is that there needs to be a parallel purpose between students and teachers for creativity to manifest in classrooms. Such parallel purposes are apparent in mentorship or apprenticeship models wherein teachers live out the realities they aspire to (Beetlestone, 1998; Craft, 2000; Fryer, 1996; Shagoury-Hubbard, 1996). Sawyer's (2004a, 2004b) improvisational approach which involves the "co-construction" of solutions with students is also important here as is Hämäläinen & Vähäsantanen (2011) notion of "orchestrating creativity" by changing the direction of pre-planned lessons to accommodate interactions in the classroom. This involvement of the teacher as a "creative equal" to students links to sociological conceptualisations of creativity. The involvement of adults working as equals with students in orchestrating creativity is a foundational premise of creative practitioner innovations in education such as the Queensland *Smart State Strategy* (Hay & Kapitzke, 2009) and *Creative Partnerships* in the UK (Hall & Thomson, 2007; Jones & Thomson, 2008).

In the discourse of teachers' partnership with students in the development of creativity, there is considerable space given to teacher autonomy (Burnard & White, 2008; Simmons & Thompson, 2008; Steers, 2009). These researchers imply that if teachers are given more space and capacity to direct lessons according to the particular contexts in which they find themselves, they will be able to ensure more creative

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outcomes for their students. Furthermore, discourses of teacher autonomy in accounts from the above referenced writers imply that the realisation of creative outcomes is related to the affordances made for the teacher to tailor classes and learning experience to their own cohorts of students. In Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis, I draw out how ideas of teacher autonomy and opportunities to tailor classes relate to power effects of the school institution and to the construction of creativity for one individual teacher. This autonomy is not considered as something "naturally occurring" and "fully-formed" or as something that all teachers can possess and act upon. Citing a range of examples of individual teacher practices within spaces for action, I relate a teacher's freedom to construct creativity to the forces of normalisation and surveillance within the school context. While there are multiple inflections of their own freedom to construct creativity, the analysis of the discursive conditions throughout this thesis demonstrates that these inflections are a dimension or a face of a wider network of power relations.

In terms of teaching "for creativity", a theme in the literature is the fostering of specific thinking styles such as the inculcation of possibility thinking, or the posing of "as if" and "what if" questions in schools (Burnard et al, 2006; Craft et al 2012; Craft et al. 2014; Cremin, Burnard & Craft, 2006; Jeffrey, 2006b; Jeffrey & Craft, 2006). Interestingly Craft (2012) calls possibility thinking a *theory* of creativity, one that incorporates "a taxonomy of question-posing and question-responding, and the inter-relationship with imagination, risk-taking, self-determination and immersion, as well as exploring pedagogical strategies" (Craft, 2012, p. 178). The choice of the term "theory" to incorporate themes of the imagination, along with what children and teachers say and do, seems to present a comprehensive or unified account of creativity. One interpretation here is that engaging children in "possibility thinking" can legitimate

claims on teaching for creativity or teaching creatively. This is no doubt a seductive notion for policymakers, course designers and educators that wish to "package" a theory of creativity for education workshops and conferences, or for educating pre-service teachers. It must be reiterated that my focus in this thesis is not to disagree with the notion of possibility thinking as related to creativity or to suggest a different mode of thinking or theory. If possibility thinking featured strongly in Australian education discourses, my interest in invoking Foucault's work would encourage me to look at how possibility thinking emerged and its rationale. I undertake this genealogical work in the case of creativity as "critical and creative thinking" or creativity as problem solving, both of which feature in the Australian context.

Models of creativity represent another theory by which the concept is made known in schools. Conceptualisations of the creative process invariably revolve around a broad four-stage model developed by Graham Wallas (Runco, 2004; Steers, 2009; Wallas, 1973). The stages in the Wallas model are preparation, generation, incubation and verification. Preparation refers to the time when the individual observes and clarifies what needs to be addressed to solve a problem. This leads to generation where many solutions are formulated and tried out rather like experimentation. The incubation stage is linked to unconscious or undirected mental activity where the problem or desire and the various solutions exist in tension. This tension between ideas in the incubation stage correlates with the notions of blind variation and selective retention from evolutionary biology (Claxton, 2006; Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Perkins, 1995; Simonton, 1995, 1998, 2011; Sternberg, 2000; Sweller, 2009; Ward et al, 1999). As Cremin, Craft and Clack (2012) point out however, the idea of blind variation is problematic when applied directly to creative ideas since it undermines the role of

knowledge and expertise. Wolpert (1992) provides an interesting analogy between a scientist choosing a solution and a chess player making a move in a game:

> What is so impressive about good scientists is the imaginative solutions they come up with. Perhaps the analogy is with chess – choosing the right line many moves ahead: to think of the chess master as making random searches, like a crude computer programme is quite misleading. (Wolpert 1992, p. 60)

The point here is that the chess player deploys knowledge traditions and subtle tactful execution of skill rather than leaving the outcomes to chance. After an incubation phase, this leads to a transformation or time of discovery when a new solution is generated. The final stage, the verification stage, occurs when a solution is selected and tested. There are many adaptations to the model developed by Wallas where researchers have further subcategorised some of the stages. For example, the contemporary creativity researcher, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, presents five aspects in his process: preparation, insight, incubation, evaluation and elaboration (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). His inclusion of evaluation and elaboration extends the idea of verification and suggests a continual process beyond the selection of the solution.

There are critiques in the literature of a stage model conceptualisation of creativity. For example, Jack Glickman (1978) argues that stage conceptualisations, such as the process from preparation to verification, can be generically applied to "everyday" thinking and interaction not normally considered creative. Additionally, he outlines another shortcoming of process conceptualisations in their inability to provide a language for the "short burst" creativity like improvisation, concluding that "skill in

execution cannot be considered necessary for artistic creation since works of art are so often not executed by their creators" (Glickman, 1978, p. 160). A stage model conceptualisation of creativity posits that the individual can direct creativity and that a "creative process" can be claimed in schools by structuring lessons around a trajectory from brainstorming to the eventual refinement of an idea.   It also assumes a forward momentum where ideas will be generated after preparation for the problem, or where the "best" or "strongest" idea will emerge from the incubation phase.

There is an interesting relationship between the genius account of creativity and stage model conceptualisations. On the one hand, the notion of incubation seems to draw on a genius discourse, but the discourses of purposeful selection and verification suggest that the author of creativity possesses control over it. The addition of others stages that can be directed move an unwieldy conceptualisation of the unknown and of the invasion of ideas into classroom contexts. Creativity is shown here to be a vastly versatile concept; the temporal dimensions of the concept can be modified, and the construction of an operable model for schools can incorporate discourses that alone would resist incorporation into the work of schools. Through the focus on "critical and creative thinking", problem-solving and design discourses in the Australian curriculum context, this thesis demonstrates how operable constructs of creativity are legitimated.

Coinciding with discourses of creativity as "teachable" are discourses of assessment. Just as creative teaching can take many forms, e.g. teaching for creativity or teaching creatively, there are multiple discourses of the assessment of creativity. The development of subscales and creativity assessment measurements represents a face of the psychological study of creativity. For example, Torrance (1974) outlined four assessable components: fluency (ability to produce a large number or ideas), flexibility

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(ability to produce a large variety of ideas), elaboration (ability to develop, embellish or fill-out an idea) and originality (ability to produce ideas that are unusual). These four components give rise to a plethora of instruments on assessing creativity as a psychological construct such as the self-construct creativity scale (Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009). "Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking" (Torrance, 1974), or modification of these tests, are used in the present and form the basis of much current empirical literature on creativity.

Assessment modalities have also been developed to coincide with a social perspective on creativity. One assessment technique premised on social perspectives is the "Consensual Assessment Technique" (CAT) (Amabile, 1996; Fautley, 2004; Hickey, 2001). The CAT takes account of the judgement of observers considered appropriately qualified to recognise the level of creativity inherent in students' work. The underlying assumption of this technique is that only experts in a specific field of judgement are in a position to appreciate the originality and novelty value of a work. In the field of music education, an interesting finding in the work of Hickey (2001) was that, of five groups of judges assessing the creativity in students' work - second grade children, seventh grade children, music theorists, teachers and composers - the least amount of agreement on the level of creativity was from the composers. The author's reasoning that "the world in which professional composers work may be too far removed from the world of children's musical creative thinking" (Hickey, 2001, p. 241), and recommendation that composers should be "trained" for what to look for indicates a disjuncture between institutionalised models of creativity and the "real" work of composers. Drawing on interviews with teachers in a high school music department, this thesis also problematises notions of an assessment technique such as the CAT, pointing

out the problematic nature of consensus on the creative merits of students' work even among expert judges.

The final version of creativity that converges around the theme of "known and appropriated" is creativity that maximises the economic fate of individuals and of nation states.

Maximising the economic value of creativity in education.

A version of creativity that considers it to be an economic necessity is highly prevalent in contemporary contexts and is invariably linked to discourses of creative industries and a knowledge economy. The various inflections of how the concept is harnessed to ameliorate the economy begins with an underlying assumption that creativity can be "known" - its value can be identified in government policy. Many commentators such as Banaji et al. (2010, p. 70) argue that the union of economic and creativity discourses "annexes the concept of creativity in the services of a neoliberal economic programme and discourse".[5] The choice of the word "annexes" is interesting here in light of the discussion on how discursive conditions brought about by neoliberal ideals of utility maximisation and productivity reify and compartmentalise creativity. Chapter Five of this thesis takes up the discussion on how such annexing occurs in the Australian context.

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[5] This represents the first reference to the concept of neoliberalism throughout this thesis. Like creativity, this concept does not refer to any universal entity. The contextualising of neoliberalism for this thesis is provided in Chapter Four.

A monetary value attached to creativity confers great significance upon it. For example, the introductory pages of the *Creative Economy Report 2013* published by UNESCO and the UN makes the claim that:

> Figures published by UNCTAD in May 2013 show that world trade of creative goods and services totalled a record US$ 624 billion in 2011 and that it more than doubled from 2002 to 2011; the average annual growth rate during that period was 8.8 per cent. Growth in developing-country exports of creative goods was even stronger, averaging 12.1 per cent annually over the same period. (UN, 2013, p. 153)

These figures compel policy makers to understand and act on the value of creativity since industries with the word "creative" attached are credited with a doubling of the national economy over a ten-year period. For developing countries also, creative industry is also a "winning formula". Since the same document quoted above is careful to point out that investment in creative industries also leads to significant gains in such intangible metrics as quality of life, well-being and self-esteem, as well as economic benefit, the underlying message is that government cannot neglect creative industry. It is difficult to reconcile a notion of creativity that is responsible for generating USD624 billion in wealth with a hazy sense of divine inspiration or undirected child play. Economic framings of creativity are only compatible with a "knowable" account of the concept; creativity is defined by its association with industry and economic growth.

In both the UK and Australian contexts, discourses of creativity are frequently articulated in tandem with the notion of a knowledge economy (Australian Government, 2013; Florida, 2002; Hay & Kapitzke, 2009; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Sawyer, 2006).

Such an economy is one which positions knowledge as the new goods rather than commodities, labour and material goods (Ozga & Lingard, 2007; Rivzi & Lingard, 2009; Winter, 2012). Although there is no singular theory of the knowledge economy, the techno-economic paradigm is primarily drawn upon in the Australian context (Bullen et al., 2004)[6]. Through an analysis of *Backing Australia's Ability: An Innovation Action Plan for the Future*, Bullen et al. (2004) demonstrate how the techno economic paradigm, as a theory of economic change, emerges from post Fordist, neo Schumpter economics.

The works of Seltzer and Bentley (1999) are among those widely cited in understanding how creative individuals are conceptualised in a knowledge economy where "technological progress, organizational change and intensified global competition have driven a shift from manual work to 'thinking jobs' that emphasize a whole new range of skills, from problem-solving and communication to information and risk management and self- organization" (Seltzer and Bentley 1999, p. viii). Their belief that creativity is "the application of knowledge and skills in new ways to achieve a valued goal" (Seltzer & Bentley, 1999, p. 11) aligns with their aspiration that students should learn to "diversify their ranges of skills and knowledge" and "apply what they know in multiple work contexts" (Seltzer & Bentley, 1999, p. 4).

The "twenty-first century worker citizen" (Queensland Government, 2005; Williams, Gannon & Sawyer, 2013) constructed in education policy is an inflection of the creative individual appropriated by the knowledge economy. The following subjectification of a creative individual from the Queensland Government exemplifies

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[6] See Bullen et al. (2004) for a range of other theorisations of the knowledge economy.

abilities such as self-organisation and the capacity to adapt oneself to meet multiple demands:

> The capacity to think ahead as well as respond and adapt to change is as much an attitude as it is a skill. Such an attitude of foresight, responsiveness and adaptability is strongest in a society that provides the safety and security of social stability at the same time that it values the dynamism of creativity, inventiveness and the energy of the human spirit. (Queensland Government 2005, p. 44)

The Creative Partnership programme in the UK provides a case study example of how creativity is associated with the knowledge economy (Hall & Thomson, 2007; Jeffrey & Troman, 2013; Jones & Thomson, 2008; Neelands & Choe, 2010). This programme aims to give students access to creative professionals like artists and musicians with whom they work on creative projects, and is targeted at students most at risk of exclusion in education. These creative projects can take multiple forms such as a part-time artist in residence working on self-portraits with Year Five pupils as analysed in a research project by Hall and Thomson (2007). The links between creativity and the economy are thus made explicit in documents arising from the programme:

> Creativity is widely regarded as a critical factor in the future economic success of the country… One of CP's key aims is to encourage and generate creative thinkers who are capable of independent thinking and questioning, innovation, risk-taking and other entrepreneurial and enterprising behaviours. By encouraging these creative skills, we believe we are preparing the next generation for a work life that features continual

change and requires flexibility for success. (Creative Partnerships, 2005, p. 1)

The rhetoric here of the "next generation" whose work will "feature continual change" is foundational to an economical framing of creativity. As I progress through the analysis chapters of this thesis, I will engage further with the constructedness of continual economic change and with the incitement for creativity to cope with the change.

The knowledge economy legitimates some collaborative and improvisational forms of creativity. Sawyer (2012) holds that the core of the knowledge economy is innovation and highlights the collaborative practices of successful and well-known businesses. He claims that collaborative and improvisational forms of creativity will meet the demands of the knowledge economy:

> In today's knowledge societies, one of the key missions of the schools is to educate for creativity. The knowledge economy is, at root, driven by the creation of new knowledge - prototypically, technological innovation, but also the creation of new procedures and new organizational forms (e.g., distribution of goods, market segmentation and targeted advertising, new financial instruments for funding research investment or international trade). …To educate for the innovation economy, schools must provide students with opportunities to engage in collaborative knowledge building activities, through disciplined improvisations. (Sawyer, 2006, pp. 46 - 47)

There is no doubt cast here on the knowledge economy, on its legitimacy in determining the missions and goals of schools; versions of creativity outside of the

prototypical organisational forms that the knowledge economy promotes are also excluded. Where Sawyer (2006, p. 41) says that "creativity always occurs in complex collaborative and organisational settings" in contemporary times, there is little acknowledgement that his writings are premised on *a* view of creativity in *a* view of the knowledge economy. This view is not unanimously referenced across the literature. Sawyer's interest in improvisation and group music-making (as referenced earlier) no doubt drives this marriage of collaboration and the knowledge economy. The malleable concept of creativity is the conduit for collaboration to the knowledge economy here.

Along with the knowledge economy, the concept of creative industries also frames how creativity is constructed in education. The link between creative industries and education is established in the Australian context through the culture policy, *Creative Australia* (Australian Government, 2013) in its assertion of how "the pathway into a career in the cultural economy begins with a strong arts education at school" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 88). Not only does this juxtapose creativity with the economy but also stipulates arts education as the particular curricular area that best facilitates the preparation of students for creative industries. There is no doubt that creativity is pivotal here:

> Cultural and creative industries are the lifeblood of a vibrant and inventive society. Successful creative businesses do not succeed solely on the strength of creative content and services. They also deploy energy and creativity in managing sustainable and competitive businesses. (Australian Government, 2013, p. 90)

Drawing on the prioritisation of design industries in the Australian context, I will develop an argument in Chapter Five of how these industries rationalise creativity in education.

The place of "creativity" in "creative industries" is contentious and moves according to various models. One could pose the question of what makes an industry creative and another not, or to what aspects of industry the label "creative" applies. These questions resonate with a dualism between creativity as a specialised or a rare form of production and creativity as related to "everyday" business activities. Models that locate creativity at the core of industry (e.g. Throsby's 2008 concentric model wherein the "core-creative arts" of literature, music, performing arts and visual arts are located in the centre) are problematic:

> This sort of model, which sees "the arts" either as pure creativity and/or providing the raw material subsequently "commercialized" by the cultural industries, fails to give an adequate account of the real processes at work in the sector, and evades some of the real tensions between creative labour and the conditions in which it is put to work. It also posits a kind of "individual genius" or approach that fails to address the collaborative nature of creative production or the way in which the "industry" actively constitutes the "artistic" or generative creative product. (O'Connor, 2010, p. 57)

O'Connor here draws attention to how industry establishes parameters around knowledge of creativity. However, in problematising the notion of creative industries, he introduces terms such as "creative labour", "processes at work" and "the sector". While O'Connor critiques the legacy of the individual genius here to the extent that it

precludes collaborative creativity, his wrangling with this legacy introduces other definitional parameters for creativity - there is a "creative sector" and one can engage in "creative labour". O'Connor's adoption of the terms "sector", "labour" or "production" in locating creativity in the creative industries is premised on a view that creativity can fit into industry discourses and that the language of industry can be stretched across the concept of creativity. "Production" and "labour" here become another set of co-ordinate points for the concept along with others referenced earlier like divine inspiration and genius or field and habitus.

Cunningham and Hartley (2001) believe that creative industries can modify our understanding of creativity, further testament to the changeable notion of the concept. Their argument that creativity "needs to be reconceptualised in line with the realities of contemporary commercial democracies", where art is "something intrinsic, not opposed to the productive capacities of contemporary global, mediated, technology-supported economy" (Cunningham & Hartley, 2001, p. 3), is also one for creativity as compatible with creative industry. Their belief is that creativity can be reconceptualised away from "high art" or "elitist" associations in line with changing trends of industry and the knowledge economy:

> By bringing the arts into direct contact with large-scale industries such as media entertainment, it allows us to get away from the elite/mass, art/entertainment, sponsored/commercial, high/trivial distinctions that bedevil thinking about creativity, not least in the old humanities and social sciences. (Cunningham & Hartley, 2001, p. 2)

"Getting away from distinctions" is presented here as a way to bring creativity into line with the growth of industry. Furthermore, the idea of such distinctions "bedevilling" how we think about creativity has the effect of projecting the concept as somewhat stubborn and unwieldy. Creativity is a vexing factor between both poles of each distinct pair - for example, between art and entertainment or between high and trivial art forms. However, there are still difficulties with the notion of the arts being brought into contact with industry as a way to remedy the bedevilling of thinking about creativity. It accepts as a "first principle" that creativity "applies" to the arts and to industry and that a version of creativity can be morphed to coincide with the values and the associated purposes of each. The discussion thus far highlights points where such a morphing is very problematic. According to this principle, creativity as a muse that invades the individual in Nietzsche's writings would be compatible with a creativity that facilitates US$ 624 billion in profit as quoted in the UNESCO document discussed earlier. Rather than aiming to join these threads from Nietzsche to UNESCO together, or to justify a version of creativity that subsumes both, this thesis dispenses with the quest for a harmonious concept of creativity through foregrounding the discursive parameters in policy and practice.

A pattern throughout the chapter to this point is that creativity is referred to in a singular form: creativity as opposed to creativities. Whatever creativity is or what creativity can achieve has been predominately framed by a singular conceptualisation. I now discuss research in education where a discourse of creativity is replaced by a plurality.

Creativity and multiplicities.

The idea of creativities is discussed in this section under the two headings of "gradated" and "multiple" versions of the concept. Both of these terms grasp the sense of creativity as that which exists on a continuum from the everyday to the eminent, or that which manifests in multiple forms of practice and expression.

Gradated creativities.

The notion of "little-c" creativity (Craft, 2000, 2001b, 2002, 2003b) in addition to "big-c" creativity interrupts an otherwise prevalent notion of a singular creativity. Led by an argument that genius accounts of creativity place it outside the realm of everyday schooling, Craft's "little-c" creativity relates to everyday processes and events rather than preserving it for the realm of genius or extraordinary achievement. As Sawyer et al. (2003, p. 240) say, if creativity is only reserved for the realm of musical genius or scientific breakthrough, the conclusion reached may well be that "children are not really creative".

Associated with possibility thinking (Burnard et al., 2006; Craft et al., 2012; Craft et al., 2014; Cremin et al., 2006; Jeffrey, 2006b; Jeffrey & Craft, 2006) as discussed earlier, the notion of "little-c creativity" (Craft, 2000, 2001b, 2002, 2003b) or "everyday creativity" (Beghetto & Plucker 2006; Craft, 2003b; Runco, 2003) refers to creativity that involves engagement with "day-to-day" problems. Anne Craft (2001a, p. 14) invokes a democratic notion of creativity in establishing that the "little-c" variety of the concept is for "the ordinary person, recognising that all pupils can be creative". The appeals to the "ordinary" resonates with Vygotsky's work, in particular where he uses the following analogy:

Just as electricity is equally present in a storm with deafening thunder and

blinding lightning and in the operation of a pocket flashlight, in the same

way, creativity is present, in actuality, not only when great historical works

are born but also whenever a person imagines, combines, alters and creates

something new, no matter how small a drop in the bucket this new thing

appears compared to the works of geniuses. (Vygotsky, 1967/2004, pp. 10 -

11)

Kaufman and Beghetto's (2009) example of the individual who fuses Chinese and

Italian foods, or the unexpected representation mode for a music concept is an

illustration of a type of "everyday" creativity. Fundamental to notions of "little-c" or

"everyday" creativity is the idea that anyone can be creative. Ken Robinson endorses

this point in saying:

We all have creative abilities and we all have them differently. Creativity is

not a single aspect of intelligence that only emerges in particular activities,

in the arts for example. It is a systemic function of intelligence that can

emerge wherever our intelligence is engaged. (Robinson 2011, p.12)

In the Australian context, a similar view of the transferability of creativity can be

traced in education policies. In locating creative thinking in a constellation of "skills,

behaviours and dispositions… in all learning areas at school" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 1),

ACARA implies that there are multiple outlets for "creative thinking" to manifest,

rather that preserving it as an unfathomable quality or one that pertains to one curricular

area such as the Arts. I focus on the construct of "critical and creative thinking" in

Chapter Five, as an example of "little-c" creativity, demonstrating how it occupies a place in a curriculum superstructure and applies to everyday problem-solving contexts.

Beghetto and Kaufman (2007; see also Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009) present a gradated framing of creativity in their developmental continuum extending from "mini-c", to "little-c", to "pro-c", and finally to "big-c" creativity. In this continuum, "mini-c creativity" is defined as the reorganising of personal insights and process by which an individual sequences information. For Beghetto & Kaufman (2007), "pro-c" or "professional creativity" represents a category between "little-c" and "big-c" creativity. Someone who has worked for ten years in a domain garnering success but not eminence falls within this category. In this gradated framing, the same definition used by Anna Craft for "little-c" and "big-c" creativity applies: "little-c" is every-day problem-solving while "big-c" is eminent creativity such as that celebrated in figures like Einstein or Mozart[7].

All of these levels or gradations of creativity represent an attempt to make an elusive concept comprehensible. There is a notion of standardisation here in terms of the level of creativity inherent in an individual's work at various life stages. In one form or another, an individual's cognitive processes and Mozart's compositions can be termed creativity. This negates tensions between elitist and democratic notions of creativity or between subject, process and product since the term "creativity" can subsume all.

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[7] Big-c creativity is similar to Boden's "h-creativity" (historical creativity). The notion of "h-creativity" is concerned with ideas that have shaped humanity and is distinct from "p-creativity" (psychological creativity) (see Boden, 1992).

Multiple creativities.

The notion of multiple intelligences (Gardner 1993b, 1998) supports the idea of multiple creativities. Since creativity manifests differently across various domains of intelligence, advocates of the idea of multiple creativities argue that it makes little sense to think of a singular "creativity" common to every domain. For example, the literature speaks of business creativity (Agars, Baer & Kaufman, 2005) and musical creativity (Burnard, 2012a, 2012b). In the field of music creativity, Burnard's (2012a, 2012b) argument is that creativity cannot be located in one form of practice, but manifests in many forms such as performance, composition, in the use of technology and in the decisions and actions of DJs. Here she challenges the notion of creativity as relating only to products such as a notated composition (see also Humphreys, 2006). Burnard's (2012a) multiple varieties of creativity traverse person, place, product and process-focused ontological points. Burnard goes on to argue that:

> The study of musical creativities surely needs to incorporate an understanding of music's social, temporal, and technological dimensions. Since the proliferation of digitized musics in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new vocabulary of musical creativity has been facilitated by social technologies such as the internet. The sites on which artists and fans create their own music, download playlists, remix music, and share files have a sense of a virtual community and collectiveness. (Burnard, 2012a, p. 16)

The statement that "a new vocabulary of musical creativity has been facilitated" indicates Burnard's (2012a) belief on the "movability" of creativity. It also points to the discursive positioning of the concept; creativity is a product of ever-evolving

vocabulary. The argument seems to suggest that there are as many creativities as there are modes of expression and that these creativities multiply on account of the development of technologies and practices. If there are multiple music creativities, it follows that there are multiple forms, versions and variants of creativity in different fields also.

Acknowledging multiple forms of creativity across different knowledge fields and within knowledge fields is very much at odds with quests to develop consensus in the formulation of assessments for creativity, or the delineation of appropriate environments for creative work. The teachers who participated in this research, and are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis, believe too that creativity can manifest in multiple ways. Some of these beliefs opposed how schooling technologies produce homogeneous and comparable creative outputs. As I progress through the analysis in the thesis, I outline teachers' support for multiple creativities and the activities in which they engage to facilitate multiple forms, along with some power effects that facilitate a silence around multiplicity. The accounts of silence about multiplicity and teachers activities to facilitate many forms of creativity combine to portray a nuanced picture of the construction of creativity in Australian education policy and practice.

Conclusion

This chapter contextualised a multitude of creativity discourses that find expression in education policy and practice. Firstly, I highlighted different ways in which research enquiry into creativity is categorised, including the ontological bases of the person, product, process and place, along with categorisations of disciplinary perspectives and historical trajectories. Secondly, the main section of this chapter

presented a range of versions of creativity. These versions demonstrate the multiplicity of creativity knowledge in terms of how creativity is associated with divergent subjectivities, outcomes and work practices. Each version of creativity discussed here is a configuration of knowledge: subjectivities are constructed, work practices are recommended, behaviours are appropriated, various patterns of engagement between students and teachers are advocated for, processes and products are valued differently, and rationalisations for developmental imperatives like play are made.

A persistent theme throughout the chapter, important for the argument that there is no singular and universally accepted truth about creativity, is that there are tensions between all of the possible versions of creativity. The chapter outlined points of divergence between the different versions. Taking this divergence into account, creativity emerges as a nebulous and malleable concept on the map constructed. There is no universal creativity; there are discourses that are actively constructed in contexts such as education policies and schools.

Rather than stopping with an acknowledgement that creativity is a paradoxical and unwieldy concept, this chapter also pre-empted the line of enquiry taken in this thesis - that attending to the discursive construction of the concept sheds light on versions of creativity reified in policy and practice. The chapter presented some of the discursive conditions largely omitted in the "take-up" of creativity in education such as the Cold War context of Guilford's problem-solving. Furthermore, it contextualised some of the questions that an analysis of discursive conditions would extend to: How did a generic skill conceptualisation become associated with creativity? How are links established in policy between creativity and the economy? How is creativity constructed as an

inherently desirous phenomenon? These questions are taken up in the analysis chapters of this thesis.

In proceeding throughout the thesis to analyse the relationship between versions of creativity and the discursive conditions of policy and practice, I draw on the configurations of knowledge on subjects and work practices that are outlined here within each version. My argument is that policy and practice legitimates some versions of creativity which ignoring others. Whether these versions are "in or out" of the truth in the sites under analysis, they *all* feature on a broad map of creativity in education literature. This map shows that creativity does not *have* to be affixed only to select dispositions and practices in policy and schools. Alternative behaviours and practices to those legitimated in policy or rewarded by schooling technologies *can* and *have also* been associated with creativity. There *need not* be an inevitability to real effects in schools of problem-solving intelligence considered more creative than collaborative group improvisation. There *need not* be a naturalised assumption that a teacher is outside a student's creative development in deference to an unfathomable genius discourse. Every construction, such as that of promoting a self-authored conceptualisation of creativity in policy omits alternative possibilities, such as locating creativity in social relations and collaborative contexts. This review of the field has produced a map that remains broadly reflective of the field's many oppositional points of reference, along with its many anomalies and paradoxes.

Having produced this map of knowledge of creativity and outlined the discursive production interest of my work, I now proceed to analyse how creativity is discursively constructed in policy and practice. Before doing so, the next chapter outlines how Foucault's work in used throughout the thesis.

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Chapter Three: Foucault's Work

My problem, as I have already said, is in understanding how truth games are set up and how they are connected with power relations. (Foucault, 1994b, p. 296)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce key concepts used throughout the thesis and to indicate where they feature in the body of Foucault's work. Due to the centrality of Foucault's concepts throughout this thesis for the methodological and analytical approaches, it is important here to refer each concept back to where and how it was used by Foucault. Throughout the chapter, I pay particular attention to the concepts used to analyse the constructedness of creativity knowledge in Chapters Five to Seven of the thesis (*homo economicus*, disciplinary power and ethics).

As well as the contextualisation of Foucault's themes and concepts, the second function of this chapter is to highlight how the thesis relates to a body of other educational research inspired by Foucault's writings. I outline how Foucault's work is used in multiple geographical contexts and research fields, thus locating this thesis in a broad spectrum of Foucault-inspired work. The chapter foregrounds a range of conversations already occurring in diverse sites from leadership to social movement studies on how knowledge and subjectivities are constructed and produced. It is therefore concerned with the *discursive construction* element of the thesis title. Many of

the examples of the discursive construction of knowledge presented in the chapter are taken from the Australian context, again contextualising the focus on policy and practice in this country throughout the thesis. In many ways therefore, this chapter establishes a basis or "conversation to be extended" for my work on creativity. As I progress through each of the concepts, I establish how they were used by Foucault, how they have been drawn upon by others and how they are used throughout my work to understand the discursive construction of knowledge on creativity. The chapter begins with a short biographical section.

The Life and Legacy of Michel Foucault

The life and work of Michel Foucault (1926 - 1984), is the subject of multiple biographies (Eribon, 1991; Macey, 1995; Miller, 1994). He was born Paul Michel Foucault into an upper middle-class family in Poitiers, France. The son of a prominent surgeon in Paris, he later went against his father's wish that he too would become a surgeon. Foucault excelled in philosophy, history and literature throughout his studies. In the Autumn of 1946, he entered the prestigious *École Normale Supérieure* graduating with a DES (*diplôme d'études supérieures)* in Philosophy in 1949, after his thesis *La Constitution d'un transcendental dans La Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel* or *The Constitution of a Historical Transcendental in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* was completed. A significant meeting at the ENS was with Louis Althusser, who held a position as tutor there. Foucault had a succession of careers including writer, researcher, journalist and political activist (Ball, 2013) and spent time in Sweden, Poland, West Germany, Iran and the United States. Foucault's reputation as a cultural attaché grew throughout the time he spent as a cultural diplomat in Uppsala, Sweden, as leader of a

Centre Francais of the University of Warsaw, and as director of the *Institut Français* in Hamburg, West Germany.

Foucault doctoral thesis under the title *Folie et déraison: histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* or *Madness and Unreason: A History of Madness in the Classical Age,* was eventually completed in 1959. An abridged version of this thesis was later published in 1965 as *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason.* He became Professor of the History of Systems of Thought, a professorial title he himself chose, at the College de France. Over a period of twelve years, he gave a lecture series every year from January to March including the 1975/1976 series *Society Must be Defended* (published in 2003), the 1978/1979 series *Birth of Biopolitics* (published in 2004), and the 1981/1982 series *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (published in 2001), all of which are drawn on throughout this thesis since they establish the context within which Foucault introduced the concepts of *homo economicus,* disciplinary power and ethics.

Additionally, numerous books written by Foucault throughout his lifetime also inform this thesis. Those most frequently drawn upon throughout the thesis (again since they reflect Foucault's engagement with the analytical concepts chosen for this thesis) include *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), *Birth of the Clinic,* (1973), *Discipline and Punish* (1977), *The History of Sexuality: Volumes 1-3* (1978, 1985, 1986) and *Fearless Speech* (2001a).

It is difficult to affix a single label to Foucault's work that can capture the entirety of his approach and research orientation. Although the label post-structuralist is often

attached to his work, Foucault did not classify himself a post-structuralist or as belonging to any other particular "category" of thinkers. As he said:

I think I have in fact been situated in most of the squares on the political checkerboard, one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, new liberal, etc. (Foucault, 1984, p. 383)

This recognition of how his work and commentary had been affixed to multiple squares on a "political checkerboard" was not problematic or worrying for Foucault. Rather, some comments that he made indicate an excitement and pleasure taken in the difficulty of definitively labelling his work. As he said, "I'm very proud that some people think I'm a danger for the intellectual health of students" (Foucault, 1988, p. 13). Foucault was therefore not concerned with upholding fixed positions such as "explicit anti-Marxist" or with conservatively adhering to such identities when teaching students.

Although some commentators disagree with the notion of ruptures in the phases of Foucault's research (e.g. Harrer, 2007), a large number of authors have discussed Foucault's *oeuvre* in terms of three phases - an archaeological, genealogical and ethical phase (Abrams, 2002; Burkitt, 2002; Golder, 2015; Välikangas & Seeck, 2011). While I agree that there is a prominence of some modalities of power over others at particular times of writing (e.g. disciplinary power in texts like *Discipline and Punish)*, I don't believe that this equates with a distinct phase of Foucault's work. Foucault always emphasised dialectical power relations and multiple inflections of power, and so I prefer to see his work as a broad power/knowledge project (a neologism discussed in this

chapter). Regardless of the phase with which Foucault's ideas are associated, he described his work as:

> That which is susceptible of introducing a significant difference in the field
>
> of knowledge, at the cost of a certain difficulty for the author and the
>
> reader, with, however, the eventual recompense of a certain pleasure, that is
>
> to say of access to another figure of truth. (Foucault, 1994a, p. 367)

Keywords here in understanding Foucault's project are "knowledge" and "figures of truth". Foucault reminds us that our knowledge of social systems (health, the judiciary, education), identities (doctors, criminals, teachers) and how we act on such knowledge and identities (treating patients, punishing others, teaching students) are always contingent and partial.

There is now widespread use of Michel Foucault's work in research, as demonstrated by the proliferation of books, journal articles and online discussion fora that draw upon his work. The "Foucault effect" (Burchell et al., 1991) has influenced diverse studies in history, psychology, criminology, politics, sociology, education and policy research (Fimyar, 2008). Such diverse studies appear in fields from feminist studies (McLeod & Wright, 2012; Sawicki, 1994, 1998) to cultural studies (Beard, 2009; McCarthy, Bratich & Packer, 2003), to studies of the health and judiciary systems (Petersen & Bunton, 1997; Rajkovic, 2012). As Peters and Besley writes:

> The Foucaultian archive provides an approach to problematize concepts and
>
> practices that seemed resistant to further analysis before Foucault, that
>
> seemed, in other words, institutionalised, ossified and destined to endless
>
> repetition in academic understandings and interpretations. After Foucault, it

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is as though we must revisit most of the important questions to do with power, knowledge, subjectivity and freedom in education. (Peters & Besley, 2007, p. 10)

A broad overarching theme from Foucault's work is the notion of knowledge as a social practice. In emphasising the constructedness of knowledge, Foucault turned away from the hegemony of Marxist theories and perspectives. Another way to understand the broad focus of Foucault's "project" is his view of philosophy as a diagnosis of the present (Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & Thaning, 2016). In using the word "diagnosis", these writers capture the sense of active enquiry and of meaning-making in the face of current constructions of knowledge, rather than accepting an inevitability. I take up this discussion of "the present" further in my discussion of genealogy.

The revisiting of questions and problematisation of concepts, as facilitated by Foucault's work, occurs in a range of international contexts. In the Australian context, there is a strong trajectory of educational research drawing on Foucault's writings (Bourke, 2011; Bourke & Lidstone, 2014; Clarke, 2009; Gobby, 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Hay & Kapitzke 2009; Lingard & Sellar, 2013; Niesche, 2011, 2013a, 2013b; McNicol Jardine, 2005; Weate, 1996, 1998, 1999; Yorke, 2011). Foucault's work is also widely drawn-upon in European contexts such as Ireland (e.g. Lolich, 2011; Morrissey, 2015), the UK (e.g. Ball, 1990, 2013, 2016; Ball & Olmedo, 2013; Gillies, 2008, 2013; Readman, 2010, 2011), Norway (e.g. Knudsmoen & Simonsen, 2016; Simonsen, 2015), Spain (e.g. Olmedo, 2013), Sweden (e.g. Andersson & Fejes, 2005), and wider afield in post-apartheid South Africa (Tikly, 2003), and the US (e.g. Freie & Eppley, 2014; Stickney, 2012). I further elaborate on work conducted by the above researchers where

relationships are identified between my own work and the work of others. I now discuss the key concepts I use throughout this thesis.

Central Themes

The epistemological stance taken in the thesis that creativity knowledge is constructed, and the view that some versions of creativity are legitimated while there is a silence about others in policy and practice, is premised upon creativity as a constellation of discourses. Therefore, the theme of discourse, along with the closely associated notions of discursive practices, object formation and genealogy all inform this thesis and are contextualised below. Other concepts inform specific chapters of the thesis, namely *homo economicus* in Chapter Five, disciplinary power in Chapter Six and ethics in Chapter Seven, and so relating them back to Foucault's writings provides some necessary grounding for the reader.

Discourse and discursive practices.

The concept of discourse is at the core of this thesis since the word "creativity" is not understood to represent any given entity or inherent totality of meaning. Positioning creativity as a discourse, or as a range of discourses, facilitates analysis of how *different* conditions of possibility in policy and practices ultimately mean that *different* things about creativity can be "said" other than those currently said in policy and in school institutions. The term "discourse" can have very different meanings depending on the stance of the author and of the theorists whose work informs the writing. In everyday parlance, discourse is often thought of as written or spoken text. For example, discourse analysis can be construed as the close examination of text (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997;

Fairclough, 2003; Luke, 1996). However, in keeping with the writings of Foucault, language codified in text or in utterances is not the only interpretation of discourse. Mills provides a broader view of discourse in establishing that it is:

> Something which produces something else - an utterance, a concept, an effect - rather than something which exists in and of itself and which can be analysed in isolation. (Mills, 2004, p. 17)

Discourses are established here, not as material things or artifacts existing in print or other form, but as practices or effects. Rather than isolated constructs, discourses can be thought of as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Moving beyond discourse as what is observed and listened to gives it a constructive and fashioning function. In the *Order of Things* (Foucault, 1970) for example, the epistemic history on economics was traced into renaissance, classical and modern times. Foucault argued that discourses of the economy were different throughout each of these epochs and therefore the ways in which it was written and spoken about were confined by the time period in question. Discourse imposes a particular structure on what statements have any validity.

The concept of discourse is a major theme throughout *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972). In this text, Foucault cast aside the primacy of singular knowledge and the author function, allowing them only a "fragile, uncertain existence" (Foucault, 1972, p. 211). There is no historical unity or continuity that grants discourse an objective nature. Constructed orders of discourse cannot be analysed in terms of the knowledge and categories created, but at the "meta level" of *objects* of discourse (Foucault, 1972). For example, in relation to psychopathology, a "variety of objects

were named, circumscribed, analysed, then rectified, redefined, challenged, erased" (Foucault, 1972, p. 41). Minor behavioural disorders, which previously had no associations with the object of psychopathology became ensconced into this new register with lesions of the central nervous system. Psychopathology was never a static objective entity, always "very precarious, subject to change and, in some cases, to rapid disappearance" (Foucault, 1972, p. 40).

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1972), Foucault drew attention to three considerations in regard to the formation of objects. The first is the requirement to "map the first surfaces of their emergence" (Foucault, 1972, p. 41). This refers to the designation of the object, or the way in which the discursive practice "finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object - and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable" (Foucault, 1972, p. 41). Secondly, Foucault discussed the importance of describing the "authorities of delimitation". He used the example of madness, outlining how authorities included medicine, the law and religion. Finally, one must analyse the "grids of specification". There were different kinds of madness "divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified" from different themes, or 'grids of differentiation' including the soul, the body and the life and history of individuals" (Foucault, 1972, p. 42).

Relationships between objects of criminality and pathological behaviour or delinquency weren't sudden discoveries of the psychiatrist or the police. The challenge Foucault signals is to analyse what made such relations possible, and furthermore to analyse how the relationships formed "could lead to others that took them up, rectified them, modified them, or even disproved them" (Foucault, 1972, p. 43). As he said:

These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization…(they) enable it (the object) to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them, to define its difference. (Foucault, 1972, p. 45)

Foucault's (1978) text *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1* illustrates his understanding of how discourses are constructed. The premise of the book is that in the nineteenth century, there was an "endlessly proliferating economy of the discourse on sex" (Foucault, 1978, p. 35) rather than sexuality being a site of repression by church and legislative forces. His references to a "regime of discourse" that marked particular sexuality discourses "obsolete and silenced" (Foucault, 1978, p. 27) convey how power cannot only be a downward repressive force but a set of relations that creates and is productive. Foucault (1978) draws attention to the way in which psychology, medical science and school architecture (the design of dormitories and the inclusion of partitions therein) were all deployed in the development of a science of sexuality. The way sexuality was spoken about was the "product" of practices, prohibitive and otherwise, that emphasised the contingency of knowledge about the concept (Foucault, 1978, 1985; Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Smart, 2002). Foucault argued that there is a continuum in sexuality-related discourses that prioritises the confession from Christian monasticism to contemporary psychoanalysis. A confessional society is one that ascribes roles such as confessor or judge to construe a situation wherein the object of focus becomes something "to say exhaustively in accordance with deployments that were varied, but all in their own way compelling" (Foucault, 1978, p. 32).

In Foucault's writings on discourse, it is constituted by the underlying ideas, beliefs, ideologies and promotion of one "truth" over another, rather than by the singular "things said". Examination of these wider discursive conditions is necessary to critique the "incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as breath, a writing that is merely the hollow of its own mark" (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). As Kendall and Wickham explain, "discourses are not closed systems… the possibility of innovation in discourse is always present within any discourse and within tangential or succeeding discourses" (1999, p. 41).

The concept of discursive practices is intimately related to discourse. Foucault defined the related concept of discursive practices as "a body of anonymous historical rules" (Foucault, 1972, p. 117). They are "always determined in the space and time that has defined a given period and for a given social, economic, geographical or linguistic area the conditions of operation of its enunciative function" (Foucault 1972, p. 117). Rather than mere language practices, discursive practices in the work of Foucault are inherently connected to knowledge formations (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014). Discursive practices revolve around how "truth effects" are created and upheld and the conditions that govern the possibility and limits of statements (Foucault 1972). The rules by which statements, concepts, modalities and strategies were constructed account for their related truth effects. For Foucault, such rules delineate what is within the "true" rather than attributing any truthfulness to statements at face value:

> The statement is not therefore a structure (that is, a group of relations between variable elements, thus authorizing a possibly infinite number of concrete models); it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs

and on the basis of which one may then decide . . . whether or not they "make sense" according to what rule they follow one another. (Foucault, 1972, p. 86-87)

In analysing how discursive conditions relate to configurations of truth on creativity, I am led by Foucault's writings on discourse and discursive practices. I do not work with any singular notion of creativity, for example that it manifests in a process, and analyse how teachers facilitate such a notion. Instead, I consider truths articulated in education as "products" of the discursive parameters of policy and practice. In this thesis, I position neoliberal ideals and disciplinary power as constellations of practices that actively construct particular objects of creativity. As Chapter Two has highlighted, there are multiple and conflicting ways by which creativity can be recognised and understood, and there is no *de facto privilege* (Foucault, 1972, p. 30) attached to any one way. Yet, as I argue, very specific demarcations of truth that prioritise productivity and competition are established in policy. Foucault's writings on discourse, objects and discursive practices facilitate an analysis of *how* the creative object takes on a neoliberalised form and shape in Australian education policy. Both neoliberal ideas and disciplinary power establish discursive conditions - e.g. economy-oriented objectives and efficiency-oriented appropriations of time - inside of which correlative objects of creativity are actively constructed. Such an object is related to design (to find expression in creative industries) and is amenable to assessment (to align with surveillance and comparative technologies in schools).

Power and knowledge.

Foucault's power/knowledge neologism is an important "over-arching" concept of his work. It captures the mutual relationship between power and knowledge and the sense that the concepts cannot be separated from each other. While knowledge is not synonymous with power and cannot be reduced to it, it emerges from the effects of power relations. Furthermore, configurations of knowledge (normalising systems) act as regimes of power-producing truth through which truth and falsity can be determined (Gillies, 2013). This neologism is premised on a view of power as a productive series of relationships between individuals. Power is not equivalent to domination or something possessed by the state or particular social classes (Dean, 2007; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983; Foucault, 1980, 1985). Foucault said:

> [W]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms" it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him [sic] belong to this production. (Foucault 1977, p. 194)

Here, Foucault illustrates how power relations "exist at different levels in different forms…(and are) not fixed once and for all" (Foucault, 1994b, p. 292). It is through the various manifestations of power that knowledge is constructed. For example, he pointed out that knowledge about sexual identities was constructed by the confession as a technique of producing truth (Foucault, 1985). Similarly, the knowledge of what

constitutes criminal behaviour or madness is attributed to the effects of disciplinary and normalising power (Foucault, 1977, 1983).

Kendall and Wickham (1999) point out the inseparability of power and knowledge in saying:

> Power and knowledge are mutually dependent and exist in a relation of interiority to each other, although Foucault accords power a kind of primacy: power would exist (although only in a virtual form) without knowledge, whereas knowledge would have nothing to integrate without differential power relations. (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 51)

This "relation of interiority" within which power and knowledge exists is central to this thesis. Through my focus on the discursive conditions of possibility in policy and practice, it is this relationship between power and knowledge through which I analyse the construction of knowledge. Instances of policy formulation and schooling practices are cast as power relations that produce and legitimate truths on creativity. Practices in which the teachers engage to sustain or counter the discursive constructions established by policy and practice are also cast as power relations.

As well as informing the construction of objects like criminal behaviour, the interiority of power/knowledge also plays out in the construction of subjectivities. For example, a delinquent as a subject position is not representative of any "natural order". Rather, knowledge of the delinquent is caught up with power relations within the penal institution:

It is not a matter of delinquents, a kind of psychological and social mutant, who would be the object of penal repression. Delinquency should be understood, rather, as the coupled penality-delinquent system. The penal institution, with prison at its center, manufactures a category of individuals who form a circuit with it. (Foucault, 1994e, p. 35)

Similarly, knowledge about the "insane" or "mad" subject was constructed through history. In some cases, Foucault demonstrated how behaviours classified as medical issues in nineteenth century were not classed as such prior to then. Whereas Foucault notes that in the classical period, "madness" was still met with confinement, people who previously exhibited unexpected or atypical behaviours were not considered ill (Gutting, 2005). Where there is mobility and unfixedness of power relations, the knowledge constructed on subject identities, whether that of the executor or condemned man, is never permanent.

The notion of the subject's resistance to power effects is important to how knowledge is constructed. While there are forms of power that impose limits such as violence and domination (Foucault, 1994b, 2003), there is otherwise always the possibility of resistance. Foucault spoke about how resistance occurs in a "relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation" (Foucault, 2002c, p. 342). As a case in point, knowledge of the military in contemporary society also incorporates military desertion and other practices of resistance.

The notion of resistance is important for the analysis of conditions of possibility in this thesis as it occupies a place in a power/knowledge relationship. Knowledge about

creativity is understood as that which coincides with specific relations of power, both in its normalising forms and in a subject's resistance. Resistance presents a more comprehensive picture of how individuals manage oppositional agenda such as performativity (Jeffrey & Troman, 2013; Troman, Jeffrey, & Raggl, 2007) or play the "artful dodger" (Adams, 2013) to construct the concept of creativity. While I have mentioned the notion of resistance here in terms of how the individual "speaks back" to normalising power effects of knowledge construction, I take up this theme of "speaking back" later in this chapter through a focus on counter-conduct rather than through the generic idea of resistance (Foucault, 2009). Counter-conduct is better aligned with Foucauldian accounts of power since it acknowledges that our behaviours are being conducted through forms of governmental reasoning, and that our countering manifests within the discursive parameters of this conducting.

Genealogy

At its broadest remit, a genealogy is concerned with the history of the present and the particular knowledge and patterns of thought that operate behind "monuments of the past" (Foucault, 1972, p. 7). It draws on Nietzsche's "pursuit of the origin" (Foucault, 1998, p. 371) in seeking to understand the matrices of conditions of possibility and rationalities that construct current understandings of "the way things are". Foucault used the term genealogy to describe the work conducted in texts such as *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and *The History of Sexuality: Volumes 1-3* (1978, 1985, 1986).

A genealogical method breaks with assumptions about an inherent nature to subjects. Rather than "deducing concrete phenomena from universals" (Foucault, 2004, p, 3) - for example, the universal of the government state or the "delinquent" - each such

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universal is passed through the grid of practices through which it emerges. As an illustration of this point, Foucault indicates how understanding the modern state requires one to analyse how its emergence coincided with such factor as the rise of human sciences, with the foregrounding of population control and with technologies of surveillance. In *Discipline and Punish* (1977), Foucault drew attention to how contemporary conceptualisations of punishment were "adaptation and refinement" of the spectacle by which the condemned man was tortured by the sovereign (Foucault, 1977, pp. 77 - 78). Foucault's genealogy of forms of punishment pointed out that contemporary forms of punishment are not universal, but are refinements of a juridico-political function that public executions once fulfilled.

In its suspicion towards singular knowledge constructions and questioning of universals such as the state, genealogy is different to historical enquiry. A genealogy departs from the tendency of historical enquiry to affix particular events to particular eras. Derek Hook (2005, p. 11) argues that "much traditional history exercises a type of 'transcendental teleology' in which events are inserted in universal explanatory schemas and linear structures and thereby given a false unity". Revisiting an earlier discussion, a traditional historical account of insanity or delinquency would concern itself with linear developments and explanations through time, taking such concepts as cohesive unities and privileged structural entities. Genealogy, however, differs from traditional historical enquiries, not affording events (e.g. the designation of particular behaviours as mental illness) a "timeless and essential secret" (Foucault, 1998, p. 371). For Foucault, the "secret" that can be revealed through genealogy is that such constructs as insanity "have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in piecemeal fashion from alien forms" (Foucault, 1998, p. 371).

Inspired by Foucault's writings, many examples of genealogies of education exist in the literature. Some writers focus on education and schooling (Hunter, 1994; Meadmore, 1993), on higher education entry policy (Gale, 2001), or on how the modern research university is constructed (Simons, 2007). Other researchers draw on genealogy to problematise knowledge configurations on subject positions like school leaders (Niesche, 2013a, 2013b), children with special education needs (Allan, 1996), participative students (Anderson, 2015) and twenty-first century learners (Williams, Gannon & Sawyer, 2013). The ways in which the above writers bring Foucault's work to bear on their own concerns with the constructedness of themes and subjectivities in education demonstrates the possibility of using Foucault's genealogy in multiple contexts. Inspired by the above examples, I further discuss how Foucault's writings on the concept of genealogy inform this thesis in Chapter Four (reserved for methodological design of the research).

Neoliberalism and *homo economicus.*

Foucault wrote about neoliberalism as an art of government that succeeded from sovereignty-centred models of governing[8]. It is premised on a specific rationality of governing individual's interests rather than territory. Rationality in Foucault's work relates to a series of government tactics that deal, "not just in closed circuits of control, but in calculations of the possible and the probable" (Gordon, 1991, p. 35). Rationality invokes a systematic nature to governance characterised by calculation rather than accident and arbitrariness (Dean, 2002; Lemke, 2000; Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose & Miller, 2010; Rose, O'Malley & Valverde, 2006). Foucault emphasised how governmental rationality prioritised individual's interests rather than only material entities and territory. The concern of government rationality can be illustrated by Foucault's metaphor of a ship. Sailing from point a to b is not a simple matter of a captain performing a number of mechanical actions or "governing the sailors". Rather, it is about establishing relations between the sailors and considering "all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 94).

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[8] There is considerable debate in regard to Foucault's "sympathy" towards or "apology for" neoliberalism (Dean, 2015; Gordon, 2015; Zamora, 2014). This relates to a point made earlier in the thesis on how Foucault has been accused of occupying many places on a political checkerboard. Zamora (2014, online) claimed he "was astonished by the indulgence Foucault showed toward neoliberalism". This resulted in much commentary critiquing the veracity of the claim that Foucault was seduced, attracted to or a devout supporter of neoliberalism. Mitchell Dean (2015) does not see Foucault's work as an "apology for" neoliberalism in the traditional use of the term, but as an "apologia of" - a scholarly and serious defence of thinking that was behind a phenomena at the time of writing. This thesis avoids any normative judgement on whether or not Foucault was a "neoliberal", instead using his writings on the concept as a series of analytical tools.

Foucault also critiqued the art of government through time in his 1978/1979 lecture series *The Birth of Biopolitics* (published in 2004). Throughout this work, he outlined how government practices were altered through time based on changes on knowledge about how to govern, about what needed to be governed and about who could govern. His genealogy of the neoliberal state brings into focus the emergence of the population as a site of governmentality through multiple readjustments and resequencing of the art and reach of government.

In speaking of neoliberalism as an art of government, Foucault associates it with the rationality of managing interests (Ball, 2013; Dean, 1999; Foucault, 2009; Gillies, 2008; Simons & Masschelein, 2008a, 2008b). He does not give it an all-encompassing ideological status as implied in other accounts (Harvey, 2007a, 2007b). Instead of a government-imposed ideology, Foucault's neoliberalism is a market-oriented rationality or form of reasoning by which subjectivities are constructed. Webb, Gulson and Pitton (2014, p. 33) capture the relationship between government rationality and the construction of subjectivity in saying that neoliberalism refers "to the tactics, mechanisms and other technologies used to persuade populations to discipline themselves economically and/or enterprisingly".

Foucault's writings on neoliberalism as an art of government are frequently invoked in education (Hay & Kapitzke, 2009; Lolich, 2011). Knowledge of constructs and subjectivities appropriated by neoliberal frames of reference can be brought into focus through the example of purposes of higher education and the correlative construction of academic subjectivity (Ball, 2012a; Lolich, 2011; Morrissey, 2015). Researchers have identified how a neoliberal restructuring of education involves the commodification of academic practice (Ball, 2012a, p. 18), the erosion of "solidarity with the broader public

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sphere" (Morrissey, 2015, p. 617) and a demise of the public intellectual (Lynch, 2015).
I draw on the ways in which the above authors have used Foucault's writings about
neoliberalism to analyse how creativity and creative teacher/student identities are
constructed in similar political climates.

Homo economicus is central to understanding Foucault's conceptualisation of
neoliberalism. He uses this term in a double sense. Firstly, he refers to it as a grid of
rationality for social interaction and the conduct of society. On such a grid, the market,
competition and entrepreneurship feature as coordinate points. A grid featuring these
points becomes "a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual
behaviour" (Foucault, 2004, p. 243). As an illustration, crime is not appraised with
reference to a moral or religious sense of right or wrong, but on a *homo economicus* grid
of intelligibility is considered from the point of view of the financial costs. There is an
"anthropological erasure of the criminal" (Foucault, 2004, p. 259). As Foucault says:

> In other words, all the distinctions that have been made between born
> criminals, occasional criminals, the perverse and the not perverse, and
> recidivists are not important. We must be prepared to accept that, in any
> case, however pathological the subject may be at a certain level and when
> seen from a certain angle, he is nevertheless "responsive" to some extent to
> possible gains and losses, which means that penal action must act on the
> interplay of gains and or, in other words, on the environment; we must act
> on the market milieu in which the individual makes his supply of crime and
> encounters a positive or negative demand. (Foucault, 2004, p. 259)

He uses the example of two "categories" of drug users to illustrate the point of how penal action acts on potential gains and losses. Firstly "habitual consumers" who, in striving to obtain illegal drugs at any cost, were more likely to engage in criminal behaviour. To prevent crime, he illustrates how a "policy of law enforcement" (Foucault, 2004, p. 257) made drugs available at the lowest price to these consumers. This was in contrast to drug users whose demand was "inelastic" and who would forgo use due to excessive prices. For this category, he demonstrates that the attitude taken was such that the price should remain as high as possible (Foucault, 2004, p. 58). While this example in Foucault's work does not make explicit the actions taken by law enforcement agencies to facilitate lower and higher prices according to different patterns of drug usage, it demonstrates how market principles were applied to crime in society.

As well as using the term *homo economicus* as a grid of intelligibility, Foucault also uses it to refer to a "behavioristically manipulable being" (Lemke, 2001, p. 11), the corollary of this grid of rationality. Such an individual is self-interested, competitive, entrepreneurial and agile (Gillies, 2011). Although *homo economicus* had existed prior to liberalism or neoliberalism[9], Foucault positions this individual at the crux of government modalities, as "the partner, the vis-a-vis, and the basic element of the new governmental reason formulated" (Foucault, 2004, p. 271).

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[9] The notion of *homo economicus* or economic man appeared as early as 1776 in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (Schneider, 2010). Gary Becker, the 1992 Nobel Prize winning economist, argued for the principles of utility maximisation in individuals' rationalising of their behaviour through time (see Lemke, 2001; Read, 2009 and Schneider 2010 for a genealogy of *homo economicus).*

Foucault's *homo economicus* is widely used in education research (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2008; Bowl, 2010; Bowl & Tobias, 2012; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Peters & Marshall, 1996; Saunders, 2010). Some of the themes addressed using *homo economicus* include community education policy (Leach, 2014), the management of youth (Besley, 2010) and life-long learning in the knowledge society (Safstrom, 2005). Safstrom (2005) uses *homo economicus* to describe the subject position of the life-long learner in the Swedish context. The point of dialogue between Foucault's *homo economicus* and the subject position of Safstrom's work is evident where he points out that the Swedish life-long learner is "governed by the rules of the market economy" (Safstrom, 2005, p. 587). Like Safstrom, Leach (2014) also finds that *homo economicus* manifests in discourses of life-long learning in community and adult education policy, this time in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. This "character" is used as a tool of analysis to progress her argument that in Aotearoa New Zealand, community and adult education is redefined by a "learn to earn mentality" where individual choice is tempered by a responsibility to choose study programmes targeted at supplying the labour market (Leach, 2014, p. 715).

Using the insights provided by these writers into how *homo economicus* acts as a unit of analysis by which a neoliberal art of government can be identified, I argue that creativity is appropriated by a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility. Throughout the policy analysis in Chapter Five, I demonstrate ways in which Foucault's writings about *homo economicus* find expression in these documents. I look at the relationship between his writings on the market and the Australian policy context. I seek out where service of the economy and the development of human capital are driving forces by which educational reform is rationalised. Additionally, I look at how the characteristic features

of *homo economicus* (the individual) align with the characteristics of the subjects

constructed in the documents. Such characteristics include competiveness, outcome-

orientedness, persistence and calculativeness. I identify versions of creativity that are

framed within and woven into a neoliberal grid, e.g. creativity as a generic

employability skill within the established context of a need to make economic progress.

I then point out alternative versions of creativity from the literature that would not align

with neoliberal discursive conditions such as creativity as self-fulfillment or as self-

expression, neither of which respond to market and economic appropriations of

education. Both in relation to discourses of creativity brought into the true by the

conditions of possibility in policy, and to discourses "outside of" these conditions,

Foucault's writings on *homo economicus* are a point of reference around which the

arguments revolve.

Disciplinary power.

Disciplinary power prioritises normalisation and surveillance in the management

of individuals and groups. This type of power is a major theme in Foucault's text

Discipline and Punish (1977), a text that would "serve as a historical background to

various studies of the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in

modern society" (Foucault, 1977, p, 308). Throughout this text, Foucault provides

numerous examples of how the behaviour of soldiers in the military and children in

schools was regulated and controlled. Regulation and control differed from sovereign

inflections of power where spectacles such as public beatings, were used to attain

control. As I discuss below, the examination and timetable were used instead to "permit

the fabrication of the disciplined individual" (Foucault, 1977, p. 308). The capacity of

the examination and the timetable to normalise behaviours and exert a gaze of surveillance over individuals brought about compliance and docility in a more efficient fashion. Disciplinary power has a coercive effect which, according to Foucault, "establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination" (Foucault, 1977, p. 138). In institutions such as schools and prisons, this modality of power aims towards an "individual and collective identity through which governing operates" (Dean, 1999, p. 32).

Foucault emphasises that a central prerogative in a disciplinary society is the management of populations. The shift away from a focus on each individual towards a focus on birth rates, death rates, and statistics on criminal behaviour aligns with the emergence of a "power of regularisation" (Foucault, 2003, p. 247). A displacement of the economy from its conceptualisation as the "art of properly governing a family" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 91) to the "isolation of that area of reality that we call the economy" (Foucault, 1991a, p. 99) has a similar effect in rendering ineffectual the family model, paving the way for new rationalities and technologies of managing populations. Emphasising the displacement of family in favour of the management of populations, Foucault writes:

> Discipline was never more important or more valorised that at the moment when it became important to manage a population; the management of the population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of population in its depths and details. (Foucault, 1991a, p. 102)

The timetable and the examination facilitated an increased level of control in disciplinary society. In *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault argued that the timetable "has the function of treating multiplicity itself, distributing it and deriving from it as many effects as possible" (Foucault, 1977, p. 148). "Treating multiplicity" in this sense refers to the streamlining of divergent practices, of ensuring that each individual's activities were co-opted into a "collective and obligatory rhythm" (Foucault, 1977, p. 36). The use of time and efficient timetabling were components of the training of soldiers as docile bodies. The timetable afforded a kind of regulatory system (Foucault, 1977; Gore, 1997; O'Farrell, 2005) where, for example, it established ideas of the normal in terms of the time taken for individuals to learn a skill. The notion of the timetable in Foucault's work is not about the haphazard attribution of a time frame to a particular activity, but about the calculated and ritualising occurrences that inscribe patterns and regularity into the student's body. Foucault calls to attention the insidiousness of the events of timetabling in pointing out how "the act is broken down into its elements; the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined; to each movement are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed" (Foucault, 1977, p. 152).

Foucault outlined how the examination fulfilled a disciplinary function using examples from hospital and school contexts. In the case of the school, he writes, "it became less and less a question of jousts in which pupils pitched their forces against one another and increasingly a perpetual comparison of each and all that made it possible both to measure and to judge" (Foucault, 1977, p. 186). Furthermore:

Thanks to the whole apparatus of writing that accompanied it, the examination opened up two correlative possibilities: firstly, the constitution of the individual as a describable, analyzable object, not in order to reduce him to "specific" features, as did the naturalists in relation to living beings, but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly, the constitution of a comparative system that made possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given population. (Foucault, 1977, p. 190)

The normalising influence of the examination and the timetable exerted a gaze of surveillance over individuals. To illustrate how this surveillance worked in disciplinary society, Foucault invokes the image of the Panopticon, a structure proposed by the architect Jeremy Bentham. The Panopticon was an observation centre, consisting of towers with an observatory deck at the top. Each of the inhabitants knew they were potentially under surveillance by virtue of its design. The point was not whether or not an observer was physically in the deck, but that each individual knew they were potentially being observed. Under the Panoptic gaze, "all the activity of the disciplined individual must be punctuated and sustained by injunctions whose efficacy rests on brevity and clarity; the order does not need to be explained or formulated" (Foucault, 1977, p. 166).

Through a whole range of surveillance systems such as specific classroom architecture, educational research demonstrates ways in which the individual is

observed and governed (Brook, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Gore, 1997; Grant, 1997; Jones, 2000; Kalmbach-Phillips & Nava, 2011; Kamler, 1997; Lewis & Hardy, 2015; Manuel & Llamas, 2006; Meadmore, 2000). Focusing on teachers in the context of "National Assessment Program, Literacy and Numeracy" (NAPLAN)[10] technologies, Lewis and Hardy (2015) draw on Foucault's writings on surveillance effects to argue that the imperative of students attaining high NAPLAN results to facilitate a "positive depiction" of their school ensures that teachers' work is constantly monitored and evaluated. Their argument is that it is through a surveillance effect that knowledge of the value of their work is constructed by target-setting and reputation logics rather than by "more educative and authentic discourses of schooling" (Lewis & Hardy, 2015, p. 261).

Bourke, Lidstone and Ryan (2015) offer another account of how surveillance effects regulate the work of teachers in the Australian context. Drawing on interview data from twenty teachers in Queensland, they argue that the idea of teacher professionalism is not an autonomous entity but a constellation of "covert forms of discipline with the multidirectional gaze of the community, parents, colleagues, administrators and students, acting both independently and in consort" (Bourke, Lidstone & Ryan, 2015, p. 96). Couching professionalism in terms of convert technologies of surveillance and a multidirectional gaze demonstrates the constructive powers of discipline. Research like the abovementioned sets a context for engagement with how teacher subjectivities and constructs like creative teaching are made operable in the policy and practice sites analysed in this thesis.

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[10] NAPLAN tests are carried out annually in May for students in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA).

The "conversation" in research on how the effects of disciplinary power construct student subjectivities is also relevant to this thesis since it foregrounds how desirable and appropriate student behaviours are a product of discursive conditions rather than objective entities. Invariably drawing on the construction effects of Foucault's notions of the examination, surveillance and the appropriations of time as delineators of possibly knowledge, researchers like Brook (2000), Deacon (2005, 2006), Gore (1995, 1997) and Kamler (1997) exemplify how a signifier such as the "good student" or "appropriate behaviour" is fashioned. For example, Kamler (1997) illustrates how a "morning routine" and "circle time" in schools work to normalise docile behaviour of group members, and she documents the bodily effect of such routines on the individual's posture, eyes and mouths (Kamler, 1997, p. 374). Similarly, analyses of the workings of disciplinary power in education point out how handwriting fixes into place students' body positions (Jones, 2000), how an initiation, response, evaluation model in Socratic lecturing constructs students as subservient to a lecturer (Kamler, 1997), how biometric data makes the student "knowable" (Hope, 2015) or how textbooks work to establish age authority and gender relations (Luke, 1996). These all represent examples of how schooling is a type of:

> Calculated conditioning, an edifying example, having effects on pupils and
> teachers alike (not to mention parents and society at large); it must
> rehabilitate the recalcitrant and rebellious, and regulate the ready and
> willing, well before they enter the formal schooling system, and long after
> they leave it, and at the same time prevent the decay of citizens' knowledge
> or the corruption of their values. For more than two centuries now, such a

generalised and therapeutic pedagogy has sought to normalise subjects precisely by enlightening them. (Deacon, 2002, p. 456)

In this thesis, I draw on Foucault's notion of disciplinary power in Chapter Six. I argue that the tactics of control such as normalisation and surveillance, both of which are widely documented in Australian education research, demarcate conditions by which creativity can be known. This entails engaging with existing work on disciplinary power and student subjectivities to extend the conversion to the ways in which "creative student" subjectivities and behaviours are constructed. I argue that the normalisation of behaviours, appropriation of times and processes of homogenisation, all of which are related to Foucault's disciplinary power, sustain and legitimate a linear and prescriptive construct of creativity while undermining alternative notions of unconventionality and ambiguity.

Ethics

In this section, I discuss the concepts of ethical self-formation, counter-conduct and *parrhesia* (Foucault, 1985, 2001a, 2001b) since it is through a synthesis of Foucault's writings on these three concepts that I analyse the data in Chapter Seven.

Ethics for Foucault relates to the individual's freedom in spaces for action (Foucault, 1994b). The capacity to act comprises a central dimension of Foucault's account of power since power does not equate directly with domination. In order to continually ensure that neoliberal rationality and disciplinary power are generative and productive, the individual's freedom is presupposed. The intimate relationship between ethics and freedom for Foucault is evident where he asks, "what is ethics, if not the

practice of freedom, the conscious *[réfléchie]* practice of freedom?" (Foucault, 1994b, p. 284).

Foucault's accounts of freedom and ethics draw on antiquity and the principle of the care of the self. The care of the self involves a range of physical and meditational activities:

> Taking care of oneself is not a rest cure. There is the care of the body to consider, health regimens, physical exercises without overexertion, the carefully measured satisfaction of needs. There are the meditations, the readings, the notes that one takes on books or on the conversations one has heard, notes that one hears again later, the recollections of truths that one knows already but that need to be more fully adapted to one's own life. (Foucault, 1986, p. 51)

Such practices are "not for knowledge, but for the subject, for the subject's very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 15).

All of these practices comprise the individual's *askesis* or art of living. Foucault uses the example of *Alcibiades I* from *Plato's Dialogue* to illustrate the care of the self. Alcibiades was from a generation of powerful and aristocratic young men destined for power and governance in ancient Athens. Dismayed at the superior education and strength of his Spartan opponents, Alcibiades turned to Socrates for advice. The advice given was not to learn the ways and means of power but that there is "time, not to learn, but to take care of yourself" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 46). Moreover, taking care of the self in an art (*tekhne*) and "one's self and the care of the self must be given a definition from

which we can derive the knowledge required for governing others" (Foucault, 2001b, pp. 51 - 52).

Contrary to the principle of taking care of the self is the principle of knowing the self. This is about being able to give an account of the self to another and establish the truth about oneself according to the other's judgement (Foucault, 1986, 2001b). For example, where the individual confesses to an external source and is deemed healthy or abnormal, this truth is reflected by the other's judgement. Looking to antiquity, Foucault argued that the principle of taking care of the self is ontologically prior to knowing the self. Furthermore, in antiquity, the question of accessing truth and spiritual practices were never separated (Foucault, 1985, 1986, 1994b, 2001b). For Foucault, the "Cartesian moment" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 14) was the point at which truth and spiritual practices became disassociated:

> When the philosopher or scientist or simply someone who seeks the truth
>
> can recognise the truth or have access to it in himself and through his acts
>
> of knowledge alone, without anything else being demanded of him or
>
> without his having to alter or change in any way his being as subject.
>
> (Foucault, 2001b, p. 17)

From this Cartesian moment onwards, knowledge and truth could be attained without recourse to care of the self. The subject could *know* itself. Knowledge could be objectified and one could comprehend and manage the self on an objective level by adhering to codes of conduct or prohibitions. Foucault considers two reasons to account for why the principle of care for the self was inverted in favour of knowing the self, or why "our philosophical tradition has ignored or effaced certain dimensions of our

experience" (Davidson, 2001, p. xxvii). The first he argues is the secular tradition that sees law as the basis for morality. The second is the Descartian idea of the rational thinking subject. Foucault emphasises that the inversion of these two principles had a profound effect on how individuals constituted themselves as subjects. The effect of this inversion can be seen in how confessional discourses of sexuality were constructed to reflect the incitement to know the self.

Foucault's detailed exploration of when the principles became separated paves the way for the "practice of an intellectual freedom that is transgressive of modern knowledge-power-subjectivity relations" (Bernauer & Mahon, 2005, p. 160). Importantly, however, Foucault's writings do not look towards a golden age of ancient civilisation to which contemporary society can return. As he said "nothing is more foreign than the idea that, at a certain point, philosophy went astray and forgot something, that somewhere in its history there is a principle, a foundation that must be rediscovered" (Foucault, 1994b, pp. 294 - 295).

Foucault presented a framework that weaves together the ancients' care for the self and their style of living. This framework of an individual's ethical formation comprises four axes (Clarke, 2009; Foucault, 1985; Niesche & Haase, 2012; Niesche & Keddie, 2015; O'Leary, 2002). The first aspect is "ethical substance", the part of oneself that forms the "prime material" for concern with ethics. Examples of the ethical substance for the Ancient Greeks included the acts linked to pleasure and desire (Foucault, 1985, p. 26). Secondly, "modes of subjection" relates to the ways in which one is incited to recognise moral obligations (Foucault, 1985, p. 27). This is concerned with how the subject recognises his/her relation to the rule and their "obligation to the rule whether publicly or silently" (Foucault, 1985, p. 27). Fidelity in marriage could be

seen a mode of subjection if the ethical substance or prime material for ethics is the mastery of desires. The third aspect of Foucault's framework, forms of elaboration, is concerned with particular practices that one undertakes in order to "transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's behaviour" (Foucault, 1985, p. 27). The forms of elaboration relate to the modes of subjection since they denote how the individual aligns him/herself with normalised obligations on how to conduct him/her self. Finally, the telos is the "outcome" that the subject aspires to, or the mode of being they seek to pursue.

Foucault's work on ethics has informed much education research across such themes as ethics education (Christie, 2005), motivation (Clarke & Hennig, 2013), subjectification (Niesche & Haase, 2012; Stickney, 2012) and social justice (Niesche & Keddie, 2015). Using Foucault's body of writings on ethical self-formation to inform accounts of ways in which individuals construct themselves against neoliberal technologies of normalisation, researchers illustrate how individuals engage in practices of self-formation (Ball, 2016; Niesche, 2013a; Niesche & Keddie, 2015). Individuals' practices "mount a criticism of the system of truth" (Ball, 2016, p. 1140), and, in addition to the effects of normalisation, *also* construct the good teacher or principal.

In the third analysis chapter of this thesis, I draw on Foucault's ethics to analyse how an individual teacher's practices of ethical self-formation sustains or counters normalised conceptualisations of creativity. I draw on the notion of ethical substance to analyse this teacher's views on the components or constitutive elements of creativity, and on the idea of modes of subjection to analyse how the teacher aligns his practices with authority sources. The patterns by which creativity discourses feature in the individual's expression of his *telos*, and the practices enacted to pursue this *telos*, also

inform how creativity is constructed. Using Foucault's writings on forms of elaboration and modes of subjection, I indicate the practices (forms of elaboration) that the teacher undertakes to construct creativity in accordance with his own vision. The five practices of reporting to parents about student progress, writing a PhD thesis, undertaking project work with junior classes, advocating for students and modelling creative practices are all theorised as forms of elaboration enacted by the individual to negotiate the concept of creativity. Within the framework of the four axes of ethical self-formation, the five practices are also theorised as counter-conduct and *parrhesia.*

Parrhesia

Foucault engages with the concept of *parrhesia* throughout his writings on the development of a politics and government of the self, and so incorporates it into his views on power. The term roughly translates as "speaking freely", usually in a context where the speaker criticises higher sources of authority such as a subject speaking to a sovereign. *Parrhesia* is a "kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness… and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 19). The individual freely speaks truth "to power" and in doing so criticises a normative order or the actions of superiors. Although the speaker of *parrhesia* assumes great risk, they disrupt linear trajectories of power from higher to lesser authority sources. As Gillies (2013, p. 64) says "parrhesia is in some ways, therefore, a reversal of power. It is the dominated who answer back, who challenge".

Foucault writes about five principles or features of *parrhesia*: frankness, truth, danger, criticism and duty, all of which help to understand what this concepts means

and the context within which it was exercised. Frankness relates to the "content" of the speech and to the form that it takes. It is a complete account as understood by the speaker, an exact account where the speaker hides nothing. In regards to the form of *parrhesia*, Foucault indicates that it resisted rhetorical forms. Unlike rhetorical forms with equip the speaker with "technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience", *parrhesiastes* "acts on other peoples' minds by showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 11). Truth is synonymous with belief in Foucault's work; *parrhesia* is spoken because it known by the speaker to represent the truth. *Parrhesia* then is not taking a position from a multiplicity of different options; there can only be one position. The speaker has the courage to speak freely due to the conviction that this speech is the reality. There is always danger and risk involved in *parrhesia* due to the unequal power relations and the sense of speaking "upwards" to a higher authority. Although individuals in Ancient Greece could be put to death, other less extreme consequences of speaking freely included exile or loss of popularity (Foucault, 2001a).

Rather than simply informing another of the truth, an essential function of *parrhesia* is criticism. Foucault indicates how the criticism takes the form of "advice that the interlocutor should behave in a certain way, or that he is wrong in what he thinks, or in the way he acts" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 17). The final consideration, duty, postulates that this free speaking occurs from the speaker's conviction about what needs to be said. The speaker is not forced or compelled to speak but does so of their free-will, as in the example of a criminal who confesses his crime to someone else out of a sense of moral obligation (Foucault, 2001a).

The concept of *parrhesia* features in a limited amount of education research on diverse themes from academics' subjectivity (Tamboukou, 2012), the politicisation of youth (Besley, 2006; Lazaroiu, 2013), practices of socially just leadership (Niesche & Keddie, 2015), and teachers' "refusal" of neoliberalism (Ball, 2016; Ball & Olmedo, 2013). While the concept is used in multiple and diverse contexts, few of the above research projects engage with teachers' *parrhesia*. The concept very rarely features in accounts of the construction of creativity.

While there are few instances in the research of teachers' use of *parrhesia*, the examples from university academics discussed in literature (Huckaby, 2008; Tamboukou, 2012) align with how the concept is used in this thesis. Tamboukou (2012) offers the pessimistic view that academics in "dark times" (neoliberal reformulations of the purpose of higher education) engage in little truth telling *(parrhesia)* at a time when "academics as intellectuals have actually been marginalised and even erased from the language and the grammar of higher education policy documents" (Tamboukou, 2012, p. 861). While Tamboukou's account illustrates the contexts wherein more *parrhesia* is necessary and establishes the relevance of *parrhesia* to these contexts - "we are part of 'the powerful other' we want to challenge" (Tamboukou, 2012, p. 861) - her theoretical paper does not provide examples of where academics mount this challenge.

The literature provides some examples of where *parrhesia* is spoken to challenge unfavourable situations. For example, "academic warrior", a pseudonym used for an academic in Huckaby's (2008, p. 771) research, confronts versions of education that do not align with the vision he holds. Huckaby (2008) positions this academic's practices of providing witness in court hearings for schools affecting minority or oppressed groups, even if considered too "political" by the academy (and so potentially damaging

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to opportunities for tenure), as instances of critical, duty-bound and rather dangerous free-speech.

In this thesis, I draw upon Foucault's writings on *parrhesia* to theorise and better understand David's forms of elaboration, which in turn comprise an element in Foucault's axes of ethical self-formation. In the broader framework of this thesis, these forms of elaboration, which are theorised with reference to Foucault's writings on *parrhesia,* inform an account of how an individual teacher constructs his ethical self, and in so doing, constructs creativity. Drawing on the work of the researchers above, in Chapter Seven, I theorise practices which the individual undertakes to pursue a creative vision, such as frank reporting to parents on creativity in students' work, or advocating for students against normalisation and surveillance systems, as characteristic of Foucault's *parrhesia.* I theorise such practices as characteristic of *parrhesia* by outlining how features such as duty or frankness can be applied to the teachers' undertaking of these practices.

Counter-conduct

The concept of counter-conduct is highly significant in understanding power effects as relational. Foucault's theory of governmentality as the conduct-of-conduct is premised upon the freedom of the individual. Individuals' conduct cannot be steered or directed, for example to align with economic appropriations of education, unless there is a plurality of forms and directions that their behavior could otherwise take. Implicit in this account of power is a space for individuals' resistance. While policy makers or influential stakeholders may seek to direct actions in ways that align with government or institutional programmes, a Foucauldian account of power points out that individuals

can resist this direction and steering. They can act on their freedom to initiate "movements that also seek, possibly at any rate, to escape direction by others and to define the way for each to conduct himself" (Foucault, 2009, p. 259).

It is in the context of power relationship involving steering behaviours and opportunities for resistance that counter-conduct needs to be understood. Foucault struggled to find a word to describe how individuals "speak back" to power relations and counter them. He posed the question: "How can we designate the type of revolts, or rather the sort of specific web of resistance to forms of power that do not exercise sovereignty and do not exploit, but conduct?" (Foucault, 2009, p. 266). He sought terminology distinct from revolt or dissidence, both of which were "too strong to designate much more diffuse and subdued forms of resistance" (Foucault, 2009, p. 266). Eventually, Foucault settled for the term counter-conduct since it had the "sole advantage of allowing reference to the active sense of the word 'conduct' - counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others" (Foucault, 2009, p. 268). Counter-conducts are therefore "active" in the sense that they are practices undertaken by the individual who is "never in a position of exteriority to power" (Foucault 1978, p. 95). When steering is antithetical to how one wishes to be conducted, "tactical elements that are pertinent in the anti-pastoral struggle" (Foucault, 2009, p. 282) are deployed.

In drawing on Christianity in the Middle Ages to elaborate on the theme of counter-conduct, Foucault provided examples of five sites where counter-conducts occurred. These include asceticism, communities, mysticism, scripture and eschatological beliefs (Foucault, 2009). Taking the example of communities further, Foucault spoke about how communities countered the authority of the pastor who could

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control who had entry into the community through baptism. Counter-conduct manifested in the refusal of obligatory baptism of children and the move towards adult, voluntary baptism (Foucault, 2009). The point is that baptism was not rejected or that the community dissented from the authority of the pastor, but that a space was carved out for individual's will to join the community as an adult rather than baptism as the effect of a pastor's act on someone who couldn't resist their authority. An interesting point about such counter-conducts in relation to Christianity, illustrating the multiplicity of power relations, is that they were "fed back" into the church:

> Threatened by all these movements of counter-conduct, the Church tries to take them up and adapt them for its own ends, until the great separation takes place, the great division between the Protestant churches, which basically opt for a certain mode of re-implantation of these counter-conducts, and the Catholic Church, which tries to re-utilize them and re-insert them in its own system through the Counter Reformation. (Foucault, 2009, p. 282)

This point about how the church later co-opted and "implanted" practices which had formerly countered its systems of administration, emphasises the interiority of counter-conducts. If these actions, such as the move towards adult voluntary baptism, were revolts against the church in the sense of a complete rejection of its teaching, it is highly unlikely they would be later co-opted by that church. Counter-conducts are therefore subtle forms of action.

As an analytical concept, counter-conduct is invoked in a range of research projects that focus on how particular subjectivities are resisted (Bill, 2016; Death, 2010,

2016; Hope, 2010; Niesche, 2013a; Niesche & Keddie, 2015). In the area of school leadership, Niesche (2013a) considers leadership as a form of counter-conduct, and in his research illustrates examples of counter-conduct such as a principal remaining silent about documents or websites that they don't feel represent their work. Also in the field of educational leadership, Niesche and Keddie (2015) consider the actions of individual school retaining their autonomy in the context of an alliance as manifestations of counter-conduct. These examples from the field of leadership are important for this thesis as the data analysed in Chapter Seven emerged from interviews with a school deputy-leader. The examples facilitate a cross-referencing of the struggles encountered, and of the countering practices enacted, by the leaders that feature in previous research and the teachers that participated in this project.

An example of an individual's counter-conduct is provided by Amanda Bill where she considers how a practice-based research project "illustrates a 'creative self' in conflict with a 'neoliberalised' self" (Bill, 2016, p. 11). For Bill, her *Seven Lamps* project is an exercise in counter-conduct since it addresses what she called the disjuncture between enterprisal and humanist creativity. While still satisfying university "output" demands and attracting funding, she could pursue her own aspirations for her creative practice in pursuing this project. In Chapter Six and Seven of this thesis, I look at similar tensions and identity how teachers negotiate and construct their "creative selves".

Examples of counter-conduct where youth counter normalising regimes are also provided in the literature (Death, 2016; Hope, 2010). These examples are also sources of inspiration for how Foucault's counter-conduct can be invoked in this thesis. Carl Death (2016, p. 209) provides examples of how "power and resistance, government and

dissent, are mutually constitutive" where he discusses the phenomenon of "pexing" in South Africa (where youth gather in large numbers with expensive items as a symbol of wealth and often destroy them to the dissatisfaction of onlookers). Using counter-conduct as an analytical strategy, he theorises that:

> Pexing can therefore be seen as a set of performances and practices which have created very visible and prominent spaces of rebellion and inversion of mainstream social values. These are to some degree temporary and carnivalesque - with the widespread assumption that after the show, life returns to normal - but in the moment they are striking manifestations of the will "not to be like that" and "not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price". (Death, 2016, pp. 82 - 83)

While such examples of protest may seem extreme, researchers outside of this South African context may be more familiar with Andrew Hope's (2010, 2015) examples of students countering surveillance technologies considered normative and oppressive. Where it was believed by students in his research site that surveillance techniques were unnecessarily intrusive, they engaged in concealment strategies such as switching online identities, borrowing internet passwords or avoiding areas consistently monitored by school staff (Hope, 2010). The accounts of counter-conduct practices actioned by school leaders, academics and students above and the theorisation enabled by Foucault's writings of such practices, establish a basis in the literature to engage with how teachers act to counter disciplinary effects that undermine their own visions for creativity. These examples, which highlight the plurality of counter-conducts from

concealment strategies to very obvious "outward" displays, direct my analysis of counter-conducts as they are articulated by teachers.

In Chapter Seven of this thesis, I theorise an individual's practices (forms of elaboration in his ethical self-formation) using Foucault's writings on counter-conduct. Counter-conducts are the actions by which the teacher aims towards his end-goals and visions of (creative) teaching. In developing an argument that knowledge of creativity can be related to a constellation of power effects, an analysis of an individual's countering of steering mechanisms is an essential component to gain a fuller account of the discursive construction of creativity. Actions such as challenging the expectations of parents or opting to teach junior classes are theorised as counter-conduct through the lens of Foucauldian scholarship on the concept. Such actions are significant as they are one component of an individual's construction of creativity, and in the broad thesis framework, are significant in gaining a fuller picture of the construction of the concept of creativity in Australia.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the work of Michel Foucault and outlined how his body of writings informs this thesis. Although the vast range of literature and disparate contexts within which Foucault used the above-mentioned concepts makes a comprehensive overview of Foucault's work impossible, this chapter has limited itself to key methodological and analytical perspectives from his writings. Central themes informing this thesis are power, discourse, discursive practices and power/knowledge. Following the presentation of these key themes, I contextualised other specific concepts

used throughout the thesis: genealogy, disciplinary power, ethical self-formation, *parrhesia* and counter-conduct.

Throughout my discussion of these theoretical tools, I engaged with how the concepts are used in a range of disparate fields. From leadership to social movement studies, school reform and surveillance technologies, Foucault's works are widely used in education, both in Australia and beyond. The exemplars of research provided here established in the literature a basis for this thesis through the identification of points of dialogue between the work underway and work conducted by other researchers. Such exemplars highlight the multi-directionality and subtleties of knowledge production. In the divergent range of themes that draw on Foucault's work, very few projects incorporate a diverse range of Foucault's ideas to analyse the construction of a single concept; there are very few instances where an understanding of one theme or topic is informed by an *ensemble* of *homo economicus,* disciplinary power, ethics, *parrhesia* and counter-conduct. The analysis of the construction of creativity using this ensemble of Foucault's tools is founded on a constellation of researcher choices on the selection of concept and their relationship to research sites (to be justified in the next chapter on research design). It is important to acknowledge that this ensemble is not considered a universally understood "genealogical approach", and as discussed in the limitations section of Chapter Eight, the analysis could be otherwise presented. Since Foucault's work is widely invoked in educational literature and creativity is a topic of great global and national concern, the many points of application in this thesis between Foucault's writing and creativity afford an important timely and nuanced picture of how the concept is constructed.

The thesis proceeds to analyse how policy, a school institution and an individual construct the concept of creativity. At each of these three sites, this analysis is facilitated by Foucault's concepts. In Chapter Five, a selection of policies is analysed through Foucault's writings on *homo economicus,* and I argue that this analysis reveals how a neoliberalised construct of creativity is formed. In Chapter Six, I argue that the disciplinary effects in a school institution construct a version of creativity that unfolds in a linear fashion and remains within conventional work patterns and behaviours. It is Foucault's accounts of disciplinary power that facilitates this analysis. Finally, in the third analysis chapter, Chapter Seven, I use the concepts of ethical self-formation, counter-conduct and *parrhesia*, to illustrate how creativity is constructed through an individual's ethical self-formation. Before engaging in this analysis, Chapter Four outlines the methodological design of this thesis.

Chapter Four: Research Design

I would like my books to be a kind of toolbox which others can rummage

through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own

area… I write for users, not readers. (Foucault, 1974, pp. 523–524)

What I've written is never prescriptive either for me or for others – at most

it's instrumental and tentative. (Foucault, 2002d, p. 240)

Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the methodological design of the research. Firstly, I

establish the epistemological basis of the thesis. Secondly, I discuss Foucault's

genealogical approach and argue for its appropriateness in this research project. The

third section details the procedures involved in the thesis, including those related to

complying with ethical procedures, selecting participants, and analysing the data. The

fourth section of the chapter is the contextualisation of the term "neoliberalism", since

the research design involves multiple negotiations of the concept. Finally, I discuss my

positionality as a researcher.

In considering the place and the framing of a research design chapter in this

thesis, I engaged with numerous debates on what the chapter should entail. For some,

methodology is used interchangeably with methods, where content in a "methodology

section" details data collection methods (e.g. Kim et al., 2013; Moradi et al., 2012). For others, the term "methodology" stands as a broad descriptor that signifies whether the research is quantitative or qualitative in nature (e.g. Joseph, 2015; Troman, Jeffrey & Raggl, 2007; Webb et al., 2004). Methodology is the theory that informs and underpins the methods used throughout the research (O'Donoghue, 2007; Tennis, 2008; Thomson, 2013). This broadens the meaning and the implication of discussing methodology beyond an elucidation of data collection methods. Rather, it is a "combination of epistemic stance and the methods of investigation" (Tennis, 2008, p. 107). The epistemic stance extends to the framing of the research question, the assumptions behind that particular framing, the beliefs on how the question can be answered, the ways in which the data can be analysed, the perceived validity of the work and the role of the researcher. My methodological choices were influenced by the importance of dialogue with all of the considerations above.

Epistemology

In drawing on the work of Michel Foucault at all stages of the analysis, this thesis aligns with his views on the construction of knowledge. Therefore, the epistemological underpinning of this research is the inseparable relationship between power and knowledge. Foucault's refusal to align himself with any particular normative position or tradition of thought attests to his rejection of singular accounts of how knowledge is formed. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, p. xviii) argue, Foucault does not believe that "a hidden deep truth is the cause of the misinterpretation embodied in our everyday understanding". Constructions such as the knowing subject, the entity of the state, the human condition, all of which feature in historical or humanist accounts of truth, are

subjected to Foucault's critique in his genealogies of how they come to exist. He also sought to understand the power relations that are played out in the relationships between human subjectivity and social structure" (Howarth, 2013, pp. 6–7)[11]. Knowledge constructed whether in relation to the subject (Foucault, 1977, 1985, 2001b), punishment (Foucault, 1977), sexuality (Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986), health (Foucault, 1973), the neoliberal state (Foucault, 2004), or religious practices (Foucault, 1978, 2009) are not pre-given entities, but born out of the effects of power relations and rationalisations. As Foucault said, "it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, [and] it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power" (Foucault, 1980, p. 52).

This thesis is informed by interpretivist approaches since it begins from the belief that research data and its subsequent analysis are subjective by virtue of participants' context and the contingent nature of any grid of interpretation applied to the work. In line with epistemological understandings of knowledge as socially constructed, Blackledge & Hunt (1991, p. 234) outline a number of assumption of interpretivist research. First, "everyday" activity is the foundation of society, a point that links to Foucault's emphasis on practices. It is through analysing the practices in which people engage that "assumptions… kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought" (Foucault, 1988, p. 154) can be understood. In all of the sites of his analyses such as the hospital, prison or the school, Foucault sought out the "mundane" practices

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[11] Howarth (2013) refers to this concern as a question addressed by post-structural research. However, Foucault did not accept his work being labelled post-structural or otherwise (Foucault, 1984). Therefore, in drawing heavily on Foucault's work throughout this thesis, I do not label this work as post-structural.

like the marching patterns of soldiers or the posture of school children when handwriting to understand the effects of power. As he said:

> Here we are taking as a homogenous domain of reference not the representations that men give of themselves, nor the conditions that determine them without their knowledge, but rather what they do and the way they do it. That is, the forms of rationality that organize their ways of doing things (this might be called the technological aspect) and the freedom with which they act within these practical systems, reacting to what others do, modifying the rules of the game, up to a certain point (this might be called the strategic side of these practices). The homogeneity of this historico-critical analyses is thus ensured by this realm of practices, with their technological side and their strategic side. (Foucault, 1984, p. 48)

Inspired by this therefore, when looking at the discursive construction of creativity in schools, my interest is in the "realm of practices" in classroom contexts.

Another principle of an interpretivist approach is the element of freedom involved in such everyday action and activity; "people can and do create their own activity to some extent; everyday life is produced by people employed within the system acting together and producing their own roles and patterns of action" (Blackledge & Hunt, 1991, p. 235). The notions of freedom and autonomy here are also very central to understanding Foucault's account of power. Since power is not a given entity in Foucault's work, or possessed by any one individual or group (such as the "state" or the school institution), an analysis of the individual's practices is necessary to gain an understanding of its dialectical nature and multiple effects. This involves identifying the

place of individuals' actions in their own ethical self-formation and their practices of countering undesired normalising power effects. In constructing meaning on the concept of creativity, the individual's practices in spaces for action are identified and discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

The final point about the interpretivist approach for Blackledge and Hunt (1991) is that creation of meaning is borne out of constant negotiation and renegotiation. Meaning does not remain static but is an ever-evolving product of changing patterns of interaction. These processes of production and negotiation, which underpin interpretivist approaches, are congruent with the Foucauldian account of power/knowledge that informs this thesis (discussed in Chapter Three). I engage with the way in which creativity is constructed (knowledge) through neoliberal inflections in policy, disciplinary power effects in schools and individuals' ethical self-formation (all relations of power).

As well as being informed by interpretivist approaches to research, this thesis also aligns with a "defamiliarising" research orientation (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 53). It brings this orientation to effects that demarcate specific boundaries around what creativity can mean and to the aspirations held for it in society. As my analysis shows, any meaning associated with creativity (for example, that it is synonymous with design and problem-solving) does not represent the entirety of creativity knowledge in Australian education. The analysis illustrates how the individual, who features in Chapter Seven, interprets normalised meanings in light of his own vision and beliefs, and may renegotiate creativity with school management and parents by enacting forms of elaboration (theorised by Foucault's writings on counter-conduct and *parrhesia* in Chapter Seven).

While the assumptions outlined above highlight ways in which I situate this thesis "within" interpretivism, the ways in which I also position this work as outside of an interpretivist orientation (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013) are also relevant for this thesis. Jackson and Mazzei (2012, 2013) raise issues of what interpretivism means when researchers purport to interpret what participants are saying. These authors argue that to follow particular procedures such as coding of material as part of the interpretative process may result in research coming back to what's already known or to what has been established as parameters for knowledge. I avoid coding when guided by the defamiliarisation principle in this research as to code is to implicitly agree with assumptions that "data saturation" can occur, that studies can be replicated or triangulated, or that stronger claims for knowledge can be claimed through practices like co-rating.

The next section identifies how a genealogical approach corresponds with the epistemological assumptions highlighted above.

A Genealogical Approach

This thesis is informed by a genealogical approach (Foucault, 1977, 1985). My reading of Foucault's genealogies coincided with my growing sense that creativity discourses are products of the contexts within with they are articulated. Bearing in mind Foucault's wish that his concepts and texts would be used as a toolbox for enquiry in diverse contexts, I was encouraged to bring Foucault's ethic of questioning the present to the question of the truth about creativity.

This thesis acknowledges that Foucault's genealogies are primarily diachronic analyses while his archaeological investigations can be considered synchronic. Writers, however, have pointed out the blurred line between archaeology and genealogy (e.g. O'Farrell, 2005). While the policy documents on which this thesis focuses were produced in a relatively short timeframe, there are elements of diachronic analysis throughout the thesis – for example, consideration of the development of the Melbourne Document from previous iterations, teachers' discussion of their experiences before NAPLAN and AITSL technologies. Each of the policy texts relate to each other, as further discussed below. The documents, brought together as a discourse nexus, provide a timely and contemporary snapshot of how creativity discourses manifests in the Australian context. The ideas of Foucault's genealogies are brought into dialogue with this contemporary policy discourse nexus. Due to the difficulties in labelling research approaches which draw upon Foucault's writings, I do not call this approach a genealogy but rather a genealogical approach. My focus is on engagement with the ideas on power/knowledge and of omitted knowledge that surfaces in Foucault's genealogies, rather than on direct replication of Foucault's genealogies.

Although the specific aim and questions of the thesis do not extend to the detailed historical enquiry of Foucault's genealogies[12], and the parameters on the sites of enquiry makes this work different to Foucault's projects, there are many points of correlation between his work and this thesis. Firstly, Foucault's genealogies did not focus on a singular perspective such as the state as a distinct entity (Foucault, 2004) or delinquent as a universally recognised figure (Foucault, 1977), but sought to understand the conditions of possibility within which these were constructed. By conceptualising themes such as sexuality as constellations of discourses, Foucault rejected that they "existed outside" of the discursive nets established by Christianity or ancient Greek technologies of the self. I do not begin this research with a pre-established view of what creativity is. For example, I do not seek to understand how teachers administer the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) for creativity or how they accommodate "creative giftedness" in classrooms. Both of these assume a point of reference for creativity, whereas the "critical ethos" (Dean, 1999, p. 42) or ethical orientation of a genealogy is incitement to study the form and consequences of such universals (Meadmore, Hatcher & McWilliam, 2000).

Secondly, the conceptualisations of power and power/knowledge guiding this thesis align with the work of Foucault's genealogies. I draw out how creativity is constructed by the power traversing through a neoliberal art of government, disciplinary effects and an individual's ethical self-formation. Just as Foucault linked knowledge of concepts like madness or delinquency to power throughout specific time periods and

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[12] Researchers like Hook (2005, p. 26) argue that Foucault's "methodological reflections" should not limited to the domain of history.

wider discourses such as Christianity or medicine, I too trace how discourses of standardisation, the economy or productivity, actively construct knowledge about creativity. Significant for Foucault's genealogies, the important space for individuals' resistance within a power/knowledge relationship is factored into this account of the discursive construction of creativity through a focus on teachers' practices of counter-conduct and *parrhesia*.

Another point of compatibility between Foucault's genealogies and the work underway in this thesis is that his genealogies were also concerned with activating subjected knowledge (O'Farrell, 2005). Throughout this analysis, I too point out where there is a silence about particular discourses of creativity arising from the conditions that inhere in policy and practice. This is to "make visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all" (Foucault, 1991b, p. 76). As an illustration, where I argue that the discursive conditions inherent in education policy construct a creative individual as competitive and daring, I indicate how this ignores versions of the creative individual that prioritise self-expression and relationality. When I link a stage model conceptualisation of creativity to the time appropriation effects of disciplinary power in the school institution, I outline how these conditions facilitate a silence around discourses of improvisation, incubation or indeterminacy of the creative object. By definition, it would be impossible to highlight all the discourses around which there is a silence in policy and practice; the foregoing represent a small number of examples.

Foucault's writings on the contingency of the present align with the epistemological assumptions outlined on the co-existence of power relations with knowledge. As Maria Tamboukou states:

Foucault's genealogies create a methodological rhythm of their own, weaving around a set of crucial questions… What is happening now? What is this present of ours? How have we become what we are and what are the possibilities of becoming "other". (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 215)

The analysis of neoliberal ideas and of the effects of disciplinary power in practice throughout this thesis brings the question of "what is happening now" to bear on the discursive construction of creativity in the current Australian context. Tamboukou's (1999) "possibilities of becoming other" is addressed where examples of discourses omitted by normalised conceptualisations of creativity are pointed out. In other words, I affirm how, given alternative discursive conditions, creativity could always be articulated differently in the Australian context.

The themes of descent and emergence are central to Foucault's genealogies (Foucault, 1998). Foucault wrote that "the search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously thought immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; its shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself" (Foucault, 1998, pp. 374 - 375). Descent is therefore about showing how things are in the present and not presupposing cause and effect relationships. In Foucault's genealogy of the prison, he did not presuppose a unity between increased surveillance and prisoner behaviours; modern surveillance belongs in a trajectory of developments by which prisoners came to discipline themselves and

behave in appropriate ways. The surface of emergence relates to the discursive contexts within which a discursive practice emerges; for example, the surface of emergence of modern medicine was the teaching clinic (Foucault, 1973). In this thesis, I do not seek foundations for the notions of creative play, creative problem-solving or creative design. I use Foucault's writing on descent to disrupt the unity and consistency of such constructions. By analysing the rationalities through which associations like creativity *and* play or creativity *and* problem-solving are made in government policy, I take up the challenge to:

> Suggest - not by means of normative argument but instead by presenting a series of troublesome associations and lineages - that institutions and practices we value and take for granted today are actually more problematic than they otherwise appear. (Garland, 2014, p. 372)

As previously mentioned, there are no "how to" guides that offer detailed guidelines for how to conduct a genealogical analysis. However, Maria Tamboukou in her text *Writing Genealogies: An Exploration of Foucault's Strategies for Doing Research* (Tamboukou, 1999) offers some helpful guiding principles. She outlines how a beginning point is the identification of a problem or "a socially shared 'discomfort' about how things are going" (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 213). Accounts of how schools damage creativity or accounts of economised or monetised creativity are a problem for the education community. Conflicting messages, for example to teach specific skills or to facilitate more collaborative work, are given to teachers about how and what they should teach for creativity. Some student work patterns and behaviours may be undermined if singular versions of creativity are foregrounded in schools. These include

risk taking where a creative model approach dominates, or collaboration with others where individualism or competition is associated with creativity. After identifying this shared discomfort, Tamboukou (1999) discusses the need to analyse "a cluster of power relations sustaining and being sustained by certain types of knowledge" (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 213). Rather than accepting a normative position that schools have a damaging impact on creativity, a genealogical approach sheds light on the institutional practices of normalisation and surveillance, and analyses those knowledge configurations are that compatible with such practices and those that are sidelined.

In addition to Tamboukou's (1999) work, I also draw on guiding principles for conducting a genealogical enquiry offered by Foucault himself. He broadly incorporated three considerations in summarising his approach to genealogy:

- Treat the past discourse not as a theme… but as a monument to be described in its character disposition.

- Seek in the discourse not its laws of construction… but its conditions of existence.

- Refer the discourse, not to the thought, to the mind or to the subject which might have given rise to it but to the practical field in which it is deployed. (Foucault, 1978, p. 15)

Throughout the preceding discussion, I have identified how the work in this thesis will describe creativity as an effect of specific conditions of possibility. The practical fields within which discourses of creativity are deployed are the fields of policy and institutional practice. The sections to follow on how concepts from Foucault's work

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were chosen to analyse policy and teacher interview data further outline how these three broad considerations are incorporated into the analysis.

Challenges of a genealogical approach.

There are challenges in adopting a genealogical approach to one's work. Firstly, as discussed before in Chapter One, it is not possible to define the steps one might take in conducting a genealogical enquiry.[13] Undertaking work inspired by Foucault's genealogies requires the researcher to determine how some of the tools he offers relate to their own contexts and to the specific parameters of their work. Foucault did not structure a genealogical enquiry around the three sites of policy, school institution and the individual to analyse how knowledge of a single concept is discursively constructed across these three contexts. His genealogies focused on historical developments through extended periods of time (e.g. Foucault 1977, 1983). However, the work underway in this thesis is called a genealogical approach since it maintains Foucault's "genealogical suspicion towards objects of knowledge" (Yates & Hiles, 2010, p. 72). Furthermore, it is premised on discourse, power/knowledge and multiplicities of power relationships, and is concerned with the activation of knowledge around which there is a silence (as discussed in the previous section). The lack of a "blueprint" and the challenge inherent in orienting Foucault's exemplars of genealogy to empirical data in addressing contemporary question are not incapacitating factors. Indeed, quite the opposite - this

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[13] This contrasts with other discourse analysis approaches such as Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) where there are three level of analysis: the level of text (description of text), the level of discursive practice (interpretation, pragmatics) and the level of social practice (explanation of social context).

"elusivity" creates a space for the researcher to interpret Foucault's work in light of the particularities of each project (Ball, 2006).

Having outlined ways in which a genealogical approach aligns with the epistemological underpinnings of this thesis and the points of contact between Foucault's genealogical approaches and the aims of this thesis, I now detail the methods used.

Methods, Context and Procedural Details

The methods of document analysis and qualitative interviews provide multiple opportunities for engagement with the conditions of possibility within which truth about creativity is articulated, and are therefore compatible with a genealogical approach. The selection of a range of policy documents guided by Foucault's power/knowledge ensured that the analysis extended beyond enumerating the instances where each document referenced creativity. A textual study of a limited number of national documents, or confining the analysis to prescriptive educational documents such as teacher standards and curricula, would not facilitate the extensive portrayal of creativity knowledge facilitated by analysis of cultural *and* educational government policy, or national *and* global documents. This fuller and more extensive portrayal is important to understand how the present demarcations of creativity that appear in curriculum and standards documents take their current form.

The decision to hold two interviews with each of seven teachers was made in consideration of the great potential for interviews to access significant practices that related to their construction of creativity. The interviews provided a space within which factors such as the length of time the teachers had been teaching, teacher perspectives

on education objectives and reform, or their engagement with school management and parents could be cross-referenced with their everyday practices. Within the discussion of these conditions, creativity discourses were related to a complex and nuanced portrait of school practices.

Document analysis

In Chapter Five of this thesis, I analyse a range of policy documents. The following section outlines the approach to this analysis.

Selection of documents.

After deciding to analyse a range of policy documents, a challenge was to select a range of policy documents that I could bring into dialogue with the ideas of Foucault's genealogical approach. A choice, if I were to aim to replicate Foucault's genealogies, would be to include a range of documents over a considerably longer time-frame. This diachronic approach could access how creativity discourses have changed through time. My focus, however, was in analysing patterns by which discourses manifest in contemporary context and in how this manifestation dialogues with broader policy critique in Australian education. Furthermore, the research was designed in such a way that the policy analysis chapter would be one of three sites of analysis. To focus on the present manifestation of creativity discourses as they appear in policy and move across different texts, and to retain a sense that policy construction of creativity is one lens through which to access creativity discourse in Australian education, I decided to focus the analysis on a relatively synchronic policy site. Some diachronic analysis is also included, however, since I point out how these documents are informed by predecessor documents. The themes and ideas behind Foucault's genealogies (for example, on

power/knowledge and on suspiciousness towards universals) strongly inform the analysis, and so there is compatibility between analysis of recently-published documents and what is termed a "genealogical approach" in this thesis.

After deciding on the scope of the policy analysis, the next step was to establish a set of government documents that would facilitate a broad overview of the creativity agenda in contemporary Australian education. While bearing in mind Foucault's point that the "not-said" is discourse as is the "said", and that discourse is not a "count-noun" (see discussion in Chapter Three), to initiate the enquiry, the criterion used was to select documents that frequently referenced the root "creat/" (create, creativity, creative etc.). It soon became clear that no sample of chosen texts could exhaustively encapsulate the entirety of the "creativity agenda" in contemporary Australian policy. For example, no documents specifically outlined the Australian Government's understanding of creativity. This is not surprising since education policy draws together a multitude of perspectives and reflects the concerns of multiple stakeholders (Ball, 1990; Jones & Thomson, 2008; Rivzi & Lingard, 2009). A second delimiting criterion I used to select documents was to anchor the analysis in curriculum policy, and to extend the discussion to the broader social context such as the dialogue between cultural industries and education curricula. Due to the recent publication of the ACARA national curriculum, and its centrality in Australian education, I began my analysis with one instalment of this curriculum – *The Australian Curriculum: The Arts, Foundation to Year 10* (ACARA, 2013a). Although any of the documents from this curriculum could have been chosen, this instalment fulfilled the criterion of referencing the root "creat/" multiple times. It addition, it linked to the subject specialisation of the teachers interviewed (high school music). Related National Curriculum documents are *Critical*

and Creative Thinking (ACARA, 2013b), an elaboration of one of the general capabilities, and the shaping document *Shape of the Australian* Curriculum (ACARA, 2012). Both of these documents are also incorporated into the analysis.

Any ACARA curriculum discourses of creativity can be related to the discursive conditions created in another highly significant document in the national context: *The Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008). Through its function in setting out the nationally accepted agreed-upon goals for all young Australians, the "Melbourne document" (as this declaration is referred to throughout the thesis) is highly relevant to this study. "Creative" is specifically mentioned in one of the goals: "All young Australians become: successful learners, confident and *creative individuals*, active and informed citizens" (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 8, emphasis added). As Chapter Five of the thesis will outline, the Melbourne document establishes a rationale for many contemporary education policy documents in the Australian context and also demonstrates the intersections between global policy imperatives and the national context.

The significant document, *Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (AITSL, 2011), was included since it occupies a central place in how teachers' work is defined and recognised. Since its function is to formulise nationally endorsed teaching standards, it represents an assemblage of influential discourses in Australian education. For this reason, the discursive conditions for creativity therein are important for how the concept is constructed.

The final national context document included was *Creative Australia: National Culture Policy* (Australian Government, 2013). As signified by the title, this document

articulates the views and aspirations of the Australian Government for creativity. I consider the cross-referencing between education and the views on creativity within the document to be highly important in any understanding of the creativity agenda in the national context. In particular, the section titled "a universal arts education for lifelong learning and to drive creativity and innovation" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 77), establishes links between national aspirations for creativity and how creativity is to be appropriated in education contexts.

One document in the selected policy chain is outside of the national context. The rationale for including the *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving (Volume 5)* (OECD, 2014) document is that policies in Australia draw upon PISA discourses and align prerogatives for Australian education with the frames of reference used by the OECD (e.g. using PISA testing data to compare education systems across member countries). The inclusion of the *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving (Volume 5)* (OECD, 2014) document adds a global dimension to the study. Further contextualisation information on the documents is included in Chapter Five throughout the analysis.

Choosing analytical concepts and framing the policy analysis.

This analysis is led by a policy as discourse orientation (Bacchi, 2000; Ball, 1994). It starts from the premise that there are very particular ways in which "policy ensembles (and) collections of related policies exercise power through a "*production* of 'truth' and 'knowledge' as discourses" (Ball 1994, p. 21, author's emphasis). As such then, what features in policy and appears as objective knowledge on the nature of

creativity or as knowledge on creativity's place in the curriculum represents a particular "point in the diagram of power" (Ball 1994, p. 22).

I decided to focus on the concept of neoliberalism in the policy analysis chapter due to a gap in the literature whereby the concept of creativity is rarely addressed in critiques of neoliberalism and education within the Australian context. Numerous critiques indicate a concern with neoliberal influences on education in Australia (Clarke, 2012a, 2012b; Connell, 2013a, 2013b; Gobby, 2016; Lingard, Sellar & Savage, 2013; Thompson & Mockler, 2015), yet very few researchers have analysed the relationship between neoliberalism and the significant concept of creativity in this country. A *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility is one concept, intimately connected to neoliberalism for Foucault. While other concepts, such as biopoltics, could have been chosen, the choice of *homo economicus* situates this thesis as a continuation of other conversations occurring in educational research. Researchers frequently draw upon the concept (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2008; Bowl, 2010; Bowl & Tobias, 2012; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Peters & Marshall, 1996; Saunders, 2010), yet it has rarely been associated with creativity in the literature. Furthermore, as I discuss below, there was congruence between policy critique of neoliberalism, the wordings of the documents and characteristics of a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility. Finding these patterns of congruence led to the selection of the concept for this particular chapter. While only one concept is foregrounded in this (as in all) analysis chapters, any sense of inevitability that a version of creativity emerging from a *homo economicus* grid of analysis is the *only* version of creativity that surfaces in Australian creativity is avoided by the dialogue presented between this and other versions in subsequent chapters. The thesis, as a whole, presents three different pictures of the construction of creativity, and the eternal contingency of

that construction is highlighted by the interplay between these constructions at each of the three points.

For the sake of greater clarity and coherence, each document is discussed in turn throughout Chapter Five. Each subsection throughout Chapter Five (the policy analysis chapter) is a synthesis of how perspectives on Foucault's *homo economicus,* and existing literature on neoliberal influences in education link to the conditions within which creativity is discursively constructed in the aforementioned policy documents. For example, after reading *The Melbourne Declaration of Goals for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008), I identified two themes of employability and an unstable environment used alongside creativity discourses. Both of these terms feature in critiques of neoliberalism in education. For example, Bowl (2010) demonstrates the prioritisation of skills for the workforce and life-long learning in education contexts, while Hay and Kapitzke (2009) point out the subjectification of individuals to cope with unstable futures. In his writings on *homo economicus* Foucault referenced how the *homo economicus* "character" acts on his own interests and is eternally enterprising (Foucault, 2004, p. 278). Due to the correlation between employability/unstable future environments in this document's construction of creativity, in existent literature on neoliberalism in education and in Foucault's writings on *homo economicus,* headings such as "unstable environment" and "productivity" are used to structure the discussion of these documents.

Interviews

Chapters Six and Seven are based on a range of interviews with teachers. The following section outlines the methodological details of the interviews.

Rationale for interviews in this study.

The semi-structured interview is an important component of this study. Interviews are hugely beneficial in many ways since through the media of discussion and conversation, they can create a forum in which multi-faceted issues can be freely explored (Hollway & Jefferson, 2008). Due to the discourse focus of this thesis, the interview is a highly appropriate forum for accessing the "instances and phenomena" (Schostak, 2006, p. 78) that teachers relate to creativity. It provides a forum to understand the significance and interpretation that teachers attribute to experiences, lessons or conversations (Jackson & Mazzei 2012, 2013). Through the focus on practices, the interview could elicit further detail on teacher practices and facilitate engagement with teachers in a way not afforded by measures such as printed questionnaires. For example, when teachers said they consider creativity in terms of "doing things outside the box" or that there often "isn't much time for creativity", I could explore what these ideas meant in terms of the practical things teachers or students did or the barriers they encountered.

A small number of interviewees participated in this qualitative research. Smaller sample sizes facilitate more detailed and richer exploration of teacher practices through Foucault's concepts, and therefore are more conducive to the aim of this work rather than a larger number. The aims of this research and research questions do not call for exhaustive samples or high levels of correlation. There are no claims made to

generalisation or applicability in other contexts, as discussed in the limitations section of Chapter Eight.

Initial procedures and choosing participants.

In any research, ethics must be regarded as a central consideration from the outset and throughout all stages of the research process and presentation (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2006; Denscombe, 2003). Ethical clearance was sought from the University of New South Wales in March 2014 after an application to conduct the research was considered by an ethics panel. After this clearance was granted, I then applied for permission to conduct research from the New South Wales State Education Research Application Process (SERAP) and the Catholic Education Office (CEO)[14]. On approval, a letter was sent to the principals of ten schools to invite them to participate in the study. The letter sought the participation of music teachers as I wanted to focus my discussion within my area of expertise, and I wished to engage with the teachers to understand their practices. Also, interviewing music teachers provided the opportunity to refer the discussion to an area of the curriculum within which creativity is frequently referenced (the Arts curriculum).

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[14] Differing school systems (such as public schools and Catholic school) have independent channels in New South Wales by which applications to conduct research are processed.

After school principals indicated that members of the school staff were interested in participating in the research[15], I sent another letter to the schools, this time to the teachers. In this letter, I provided details on the nature of the project, assuring confidentiality and seeking their consent. Participants signed consent forms at this stage where they agreed to participate in two one-hour long recorded interviews. Interview schedules were compiled on the basis of the literature review and research questions (see Appendix Two). All questions were open-ended and formulated in a way that aimed to invite viewpoint on the issues in question. Sometimes the focus of the interview switched to experiences of the teachers throughout their career or a struggle encountered with creativity rather than focusing only on the sample of questions I had prepared. I was struck by the number of time participants shared many anecdotes or found a basis for their own creative teaching practices in their memories of childhood. While I expected qualitative interviews to access such discussion, the regularity throughout signalled something for me of the personal and idiosyncratic relationship that each teacher held to a notion of creativity. As Goodley (1996) argues, whereas an official written document (such as the Curriculum or AITSL standards) is intended to strike a reader on an objective level, the "human document is comprehended

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[15] Three additional schools initially indicated their interest in taking part in this project. However, two believed that only one teacher would be able to participate (one school only had one music teacher, and at another school the timeframe did not facilitate more than one teachers' participation). At the third school, a Catholic Primary School, I spoke to three teachers. Since the school hired a specialist music-teacher, not all of the teachers regularly taught music. Rather than work with data from a small number of teachers in four different schools, and include limited interview material on teacher practices across a plethora of different contexts, my interest was in the facilitation of richer engagement with teachers' creativity-related practices. Restricting my focus to one high school music department with seven specialist music teachers better facilitated this engagement.

emotionally" (Goodley, 1996, p. 335). Interviews were recorded with participant consent to assist in analysis and retrieval (Oppenheim, 2005). All of the data was transcribed.

Profile of school and participants.

Ball et al. (2012) and Thomson (2003) draw attention to the importance of context in education research. I agree with these researchers that in analysing data and in any presentation of the "way things are", researchers need to identify and understand the particularities of each context. The "thisness" of each school (Thomson, 2003) means that research data is unavoidably a product of a particular site, rather than a generic "one-size-fits-all" construct. Since "each school 'place' is a distinctive blend of people, happenings, resources, issues, narratives, truths, knowledges and networks, in and through which the combined effects of power saturated geographies and histories are made manifest" (Thomson, 2003, p. 73), there is no generic "Australian school" that I can look to in presenting this research. Factors that preclude such a school are the school's place in situated contexts, in professional cultures, material contexts and external contexts (Ball et al., 2012, p. 21). Since the distinctiveness of the school site and of the individual teachers is an irremovable aspect of my "data", I discuss the "thisness" of my research below.

City High School (CBD[16]) is a small selective urban public high school with a very strong reputation in the state of NSW (as measured by NAPLAN data). An offer of admission to the school is determined by prospective students' performance in intensive selection tests. The school attracts highly experienced teachers. It is reported by teachers

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[16] Pseudonym

to be a highly desirable school to work in with high levels of managerial and collegial support. The school is very well equipped in terms of abundant space and resources and is adjacent to expansive public lands.

In terms of external contexts, CBD staff considers the parent body to hold high expectations for their students at this school. The school fares very well on the *MySchool* website[17] in relation to measures such as NAPLAN scores. In articulating the privileged context within which he works, one of the teachers commented that "we get to select our students and we're a government school so we're extremely unique… We don't have the upward climb" (Stephen[18]).

Out of the seven participants who took part in this research, three teachers are pursuing postgraduate research in music education. Other important contextual information is that the sample includes teachers in senior management and High School Certificate (HSC) examiners, and teachers who have worked overseas or in private sectors. A short biographical sketch of each teacher is included below for context.

Charlie taught for thirty-three years and is currently the Head of Music at the school. He is also a maths teacher and a pianist. For the past ten years, he has worked as a senior examiner in composition. Part of his role involves working with "gifted and talented students" in the school.

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[17] MySchool is a website under the auspices also of ACARA. It provides a platform where information on profile, academic performance, funding sources, enrolment numbers and attendance rates for all schools in Australia can be accessed.

[18] Pseudonym

Stephen also teaches drama and technology as well as music in this school. Along with teaching, he also runs his own business (one that would be associated with the "creative industries" in some literature). Although Stephen moved in and out of his teaching career over a number of years to work as a performer and to run his business, his teaching experience totals the equivalent of ten years' full-time work.

Helen has worked for twenty-nine years across many different school contexts, both internationally and in Australia. She worked as a performer concurrently with teaching and occasionally left the teaching profession to pursue this alternative career. Helen is pursuing PhD studies in music education.

Susan has worked at three different schools prior to CBD School, over a total period of thirty-two years. She is a French and German teacher as well as a music teacher. Piano, singing and choral conducting are her areas of expertise in this school.

Barbara's university studies were in violin, organ and singing. She played the violin in orchestras throughout her time in university. She has now taught for twenty-six years and has worked in Montessori, primary and second-level school contexts.

Gillian has worked as a teacher for five years and reports that she became a teacher after the role model influence of her own teachers. She has extensive experience of solo piano performance and accompaniment. Gillian has responsibility for the school choir and also has worked as a composer for an arts company in the city where this school is located. Gillian has recently completed a Masters in Education, which included some modules on creativity.

David has worked as the deputy-principal of CBD School for the past ten years, and as music teacher at the school for twenty-six years (teaching music before and

during his deputy-principalship). He credits early experiences of performing and the enjoyment derived from them to his decision to pursue music education at university. Other music pursuits outside of teaching include playing the guitar and singing. David's future study plans to undertake PhD research on creativity in music are important for the discussion of "forms of elaboration" in Chapter Seven and so further information is included in that chapter.

Timing and purpose of the first interview.

I conducted two interviews with each of the teachers, each interview at either end of the document study. The first interview explored teachers' broad views of creativity and themes related to their practice and experience. In summary, the purpose of this first interview was to:

- Gain an understanding of the teachers' personal experiences, influences of others, personal convictions etc. in regard to the meaning of creativity.

- Understand teachers' broader views about teaching - their work practices, their engagement with management and parents.

- Gain insight into how their beliefs about how creativity related to such concerns as reporting progress to parents, planning lessons and documenting progress.

Timing and purpose of the second interview.

After a close reading of the policies and the transcripts from Interview One, a second interview was held with the participants. The purpose of this second interview was to:

- Access descriptive examples from the teachers of lessons they associated with creativity.

- Access descriptive examples from the teachers of lessons they did not associate with creativity.

- Discuss policy constructions with the participants and to understand their levels of agreement/disagreement.

- Explore how this agreement/disagreement related to their practice.

Interview questions for the first and second interview are included in Appendix Two.

Choosing analytical concepts and framing the analysis of practice.

In choosing analytical concepts for Chapter Six, engagement with how power relations work to discursively construct the concept of creativity was my primary concern. Concurrently to reading Foucault work, I also read and reread the interview transcripts with a view to identifying which concepts in Foucault's work resonated with the work of these teachers. I identified institutional practices of assessment and timetabling that teacher referenced in their discussion of creativity, and noted how these resonated with the practices that Foucault addressed in *Discipline and Punish* (1977). I also identified example of where teachers negotiated or countered what they believed to be the negative effects of technologies like timetabling or assessment, and found these negotiations could dialogue with Foucault's writings in texts like *The History of Sexuality* (1978, 1985) and *Hermeneutics of the Subject* (2001b). These multiple relations of power articulated by the teachers (institutional and individual, normalising and resisting) therefore aligned with Foucault's account of power in social systems.

To facilitate a richer discussion of the multiple power relations identified, I decided that the interview data could be analysed over two chapters - one to portray the construction of creativity at the level of the school institution and another at the level of the individual. This was an arbitrary decision since modalities of power work together and concurrently in Foucault's account. The rationale for this structuring system is that it facilitated deeper engagement with a wide range of Foucault's concepts - disciplinary power in the case of institutional practices and ethical self-formation in the case of the individual's practices. In the chapter focused on the school institution, I include examples of how creativity is normalised in schooling practices (Chapter Six). In the individual-focused chapter, Chapter Seven, I discuss the how one teacher counters and negotiates this normalisation.

To analyse the discursive construction of creativity at the level of the institution, I drew on work on how the effects of disciplinary power play out in education, both globally and in the Australian context (Brook, 2000; Deacon, 2002, 2006; Gore, 1995, 1997; Grant, 1997; Hayter et al., 2008; McNicol Jardine, 2005; Jones, 2000; Nettleton, 1994; Niesche, 2013a, 2013b; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). Since Foucault advised that genealogies need to be referred to a specific context (Foucault, 1978), this chapter engages with institutional imperatives and refers discussion and analysis to "everyday" and "real" school practices like timetabling and planning. Since a genealogy is not interested in accepting at face value assertions such as "creativity is killed by schools", this chapter looks "more closely at the workings of those practices in which moral norms and truths about ourselves have been constructed" (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 208). Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1977) provided a range of idea and concepts through which the practices and experiences of teachers could be theorised. I constructed three

main themes from my reading of *Discipline and Punish* (1977) - normalisation of behaviours, comparison and appropriations of time - after identifying that the same themes framed the practices of the school institution and experiences of the teachers.

For the final interview analysis chapter of this thesis, I sought theoretical tools that would facilitate analysis of how normalised accounts of creativity did not permanently fix what creativity in education could come to mean. Foucault's notions of power/knowledge and of power relations required that the analysis would extend to practices by which normalised ideas of creativity are co-opted or countered by the individual. In juxtaposing my reading of Foucault's later work in texts such as *The History of Sexuality (1985) and Hermeneutics of the Subject (2001b)* with the interview material, I saw the potential to theorise teacher practices undertaken in the context of normalising assumptions about creativity as components of their ethical self-formation. Analysis of the self-formation practices undertaken by teachers against the backdrop of normalised assumptions about creativity addresses a concern of genealogical analysis to "note[s] the limits imposed by the social conditions within which practices of the self are cultivated" (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 215). As with the previous two chapters, I was informed by previous research that drew on Foucault's work on ethical self-formation in education.

I followed Niesche and Keddie (2015), along with O'Leary (2002), in drawing on Foucault's writing on *parrhesia* and counter-conduct to understand and theorise forms of elaboration in which one engages as part of one's ethical self-formation. Each of the sections headings throughout Chapter Seven reflect a different linkage point between the individual teacher's beliefs and practices on creativity, and Foucault's writings about ethical self-formation, *parrhesia* and counter-conduct. Together, they offer a

detailed picture of one individual teacher's construction of the concept of creativity and the patterns by which he accepts or counters normalised creativity discourses.

For greater depth and in order to engage with ideas of ethical self-formation, I felt that a sustained focus on one individual would be preferable to detailing the practices of a group of teachers in Chapter Seven. David's personal biographical and contextual details revealed a high level of engagement and reflection on issues related to neoliberalism and disciplinary power effects. He is both a classroom teacher and a deputy-principal. This role has presented many clashes and tensions between leading a school and facilitating opportunities that he believes are most conducive to creativity. In making sense of these tensions, David will soon pursue PhD research on creativity in music. While any of the teachers' transcripts could have been drawn upon, David's interviews were chosen for the reasons above.

All of the concepts chosen throughout the analysis chapters have been used in alternative education contexts such as leadership or social movement studies (as identified in Chapter Three). They have not been used together in an ensemble in the area of creativity in education. There is no doubt that other concepts could have been chosen to frame and to structure this analysis. Similarly, given the same transcripts and the concepts identified here, another researcher would arrive at an alternative portrayal of the discursive construction of creativity. In presenting these methodological details and procedures, the aim here is not to assist a replication of this study by another researcher. Rather, it is a detailing of the thinking process behind my portrayal of the construction of the concept of creativity arising from the conditions of possibility inherent in policy and practice.

Research Design and the Concept of Neoliberalism

Throughout the bodies of literature consulted for this thesis on creativity, on the work of Michel Foucault and on critical/political perspective on education policy and practice, the term neoliberalism remained one of the most enduring. Since the term was largely the subject in Foucault's lecture series *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2004) and since many of the policies analysed as part of this thesis emerged in the context of what has been called a neoliberal education revolution, this research could not be designed in neglect of the term. A balance that needed to be struck in writing this thesis was not to accept neoliberalism as a downward and universally known ideology (see Adams, 2013; Mansfield, 2009). To avoid such a contextualisation of neoliberalism, I do not consider the construction of creativity in "neoliberal contexts" or in a "neoliberal era" as if it could subsume education in Australia at the current time. To do so would negate the constructedness of such a neoliberal era or context. Instead, a *version* of neoliberalism (as mapping human interaction and social systems to a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility) informs this thesis, and the discussion of neoliberalism is largely confined to one chapter.

In this design chapter, the final chapter before analysing the data, I take the opportunity to signify how this research draws on neoliberalism, and where it diverts from other research projects that draw on the intersection between neoliberalism and creativity. The following contextualisation of neoliberalism is presented in four sections. Firstly, I outline the historical context of neoliberalism. I then draw out links between neoliberalism and Australian public policy. Thirdly, I discuss features by which neoliberalism is characterised in education, with particular emphasis on work

undertaken in the Australian context. The final section of this contextualisation of neoliberalism examines literature on the intersections between neoliberalism and creativity.

Contextualising neoliberalism.

Capturing the difficulty in defining and making neoliberalism "operable" in research contexts, Springer, Birch and MacLeavy (2016, p. 2) in *The Handbook of Neoliberalism* say, "as a field of study, neoliberalism has grown exponentially over the past two decades coinciding with the rhetorical rise of this phenomenon as a hegemonic ideology, a state form, a policy and programme, an epistemology, and a version of governmentality". The difficulty in grasping the meaning of neoliberalism is also echoed by other authors (Flew, 2010; Rowlands & Rawolle, 2013; Venugopal, 2015). It is invariably characterised in literature as orientation around/centralisation of the market and competition in every sphere of human existence. Such a characterisation calls attention to the technologies by which the market is prioritised and to the effects this brings about. For example, the subjectivities (e.g. the "good teacher", the "successful citizen") and values systems (e.g. what constitutes fairness or equity) constructed by discourses of productivity and competitiveness represent widely-documented effects of neoliberalism.

Due to the way in which neoliberalism manifested differently in various contexts, it is impossible to chart a linear history of the concept (Davies & Bansel, 2007; Harvey, 2007a, 2007b; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). Harvey (2007b, p. 27) makes the point that "the world stumbled toward neoliberalism through a series of gyrations and chaotic motions". Two such motions widely credited as major foundations for neoliberalism are

the German school and the Chicago School. In Germany, the Ordoliberals emerged in the 1930s against the backdrop of fascism and Nazism (Davies & Bansel, 2007; Foucault, 2004). Foucault describes how there emerged a deep appreciation of the state's role in creating competition. This manifested in the *Gesellschaftspolitik* - a "policy of society and a social interventionism… (that) must nullify the possible anti-competitive mechanisms of society, or at any rate anti-competitive mechanisms that could arise within society" (Foucault, 2004, p. 160).

The Chicago school gained popularity in the 1950s. An instigating factor in the American context for the remodelling of government practices was Keynesianism, broadly a measured balance between labour and capital and geared towards maximum employment (Harvey, 2007a). In contrast to the Ordoliberals, according to Foucault's (2004, p. 243) account, "American neoliberalism evidently appears much more radical or much more complete and exhaustive". This "radical" neoliberalism was a "generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary exchanges… as a principle of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behaviour" (Foucault, 2004, p. 243). It is in the context of American neoliberalism that Foucault more comprehensively developed his notion of *homo economicus,* a concept I centralise in engaging with the discursive parameters established by a neoliberal art of governing (discussed in Chapter Three).

The foregrounding of the market and the promotion of neoliberal forms of competition have made an impact in many countries. Margaret Thatcher's dismantling of the coal industry in the UK and gradual erosion of "working class solidarities" (Harvey, 2007a), and her support for Structural Adjustment Programmes such as the IMF and WorldBank rescheduling loan repayments with struggling economies like that

of Argentina (Connell, 2013a), are examples of such neoliberal policies. Similarly, under Reagan's leadership in the US, the challenge mounted to the PACTO (an air traffic-controllers union) and a coup of investment bankers in New York City are some examples which "established a principle that, in the event of a conflict between the integrity of financial institutions and bondholders on one hand and the well-being of the citizens on the other, the former would be given preference" (Harvey, 2007a, p. 31; see also Hursh & Henderson, 2011). Chile represents the first state formed by neoliberal policies and rationalities (Connell, 2013a, Harvey, 2007b). Here, a group called the Chicago boys (on account of their training at the University of Chicago and therefore linked to the American variant of neoliberalism) were charged with restructuring the economy, and did so through the privatisation of assets and opening up of national resources to private corporations (Harvey, 2007a). It can be seen therefore that neoliberalism impacted globally in multiple forms and varieties. This impact also came to bear in Australia.

Neoliberalism and Australia.

In any political or critical enquiry into Australian education, the concept of neoliberalism in one manifestation or another is frequently foregrounded (Beeson & Firth, 1998; Davies & Bansel, 2009; Saul, 2005). As Beeson and Firth (1998, p. 222) write, since the 1980s, the Australian Labor Party "pioneered many of the policies and strategies that have become the bilaterally supported conventional wisdom". The proliferation of neoliberal strategies in the time passed since the 1980s is still evident in the "remarkably concerted fashion" (Davies & Bansel, 2007, p. 247) by which neoliberal ideas and policies continue to gain a strong foothold in Australian education.

Besson and Firth (1998) track three government reports written under Labor governments since 1980 and argue that they represent what could be termed a neoliberalisation of Australian public policy. The first is the Garnaut Report (1989), "a watershed in Australian policymakers' moves toward a new political rationality" (Beeson & Firth, 1998, p. 7). This report opened new lines of thought about Australia's economy taking its place within an international global economy. Following from this was the Hilmer Report (1993), which sought to protect the "competitive process per se" (Beeson & Firth, 1998, p. 26). Finally, according to Beeson and Firth (1998), it was the Karpin Report (1995) that sought to "instil" neoliberal values in the individual. They believe:

> Karpin's solution to Australia's perceived economic problems (was) to inculcate "enterprising" attitudes and values amongst the population at large. More specifically, Australia's population, be they employees or managers (needed) to be enterprising in the broadest sense of the word, not only in business but also in social community organisations and in terms of their own personal lives in a changing world. (Beeson & Firth, 1998, p. 224)

This report set a precedence for notions of efficiency in terms of how education could respond to the demands of the labour market and foregrounded corporate discourses of universities attracting international fee-paying students.

An "education revolution" was a further inflection of neoliberal discourses that emerged in Australia after a Labor victory in 2007. This revolution largely revolved around a productivity and participation agenda (Gillard, 2008a, 2008b; Reid, 2009),

signalling new partnerships between states/territories, new funding models and the formation of a nationally endorsed curriculum. The rhetoric of productivity informing this education revolution is evident in the comments below from the then serving Labor government:

> Productivity was driven by the industrial revolution in the 19th century and the technological revolution in the 20th century. In the 21st century, a human capital revolution will drive productivity growth. That's why Labor is now calling for an education revolution in Australia. (Australian Labor Party, 2007, online)

Importantly, at the time of the "education revolution" policies espousing discourses of productivity, the Labor government dominated in every state. This "facilitated the creation of an image of consensus politics, (and) enhanced the perceived legitimacy of the education revolution" (Clarke, 2012a, p. 308).

A link between neoliberalism and the education revolution is premised in critical literature on the ways in which the logics of choice and competition underpin the emergent education reforms. In the midst of this revolution, reforms included the establishment of a school information website where parents could access information about each school, such as NAPLAN testing data. Providing this information on a public forum along with discourses of equipping parents to make the best decision positions parent as consumers (Lingard, 2010; Reid, 2009). Logics of choice and the correlative reconceptualisation of education as an arena where people pursue their own best interests reflect a neoliberal prioritisation of the market (Foucault, 2004; Harvey, 2007a, 2007b).

A large number of studies have critiqued the effect of neoliberal influences in Australian education, for example under the themes of leadership (Gobby, 2016; Lingard, 2010, 2011; Niesche, 2013a, 2013b), accountability (Clarke, 2012a; Kostogriz & Doecke, 2011; Lingard, 2011) and equality (Connell, 2013a; Lingard & Sellar, 2013). In the discussion to follow on characteristic features of neoliberalism in education, work from these writers in the Australian context is incorporated.

Neoliberalism and education.

The three themes of managerialism in education, privatisation and standardisation represent three points by which neoliberal influences are critiqued in literature. A discourse of managerialism, or "new managerialism" so called by Gewirtz and Ball (2000), has coincided with increased devolution of authority to individual schools. One point of critique in literature is that managerialism represents a change in emphasis from welfarist concerns to technologies of standardisation and performativity (Lingard, 2010; Lynch, 2015). Rather than a sense of purpose in education being articulated in terms of vocation and public good, a neoliberal lexicon "signifies the development of a whole new system of disciplinary regulation through measurable accountability, quality assurance and performance" (Lynch, 2015, p. 5). Teacher and principal professionalism becomes reconceptualised to reflect this lexicon of enterprise and excellence (Bottery, 1996; Tang, 2011; Wong, 2008). Emphasis is placed on outputs and measurable data rather than on inputs or gains. Such outputs are test scores, enrolment figures, teacher performance indicators and school performance data.

Brad Gobby's (2013a, 2013b) work argues that the Independent Schools Movement in Western Australia represents a global neoliberal turn towards self-

management of schools. The IPS can be considered an extension of previous School Based Management initiatives in Australia (Angus, 1994; Lingard & McGregor, 2014; Niesche, 2010). Other examples of a global turn towards self-managing schools are academies in the UK (Gorard, 2009; West, 2014) and charter schools in the US (Baltodano, 2012; Crawford, 2001). Gobby (2013b) argues that the principals in schools where authority is devolved are shaped by managerialist rationalities of government. Schools are given greater choice and freedom to make decisions on issues such as recruitment, but since budget efficiency is paramount, he argues this choice is shaped by discourses of competition and choice (see also Ball, 2012b; Day, 2002; Hursh, 2013; Kostogriz & Doecke, 2011; Lingard, 2010; Lingard & McGregor, 2014; Olmedo 2013).

After managerialism, a second broad demarcation by which neoliberalism can be understood is the encroachment of the private sector into the public. The growth of the private school sector, "for-profit" teacher education courses (Lynch, 2015), and "edubusinesses" (Ball 2007; Hatcher, 2006; Olmedo, 2013) are all testament to privatisation of education. Commodification of education (Olssen & Peters, 2005) and the influence of private interests are particularly topical in the third level context. Stephen Ball's paper *Performativity, Commodification and Commitment: An I-Spy Guide to the Neoliberal University* (2012a) provides multiple examples of industry links to education such as the position of the Boustead Group, an engineering services and geo-spatial technology company, as a majority shareholder of UNiM (University of Nottingham in Malaysia).

In the Australian context, Gobby's (2013b) writings about principals who outsource provision of technological and catering facilities to private companies portray school principals as business CEOs. Other examples of principals as CEOs of private

enterprises are also provided in Niesche's (2013b) work. Neoliberal discourses of privatisation and choice construct principals as "perpetually assessable subjects" (Niesche, 2013b, p. 134) who are "heavily informed by business ethic" (Niesche, 2013b, p. 137). This business ethic manifests in schools in the writing of grant applications and funding bids wherein each principal "assumes certain financial liabilities and responsibilities on behalf of the school" (Niesche, 2010, p. 258). Although, the argument is made that choice logics are hallmarks of a democracy and also speak back to stagnation or inefficiency, the imposition of market ideals is not necessarily conducive to equality of outcomes. For example, as Ball (2009) argues, choice policies lead to social class divisions in schools. In addition, evidence suggests that policies such as Open Enrolment in the UK context allow schools to select students with highest test scores on enrolment (Hursh, 2005, p. 7).

Finally, the "standards movement" features strongly in critiques of neoliberal influence in education. As Suspityna (2010) says:

> The preoccupation with checking, accounting, and monitoring is an essential characteristic of the audit culture that pervades institutions and organizations. The audit culture challenges the grounds of the legitimacy of knowledge and operates on mistrust: the authority of teachers and academics, who are the producers of professional and disciplinary knowledge, is superseded by bureaucratic authority in judging the validity of that knowledge. (Suspityna, 2010, p. 571)

The standards movement has reconceptualised the meaning of educational accountability, a contentious term widely critiqued in contemporary educational policy

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and discourse (Epstein, 1993; Poulson, 1996). Particular conservative models of accountability couched in terms of marketisation and government control have received considerable currency in the absence of other broader conceptualisations (Epstein, 1993). Accountability systems construed as regulative and calculative exist all over the world (Ball, 2003; Hursh, 2013; Kostogriz & Doecke, 2011, Webb, 2006, 2011). In the Australian context, faces of regulative accountability systems are NAPLAN testing and the *MySchool* Website. In the US, manifestations of calculative regimes include standardised testing and subsequent rating of teachers as effective or ineffective based on these outcomes (Hursh, 2013). In the UK, similar initiatives include the SAT exams and OFSTED inspection model (Jeffrey, 2002).

A feature of the education revolution in the Australian context (AITSL, 2011) was the implementation of a framework for teacher education/development that comprises seven standards nestled within three domains (e.g. professional knowledge) and four career stages (e.g. graduate). The establishment of standards as authoritative measures for teacher education and development (Mulcahy, 2011), is problematic in that "dot point descriptors", which function to encapsulate and define professional work in constructions such as "the standards are a public statement of what constitutes teacher quality" (AITSL, 2011, p. 2), are at odds with beliefs on the "labour" of teaching as idiosyncratic (Kostogriz & Doecke, 2011). Clarke and Moore (2013) argue that when standards are applied to teacher development/education, there is:

> The risk of the reduction of teaching to disconnected dot points that
> background the intellectual underpinnings of teachers' work, that under-
> play its profoundly emotional and social dimensions (including its shaping

by wider social, economic, and political contexts), and that privilege compliance over critique in the interests of reducing teaching to individually auditable competencies. (Clarke & Moore, 2013, p. 4)

Standards based accountability is critiqued in the Australian context also with reference to NAPLAN and the *MySchool* website technologies. Lingard (2010, 2011) argues that a premise of NAPLAN and *MySchool* (why they were chosen as measures, why information is available in the public sphere etc.) is a neoliberal assumption that competition between schools and parents' abilities to choose schools on the basis of data will lead to greater "performance". Both Kostogriz and Doecke (2011) and Gobby (2016) analyse how accountability technologies incite education stakeholders to value instrumental data. In the case of Gobby's (2016) research, the *MySchool* website promotes a discourse of calculation in parents' engagement with schools. Through the rhetoric of choice and statistical information made available on this website, they are presented with a commensurate space of equivalence (Lewis & Hardy, 2015; Rawolle & Lingard, 2008). In the research of Kostogriz and Doecke (2011), standards based accountability caused tensions for teachers where they grappled with a disjuncture between externally mandated demands (such as the "codification" of progress in a language not always understood by students and parents), and their own sense of professional responsibility. They said:

The subject is split, as it were, in the ordinary course of events between multiple truths (e.g., between professional responsibility and standards-based accountability and between the public good and economic). Truth in this ruptured situation is a matter of conviction that emerges from the active

experience of identifying oneself with a cause. (Kostogriz and Doecke, 2011, p. 410)

Having established ways in which neoliberalism is related to Australian education in the literature, I now contextualise how it has been related to creativity.

Neoliberalism and creativity.

Importantly for the "scene-setting" of this project, a limited amount of research merges the themes of neoliberalism and creativity. One point of emphasis in this research is the select versions of creativity that a neoliberalised economy of truths and values propagates. Thornham (2014, p. 536) points out that a neoliberal agenda "return(s) us to a notion of creativity more akin to a Kantian understanding of creativity as authored, as individual genius, and as originality". The broader argument of her paper is that "creativity as process or method is becoming increasingly negated" as has creativity as social engagement (Thornham, 2014, p. 550 - 551).

In questioning the role of creativity in the "global economies of education", Grierson critiques the economic inflections of creativity saying:

The universalising of an autonomous individual subject … will serve to displace the reinvention of this subject in the means-end, economically inscribed discourses of creativity through which the "whatever is, is" of the Aristotelian categories reinforce representational modes of things, self and world. (Grierson, 2011, p. 348)

Here, she argues that space is elided for the metaphysical account of creativity as self-revelation.

The theme of neoliberal subjectification of the creative individual also features widely in literature (Bill, 2016; Grierson; 2011; Hay & Kapitzke, 2009; Mølholm, 2014). A paper by Hay and Kapitzke (2009) on the "reconstitution" of creativity through student subjectivity, where these authors argue that the logic of the market drives the rhetoric of creativity in the Queensland context, exemplifies such work. Using the example of a curriculum innovation called the *Gateway to the Aerospace Industry*, they draw out the "creative individual" that is constructed:

> A degree of "inventiveness" is required, but creativity is here rendered a routine phenomenon co-existing with generic "foresight" and "energy of the human spirit"… nothing and no one is exempt from this imperative to be "smart." Across every social level and "field of enterprise," from medicine to plumbing, all are required to engage in lifelong learning for creative capacity building. (Hay & Kapitzke, 2009, p. 158)

Hay and Kapitzke's (2009) belief that "no one is exempt" from neoliberal subjectification points towards some of the "real effects" that I take up in this thesis. In arguing that creative subjectivities are appropriated with neoliberalism-related concerns of capitalism and promotion of entrepreneurialism, Hay and Kapitzke (2009) emphasise that "governments have in large part abdicated responsibility for those who have been 'switched off' by the pressures of contemporary capitalism and are unable to craft settled, successful lives" (Hay & Kapitzke, 2009, p. 162). This is an effect of the neoliberal appropriation of creativity discourses; some students who do not align with the imperative to increase their productivity or to "tender for business" are ignored by these policies. I too aim to draw out patterns by which there is a silence about particular

student and teacher subjectivities as a result of normalised constructs of creativity, for example those students and teachers who require open-ended incubation time, or those who shun away from "bold" and "daring" products/processes.

Another theme that emerges in the literature on creativity and neoliberalism is the dichotomy between the two concepts (Adams, 2013; Burnard and White, 2008; Chappell, 2008; Jeffrey & Troman, 2009; Mansfield, 2009; Munday, 2014; Simmons & Thompson, 2008; Troman, Jeffrey & Raggl, 2007; Turner-Bissett, 2007; Wild, 2011). Throughout the writings of the authors above, it is often performativity that is cast as an oppositional force to creativity. Performativity can be considered a dimension of neoliberalism since it is also oriented around market appropriations of education and technologies of "visible" truths. As Stephen Ball says:

> Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic). The performances (of individual subjects or organizations) serve as measures of productivity or output, or displays of "quality", or "moments" of promotion or inspection. As such they stand for, encapsulate or represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organization within a field of judgement. (Ball, 2003, p. 216)

Such a "dichotomy theme" between performativity/neoliberalism and creativity is seen in Burnard and White's (2008) positioning of both themes as counterpoints to each other. This distinction is also borne out in the work of Adams (2013) who portrays

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creativity as the "artful dodger" to the effects of neoliberalism, and in Munday's (2014) research where he critiques notions of creativity as an "antidote" to performativity.

Even where creativity is the "good", the "dodger" the "relief", in the writings above, it is still defined with reference to an oppressive power of neoliberalism/performativity. Accounts of the relationship between creativity and neoliberalism couched in terms of "resistance" or "struggle", demonstrate Nietzsche's notion of "ressentiment" (see Purcell, 2016), where any alternative is an opposition to another force, rather than an alternative modes of thinking.

I aim to avoid binaries between creativity and neoliberalism in this thesis in three ways. Firstly, I am guided by neoliberalism as an art of government rather than as an oppressive ideology. Secondly, in my analysis of Australian education, I focus on this art of government in one chapter, underlining my belief that it is *one* lens by which power relations can be brought into focus. Finally, where it is argued that creativity discourses are normalised by a neoliberal art of government (a particular power relation in the construction of creativity) throughout this chapter, I highlight how these same normalisations are co-opted by the individual in their ethical self-formulation (another power relation in the construction of creativity).

Positioning the Researcher

The nature of qualitative work informed by an interpretivist research paradigm is such that one is never "outside" the work. This is not a story of objective truth or positivist findings supported by evidence. Although some research guides suggest a neutral position in "recognizing, understanding and balancing subjectivities" (O'Leary,

2004, p. 50), a research orientation that takes as a starting point the constitutive role of discourse rejects notions of the researcher being outside of the research. Humes and Bryce (2003, p. 180) contend that, due to power relationships, researchers are bound up in activities that "extend well beyond the intellectual pursuit of 'truth'". My subjectivity has determined the choices made in this project, including the selection of the theoretical tools and the concepts for analysis. Angrosino (2005, p. 734) makes the point that researchers should "recognize the possibility that it may be neither feasible nor possible to harmonize observer and insider perspectives so as to achieve a consensus about 'ethnographic truth'". Understanding the complexity of another's views, motivation and emotion is contingent on a constellation of individual and social factors. Rather than underplay the "conscious and unconscious baggage" (Scheurich, 1995) that I bring to the project, I acknowledge my voice throughout. As I have written in Chapter One, I have struggled with the meaning of creativity both in my childhood and adult life, inside and outside of the teaching profession. I am concerned about the effects of schooling, within which I am implicated as a teacher, and concerned about how these effects establish limits to the knowledge on educational concepts such as creativity. I consider it very important to engage with ways in which neoliberal effects construct my own and my colleagues' identities, and to understand the value base from which multiple outcome and competition-oriented demands are being placed on teachers.

In describing new empiricism and materialism, St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016, p. 5) consider an alternative "plane of immanence" to the one on which conventional social science research rests (see also Peters & Burbules, 2004). A thought-provoking point they make is that "perhaps everything exists on the same flat plane with no depth, with no hierarchies of subject/object or

real/language/representation" (St Pierre et al., 2016, p. 5). This mode of thinking problematises a detachedness in much conventional social science research of the subject from the object. Throughout this thesis, my aim is not to understand how teachers teach the creative object, or how students engage in a particular version of creativity (e.g. how they progress through Wallas' four-stage model). I believe my work is premised on a zone of immanence congruent with St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei (2016), in that I focus on how subjects are constructed, as *part of* the object of creativity, by policy formulation and the teaching practices of individuals. The object and the subject are brought to a single flat plane by virtue of the discourse focus.

In terms of the ethical imperative to think in terms of new empiricism highlighted above, I was also struck by St. Pierre et al.'s (2016, p. 4) comment that "we have ample evidence that the existence we've created in not ethical, and the piling up of that evidence forces us to imagine a different existence". This thesis brings the question of our future existence to bear on our current conceptualisations of creativity. What kind of future is being imagined by neoliberal agenda in education? Do the disciplinary effects of schooling result in a silence around versions of creativity that might otherwise feature in the future of Australian students? Does the dominant rhetoric of the "goodness" of creativity preclude engagement with a malevolent version of the concept? Foucault's work facilitates a "critique of what we are… at one at the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" (Foucault, 1984, p. 50). Through highlighting the contingency of creativity knowledge, this thesis points out alternative existences featuring different versions of creativity.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the methodological design of this research. Firstly, it contextualised the research with regard to its power/knowledge epistemological orientation. Following this, a genealogical approach was discussed. Here, I signalled how the focus on conditions of possibility and on the activation of knowledge around which there is a silence, central to Foucault's genealogical project, are closely aligned with the aims of the thesis. The next section detailed the data collection and analysis procedures where I also provided the rationale for the inclusion of document analysis and interviews in the project. In relation to the documents, I outlined the selection criteria for the documents, and the decisions that led to the selection of analytical concepts. My discussion of interviews extended to how the participants were chosen, to details on the timing and purposes of the interviews, to details on the choice of analytical concepts and to contextual details of the school and participants. An important section of this chapter, in establishing the design of the research, was to indicate where the concept of neoliberalism fits in this research. Since it emerges in bodies of literature on Australian education, creativity, and the use of Foucault's writings in education, it was important to identify where this thesis intersects with the concept of neoliberalism and where it diverges from many accounts in education wherein it features. Perspectives on ethical considerations and researcher positioning, with a particular focus on how my subjectivity informed the research, were presented to conclude this chapter.

A consistent theme throughout this chapter was the impossibility of "extracting" a framework for analysis from the writings of Foucault. Foucault's writings were not

intended to comprise a method that could be applied to diverse research contexts. Therefore, bearing in mind Foucault's wish that his writings would be seen a toolbox which researchers could draw upon in addressing their own questions, I designed my research around his work. This design involved the foregrounding of specific concepts within each of the analytical chapters: *homo economicus* to analyse policy in Chapter Five, disciplinary power to analyse interview data on institutional practices in Chapter Six and ethical self-formation, counter-conduct and *parrhesia* to analysis interview data with a focus on the individual in Chapter Seven.

After presenting these methodological design details and procedures, the analysis of the data is conducted over the next three chapters.

Chapter Five: Creativity and Education Policy

> Critique is not a matter of saying things are not right as they are. It is a
>
> matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of
>
> familiar, unchallenged and unconsidered modes of thought the practices
>
> that we accept rest. (Foucault, 1988, p. 85)

Introduction

This chapter argues that creativity is constructed by neoliberal agendas that ratify particular discourses of creativity while ignoring others in education policy. Although research in the Australian educational context indicates a great concern with neoliberalised rationalities and agenda (Clarke, 2012a, 2012b; Connell, 2013a, 2013b; Rivzi & Lingard, 2009), little work has been conducted on how the concept of creativity is implicated, modified and co-opted against the backdrop of this neoliberalisation. This chapter addresses this gap.

In making my argument for a neoliberalised creativity agenda in education policy, I do not consider neoliberalism as a top-down ideology of government portrayed by such writers as Mirowski (2013) or Harvey (2007a, 2007b). Rather than engage with how creativity is constructed against the backdrop of neoliberalism as juggernaut (Doherty, 2015), as cascade (O'Connell, 2013a) or "theory of everything" (Flew, 2010; Rowlands & Rawolle, 2013), I consider it from a Foucauldian perspective as an art of government that prioritises the market, competitiveness and entrepreneurialism (Dardot

& Laval, 2013). The state is not a power-wielding entity that dominates over individuals, but creates the conditions for the embedding of market values, and steers individuals at a distance towards them (Foucault, 2004). Individuals are subjectified as correlates of this art of government (e.g. the competitive individual who negotiates market trends or the life-long learner who takes responsibility for his/her destiny rather than expecting the state to do so).

The intention in this chapter is to highlight the "modes of thought" on which the "practices we accept rest" (Foucault 1988, p. 85). I show how a neoliberal art of government manifests in these policy texts and how it fashions creativity. My interest therefore is not only the textual level of what the documents specifically say about creativity ("creativity is" or "a creative teacher is/does…"), but also how conditions of possibility (e.g. a discourse of measurement) are compatible with only particular versions of creativity and therefore implicitly construct it. While discourses of measurement and national productivity are not explicitly invoked in textual constructions like "creativity can be measured" or "creativity is synonymous with productivity", the prevalence of such frames of reference in the policy sites are compatible only with select versions of creativity. I develop my argument for a neoliberal fashioning of creativity by highlighting key excerpts from the policies and aligning these with Foucault's writings on *homo economicus.* As part of this analysis, I also provide examples of creativity discourses omitted by neoliberal ideas in policy. As previously discussed in Chapter Four, the aim is not to offer an exhaustive account of the documents, or of all the versions of creativity brought inside and left out of the true, but to highlight the arbitrariness of creativity as it is constructed in the texts.

Throughout this analysis, I argue that the versions of creativity that permeates the policy chain are oriented around employment readiness, entrepreneurialism, competitiveness and productivity. Creativity is further made known in these documents as a measurable construct that can manifest in enterprise schema. Both student and teacher subjectivities are implicated in these appropriations. Students are constructed as problem-solvers, designers, life-long learners and risk-takers. Correlating with this, teachers are positioned in the documents as those who model problem-solving processes, are focused on outcomes, teach essential skills and can teach "critical and creative thinking" across an entire national curriculum. Each such association between productivity or measurability signifies neoliberal agenda in education, and when creativity discourses are articulated in accordance with these, a neoliberal creativity object is constructed. This chapter addresses the first and third of the research questions: *How are discourses of creativity constructed in educational policy? What discourses of creativity are ignored or omitted in policy and practice?* Excerpts from policies are underlined in each section to emphasis the correlations between policy texts and a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility.

Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians

The *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* (2008) broadly establishes the agenda for Australia's educational future. After a preamble on the importance of schooling for intellectual, physical, social, emotional, moral, spiritual and aesthetic development in the contemporary context of the knowledge economy and globalisation, the document then describes the two goals to guide Australian education

policy: (1) that Australian schooling promotes equity and excellence and (2) that all young Australians become successful learners, confident and creative individuals, and active and informed citizens. The document discusses the Australian government's commitment to action across eight areas: developing stronger partnerships, supporting quality teaching and school leadership, strengthening early childhood education, enhancing middle years development, supporting senior years of schooling and youth transitions, promoting world class curriculum and assessment, and improving educational outcomes for Indigenous youths and disadvantaged Australians, especially those from low socio-economic backgrounds.

The *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008) can be considered as a "major authority in society… recognised by public opinion" (Foucault, 1972, p. 42). Its authority derives from the federal agency responsible for its publication: the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA). Before any content is revealed, the names, titles and positions of nine education ministers are presented on the second page. The fact that all nine Australian education ministers at state and federal level endorse the document establishes that its contents are ratified at the most senior political level in the country.

This declaration was made in the context of Australia's education revolution. Importantly, as discussed in Chapter Four, this revolution is premised upon neoliberal logics of productivity, choice and competitiveness (Lingard, 2010) and human capital acquisition (Buchanan & Chapman, 2011). Since this declaration represents a pivotal "roadmap" document in what has been critiqued as a neoliberal education revolution,

analysis of this declaration is necessary to understand how creativity is shaped by neoliberalism.

Creativity oriented around employability.

This document positions "critical and creative thinking" as one of a number of "generic and employability skills that have particular application to the world of work and further education" (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 13). The emergence of a skill conceptualisation of creativity in the Melbourne document arose from many adjustments to predecessor documents. Back in 1989, *The Hobart Declaration on Schooling* (Ministerial Council for Education, 1989, online) outlined a prerogative "to respond to the current and emerging economic and social needs of the nation, and to provide those skills which will allow students maximum flexibility and adaptability in their future employment and other aspects of life". A greater sense of urgency for these employment related skills was articulated almost ten years later in the *Adelaide Declaration on National Goals for Schooling in the Twenty-First Century* (Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, 1999, online) since "Australia's future depends upon each citizen having the necessary knowledge, understanding, skills and values". It was in 2008 however that the *Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008) referenced how students need to "think creatively" as part of a "range of generic and employability skills" (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 13). Since these priorities informed the formulation of the National Curriculum, and many of the creativity discourses throughout the policy chain, the delineation of a construct called "critical and creative thinking" can be thought of as a "surface of emergence" of the

object of creativity as a generic capability. It signifies a "new surface of appearance…

with its own normativity" (Foucault, 1972, p. 41).

The linkage of these capabilities to employment reflects a neoliberal discourse of

the enterprise becoming the "universally generalized social model" (Foucault, 2004, p.

242). The capabilities transcend over a vast range of spheres of development from

ethical understandings to ICT capability. All of the capabilities, including "critical and

creative thinking", "ICT capability" and "intercultural understanding" are established

within discursive frames that prioritise employment:

> Education equips young people with the knowledge, understanding, skills
>
> and values to take advantage of opportunity. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4)

> To maximise their opportunities for healthy, productive and rewarding
>
> futures, Australia's young people must be encouraged not only to complete
>
> secondary education, but also to proceed into further training or education.
>
> (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4)

> Schooling should also support the development of skills in areas such as
>
> social interaction, cross-disciplinary thinking and the use of digital media,
>
> which are essential in all 21st century occupations.
>
> (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 5)

There is a neoliberal instrumentalism invoked here (Bowl, 2010; Clarke, 2012b;

Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) since no aspect of a student's education is outside of the

broader purpose of employability. Rather that aligning the goals of education with

cultural or social purposes to "enlighten, transform, liberate (or) democratise"

individuals (Bowl, 2010, p. 734), the discourse of opportunity, occupation and maximisation articulated in this document articulates that the primary purpose and function of education is to ensure readiness for the workforce.

In isolation, some of these capabilities do not appear to have any connotations with employment; "ethical understanding" with its associated descriptor that it will help students "to develop an awareness of the influence that their values and behaviour have on others" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 22) does not, for example, allude to the world of work. However, when such capabilities are framed as generic or employability skills, values such as ethical understanding are cast as elements of a workplace preparation and readiness agenda. This is problematic because ethical understandings, or student development of awareness of the effects of their behaviours on others, are highly contestable and nuanced points of discussion. As an illustration, Niesche and Hasse (2012) argue for the emotional dimension of teacher ethical development, while Hartley (2000, p. 117) discusses the complexity of "interpersonal" in contemporary society in which "we can no longer speak with certainty of the 'family' as an agreed concept, for it now has many permutations… (and) religion and other integrating rituals are in decline". These examples illustrate the complexity of ethical understanding and interpersonal development, and indicate that they are open to multiple meanings that do not invoke common frame of reference or pre-existent value systems. "Interpersonal" and "ethical" are value-laden terms and their normative casting as employability/generic skills elides engagement with the complexity of such values.

In Foucauldian terms, subsuming ethical understanding in a framework of employability skills represents the centralisation of the market and competition as a value system:

At once an economic policy or a policy of the economization of the entire

social field, of an extension of the economy to the entire social field, but at

the same time a policy which presents itself or seeks to be a kind of

Vitalpolitik with the function of compensating for what is cold, impassive,

calculating, rational, and mechanical in the strictly economic game of

competition. (Foucault, 2004, p. 242)

Constructions such as "ethical understanding" or "interpersonal relations" can be

seen as the "softer side" of the rational and competition-focused notion of maximising

and taking advantage of opportunities. Foucault's quote above indicates that this

balancing and compensation is characteristic of neoliberalism. Consistent with

Foucault's neoliberalism, the placement of this range of disparate generic skills, some of

which may be considered social in nature and outside the realm of employment or

economics, as employability skills signifies the "eliding of any difference between the

economy and the social" (Lemke, 2001, p. 7). While an economic game is being played

out ultimately about preparing students for the world of work, the inclusion of these

"soft" and seemingly related capabilities ensures that the student is not "alienated from

his work environment, from the time of his life; from his household, his family, and

from the natural environment" (Foucault, 2004, p. 242). Since these values also extend

to how students "learn to understand themselves and others (and) manage their

relations", or "develop an awareness of the influence that their values and behavior have

on others", they signify "warm moral and cultural values which … are antithetical to the

'cold' mechanism of competition" (Foucault, 2004, p. 242). A compensatory

mechanism ensures that the social goal of better interpersonal relations and the

economic one of gaining maximum employability co-exist and appear mutually reinforcing.

In the Melbourne document's appropriation of creativity as a generic employability skill, there is a silence around sociological-oriented accounts of the concept. Both the positioning of the creative object in social rather than individualised contexts (Amabile, 1996; Thomas, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and aspirations for creativity related to inclusion and social justice (Hall & Thomson, 2007), are negated when it is unquestionably asserted in an employability framing. The equating of creativity with collaborative work patterns or students' interactions with others is potentially undermined if "critical and creative thinking" is foregrounded as a generic skill that ensures students are best placed to maximise their opportunities in the workplace. Advocating for a notion of creativity as inclusive practice or social engagement (Adams, 2013; Thornham, 2014) is made more difficult where it is associated with employment and gain or where students, teachers and other stakeholders may not see their activities outside of "employment readiness" as relating to creativity.

Additionally, those accounts of creativity that make a distinction between the concept and "skill in execution" (Brown, 2013; Glickman 1978) are undermined when creativity is conceived of as generic, and comprehensible only as a means-end entity for accessing the employment market. Concepts such as indeterminacy and incubation time are difficult to align with a skill that *can* and *must* be developed. This could have the effect of discouraging students and teachers from valuing long periods of engagement with problems and issues, or of dissuading students from suggesting tentative solutions to be trialed and retrialed, instead potentially only valuing decisiveness and timely achievement of outcomes.

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Creativity in an unstable environment.

Along with other documents in the chosen policy chain, including the Culture Policy and the PISA document, the Melbourne document also normalises the idea of creativity as a general capability in its portrayal of an unstable environment within which this capability will need to be deployed. Throughout the document, many complex pressures are identified and it's inferred that unless the individual is able to creatively and confidently cope with these he/she will fail to cope and thrive:

> The Melbourne Declaration acknowledges <u>major changes in the world</u> that are placing <u>new demands</u> on Australian education. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4)

> <u>Global integration and international mobility have increased rapidly</u> in the past decade. As a consequence, new and exciting opportunities for Australians are emerging. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4)

> <u>India, China and other Asian nations are growing</u> and their influence on the world is increasing. (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 4)

Acquiring generic skills such as critical and creative thinking is a global imperative since "complex environmental, social and economic pressures such as climate change that extend beyond national borders pose unprecedented challenges, requiring countries to work together in new ways" (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 5). The language here of "complex", "unprecedented" and "pressure" can be thought of as an associated field, one that "turns a sentence or a series of signs into a statement, and which provides them with a specific representative context" (Foucault, 1972, p. 98). The statement that emerges about creativity, arising from its place in the same document as

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the above points about global change and rapid advancement, is that it is a combative and urgently required force. Here, creativity is articulated as a "must".

As part of the urgency of creativity established by uncertain futures, the language of unprecedented pressures and of the necessity of ensuring that Australian students acquire specific skills to compete with other nation states casts creativity in terms of competition. This centralisation of competition is pivotal to a neoliberal art of government for Foucault (Foucault, 2004). Whether conceived of as an "explanatory social logic" (Clarke, 2012a; Glynos & Howarth, 2007) or as a vision of the future (Apple, 2003), competition is a fundamental principle of neoliberal governmentality. Where the document outlines how young Australians need to engage in new and creative ways with problem-solving, the logic is that creativity is vital in the promotion of Australia's capacity to provide a high quality of life. Creativity isn't primarily about self-revelation or self-fulfilment as some versions would have it (e.g. Grierson, 2011), but is invoked in the neoliberal prioritisation of competition produced by growing nation stages such as India and China in the world economy.

The orientation towards uncertain futures can be understood as a steering mechanism of neoliberal governmentality (Foucault, 2004, Hay & Kapitzke, 2009). There is a discourse of nation states working together in the face of challenges such as climate change but the notion of competing in a global economy of knowledge and innovation is prioritised in appearing first in the document's preamble. The individual's freedom for decision-making is shaped by the imperative to make wise and context-specific choices, an example of the "employment of knowledges, techniques and practices… in the direction of enterprise, choice, innovations and problem-solving" (Gobby, 2013a, p. 24). The inherent message is that an individual *has to* develop

creativity skills because a multitude of difficulties abound. Where creativity is promulgated within discourses of uncertainty and risk, the assumption is that the individual will recognise and unquestionably respond to the legitimacy of a vital skill framing of the concept.

In the promotion of creativity as a necessity and its co-option into discourses of negotiating an uncertain world, other conceptualisations presented in Chapter Two are incompatible. For example, "little-c" creativity (Craft, 2001a, 2001b, 2005; Neelands & Choe, 2010; Simonton, 2013), which locates creativity in the day-by-day actions and processes enacted by individuals, are downplayed here. This means that certain student behaviours and practices (e.g. processes of experimenting with instrumentation in music classes) may not be recognised or valued as creative to the same extent as activities that play a role in competition (e.g. developing compositional products that can be compared alongside "outputs" from other nations). Activities that don't feature on a competition-oriented grid could be ignored or given little importance in favour of competitive and daring behaviours. The democratic assumptions behind "everyday creativity", "little-c creativity" or "mundane creativity" (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007; Craft, 2000, 2001b, 2002, 2003b) are undermined when creativity is given a "survival-of-the-fittest" mandate. Ultimately, *some* students and *some* work patterns may be valued more than others. A version of creativity premised on "the everyday rather than extraordinary circumstances" (Craft 2005, p. 19) cannot be articulated where authoritative voices associate it with complex pressures and unprecedented challenges.

To summarise, a neoliberal art of government manifests throughout the Melbourne document as exemplified by the economising of the social and the centralisation of competition. Both of these characteristic features of this governing art

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are premised on creativity as a generic skill called "critical and creative thinking", as employment-oriented and as vital to cope with uncertain futures.

The Australian Curriculum (ACARA)

In this section, I analyse *The Arts: Foundation to Year 10* (ACARA, 2013a) from the Australian Curriculum. Since this document is heavily informed by *The Shape of the Australian Curriculum* document (ACARA, 2012), and draws on a generic capability notion of creativity, as expanded on in the *Critical and Creative Thinking* document (ACARA, 2013b), I also extend the analysis to these two related documents. Although there had been previous consultation to subsume the arts into a National Curriculum, it was in September 2009, that the project of an integrated Arts curriculum began in Australia with a four-tiered model of shaping, writing, implementing and monitoring/evaluation. Political support for the arts curriculum, and for its linkage with creativity, is evident in the following statements from two senior cabinet ministers:

> The fact that the Arts curriculum is the second to be developed, after the foundation subjects of Maths, Science, English and History, demonstrates the Gillard Government's commitment to fostering creativity and recognising that the Arts are at the centre of our way of life. (Garrett & Crean, 2011, online)

A neoliberal steering-at-a-distance is apparent in the duality of ACARA authoritative stance coupled with a deferment of decision-making to individual schools:

> The Australian Curriculum <u>makes clear to teachers</u> what is to be taught. It also makes clear to students what they should learn and the quality of

learning expected of them. <u>Schools are able to decide how best</u> to deliver

the curriculum, drawing on integrated approaches where appropriate and

using pedagogical approaches that account for students' needs, interests and

the school and community context. (ACARA, 2012, p. 13)

While ACARA will make it clear what is to be taught and the quality of learning

expected, it is up to individual schools to meet these demands, regardless of situational

circumstances such as access to resources. ACARA is one of the "institutional sites

from which the doctor makes his discourse, and from where this discourse derives its

legitimate source and point of application" (Foucault, 1972, p. 51). The discourses of

quality and expectations that are disseminated by ACARA are legitimated due to the

centrality of ACARA as a permanent fixture on the Australian education landscape. It

administers nation-wide examinations (Lingard & Sellar, 2013; Thompson, 2013;

Thompson & Harbaugh, 2013; Thompson & Mockler, 2015) through its NAPLAN

testing in Australian schools in Years Three, Five, Seven and Nine. Additionally, it is

ACARA who maintain the school information website *MySchool (*a platform where

information on school profile, academic performance, funding sources, enrolment

numbers and attendance rates for all schools in Australia can be accessed), and so plays

a key surveillance function in Australian education (Hardy & Boyle, 2011; Niesche,

2013b). Both NAPLAN and *MySchool* emanated from the transparency and

accountability rhetoric of the education revolution (Kostogriz & Doecke, 2011; Lingard,

2010; Thompson, 2013).

The examination and surveillance functions of ACARA work in Australia to

establish discursive conditions for the knowledge of creativity as discussed below.

Curriculum formulation and generic creativity.

In this section, I argue that the way in which creativity comes to be known in the ACARA curriculum is premised on a generic, cross-discipline conceptualisation. Creativity, as a generic or uniform concept, is one that can be co-opted and "applied" across a multiplicity of learning experiences from the maths field to music.

A cross-discipline appropriation of creativity by the curriculum developers is not explicitly related to any curriculum theory or philosophy. On reading the curriculum, and the appropriations of creativity therein, one is not made aware of the view of knowledge that informs the curriculum formulation (Apple, 2001; Giroux, 2007; Welle-Strand & Tjeldvoll, 2003). As Welle-Strand and Tjeldvoll (2003, p. 360) argue, the curriculum organisers' "understanding of creativity is, to a considerable extent, assumed to depend upon their position in terms of cognitive roots in one or more curriculum philosophies and sociological paradigms". Creativity knowledge in a curriculum with roots in essentialism would appear differently to creativity framed within a pragmatic paradigm" (Cremin, Craft & Clack, 2012; Welle-Strand & Tjeldvoll, 2003). Differing epistemological assumptions of these philosophies or theories (essentialism or progressivism) demarcate different discursive conditions for creativity. What is valued as creativity is dependent, for example on whether it is couched in terms of the "back to basics" and common culture orientations of an essentialist approach, or a "learn by doing" and personalised learning discourses associated with progressivism. However, this engagement with epistemological roots and perspectives is absent from the curriculum shaping document, *The Shape of the Australian Curriculum* (ACARA, 2012), with no references to the role that knowledge is taught to play, or to

epistemological foundations (Ditchburn, 2012; Reid, 2009). Where the curriculum rationale document begins with a discussion of the Melbourne document, it disavows the reader of foundational ontological and epistemological questions and of "sensitivity to the ongoing struggles that constantly shape the terrain on which education operates" (Apple, 2001, p. 410).

Drawing on Foucault's notion of the enterprise schema in the *Birth of Biopolitics* (2004), I argue that in the place of deliberation on what creativity could mean in each individual subject of the curriculum, a generic conceptualisation of the concept is chosen since it affords greater utility value. A construct like "critical and creative thinking" as one of a number of "curriculum items" (other capabilities, cross-curricular priorities), makes it possible for a curriculum to present a seemingly cohesive and complete national curriculum:

> The Australian Curriculum describes a learning entitlement for each Australian student. It sets out what young people should be taught (through the specification of curriculum content from learning areas, general capabilities and cross-curriculum priorities) and an expectation of the quality of their learning (depth of understanding and sophistication of skills described through achievement standards). (ACARA, 2013c, p. 15)

> For each of the general capabilities, a learning continuum has been developed that describes the knowledge, skills, behaviours and dispositions that students can be expected to have developed at particular stages of schooling. The general capabilities have been developed to enhance learning area content and will assist teachers to plan for and to guide

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student learning of these important areas of the curriculum. <u>Teachers are</u>

<u>expected to teach and assess general capabilities</u> to the extent that they are

incorporated within each learning area. (ACARA, 2012, p. 23)

In order to facilitate specification of outcomes and continua of learning, the

constitutive elements of the curriculum need to be presented as elements that can

combine together and can be correlated with others for a multiplicity of purposes. The

place of "critical and creative thinking" in the curriculum is analogous to the place of a

university module that can be a component of any course of study across every school

and faculty of a university, whatever the title of the final reward or the level of study. I

contend that the placing of "critical and creative thinking" in the curriculum, and of

such a module in the university, can be seen as the mobilisation of the enterprise form.

As Foucault said, the enterprise is "not orientated towards the commodity and the

uniformity of the commodity, but towards the multiplicity and differentiation of

enterprises" (Foucault, 2004, p. 149). Furthermore, he questions:

What is involved is the generalization of forms of "enterprise" by diffusing

and multiplying them as much as possible, enterprises which must not be

focused on the form of big national or international enterprises or the type

of big enterprises of a state. I think this multiplication of the "enterprise"

form within the social body is what is at stake in neo-liberal policy. It is a

matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what

could be called the formative power of society. (Foucault, 2004, p. 149)

If the market regulates social interaction and becomes the formative powers in

society, then the forms of the market (transferability of skills and products, multiplicity

of applications for each such skill and product) has to be reflected in how the curriculum is structured. The way in which an enterprise grid is applied over creativity can be illustrated with reference to how the curriculum document applies taxonomies and partitioning devices to the "critical and creative thinking" construct (ACARA, 2013b).

The form by which the capability is communicated to teachers requires one to engage with a sixteen-page document, *Critical and Creative Thinking* (ACARA, 2013b). This document accompanies the curriculum and specifies the "operability" of this general capability for the educational community. This capability is broken down into four elements:

- Inquiring: identifying, exploring and organising information and ideas
- Generating ideas, possibilities and action
- Reflecting on thinking, actions and processes
- Analysing, synthesising and evaluating information. (ACARA, 2013b, p. 7)

Exploration of each of these examples brings one into the architecture of the curriculum. Pursuing the first example for "generate ideas, seek solutions and put ideas into action: level one", the only example provided in this instance is "ACELY1650: Use comprehension strategies to understand and discuss texts listened to, viewed or read independently"[19]. The icons underneath the content descriptor reveal that three other capabilities, "Literacy", "Intercultural Understanding" and "Personal and Social

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[19] The online version of document is used here to facilitate the cross-referencing of each element with content descriptors (a hyperlink is provided within the text naming each element to bring the reader to the content descriptors).

Capability" and the cross-curricular priority, "Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Histories and Cultures", are relevant to this particular content descriptor. There is also an age/stage appropriation of creativity articulated through these descriptors; ACELY1650 relates to students "typically by the end of foundation year". "Critical and creative" thinking therefore occupies a place alongside other capabilities and cross-curricular priorities and is enmeshed within a curricular super-structure. All of these capabilities and priorities reflect "pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain" (Foucault, 1994c, p. 12) a neoliberal enterprise-schema construct of creativity that prioritises utility value and a multiplicity of purpose. Such a schemata facilitates the "setting out" and "specifying" work that the curriculum aspires to. Creativity can be "forced" into the curriculum in the same way as any other concept or concern identified by curriculum developers.

Alongside its effect of legitimating a version of creativity that can be discretely packaged in a curricular super-structure, the curriculum presents tensions for alternative accounts. One tension here is that contextualisation discourses of creativity pertaining to the place wherein it manifests (Amabile, 1996) or to the varying resources that individuals bring to creative endeavour (Sawyer, 2012) are downplayed where it is assumed that "critical and creative thinking" can be mapped to discrete content descriptors. A "unity of purpose" construct of creativity assumes that all students are thinking creatively when engaged in such work as that described by *ACELY1650,* regardless of school or other situational factors. This "unity of purpose" does not concur with accounts of creativity in discreet fields of enquiry. It is incompatible to an extent with the work of Humphreys (2006) or Burnard and Younker, (2002) who advocate for

distinct knowledge traditions owing to children's "music biographies" (their age, context etc.) as pivotal in understanding the creativity in their work.

Productivity and human capital.

It is also possible to trace a relationship between Foucault's writings on neoliberalism and creativity in the ACARA curriculum through engaging with the idea of human capital. The themes of human capital and productivity are central to Foucault's writings about a neoliberal art of government. I discuss these two themes alongside the notion of child play for two reasons. Firstly, references to child play are included throughout the ACARA document. Secondly, play is a dominant theme in relation to creativity, particularly in relation to developmental-focused versions of the concept as discussed in Chapter Two. I argue here that a neoliberal productivity agenda is at work throughout this curriculum's discourses of play to align students' experiences of play with notions of gain and utility value. A neoliberal grid of human capital is applied over child's play, even though this aspect of their development may appear incommensurate or difficult to reconcile with economic imperatives. Foregrounding the notion of human capital, Foucault posed this question:

> To what extent is it legitimate and to what extent is it fruitful, to apply the grid, the schema, and the model of *homo economicus* to not only every economic actor, but to every social actor in general inasmuch as he or she gets married, for example, or commits a crime, or raises children, gives affection and spends time with the kids? (Foucault, 2004, p. 268)

His questioning here pre-empts his writings on how neoliberal policies did apply such a grid and schema over all actions of the individual. It may not appear possible to

incorporate affection or time spent with children into an economic grid. However, using examples of how neoliberals viewed marriage as a series of economic exchanges between individuals or conceptualised criminality in terms of costs and losses, Foucault showed that the model of the economy could be stretched across all social interaction.

In the curriculum, references to curiosity and exploration in relation to creative play are made where the document discusses how children "are curious about their personal world and are interested in exploring it" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 13). This broader capacious notion of play is further maintained throughout the curriculum:

> In the early years, play is important in how children learn, students have
> opportunities to learn through purposeful play and to develop their sensory,
> cognitive and affective appreciation of the world around them through
> exploratory, imaginative and creative learning. (ACARA, 2013a, p. 13)

These accounts of play involving curiosity and exploration correspond with developmentally focused accounts of play as exploratory (Russ, Robins & Christiano, 1999) or the prerogative of the imagination (Vygotsky, 1967/2004).

On the same page of the curriculum however, just after the notions of curiosity and exploration are introduced, there is "internal discontinuity that suspends" (Foucault, 1972, p. 33) a view that play is only a child-directed phenomenon:

> Purposeful play engages students in structured activities that can be
> repeated and extended. This repetition is a form of practising and supports
> the sequential development of skills in the Arts. (ACARA, 2013a, p. 13)

Almost immediately following the notions of imaginative or affective associations with play, the curriculum describes the formulisation of some of the "instincts to play evident in the early years" into "both experimentation and artistic practice" (ACARA 2013a, p. 13). Furthermore, by this stage, "during these years of schooling, students' thought processes become more logical and consistent, and they gradually become more independent as learners" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 15). A purpose is therefore affixed to play at all stages of this curriculum. The initial curiosity/exploratory associations made with play at the start of the curriculum very soon give way to a "means-to-an-end" conceptualisation. Such ends include the development of skills, and the production of "logical and consistent thinking". These valued outcomes are components of the previously discussed agenda of the Melbourne document and ACARA to develop generic and employability skills and to develop forms of practice that are necessary to compete in a global economy.

The discourse of purpose and formulisation as culmination points of development from instincts to play gives play a utilitarian purpose. Just as "the formative or educational relationship, in the widest sense of the term, between mother and child, can be analyzed in terms of investment, capital costs, and profit - both economic and psychological profit on the capital invested" (Foucault, 2004, p. 244), play has a "bigger purpose". Reflected here is a "rationally inscribed instrumentalism in institutional practice" (Grierson, 2007, p. 533) in the marshalling of play into human capital.

Broader views that think of creativity in terms of revelation (Grierson, 2011) or the expression of imagination (Lindqvist, 2003) are difficult to reconcile with a general capability construct wherein experience, process, or judgements are generalisable, or with an idea of creativity that involves stages from the improvisational and purposeless

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to the actualised and formulised. Dewey's (1934) centrality of child-led education and of the place of creative play therein is undermined where child directedness gives way to play as a component of a productivity agenda.

The case for a neoliberalised version of creativity in the ACARA Curriculum presented throughout this section is made by pointing out the resonance points between Foucault's writings on the form of the enterprise and human capital as they relate to curriculum architecture and child play. The version of creativity constructed in this document is one that takes its place alongside other curriculum imperatives and can be marshalled into a national productivity agenda. A significant point, however, is that these versions are not immediately compatible with alternatives that position creativity in specific contexts (specific knowledge fields, specific constellations of student dispositions) or those that see creative play as a developmental child-led prerogative.

Australian Professional Standards for Teachers

The *Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (AITSL, 2011) document was produced by the Australian Institute for Teaching and School Leadership, an Institute established in 2009 by the federal government with the goal of improving the quality of teaching and leadership in schools. The stated aim of the document is to present a "public statement of what constitutes teacher quality" (AITSL, 2011, p. 2) in a "mapping" of the teaching profession across three domains, seven standards and four career stages. After outlining how the goals of the Melbourne document are supported, the AITSL standards claim to "define the work of teachers and make explicit the elements of high-quality, effective teaching in 21st century schools that will improve educational outcomes for students" (AITSL, 2011, p. 2). The establishment of the

AITSL, alongside ACARA, also arose out of the aforementioned education revolution initiated by the Productivity Agenda Working Group of the Council of Australian Governments. The development of teacher standards in the Australian context is an articulation or inflection of a global "standards movement". In the literature, this movement is associated with neoliberal managerialism in education (Clarke & Moore, 2013; Niesche, 2013a, Sachs, 2001; Yinger & Hendricks-Lee, 2000), one effect of which is the reconceptualisation of teaching as a craft that can be normalised.

Due to its significant place in Australian education as a nationally endorsed document informing all stages of a teacher's development from the accreditation of their initial teacher education course to their certification as lead teachers, the *Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (AITSL, 2011) plays a very important role in constructing education in the national context. Although ideas of "critical thinking", "creative play" or "creative products" are not explicitly referenced in the document, as I progress through this section I develop an argument that the discursive conditions established therein nonetheless work to legitimate and conversely omit particular versions of creativity. I pay attention to Foucault's writings on quantification and calculation, and on the elision of moral and anthropological traits. Both of these are "co-ordinate points" on a neoliberal *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility.

A discourse of measurement.

There is a strong discourse of measurement and quantification throughout this document, as exemplified by these examples from the document's introductory page:

The Australian Professional Standards for Teachers (the Standards) <u>reflect</u>
<u>and build on national and international evidence</u> that a teacher's
<u>effectiveness has a powerful impact</u> on students. (AITSL, 2011, p. 1)

The <u>key elements</u> of quality teaching are <u>described</u> in the Standards. <u>They</u>
<u>articulate what teachers are expected</u> to know and be able to do at four
career stages: Graduate, Proficient, Highly Accomplished and Lead.
(AITSL, 2011, p. 1)

The Standards and their descriptors <u>represent an analysis</u> of effective,
contemporary practice by teachers throughout Australia. Their development
included a <u>synthesis of the descriptions of teachers' knowledge, practice</u>
<u>and professional engagement</u> used by teacher accreditation and registration
authorities, employers and professional associations. (AITSL, 2011, p. 1)

Such discourses of measurement (e.g. "key elements" of quality teaching) and
establishment of authoritative frames of reference (e.g. "building on evidence") reflect a
neoliberal veridiction of truth (Clarke & Moore, 2013; Lingard & Sellar, 2013; Lynch,
2015) or a neoliberal "fetishization of standards, measurement, transparency, and
accountability" (Clarke & Moore, 2013, p. 4). This document works to establish
parameters within which *all* teaching in Australian schools can be known, whether this
teaching is termed "creative" or not, or whether it is concerned with development of
student creativity, or otherwise. Creativity is discursively constructed in Australian
classrooms and schools where these standards authoritatively define the quality and
effectiveness of a teacher and of teaching. The discourse of measurement throughout the
document implies that teaching can be made explicit, that it can be reflected in a public

statement, and that it can be "located" in a framework which makes clear the knowledge, practices and professional engagement required across teachers' careers. While the word creativity is not invoked in any of the quotations above, the effect of discourses of "evidence" and "synthesis" is to demarcate terrain on which a measurable, articulable and visible version of creativity can be legitimated.

One reason for the high incidence of measurement discourses in the AITSL standards is that they are informed by a range of insights from the business and corporate world. For example, the research cited in the document on the impact of quality teachers arose from work from McKinsey and Company, an advisory body on governments' performance and productivity (Bourke, 2011). The research cited by the McKinsey and Company group identifies how "high performing school systems, though strikingly different in construct and context, [maintain] a strong focus on improving instruction because of its direct impact upon student achievement" (Barber & Mourshed, 2007, p. 13). The incorporation here of ideas of "high-performing" and "direct impact" into a teacher standards document signifies a transfer of measure-oriented language from business contexts to education. These ideas reflect a neoliberal "lexicon of enterprise, excellence, quality and effectiveness" (Gewirtz & Ball, 2000, p. 256), within which a quantifiable notion of creativity is legitimated. This has the effect of establishing that any teaching whether "in the name of" creativity or otherwise needs to be impactful and reflective of the work underway in high performing school systems.

There is very limited representation of the voices of academics and teachers in the construction of the teaching standards. The only academic voice cited throughout the standards is that of Professor John Hattie (currently the chairperson of AITSL) whose primary research interests include measurement models, models of teaching and

learning, and performance indicators and evaluation (University of Melbourne, 2016). These research interests are reflected in his text *Visible Learning* (2008), the "world's largest study *quantifying* the effect" (Ferrari, 2014, online, emphasis added) of particular teaching variables. The purpose of drawing attention to Professor Hattie's research interests and widely-acclaimed publication, bearing in mind the influential position he occupies as chairperson of AITSL, is to point out that a version of creativity that can be quantified, modelled and measured strongly aligns with these interests. Of particular relevance to this study is Professor Hattie's previous research conducted in the area of creativity in education (Hattie, 1977, 1980). His two research projects were concerned with the conditions for administering creativity tests (Torrance Creativity Tests for divergent thinking along with tests which were later derived from these). An underlying assumption behind this research is that a language of "procedures", "measures" and "variables" extends to creativity. This assumption is evident in his conclusions that "finding optimal conditions for the administration of creativity tests is a mammoth task, but it is one that must be done before creativity tests are to take their place beside convergent production tests in school assessment" (Hattie, 1980, p. 87). Significantly, the versions of creativity that are premised upon measurable constructs (e.g. divergent thinking abilities that derive from cognitive psychology) and assessment tests (e.g. Torrance Creativity Tests) align with the work and interests of Professor Hattie, and there is no engagement here with the notion of creativity outside of a creativity-test discourse.

A lack of teacher involvement in the construction of the standards may also work to strengthen the discursive conditions for only select versions of creativity. While the AITSL document claims "each descriptor has been informed by teachers' understanding

of what is required at different stages of their careers… (through) an extensive validation process" (AITSL, 2011, p. 1), Bourke and Lidstone (2014, p. 843) assert than over a short consultation process, teacher shaping took the form of "responses to predetermined questions". Although, they don't provide elaboration on this statement, an analysis of the questions posed by AITSL to teachers illustrates their point. For example, rather than asking teachers how standards of their profession might be articulated or if standards *can* be expressed on a continuum, one consultation question was phrased: "Do the draft standards reflect what you would expect teachers to know and be able to do for each of the four levels (graduate/proficient/highly accomplished and lead teachers)?" These four levels and categories are presented as pre-established entities where teaching can be conceptualised on a continuum from graduate to lead teacher. The question of whether or not one can describe and standardise teaching in terms of what teachers should do across all contexts is negated. Teacher reticence towards the notion of standardised teaching and therefore by extension towards the notion of standardised "creative teaching" or "teaching for creativity" across different career stages may have been ignored by the consultation process.

There is not much acknowledgement of the "idiosyncratic and contingent in teaching and learning" (Clarke & Moore, 2013, p. 3), such as the emotional aspects of teaching or the singularity of context, in discursive conditions that prioritise measurability. The rhetoric of quantification and measurement in the document is very much at odds with Bauman's (1997, p. 203) belief that "we do live in a diversified and polymorphic world where every attempt to insert consensus proves to be but a continuation of discord by other means. This world has undergone for a long time ... a process of thorough and relentless 'uncertainisation'". A public constitution of the

teaching profession and a neat mapping of teaching into domains and career stages appears to achieve the consensus denied in the above statement.

Discourses of creativity wherein it emanates in micro-moments and in tactful exchanges between teachers and students (Thomas, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) are not compatible with the theme of measurement. Space is elided here for an account of creativity that prioritises the context wherein it manifests or the bearing of factors such as the level of trust between students and teachers. The discursive space that prioritises measurement and mapping implies a generic and generalised notion of classrooms regardless of the level of investment of the teacher/student in an apprenticeship relationship, or of the trust they place in each other in exchanging symbolic capital and negotiating habitus. The deeply sociological accounts of creativity that prioritise social reasoning are difficult to align with the "public constitution" rhetoric. Such reasoning and negotiation of the social context by students and teachers may be undermined by the document.

Other versions of creativity that resist measurement, and are therefore difficult to reconcile with quantification-centred frames of reference, include those that prioritise emotional dimensions of creativity (Adler & Obstfeld, 2007; Bion, 1961). For example, the significance of emotion in identity construction (Niesche & Haase, 2012; Zembylas, 2003) has been highlighted, contrary to a previous Cartesian dualism between emotion and cognition (Beatty, 2000). Emotions have been considered foundational to other constructs such as leadership even though power effects restrain and keep them "in check" (Beatty, 2000; Hargreaves, 1998; Sachs & Blackmore, 1998). Such researchers position teaching as emotional labour rather than simply a technical or cognitive activity, and point out how it is deeply premised on relationships and engagement with

others. The AITSL standards, as part of a reform of Australian education, do not make any reference to emotion and so "bracket out" this dimension of teaching/learning, whether creative or otherwise. Keeping the lines of enquiry open for emotion in these standards would facilitate the discursive construction of a version of creativity compatible with the work of the above researchers on the growing recognition of the place of emotion in teaching and learning.

Teaching as a technical activity.

In this section, I argue that a neoliberal technical rationality (Clark, 2012b; Lynch, 2010; Mansfield, 2009) in the AITSL standards make possible only select appropriations of creativity discourse. By technical rationality, I refer to the framing of education in terms of processes rather than in relation to notions of the public good (Clarke, 2012b; Fielding & Moss, 2011; Morsy, Gulson & Clarke, 2014)[20]. The performance and measurement-oriented authoritative frames of references (discussed in the previous section) that manifest throughout the AITSL standards sustain technical and rationalist versions of creativity rather than versions that include moral or ethical considerations. Foucault's writings on neoliberalism's elision of the moral and anthropological are used below to argue that technical and rationalist constructs of teachers and teaching are borne out in the document rather than engagement with the ethical and the moral.

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[20] I do not use Foucault's work to argue a case that teaching *is* ethical/moral/public good work as opposed to technical work. All of these terms are constructed rather than signifying any universal position.

The way in which a "teaching as technical activity" stance relates to creativity can be illustrated in how the Melbourne document's goal that "all young Australians become successful learners, confident and creative individuals" (MCEETYA, 2008) finds expression in the AITSL standards. Developing creativity and confidence, in terms of fostering student optimism and ability to relate to others (MCEETYA, 2008) represent idiosyncratic and contingent aspects of teachers' work. Such aspects remain elusive of standards (Clarke & Moore, 2013; Mulcahy, 2011). Although the AITSL standards claim to support this goal, very limited references to creativity appear throughout the document. There is, for example, no mention of the associations made by the Melbourne document between optimism/healthy relationships and creativity. The only references made to the root "creat/" are in relation to how a teacher is required to *create* (productive) learning environments and *create* rapport.

There is a double standard here and a large disconnect between the stated aims and goals. On the one hand, the standards claim to support broad goals of the Melbourne document, which are associated with creativity, and yet on the other hand, the public constitution it articulates engages in a very limited way with the term. Clarke and Moore (2013, p. 5) would view this disjuncture between confident and creative individuals and distillation to dot points on creating environments as an expression of "an inevitably inadequate attempt at symbolically capturing and rendering the multidimensionality of teaching". In view of the centrality of this document to teachers' development, and of the otherwise strongly prevalent discourses of creativity in the policy trajectory, this absence and discontinuation of broader creativity discourses in the *Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (AITSL, 2011) is striking. The fact that the AITSL document does not explicitly mention notions of optimism or relationships

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among students as significant in aspiring towards confident and creative students (as in the Melbourne document) does not mean that a discussion comparing both documents is rendered irrelevant; discourse is as much about the "not said" as the said (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). The absence conveys an implicit message that creativity does not feature in the public constitution work of the standards and that "good teaching" can be made "knowable" and "operable" with only very limited engagement with the concept.

The "siphoning off" of measurable elements of human interaction, seen here in dot points such as "create productive learning environments" rather than engagement with the notion of developing confident and creative individuals, resonates with neoliberalism's demarcation between the whole subject and the part of the subject that features on a *homo economicus* grid (Foucault, 2004). As Foucault pointed out, this splitting of the subject was also the case with criminality and marriage, where only measureable conceptualisations of the subject were important:

> The subject is considered only as *homo economicus*, which does not mean that the whole subject is considered as *homo economicus*. In other words, considering the subject as *homo economicus* does not imply an anthropological identification of any behavior whatsoever with economic behavior. It simply means that economic behavior is the grid of intelligibility one will adopt on the behavior of a new individual. It also means that the individual becomes governmentalizable, that power gets a hold on him to the extent, and only to the extent, that he is a *homo economicus*. That is to say, the surface of contact between the individual and the power. (Foucault, 2004, p. 252)

I contend here that the elision of the moral dimension of teaching and of engagement with broader discourses of teaching represents a detachment of *homo economicus* from the whole subject. While a monetary or economic value is not placed on the teacher "knowing students and how they learn" (the first of the standards), the technical ideas of "demonstrate", "develop", "evaluate" or "lead" as descriptors within the standards demonstrate AITSL's selection of particular behaviours that side line deliberation on the broader goals referencing creativity. These are behaviours than can be mandated and assessed and so appropriated into technical frames of reference, rather than into ethical or moral frames.

Despite the rhetoric of the centrality of creativity in the Australian context, for example in constituting one of the broad goals of the Melbourne document, referencing the concept only in terms of how the teacher creates rapport and environments in this document, negates the broader political roles creativity could play. In a neoliberal technical framing, there is little space for engagement with the appropriateness of creativity or for broader political and moral questioning of its limits (Craft, 2003a, 2005; Lane, 2001; Sheldrake et al., 2001). For example, engagement with the idea of a malevolent creativity or one that can be used to wreak havoc on humanity (Cropley, Kaufman & Cropley, 2013; Steers, 2009) is not facilitated. While it could be argued that a standards document could not do this work, the technical means-end constructs such as "select and use relevant teaching strategies to develop knowledge, skills, problem-solving and critical and creative thinking" (AITSL, 2011, p. 12) strewn throughout the document circumvents questions of whether or not creative thinking *can* be developed or what "relevant" means in each particular school and with each cohort of students. It also avoids "limit-focused" questions of whether creative thinking is always desirable or

if there are possible situations where creative thinking could result in destructive actions. The "creativity as good and desirable" logic is not questioned or challenged in these standards. The need expressed by previously discussed writers (Craft 2006; Cropley, Kaufman & Cropley, 2013; Steers, 2009) on the need to engage with "humanising" and "wise" versions of creativity that align the concept with benevolent outcomes, rather than malevolent or harmful actions, does not resonate with this document.

The argument throughout this section on the AITSL standards progressed as follows: neoliberal measurement-orientation along with the elision of the moral dimension of behaviours establishes discursive conditions for a technical and rationalistic version of creativity while facilitating a silence around a morality laden and idiosyncratic version.

Creative Australia: National Culture Policy

Creative Australia is the most recent Australian culture policy, introduced twenty-one years after an arts policy similarly entitled *Creative Nation* (Australian Government, 1994). This Culture Policy was released in 2013[21] during the term of a Labor-led government.

It was introduced by the then Prime Minister Julia Gillard and the Minister for the Arts, Simon Crean, and begins with the assertion that the policy "celebrates Australia's strong, diverse and inclusive culture. It describes the essential role arts and culture play in the life of every Australian and how creativity is central to Australia's economic and social success: a creative nation is a productive nation" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 6). This policy is built around five goals: (1) recognizing the importance of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures, (2) ensuring public support of the arts is equitable, (3) supporting artists, (4) strengthening the cultural sector and (5) encouraging innovation and creative industries. This culture policy, while not exclusively related to education in the same way as the AITSL standards or ACARA curricula, occupies a place in the same national policy chain alongside the aforementioned documents. It was written by the same government, and affirmed authoritatively by two senior government ministers. It celebrates the new curriculum

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[21] Since the publication of this document by a Labor Government in 2013, Australia has seen a number of changes of government. The level of commitment to the goals of the 2013 Policy are dependent on the priorities of Government. These priorities are contestable and difficult to predict in advance. For example, Caust (2015) highlights "cultural war" between previous Federal Coalition Governments and artist groups. See Caust (2015) on the future prospects of this Culture Policy.

and aligns itself with the Melbourne document. Since one of the aspirations of this policy is to ensure that "the important role of creativity across the curriculum (is) better understood" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 78), I consider the cross-referencing between education and the views on creativity within the document to be highly important in any understanding of the creativity agenda in the national context.

Subjectification of the competitive creative individual.

A significant discursive condition for creativity in this policy is the construction of a competition-oriented subjectivity. Through the many references in the policy to creative industries, to a creative economy or to a creative nation, a persistent theme is the importance of creativity for self-advancement and for future prosperity:

> In the future, creative industries will play a greater role in contributing to the economic prosperity of the nation. Research demonstrates that the economic contribution made by these industries is growing at a rate faster than the broader economy. Employment generated through the cultural and creative industries is also predicted to grow. To ensure Australia sustains this momentum and remains competitive on the global stage, the Government will continue to invest in its infrastructure and its people. (Australian Government, 2013, p. 94)

The invocations towards economic prosperity and remaining competitive are made more urgent throughout the document due to a need for "regulation and leveraging our proximity to, and knowledge of, a rising Asia into a competitive advantage" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 3). Against the backdrop of international competitors, "Australians are ambitious and competitive" (Australian Government,

2013, p. 41), and while "some fear this competition with the rest of the world will make it harder for Australian creators and creative industries to survive", "others are more optimistic" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 39).

There is a competitive individualism portrayed here in this incitement to bring "one's economic, social, and cultural resources to bear on the market" (Apple, 2003, p. 12). Such discourses of "what Australians are" positions Australian students as poised for and pre-programmed for competition between other nations. The idea of Australians being in charge of their own destiny is also referenced in this document (Australian Government, 2013, p. 9), and also develops the competitive logic. This is an example of Foucault's "active governmentality" (Foucault, 2004, p. 121):

> The beneficial effects of competition are not due to a pre-existing nature, to a natural given that it brings with it. They are due to a formal privilege. Competition is an essence. Competition is an eidos. Competition is a principle of formalization. Competition has an internal logic; it has its own structure. Its effects are only produced if this logic is respected. (2004, p. 120)

Part of the formalisation and logic of competition in this Australian policy context is the emphasis on a "natural" competitiveness of Australians alongside multiple iterations of the need to compete with others. As Mølholm (2014, p. 245) says, discourses that construct subjectivities around competition rationalise the individual who is "bold and adventurous and not afraid of confronting and criticizing the established systems and institutions… who is persuasive and comfortable when presenting something new". Remaining competitive on a global stage as referenced in

the document requires one to take risks and go beyond pre-tried and pre-tested models in pursuing one's own destiny. This subject construction is a characterisation of *homo economicus*, described by Foucault as "someone who pursues his own interest, accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment" (Foucault, 2004, p. 270).

Swathes of alternative conceptualisations of creativity are not mentioned since they do not align with competitive individualism, most notably those premised on a sociological version of the concept (Amabile, 1983; Sawyer, 2012; Thomas, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) The sociological notion of audience judgement in the attribution of creativity is limited if creativity is "needed right now" in a creative-industry economy growing faster and faster as construed by this document. The intricacies of networks of relationships developed through sustained immersion in fields in the recognition and valuation of creativity are not compatible with language of individualism wrought by competition. For example, Thomas' (2010a, p. 38) views that "the practical reasoning in the making of creative performances and the students' artworks necessitates a collective commitment from teachers and students" are not compatible with prioritised discourses of competition. Teachers and students who aren't competitive "by default", or don't see their creativity as related to competition, preferring collaborative work practices, may find their work less associated with and valued as creative than the work of others.

Industry links with education.

The Culture Policy is a site wherein neoliberal reagenting (Hatcher, 2006; Jones, 2003) of educational institutions to become more "business friendly" and align with the productivity prerogatives of industry can be analysed. The emergence of business and

industry interests as "new agents capable of driving the government's agenda" (Hatcher, 2006, p. 614) establishes discursive conditions for the concept of creativity by legitimating versions that are favoured in industry contexts. The facilitation and promotion of business interests in the realm of education can be seen in the examples of partnership and sponsorship between educational institutions and advisory bodies/think tanks (Olmedo, 2013), companies holding shares in universities (Ball, 2012a), for-profit teacher education colleges (Lynch, 2012) and companies administering training modules in schools (Hay & Kapitzke, 2009). All of these reflect the extension of the private sector into education (Ball, 2009; Derqui, 2001; Hatcher, 2006; Hursh, 2005; Olmedo, 2013).

Although this Culture Policy document "is not only about developing the skills for a career as a creative professional" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 77) and it "acknowledges the importance of the arts for art's sake" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 126), it considers creativity to be a "vital twenty-first century skill to drive innovation and productivity" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 77). Importantly, "creative thinking and design will play key roles in positioning young minds to be innovators" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 79) and to have "entrepreneurial drive" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 21). Here, discourses of creativity are inextricably linked to innovation/productivity, "claim[ing] a field that specifies them in space and a continuity that individualises them in time" (Foucault, 1972, p. 26). "Creative design" becomes the field that links early arts education to the world of industry and innovation and facilitates an alignment between the interests of industry and how creativity is to be conceptualised in education.

In the quotation below, the affixing of design to creative thinking and creative

industry naturalises discourses of partnerships with private organisations, productivity

and efficiency:

> Creative thinking and design will play key roles in bringing innovation to
>
> the core of Australia's industries across all sectors. Government, the
>
> cultural sector and industry have a role to play in forging partnerships
>
> between creative industries and manufacturing, education, health and other
>
> sectors. This approach has the potential to lead to new ways of conducting
>
> business, with increased productivity and efficiency across the economy.
>
> (Australian Government, 2013, p. 94)

According to the document, design thinking has been "recognised as one of the

most important catalysts for effective innovation" (Australian Government, 2013, p.

91). Furthermore "design is a pervasive capability for solving problems and providing a

competitive edge for products and services… a substantial vehicle for the sector to take

advantage of new opportunities" (Australian Government, 2013, p. 91). Through a "play

of prescriptions" (Foucault, 1994c, p. 11), a *possible* version of creativity, a problem-

solving design process, is linked to the reality of design industries in the students'

futures. In such constructions, a plethora of neoliberal discourses discussed throughout

this chapter from the orientation around employment, to measurable constructs like

problem-solving are drawn together. The forms of interaction recognised and valued by

markets (e.g. the prioritisation of innovation and entrepreneurialism, efficiency,

productivity and the forging of partnerships) are translated to educational contexts by a

notion of creativity as design. All of these translations and prioritisations act as

coordinates on a neoliberal grid of intelligibility that together develop an argument for a neoliberalised creativity. Singular instances of discourse of design may seem removed from neoliberal economisation but when they are invoked alongside industry and employment, design is given a neoliberalised purpose. Foucault (1972) said that in analysing the workings of discursive practices, one should not think in terms of a sudden discovery between signifiers but about the "relationships between the surfaces on which they appear" (Foucault, 1972, p. 47). There is no natural objective correlation between creativity, industry and a vibrant economy but when the concept of design industry is associated with creativity, an industry-related framing for the concept is legitimated.

The arrangement of creativity discourses to align with industry only partially extends to the plethora of discourses from Chapter Two. Prioritisation of the industry establishes process (Guilford, 1967) and product conceptualisations of the nature of creativity. Where the standards of industry are influential in determining how creativity is constructed, there is little space reserved for versions of creativity that invoke a state of fulfilment, or a "connection to a primordial realm… expression of inner essence or ultimate reality" (Lubart, 1999, p. 340). Such metaphysical connotations of creativity construct correlative subject positions, such as a "journeying subject" or a "destiny-bound subject", both of which are downplayed or negated by industry-oriented framings of creativity. While such subject positions occupy a space on a map of what creativity could mean and how it could be conceptualised in education, little recognition or consideration of such positions is made possible by aforementioned discourses of forging partnerships and conducting business.

A neoliberal version of creativity is constructed in the Culture Policy throughout the discourses of competition and the subjectification for competition, along with the foregrounding of design that links education to industry. While creativity as an individually-driven design process and as bold daring endeavour sits easily on such discursive terrain, sociological and self-fulfilment accounts do not.

PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem-Solving (Volume V)

The *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving (Volume V)* is the fifth of six instalments of the 2012 PISA results. Since 2000, the OCED has administered the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests every three years to fifteen-year-old students. The purpose of this international assessment is to evaluate education systems worldwide. The 2012 PISA tests were in the areas of mathematics, reading, science and problem-solving, and involved 510,000 students throughout sixty-five participating countries and economies.

The PISA testing results act as a "grid of specification" (Foucault, 1972, p. 42) in that PISA proclaims an evaluative role for measuring the quality of education systems and for comparing/ranking education systems based on its test data. Through its functions of evaluating and ranking, the OECD takes on a "policy actor role while also articulating a particular neoliberal version of globalisation" (Rivzi & Lingard, 2009, p. 137; see also Mitter, 2004).

This OECD document occupies a significant place in the Australian context. The aspirations for Australia's education system are tied in with the benchmarks and indicators used by the OECD. For example, the Melbourne document legitimates OECD

constructs through celebrating how, "in international benchmarking of educational outcomes for 15-year-olds in the 2006 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment, Australia ranked among the top 10 countries across all three education domains assessed" (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 5). Similarly, the AITSL standards reference OECD research in its preamble and contextualisation for the standards. This includes 2005 research on teacher quality and the effects on student achievement, and 2009 research on the development of teacher standards in international contexts. Another example of the close ties between OECD indicators and Australia can be found in the Culture Policy where the following legitimation is documented:

> Australia is economically successful as well as stable socially and politically, with strong national institutions and respect for law. The OECD ranks Australia as having the 13th highest per capita gross domestic product in the world and at a time when much of the world has been in recession Australia has reported consistent economic growth. Australia ranks second after Norway on the United Nations Human Development Index, and in the top 10 OECD countries for completion of higher education, and life expectancy. (Australian Government, 2013, p. 42)

Therefore, the discursive conditions for creativity inherent in the Programme for International Student Assessment, the self- proclaimed "world's premier yardstick for evaluating the quality, equity and efficiency of school systems" (OECD, 2014, p. 3), is legitimated in the Australian context, as in multiple other countries (see Grek, 2009 and Rivzi & Lingard, 2009 on the "PISA effect" in Europe). PISA is accepted as "not only an accurate indicator of students' abilities to participate fully in society after

compulsory school, but also a powerful tool that countries and economies can use to fine-tune their education policies" (OECD, 2014, p. 4). In the sections below, Foucault's writings on investment in the self and on the enterprising characterisations of *homo economicus* are used to highlight neoliberalised discursive conditions for creativity throughout this document.

Teaching for life and lifelong learning.

In *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving (Volume V)*, the "good teacher" is subjectivised in accordance with how they teach measurable constructs like creative problem-solving, and with how they prepare students for a jobs market:

> While schools are not the only environment in which problem-solving competence is nurtured, <u>high-quality education, in a wide range of subjects, certainly helps to develop these skills</u>. Progressive teaching methods, like problem-based learning, inquiry-based learning, and individual and group project work, can be used. (OECD, 2014, p. 28)

> <u>Good teaching promotes self-regulated learning</u> and metacognition – particularly knowledge about when and how to use certain strategies for learning or for problem solving – and develops cognitive dispositions that underpin problem solving. It prepares students to reason effectively in unfamiliar situations, and to fill gaps in their knowledge by observing, exploring and interacting with unknown systems. (OECD, 2014, p. 28)

> <u>The best educators</u> have always aimed to foster the skills needed to perform non-routine tasks, i.e. to teach for life, not for school. (OECD, 2014, p. 28)

To construct this "good teacher" subjectivity, the OECD engages with identities, fabrics and constructs in place, another point of neoliberal critique (Lynch, 2010). What "the best educators" do is a very subjective question, and is open to a high level of interpretation and contestation, as highlighted by a plethora of research in the Australian context and beyond (Clarke & Moore, 2013; Hargreaves & Fullan, 2012; Hartley, 2000; Hattie, 2003, 2012; Hattie & Timperley, 2007). What good teachers do, along with the equally contestable construct of a "good" student, is highly contingent upon the social context and the role that the curriculum is thought to fulfil (Welle-Strand & Tjeldvoll, 2003).

The idea of "teaching for life" affixed to problem-solving to describe what good teachers do is an important factor for the discursive construction of creativity. "Teaching for life" (equivalent to "teaching to perform non-routine tasks" in the OECD quotation above) may not go far beyond teaching for employment readiness. Although the same word "life" is given much broader application in the Culture Policy and the Melbourne document - e.g. preparation for "potential life roles as family, community and workforce members" (MCEETYA, 2008, p. 9) - it is only life as an employee that is prioritised here in the PISA document. This is exemplified in a section on *why* the OECD measures problem-solving competence:

> Today's workplaces demand people who can solve non-routine problems. Few workers, whether in manual or knowledge- based occupations, use repetitive actions to perform their job tasks. (OECD, 2014, p. 119)

> For example, the labour market today values a mechanical engineer's ability to formulate a problem as a particular mathematical model. Once the

model is formulated, a computer – not the engineer – will apply rules to calculate the actual solution. How do engineers choose the correct mathematical model? <u>They likely rely on analogies with problems they have solved in the past.</u> <u>It follows that to develop the expertise and flexibility required by non-routine problems, education in any subject, trade or occupation must include exposure to numerous real-world problems on which to draw.</u> (OECD, 2014, p. 119)

The mention above of trade, occupations and the labour market introduces a strong rationale consistently running throughout the document for the importance placed on problem-solving, that students will need these problem-solving capabilities when they enter the employment market. Education is remodelled here "through the lens of economics (where) what matters is not what is learned about the world, but what competencies and orientations (such as life-long learner) are being produced in learners (Yates & Grumet, 2011, p. 5). The emphasis on changing patterns of work as determined by evolving complexity in the labour market, and on the need to embed preparation for this change in schooling contexts, represents a utility-led conceptualisation of education. The premising of social relations and exchange among individuals upon such a utility value as the changing needs of the labour market is fundamental to a neoliberal *homo economicus* grid for Foucault. It is through "a problematic of needs" by which *homo economicus* can be governed "since on the basis of these needs it will be possible to describe or define, or anyway found, a utility which leads to the process of exchange" (Foucault, 2004, p. 225). For Foucault here, exchange or interactions between individuals in any sphere from education to the judiciary is determined by the value and outcome of that exchange.

The decision of the document writers to cite Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1919) in emphasising the importance of students acquiring creative problem-solving skills can also be mapped to Foucault's *homo economicus* grid. Since Crusoe was stranded on a desert island and "had to re-invent agriculture and tame a flock of wild geese" (OECD, 2014, p. 6), he is positioned in the document as the ultimate problem-solver. The message given to pre-empt the importance of problem-solving skills is that this character could not have survived without such skills. Here, creative problem-solving is established as a skill that needs to be drawn on throughout one's entire life in order to deal with everyday challenges. Interestingly, the Crusoe figure has been called the quintessential *homo economicus* in research (Grapard, 1995; Hewitson, 1994). The parallels between Foucault's *homo economicus* and Crusoe, as the quintessential problem solver, are made clear in Grapard's (1995, p. 37) work where she describes a "single, independent economic agent or individual, unencumbered by social ties".

The use of the figure of Crusoe here establishes a context for the discourses of teaching for life and the correlative constructions of what good teachers do. It implies that unless teachers recognise the value of creative problem-solving to cope with uncertain futures and challenging circumstances, they aren't teaching for creativity or teaching creatively; good teachers are focused on life skills and their endeavours in the name of creativity need to reflect this.

The discourses around life as an employee, and around how good teachers foster prerequisite skills for employment align with the neoliberal construction of the life-long learner (Fejes, 2008; Gillies, 2011; Grek, 2009; Jankowski & Provezis, 2014; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Simons & Masschelein, 2008a, 2008b; Zukas et al. 2003). As Grek (2009, p. 27) says, "emphasis on lifelong learning is indicative of the concern to embed

responsibility for continuous self-improvement and up skilling in the individual learner"
(Grek, 2009, p. 27). Another term for the life-long learner is the "twenty first century
learner", similarly characterised in research as the "self-managing, entrepreneurial
individual… (the) responsibilised citizen of the post-welfare state" (Williams et al.,
2013, p. 799). The life-long learning citizen, for whom entry to a career or a university
degree does not signify an end to learning lest they become "relegated to low-wage,
low-skill jobs" (Kay, 2010, p. 17), is a construct traversing in global and Australian
contexts (Dardot & Laval, 2013; Grumet & Yates, 2011; Lynch, 2015).

Each characterisation of the life-long learner in the above writings has a correlate
with Foucault's description of *homo economicus. "*Self-managing and entrepreneurial"
(Williams et al., 2013, p. 799) can be mapped to one who *"*produces something to his
own satisfaction" (Foucault 2004, p. 270). The "responsibilised citizen" (Williams et al.,
2013, p. 799) is analogous to the individual who is "to be let alone… eminently
governable" (Foucault 2004, p. 270).

The lifelong learner or the contemporary *homo economicus* is positioned
throughout this PISA document as the only individual who will cope in an ever-
changing world:

> As machines and computers are increasingly replacing humans for
> performing routine tasks, highly skilled workers, who are capable of
> applying their unique skills flexibly in a variety of contexts, regulating their
> own learning, and handling novel situations, are more and more in demand.
> (OECD, 2014, p. 60)

Indeed, the skills that are easiest to teach and test are also the skills that are easiest to digitise, automate and outsource. For students to be prepared for tomorrow's world, they need <u>more than mastery of a repertoire of facts</u> and procedures; <u>students need to become lifelong learners</u> who can handle unfamiliar situations where the effect of their interventions is not predictable. (OECD, 2014, p. 26)

The incentivisation for the individual to invest in themselves emerges in discourses of the need for skills that always transcend those that can be routinised, and for individuals to accept no end-point to their achievements. The messages communicated in the above quotations are that "there will always be unfamiliar situations to cope with", and that "what counted as success and mastery in the past is now relegated to what computers can do". Creative problem-solving is legitimated in grids of specification that link to aspirations towards the greatest possible employability prospects.

Throughout the message of the need for life-long learning and a conceptualisation of education as preparation for life as an employee, within which creativity as problem-solving is legitimated, some discourses of creativity introduced in Chapter Two are not mentioned. The notion of the creative genius, with its allusion to uncontrollability and unpredictability (Grierson, 2011; Nietzsche, 1952), are contrary to the incitement to take control, to direct or to "apply" skills. A version of creativity that "invades" the individual such as that described in Nietzsche's (1952) *Overman* in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* or is premised on the idiosyncrasies of "experienced thinkers" (John-Steiner, 1997), become secondary where the emphasis is means-end and positivist.

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Dispelling the notion that creativity could be wholly synonymous with an unpredictable force such as talent, the PISA document outlines how:

> Students' ability to perform at high levels is not only a function of their aptitude and talent; if students do not cultivate their intelligence with hard work and perseverance, they will not achieve mastery in any field. (OECD, 2014, p. 111)

Versions of creativity that prioritise talent, such as those premised on genius or divine-inspiration, are difficult to reconcile with the notion of creativity as problem-solving developed by consciously-directed work. Student aptitude and talent is referenced above but unless tempered by quality teacher instruction of problem-solving and the development of reasoning skills in unfamiliar contexts, these alone will not lead to mastery or high levels of performance. The "unknowns" such as innate talent, synonymous with creativity, or at least a fundamental component of creativity in alternative accounts, are cast in this document as somewhat inadequate and incidental.

Profiling of students.

The final section of this chapter argues that the way in which the PISA document profiles aspirational and successful students has important implications for the construction of creativity.

As previously discussed, the significance placed on students' performance on non-routine tasks is the rationale for PISA's assessment of problem-solving competence (OECD, 2014, p. 26). Although the document doesn't explicitly define non-routine tasks, it draws on Autor, Levy and Murnane's (2003) work published in the *Quarterly*

Journal of Economics to distinguish them from routine tasks. While routine equates with repetition and procedure, non-routine tasks can require either "manual" or "abstract" skill.

The word "creativity" only appears in this document in relation to tasks that are of a non-routine abstract nature. The document indicates that such tasks are "based on the processing of information and require problem-solving skills, intuition persuasion and creativity" (OECD, 2014, p. 27). In a hierarchy here from routine to non- routine, manual to abstract tasks, the implication is that creativity is only in the realm of those non-routine and abstract skills at the apex of this classification system. What is missing from the PISA document is that the purpose of the work cited to construct this classification system is to address questions of how "computerisation reshapes the task composition of work and hence the structure of labor demand" (Autor et al., 2003, p. 1280). Through the emphasis on non-routine skills, creativity is marshalled by this PISA document into the same frames of reference used in economic discourses of labor demand and computerisation.

Throughout the discussion of non-routine tasks, the *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving (Volume V)* document profiles students who are successful at such tasks. Creative problem-solving students are characterised in the document as quick learners, goal driven and persistent. These characterisations are derived from the four subsections used to measure student problem-solving:

Students who are good at tasks whose main cognitive demand is "planning and executing" <u>are good at using the knowledge they have; they can be characterised as goal-driven and persistent</u>. Students who are strong on

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tasks measuring "exploring and understanding" or "representing and formulating" processes are <u>good at generating new knowledge; they can be characterised as quick learners,</u> who are highly inquisitive (questioning their own knowledge, challenging assumptions), generating and experimenting with alternatives, and good at abstract information processing. (OECD, 2014, p. 84)

Goal driven, quick learners and persistent individuals are all traits of *homo economicus*. Firstly, there is a strong resonance between "goal driven" and Foucault's descriptors of *homo economicus* as bold, daring and competitive. "Quick learning" echoes with notions of consistently taking responsibility to pursue life-long learning and being sufficiently equipped to deploy learning in new contexts. At all times, whether in education or in the work force, *homo economicus* is an "entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (Foucault, 2004, p. 226). Success on a neoliberal grid of rationality is the capital produced by the individual, by their own "goal driven" and "quick learning" pursuits and initiatives.

As in the case of the "good teacher", constructions such as "quick learners" or "persistent students" are subjective and contestable. For example, students who progress through tasks quickly may not necessarily understand the foundations of strategies or procedures and may not be able to apply their learning across different contexts (Mazur, 1997; Zirbil, 2006). Students who are goal-driven and persistent may not recognise that there are often multiple ways to achieve a target, and in focusing on specific outcomes, may achieve what some call surface over deep learning (Stanger-Hall, 2012). The point here is not to claim that the document should replace these learner constructions with

others or make a distinction between "surface learning" and "deep learning", but that the current constructions normalised in the PISA document are not pre-given or universally understood entities.

Through such demarcations of student characteristics above, improvisational abilities that feature in some versions of creativity are not mentioned. The promotion of improvisational experiences to develop student creativity is difficult to reconcile with advocating for goal-driven work patterns in schools. In addition, the document's advocating for persistence and goal-focus may not value or recognise spontaneous or "short burst" behaviours (Glickman, 1978).

The student constructed in this PISA document ("goal-driven" etc.) is not directly compatible with alternative subjectification, such as "reflective", "relational", or "co-operative", all of which *could* have been used to characterise learners; the creativity map introduced in Chapter Two demonstrates how such alternatives as "reflective" traverse self-fulfilment (Grierson, 2011; Lubart, 1999) and sociological (Sawyer, 1992, 2006; Thomas, 2007) versions of creativity. The classification and demarcation of student characteristics to align with their performance in subsections of a creative problem-solving construct is antithetical to relational accounts of creativity wherein it is positioned as the "sum of its relations with the people who are experiencing it at any one moment" (Adams, 2013, p. 245). Since relational subjectivities are different to those constructed in the PISA document, more co-operative and collaborative versions of creativity are not discursively constructed in the document.

The way in which this document works to centralise teaching for life discourses and profiles students as persistent and goal driven are two examples of how it

discursively fashions a space for creativity as problem-solving and as the eternal maximisation of life opportunities. This discursive fashioning however elides creativity as innate and unfathomable or as that located in relational and reflective student behaviours.

Conclusion

Using Foucault's work on *homo economicus*, this chapter has argued that the discursive conditions established in the documents analysed construct a neoliberalised creativity object. This object is oriented around the economy, employability, productivity and measurability. Furthermore, I have argued that neoliberal discourses of the life-long learner and the competition-oriented individual associate creativity with design and industry, with "bold" and competitive endeavour, and with intentful and outcome-oriented problem-solving. Creativity, as part of a generic employability skill, is ensconced in competition discourses since it is deemed necessary in Australia's competition with other nation states. Market and competitive forms are interiorised in the Australian context since rankings of countries on the basis of their creative problem-solving results is a factor in the formulation of policy. The constructions of successful students as quick learners or goal-driven, as measured by performance within very specific problem-solving parameters, are all co-ordinates on a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility.

Ignored by these constructions are conceptualisations of creativity which position it as the prerogative of self-development and self-revelation, or where it is a refuge from market-oriented discourses. There is a silence around a version of creativity premised upon the individual's awareness of the world, and of their place therein, where

creativity is mandated as problem-solving for skilled employment. Sociological

constructs of creativity that prioritise relations among students, tactful exchanges

between teachers and students and the role of a field in deeming work to be creative or

otherwise, are not compatible with the bold competitive individual. Notions of creativity

outlined in Chapter Two, wherein it can only be deemed as such "after the fact"

(Brown, 2013; Thomas, 2010a, 2010b), or requires significant incubation or

improvisational time (Sawyer, 2003) are not supported by the discursive terrain laid out

throughout the documents (e.g. unstable and challenging environments), and are

therefore omitted by prevalent appropriations of the concept.

Creativity could *be* and *do* other than that which enhances employability, and

could be cast within different patterns by which citizens interact together, other than in a

competition-focused way. This chapter has identified how policy constructs in the

sample of documents legitimate and solidify only particular views of creativity, while

simultaneously working to discontinue and destabilise others. However, this analysis

represents engagement with only a single concept from Foucault's work: a *homo*

economicus grid of intelligibility. As well as the contingency of creativity in policy,

creativity is also constructed by practices at the institutional and individual level. I now

proceed to draw on interviews with teachers to show how the effects of disciplinary

power construct the concept of creativity.

Chapter Six: Creativity and the School Institution

At present, the problem lies rather in the steep rise in the use of these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, throughout the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them. (Foucault, 1977, p. 306)

Introduction

In this chapter, I draw on interview data from the participating teachers to highlight how the effects of disciplinary power in the school establish a range of discursive conditions within which creativity is constructed. As I progress through the analysis, I show how select discourses from the myriad of possible truths, as contextualised in Chapter Two, are sustained by disciplinary effects in schools while there is a silence about other truths.

The version of creativity constructed by disciplinary power effects is one that can unfold in linear stages, is realised through the replication of products, can be recognised, directed and assessed by the teacher, and can coincide with principal/parent expectations on what "good teachers" do. In the construction of these versions of

creativity, discourses that prioritise unconventionality, ambiguity and risk-taking are ignored.

The disciplinary effects of surveillance and normalisation are widely documented in educational literature (Brook, 2000; Deacon, 2005, 2006; Gore, 1995, 1997; Grant, 1997; Hayter et al., 2008; McNicol Jardine, 2005; Jones, 2000; Meadmore, 1993; Nettleton, 1994; Niesche, 2013a, 2013b; Popkewitz & Brennan, 1998). For example, Jennifer Gore (1995) uses Foucault's reading of the interiority of disciplinary power to argue that "education *is* naming, communicating, and upholding norms – norms of behaviour, of attitudes, of knowledge" (Gore, 1995, p. 172, author's emphasis). Against the backdrop of schooling as a site of "social orthopaedics" (Foucault, 2002a, p. 57), or a site of surveillance of normalisation, little work has been done to address how creativity is implicated within this site.

Throughout this chapter, I use three themes derived from Foucault's work on disciplinary power to structure the discussion on the construction of creativity in the school institution. Each of the three themes - the normalisation of student and teacher behaviours, homogenisation and comparison of student work, and the appropriation of time - frame an analysis of the "techniques, procedures, levels of application, [and] targets" (1977, p. 215) of disciplinary power, which Foucault applied to his analyses of prison, health and military systems (Foucault, 1977, 1983). In analysing the normalisation of individuals' behaviour, I outline how student behaviours are influenced in schools by the suppression of unwanted or unexpected behaviours, the aversion of risk, and the co-ordination of classroom dynamics. Secondly, I consider the homogenisation and comparison effects of disciplinary power and draw attention to the ways that comparisons between students, singular conceptualisations of the student and

the prioritisation of assessment are compatible only with select versions of creativity. Finally, in the third section of the chapter, I identify the implications for the construction of creativity that arise from the ways in which time is appropriated in schools. More specifically, this includes an analysis of the effects brought about by the prescription of curriculum, the premium placed on preplanning of teachers' work, the "packaging" of lessons into discrete time frames, and the stipulation of outcomes for these timeframes. All of the themes and subthemes used throughout this chapter reflect a structure system which facilitates a dialogue between Foucault's writings and participant conversations. The intention in structuring the material as it appears here is not to exhaustively analysis participant data with reference to the full range of issues identified by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* (1977). The structure system used here draws upon headings used by Foucault in his *Discipline and Punish* (1977) text, but is informed primarily by key themes that emerge in this data. Although other sections of Foucault's texts could have been drawn upon, or Foucault's headings could be directly replicated, the headings as they appear here represent my portrayal of a system by which the effects of disciplinary power in the school institution can be analysed.The analysis throughout this chapter addresses the following two research questions: (1) How do practices of a school institution sustain particular discourses of creativity? (2) What discourses of creativity are ignored or omitted in policy and practice?

Normalisation of Individuals' Behaviour

The effects of disciplinary power to control student and teacher behaviour (Kamler, 1997) construct the concept of creativity. Foucault discussed how training in schools involved "few words, no explanation, a total silence interrupted only by signals

- bells, clapping of hands, gestures, a mere glance from the teacher" (Foucault, 1977, p. 166). Although the description of the total silence and mere glances represents an extremity that may not be typical in contemporary education contexts, accounts of a very effectively managed environment where power relations are inscribed on the individual and reflected back in how they conducted themselves, are widely conveyed in literature. For example, teachers who adopt institutionalised identities and roles such as the fully accountable teacher (Poulson, 1996; Zukas et al., 2003) or the child who "plays school" (Gore, 1995, p. 166) bear out how the normalisation effects of disciplinary power become inscribed on the individual. Below, I argue that the suppression of unwanted behaviours, aversion to risk, discourses of coordination and notions of the good teacher reflect normalising effects through which creativity is constructed.

Suppression of unwanted behaviours.

Throughout the conversations with teachers on the place of creativity in the classroom, many references were made to discipline and to expectations on how classrooms were to be managed. An example of a "calculated constraint" (Foucault, 1977, p. 135) that emerged was the notion of discipline and control through the suppression of behaviours deemed inappropriate. The suppression of unwanted behaviours or their exclusion can be considered as the other side of a normalisation of those behaviours that are deemed to be desirable (Gore, 1995). In the quotation below Barbara discussed an experience in a lesson in which students were engaged in creative music making:

I just go (singing two tones) and they all go (repeating same sound) back

and then bang, they're dead still, they're frozen and they know I've got

something to say…its very powerful because you only use it maybe once in

a day or once in a space when you're working… because you're letting the

buzz happen and when you actually want them back you've got them

straight away. (Barbara)

The comment from Barbara on the power of her technique to manage the class

illustrates a well-established order in the classroom (Foucault, 1977). She positions this

technique as part of her armoury in eliminating what might disturb or run contrary to

how she envisioned the lesson would progress. This links with Foucault's argument

that "an attempt is also made to assure the quality of the time used: constant

supervision, the pressure of supervisors, the elimination of anything that might disturb

or distract; it is a question of constituting a totally useful time" (Foucault, 1977, p. 150).

Since Barbara associated this lesson with creativity, there are tensions with some

versions previously discussed. For example, the belief that creativity emerges in

unconventional work practices, or that non-traditional environments are best suited to

facilitate creativity (Lassig, 2013) does not directly correspond with the notion of

teacher-centred control indicated in Barbara's lesson above. Similarly, the extent to

which student attributes associated with creativity may be disliked by teachers

(Kampylis, Berki & Saariluoma, 2009; Westby & Dawson, 1995) becomes an issue

where the teacher has ultimate control to call a halt to the work and re-establish order.

Another example of how classroom control impinges on the affordances for

creativity emerged where Charlie discussed the notion of balance:

> Classroom discipline has to be balanced against creativity because often
> that's the one area where kids will… If you're being... doing things outside
> the box, that's when kids are going to try all sorts of behaviour… so
> you've got a bit of a balancing act I think for the poor graduate teacher.
> (Charlie)

In the quotation above, Charlie indicates his belief that newly graduated teachers may need to suppress certain behaviours and actions in order to maintain an established order of classroom discipline. He infers that there is a delicate balance between a teacher's engagement in risk-taking or experimental practices, and reciprocal behaviours, on the part of the student that are normally covert or in some ways contrary to an established order. The notion of a "balancing act" implies that teaching, again particularly at the graduate level, is a process of carefully selecting appropriate actions and practices in the hope of "offsetting" risky student behaviours. Other terms for behaviours "outside the box" are unconventional or idiosyncratic behaviours (Kampylis, Berki & Saariluoma, 2009; Westby & Dawson, 1995), which are prioritised and celebrated in other accounts of creativity. As with the previous example from Barbara, these behaviours are somewhat suppressed where discipline and control are prioritised in the school institution. Teacher behaviours and work approaches, which may be described as unconventional or contrary to institutional expectations, are excluded to a degree in this classroom since their work must align with "inside the box" behaviours.

Aversion to risk.

An example of a behaviour positioned outside of the norm is the taking of risks and working contrary to a predetermined model. The impact of homogenising forces in

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exerting a "constant pressure to conform to the same model… so that they might all be like one another" (Foucault, 1977, p. 182) is also conveyed in teachers' beliefs that students are not rewarded for risk taking. While risk taking and unconventionality are associated with creativity by these teachers and in literature (Belluigi, 2009; Forster, 2012; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995; Hall, 2010; Jones, 2010; Kampylis, Berki & Saariluoma, 2009; Lassig, 2013; Merrotsy, 2013; Sternberg, 2006), the points from Gillian and David below indicate their belief that notions of success in schools revolve around producing further examples of works that have already been ratified by the status quo:

> My current question is: why would a student decide to take all these risks when everything they've done so far has been without risk, has been to follow the instruction and they've had success. They've achieved the notion of success by following the training. What's the imperative to break free of that and… as people would call the creative drive… what's the imperative? (Gillian)

> This is why students have… quite often have had the creativity trained out of them. They meet the criteria and they get a tick. They do exactly what they've been told and they get a gold star. They reproduce that thing perfectly, they get their AMEB Grade[22] whatever… Where is the risk? (David)

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[22] Australian Music Examinations Board

The posing of a similar question on whether school reward creative risk taking by both of these teachers, alongside their arguments, implies that the answer for them is not in the affirmative. The TED talk *Do Schools Kill Creativity?* (Robinson, 2002) resonates with these two teachers' comments on how the aversion to risk engendered by schools strongly diminish students' motivation for creative risk taking. The model of success that is rewarded by the gold star or the achievement of the product previously deemed creative manifests as an "average to be respected or as an optimum towards which one must move" (Foucault, 1977, pp. 182 - 183). Where conceptualisations of creativity depart from this model or run counter to the normalising effects of disciplinary power, they are ignored.

Coinciding with the downplaying of creativity-related accounts of risk, there is also a silence about discourses of creativity as a social-justice oriented concept (Adams, 2013; Dewey, 1985). Creativity is not afforded in equal measure to all students where the emphasis is on maintaining the status quo and rewarding only those students who attain success within narrow boundaries of a high-stakes exam. The centralisation of the examination in schools establishes a normalised value system wherein behaviours such as creative risk-taking are suppressed. In addition to aversion of risk, the prioritisation of the examination also has the effect of coordinating and homogenising student behaviours.

The coordinated classroom.

Classroom management that is geared towards the facilitation of examination imperatives also has implications for how the concept of creativity is constructed. In the quotation below, David articulates his belief that the teaching that occurs in striving

towards bodies of knowledge defined by high-stakes exams results is of a very controlled nature. The centrality of such results can reconfigure classroom dynamics:

> This lesson you're going to learn this skill and everything is managed… every spoken word, every answer, judged and coordinated. You know this person is going to give you the right answer. Good, pick out the bit you want from that answer and use that to show ... move on to the next bit. All perfectly planned and organised and then we can tick the box. (David)

The idea of "every spoken word… judged and coordinated" resonates with Foucault's (1977) work on the homogenisation effect of disciplinary power. David positions each action of the teacher as a component of a predetermined sequence, calling to mind the notion of the construction of a machine "whose effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is composed" (Foucault, 1977, p. 164). Schools and classrooms here are not put forward as dynamic spaces characterised by multiple voices. Rather than inculcate a learning situation led by individual student need and readiness (Bernstein, 1996; Hall & Thomson, 2007), David believes that teachers are driven towards ensuring the demands of the NAPLAN and Higher School Certificate (HSC) exam are facilitated. These demands control classroom dynamics and patterns of classroom exchange. This management style is underscored by an ethic of productivity (MCEETYA, 2008) and measurability (AITSL, 2011), as discussed in the previous chapter.

A "strict economising of power and efficiency" (Foucault, 1977, p. 28) can be traced into David's experience where he says, "Good…pick out the bit you want… move on to the next bit". He portrays an image of a highly controlled classroom where

classroom interactions are managed in the most time and cost-efficient way possible to arrive at a finished "product" of a high examination result. This is interesting in view of David's later discussion of a factory model of schooling and also wider critiques in educational research of such models of school administration (Hardy & Boyle, 2011; Reyes-Guerra et al., 2014; Wong, 2008). Some critiques of factory models of schooling draw attention to negative repercussions for creativity (Robinson, 2002, 2011). In a factory model of schooling, where the concern is with turning out finished products as deemed ready by the high-stakes exam, space is elided for engagement with the limits and risks of creativity (Craft, 2003a, 2005; Steers, 2009). The configuration of classroom dynamics around these exams detracts from questions of what student creativity is capable of achieving, or how it might present moral or political challenges in students' future lives.

Some of the teachers offered alternative views of classroom management that did not align with the previously discussed notions of suppression and control over classroom dynamics. In the quotation below, Barbara provided an example of how her classroom during creative lessons is characterised by noise, play and freedom to make mistakes:

> I'm someone who is not afraid of kids at play and I'm not afraid of a noisy classroom and I'm not afraid of kids generating lots of ideas and being able to do it because of the energy comes back and you get a better result from that. (Barbara)

I say to the students…"I want you to pace the room in that pulse, in the beat

and then sing it loudly and confidently, everyone at the same time, all over

the place… and make mistakes loudly and confidently". (Barbara)

Here, Barbara maintains a strong conviction that the environment conducive to

creativity is one characterised by movement rather than students sitting in rows or being

subjected to her control. This detracts from the characteristic "precision and

application" (Foucault, 1977, p. 151) of disciplinary power exemplified in earlier

examples of classroom management concerns held by teachers. Barbara's classroom

here aligns with accounts of creativity that associate it with free-play and improvisation

(Russ & Wallace, 2013; Sawyer, 1992). It is noteworthy that Barbara is a "lead teacher"

as demarcated by the AITSL (2011) standards, and not under similar surveillance to the

"poor graduate teacher" that Charlie spoke of previously. Thinking alongside Charlie's

comment, Barbara has mastered the act of balancing creativity and behaviours "outside

the box" and so her creative lessons are feasible.

Her repetition of "not afraid" three times implies that her celebration of noise,

play and freedom to make mistakes contrasts with a fear held by others. While she

claims not to be subject to expectations in the way that other teachers are, Barbara still

draws attention to other teachers' internalisation of the effects of disciplinary power.

The modality of disciplinary power is such that it "implies an uninterrupted, constant,

coercion, supervising the processes of the activity, rather than its result and it is

exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible, time, space

and movement" (Foucault, 1977, p. 137). Foucault's argument here is that subjects

inscribe power relations of surveillance systems upon themselves, and become

"inmates… caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers"

(Foucault, 1977, p. 201). In highlighting how some teachers are afraid of noise and mobility in the classroom, Barbara here "bears out" some possible effects of surveillance on the teaching profession.

The interesting question is why teachers would be afraid of play, noise and ideas and from where this fear arises. Whether this awareness comes from her experiences of other colleagues, encounters with school management, or engagement with discourses of classroom management, it invokes a compatibility between normalising effects and how they are "lived out" by the teacher:

> The efficiency of power, its constraining force has, in a sense, passed over to the other side - to the side of its surface of application. He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. (Foucault, 1977, p. 202 – 203)

Barbara's construction of herself as someone who is "not afraid" to engage in work practices contrary to those of other teachers' indicates that her classroom is not always a highly co-ordinated work environment. Her comments on students' freedom to make mistakes "loudly and confidently" depict a classroom where the final score of an examination does not dictate how the classroom is managed. Since Barbara believes that the freedom to make mistakes is important for the development of student creativity, she is unhindered by fear of noise or play. Her encouragement of movement, and of students making loud and confident mistakes, are actions taken in resistance to the normalising

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influences of disciplinary power. This is a counter-conduct (Foucault, 2004, 2009) to the steering mechanisms of the examination and of normalisation, enacted by Barbara in the interest of developing student creativity. While counter-conduct is established as a central theme in the next chapter analysing the practices of David only, Barbara's work practices here demonstrate that other teachers engage in counter-conduct within the school institution.

The good teacher.

Beliefs held by parents and students on what "good teachers" do (Kamler, 1997; OECD, 2013) also establish discursive conditions for the construction of creativity. The thesis acknowledges that there are complex questions on the nature of a "good teacher" and that there is not unanimous agreement on such a construct. The notion of a "good teacher" intersects with a range of discussions on teacher identity (e.g. Sachs, 2001) accountability (Poulson, 1996, 1998), teacher professionalism (Day, 2002; Webb et al., 2004), on educational reform (Gewirtz & Ball, 2000) and on teaching in democratic contexts (Biesta, 2004). As an illustration, a definition of a "good teacher" in a state publicly-funded school may be very different to that of a "good teacher" in a private setting. Alex Moore (2004, pp. 3 - 7) in his text *The Good Teacher: Dominant Discourses in Teaching and Teacher Education* captures the ambiguity around the "good teacher" in highlighting three discourses: charismatic subjects, competent craftspersons and reflective practitioners. He acknowledges that discourses "evolve from being merely beliefs or views about teaching to discourses through which teaching is fundamentally perceived, experienced, spoken about and understood" (Moore, 2004, p. 8). This resonates strongly with Foucault's work on discourses: contingent and

arbitrary beliefs and assumptions about good teaching can become reified into an articulation of truth and fossilised knowledge on good teaching. In this thesis, I do not prioritise one "model" of the good teacher or ascertain the extent to which creativity discourses align with such a characterisation. The term "good teacher" is used only to the extent that it is directly referenced by research participants or that participants' discussion on creativity and the effects of disciplinary power can be cross referenced with a construct of such a teacher.

I have already discussed the frames of reference for beliefs over the nature of good teaching in the AITSL standards (AITSL, 2011, p. 2), and argued that these standards legitimate a publicly visible and measurable version of creativity. Bearing in mind that the teachers in this sample are "governed" by these standards, the points made previously about how AITSL constructs good teaching and creativity, relates to these participants. Focusing on disciplinary power in the school institution, here I consider how the effects of school examinations discursively construct the good teacher. These beliefs exert a gaze of surveillance over teachers and control them in a "mechanism of objectification" (Foucault, 1977, p. 216). In addition to the effect of controlling dynamics and patterns of exchange between teachers and students, high-stakes examinations construct an account of what good teachers do in classrooms. Below, Gillian's comment illustrates how her actions in the classroom are subject to a gaze of surveillance:

I have had lots of lessons… where I've walked in and I've said, "this is what I'm looking for"… and the kids have gone… "but how are you marking this?" And you have to almost reassure them that you're not

tricking them into lessening their level of work because you're actually

after their thinking process and their creativity… so you sometimes come

across some resistance to get the skill that you want. (Gillian)

Plus you have parents and so forth saying "How come you're doing this in

the classroom? I just need my kid to be through the HSC". And sometimes

kids have that message as well… If they don't value creativity or see value

in it because they haven't learned its valuable, they're not going to want

that in the lesson. You're trying to do all this creative stuff and they go,

"How does this relate to my exam?" They're obviously result driven as

well. That can be a culture, it can be what they've learnt. It can be home

pressure. (Gillian)

Here, Gillian discusses how she is confronted by a corpus of knowledge that

delineates what a good teacher does, on what one prioritises, and on how one should

align themselves with the aspirations and expectations of parents (Kamler, 1997; Vick

& Martinez, 2011). These questions and expectations from students and parents exert a

normalising gaze that "makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish" (Foucault,

1977, p. 184). The parent questioning what Gillian is doing, and a sense of student

suspiciousness towards what Gillian does in the classroom, exerts a force by which

Gillian's work and her subjectivity is being constructed. These processes of

subjectification are in addition to those highlighted in the policy analysis of Chapter

Five, where, for example, what "good educators" do is aligned with prioritising and

teaching problem-solving (OECD, 2014).

The comments from Gillian above on parents "just wanting" their son/daughter to get through the HSC positions parents and students as investors. Investment accounts of creativity (Sternberg, 2006) claim that "creativity is in large part a decision that anyone can make but that few people actually do make because they find the costs to be too high" (Sternberg, 2006, p. 97). These students and parents are balancing costs and outcomes, and their decision on whether or not Gillian is a good teacher is dependent on her actions in response to this balancing.

What is "just needed" causes tension for Gillian and confronts her ideas on what a creativity-oriented teacher does in the classroom. This "just needed" is premised on a particular body of knowledge that has been implemented and put in place already by groups like ACARA, who administer school examinations. Parents and other stakeholders legitimate a "hold" that this knowledge has over teachers in querying how Gillian is marking student work, or why she is going "off-track" rather than getting students through the HSC exam. There is a tension indicated here with accounts of creativity where it is positioned in tactful and trustful micro-moments between the student and teacher (Thomas, 2009, 2010b). The idea of creativity emerging in trustful relationships correlates to a higher degree with a sense of freedom on the part of the teacher to work and interact with students in ways they feel are conducive to its development, rather than with a strong sense of adherence to examination requirements . Where parent and school management surveillance works to construct what a good teacher does in the classroom and pre-determines how she/he should act, the opportunities for trustful exchanges may be limited. In addition, the surveillance and normalisation effects that determine what a good teacher does may downplay creativity discourses premised on the indeterminacy of the creative object (Brown, 2013).

Disciplinary power effects, which determine and establish constructs such as the examination as the arbitrator of the quality of education, or the effective teacher who ensures that students are sufficiently prepared for exams, make little room for indeterminacy or ambiguity on the merits of student and teachers' work.

The analysis thus far of how normalisation of behaviours in a school institution construct creativity indicates that teacher-controlled, examination-endorsed versions that can be coordinated in classrooms are correlative with the effects of disciplinary power. At the same time, however, the effects of normalisation facilitate a silence around accounts that prioritise unconventional work practices, risk taking and improvisational activities. Homogenisation and comparison effects of disciplinary power are now discussed.

Homogenisation and Comparison

In this section, I argue that the way in which disciplinary power works to inculcate a "fixing of difference" (Foucault, 1977) informs how creativity is constructed. Foucault spoke about how disciplinary power "lowered the threshold of describable individuality and made of this description a means of control and a method of domination" (Foucault, 1977, p. 191). By this, he draws attention to how disciplinary power foregrounds, not the sovereignty of the individual, but the population-related information on the individual garnered through mechanisms of surveillance and normalisation. The categorisation of students where some are "at risk", have "special educational needs", or are "gifted" (Ball, 2013), all signify how Foucault's "whole analytical pedagogy… meticulous in its detail" (Foucault, 1977, p. 159) works to construct knowledge of the

student population. I now proceed to highlight how an analytical pedagogy that works to homogenise individuals relates to the construction of creativity.

The facilitation of comparison.

In discussion on the NAPLAN exam and the High School Certificate (HSC), some of the participating teachers acknowledged its analytical role and potential to inform and direct pedagogy:

> It's good to have data coming from a wide pool. We have this general system of gathering data about a child's literacy levels. (Helen)

> We'll reflect on it and go… "Oh wow… according to the stats, that year group has a problem with their syntax, that year group has a problem with grammar, their reading is fantastic, their writing is shocking. Great let's… we know that now, let's make sure that we have a bit more of a focus on enhancing their writing". (David)

Helen's use of "data coming from a wide pool" and David's use of "the stats" underscore a level of acceptance of the legitimacy of the pool and the statistics, and indicates some deference to the bodies of knowledge that NAPLAN fixes in place. These teachers afford NAPLAN a levelling function in determining where students and teachers are "going wrong". NAPLAN achieves such a levelling function by playing a diagnostic role and through the facilitation of comparison between individuals and groups. The auditing culture engendered by NAPLAN (Cillekens & Harriet, 2016; Thompson & Harbaugh, 2013; Thompson & Mockler, 2015) manifests in this school. This is significant for creativity truths in the school institution because the acceptance

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and legitimation of NAPLAN's auditing function signifies an extension of some power effects by which creativity is constructed by the normalising and surveillance functions of ACARA (as discussed in the section on curriculum policy in the previous chapter). An acceptance of the role of NAPLAN in the comments from the two teachers above, and by extension their acceptance of ACARA's truth formations about education, aligns with Deacon's (2006, p. 183) point that "over a comparatively short period of time, modern schooling has brought countless individuals and diverse populations to accept and tolerate steadily increasing degrees of subjection".

Susan and Charlie also expressed a belief that there *needs* to be a uniform framework within which all students' progress is interpreted, and that the success of their programmes (and their teaching) can be measured by the data:

> You need to have something … that kids have a sort of a certificate of attainment… a common area between lots of students. But it does tend to be a bit of a barrier because you have to teach them to write answers in a certain way because that's what's accepted in the HSC or that's what's accepted in NAPLAN. (Susan)

> We're doing a whole school push in stage four literacy at the moment… certainly I'm interested in seeing the results and if there are kids that are showing deficits in certain areas, then we have to look at why … we all have to adjust what we do, the way we teach things in order to try and solve those sorts of issues with certain kids…we'll probably use that data to measure the relative success of that, to see when we get the year nine data if there is a change. (Charlie)

Through these teachers' legitimating of NAPLAN's function in the school, they implicitly endorse the patterns by which ACARA constructs creativity as a general capability, as a design process, and as the prerogative of the employment market. In other words, the "creativity construction work" of ACARA, as discussed in Chapter Five, is carried through into schooling practices where teachers articulate support of the role and remit of this same group in education. The silence around creativity as subject-specific, or as premised on later judgement, throughout the ACARA documents discussed, is implicitly co-opted at an institutional level in the legitimation of ACARA-derived NAPLAN technologies.

Generic learners.

A homogenisation of learners occurs in the foregrounding of stages and models, or in the establishment of templates for products previously endorsed by examination technologies. An example of a homogenising effects is seen in constructs such as "the nature of learners" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 13), which ascribes to students what they should typically be able to achieve at particular stages. Drawing on the discussion of curriculum philosophy and theory in the previous chapter, one is not informed if this generic "nature of learner" is a nature under a progressivist lens or that emanating from an essentialist or other perspective (Ditchburn, 2012; Welle-Strand & Tjeldvoll, 2003). The effect for creativity, however, brought about by articulating *a* nature of learners (a socially constructed entity using Foucault's writings) is that this also endorses *a* version of creativity. Attempts to definitively profile learners in educational settings would, for Foucault, correspond with the way in which delinquents were normalised. Such profiling:

Effac[es] what may be violent in one and arbitrary in the other, attenuating the effects of revolt that they may both arouse, thus depriving excess in either of any purpose, circulating the same calculated, mechanical and discreet methods from one to the other. (Foucault, 1977, p. 303)

Contrary to the attenuating and calculation of behaviours articulated in Foucault's writings above, some teachers like Barbara found it very difficult to determine what form creative teaching and learning might take. She emphasised a belief that students' needs and skill sets differ, and as a result, a disjuncture between norms relating to creativity and the reality of classrooms. One implication of differing needs and abilities among the student population for Barbara is that student creativity takes different forms and manifests at different rates of progression:

The challenge is to accommodate high fliers with the children that are very stilted and want a box and that's the only way that they've…. You know, just give me the rules, just give me exactly what you want and I'll give it back to you. And they are challenged by the fact that you're saying "there is no such thing as a wrong note. It's just personal choice" … they're challenged to do, to come up with something and for some kids, creativity is just the most tiny deviation from their sense of structure and things like that so… they're… the challenge is for those children to feel safe and feel brave enough to try something different and I think that sometimes is the biggest challenge in creativity because they know the way that it sounds and they know the way it should be and they want to please the teacher. (Barbara)

Barbara here articulates the place of individual difference (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Humphreys, 2006; Sternberg, 2006; Welle-Strand & Tjeldvoll, 2003) in relation to creativity. Individual difference accounts of creativity relate to how people react and respond differently to various factors such as time pressures (Amabile et al., 2002) or to the prestige granted to work by expert opinion (Sawyer, 2012). Confronting student subjectification as competitive daring individuals (Hay & Kapitzke, 2009; Mølholm, 2014), Barbara articulates a version of creativity that, for some, is no more than a "tiny deviation from their sense of structure".

Related to this, Susan also links the ability to cater for difference between each student as an expression of creativity on the part of the teacher. Since creativity manifests differently in all children, she believes that a teacher needs to creatively select and draw on differing approaches in the classroom:

> Just give the kids a whole selection of these (different approaches to music
> education such as those derived from the writings of Kodaly or Orff)
> because every child has a different individual way of learning … One
> method might suits a group of kids in your class but the other kids may not
> necessarily get it. But if you change the method, that first lot might not get
> it but the second lot might. So you're catering for different learning styles
> as well… A creative teacher will do that. (Susan)

The idea of individual difference expressed in the comments from Barbara and Susan above takes account of different combinations of "resources for creativity" that each student can access (Sternberg, 2006). Demarcating a central model for the development of creativity that is sufficiently robust to account for many sites of

individual difference is highly problematic. While Barbara speaks of students who are both "high fliers" and "very stilted" she nonetheless feels both categories of students engage in creative work. While one may require little guidance and relish opportunities to work in novel contexts, another needs set rules and boundaries to feel safe. Susan's comments similarly establish that a "one-size-fits-all" approach to teaching is not feasible on account of students' receptivity to different approaches. Her experience of different learning styles informs a belief that (creative) teachers must continually modify how and what they teach in the classroom. Comments from these teachers oppose a managerial role of the curriculum (Hall & Thomson, 2005) and the streamlining effects of policy that culminate in the establishment of norms to construct creative students as a homogeneous group.

Comparative assessments.

During the interviews, teachers spoke about how normalised discourses of assessment bear upon the construction of creativity. For example, some of them highlighted the unfeasibility of establishing normative grounds or "distribution according to ranks or grade" (Foucault, 1977, p. 181). Some of the teachers, like David below, articulated how dominant modes of norm-referenced assessment in schools, such as rubrics or criteria frequently used in educational contexts, are not amenable to the assessment of creativity:

> We move outside the normal realm of school rubrics, standards, outcomes,
> many of those things must be actually removed or intentionally destroyed
> and avoided to be creative. (David)

You've got to be susceptible to new ideas and not have this blinkered

approach that the only answer is going to be this and the only way of doing

it is going to be this. (David).

In his reference to moving outside of a "blinkered approach", David expresses the

difficulty of maintaining creativity in normative frames of reference that delineate limits

to accepted knowledge and groups students together as one entity. While appropriations

of creativity for "the normal realm" of schooling manifests in such constructs as

assessable components of creative problem-solving (OECD, 2014), David's comment

above indicates a belief that the knowledge inherent in these permutations cannot be

positioned as the only knowledge of creativity. The "blinkered approach" that he alludes

to is a manifestation of "the constitution of a comparative system that made possible…

the characterization of collective facts" (Foucault, 1977, p. 190). Facts include: "*this* is

creativity because it conforms to these norms" or "*these* are *the* norms by which I can

describe this endeavor or this product as creative". In his references to "moving outside

the normal realm" and to "new ideas", David aligns his beliefs with the notion of

creativity as original and novel, two defining characteristics frequently used in research

(Amabile, 1996; Brown, 2013; Pope, 2005). On account of the ideas of novelty and

originality, attempts to grasp the extent and scope of students' work in advance, through

the formulation of criteria or rubrics, are rendered highly problematic.

The *Consensual Assessment Technique* (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Amabile &

Pillemer, 2012; Hickey, 2001) commonly cited as an assessment technique for the

creativity of student work as discussed in Chapter Two, also arose during the

interviews. The premise of the technique is that student work is recognised as creativity

only if appropriately qualified and informed people in a specific field recognise it as

such. The CAT does not appeal to nationally documented data sets or to standardised categories for the determination of creative work, instead premised on the judgement of experts.

In relation to creativity and assessment, Helen expressed some reservations about the CAT technique. While acknowledging that it is, for her, the best "fit-for-purpose" in terms of providing a foundation for articulating among colleagues creativity in students' work, she still indicated that it is problematic in terms of finding consensus on the "true" creativity level in this work. A problem arises for Helen when the norms held by the two experts are very different:

> The CAT is what's done here at the audition process. I still find problems
> with that especially with the way the numbers are worked out. So looking at
> the rubrics… what gets a one, what's a two, a three... There are often
> subtopics to those rubrics, which are often ignored and not even teased out
> so you're looking at … even what is creativity? And in terms of the
> audition, it's mainly described as the way in which the child plays, the way
> in which the child interprets the composer's intentions… and I think that's
> a fairly big ask for an eleven year old. (Helen)

An efficient and fully normalised assessment technique would "combine the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth" (Foucault, 1977, p. 183). The problematic notion of creativity, however, resists the deployment of force and the establishment of truth since, as Helen flags, there is a lack of agreement among teachers on the subscales of the rubrics. Consensus on the elusive nature of creativity is not straightforward for these teachers,

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yet they are working within an educational institution where disciplinary power seeks to establish truths about the concept through referencing creativity on the assessment rubric for entry to the school.

David and Charlie further indicated tensions in the requirement to establish truth on student creativity in assessments:

> I like to think I'm reasonably knowledgeable… I like to think I'm reasonably well educated… I like to think I've had a lot of experience doing this thing, music teaching. I could not be the sole judge of anything considered creative because… I'm sorry… I don't know... I haven't had all of the experiences. (David)

> I've been teaching now for thirty-three years but it's taken me that long really to get an appreciation of what a good composition is about. Certainly, when I think back to those first six years when I was in (former school)… I mean I did have a very talented kid that did some amazing composition stuff but I don't think I appreciated it to the same extent. (Charlie)

By virtue of their extensive experience and their positions - David is a deputy principal and a composer, and Charlie is a composition examiner at HSC level - both teachers could be considered expert markers in student auditions using the CAT technique. The rhetoric of the expert attributing creativity to students' work would place David and Charlie in a prime position to cast judgement on students' creative products and processes. However, they disrupt this rhetoric in expressing how they are still unsure of what counts as creative work and in articulating how the appreciation of creativity is an on-going learning curve. The comments from Charlie and David above

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disrupt a seamless transfer between teachers' judgement and individuals' actions and aptitudes. Any notion of efficiency cannot be compatible with Charlie's belief that it has taken him over thirty years, during which time work he would later value much more so as creative went somewhat unrecognised, to appreciate "good" creative composition. As the comments above show, neither David nor Charlie can unanimously establish truth in accordance with universal norms for creativity in music composition. Creativity proves elusive of the otherwise prevalent normative-judgement frames of reference by which society is arranged:

> We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the social worker judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements. (Foucault, 1977, p. 304)

The establishment of truth by an educator-judge is not compatible with David or Charlie's beliefs on the impossibility of judgement over students' work when students' experiences differ to those of the teacher. The associations made by these teachers between creativity and sets of experiences previously encountered by individuals aligns with Vygotsky's (1967/2004) account of how disassociated elements from one's experience are subsequently associated in their creative work (Lindqvist, 2003; Smolucha, 1992; Vygotsky, 1967/2004). In addition, David's prioritisation of the student's experience aligns with Dewey's (1934) account of children's creative development wherein "all gains from what has been already affected and periodically consolidated are always with a view to what is to be done next" (Dewey, 1934, p. 56).

Creativity, in the views outlined above from two teachers, can only be understood with reference to that student's previous experience, and not to an onlooker's observable criteria. These views are not directly compatible with a myriad of others on the assessment of creativity such as discourses of creative problem-solving assessment (e.g. OECD, 2014) and creativity tests (e.g. Hattie, 1980; Torrance, 1974, 1981). These views are not directly compatible with a myriad of others on the assessment of creativity such as discourses of creative problem-solving assessment (e.g. OECD, 2014) and creativity tests (e.g. Hattie, 1980; Torrance, 1974, 1981).

Technologies of comparison and homogenisation in schools such as NAPLAN exams have been shown throughout this section to legitimate a construct of creativity that manifests in the same way in all students, that can be assessed and over which judgement can be applied. At the same time, however, there is a silence around versions of creativity that prioritises differences between individuals and that locate it in the unique and idiosyncratic experiences of individuals. The final theme used to relate the construction of creativity to Foucault's writings on disciplinary power is the appropriation of time.

Appropriation of Time

Discourses of time management and maximum utilisation of time in schools (Deacon, 2006; Gore, 1995) also establish markers by which creativity is constructed. More specifically, as I argue throughout this section, these discourses construct creativity as a linear phenomenon that can be planned for in advance and can manifest in allocated chunks of time. Foucault spoke about how a series of techniques and technologies were used to efficiently and effectively manage systems such as the school and military (Foucault, 1977). In the case of the elementary school in France, he illustrated how it was formerly a place where students worked "for a few minutes with the master, while the rest of the heterogeneous group remained idle and unattended" (Foucault, 1977, p. 147). However, in disciplinary society, the school was characterised by calculations and organisational measures where, for example, students taking the highest lessons sat on the benches closest to the walls (Foucault, 1977). Illustrating the organisational effects of disciplinary power, Foucault said:

> In organizing "cells", "places" and "ranks", the disciplines create complex
> spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces
> that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out
> individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and
> indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a
> better economy of time and gesture. (Foucault, 1977, p. 148)

In contemporary education, examples of such organisations and segmentations can be observed in curriculum debates on when students should have attained particular skills, in timescales for the implementation of new curricula and in stage

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conceptualisations of a teacher's development from graduate to lead teacher (AITSL, 2011). These discourses are premised on a view that one's development as a student and as a teacher can occur in demarcated stages. In the sections below, I highlight how such appropriations of time construct truths about creativity.

Prescriptive curriculum.

Disciplinary power takes effect to centrally manage how time is utilised in schools through high levels of curriculum prescription. The effect of an overly prescriptive curriculum to objectify creative teaching and learning is analogous to the attempts made to objective crime and criminality, as expressed in Foucault's writings:

> The need to measure, from within, the effects of the punitive power prescribes tactics of intervention over all criminals, actual or potential: the organization of a field of prevention, the calculation of interests, the circulation of representations and signs, the constitution of a horizon of certainty and proof, the adjustment of penalties to ever more subtle variables; all this also leads to an objectification of criminals and crimes. (Foucault, 1977, p. 101)

Foucault's contention here is that it is the measurement, the organisation and other various calculations of criminality that establish the limits and parameters by which it is understood. A high level of prescription similarly establishes discursive parameters around the concept of creativity. Teachers in this sample discussed how greater mandating of content in music curriculum diminished their opportunities to facilitate work that they associated with creativity. For example, Barbara and Susan

highlighted some implications of a move from the previous NSW syllabus to the

ACARA Arts curriculum (ratified but not implemented to date in NSW):

> I think the worry for a lot of teachers is that if there's this new curriculum,
> it is going to be more prescriptive and… in looking at the drafts, some of it
> is. But the question will be, "Does it stifle creativity"? For someone with
> good musical training, a more general broad curriculum opens up the world
> for teaching and creativity. (Barbara)

Barbara here suggests that the new ACARA curriculum in the Australian context, with its greater "organization of comparative fields" (Foucault, 1977, p. 190) and determination of outcomes, might have the effect of "clamping down" on creativity unlike the broader content parameters of the current NSW syllabus. An attempt to fossilise what occurs in classrooms through explicit mandating in curricula causes tensions for the possibility of the teacher being able to direct teaching and learning as they see fit. Barbara considers some aspects of the new curriculum regrettable since the syllabus in use already affords her opportunities to make creative choices and implement creative activities.

Susan also discussed how the syllabus written by the Board of Studies, Teaching and Educational Standards (BOSTES), currently in use in the NSW context, provides for greater autonomy and greater creativity on the part of the teacher. She believes that the "openness" of the current NSW curriculum, which only has three outcomes, facilitates greater potential for teachers to meet these outcomes as they please. She associates this openness with teachers' creative choices:

Well I think the beauty of the curriculum for music in New South Wales is you really only have three outcomes. You have to be able to listen, you have to be able to perform and you have to be able to organise sound. They (teachers) have a lot more freedom and there's a lot more creativity in how they might use the curriculum. (Susan)

The comments from Susan, in conjunction with Barbara's comments, underline beliefs that over-prescription can have the effect of excluding versions of creativity that prioritise teacher autonomy. Accounts in literature that associate creativity with teachers' decision-making and flexibility in how they undertake their work (Burnard & White, 2008; Steers, 2009; Turner-Bisset, 2007) are confronted by greater prescription and regularisation of teachers' work.

The notion of a curriculum premised on the enterprise form, as discussed in the previous chapter, is also relevant to the discussion on how prescriptive curriculum sustains particular discourses of creativity while downplaying others. Prescription extends to the orientation of general capabilities and cross-curricular priorities around content descriptors in the ACARA curriculum (ACARA, 2013a). Rather than engagement with the notion of musical creativity, curricular forces prioritise a domain-general account of creativity that can co-exist with a multitude of priorities and capabilities across a curriculum of eight areas (of which the arts is just one area and music just one of five arts). The discourses of "critical and creative thinking" as a generic employability skill (MCEETYA, 2008) and the legitimation of the PISA creative problem-solving construct (MCEETYA, 2008; OECD, 2014), as discussed in the previous chapter, position creativity in Australian education as largely domain-general. There is a diminishment here of how creativity in specific fields of practice

(Burnard & Haddon, 2014; Humphreys, 2006; Menard, 2013; Peers, 2011; Weate, 1998) can be conceptualised in the curriculum, and of how teachers can make autonomous creative teaching choices as aspired to by Susan and Barbara above.

Preplanning.

The notion of preplanning in schools prioritises advance documenting of how lessons and school days are structured. Related to the discussion on the "good teacher", this thesis does not take a normative position on the idea of "preplanning". It acknowledges that the practice of teacher preplanning of lessons can and is related to a range of discourses in education. For example, for Dewey (1938), impulse and the child's spontaneity are prioritised in educational contexts and so to plan objectives in advance can be considered somewhat "anti-educational". On the other hand, discourses of public accountability and transparency (Epstein, 1993; Poulson, 1998, 1996; Suspitsyna, 2010) support the practice of planning. Teachers conduct their work at a nexus of these discourses. The discussion of preplanning here does not make any claim on the value/legitimacy of planning, rather highlights how it relates to creativity as expressed in teacher interviews.

The practice of preplanning invokes a "positive economy (that) poses the principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, even more available moments, and, from each moment, ever more useful tools" (Foucault, 1977, p. 154). The utility value that can be extracted from time in the case of preplanning, manifests in how preplanning facilitates school management's assessment of teachers' work, and in how colleagues can compare

and hold each other to account against recognised standards. Preplanning invokes an ongoing justification of the use of lesson times.

Discourses of progression in accordance with prepared lessons, or of ensuring that the work conducted in each lesson is referred back to a long-term plan, presents challenges for some of the teachers. From the quotations below, it appears that the basis on which the teachers act in the classroom is their content knowledge and an awareness of each student's individual difference. Furthermore, it seems that the activities undertaken by the teacher in each class are are informed by teachers' prior experience and an ongoing "trial-and-error" approach towards finding the best fit between skill/knowledge/content and each individual student. For example, in the quote below, Stephen discusses a programme of work where students were asked to compose additional sections for music they had been presented with. Since all students have different starting points and different ideas, he believes there is no unanimously agreed-upon "profitable durations" (Foucault, 1977, p. 157) by which time can be deployed:

> I can't give them a lesson plan … what I am doing is… I'm giving them a project in which the sets of experiences all need to be ticked. You get pretty quickly to where it is that they might need to go… a little bit more research or they might need to just have a little bit more scaffolding to get them to the next sequence. (Stephen)

This comment about the teacher providing a little more scaffolding as the need is expressed in the context of the project, rather than seeing a predesigned lesson through from start to completion, links with the notion of competence pedagogy over performance pedagogy (Bernstein, 1996; Hall & Thomson, 2005). Stephen's teaching is

not motivated by universal outcomes such as a completed product or mastery of a problem-solving process (Guilford, 1967; OECD, 2014), but by responding to "what children need to know, understand and be able to do" (Hall & Thomson, 2005, p. 15). Where he references the "next little bit", he alludes to the competence the student requires in the context of *that* particular project.

For some teachers, creating the space for experimentation and exploration results in very successful outcomes. Barbara, for example, discusses the "extraordinary" outcomes that can be achieved when exploration is facilitated in the classroom. Although occasional in the sense that creative outcomes cannot ever be guaranteed, the work and discoveries she outlines below could not be achieved if space was not reserved for experimentation in the school day:

> I say, "Go away and muck around with it and come back and show us what you come up with". And sometimes they come back and say, "Nothing happened". And at other times, it's "wow, you know, I've just invented a minimalist piece". Seriously one group came back one day with a Philip Glass piece, playing drum sticks on chairs… and it was totally minimalistic, total set beat and one changed just slightly and that was reflected in the next one and the next one. It was just extraordinary, like Philip Glass all over again! (Barbara)

"Mucking around" with resources and acknowledging that "nothing will happen" in some classes is not directly compatible with the idea of explicitly preplanning lessons in advance. In addition to students arriving at product such as this minimalist composition, Helen below also discusses how space is required for the teacher to

creatively modify their teaching approaches and explanation style in accordance with the student's receptiveness to her teaching. As in the case of Stephen's scaffolding discussed earlier, Helen outlines how these modifications to the lesson cannot be planned in advance, unfolding only in the context of the lesson:

> If you find certain things aren't getting through, like the understanding of an *appoggiatura* (a musical ornament), you suddenly have to think up a way to demonstrate. That's not you directing it but trying to get the kids to direct the understanding… You think up a creative way to explain on the spot. You're able to look at given material and having to vary the way that you approach it. You know the teacher is there to sort of guide the learning, but that learning is not a predictable story. You need to think on your feet, need to change direction, need to create a new set of parameters or even have to change the criterion. (Helen)

It is difficult to reconcile this model of pedagogy with the institutional imperative of:

> Arranging different stages, separated from one another by graded examinations, drawing up programmes, each of which must take place during a particular stage and which involves exercises of increasing difficult; qualifying individuals according to the way in which they progress through these series. (Foucault, 1977, p. 159)

While planning in advance and "arranging stages… of increasing difficulty" may be espoused in discourses of what a good teacher does (AITSL, 2011), and may serve school accountability and management imperatives (Suspitsyna, 2010), as a practice it

does not appear to represent the situational and contextual realities of Stephen and Helen's work. While all of the students in these teachers' classes experience challenges in composing music and acquiring skills that need to be mastered, their proficiency levels at the beginning of the series of lessons are not the same. As a consequence therefore, these teachers' "inputs" into the learning experiences of each student do not take the same form for everyone. These teachers portray judgement on both the *nature* of the help they offer each student and the *time* at which this help is offered as judgements that can be made in the context of each lesson. The teachers mentioned above justify their professional judgement on the nature and timing of help offered to students as the lesson progresses by highlighting the individual difference of each student and a sense of unpredictability by which each and every student will master a new skill or understand a concept.

In Stephen's mention of how one student might require "just that little bit more scaffolding" and Helen's mention of "trying to get the kids to direct their understanding" in arriving at creative outcomes, these teachers' discourses of creativity align with a social perspective of an apprenticeship between student and teacher (Thomas, 2009, 2010b). They position students as those who need guidance, and they themselves as those who can move students' learning to the next stage.

Fixed time.

Efficiency in the appropriation of time infers a linearity in time management where "moments are integrated, one upon another…oriented towards a terminal, stable point" (Foucault, 1977, p. 160). The notion of integrating moments sustains only particular conceptualisations of creativity such as process models (Guilford, 1967;

Lubart, 2001) or design stages (Australian Government, 2013), both of which have beginning and end points. Helen's account of her own actions in the classroom, however, runs contrary to classes which progress linearly from beginning to end as documented on a lesson plan:

> I would see something happening and follow that tangent and I think music teachers, drama teachers, dance teachers do that automatically… you have that streak in you to actually pick up on the nuances of what's happening in the classroom… a student suddenly playing with great aplomb… and if something interesting is going on then you drop the plan and you move to that very exciting moment that might be happening. (Helen)

If Helen were focused upon a terminal stable point, the student playing with aplomb would be incidental and secondary to the order of activities scheduled for the lesson. However, she considers these unexpected occurrences to be manifestations of creativity and, as such, they require that she deviate from the outlined plan. The students in Helen's class may be demonstrating "short burst creativity" (Glickman, 1978) where it appears outside of predetermined stages and models. Similarly, a rather incidental and unheralded occurrence aligns with "little-c" (Craft, 2001b, 2002; Gardner, 1993; McLellan & Nicholl, 2013), "mini-c" (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007) or "mundane" (Cross, 2012) creativity. If creativity is thought to converge only around linear appropriations of time as effected by disciplinary power, "short burst" or "little-c" creativity that emerges might go unrecognised.

Stipulation of outcomes.

Discourses of immediacy, or a demarcation of what *must* be achieved in particular time frames, advance a view of time wherein it can "cover… and master" (Foucault, 1977, p. 148) a multitude of people and situations. Such discourses are compatible with narratives in the policy chain, as discussed earlier, that every student *must* demonstrate "critical and creative thinking" (ACARA, 2013a, 2013b; MCEETYA, 2008) due to immediate economic imperatives (Australian Government, 2013) and complex, social and personal pressures (MCEEYA, 2008).

However, some of the teachers problematised stipulations that creativity can and must be exhibited in their beliefs that it manifests at different stages and in different ways for children. For example, Helen articulated her sense of the importance of free-play for the development of creativity in students at the early stages of development:

> Bang on pots and pans and do these things that are associated with play…it's called creative play and I think it needs to be play for quite a long time. (Helen)

> I think being creative has an element of play and that element of freedom where a student is able to perform … and it should not to be judged… I think it is a danger to actually put a figure or even… "Yes this is good or this is not good". We wouldn't look at a two year old's drawing and say "this is good". We just know it's developmental, it's part of what they need to do, they need to scribble. (Helen)

Some people… it's fits and starts and then reflection time… the product doesn't come for quite a while later. Others want to provide that product almost spontaneously. At the moment the ways schools are structured with lock step arrangements…they're not that helpful for creative tasks. (Helen)

Since "pretend play constitutes an open-ended event and serves as a tool that a child uses for a variety of creative purposes" (Russ & Wallace, 2013, p. 136; see also Lewis, 2006), sidelining or denying children opportunities for play in the pursuit of immediate organisational demands is problematic. Helen's sense of the importance of a more fluid concept of time, where there is an element of freedom and recognition of individual difference without premature judgement, is not congruent with "lock step" arrangements, or with arrangements of "segmentation, seriation, synthesis and totalisation" (Foucault, 1977, p. 160). Drawing on the previous discussion of the CAT technique, one such arrangement may be the requirement to make evaluative judgement of students' work at auditions. Loosening the sense of what *must* be achieved by the end of a lesson or series of lessons and dispensing with pedagogies premised on the stipulation of outcomes is necessary in the pursuit of creativity for Helen.

Charlie made a similar point on the necessity of deviating from closed or fixed appropriations of time, appealing to how they are antithetical to the "lived-out" realities of people who are celebrated as being creative. Composition, both in the curriculum document (ACARA, 2013a) and in the experiences of these teachers, is associated with creativity. Since individuals recognised as composers, and therefore as creative individuals in this discourse nexus, do not work to exam conditions when composing, there is tension introduced where institutional limitations impose a time limit over

compositional work. Below, Charlie spoke of his admiration for a policy change in the New South Wales context on the structure of the assessment mode for composition:

Students had to write a melody under exam conditions and do some harmony under exam conditions. That was removed in 1995. I think it was because it's unrealistic. No composer works within a three-hour time frame. It just didn't work. (Charlie)

Charlie's comment above indicates that in New South Wales over twenty years ago, the knowledge of creative composition in schools was that composition could be realised within a three-hour timeframe. This relationship between the management of time and composition was calibrated by "discipline (that) makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism" (Foucault, 1977, p. 177). More than just an administration power, this stipulation of a time limit established boundaries around what was considered composition in high school and imposed limits on how it was defined. The knowledge of composition constructed by this power was a product of the technologies of organising the multiple rather than representative of broader knowledge of what "real" composers did. Twenty years later, if read through Foucault's thesis on the operation of disciplinary power, we are no closer to any real objective knowledge of high school composition, but interpret it according to a different inflection of disciplinary power. Creative composition in music education is now study and work that comes to fruition over an entire year. Charlie heralds as positive the move to further align system requirements with what "real" composers did. Through his comments above, he affirms individualistic subjective accounts of how "creative

thinkers" (John-Steiner, 1997) work, rather than foregrounding a totalising view of how creativity can manifest.

Conclusion

Throughout the analysis in this chapter, I argued that disciplinary modalities of power work in schools to sustain particular discourses of creativity while facilitating a silence around others. To make the arguments throughout, interview data with seven teachers was analysed through Foucault's work on the normalising and surveillance effects of disciplinary power. Three themes were used to structure the discussion: the normalisation of behaviours, the homogenisation and comparison of individuals' work and the appropriation of time. In accordance with Foucault, the measures and techniques discussed throughout this chapter are not considered as "negative mechanisms that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; but are linked to a whole series of positive and useful effects which it is their task to support" (Foucault, 1977, p. 24). These disciplinary techniques produce effects within which creativity is implicated.

Processes of schooling establish conditions of possibility within which select versions of creativity can manifest. For example, the imperatives of teacher preplanning and of positioning creativity within a curriculum superstructure foregrounds a conceptualisation of creativity as that which can unfold in a linear fashion, such as in a problem-solving process or in a design model. Discourses of classroom management and control congruent with the effects of disciplinary power, along with the central position held by high-stakes exams, naturalise an account of creativity that is compatible with "status quo" student behaviours and with "good teacher" practices.

The discourses outlined above omit other potential accounts of creativity. For example, maintaining that creativity is related to ambiguity (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995; Merrotsy, 2013) or unconventionality (Lassig, 2013; Sternberg, 2006; Urban, 1991), and espousing work environments characterised by choice and freedom, are all confronted by an effect of disciplinary power to prioritise teacher control. Accounts of creativity that revolve around free play (Russ & Wallace, 2003), improvisation (Sawyer, 1992, 2003) or indeterminacy (Brown, 2013; Glickman, 1978) exist in tension with these schooling processes that strive for maximum utilisation of time. The tendency of schooling technologies to homogenise and compare students and teachers, and to undermine risk-taking, appropriates an account of creativity that remains within pre-established boundaries and does not interrupt deference to the bodies of knowledge created by high stakes exams.

Analysis of interview data throughout this chapter has shown that teachers engage with disciplinary power when they encounter tensions between normalising technologies and their own constructions of creativity. For example, Stephen and Helen direct their attention in class to contextualised micro-moments, wherein they believe creativity manifests, and deviate from their lesson plans to pursue these moments. Gillian and Barbara confront discourses of subservient risk-averse students, requiring the students to make mistakes and to challenge pre-established patterns of work in the pursuit of creativity. In the next chapter, I engage further with this theme of the individual's freedom to engage with normalising technologies. I use Foucault's concept of ethics to highlight how one teacher's practices of ethical formation constructs an account of creativity which interprets, negates and counters the neoliberalised and disciplined accounts of the concept presented thus far.

Chapter Seven: Creativity and the Individual

My role - and that is too emphatic a word - is to show people that they are
much freer than they feel, that people accept as truths, as evidence, some
themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and
that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed. (Foucault,
1988, p. 10)

Introduction

In this chapter, I show how an individual teacher (David) constructs creativity
through practices of ethical self-formation, and in so doing how he sustains or resists
normalised constructions of the concept discussed in Chapters Five and Six. The chapter
therefore addresses the following research question: How does an individual accept or
resist normalised assumptions about creativity constructed in policy and practice? The
interplay between a normative conceptualisation of creativity, discussed through the
previous chapters, and an individual's meaning-making can be understood as "an
'agonism'… that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-
face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation" (Foucault,
2002c, p. 242; see also Foucault, 1993, 1994b, 2001b). Knowledge articulated in and
through the individual's spaces for action is a form of power since "once applied in the
real world, (it) has effects, and in that sense at least, 'becomes true'" (Foucault, 1977, p.
27). I use Foucault's notion of ethical self-formation, incorporating *telos*, ethical

substance, modes of subjection and forms of elaboration (Foucault, 1985, 1994b, 2001a, 2001b, 2009) to highlight how the individual's construction of his subjectivity involves nuanced patterns whereby normalised discourses of creativity are co-opted and countered. Drawing on research by O'Leary's (2002), in addition to Niesche and Keddie's (2015) work, I position practices of counter-conduct and *parrhesia* as forms of elaboration (one of the four axes of ethical formation).

Firstly, I analyse David's construction of the concept of creativity by highlighting how creativity relates to his end-goals of teaching (*telos*). Two end-goals are identified throughout the chapter: that students' self-awareness of their potential and capability will grow, and that students will be able to solve problems using novel insight. I then identify discrete skill sets and unconventional work practices as two primary substances of creativity arising from these end-goals. Following this, I proceed to highlight how the Department of Education and Communities (DEC), as a mode of subjection, relates to each of the two ethical substances. One the one hand, I outline how David applauds the mandated examinations of the DEC for their role in developing skills such as technical proficiency on a musical instrument. On the other, however, I discuss how the same examinations have the negative effect for David of discouraging unconventionality (his second primary substance of creativity). Finally, I outline five practices that David undertakes in pursuing his *telos* to bridge a divide between the two distinct substances of creativity. These five practices - personalising reports to parents, writing a PhD thesis, conducting project work with junior classes, advocating for students and modelling creative practices - are all theorised as counter-conduct and *parrhesia* using Foucault's writings. In Foucault's four axes of ethical self-formation, these practices are forms of elaboration.

Telos: A Vision for Creativity

David's *telos* provides a point of reference from which to engage with a myriad of components, authority sources and practices related to creativity. As discussed in Chapter Three, Foucault defined *telos* as an end point to an individual's course of actions, as the "circumstantial integration" (Foucault, 1985, p. 28) of each action in the contours of an ethical subject's life. Therefore, as I progress through the analysis, I outline how David strives to integrate his views on an ethical subject into his actions. I consider how views about students' future lives and the end-goals of teaching inform David's *telos,* and the ways in which creativity features therein.

The place of creativity in students' lives after their time in high school is an important element of David's *telos.* An analysis of David's belief on this place conveys the "stylization of attitudes" (Foucault, 1985, p. 92) that constructs the concept of creativity. David believes that students will require an ability to engage in creative problem-solving in the future, and will need to be able to answer questions not yet asked:

> Without creativity we don't have solutions to the problems that we have. If
>
> you take any problem... social problem, drug addiction, theft, traffic jams…
>
> any problem needs a solution. Now if we keep trying to apply the same
>
> solutions that we've tried, we're not really going to get much difference,
>
> are we? Not really. I mean build another road and you'll have less traffic
>
> jams. Ok but you might just move the traffic jam... but eventually, there's a
>
> sort of finite physical resource. There's a point at which you can't keep
>
> doing the same thing and expect a different result. So you need a new thing.

Do it differently. That's creativity, to do something in a new way or in a different way.

David aligns with a problem-solving discourse of creativity. Creativity here is about finding solutions and about pushing the boundaries of previously tried-and-tested modes of finding answers. This problem-solving discourse resonates with Guilford's view that "there is something creative about all genuine problem-solving, and creative production is typically carried out as a means to the end of solving some problem" (Guilford, 1967, p. 312). The juxtaposing of creativity with problem-solving here is similarly a feature of the PISA document (OECD, 2014) analysed in Chapter Five, and of other policy constructions that equate creativity with the ability to navigate problematic contexts (Australian Government, 2013; MCEETYA, 2008).

However, David does not believe that creativity can be simultaneously termed problem-solving without any further qualification. Since David references social problems along with traffic jams, he is reluctant to attach a field-specific type of problem-solving such as mathematical reasoning to creativity. Problem-solving for David incorporates mathematical reasoning and urban planning but he emphasises how he reserves the term creativity for what is new and different. While solving infrastructure-related problems is associated with creativity, David does not believe a creative student body on graduation can be equated with a productive or an entrepreneurial student body. Although both productivity and entrepreneurialism are frequently juxtaposed with creativity (Australian Government, 2013; Buckingham & Jones, 2001), David makes a distinction between these terms and creativity. He feels that policy constructs that portray them as meaning the same thing are "jargonistic…in a

propaganda sort of way". He makes the following two points to illustrate what he considers to be the difference between the terms:

> Give me a hundred bucks and I'll put it in the bank at two percent… I'm not going to make a lot of money on it. Give me a hundred million bucks and I'll put it in the bank at two percent, I'm going to make a lot of money on it. That doesn't make me creative. I could obey all the rules and do it all right and come up with a lot of profit but it doesn't mean I'm creative.

> If I go into the kitchen and create some scrambled eggs, you can use the word create in that sense, to make something. So in its simplest barest sense with none of the overtones I use with creativity, with none of my prejudice applied to the word… if I take all of that prejudice out and just go for the bald basic "to make something", well product is the same. Produce is the same.

In these illustrations, David indicates his belief that the terms productivity and entrepreneurialism relate to good financial decision-making and to everyday domestic activities. He does not wish for his students' creativity to be equated with the soundness of their financial decisions or with "bald basic" production. Looking back to the previous chapter, this indicates a tension with the belief that creativity can manifest in a model with pre-demarcated stages. For David, *creative industries* need to be markedly different to *industries* and not sites characterised by good business sense or high productivity levels. Since trying different solutions to recurrent problems requires risk-taking with no guarantee of success, David resists notions of forecasting the return on

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investments in creative industries or forecasting revenues that creative problem-solving can generate.

Creativity and the end-goals of teaching.

In discussing the end-goals of teaching, the emphasis is not on a temporal end-point, as in the kind of teacher David wishes to be in ten more years, but on the desired outcomes he wishes to achieve by his teaching. In saying that his *telos* involves "helping students to grow into something they didn't know they could become", David wants students to exceed expectations they hold of themselves and to overcome limitations in their context. He hopes that students will see new applications for knowledge, ask questions, and engage in work patterns that are not always conventional:

> Education - *educare* - is to lead into the light… I would hope they (the students) would say that I gave them the opportunity to grow into something that they didn't know they could be. But I'm much more driven toward giving them something they don't know about and joining them on a journey.

In his discussion of creative teaching and learning that revolves around a journey towards the development of attitudes and discovery of new applications for previously mastered material, and the facilitation of students' discovery of something they didn't previously know of themselves, David aligns with a notion of creativity as self-revelation and self-fulfilment (Lubart, 1999; Grierson, 2011). Grierson's (2011, p. 348) emphasis on how the "processes of time and being can be activated as a process of

revealing in the moments or events of creativity" resonates particularly strongly with David's notions of "leading into the light", of growing and of partaking in a journey.

The duality between David's emphasis on skills and dispositions that need to be taught in addressing identifiable problems on one hand, and on moving beyond pre-established solutions on the other, is significant. It establishes two dichotomous constitutive "elements" or "components" of creativity. Simultaneously, David's broad vision of teaching and of the place of creativity therein invokes notions of the known and the unknown, the planned and the improvisational, and the codified and the contingent. The first of the descriptors in each pairing is conceptualised in this thesis as one ethical substance of creativity, hereafter called the "skills substance". The second of each pairing is referred to in the discussion to follow as another ethical substance, hereafter the "unconventional substance". Positioning these two elements as two different components of creativity affords the opportunity to analyse how they are both implicated by modes of subjection, and how they intersect with forms of elaboration.

Ethical Substance and Modes of Subjection

Following Foucault's invitation to draw upon his writings as a set of tools to address diverse questions, I construe a "skills component" and an "unconventional component" as two ethical substances of creativity, and the *Department of Education and Communities* as a mode of subjection in this thesis. As discussed in Chapter Three, the ethical substance is concerned with the material of ethics, or the part of the self that is recognised as the "prime material of moral conduct" (Foucault, 1985, p. 26). In the context of Foucault's work on sexuality in Ancient Greece, he argued that the substance was the aphrodisiac, the "acts, gestures and contacts that produce a certain form of

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pleasure" (Foucault, 1985, p. 40). The analysis to follow shows how both of the ethical substances identified intersect with David's freedom in multiple ways just as the ethical substance of morality intersected with the freedom of the Ancient Greeks (Foucault, 1986, 2001b). These two components are foundational to David's meaning-making on creativity, and so their positioning as ethical substances in this thesis facilitates engagement with the discursive construction of creativity through the architecture of Foucault's four axes.

For greater clarity, I amalgamate the discussion of ethical substances and modes of subjection (ways in which the individual establishes its relation to the moral code) into the same section in this chapter. These two elements of Foucault's four-fold axes are inseparably linked; through engagement with modes of subjection, an individual acts on and negotiates the ethical substance. In this thesis, I consider the *Department of Education and Communities* as a mode of subjection to illustrate how David establishes relations between authority sources and the two ethical substances of creativity. While there are other modes that could have been chosen, David is employed by this body and in his position as a teacher and deputy-principal, he is required to engage with its directives and mandates. Furthermore, the DEC features strongly in his students' work through the administration of examinations, and it frequently emerged in discussions of both the "skill" and "unconventional" substances of creativity.

Skills as a primary substance of creativity.

The first component of creativity for David is a constellation of skills, competencies and knowledge, what Sternberg & Lubart (1992) would term "resources for creativity". For example, as David explains:

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I completely agree that you need to be well read, you need to be able to write, you need to be able to argue logically, and mathematics is going to give you a really good sense of logic, logical argument... science is going to give you a real sense of process and procedure to argue logically even if you're not going to be a scientist. That's fine.

You must document progress. There are skills to be acquired. There are understandings… Yes a student needs those and we need to be able to assess their progress and development. The development through those skills, the acquisition of skills and understandings and their ability to demonstrate that is important. Otherwise we can't tell what skill, what understandings they have… without that, you're not going to have ticked all the boxes and be given the time to do the things that leads to creativity.

In saying that creativity cannot be arrived at without the understandings and skill-sets gained through a broad curriculum, David positions understandings and skills as a substance that must be acted upon to realise his visions for creativity. The quotes above outline a myriad of dispositions and foundational abilities, from a sense of logic gained in the study of mathematics, to the understanding of processes achieved by the study of science. Such foundation points are not specific to any one career or outcome. For David, without ensuring that "all the boxes" involved in leading to creativity "have been ticked", students are deficiently equipped to achieve creative outcomes. To ignore bodies of knowledge related to music education, such as conventions in harmony writing or instrumental techniques, is, in David's belief, to stand in the way of creative outcomes and to deny students a foundation for creative work.

David's recognition of a skill and knowledge base as a substance of creativity intersects in a positive way with the DEC.

Skills and the DEC as a mode of subjection.

As a mode of subjection, the DEC with its mandated examinations complements and supports the skill-oriented substance of creativity for David. David's engagement with the DEC represents ways by which he "establishes his relation to the rule and recognises himself as obliged to put it into practice" (Foucault, 1985, p. 27). In relation to the "trained" element of creativity, David believes that the DEC, as the employment body he works for, exerts a legitimate expectation that teachers ensure students in their care attain high standards. While he may question the appropriateness of high-stakes examination scores as a measure of the "best education" schools can provide, he is aware of his obligations to the DEC. As David says:

> We're employed by the Department of Education to present kids at the end
>
> that have the best education and, at the moment, the marker of the best
>
> education… the indicator is a high ATAR[23].

David believes that the examinations of the DEC's *Higher School Certificate*, as a mode of subjection, are a useful and appropriate feature of school life in developing aspects of creativity. Their disciplinary effect in conducting the work of teachers and reifying bodies of knowledge that must be taught is not seen as oppressive or wholly damaging. Instead, he articulates how the HSC exams ensure that students have a robust foundation in a subject discipline like music. Since the ability to argue logically and to

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[23] Australian Tertiary Admission Rank

understand the rudiments of music are prerequisites of creativity for David, their

prioritisation by examination technologies is advantageous. As he says:

> I believe that technique, understanding… fluency and facility on an
>
> instrument or a voice… theoretical understanding and knowledge of
>
> theory…all of those things are the skill set that are required for someone to
>
> have fluency in the field... and all of those things are the building blocks
>
> upon which a creative performance can take place.

> We need them to be smart enough to demonstrate that they have the skills
>
> required to think, to read and to write, to be critical, to have skill sets like
>
> aural discrimination. Even just general discrimination such as quality of
>
> documentation given to them. They need to be thoughtful, to have those
>
> skills and the broader the skill set, the better, I believe, for any musician.

In emphasising how "we need" students to demonstrate certain skills and

dispositions and on "presenting" students at the end of their school career in accordance

with the measurement framework of his employer, David is speaking here as a deputy-

principal. His position in the school as a deputy-principal is an important contextual

factor in David's level of alignment with the DEC as a mode of subjection. As a leader,

David has a high level of responsibility to address a multitude of forms of compliance

(Niesche, 2014, p. 30). These include the directives from his employment body on child

protection, assessment policy, employment law and health and safety, as well as parent

and teacher needs. One of David's responsibilities is to support the principal in ensuring

that the school institution complies with DEC directives. While individual teachers also

have responsibility in this regard, their responsibility for "whole school" compliance is

not as explicit as that of the school management. As the discussion on David's comments and practices in the remainder of this chapter points out, tensions are apparent between David's position as a deputy-principal and his aspirations for the development of creativity as a classroom teacher. While a greater degree of alignment with DEC mandates represents a greater degree of constraint for David, his position as deputy-principal means that David can make a range of choices on class level and curriculum content. These choices are discussed later as forms of elaboration.

In his emphasis on "demonstration of outcomes" and in earlier comments on how skills *must* be documented, David aligns with discourses of measurement that manifest in documents like the AITSL standards (2011). Another neoliberalised frame of reference, which I have argued permeates through policy documents, and is sustained here by David's comments, is the discourse of employability and preparedness for successful life (MCEETYA, 2008; OECD, 2014). He references skills and dispositions as one component of creativity and talks of how they lead to a "rounded education" without which students would be disadvantaged in later life. However as subsequent sections will argue, David breaks with discourses of a deterministic preparation for later life in his assertions that creativity "breaks the mould", and stops individuals from engaging in "tried-and-tested" patterns of work. This ability to break away from "tried-and-tested" work patterns represents a second component of creativity for David.

Unconventional work practices as a primary substance of creativity.

In addition to developing skills and competencies, David believes that improvisational activities and a willingness to take risks are components of creativity.

While he underlines the importance of students acquiring skills, he expresses that creativity is not facilitated where these skills are routinely deployed. As he says:

> I believe the other side (of creativity) is… you've got to learn how to break the rules. The only purpose for learning the rules is so… this is going to sound a bit over the top… but the purpose for learning the rules is so you learn how to break them.

In talking about "the other side", David positions the ideas of breaking rules or taking risks as contrary to the high premium placed by schools on exams. Since system imperatives highly value knowledge and skills that can be observed and accounted for in assessment results, David feels that there is little space in the school institution for unconventional aspects of creativity. For example, he says:

> As you progress through high school, you, the kids, teachers tend to aim towards the number because that's the final characteristic of the end result, that's the end result which I believe is a bit sad. But it's true. So schools don't have much space for creativity. Even in music.

> So you can't already set out what the outcomes are. You can't… It's not a standards referenced, outcome based approach to assessing. If that's the only purpose, to meet the outcomes, then you've already put the limit on what anyone should or would do in your classroom or in your school. You've already said, there's the ceiling, the artificial ceiling.

> Outcomes say "you've got to be able to do this". It's already prescribed. There is no creativity. It's already been achieved. It's already been achieved

by hundreds of thousands, millions of other people before you so it's not new. So prescription of creativity is the exact opposite of itself. You can't prescribe creativity.

Here David's account of creativity is not in tandem with the institutional emphasis on processes of normalisation. He mounts a challenge to the sense of remaining within defined boundaries and aversion of risk where he explicitly refers to the need to break outside of modes of schooling that inculcate this. David resists an emphasis on classroom control and management, or on the "good teacher" discourse discussed in Chapter Six, where these constructions are fixed by a singular focus on a body of knowledge and on the "final number" of the examination. In David's view, the emphasis on a final number to define a student's level of success positions students as a heterogeneous group with no incentivisation to go beyond established boundaries. It is this emphasis on final scores and comparison technologies that presents tensions for David in how the DEC, as a mode of subjectivity, relates to the development of creativity.

Unconventional work practices and the DEC.

David's beliefs on unconventionality as an ethical substance of creativity, and the normalising technologies of the DEC, are the basis of a perceived negative correlation between the DEC and creativity. This contrasts with the complementary relationship discussed in the previous section on the "skills substance". Even though the HSC and ATAR (Australian Tertiary Admission Rank) are positively regarded in providing a frame of references for the aptitudes and skills components of creativity, these modes of subjection are the very modes that curtail the second vital ethical

substance - the requirement for the student to go beyond what's safe and known. For this second component, the HSC is an example of "modes of subjectivity (that) become problematized… insofar as they become untenable" (O'Leary, 2002, p. 108). David could incorporate the DEC as a mode of subjection into his creative vision since it played a role in ensuring that "groundwork" of creativity was covered through the emphasis on the acquisition of skills. However, it is untenable and problematic because the discourse of "outcomes", "final numbers" and "end results", within which the skills are assessed by the DEC through examinations, frequently precludes space for unconventionality, for "breaking the rules", or from deviating from the requirements of examinations. This preclusion is significant for David, since it acts as a barrier to the realisation of his vision for creativity.

The central issue for David is the primacy given to a final score in what he calls a "number crunching exercise". He believes that this number, which acts as a portal to a university, detracts from the time required for creativity, curtails the space for improvisation, and suppresses the exposure of students to the unknown. The more that processes of skills acquisition (the first part of the ethical substance) are conceptualised as the entirety of a students' work, the lesser the opportunity for David's creativity-related visions to be realised. He articulates the shortcoming of normalising systems for creativity in saying:

> They meet the criteria, they get a tick. They do exactly what they've been
> told and they get a gold star. They reproduce that thing perfectly, they get
> their AMEB Grade. The moment that start doing something different,

they're told that's wrong. I actually believe that we're training the creativity out of musicians.

It's designed on a number crunching exercise. I mean kids, at the end of twelve years of schooling, are churned out with a number next to their name and that number gives them the chance to go to a university.

David here objects to the prescription effects that disciplinary power brings about and also to fixed conceptualisations of time, both of which have been discussed in the previous chapter. In highlighting the incompatibly between an orientation towards mandated outcomes and creativity, David evokes an indeterminacy of the creative object (Brown, 2013), a theme he pursues through his practices discussed in later sections.

I have argued that David's broad creativity-related vision subsumes two components: a focus on skills and a facilitation of unconventionality and risk. While he readily accepts the authority source of the DEC and examinations in regards to developing the first component, he feels that the DEC, as a mode of subjection, negatively impinges on the second. Having identified this disjuncture that David perceives between both components, I now highlight practices through which David pursues his vision for creativity. These practices are theorised as forms of elaboration using Foucault's writings on counter-conduct and on *parrhesia*.

Forms of Elaboration

David's forms of elaboration include personalised reporting to parents, writing a PhD thesis, undertaking project work with junior classes, advocating for students and

modelling practices. In Foucault's four-fold axes of ethical self-formation, forms of elaboration comprise the self-forming activities that are undertaken by the individual to "transform oneself" (Foucault, 1985, p. 27) in order to pursue their *telos*. David's forms of elaboration derive from his beliefs that student creativity manifests in unconventional work patterns, and that this creativity will help them to solve problems in previously unaddressed ways. Furthermore, the forms of elaboration undertaken by David arise from his beliefs on the limitations of the DEC's authority, and the negative repercussions for the development of student creativity brought about by the centrality of examinations.

Chapter Six identified that expectations (e.g. to attain high standards in examination results) and frames of reference (e.g. what a good teacher does, how a classroom is to be effectively "managed") conduct participants and represent power relations and steering mechanisms. Although a deputy-principal can be considered to be in a "position of power" in normative conceptualisations of power in education (for example, the belief that a deputy-principal "possesses" more power than a parent or student to make decisions), the analysis in Chapter Six highlights how disciplinary power conducts their actions. Rather than premising the discussion on "fixed" or normative positions of power as occupied by individuals, the conceptualisation leading this thesis is that every individual occupies shifting places on networks of power. Following this line of thought, my discussion of counter-conduct and of speaking truth to power (*parrhesia)* is premised on the conduct effects of disciplinary power, as discussed in Chapter Six, and on a deputy-principal's shifting positions on networks of power.

This discussion incorporates practices enacted by David which can be theorised by Foucault's writings on counter-conduct and *parrhesia*. As discussed in Chapter Three, practices of counter-conduct are actions taken by the individual in order to counter effects of normalisation that direct him/her in ways considered undesirable. These practices are the "operationalisation of tactics" enacted to modify power relations (Demetriou, 2016, p. 222). For example, in choosing junior exam-free classes, David counters the effects by which examinations structure his time.

This section is also informed by Foucault's writings on the concept of *parrhesia*, a "kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness… and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 19). In the framework of this thesis, Foucault's writings on *parrhesia* are used to theorise and better understand David's actions as they relate to his construction of the concept of creativity. As an illustration, in garnering support for his PhD thesis on time management, he speaks the truth as he understands it to his principal and to school management. Engaging with Foucault's writings on counter-conduct and *parrhesia* to better understand David's actions contributes to a fuller understanding of how creativity is discursively constructed in Australian education. My aim is not to "diagnose" definitive acts of *parrhesia* (or counter-conduct) as they are enacted by David, but rather to bring his actions into dialogue with Foucault's writings on the concepts. This dialogue is presented where I highlight how David's actions convey some characteristic features of *parrhesia* such as risk, duty and the rejection of flattery (see discussion in Chapter Three on characteristics of *parrhesia)*.

In undertaking these five practices, I emphasise how David constructs a particular subjectivity as a deputy-principal and teacher that develops student

opportunities for creativity, and facilitates his creative teaching in alignment with his vision for the concept.

Reporting to parents.

Since his notion of creativity is one that departs from what can be quantified and measured, David counters normalised assumptions about creativity when reporting to others on students' work. David expressed a difficulty in identifying with dominant conceptualisations of creativity held by students, parents, principals and the wider public where they are focused on skill acquisition or technical ability. Again, this focus extends to only one of the ethical substances of creativity for David. When he talks to parents, he doesn't undermine or reject dominant beliefs about creativity, but incorporates them into wider aspirations he holds for it. As he says:

> What I would be talking about and what they (parents) would be expecting me to talk about might be a little different. I think what people would expect to be creative might be a product so… they (the students) did a performance that people liked or they composed a piece of music that fit the model very well. If I was to tell someone that their child was creative, it's more that they are not doing what everyone else is doing, it's more that they are behaving in a way that's different to what most people are doing. It's more that, if they are producing object, artefacts, pieces of music themselves, that they are not like the model.

The use of language such as "might be a little different" shows a level of incompatibility with how creativity is normally understood in contemporary discourse. The points of emphasis that he brings to a discussion, revolving around how a student's

creativity is manifest in behaviours different to the norm, can be interpreted as a

manifestation of desire to "escape direction from others and to define the way"

(Foucault, 2009, p. 259) by which creative work is evaluated. Although David believes

that the account he would render to parents is most likely different to what they would

expect, his emphasis on novelty and originality better align with David's vision around

creativity as new ways of solving old problems.

David's reporting to parents here also reflects the rejection of rhetoric and

flattery, both of which were also rejected by the Ancient Greeks when speaking freely

(Foucault, 2001a, 2001b). Foucault describes the truth of rhetoric as a truth "known by

the person speaking and not the truth contained in what he says" (Foucault, 2001b, p.

382). He illustrates this with the example of a general who could persuade troops that

the enemy about to be faced was less formidable than he really is. David's refusal to

attribute creativity to work which "fit the model very well", even though parents might

expect that attribution of him, indicates his resistance to convey a truth different to the

one he knows and believes as the speaker.

As discussed, ensuring that students attain high scores is an important aspect of

David's work. However, to equate that solely with creativity and attest that these

students are creative by virtue of examination achievement is very problematic for him.

In his view, the achievement of satisfactory examination results is not a creative

outcome but a preparation to do "more of the same". Since *parrhesia* "does nothing

other than put to work the truth of true discourse in all its naked force, without

adornment" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 382), David challenges rhetoric that links good

teaching with sameness. In the comment below, he draws attention to how the cycle of

singularly focusing on examination, pervasive in both high school and university, needs to be broken to order to achieve more creative outcomes:

> They're really good at being HSC students. Woopedoo. What does that do? It makes them really good at getting into a university. And then what happens at university? More of the same. I mean most people who did really well when I was at university did more of the same… I reckon you've got to break that mould.

If David's comments remained at the level of flattery in deference to the rhetoric of skill acquisition when reporting to parents about the creativity of students' work, he would seek to describe students' work as creative within the confines of a good HSC result or proficiency in music sight-reading. However, in view of David's wider *telos*, incorporating the relationship between creativity, the unknown and questions not yet asked, he would find such flattery "incorrect, (and) a false image of himself" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 376). In light of the discussion in the previous chapter on the surveillance effects of parents' focus on successful examination results, David speaks up to them and to school management through his comments on the examination above. His rather desultory comment on the focus on examinations in both high school and university is surprising given the deference to examination technologies in schools, and the responsibility David has as a deputy-principal to ensure that the school complies with the DEC's indicators of a high standard of education.

The second practice discussed below conveys another of David's attempts to "break the mould" of singularly focusing on examination results.

Writing a PhD thesis.

A second mechanism by which David counters the authority of the examination in the school is his engagement in PhD study in the area of creativity in music education. To counter the authority invested by school personnel and management in examinations, David positions his PhD as a way to gain more support for his ideas on creativity. David recognises that one way to counter the steering effects of the examination in his school is to convince his principal and other teachers of the merits of alternative modes of working in classes. The time involved in pursuing his research shows the extent of his desire to be conducted in different ways, and of the perceived benefits of the outcomes of his study. While proposal plans are not finalised, David hopes to argue for the potential of more open-ended project based work comprising more student choice and student-directed time. He believes that:

> Having freedom without the desire to hit a particular set of criteria, having
>
> the freedom is the thing that will give you the chance for creativity… Time
>
> is the commodity… that is, that we have the least of in schools. I believe
>
> that people are creative and would be creative if they were given time. I
>
> believe that teachers would be much more creative if they were given time.
>
> I know a bunch of teachers who say "don't put me on the senior classes
>
> because all that 'stuff' has to happen there".
>
> I want them (students) to have time to hang out and make music with each
>
> other without someone saying it must look like this. That's what I believe I
>
> will do. That I will core out some time for no quantitative assessment, some
>
> time for no expectation other than free reign of imagination. There is space

for it to happen but people have got to trust one another. Parents have to

trust teachers. Kids have to trust teachers. Teachers have to trust kids.

In providing a rationale for his future study here, it is apparent that it is driven

by a strong belief that people "would be creative if they were given time". His

undertaking of this work can be thought of as countering what David perceives to be an

over-emphasis on appropriating time in classrooms and the mandating of outcomes. The

freedom to work without having to achieve specified outcomes and the "space for the

imagination" that he speaks of above are features of teaching and learning that he

wishes to explore in his study.

As well as a more "relaxed" use of time, David wishes to explore the results of

students having more say in their work, and the outcomes of students' work not being

directed by the teacher. However, David is still concerned that that school's

examination results remain at the high level the school currently celebrates. Since he

recognises his obligations to the DEC as a teacher and deputy-principal, he emphasises

that the new approaches he seeks to recommend in the school will not affect his level of

compliance with the DEC body. In saying, "there is space for this to happen", he

establishes that the ideas of undirected time and greater levels of student freedom are

not circumventing his obligations or contractual duties. Rather, he is working within

particular parameters that the DEC has established. Due to the imperatives of

maintaining consistently high exam results and complying with DEC mandates, David

is "working from within" in garnering support and recognition for his research. He aims

to persuade the school principal and the DEC on his convictions that creativity arises

from an environment characterised by choice, indeterminacy and open-endedness while

simultaneously complying with institutional imperatives. This sense of "working from

within" is in accordance with Foucault's account on freedom, where it is not some final destination point away from the stricture and confines of the individual's current context (Bernauer & Mahon, 2005; Foucault, 1994b). In order to gain the support of school management and colleagues, David believes that he needs to secure the backing of others considered senior to him in the education field:

> If I can somehow argue this point and I have enough people who are very successful… because you still have to tick enough boxes that people will pay attention, right… so people have still got to say, "aw that's right". They've got to agree. But if I get enough people who are well respected enough by others to agree… people will say, "There's a bunch of academics who agree with this. Good. We'll trust you. You can do it".

> Now, I have to have people prepared to trust me… for the principal to say, "Well kids seem to be going ok don't they… they seem to be getting the marks so we can't really say he's not doing the job… but gee it doesn't look like a normal classroom". If they trust me, they'll let me go… then I can do that.

In working from within, David is not making a kind of revolt or acting in dissidence (Foucault, 2009). Just as the community in the pastoral society of Foucault's *Security, Terror, Population* lectures began to see alternatives from the baptism of children towards adult and voluntary baptism (Foucault, 2009, p. 277), David is seeking new community understandings into how creativity can be facilitated and embraced at his school. Foucault's account of power and relationality comes to the fore here. Power is not conceived of as an object that can change its location from the authority of the

examination to practices David will advocate for. Rather, as in the case of other school leaders in research (Niesche; 2013a, 2013b; Niesche & Keddie, 2015), David is playing a strategic game of balancing countervailing forces between how to facilitate both ideas of his ethical substances, and garnering support from those respected in the education community. His PhD is therefore a practice that testifies to the way in which power is both diffuse and elusive of fixed direction.

There is an interesting point of resonance between David's actions and the notion of gatekeepers, which Csikszentmihalyi (1997) and Sawyer (2006) apply to creativity. While David doesn't talk about gatekeepers in terms of products that are deemed creative, he positions the principal as someone he needs to convince of the benefits of experimentation and unconventionality. The principal is a kind of intermediary in a position to decide if David's ideas have merit, or if they are appropriate for the school context. If the principal, a gatekeeper of sorts, decides that David's ideas can be realised in his school, and that they are compatible with the myriads of compliance forms such as the DEC examinations, the field of music education in this school legitimates his approach. If David can convince others that his account of creativity attains the self-expression depths to which he aspires, while not negatively impinging on the schools' high reputation, he believes his ideas will be accepted and legitimated.

Project work with junior classes.

Counter-conduct is also apparent in David's election to teach particular classes that do not have a final high-stakes examination. Since he believes that NAPLAN classes or the HSC directs the conduct of teachers in ways antithetical to creativity, for

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example excluding behaviours that deviate from an established order, choosing a class level other than one of those targeted by these exams to make space for creativity represents a type of counter-conduct. David here is acting on his subject-position as a deputy-principal to choose these classes. In this school, teachers teach across all the class levels and so, while they may not only work with students in Year Twelve (final year terminating with the HSC exam), they have to address examination imperatives in their daily work. They cannot make the choice afforded by David's unique position as deputy-principal to work only with junior classes. David's choice to work with junior classes does not manifest as a level of disobedience or refusal to comply, but as a way of countering the steering mechanisms of examination technologies. In the comments below, he provides an example of a project-based approach:

> I have a little group of musicians and we have to do a performance after
> four or five hours together… and they're learning skills as a small
> ensemble … I believe that's going to run in the background and we will
> address that as we go along. I started by saying to each of the kids, "what's
> the piece of music that's rattling around your head at the moment. What is
> it that you can't stop listening to or something that you're really keen on at
> the moment, a favourite song or favourite piece"?

The fact that David associates this project with creativity evokes a Vygotskian understanding of the concept, which centres on disassociated elements of a student's prior experience and subsequent associations (Smolucha, 1992). In addition, David's beliefs resonate with the primacy Dewey placed on experience (Dewey, 1934, 1938). The students' stage-of-readiness and their individual immersion in musical problem-

solving experiences leads the lesson, rather than set pieces of music and pre-established issues.

David went on to describe how his use of the students' own selections of music and the eventual aim of a group composition and performance presented a range of issues and learning opportunities with which students had to engage. Since there was no pre-determined arrival point, he found these classes more conducive to exploration and improvisation, both of which feature in David's *telos* for creativity. For example, lessons premised on new applications for previously encountered material and on musical problem-solving facilitated the kind of dialogue below:

> "Are we going to leave the melody as it is and go 'ouch' or are we going to
> do something different with that"? ... And so that process pushes them (the
> students) to find musical solutions… to find solutions to musical problems
> and I believe, well we're having fun.

As David says below, these kinds of project-based experiences are much more feasible in the junior classes:

> You put me on junior classes where we can do holistic stuff that ticks all
> those boxes in a couple of weeks… then I've got the rest of the year to go
> different places.

The challenges that arise and the experiences facilitated by David's projects with junior classes cannot all be pre-planned or mapped out in advance, a prerogative of the effects of disciplinary power discussed in the previous chapter. His use of the phrase, "we can do holistic stuff that ticks all those boxes in a couple of weeks" followed by

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"then I've got the rest of the year to go different places" clearly illustrates how David prioritises the learning opportunities inherent in group work over highly-mandated outcomes that feature in senior curriculum classwork. His description of how he can meet specific objectives as mandated by the curriculum and school management, while still facilitating experiences that he deems creativity-oriented, indicates a nuanced example of a counter-conduct "in the very general field of power relations" (Foucault, 2004, p. 202). Illustrating how this counter-conduct plays out in practice, David says:

> I believe that the outcomes are going to run in the background and we will address them as we go along. But actually I don't use it (this course of ensemble work with a junior class) for that purpose.... I'm still trying to remember what the aim of this current class is… But actually I don't care, we'll get into that in the last week if we have to because that's going to be a really simple thing. The stated aim we will come to … and I might have to contrive to reach it.

In this comment, David positions aims that are normally prescriptive and used to appropriate the efficient use of time (as discussed in the previous chapter) as something that he has forgotten. He counters any notion of a specified aim mandating what he does in the classroom by dramatically limiting its centrality here. The choice of the word "contrive" is interesting. Since David had spoken about the aim as something he will achieve, I do not interpret contrive to mean "fabricate" or "make up" a link between his activities and the aim. Rather, it seems from the context of the conversation that accounting for the specific alignment between the aim and work underway may require a diversion from his overall project. By choosing processes and experiences that

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resonate with what he wants to do, David positions the achievement of the aim as a "really simply thing". He rationalises how to balance his aspirations for creativity with the imperatives to document progress.

In saying, "I don't care", and in prioritising his view of creativity over delineations of aims, it might seem that David is making a kind of "revolt" against the disciplinary effects of schooling. However, as Foucault says, this word "is too strong to designate much more diffuse and subdued forms of resistance" (Foucault, 2009, p. 266). The comment on "contriving" and backward planning followed soon after David expressed his belief that his work will meet all required outcomes. He believes that his classes will lead to a rich tapestry of learning experiences, with the result that it is difficult to find the descriptor on an outline of aims:

> We will have had so many experiences that if I come back to this after each
> lesson and said, "Man, this is stuff we did… let me find where that box
> could be… oh there it is". They've had a huge experience of music making
> and musical problem-solving where they've had to understand a whole
> stack of stuff, and not just understand it. Do it… you know. Find it. Search
> the solution out.

As previously outlined, classes of this nature do not occur in a vacuum devoid of the effects of disciplinary power. The quotation below illustrates some of the institutional and normalising forces at work in David's context:

> So I have to say to these classes every time: "This can be the most boring
> class you've ever done or you can make it happen. Either I lead it or we
> make music together. It can dissolve into nothing and you can have a very

wasteful time… at which point, once it gets too wasteful, I jump in and be

the teacher again telling you what to do. Or we can do something that I

think is going to be something really fun. Trust me on this".

While at first there is an emphasis on working together with the student, and the

egalitarian notion of "making music together", which corresponds with a notion of

creativity in exchanges between students and teachers (Thomas, 2009, 2010b), his

comments here also evoke patterns of classroom dynamics which David is trying to

circumvent. In alluding to his power to "jump in" and influence the course of the

lesson, to "wasteful time" or to "being the teacher" throughout these articulations of

counter-conduct above, David invokes normalised assumptions of what these mean. In

his overall vision of problems only arising in the context of the lesson, the point at

which the use of time becomes "too wasteful" is far from clear. As I have argued in the

previous chapter, productive use of time and the "good teacher" who imparts knowledge

are discourses associated with disciplinary power and examination imperatives. Since

David uses these references when engaging students, he assumes a shared uniform

understanding of how time should normally be spent, and of what a good teacher does.

Terms like "being the teacher again", imply the work underway in this lesson or the

subjectivity constructed is not characteristically "the teacher". This represents an

example of a "permanent provocation" (Foucault, 2002c, p. 342) between a sense of

what the teacher would otherwise be doing in the classroom and what David aspires to

do. While it is clear from the comments above that David does not wish to revert to

"jumping in" or to directing the students, his comment that he always tells classes about

his capacity to do so indicates a dualism in the message given to students. This is an

example of where the subjectivity David seeks to construct can be compromised by his

position in the discursive context of a school institution. The image of a deputy-school leader and teacher as one who can "jump in" and direct is compatible with the effects of disciplinary power discussed in the previous chapter where, for example, "good" teachers are able to offset "outside the box" behaviours and co-ordinate the progression of activities in their classrooms. While David aims to resist this jumping in (to establish what he believes to be the best environment for creativity), he may have to compromise the subject position constructed in order to fulfil a role partly created by disciplinary power effects in the school institution. Since David's work occurs in an institutional setting wherein his and students' subjectivity are being actively fashioned, his counter-conduct and the effects by which his conduct is steered are simultaneously articulations of the power flowing throughout the discursive context of the school.

Advocating for students.

The example explored throughout this section, by which David counters normalising effects, is one of his advocacy for students whose behaviours are disapproved of by classroom teachers. This is another example of where David uses his position as a deputy-principal to his advantage in the pursuit of his vision for creativity. As the previous chapter has shown, for some teachers a negative effect of surveillance and normalisation in institutions is that behaviours not oriented towards examinations are suppressed. An example of such a previously discussed effect by which the examination appropriates behaviours, is the prioritisation of student compliancy while simultaneously excluding behaviours such as risk-taking. Since teachers report to David on student behaviours, he has an opportunity to resist situations in which he believes

creativity-related behaviours are being excluded. In the example below, David indicates how he uses his position in the school to counter such exclusions:

> I had a staff member complain about a student and this student had gone to the learning and welfare support meeting… this kid… we were looking at whether or not we were going to have to have him assessed for being you know… having a learning difficulty… and this kid kept coming up. "Oh he's just completely not engaged. He's disrupting the class. Oh it's a very serious… a real problem". So it had come up so many times that it reached me and I went to the teacher and I said, "Right, tell me what's happening". This kid was just really really smart and actually very creative. He's already heard the beginning of the sentence, knows where the sentence is going, thinks three steps down the track, comes up with something quite laterally… but somehow related to this thing and makes a stab at the answer that the teacher's going to ask for in ten minutes. You know… and calls it out and the teacher is disappointed that this kid is disrupting the class. Because he doesn't fit the mould.

The tension between David's subjectivity as a teacher and as a deputy-principal is evident in the gap between the creative behaviours David celebrates and the expectation on him to maintain and support an established order that may suppress these behaviours. In his comments earlier on his teaching preference for project work in junior classes, David prioritised student voice and self-direction and spoke about the notions of breaking rules and taking risks in pursuing creative outcomes. However, here his work as a deputy-principal requires that he supports a teacher who considers student

behaviours that diverges from those expected to be highly problematic. On reviewing the situation, David felt the student's unconventional behaviours and divergent thinking processes were related to his creativity. Where a conduct expected of him may traditionally be to impose and maintain a particular type of order, he countered this by using his deputy-principal position to advocate for the student and reason with the teacher that he didn't see the behaviour as intentionally disruptive. This coincides with his vision that creativity is not facilitated by factory models of schooling where teachers appropriate only desired classroom dynamics. Rather than insisting on the status quo, or in this instance, rather than "siding" with a teacher's dislike of certain characteristics of creative students (Westby & Dawson, 1995), David constructs himself as a student advocate to help facilitate his version of creativity in the school.

As well as representing a countering of disciplinary power effects, this experience also reveals a frankness that Foucault associated with *parrhesia.* Although, on this occasion, he was not directly speaking "upwards" and risking danger associated with *parrhesia* as in a philosopher speaking to a sovereign (Foucault, 2001a, 2001b), he nonetheless takes a level of risk with his frankness. Here, David gives a "complete and exact account of what he has in mind so that the audience is able to comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks… avoiding any kind of rhetorical form which would veil what he thinks" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 12). In advocating for the student considered disruptive, David speaks up to normalising and surveillance effects in the school and to the behaviours they engender. Drawing on the previous chapter, such effects include the expectations of school management that classrooms are appropriately disciplined, or the questioning of parents where teachers' actions deviate from preparation for examinations. His practice of advocating for the student comes from his conviction on

what is true in terms of the environment and the student dispositions that support creativity.

In addition to frankness, a sense of duty emerges in this experience of advocating for a student. Drawing on Foucault, "no one forces him to speak, but he feels that it is his duty to do so" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 19). David was not in any way compelled to deviate from an expected pattern of student/teacher interaction. Foucault establishes that a sense of duty, a "duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as a sovereign" (Foucault, 2001a, p. 19), is a characteristic feature of *parrhesia*. Against the backdrop of surveillance and normalising power effects, David felt it was his duty to maintain a space for those behaviours that are otherwise supressed and downplayed. He did not believe that this student's behaviours warranted labelling as a manifestation of a learning difficulty or warranted disciplinary sanctions. Although contrary to an established status quo, David, led by a sense of duty, took the opportunity to advocate for the student and to ensure greater receptivity in the school towards behaviours he associates with creativity.

Modelling practices.

In order to pursue his visions for creativity, David believes it is not enough for a teacher to merely talk *about* creativity, or to sustain a highly regulated work environment with clear demarcations between teacher and student. Instead, bearing in mind that part of David's *telos* involves "joining the students on a journey" in transcending boundaries and safety nets, David spoke of the necessity of investing himself in class activities and of demonstrating to student that he too aspires to the

"new" and "different" that he associates with creativity. In reinforcing this point, he said:

> I think you need to be a teacher and a performer or a composer… I don't believe you can be a person who merely… and this is going to sound horrible, because I'm in the education business...who merely conforms to the outcomes. To provide opportunity for creativity and to be able to assess creativity, I think you need to be a person who aspires to that themselves. So when I want to write a different piece of music, I change the tuning on my guitar. Otherwise, I just go to the same chord shapes I know already. I mean, I'll play the same thing. So change the tuning.

The message he gives here is that it is only in aspiring towards creative outcomes himself that David is in a position to facilitate and recognise similar outcomes in students' work. When he himself models unconventional practices and novel deployment of skills, such as in the example of changing the guitar tuning, he is at once a teacher and a performer/composer. His expectation that such a deviation by one in the "education business", from conforming to outcomes will be negatively interpreted, portrays this modelling practice as a counter-conduct.

David's tuning of his own guitar in different ways in the music classroom rather than mandating to students to change instrument tuning is a singular example of "the utilization of tactics which allows the modifications of relations of power" (Foucault, 2009, p. 216). Merely telling student what they should do or preserving creativity for the realm of students' activities only would equate with a downward conceptualisation of power. By the example of modelling such practices and aspiring towards creativity in

his own work, David modifies downward relations of power. The power relations in a disciplinary environment, where teachers assess students, conform to outcomes and coordinate student behaviours, are confronted by David's actions of modelling practices with his class. In striving towards his *telos* for creativity, David adjusts his role from one who mandates what students do to one of a co-creator with the students.

Throughout these notions of co-creating with students, and in earlier comments where David said that he does not wish to be a final judge of students' work, he invokes a *parrhesiastic* relationship where "at a given moment the person to whom one is speaking finds himself in a situation in which he no longer needs the others discourse" (Foucault, 2001b, p. 379). A classroom with fellow performers or composers, rather than a downward hierarchy from teacher to student, creates possibilities for students to build a relationship of sovereignty to themselves (Foucault, 2001b), and to realise that what they do in his class is one and the same process/journey as that undertaken by the teaching deputy-principal. In the example above, David's actions facilitate a sense of self- sovereignty in the sense that he doesn't require students to merely follow his instructions in order to engage in creative practice, but demonstrates that their actions and processes are as likely to lead to creative outcomes as those of the teacher. Through his modelling practices, David establishes more equalised relationships between teacher and student, not premised upon teacher direction, but upon acknowledgement that every individual (teacher and student) can aspire towards creative outcomes.

The fluidity in relationships between individuals here corresponds with sociological and relational accounts of creativity that prioritise exchanges between students and teachers (Adams, 2013; Brown, 2013; Thomas, 2009, 2010b). The work is not considered creative only when a master teacher deems it so; creativity emerges

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through trustful engagements between individuals and is a product of shared experiences among them (Adams, 2013). Despite the challenges and uncertainties, and the necessity to negotiate normalising influences in the school institution, David concluded by asserting the long-term benefits of the forms of elaboration outlined above. On the basis of his own observations and accounts from former students, striving to attain more equal relationships and student self-sovereignty bears the fruit of David's aspirations for creativity:

> This is what I have tried in my teaching and there are a lot of students who I still keep in contact with who are making music out there, who do have fulfilling lives as musicians or as music teachers. Or are still making music for fun because they enjoy it.

In an ever-evolving economy of truth and reality, David's practices, as exemplified here throughout this chapter, emerge from convictions he holds on creativity. These convictions and beliefs derive from his *telos* or vision for creativity, which, to varying degrees, supports or counters normalised accounts of the concept.

Conclusion

This chapter presented an account of an individual's construction of the concept of creativity, an account made possible using Foucault's writings on ethical self-formation, incorporating the concepts of counter-conduct and *parrhesia* as forms of elaboration. Using a range of examples of specific practices, I indicated how David sustains or counters normalised discourses of creativity highlighted in Chapters Five and Six, and how he negotiates the tensions between normalising influences and his own *telos.*

This chapter demonstrated multiple points of alignments between the neoliberalised/disciplined accounts of creativity from Chapters Five and Six, and David's individualised account. There is not a clear divide between these accounts discussed in previous chapters and David's active construction work; the relationship between "normalised creativity" and "individualised creativity" reveals patterns of co-option and countering. For example, the neoliberalised notion of creativity as related to productivity and entrepreneurialism, or its juxtaposing with prescribed skills and knowledge bases, are not outside of David's beliefs on the concept. Creativity for him will ameliorate living conditions and come to the service of students as they navigate their future work lives and engagement in society. David believes that creativity, as the propensity to take risks and go beyond established conventions, cannot occur without the development of the range of skills and knowledge centralised by the examination.

Other neoliberalised and disciplined discourses of creativity strongly misalign with how David conceives of the concept. Rather than appearing as stark dichotomies, these misalignments emerge where positive correlations outlined above signify

definitive limits to creativity. He fundamentally disagrees with the notions of entrepreneurialism or productivity as synonymous with creativity, arguing that creativity is not "doing more of the same", a discourse engendered by economy or productivity-oriented frames of reference. Similarly, he believes that an appropriation of student behaviours in classrooms that eradicates risk-taking and unconventionality have the effect of "training the creativity out of students".

Throughout this chapter, I pointed out where David's position as both a deputy-principal and teacher presents multiple tensions for him. He believes that creativity is related to unconventional behaviours and to the breaking of rules or conventions. He also has responsibility for ensuring that the examination-oriented indicators of his employment body are met, and that he supports teachers with students considered disruptive. To deal with the tensions manifest in this dual subject-position and with the misalignment between his own and normalised accounts of creativity, David engages in a range of practices to construct himself as an advocate for students and as a co-worker with them. David's practices are a lens through which to analyse his personal beliefs and practices, and also to analyse the patterns by which such beliefs and practices relate to the policy and institutional context.

This chapter is an important contribution to the thesis in that it focuses on the nuances of an individual-level construction of creativity, and illustrates the active construction of the concept against specific conditions of possibility. Neither policy constructs of creativity, nor institutional normalisations of the concept, are given any primacy above the individual's construction work. Rather, the notions of *telos,* ethical substance, modes of subjection and forms of elaboration (theorised as counter-conduct and *parrhesia*) prioritise the individual. While a plethora of discourses constructs a

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neoliberalised version of creativity in education policy and disciplinary power effects construct another "reality" for creativity in Australian schools, another equally valid reality, in a Foucauldian conceptualisation, is the effects of individual practices that emerge from their freedom to act.

Power effects traverse David's actions and practices as well as traversing policy and institution-level practices. The analysis of power effects throughout this chapter portrays the subtleties of power at the individual level, one of three levels in focus throughout this thesis. Taken together, the three analysis chapters link the construction of the concept of creativity to the conditions of possibility in policy and practice, providing a detailed and nuanced account of how creativity is constructed in the Australian context.

The final chapter of this thesis draws together conclusions on the contingency of creativity knowledge construction and outlines the contributions of the thesis.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

In a society like our own, games can be very numerous… the more open the game, the more appealing and fascinating it becomes. (Foucault, 1994b, p. 300)

This conclusion chapter begins with a summary of the thesis, within which I outline the contribution made by all of the other chapters. In the context of this summary, I also identify the responses the thesis offers to the research questions. These responses follow a reiteration in underlined text of the research questions throughout the chapter summaries. The second main section of this chapter is an outline of the specific contributions of the thesis. Under the three headings of Australian perspectives on creativity, policy studies and Foucault's work in education research, I present a range of specific contributions that the thesis offers to the literature. Following this, the limitations of the research are discussed where I acknowledge the ways in which the research design precludes the generalisation of the conclusions reached. This thesis concludes with some final thoughts, which I call "displacements and transformations".

Summary of Thesis

This thesis used the work of Michel Foucault to ascertain *how* creativity becomes articulated and known in Australian education in policy, in normalising and surveillance technologies of institutions and in the specific practices enacted by an individual teacher. It foregrounded the discursive conditions of possibility in policy and practice as

a means to shed light on how creativity, despite being elusive of any fixed meaning, is reified into multiple truths. No truths about creativity (e.g. that it is linked to problem-solving, is a general capability, can be assessed, can be facilitated in pre-planned lessons etc.) were taken as pre-established realities in this thesis. Rather, my concern was with how power effects in policy and practice reify truths or versions of creativity. Taking three access points into the creativity discourses in the Australian context (policy, the school institution and the individual), I have identified that multiple versions of creativity are simultaneously being constructed. Contradictory truths about creativity are being told throughout the discourse nexus. For example, education policy constructs creativity as that which can be channelled into a design process and into problem-solving strategies, whereas some teachers speak of the impossibility of ascribing creativity to any work previously done by someone else. I have drawn out how discursive conditions in policy and practice legitimate particular versions of creativity whilst also lending little support towards alternative versions. Without advocating for or supporting particular versions of creativity, the thesis highlights the significance and "real effects" brought about by how creativity is constructed in Australian education. These effects are further discussed in the summary of the chapters below.

Chapter One introduced the topic and highlighted the paradox of the concept of creativity being simultaneously reified in educational contexts and that which resists fixed meaning. I relayed personal encounters with this paradox throughout my time as a student and as a primary teacher. This chapter also highlighted the potential for Foucauldian concepts of discourse and power/knowledge to be brought to bear on the problem of creativity. The contributions of this thesis to the literature on creativity in Australia, to policy enactment studies, and to Foucault-inspired research were outlined

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(see contributions section below for more discussion). Also, in this chapter, I articulated the overall aim of the project: *To understand how Australian education policy, institutions and individuals discursively construct the concept of creativity.*

After outlining the potential of Foucault's work to meet this aim, I outlined the questions addressed by the thesis:

- How are discourses of creativity constructed in educational policy? (addressed in Chapter Five)

- How do practices of a school institution sustain particular discourses of creativity? (addressed in Chapter Six)

- What discourses of creativity are ignored or omitted in policy and practice? (addressed in Chapters Five and Six)

- How does an individual accept or resist normalised assumptions about creativity constructed in policy and practice? (addressed in Chapter Seven)

Chapter Two engaged with the concept of creativity and emphasised that there is no universally applicable conceptualisation. This chapter is important to the thesis in that it points out the impossibility of singular truths about creativity, establishing a rationale for an analysis of discursive conditions in the quest to understand the concept. It surveyed the field of creativity in education research to identify a plethora of discourses. These discourses or versions were structured around five themes: "creativity and the individual", "creativity and the social context", "creativity as unknown and unwanted", "creativity and appropriations in education and economic contexts" and "creativity and multiplicities". Through the lens of these different themes, the chapter

identified how different possible creativity-related objects and subjectivities are constructed (e.g. the appropriation of different behaviours and different patterns of engagement between individuals). To destabilise and problematise particular versions of creativity, I drew attention to various tensions and points of incompatibility between them. I pre-empted the work to follow in Chapters Five to Seven by outlining discursive conditions that account for the constructedness of creativity versions and by drawing attention to the questions that a discursive-condition analysis would pose. In the analysis of how policy and practice construct creativity, it is the range of versions discussed here in Chapter Two that forms the basis of the discussion by which conditions relate to particular creativity discourses. Therefore, the "possible version" contextualisation of creativity discourses in Chapter Two also acted as a scene setting for the analysis of creativity discourses both inside and outside "the true".

Chapter Three introduced the work of Michel Foucault and outlined how this is drawn upon throughout the thesis. I indicated how his works are widely used in education research, but have rarely informed research on creativity. I identified how his notions of discourse and power/knowledge closely align with the aim of this thesis to understand how the truth articulated about creativity reflects the conditions of possibility inherent in policy and practice. I then contextualised the specific concepts from Foucault's work which are used to analyse data in this project: *homo economicus*, disciplinary power, ethical self-formation, *parrhesia* and counter-conduct. I outlined how these concepts facilitate close engagement with the three sites of policy, the school institution and the individual, and so facilitate a detailed and nuanced portrayal of how creativity is constructed in education. After identifying where Foucault introduced and

used the concepts, I then provided some relevant examples of where they are used by other researchers before specifying how I make use of each concept in this thesis.

Chapter Four detailed the methodological design of this thesis. Firstly, I discussed epistemological underpinnings and ways in which Foucault's genealogical approach guides the work. I identified how a genealogical approach is suited to the aim of this thesis since Foucault's genealogical enquiries were focused on how conditions of possibility construct knowledge, and on how conditions facilitate a silence around alternative truths. The chapter also relayed relevant details on the policies (e.g. from where they emerged and author details) and on the school/participants (e.g. school context and teachers' number of years worked) and, in doing so, contextualised the document and interview transcript data sets. An "approach to analysis" section within the policy and interview discussion outlined how the above-mentioned concepts from Foucault's work were chosen and appropriated as analytical concepts for Chapters Five to Seven. The ethical procedures of complying with university policy in recruiting participants and gathering data were outlined. This chapter then engaged with the concept of neoliberalism, one that frequently arises in literature on creativity, on policy critique in Australian education and on Foucault's work. Due to its centrality in all of these bodies of literature, the particular conceptualisation of the concept guiding this thesis was presented here in this design chapter. Importantly, this chapter concluded with a section on positionality where I outlined how my subjectivity, and decisions I took throughout the research, locate me within the project, rather than as a detached or objective researcher.

Chapter Five, the first of the analysis chapters, focused on five education policies including *Australian Curriculum: The Arts Foundation to Year 10* (ACARA, 2013a),

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Australian Professional Standards for Teachers (AITSL, 2011), *Creative Australia* (Australian Government, 2013), *The Melbourne Declaration of Goals for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008) and *PISA 2012 Results: Creative Problem Solving Volume V* (OECD, 2014). In this chapter, I drew on Foucault's notion of a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility to address the first and the third research question. In relation to the first question, on <u>how discourses of creativity are constructed in educational policy</u>, I argued that the parameters established by neoliberal ideas of competition, productivity and entrepreneurialism, all of which permeate through the policy documents, sustain particular versions of creativity: creativity is design and problem-solving oriented, manifests in bold and daring behaviours and is vital to cope with uncertain and unstable environments. The truth of neoliberalised versions of creativity derives from their emergence in identified national concerns such as employability and economic instability and in systems of specification that orient them to curricular architectures, industry discourses and to international benchmarking technologies.

In relation to the other relevant research question for this chapter<u>, on the discourses of creativity ignored or omitted in policy, </u>a number of discourses were identified in the context of the analysis. These include discourses of indeterminacy and incubation, notions of "little-c" or "mundane creativity" or engagement with the idea of a "malevolent" creativity. Discourses of creativity as a specialised talent, as a constellation of the individual's unique resources, or as individual genius are not mentioned where creativity is expressed as that which can be developed in all. Creativity that emanates from tactful exchanges between teachers and students, in

relations among individuals, in sustained engagement in specific fields, or that has emotional dimensions are secondary to the notion of individual gain and competition.

Chapter Six, the second analysis chapter, focused on the school institution and drew on data from two interviews with each of seven participants. In this chapter, I drew on Foucault's notion of disciplinary power to address the second and third research questions. In regards to the question of how practices of a school institution sustain particular discourses of creativity, I argued that disciplinary effects of the normalisation and comparison of individuals in schools, and the appropriation of time, produces particular versions of creativity. These versions are such that it can unfold in a linear fashion, can be assessed, can be directed by the teacher, can coincide with parents' expectations on what good teacher do, and can lead to products already established as creative. Turning my attention to the question of the discourses of creativity that are ignored or omitted in practice, I argued that there is a silence around alternative truths that associate creativity with risk-taking, unconventionality and ambiguity, or with behaviours not necessarily liked by teachers. Discourses of free-play, incubation time, specific fields of knowledge and creativity that eludes assessment are omitted in output and measurement-oriented frames of reference (e.g. those premised on high stake examinations). A normalisation of what the "good teacher" does presents a tension for accounts of creativity that position it in apprenticeship models, in micro-moments between the student and teacher, or alongside a call for greater levels of teachers' decision-making, flexibility and autonomy in facilitating the concept.

Finally, **Chapter Seven** focused on one individual teacher. In this chapter, I argued that the way in which the formation of a particular subjectivity, which co-opts and counters normalised discourses of creativity, demonstrates how creativity is

constructed at the level of the individual. This analysis was informed by Foucault's four axes of ethical self-formation, incorporating counter-conduct and *parrhesia* as forms of elaboration. Throughout this chapter, I engaged with the fourth research question: <u>How does an individual accept or resist normalised assumptions about creativity constructed in policy and practice?</u> I highlighted how neoliberalised notions of entrepreneurialism, productivity and problem-solving, along with disciplinary powers' emphasis on teaching and assessing generic and normalised skills, constitute elements of creativity for this individual teacher. However, the practices in which he engages to constitute his subjectivity - personalised reporting to parents, writing a PhD thesis, undertaking project work with junior classes, advocating for students and modelling practices - indicate his countering of mandated behaviours and outcomes. In pursuing his own vision of creativity through his practices of counter-conduct and *parrhesia*, this teacher prioritises student choice and direction, improvisational time, and the avoidance of pre-established work patterns.

Specific contributions of the thesis

The contributions of this thesis are discussed below at three levels. The first contribution it makes is to the literature on how creativity is conceptualised in the Australian context. Secondly, it contributes to policy enactment studies by providing an account of how creativity discourses are interpreted and enacted at three different sites. The third category is the contribution the thesis makes to Foucault-inspired education research. The key point relating to each contribution is presented in underlined text in the discussion below for clarity.

Australian perspectives on creativity.

In view of the centrality of the topic of creativity in Australia, a contribution of this thesis is that it fills a gap in the literature on the concept in this country. Few accounts are offered in the literature of how creativity is positioned and articulated across a range of contemporary Australian policy texts. This thesis presents a current and contextualised account of the knowledge of creativity that manifests in influential policies in Australian education and in situated practices in schools. The timely study was conducted in the context of a wave of policy "firsts" - a new Australian National Curriculum and recent rearticulating of the place of creativity in the success of the individual and the nation (ACARA, 2013a; Australian Government, 2013; MCEETYA, 2008). The relatively recent publication of a new curriculum that speaks of "creative and expressive potential" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 6), and the incorporation of a generic capability called "critical and creative thinking" that extends across all learning areas, demonstrates the concern with creativity. The following three sections reflect a very limited sample of current creativity-related questions and debates to which the Australia-specific conclusions reached in this thesis can respond.

Sample question one: Is creativity damaged by neoliberalism?

A common theme in literature is that neoliberalism manifests as an oppositional force to creativity (Adams, 2013; Mansfield, 2009). However, the analysis throughout this thesis does not support an assertion that a stark point of contrast can be made between creativity and neoliberal imperatives in education. It does not portray creativity as wholly related to self-revelation (Grierson, 2011) or as that which exists "under the sign" of the market (Bröckling, 2013). Instead, this thesis reveals a more nuanced

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account of how the school institution and teachers engage with neoliberalised versions of creativity. Using the conceptualisation of neoliberalism afforded by Foucault - the centralisation of the market and the prioritisation of competitiveness, entrepreneurship and productivity (Foucault, 2004) - this thesis highlights how the truth about creativity is influenced by such discourses in the Australian context. Many discourses of normalisation and problem-solving, linked to market metrics and entrepreneurship, are articulated as relating intimately to creativity in teachers' discourses. Teachers welcomed the prioritisation of key skills and diagnosis of learning needs as afforded by NAPLAN technologies, outlining their belief that mastery of skills is foundational for creativity. As well as taking a place in neoliberal productivity and economy-oriented discourses, problem-solving also comprised part of an individual teachers' *telos* for creativity. Elements of creativity discourses that may be termed neoliberal are supported by the discursive conditions in schools and compatible with an individual's visions of teaching.

However, this analysis provides examples of how a teacher engages in practices to align creativity to the aspirations that he holds, and in so doing counters some neoliberal appropriations. Chapter Seven of this thesis shows how David downplays discourses of competition in pursuing and advocating for learning experiences where students will "just hang out and make music together". He resists discourses of productivity by reporting to parents that creativity manifests in student work that deviates from "more-of-the-same" type products. Therefore, a more nuanced picture of the relationship between creativity and neoliberalism in Australian education emerges from the examples in this thesis, rather than a stark dichotomy or binary between the concepts.

Sample question two: Is creativity domain general or domain specific?

In the midst of debates on whether creativity is domain general or domain specific (Baer, 1998, 2012; Deng, 2007; Lassig, 2013; Silvia, Kaufman & Pretz, 2009), the analysis of the conditions of possibility in this thesis provides insights from the Australian context. It is a domain general skill where it is positioned as a generic employability concern in policy (ACARA, 2013b; MCEETYA, 2008). Throughout the argument on the conditions inherent in the documents, a rationale for this domain-general construct is provided. If creativity is vital for economic success and for competition with other nation states, it must be relatable to all subject areas as a generic capability. I associated truth about a generic nature of creativity to an instrumentality and measurability engendered by neoliberalism and to the normalising effects of disciplinary power.

At the same time, however, the curriculum references how discreet subject areas "involve different approaches to arts practices and critical and creative thinking that reflect distinct bodies of knowledge, understanding and skills" (ACARA, 2013a, p. 12). In speaking of creativity with the teachers in a music department, there were many elucidations of creativity that is very much inherent to the music field (Burnard & Younker, 2002; Humphreys, 2006; Running, 2008). Within this field, composition was frequently linked to creativity, while other teachers believed creativity manifests in performance. One teacher commented that it had taken thirty or more years to appreciate creativity in the domain of composition alone. These accounts of subject-specific creativity, and of the difficulty in recognising creative work, were offered in teachers' critiques of normalised constructs of creativity. The individual teacher, whose discussions form the basis of Chapter Seven, outlined very specific actions that he takes

in the pursuit of his vision for creativity. <u>This thesis demonstrates a disjuncture between a predominately generic conceptualisation of domain-general creativity in policy, and multiple articulations of music-specific creativity in the school. At different points on a policy and practice nexus in Australia, creativity is both domain-specific and domain-general.</u>

Sample question three: Can creativity be taught and assessed?

In light of questions on whether one can teach for creativity (Cropley, 1999; Jeffrey, 2006a, 2006b; Jeffrey & Craft, 2004), or can assess creativity (Amabile, 1996; Hickey, 2001; Leong & Qiu, 2013), the analysis provided throughout this thesis articulates views on teaching and assessment from the Australian context. Throughout the thesis, I identified many discourses of creativity that assert it can be taught by teachers. I argued that policy and institutional discourses of assessment pertain to specific discursive conditions of neoliberal values and disciplinary effects. For example, the necessity of creativity for problem-solving is related to the measurability of this construct and to its utility value in design industries. Notions of teaching for creativity in this analysis extended from ideas of explicitly teaching problem-solving and modelling design skills to ideas of unsettling students rehearsed work patterns and breaking with pre-established conventions.

Assessment of creativity is possible in the Australian context where descriptors such as "creative problem-solving" (OECD, 2014) are associated with creativity. However, the rationale for an assessable version of creativity is linked in this thesis to neoliberal discourses of efficiency and to disciplinary effects of comparison and homogenisation. The assessment of components of problem-solving is further linked in

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this thesis to the benchmarking of students and to the acquisition of data on student performance. In practice, discourses of assessment ranged from support of the Consensual Assessment Technique (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Hickey, 2001), to beliefs that it takes thirty years to understand how to assess creativity in music, to the belief that creativity resists assessment of any kind. Teachers articulated the difficulty of applying normative judgment to creativity, against the predominance of normalising forces in institutional contexts. The Foucault-inspired analysis throughout this thesis problematises any uniform views on how to teach for creativity/ to teach creatively or how to assess the concept.

Policy studies.

Another contribution made by thesis is in the field of policy studies. The thesis responds to the importance that Ball et al. (2012, p. 184) placed on putting "policies in context and understand[ing] more about the processes behind their enactment". It does not ascribe to a notion of direct "translation" from published policy to schools/teachers. Therefore, the interest in this thesis is not in the level of teacher compliance with particular invocations such as "schools need to develop students' creative problem-solving skills" (e.g. OECD, 2014). Rather, the interest here is in how the power effects within a school institution make it possible to articulate such a notion as creative problem-solving. This thesis offers a nuanced policy study focused not on teachers' implementation of reified creativity policy, but on the contextual factors in school that sustain or counter such reifications.

Compatibility and tensions between discourses.

There is discrepancy in how particular discourses of creativity transfer between policy, institutions and individual sites. Some of the knowledge configurations that emerge at particular sites are compatible with the knowledge articulated at others. For example, the normalisation of skills that I have argued is an effect and outcome of disciplinary power at the level of the institution is compatible with individual-level beliefs that these skills are a component of creativity. The analysis in Chapter Seven highlights the individual teacher's conviction on the need for students to demonstrate mastery of particular skills and work-practices. According to David, if students haven't learned these rules, they have no basis from which to break them; unless foundational elements of skills and bodies of knowledge are put in place, students are placed at a disadvantage and not given the opportunity to creatively express themselves. Another example of compatibility between creativity discourses at different sites is how policy document constructions of creativity as a generic employability skill are sustained by institutional imperatives to make these skills visible and assessable.

There are other themes or unities where tension is indicated or where the knowledge that emerges at one level does not sit easily in all contexts or sites of analysis. This can be due to fundamentally different premises about the nature of creativity. For example, school institution-level discourses that have the effect of increasing visibility around creativity are difficult to reconcile with the individual's belief that creativity is about the unknown and resists reification. Institutional practices that prioritise high-stake examinations are in tension with discourses that equate creativity with breaking rules, with creativity that manifests according to individuals' rate of development and with creativity that requires abundant incubation time.

Furthermore, a discourse of creativity wherein it is impossible to assess or that unfolds in different ways for individuals (as discussed by teachers in Chapter Six and Seven) is difficulty to reconcile with intent-oriented design or problem-solving conceptualisations. A nuanced picture of how policy discourses move through the three sites of articulation has been presented in this thesis. Some discourses of creativity are constructed at all three sites while others are specific only to particular policies or practices.

Limitations and conditions of individuals.

This thesis highlights how the construction of discourses of creativity by individuals is informed by their specific limitations and conditions. There are simultaneously constraining forces and spaces of action inherent in policy and practice for individuals, both of which inform the construction of creativity. For example, in constructing the concept of creativity in education documents, policy makers also draw on economic and social agendas. Furthermore, the impact of globalisation infers that policy-makers draws on discourses of creativity beyond the Australian context and reflect the creativity appropriations of groups like the OECD in their publications.

Each individual school in Australia reflects a different context for the articulation of creativity discourse. The teachers that participated in this research spoke of their unique placement and place of enunciation in a public selective high school. They didn't feel under the same pressure to prioritise NAPLAN as occurs in other contexts (Cillekens & Harriet, 2016; Thompson & Harbaugh, 2013), and remarked that their students' musical starting place and foundation for creativity was markedly different to that of many other students. The conclusions reached in this thesis about how the school

institution constructs creativity are therefore specific to the discursive conditions in this school.

The construction of creativity discourses is also informed by the specific conditions of possibility that relate to each individual teacher. Even in this one school, individual beliefs and practices in relation to creativity emanated from teachers' differing senses of their agency and capacities for action. Ball et al.'s (2012, p. 48) claim that, "as teachers engage with policy and bring their creativity to bear on its enactment, they are also captured by it… they change it, in some ways, and it changes them" is borne out in this thesis. For example, a recently graduated teacher commented on her sense that classes were being monitored and that senior colleagues were judging her classroom management skills. This impacted on her confidence in pursuing with lessons characterised by noise, mobility, or disrupting the status quo, some of which she associated with creativity. Interestingly Ball et al. (2012, p. 63) noted in their typology of actors that junior teachers are "receivers" where their "creativity is strongly framed or articulated by the possibilities of policy".

Within this one music department, the practices relating to creativity were informed by a host of individuals' previous experiences: postgraduate reading, working as an artist-in residence, composing and performing, and employment in creative industries. David's unique subject position as a teaching deputy-principal is reflected in his construction of creativity. Simultaneously, he had to comply with mandates of his employment body and school management and also construct himself in accordance with his visions for creativity. As discussed, he pursued this vision by electing to teach junior classes with no terminal examination, by engaging in project work, by advocating

for students' creative behaviours and by establishing more equal relationships with students.

These examples of how the contingency of conditions of possibility work to construct creativity testify to the ways in which "diversities and distributions also produce spaces of avoidance and creativity and different ways of being a teacher and doing teaching" (Ball et al., 2012, p. 97). They offer an alternative account to simplistic notions of the translation of policy into practice.

Foucault in education research.

A third contribution of the thesis is its presentation of an example of how Foucault's work can be used to address contemporary questions in education. In providing this example, it responds to the need identified by Deacon (2006) and Lazaroiu (2013) for more work that draws on Foucault's writings to analyse empirical data. This thesis extends to a wide range of concepts from Foucault's work in addressing this need.

Orienting Foucault's writings to specific purposes and contexts.

This thesis illustrates examples of how Foucault's writings can be positioned as analytical concepts and methodological principles. Foucault's writings incorporate detailed theoretical and historical elaborations, rather than any blueprint for how these writings can be "applied" in education or in any other field. In taking up Foucault's challenge that writers use his writings as a toolbox, it is left to the researcher to draw on Foucault's work in their own specific contexts to find the points of application between their concerns and those of Foucault. The first step taken in this thesis to understand

how conditions of possibility establish truth about a concept that resists truth was to position the interplay between creativity and sites of meaning-making (policy and practice) as an interplay of power and knowledge. As described in Chapter Four, I then chose a range of analytical concepts from Foucault's texts that could be "plugged into" data sets (Hook, 2015; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, 2013) in order to theorise a portrayal of the construction of creativity in policy and practice. The selection of coordinate points on a *homo economicus* grid of intelligibility (Chapter Five), the presentation of three key themes for an analysis of disciplinary power (Chapter Six), and the interpretation of practices undertaken in the interest of creativity through the lens of ethical self-formation (Chapter Seven) all represent a research design premised on the invocation of Foucault's writings to address specific aims and questions.

While I do not in any way consider my work a "how-to" exemplar of Foucault-inspired education research, a contribution made by this thesis is to render one account of how his work can be used in a way it hasn't before (i.e. drawing the concepts into an *ensemble* to help understand the constructedness of creativity), thus testifying to the potential of Foucault's work to address very contemporary questions. Other researchers can see how I interpreted Foucault's work and its applicability in light of my questions and research aim. Elements of the approach I took here, such as the melding of concepts with sites of articulation, may work in other contexts with different empirical data or with different aims. With the limitations outlined later in this chapter, this thesis is an example of work that associates Foucault's writings with the topical concept of creativity in a specific geographical context where both Foucault's work and the concept are of great interest.

Modalities of power over singular conceptualisations.

The thesis also addresses another issue identified in literature where accounts of the "way things are" often lean exclusively on one direction of power. For example, Foucault's work has been invoked in portrayals of a singularly downward and dominating account of power where there is no acknowledgement of individuals' capacities for counter action (Leask, 2012). Another concern identified in research is that work drawing on Foucault's writings on freedom and the practices of the self, do not always contextualise the limitations and struggles within which these practices unfold (Olssen, 2005; Wolosky, 2014).

This thesis does not confine itself to *only* early or *only* late works from Foucault, but reads discourses of creativity through his multiple writings on different directions of power effects. It identifies several points of resonance between creativity and Foucault's work on multi-modalities of power, facilitating a nuanced view of how knowledge moves between different sites as influenced by the particular conditions of possibility. Although I certainly would not claim that this work represents something of "comprehensive" Foucauldian grid of analysis, or that it takes account of Foucault's writings on all the subtleties of power, the thesis retains a space for dialectical views of power and for the multi-directionality of its effects. This dialecticism is reflected throughout the research where technologies of disciplinary power such as the surveillance gaze of school management and parents are discussed in conjunction with the individual's freedom and practices of countering.

The account of dialectical power relations provided by this thesis is important work in light of many education research trends that construe certain themes such as

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performativity as dominant and oppressive, and others such as arts education or

creativity as inherently good. For example, in some accounts, creativity is an antidote

(Munday, 2014) or a counterpoint (Burnard & White, 2008) to the effects of

performativity. In this thesis, the focus on high examination results and outcomes, and

the negative effects on the development of creativity as expressed by teachers, do align

with critiques of performativity. However, some of the intersections between

performativity and creativity are much more subtle than oppositional, such as the

illustration of how skills normalised by examinations in the field of music education are

important elements of creativity for the teachers.

Limitations

There are limitations to this research as there are in any research project. Firstly,

the conclusions reached in this research cannot be generalised across other contexts.

The creativity discourses throughout the goals of *The Melbourne Declaration of Goals

for Young Australians* (MCEETYA, 2008) are connected to Australia's responsibilities

towards particular groups such as Indigenous learners and students from low socio-

economic backgrounds. Similarly, goals and aspirations for creativity throughout the

policy chain are connected with other nation-specific factors such as the recognition of

"creative services" as one of the fastest growing areas of the Australian economy

(Australian Government, 2013, p. 7). Therefore, all of the creativity discourses

throughout the policies analysed here are articulated within Australia-specific

parameters.

The selection of only policy and teachers' interview as data sets does not facilitate

an exhaustive portrayal of the discursive construction of creativity in Australian

education. An analysis of the consultation process by which policy is formulated, a case-study of Australian people celebrated as creative individuals, or extending the analysis to pre-primary or adult education reflects a host of other avenues of enquiry which could have accounted for alternative portrayals of how creativity is constructed.

Another limitation of the thesis is the singular focus on one school and the impossibility of generalisability to other contexts. As discussed earlier, the discourses of creativity constructed by the school in which this research was conducted are unavoidably specific to that school's context. Each of the descriptors like "public", "selective", "high school" or "music department" demarcates frames of reference from within which all of the teachers' discourses of creativity are articulated.

The exclusive use of Foucault's work to portray multiple ways by which the truth of creativity is constructed can also be considered as a limitation of this research. As outlined in Chapter Three, I used Foucault's work to address a gap whereby few research projects draw on his work to understand the concept of creativity. A limitation of focusing only on Foucault's work to understand creativity is that his writings establish methodological and epistemological principles that underpin the conclusions that can be reached. There are many other post-structural writers whose work could have been drawn on here. For example, the theoretical insights from Ranciere's concept of the police or Lyotard's notion of language games would potentially lead to different conclusions on how meaning is made of creativity. The thesis could have been conducted as a post-structural feminist analysis or underpinned by social-justice perspectives, both of which could also have led to different conclusions.

If alternative concepts from Foucault's work were used, an alternative portrayal of how creativity is constructed could potentially emerge. The concepts of archaeology or biopolitics could have been drawn upon in conducting and writing up this research project. From the concepts I did choose, alternative directions could have been taken. For example, the corrective training of bodies, as an effect of disciplinary power, was discussed only to a very limited extent throughout the thesis (Chapter Six). In Chapter Seven, this analysis could have been otherwise informed had the decision been made to incorporate writings on the constitution of a *paraskue* in the discussion on forms of elaboration. The concepts of *homo economicus,* disciplinary power and ethics were chosen here since they facilitate the theorisation of policy and interview data in ways that were consistent both with the work of Foucault's genealogies, and with work previously undertaken in educational research. Furthermore, they resonated with the aim of the thesis to analyse the discursive construction of creativity at the sites of policy and practice, and facilitated rich and multi-levelled theorisations of the conditions inherent in these sites. The decisions made throughout this thesis reflect my framing of how multiple points from Foucault's work can dialogue with policy and practice in addressing a current and relevant problem. While adding new dimensions to the project, the inclusion of other "data sets", theoretical writings or concepts would not have altered the overall premise that this thesis is one interpretation of multiple constructions of truth on the concept of creativity.

Final Thoughts: Displacements and Transformations

I conclude this thesis with some personal thoughts on the "displacement and transformation of frameworks of thinking, (and) the changing of received values" (Foucault, 1994d, p. 327) that this project has facilitated. Since there are multiple discursive conditions responsible for the construction of creativity knowledge, there will always be multiple ideas on *what* creativity is, on *who* is creativity, and *where* creativity is best facilitated. Previously, in my experiences of trying to establish how creative I was, or of querying if students were creative, I was working within frameworks where any possible answers to these questions were largely predetermined. It makes sense, via Foucault, that creativity *is* a *and* b, x *and* y, regardless of how dichotomous or otherwise each paring is. To illustrate this point: creativity can manifest in design processes *and* simultaneously can resist encapsulations in any process accounts. It can be marshalled into a generic skill and attributed a dollar value *as well as* retaining the elusiveness and unfathomability inherent in ideas of genius. When read through Foucault's concepts, if a truth about creativity is articulated in a particular space (e.g. a teacher education policy), an alternative truth emanating from a different space is not more or less true. The dichotomous versions of creativity and contradictory claims to truth on the concept, which I encountered as a student and teacher, are attributed in the thesis to the conflicting conditions within which the truth is articulated.

On completing this work and reviewing the conclusion arrived at, I can bring the insights gained in this thesis to bear on one eternally challenging question: What is creativity? After engaging with the neoliberal influences in policy, the disciplinary power effects in the school institution and the ethical self-formation practices of an

individual, the arbitrary nature of singular definitions is evident. The analysis shows how I would reject any objective or singular definition. Yet, I could offer a response based on the work that I have presented here. I would draw on a Foucauldian/Lyotardan notion of a game, and suggest: *What we construct as "creativity" reflects our navigation of a (never-fixed) nexus of documented, institutional and individual limits and possibilities* - a response hardly likely to inform any listings of "creative student characteristics" or "steps to teaching creatively".

Dispensing with a quest for absolutes and presenting an alternative account of creativity is to engage in philosophical activity. As Foucault said, "the movement by which, not without effort and uncertainty, dreams and illusions, one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true and seeks other rules - that is philosophy" (Foucault, 1994d, p. 327). Writing this thesis has strongly reaffirming my sense that the truths we tell about creativity are unequivocally a product of the context within which those truths emerge. Speaking of truth, Foucault reminded us:

> To be very mindful that everything one perceives is evident only against a familiar and little known horizon, that every certainty is sure only through the support of a ground that is always unexplored…there is a whole ethic of sleepless evidence that does not rule out, far from it, a rigorous economy of the true and the false. (Foucault, 2002b, p. 448)

Through foregrounding the effects of discursive conditions in policy and practice, this thesis is an analysis of the "rigorous economy of the true" by which horizons on creativity knowledge are constructed in Australian education.

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Appendix 1: Discourses of Creativity in Australian Media Outlets

School systems "hamstring creativity", The Australian, 23/03/2013

This article argues that the ways in which schools are currently administered do not facilitate student creativity and that a traditional curriculum impedes on the potential of ICT and technology to revolutionise schooling. Creativity in this account is:

- Antithetical to traditional modes of schooling

- An objective of schooling

- Needs to be fostered

- Realised by students having greater say in their work practices

Educators argue creativity just as important as literacy and numeracy in national curriculum, ABC News, 02/01/ 2015

This article cites a university academic, a school principal and an actor to critique what is perceived to be an insufficient focus on creativity in the new Australian Curriculum. It argues that creativity isn't taken seriously enough in the curriculum. In addition, creativity is:

- Different from traditional literacy or numeracy

- Linked to occupations and "reinventing oneself"

- Necessary to solve problems related to food shortage or the climate

- A core or basic skill

- About risk taking and resilience

- Linked to early years play and inquisitiveness

- Premised on intellectual rigor

- Realised in children of all ages "grappling together" and collaborating

The importance of a creative and stimulating classroom environment, Education HQ, 04/11/2014

This article describes an environment conducive to creativity in schools and lists the benefits that such an environment brings for student engagement and learning. The need to depart from the "old traditional style of teaching" is a key theme throughout. The implicit truths about creativity established here are:

- It is enhanced by access to a variety of material

- It is related to physical movement

- Teachers facilitate it by rewarding students and showing interest in their lessons

<u>Vivid 2016: The skill that 65 per cent more employers want, Sydney Morning Herald, 29/05/2016</u>

This article reports on a panel discussion at a Sydney festival which sought to understand the meaning of creativity and whether or not it can be taught. It also cites the results of a *Foundation for Young Australians* survey of 2.4 million job advertisements. Creativity in this account is:

- Linked to collaborative contexts

- Linked to competitiveness in terms of "identifying a problem, analysing the players, and finding a gap in the market for you or your employer to exploit"

- Linked to employment prospects since there is an "average salary boost of $3,129 per job listening creativity as an attribute"

- Attributed to a specific range of occupations: advertising professionals, sales representatives, multimedia specialists, web developers and chefs

- Responsible for a stronger economy wherein model global businesses include Uber and Airbnb

<u>Creative Play: in praise of getting messy, Sydney Morning Herald, 15/05/2016</u>

This article quotes an academic and school principal who advocate for play in the early years in the development of children's creativity and argue against replication and mimicry of others work for this development. This article establishes that creativity is:

- Related to experimenting and learning new techniques

- Damaged by adults "fixing" student work or prescribing how creative products should look on completion

- About individuality and self-expression

Teaching needs a shake-up to give children the education they need for the future, Sydney Morning Herald, 03/04/2016

This article critiques current "Industrial Age" teaching models and argues that teaching better needs to prepare young people to "thrive in a complex, volatile and ambiguous world". The article draws attention to criticism from Andreas Schleicher, OECD's education director, on Australia's performance on PISA tests. Creativity is conceptualised here as:

- Related to student choice

- Related to project-based work

- Realised and facilitated in teamwork

- Developed where student work takes account of personal interests

- Necessary for adapting to the pressures and problems of life

<u>We can rebalance Australia's economy with creative industries, The Conversation, 20/02/2014</u>

This article discusses how the negative effects of a diminishing commodities export market in Australia can be rebalanced by creative industries. Creativity is linked to:

- Design innovation

- "cross-fertilisation" of multiple skills across the design sector

<u>Creative new teaching methods bring "hero moments" to students in south-west Sydney, ABC News, 30/11/2015</u>

This article reports on a teaching approach that involves movement, theatre and games. The teaching ideas comprising this new approach are credited with higher results and students having greater confidence. Throughout the article, the following truths are told about creativity:

- It manifests in a constellation of skills

- It is needed for jobs that the future will bring

- It is a process of taking risks and solving problems

- Exposure to creative experiences is linked to students doing better academically and socially

- Creative teaching methods can be taught

Appendix 2: Interview Questions

<u>Sample Questions from First Interview</u>

- Why did you wish to become a teacher and more specifically a music teacher?

- Can you remember a time you described someone's work as creative? Can you remember a time someone described your work as creative?

- What factors of school life support creative teaching and learning?

- Are there any factors about school life that present a barrier to creative teaching and learning?

- Are there any aspects of the music curriculum that better facilitate student/teacher creativity than others?

- If a parent asked you to comment on their son/daughter's creativity what kinds of things would you say?

- If you were discussing student creativity with a colleague, what behaviours/products/processes would you focus on?

Sample Questions from Second Interview

- Do you think about student creativity when you are planning your work? If so, how does it relate to your lesson planning?

- Can you document developments in the level of creativity of student work?

- Please tell me about a lesson you consider particularly creative (on your own part or on the part of the students). What did you do? What did the students do? How was the classroom arranged? What kinds of notes or preplanned materials were available? Did you assess the lesson?

- How would these factors differ from a lesson that you wouldn't consider creative?

- What impact do you see the AITSL standards or the Australian Curriculum having on your work?

- Do you agree that a creative nation is a productive nation, that creative problem-solving is necessary for success in life or that all children's creative potential can be maximised in school? (all constructs from the policy documents)

- Why do you think that creativity is a concern of the Australian government?

- How do you see creativity benefitting your students' later lives?